    [Senate Hearing 107-696]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2003

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2225

    AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
       OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
    DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
      STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                   STRATEGIC

                                   ----------

                      MARCH 7, 13, 20; APRIL 10, 11, 2002

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                            2003--Part 7  STRATEGIC

                                                     S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2003

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2225

    AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
       OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
    DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
      STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                   STRATEGIC

                                   __________

                      MARCH 7, 13, 20; APRIL 10, 11, 2002

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MAX CLELAND, Georgia                 BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico            JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
                         David S. Lyles, Staff Director
                  Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

                           Subcommittee on Strategic

                       JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 BOB SMITH, New Hampshire,
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico            JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                  Ballistic Missile Defense Program and Budget
                                 march 7, 2002

                                                                       Page

    Aldridge, Hon. E.C. ``Pete'', Under Secretary of Defense for
      Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.........................     9
    Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense
      Agency.........................................................    10

           Ballistic Missile Defense Acquisition Policy and Oversight
                                 march 13, 2002

    Aldridge, Hon. E.C. ``Pete'', Under Secretary of Defense for
      Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.........................    72
    Christie, Hon. Thomas P., Director, Operational Test and
      Evaluation, Department of Defense..............................    76
    Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense
      Agency.........................................................    78

      National Security Space Programs and Strategic Programs and Systems
                                 march 20, 2002

    Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander in Chief, United States
      Space Command..................................................   137
    Teets, Hon. Peter B., Under Secretary of the Air Force and
      Director, National Reconnaissance Office.......................   142
    Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................   165

        Department of Energy's Environmental Management Program and the
     National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Program and Other
                               Weapons Activities
                                 april 10, 2002

    Roberson, Hon. Jessie Hill, Assistant Secretary of Energy for
      Environmental Management.......................................   253
    Beckner, Everet H., Ph.D., Deputy Administrator for Defense
      Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration.............   280
    Erickson, Ralph E., Associate Administrator for Facilities and
      Operations, National Nuclear Security Administration...........   291

            Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Programs
                                 april 11, 2002

    Stenbit, Hon. John P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.............   330
    Newbold, Lt. Gen. Gregory S., USMC, Director of Operations, J3,
      the Joint Staff................................................   334
    Szemborski, Rear Adm. Stanley R., USN, Deputy Director for
      Resources and Requirements, J8, the Joint Staff................   334

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2003

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2002

                                   U.S. Senate,
                             Subcommittee on Strategic,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                  BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM AND BUDGET

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:57 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Reed, Byrd, Bill
    Nelson, Inhofe, and Allard.
        Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director.
        Professional staff members present: Kenneth M. Crosswait
    and Richard W. Fieldhouse.
        Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    minority counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member;
    and William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert and Thomas C.
    Moore.
        Committee members' assistants present: Erik Raven,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
    Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson;
    J. Mark Powers and John A. Bonsell, assistants to Senator
    Inhofe; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch
    Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; and Kristine
    Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Reed. Let me begin the hearing. Senator Allard, our
    ranking member, is on his way, and I believe others may be
    joining us, but I want to welcome General Kadish and Secretary
    Aldridge. Thank you for appearing this afternoon. I will give
    my opening statement and when Senator Allard arrives, recognize
    him for his opening statement as well as other Senators. At the
    conclusion of our statements, we would ask General Kadish and
    Secretary Aldridge to make their opening statements.
        Mr. Secretary, I am told you did not submit a statement for
    the record.
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir. I have one for next week when
    we talk about the management issues. I just have a very short
    verbal presentation.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        The Strategic Subcommittee meets this afternoon to receive
    testimony on the Department of Defense Ballistic Missile
    Defense (BMD) program and budget. Our two witnesses today are
    the Honorable E.C. Pete Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense
    for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and Lt. Gen. Ronald
    T. Kadish, Director of the newly organized Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA).
        Secretary Aldridge is in charge of all major defense
    acquisition programs for the Department, including missile
    defense programs. I want to thank him for being here today to
    help us put the missile defense budget in the context of the
    overall acquisition budget. General Kadish is, of course, well-
    known to members of this subcommittee. I welcome you here once
    more, General.
        This is the first of two scheduled hearings this
    subcommittee will have on the subject of missile defense. This
    hearing will focus on how the Defense Department plans to spend
    the $7.5 billion it has proposed for ballistic missile defense
    in fiscal year 2003, as well as how it intends to spend over
    $40 billion it has planned for fiscal years 2003 through 2007.
        The second hearing, scheduled for next week, will focus on
    the changes in oversight and acquisition policy the Department
    is implementing for ballistic missile defenses. I have
    substantial concerns with the large scope of these changes in
    oversight and policy, and I believe a number of my colleagues
    have similar concerns. However, I would urge my colleagues to
    save oversight-related questions until next week's hearing. We
    have plenty on our plate today in establishing a fair
    understanding of this large and complex missile defense budget
    proposal.
        It is, indeed, critically important to understand the
    budget that has been proposed for missile defense, and to make
    sure we are spending our money wisely and efficiently in this
    area. The theater ballistic missile threat to our deployed
    forces exists today, and it has existed for over a decade. A
    ballistic missile threat to our homeland could materialize as
    well, although the likelihood and timing of such a threat, and
    its magnitude, are subjects for debate.
        The administration has proposed spending a prodigious sum
    of money on missile defense in fiscal year 2003, as it did for
    the current fiscal year, but spending vast amounts of money
    does not guarantee anything but expensive operations of
    government contracts. Unless that money is spent wisely, this
    country will not proceed expeditiously on a course to either
    effective theater missile defenses for our troops or an
    effective national missile defense (NMD) for our homeland.
        Increases in funding do not guarantee success for programs
    as complex and difficult as missile defense, and unfortunately
    an example of this is the much-touted PAC-3 missile defense
    program. It had a string of notable test successes which led to
    the administration's proposing a $300 million increase in the
    program for fiscal year 2002, mostly to buy missiles. Congress
    enthusiastically added $82 million more to the administration's
    request, but the $382 million in additional funds did not
    prevent a PAC-3 system from missing two out of three targets
    during its last flight test on February 16.
        This is not an indictment of PAC-3, but it should awaken us
    all to the fact that funding itself does not ensure success,
    and nothing can replace realistic flight tests to determine the
    operational effectiveness of a missile defense system. That is
    why I am encouraged by the administration's new focus on
    ballistic missile defense testing.
        We must keep in mind that every billion dollars spent on
    missile defense is a billion not spent on counterterrorism
    efforts, on increased protection for our ports and borders, on
    biowarfare defenses, on vaccines for our citizen soldiers, on
    cooperative programs to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons
    and other weapons of mass destruction, on transformation of the
    Army into a more mobile, lethal, and relevant force, on our
    much-needed Navy ships, and on a host of other crucial
    programs.
        Last year, the administration's missile defense program was
    long on funding but short on details. Despite numerous hearings
    on missile defense and a very long briefing that General Kadish
    was gracious enough to provide members of this subcommittee, we
    were left with a number of important unanswered questions, such
    as: What is the administration's overall plan for missile
    defense? What does it mean to say that the administration has a
    goal of employing a ballistic missile defense system that
    layers defenses to, ``defend the U.S., deployed forces, allies,
    and friends?'' When might such a vast defensive network be
    deployed? What would it look like? How much would it cost?
        As I mentioned before, our troops overseas are facing the
    threat of hundreds of short- to medium-range theater ballistic
    missiles right now. When will effective theater defenses, such
    as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Navy Theater-
    Wide, and the Navy Area-Wide be deployed? How many such systems
    will be bought?
        As for national missile defense, why does the
    administration plan appear to be at odds with its rhetoric? In
    testimony before the full committee last year, Deputy Secretary
    of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz sounded positively alarmed about
    the prospect of imminent ballistic missile attacks from North
    Korea. He said, ``in 1998, North Korea surprised the world with
    its launch of a Taepo Dong missile over Japan with a previously
    unknown and unanticipated third stage. If we do not build
    defenses against these weapons now, hostile powers will soon
    have or may have already the ability to strike the United
    States and allied cities with a nuclear, chemical, or
    biological weapon.'' But the administration is not building
    missile defenses now.
        Under President Clinton's national missile defense plan,
    construction of an extant radar in Alaska would have been done
    this spring. The construction of this radar, coupled with
    continued flight tests and the eventual production of
    interceptor missiles, would have provided the best defense
    against North Korean missiles. Yet last year, the
    administration requested no funding for such a radar. It will
    not be built this year.
        With the huge amount of funding it received last year for
    missile defense, why didn't the administration begin to build
    the best national missile defense we know how to build? Now
    that the ABM Treaty issue is decided, for better or worse, does
    the administration intend to start building our best available
    defensive systems next year? Is it funded in the fiscal year
    2003 request? It appears that the answer to these questions is
    no.
        Other questions on national missile defense that remain
    unanswered include the following: How much might the
    administration's national missile defense plan cost? The
    Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that a layered
    national missile defense system could easily exceed $150
    billion. How effective will the administration's national
    missile defense be? How will it be tested, and how realistic
    will the tests be? Will realistic countermeasures be used, and
    will our system be able to overcome them?
        One reason the administration gave last year as to why they
    could not answer these questions was that their approach to
    missile defense was evolving, with no plan yet in place. How
    much do we want to spend just on evolution? The administration
    has now been in office for over a year, and is well into
    spending the nearly $8 billion for missile defense Congress
    provided in fiscal year 2002.
        Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, I hope you will
    provide better and more complete answers to these types of
    questions this year than we were provided last year.
        I should add that our staff will coordinate closely with
    the Senate Appropriations Committee staff this year, as we did
    last year, so the answers you provide to our questions will
    also help the appropriators do their job. I would note not only
    the presence of my colleague, the ranking member, Mr. Allard,
    but also the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
    Senator Byrd.
        I strongly support rapid deployment of theater ballistic
    missile defenses for our troops as soon as we can prove these
    defenses will work. I also continue to support research and
    development of a national missile defense for our homeland, but
    I also want that system to be proven to work before we deploy
    it.
        Finally, I believe ballistic missile defense funding should
    be balanced with other pressing national security needs. The
    events of September 11 have changed attitudes on our security
    and missile defense. The American people, both Service members
    and citizens, want and deserve protection from the most likely
    and dangerous potential threats. It is up to both the
    administration and Congress to be smart about how to best
    protect them.
        Now, before we turn to our witnesses, let me recognize the
    ranking member, my colleague, Senator Allard, and then Senator
    Byrd.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
    our witnesses today. Secretary Aldridge, it is a pleasure to
    have you here today, and General Kadish, it is good to see you
    again. We appreciate your willingness to take time out of your
    busy schedules and your efforts to assure that all Americans
    are protected from weapons against which we do not yet have an
    effective defense, ballistic missiles.
        How, and even whether, we should develop and deploy such
    defenses has been a matter of serious controversy for nearly 20
    years. In many ways, the debate on missile defense represents a
    fundamental difference in approach to national security. One
    relied on arms control and special bilateral arms control
    agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States as
    the central aspect of our defense. From this perspective, the
    ABM Treaty was consistently described as ``the cornerstone of
    strategic stability.''
        The other view is that the United States needs to provide
    for its own defense and cannot afford to rely exclusively on
    agreements with adversaries to limit the threats it has to
    face. From this perspective, arms control agreements such as
    the ABM Treaty are less significant, and the development of
    military capabilities needed to meet threats, including the
    ballistic missile threat, is paramount.
        I believe that the end of the Cold War has strengthened the
    argument that bilateral arms control with the Soviet Union no
    longer addresses our central security concerns. Ballistic
    missiles and weapons of mass destruction have proliferated,
    posing significant and increasing threats to the United States,
    its allies, friends, and deployed troops. An arms control
    agreement that prevented the development of effective defenses
    seems to me to be increasingly out of touch with our security
    needs. It was in this context that President Bush last December
    13 made the courageous decision to withdraw from the ABM
    Treaty.
        Some will no doubt continue to believe that this decision
    was mistaken, but the decision has been made. Russia and our
    allies have accepted the decision, and predictions of Russian
    withdrawal from other arms control agreements and an
    unconstrained arms race appear to have been inaccurate, and the
    means and the nature of the BMD debate have changed.
        This is not a philosophical argument any more. The passions
    generated by a commitment, well-meaning and honestly held, to
    an arms control framework at the center of which stood the ABM
    Treaty must be replaced by rational consideration of how to
    achieve effective ballistic missile defense capabilities as
    efficiently and promptly as possible.
        I fear, however, that the emotion of the past debates
    continues to play a large role in the shaping of the
    subcommittee agenda. The chairman has decided that we will have
    two hearings on the Missile Defense Agency and its budget of
    about $6.7 billion.
        As important as the ballistic missile defense program is, I
    must note that the subcommittee's jurisdiction is broad, and
    includes many difficult issues that we need to address, some of
    which we will now in all likelihood give insufficient
    attention. Indeed, I had hoped for a separate hearing on space
    programs and management, since a number of space programs have
    run into technical, schedule, and cost challenges, and the
    management and oversight processes for space programs are going
    through a period of substantial reform. Instead, all space and
    strategic programs, with a combined budget of about $40
    billion, will be covered in one hearing.
        I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that we have reached an
    agreement to schedule time to deal with issues related to the
    Department of Energy environmental management (EM) programs.
    The EM budget request for fiscal year 2003 is $6.7 billion,
    almost exactly the same as MDA's request, and includes a major
    reform initiative that promises to speed the cleanup of former
    nuclear weapons facilities by decades. This initiative is
    important not only to the Department of Energy but to all
    Americans who live near these sites, and it deserves our
    attention.
        I look forward to working closely with you to find a time
    convenient not only to you and me but all our interested
    subcommittee members, Mr. Chairman. While I am still not
    satisfied that the subcommittee is pursuing a more balanced
    approach to the broad and complicated issues over which we
    exercise our authority, I respect the majority's right to have
    the hearings they want to have. I do not question in any way
    their motives, and I understand that they have serious concerns
    about the missile defense program.
        Thus, we will hear over the next two subcommittee hearings
    many criticisms from some of our colleagues about the priority
    accorded to missile defense, the efficacy of missile defense
    programs, and the approach taken to the development of missile
    defense capabilities. I believe that most of these criticisms
    are baseless. For example, critics of missile defense often
    maintain that ballistic missiles pose the least likely threat
    that the Nation must face. This is simply false. Ballistic
    missiles pose the most likely threat we must face. Indeed, we
    face it today.
        Missiles and weapons of mass destruction are meant to
    deter. I know my colleagues on the other side of the aisle
    believe this. They have often argued that our own nuclear force
    levels are too high, and that effective deterrence does not
    require that many nuclear weapons. According to the latest
    national intelligence estimate (NIE), our Nation faces a likely
    ICBM threat from Iran and North Korea, and a possible threat
    from Iraq. Dozens of nations have short- and medium-range
    ballistic missiles already in the field that threaten U.S.
    interests, military forces, and allies.
        The clear trend in ballistic missile technology is toward
    longer range and greater sophistication. Once deployed, these
    missiles threaten the United States, its allies and friends,
    and its deployed troops. No one has to fire them to be
    effective. I want to repeat that. No one has to fire them to be
    effective. They are effective by their mere presence.
        The NIE does conclude that other forms of attack are more
    likely than missile attack, but it also concludes that nations
    hostile to U.S. interests are developing these capabilities
    precisely to deter the United States, and that the likelihood
    that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction would be used
    against U.S. forces or interests is higher today than during
    most of the Cold War, and will continue to grow as the
    capabilities of potential adversaries mature.
        The NIE simply reinforces the conclusion presented by our
    committee chairman last May when he said, ``the question is not
    whether there is or will be a threat to the United States from
    ballistic missiles. There is, or probably will be soon, from
    North Korea.'' Still, some critics may continue to argue that
    such nations would never dare attack, knowing that our vastly
    superior forces could destroy them. Again, I disagree. We
    already know that our adversaries believe that we can be
    deterred from pursuing our interests.
        A week ago, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities
    Subcommittee received some remarkable testimony from Mr.
    Charles Duelfer. In his capacity as the Deputy Executive
    Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, known as
    UNSCOM, he had the opportunity to interview senior Iraqi
    ministers on Saddam Hussein's perceptions of the Persian Gulf
    War.
        Now, many of us are aware the United States threatened Iraq
    with extraordinary, regime-ending consequences should that
    nation use chemical or biological weapons against coalition
    forces during the conflict. The use of this threat has been
    seen as triumph of deterrence, but according to Mr. Duelfer,
    Iraq loaded chemical and biological warheads on ballistic
    missiles, and authority to launch those missiles was delegated
    to local commanders with no further intervention or control by
    higher Iraqi authorities, with orders to launch if the U.S.
    moved to Baghdad, and we never attacked Baghdad. The Iraqi
    regime survived, and survives to this day, and they would
    attribute that survival to the deterrent effect of missiles and
    weapons of mass destruction.
        The argument that missiles pose the least likely threat, or
    that we can deter all of our adversaries, is a precursor to the
    contention that Missile Defense Agency funding could better be
    spent on other defense programs. This, too, I think is
    incorrect. How should we compare it? We have only very limited
    capability to defend against ballistic missiles, and the
    current BMD program is attempting something that we have never
    done before: an effective missile defense system that
    integrates the capabilities of dozens of projects.
        We propose to spend $6.7 billion this year to do this, less
    than requested last year by about $300 million. We have
    substantial legacy capabilities in every other mission area,
    yet the budget request proposed to spend over $35 billion to
    counter the terrorist threat. We will spend $11.3 billion on
    three tactical aircraft programs in 2003, and probably about
    $350 billion over the lifetime of these programs. We will spend
    about $20 billion on space programs in 2003.
        I do not argue that funding other systems is unjustified.
    Indeed, I support robust programs in all of these areas. I
    argue that spending on missile defense is not out of line,
    given the magnitude of the challenge and the severity of the
    threat. I confess that the logic of the argument that we are
    short of ships and airplanes so we do not need missile defense
    escapes me.
        Again, to quote our committee chairman, Senator Levin,
    speaking specifically about our national missile defense
    system, ``I do not believe that cost will be a major
    impediment,'' but that raises another point of the critics that
    we may hear today, that the focus within the missile defense
    program is wrong. Thus, we need to spend less on national
    missile defense and focus more on theater missile defense that
    would protect our allies, friends, and deployed troops.
        Of course, last year, our colleagues sought to cut $1.3
    billion from missile defense, about half of which could be
    reasonably defined as theater missile defense, but
    fundamentally we have to recognize that there is no clear
    dividing line between national missile defense and theater
    missile defense. A system like THAAD, the theater system for
    the United States, might be the German national missile
    defense, or perhaps THAAD will contribute to the U.S. national
    missile defense mission by protecting U.S. territories, or if
    the system is upgraded, protecting the U.S. from long-range
    missiles.
        What we used to call the ground-based national missile
    defense system could, depending on where it could be based,
    defend Northern Europe from intermediate-range missile threats
    from the Middle East. Some boost-phase systems could shoot down
    missiles at any range. The whole notion behind the proposed
    ballistic missile defense program is to develop a single
    integrated missile defense system that can deal with threats of
    all ranges, and an architecture that is determined by threat
    assessments and technical maturity, and we need to move beyond
    terms that have largely lost their meaning.
        There is no doubt that we will hear from many members
    concerns about specific programs. No doubt the missile defense
    program will have its share of failures, as well as successes.
    I would remind my colleagues that very few programs are
    strengthened by deep funding reductions. While the challenge of
    producing effective missile defense is daunting, I would also
    remind my colleagues of the statement by our committee
    chairman, ``do I believe we can achieve an operationally
    effective national missile defense system?'' and his answer
    was, ``I do.''
        Finally, I understand that the chairman's intent is to
    focus this week's hearing on Missile Defense Agency budget and
    programs, and next week's hearing on MDA organization and
    management processes. Mr. Chairman, I will try to abide by your
    desires. Nevertheless, as MDA management processes are
    reflected in its programmatic request, we will quite possibly
    hear criticisms of these processes today as well. I am afraid
    these criticisms will devolve into a fundamental disagreement
    that some of our friends on the other side of the aisle may
    have with the direction of the entire Department of Defense.
        The Department is embracing capabilities-based spiral
    development as a means of putting militarily useful capability
    into the hands of the warfighter faster than we have in the
    past. This is an approach based on commercial best practices,
    and it is endorsed by GAO in studies solicited by this
    committee.
        My colleagues who take issue with capabilities-based spiral
    development may find themselves in the awkward position of
    endorsing the old Pentagon acquisition system, complete with a
    rigid, demanding requirements process that leads to concurrent
    development of systems and technology, high technical risk,
    schedule delays, cost increases, and weapons-systems cycle
    times measured in decades--a system that for years this
    committee has sought to improve.
        The capabilities-based spiral development approach, as I
    understand it, is intended to be an incremental, disciplined,
    and realistic approach to the development and deployment of
    weapons systems. As it pertains to the Missile Defense Agency,
    the process is not devoid of oversight by the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, and will not deny Congress insight into
    missile defense project activity, but these are not issues
    unique to the missile defense program.
        I am grateful that we have Secretary Aldridge with us
    today, and next week as well, to deal with these Department of
    Defense acquisition issues. I know I have taken more time than
    usual for my statement, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the
    members of the subcommittee for their patience. Again, welcome
    to the witnesses, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        As Senator Allard indicated, we are trying to concentrate
    in this hearing on the budget applications and in the next
    hearing on management. With that, Senator Byrd, do you have a
    statement?
        Senator Byrd. I do not have a statement, Mr. Chairman. I
    have some questions. Shall I wait?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have a 25-minute
    opening statement. [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Senator Nelson, forgive me. Go ahead.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the nature of
    Senator Byrd's questions, but I wonder if maybe we should not
    hear the testimony from the witnesses first.
        Senator Reed. I understand that. I thought the Senator
    might have questions that he would make in lieu of the
    statements. Obviously, we will wait until after the statements.
        General Kadish, your testimony, or Secretary Aldridge. Who
    prefers to go first?

     STATEMENT OF HON. E.C. ``PETE'' ALDRIDGE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
           DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

        Secretary Aldridge. Mr. Chairman, I will go first if you do
    not mind.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Allard, members of the
    subcommittee, Senator Byrd, Senator Nelson, it is an honor to
    have the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to
    discuss the President's fiscal year 2003 defense budget request
    as it pertains to ballistic missile defense. I am most
    fortunate to be here today with Lieutenant General Kadish,
    Director of the Missile Defense Agency and, consistent with his
    newly defined authority, I will defer questions on program and
    budget to him. I have read his written testimony and fully
    endorse it.
        Because the hearing on acquisition policy and oversight
    will be held next week, I will be pleased to provide written
    testimony on those topics at that time. I have a very short
    opening oral statement today, sir.
        Last year, the President announced our intention to
    withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. He
    observed the self-evident fact that our greatest threats no
    longer come from Russia but from terrorists who strike without
    warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.
    He also said that these new enemies actively seek the ability
    to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via a missile.
        The four priorities of our missile defense program speak to
    these dangers. They are: (1) to defend the United States,
    deployed forces, allies, and friends from ballistic missile
    attack; (2) to employ a ballistic missile system that layers
    defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of their flight,
    i.e., boost, midcourse, and terminal, and against all ranges of
    threats; (3) to enable the military departments to field
    elements of the other ballistic missile defense systems as soon
    as practicable; and (4) to develop and test technologies, use
    prototypes, and test assets to provide early capability, if
    necessary, and improve the effectiveness of deployed capability
    by inserting new technologies as they become available, or when
    the threat warrants an accelerated capability.
        These objectives are challenging, but by no means
    impossible. We have experienced significant and meaningful
    successes in hit-to-kill technologies, the latest generation
    Patriot missile, and the Airborne Laser (ABL) program. We have
    also had some problems, as should be expected in any effort to
    develop new kinds of technology to counter new kinds of
    threats.
        As for my role as the defense acquisition executive, let me
    just say that the starting point for further testing and
    implementation successes is this fiscal year 2003 budget. I
    have every confidence that it will advance our efforts as we
    work to solve these technical challenges and to mitigate these
    very real threats.
        I would like to turn the floor over to General Kadish, and
    if you desire, we can respond to questions after his testimony.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        General Kadish.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Kadish. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here
    today to explain our fiscal year 2003 missile defense budget.
    To allow more time for questions, I would like my prepared
    statement entered into the record. We have made considerable
    progress in our programs since I last testified, and we spent
    the past year testing key technologies and their integration,
    and restructuring our program to better address the challenges
    we face.
        Since I will be here next week to address some of the
    changes in our restructured program, I will confine my remarks
    this afternoon to testing. I would like to provide a quick
    video report card, as awkward as it is in this forum, on the
    moneys that were spent last year and this fiscal year on our
    test results. I would also like to discuss the objectives of
    the missile defense program. Those objectives that Secretary
    Aldridge has outlined have not changed.
        Our goal is to develop a single integrated ballistic
    missile defense system to defend the populations and forces of
    the United States, its allies, and friends against all types
    and ranges of missiles. Based on the results of last year's
    missile defense review, the Department has moved away from an
    independently managed element-centric approach and established
    a single program to develop an integrated system.
        This system will consist of elements configured in layered
    defenses for integrated and autonomous operations and mutual
    support. This will give us multiple engagement opportunities,
    along the threat missile's flight path in boost, midcourse, and
    terminal phases. Our testing program is currently focused on
    individual elements, their performance within the proposed BMD
    System, and their testing is certainly gaining momentum. We
    conduct many kinds and levels of tests during the development
    of this technology, including models and simulations, ground
    testing, risk reduction flights, intercept flights, and system-
    wide tests and exercises. We have done almost a test a month
    since I was here last summer, and we expect to stay at least on
    that pace this year, testing in a very aggressive way.
        Now, with your indulgence, I would like to show a
    relatively short film, a little over 8 minutes long on our test
    results last year.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Copy retained in committee files.]

        It will include some ground testing of the Airborne Laser,
    as well as some flight testing of all the different activities
    that we have. It will also show some of our failures this past
    year.
        What you will see here in the beginning is a description of
    the types of threat missiles we face, and the time span is from
    January 2001 through January 2002. You can see the layered
    defenses and the way the threat missiles are constructed. I
    would like to just point out right now you have boost phase,
    when it is boosting, midcourse, when it is coasting to the
    target, and terminal, when it is actually attacking the target,
    and you get long-range, medium-range, and short-range threats.
    No one system as we currently understand it can attack in each
    one of those phases.
        The first test is a ground test of the Airborne Laser,
    which is in the boost phase of the attack, and we had something
    called first light, and what you are going to see here is not
    very spectacular, but it is to an engineer. It is the actual
    heating up of the surfaces of the different lenses of the
    laser, and we got significant performance out of that laser the
    first time we lit it up, so that is on track.
        We had a Patriot test, and this was very complex. We shot
    two Patriot 3s and one Patriot 2 at incoming missiles, and you
    can see the Patriots, both the 3 and 2, actually doing the
    intercepts.
        Now, we have had some failures in Patriot, as was noted in
    your opening remarks, Senator Reed, but I believe that those
    are at the edge of the envelope, and we will be able to
    structure those tests in the future to be effective.
        I also include Arrow here, because we spent a considerable
    amount of investment in the Arrow system, and we did a test of
    the Arrow, which is a system in the terminal phase against
    shorter-range missiles. The target was launched from an F-15
    off the coast of Israel, and you will see the Arrow rising to
    the intercept point.
        This is a blast fragmentation warhead, but is almost
    accurate enough to be hit-to-kill. The crosshairs are on the
    Arrow interceptor rising to meet the target, and you can see
    the target there, and it was destroyed, so the investment in
    Arrow was and continues to be fairly effective.
        Now I would like to talk about a non-intercept test against
    long-range missiles in the midcourse, where we are developing
    the booster to actually boost to kill vehicles. We have done
    two tests of this technology, one last August and one in
    December. This is the August test, and this is basically the
    booster, the rocket stack, if you will. It was successful. We
    did not have any intercept tied to it, but that encouraged us.
        As you might recall, we were behind in this development,
    and this test was pretty effective. However, in December of
    this past year we did another test just of the booster without
    an interceptor attached to increase our confidence, and to our
    chagrin we were not successful in this test. I would like to
    show you what an unsuccessful booster test looks like.
        This is about 13 seconds into flight. As you can see, it
    will self-destruct, basically, in the process, and then tumble
    to Earth. We believe we know what caused that. That is why we
    do testing, and we will fix it in the process.
        Now I would like to talk about the two ground-based tests
    we have done. They are identical. We are three-for-five in
    these types of tests. The last two were successful. This was
    the one done in July last year. You can see the interceptor
    rising to meet the target that was launched from Vandenberg Air
    Force Base, about 4,800 miles away, and the intercept occurred
    about 140 miles into space, and this is a view that we have not
    shown you before of the actual interceptor video as it came in
    and hit the target.
        This is another view from a different sensor, and the radar
    track on the right confirmed the actual intercept.
        The test we did after that was in December. We are starting
    to build a track record on this. It was identical to the one we
    did in July to confirm our confidence in the hit-to-kill
    technology. I will note that we have the next one scheduled for
    March 15 of this year and right now we are just a few days away
    from that intercept test.
        Again, the target launched from Vandenberg and the
    interceptor from the South Pacific, and it rose to meet the
    target, and you can see the things the seeker saw. This is the
    way it approached the actual target at 7\1/2\ kilometers per
    second. That is the last thing you saw before it hit, and we
    confirmed the actual intercept through other sensors, and you
    can see that here.
        Now, I am pleased to show the first sea-based intercept by
    a standard missile. This is in the midcourse against medium or
    intermediate-range missiles. It is done from an Aegis cruiser.
    We did this test twice, once last year, and we did not have an
    intercept attempt, it basically flew by the target to gather
    data, and that is what this shows right here. This is a fly-by.
    We were going to do it again this January, a year later, but we
    were able to get the missile in such a position that it
    actually intercepted the missile that you will see here in a
    minute, although that was not the primary objective of the
    test.
        The target was launched out of Kawai in the Hawaiian
    Islands, an intermediate-range target. The Aegis cruiser with a
    standard missile was about 450 kilometers away. You can see the
    launch of the standard missile to rise and meet that missile in
    outer space, a very exciting launch from that standpoint. This
    is what the kill vehicle actually saw as it was coming in for
    the intercept, so you can see how accurate we are getting in
    the overall approach that we are using.
        So that video report card shows how we have been spending
    the money Congress has allocated to us over the past year to
    year-and-a-half, and you can see, our tests were some obvious
    successes and some failures, but from a testing point of view
    we learn a lot from our failures as well.
        Both the pace and complexity of our testing are going to
    pick up, and we will have 12 more flight tests scheduled for
    the remainder of this fiscal year, together with 14 ground
    tests and 13 system-wide tests.
        Now, just a brief word about the budget. As you pointed
    out, the fiscal year 2003 budget is substantial, but it
    continues in the same range as last year to provide us the
    stability we need in this aggressive development program, and
    in so doing it supports our program objectives. We have asked
    for a total of $6.7 billion for fiscal year 2003, which is
    slightly less than last year. This amount reflects the decision
    by the Department to transfer to the Army all the funding for
    fiscal years 2003 to 2007 for Patriot 3 and the other program
    called MEADS.
        We plan to continue PAC-3 operational testing in our
    development of THAAD and ground and sea-based midcourse defense
    as well as the Airborne Laser. I expect that experimental work,
    especially in the area of boost-phase defense, will continue
    aggressively, and our 2003 funding will help us reach our goal
    for initial test bed capability for the ground-based system by
    calendar year 2004.
        In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my
    remarks. The details of our program have been provided to you
    and the rest of the members and staff. Over the past year, we
    have made some significant strides in our development, as some
    of our major test events have shown, yet we also have some
    significant challenges ahead to ensure our missile defenses
    will become effective as soon as possible, and will remain so
    throughout their life. With your continued support and that of
    the American people, I have every confidence we can do it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF

        Good morning. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
    present the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2003 missile defense
    program and budget.
        The Department of Defense is developing effective missile defenses
    for the territories and deployed forces of the United States, allies,
    and friends. Ballistic missiles already pose a threat to the United
    States and to U.S. interests, forces, allies, and friends. The missiles
    possessed by potential adversaries are growing in range, reliability,
    and accuracy. The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies,
    materials, and expertise can also occur in unexpected ways, enabling
    potential adversaries to accelerate missile development or quickly
    acquire new capabilities. Missiles carrying nuclear, biological, or
    chemical weapons could inflict damage that far surpasses what we
    experienced last September 11. The events of that day underscored the
    vulnerability of our homeland, even to assault from distant regions.
        Defensive capabilities to counter this threat cannot be deployed
    overnight. We also recognize that the threat is continually changing.
    So we are taking an approach to build missile defenses that will allow
    us to put capabilities ``in play'' as soon as practicable to provide
    the best defenses possible against the projected threat, based on
    technological progress and success in testing. After nearly a decade of
    steady developmental progress, we are deploying the first Patriot
    Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3, missiles to give our forces protection
    against short-range threats. In the coming years we plan to introduce
    new capabilities to defeat medium- and even longer-range ballistic
    missiles.
        Over the past year, we have made considerable progress in
    demonstrating key missile defense technologies and integration
    concepts. This past January we took a significant step forward and
    broke new ground with the successful midcourse intercept of a medium-
    range ballistic missile target using a sea-based interceptor. Following
    successful intercepts of long-range targets in July and December of
    last year, we gained further confidence in our Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) design and capability. With the Airborne Laser, or ABL,
    we are making steady progress in the development of directed energy
    technologies by achieving record power levels in the last two tests and
    successfully completing the final lasing test for Laser Module-1.
        Some of our tests showed we need more work to achieve our design
    objectives. The third test late last year of the boost vehicle under
    development for the GMD element failed to launch as planned. Because a
    faster ground-based interceptor will increase significantly our
    engagement envelope, we are focusing intently to resolve the associated
    development problems. Recently, PAC-3 began a series of operational
    tests. In mid-February, PAC-3 teamed up with PAC-2 in a multiple
    simultaneous engagement test to intercept three air-breathing targets,
    but intercepted just one. Despite some setbacks, we continue to make
    remarkable strides, Mr. Chairman, and we grow increasingly confident in
    our ability to deliver effective missile defense capabilities over the
    next few years. Yet, we should all recognize that there remains a long
    road ahead.

                          APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

        The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will develop incrementally a
    Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System that layers defenses to
    intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight--
    boost, midcourse, and terminal.\1\ These increments will be transferred
    to the Services for production and deployment as soon as practicable.
    We are working with the warfighters, the CINCs, and the Services
    throughout this process.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ On January 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense established the
    Missile Defense Agency to manage the development of effective missile
    defenses.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Based on the results of last year's rigorous missile defense
    review, the Department has moved away from an independently managed,
    element-centric approach and established a single program to develop an
    integrated BMD System. The BMD System will consist of elements
    configured into layered defenses to provide autonomous and mutual
    support, including multiple engagement opportunities, along a threat
    missile's flight path. The missile defense program supports numerous
    risk reduction activities, including flight tests, ground simulations,
    and hardware-in-the-loop demonstrations.
        Engineering complexities and operational realities associated with
    missile defense require operational and system integration as well as
    an ability to operate elements autonomously. Therefore, a key tenet of
    the missile defense program is robust, realistic testing within the BMD
    System Test Bed. This Test Bed is an integrated set of components that
    are widely dispersed among operationally realistic locations primarily
    throughout the Pacific and continental United States. While its
    specific components have independent utility, the Test Bed is designed
    to support development of missile defense elements and demonstrate an
    integrated, layered missile defense system. We will use the Test Bed
    over the next few years to validate the midcourse, boost, and terminal
    elements, including supporting sensors, and the necessary BM/C\2\ and
    communications components. This Test Bed was most recently used to test
    the Standard Missile-3 interceptor for Sea-based Midcourse Defense
    (SMD) and in fiscal year 2002 it will host additional GMD and SMD
    intercept flight tests and a major System Integration Test.
        The BMD System Test Bed includes prototypes and surrogates of the
    System elements as well as supporting test infrastructure to provide
    trajectory, sensing, interception, and BM/C\2\ and communication
    scenarios that resemble conditions under which the system might be
    expected to operate. It will enable testing against faster, longer-
    range target missiles than we are using today, and it will allow us to
    test using different geometric, operational, and element
    configurations.
        As they become available, we could use prototypes and test assets
    to provide early capability, if so directed. A decision to employ test
    assets would depend upon the success of testing, the appropriate
    positioning of Test Bed components, the availability of test
    interceptors and other assets, and the international security
    environment. Our test infrastructure, in other words, will have an
    inherent, though rudimentary, operational capability.
        Our program is now entering a new phase, moving from technology
    development to system engineering, and we face a very significant
    challenge of integrating many diverse elements into one system. We
    employ thousands of individuals throughout the United States. We are
    also collaborating extensively with all of the Military Departments and
    the Joint Staff as we investigate different basing modes and deal with
    associated operational and planning challenges. Our approach to
    managing resources is clearly an important element of our approach to
    missile defense. This committee's support for the President's Freedom
    to Manage Initiative will reduce statutory requirements that can
    restrict management flexibility, allowing us to more efficiently and
    effectively execute the Missile Defense program.

                              ACQUISITION STRATEGY

        The BMD System is highly complex, so we are using an acquisition
    approach that capitalizes on advances in missile defense technology and
    continually adjusts to changes in external factors (e.g., threat,
    policy, and priorities) as appropriate. We are following an aggressive
    research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) acquisition
    strategy that allows us to respond to changes in the threat, manages
    changes in system technologies, and ensures progress in development and
    testing.
        The BMD System architecture will take shape based on periodic
    decisions and assessments within the MDA and the Department's Senior
    Executive Council (SEC). Annual assessments will include evaluations of
    element test performance, system architecture, technological and basing
    alternatives, and the threat. The initial goal is to provide limited
    protection against long-range threats for the United States and
    potentially our allies within the 2004-2008 timeframe, while delivering
    more advanced capabilities against shorter-range threats.
        The traditional requirements process has not worked well for
    missile defense. Missile defense is a cutting-edge development effort
    and an area where we have very little operational experience. The
    requirements definition process typically leverages operational
    experience to set system specifications many years before actual
    deployment, a process that can lead to a less than optimum deployed
    capability that does not take advantage of the most advanced
    technologies.
        Let me illustrate what I mean. The B-52 bomber that first flew in
    1952 is hardly the same aircraft that dropped bombs over Afghanistan in
    the war against terrorism. The original B-52 design, which gave us an
    early intercontinental bombardment capability, was enhanced over time
    through hardware and software improvements to meet evolving operational
    challenges. It may look the same, but today's B-52 is a very different
    aircraft.
        Similarly, we enhanced over many years the Patriot batteries we saw
    in the 1991 Gulf War. Although its capability to defend small areas was
    improved during Operation Desert Shield, performance against Iraqi
    Scuds was not impressive. As a result, the Department initiated a
    follow-on enhancement program and replaced the original missile with a
    completely new interceptor.
        These examples illustrate that in today's dynamic security
    environment, a requirement written in a system's development phase can
    quickly become irrelevant or a one-way street that leads developers
    into a technological cul-de-sac. Five years ago, nobody could have
    written a requirement for today's Internet and gotten it exactly right.
        We, therefore, have modified our acquisition approach. In line with
    the Secretary's decision to cancel the current Operational Requirements
    Documents (ORDs) related to missile defense, we are using the ORDs as
    reference documents, but not as the final measures of development
    progress. Instead of developing a system in response to a clearly
    defined threat from a known adversary, we are looking at missile
    capabilities that any adversary could have in a given timeframe. We
    also continually assess missile defense technology options and
    availability. Using a capability-based approach to ensure that a
    militarily useful BMD System can be deployed as soon as practicable, we
    are setting initial capability standards and engaging the CINCs,
    Services, and industry. This acquisition approach supports the
    effective engineering and integration of the BMD System and ensures a
    transition of effective, threat-relevant system capabilities to the
    Services for production, deployment, and operations.
        While we are moving away from some of the rigidities associated
    with the traditional acquisition process, we are not abandoning
    discipline in development. Capability-based acquisition requires
    continual assessment of technical and operational alternatives at the
    element and BMD System levels. We will build what we can
    technologically, and improve it as rapidly as possible. Configuration
    management and risk management will continue to guide the engineering
    processes.
        In a capability-based approach that pursues parallel development
    paths, a risk management program is essential. To execute BMDS level
    risk management, we are identifying risk issues and an analytical basis
    for modifications and enhancements. This disciplined risk management
    process supports the annual review and assessment of the BMD System and
    accommodates significant user participation at the appropriate times
    during development.
        The missile defense acquisition strategy engineers and tests the
    system using a 2-year capability ``block'' approach, with the initial
    introduction of elements into the expanded Test Bed starting as early
    as fiscal year 2004. The initial BMD System capability (Block 2004)
    will evolve as technologies mature and are demonstrated satisfactorily
    in the BMD System Test Bed. This capability will be increased
    incrementally in future blocks through the introduction of new sensor
    and weapon components, and by augmenting or upgrading existing
    capabilities.
        Each BMD System Block is comprised of selected element
    configurations integrated into the overall System BM/C\2\. There will
    be annual decision points at which time assessments will be made on the
    basis of: effectiveness and synergy within the system; technical risk;
    deployment schedule; cost; and threat. This assessment of progress will
    determine whether a given developmental activity will be accelerated,
    modified, or terminated. Implementing changes expeditiously and
    prudently maximizes value from our investments and allow more rapid
    program adjustments based on threat projections and technological
    progress.
        Each subsequent block will build on and be integrated into the
    capabilities provided by predecessor blocks that make up the BMD
    System. This evolutionary strategy allows us to put the high
    performance technologies ``in play'' sooner than would otherwise be
    possible. Once they have been demonstrated, elements or their
    components will be available for emergency use, if directed, or for
    transfer to the Military Departments for production as part of a
    standard acquisition program.

                              PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

        Our approach to developing missile defenses builds on the
    technological, engineering, and integration progress we have made to
    date. We are currently pursuing parallel development efforts in order
    to reduce risk in the individual RDT&E efforts and aggressively
    demonstrating technologies for integration on land, sea, air, and
    space-based elements. When a capability is sufficiently validated, that
    element or component will be ready for a decision regarding transition
    to production.
        We are also exploring new concepts and experiments for the
    development of advanced sensor suites and kinetic and directed energy
    kill mechanisms for potential sea, ground, air, and space deployment.
    In line with our disciplined walk-before-you-run, learn-as-you-go
    approach to testing, we are incorporating more realistic scenarios and
    countermeasures into the missile defense development test program. The
    Test Bed will be expanded to accommodate this aggressive and robust
    testing approach.

        The Missile Defense Program allocates resources required for the
    BMD System, including the integration of individual elements into a
    single, synergistic system to defend the territories and deployed
    forces of the United States, allies, and friends. The BMD System
    segment comprises System Engineering and Integration (SE&I), BM/C\2\,
    communications, targets and countermeasures, test and evaluation,
    producibility and manufacturing technology, and program operations
    (which includes Management Headquarters and the Pentagon Reservation).
    Funding in this segment provides resources to define, select, test,
    integrate, and demonstrate the elements in the Terminal Defense,
    Midcourse Defense, Boost Defense, and Sensor segments. The tasks
    included in this segment are those that will benefit the entire BMD
    System, not just a particular element or program. This segment also
    includes management efforts to ensure architectural consistency and
    integration of missile defense elements within the overarching missile
    defense mission.
        The President's budget requests $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2003
    for RDT&E in the BMD Segment, an increase of $255 million over the
    fiscal year 2002 enacted funding level. RDT&E and military construction
    funding in this segment across the fiscal years 2003-2007 FYDP is about
    $6.0 billion.

        As the central engineering component within MDA, the Systems
    Engineering and Integration activity provides the overall system
    engineering development and integration of the BMD System. SE&I
    activities will define and manage the layered BMD System
    collaboratively by providing detailed systems engineering and
    integration across the entire spectrum of system capabilities.
    Capability-based acquisition requires continual assessment of technical
    and operational alternatives at the component, element, and system
    levels. The systems engineering process involves setting BMD System
    Technical Objectives and Goals; addressing existing, emerging, and
    postulated adversary capabilities; assessing and determining system
    design and element contributions; synthesizing system blocks;
    introducing new technologies and operational concepts; conducting
    system risk analyses; and considering impacts of potential foreign
    contributions to BMD System capabilities.
        The BM/C\2\ activity will develop and integrate the BM/C\2\ and
    communications functions for the BMD System. To provide maximum
    flexibility to the warfighter, this activity includes the development
    of specifications needed to ensure Terminal Defense, Midcourse Defense,
    Boost Defense, and Sensor segments are properly integrated and
    interoperable with external systems, to include those of allies.
    Communications funding consolidates and refines BMD System-wide
    communication links to allow components of the BMD System to exchange
    data and to permit command and control orders to be transmitted to
    weapons and sensors.
        The Targets and Countermeasures program provides capability-based
    ballistic missile targets, countermeasures, and other payloads to
    support system-testing as well as element testing across the segments.
    Standard interfaces are being defined between payloads and boosters, so
    that we can introduce different targets into BMD System flight test
    scenarios with greater efficiency. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, we
    are establishing an inventory of target modules (boosters, reentry-
    vehicles, countermeasures, and instrumentation) to shorten the build-
    cycle and support more frequent flight tests.
        The Test and Evaluation program includes the test and evaluation
    infrastructure, tools for program-wide use, and execution of system-
    level testing. Individual BMD System elements will conduct risk
    reduction, developmental, and operational testing. System level tests
    go beyond these, testing synergy, interoperability, BM/C\2\ and
    communication links across the elements. Also resourced are those tests
    conducted for the purpose of making critical measurements required
    across the missile defense regime, for example, measurements of
    adversary missile characteristics such as plume signatures, lethality
    measurements, and characterization of potential countermeasures. Such
    data collection becomes an important input to the design and
    development of effective defenses.
        Supporting robust, realistic testing requires a significant
    investment in the development and maintenance of the requisite test
    infrastructure, analytical tools, and computational capabilities.
    Because this supports both the system and all of its elements, it is
    resourced centrally at the system level. The BMD System test
    infrastructure includes a number of critical, specialized ground test
    facilities, test range facilities, launch capabilities, and
    instrumentation, such as several airborne sensor platforms and other
    mobile capabilities unique to missile defense testing. Core models and
    simulations, both for engineering and integration purposes, are also
    developed, validated, and maintained. These range from detailed
    phenomenology and lethality codes used by all the system elements to
    large-scale wargaming simulations required for BM/C\2\ and operational
    concept of operations development. A number of computational
    facilities, data libraries, and simulation facilities are also
    resourced at the System level.

    Terminal Defense Segment (TDS)
        The Terminal Defense Segment involves development and upgrades of
    missile defense capabilities that engage short- to medium-range
    ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their trajectory. The
    missile or warhead enters the terminal phase when it reenters the
    atmosphere. This is a short phase, lasting less than a minute. Elements
    in this defense segment include Theater High Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD), PATRIOT Advanced Capability Level 3 (PAC-3), Medium Extended
    Air Defense System (MEADS), and a sea-based terminal concept definition
    element (successor to the Navy Area activities). Additionally, other
    elements funded by the MDA are the Israeli Arrow Deployability Program,
    which includes the Israeli Test Bed (ITB), Arrow System Improvement
    Program, and studies via the Israeli Systems Architecture and
    Integration effort.
        The MDA budget allocation for TDS activities in fiscal year 2003 is
    $1.1 billion, which includes funds for RDT&E and military construction.
    The MDA budget includes about $5.8 billion in fiscal year 2003-2007 for
    the terminal defense segment. These figures reflect a decision by the
    Department to transfer to the Army all funding for PAC-3 and MEADS from
    fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007.
        Congress returned PAC-3 and MEADS to MDA for fiscal year 2002
    pending the fulfillment of congressionally mandated requirements. Upon
    satisfaction of all congressional directives, we will transfer the PAC-
    3 to the Army.

        TDS Elements
        THAAD is designed to defend against short- to medium-range
    ballistic missiles at endo- and exo-atmospheric altitudes, which can
    make effective countermeasures against THAAD difficult to employ. It
    also allows multiple intercept opportunities, and can significantly
    mitigate the effects of weapons of mass destruction. THAAD will protect
    forward-deployed U.S. and allied armed forces, broadly dispersed
    assets, and population centers against missile attacks.
        In fiscal year 2003, we will complete missile and launcher designs
    and initiate manufacturing of missile ground test units, continue
    fabrication of the first and second radars, and continue to fabricate
    and test the BM/C\2\ hardware and software. We will support robust
    ground-testing and flight-hardware testing in preparation for missile
    flights in fiscal year 2004 at the White Sands Missile Range. The
    element development phase will refine and mature the THAAD design to
    ensure component and element performance, producibility, and
    supportability. There are five major THAAD components: missiles,
    launchers, radars, BM/C\2\, and THAAD-specific support equipment.
        PAC-3 provides terminal missile defense capability to protect U.S.
    forward-deployed forces, allies, and friends. PAC-3 can counter enemy
    short-range ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and aircraft
    employing advanced countermeasures and a low radar cross-section. PAC-3
    successfully completed development testing last year, during which
    there were three intercepts of ballistic missiles, two cruise missile
    intercepts, and four multiple simultaneous engagements of ballistic and
    cruise missiles. The start of PAC-3 operational testing in February
    2002 shows that we still have work to do. In fiscal year 2003, we will
    execute activity to develop, integrate, and test evolutionary block
    upgrades. Plans include transitioning PAC-3 to full rate production to
    build up PAC-3 missile inventory and field additional PAC-3
    capabilities.
        The Department decided in December 2001 to cancel the Navy Area
    program after a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Nonetheless, the need for timely
    development and deployment of a sea-based terminal ballistic missile
    defense capability remains. We have initiated the sea-based terminal
    study directed by the Department, which we expect to conclude this
    spring.
        MEADS is a cooperative effort between the U.S., Germany, and Italy.
    MEADS will provide robust, 360-degree protection for maneuver forces
    and other critical forward-deployed assets against short- and medium-
    range missiles and air-breathing threats, such as cruise missiles and
    aircraft. In fiscal year 2001, the trilateral MEADS activity embarked
    on a 3-year risk reduction effort. In fiscal year 2003, MEADS will
    continue design and development activities for key system components,
    which includes efforts to integrate the PAC-3 missile with MEADS.
        The Arrow Weapon System (AWS), developed jointly by the United
    States and Israel, provides Israel a capability to defend against
    short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The Arrow Deployability
    Program allows for Israel's acquisition of a third Arrow battery and
    Arrow's interoperability with U.S. systems. The Arrow System
    Improvement Program will include both technical cooperation to improve
    the performance of the AWS and a cooperative test and evaluation
    program to validate the improved AWS performance. We will support
    additional flight testing and supply of components for additional
    missiles to be built in Israel. Continued U.S. cooperation with Israel
    will provide insight to Israeli technologies, which may be used to
    enhance U.S. ballistic missile defenses.

    Midcourse Defense Segment (MDS)
        Midcourse Defense Segment elements engage threat ballistic missiles
    in the exo-atmosphere after booster burnout and before the warhead re-
    enters the Earth's atmosphere. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense and
    Sea-Based Midcourse Defense elements of the MDS are the successors to
    the National Missile Defense and Navy Theater Wide programs,
    respectively. The Sea-based Midcourse activity includes a cooperative
    missile technology development effort with Japan. Our budget for this
    segment in fiscal year 2003 (RDT&E and military construction) is almost
    $3.2 billion, or $570 million less than the funding enacted for fiscal
    year 2002. MDS funding is about $14.8 billion across the FYDP.

        MDS Elements
        The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) will engage threat
    missiles primarily during the descent phase of midcourse flight. Our
    GMD development activity has three main objectives: (1) demonstrate
    hit-to-kill; (2) develop and demonstrate an integrated system capable
    of countering known and expected long-range threats; and (3) develop
    infrastructure and assets for the initial GMD components of the BMD
    System Test Bed to conduct realistic tests using operationally
    representative hardware and software and produce reliable data for GMD
    and BMD System development.
        During fiscal year 2002, the GMD element will build upon the
    successful intercept tests of July and December 2001 by further
    demonstrating hit-to-kill and discrimination capabilities using
    increasingly complex and realistic test scenarios. Development of the
    2004 BMD System Test Bed continues with an upgraded Cobra-Dane radar in
    Alaska as a temporary surrogate for Upgraded Early Warning Radars
    (UEWRs); an accelerated version of the In-Flight Interceptor
    Communications System (IFICS) and Battle Management, Command, Control
    and Communications (BMC3) capability; five ``common'' silos with
    sparing; Command Launch Equipment (CLE); and software upgrades.
        In fiscal year 2003 five Ground-Based Interceptors using a
    precursor of the objective booster and an operationally representative
    kill vehicle will be developed for installation and testing in fiscal
    year 2004. MDA will continue to develop the objective booster and
    continue with the complementary EKV activity. This objective may allow
    for a common EKV for Ground and Sea-based Midcourse Defenses. BM/C\2\
    and communications incremental prototypes will be integrated and
    demonstrated at multiple locations and assessed with user
    participation. The Prototype Manufacturing Rate Facility will continue
    in fiscal year 2003 to support a wide range of interceptor needs for
    the increased rate of flight tests. Research and development efforts
    for Block 2004 and subsequent blocks will support the development of
    the initial GMD parts of the Block 2004 BMD System Test Bed. This
    facility will also support continued development and testing of more-
    capable interceptors, sensors, and targets.
        Sea-based Midcourse Defense will develop a ship-based capability to
    intercept threat missiles early in the ascent phase of midcourse
    flight. SMD continues to build upon the existing Aegis Weapons System
    and Aegis Light-weight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Intercept
    (ALI) activities while pursuing alternative kinetic warhead
    technologies.
        In January 2002, we conducted the first of many flight tests for
    the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) in order to demonstrate kill vehicle
    guidance, navigation, and control against a live ballistic missile
    target. The SM-3 launched from the U.S.S. Lake Erie, which was
    positioned in the BMD System Test Bed more than 500 kilometers away
    from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, and successfully collided with
    its target missile in space using infrared sensors. This was the first
    intercept for the hit-to-kill SMD element.
        Funding in fiscal year 2003 continues for concept definition, risk
    reduction, and testing to further the development of a capability to
    defeat medium- to intermediate-range threats. The SMD project has three
    primary objectives in fiscal year 2003: (1) continue testing and
    complete ALI Flight Demonstration Project; (2) design and develop a
    contingency ship-based ascent and midcourse ballistic missile intercept
    capability based on ALI and associated technologies; and (3) continue
    an effort initiated in fiscal year 2002 to provide a ship-based missile
    defense system designed to provide an ascent midcourse phase ``hit-to-
    kill'' technology in the fiscal years 2008-2010 timeframe.
        The United States and Japan, under a 1999 Memorandum of
    Understanding, are conducting a cooperative systems engineering project
    to design advanced missile components for possible integration into the
    SMD element. This project leverages the established and demonstrated
    industrial and engineering strengths of Japan and allows a significant
    degree of cost sharing.
    Boost Defense Segment (BDS)
        The Boost Defense Segment addresses both directed energy and
    kinetic energy (KE) boost phase intercept (BPI) missile defense
    capabilities to create a defense layer near the hostile missile's
    launch point. To engage ballistic missiles in this phase, quick
    reaction times, high confidence decision-making, and multiple
    engagement capabilities are desired. The development of high-power
    lasers and faster interceptor capabilities are required to engineer
    kinetic and directed energy capabilities to provide options for
    multiple shot opportunities and basing modes in different geographic
    environments. MDA RDT&E funding in the Boost Defense Segment is $797
    million in fiscal year 2003, an increase of $197 million over fiscal
    year 2002 enacted funding, and is approximately $7.5 billion from
    fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007.

        The BDS employs multiple development paths. Information derived
    from this approach will help evaluate the most promising BPI projects
    to provide a basis for an architecture decision. The BDS will
    demonstrate the ABL for the Block 2004 Test Bed. It will define and
    evolve space-based and sea-based kinetic energy BPI concepts. Also, we
    will evaluate Space-Based Laser technologies. At the appropriate time,
    based on mature system concepts and technologies, we will initiate a
    focused demonstration of this concept in the Test Bed.
        BDS Elements
        ABL will acquire, track, and kill ballistic missiles in their boost
    phase of flight. Management and funding responsibility for ABL has
    officially transferred from the Air Force to the Missile Defense
    Agency. ABL integrates three major subsystems (laser; beam control; and
    battle management, command, control, communications, computers, and
    intelligence (BM/C\4\I)) into a modified commercial Boeing 747-400F
    aircraft. ABL-specific ground support equipment also will be developed.
        Building on successful sub-system testing and the modification of
    aircraft structures, in fiscal year 2003 we will commence major
    subsystem integration and testing activities. The ABL Block 2004 phase
    culminates in a lethality demonstration (missile shoot-down) against
    boosting ballistic missile threat-representative targets and delivers
    one aircraft for integration and testing. If directed, this aircraft
    could also provide an emergency defensive capability. We plan to
    develop a second test aircraft, which will further develop this new
    technology.
        The Kinetic Energy Boost defense activity reduces the technical and
    programmatic risks of fielding a boost phase intercept capability. The
    KE Boost strategy is to define and assess militarily useful boost phase
    concepts, invest in focused risk reduction activities, and execute
    critical experiments. We will tap the brightest minds in the public and
    private sectors to define the most effective approach to killing
    ballistic missiles as they boost. We identified several lucrative
    technology candidates for immediate investment, including fast burn and
    flexible axial propulsion technologies, agile kill vehicles, early
    detection and track sensors, quick-reaction BM/C\2\, and affordable
    weapons platforms. We will assess these component technologies through
    rigorous ground and flight tests.
        We will evaluate prototype component and element configurations
    under realistic operational conditions. We will experiment using
    emerging component technologies and test infrastructure to resolve
    tough technical challenges, such as predicting the point of intercept
    and finding the missile tank in the presence of hot exhaust. When
    possible, we will exploit targets of opportunity by tracking space
    launch vehicles and test missions launched out of Vandenberg, Air Force
    Base. The test data we collect from our risk reduction work and
    critical experiments will help guide decisions concerning focused
    demonstrations in fiscal year 2005.
        We are evaluating options for continuing SBL activity. The SBL
    project involves technology development and risk reduction activities
    in the key areas of laser output, beam control, and beam director
    design to demonstrate feasibility of boost phase intercept by a high-
    energy laser in space. These efforts leverage work started under
    previous SBL-funded technology development programs.
    Sensor Segment
        Sensors developed in this segment will have multi-mission
    capabilities intended to enhance detection of and provide critical
    tracking information about ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
    The fiscal year 2003 budget request for RDT&E in this segment is $373
    million, which represents an increase of $38 million over fiscal year
    2002 funding. The MDA budget provides $3.9 billion for the sensor
    segment during fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007.

        The Space Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low) element will
    incorporate new technologies to enhance detection; improve reporting on
    ballistic missile launches regardless of range or launch point; and
    provide critical mid-course tracking and discrimination data for the
    BMDS. When SBIRS-Low is integrated with other space-based infrared,
    interceptor, and surface-based radar sensors, the BMD System will have
    a capability to counter a broad array of midcourse countermeasures.
    Moreover, SBIRS-Low will not carry many of the risks associated with
    forward deployed ground-based sensors, which can be vulnerable to
    attack and for which foreign basing rights must be negotiated.
        Per direction in the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense
    Appropriations Conference Report, plans for Satellite Sensor
    Technology, including SBIRS-Low, will be provided to congressional
    defense committees by May 15, 2002. The restructured SBIRS-Low activity
    will support numerous risk reduction activities, including technology
    maturation, ground simulations, and hardware-in-the-loop
    demonstrations. Based on cost, schedule, capability, and threat
    assessments, decisions will be made regarding production of a
    demonstrated SBIRS-Low capability.
        The international component of the Sensor Segment is the Russian-
    American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) project. We are cooperating with
    the Russian Federation in the area of early warning missile defense
    technologies. RAMOS is an innovative U.S.-Russian space-based remote
    sensor research and development initiative that engages Russian early
    warning satellite developers in the joint definition and execution of
    aircraft and space experiments.
        The Russians continue to review the agreement to execute the RAMOS
    project presented last July by the United States. Assuming agreement is
    reached this summer, in fiscal year 2003 we will complete detailed
    designs of the satellites and sensor payloads, begin fabrication and
    assembly of U.S. sensors and ground support equipment, and continue
    sensor software and modeling and simulation development. Launches of
    the first and second RAMOS satellites are projected to occur in fiscal
    year 2006.
    Technology
        The Technology effort will develop components, subsystems, and new
    concepts based on high-risk, high-payoff approaches. The primary focus
    of this effort is the development of sensors and weapons for future
    improved missile defense platforms. Investments maintain a balance
    between providing block upgrades to current acquisition programs and
    developing the enabling technologies for radically new concepts.
        Our budget for the Technology segment in fiscal year 2003 is $122
    million (RDT&E), a reduction of $18 million from fiscal year 2002
    enacted level. Funding from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007 is
    projected to be about $697 million.

        To enable the BMD System to pace the threat, the Advanced
    Technology Development (ATD) effort is focused in four primary areas:
    (1) Terminal Missile Defense, (2) Midcourse Counter-Countermeasures,
    (3) Boost Phase Intercept, and (4) Global Defense. In addition to these
    tasks, investments are made in a strong technology base to move beyond
    the state-of-the-art in radars, infrared sensors, lasers, optics,
    propulsion, wide-band-gap materials, photonic devices, and other
    innovative concepts. The ATD office also works with the Systems
    Engineer and other segments to ensure seamless transition of proven
    advanced technology products into the BMD System.

                                    SUMMARY

        The BMD System will counter the full spectrum of ballistic missile
    threats, capitalize on existing technologies and capabilities, and
    foster innovation. It will incrementally incorporate capabilities
    needed to detect, track, intercept, and destroy ballistic missiles in
    all phases of flight using kinetic and directed energy kill mechanisms
    and various deployment approaches. We have implemented a disciplined
    and flexible acquisition strategy to provide a timely, capable system.
    This approach protects against uncertainty by ensuring that the United
    States will have the ability to defend itself, its deployed forces,
    allies, and friends from a ballistic missile attack should the need
    arise.
        I believe the approach I have outlined here toward developing and
    deploying missile defenses can meet the growing threat and provide for
    the earliest possible fielding of effective defensive capabilities.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, General Kadish. Thank you,
    Secretary Aldridge. We will have 6-minute rounds of questions
    and if necessary conduct second and third rounds.
        In your statement, General Kadish, you state that, instead
    of developing a system in response to a clearly defined threat
    from a known adversary, we are looking at missile capabilities
    that any adversary could have in a given timeframe. Would that
    include the potential to defeat a missile with several warheads
    and with sophisticated countermeasures, such as the Russians
    might have?
        General Kadish. The basic thrust of this development
    approach is not against those kinds of threats per se. It is
    against what we have been referring to as rogue states, or
    states of concern, but against the proliferation of missile
    attack, and the accidental launch issue of the Russian and
    Chinese arsenals is embedded in there, but the primary thrust
    is against the proliferating states.
        Senator Reed. I think this is stated rather broadly, any
    adversary could have any capability at any given timeframe, and
    we have at least the potential for much more sophisticated
    missiles that you are preparing our counterdefense for, is that
    correct?
        General Kadish. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. There is some issue about this capability
    analysis in my mind. Basically, you define the threat, and you
    are trying to design a system against that threat, and it is
    not the comprehensive threat of any missile, it is the threat
    of rogue nations. Isn't that fair?
        General Kadish. Well, Senator, it is hard to distinguish.
    At some point the basic missile technology is the same, and
    whether it is sophisticated, with integrated countermeasures
    and finely honed, machined warheads, or whether it is basically
    crude missile construction presents us all sorts of different
    problems, so eventually you have to assume that whoever the
    adversary might be, they are going to have sophisticated
    missiles.
        Senator Reed. So you are designing a system today that will
    counter the very sophisticated threats we know are possible to
    deploy?
        General Kadish. We are designing a system that will be
    increasingly capable over time to handle threats that come up.
    That does not mean we have a grand design against all threats
    right out of the package, and that is the very essence of
    capability-based approaches, that we can build what we can
    against a reasonable threat projection and then build on it as
    rapidly as possible.
        Senator Reed. Let us turn now just to both you and
    Secretary Aldridge. In the general outline of the budget last
    year and the first year of the Bush administration, there was a
    57 percent increase, almost $8 billion was provided, total, for
    missile defense. This is a significant increase, and it raises
    questions about how one can effectively spend that amount of
    money in a short period of time. Again, in this budget you are
    requesting about the same level of funding, and in following
    budgets it looks like the same level. This could be an odd
    funding profile for a major system that usually requires
    different levels of funding as the system matures, and the
    system tests out.
        Secretary Aldridge, what can you accomplish at this level
    of funding for the next several years?
        Secretary Aldridge. First of all, this funding does not
    include any deployment. The decision is made that this is an
    R&D effort, that if the decision is made to deploy something,
    to begin the production of some piece of equipment that would
    be fielded, it would be moved to the appropriate Service who
    would have that responsibility, just as we have done for PAC-3,
    that is give it to the Army. You see the funds transferred
    basically to the Army, even though General Kadish shows it as a
    line item, because it was transferred.
        So a normal acquisition program that, as it phases through
    development and starts into production, you expect the budget
    to increase, but because this is basically an R&D effort which
    has been laid out for a variety of technologies for a variety
    of missile ranges, level funding is not unexpected in the first
    few years, as we put this program together, so it does not
    follow the same characteristics as you would see under a normal
    acquisition, where production is included in the cost
    estimates.
        Senator Reed. General Kadish, do you have a comment?
        General Kadish. That is exactly right, and I would use an
    analogy to show how we would spend within that $8 billion
    allocation, and that would be, if you took an analogy of an
    airplane, you have hydraulics, you have the landing gear, you
    have avionics, wings, and the cost of those things varies over
    time based on the development and maturity of the parts, and
    that is how we are actually managing the program.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, you anticipated my next
    question. There is no deployment money in this profile for the
    next several years, and General Kadish in his statement was
    talking about deploying a system over the next few years. Your
    prepared statement is optimistic about our ability to deliver
    effective missile defense capabilities over the next few years.
    That raises a question of whether or not, within the 5-year
    defense plan, you are considering whether you transfer to the
    Services the cost of a deployed system, how much it might cost,
    and where does the money come from?
        Secretary Aldridge. You are correct, there are no
    deployment dollars included in the Future Years Defense Program
    (FYDP). The reason is, we do not know what we are going to buy.
    We do not know where to put the money, and whether it is going
    to be an Army budget, an Air Force budget, or a Navy budget.
    When we get to the point of making a decision to deploy, which
    we will get into next week in looking at the management
    structure, there is a board of directors that oversees the
    activities of the Missile Defense Agency.
        When a decision to deploy is made we will have to determine
    where the funds come from for that deployment based upon what
    it is we are going to deploy, but it really is impossible to
    provide you with a realistic estimate at this point as to what
    kind of money it would be, whether it is a ground-based, long-
    range interceptor, a national system, whether it is an Aegis
    sea-based, or whether we want to do more PAC-3s, or THAAD.
        We have no estimate because we have not made that decision
    yet, so we cannot tell you what something will cost if it
    cannot be defined. When it is defined, we will have to come
    forth and tell you what the budget will be for that purpose.
        Senator Reed. My time has expired in this round.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. General Kadish, I thought your illustration
    on the video was pretty remarkable. It looks to me as though
    you have made some significant progress in this last year.
    Based on your assessment of the BMD technology and your
    understanding of current intelligence, how confident are you
    that you can deliver a timely warfighting capability based upon
    what you think are the possible threats out there? I do not
    expect you to get into intelligence, but just based on what you
    know.
        General Kadish. I think the first substantiation of that is
    our recommendation to procure the initial quantities of Patriot
    3 that we started asking for last fiscal year and will continue
    to ask for. We have enough confidence right now that for
    deployed forces in whatever area, which we could actually
    protect with a PAC-3, that we will have an effective defense
    for theater ballistic missiles. That is the first step.
        Then as we look at the various elements of the BMD System
    that we hope to test and have confidence in, we will be
    increasingly more capable over time against all ranges of
    threats. At this point in time we have a situation where the
    hit-to-kill technology I think is reaching the point where we
    can judge it reliable enough to be effective. We then have to
    judge the countermeasure systems that might be used against it
    and put in counter-countermeasures to handle that. As we then
    go over time I believe we can have an effective missile defense
    against ranges of threats that we are concerned about, but
    there are still many challenges ahead on that.
        Senator Allard. Various critics, like the Union of
    Concerned Scientists, have maintained that relatively
    inexpensive countermeasures easily acquired or developed by
    rogue nations can defeat the BMD Systems you are trying to
    field. You refer to that in the latter part of your comments.
    Would you please describe the efforts you put into place to
    judge likely countermeasures, assess their effectiveness, and
    develop possible countermeasures against that, and who heads
    this effort?
        General Kadish. We have spent a great deal of time talking
    internally about and deciding how to manage this countermeasure
    issue. I guess the best way to describe it is that we have a
    group of people that retired Gen. Larry Welch is heading up for
    us whom we call the red, white, and blue team, for lack of a
    better term, where the red team conjures up countermeasures,
    the blue team responds with the potential counter-
    countermeasures, and the white team referees any testing that
    we do along those lines.
        Now, we have not fully implemented all the different facets
    of that approach, but we are well on our way. In fact, we have
    some money in the budget allocated for that effort this year,
    so given the threat documents that we have, the intelligence
    that we have, and the effort by this group and internal to the
    agency itself with our contractors, I believe we will have a
    very good handle on the countermeasures problem, but again, you
    are never certain about something like that. This is a game
    that is played in every military system, but I believe that we
    will not be in a situation, especially with layered defenses,
    where we will be easily defeated by simple countermeasures.
        Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge, I have no doubt some
    missile defense technology efforts will run into unexpected
    challenges on occasion, and it seems apparent to me that you
    intend to exercise close scrutiny over the MDA program elements
    and technology development. You have been a stern judge of some
    of these efforts already, including the Navy Area defense and
    SBIRS-Low. Yet some of our colleagues express a continuing
    concern that the various offices of acquisitions, technology,
    and logistics will be cut out of MDA program oversight, and I
    have a couple of questions in that regard. Can you assure us
    that the MDA efforts will get sufficient independent review
    from your offices?
        Secretary Aldridge. Absolutely. As we will discuss in great
    detail next week, we have a process in place to continue to
    provide that oversight responsibility both to the Office of
    Secretary of Defense, through the Senior Executive Council,
    which will be the board of directors, as well as independent
    advice to General Kadish that will provide him the viewpoints
    of the various offices within OSD.
        You can be assured that I have a personal stake in this
    matter. General Kadish can attest to the fact that I get
    heavily involved in two major programs, both Navy Area and
    SBIRS-Low, which you have mentioned. I do not think there is
    any doubt in their mind that OSD has sufficient oversight of
    those programs.
        Senator Allard. What formal mechanisms do you have in place
    to find out about program problems after a decision has been
    made to move a project to a Service for procurement?
        Secretary Aldridge. When it goes into the normal
    procurement process, it will go into our normal defense
    acquisition system. There will be a Defense Acquisition Board
    (DAB). Once a decision is passed for deployment, which we would
    call milestone C, the normal process will occur, just like it
    does in any other weapons system. When it transitions from R&D,
    which General Kadish will perform in his Missile Defense
    Agency, if the decision is made to deploy, we will select the
    Service.
        There will be a transition period in which the Service will
    become involved, but then it will be in the normal process.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kadish and Secretary Aldridge, on February 16,
    2002, The Washington Post carried an article titled: ``Rumsfeld
    Pares Oversight of Mission Defense Agency.'' Are you familiar
    with that article, Mr. Secretary?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I have heard about it.
        Senator Byrd. The gist of the article was that the Pentagon
    will not hold national missile defense programs to the same
    reporting and oversight standards as other major weapons
    systems. Secretary Aldridge, what is so important about
    national missile defense technology that exempts it from the
    same kind of rigorous review that is expected of other weapons
    systems?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, Senator Byrd. That article is
    wrong. We have a process in place through which the OSD will
    provide oversight. Again, we are getting into next week's
    issues, but let me go ahead. There is a Senior Executive
    Council that is chaired by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense, the three Service Secretaries, and
    myself. They will act as a board of directors for any decision
    that is made regarding deployment and the stopping or starting
    of any program within missile defense.
        In addition to that, we created a Missile Defense Support
    Group (MDSG), which consists of all the OSD offices that have
    any degree of oversight over the Missile Defense Agency or its
    budget. It is also supported by a Missile Defense Working
    Group, which has the key technical analysis of all the
    organizations, including the Services, out of which the MDSG
    reports directly to me. It has a function to supply input into
    the Missile Defense Agency to General Kadish. It is also the
    body which will provide input to the Senior Executive Council
    when they make decisions regarding the deployment of missile
    defense.
        Once the R&D program is over, any program in missile
    defense that goes to a Service will go into the normal
    acquisition system, as any other weapons system in the
    Department of Defense. It will act the same way, so there is no
    credibility to the article that we are losing oversight to the
    Missile Defense Agency.
        Senator Byrd. Will Congress continue to receive cost
    estimates, testing goals, and other important information about
    missile defense programs with respect to national missile
    defense technology?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Last year, the Defense Authorization Act
    included a provision that requires the Department of Defense to
    report to Congress on annual program goals for national missile
    defense research. It may be that this information is buried in
    the thousands of pages in budget documentation that the
    Pentagon has given to Congress, but I do not know of any clear,
    concise report of that information.
        Mr. Secretary, has the Department complied with the
    provisions of law that require the Department to give this
    information to Congress?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I will let General Kadish
    answer that question.
        General Kadish. Senator Byrd, we believe we have and will
    continue to. We have submitted many hundreds and thousands of
    pages of support documentation, and I have gone through, I
    think, 25 or more hours of briefings of the personal and
    professional staff members, and I am hoping through that
    process we have answered not only the intent but the letter of
    the request of Congress last year. If that is not the case,
    then we need to go back and make sure that we do.
        Senator Byrd. Do you plan to give Congress briefings or
    supply a clear report of the annual program goals for missile
    defense programs?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Secretary Aldridge, you just said that
    missile defense programs will receive rigorous independent
    review. My concern is that Congress has access to this critical
    information in a timely manner. Can this information be
    supplied, and will it be supplied, to Congress so that it can
    act in a timely manner?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Last year, you canceled the Navy Area
    program, but for months the Pentagon claimed that this program
    was a success. Why did it take so long to tell Congress that
    you were wrong, and that the program was a failure? Is this the
    sort of independent review we can expect?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir. We did notify Congress--the
    Nunn-McCurdy Act has a requirement that we live by. We did
    notify Congress of a cost breach of over 25 percent. I think it
    was at the normal time when we have to notify Congress.
        There is a period of time which elapses for us to have to
    recertify the continuation of that program. In the process of
    working through to get the details of the recertification
    process, we found that the costs were increasing beyond the 25
    percent threshold that we were required to notify Congress of
    ahead of time. That deadline for certification ran out on
    December 13, 2001.
        The Secretary of Defense has delegated to me the
    authorization to recertify if we believe the program should
    continue. At that point I have to make certification on four
    criteria. First, is this program in the Nation's interest.
    Second, there is no other alternative to the program. Third,
    that the costs are under control. Fourth, the management system
    is in place to keep the costs under control.
        From the time we notified Congress of the time when I had
    to make the certification, the cost estimates had grown from
    roughly 25 percent to over 70 percent. I could not sign a
    letter that said I believe these costs were under control, and
    by law the funding must terminate. That is an indication of the
    kind of oversight we will continue to have for missile defense,
    but it was clear that we could not continue the program under
    the conditions that the law has dictated to us.
        Senator Byrd. So Congress is and will be apprised of the
    results as stage to stage is reached, and the final result,
    what the money is for.
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. The process we have in place
    will clearly provide Congress with the information they need to
    carry out your duties.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I think my time has expired.
    May I ask another question?
        Senator Reed. Yes, Senator, please.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Allard.
        Mr. Secretary, do you believe that providing this
    information to Congress constitutes an incumbrance, or
    constitutes an excessive burden on the Missile Defense Agency?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Categorically, are you saying no?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Byrd, would you like my time?
    I would yield to Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. I thank the Senator. That is very kind of
    you. I am quite willing to stay and take my turn again.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead.
        Senator Byrd. In the past, the GAO has had trouble getting
    documents about missile defense programs in a timely manner--
    and excuse my voice. I do not have the voice I had when I was
    21.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But you have a lot more power than
    when you were 21. [Laughter.]
        Senator Byrd. Which was a long time ago.
        The GAO has reported that it took as long as 4 months for
    the Department of Defense to fulfill some of the document
    requests. These delays hinder efforts to expose the inner
    workings of the Pentagon to even a small bit of daylight.
    General Kadish, what measures have been taken to make sure that
    the General Accounting Office has access to the information it
    needs to complete its reports?
        General Kadish. Senator, we have a process that we use for
    all kinds of information exchange, either with the GAO or any
    agency, and we try to do it as expeditiously as possible. That
    process is a continuing effort, and we make, in my view, a good
    faith effort to get those documents out.
        The bureaucracy, however, does turn at its own rate, and we
    try to expedite it as much as possible. There are many people
    who get involved in that type of delivery mechanism throughout
    the Department of Defense.
        Senator Byrd. The General Accounting Office is an arm of
    Congress. You recognize that?
        General Kadish. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Byrd. So when the GAO requests information, it is
    Congress that is requesting the information. That is
    understood, is it not?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir, and we have long-established
    procedures for dealing with that, and we follow them as
    religiously as possible.
        Senator Byrd. But my question is, does the Department
    recognize that the General Accounting Office is an arm of
    Congress, and when the Comptroller General asks for information
    that is helpful to Congress in its conduct of the oversight of
    these programs and the appropriations therefore, is it not
    recognized that this request from GAO is in essence a request
    from Congress?
        Secretary Aldridge. Senator, let me answer that for the
    Department of Defense. The answer is, absolutely. We have a
    very good relationship with David Walker and GAO. I was with
    him all morning on a panel that we both sit on, and it is clear
    that the GAO is an arm of Congress and provides information to
    you just like any other agency would.
        Senator Byrd. Very well. I have one more question.
        General Kadish and Mr. Secretary, would you provide the GAO
    with the information it needs in a timely and complete manner?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        General Kadish. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, do I have any of my 6
    minutes left?
        Senator Reed. You have 1 minute.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In that 1 minute, could you explain to
    us what happened to the old space-based system? Mr. Secretary,
    we were going to develop a space-based missile defense system.
    Whatever happened to that, and how does that compare with this?
        Secretary Aldridge. The program that General Kadish has
    outlined has a part of it called the boost-phase intercept, and
    parts of the technology he is looking at are space-based
    elements either kinetic kill vehicles or Space-Based Lasers and
    things of that nature. That is a little further out in time,
    but it is an element of his program.
        Senator Bill Nelson. But that was not what you were testing
    here?
        General Kadish. That is correct. The tests that I showed
    you here were ground-based and sea-based intercept attempts. As
    we get further down in our program execution, starting
    basically in 2003 and out, we will be doing increasingly more
    experiments in the space arena.
        Secretary Aldridge. But the hit-to-kill technology, even
    though it is on an interceptor going up, is not very much
    different than an interceptor coming down. It is the same
    technology, and the progress that is being made in hit-to-kill
    technology has a wide application across boost, midcourse, and
    terminal phases.
        Senator Reed. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Byrd had
    expressed his interest in the Navy Area defense, and I want to
    express my interest in SBIRS-Low, both of which I mentioned
    earlier. I want to pose this question to both General Kadish
    and Secretary Aldridge.
        SBIRS-Low ran into some heavy political opposition in
    Congress last year, and some opponents questioned both the
    technology and the requirements of the program.
        First of all, I would like to know whether you are both
    supporting SBIRS-Low or not, and what are the continuing needs
    for the capability that would be provided by SBIRS-Low?
        Secretary Aldridge. First, Senator, I clearly support
    SBIRS-Low. It is quite disappointing that we had to take the
    action that we did take on the program. It is going to be an
    essential part of the future missile defense capability, and
    unfortunately it ran into some problems such that I could not
    come forth and tell you honestly that we could deliver the
    weapon or the spacecraft on the schedule that was provided at
    the cost that we were given.
        Again, that is what I am paid the big bucks for, to make a
    decision on these kinds of programs. It was clear that program
    was unexecutable with the cost and schedule that was being
    developed, and therefore I had to make a decision that we were
    going to restructure the program so that when we do come back
    to Congress with a program for SBIRS-Low, it is one that I can
    tell you honestly we can deliver on schedule, with the
    performance, on the cost that we tell you it is. I could not do
    that with the SBIRS-Low program that was being developed.
        The money that was provided for in fiscal year 2002 was
    reduced in conference, and we are using those dollars to
    restructure the program. General Kadish has been requested to
    come back to me with a restructured program, I think in a month
    or so, so that we can determine where we go at this point in
    time and what kind of program is going to be viable, but we
    have to have something like this program to make our missile
    defense program viable.
        Senator Allard. General Kadish?
        General Kadish. I would endorse exactly what Secretary
    Aldridge said in terms of the support of SBIRS-Low. I think we
    need a space sensor in order to bring along the effectiveness
    of all the missile defense elements, and we are attempting now
    to restructure the SBIRS-Low program to meet those requirements
    as best we know how and to orient it to a capabilities-based
    approach.
        One major debate that will go on, I think, for some time is
    whether we need a space-based sensor, or can we do it with
    radars alone on the ground or at sea. I think at this point the
    evidence and the studies that I have seen are not compelling
    enough to make such a stark choice, certainly at this time, and
    the belief I have currently is that we are going to need to
    have both radar and space-based sensors to do this job
    effectively, we still have a lot of work to do, but in the
    meantime, SBIRS-Low is a critical space-based element of our
    sensor suite.
        Senator Allard. General Kadish, you mentioned other systems
    that may provide some of the capability we have in SBIRS-Low,
    but are we moving ahead with those systems, or are we pretty
    much focusing on SBIRS-Low?
        General Kadish. We are moving ahead with both. The problem
    we have with terrestrial-based sensors is geography. They have
    to be in the right spot. The advantage of space is that we have
    the ability to have a wide-ranging view of our threats base.
        Senator Allard. The thought is that it is probably not to
    our advantage to have those kinds of facilities where you would
    have to ask permission in other foreign countries for those
    facilities.
        General Kadish. The unfortunate part of ground-based
    systems is you cannot base them on U.S. territory and be
    totally effective in missile defense.
        Senator Allard. So you have a problem there, using it on
    foreign soil?
        General Kadish. Correct.
        Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, you
    are both probably aware that the Congressional Budget Office
    (CBO) was recently asked by Senators Levin, Conrad, and Daschle
    to estimate the cost of several of the BMD Systems that could
    protect the U.S. homeland from long-range ballistic missiles.
    The Senators who requested this study estimated the cost of a
    modest defense to our homeland at $150 billion. Can you comment
    on the relevance of the CBO study and the specific systems it
    analyzed?
        General Kadish. Sir, if I might take that question, the CBO
    study was well done for the assumptions that it made. The
    problem is, the assumptions on which it was based could
    potentially give an inaccurate picture of what any of these
    systems might cost. The definition of life cycle, the
    definition of the systems that were actually in that report at
    this point in time, do not bear a resemblance to anything we
    are working on in detail, so the art of cost estimating could
    get a little bit out of whack from that standpoint.
        It is useful information for illustrative purposes, but we
    do not have a force structure defined well enough to tell you,
    as Secretary Aldridge pointed out earlier, exactly what these
    things are going to cost at this point in time. As we define
    our production and deployment efforts, we will have those cost
    estimates, and at that time I think we should have that debate.
        Senator Allard. So valid assumptions are important and,
    based upon that, you do not believe the $150 billion estimate
    is valid?
        General Kadish. There are a lot of problems with that
    estimate, and we are not building those configurations, so I do
    not think it is valid.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. As I understand both of you, you
    subscribe to the doctrine that you cannot deploy something that
    has not been developed, and as I understand both of you, you
    are saying that the matter of deployment is something that you
    will come to Congress to get the appropriations for?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, that is correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What is it, then, about the R&D
    program that in your mind caused a violation of the ABM Treaty
    that thus required a withdrawal from the treaty?
        Secretary Aldridge. Let me start, and General Kadish can
    maybe come in on this.
        When the President asked us, General Kadish and the
    Department, to develop a missile defense program, it was under
    the assumption that program would proceed without the
    constraint of an ABM Treaty. We were heading toward developing
    the most effective missile defense system we could build with
    the resources made available to us.
        As that program was proceeding, we were running into
    constraints of the treaty that were prohibiting us from making
    progress in the R&D phase, such as, we were trying to use the
    Aegis radar to track some targets and some interceptors, which
    was clearly a violation of the ABM Treaty. We were trying to
    get data, data that would help us in looking for midcourse
    capabilities, for radar technology that would help us in the
    future. In fact, we did, we eliminated certain aspects of those
    tests because we were living under the ABM Treaty, and the
    decision was made to do so, but as you continue to proceed
    developing a wider range of testing, more capability, it was
    clear we were losing ground relative to getting more and more
    data that would give us the confidence to proceed because of
    the ABM Treaty.
        In addition to that, if there was a need to deploy for some
    emergency reasons, which we are looking for, like the 2004
    timeframe, it was relatively clear that if we started to deploy
    a national system there would be arguments that that was a
    violation of the ABM Treaty, so we were restricting the
    President's options. I think the combination of restricting his
    options and prohibiting us to do a thorough testing program, a
    judgment call was made that the strategic situation has changed
    sufficiently that missile defense is the right way to go, given
    the other strategic conditions, such as nuclear warheads and so
    forth, that the President made the decision to withdraw from
    the treaty. We are still living by the treaty up until June 13,
    and we are still having to restrict the number of tests.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So there is not a part of your testing
    right now that you consider a violation of the treaty?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, we are not violating the
    treaty.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You mentioned the Aegis system. Is
    testing on that in the future going to violate the treaty?
        Secretary Aldridge. If you use the Aegis radar as a ship-
    based missile defense system for national purposes, that was a
    violation of the ABM Treaty, and I do not remember the article.
    I think it is Article VII which says you cannot test mobile ABM
    systems.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, given the delicacy of the
    situation with the Russians, there is a joint program that you
    requested money for, RAMOS. Have the Russians given any
    indication that they intend to continue the program since your
    announcement to withdraw from the ABM Treaty?
        Secretary Aldridge. I have not talked with them. Maybe
    General Kadish can answer that.
        General Kadish. We have been in discussions with the
    Russians over the RAMOS program activity, as well as other
    cooperative efforts, to some degree, and at this point in time
    I cannot tell you what their final decision is going to be in
    terms of participating. We have been at this I think almost 7
    years, trying to get this particular effort off the ground with
    the Russians. At some point here in the next 6 to 8 months, I
    would expect we are going to have to make some major decisions
    on that program, but right now we are still in discussions, and
    things are proceeding and we are waiting for a final go-ahead
    from the Russian Government.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is a program of small satellites,
    so that you have a canopy up there that would detect through
    infrared any kind of missile launches?
        General Kadish. It is an experimental set of satellites to
    do what you describe, so it is not a constellation. It is two
    satellites to experiment in technically interesting
    wavelengths.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Would we go it alone, without the
    Russians, if they pull out?
        General Kadish. My recommendation to the Secretary would be
    no.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Why is that?
        General Kadish. We have some mutual benefit out of the
    program, but when I look at the scheme of things there are
    other ways we could accomplish that if we had a unilateral
    approach.
        Senator Bill Nelson. As I understand it you are going to
    have a hearing on this next week.
        Senator Reed. I am, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson. A continuation of this?
        Senator Reed. A continuation, but more a focus on program
    management.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I have to run to a meeting with
    Senator Graham right now, and I will save questions for next
    week. I would like to get into it. I happen to think Secretary
    Aldridge is about one of the best appointments in this
    administration, and I think that he has a great deal of wisdom
    and experience, and I want to poke and probe it a little
    further.
        Secretary Aldridge. As you have done many times before.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Also, thank you
    for your graciousness in yielding to Senator Byrd.
        Secretary Aldridge, just for the sake of clarification, I
    know we are going to get into program management in the next
    hearing, but in a dialogue between Senator Byrd and yourself,
    you pointed out that Navy Area was canceled as a result of
    Nunn-McCurdy. Would Nunn-McCurdy apply to this new review by
    the Senior Executive Council? Would you feel compelled to apply
    that there?
        Secretary Aldridge. The Nunn-McCurdy applies to programs,
    and we would like, if we got into SBIRS-Low, for example, as
    part of the missile defense program, Nunn-McCurdy would apply
    to that. If it is just an R&D program without development, or
    deployment, I think it would not apply. I would have to go back
    and look at the language, but I think it only gets into
    programs when we have procurement.
        Senator Reed. As you stated today, everything you proposed
    in this $8 billion budget is RDT&E, it is not deployment, so
    effectively with regard to Nunn-McCurdy, which has proven
    useful at least in one circumstance, if not several, you are
    not only forcing a decision but also making a tough decision
    about a program that would no longer be operative.
        Secretary Aldridge. I think that is true, but again, I do
    not know. I cannot recall the details of Nunn-McCurdy in this
    particular instance with the Navy Area, which we had, in fact,
    started into a deployment mode. It did apply, but I do not know
    exactly what the degree of threshold would be for R&D.
        Senator Reed. We will give you an opportunity in the next
    hearing.
        Secretary Aldridge. I will check into that beforehand.
        Senator Reed. Let me raise another question along the lines
    of deployment and RDT&E. General Kadish, you have spoken a
    number of times about a possible contingency deployment at Fort
    Greeley, Alaska, of five prototype test missiles in conjunction
    with the Cobra-Dane intelligence radar. In your view, is that
    an RDT&E which you could do now if sufficient resources were
    appropriated this year?
        General Kadish. That is a part of the test bed that we
    talked about during last year's hearings and discussions as
    well as this year. The primary use of those assets would be a
    part of this test bed, which would be both ground-based test
    activity and used in flight tests, depending on how we actually
    do it. The contingency capability that I have talked about is a
    decision yet to be made, whether or not we would activate that
    capability.
        Senator Reed. But you would put in place five missiles at
    Fort Greeley?
        General Kadish. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. Is the Cobra-Dane radar a pilot test bed?
        General Kadish. Plus many other things.
        Senator Reed. Is it a part of research and development?
    Would you at some point say, is it now contingently
    operational?
        General Kadish. If it is judged effective enough for what
    we think it could be used for, and the Secretary judges it to
    be so.
        Senator Reed. I understand that, and please correct me if I
    am wrong, you cannot actually launch the missiles from Fort
    Greely, since the debris from the missiles could fall on
    populated areas.
        General Kadish. Initially, we have not specified that we
    would launch from Fort Greely. We have environmental
    regulations and rules that we have to evaluate before we would
    make such a decision. I would not, however, rule out that
    capability. In fact, it would be very desirable we do that type
    of thing now, even in the continental United States, at the
    White Sands Missile Range, where we could actually move people
    off of the endangered area of the range to do the missile test.
    We have some environmental restrictions, and we will go through
    those in a very disciplined way to make those types of
    decisions should we decide it is in our best interest to do
    that.
        Senator Reed. But you have already decided, I presume, to
    put the Test Bed up at Fort Greely, even though there is a
    question whether or not the missiles can be fired?
        General Kadish. That is correct, because the value of the
    Test Bed should not be underestimated from the physical
    location of those assets where we might be using them in an
    operational mode. We have taken some heavy criticism about not
    being operationally representative in the phasing of our
    testing, not just flight testing, i.e., having the actual
    infrastructure hooked up with the communications links, the
    computer systems, and those types of things. Just as we build
    prototype F-15s and ships and tanks, we want to do the same for
    missile defense.
        Senator Reed. One other question with respect to Fort
    Greely. I also understand that because of geometric
    considerations you will not have an ICBM-class target with
    which to test the Fort Greely missiles and Cobra-Dane radar,
    even if you could launch from Fort Greely.
        General Kadish. We are still looking at the target
    situation. We have a long-range, air-launched target under
    development. We have not fully defined what that requirement is
    going to be. It would certainly not be in place for the 2004
    timeframe, but we have some decisions to make for the outyears
    as we go into further testing.
        Senator Reed. But just to conclude, there is a possibility
    that you could declare a contingent deployment by 2004, even
    though there is a question whether the missiles can actually be
    fired from that location, and you have not yet defined a target
    missile to test against and are unlikely to do so before 2004.
        General Kadish. I think embedded in that statement are a
    number of incorrect assumptions. First of all, we will continue
    our testing out of Kwajalein and Vandenberg and other areas
    aggressively over the next few years. That gives us confidence
    that no matter where we launch the interceptor from, it will be
    effective against the target that we are aiming at, and
    therefore, having the missiles in the Test Bed, should we judge
    them effective enough through that other testing, it does not
    matter whether we have fired them out of that location,
    although we would like to.
        I will point out that our strategic missile offensive force
    has not, to the best of my knowledge, been fired out of the
    locations they have been deployed at in the United States. It
    is the same issue.
        Senator Reed. Let me reserve some additional questions for
    a third round. I recognize Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
    apologize, Mr. Chairman, for not being here for the entire
    hearing. We had two amendments on the floor that we were busy
    with.
        I do not know what has been asked, but I have worked with
    both of you before and, quite frankly, it is a relief that we
    are where we are today, and where I think we should have been
    several years ago. I am sure you have discussed the options of
    sea-based and land-based missile defense.
        Most of us who have been pushing for this for a long time
    have come to the conclusion that we need to do something with
    the Aegis investment we have right now, given the high tier
    capability, in terms of the flexibility, and also capitalizing
    on an investment that has already been made with the Aegis
    system.
        Where are you on that particular system right now? What are
    your thoughts for the future?
        General Kadish. Senator Inhofe, I was very pleased to have
    in my opening statement a video showing our first intercept of
    the Aegis Leap Intercept (ALI) program, and that was a very
    exciting event for a lot of us who have been laboring in this
    program for sometime. I expect that we will have our challenges
    technically with that, but it is a key part of our program
    because of the mobility that Aegis provides, as well as the
    capability.
        Senator Inhofe. About how many ships would you be wanting
    to get to become capable with this?
        General Kadish. Senator, I am unable to answer that
    question now because we will have to make some judgments when
    the testing gets a little further along and how effective is it
    versus the threats we are going after, and then provide
    recommendations to the Secretary as to the force structure.
        Senator Inhofe. When you think about the changing threat
    that is out there, last time we had a meeting like this we
    would never have thought that we would be in Afghanistan today,
    and when you think about the flexibility and the places that it
    can be put, that is something that I think is the most flexible
    for these threats that we cannot anticipate.
        Now, it is my understanding that in terms of the ABM Treaty
    we are going to be able to go ahead and not worry about that
    after about July or August. What is the timeframe?
        Secretary Aldridge. I believe it is June 13.
        Senator Inhofe. There are several of us who have felt for
    quite a number of years that this is something, a step that
    should have been taken a long time ago, and it is interesting
    because even the architect of the ABM Treaty of 1972, Henry
    Kissinger, has said that it is insane to make a virtue out of
    your vulnerability, which is exactly what we have done.
        Secretary Aldridge. Senator, I was part of the negotiating
    team 32 years ago.
        Senator Inhofe. I knew that you were. Let me ask you this,
    then. Do you agree?
        Secretary Aldridge. It sounded like a good idea at the
    time. [Laughter.]
        Senator Inhofe. I hate to tell you this, Mr. Secretary, I
    did not think it was a good idea at the time, but certainly
    with two superpowers, and with the environment we were in
    there, it was certainly a good argument. Are you pretty much in
    agreement now with Henry Kissinger and his new view?
        Secretary Aldridge. Sir, I support the President very
    strongly on this one.
        Senator Inhofe. There are a lot of others that came forth,
    Condoleezza Rice and others, who were very forceful in thinking
    sooner or later we are going to have to put that relic to bed
    and start defending America.
        One of the problems I have had over the last few years is
    how bad our intelligence has been in determining when countries
    are going to have this capability. I remember the August 1998
    inquiry we made. We asked General Shelton, Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, how long it would be until North Korea
    would be able to accomplish a multiple-stage rocket, and the
    response we received was, it is going to be somewhere between 5
    and 10 years, and then 7 days later, one was fired from North
    Korea.
        Then I recall the NIE of 1995, when they said how many
    years it was going to be, but then they put the word indigenous
    in, and I always felt that does not make any difference. If
    Iraq has the capability of a missile that will reach the United
    States of America, whether it is indigenous or not does not
    make any difference to me. It still does the same damage. Are
    you satisfied that since we have progressed to the point where
    we are now, that you are going to be able to move forward, and
    that there are not any other obstacles, major obstacles in the
    way, as the ABM Treaty was, for quite a while?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. Well, obviously we still have
    to live with the treaty through June 13. There are certain
    things we cannot do during the testing process, but at that
    point in time I do not anticipate we will have any difficulty
    doing the tests we need to do to prove the system.
        Senator Inhofe. I am very proud of all of you who had the
    fortitude to stay with it. I am satisfied with where we are
    today. Thank you very much.
        One other question on the budget, and I think that is what
    we should be talking about today. Are you having serious
    problems in getting the budget that is necessary to reach our
    deployment when we want to?
        Secretary Aldridge. So far we have not heard of any major
    cuts in the request that the President has made. That does not
    preclude that happening as we go down through these hearings,
    but so far I guess I have not heard of anything at this point.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        General Kadish and Secretary Aldridge, Senator Byrd raised
    questions of compliance with informational requirements to
    Congress, and in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2002, one of the important requirements was the one to include
    total life cycle cost for each missile defense program that
    enters the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD)
    phase. This is section 232 of the act.
        I understand the THAAD missile defense program is in the
    EMD phase, yet its life cycle cost estimate was not provided to
    Congress. Can you explain why those costs were not given to us?
        General Kadish. Senator, I would like to take that for the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The life cycle reporting requirement of Sec. 232(d)(2)(A) calls for
    life-cost information on Missile Defense programs that enter EMD or the
    equivalent phase. Under the new acquisition management strategy for
    Ballistic Missile Defense System elements, life cycle costs will be
    developed to support the decision process to move a block configuration
    of an element into production and operations. The old EMD phase for
    THAAD was cancelled. Life cycle costs for a block configuration of
    THAAD will be developed at the appropriate time as part of the decision
    to procure a quantity of that configuration and these costs wil be
    provided to Congress accordingly.

        General Kadish. There are some technicalities here. We
    certainly want to follow the letter as well as the spirit of
    the law, but right now the way the program is constructed we
    have nothing technically in engineering and manufacturing
    development. It is all in R&D, so THAAD is no different in
    technical terms from SBIRS-Low or Aegis Leap Intercept.
    However, that may be a distinction without a difference for the
    intent of the question, so I would like to make sure we go back
    and answer what we really can do along those lines.
        However, I will say this. No matter what answer we give you
    from an overall perspective, the force structure that we will
    buy as a basis for that life cycle cost estimate is not
    settled. We originally had an inventory objective of 1,200
    missiles. As Secretary Aldridge pointed out, that may or may
    not be the right quantity based upon where we think we are
    going to go with that particular element of the program, so
    since life cycle costs are inherently based on things like the
    quantities you are going to buy, how many of them, where you
    are going to put them and so forth, we may have a situation
    where we cannot accurately give you those costs at this point
    in time.
        Senator Reed. Is it your contention that THAAD is not in
    any part in the EMD phase?
        General Kadish. Again, that may be a distinction without a
    difference. It is certainly in the development phase, and what
    we would like to do is supply you the cost numbers that will
    get at the spirit as well as the intent of the question, but we
    have severe limitations in telling you what the life cycle cost
    is over 20 years, when we do not have a basically agreed-to
    force structure like how many missiles we are going to buy, and
    so that is going to be a problem. We could probably tell you
    what the first missile is going to cost.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, you have done a lot of
    research and development and bringing products to the field. Is
    it difficult to calculate life cycle costs for a system, even
    though you might not know how many F-22s you are going to buy,
    or how many of anything you are going to buy?
        Secretary Aldridge. Normally when we enter what used to be
    called EMD, which is now called system development and
    demonstration (SDD), we have a program that is usually laid
    out, as we have for Joint Strike Fighters. When we entered the
    SDD just last October, we have an inventory objective set up
    and we can tell you, we have a schedule, we have a production
    schedule, we know how many we are going to build, and we can
    tell you what the life cycle cost is going to be.
        There has been no decision, a Milestone B Decision, to
    enter SDD for THAAD. We have not made a decision on that. We
    have not made an inventory, so I cannot tell you what the life
    cycle cost is going to be without an inventory objective. As
    soon as we get there, we will. There is no attempt to try to
    not comply with Congress on this, but we have no objective in
    mind.
        We do have an inventory objective for PAC-3. We have an
    inventory objective of 2,200 missiles. We can lay out a life
    cycle cost for that, but I think THAAD is in this gray area and
    we have not made a decision on how many we are going to build,
    when we are going to build it and so forth, so it is hard to do
    that. But when we do, when we get to that point, there is no
    doubt that we can give you a life cycle cost.
        Senator Reed. Let me raise another question about the
    overall budget, and that is, you have proposed to fund the BMD
    System element at over $1 billion for this year, fiscal year
    2003, and this element provides integration of the individual
    ballistic missile defense elements, but the design and
    architecture of these individual ballistic missile defense
    elements is not yet known. I think the testimony this afternoon
    reflects that. In response to practically every question we
    have raised you said we just do not know yet, we do not know
    what it is going to look like, and yet you are asking for $1
    billion to integrate elements which you have not committed to
    do yet, roughly one-seventh of the total request. What is your
    rationale?
        General Kadish. The rationale is quite simple. We have to
    fund the infrastructure to do that thinking and development
    effort to give ourselves those answers, so those particular
    funds buy an awful lot of the infrastructure that underlies our
    elements, including the integration engineering that answers
    the very questions you are posing.
        Senator Reed. But $1 billion? We are not talking about
    infrastructure in terms of the hardware, the missiles
    necessarily.
        General Kadish. No, but we are talking about test
    infrastructure that is common for a lot of our elements. We are
    talking about system-wide tests that we get data for that are
    applicable to our elements. We are talking about the
    engineering required for us to develop the specifications for
    the integration and interoperability, and so there was an awful
    lot of work that underlies the other element activities if we
    are going to achieve the vision of a BMD System against all
    threats.
        Senator Reed. When you talk about what the common Test Beds
    for the elements are, one would presume you know what your
    elements are, not perhaps fully defined, but to integrate
    something I think you have to have something to begin with, and
    a lot of your responses today are, we have not decided yet. We
    do not know. It could look like this.
        General Kadish. Again, I think the assumption you are
    making that we do not know what we have so we cannot integrate
    it, or we do not know what we should integrate if we do not
    have it, is incorrect because it is a multifaceted problem. We
    have a situation where we will specify integration requirements
    that elements have to adhere to as well as taking where they
    are and integrating them with the basic specifications they are
    already working under, and so it is a mixed bag of things that
    have to be done, and we need the best talent we can find to do
    that, because it is very complicated.
        Senator Reed. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Based on the Chairman's excitement over this program, I
    think I have to ask this question. If Congress were to give you
    more dollars, could you spend them?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir, I could.
        Senator Allard. I guess the bottom line in missile defense
    is do you have some unfunded requests?
        General Kadish. We have tried to strike a balance to do all
    the things that we think we need to do to bring this
    development program in. There will always be unfunded
    requirements of different parts of the structure because time
    passes and we learn more about it, and we may have missed the
    mark on certain levels of funding for certain things. It is a
    continuous process of adjustment, so I do not think you would
    find the answers different from any program brought before you.
    If you asked, are there unfunded requirements, the answer would
    be yes, but we think we have the priorities set correctly.
        Senator Allard. Can you provide me at least with some of
    those unfunded requests, prioritized?
        General Kadish. Certainly, Senator. We can do that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        We have tried to strike a balance to do all the things that we
    think we really need to do to bring this program in and we think we
    have the priorities set correctly. However, in balancing what we can
    do, invariably there are activities where we could use additional
    resources. In addition, conditions change as time passes and we find
    that there are opportunities we were not fully aware of at the time of
    the President's budget request that could use budget-year resources.
    Based on our current view of potential unfunded requirements, we show
    potential funding shortfalls in SBIRS-Low for $50 million.

