AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING STABILITY, AVOIDING CHAOS

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AFGHANISTAN: BUILDING STABILITY, AVOIDING CHAOS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2002

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.

The committee met pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.


The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will please come to order. We have two very distinguished witnesses in our first panel, and I will get to that in just a moment. I would ask unanimous consent, in the interest of time, that my formal statement be placed in the record at this moment as if read. Let me just very, very, very, very briefly summarize it, because I want to have as much opportunity to get to the issue of discussing Afghanistan with our first two witnesses.

Whenever anyone asks me about Afghanistan, and whether or not we should be there, and should we expand the force, and so on, I always say, “Everybody ought to try to think back why did we go in the first place. Why did we go in the first place?” Interestingly enough, I think, as usual, the American people are way ahead of the political leaders in both parties, the administration, the Congress throughout the country, in that in a recent Gallup poll, 80 percent think the United States should keep troops in Afghanistan, while 16 percent of the U.S. population thinks we should take the troops out. The bottom line is, they understand why we went in the first place.

What I want to examine today, because I have had, and I want to say it publicly, absolute cooperation, as chairman of this committee, from the State Department and from the White House. I do not interface as well, and I always—anything with Secretary Wolfowitz has always been responded to, but I do not interface with Defense as much in my capacity as chairman of this committee. But two things have emerged, and I just want to give the witnesses a heads-up of the direction I would like to take this hearing.

I know I am a broken record to both of them about the need to expand the international security force. It seems as though we have replaced the strategy—not replaced; we have, instead of a strategy of an international security force being extended beyond Kabul, that we basically have, my phrase, not yours, a warlord strategy, which is, if there is peace and calm in any of the four
major sectors of Afghanistan, even though it is imposed by and/or is primarily accountable to the fact that a warlord is in charge, that—that constitutes stability.

I also want to talk about the time needed to build up an all-Afghan army and police force, its status, its personnel, its timing. Because as I understand the basic underlying premise of the administration, one that I do not disagree with, is that there is a need to have a central government, have a security force that is made up of all factions, all of the major tribes represented in Afghanistan, and a police force, and that the notion would be that they would be the ultimate stabilizers of a government.

But there is sometimes, as my grandmother would say, something missed between the cup and the lip, and we have to get to that point. How long is it going to take us to get to that point, what kind of progress are we making to get to that point, and what is the structure for stability in the meantime? That is what I want to talk about today.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Over the past half-year we have achieved great battlefield success in Afghanistan. Our servicemen and servicewomen have defeated the Taliban, and gotten al-Qaeda on the run. We haven’t yet captured bin Laden, but I’m confident that we’ll achieve this goal.

As we reach the next stage in the war, several questions arise: What is status ongoing operations against al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan? What is the humanitarian situation? What is our assessment of the loya jirga process?

Perhaps the most important question, however, is one of commitment: Will we stay the course and build security in Afghanistan, or will we permit this country to relapse into chaos?

President Bush has often promised that America will lead the way in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. His April reference to the Marshall Plan was particularly apt: After World War II, America used its soldiers as peacekeepers and its dollars as peacebuilders.

This may have been the wisest investment of the past century: We turned our most bitter foes into our staunchest allies.

But if we’re going to talk about a new Marshall Plan, we should be willing to back up our words with deeds.

The original Marshall Plan cost $90 billion in today’s dollars. Our total pledge for Afghan reconstruction is less than 1 percent of that, and we’ve only delivered a fraction of this pledge.

All the money in the world, however, won’t do much good without security. Absent that, any reconstruction funds will be siphoned into the pockets of greedy warlords. And that, in fact, is exactly what we’re seeing right now.

In Mazar-e Sharif recently, a U.N. worker was gang-raped by seven armed men—in a part of the country controlled by two warlords, one of whom serves as the government’s Deputy Defense Minister.

In Herat, the warlord Ismail Khan has invited Iranian agents to help him consolidate power, while reports of human rights abuses skyrocket.

What do these cases—typical of the situation throughout the country—have in common? These warlords are all on the U.S. payroll.

Maybe I’m missing something here, but I just don’t think this makes sense. Asking warlords to uphold law and order is like asking the Cali cocaine cartel to be our partners in the drug war.

Warlords aren’t the solution to Afghanistan’s problems—they’re the cause of Afghanistan’s problems.

The long-term solution is to rebuild Afghanistan’s army and police force—but that can’t happen overnight.

In the meantime—at least a year, and probably longer—there are only three alternatives:
Use American troops as peacekeepers. Build up a robust international force. Or let Afghanistan revert to chaos. U.S. forces seem to be involved in de facto peacekeeping right now. Wouldn't it be better to clarify the mission, and let our allies share the burden?

Afghan leader Hamid Karzai, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and nearly every expert on the region has called for expansion of the U.N.-mandated security force, ISAF, both in scope and tenure. In my view, this is clearly in our national interest. We should view ISAF as a force-multiplier.

Without U.S. or U.N. peacekeepers, we're left with the third option: letting Afghanistan degenerate into the state of lawlessness that made way for the Taliban. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, America turned its back as the country disintegrated.

President Bush has rightly promised not to repeat this mistake. If we fail to uphold the President's promise, Afghanistan will again become a den of terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and exporters of violent insurgency.

One other factor makes such a failure unacceptable to our national interest: Afghanistan is a test case for Iraq.

Anyone who wants to see Saddam Hussein removed from power in Iraq—as I do—will be looking very closely at the administration's game plan in Afghanistan. Simply put, if we can't demonstrate long-term commitment in Afghanistan, nobody will trust us to make a long-term commitment in Iraq.

Ousting Saddam, like ousting the Taliban, is only the first step in a long process. Everyone knows we can remove an evil regime. The question is, are we willing to expend the security, financial, diplomatic, and political resources to make the successor regime a success?

The U.S. has power—but do we have staying power?

We have with us today several highly distinguished witnesses.

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has recently returned from a mission to South Asia, where he successfully averted a nuclear war—not bad for a few days' work.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has been one of the administration's leading architects of strategic planning for Afghanistan; I am particularly looking forward to his detailed discussion of these plans for assuring Afghan security in the months to come.

Ambassador Peter Tomsen knows the political landscape of Afghanistan inside-out. As special envoy to Afghanistan for the previous President Bush, he dealt with many of today's power-brokers long before they had any real power to broker. He is currently ambassador-in-residence at the University of Nebraska, Omaha.

Brig. Gen. David Grange earned three Silver Stars and two Purple Hearts during his service in Vietnam, and has served in Delta Force, Ranger and other Special Operations units during his 30-year military career. As commander of Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, he is particularly well-equipped to comment on U.S. participation in peacemaking operations.

Up to now, the administration's plan has seemed to focus on the hope that warlords, if properly motivated with cash and weapons, will become reliable partners for peace. But as Secretary of State Powell once said, in his capacity as a military planner, “Hope is not a strategy.”

Perhaps today's hearing will give us a clearer picture of the strategy underlying this hope.

The Chairman. I am anxious to hear from both our witnesses, and with that, I will yield to my colleague, Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to join you in welcoming Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz to this committee. I look forward to their testimony and reviewing with them Afghanistan's prospects for the future.

I am hopeful that we are witnessing the emergence of a free and stable Afghanistan from more than two decades of war and instability, but it is clear that at least for the foreseeable future, Afghanistan's evolution will be marked by both advances and setbacks. And since the commencement of offensive military operations in Afghanistan, I have urged the administration to think si-
multaneously about what steps will be necessary to rebuild the nation after the Taliban and al-Qaeda were removed.

I was pleased that, early on, President Bush stated that the United States would, and I quote, “Not just simply leave after the military objective has been achieved.” The administration correctly recognized that, without providing the people of Afghanistan with an environment in which the construction of a democracy and market-based economy was not only possible, but likely, the country would remain a source of insecurity and terror.

The United States’ international efforts have permitted the people of Afghanistan to begin rebuilding their economy, their government, and personal liberties, and I applaud the role that the international coalition has played in carrying out the reconstruction efforts, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately, despite this strong record of success, the future of Afghanistan remains uncertain. Without a strong international commitment to the reformation of a representative and effective government, our efforts could go to waste.

The loya jirga recently completed its work, selected Hamid Karzai to be President. Karzai continues to construct a broad-based representational government to rule Afghanistan. Pundits here in Washington and around the world are debating the criteria employed in selecting cabinet members of the new government, and it is clear to most that the current security situation in Afghanistan was the primary determination in the selection process.

I am supportive of efforts underway to expand training and equip a new Afghan national army. A successful transformation is one of the most important elements of long-term security, but in the meantime I continue to be concerned that the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, may not be up to the task of ensuring the requisite amount of security for Afghan reconstruction to continue.

The ability of ISAF to maintain peace and security, and to project power into the farthest region of Afghanistan, is vitally important if the international community is to assist Karzai in enforcing the rule of law, and defending the threat posed by extremists, warlords, and terrorists. Only then can we replace Afghanistan’s despair with a genuine future of hope.

Afghanistan’s reconstruction efforts have benefited, for the moment, from the capture of major al-Qaeda operatives as well as the dispersal of other major players around the world. Their likely strategy is to prepare and to undertake suicidal attacks against Western and Jewish targets, especially in Arab states allied with the West, while larger operations are prepared for the United States, such as the so-called “dirty bomb” plots.

Though relatively small and widely dispersed, the al-Qaeda strikes appear to be coordinated by a senior group of leaders. In short, al-Qaeda’s command structure may have survived the United States’ military campaign in Afghanistan, even though its base in the country was eliminated.

Instances like the bombing of a Tunisian synagogue and French and American targets in Karachi do not have the profile or drama of past military clashes in Afghanistan, but al-Qaeda attacks are likely to occur at any time and almost anywhere, including Afghan-
istan. Countering them has become as much a task for police and intelligence as a military operation. Help from other governments, especially in the Islamic world, is vital, as is effective monitoring of potential targets, including infrastructure and weapon sources.

We know that a substantial number of al-Qaeda operatives managed to escape Afghanistan, and travel undetected, at least, at first, to countries around the region. We also believe a substantial number will look for opportunities to infiltrate back into Afghanistan. Most seriously, the alleged plot involving Jose Padilla, the alleged al-Qaeda recruit arrested in Chicago, has the evidence that al-Qaeda is determined to strike with weapons of mass destruction, and is actively seeking to procure or steal them.

It is that concern that has led a number of us to recommend to the Bush administration that the United States formulate a new global coalition designed to keep nuclear and bioweapons out of the hands of al-Qaeda and other terrorists. In short, Afghanistan is not out of the woods yet, any more than terrorist threats to the United States involving weapons of mass destruction have lessened since September 11.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the United States can assist in bridging the gap in ISAF’s abilities and capabilities, and the threats posed to Karzai’s young and still fragile government, even as the Bush administration focuses on preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I might note that there are a number of people in the audience who have been keenly interested in this subject. Among them, as working with the President, have been women’s groups in the United States, who have testified before this committee about the security question, and today the Feminist Majority, now the Women’s Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan, and NOW Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund, and the Equality NOW, are all represented here in the audience, and have impor-tuned this committee and this chairman on occasion, and I am sure they have at the State Department. I know they have spoken with the Secretary.

Today’s paper, the New York Times, and other major papers are full of stories relative to the assertiveness of women in Afghanistan, taking significant risks to make sure they do not go back to the Dark Ages that they just came out of. So I welcome them and others that are here today.

We have two very distinguished witnesses. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recently returned from a mission in South Asia, where he successfully averted a nuclear war. Not bad for a few day’s work. You did a hell of a job, Rich; congratulations. I want to state again publicly, I think the administration, and you in particular, played a very significant role in diffusing the single most dangerous circumstance that exists at the moment.

We also have Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who has been one of the administration’s leading architects of strategic planning for Afghanistan. I am particularly looking forward to his discussions on plans for sharing security in the months to come, and I want to thank him again, not only for his being publicly
available, but privately available whenever we have sought, or I have sought, at least, any information from him.

I invite you to make any comments you wish in your statements, and do not worry about the clock. We are anxious to hear what you have to say. So as fully as you think you need to speak, please feel free. Do not worry about these lights going on. They will go on for us, not for you. Mr. Secretary, you can begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senators.

Paul and I have, in our professional lives, spent a considerable amount of time in this very room in front of this panel, and we have come to realize, at least I have, that the patience of the committee is in inverse proportion to the length of my opening statement. So I am going to keep it very short, and I know you will allow me to have my comments submitted for the record.

I just thought I would mention briefly the winners and the losers in the recent loya jirga, and what is left to do. I think the winners, first of all, are pretty easy to enumerate: the Afghan people and, particularly, women. This committee—the whole Congress, but this committee in particular, has been very interested in all the women in Afghanistan. I think the newspaper article in the New York Times, to which you referred, Mr. Chairman, is witness to the fact that in 6 months' time, women have gone from being held basically in contempt in Afghan society to a role where they felt secure enough to take part in a very robust and boisterous loya jirga. So the Afghan people, and women in particular, are the first winners.

Second, Hamid Karzai is clearly a winner. He is a much better politician than any of us knew 6 months ago, and he managed competing pressures very, very well. He has to be considered in the winner's category.

Another is a Tajik by the name of Fahid Khan, who is the First Vice President and still the Minister of Defense. He would have to be considered to have come out a winner.

Fourth, the international community has been a winner, because we have been part of, thus far, what is a great success story, and I think it far outstripped in pace any ideas that any of the pundits had about the ability to resolve the questions of Afghanistan in anywhere near this rapid timeframe.

The fifth winner are the coalition forces. Primary among them, of course, the United States and the ISAF, because in the minds of many in Afghanistan, there is not much difference between the coalition and ISAF. And we are the ones who made it possible for the Afghan people to eschew the role of the gun and the rule of the gun.

Now, who are the losers? Well, I think you have to consider, at least in the short term, that the conservatives are the losers. They lost some serious altitude during the loya jirga. They were boisterous. There was some intimidation, or at least attempts at it, mostly verbal, but they lost ground.
The second people who lost ground were some of the families of Zahir Shah, who envisioned a much greater role, a more active role for the former king, and they did not have their dreams realized.

I think, third, one has to realize that there are some in the Pushtun community who feel that they lost ground, or they did not command as many portfolios as they might have hoped. There is a lot of misinformation in the public about what the makeup of Afghan society really is. In percentage terms, we have not had a census since 1979, so any numbers that anybody talks about are extrapolations from 1979. We do not know what percentage the Pushtuns or the Tajiks really have in the overall population, but I think it is fair to say that some in the Pushtun community are a little disappointed.

Now, what is left for President Karzai to do? Well, I think, first and most importantly, he has to consolidate the instruments of power and he has to extend them out into the countryside to get to the very thing you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, and that is warlords and warlordism.

Second, I think Afghanistan’s society has to come to grips with the role of Islam in their nation. Do they envision themselves as a Turkey, or a Pakistan, or what? And I think that is a debate that we are going to see and witness as we move to the future.

Finally, Mr. Karzai and the 29 ministers who make up his cabinet have to very definitely be seen in relatively rapid fashion, not only formulating a constitution to be voted on in about 18 months, but to be able to extend the fruits of the international community’s largesse, particularly in terms of reconstruction aid to far-flung areas in Afghanistan. Those are three pretty big challenges for any cabinet and any President. Mr. Chairman, I will stop there, and turn it over to my colleague and friend, Paul Wolfowitz.
The backbone of Afghanistan’s future security structure must be the new Afghan National Army (ANA). The United States has taken the lead, working closely with ISAF, the French, and other coalition partners, in training and equipping troops for the ANA. Germany has the lead, with United States and other international assistance, on developing a viable police force.

Afghanistan has also made large strides in opening up its politics and improving its governance. The Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), which governed for the six months before the loya jirga, was a multi-ethnic, broadly representative government that succeeded in establishing a basis for a central government that will remain responsive to the will of the Afghan people.

The AIA ably performed the role that the Bonn Agreement laid out for it. It was responsible for many successes, such as reopening schools, including schools that educate girls; putting in place the starting points for building national security institutions; establishing judicial and human rights commissions; reintegrating women and ethnic minorities into society; and announcing and beginning to implement a ban on opium cultivation and harvesting. We will continue to work with the Afghan Transitional Administration to protect the rights of women and encourage their effective participation in civic life.

Significant progress has also been made in creating an inclusive political process that generates incentives for groups and individuals to give up armed struggle for political goals. The Emergency loya jirga began the process of healing the country’s wounds by bringing together Afghans from all ethnic groups, religions, and political persuasions to discuss Afghanistan’s future. It elected Chairman Karzai to continue to lead Afghanistan for the next two years, the cabinet has been selected, and steps have been taken toward creating a National Assembly.

Nonetheless, the road ahead is long, as demonstrated by the sharp political disputes at the loya jirga and continuing concerns about the security of international assistance workers, particularly in northern Afghanistan.

There has also been progress in meeting the humanitarian needs of Afghans and beginning the process of reconstruction, but gaps remain. The new Transitional Authority faces major challenges, beginning with the need to fill the gap between needs and pledged resources. The Afghan government predicts a $390 million budgetary shortfall this year.

The World Bank, Asian Development Bank and UNDP estimate reconstruction needs of $1.7 billion over the next year, while humanitarian and security assistance needs could raise this figure to $2.9 billion. The long term costs of this project over the next five years are going to be tremendous, perhaps as much as $10 billion.

Refugees are returning at a faster rate than expected—more than one million to date, with two million expected by the end of the year. While this is a welcome sign of the return of normality, UN and other agencies tasked with helping refugees and displaced persons are facing potentially crippling funding shortfalls as the higher refugee inflow has driven costs faster than predicted.

U.S. contributions to Afghanistan have already exceeded the $297 million pledged earlier this year in Tokyo. Appropriated funds for fiscal year 2002, plus requested funds for FY 2003 and a $250 million supplemental request currently before Congress, would boost official American assistance to over $900 million for FYs 2002 and 2003 combined. This does not include funding for U.S. military operations.

Mr. Chairman, the United States, the Afghan people and the international community have undertaken an enormous job, but one that I believe is critical to our national goals and well worth the costs. We must stay the course, and with your continued support, Mr. Chairman, and that of this Committee, I am confident we will succeed.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

This distinguished committee has long provided our country strong leadership and bipartisan support, especially now that we are waging this war on terrorism, and I thank you for that. I thank you also for the opportunity to come here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s perspective on how the campaign in Afghanistan to kill, capture, and disrupt terrorists has helped us to protect the American people, and also to discuss how we are helping the
Afghan people help themselves, to ensure that their country does not, once again, become a terrorist sanctuary.

To chart the way ahead, Mr. Chairman, it is important to understand how we got to where we are, so let me spend a moment on the early parts of the military operation. From the beginning of the war on terrorism, President Bush emphasized that the United States must apply, as he said, every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and the President concluded, every necessary weapon of war to the destruction and defeat of the global terror network.

Each of those instruments has a role. Each one reinforces the other. The military is only one of the instruments that we need to wage this war on terrorism. The military cannot do its job without the support of other elements, particularly intelligence and diplomacy, and its role is frequently to support the efforts of those other instruments of national power.

This hearing is focused, and appropriately so, on Afghanistan and on our military effort there, but it is important to emphasize, as we have done from the beginning, that this campaign is not about a single country or a single terrorist network. Al-Qaeda alone has spread throughout the world. It is a network. A network by its very nature is based on the idea that should one node be eliminated, the network can still continue to function.

Well before September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda had burrowed into some 60 countries, including the United States, Germany, France, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines. It had critical nodes in Hamburg, Germany, and Jacksonville, Florida, as well as in Afghanistan. The pilots who flew the suicide attacks were not trained in Afghanistan. Many got their training right here in the United States.

So Afghanistan was an important node in the network, but by its nature, a network does not have a headquarters. So while we focus on Afghanistan today, we must understand that it is only one node of that terrorist network. The very name of the organization, al-Qaeda, which means “base” in Arabic, indicates that the entire organization is the base of terrorist operations. It is spread throughout the world, and it needs to be eliminated, root and branch.

In Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda’s plots and plans flourished under the protection of the tyrannical Taliban, America’s Armed Forces went to work to root out both. Our intention, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, was not only to deprive the terrorists of a sanctuary in Afghanistan where they could safely plan, train, and organize, but also to capture and kill terrorists, and to drain the swamp in which they breed.

Over the last 8 months, with our coalition partners, we have defeated a vicious regime that gave refuge to evil. We have killed or captured many of its ringleaders, and we have others on the run. Even in Afghanistan, however, our work is far from complete, but we are encouraged by the many truly remarkable aspects of this campaign to date.