        Secretary Aldridge. Can I just make one point here? There
    is a funding profile that is laid into the budget, and as we
    have talked about the various boost phase, midcourse, terminal
    phase, and the ranges of missiles we have to defend against,
    there are multiple technologies that are associated with each
    of those elements, and some of those technologies are going to
    work, and some are not.
        When we got the Navy Area, there was some funding that was
    reduced. We reallocated some of that funding back to other
    priorities. That will happen in the budget as we go forth, and
    then it may be we get to the point of deployment, one of the
    technologies is not working, there are funds available to maybe
    reallocate to the deployment from the missile defense budget.
    It may not have all of it, but I think we have to anticipate,
    as we go over with time, these funding profiles will change as
    programs succeed and some fail.
        The way we have laid out the program, we should expect some
    of those to happen. We should expect some failures, we should
    expect some high successes, and when we do, we reallocate that
    funding, and so to say that there is a program profile that
    starts in fiscal year 2003 and goes to fiscal year 2007, and
    that is exactly what you are going to do, may not be the case.
    It may be that something changes as time goes on, and we should
    expect that.
        Senator Allard. I appreciate candid remarks on that from
    both of you, because I think that adds credibility as far as
    your request before Congress.
        Now, one thing I did want to clarify for the record, there
    is the THAAD request. I understand that includes a request for
    10 additional missiles, and for the record I just wanted to
    clarify that these are test missiles, is that correct?
        General Kadish. That is correct, Senator. We have a little
    bit of confusion in this terminology between contingency and
    test. The request is for test missiles for test purposes.
        You will also see in the documentation that, even though
    that is the primary use, we may use them all up in tests, but
    if an emergency arises, a theme throughout the entire program
    is that we may use our test assets for operational use, but
    primarily they are test assets, and bought for that purpose.
        Senator Allard. I want to move to a couple more questions,
    and I think we will just wrap it up on my side, Mr. Chairman.
    The ABL, I believe personally that the ABL is still a very
    important effort, is that working out on the scheduling for
    ABL?
        General Kadish. Senator, we basically have gotten the
    responsibility for ABL because it is so important to missile
    defense purposes. In that process, as with any development
    program, we took a hard look at what the schedule was, what
    risks were involved, and we have adjusted the schedule with the
    moneys required to handle that adjustment.
        I think it is absolutely remarkable the progress that
    program has made, with its very revolutionary technology, but
    we have those struggles in the development program, and they
    are complex, but I am very confident at this point we know as
    much as we can know about the reasonableness of that schedule.
    I have good confidence in our ability to estimate that.
        Now, as time goes on, whether that schedule will actually
    come to fruition is the trick in this business. I cannot
    guarantee we are going to meet it, but we have the best handle
    on it that we can have on it today. I have confidence we are on
    track to meet it.
        Senator Allard. So the plane is pretty close to flying, or
    is it flying yet?
        General Kadish. There are two parts of that flying
    equation. The first part is the first flight of the aircraft
    without the mission equipment operational. I think that will
    occur hopefully in June, probably in July of this year, and
    then the first shootdown, which would occur in the fall of
    2004, if not earlier, should we have some successes in the
    early testing, so that is what we are working on right now.
        Senator Allard. On the Space-Based Laser (SBL), obviously I
    was pleased, I mentioned earlier, with your demonstration, but
    can you comment a little bit on the next generation as far as
    the SBL? I know Senator Inhofe asked that question. Is there
    further comment you want to make on that particular program?
        General Kadish. We took a funding reduction in last year's
    appropriation for the SBL experiment that we had ongoing in
    2012, and that reduction was significant enough for us not to
    be able to make that experiment work, so what we have done in
    this budget is bring the SBL activities back down to
    technologies that we are trying to put together to support
    that, and we will be looking for the way ahead with the actual
    experimentation here over the next year or so with Secretary
    Aldridge, but no decisions have been made how to recover that
    experiment yet.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Let me just pursue a few final
    questions following up on Senator Allard's questions about the
    Airborne Laser. You now hope, I believe, to test in 2005 a
    laser on a prototype aircraft, is that correct?
        General Kadish. No, that is not correct. I think we are
    heading towards testing in calendar year 2004, the fall of
    calendar year 2004, with a half-power laser, that is correct.
        Senator Reed. When do you expect to have a full-power laser
    capable of testing and deployment?
        General Kadish. As soon as we can do it, Senator, but I
    cannot give you a date right now. A lot will depend upon how
    successful we are marching to that 2004 date with the half-
    power laser. The achievement which that represents is rather
    significant. Whether it is half-power or full-power is an issue
    with the operational capability of the airplane, but the very
    fact that we could achieve a shootdown of any magnitude with
    that particular power laser is a major technical
    accomplishment.
        Senator Reed. With respect to Navy Theater-Wide, General
    Kadish, there has been the need to develop radar for the
    theater-wide system, and there has been a debate about the X-
    Band radar and alternative radars. Are you committed to
    developing an X-Band radar for the Navy theater-wide radar, or
    now the sea-based midcourse system?
        General Kadish. I do not believe I am committed to do
    anything in terms of the selection of those radars at this
    point in time. I think one of the things you have to understand
    as we begin to look at the environment outside the treaty
    constraints, is that one of the things we are looking very hard
    at is the value of having autonomous radars, integrated into a
    shooting system, if you will, and relying only on those radars.
    The treaty will allow us to look at off-board cuing and
    different types of configurations of sensors, so it throws a
    different light on the selection that we might have with any
    particular technology.
        However, I will say this. We have had ongoing for many
    years a development program with what we call S-Band radar
    which is already on the Aegis cruiser, and then the X-Band,
    that gives us better discrimination capability for missile
    defense efforts, and we have to decide what to do about that.
        We have funded the programs, I believe, in the 2003 budget
    for continuation, but we have some big decisions. We would
    recommend to Secretary Aldridge, probably in the next 6 to 8
    months, in the 2004 deliberations on exactly which way we are
    going to go.
        Senator Reed. Last month, the Navy announced a contract
    worth $420 million to develop an S-Band radar component for
    sea-based midcourse defense. Why would the Navy be initiating
    this contract rather than the Missile Defense Agency?
        General Kadish. We still have components of our program
    being managed by the different Services. What has changed in
    the Missile Defense Agency management structure is that now we
    have direct control of the programs through the Services, as
    before they were reporting through different chains to the
    Services using our dollars allocated by Congress.
        So it is a different management structure, but you can
    expect that the Services, where they are doing that work on our
    behalf, will be letting the contracts. Some will be let out of
    the Missile Defense Agency direct. Some will be done by the
    Services.
        Senator Reed. A final question. We have talked before about
    countermeasures, and General Welch is leading your efforts on
    the countermeasures. How much are you requesting this year in
    terms of funding for research on countermeasures?
        General Kadish. I would like to take that for the record,
    but when you say research on countermeasures there are
    different ways we can answer that question, and we will try to
    do it for the record. If you are talking about dollars spent on
    actually developing the countermeasures themselves to test
    against, that is one number. If you are talking about the
    additional dollars that we are spending to develop our systems
    to deal with those countermeasures, that is a different number,
    and a lot harder to segregate, because we do that altogether in
    our development program, but it is a major part of our
    development effort to deal with countermeasures.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In the fiscal year 2003 President's budget, the Missile Defense
    Agency's planned spending for countermeasure/counter-countermeasure
    research and development is $219.967 million. The planned allocation of
    the requested funds is:

              $72.013 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1050 Advanced
            Concepts
              $60.279 million--PE 0603175C BMD Technology, 6010 Advanced
            Technology Development
              $30.000 million--PE 0603882C Midcourse Defense Segment, 3050
            Common SE&I
              $26.475 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1030 Targets and
            Countermeasures
              $30.000 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1060 Test and
            Evaluation
              $1.200 million--PE 0603880C BMD Systems, 1050 Intelligence

        Secretary Aldridge. Just a comment. The concept that we
    have applied for missile defense, which is looking for boost
    phase, midcourse, and terminal phase by itself is a
    countermeasure program, because it is very difficult for any
    adversary to build countermeasures to deal with each one of
    those phases. In the boost phase you do not have to worry about
    warheads or decoys. You try to go after the booster. There is
    very little they can do for countermeasures. During midcourse
    phase there is a different set of circumstances. Terminal is
    another set of circumstances.
        So by the way we are designing the program--and of course
    we are employing spiral development of the capability with
    time--it has a natural countermeasure sense to the program that
    I think is important for us to realize.
        Senator Reed. Senator Allard, do you have any more
    questions?
        Senator Allard. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. If there are no further questions, we will
    recess the hearing. Thank you.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                         NEED FOR FOREIGN-BASED RADARS

        1. Senator Reed. General Kadish, during the hearing you stated that
    foreign radars were necessary to provide for adequate missile defense
    coverage if SBIRS-Low was not deployed. I understand, however, that a
    recent Pentagon study showed that a combination of new and existing
    radars, all based CONUS, would provide adequate coverage for a national
    missile defense system. Could you please clarify why you asserted at
    the hearing that foreign radars were necessary, given the results of
    the recent study?
        General Kadish. If the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-Low is
    not deployed, a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system consisting of
    non-U.S.-based radars is necessary to provide adequate coverage.
        The referenced study is the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) SBIRS
    study directed by the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). The study
    states that a Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) missile defense system is
    effective against the less sophisticated threats that rogue nations
    could pose in the near term. The study also states that in addition to
    CONUS-based radars, non-U.S.-based radars would be needed to handle
    more challenging threats.
        Ground-based radar is inherently limited to line-of-sight,
    restricting range and delaying acquisition of the threat target until
    it rises above the radar horizon. The more time the BMDS has to
    evaluate the target, the better discrimination and targeting will be.
    Radars based overseas extend the horizon and the time available for
    defenses to mitigate the impact of evolving adversary countermeasures.
    An effective defense requires that threat missile complexes be observed
    soon after the last rocket stage burns out. In the absence of SBIRS-
    Low, only radars based beyond CONUS borders can do this.

                       PRESIDENTIAL ALLOCATION OF FUNDING

        2. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, the Fiscal Year 2002 National
    Defense Authorization Act reduced the administration's 2002 ballistic
    missile defense request by $1.3 billion, and then made that amount
    available for combating terrorism or ballistic missile defense. The act
    required the President to determine how to use the $1.3 billion, based
    on the national security interests of the United States, and required
    the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report describing the
    Secretary's plan for use of the funds. Has the $1.3 billion been
    allocated by the President, and if so, what is the status of the report
    to Congress?
        Secretary Aldridge. Congress chose not to appropriate funds in a
    manner that would have required the allocation contemplated by Section
    1010 of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act.
    Therefore, the authorization has not been allocated.

                        PROCUREMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSES

        3. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how early could we begin procuring
    missile defense systems for deployment, and which systems might we buy?
        General Kadish. This budget request contains funds for the Patriot
    Advanced Capability (PAC-3) production, so we have already begun the
    process. We have not, however, completed our Block 2004 and 2006
    definition and configuration that will provide the basis for any future
    production decisions.
        Based on continued testing success and capability assessments, we
    could procure small quantities of the Theater High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD), as well as a rudimentary ground- or sea-based
    midcourse capability in 2005-2006.
        The GMD test assets we are acquiring for use in the BMDS Test Bed
    are just that, for testing, with the potential for contingency
    employment. They are not operational systems for deployment.

                           FISCAL YEAR 2002 FYDP DATA

        4. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, one of the principal ways we
    use to understand a new budget is to compare it to the old one. For
    programs such as missile defense with long development times, it is
    critical to understand the budget for the outyears as well as for the
    next year. To help our understanding, the Department of Defense
    invariably presents last year's 5-year budget plan, or Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP), as it is called, along with this year's FYDP,
    so comparisons can be made. I understand that this was, in fact, done
    this year for virtually all defense programs except for MDA programs.
    Could you please provide last year's FYDP for all MDA programs and
    projects to help us complete our review of the fiscal year 2003 budget
    submission?
        Secretary Aldridge. The Fiscal Year 2002 Ballistic Missile Defense
    Organization (BMDO) budget was originally prepared and submitted by the
    previous administration for $4.5 billion. The current administration
    revised the fiscal year 2002 ballistic missile defense budget and
    program significantly during last summer. That revised fiscal year 2002
    budget request was $7 billion and was submitted during June 2002. The
    Department did not issue fiscal guidance for fiscal years 2003-2007
    until August 2002, so no official out-year fiscal information was
    available to support the amended request.
        Other DOD programs may have been able to provide approximate out-
    year detail for the amended budget, but this data is unofficial and
    would closely match current planning figures only because those
    programs were not substantially revamped last summer. However, at the
    time the amended budget was submitted, BMDO was still exploring, with
    the Department, alternative BMD programs plans, strategies, and funding
    levels for fiscal years 2003-2007. Refinement of these strategies and
    plans continued until submission of the fiscal year 2003 budget
    request.

         OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES DATA FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        5. Senator Reed. General Kadish, reporting of obligations and
    expenditures data for current and previous years is one way to gauge
    the top-level health and progress of a program. Such obligations and
    expenditures data are typically provided to Congress as part of routine
    staff briefings by DOD program managers. However, they were not
    presented this year for MDA programs. Could you please provide
    obligations and expenditures data and projections for each budget
    project in the MDA for fiscal years 2001 and 2002?
        General Kadish. See attached charts.

                              NMD COUNTERMEASURES

        6. Senator Reed. General Kadish, there are a number of simple
    countermeasures discussed by organizations and individuals such as the
    Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Independent
    Review Team previously led by General Welch, and others. The most
    notable of these include tumbling re-entry vehicles with tumbling
    conical balloon decoys, and re-entry vehicles disguised by simple
    balloons. Are you aware of these?
        General Kadish. Yes.

        7. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how do you intend to defeat such
    countermeasures with a midcourse system and do you intend to flight
    test against all of these countermeasure types, and if so, when?
        General Kadish. MDA, with special focus on its GMD activity, has
    implemented countermeasure and counter-countermeasure processes to
    ensure the BMD System can negate not just simple threat
    countermeasures, but will continue to develop the BMD System to counter
    more complex threat countermeasures as they evolve.
        The approach the Department has taken towards missile defense is to
    have redundant capabilities by deploying different elements. The BMD
    System will consist of elements configured into layered defenses to
    provide autonomous and mutual support, including multiple engagement
    opportunities, along a threat missile's flight path. Common sense tells
    us that the more shots we can take, the better will be our overall
    chance of success. It will also make it more difficult for the enemy to
    use countermeasures against us, because he will have to design
    countermeasures for the midcourse stage of flight, as well as the boost
    and terminal stages of flight.
        The capability-based, block delivery approach to development of the
    BMD System has been formulated to take the greatest advantage of
    available countermeasure and counter-countermeasure technology. The MDA
    Targets and Countermeasures project funds targets and countermeasures
    in support of BMD programs, including the GMD element. Major efforts
    include maintaining a required inventory of major target components
    such as boosters, reentry vehicles countermeasures, and developing and
    incorporating countermeasures into targets for testing against BMD
    elements and components.
        The MDA countermeasure/counter-countermeasure effort identifies and
    prioritizes solutions to credible countermeasures and incorporates
    robust testing against a broad range of threats. Results of the testing
    program help develop additional algorithms to mitigate these threats.
    Threat estimates are being changed from point-designs to capability-
    based. Solutions with potential counter-countermeasures effectiveness
    will be evaluated through the MDA Red-White-Blue team process for
    incorporation by block upgrades into the midcourse segment (both ground
    and sea).
        A key element of our counter-countermeasures program is Project
    Hercules. This is a national effort to develop a broad range of robust,
    adaptive, physics-based algorithms designed to defeat nominal and off-
    nominal deployments of reentry vehicles and associated countermeasures.
    The initial focus of Project Hercules has been midcourse discrimination
    for the GMD element. In fiscal year 2002, Project Hercules expanded its
    scope to include all phases of missile flight. In cases where credible
    countermeasures discussed by outside reviewers in the unclassified
    community were not already under investigation by Project Hercules, the
    Project has focused resources on mitigations strategies.
        For the midcourse BMD elements, in fiscal year 2002, MDA initiated
    advanced development of discriminating seeker components including
    multicolor focal plane arrays and laser radars, as well as beginning
    advanced development of transportable discriminating radar and
    miniature kill vehicle concepts. These efforts will continue in fiscal
    year 2003. Additionally, interactive discrimination concepts are being
    pursued.
        MDA plans to test all BMD elements and BMDS blocks against a
    variety of increasingly complex countermeasures. While definitive
    flight testing dates have not been set, this testing will evolve as the
    initial GMD parts of the BMDS Test Bed are developed and constructed.

        8. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much funding are you proposing
    in fiscal year 2003 to develop counter-countermeasures to these simple
    types of countermeasures?
        General Kadish. The BMDS budget for fiscal year 2003 includes $153
    million to fund efforts related to the development of counter-
    countermeasures. The GMD portion of that is $30 million.

                              ABL COUNTERMEASURES

        9. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the ABL is a revolutionary
    technology that could give this country a powerful defense against both
    theater and possibly long-range ballistic missiles. However, as with
    all technologies, there are countermeasures that could be used by an
    adversary. For the ABL, some of these potential countermeasures are
    quite simple, such as reflective paints. The National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 required the Department to set
    up a countermeasures test and evaluation effort for the ABL. What is
    the current status of that program, and how much funding does that
    program have this year and how much funding do you propose for this
    program for fiscal year 2003?
        General Kadish. The Directed Energy Countermeasures Assessment Team
    (DECAT), set up while the ABL program was under Air Force management,
    continues to be the only countermeasures effort for ABL. With the
    transition of ABL to the MDA, the ABL program will continue the DECAT
    effort and will also rely on the MDA Targets and Countermeasures and
    MDA Test and Assessment offices for internal countermeasure analysis.
    MDA did not fund any independent analysis of countermeasure for ABL in
    fiscal year 2002 or fiscal year 2003.

        10. Senator Reed. General Kadish, what products are planned for
    this effort in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003?
        General Kadish. We would be glad to address this effort in a
    classified briefing at your convenience.

        11. Senator Reed. General Kadish, in 1998, the Department set up a
    DECAT to evaluate potential ABL countermeasures. Does this team still
    exist, are its members the same, and how have the results of the DECAT
    been folded into ABL designs or operations?
        General Kadish. The DECAT continues to function and its membership
    is unchanged. How the results of the DECAT have been folded into ABL
    design will be answered in a classified briefing at your convenience.

                              ABL FUNDING INCREASE

        12. Senator Reed. General Kadish, both the fiscal year 2002 and the
    proposed fiscal year 2003 budgets for the ABL have had $200 million
    increases from the previous year. The fiscal year 2003 budget also
    indicates that the first test of the ABL has slipped by a year, to
    fiscal year 2005. What specific technical challenges have caused the
    program to slip and why do you need another large funding increase for
    the program?
        General Kadish. The technical challenges that caused program
    slippage include additional time and effort to incorporate lessons
    learned from the January 2002 Laser Module 1 test that produced 118
    percent of expected power. Furthermore, the original vendors supporting
    coatings in beam control optics turned to commercial markets, and
    additional time was needed to find and qualify new competent vendors.
    Finally, the test schedule, cramped because of these delays, had to be
    restructured to allow sufficient time both for the conduct of each test
    and analysis between tests.
        Funding increases reflect this program stretch out, as well as
    added work to structure the program into block increments of increased
    capability for integration into the BMDS.
        In addition, the fiscal year 2003 budget request reflects the
    incorporation of a more robust advanced technology development effort
    to include a system integration laboratory (SIL) at Edwards AFB. The
    SIL will be used to prove out and mature technologies as well as
    troubleshoot any issues on the Block 2004 system and subsequent blocks
    to reduce risk, provide phased build-up of the Iron Bird, and address
    lethality.
        Both the fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 budgets fund
    additional spares for the optical and laser systems to reduce schedule
    serialism and risk of excessive schedule delays during integration and
    testing.

            -  Beam control efforts include critical beam transfer assembly
            flight spares, duplicate flight processor diagnostic system,
            flight processors, and spare flight turret ball assembly
            components.
            -  Laser efforts include additional plumbing, integrating
            support structure, optical hardware, electronics and actuators,
            fluid products, turbopump, gain generator subsystem, singlet
            oxygen generator, pressure recovery subsystem, and mechanical
            hardware.
            -  Test and Integration funds provide for hardware and software
            for secure communications system throughout the ABL test
            facilities.

        13. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much of this funding is
    needed specifically to work on the technical challenges that need to be
    solved in order to get the first test aircraft to actually work, how
    much is for other activities, and what are those activities (e.g.,
    design and purchase of a second aircraft)?
        General Kadish. For fiscal year 2003, total ABL funding request is
    $598 million; $338 million is for the first aircraft, Block 2004.

             $280 million will be used for the Block 2004 contract
            efforts
             $58 million in government costs associated with Block
            2004 test operations at Edwards AFB, modeling, simulation, and
            analysis, target purchases for the Block 2004 aircraft, and
            program office operations
             $105 million is budgeted for the Block 2008 efforts to
            include completing a system requirements review and preparation
            of the preliminary design
             $50 million for the systems integration laboratory
             $20 million for advanced technology development
             $55 million for long lead components for Block 2008
             $30 million for the initial payment on the Block 2008
            aircraft

                                  ABL TARGETS

        14. Senator Reed. General Kadish, according to your budget
    documents, a total of 18 target missiles are to be bought for the ABL
    between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003. Please identify for
    which test each of these targets is being bought, state the purpose of
    the test, and the currently planned date for the test.
        General Kadish. The MDA reduces risk inherent in this unprecedented
    and revolutionary development effort by incrementally building and
    testing segments until the ABL weapon system is completely integrated
    and tested. Using this approach, we will ``build a little, test a
    little.'' The target set ABL will use has been developed in order to
    meet the requirements for verification of element performance. Each
    series of tests has a unique set of technical verifications for the
    specific segment being tested.
    Missile Targets
        15 Lance missiles will be used in a number of tests:

        1. Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers
    and Intelligence (BMC\4\I) to verify the proper operation of the active
    Ranging System (ARS) and Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems by
    tracking the Lance upon boost and comparing data to range tracking
    data.
        2. Beam Control/Fire Control (BC/FC) to ensure ABL fine tracking
    capability (tracking illuminator laser (TILL)) and adaptive optics loop
    closure (beacon illuminator laser (BILL)) on a boosting missile target.
        3. Full-Up system to ensure full system engagement against a
    boosting missile. No target data is collected. Tests ensure ABL runs
    the entire timeline through High Energy Laser (HEL) laze (HEL flash)
    with a boosting missile target (no destruction of target).

        Three Terrier Lynx will also be used in multiple tests:

        1. BC/FC to ensure ABL fine tracking capability (TILL) and adaptive
    optics loop closure (BILL) on a boosting missile target.
        2. A Full-Up system to ensure full system engagement against a
    boosting missile. Tests ensure ABL runs the entire timeline through HEL
    engagement.
        Together, the Lance and the Terrier Lynx bound Foreign Military
    Asset performance provide a full system demonstration against a
    realistic missile target threat. The progressive testing schedule is
    not yet firm. Currently the BMC\4\I testing is scheduled for 1QFY03.
    All other testing is scheduled for 4QF04-1QFY05 timeframe.

                      NAVY THEATER-WIDE RADAR DEVELOPMENT

        15. Senator Reed. General Kadish, your budget documentation for
    last year indicated you planned to spend $67 million in fiscal year
    2002 on X-Band radar development for Sea-based Midcourse. Do you still
    plan to spend that amount in fiscal year 2002 on X-Band development for
    this program and if not, what amount do you now plan on spending in
    fiscal year 2002?
        General Kadish. Congress made an unspecified $100 million reduction
    in the fiscal year 2002 budget for the Sea-based Midcourse Program
    Element. MDA spread the $100 million reduction across the program
    element, which resulted in X-Band radar development funding being
    reduced from $67 million to $12 million.

        16. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much do you propose to spend
    for X-Band development for Sea-based Midcourse in fiscal year 2003 and
    what is the basis for this amount?
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget is $15
    million for the fiscal year 2003 X-Band solid-state radar development.
    This figure is based on funding availability, as other elements require
    funding earlier in our program's development process.

                ATTACKING BALLISTIC MISSILES BEFORE THEY LAUNCH

        17. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, our experience with Unmanned
    Air Vehicles (UAVs) such as the Predator in Afghanistan has proven that
    we now have the capability to destroy moving targets, such as trucks
    and SUVs, with a high level of confidence. This experience indicates
    that were Operation Desert Storm to occur today, we would have much
    better success attacking Scud launchers than we did then. The benefit
    of getting the launcher is that there are far fewer launchers than
    missiles. How much funding is devoted to maximizing our ability to hit
    missile launchers before or after the launch of a missile, and who is
    in charge of developing the plans and technology for this? How is this
    effort coordinated with our missile defense efforts?
        Secretary Aldridge. We do have more capability now to destroy
    moving targets than we did during Operation Desert Storm; however,
    there are no single-point solutions to attacking such time-sensitive
    and mobile targets. The solution to the problem rests in an across-the-
    board increase in capability associated with intelligence operations,
    battle management, and attack execution to shorten the joint targeting
    cycle. The presence of persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and immediately available attack weapons
    are an important cornerstone to this capability. Although it is
    difficult to determine an exact funding amount across the entire
    spectrum of platforms and programs related to this capability, one can
    highlight a few programs related to this mission. For example, in the
    President's budget submission there is $230 million allocated across
    the FYDP for accelerated Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicle programs and,
    as indicated in Program Decision Memorandum IV, there is significant
    funding allocated for Global Hawk and space-based radar across the
    FYDP. These programs will help to attain the persistent ISR required to
    detect and prosecute targets such as SCUD launchers. There is also
    funding allocated to increase the accuracy of our weapons by
    modernizing GPS ($727 million across FYDP) and fund Advance Concept
    Technical Demonstrations (ACTDs) that would, for example, arm the next
    generation of Predator with new capability.
        All of the Services and unified commands, in coordination with the
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Defense agencies, and OSD
    (AT&L) are working to develop the plans and technology for our future
    capability. The Joint Theater and Missile Defense Organization is a key
    stakeholder in this process and plays a vital role in the DOD
    coordination of these issues.

                          FUNDING FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES

        18. Senator Reed. General Kadish, besides the two new boost phase
    programs you started last year, how much of the requested fiscal year
    2003 funding is being applied to new technologies that weren't
    previously being pursued under the previous administration and what is
    the basis for your technology program element funding level?
        General Kadish. The program includes $12.3 million for new projects
    that were not pursued under the previous administration, and $34.7
    million in additional intensified funding for projects, consistent with
    the changes in focus between the prior and current administrations,
    with the following breakout.
        In fiscal year 2002, MDA realigned its technology program under
    Program Element 0603175C. This continues with the fiscal year 2003
    request. The technology program is aligned to the BMD System's boost,
    midcourse, and terminal layers, with particular emphasis on boost-phase
    intercept and midcourse counter-countermeasures. In addition the
    program has been reoriented to conduct high-risk, high-payoff work
    intended to achieve breakthrough results, whereas previous efforts
    focused on nearer-term technology insertion for theater ballistic
    missile defense programs.
        The fiscal year 2003 technology program includes $8.3 million for
    Boost-Phase Intercept, $2.0 million for interactive discrimination, and
    $2.0 million for long-range atmospheric (terminal) defense. The
    previous administration did not pursue these. The boost phase work
    includes $3.6 million for early launch detection and tracking; the
    balance of $4.7 million is for high-energy laser weapons work.
        The fiscal year 2003 technology program also includes $12.0 million
    for Miniature Kill Vehicles, an increase of $11.0 million relative to
    the previous administration, and $14.2 million for Global Defense, an
    increase of $4.7 million that covers a $3.5 million active laser
    tracking project and $1.2 million for smaller efforts. Finally, the
    $19.0 million discriminating seeker program has been significantly
    reoriented towards technology insertion for midcourse defense against
    long-range threats.
        The MDA Technology Program Element funding level is $121.8 million
    for fiscal year 2003. MDA deems this sufficient in view of the high-
    risk, high-payoff nature of this work and because a significant
    fraction of the MDA overall budget of $7.6 billion pays for technology
    work that is done under other Program Elements.

                         NAVY AREA PROGRAM TERMINATION

        19. Senator Reed. General Kadish, Navy Area was our only ballistic
    missile defense system to employ an explosive warhead to kill the
    target missile, rather than employing so-called ``hit-to-kill''
    technology. Hit-to-kill technology requires extremely accurate aiming,
    which is difficult at best, and may not work against excessively
    maneuvering missiles, some of which we saw during Operation Desert
    Storm. What is your new plan to replace Navy Area, and do you plan on
    continuing the explosive warhead approach?
        General Kadish. When the Navy Area program was canceled, the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, USD
    (AT&L) tasked the Missile Defense Agency, in close consultation with
    the Navy, to address sea-based terminal ballistic missile defense
    capability as part of the integrated BMDS. We have completed an in-
    depth review of potential options for development and fielding of a
    sea-based ballistic missile defense capability. We assessed both
    explosive warhead and hit-to-kill options during this review and will
    provide you with detailed plans of the new effort upon departmental
    approval of the way.

                        FUNDING FOR EXTRA THAAD MISSILES

        20. Senator Reed. General Kadish, how much of the fiscal year 2003
    funding request for THAAD is for production of extra missiles, or even
    radars, or other components that are not essential for the currently
    planned Block 04 flight test program of five flight tests, but will
    likely be available assets after the currently planned block 2004
    flight test program ends in fiscal year 2006?
        General Kadish. There is $40 million in fiscal year 2003 funding
    associated with the THAAD element allocated to acquiring 10 additional
    test configuration missiles for the BMDS Test Bed. These test missiles
    will include telemetry/safety instrumentation, which was originally
    planned to be acquired later in the baseline approach. Fiscal year 2003
    funding is needed to meet a delivery schedule in fiscal year 2006
    versus fiscal year 2008, as defined in the current baseline approach.
    There is no fiscal year 2003 funding for extra radars or other non-
    missile components that are not essential for the currently planned
    Block 04 flight test program of five flight tests.

                        SEA-BASED MIDCOURSE FLIGHT TESTS

        21. Senator Reed. General Kadish, your current budget documents
    indicate that three Sea-based Midcourse flight tests are planned for
    2002. What is the total cost of the three flight tests planned for
    2002?
        General Kadish. The cost for each SMD flight test is as follows:

                            [In millions of dollars]
      Target...........................          9    (includes indirect
                                                       target costs)
      Test Conduct.....................          6    (test planning,
                                                       execution, and
                                                       analysis)
      SM-3 Missile.....................         20    (recurring
                                                       manufacturing)
                                        -------------
        Total..........................         35

        The total cost for three flight tests is $105 million.

                           ALTERNATE BOOSTER PROGRAM

        22. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you have announced the award of a
    contract worth $425 million for development of an alternate booster for
    the Ground-based Midcourse program. How much funding are you proposing
    for this effort in fiscal year 2003 and when do you expect the
    alternate booster will be available?
        General Kadish. We have asked for $216.3 million in fiscal year
    2003 for Prime Contractor dual booster development.
        Test Bed versions of the boosters will each be tested in two non-
    intercept tests beginning in 2003. Additionally, MDA plans to fly these
    vehicles against targets in Integrated Flight Test IFT-14 and IFT-15,
    planned for fiscal year 2004, respectively.

        23. Senator Reed. General Kadish, when do you expect the objective
    (vice the alternate) ground-based Midcourse booster to become
    available?
        General Kadish. Test Bed versions of the dual objective boosters
    will be used for Integrated Flight Test (IFT) -14, -15, -16, and -17.
    The full objective boosters are planned for flight scheduled no earlier
    than late 2004.

        24. Senator Reed. General Kadish, are we also considering use of
    existing assets such as the Peacekeeper as an alternate booster and if
    so, when might they become available?
        General Kadish. No. Missile stacks using various stages of the
    Peacekeeper combined with other stages were considered during the
    alternate booster competition by the bidders. They were eliminated from
    consideration because of performance, size, and system cost
    considerations.
        Neither the Orbital Sciences nor Lockheed Martin configurations use
    Peacekeeper assets. Boeing has selected Orbital Sciences Corporation
    and Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space as its subcontractors for the
    GMD dual booster strategy. Orbital will build and integrate a second
    source booster vehicle using existing or slightly modified versions of
    existing Orbital boost vehicles. Boeing intends to have Lockheed Martin
    build and integrate a high performance boost vehicle (HPBV)
    configuration.

           ACQUISITION AND TESTING OF ACTUAL FOREIGN COUNTERMEASURES

        25. Senator Reed. General Kadish, I understand that the BMDO used
    to fund a modest program to acquire and test actual foreign missile
    defense countermeasures. This program was known as QP. Is this program
    still being funded by the MDA and if so, how much funding is being
    provided in fiscal year 2002, and how much is proposed for fiscal year
    2003? Alternately, if not, why not?
        General Kadish. To date, there have been no fiscal year 2002 funds
    obligated toward QP. MDA representatives met with the Space and Missile
    Defense Command and the QP contractor on March 12, 2002. MDA is
    currently evaluating QP proposals and gathering internal information
    establish requirements for the remainder of fiscal year 2002 and fiscal
    year 2003.

                           PROGRAM MANAGEMENT FUNDING

        26. Senator Reed. General Kadish, your budget proposal for fiscal
    year 2003 funds program management-related activities such as systems
    engineering and integration, support, and program operations. What
    specific products are expected to be contracted for with this funding?
    Could you please provide a breakdown of the specific products, and each
    product's expected 2003 cost?
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2003 MDA Systems Engineering and
    Integration (SE&I) budget of $371.149 million funds Systems Engineering
    and Architecture (SE&A), Threat Systems Engineering (TSE), Advanced
    Concept, Intelligence System Threat, Joint Warfighter Support, Joint
    National Integration Center, Cooperative Programs and Allied Support,
    and BMD Information Management efforts. The funding and products for
    each of these areas is as follows:

             $192.307 Million Systems Engineering and Architecture/
            Threat Systems Engineering

                     Update the Ballistic Missile Defense System
                    Technical Objectives and Goals and System Capability
                    Specification.
                     Continue to define and develop the BMDS System
                    Evolution Plans.
                     Continue to develop new/alternative concepts
                    and conduct trade studies to support system evolution
                    and risk mitigation.
                     Update standards and orchestrate activities
                    across all BMDS elements to ensure system integration.
                     Continue the establishment of BMDS level
                    criteria, metrics, and Technical Performance
                    Measurement and assess progress, identify risks,
                    support selection of alternatives, establish capability
                    increments, and ensure system integration.
                     Maintain risk mitigation activities.
                     Continue to execute the Corporate Lethality
                    program to support effective intercepts and establish
                    collateral effects.
                     Conduct force-on-force level and detailed
                    element level analyses to assess system effectiveness,
                    ensure robust performance, and establish expected
                    capabilities to incorporate in future blocks.
                     Support analysis of system alternatives
                    involving potential coalition partners that explore
                    interoperability concepts, Battle Management/Command
                    and Control (BM/C\2\) alternatives, and associated
                    engineering requirements.
                     Continue to establish requirements for and
                    provide engineering support to System verification and
                    testing.
                     Provide for the development and analysis of
                    the BMD System architecture with multiple layers
                    including boost, mid-course, and terminal intercept
                    capabilities and employing multiple sensors integrated
                    by BM/C\2\ and Communications segments.
                     Conduct the Corporate Countermeasures/Counter-
                    Countermeasures (i.e. Red-White-Blue) program.
                     Maintain an Adversary Capability Document
                    definition necessary to support BMD System design,
                    development, and testing.
                     Maintain a number of reference scenarios
                    illustrative of the threat space, for use in assessment
                    of BMDS capabilities.
                     Perform threat modeling and simulation to
                    characterize the threat, providing digital data to
                    support BMDS analyses.
                     Update modeling and simulation capability and
                    provide threat media to support analyses.
                     Produce quick reaction assessments for the
                    Director of potential impacts to BMDS capabilities.
                     Support focused BMD efforts such as Project
                    Hercules and targets and countermeasures.

             $79.501 Million Advanced Concepts

                     Develop, evaluate, and promote integration of
                    Advanced Concepts and Technologies into the BMDS.
                     Mature advanced concepts to assess their
                    viability for BMDS.
                     Develop advanced technologies for missile
                    defense.
                     Maintain cognizance in leading edge concepts
                    that could contribute to revolutionary BMD capability
                    enhancements.
                     Develop and improve decision and
                    discrimination algorithms supporting the BMDS.
                     Develop decision architecture for implementing
                    the next generation BMDS BM/C\2\.
                     Define and lead the BMDS Battlefield Learning
                    and Adaptation to respond to unexpected battlefield
                    events.
                     Lead Advanced Concept Studies as directed by
                    MDA/D, DD, DT.

             $12.615 Million Intelligence Systems Threat

                     Foreign missile characteristics and
                    performance analysis.
                     Foreign missile booster analysis.
                     Foreign missile payload analysis.
                     Foreign missile countermeasures analysis.
                     Foreign missile signatures analysis.
                     Foreign missile lethality analysis.
                     Foreign missile proliferation analysis.
                     Adversary Capability Document (ACD) support.
                     Threat Description Document (supports the
                    ACD).
                     Capabilities-based Scenarios.
                     Intelligence-based Scenarios.
                     Scenario Modeling Software Updates/
                    Maintenance.
                     Intelligence assessments work.
                     Scenario support.

             $16.407 Million Joint Warfighter Support

                     Joint Warfighter Support Program provides BMD
                    expertise to the Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs), brings
                    Joint/Combined/Coalition lessons learned to the
                    developer, coordinates block contingency deployment
                    plans, engages CINCs in C\2\ development, facilitates
                    intra/inter theater CONOPS developments, facilitates
                    program transition to Services, maintains interaction
                    with the transitioned programs, and supports CINC BMD
                    exercises, wargames, and tabletops. This will be done
                    in fiscal year 2003 by funding the BMD portion of the
                    following seven Theater CINC exercises:

                             Roving Sands 03 (JFCOM),
                             Reception, Staging, Onward Movement
                            and Integration/Foal Eagle 03 and Ulchi Focus
                            Lens 03 (USFK),
                             Juniper Cobra (EUCOM) for 2 years (03
                            and 04),
                             Terminal Fury (PACOM), and
                             Lucky Sentinel and Eagle Resolve 03
                            (CENTCOM).

             $47.937 Million Joint National Integration Center

                     Operations of the Joint National Integration
                    Center.
                     Environment, Information Management, and
                    Facility Modernization.
                     BM/C\2\ Development and Integration.
                     Exercise Support.
                     Support to Wargames and Wargames 2000.
                     Ground-based Midcourse Defense
                    Interoperability, Multi-Mission Integration Cell,
                    Theater Missile Defense Interoperability, Special
                    Programs Center.

             $1.435 Million cooperative program and allied support

                     Develop and evaluate non-U.S. operational
                    concepts created in conjunction with supported country.
                     Examinations of U.S. and foreign assets in
                    extended air defense scenarios.
                     Develop potential foreign military sales
                    opportunities.

             $20.947 Million information management systems

                     Wide area network management activities such
                    as network security and continuity of Operations.
                     Contract support for Enterprise Information
                    Architecture.
                     Enterprise information applications: email,
                    collaboration tools, and enterprise portal.
                     BMD Data Center activities: Data storage,
                    archival, retrieval.
                     BMD Information Resource Center.
                     Information Assurance Operations Center
                    Definition and Testbed.
                     BMD Information Management/Information
                    Technology Plans, Policies, and Analysis.

                              PROCUREMENT FUNDING

        27. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the MDA acquisition plans
    envision ``transitioning'' missile defense programs to the Services
    when they are ready. Once this happens, how will procurement funding
    across the FYDP be provided and will the Services be asked to fund the
    procurement of the missile defense system out of their top-line budget
    or will funding be transferred from the MDA budget to the Services?
        General Kadish. In his Missile Defense Program Direction memorandum
    of January 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense prescribes that the MDA is
    responsible for planning and budgeting for missile defense RDT&E
    activities and that the Services are responsible for budgeting for
    missile defense procurement and operations. MDA will share the
    responsibility for planning and budgeting during the Transition Phase
    with the appropriate Service. We will work with the Department to
    develop specific procurement alternatives for BMDS elements as part of
    our fiscal years 2004-2009 Program Objective Memorandum.

        [Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2003

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2002

                                   U.S. Senate,
                             Subcommittee on Strategic,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ACQUISITION POLICY AND OVERSIGHT

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Ben
    Nelson, Warner, Smith, Inhofe, Allard, and Sessions.
        Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member; and
    Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
    Republican staff director; L. David Cherington, minority
    counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; William C.
    Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward,
    professional staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer and Thomas C.
    Moore.
        Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to
    Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
    Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; J. Mark
    Powers, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Douglas Flanders,
    assistant to Senator Allard; and Arch Galloway II, assistant to
    Senator Sessions.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. We will be
    joined shortly by Senator Allard, and I thank Senator Inhofe
    for joining us.
        I want to welcome back Secretary Aldridge, Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L),
    and Lieutenant General Kadish, Director of the newly organized
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA). I would also like to extend a
    warm welcome to the Honorable Thomas P. Christie, Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) for the Department of
    Defense.
        Mr. Christie, you have a very important statutory role. You
    provide Congress and the American people the assurance that our
    military systems are well tested and that they are
    operationally effective before they are fielded to our fighting
    forces.
        Last week, we had the opportunity to examine the
    significant budget request for missile defense. This is the
    second year in a row that there have been significant requests
    for missile defense budgets.
        This week we focus on the sweeping changes in ballistic
    missile defense management and oversight that the Defense
    Department has begun to implement. These changes raise
    questions about whether there will be appropriate checks and
    balances for the Department's missile defense programs to help
    ensure both program success and the wise use of defense
    resources.
        The most fundamental question is, are these changes
    necessary to produce effective ballistic missile defense as
    soon as practicable?
        Every day we see the technological superiority of our
    Nation's fighting forces, the accuracy of our long-range
    weapons, the ability to provide incredibly detailed videos from
    above the battlefield in real time to command centers thousands
    of miles away, and the ability to fight nearly as well at night
    as we do in the day. All of these capabilities put us decades
    ahead of all of our nearest potential rivals and all of these
    capabilities were developed using our existing disciplined and
    proven policies for acquisition and oversight.
        The second major question is, are the proposed changes
    consistent with maintaining meaningful congressional oversight
    over missile defense programs?
        Congress by itself does not have the resources to oversee
    every individual military program in detail. That is why
    Congress codified in statute the roles and responsibilities of
    positions such as the one which Mr. Christie now fills and many
    others. It is clear that under the new rules for missile
    defense, these organizations will not be performing their
    traditional roles. One of the areas we will explore today is
    what roles, if any, these oversight organizations and others
    will play in the new Missile Defense Agency.
        Before recognizing our witnesses, I would ask if Senator
    Inhofe or Senator Smith has an opening statement.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
    statement. I am ready to go to the witnesses.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Smith
        Senator Smith. I do not have one either. Let us go.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Smith and Senator Inhofe.
        Before we proceed to our witnesses, and without objection,
    I would like to place in the record at this point Secretary
    Rumsfeld's January 2, 2002, memorandum establishing the Missile
    Defense Agency, as well as Secretary Aldridge's two memoranda
    of February 13, 2002, providing plans and implementation
    guidance for the new agency. I do so because this information
    will, I think, be a significant part of the discussion at our
    hearing today and well in the future.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                    ------

                                    ------

        Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, welcome.

     STATEMENT OF HON. E.C. ``PETE'' ALDRIDGE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
           DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

        Secretary Aldridge. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members
    of the subcommittee. I again thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today to discuss the management and oversight
    of the Department of Defense's missile defense program.
        On January 2 of this year, Secretary Rumsfeld issued his
    direction to the Department for the missile defense program.
    His stated objectives included the establishment of a single
    program to develop an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense
    System (BMDS) under the authority of a single organization, the
    Missile Defense Agency.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement I would submit for
    the record, and I will briefly summarize it today.
        Senator Reed. Without objection.
        Secretary Aldridge. Redesignation of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Organization as the Missile Defense Agency provides
    greater authority to Lieutenant General Kadish and his staff to
    manage the rigorous and complex technical challenges associated
    with developing missile defenses.
        Ballistic missile defense requires scientific and
    engineering breakthroughs on many different fronts at once,
    launches from both land and sea, space-based, ground-based, and
    vehicle-based sensors, warning satellites, lasers, hit-to-kill
    systems, decoy discrimination, and guidance and targeting
    systems that have to be accurate within inches at closing
    speeds of 20,000 miles per hour impacting their targets
    thousands of miles from where they were launched. We have to
    integrate all these systems into one system requiring
    extraordinary computing power and communications capabilities
    that must themselves be safe from interference and attack.
        The Secretary of Defense directed the use of a streamlined
    oversight process for the BMDS, and he has indicated his
    intention to look to the Department of Defense Senior Executive
    Council (SEC) for oversight and recommendations for decision
    making in this area. The SEC is chaired by Deputy Secretary
    Wolfowitz and includes the Service Secretaries and myself.
        In turn, I recently issued implementation guidance based on
    Secretary Rumsfeld's direction. I tasked the Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency, who reports to me, to plan and execute
    a single missile defense program, structured to integrate work
    and enable capability trades across different elements of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense System and to facilitate decisive
    action in response to program events.
        To advise the Director of MDA on management of the missile
    defense program, and to aid the SEC in executive decision
    making on missile defense, I have formed a Missile Defense
    Support Group (MDSG) which consists of 13 designated senior
    experts from selected staffs within the Department. They will
    be supported by a working group of individuals from their
    support staffs. The Chairman of the Missile Defense Support
    Group is the Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office
    of the Under Secretary of Defense, AT&L. He will report
    directly to me on all Missile Defense Support Group matters. A
    list of the MDSG principals and working group members can be
    found in my written statement.
        Finally, MDA will manage these programs during the research
    and development phase only. They will be transitioned to the
    military departments for deployment, at which time the normal
    acquisition process will take effect.
        The objectives of this reorganization of our ballistic
    missile defense efforts are to integrate programs, centralize
    their management, elevate the authority, responsibility, and
    flexibility of that management, and to provide a more
    streamlined oversight process. It will be characterized by
    extensive OSD oversight and congressional visibility. I contend
    that it will advance ballistic missile defense toward its
    intended role as one of the greatest peacekeeping technologies
    ever created.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer
    questions of members of the subcommittee at the appropriate
    time.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Aldridge follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Hon. E.C. ``Pete'' Aldridge

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the fiscal
    year 2003 Department of Defense missile defense program and budget. It
    is my goal to address the new management structure of the missile
    defense program and discuss the new, more flexible oversight process
    which is being adopted by the Department.
        On January 2, of this year, Secretary Rumsfeld issued his direction
    to the Department for the missile defense program. His stated
    objectives included the establishment of a single program to develop an
    integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System under the authority of a
    single organization, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). He directed that
    a capability-based requirements process be adopted and that streamlined
    oversight be incorporated to facilitate the earliest possible
    deployment of missile defense capabilities to the Services.
        Redesignation of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as the
    Missile Defense Agency provides greater authority to Lieutenant General
    Kadish and his staff to manage the rigorous technical challenges
    associated with developing missile defenses. The additional authorities
    are necessary due to the magnitude of the program, and the high
    priority placed on this effort by the President. It is for these same
    reasons that the Secretary directed the use of a streamlined oversight
    process. The Secretary has indicated his intention to look to the DOD
    Senior Executive Council (SEC) for oversight and recommendations for
    decision-making in this area. The SEC is chaired by Deputy Secretary
    Wolfowitz and includes the Service Secretaries and myself.
        In that regard, I recently issued implementation guidance based on
    Secretary Rumsfeld's direction. In this guidance, I directed the
    Director of the MDA to plan and execute a single missile defense
    program, structured to integrate work and enable capability trades
    across different elements of the BMDS and to facilitate decisive action
    in response to program events. This single program has the same
    reporting requirements to OSD and Congress that all other programs
    have. The Director of the MDA has been given full authority to execute
    a capability-based acquisition approach that will produce missile
    defenses at the earliest feasible date. He will have the authority and
    responsibility to develop all associated technologies and conduct
    developmental testing. He will interface with the warfighter community
    to determine desired operational features and to develop strategies for
    introducing developed capabilities into the fighting forces. He will
    have the authority to manage the acquisition strategy, make program
    commitments, award contracts, make affordability tradeoffs, and
    exercise milestone decision authority up to, but not including,
    Milestone C (the beginning of the production and deployment phase).
        The unique management and oversight processes described above apply
    only to the development phase, when the configurations of missile
    defense systems are still being defined and production and deployment
    considerations are unknown. At the point where an individual element of
    the BMDS progresses to the point of demonstrating useful capability,
    the Director of the MDA will recommend that the SEC consider it for
    transition to production and deployment. Transition to procurement will
    create an acquisition program in its own right and activate the
    management, oversight, and reporting processes used for traditional
    defense acquisition programs. I will establish the necessary product
    teams and processes needed to support a Milestone C production decision
    by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). Following the Milestone C
    decision, the designated Military Department will manage the program
    following standard acquisition processes and reporting.
        To advise the Director of the MDA on management of the Ballistic
    Missile Defense program and to aid the SEC in executive decision-making
    on missile defense, I have formed a Missile Defense Support Group
    (MDSG) of designated senior experts from 13 selected staffs within the
    Department. The Chairman of the MDSG is the Director of Strategic and
    Tactical Systems. He will report directly to me on all MDSG matters.
    The MDSG consists of senior and experienced individuals who will be
    able to provide useful insights and recommendations on policy,
    operations, acquisition, and resource matters that affect the BMDS.
    Members of the MDSG will be supported by a Working Group of individuals
    from their support staffs. They will promote the success of the BMDS by
    providing informed constructive advice on the program and keeping their
    principals advised of program progress and developments. They will
    perform independent reviews and studies of the ballistic missile
    defense program where needed. A list of the MDSG principals and working
    group members is as follows:

                    MISSILE DEFENSE SUPPORT GROUP MEMBERSHIP
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Organization                   MDSG              MDSG (WG)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    OUSD(AT&L)S&TS..................  Dr. Spiros Pallas.  CAPT Michael
                                      Dr. Kent G.          Cregge
                                       Stansberry.        LTC(P) Stephen
                                                           Kreider
    Secretary of Army...............  BG(P) John Urias..  COL Jeff Horne
    Secretary of Navy...............  Mr. David M.        Ms. Denise Del
                                       Altwegg.            Camp
    Secretary of Air Force..........  MG(S) John Corley.  COL Bo Reese
                                                          COL(S) Rex Kiziah
    USD(P)..........................  Mr. David           Dr. Peppi DeBiaso
                                       Trachtenberg.      Dr. Rob Soofer
    USD(C)..........................  Mr. Ron Garant....  Mr. Tom Kerr
    VCJCS...........................  Brig Gen Rick       Dr. Barry Fridling
                                       Lewis.             CAPT Roger Easton
    ASD(C\3\I)......................  Mr. John Landon...  Mr. Jim Martin
                                                          COL Brian Robinson
    DOD(GC).........................  Mr. Doug Larsen...  Ms. Shauna Russell
                                                          Mr. Charles
                                                           Bidwell
    DOT&E...........................  Mr. Larry Miller..  Mr. Mario Lucchese
                                                          CDR Barry Haynie
    D, MDA..........................  Dr. Glenn Lamartin  Mr. Robert Brown
    D, (PA&E).......................  Dr. Michael         Dr. James Brooks
                                       Ioffredo.          Dr. Dennis Evans
    C, (CAIG).......................  Dr. David McNicol.  Dr. Richard Burke
                                                          Mr. Steve Miller
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The first task of the MDSG will be to review the MDA plan to
    implement Secretary Rumsfeld's January 2, 2002, missile defense program
    direction, and the implementation guidance issued by me. That plan will
    address matters of great importance to the success of the BMDS,
    including the program structure and funding allocations, the management
    structure, acquisition strategy, program documentation, and interfaces
    with the Services. The first combined MDSG and MDSG Working Group
    meeting occurred on Friday, March 8, to start the process of oversight
    and review. They will meet as required and will have access to the
    information they require to perform their responsibility.
        The Department is making these changes in response to the high
    priority for missile defense articulated by President Bush. We believe
    that integrating several programs into one, centralizing their
    management within a single defense agency with greater authority,
    responsibility, and flexibility, and providing a more streamlined
    oversight process will cause missile defenses to be developed and
    deployed in a much more efficient manner than would be possible under
    the former structure. The SEC has already conducted six meetings to
    discuss the MDA, which is significantly more high-level oversight than
    other programs that normally only see this level of oversight at a DAB
    once every few years.
        Congress will have the same visibility into the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System program that it has with other programs. In this
    context, some of the classical metrics of progress are affected by the
    adoption of an RDT&E-only approach to the development phase. To ensure
    that Congress has a full understanding of the program, we are committed
    to provide necessary details of how the program will be structured and
    managed.
        The Department provided four information briefings to the defense
    authorization and appropriations committees staff, plus one to the
    House Government Reform Committee staff. During these first five
    briefings, which occurred shortly before the Secretary issued his
    direction on missile defense, we committed to provide details on how we
    planned to implement the Secretary's direction prior to issuing
    implementation guidance. On February 11 and 12, 2002, we provided four
    more briefings to each of the defense authorization and appropriations
    committees staff, presenting the implementation plans. The MDA has
    already conducted over 25 hours of briefings on the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System to members of the congressional staff. Those briefings
    provided specifics on the planned development activities for each
    element of the system this year. MDA will continue to provide Congress
    with detailed information to satisfy its oversight responsibilities.
    The annual Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress will be
    submitted on the BMDS with a separate SAR for the PAC-3 program,
    because procurement activity for PAC-3 has begun. Providing separate
    SARs will ensure full visibility into the transition of the program to
    the the Military Departments after a deployment decision, just as it
    will be done for the Army's PAC-3.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions
    you and the members of the subcommittee might have.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Christie, do
    you have a statement?

      STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. CHRISTIE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
               TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Christie. Yes, I do, a very short one.
        Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee. I also thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you and discuss our role, the role of the Office of the
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), in
    overseeing the planning and execution of a robust test and
    evaluation strategy for the various components that comprise
    our ballistic missile defense program.
        As we have heard, the Missile Defense Agency is embarking
    on a new and aggressive approach to the development and
    acquisition of missile defense capabilities. The traditional
    paradigm of developing and producing weapon systems based on a
    set of user and technical system-level requirements is being
    transformed. This new approach is evolving to provide for the
    successful development of capabilities that are responsive to
    imminent threats and can be readily deployed while, at the same
    time, maintaining essential operational effectiveness and
    suitability standards for equipment that is fielded with our
    operational forces. As this MDA acquisition and oversight
    process evolves, DOT&E, my office, is adjusting the way we will
    execute our responsibilities to accommodate this new approach.
        I use the word ``evolving'' in my references to this new
    process because I view that evolution as not yet complete. My
    staff and I have been given access to the MDA's initial plans,
    which are still in the early stages of implementation. My staff
    has been working with their MDA counterparts for some time now
    to assure that DOT&E will have access to MDA's plans and
    programs, and that that access will be adequate to accomplish
    our oversight mission. We have agreed at this point to an
    oversight approach where we are broadly involved at the MDA and
    element levels during the early research, development, test,
    and evaluation (RDT&E) phases.
        Our level of involvement will increase appropriately as the
    programs mature and progress through to the transition and
    procurement phases. We plan to monitor significant testing and
    technology interchange activities at the project level
    throughout all the phases of these programs. We will provide
    the results of our evaluations directly to the MDA, General
    Kadish, and to the senior leadership of the Department through
    the Missile Defense Support Group and its Working Group, both
    of which, as Secretary Aldridge stated, include members of my
    staff.
        As the programs move through the transition phase, we will
    increase our involvement in test planning and execution
    activities, especially as appropriate to support both live-fire
    test and evaluation and operational test and evaluation. We
    plan to provide an independent operational assessment that
    addresses the operational effectiveness and suitability for
    each capability at each of its major decision points.
        DOT&E will also prepare an annual report for the Department
    and for Congress on each of the MDA programs. As required by
    congressional language, this report will provide our assessment
    of the adequacy and sufficiency of MDA's testing program over
    the previous year.
        In addition to missile defense program redirection, MDA is
    redefining the ballistic missile defense architecture to
    provide a system-of-systems approach to a layered missile
    defense. The new approach integrates the old national and
    theater ballistic missile defense initiatives into an
    integrated layered approach now called the missile defense
    system. We will closely monitor testing of the individual
    elements within the missile defense system, as well as the
    testing of the integrated elements, including the battle
    management, command, control, communications, and intelligence
    (BMC\3\I), which will tie all the individual elements together
    to provide a robust, integrated, layered missile defense system
    capability.
        A key aspect of the development and testing of the new
    missile defense system is establishing the missile defense
    system testbed and its supporting infrastructure. This
    integration of both existing and new facilities and equipment
    is planned to support the execution of more operationally
    realistic ground and flight testing. The testbed, as we know
    it, should mitigate many of the existing test limitations that
    have prevented operationally realistic flight testing of the
    old national missile defense system. As a result of phasing in
    new launch and tracking facilities, future ground-based
    midcourse system flight testing can gradually increase in
    realism and complexity at a pace consistent with disciplined
    engineering practice and fiscal responsibility. I strongly
    concur with the funding and development of this vital testing
    asset.
        I intend to work very closely with both Under Secretary
    Aldridge and General Kadish to support the development and
    adequate testing of a capability that will secure the defense
    of our Nation and its fighting forces while, at the same time,
    maintaining our responsibility for acquisition oversight.
        Mr. Chairman and Senators, I would be pleased to answer any
    questions that you have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Christie follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. Christie

        Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the role of the
    office of the Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) in
    overseeing the planning and execution of a robust test and evaluation
    strategy for the various components that comprise our ballistic missile
    defense (BMD) program.
        The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is embarking on a new and
    aggressive approach to the development and acquisition of missile
    defense capabilities. The traditional paradigm of developing and
    producing weapon systems based on a set of user and technical system-
    level requirements is being transformed. The new approach is evolving
    to provide for the successful development of capabilities that are
    responsive to imminent threats and can be readily deployed, while at
    the same time maintaining essential operational effectiveness and
    suitability standards for equipment that is fielded with our
    operational forces. As this MDA acquisition and oversight process
    evolves, DOT&E is adjusting the way we execute our responsibilities to
    accommodate this new acquisition approach.
        I use the word ``evolving'' in my references to this new process
    because I view that evolution as not yet complete. My staff and I have
    been given access to the MDA's initial plans, which are still in the
    early stages of implementation. My staff has been working with their
    MDA counterparts to assure that DOT&E access to MDA's plans and
    programs is adequate for us to accomplish our oversight mission. We
    have agreed to an oversight approach where we are broadly involved at
    the MDA and element levels during the early RDT&E phases.
        Our level of involvement will increase appropriately as the
    programs mature and progress into and through the transition and
    procurement phases. We plan to monitor significant testing and
    technology interchange activities at the project level throughout all
    the phases. We will provide the results of our evaluations directly to
    the MDA and to the senior leadership of the Department through the
    Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG) and its Working Group, both of
    which include members of my staff. As the programs move through the
    transition phase, we will increase our involvement in test planning and
    execution activities, especially as appropriate to support both live
    fire test and evaluation and operational test and evaluation. We plan
    to provide an independent operational assessment that addresses the
    operational effectiveness and suitability for each capability at each
    of its major decision points. DOT&E will also prepare an annual report
    for the Department and Congress on each of the MDA programs. As
    required by congressional language, this report will provide our
    assessment of the ``adequacy and sufficiency'' of MDA's testing program
    over the previous year.
        In addition to missile defense program redirection, MDA is
    redefining the ballistic missile defense architecture to provide a
    system-of-systems approach to a layered missile defense. The new
    approach replaces the old national and theater ballistic missile
    defense initiatives with an integrated, layered approach, now called
    the missile defense system. We will closely monitor testing of the
    individual elements within the missile defense system, as well as the
    testing of the integrated elements, including the battle management,
    command, control, communications, and intelligence (BMC\3\I), which
    will tie the individual elements together to provide a robust,
    integrated, layered missile defense system capability.
        A key aspect of the development and testing of the new missile
    defense system is establishing the missile defense system testbed and
    its supporting infrastructure. This integration of both existing and
    new facilities and equipment is planned to support the execution of
    operationally realistic ground and flight-testing. The test bed should
    mitigate many of the existing test limitations that prevented
    operationally realistic flight-testing of the old national missile
    defense system. As a result of phasing in new launch and tracking
    facilities, future Ground-based Midcourse System flight-testing can
    gradually increase in realism and complexity at a pace consistent with
    disciplined engineering practice and fiscal responsibility. I strongly
    concur with the funding and development of this vital testing asset.
        I intend to work very closely with both Under Secretary Aldridge
    and General Kadish to support the development and adequate testing of a
    capability that will secure the defense of our Nation and its fighting
    forces, while maintaining our responsibility for acquisition oversight.
        Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions you may
    have.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Christie.
        General Kadish.
        General Kadish. I have submitted a statement, I would like
    it included in the record, and I have some opening remarks.
        Senator Reed. General Kadish, you are recognized.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Kadish. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
    the subcommittee.
        We have modified our approach to the acquisition of missile
    defenses to reflect the reality of change and surprise in our
    world today. September 11 brought home this reality very
    forcefully to all of us in the Missile Defense Agency. The
    Department has restructured the missile defense program as a
    national priority with focused management attention so that we
    can reduce our decision cycle time during development to handle
    a very complex set of challenges.
        I believe we can meet those challenges if we do two things.
    First, make sure our technologies are mature enough to begin
    development and testing, and second, take an evolutionary or
    phased approach to development, production, and deployment.
        To support this approach, on January 2, of this year, as
    Secretary Aldridge alluded to, the Secretary of Defense
    redesignated the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as the
    Missile Defense Agency and changed the responsibilities and
    authorities of the Director. While some of these authorities
    given to the Director are new, all of them are within the
    Secretary's existing statutory powers. Moreover, our activities
    will be just as apparent, I believe, and our accountability to
    you and the American people just as assured as they have been
    in the past.
        The Secretary has set up a formal oversight process for the
    missile defense program, as described by Secretary Aldridge. As
    Director, I will continue to report to the Under Secretary, and
    the SEC, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, which will provide
    executive oversight of the program. The SEC provides guidance
    regarding policy, planning, and programming, and makes
    decisions on whether to stop, start, slow, or accelerate
    activities, and approves recommendations on the fielding of
    system elements. SEC members demand high standards of
    accountability, as was made clear with the Department's
    decisions to cancel the Navy area program and restructure the
    space-based infrared radar system (SBIRS)-Low program. I have
    briefed the SEC six times since last August on the status of
    our plans.
        There is also a standing Missile Defense Support Group, as
    described by Secretary Aldridge. Its chairman reports directly
    to the Under Secretary, and all members are senior and
    experienced in missile defense.
        In my view, there are two major reasons for these changes.
    The first is to provide more focused executive oversight and
    reduce decision cycle time throughout the development process.
    Program reviews in the traditional world of acquisition are
    episodic and subject to individual program events or
    milestones, which may be separated by months and years. Our new
    procedures provide for more frequent and comprehensive
    departmental oversight and will allow us to better respond to
    changing conditions and emerging events throughout the program.
        The second reason we have changed our processes is that the
    existing departmental procedures were designed for a single
    service acquisition. When we are dealing with very complex
    programs, such as the F-22, the DDG-21, or the Comanche attack
    helicopter, ultimately we are looking at one service to operate
    and deploy the system.
        Missile defense is very different. We have three military
    departments, the Joint Staff, and the regional commanders in
    chief all deeply involved. System integration requires that we
    cross Service boundaries at the outset of development, as well
    as many technical boundaries. Even at the mission execution
    level, no one Service will operate this system as a total
    system. The Missile Defense Agency, I believe, was established
    to pull these strands together and make an effective system.
        Now let me turn to the subject of congressional oversight
    very briefly. We will continue to provide Congress annual
    budget justification materials supporting the President's
    budget submission. Detailed budget and schedule summaries for
    all major budget projects within the system will be part of
    this submission, and will include our extensive engineering and
    rigorous testing activities as well as infrastructure plans for
    such development activities as THAAD and the Ground-based
    Midcourse system.
        In addition to the annual schedule of program hearings, we
    have provided extensive briefings and numerous briefing
    opportunities. So far, during January and February of this year
    alone, we have concluded 25 hours of briefings to congressional
    professional and personal staffs, and these briefings will
    continue as you desire.
        In order to deal with threat uncertainty, we are looking at
    a broader range of capabilities an adversary might have in a
    given time frame, and then developing defensive capabilities
    incrementally and in blocks. In simple terms, capability-based
    development means looking at the threats we face and building
    and deploying what we can in the shortest possible time. We
    accept that the capability we put in the field initially will
    be imperfect, but we can advance it and enhance it over time.
        This requires that the user and the developer work closely
    together in a disciplined way throughout the developmental
    process. It requires rigorous testing to see what works best
    and to see what might help improve the deployed system. In
    short, it allows requirements to be flexible by putting the
    user and the developer on the same page in understanding how to
    develop a product like missile defense using unprecedented and
    very complex technology. This is the best way I can think of to
    build a complex missile defense system.
        This approach is not really new. Our Nation has used it
    successfully in the past to develop the Polaris submarine-
    launched ballistic missile and the SR-71 reconnaissance
    aircraft. We are certainly familiar with upgrading systems over
    time. The B-52s that flew over Afghanistan last fall were far
    different aircraft than those that first rolled off the
    production lines 5 decades ago.
        The authorities that the Secretary has given me are
    important to our success in my opinion. Reporting on the
    missile defense program will continue, and we will continue to
    pass to Congress and this subcommittee the information it needs
    to do its job.
        Clearly, our ability to react rapidly to the swift-moving
    international security environment, while at the same time
    reforming how we do business within the Department, is a
    central challenge for us all. This committee's support for the
    President's Freedom to Manage Initiative will reduce statutory
    requirements that restrict management flexibility, allowing us
    to more effectively and efficiently execute the missile defense
    program with which we have been entrusted.
        At the end of the day, however, it is very important that
    whatever we deliver actually improves our security. With your
    support, I am committed to making sure that happens, Mr.
    Chairman.
        That concludes my statement.
        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Kadish
    follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF

        Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. It is a
    pleasure to appear before you today to testify on the recent
    establishment of the Missile Defense Agency and reorganization of the
    missile defense program. I welcome this opportunity to describe our
    reorganization.
        On January 2, of this year, the Secretary of Defense redesignated
    the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as the Missile Defense
    Agency and changed the responsibilities and authorities of the
    Director. Your staff is familiar with the Secretary's directive.
        The Secretary gave the Agency--and me as Director--new priorities
    and direction, and expanded responsibilities and authority to execute
    the missile defense program. Some of these new authorities differ from
    traditional departmental processes, but all of them are within the
    Secretary's existing statutory powers. Our activities will be just as
    apparent, and our accountability to you and the American people just as
    assured, as they have been in the past. We are developing a detailed
    plan by April to implement the Secretary's guidance. We believe that
    the changes we are instituting will provide for a better structure to
    manage and execute the missile defense program and will enhance our
    performance as responsible stewards of the resources entrusted to us.

                               PROGRAM DIRECTION

        The Secretary spelled out four top priorities for missile defense.
    They are:

             First, to defend the United States against limited
            missile attack, as well as to defend U.S. deployed forces,
            allies, and friends;
             Second, to employ a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
            System that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases
            of their flight against all ranges of threat;
             Third, to enable the Services to field elements of the
            overall BMD System as soon as practicable; and
             Fourth, to develop and test technologies, to use
            prototypes, and to test assets to provide early capability, if
            necessary, and to improve the effectiveness of deployed
            capability by inserting new technologies as they become
            available or when the threat warrants an accelerated
            capability.

        The Secretary also provided specific objectives for the program to:

             Establish a single program to develop an integrated
            system under a newly titled Missile Defense Agency (MDA);
             Assign the best and brightest people to this work;
             Apply a capability-based requirements process for
            missile defense; and
             Direct the MDA to develop the missile defense system
            and baseline the capability and configuration of its elements
            and the Military Departments to procure and provide for
            operation and support.

                      THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

        We are developing a single integrated BMD System to counter all
    ranges of ballistic missiles.
        Let me clarify some of the terms we use. When we speak of one BMD
    System, we refer to the operational integration of all missile defense
    elements, including sensors, weapons, and battle management/command and
    control capabilities, regardless of which Service operates them. We
    speak in terms of three defense segments that categorize the
    capabilities to intercept a hostile missile during each phase of its
    flight: a Terminal Defense Segment, a Midcourse Defense Segment, and a
    Boost Defense Segment. We group sensors under a fourth segment.
        Some of the terminology has changed. For example, the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense, or GMD, replaces the former National Missile Defense
    designation as a better descriptor of what it is--a capability to
    destroy missiles in the midcourse phase of flight using a ground-based
    interceptor.
        Each defense segment is made up of elements, which correspond
    roughly to the old Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Within
    the Midcourse Defense Segment, for example, GMD is an element, and
    within the Terminal Defense Segment, THAAD is an element. Below the
    element level, we have components--THAAD is an element, while its
    radar, for example, is a component.
        In programmatic terms, we no longer speak of national or theater
    missile defense. Operationally, the terms can take on different
    meanings depending on where you live. The distinction between them made
    sense a decade ago, when we faced the stark difference between a Soviet
    ICBM threat and an Iraqi Scud. Now it no longer does. The same North
    Korean missile aimed at Japan could be a national threat to our ally,
    but a theater threat to us--unless it were retargeted toward the United
    States, in which case it would become national again. Furthermore, at
    some point in time, a short-range missile could threaten our homeland
    just as well as an ICBM could, if, say, it were launched from the sea
    off our coast.
        Especially after September 11, from my point of view, we want to
    make sure that we are effective against all ranges of threats. It is a
    national decision as to where and when we deploy our capabilities. We
    face the complex task of integrating many elements, because the flight
    physics of the variety of missile speeds, trajectories, and the
    environments through which missiles travel preclude our having one
    defensive technology that can do it all.

                             DEPARTMENTAL OVERSIGHT

        The Secretary has set up a formal oversight process for the missile
    defense program. As Director, I continue to report directly to the
    Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).
    The Senior Executive Council, or SEC, chaired by the Deputy Secretary,
    provides executive oversight of the program. Permanent members are the
    Service Secretaries and the Under Secretary (AT&L). Other Department
    officials will be included as needed, depending on the subject at hand.
        This Council conducts periodic formal and informal reviews of the
    program. I have already met with the SEC six times since last summer,
    including several to provide formal briefings of our status and plans.
    Planned reviews include such topics as program plans, management
    approaches, test performance, system architecture, technological
    alternatives, basing options, and the threat. The SEC provides guidance
    regarding policy, planning, and programming; makes the decisions as to
    whether to stop, start, slow, or accelerate efforts; and approves
    recommendations on fielding elements of the system. This group demands
    high standards of accountability. You have seen some of this recently
    regarding Department decisions to cancel the Navy area program and
    restructure SBIRS-Low.
        Additionally, the Department has created a new, standing Missile
    Defense Support Group, the Chairman of which reports directly to the
    Under Secretary. This Support Group provides advice both to the Under
    Secretary and to me, as well as input to the SEC. It performs
    independent assessments, and is supported in turn by a working group.
    The members of the Support Group are all senior and all experienced in
    missile defense.
        Why these changes? There are two major reasons. The first is to
    provide more direct and focused executive oversight and reporting. We
    need to reduce decision-making cycle time, and we are looking for real-
    time involvement. If we went through the normal departmental processes,
    the reviews would be episodic, subject to individual program events or
    milestones, and there could be years between these events. Our new
    procedures provide for more frequent and more comprehensive oversight
    of the missile defense program than we currently have and can better
    respond to changing conditions and emerging events. They provide for
    more internal accountability at a more rapid pace than we have had in
    the past.
        The second reason we have changed our processes is that existing
    departmental procedures were designed to satisfy the needs of single
    Service acquisition. Even when the Department deals with very complex
    programs, such as the F-22, the DDG-21, or the Comanche attack
    helicopter, ultimately we are looking at one Service to operate the
    deployed system. Our acquisition procedures have been designed over
    time to provide oversight for that one Service. Very seldom have
    Service boundaries been crossed.
        Missile defense is different. In missile defense, we have three
    Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and the warfighting commanders
    in chief, all deeply involved in providing the kind of layered defenses
    we need. Service boundaries are crossed from the start to provide for
    integration within the BMD System. Even at the operational level, no
    one Service will operate missile defenses. That is why the Missile
    Defense Agency was created in the first place, to pull all these
    strands together, regardless of whether the basing mode of any single
    element was on the ground, at sea, in the air, or in space. Oversight
    for the missile defense program under these circumstances requires a
    new approach. I can assure you the work on this approach has already
    been rigorous.
        Let me describe some other features of the restructured program and
    processes, and then I will come back to the important issue of
    congressional oversight.

                          CAPABILITY-BASED ACQUISITION

        There appears to be confusion about what capability-based
    acquisition is. Some have interpreted this as doing away with
    requirements. That is not the case. We are not doing away with
    requirements. We are, however, changing how we derive, define, and deal
    with them.
        Instead of developing systems to respond to a narrowly defined
    threat from a known adversary, we find we cannot know with confidence
    what specific adversary might pose what specific missile threat and
    when. Hence, as a starting point, we are looking at the broader range
    of capabilities an adversary might have in a given time frame and then
    developing defensive capabilities based on technological maturity in
    blocks that will evolve over time.
        The traditional development process started with specific military
    requirements generated by the user and became formalized in the
    Operational Requirements Document, or ORD. This traditional ORD
    approach has generally served us well, especially in procurements
    involving well-known technologies, proven systems, sizeable production
    runs, and established operational experience. None of these yet exist
    in missile defense.
        For us, the strengths of the traditional requirements generation
    process can also be its weaknesses. It is rigorous, but that very rigor
    translates into a lack of the flexibility needed to deal with
    unprecedented technology development. Requirements defined in ORDs are
    typically set many years before actual system deployment, and can often
    lead to less than optimum capability against a threat that exceeds the
    description specified earlier.
        Furthermore, at the moment, we do not yet know all the technical
    approaches that will work best. Five years ago, we could not have
    foreseen, let alone written down, all the uses that define today's
    Internet. It would not be prudent to lock in our development path now
    and find out some years down the road that we have weakness in the
    system. This could come about because of an unexpected technical
    obstacle, because of some new development in the threat, or because we
    failed to exploit some practical technical innovation that we might
    otherwise have captured with our incremental acquisition approach.
        Yet we always face the risk of being surprised by changes in the
    threat. Missile defense has perhaps more uncertainties in this regard
    than many other mission areas. We do not want to alter our baseline
    every time we recognize a change in the threat. Such changes could
    ripple through the program and likely cause significant delay and cost.
    So instead of a point threat, we are setting a wider range of
    boundaries for adversarial capabilities over time in defining our own
    needed capabilities. The baseline we set must be able to deal with
    surprises and changes in the threat. A capability-based approach allows
    us to adjust to those changes in ways that the traditional requirement-
    based approach does not.
        These capability definitions act as formal requirements, with one
    key difference--they can be changed as necessary during the
    developmental stages to reflect changes in the threat or to take
    advantage of technical or engineering breakthroughs. Since they evolve
    in parallel with capabilities, they allow us to reduce cycle time,
    schedule risk, and cost risk.
        While we are moving away from some of the rigidities of the past,
    we are not abandoning rigor in development. In my opinion, far from it.
    A capability-based approach provides for significant discipline. It is
    just guided by different mileposts. Instead of the traditional process
    where users define the requirement in great detail, then, subsequently,
    developers translate the requirements into specifications, we intend to
    do both at the same time. In so doing, we can accrue the same
    advantages that the commercial world enjoys.
        We are bringing together users and developers under our Agency's
    lead--the warfighters, the Services, and industry. Together, all of
    them will have a continuous and constructive role in establishing the
    mission requirements for missile defenses, unlike that under the older
    process. The warfighters will not disengage after setting the
    requirements at the outset, and industry will not be brought in at the
    last moment--they will both be present from the start. This partnership
    will be continuous and remain vital throughout the whole development
    process. This focused, unbroken interaction will allow us to make more
    timely capability trades, explore a broader range of options, and
    upgrade our capabilities to keep them current.
        The developmental goals drawn up by this interaction are
    periodically reassessed until a decision is made to capture them and
    fix the characteristics of each 2-year block increment of capability.
    That is our plan--to be able to field, when directed, an effective
    capability, proven through rigorous testing, in 2-year blocks and to
    upgrade it incrementally and continually as the need arises. This
    aspect is called evolutionary acquisition.
        In sum, capability-based acquisition is a flexible approach to the
    acquisition of complex systems, incorporating advanced technologies,
    that permits the early deployment of a limited but effective capability
    that can be progressively enhanced over time as needed. It provides for
    continuous warfighter involvement and disciplined development aimed at
    reducing cycle time. It stays relevant to the threat and remains
    technologically current. That is our vision for the capability-based
    approach and also how we intend to execute it.
        This approach is not really new. Our Nation has used it
    successfully in undertaking previously unprecedented technological
    endeavors. Among other programs, we used this approach for making the
    trade-offs and accelerating the schedule to develop the Polaris
    submarine-launched ballistic missile and the SR-71 reconnaissance
    aircraft. We are certainly familiar with upgrading systems over time.
    The B-52s that flew over Afghanistan last fall were far different
    aircraft than those that first rolled off the production lines five
    decades ago.

                               PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        As we changed our approach to development, we found we also had to
    change our approach to management. The program is moving from being
    element-centric to system-centric, and the transitions during the
    acquisition cycle are more complex, especially in the hand-off from
    development to production. Our program has entered a new phase, having
    moved from technology development to systems engineering and the very
    significant challenge of integrating many diverse elements, including
    battle management, into one BMD System. This management challenge is at
    least equal to our technical ones, and it is no less urgent.
        This challenge of systems engineering is unprecedented because not
    only do we have thousands of individuals involved in hundreds of
    efforts at dozens of locations, but we also are dealing with cutting-
    edge technologies at varying levels of maturity, involving all Services
    and their doctrines, investigating four different basing modes, and
    making it all work together. The systems engineering task for the BMD
    System involves, among other aspects, developing interface
    requirements, element design requirements, verification methodologies,
    and assessments needed for recommendations on system progress.
        Our revised approach to acquisition now specifies three broad
    phases: Development, Transition, and Procurement. As Director of the
    MDA, I have oversight and responsibility for managing the first two
    phases, Development and Transition. The SEC, upon my recommendation,
    approves progression between the two.
        During the Transition phase, the Services take on increasing
    responsibilities, as elements move closer to production and possible
    deployment. At the start of the third phase, Procurement, the Services
    pick up responsibility for managing the production, fielding, training,
    and support of the elements of the BMD System and their components.
    Budgeting during this phase is divided. The MDA will budget for RDT&E
    funds, and the Services will budget for procurement, operation, and
    support funds.
        Managing the transition between the Development and Procurement
    phases will be complex, but it can be done efficiently and effectively.
    While MDA retains system oversight, responsibility for each element is
    shared by MDA and the Service that will operate it once deployed. We
    will baseline the capabilities and configurations during transition,
    and the Services will develop capability-based ORDs around performance
    that, by this stage in development, has been characterized for a
    particular element. These ORDs will become effective on transfer of the
    element to the gaining Service.
        MDA has overall responsibility for designing and maintaining the
    integrated Missile Defense System. For this reason, MDA retains
    responsibility for those element specifications that contribute to
    ensuring full element integration into the initial system block and in
    all subsequent blocks.
        When ready, I will make recommendations for the procurement of
    elements or their components. Only the SEC can approve the move to
    production, and the associated budget and force structure objectives.
        This decision point is not exactly equivalent to any milestone in
    the traditional acquisition framework, but is tailored to be a decision
    to transfer to a Service the responsibility for producing a particular
    configuration of an element and operating it in a quantity appropriate
    to the maturity of the system and its military utility. Should the SEC
    approve the move, elements entering the procurement phase would fall
    under the formal purview of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
    or JROC, and traditional oversight and reporting mechanisms come into
    play. As is the case now, the Under Secretary (AT&L) will continue to
    oversee Service procurement activity.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Let me turn to the subject of congressional oversight. In the near
    term, changes to the missile defense structure will lead to changes in
    the information Congress had previously seen, since the former Major
    Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are now elements within the
    overall BMD System. For example, prior reports included details for the
    PAC-3, THAAD, NMD, Navy Area, ABL, and SBIRS-Low. These now lie within
    the overall missile defense program. Additionally, these former reports
    also included RDT&E, military construction, and procurement
    information. Yet since the missile defense program is now primarily an
    RDT&E program, unit cost information will be available only after
    production decisions have been made. Thus while we have unit costs for
    PAC-3 this year, the unit costs for other elements will come later.
        That underscores the difficulty of estimating system or even
    element costs at this time. RDT&E costs are expected to continue,
    although future levels may vary depending on which elements and
    components are chosen for full development. This parallels our RDT&E
    experience in other systems as well, as we move to upgrade the right
    capabilities in response to changes in the threat and technology.
    Similarly, procurement costs and life cycle costs cannot be estimated
    with precision at this time, because force structure decisions on the
    elements or the components eventually chosen have not been made.
        Nonetheless, we will submit to Congress a Selected Acquisition
    Report (SAR) for the BMD System RDT&E program, to include major program
    schedule objectives and an estimate of the BMD System and RDT&E program
    funding. Without procurement, the report cannot address production unit
    costs, but it will, however, include major prime contractor cost
    performance data. Congress will receive unit costs to support planned
    procurement once the SEC decides to start that procurement.
        Additionally, we will be supplying--as we have this year--Congress
    with annual detailed budget justification materials supporting the
    President's budget submission. For example, this year's R-2 budget
    document describing the details of our request is over 400 pages long.
    The information is consistent with the BMD System work breakdown
    structure, legislated program elements, and special interest items.
    Included are detailed budget and schedule summaries for all major
    budget projects within the system, such as the extensive engineering
    and rigorous testing infrastructure and activities needed for THAAD and
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense development.
        Furthermore, in addition to the annual schedule of program
    hearings, we have provided extensive briefings--and briefing
    opportunities--to both Members of Congress and congressional staff
    members. So far, during January and February of this year alone, we
    have had over 25 hours of briefings on the program to personal and
    professional staff. These briefings will continue as needed.

                              OPERATIONAL TESTING

        During the development phase, MDA will be responsible for
    conducting developmental testing with the purpose of characterizing the
    capability and military utility of the technologies and their
    integration, and for making recommendations for transition. As Director
    of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, I was responsible for
    that. As Director of the Missile Defense Agency, I remain so. That has
    not changed. Moreover, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
    is represented on the Missile Defense Support Group and as such will be
    in a position to advise the Under Secretary and me throughout the
    development and transition phases.
        During the transition phase, an operational test agent will be
    designated and focused operational testing will be conducted to
    characterize the operational effectiveness and suitability of the
    element block configuration under consideration. This operational
    testing will be conducted under the oversight of the Director,
    Operational Test and Evaluation and in accordance with a Test and
    Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) that he and I will jointly approve. Based
    on the results of that operational testing and other inputs, the SEC
    will decide whether to transfer the tested configuration of the element
    to the Service for procurement and operation. All statutory
    requirements relative to operational testing will be met. Our fiscal
    year 2003 budget, presented separately, details our plan to expand the
    BMD System test bed, useful for both developmental and operational
    testing.

                           RELATIONSHIP WITH INDUSTRY

        A final important facet of our restructured program is how we will
    work with our industry partners to develop capability.
        In many ways, our relationship with industry is even more complex
    than with the Services. To help us find the right solution, we looked
    at how other unprecedented programs had been managed in their day, and
    these included such diverse and pioneering efforts as the Manhattan
    Project, the Mercury, Apollo and ICBM program, and the experience with
    the Space Shuttle. In each case, government maintained total program
    responsibility, but what became clear was that the government, too
    often, did not have a detailed enough understanding of either exactly
    what to buy or what industry could offer. The solution lay in forging a
    much closer relationship between government and industry than normal
    practice entails.
        This is the approach we are taking: to bring together as a national
    team the best and the brightest from the government, academia, and
    industry, so as to ensure timely and effective development of missile
    defense capability. This management approach will provide significant
    value to the missile defense program in bringing the best talent, the
    essential capabilities, the right process methodologies, and all of the
    pertinent proprietary information to bear on our solutions. It will
    provide a strong, disciplined approach with incentives for high
    performance and quality output.
        To recap, government has total system responsibility. Industry
    teams are responsible and accountable for block capability design, BMD
    System integration, and the tough challenge of ensuring effective and
    positive battle management, command and control. In addition to the
    standard mechanisms of traditional program oversight, I intend to meet
    regularly with the CEOs of the relevant firms. I have already met with
    them, both singly and together as a group. They are on board.

                                    CLOSING

        Mr. Chairman, we have modified our approach to the acquisition of
    missile defenses because of the changes in our world. September 11
    brought home the lesson forcefully. As Secretary Rumsfeld said, ``We're
    at a moment where we no longer have the margin for error [that we] . .
    . had decades ago where our weapons were relatively short range and
    where the warheads were relatively modest.\1\ '' We can expect to be
    surprised again, and the consequences could be grave.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Interview with [Britain's] The Daily Telegraph, February 25,
    2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Department has restructured the missile defense program so that
    we can reduce our decision cycle time during development to handle a
    very complex set of challenges and to react better and faster to
    changes in the threat. The authorities granted to me as Director are
    limited by checks and balances. They are monitored by a responsive
    oversight process that will ensure accountability and visibility for
    missile defense development both to the administration and to Congress.
        Clearly, our ability to react rapidly to the swift-moving
    international security environment, while at the same time reforming
    how we do business within the Department, is a central challenge for
    all of us. This committee's support for the President's Freedom to
    Manage Initiative will reduce statutory requirements that can restrict
    management flexibility, allowing us to more efficiently and effectively
    execute the missile defense program with which we have been entrusted.
        What is important is that, at the end of the day and with your
    support, what we in the Missile Defense Agency deliver must be of use
    to the warfighter and must improve our Nation's security. I am
    committed to making sure that happens.
        Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I welcome your and the
    subcommittee's questions.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Your statements will all
    be included in the record.
        Let me also state that we are extremely fortunate to have
    gentlemen like yourselves with experience and the dedication
    that you bring to this endeavor. So, thank you.
        Now let me recognize Senator Allard for any comments he
    might have.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have some comments I would
    submit for the record. I would like to get moving ahead with
    the hearing. I ask unanimous consent that my remarks be made a
    part of the record.
        Senator Reed. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our witnesses today.
    Secretary Aldridge, General Kadish, it's good to see you again, and Mr.
    Christie, it's a pleasure to have you here today.
        The Department of Defense is embracing capabilities-based, spiral
    development as a means of putting militarily useful capability into the
    hands of the warfighter faster than we have in the past. This is an
    approach based on commercial and public sector best practices, and
    consistent with recommendations in General Accounting Office (GAO)
    studies solicited by this committee.
        The Missile Defense Agency appears to me to be at the leading edge
    of these broader changes within the Department of Defense. This past
    year was a challenging one in many ways for the missile defense
    community. General Kadish, you had the extraordinarily difficult task
    of trying to manage very demanding programs, even as those programs
    were being reoriented in a series of wrenching policy, organizational,
    and management shifts. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization was
    transformed into the Missile Defense Agency. You changed the whole
    approach of your BMD program, from one built around stove-piped
    elements to a single integrated BMD System to provide layered defenses
    against missiles of all ranges. You have established a national team to
    provide the expertise and insight to help integrate all the elements of
    this system. You have had to adapt your management processes as
    directed by Secretary Aldridge. You've had to alter program content to
    reflect an acquisition approach that emphasizes technical maturity and
    proven capability prior to deployment. That is a daunting agenda for 1
    year, but one I think you handled well.
        Successful acquisition and technology development organizations, as
    documented by GAO, separate technology development from product
    development and mature technology by using integrated engineering
    prototypes before proceeding with production decisions. Many of these
    approaches are being adopted by DOD. In practice, the spiral technology
    development approach should allow for technology to mature under the
    Missile Defense Agency to the point that it can be incorporated into a
    program run by the Services without many of the problems associated
    with past acquisition programs.
        Will this approach be successful? No one can say. Acquisition
    reform is always difficult. It will depend on good management
    discipline at DOD. DOD's unreformed requirements and budget processes
    will also challenge this new acquisition approach. I expect our
    witnesses will have something to say about how the MDA will define BMD
    requirements and how that will differ from the process as it applies to
    other programs. In addition, the appropriate level of developmental
    testing necessary to mature technology, as well as the level of
    operational testing for each production spiral still needs to be worked
    through. While the information I have seen to date leads me to believe
    that the operational test and evaluation community will get visibility
    and input into MDA programs, I look forward to our witnesses shedding
    some light on how they anticipate this approach will work.
        I know some critics may simply have a fundamental disagreement with
    the direction of the entire Department of Defense acquisition reform
    movement. Yet unless someone proposes a better alternative than this
    new approach, we all may find ourselves in the awkward position of
    having to live with the old Pentagon acquisition system, a system that
    led to concurrent development of systems and technology, high technical
    risk, schedule delays, cost increases, and weapons system cycle times
    measured in decades--a system that for years this committee has sought
    to improve. Personally, I don't believe that such a result would be
    desirable.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for your patience today. I look
    forward to working with you in the future in what I hope will be common
    cause to improve the defense acquisition system and assure that
    effective missile defenses are deployed as soon as practicable. I look
    forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

        Senator Reed. I presume there is no other member who wants
    to make an opening statement.
        Senator Smith. I have one for the record, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Without objection, it will be included in the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Senator Bob Smith

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen, for taking time
    out of your busy schedules to appear in front of this subcommittee. I
    have long been a staunch and vocal proponent of missile defense. I want
    to congratulate the administration for its total ``reinvention'' of the
    missile defense program. I think it is exactly the right thing to do to
    view ballistic missile defense from a single, integrated, layered
    approach, and the elevation and renaming of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Organization to the Missile Defense Agency is a positive step.
        I believe this approach best enables the MDA to drive toward its
    priorities of defending the United States homeland, our deployed
    forces, allies, and friends; providing layered defenses in the boost,
    midcourse, and terminal phases of flight against all ranges of threats;
    enabling the Services to field elements of the system as soon as
    practicable; and to develop and deploy prototypes should the threat
    warrant.
        I applaud the progress that has been made. I also applaud the
    innovative acquisition and programmatic review structure that has been
    defined to assist this program through its development. I believe the
    evolutionary spiral development process acknowledges that early in the
    development phase it is impossible to define the end state of an
    operational system, to be developed and fielded in an incremental
    fashion which allows ``small steps'' to be taken first and lessons
    drawn from them before requiring the system to ``run.''
        Mr. Chairman, far too often the Services, with the best interests
    in mind, develop Operational Requirements Documents much too early in
    development and then spend money trying to drive to those requirements
    with blinders on before seeing that the development path should be
    driving towards alternative requirements.
        This has been especially the case in space programs. The
    evolutionary spiral development process will enable a prudent,
    thoughtful approach to instituting increased requirements in the
    program versus the traditional ``requirements creep.'' I believe the
    programmmatic and acquisition review structure you have instituted is
    very well thought out and is the right structure for an ambitious
    missile defense program. There have been criticisms levied against the
    program that somehow the program will have less oversight and will be
    in the hands of a small group that will run rampant. Those arguments
    are unfounded.
        The review and oversight of the missile defense program, in fact,
    will be far more robust than that on traditional programs. The program
    will be reviewed by the DOD's Senior Executive Council at least
    annually, where other programs are reviewed only at major milestones or
    events. Both the Missile Defense Support and the Working Group,
    consisting of membership form the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    operational test and evaluation, and other offices that normally are
    represented on Defense Acquisition Boards, will review the program at
    far greater intervals than normal programs. Congress will also be
    affored many opportunities to review the program.
        Again, I applaud you gentlemen, and the administration, for showing
    the courage to revamp the missile defense program into one that has the
    highest probability for success. I look forward to working closely with
    you to help make it happen.

        Senator Reed. We will conduct 6-minute rounds of questions.
    Let me begin, and we will take as many rounds as necessary to
    answer all of our questions.
        Gentlemen, section 232 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 states the following:
    ``Officials and elements of the Department of Defense specified
    shall, on an ongoing basis, review the development of missile
    defense goals and the annual missile defense program plan and
    provide to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, now the Missile Defense
    Agency, any comments on such matters as considered
    appropriate.''
        Included among that group of designated agencies is your
    agency, Mr. Christie. Did you have an opportunity, prior to the
    submission of the program plan and defense goals to Congress,
    to provide any comments on the development of the goals and
    program plan in accordance with section 232?
        Mr. Christie. To be brutally frank, I did not have that
    opportunity this year. I will have that opportunity in the
    future. I think the plans were put together toward the end of
    the year, and I had made arrangements with General Kadish to
    begin our process of oversight and interaction with his staff
    once the process of restructuring the MDA programs and
    organization was completed. Unfortunately, we did not have the
    opportunity to look at the budget preparation before it was
    submitted to the Hill.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Christie.
        General Kadish, did you provide your goals and program plan
    to all of the organizations, stipulated in section 232, prior
    to submitting them to Congress?
        General Kadish. We made the normal budget submission
    through the departmental process. I would have to go back and
    check to make sure of all the areas in that section. I am not
    familiar with them at this point. But we went through the
    normal process within the Department in a very expedited manner
    because of the time lines we were facing.
        Senator Reed. Could you, for the record, indicate whether
    or not you provided those goals and plans?
        General Kadish. I would be happy to, Senator.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 was
    signed into law on December 28, 2001. By that date, the Missile Defense
    Agency's fiscal year 2003 budget estimate had already been prepared by
    the agency and forwarded through Department of Defense channels to the
    Office of Management and Budget. Consistent with Department processes
    in effect prior to the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Act, the
    budget estimate and the accompanying goals and program plan were
    reviewed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics and the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, but
    not by the other three offices identified in Section 232(e).
        Processes for the fiscal year 2004 budget estimate will include the
    five offices identified in Section 232(e). In addition, all are members
    of the Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG). The Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics established this
    group in February 2002 to provide a continuing role in providing
    insights and advice throughout the development of the Ballistics
    Missile Defense System (BMDS). In this role, the MDSG will have regular
    access to BMDS program information on an ongoing basis.

        Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, just a follow-up point,
    if those goals and plans were not provided, are you going to
    follow through and ensure that this section of the law has been
    complied with in this budget cycle and in the future?
        Secretary Aldridge. Absolutely. The process last year was
    somewhat rapid and condensed, based upon a lot of reasons,
    starting with September 11. So, a lot of things we would
    probably have done in a normal year were not completed to the
    degree we would like.
        I would just say the program content that has been
    submitted to Congress has gone through the Senior Executive
    Council, which is the Deputy Secretary, myself, and the Service
    Secretaries, along with the management structure. We all
    supported that particular activity.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you indicate that the new
    missile defense program has the same reporting requirements to
    Congress that all other programs have. Section 2430 of Title 10
    defines a Major Defense Acquisition Program, or an MDAP, as
    ``an acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive
    classified program that is estimated by the Secretary of
    Defense to require an eventual total expenditure for research,
    development, test, and evaluation of more than $300 million.''
    Virtually all major missile defense programs fall into that
    category, and in fact, as of December 2000, all major missile
    defense programs were MDAPs.
        Section 2413 of Title 10 requires submission each year of
    an MDAP for the development schedule, including estimated
    annual costs until development is completed, the planned
    procurement schedule, including the best estimate of the
    Secretary Defense, and the annual cost and units to be
    produced.
        It is my understanding that this information was not fully
    submitted to Congress. Why not?
        Secretary Aldridge. I think there is a definition problem
    with what a Major Defense Acquisition Program is. In the
    ballistic missile defense program we have laid out, it is
    undefined that any one of the elements is an MDAP until there
    is a decision to proceed with a deployment or some plan to
    proceed with the deployment in some future year. At this point
    in time, it is undefined as to what it is that we are going to
    build, what are the technologies we have in place. Right now,
    we are just working through a research and development program.
        In any event, let me just say that there is no intent to
    deny Congress any information and that the plan is to provide
    all information required by Congress, by whatever provisions
    there are, both in terms of Selected Acquisition Reports,
    detailed budget information, and that type of data.
        So, at this point, I think the question is a definition of
    an MDAP and what is the precise reporting requirement for the
    Department. Whether or not it is an MDAP, the data will be
    provided to Congress, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Again, just to clarify my understanding, many of these
    programs in the missile defense area were MDAPs as of December
    2000 and became transformed into something other than an MDAP
    after that. Is that correct?
        Secretary Aldridge. That is correct. We terminated those
    programs as MDAPs because they did not fall into the definition
    of what a Major Defense Acquisition Program would be. But we
    certainly continue the program and keep the contracts, and we
    will report those to Congress whether or not they are MDAPs.
        Senator Reed. Well, you are as experienced as anyone, and
    you understand that this is one of those baseline information
    requirements that is not only helpful to Congress, but helpful
    to the management of the Department of Defense.
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, I do know that.
        Senator Reed. That raises a second question, which is, is
    it your position that the law is satisfied by your simply
    giving us the information? Or do you feel that you have to give
    this information to us?
        Secretary Aldridge. We have to give the information to you,
    sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Now I would like to recognize Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Aldridge, General Kadish, and Mr. Christie, I
    want to welcome you.
        Secretary Aldridge, one of the criticisms that seems to be
    creeping up from time to time in the press--I think following
    the last hearing, maybe we read a little bit about it--is that
    there are those who are suggesting that the way the Missile
    Defense Agency has been reorganized reduces or even negates
    independent oversight of some missile defense programs.
        Would you generally discuss the effectiveness in the past
    of OSD oversight for development and acquisition programs and
    talk about the need to improve or streamline the oversight
    processes?
        Secretary Aldridge. All right, sir. First of all, most of
    the activities in the Department of Defense on acquisition are
    associated with a single program, whether it is an F-22 or a
    Joint Strike Fighter, a ship, a tank, or a combat vehicle, and
    the process that occurs under those is very well-defined in
    milestones of A, B, and C. There are groups inside of the
    Department of Defense called Overarching Integrated Product
    Teams (OIPTs) that consist of individual members of the various
    organizations who look at these programs together and then make
    recommendations as they move through the milestones and through
    the decision process, usually through Defense Acquisition
    Boards (DABs). But those are associated with essentially a
    single type of program in which the individuals involved can
    talk to a program manager. He has a very specific thing to do,
    and the process works, I would say, well. We have done some
    things to improve it--and maybe we will talk about that later
    on--in trying to streamline that process even more.
        In missile defense, it is a different issue. We have a
    program that is highly complex with a series of programs with
    sensors, with interceptors, with the command and control
    system, it is what we define as a system of systems. It is not
    any one program. It is a system of systems, which makes the
    acquisition process very difficult. What we were trying to do
    with this process is to try to keep the focus on getting a
    system deployed, but doing it in a way that takes into account
    that there are multiple systems that have to be reviewed from
    multiple offices.
        We have 13 individuals through the Missile Defense Support
    Group that have equities in missile defense, but we have
    brought them together into a single team so that they have
    access to the same information from the MDA and they all are
    not going to the program individually at different times asking
    for different types of information. It is our view that with
    this Missile Defense Support Group, by having its 13 members
    working together, there is a synergy between individual members
    hearing things, hearing the thoughts of the other people on the
    team that can provide better oversight of what is going on in
    the missile defense program.
        There is one other point, and that is that this is only
    during the research and development phase when this activity
    will be undertaken. When there is a decision to move a
    particular system, as we have done for the Army's PAC-3 system,
    then the acquisition system goes back to the normal process of
    the Defense Acquisition Boards. As these programs come out of
    missile defense and go to production and go to deployment, the
    normal DAB process will continue. So, the oversight
    responsibility we are talking about is that which exists only
    during the research and development phase.
        I think what we have done here is to provide a unique
    ability to monitor this very complex system in a way that is
    going to give General Kadish the responsibility and authority
    to manage his program efficiently and yet still provide the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services,
    which are members of this team, including DOT&E, including the
    Joint Staff, the ability to see into the program for the
    purpose of advising me, the Missile Defense Agency, and the
    Senior Executive Council on new things to do.
        Let me just say one short thing about acquisition
    streamlining. We have mandated now that spiral development
    shall be one of the milestones and characteristics of programs
    that we produce. What do we mean by spiral development? That is
    the ability to deploy something that is maybe not the 100
    percent solution, but it is the 80 percent solution with an
    architecture that would allow that capability to be improved
    with time as technology matures. That is a way to get these
    systems in the field sooner with less risk, less cost
    uncertainty, change uncertainty, and it allows us to, in some
    cases, get older systems out of the field quicker or, in the
    case of missile defense, to get the system in the field
    quicker. So, that is one area that we have been focused on to
    streamline the process.
        The other is in the Defense Acquisition Board, where we
    have reduced the size of the Defense Acquisition Board from 16
    members to 10, and we now have included the Service
    Secretaries. So, the DAB is now the decision board of the
    Department for defense acquisition, and because the Service
    Secretaries sit on that board, the process works extremely well
    and much faster because they are the decision makers. We do not
    have to staff decisions after the board meets.
        We are seeing the acquisitions process go much faster. In
    fact, in some cases, we do not have to have DAB meetings
    because the process does work.
        Sir, that is probably a long answer to your short question.
        Senator Allard. You took up all my time. [Laughter.]
        Secretary Aldridge. I am sure you will go around again.
        Senator Allard. We wanted to have a full response and I
    appreciate your full response. When my time allows, I will come
    back with a follow-up question to Mr. Christie as to how he
    views his role.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too
    appreciate you gentlemen being here today to help enlighten us
    as to the process with respect to budgeting for missile
    defense.
        As you may recall from previous hearings and meetings, one
    of my concerns has been knowing when we are moving from
    research and development to deployment. I asked some of your
    colleagues will we know when we are there, because it was very
    difficult to try to dissect and delineate in the budget what
    was purely research and development and those elements that
    began to blur potential deployment or readiness for deployment.
        We have gone 6 more months since those questions were
    appropriate, so what is the distinction between deployment and
    research and development?
        Obviously, the concern is treaty obligations, but I think
    it is also a matter of budget concern even if we did not run
    the risk of being in violation of a current treaty. I would ask
    you, General Kadish, because we have had this sort of
    conversation previously.
        General Kadish. Senator, the way the program is
    constructed, with the exception of PAC-3, which is in the early
    phases of procurement and deployment, all our efforts are
    oriented to research and development and the test
    infrastructure in order to support to that. We have not
    proposed to Secretary Aldridge or the Department specific
    deployments other than in PAC-3.
        I suspect, however, that as we go forward in the coming
    months and years, we will be proposing those efforts based on
    the success or lack thereof of our research and development
    program.
        I would also say that everything we are doing in terms of
    the application of the budget to fiscal year 2002 is still in
    compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty until June 13
    or 14 of this year. We will continually evaluate that.
        But our efforts right now are not to specifically produce
    elements for deployment activities, except for PAC-3.
        Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, with the suggestion
    that success may or may not be defined as the 100 percent
    solution, has there been any further effort to define what
    might be considered success in terms of testing that might lead
    to a request for deployment? What I am asking for is a
    percentage. Would it be 80 percent, 90 percent, or 50 percent?
    Give me some idea of what we would consider successful in terms
    of moving forward.
        General Kadish. Senator, we are now in the process of
    refining our definitions, our understanding, but basically I
    think they are going to stay pretty much the same in terms of
    what we used to call single-shot probability of kill and the
    different measures we use for effectiveness. Rather than give
    you specific numbers in open testimony, I would rather provide
    them in a classified arrangement at the appropriate time.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That would be fine. But are you working
    on what constitutes sufficient success so as to lead to a
    recommendation to deploy the system?
        General Kadish. That is correct. This gets to be a very
    important part of this evolutionary capability approach that we
    are taking because success definitions will be an important
    part of the decision to move forward. Let me put it this way:
    Right now we have zero probability of intercepting a ballistic
    missile. Some judgment will have to be made as to whether or
    not anything greater than zero is useful, and those things will
    be a part of not only the technical judgments, but the
    operational judgments made by a larger group within the
    Department, in my view.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate that very much. Obviously,
    I think all of us are hoping that the program can be successful
    and be a part of our national defense, certainly against the
    kind of weapons of mass destruction that may come our way, and
    being able to prevent that from happening is in everybody's
    best interest. I also think, though, given the fact that we are
    stretching dollars to do a lot of different things in the
    military budget, you can appreciate the fact that we are always
    going to be a little bit concerned about how much of our budget
    we put in missile defense. Certainly, research and development
    is one thing, but the standard has to be relatively high for us
    to be able to deploy a system. I appreciate the fact you are
    working on it.
        Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, let me echo what the chairman and others
    said. How great it is to have you three people in the positions
    that you are in at this time of great threat to our Nation. I
    appreciate your service very much.
        This hearing is on acquisition and oversight. I would like
    to talk about the oversight portion of that.
        First of all, General Kadish, just for clarification, you
    made reference in your testimony to the contingency
    capabilities of THAAD and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense.
    Now, some of the missile defense opponents out there seem to
    have misunderstood that this contingency capability is
    equivalent to operational deployment capability in these
    systems. I wonder if we could clarify this. My understanding is
    that if you have something that is not yet fully developed, it
    could still be used in the event that we have nothing else to
    use at that time. Would you clarify this?
        General Kadish. Senator, there has been a lot of
    misunderstanding about this contingency capability, and you are
    right to try to clarify it.
        Whether we are talking about missile defense or not,
    whether it is a Global Hawk or any other system, whenever you
    have a testing asset or something that is in testing for
    developmental purposes, you have an inherent capability because
    nothing existed before you built that. The question comes, in
    the way we have constructed our program, at what point in time
    would you be able to use a missile defense asset that is in
    testing to protect ourselves or deployed forces if the need
    arose and we were in some extreme situation? I think that the
    answer to that question is whenever we have a test asset that
    is under testing, if it is in the right position, if it could
    be used in an operational mode, just as we are using the Global
    Hawk today, which is in development, in Afghanistan for
    operational purposes.
        The very fact that a test activity exists could be used for
    operational capability, but it will not be up to what the
    original standards that we were trying to develop a particular
    system for. You would pay a high price in a sense because you
    would not be able to do much more testing with that asset.
        So, the idea of test assets being used in contingency
    operations when there is a wartime need, or in the case of
    missile defense, when there is a peacetime need to have that
    capability as a deterrent or otherwise, will always be there in
    our development process.
        Senator Inhofe. The way I have stated it before is that if
    it is not perfect, it is better than nothing if nothing is what
    we have right now.
        General Kadish. That is exactly right.
        Senator Inhofe. I have gone through 8 or 9 years of being
    really distressed about the continued underestimating of the
    threat that is out there. I began to get concerned about this
    when President Clinton vetoed the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, and in his veto
    message, he said that the major reason was that there is money
    in there for a missile defense system and there is no threat.
    Of course, the NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate, of 1995
    said that before a rogue nation would have any kind of
    capability, it would be many years. It was way out into the
    future, which we know, now, was not the case.
        Later on we found that they used the word ``indigenous.''
    Well, to me it makes no difference whether a rogue nation
    develops a missile that can reach Washington, DC, that is
    indigenous or whether they buy it with technology from China or
    somebody else.
        It was music to my ears on July 12, 2001, when Secretary
    Wolfowitz said, ``While we have been debating the existence of
    the threat for nearly a decade, other countries have been
    busily acquiring, developing, and proliferating missile
    technology. We can afford to debate the threat no longer. We
    are in a race against time, and we are starting from behind,
    thanks in no small part to the constraints of the antiquated
    ABM Treaty.''
        Could you share with us your views on the growing
    likelihood of rogue nations having missile capability that
    would be a threat to us?
        General Kadish. I guess the way I would like to start the
    answer to that question is that I review the intelligence data
    every day to make sure that we have consistency with our
    developmental program, and that we can be responsive to what we
    are actually designing against the threat. From a missile
    proliferation standpoint, the threats we see that are
    developing outside of Russia and China, they are significant,
    especially in the short-range and intermediate-range missiles,
    and moving very rapidly in my opinion to long-range missiles.
    So, we have a threat that is somewhat unprecedented for us in
    terms of missile proliferation and weapons of mass destruction.
        Senator Inhofe. Secretary Aldridge, do you have any
    comments on that?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. Just to highlight what
    General Kadish says, this is a missile defense program that is
    not just aimed at national missile defense. This is defense of
    our troops in the field, in addition to national missile
    defense. There is no doubt that there are threats of short-
    range, medium-range, and long-range. So, the threats that this
    system must deal with are there. They are being tested today in
    a wide variety of ways. So, there is no doubt that there is a
    threat. The threat is here. It is growing and the program we
    have laid out is a way to try to handle that.
        The program is also dealing with intercepts at various
    stages of the missile's trajectory, in the terminal phase, in
    the midcourse phase, and we are working on the boost-phase
    intercept, which makes it very difficult for an adversary to
    design a countermeasure against all types of intercepts that we
    could employ in our system. So, not only must we deal with the
    current threat, we must think about the future threats as they
    evolve. Our program, as it is laid out, is designed exactly for
    that reason.
        Senator Inhofe. My time has expired and I do want to follow
    through with this later. I am glad we are no longer talking
    about a national missile defense system and a theater missile
    defense system as though they are unrelated but we are talking
    about a defense system against a missile.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Smith.
        Senator Smith. That is a long time coming. I am glad to
    hear we finally are talking about it that way.
        Gentlemen, the Department has canceled these Operational
    Requirements Documents (ORDs) as they pertain to missile
    defense programs. They defined in some detail, or tried to,
    just what the capabilities of the system would be at the time
    it was developed and deployed. It seems to me that is
    consistent with what you are trying to do in terms of the
    flexibility for a spiral development process.
        Let me ask you first, Mr. Secretary, what is the
    alternative process here to ensure that the architecture of
    missile defense will head us toward an integrated solution? You
    have at least some idea down the road where we are headed. I do
    not think I can think of any particular system, from some
    military requirement or even building a car, for that matter
    where if you do not have some idea of what your end goal is as
    to what its function is, how you can continue to develop it?
        Secretary Aldridge. Sir, I believe we are taking a slightly
    different approach in missile defense, and the approach we are
    taking is called capabilities-based. It is different from an
    ORD that would say to you, you would not deploy a system until
    it achieves a .95 kill probability against 10 rockets or 10
    ballistic missiles within 5 minutes. If General Kadish could
    say I can shoot down 8 of these missiles, it is going to take
    me 6 minutes with a kill probability of .9, it may be
    sufficient that we say that is a capability we believe we need.
    It is adequate for our needs to protect our country at this
    time against that threat.
        Then what we would do is, if we deployed it, because it was
    a capability that we believed we needed, we could improve it
    with time so that pretty soon it could do 10 missiles in 5
    minutes and then maybe 50 missiles in 1 minute. So, the idea of
    a capabilities-based decision to deploy is that it gives us
    what we need at the time, irrespective of whether or not we had
    an operational requirement for certain probabilities.
        This is not serving our needs at this time for this
    program. It serves other programs perfectly fine where there
    may be a more well-defined threat, a certain armor plating
    thickness, and things of that nature. For this system, that is
    not appropriate.
        Senator Smith. General Kadish, with respect to the
    warfighter, how are we going to ensure that he believes that it
    is going to be militarily useful for him?
        General Kadish. The essence of the capability-based
    approach and spiral development is that we have a tight linkage
    with the warfighter and the developer at the same time.
    Traditional ORD documentation gives you a time period where
    warfighters specify a requirement and then give it to the
    developers that write them in the specifications and then we
    give it to a contractor.
        This effort is for us to try to do that together, given the
    fact that we can now make trades among different system
    elements that we did not think about before because we had an
    ORD for a Navy Theater-Wide system and we had an ORD for a
    national missile defense system. Now we can look at sensors and
    missiles, interceptors, and communications systems that bring
    these together, and our hope is that we are going to be able to
    make a better system among those elements doing it without the
    ORD specifications and in a faster time line.
        Senator Smith. I do not think it is arguable that probably
    the most mature BMD System that we have now is the PAC-3.
    Right? I think we would all agree on that.
        Just using that as a yardstick, did the PAC-3 ORD that was
    laid out a few years ago accurately or inaccurately come close
    at all to reflecting the threats that we now expect the PAC-3
    to deal with?
        General Kadish. It put us in the ballpark, but we are
    dealing with threats now that are much different than what PAC-
    3 was originally specified to counter. That is part of the
    problem with threat-based, ORD-based requirements because you
    have to deal with an exquisitely defined intelligence threat
    that may or may not be wrong. So, although we have a general
    capability with PAC-3 that is pretty good, we still do not meet
    all the definitions of threats that we had set out to
    accomplish with that particular effort.
        Now, we are going to upgrade it over time. That is the
    whole idea with all our elements, but that is the nature of the
    threat that we have to deal with. If a threat was specified in
    the ORD document to go 1,000 kilometers and we find out it goes
    1,200 kilometers, that is a difference in the requirement.
        Senator Smith. A lot of criticism was thrown out there,
    over the past 12 years that I have been on this committee. The
    term ``redundancy'' has been used a number of times in terms of
    the systems, which I never really believed was the case. But if
    there was some redundancy--and apparently that seems to be the
    conclusion now because of the way we are moving toward
    elimination of some of these systems--was any of that caused
    by, in your opinion, the demarcation that we used with the ABM
    Treaty between theater and national missile defense systems?
    Could we have avoided a lot of wasted money and perhaps gone
    quicker toward the more integrated system if we had not been
    dealing with trying to finesse that ABM Treaty as to what was
    theater, what was not theater, et cetera?
        Secretary Aldridge. That is a hard one.
        Prior to this time, prior to the time that General Kadish
    and the Secretary reorganized the program to include a much
    broader scale of intercept zones, as well as ballistic missile
    ranges that we wanted to detect, the program was designed with
    the ABM Treaty in mind, with its restrictions. Since that time,
    we have designed the program without the ABM Treaty, although
    we are abiding by the provisions of the treaty and we are not
    doing things that we could be doing in the test program that
    would give us additional information that would aid decisions
    for the future. We are not now doing those until we get to June
    13. So, there has been some degradation of the information that
    we would have available because of the ABM Treaty, and I
    believe the President, looking at that and the needs for the
    future--that is the reason he has made the decision to withdraw
    from that treaty because it will, in fact, impede us in the
    future.
        Senator Smith. Thank you. That is a good answer. I
    appreciate it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Smith.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
    make a brief statement and have my full statement placed in the
    record.
        Senator Reed. Without objection, Senator.
        Senator Akaka. On Monday, I chaired an open session of the
    International Security and Proliferation Subcommittee of the
    Governmental Affairs Committee, at which the Central
    Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Officer for
    Strategic and Nuclear Program's, Robert Walpole, testified. Mr.
    Walpole made three points in that hearing which are worth
    repeating today.
        First, the immediate threat to American forward-deployed
    forces and allies comes from short- and medium-range ballistic
    missiles and land attack cruise missiles.
        Second, United States territory is more likely to be
    attacked with weapons of mass destruction using non-missile
    means.
        Third, some countries with ballistic missile systems, such
    as Iran and North Korea, are upgrading their capability to
    launch ICBMs, but Iran is not likely to attempt to test launch
    an ICBM until the last half of the decade.
        These conclusions suggest our missile defense program
    should concentrate on the immediate threat while designing and
    testing the capability to address the long-term threat from
    rogue states.
        I thought I would share that in this meeting.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. This is a
    critical issue that deserves all the attention you are giving it.
        On Monday, I chaired an open session of the International Security
    Subcommittee of the Governmental Affairs Committee at which the Central
    Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and
    Nuclear Programs, Robert Walpole, testified.
        Mr. Walpole made three points in that hearing which are worth
    repeating today:
        First, the immediate threat to American forward-deployed forces and
    allies comes from short- and medium-range ballistic missile and land-
    attack cruise missiles.
        Second, United States territory is more likely to be attacked with
    weapons of mass destruction using nonmissile means.
        Third, some countries with ballistic missile systems, such as Iran
    and North Korea, are upgrading their capability to launch ICBMs, but
    Iran is not likely to attempt to test launch an ICBM until the last
    half of the decade.
        These conclusions suggest our missile defense program should
    concentrate on the immediate threat while designing and testing the
    capability to address the long term threat from rogue states.
        I am concerned that the new, $7 billion ``capabilities-based''
    program being proposed by the administration for missile defense does
    not ensure that we will have a missile defense system capable of doing
    anything well. Rather than taking a targeted approach which would
    ensure the development of a missile defense capability, the proposed
    program seems to take a shot-gun approach, scattering our money and
    technical expertise across a range of too many technologies.
        In addition, the budget documents presented to Congress so far seem
    more notional than real. This would not be of concern if the
    administration was presenting us with a hypothetical program, but
    unfortunately these are real dollars which the President wants Congress
    to approve now and commit to in the out-years. Without more specific
    justification and numbers, it is hard to understand how the
    administration has arrived at this $7 billion-plus program.
        Moreover, the administration wants to remove this program from the
    normal checks and balances of a major acquisition program, cancelling
    the Operational Requirements Documents and excluding the Pentagon's
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from his usual oversight.
        Instead, the administration is proposing that part of the job of
    overseeing whether or not the program is functioning properly be done
    by the major industry contractors involved in developing the program.
    This is a bit like putting the fox in charge of the henhouse. Enron did
    this with its outside auditors, and we know how well that worked.
        We need a missile defense capability. We need it sooner rather than
    later, but we need it to work against real world enemies. I am not
    certain that the approach being proposed by the administration achieves
    either objective.
        Thank you, and I look forward to the testimony.

        Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, according to a memorandum
    from the Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency will
    no longer rely upon system threat assessment reports developed
    by the Defense Department's intelligence agencies, but will
    develop a unique document called an adversary capabilities
    document.
        My question is, will the preparation of the adversary
    capabilities document require that the Missile Defense Agency
    duplicate functions performed by other parts of the Department
    of Defense?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir. The threat capabilities
    document will be based upon the work of multiple defense
    agencies as inputs. It is really the document that the Missile
    Defense Agency needs to have with that type of data so they can
    design missile defense systems against these capabilities, but
    there is no intent to duplicate what is going on in the other
    agencies, certainly in the intelligence agencies.
        General Kadish. If I could add to that, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Yes, General.
        General Kadish. Where we have an intelligence estimate that
    defines the threat, it will include automatically that
    intelligence estimate. But what we are trying to do is work
    with the capabilities-based approach, where we define
    parameters larger than that threat estimate, for instance. They
    tend to be point-designed solutions given to us about what the
    threat looks like. We would like to hedge the uncertainty of us
    making a mistake in that area, and go to what we call physics-
    based assessments and look at the physical parameters that
    could be around that threat and design, as best we can, for
    those parameters which would include the specific definition by
    the intelligence community. So, it is a much more effective way
    in my view of defining the threat for our purposes.
        Senator Akaka. The Secretary's memorandum directs the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    to base production decisions on initial performance
    demonstrated through credible testing, availability of system
    alternatives, and threat evolution.
        Would initial performance be based on developmental
    testing, operational testing, or some other form of testing?
        Secretary Aldridge. It will be based on the developmental
    testing to date, but it will continue after that decision to
    ensure that when we get to the point of becoming operational,
    there will be additional tests to be done. That will become
    part of Mr. Christie's office, to look at the operational side
    of things, while he is continuing to oversee the development
    testing as well through our Missile Defense Support Group.
        Senator Akaka. In that memorandum too, the Secretary
    directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics to plan and execute work such that it
    may be truncated or stopped under certain circumstances.
        What metrics will be used to determine which programs will
    be truncated or stopped?
        Secretary Aldridge. Sir, we have laid out a program for
    missile defense that, in some cases, has multiple or parallel
    technology paths that may or may not work. If at any point we
    see that the technology is not performing at the level that we
    desire, the cost is growing too large, or the schedule is not
    sufficient to meet the architecture we laid out for missile
    defense, we will make a decision as to whether to proceed on
    that program or not.
        There is a process in place by which that is done. Major
    decisions of that kind will be made by the Senior Executive
    Council, which essentially will be the board of directors. They
    will make a recommendation. Of course, the Secretary of
    Defense, the President, and ultimately Congress have to support
    that decision of whether or not to deploy where a capability
    that has been demonstrated is sufficient to meet the needs of
    the Nation at that time. So, it is elevated at a higher level
    and a variety of metrics will be determined.
        We were faced with a problem just recently with the Navy
    Area terminal defense system, which exceeded its cost
    estimates, and we faced up to that decision and decided to
    terminate that program because it was not under control, as it
    was defined, and it violated the Nunn-McCurdy Act. It was given
    to me for the purpose of certification that the program should
    continue, and I could not meet the certification criteria to
    continue the program and I terminated it.
        Senator Akaka. In the January 2, 2002 memorandum, the
    Secretary directed the Missile Defense Agency's director to use
    transactions other than contracts, grants, or cooperative
    agreements to carry out applied and advanced research. So, what
    selection criteria will determine whether the agency uses other
    transactions for a project?
        Secretary Aldridge. I would like to ask General Kadish to
    address that, if I could.
        Senator Akaka. General.
        General Kadish. We intend to use the other transactions
    authority based on the authority being granted in the first
    place for prototyping and rapid acquisition activities. For the
    most part, however, I see us, at least at this point in time,
    using the traditional authorities for our major efforts. But
    where it is appropriate--and it gets to be a judgment call at
    some point in the process--we will use the other transaction
    authority for our beneficial purposes. But as a matter of fact,
    I think that over time we will basically use the contracting
    authority that is in the Federal acquisition regulations, but
    we will look every time at whether other transaction authority
    makes sense.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing a
    former member of this subcommittee to join you today. Senator
    Allard, you do a fine job as ranking member for this
    subcommittee and I commend you and Senator Reed. I have sat in
    both of those seats in years past.
        Mr. Secretary, welcome. You are an old friend and an old
    colleague.
        Senator Smith asked a key question relative to the ABM
    Treaty, and I have propounded that same question I think for
    almost 24 consecutive years to previous panels here.
    Consistently impartial observations by your predecessors, both
    uniformed and civilian, have been that this Nation was going to
    comply with the ABM Treaty, but that we recognized that the
    treaty imposed, in all probability, delays, higher costs, and
    the possibility of, in the end, getting a system which was more
    expensive, took longer to build, and could not be as efficient
    and as effective. Therefore, I commend the President for his
    decision to withdraw from the treaty, and hopefully you will
    reappear before this subcommittee after the withdrawal date and
    we will look at what your new ideas are.
        I would like to ask you about the Arrow program. Congress
    has been supportive of the Arrow program. Mr. Secretary, what
    provisions do we have this year, in terms of funding and
    sharing of technology, for Arrow? General, what is your
    professional view as to the effectiveness of the Arrow system,
    because I think there has been a rather dramatic breakthrough
    in missile defense in Israel.
        Secretary Aldridge. Senator, we certainly have been
    following that program for quite a few years and it has been a
    successful program. We have funding in the budget request to
    continue that. We have also provided co-production for
    producing that missile in our country. I do not recall the
    numbers. General Kadish can address that, but it is certainly
    something that has been supported by previous administrations,
    and this administration, and I will let General Kadish talk
    about where we think we are headed.
        General Kadish. Senator, I think we have close to a billion
    dollars in investment in the Arrow program with the Israelis.
    They declared it operational, I think 8 or 9 months ago. I
    would have to get you the exact date. It is the only blast
    fragmentation, non-nuclear missile defense system deployed in
    the world today.
        It is effective. The flight tests have shown that they can
    reach the parameters that they are going after and they can
    destroy the missiles. As Secretary Aldridge said, we have a
    continuing relationship with the Israelis. I believe the number
    is on the order of $60 million in this budget request. I would
    have to get you the exact number for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Successful tests of the Arrow Weapons System, particularly the
    September 14, 2000, intercept flight test, prompted the Israel Defense
    Force (IDF) to declare the Arrow operational effective October 17,
    2000.

                            [In millions of dollars]
    The fiscal year 2003 funding breakout is as follows:
        Arrow System Improvement Program.......................         55
        Co-manufacturing.......................................          5
        Israeli Test Bed.......................................          3
        Israel System Architecture & Integration...............          2
        Program Support........................................          1
            Total..............................................         66

        Section 8112 of the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Appropriations Act
    provided additional funds for establishing an Arrow production
    capability in the United States, and MDA has programmed $40 million for
    this purpose. In response to that direction, the U.S.-Israel Arrow Co-
    Production Capability Development (ACCD) program will provide for
    establishing in the United States, by the end of fiscal year 2004, the
    capability of U.S. co-produced Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
    Category II and non-MTCR controlled Arrow missile components to assist
    Israel with Israeli co-produced components, assembled by Israel into
    prototype Arrow missiles, and tested in Israel to qualify both nations'
    Arrow missile component co-production lines. The MDA has programmed $45
    million ($40 million in fiscal year 2002 and $5 million in fiscal year
    2003) for the ACCD which includes only pre-production activities.

        Senator Warner. I think that is correct. But their test
    program has been exemplary.
        General Kadish. Yes, it has. They have had their failures
    just like we have, but the record of success has proven the
    adequacy of the program.
        Senator Warner. Is it a system that has the potential to
    augment our own PAC-3 and other defensive measures?
        General Kadish. Yes, Senator, it does. We have done
    numerous interoperability demonstrations with Israel to ensure
    that we can have interoperability and provide a layered-like
    defense using Patriot, and those have been very successful.
        In the future, we are going to be looking harder at this as
    time goes on and as we look at the overall Ballistic Missile
    Defense Systems that we are going to be investigating from a
    technical standpoint. So, it certainly has a large impact and a
    large usefulness for the Israelis, and other uses of it will
    have to be determined in the future, if any.
        Senator Warner. Is another use possibly incorporating it in
    our own inventory of defenses?
        General Kadish. I would not rule that out, but from a
    technical standpoint, there are other issues associated that
    are programmatic, and budgetary, and it would have to go
    through a review. But anything that contributes to our missile
    defense capability is a good thing from my perspective.
        Senator Warner. I think it is worthy of that consideration.
        I thank the chairman and the ranking member.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
        Mr. Christie, in your statement for today's hearing, you
    said that you wanted to assure that DOT&E's access to Missile
    Defense Agency plans and programs is adequate for us to
    accomplish our oversight mission, which is a sentiment I
    certainly applaud. Can you ensure that proper robust testing is
    planned and executed for the missile defense system if you and
    your staff and support contractors are not involved in test
    planning?
        Mr. Christie. I did not say that we are not involved in the
    test planning.
        Let me back up a little bit to last summer. Shortly after I
    was confirmed, I met with both Secretary Aldridge and General
    Kadish about how we would go about executing our oversight
    responsibilities as General Kadish was restructuring the
    program. By mutual agreement, I backed off until the programs
    were restructured before my staff became more intimately
    involved. Now, we continued to exercise our oversight on PAC-3,
    since that was entering operational testing, but heretofore
    until the first of the year, we had not been intimately
    involved.
        We are involved now, and I have no reason to believe that
    we will not be able to carry out our normal oversight
    responsibilities to include being involved with the MDA in
    their test planning activities, as well as observing the tests,
    evaluating the results, and providing an independent evaluation
    of those results.
        Senator Reed. But at this point, with the exception of PAC-
    3, you are not personally, nor is your staff, intimately
    knowledgeable about the details of these programs?
        Mr. Christie. Oh, I would not say that. I am not sure I am
    intimately knowledgeable on all those programs, but I think we
    have had access to all of their documentation since it was
    presented to Congress. So, we are getting into the details of
    all the programs. Accordingly, I would not characterize us as
    not having access.
        Senator Reed. Would you characterize your access as
    unfettered, not just yourself but all of your staff members and
    relevant contractors, anyone that you would want to have
    access?
        Mr. Christie. I cannot answer that in a positive manner at
    this point because we are still evolving in this process. My
    agreements with General Kadish and the work between my staff
    and his show no indication that that is not going to be case. I
    cannot say at this point in time that we have unfettered access
    to what is going on there, but I have no reason to believe that
    we will not as time evolves.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, Secretary Aldridge, and General
    Kadish, as I understand Title 10, the Director is given
    specific statutory authority, access to all records and data in
    the Department of Defense, including the records and data of
    each Military Department that the Director considers necessary
    to review in order to carry out his duties under the section.
    So, it would appear to me, statutorily, that Mr. Christie can
    have access to any data, without agreements, from anyone in the
    Department. Is that your understanding, Secretary Aldridge?
        Secretary Aldridge. That is my understanding.
        Senator Reed. That is, indeed, the policy.
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me return to an issue that was raised previously about
    contingency deployments and General Kadish's explanation of the
    confusion. But let me take it from this perspective.
        The administration proposes to buy hardware in 2003 to
    support contingency deployments in 2004 for a number of missile
    defenses, including national missile defense, THAAD, Navy
    Theater Wide, and the Airborne Laser (ABL).
        In the past, for virtually all major defense programs, a
    rigorous set of operational tests has been performed prior to a
    deployment, contingency or otherwise, and it was done for
    obvious reasons, to make sure the systems actually work before
    you raise not only the expectations that they will work among
    the American public, but also the reliance that the military
    will put upon these systems.
        Now, Mr. Christie, you are in charge of operational
    testing. Are there any plans to conduct any operational testing
    on any of these missile defense programs prior to 2004?
        Mr. Christie. The programs you mentioned? I do not think
    so. I think a 2004 decision, if it happens, will be based
    primarily on technical testing, if such a decision to deploy is
    made. My view is at that point in time I will be called upon or
    my office will, in fact, have the responsibility to report to
    General Kadish and to Secretary Aldridge and to the Secretary
    our view, based on the testing to date, of what capability we
    have attained or demonstrated, so to speak, so that the
    decision makers can, in fact, make an informed decision as to
    whether to deploy that capability.
        On the matter of operational testing before deploying for
    contingencies, I think as General Kadish mentioned, over the
    years I can mention several systems that have been deployed
    operationally: JSTARS in the Persian Gulf War, Predator in both
    Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as in Afghanistan, and Global Hawk.
    We have done that in the past. We have done that based on an
    evaluation by the decision makers of the technical testing up
    to that point. There had been no operational testing of those
    systems in their initial deployments.
        I am not advocating that is the way to go. I am just saying
    that is just a fact of life.
        Senator Reed. But those operational tests were not
    performed. I presumed they were being planned, though?
        Mr. Christie. Oh, yes. There are operational tests planned
    with the midcourse system that we are talking about here, which
    could be deployed with a decision in 2004. There are
    operational tests planned. As I recall that data, I do not
    think they will take place before a possible decision in 2004
    is made.
        Senator Reed. With all of the systems you indicated, was
    their deployment driven by a conflict?
        Mr. Christie. Or a perceived need, yes, in a conflict.
        Senator Reed. Here, it seems to me, an arbitrary date has
    been selected of 2004 that will preclude operational testing
    before that date. Is that true?
        Mr. Christie. Well, I do not think in the progress of the
    program that we will have come to the point where we will be
    planning to execute operational testing. I think we are
    planning a series of technical tests, flight tests, as a matter
    of fact, with this system, with an average of four tests a year
    up to that point.
        Senator Reed. Senator Allard, can I ask your indulgence to
    ask General Kadish a question? I will let you respond. But can
    I have an additional minute?
        Senator Allard. Yes, that will be fine.
        General Kadish. You mentioned 2004. That is where we are
    working on the ground-based system against long-range threats
    to have our testbed in place, which would include up to five
    missiles available. We expect that we could make that date for
    the testbed purposes. As we go further in time from now on,
    based on the testing and developmental testing that we intend
    to do, there may be a decision at some point to actually use
    those assets. But the date that we have is for the testbed
    capability to be put into place so we can add it to our test
    requirements.
        Senator Reed. Then we are talking now in terms of national
    missile defense, the old land-based system, if you will.
        General Kadish. It is the land-based system, right.
        Senator Reed. Do you have any operational test plans for
    the land-based system prior to 2004?
        General Kadish. We have plans for developmental testing
    that the operational testers will participate in. They are not
    classified as operational tests. We expect to do operational
    testing in our planning as we transition to procurement, and
    that is usually when it is done in any program.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask a follow-up question just so I
    understand. In one of your previous comments, talking about the
    contingency deployment, you said you suffer a loss because you
    cannot use them as you would a normal test item?
        General Kadish. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. So, we face the possibility of declaring a
    deployment of the land-based system in 2004 without operational
    testing and, as a result of that deployment, not being able to
    fully test those deployed missiles. Is that a possibility?
        General Kadish. When you say fully test, the fact that it
    is actually being used is a test in and of itself. But it would
    not be according to our original test plans, if that is the
    concern that you have.
        But just like anything else, if we use JSTARS, Global Hawk,
    or Predator, the using community and the developing community
    on those systems learn an awful lot that they would not have
    learned in a very sterile test program. So, the operational use
    of those systems in my view leads to a better follow-on
    improvement of the system.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to go back to a question, Mr. Chairman, that you
    asked Mr. Christie. Mr. Christie, you had indicated that you
    had not reviewed the Missile Defense Agency program goals,
    according to a question from the chairman early on, in this
    year's budget as required by section 232 of last year's defense
    authorization bill. I would just like to note for the record
    that our bill was not passed until late December, and was that
    the reason why the required review was not done this year?
        Mr. Christie. Well, that contributed to it, but I think the
    major reason was that they were still in a state of flux in
    getting their budget materials together until the last moment.
        Senator Allard. But you would not go and begin to apply the
    law before it was signed by the President and had become law,
    would you?
        Mr. Christie. That is right.
        Senator Allard. So, then a plausible explanation for that
    is the President's budget process was on the way. When do you
    start the budget process? In the middle of the year, June?
        Mr. Christie. The summer, yes.
        Senator Allard. You need to have it ready by December in
    order for the President to present his budget when we come back
    into session. Is that correct?
        Mr. Christie. Yes.
        Secretary Aldridge. Well, in fact, this year we did not
    even start the budget process until October for lots of
    reasons. One, getting the team. The team for Secretary Rumsfeld
    was not even on board until June.
        Senator Allard. Congress had not passed the defense
    authorization bill providing for the section 203 compliance.
    So, I would suspect that this year you will have an opportunity
    to review it. Correct?
        Mr. Christie. Absolutely.
        Senator Allard. I also wanted to follow up a little bit on
    discussions that I was having earlier with Secretary Aldridge.
    I asked him to give a general overview about the development
    and acquisition programs and whether they needed to be
    streamlined or not, if you will recall.
        Mr. Christie, are you satisfied that you had adequate
    insight and input into missile defense test programs? Will your
    role differ in the Missile Defense Agency technology
    development efforts compared to other technology development
    programs?
        Mr. Christie. Well, in answering the latter question, I
    would answer that we are dealing with what is called a
    capabilities-based process here, and I envision my
    responsibilities at various points, at least annually and
    certainly in response to congressional requirements, to
    evaluate what testing has taken place, what testing is in fact
    planned, and to provide an independent assessment to the
    decision makers as to what capabilities we have, in fact,
    demonstrated in testing, whether it be technical or operational
    at that point, against what threats. We will address what kind
    of capability will we have if we were to, in fact, produce this
    system or deploy it. So, that is how I envision our working in
    this context.
        That is certainly different than the large programs such as
    F-22 or the other standard Major Defense Acquisition Programs
    where we have a statutory responsibility for deciding or
    evaluating the effectiveness and suitability of a system and
    the adequacy of the operational testing that took place before
    a system is, in fact, produced and deployed. So, it is
    different.
        We are evolving. We will evolve in this process. We have
    not been there before.
        Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, I am
    looking at a chart here about flight and major ground tests
    which are slated for 2002, 2003, and 2004. This is the Missile
    Defense Agency program overview report issued February 22, of
    this year, by Dr. Lamartin. I am looking at this chart, and it
    looks to me like we have a large number of Midcourse Defense
    segment tests designed from 2002 to 2007. A large number of
    those have a ground-based element in them, and then we even
    have a sea-based element in those also. This is on the flight
    and major ground tests. I would like to make it a part of the
    record and perhaps maybe you would like to comment further on
    these planned flight and major ground tests.
        Secretary Aldridge. I think General Kadish is probably
    better able to answer that question, sir.
        General Kadish. Senator Allard, I think that the schedule
    we have in testing reflects the fact that we took action to
    make our test program much more robust than it has been in
    previous years, and to put the testbed and the infrastructure
    in place to do it. We put a lot of money in the budget to do
    that.
        I might say that we welcome Mr. Christie and his
    organization's involvement in this. In fact, if you go back and
    trace the heritage of that test program that you alluded to,
    that heritage is built on the fact that there was an awful lot
    of input from DOT&E and others inside and outside of the
    Government about the inadequacy of our test plans because of
    budgetary and other limitations. We have addressed that in
    great detail, and frankly, it would surprise me if we had those
    kinds of criticisms again as a result of any review of our test
    program. We are trying very hard to make sure that we can test
    realistically, that we can test frequently, and that we can
    test to our own satisfaction that these systems will work as
    intended. There is no intent on our part--and it is certainly
    reflected in the large amount of dollars allocated in this
    budget for testing and research and development--to avoid any
    kind of accountability in testing.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make that
    chart a part of the record.
        Senator Reed. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, if I might have a little
    indulgence from you.
        Senator Reed. Please.
        Senator Allard. Then I am going to wrap it up here.
        Senator Reed. I have additional questions.
        Senator Allard. The General Accounting Office has put out a
    series of studies at the request of this committee--and I am
    going to address this to you, General Kadish--that detail how
    the defense acquisition system might be improved based on
    commercial and public sector best practices. Some of these
    practices included separating technology development from
    product development, maturing technologies before using them in
    programs, using prototypes to demonstrate design stability, and
    proving through testing that the design is capable.
        General Kadish, are you familiar with these reports? Could
    you describe the areas of consistency between the GAO
    recommendations and the Missile Defense Agency acquisition
    process?
        General Kadish. Senator, I am familiar with the reports,
    and if I could, I would like to take that question for the
    record to be more detailed in answering the question.
        But in general, it is my view that we took an awful lot of
    best practices all the way from the National Reconnaissance
    Office early operational methods to many different ways of
    adopting best practices. I am confident that if we laid out
    those issues pointed out in the GAO reports on improving
    management, we would have a high percentage of those
    recommendations adopted in our approach.
        Senator Allard. I understand that is a complex question.
    Would you submit a written answer in more detail to the
    subcommittee, and then also not only talk about where the
    similarities are but point out some areas where there might be
    some differences, if any?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The GAO has developed several reports on the topic of ``Best
    Practices.'' The GAO testimony of May 10, 2000, focused on best
    commercial practices for developing new products and provides a summary
    of those practices. The testimony acknowledged that DOD has taken steps
    to reflect best commercial practices in its acquisition policies. MDA
    has also adopted many of those recommendations in its acquisition
    approach.
        The major theme of GAO's assessment is the management of
    technology; specifically separating technology and product development.
    The BMD program is structured to target technologies for production
    only when sufficient maturity is reached. The effort is based on a
    ``fly before buy'' strategy. Multiple technologies will be aggressively
    demonstrated and subject to early, robust, and realistic testing.
    Parallel development is used to reduce risk in the RDT&E effort.
    Progress in testing will influence the decision process to stop, slow,
    or accelerate individual projects. Robust testing, modeling, and
    simulation are key tenants of MDA's strategy to increase knowledge and
    reduce risk. Only when a capability is sufficiently verified will that
    element or component be ready for a production decision. MDA's approach
    clearly helps to isolate technology development from production.
    Additionally, procurement decisions will be further assessed on
    performance relative to the overall integrated system construct.
        GAO found that most successful firms limit production timelines
    from 18 months to just over 4 years. This limitation kept companies
    focused on delivering a product. The missile defense evolutionary
    acquisition strategy uses a capability, biannual ``block'' method that
    reflects a similar approach. Under this strategy, blocks of operational
    system capabilities based on demonstrated, mature technology are
    developed, produced, and fielded in increments. This approach keeps the
    program focused on delivering advanced capabilities to the field as
    quickly as possible. BMD biennial blocks also capture pre-production
    capabilities that are available for contingency/emergency fielding.
    Successive increments integrate improved technology to upgrade the
    system and improve existing capabilities.
        According to GAO, matching customer need with proven technology is
    an important success factor. MDA's evolutionary acquisition strategy
    will provide proven mature technology and capabilities. User needs will
    be addressed by an ongoing analysis of potential adversary missile
    characteristics determined by existing evidence and technically-
    feasible engineering limits. The assessment to optimize the system
    against the need and match required performance with the capability of
    technology is made in collaboration with research centers, industry,
    and the Services.
        GAO found that making production a concern during development
    forces discipline and trade-offs in design. This environment encourages
    realistic assessments of risks and costs. Production is always a
    concern in the commercial sector because unless a product can be
    produced at a cost that the customer will buy (and make the company a
    profit) it makes no sense to pursue development. While the profit
    motive is not a issue in DOD, production is still a major concern
    because failure to both control production costs and meet performance
    needs puts the project at risk.
        One approach MDA has pursued to manage those two goals is to
    improve communication and cooperation among RDT&E, production, and user
    groups to better focus the development process. In support of that
    concept, MDA has established a collaborative effort, the National Team,
    to better leverage industry (production) talent and innovation at the
    very beginning of the development effort. In addition to defense
    industry leaders, the National Team is bringing together federally
    funded research development centers (FFRDC) and support contractors to
    share information and bring creative solutions to problems early in the
    design process. The National Team adds industry rigor to the
    engineering process by addressing prodution and supportability issues
    while focusing on integrating elements into a cohesive single system.
    This multidisciplinary team also addresses critical issues such as
    system specifications and block configurations. The approach balances
    the ``future focus'' of research groups with the industry focus of
    preventing overreaching and getting a useful product delivered to the
    user.
        Underlying MDA's management approach is a commitment to
    successfully deliver affordable and effective missile defense
    capabilities to the Nation as quickly as possible.
        MDA's management approach reflects the intent behind the best
    commercial practices reported by the GAO. Overall, two factors result
    in some differences between commercial practices and those used by MDA.
    Private sector companies function in a different, more ``closed''
    environment than Government agencies. Profit--not development--is the
    critical success factor that drives decisions. Multiyear capital
    resources commitments are the norm. Government agencies function in
    more open environments with more diverse ``stakeholder'' interests to
    address. Also, Government capital resources are committed and justified
    on a yearly basis.
        Commercial development is usually an incremental improvement to an
    existing product. There is considerable high-fidelity predecessor in-
    house knowledge in all areas of development. While MDA's ``block''
    strategy will eventually get to the same point, we are not there now.
    In many areas we have to manage more technology risk than we prefer,
    particularly as we develop initial capabilities. That is why robust
    testing, modeling, and simulation are key to our effort.
        The GAO's overarching recommendation is to structure programs to
    support research and development to advance technology and then to
    establish a basis for determining which technologies and subsystems
    meet performance standards for development. MDA's capabilities-based,
    evolutionary acquisition clearly parallels that approach. MDA is
    committed to vigorously investigating and pursuing any practices that
    will improve the outcome of this critical national priority.

        Secretary Aldridge. Senator, if I could just comment. It is
    not often I agree with GAO reports, but in this particular
    case, many of the recommendations there do follow along with
    what we are trying to do in the acquisition business across the
    Department of Defense.
        In fact, this idea of not doing technology until it is
    available is in fact the essence of spiral development. We will
    deploy those technologies which are available and we will wait
    for those technologies to evolve before we try to enter them
    into new equipment in the future.
        Prototyping is clearly something that is on our list. In
    fact, we have increased the funding request for doing advance
    concept technology demonstrators this year from $159 million
    appropriated last year to $200 million. We are going to start
    to do some new things, especially as those apply to
    counterterrorism prototypes.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit to the
    witnesses maybe one or two questions after the hearing. I think
    it is standard that we can do that.
        Senator Reed. It is standard procedure. The record will
    remain open for additional questions and also for the
    statements of members.
        Senator Allard. Yes, I will submit some more. I have
    wrapped up my questions.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Chairman Levin.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me first start with Secretary Aldridge. When we
    questioned the Service Chiefs at last week's full committee
    hearing, each of the Services said that they had not been
    consulted at all on the level of funding in the missile defense
    budget. Can you tell me why they were not consulted?
        Secretary Aldridge. Sir, we have a process in the
    Department where the Service Secretaries were involved with the
    budgetary process. If they did not share that information with
    their Service Chiefs, that was perhaps something they could
    have done and should have done.
        The Senior Executive Council of the Department has reviewed
    the missile defense program. It has been reviewed in detail by
    the Secretary of Defense. We went over the management
    functions. We went over the budgetary items, the concept of the
    missile defense program, and that was reviewed and approved by
    the Senior Executive Council which results in the budget that
    has been submitted.
        But the Service Secretaries were involved. I was heavily
    involved, the Deputy Secretary and the Secretary, and the
    program of record is the one that we have agreed is the right
    thing for us to proceed with. I do not know why the Service
    Secretaries did not share that information with the Service
    Chiefs.
        Chairman Levin. Is it a little unusual, in your view, that
    the uniformed Service Chiefs were not involved in this
    consideration of the budget on missile defense?
        Secretary Aldridge. I would have thought that the Service
    Secretaries would have shared that information. Since this is a
    separate defense agency that deals with a variety of Services
    and activities, I cannot answer why they did not share that,
    sir.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Aldridge, the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council, the JROC, which is headed by the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs, is required by law to ``assist the Chairman
    in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military
    requirements to meet the National Military Strategy.'' The JROC
    is also required by law to evaluate ``the cost, schedule, and
    performance criteria of acquisition programs.'' Finally, the
    JROC is required by law to provide oversight information to
    Congress, and thus, like Mr. Christie, is an important avenue
    for Congress to gain independent insight into these defense
    programs.
        One of the most important functions that the JROC provides
    is review and approval of the program's Operational
    Requirements Document, which establishes the performance goals
    that a system has to meet in order to make it useful to our
    military.
        Was the JROC formally asked to provide written comments on
    the memorandum that abolished the Operational Requirements
    Documents, and if so, would you send us those comments?
        Secretary Aldridge. Sir, I would like to answer the
    question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did comment on
    program management for missile defense. The JROC itself did
    not. JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman, sir, of the Joint
    Chiefs. That is not part of the process by which we are
    undertaking missile defense. The JROC has a very firm
    requirements process of determining what is absolutely
    essential for the military to deploy.
        The approach we are taking on missile defense is a
    capabilities-based approach. General Kadish, as he develops the
    program in its R&D state, if it is in fact ready for production
    and deployment, will advise the Senior Executive Council
    whether that capability is sufficient to proceed.
        At that point, when there is a decision to proceed to a
    production and deployment, it does go into the JROC process.
    The normal deployment process enters into the regular
    acquisition system, but not before that time. Prior to that
    time, the Missile Defense Agency is involved with research and
    development only to develop a capability that is desired by the
    country.
        Part of what the Missile Defense Support Group does, in
    fact, is include the Joint Staff as members of that group, and
    the process by which advice is given both to the Director of
    MDA, as well as to the Senior Executive Council, goes through
    the Missile Defense Support Group, which does include not only
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff but also DOT&E. It also includes the
    Comptroller and Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). All the
    agencies of the Department that have an equity in missile
    defense are included within that support group, which does
    provide the independent advice.
        Chairman Levin. Well, I think our top military leaders
    ought to have a very deep involvement in this assessment. The
    JROC is required by law to evaluate the cost, schedule, and
    performance criteria of acquisition programs. I think that
    there needs to be a much deeper involvement in it, and I think
    this subcommittee and our full committee is going to work to
    assure that that in fact happens.
        I am wondering, Mr. Christie, if you would tell us whether
    or not you and your office are acting in ways, relative to the
    missile defense, differently than your predecessor Mr. Coyle
    acted. Do you know?
        Mr. Christie. I think in earlier discussions I made the
    point that a year ago, or last summer after I was confirmed, I
    discussed our involvement with both of the gentlemen here at
    the table, as I knew they were totally restructuring the set of
    programs in this Missile Defense Agency. By mutual agreement,
    we backed away until all of these programs were properly
    structured and we would have something to begin to look into. I
    stated earlier that PAC-3 was not one of those because that
    program was proceeding into operational testing.
        We have worked over the last couple of months to come up
    with a working arrangement whereby we will be involved in the
    testing that takes place and the planning for tests, and I am
    confident that our involvement will, in fact, probably come
    close to whatever Mr. Coyle was doing before. His office was
    quite heavily involved, I think, in the technical testing that
    was going on because most of the evaluations that he was doing
    were based on technical testing. We will be involved also.
        Chairman Levin. When do you expect the details of that
    arrangement would be worked out?
        Mr. Christie. We have pretty well worked them out now.
        Chairman Levin. Are they in writing?
        Mr. Christie. We have a set of charts that provide that
    detail. My staff is a member of the Missile Defense Support
    Group. However, we do not have a memorandum of understanding or
    anything like that that the two of us have signed.
        Chairman Levin. You think there are written charts.
        Mr. Christie. Yes, we have charts. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Could you submit them to this subcommittee?
        Mr. Christie. I will do so.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The information referred to appears in question for the record
    number 9.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
        I would like to finish up a series of questions.
        Going back to the discussion of the contingency deployment
    for the land-based system, General Kadish, if you declared this
    system contingency deployed, would you be operating the system
    and running it or would it be transferred to a Service?
        General Kadish. That is a great question.
        Senator Reed. Well, you keep asking questions all
    afternoon, and you finally get a great one. [Laughter.]
        General Kadish. The reason I say that is we are dealing
    with trying to understand how that operates now. It is clear,
    at least at this point in time, that any kind of contingency
    operation of any system that we would have in missile defense
    needs to be done by operators who are the warfighting experts.
    However, just as we did, and I hate to go back to other
    analogies, but as I recall, when we deployed JSTARS during the
    Persian Gulf War, we still had contractors operating parts of
    that system because they were not ready for trained airmen to
    actually operate them. So, I would expect that elements of our
    contractor and Missile Defense Agency personnel would be
    involved in the operation, but the actual warfighting decision
    making is done by the proper chains of command.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Secretary Aldridge, you stated last week that all of the
    internal oversight organizations of the Pentagon are to be
    involved in the Missile Defense Support Group. You reaffirmed
    that today.
        But your memorandum of February 13 severely restricts the
    number of personnel from these organizations to be allowed
    access to missile defense program information. I understand
    that the limit is two or three people from each organization,
    and in any case, your memorandum allows you and General Kadish
    to personally approve each person to be allowed access. I also
    understand that prior to this current administration, there
    were dozens of people who on an as-needed basis had access to
    the information.
        With such limited access, how do you expect the Pentagon's
    oversight organizations to operate fully, completely, and,
    indeed, independently if in fact you and General Kadish can
    veto people who might be looking over your shoulders?
        Secretary Aldridge. Well, the intent is that the individual
    offices nominate the people that they want to put on the
    program, and that nomination is for the senior person which is
    the Missile Defense Support Group individual. In addition to
    that individual, we allow two more technical people to
    participate.
        We just did not want hundreds of people who show up at
    meetings to hear data. We think that 13 organizations that can
    have 34 people, essentially full-time, working on this problem
    is probably enough to make sure that all the equities of all
    the offices are sufficient without it getting out of hand. That
    was the rationale.
        The individuals who are nominated are, in fact, approved by
    us because we felt that we wanted to make sure people had the
    experience, that they have an understanding of missile defense,
    they have the expertise to be valuable, and that offices are
    not just nominating people because they are trying to get rid
    of somebody who is not a productive part of their organization.
    So, we want to have some say-so that the 34 people who were, in
    fact, involved were capable individual people who could
    contribute to the job.
        Now, once the Working Group members have access to data,
    what they do with it and how they deal back at their
    organizations, that is up to them. They can bring in other
    people to discuss, seek advice, and things of that nature. But
    we believe that 39 people to provide for the oversight of this
    organization was sufficient to meet the needs of the
    Department, meet the needs of the Missile Defense Agency, and
    meet the needs of the Senior Executive Council, which have to
    make independent judgments. That was the rationale.
        Senator Reed. Well, one could raise the question of a lack
    of confidence in the judgment of people like Mr. Christie to
    appoint people to this group.
        Secretary Aldridge. I think we took Mr. Christie's
    nominations.
        Senator Reed. Well, you could have said no.
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, if he would have submitted someone
    who we believed in our judgment was not going to contribute to
    this process, yes, sir, we could say no.
        Senator Reed. But I still think the point remains that you
    reserve the right to contradict or veto the decisions,
    including those of the JROC, for example. You essentially take
    who was sent to you, and that might be for many reasons, some
    you alluded to, but there might be other reasons.
        Secretary Aldridge. It could, based on the reasons I
    stated, but we did not.
        Senator Reed. Is there any other program that is managed or
    run in this way in the Department of Defense?
        Secretary Aldridge. The only one that can be identified as
    closest is probably the National Reconnaissance Office, which
    deals with systems of systems, and one coming, which will be
    the Army's Future Combat System. It is going to have similar
    characteristics of multiple pieces of programs that have to be
    highly integrated.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Secretary Aldridge, last week we discussed the application
    of the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which establishes cost control
    mechanisms for major defense programs. There was some ambiguity
    about its application. In support of the annual reviews of
    missile defense programs, one of which is scheduled for this
    fall, what sort of cost control mechanism will be applied and
    what specific data and documentation will be reviewed to
    understand whether the programs are on target if not Nunn-
    McCurdy?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I did go back and look at
    Nunn-McCurdy. It does not apply to R&D programs until you get
    to a decision point for actual deployment. So, in the R&D
    effort, Nunn-McCurdy would not apply in this particular case.
    So, we will have to find other mechanisms to ensure that the
    programs remain under cost control.
        As they are going through R&D, it is very difficult to
    identify what the end state is going to be, and so it is not
    until we have a program that can be defined and an end state of
    the R&D program, and if we are successful, this is when we will
    actually enter into full-scale engineering development, and
    this is when we will start production, and then we can lay out
    a cost of a program and check its milestones. Until we make
    that full decision, it is very difficult to track program
    content in the sense of a Nunn-McCurdy certification, but we do
    track the program in terms of what we expect the R&D to cost
    and what it is really costing.
        We ran into one. It was not a Nunn-McCurdy breach, but it
    was the SBIRS-Low program in the missile defense program. It
    was going up in cost at a significant rate, and we decided that
    this was a program that was unexecutable, and we have asked it
    to be restructured. So, the process will continue to look at
    programs in the normal way. It just does not have the Nunn-
    McCurdy tool, as one of many tools, of monitoring cost,
    performance, and schedule.
        Senator Reed. But you will be developing documentation and
    data to support reviews?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. There will be a Selected
    Acquisition Report (SAR) that will be written in that way. As
    we have done for PAC-3 as it moves out, there will be a
    separate SAR for each of those programs.
        Senator Reed. Congress will have access to that data and
    documentation?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, also in your February 13,
    memorandum to General Kadish, you requested that he send you,
    within 60 days, a program implementation plan to address in
    part the following: program structure with funding allocations;
    the Ballistic Missile Defense System program baseline;
    technical and program management structure; acquisition
    strategy; planned program documentation and reporting to OSD,
    Services, and Joint Staff interfaces; the approach to test and
    evaluation; and a transition plan for transfer of programs to
    Services.
        General Kadish, are you on schedule for delivery of that
    plan?
        General Kadish. We are in the process of putting it
    together right now. Given the complexity of some of the things
    we are doing, I am a little bit worried about the deadline that
    Secretary Aldridge has set. But our intent is to fully
    document, as best we can, and have the Missile Defense Support
    Group review that plan in some detail, and then we would
    respond to that advice out of the MDSG. So, we are underway
    with the implementation plan right now, and I am hoping that it
    will be, if not on time, very close to being on time.
        Senator Reed. When you send it to Secretary Aldridge, may
    we also see it in Congress?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir. I defer on that question to
    Secretary Aldridge.
        Secretary Aldridge. I do not see any reason why you cannot.
    It should be available to you. Once we go through the process
    that we all agree to, the Missile Defense Support Group has
    agreed to it and the SEC agrees this is the plan we are on, I
    do not see why it should not be available to you immediately.
        Senator Reed. It might be interesting to see the plan
    before the MDSG agrees to it. Sometimes the changes are more
    illustrative than the actual substance.
        Secretary Aldridge. We will reserve it for next year's
    testimony, sir. I will tell you how it turned out. [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Well, or the next hearing.
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir, the next hearing.
        Senator Reed. Let me conclude with a comment as much as a
    question. We have heard a lot about capabilities-based
    development. Frankly, I have a list of different descriptions
    by General Kadish and yourself, Mr. Secretary, of what
    capabilities-based means. They are not entirely identical.
        Secretary Aldridge. Oh, yes, sir, they have to be.
        Senator Reed. They have to be. [Laughter.]
        Do you want me to read them? All right, here we go.
        In your testimony, General Kadish, you said it meant ``a
    flexible approach to the acquisition of complex systems,
    incorporating advanced technologies that permit deployment of a
    limited but effective capability that can be progressively
    enhanced.'' In today's testimony, you mentioned the word
    ``threat,'' which was not part of the previous exposition, at
    least to my recollection.
        In your testimony, Secretary Aldridge, you said it ``would
    procure missile defenses at the earliest possible date.''
        Mr. Christie, you said the new approach ``is evolving to
    provide for the successful development of capabilities that are
    responsive to threats while, at the same time, maintaining
    essential operational effectiveness for equipment that is
    fielded.''
        Page 14 of the Department's Quadrennial Defense Review,
    defined it as ``focusing more on how an adversary might fight
    than who the adversary might be.''
        Then Secretary Rumsfeld, in his testimony before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee last June, said it meant we would
    ``work to select, develop, and sustain a portfolio of U.S.
    military capabilities to help us prevail against current
    threats and dissuade potential adversaries from developing
    dangerous new capabilities.''
        My sense is that, at least in terms of the expression,
    there are slightly different views and maybe even significantly
    different definitions. But when we engage on these questions,
    the ultimate answer always seems to be, well, we are doing a
    capabilities-based assessment and it is different and you do
    not understand because it is capabilities-based.
        I am concerned that this is just a new buzz word, new
    jargon, and there is, I think, a consequence, as you, I think,
    would admit, of moving away from the old system. A requirement
    target was set and you pretty much knew if you measured up to
    what the requirement was. Here, that requirement is very
    flexible. It can move around, and I think you would say that
    you have to do it that way. But it also invites the possibility
    that you can dumb-down standards. You can deploy things for
    reasons unrelated to the quality of the system, just because
    you feel compelled to do it. That, I think, takes away from
    some of the rigor that we normally see in defense programs.
        That is a comment. If you would like to rejoin, I would
    invite you to do that, but that is my final comment.
        Secretary Aldridge. I will try to do this with a short
    comment. All those statements you read are not inconsistent.
        Senator Reed. No, but they are not precise, not as precise
    as saying we are going to build a system.
        Secretary Aldridge. Right, but I also notice that in many
    of the statements, you were mixing up spiral development with
    capabilities-based development. What we are talking about in
    terms of capabilities is the future. We may not know who we are
    going to fight, when we are going to fight, or where we are
    going to fight. Therefore, we must design a capability that
    says this is what we want to do in spite of this uncertainty. I
    think that is one approach.
        Once we do define what capability we want, the issue of
    spiral development now enters the picture, what we want to
    improve with time, and that is what spiral development does. It
    allows that initial capability to be improved in time.
        They are related but they are in fact separate. I think we
    have described capabilities, and maybe that is all I should
    say.
        Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Secretary, staff has selected
    descriptions of what was purported to be the capabilities-based
    approach, not the integration of both.
        This leads to a few questions. If you are doing
    capabilities, there are some very simple measures. One is, what
    missiles are you going to defend against and in what time
    frame? When are you going to deploy? Those are the types of
    answers that ultimately we are going to have to come to. At
    this point, I have not heard those answers, and we are spending
    a great deal of money in the process.
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. We have not made those
    decisions.
        Dumbing down the requirements and perhaps doing some things
    that are less capable than we would like is not the intent of
    any of this. I am an American. I am a taxpayer and want to make
    sure that what we get for our country is the very best we can
    provide at the right cost and schedule and performance. So, the
    issue of trying to institute a process that is going to allow
    perhaps less capability than we would otherwise desire is
    certainly not what we are intending to do here. We are trying
    to do it faster, quicker, and certainly with the oversight of
    the Department of Defense, and we always have to come to
    Congress when it comes to a decision to deploy. We have to get
    the funding to make that happen.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Secretary Aldridge. Mr. Christie,
    General Kadish, thank you.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
                       required congressional information
        1. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing you
    committed to sending Congress such information on missile defense as is
    required to be submitted for Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This
    information includes the development schedule, including estimated
    annual cost until development is completed, the planned procurement
    schedule, including the best estimate of the Secretary of Defense of
    the annual cost and units to be produced. Please provide this
    information for all missile defense programs that were previously Major
    Defense Acquisition Programs as soon as possible in order to support
    congressional reviews of the fiscal year 2003 budget request for
    missile defense.
        Secretary Aldridge. The fiscal year 2003 budget estimate
    documentation together with the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
    provide the most up-to-date information available regarding cost,
    schedule, and development, including those previously identified as
    Major Defense Acquisition Programs. Specifically, the estimate provides
    funding requirements for the next 6 years, by year; schedule, including
    hardware and software deliveries, to the extent known; and planned
    decision points and test events for all program activities at least
    through completion of planned testing and evaluation of the prototype.
        Developing a single, integrated missile defense system is a vast
    technical challenge that will take time and effort to mature. We are
    working hard toward the important goal set forth for us by the
    Secretary of defending the United States, deployed forces, allies, and
    friends by developing a system that layers defenses to intercept a
    ballistic missile in all phases of flight against all ranges of
    threats. The system will add capability over time. We will deploy
    individual elements and components of the system only once their
    technological maturity and military utility have been clearly
    demonstrated. Until that time, we will not know how many units should
    be produced or their cost. We will deploy those components in an
    architecture that allows our capability to be improved as the
    technology matures.
        We have provided Members and their staffs documentation and
    briefings on our strategy and our progress. We will continue to provide
    that information to Congress as we develop the system and the
    information becomes available.

           STATUS OF DOT&E ACCESS TO MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY PROGRAMS

        2. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, during the hearing, Secretary
    Aldridge agreed with me when he said that ``statutorily, Mr. Christie
    can have access to any data without agreements with anyone else in the
    Department.'' Do you, your staff, and your support contractors now have
    unfettered access to all information you and your staff deem necessary
    in order for you to perform your oversight responsibilities for Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) programs, especially the responsibility you
    committed to at the hearing of independently assessing the capabilities
    of the 2004 ``contingency deployments'' for missile defense?
        Mr. Christie. As of this point in time, DOT&E and our federally-
    funded research and development contractor (FFRDC) support staff have
    not gained unfettered access to the MDA programs. The various MDA
    programs are still undergoing the process of restructuring. In the
    meantime, we have obtained for review some reports on the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense System. Additionally, we have regular access to the
    Patriot PAC-3 program that is currently in operational test and
    evaluation being conducted by the Army. We have also had some insight
    through the Missile Defense Steering Group into the restructure of the
    SIBRS-Low program. We have been awaiting delivery of the MDA
    Implementation Plan to ascertain how they propose the OSD staff
    (including DOT&E) will carry out its oversight of the MDA programs. In
    the meantime, DOT&E has proposed a T&E implementation plan that spells
    out the access we need in order to perform our oversight and
    independent evaluation responsibilities. This proposal includes details
    on the types and level of access needed by ourselves and our FFRDC
    support staff in interacting with the MDA, the various program offices,
    and the system contractors. Our plan identifies the types of
    information, documents, and meetings we need access to in order to
    adequately evaluate the MDA programs and prepare our annual assessment
    reports for the MDA and Congress. This plan has been provided to MDA
    for comments or acceptance. We anticipate that we will have access to
    all requisite information and participation in meetings to perform
    DOT&E's mission.

                             RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS

        3. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, have you rejected any request
    for a particular individual to be a member of the Missile Defense
    Support Group (MDSG)? If so, which organization was affected and what
    was the basis of the rejection?
        Secretary Aldridge. I accepted the nominations from the Secretaries
    of the Services, the Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
    the senior members of the other organizations from the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense for their representatives to the Air Force request
    for a second seat on the MDSG. Although I have delegated Milestone
    Decision Authority for Space to the Air Force, I did not feel one
    Service deserved more representation on the MDSG than any other
    Service. The Missile Defense Agency has established a board of
    directors (BOD) with each of the Services, and the Air Force BOD
    ensures both space and other procurement programs are integrated and
    addressed.

                    ACCESS OF SUPPORT STAFF AND CONTRACTORS

        4. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, you testified that the rules
    you have established for the MDSG allow at most three people from any
    given independent oversight organization to participate in the MDSG.
    Three people is not a sufficient number for substantial independent
    analysis to be performed by any of these independent organizations. Do
    your rules, therefore, allow for the independent oversight
    organizations' staff and contractor support personnel, who are not
    members of the MDSG, to have access to MDA programmatic information,
    either via the MDSG process of via other means? If not, how do you
    expect meaningful independent analyses to be conducted by these
    organizations?
        Secretary Aldridge. The Missile Defense Support Group and
    associated Working Group comprise a total of 34 individuals. This is an
    efficient size to allow independent analysis and to conduct dialogue
    leading to sufficient advice to the Director of the MDA, the Senior
    Executive Council, and me. Individual members may distribute MDA
    information as they deem necessary within their own organization to do
    their job as long as it is controlled according to its security
    classification (as a minimum For Official Use Only) and is considered
    pre-decisional, and the individuals have a need to know. If an
    organization requires additional people to have access directly with
    MDA to fulfill a specific requirement this is agreed to between the MDA
    and the individual organization. Each MDSG principal has a
    corresponding senior level point of contact within the MDA for
    coordination and interactions on a daily basis.

        5. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, could you please provide, as
    soon as possible, the rules of access for non-members of the MDSG?
        Secretary Aldridge. The MDSG meetings are closed to non-members to
    allow open dialogue and efficient operations dealing with pre-
    decisional information. Non-members are allowed access on an
    invitational basis controlled by the chairman for specific activities
    as deemed necessary by the MDSG body as a whole.

                    OPERATIONAL TESTING FOR 2004 DEPLOYMENTS

        6. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, it was established at the hearing
    that no operational tests were planned for any of the missile defense
    systems for which there is a potential 2004 ``contingency deployment.''
    Although other systems, such as JSTARS and Predator were in fact
    deployed prior to the completion of operational testing, it is my
    understanding that these systems did not pre-plan such ``contingency
    deployments.'' Thus, the pre-planned nature of the proposed missile
    defense contingency deployments, and the fact that we are budgeting
    extra funding for them now, makes them unique. Do you believe that
    preplanning on these contingency deployments for 2004, and buying extra
    hardware now to support such a deployment, is a prudent action without
    plans for any operational tests prior to the deployments and if not,
    why not?
        Mr. Christie. Historically, acquisition programs have not pre-
    planned contingency deployments. JSTARS and Predator are two recent
    examples of programs among many others over the years that were taken
    out of an ongoing development and test and evaluation program to
    support an urgent operational need. However, planning for an early
    contingency deployment should not be any different from planning for an
    initial block capability. Plans for developing and acquiring systems
    that address an imminent or volatile threat, where contingency
    deployment is likely, should include a strategy that builds basic
    operational utility testing into the engineering and development
    process. This is precisely what capabilities-based acquisition is
    supposed to accomplish, by involving all stakeholders early in the
    design process and sharing information about the eventual required
    capability. Under this approach, we could deploy at any time in any
    design increment and be assured that our confidence in operational
    capability, while not complete, is balanced with respect to our
    confidence in other critical design factors. Our goal is to assist the
    MDA in developing a strategy that builds basic military utility
    assessments into the engineering, development, and testing processes
    for each of their programs. This will allow DOT&E to provide the best
    possible assessment of capability and provide higher confidence in the
    2004 contingency system. While not as rigorous as a full operational
    test and evaluation plan, this strategy balances confidence in
    operational effectiveness against the risk posed by an emerging and
    evolving threat.

        7. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, if so, why should other, less
    complex defense programs not also begin to plan, and budget for, such
    contingency deployments with no prior operational testing and what
    should the criteria for pre-planning such contingency deployments be?
        Mr. Christie. In general, all systems should employ a strategy
    where operational test requirements, along with other requirements for
    training, logistics, tactics, etc., are developed early on, such that
    an intermediate decision to deploy could be made at any time. For most
    military systems with a moderate level of complexity, this is a prudent
    approach. The more complex a system is, the higher the risks of using
    this approach in lieu of adequate operational testing. There is an
    important distinction between emergency deployment and planned
    contingency deployment. Planned contingency deployments reflect
    deliberate efforts to exploit capabilities that are demonstrated during
    early system development. This includes the development of associated
    operational concepts and tactics. An emergency deployment is
    characterized by very rapid configuration of a system to address a
    specific need with little planning, confirmation of capability, or
    tactics development.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE GOALS AND ANNUAL PLAN

        8. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the preamble to your fiscal year
    2003 budget estimate documentation states that the ``program goals and
    detailed test and expenditure plans'' required by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 are contained in the
    documentation. However, the documentation provides detailed information
    only for fiscal year 2003, and virtually no information on longer-term
    program goals. To assist in congressional review of the fiscal year
    2003 missile defense budget proposal, could you please provide the
    missile defense goals and program plans as soon as possible?
        General Kadish. The fiscal year 2003 budget estimate does provide
    information on long-term program goals. Specifically, the estimate
    provides funding requirements for the next 6 years, by year. It also
    provides schedule, including hardware and software deliveries, to the
    extent known, and planned decision points and test events for all
    program activities at least through completion of the planned element
    or component testing.
        Our overarching goal is to defend the United States, deployed
    forces, allies, and friends by developing a system that layers defenses
    to intercept a missile in all phases of flight against all ranges of
    threats. The system will evolve over time. We will deploy elements or
    individual components of the system when their technological maturity
    and military utility are clearly demonstrated. Additionally, we will
    deploy those components in an architecture that allows our capability
    to be improved as the technology matures.
        We have provided members and their staffs documentation and
    briefings on our strategy and our progress. We will continue to provide
    that information as we develop the system.

                    WRITTEN INFORMATION ON OVERSIGHT PROCESS

        9. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing, Mr.
    Christie  said that he would submit the charts that document the
    arrangement that has been worked out for how DOT&E will be involved in
    missile defense test planning. Could you please provide, as soon as
    possible, any documents or charts presented to the MDSG which deal with
    how MDA programs will be overseen?
        Secretary Aldridge. The following charts were developed and
    approved by DOT&E and presented to both the MDSG and the MDSG Working
    Group once they were formed. They were also presented to members of
    congressional staff prior to my signing the February 13, 2002,
    Implementation Guidance. Currently DOT&E and MDA are working the
    specifics of the MDA implementation plan concerning DOT&E planning,
    oversight, and responsibilities.

                           DOCUMENTATION ON R&D COSTS

        10. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing you stated
    that the Department would ``track [missile defense programs] in terms
    of what we expect the R&D to cost and what it's really costing.''
    Furthermore, you committed to providing this data to Congress. Could
    you please provide the current estimated costs and original costs for:
    (1) the following prototype items; and (2) the research and development
    costs associated with development of the prototype items: Airborne
    Laser prototype; each SBIRS-Low prototype satellite; THAAD prototype;
    Sea-based Midcourse prototype; and the Space-Based Laser prototype?
    Furthermore, could you please provide this information as soon as
    possible to support congressional review of the fiscal year 2003
    missile defense budget?
        Secretary Aldridge. Prototypes are interim engineering units, which
    by their nature, do not have firm ``production unit'' baselines.
    Technical specifications, purpose, and fidelity of a prototype are
    continually adjusted to match the development need. As a result,
    prototypes are unique to both individual programs and to the stage of
    that program's development. Prototype costs cannot be measured like
    production units, their costs are embedded in the element and program
    development costs. Those costs are estimated in the fiscal year 2003
    budget request.

                         DOCUMENTS USED FOR MANAGEMENT

        11. Senator Reed. General Kadish, given that Operational
    Requirements Documents (ORDs) have been abolished, as well as program
    baselines and production unit cost estimates, it is unclear what
    documentation you are currently using to manage your programs. Could
    you please provide, as soon as possible, a list of the documents you
    are currently using to monitor and manage MDA programs, and a
    description of what each document contains?
        General Kadish. ORDs have been canceled only for missile defense
    elements in development, not for those ready to be transferred to the
    Services. Capability-based ORDs will become operative upon transfer of
    capabilities to the Services.
        Under the Department's traditional acquisition process, development
    started with specific military requirements generated by the user.
    These requirements were formalized in the ORD. Following the ORD, Key
    Performance Parameters (KPP) were established and used to define
    contract requirements and deliverables. Contract performance was
    reported using the Earned Value Management System (EVMS). Department
    and congressional oversight was afforded through the Defense
    Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and the SAR, respectively.
        For MDA, the strengths of the traditional requirements generation
    process were also its weaknesses. It is rigorous, but that very rigor
    translated into a lack of the flexibility needed in missile defense
    development to deal with unprecedented technology development,
    uncertain threats, and complex multi-system integration. Requirements
    defined in ORDs are typically set years before actual system
    deployment, and can lead to less than optimum capability against a
    threat that exceeds that description. Furthermore, we do not yet know
    all the technical approaches that will work best.
        MDA's capability-based strategy implements acquisition discipline
    during development from a top-down perspective. This top-down approach
    promotes optimal system performance, maintains developmental
    flexibility, and ensures a high-level system integration. MDA's system
    engineering process begins with the development of System-wide
    Technical Objectives and Goals (TOG) to communicate expectations for
    evolving BMDS capabilities. This document will provide metrics for
    comparing alternatives and high-level strategy for development. Because
    specific threat identification, as previously captured in the System
    Threat Assessment Report, is no longer possible, the Adversary
    Capability Document (ACD) provides the range of capabilities a
    potential adversary might be able to deploy. Subsequently, more
    detailed System Capability Specifications (SCS) will provide capability
    requirements for the overall system, elements, components, and
    interfaces. The TOG and SCS will help define the overall system
    configuration and architecture.
        From the TOG and SCS, MDA will develop capability specifications
    for individual elements and components. These two documents are
    respectively known as the ECS and the CCS. Capability specifications
    will include hardware and software descriptions as well as interface
    design requirements. These detailed specifications will be reflected in
    traditional cost, schedule, and performance metrics used to define
    contract requirements and deliverables. Contract performance will still
    be managed using the traditional Earned Value Management System (EVMS)
    practices. Traditional `control' documents such as Risk Management
    Plans and Cost Analysis Requirements Descriptions (CARDs) remain in use
    for each individual program element. Congressional oversight will still
    be afforded through the SAR. In place of the Defense Acquisition
    Executive Summary (DAES) report, we submit an MDA Quarterly Report that
    contains an overall BMDS status and assessment for use by the Missile
    Defense Support Group. We are also developing a BMDS Integrated Master
    Schedule (IMS) for internal use. The IMS will capture key schedule
    information from the element programs and certain MDA business and
    functional processes for use in preparing a BMDS-level schedule
    assessment that will be included in the MDA Quarterly Report.
        In sum, the key documents MDA uses to management development are:
    the TOG, ACD, SCS, ECS, and CCS, in addition to the MDA Quarterly
    Report and SAR. At the execution level there is no change between
    requirements-based and capability-based acquisition approaches. Using
    capability-based acquisition, baselines will still be in place to
    determine if programs are running on cost and on schedule. Reporting
    requirements will still be available to judge the trade off of
    additional developmental risk for additional performance or additional
    cost. The Department will still be able to determine if a missile
    defense program should be accelerated, decelerated, modified, or
    terminated. After a program completes the development phase and moves
    into the transition phase prior to procurement, the military Services
    will prepare the normal acquisition documentation.

                                PAC-3 TRANSITION

        12. Senator Reed. General Kadish, the PAC-3 system has been
    transitioned to the Army for procurement. Is the system meeting its
    threshold ORD performance and if not, why not?
        General Kadish. The Secretary of Defense has canceled missile
    defense ORDs, including the PAC-3 ORD, thereby removing the former
    threshold ORD performance parameters as go/no-go criteria for the
    purpose of electing to produce and field missile defense systems. This
    provides greater flexibility for the application of military judgment
    in delivering capability to the field. Our testing to date indicates
    PAC-3 is meeting almost all of the former threshold ORD performance
    requirements. Rather than delay fielding this critical warfighter
    capability, we have opted to proceed with limited procurement supported
    by a disciplined program to continue enhancing system performance
    against existing and emerging threats. Once the PAC-3 system completes
    operational testing we will be positioned to evaluate, along with the
    warfighter, the level of performance this system provides and whether
    to proceed with a full-rate production decision.

        13. Senator Reed. General Kadish, is a new ORD being developed for
    PAC-3, and if so, by whom?
        General Kadish. The Army Combat Developer, the U.S. Army Air
    Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH) is presently recasting the
    existing PAC-3 ORD into a capability-based ORD.

        14. Senator Reed. General Kadish, who is in charge of approval of
    any new PAC-3 ORD, and who will have to concur with it?
        General Kadish. The JROC is responsible for approving the
    capability-based ORD. MDA will cooperate in developing the document and
    will provide concurrence before it is submitted for formal review and
    approval by the JROC.

                              ARROW SYSTEM TESTING

        15. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, the test program for the Arrow
    system was a subject of discussion during the hearing. What is your
    assessment of the Arrow test program?
        Mr. Christie. Since Arrow is not designated a Major Defense
    Acquisition Program, DOT&E has not had visibility into the program to
    date. As directed in the fiscal year 2002 appropriations language, we
    plan to review Arrow program plans, reports, and test activities and to
    provide our assessment of the program in this year's annual report.

                                ORD RESTRICTIONS

        16. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, one reason given for
    abolishing missile defense ORDs is that they are ``too restrictive.''
    Can you provide some examples of defense programs that have not been
    fielded because their ORDs were too restrictive?
        Secretary Aldridge. We know of no system that has not been fielded.

                  CAPABILITY TO DO POST-ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENTS

        17. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you stated at the hearing that
    one of the benefits of deploying a contingency operational capability
    is that we will learn more than we would have in a ``very sterile test
    program.'' However, one of the areas test programs focus on is data
    gathering--usually much more so than deployed programs. What
    information will not be available in the contingency deployment that
    would be available during an operational test, e.g., do you plan on
    actually flying missiles against targets as part of any of the
    contingency deployments or do you plan on embedding test
    instrumentation into the contingency deployments to get data for post-
    engagement assessment?
        General Kadish. Operational testing is typically of short duration
    and, while it is designed to be as realistic as possible, it does not
    substitute for the knowledge gained about using the system after it is
    deployed. Deployment provides opportunities to see how hardware and
    software work in many different situations that could not be fully
    explored during limited operational testing. For example, integration
    of battle management command and control with the existing command
    structure can be much more thoroughly demonstrated, particularly with
    the built-in test capability that the BMDS will have. Even if a
    contingent operational capability is deployed, MDA's capability-based
    acquisition program will continue to evolve the BMDS through spiral
    development to a more capable system. In support of this ongoing RDT&E
    program, a full spectrum of testing and data collection will continue,
    particularly focusing on target intercepts and post-intercept analysis.
    However, we have yet to fully define the details on what data will be
    collected from a BMDS that is contingently deployed and what data will
    be collected during the concurrent RDT&E program. They will depend in
    part on the BMDS Block capability that is deployed. In any event,
    contingency deployment, if it occurs, is expected to supplement and not
    eliminate test information collected on BMDS capabilities.

                         CONSULTATION OF SERVICE CHIEFS

        18. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, during the hearing you stated
    that you did not know why the Service Chiefs were not consulted on the
    missile defense budget, and you did not explain why the JROC was not
    consulted on the memorandum that abolished ORDs for missile defense.
    Could you please now answer these questions, and indicate if you plan
    in the future to obtain the opinions of these groups regarding missile
    defense programs and if you do plan to obtain the opinions of the
    Service Chiefs and the JR0C in the future, could you please explain the
    process by which this will be accomplished?
        Secretary Aldridge. Both the Secretary of Defense January 2, 2002,
    Directive and my February 13, 2002, Implementation Guidance Memorandum
    were coordinated with the Service Secretaries and the Vice Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to signature. Since that time these
    organizations have been represented by their nominated principals on
    the Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG). This group will be used to
    provide advice to the Director, Missile Defense Agency, me, and the
    Senior Executive Council that is composed of the Service Secretaries,
    me, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the course of its work, the
    MDSG will review the missile defense budget and other priority issues.
    The Director of the MDA will obtain the advice of the warfigther
    community on desired operational features and approaches to system
    deployment. The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization
    (JTAMDO) will serve as the voice for the combatant commanders and
    Services to lead the collaborative effort with the combatant commanders
    and Services on operational matters. JTAMDO will also develop
    operational concepts, develop the operational architecture, and assess
    military utility, during Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
    development and transition. Further, MDA will work closely with JTAMDO
    in developing the joint command and control architecture for the BMDS
    and integrating it into the applicable joint command and control
    architectures for missile defense. Further, the Director of the MDA has
    created a board of directors with each of the three Military Services
    to facilitate interaction and solicit advice to ensure that system
    development activities are closely coordinated with the needs of the
    warfighter.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

     SYSTEM THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORTS AND ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES DOCUMENTS

        19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, according to Secretary
    Rumsfeld's memorandum dated January 2, 2002, the MDA will no longer
    rely upon System Threat Assessment Reports developed by the Defense
    Department's intelligence agencies, but will develop a unique document
    called an Adversary Capabilities Document (ACD). Are there specific
    reasons why the Department's intelligence agencies cannot prepare the
    ACD, and will the ACD be coordinated with the Department's intelligence
    agencies?
        Secretary Aldridge. The intelligence agencies are chartered to
    provide intelligence data and assessments that are based on data that
    are collected, processed, and analyzed from a variety of intelligence
    collection assets. These data are evidence-based. The ACD is not
    limited by evidence-based capabilities and assessments. It will be
    based on the limits of technological capabilities and physics, not
    simply the limits of intelligence-projected capabilities. A task such
    as the ACD is outside mission statements and charters for the
    intelligence agencies, as currently defined
        However, intelligence data is also included in the ACD. For each
    parameter in the ACD, intelligence data is always the inner bound or
    starting point in determining the theoretical minimum and maximum
    value. Every effort is being made to coordinate the development of the
    ACD with the intelligence agencies. The Missile and Space Intelligence
    Center, the National Air Intelligence Center, and the Defense
    Intelligence Agency have been represented at every review meeting thus
    far. Their participation is critical to the success of the ACD.

        20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, General Kadish said in his
    testimony that the ACD will be ``physics-based and look at the physical
    parameters that could be around the threat.'' Could you detail which
    physics-based parameters will now be included in the ACD and if that
    information will require detailed knowledge of an adversary's missile
    and warhead configuration?
        Secretary Aldridge. The set of parameters emphasizes what is
    possible to observe directly, starting from DIA missile modeling
    parameters. Parameters derived or inferred from these, and missile
    technology and warhead data, are included as warranted. While specific
    instances of adversary information are useful as examples, or as the
    first step in locating certain parameter boundaries, detailed knowledge
    about adversary missiles and warheads is not required and is not the
    focus of the ACD. Additional detail will require a classified setting.

               JANUARY 2, 2002 MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY MEMORANDUM

        21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in a memorandum dated
    January 2, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the MDA to create an
    acquisition process separate from the Defense Department's traditional
    acquisition process. Does the MDA intend to seek legislative relief to
    accomplish the goals and direction of the Secretary of Defense and with
    this phased approach to deployment, is there a risk that too many
    programs will enter the pipeline driving up the need for resources
    downstream beyond what can be expected to be available?
        Secretary Aldridge. The Missile Defense Agency and the Department
    of Defense see no need to seek legislative relief to accomplish the
    goals and direction of the Secretary of Defense concerning missile
    defense. The Senior Executive Council will continuously review the
    missile defense program, and revise it to ensure that risk is managed
    within appropriate resources.

        22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in the January 2, 2002
    memorandum, the Secretary directed the MDA's Director to use
    transactions other than contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements
    to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research. You indicate that
    at least some contracts, such as those being awarded to establish
    ``National Industry Teams,'' will be awarded outside of the authority
    of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. If so, doesn't this remove a
    significant amount of oversight over contracts worth billions of
    dollars, and could you provide a list and the amounts of contracts
    which to date have been or to which there is an intent to award outside
    the authority of the Federal Acquisition Regulations?
        Secretary Aldridge. There are two types of other transaction
    authorities under 10 U.S.C. 2371. One type is to carry out basic,
    applied, or advanced research and the other, known as Section 845, is
    to carry out prototype projects directly relevant to weapons or weapon
    systems proposed to be acquired or developed by the DOD.
        The authority to use ``other transactions'' (OTs) in accordance
    with Section 845 was delegated to the Directors of all the Defense
    Agencies in December 1996, providing the authority to enter into
    transactions (other than contracts) under prototype projects.
        The Secretary of Defense memorandum dated January 2, 2002,
    encouraged ``flexible acquisition practices,'' and delegated to the
    Director of the MDA, ``authority to use transactions other than
    contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to carry out basic,
    applied, and advanced research.''
        To date, only two OTs have been awarded by the Missile Defense
    Agency, both using the Section 845 prototype authority. HQ0006-02-9-
    0001 was awarded in the amount of $23 million to the Boeing Corporation
    as the lead of the Missile Defense National Team (MDNTS(I)) for Systems
    Engineering and Integration; and HQ0006-02-9-0002 was awarded in the
    amount of $23 million to Lockheed Martin Corporation as the lead of the
    Missile Defense National Team (MDNTB(I)) for Battle Management,
    Command, Control, and Communications. The period of performance for
    both OTs is through June 2002; however, it is anticipated that they
    will both be extended to December 2003, with an estimated increase in
    total value to $141 million and $141 million respectively. It is also
    anticipated that 2-year increments for the block evolution of the BMDS
    may continue through December 2011 for a total potential value of $950
    million per OT.
        In order to ensure that adequate oversight was provided for in
    these agreements, the OTs were awarded using the guidance provided by
    the DOD Other Transaction Guide dated December 2, 2001. The MDA OTs
    include an oversight provision titled ``Comptroller General Access''
    which provides the Comptroller access to the contractors records Other
    oversight, which is similar to FAR contracts, comes through OT Annual
    reporting to Congress, Defense Contract Audit Agency review of invoices
    and allowable costs, and Defense Contract Management Agency
    Administration and review of accounting systems.

        23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in the January 2, 2002
    memorandum, the Secretary stated that he would decide, with input from
    a Senior Executive Council, to use test assets for emergency or
    contingent capability. The test assets referred to in the memo are
    scheduled to be available in a little more than 2.5 years. What
    criteria will the Secretary use to determine if a test asset should be
    used as a contingent or emergency capability?
        Secretary Aldridge. Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Senior
    Executive Council have established specific criteria at this time for
    determining if test assets can be used as a contingency capability. It
    will be a case-by-case decision based on operational needs, ballistic
    missile defense element capabilities, test results, and other criteria
    deemed appropriate at the time of the decision.

         OPERATIONAL TESTING AND CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY CAPABILITIES

        24. Senator Akaka. Mr. Christie, if test assets are not
    operationally tested before they are determined to be available as a
    contingency or emergency capability, how can the Secretary be sure that
    the assets will work in an operational environment?
        Mr. Christie. As I stated in a previous response, I recommend that
    operational utility be addressed throughout development, so that
    capabilities may be deployed at any time without a disproportionate
    risk of operational difficulties. Under this approach, interim concepts
    of operation would be developed which account for the current state of
    system development. Putting together an operational capability and
    concepts of operations using components that are at various stages of
    maturity is risky. Previously, I pointed out the distinction we see
    between contingency deployments and emergency deployments. We believe
    that the philosophy we have described will balance the risk of either
    eventuality. By definition, an operational testing program, supporting
    a full-rate production decision or Initial Operational Capability,
    should employ production representative hardware. However, since such
    hardware is generally not available during development, interim
    deployments will exploit hardware built for testing. This strategy will
    put low-rate initial production equipment into service and may require
    a higher degree of interoperability or different interfaces than the
    final system concept, as required inputs from immature elements may
    have to be provided by a combination of other systems. The Secretary
    will have to weigh the relative risks of deploying an immature system
    against the risk posed by the given emergency. Addressing operational
    issues early and continuously in the development process will provide
    the best possible information to support decisions for contingency
    deployment.

          MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND FISCAL YEAR 2003 OMB ASSESSMENTS

        25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, in the President's fiscal
    year 2003 budget, the administration presented the results from its
    ongoing review of programs throughout government to identify strong and
    weak performers. Often, the budget request sought to redirect funds
    from lesser performing programs--or programs with unknown performance--
    to higher priority or more effective programs. How did MDA's programs
    rank in the OMB assessment?
        Secretary Aldridge. OMB did not publish a rating of the Missile
    Defense Agency programs in the fiscal year 2003 President's budget.

             MATURE TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES-BASED ASSESSMENTS

        26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Aldridge, my understanding of your
    ``capabilities-based'' methodology is that once you have considered all
    mature technologies that can be used in a missile defense system, you
    will determine the military application of each capability. Have you
    completed a survey of all mature technologies to determine what
    capabilities exist and how do you define a mature technology?
        Secretary Aldridge. MDA continuously monitors and assesses
    technology developments to identify new and maturing opportunities that
    could materially improve the capability of the BMDS. This is not a one-
    time or episodic process.
        MDA is in the process of refining a technology maturity evaluation
    process for the BMDS program. This process is being patterned after
    NASA's Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) and the DOD 5000.2-R
    acquisition regulation.

              DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TESTING AND EVALUATION ROLE

        27. Senator Akaka. Mr. Christie, the administration has given the
    Director of Operational Testing and Evaluation a role in determining
    whether or not missile defense programs are functioning properly with
    the major industry contractors involved in developing the program. In
    addition, the Secretary proposes establishing ``National Industry
    Teams'' through transactions other than contracts, grants, and
    cooperative agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced
    research. If these transactions are outside of the authority of the
    Federal Acquisition Regulation, what oversight will anyone have over
    the contractors?
        Mr. Christie. We have not had access to details on the roles and
    responsibilities of the ``National Industry Teams,'' and, thus, are
    unable to address this question explicitly. If the intent of the teams
    is to perform basic, applied, and advanced research, then the Services'
    R&D laboratories or national FFRDCs are the right organizations to
    provide oversight. Even if these efforts were funded by traditional
    contracts, DOT&E does not have adequate resources to evaluate the
    delivery of research products unless they are incorporated into a
    system concept with mission requirements and measurable performance
    characteristics.

        28. Senator Akaka. Mr. Christie, the Secretary's January 2, 2002,
    memorandum directs the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, to base production decisions on initial
    performance demonstrated through credible testing, availability of
    system alternatives, and threat evolution. Secretary Aldridge stated
    that the initial performance decision on which production decisions
    would be based would come during the developmental testing phase. If
    that is the case, then by definition some initial deployment decisions
    would be made during the developmental testing phase. In that
    situation, why aren't you involved at an earlier stage in order to
    ensure operational decisions are consonant with performance
    capabilities and if you are not involved, then would deployment
    decisions be made based on the developmental testing phase with no
    assessment by you of the adequacy of the performance criteria in
    meeting the capabilities based design?
        Mr. Christie. Production decisions have historically been tied to
    demonstrations of operational effectiveness and suitability through
    operational test and evaluation. Under the MDA acquisition strategy,
    they will perform ``credible testing'' in order to access an element's
    capability prior to recommending a production decision. DOT&E will have
    insight into this ``credible testing'' through my participation on the
    Missile Defense Support Group. Through this forum, I will offer my
    advice to the Director of the MDA and to the Senior Executive Council
    as to what testing should be performed and whether the testing
    performed adequately demonstrates operational capability consonant with
    the maturity of the element and the magnitude of the production or
    deployment decision.

                           PROGRAM STOPPAGE CRITERIA

        29. Secretary Akaka. General Kadish, in his January 2, 2002
    memorandum, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the Under Secretary of Defense,
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to plan and execute work such
    that it may be truncated or stopped under certain circumstances. Under
    the capability-based model, when will the criteria for continuing or
    stopping a program be established--before development begins, prior to
    testing, or after completion of testing?
        General Kadish. Under our capability-based approach, we do not plan
    to pre-determine specific criteria for continuing or stopping a
    program. Instead, we will establish metrics by which we will measure
    each element's or concept development's progress. We will use those
    metrics, covering cost, schedule, and progress versus risk, as part of
    our on-going assessment process for the entire BMDS.
        Our recommendation to continue, accelerate, modify, or stop a
    particular element or concept will consider those metrics, but will
    also consider changes to an adversary's potential capability, as well
    as changes in policy, operational considerations, and affordability
    considerations. We will bring our assessment and recommendations to the
    SEC at least annually for their review and approval.

                          TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS

        30. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, the MDA is currently doing a
    technology readiness level assessment of all system elements of
    critical technologies. Standard practice is to not enter into an
    acquisition program for a system until it reaches Technology Readiness
    level (TRL) 7. Generally, system requirements are used in determining
    the level of maturity of the system. How are you determining the TRLs
    for missile defense if operation requirements have been canceled?
        General Kadish. MDA continues to use the DOD approved definitions
    of TRLs. MDA is establishing a detailed checklist to move elements/
    components and new technologies from one TRL to the next that focuses
    on whether specific engineering and production milestones have been
    achieved during development in lieu of operational requirements. For
    example, a checklist to determine whether the development of a
    technology has reached TRL 3 could include assessment categories such
    as ``Integration and production issues have begun to be addressed'' and
    ``Components of technology have been identified and have been partially
    characterized.''

        31. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, how is the MDA assessing the
    readiness level of the different software components critical to
    missile defense systems? Will MDA's assessment of technical readiness
    levels include as assessment of how well the multiple systems work
    together? How will you address integration concerns?
        General Kadish. MDA assesses software readiness based on
    progressive tests conducted throughout the development cycle. This
    testing is conducted throughout development at the element and
    integrated system level. Thus, MDA's assessment of technology readiness
    levels includes assessments of how well the multiple systems work
    together. MDA's approach to addressing integration concerns is to test
    top-level system performance starting as early as possible with
    software algorithm benchmark and constructive simulations, then
    proceeding through Hardware-in-the-Loop, System Integration Tests, and
    Integrated Flight Tests.

        32. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, one of the significant
    differences between TRL 7 and TRL 8 is that the latter uses an
    operational environment for testing rather than a relevant environment
    that might involve proxies and idealized conditions. How will you be
    able to specify an ``operational environment'' if you have not
    committed to an architecture, quantities, fielding requirements, or
    some expectation of how the system must operate?
        General Kadish. MDA does plan to demonstrate specific sets of
    system capabilities, defined as blocks. Each block configuration of the
    BMD System consists of a number of elements with a range of system
    capabilities, architectures, and operational concepts to guide testing
    of the system capability. These architectures and operational concepts
    will evolve over time and are developed with input from the CINCs and
    Services. As the BMDS evolves and these blocks are defined, appropriate
    operational environments will be developed and instituted within the
    BMD Test Bed, against which each block capability can be demonstrated.
    Tests will consider the operational environment appropriate to each
    block at the time of testing. Full operational testing of the element
    or component capabilities will be conducted prior to transferal to a
    Service for procurement.

                           LOW-EARTH ORBIT SATELLITES

        33. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, a successful missile intercept
    by an NMD exo-atmospheric kill vehicle could result in the detonation
    of the nuclear charge due to salvage fusing. A low-yield (10-20
    kiloton), high altitude (125-500 km) nuclear explosion could disable--
    in weeks or months--all low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites not
    specifically hardened to withstand radiation generated by that
    explosion. Is your office working with NASA, Intelsat, NRO, and the
    satellite industry to ensure LEO satellites and the international space
    station would not be affected by a possible nuclear explosion resulting
    from a mid-course interception?
        General Kadish. MDA has met with many organizations, to include
    those mentioned, to discuss the potential effects of exo-atmospheric
    intercepts of ballistic missiles. One of the benefits of a layered
    missile defense system is the potential to intercept ballistic missiles
    in the boost phase, so that the scenario described could be avoided
    altogether.

                              FUTURE CAPABILITIES

        34. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, have you done any preliminary
    engineering studies for the various capabilities you are trying to
    develop, e.g., have you calculated the minimum speed required for an
    ICBM defense interceptor for boost, mid-course, or terminal phase, and
    have you applied these minimum requirements to the systems that you are
    attempting to expand from theater defense to ICBM?
        General Kadish. The Missile Defense Agency has conducted
    engineering studies and architectural trade studies for many years.
    These studies have been instrumental in providing an understanding of
    the major element and component parameters affecting overall system
    performance. Commensurate with a capability-based acquisition approach
    to the BMDS, the MDA will use these results to guide the pursuit and
    selection of concepts, technologies, and solutions to the missile
    defense problem as soon as they become mature enough and provide a
    sufficiently useful military capability to include in the evolving
    system. Existing capabilities for missile defense will be adapted and
    integrated for their inherent capabilities against ballistic missiles
    of all ranges.

        35. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, how much of the theater defense
    system will have to be redesigned to meet the new requirement?
        General Kadish. None of our existing systems must be redesigned. We
    will assess the capability of each element and component to contribute
    to the overall missile defense mission, and accelerate, truncate,
    modify, or initiate efforts to improve our mission capability over time
    based on the maturity and availability of technology to support that
    evolution. This is the basis of the capability-based acquisition
    approach we are applying to missile defense.

                                 FUTURE TESTING

        36. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, you have stated that you plan to
    be able to deploy an emergency system in 2004. According to the current
    testing matrix, how many integrated flight tests should be completed by
    then and will any of these tests be in an operational environment?
        General Kadish. We are planning to complete four integrated flight
    tests of the GMD element per year. All testing will develop and
    demonstrate inherent operational capability at increasingly higher
    levels of performance. The location and layout of the BMDS Test Bed has
    been selected in order to simulate as closely as we can an operational
    configuration of sensors, weapons, and BMC3. To the extent that the
    operational environment can be defined today, the MDA is designing and
    using the BMDS Test Bed to represent it and demonstrate system
    capabilities.

        37. Senator Akaka. General Kadish, how realistic will the testing
    conditions, support systems (radars), target cluster, etc., be by then?
        General Kadish. The development of BMDS will proceed on a step-by-
    step basis, rigorously demonstrating system capabilities through
    increasingly more realistic testing against a widening variety of
    threats displayed in a variety of relevant operational environments.
    The realism of testing conditions at the BMDS Test Bed for a particular
    stage of block development will pace the evolutionary spiral
    development of the BMDS. As the threat evolves, testing and the
    necessary test infrastructure will be adapted to reflect the need to
    demonstrate capability over a wider threat space. In the end, realism
    would be a factor in the assessment of whether or not an emergency
    system should be deployed. Deployment will depend on specific threats
    and available resources.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                                   SBIRS-LOW

        38. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, both of
    you indicated your belief that SBIRS-Low will be a critical component
    of a missile defense system. At the same time, critics continue to
    question the need for SBIRS-Low and its capabilities. Is there a
    continuing need for the capabilities provided by SBIRS-Low?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, there is still a critical need for SBIRS-
    Low in the BMDS. Specifically, SBIRS-Low is being designed to:

             provide 24/7 global coverage, and bridge gaps in
            ground-based sensor systems
             assure midcourse tracking
             discriminate warheads from countermeasures by
            mitigating the effectiveness of radio frequency (RF) and high
            traffic countermeasures that negate or seriously challenge
            radar sensors
             mitigate risk to forward-deployed assets

                     overcomes political sensitivity with regard to
                    basing rights
                     is less vulnerable to attack

             provide vital midcourse signature data to support all
            ballistic missile defense sensors and interceptors.

        General Kadish. Yes, there is a continuing need for the capability
    provided by SBIRS-Low. SBIRS-Low is intended to provide the BMDS with
    global, continuous (24/7) surveillance and infrared midcourse tracking
    of ballistic missiles. Currently, no other system exists or is planned
    that can ensure this kind of seamless coverage and tracking.
        SBIRS-Low's ability to detect, track, and discriminate lethal
    targets and associated objects in the infrared spectrum complements
    radar performance and protects the BMDS against the effects of radar
    countermeasures. Using its ability to perform these functions over the
    radar's horizon SBIRS-Low extends the BMDS battlespace by providing
    early precision cues to radar and interceptors prior to launch. SBIRS-
    Low continues its critical functions, by providing target information
    to the in-flight interceptor and assessing the success of the
    engagement.

        39. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, why is
    the capability provided by SBIRS-Low important?
        Secretary Aldridge. SBIRS-Low is critical to an effective missile
    defense because it is space-based, infrared, and in low earth orbit:

             Because it is space-based, SBIRS-Low can continuously
            monitor all of the earth's surface. This means there will be no
            blind spots or safe havens from which missiles can be launched
            without the U.S. detecting them. Earlier tracking allows
            earlier interceptor commitment and an increased opportunity for
            multiple engagements. A SBIRS-Low could provide key threat
            development information from inland test ranges which are
            currently inaccessible. It also provides the capability to
            track missiles along their entire trajectory from launch to
            intercept or reentry regardless of launch point or missile
            trajectory. No other BMDS sensor provides this capability. The
            extended viewing times make precise tracking and discrimination
            techniques possible based on long-term observations such as
            heating or cooling trends.
             Because it employs infrared sensors, SBIRS-Low adds
            robustness to the BMDS, complementing radar systems in several
            ways. Compared with radars, infrared sensors can more
            effectively provide wide area surveillance. Infrared sensors
            provide a second phenomenology--reducing the effectiveness of
            radar countermeasures. Because interceptors employ infrared
            seekers, the target information handover is simplified. A mix
            of infrared and radar sensor assets provides the ballistic
            missile command and control (BMC2) with a variety of options to
            optimize allocation of sensor to target.
             Because it maintains a low earth orbit and employs
            highly sensitive sensors, SBIRS-Low is capable of midcourse
            tracking and discrimination that can't be done by the Defense
            Support Program (DSP) or SBIRS-High. SBIRS-Low also simplifies
            target information handover because it passes target
            information from the same viewing angles achieved by the
            interceptor seeker.

        General Kadish. SBIRS-Low is critical to an effective missile
    defense because it provides a continuous capability to do global
    surveillance and midcourse tracking of ballistic missiles.
        Because it is space-based, SBIRS-Low, in sufficient orbiting
    numbers, can continuously monitor the earth's entire surface. This
    means that there will be no blind spots or safe havens from which
    missiles can be launched without detection by the United States. SBIRS-
    Low's ability to detect and track targets over the radar's horizon
    provides the BMDS earlier tracking, which allows earlier interceptor
    commitment and an increased opportunity for multiple engagements.
    SBIRS-Low could provide key threat development information from inland
    test ranges that is currently inaccessible. It also provides the
    capability to track missiles along their entire trajectory from launch
    to intercept or reentry regardless of launch point or missile
    trajectory. No other BMDS sensor provides this capability. The extended
    viewing times make precise tracking and discrimination techniques
    possible based on long-term observations such as heating or cooling
    trends.
        Because it employs infrared sensors, SBIRS-Low increases the
    probability of BMDS engagement's success and complements radar systems
    in several ways. Compared with radars, infrared sensors can more
    effectively provide wide area surveillance. Infrared sensors provide a
    second phenomenology--reducing the effectiveness of radar
    countermeasures. Because interceptors employ infrared seekers, the
    Target Object Map (TOM) handover is simplified. A mix of infrared and
    radar sensor assets provides the BMC2 with a variety of options to
    optimize allocation of sensor to target.
        Because it maintains a low earth orbit similar to the viewing
    geometry of the kill vehicle sensor and employs highly sensitive
    sensors, SBIRS-Low is capable of midcourse tracking and discrimination
    that cannot be done by DSP or SBIRS-High.

        40. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, can
    other systems provide the same or better capabilities as SBIRS-Low?
        Secretary Aldridge. Not entirely. While large, land-based X-Band
    radars placed at strategic locations around the world could provide
    much of the coverage, they would not provide the total coverage
    required for an effective BMDS. SBIRS-Low will be able to view missiles
    launched anywhere on the globe without any dependency on foreign
    basing, thus reducing the sensors' vulnerability to direct attack and
    mitigating the geographic viewing limitations of surface-based radars.
    That is precisely why the SBIRS-Low capability is key to an effective,
    reliable sensor suite. In addition, a balanced infrared and radar
    sensor suite mitigates the effectiveness of adversary countermeasures
    against the BMDS. Complementary sensors based on different
    methodologies (i.e., radar and infrared) create a capability that is
    highly effective against a wide variety of countermeasures.
        General Kadish. No single sensor alternative can replace a space-
    based infrared sensor for global, continuous surveillance and infrared
    tracking capabilities.

                  HIT TO KILL AND DIRECTED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES

        41. Senator Allard. General Kadish, with the termination of the
    space based laser integrated flight experiment, the Airborne Laser is
    the only major laser technology development effort being pursued by the
    MDA. Is it your view that laser or other directed energy weapons
    represent the next generation of missile defense technology after
    ``hit-to-kill?''
        General Kadish. Directed energy technology may be the next
    generation of missile defense technology. Clearly, we are pursuing
    relatively mature ``hit-to-kill'' technologies because we believe they
    can contribute capability during the midcourse and terminal phases of a
    ballistic missile's flight. Intercepting missiles during their boosting
    phase has many advantages. Unfortunately, the short burn times for many
    of the threat missiles make it difficult for a ``hit-to-kill'' vehicle
    to reach the target while it is boosting. The short time lines and
    accessibility to the launch regions make the ABL and the Space Based
    Laser (SBL) directed energy concepts attractive for boost phase
    defense. We are exploring these technologies to add to the missile
    defense system.

        42. Senator Allard. General Kadish, are directed energy
    technologies mature enough and promising enough to warrant greater MDA
    focus?
        General Kadish. MDA is interested in directed energy technologies
    for missile defense. Several demonstrations in the past (e.g., the
    Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL) and the Theater High Energy Laser
    (THEL)) lead us to believe directed energy technologies may soon be
    available to contribute useful capability to the BMDS. The MDA budget
    submittal for fiscal year 2002 contained a large increase in funding
    for directed energy technologies such as the ABL and SBL. Unfortunately
    due to the reduced fiscal year 2002 funding for the SBL flight
    experiment, we have had to restructure the SBL from a flight experiment
    project to a component technology project.

        43. Senator Allard. General Kadish, what role does the MDA
    anticipate playing in the development of directed energy technologies?
        General Kadish. MDA and its predecessor organizations, SDIO and
    BMDO, have a long history of funding and managing directed energy
    technology development projects. Unfortunately, funding limitations and
    changing mission priorities caused us in the mid-1990s to select the
    SBL as our sole investment. However, due to the reduced fiscal year
    2002 funding for the SBL flight experiment, MDA has had to restructure
    the SBL from a flight experiment project to a component technology
    project. The ABL was added to MDA funding and management
    responsibilities during the past year. MDA is committed to the flight
    of the first aircraft and to the first lethal shoot down of a missile
    target. MDA will remain involved in defining, guiding, and setting
    priorities for the Department's directed energy technology projects.

             NUNN-MCCURDY AND MDA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA

        44. Senator Allard. Secretary Aldridge and General Kadish, you
    indicated during your testimony that the Nunn-McCurdy law would not
    apply to the MDA's research and development efforts. At the same time,
    you clearly indicate the intent to continue successful technology
    developments and turn off those efforts that do not live up to
    expectations. What criteria will the MDA use in determining which
    technology efforts to continue, which to discontinue, and will these
    criteria be formalized in any way?
        Secretary Aldridge. Each of the BMDS elements, and the overall
    program, will be managed by Missile Defense Agency using internal
    baselines. Progress of each development activity will be monitored
    against its baseline to show how each element and its technology
    efforts are progressing relative to expectations. Periodic reviews will
    focus on the progress of each effort and produce recommendations that
    an effort be continued, accelerated or terminated. The metrics for such
    a recommendation will consider cost, schedule progress, technology
    maturity and risk. The Director of the MDA will make any such
    recommendation to the Senior Executive Council at least annually.
        General Kadish. Under our capability-based approach for acquisition
    we are establishing metrics by which we will measure each element's or
    concept development's progress. Those metrics, covering cost, schedule,
    and progress versus risk, are a part of our ongoing assessment process
    for the entire BMDS.
        We still use internal baselines for measuring element and
    aggregated system progress. We will maintain visibility and controls to
    adjust, stop, slow, or accelerate a program based on routine
    assessment. This is similar to how we have supported such decisions in
    the past.
        Our recommendations will also consider changes to an adversary's
    potential capability, as well as changes in policy, operational
    considerations, and affordability considerations. We will bring our
    assessment and recommendations to the SEC at least annually for their
    review and approval.