Our military campaign in Afghanistan has had some striking features, some surprising, others less so. Not surprisingly at all, we have seen America’s men and women in uniform conduct their op-
erations with great bravery and great skill, as we saw at Mazar-
e-Sharif and Tora Bora, and in Operations Anaconda and Mountain
Lion.

What may have been a surprise to some was the remarkable
speed with which the military plans were put together, the swift
success of the military operations, measured in weeks, rather than
months, and with relatively few troops on the ground. On Sep-
tember 11, let me remind you, there simply were no war plans on
the shelf for Afghanistan. General Franks was starting from
scratch on September 20, when he received the order from the
President to begin planning a campaign. Less than 3 weeks later,
on October 7, we commenced military operations, and less than 2
weeks after that, we had troops operating on the ground with Gen-
eral Dostam in the north. In many ways, it was a remarkable feat
of logistical and operational utility.

If you would permit me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read from
an actual dispatch that we received from one of those Special
Forces captains on the ground, or more accurately, on horseback,
in northern Afghanistan. This is from October 25, shortly after he
and his unit were inserted:

“I am advising a man on how best to employ light infantry and
horse calvary,” he said, “in the attack against tanks, mortars, artil-
lery, personnel carriers, and machine guns, a tactic which I
thought had become outdated with the invention of the Gatling
gun. The Mujaheddin have done that every day we have been on
the ground. They have attacked with 10 rounds of ammunition per
man, little water, and less food. I observed one man who walked
10-plus miles to get to the fight, who proudly showed me his artifi-
cial right leg from the knee down.

“There is little medical care if injured, only a donkey ride to the
aid station, which is a dirt hut, but the Muj are doing very well
with what they have. We couldn’t do what we are doing,” he went
on, “without the close air support. Everywhere I go, the civilians
and Muj soldiers are always telling me they are glad the USA has
come. They all speak of their hopes for a better Afghanistan once
the Taliban are gone. Better go,” he concluded, “General Dostam is
finishing his phone call with a Congressman back in the United
States. Yes, we had that element of this fight as well.”

Another dispatch from one of his comrades on November 10,
after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, reads in part: “We rode on begged,
borrowed, and confiscated transportation. While it looked like a
ragtag procession, the morale into Mazar was triumphant. The
locals loudly greeted us, and thanked all Americans. Much waving,
cheering, and clapping, including from the women. The U.S. Navy
and Air Force”—this from an Army man—“did a great job. I am
very proud of my men, who performed exceptionally well in ex-
treme conditions. I have personally witnessed heroism under fire
by two U.S. noncommissioned officers, one Army, one Air Force,
when we came under direct artillery fire last night, less than 50
meters away. When I ordered them to call close air support, they
did so immediately without flinching.”

“As you know, the U.S. element was nearly overrun 4 days ago,
but continued to call close air support and ensured the Muj forces
did not suffer defeat.” He concluded, “These two examples are typ-
ical of the performance of your soldiers and airmen. Truly, uncom-
mon valor has been a common virtue.”

In many ways, those two dispatches, I think, capture the ingredi-
ents of an extraordinary military success. But another element of
our success, which was undoubtedly a surprise to the terrorists but
barely noticed by many others, was something that did not happen,
something that calls to mind Sherlock Holmes’ famous observation
about the dog that did not bark. We did not become bogged down
in a quagmire, unlike the British in the 19th century, or the Sovie-
ts in the 20th. Nations that arrive in Afghanistan with massive
armies tend to be treated as invaders, and they regret it. Mindful
of that history, General Franks has deliberately and carefully kept
our footprint small to avoid just such a situation. On balance, our
partnership with indigenous forces has been very positive and con-
tinues to be so.

From the beginning of the war on terrorism, we have stressed
the importance of understanding the nature of our enemy as a net-
work. Al-Qaeda is not a snake that can be killed by lopping off its
head. It is more analogous to a disease that has infected many
parts of a healthy body. There is no one, single solution. You can-
not simply cut out one infected area and declare victory, but suc-
cess in one area can lead to success in others, and our success in
Afghanistan has contributed to the larger campaign.

In Afghanistan itself, through actions there, somewhat less than
half of the top 30 or so leaders of the al-Qaeda organization have
already been killed or captured. Well over 500 enemy are currently
detained in Guantanamo or in Afghanistan as a direct result of our
operations in that country. But equally important, if not more so,
the worldwide efforts of our law enforcement and intelligence agen-
cies, in cooperation with more than 90 countries, have resulted in
the arrest of some 2,400 individuals.

Our military success in Afghanistan has contributed to that larg-
er success, both indirectly, by encouraging others to cooperate, and
also more directly. Abu Zubayda, for example, one of bin Laden’s
key lieutenants, was driven out of his sanctuary in Afghanistan,
and as a result, was captured last March. His partial cooperation,
in turn, contributed to the detention of Jose Padilla, who came into
the United States with the intention of planning and coordinating
terrorist attacks.

A Moroccan detainee in Guantanamo led us to three Saudis plan-
ing terrorist attacks in Morocco, all of whom were subsequently
arrested, including one top al-Qaeda operative. In December,
the discovery of a videotape in a safe house in Afghanistan led to the
arrest of an al-Qaeda cell in Singapore that was planning to attack
a U.S. aircraft carrier and U.S. personnel in that country. The co-
operation of Pakistan under the leadership of President Musharraf
has been extraordinary, leading to nearly 400 arrests in that coun-
try alone.

These developments are encouraging; however, it is important to
remember that al-Qaeda is still dangerous and active. This net-
work still poses threats that should not be underestimated.

Let me talk now about our efforts to build a more stable Afghani-
stan in the long term. Because while our primary mission in that
country has been to kill or capture terrorists who threaten the
United States, or those who have harbored them, it is also important to help the Afghans establish long-term stability in that country, so that it does not once again become an outlaw country that provides sanctuary for terrorists.

While the success of those efforts will depend most of all on the Afghans themselves, the United States and its coalition partners have a critical role to play in achieving that goal. In shaping that role, and as in shaping the military campaign itself, we are very mindful of that historical Afghan animosity to foreign armies and foreign occupiers. We have always viewed our mission in Afghanistan as one of liberation, not occupation. So with this in mind, we have tackled the challenge of striking the balance between keeping Afghanistan from reverting back to a terrorist sanctuary, and at the same time, keeping our footprint small.

Afghans are an independent, proud people, and we have worked from the beginning to minimize the number of our troops there, and to focus instead on helping the Afghan people to help themselves in their journey to representative self-government. We have made it clear, and we need to continue to do so, we have no intent of colonizing Afghanistan. We have been careful through our actions and our words to avoid creating the expectation that the United States can solve all of that country's problems, and we have made a determined effort not to take sides in Afghanistan's internal quarrels. But we have, in fact, seen that Afghans are good at solving problems when they must, and we must help them to deal with as many as they can.

There are positive signs that Afghans are making progress. Secretary Armitage described in his testimony how the Afghan people made a significant step forward with the successful convening of the loya jirga. But along with self-government must come self-sufficiency, in terms of Afghanistan's security. That task is made more challenging by the formidable geography of Afghanistan. It is a country roughly the size of Texas, with peaks in the Hindu Kush Range, which translated, by the way, means “Hindu Killer,” that reach some 24,000 feet, 10,000 feet higher than the highest of the Rockies.

If I might, Mr. Chairman, I would like to put up a chart. When we say that it is roughly the size of Texas, at least for those of us who are not natives of Texas, it may not carry enough meaning. I found it more meaningful to look at a map of Afghanistan superimposed on the southern United States, and you can see that it would stretch from Washington, DC, down almost to New Orleans, and from St. Louis, Missouri, down past Atlanta. It is huge.

It is not only large, but if I could show you another chart, it has incredible terrain. This is a satellite photograph of Afghanistan, and the neighboring regions of Pakistan. You can see the enormous expanse of mountains, and down in the southwest corner, that formidable desert, which, in the Afghan language, is called the Desert of Death.

The sheer size and unforgiving terrain of the country has been a major factor in planning our military operations, and it must remain a key factor in planning long-term security arrangements; but, encouragingly, the situation is becoming more stable. Out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan, our forces have experienced harass-
ment mainly in only 5. The Taliban has so far failed to mount their often predicted spring offensive, and loya jirga convened with no serious security incidents, despite numerous threats.

Our coalition partners are contributing to stability through their humanitarian work. It is especially worth noting that Jordanian personnel have been running a field hospital, which by itself, to date, has treated some 77,000 Afghan civilians. The overall improvements in conditions in the country are perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that people are voting with their feet. In just the first 5 months of the year, 1.2 million refugees are recorded as having returned to Afghanistan. That was the U.N.'s projection for the entire year of 2002. The U.N. has now doubled its target to 2 million refugees that they hope will return in this calendar year.

On the security front, we are committed to working with the Afghan Transitional Authority and the international community to find effective solutions to the remaining challenges to that country's security. One of the most important pieces is training the Afghan army. At the beginning of May, U.S. Army instructors took on the task of helping to build an Afghan national army by initiating the training of the first group of Afghan recruits. Coalition partners are also assisting in this effort. France has already begun training a battalion, and others, including the United Kingdom, Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Korea, India, and Romania, are assisting with personnel, or funding, or equipment.

I would appeal to you, Mr. Chairman, and all of the Members of the Senate and of the House, to approve as rapidly as possible our supplemental request for fiscal year 2002. It contains a request for $50 million in FMF and $20 million in peacekeeping operations funds that would permit us to accelerate the training and equipping of an Afghan army.

The biggest gap, I must say, in this effort has been the lack of authorities for funding. Even though we have a lot of money for other purposes, we have to scrape around and go to some of the countries I just mentioned in order to get the funds for salaries or equipment.

To further enhance regional stability, the 18-nation International Security Assistance Force has been helping to stabilize the situation in the capital of Kabul. The British did a splendid job leading that effort in its first 6 months, and we expect the same from our Turkish allies who have now agreed to take over the lead.

Last month, the U.N. Security Council extended ISAF's mandate in Kabul until the end of the year. ISAF forces helped to train the Afghan national guard that protected Kabul during the loya jirga. Other important efforts to provide a more secure environment include the very important German-led effort to train a police force, and British counterdrug operations.

However, the most important instrument that the Afghan Authority and we have to establish a stable security situation is the leverage provided by economic assistance. It is in our interest to provide such assistance, and to help the Afghans rebuild their country after almost a quarter century of war so that it will not once again become a haven for terrorists.

The leadership provided by the State Department, as described by Secretary Armitage, has been key to that effort. Particularly im-
portant was the organization of the Tokyo Donors Conference that Secretary Armitage described. In support of those reconstruction efforts, the U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM] is also executing a plan to collocate personnel from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department besides our Special Forces and civil affairs teams that are operating throughout the country. This will allow USAID people to get out beyond Kabul and better monitor U.S. assistance, while providing them some protection in what remains an insecure environment.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the campaign in Afghanistan, along with many other efforts now underway by many instruments of our government, has contributed to the disruption of the global terror network in tangible and far-reaching ways. Our task extends well beyond Afghanistan, and even in Afghanistan it will still be a long and difficult one, but the stakes are enormous.

As President Bush said, speaking to the cadets at West Point 2 weeks ago, “We have our best chance since the rise of the Nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace, instead of prepare for war.”

We can do this not by imposing our own model of human progress on other nations of the world, but, as the President said, “we can support this effort when we reward governments that make the right choices for their own people.”

In our development aid, in our development efforts, in our broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation, tolerance, and human rights, and we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.

In Afghanistan today, we see a democratic spirit rising from the remnants of a once-failed state that is trying to defy the ravages of decades of war and misrule. Despite a beginning that will at times be rocky, and no doubt suffer some setbacks, the Afghan people are hopeful for a new tomorrow, hopeful that they, too, can have a chance at peace instead of war. We remain committed to doing our part to help them on that journey, and we want history ultimately to judge us as having been dedicated to liberation, not occupation. We appreciate the continued leadership of this committee and the support of the Congress in these ongoing efforts. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee: This Committee has long provided our country strong leadership and bipartisan support, especially now as the United States wages the war against terrorism. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the Defense Department’s perspective on how the campaign in Afghanistan to kill, capture and disrupt terrorists has helped us protect the American people, and how we are helping the Afghan people help themselves to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a terrorist sanctuary.

I. HOW THE CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN HAS HELPED PROTECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

From the beginning of the war on terrorism, President Bush emphasized that the United States must use “every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war, to the destruction and defeat of the global terror network.” Each has a role; each reinforces the others. The military is only one of the instruments that we need to wage this war on terrorism. The military cannot do its job without the support of other elements, particularly intelligence,
and its role is frequently to support the efforts of those other instruments of national power.

This hearing is focused—and appropriately so—on Afghanistan and our military effort there, but it’s important to emphasize, as we have from the beginning, that this campaign is not about a single country or a single terrorist network. Al-Qaeda alone is spread throughout the world; it is a network. A network, by its very nature, is based on the idea that should one node be eliminated, the network can still continue to function.

Well before September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda had burrowed into some 60 nations, including the United States and Germany, France and Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines. It had critical nodes in Hamburg, Germany and Jacksonville, Florida as well as Afghanistan. The pilots who flew the suicide attacks were not trained in Afghanistan; many got their training in the United States.

Afghanistan was an important node in the network, but by its nature a network does not have a headquarters. So, while we focus on Afghanistan today, we must understand that Afghanistan is only one node of this terrorist network. The very name of this organization, al-Qaeda, which means “base” in Arabic, indicates that the entire organization is the base of terrorist operations. It is spread throughout the world and it needs to be eliminated, root and branch.

In Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda’s malignant plots and plans flourished under the protection of the tyrannical and corrupt Taliban, America’s armed forces went to work to root out both. Our intent, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, was to deprive the terrorists of a sanctuary in Afghanistan where they could safely plan, train and organize—not only to capture and kill terrorists, but to drain the swamp in which they breed. Over the last eight months, with our coalition partners, we have defied a vicious and repressive regime that gave refuge to evil. We have killed or captured many of its ringleaders. And we have others on the run, where they are more vulnerable.

Even in Afghanistan, our work is far from complete, although we are encouraged by the many truly remarkable aspects of the campaign to date.

Our military campaign in Afghanistan has had some striking features, some surprising, others less so. Not surprisingly, we have seen America’s Armed Forces conduct their operations with great bravery and skill, as we saw at Mazar-e-Sharif, Tora Bora and in Operations Anaconda and Mountain Lion. What may have been a surprise to some was the remarkable speed with which military plans were put together, the swift success of the military operations—in weeks rather than months, and with relatively few troops on the ground. On September 11th, there simply was no war plan on the shelf for Afghanistan. General Franks was starting from scratch on September 20 when he received the order to begin planning, but less than three weeks later, on October 7th, we commenced the military operations. And less than two weeks after that, troops were operating on the ground. In many ways, it was a remarkable feat of logistical and operational agility.

Another element of our success, which was undoubtedly a surprise to the terrorists and barely noticed by many others, was something that did not happen, something that calls to mind Sherlock Holmes’ famous observation about the dog that didn’t bark. We did not become bogged down in a quagmire—unlike the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the 20th century. Nations that arrive in Afghanistan with massive armies tend to be treated as invaders, and they regret it. Mindful of that history, General Franks deliberately and carefully kept our footprint small to avoid just such a predicament. On balance, our partnership with indigenous forces has been very positive.

From the beginning of the war on terrorism, we have stressed the importance of understanding the nature of our enemy as a world-wide network. Al-Qaeda is not a snake that can be killed by lopping off its head. It is more analogous to a disease that has infected many parts of a healthy body. There is no one single solution. You can’t simply cut out one infected area and declare victory, but success in one area can lead to success in other areas as well. The bottom line, as President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have repeatedly cautioned, is that this campaign will be a long and difficult one.

Coalition forces have eliminated the secure operating environment that al-Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan and degraded cohesion of the worldwide network. Well over 500 enemy—including somewhat less than half of the top 30 leaders—have been killed or captured—as a result of operations in Afghanistan and are currently held in Guantanamo or in Afghanistan. Equally important, if not more so, the world-wide efforts of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in cooperation with more than 90 countries, have resulted in the arrest of some 2,400 individuals.

Our military success in Afghanistan has contributed to that success by encouraging others to cooperate. Our efforts in Afghanistan have also helped law enforce-
ment actions more directly. Abu Zubayda, one of bin Laden’s key lieutenants, driven out of his sanctuary in Afghanistan and was captured last March; his partial co-operation in turn contributed to the detention of Jose Padilla, who came into the United States with the intention of planning and coordinating terrorist attacks. A Moroccan detainee in Guantanamo told of three Saud planning terrorist acts in Morocco, all of whom were subsequently arrested, including one top al-Qaeda operative. In December, the discovery of a videotape in a safe house in Afghanistan led to the arrest of an al-Qaeda cell in Singapore that was planning to attack a U.S. aircraft carrier and U.S. personnel in that country.

President Musharraf’s leadership has made Pakistan a much less friendly environment for Taliban and al-Qaeda. Since last fall, the U.S. has sent the government of Pakistan about 1,500 requests for assistance on terrorist suspects. They have responded to most of them and continue to work on others. In the course of numerous raids on foreign terrorist suspects, some 370 arrests have been made.

These developments are encouraging. However, it is important to remember that al-Qaeda is still dangerous and active. This network still poses threats that should not be underestimated. However, when the network as a whole is under pressure and on the run, it becomes harder for them to carry out their evil plans and more likely that they will make mistakes that permit us to capture more of them.

II. HELPING TO BUILD A STABLE AFGHANISTAN

While our primary mission in Afghanistan has been to kill or capture terrorists who threaten the United States or those who have harbored them, it is also important to help the Afghans establish long-term stability in that country, so that Afghanistan does not once again become an outlaw country that provides sanctuary for terrorists. While the success of those efforts will depend most of all on the Afghans themselves, the United States and its coalition partners have a critical role to play in achieving that goal. In shaping that role, as in shaping the military campaign itself, we have been very mindful of the historical Afghan animosity to foreign armies and foreign occupiers.

We have always viewed our mission in Afghanistan as one of liberation, not one of occupation. So with this in mind, we have tackled the challenge of striking the balance between keeping Afghanistan from reverting back to a terrorist sanctuary, and keeping our footprint small. Afghans are an independent, proud people. For that reason, we have emphasized from the beginning that we intend to minimize the number of troops there, and to focus instead on helping the Afghan people to help themselves in their journey to representative self-governance.

We have made it clear, and we need to continue to do so: we have no intent of “colonizing” Afghanistan. We have been careful, through our actions and through our words, to avoid creating the expectation that the United States is going to solve all of the Afghanistan’s problems. We have made a determined effort not to take sides in Afghanistan’s internal politics. In fact, we have seen that Afghans are good at solving problems when they must; and we must let them deal with as many as they can.

If a representative government is to take hold, Afghans themselves are the only ones who can make self-government a reality. President Bush has said that the United States does not intend to create the future government of Afghanistan. “It is up to the Afghans themselves,” he said, “to determine their future.” As they do, the United States and our allies will continue to support the new Transitional Authority and the people of Afghanistan. Their success will contribute, not only to the long-term stability of Afghanistan, but to the peace and security of the world at large.

There are positive signs that the Afghans are making progress. Just last week, the Afghan people made a significant step forward when more than 1,500 delegates from all 32 provinces and ethnic backgrounds came together under one roof. When this traditional loya jirga, or Grand Council, elected Hamid Karzai president of the new two-year transitional government based on Western-style ideas of control and accountability. A Karzai senior advisor captured how extraordinary was this first step, saying that, for the first time in 23 years, the people of Afghanistan are acquiring a voice.

Along with self-government must come self-sufficiency in terms of Afghanistan’s security. That task is made more challenging by the formidable geography of Afghanistan. It is a country roughly the size of Texas, with peaks in the Hindu Kush (or “Hindu Killer”) Range that reach some 24,000 feet—ten thousand feet higher than the highest of the Rockies. The sheer size and unforgiving terrain of the country has been a major factor in the planning of our military operations and remains a key factor in planning long-term security arrangements.
Encouragingly, the situation is becoming more stable. Out of 32 provinces in Afghanistan, our forces have experienced harassment attacks mainly in five provinces, in the Taliban heartland of southern and eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban have so far failed to mount their often predicted spring offensive. The loya jirga convened with no serious security incidents—despite numerous threats—and clashes among militia leaders have been limited.

The Taliban regime collapsed quickly with no successor. Not surprisingly, criminal activity revived faster than police forces could be created. This activity tends to be localized along routes through which international aid flows: from the North and from Pakistan—incidentally, traditional areas for banditry.

Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructure is another hindrance, not only to maintaining security, but also to distributing humanitarian aid. From the beginning, humanitarian operations were a key part of our military operations—a concerted effort to reverse the desperate conditions created by the Taliban regime. Just one week before September 11th, the U.N. warned that 5.5 million Afghans, surviving on cattle feed, grass and insects, were facing death without immediate help. The defeat of the Taliban and the ending of civil war conditions have brought food to more than five million people who were facing famine last fall.

Even before last September, the United States was the largest contributor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. When military operations began last October, those efforts were stepped up, and, from the beginning, humanitarian missions were an integral part of our military missions. Today, the picture is vastly different. Easing the plight of widespread starvation was a humanitarian duty before the war. Today it is one of the keys to bolstering political and civil stability.

Coalition partners are also contributing to stability through their humanitarian work. It is especially worth noting that Jordanian personnel have been running a field hospital that, to date, has treated 77,000 Afghan civilians. The Spanish and others have also provided assistance through their military hospitals. The Indians have provided a contingent of military medical personnel.

The improvement in the situation is demonstrated by the fact that people are voting with their feet. In just the first five months of the year, 1.2 million refugees are recorded as having returned to Afghanistan already, which was the UN’s projection for all of 2002. The UN has now doubled the target to two million.

One crucial factor in the success of a representative government in Afghanistan is, first and foremost, a stable and secure environment in which it can gain a firm hold and ultimately flourish. The U.S. is committed to working with the Afghan Transitional Authority and the international community to find effective solutions to the remaining challenges to Afghanistan’s security.

One of the most important pieces is training the Afghan army. At the beginning of May, U.S. Army instructors took on the task of helping build an Afghan national army, by initiating the training of the initial group of Afghan recruits for the new Afghan National Army (ANA). Coalition partners are assisting in this effort. France has already begun training a battalion, and other countries, including the U.K., Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Korea, India, and Romania, are assisting with personnel or funding or equipment. In the process, we are also “training the trainers” so that the process can become self-sustaining.

To further enhance regional stability, the 18-nation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been helping to stabilize the situation in the capital city of Kabul since January. The British did a splendid job leading that effort in its first six months, and we expect the same from our Turkish allies who have now taken over the lead.

Last month, the United Nations Security Council extended ISAF’s mandate in Kabul until the end of the year. ISAF forces helped train the Afghan National Guard to protect Kabul during the loya jirga, which was held without incident. Other important efforts to provide a more secure environment include the German-led police training program and British counter drug operations.

However, the most important instrument that the Afghan Authority and we have to establish a stable security situation is the leverage provided by economic assistance. It is in our interests to provide such assistance, and to help Afghans rebuild their country after almost a quarter century of war so it will not again become a haven for terrorists.

The leadership provided by the State Department as described by Secretary Armitage, has been key to that effort. Particularly important was the organization of the Tokyo Donors Conference that Secretary Armitage has described.

Our troops on the ground are also making a direct contribution to economic assistance, implementing humanitarian projects across Afghanistan that include repairing hospitals, digging wells, and repairing irrigation canals. We repaired or built 48 schools in eight different regions of Afghanistan. And for over 30,000 children for
whom the sound of gunfire was a natural part of life, school is open, certainly one of the most far-reaching ways we have helped shape their future. In Herat, with just a few U.S. personnel, a U.S. Civil Affairs project, using local labor, de-silted over 250 kilometers of irrigation canals, allowing thousands of farm families to do their spring planting. The Department is allotting $10 million dollars for more than 75 such projects, anticipated to continue through the next 12 to 18 months. These activities have been coordinated with civilian relief organizations and have already begun to positively impact the lives of many Afghans.

In support of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, CENTCOM is also executing a plan to co-locate personnel from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department with our special forces and civil affairs teams that are operating throughout Afghanistan. This will allow USAID's people to get out beyond Kabul and better monitor U.S. assistance, while also providing them some protection in what remains an insecure environment.

CENTCOM's humanitarian efforts have been undertaken to reduce the suffering of the Afghan people, and in the process, have helped build the conditions for a stable peace—an outgrowth of health, food, educational, and economic security. The U.S. military is proud of its contribution to the important efforts of USAID, the U.S. Department of State, the U.N. and other international agencies and non-government organizations to provide a better life and a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION

Along with the many other law-enforcement, diplomatic, financial and intelligence efforts now underway, the campaign in Afghanistan has contributed to the disruption of the global terror network in tangible and far-reaching ways. But, our task extends well beyond Afghanistan and will be a long and difficult one. The stakes are enormous.

As President Bush said, speaking to cadets at West Point two weeks ago, “we have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.” We can do this is not by imposing our own model of human progress on other nations of the world. But, as he said, we can support this effort “when we reward governments that make the right choices for their own people. In our development aid, in our diplomatic efforts, in our international broadcasting, and in our educational assistance, the United States will promote moderation and tolerance and human rights. And we will defend the peace that makes all progress possible.”

In Afghanistan today, we see a democratic spirit rising from the remnants of a once-failed state that is trying to defy the ravages of decades of war and misrule. Despite a beginning that will, at times, be rocky and no doubt suffer some setbacks, the Afghan people are hopeful for a new tomorrow—hopeful they, too, can have a chance at peace instead of war. We remain committed to doing our part to help them on their journey. And we want history ultimately to judge us as having been dedicated to liberation, not occupation. We appreciate this Committee's continued leadership and guidance in these ongoing efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

We will take 7-minute rounds so everybody gets in, and then if you have time, we will try for a second round.

Let me begin by saying to you both that, speaking for myself, I think it is a remarkable military undertaking. Having spent 4 or 5 days down on the ground, it was impressive. It continues to be impressive, and I think, notwithstanding the fact that it is going to be fairly easy to Monday morning quarterback everything about every operation, I think we should all be very proud of what you have put together, and what our fighting women and men did.

I must tell you, I have had this conversation with Secretary Armitage. I wish every American could see those young women and men. I mean they are incredible and will make everybody proud.

But what I want to talk about is not to second-guess anything we have done so far, I want to figure out what we do from here. Would one of you, or both of you—I will just ask a generic question, rather than the finely tuned questions my staff have developed
here, and that is: Explain to me what the role is of the warlords. In Mazar, Dostam is obviously the guy in charge, but there is a power struggle going on up there. In Herat, there is—obviously, you have a guy named Ismail Khan, who is a tough actor, and there seems to be some more to that. I am going to put a map up here, in the absence of my ranking member. This is too hard to see from here, but these various indications show armed clashes, attacks against minorities, attacks against refugees, attacks and intimidation of loya jirga candidates, and attacks and intimidation of women, and attacks on international humanitarian NGOs.

Now, over in Iraq, there is not a lot happening there, which is good, on the surface; but when I was there, the talk was that we were all concerned about each of these warlords having their own sponsors. In Herat, we were worried about the Iranians and their cooperation with Ismail Khan. I spent hours, and hours, and hours, literally. I mean 6 or 7 hours with the now officially near-term elected President and his people, including Tajiks in the administration.

The concern was that these warlords all had their own agendas, and that although they could maintain peace, there would not be any loyalty to and/or allegiance to a central government. I thought—and it may be able to be done anyway, I thought our purpose here was not only to drain the swamp, but as—the Congressional Research Service, we asked them to look at this for us, and they came up with the following summary.

It says, "U.S.-led efforts to end Afghanistan’s role as a host for Osama bin Laden and other anti-Western Islamic terrorists requires not only a defeat of the Taliban, but also the reconstruction of a stable, effective, and ideologically moderate Afghan state."

Now, do we think that is true? I mean do we think—obviously, defeating Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, everybody agrees on that one, but is it important, is it important that we be responsible for, the world community and us included, the reconstruction of a stable, effective, ideologically moderate Afghan state? Is that part of our charge? If it is, what role do these warlords play in bringing that about?

Mr. Armitage. Mr. Chairman, I will give it a go first. You asked at the beginning what is the warlords’ agenda. In effect, it is the same as it has been in the past. It is to hold on to power and be able to collect revenues. They want to be a large factor in whatever the future holds for Afghanistan.

No. 2, you would have a very good sense of this after your excellent trip in January out there. The warlords, particularly the one to whom you referred, Mr. Dostam, feels that he and some of his Tajik colleagues have had the majority of the burden in the fighting, and they want the majority of the spoils.

The latter question about is it our role to be involved in reconstruction, it seems to me that the President has made the decision that it is. He said that we are going to be involved for a long time and he made that very clear. We are going to be involved for a long time, not just in the sphere, which Paul and Secretary Rumsfeld are so responsible for in the military sphere, but in the reconstruction, along with the international conference.
I think the fact that it was the United States, which was the con-
vener, if you will, of the Tokyo Conference, it indicated that we are
not going to have a half-measure. We are not going to make the
mistake we made in 1989 and allow what is a very nation-state to
backslide into becoming a swamp again.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will just add to that, I agree with everything
that Secretary Armitage said. I think the basic strategy here is,
first of all, to work with those warlords or regional leaders, what-
ever you prefer to call them, to encourage good behavior. I think
we have a number of means for doing so. Some of them include
local diplomacy. We have been engaging, particularly up in the
Mazar-e-Sharif area, where you pointed out there have been some
recent incidents, due to fighting between two different warlord fac-
tions, with our Special Forces who have considerable influence to
courage better behavior.

As I mentioned in my testimony, we are arranging to have State
Department people out in some of the provincial areas with our
Special Forces, so that they can begin to exercise their good offices.
I think it underscores the importance of economic assistance. Be-
cause, as Secretary Armitage said, at the end of the day, what
these people want, among other things and perhaps most of all, are
money and resources to help their people.

The long term solution is to shift the balance of forces between
the central government and the regions—training the Afghan army
is a key element of doing that. Again, I cannot emphasize enough
how important economic assistance is, because the more real re-
sources that flow through Kabul, through the Transitional Author-
ity, the more those local leaders have to look to Kabul.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, is it not flowing directly, some of it directly
to these warlords? In other words, one of the things we spent a lot
of time talking about in Kabul, in Afghanistan, and here, with you,
with the State Department, with the White House, is that Karzai's
popularity and support rest on a couple of factors.

One, he is viewed by all the parties—and when I met with
Kanoni, and all the rest of these guys, they all said, basically, “We
are not crazy about the guy, but he is the best thing we have to
get aid. He is a magnet for us.” Two, he does not have an army.
He does not have any guys. He cannot control it by himself. No.
3, he is the guy who represents the majority, but is going to count
us in on the deal.

So I thought, initially, the notion was that in order to give him
some heft, we had to make sure that everybody understood that
they had to go through him to get that road built in Herat, go
through him to get that school reconstructed in Mazar, and as I un-
derstand it, that is not—let me just ask the question. Is that hap-
pening? How much goes directly, so that you have a guy like Birkat
Khan who seized control of the whole province, being the guy who
is building the road for the folks down the street?

Mr. ARMITAGE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, these warlords have
access to their own resources for a lot of different reasons, some of
them very bad, like drugs, and they can do anything with that,
such as build roads, or anything else that they are able to.

Our money goes into the central government, and we have rel-
atively little, thus far, representation in the far-flung locations.
This is why I put a lot of stock in what Paul was saying, by attaching USAID and State officers to the Special Forces units, whether they be in the number of a dozen or several dozen in various areas, so they can give us better advice on what sort of projects might reasonably be funded out of the central government's coffers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will come back to that. My time is up.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. As both of you mentioned, the work of our military has been tremendous, and almost semi-miraculous from a standing start, as Secretary Wolfowitz said. General Franks only started the planning on September 20, that part of the situation was unavoidable, but we quickly picked up our pace and succeeded.

What is occurring now, it seems to me, does not necessarily have to be improvised in the same way, but I have a sense that it is being improvised. Let me review items that you both have discussed as objectives. One is democracy building respect for human rights educational opportunities, and economic assistance. We hope the latter leads to at least a reasonable economy, even if not a vibrant economy, as is often mentioned as the goal. It is not clear to me how much of that is occurring in Afghanistan; but some may, and probably a lot should.

There must be a security framework around, so that as the democracy, the economy, and public diplomacy begin to work, it does not fall part at the fringes, outside of Kabul at the country's extremities. Likewise, how this fits with what we are doing. Do we have a plan or plans for Pakistan? Our commitments there are very substantial, or at least have been implied that way. Similarly what are our commitments in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and other countries nearby.

My hope would be that at some point the administration would be able to provide, if not a book, at least a report as to how all of this is likely to be achieved over the course of an intermediate period of time. What I think we are getting, essentially, are reports of very commendable activities, but I do not have a confident sense of exactly where all of this leads, except that we are hopeful for the best.

In part, there has to be improvisation. We have the 18 members of ISAF, and they have their own agendas, although they are coincident by and large with ours. We are committed, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, not to become bogged down, and there is a lot of thoughtfulness about how you do this without becoming bogged down. Likewise, how do we run military operations, the cleanup situation, or the activities at the border, even as we try to establish peace.

Can either one of you give some idea as to what the thinking is in the administration pulling together State, Defense, Treasury, etcetera, and in some coherent plan that all of us could understand and support give some idea of what kind of financial commitments are required, not just for this year, but for several years down the trail?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator Lugar, I will commit to sending a letter to the committee, outlining just this, but I want to respond directly
to your question, but it would be necessarily a lengthy response, and we'll do it.

To the extent we have well developed thinking, and I appreciate your comments about the need for a little improv along the way, security is the overarching necessity. And, underneath that, we have agriculture, for the obvious reasons, and health, the next two in order of priority, and the reasons are quite obvious, because one half of the 26-plus million people in Afghanistan have a need either in the health area or in the food area. They have malnutrition, et cetera.

So that gives you a pretty good idea of your next two priorities, and after that, education, which is right up next to it, and then infrastructure development. That is just sort of the priority, as we see it, and we are trying to put our money against it.

Right now, Senator, in answer to your specific comments about democracy, human rights, et cetera, we have 21 State people at our embassy in Kabul, and seven USAID people, one person who covers human rights, and one who covers religious freedom and democracy. So I think, given the 10 percent of our staffing there, that will give you an idea of the emphasis we are putting on it.

In terms of public diplomacy, I am pleased with our story. You are the ultimate judge, and I appreciate your comments about Under Secretary Beers, but in the last 4 months, we have increased Radio Free Afghanistan broadcasting to 7 hours a day. We have Voice of America, up from 2.5 to 6 hours a day. We have two transmitters being built, which will provide 24/7 coverage for radio, the principle means of communications in Afghanistan.

We have exchange programs, one ongoing now with young students, called the Seeds of Peace program, and we have 12 participants here in the United States, and in August, we will have 18 women from the Women in Government group visit. We could have had it earlier, but we did not know who was going to be in government, and who was going to be around. So now that they have had their loya jirga, we are bringing them in August.

We are dealing in the country with a literacy rate that is about 15 percent above the age of 15. So printed materials are not a desired medium across the board, unless they are very much pictographs. So I think we are alert to the problems of public diplomacy. I will send a letter to the committee with our full thinking and the numbers we think would be associated with this over the next several years, Senator.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that would be very helpful, because the letter apparently would be the plan.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Indeed.

Senator LUGAR. It would illustrate the necessary elements that are important in all of this, and have money attached to it. That is important in giving us some idea of where we are headed in all this.

Having said that, you mentioned you have an employee devoted to democracy and one devoted to human rights. Granted, the State Department might not have resources for more people there, but organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy, or others can be engaged. We must utilize all the tools at our disposal. It is extremely important, in terms of our national security, that
Afghanistan be a success, so that there is, in the Muslim world, a success?

In other words, the overall public diplomacy message that keeps coming to us is that polls of countries indicate people do not like us, and in some cases, that understates it. To what extent does success in Afghanistan help turn that around, offer a model of a better life for people, that represents our ideals and our country?

Mr. Armitage. Sir, we are very bullish on the National Endowment of Democracy, as a general matter. We are going to make use of them in many countries around the world. I have Ambassador David Johnson with me here today, and he can provide the specifics about whatever contracts we may have with them right now. I do not know.

Of the 21 people, as I mentioned, in the embassy now, we have two devoted to the issues that you mentioned. We are going up to 31 State people over the summer. We are only limited by the fact that they are living in trailers, and we have a chancery that partly works and partly does not. We do not have any living quarters, etcetera.

The Chairman. Do the toilets flush yet?

Mr. Armitage. They do, sir. I will not tell the story you told us about it.

The Chairman. No, no, no. I want to make sure—well, do we need to provide money so you can build something else? I mean——

Mr. Armitage. We have the money in the supplemental, sir, for that, and I am anticipating no problem, other than getting the supplemental voted on.

On the larger question of the necessity of a success, particularly in the Muslim world; absolutely, but it is tied, I think, to the country you mentioned earlier, Pakistan. I do not think we are actually going to have a success, unless we are successful in both countries.

President Karzai has informed us that he is quite convinced of the sincerity of President Musharraf, and the fact that notwithstanding 10 or 11 years of a failed policy in Pakistan regarding support for the Taliban, that right now, Pakistan is on the right side of the ledger, President Musharraf is moving, I think, quite assiduously against madrasses, making them at least registered, if not getting rid of those that are beyond the pale. You saw in today’s news broadcast that by virtue of the fact that he has ordered his soldiers into the heretofore forbidden tribal areas, they are suffering casualties very much at our behest, but I think the success has to be the success of both countries.

Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Lugar, if I might just make a point, on the security front. We do have a plan to train 14,400 soldiers for the Afghan army over the next 18 months, and quite frankly, we are looking at whether that number might be increased. The two biggest issues are recruitment and funding. I would appeal once again for congressional action on the State Department supplemental, which contains $50 million for training and $20 million for peacekeeping operation funds. The sooner we get that money, the sooner we will be able to look at expanding recruitment.

Also, in our request for fiscal year 2003, we requested $100 million in authority to move DOD funds, if appropriate, from other programs or operational funds into this kind of training. I would
appeal to get—I think it is not so far made it through the budget process up here—but I would appeal to you to try to consider that, because I think it would give us a great deal more flexibility if the opportunities develop to do more training.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you for those specific suggestions; we appreciate it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer has to leave, and Senator Nelson has been gracious enough to—

Senator BOXER. Well, I got here before he did.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, but I go by the seniority rule; but go ahead.

Senator BOXER. No; I am senior to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are.

Senator BOXER. So what is the problem?

The CHAIRMAN. No problem.

Senator BOXER. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought I was just being nice here.

Senator BOXER. Senator, you are always nice.

Senator BOXER. I just want to say to both of you, thank you very much for your focus on this. I could not agree more with Senator Lugar, as far as making Afghanistan a success, and it is in our hands, and that is the burden of being the leader of the free world, and we are, and in this particular case, we cannot afford failure. It is not an option, as they say. I also wanted to note again the presence of the women’s groups who are here today, and to thank them from the bottom of my heart.

Mr. Chairman and our Ranking Member, Senator Lugar, I think it is important to note what Bernard Lewis said, who is a great historian, and a pretty conservative one at that, and when asked by Charlie Rose if he could name the one reason that the Muslim countries have not been able to be successful, the answer came back without a moment’s pause, “The women. They have not allowed the women to be part of the society.” This was quite an eloquent statement, I think, from him.

So what I want to spend my time doing, and I hope to be able to do it on a one-on-one with you, Secretary Wolfowitz, if we have a chance, is to plead the case, make the case for immediate expansion of the international force. That does not mean our troops. It does not mean occupation. Of course, you are right on the point, it means protection, and protection is not occupation.

When you have Hamid Karzai asking for this, and when you have Dr. Sima Samar, who the President was so gracious to put in the gallery, the First Lady’s box, during the State of the Union Address, asking for this, and when you have the women coming to us via these women’s organizations, and also in person, taking the risks of travel, to tell us this is their highest priority, and I would say, Secretary Armitage, you are right, they list security first, then they talk about education, health, and the rest.

I just want to put into the record, Mr. Chairman, a couple of third party quotes from my position here. The international think tank, the International Crisis Group, wrote, “The security situation outside Kabul remains tenuous, and roadside banditry and flare-ups of fighting between rival military factions have been common. Many unemployed former fighters, with weapons and time on their
hands, represent a dangerous element." And they say, "It is deeply troubling that some Afghans are expressing nostalgia for the relative security and stability that were present before.

I think it is important, because we have to know history, that it was this very lack of security that led to the Taliban coming into power in the first place. The Taliban first gained the support of Pakistan in 1994, when they rescued a 30-truck Pakistani convoy that was hijacked by a warlord just south of Kandahar. The Taliban gained popularity throughout Afghanistan at that time by continuing to eliminate roadblocks that were set up by local warlords, where hijackings and extortion were common, and we know what happened then. Osama bin Laden was given haven, et cetera. None of us wants it to happen. You do not. We do not. It cannot happen. But I say that there is this lack of security.