        [Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2003

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2002

                                   U.S. Senate,
                             Subcommittee on Strategic,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIC PROGRAMS AND SYSTEMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Reed, Bill Nelson, E.
    Benjamin Nelson, Inhofe, Allard, and Sessions.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; and Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    minority counsel; Brian R. Green and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
    professional staff members.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Thomas C. Moore.
        Committee members' assistants present: Erik Raven,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator
    Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce,
    assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; and Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator
    Allard.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order and welcome
    both Secretary Teets and General Eberhart as well as my
    colleagues Senator Inhofe and Senator Nelson. Senator Allard
    will join us momentarily.
        The Strategic Subcommittee meets this afternoon to discuss
    national security space programs and strategic programs. We
    have two panels today. On the first panel, we will discuss
    space programs and issues with Gen. Ralph Eberhart, the
    Commander in Chief of U.S. Space Command, and Peter Teets, the
    Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director of the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO). On the second panel we will
    discuss strategic systems and issues with Adm. James Ellis, the
    Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command. Admiral Ellis
    will be accompanied by Maj. Gen. Franklin Blaisdell and Rear
    Adm. Dennis Dwyer.
        We have a lot to cover this afternoon, particularly in the
    area of space programs. The Defense Department's space
    satellites provide our Nation's military with precise guidance
    for our weapons, navigation for our troops, sophisticated
    intelligence, and other critical data. Given the importance of
    space to our current and future military operations, it is
    troubling that a number of our major space acquisition programs
    have cost and schedule concerns.
        Lt. Gen. Brian Arnold, the new commander of the Air Force's
    Space and Missile Systems Center, was recently quoted as
    saying: ``In virtually every one of our major space programs,
    we are out of control on cost and schedule.'' Unfortunately,
    basic problems with the way some space programs are managed
    appear to have contributed to these cost and schedule problems.
        Against this backdrop, the Pentagon has begun a major
    overhaul in how it manages and oversees its space programs. It
    has delegated much of the oversight for both Air Force and NRO
    space programs to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. While
    this may help coordinate the space efforts of these two
    organizations, which I support, I am concerned that the
    historical oversight provided by the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) for Air Force space programs may not be as strong
    as it should be. The inherent jointness of all space programs
    and the current problems with these programs argue for
    stronger, not weaker, oversight by the OSD.
        In addition, a certain level of oversight is required by
    law for all major defense acquisition programs, including space
    programs.
        Today we will discuss how the Defense Department plans on
    providing oversight for its space programs, as well as look at
    some of the specific programs that have run into trouble as
    well as the Department's actions to implement the
    recommendations of the Space Commission's report.
        Now I would like to recognize the ranking member, Senator
    Allard. Senator.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like
    to welcome our witnesses today.
        Today we have the challenging task of reviewing the full
    range of policies, programs, and budget requests for space and
    strategic systems. Both of these areas have been marked by
    controversy and change in the recent past. Today I believe
    everyone recognizes that space is becoming more and more
    important to our military and indeed to the well-being and
    prosperity of all Americans. Navigation, weather,
    communication, and imagery satellites enable the full range of
    modern military capabilities that allow our forces to
    thoroughly dominate the modern battlefield.
        Yet, with this increasing significance, we must pay
    attention to the safety and security of our Nation's space
    assets and our ability as a Nation to sustain these
    capabilities in the near term and expand them in the future. We
    have serious reason to be concerned. First, U.S. space assets
    are increasingly vulnerable to attack. Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA) George Tenet, and Vice Adm. Thomas
    Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
    testified just yesterday before the full committee that a
    number of nations and non-state entities are developing the
    means to disrupt, degrade, or defeat U.S. space systems.
        Our increasing reliance on space-based capabilities makes
    these vulnerabilities all the more disturbing. Indeed, the
    Space Commission chaired by now-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
    noted that we are ripe for a ``space Pearl Harbor.''
        Second, space programs have not had a stellar management
    record in the recent past. Key programs such as the Space-Based
    Infrared Systems (SBIRS)-High early warning satellite system
    have suffered developmental difficulties, schedule delays, and
    cost increases. Yet, the requirements for these programs remain
    compelling and I am not aware of viable alternatives to meet
    these requirements.
        Third, while senior DOD leaders have identified space
    capabilities that could transform how our military fights, I am
    not yet convinced that the Department has fully embraced these
    efforts or that congressional critics of space programs are
    ready to fully support them. For example, the Air Force
    supports a transformational communications architecture that
    could allow much more efficient use of communications
    satellites and greatly increase communications bandwidth. But I
    am concerned that this new architecture is not well understood
    and could have a ripple effect on communications satellites now
    being developed.
        Space-Based Radar (SBR) and the Spare-Based Infrared System
    (SBIRS)-Low are both systems that promise tremendous new
    capabilities and are strongly supported by our military
    leaders. Last week, in fact, Secretary Aldridge, General
    Kadish, and General Eberhart all endorsed SBIRS-Low as an
    important priority. But congressional support for these key
    efforts has been problematic.
        Fourth, organization and management processes are going
    through a period of substantial change. On the one hand, I
    applaud the initiatives to correct poor management of the space
    programs in the past. On the other hand, we all need to be
    concerned during any period of change that these changes are
    responsive to past problems and effective in correcting them.
    Any time bureaucratic interests are challenged during a
    reorganization, good intentions can be derailed both subtly and
    quickly.
        Likewise, how we think about strategic systems is changing
    dramatically. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in
    January is a truly radical document. It addresses the
    tremendous changes in the international security environment
    over the past decade by reformulating the nuclear triad into a
    new triad that includes not only nuclear forces, but precision
    conventional munitions, active and passive defenses, and the
    defense industrial infrastructure.
        This formulation represents a fundamental shift in how we
    look at strategic issues, a significant step away from mutually
    assured destruction (MAD), less reliance on nuclear weapons,
    increasing reliance on missile defenses, and a range of options
    to deal with a range of threats to and attacks on the United
    States and its forces and interests by any of a number of
    potential adversaries.
        This dramatic reformulation brings with it new questions
    about the role of Strategic Command, the role of nuclear
    weapons, and Strategic Command requirements. These questions I
    think were inevitable, given how much the world has changed
    since the end of the Cold War. But the NPR has brought them
    into sharp focus, and today's hearing will provide us some
    opportunity to address them.
        We are fortunate to have Under Secretary Teets and General
    Eberhart for the space panel and shortly thereafter Admiral
    Ellis, Major General Blaisdell, and Rear Admiral Dwyer for the
    strategic panel to talk about these critical issues.
        Again, I thank each and every one of you for taking the
    time out of your busy schedules to join us today and I look
    forward to your testimony.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Senator Nelson, do you have a statement?
        Senator Ben Nelson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too
    want to thank both panels of witnesses for appearing here today
    to discuss our nuclear security, space, and strategic programs.
    I especially would like to thank Admiral Ellis from Offutt Air
    Force Base, Strategic Command, in Nebraska for being here
    today. General Eberhart, I very much appreciate the opportunity
    to visit with you today about space assets.
        This year we are again trying to determine whether the
    budget provides enough for our strategic policy and protection.
    There is also added concern because we realize that we are no
    longer, if we ever were, a fortress that cannot be penetrated.
    With the limited resources and the prioritization that have to
    go on, we must, in fact, raise questions.
        But some of our adversaries continue to pursue nuclear
    technology and, if gained, will not hesitate to use it. Saddam
    Hussein has stated that as long as other countries possess
    ballistic missiles he is going to continue to attempt to gain
    the same leverage. So it is imperative that our expenditures
    are both cost effective and are carefully allocated so our
    children and grandchildren can enjoy the same sense of security
    that we have enjoyed in the past and look forward to having in
    the future.
        So I look forward to hearing your testimony, your comments,
    and the opportunity to raise some questions as we go along.
    Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
    statement, but I agree with what Senator Nelson said in his
    remarks. Saddam Hussein also said that at the end of the
    Persian Gulf War, if we had waited 10 years to go into Kuwait
    the Americans would not have done what they did because he
    would have a missile that could reach them. Here it is, 10
    years later.
        So I want to get into a line of questioning as to the
    immediacy of threats and where they are, as much as we can do
    it in an open session like this.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        General Eberhart, we will begin with you and then we will
    turn to Under Secretary Teets for his opening statement. Both
    of you have submitted prepared statements. Both will be
    included in the record, and you may summarize as you wish.
        General Eberhart.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
                      UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND

        General Eberhart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a
    pleasure to be back with this subcommittee. It is also a
    pleasure to represent the wonderful young men and women in the
    North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), U.S. Space
    Command, and Air Force Space Command. They are doing remarkable
    things in both Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring
    Freedom.
        When I talk of these individuals, I am talking about a
    truly joint combined team of Canadians and Americans, soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, and our contractors, all
    doing what is necessary to make sure we succeed in these very
    important mission areas.
        In Operation Noble Eagle, to date, we have flown over
    19,000 sorties in support of Operation Noble Eagle, making sure
    it is safe for people to fly in our airspace. We have done this
    without incident or accident, which speaks to the
    professionalism and the skill of those aviators--once again,
    they are aviators of all Services--and to those who generate
    the sorties, maintain the aircraft, and make it possible for
    them to fly.
        I would also offer that we have achieved a new level of
    jointness in this operation, also reflected in Operation
    Enduring Freedom. But this one is special in terms of the
    cooperation that exists between the Services and the FAA,
    Customs, the Coast Guard, and other law enforcement agencies.
    This is a sense of jointness that we must continue to cultivate
    as we move ahead in terms of homeland security.
        We have flown over 19,000 sorties, at a cost on the order
    of $500 million. I think that we have done this very
    professionally. It has served its purpose, but in the long run
    this is not the right way to work this problem. The right way
    to work this problem begins right on the ground. It begins
    right at our airports, our airfields, in terms of improved
    security, the steps that we have already taken, the steps that
    we are committed to take in the future.
        It is also in improved security on board our aircraft in
    terms of air marshals, in terms of briefings to crews to
    actively resist, in terms of cockpit doors that are secure and
    cannot be penetrated by a terrorist, in terms of improved
    cooperation, as I said, with the FAA, so that when there is an
    anomaly, it is immediately shared with NORAD and collectively
    we take the appropriate action. It is also the ability for
    NORAD now to not just look out for external threats, but also
    have a radar picture so we can see threats in the internal, the
    interior of the United States. We are working that connectivity
    as we speak. So that is the way to work this problem in the
    longer term.
        Let us now turn to what we are doing in terms of Operation
    Enduring Freedom to support Gen. Tommy Franks and those brave
    young men and women who go in harm's way. Our primary
    contribution has been in the mission area of force enhancement.
    We do things like improve satellite communications. To give you
    a feel for how far we have come since Operation Desert Storm,
    we are providing Tommy Franks today about seven times the
    bandwidth that was available to General Schwarzkopf in
    Operation Desert Storm, seven times.
        So that allows you to do a lot of things through reachback,
    that cuts down on your footprint in the theater. If you look at
    people deployed in this conflict versus Operation Desert Storm,
    there is about 322 times as much bandwidth available per person
    deployed--that's very impressive.
        So we must stay the course in terms of the Advanced EHF,
    the wideband gap-filler, and the UHF capability for our mobile
    users. I believe that that is a good investment in terms of
    situational awareness, command and control, and in terms of the
    effectiveness, efficiency, and lethality of our forces.
        We provide weather support. We provide updated weather
    information. We do that essentially on the half hour, as
    opposed to in the past where we would have done it on the hour
    for General Franks and his folks. So not only observations, but
    forecasts, and also space weather and what effect that space
    weather might have on their operations. In most cases we are
    referring to their communications capabilities.
        Next, missile warning. We do this through the Defense
    Support Program (DSP). Thank goodness we have not had to call a
    missile shot to Tommy Franks or his forces, but we are watching
    closely to make sure the enemy has not launched a Scud or
    similar type short-range ballistic missile.
        We also use this DSP for battlespace characterization, so
    we can essentially do some combat assessment, and some bomb
    damage assessment, using this system. Bright young men and
    women out there have figured out how to use a system that was
    designed to detect ICBM launches in these and other exciting
    ways.
        That is why we need the Space-Based Infrared System
    referred to by Senator Allard. That is so very important, not
    only for the national mission, but also for operational and
    tactical levels of warfare, to support all warfighters
    regardless of the medium in which they fight.
        Finally, in terms of computer network operations, we
    immediately went to Information Condition (INFOCON) Alpha,
    which I believe paid off in terms of securing our networks. I
    believe it also sent a valuable message in terms of deterrence.
    We actually saw for the first few months after this horrific
    event on September 11 that the number of attempted probes
    actually dropped by half. I think that is for several reasons.
    I think, one, because we went to INFOCON Alpha. I also believe
    that it was not patriotic at that time to try to hack into our
    system. I also believe that offshore hackers knew we were mad
    and decided not to test us during this period of time. I am sad
    to report that those probes have now returned to the level that
    we saw before September 11.
        So in summary, your air and space warriors out there of all
    Services, to include our very important civilian complement,
    are working hard to ensure that we succeed in both Operation
    Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. On their behalf, I
    thank this subcommittee for your continued support over the
    years, but more importantly for what you will do for us in the
    future.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Eberhart follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee:
        Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today
    representing the outstanding men and women of North American Aerospace
    Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Space Command (USSPACECOM).
    The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians, reservists, and
    guardsmen serving in NORAD and USSPACECOM have been instrumental in our
    success to defend the homeland and attack terrorist factions in the
    global war on terrorism. At home or abroad, the commitment of our
    Service men and women to the Nation's security has been nothing less
    than phenomenal.

                        PEOPLE--OUR NUMBER ONE PRIORITY

        Our first priority is our people. Our warfighting edge depends on
    the dedication, professionalism, and sacrifice of the men and women in
    our Commands. Without them, even our most effective weapon systems are
    of little value. As always, we need to continue to recruit, retain,
    equip, and train our entire force.
        We appreciate the critical role the members of this subcommittee
    have played to improve their quality of life. The Fiscal Year 2002
    National Defense Authorization Act reflected the country's confidence
    in and concern for the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces. Our
    people have heard your message and are grateful for your actions. This
    year's Defense Authorization Act provides many important quality of
    life improvements such as needed pay raises, more robust health
    benefits, improved housing benefits (better on-base housing and
    increased off-base housing allowance), and greater educational
    opportunities. All of these are key to helping us retain and recruit
    the quality force our Nation needs.
        The men and women of our Commands serve in virtually every location
    where U.S. and allied forces operate. To the best of our ability, we
    are safeguarding our people and facilities by continuing to conduct
    regular anti-terrorism training, assess and correct our own
    vulnerabilities, and educate our people to be constantly on guard. We
    do not view force protection as a mission unto itself, but inherent in
    all we do.

                                     NORAD

        For 44 years, NORAD has adapted to the changing threats by
    transitioning from an initial ``air'' defense orientation to a broader
    ``aerospace'' dimension--one that also provides surveillance and
    warning of ballistic missile attacks and space events. Our ability to
    provide surveillance and control of U.S. and Canadian airspace remains
    vital and constitutes a critical component to the defense of North
    America. The unprecedented attacks on September 11, 2001 were a
    reminder to the United States of the need to detect, assess, and warn
    of hostile aircraft or missile attack against North America.
        Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). Prior to September 11, 2001, our air
    defense posture was aligned to counter the perceived external threats
    to North America air sovereignty--we considered flights originating
    domestically as ``friendly by origin.'' Within this context, our
    aerospace warning and control missions were oriented to detect and
    identify all air traffic entering North American airspace, and if
    necessary, intercept potentially threatening inbound aircraft. In
    response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, NORAD's mission has
    expanded to protect North America against domestic airborne threats.
        On September 11, 2001, we quickly transitioned to an interoperable,
    joint, and interagency force consisting of active, Reserve, and
    National Guard units, and U.S./Canadian military aircraft and naval
    vessels. Over 13,000 men and women are participating in ONE activities
    on a day-to-day basis. For the first time in NATO's history, Article V
    of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked in defense of the U.S.
    homeland. As a result, seven NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft and
    nearly 200 people from 13 nations are serving side-by-side with our
    forces to ensure the safety of our citizens.
        NORAD forces remain at a heightened readiness level to counter
    potential threats. In all, over 19,000 sorties have been flown over the
    U.S. and Canada in support of ONE. By contrast, only 147 sorties were
    flown as part of the NORAD air defense mission during all of 2000. To
    the credit of the outstanding men and women involved in this critical
    homeland defense mission, all sorties to date have been executed
    without a mishap. Our success is the result of the professionalism of
    our people and cooperation between the U.S. and Canada.
        In addition, we have partnered with the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) and NAVCANADA to streamline notification between
    regional and sector operations centers, to improve communications
    connectivity, and to deploy additional portable radars in ``blind
    spots'' across the country for better interior coverage. The result is
    a more rapid, reliable response to FAA requests for assistance as
    incidents unfold. With the approval of the President and Secretary of
    Defense, we have also developed effective rules of engagement for
    hostile acts over domestic airspace to ensure the safety of our
    citizens and the protection of critical infrastructure.
        We continue to improve our procedures and coordination with the
    Office of Homeland Security, the FAA, civilian law enforcement
    organizations, and other government agencies from the U.S. and Canada.
    Feedback regarding our air defense support to National Security Special
    Events such as the Super Bowl and 2002 Winter Olympics has been very
    positive.
        We are heartened by the progress made to improve security at our
    airports and aboard aircraft. Measures such as new passenger and
    baggage screening procedures, heightened terminal security, hardened
    cockpits, and more air marshals are our first, and best, defense. This
    increased vigilance should deter foul play on the ground and reduce the
    need to commit fighters in the air. We believe our NORAD air defense
    capabilities are the last line of defense; when NORAD interceptors are
    called to action, we are exercising the Nation's option of last
    recourse. This progress made to secure our airports, aircrews, and
    aircraft has made flying in the U.S. and Canada safer than at any time
    in aviation history.
        Low-Altitude Air Threat. In addition to traditional air defense
    threats, we need the capability to defend North America against low-
    altitude, air-breathing threats such as cruise missiles, crop dusters,
    and general aviation traffic traveling below 5,000 feet. This is a
    significant challenge in congested population areas due to volume of
    air traffic, as well as the northern regions in which general aviation
    serves as the primary means of travel between remote communities. We
    advocate a three-pronged approach to counter this evolving threat.
    First, through the efforts of the North American Aerospace Surveillance
    Council, we will continue to improve our wide-area surveillance around
    the perimeter and internal regions of North America. Our goal is to
    provide a single, integrated air picture of North America that is made
    available to NORAD, FAA, NAVCANADA, and other government agencies.
    Second, we will support an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration to
    assess alternative surveillance technologies that can support this
    goal. Finally, we will leverage law enforcement initiatives related to
    general aviation (specifically for indications and warning of potential
    incidents), emerging command and control capabilities, and other
    research and development efforts.
        Resources. We appreciate your quick passage of the Defense
    Emergency Response Fund. As a result, we have been able to address
    several critical command and control shortcomings highlighted by the
    terrorist attacks. Specifically, we are upgrading our Battle Control
    System from vintage 1970s technology to enable us to provide real-time
    display of North American airspace, and provide effective command and
    control of our air defense aircraft. Additionally, we will be able to
    tap into a more extensive array of radars and sensors, process data
    more timely and accurately, and monitor a larger number of aircraft
    across a broader area, which will improve our situational awareness at
    all levels. In the long term, we remain committed to the sustainment
    and modernization of our air defense command and control
    infrastructure.
        Homeland Security. We remain engaged as the DOD explores options
    for the formation of a new command for homeland security. Our focus is
    to maintain current readiness and meet the requirements of this vital
    mission, regardless of the command option selected.

                                   USSPACECOM

        Established in 1985, USSPACECOM is charged with the missions of
    force enhancement, space control, space support, planning for force
    application, and most recently, the DOD's computer network operations.
    While we prosecute the war on terrorism, the decisive advantage space
    and information-based capabilities provide to our warfighters will
    continue to be critical to our Nation's success.
        Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). We continue to bring every space
    and information operations (IO) capability to bear for General Tommy
    Franks at CENTCOM and the other Combatant Commanders. Currently, we
    have people deployed in support of OEF to include a robust Space and
    Information Operations Element (SIOE) forward at the CENTCOM
    Headquarters. In addition, we are leveraging an SIOE reachback
    capability at Peterson AFB to provide additional space and IO expertise
    and planning support to CENTCOM and the other Combatant Commanders in
    support of the global war on terrorism.
        Force Enhancement. Our force enhancement efforts over the past
    decade have helped us integrate space into joint and coalition
    operations. OEF has illustrated again the effectiveness of, as well as
    our reliance on, these systems.
        Over 50 percent of the precision-guided munitions employed in OEF
    are Joint Direct Attack Munitions, guided by Global Positioning System
    (GPS). The all-weather, day-night accuracy of these weapons gives our
    warfighters a decisive advantage. Similarly, GPS has become a necessity
    for civil authorities and commercial industry around the world. From
    precision farming to financial transactions to surveying remote parts
    of the earth's surface, every sector of our society relies on the
    navigation and timing services provided by this system. As a result, we
    have initiated a modernization program to provide a more robust anti-
    jam capability for our military forces, and additional signals for
    civil and commercial applications. We appreciate Congress' continued
    support to properly sustain and modernize this national resource.
        Missile warning continues to be one of our top priorities. The
    Defense Support Program (DSP) has served as our mainstay for strategic
    missile warning for over three decades. Through innovative
    improvements, we have successfully fielded new theater missile warning
    and battlespace characterization capabilities to provide direct support
    to theater commanders and deployed forces. While DSP has served us
    well, we need the improved detection capabilities of the Space-Based
    Infrared System (SBIRS) to counter emerging strategic and theater
    ballistic missile threats. The SBIRS system-of-systems will be
    essential to our future early warning and space surveillance
    capabilities, ballistic missile defense systems, and will provide
    commanders better battlefield situational awareness. We are aware of
    the SBIRS acquisition difficulties. However, the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council's revalidation of our warfighter requirements in
    January 2002 reconfirmed the urgency to develop and field this critical
    capability. Reliable and secure satellite communications (SATCOM)
    systems are also vital to our military's readiness. In OEF, we are
    providing 322 times the communications bandwidth per person deployed
    compared to Operation Desert Storm a little over a decade ago. This
    exponential growth reaffirms our need to modernize our capabilities
    with a blend of military, civil, and commercial systems.
        Computer Network Operations. On April 2, 2001, we activated the
    Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO) to better align
    our computer network defense and attack missions and improve unity of
    command. In addition, the JTF-CNO makes more efficient use of available
    resources, establishes a clear cross-agency coordination process, and
    eases integration with the intelligence community and other mission
    partners. Computer Network Defense continues to be our top priority,
    with the goal to ensure stable, effective networks for the Department
    of Defense. Our experience with the Code Red Worm and its variants
    underscored our reliance on Internet connectivity and the vulnerability
    of our gateways. While the effects of many viruses and intrusions
    caused considerable damage to the commercial sector, we have been able
    to keep our networks operating at peak performance. In OEF, we have
    sustained proactive defensive postures based on potential threats,
    verified Information Assurance Vulnerability Assessment compliance, and
    maintained heightened operational security levels. For the long term,
    we are assessing technical and operational solutions to further
    strengthen the Defense Information Infrastructure and develop computer
    network attack capabilities for all our warfighters.
        Space Control. The political, economic, and military value of space
    systems makes them attractive targets for state and non-state actors
    hostile to the U.S. and its interests, especially as an asymmetric
    method for leveling the playing field. Not only are threats emerging on
    a daily basis, but access to advanced commercial space services
    continues to chip away at our information superiority edge.
        In response, our first priority should be to field effective space
    situational awareness capabilities that enable us to identify, track,
    and characterize potentially hostile threats. We must understand
    potential adversaries' intent and be capable of warning of hostile acts
    before they occur. We will also need to develop new capabilities for
    operations through, to, from, and in space. Along with increased
    vigilance on our part, these efforts will serve as a deterrent to
    would-be attackers.
        Space Support. The path for Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles
    (EELVs) is clear as we prepare for the first commercial launches of the
    Atlas V in May 2002 and the Delta IV in July 2002. Our first DOD EELV
    launch is scheduled for September 2002. By contrast, we still have much
    work to do to determine our long-term strategy and the investments
    needed for Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs). We are partnering with the
    Air Force and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to
    develop an RLV Roadmap that will be released within the next few
    months. We are excited about the potential military application of RLVs
    and believe early missions could include satellite reconstitution,
    refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. RLVs
    hold tremendous promise as we strive to better meet warfighter needs by
    providing a ``launch on demand'' capability in the future.
        Space-Based Radar (SBR). The requirement for a SBR capability
    remains valid. Our military operations require the day-night, all
    weather, broad-area surveillance capabilities a SBR system offers. In
    response to the Fiscal Year 2001 DOD Authorization Conference Report,
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense has recently signed a multi-service,
    multi-agency SBR roadmap, which brings together requirements for DOD
    and national users. As part of the SBR roadmap implementation, we are
    involved in an analysis of alternatives to allow DOD leadership to make
    SBR decisions as we consider other intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance needs.
        Radio Frequency Spectrum. Access to the radio frequency spectrum is
    considered essential to our success in all future military operations.
    We depend on the 1755-1850 MHz band to perform a host of critical DOD
    command, control, and communications functions, as well as to operate
    many of our military satellites. It is also the preferred operating
    band of the U.S.-based communications industry as they develop the
    third generation wireless services. Without question, limiting our
    access to this band or forcing our move to another band could have
    serious consequences in terms of combat capability. We need to achieve
    the right ``win-win'' solution and will continue to work with all
    parties to find the best answer to this challenge. We ask for your
    support to protect the spectrum needed to execute critical warfighting
    missions.
        Space Commission. We continue with implementation of the Space
    Commission Report recommendations. Specifically, we are preparing for
    the split off of Air Force Space Command from NORAD and USSPACECOM on
    April 19, 2002. We believe the changes being made will help ensure our
    military and national space communities are ready to meet the
    challenges ahead.
        Partnerships. Effective partnerships across the entire space and
    information communities--military, intelligence, civil, and industry--
    are essential to better leverage our space and information
    capabilities. We continue to work with the NRO, National Imagery and
    Mapping Agency (NIMA), and National Security Agency (NSA) to seek new
    avenues to improve support to warfighters and national decisionmakers.
    In addition, we are working with the NASA to explore common space
    systems, increase our space surveillance capability, and improve human
    spaceflight safety. Finally, through our partnerships with other
    agencies, we are investigating ways to collectively support our
    computer network operations mission.
        We need to balance the advantages of commercial partnerships with
    the inherent risks associated with expanding our use of commercial
    systems. We do this by assessing our vulnerabilities and ensuring
    protected military systems are available for our most critical military
    missions.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We believe the NORAD and USSPACECOM missions will continue to grow
    in importance as the Nation responds to current and emerging threats.
    Our capabilities will help build the foundation needed to fulfill DOD's
    transformational goals to protect the U.S. homeland and critical bases
    of operation, deny sanctuaries to our enemies, as well as project and
    sustain combat power. We will also serve a central role as the DOD
    leverages information technology, conducts effective information
    operations, and strengthens space operations in the future.
        We continue to find new ways to improve these unique capabilities
    by integrating them into all aspects of our military missions. As we
    develop our next generation systems, we should invest the necessary
    resources, energy, and intellectual capital to protect our vital
    interests and sustain our lead in the space and information domains. We
    appreciate Congress' continued support of our people and to maintain
    our high state of readiness. With your help, we will ensure our air
    defense, space, and information forces continue to play a key role in
    our Nation's defense.
        Again, I am honored to appear before you and look forward to your
    questions.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, General Eberhart.
        Mr. Secretary.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PETER B. TEETS, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
           FORCE AND DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

        Secretary Teets. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
    afternoon to you. I would like to start by thanking the Armed
    Services Committee for their support of my nomination and then
    subsequently the Senate for confirming my nomination last
    December 7. I was subsequently sworn in as Under Secretary of
    the Air Force on December 13 and want to assure you I have been
    working hard ever since.
        I find that I have arrived on the scene at what I would
    call an opportune time. I am the beneficiary of the results of
    three important commissions that were established to look at
    the national security space situation. One has been referred to
    widely, the National Security Space Commission, chaired by
    Secretary Rumsfeld, and I will have more to say about that in a
    moment or two and also be happy to take questions about
    implementing those recommendations.
        There were also two other important commissions. There was
    an NRO Commission. Senator Allard participated in that as well,
    of course, and that was an important piece of work which gave
    some recommendations for the NRO. I have taken those
    recommendations seriously and we are in the process of
    implementing that commission's results as well and
    recommendations as well.
        Then lastly, perhaps you are familiar with the fact that
    Don Kerr headed up a remote sensing panel that provided an
    important database to the intelligence community regarding
    remote sensing capabilities and the future of remote sensing in
    our country.
        So I really have had the benefit of all three commissions'
    results completed and I find all three to have very valuable
    recommendations for implementation. All of it leads in a way to
    a situation where I think we can realistically look forward in
    the relatively distant future toward a situation in which the
    United States can achieve something that I would call universal
    situational awareness. We can in fact have collection
    activities going on in space which, when properly merged with
    air assets, properly merged with activity on land and on the
    sea, we can indeed find ourselves in a situation where we can
    know what is going on around the Earth. Obviously, this war on
    terrorism has taught us that this is a vitally important goal
    to try and strive toward.
        At this point in time, I would tell you that I have four
    immediate priorities, however, that will stop far short of the
    ultimate vision that I just described. The four priorities are:
    first of all, getting our space acquisition programs on track.
    We have heard already today references to our SBIRS-High
    program, and it is a program that is experiencing considerable
    difficulty and trauma.
        Since taking on the job, I have had a number of intensive
    reviews on the subject of SBIRS-High and we are currently on a
    path, a parallel path really, of trying, number one, to see if
    we can properly restructure the contract that is in place to
    provide a contract that can be executed and that can deliver a
    system that can meet all the requirements that have been
    specified for it.
        In parallel with that, however, I have been asked to look
    into an alternate option using some NRO people and assets to
    see if we can find an alternative which can provide the
    necessary and vitally important information that will come from
    SBIRS-High.
        I will be more than pleased to answer additional questions
    about SBIRS-High and how we are proceeding with it. But I would
    like right now to point out simply that as the newly named
    executive agent for DOD space I work and will continue to work
    extremely closely with Secretary Aldridge as the Under
    Secretary of Defense and the senior defense acquisition
    official. I have and will continue to work closely with John
    Stenbit, the Assistant Secretary for C\3\I.
        There is no desire on my part to try and exclude the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense or any of the necessary components
    that can add value to the process, and I would certainly want
    them to continue to have an oversight role. I do think,
    however, that as we have been trying to implement the National
    Security Space Commission recommendations, we have an
    opportunity to put together an organization which can look at
    the intelligence community activity in the NRO as well as Air
    Force and become excellent stewards of Army, Navy, and Marine
    Corps space requirements.
        Of course, as we have started to create this new national
    security space organization, we have included within it the
    national security space architect, who happens at this point in
    time to be Army General Steve Farrell. So we are doing
    important architectural work that crosses the entire national
    security space community and we have an opportunity now to also
    put together another organization called the Directorate of
    National Security Space Integration, which can migrate best
    practices, if you will, across all the national security space
    community. Again, I will be more than happy to answer more
    questions on that as we move forward.
        Now, another very important priority is to drive hard on
    the issue of assured access to space. I think it's clear that,
    from the results that have come back from the current war on
    terrorism, our space assets are more important than they have
    ever been. We need to be in a situation where we can sustain a
    launch failure. After all, I think we all know that the highest
    risk part of a space mission is in its initial deployment. The
    space launch event is a traumatic event, it is a high energy
    event, failures sometimes occur.
        We need to be in a position to be able to sustain a failure
    and still provide the next launch in a short period of time. So
    in looking at that, one of the things we want to do is drive
    hard on the Enhanced Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program
    to make certain that there are not single point failures which
    could cause both launch systems to be down in the event of the
    failure of one of them, and we will be looking hard at that.
        An additional priority that I have is to really look hard
    at how we can apply best practices across the national security
    space community, and I offer just a couple of examples. The NRO
    over a period of some 40 years has developed a solid system of
    acquisitions that has thorough oversight and yet which can be
    implemented in an expedited fashion. Typically speaking,
    milestone decisions can take place in a period of 90 days,
    rather than 180 days, and we can improve the cycle time by
    getting the right people together, sitting around the table,
    and addressing problems in real time. So I think this whole
    idea of national security space integration can lead to
    spreading best practices across the community.
        Another example would be in the launch system process for
    actually preparing systems for launch. It turns out that the
    Air Force and NRO have classically had two different processes
    or practices for readying launch systems for the launch event.
    We can rapidly change that. We can drive hard on a single
    practice and process that can increase reliability and give us
    more confidence in our space launch capability.
        Lastly then, another immediate priority that has come from
    the many commissions that have looked at the space situation is
    the need to develop a professional cadre of people across the
    space community. I know that General Eberhart at Air Force
    Space Command has been working extremely hard to make that a
    reality. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force at the last Corona
    meeting that we had focused on that very event, and General
    Eberhart presented his views on how the Air Force could move
    forward on that.
        I have had several discussions with Under Secretary
    Livingstone and Under Secretary Brownlee relative to Navy and
    Army participation in developing this cadre of space talent
    across all the military services and think we can make some
    strong progress there.
        I would close my remarks by simply saying that in this
    roughly 3 months that I have been in the job I have received
    terrific support from General Eberhart and Space Command. I
    have received great support from Secretary Roche and Chief of
    Staff of the Air Force General Jumper. Secretary Rumsfeld has
    also provided strong support.
        Frankly, I feel as if I am in a situation where I have been
    empowered to make a difference in this national security space
    arena and I look forward to that. I should also add that the
    Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet, has been
    enormously supportive in helping to merge NRO activity with DOD
    activity. I do think we have an opportunity to make a
    difference in the national security space arena.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Teets follows:]

     Prepared Statement by Hon. Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air
                                     Force

        It is my distinct honor to be before the subcommittee today
    representing the ``space side'' of the world's greatest air and space
    force. You have previously heard from the Secretary of the Air Force
    and the Chief of Staff about the state of affairs of the Air Force as a
    whole. I believe the ``Top 4'' of the Air Force--the Secretary, the
    Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief, and I--make a good team. We are of one
    mind regarding the vision of a Total Air and Space Force providing
    global reconnaissance and strike across the full spectrum of operations
    in the service of this great Nation. Given the focus of this
    subcommittee, and my role in the implementation of the National
    Security Space Commission, I plan to focus my remarks today on the
    space responsibilities and capabilities of the Air Force.
        The commission Congress chartered to assess the organization and
    management of national security space, commonly referred to as the
    Space Commission, recommended several changes in the way the Department
    of Defense (DOD) is organized to perform the national security space
    mission. Secretary Rumsfeld chaired that commission before he became
    Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and he's provided the Air Force with
    tremendous support in our implementation efforts. Secretary Roche and I
    are in lock step with his directions for implementing the Commission's
    recommendations.
        I am delighted to report that the Air Force has made good progress
    with the tasks assigned to it by Secretary Rumsfeld. In order to apply
    the ``cradle-to-grave'' approach recommended by the Commission, we have
    transferred command responsibility for the Air Force's Space and
    Missile Systems Center (SMC) from the Air Force Materiel Command to the
    Air Force Space Command to align space research and development efforts
    and operations under one organization. We have also made the SMC
    Commander the Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space. I have
    been jointly named Director of the NRO by the DCI and the SECDEF.
    Serving jointly as the Under Secretary of the Air Force and as the
    Director of the NRO is not without precedent. The first Director of the
    NRO, Dr. Charyk, served in this dual role capacity, as have several of
    our Nation's previous national security space leaders including Mr.
    Aldridge, our current Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics. I have also been asked by Secretary Roche to
    assist him by serving as the Air Force's acquisition executive for
    space related systems. Secretary Rumsfeld's request that Mr. Aldridge
    delegate Milestone Decision Authority for major DOD space programs to
    the Under Secretary of the Air Force has made me the senior civilian
    responsible and accountable for managing the Nation's national security
    space program for the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
    Community. In my view, the buck stops with me for national security
    space issues--and I am thrilled and honored to have been asked to take
    on this important challenge.
        We are in the midst of an epic struggle of good versus evil in the
    war on terrorism. To date, our space-based systems have performed
    incredibly well in support of our troops engaged in Operation Enduring
    Freedom in Afghanistan. Air Force aircraft have dropped nearly 7,000
    tons of munitions in Afghanistan with 73 percent of that tonnage being
    precision guided. A good portion of that 73 percent would not be
    possible without today's space-based assets such as the GPS. In
    addition to the precision guidance supplied by GPS, our military SATCOM
    systems form the backbone of the information pipeline providing
    critical data to U.S. and allied soldiers operating in that theater.
    Furthermore, our satellite collection systems for weather and
    intelligence data have been more responsive to our warfighters on the
    ground than in any time in our history.
        The ever-increasing significance of the Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance (ISR) contribution to operational and tactical
    warfare is simply phenomenal. We can finally assess the effects of our
    attacks in near real time because of the contributions of GPS, SATCOM,
    and space-based ISR systems and all the hard work that has been done to
    integrate space with airborne ISR and airborne strike systems. In the
    near-term we will continue to focus on improving the integration of our
    space-based systems across the full spectrum of joint operations.
        The execution of the war has demonstrated once again how critical
    space dominance is for successful force projection and force
    application. In addition, we continue to recognize the need for
    persistent, 24/7, all-weather, surveillance collection capabilities. We
    talk on the ``air'' side about the number of sorties generated as a
    measure of support and effort to a campaign. One of the best features
    about a space-based asset is that it doesn't require additional sorties
    in wartime--it's already there, on-orbit, ready when called upon. Of
    course, with the limitations of today's imaging satellite
    constellations, we aren't able to stay at any one place for very long.
    My vision for national security space includes leading the
    transformation from a reconnaissance to a surveillance mindset in order
    to provide persistent on-demand space-based capabilities to achieve
    universal situational awareness for our warfighters and our Nation's
    leaders.
        That is a brief assessment of how I see the current national
    security space environment and a bit of our vision for the future. I
    would now like to talk about my four immediate priorities for
    addressing the near-term needs of the Nation's national security space
    portfolio. These are: (1) Getting space acquisition programs on track;
    (2) Providing assured access to space; (3) Integrating black and white
    space, applying ``best practices'' where applicable; and (4)
    Establishing a career path for space professional and leadership
    development.

                      GETTING SPACE PROGRAMS BACK ON TRACK

        As the subcommittee is no doubt aware, the Air Force is facing
    significant challenges in several of our most important space
    acquisition programs. Our biggest challenge is in developing the SBIRS-
    High program, which is designed to provide the Nation with the next
    generation of missile warning capability as well as enabling missile
    defense. In January of this year, the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC) revalidated warfighter requirements for the SBIRS
    system-of-systems, reconfirming the need to field this capability as
    soon as possible. At the same time, however, the Air Force-chartered
    Independent Review Team examining SBIRS-High reported a number of
    deficiencies in the program. It found that the program was too immature
    when it entered the system design and development phase, that higher-
    level system requirements were not properly allocated into lower-level
    requirements, and finally, there was a significant breakdown in
    execution management. These findings concern me not only because of the
    importance of SBIRS but also because these problems may afflict other
    space programs. One of the common threads of the review team's findings
    was that inadequate systems engineering contributed to the problems
    affecting SBIRS-High. So in response, I am currently examining other
    space acquisition programs to see if they suffer from the same problem.
    It is clear that the Air Force must address these deficiencies wherever
    they exist in order to be a good steward of space programs and the
    taxpayers' money. Later in my statement I will discuss reforms we are
    pursuing in order to improve the stability of space acquisition
    programs.
        As for SBIRS-High, on 31 December 2001 Secretary Roche reported a
    Nunn-McCurdy cost breach requiring that the Secretary of Defense, or in
    this case his delegate, Secretary Aldridge, certify by 3 May 2002 that:

             The program is essential to national security;
             That no less costly alternatives that provide equal or
            greater military capability exists;
             That new cost estimates are reasonable; and
             The management structure is adequate to manage and
            control the program.

        It is obvious that both the contractors and the government have
    made mistakes with this program. I have asked my staff to prepare
    alternative solutions that may satisfy these criteria if it is
    determined that the SBIRS-High program cannot meet them. Secretary
    Aldridge will chair a meeting, in late April, to review both the
    current SBIRS-High program as well as the alternatives, and to make a
    decision whether to continue or cancel the existing program. I cannot
    stress strongly enough the need to field a system that delivers the
    required capabilities in time to replenish the existing Defense Support
    Program constellation. If the current SBIRS-High program cannot meet
    those requirements, it is my priority to deliver a system that can.
        While we are working hard to address the problems with SBIRS-High,
    I would like to highlight an emerging success story in the area of
    military satellite communications. In the war in Afghanistan we are
    providing 322 times more communications bandwidth per person when
    compared to Operation Desert Storm 10 years ago. However, even this
    increased capacity is not enough to meet projected requirements. My
    highest priority is making certain that warfighters have the space-
    borne capabilities necessary to fight and win our wars, and MILSATCOM
    is one of those areas where the warfighters need as much capability as
    we can give them. To that end I have directed the National Security
    Space Architect office to conduct a Transformational Communications
    Study examining what the next generation of SATCOM systems must provide
    in order to meet future requirements. This study is examining a variety
    of capabilities and architectures that will help us achieve our goal of
    eliminating communications as a constraint on the warfighter. Among
    other things, we are looking at cutting-edge areas such as laser
    communications, optical links, and the development of a network-centric
    architecture integrating satellites and terminals to replace existing
    stove-piped systems. The final architecture will deliver orders-of-
    magnitude increase in capability over the systems in service today. I
    anticipate that the study, expected to be complete in July 2002, will
    give the military space community an integrated roadmap showing how we
    can deliver transformational communications capabilities to warfighters
    and national users in the near term.

                            ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE

        In delivering those kinds of capabilities to the warfighter, it is
    my job as the chief acquisition executive for military space programs
    to ensure that the United States has assured access to space. We have a
    lot of hard work to accomplish to make sure we have the access we need
    and desire.
        The phrase ``access to space'' historically has meant launch
    operations and, in partnership with the commercial sector, the Air
    Force is striving to fulfill this mission. The Atlas V and Delta IV are
    expected to have their first commercial launches this summer, with the
    first DOD launch scheduled for later this year. The EELV is already
    projected to save the taxpayer well over 25 percent of the costs
    typically associated with our legacy launch vehicles, and it will do so
    while meeting our stringent requirements for safety and reliability.
    Beyond EELV, the Air Force continues its relationship with NASA in
    developing a RLV technology roadmap. We welcome the opportunity to
    exploit a future RLV to conduct military missions ranging from
    reconnaissance to on-orbit satellite support and, potentially, even
    force application if directed by national leadership.
        In support of these launch efforts, the spacelift ranges at Cape
    Canaveral and Vandenberg AFB continue to be modernized to become more
    responsive to users and easier to maintain, while becoming less
    expensive to operate. These national assets are becoming increasingly
    valuable to both government and commercial users, and the Air Force is
    actively seeking new ways to exploit our civil and commercial
    partnerships in spacelift to increase efficiencies and reduce costs.
        However, even these efforts are not enough to provide assured
    access to space. We are not where I want to be yet, but we are taking
    steps to get there.
        For instance, access to space extends beyond spacelift--it also
    means making sure that once we get into space we stay there for the
    duration. As the global environment grows increasingly dangerous, we
    are exploring new systems, tactics, and policies that can guarantee the
    security and performance of our space-based assets. Our space control
    efforts are developing new space surveillance software that,
    extrapolating from existing telemetry, can tell us when our satellites
    are being attacked, and how. This universal situational awareness
    capability is vital to ensure that we cannot only rapidly identify the
    enemy attacking us, but also can take the appropriate measures in
    response. By also developing offensive space control capabilities--
    including counter-communications, counter-surveillance, and counter-
    reconnaissance systems, as well as a new ``space range'' to test and
    exercise these capabilities--the Air Force will provide our national
    defense leadership with a number of options in the event that our
    defensive systems fail to guarantee our access to space.
        We are also pursuing methods of protecting the integrity of our GPS
    signal for both military and civil users alike. As the war in
    Afghanistan demonstrates, weapons like the GPS-guided Joint Direct
    Attack Munition (JDAM) are absolutely critical to winning battles. We
    must not forget that delivering this all-weather, day-and-night attack
    capability to the warfighter requires a modern and secure GPS
    infrastructure. Our GPS modernization efforts, including our GPS III
    satellite program, will result in a more robust signal providing the
    warfighter with more accurate location and targeting information. They
    will also give theater commanders more options to protect the signal
    from disruption by hostile forces, enabling our units to successfully
    continue the fight even when faced with a jamming threat. While the
    improvements to GPS are critical to our military, it must not be
    forgotten that a better GPS system also provides numerous benefits to
    civil authorities and commercial industries in America and worldwide.
    GPS is truly a modern American success story, and the Air Force is
    working hard to guarantee its performance in the future.
        Guaranteeing GPS performance, as well as providing increasingly
    capable MILSATCOM, requires that the U.S. military maintain access to
    critical sections of the radio frequency spectrum. We are seeing a
    number of proposals to develop new wireless services using frequency
    bands currently required for a number of critical U.S. military
    capabilities. It is obviously of critical importance that we achieve a
    solution which meets the need of all interested parties to ensure that
    the U.S. military retains use of the spectrum frequencies critical to
    our warfighting capabilities.
        Due to our increasing dependence on access to space for military,
    commercial, and civil missions, the Air Force must remain in the
    vanguard in developing innovative, reliable, and affordable space
    capabilities. In the future, we must do more to assure our access to
    space, and I am committed to a thorough review of what systems,
    strategies, and policies this access requires.

                BLACK/WHITE SPACE INTEGRATION AND BEST PRACTICES

        As our SBIRS experience clearly demonstrates, existing Air Force
    and DOD acquisition practices are too inflexible to address the unique
    requirements of space system acquisition. As part of the Air Force's
    Space Commission implementation planning during the summer of 2001, a
    series of ``Best Practice'' teams composed of both NRO and Air Force
    members were formed to align Air Force and NRO space programs and
    practices in various areas. As you might expect, one valuable team
    focused on the critical area of acquisition practices.
        Over the course of this investigation, the team made a key
    discovery: the Air Force and the NRO already share many of the same
    ``Best Practices.'' The team did find a number of areas, three on the
    NRO side and two on the Air Force side, that required relatively minor
    administrative changes to the way the NRO or Air Force did business.
    However, they discovered one additional, substantial difference between
    the way the NRO and Air Force operates. The NRO's acquisition milestone
    decision cycle time was much shorter than the typical DOD milestone
    decision cycle time for programs of similar magnitude and complexity.
    Obtaining a decision at a Defense Acquisition Board via the process
    described in the DOD 5000 series documents typically takes 8 to 12
    months to get through the Integrated Product Team structure. In
    contrast, historical data on NRO programs shows the nominal time
    required to get through the NRO's Independent Program Assessment
    process is only 8 to 12 weeks. Months to weeks--that's a significant
    reduction in decision cycle time!
        I'll be the first to admit that making bad decisions quicker than
    before would not be an improvement, but decision delays often impose
    unintended costs on a program just as surely as requirements creep and
    program mismanagement do. Faster decisions by senior leaders can
    actually help provide program stability, a key ingredient to program
    success, by allowing the program office and contractor to spend their
    time performing actual development work instead of preparing for overly
    burdensome oversight. Faster decision cycles also support agile and
    flexible acquisition practices because they allow for direction from
    the real decisionmakers when needed, thereby enhancing our ability to
    make timely adjustments to our plans. This is the best way to enable
    our system program offices to deliver the most cost-effective
    capability possible to the warfighter in a timely manner.
        To that end, we have adapted the NRO process to fit DOD statutory
    requirements and allow full involvement by OSD and the other Services.
    I plan to approve several ``pathfinder'' activities using this NRO-like
    acquisition oversight process to assess how this NRO process can be
    best applied to DOD space programs. A ``pathfinder'' activity for GPS-
    III is already underway and I expect to be able to report on its
    results this summer. This ``streamlined'' process has worked for the
    past 7 years at the NRO, and I see no reason why it won't work for DOD
    space systems.
        The establishment of similar processes between black and white
    space is a terrific first step toward integration, but we will continue
    to explore other ``Best Practices'' and diligently implement associated
    findings. I'm not picky about where we find these ``Best Practice''
    ideas. We started this effort by focusing on the Air Force and the NRO,
    but we are now in the process of expanding our vision to include the
    practices of the other Services and from industry. The motto ``not
    invented here'' will not apply on my watch--a good idea is a good idea.
        The establishment of Joint Program Offices (JPO) between the Air
    Force, the NRO, and the other Services is also on my agenda in order to
    foster further continued black and white space integration. The first
    evidence of this will be the establishment of a JPO for Space-Based
    Radar in the very near future.

           SPACE CAREER DEVELOPMENT AND SPACE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT

        Implementing these best practices and improving National Security
    Space management both depend first and foremost upon great people doing
    great work.
        As part of the Space Commission implementation, we are working to
    describe and define the appropriate set of education, training,
    experience, and personnel policies needed to develop a cadre of Air
    Force space professionals. Air Force Space Command, under the
    leadership of General Ed Eberhart, has taken the lead on this very
    important task. The plan they are putting together focuses primarily
    upon the Air Force and Air Force elements of the NRO, but we are
    working to share our ideas, problems and our potential solutions with
    the other Services to create the necessary construct that will build
    and maintain the quality of our Nation's National Security Space
    personnel. Secretary Roche is expending significant energy to build a
    space community equal to the pilot community. I am wholeheartedly
    committed to putting the appropriate structure in place to make sure we
    continue to have the world's best space personnel.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Since becoming the Under Secretary of the Air Force in December
    2001, I have tried to follow a rule that Stephen Covey identified in
    his book: ``The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People'' which is
    ``Seek first to understand, then to be understood.'' I have spent some
    time getting up to speed on the issues, and we are now beginning to
    move out in earnest in making the changes that need to be made to
    transform our Nation's national security space capabilities and
    organizational constructs.
        These are exciting times for national security space as we
    transform, reorganize, and establish roles, missions, strategy,
    streamlined acquisition policies, and space career guidelines. The Air
    Force and the NRO are going to lead this effort with the full
    integration and inclusion of our sister Services and other applicable
    government agencies. We obviously have received tremendous
    encouragement from Congress in this effort, and I thank you all for
    your continued guidance and support.
        I am on a great team with great support from General Eberhart,
    General Jumper, Secretary Roche, Secretary Rumsfeld, and DCI George
    Tenet. When I look at the superb quality of the people that work as
    part of the NRO, Air Force Space Command, and the Air Force in
    general--I don't see how we can fail at anything that we put our effort
    against.
        America is currently the preeminent spacefaring nation in the
    world. It is imperative that the national security space capabilities
    support our troops and national leaders. I will strive with your help
    and support to ensure we maintain our dominant position.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, General
    Eberhart, both for your excellent testimony.
        Let us proceed with two rounds both of 6 minutes each. I
    will begin. You have already noted, Mr. Secretary, the problems
    of SBIRS-High. It appears to be about $2 billion over budget, a
    slip of 18 to 24 months in schedule. It is a critical system.
    You obviously need this system, as General Eberhart has
    indicated in his testimony also. So we have to proceed and try
    to, as you are doing, reform the acquisition process to get it
    back on track.
        General Eberhart, are the original requirements for SBIRS-
    High still valid, and could you briefly summarize those
    requirements?
        General Eberhart. Yes, sir. If you look at the record since
    about 1994, since we decided the way ahead in terms of the
    SBIRS program, we have first established, then periodically
    reviewed those. Most recently, we reviewed those requirements
    in January of this year once we knew that there was a problem
    with the SBIRS program, to make sure that in fact those
    requirements were still valid, that we were not marching to
    Cold War requirements or requirements that could have caused
    cost or schedule problems.
        We have also done this through senior warfighters forums,
    where the Deputy Commanders in Chief of the unified commands
    get together, and then we finally go to the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC). So we did that in January, formally.
    Then we did that again just last month, after the February
    meeting with Mr. Aldridge and Secretary Teets.
        So I believe those requirements are valid. They are valid
    in terms of timing. They are valid in terms of sensitivity.
    They are valid in terms of what we believe we should be able to
    do with this system as you look across from the mission areas
    of strategic warning, theater warning, technical intelligence,
    and finally battle space characterization.
        So I believe in every case, we have concluded that those
    requirements are valid and when we presented those requirements
    again when all the stakeholders were in the room with the Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we did not get any
    pushback, Mr. Chairman. Everyone agreed.
        Senator Reed. General, when do you conclude that a
    replacement must be in operation for the DSP program, which is
    our major form of national warning?
        General Eberhart. Sir, we have flowed out, based on
    optimistic views of the health of the DSP constellation,
    assumptions that the next two launches will be successful,
    which are key. We have also looked at in case one of those
    launches is not successful. The details of that, Mr. Chairman,
    are classified. We will be able to provide that for the record,
    in a classified format.
        But we have to stay pretty much on the revised schedule we
    have outlined today. If not, we in fact will have degraded
    capability in both theater warning and possibly in strategic
    warning.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, can you give us some details about how we go
    about fixing this problem in terms of not only substantive
    changes, but also the likely schedule of activities that you
    are anticipating?
        Secretary Teets. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, we are currently
    in the midst of a dual-forked, parallel path to look at the
    SBIRS program. As you indicated, we are talking about a very
    serious problem that was discovered, which has created the
    likelihood of an 18- to 24-month slip, the likelihood of a very
    significant $2 billion cost overrun.
        One of the things we have done is establish an independent
    review team (IRT) to look at and find the root cause of how
    this could possibly happen. I think the results of that IRT
    have been helpful in trying to establish rapidly corrective
    action and put in place a program that can be properly
    executed.
        But because of the critical nature of the SBIRS program, we
    also want to have an emergency or an alternative path that,
    should we find ourselves in a situation where we are not
    confident that SBIRS-High can be put back together again, so to
    speak, and put on a restructured course, that we would have an
    alternative way of proceeding.
        Now, all of this is leading up to an early May Nunn-McCurdy
    certification by Secretary Aldridge. So again I would
    reemphasize, we are not trying to take Secretary Aldridge or
    the defense acquisition community out of the picture. We are
    working with that community. The current path that we are on is
    to put forth, in late April, a solid look at what would a
    restructured SBIRS program look like. The prime contractor in
    this case is Lockheed Martin and Lockheed Martin has made some
    significant management changes at its Sunnyvale facility. They
    have brought in additional resources from satellite operations
    to bolster the management team. They brought in additional
    systems engineering talent. They have responded strongly, with
    the president of the corporation taking a strong hand in
    overseeing the activity that is going on.
        Meanwhile, our system program director, Colonel Mark
    Borkowski at the Space and Missile Center, is working very hard
    to restructure the contract. One of the things that the IRT
    found is that there were some problem clauses in the contract.
    The contract had been made in a way that provided total system
    performance responsibility to the contractor. The fact is that
    the government needs to be the total system requirements owner
    and to exercise proper oversight. So the contract that we are
    in the process of trying to restructure will have that clause
    removed and the government will have total system performance
    responsibility and the contractor will have clear requirements
    laid upon him for the system, but then also a clear requirement
    to manage his subcontractors.
        So we are putting that revised or restructured contract
    together right now. We would hope by the 1st of May, give or
    take a few days, to have that restructuring complete, go forth
    to Secretary Aldridge, and it is my hope that we will be able
    to recommend to Secretary Aldridge that he be able to recertify
    the program.
        At the same time, however, because it is a difficult
    situation, we have embarked upon an alternate course, a backup
    course if you will, where the NRO is working diligently to look
    at alternative architectures which could meet fundamental
    requirements that General Eberhart has spoken of in perhaps
    some spiral development way, but in a way that we can have high
    confidence that we will not be left out in the cold should we
    determine that SBIRS-High as it is currently defined cannot be
    done.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I have had an opportunity to visit with some of the
    commercial imagery people. I think we have two-thirds of the
    industry in Colorado. They tell me that they were used quite a
    bit after September 11 and that the military generally
    appreciated their up-to-date, very current information and
    data.
        Secretary Teets, I am under the impression that you believe
    that commercial imagery can be a valuable adjunct to government
    imagery assets, is that correct?
        Secretary Teets. That is correct, Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Do you believe that the promise of funding
    for commercial imaging products in Future Years Defense Program
    will be sufficient to convince commercial imagery firms to
    proceed with the development of next-generation imagery
    satellites?
        Secretary Teets. Yes, I do think it will. I think that
    commercial imagery can play an important role for government
    users and that includes the national security space community.
        Senator Allard. They do not see anything in the budget that
    makes them think that the money is going to be out there in the
    future, and when they go for money to borrow to continue
    operations they are looking for some assurance that they are
    going to be able to receive financing if they can provide a
    service which we seem to use, particularly at times of crisis,
    like we did during the terrorist attacks.
        So I am interested to know why you think this would be
    available for them?
        Secretary Teets. Well, I think that one of the important
    uses for commercial imagery can be in fact the intelligence
    community. I think that, while in an open forum I am not at
    liberty to talk about the National Foreign Intelligence Program
    (NFIP), I think you would find that there is a desire at least
    to use some of the commercial imagery to provide some important
    capability or collection requirements for the intelligence
    community.
        Senator Allard. I am amazed at how many other countries
    seem to be getting into commercial imagery to one degree or
    another, and I think that there is a certain advantage to
    having that type of business here and not having to rely on
    foreign countries. So I keep looking for ways in which we can
    keep that as an adjunct to what our military does.
        Sometimes systems are not always perfect, but if they do
    not work there needs to be a reliable backup. I think that we
    need some sort of insurance policy to make sure they are there.
        On space systems acquisition, the commander of the Air
    Force Missile Center was quoted recently as saying that all his
    major space development and acquisition programs were in
    trouble. Secretary Teets, do you agree with that statement?
        Secretary Teets. I think it would need to be taken in
    context. I do think that there are serious acquisition problems
    within the national security space community. I would say that
    I have tossed and turned on numerous nights thinking how we
    could find ourselves in the situation we do right now.
        My own analysis of that is that perhaps we had in the time
    of the 1990s some significant budget pressures and yet had a
    desire to continue on with a robust space constellation, and in
    so doing I think, perhaps not consciously, we assumed more risk
    than we have in earlier times. I find that in some of the space
    programs we experimented with contract clauses. We experimented
    with things like handing risk off to the contractor, thinking
    that that would somehow make the risk go away. This total
    system responsibility clause that I mentioned before could be
    an example of that.
        I think other contracts have other innovative ideas to try
    and lower costs of the programs. On the other hand, I think we
    find ourselves in a situation right now where you would have to
    say that some of those things have not worked. So I do think
    that the time has come for us to get back to basics and put
    together contracts which are well understood by both contractor
    and government and can in fact be executed. While that is going
    to require some financial resources to achieve, I think it is a
    necessary ingredient and we are proceeding accordingly.
        Senator Allard. General Eberhart, the Chairman asked most
    of the questions on SBIRS-Low and SBIRS-High, so I am going to
    ask another question here to Secretary Teets. So I am not
    ignoring you. I am not picking on you, Mr. Secretary.
        General Eberhart. I will not take that personally.
        Senator Allard. I do not want anybody to feel neglected
    here.
        In response to the recommendations of the Space Commission,
    there have been changes in space management and organization. I
    have been particularly interested in this. Some of those are
    related to the oversight role of the OSD. This committee
    apparently has been getting mixed messages about what this role
    will be.
        Secretary Teets, I am wondering if you can clarify that and
    share with us what your understanding is of the role of
    Secretary Aldridge, his staff, and his organization in the
    oversight of space programs.
        Secretary Teets. Sure. I have been designated as the DOD
    executive agent for space and as such have milestone decision
    authority. On the other hand, as I mentioned earlier, I intend
    to stay very closely coupled with Secretary Aldridge and his
    office. I also intend to stay closely coupled to John Stenbit,
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C\3\I. They have
    important contributions to make.
        Virtually all of the military space programs have been put
    in this national security space organization that now is in
    being, with the exception of SBIRS-Low, and I do want to just
    say a word about that if I may. General Kadish at the Missile
    Defense Agency has acquisition authority for SBIRS-Low. I met
    with General Kadish just yesterday, as a matter of fact, and we
    talked about how that acquisition would proceed and how we
    would work together to make sure that SBIRS-Low does indeed
    complement SBIRS-High and how the whole missile defense
    equation can come together.
        The bottom line is that we are going to form a board of
    governors, if you will, that all participate in, General Kadish
    will participate, Dr. Marvin Sambur, the Assistant Secretary of
    the Air Force for Acquisition will participate, and we will
    regularly take an oversight role of what is happening on the
    SBIRS-Low program. That will then be reported right up through
    General Kadish's chain of command, which is straight to
    Secretary Aldridge.
        So again, I think what we are trying to do is work closely
    together, not trying to exclude the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense from any oversight responsibility for space programs,
    but rather have a focused national security space program where
    we can implement unique contracting arrangements, we can
    implement best practices from operations as well as from
    acquisition to get these space programs back on track.
        Senator Allard. Thank you for your responses to my
    questions. My time is expired.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Nelson from Nebraska.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Eberhart, in our conversation earlier today we
    discussed the potential threats to America's critical
    infrastructure, including systems of satellites, which could
    obviously threaten the military and, more likely as well,
    commercial use of such applications. I am hoping that maybe you
    could speak to the subcommittee today about those threats, to
    the extent that you can in this open session, and what kinds of
    steps we are taking to protect against that kind of threat.
        General Eberhart. Yes, Senator. As we discussed earlier, we
    are concerned about our space control mission. One of the
    pillars of that mission is the protection of our space assets,
    it was one of the transformational goals, goal number six that
    the Secretary of Defense outlined at the National Defense
    University several weeks ago, essentially ensuring that we can
    operate in space, that our space capabilities are not at risk.
        There are technologies available out there where a foe,
    whether it is a nation state, a terrorist, or anybody who
    wishes us ill, could in fact jam uplinks, downlinks from our
    communications satellites. Obviously, they could attack the
    ground station with terrorist attacks or a military attack.
    They can use blinders of sorts to try to interrupt our imaging
    satellites.
        So those capabilities are out there and those are
    capabilities that concern us. As we look to the way ahead,
    first of all we need to understand the space order of battle.
    We need to understand who truly has these capabilities and the
    details involved.
        Second, we need to build not only a good defense, but in my
    view we need to build a good offense. Defense comes in the way
    of alarms so that we in fact know that somebody is tampering
    with our systems; two, to some extent hardening those systems
    so they cannot tamper with them; or three, making them
    redundant enough so if they take out one part of that
    capability, we have a backup capability that we can use or
    having such a robust constellation that we can use other
    satellites. It's also protecting our ground stations, making
    sure they are secure, good force protection, if you will.
        I believe that over time you could even see microsatellites
    in escort mission roles. Those are the kinds of things that we
    have to understand. Those are the kinds of things we have to
    explore to make sure that we have space supremacy in the
    future.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Now, probably the most
    difficult question is does the budget that is before us help us
    achieve these goals?
        General Eberhart. Sir, when you look at the additions over
    the last year across the budgeted program years, we have made
    significant increases in the amount of money that we have
    committed to space control. So with the support of this
    subcommittee and others, we believe that we will be taking the
    proper steps to ensure that we have protected our space assets.
        Senator Ben Nelson. So you think that there is enough in
    research and development to continue to remain on the cutting
    edge and ahead of our adversaries?
        General Eberhart. Sir, obviously that is a loaded question
    for CINCSPACE. CINCSPACE never thinks you spend enough money on
    space. But realistically, I think it is an amount that is
    satisfactory at this time, until we better understand some of
    these technologies and the way ahead. Then we are going to have
    to spend more money in terms of procurement.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I will only be able to stay for this one round, so let me
    do as much as I can. General Eberhart, since Senator Allard
    spent all his time with Secretary Teets, I will spend my time
    with you. I agree with your written statement on Global
    Positioning Systems, satellite navigational systems, when you
    said it gives our warfighters a decisive advantage.
        This has been true to an extent in civilian aviation, that
    a lot of pilots have ignored other resources that are there or
    forgotten how to use them, I suspect. I have been told by some
    people in the Air Force that this same thing is true with them.
    My personal experience was flying an airplane around the world
    and never losing a satellite. That was 10 years ago. So I have
    a great appreciation for it, but I also know the dependence we
    have on it.
        So it gets to the issue of jamming. How confident are you
    right now that, if you get into something more sophisticated
    than al Qaeda and the Taliban, do you agree that locating some
    kind of a jamming system or anti-jamming system is something
    that we need to really proceed on rapidly?
        General Eberhart. Yes, sir. We have a program called
    NAVWAR, which stands for Navigational Warfare, that talks about
    the way ahead in terms of ensuring that people cannot deny us
    the use of this GPS that, as you have said, we have become so
    reliant on. So we have to do two things in my view. We have to
    be able to burn through the jamming, so we have to develop the
    capability to burn through the jamming; and second, we have to
    identify the source of the jamming so we can take it out.
        Senator Inhofe. Timing-wise, though, it just seems that I
    have talked to some people in DOD that do not seem to be in as
    big a rush for this, and I think you have expressed a sense of
    urgency, too. When do you think we can have something that will
    work?
        General Eberhart. Sir, I believe that on the current path
    we will have some capability in this area in terms of burn-
    through in about 2010. A full-up capability will be a little
    bit later than that, depending on if it is 10 dB or 20 dB.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
        Secretary Wolfowitz said, ``the program we inherited''--
    talking about ballistic missile defense--``was designed not for
    maximum effectiveness, but to remain within the constraints of
    the ABM Treaty. As a result, development and testing of
    programs for defense against long-range threats were limited to
    ground-based components, ignoring sea, space, and so forth.''
        Since we are going to be out of the treaty on June 13, are
    you satisfied with the pace that we will have once we can start
    aiming at space-based missile defenses and be able to get
    there?
        General Eberhart. Sir, I must admit that I was very
    disappointed in terms of what happened to the space-based laser
    program in last year's deliberations, which I think will set
    back the space capability quite some time. I believe that we
    need to resurrect that capability once we all agree on what the
    requirements are and the way ahead.
        But in terms of doing this from space, if we are not
    pursuing a space-based laser program then we are not getting
    any closer.
        Senator Inhofe. What this leads to, of course, is your
    views on the growing likelihood of a rogue nation attack or of
    blackmail of the U.S. using ballistic missiles. We had a
    hearing the other day with George Tenet, the Director of
    Central Intelligence, and Admiral Wilson, the Director of the
    Defense Intelligence Agency. They talked about the National
    Intelligence Estimate, the current one that says: ``As outlined
    in our recent National Intelligence Estimate, most intelligence
    community agencies project that by 2015 the U.S. most likely
    will face an ICBM threat from North Korea and Iran and possibly
    Iraq.''
        Well, turning that around, it is implying that that threat
    is not there until 2015. I was trying to get this question
    asked at that last hearing, but my time expired. In fact, I
    went quite a bit over my time. I remember so well what happened
    on August 31, 1998, when, much to our surprise, they did fire
    from North Korea a Taepo Dong I missile that actually had three
    stages. The third stage was a defective stage, but nonetheless
    it had the capability or would have had the capability of
    reaching orbit and, even with the defective stage, would have
    reached Alaska.
        Now, that happened almost 4 years ago. How do they justify
    talking about 2015 when that demonstration took place 3\1/2\
    years ago?
        General Eberhart. Sir, I am not in a position to say what
    George Tenet had on his mind when he gave this date. I think it
    was probably a collective date for those countries. Without
    getting into a specific date, I can tell you that I am
    concerned about North Korea, specifically for the reasons that
    you have outlined.
        I am also concerned because, as we know, their testing and
    deployment schedules are not usually consistent with what you
    and I would do in terms of probability of success. Sometimes
    they will deploy a system when it has not enjoyed the same
    success that we would want to see in this country.
        So I do believe that North Korea could have that capability
    much before 2015, without getting into a specific date.
        Senator Inhofe. That is my feeling, too. Of course, it is
    the Space Command's responsibility to be able to be prepared
    when that time comes. This has been something that has bothered
    a lot of us who have read some of these estimates. I think the
    National Intelligence Estimate of 1995 was certainly flawed in
    my opinion, and I think it has now proven, looking back, that
    it was not that accurate.
        I thank you for that answer.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Nelson of Florida.
        Senator Bill Nelson. It is good to see both of you. Of
    course, I think that you are doing the Lord's work, and so I
    would like to pick up from my colleague from Nebraska and ask
    you, if we had a pot of money and it were available, where
    would you put significant improvement and increase to this
    existing budget. You mentioned the Space-Based Laser, that you
    were disappointed that it was cut. Both of you, if you would
    respond to that.
        Secretary Teets. I think there is strong reason to want to
    push forth some R&D aggressively in the field of space control.
    I for one am an advocate of wanting to see us move faster than
    we currently are on track to do. I would think that is an area
    for pursuing with some vigor.
        I would say--and I fully recognize now, though, that all of
    these budget considerations get into the matter of priorities
    and judgmental factors. I do know that the fiscal year 2003
    budget, the President's budget that we have submitted, does
    call for significant increases in the amount of resources that
    we are requesting be spent on space. I think we have done a
    reasonable job of sorting through those requirements.
        We will be, as you probably know, requesting funds to start
    a space-based radar system, and space-based radar system will
    be focused on the need for providing ground mobile target
    indications to warfighting equipment and do it in a way that,
    if other assets for identifying mobile targets are denied to
    us, we will have an overhead system that can do it. So I do
    think it is a high priority for us to properly start to develop
    this space-based radar system.
        We also will be requesting or having requested in the 2003
    budget resources for what we would call a Transformational
    Communications System. This is going to be an aggressive system
    that will hopefully give us the capability to essentially
    remove communication bandwidth constraints from the warfighter
    and ultimately be able to field a communications system that
    can provide necessary information and intelligence and
    communications capability to all of our warfighters where they
    need it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So that each of them can talk to each
    other?
        Secretary Teets. Each of them can talk to each other and
    they can provide, I will say, first-rate information, visual as
    well as voice, into the cockpit of an airplane and get it
    straight to the warfighter.
        We are in the process right now, the National Security
    Space Architect is running this Transformational Communications
    System study. We have participation, by the way, from the Navy,
    Army, Marine Corps, NRO, and NASA, as a matter of fact. NASA's
    requirements are playing into this Transformational
    Communications Architecture.
        What we hope to do is be able to build a system which will
    provide for truly joint warfighter operations and provide
    information to all elements of the warfighting activity where
    needed, and in a very timely way.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General.
        General Eberhart. Sir, if you will allow us to be partners
    here, if the Secretary is going to spend his money that way, I
    will complete the board here and I will make sure that SBIRS is
    properly funded. I also would advocate that we start taking
    some significant steps in terms of developing a RLV program. We
    are going through a study with NASA right now in terms of the
    way ahead. From what we have seen right now it looks very
    promising to leverage NASA's SLI, their Space Launch
    Initiative, and to come up with almost a JSF-type arrangement,
    where we can use common technology, common parts, so that we
    can develop a reasonable launch vehicle that would have utility
    for NASA and the military.
        But if you only gave me $1 to spend, I want to be very
    clear, I would spend it on the wonderful men and women out
    there serving day in and day out.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, I am glad you brought up the
    follow-on man-rated launch vehicle, because we have had so many
    starts and stops on that. Right now in the NASA budget over the
    next 5 years there is a $5 billion program for developing the
    technologies for whatever this new launch vehicle is going to
    be. Of course, what happens is the space shuttle just keeps
    getting stretched out and out and we are really looking,
    practically speaking, for another 15 years on the shuttle.
        Can you tell me some more about the joint cooperation and
    participation, since such a reusable vehicle would clearly be
    something that the Department of Defense would have need of as
    well as NASA? Is that cooperation there and is there a
    consideration on joint funding so that NASA does not have to
    bear the full cost of the development of the technologies with
    NASA's little budget compared to the DOD budget?
        General Eberhart. Sir, we have been looking at this now
    almost a year because initially what spurred us was the fate of
    the X series that was being pursued by NASA. As we got together
    collectively and looked at if there was any military utility in
    any of those vehicles to try to keep those alive, we decided
    that essentially we had wrung out all we could in terms of
    lessons learned, technology, et cetera, and it was time to
    start afresh, if you will, with those lessons learned.
        As we look at this 120-day study, I think our goal is
    clearly to do just what you say: first and foremost, to be good
    stewards of the taxpayers' dollars and to see where we can
    better leverage the dollars available. I think as a result we
    will field a capability eventually that would be much cheaper
    than if we pursued it individually.
        So in general terms, that is exactly where we are headed.
    The devil is in the details and there is a lot more work to be
    done here, but at least we have decided that this is the right
    thing to do.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I
    just want to say this as a parting statement in corroboration
    of the General's statement: It is very important to this
    country that we have a workable and efficient follow-on, man-
    rated vehicle to the shuttle at such time that it can be
    developed. What I would not want to see is this Nation
    penalized by not developing it because it is being developed
    out of a small budget of NASA, when in fact the need is so much
    greater than that.
        The fact is that NASA is trying to get 10 pounds of
    potatoes in a 5 pound potato sack and it cannot do everything
    it has to try to do. I think there is going to have to be some
    direct major participation by the Department of Defense in
    funding of this replacement vehicle for the future.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Secretary Teets, I am encouraged by your comments
    indicating your intention to cooperate with OSD and to work
    closely with Secretary Aldridge particularly. Let me ask two
    specific questions along this line.
        There are numerous reviews required both by regulation and
    by statute, including the integrated product team reviews and
    defense acquisition executive summary reviews. Will space
    programs continue to be subject to reviews by the Office of
    Secretary of Defense using the existing review process?
        Secretary Teets. No. I think that there are changes afoot
    in that acquisition process as it relates to space programs.
    When I say changes afoot, what I mean is that we are in the
    process of trying to outline a defense space acquisition board
    activity which can operate on a compressed time scale, time
    frame, from today's defense acquisition board timeframe.
        I think there are characteristic differences in space
    programs from most major defense programs that warrant some
    special considerations. One of the things that we are going to
    try to implement is, and we are going to try it first as
    essentially a pathfinder with GPS III this spring and summer, a
    way to have--instead of sequential review, we are going to have
    review in parallel.
        We are going to have stakeholders sit at the same table and
    review the current status of the acquisition program or the
    plan as it may well be and make decisions in a much faster way.
    So as I mentioned before, rather than having a major milestone
    requirement a 6-month or more period of time from the start of
    the time until the acquisition decision can be made, we are
    going to try and compress that to something more on the order
    of a 3-month period of time.
        We are going to try and accelerate independent cost
    estimates. We are going to try and use a database that, very
    frankly, has been built up by the NRO over the years for cost
    estimating in space programs, sophisticated space programs, and
    be able to bring that to the table in a way that we can see the
    necessary oversight activities happening, but do it quicker.
        In all of that activity, though, we will be asking for
    representation from OSD, from Secretary Aldridge's operation,
    and also from John Stenbit's operation. So we are not trying to
    exclude them. We are trying to involve them. But we are not
    wanting to do it in series or sequential review. We want to try
    and do this in a parallel fashion.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Obviously, we would
    be very interested in the details of this new approach, and
    particularly if there are any type of statutory issues raised
    in your proposed new approach to the acquisition process.
        Secretary Teets. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is modeled on
    something that is called NRO Directive 7, that has been in use
    for a while. I would be pleased to provide you with some of
    those details.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Mr. Secretary, one other question, which is, on February 14
    Secretary Aldridge delegated milestone decision authority for
    DOD space systems to you. This gives you a great deal of
    discretion to waive certain requirements or to make judgments
    about whether they have been accomplished. I understand there
    may now be a proposal in the Pentagon to take back this
    discretionary authority, back to Secretary Aldridge. Could you
    give us a sense of the current status of this authority?
        Secretary Teets. Yes. I believe that the paperwork has been
    completed that does in fact designate the Air Force as DOD's
    executive agent for space, and in turn the Secretary of the Air
    Force has delegated that responsibility for space programs to
    me. So I believe that I am currently the DOD executive agent
    for space with milestone decision authority.
        There are a number of other recommendations coming out of
    the Space Commission that are in progress. For example, the
    assignment of the national security space architect to my
    organization is in progress, but I have not seen that formal
    piece of paper signed yet. I have created an organization that
    has a national security integration directorate and it is in
    place. We had some time ago moved the Space and Missiles Center
    Command away from Air Force Material Command to Air Force Space
    Command. As a result, General Arnold reports now directly into
    General Eberhart as Air Force Space Command CINC.
        In addition to that, you probably have seen that General
    Lord has been named as the next Air Force Space Command
    Commander in Chief as a four-star appointment. That change of
    command will take place some time in the spring.
        So implementation of all of the National Security Space
    Commission recommendations are in work and we are moving out
    aggressively on them.
        Senator Reed. The September 14 memo stands, then, as the
    main directive?
        Secretary Teets. When you say ``the September 14 memo,'' I
    am sorry, sir, but I am not that familiar with a September 14
    memo.
        Senator Reed. In that case, Mr. Secretary, we will clarify
    it by placing it in the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Teets. OK. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I just have one remaining
    question. I understand we are not too far away from the vote,
    about 4 o'clock or so.
        Senator Reed. 4 o'clock.
        Senator Allard. In the Defense Authorization Act last year,
    we established a new space career field, which included
    development of space doctrine and concepts of operations in
    space and development and operation of space systems. I am
    interested to know what the status of this effort is and when
    will we see the implementation instructions for the career
    field. Maybe both of you could respond? General Eberhart?
        General Eberhart. To be very candid, that is all a work in
    progress, Senator Allard. We are committed to this in terms of
    space doctrine, since we have published our space doctrine. At
    Air Force right now, the joint doctrine is under review. So
    since the subcommittee looked at that, the Air Force has
    published, I think, some very worthwhile and useful space
    doctrine.
        Second, we have worked hard to operationalize and normalize
    the operation of the command and control of our space assets
    and our space capabilities. We do this predominantly through an
    air and space operations center out at Vandenberg Air Force
    Base, where SPACEAF, Space Air Forces, is assigned, now under
    the command of Major General Looney.
        In terms of developing space professionals, we have been
    working this very hard. We have been working this with all the
    stakeholders in the room. It is very important that we not only
    address officers, but also address the very important enlisted
    and civilian members of our team.
        Also, as the Secretary has indicated, we focus
    predominantly upon development of Air Force space
    professionals, but we also have to make sure that there is some
    consistency there as we look at space professionals in other
    Services. We in the Air Force have decided essentially that the
    Space Commission is right, the Authorization Act is obviously
    correct, and that we need to focus our efforts and truly ensure
    we have the space professionals obviously with the space
    expertise we need here in this new century.
        So I guess to draw an analogy, we have been looking at both
    the Nuclear Navy, the Rickover Navy model, and also what we
    have been doing for decades in terms of developing our pilot
    force in terms of periodic upgrades, periodic education,
    periodic training, and spending more time in that career area
    than any other area as you progress through the ranks.
        So as the Secretary mentioned, this was a topic of the most
    recent senior-level meeting that we had with the Secretary, the
    Chief of Staff, all four-star commanders, the Under Secretary,
    and all Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. Everybody was
    committed. Now, there will be some dollars involved with this
    because we are developing syllabuses to make sure that we have
    the right training. Again, this is training over a career. You
    are trained once at a basic level, then you go back for
    graduate training, if you will, as you progress through the
    ranks.
        I think that we have the concept now. We are putting it on
    paper. We will soon brief it through the executive agent for
    space and then to the Secretary of Defense. But I think
    everyone agrees that we are headed in the right direction here
    and we are committed to that.
        Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, do you want to comment on
    that?
        Secretary Teets. I think General Eberhart covered it
    extremely well. I can tell you that Secretary Roche, I, and
    Secretary Rumsfeld are strongly committed to making certain
    that we develop this cadre of talent across not just the Air
    Force, but across all Services as well. I think, frankly, some
    of the expertise that has developed over the years in the NRO
    can be brought to bear in a helpful way here.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I thought of another question
    just briefly. What is the relationship between George Tenet and
    the Secretary of Defense? Do we have a good relationship there?
        Secretary Teets. We have an excellent relationship there.
    The two speak frequently.
        Senator Allard. Do they have breakfast occasionally?
        Secretary Teets. I believe so, indeed.
        Senator Allard. Very good.
        Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Just for the information of my colleagues, the vote is
    scheduled at 4:25 on final passage of the Campaign Finance
    Reform Bill. I recognize Senator Nelson of Nebraska. We should
    be able to conclude this round and introduce our second panel
    before the vote.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I will forego a question at this time.
    Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Senator Nelson of Florida.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Teets, you spoke earlier
    about the explosion of commercial imagery. Is part of that
    enhanced capability of commercial imagery, is that in China and
    India, and what kind of problem does that pose for us?
        Secretary Teets. Commercial imagery availability is
    worldwide, if that is what you mean. Now, there are two U.S.
    companies. There is a French company. There is an Israeli
    company. They are all engaged in commercial imagery. If you
    want to buy a satellite image of some place in China, you
    certainly can do so. You give them the coordinates and you will
    get a satellite image back.
        Now, there are questions as to its operational use that
    need to be worked through. Timeliness is an issue. If you are
    going to actually depend on this kind of imagery for
    warfighting purposes, you need it on a very short time scale
    and you need it deliverable to the right set of people. So I do
    think timeliness is an issue as it relates to commercial
    imagery.
        But clearly it is worldwide coverage and those images are
    available.
        Senator Bill Nelson. With the foreign companies, such as
    the French that you mentioned, how quickly can two nations, for
    example that are now facing each other at the Kashmir border,
    obtain imagery so that they know what the other side is doing?
        Secretary Teets. I do not want to say that I have looked
    into this situation to the extent that I can give you a precise
    answer, but I would say to you that if the price were right,
    the physics are such that it could be delivered soon. I mean,
    you could redirect, recommand a satellite. If the weather is
    good, you could get an image of that border within a matter of
    hours.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Now, one of the priorities for future
    funding you mentioned was the Space-Based Radar.
        Secretary Teets. Yes.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us some more about that. That
    would allow you to know what is going on regardless of the
    cloud cover, is that correct?
        Secretary Teets. Yes. The Space-Based Radar that we are
    talking about initiating a program for, is really intended to
    provide ground mobile target indications. That is its primary
    function. Its primary function is not as an imaging synthetic
    aperture radar (SAR). So what this system will be able to do
    will be to provide these ground mobile target indications so
    that if you have something on the ground that is moving you can
    identify it with GPS coordinates and take rapid action against
    it.
        This Space-Based Radar that I am referring to is not so
    much an intelligence collection device as it is a warfighters'
    targeting system.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us some more about these
    microsatellites?
        Secretary Teets. I would turn to General Eberhart for that,
    because it is a concept that I read a little bit about, but I
    know General Eberhart has looked at it.
        General Eberhart. Sir, we have several pilot programs over
    the next 2 years where we will do microsatellite work, sort of
    proof of concept. One will be fairly short-lived orbit and be
    later this year. Another one will stay up there for a while
    longer as we demonstrate the capability to allow this
    microsatellite to do a variety of things: first of all, to show
    the ability to have a very robust constellation, so therefore
    it would be difficult from a space control vantage point to
    knock out. Second, that you can use these satellites possibly,
    depending on how you control them, for on-orbit maintenance, if
    you will. You could use these satellites for on-orbit escort.
        You are limited only by your imagination here in terms of
    how you could use these satellites. Obviously, the cost to get
    them on orbit, the cost of the satellite, is reduced based on
    the size that we are talking about. You could put many in orbit
    with the same launch. So I think that there is exciting
    opportunities here that we will better understand after we do
    our first couple of proof of concept demonstrations.
        Senator Bill Nelson. These microsatellites could be at any
    altitude?
        General Eberhart. I guess they could, sir, but I think
    initially more the LEO and the GEO type orbits is what we would
    be talking.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You said GEO?
        General Eberhart. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General, for your excellent
    testimony, and we will excuse you and ask the second panel to
    come forward. Thank you very much. [Pause.]
        We will resume the hearing. Welcome, Admiral Ellis. Good to
    see you again.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Reed. General Blaisdell and Admiral Dwyer, thank
    you for being with us this afternoon. We look forward to
    hearing from each of you today. Admiral Ellis, now that the
    Nuclear Posture Review has been completed, we would like to
    hear from you as to the next steps the Department of Defense
    will take as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review. We
    especially want to know how this policy document gets
    translated into meaningful guidance for you as you execute the
    duties of your command.
        Major General Blaisdell, you have begun to retire the
    Peacekeeper missile and have a number of modernization programs
    under way. We would like to discuss these issues as well as
    other areas of concern to you.
        Admiral Dwyer, my congratulations to you on the 95th
    successful Trident II missile test in a row. Fortunately, the
    Navy football team is not as proficient. Now that the Navy has
    determined that it will rely on 14 Trident submarines that will
    last 44 years with one refueling, we would like to hear about
    plans to implement this approach with respect to the Trident II
    missile program.
        I would like to recognize Senator Allard if he has a
    comment at this time.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any comments
    now, but if they get proficient at football what happens to
    West Point?
        Senator Reed. We have to come up with an even more
    destructive system. [Laughter.]
        Senator Allard. Better thank your lucky stars.
        Senator Reed. I guess if they apply their energy to Trident
    submarine that is fine, that is okay. But football is something
    else.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson likes to bet.
        Senator Reed. We do not play Nebraska.
        Senator Allard. Thank goodness.
        Senator Reed. Thank goodness, that is right.
        Admiral Ellis, I note that you have submitted an opening
    statement on behalf of the panel and it will be included in the
    record. Please go ahead.

    STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
                    UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Allard, Senator Nelson, I am honored to appear once again
    before you today to address the posture of the United States
    Strategic Command. I am also pleased, as you have noted, to
    have with me today Major General Blaisdell, who is the Director
    of Nuclear and Counterproliferation on the Air Force Staff, and
    Rear Admiral Dwyer, who is Director of the Navy Strategic
    Systems Program.
        Thanks to their efforts and your continued support, I am
    proud to report that our Nation's strategic forces remain
    ready. As they have been for the past 56 years, they are manned
    by true professionals who stand ready with the Nation's
    ultimate deterrence against major military attack on the United
    States and its allies, while also serving in new roles
    reflective of a dramatically changed set of national security
    challenges.
        I am pleased with the increased focus on and resources
    being invested in our strategic capabilities, particularly as a
    result of the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review. More
    than a much-needed capabilities assessment, the NPR brings
    increased emphasis to ensure our streamlined strategic forces,
    weapons, infrastructure, communications, intelligence, and
    planning receive the resources required to ensure their
    effectiveness and in many cases extend them well beyond their
    original design life.
        We are reshaping our national strategic capability in
    response to a dramatically changed international environment.
    We will integrate improved strategic strike forces, both
    nuclear and conventional, active and passive defenses, and a
    renewed and responsive infrastructure. This so-called new triad
    will be enabled by improved command and control systems as well
    as robust, adaptive, and responsive intelligence and planning
    capabilities.
        To become a reality, this effort will require sustained
    support from the Services and, of course, from you and your
    colleagues. Success in this effort will allow us to continue to
    reduce the Nation's reliance on nuclear weapons and enable us
    to confidently meet the President's goal of 2,200 to 1,700
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 2012.
        As the joint commander of the Nation's strategic forces, my
    focus has been on working with the Department of Defense and
    the Services, particularly the Navy and the Air Force, on
    ensuring this year's budget and the Future Years Defense
    Program provides the support necessary to meet the requirements
    for our new strategic capabilities. For fiscal year 2003, the
    President's budget funds the highest priorities for our
    strategic forces and for capabilities supporting these forces.
    Increased funding has also been directed towards
    infrastructure, defenses, and development of new supporting
    capabilities.
        My most pressing concern for the strategic forces is
    modernizing and sustaining an aging force structure, including
    our delivery platforms, their weapons systems, and warheads.
    From the venerable B-52 bomber to the newest Trident missile
    submarines, each platform and weapons system has a scheduled
    life extension program designed to keep it in service for at
    least the next 20 years. Some will be expected to serve well
    beyond that time.
        In addition to modernizing existing systems, we must also
    improve our strategic capability through modernizing and
    developing new supporting capabilities. These capabilities
    include our command, control, communications, computers,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR)
    capabilities, our war-planning systems and processes, and our
    nuclear weapons infrastructure.
        We are also pursuing new strategic capabilities in
    conventional strike, non-kinetic options, and advanced
    intelligence. The Nation is also developing missile defenses as
    an integral element of our strategic capability.
        As always, our people will continue to be the foundation of
    our military success. I appreciate your continued efforts to
    improve the quality of life for our military and their families
    as well as our civilian professionals.
        All of these issues and concerns are interrelated.
    Together, the sustained investment in our people and in our
    existing systems and in developing broad new non-nuclear
    strategic capabilities are required to realize the President's
    goal of reducing our operationally deployed strategic nuclear
    weapons to the lowest levels consistent with our national
    security. I am firmly committed to reaching that goal with your
    continued support.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee:
        It is an honor to appear before you representing the outstanding
    men and women of United States Strategic Command. I appeared before the
    full Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the policy issues
    associated with the Nuclear Posture Review, and I welcome this
    opportunity to address the Strategic Subcommittee on the programmatics
    and requirements supporting my command's posture.
        I appear before you today to report that our Nation's strategic
    forces are ready. As they have been for the past 56 years, they are
    manned by true professionals, trained and ready to respond when called,
    yet hopeful that our efforts of dissuasion and deterrence prevail to
    prevent military attacks against the United States and our allies.
    Nonetheless, the renewed focus on supporting and modernizing aging
    strategic systems and infrastructure must be sustained to ensure our
    forces remain a ready, reliable, and credible element of our Nation's
    security posture. Thank you for your sustained support of our strategic
    forces and your commitment to a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear
    weapons stockpile.

                         EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC POLICY

        Since the end of World War II, the United States has had forces
    postured to conduct long-range strategic operations in support of our
    national defense. The creation of Strategic Air Command in 1946
    integrated the impressive conventional long-range strike capabilities
    developed during World War II with the emergent capabilities of nuclear
    weapons. As the Cold War developed and simmered, our strategic forces
    assumed a decidedly nuclear focus in order to deter the imposing threat
    of nuclear war with the Soviet Union and her allies. The enormous
    responsibility of safeguarding, maintaining, and, if needed, employing
    nuclear weapons demanded a culture of rigorous discipline and
    professional excellence that continues to this day both in our
    strategic task forces and in our headquarters.
        With the development of both land-based and sea-based ballistic
    missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads, our war planning
    process, already complex to support our strategic aviation forces,
    required significant improvements in capability to ensure the triad of
    sea, air, and land forces could be effectively employed in support of
    our national defense. At the same time, we realized the strategic
    mission required joint cooperation for effective integration. That was
    achieved through the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff which, in
    1960, effectively formed the first joint organization with global
    responsibilities. Strategic Air Command and the Joint Strategic Target
    Planning Staff served the Nation well during the Cold War. Today's
    culture of excellence, complex weapons, and our existing triad of
    operating forces that make up U.S. Strategic Command were all forged
    during that period.
        The end of the Cold War provided an imperative to reevaluate the
    organization and focus of our strategic forces. In 1992, our nuclear
    forces were integrated under one Combatant Commander charged with
    planning and, if directed by the President, executing our Nation's
    strategic warplans. What had been a large element of our national
    strategy during the Cold War, became a more streamlined, and focused,
    but still essential element of our national strategy. Forces allocated
    to U.S. Strategic Command now represent less than 3 percent of all DOD
    personnel and expend less than 3 percent of the DOD's total
    obligational authority.
        The mission of our Nation's strategic forces over the last 56 years
    has been enduring: to deter a major military attack on the United
    States and if necessary employ strategic forces to defeat any
    adversary. While that specific purpose is unchanged, our methods of
    meeting that mission have changed dramatically.
        During the Cold War, we fielded increasingly complex weapons
    focused on a specific group of states, the Soviet Union, and its
    allies. Our war plans were developed to counter these states and the
    threat they represented. Today, the Soviet Union no longer exists. None
    of its successor states are considered our enemy. Yet, the specter of a
    major attack using weapons of mass destruction remains and is growing
    more complex. The key difference between the international environment
    today and the environment during the Cold War is that the United States
    cannot predict with confidence what nation, combination of nations, or
    non-state actors may pose a threat to our vital interests or those of
    our friends and allies decades from now. As a result, our war plans and
    operating forces must be postured to assure our allies, dissuade
    potential enemies, deter those countries that threaten us, and, with
    Presidential direction, defend our Nation and defeat those that may
    choose to attack us.

                           THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

        As I noted in my testimony before you last month, I welcome the
    results of the Nuclear Posture Review. More than a much needed
    capabilities assessment, it brings increased focus to ensure all our
    strategic forces, weapons, infrastructure, communications,
    intelligence, and planning receive the resources required to enhance
    their capabilities and, in many cases, extend them well beyond their
    original design life. Over the next decade, our national strategic
    capability will integrate improved strategic strike forces, both
    nuclear and conventional, active and passive defenses, and a renewed
    and responsive infrastructure. This new triad will be enabled by
    improved command and control systems as well as robust, adaptive, and
    responsive intelligence and planning capabilities.
        To become a reality, this new triad will require sustained support
    by the Services and Congress. Success in this effort will allow us to
    continue to reduce the Nation's reliance on nuclear weapons and enable
    us to meet the President's goal of 2,200-1,700 operationally deployed
    strategic nuclear weapons by 2012. For fiscal year 2003, the
    President's budget includes increased funding to cover the highest
    priorities for our strategic forces and for capabilities supporting
    these forces. Increased funding has also been directed towards
    infrastructure, defenses, and development of new capabilities. Taken
    together, these funding increases put us on the path of refocused
    strategic capability and the lowest number of nuclear weapons
    consistent with our national security.

                           STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE

        To address a broad range of threats, our Nation's security rests on
    several factors, particularly on our demonstrated will and capability
    to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged. Our
    declaratory policy communicates costs to potential adversaries. Our
    warfighting capability, including a robust triad of strategic forces,
    conveys credibility across the full spectrum of conflict--conventional
    to nuclear. The Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the wisdom of
    preserving the complementary strategic triad of land-based
    intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic
    missiles, and strategic bombers as the backbone of our strategic strike
    forces.
        Each leg of the Nation's offensive strike forces possesses unique
    attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk. Intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBMs) provide prompt response; strategic
    submarines (SSBNs) provide survivability; and bombers provide
    flexibility. The diversity of our strategic forces and the synergy
    created by these attributes are designed to complicate any adversary's
    offensive and defensive planning calculations while simultaneously
    providing protection against the failure of a single leg of the triad.
        Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable,
    low cost, prompt response capability with a high readiness rate. They
    also promote stability by ensuring that a potential adversary takes
    their geographically dispersed capabilities into account if
    contemplating a disarming first strike. Without a capable ICBM force,
    the prospect of destroying a significant percentage of America's
    strategic infrastructure with a handful of weapons might be tempting to
    a potential adversary in a crisis.
        Ballistic missile submarines continue to carry the largest portion
    of our strategic strike force. With approximately two-thirds of the
    force at sea at any one time, the strategic submarine force is the most
    survivable leg of the triad, providing the United States with a
    powerful, assured response capability against any adversary. Submarines
    at sea are inherently survivable and hence stabilizing. Submarines in
    port, however, are more vulnerable and could offer an extremely
    lucrative target in crisis. Thus, in any foreseeable force structure,
    the United States must preserve a sufficiently large strategic nuclear
    submarine force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets
    to ensure an at-sea response force capable of deterring any adversary
    in a crisis.
        Strategic bombers are the most flexible element of our strategic
    strike forces. The ``man in the loop'' allows force dispersal to
    improve survivability and aircraft recall during mission execution. The
    low-observable technology of the B-2 bomber enables it to penetrate
    heavily defended areas and hold high-value targets at risk deep inside
    an adversary's territory. In contrast, the B-52 bomber can be employed
    in a standoff role using long-range cruise missiles to attack from
    outside enemy air defenses. This mixed bomber force can generate to
    alert status when necessary to deter escalation or provide assured
    response should deterrence fail.
        In accordance with the Nuclear Posture Review our strategic forces
    are proceeding to the following levels:

             500 Minuteman III ICBMs
             14 Trident SSBNs equipped with Trident II (D-5)
            missiles
             76 B-52 and 21 B-2 bombers

        In addition, the Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the plan to
    deactivate our 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, eliminate the nuclear re-role
    requirement for the B-1 bomber, and remove four Trident SSBNs from
    strategic service.
        With no new forces in development, this triad of strategic strike
    forces will remain the backbone of our Nation's strategic deterrent
    capability for at least the next 20 years. As such, we must ensure
    these forces remain robust, reliable, and secure.

                 STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION AND SUSTAINMENT

        Today we have no new strategic systems under development. With the
    exception of the Trident II (D-5) missile, which is still in low-rate
    production, the United States has in-hand all of its major strategic
    systems. Therefore, as our Nation comes to rely on our existing
    strategic force, the imperative for modernizing and sustaining that
    force becomes even more critical. Since we must maintain these existing
    systems for at least the next 20 years, it is also crucial to sustain
    the industrial base that provides key components and systems unique to
    our strategic forces.
        Sustainment and modernization of the strategic bomber force is
    critical to provide a force that can support our strategic strike
    requirements as well as the conventional needs of our regional
    Combatant Commanders. The B-52 is projected to remain the workhorse of
    our bombers through 2040. That will make it an 80-year-old aircraft
    when it is finally retired. Based on current trends, the critical focus
    for sustaining the B-52 is upgrading electronic components to ensure
    command and control capability and platform survivability in future
    conflicts. The Advanced EHF communications upgrade for the B-52 is
    vital to maintaining a capability across the spectrum of conflict and
    executing the flexible, adaptable plans necessary to address a wide
    range of threats. We cannot afford to slip this upgrade any further
    without adversely impacting combat capability when the UHF Milstar
    communications constellation begins to lose capability. In addition, we
    will need to monitor the impacts of unforeseen aging problems with the
    airframes themselves as we continue to use these venerable aircraft in
    the global war on terrorism.
        The B-2 bomber is similarly projected to remain in service through
    2040. While certainly a newer aircraft, the B-2 must also receive the
    same command and control capability as the B-52, allowing flexible
    targeting. This will require an Advanced EHF suite to ensure the
    capability for in-flight retargeting and recall in both nuclear and
    conventional roles.
        U.S. Strategic Command relies heavily on air refueling forces to
    support both bomber and airborne command and control aircraft. We are
    facing similar challenges in sustaining the aging KC-135 aircraft which
    are committed to direct support of our strategic forces. I fully
    support the Air Force's continuing efforts to sustain these aircraft
    while pursuing a follow-on capability which will remain critical to our
    strategic mission.
        Our ICBM force will undergo significant transition over the next
    decade. The Peacekeeper ICBM system is programmed for deactivation
    beginning in the first quarter of fiscal year 2003 and aggressively
    continuing over the following 3 years. This retirement program is fully
    funded in the President's budget and phased to meet our warfighting
    requirements while adhering to the highest standards of safety and
    security requirements. The Minuteman III missile system is also
    undergoing comprehensive inter-related modernization programs designed
    to extend its service life through 2020. The President's budget funds
    the guidance and propulsion replacement programs at procurement rates
    that ensure the overall readiness, reliability, and capability of our
    ICBM forces into the next decade. Equally important, the safety
    enhanced reentry vehicle program will allow us to use the Peacekeeper
    W87 warhead on the Minuteman III ICBM as the Peacekeeper leaves
    service. This modification enables us to retain the capability of one
    of our newest warheads with its modern safety and reliability features
    while retiring the W62, the oldest ICBM warhead in our inventory later
    in this decade.
        Our ballistic missile submarine force is also in the midst of
    significant transition. The Navy is in the process of converting four
    of our older Trident ballistic missile submarines to carry the Trident
    II (D-5) missile system. This conversion will provide us with 14 D-5
    equipped SSBNs while making 4 Trident I (C-4) missile equipped
    submarines available for conversion to cruise missile and special
    operations capable submarines. The program for D-5 conversions is fully
    funded and on track.
        On a very positive note, our Trident submarines' hull lives have
    been extended from 30 to 44 years. Although the Navy must procure
    additional missiles and conduct a D-5 missile life extension program,
    this will ensure sufficient missiles are available throughout the
    Trident submarine service life. This program was fully funded in the
    President's budget, however, last year's $25 million reduction in the
    D-5 missile program budget will result in an overall $60 million cost
    associated with the shutdown and restart of three critical component
    production lines during fiscal year 2002. I am working with the Navy to
    address these impacts in their future years defense program for the D-5
    missile.
        In regards to our nuclear weapons, my overall assessment is that
    our stockpile is reliable and safe. I have concerns, shared by NNSA's
    John Gordon, that the stockpile is showing signs of aging, and
    manufacturing defects are being discovered which indicate that previous
    reliability assessments were optimistic. This is due, in part, to the
    success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program in expanding our knowledge
    of warhead performance through the development of improved
    surveillance, modeling, and simulation tools. This greater scientific
    understanding has enabled us to identify potential problems and
    uncertainties of which we were previously unaware. The ongoing
    refurbishment of the W87 warhead has marked an important technical
    milestone for stockpile stewardship, as it is the first major
    refurbishment of a nuclear warhead in a non-testing environment.
    Approval has also been given for several critical warhead life
    extension programs--the B61, the W76, and the W80. Together these four
    systems will comprise a significant portion of our country's enduring
    nuclear stockpile.

         COMMAND, CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE, AND PLANNING SUSTAINMENT AND
                                 MODERNIZATION

        Our command and control, as well as intelligence and planning
    capabilities, are essential ``force multipliers'' and serve to enhance
    and unify our forces. As we transition to the broader range of
    deterrent capabilities suggested by the Nuclear Posture Review, we must
    ensure new C\4\ISR capabilities are available across the range of
    strategic options. Our current C\4\ISR capabilities include a robust
    war planning capability, fixed and mobile command and control
    facilities, and a joint intelligence center. As with our other
    strategic forces, these systems must be modernized in terms of
    capabilities and capacity.
        The security challenges of the next decade require that we become
    more flexible and adaptive in our shift from a specific state, or
    threat-based strategy, to a capabilities-based strategy. U.S. Strategic
    Command has begun development of a planning system that retains the
    rigor and expertise developed over the last several decades, yet
    employs modern computing techniques and streamlined processes to
    significantly improve our planning capability. This effort is a
    critical element in enabling rapid, flexible crisis response that
    integrates nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic weapons into our war
    plans. This new approach to planning will require significantly more
    collaboration with the regional Combatant Commanders as we continue to
    better integrate our military capabilities across the spectrum of
    conflict. Our goal is to remove inefficiencies between current theater
    and strategic war planning development by eliminating seams and
    expanding available options for our senior leaders in future crises.
    This is a significant change and will be facilitated by a comprehensive
    review of our current war planning processes.
        I am pleased with the increased attention given to the long-term
    modernization and sustainment of our two airborne command and control
    systems. The National Airborne Operations Center, the E-4, is operated
    by Strategic Command as an airborne element of the National Military
    Command System. As with most of our strategic forces, it requires
    sustainment and modernization investments into current capability while
    integrating new command, control, and communications requirements.
    Increased senior leader attention during the last year has resulted in
    significant improvements in E-4 modernization funding in the
    President's budget. This vital funding ensures these aircraft have the
    required capabilities to support our senior leadership in any future
    national crisis. Similarly, the E-6B airborne command and control
    aircraft modernization is funded by the fiscal year 2003 budget
    submission. The funding requested corrects demonstrated operational
    deficiencies impacting aircraft mission capability rates.
        As the combatant commander of strategic forces, I am very
    interested in the replacements for our Defense Support Program (DSP)
    constellation and Milstar communications satellites. The successful
    fielding of these systems directly affects our strategic warning and
    communications requirements. The SBIRS-High capability is vital to our
    warning timelines and ability to execute our strategic forces when
    under attack. Similarly, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
    satellite system is necessary to ensure global, secure, survivable
    communications between our senior leadership and strategic forces. I
    understand the concern with the costs and schedule progress of both of
    these systems, however, the current DSP and Milstar systems have finite
    lifetimes, and we must preserve the requirement for replacement of
    these critical capabilities as they approach the end of their
    technological life. If current legacy satellite systems degrade
    significantly without replacements, we are seriously affecting the
    ability to capably respond with our strategic assets, as well as with
    all of our modern, networked military forces.
        Our Strategic Joint Intelligence Center is tasked with a wide range
    of intelligence requirements supporting development of our strategic
    and theater war plans. It also supports all regional Combatant
    Commanders in the global war on terrorism through participation in a
    federated intelligence process, where we apply our imagery analysis
    expertise in such areas as weapons of mass destruction proliferation,
    hard and deeply buried targets, and battle damage assessment. I
    personally benefited from this expertise in 1999 as the commander of
    forces during Operation Allied Force and today I'm sure Central Command
    similarly appreciates their significant contribution to the ongoing
    campaign in Afghanistan.
        As you may know, the current system of managing our intelligence
    information is reaching its maximum capability. This tasking,
    processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) system is a limiting
    factor and has been previously identified as a problem area but still
    requires significant effort to correct. The President's budget includes
    funds to address this area. However, I believe an uncertainty still
    exists over the future years defense program to meet intelligence
    community requirements. This limitation will be exacerbated by the
    increased flow of intelligence information envisioned by emerging
    capabilities. Similarly, the intelligence information infrastructure is
    currently vulnerable to single-point failures. Now is the time to
    address these critical vulnerabilities as we expand our intelligence
    requirements against new threats. Given our military's growing reliance
    on network-centric warfare, we must keep pace in developing TPED
    systems if we are to prevent the fog of war from becoming digital.
        I am very concerned about the future plan for equipment used to
    enable secure encrypted communications with not only our strategic
    forces and command and control aircraft but the entire military as
    well. Equipment used on our strategic forces will require replacement
    beginning in fiscal year 2005.