The International Crisis Group has recommended that force be increased from its current level of 4,500 to 25,000 troops, and other respective organizations, the Stimson Center called for 18,000 troops. I guess I am puzzled, because on this issue we have been so close together, people from different sides of the aisle, why there seems to be this hesitancy when it is not going to be American troops. Karzai is asking for it, and we know in 2 years, hopefully, the Afghan people can protect themselves. This is an interim kind of solution.

During February and March of 2002, Human Rights Watch documented cases of sexual violence against Pashtun women, perpetrated by the three main ethnically based parties, and then militias in the north. Many women describe how they have to fight off attackers, or hide young female relatives out of fear of rape. We know Sima Samar herself had threats. She had to spend one night at the United Nations guest house. And outside of Kabul, it is far worse.

Reuters reported in April an acid attack on a female teacher in Kandahar after handwritten pamphlets were found, circulating in the city, warning men against sending their daughters to school or their wives to work. I have heard first hand from Afghan women, who call my office, who say that security is their No. 1 concern.

So I would say one more thing here. Bernette Rubin, an expert on Afghanistan, wrote the following in the New York Times, "Both Afghans and international officials see the refusal to expand the international force as the start of American disengagement repeating the mistake of the 1990s, despite promising to learn from that experience. Providing security for rebuilding Afghanistan is now the front line in the war against terrorism. Failure here will undermine all other commitments, and many fear failure has already started. There is still time to prove them wrong."

Now, I do not believe that failure has started. I see so many wonderful, good things, and when Secretary Armitage talked about the loya jirga, and the women’s voice, and the fact that in this amazing setting, things got accomplished, and got done, and Karzai was—these are all wonderful things.

I am just concerned that for some doctrinaire reason—occupation, that is not what we are asking for. We are saying, protection of the people. It is a short-term thing. I would hope we could get past this idea that if we do support a larger troop deployment, it
is occupation, because I do not see that at all. I see it as an interim measure, and I—in the time remaining, I wonder if you could comment, is your mind opened at all to this?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. First of all, let me say, I agree with a great deal of what you said, particularly about the importance of women, both in Afghanistan and in the Muslim world, in the larger sense. There are a few things that are just factually wrong, and it is important to start from the right set of facts.

Whoever referred to the relative stability and security that were provided by the Taliban obviously did not read about the 5 million people on the verge of starvation, or the civil war that was raging in that country.

Senator BOXER. No, no. You misunderstood. Those were people who were telling reporters this. Of course, it is ridiculous, but if even some people think that, it is dangerous.

Secretary WOLFOWITZ. But there has been a huge improvement in the situation. That it is not perfect is not surprising. It is a country that has been through 25 years of civil war, and it is going to take time. Things are not going to change immediately.

But the other one is, there is no refusal to expand the Afghan force, whether it is referring to the Afghan army, where I have been saying over and over again, we would like more money to be able to expand it faster, or whether it is referring to ISAF, where there is absolutely no doctrine. I mean, no one is saying that we are opposed to expanding ISAF, or opposed to having it play other roles. Our biggest problem so far has been sustaining ISAF in its present role.

One of our big diplomatic challenges of the last few months, which we were successful at, was finding someone to take over the lead from the British in ISAF. When the Turks agreed to take it over, they expressed extreme reluctance to take missions outside of Kabul. That does not mean that we are holding a doctrine opposed to looking at other roles, but it is important to remember both the magnitude of the problems that this government has inherited, and the sheer size and unruliness of the country.

Are there going to be problems? We are going to make progress on them, it seems to me, step by step. I think we are making steady progress, but one of the reasons why we say it is going to be a long road is that there is a lot of work to do. But there is no doctrine involved here at all. We are trying to do whatever makes sense to stabilize that country.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ARMITAGE. You have an exquisite understanding of the problems of women in Afghanistan, but I want to get on the record about this. Security is the overarching one, but 23 years of war, the years of Taliban rule, have all brought other things to the fore that we have to be attacking simultaneously. It is not just a matter of empowerment of women, which is important in and of itself. We have an education problem.

During the Taliban rule, of those eligible for primary school, 39 percent of boys went to school, only 3 percent of women were enrolled in school. Right now, out of 4.4 million primary school-eligible kids, we have over 3 million enrolled, so almost 75 percent.
Now, women, or girls, lag behind boys, but we are well up to the 60 percentile mark of girls going to school.

If you look at the health care area, one in 15 Afghan women dies as a result of a pregnancy, or a post-natal problem. That compares to one in 3,000 here in the United States. One in four kids in Afghanistan die before they are 5 years old. So we have a whole bunch of problems to attack at the same time, and not just the ISAF ones.

Senator BOXER. Right. Mr. Chairman, I am going to end here and just say this. I sense a little bit of spark of hope there when you say there is no doctrinaire approach to this, you are going to look at this. So I feel that it is hopeful.

Let me just say, you cannot go to the doctor, and you cannot go to school, indeed, you cannot go out of your house if you do not feel safe; so protection, it seems to me, is the key here. I hope we will listen more to the voice of the women there, because that really is the voice of the people, I think. And if we do that, I feel so confident that this will, in fact, be the model that Senator Lugar is looking for.

I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Let me make sure about, I guess, something factual. There is no doctrinaire position, but we did—I met with the British one-star who was in charge of that operation, and with our military there. We are not opposed to expansion of ISAF, but we made clear we would be no part of it; is that right?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. The ISAF leadership was held by the British and then by the Turks, and we are trying to keep our forces focused on their job of finding terrorists and finding Taliban.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not my question, Paul. I know that. That is our first job. But did we not—I was told by the Brits that we explicitly said we would not be part of an ISAF force, period; is that right or wrong?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And we are not part of ISAF.

The CHAIRMAN. No, not that we "we are not," we would not, under any circumstances be part of an ISAF force; is that correct?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, actually, Secretary Armitage is reminding me, we have 36 people in the headquarters helping to advise them. There is a very close relationship between ISAF and CENTCOM. We provide a lot of the basic support that makes them safe and secure. They are really two operations that are connected to one another.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say it another way, and you sound like your State Department guy now; no offense, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. ARMITAGE. What does the State Department guy sound like, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Not like you.

Thank, God. I mean thank God, you do not sound like him.

Let me make sure I understand this. I was told the following, with a U.S. colonel standing with me, who was a liaison to the ISAF force, and a captain. After a 2-hour brief, I was told in February and then again in May, that we said we would not be a part of an expansion of ISAF; no U.S. boots would be on the ground with an ISAF force, if it expanded.
Second, I was told by, and I do not want to—I was told by ISAF officers that they thought that would be all right, if we had made a commitment to be an extraction force, if they expanded, or if we were prepared to provide other guarantees of participation with them. As the British one-star, whose name escapes me now, said, “Senator, how long do you think my Parliament will let me stay here, absent your full participation with us?” I then met with Mr. Brohimi, who indicated that the Turks had told him that they were looking forward to this command, as long as the “big dog” was with them—us. When the President stated, as I thought I heard him say, we would not be part of ISAF, the Secretary of Defense said, I thought, I stand to be corrected, we would not be part of ISAF.

It is not at all surprising to me that the little dog said, “Well, wait a minute. We are not interested in expanding.” So I am trying to get that connection. Did we or did we not say we would be part of ISAF, if it expanded? The way I got it was basically, “If you guys want to expand, you go ahead, but do not count us in on the deal.”

If that is what we said, there is no question no one is going to expand ISAF. I am trying to get a sense here of what the real story is.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ, Senator, we have been crucial to making that operation work. The British were in at the beginning. They stayed for 6 months. They did not leave because we were not participating. They left because they could not sustain it longer than 6 months, just as they cannot sustain some of their operations on the other side with our coalition forces.

Our people have important work to do that only American forces can do, or a few allies in small numbers, and that is rooting out terrorists and capturing them. It is difficult work, and it is work that is uniquely suited to the U.S. military. As you mentioned, the Turks said they would not come in without the “big dog” around. We gave them the assurances they needed to come in, and we will give whatever assurances, if those are needed, for other countries that want to participate.

Our biggest problem to date has been that even the countries that started out there, like the U.K., cannot sustain those commitments for logistical or other reasons, and there is not a huge number of countries signing up to volunteer.

The CHAIRMAN, I apologize to my colleague for interrupting.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL, Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I appreciate you asking the question, because I think we could probably take that down two or three more levels, and maybe some of our colleagues will do that, and if I have time, I will come back to that.

Gentlemen, thank you both. As always, we are grateful for your leadership.

Secretary Armitage, you mentioned that you believe the success in Afghanistan and Pakistan was tied together. I assume what you were referring to was our success in the overall region of our policies. My question is this: Does the administration have an integration of policies that, in fact, builds on your observation that you just shared with us a few minutes ago, that would, in fact, enlarge just the Afghanistan/Pakistan relationship?
For example, do you believe, do you have a policy, and is it so integrated, and how are you doing it, that the success, and the relationship, and our involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan have an impact on, are tied to, and coordinated with our policies in the Middle East, Indonesia, other trouble spots in the world? Do you believe, as we reverse the optics here, which has been mentioned this morning, Senator Lugar talked about it, why is it people seem not to care for us, some people?

Do we have an integrated policy that reverses those optics to say the Muslim world is looking at us, or the Arab world, or any world, through their optics, not America’s? Your comment led me to believe, and I want you to respond to this, that, in fact, the administration does have a policy to understand that these areas are all linked together, Iran, Iraq, that you cannot, in fact, deal in this universe without having some certainly spillover, symbolism, words, deeds, actions, that, if you do one here in Afghanistan or Pakistan, that it is tied, in fact, to how the world sees us and our actions in the Middle East, or in Indonesia, or anywhere else.

So I would appreciate it if you could take that a little further and explain to me if we have such a policy, and how it works.

Mr. Armitage. Senator Hagel, I think Paul and I would say we have an integrated policy and strategy. I think he would be a better judge of it, and you can tell us after you have examined this. I mentioned two states, but I think you immediately could expand it to the Central Asia region, the so-called front line states in the war on terrorism. We have everything from the supplemental to our appearances here in front of the committee and other committees. We have made it very clear that we see it as a total package.

I think when you talk about Indonesia and others, it gets back to our joy and pleasure with Turkey leading the ISAF, because it makes the point, here is a Muslim country that’s leading, not a foreign occupier trying to put some other religion on top of the nation’s religion. It was a very deliberate choice of ours to go after Turkey, to make the point that we are trying to make through public diplomacy, that Paul was so eloquent about up there. We do not want to occupy, we are not here to change your way of life, other than a few items, and that once we have completed our task, we will leave.

The public diplomacy aspects are, I think, the area where it is almost tied together. We are able to make the point in the Muslim world, and Indonesia, which you mentioned, is the largest Muslim country in the world, that we are not opposed to the great religion of Islam. We do this in a number of ways we think are integrated.

It is quite clear that terrorists themselves are not bound by any geographic region. We have recently seen al-Qaeda—or have reports of al-Qaeda meetings in Indonesia. Malaysia has accomplished, I think, a magnificent endeavor on the arrest of the 15 terrorists, along with Singapore, and arrested a bunch more. So I think we are pretty integrated.

We are not as far along in our public diplomacy strategy as we ought to be, and I am sure Under Secretary Beers was quite open about that. But if understanding is the beginning of wisdom, we understand that, and then we will go ahead and try to get smarter on it.
Senator Hagel. Paul, would you like to respond to that?

Mr. Wolfowitz. I agree with everything that Rich just said. It is important, the President has said this, not just to kill terrorists, but to build a better world beyond this war on terrorism. And I think a key part of that is reaching out to the Muslim world. My own experience as an American Ambassador in Indonesia, with some 200 million Muslims, the largest Muslim population of any country of the world, convinces me that the great majority of the world’s Muslims would like to be part of successful, free democratic, prosperous societies, those that embody what might be called Western values, but that are, in fact, universal values.

I think whoever made the point earlier, that success in Afghanistan can be a useful model, I think was on the right track. I think success in moderate countries, like Turkey or Indonesia, can contribute to a larger dynamic, but we need to work on the positive side of this as well as the more negative side of fighting terrorists.

Senator Hagel. A follow-up question to that point. Is it just our interpretation or understanding, as you just said has been said here, that the role model for Muslim countries really would be Turkey, for other nations? Is that not the designation of the other Muslims/Arabs to decide, rather than for us to decide for them, “Now, you want to be like Turkey?”

I have heard from other Arabs/Muslims from around the world that Turkey is not necessarily the secular country that many Muslims would emulate. I happen to be a great supporter of Turkey. My bigger question is: Are we making these determinations through our optics, or trying to understand the optics of the others, how they see it, and not just how the United States sees it?

Mr. Wolfowitz. I think those lines I quoted from the President indicate it is up to people to choose their own futures. I think where they are going on paths that are embracing democracy and freedom, then it is in our interest to support them. It is their decision, if they are Muslims, to decide what they think Muslim values are.

My comment about Turkey, my comment about Indonesia—they are very different countries, by the way. The Indonesians would emphatically reject the idea that it is a secular country, but it recognizes five different religions, not just a single one.

Senator Boxer referred to Bernard Lewis—many years ago, he came to visit me in Indonesia when I was Ambassador. We had a long discussion late one evening with a group of some dozen Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. At the end of it, he said, “You are Indonesians. You are Indonesian Muslims. You have to decide for yourselves the place of religion in society. But after what I have heard this evening, I hope someday you will send missionaries to other Muslim countries.”

There are things that people have to decide for themselves, but I think what we can decide for ourselves is that those countries that choose to be on the path of democracy, that choose to be on the path of freedom, that choose to be on the path of economic growth, fueled by private enterprise, those are countries that I think represent the future, and a future we want to support.

Mr. Armitage. I think the way that I look at it, Senator, is there is nothing necessarily contradictory about Islam and democracy,
and beyond that, I agree with Paul, that they can choose their own brand or form, et cetera, but that is, I think, kind of the basic—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, sometimes people suggest that if Islam is a state religion, that somehow that is inconsistent with our outlook. I ask people to stop and think how many European countries have Christianity as an official state religion. There are many ways to pursue paths that represent democracy and freedom. There are many different ways, but I think we can tell the difference between those who are on that path and those who are not.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Senator Biden is temporarily out of the room, and has asked that I preside temporarily, and in that role, I recognize Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Both of you know how personally I am a fan of the job that both of you are doing. I think you and your respective two bosses are some of the finest appointees in the whole administration. I would use this subject of Afghanistan just simply to say to Secretary Armitage, as I have already said to Secretary Wolfowitz, let us do not make the mistake that we made in Iraq when we left the downed pilot, who happens to be from Jacksonville, Florida, who was declared dead, Commander Scott Speicher.

We did not go back to get him. There were a series of mistakes. Then after a live sighting, his status has been changed to MIA, and there is consultation now going on as to whether or not his status ought to be changed to POW. But in the meantime, a few weeks ago, we have confirmed his appointment to captain. I take every opportunity as I can to remind you all of this, on behalf of Senator Pat Roberts, Senator Bob Smith, and myself. I will be offering an amendment to the DOD authorization bill today, again, putting this issue front and center.

Now, what I want to talk about Afghanistan, I would like you all to respond, please, is that in my case, having been to Afghanistan twice since the first of the year, having talked to our troops, having seen that inhospitable kind of environment, having been so proud of the phenomenal military success that our Nation had at the outset, as summarized by that photograph on the front pages of marrying high tech and low tech of the special operations troops, on horseback, with the Northern Alliance calling in the pinpoint air strikes. We had this phenomenal success, to begin with, and then we came to Tora Bora, and it looks like that we let the back door stay open so that they could get out; and our prime objective of al-Qaeda, bin Laden himself, escaped, and part of trying to remedy that is us trying to help close that border, or have hot pursuit.

I have spoken directly with the President of Pakistan about that issue, and he has to say one thing publicly, and I understand that, but it’s just like Bonnie and Clyde in the 1920s, they would rob a bank, and they would go across the state line, and the sheriff that was pursuing them could not go after them. He would have to stop at the state line. Well, we need to be able to pursue. But there was a lot more involved in Tora Bora.

There were questionable loyalties; why did we, for example, go with a guy named Hazret Ali, instead of Ghamsharik, and then he hired a guy named Ilyas Knel, and there is some question about
them actually giving cover to the retreating al-Qaeda, so that they got across the border.

Can you enlighten us, in light of our phenomenal military success, how did we goof there? And then further answer the question, if you would, I take it that we tried to correct some of our mistakes when we went in on the Anaconda mission?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, as I understand it, there are a couple of tactical considerations that have to be kept in mind, and then a larger strategic one. From a tactical point of view, first of all, it has to be underscored just how quickly everything was happening. This operation in Tora Bora took place, I think, only 3 weeks after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, and even less time than that after the fall of Kabul.

General Franks was assembling what he could assemble very quickly. It was his judgment, and the judgment of tactical commanders, that to do that operation alone in that incredibly difficult terrain would have required a massive highly visible buildup, and a major logistic undertaking, which would have ensured the departure of many more enemy forces before we even arrived.

Second, and related to that point, is, I would like to go back to my satellite photograph of Afghanistan. We are talking about an incredible country. You do not seal borders there. It is not even clear that if we had had an all-American operation, and the time to assemble people, that we would have done a better job. It is true, they would not have been bribed, that was a problem; but on the other hand, they would not have known the terrain as well, they would not have known the local people.

The net effect of that operation was, in fact, the capture—both in Afghanistan and Pakistan—and killing of several hundred al-Qaeda, so I would not judge it a failure. In fact, under the circumstances, the speed at which it was put together, I think, is pretty impressive. So when in Anaconda we relied more heavily on American and coalition forces, it was not because we had, quote, “learned a lesson,” but we had more capability available.

I would also think that this discussion and many others would benefit from recognizing the strategic point that I made in my testimony, which is that we deliberately did not plan an operation in Afghanistan to put in 100,000 or 150,000 American troops along the model of the Soviets. I think that is what the terrorists expected us to do—they expected us to get bogged down, and to have opportunities to kill us in great numbers, and for us to make a lot of new enemies in Afghanistan.

Not everyone that we enlisted at Tora Bora were people we wanted to enlist; but on the whole, we have had a good deal of success in enlisting local forces to do our work for us, and in the process, do some of their own. It is imperfect. I think anyone who sets a standard of perfection really does not understand anything about the history or the geography of that country. Against a reasonable standard, I believe that General Franks and his people have been remarkably successful and shown remarkably good judgment.

Senator NELSON. Well, as a matter of fact, in Anaconda, it is my understanding that you actually ran a feint of the old Soviet model of the frontal attack, and when that was repulsed, the al-Qaeda were high-fiving about how they had done it again, just like they
had done to the Soviets over a decade earlier, but then you swooped in on them from the rear, and you are certainly to be commended for that.

Mr. Wolfowitz. It is our military that deserves to be commended, but I think they have learned either by studying or by intuition a great number of the lessons from the terrible experience of the Soviets there; and I think, as you correctly point out, it took the terrorists by surprise. I think they expected us to repeat some of what they had seen 20 years ago, and we did not let them do that.

Senator Nelson. Did over 1,000 al-Qaeda get away in Tora Bora?

Mr. Wolfowitz. It is very hard to determine numbers. The numbers I have seen are less than that. We think hundreds got away, but many more hundreds were killed or captured. Even those estimates are a bit uncertain, because some of those killed people are still buried in the bottom of caves and tunnels that we will never find out about.

Senator Nelson. Did many get away in Anaconda?

Mr. Wolfowitz. I would like to answer that for the record. My impression and recollection from that time—and, again, let me start out by saying that there was an awful lot we did not know about that terrain and those conditions. Our estimates—and they are estimates—I believe were much smaller.

Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the chairman of this committee for holding this timely hearing.

And I want to thank both these gentlemen, these two Secretaries, for their just truly exceptionally, outstanding leadership. It has been magnificent listening to you. I continue to be impressed with your leadership, in that you have an understanding of situations. You are principled, but you are also very pragmatic.

In following up on part of the answer that was to Senator Nelson’s question, we are running into a lot of history here, history and geography, and for everyone, and I am glad to hear your positive outlook, and it is good to be optimistic.

But let us recognize the history of the instability, and violence, and the lack of democracy in this country just in the last 100 years of Afghanistan. In the last 100 years, they have had 12 rulers, most of which ended their terms being assassinated, deposed, or exiled.

I could go through them. You ought to go through them all, from 1919, Durani Pashtun, Hadid Bula Khan, assassinated, because too much British influence, Amanullah Khan, deposed and exiled in 1929 due to a revolt by the Ghilzias, in opposition to his modernization ideas; 1929, one that did not even last 1 year, another, a Tajik overthrown and killed; another one assassinated; next one, deposed and exiled; overthrown and killed after that; next one, killed in a shoot-out.

From 1978 to 1979, Hafizullah Amin, overthrown and killed, invading Soviet military forces; Karmal, 1986, replaced and exiled. Another Pashtun in 1992 overthrown and killed. The Mujahadeen
retreated to the extreme northeast. And, of course, Mullah Omar fled in the face of the United States’ attacks and bombings, and also attacks by anti-Taliban forces.

This is what you all are facing, as we are trying to bring some stability and concepts of universal freedoms and human rights to this country, which has no history of it. In fact, when it was ever tried, it ended up being to the detriment, extreme detriment of whomever was trying to move it that way.

Now, we are talking about draining this swamp. The people of Afghanistan are fortunate that the good leadership and efforts of our military forces have removed from that swamp the Taliban forces, their repression and intolerance. What we now need to do is fill in that swamp with soil, so that these concepts of security, and freedom, and individual liberty can take root and grow.

Now, in doing so, we first have to install security and a structure that will endure, so that you can have this concept of individual rights, and a concept put into a constitution that one's group rights, or ethnic rights, or tribal rights are protected, and that individual rights are protected, and also, obviously, a constitution.

Now, how this is going to be formed? I would like to hear your views as whether this is a federation or a confederation that secures security, No. 1. You talked about agriculture and health, economic development, education, and opportunities through individual freedom. Some of the more powerful warlords have expressed reservations about the loya jirga, and have intimated that they would resist any control, centralized control, from Kabul. This is not at all surprising, again, looking at Afghanistan’s history; but it does certainly present a problem, as far as having a unified country.

So what we are going to end up with? And this is my concern, and I would like you all to address it, is whether we are going to end up with all of these—you will try to get a regional force, or a national force, but you may end up with regional forces, and you are either going to have this current regime being a transitional regime, hopefully, to a pluralistic democracy, with respect and protection of individual rights, thereby securing all ethnic groups; or you are going to end up with a divided country, with the Northern Alliance group, the Tajiks, and the Hazaras, and the Uzbeks, and then the southern part, generally by Pushtuns, or the third approach is going to be a very long-term caretaker ward of the international community of obviously all the bordering neighboring countries, as well as others, which means a very, very long deployment, and probably not very satisfactory.

Now, where do you see this moving? In the short term, I see this as a Balkanized country. How do you see our ability to influence people to actually join a national force, as opposed to being in a regional, or tribal, or warlord force, and how do you see us, as well as our allies, trying to be James Madisons, in a different sense, in structuring a constitution that has buy-in from all the people, and all the factions, and the warlords of Afghanistan?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, Senator, neither Paul or I are people who look at the world through rose-colored glasses; and if we were, your short history would certainly take care of that. But there is one dif-
ference, and I will go through it now, and all of the 12 leaders who you mentioned.

First, we are trying to bring about several things at once. We are trying to reduce the availability of money to certain warlords, the eradication of the poppy and heroin crop, which will have, I think, a positive effect on the country. We are trying to develop simultaneously a national army, the French are training the battalion. We are in the midst of our second battalion training, or will be on 1 July, to be a multi-ethnic national force. So that is part of it as well.

I think on the diplomatic side, the one difference from the previous 100 years is that, at least for a time, and this is at play now, the great powers play the great game as something other than zero-sum. That was certainly the case in Petersburg, the Bonn agreement, where the Russians, the United States, the Iranians, the Pakistanis, all worked positively toward Afghanistan, rather than in a more traditional way.

Now, our job in diplomacy is to try to make sure that prevails. Now, there are some bad straws in the wind. The Iranians, as the chairman mentioned, are busy in Herat. Thus far, the Russians have been pretty good. We think the Pakistanis are playing the game straight with us now, but it is something that is going to take constant attention. Because if we are not successful in keeping this as something other than zero-sum, then the Balkanization to which you refer will be a fact.

Now, with regard to the constitution, over the next 18 months, as the transitional government writes its constitution, I do not know what they are going to come up with, but we are going to make available to help them groups like the National Endowment for Democracy. We have used the Asia Foundation for some activities, up through the loya jirga, NGOs such as that, to try to give them exposure to the best possible advice; but I do not know what they are going to come up with at the end.

Senator Allen. Well, will we be insisting that, regardless of how they form this confederation, or federation, or constitution, that, obviously, security matters, but also that these universal rights are respected——

Mr. Wolfowitz. Absolutely, and——

Senator Allen [continuing]. By law.

Mr. Wolfowitz [continuing]. I think the two things we do not want them, I think your phrase was to become a permanent ward of the international community, and we do not want them to descend back into the kind of lawlessness and violence that made them a sanctuary for terrorists. I do think it is important that we help them find their own way, but while the history is important, I believe in many places around the world, over time, the United States has been able to use its influence to work with local people, whether it is Korea, or the— I happen to think of Asian examples, because Rich and I have worked a lot in Asia. But if you think about Korea, or the Philippines, or Taiwan, American influence over a period of time has greatly strengthened those people who favor freedom, and democracy, and progress over those who do not, and there is not an instant fix, especially not for a country with Afghanistan's problems.
I believe whatever fix they come up with is going to involve some considerable degree of regional autonomy. We had it ourselves, especially in our founding. It does not mean lawlessness; but hopefully, even the regional governments will begin to be held to higher standards, and standards of how they treat their people.

I would like to repeat again, I do not think it can be said often enough, security is not just a matter of guns, it is also a matter of money, that when people are rewarded financially for good behavior, or have those resources withheld when they do not. It is a major instrument in the hands of a central government.

And that is why, at the same time that we in DOD are putting a big emphasis on training an Afghan army, we support in every way we can the efforts of the State Department and Secretary Armitage to raise as much support as we can from the international community and the United States to give that central authority more leverage over the regions.

Senator Allen. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I think it is important to note that those three examples you gave, Korea, Philippines, and Taiwan, we invested about 50 years, I hope we understand that we are in for a long haul, and no one calls for a timetable for withdrawal.

Senator Chafee.

Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on building stability and avoiding chaos in Afghanistan. It is a tall order, and as Senator Lugar said, it has the opportunity to be a model, if we are successful. I commend you on the hard work you are doing.

In reading through both your testimonies, and during the hearing thus far, I have not heard one mention of the United Nations yet. Have we had a bad experience in our relationship with the U.N.? Why has the U.N. not yet been mentioned here in our hearing?

Mr. Armitage. Well, we make great use of the United Nations Special Representative, Ambassador Brahimi, who has worked very closely with us. Secretary Powell speaks to Kofi Annan, the Secretary General, regularly about Afghanistan. So we have not had a bad experience.

We have found them very helpful in the political buildup through Bonn, the Petersburg Agreement, and laterally, as we went through the loya jirga. But the structures that exist for reconstruction, et cetera, are the G–8, the Afghan Support Group for Humanitarian Aid, and the Afghan Reconstruction Support Group, cochaired by the United States. So there are a bunch of ad hoc groups that are responsible for the money, but there is no bad odor associated with the United Nations, quite the contrary.

Senator Chafee. Secretary Wolfowitz.

Mr. Wolfowitz. I even mentioned them in my testimony. As the Secretary of the Army said, Brahimi’s role is quite key as a coordinator of all international support to the Karzai government, and we view him as really crucial in that effort. On the military security side, the ISAF operates under U.N. Security Council mandate, in fact.

Senator Chafee. If I could take more of my time.
The Chairman. Sure.

Senator Chafee. We have talked about the size of Afghanistan, trying to understand how an organization such as the Taliban could control such a large amount of territory. Senator Lugar noted the miracle of our successful military campaign naturally leads one to wonder what happened to the Taliban. In your testimony, you say we have arrested 2,500 al-Qaeda members worldwide. In the worst-case scenario, did the enemy just melt into the mountains? Are they currently intact in their sanctuaries they might have prepared there? Is that still a concern?

Mr. Wolfowitz. I think they are all over the place. Some of them just changed uniforms, and others did not even have to change uniforms, because it was the same uniform. They changed sides. It was inevitable, as in a country like that, that you lose structure. We have tried to focus on those people that we really think are hard core. Any number of people, I think, have actually come over to the new authorities, which also is a warning. They could be rented by a different side under different circumstances.

So you have the combination of people who have been killed and captured, some numbers who were still very hostile to us, who were in hiding, or in the mountains, and we have had rocket attacks, which we assume probably come from people like that, but so far, these attacks have been small scale.

But as I mentioned in my testimony, there has been a fear all spring, and predictions from some quarters of our intelligence community, that there would be a major Taliban offensive. I think they were trying to mount one. They were not successful. That does not mean they are not out there, still trying.

I could not agree more strongly with what the chairman said. This is a long-term project. There is still a lot of work to do, not only in reconstructing a stable Afghanistan for the future, but also in clearing out those bad elements that caused us so much grief.

Senator Chafee. You say they might have just changed uniforms. Is there also a fear that there are still sanctuaries in those very rugged mountains that we saw from satellite images?

Mr. Wolfowitz. I would not call them sanctuaries. I mean, if it is large enough to be identifiable as a training area or a base of operations, I think we can be pretty sure about finding them and going after them; but for individuals to hide all over the place is a fairly simple thing. We are accomplishing a lot also by keeping them in that condition, as opposed to organizing and fighting.

Senator Chafee. So if they are not in sanctuaries in the mountains, are they then still amongst the general population?

Mr. Wolfowitz. In some numbers, I am sure——

Senator Chafee. A followup question would be: You talked about not being in a quagmire. In Vietnam, one of the problems was that our enemy was everywhere. They were simply members of the general population. Is that a fear in Afghanistan?

Mr. Wolfowitz. Not in most parts of the country. As I said in my testimony, there are only 5 provinces today where we find significant pockets of hostile people, so that tells you that the problem is confined geographically. I think it is confined in size, but most importantly, regarding the allusion you made to Vietnam, these are not, in the old guerrilla phrase, fish swimming in a friendly sea.
I think most of the population is not very friendly to them, and one of the ways in which we find their hiding places is because they are very frequently turned in by local people, and that is a major part of our effort. Sometimes it is lubricated with money, but sometimes I think it is simply because they earned the hostility of a great many of the local populations around the country.

Mr. ARMITAGE. You will see, Senator Chafee, press reports of some arms caches being identified by local populations, too; or the coalition forces, or ISAF, and I think this is indicative of just what Paul is saying.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Chafee, I might say, I think your questions bring out what a complex environment it is there. And I must say that one of the things that was so impressive to me and Secretary Rumsfeld in the briefings that we got from our Special Forces people who operated there, it was not only the extraordinary level of military skill that they display, but their sophistication about local customs, and local languages, and local politics; and they have to have it, but they seem to have it, and they seem to find their way through that complexity with a great deal of skill and effectiveness.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, how many al-Qaeda do you estimate are left in Afghanistan or on the border with Pakistan?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I do not know of a reliable estimate. It is easier to estimate the numbers that we have captured and killed than to know how many are left. I can try to get you a classified answer for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be helpful, if you could. Well, I will refrain from any more questions. Do you have any questions? I know that the Senator from Florida had another question. Go ahead and finish.

Senator NELSON. The last time that I was in Afghanistan, I was just struck with the enormity of the task that we have in trying to bring about stability there, the lack of infrastructure, the lack of law and order. The United States, in a heroic effort, not only in our military operations, but then in our military operations as an outreach to the community, helping them build institutions, you know, it came foursquare.

To me, as we went from Baghram to Kabul, to visit with our Ambassador, and they were still trying to de-mine the grounds of the U.S. Embassy, and as we proceeded from where we landed in the helicopter to the embassy, suddenly someone stopped us in the road and said, “Wait a minute, we just found a mine a hundred yards up the road, on the side of the road.” And they blew it up.

We are in this now so much for the long haul, and yet it is so important to us. They had a huge drought there when I was there in January——

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Still do.

Senator NELSON [continuing]. And that is going to make it difficult to try to get farmers to grow crops, instead of growing poppies, and so forth. Give me some reason to have optimism.
Mr. Armitage. I wish you had not asked the question. You can be optimistic, sir, if you stop the car in time.

Senator Nelson. I am grateful for the little things, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Armitage. That is a big thing. The point of our program is to get people out of the poppy business and get them back in the farming business, and we have supplied 7,000 metric tons of seed, and 15,000 metric tons of fertilizer, getting ready for the fall planting season, which would be realized, of course, in the spring.

At the same time, USAID and the international community are trying to put together, again, the infrastructure for the delivery of water. The drought has continued and, at least in my building, they say now it is a drought of almost biblical proportions; but there was a water system that transferred water from the mountains, where there were snows, et cetera, at one time. We are trying to rebuild that.

Along with talking people out of growing poppy, there are other ways to get them out of the business, and to dissuade them from poppy cultivation. Some of it is covert, obviously, but part of it is international. We have worked very closely with the Russians, who realize they have a huge problem in Moscow, because that is where the heroin goes first now, to have them do a better job with the border control, and to be more of a prosecutorial mind set, in terms of drug flow, and this is happening to some extent.

I do not want you to accuse us of being optimists. We realize just what the chairman and others have said, this is a long, tough slog, and we have started on the journey, and the good news is that the President of the United States has said we are in it for the long run. We realize it is not going to be a 1, 2, 3-year fix. If you look at 23 years of war and 3½ years now of drought, it gives you an idea of the enormity of the task, and the fact that literally a generation is without education. So we are going to be at it for a long, long time. It is not a matter of optimism or pessimism, I think, Senator, it is a matter of just realism, and willingness to put the shoulders to the grindstone.

Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, on the optimistic side, I am impressed by that statistic about the 1.2 million refugees who have come home, which was the goal the U.N. had set for the entire calendar year, and they reached it in May. I think people are voting with their feet, and there is still an enormous amount of work to be done, but it is worth remembering how far that place has come in a relatively short time.

Senator Nelson. When Senator Shelby and I were last there, we found ourselves in the unusual situation—as we were having our luncheon meeting with Chairman Karzai in the old king’s palace, with the plaster cracking on the ceilings, and so forth, we found ourselves in the unusual situation of impressing upon him the need for him to be more careful about his personal security. We urged the same thing when we met with President Musharraf.

What can you tell me about our attempts there to surround him with troops that would be loyal, and to get him to stop from wading in the crowds, and that kind of stuff?

Mr. Wolfowitz. There is not so much I think we would want to say here, other than the fact that we have noticed the same phe-
nomenon, and we have been involved in some training. It is very difficult to persuade natural politicians from wading into crowds. We have seen that happen even closer to home. It is a natural impulse of a born politician, but we would be more than happy to provide on a classified basis just what efforts have gone into this, sir.

Senator Nelson. Well, I figured that Senator Shelby and I were instruments to be used by you in trying to convey that message when we were meeting with him. This was several months ago.

Let me ask again about how, Secretary Wolfowitz, did we get in the situation where we were having to decide on the Tora Bora assault between two warlords, one of whom seemed not to provide the closure of that rear exit, and what did we learn from that, that we can avoid those kind of mistakes in the future? Tell me just what you can for the record here, as we prepare for the future on trying to go get the No. 1 guy, who we still do not have.

Mr. Wolfowitz. Yes, but I guess do not accept the premise that General Franks’ people made a mistake. They made judgments in circumstances, as I said earlier, of a very rapidly evolving tactical situation. They obviously know things now about the particular individuals that they did not know at the time; and with that knowledge, they would rely on some of them and not rely on others.

But I think the notion that we somehow could have avoided relying on local forces is false. If we had not used local forces, I think even more people would have gotten away. That is certainly General Franks’ judgment, and everything that I have seen reinforces that.

If there is a lesson there, it is that you can never have enough good intelligence on the people that you are working with. You need to learn from experience. We were there basically for 3 weeks when all of that happened. I think we have a much better read on who we can work with and who we cannot work with now; but look, betrayal is part of that culture, as well. People fight for one side one day and another side the next day.

Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I follow up with one additional comment? I want to commend you all for your success in the diffusing the extremely high tensions—they are not completely diffused—between India and Pakistan.

But I bring that up, having been there myself, having gone from Islamabad to New Delhi with Senator Shelby, arguing the same things that you all have done very successfully recently, and I congratulate you on that. But I bring up this issue in terms of not only what that would mean to world peace, were they to get into an exchange of nukes, but what that would do to our effort to go after al-Qaeda. Because I believe that porous border of highly mountainous terrain, with Pakistan/Afghanistan, is where a lot of the al-Qaeda still are; and yet, we see the troops at least being threatened to be pulled off of there, the Pakistani troops, to the Kashmir border, and, therefore, not guarding that rear door. Tell us what you can about that.

Mr. Wolfowitz. You are absolutely right in expressing that concern. I would say it is one of several reasons why we in the Defense Department were very appreciative of Secretary Armitage’s diplomatic efforts. If that conflict breaks out into war, not only will it be terrible for the people involved, but it will be a real setback for
our effort to get terrorists in some significant numbers, or in these very wild tribal areas of Pakistan, where, by the way, the Pakistani Government has never exercised a great deal of authority.

They have made significant efforts over the last few months to put more people in there, but some of those people were diverted by the building crisis on the Indian border. If it were to break out into war, I think it would seriously degrade those efforts.

So far, I must say that the troops that are there seem to be doing a very aggressive job of going after al-Qaeda. It is wild country, it is difficult country, but I think they are making progress. We would like to see that progress continue.

Mr. Armitage. It is a generally held view, Senator Nelson, that nothing would represent success in a greater way for al-Qaeda than a dandy little war between India and Pakistan. They would be the only beneficiary.

Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you very much. We will have a few written questions, if that is OK. Let me say in your parting here that I think you have done an incredible job. I do think, one area of disagreement, personally, is that I think that U.S. leadership is still possible to expand ISAF beyond Kabul. I think absent doing that, and relying on warlords as much as we do while we are trying to set up this interim government, is a judgment call. I respect the call, but I think we are making some mistakes.

Every time I see the President, the first thing he says to me, “Do you have anything to say, except about Afghanistan?” So I am a broken record on this, but I appreciate your answers, and I appreciate you making yourself available.

You are excused, unless you have any closing comment either one of you would like to make.

Mr. Wolfowitz. No. Thank you.

Mr. Armitage. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman. You guys are like good trial lawyers. Never ask a question to which you do not know the answer. Thank you both very much.

We have a second panel, and I would like now, while some are leaving the room, Ambassador Peter Tomsen knows the political landscape of Afghanistan inside and out. As Special Envoy to Afghanistan for the previous President Bush, he dealt with many of today’s power brokers long before they had any real power to broker. He is currently the ambassador-in-residence at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. It seems to me, that in my former capacity as the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I kept calling people from the University of Nebraska at Omaha, and I do not know what the deal is here, but it must be a real sanctuary there.

Senator Hagel. I am a graduate, believe it or not. It probably takes that idea out of your mind, but——

The Chairman. No, no.

In my mind, that elevates it considerably.

The thing I know most about Omaha is that it is very close to Iowa. It is a long story; it is an inside joke.

Brigadier General David Grange earned three Silver Stars and two Purple Hearts during his service in Vietnam. He has served in
Delta Force, Ranger, and Special Forces operations during his 30-year military career, and as commander of Task Force Eagle in Bosnia, he is particularly well equipped to comment on U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations.

Now, I would invite you, Mr. Ambassador, if you have an opening statement, and then General Grange, and then we will go to questions. And I thank you for your patience.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. PETER TOMSEN, SPECIAL ENVOY TO AFGHANISTAN (1989–1992), FORMER AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA, AMBASSADOR-IN-RESIDENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA, OMAHA, NE

Mr. Tomsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the panel, too. I would also like to thank the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, because we meet periodically, and I must say that you have a lot of Afghan experts on your staff, on both sides of the aisle.

There is an old American saying that posits, "The biggest enemy of better is best," and that applies to Afghanistan. If you go for the best, as you, Senator, and others were commenting, you are not going to get there. All we can hope for is steady, incremental improvement, given the horrendous situation after 25 years of war, and the many problems, economic, security, et cetera, that rock that country.

The loya jirga was, in my opinion, a success overall. There were setbacks, there were complaints, and you can read about them in the New York Times op eds; however, again, "the biggest enemy of better is best." Hamid Karzai was selected by secret ballot, which he insisted on, by a great majority of the delegates. The cabinet that he has represents diversity, the different ethnic groups, broadly speaking, in the country. Actually, probably not even the Almighty could satisfy all Afghan groups that they are fairly represented. But I think there is a broad representation of all ethnic and religious groups in his cabinet. I think he has done very well. The three Vice Presidents represent the main ethnic groups in the country, Pushtun, Hazara, and Tajik.