                            PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

        As we transition into the future, it is essential that we sustain,
    modernize, and enhance our existing strategic systems. The Quadrennial
    Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review also direct investments in
    new capabilities that will support and enhance the national security
    elements of assure, dissuade, deter, defend, and defeat. Some of these
    investments include advanced strike capabilities, defenses,
    intelligence and planning capabilities, and command and control
    improvements.
        The Department of Defense is pursuing advanced precision strike
    capability to support our combatant forces throughout the spectrum of
    conflict. Our strategic forces will take advantage of these
    capabilities to replace certain missions previously assigned solely to
    nuclear weapons and provide non-nuclear options to our senior
    leadership as well. I support these initiatives. I also support the
    focus and resources expended on ensuring our Nation's command and
    control systems are an enabler for our joint warfighters and not a
    constraint. General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    is leading the charge on developing joint C\4\ISR that closes the gaps
    and seams between the combatant commands and the Service provided
    forces. In addition, I fully support Under Secretary Aldridge and
    Assistant Secretary Stenbit in their efforts to ensure that enduring
    national command and control requirements of global, secure, survivable
    communications are maintained in any future satellite architecture.
        The challenges of hard and deeply buried targets, strategic
    relocatable or time critical targets, advanced conventional weapons
    employment, and offensive information operations targeting require a
    much greater fidelity in intelligence than we currently possess. There
    are no immediate solutions to these challenges. I fully endorse the DOD
    systems approach to address these requirements, since it is far more
    than just a hardware or resource issue. We need to comprehensively
    assess our intelligence capability from our hardware, to our people,
    organizations, and processes to ensure we develop a robust system that
    supports the full range of our Nation's warfighting capabilities.

         DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

        This year's Nuclear Posture Review officially recognized a
    responsive infrastructure as one of the critical elements of our
    strategic posture. The safety, surety, and reliability of our strategic
    nuclear arsenal depend heavily on the Department of Energy's (DOE)
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Your continued support
    of NNSA is vital to ensuring they can support our strategic forces.
    They are making great strides in improving the nuclear weapons complex.
    As does John Gordon, I fully support current efforts to revitalize the
    laboratory and production infrastructure, and increase our nuclear test
    readiness.
        Our nuclear weapons production complex has deteriorated to the
    point that significant investment is required in order to effectively
    refurbish our active stockpile. Without sustained investment in the
    NNSA infrastructure, we risk losing confidence in our nuclear stockpile
    and eliminate any possibility of accelerating retired warhead
    dismantlement. We must realize that a robust, agile, and flexible
    nuclear weapons complex--comprised of both infrastructure and talented
    people to research, design, develop, and manufacture or refurbish
    nuclear weapons as necessary--provides us with the ability to respond
    to a changing national security environment and is itself a deterrent
    which complements our military forces. To this end, the need for
    sustained support of NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program has never
    been greater.
        The Stockpile Stewardship Program provides no concrete assurance
    against the need for a nuclear weapons test in the future. As General
    Gordon stated in his testimony to the full committee last month:

            ``Over time, we believe that the stewardship program will
            provide the tools to ensure stockpile safety and reliability
            without nuclear testing. But there are no guarantees. It is
            only prudent to continue to hedge for the possibility that we
            may in the future uncover a safety or reliability problem in a
            warhead critical to the U.S. nuclear deterrent that could not
            be fixed without nuclear testing.''

        There is currently no need to conduct a test today, however, our
    current test readiness posture of 24 to 36 months does not provide for
    a timely and effective response to unexpected events, whether internal
    (related to problems with the stockpile) or external (related to
    foreign actions). Both the Nuclear Posture Review and the report of the
    fiscal year 2000 Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security
    of the United States Nuclear Stockpile identified the need to improve
    test readiness. I fully support this effort.
        A less visible, yet equally vital, element of a responsive
    strategic infrastructure is the industrial base supporting our
    strategic systems. One of the inevitable results of having no new
    development or production of strategic systems for almost 10 years is
    the decline of critical industrial capabilities unique to strategic
    systems such as hardened electronics, solid rocket motors, and reentry
    system technology. The President's budget includes funding for programs
    sustaining strategic systems technology and I appreciate your continued
    support in this area.

                                   OUR PEOPLE

        As General Myers stated in his testimony before the full committee,
    the success in all our missions depends on our number one asset--our
    people. Maintaining our culture of excellence at U.S. Strategic Command
    depends on recruiting and retaining the best and brightest. Working
    with nuclear weapons demands nothing less. I am grateful for the
    continued emphasis Congress and this administration have placed on
    raising the standard of living of our Service members and their
    families.
        Strategic Command has always had a strong relationship with the
    Nation's Guard and Reserve personnel who support our strategic mission.
    The Guard and Reserve operate almost 75 percent of our designated
    tanker forces. In addition, we have 84 reservists recalled to active
    duty at our headquarters primarily supporting our dedicated efforts in
    support of the global war on terrorism.

                                FORCE PROTECTION

        Our people have unique responsibilities for stewardship of our
    nuclear weapons. They are dedicated and devoted professionals who take
    very seriously the development of our strategic war plans and the
    safeguarding and security of the nuclear weapon systems that provide
    the deterrent force for our Nation. The events of September 11 only
    served to heighten our keen sense of awareness of our responsibility.
    Your committee has already received testimony from the Services and the
    National Nuclear Security Administration regarding ongoing efforts to
    increase our already high levels of nuclear weapons security. I
    appreciate your support of the President's budget request to increase
    funding for additional security personnel and force protection
    initiatives for our task forces and the Department of Energy.

                                   CONCLUSION

        I assure you that Strategic Command is ready now and I am
    personally committed to sustaining that readiness into a challenging
    future. I am pleased with the current focus on and resourcing of our
    strategic forces. Continued attention in the Future Years Defense
    Program is required to address previous reductions in the Trident II
    (D-5) missile life extension program, funding replacements for
    encryption equipment, and fully funded upgrades to the intelligence
    TPED system.
        Reshaping our strategic capabilities will require sustained support
    in the years ahead. As the Secretary of Defense stated in the foreword
    to the Nuclear Posture Review:

            ``Constructing the new triad, reducing our deployed nuclear
            weapons, and increasing flexibility in our strategic posture
            has resource implications. It costs money to retire old weapons
            systems and create new capabilities. Restoring the defense
            infrastructure, developing and deploying strategic defenses,
            improving our command and control, intelligence, planning, and
            non-nuclear strike capabilities require new defense initiatives
            and investments. However, these investments can make the U.S.
            more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.''

        I appreciate your continued support for the men and women of U.S.
    Strategic Command and the unique and essential contributions they make
    to our Nation's security. I look forward to reporting our progress to
    you in the future.
        Thank you and I welcome your questions.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral Ellis.
        General Blaisdell, do you have a comment, or Admiral Dwyer?
        General Blaisdell. It is a pleasure to be here, Mr.
    Chairman, again. I do not have an opening statement. I am here
    to support Admiral Ellis.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral Dwyer.
        Admiral Dwyer. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here. I
    also note that you won this year.
        Senator Reed. You are already ahead of the game, Admiral.
        Admiral Dwyer. But I have no comments, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Let us proceed with a round of 6 minutes and if we have
    additional time before the vote perhaps ask individual
    questions as the case may warrant.
        Admiral Ellis, as I indicated in my opening statement, the
    Nuclear Posture Review has been completed. Could you explain
    the process that follows the Nuclear Posture Review that will
    actually provide your command with the guidance it needs to
    develop target plans?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir, certainly. I would be glad to. The
    Nuclear Posture Review was a congressionally-mandated review
    chartered or undertaken by the Secretary of Defense and he has
    submitted that report to Congress as directed. It is
    anticipated that that will be followed by presidential
    guidance, as Secretary of State Powell mentioned to you in the
    colloquy that you had before your Appropriations Committee
    subcommittee hearing. The President will make the decision on
    what elements of that are to be emphasized and provide his
    guidance in turn to the Secretary of Defense.
        The Secretary of Defense then will add to that guidance
    with more specificity, provide it to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff and, through him, to me for ultimate
    implementation in future planning efforts.
        Senator Reed. Admiral, I notice in the new triad, which is
    one of the marquee elements of the Nuclear Posture Review, that
    there are conventional forces. Does that mean that Strategic
    Command will be, in fact, conducting non-nuclear war planning
    as part of this new approach?
        Admiral Ellis. What that implies, sir, I think, is that we
    find that a new strategic concept of deterrence is appropriate.
    Such a concept has to be broadened beyond strategic equaling
    merely nuclear and a broader range of options and possibilities
    needs to be presented to the President and the rest of the
    Nation's leadership. That could and should include non-nuclear
    kinetic capabilities, the advanced conventional weapons, if you
    will, and even ultimately, if and when they deliver or are
    developed, non-kinetic capabilities.
        So over the long term, over the next decade, I expect that
    that is a direction that we at Strategic Command will be going
    in the future.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Ellis, is there in your estimate a
    validated requirement for a new nuclear weapon?
        Admiral Ellis. No, sir, at this time there is no
    requirement for new design or creation of new nuclear weapons.
        Senator Reed. General Blaisdell, Admiral Dwyer, is that
    your view also?
        General Blaisdell. That is also my view. There is no new
    requirement for nuclear weapons.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Dwyer?
        Admiral Dwyer. That is our view. We are extending the life
    of our current warheads, Senator.
        Senator Reed. How would such a requirement be developed if
    in fact a new requirement would emerge? Admiral Ellis?
        Admiral Ellis. The established processes by which military
    requirements are generated and then options are reviewed by
    which those requirements could be met, would be the system by
    which that would come forward, sir. Clearly, that would involve
    the classic procurement processes and the appropriate levels of
    oversight and scrutiny during that effort.
        Senator Reed. Now, is there a validated requirement for
    providing new capabilities to an existing nuclear weapon?
    Admiral Ellis?
        Admiral Ellis. There are ongoing studies, as you are aware,
    Senator, to deal with a broadened and increased target set,
    particularly the hard and deeply buried targets which we have a
    proliferation of around the world. Advanced conventional
    weapons are certainly a part of that assessment, but a full
    spectrum of assessments is under way as to how that capability
    could be used or employed.
        Clearly, there are no decisions. There are only studies
    under way, as you have been briefed, I think, by the Secretary
    and at the staff level.
        Senator Reed. General Blaisdell, Admiral Dwyer, do you have
    anything to add?
        General Blaisdell. On the Air Force side, in partnership
    with DOE, there is a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)
    program that I believe has been brought over to you, still a
    study program. It does use existing resources, and we are
    partnering with the Department of Energy in that effort.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Dwyer.
        Admiral Dwyer. Mr. Chairman, we are participating also in
    the studies with DOE and the Air Force.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Blaisdell, as the Peacekeeper is retired the
    warhead from the Peacekeeper will be available for the
    Minuteman III ICBM. This will allow retirement of the older of
    the two Minuteman III warheads, the W-62. Does the Air Force
    have any plans to extend the life of the W-62?
        General Blaisdell. No, Mr. Chairman, we do not. It was
    decided not to extend the life of the W-62. So as the Mark 21
    warheads which are on the Peacekeeper, as we proceed through
    Peacekeeper retirement we will store those and then start to
    take down the W-62 warheads and then replace those W-62s with
    the Mark 21s from Peacekeeper.
        Senator Reed. Does the Air Force have any continuing
    military requirement for the W-62?
        General Blaisdell. We do not at this time.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me ask you just a general question, General Blaisdell.
    Does the budget request fully support the Peacekeeper ICBM
    retirement program?
        General Blaisdell. Yes, sir, it does. We are fully funded
    as far as Peacekeeper, $4.9 million in 2002 and $537 million
    over a total program cost for Peacekeeper. So we are funded. We
    are prepared to take that down as we have indicated, 17, 17,
    and then 16, over 3 years, and then 2 years to clean up what is
    left of the program.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, I am looking here at an
    article on March 16 from the International Herald Tribune and
    it prompted me to ask a question: Apparently there was at one
    point considerable concern expressed after the release of the
    Nuclear Posture Review that Russia might feel compelled to
    respond by sustaining a larger nuclear force than it would have
    otherwise.
        How do you perceive the Russian reaction to the Nuclear
    Posture Review from your perspective and your contacts with
    Russian defense personnel?
        Admiral Ellis. Sir, I have not had contact with them since
    the release, or the leak, of the Nuclear Posture Review. But I
    can only draw on the public statements that have been made by
    the Russian authority, Minister Ivanov, who was in this country
    recently and appeared jointly with the Secretary of Defense in
    a press conference that addressed these issues. It is apparent
    from my reading of his statements and answers to questions that
    were posed to him that they understand our legitimate defense
    requirements as we understand their national security
    requirements. Each of us is committed to substantial reductions
    in our strategic nuclear forces. That effort is continuing and
    that dialogue and the strengthening of our relationship is also
    progressing, as I read the statements that have been made in
    the press.
        Senator Allard. You and I both come to the same conclusion
    on that. They did not seem to have any kind of angry response
    as far as Russia was concerned.
        Admiral Ellis. That is correct, sir. I saw no indication of
    that in the press or elsewhere.
        Senator Allard. Admiral, how will the changes in the NPR
    affect STRATCOM's role in planning and implementing military
    operations?
        Admiral Ellis. As we were discussing with the Chairman, as
    additional capabilities deliver and STRATCOM's inclusion of a
    broader range of capabilities and presenting strategic options
    for the Nation's leadership, our planning is going to have to
    become more robust and also more responsive to a growing range
    of contingencies, at both the strategic and potentially the
    regional level.
        Senator Allard. Let me get a little more specific.
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Particularly as it would apply to rogue
    states, what would be our deterrent possibilities there? Do you
    think that there is something we can do to deter rogue states?
        Admiral Ellis. I think as we have discussed the drawdown in
    operationally deployed nuclear weapons in the wake of the NPR,
    it is clear that we have redefined or expanded the capabilities
    that have to be a part of deterrent concepts. The Nation has
    long had a policy related to those who might employ weapons of
    mass destruction against us, against our forces, or against our
    allies, in which, while we will not specify precisely what our
    response would be, it would be overwhelming and it would be
    devastating to those who might consider such an option. That
    deterrent statement posture still stands.
        Senator Allard. Talk a little bit about your confidence in
    the stockpile remaining safe, viable, and effective in the
    short-term, mid-term, and the long-term.
        Admiral Ellis. Sir, as the old sage said, predictions are
    difficult, particularly when they concern the future. I think
    the important element about the science-based Stockpile
    Stewardship Program is that when it is fully in place it will
    give us the tools to more precisely assess and examine the
    aging stockpile as we move into the future years.
        Obviously, the average age of the stockpile is approaching
    20 years. There are elements to that that will logically be of
    concern to us, as there are with any aging system. So I believe
    that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will give us a better
    capability to identify problems. That is not the same as the
    ability to correct them or to guarantee, with certainty, that
    in the event of some unexpected wide-ranging and wholesale
    problem associated with the stockpile, that correction of such
    a deficiency might not ultimately call into question its
    reliability and then force us to address the issue of whether
    or not testing would be required.
        But we are learning more about that stockpile every day. We
    are developing more and more tools, NNSA and the Department of
    Energy are, to more accurately assess and predict the effects
    of aging on that stockpile. So I have confidence in our ability
    to find the problems. But their correction and how large they
    are and what that does to our confidence in the systems is yet
    to be determined.
        Senator Allard. Do not these considerations support the NPR
    recommendations that we sustain a substantial responsive force
    of warheads, that we improve nuclear test readiness, and that
    we rebuild and sustain a capable nuclear weapons
    infrastructure?
        Admiral Ellis. I think, as you are well aware, sir, we have
    approached this in the United States' standpoint from exactly
    the posture that you describe. In other words, we have elected
    not to produce new designs or to produce new copies of old
    designs of nuclear weapons, and to rely on the weapons that are
    currently in existence to sustain us through the future years
    and requirements for this essential element of our deterrent
    posture.
        All of the pieces that you describe are necessary elements
    to ensure that that capability is safe, secure, and credible
    for the future.
        Senator Allard. My time has just expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Senator Nelson of Nebraska.
        Senator Ben Nelson. You may have been saved by the bell,
    Admiral.
        Strategic Command relies heavily on the National Nuclear
    Security Administration's (NNSA) ability to ensure the safety
    and reliability of our Nation's stockpile. Since 1992 explosive
    tests have not been conducted. I understand you have indicated
    that you do not necessarily think that they are required, but
    instead a lengthy and tedious process of disassembly and
    inspection, to include the refurbishment, is under way.
        Do you think that the development of this effort is
    effective at the present time? Can we develop improved
    surveillance, modeling, and simulation tools to show that
    earlier reliability assessments were optimistic? In other
    words, can we second-guess and improve our original
    predictions?
        Admiral Ellis. I think you are exactly right, Senator. The
    development of more sophisticated tools is going to give us the
    ability to more precisely monitor and assure ourselves exactly
    what the true status of the stockpile is, and that is the
    essential element in the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
    Program. That effort continues. There are very sophisticated
    modeling techniques under development. There are very complex
    and sophisticated tools that are being developed in the
    laboratories to give us a more complete understanding of the
    physics and the effect of age on these weapons.
        All of that will give us more knowledge, more insight, more
    understanding, and then more confidence in what we know about
    the stockpile. So we will know more and not know less about
    this vital capability as we look to the future.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Is the current funding adequate for us
    to be able to continue to improve the tools to go back and
    check the effectiveness of our predictions?
        Admiral Ellis. I certainly would not presume to speak for
    General Gordon, who heads NNSA, and say that his budget is
    entirely adequate. I suspect, like all folks, he has adjusted
    the pace of his programs as a reflection of the funding that is
    available. But in balance, clearly the additional focus and the
    additional resources that have flowed to the entire body of our
    strategic deterrent program, which includes the infrastructure,
    its upgrade and modernization, is a very positive step and will
    assist greatly in our pursuit of those objectives in the
    future.
        Senator Ben Nelson. If we will reduce our warheads to a
    level of between 1,700 and 2,000 or in that range, is that
    possible within the time frame of 2012?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The 1,700 to 2,200 number is
    achievable. All of those elements have to come together
    appropriately. As I say, the resources and attention that are
    being devoted to that give us some cause for optimism. The
    program is under way, and indeed the reductions and a number of
    the elements that are part of the NPR have already begun. So I
    think that is a very positive sign.
        As with all programs that have a decade-long life or
    longer, the sustainment of that effort, the continued support,
    not just financial but also in terms of the intellectual
    capital, the people, the challenges we face in retaining and
    attracting new talent as the brain trusts in the laboratories
    approach retirement, those types of things have to be addressed
    as well as we look to the future.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate it very much. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Let me note that the vote has begun on campaign finance
    reform. I propose to recognize Senator Sessions for his
    questions and when he concludes at that point we would likely
    have additional questions which we would submit to you in
    writing and ask for your response.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I
    have not been able to be here as much as I would like.
        Admiral Ellis, thank you for your leadership and work. I
    have great respect for you. I support the substantial reduction
    in our nuclear weaponry. We want to do that. But we do not have
    the capacity to build any new ones. We have completely
    eliminated our capacity to build new ones, have we not, Admiral
    Ellis?
        Admiral Ellis. That is correct, sir. We do not have the
    ability currently to build a complete nuclear weapon.
        Senator Sessions. How many other countries in the world
    still have a capacity to build at this time, do you know?
        Admiral Ellis. I think all of those that are recognized as
    nuclear powers obviously have the ability to build them,
    because they have them currently. We elected to approach, as we
    were saying earlier, our sustainment of the stockpile in a
    different manner and that is to refurbish and sustain the older
    weapons rather than design and build new ones, which would
    require testing. This was a choice that the Nation made.
        Senator Sessions. I believe that is a minimal step. If we
    are not going to have the capacity to build new ones, we ought
    to have a reserve capability. Else we freeze ourselves in a
    position where we cannot advance. It is critical that we not
    give our adversaries in the world a target of equality, a flat
    number that they know if they reach they would have equality
    with us.
        Would you not agree that that is something we need to
    avoid?
        Admiral Ellis. Certainly, Senator, some element of our
    strategic deterrence contributes to all elements of our
    national strategy. It assures allies, it dissuades those who
    might choose to compete with us, it deters those who wish us
    ill, and those are significant elements of all our military
    forces, be they conventional or nuclear. Certainly, the nuclear
    structure still plays a role in that deterrent policy.
        Senator Sessions. I know we have to go. I would just note
    that to me we are the premier nuclear power, the premier
    military power in the world. We need to use that power
    responsibly, wisely, for the benefit of ourselves and the
    world. But it would be a colossal error if we were to create
    constraints on our military that encourages our adversaries to
    attempt to reach parity. That to me is more important or as
    important as anything else we discuss.
        Thank you, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your outstanding testimony. I
    particularly want to thank Admiral Ellis because I know you had
    to adjust your schedule mightily to be here today. I appreciate
    it very much. We all do. We also appreciate the great
    leadership you are showing at Strategic Command. Keep up your
    good work.
        We will keep the record open for 2 days and if there are
    additional questions we will present those questions to you in
    writing. Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                        ALTERNATIVES FOR SPACE PROGRAMS

        1. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, according to current DOD
    regulations, all new major defense programs must conduct an Analysis of
    Alternatives (AOA), led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
    to determine whether there are more cost effective alternatives than
    the program being proposed. This helps fulfill the statutory
    requirement for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to
    perform an assessment of such alternatives. OSD has conducted AOA for
    all major Air Force space programs in the past. Do you plan to have OSD
    conduct AOAs for space programs in the future, and, if not, why not;
    how will the statutory requirements for JROC assessments of program
    alternatives be met?
        Secretary Teets. First, let me say that we will fully comply with
    all applicable statutes. Second, I anticipate that the JROC will
    continue to conduct assessments in fulfillment of its statutory
    responsibilities. With regard to AOAs, I expect the OSD staff will
    continue to be involved and participate in the conduct of AOAs;
    however, the effort will be led under my authority as the DOD space
    milestone decision authority and the leader of the Nation's national
    security space efforts.

                     DESCRIPTION OF ``PATHFINDER'' PROCESS

        2. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, in your testimony you described a
    ``pathfinder'' acquisition process for GPS-III that is underway. This
    pathfinder process is intended to allow ``full involvement by OSD and
    the other Services,'' and ``fit DOD statutory requirements.'' Could you
    please provide details as to how this pathfinder process works, and how
    it has been received, for example, what sort of meetings have you held
    with OSD personnel, at what management level, and has the response from
    OSD participants been positive?
        Secretary Teets. The GPS-III program was identified as the
    ``pathfinder'' for the streamlined DOD space acquisition process by Mr.
    Aldridge. Our goal is to reduce the workload and shorten the decision
    time for key acquisition milestones while still ensuring appropriate
    insight and oversight. A key aspect of the streamlined process is the
    use of a single, focused, Independent Program Assessment (IPA) Team in
    place of multiple Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), thereby allowing
    stakeholder participation and insight while decreasing the amount of
    time involved by reducing the number of IPTs and the hierarchical
    coordination approach. I would be happy to provide additional details
    in a briefing at your convenience.
        Since being confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Air Force, I
    have had the privilege to talk with Mr. Aldridge, who is fully
    supportive of the space commission implementation, on several occasions
    concerning our efforts to streamline the DOD space acquisition process.
    Members of my staff have also met with OSD staff to provide information
    on how the streamlined process would work for GPS-III and/or other DOD
    space-related programs and encourage their participation throughout. In
    addition, members of the OSD and Joint Staffs have participated as part
    of the GPS-III IPA Team. Reaction to the idea of a streamlined approach
    to acquisition oversight for DOD space systems has been mixed. I
    believe we are in the initial stages of making change happen. As we
    work to define and refine the new process, we will involve the
    appropriate parties to ensure that their views are heard.

        3. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, what is the forum for OSD
    participants to ask and receive answers to programmatic questions, what
    new GPS programmatic issues have been raised as a result of the new
    process, and how are they being resolved?
        Secretary Teets. There are four forms in which OSD participants can
    ask and receive answers to programmatic questions. The first is the
    normal day-to-day conduct of business. Members of my staff are
    available to answer OSD questions regarding any DOD space program and
    the OSD staff has access to the same data from the Program Executive
    Office (PEO) that my staff uses. The second forum is part of the normal
    budget cycle activity whereby the Department makes its funding
    decisions in preparation for the eventual submission of the President's
    budget. Third, when a program is under review in preparation for a
    milestone decision or key decision point, an IPA Team will be formed to
    review that program. Members of OSD will participate as part of that
    IPA Team so their issues can be brought forward and properly addressed
    as part of the program review. Lastly, the meeting where a DOD space
    program milestone decision is made will be known as a Defense Space
    Acquisition Board (DSAB). I will invite the appropriate OSD principals
    to attend the DSABs so that I can gain the benefit of their counsel
    prior to making milestone decisions for the DOD space Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs.
        In answer to the second part of your question about ``new GPS
    programmatic issues raised as a result of the new process,'' we have
    not yet completed the GPS-III pathfinder activities, so I am not aware
    of any new GPS programmatic issues at this time. I do expect to conduct
    a DSAB for GPS-III in the late summer, early fall timeframe and will be
    in a better position to answer your question at that time.

                               RAPID OSD REVIEWS

        4. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, you noted in your testimony that
    a major goal for you is reducing the decision cycle time for space
    programs, noting that the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process, with
    its associated IPT meetings, takes ``months not weeks,'' and that you
    are aiming for a much shorter process. It is my understanding, however,
    that the reason the IPT process takes as long as it does is because the
    program and the OSD oversight organizations are working to resolve
    issues, some of which require additional analysis and time to reach a
    mutually acceptable outcome. Furthermore, I understand it is highly
    unusual for a program to actually be delayed during this period,
    because the contractors continue to work as the government deliberates.
    Can you please identify which space programs have experienced delays in
    actual contractor progress as a result of the current DAB/IPT process,
    how long those delays were, and could you also please explain how,
    under an expedited decision process, there will be enough time to
    perform requisite analyses to resolve issues in a mutually acceptable
    way?
        Secretary Teets. While there are always issues that need to be
    resolved on any major acquisition program, successful resolution of
    these issues is not necessarily directly related to a lengthy review,
    coordination, and consensus process. The NRO has had success utilizing
    a focused program review process for complex space programs that
    appears to be more timely than the current DOD IPT process. Since the
    NRO is able to make decisions of the same quality as the DOD on complex
    space systems, but can do it in 8-12 weeks instead of 8-12 months, I'm
    very interested in using that decision process. It is difficult to
    explicitly name for you the programs that have experienced delayed
    progress as a result of the DAB/IPT process--mainly due to the fact
    that the blame for programmatic delay can be accurately shared amongst
    many parties. However, we can definitely begin to address reducing the
    imposed instability caused by our current lengthy decision process by
    changing the process itself and reducing its timeline. I believe this
    is important because the crafting of a realistic program schedule is
    the first step for cost control. Decision delays cause program
    schedules to be lengthened for reasons beyond the program's control.
    The end result of a lengthy decision making process and the resulting
    stretch of a program's schedule can be to cause the total cost of a
    program to increase. My goal is to reduce, if not eliminate, this self-
    imposed instability factor.

                                PLANNED WAIVERS

        5. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, do you currently anticipate
    waiving, or recommending waiving, any DOD regulations for space
    programs, and if so, which regulations and why would you want to waive
    them?
        Secretary Teets. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has given me the authority to
    waive and/or grant exemptions to DOD instructions and publications, for
    DOD space-related programs, that are under the authority of his office.
    I am to inform him of the waivers and exemptions I have granted.
        I anticipate granting the appropriate waivers and exemptions to DOD
    Instruction 5000.2 and DOD Regulation 5000.2-R. These DOD documents
    describe an acquisition oversight process meant to cover a wide variety
    of items (e.g., helmets to F-22s) and are focused on making the most
    cost-effective production decision. While this process may fit a good
    number of DOD system types, the acquisition of space programs--
    especially satellite systems--is different. The focus of the current
    DOD 5000 process is not the most appropriate construct for acquiring
    space-related systems.
        My staff is in the process of developing a document to be used in
    place of the DODI 5000.2 and DOD 5000.2-R that will be written to
    address the nuances of acquiring DOD space systems. The new document
    will comply with existing acquisition related statutes just as the DOD
    5000 series does today. The difference is that the process described in
    the new document will be focused on how best to acquire space-related
    systems.

                       HOW TO PREVENT ANOTHER SBIRS-HIGH

        6. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, in the 1990s, the SBIRS-High
    satellite program was touted as a ``lead program for acquisition
    reform.'' ``Acquisition reform,'' as applied to the SBIRS-High program,
    involved a conscious decision to minimize the amount of government
    oversight. It was recently revealed that the SBIRS-High program has
    experienced billions of dollars of cost growth, and the program is 4 to
    5 years behind its original schedule. As a result, the Air Force set up
    an independent review team to assess the corrective actions required to
    get the program back on track. Many of these corrective actions involve
    restoring appropriate government oversight to the program. You stated
    in your testimony that you were going to review other current space
    programs to ensure they have an appropriately robust level of
    government oversight. Could you please describe this review process,
    what the results are to date, and how you intend to assure robust Air
    Force and OSD oversight will occur for space programs; and could you
    also indicate what input and comments OSD oversight organizations have
    provided on this issue?
        Secretary Teets. The ``corrective actions'' of ``restoring
    appropriate government oversight'' to the SBIRS-High program have been
    taken at all levels of government and contractor management. Due to the
    Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) clauses that were part
    of the SBIRS-High contract, the System Program Office (SPO) did not
    have the ability to appropriately monitor and control contract work.
    The removal of those TSPR clauses on the SBIRS-High effort will enable
    the SPO to establish the necessary access, insight, and control
    required to appropriately manage the SBIRS-High program. The Air Force
    senior leadership is directly involved with the ongoing corrective
    actions and assessment of alternatives.
        I have already begun the effort to reestablish program stability
    and management discipline within Air Force space programs. In the past,
    increased management discipline was accomplished through the addition
    of oversight layers within the Air Force and OSD. However, instead of
    adding additional oversight layers, I am personally focusing on the
    major space programs and working closely with the Program Executive
    Officer for Space, Lt. Gen. Brian Arnold, to ensure senior management,
    outside program offices, is actively engaged on all our space
    acquisition efforts. I believe the resulting streamlined process will
    facilitate timely senior-level decisions and provide space-oriented
    expertise and direction when needed.

                       SPACE CAREER AND CADRE DEVELOPMENT

        7. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, could you please outline the plan
    you have for developing the ``cadre of Air Force space professionals''
    that you describe in your testimony?
        Secretary Teets. In response to the Space Commission Report and a
    memo from the Secretary of Defense, dated October 18, 2001, Air Force
    Space Command is developing a Space Career Management Plan. This plan
    establishes a deliberate and repeatable process, driven by requirements
    and based upon competencies, to ensure we can place the right people,
    with the right skills in the right positions to achieve national
    security space objectives. The development process spelled out in the
    career management plan is built upon three major pillars: education,
    training, and experience. These pillars are provided as methodology to
    attain leadership skills and levels of certification that will ensure
    we properly develop our space professionals through increasingly
    advanced education, training, and experience.

        8. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, how much funding is being
    allocated to new effort, what types of training do you plan to provide,
    and who will be trained?
        Secretary Teets. Air Force Space Command is requesting funding for
    the career management plan in the fiscal year 2004 Program Objective
    Memorandum (POM) process. Their POM submission will identify funds
    necessary to fully develop and implement the new education and training
    requirements outlined in the career management plan. These requirements
    include common initial education and training for all space
    professionals entering the career field. This common initial training
    will provide space professionals with a single foundation of knowledge
    spanning all aspects of military space--from concept through
    acquisition, to operations and eventual disposal of space systems. The
    plan also identifies a continuum of follow-on education and training
    requirements to increase technical depth and breadth for all space
    professionals throughout one's career.

        9. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, will this effort focus on
    military officers, civilians, or both, and will there be incentives for
    people with solid technical backgrounds to join the space acquisition
    community to help oversee the programs and prevent future problems?
        Secretary Teets. The Space Career Management Plan identifies all
    personnel considered to be space professionals--officers, enlisted, and
    civilians. As previously mentioned, the plan ensures a blend of
    expertise within the space professional career field to support a
    ``cradle to grave'' organizational philosophy while, at the same time,
    providing solid military space capabilities. Not only will this plan
    permit those with solid technical backgrounds to flourish, it
    encourages them by providing leadership opportunities at various levels
    and providing many opportunities to apply their technical expertise
    throughout their space professional careers.

                  ADVANCED WIDEBAND SYSTEM CONCEPT AND FUNDING

        10. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the Air Force has proposed
    almost $200 million of basic technology funding to begin development of
    something called the ``Advanced Wideband System'' of communication
    satellites. This system is supposed to be launched in 2009, but as of
    now I understand there is no description of exactly what the system is.
    Furthermore, I understand the first study to begin to define what it
    is, is not due until June 2002. Just what is the Advanced Wideband
    System, and why do you think you need a full $200 million next year for
    it, and particularly when the system has yet to complete its first
    concept study?
        Secretary Teets. Early transformational success depends on the
    convergence of several technological and engineering challenges. The
    $200 million in technology funding will be used to provide the
    technology pipeline for the Transformational Communications Enterprise
    (TCE). Additionally, it will fund both the concept definition phase of
    a network centric architecture of SATCOM systems and later in the
    fiscal year, the beginning of pre-acquisition studies at a detailed
    engineering level. It is anticipated that the concept definition phase
    will produce several pre-acquisition programs with multiple contractors
    engaged in concept exploration in fiscal year 2003 to cover strategic
    and tactical user needs, backbone and relay functions, and associated
    terminals. We will also be funding multiple technology developments to
    mature useful technologies for the TCE. The study currently underway,
    and planned for a July 2002 final out-brief, analyzes several
    alternative architecture approaches with the goal of removing
    communications as a constraint to the warfighter. Some of the problems
    that we are working to resolve are more timely support for airborne
    ISR, greater connectivity between joint warfighters, and more simple,
    standardized terminals. The vision for the effort is an enduring
    enterprise that will provide secure, internet-like communications
    services.

                               SPACE-BASED RADAR

        11. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the Space-Based Radar roadmap
    study, submitted to Congress in February, states that DOD has
    established a goal to deploy a Block I Space-Based Radar system by
    fiscal year 2008 or fiscal year 2010. The study also states that fiscal
    year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 will be ``dedicated to crafting [Space-
    Based Radar] requirements, assessing architectures, accomplishing
    [Analyses of Alternatives], and defining the concept of operations.''
    The proposed fiscal year 2003 budget for the Space-Based Radar is about
    $100 million, four times the fiscal year 2002 level. Why was 2008
    picked as the goal for a Block I Space-Based Radar and what are the key
    requirements a Block I system must fulfill; and why do you need $100
    million, quite a substantial sum, just to complete studies and analyses
    on the proposed system?
        Secretary Teets. The current SBR funding profile in the fiscal year
    2003 President's budget request represents a focused risk-reduction
    approach to fielding an operational SBR as recommended in the SBR
    report to Congress (signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense on 22
    February 2002). The program emphasizes risk reduction and initiates the
    Concept Definition phase. The efforts entail manufacturing non-flight
    prototype hardware and software by contractors skilled in space system
    integration to confirm system performance. This moves beyond studies
    and analyses of the proposed system. The earliest opportunity for
    Initial Launch Capability (ILC) provides a SBR program focused on a
    Ground Moving Target Indication (GMTI) capability with inherent
    Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and Digital Terrain Elevation Data
    (DTED) functionality. The key requirements a ``Block I'' system must
    fulfill are being defined under the current requirements effort. We
    will use the Operational System Acquisition approach to implement
    spiral development. The capability to be launched at ILC will provide
    some operational utility, but exactly what will be provided against
    which requirements is still in work. Since the warfighter needs these
    capabilities as soon as they can be made available, launch dates will
    be determined by technology maturity, technical risk, and available
    funding. We will shape the requirements and initial operational
    capability so the warfighter has some useful operational capability.
    This block will reflect the results and insights gained from the
    requirements, architecture, and AOAs work and initial technology
    investments. We anticipate an ongoing system requirements process that
    will further refine SBR requirements as well as flow-down system-of-
    systems requirements. These requirements will be evaluated and
    considered for inclusion in the first block SBR or deferred to a second
    block SBR system.

                         NPOESS AWARD FEE OF 20 PERCENT

        12. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, I understand that the National
    Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
    weather satellite program office plans on providing an award fee of up
    to 20 percent to the program's contractor. I further understand that
    this award fee is significantly higher than the minimum award fees
    typically given to defense space programs, which range up to 15 percent
    at the highest. The total program is over $6 billion. If a 20 percent
    award fee were applied to the whole program, it would cost taxpayers
    over $1 billion. Is the NPOESS maximum award fee to be 20 percent, and
    if so, why is it so much higher than that of other major defense space
    contracts?
        Secretary Teets. The acquisition strategy includes a maximum fee of
    20 percent. However, the 20 percent fee does not apply to the whole $6
    billion program, but only to portions of the System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD) and production phases. It does not apply to
    Operations and Maintenance (O&M) after Initial Operational Capability
    (IOC), to the launch services, to the government program office costs,
    or to any of the nearly $1 billion of development in the Program
    Definition Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase. In addition, not all the fee is
    an ``award fee.'' The fee structure is intended to incentivize critical
    elements of the program to assure success. Significant portions of the
    fee are specifically tied to key events that demonstrate the system's
    performance.
        Fee breakdown:

             Development (Cost Plus Award Fee): 2 percent base fee,
            13 percent award fee, and 5 percent mission success fee
             Production (Fixed Price Incentive Fee/Award Fee): 10
            percent target profit, 5 percent award fee, and 5 percent
            mission success fee

        Furthermore, all of the fee is held at risk until the satisfactory
    performance of the system over a specified number of years. Therefore,
    in the event the system does not meet all the requirements (including
    satellite on-orbit longevity), the government will receive some or all
    of the fee back from the contractor.
        The 20 percent level was judged appropriate for the level of risk
    the contractor is going to undertake. The November 2000 Defense Science
    Board (DSB) study found that historic fees are insufficient to make
    defense work profitable and are contributing directly to the decline of
    the high technology industrial base. The 20 percent maximum fee
    provides a commercially competitive rate of return for the system
    contractor who will deliver the complete NPOESS. The complete system
    includes the ground data processing system; all the software; the
    complete command, control, and data relay system; satellite coverage in
    three orbits; the satellites; all the sensors; and operation of the
    satellites (including the NPOESS Preparatory Project) through IOC.
        The maximum 20 percent fee is one of the innovative tools the
    NPOESS program is using to ensure the developed system is capable and
    reliable. The benefit of more reliable and longer-lasting satellites is
    considerably more than the marginal cost of the higher fee.

        13. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, who made the NPOESS award fee
    decision?
        Secretary Teets. The level of fee is part of the NPOESS Acquisition
    Strategy, which has been fully coordinated through the Air Force
    Headquarters Staff, OSD, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration (NOAA) and approved by me.

                          ADVANCED EHF PROGRAM STATUS

        14. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, late last year press reports
    indicated that the Advanced EHF satellite program, which is the follow-
    on to the MILSTAR system, was running as much as $1 billion over
    budget, partly because of increased performance demands being made by
    the Pentagon. You are asking for almost $1 billion for this program in
    fiscal year 2003. What is the current status of this program, what
    program activities are you planning to fund in fiscal year 2003, and
    are the requirements for the program now stable or are they still being
    debated?
        Secretary Teets. The AEHF program awarded the System Development
    and Demonstration (SD&D) letter contract in November 2001 and is
    currently in negotiations for contract definitization which should be
    completed by July 2002. The issues involving increased performance
    demands against an acceptable funding level have been resolved. The
    program is currently in the midst of preliminary design reviews. Of the
    $825.8 million requested in fiscal year 2003 for AEHF, $777.4 million
    is planned for the SD&D effort with the primary contractor, $19.4
    million for cryptographic development, $25.5 million for technical and
    program office support, and $3.5 million for the Joint Terminal
    Engineering Office efforts. Over half of the $777.4 million SD&D effort
    is planned for work associated with the EHF payload (e.g., antenna
    subsystem, RF subsystem, and crosslink subsystem design) with remaining
    funds identified for efforts involving the mission control system,
    spacecraft bus, and overall systems engineering.

                                   SBIRS-HIGH

        15. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the High Component of the Space-
    based Infrared System, or SBIRS-High program, is being designed as a
    more-capable replacement for our current system of early-warning
    satellites, to provide notice of a missile launch against us. It was
    recently revealed that the program is over cost by more than $2
    billion, and will incur a schedule slip of 18 to 24 months. Equally
    disturbing is the fact that, as I understand it, this large cost and
    schedule growth was not anticipated by the Air Force--it came as a very
    unwelcome surprise. I also understand that because of these problems,
    the Department may decide to terminate it, after spending well over $1
    billion on it. What were the technical reasons that caused the problem
    and were there underlying management failures which contributed to the
    problem?
        Secretary Teets. A 2-year delay in development and fielding of the
    Increment 1 ground system impacted the System Program Office's (SPO's)
    ability to focus on later phases of development. Recovery from the
    initial failure and achieving Increment 1 Initial Operational
    Capability (IOC) became an imperative for SPO and Lockheed Martin
    management focus.
        Likewise, the need to redesign the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)
    spacecraft to maintain Operational Requirements Document (ORD) key
    performance parameters also had a significant impact on cost control.
    This solar-flyer redesign activity resulted in a 6-month slip to the
    spacecraft and payload critical design reviews last year and drove
    additional ground processing functionality to a much greater extent
    than originally anticipated.
        At Secretary of the Air Force direction, and in concert with
    Lockheed Martin, an IRT was formed in November 2001 to review the
    program and diagnose the root causes and contributing factors of the
    significant cost growth. Three root causes were identified, as follows:

             The program was too immature to enter the detailed
            System Design and Development phase. In general, faulty and
            overly optimistic assumptions laid the groundwork for SBIRS-
            High program activation in 1996. These included: extensive
            software reuse; high software productivity levels; commercial
            practice benefits; economic order efficiencies with satellite
            lot buys; availability of technical models; mature
            understanding of requirements, Concept of Operations (CONOPS),
            and interface specifications; and management stability.
             The system requirements and their flow-down into
            engineering solutions were not well understood. The systems
            integration effort on the SBIRS-High program was significantly
            underscoped, both in terms of complexity and the associated
            impacts. In effect, the requirement refinement process was ``ad
            hoc,'' created uncertainty on the status of program priorities,
            and impacted cost and schedule.
             A significant breakdown in execution management
            occurred, within both the government and the contractor teams.
            The optimistic assumptions that were not borne out, and the
            flux in the program requirements, as well as the 2-year delay
            to the program in fiscal year 1999 due to other higher budget
            priorities, eventually overwhelmed the management of the
            program. Under pressure, the process discipline failed and the
            processes in place failed.

        16. Senator Reed. General Eberhart, how important is the SBIRS-High
    program, and what requirements will it fulfill?
        General Eberhart. SBIRS-High is critical to our Nation's ability to
    detect emerging strategic and theater ballistic missile threats. It
    will replace the 30-year-old Defense Support Program and will support
    warfighters' requirements of missile warning, missile defense,
    technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization.

        17. Senator Reed. General Eberhart, would a evolutionary approach
    to meeting the requirements be acceptable, and if so, should the
    current Operational Requirements Document for the system be revisited?
        General Eberhart. We believe an evolutionary acquisition approach
    for SBIRS is acceptable. The Operational Requirements Document was
    revalidated in January 2002 and accurately reflects the requirements
    for SBIRS-High.

                               SBIRS-HIGH FUNDING

        18. Senator Reed. Secretary Teets, the SBIRS-High satellite program
    has recently experienced significant cost growth, schedule slippage,
    and concerns over program management. I understand the Department is
    still considering whether or not to proceed with this program at all,
    or to cancel it and begin a replacement program. Why then does the
    proposed budget include over $800 million for this program, almost
    double last year's funding level, and how can you be sure such a
    troubled program will effectively execute such a large increase in
    funding?
        Secretary Teets. The SBIRS-High program was certified by the Under
    Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) on 2 May
    2002, as required by the Nunn-McCurdy Act to continue the program. The
    certification affirms that the program is essential to national
    security, that there are no alternatives to the program that provide
    equal or greater military capability at less cost, that the cost
    estimates are reasonable, and that the management structures are in
    place to manage the program and control costs. There is particularly
    strong consensus among our most senior military leaders that the SBIRS-
    High program is essential to national security based on the advanced
    capabilities it provides for Missile Warning, Missile Defense,
    Technical Intelligence, and Battlespace Characterization.
        The fiscal year 2002 approved program will be increased to $526.9
    million upon congressional approval of the $88.3 million above
    threshold reprogramming (ATR) request has been delivered to Congress.
    The fiscal year 2003 increase will then be $288 million over adjusted
    fiscal year 2002 program funding. The basis for the funding requested
    in fiscal year 2003 is as follows:
        $814.9 million--Total fiscal year 2003 RDT&E budget request, broken
    out as follows:
        $749.2 million--Continue Engineering and Manufacturing Development
    (EMD) contract for Space and Ground segment development (includes
    Government Furnished Equipment; Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)
    development; GEO 1&2 integration, assembly and test; Highly Elliptical
    Orbit (HEO) 1 development/delivery; HEO 2 integration, assembly, and
    test; Ground System development; System Engineering and Program
    Management, Increment 1 Pre-operations support)
        $39.9 million--Host program office support (includes payload to
    spacecraft integration, common satellite bus services, communication
    links)
        $6.2 million--Continue Air Force System Program Office support
        $19.6 million--Continue technical analysis and independent
    verification and validation of contractor by federally Funded Research
    and Development Contractor (FFRDC)
        The fiscal year 2003 budget request supports delivery of the
    following SBIRS capabilities:

      Interim Mission Control Station Backup    Oct. 2002
       (IMCSB) Certification.
      HEO 1 Payload Delivery..................  Jan. 2003
      HEO Launch & Early on Orbit Test Capable  Sept. 2003
      Integrated Training Suite Initial         Oct. 2003
       Operational Capability.

        In addition to specific deliveries, development work on the GEO
    payload, spacecraft and ground software, HEO payload integration and
    system compatibility tests, payload factory support capabilities, and
    software sustainment activities will continue in fiscal year 2003 to
    support subsequent years critical program milestones.
        The Air Force has restructured SBIRS-High to make it executable. We
    have established a realistic baseline; to ensure we effectively execute
    that baseline, we have implemented management changes based on senior
    Air Force, DOD, and Independent Review Team findings. Key changes are
    outlined below:
        A tiered management oversight structure has been established to
    focus senior Air Force and corporate leadership review on program
    progress and resolution of critical program issues. The objectives of
    these reviews are to assure management effectiveness; cost, schedule,
    and technical performance; and rapid program decision-making. The
    reviews include quarterly Chief Executive Officers (CEO) meetings,
    bimonthly President's meetings, and monthly Executive Committee
    meetings. Specific membership on the boards varies, but always includes
    senior leadership from the acquisition and operational communities, as
    well as industry.
        The Program Executive Officer for Space and I review aspects of the
    program even more frequently. Significant changes in program management
    philosophy and structure have been implemented to improve program
    performance. The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
    contract was awarded in 1996 with a total system performance
    responsibility (TSPR) clause. However, the TSPR concept has not
    achieved the desired result. Consequently, the clause has been removed
    from the contract. The program office will play a proactive role in the
    day-to-day management of program activities and acknowledges
    responsibility for system performance, cost, and schedule management.
    The program office will resume leadership of functions that had been
    relinquished to the contractor under TSPR. The SBIRS management
    philosophy is predicated on integrated government/contractor teams
    functioning under a unified systems engineering approach. The
    integrated master plan (IMP) has been restructured to provide cross-IPT
    emphasis. Contract management oversight and contractor incentives will
    be tied to major milestone accomplishments through the Award Fee Plan.
    Greatly increased government oversight and involvement should preclude
    further precipitous cost increases.
        The System Program Office (SPO) established a Program Management
    Board to control content changes and disposition any future cost
    variances. Should issues arise, alternatives will be fully assessed to
    address cost offsets with joint contractor, user, and SPO
    participation. Additionally, new requirements will be controlled to
    avoid cost growth without associated budget. The contractor has also
    established a weekly Systems Engineering Review Board that addresses
    program issues and coordinates interfaces and interdependencies across
    IPTs to reduce potential surprises or minimize their impact.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                             DETERRING ROGUE STATES

        19. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, is STRATCOM confident that it
    understands how to deter rogue states? What steps are being taken to
    better understand how rogue states are deterred?
        Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command recognizes deterring rogue
    states is clearly different than deterring the Soviet Union during the
    Cold War. As articulated in the NPR Report to Congress, terrorists and
    rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction are likely to test
    America's security commitments to its allies and friends, and a broader
    array of capabilities will be needed to deter these actors from
    undertaking the political, military, or technical actions that would
    threaten U.S. and allied interests. Currently, we are examining the
    policies and capabilities required to deter rogue states. Specifically,
    my Strategic Advisory Group is studying the policy and intelligence
    perspectives of rogue state deterrence, and will report back to me over
    the next 6 months. Also, we are working closely with the national
    intelligence community to best posture and plan for the expanding
    deterrence mission.

                                MISSILE DEFENSE

        20. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, how will STRATCOM integrate
    missile defense into its planning processes?
        Admiral Ellis. Many variables associated with missile defense
    remain undefined at this early stage, and it is difficult to foresee
    with any degree of certainty the final impact missile defenses will
    have on offensive planning. However, one aspect is absolutely clear;
    offensive and defensive operations must be fully integrated to support
    timely and effective national-level decision making. In addition, the
    U.S. will conduct continuous assessments of its new strategic
    capabilities, to include the fielding of missile defense systems, as it
    sizes its offensive strategic forces.

                             NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

        21. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, there has been substantial press
    coverage in recent days of the NPR that has suggested that the U.S. now
    targets a number of nations with its nuclear weapons, that U.S. nuclear
    weapons use is somehow more likely because they will now be used to
    deter the use of chemical and biological weapons, and that the NPR
    calls for the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons.
    Has STRATCOM engaged in contingency planning against a range of targets
    in the past, and was it the policy of the Clinton administration to
    deter rogue states from using chemical and biological weapons with the
    threat of nuclear retaliation?
        Admiral Ellis. There is no change in the U.S. deterrent strategy
    with respect to rogue states and their weapons of mass destruction. As
    was the case in the previous administration, the President retains all
    appropriate options to protect the American people and our friends and
    allies. For example, in his final report to Congress in January 2000,
    then-Secretary of Defense Cohen declared we must ``maintain nuclear
    forces sufficient to deter any potential adversary from using or
    threatening to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons against the
    United States or its allies.'' Also, in 1996 then-Secretary of Defense
    Perry stated, ``. . . we continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent . . .
    absolutely devastating in its destructive power. Anyone who considered
    using a weapon of mass destruction against the United States or its
    allies must first consider the consequences.''

        22. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the NPR recommends that the
    offensive leg of the new triad include both nuclear forces and advanced
    conventional munitions to provide options over a broader range of
    contingencies. To what extent will STRATCOM be engaged in planning and
    executing conventional force options and is STRATCOM interested in the
    development of advanced conventional weapons and delivery systems,
    potentially including conventional payloads for missiles?
        Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command currently has a small, but
    growing role in supporting regional combatant commanders with
    conventional weapons planning. We expect this role to expand
    substantially in the future, and will pursue those capabilities, to
    include advanced conventional forces, which provide global reach, rapid
    response, and strategic effects.

        23. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the NPR seeks to provide
    improved flexibility and a broader range of options to deal with
    unexpected contingencies. This in turn will require better
    intelligence, planning capabilities, and command and control. How long
    is STRATCOM's current planning cycle, what is STRATCOM's goal, and what
    are the key programmatic elements of an improved planning capability
    and are they fully funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget and throughout
    the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)?
        Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command's current adaptive planning
    cycle timelines are dependent on the size and scope of the task. The
    shortest reaction time is possible when an existing option can be
    modified to strike targets already in the command's target data base.
    This process would be measured in hours for one ICBM/SLBM, or one
    bomber delivered weapon. If a new option is required and the targets
    are not in the intelligence community's worldwide data base, the
    development time is increased substantially. U.S. Strategic Command's
    goal is to provide effective adaptive nuclear planning and surety in
    the minimum possible time. Modeling and simulation indicate the
    command's future planning timelines can be reduced up to 75 percent
    with enhanced system integration, optimization, and process
    reengineering. Although these initiatives are not funded in fiscal year
    2003, the fiscal year 2004-2009 POM initiative submitted to the Air
    Force will incrementally deliver improved capabilities. If fully
    funded, an improved planning process integrating military capabilities
    across the entire conflict spectrum is forecast to achieve Full
    Operational Capability (FOC) in fiscal year 2010.

        24. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, what are the key programmatic
    elements of an improved command and control system and are they fully
    funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget and throughout the FYDP?
        Admiral Ellis. World-wide survivable communication capability for
    strategic forces and nuclear command and control system (NCCS) elements
    is dependent on a seamless transition from the current MILSTAR
    satellite communications constellation to the follow-on Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) constellation. The fiscal year 2003
    budget supports this transition and funds a transformation
    communications study to examine alternative architectures that meet
    strategic and tactical needs. A critical component of this architecture
    is the development and fielding of AEHF terminals on all NCCS elements
    before the existing MILSTAR constellation degrades. In addition, the
    recent, significant funding improvements in E-4B National Airborne
    Operations Center (NAOC) and E-6B Airborne Command Post long-term
    modernization and sustainment programs will ensure these vital airborne
    command and control platforms can support national-level decision
    making and force direction in future crises. U.S. Strategic Command's
    Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC) is funded in the fiscal year
    2003 budget but has significant shortfalls across the FYDP. The
    Department is conducting a review of the overall MCCC program.
    Additionally, I am working with the Services on modernization of the
    equipment used for secure encrypted communications with not only our
    strategic forces but also the entire military. This equipment will
    require replacement beginning in fiscal year 2005, but remains unfunded
    in the FYDP.

        25. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the NPR indicates that DOD will
    conduct regular reviews of the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces and
    assessments of the viability of the NPR-recommended nuclear force
    reductions. Will the criteria STRATCOM uses to reassess the sufficiency
    of nuclear force levels recommended by the NPR include the health and
    capabilities of the other legs of the new triad?
        Admiral Ellis. Future assessments of the adequacy of U.S. nuclear
    forces will be conducted using several complementary criteria. Among
    them will be the global security environment, the emerging capabilities
    of nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces, our progress in developing
    active and passive defenses, and the health of our research and
    development efforts and industrial infrastructure.

        26. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis and General Blaisdell, the
    Minuteman III will be modernized in a number of efforts that are
    currently planned to proceed more or less in unison to maximize
    efficiency, minimize cost, maximize security, and minimize disruption
    to forces in the field. Delays or complications in any of these
    programs could impact cost and schedule for the other efforts. Are
    STRATCOM and the Air Force confident that multiple, simultaneous
    upgrades to the Minuteman is a prudent, low risk approach to preserving
    ICBM capability?
        Admiral Ellis. Minuteman III modernization programs are
    synchronized to field upgrades in a series of just-in-time deployments.
    A prime example is the synchronization of the guidance replacement
    program (GRP) and the propulsion replacement program (PRP). The PRP
    booster requires a GRP guidance set, and as a result, the stability of
    GRP is key to maintaining on-time deployments of PRP boosters. As you
    stated, the primary risk to the overall Minuteman III program is a
    change to one of the interlocked, supporting programs. The Air Force
    aggressively worked the technical issues that have occurred during
    design, test, and deployment, and I am confident, if individual program
    stability and funding levels are maintained, the approach to Minuteman
    III modernization is appropriate.
        General Blaisdell. The Air Force regards the Minuteman III
    modernization approach as overall low risk. The primary risk associated
    with our interdependent system upgrades is largely based on maintaining
    required funding to support projected delivery schedules to the field.
    This risk has been successfully mitigated through consistent support by
    U.S. Strategic Command, OSD, Congress, and the Air Force. In addition,
    any potential risk that may arise due to the interdependence of
    programs (for example, the propulsion replacement and guidance
    replacement programs) is mitigated by careful synchronization and
    planning by our logistics, maintenance, and security force
    professionals. The plan minimizes maintenance and security forces
    deployments by maximizing delivery and install trips to the field.

        27. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis and General Blaisdell, are
    STRATCOM and the Air Force confident that the operational availability
    of the Minuteman force throughout this process can be sustained at
    acceptable levels and will these levels vary significantly from the
    availability levels achieved historically?
        Admiral Ellis. U.S. Strategic Command actively monitors and
    coordinates with the Services on force modernization, and we are
    confident Minuteman III operational availability will be sustained at
    acceptable levels, similar to those sustained historically. Air Force
    Space Command is committed to providing the required number of
    strategic alert ICBMs, and the ongoing modernization processes will be
    accomplished within those current and future ICBM alert commitments.
    Historically, modernization processes have not significantly interfered
    with Minuteman alert rates.
        General Blaisdell. The Air Force coordinates very closely with U.S.
    Strategic Command to ensure the historically high ICBM alert rate of
    approximately 99.6 percent continues to provide the warfighter with the
    most effective and reliable weapon system in our nuclear inventory. Due
    to the carefully planned integration and synchronization of the
    Minuteman III modernization programs, the Air Force is committed to
    ensuring operational availability will remain at consistently high
    levels throughout force modernization.

                                 BOMBER ROADMAP

        28. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, the Air Force bomber roadmap
    indicates that the current nuclear capable bomber force will remain in
    place, with no additional procurement, through about 2040. At that
    time, the average age of the B-52 fleet would be about nearly 80 years
    and the B-2 fleet would be about 45 years. Are you satisfied with this
    roadmap?
        Admiral Ellis. I fully support the Air Forces' bomber roadmap, to
    include full funding and timely fielding of various B-2 and B-52
    modernization and sustainment programs and the goal of starting a new
    bomber acquisition program not later than the 2012-2015 timeframe.
    However, we will need to monitor the impacts of unforeseen aging
    problems with the airframes themselves as we continue to use these
    venerable aircraft in the war on terrorism. I support the Air Force's
    ongoing comprehensive review of the bomber roadmap and look forward to
    reviewing the results.

        29. Senator Allard. Admiral Ellis, do you believe that the
    modernization plans for the bomber force are adequate, given STRATCOM's
    requirements?
        Admiral Ellis. I fully support current Air Force bomber
    modernization plans and believe the program is structured to meet
    current and future U.S. Strategic Command requirements. Of particular
    interest is full funding and timely fielding of survivable
    communications upgrades in the B-2 and B-52. In addition, ongoing and
    planned avionics upgrades and situational awareness and electronic
    countermeasures improvement programs are essential to ensure the
    effectiveness of the bomber force for the next four decades.

                       ADVANCED EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY

        30. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, the committee has been
    informed that U.S. allies who were contributing to the Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program have not provided expected
    fiscal year 2002 funds because of their concerns that the new
    transformational communications satellite strategy may result in a
    smaller AEHF constellation that will not meet their needs. Will you be
    taking steps to assure our allies involved in this program that the
    AEHF program will remain responsive to their needs?
        Secretary Teets. The AEHF International Partners (IPs) did voice
    concerns over resource assurance. To alleviate this concern, ASD/C\3\I
    has prepared a letter to assure the IP's access to all space segment
    resources. The letters to Canada and the United Kingdom have been sent,
    and the letter to the Netherlands is in final DOD coordination.

        31. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, is the AEHF program
    technically sound and are you satisfied with the industry management
    structure?
        Secretary Teets. The AEHF program is quite challenging but appears
    technically sound. I am satisfied with the industry management
    structure.

                       EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

        32. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Eberhart, the Air
    Force decision to support two competitive EELV launch vendors was based
    in part on projections of a robust commercial launch market. These
    projections have been overly optimistic as a result of the failure of a
    number of commercial low earth orbit communications satellite programs.
    Are you concerned that the decline in the commercial launch market will
    undermine the viability of the two EELV launch vendors?
        Secretary Teets. Yes. However, maintaining two viable launch
    service providers is essential if we are to have assured access to
    space for our critical national security space sensors. Competition
    produces savings and flexibility in addition to more reliable access to
    space for our nationally critical payloads. The EELV program is a
    partnership with industry in which the Government shares in both the
    significant savings and the potential risks. Due to the downturn in the
    commercial market, it is reasonable to expect the overall cost to
    provide assured access to space may increase.
        General Eberhart. Yes, we are concerned and will continue to assess
    the situation to do what is right for our national security and the
    vendors involved.

                               SPACE-BASED RADAR

        33. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Eberhart, what
    factors give you confidence that technology and cost challenges can be
    met successfully to achieve the 2010 time frame for first launch of a
    SBR satellite?
        Secretary Teets. First, since 1992 over $500 million has been spent
    by the Air Force, the NRO, and other agencies to assess Space-Based
    Radar utility and develop enabling technologies. The Discoverer II
    program, in particular, accomplished significant technology risk
    reduction and worked detailed system engineering solutions for the now-
    canceled two-satellite demonstration. Second, there are many other
    operational or research programs ongoing with technology that directly
    translate to a future Space-Based Radar. Some examples include both
    airborne and space-based data dissemination and exploitation technology
    work by Air Force labs, FFRDCs, the NRO, and others. Third, OSD led an
    in-depth study over 7 months including services, the intelligence
    community, and other agencies resulting in the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense-signed SBR Roadmap (22 Feb 02). In the roadmap process, the
    team carefully assessed the current technology readiness levels versus
    where we need to be to deploy SBR, and developed plans to ensure we do
    everything needed to properly mature the technology. In addition, the
    NRO has continued work on radar payload technology since Discoverer II
    cancellation, and we've seen some excellent and promising results not
    only with the potential radar payload performance, but also in areas of
    affordability and producibility. Over time we've also continued to use
    independent teams to check our work and ensure we're doing everything
    possible to maximize future SBR program success.
        General Eberhart. Our confidence is based on the promising results
    of technology investment in prototype radar payloads and the DOD's
    experience with past programs such as Discoverer II. Preliminary data
    supports the performance and cost estimates that have been developed
    for SBR.

        34. Senator Allard. General Eberhart, what progress has been made
    in integrating SBR into a coherent architecture including national
    assets and airborne platforms?
        General Eberhart. At the present time, we are working with key
    stakeholders in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
    Community to develop a Concept of Operations to fulfill warfighter
    requirements. In addition, we have broadened the scope of traditional
    pre-acquisition activities to plan for an integrated system of systems
    solution that effectively incorporates existing and future airborne
    collection platforms, as well as national assets.

                               SPACE SURVEILLANCE

        35. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, space surveillance is a key
    element of space control, and space control is taking on increasing
    significance as U.S. reliance on space increases over time. An August
    2000 study of the space surveillance system found that current space
    surveillance is not adequate to meet military needs, and that the
    system today is a collection of dedicated, contributing, and collateral
    components that are not adequately integrated as a coherent
    architecture. Are you satisfied with current space surveillance
    capabilities? What improvements to current capabilities would you
    prioritize?
        Secretary Teets. Today's space surveillance capabilities do not
    meet national requirements and need to be improved. We cannot at this
    time fully support the other space control missions of offensive
    counterspace (OCS) and defensive counterspace (DCS), nor can we fully
    support other customers who rely on space surveillance data for their
    own space operations (i.e., NASA).
        We are working to transform space surveillance operations to
    broaden space situational awareness (SSA) operations. SSA not only
    includes traditional space surveillance, but also space reconnaissance,
    space intelligence, and space weather functions.
        The first and most important need is to prevent an upcoming gap in
    space-based space surveillance. Currently, the Mid-course Space
    Experiment/Space-Based Visible sensor (MSX/SBV) is expected to end life
    in 2005. The follow-on to this system, the Space-Based Space
    Surveillance (SBSS) System, is not scheduled for Initial Operational
    Capability until 2010--resulting in a 5-year gap which will degrade
    current SSA capabilities and result in the loss of crucial operational
    experience in space-based operations. We are working hard to accelerate
    SBSS.
        Other necessary improvements include the sustainment of critical
    elements of the current Space Surveillance Network (SSN), particularly
    some of our ground-based radars that provide very precise observations.
    Many of these assets are over 30 years old and need to be modernized.
    The development and integration of improved Space Control C\2\ and data
    fusion of information (like space intelligence) into SSA is also a
    critical need.

        36. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets and General Eberhart, is the
    National Security Space Architect examining future space surveillance
    architectures?
        Secretary Teets. The National Security Space Architect (NSSA)
    examined the future needs of space surveillance as part of a 1997 Space
    Control Architecture study. This effort eventually led to the August
    2000 Space Surveillance Task Force study report cited in Question #35.
    The NSSA also began an effort in 2001 to develop a top-level
    operational architecture specifically for Space Situational Awareness
    (SSA), which will include space surveillance. In addition to this work,
    the Space Situational Awareness Integration Office (SSAIO) was
    established in 2001 as the executing office for the Air Force, the lead
    service system integrator for SSA as directed by ASD(C\3\I). The SSAIO
    has developed a detailed methodology on how to evaluate future space
    surveillance system architectures and is preparing to conduct
    evaluations of mid-term capabilities.
        General Eberhart. Yes, the NSSA is conducting a study of SSA to be
    completed later this year. This study will define an architecture that
    leverages all space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and
    intelligence activities to provide an SSA common operating picture.

                                   SBIRS-LOW

        37. Senator Allard. General Eberhart, do you believe that SBIRS-Low
    could contribute to the space surveillance mission? If so, how?
        General Eberhart. Yes, we believe SBIRS-Low will be a contributing
    sensor to the Space Surveillance Network. Specifically, it will collect
    infrared and visible signature data to identify, track, and monitor
    space objects.

                           SATELLITE CONTROL NETWORK

        38. Senator Allard. General Eberhart, commercial antennas could
    potentially be used to supplement (or even potentially replace some)
    Air Force owned and operated equipment. Limited demonstrations of
    commercial antennas have been done and have demonstrated the
    feasibility of the concept. Further demonstrations have not been
    funded. Are you concerned about the obsolescence of the satellite
    control network and do you believe that commercial antennas could
    supplement Air Force capabilities in this area?
        General Eberhart. Yes, we are concerned about the aging Air Force
    Satellite Control Network. However, we have implemented a long-term
    improvement and modernization program that includes commercial off-the-
    shelf technology. This program will expand the network's operational
    capabilities and high level of performance well into the 21st century.
        In addition, commercial networks do not meet our critical
    operational requirements, such as timing, accuracy, and high-power
    commanding. Recent demonstrations of commercial antennas were not as
    promising as we hoped.

                      INTEGRATION OF BLACK AND WHITE SPACE

        39. Senator Allard. Secretary Teets, the Space Commission
    recommended that NRO and Air Force space programs be appropriately
    aligned. Part of this recommendation included the designation of Under
    Secretary of the Air Force as the Air Force space acquisition executive
    as well as the director of the NRO. That has happened. But, the most
    recent organization chart shows Under Secretary Teets at the top of an
    NRO (black space) structure and an Air Force (white space) structure,
    with an integration office in between them--something that looks like a
    stovepipe connecting two stovepipes. Would you describe in more detail
    how you intend to achieve this integration and how the organization you
    have established will support that integration?
        Secretary Teets. The Space Commission report indicated that the
    integration of military space efforts and the NRO was a desired goal,
    but that it was a far-term goal and should only happen after certain
    changes had occurred within the Air Force--namely the establishment of
    a ``cradle-to-grave'' construct and the creation of a ``space
    professional cadre.'' In the meantime, the NRO will need to do the work
    that they do, and the Air Force will need to do the space-related
    efforts they are responsible for. That being said, I have organized my
    top level staff to move forward and directly facilitate what I believe
    was the intent of the Space Commission in terms of integrating
    ``black'' and ``white'' space. With the combining of both the Director
    of the NRO and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, there is now one
    person with the clear authority to make the space programmatic
    decisions across Air Force and NRO space programs. The role of the
    office you mentioned, NSSI, as well as my two deputies is to work
    across existing organizations of the Air Force and the NRO such that,
    while there are multiple decision execution or implementation arms
    (i.e., the Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center and the NRO's
    Directorates) at the top, we can function as a single coordinated
    National Security Space entity.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith

                                 SPACE CONTROL

        40. Senator Smith. Secretary Teets, according to General Eberhart,
    space control, the ability to protect one's own space assets while
    denying an adversaries use of in-orbit resources, is ``still at idle.
    It's time to move that up.'' Our reliance on space is unquestioned and
    fully understood by the world. General Franks in his February 7
    statement in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee said the use
    of unmanned aerial vehicles, precision guided munitions, and C\4\ISR)
    systems proved to be ``very effective'' in the prosecution of what he
    considered to be ``the most accurate war in the history of the United
    States.'' All of these assets rely on space systems, such as global
    positioning satellites and the satellite communications network, to
    operate and function. Without them, we would have had a much rougher
    time prosecuting the war, and undoubtedly more lives would have been
    lost. Our dependence on space is not limited to defense purposes,
    however. Our economy is increasingly dependent on space. Our enemies
    understand this, and it is only a matter of time before an adversary
    figures out how to deny us the use of these systems, such as a pop-up
    nuclear or large conventional explosion in space. Our defenses against
    this are limited at best, and more focus is needed. What is being done
    to ensure not only that we have the assets to ensure our
    vulnerabilities are minimized, but also to ensure we have an overt
    deterrent to others trying to develop such systems?
        Secretary Teets. Measures being taken to defend against attack of
    U.S. space systems are in two space control submission areas: defensive
    counterspace (DCS) and space situational awareness (SSA). Planned
    developments will provide satellite operators, users, and decision-
    makers the information to respond to unintentional interference or
    deliberate attack against U.S. space systems. We are now developing the
    rapid attack identification and reporting system (RAIDRS), integrated
    DCS capabilities addressing threat detection, identification, location/
    classification, and attack reporting. RAIDRS will initially consist of
    distributed terrestrial elements, future satellite-hosted sensors,
    centralized data fusion and analysis, and communications
    infrastructure.
        RAIDRS will work in concert with SSA assets to allow us to timely
    detect space events and respond defensively. Expanded SSA capabilities
    will include migration of space surveillance to space basing,
    inspection of space-based objects, and more responsive interfaces to
    the national intelligence community to locate and characterize
    terrestrial threats. The combination of enhanced SSA and focused threat
    detection and warning through RAIDRS will enable satellite developers
    and operators to effectively employ a full range of defensive measures
    in response to interference or attack on our systems. These defensive
    measures include, but are not limited to, maneuver to avoid threats,
    anti-jam capabilities, satellite hardening, sensor filters, redundant
    communications, and electronic warfare defenses.
        We are exploring the feasibility of requiring satellite buyers to
    include attack detection capabilities at their ground sites and host
    sensors on board satellites that support critical missions. In
    addition, we are evaluating the utility of fielding escort satellites
    capable of detecting threats and actively defending our space assets.
    While terrestrial-based interference or attack on our satellites can be
    accomplished with modest capabilities, attacking our space assets from
    space is a very expensive and high technology capability, requiring
    significant resources by any adversary. Developing comprehensive
    defensive capabilities will deter nations from committing high value
    resources to an attack that would have a low probability of succeeding.

                            SPACE FORCE APPLICATION

        41. Senator Smith. Secretary Teets, to date, space has been
    relegated to a support role. The ``weapons in space'' issue has
    paralyzed the country and prevented it from moving out on systems which
    would protect the American people. A key component of boost-phase
    defense is the space based laser, which was on course for a 2012
    demonstration. Recently the Department cut the program's budget from
    $200-$300 million per year to $50 million per year, effectively killing
    the program. The program was cut in fiscal year 2002 ($170 million to
    $50 million) as a bill payer for other issues. There has been no overt
    congressional opposition to the program. Why didn't the administration
    defend the program and restore it to its previous levels in the
    President's budget?
        Secretary Teets. The Space-Based Laser program is run by General
    Kadish at the Missile Defense Agency and I would ask that any
    programmatic questions be presented to him.

                                INDUSTRIAL BASE

        42. Senator Smith. Secretary Teets, the cost of entry for companies
    into the space arena is very high, and the current companies seem to
    not be finished yet with consolidation. There are several new companies
    and with fewer and larger programs it is difficult for a smaller
    company to compete for the larger programs. Are you concerned that the
    large companies will starve innovation (which will ultimately have an
    adverse impact on the industry attracting new college graduates) in
    favor of maximizing the ``bottom line''?
        Secretary Teets. Space industrial base issues are always a concern.
    Space systems are expensive and the risks and consequences of failure
    are substantial. The government must work to mitigate risks, control
    our costs, and meet operational needs. It can often be a fine line
    between prudent risk mitigation and the elimination of innovation. I
    think the real area that is ripe for small and/or new companies with
    innovative ideas for space-related applications is space science and
    technology. In fact, the small business innovation research program is
    intended to cultivate such companies. Secretary Rumsfeld has, in his
    fiscal guidance to the Department and in his 18 October 2001 memo
    regarding Space Commission implementation, made it clear that space-
    focused science and technology is a high priority area for this Nation.
    Opportunities and avenues for truly promising ideas are there.

                                NORTHERN COMMAND

        43. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, I understand that DOD is
    reorganizing the joint warfighting commands to add the new ``Northern
    Command'' for homeland defense. I understand that the Unified Command
    Plan and the details of the reorganization are not out yet; however,
    can you give me any insight into how roles and responsibilities will
    change among U.S. Space Command, NORAD, and Strategic Command and how
    are we going to maintain our focus on the space and missile defense
    missions in our shuffle to take on the important homeland security
    mission?
        General Eberhart. Unified Command Plan 2002 does not contain new
    mission requirements or change the focus of NORAD, U.S. Space Command
    or U.S. Strategic Command. It does establish a new unified command,
    U.S. Northern Command, which will be responsible for U.S. homeland
    defense and support to civil authorities.

                                      GPS

        44. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, with the increasing reliance
    on GPS, both in terms of our military and in the civilian sector, it
    seems we should be very clear in our minds where we are headed with
    GPS-issues such as frequency protection, military versus civilian
    control, signals, power, accuracy, international involvement, etc.
    There doesn't seem to be a clear plan for the future of GPS and how it
    will continue to support national security objectives while the
    commercial use of the system expands. Are we working on one, and are we
    making sure we focus on all elements of the system, both long- and
    short-term?
        General Eberhart. U.S. Space Command has worked with the Air Force
    to ensure GPS will continue to meet the many needs of the military,
    civilian, and commercial communities for the short- and long-term. For
    example, to address immediate requirements, we are currently launching
    two to three Block II-Replenishment satellites per year. Next year, we
    will launch the first ``modernized'' replenishment satellite that will
    feature new signals for civilian and military users.
        In approximately 2009, we will introduce the new Block III GPS
    satellite which will feature improved accuracy, new cross-link
    commanding, and have an additional antenna to provide increased power.
    We will also improve the ground control element of GPS constellation.

                                   SBIRS-LOW

        45. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, the SBIRS-Low has been plagued
    with overruns and poor program management, both on the government and
    the contractor sides. ``Requirements creep'' is always difficult on
    space programs, and is a cause of the problems on SBIRS-Low. In
    addition, the Department is mulling a potential shift in strategy on
    SBIRS-Low which would combine the two currently competing prime
    contractors into a single team. How will you ensure space requirements
    are set and don't creep and will there be a ``Space Requirements
    Oversight Council'' that will validate requirements?
        General Eberhart. We will continue to use the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council to validate warfighter requirements for space-based
    assets.

        46. Senator Smith. General Eberhart, what are the prospects that a
    ``national team'' will be able to produce a better team than a winner
    of the competition, and how are you going to ensure the government gets
    a ``good deal'' from the resultant business/contractual arrangement?
        General Eberhart. We defer to the Missile Defense Agency, since
    they have the lead on SBIRS-Low acquisition.

        [Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2003

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2002

                                   U.S. Senate,
                             Subcommittee on Strategic,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AND THE
     NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE PROGRAM AND OTHER
                               WEAPONS ACTIVITIES

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Reed, Inhofe, Allard,
    and Sessions.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    minority counsel; and Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Thomas C. Moore.
        Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; John Gastright, assistant to Senator
    Thurmond; and Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Reed. Let me call the hearing to order. The
    Strategic Subcommittee meets today in two panels to discuss the
    Department of Energy's Environmental Management (EM) program
    and weapons activities at the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA). The witness on the first panel is Ms.
    Jessie Roberson, the Assistant Secretary of Energy for
    Environmental Management. Secretary Roberson, welcome.
        The witnesses on the second panel will be Dr. Everet
    Beckner, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and Mr.
    Ralph Erickson, the Associate Administrator for Facilities and
    Operations, both at the NNSA.
        In the past, the Strategic Subcommittee has had the
    opportunity to discuss EM programs and weapons activities in
    two separate hearings. At the EM hearing, we would ususally
    have the opportunity to hear from the major prime contractors
    responsible for implementing the DOE cleanup programs.
        In past hearings we have had the opportunity to hear from
    the operating contractors at the NNSA weapons plants and the
    directors of the three laboratories. Unfortunately, the
    committee's schedule this year does not permit us to hear from
    the contractor-operators and lab directors of these facilities
    in person. Nevertheless, it is important that we hear from
    these contractors as they are charged with implementing the
    various programs that we will discuss today.
        For that reason, I would like to extend to these
    contractors the opportunity to provide testimony to be included
    in the subcommittee's record of this hearing. Several NNSA
    contractors have submitted testimony for the record already.
    The testimony that we have will be included in the record. Any
    testimony from any other NNSA or EM prime contractors will also
    be included in the record provided such testimony is submitted
    by 6:00 p.m. Monday.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by John C. Browne

        Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Strategic
    Subcommittee for the opportunity to submit this report on the status of
    national security programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los
    Alamos is one of three multi-program scientific institutions supported
    by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
    (NNSA), and has been operated by the University of California since its
    inception in 1943. Seventy percent of the work at Los Alamos supports
    the NNSA mission. Eighty percent of our work is directly related to
    national security. All of our work stems from our historic public
    service and national security mission. We appreciate the support this
    subcommittee has given us in carrying out our mission.
        The new threats of the 21st century--worldwide terrorism and the
    daunting possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction--cannot
    be met by nuclear deterrence alone. With the formation of the Office of
    Homeland Security and the issuance of the Nuclear Posture Review and
    the Quadrennial Defense Review, our country is developing new national
    security policy directions for the 21st century that will require a
    broad array of scientific and technological innovations in the coming
    decades. The NNSA weapons laboratories will provide the Nation with
    many of the needed science and technology capabilities that will
    support our Nation's needs in nuclear deterrence, conventional defense
    and homeland security.
        Our stockpile stewardship mission is directly linked to the urgent
    national security priorities of our country. We are aligned with the
    new nuclear strategy set forth in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
    which outlines a deterrence strategy based on a new triad of non-
    nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, a strong defense capability,
    and a responsive defense infrastructure. The active support of the new
    triad by healthy and responsive national laboratories, as well as the
    DOD, will be key to the success of this deterrence strategy. We are
    committed to:

             Ensuring the safety, reliability, and responsiveness
            of the U.S. nuclear-weapon stockpile;
             Reducing threats to U.S. and global security, with a
            special focus on countering proliferation and possible
            terrorist acquisition, threats, and use of weapons of mass
            destruction; and,
             Providing technical solutions to long-term national
            security problems in infrastructure vulnerabilities, energy,
            environment, and health.

        We are as focused and committed today to our mission and purpose as
    we were 60 years ago. The stockpile stewardship mission--maintaining
    the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile without
    nuclear testing--is one of the most difficult technical challenges this
    Nation has ever attempted. As our nuclear weapons age beyond their
    design lifetimes, Directed Stockpile Work--surveillance, assessment,
    and response--will increase. Certification of nuclear weapons in an
    environment without nuclear testing requires the best science in
    modeling and simulation, dynamic material behavior, special nuclear
    materials and explosives, and experimentation. Therefore, our weapons
    activities must focus on ensuring a balanced and sustainable
    stewardship--between direct stockpile work and the campaigns that
    support the underlying science needed to certify stockpiled weapons and
    to meet future nuclear weapon requirements--for this decade and beyond.
        To meet the technical and operational challenges posed by our
    demanding mission, last September I appointed a new nuclear-weapon
    program management team and restructured the laboratory to be more
    focused on execution and product delivery. There are several structural
    changes in the NNSA being implemented in the field and site offices.
    These changes should strengthen our partnership with the NNSA, at all
    levels, which already has improved markedly under General Gordon's
    tenure. The University of California (UC) has appointed a new vice
    president for laboratory management and has increased its oversight and
    involvement in improving laboratory performance and operations. We are
    operating under a new 5 year contract between UC and DOE/NNSA that
    requires us to perform against rigorous technical and operational
    standards that will serve the Nation well.
        We have made great progress during this past year. I will highlight
    some major accomplishments in our Stockpile Stewardship Program, our
    threat reduction program, and in our operations. I will also review key
    issues and challenges with respect to our mission that face us in the
    future--and to the science, the workforce and the infrastructure that
    underpin that mission. In the attached addendum, key elements of our
    nuclear weapon and threat reduction programs are addressed in greater
    detail.

                    PROGRESS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: HIGHLIGHTS

    I. Stockpile Stewardship Program
        In 1995, we were tasked to conduct a stockpile stewardship effort
    to sustain the enduring nuclear-weapon stockpile without nuclear
    testing. Sustaining the nuclear deterrent under these conditions
    continues to pose a grand challenge. It is my primary responsibility to
    position the laboratory and provide the people and tools to ensure that
    we are equal to this challenge. The requirements of stockpile
    stewardship are technical, determined by the science of nuclear
    weapons, by the processes of aging affecting both the workforce and the
    weapons, and by required levels of confidence. It is essential that we
    meet these requirements. I would like to highlight a few of our
    achievements in meeting these requirements.
        Annual Certification. For the sixth consecutive year, I have been
    able to certify to the Secretaries of Defense and Energy that the five
    Los Alamos designed weapons (the B61 family, W76, W78, W80, and W88) in
    the U.S. nuclear stockpile remain safe and reliable and that a nuclear
    test is not required at this time to resolve any of the issues that
    exist for these weapons. Although I am concerned about a growing number
    of issues identified by our ongoing surveillance activities, to date we
    have been able to resolve most of the issues through assessments,
    changes in operating conditions, or refurbishment plans. In the past
    some of these issues would have required nuclear tests to resolve. The
    challenge we face is to have certification tools and trained people
    adequate to address these issues.
        We have strengthened our certification approach each year since
    beginning this process in 1996. In the past year, Los Alamos and
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories reached agreement on an
    approach for certification that utilizes similar methodologies while
    maintaining independence for peer review purposes. In addition, we are
    planning to phase in internal ``red teams'' or ``fresh-eye teams'' at
    Los Alamos designed to look for the issues that might have been
    overlooked by the responsible warhead design and refurbishment team.
    Reports from both teams will be submitted to me for incorporation into
    my annual assessment of the stockpile.
        Pit Manufacturing and Certification. One of our highest priorities
    at Los Alamos National Laboratory is to re-establish the Nation's
    capability to manufacture plutonium pits, the heart of nuclear weapons.
    The W88 has been selected as the crucial prototype for restoring the
    Nation's nuclear manufacturing capability. Producing a pit for a
    nuclear weapon involves two distinct but intertwined activities:
    manufacturing and certification. Significant progress in this program
    has been made in this last year. We are well along in establishing a
    limited manufacturing capacity for pits. Eleven developmental units
    have been produced to date. We are on schedule to deliver a certifiable
    W88 pit, defined as one that meets all manufacturing requirements and
    specifications, by April 2003.
        Even though we will provide a key capability in a timely fashion,
    the laboratory will not have sufficient capacity to meet envisioned
    future pit production requirements. We support NNSA's pit production
    strategy, which is based on an assessment of pit lifetime and numbers
    of weapons projected in the stockpile, to reestablish industrial-scale
    pit production in the longer term.
        Certification of the pit is an extremely challenging process that
    requires both highly specialized equipment and expertise. Los Alamos
    has identified a series of laboratory and sub-critical experiments that
    are designed to test and validate our computer simulations that will be
    needed to ensure that the pit will perform as designed. Based on
    improved planning and better certification methodology, we have been
    able to move up our schedule for certifying these pits for war reserve
    use from the previously scheduled date of 2009 to 2007.
        Directed Stockpile Work. In addition to our pit manufacturing
    responsibilities, we are also responsible for neutron target tube
    loading, detonator fabrication for all the weapons in the stockpile,
    Beryllium component manufacturing, pit and valve surveillance testing,
    and high fidelity mock pits for joint test assemblies (JTA) used in
    flight testing.
        In the area of stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs), we began
    engineering development for the Navy's W76 warhead and will proceed
    toward production development and certification with the first
    production unit (FPU) scheduled for 2007. Evaluation of the condition
    and life expectancy of the materials in the nuclear explosive package
    is being addressed. A major refurbishment is planned to support the
    extension of the lifetime of this warhead to 2042. We also have
    finalized plans with NNSA, Pantex, and Y-12 to begin refurbishing
    canned subassemblies of the B61 Mod 7 and 11 in 2006. In support of the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory W80 Life Extension Program, we
    are developing the Acorn gas transfer system with the Sandia-California
    site. With Sandia, we have completed the W80 baseline program and
    continue to support knowledge transfer to LLNL.
        As part of the enhanced surveillance program, Los Alamos continues
    to be a national leader in materials characterization and aging
    studies. We are developing non-destructive technologies for
    surveillance and diagnostics on components and systems that will help
    us improve our understanding of nuclear weapons aging.
        Advanced Simulation and Computing. The Advanced Simulation and
    Computing (ASC) program of the NNSA is an essential element of the
    nuclear-weapons program. The objective is to provide greater computing
    power and to develop new computational models that will allow weapons
    designers and other nuclear weapons experts to use validated modeling
    and simulation to assess changes in the stockpile to determine if the
    existing weapons remain safe and reliable without nuclear testing.
        We continue to make rapid advances in the ability to simulate
    nuclear explosions faster and with greatly increased detail. During
    this past year, we completed the first three-dimensional simulation of
    a full nuclear weapon system explosion using the LLNL 12 TeraOps White
    computer. This calculation represents the first time that we have been
    able to compute a fully-coupled primary and secondary explosion to
    analyze weapon performance. It represents a breakthrough for the
    program and unprecedented detail for designers and analysts.
        The Strategic Computing Complex (SCC) was completed on schedule and
    under budget. We are installing the first phase of 10 of the 30 TeraOps
    computers that were purchased for this ASC program. We are installing
    the full capability in ``phases'' in order to facilitate performance
    testing to connectivity requirements. The computer will provide the
    computing power required to run the new computational tools to support
    the Stockpile Stewardship Program mission. These new weapon-system
    simulations will replace the less-predictive legacy based models.
        Hydrodynamic Testing. The nuclear weapon primary is the most
    critical component of the weapon. Understanding its performance is
    essential to confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile.
    Hydrodynamic tests of primary systems--non-yield experiments measuring
    the implosion characteristics of primary systems using simulated
    nuclear materials--enable us to evaluate some crucial aspects of
    nuclear weapon performance. Completion of the first axis of the Dual
    Axis-Radiographic Hydro-Test (DARHT) facility has enabled us to perform
    these tests with outstanding spatial resolution of the imploding
    surrogate pit. We performed five major hydro tests (four at DARHT) in
    the last quarter of fiscal year 2001 directly related to stockpile
    systems and in support of certification activities and plan six more
    later this year. Following commissioning and optimization of the second
    axis of DARHT, the facility will provide an enhanced diagnostic
    capability in fiscal year 2004. We are also continuing to develop
    proton radiography as an advanced capability in order to maintain our
    ability to certify the refurbished nuclear weapons, and to validate the
    predictive capabilities of next-generation designers.
        Test Readiness. The Nuclear Posture Review has called for enhanced
    test readiness. We support test readiness through a number of
    collaborations with the Nevada Test Site. The most prominent
    collaboration is that of sub-critical, non-yield, underground tests
    that address key dynamic materials issues and exercise the
    infrastructure required, should a return to underground nuclear testing
    be needed. In February, we conducted a successful collaborative sub-
    critical experiment in Nevada that yielded significant data. Although
    we see no reason to do a nuclear test today, we support General
    Gordon's direction to reduce the timescale required to resume nuclear
    testing as a prudent measure.
        Advanced Concepts. The Nuclear Posture Review identified a need for
    the nuclear-weapons design laboratories to maintain their design
    expertise through the study of advanced concepts that could meet
    changing weapon requirements in the future. These studies include new
    and extended concepts (those that may have been developed and tested in
    the past, but not deployed). At Los Alamos, we have an NNSA-approved
    effort evaluating robust earth-penetrating weapons and a small study
    group looking at past R&D efforts that could be developed to meet
    changing national needs for nuclear deterrence. If the country requires
    a vigorous effort, we will need explicit support and funding for such
    advanced concepts.
    II. Threat Reduction Programs: Non-proliferation, Counterterrorism,
            Homeland Security, and Defense Transformation
        As a result of shifting national security priorities since
    September 11, the newly created Office of Homeland Security has been
    charged with protecting the United States from terrorist attack. We are
    strongly committed to supporting this effort and are participating with
    Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories in an effort to
    defend the U.S. against nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorist
    attacks.
        For example, our pioneering work on sequencing the human genome
    helped not only to develop technologies and breakthroughs, but also to
    grow a unique bioscience base at the laboratory. Because we had
    developed this capability, in the aftermath of September 11 we were
    able to play a key role in analyzing DNA of anthrax samples from the
    mail attacks. We were able to determine that these samples came from
    the common Ames strain, which assisted in efforts to respond to and
    treat victims. With Livermore, we deployed a biological agent detection
    system at the Salt Lake City Olympics. The multi-spectral thermal
    imager (MTI) satellite, developed in a joint project with Sandia
    National Laboratories, was re-deployed to help analyze the destruction
    and the dispersal of potentially harmful debris from the attacks on the
    World Trade Center.
        We currently are working with Sandia to develop a critical
    infrastructure analysis capability, which derives from an innovative
    simulation and modeling approach originally developed for understanding
    and improving large-scale transportation networks. The National
    Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) will use this
    approach for government planning and analysis of vulnerabilities and
    responses to terrorist attacks.
        We have provided the Nation with our expertise and special
    equipment for over 25 years in addressing threats of stolen or
    improvised nuclear devices through our NEST teams that continue to
    serve today. We also have been working since the early 1990s to help
    secure vulnerable nuclear materials in Russia, and have supplied
    technologies for decades to help the International Atomic Energy Agency
    and other governments control nuclear materials.
    III. Laboratory Operations
        During the past year, we rigorously continued our efforts to
    integrate safety and security into our programmatic work. We have
    fortified our physical and cyber security, and have increased security
    still further since September 11. Our guard force is over 500, with a
    large contingent of SWAT teams; our defense against a terrorist attack
    has been significantly enhanced; our special nuclear materials are in a
    safe and secure configuration. Because of the rapid pace of change in
    technology, maintaining an appropriate level of support for cyber
    security will be critical to our ability to meet the challenges
    presented by this continuing threat.
        Laboratory safety performance has markedly improved compared to
    national benchmarks--total recordable incidents have decreased over the
    past 4 years from over 4.0 per 200,000 hours worked to less than 2.0
    this year. In the same time frame, lost work day cases have decreased
    from over 3.2 per 200,000 hours worked to 0.90. Waste generation and
    radiation exposures have all been significantly reduced, and we have
    moved some of our transuranic waste off site from Area G to WIPP,
    although I believe that the DOE could increase the priority to ship
    more waste.
        Project management improvements at Los Alamos continue to build on
    a strong foundation we established 3 years ago. We presently have three
    major construction projects that either have finished or will finish
    significantly ahead of schedule and under budget.
                     major challenges: ensuring the future
    I. Science: Achieving Program Balance
        The biggest challenge facing the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
    developing a balanced program within the budgets provided by Congress.
    The balance that must be struck is between warhead life extension
    programs, infrastructure maintenance and recapitalization, sustaining a
    preeminent capability in weapons-relevant science and experimentation,
    test readiness, and exploration of advanced concepts. The Future Years
    National Security Plan (FYNSP) that NNSA submitted to Congress this
    year is a good start toward providing a process for achieving this
    balance. At present, scientific investments needed to ensure that the
    next generation of weapons designers will be able to certify the
    stockpile in future decades are under stress due to the focus on the
    refurbishment of three weapons systems in the coming decade. The
    predictive assessment tools currently available to certify these
    planned LEPs are not yet adequate for the scope of these
    refurbishments. The addition of new production facilities, such as the
    Modern Pit Facility, will add to that stress unless the future year
    budgets accommodate such large expenditures.
    II. Threat Reduction
        NNSA, working with LANL and the other NNSA Laboratories, has had
    many successes with the existing Chemical and Biological National
    Security Program (CBNP), but the important research in this area needs
    to be expanded to include a broader range of biological threats. On the
    nuclear side of the equation, however, no CBNP-like program currently
    exists. Because of the threat posted by nuclear and radiological
    terrorism, we believe that creation of a broad-based nuclear threat
    program is critical to meeting the challenges in this area. A new
    program within NNSA could be modeled upon the already successful CBNP
    program. Lastly, in order to tie all of these activities together, I
    believe that NNSA should take on a major responsibility for homeland
    security research and development.
    III. Workforce
        A large number of personnel at Los Alamos are nearing retirement,
    and it is critical that we effect the transfer of technical and
    programmatic knowledge that they embody. We must attract and retain the
    next generation of stockpile stewards. We are planning to hire
    approximately 1,000 employees during fiscal year 2002--600 to meet
    workload requirements and 400 to address attrition. We are aggressively
    recruiting, and are strategically focusing these hiring efforts to
    attract 80 percent of new hires at the entry-level. To date, this
    fiscal year we have hired over 300 new employees. To attract the most
    outstanding scientists, engineers, technicians, and support personnel
    we must focus our efforts on sustaining and improving the quality of
    life for our employees. We must redouble our efforts in areas that
    impact our ability to attract and retain a diverse and high quality
    workforce--by ensuring that we retain our ability to pursue cutting
    edge science and research, by improving our infrastructure and
    facilities, and through a continued focus on and investment in
    education, the environment, and economic development.
        Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) is a key tool
    that I have available to help attract and retain the best scientists
    and engineers. LDRD is a well-managed program as indicated by a recent
    GAO audit of the program. I strongly recommend that Congress continue
    its strong support for LDRD. Continued support of the Los Alamos
    schools and Los Alamos National Laboratory Foundation also is key to
    employee recruiting and retention, as well as to education and economic
    development in the region.
    IV. Infrastructure
        We continue to experience deterioration of our infrastructure and
    facilities, which may serve to undermine our long-term ability to
    fulfill stockpile stewardship objectives. We have developed a Ten Year
    Comprehensive Site Plan that NNSA has approved as a guide for
    prioritizing maintenance and facility replacement at our site. In
    addition, I have chartered an external review of our facilities and
    infrastructure to determine where and how we might shrink our footprint
    for today's mission.
        In particular, we need your support for the replacement of our 50-
    year-old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building, which is
    planned for relocation within an Integrated Nuclear Complex at our TA-
    55 site. We strongly support General Gordon's 10 year Facilities and
    Infrastructure Revitalization Initiative. Congress provided an initial
    appropriation last year ($200 million), but this will continue to be a
    critical issue in fiscal year 2003 and the outyears. Without your
    continuing and strong support of this initiative, we will not be able
    to carry out either the manufacturing or certification efforts for the
    stockpile.

                                   CONCLUSION

        For more than a half a century, the Nation's investments in Los
    Alamos have helped ensure our National security. We face ongoing and
    new challenges--a new Nuclear Posture with fewer deployed nuclear
    weapons, certification of an aging stockpile without nuclear testing;
    the need for a balanced program ensuring science in our programmatic
    endeavors; and the need for new technologies to address non-
    proliferation, threat reduction and counter-terrorism. We are committed
    to meeting these challenges to our Nation's security.
        In conclusion, I would like to thank you for your past support.
    Your continued support is critical to our ability to meet the
    technically demanding and vital national security challenges we face
    today and in the future.
                                     ______

              Addendum to the Prepared Statement by John C. Browne

        The following information supplements the laboratory report
    submitted by Director John C. Browne of Los Alamos National Laboratory
    (LANL).
                             STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

        The purpose of the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is to
    maintain high confidence in the continued safety and reliability of the
    Nation's nuclear weapons arsenal without returning to underground
    nuclear testing. SSP consists of several integrated sets of activities:
    surveillance, life extension, manufacturing, design capability,
    infrastructure revitalization, workforce regeneration, and
    certification. Each of these depends on and contributes to the others
    and success requires that there be a reasonable balance among and
    between them--suggestions that the SSP should be skewed to place
    significantly more emphasis on one over the others put the overall
    success of SSP at risk.
        As the gap between the time when the last nuclear test was
    conducted and the date of each annual certification grows, our ability
    to successfully execute the stockpile stewardship mission becomes more
    difficult. We will not be able to do the job if we do not reverse the
    aging of our infrastructure or the aging of our workforce. Nor can we
    expect success if we do not systematically improve the scientific and
    technical tools and machines that allow weapons technical experts to
    advance their understanding through experimentation, computation, and
    simulation. These issues are discussed in greater detail below.
    Surveillance
        Surveillance occurs year-round on all weapons systems in the active
    stockpile, including the five systems for which Los Alamos is
    responsible: B61, W76, W78, W80, and W88. Its purpose is to identify
    indicators of existing, or impending, conditions that could impact
    safety, reliability, or performance, with the goal of developing a
    predictive capability. This is accomplished by using a suite of tests,
    including:

             Functional testing of selected components;
             Destructive analysis of components to identify defects
            or failures in individual nuclear and non-nuclear parts;
             Flight testing of warheads in which nuclear material
            has been removed and replaced with precision instrument
            packages that match the critical features of weight and moment
            of inertia; and
             Nondestructive evaluation of selected components.

        Results of these tests are combined with data collected over the
    life of each weapon system for analysis by nuclear weapons experts who
    use expert judgment to determine impacts. Defects from aging, design or
    production that are revealed through surveillance activities are
    formally addressed via ``significant finding investigations'' (SFI).
    Significant Finding Investigations
        SFIs are conducted in accordance with formal, NNSA-established
    protocols whenever a condition is found in a stockpiled weapon that
    does not meet the original weapon condition or design intent. Multi-
    disciplinary expert review teams begin by assessing the potential and
    immediate impacts of the identified condition. The results of this
    initial assessment determine the priority assigned to resolution of the
    SFI. Safety-related SFIs automatically receive top priority.
        On average, LANL conducts about 500 surveillance tests per year on
    weapons drawn from all stockpiled systems. We expect to conduct 650
    surveillance tests in fiscal year 2003. The number of weapons systems
    in the nuclear stockpile is the primary basis for selecting the level
    of surveillance activity; the number of individual weapons is a
    secondary consideration. Thus, surveillance activity is not projected
    to decline as a result of the Nuclear Posture Review and its goal to
    achieve significant reductions in the number of weapons in the nuclear
    stockpile.
        The ratio of SFIs in LANL-designed systems to surveillance tests
    since the end of underground nuclear testing is 65:5000. At the current
    time, LANL has 30 open SFIs, ranging in age from 1 to 65 months; none
    of these are safety-related. LANL's average time to complete and close
    an SFI is 34 months, depending on the extent to which large-scale
    experiments such as hydrodynamic tests or detailed computer simulations
    are required.
        SFI protocols provide a flexible, risk-based approach that assures
    immediate attention and highest priority for real or potential safety-
    related problems and provides that other SFIs will be prioritized with
    other ongoing SSP work. This approach assures the best use of available
    resources. Significant acceleration of the rate at which SFIs are
    completed and closed would require considerably increased funding, or
    significant reductions in funds currently devoted to other SSP work, or
    both. Absent specific evidence that the safety, reliability or expected
    performance of any stockpiled weapons system is in doubt, LANL would
    not advocate such acceleration.

                       STOCKPILE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

        Even in storage, nuclear weapons have dynamic properties that cause
    changes and deterioration of some parts and components over time. To
    address these changes and to assure continued safety and reliability,
    NNSA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Nuclear Weapons Council
    (NWC) have agreed on specific life extension programs for selected
    weapons systems.
        Two LANL-designed systems--the B61 and the W76--have been
    designated for life extension programs. Based on a process (Phase 6.X)
    that mimics the management framework for designing and building nuclear
    weapons and that was used by the DOE Office of Defense Programs (now
    NNSA/DP) for over 40 years, both systems will be refurbished.
        B61 LEP
        Refurbishment of the B61 Mods 7 and 11 canned subassemblies is
    scheduled to begin in 2006. A feasibility and cost study was authorized
    last year. Planning, risk assessment, scheduling and cost estimating
    are in progress at LANL; material tests are being performed at Y-12 and
    at Los Alamos. The Kansas City Plant will evaluate the manufacture of
    new components with substitute materials. The Certification Plan, Test
    and Evaluation Plan, and Weapon Design and Cost Report are scheduled to
    be released in July 2002. The B61 LEP is on track to meet its scheduled
    commitments.
        W76 LEP
        Extension of W76 warhead life through 2042 has been established by
    the Department of the Navy. A comprehensive evaluation of the condition
    and life expectancy of the materials in the nuclear explosives package
    has been completed. Engineering development was begun last year and
    will continue through production development and certification. LANL's
    W76 LEP is on track to meet its scheduled commitments.
    Manufacturing
        In addition to its responsibility for the B61 and W76 LEPs, LANL
    contributes to the overall sustainment for all nuclear weapons via
    various manufacturing activities. These include manufacture of
    beryllium parts in the new Beryllium Technology Facility at LANL, which
    was qualified last year and is the only such capability in the country.
    LANL also makes tritium-loaded neutron sources for Sandia National
    Laboratories and supplies detonators to the Kansas City Plant. LANL
    also is responsible for producing joint test assemblies (mock pits for
    field test devices) as well as packaging and transportation materials
    for shipping explosives components. All manufacturing commitments have
    been met on time and to specification; we expect to continue this level
    of performance in fiscal year 2003.
        The largest and highest priority manufacturing activity at LANL is
    pit manufacturing. LANL is on track to produce a certifiable pit for
    the W88 in 2003. ``Certifiable'' means that we can demonstrate that the
    pit has been fabricated according to design specifications, can be
    manufactured in a reproducible process, and that necessary quality
    systems are in place. Associated safety, security, and technical
    requirements are demanding. Specific processes include materials
    purification and alloying, machining, welding, and inspection. While we
    have made every effort to duplicate what was done in the original
    manufacture of pits at Rocky Flats, changes in environmental
    requirements and other factors have necessitated some modifications.
    More than 40 separate processes have to be documented and individually
    qualified.
        To date, LANL has produced 11 pits for engineering development and
    testing purposes. The production schedule for the remainder of the year
    will include 3 more pits, 19 hemi-shells for testing and analysis, 4
    subcritical components, and many small parts for certification.
        Pit manufacturing is a multi-purpose effort that is designed to:
    (a) reestablish the capability to manufacture plutonium pits in limited
    (10- to 20-year) quantities; (b) prototype processes and configurations
    for use in a Modern Pit Facility; and (c) produce replacement pits for
    those destructively tested in the annual surveillance of the W88
    system.
        Taken together, all manufacturing activities at Los Alamos make
    LANL the second largest production site in the NNSA complex.
    Certification
        LANL and Sandia National Laboratories jointly share the
    responsibility for continually assessing the safety and reliability of
    the nuclear weapons for which we are the joint design agencies.
    Annually, LANL and SNL issue annual assessment reports that summarize
    the laboratories' knowledge about the health of our warheads. These
    reports, in conjunction with the annual assessment letters issued by
    the President of SNL, and myself to the Secretaries of Energy and
    Defense, constitute the formal evaluation of the safety and reliability
    of the nuclear weapons in the Nation's stockpile. This annual
    certification is currently being accomplished without nuclear testing
    and represents one of the most technically challenging tasks ever
    assigned to the laboratories. Although there are no guarantees that
    certification without testing will always be possible, I am confident
    today that the warheads remain safe and reliable.
        A second certification responsibility that applies uniquely to LANL
    is the requirement to certify pits manufactured here. Pit certification
    involves three types of certification activities:

             Production certification--assurance that the pits are
            made according to design specifications;
             Engineering certification--assurance that the pit will
            endure the ``Stockpile-to-Target-Sequence environments''
            encountered during storage, handling, and delivery; and
             Physics certification--assurance that the pit will
            produce the required yield to perform its mission.

        Los Alamos has identified a series of laboratory and subcritical
    experiments that are designed to provide the necessary data, within the
    limits of non-nuclear tests that will allow our technical experts to
    certify the pit will perform as required. We have also obtained NNSA
    approval of a baseline change that will allow the certification date to
    move forward from 2009 to 2007.