The challenges of reconstruction now are before us. I wrote a May 17 editorial published in the Wall Street Journal on some problems in the reconstruction process. Hamid Karzai gave a VOA interview yesterday, in which he says, "Foreign aid continues to be a trickle, and now that the loya jirga is finished, we have to deliver. Our honeymoon is over," is what he told VOA.

There has been a lot of talk about $4.5 billion going out there, but, in fact, as I mentioned in that Wall Street Journal editorial, a lot of it is captured and snarled in aid bureaucracies, the United Nations, our own, British. It is not getting down to the lowest level. In fact, the only reconstruction activity that we have seen has been the Special Forces civil action teams out in the villages, building wells, schools, roads. The money that is for reconstruction, that has been promised and appropriated, is not there. The traction is not there. Something has to be done.

The four strategic reconstruction goals are mentioned, I will not go into them in my statement, which I would point to. The most important by far is the revival and modernization of Afghan na-
tional self-governing institutions, democratic, economic, administrative, and military. There was a lot of—sort of skeptical comments on Afghan’s ability to govern themselves in this session, but I would underline that from 1933 to the Soviet invasion there was stability in Afghanistan, there was progress along the democratic path. Unlike South Korea, Taiwan, this did not come because of sustained American pressure. It came from an Afghan elite in Kabul, including the former king, Zahir Shah, who introduced a democratic constitution in 1964, and then implemented that democratic constitution, including two parliamentary elections, which were held in 1965 and 1969.

It was outside interference by the Soviet Union, primarily the KGB operating through Communist parties inside Afghanistan, who were situated in the military as well as the civilian side, that overthrew this democratic process; but these institutions were building in the 1960s and early 1970s. Well, we should go back to them. Hamid Karzai’s father was Speaker of the Parliament during that period.

Success or failure of the massive historic reconstruction process in Afghanistan will depend mainly on implementation of this first strategic goal. Revival of Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself when foreign aid tapers off in 5, 7, or 10 years’ time.

Nation building, a la Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, is not necessary in Afghanistan. They were never nations. Afghanistan has been a nation for 300 years. It was never colonized. In the 20th century, it sprouted its own self-governing institutions. In my opinion, the centerpiece of the international community’s reconstruction efforts should, therefore, be to aid and facilitate the reestablishment of Afghanistan’s governing institutions, equipping them to operate in today’s 21st century environment. The U.S.-led coalition and the current pro-Western Afghan leaders must succeed in this endeavor. The stakes are huge. Capacity-building to fill out and render Afghan institutions effective is key. Failure would lead to renewed fragmentation and chaos in Afghanistan, wasted foreign investment, and the resumed exploitation of Afghan territory by terrorists.

Only an Afghan government, standing once again on its own two feet, can keep the peace internally and resume a constructive role in the international community. In this connection, I urge positive consideration by the Senate for the Henry Hyde House bill, the Freedom Support Act, which is modeled on the Freedom Support Act for Newly Independent States, passed in the early 1990s by Congress. You took the initiative; you should take it again. It is going to establish, if it is approved, a separate budget, like the Freedom Support Act budget.

It will have a separate budget for Afghanistan. It will not be, as has been the case so far, taking money incrementally from different pots around the Federal Government, but establish structurally a budget, establish the position of coordinator, which Rich Armitage first held in the early 1990s for the NIS Freedom Support Act budget, and is now ably carried out by Bill Taylor, Ambassador Taylor, in the State Department, a coordinator to bring together all of the different agencies in the U.S. Government in a coordinated
way, who are involved in Afghanistan, and I believe there are over 20 today.

Let me just end by commenting that I support the expansion of ISAF to regions inside Afghanistan, particularly Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. I would underscore what you said, Mr. Chairman, if you look at that area of Mazar-e-Sharif, the Tajik commander, Atef Mohammed, and Dostam are at each other’s throats. Mohakek is a Hazara warlord; he is also involved. They have all agreed that they support the deployment of an ISAF contingent, and it only has to be a couple hundred to Mazar-e-Sharif.

That would definitely assist stability and security in the area, and reconstruction in the area; otherwise, without this foreign sort of referee presence, until the central government is able to establish the military with a reach across the country and security from the center, the fighting in the region is going to continue, the attacks on refugees and also on women are going to continue, and that applies, to a lesser extent, to Kandahar and Jalalabad.

It would not take much, you are not going to be deploying thousands to these different urban centers of Afghanistan. You are going to be deploying tens or hundreds, but it would accomplish a great deal in bringing security to these areas. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Tomsen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PETER TOMSEN, AMBASSADOR-IN-RESIDENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA; FORMER AMBASSADOR AND SPECIAL ENVOY TO AFGHANISTAN

AMERICAN POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN

An old American saying posits: “the biggest enemy of better is best.” It is worth-while for Americans to keep this practical guideline in mind when evaluating the just-completed Afghan loya jirga. There were setbacks, unfulfilled objectives, and many would argue harmful decisions at the loya jirga. In general, however, the positive outweighed the negative. And, in the months and years ahead, there will be plenty of time to shave away the negative.

The December, 2001 Bonn accords laid out an ambitious roadmap to achieve peace, stability, democracy, human and gender rights, and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The June, 2002 loya lirga, like the June, 2004 parliamentary elections, is a critical milestone to realize these goals.

In Afghan history going back to the eighteenth century, the selection of a legitimate Afghan leader during times of trouble has been the principal mission of Afghan loya jirgas, with only a few exceptions—such as the 1964 loya jirga convened to approve a democratic constitution. The just completed Afghan loya jirga accomplished that main task—selection of Hamid Karzai to head the Afghan transitional regime until the June, 2004 parliamentary elections.

Criticism of the loya jirga by Afghans and non-Afghans has centered on non-selection of a mini-legislature called for in the Bonn accords, and correcting the imbalance in the cabinet stemming from the Northern Alliance’s unfortunate unilateral seizure of Kabul last fall.

Mr. Chairman, each of these criticisms has some validity; however, demanding the “best” in the current Afghan environment is folly. Not even the Almighty could have satisfied all Afghans in the distribution of cabinet portfolios.

Overall, the loya jirga successfully maintained essential progress along the Bonn roadmap. The expectation that 1,500 representatives of Afghanistan’s varied groups and factions could agree on a mini-legislature in this brief period was, frankly, unrealistic from the beginning. The larger (but not majority) Pashtun group can point to Pashtun Hamid Karzai at the top of the transitional regime, plus one of the three Vice Presidents, Pashtun Abdul Qadir (the brother of renown Afghan commander Abdul Haq), as substantial Pashtun representation in the Afghan leadership. Pashtun Zahir Shah will play an important symbolic role as “father” of the nation. Structural ethnic balance at senior levels is largely centered out by a Tajik and Hazara filling the other two Vice Presidential posts. Hamid Karzai’s twenty-eight member cabinet also reflects broad Afghan ethnic-religious balance. A well-known
Afghan woman is Minister for Women’s Affairs. The outspoken Sima Samar will head the Human Rights Commission.

Challenges of Reconstruction

There are four strategic reconstruction goals in Afghanistan. The goals should be viewed—and implemented—along an integrated path. Each goal is linked with the other three.

- Revival and modernization of Afghan national self-governing institutions; democratic, economic, administrative and military.
- Implementation of “bottom up” community-based reconstruction through Community Reconstruction Centers.
- Rebuilding Afghanistan’s macro-infrastructure, including roads, bridges, agriculture and telecommunications.
- Humanitarian relief for endangered sectors of the Afghan population.

Success or failure of the massive, historic reconstruction process in Afghanistan will depend mainly on implementation of the first strategic goal: revival of Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself when foreign aid tapers off in five to ten years time. Nation building a la Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor is not necessary in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been a nation for 300 years. It was never colonized. In the 20th century, it sprouted its own self-governing institutions, and slowly modernized them during the forty years prior to the Soviet invasion.

The centerpiece of the international community’s reconstruction effort should therefore be to aid and facilitate the re-establishment of Afghanistan’s governing institutions, equipping them to operate in today’s 21st century environment. The U.S.-led coalition and the current pro-Western Afghan leaders must succeed in this endeavor. The stakes are huge. Capacity-building to fill out and render Afghan institutions effective is key. Failure would lead to renewed fragmentation and chaos in Afghanistan, wasted foreign aid investment and the resumed exploitation of Afghan territory for international terrorist and narcotics operations. Only an Afghan government standing once again on its own two feet can keep the peace internally and resume a constructive role in the international community.

The Senate’s support of the House Henry Hyde bill will give a great boost to meeting the reconstruction challenge in Afghanistan. Even today, there is no American reconstruction strategy, fund to support the strategy, and efficient executive branch machinery to implement the strategy.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in December, 1991, Congress wisely established the Freedom Support Act to give sustenance to our political rhetoric of support for the transition to free market democracies by the Newly Independent States (NIS). Deputy Secretary of State Armitage became the first NIS aid coordinator. He and his successors, Ambassador Morningstar and Taylor, have extremely effectively piloted Freedom Support Act programs. The Senate’s support for the Henry Hyde initiative will fill the confusing vacuum in the Administration on strategy, funding and program implementation for Afghan reconstruction. Congress rose to the occasion in the 1990s by passing the Freedom Support Act. It is time to take a similar step in 2002 to accomplish U.S. interests in Afghanistan.

American Regional Diplomacy

There is need for a comprehensive U.S. diplomatic policy on Afghanistan and the region. American goals of combating terrorism, promoting peace, stability, democracy, human and gender rights, and fighting narcotics trafficking must have a broader regional scope. We need to remember that Afghanistan’s horrendous condition has mainly been created by outsiders—the 1979 Soviet invasion and subsequent eight-year brutal occupation, followed by another invasion by foreign Muslim extremists from Pakistan and the Gulf, supporting their own Afghan surrogates to reign from Kabul.

A creative American diplomatic architecture for the region should strive for a consensus among the “outer ring” of powers surrounding Afghanistan to respect Afghanistan’s independence, neutrality and sovereignty. Such an approach, perhaps modeled on the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, could restrain the states in the “outer ring” from attempting to manipulate Afghanistan to serve their competing strategic objectives in the Central-South Asian region.

Afghan Legitimacy

Mr. Chairman, may I conclude by stressing the significance of avoiding “Mother Hen” tactics toward Afghan politics. As you know, Afghans are a proud, independent people, inured historically to resisting outside attempts to dominate Afghanistan. They have recently, with our help, thrown off the yoke of first Soviet, then radical
Muslim, control. We must not establish an American image of just the next outsider trying to dictate who rules in Afghanistan. Outside arm-twisting on behalf of preferred political power arrangements may be effective for days or a few months, but it is doomed to failure in the long run.

The overarching intention of the Bonn accords has been to help the Afghans to form the legitimate Afghan regime, chosen by Afghans, which has been missing for a quarter century. Conflict will continue to tear Afghanistan as long as this void in legitimacy exists. American and other outsiders can discreetly advise Afghans on how to govern themselves. The decision-making in Afghan politics, however, must be, and be seen to be, done only by Afghans.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. General, welcome.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID L. GRANGE, U.S. ARMY (RET.), CHICAGO, IL

General Grange. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to share some thoughts today with the committee. I have no access to any classified information on this subject, and, in fact, I am serving now as a philanthropist for the McCormack-Tribune Foundation in Chicago. Any free time I have——

The Chairman. Maybe we can talk after this.

General Grange. Sir?

The Chairman. I said, maybe we can talk after this.

General Grange. Yes; absolutely. But my free time is spent really on my John Deere tractor on my farm in Illinois. But I would like to speak from experience serving in heavy, light, and special operating units in combat and also in peace support operations, especially challenges after the main fight, where the entry into the country has occurred.

I believe that you always have to back up and ask, like someone said earlier, why are we in Afghanistan? What is the purpose of the United States in this commitment? I understand that the mission is to disrupt, if not destroy, the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, to deny them the sanctuary in Afghanistan, and to remove the Taliban from power.

Our military has removed the Taliban from power. I do not believe that we have destroyed, but we have disrupted the al-Qaeda operations, and we have denied the sanctuary in Afghanistan, though it has probably moved to Pakistan.

But this is only the first phase of what our commitment is to Afghanistan. Any military operations consolidation phase or a country at war reconstruction phase is the most difficult aspect of any operation. If we expect to see some semblance of rule of law, democratic government, or a free market economy, and an institutional capacity of Afghanistan, though not necessarily a replica of the United States of America, we have a long way to go.

I have submitted enclosure one. It is the international community’s challenge to a peace support operation, and it was discussed a little bit by the earlier panel about military objectives, and other than military objectives to reach goals set by the national command authority. It is something that can be discussed later during our questions following this testimony; but this chart shows the challenge, and it has to do with not just the military, but it has to do

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1The enclosure is a chart that can be found on page 52.
with money, it has to do with other organizations that have a very big role in achieving our goals.

If these are the criteria to define winning, and that is the democratic society, a free market economy, some type of institutional capacity, then we must stay the course and commit the time and the resources, and see the mission through. I believe that our responsibility is not only to destroy the enemy and make Afghanistan safer, but I think we have a responsibility to make it better.

Nothing could be more detrimental to the prestige, to the honor, and the credibility of the United States of America than not to accomplish what we have set out to achieve. We must fulfill what we promised to others. In essence, I believe we must walk our talk.

Our Nation also has the responsibility to our military, and I really appreciate the remarks that Senator Nelson mentioned earlier about leaving a fallen comrade in the status of a prisoner of war, or an MIA. I think that is extremely important to our Armed Forces. I do not think that we should ever send our Armed Forces into harm’s way unless we maintain the will to win, and that means to complete the mission.

It is very important to the American people that those who have already given the ultimate sacrifice have not done so in vain. What hurts a soldier more than austere conditions, fear, loneliness, and even wounds, is the lack of will to follow a mission through.

It took the United States 10 to 12 years to kick-start our form of government. We cannot expect Afghanistan, Bosnia, or any other country, torn by war, to do so in 1 or 2 years. That is why we should never put a time limit on an operation, but maintain the resolve for as long as it takes to reach our stated objectives. After years of murder, rape, and destruction in any country that we have been involved in, to love thy neighbor takes time. We Americans are attuned to the 100-yard dash, not a marathon, and this particular operation is a long run.

The enemy has a vote when this victory is decisive. We are not fighting a nation state in this case. The enemy is a terrorist organization. Who decides on surrender? Who decides that they are defeated? What are our measures for mission accomplishment? A very tough situation.

This particular fight in Afghanistan to defeat terrorists not only sets the example for the world of America’s determination, and I think Senator Hagel asked this question, but it is also critical to the region’s stability. What is their perception of what we are doing? What happens in Afghanistan affects the overall security of southwest Asia. This fight is not defined only by Afghanistan’s national borders. If so, it would be like our fighting in South Vietnam, which at times had total disregard for Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.

The enemy does not recognize the borders, but takes advantage of the vulnerabilities that these seams offer, and continually creates negative influences on our campaign; for example, one that was brought up earlier were paramilitary operations in Kashmir, to distract our efforts.

The United States and our coalition have deployed a powerful military force in Afghanistan, and power does matter. But power is relative to the situation at hand, especially in unconventional
warfare. Tangible power, bombs, tanks, infantry battalions, are easy to quantify, but intangible power is hard to quantify, and though relative to this kind of conflict, it must be considered. Propaganda, disinformation, black market payroll, and the manipulation of religious beliefs are as powerful as any B-52.

We must be able to apply various means of power, and not only the physical and organizational domains of an operation, but particularly in the moral domain, where we achieve the most effect. In your packet, I have enclosure two, and it talks about conflict resolution and the time it takes to meet an objective, operating in the physical, organizational, and moral domain. The biggest payback is in the moral domain, but the experts operate in all three domains to achieve their objectives.

It is imperative that the coalition can strike hard with one hand and provide humanitarian assistance with the other. The people of Afghanistan, like any other people around the world, respect strength, magnified by compassion. Our mission in Afghanistan requires a robust civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, and engineering effort to provide the humanitarian assistance, and development projects critical to reconstruction, backed up by a viable strike force.

Operation Anaconda, I believe, got the attention of the enemy. The Taliban and the al-Qaeda spent a lot of time preparing a firesack to trap and destroy coalition forces in the valley. They wanted to bloody Americans, to challenge America's resolve to continue this fight. They lost the battle. They now have reassessed their strategy and are now lying low, conducting reconnaissance and small-scale guerrilla operations, influencing the peoples of remote villages, and waiting us out. In their minds, we will not stay the course.

It is imperative that we sustain our efforts. In fact, I recommend we increase them if we expect to win. It can be done, I believe, without the appearance of an occupation force. Aggressive coalition, and eventually combined with Afghanistan army patrolling must continue to maintain pressure on the enemy, especially in the eastern provinces. Our forces and efforts must adapt to the various regions of Afghanistan, with a holistic strategy using military, other government agencies, non-governmental agencies in a synchronized campaign. We have had a hard time doing that in the past.

A robust, credible Afghanistan army cannot be built without money, quality weapons, a multi-ethnic force mix, a sense of pride of being a part of that army, and a sense of purpose in support of the country. The army should have a fair representation of not only Tajiks and Panjshiris, but also Pushtuns. The benefits of being a part of this army must outweigh anything that the warlords, terrorists, or black marketers can offer them. Our advisory efforts to this army will be critical to success.

The international security force, along with the Afghan army, eventually must operate outside of Kabul. They have no credibility unless they do. To avoid confrontation, though there are always risks involved in this strategy; this force must work as combined patrols with the regional warlord militias. Regional coalition liaison teams are critical to the success of these combined patrols, and that includes Americans.
We must recognize the warlords have special powers, and the Karzai government, as well as the coalition leaders, must establish a cooperative relationship with them. It is like dealing with any faction leaders in any other conflict we have been involved in. Fighting them will just lead to disaster. The warlords’ militia should be made an auxiliary part of the national army, paid to protect regional infrastructure, with emphasis on “we are all Afghans.”

Without this cooperation, the road networks and bridges will never truly be developed and open for trade, and the establishment of a free market economy. Humanitarian relief aid will never get to remote sites, and water wells, schools, hospitals, and communication infrastructure will never be constructed, critical to the refugee return.

Right now, the lifeline for coalition forces is the air bridge. This cannot be sustained forever. As you all know, the wings are being flown off our aircraft. Ground lines of communication must be opened to continue military and non-military efforts in Afghanistan. The construction of major public works should not be done with a Brown and Root model, though I must admit, I have had great success with their support in other operations. It is very effective, but it does not facilitate the commitment of the Afghanistan people.

Reconstruction projects are a great opportunity, providing work and a sense of pride to the local communities. What we want is an employed work force, not trigger pullers carrying AK–47s. A series of regional arsenals should be established to contain heavy weapons, still belonging to the regional warlords, as I think it would be a mistake to try to take them away, and maintained and inspected by the national government and coalition advisors. An inspection program of these arsenals among warlords, supervised by the national army, should be instituted.

The U.S. military contribution to a sustained campaign to bring a chance of lasting peace to Afghanistan and the region should be as follows, and this is my summary: special operating teams, consisting of civil affairs, public affairs, psychological warfare, and engineers should be collocated with regional warlords, and tribal chiefs at key villages and nodes.

Military advisors should be integrated throughout the Afghanistan army. Rapid reaction force to respond and support the coalition/national/Afghan army should be established and on hand. At least a combined arms brigade, American, to continue search-and-destroy operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban remnant forces should remain a robust infrastructure and institution support elements, i.e., civil affairs, public affairs, engineers, medical, communications, et cetera, need to be there to enhance nonmilitary reconstruction efforts.

In closing, our Nation has committed itself to the accomplishment of this mission. We have spent considerable resources to date, and we have sacrificed human life. We are obligated to stay the course and win this fight. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Grange follows:]
I appreciate the opportunity to share some thoughts with you today on a security plan for Afghanistan. I have no access to classified information and my thoughts are a result of my experiences serving in heavy, light and SOF forces around the world, being a part of both victory and defeat.

Why are we in Afghanistan? What’s America’s purpose? I understand that the mission is to disrupt if not destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, deny them the sanctuary of Afghanistan, and remove the Taliban from power. Our military has removed the Taliban from power. We have not destroyed but we have disrupted al-Qaeda operations. We have denied sanctuary in Afghanistan, though be it, it has moved to Pakistan. But this is only the first phase of what our commitment is to Afghanistan. Any military operations’ consolidation phase, or a country at war’s reconstruction phase is the most difficult aspect. If we expect to see some semblance of rule of law, democratic government, free market economy, and institutional capacity—though not necessarily a replica of the U.S. model—we have a long way to go. (Enc—IC Challenge During PSO) If these are the criteria to define winning, we must stay the course and commit the time and resources and see the mission through. I believe that our responsibility is not only to destroy the enemy and make Afghanistan safer, but also to make it better.