                        WEAPON'S SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

        All of the foregoing accomplishments and potential for future
    achievements are attributable to and depend on the availability of a
    robust, continually advancing science and technology base. I am
    concerned that near-term and competing demands often appear to be more
    immediately urgent than new investments in science and technology and
    that the temptation to balance today's budgets by postponing such
    investments is often too great to resist. Three subjects are worth
    mentioning in particular:

             Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC);
             Hydrodynamic Testing (DARHT); and
             Proton Radiography (LANSCE, AHF)
    Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
        The ASC program is intended to provide via computation and
    simulation the types of information previously obtained via underground
    nuclear testing--although it must be noted that ASC is not and is not
    intended to be a substitute to replace all testing. The objective of
    the program, which is a joint effort among the three NNSA Laboratories,
    is to provide by fiscal year 2005 validated 3-D, high-fidelity physics,
    full-system simulation codes required for engineering, safety and
    performance analysis of the stockpile.
        At all three laboratories, we continue to make rapid advances in
    our ability to simulate nuclear explosions more quickly and with
    greatly increased detail. Earlier this year, LANL completed its first
    3-D simulation of a full nuclear weapon system explosion. The
    calculation was run remotely from Los Alamos on the ``White'' machine
    at Livermore Laboratory. In about 4 months of around-the-clock
    computing, the simulation used more than 480 million cells on 1,920 of
    the White machine's 8,000 plus processors. Actual time on the central
    processing unit was the equivalent to computing continuously on a high-
    end home computer for more than 750 years. This first-ever 3-D
    simulation represents significant advances in visualization techniques
    as well as in computing power.
        The ultimate objective of the ASC program is a 100-teraflop machine
    which we believe is necessary to provide timely weapon system
    simulations for the weapons design community. The next step beyond the
    White machine at Livermore is acquisition and installation of the 30-
    teraflop ``Q'' machine at LANL, which is currently underway.
    Hydrodynamic Testing and DARHT
        The most critical component of a nuclear weapon is the primary.
    Hydrodynamic tests--non-yield experiments that measure implosion
    characteristics--enable us to examine and more fully understand primary
    performance.
        To date, one axis of the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
    (DARHT) facility has been completed and the second axis is scheduled
    for completion at the end of calendar year 2002. Commissioning of the
    second axis will take place during fiscal year 2003 and the full 2-axis
    capability will become available in fiscal year 2004. LANL has
    successfully operated the first axis for experimental purposes while
    continuing construction on the second axis, thus capitalizing on the
    initial investment of taxpayer dollars before the entire facility has
    been completed.
        Using a single axis, DARHT has enabled us to image hydrodynamic
    tests with unprecedented resolution and clarity. The second axis will
    enable stereoscopic and time-sequenced views of hydrodynamic
    experiments, which are vital to supporting life extension programs, W88
    pit certification, and validation of new modeling tools for simulating
    weapons safety and reliability. We expect that DARHT will be the
    primary test facility for the Stockpile Stewardship Program for the
    coming decade.
        Eventually, however, advanced radiography capabilities will be
    needed to address future challenges of stockpile stewardship and to
    train and qualify the next generation of weapons designers who will be
    the first generation required to certify the nuclear stockpile having
    had no direct nuclear test experience.
    Proton Radiography, LANSCE, and AHF
        In a no-test environment, high-fidelity radiographic motion
    pictures of hydrodynamic tests will be the next best means of
    understanding weapon performance. The most promising technology--
    developed by scientists at Los Alamos via the Laboratory Directed
    Research and Development (LDRD) program--is proton radiography.
        Proton radiography is already an operational tool at the Los Alamos
    Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and has been used to make quantitative
    measurements of high explosive and other weapon relevant material
    behavior under extreme dynamic conditions. The capability is used by
    weapon designers and by other research collaborators on a variety of
    science undertakings. Proton radiography has already provided data that
    has influenced stockpile decisions. Its availability supports and
    strengthens LANSCE as the laboratory's flagship user research facility.
        LANSCE just completed one of its most successful and productive
    running periods, operating with greater than 90 percent availability, 7
    days/week, 24 hours/day. This rate of availability allowed LANSCE to
    support more than 200 experiments and over 300 users. In this respect,
    LANSCE is a key element in LANL's efforts to provide the intellectual
    capital that we will need over the next decade. By providing an
    exciting experimental tool to address basic science and stockpile
    issues, we are continuing to attract early-career scientists who bring
    fresh approaches to LANL's mission and related tasks. Historically,
    LANSCE has been the entry point for over 1,000 of our scientific and
    technical personnel.
        Advancing radiographic capabilities to accurately image
    hydrodynamic experiments with sufficient detail to address long-term
    certification and assessment requirements is critical. A high-
    resolution radiographic motion picture of a hydrodynamic test provides
    us with a means of understanding weapon implosions. Data obtained from
    these experiments will provide the strongest technical justification
    for determining nuclear weapon performance, short of a nuclear test.
    High-energy proton beams delivered with flexible time-sequencing (tens
    of pulses) will provide an unprecedented capability to directly image
    very thick complicated geometries of surrogate weapon configurations.
    The most promising technology for establishing this capability through
    the creation of an Advanced Hydrodynamic Facility (AHF) is based on
    high-energy protons. Current efforts are underway to evolve the
    technically essential tool of radiography based on the current x-ray
    facilities to an AHF based on protons. This work is essential to ensure
    that this critical prediction validation and precision design tool can
    be developed to maintain future nuclear-weapon expertise. An AHF
    designed to address design physics requirements in the 2015-2020
    timeframe must be started soon. The Nation's investment in this area is
    both prudent and timely.

                     THREAT REDUCTION AND HOMELAND SECURITY

        For decades, the U.S. has invested in tools to respond to a nuclear
    accident or guard against a surreptitious nuclear weapon threat and has
    provided help to the International Atomic Energy Agency and other
    governments to safeguard and control nuclear materials. Since the early
    1990s, we have helped secure vulnerable nuclear materials in Russia.
    Dating to the early 1980s, LANL has conducted research in biological
    sciences--research initially supported via LDRD funding--which led
    directly to our ability, post-September 11, to support deployment of
    the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS) system,
    developed with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and to
    provide forensic expertise in analyzing anthrax samples. Obviously,
    these efforts have taken on new and urgent priority since September 11.
        NNSA has unique expertise, resident at Los Alamos, Lawrence
    Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories, in nuclear, chemical, and
    biological technologies. That expertise has a long and successful
    history of supporting the intelligence community. In light of the new
    priorities and challenges following September 11, I believe that the
    NNSA Laboratories can and should play a central role in providing the
    science and technology for countering the terrorist threat and
    protecting the U.S. and its allies against weapons of mass destruction.
    Three key near-term challenges are particularly suitable for NNSA
    laboratory attention:

             Preventing and responding to threats of nuclear
            terrorism;
             Detecting and countering biological weapons; and
             Analyzing and protecting the Nation's critical
            infrastructure.

        Programs already are underway in all of these areas, including our
    work in biological research and in the National Infrastructure Security
    Analysis Center (NISAC), which we are conducting in cooperation with
    Sandia National Laboratories.
        Tightly controlling nuclear and radioactive materials continues to
    be the key to preventing terrorists or rogue states from creating
    radioactive dispersal devices--so-called ``dirty bombs''--or nuclear
    weapons. The demonstrated global reach of terrorists and states that
    sponsor terrorism and their interest in weapons of mass destruction
    call for enhanced protection and management of nuclear and radioactive
    material inventories.
        The goal of a strong, integrated, NNSA-led program is a global web
    of protection that:

             Ensures nuclear and radioactive materials are
            protected from theft and misuse;
             Responds to thefts of materials and threats involving
            nuclear and radioactive materials;
             Interdicts illicit trafficking in nuclear and
            radioactive materials;
             Detects and responds to non-nuclear-weapon states'
            attempts to produce or acquire materials for nuclear weapons
            programs;
             Promotes responsible management of existing military
            and civilian nuclear and radioactive material inventories; and
             Provides international confidence in the global
            systems of protection and control.

        We should seriously consider a specifically defined role for the
    NNSA and its laboratories as principal R&D support to reducing the
    threat and securing our homeland from terrorists and their potential to
    use weapons of mass destruction whether nuclear, chemical or
    biological, against us. A streamlined, integrated approach to funding
    and program development that would ensure needed state-of-the-art
    technologies and a longer-term R&D program to address future
    contingencies would contribute significantly to our ability to
    effectively counter terrorist threats.

              LABORATORY DIRECTED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (LDRD)

        The LDRD program enhances the scientific and technical capabilities
    of national laboratories to meet long-term science and technology needs
    of the Nation. This means being able to explore new developments in all
    relevant areas of science quickly and develop ideas that eventually
    serve the policy objectives of the Federal Government. Throughout the
    history of the LDRD program the laboratory has focused a significant
    portion of these resources on important scientific questions that
    underpin our nuclear weapons mission. LDRD investments have produced
    innovations essential to the ability of the laboratories to continue to
    accomplish our long-term programmatic missions. The program has a clear
    reputation for attracting high-caliber staff needed to meet the science
    and engineering challenges of stockpile stewardship, reducing the
    threat of weapons of mass destruction, homeland defense, and other
    missions. LDRD advances the frontiers of knowledge in scientific fields
    vital to the laboratories' missions, future, and effectiveness in
    serving the Nation. Some examples of success and clear benefit follow.
        In the absence of testing for nuclear weapons, more detailed
    knowledge is needed on nuclear and other key materials contained in
    weapons systems in order to better understand how they age. We recently
    invested in work exploring issues such as the interactions of a
    plutonium surface with its surrounding environment. Such studies help
    us understand what might happen as a weapon ages, and also inform us
    about better ways to store nuclear materials or even to clean up
    environmental legacies from the Cold War. In addition, we have
    identified opportunities for additional research on nuclear materials
    and their properties, based on novel experimental approaches and new
    capabilities in materials modeling. The investment in these research
    topics does and will have direct impact on our ability to perform our
    mission.
        In the area of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD), the Nation faces potentially devastating new weapons
    systems based on chemical or biological weapons. LANL is seeking ways
    to detect the development or use of such weapons. Several new ideas
    have been proposed and funded to explore fundamental science and
    technology needed to combat the development and use of WMD. For
    example, researchers are exploring the fundamental mechanisms that
    produce virulence in pathogens. Understanding these mechanisms should
    enable us to design new sensors for rapid and early detection of the
    use of biological weapons.

                    FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVE

        The entire nuclear weapons complex managed by the DOE/NNSA--the
    production plants and laboratories--is faced with serious aging
    problems that threaten our ability to carry out the stockpile
    stewardship mission. To continue to work effectively on these DOE/NNSA
    missions, our laboratory needs outstanding scientists and engineers
    working in state-of-the-art facilities. Our facilities have badly
    deteriorated buildings, roads, sewer systems; electrical power grid and
    other critical infrastructure are approaching 50 years old and are
    crumbling at an alarming rate. A dedicated and enduring revitalization
    effort is crucial for the long-term viability of this laboratory and
    the weapons complex as a whole.
        We believe that there are three distinct areas that must be
    addressed in order to ensure infrastructure sustainability to meet our
    mission. Those three areas include: implementing formal facilities
    consolidation efforts and cost reduction initiatives; addressing high-
    priority facility maintenance backlogs; and investing in new
    construction projects, where appropriate and economically feasible.
    Each of these areas requires commitments to achieve positive results.
    Each area addresses safety and security needs and allows laboratory
    facilities to be sustainable over the next 20 to 40 years.
        Ten or more years ago, the long-term outlook for the nuclear
    weapons complex and budget was uncertain, but the requirement to ensure
    the safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrent remains.
    During this period, Los Alamos and much of the rest of the nuclear
    weapons complex sacrificed continual reinvestment for the future in
    favor of short-term operational needs. With existing operating funds,
    we have been able to complete some urgent maintenance at our aging
    facilities, but this only scratches the surface. Only the utmost top-
    priority issues have been addressed, while the backlog of unfunded
    maintenance continues to grow as facilities age. The demands placed on
    the safety and security infrastructure from increased regulation and
    oversight have also stressed our resources. We are still running many
    buildings to failure.
        We strongly support General Gordon's 10-year Facilities and
    Infrastructure Revitalization Initiative. Congress provided an initial
    down payment last year, but continued support is critical in fiscal
    year 2003 and beyond. Without continuing and strong support of this
    initiative, we will not be able to carry out either the manufacturing
    or certification efforts for the stockpile. Furthermore, we request
    your strong support for General Gordon's Five Year Defense Plan for
    NNSA at a level that can support the growing requirements and need for
    development of new tools and experimental facilities for certification
    of an aging stockpile.
                                     ______

                     Prepared Statement by C. Paul Robinson

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
    you for the opportunity to submit this statement. I am Paul Robinson,
    director of Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is managed and
    operated for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the
    U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by Sandia Corporation, a subsidiary of
    the Lockheed Martin Corporation.
        Sandia National Laboratories is one of the three NNSA Laboratories
    with research and development responsibility for nuclear weapons.
    Sandia's job is the design, development, qualification, and
    certification of nearly all of the non-nuclear subsystems of nuclear
    warheads. Our responsibilities include arming, fuzing, and firing
    systems; safety, security, and use-control systems; engineering support
    for production and dismantlement of nuclear weapons; field support to
    the military; and surveillance and support of weapons in stockpile. We
    perform substantial work in programs closely related to nuclear
    weapons, including intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty
    verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory,
    Sandia also conducts research and development for DOE's energy and
    science offices, as well as work for other national security agencies
    when our special capabilities can make significant contributions.
        I will begin my statement by reviewing highlights of Sandia's
    recent accomplishments in the nuclear weapons program and other
    national security programs, including Sandia's contributions to
    homeland security and the war on terrorism. I will then discuss issues
    of concern to Sandia in fiscal year 2003 and address in detail Sandia's
    responsibilities in NNSA's stockpile stewardship and nonproliferation
    missions. Before concluding, I will comment on the NNSA Administrator's
    governance initiative for improving the NNSA-contractor relationship.

                  HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT SANDIA ACCOMPLISHMENTS

        The NNSA Laboratories accomplished much during fiscal year 2001.
    The investment the Nation makes in these unique institutions yields
    valuable results for national security.
        At Sandia National Laboratories, we perform our scientific and
    engineering work with the mission in mind--never solely for its own
    sake. Even the fundamental scientific work that we do (and we do a
    great deal of it) is strategic for our mission needs. Sandia's
    management philosophy has always stressed the ultimate linkage of
    research to application.
        We sometimes hear the phrase ``science-based engineering'' to
    describe our approach, but this term is really a solecism: Engineering
    is inherently scientific and cannot be practiced with excellence unless
    it is deeply integrated with its supporting sciences and employs
    scientific methodology. When someone refers to Sandia as ``the Nation's
    premier engineering laboratory,'' that statement does not tell the
    whole story: We are a science and engineering laboratory with a focus
    on developing technical solutions to the most challenging problems that
    threaten peace and freedom.
        Sandia's unique philosophy of research and development--which
    derives from its heritage of 50 years under industrial management--
    yields significant results for its sponsors. I will briefly highlight
    some of the outstanding achievements from our work portfolio of fiscal
    year 2001 in the areas of nuclear weapon activities, nuclear
    nonproliferation, homeland security, and combating terrorism.
    Salient Accomplishments in Weapons Activities
        Sandia completed work to qualify the B61-11 earth-penetrating bomb
    as meeting all requirements, resulting in its acceptance as a standard
    stockpile item. We made alterations to enhance the safety and security
    of all B61 bombs at field locations. In recognizing the efforts of the
    B61-11 certification team, the Commander in Chief of Strategic Command
    cited the weapon's many advantages over the retired B53-1 bomb.
        Similarly, we concluded a 3-year testing and evaluation program
    resulting in acceptance of the Alt. 342 W87 Life Extension Program
    warhead for the Air Force by the Nuclear Weapons Council as a standard
    stockpile item.
        A significant milestone in directed stockpile work in fiscal year
    2001 was our progress in redesigning the integrated arming, fuzing, and
    firing system (AF&F) for the W76 warhead for the Trident missile. We
    recently completed the redesign of a Joint Test Assembly for the W76,
    which will be used to periodically assess the conformance of the de-
    nuclearized version of the actual war-reserve warhead.
        Sandia played a major role on the NNSA's B83 Systems Engineering
    Group, which completed development of Alt. 355 for the B83 modern
    strategic bomb. Alt. 355 is a near-term field retrofit kit that
    incorporates design modifications to certain hardware.
        We completed the Warhead Simulator Package for the Type 3E Trainer
    for the B61-4 bomb. The Warhead Simulator Package simulates the
    electrical functionality of the real war-reserve weapon. The new
    trainer allows military personnel to realistically practice lock/unlock
    and arming/safing operations without exposing a real nuclear weapon to
    vulnerabilities. The first production unit of the trainer has been
    delivered.
        Sandia has major responsibility in nuclear weapon use-control
    systems, which are designed to allow arming of the warhead by national
    command authority only. We completed a 4 year, full-scale, code
    management system engineering project, which delivers a significant
    security enhancement to weapon code operations in Europe. The system
    enables recoding of nuclear weapons in a fully encrypted manner and
    greatly simplifies use and logistics.
        We have also achieved many important advances in the science and
    engineering campaigns that enable our successes in directed stockpile
    work, including radiation-hardened microelectronics, above-ground
    experimental physics, and advanced simulation and computation.
    Accomplishments in Nuclear Nonproliferation
        Preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials or weapons to
    dangerous regimes or terror groups has become a matter of great
    urgency. NNSA's role in nonproliferation is acknowledged in its mission
    statement: ``To strengthen United States security through the military
    application of nuclear energy and by reducing the global threat from
    terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.'' Sandia's recent
    contributions have strengthened this effort.
        As nuclear fuel reprocessing is adopted by more nations, the
    proliferation risk associated with fissile materials increases. To
    evaluate the risk, Sandia developed a proliferation analysis
    methodology for quantifying the proliferation resistance of nuclear
    power production fuel cycles. The methodology uses the tools of
    probabilistic risk assessment to identify proliferation pathways for
    various definitions of proliferators.
        NNSA's ``Second Line of Defense'' (SLD) program for the security of
    fissile materials provides consultation to customs agencies to combat
    trafficking of nuclear material across international borders. In 2001
    we assisted 26 site surveys performed at Russian airports, seaports,
    railroad checkpoints, and border crossings to evaluate strategies for
    minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. These site
    surveys included the deployment and acceptance of systems installed at
    eight Russian Federation State Customs Committee facilities to detect
    and deter illicit movements of nuclear materials out of Russia. The
    program has been successful and is growing to include other countries.
        Also with Russia, after 4 years of negotiation and collaboration
    with the All Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), we
    kicked off a joint facility-to-facility remote monitoring project in
    June 2001. The project will evaluate advanced fissile material
    monitoring and communications technologies in a bilateral verification
    regime.
        Sandia is responsible for satellite-based sensors for detecting
    nuclear detonations in the atmosphere. We developed a new space-to-
    ground communication path for monitoring Nuclear Detection System
    sensors onboard the Department of Defense Global Positioning System
    (GPS) satellites. The launch of a GPS satellite equipped with the
    Nuclear Detonation Detection System Analysis Package in January 2001
    significantly enhanced the Nation's ability to detect nuclear
    detonations occurring anywhere in the earth's atmosphere.
    Contributions to Homeland Security and the War Against Terrorism
        Like most Americans, the people of Sandia National Laboratories
    responded to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, with newfound
    resolve on both a personal and professional level. As a result of our
    own strategic planning and the foresight of many sponsors to invest
    resources toward emerging threats, Sandia was in a position to
    immediately address some urgent needs.
        For example, by September 15, a small Sandia team had instrumented
    the K-9 rescue units at the World Trade Center site to allow the dogs
    to enter spaces inaccessible to humans while transmitting live video
    and audio to their handlers. This relatively low-tech but timely
    adaptation was possible because of previous work we had done for the
    National Institute of Justice on instrumenting K-9 units for SWAT
    situations.
        You may not be aware that a decontamination formulation developed
    by Sandia chemists was one of the processes used to help eliminate
    anthrax in the Hart, Dirksen, and Ford buildings on Capitol Hill, and
    at contaminated sites in New York and in the Postal Service. Sandia
    developed the non-toxic formulation as a foam and licensed it for
    industrial production.
        Sandia engineers worked around-the-clock to modify the ``Steel
    Eagle,'' air-dropped, unattended ground sensor for deployment in
    Afghanistan. Originally designed under sponsorship of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency in the 1990s to identify mobile missile launchers,
    we modified the system to detect light trucks and armored vehicles. The
    sensors can be deployed from F-15E, F-16, and Predator unmanned
    aircraft.
        Speaking of the Predator, this unmanned aerial vehicle has gained
    recognition for its ability to capture and transmit in real time high-
    quality radar images of terrain, structures, and moving vehicles
    through clouds and in day or night conditions. You may perhaps not be
    aware that the advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability on
    the Predator was substantially developed by Sandia National
    Laboratories. We began working on miniature radars based on synthetic
    aperture concepts in 1983 in the nuclear weapons program. In 1985 we
    became involved in a special-access program for the Department of
    Defense (DOD) to develop a one-foot-resolution, real-time SAR suitable
    for use in unmanned aircraft. Sandia flew the first real-time, one-
    foot-resolution, SAR prototype in 1990. Follow-on work sponsored by DOD
    continued to improve the system, and a partnership with an industrial
    firm, which shared program costs, transitioned the technology into the
    field-deployable systems used in Afghanistan.
        In addition to our contributions to the military toolbox for
    counter-terrorism, Sandia has responded to urgent needs in the arena of
    homeland security. An array of devices invented by explosives experts
    at Sandia have proved to be effective for safely disarming several
    types of terrorist bombs. For the past several years, our experts have
    conducted training for police bomb squads around the country in the
    techniques for using these devices for safe bomb disablement. The shoe
    bombs that Richard Reid allegedly tried to detonate onboard a trans-
    Atlantic flight from Paris to Miami were surgically disabled with an
    advanced bomb-squad tool originally developed at Sandia. That device,
    which we licensed to industry, has become the primary tool used by bomb
    squads nationwide to remotely disable handmade terrorist bombs while
    preserving them for forensic analysis.
        Detecting explosives in vehicles is a major concern at airports,
    military bases, government facilities, and border crossings. We have
    developed and successfully tested a prototype vehicle portal that
    detects minute amounts of common explosives. The system uses a Sandia-
    patented sample collection and preconcentrator technology that had
    previously been licensed to industry for use in screening airline
    passengers for trace amounts of explosives. The Technical Support
    Working Group and DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security funded this
    research.
        Sandia is a partner with Argonne National Laboratory in the PROTECT
    program (Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for
    Chemical/Biological Terrorism), jointly funded by DOE and the
    Department of Justice. PROTECT's goal is to demonstrate systems to
    protect against chemical attacks in public facilities, such as subways
    and airports. For more than a year, a Sandia-designed chemical detector
    test bed has been operating in the Washington, DC Metro. The system can
    rapidly detect the presence of a chemical agent and transmit readings
    to an emergency management information system. We successfully
    completed a demonstration of the PROTECT system at a single station on
    the Washington Metro. The program has since been funded to accelerate
    deployment in multiple metro stations. DOE has also been requested to
    implement a PROTECT system for the Metropolitan Boston Transit
    Authority.
        Another major worry for homeland security is the potential for acts
    of sabotage against municipal water supplies. In cooperation with the
    American Water Works Association Research Foundation and the
    Environmental Protection Agency, Sandia developed a security risk
    assessment methodology for city water utilities. This tool has been
    employed to evaluate security and mitigate risks at several large water
    utilities. We have used similar methodologies to evaluate risks for
    other critical infrastructures such as nuclear power-generation plants
    and chemical storage sites.
        These and other contributions to homeland security and the war
    against terror are possible because of early investment in the
    capabilities that were needed to respond to emerging threats. The
    outstanding technology base supported by NNSA for its core missions is
    the primary source of this capability. We also made strategic decisions
    to invest laboratory-directed research and development funds (LDRD) in
    the very things that we knew were urgent needs: items to the
    Afghanistan theater, the decontamination foam, the sensors we have
    deployed, and special-purpose robotics that we have developed. In
    addition, requests for Sandia services from Federal agencies other than
    DOE for work in emerging areas of need have increased. Approximately 28
    percent of our total laboratory operating budget is provided by Federal
    agencies other than DOE.

                        BUDGET-RELATED ISSUES OF CONCERN

        Sandia National Laboratories is very busy with work for its core
    mission responsibilities in nuclear weapon stockpile stewardship. We
    have a substantial workload of life extension programs for stockpiled
    systems that requires refurbishment or complete re-design of electronic
    subsystems and other components. In addition, the responsibility for
    stockpile certification as weapons age is an ongoing challenge that
    engages our science and engineering campaigns.
        Significant changes will be required to weapon systems that are
    scheduled to remain in the deployed stockpile or responsive force for
    decades. This workload is not materially affected by the recent Nuclear
    Posture Review. Life extension activities require substantial resources
    of people and facilities. In addition, several studies \1\ have
    repeatedly shown that the infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex
    has eroded significantly and needs refurbishment. These and other
    requirements will demand their share of resources from a program that I
    described last year as ``wound too tight.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study; Complex 21;
    Defense Programs Phase I and II Maintenance Studies; Energy Federal
    Contractor Organization Group Study; Office of Secretary of Defense
    Program Analysis and Evaluation Review; Stockpile Stewardship Program
    30-Day Review; DOE Inspector General's Defense Programs Production
    Facilities Assessment; Fiscal Year 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to
    Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States
    Nuclear Stockpile (Foster Report).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In an effort to relax this tension, the Defense Programs
    laboratories worked closely with NNSA during the last several months to
    create a multiyear plan to prioritize and integrate programmatic needs
    within a defensible appropriations profile. The funding levels of the
    multiyear estimates in that plan reflect our consensus estimate of
    resource requirements under the guidance provided by Presidential
    directives, DOD requirements, and the recent Nuclear Posture Review.
    The plan is a significant milestone inasmuch as NNSA has for the first
    time outlined a multiyear planning basis agreement with the
    administration. With careful management, we believe that NNSA's major
    deliverables can be completed within the Future Years National Security
    Plan schedule and budget profile.
        The fiscal year 2003 budget request is generally consistent with
    NNSA's Future Years National Security Plan, and it should provide
    adequate resources for Sandia National Laboratories to meet its mission
    obligations as currently defined. Four issues of concern to Sandia that
    I would like to bring to your attention are: the Microsystems and
    Engineering Sciences Application (MESA) Complex; the refurbishment of
    NNSA's Z Accelerator; a joint Air Force/NNSA initiative in advanced
    physical security research and development for nuclear weapons; and the
    problem of cyber security against sophisticated network attacks.
    Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Application (MESA) Complex
        Sandia's Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA)
    complex is the cornerstone of our initiative to address the need for
    microelectronics and integrated microsystems to support a certifiable
    stockpile for the future.
        Microelectronic components are critical to the NNSA Defense
    Programs mission. Several key components in deployed nuclear weapons
    will need to be replaced within the decade. In most cases, components
    cannot be replaced with replicas of the originals because they are
    technologically obsolete and the supplier base, materials, and design
    tools to support them no longer exist. Moreover, competent designers
    would not elect to use decades-old electronic technology, even if it
    were available. Sandia has little choice but to meet component
    replacement needs using the latest microsystem technologies.
        In addition, Sandia has a requirement to preserve critical
    competencies in radiation-hardened microelectronics for defense and
    space hardware. In accordance with the congressional mandate for a
    national defense electronics partnership,\2\ Sandia retains the
    capability for radiation-hardening technology and sustains a supporting
    infrastructure for developing and producing radiation-hardened
    microelectronics. MESA will provide the infrastructure to meet that
    mandate for future decades.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 105th Congress, 1st Session, National Defense Authorization Act
    For Fiscal Year 1998, Report 105-29 to Accompany S. 924, June 17, 1997.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am pleased to report that the preliminary engineering design
    (Title I engineering) of the MESA complex has been completed and that
    final engineering design (Title II engineering) is well underway. We
    are working hard to bring this facility into operation on a schedule
    that would allow it to contribute to the scheduled stockpile
    refurbishment programs approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council and
    supported by the Department of Defense, but it is not yet clear whether
    that will be possible.
    Z Accelerator Refurbishment
        NNSA's Z Accelerator at Sandia National Laboratories has proved to
    be an important and unique asset for the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
    Still the world's most powerful and energetic source of x-rays,\3\ Z
    supports NNSA campaigns in nuclear weapon primaries and secondaries,
    dynamic materials, nuclear survivability, and inertial confinement
    fusion. Moreover, the recent demonstration of short-pulse, high-power
    \4\ lasers and the installation of the Z-Beamlet laser at Sandia has
    created the opportunity to cost-effectively explore new mission
    applications, including advanced radiography of laboratory experiments
    for stockpile stewardship, the fast ignition inertial confinement
    fusion concept, and the science of materials under extreme conditions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Power: 230 trillion watts. Energy: 1.6 megajoules.
        \4\ On the order of 1015 (thousand trillion) watts, or ``petawatt''
    (PW).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Pending the completion of the National Ignition Facility, Z will
    continue for many years to be the most capable U.S. facility for
    producing the high-energy-density environments required for studying
    the phenomenology of nuclear explosives. A refurbishment project to
    replace aging components and increase the capability of Z by over 50
    percent was initiated with an appropriation of $10 million in fiscal
    year 2002. Those incremental funds allowed us to address a backlog of
    experimental requests in this current operating year.
    Physical Security Research and Development
        For the past three decades, Sandia National Laboratories has made
    unique contributions to both the Department of Energy and the
    Department of Defense for the security of nuclear weapons. Currently,
    both NNSA and the Air Force have designated Sandia as their weapon
    security systems engineer.\5\ Sandia is assisting the NNSA's Defense
    Nuclear Security Office in assessing and engineering security systems
    so that there is consistency in the approach used for security across
    all NNSA facilities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Through the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Security and the
    USAF Force Protection Command and Control System Program Office,
    Electronic Systems Center (ESC).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Both NNSA and USAF maintain high security for the nuclear weapons,
    materials, or facilities under their control, and they have steadily
    improved security during the past two decades. I am confident that the
    recent allegations that security may be lax at NNSA nuclear weapon
    facilities are incorrect. However, we must not be satisfied with the
    status quo. NNSA and DOD are responding to the increased terrorist
    threat by examining how security systems can be significantly enhanced
    with new technology. Numerous upgrades at Air Force nuclear weapon
    sites are under consideration. Unfortunately, those upgrades may be
    forced to employ older technology that is actually more expensive and
    offers less capability. Just as new technology has revolutionized war-
    fighting, so it offers an opportunity for a similar revolution in
    security systems.
        Past investments by DOE in Sandia's security systems research and
    development program have yielded crucial technology for the protection
    of DOE and DOD nuclear assets. In recent years, Sandia's extensive
    security expertise has been widely sought by other Federal agencies and
    public entities, including, for example, the Secret Service, the
    Department of Defense, State and Federal prison systems, Dade County in
    Florida, many public school systems, the National Institute of Justice
    (in support of local law enforcement), and the 2002 Winter Olympic
    Games.
        A robust program of security research and development can adapt new
    technological capabilities for security applications. We have proposed
    a joint Air Force/NNSA research and development program in nuclear
    weapon security technology, to be established under the leadership of
    Sandia National Laboratories. Such a program will result in greater
    protection for our nuclear weapons and, ultimately, reduced security
    operational costs. We anticipate joint annual funding by the Air Force
    and NNSA to raise the existing programmatic effort at Sandia to the
    level required for this initiative.
    Cyber Security
        During the past several years, Sandia has experienced an increase
    in the level, intensity, and sophistication of network attacks directed
    against our computer resources. We have significant concerns about the
    ability of any cyber security system to withstand the very
    sophisticated attacks that are emerging. These developments cause us to
    worry that the sophistication of these threats are growing at a faster
    rate than we are able to respond in hardening our systems against
    intrusions. This remains one of my most critical concerns.

                               WEAPONS ACTIVITIES

        At Sandia, weapons activities include directed stockpile work,
    campaigns to advance the scientific and engineering capabilities
    required for weapons qualification and certification, and readiness
    programs for NNSA's technology base, facilities, and infrastructure.
    Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review
        The Secretary of Defense released the NPR in January. It was
    conducted in response to a congressional request to lay out the
    direction for American nuclear forces for the next 10 years. The full
    implications of the NPR will not be known until the final configuration
    and schedule for the Nation's nuclear arsenal is worked out. However,
    the NPR calls for sustaining a responsive nuclear force and maintaining
    a robust and responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure for the long
    term. It is clear that any savings that may result from the NPR will
    not be realized for many years.
        The NPR calls for reducing operationally deployed nuclear weapons
    to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade. Most warheads
    that will be removed from the operationally deployed stockpile will be
    maintained as a ``responsive force'' in case of a major change in the
    global security environment. The intent is to maintain the warheads of
    the responsive force in a condition that would permit them to be
    redeployed in a matter of weeks or months. Consequently, warheads in
    the responsive force will require a level of maintenance and
    surveillance not substantially different from that required for
    deployed systems. Their limited-life components will need periodic
    replacement, and their electronic subsystems will have to be upgraded
    so as not to become obsolete with the passage of time.
        Thus, the warheads of the responsive force will require life
    extension activities similar to what they would receive if they were in
    the active stockpile. Only one warhead, the W62, is proposed to be
    retired. The NPR calls for retiring the Peacekeeper (MX) inter-
    continental ballistic missile, but the relatively modern W87 warhead on
    that system will be retained as a replacement for the aging W62 on the
    Minuteman III. The B61 and B83 bombs also will be retained and may
    require modifications.
        The NPR also calls for NNSA to improve its test readiness program
    for contingent resumption of underground nuclear testing. Adhering to
    the test moratorium continues to be U.S. policy, but should a need to
    test arise, the current preparation time of 2 to 3 years is considered
    unacceptable.
        In summary, I do not expect the Nuclear Posture Review to
    materially impact the workload of Sandia National Laboratories in
    stockpile stewardship in the next several years.
    Directed Stockpile Work
        Directed Stockpile Work encompasses all activities that directly
    support specific weapons in the nuclear stockpile. Those activities
    include current maintenance and day-to-day care as well as planned
    refurbishments. This work includes research, development, engineering,
    and qualification activities in direct support of each weapon type both
    in the present and future. Directed Stockpile Work maintains a balanced
    effort of near-term weapon activities and long-term research and
    development supported by campaigns.
        Stockpile Research and Development
        Stockpile Research and Development includes the engineering
    development and exploratory research and development to support near-
    and long-term requirements of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This
    activity includes development of new weapon designs when needed and
    authorized, preproduction design and engineering activities, design and
    development of weapon modifications, and safety studies and
    assessments.
        Specific focal areas anticipated for the next 2 fiscal years
    include support for system studies, mutual defense agreements, and
    U.S./foreign weapon cooperative safety exchanges; development of
    specified components and subsystems; improved engineering business
    practices and information systems; modernized flight test assemblies
    and instrumentation; refurbishment of several enduring stockpile
    systems; and continued vigilance through exploration of future system
    concepts.
        Engineering Development. The bulk of the engineering development
    planned in stockpile research and development will support life-
    extension refurbishments. The objective of the stockpile life extension
    effort is to improve and extend the safety and reliability of U.S.
    nuclear weapons 20 to 30 years by upgrading or replacing components and
    subsystems rather than entire warheads. Sandia has been identified by
    NNSA to be the systems integrator for refurbishments.
        Two refurbishment programs are in the engineering development
    phase: the W76/ Mark 4 (Trident), with a first production date of
    fiscal year 2007; and the W80 warhead for Air Force and Navy cruise
    missiles, with scheduled first production in 2006. We are also engaged
    in a study of technical feasibility and cost for possible refurbishment
    of the B61 strategic bomb, with first production in fiscal year 2004.
    These refurbishments will replace critical components to ensure decades
    of life extension.
        Exploratory Research and Development. Sandia's advanced warhead
    concepts group participates with similar teams at the other Defense
    Programs laboratories and NNSA headquarters to assess nuclear weapon
    modernization options for emerging military requirements under the
    advanced concepts initiative headed by NNSA. DOD and NNSA jointly
    review requirements and identify opportunities for further study.
        Stockpile Maintenance
        Sandia's responsibilities in stockpile maintenance include design
    and production of certain components for system life extension
    programs, limited-life component exchange and repairs, as well as other
    engineering activities that directly support maintenance of nuclear
    warheads in the stockpile. For each weapon in the inventory, we must
    understand and resolve defects (called ``significant findings''),
    maintain use-control equipment, and replace hardware consumed by the
    surveillance function. During calendar year 2001 we completed and
    closed 18 significant finding investigations. Because the service lives
    of many nuclear weapons have been extended well beyond their original
    intent, we are exhausting the supply of surveillance units available
    for flight testing. More flight test units must be produced, but the
    instrumentation to measure performance in joint flight tests with DOD
    must be redesigned using electronics technology available today.
        We have finished a complete redesign of the W76 joint flight
    vehicle and are currently working on redesigns of the W78 and W87 joint
    flight vehicles. In addition to these complete redesigns, we have added
    functionality to the B61 joint flight vehicle by developing and
    incorporating spin sensors. We are now in the process of incorporating
    this technology in the B83 joint flight vehicle.
        Neutron Generator Production
        Sandia has the production mission for neutron generators, an
    essential component of U.S. nuclear warheads. Sandia manages two pieces
    within its total production mission: (1) neutron generator production,
    including both the recertification of neutron generators from the field
    that have remaining service life and the new neutron generator build;
    and (2) the Concurrent Design and Engineering (CDM) production
    assignment. As neutron generator production ramps up and the CDM
    program grows to support the W76 and W80 life extension programs,
    production operating funds will require an increase over fiscal year
    2002 of approximately $45 million by fiscal year 2005. Estimates are
    still being generated as the refurbishment programs continue to define
    the CDM components they will need.
        Stockpile Evaluation
        Stockpile evaluation includes laboratory tests, flight tests,
    quality evaluations, special testing, and surveillance of weapon
    systems to assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapon
    stockpile as a basis for the annual certification to the President.
        Surveillance testing frequently results in recommendations for
    repairs and upgrades to the stockpile. Last year, following Sandia
    procedures, DOD replaced limited-life components in several weapon
    systems to add what we believe will be significant periods of
    maintenance-free service while the weapons are in DOD custody.
        I am happy to report that we have completed Title 1 (design) of the
    new Weapons Test Evaluation Laboratory construction project that
    Congress funded as a line item 2 years ago. This state-of-the-art
    facility will replace our 40-year-old building at the NNSA weapons
    facility near Amarillo, Texas. Completion is scheduled for Fall 2004.
    We are developing advanced diagnostic tools to update existing test
    equipment, and we hope to incorporate other enhancements from the
    Enhanced Surveillance Program. Our goal is to move the surveillance
    program toward a predictive capability that will allow us to replace
    components in our aging stockpile before they affect reliability.
        DOD and DOE annually conduct joint flight tests on weapons of each
    weapon type in the enduring stockpile. Historically, flight tests have
    uncovered about 22 percent of the defects in surveillance databases.
    After a hiatus in Air Force cruise missile testing due to missile
    problems and infrastructure renewal, I am happy to report that we have
    begun flight testing again with two successful air-launched cruise
    missile tests, although it will take us several years to catch up with
    our desired level of testing. As we work with the Air Force on flight
    testing for existing warheads and determine their future needs for an
    upgraded system, we are desperately short of Air Force test hardware
    for the air-launched cruise missile. We face a near-term problem of
    having limited opportunities for both flight testing of existing
    systems as well as proving the interfaces necessary to field our
    proposed life extension program for the W80 warhead.
        To help compensate for shortfalls in flight tests and a dramatic
    reduction in the number and variety of reentry vehicles that can be
    flown if the W87 is deployed on Minuteman III, on-board instruments
    must be improved to provide additional performance information in fewer
    tests. This past year, we successfully flight-tested an enhanced-
    fidelity instrumentation package in the W87 reentry vehicle.
        The Tonopah Test Range, which Sandia operates under agreement with
    the Air Force, is absolutely irreplaceable as a flight-test site for
    air-delivered bomb systems. Without it, we could not continue to assess
    and certify systems nor perform research and development on new
    delivery systems. I urge continued congressional support for joint use
    of the Tonopah Test Range and the proper level of funding support for
    range infrastructure to ensure its viability.
        I would like to address the two reports issued by the DOE Inspector
    General this past year on the surveillance program--one on the testing
    backlog for flight and laboratory tests, and the other on the
    significant findings investigation process. While I do not believe that
    the situation is as dire as the headlines might have suggested, there
    was action necessary on the part of NNSA and the laboratories to
    improve performance. I assure you that we at Sandia are taking this
    matter very seriously. We are working with the Navy and Air Force to
    ensure the availability of samples and flight-test vehicles to
    eliminate the identified backlogs. As you might expect, as a result of
    the tragedy of last September and the focus on prosecuting the war,
    this may take longer than any of us might desire, but I can assure you
    that we have everyone's complete cooperation. The laboratories fully
    support the actions being directed by NNSA in response to the IG's
    reports, and I believe that future reviews in this area will show
    improvement.
        The surveillance program is the foundation for maintaining the
    aging stockpile. We believe that the surveillance program should
    maintain an adequate number of flight tests each year using military
    personnel, procedures, and hardware. Therefore, I urge you to assure an
    appropriate level of support for the joint surveillance flight test
    program, for both NNSA and the DOD, to sustain confidence in the
    reliability of our strategic nuclear deterrent.
    Campaigns
        Campaigns are multifunctional efforts across the NNSA Defense
    Programs laboratories, the production plants, and the Nevada Test Site
    that, in aggregate, constitute an integrated weapons science and
    technology program for developing critical capabilities for weapons
    qualification and certification. The goal of the NNSA Defense Programs
    campaigns is to address current or future capability needs by employing
    the best scientists and engineers and using the most current scientific
    knowledge and technologies. Many of the campaigns are interrelated and
    establish a foundation for future deliverables in directed stockpile
    work. Without a robust campaign program, our ability to support
    stockpile stewardship would be seriously harmed.
        Engineering Campaigns
        NNSA's engineering campaigns strengthen the science and engineering
    competencies that directly support mission responsibilities in enhanced
    surety (comprising safety, use-control, and reliability), annual
    weapons system certification, nuclear survivability for nuclear weapons
    and other military systems, enhanced surveillance of the nuclear
    weapons stockpile, and advanced design and production technologies to
    support system life-extension programs.
        Enhanced Surety. This campaign provides the most modern surety
    possible for nuclear weapons during replacement, refurbishment, and
    upgrades of weapon components. Specifically, this campaign is
    developing surety options and technologies for the B61, W76, and W80
    weapon life-extension programs. It is also developing new surety
    assessment methodologies and supporting the integration of microsystem
    components into surety components, subsystems, and architectures.
        Weapon System Engineering Certification. This campaign develops
    validated computational models and a suite of tools to support
    certification of the B61, W76, and W80 life extension programs.
        Nuclear Survivability. Nuclear weapons must be able to survive and
    function in severe environments. Radiation produces thermal and
    mechanical stresses that may impact the reliability of weapon
    components. Although large fluxes of radiation would result from
    hostile attacks, disruptive levels of radiation are also present in
    natural environments, such as space. Also, periodic weapon diagnostics
    and exposure to radioactive decay from the nuclear explosive package
    can produce lower radiation levels of longer duration. Radiation can
    deform, spall, or degrade materials; change the conductivity of
    electronic components; generate and transmit shocks in materials; and
    release trapped gases. Microelectronic components are especially
    vulnerable to these effects.
        This campaign develops microelectronic technologies and
    certification tools to ensure that refurbished stockpile weapon
    components satisfy their radiation survivability requirements as
    defined in each weapon's stockpile-to-target sequence. These
    capabilities are being developed for immediate application to the W76
    life extension program, which is critically dependent on their timely
    development and validation.
        Sandia operates a number of test facilities that provide intense x-
    ray, gamma-ray, neutron, electron, and mechanical environments to
    support the qualification of weapon systems and components and to
    validate simulation codes.
        Our goals for the next several years include demonstrating the
    maturity of next-generation, radiation-hardened microelectronics by
    designing and fabricating test devices and circuits and characterizing
    their performance in radiation environments. We will also conduct
    experiments to validate mechanical response models, mature our
    understanding of radiation-induced damage mechanisms in semiconductor
    materials, improve our diagnostic capabilities to support material
    characterizations, and investigate radiation hardening phenomena in
    microelectromechanical systems.
        Enhanced Surveillance. The Enhanced Surveillance campaign develops
    tools, techniques, and models to measure, qualify, calculate, and
    predict the effects of aging on weapon materials and components and to
    understand how those effects impact weapon safety and reliability.
        One enhanced surveillance project uncovered unexpected behavior in
    desiccants designed to maintain a non-corrosive internal weapon
    atmosphere. Our new understanding of desiccant behavior is guiding the
    formulation of new desiccants for weapons refurbished under stockpile
    life extension programs. Another project discovered problems with newly
    procured material for replacement o-rings. The problems with the
    incoming material were assessed, and a negative impact on the stockpile
    was averted.
        In the future, enhanced surveillance techniques will strengthen the
    credibility of the deterrent by warning of manufacturing and aging
    defects in time to schedule weapon refurbishments before performance is
    impaired.
        Advanced Design and Production Technologies. The Advanced Design
    and Production Technologies (ADAPT) campaign provides technology
    maturation and integration of modern product realization tools and
    methods across NNSA's product realization enterprise, including
    laboratories and plants.
        Science Campaigns
        NNSA's science campaigns advance our understanding of the physical
    principles of nuclear explosive systems and support weapons system
    certification activities.
        Dynamic Materials Properties. The Dynamic Materials Properties
    campaign develops physics-based, experimentally validated data and
    models of all stockpile materials under a broad range of dynamic
    conditions found in nuclear explosions.
        Primary Certification. The Primary Certification campaign includes
    experimental activities to develop the capability to certify rebuilt
    and aged primaries to within a stated yield without nuclear testing.
    Sandia's efforts in this area focus on the development and
    implementation of advanced compact flash radiographic sources for use
    on subcritical experiments.
        Secondary Certification and Nuclear Systems Margins. The Secondary
    Certification and Nuclear Systems Margins campaign includes
    experimental and computational activities that will determine the
    minimum essential factors for producing an effective weapon.
        Sandia's contribution is to support the development of
    computational models to predict the performance of nominal, aged, and
    rebuilt secondaries and perform collaborative experiments with the
    other NNSA laboratories in radiation case dynamics, radiation flow, and
    secondary performance.
        Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign
        To achieve simulations with sufficient complexity and fidelity to
    support stockpile stewardship, NNSA must increase computational
    capability and capacity tremendously. The Advanced Simulation and
    Computing (ASC) campaign will hasten advances in computational science
    to enable the shift from test-based methods to computation-based
    methods.
        ASC activities at Sandia consist of code development for stockpile
    applications; problem solving environments; maintenance of sufficient
    on-site computational, networking, and communication capabilities; and
    partnering alliances with university and industry researchers. We are
    working on new mathematical methods, algorithms, and software for
    solving large-scale problems on massively parallel, often distributed
    systems. Areas of importance include mechanical and thermal response of
    weapons, shock physics, chemically reacting flows, electromagnetics,
    and the computational analysis and design of materials. As these
    techniques are developed, they are incorporated into codes relevant to
    stockpile applications. ASC simulation tools are being used to support
    design and certification activities for the W80 and W76 life extension
    programs.
        Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign
        This campaign includes activities to support ignition implosions on
    the National Ignition Facility and to enhance experimental capabilities
    for stockpile stewardship on Sandia's pulsed power facilities. A fusion
    yield of 200 to 1,000 megajoules in the laboratory is a long-term goal.
    We are providing intense x-ray sources for weapon physics and weapon
    effects testing, evaluating high-yield inertial confinement fusion
    concepts in the laboratory using z-pinches, and developing
    sophisticated diagnostics for the National Ignition Facility and Z
    Accelerator to support stockpile stewardship.
    Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF)
        Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities provides physical
    infrastructure and operational readiness at the laboratories, the
    Nevada Test Site, production sites, and other NNSA sites where the
    scientific, technical, and manufacturing activities for stockpile
    stewardship are conducted.
        Operation of Facilities
        Operation of facilities includes NNSA Defense Programs' share of
    the costs to operate and maintain programmatic facilities in a state of
    readiness at which each facility is prepared to execute programmatic
    tasks identified under directed stockpile work and the campaigns. These
    costs include the structures, equipment, materials, procedures, and
    personnel necessary to provide program sponsors with a facility that is
    safe, secure, reliable, and ready for operations.
        Sandia has a large number of facilities supported by the Readiness
    in Technical Base and Facilities subcategory:

             The Microelectronics Development Laboratory maintains
            radiation-hardened integrated circuit technologies.
             The Compound Semiconductor Research Laboratory
            generates new technology options in semiconductor materials,
            processes, and device technologies to support directed
            stockpile work.
             The Tonopah Test Range in western Nevada provides
            Sandia with essential flight test capabilities (including those
            for joint test assemblies) as part of the stockpile
            surveillance effort.
             The Albuquerque Full-Scale Experimental Complex
            comprises Sandia's Technical Area III experimental facilities.
            The facilities and most of the test equipment they house range
            from 30 to 50 years old. An RTBF construction project, Test
            Capabilities Revitalization, is planned to renovate and
            refurbish the complex.
             Sandia's Z Accelerator is the world's most powerful
            laboratory x-ray source. It supports directed stockpile work
            and NNSA campaigns in dynamic materials properties, secondary
            certification and nuclear systems margins, inertial confinement
            fusion ignition and high yield, and nuclear survivability.
             NNSA's Neutron Generator Production Facility at Sandia
            manufactures neutron generators, a limited-life component
            required in U.S. nuclear warheads.
        Program Readiness
        Program Readiness includes activities that support more than one
    directed stockpile work activity, campaign, or facility and that are
    essential to achieving mission objectives. Sandia has numerous projects
    and programs covered by this budget subcategory. They include the
    following:

             The Defense Nuclear Materials Stewardship project
            develops materials management systems to enhance the safety,
            security, and accountability of nuclear weapons, nuclear
            materials, and weapon components during storage, handling, and
            transportation.
             The Knowledge Management Program develops workforce
            stewardship strategies to recruit and retain staff with
            essential skills, enhance career development, and improve
            access to retirees and other resources of knowledge for active
            weapon professionals.
             The Microsystems Infrastructure Readiness Project
            maintains Sandia's microsystems capabilities, with a secondary
            role of developing capabilities to support fabrication of war-
            reserve microsystem components.
             The Pulsed Power Technology Project maintains our
            capability for designing a wide variety of pulsed power
            drivers, ranging from high-impedance accelerators for gamma
            rays and radiography to high-power drivers for z-pinches.
        Construction
        Sandia's construction plan is designed both to provide the
    facilities we need to support programmatic objectives and to eliminate
    excess and substandard space.
        Sandia's Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Application (MESA)
    complex, discussed earlier, is the top priority in our construction
    plan. Other vital line-item construction projects include the
    following:

             The Weapons Evaluation Testing Laboratory at NNSA's
            Pantex Plant will provide a state-of-the-art facility for
            testing weapon components and implementing advanced diagnostic
            techniques developed by the enhanced surveillance campaign.
             Funded as construction under the Advanced Simulation
            and Computing campaign, two key facilities supporting the ASCI
            program are under construction at Sandia laboratory locations:
            The Distributed Information Systems Laboratory (DISL) at
            Sandia's site in California will develop distributed
            information systems for enabling collaborative computational
            work across the nuclear weapons complex. The Joint
            Computational Engineering Laboratory (JCEL) at Sandia's site in
            New Mexico will support multi-physics code development on
            massively parallel computers.
             The Model Validation and System Certification Test
            Center will provide testing facilities to continue providing
            data for weapons certification; enhance capabilities to
            facilitate large-volume data delivery; and replace an aging
            communications infrastructure with integrated command and
            control, data collection, processing, and distribution systems.
             The Test Capabilities Revitalization project will
            modernize Sandia's nonnuclear field testing and experimental
            infrastructure and our diagnostic capabilities to perform
            weapons qualification, development, surveillance, and model
            validation. The project will renovate existing facilities and
            provide new facilities, subject to cost-benefit studies.
        General Plant Projects
        General Plant Projects Program funding is essential for managing
    our facilities and conducting safe and reliable facility operations.
        This change has given laboratory management some flexibility in
    determining the amount of general plant project and capital equipment
    funding needed to maintain infrastructures and to respond to changes in
    infrastructure maintenance requirements. The funding limit for general
    plant projects is $5 million per project. The new flexibility we have
    to determine the best use of general plant funds has enabled us to
    improve administrative and support facilities that have been neglected
    far too long.
        Sandia received DOE approval in fiscal year 2001 to fund and
    construct an Institutional General Plant Project (IGPP) building. IGPPs
    are construction projects for general-purpose institutional space
    funded through indirect cost recovery rather than by direct funding
    from a programmatic sponsor. Sandia was the first DOE contractor to
    pilot this alternative that is now permitted by new regulations. We are
    seeking approval to construct two additional buildings through the IGPP
    mechanism in fiscal year 2002.

                        DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

        Sandia's support for the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation (NN) includes research and development on systems for
    detecting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, verifying
    international arms agreements, enhancing the protection of nuclear
    material and weapons in Russia, eliminating surplus inventories of
    fissile materials in Russia, protecting against chemical and biological
    incidents, and providing mechanisms to enhance regional stability.
        I am pleased that the fiscal year 2002 budget reversed a downward
    trend in NNSA's programs for nonproliferation and verification research
    and development. This important investment yields leading-edge
    prototypes and demonstrations that serve our national security
    interests exceptionally well.
        The greatest successes coming from this program are the result of
    persistence in providing support over long periods to allow for the
    full development and demonstration of applied technologies. We
    appreciate your trust in the laboratories to take technical risks that
    have yielded innovative solutions for monitoring treaties, protecting
    nuclear materials, and protecting against threats of chemical and
    biological terrorism. I urge your continued strong support for this
    important research and development program.
    Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
        Sandia is developing a new generation of satellite-based sensors to
    detect low-yield nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. We also are
    developing a seismic data processing system to enhance detection of
    underground nuclear explosions. Our activities are part of a
    multilaboratory effort to develop affordable, deployable, and flexible
    sensors for seismic, hydro-acoustic, radionuclide, and infrasound data
    acquisition and processing. These activities are coordinated and, in
    many cases, co-funded by the Department of Defense, which has the
    operational nuclear-test monitoring responsibility for the U.S.
    government.
        We are developing airborne and satellite-based systems for
    detecting and characterizing proliferation-related activities involving
    chemical weapons, biological weapons, and missiles. Sandia coordinated
    the integration of NNSA's Multispectral Thermal Imager Satellite
    research project, which has recently completed its second year of
    successful operation and research. We are also developing a laser-based
    system for remote detection and identification of chemical and
    biological species in effluent plumes. We will conduct flight tests
    this year of the integrated system on an unmanned aerial vehicle. We
    have made impressive progress toward developing specialized chemical
    and biological microsensors, bioinformation systems, and
    decontamination technologies for nuclear, biological, and chemical
    weapons and for detecting nuclear material smuggling. With regard to
    the microsensors, we are currently conducting field trials, and
    preliminary results are very promising.
    Nonproliferation and Arms Reduction Transparency
        NNSA's Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National
    Laboratories assists a number of countries and agencies in evaluating
    the applicability of arms control technologies and protocols for
    regional security issues. Export-approved monitoring equipment is
    available for representatives of regional parties from areas such as
    south Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Korean peninsula, to
    evaluate for application to specific regional problems. For example,
    the CMC is currently engaging Pakistan and India in a cooperative
    boundary monitoring project. The CMC also supports technical analysis
    of policy options for DOE and provides national security insight to
    other organizations. CMC staff also provide technical consultation to
    U.S. negotiating delegations.
        In an effort to extend the accessibility of the CMC to an affected
    region, a similar institute is being established in Amman, Jordan. This
    development is a cooperative effort of the Department of State, the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and NNSA. It is a significant
    cooperative development involving the United States and Jordan and
    represents an opportunity to foster stability in that region through
    the integration of technology and policy.
        In other activities, Sandia assists with the evaluation of export
    licenses for technology with possible uses for weaponization
    activities. We also help develop technology for International Atomic
    Energy Agency remote monitoring and inspections. Sandia develops
    remotely accessed, unattended cooperative monitoring systems for
    applications in foreign states without nuclear weapons that are party
    to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. These
    activities typically support the International Atomic Energy Agency and
    bilateral safeguards agreements between the United States and foreign
    states with nuclear materials of U.S. origin. Other work is conducted
    for the physical protection of nuclear materials in the Baltic and
    independent states of the former Soviet Union and in states that are
    party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
    These activities include the International Atomic Energy Agency
    International Physical Protection Advisory Service, training classes,
    and physical security upgrades.
    U.S./Russian Nuclear Security Programs
        Sandia supports a broad range of cooperative programs with Russia
    in nuclear security. These programs, funded by NNSA, DOD's Cooperative
    Threat Reduction program, and the Department of State, address the
    safety and security of nuclear weapons, the security of fissile
    materials, verification of fissile materials, and defense conversion.
        I want to make special note of the importance of the activities
    with Russia. The terrorist attacks last September have made us all
    acutely aware of the catastrophic potential of weapons of mass
    destruction should they end up in the wrong hands. The cooperative
    efforts to protect nuclear materials and maintain state control over
    nuclear capabilities and assets in Russia are important initiatives
    that must continue. We promote a vision called ``Global Nuclear
    Management'' that, if realized, would assure the control of all nuclear
    materials in the world. However, the current state of protection for
    nuclear materials in Russia, while improved through the past efforts of
    this program, is an important indication of the potential for nuclear
    material proliferation. We must continue these efforts with Russia.
        Russian Transition Initiatives
        In support of defense conversion programs, Sandia has been an
    active participant in the Russian transition programs, including the
    International Proliferation Prevention Program, which engages weapons
    scientists, engineers, and technicians from the former Soviet Union in
    nonmilitary projects. This program provides seed money for nonmilitary
    research and provides links with U.S. industry to commercialize the new
    activities. In a particularly effective case, Sandia engineers worked
    with Spektr Conversion LLC, a company formed by scientists at the
    Russian nuclear weapons laboratory, the All-Russian Scientific Research
    Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF), and a U.S. manufacturer,
    Numotech Inc., to design and build a wheelchair seat cushion to prevent
    pressure sores. The prototype cushion was clinically tested at a VA
    hospital and is approved by the FDA. The program provided employment
    opportunities in an area of civilian need for Russian technical
    personnel.
        International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
        A major Sandia program that addresses the security of nuclear
    weapons and fissile material in Russia is the Materials Protection,
    Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program. Since 1993, Sandia has
    participated in this multi-laboratory effort to reduce the threat of
    diversion of Russia's nuclear weapons and weapon-usable nuclear
    material to rogue states or terrorist groups. This program, which
    originally included projects in Russia and a number of the newly
    independent states, now focuses on Russia in the areas of nuclear
    material and nuclear facilities operated by the Ministry of Atomic
    Energy, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and smaller independent
    ministries. Activities include vulnerability assessments, protection
    system design, training, and support for hardware installations and
    maintenance. Assistance is also provided to states other than Russia to
    protect fissile materials, on-site and in transit, against theft.
    Protecting U.S.-origin nuclear material in other countries is a
    particular concern. A related activity provides assistance to the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to develop physical
    protection guidelines.

                               GOVERNANCE REFORM

        A very important initiative by the NNSA Administrator is an effort
    to redesign the NNSA contractor relationship through a new approach to
    governance. The goal is to implement a simpler, less adversarial
    contracting model capitalizing on the private-sector expertise of the
    management and operating contractors while increasing contractor
    accountability for performance and responsiveness to NNSA requirements.
        The current governance structure for the NNSA Laboratories is
    broken. I doubt that any of my lab director colleagues would disagree
    that the current governance regime unreasonably constrains us from
    exercising prudent management authority and bold leadership in
    accordance with best industrial practices; and yet, that kind of
    leadership was precisely what the Federal Government bargained for
    under the original GOCO (government-owned, contractor-operated)
    contracting model. The influential Galvin Report \6\ was perhaps the
    most adamant of several studies that have been critical of the
    excessively bureaucratic nature of DOE governance of the laboratories.
    The Galvin Task Force found that the GOCO model has been so encumbered
    with bureaucratic accretions that it would be better to scrap it
    altogether and privatize the laboratories. While that is probably too
    drastic a remedy, we should all be concerned that the current
    laboratory governance regime fails to encourage management initiative
    for superior performance beyond mere compliance with an array of
    bureaucratic prescriptions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National
    Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Task Force on
    Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories.
    Robert Galvin, Chairman, et al., February 1995.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As originally conceived, the GOCO model was a strategic partnership
    between a Federal agency and a premier industrial or academic entity.
    In simple terms, the key operating concept was that the Federal sponsor
    articulated WHAT was to be achieved (the mission and its programmatic
    deliverables) while the contractor determined HOW to achieve it, in
    accordance with best industrial practices. The laboratory governance
    reform initiative that the NNSA Administrator proposes includes an
    assurance strategy that will employ several private-sector assurance
    systems such as comprehensive internal auditing, oversight by boards
    and external panels, third-party certifications, and direct engagement
    between oversight bodies and NNSA's leadership.
        The first phase of this initiative will attempt to reduce
    contractual prescriptions that exceed those mandated by law and
    regulation. The second phase will design and demonstrate a new
    governance model, conducted as a pilot program at Sandia National
    Laboratories. If the subsequent appraisal of the pilot phase is
    positive, the new model would likely be implemented at other NNSA
    Laboratories and plants.

                               CONCLUDING REMARKS

        In my view, the National Nuclear Security Administration, under the
    businesslike leadership of General John Gordon, has made significant
    progress during the past year in its organizational effectiveness. The
    agency is now functioning with evident coordination and teamwork,
    attributes which will likely be strengthened even more as the
    administrator's organizational and operational plans are implemented.
    To assure continued success, however, the agency needs long-term
    support from Congress and sustained resources to meet the formidable
    requirements of stockpile stewardship in the years ahead.
        On behalf of the dedicated and talented people who constitute
    Sandia National Laboratories, I want to emphasize our commitment to the
    NNSA mission to strengthen United States security through the military
    application of nuclear energy and by reducing the global threat from
    terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is our highest goal to be
    a national laboratory that delivers technology solutions to the most
    challenging problems that threaten peace and freedom.
                                     ______

                     Prepared Statement by C. Bruce Tarter

                                OPENING REMARKS

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to provide a statement on the budget request for fiscal
    year 2003 for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). I am
    the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
    Livermore is committed to maintaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear
    weapons stockpile as a principal participant in the Nation's Stockpile
    Stewardship Program. The laboratory is also engaged in vital national
    programs to reduce the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction and to provide for homeland security.
        My statement discusses Livermore's accomplishments in NNSA programs
    as well as the technical and programmatic challenges we face. But
    first, I want to thank Congress for your continuing support of the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program and our nonproliferation and threat
    reduction activities. The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to
    make excellent technical progress in the face of many challenges, some
    of the toughest of which likely lie ahead as weapons continue to age. A
    strongly supported and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program is
    clearly needed to ensure that this Nation can maintain the safety,
    security, and reliability of its nuclear deterrent over the long term.
    The 5-year plan of the National Nuclear Security Administration details
    the need for a strong program, and I support NNSA's plan and the budget
    request for fiscal year 2003.
        Strong and sustained support is likewise needed for programs aimed
    at providing technologies to reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) through nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
    counterterrorism activities. Because Livermore and our sister NNSA
    Laboratories had been working for the past decade to develop technical
    capabilities to detect, counter, and mitigate WMD proliferation and
    terrorism, we were able to respond rapidly and effectively to the
    events of September 11 and its aftermath. Although those investments
    are paying great dividends in the newly declared war on terrorism,
    substantial investment is needed to develop vastly improved warning and
    responsive capabilities to protect the U.S. against these threats, now
    and in the future. We are fully committed to this long-term national
    security endeavor.

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Exactly 1 year ago, NNSA Administrator General John Gordon, head of
    the NNSA, and Admiral Richard Mies, Commander in Chief of U.S.
    Strategic Command, were at Livermore to commemorate the certification
    of the refurbished W87 ICBM warhead. Speaking as the ``customer,''
    Admiral Mies called the occasion an ``historic event'' and ``the first
    real test of stockpile stewardship.'' The W87 life-extension program
    challenged all elements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Devising
    the engineering improvements to the warhead, going into production in a
    less than fully functional weapons complex, and certifying the
    performance of the refurbished warheads without nuclear testing were
    all major accomplishments. It is an important success story, but in the
    words of General Gordon, ``we still have a long way to go.'' More
    challenging technical issues are on the horizon as the weapons continue
    to age, as other weapon systems are refurbished, and as new needs
    emerge.
        Weapon-refurbishment decisions and actions bring into play the full
    spectrum of capabilities that we are striving to attain through the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program. First, to recognize and evaluate aging
    problems (and other defects) in weapons and devise remedies, we must
    understand in detail the science and technology that govern all aspects
    of nuclear weapons. We are making progress here, but we need even
    better investigative tools. Second, the nuclear weapons production
    complex must be able to remanufacture parts and refurbish weapons as
    needed. Currently the complex is far from fully functional. Third, we
    must be able to certify with confidence the performance of both the
    refurbished warheads and the other weapons in the stockpile. This task
    requires the application of expert judgment, together with the advanced
    experimental and computational tools we are using to improve our
    fundamental understanding of nuclear weapons. Finally, acquisition of
    this spectrum of capabilities is time urgent to meet existing
    requirements for weapon refurbishment and to deal with other weapon
    performance issues as they arise.
        Thus a principal goal of the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been
    to expeditiously put into place a set of vastly improved scientific
    tools and modern manufacturing capabilities, including 100-TeraOps
    supercomputers, advanced radiography capabilities to take three-
    dimensional images of imploding mock primaries, a high-energy-density
    research facility (the National Ignition Facility) to study the
    thermonuclear physics of primaries and secondaries, and efficient and
    flexible manufacturing facilities. These investments are very demanding
    of resources, as is the need to meet requirements imposed by the
    Department of Defense (DOD). The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review provides a
    high-level policy perspective of what will be demanded from the NNSA
    Laboratories to sustain the Nation's nuclear posture. Concurrently,
    NNSA has developed a 5 year plan for its Defense Program activities.
    The proposed budget for fiscal year 2003 and succeeding years is larger
    than recent budgets, but there is much to be done and we must manage to
    achieve our critical milestones with the resources provided.
        Livermore has major responsibilities within the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program, and our successes in 2001--as well as the
    challenges that lie ahead--provide a snapshot of the overall program. I
    already mentioned the successful certification of the W87 warhead,
    refurbished through a life-extension program (LEP). In addition,
    Lawrence Livermore and Sandia/California are starting the LEP for the
    W80 cruise missile warhead, designed by Los Alamos. This program will
    implement refurbishment options defined in a formal DOD/DOE study
    completed in 2000. It builds upon a modern baseline understanding of
    the W80 and its performance, which was developed cooperatively by the
    New Mexico and California laboratories during the DOD/DOE study and
    through significant additional work performed during 2001. At this
    time, there is a congressional hold on NNSA work for the LEP while the
    Air Force defines its plans for life-extension work on the cruise
    missiles themselves. Prompt agreement on the path forward is needed if
    we are to be able to meet the directed date for the W80 first
    production unit (FY 2006). Also in fiscal year 2001, we completed a
    pilot project to demonstrate the capability to conduct warhead pit
    surveillance operations, and we are now performing full surveillance on
    two warhead pits. Transfer of certain pit surveillance responsibility
    for LLNL-designed warheads to Livermore makes the work load at the TA-
    55 facility at Los Alamos more manageable.
        Lawrence Livermore is also responsible for a number of state-of-
    the-art experimental and computer facilities--in operation and in
    development--that are essential for stockpile stewardship. Construction
    of the Contained Firing Facility for hydrodynamic testing at Site 300
    is now finished. Qualification testing has been completed to assure the
    facility's ability to contain debris from experiments that use up to 60
    kilograms of high explosives. The first stockpile-related experiment
    was executed last month, and an active testing schedule is now under
    way.
        Construction of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore
    is now more than 60 percent complete. I am extremely pleased to report
    that NIF remains on track and is meeting its baseline cost and schedule
    as provided to Congress in September 2000. We expect to have NIF's
    first laser beams delivered to the target chamber within the next year.
    Over the past 2 years, regular reviews of the NIF Project have been
    held every 6 months. Among other positive findings, the most recent
    review concluded that ``The project has made impressive progress and
    has been responsive to previous review team recommendations.'' NIF
    remains a funding-constrained project that could be completed earlier
    and at significantly less total cost if more of its total project
    funding were to be made available in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year
    2004 rather than in later years.
        The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program is central to
    many of the success stories of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Last
    summer, we took delivery from IBM of ASCI White, the world's most
    powerful computer, capable of 12.3 TeraOps (trillion operations per
    second). This machine has been used intensively by all three weapons
    laboratories to support stockpile stewardship through a variety of
    applications. For example, in the fall of 2001 both Livermore and Los
    Alamos used this machine to complete the first-ever fully three-
    dimensional simulations of a complete warhead explosion. We are
    earmarked to take delivery of our next ASCI computer in fiscal year
    2004, a machine that will be capable of 60 to 100 TeraOps. The
    groundbreaking ceremony for construction of the Terascale Simulation
    Facility (TSF) to house this computer was held just last week.
        The events of September 11 highlighted the immense value of the
    NNSA Laboratories' technical capabilities and their activities to
    reduce the threats posed by the proliferation or terrorist acquisition
    of weapons of mass destruction. These efforts are part of a
    comprehensive set of activities aimed at proliferation prevention
    (e.g., through cooperative programs with Russia), detection and
    reversal, response, and avoiding surprise (including support to the
    U.S. Intelligence Community).
        Post-September 11, Lawrence Livermore provided analysis and
    assessments as well as information-operations tools and expert
    personnel to the Intelligence Community. Our Nuclear Threat Assessment
    Center operated 7 days a week to evaluate numerous smuggling incidents
    and nuclear-related threats. Miniaturized DNA analysis technology
    pioneered by Livermore made possible several biodetectors with vastly
    improved capabilities which are being commercialized and are at the
    core of the Nation's biodefense capabilities. In addition, our
    Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS), extensively
    used by the DOD, supported U.S. military efforts with evaluations
    focused on sites of concern in and around Afghanistan. Later in my
    statement, I provide many other examples of the capabilities and expert
    assistance we are providing to help government entities defend against
    WMD terrorism.
        In short, Livermore's assessment capabilities and technologies are
    contributing to homeland defense in manifold ways. We were able to
    respond immediately because we had begun to address the threat of WMD
    terrorism long before September 11. We take a comprehensive approach to
    the problem, developing technologies and tools to counter threats and
    working closely with Federal, state, and local response agencies to
    ensure that our technological solutions meet real-world operational
    needs. In several key areas, the research programs benefited greatly
    from the use of Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD)
    funding for exploratory efforts that led to technologies that are now
    being deployed; for example, without the head start provided by LDRD,
    the advanced biodetection systems that are now being fielded would
    still be in development. We are poised to contribute to homeland
    defense in the long-run through the development of more advanced
    technologies to defend against both current and future threats. The
    nation would greatly benefit from sustained funding for long-range
    research and development activities at the NNSA Laboratories to improve
    homeland security.
        One area of concern is the proposed fiscal year 2003 budget for
    Environmental Management efforts at the Laboratory, which constitutes a
    reduction of about 27 percent from the fiscal year 2002 allocation of
    $40.9 million. The Laboratory requires an additional $17.5 million
    above the budget request to maintain its existing Environmental
    Management program, which consists of two parts. The first is
    Environmental Restoration--the clean up of groundwater and soil
    contaminated from past operations. Considerable work has been done in
    remediating contamination at the laboratory's two sites. However, with
    the proposed cuts, Livermore will miss critical cleanup milestones that
    have been negotiated by DOE with the State of California and the U.S.
    Environmental Protection Agency. In contrast, the laboratory strongly
    believes that we should accelerate our cleanup activities, and we are
    again proposing this initiative to DOE as we have in past years. The
    second part of the program, Waste Management, involves the treatment,
    handling, and disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste from ongoing
    and past operations. Under the current proposed budget, it will be
    impossible to support the laboratory's programmatic needs with a safe,
    compliant waste management program. This will have severe impacts on
    the national security mission and will cause certain programmatic
    activities to be deferred and/or cancelled.
        On a positive note, from Livermore's perspective, I am very pleased
    with the progress that General Gordon is making at NNSA and with
    changes at the University of California in its role as manager of the
    Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories. Preparation of the 5
    year plan for NNSA's Defense Program activities is the first of what I
    expect to be many tangible benefits from NNSA organizational changes.
    General Gordon's plan to eliminate a layer of field management and to
    reengineer operations at NNSA sites are other important steps. We at
    Livermore are working with NNSA to find ways to significantly reduce
    the administrative workload. As part of the University of California's
    management and operations contract extension, the position of Vice
    President for Laboratory Management was created and John McTague was
    selected to serve. Dr. McTague is providing outstanding leadership in
    efforts to strengthen management accountability, institute more uniform
    best practices in operations at Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos, and
    foster even greater cooperation between the laboratories.
        As you may be aware, I will be leaving my position as laboratory
    director soon, when my successor has been selected. I appreciate the
    support that this committee has provided to Lawrence Livermore and to
    me during my tenure. I also appreciate having had the opportunity to
    serve our Nation in this manner. I look forward to the very positive
    future that I believe Lawrence Livermore will have with your continued
    support.

                       THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

        The Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to ensure the safety
    and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile required to meet
    national security needs of the 21st century. Confidence in the safety
    and reliability of the weapons is to be maintained through an ongoing
    and integrated process of stockpile surveillance, assessment and
    certification, and refurbishment. Stockpile stewardship is a principal
    mission of the NNSA. NNSA began operation in March 2000.
        Earlier this year General John Gordon, Administrator of NNSA,
    announced organizational changes to enhance NNSA's performance in core
    mission areas. The changes realign and separate programmatic and
    operational functions within the agency. The organizational and other
    positive changes adopted by General Gordon will clarify lines of
    communication and authority, which should improve overall efficiency
    and performance. Execution of the Stockpile Stewardship Program remains
    the primary responsibility of the NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense
    Programs (NNSA/DP).
        The changes being made at NNSA will facilitate long-range planning
    and the preparation of a comprehensive 5 year budget, which are
    critically important. The Stockpile Stewardship Program faces many
    competing demands for available resources. Difficult trade-off
    decisions will have to be made. NNSA must balance evolving requirements
    for directed stockpile work, the need for vigorous campaigns to prepare
    stockpile stewards for the more challenging issues that will arise as
    weapons continue to age, and required investments in research and
    production facilities and people.
        We will greatly benefit from enhanced 5 year planning because it
    will establish reliable future program bases at each of the
    laboratories and production facilities, which greatly helps in
    resource, workforce, and facility planning. Completion of the Nuclear
    Posture Review has also been an important step in defining future
    program policy direction. Livermore's expertise in many nuclear-weapons
    issues is a national resource that has contributed to these
    deliberations. Enhanced 5 year budget planning and the outcome of high-
    level reviews are also important for the future of our laboratory's
    nonproliferation and arms control programs.
    Integrated Program Management and Execution
        Integrated program management and execution is critical to the
    success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The three major program
    elements--surveillance, assessment and certification, and
    refurbishment--are tightly interconnected. So are the activities of the
    three laboratories, the production plants, and the Nevada Test Site.
    Livermore has many close partnerships and working relationships with
    other sites in the weapons complex. As one of the two nuclear design
    laboratories, we have particularly important formal certification
    responsibilities. The laboratory also operates a number of unique,
    state-of-the-art experimental and computer facilities that are
    essential for both assessment of stockpile performance and
    certification of refurbishment actions.
        The Stockpile Stewardship Program is formally managed by NNSA/DP
    through three overarching sets of activities: Directed Stockpile Work,
    Campaigns, and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities. NNSA/DP uses
    this breakout to make evident program integration, establish more
    clearly program goals and budget priorities, and help to identify
    program risks if there are budget shortfalls. The integrated program
    activities include:

             Directed Stockpile Work. Directed Stockpile Work
            supports the readiness of weapons and includes activities to
            meet current stockpile requirements. The effort includes weapon
            maintenance, comprehensive surveillance, weapon baselining,
            assessment and certification, supporting research and
            development, and scheduled weapon refurbishments. It also
            includes other stockpile commitments, such as dismantlement and
            information archiving.
             Campaigns. Campaigns are directed at making the
            scientific and technological advances necessary to assess and
            certify weapon performance now and over the long-term. They
            develop and maintain specific critical capabilities that are
            needed to sustain a viable nuclear deterrent. Each campaign has
            milestones and specific end-dates designed to focus advanced
            basic and applied science, computing, and engineering efforts
            on well-defined deliverables related to the stockpile. The
            current set of 17 campaigns provides a planning framework for
            the program's research and development activities.
             Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities.
            ``Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities'' ensures that
            necessary investments are made in people and their supporting
            infrastructure. Readiness includes the fixed costs and the
            investments of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and it aims
            to ensure the presence of: (1) high-quality, motivated people
            in the program with the needed skills and training; (2) a well-
            maintained, modern infrastructure--to support the activities of
            these people--that is operated in a safe, secure, and
            environmentally responsible manner; and (3) special
            experimental and computational facilities that must be
            developed and brought on line for stewardship to be successful
            in the long term.

        A rigorous planning process has been established to clearly define
    programmatic milestones to be achieved within each of these program
    areas. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is now defined by a series of
    5-year plans, one for each program element, describing goals and
    objectives. The 5-year plans, which were developed with participation
    by the laboratories, plants, and the test site, are accompanied by
    annual implementation plans with detailed milestones.

           ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN DIRECTED STOCKPILE WORK

        Livermore is the design laboratory for four weapon systems in the
    stockpile: the W87 and W62 ICBM warheads, the B83 bomb, and the W84
    cruise missile warhead. They are expected to remain in the stockpile
    well past their originally anticipated lifetimes; the W62 already has.
    Significant effort is being expended on weapons surveillance and
    baselining, on assessing the weapons' performance, and on maintenance
    and selective refurbishment. We have just completed a major effort to
    extend the stockpile life of the W87 warhead, and Livermore and Sandia/
    California have been assigned the responsibility for the engineering
    development work to refurbish the W80, a Los Alamos-designed weapon.
    Stockpile Surveillance and Baselining
        Our stockpile surveillance efforts focus on assessing the condition
    of Livermore designs in the stockpile and on understanding the effect
    of aging on weapons in the stockpile. Aging is important because it
    affects the physical characteristics of materials, and we must
    determine how these changes impact weapon safety and performance. With
    a better understanding of aging, our stockpile surveillance can be more
    predictive, making possible systematic refurbishment and preventative
    maintenance activities to correct developing problems. An important
    factor here is to be able to detect subtle changes to the weapon system
    well in advance of the change causing a safety, reliability, or
    performance issue. This is essential to prepare for upgrades or life
    extension efforts that may take many years to fully implement.
        As we gather more data and gain experience, we review and upgrade
    our surveillance programs--refining sampling plans, measuring
    additional attributes, introducing new diagnostic tools, and improving
    analysis methods. We are also taking on responsibility for surveillance
    of pits from Livermore-designed weapons in the stockpile to better
    balance the workload. These activities had been conducted at Los
    Alamos.
        In addition, we are improving the sensors and techniques used to
    inspect all stockpiled weapons. In concert with the Enhanced
    Surveillance Campaign and as part of the Directed Stockpile work, we
    have developed processes to deploy newly emerging diagnostics into the
    core surveillance program. These diagnostics are enabling us to better
    diagnose and quantify the condition of the stockpile, and to identify
    aging characteristics at the earliest possible time. For example,
    Livermore, in cooperation with Y-12, has completed the development of
    an analytical model and the development and deployment of a suite of
    diagnostic tools that enable us to understand the aging behavior of
    secondary assemblies. We are also completing development of high-
    resolution x-ray tomography for imaging weapon pits; first phase
    deployment at LLNL is complete and has been demonstrated, and
    deployment at Pantex is continuing. Furthermore, development continues
    of high-energy neutron radiography for nondestructively detecting small
    voids and structural defects in weapon systems.
    Stockpile Safety and Performance Assessments
        Assessments of the safety and performance of stockpiled weapons and
    modification actions must be demonstration based--that is, grounded on
    existing nuclear test data, non-nuclear tests, fundamental science
    experiments, and simulations using validated computer models. To the
    extent possible, non-nuclear tests are used to assess weapon safety and
    performance. Together with past nuclear test results, they also are
    used to validate computer simulations. Once validated to the extent
    possible, these simulations guide expert judgment in making complete,
    integral assessments of stockpile issues. Such demonstration-based
    assessments underpinned Livermore's W87 stockpile life extension
    program (discussed below) and will provide similar support to our W80
    life extension work. In addition, this methodology is applied to the
    assessment of issues that arise in the course of ongoing stockpile
    surveillance and is the foundation of our annual certification
    assessments.
        Annual Stockpile Certification. Annual certification of the
    stockpile is fully reliant on the laboratories' assessment
    capabilities. Formal review processes for certification of weapon
    safety and reliability in the absence of nuclear testing have been
    established as part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It is
    essential that judgments and decisions made by the stockpile stewards
    are credible among themselves, to DOD and others in the nuclear weapons
    community, and to the administration and Congress, and the annual
    certification process is an essential means to that end.
        Annual certification is based on the technical evaluations made by
    the NNSA Laboratories and on advice from the laboratory directors, the
    Commander in Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, and the Nuclear
    Weapons Council. In the course of annual certification, our laboratory
    collects and reviews all available information about each stockpile
    weapon system, including physics, engineering, and chemistry and
    materials science data. This work is subjected to rigorous, in-depth
    review by scientists, engineers, and managers throughout the program.
    In addition, it is reviewed by several DOD groups. Livermore completed
    its support of the 2001 annual certification cycle in September 2001,
    when I sent my annual certification letter to the Secretaries of Energy
    and Defense. In conjunction with their colleagues at Sandia, Livermore
    personnel are now well into the 2002 cycle and are on a pace to
    complete our support of that cycle on schedule.
    Stockpile Maintenance and Refurbishment
        Each year, the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan sets the requirement
    to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, and it
    specifies the number of weapons of each type to be in the stockpile.
    Among other responsibilities, the DOD establishes military
    requirements, which are incorporated into the plan. These requirements
    drive the Directed Stockpile Work workload for NNSA, particularly in
    the resource-intensive area of refurbishment activities and life-
    extension programs. The W87 life-extension program is in its production
    phase and activities are planned for the B61, W76 and W80 systems.
        The W87 Life Extension Program. In April 2001, Admiral Richard Mies
    (Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command) and General Gordon
    visited Livermore to celebrate certification of the life-extension
    refurbishment of the W87 ICBM warhead. Formal certification was
    completed with signing of the Final Weapon Development Report by Sandia
    Director Paul Robinson and myself. This first completed certification
    of a warhead refurbished through a life-extension program (LEP) is a
    groundbreaking milestone for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. It
    demonstrates effective cooperation of the laboratories and the
    production facilities to overcome physics, engineering, and
    manufacturing challenges to meet DOD requirements without conducting a
    nuclear test.
        The development activities for this program included extensive
    flight testing, ground testing, and physics and engineering analysis.
    High-fidelity flight tests, incorporating the latest technological
    advances in onboard diagnostic instrumentation and telemetry, provided
    added confidence in the reliability of the design modifications.
    Assessment of nuclear performance is based on computer simulation, past
    nuclear tests, and new above-ground experiments that addressed specific
    physics questions raised by the engineering alterations and computer
    simulations.
        The objective of the W87 LEP was to enhance the structural
    integrity of the warhead so that it may remain part of the enduring
    stockpile beyond the year 2025 and meet anticipated future requirements
    for the system: the W87/Mark 21 is planned as a single RV option for
    the Minuteman III ICBM. The first production unit was completed at the
    Pantex Plant in February 1999, and production is proceeding on schedule
    for completion early in 2004.
        Life Extension of the W80. Under the direction of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, the W80 Project Officers Group (POG) is pursuing an
    LEP for the W80 cruise missile warhead, which was developed by Los
    Alamos and Sandia/New Mexico. A formal study that defined refurbishment
    options and their feasibility (known as a 6.2 study) was completed in
    2000. Livermore and Sandia/California participated as an
    Interlaboratory Peer Review team. In this role, the California team
    evaluated proposed modifications to the warhead for feasibility, aging
    effects on the modifications, impact to the DOE complex, and production
    issues. The W80 POG has selected a final refurbishment option for the
    LEP, and NNSA has assigned the associated engineering development task
    to Livermore and Sandia/California. This assignment better balances the
    workload among the laboratories and provides a vehicle for the
    laboratory to develop the skills of the next generation of stockpile
    stewards. The California laboratories will also be the design agencies
    for certifying the safety and reliability of the refurbished warheads,
    the W80 Mods 2 and 3. Los Alamos and Sandia/New Mexico will continue to
    be responsible for certification of the W80 Mods 0 and 1.
        During 2001, the New Mexico and California teams completed a
    baselining study to establish a modern understanding of the current W80
    and its performance. Livermore is now continuing to conduct above-
    ground experiments and simulations on the current warhead in
    preparation for beginning work on the LEP modifications. At this time
    there is a congressional hold on NNSA work for the LEP as the Air Force
    defines its plans for parallel life extension work on the cruise
    missiles themselves.

       ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP CAMPAIGNS

        As I have earlier described, stockpile stewardship campaigns are
    focused, technically challenging, multifunctional efforts that address
    critical capabilities that will be needed to achieve certification of
    stockpiled weapons as more challenging issues arise. Eight campaigns
    are aimed at providing the scientific understanding needed to certify
    the nuclear weapons stockpile and to support required weapon
    modernization in life extension programs. Three additional campaigns
    focus on weapon engineering. They provide specific tools, capabilities,
    and components in support of weapon maintenance, modernization, and
    refurbishment, as well as certification of weapon systems. The final
    six campaigns support readiness by focusing on sustaining the
    manufacturing base within the weapons complex. Examples of Livermore's
    major contributions to these multi-site campaigns are highlighted
    below.
    Experiments, Theory, and Modeling to Better Understand Plutonium
        One of the major success stories of the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program is the significant improvement we are making in understanding
    the properties of plutonium. This is a very important issue--we need to
    understand aging in plutonium and the effect of aging-related changes
    on the performance of an imploding pit of a stockpiled weapon. The
    required capacity of the production complex depends on the anticipated
    lifetime of plutonium pits in the stockpile. An accurate assessment is
    necessary. If we under estimate the lifetime of pits, we may over
    invest in facilities to remanufacture plutonium parts. If we over
    estimate the lifetime of pits, the Nation could find itself critically
    short of capacity for plutonium operations when it is vitally needed.
        Laboratory Experiments and Modeling. Available information
    indicates that plutonium used in pit applications is stable; however,
    we must assess the effects of long-term aging. Plutonium's properties
    are among the most complex of all the elements. To study the subtleties
    of plutonium, we have combined advances in theoretical modeling with
    the use of sophisticated experiments. For example, we are using old
    pits and accelerated-aging alloys to determine the lifetime of pits.
    Accelerated-aging samples are plutonium alloys with a mixture of
    isotopes to increase the rate of self-irradiation damage so that the
    material ``ages'' faster.
        Data from our materials, engineering, and dynamic experiments show,
    so far, that pits are stable. Livermore has conducted important
    experiments on old pits using advanced materials characterization tools
    such as our Transmission Electron Microscope, the most powerful such
    instrument in the NNSA complex. Using the Transmission Electron
    Microscope, we have discovered nanoscale (10-9 inch) bubbles
    that are likely filled with helium in the microstructure of aged
    plutonium. The plutonium appears to be accommodating the helium, which
    is created through self-irradiation, in a stable form. The presence of
    these bubbles was predicted theoretically using computer simulations of
    the radiation damage process.
        Experiments at the Nevada Test Site. Livermore is conducting sub-
    critical experiments at the Nevada Test Site to investigate the
    properties of plutonium shocked and accelerated by high explosives.
    Matter can be ejected from the free surface of materials that undergo
    shock. The experiments characterize ejecta, which is thought to affect
    the performance of primaries in weapons. Performance is being studied
    as a function of plutonium age as well as surface finish and
    manufacturing technique. Results will affect estimates of pit lifetime
    and decisions about future production of replacement pits, and improve
    our fundamental understanding of performance.
        Unlike our first three subcritical experiments, tests in the
    current Oboe series are performed inside individual confinement
    vessels. Eight of the nine planned Oboe experiments have been
    completed, two of them in 2001. By using small expendable vessels, up
    to 12 separate experiments can now be conducted in the same underground
    test chamber--the zero room--over several years. Following the test,
    after the chamber is determined to be contamination-free, personnel are
    allowed to enter the zero room to retrieve films and data. The use of
    the vessels for subcritical experiments is resulting in significant
    cost reduction and improved data return. In the past, each subcritical
    experiment followed a complex schedule with time-consuming
    preparations, and after each test, the zero room, with all its
    diagnostic equipment, was permanently contaminated and could not be
    reused.
        In addition, we are bringing into operation the Joint Actinide
    Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) Facility at the Nevada
    Test Site, a two-stage gas gun for performing shock tests on special
    nuclear materials. JASPER experiments, which are planned to start
    during this fiscal year, will complement other experimental and
    modeling activities by providing scientists more precise equation-of-
    state data at extreme conditions than can be obtained from other types
    of experiments. To support the planned JASPER experiments, two inert-
    atmosphere gloveboxes have been installed in the Device Assembly
    Facility (DAF). These gloveboxes will be used to assemble the special
    nuclear material targets into their final experimental configuration.
    We are now performing the final design modifications to the target
    chamber necessary to qualify the facility for use with plutonium.
    Modeling and Experiments to Probe Weapon Performance
        The Contained Firing Facility/Flash X-Ray Facility. Hydrodynamics
    testing is the most valuable experimental tool we have for diagnosing
    device performance issues for primaries in stockpiled weapons. Through
    hydrodynamics experiments conducted at Livermore's Site 300 and the
    Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) at Los
    Alamos, weapon scientists are able to characterize the energy delivered
    from the high explosives to a mock pit, the response of the pit to
    hydrodynamic shocks, and the resulting distribution of pit materials
    when they are highly compressed. These three pieces of information are
    critical for baselining weapons, certifying stockpile performance, and
    validating hydrodynamics simulation codes.
        Over the past decade, we have made tremendous advances in the
    development of diagnostics capabilities and experimental techniques
    used in hydrodynamic testing. We are now able to gather far more
    revealing data from hydrodynamic tests than was possible when we
    developed the weapons that are now in the stockpile. The most
    sophisticated type of hydro experiment is the ``core punch,'' in which
    scientists use high-energy radiography to record a digital image of the
    detailed shape of the gas cavity inside a pit when it is highly
    compressed. In 1998, we carried out the first core punches on two
    important stockpile primary devices: the W76 SLBM warhead and the B83
    strategic bomb.
        The Flash X-Ray Facility was shut down in 1999 and work began on an
    upgrade that will contain the debris created by explosive testing.
    Construction of the Contained Firing Facility is now finished, and the
    qualification testing has been completed to assure its ability to
    contain debris from experiments that use up to 60 kilograms of high
    explosives. The first stockpile-related experiment was executed last
    month. Livermore is now able to conduct these critically important
    experiments with isolation from the surrounding environment.
        Three-Dimensional Simulation of a Nuclear Weapon Explosion. Our
    hydrodynamic testing of mock primaries is complemented with a vigorous
    simulation program that achieved a remarkable milestone in October
    2001. The first-ever three-dimensional simulation of a full-system
    nuclear weapon explosion was completed using the ASCI White computer at
    Livermore. Demonstrating the ability to use a single code to simulate
    in three dimensions the operation of a full weapon system, from primary
    implosion through secondary explosion, marks a major step forward in
    our weapon simulation program. This achievement demonstrates an
    unprecedented capability for addressing the complex 3D behavior
    expected from an aging stockpile.
        The complex computer model that was used, called a ``burn code,''
    employs tens of millions of zones--hundreds of times more than a
    comparable two-dimensional simulation. The work was completed through
    an intense, sustained effort that involved weapons code developers and
    computer support personnel. It required innovative three-dimensional
    algorithms able to represent the relevant physical processes and run
    efficiently on the machine's parallel architecture. The simulation ran
    a total of 43 days on 1,024 processors of the ASCI White computer and
    produced tens of terabytes of data. Analyzing and preparing the data
    for visualization again required the parallel processing capability of
    ASCI White. This post-processing enabled our weapon scientists to get
    an accurate and detailed picture of the full operation of the weapon
    from beginning to end.
        Modeling and Experiments of High-Explosive. Some of the most
    technically challenging problems involve modeling the chemistry of
    detonation occurring at conditions up to 500,000 atmospheres pressure
    and many thousands of degrees centigrade. Conventional explosives have
    been successfully modeled in the past using the assumption of
    instantaneous reaction rate. The most advanced weapons in the stockpile
    use insensitive high explosives in which the detonation reaction rates
    are much slower. Livermore scientists have now linked a sophisticated
    chemistry code, Cheetah, to the hydrocode ARES. In the simulations of
    detonation, ARES determines the motion of the materials, Cheetah
    provides at each time step the state of chemical reactions and
    equation-of-state data for the relevant intermediate and final reaction
    products, which affects subsequent hydrodynamic performance. Although
    the work is in the early stages, simulations are identifying detonation
    phenomena not previous resolved.
        The safety of the stockpile continues to be of paramount
    importance. Although we believe that the stockpile is safe, the
    vulnerability of nuclear weapons to complex stimuli involving fire,
    mechanical crush, and shock remains a critical issue. To help meet this
    assessment challenge, we have developed the capability in the ALE3D
    code to simulate a weapon in a coupled thermal-chemical-mechanical-
    hydrodynamic environment, which is typical of a weapon in a fire
    scenario. An experimental effort is collecting fundamental material
    property data from which models are developed and then implemented in
    ALE3D. This capability is being used to help assess both weapon safety
    and safety issues at the Pantex Plant.
    High-Energy-Density Weapon Physics (HEDP) Calculations and Experiments
        To determine the performance of thermonuclear weapons, we need to
    accurately model how various types of radiation interact with their
    surroundings. The fundamental physical processes are particularly
    complex in the dynamic high-energy-density conditions present during
    the functioning of a weapon. Materials behave very differently at star-
    like pressures and temperatures. Modeling weapon performance is made
    even more difficult by the fact that many of the issues we need to
    consider are inherently three-dimensional. Weapons have been designed
    as one- or two-dimensional objects but they are in detail three-
    dimensional and age three dimensionally (e.g., cracks or other
    irregularities). To address these issues in the absence of nuclear
    testing requires high fidelity three-dimensional modeling that requires
    the computing power that ASCI promises to deliver. It also demands
    experimental facilities and capabilities that can generate data in the
    relevant regimes to develop and validate these models.
        High-Energy-Density Physics Experiments. Extraordinary progress
    continued to be made during the past year toward developing
    quantitative metrics for stockpile assessment and warhead
    certification. Analysis based on these metrics has been the basis for
    defining a detailed experimental weapons-physics program to be
    conducted at HEDP facilities. The Omega laser at the University of
    Rochester and the Z Machine at Sandia continue to be used effectively
    to examine physics issues important to improving our understanding of
    weapon performance, and to aid in the design and planning of future NIF
    experiments. For NIF, which will deliver nearly 60 times the energy
    density of Omega, we are actively working to develop the associated
    experimental infrastructure required to support those experiments.
    Although the assessment and warhead certification approaches of the
    national laboratories differ, they all require an enhanced
    understanding of HEDP weapon behavior as an essential component of
    their Stockpile Stewardship Programs. We are jointly exploring ways to
    collaborate closely on topics of mutual interest in this area while
    attempting to maintain a necessary level of independence in order to
    assure independent peer review of critical stockpile issues.
        High-Energy-Density Physics Modeling. Livermore researchers
    achieved a number of major three-dimensional HEDP simulation milestones
    during the past year. Two major milestones in 2001 were the first-ever
    three-dimensional simulation of the thermonuclear performance of a
    weapon secondary and the three-dimensional simulation of the integrated
    performance of a modern two-stage nuclear weapon. In addition to the
    codes developed to simulate nuclear weapon performance, the laboratory
    continues to develop the three-dimensional code HYDRA. In 2001 HYDRA
    was used to simulate the performance of targets being designed to
    achieve ignition and thermonuclear burn on the NIF in three dimensions.
    The simulations conducted this year included the first ever-integrated
    three-dimensional simulation of the entire ignition target (hohlraums
    and fusion capsule). All of the work cited above was carried out at the
    laboratory using the ASCI White supercomputer.
        accomplishments and challenges in technical base and facilities
        Assessments of weapon performance and certification of weapon
    refurbishments must be based on scientific and engineering
    demonstration to be credible. In the absence of nuclear testing, we
    rely on data from past nuclear tests as a benchmark, component-level
    experiments and demonstration, and advanced simulations for an
    integrated assessment of weapon performance and safety. This approach
    has enabled us to successfully certify the W87 life-extension
    refurbishment and address stockpile issues that have emerged to date.
    However, as the stockpile ages, we anticipate that more difficult
    issues will arise.
        These needs--to be able to assess and certify both weapon
    performance and refurbishment actions--drive the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program's investments in much more capable experimental facilities,
    such as the NIF, the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility
    and even more advanced hydro-test capabilities, and greatly enhanced
    numerical simulation tools developed through the Advanced Simulation
    and Computing (ASCI) program. We are not progressing as quickly as we
    could to acquire these greater capabilities because of competing needs
    for Stockpile Stewardship Program resources that must be balanced. The
    program must meet requirements for Directed Stockpile Work (e.g., life-
    extension programs) and pursue vigorous campaigns in weapons science
    and technology. In addition, the nuclear weapons complex is in need of
    infrastructure recapitalization to support all of these activities.
    Program success requires both efficient, flexible, and modern
    manufacturing facilities and a work environment at the laboratories and
    production facilities that makes it possible to attract and retain an
    exceptional staff. Here, the discussion focuses on two areas where much
    more capable research facilities are required--NIF and ASCI--and on the
    need for infrastructure reinvestment.
    The National Ignition Facility
        Construction is continuing at Livermore on the NIF, a major
    research facility housing a 192-beam laser and associated experimental
    capabilities. NIF will be the world's largest laser, delivering 60
    times more energy density than the Omega laser at the University of
    Rochester (and the previous Nova Laser at Lawrence Livermore),
    currently the largest laser in the NNSA High Energy Density Science
    program. NIF will provide 1.8 megajoules of ultraviolet laser energy
    that can be used to compress and heat a small capsule filled with
    deuterium and tritium to conditions at which thermonuclear fusion
    occurs. NIF is a cornerstone and essential element of the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program. It will also provide scientific and technical
    information that may eventually lead to practical fusion energy
    production.
        The baseline plan and schedule for NIF was included in General
    Gordon's certification of the NIF project, provided to Congress on
    April 6, 2001. The schedule provides for project completion at the end
    of fiscal year 2008, and the NIF team's goal in the coming year is to
    achieve ``first light'' by delivering four laser beams to the target
    chamber. The fiscal year 2002 budget provides $245 million for
    continued NIF construction and the fiscal year 2003 budget provides the
    requested $214 million. The pace of construction has now been
    constrained over the past 2 years by available annual funding in the
    overall NNSA/DP budget, and the project could be completed
    significantly earlier at a lower total cost if more funding were
    available in the near term.
        The Importance of NIF to Stockpile Stewardship. NIF is vital to the
    success of stockpile stewardship. It will be the only facility capable
    of well-diagnosed experiments to examine thermonuclear ignition and
    burn and to study the high-energy-density properties of primaries and
    secondaries in nuclear weapons. We need the facility for experimental
    study of key issues related to the effect of aging on weapons and for
    certification of the performance of refurbished weapons. In addition,
    NIF experiments provide the only available means for advancing critical
    elements of the underlying science of nuclear weapons. NIF experiments
    will provide necessary data for sophisticated computer simulation
    models being developed for stockpile stewardship, and the models
    themselves need to be tested in the physical conditions that only the
    NIF can provide. Finally, NIF will help to attract and train the
    exceptional scientific and technical talent that is required to sustain
    the Stockpile Stewardship Program over the long term.
        In April 2001, NNSA released the report of the High-Energy-Density
    Physics (HEDP) Workshop, held January 30-February 2, 2001. This report
    reconfirmed NIF's essential role in the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    and recommended that NIF be completed to its full 192-beam
    configuration on its baseline schedule. The Workshop Panel included
    representatives from DOE, NNSA, DOD, the three NNSA Laboratories, and
    Argonne National Laboratory. They reviewed presentations by experts in
    weapons design, high-energy-density science (HEDS), and Inertial
    Confinement Fusion (ICF) from the three laboratories that discussed
    options for NIF deployment, other HEDS facilities that can complement
    NIF, and Stockpile Stewardship Program needs for HEDS and weapons
    experiments/calculations for future stockpile certification.
        NIF Project Technical Progress and Accomplishments. Overall the NIF
    project is more than 60 percent complete. Major progress continues to
    be made and at a rapid pace. In September 2001 the NIF conventional
    facilities construction, a $270 million project, was completed on
    schedule and on budget. In October, the Project completed installation
    of one-quarter of NIF's beampath infrastructure. Now in place are the
    precision-cleaned enclosures for the components of 48 laser beams. A
    strong partnership between the laboratory, Jacobs Facilities Inc. (the
    contractor for installation, management, and integration), and the
    local building and crafts trade unions have enabled the Project to
    achieve these key milestones. We are continuing to install NIF
    infrastructure and at the end of March we have nearly one half or 96
    laser beams worth of precision-cleaned enclosures installed.
        The NIF team continues to make outstanding technical progress. Last
    year I cited numerous examples of progress on crystals, laser amplifier
    glass and optics damage mitigation. Now nearly 80 percent of the
    required 3,072 high-quality laser-glass slabs are in hand, and over
    half of the large crystals used for optical switches and frequency
    conversion have been grown. This year we have made even greater
    progress on the development of new optics polishing techniques that can
    reduce the damage potential of NIF optics much more than our
    requirements. We are currently implementing these new techniques at our
    vendors to provide the first optics for NIF's final focusing systems.
        NIF's clean-room facilities are being commissioned, and production
    has begun on some components. Validation of NIF's clean assembly,
    transport, and installation requirements was demonstrated with the
    installation of a laser-glass slab assembly into NIF's main amplifier.
    In addition:

             We have begun installing equipment into NIF's core
            area for generating seed laser pulses, controlling the entire
            laser system, and powering the laser amplifiers.
             We are nearing the point where we will begin
            installation of actual laser components, glass, optics,
            crystals, flashlamps, etc. for the operation of the first four
            laser beams in the coming months.

        In the coming year the NIF team's goal is to achieve ``first
    light'' by delivering four infrared laser beams through the entire
    laser chain into a diagnostics station. Soon after, these four laser
    beams will be transported to the final optics assembly where they will
    be converted to ultraviolet light and focused to the center of the
    target chamber. This achievement will serve to provide validation and
    confidence in all of NIF's systems and will allow operational
    activities to commence. As more of NIF comes on line, fundamental
    physics regimes for materials science, high-energy-density science, and
    thermonuclear ignition and burn will become accessible for study. NIF
    will provide temperatures and pressures needed to validate computer
    codes and address important issues of national security and basic
    science.
        Reviews of the NIF Project. Over the past 2 years, regular reviews
    of the NIF Project have been held every 6 months. These reviews are
    managed by NNSA Office of Defense Programs and bring together experts
    in a variety of technical, fiscal, and project management fields to
    thoroughly review the status of the NIF construction project. The most
    recent review was held in November 2001. Mr. Willie Clark, from NNSA's
    Office of Project Management and Engineering Support, led this review.
    The findings and conclusions of this review included:

             The project has made impressive progress and has been
            responsive to previous review team recommendations.
             A strong management team is in place; the NIF Project
            organization is functioning very effectively.
             Significant safety improvements have been made.
             Effectiveness of NNSA oversight has improved.

        In addition to these semi-annual reviews, NNSA staff in the Office
    of the NIF Project attend regular monthly Project reviews held at
    Livermore. These reviews provide detailed status reports and
    assessments of cost and schedule for the Project. We also provide
    quarterly reports on the NIF's construction project to the Deputy
    Secretary of Energy.
        Preparation for NIF's Experimental Program. With the rapid progress
    being made on the NIF Project, we are at once pleased and concerned
    that experiments on NIF are becoming a reality in the coming year. We
    are pleased because NIF's promising role in the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program will become evident even with the first few laser beams, which
    will provide more energy than the entire Omega laser, the world's
    largest currently operating laser system. We have planned a campaign of
    experiments for the first phase of NIF operations that will help
    provide important scientific data on stockpile-relevant materials and
    that may help us to enhance our ability to reach fusion ignition using
    large short-pulse laser systems.
        I am also concerned because the experimental program for NIF and
    for other high-energy-density science facilities is being placed under
    great pressure because of reductions in funding in the fiscal year 2003
    budget. These reductions place our experimental program in jeopardy by
    preventing the timely development and fielding of NIF's core diagnostic
    systems that are essential for collecting the data from experiments. We
    are also facing delays in the development and fabrication of the
    cryogenic target systems required for ignition experiments on NIF.
    Delay of these critical programs reduces our ability to provide NIF as
    a key facility for stockpile stewardship and impacts scheduled
    availability for upcoming Stockpile Life-Extension Programs.
        We are currently working with NNSA and General Gordon to better
    understand our options for fiscal year 2003 for these programs. Current
    projections, however, are not positive for providing for the effective
    utilization of NIF as it comes available in the next year.
    The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) Program
        The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program (formerly
    called the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative) is greatly
    advancing our ability to computationally simulate the performance of an
    aging stockpile and to certify the details of refurbishment projects.
    To make the needed major advances in weapons science and engineering
    simulation codes, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national
    laboratories are obtaining from U.S. industry dramatic increases in
    computer performance and information management. The ASCI program is
    integrating the development of computer platforms, simulation
    applications, and data management technologies. It will take a string
    of successive investments to achieve ASCI's long-term goals.
        Livermore's partnership with IBM has been highly successful. We
    took delivery of ASCI Blue Pacific in fiscal year 1998 and then ASCI
    White in fiscal year 2000. Both machines exceeded their performance
    requirements and are being used to support stockpile stewardship
    through a variety of applications, some of which I have discussed. The
    important next step in ASCI at Livermore is a supercomputer capable of
    60 to 100 TeraOps (trillion operations per second). It is planned for
    late 2004. Necessary funding was received in fiscal year 2002 to begin
    construction of the Terascale Simulation Facility to house this
    computer. The building will be available in time to accept it.
        ASCI White Successfully Meets Tri-Laboratory Needs for Stockpile
    Stewardship. In 2001, the laboratory was home to the world's most
    powerful supercomputer, the IBM ASCI White machine, which is capable of
    12.3 TeraOps. It was the latest step in ASCI's ambitious efforts to
    rapidly advance the state-of-the-art in computers, computational
    models, and data management tools needed to simulate the performance of
    nuclear weapons. It represented the first ``most capable'' system in
    the NNSA complex, a system of unique capability and the major resource
    for all three laboratories, two computing at a distance.
        ASCI White is based on the next-generation IBM processor, node, and
    switch technology. It consists of 512 nodes, each with 16 processors.
    Exceeding its contractual performance requirement of 10 TeraOps, the
    machine is about a factor of three faster than Livermore's Blue Pacific
    computer, which was used to perform the first ever 3D simulation of the
    full functioning of a nuclear weapon primary. The machine also provides
    over 8 trillion bytes (terabytes) of main memory and about 110
    terabytes of global disk space. This system was successfully used and
    shared since early 2001 by all three NNSA Laboratories. To meet each
    laboratory's requirements to run problems, calculations were
    interleaved in an integration schedule for the machine. Livermore
    successfully completed a three-dimensional secondary burn simulation in
    June 2001. The calculation demonstrated the modeling of 3D features at
    unprecedented resolution and validated scaling for several physics
    algorithms.
        Calculations done by Los Alamos and Livermore for the three-
    dimensional prototype full-system coupled simulation were both
    completed on ASCI White in late 2001. The size and scale of ASCI White
    allowed the two laboratories to employ a level of spatial resolution
    and depth of physics models that were heretofore completely beyond
    reach in 3D. The speed, large memory, and stability of White were
    essential elements contributing to the successful series of
    calculations executed to accomplish these calculations. Similar
    problems are now being run in support of additional calender year 2002
    and calendar year 2003 programmatic deliverables. Sandia also used ASCI
    White to perform structural dynamics calculations for different
    environments that weapons might encounter. One terabyte of core memory
    was used on each structural dynamics calculation in simulations that
    were completed in late September 2001 and set many world records. These
    calculations demonstrated effective use of computing capabilities at a
    distance.
        Simulation Modeling and the Problem-Solving Environment. ASCI is
    more than powerful computers; it is the development of advanced
    simulation techniques as well as data management and visualization
    tools. Three Gordon Bell Awards, two in 1999 and one in 2000, exemplify
    the outstanding simulation development capabilities at Livermore and a
    growing base of expertise in using the machines. Most notable was the
    1999 Gordon Bell Award for best performance in supercomputing. A team
    led by Livermore researchers, with collaborators at the University of
    Minnesota and IBM, solved a supercomputer problem with broad
    applications.
        Work by Los Alamos scientists provides a directly relevant example
    of data management progress in 2001. They were able to use
    visualization techniques developed by ASCI for the three-dimensional
    full system coupled simulation mentioned earlier. These tools allowed
    the scientists to run this calculation of unprecedented size on the
    Livermore 12-TeraOps system and then utilize the 32-node visualization
    partition on that computer to distill the data, send it back to Los
    Alamos, and interactively visualize the simulation results at Los
    Alamos. This capability was critical to enable Los Alamos' effective
    use of the system. The data not necessary for visualization was stored
    at unprecedented rates on the Livermore archive. For this particular
    calculation, Los Alamos stored 12.6 terabytes (roughly equivalent to 12
    million novels) in 13 hours in the Livermore archive, approximately 50
    times faster than would have been possible just 2 years earlier. Such
    advances in storage capability were necessary for the environment to
    function. They demonstrate the inherent balance necessary and careful
    planning undertaken in the ASCI simulation enterprise.
        Beyond ASCI White and the Terascale Simulation Facility. The next
    supercomputer at Livermore after ASCI White will move us much closer to
    ASCI's goal of full-scale simulation of weapons performance using
    advanced physics models with data derived from extensive, first-
    principles physics simulations. The threshold for that capability is
    100 TeraOps, and reaching the goal quickly is vital to success in
    stockpile stewardship. Plans call for ASCI ``Q'' (30 TeraOps) to be
    operational at Los Alamos in 2002, a 20-TeraOps machine at Sandia in
    2003, and a 60- to 100-TeraOps machine for Livermore late in 2004. At
    the onset of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, ASCI set as a goal the
    delivery of a 100 TeraOps computer by 2004. The machine at Livermore
    will be as close to 100 TeraOps as can be afforded within budget
    limitations. It is important that plans for the 60- to 100-TeraOps
    machine not slip.
        The 60- to 100-TeraOps machine will be very large, and will require
    the Terascale Simulation Facility (TSF) to house it. The congressional
    line-item funding for this project was sufficient to enter into a
    construction contract this year. This contract was recently signed and
    the groundbreaking ceremony occurred on April 4, 2002. The TSF will
    consist of a two-story computing facility with power and space to
    accommodate a 100-TeraOps-class system; assessment areas and networking
    control areas necessary for direction and assimilation of data; and a
    four-story office structure for staff to manage and utilize the
    simulation environment. We expect about 24,000 square feet of the
    machine room (of the 48,000 square feet planned) to be available and
    fully equipped to accept an ASCI-scale system by June 2004, just a few
    months ahead of the arrival of the system.
        The two machine rooms in TSF will guarantee our capability to site
    any system required by the program. The TSF will function more like an
    experimental facility than a computer center by supporting very close
    cooperation between staff and analysts. Round the clock support for
    major runs, restart capability for huge simulations, vast storage
    archives, first-class data assessment facilities and on-the-fly trouble
    shooting will support a mode of operations where ``runs'' will be
    viewed as ``shots,'' analogous to nuclear tests, requiring intense
    support to succeed. This was the model adopted by Livermore to support
    the White system, and it proved to be extremely successful.

    Infrastructure Recapitalization
        Stockpile stewardship requires major investments in new facilities
    and capabilities to make it possible for scientists and engineers to
    more thoroughly understand the performance of nuclear weapons. As
    discussed above, at Livermore these investments include construction of
    NIF and acquisition of ASCI supercomputers and the TSF. The Stockpile
    Stewardship Program will not succeed without the new-facility
    investments that are being made at the NNSA Laboratories. Scheduled
    programmatic work at the laboratories and the plants has also placed
    exceedingly high demands on provided funding. The cumulative effect of
    necessary continuing attention to the highest and most immediate
    priorities over the course of the Stockpile Stewardship Program has
    been shortage of funds to recapitalize NNSA's underlying
    infrastructure.
        In fiscal year 2002, funding began for NNSA's new facility
    reinvestment initiative. The initiative focuses on those underlying
    infrastructure needs at NNSA sites in support of directed stockpile
    work and campaign programmatic requirements. Livermore fully supports
    the initiative and is already working on several high-priority
    recapitalization and disposition projects utilizing first year funding.
    At Livermore, only 68 percent of our employees currently reside in
    permanent space, and 53 percent of the temporary office space (trailers
    and modular buildings) is nearing or beyond end-of-service life.
    Overall, over 35 percent of Livermore's office and laboratory space is
    less than adequate and in need of rehabilitation. Our overall
    maintenance backlog is about $420 million if directly funded (with
    programmatic dollars, for instance). In addition, obsolescent equipment
    needs to be replaced. For example, the laboratory struggles to keep
    pace with rapid advances in telecommunications capabilities, which are
    critically needed to use our supercomputers efficiently and securely
    and to upgrade our business operations. In addition, we have legacy
    facilities from long-discontinued programs as well as unusable or
    unsafe laboratory space that must be decommissioned, decontaminated
    (where necessary), and demolished. Our legacy facilities and other
    excess marginal space require considerable up-front investments to
    rectify. We also have to invest so that buildings at Livermore meet
    present-day seismic safety codes and the latest, more demanding safety
    criteria.
        Currently, we invest $8 to $10 million per year of overhead into
    reducing our maintenance backlog. Over the next 10 years, we estimate
    that Livermore will need an additional $25 million per year in new
    funding to apply to maintenance deficiencies, $10 million per year for
    demolition of its excess facilities, and $15 million per year to keep
    pace with technological changes. We will be working with NNSA to
    develop appropriate funding levels to address these concerns through
    the facility reinvestment initiative.
        Our overall infrastructure recapitalization goal is to provide and
    maintain high quality, technologically state-of-the-art facilities
    capable of meeting current and future mission requirements effectively
    and efficiently. It is also important to note that sustaining the
    quality of our workforce is a particularly challenging task in view of
    the high demand in the private sector for skilled people. These
    upgrades will provide quality facilities in order to attract and retain
    the exceptional workforce that we need to accomplish our missions.

       REDUCING THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATION OR TERRORIST ACQUISITION OF
                          WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

        National security is threatened by the proliferation and potential
    use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively referred
    to as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD). The events of September 11,
    2001, clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of free societies to
    devastation as a result of concerted efforts of extremists. Adding to
    this vulnerability are indications that terrorist groups, including the
    followers of Osama bin Laden, are attempting to acquire WMD. In
    addition, at least 20 countries, some of them hostile to U.S.
    interests, are suspected of or known to be developing WMD.
    Livermore's Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Program
        Livermore is applying its nuclear expertise to the challenge of
    nuclear weapons proliferation. Because the threat of proliferation is
    not restricted to nuclear weapons and in response to legislation
    calling for enhanced U.S. capabilities against WMD proliferation, we
    are also developing the technologies, analysis, and expertise needed to
    help stem the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. These
    activities build on the large investment in chemical and biological
    sciences at Livermore.
        Our program in nonproliferation, arms control, and international
    security is tackling the problem of WMD proliferation across the entire
    spectrum of the threat. We take a comprehensive approach to the problem
    with activities to prevent proliferation at the source, to detect and
    reverse proliferant activities, and to counter WMD terrorism.
        Improved scientific and technical capabilities are essential for
    WMD threat reduction. The NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation supports the bulk of the research and development
    activities that provide the technological base for those U.S. agencies
    with operational responsibility for characterizing foreign weapons
    programs and detecting proliferation-related activities, for detecting
    and mitigating the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S.
    civilians, and for negotiating and monitoring compliance with arms
    reduction and other agreements.
        Two aspects of the laboratory's contributions in 2001 to the
    National WMD nonproliferation effort are highlighted here:

             Assisting Government Agencies Defend Against WMD
            Terrorism. Long before September 11, 2001, Livermore was
            addressing the threat of WMD terrorism. We have developed
            technologies and tools to counter nuclear, chemical, and
            biological terrorist threats and are working closely with
            Federal, State, and local response agencies to ensure that our
            technological solutions meet real-world operational needs. Many
            of our counterterrorism technologies and technical capabilities
            have been deployed, before September 11 and in its aftermath,
            to assist State and local governments defend against WMD
            terrorism.
             Preventing Proliferation at the Source. Proliferation
            is most effectively halted at the source--of weapons-usable
            nuclear materials, of weapons-related technology, and of WMD
            expertise. We are a major player in the U.S.-Russian
            nonproliferation programs. These programs consist of an
            integrated set of activities to secure at-risk nuclear material
            in Russia, dispose of excess highly enriched uranium and
            plutonium, and assist in downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons
            complex by helping the Russian closed cities and weapons
            institutes develop self-sustaining commercial applications of
            their scientific and technical expertise.
    Assisting Government Agencies Defend Against WMD Terrorism
        Countering terrorism has been a central element of Livermore's
    national security mission for many years. The events of September 11
    have lent new urgency to our efforts to apply the laboratory's
    technologies, tools, and expertise to assist state and local
    governments in preparing to defend against and respond to WMD
    terrorism. Effective defense against terrorism requires the integration
    of science and technology with emergency response operations, which in
    turn requires coordination and collaboration between research and
    development (R&D) institutions like Livermore and the various Federal,
    State, and local emergency response agencies. We have made important
    and unique contributions to counterterrorism preparedness, and with
    increased resources we could do even more.
        Countering the Nuclear Threat. Our Nuclear Threat Assessment
    Program has provided comprehensive assessments of nuclear threats for
    more than 20 years. This program is also the Department of Energy (DOE)
    lead for assessing illicit trafficking in alleged nuclear materials. We
    apply long-standing Livermore expertise in nuclear materials, nuclear
    weapons, and device diagnostics to develop improved capabilities for
    dealing with radiological emergencies, including terrorist events. We
    are also a key participant in the DOE's national nuclear incident
    response groups, including the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (which
    deals with nuclear terrorism or extortion threats), the Accident
    Response Group (which responds in the event of an accident involving
    U.S. nuclear weapons) and the Radiological Assessment Program (which
    assists State and local agencies). Livermore maintains a deployable
    response capability, called HOTSPOT, which can be deployed to any
    location by military aircraft to provide local radiological field
    support.
        Specifically, the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP) provides
    technical and operational expertise to State and local agencies to
    mitigate the consequences of a radiological incident or emergency. It
    uses DOE and national laboratory experts with skills in assessing
    radiological and toxic contamination and the attendant risks to human
    health. The Livermore RAP team has primary responsibility for
    California, Nevada, Hawaii, and the U.S. Pacific Rim territories. It is
    called upon, on average, three to five times per year. In 2001, it
    responded to three requests for assistance along with normal exercises
    and training. Typically, RAP investigates containers suspected of
    housing radioactive materials, seeks the location of lost industrial or
    medical radioactive sources, and advises Federal, State, and local
    authorities on the consequences of a radioactive release or personnel
    contamination. RAP regularly drills with similar teams from other
    Federal agencies, State, local, and tribal governments as well as
    private companies and organizations. To deal with the latest emerging
    threats, RAP now includes training to recognize and respond to nuclear
    terrorism within the ``nuclear triage'' program being developed at DOE
    headquarters.
        Livermore has developed a concept for correlated sensor networks
    for detecting and tracking ground-delivered nuclear devices or nuclear
    materials. A novel algorithm integrates data from the various sensors,
    together with information from other sources (e.g., an intelligent
    traffic system) to identify sources of concern, track their movement
    through the road network, and guide responders in intercepting the
    suspect vehicle. This concept has been successfully demonstrated in an
    urban environment. We have had discussions with the County of Los
    Angeles concerning deploying a prototype system in the county in order
    to gain real-world experience with the network in a congested
    metropolitan area and to work with the appropriate response agencies to
    develop a concept of operations.
        Defending Against Bioterrorism. The biodefense capabilities that
    have been deployed in the wake of September 11 have, at their core,
    advances in biological detection instrumentation and DNA signatures
    made at Livermore and its sister laboratory at Los Alamos. We are
    developing gold-standard DNA signatures of top-priority threat
    pathogens (anthrax, plague, etc.) and are working with the Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to validate these signatures and
    distribute them to public health agencies nationwide.
        We have made technology breakthroughs in biodetection
    instrumentation, pioneering the miniaturization and ruggedization of
    both flow cytometry and DNA identification devices. Our miniature
    thermal cycler unit makes possible DNA amplification via polymerase
    chain reaction (PCR) and identification in minutes rather than the
    hours and days previously required. Livermore's miniaturized PCR
    technology has been licensed to private industry and forms the basis of
    today's most advanced commercial biodetection instruments (e.g.,
    Cepheid's Smart Cycler, ETG's handheld biodetector).
        The Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS),
    developed jointly by Livermore and Los Alamos, was deployed as part of
    the overall security strategy for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt
    Lake City. (Cepheid Smart Cyclers are the heart of the BASIS field
    laboratory.) In developing BASIS, Livermore and Los Alamos worked
    closely with the many law enforcement, emergency response, and public
    health agencies that would be involved in dealing with a bioterrorism
    event to develop appropriate sample handling (chain of custody),
    communications, and response protocols.
        Atmospheric Modeling for Consequence Management. The Atmospheric
    Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), located and operated at the
    laboratory, is a national emergency response service for real-time
    assessment of incidents involving nuclear, chemical, biological, or
    natural hazardous material. ARAC can map the probable spread of
    contamination in time for an emergency manager to decide whether
    protective actions are necessary. ARAC is on call to respond to real
    incidents and can also be used to evaluate specific scenarios for
    emergency response planning, such as optimizing the siting of
    bioaerosol samplers or determining evacuation routes.
        Since it was established in 1979, ARAC has responded to more than
    70 alerts, accidents, and disasters and has supported more than 800
    exercises. In addition to accidental radiological releases (e.g.,
    Chernobyl, 1986; Three Mile Island, 1979), ARAC has assessed natural
    and manmade disasters (Mt. Pinatubo volcanic ash cloud, 1991; Kuwaiti
    oil fires, 1991). ARAC has also provided assessments to State and local
    responders to toxic chemical accidents (e.g., Richmond sulfuric acid
    cloud, 1993; Sacramento River Spill, 1991). State and local agencies
    can request ARAC support for actual releases or planning by contacting
    DOE's Office of Emergency Response or the ARAC program office at
    Livermore.
        Chemical Analysis for Forensic Attribution. Timely and complete
    analysis of suspect chemicals can answer important questions related to
    nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement. Our Forensic
    Science Center has assembled a unique capability for detecting and
    characterizing ultratrace levels of virtually any compound in any
    sample matrix. Expertise and instrumentation are available for complete
    chemical and isotopic analysis of nuclear materials, inorganic
    materials, organic materials (e.g., chemical warfare agents, illegal
    drugs), and biological materials (e.g., toxins, DNA). The Forensic
    Science Center also develops advanced laboratory and field capabilities
    for ultratrace analysis, including a portable (55-pound) gas
    chromatograph/mass spectrometer, field kits for thin-layer
    chromatography, and novel sample collectors using solid-phase
    microextraction.
        The Forensic Science Center has begun the rigorous testing required
    to become the second U.S. laboratory certified by the Organization for
    the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is responsible for
    implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under the terms of
    the CWC, all samples collected from inspected facilities must be
    analyzed at two OPCW-designated laboratories. The U.S. Congress
    mandates that all U.S. samples be tested in the U.S. Currently, the
    U.S. has only one designated laboratory, the Edgewood Chemical and
    Biological Forensic Analytical Center. Livermore will provide the
    second required facility.
        Over the years, the Forensic Science Center has responded to many
    requests from law enforcement for assistance in forensic analysis of
    unique samples. The Center has been brought in to analyze the ``cold
    fusion'' explosion at SRI International, Supernote counterfeit bills,
    methamphetamine samples, biotoxins, suspect chemical-warfare specimens,
    and nuclear contraband. It has characterized explosive traces from the
    1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Unabomber case, and the Fremont
    serial bomber; performed forensic sleuthing related to the Riverside
    ``mystery fumes'' case; and analyzed samples for the Glendale ``Angel
    of Death'' case. Locally, the Center assisted Livermore police by
    rapidly identifying a vapor that sickened response personnel at the
    scene of a suicide; once the chemical was identified (malathion), law
    enforcement agencies were able to take appropriate personnel-protection
    measures and complete their investigation.
        At the height of the anthrax incidents, the Forensic Science Center
    was called upon to analyze a suspect powder found at a local business.
    Livermore scientists worked through the night to complete the analysis,
    confirming that the powder was harmless.
        New Search and Inspection Technologies. There is a pressing need
    for technologies to improve the screening of passengers, baggage, and
    cargo. Candidate technologies, in various stages of development at
    Livermore, include computed tomography (CT), x-ray scanning, gamma-ray
    imaging, neutron interrogation, and ultrasonic and thermal imaging. We
    have recently established a national test bed for cargo container
    experiments. This facility will provide a nationally available test bed
    for determining whether inspection technologies in use and under
    development can be scaled to the magnitude of the shipping container
    problem. Outside agencies will be able to make measurements, using
    national laboratory or their own equipment and measurement techniques,
    on actual and mock weapons materials in actual cargo containers. Under
    DOE direction, Livermore will operate this test bed as a national
    service, providing a common basis for the comparison and evaluation of
    alternative approaches.
        Two laboratory-developed search technologies demonstrated their
    applicability to counterterrorism response when they were deployed to
    the World Trade Center. The first, a micropower radar, can ``see'' many
    feet into concrete rubble and could be a valuable tool for search and
    rescue operations. The other, a remote monitoring instrument that uses
    hyperspectral data to detect and identify trace gas emissions, was
    flown over Ground Zero to characterize hazardous gases emanating from
    the rubble pile.
        Avoiding Surprise about Adversaries. One of the most critical, yet
    difficult, elements of homeland security and counterterrorism is
    gaining insight into the capabilities, intentions, and plans of
    persons, groups, or States hostile to the U.S. Our International
    Assessments Program (Z Division) is one of the strongest capabilities
    in the country for analysis and research related to foreign nuclear
    weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including early-stage
    foreign technology development and acquisition, patterns of
    cooperation, and foreign cyber threats. This capability is more
    important than ever before, as the bipolar (U.S.-Soviet) world has
    disintegrated into a melange of traditional allies, regional and tribal
    allegiances, and transnational extremist groups. In the aftermath of
    September 11, we provided intelligence analysts and assessments as well
    as information-operations tools and expert personnel to the U.S.
    Intelligence Community. Our assessments of foreign weapons programs and
    activities provide important input to policy makers and diplomats as
    they develop strategies for U.S. responses to events affecting national
    security.
        Risk and Vulnerability Assessments of Critical Facilities. Through
    our participation in DOE's Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Program,
    we have made systematic assessments of the threat environment, cyber
    architecture, physical and operational security, policies and
    procedures, interdependencies, impact analysis, risk characterization,
    and possible mitigation measures for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in
    Salt Lake City, 11 electric and gas infrastructures, and several
    independent service operators (ISOs), including the California ISO
    during the past summer's electrical energy crisis.
        We have analyzed the vulnerability of buildings, dams, and other
    structures to catastrophic damage from earthquakes and explosive
    events. For example, we have also evaluated the earthquake
    vulnerability of major bridge structures (including the Golden Gate and
    San Francisco-Oakland Bay bridges), the structural integrity of nuclear
    material shipping containers for a variety of impact scenarios, and the
    likely damage resulting from the explosion of natural gas storage tanks
    in a suburban environment.
        Expert Personnel Assisting Homeland Security Agencies. A number of
    Livermore scientists serve on various task forces, committees, and
    advisory groups dealing with aspects of homeland security and
    counterterrorism. For example, a Livermore expert on x-ray imaging is a
    member of the National Academy of Science Committee on Assessment of
    Technology Deployed to Improve Commercial Aviation Security. Other
    laboratory scientists serve as technical advisors to the U.S. Customs
    Service, the National Guard, and the Los Angeles Emergency Operations
    Center, and as members or advisors to various Defense Science Board
    task forces addressing homeland defense. Still others are assisting the
    California State Office of Emergency Services (OES) with training
    related to weapons of mass destruction and as members of the California
    Council on Science and Technology, which is providing technical advice
    to the OES's State Strategic Committee on Terrorism.
        Engineering a Novel Truck-Stopping Device. In October 2001, the
    Governor of California contacted Livermore requesting assistance to
    develop a means of stopping tanker trucks, to keep hijacked trucks from
    becoming motorized missiles. The objective was to make it possible to
    stop these large trucks using equipment readily available to peace
    officers, namely their vehicles and their weapons. A retired Livermore
    engineer and consultant teamed with laboratory engineers, technicians,
    and heavy equipment operators to develop a simple mechanical device to
    accomplish this. It can be readily attached to the back of a tanker
    truck. When bumped from the rear by the patrol vehicle, the device
    would cause the trailer braking system to lose air pressure
    automatically locking the trailer brakes. A prototype was demonstrated
    in Oakland in late November, and remote-controlled testing at high
    speeds was conducted at the Nevada Test Site in February and March.

    Preventing Proliferation at the Source
        With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 10 years ago, arose the
    threat of materials and expertise related to WMD leaking from Russia to
    terrorists or countries of concern. Lawrence Livermore is a major
    player in the U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs, which are
    striving to stem proliferation at its source. These programs consist of
    an integrated set of activities to secure at-risk nuclear material in
    Russia, dispose of excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and
    assist in downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons complex by helping the
    Russian closed cities and weapons institutes develop self-sustaining
    commercial applications of their scientific and technical expertise.
        In light of the current focus on countering terrorism, we must not
    lose sight of the importance of these and other nonproliferation
    programs. By securing weapon materials, technologies, and expertise at
    the source, we keep the raw ingredients for weapons of mass destruction
    out of the hands of proliferators and terrorists. Attempts to counter
    WMD terrorism without simultaneously working front-end issues will not
    solve the problem.
        Protection and Control of Nuclear Materials and Accounting (MPC&A).
    The security of Soviet-legacy nuclear materials is critical to the
    security of the U.S. Through the NNSA's MPC&A Program, we are helping
    various Russian sites improve the protection of their fissile
    materials. Livermore specializes in vulnerability assessment, gamma ray
    spectroscopy, access control and security system integration, and
    information systems. We lead the MPC&A project teams for Chelyabinsk-
    70, Sverdlovsk-44, Bochvar Institute, and Krasnoyarsk-45 and provide
    project support for seven other sites.
        Of the various laboratories involved in the MPC&A Program,
    Livermore is unique in its role with the Russian Navy. Since the work
    began in 1997, MPC&A upgrades for four nuclear refueling ships have
    been completed and commissioned. Our activities at the Russian Navy
    facilities have been some of the most successful of the entire MPC&A
    Program. Success is attributable to the combination of a highly focused
    user (the Russian Navy), an excellent subcontractor and system
    integrator (the Kurchatov Institute), and a highly trained team of NNSA
    and national laboratory personnel that has built an excellent working
    relationship with the Russian personnel. In September 2000, MPC&A
    cooperation was formalized through an implementing agreement between
    the Russian Navy and the NNSA that included further cooperation at
    Russian nuclear weapon storage sites. Work at a number of these sites
    is under way and is meeting with the same success as previous
    activities with the Russian Navy.
        We participate in the NNSA's Second Line of Defense Program,
    designed to curtail the illicit transport of items of nuclear
    proliferation concern from Russia. Together with other participating
    DOE laboratories, we are working with the Russian Customs Service to
    equip high-risk border crossings with radiation detection equipment.
    Moscow's Sheremetyovo International Airport complex and a port on the
    Caspian Sea were equipped in October 1998. Seven other sites (including
    several possible transit points to Iran or North Korea) have been
    identified as high priority, and equipment is being installed. This
    past year, we completed, jointly with our Russian collaborators, a
    training manual and curriculum that will be used by more than 30,000
    front-line Russian customs officials. In addition, several training
    courses on dual-use export controlled items were developed and
    incorporated into the Russian Customs Academy's professional
    curriculum.
        Downsizing the Russian Nuclear Weapon Complex. To help accelerate
    the downsizing of the Russian weapons complex and to prevent displaced
    weapons workers from seeking employment with potential proliferators,
    the U.S. and Russia have launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI),
    a cooperative program to create self-sustaining civilian jobs for
    displaced workers in the closed nuclear cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and
    Zheleznogorsk.
        We are leading a medical technology development project with the
    Avangard Electromechanical Plant (a weapons assembly facility) at
    Sarov. In September 2001, lengthy negotiations led by Livermore
    scientists culminated in a formal partnership agreement between the
    Avangard Electromechanical Plant and Fresenius Medical Care (the
    world's largest provider of products for individuals with chronic
    kidney failure) to establish a commercial medical products
    manufacturing facility at Sarov. Eventually, the Avangard/Fresenius
    project will employ hundreds of former weapons workers in the
    production of dialysis equipment and treatment kits. This agreement
    represents a major milestone in U.S. efforts to engage a Russian serial
    production facility.
        We are also involved in the NNSA's Initiatives for Proliferation
    Prevention (IPP), which focus on helping Russian research institutes
    find commercial nonweapons applications of their technical specialties.
    In spite of difficulties created by limitations on LLNL's ability to
    establish new contracts and requirements that IPP payments be free of
    Russian taxes, progress has been made on many existing projects. For
    example, LLNL has teamed with Cyclotec Medical Industries and the
    Biophysical Laboratory (Biofil) Ltd., a spin-off from the Russian
    Federal Nuclear Center Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF,
    Arzamus-16), to develop and manufacture transcutaneous electrical nerve
    stimulation (TENS) devices for noninvasive treatment of traumatic
    short-term pain. TENS devices deliver low levels of electrical pulses
    that inhibit or interfere with the transmission of pain signals to the
    brain. Under this IPP project, TENS devices have been miniaturized and
    incorporated into adhesive-bandage- and orthotic- (splint and brace)
    type materials. The IPP-developed device is an order of magnitude
    smaller and lighter than products with similar functionality at one-
    quarter of the cost. The components for these devices will be
    manufactured in Russia and then shipped to the U.S. for testing and
    assembly. The total U.S. market for pain control products,
    pharmaceuticals, therapy, devices, and implants is estimated to be more
    than $2 billion. The U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) has
    advised Cyclotec that it will recommend the use of the company's TENS
    products as ``viable alternatives to drugs for pain relief.''
        Promoting Regional Security through Science and Technology
    Cooperation. As the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Israel
    highlight, regional conflicts are fraught with the potential to
    escalate rapidly, both in the level of violence and in the number of
    players. This escalation potential is particularly worrisome when the
    participants already possess or are striving to acquire weapons of mass
    destruction. In order to promote security and stability in these
    regions of concern, rather than attempting to intervene once conflict
    has spiraled out of control, we are supporting science and technology
    cooperation as a mechanism of engagement that is nonthreatening and
    beneficial to all involved.
        Together with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and under the aegis
    of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
    Organization (UNESCO), we have collaborated with seismological
    organizations from Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Authority,
    Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Oman in a seismology
    technical working group. This topic is of widespread concern in the
    area, given its active seismicity and recent damaging earthquakes in
    Turkey, Greece, India, and Afghanistan.
        We are also participating in a number of projects in Central Asia.
    Some of these projects involve collaboration on radiation detection
    technologies, with the goal of improving border security in the region
    to prevent illicit smuggling of nuclear materials. Other projects are
    characterizing the composition and flow of groundwater and associated
    contaminants in an attempt to improve the preservation and use of
    regional water resources. Water--quality and quantity--is an important
    transboundary issue in Central Asia, affecting decisions related to the
    transport of oil and natural gas across the Caspian Sea, hydroelectric
    versus agricultural use of water, and contamination due to Soviet
    legacy issues.
        These collaborations leverage Lawrence Livermore capabilities in
    seismic monitoring and event analysis, radiation detection
    technologies, modeling of the flow of water and contaminants in
    underground aquifers, atmospheric science, biology and genomics, and
    energy resources. The projects can provide real benefits in, for
    example, interdicting illicit smuggling associated with weapons of mass
    destruction and reducing environmental stresses that undermine public
    health and regional economics. By speaking the common language of
    science and promoting cooperation on relatively ``safe'' transboundary
    issues, these projects can also help to develop indigenous capabilities
    that improve the regional standard of living, thereby enhancing
    stability and security in critical areas of the world and, ideally,
    removing motivations for the acquisition of weapons of mass
    destruction.

                        POST-SEPTEMBER 11 SITE SECURITY

        Our response to the terrorist attacks on September 11 included
    swift actions to enhance the security of the laboratory and to
    reevaluate what additional security measures are appropriate in view of
    the changed threat. Livermore's Safeguards and Security program is
    designed to protect special nuclear materials and classified
    information as well as personnel, property, and the public. A layered
    approach is used to both physical and cyber security with the amount of
    protection and the types of access controls provided depending on the
    relative attractiveness of the asset.
        Post-September 11, we quickly took effective steps to provide a
    more robust site security posture at the laboratory. Livermore now
    operates routinely at heightened security. Closure of non-essential
    perimeter gates and roadways near the nuclear materials ``Superblock,''
    increased patrols and random searches, additional armed officers at
    perimeter entry points, 100 percent search of all truck deliveries are
    among the measures being taken. To meet staffing needs to sustain the
    posture, we have embarked on an aggressive hiring and training effort.
    We also continue to improve our cyber security defenses, and the
    laboratory has received funding to implement several physical security
    enhancements.
        It is important that funding keep pace with the demands for greater
    security. In the area of cyber security, the threat continues to grow
    in sophistication while funding levels to implement upgrades remain
    nearly flat. As for physical security, the laboratory has aggressively
    pursued technology solutions as a cost-effective alternative to
    increasing staff. An example is our development and continual
    improvement over the past 14 years of the Argus system for access
    control and alarm station management, which is now widely used in the
    DOE complex to significantly reduce staffing needs. The ``Smart
    Camera'' technology that Livermore developed is now being applied at
    the laboratory, and other NNSA sites are eager to install it. There are
    numerous other areas where research and develop funding is needed to
    make technological advances that would reduce staffing requirements
    and/or provide greater security without increasing workforce size.
        One factor that could radically modify workforce requirements and
    budgets for Safeguards and Security at the laboratory is DOE's policies
    with regard to protection strategies, the Design Basis Threat (DBT),
    and the capabilities afforded potential adversaries. The DBT is being
    reexamined post-September 11.
        In addition, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia/California national
    laboratories are taking steps to deal with a long-standing issue--the
    physical proximity of East Avenue. The road runs between the two
    laboratories and both have significant facilities close to it.
    Controlled access to East Avenue would provide enhanced security for
    facilities and personnel. We have DOE, political, and public support
    for moving forward on closure of East Avenue. Alameda County, the City
    of Livermore, and our neighbors are receptive to the proposal, and we
    are looking at methods to fast-track the project. NNSA has given the
    project high priority and is providing funding for a conceptual design.

                   ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AT THE LABORATORY

        We are very concerned about the proposed fiscal year 2003 budget
    for Environmental Management efforts at the laboratory, which
    constitutes a reduction of about 27 percent from the fiscal year 2002
    allocation. The laboratory requires an additional $17.5 million above
    the budget request to maintain its existing Environmental Management
    program. Specifically, $8.1 million must be added to maintain the
    baseline groundwater cleanup program, and $9.4 million must be added
    for activities to manage newly generated wastes.
        Environmental Restoration. Considerable work has been done to
    remediate soil and groundwater contamination at the laboratory's main
    site and Site 300 to reduce risks, meet community interests, and
    satisfy regulatory requirements under Federal Facility Agreements. Both
    sites are on the Superfund list. The majority of the contamination at
    the main site occurred during World War II when it was a Naval Air
    Base. Solvents used to clean airplane engines were spilled on the
    ground, and they eventually leaked into the groundwater resulting in
    the current contaminant plumes. Discontinued Laboratory operations also
    contributed to the contamination, which threatened the drinking water
    for the nearby City of Livermore. Site 300, located 13 miles from the
    main site, has been used for high-explosives research and testing. Past
    operations resulted in the release of hazardous and radioactive
    materials.
        Specific actions such as characterization of suspected contaminated
    areas, as well as the design, construction, and operation of treatment
    facilities have been negotiated and agreed to with the regulators and
    stakeholders in order to accomplish satisfactory cleanup.
    Unfortunately, shrinking budgets in recent years have made it extremely
    difficult to maintain the level of progress and to meet all of the set
    requirements and schedules despite the laboratory's best efforts to
    accomplish needed work using innovative and cost-effective methods. As
    a result, regulatory commitments are not being met in as complete and
    timely a manner as desired, and contamination may continue to spread,
    increasing the magnitude of the problem and cleanup costs.
        With the proposed cuts in the fiscal year 2003 Environmental
    Restoration budget, Livermore will miss critical cleanup milestones
    that have been negotiated by DOE with the State of California and the
    Environmental Protection Agency. Much of the existing groundwater
    cleanup equipment and operations will be shut down, leaving potentially
    contaminated areas unevaluated and allowing some areas with known
    contaminated groundwater plumes to continue to spread unchecked toward
    farming and residential areas. The amount of sampling, analysis, and
    regulatory reporting will decrease significantly; and there will be a
    significant delay in the cleanup of both the main Livermore site and
    Site 300.
        Waste Management. Despite successful efforts over the last 5 years
    to reduce waste management costs, increases in DOE and regulatory
    requirements, coupled with yearly budget reductions, have put the
    laboratory in a difficult position. The proposed reduction for fiscal
    year 2003 is particularly large--$14.8 million compared to $21.3
    million authorized in fiscal year 2002 and $23.7 million required to
    sustain waste management activities at the laboratory, which must meet
    State and Federal regulations.
        Hazardous waste management has two components to its budget. There
    is the basic cost of maintaining day-to-day operations and managing
    wastes of all types in a safe and compliant manner. There is also a
    proposal to clean up the laboratory's legacy waste. Livermore has over
    2,200 cubic meters of legacy mixed, low-level, and transuranic wastes
    in storage in facilities that should be relocated. Some of this
    material has been in storage for over 15 years; most of the waste has
    been stored outside and exposed to effects of weather; and container
    integrity is a looming issue.
        Under the current proposed budget, it will be impossible to meet
    the laboratory's programmatic needs with a safe, compliant waste
    management program. This will have severe impacts on the national
    security mission and will cause certain programmatic activities to be
    deferred and/or cancelled. In particular, because of Livermore's
    limited waste management handling capabilities, a number of critical
    research and development programs that generate RCRA-regulated waste
    will be put on hold to maintain compliance. In addition, all stored
    radioactive waste will remain at Livermore because there will not be
    funding available for disposal off site. Lack of space will prevent the
    laboratory's Hazardous Waste Management Department from accepting newly
    generated radioactive waste. This will shut down critical work on
    stockpile stewardship. Furthermore, the proposed budget does not
    include sufficient funding to begin waste management operations in the
    new $62-million Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF),
    which features modern and safer technologies. Mixed and radioactive
    waste that has been stored on site for many years will continue to be
    stored outdoors instead of in the new facility.
        The DOE Environmental Management Cleanup Reform Fund. The
    laboratory has submitted a proposal to obtain an additional $30 million
    for accelerated environmental cleanup from the Environmental Management
    Cleanup Reform fund, which DOE proposes to create as part of the fiscal
    year 2003 Environmental Management budget. We believe our proposal to
    be very competitive; however, an award from this fund will not
    adequately replace the $17.5 million shortfall in funding needed to
    maintain our existing Environmental Management program. For Livermore
    to qualify for any of the funds, the State of California will have to
    renegotiate its compliance agreements, which is one of the
    requirements.

                                SUMMARY REMARKS

        The Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to make excellent
    technical progress in many areas, some of which I have highlighted
    here: notably, the W87 ICBM warhead life extension, completion of the
    Contained Firing Facility, progress on construction of the National
    Ignition Facility, the dedication and use of the ASCI White
    supercomputer, progress on future ASCI plans at Livermore, and numerous
    scientific and technical achievements that are improving our
    understanding of the aging of nuclear weapons and weapon performance.
    However, many difficult challenges lie ahead. There is continuing need
    for a strongly supported and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program to
    maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear
    deterrent over the long term. The NNSA's 5 year plan for Defense
    Programs reflects the need for a strong program, and I support NNSA's
    plan and the budget request for fiscal year 2003.
        Strong and sustained support is likewise needed for our activities
    directed at reducing the threat posed by the proliferation and
    terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. As I have
    highlighted, Lawrence Livermore and our sister NNSA Laboratories made
    unique and important contributions to homeland security post-September
    11. We were able to respond so rapidly and effectively because of the
    technical and operational capabilities we had developed over the past
    decade and more to deal with the WMD terrorist threat. Although these
    technologies and systems performed extremely well, surpassing our
    highest expectations in many cases, still-better capabilities are
    needed to effectively protect the U.S. homeland from the threat of WMD
    terrorism. September 11 demonstrated the high level of technical
    innovation, operational sophistication, and determination of today's
    terrorists. The challenge we face in defending against such determined
    adversaries will only grow greater in the years to come. The Nation
    must make a sustained commitment and long-term investment in the
    research and development required to create the improved warning,
    detection, and response capabilities needed tomorrow and in the future.
        Post-September 11, we quickly instituted a more robust site
    security posture at the laboratory. This heightened level of security
    has become the norm, and we have embarked on an aggressive hiring and
    training effort to meet staffing needs to sustain this posture. It is
    important that funding keep pace with demands for heightened security.
    Funding is also a concern in the area of Environmental Management. The
    progress we have made in remediating soil and groundwater contamination
    is in jeopardy with the proposed fiscal year 2003 budget. At the
    proposed funding level, we will be unable to meet currently negotiated
    Federal Facility Agreements or to operate a compliant waste management
    program that meets facility infrastructure needs. It will also be
    impossible to support Livermore's programmatic needs with a safe,
    compliant waste management program. This will have severe impacts on
    the national security mission and will cause certain programmatic
    activities to be deferred and/or cancelled.
        Finally, I wish to express my appreciation again for the support
    that this committee has provided for the important national security
    work that Lawrence Livermore performs for the country, during my tenure
    as director and throughout the laboratory's history. We are celebrating
    our 50th anniversary this September and looking forward to the next
    half-century of service to the Nation. Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory has a bright future with your continuing support.
                                     ______

                     Prepared Statement by Dennis R. Ruddy

        Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that my written testimony be
    included in the record.
        My name is Dennis Ruddy. I am President and General Manager of BWXT
    Pantex, which manages the National Nuclear Security Administration's
    Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas.
        Since BWXT Pantex assumed operations of the plant a little more
    than a year ago, we have made significant progress in fulfilling the
    site's important national security missions:

             Evaluate, retrofit, and repair weapons in support of
            both life extension programs and certification of weapon safety
            and reliability;
             Dismantle weapons that are surplus to the strategic
            stockpile;
             Sanitize components from dismantled weapons;
             Develop, test, and fabricate chemical and explosive
            components; and
             Provide interim storage and surveillance of plutonium
            components.

        BWXT Pantex is preparing to accomplish future work that will
    provide a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile for many years to
    come. That preparation involves improving our infrastructure and
    technology within a new security environment to ensure our ability to
    meet Stockpile Life Extension Program objectives.
        I believe we all recognize the challenge of providing for the
    security of our facilities and our personnel in the wake of the events
    of September 11, 2001. Immediately after the tragic events of that day,
    we implemented a contingency plan to ensure the security of the site
    and our personnel. Since that time, we have enhanced security in a wide
    variety of areas. We increased security patrols around the site,
    tightened our requirements to access the facility, improved our
    physical security systems and replaced equipment that was beginning to
    show its age. While our workforce, and particularly our security force,
    has responded admirably, these enhancements have not come without
    costs. This fiscal year, more than $16 million in supplemental funding
    has been given to Pantex to cover these expenses. This amount is over
    and above the $68 million originally earmarked for Pantex security.
        Much of this funding has been used to cover overtime for our
    security force. Before September 11, our security guards normally
    worked 12 hours a day, on 4 consecutive days. Then, they had 4 days
    off. Since September 11, they have worked 6 consecutive 12-hour days,
    then been given 2 days off. In order to meet the NNSA's new security
    requirements, reduce our overtime, and put our guards back on a more
    reasonable work schedule, we established a target to hire 140
    additional security officers by the end of this fiscal year. Through
    operational efficiencies and other security enhancements, we are
    seeking to reduce this new staffing to 109 additional officers. Either
    number will be a significant increase in security personnel compared to
    our staffing before the terrorist attacks. In addition to personnel
    additions, we are currently considering other security enhancements and
    their associated costs. In order to develop these security improvements
    and retain our new personnel, permanent increases in security funding
    will have to be made a priority.
        Despite the increased attention that we have given to security, our
    mission to support stockpile stewardship remains our primary focus. The
    Nation still depends on a reliable nuclear deterrent to protect our
    country and our allies, and BWXT Pantex is committed to safely
    providing weapons of the highest quality to our customer. As we look
    ahead, we see that the majority of our weapons dismantlement workload
    will be complete by 2008. Our weapons evaluation workload remains
    steady for the foreseeable future. Beginning in 2005, we are planning
    for a surge in work to support the Stockpile Life Extension Program
    (SLEP) effort. The additional SLEP workload will involve modifications
    to nine weapon systems and will bring with it additional evaluation
    requirements.
        Unfortunately, projected budgets in fiscal year 2003 through fiscal
    year 2007 do not currently correspond with our projected workload.
    Beginning in fiscal year 2005, we see a $12 million to $16 million per
    year difference between our budget needs and the NNSA's FYNSP funding
    targets for weapons work. The FYNSP targets in the Campaigns area are
    $2 million to $7 million per year less than needed beginning in fiscal
    year 2003, a shortfall that impacts technology developments necessary
    to complete SLEP work. However, the largest reductions are seen in the
    Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) area. Beginning in
    fiscal year 2004, shortages ranging from $32 million to $42 million
    each year will severely impact our ability to meet NNSA workload needs.
        Although much of the budget shortfall is seen in later years, we
    have particular concern over the effect of Campaigns and RTBF funding
    in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 on SLEP work. The military is
    depending on SLEP to provide a safe, secure nuclear deterrent for many
    years to come. We see that reductions in Campaigns and RTBF funding in
    fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 will delay or eliminate
    technological and facility improvements needed to implement the SLEP
    schedule on time.
        As I have testified to this group before, we have significant
    infrastructure needs at Pantex. I am happy to report that thanks to the
    increased funding that we have received, we have made progress in
    improving our infrastructure. The fiscal year 2001 plus-up and
    supplemental funding of approximately $15 million allowed us to make
    some roof repairs to prevent leaks in weapons production facilities and
    replace some aging equipment necessary for our work. In fiscal year
    2002, we are receiving $22 million in Facilities and Infrastructure
    Recapitalization Program (FIRP) funds and a plus-up of at least $20
    million. These monies will be carefully used to make additional roof
    repairs, replace obsolete fire alarm systems, and carry out much-needed
    maintenance in a wide variety of areas.
        Still, there is much to be done. We had a $218 million backlog in
    infrastructure needs in fiscal year 2000. That number increased to $262
    million in fiscal year 2001. The FIRP funds mentioned earlier will
    allow the fiscal year 2002 infrastructure backlog to decrease to
    approximately $248 million. (See Figure 1.) As this chart shows, we
    have turned the corner and are beginning to decrease the deferred
    maintenance backlog. While we are spending our infrastructure funds on
    the highest-priority items, the fact remains that more than 50 percent
    of the plant's square footage is over 25 years old. Many building
    elements are at the end of their service life and require restoration.
    We cannot meet the future infrastructure requirements of the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program without continued expenditures to keep our
    facilities in the condition necessary for high-quality, safe nuclear
    weapons work.

        Another key factor in our ability to support stockpile stewardship
    in the long term is the recruiting and retention of employees with
    critical skills. BWXT Pantex has taken a proactive approach to
    recruiting, retaining, and developing the critical skills necessary to
    accomplish future weapons work. We have identified the critical skills
    in engineering, science, and other areas necessary for us to maintain
    and grow our technical basis for weapons work. Of the 1,174 positions
    we consider to be critical, we have only 78 vacancies. This is an
    improvement over the 200 critical skill vacancies we had 1 year ago. In
    addition to outside hiring, we have initiated two new programs to
    develop our employees from within. Late last year, BWXT Pantex
    announced the development of an Engineering Graduate Studies Program in
    conjunction with Texas Tech University, West Texas A&M University, and
    the Amarillo Economic Development Corporation. This program is allowing
    our employees and other workers in the community to earn advanced
    engineering degrees locally. We also worked with West Texas A&M to
    develop an Employee MBA program to allow our workers to receive
    advanced instruction in business. Both of these programs have been very
    well received by our employees and will provide us with a higher
    quality workforce in the years to come. As long as our budgets remain
    stable, we will be able to offer a working environment that helps
    attract and retain people with the key skills that we need.
        As our workload at Pantex increases, so does the amount of
    oversight at our plant and other sites around the Complex. While we
    recognize and agree with the need for independent evaluation of our
    results, the growing oversight into our processes and activities
    detracts from the attention we are able to give to the day-to-day work
    that the NNSA requires of us. In this fiscal year alone, we have
    already had 25 audits from the Inspector General, DOE/NNSA, General
    Accounting Office, and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
    This trend is sharply up from fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001.
        Looking to the future, we believe that positive gains will be
    realized as the reorganization of the NNSA continues. A streamlined
    path of communication will improve our business and make us more agile
    in responding to requests. The ability of NNSA to use its resources to
    better support the sites will increase efficiency. Movement of more
    decision-making responsibility to the field offices will also lead to
    more efficient operations. We fully support these changes and look
    forward to the reorganization being implemented as soon as possible.
        As I said at the outset, BWXT Pantex is laying the groundwork for
    important stockpile stewardship work to extend the life of our nuclear
    weapons stockpile. Improvements in technology and infrastructure will
    prepare the site to meet NNSA's Stockpile Life Extension Program goals.
    In the interim, we will work with NNSA and Congress to address the
    challenges that we currently face.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present these views
    to you today. I look forward to continuing to work with you and the
    members of this committee to ensure the safety and reliability of the
    stockpile in the future. I will be happy to answer any questions the
    subcommittee may have.
                                     ______

                     Prepared Statement by John T. Mitchell

        Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, thank you for the
    opportunity to update you on Defense Programs activities at the Y-12
    National Security Complex in Oak Ridge and to provide you my views on
    our near-term and long-term ability to meet the challenges of the
    Stockpile Management Program. We have made considerable progress at Y-
    12 over the past year, but still face significant challenges in meeting
    the expectations of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    over the long-term.

                                    OVERVIEW

        The past year at Y-12 has been one of renewal and change. Many
    longstanding challenges have been met head-on and significant progress
    has been made. New management systems and processes have started to
    take effect and increased effectiveness and control are clearly
    visible. Our emphasis on Safety and Security as the cornerstones of our
    operations have resulted in satisfactorily completing both the
    Integrated Safety Management Phase II review and the security review
    performed by the NNSA/DOE Office of Assessments this fiscal year. Both
    in our response to the events of September 11 and the measurement of
    our safety performance, it is clear that the groundwork laid in 2001
    has supported improved execution of these key responsibilities.
        Aided by the funding identified through the Facilities and
    Infrastructure Initiative, we have commenced a long-term plan to
    consolidate the active functions of Y-12 into a reduced footprint
    through a balanced program. Our approach includes reducing the occupied
    building inventory, removing unoccupied buildings from the inventory,
    reusing major facilities where possible, and the selective investment
    in re-capitalization where long-term efficiencies result.
        We have re-energized the planning and execution of an aggressive
    technology infusion program at Y-12 to both optimize support for the
    upcoming defined workload and to assure long-term, safe, secure, and
    efficient modern capabilities to meet the Nation's security needs. We
    have started the renewal of the dedicated Y-12 workforce through major
    increases in college-level recruiting, cooperative university programs,
    and emphasis on increasing the technical and managerial competence
    level of our workforce. Throughout these focused efforts, we have
    placed great value on detailed program planning and a project
    management culture for execution effectiveness. Site-wide integration
    in resource planning and prioritization has assured a balance in
    investments and a clear definition of needs versus wants.

                                 INFRASTRUCTURE

        BWXT Y-12 has been implementing its strategy for infrastructure
    improvement--intense planning focused on scientific and manufacturing
    needs, definition of equipment, facilities and skills, and alignment of
    technology development. Our goal is to create a consolidated
    manufacturing footprint, with a central hub of secure operations
    surrounded by the developmental, technical, and other support functions
    needed to execute the mission.
        Y-12 has begun the process of removing non-essential facilities.
    This removal will make room for beneficial upgrades to the plant and
    reduce cost for surveillance, analysis, maintenance, and security. The
    Facilities and Infrastructure (F&I) Initiative has been pivotal to our
    demolition efforts, as well as providing critical support for much-
    needed maintenance and facility repairs.
        Y-12 has also begun the first major steps in deploying key
    investments in the future of Y-12. We are beginning the preliminary
    design for high enriched uranium materials facility, the next major
    step in improving the storage of the Nation's inventory of highly
    enriched uranium. We also have received approval to begin preliminary
    design of the purification prototype facility, the first element of the
    Special Materials Capability Program. The architect-engineering
    contracts are in place for both these projects. In addition, prototype
    development of a new beryllium manufacturing capability is underway and
    we are ready to begin conceptual design for a production utilities
    project.
        Following these projects, we need to move forward on plans to
    consolidate depleted uranium operations, upgrade enriched uranium
    operations, relocate quality evaluation operations, and upgrade
    safeguards and security systems by reducing the protected area of the
    plant. There will also be continued emphasis on use of F&I to make
    critical facility repairs and to continue the infrastructure reduction
    activities to consolidate and disposition excess facilities.
        Achieving and sustaining infrastructure improvements within the
    NNSA funding forecasts continues to be a challenge. The cost to operate
    aging facilities increases as demands for maintenance and capital
    replacement expand. Sustainable support will be necessary for Y-12 to
    meet mission requirements while resolving problems caused by years of
    deterioration at Y-12. The trade-off between operations, maintenance,
    and capital investments must continue to recognize the long-term
    interests of Y-12.

                                   TECHNOLOGY

        Y-12 has begun two important initiatives over the past year that
    will improve the way technology is introduced in the plant and its
    missions. The introduction of new technologies must be managed from a
    different perspective today than was the historic norm for the
    production complex. The stockpile stewardship paradigm may well require
    a higher level of technology for refurbishment than was required for
    the original build. When a flaw is identified, the resolution of that
    flaw will be reverse-engineered from test data. The tolerances for that
    new part can be much more exacting than was originally required. In
    addition, today's technology introduction may be based on the ability
    to achieve substantial efficiencies in mission execution. These
    efficiencies may stem from the introduction of technologies that were
    not previously available or concepts that were previously discarded
    based on then-valid mission requirements that are no longer appropriate
    (e.g., stockpile size).
        The first initiative, technology roadmapping, has the goal of
    modernizing the processes, equipment, and supporting systems (e.g.,
    computing and information management systems). The roadmap would
    identify the strategies and direction of the technology program. These
    strategies would be screened against the time to bring them to the shop
    floor, cradle-to-grave cost estimate, potential for success, and return
    on investment.
        In a second initiative, BWXT-Y12 has begun a technology partnership
    with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The technical needs of
    Y-12 are heavily weighted toward ORNL's R&D agenda (i.e., materials
    science, modeling/computational science, and instrumentation and
    control). In these key areas, ORNL provides access to state-of-the-art
    facilities, leverage for Y-12's development funds, and a pathway to the
    broader technical community--private industry, the science
    laboratories, and academia.
        The introduction of technology into Y-12 will be critical to the
    future economical execution of our mission. Again, the trade-off
    between operations, technology introduction, and capital improvement
    will require a sustained commitment to the long-term interests of Y-12
    and its mission.

                               MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

        BWXT Y-12 is bringing fiscal discipline to Y-12. We have
    established a centralized planning function to include estimating,
    schedule planning, resource budgeting, strategic baseline planning,
    performance measurement and reporting, and systems management. A common
    tool-set has been established to provide the planners consistent
    planning software across the Y-12 site.
        Using these tools, we have developed schedules and resource
    requirements for all work activities, including work breakdown
    structure (WBS) elements, and the estimated costs, schedule, duration,
    resource loading, and the required earned value protocols for each
    element. The 10-year baseline is complete covering all major projects
    planned at Y-12, including future weapons programs, modernization
    programs, infrastructure reduction projects, and technology development
    activities.
        Currently, we are focusing on several key upgrades to our process.
    While standard estimating procedures and formats have been established
    for all work done across the site, we are working to improve the
    accuracy of our estimates. Also, we are working to improve our
    production control systems, including the recent completion of a pilot
    project. The resulting schedules will provide the required integrated
    planning for preventative maintenance, operations, inventory, and
    facility maintenance efforts.
        These initiatives provide managers the visibility to effectively
    manage cost, control scope, and maintain schedule commitments. We are
    working hard to assure that the resources placed in our care are well
    spent on activities of highest importance to our mission.

                                   WORKFORCE

        Y-12 is taking action to assure the technical base is available to
    carry out its mission in the future. We have defined our critical skill
    needs and initiated the hiring of entry level, technical talent to
    prepare them to be tomorrow's leaders. In order to attract the best
    talent, we have initiated cooperative education programs, including the
    establishment of internal mentors to maximize the benefit of their time
    at Y-12. We are now developing a program of partnerships with
    universities in the region and preliminary response to the concept of
    these partnerships has been enthusiastic. Our objective is to assure
    the best people are attracted to Y-12 as a vibrant workplace whose
    mission is important to national security.
        Safety is the responsibility of all employees and important to
    everyone. BWXT Y-12 has been working to bring the commitment to safety
    to be a first principle at Y-12. All supervisors and managers completed
    safety leadership training followed by rolling safety focus meetings
    with all employees. The routine employee interaction on safety issues
    has begun to show improvement in our safety metrics for the plant.

                              MISSION PERFORMANCE

        Y-12 continues to meet the direct needs of the nuclear weapons
    program with timely delivery of products and execution of a wide
    variety of supporting activities. Shipments of fuel for the nuclear
    Navy have been accomplished on time. Planning for the near-term needs
    has resulted in restarting several needed capabilities as well as the
    introduction of several new technical capabilities. Y-12 has also
    participated with ORNL to provide centralized and integrated
    capabilities critical to the success of our national commitment to non-
    proliferation. A strong and refocused capability to perform work for
    the full range of government and commercial customers supportive of
    base Y-12 mission needs has been initiated in partnership with ORNL.
    This growing and diversified work mix is vital to the retention of
    critical capabilities and the development of those required for the
    future.

                                    SUMMARY

        While Y-12 has made major steps forward in the past year, there is
    still a long road ahead to achieve long-term, sustainable capabilities
    to meet national security needs with confidence, including management
    leadership and execution effectiveness. Consistent, balanced funding
    support for operations, technology introduction, and infrastructure re-
    capitalization will be required. Consistent, timely, and visible
    definition of program requirements will be needed as well as commitment
    to stand behind initiatives and investments until they are completed
    and have produced the expected results. Y-12 must continue to be fully
    supported in all areas for it to continue to meet long-term national
    security needs.
                                     ______

                    Prepared Statement of David S. Douglass

        Mr. Chairman, my name is Dave Douglass. I am President of Honeywell
    Federal Manufacturing & Technologies, which manages the National
    Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) facility in Kansas City,
    Missouri, and facilities supporting transportation safeguard activities
    in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Kansas City Plant today is an active,
    safe, secure, and reliable facility that serves as one of our country's
    most unique and valued national security assets. Our diversity of
    sophisticated, complex, and leading-edge manufacturing capabilities is
    equaled by few facilities in the country, and the fact that these
    capabilities are housed under one roof in a secure environment is
    rivaled by no other manufacturer in the world.
        We bring to the nuclear weapons complex and our Nation expertise in
    science-based manufacturing; supply chain management; e-business
    systems; sophisticated electronic, mechanical, and rubber and plastics
    manufacturing; and a consistent reputation as one of the NNSA's
    highest-rated contractors. The nonnuclear components we produce
    comprise 85 percent of the parts manufactured within the nuclear
    weapons complex, as well as 85 percent of the components that
    constitute a nuclear weapon.
        With the help and support of this subcommittee and Congress over
    the past 4 years, we have begun to address issues impacting our talent
    pipeline and critical skill needs, infrastructure deficiencies, and
    recapitalization concerns at the Kansas City Plant. Since last year's
    testimony, we have used the $12 million in plus-up funding you provided
    to hire 300 people, keep our critical skills filled at a 99-percent
    level, and meet urgent infrastructure and recapitalization needs,
    including equipment upgrades, critical roofing repairs, and renovations
    to air handling systems in our production areas. In each case, we were
    able to maximize the dollars we spent by focusing on the highest
    priorities, however unglamorous they may have been. However, while we
    may have begun to turn the tide, we have not fixed the problems; and we
    continue to seek your support in addressing on-going, long-term issues
    facing the Kansas City Plant.
        Mr. Chairman, as both a taxpayer and a contractor, I believe we
    should be held accountable for the highest standards of performance.
    This includes driving efficiency improvements throughout our
    organization. To this end, Honeywell has implemented a number of
    efficiency improvements at the NNSA's Kansas City Plant that embrace
    commercial best practices and ensure ever-increasing value for NNSA
    investments. Honeywell treats Federal Manufacturing and Technologies
    the same as its commercial businesses, holding us to the same standards
    of performance. This includes achieving 6 percent year-over-year
    improvement in productivity, qualifying for and maintaining ISO quality
    and environmental system certifications, implementing cost-saving
    digitization applications, achieving safety metrics that are
    significantly better than national or NNSA standards, and training
    employees in the use of continuous improvement tools such as Six Sigma.
    All 2,000 of our salaried associates are Six Sigma Green Belt
    certified, plus more than 150 of our employees are certified in Six
    Sigma Black Belt productivity tools. Furthermore, when we were awarded
    the contract to continue operating the Kansas City Plant in 2000, we
    committed we would achieve $25 million in efficiency improvements at
    the Kansas City Plant in the first 2 years of the contract. Last year,
    our first year, we achieved $20 million. By the end of this year, we
    fully expect to meet and far exceed the remaining $5 million
    commitment.
        As part of our vision of the Kansas City Plant as a multi-mission,
    national security asset, we have grown our Work-for-Others program by
    42 percent in 2 years. Other government agencies, including military,
    law enforcement, and intelligence organizations, are finding increasing
    value in our combination of advanced technology solutions and a high-
    security environment. Our robust Work-for-Others program helps offset
    overhead costs and retain critical-skill associates by offering them
    new technical challenges. This value benefits both the government and
    the taxpayer.
        A natural question is: If we have derived these millions of dollars
    of efficiency improvements, why do we require sustained funding
    support? It is well-documented that the Department of Energy made a
    conscious decision in the 1990s to focus investment on science and
    defer investment in production. Our efficiency improvements during this
    decade gave us flexibility to balance near- and long-term needs. Thus,
    the savings generated by our efficiency improvements were factored into
    our budget forecasts, allowing us to augment NNSA funding to support
    infrastructure improvements, critical skill needs, and high-priority
    programmatic requirements. However, continued investment at 2.4 percent
    created a substantial backlog of infrastructure needs, compared to an
    industry standard of 5 percent.
        The Kansas City Plant is at a juncture: We are inhibited by funding
    pressures and modernization issues from achieving the full readiness
    needed to accomplish our task at hand. We will meet our directed
    stockpile work obligations, but we will do so at the expense of
    preparing for the future. Over the next 2 years, our workload will
    begin to escalate as we prepare for full-scale production for the
    Stockpile Life Extension Programs. Yet, as the adjacent infrastructure
    requirements chart indicates, at the same time we gear up for new work,
    our infrastructure and recapitalization backlog reaches peak levels.

        As the chart also indicates, we require $65 million a year to
    sustain investment in the Kansas City Plant, and limited funding has
    pushed the backlog into the next 5 years. The additional Facilities &
    Infrastructure Recapitalization Program funding is significantly
    helping us lessen the backlog, and I strongly endorse continued support
    of this important effort.
        The Government has a very capable, diverse, experienced, secure
    manufacturing facility: the Kansas City Plant. It makes good business
    and economic sense to invest in it and push this national security
    asset to its highest potential. No other facility is as diverse as the
    Kansas City Plant. Unlike commercial manufacturers, we are in a
    position to manage the NNSA's requirements to produce high-quality,
    low-volume components; retain skills to sustain aging or obsolete
    technologies; and warehouse parts needed to maintain the 25 year life
    expectancy of the stockpile--at an affordable cost to the government.
        We strongly support General John Gordon in his efforts to simplify
    and streamline the NNSA and implement a new governance model for
    management and operating (M&O) contracts. In keeping with the premise
    behind M&O contracts--to select contractors based on their operational
    and management experience and provide them with the objectives of what
    needs to be accomplished--we have taken several steps to simplify and
    streamline operations at the Kansas City Plant. These steps include
    introducing commercial industrial standards, including manufacturing,
    procurement, and human resources best practices. For the new governance
    initiative to improve performance and reduce costs successfully across
    the complex, we believe the initiative must radically change M&O
    operations in four key areas: culture, core processes, performance
    management, and the government/contractor relationship.

             Culture Change: M&O employees should be treated no
            differently from employees who work for the contractor at other
            locations. Contract and other DOE requirements and programs
            that make the M&O employee a unique employee, and that
            consequently limit the contractor's ability to rotate in talent
            from other parts of the corporation, are unnecessary and should
            be revised or eliminated.
             Core Processes: The NNSA should require contractors to
            bring robust core processes to M&O operations, particularly in
            the areas of strategic planning, continuous improvement,
            leadership development, and performance management. NNSA
            requirements and practices that dictate the processes to be
            applied in M&O contracts should be eliminated.
             Performance Management: Core processes should be
            assessed by independent and knowledgeable third-party sources,
            and contractors should be judged by the NNSA based on the
            maturity of their processes rather than isolated and unexpected
            incidents.
             Government/Contractor Relationship: A partnering
            relationship should create alignment in business imperatives
            for NNSA facilities and a clear understanding of roles and
            responsibilities. We support the concept that it is the role of
            the Government to identify what needs to be done and the role
            of contractors to determine how the work should be done, based
            on the expertise that caused them to be selected in the first
            place. We envision NNSA personnel working in concert with the
            contractor to accomplish mission objectives by eliminating
            barriers to the contractor's tasks, working with stakeholders
            to resolve community concerns, and working within the
            Government to ensure program alignment with overall Government
            needs.

        Finally, it is imperative that we maintain balance between science
    and production. Scientific advancement is vital. We must develop our
    manufacturing technologies, train our employees, and maintain our
    facilities. However, it is just as important that the skills and
    capabilities needed to turn science into reality--real robust
    products--keep pace with technological advancements. This brings us
    full circle to the issue of long-term reinvestment in and value of the
    Kansas City Plant as a national security asset.
        Mr. Chairman, you may also ask about the impact of the
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for a reduction in
    our nuclear stockpile, on the Kansas City Plant. Our volumes will
    eventually fall, but the need for components will not be diminished.
    However, the more volumes fall, the less attractive this work will be
    to commercial industries that must maintain profit margins. These
    companies cannot afford the overhead needed to sustain aging or
    obsolete technologies, warehouse parts, or retain expertise in critical
    skills needed to maintain the 25-year life expectancy of the stockpile.
    Reinvesting in the Kansas City Plant, and allowing us to defray
    overheads costs by expanding use of the facility, will address both
    short-term and long-term nuclear weapons complex needs.
        The Kansas City Plant is busy. We support 42 product families and
    120 advanced technologies, shipping more than 60,000 product packages
    annually. We are producing components for every weapons system in the
    active stockpile. We are hiring new associates and actively addressing
    critical skill needs. We have begun to increase infrastructure
    investments to recover from funding shortfalls in the 1990s. We are
    developing new manufacturing capabilities and suppliers required to
    support the upcoming Life Extension Programs. The next few years will
    see significant challenges as we continue to address critical skills,
    and upgrade our infrastructure while preparing for sizeable new
    production requirements driven by the Life Extension Programs. Our
    success is directly tied to a sustained funding profile, which fully
    accounts for these challenges.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present these views
    to you. Honeywell is committed to our national defense mission and to
    the future success of the Kansas City Plant and nuclear weapons
    complex. I look forward to continuing to work with you and the members
    of this subcommittee to address these challenges.

        Senator Reed. I would like to add that submitting testimony
    is completely optional. Senator Allard and I would have
    preferred the opportunity to hear from the contractors in
    person, but, as I indicated, the committee's schedule this year
    just does not allow this opportunity.
        At $7.1 billion, the EM program is the single largest
    program at the Department of Energy. Of that amount, $6.4
    billion falls within the jurisdiction of this subcommittee. The
    expenditures and schedules for this program are largely derived
    from a series of enforceable agreements that the DOE has
    entered into with the relevant States and the Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA).
        For the most part, the States and communities that host
    these DOE sites feel strongly that these agreements protect the
    health and well-being of the communities and the employees who
    work there. These agreements have been the driving force to
    remedy the well-documented history of environmental
    contamination by DOE and its predecessor agencies. These
    agreements have in some instances limited the ability of the
    DOE and the contractors to introduce innovative cleanup
    approaches and to change how the cleanup is conducted.
        On the other hand, the States and the EPA are also
    interested in having cleanup progress quickly and in the most
    cost-effective way.
        Roughly 12 years of experience with this program has taught
    that where there is cooperation and a partnership among DOE,
    the States, and the EPA, progress is made. Faced today with
    growing cleanup costs, DOE has proposed in the fiscal year 2003
    budget a new program called the Cleanup Reform Initiative. The
    budget request is short on details for this $800 million
    initiative, but my preliminary understanding is that this
    account would be available to any site that submits a proposal
    for accelerated cleanup.
        While on its face this appears to be a creative approach to
    cleanup, it also appears that this account was created by
    underfunding the baseline cleanup accounts. Thus, the fiscal
    year 2003 President's budget request will not allow the DOE to
    meet the requirements contained in all the agreements.
    Moreover, I understand that to qualify for the funds in this
    account the States and the EPA have to modify the agreements in
    ways that may reduce the overall level of cleanup.
        The implementation of this new initiative is complicated
    further by the recent announcement of an agreement with the
    State of Washington to provide $430 million of the $800 million
    to the Hanford site. One of the main topics on which I want to
    focus today, Secretary Roberson, will be the new Cleanup Reform
    Initiative and the plans to implement it.
        Over the past few years, DOE has made substantial progress
    in cleaning up the contaminated sites, treating and safely
    storing waste; yet, much remains to be done. Some of the
    achievements have been possible using new technology. At many
    of these sites, new or improved technologies will continue to
    be needed to sustain progress.
        The second issue that I want to discuss today is the
    significant reduction in research and development funds in the
    fiscal year 2003 budget request. How does this reduction square
    with the continuing requirement for new technologies? The EM
    program is a complex and challenging program that will remain a
    challenge for many years to come. I share your fundamental goal
    of getting cleanup accomplished sooner and at a reduced cost.
        Secretary Roberson, we welcome you to the subcommittee
    today and note that this is your first opportunity to testify
    since your confirmation last year. Now I would like to
    recognize Senator Allard.
        Senator.
        Senator Allard. Welcome, Madam Secretary. Good to have you
    before the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank
    our witnesses for appearing before the Strategic Subcommittee
    today and providing testimony on some very challenging issues
    facing the Department of Energy.
        Our witnesses today will be speaking about challenges that
    initially arose out of the Manhattan Project when our Nation's
    very existence was at stake, almost 60 years ago. World War II
    led to the creation of the nuclear weapons program, which
    required enormous cooperation among many sites and States. In
    an effort to keep the mission secret, security architects of
    the Manhattan Project used multiple sites, with each site
    responsible for its own individual scientific task or weapons
    components for the larger mission.
        The success of the Manhattan Project required intricate
    planning and enormous cooperation among the various sites and
    the States where they were located. Now, why am I reflecting on
    those early days of our Nation's nuclear weapons program? I do
    so because today we again find ourselves facing enormous
    challenges. Today we have an aging nuclear weapons complex
    filled with an aging nuclear weapons work force, both requiring
    resources and attention to reinvigorate the program. We have
    inherited environmental challenges from the legacy of our
    Nation's nuclear weapons program, from a time when we were not
    as knowledgeable, concerned, or careful.
        Cooperation between the sites and their States is still key
    to maintaining our national security requirements and to meet
    our environmental responsibilities. Today I am concerned that
    cooperation between some of the sites and the States where they
    are located is strained at best and perhaps even broken.
    Cooperation is being traded in for opportunity, intrigue, and
    politics.
        If we cannot work together across the Department of Energy
    complex, then each site in each State will find themselves
    isolated, unable to interact as the complex was designed. No
    individual site can be successful as its own entity. Each site
    is dependent on the other sites to make their mission relevant
    and successful.
        There are both benefits and burdens in working with the
    other sites and States. Some sites have expanding national
    security and environmental missions for the future. Others are
    being closed. Their mission has been transferred and it is time
    to clean them up and move their funding to the remaining sites.
        I have worked tirelessly to make sure the Rocky Flats site
    will be cleaned up and closed as an EM site by 2006. The
    surrounding communities have worked together and exhibited as
    great a spirit of cooperation as I have ever seen. They were
    communities that were at odds on how to proceed, but decided to
    set aside obstacles and opposition and move forward with focus
    and determination to get the site cleaned up.
        I have worked with the Department of Energy and the site
    manager to make sure they had everything they needed to make
    this job move forward. They have been extremely dedicated to
    this mission. I worked with other members of this subcommittee,
    including Chairman Reed, the Senate, and the House to try to
    make the process work instead of getting bogged down in
    bureaucratic gridlock. I have worked with the State of Colorado
    and other Federal agencies, including the EPA and the
    Department of the Interior, to make sure the 2006 date would be
    kept on track.
        Remember, in 1995 the Rocky Flats site had a baseline for
    closure of 70 years, costing over $30 billion. We are now
    trying to reduce that to 10 years and $7 billion. The workers
    at that site have been tremendous. Just last week I was at a
    Rocky Flats meeting with the union membership, and I can tell
    you that I have never been prouder of a group of workers. They
    are making history, and we should provide these union members
    the tools and opportunity to succeed. Their dedication and
    determination has been absolute.
        Although we do not have a future mission at Rocky Flats,
    completing the cleanup is important for the rest of the complex
    for several reasons. First, it is the responsibility of the
    Federal Government to return that land to the people of
    Colorado in an environmentally safe and desirable manner. The
    site will be designated a national wildlife refuge once the
    cleanup is completed.
        Second, we have agreements with Russia to reduce the amount
    of weapons-grade plutonium in both of our stockpiles in an
    effort to promote international nonproliferation goals.
        Third, the more than $650 million that goes to Rocky Flats
    each year for cleanup will become available upon closure to
    fund ongoing and future missions at the other sites. Rocky
    Flats costs $1 million a day just to turn on the lights, and I
    am not sure they ever do shut off all the lights. So it is easy
    to see why it is important to close this site, which has no
    future mission.
        Finally, it is important to demonstrate to the Nation and
    the world that such a cleanup is possible and attainable.
        Mr. Chairman and this subcommittee, I regret to inform you,
    that today the closure of Rocky Flats is at risk. Instead of
    following the proud vision and model of the Manhattan Project,
    the Governor of South Carolina has decided to play politics. As
    a result of his dangerous gamesmanship, our Nation's security
    and our Nation's environmental security have been placed at
    risk.
        Specifically, the Governor of South Carolina has
    effectively closed his State's borders to shipments of nuclear
    materials, and by doing so, threatens to bring our nuclear
    weapons program, our EM program, and perhaps our nuclear
    nonproliferation program to a screeching halt. How short-
    sighted these actions are. It is not just Rocky Flats that is
    directly impacted. By design, all of the sites are
    interconnected and interrelated. Beyond the direct impacts
    caused by one State's action, there is a domino effect in which
    the other States may follow suit and thereby threaten both the
    nuclear weapons program and the EM program.
        For almost a year, the administration has been trying to
    work with South Carolina to keep a strong future mission for
    the Savannah River Site (SRS) while also cleaning up the EM
    facilities. I believe in the mission being conducted at
    Savannah River. There currently is a new tritium extraction
    facility (TEF) under construction. A new mixed-oxide plutonium
    (MOX) facility is being designed. Several other waste
    processors and storage facilities are either in the design
    phase or the construction phase. The work force at the site is
    doing a great job in conducting the mission.
        However, the commitment by the State of South Carolina does
    beg a question for this committee: Why are we spending or
    considering spending so much money on projects in South
    Carolina, including processes which require the shipment of
    nuclear materials into South Carolina, if the border has been
    closed to such shipments?
        I will not even begin to get into the amount of nuclear
    material and waste currently in South Carolina that is already
    designated to be shipped out of that State. The Governor is
    picking and choosing which materials can come into South
    Carolina and which ones cannot, and he demands that material
    already there be shipped to other States. He wants a guarantee
    unlike that which has been given to any other State, that any
    waste that comes into South Carolina in the future will leave
    South Carolina, and it is my understanding DOE has offered such
    an agreement.
        In fact, the Governor has been offered both a legislative
    guarantee and a guarantee in the form of a record of decision.
    Either approach would be enforceable by the State. But every
    time the Department of Energy met a demand, another one would
    appear, pushing the threshold even higher.
        I am very sympathetic to the State's situation, but through
    negotiations we must produce results. Compromise is a two-way
    street. Up until now, I have tried to be patient, waiting and
    watching as DOE kept offering more and more to the Governor's
    increasing demands. Today, Mr. Chairman, my patience is gone.
    When a State unilaterally shuts their borders, they should be
    aware that their borders can be shut down in both directions.
    Perhaps they can for a time keep materials from coming into
    their State, but also can find materials no longer have a path
    out, either. If other States in turn shut down their respective
    borders, our national security environmental responsibilities
    may hang in the balance.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
        Senator Inhofe, do you have an opening statement?
        Senator Inhofe. I do not have an opening statement, Mr.
    Chairman, but I have a great deal of concern. I served as
    Chairman of the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee
    for 4 years. One of the problems we have is the cost of
    cleanup, the cost of compliance with environmental regulations.
    It is my understanding that the administration has been working
    on legislation that might address this in that they might
    exempt some installations from some of the EPA regulations.
        I wanted to just mention that to you now in case you are
    not familiar with the status of that. Maybe one of your staff
    people could find out before the question and answer period,
    because that is something I think is very critical, very
    significant to our state of readiness, and I want to ask that
    question.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Madam Secretary, your statement is a part of the record.
    You may proceed to summarize your statement.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JESSIE HILL ROBERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
                  ENERGY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

        Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chairman Reed,
    Senator Allard, Senator Inhofe, and other subcommittee members
    that may arrive.
        I am here today to ask for your support for the
    Department's efforts to reform the Environmental Management
    program. I am pleased to report to you that the transformation
    of the Environmental Management program has begun. DOE has
    already taken the first steps to change our focus from risk
    management to risk reduction and elimination, to shift our
    focus from process to product, and to instill in this program
    the kind of urgency necessary to clean up and close the nuclear
    legacy of the Cold War to protect and secure the homeland.
        We have already taken several steps to immediately
    implement proposals for reforming and revitalizing this
    program. We have developed special teams and deployed those
    teams to most of our sites in combination with our field
    elements, our contractors, State and Federal regulators. We
    have also involved other stakeholders in the communities around
    those sites to develop accelerated cleanup plans.
        We have taken actions to further augment the Nation's
    security through the consolidation of nuclear material at EM
    sites, a key recommendation of the Top-To-Bottom Review of the
    Environmental Management program. We are working in partnership
    with the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure
    that our nuclear material is safe and secure. This accelerated
    effort will lead to more secure protection of our nuclear
    material inventory while reducing the cost of storage and
    protection at multiple sites.
        DOE has also taken the initial steps to align our internal
    processes and management to enable a streamlined, more focused
    approach to cleanup. EM has begun reviewing our contracts to
    ensure that they are effectively meeting our cleanup and
    closure needs. We have also begun reviewing existing systems
    and, where necessary, developing new systems for managing our
    contracts to ensure effective government oversight.
        The progress we have made so far is very significant. It
    would not have been possible without the active support of the
    members of this subcommittee. I appreciate your support and
    your confidence.
        As far as we may have come to date, the unfinished work
    ahead of us is great. Most of the hardest work and the toughest
    challenges are still before us. The EM budget request for
    fiscal year 2003 contains key initiatives and tools we need to
    help us continue the work of reforming this program. Our budget
    request for $6.7 billion is about the same amount as
    appropriated last year. However, if we can achieve agreements
    for accelerated closure at our sites around the complex, we are
    prepared to amend our request consistent with the funding needs
    of those agreements.
        Our fiscal year 2003 request has two components, a base
    budget of $5.9 billion and a new cleanup reform account. This
    new account is proposed specifically to fund projects and
    activities at sites that achieve agreements with their States
    to enable accelerated cleanup and closure.
        More details of our fiscal year 2003 request are contained
    in my formal statement, so I will not go over those. I
    recognize that there have been many questions, many that you
    cited in your opening comments, that have been raised about
    this new cleanup reform account: How will it be allocated? What
    criteria will be used? What happens if DOE cannot propose a
    specific site allocation after the markup?
        I want to make several broad points at the outset. First,
    this account is critical to the success of our efforts. Second,
    it is our intent to look for more efficient and effective ways
    of achieving cleanup and risk reduction in the base budget of
    $5.9 billion, thus to demonstrate more visible and tangible
    results for the entire budget request.
        Third, it is not our intent to get out of compliance with
    any of our regulatory agreements. This is not an assault on our
    cleanup agreements. These agreements are living documents with
    processes to enable improvements and revisions to achieve our
    mutual goals.
        Fourth, DOE is looking not only to States, but even more so
    to ourselves. We cannot achieve the results we want unless we
    address our own business practices.
        Fifth, DOE is not seeking any new authority from Congress
    at this time to achieve our accelerated objectives. We believe
    we have adequate authority within the current statutory
    framework. If in the future we believe we need new authority
    from Congress to carry out reforms of this program, we will
    inform Congress at the appropriate time.
        Members of this panel have appropriately demanded more of
    DOE, more accountability, more fiscal responsibility, more
    tangible results. We are strongly aligned with your efforts to
    improve our work. The fiscal year 2003 budget request is based
    on a simple premise: that Congress, the States, and the
    communities that host DOE sites all want accelerated risk
    reduction and cleanup. This budget request will put into place
    a valuable set of tools and instruments we need to achieve this
    mutual goal.
        I do not come before you claiming that we have all the
    answers. In many respects, this is possible because of the work
    of those who have come before us. Nonetheless, we feel a sense
    of urgency that requires that we forge ahead in spite of the
    uncertainties. I am confident that we can, working together, be
    successful.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Roberson follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Jessie H. Roberson

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this
    opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of Energy's
    Environmental Management (EM) program and its fiscal year 2003 budget
    request.
        We meet today at an historic moment for the Environmental
    Management program. This is no ordinary year. This budget request does
    not come at an ordinary time. This administration has just completed a
    comprehensive review of EM and has concluded that this program is badly
    in need of repair. For 10 years we have spent tens of billions of
    dollars but have failed to make commensurate progress towards cleanup
    and risk reduction. If present trends continue unchecked, we will
    squander taxpayer money and make only minimal progress towards cleanup
    and risk reduction. This is unacceptable. This administration is
    determined to make changes.
        This budget represents the first step towards addressing the
    fundamental problems facing EM. DOE has analyzed what is wrong and has
    taken the first steps forward. To go further, we need the help and
    support of Congress. We need the help and support of States and our
    State and Federal regulators. We need the help and support of
    stakeholders and communities throughout America. We can turn this
    program around and produce real progress towards cleanup, but only if
    we all work together towards our common goals.
        The Department is requesting $6.714 billion for the EM program for
    fiscal year 2003. This is approximately the same level as Congress
    appropriated for the program in fiscal year 2002. In a year when
    demands for Federal dollars are particularly high, this request
    demonstrates the administration's commitment to cleaning up the
    contamination resulting from Cold War nuclear weapons production and to
    ensuring that our surplus nuclear materials are safe and secure to
    protect the homeland.
        The budget request before you begins to fundamentally change the
    way the cleanup is carried out. We have proposed structural changes in
    our request to enable us to begin these badly needed changes. The
    request provides ``base funding'' to ensure safety and security, and to
    support on-going cleanup activities at the sites. But it also includes
    a new and separate $800 million EM cleanup reform account. These funds
    will be made available to those sites that can in partnership with
    their regulators, their contractors, and their communities change their
    way of doing business to provide more tangible progress towards cleanup
    and risk reduction. If the vast majority of sites agree to the reforms
    we think are necessary, it is possible that the $800 million may become
    over-subscribed. In this event, the administration is prepared to
    support additional resources to complete reforms at remaining sites.
        The reforms proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget request do not
    fully meet my own or the Secretary's expectations of an effective and
    revitalized EM program. Rather, it is a transitional budget. It
    contains some elements of the changes we plan to put in place, but it
    is really only a first step in the transition toward a more risk-based
    and efficient cleanup program. Therefore, in my testimony, I would like
    to take a step back from the details of the request to discuss the
    current circumstances of the EM program, the conclusions of the
    recently completed program review, and key elements of my
    implementation strategy. I will then address the priorities used to
    formulate the fiscal year 2003 request and provide highlights of the
    critical work we plan to accomplish in fiscal year 2003.
     laying the groundwork for fundamental change--the challenge before us
        The EM program is responsible for cleaning up the environmental
    legacy of the Nation's nuclear weapons program and government-sponsored
    nuclear energy research. The cleanup program is one of the largest and
    most diverse and technically complex environmental cleanup programs in
    the world. Responsible for the cleanup of 114 sites across the country,
    the EM program faces the challenge of:

             safely dispositioning large volumes of nuclear wastes,
            including over 340,000 cubic meters of high-level waste stored
            at the Hanford, Idaho, West Valley and Savannah River sites;
             safeguarding materials that could be used in nuclear
            weapons, including over 2,000 tons of intensely radioactive
            spent nuclear fuel, some of which is corroding, and more than
            18 metric tons of weapons-usable plutonium;
             deactivating and decommissioning several thousand
            contaminated facilities no longer needed to support the
            Department's mission; and
             remediating extensive surface and groundwater
            contamination.

        The painful truth is that EM has not effectively managed this
    daunting task. Ironically, EM's own indicators would say we are doing
    well. We have met over 90 percent of our regulatory milestones, and our
    contractors routinely receive over 90 percent of their available fee.
    In large part, however, we are measuring process, not progress. This
    must change.
        To illustrate the magnitude of the challenge, EM's own internal
    estimates of what it will cost to complete cleanup continue to grow.
    EM's most recent life-cycle cost estimate, based on current plans, is
    $220 billion, an estimate that could easily increase to more than $300
    billion without breakthrough changes in the program. Additionally, only
    about one-third of the EM program budget today is going toward actual
    cleanup and risk reduction work. The remainder is spent on maintenance,
    fixed costs, and other activities required to support safety and
    security.
        The schedule estimates from just a few years ago have also proven
    to be overly optimistic. Over just the past few years, the estimated
    closure or cleanup completion dates have slipped for numerous sites.
    Moreover, the three largest sites--Savannah River, Idaho National
    Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, and Hanford--have such long-
    term completion dates (2038, 2050, and 2070, respectively) that the
    estimates for cost and schedule are highly uncertain and subject to
    change.
        While most of the risks at these contaminated sites do not pose an
    imminent threat to public health and the environment, the complacency
    and inaction of the status quo will eventually have startling
    consequences. DOE spends billions of dollars each year simply to keep
    these materials safe and secure. Each year we do not move aggressively
    to reduce and remove these risks, they become costlier to manage and
    maintain. On the present course, we face the real possibility that we
    will never meet our cleanup and closure goals.
        While these outcomes are not acceptable, they are also not
    inevitable. This administration believes firmly that reform of the
    complex is possible, as well as urgent. We have seen examples even
    under the current approach where an accelerated risk-based approach has
    yielded concrete results that have served the public interest in
    cleanup and closure. At Rocky Flats in Colorado, a risk-based
    management approach, effective contracting strategies, and an overall
    sense of urgency have produced real progress towards cleanup and
    closure. This site has worked hard and struggled to be at the point it
    is today. That same effort is needed throughout the DOE complex.
        I believe with appropriate management and with your support, we can
    replicate these successes throughout the Nation.

                    CONCLUSIONS OF THE TOP-TO-BOTTOM REVIEW

        Last year, the Secretary of Energy told Congress that the status
    quo in the EM cleanup program was unacceptable. He directed me to
    conduct a comprehensive review of the cleanup program with the goal of
    quickly improving performance. The team I formed to conduct the review
    concluded that there are numerous structural and institutional problems
    that are driving EM's poor performance. The report also included
    several specific calls to action to remedy this situation. In the
    broadest sense, the report urged that the EM program transform its
    mission from managing risk to reducing and eliminating risk. The report
    was issued on February 4, 2002. I am moving out aggressively to
    evaluate and act on the recommendations of this report and work with
    Congress, the States, and stakeholders to develop mutually acceptable
    approaches.
        The recommendations, and the problems they address, generally fall
    into four areas:
        1. Improve DOE's Contract Strategy and Management. The issue here
    is both our overall contracting strategy and how we manage contracts.
    The report concludes that EM's contracting approach is not always
    focused on accelerating risk reduction and applying innovative
    approaches to doing work. Effective contracting practices are essential
    to improve program performance. The EM review concluded that the
    processes for contract acquisition, establishment of performance goals,
    funding allocation, and government oversight are managed as separate,
    informally related activities rather than as an integrated corporate
    business process. This results in performance standards that are
    inconsistently and ineffectively applied. The report recommends that
    EM:

             Improve the quality of the contract solicitation
            process to attract broader contractor participation.
             Require clarity in contracts with respect to work
            scope, regulatory requirements, and end points.
             Clearly identify the nature and extent of uncertainty
            and risks, and align the type of contract accordingly.
             Increase emphasis on real risk reduction by focusing
            fees on end points rather than intermediate milestones.
             Eliminate the use of subjective performance measures.

        The report recommends that DOE undertake a review of all existing
    contracts for their alignment with these principles and revise or amend
    those contracts to improve this alignment. Our point here is not to
    criticize or penalize contractors. Obviously, they did what DOE asked
    for. But I do not believe that we asked for the right things, and we
    did not create contract vehicles that pushed them to perform. We must
    begin implementing more aggressive contracts--ones that genuinely
    challenge them to achieve and to shoulder more risk--while providing
    significant profit for truly outstanding performance. But, conversely,
    it means that mediocrity will reap no rewards.
        2. Move EM to an Accelerated, Risk-Based Cleanup Strategy. EM's
    cleanup strategy is not based on a comprehensive, coherent,
    technically-supported risk prioritization. The framework, and in some
    cases, the interpretation of DOE orders and requirements, environmental
    laws, regulations, and agreements have resulted in the diversion of
    resources to lower-risk activities and over-emphasis on process. To
    move towards a more risk-based approach:

             Cleanup work should be prioritized to achieve the
            greatest risk reduction at an accelerated rate.
             Realistic approaches to cleanup should be based on
            technical risk evaluation, anticipated future land uses, points
            of compliance, and points of evaluation.
             Cleanup agreements should be assessed for their
            contribution to reducing risk to workers, the public, and the
            environment.

        The report recommends that DOE initiate an effort to review current
    DOE orders and requirements as well as regulatory agreements, and
    commence discussions with States and other regulators with a view to
    achieving regulatory agreements that accelerate risk reduction based on
    technical risk evaluation. The issue here is not to avoid compliance
    with regulatory agreements. The issue here is that we need to work with
    States and regulators to ensure that these agreements truly match up
    with a risk-based approach. We are determined to begin this effort now.
        3. Align DOE's Internal Processes to Support an Accelerated, Risk-
    Based Cleanup Approach. The review concluded that EM's internal
    business processes are not structured to support accelerated risk
    reduction or to address its current challenge of uncontrolled cost and
    schedule growth. We must instill a sense of urgency in the system. If
    we are to accelerate the cleanup and reduce risk, we must transform
    EM's processes and operations to reflect this urgency and time
    sensitivity. Some specific actions include:

             Improve work planning to increase the up-front
            understanding and planning of work and apply project management
            principles to all core work areas.
             Expand the application of Integrated Safety Management
            (ISM) to higher-level work planning, where decisions are made
            about what work is appropriate and desirable and breakthrough
            safety improvements may occur.
             Develop ``lessons learned'' at a corporate level to
            provide a frank description of significant project issues, with
            corporate lessons learned required for all EM managers.
             Apply DOE requirements in a manner consistent with the
            work at hand, clarifying requirements relevant to cleanup and
            streamlining the process for interpreting DOE orders and
            requirements for more complex cleanup projects.
             Accelerate the closure of small sites. With relatively
            little additional investment, the risks at remaining small
            sites can be eliminated sooner, and the life-cycle costs
            reduced.

        4. Realign the EM Program so its Scope is Consistent with an
    Accelerated, Risk-based Cleanup and Closure Mission. The current scope
    of the EM program includes activities that are not focused on or
    supportive of an accelerated, risk-based cleanup and closure mission.
    EM should redeploy, streamline, or cease activities not appropriate for
    accelerated cleanup and closure. Specifically, EM should:

             Accelerate the consolidation of activities that
            require safeguards and security infrastructure to enhance
            safety and security, reduce threats, reduce risk, and save
            money.
             Refocus the EM technology program to directly address
            the specific, near-term applied technology needs for cleanup
            and closure.
             Eliminate or transfer from EM those activities not
            directly supporting an accelerated, risk-based cleanup and
            closure program.

                         MAKING CHANGES ON A FAST TRACK

        The review identified specific issues and recommendations that will
    allow us to move aggressively to change the EM program's approach to
    its cleanup and closure mandate. Similarly, the sites have contributed
    their own site-specific strategies and proposals to refocus and
    accelerate their efforts. All the recommended changes are designed to
    focus the program on one primary result--reducing risk to public
    health, workers, and the environment on an accelerated basis.
        We have already instituted some changes, and will continue to take
    action as soon as possible and practicable to bring about the changes
    that are needed. We have deployed special teams to most of our sites to
    work with DOE, our contractors, State and Federal regulators, and other
    stakeholders to develop revised cleanup plans. I am very pleased that
    we signed a letter of intent with the Hanford site in Washington that
    will enable us to significantly accelerate our work there and achieve
    more risk reduction. We are engaged in similar discussions at the
    Savannah River, Oak Ridge, and Brookhaven sites, and I expect to
    achieve similar results at these sites over the next few months.
        Additionally, we are already acting to ensure our contracts align
    with and support our accelerated cleanup mission. We recently announced
    that a new contract will be competed and awarded for cleanup of the
    Mound Site in Ohio. The new contract, streamlined and focused on
    reducing risk, will emphasize completing cleanup safely and more
    quickly, with a goal of transferring the site to the community by 2006
    or earlier.
        Similarly, as the review makes clear, EM needs to get its own house
    in order to ensure its internal processes and policies support the
    urgency of its mission. As part of our human capital strategy, we have
    just completed a reassignment of 40 percent of the program's 70 Senior
    Executives in order to strengthen, streamline, and remove unnecessary
    layers from the leadership of the program. Our purpose is to better
    leverage the unique talents of these executives, force better
    integration between the field and headquarters on the challenges
    confronting the program, and to stimulate new thinking and creative
    solutions to the cleanup.
        We are taking actions to further augment the Nation's security
    through the consolidation of nuclear material at EM sites, a key
    recommendation of the top-to-bottom report. We are working in
    partnership with the National Nuclear Security Administration to ensure
    that our nuclear material is safe and secure. This accelerated effort
    will lead to more secure protection of our nuclear material inventory
    while reducing the expensive cost of storage and protection at multiple
    sites.
        This is just a beginning. We will continue to work quickly to
    implement the recommendations of the top-to-bottom report.

                      THE FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET REQUEST

        A key element for implementing the review's recommendations is to
    ensure that the program's funding is properly aligned to support needed
    change. The fiscal year 2003 budget request is a first step towards
    achieving that alignment. It incorporates some new ways of doing
    business and includes a significant structural change designed to
    foster agreement on expedited, more risk-based cleanup approaches.
        EM's fiscal year 2003 budget request of $6.7 billion is essentially
    the same level as appropriated for fiscal year 2002. The budget request
    is composed of two parts: a base budget request and a new Environmental
    Management Cleanup Reform Appropriation request of $800 million to
    implement fundamental changes to the cleanup program.

                          CLEANUP REFORM APPROPRIATION

        EM is requesting a new Cleanup Reform Appropriation that is
    critical to beginning implementation of the recommendations of the top-
    to-bottom review. While the overall size of the request is consistent
    with past years, DOE is requesting from Congress new discretion in
    allocating this money among the sites, and for specific projects within
    sites. We believe that this approach is essential to meeting the common
    goal of States, taxpayers, and DOE accelerated cleanup and risk
    reduction. DOE realizes that we are asking a great deal from Congress
    with this request, and we are eager to work with you to accomplish this
    goal.
        The Cleanup Reform Appropriation would in essence be a performance
    tool--a pool of funds available to those sites that both demonstrate
    their ability to realign to a more accelerated risk-based approach, and
    provide to DOE specific proposals consistent with this new approach
    that achieve greater risk reduction, faster.
        We are now in the midst of reassessing and realigning our
    activities to enable a more risk-based, accelerated cleanup approach.
    It is our goal to develop agreements at each site on a specific set of
    changes and commitments by all parties that will reflect this new
    approach. I have no doubt that this process may often be difficult.
    Everyone will have to let go of certain things they favor in the
    broader public interest of achieving more risk reduction faster.
    Indeed, the top-to-bottom review concluded that every player in the
    cleanup business needs to make changes to enable a more effective
    cleanup strategy.
        Once these strategic agreements are reached, we will develop
    specific plans that implement this new approach. These plans should be
    supported by the State and Federal regulators, should align with a
    revised contract and regulatory strategy, and should reflect a risk-
    based accelerated approach. These plans might be new projects not
    previously in the sites' baselines. They might be modified, accelerated
    versions of existing projects. I am also open to supporting projects
    that already reflect an accelerated risk-based approach, but where
    additional funds can achieve even greater risk reduction at a lower
    life-cycle cost. Each project proposed for the cleanup fund would have
    a new cost savings and funding profile. Funds from the Cleanup Reform
    Appropriation would then be made available to fund or supplement
    existing funding from the base budget for the project. The appropriate
    congressional committees will be informed of the agreement and the
    commitment of funds from this appropriation. The funds identified with
    the acceleration will be merged with the funds in the parent
    appropriation (e.g., Closure, Site/Project Completion, Post-2006) of
    the old activity.
        This new appropriation will provide the stimulus necessary to
    encourage our sites, our contractors, DOE headquarters and program
    elements, and State and Federal regulators to quickly forge agreements
    to enable more effective cleanup approaches. An example of the
    candidate projects identified during the review for alternate
    strategies that should produce results quicker and with substantial
    life-cycle savings are high-level waste vitrification projects. The
    review identified alternative approaches to treating high-level waste
    that would limit vitrification to the high-risk component and pursue
    alternative treatment approaches for lower-risk components. These
    alternative approaches offer the potential of earlier true risk
    reduction and could save the taxpayers tens of billions of dollars.
        In summary, this Cleanup Reform Appropriation provides EM with the
    tool we need to jump-start our reform agenda. It enables DOE, Congress,
    communities, regulators, and contractors to work together to achieve
    our common goal of accelerated cleanup and risk reduction. It also
    maintains for Congress the necessary oversight and checks and balances
    to ensure that this fund is managed prudently, and consistently with
    our common goals.

                              BASE BUDGET REQUEST

        The base budget request would protect our workers, the public, and
    the environment while continuing cleanup progress across the DOE
    complex. As I said earlier, this fiscal year 2003 budget is a
    transitional budget. It does not fully reflect the changes we have
    proposed and will be implementing throughout the DOE complex over the
    next several months. The progress towards cleanup and risk reduction
    reflected in this request does not meet either my, or the Secretary's,
    expectations for this program. But it does provide us with the set of
    tools we need to begin the process of improving EM's performance. In
    building the request, the Department applied the following principles
    and priorities:
        Protect human health and the environment: The budget request
    continues to place the highest priority on protecting the health and
    safety of workers and the public at all DOE sites. We expect
    outstanding safety performance as a matter of course. We demand this
    from our contractors and ourselves, and we will accept nothing less.
        Surveillance and maintenance: Surveillance, maintenance, and
    support activities needed to maintain waste, materials, facilities, and
    sites in a safe and stable condition are fully funded in the base
    budget. This funding maintains the sites in an operating and safe
    condition. Examples of these types of activities in the request
    include:

             Safe storage, configuration, and accountability of
            nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuel at sites such as the
            Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
            (INEEL), the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and the
            Hanford Site in Washington;
             Safe storage of high-level, mixed, and low-level
            waste, as well as management and disposal of hazardous and
            sanitary waste, across the DOE complex, including tank safety
            activities at the Hanford, INEEL, and Savannah River high-level
            waste tank farms;
             Long-term stewardship at more than 35 sites where
            cleanup has been completed but where some contaminants still
            remain. In fiscal year 2003, this will include Weldon Spring in
            Missouri, which is expected to complete cleanup and transition
            to long-term stewardship by the end of fiscal year 2002;
             Maintaining the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in
            Ohio in cold standby, including uranium deposit removal;
             Surveillance and maintenance of more than 62,000
            depleted uranium hexafloride and other uranium cylinders
            located at gaseous diffusion plants in Kentucky, Ohio, and
            Tennessee;
             Surveillance and maintenance of facilities, including
            excess contaminated facilities pending deactivation and
            decontamination;
             Groundwater monitoring and continued operation of
            treatment systems; and
             Essential landlord functions.

        Safeguards and security: This is first EM budget request since the
    events of September 11. Our Nation is more aware than ever before of
    the critical need to maintain vigilance in our domestic security and to
    protect against terrorism. The EM program is responsible for many tons
    of surplus nuclear material. The budget request provides funding at
    approximately the fiscal year 2002 appropriation, reflecting both
    increased and decreased safeguards and security needs. In particular,
    reduced requirements in Environmental Management Defense Facilities
    Closure Projects are commensurate with the planned removal of special
    nuclear materials from Fernald and Rocky Flats sites, and reflect
    completion of security upgrades in Miamisburg this year.
        Accelerated cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats, Fernald, and Mound:
    The request supports the work necessary to continue accelerated cleanup
    and closure of the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site in
    Colorado. The request maintains a focus on closure of the Fernald
    Environmental Management Project and the Mound Site in Ohio. Closing
    these sites will eliminate significant risk and financial liabilities
    that EM cannot afford to maintain. Our base budget request also funds
    supporting activities at sites such as the Savannah River Site and Oak
    Ridge in Tennessee that are critical to achieving closure of these
    three major sites.
        At Rocky Flats, the fiscal year 2003 request keeps the site on
    track for closing in 2006. In fiscal year 2003, it supports:

             Eliminating the Security Protected Area. In fiscal
            year 2001, special nuclear material was consolidated into a
            single building, significantly reducing the size of the
            Protected Area. This both reduced security costs for the
            buildings being dismantled and improved productivity by
            reducing the time it takes work crews to gain access to these
            facilities. In fiscal year 2003, based on the current estimates
            for shipping nuclear material off-site, we will be able to
            eliminate the Protected Area entirely. Cost savings can than be
            shifted to active cleanup, rather than maintaining costly
            safeguards and security measures;
             Shipping 3,700 cubic meters of transuranic waste to
            WIPP, and 35,000 cubic meters of low-level waste and 3,600
            cubic meters of low-level mixed waste for disposal, subject to
            receiver site availability;
             Completing shipments of plutonium metals and oxides
            off-site; and
             Continuing deactivation and decontamination (D&D)
            activities for Buildings 371, 707, 771, and 776/7, and
            associated remediation work.

        At Fernald, the fiscal year 2003 request supports:

             Continuing remediation of the silos;
             Shipping about 93,500 cubic meters of waste to a
            permitted off-site commercial disposal facility; continuing
            packaging and on- or off-site disposition of mixed and low-
            level wastes; and placing 43,000 cubic meters of remediation
            waste in the on-site disposal facility; and
             Continuing D&D of the Pilot Plant Complex and
            Multicomplex, and initiating D&D of the Liquid Storage Complex.

        At Miamisburg (Mound), we will continue efforts to cleanup
    contamination and transfer land to the community for economic
    development. We have already transferred 121 acres, or about 40 percent
    of the site, for this purpose. The fiscal year 2003 request supports:

             Continuing acceleration of site cleanup and transfer
            of site properties by completing ``critical path'' deactivation
            and decontamination activities in the Main Hill Tritium
            facilities (i.e., R, SW, and T Buildings);
             Completing site preparations and beginning excavation
            of thorium- and polonium-contaminated soil (i.e., Release Site
            66), the largest contaminated soil excavation project at Mound;
            and
             Shipping over 19,000 cubic meters of contaminated soil
            and debris for off-site disposal.