Nothing could be more detrimental to the prestige, honor, and credibility of the USA than not to accomplish what we set out to achieve. We must fulfill what we promise to others—in essence, to walk our talk. Our nation also has a responsibility to our military. Never send our Armed Forces into harm’s way unless we maintain the will to win. It is very important to the American people that those who have already given the ultimate sacrifice have not done so in vain. What hurts a soldier more than austere conditions, fear, loneliness and even wounds is a lack of will to follow a mission through.

It took the United States 10 to 12 years to kick start our form of government. We cannot expect Afghanistan, Bosnia, or any other country torn by war to do so in one or two years. That is why we should never put a time limit on an operation, but maintain the resolve for as long as it takes to reach our objectives. After years of murder, rape, and destruction, to love thy neighbor takes time. We Americans are attuned to the 100-yard dash, not the marathon. In Afghanistan’s case this is a long run.

The enemy has a vote on when victory is decisive. We are not fighting a nation state; in this case, the enemy is a terrorist organization—who decides on surrender? Who decides they are defeated? What are our measures for mission accomplishment?

This particular fight in Afghanistan to defeat terrorists not only sets the example to the world for America’s determination, but is critical to this region’s stability. What happens in Afghanistan affects the overall security of Southwest Asia. This fight is not defined by Afghanistan’s national borders; if so it would be like our fighting in South Vietnam, which at times had total disregard for Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam. The enemy does not recognize borders but takes advantage of the vulnerabilities that these seams offer, and continually creates negative influences on our campaign, (i.e.—paramilitary operations in Kashmir, to distract our efforts). We have to conduct our campaign regionally as well.

The United States and our coalition have deployed a powerful military force in Afghanistan. Power matters, but power is relative to the situation at hand. Tangible power—bombs, tanks, and infantry battalions—are easy to quantify. But intangible power is hard to quantify, though relative to this kind of conflict. Propaganda, disinformation, black market payroll, and the manipulation of religious beliefs are as powerful as a B-52. We must be able to apply various means of power in not only the physical and organizational domains, but particularly in the moral domain, where we achieve the most effect. (Enc—Conflict Resolution—PSO/Combat) It is imperative that the coalition can strike hard with one hand and provide humanitarian assistance with the other. The people of Afghanistan, like any other people around the world, respect strength magnified by compassion. Our mission in Afghanistan requires a robust civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, and engineer- ing effort to provide the humanitarian assistance and development projects critical to reconstruction, backed up by a viable strike force.

Operation Anaconda got the attention of our enemy. The Taliban and al-Qaeda spent a lot of time preparing a firesrack to trap and destroy coalition forces in the valley. They wanted to bloody Americans, to challenge America’s resolve to continue the fight. They lost the battle. They have reassessed their strategy and are now laying low, conducting reconnaissance and small-scale guerrilla operations, influencing remote villages, waiting us out. In their minds, we will not stay the course.
It is imperative that we sustain our efforts, in fact increase them, if we expect to win. Aggressive coalition and eventually, combined Afghan Army patrolling must continue to maintain pressure on the enemy, especially in the Eastern provinces. Our forces and efforts must adapt to the various regions of Afghanistan with a holistic strategy using military, other government agencies, and non-government agencies in a synchronized campaign.

A robust, credible Afghan Army cannot be built without money, quality weapons, a multi-ethnic force mix, sense of pride, and a sense of purpose. The army should have a fair representation of not only Tajiks and Panjshiris, but also Pashtuns. The benefits of being a part of this army must outweigh anything warlords, terrorists, or black marketeers can offer. Our advisory efforts to this army are critical to success.

The international security force, along with the Afghan Army eventually must operate outside of Kabul. They have no credibility unless they do so. To avoid confrontation, though there are always risks involved, they must work as combined patrols with the regional warlord militias. Regional, Coalition Liaison Teams are critical to the success of these combined patrols.

We must recognize that warlords have special powers, and the Karzai government, as well as coalition leaders, must establish a cooperative relationship with them. Fighting them will just lead to disaster. The warlords’ militias should be made an auxiliary part of the national army, paid to protect regional infrastructure, with emphasis on "we are all Afghans." Without this cooperation, the road networks and bridges will never truly be developed and opened for trade and the establishment of a free market economy; humanitarian relief aid will never get to remote sites; and wells, schools, hospitals and communication infrastructure will never be constructed. Right now, the lifeline for the coalition forces is the air bridge. This cannot be sustained forever. Ground LOCs must be opened to continue military and nonmilitary efforts.

The construction of major public works should not be done with a Brown & Root model. Though effective, it does not facilitate the commitment of the Afghan people. Reconstruction projects are a great opportunity providing work and a sense of pride to the local communities. What we want is an employed work force, not "trigger pullers" carrying AK-47s.

A series of regional arsenals should be established to contain heavy weapons, still belonging to the regional warlords, but maintained and inspected by the national government and coalition advisors. An inspection program of these arsenals among warlords, supervised by the national army, should be instituted.

U.S. military contributions to a sustained campaign to bring a chance of lasting peace to Afghanistan and the region should be as follows:

- SOF teams (SF, CA, Psyops, Eng) co-located with regional warlords and tribal chiefs at key villages and nodes.
- Military advisors integrated throughout the Afghan Army.
- Rapid Reaction Force to respond and support the coalition/national Afghan Army.
- At least a combined arms brigade to continue search and destroy operations against al-Qaeda/Taliban remnant forces.
- Robust infrastructure/institution support elements (i.e.—civil affairs, public affairs, engineers, medical, communication, etc.) to enhance nonmilitary reconstruction efforts.

Our nation has committed itself to the accomplishment of this mission. We have spent considerable resources to date, and have sacrificed human life. We are obligated to stay the course and win this fight.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, general.

Mr. Ambassador, in my foray into Afghanistan and the region, as well as following it very closely here, I have not met anybody in uniform in place in Afghanistan, nor have I met anyone engaged on the ground in Afghanistan in a civilian capacity, who says anything other than what both of you just said, there is a need to expand the security force.
Now, I think that the team the President has put together in his administration is made up of an awful lot of bright people. What is the disconnect here? What is the disconnect? How do you explain—and I am not suggesting you have any inside information, but how do you explain this, at best, reluctance, and most probably outright hostility to the notion of expanding ISAF?

Does it relate to the conviction that we do not have enough reliable partners, and we will end up having to do it all? Does it relate to your opening comment, that the enemy of the good is the best, or however you phrased it? Try to give me some insight, knowing the country, and having worked in the last Bush administration. I am not trying to be critical; I am really not.

Let me say one other thing. When I got back from Afghanistan, like everyone who makes the trek, I wrote a report; my staff and I wrote a report and discussed it with the administration. I was initially very hopeful that the President’s assertions about a Marshall Plan, coupled with the recognition on the part of White House personnel in the country and from the National Security Agency, as well as folks at the State Department, that there is a recognition, there was a need for expanding any security—whatever you want to call it, security force beyond Kabul. To tell you the truth, I was a bit surprised when that battle seemed to be lost by those proponents who said that is the way to go. Help me out. What is this all about?

Mr. TOMSEN. I will try to. I want to repeat what you said, though, echo what you just said there, that we have to give the utmost praise to our military for what they have done in Afghanistan, and this brilliant victory, and what they are doing now. I mentioned the civil action groups that are right now out in the villages and towns, the only ones really in the whole international aid establishment community that I have seen doing work at the village level, with villages, in a practical domain.

The CHAIRMAN. It is amazing.

Mr. TOMSEN. Yes. It is also unfortunate that—that is why I think this Henry Hyde Freedom Support Act initiative is so incredibly important. It will give a framework to a Marshall Plan-type initiative for Afghanistan. It gives it focus, it gives it a budget, and it gives it a coordinative mechanism inside the U.S. Government, like Rich used to do, and Bill Taylor does today, to make sure that those countries, 12 of the countries, which came out of the former Soviet Union are getting assistance in a coordinated way from our government.

I was asked to appear on Christiane Amanpour’s CNN show a number of times, and one time she asked me, this was in November, “Why is CENTCOM, including General Franks, opposing the deployment of ISAF to Kabul.” This was not to the other urban areas. It was to Kabul.

I said, I think it is a mistake. You have just heard in the testimony division between, we have to go after the bad guys, which we do, al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the one hand, and on the other hand, on this other track, we have to assist Afghanistan to come back to the track of a normal country.

The fact of the matter is that there is a thick linkage between these two, and you are only going to succeed in the first area if you
have a functioning government, with military security, economic, political arms that work, which has the support of the people, and that is the Bonn track, and it is working. The loya jirga worked. They are going to have elections. Again, they are going to have parliamentary elections in 2004. That is the long-term answer, that is the moral domain, as my colleague stated here in his testimony.

But I think what we are seeing, what the hangup is, it is from—within the Pentagon, there is this feeling that expanding ISAF is going to interfere with going after Taliban and al-Qaeda. I think that is mistaken, and also there is a problem, and I think the Pentagon has a point here, that we have to get support of our allies to do this. But you are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman, unless the United States shows leadership, there is no chance we are going to get support of our allies.

We can do it, if we show leadership, and we should have done it, in my opinion, 2 months ago. Indeed, the three commanders squabbling among themselves around Mazar-e-Sharif, causing so much friction up there, they have requested ISAF deployment to their region, because they know that they cannot continue.

As the attacks were going on in November and December, some French and Jordanian contingents were deployed up there, working with these various groups, and their fighting stopped. Then the French and Jordanians left, and now the friction has resumed. So I just end up where I began. I think in answer to your question that the problem is coming from our uniformed services, who have performed so brilliantly and are still performing so brilliantly, I just think here it is political, and I am afraid that they are able to carry the day inside the Pentagon.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the irony is, and I do not—I mean you have been there, in terms of an administration working on this, this kind of reminds me, general, of, I was a broken record with the Clinton administration about exercising force in the Balkans. I will never forget, I came back from my first trip in 1992 having met with Milosevic, where I had the interesting conversation, when he asked what I thought of him, and I said, “I think you are a war criminal and I am going to spend the rest of my career seeing that you get tried as one.” It was a very nice conversation. I mean he looked at me like, “lots of luck in your senior year,” and that was it.

But I came back, and at least in the Oval Office convinced the President that we should lift the arms embargo, and he turned to Christopher, who did not think that was a good idea, and he said, “OK. We will do that, but we will not do it unilaterally, so Chris, head to Europe and talk them into this.”

Christopher went to Europe, he was a fine Secretary of State, and a fine man, I am a great admirer of his, and basically said, “You guys really do not want to do this, do you? We think we should lift the arms embargo, but you guys do not really want to do this, do you?”

Everybody said, “No, we do not want to do this,” and that was the end of it. He came back and reported that no one wanted to lift the arms embargo.

This reminds me of the same thing. I do not see, in my experience, where the uniformed military is objecting to expansion. I
think the civilian military is objecting to the expansion, in country, in country. I am not going to get anybody in trouble, but in country, I could name you the highest ranking military officials, and they all think we should expand ISAF. This idea of legitimate concern, of interfering with the efforts of going after al-Qaeda—the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, that is arguably true in one of the three parts of the country.

You might be able to describe this policy as sort of paraphrasing Julius Caesar, all of Afghanistan is divided into four parts. In one part, that is arguably the case, but it sure as heck is not the case over in the Iranian border. It sure in heck is not the case up in Mazar. It is not the case in other places. So I am confused here as to why, why there is this resistance, when on the ground with our military, there is not resistance.

I mean I could—again, I do not want to get people in trouble, but I spent hours, and they say, no, no, no, look, it has to be expanded, and asking the Europeans and other allies to expand, and say we are unopposed to expansion is very different than saying, “I want to make clear to you, we are not going to be any part of it. We are not going to supply any forces. We are going to stay here and concentrate on this, but we encourage you to expand.” It is sort of like Christopher’s trip to Europe. So, I still am somewhat baffled.

I am going to come back in the next round, general, to you, I want to talk to you about the Bosnia experience, and whether or not it applies in any way. But, Mr. Ambassador, I do not—I think it has to do with this overwhelming and overarching fear and concern, practically and politically, about nation building, and about us being engaged there.

Mr. TOMSEN. Could I comment just briefly?

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Mr. TOMSEN. I think the President himself has come out forcibly in underscoring that we are going to stay, for a Marshall Plan. We are in there for the long haul. What you are getting at, I think, and what I was trying to get at is this misconception that there is an internal contradiction between going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the one hand, and helping the government develop the institutions that it needs to in helping the country move back onto a free market democracy track, which it was on in the 1960s and early 1970s, that there is a contradiction here. And the answer to this is, there is not a contradiction, and that is what I mentioned on the Christiane Amanpour show, that one supports the other, and ultimately if you have a central government that is functioning with democratic institutions, it is going to help in the task of going after al-Qaeda and the Taliban. There is a misunderstanding of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was interested in your support of Senator Hyde’s Afghanistan Freedom Support Act. I will look at his bill and see what he has done. It may help satisfy the question I raised with the first panel, and that is, is there an overall plan that lays out a course of action, at least one that is coherent enough for us as lay people to read and understand? Secretary Armitage said that he would send a letter outlining these elements, and he went through a number of prerequisites. So there
may be something there, but I am not sure, and that is why I have asked the question. Now you are suggesting that this legislation, may serve a similar purpose as the Freedom Support Act did at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union. This might be helpful in laying out a strategy and a plan.

I would like to see a small book, and maybe this would be just for my own edification, in which we recite the very important history of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a sovereign state, unlike Palestine, or other states we are talking about at the current time.

Afghanistan seemingly governed itself reasonably well for much of this century before disruptions occurred. So that is encouraging as a background. Because most of us hearing all the testimony and the current events see a chaotic situation of near anarchy, of warlords at each other’s throats. There is almost denial of the central government, and you are saying that was not always the case, and that there at least is some experience in this area, and the question is how you get back to that.

Now, if we did get back to that, without knowing the history of the country, my guess is that our expectations would be greater for the people of Afghanistan. We have discussed the role of women, democracy, freedom, education, health, and so forth. It is clear we must help establish standards well beyond those that existed in the 1930s. This will require assistance, economic assistance, technical assistance, and that must be part of the plan, and an Afghanistan Freedom Support Act.

The problem with the former Soviet Freedom Support Act was that ultimately most of the pieces sort of fell off the wagon, because there was lack of support in Russia. The institutions there were so forbidding that even though we were talking about agricultural reform, they were not, and we are still discussing this in a rudimentary way today. So even here, it is not skepticism, but some sense of limitation as to how much occurs how fast. I ask this question as a preface.

Clearly, there is a debate going on in our administration on how involved we should be in Afghanistan. It started with the war, and the thought was that our role should be limited to the fewest people, helicopters, et cetera, instead we hoped to rely upon Afghans on the ground, and others. This phobia may be well-founded, in the past others had got bogged down, and we would not. So that is the way we fought it, and it was successful. It was remarkable.

Now, the problem of governance after all this is a different sort of issue. And the feeling is, still, you might get bogged down almost in the same way, caught between warlords and ethnic leaders. Many feel this is untenable, and would not be supported by the American people for very long. Therefore, you keep walking around the problem and studying it to determine how can you do this with the least number of people on the ground, maybe even money?

I am trying to come to grips with how we move beyond that. I share the chairman’s anxiety in many ways, that somehow or other the Marshall Plan idea, the President’s commitment, all these things have been enunciated in a fairly bold way. But I am still looking for the plan, and a structure of how this occurs, and some dollar amounts attached to it, with numbers of American military
forces as well as diplomatic presence in conjunction with allied contributions necessary to accomplish our goals.

Mr. TOMSEN. To answer the first part of your question, my testimony has three elements that are there in the Freedom Support Act. One is what you were getting at earlier in the hearing, a strategy, a reconstruction strategy, which is missing, an umbrella, and from democracy, to women’s rights, to infrastructure, to education, you want to see a structure and a strategy, and if you look at the material that has come with this Henry Hyde bill, it describes that strategy objective.

Second, it is a separate budget. You will have a press conference in the administration, and somebody wants to say something nice, it is going to be on Afghanistan, so it is announced that $100 million has been allocated for refugee assistance, but it has already been allocated; or say, $10 million is taken from another pot of money in the administration for announcement of this press conference. There is not the overall coherence you need which would come with something like the Freedom Support Act. Most important, and I noticed this when I was the U.S. Ambassador to Armenia for 3 years, the presence of this coordinator mechanism in the State Department, not in one of the elements of the aid community, but right there in the State Department, the last stop before the budget goes to the Hill, the final budget, was of an advantage to ambassadors, because we could talk to our staff, and I had 12 agencies at post, and put together an integrated plan, and then send it to this coordinator mechanism, Ambassador Taylor now, and then the budget would go up to the Hill.

So in the field, we were coordinated, and in Washington there was coordination, because USAID and USIA, and other elements of the aid community, had to be coordinated by this coordinator. So you need that for Afghanistan, since so many agencies and departments now are involved in Afghanistan.

Congress took the lead on the Freedom Support Act. It did not come out of the administration. You guys said, “Hey, there is a problem here,” and you resolved it, and you did. So I would argue that you should do it again.

Senator LUGAR. I applaud each of those three steps, because I think that is really the heart of the strategy, to begin with, and not improvisation with funds, and which somehow you—there is something from some other account, which we cannot possibly follow, as you say, it was already there, maybe. It would be hard for us to be bookkeepers. There just is not a discreet plan, or financing, or coordination, so I really appreciate those answers, because they are really a rifle shot, it seems to me what we ought to be about in our questioning and our oversight.

General GRANGE. Mr. Chairman, can I add a quick comment to that question?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

General GRANGE. Because I think Senator Lugar hit on two key things that I associate with from my experience in the military. One is this overarching strategy. In the military we have something called the commander’s intent, and that really sets the purpose, and what has to be done, what is the end state of any operation, and commander’s intent is something that goes to everyone
who is involved, and everyone then is supposed to understand it, to execute it properly. So I think that that is essential, a strategy, a commander's intent.

The other piece that you mentioned was the phrase “bogged down.” We are associating that with the Soviet experience when we use that phrase. But if it has to do with time, we are going to be there for some time. So the point is, why do it on the cheap? Why not do it right, and set it up as an example for the world to see that we do follow through with what we say we are going to do, and complete the mission?

Mr. TOMSEN. Could I have 20 seconds to followup on this?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you. More than 20 seconds?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Mr. TOMSEN. Thank you. The Afghans want the United States to be intrusive; they do not want thousands and thousands, say 10,000-20,000 U.S. troops with fire support, and bases like in Vietnam. I think General Franks and CENTCOM have, again, have just performed brilliantly in keeping us at the 7,000 or below level, but they want America there symbolically, and in substance.

And it does not matter how many Americans are there in an aid capacity, or, say, nonmilitary capacity. They see us as having given them the wherewithal to defeat the Soviets, which we did. They defeated the Soviets. They saw us as helping them throw off the yoke of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which our military did. So we have a very good image and reputation in Afghanistan. We should not worry too much about intrusiveness, if we stay away from deploying tens of thousands of troops there, as the general and others have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to each of you.

As you, Senator Lugar, and you, Chairman Biden, know each of these individuals, I do, and I am a friend of each, and I am an admirer of each, and not just is it a result of my narrow parochial interests that Ambassador Tomsen resides at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

I think these two witnesses have laid out the best dynamics of understanding of what is going on that I have yet heard and have yet read. I think both of you, each of you, have it right, exactly right, and I am not sure I would disagree with a sentence in any of this.

Now, with that, and I am just sorry that our two Deputy Secretaries are not here to hear this, and I am going to send them each a note today with copies of your testimony, and request that they take the time to read, which you have each written.

Senator Lugar is, I think, on track with his general question that he has just proffered, and it resembles somewhat the line of questioning that I had for Secretary Armitage. When I asked the question, what is the integrated overall policy of this administration, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which he acknowledged are interrelated, and when I developed that a bit, the Secretary did not
give me a very good answer, and I had 7 minutes, so I did not have
a chance to come back and talk more about it.

But here is the point, I am concerned with what we are doing
in Afghanistan, because I fear it is being seen and will be seen as
kind of a glancing blow strategy, not our role, not our responsibility
kind of strategy, and we heard remnants of that from both the Sec-
retaries this morning. That was not our intent when we went to
Afghanistan, be in for the cheap, get out for the cheap, and, of
course, we declare war on Iraq weekly, and threaten to invade, and
I am not sure that helps our overall focus and discipline and re-
sources.

And it is like the general knows so well, resources matter; but
what matters most is where you apply those resources and how you
use those resources. Because even America—in America, we have
finite military capabilities and assets, and the general knows that,
as well as do you, Mr. Ambassador.

The general’s comments here about the blow to American pres-
tige and honor, aside from what this would do, unravel our war
against terrorists, and our overall objective, and partly why I asked
Secretary Armitage that question about reversal of the optics. And
do you think that anything we do in that region, Afghanistan and
Pakistan is in any way interpreted by anybody else around the
world, that we may not just be, and I know this is a concern, trying
to do too much, in one sense, but at the same time, too little?

I think there is a conflict, that my sense is that Senator Lugar
was getting to a little bit, as well as Chairman Biden, there is a
bit of a schizophrenic kind of approach to all of this. I am one who
believes and have believed, believe more today than I did a few
months ago, that our commitment in Afghanistan must include ex-
actly what the two of you have laid out here, and it cannot be done
on the cheap.

There is just too much writing on this, and I would be interested
in your defining, each of you, a little bit deeper than your testi-
mony in any way that you want to take this, numbers, aid. You
mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, that you have heard and know of in
your constant relationships and contacts with people over there,
that the aid is not getting done. That cuts right to the crediblity
of our word, our commitment.

Now, we can come up and testify at all these fancy hearings, and
say, “Oh, no, we have $4.5 billion,” but, in fact, when you get on
the ground over there, do they really have $4.5 billion, and where
is it going? The unraveling process will come quickly, as each of
you know, because each of you had real-life experiences in these
kinds of things.

So I throw out to each of you, as I have made some comments
overall, but to take my thoughts, comments, questions, and proceed
in any direction you wish to go, because I do not think either one
of you overstates the concerns you have, based on not just your
own experience and knowledge, but on a perception and a perspec-
tive that few of us have.

So go ahead, Mr. Ambassador, you begin.

Mr. Tomsen. Thank you, and thanks for all your help, Senator,
at UNO, University of Nebraska, and our Center for Afghanistan
Studies, too.
I want to answer the general question about what influence this is having internationally and regionally, what we are doing in Afghanistan. I would give a positive and a negative side to that. On the positive side, if we succeed in Afghanistan, we will be creating a model of an American-led international operation, helping a Muslim population to throw off extremism, Muslim extremism, and returning to the road of democracy, and economic development, and moderate Islam.

So Afghanistan could be a model for the Muslim world, and internationally, a country that was sunk into the abyss of radical extremism, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban, but its population did not want it. Its population was moderate Islam, and we helped them get back on the track, and prosper. So that would have a ripple effect, I think.

One of the reasons why the Iranian clerics—I would not say the Foreign Minister or the President of Iran, I would say the Iranian clerics—are interfering against Hamid Karzai, because they are worried that this model might succeed.

Also, if Afghanistan, given its location, can get back on the right track, it will be a crossroads for global corridors of trade, and commerce, and telecommunication connecting Europe, and China, and Russia, and South Asia.

On the resources, doing it right, if you want to build a well, for example, or reconstruct a school, or road as our Special Forces are doing, it only cost $200 or $5,000. Not much, but we have to do it right, and we will not be spending that much at the local level. Unfortunately, the way the aid bureaucracies are organized, internationally and in our own country, is that 80 percent of the money gets sopped up by salaries for expatriates, the Americans, or U.N. types, as the case may be, trips to the region, and in the end, there is not much action on the ground, in terms of actual projects. The Armenian Prime Minister used to complain to me all the time about international aid projects in his country.

I guess I have run out of time, so I will stop there.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General GRANGE. I think that actually goes back to all the questions that have been brought up, and that is, I believe our concern is three major things. One that I will just disregard right away is: I do not think we are hung up on this aversion to have casualties like we used to be. I do not think that is really the big issue now, but I think these are the issues of maybe the hesitant nature of what is going on.

One is that getting in a fight with others, as you expand out of Kabul with a security force, no one wants to get into a fight with others while we are still fighting the Taliban and the al-Qaeda. I think that is a concern.

No. 2 is that the commitment, as this broad front with the war on terrorists, it is a broad front. It is a global commitment. And I believe, when I left the military at the end of 1999, we worked pretty hard, and we did not have the war on terrorism yet. The division I commanded, when we went those 2 years—and some of you visited our units. We were all over the map. And it is hard to say what mission could be eliminated, and what you continue on with.
But it was quite a lot of commitment, not only in time, but people, and, of course, resources, ammunition, equipment, et cetera. So there is a concern on commitment with more in Afghanistan. I think those are the two main issues of concern.

To solve that, one is that, in my mind, I would think Afghanistan was the main effort. We are not fighting Iraq right now. I mean we may be gathering intelligence and that in other places around the world, and we have other things, the Republic of Georgia, Yemen, Philippines, Colombia, et cetera, but the main effort in my mind, I would think, would be Afghanistan. And if that is your main effort, that is what you resource to accomplish the mission.

And I agree with what the ambassador said, if that is successful, I believe through the optics of others in that region with different cultures, that some of the other people we have problems with will fall in line, because it will be a model, it will be a success story, and success stories, people want to emulate.

So I really think there is something there, and if we win that, it will have a great effect on what we are trying to do globally. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Gentlemen, we have kept you a long time. I just want to make two relatively brief comments.

First, I think your experience in Bosnia showed you, general, that all the protestations by elected officials up here turned out to be wrong. From 1993, on, I heard from everyone that the American public will never sustain the allocation of forces, and the deployment of forces in the Balkans. It will not happen. I do not know anybody who ran a campaign for Congress or the Senate who won or ran on the ticket, “Bring the boys home.” I have not had anyone come up knocking on my door or out there saying, “The most important thing is get out of Bosnia, get out of Kosovo, bring the boys home.”

Second, the polling data overwhelmingly sustains the position that the American people understand that we have to keep forces in Afghanistan. The job is not done, and we have a long way to go. They are pretty smart. They have it figured out.

I think that part of the problem here is that there is a disconnect with some, both a hangup and a disconnect. Some of our—what is left of the left, and what is the furthest of the right seem to have gathered together to conclude that we are overextended, and nation building is not something we should be involved in.

I had a long meeting with the President where he outlined for me for an hour and 45 minutes what we had to do, and I was impressed. In walking out—I will not mention the official’s name, as I got from the Oval Office out into the West Wing, but we were outside and this particular official came running down the hall and said, “Are you going to stop at the stakeout?” Meaning where the press is.

I said, “Not if you do not want me to,” and they wanted me to, because it was a bipartisan effort here.

They said, “Not that we want you to, but you are not going to mention nation building, are you?”

I said, “You mean what the President has spoken to me about for the last hour and 45 minutes?” I said, “No, I won’t mention that.”
There is an incredible hangup on this notion about “nation building,” just the use of the phrase, in my experience.

Second, I really do think that there is a disconnect among some in the Congress and the administration, between our objectives with regard to Iraq and the unfinished business in Afghanistan. I have had numerous world leaders and counterparts in parliaments in Europe say, “You want to go in and take down Saddam, and you are not even going to stay in Afghanistan.”

The greatest worry I find, Mr. Ambassador, is they are worried about not whether we can take down Saddam, but what do we do after we take him down? I facetiously say, “Your old boss stopped for a simple reason. He didn’t want to stay for 5 years in Baghdad.”

So I hope we can begin to articulate this correlation between getting the job done properly in Afghanistan and our flexibility and ability to deal in other parts of the world, and what impact failure to do that might have on interest in other parts of the world, but both your testimonies have been extremely helpful.

General, you headed up Task Force Eagle in Bosnia. Do you think it is time for us to get out of the Balkans and out of Bosnia?

General Grange. No, but I would like to—I think we can do it better. I have looked back hard at peace support operations, whether they be chapter six peacekeeping, chapter seven peace enforcement, et cetera.

When I got to Bosnia, I believed we were in a reactive mode. You do not win. You do not accomplish a mission in reactive mode. You have to be proactive, and we moved to a proactive mode. But then if you are really good, you then go to the next phase, which I call interactive. And that is some of the things that I think the ambassador, and myself, and others laid out in our testimony, and that is how you integrate with the communities involved in the operation, and with the people that you are dealing with, the people of that nation.

You interact, so you really have a taste, a feel, you see what is going on, and you know what to do, and when. And we got pretty good at it at the end of our tour. But you cannot do that with a base camp mentality, giving soldiers, hamburger joints, and cappuccino stands. You have to do that by getting out, not sitting in base camps, but getting out with the society that you are dealing with.

I would do the MFO different. I would use that as an emergency deployment, readiness exercise, live-fire training, a dessert training area for the United States Army. And if Israel and Egypt did not like that, then I would pull out. I would tie the requirement into some of the things we are supposed to be ready to do for war. There is just a lot of things we can do to make these missions better, more effective for our readiness.

Any of these missions, any of these missions that I have been on—and in Bosnia I had 29 different units working for me, not counting the allies. Any of these missions, when some kid looks up at the American flag on the right sleeve of the soldier, you know you are making a difference, because a lot of people hate that flag, but I think more love it, and it makes a difference.

The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your time, your testimony, and your input. Hopefully together—we are joined together
bipartisanly here, and hopefully together with the administration we can develop or be part of implementing that agenda, that plan, but like the Senator from the great State of Indiana said, I have not seen it yet, and I am anxious to see it.

I thank you both very much, and we are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:51 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

I am pleased to be here today to consider the status of our efforts in Afghanistan. In particular, I am grateful for the opportunity this hearing provides to discuss some of the specific diplomatic and humanitarian efforts that will be necessary to build a more secure and prosperous future for the people of Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, we have witnessed nearly all of the alarming characteristics of many of the world’s weakest states. Such states attract terrorists and other international criminals who depend for their survival on manifestations of lawlessness such as piracy, illicit air transport networks, and trafficking in arms, drugs, gems, and people. The terror that accompanies these shadowy groups further weakens the integrity of the host state, while encouraging grave human rights practices on an ever larger scale. We saw this on September 11, but the suffering caused by such terrorist groups runs much deeper. Indeed, such networks fuel conflict, inhibit legitimate economic development and provide a breeding ground for increasingly dangerous terrorist activities world-wide. Afghanistan proves why such weak states must not be allowed to threaten our global order. But now, Afghanistan must also stand as a testament of the international community’s commitment to securing and rebuilding those same societies.

At the same time, no hearing on Afghanistan could overlook the rights of women and girls who have suffered so ferociously under the Taliban regime. In recent months we have watched with horror as the women of Afghanistan have emerged from their enforced seclusion to describe years of abuse. The world has witnessed few more egregious examples of institutionalized discrimination against women, although we must recognize that women in many other societies are living equally restrictive lives. Once again, our progress in promoting the re-integration of women into the public life of Afghanistan will long be viewed as a test of our global commitment to the advancement of women’s rights.

I firmly believe that a secure future in Afghanistan depends on the ability of the international community to promote human rights and democratic governance during this crucial transition period. This will not be an easy task in the aftermath of so many years of segregation, violence, and institutional collapse. But our efforts in Afghanistan will serve as a much larger measure of our commitment to building a more secure global environment. We are a strong and prosperous nation. And we must understand that our security ultimately depends on our ability to build similarly prosperous, democratic societies around the world.

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. Are there any circumstances under which the United States would be willing to consider participation in the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)? If so, what are those circumstances?

Answer. The Bonn Agreement asserted the Afghans’ responsibility for providing their own security, and established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist them. The ISAF serves in Afghanistan under authorization of UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (20 December 2001), which limits ISAF to Kabul and its surrounding areas. UN Security Council Resolution 1413 extends the same mandate under Turkish lead through December 2002.
The United States already supports ISAF in several ways, including through our position on the UN Security Council, which specifically authorizes the extension of the ISAF operating mandate, most recently through December 2002. Through a liaison cell in Kabul, the U.S. Central Command assures deconfliction of military activities. The U.S., through a bilateral Letter of Arrangement with the ISAF lead nation (currently Turkey), is committed to provide certain other kinds of backstopping support, as needed in emergencies and depending on available resources.

The U.S. is not opposed to ISAF expansion. However, other countries have not been willing thus far to provide the resources, logistical support, and personnel sufficient to support expansion outside of Kabul. We have also believed that security outside Kabul could be assisted through other means. We continue to monitor the situation.

Question. Are there any circumstances under which the United State would be willing to consider active diplomatic and military support for the expansion of ISAF? If so, what are these circumstances?

Answer. The U.S. does not oppose ISAF expansion. However, other countries have not been willing thus far to contribute the resources, logistical support, and personnel needed to support expansion of ISAF’s mandate outside of Kabul. We have also believed that security outside Kabul could be assisted through other means. We continue to monitor the situation.

ISAF operates in Afghanistan under authorization of the UN Security Council (Resolution 1386, 20 December 2001). Should the UN decide to expand the ISAF mission, the U.S. would work in the Security Council to craft a sustainable mission. Complicated issues of command and control for ISAF deployments outside of Kabul would also need to be resolved.

Question. Are U.S. forces currently tasked with the mission of upholding internal security and maintaining law and order in Afghanistan? Are there any contingency plans to task U.S. forces with this mission?

Answer. U.S. forces are not tasked with the mission to uphold security and law and order. Maintenance of security is the responsibility of the Afghans. However, small numbers of U.S. Special Operations Forces and Civil Affairs teams have on a number of occasions acted as intermediaries and exerted a constructive influence to dampen conflicts among regional leaders. These personnel are stationed around the country and interact with key regional leaders. They have proved extremely effective also at delivering humanitarian aid, getting infrastructure projects identified and started, among other tasks.

Question. Have any government officials, or U.S. military personnel, instructed Pacha Khan Zadran (and other recalcitrant warlords on the U.S. payroll) to accept the authority of the central government?

Answer. Yes. Pacha Khan Zadran has been urged by U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel on a number of occasions to accept the authority of the Afghan Transitional Authority.

Question. There are numerous reports of interference with and attacks against staff engaged in delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially in the area around Mazar-e Sharif. In the wake of the rape of an aid worker and attacks on relief vehicles, international NGOs this weekend issued a strong plea for expansion of international peacekeeping forces. What is the administration’s plan for dealing with these law-and-order failures in the near term?

Answer. The Afghans acknowledge their responsibility for providing security in Afghanistan. Law-and-order issues fall outside the DOD mission in Afghanistan. The U.S., however, is fully engaged in addressing these issues and concerns. We support the UN—in New York and through its Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)—in helping the Afghans to address these outrages.

UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi (UNAMA’s head, and in conjunction with the Afghan government, and the international community) is working with regional leaders in Afghanistan to ensure they honor commitments to facilitate provision of assistance to communities in need.

As noted, the NGO community in northern Afghanistan has confronted local leaders about security conditions, and has undertaken a local media campaign to explain the risks of decreased aid if these abuses continue.

Our Ambassador in Kabul and the Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have also expressed directly to regional leaders the U.S. government’s concern about the security situation in their areas, and have called on them to fulfill commitments to provide proper security, and to hold accountable those responsible for recent attacks.
Training and deploying Afghan military and police forces will mitigate many of these concerns.

**Question.** How long is the training and equipping of an independent Afghan national army and police force expected to take? How much money has the administration requested for these operations, and how much will be required in the coming year?

**Answer.** The Afghan National Army (ANA) training program began in May 2002. The U.S. Central Command projects that the U.S.-led effort will train over 14,000 soldiers in light infantry and border guard units in approximately 18 months (provided adequate numbers of recruits), creating the largest army in Afghanistan. In December 2003, Afghan trainers—already being prepared—will take the lead in this training program. The first ANA battalion will graduate on July 23, 2002.

The State Department supplemental appropriation request seeks $70 million for ANA training and recruits’ salaries ($50M in Foreign Military Financing and $20M in Peacekeeping Operations funds). In the DOD supplemental, we requested authority to move up to $100 million in DOD funds from other programs or operational funds into ANA training, if appropriate. Passage of DOD’s supplemental funding request will help ensure that the ANA training program can fulfill its mission of fielding a military force that can provide security in Afghanistan over the long term.

The German government has the lead for Afghan police reconstruction. Within the U.S. government, the State Department manages U.S. contributions to the police reconstruction effort and can best address this issue.

**Question.** What provisions are in place to maintain security during the interim period before an Afghan army and police are fully operational? If the administration does not support ISAF expansion, and if U.S. forces are not being used as peacekeepers, what is our strategy?

**Answer.** The Afghans acknowledge their responsibility for providing security in Afghanistan. We are working with them to build their capacity to take on this responsibility. Through the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA), border guards (included as part of the ANA training program), and police, the Afghan government will become better able to provide broader security on its own.

In those areas where trained Afghan national forces have not yet been deployed (or will not be available for some time), local commanders are using their own men and resources to provide security. That is the commitment they have made to the Afghan Transitional Authority that emerged from the June loya jirga.

The U.S. and international community are working to give Afghans the training and equipment they need to solve these problems on their own—effective military and police forces.

The U.S. is not opposed to ISAF expansion. No nation has come forward with the numbers of men and other resources necessary to support a sustained mission outside of Kabul however.

As an interim measure, the U.S. is using combined teams of Special Operations Forces, Civil Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development and State Department personnel, working with regional and local leaders, to assist in maintaining stability in the regions. On numerous occasions, these U.S. personnel, though few in number, have exerted their influence effectively to help dampen conflicts among regional leaders and to promote national unity.

**Question.** The current ethnic makeup of the Afghan army, under the control of Marshal Muhammad Fahim, is overwhelmingly skewed toward Panjshiri Tajiks. What safeguards will the United States put in place to insure that the Afghan army we are training will adequately reflect the ethnic makeup of the country?

**Answer.** The Afghan government has made the commitment to provide Afghan National Army recruits that reflect the ethnic mix of the country. This is an Afghan responsibility, but one that we support as part of our efforts to help field a credible national army. So far, the ethnic breakdown of the first two battalions trained by the U.S. Central Command has roughly corresponded to the ethnic makeup of the country.

**Question.** Throughout Afghanistan, many regional commanders allied with the United States have perpetrated abuses on the Pashtuns, who form the largest ethnic group in the country. What actions are being taken to prevent a Pashtun backlash against the United States?

**Answer.** Ultimately, ethnic harmony in Afghanistan depends on the success of the Afghan Transitional Authority, with its balance of ethnic, political, and regional forces as developed by Afghans themselves in the June loya jirga. In the meantime, the U.S. response to human rights abuses has been swift and vocal. Through our embassy in Kabul, the U.S. government has sought to promote better human rights
observance across Afghanistan. Whenever and wherever abuses have been committed, the U.S. has denounced the acts publicly, to President Karzai, and to regional or local leaders where such abuses have occurred. The U.S. also supports public awareness campaigns promoting human rights in Afghanistan, and highlighting our leading role in helping the Afghan government build a new, tolerant state where such abuses are a relic of the past.

Unfortunately, many groups harbor long-standing feuds and hatreds against one another, and some are tempted to settle old scores.

The U.S. has also supported UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi’s efforts to bring such abuses to an end across Afghanistan.

Question. What is the United States doing in response to acts of violence against women in the north and intimidation tactics against employment and education of women in the south? What has the U.S. done to address the physical intimidation of Sima Samar?

Answer. The U.S. response to human rights abuses—including abuse of women and girls across Afghanistan—has been swift and vocal. Our embassy in Kabul has been involved in efforts to promote better human rights observance across Afghanistan. Whenever and wherever abuses against women have occurred, the U.S. has denounced the acts publicly, to President Karzai directly, and to regional or local leaders where such abuses took place. We have also approached the Afghan government to improve security for women officials and international workers in Afghanistan.

In addition to policy pronouncements, the U.S. has sought to improve the material lot of women and girls in Afghanistan through practical measures. The U.S. was actively involved in promoting the establishment of a cabinet-level Ministry of Women’s Affairs in the Afghan government, as well as a Human Rights Commission. Through our aid and funding, the U.S. provides broad institutional and program support that improve the lives of Afghan women and children. The U.S. is involved in a public-private partnership activity—the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council—which focuses attention on women’s issues in Afghanistan. The U.S. also supports public awareness campaigns promoting human rights in Afghanistan, and highlighting our leading role in helping the Afghan government build a new, tolerant state where such abuses are a relic of the past.

Concurrent with our work with Afghan government officials, the U.S. has supported UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi’s efforts to bring such abuses to an end across Afghanistan. In this, Brahimi is joined by the UN Commission for Human Rights, which monitors violence in Afghanistan.

The State Department has released a report to Congress, “U.S. Support for Afghan Women, Children and Refugees,” that addresses in greater detail U.S. government efforts in this area. See <www.state.gov/g/wi>.