        Increased shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP): The
    request maintains support for a significantly increased rate of
    shipments of transuranic waste to WIPP. The WIPP facility in New Mexico
    is critical to EM closure and completion goals at other sites. For
    example, WIPP is critical to the Department's commitment to the State
    of Idaho to ship 3,100 cubic meters of transuranic waste out of the
    State by December 2002, and to meeting the schedule for closure of
    Rocky Flats. In fiscal year 2002, the Department provided an additional
    $12 million to WIPP to increase by almost 50 percent the rate of
    shipments. The fiscal year 2003 request supports:

             Continued increased shipments of contact-handled
            transuranic waste; and
             Continued progress toward beginning shipments of
            remote-handled waste, including submission of regulatory
            documentation to the New Mexico and EPA regulators and facility
            upgrades and modifications needed for remote-handled disposal
            operations.

        Continuing progress: EM will continue to make progress in
    completing cleanup projects in accordance with existing approaches and
    under existing agreements. The Department will continue efforts to
    clean up release sites; to treat, store, and dispose of hazardous and
    radioactive waste; and to decontaminate and decommission facilities at
    many sites. However, we expect to accelerate the pace of progress of
    many of these projects as we begin to implement the top-to-bottom
    review recommendations. For example, the request provides funding to:

             At the Hanford site, continue construction of the
            Waste Treatment Plant to vitrify high-level waste. By the end
            of fiscal year 2002, we will have begun construction of two of
            three major facilities, and completed 50 percent of the
            engineering and design for all three. Work in fiscal year 2003
            will focus on continuing construction of the vitrification
            facility, starting construction of the pretreatment facility,
            and purchasing major equipment, as well as designing the feed
            delivery system.
             At INEEL, begin operation of the Advanced Mixed Waste
            Treatment Facility, treat about 1,625 cubic meters of
            transuranic waste, and complete construction and begin
            operation of the CERCLA disposal facility for remediation
            waste, as well as continue operations to move spent nuclear
            fuel to safer storage.
             At the Savannah River Site, continue stabilization of
            high-risk nuclear material solutions in the canyons; continue
            activities to suspend and deactivate F-Canyon; complete
            construction work to stabilize and package plutonium for long-
            term storage, and the transfer of americium/curium solutions to
            the high level waste tanks for eventual vitrification.
             At the Oak Ridge Reservation, complete major risk
            reduction remediation projects, including excavation,
            treatment, and off-site disposal of highly contaminated
            sediments from ORNL surface impoundments, and excavation of
            uranium contaminated soils from the Y-12 Boneyard/Burial site
            and disposal in the new on-site disposal cell. The request also
            continues D&D work at East Tennessee Technology Park, including
            completing the dismantlement of two of the three remaining
            cascade units in Building K-31.
             At the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky,
            complete high priority remedial actions, including cleanup of
            the North/South diversion ditch and continue scrap metal
            removal and groundwater actions, as well as characterization of
            high priority DOE Material Storage Areas.
             At the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, complete
            high priority remediation projects, and continue groundwater
            remediation, storage yard removal, and disposal of mixed low
            level waste.
             At West Valley in New York, continue decontamination
            of spent fuel processing and storage facilities, and continue
            construction of the Remote-Handled Waste Facility that will be
            used to prepare transuranic and other high-activity waste for
            shipment and disposal. We will complete all vitrification
            processing operations and deactivation of vitrification
            facilities, including shutdown of the melter, by the end of
            fiscal year 2002.
             At the Nevada Test Site, continue low-level waste
            operations in support of the DOE complex and priority
            remediation work, including modeling activities at the
            Underground Testing Area, and remediation of 13 industrial
            sites.
             At Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York,
            continue high priority groundwater monitoring and remediation,
            and finalize and begin implementing the cleanup plan for the
            Peconic River.

        Focusing on cleanup: This budget request is the first reflection of
    a key tenet that success for the EM program requires a laser-like focus
    on its core mission of cleanup and closure. If activities do not
    support that mission, then EM should not be doing them. This budget
    request begins to implement this tenet by shedding several activities
    traditionally funded by EM, but which are not essential to achieving
    the Department's cleanup goals. For example:

             The request reflects a significant reduction in
            funding in headquarters-controlled and -managed accounts.
            Overall, funding for such headquarters-based programs and
            support services will be reduced to almost 50 percent of the
            fiscal year 2002 levels. While our request significantly
            reduces support services for headquarters-directed activities
            related to such programs as pollution prevention, hazardous
            worker training, and long-term stewardship, these functions
            will continue at some level as appropriate, but will be carried
            out by Federal employees rather than contractors.
             The budget request also reflects major shifts in the
            structure of the EM technology program to focus efforts on
            specific, short-term applied technology needs for cleanup and
            closure. These changes are discussed below.
                       refocusing science and technology
        EM's fiscal year 2003 request of $92 million for science and
    technology is significantly less than the $204.7 million appropriated
    in fiscal year 2002. This is the result of a dramatic shift in the
    program structure to ensure it is clearly focused on meeting cleanup
    and closure needs.
        In parallel with the broader review of the EM program, we have also
    undertaken an in-house evaluation of EM's Science and Technology (S&T)
    Program. As a result of this review, we concluded that an integrated
    technology program is an essential element for successful completion of
    the EM cleanup effort and for post-closure requirements. However, for
    the program to have maximum impact, it must be streamlined and highly
    focused on a limited number of critical, high-payback activities where
    real, measurable improvements can be gained versus a larger number of
    activities that offer only marginal improvement. It must be end-point
    and risk-driven to provide the necessary technical basis for future
    decision making.
        Toward this end, we are reorienting the S&T program to focus on two
    primary areas: (1) direct technical assistance to closure sites to
    ensure they have the necessary technology and technical support to meet
    closure schedules, and (2) alternative approaches and step improvements
    to high-risk, high-cost baselines to ensure all possible alternatives
    have been evaluated and that workable alternatives are available and
    used as the cleanup progresses. EM will execute this new approach using
    streamlined management structures and processes.
        As the first step, we are thoroughly reviewing ongoing activities
    to determine their applicability to the new areas. By June 30, 2002, we
    expect to have decisions on these activities and an operational plan
    for transitioning and managing S&T activities in fiscal year 2003 and
    beyond. We believe this realigned S&T program will better suit the
    Department's needs.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The changes that I envision are not changes on the margin. The
    reforms undertaken thus far are but a beginning, and must permeate the
    entirety of the scope and management of this program to create and
    sustain meaningful measurable success. They are a complete overhaul of
    the Department's environmental cleanup program that cannot afford to
    wait.
        I believe we face an historic opportunity to refocus, reshape, and
    transform this program. All of us, and all of our regulators and
    stakeholders throughout the country, want the same things from this
    program: accelerated cleanup and risk reduction. Making the changes we
    propose will not be easy. It will involve painful changes in the way
    all of us do business. I believe we have no alternative. The status quo
    is not an option. Muddling through and hoping for something different
    later is not an option. We cannot wait for a future time in the hope
    that making these changes might be easier.
        This is our moment. If we do not start to do what is needed now, we
    will have failed the taxpayers of today and the future generations of
    tomorrow.
        This is a marathon, not a sprint. This is not a process that will
    be completed overnight, but neither can we afford to delay. Delay only
    leads to increased cost and lack of real risk reduction. Eventually,
    delay will turn festering high cost problems into immediate public
    health risks.
        If we are ultimately to be successful, we need your help. I ask
    your support for the budget request before you. It is a critical first
    step to achieving our mutual goal of completing the cleanup of the
    nuclear weapons sites. I look forward to working with Congress and
    others to achieve this goal.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
        We will have a round of questions for 6 minutes each and,
    if appropriate, a second round. Let me begin by focusing again
    on the new cleanup reform initiative. Could you give us a
    description of the goals of this account, this new program?
        Ms. Roberson. In general terms, the goal of this account is
    to reinvigorate our efforts to learn from past experience and
    past investments. For instance, you cited our science and
    technology program. We have a number of technologies that we
    have made investments in, and we want to evaluate those
    investments and their results and determine whether those
    technologies are ready to be deployed to help address existing
    problems that we have otherwise not been able to overcome.
        So the focus of the program is to provide the opportunity
    to reinvigorate the program, refocus on our priorities,
    streamline and de-layer the organization, and apply our
    resources more directly and visibly to the work before us.
        Senator Reed. There is some discussion or at least the
    suggestion that $430 million of this $800 million fund has been
    committed already to the Hanford site in Washington. Is that
    correct?
        Ms. Roberson. We have reached an agreement with the State
    of Washington and the Environmental Protection Agency on an
    accelerated strategy for cleanup at the Hanford site and we
    have costed that out and our estimate is that it will require
    an additional $433 million.
        Senator Reed. Now, that leaves approximately $370 million
    in this new account. Is that enough to help meet compliance
    agreements or create incentives for the States and contractors
    to make additional progress at all the sites you have to deal
    with?
        Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, we believe it is. The
    administration's commitment is to amend its request if we reach
    agreements at more of our sites and the $800 million is not
    sufficient.
        Senator Reed. It also raises the question that the
    resources that you are targeting for this new initiative almost
    necessarily come in part from reductions in other areas. Does
    that leave you vulnerable to not meeting the court-ordered,
    court-mandated requirements that you face around the country?
        Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, we believe that we can meet our
    cleanup agreement milestones. But our obligation is to go
    beyond that and address our environmental obligations more
    broadly and integrate all of our activities. The additional
    funding that we ask for allows us to meet our legal commitments
    as well as advance the cleanup more broadly.
        Senator Reed. So you are confident that you have enough
    resources to meet all of the ongoing legal obligations you have
    and that this $800 million is in effect a new initiative that
    would allow you to do things differently, accelerate cleanup,
    apply more effort at sites that are already being handled; is
    that fair?
        Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, yes, I believe so. But I would
    also emphasize that we are not viewing the $800 million in
    isolation from the base budget. We believe it provides us the
    opportunity to also look at the activities built within the
    base budget, and that the cleanup strategies that are being
    developed at our sites across the complex look at the totality
    of the environmental obligations we have at each site.
        Senator Reed. Now, essentially, because the $800 million
    cannot possibly cover every site in this country, what are the
    criteria you are using to determine, for example, that the
    Hanford site would get $433 million and perhaps another site
    would get $20 million or $30 million or nothing?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, I would like to address that in general
    terms, but I would be glad to provide more detail in writing,
    because we have looked at each site. I am sure you are aware we
    have a baseline cleanup program at each site. So the primary
    criteria is more direct and timely resolution of those issues
    based upon experiences we have had, both successes and failures
    and lessons learned.
        So it would be different depending on the environmental
    issues at each site. But acceleration is the key.
        Senator Reed. Now, to qualify for this new money in this
    new cleanup reform account, must the States renegotiate their
    agreements with the Federal Government in some way? Is that
    part of the quid pro quo?
        Ms. Roberson. No, sir, that is not. No, sir, Mr. Chairman,
    that is not a requirement. Let me say two things. The
    agreements that we speak of in this program are not the Federal
    facilities agreement on cleanup. This is not an assault on
    those agreements. However, I will say, as in Hanford, in
    working with the State Department of Ecology and the EPA, the
    opportunities to accelerate that impacted milestones on those
    commitments we believe should be addressed and I believe that
    the regulators and States have agreed with that.
        But that is not the going-in position we have. We are not
    starting with the regulatory agreements. The scope that we are
    trying to reach strategic agreement on is our total
    environmental obligation at a site.
        Senator Reed. But is it implicit in your discussions with
    the States that they have to be flexible in terms of not only
    the agreements, but also perhaps the standard of cleanup, to
    get this extra money?
        Ms. Roberson. That is not implicit in our process. I can
    tell you what is implicit is that in many of our agreements we
    have fairly difficult processes to work through, and so there
    are cases where we are suggesting modifications to the
    structural processes.
        Senator Reed. But no modification to the standards? The
    standards remain the same?
        Ms. Roberson. I do not believe we have suggested in any
    State that we change the standard.
        Senator Reed. Just a final point, then. Essentially you are
    looking at a range of different facilities that have to be
    cleaned up. You are not implicitly or explicitly going in and
    demanding any changes in the cleanup agreements, any lowering
    of standards, anything else. How does the State then
    distinguish themselves, make themselves eligible for this
    money?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, what we are doing is sitting down with
    the regulators, both State and Federal, at each site and
    proposing and in some cases actually developing in conjunction
    with them a strategy to accelerate the cleanup. There will be
    cases where that does in fact affect milestones or structural
    processes built into the cleanup agreements. We would hope that
    they would consider those.
        But we are not coming in and plopping something down on the
    table and saying, you take it or leave it. That is not the way
    this process works.
        Senator Reed. In terms of this, the request for research
    and development, there is a substantial decrease, it appears,
    in the budget submission. One of the points that I made in my
    statement was that the future depends a great deal on new,
    innovative, and cost-effective techniques, and if we do not
    fund that type of research we will end up doing the same thing
    we did last year and the year before and spending probably more
    money.
        Why are we decreasing the research and development so much?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, our science and technology program is a
    key constituent of the accelerated cleanup and accelerated
    cleanup reform. In structuring our fiscal year 2003 budget and
    reforming the program, we placed our emphasis on integration of
    technology investments and accelerated cleanup. Our goals in
    that were to optimize the investments previously made in
    science and technology, to concentrate on high-risk, high-cost
    problems, and to streamline and delay the science and
    technology organization and processes both at headquarters and
    in the field.
        Second, consistent with this philosophy, the Environmental
    Management Science Program, which is focused on long-term
    research and development, has been transferred to the Office of
    Science's newly created environmental remediation program. The
    Science office is making significant investments in
    environmental research and will continue to work closely to
    meet EM's basic research needs for the future.
        Senator Reed. You seem to have anticipated that question,
    Madam Secretary.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to just reiterate again for the record, Madam
    Secretary, that the Rocky Flats site is scheduled to be cleaned
    up and closed by 2006, and in fact upon closure the site will
    be designated as a national wildlife refuge for generations to
    enjoy in the future. The 2006 closure date is about 60 years
    earlier than the baseline closure date that was anticipated in
    1996.
        Additionally, the 1996 baseline budget anticipated the
    Rocky Flats site spending over $30 billion to be cleaned up and
    closed. The 2006 closure plan will cost about $7 billion.
        I have about 15 questions I want to ask you in relation to
    Rocky Flats. I would just request that you simply give us a yes
    or no answer if you can. I do not mean to be hostile--lawyers
    use that with a hostile witness. I certainly do not view you as
    a hostile witness. In fact, I view you as a friend, but time
    may not give us an opportunity to get into a lot of the detail.
    But elaborate briefly, so I can just get it on the record here
    and stay within my time limit. I want to keep the chairman
    happy here.
        If all issues outside of Rocky Flats were kept on schedule,
    are there any issues specifically on the site that would cause
    a 2006 closure date to be missed?
        Ms. Roberson. The project currently is on schedule and
    slightly under cost, so we believe that we could achieve the
    intended scope.
        Senator Allard. Is the contractor completing their work on
    time and within budget to complete the cleanup and closure of
    Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Is there adequate funding to complete the
    cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. With the continued support of Congress, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
    technical obstacles which would delay the completion of cleanup
    and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. Briefly, the project is very challenging.
    There are still some small waste streams that we are working
    on, but they are not critical to the schedule right now.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated safety
    issues which would delay the completion of cleanup and closure
    of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. No, sir.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
    problems with the work force at Rocky Flats which would delay
    the completion of cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
    problems with the State of Colorado which would delay the
    completion and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
    problems with the Department of Energy field office in Colorado
    which would delay that 2006 closure?
        Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
    problems with the Department of Energy's Office of Environment,
    Safety, and Health (ES&H) which would delay completion?
        Ms. Roberson. I do not believe so.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
    problems with any other office within the Department of Energy
    which would delay the closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. At this time, none that I am aware of, sir.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. Are there any current or
    anticipated problems with the Office of Management and Budget
    (OMB) or the White House which would delay the completion date
    scheduled for 2006 on Rocky Flats?
        Ms. Roberson. None that I am aware of.
        Senator Allard. Are there any current or anticipated
    problems with the EPA or the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
    Board (DNFSB) which would delay that closure beyond 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. No, sir.
        Senator Allard. Are there any problems occurring in either
    the Hanford site, Idaho, Oak Ridge, WIPP, or Yucca Mountain
    which you anticipate will delay the competition of cleanup and
    closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. None that I am aware of.
        Senator Allard. Other than issues within the State of South
    Carolina, are there issues associated with any organization,
    State, nation, or other entity which you anticipate will delay
    the completion of cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats by 2006?
        Ms. Roberson. None that I am aware of.
        Senator Allard. So as I understand it, Madam Secretary,
    other than some issues not impacting the critical path, the
    only issue that will delay the closure of Rocky Flats past
    2006, and in fact places closure at risk for the foreseeable
    future, is the inability to ship certain materials to South
    Carolina?
        Ms. Roberson. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, in my view the responsibility
    for failing to clean up and close Rocky Flats by 2006 falls
    directly on the Governor of South Carolina. He not only puts
    the closure of Rocky Flats at risk, but the entire nuclear
    complex.
        Moving on to another question, the National Nuclear
    Security Administration has responsibility of shipping many of
    the EM waste types, including surplus plutonium. With the
    closure of sites like Rocky Flats and the proposed acceleration
    of cleanup of the four major EM sites, I think it is a very
    important thing that the shipping of those wastes occur on
    schedule.
        Are you confident that NNSA will keep the shipping of
    plutonium and other special nuclear material from EM sites on
    schedule?
        Ms. Roberson. Senator Allard, is this a yes-no?
        Senator Allard. No, you can elaborate on this one if you
    would, please.
        Ms. Roberson. OK. I have the opportunity and pleasure of
    working very closely with Dr. Beckner, and I believe they are
    committed. We are working very aggressively. Clearly, delays in
    this schedule can continue to challenge their ability to
    support the shipping campaign from Rocky Flats to Savannah
    River on the schedule that we have asked them to, but we
    clearly still have the opportunity to do so.
        Senator Allard. How do the delays caused by the State of
    South Carolina impact the shipping schedule of materials coming
    out of Rocky Flats?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, I think Dr. Beckner will be prepared to
    respond to that.
        Senator Allard. OK.
        Ms. Roberson. But continued delays simply put us in a
    position of having to make choices between how to use the
    transportation resources.
        Senator Allard. It looks like my time has expired, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Do you want a second round?
        Senator Allard. Yes, in the second round I will catch up.
        Senator Reed. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. I hope everyone is observing a record has
    now been set. I spent 8 years in the House and now nearly 8
    years in the Senate. That was a total of 18 questions that were
    asked and answered in 6 minutes. That has never happened before
    in the history of the institution, and I do not know which one
    to compliment. But I make a request, Madam Secretary, that you
    not be so short and brief in response to my questions.
        First of all, I want to get back to what I said. I
    recognize also that some of the problems in the environmental
    standards and rules and regulations that we are experiencing on
    our various military installations are not on your end.
        There are some that are like water runoff. When you get
    into endangered species, for example, and the endangered
    species program in the Southeastern United States, the better
    job we do, the more serious the problem becomes. Camp Lejeune
    and Fort Bragg, where they have red ribbons around training
    areas because it is a suspected habitat of the red-cockaded
    woodpecker, and so the better job they do the more red ribbons
    there are.
        But there are many areas that do affect you. So what I
    would like to do is ask you for the record: When I heard that
    the legislation is being considered by the administration--and
    I have been talking about that and actually opposing it for
    quite some time. I am very interested in the status of that. It
    is something that directly affects the readiness of our
    military.
        I can tell you right now, in many areas the cost of
    compliance with environmental regulations in our training areas
    exceeds the cost of ammunition. So I see that as something that
    is very serious.
        Following up a little bit on what the chairman talked about
    on the adequacy of the budget, I have to ask the same question.
    You mentioned in your opening statement the $6.7 billion is
    essentially the same as last time, and yet the problems we know
    are greater now than they were last time. I took some time and
    went around to various installations such as the closing and
    the cleanup of McClellan, plutonium being the main villain
    there, and the guys that do not come here to testify but talk
    to me on the ground say that they do not know what kind of an
    end is in sight, but it was dramatically underestimated as to
    what the ultimate costs would be.
        I know it is very difficult to do that, but I think it is
    important for this committee to know as early as possible if
    you think it is not going to be adequate, the amount that is
    there. It just seems to me that if the amount is essentially
    the same as it was last time that it would be a problem.
        Is there anything you want to add to what you said about
    the budget and about problems that you see coming up?
        Ms. Roberson. Senator Inhofe, we are working very
    aggressively to do just as you just noted. We have deployed
    teams all over the complex and I personally am engaged in
    evaluating and discussing the strategy to accelerate the
    cleanup at every site. We are not at this moment in a position
    to identify whether more funds will be needed than the $6.7
    billion, but we are working very aggressively and we expect
    that we would be within the next 30 days.
        Senator Inhofe. I think it is important for another reason,
    too. There has been a lot of discussion about future BRAC
    rounds. One of the arguments against it is that we know that
    there is some time in the future when you close an installation
    where money savings will be achieved, but we know for sure that
    in the first 3 and 4 and 5 years it will be very expensive.
        So it is important for those of us who are going to be
    making a decision at a time when our military needs much more
    than the budget that the President has talked about, which I
    think he feels is the best he can do under the circumstances,
    that we be able to make that evaluation so we will know what
    that cost is going to be. So I think it is important for us to
    hear from you the unvarnished truth on these things.
        What was the statement you made when you said the cleanup
    of the environmental legacy of the Nation's nuclear weapons
    program and government-sponsored nuclear energy research? How
    critical is the role of Yucca Mountain in cleaning up these
    sites?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, we are clearly counting on opening up
    Yucca Mountain in our plans for disposition of certain
    materials in the Environmental Management program. The
    Department's long-term plans for high-level waste and spent
    nuclear fuel requires the opening of Yucca Mountain. Where the
    opening of the repository may be delayed, EM cleanup plans
    therefore might not be immediately affected, but clearly it
    would require some additional investment to look at storage and
    other alternatives for disposition, because we have no other
    alternatives right now.
        Senator Inhofe. The cost to that, have you done some
    analysis? Let us say for some unforeseen reason, which I do not
    think is going to happen, it should not become available; then
    what would the cost be?
        Ms. Roberson. I am sure the Department has, but I do not
    have that at hand with me, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. That would be a good thing for the record,
    to give some approximate cost there.
        [The information referred to follows:]

             Cost to EM Program if Yucca Mountain is not Developed

        The Department of Energy assessed the costs of not opening a
    geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear
    fuel. The life cycle cost impacts to the DOE's Environmental Management
    program for not opening a repository are estimated to be $12.1 billion
    (in fiscal year 1998 constant dollars) over the next 100 years (Final
    Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the
    Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at
    Yucca Mountain, February 2002). These costs are primarily to place DOE-
    owned spent nuclear fuel in safe long-term storage. After that 100 year
    period, the cost would be approximately $110 million per year (in
    fiscal year 1998 constant dollars), in perpetuity.

        Senator Inhofe. Lastly, let me read a statement here, which
    you have read, I am sure, a written statement made by Bruce
    Tarter, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Lab. He says:
    ``All stored radioactive wastes will remain at Livermore
    because there will not be funding available for the disposal
    offsite. Lack of space will prevent the laboratory's hazardous
    wastes management department from accepting newly generated
    radioactive wastes. This will shut down critical work on
    stockpile stewardship.''
        I guess the question I would have is, do you feel that this
    could have an effect on some of the programs such as stockpile
    stewardship? What effect do you see?
        Ms. Roberson. I am not sure if he is referring to hazardous
    wastes, mixed waste, or transuranic (TRU) waste.
        Senator Inhofe. Hazardous waste.
        Ms. Roberson. Hazardous waste. The Department has actually
    invested in processing and treatment capability at Lawrence
    Livermore, which has not yet been started up. We are in the
    process of trying to accomplish that. So we do believe we will
    provide some relief for that site and for the lab with the
    startup of those operations.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Ms. Roberson. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Madam Secretary, I just have one question and then I will
    turn to Senator Allard. In our previous discussions you
    indicated that if there was a shortfall of funding that there
    would be a commitment or that it would be the commitment of the
    administration to get additional funds. How would those
    additional funds be authorized and appropriated? Are you
    considering, at least as a contingency, a supplemental
    appropriation for this year or next year?
        Ms. Roberson. As the administration identified in its
    budget submission to Congress, I believe that the Office of
    Management and Budget is considering both options, depending on
    how far along we can get in the development of these agreements
    and what the funding needs are. If we have agreement and can
    identify the funding need before the appropriations process
    proceeds too far, we would amend our request.
        Senator Reed. Very good. Let me ask an additional question.
    If the Price-Anderson indemnification authority is not extended
    for DOE defense contractors prior to August, will you be able
    to enter into any new contracts after August?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, should Price-Anderson expire without
    reauthorization, we would have to look to authority under other
    statutes to provide protection for the contractors. However, it
    is my understanding that authorities under other laws are
    limited and that authority comparable to that available under
    Price-Anderson does not exist.
        If the Department's Price-Anderson authority were not
    available for an extended period of time, we would have to
    reevaluate some of our planned procurement actions and
    strategies. Termination of existing contracts in favor of a new
    renegotiated competed contract may have to be postponed until
    that is resolved.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, if I could follow up on your
    Price-Anderson question. I had two and you asked one of my two
    questions. The second one I have is are there any national
    security missions that would be at risk if Price-Anderson is
    not authorized?
        Ms. Roberson. Well, I think for the Environmental
    Management program the primary concern would be securing
    contract services to carry out the mission. So, with the
    assumption that the current contracts would stand, any new
    procurements we think would be at risk.
        Senator Allard. Your fiscal year 2003 budget requests
    greatly reduced funding for the long-term stewardship program.
    However, the DOE will not be able to walk away from its sites
    without putting in place long-term monitoring and surveillance
    plans which are accepted and approved by the host States. What
    are the anticipated costs associated with the long-term
    stewardship responsibilities and give us some insight into the
    program, if you would?
        Ms. Roberson. Again, I do not have a handy estimate for the
    total long-term stewardship program. The total I would like, if
    we can, to provide that to you in writing, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                             Long-term Stewardship

        The fiscal year 2003 budget request for long-term stewardship
    provides the Department the resources necessary to perform the required
    post-cleanup remedy monitoring and maintenance activities at our
    completed sites. The Department cost-effectively manages over 30
    completed sites through our Long-term Surveillance and Maintenance
    program. Funding for this program has been consistent at approximately
    $5.5 million per year, which is sufficient to maintain our current
    long-term stewardship requirements at our sites.
        In addition, the fiscal year 2003 request allocates $1 million for
    long-term stewardship policy and guidance development. This level of
    funding is sufficient based on the technical capacity and performance
    of the Federal long-term stewardship staff. Previous year funding
    requests contributed to the successful completion of the report to
    Congress in fiscal year 2001, the National Long-Term Stewardship Study
    in fiscal year 2002, and the Strategic Plan in fiscal year 2002. We
    also expect to complete the Science and Technology road map in fiscal
    year 2003. Together these documents complete the foundational basis for
    our long-term stewardship efforts.
        Costs associated with managing the long-term stewardship at sites
    include both the remedy monitoring and maintenance costs as well as the
    land management/land ownership costs. The Department is evaluating the
    possible transfer of Department-owned land, including land with
    associated long-term stewardship responsibilities, to Federal land
    management agencies, interested local or tribal governments, or
    appropriate private entities. Regardless of the ultimate disposition
    path, the Department will assure the land is managed consistent with a
    Federal land management mission and/or consistent with local values and
    needs (e.g., economic development, natural resource protection, or open
    space).
        In January 2001, the Department provided to Congress a report on
    long-term stewardship that included an estimate of approximately $100
    million (in fiscal year 2000 constant year dollars) per year for post-
    closure care after cleanup at all sites had been completed. There are,
    of course, significant uncertainties associated with the estimate.
    Moreover, we are in the process of developing accelerated cleanup plans
    for the DOE sites that may change the cost of post-closure care.

        Ms. Roberson. We have not reduced our effort in long-term
    stewardship. The reduction in funding that we see in the fiscal
    year 2003 request is a reflection of our commitment to carry
    out our Federal responsibility in the long-term stewardship
    area. We have a team of Federal employees carrying out the work
    that had been distributed among a host of contractors, to
    refocus that program.
        We also refocused the policy-setting for long-term
    stewardship in headquarters to allow us to bring about
    effective lessons shared and consistency in the way we carry it
    out. So our emphasis on long-term stewardship has not been
    reduced one bit. In fact, it has increased.
        Senator Allard. I would like to go back to the chairman's
    comments on money that you set aside for cleanup reform. What
    you propose will require each site to review their current
    cleanup proposal and then to present to DOE an accelerated
    cleanup proposal. Can you summarize the administration's
    reasons for proposing the accelerated cleanup initiative?
        Ms. Roberson. The primary reason for proposing the
    accelerated cleanup initiative is a result of the insights
    gained in the evaluation of the program that Secretary Abraham
    commissioned that we titled the ``Top-To-Bottom Review.'' There
    were a number of insights in the Top-To-Bottom Review which led
    to this structured proposal. In simple terms, those were that
    we had opportunities to accelerate the work that we were not
    taking advantage of, that we had an infrastructure built up in
    the program that should be streamlined and refocused on getting
    the work done, and that in general terms the employees in this
    program and our contractors have to be reminded that our job is
    actually to reduce risk and complete the cleanup, and that
    these programs, although there are other obligations that come
    as the weapons program modernizes and other things happen, the
    Environmental Management program certainly has other projects,
    that we are not proceeding aggressively to address those
    environmental problems captured in the program today.
        Senator Allard. What has been the response by the States
    and regulators to this initiative?
        Ms. Roberson. I think the response has been cautious
    optimism. We have had discussions, I believe, with just about
    every State, with the regulators in every State in which we
    have a site, not just the large sites, the small sites as well.
    I have had the opportunity to speak with the regulators myself.
        At most of our sites there is a proposed accelerated
    strategy that has been put on the table. In many States it has
    been developed in conjunction with the regulators, and it is
    undergoing evaluation. In some cases it is undergoing
    evaluation by DOE because it was proposed from the site rather
    than with the involvement of headquarters.
        So I believe the reception has been cautious optimism, and
    I am appreciative of that and I think that Congress and the
    Department will benefit from that.
        Senator Allard. I am assuming that with this new
    accelerated cleanup you are going to rely on new technologies
    for waste processing. If so, how will the feasibility of these
    new approaches be tested without a strong science and
    technology program within EM?
        Ms. Roberson. We think we are maintaining a strong science
    and technology program. We also believe leveraging that
    research, basic research side of the program, with the Office
    of Science, who have the ability to look across all of DOE and
    help us identify those opportunities to advance, will help us
    even more.
        So even though the dollars are less, we actually believe
    our actions are strengthening our effort and our ability to
    invest in those science initiatives and technologies that are
    going to advance the program. There are two things we are
    doing: one, we are trying to leverage in the basic science area
    with the science program; and two, we are going through a
    review out there at the sites today, to be completed by the end
    of April, where we look at application of those technologies
    that we have already invested in.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, that completes my
    questioning.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your testimony today and
    your work, not only in the past but in the days ahead. Thank
    you very much.
        Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Reed. Let me call the second panel forward.
    [Pause.]
        Our second panel today consists of Dr. Everet Beckner,
    Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and Mr. Ralph
    Erickson, the Associate Administrator for Facilities and
    Operation of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
    Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for joining us today.
        In addition, we have written testimony from Admiral Bowman,
    the Deputy Administrator for Naval Reactors, that will be
    included in the record.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Bowman follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Adm. Frank L. Bowman, USN

        Thank you for inviting me to submit a statement on Naval Reactors'
    fiscal year 2003 Department of Energy budget request.
        Let me also thank you for the faith you continue to place in my
    program and for protecting the core values that have been the hallmark
    of the program's success for more than 50 years. Through your diligent
    efforts and support, our nuclear fleet remains deployed around the
    world, fully engaged in the war on terrorism.
        We all recognize that the threats our country faces today are as
    great as anytime in the past. We also know these threats are not
    limited to hostile nations with fixed borders but can come from
    organizations with no fixed borders, operating under a veil of secrecy
    and outside the international community.
        Our ongoing campaign against terrorism underlines the importance of
    nuclear-powered ships in defending our national interests and in
    responding to aggression against the United States. As our Nation was
    being attacked on September 11, U.S.S. Enterprise was headed home, by
    way of a planned port visit. Upon seeing the attack on our country on
    CNN at sea, the captain ordered the rudder hard over and U.S.S.
    Enterprise reversed course and prepared for action as the first
    aircraft carrier in position to respond to the attack. Also, a nuclear-
    powered submarine was within striking distance to attack targets in
    Afghanistan on September 11.
        When the President did order our military forces into action,
    aircraft from the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Enterprise and
    Carl Vinson, along with Tomahawk missiles launched from submarines and
    surface ships, carried out the initial attacks on targets in
    Afghanistan without any of the restrictions imposed on most land-based
    aircraft. Our nuclear fleet again demonstrated its capability to
    operate freely over much of the globe within striking range of the
    majority of targets.
        It is more than a commercial--our aircraft carriers are 4\1/2\
    acres of sovereign U.S. territory from which we can conduct sustained
    combat operations quickly and without having to negotiate staging
    rights on foreign soil. Nuclear power enhances these warships'
    capability and flexibility to sprint where needed and arrive ready for
    around the clock power projection and combat operations. Sustained
    high-speed capability (without dependence on a slow logistics train)
    enables rapid response to changing world circumstances, allowing
    operational commanders to surge these ships from the United States to
    trouble spots or to shift them from one crisis area to another. Nuclear
    propulsion helps the Navy stretch available assets to meet today's
    worldwide commitments.
        Our 54 operational nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) in the Navy's
    inventory possess inherent characteristics such as stealth, endurance,
    mobility, firepower, and multimission flexibility. These
    characteristics allow submarines unfettered access to contested
    battlespace 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for as long as required.
    Once there, submarines can covertly monitor adversaries without risk of
    political or military escalation--a particularly valuable capability
    since adversaries understand and can sometimes avoid reconnaissance.
    Should tensions escalate, submarines can also execute Tomahawk strikes
    from undisclosed locations without warning, often from inside an
    adversary's defensive umbrella.
        The Nation's 18 strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
    continue to form the bedrock of the country's strategic deterrence.
    These submarines carry the majority of our nuclear triad's warheads and
    are the most survivable units in this force, at the least cost.
        Many of the impressive capabilities these ships possess were
    developed with funding that was supported by this subcommittee.
        While new development is important, the number-one priority is
    ensuring the officers and sailors that are out there defending our
    Nation's interests are operating safe, effective nuclear propulsion
    plants. This is where most of Naval Reactors' funding goes. Today, the
    Naval Reactors program supports 102 reactors in 54 operational attack
    submarines, 18 ballistic missile submarines, 9 nuclear-powered aircraft
    carriers, 4 training and prototype platforms, a deep submergence
    vehicle, and 1 attack submarine undergoing inactivation.
        The average age of these ships today is 16\1/2\ years, but this
    average will exceed 22 years by the end of the decade because so few
    new ships are being added to the fleet. As these ships age, they place
    a greater and greater demand on Naval Reactors' DOE budgets.
        Also, with the funding authorized by this subcommittee, we are
    designing better, more cost-effective nuclear propulsion plants for the
    future. When the Navy's new Virginia-class attack submarine is
    delivered, it will provide needed capability for the 21st century at an
    affordable price. The reactor plant design uses advanced component and
    systems technology--including the first core designed from the start to
    operate throughout the life of the ship. The Virginia-class also has a
    simplified plant arrangement with fewer components compared to previous
    designs, which reduces construction costs and will reduce future
    maintenance costs.
        The nuclear propulsion plant design of the new CVNX-class aircraft
    carrier is well underway. The CVNX reactor plant will provide 25
    percent more energy than Nimitz-class ships and substantially more
    electric generating capacity than the reactors and electric plant used
    in Nimitz-class ships. The extra energy will support higher operational
    tempos and future electrical load growth in the CVNX-class or longer
    life. We are designing and developing the CVNX nuclear propulsion plant
    without an increase in our DOE budget.
        To meet the increasing demands on our submarine fleet, Naval
    Reactors is working on a Transformational Technology Core (TTC) to
    deliver a significant energy increase to future Virginia-class ships
    with minimum impact to the overall ship design.
        New transformational capabilities will soon be coming to the
    nuclear-powered submarine fleet through the conversion of four Trident
    submarines into SSGNs. With these ships, the Navy will be able to give
    theater CINCs an extraordinary strike/Special Operating Forces
    capability with a flexible, survivable platform that simultaneously
    relieves the operational strain on our naval forces. Surface ships and
    attack submarines now carrying Tomahawks can be freed up for other
    missions--a force multiplier. To this end, we are on course for a UUV
    and Tomahawk demonstration in December 2002 on an Ohio-class submarine.

                              NUCLEAR FLEET ISSUE

        Let me briefly discuss the most important issue I see with our
    submarine fleet today--put simply, we do not have enough of them:

             Today, we have only 54 operational SSNs--not enough to
            meet all of the Unified CINCs' and the national intelligence
            community's highest operational and collection requirements as
            identified in the 1999 Joint Staff SSN report on force level.
             Fleet operational data and Joint CINC demands clearly
            show the mismatch between current force structure and
            requirements. With force structure decreasing over the past
            several years, submarine operational commanders have had to
            reduce the number of deployed ships. In spite of the fact that
            fewer SSNs have been available to deploy, the demand for
            submarines continues to increase, especially since September
            11.
             The Navy is doing what it can to stretch existing
            assets to meet requirements within today's budget and overall
            priorities. For example:

                     We are refueling the first generation of the
                    Los Angeles-class submarines and extending these
                    submarines from 30 to 33 years. However, pushing the
                    hull life comes at a cost. Life extension exacerbates
                    the ``aging fleet'' problem. As the fleet ages, more
                    resources are required for support, and we have our
                    young submariners out there with outdated technology.
                     Additionally, to improve the operational
                    effectiveness of the submarine fleet, we have taken
                    steps to forward-base three submarines in Guam to
                    maximize their effectiveness by putting them closer to
                    the action.
                     To meet just the highest priority requirements
                    being placed on the submarine fleet, we should refuel
                    all remaining Los Angeles-class submarines. Two are
                    currently scheduled for inactivation. While this is the
                    right near-term decision to stem the bleeding for
                    submarine force restructure, refueling Los Angeles-
                    class submarines does not solve the longer-term problem
                    with submarine force structure. Next decade, we will
                    decommission three or four Los Angeles-class submarines
                    per year as the boats built in the 1980s reach end of
                    service life.

        The only long-term solution to meeting force level requirements is
    to build more submarines. As we consider future budgets, we must
    include increasing the Virginia-class submarine build rate to meet the
    Nation's long-term force level requirement for attack submarines. The
    force level issue is ultimately a resource question. The practice of
    buying submarines one at a time will not achieve the submarine numbers
    we need for the future and is not a cost-effective way to buy anything,
    including submarines. Multiyear procurements of more than one ship per
    year would provide significant savings compared to one per year.
    Coupled with leverage from buying material in Economic Ordering
    Quantities, real savings can be achieved. Innovative contracting
    approaches should be encouraged in this period of tight resources for
    ship construction.
        As my good friend, Admiral Bob Natter, our Atlantic Fleet
    Commander, says, ``We can fight 'em here or we can fight 'em over
    there. I prefer to fight them over there.'' Well, me too. Everyone
    knows and agrees submarines will be an absolutely necessary part of
    fighting them over there. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
    recently said we must exploit our military strengths as the war on
    terrorism continues. These strengths, he said, are intelligence,
    precision strike, and the ability to operate underwater. Well, that
    sounds just like submarines to me. We need to get going.

              FISCAL YEAR 2003 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET REQUEST

        Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2003 DOE budget request is $708
    million, an increase of only $5 million after inflation from fiscal
    year 2002 to fiscal year 2003. To put my budget request in perspective,
    it is less than 4 percent of the DOE budget. From the early 1990s to
    2000, Naval Reactors' budget has declined 32 percent in real terms, and
    has remained fairly steady for the last 3 years.
        Naval Reactors supports the 81 nuclear-powered warships that make
    up over 40 percent of the Navy's major combatants. This responsibility
    includes ensuring safe and reliable operation of reactor plants in
    these ships, enhancing the reactor plants' performance, as well as
    developing improved reactor plants to support the Navy's needs for the
    future.
        Sustaining today's 102 operating reactors requires continual
    analysis, testing, and monitoring of plant and core performance.
    Nuclear propulsion is a demanding technology--the harsh environment
    within a reactor plant subjects equipment and materials to the harmful
    effects of irradiation, corrosion, high temperature, and high pressure
    over a lifetime measured in decades. In addition, Naval Reactor plants
    must be rugged enough to accommodate ships' pitching and rolling; have
    the resilience to respond to rapidly changing demands for power; be
    robust enough to withstand the rigors of battle and shock; and be safe
    and easily maintainable by the sailors who must live next to them.
        Naval Reactors' DOE laboratories have made significant advancements
    in components, materials, core lives, and predictive capabilities.
    These advancements allowed the Navy to extend the service life and
    intervals between major maintenance periods for nuclear-powered
    warships and to reduce ship off-line time for maintenance. Increasing
    ship availability also increases the Navy's warfighting capability,
    while reducing maintenance costs. Added ship availability is
    particularly important in the face of fleet downsizing, because the
    operational demands on each remaining ship continue to increase. In the
    same vein, some development effort is devoted to ensuring Naval
    Reactors can meet the Navy's need to extend warship lifetime. Longer
    ship lifetimes are achievable because we are able to extend reactor
    plant lifetime. But longer lifetimes require more resources to support
    an older fleet.
        We are able to extend the lifetime of existing reactor plants
    because of the robust designs that resulted from solid engineering and
    design work done upfront. After significant additional engineering
    work, we determined that those reactor plants will be able to stay in
    service longer than we had originally intended. The engineering work to
    support those ships in their extended lives will continue during that
    period of life extension. For new reactor core and reactor plant
    designs, we are using the experience of the past 50+ years to
    incorporate improvements into both design and construction. It is
    imperative that we continue to deliver robust designs. It is equally
    important that we do the necessary engineering work now to ensure that
    those reactor plants are able to meet the needs of national defense
    now, and for the next several decades.
        New plant development work at the program's DOE laboratories is
    focused on completing the design of the next-generation submarine
    reactor for the Navy's new Virginia-class attack submarines and on
    continuing the design for a new reactor plant for the Navy's new CVNX-
    class aircraft carriers.
        The design of the reactor plant for the Virginia-class submarine is
    nearly complete. Today, 100 percent of reactor plant components have
    been delivered--all on schedule to support ship construction, and
    within budget. The pre-reactor-fill testing and initial reactor fill
    for the lead ship have been completed. Reactor plant construction is
    over 98 percent complete, and overall lead ship construction is over 70
    percent complete and on schedule. Virginia is expected to go to sea in
    fiscal year 2004 and will provide needed capability for the Navy at an
    affordable price.
        CVNX is the first new carrier designed since the 1960s Nimitz-
    class. The CVNX reactor plant will build on three generations of
    nuclear propulsion technology developed for submarines since Nimitz.
    This plant will incorporate needed advancements in warfighting
    capabilities and significantly reduce lifecycle costs.
        Reactor plant design work is on schedule to support the long design
    and manufacturing lead-times of reactor plant components needed for the
    CVNX ship construction schedule. Current design efforts include general
    arrangement design, system description and diagram development, and
    component design (such as final sizing and system interface
    evaluations). Long-lead reactor plant forging procurements began in
    fiscal year 2001, and the first reactor core procurements will begin in
    fiscal year 2003. Necessary system descriptions and general
    arrangements required for later design activities have been
    established.
        Major inactivation work on shutdown prototype reactors is nearly
    finished. The last of the prototype reactor plants at the Naval
    Reactors Facility in Idaho was defueled in fiscal year 1999.
    Inactivation and cleanup work at the Windsor site in Connecticut is
    complete, and regulatory approval for unrestricted release has been
    requested. The two shutdown prototype reactors at the Kesselring site
    in New York have been inactivated and defueled, and major dismantlement
    work will be completed in fiscal year 2002.

                          PROGRAM BUDGET REQUIREMENTS

        Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2003 DOE budget request of $708 million
    is adequate to meet Program requirements for now. To live within our
    means over the past several years, Naval Reactors has eliminated
    infrastructure, consolidated functions and facilities, revised work
    practices to become more efficient, and downsized the nuclear
    industrial base. To support higher priority efforts--fleet support,
    CVNX- and Virginia-class reactor plant designs, spent fuel processing,
    and prototype inactivation work--I have deferred important work, such
    as advanced reactor technology work and technology development for a
    submarine with electric drive, dismantlement and clean up of shutdown
    facilities and laboratory facility upgrades. It is not healthy to defer
    advanced concept development for a long period. This is the seed corn
    to meet future requirements and to ensure that we maintain our
    preeminent position in naval power. In addition, my laboratory
    facilities are approaching or exceeding the 50 year point and need
    upgrading and refurbishment. Also, we are beginning development of a
    new, high-energy core to meet fleet demands in the future. I am
    reviewing future resource requirements to determine what will be
    necessary to deliver technology the fleet will need in decades ahead.

       NAVAL REACTORS FISCAL YEAR 2003 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET DETAIL

        Naval Reactors' technical budget request is categorized into four
    areas of technology: Reactor Technology and Analysis, Plant Technology,
    Materials Development and Verification, and Evaluation and Servicing.
    This approach supports the integrated and generic nature of our DOE
    research and development work. The results of Naval Reactors DOE-funded
    research, development, and design work in the following technology
    areas will be incorporated into future ships, and retrofitted into
    existing ships.

             The $228.6 million requested for Reactor Technology
            and Analysis will fund continued work on the next generation
            reactor for the Virginia-class submarine and development work
            on the new reactor for CVNX-class aircraft carriers, and will
            ensure the safe and reliable operation of existing reactors.
            The reduction in operating plant maintenance periods places
            greater requirements on thermal-hydraulics, structural
            mechanics, fluid mechanics, and vibration analysis work to
            accurately predict reactor performance and to identify and
            avoid problems. Also, the continued push for longer life cores
            means we will continue to operate reactors beyond our
            operational experience base for many years to come. Developing
            improved analysis tools and a better understanding of nuclear
            data will allow us to predict performance more accurately
            throughout extended core life. Other efforts in this area
            include improving and streamlining core manufacturing processes
            to reduce cost and hazardous waste, performing reactor safety
            analyses, developing components and systems to support the
            Navy's acoustic requirements, and developing improved shield
            designs to reduce costs while preserving our record of
            excellence in radiological and environmental control. In
            addition, Naval Reactors is beginning concept studies on a new
            high-energy core, the transformational technology core (TTC),
            to support increased fleet operation requirements.
             The $112.1 million requested for Plant Technology
            provides funding to develop and analyze those systems that
            transfer, convert, control, and measure reactor power to
            maximize plant performance. The request reflects the goal of
            enhancing steam generator performance, which will benefit CVNX
            steam generators--the largest components developed to date by
            Naval Reactors. Development of technologies in the areas of
            chemistry, energy conversion, instrumentation and control,
            plant arrangement, and component development will continue to
            improve performance and support operational requirements. Naval
            Reactors is also developing components to address known
            limitations or to improve reliability of instrumentation and
            power distribution equipment to replace older, technologically
            obsolete equipment that is increasingly difficult to support.
             The $136.2 million requested for Materials Development
            and Verification will fund essential material analysis and
            testing as ships are kept in service longer than originally
            intended as well as part of Naval Reactors' share of the
            Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). Reactor core and reactor plant
            materials will have to perform safely and reliably for a longer
            time. Work on the core and core structural materials includes
            testing and analysis of fuel, poison, and cladding materials to
            verify acceptable performance, as well as developing materials
            with improved corrosion resistance. Testing and development of
            reactor plant materials also ensures reliable performance and
            leads to improvements such as reduced cracking and stress.
             The $144.4 million request for Evaluation and
            Servicing sustains the operation, maintenance, and servicing of
            land-based test reactor plants and part of Naval Reactors'
            share of the ATR, a specialized materials testing facility
            operated by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and
            Technology. Materials, components, cores, and systems in these
            plants provide important technical data and experience under
            actual operating conditions, thus allowing potential problems
            to be identified and addressed before they occur in the
            operating fleet. With proper maintenance, upgrades, and
            servicing, the two operating test reactor plants and the ATR
            will continue to meet testing needs for quite some time.
               Evaluation and servicing funds also support
            initiation of a dry spent fuel storage process line that will
            allow for placement into dry storage at Naval Reactors Facility
            (NRF) of naval spent nuclear fuel currently stored at the Idaho
            Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC).
            Additionally, these funds support ongoing cleanup of facilities
            at all Naval Reactors sites to reduce hazards to personnel, and
            reduce potential liabilities due to aging facilities, changing
            conditions, or accidental releases.
             program infrastructure and administrative requirements
             In addition to the budget request for the important
            technical work discussed above, infrastructure and
            administrative funding is also required for continued operation
            of the program. Specifically, the fiscal year 2003 budget
            request includes:
             Facility Operations: $50.0 million in funding is to
            maintain and modernize the program's facilities, including the
            Bettis and Knolls laboratories and the Expended Core Facility
            (ECF).
             Construction: $11.3 million in funding is to refurbish
            and replace program facilities. This includes the continuation
            of the ECF Dry Cell project in Idaho, which will significantly
            improve Naval Reactors' ability to process naval spent fuel for
            dry storage. (As identified and agreed to in a Settlement
            Agreement signed by the Department of Energy, the Navy, and the
            State of Idaho, Naval Reactors fuel must be among the early
            shipments of spent fuel to the first permanent repository or
            interim storage facility.) The requested funding also enables
            the continuation of the Major Office Replacement Building
            project.
             Program Direction: $25.4 million in funding is to
            cover Naval Reactors' 191 DOE personnel at headquarters and the
            program's field offices, including salaries, benefits, travel,
            and other expenses. This staff maintains oversight of the
            program's extensive day-to-day technical and administrative
            operations, while continuing to ensure compliance with growing
            environmental, safety, and other regulatory requirements, all
            of which, notwithstanding our excellent record, necessitate
            substantial effort.

              PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS, GOALS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

        My program has a long history of operating with the highest levels
    of integrity and operational accountability. Our husbanding of taxpayer
    dollars provided by this subcommittee has been positively recognized in
    two very recent reports. In forwarding my fiscal year 2003 budget
    request to you, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rated Naval
    Reactors as ``Effective'' the highest adjectival rating on OMB's scale
    and noted: ``Outputs are identifiable and make key contributions to
    national security. Delivery schedules are consistently met. Contracts
    have positive and negative incentives, and include performance
    requirements.''
        Furthermore, in a report dated December 12, 2001, the General
    Accounting Office recognized Naval Reactors' strong performance within
    DOE and NNSA. The report stated: ``The Office of Naval Reactors, which
    is a part of NNSA, has long been recognized as having a focused
    mission, strong leadership, clear lines of authority, long-serving
    employees, and a strong set of internal controls, as well as a culture
    that enhances accountability and good control over its costs and
    contractor performance.'' The Naval Reactors program has always been
    dedicated to continual improvement. We use semiannual reviews of short-
    and long-range plans to rebaseline work and revisit program priorities.
    Monthly financial reports from contractors are used to compare actual
    performance against short- and long-range plans. Additionally, Naval
    Reactors headquarters maintains close oversight of its management and
    operating contractors through periodic reviews, formal audits, and
    performance appraisals.
        For fiscal year 2001, my program met or exceeded all three major
    performance targets. We ensured the safety, performance, reliability,
    and service life of operating reactors for uninterrupted support of the
    fleet. We exceeded 90 percent utilization availability for test reactor
    plants, and by the end of fiscal year 2001, U.S. nuclear-powered ships
    had safely steamed over 122 million miles. Naval Reactors developed new
    technologies, methods, and materials to support reactor plant design,
    which included surpassing the fiscal year 2001 goal of 93 percent
    design completion of the next generation submarine reactor. We
    initiated detailed design on the reactor plant for the next generation
    aircraft carrier, which is on schedule to meet the planned ship
    construction start. Additionally, Naval Reactors maintained its
    outstanding environmental performance--no personnel exceeded Federal
    limits for radiation exposure, and no significant findings resulted
    from environmental inspections by State and Federal regulators.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The ongoing support of the Senate Armed Services Strategic
    Subcommittee is one of the most important factors in our success story.
    The subcommittee has recognized the requirements and demands the
    program confronts daily: a growing need for power projection and
    forward presence far from home, which strains our dwindling number of
    nuclear ships; an aging nuclear fleet; and the funding required to meet
    these commitments today and in the future.
        The unique capabilities inherent in nuclear power have played a
    vital role over the past 50 years in our Nations' defense. This legacy
    is as strong and vibrant today as it ever has been. Actions in the
    Persian Gulf, peacekeeping actions in Eastern Europe, and, most
    recently, the war against terrorism have demonstrated the value of
    nuclear power. With your continued support, this legacy will continue
    far into the future as the Nation meets each new threat with strength
    and resolve. Naval Reactors' record is strong, the work is important,
    and the funding needs modest.
        I thank you for your support.

        Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, Mr. Erickson, again we welcome
    you to today's hearing. We look forward to discussing with you
    the weapons activities of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, at $5.8 billion the second largest program at
    the Department of Energy.
        Dr. Beckner, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has raised
    more questions than it has resolved, not the least of which are
    the responsibilities of NNSA from now through 2012. While the
    NPR directs a reduction in the operationally deployed levels of
    nuclear weapons from the number deployed today, the NPR also
    directs that all of those 8,000-plus warheads be stored. The
    NPR does not say, however, how those warheads are to be
    maintained.
        Is it NNSA's obligation to maintain all the warheads in a
    fully modernized and ready status or something else? What does
    the NPR mean for the stockpile life extension program? Must
    your agency extend the life of the total stockpile? Must your
    agency maintain tritium for all of the stockpile?
        The NPR also talks about developing a capabilities-based
    approach. What does that mean for your responsibilities with
    respect to the stockpile? Does that include the development of
    new nuclear weapons?
        The NPR also discusses the status of test readiness, the
    ability to conduct a nuclear test. Retaining the ability to
    conduct a nuclear test is not a new responsibility for your
    complex. Retaining this capability was required by President
    Clinton and included in President Clinton's enumerated
    safeguards for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty along with
    maintaining a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program.
        What is an appropriate test readiness posture and how is it
    achieved? Does it entail the assignment of arbitrary time lines
    or is it something that must be served by maintaining defined
    skills and capabilities?
        The NPR also recognizes the importance of the
    infrastructure of the NNSA and the need to ensure that the
    infrastructure is capable in all aspects of maintaining the
    stockpile in the absence of nuclear weapons testing.
        Over the past 2 years your agency has started to make
    progress in addressing the needs of its facilities and
    infrastructure. Dr. Beckner, we look forward to addressing
    these issues with you and Mr. Erickson. You have both submitted
    prepared written statements which will be part of the record.
        Now let me turn to Senator Allard and ask for any opening
    comments he might have.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like
    to welcome our second panel of witnesses, Mr. Erickson and Dr.
    Beckner.
        Let me briefly mention my interest in making sure the
    weapons activities within the National Nuclear Security
    Administration are receiving the focus and leadership they
    require to make sure our nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and
    reliable, now and in the future. With an aging infrastructure
    and an aging work force, we need to make sure we are putting
    resources into our nuclear weapons program to make sure we
    continue to attract the best and the brightest and that they
    have the necessary facilities to conduct their important work
    for our Nation's security.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Included in
    your testimony I hope you will discuss NNSA's plans for a
    Modern Pit Facility (MPF). As mentioned in the recently
    released third Foster panel report, they mention the future
    years budget commitment for a full-scale pit production
    facility is still in doubt. The Foster panel report went on to
    urge that the Nuclear Weapons Council, NNSA, and DOD should
    establish a requirement that NNSA expeditiously produce an
    approved design, make a site decision, complete safety studies,
    and obtain environmental permits for pit production and
    secondary production facilities.
        It appears to me that we should at least be moving out with
    an initial conceptual plan to determine some of the technical
    obstacles for such a facility and the best options.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
    witnesses.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Beckner.

    STATEMENT OF EVERET H. BECKNER, PH.D., DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
       DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Dr. Beckner. Thank you. I am pleased to be here this
    afternoon. I am deeply appreciative of your support. The work
    of the subcommittee is gratifying for the thousands of men and
    women across the country who have dedicated their professional
    lives to making the Stockpile Stewardship Program a success. We
    recognize the importance of this, as do you.
        As I said in my confirmation hearing, I believe in systems
    analysis and using the best information available to find the
    right solutions, not by intuition or accommodation, but by
    hard-headed analysis. That is what we are doing with all the
    elements of the stewardship program.
        Stockpile Stewardship is delivering results today.
    America's nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable.
    Since the end of underground testing, using the tools of
    stewardship we have successfully certified the B61-11 and we
    have recertified several warheads with components that have
    been modified, replaced, or in some cases redesigned.
        A number of problems uncovered by the surveillance program
    have been solved without recourse to nuclear testing. The
    President's fiscal year 2003 budget will allow us to invest the
    resources and the tools and experimental capabilities that we
    must have in the future to deliver on our commitments to our
    customers, the Department of Defense, and the citizens of the
    United States.
        This afternoon I will talk about several stewardship
    programs that are of particular interest to this subcommittee
    and ones that I focus on regularly. First and most important
    are the life extension programs for the W87, the W76, the W80,
    and the B61. Second, W88 pit manufacturing and certification at
    Los Alamos and our planning for a Modern Pit Facility. Third,
    enhanced test readiness. Fourth, the advanced strategic
    computing initiative. Fifth, the NIF under construction at the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Finally, the commercial
    light water reactor program and the production of tritium to
    support the stockpile.
        First let us talk about getting work done. The men and
    women of the Stockpile Stewardship Program continue to meet
    their formidable day-to-day challenges with ingenuity and
    innovation, both in the way we do science, and in the way we
    organize the work we do. Without the critical work of our
    stockpile stewards at the labs, plants, and in the Federal
    structure, we could not perform our mission. Our people remain
    our number one resource that must be carefully attended now and
    into the future.
        To that end, the NNSA must and is working to improve the
    infrastructure across the complex. This subcommittee has heard
    and seen firsthand some of the antiquated working conditions we
    ask our people to work in. The $242 million in the President's
    budget for this year for the Facilities and Infrastructure
    initiative will begin to correct this problem. You will hear
    more about that from Mr. Erickson. This will have a direct
    impact on worker morale and productivity.
        On the life extension program: As members of this
    subcommittee are well aware, the NNSA labs and plants have a
    validated requirement from the Nuclear Weapons Council to
    extend the service life of the W87, the W76, the W80, and the
    B61. These requirements were, if you will, revalidated by the
    Nuclear Posture Review, which lays out the direction for this
    Nation's nuclear forces for the next 5 to 10 years.
        Life extension work involves all the elements of the
    weapons complex. For the last several years we have been
    extending the life of the W87 warhead for the Air Force. This
    work is ongoing at Y-12, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia, and
    Pantex. We are more than halfway through this effort and expect
    to wrap up the work by late 2004.
        Life extension for the W76 involves a comprehensive
    overhaul of the warhead, including replacement of the arming,
    fusing, and firing set. We will also be requalifying the weapon
    primary. For the W80 we will be replacing the trajectory
    sensing signal and the neutron generators, the tritium bottles,
    and incorporating surety upgrades. For the B61 we will be
    refurbishing the secondary.
        These life extension programs will ensure that these
    weapons will remain safe, secure, and reliable in the U.S.
    nuclear arsenal for the additional 30 years once the work is
    complete.
        Over the last several years the NNSA has been implementing
    a pit manufacturing and certification program to restore the
    capability of the U.S. to manufacture and certify this critical
    component without nuclear testing. This project is a pivotal
    challenge to the Stockpile Stewardship Program. I am pleased
    with the high level of management attention this program
    continues to receive at Los Alamos and the progress made in
    meeting this important national security objective. We remain
    on track to deliver a certifiable W88 pit in fiscal year 2003.
    Headquarters and Los Alamos staffs have been able to accelerate
    the date for a certified pit to fiscal year 2007 from fiscal
    year 2009, which I believe was the date given you last year,
    resulting in a savings for the taxpayers.
        While the Los Alamos facility, TA-55, for making W88 pits
    is adequate for the task at hand, it lacks the capacity and
    flexibility to manufacture pits in sufficient quantities to
    support the entire stockpile. So the NNSA is working on a
    longer-term solution. We have a project team in place that has
    undertaken the required preconceptual planning work. During
    this phase we are carefully examining a number of issues,
    including technology development to ensure that the facility
    will meet both current and future requirements to fabricate
    replacement pits for the current nuclear stockpile or pits for
    new designs if required.
        Our next decision point for the Modern Pit Facility will be
    later this month, at which time we will decide on proceeding to
    conceptual design.
        As members of this subcommittee are well aware, the NNSA is
    maintaining a capability to conduct an underground nuclear test
    within 24 to 36 months based on existing presidential
    direction. The Nuclear Posture Review, however, raised several
    concerns about our test readiness posture, which we are
    addressing in a study to be completed later this spring.
        DOD and NNSA will work together to refine nuclear test
    scenarios and evaluate cost-benefit tradeoffs in order to
    determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness
    time to support the policies of the Nuclear Posture Review.
        The President's fiscal year 2003 budget has requested an
    additional $15 million to implement the results of the
    aforementioned study once the administration determines the
    best path forward. We will of course keep Congress fully
    informed on this important national security activity as we
    proceed.
        The ASCI program, working with America's leading computer
    manufacturers, is developing the three-dimensional simulation
    capabilities based on advanced weapons codes and high-
    performance computing that the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    needs to support stockpile refurbishment activities and other
    analyses. The supercomputers at all three weapons labs are
    fully utilized to meet the needs of the scientists and
    engineers. Later this year we will bring on line our newest
    machine, a 30 TeraOps machine, at Los Alamos.
        One of the most important science and engineering programs
    we have in the program is the NIF. I know that this
    subcommittee has been a strong supporter of the NIF and we are
    grateful for that support. In 2002 the NIF team at Lawrence
    Livermore is continuing to make steady progress toward its
    milestones. We have recently reported to the committee and
    others that several important milestones were met on or ahead
    of schedule, including completion of conventional construction
    and positioning in seismic tiedown of the target chamber.
        The program remains on track to begin stewardship
    experiments in 2004 with 8 beams and by the time 192 laser
    beams are brought up in 2008 we will have conducted some 1,500
    stewardship experiments.
        We are continuing to make progress in establishing the new
    source of tritium. We have in place a multiyear contract with
    the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to provide irradiation
    services. We expect the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    will grant license amendments this fall to the TVA reactors,
    Watts Bar and Sequoyah, that will be used for tritium
    production. Commercial vendors across the country are
    manufacturing parts for the tritium-producing rods that will go
    into the reactors in fiscal year 2004.
        I am concerned, however, with the TEF at Savannah River.
    While construction of the civil and structural portion of the
    tritium extraction facility is well along, it is several months
    behind schedule. In addition, the bids on the rest of the plant
    contract were well above the baseline estimate.
        As a result of these and other factors, we are carefully
    reviewing and revising our cost and schedule estimates for
    completion of the facility. We will be coming to Congress with
    a new baseline in a reprogramming package later this spring.
        Mr. Chairman, I know that Congress wants less bureaucracy
    and more output from this program, with fewer problems along
    the way. You want a program output that enhances security,
    which maintains and enhances the safety, reliability, and
    performance of the nuclear stockpile, and which bolsters U.S.
    leadership in science and technology. I am convinced that the
    management reforms that the NNSA is implementing will address
    your first concern. I am also convinced that the stewardship
    program is today ensuring that America's nuclear deterrent is
    safe, secure, and reliable. Of equal importance, the science
    and engineering campaigns of stewardship are advancing the
    frontiers of science and technology to help the country meet
    the economic and security challenges of this new millennium.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Beckner follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Dr. Everet H. Beckner

        Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the fiscal
    year 2003 President's budget request for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) with a focus on our weapons work and the budget
    needed to ensure that we can meet our commitment to provide the Nation
    with a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile. The fiscal year 2003 NNSA
    budget request for Defense Programs weapons activities totals $5.11
    billion, representing an increase of $305 million over the fiscal year
    2002 enacted appropriation, which includes $25 million supplemental
    appropriation for the Secure Transportation Asset. I would like to
    begin my testimony here today by setting a policy framework and
    discussing the issues faced by NNSA.

                  TRANSFORMING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

        President Bush is transforming U.S. national security strategy to
    meet the threats of the 21st century. The NNSA is intimately involved
    in the formulation of the administration strategy through participation
    in the Strategic Review and Nuclear Posture Review. We responded
    swiftly and comprehensively to the terrorist events of September 11,
    protecting our valuable national security assets and employees, and
    offering our unique capabilities to the national response. We have
    contributed directly to the homeland security needs of Governor Ridge
    with our technology and scientific staff. Work such as this will extend
    into fiscal year 2003 and beyond.
        While the policies and priorities established by the President, the
    Secretary, and Congress will determine the scope of our work over the
    years to come, nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of our
    national defense strategy. The NNSA will make significant contributions
    to the administration's new capabilities-based national security
    strategy that requires us to maintain our military advantages in key
    areas while developing new capabilities.
        The NNSA faces major challenges during the next 5-year period in
    responding to evolving customer requirements while maintaining and
    improving the health of the Nation's national security enterprise. The
    expanded focus on international terrorism following the September 11
    attacks underscores the importance of maintaining a strong capability
    in the science and technology of national security.
        NNSA's ability to perform its national security functions depends
    upon revitalizing our scientific and engineering expertise to ensure
    the reliability, safety, and security of the Nation's nuclear weapons.
    Much of the physical and intellectual infrastructure of the national
    security enterprise was built during the era of underground nuclear
    testing, and has eroded to the point that we are no longer able to
    perform some essential tasks. It is imperative that we address these
    issues during the upcoming 5-year period. NNSA's program and budget
    planning emphasizes maintaining an adequate workforce of scientific,
    technical and business skills, and building a diverse, multi-talented
    leadership. We must be able to recruit, train, and develop highly
    skilled employees throughout our organizations in a highly competitive
    employment environment. We must implement our plans to renew the
    physical infrastructure to ensure adequate capability and capacity, as
    well as compliance with environment, safety, health and security
    standards.
        Another key element to NNSA's ability to perform its national
    security functions is an organizational plan to achieve greater
    effectiveness and efficiency. On February 25, NNSA submitted its
    ``Report to Congress on the Organization and Operations of the NNSA''
    describing our accomplishments to date and our strategy for operating
    an integrated national security enterprise.

                                 BUDGET SUMMARY

        By way of summary, the NNSA fiscal year 2003 request supports the
    recommendations from the Nuclear Posture Review to assure the continued
    safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile without underground
    nuclear testing, develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base,
    refurbish and extend the lives of selected warheads, and maintain the
    science and technology base needed to support nuclear weapons. The
    request protects the operational readiness of the nuclear weapons
    stockpile through surveillance, experiments, and simulations for
    individual weapons and weapon systems, and investment in advanced
    scientific and manufacturing for the future.
        The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request for Defense
    Programs was developed based on two primary resource drivers. First,
    the strategic reviews of national security-related activities conducted
    this past year. The NNSA actively participated in the President's
    strategic review of deterrence and missile defense policy and was a key
    participant in the NPR which lays out the direction for this Nation's
    nuclear forces over the next 5 to 10 years. These reviews reaffirmed
    NNSA's stockpile refurbishments and the need for a robust, responsive
    research and development and industrial base of which the nuclear
    weapons enterprise is a key element. The NNSA laboratories are on the
    cutting edge of technology and have a vital national security role to
    play in combating terrorism. The other is the President's Management
    Initiatives on the human capital management and competitive sourcing
    initiatives which serve to focus our fiscal year 2003 activities,
    particularly in the NNSA restructuring of the headquarters and field
    offices and in the Federal program direction budget. Recruitment,
    retention, and skill mix are critical to NNSA's success in the future
    and are key to our plans for re-engineering the workforce.

                             STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

        In spite of the many challenges we are facing, the NNSA has
    continued to meet the core stockpile stewardship mission--that is, to
    maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile
    to meet national security requirements.
        As I stated earlier, the NNSA actively participated in the
    strategic reviews of national security related activities conducted by
    the administration. Participation by NNSA ensured that the choices,
    plans, and requirements being developed were within the realm of the
    technical and production capabilities of the NNSA. It also increased
    the awareness of our issues and technical capabilities within the
    administration's national security senior management team.
        While there are many important points and conclusions in the NPR
    including the goals to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear
    weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by calendar year 2012 and the
    maintenance of a ``responsive force'' for use as a hedge against
    unforeseen problems, several points are of particular relevance to the
    NNSA.
        First, nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, remain a key
    element of U.S. national security strategy. The NPR reaffirms that
    NNSA's science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program is necessary to
    ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile in the
    absence of nuclear testing. This includes surveillance of our aging
    weapons, weapon refurbishment, chemistry and metallurgy of materials
    aging, detailed understanding of weapons physics, reestablishment of
    warhead advanced concepts teams, and development of additional
    diagnostic and predictive tools for long-term stewardship. The NPR
    revalidated the stockpile refurbishment plan previously developed and
    approved by the NNSA and the Department of Defense. The fiscal year
    2003 budget request for Directed Stockpile Work is $1.2 billion, an
    increase of $190 million, or about 18 percent over last year.
    Principally, this increase allows us to support life extension
    activities for the W80, W76, and B61 warheads, including supporting
    research and development and additional hydrodynamic testing for
    assessment and certification. Also, $2.1 billion is requested for the
    16 scientific and engineering campaigns that provide the knowledge,
    technologies, and capabilities to address current and future stockpile
    issues.
        Second, more than any previous review, the NPR's concept of a new
    triad emphasizes the importance of a robust, responsive research and
    development and industrial base. This calls for a modernized nuclear
    weapons complex, including contingency planning for a Modern Pit
    Facility, which would provide the Nation with the means to respond to
    new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner. The fiscal
    year 2003 budget request supports our industrial base through a request
    of $1.7 billion for Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, a 10-
    percent increase supporting the operations of weapons complex
    facilities. In addition, the NNSA has requested $243 million for the
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization program to continue this
    important multiyear initiative into its third year. This program is
    managed by Mr. Ralph Erickson who serves as the Associate Administrator
    for Facilities and Operations.
        Third, a study examining the aspects of reducing test readiness
    lead time below the existing 24- to 36-month requirement for a fully
    diagnosed test. The NPR states that the lead time needs to be shortened
    out of prudence, not because there is a current need to test. In fiscal
    year 2002, the NNSA and the DOD will study the optimum test readiness
    time that best supports the new triad, as directed by the NPR. Pending
    the outcome of the study, the fiscal year 2003 request includes $15
    million for Enhanced Test Readiness activities at the Nevada Test Site.
        It is NNSA's judgment, at this time, that a resumption of
    underground nuclear testing is unnecessary, because stockpile
    stewardship is working and is on track to deliver scientific tools
    needed for certification into the future. Since the end of underground
    testing, the U.S. successfully certified the B61-11 and has recertified
    several warheads with components that have been modified, replaced, or
    in some cases redesigned. A number of problems uncovered by the
    surveillance program have been solved without recourse to nuclear
    testing.
        The NPR calls for increased emphasis on the reducing the time
    required for a nuclear test, if directed by the President at some
    future date. This may call for NNSA contractors to recruit and train
    new staff to become skilled to support fielding and performing nuclear
    experiments and or tests. Additionally, NNSA would acquire specific
    long-lead-time equipment needed for testing, such as field-test neutron
    generators and certain test diagnostic equipment. Another important
    aspect of enhancing test readiness is to revise testing procedures to
    make them compliant with current safety and environmental regulations.
    Finally, high-fidelity field exercises would be conducted to
    demonstrate the ability to field a nuclear test.
        The NPR states that the number, composition, and character of the
    Nation's nuclear forces ought to reflect the reality that the Cold War
    is over and that required capabilities may now need to be different.
    For example, current weapons in the stockpile cannot hold at risk a
    growing category of potential targets deeply buried in tunnel
    facilities, possibly containing chemical, biological, nuclear, or
    command and control facilities. As a result the NPR endorsed NNSA's
    Advanced Concepts Initiative that could provide the Nation with options
    that could be considered for future production and deployment. Also, as
    required by the NPR, it would provide an opportunity for NNSA and its
    contractors to exercise critical skills necessary for the long-term
    sustainment of the Nation's defense.
        By direction of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and in response to an
    Air Force requirement, the initial focus of the Advanced Concepts
    Program will be the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), for which
    $15.5 million is requested in fiscal year 2003 as part of the Directed
    Stockpile Research and Development activity. The 3-year RNEP
    Feasibility Study will assess the feasibility of modifying one of two
    candidate nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile to provide
    enhanced penetration capability into hard rock geologies and develop
    out-year costs for the subsequent production phases, if a decision is
    made by the Nuclear Weapons Council to proceed. This work complies with
    existing legislation, including Section 3136 of the Fiscal Year 1994
    National Defense Authorization Act. The fiscal year 2003 budget
    contains no other funds for Phase 6.X advanced concept study
    activities.
        Finally, the NPR calls for a stable, adequately funded FYNSP. The
    NNSA's costs will not be reduced in the immediate future as a result of
    NPR, since near-term costs are driven by restoring production
    capabilities and revitalizing the infrastructure, not by the number of
    warheads in the stockpile or even the number to be refurbished.
    However, we do expect that cost savings from refurbishment of a smaller
    number of weapons will be realized beginning about fiscal year 2010.
    Also, workload analysis shows that the NNSA enterprise's capacity will
    be stretched, approaching maximum capacity while our systems are on the
    process line for refurbishment, thereby limiting our ability to
    dismantle significant numbers of weapons over the next 10 years. The
    FYNSP for the NNSA was provided to Congress on March 26, 2002.
        A less obvious, but significant result of the NPR is the improved
    cooperation and coordination between the NNSA and DOD. The Nuclear
    Weapons Council is working, policy levels between the agencies are
    effective, and the DOD has offered strong support for needed programs
    in NNSA.
        I would now like to turn to several specific programs that make up
    the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The success of these programs will
    be central to our ability to continue to support and certify the
    stockpile in the years to come.

                        STOCKPILE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

        Our most important responsibility is to deliver on our commitments
    to our customer, the Department of Defense. The NNSA has a validated
    requirement from the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to extend the
    service life of the W87, W76, W80, and B61. This requirement was
    revalidated by the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review. The life
    extension work will involve the entire weapons complex. The Kansas City
    Plant will manufacture the non-nuclear components; Y-12 National
    Security Complex will refurbish the secondaries; Savannah River Tritium
    Facility will supply the gas transfer systems; Sandia National
    Laboratory will produce the neutron generators and certify all non-
    nuclear components. Pantex Plant will serve as the central point for
    all assembly and disassembly operations in support of the refurbishment
    work. Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore will continue to certify the
    nuclear package.

                                      W87

        The life extension program on the W87 warhead was authorized by the
    NWC in fiscal year 1994. The program achieved First Production Unit
    (FPU) in the second quarter of fiscal year 1999. The ongoing work at
    Pantex enhances the structural rigidity of the warhead and is
    increasing the service life by 30 years. The warhead will be mated to
    the Minuteman III missile following deactivation of the Peacekeeper
    missile. The NWC accepted the refurbished W87 as a standard stockpile
    item in the first quarter of fiscal year 2002. NNSA has completed work
    on over half of the W87 inventory and the remaining W87 stockpile will
    be refurbished by the first quarter of fiscal year 2004

                                      W76

        The NWC approved the Block 1 refurbishment plan for the W76 in
    March 2000. The Block 1 refurbishment of the warhead (about one quarter
    of all W76 warheads) will focus on the high explosive, detonators,
    organic materials, cables and addition of a new Acorn gas transfer
    system. The Block 1 refurbishment will also add a new arming firing and
    fusing (AF&F) system. The FPU of Block 1 will be available by the end
    of fiscal year 2007, and Block 1 production is planned for completion
    in fiscal year 2012. During the Block 1 production, a decision will be
    made to either continue Block 1 retrofits on the entire W76 stockpile,
    change to a Block 2 retrofit that could include other options, or stop
    the retrofit altogether. The Block 2 effort, if approved by the NWC,
    would continue from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2022 to refurbish
    the remaining W76 warheads.

                                      W80

        The NWC approved the refurbishment of the W80 in the beginning of
    fiscal year 2001. The Block 1 refurbishment of the warhead (about one
    third of the warheads in the stockpile) will focus on replacing the
    current gas transfer system with an Acorn design, new neutron
    generators, redesign of the warhead electrical system, addition of
    improved surety features and replacement of other associated
    components. The need to perform refurbishment work is driven by several
    factors including: age related effects that must be addressed to ensure
    the continued performance of the warhead, minimizing weapon movements
    between DOD and DOE, and infrastructure and capacities issues within
    the weapons complex. The FPU of the Block 1 design will be available in
    the second quarter of fiscal year 2006, and Block 1 production is
    scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2010. During the Block 1
    production, a decision will be made to either continue Block 1
    retrofits on the entire W80 stockpile, change to a Block 2 retrofit
    that could include enhanced surety options, or stop the retrofit
    altogether. The Block 2 effort, if approved by the NWC, would continue
    from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2017 to refurbish the remaining
    W80 warheads.

                                    B61-7/11

        NNSA and DOD are working to identify refurbishment options for the
    aging B61-7/11 Canned Subassembly (CSA) and associated cables,
    connectors, some limited life components, and foam components. The
    study effort is expected to be completed in late fiscal year 2002.
    Development Engineering will begin following Nuclear Weapons Council
    approval in late fiscal year 2002. This program will use systems
    engineering approaches, and the planned FPU of the refurbished B61-7/11
    will be in the third quarter of fiscal year 2006. Production of these
    refurbished CSAs is scheduled to continue to the end of fiscal year
    2008. The plan also calls for some selective non-destructive evaluation
    (NDE) and screening of CSAs as a risk mitigation effort for other
    warheads during fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004.
        I would like to note that, for the first time in a number of years,
    weapons systems cost data is included in the fiscal year 2003 budget
    request, as requested in the conference report accompanying the fiscal
    year 2002 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (107-66). The
    weapons systems cost data for fiscal year 2003 are provided in the
    Directed Stockpile Work section of the budget. In addition, we have
    resumed reporting for nuclear weapons acquisition costs for weapons
    systems in Phase 6.3 and beyond (W87, W76, and W80 Life Extension
    Programs) in a separate, classified document.

                  PIT MANUFACTURING AND CERTIFICATION CAMPAIGN

        The reestablishment of a plutonium pit manufacturing capability, a
    capability that the United States has not had since the cessation of
    manufacturing at the Rocky Flats Plant in 1989, is a key national
    security challenge that the NNSA must meet. The W88 pit is a primary
    focus of NNSA's pit campaign because an insufficient number of W88 pits
    were produced to support pit surveillance activities prior to the
    closure of Rocky Flats.
        The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign is focused on the
    near-term development of manufacturing processes at Los Alamos and a
    certification methodology applicable to the W88 pit, with a long range
    goal of reestablishing the capability to manufacture all pit types
    within the stockpile. The program remains on track to deliver a
    certifiable W88 pit in fiscal year 2003. Over the last year
    Headquarters and Los Alamos staffs have worked aggressively and have
    been able to accelerate the date for a certified pit to fiscal year
    2007. The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign budget request
    for fiscal year 2003 is $194 million.
        Program accomplishments in fiscal year 2001 include:

             Accelerated the certification date for a manufactured
            W88 war reserve pit from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2007.
             Manufactured three development and three standard W88
            pits in fiscal year 2001; one of the development pits was
            completed more than a year ahead of schedule.
             Projectized W88 activities are on-track, with all
            major milestones for fiscal year 2001 accomplished.
             Reorganized W88 Pit Manufacturing and Certification
            Activity at Los Alamos to increase management attention and
            resources on the project.
             Provided documentation required to support a fiscal
            year 2002 decision on Mission Need for a Modern Pit Facility.

        The fiscal year 2003 budget will allow the program to:

             Manufacture a development pit and the first
            certifiable pit in fiscal year 2003.
             Conduct two integrated physics tests and pit
            engineering tests in fiscal year 2003.
             Establish production controls and quality
            infrastructure in fiscal year 2003 to support the manufacture
            of the first certifiable pit in fiscal year 2003.
             Establish and implement a peer process that includes
            at least one technical data exchange between Los Alamos and
            Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in fiscal year 2003.

        While the Los Alamos facility (TA-55) for making W88 pits is
    adequate for the task at hand, it lacks the capacity and flexibility to
    manufacture pits in sufficient quantity to support the NPR
    requirements. Therefore, the NNSA is working on a longer term solution
    for a modern pit manufacturing facility. A project team is in place and
    has undertaken the required preconceptual planning work. During this
    phase we will carefully examine a number of issues, including
    technology development to ensure that the facility will meet both
    current and future requirements. NNSA's next decision point for the
    Modern Pit Facility will be later this spring when we will decide on
    whether to proceed with conceptual design.

                                TRITIUM CAMPAIGN

        In addition to restoring the Nation's ability to manufacture
    plutonium pits, the NNSA is proceeding with plans for producing new
    tritium to support the stockpile. Tritium is a radioactive isotope of
    hydrogen which decays at a rate of about 5 percent per year. All
    weapons in the stockpile must have tritium to function as designed. The
    United States has not manufactured new tritium since 1988 and has been
    relying on recycled tritium from retired weapons to meet stockpile
    requirements. To manufacture new tritium, the Tennessee Valley
    Authority (TVA) will be irradiating tritium producing burnable absorber
    rods (TPBARS) in the Watts Bar and Sequoyah 2 reactors. Irradiation of
    the TPBARS remains on schedule for the fall of 2003. The rods will
    remain in the reactors throughout the plants' normal 18-month operating
    cycles. The fiscal year 2003 request for the tritium campaign totals
    $126.2 million.
        In order to irradiate tritium-producing rods, the TVA reactors must
    have approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The TVA submitted
    formal requests in August-September 2001 asking that the reactors'
    operating licenses be amended to permit tritium production. In December
    2001 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a Federal Register
    notice proposing to issue a ``no significant hazards consideration
    determination'', which means that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can
    issue the license amendments without first holding hearings. We expect
    that the Commission will issue the license amendments by this fall.
        While the recent Nuclear Posture Review reduces the number of
    active, deployed nuclear weapons, it also requires that NNSA support a
    responsive reserve of warheads. This support would include maintenance
    of tritium inventories for the reserve. When all these factors are
    considered, the impact is small on the date when new tritium will be
    needed.
        While the civil/structural portion of the Tritium Extraction
    Facility is well along, it is several months behind schedule. In
    addition, the bids on the rest-of-plant (installation of all the
    equipment) contract came in well above the baseline estimate. As a
    result of these and other factors, NNSA is currently reviewing and
    revising the cost and schedule baselines for the facility. We expect to
    be coming to Congress with a reprogramming letter following the
    completion of these cost and schedule reviews. We have asked the
    Department's Inspector General to review this program and ensure that
    we have taken all the necessary corrective actions to get this program
    back on track. We are still aiming for its completion in fiscal year
    2006.

                   ADVANCED SIMULATION AND COMPUTING CAMPAIGN

        The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) campaign is developing
    the simulation capabilities, based on advanced weapon codes and high-
    performance computing, that incorporate high-fidelity scientific models
    validated against experimental results, past tests, and theory. The
    fiscal year 2003 budget request for the ASCI campaign is $725 million,
    which includes $55 million for line-item construction projects at LLNL
    and SNL. This is an increase of $8 million from fiscal year 2002.
        The long-term ASCI objective is to provide the validated three-
    dimensional, high-fidelity physics, full system simulation codes
    required for engineering, safety, and performance analysis of the
    stockpile and to develop the computing resources with sufficient power
    (speed, memory, and storage capacity) to support stockpile analyses.
        The schedule for developing three-dimensional weapons simulation
    capabilities is tightly integrated with the certification of the
    refurbished W87, W76, W80, and B61 warheads. Requirements for
    predictive weapons simulations determine the acquisition strategy for
    increased computing capability and capacity. University partnerships
    have also been developed through five Alliance Centers at leading
    research universities.
        Program accomplishments in fiscal year 2001 include:

             Three dimensional simulations of key mechanical
            responses of a re-entry vehicle system to normal flight
            environments, and of the performance of a full weapons system.
            Being able to simulate a complete weapon system allows
            laboratory researchers to examine key physics issues through a
            combination of simulation, precision experiments, and analysis
            of data from past nuclear tests. These codes are playing a
            major role in the plans for the remanufacture of the W76 AF&F.
             Completion of the Strategic Computing Complex at Los
            Alamos National Laboratory in December 2001 provides the
            facilities necessary to accommodate the 30-TeraOps Q
            supercomputer. The Q machine is now being delivered to Los
            Alamos. We expect to have the first portion of the machine
            running by June 2002 and the full system will be running by the
            end of the 2002.
             A comprehensive external review of all five Alliance
            Level 1 Centers was completed in October 2001. Accomplishments
            include the development of scalable, multi-physics codes,
            successful advanced degree programs and graduates, as well as
            world-class science measured through peer-reviewed
            publications.

        The fiscal year 2003 budget will allow the program to:

             Release enhanced ASCI 2-D primary design capability,
             Demonstrate three-dimensional safety simulation of a
            complex, abnormal explosive-initiation scenario,
             Demonstrate three-dimensional coupled electrical
            response of a weapon system in hostile (nuclear) environments.

                          HIGH-ENERGY-DENSITY PHYSICS

        The High Energy Density Physics Campaign advances U.S. capabilities
    to achieve high-energy-density physics (HEDP) conditions, including
    inertial confinement fusion ignition and thermonuclear burn in a
    laboratory setting, to support Stockpile Stewardship Program science
    and engineering requirements. The capability to achieve physical
    conditions nearing those produced during nuclear weapons detonations,
    including extremely high temperatures and pressures, is critical for
    conducting experiments to verify physics theory underlying nuclear
    weapons design code predictions, to validate advanced computer models
    being developed for stockpile stewardship, and to more accurately
    characterize the performance of materials exposed to a nuclear
    environment.
        The fiscal year 2003 budget request for HEDP is $452 million, which
    includes $215 million for NIF line-item construction and $76 million
    for NIF Demonstration and Operations. These funds will maintain the NIF
    project schedule. Because of overall NNSA budget priorities, only $161
    million is requested for the HEDP Core Research and Operations account.
    This is a reduction of $26 million, which will delay some long-term
    aspects of the NIF experimental program including progress toward
    ignition. However, our assessment of program impacts across all budget
    elements indicates that this is a necessary decision this year.
        The program is carried out at the three weapons laboratories as
    well as the laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE) at the University of
    Rochester, and the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Existing major
    facilities for conducting HEDP research are the OMEGA laser at LLE, and
    the Z pulsed-power facility at SNL, the Trident laser at LANL, and the
    Nike laser at NRL.
        The most important new facility for the HEDP is the NIF, under
    construction at LLNL. NIF will provide the capability for weapons
    scientists to undertake experiments to address high-energy and fusion
    aspects that are important to the primaries and secondaries of nuclear
    weapons. Several important milestones for the NIF program were met on,
    or ahead of, schedule, including completion of conventional
    construction and positioning and seismic tie down of the target
    chamber. The program remains on track to begin stewardship experiments
    in 2004 with 8 beams, and by the time all 192 lasers beams are brought
    up in 2008, some 1,500 stewardship experiments will have been performed
    on this important, one-of-a-kind tool.
        The fiscal year 2003 budget will allow the program to:

             Operate the NIF Optics Assembly Building,
             Demonstrate multiframe backlighting capability on Z,
             Install the NIF target positioner in support of first
            light to the target chamber center and start of stewardship
            experiments in fiscal year 2004,
             Utilize radiation transport experiments on Z and OMEGA
            for validation of specific aspects of Advanced Simulation and
            Computing (ASCI) radiation transport and hydrodynamics
            modeling, and
             Demonstrate filling of prototype NIF indirect-drive
            ignition capsules and quantify key characteristics.

                           NNSA ORGANIZATION STANDUP

        NNSA's organizational objectives are to improve effectiveness and
    efficiency. We approached the NNSA organization standup by implementing
    a two-phase plan. The first phase, essentially complete, focused on
    creating an integrated headquarters organization, and defining the
    structural relationship between the Federal elements at headquarters
    and the field locations. The second phase focuses on realigning our
    field structure and improving efficiencies by eliminating overlaps in
    responsibilities within the Federal structure and reducing unnecessary
    administrative burdens placed on those performing the mission.
        The recently released report summarizes our first-ever NNSA
    Strategic Plan, provides a detailed plan for assigning roles and
    responsibilities between headquarters and field elements, and discusses
    our objectives for fiscal year 2002 and beyond. We will eliminate a
    layer of management and oversight over the nuclear weapons complex by
    removing the Operations Offices from the NNSA chain of command and
    converting these offices to service centers that provide support
    services such as procurement and human resources. Each of the eight
    NNSA M&O contractors will report to its respective site offices which
    will, in turn, report to the Administrator. This locates NNSA support,
    decision making, and oversight close to the contractor, consolidates
    service functions, and allows staff reductions downstream.
        Local contract and project management will rest with each NNSA site
    office. Integration of weapons production activities will be performed
    for headquarters from the Albuquerque, New Mexico NNSA office.
    Headquarters staff will continue to be responsible for program
    planning, budgeting, policy development, and management of weapons
    research and development and nonproliferation activities.
        NNSA will launch a systematic re-engineering effort to reduce the
    number of separate offices and layers of Federal management, reduce the
    overall number of Federal employees, and identify and correct skills
    mismatches. Federal staff not performing core functions will be
    redeployed and retrained as necessary. We intend to use incentives to
    encourage higher-than-average attrition, career development, and
    retention of highly skilled employees to right size and reinvigorate
    our staff.
        NNSA has instituted an Administrative Workload Reduction Initiative
    using comprehensive input from the laboratories and plants, with task
    forces identifying specific improvements and reducing administrative
    burdens. As a result, NNSA contractors will be given clearer and more
    consistent responsibilities and authorities. They will also continue to
    comply with all environment, safety, health, and security policies.
        When these changes are fully implemented, we will realize the goals
    set by Congress in establishing the NNSA. By clearly defining roles and
    responsibilities, we will increase accountability and reduce
    duplication. By reducing administrative burdens on the NNSA
    contractors, we will operate more effectively and efficiently.

                                   CONCLUSION

        This concludes my written testimony on the policy framework and
    issues that shaped the formulation of the unified NNSA budget request
    for fiscal year 2003. The continuing support of this committee and the
    entire Congress is essential as this program continues to move forward.
    Additional information on all aspects of the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program are contained in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the
    Future Years National Security Program, and the classified Nuclear
    Weapon Acquisition Reports which have been provided to Congress. Now, I
    will be pleased to answer your questions.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Beckner.
        Mr. Erickson.

      STATEMENT OF RALPH E. ERICKSON, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
         FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                             ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Erickson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
    to discuss the facilities and operations organizations and the
    facilities infrastructure recapitalization program.
        A year ago General Gordon, the Administrator of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration, described the
    condition of the nuclear weapons complex during testimony
    before this subcommittee. He said then: ``What I found, I must
    confess, was remarkable. Almost half of our structures are over
    50 years old, old in the sense of safety, security,
    reliability, and mission effectiveness. Many facilities do not
    meet modern health, environmental, or energy conservation
    standards.''
        I am here to say I strongly support that view and have been
    asked by General Gordon to remedy that situation. The
    priorities in the nuclear weapons complex are being refocused
    to assure a viable production and laboratory capability while
    meeting the mission requirements of our customer. The Office of
    Facilities and Operations has been established to ensure the
    vitality and the readiness of the nuclear security enterprise.
        We have wide-ranging responsibilities to focus attention on
    the physical assets of the nuclear weapons complex. Some of
    these responsibilities include institutionalizing professional
    and accountable corporate facilities management activities,
    setting policy and guidance for facilities management, and
    assessing the implementation of that policy, advocating the
    programs provide appropriate resources to restore the
    infrastructure of the complex, and developing and managing the
    facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program.
        In the facilities and operations organization, NNSA
    established the Office of Infrastructure and Facilities
    Management to oversee the implementation of corporate
    facilities management and act as the program manager for
    recapitalization activities. Bruce Scott, the Director, is a
    seasoned, experienced leader with a proven track record. I have
    tasked him directly with the responsibility to establish the
    proper level of resources necessary to restore the complex to a
    condition that supports the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
        His staff represents some of the finest facilities
    professionals we have across the complex, that have significant
    weapons program knowledge. This staff clearly understands the
    role of its mission to assure a nuclear weapons complex of
    acceptable capability and capacity.
        Responsible corporate facilities management within the NNSA
    is built upon proven industry practices, successful facilities
    programs throughout the government, academia, and the private
    sector. This together with my position as an equal member of
    the NNSA Management Council ensures that the decisions made
    concerning the physical requirements of the complex are founded
    in fact, with the understanding and agreement of the risks and
    benefits, so that we truly are managing our $25 billion
    physical plant as one corporate enterprise.
        I will now address the specific program created to help
    assure the long-term health of the enterprise. The facilities
    and infrastructure recapitalization program has been
    established to ensure that the physical infrastructure of the
    nuclear weapons complex is restored, rebuilt, and revitalized.
    The base maintenance and infrastructure is funded within
    Defense Programs, Readiness, and Technical Base and Facilities
    (RTBF) activity that Dr. Beckner has touched on. The mission of
    the RTBF program is to ensure the facilities necessary for
    immediate programmatic activities are maintained to support
    that workload. Given the variety of programmatic issues, this
    funding has not been able to focus on improving the condition
    of a deteriorating nuclear weapons complex.
        Sustained incremental, preventative, and other maintenance
    and infrastructure investments above this base are needed to
    extend the facilities' lifetimes, reduce the risk of unplanned
    system and equipment failures, increase operational efficiency
    and effectiveness, and allow for recapitalization of aging
    facility systems.
        The program will direct a portion to address an integrated,
    prioritized list of maintenance and infrastructure activities
    above current operating levels. That will increase the
    operational efficiency and effectiveness of the NNSA weapons
    complex. These activities are intended to increase the
    operational effectiveness of the entire enterprise and
    recognize our landlord responsibilities at multi-user sites,
    such as Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia National
    Laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, the Kansas City Pantex and
    Y-12 plants, and the Savannah River tritium facilities.
        This program alone will not refurbish the enterprise, but
    it performs a vital function to help size and complete the set
    of requirements necessary to restore the enterprise to an
    acceptable condition. It is key to maintaining the facilities
    housing the activities conducted in support of the nuclear
    weapons life extension program.
        The facilities infrastructure program has three components:
    first, recapitalization, which funds projects to significantly
    improve both facility condition and facility mission
    availability; second, facility disposition, which provides
    guidance and resources to dismantle and dispose of excess non-
    process-contained facilities; and third and just as important,
    the facility planning, which ensures the requisite planning for
    the next year's recapitalization and disposition projects are
    done in a timely and cost-effective manner.
        Before addressing the fiscal year 2002 program, I would
    like to thank the subcommittee for their support of the $8.7
    million provided in the fiscal 2001 supplemental appropriation
    to begin the facilities and infrastructure recapitalization
    program. These funds were used to initiate the program, to
    establish the necessary processes, and basically give us a leg
    up to be prepared for the larger funding that followed in this
    fiscal year.
        This was followed by the $200 million provided in fiscal
    year 2002, which was supported by your committee, and we
    appreciate that. The objective of the 2002 program is to arrest
    the deterioration of the nuclear weapons complex that is
    occurring this year. We have identified 81 recapitalization
    projects costing approximately $137 million. Our program goals
    this year are to address the areas of failed roofing, to
    correct urgent atmospheric control, water, and electrical
    system repairs, and to address a significant level of deferred
    maintenance activities.
        Upgrading and replacing the HVAC systems in central
    manufacturing and laboratory facilities are in progress. We
    have begun renovation of mission-essential buildings to permit
    more effective and efficient operation and consolidation of
    personnel. We have scheduled 19 planning projects costing
    approximately $9 million. These are high-priority
    recapitalization and facilities disposition projects which are
    scheduled for execution in the following fiscal year.
        With regard to facilities disposition, we have begun 33
    projects costing approximately $50 million that will eventually
    reduce the footprint of the NNSA enterprise by some 500,000
    square feet.
        Looking ahead to fiscal year 2003, we plan to undertake the
    following: fund the recapitalization at approximately $180
    million, which will continue to stabilize the overall condition
    of the nuclear weapons complex. Projects will be funded from an
    integrated, prioritized list using the 10-year comprehensive
    site plans for input from each site.
        Planning conducted in fiscal year 2002 will lay the
    foundation for the recapitalization projects to be executed in
    2003. Planning and project preparation completed at this point
    saves time, money, and effort in the coming year.
        Facilities disposition will continue at the same pace as
    fiscal year 2002, supporting a further footprint reduction by
    at least another 500,000 square feet of excess facilities.
        The NNSA approach to management of its facilities and
    infrastructure is a corporate one. Dr. Beckner has described
    the programmatic approach and the use of Readiness and
    Technical Base and Facilities funding. I have just covered the
    facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program. He is
    the line program manager for the sites. I support his program
    needs. This is a team effort to improve the NNSA Stockpile
    Stewardship Program.
        The path forward: Let me describe it briefly. The various
    assessments, both ours and independent parties', clearly
    describe the general long-term financial commitment and
    management effort required to establish a capable and credible
    physical complex to continue to support the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program. These assessments make a strong case for
    continuation of this program. Our program this year will begin
    to correct the deteriorations we have seen over the past
    decade.
        Over the next several years we will ensure the
    stabilization of the condition of the complex and in places
    actually make a marked improvement. As an example, we need to
    target significant deferred maintenance backlogs which we have
    built up over the last decade. This area costs us dearly in
    current corrective maintenance and threatens unacceptable
    mission down time. It is NNSA's intent to stabilize our
    deferred maintenance backlog by fiscal year 2005 and
    aggressively reduce it to within industry standards by fiscal
    year 2009.
        We want to return our facilities' condition to a level of
    good to excellent, not where we are today. Likewise, we need to
    dedicate the resources to maintaining the new facilities that
    we are bringing on line at the same assessment level. Dr.
    Beckner has talked about NIF and the other two facilities that
    currently are in process. We must continue the efforts we have
    underway to reduce the significant amount of excess facilities.
        We owe our work force, which is our most valuable resource,
    a professional working environment in which to carry out our
    national security mission. I am convinced this program will be
    able to execute the foregoing deliverables within the funding
    levels and the time lines we propose. We will ultimately close
    out this program by merging it into the core NNSA programmatic
    components. Given the continued support by this committee, my
    vision is to complete this activity within the next 15 years.
        The most challenging issue facing General Gordon and the
    NNSA is to maintain your continued support. The NNSA critically
    assessed itself. The complex was determined to be failing. We
    have taken responsible actions by citing the problem and
    providing a reasoned and thoughtful solution. Money, though
    very important, is not the complete solution. Under General
    Gordon's leadership, we have refocused our management on the
    importance of maintaining the weapons complex.
        Fiscal visibility and accountability are in place to manage
    and allocate scarce resources. Close cooperation with the
    programs serves as a check and balance on proposed project
    priorities. Metrics are in place to determine our progress.
    Finally, the merging of all this forms a solid program
    facilities management.
        The nuclear weapons complex is a vital component of our
    national nuclear security strategy. The NNSA has organized and
    managed this challenge. Long-term funding support is crucial to
    our success. We expect to be held accountable.
        Thank you for the opportunity to report our progress and
    make our case for fiscal year 2003 funding. I will be happy to
    answer any questions that you may have now or for later
    submission. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Erickson follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Ralph E. Erickson

        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to come before you to discuss the condition of the
    facilities and infrastructure of our vital nuclear weapons complex.
    With your support, we have begun the tough, but crucial, road to
    recovery of the complex. While only in the first stage of a long
    journey, probably of some 10 years or so, I feel we have a solid story
    to tell you. Let me explain about the start of the recovery of the
    nuclear weapons complex, and especially the improved management and
    accountability with which we are undertaking the recovery.

                    CONDITION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

        Approximately a year ago, General Gordon, Administrator of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration, testified before this
    subcommittee and others describing the condition of the nuclear weapons
    complex. At that time, he provided his assessment of what he had seen
    following visits to each site in the nuclear weapons enterprise. Some
    of his words and findings bear repeating. ``What I found, I must
    confess, was remarkable. Almost half of our structures are over 50
    years old--old in the sense of safety, security, reliability, and
    mission effectiveness. Many facilities do not meet modern health,
    environmental, or energy conservation standards. They are costly to
    maintain, and difficult to keep in regulatory compliance. It is in such
    facilities we ask some of the most brilliant scientific and technical
    minds and some of the most productive people in the country to work.''
    He added, ``The physical complex requires attention and we must act
    soon, because it is unprofessional, it's inefficient, it's wasteful of
    resources, it's potentially dangerous, and it sends exactly the wrong
    message to the professionals we want to attract and keep in this
    endeavor.''
        His assessment built upon the findings of studies of which you are
    aware--all reaching the same conclusions. Defense Programs, in their
    Facilities and Infrastructure Assessment 2000; and the Foster Panel's
    February 2001 assessment of the ``Reliability, Safety, and Security of
    the United States Nuclear Stockpile'' found that ``the nuclear weapons
    complex is old, the infrastructure, a necessary part of the complex,
    has been neglected, and is not funded adequately.'' Specific details
    focus the concern: maintenance backlog is increasing by well over $100
    million a year, and has reached some $700 million; unfunded priority
    facility requirements are still increasing by about $200 million a
    year; and, possibly of greatest concern, facility and infrastructure
    conditions of the complex continue to deteriorate. In 1995, 57 percent
    of the complex was in an ``excellent to good'' condition, but by 2000
    had deteriorated to only 27 percent. ``In addition, facilities
    management is fragmented, is without uniform standards and in difficult
    times has served as bill payer for higher priority science and
    production programs across functional areas.'' These studies make the
    clear case that additional funding must be committed annually for at
    least 10 years to restore, rebuild, and revitalize a very fragile
    nuclear weapons complex.
        The recent Nuclear Posture Review highlighted concerns over the
    inadequate condition of the nuclear weapons complex in its report to
    Congress: ``A major challenge for nuclear weapons programs over the
    next two decades will be to refurbish, and thereby extend the life of,
    at least seven types of warheads. . . . In order to carry out this
    plan, NNSA has initiated efforts to recapitalize deteriorating
    facilities (or build entirely new facilities), restore lost production
    capabilities and modernize others. . . Initiatives to restore the
    production infrastructure will represent a sustained long-term effort
    and will be critical to ensuring an effective, balanced stewardship
    program for the Nation's nuclear deterrent and for the New Triad.''
        In the final Foster Report, Dr. Foster builds on the NPR finding.
    He reported to Congress in March 2002, alluding to the decision to
    conduct ``extensive refurbishment in the coming decade'' of additional
    warhead types that ``This work entails new materials and production
    methods and modified designs. It must be done in a weapons complex that
    has atrophied to a point not fully appreciated by many.''
        In today's world, irredeemably changed by the horrors inflicted
    upon our Nation last September, the question of whether a revitalized
    nuclear weapons complex is worth an investment of this magnitude is
    self-evident. As long as nuclear weapons remain a component of this
    Nation's strategic response, then the capability to develop and
    reliably produce nuclear weapons is critical. A diminished capability
    and capacity within the physical complex undermines the deterrent value
    of the weapons programs developed there. This is not just an
    undermining of the strategic interest of the Nation, it could invite an
    adversary to either question our resolve or believe in the viability of
    a nuclear arms race. Dr. Foster's compelling report frames the issue
    clearly in technical, strategic, and political terms. He concludes,
    ``But we don't have an alternative. We have to maintain the deterrent.
    It is decaying and has to be replaced.''
        General Gordon clearly understands that the facilities,
    infrastructure, maintenance, and recapitalization have been under
    funded far too long. The priority earlier had been properly given to
    establishing the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Attention to the
    infrastructure was put on hold while the science based stewardship
    program was formulated, funded, has taken hold, and is now working. He
    recognized in his report to Congress last year that the time had come
    to refocus on the physical complex, which houses the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program. Setting the scene for what I will report on today,
    he gave his commitment to provide the necessary leadership to improve
    the condition of the complex, ``Our facilities require attention.
    Others have found, as we have, shortcomings, regarding the condition of
    the complex. Improving the facilities and infrastructure of the NNSA is
    a high priority, but we need your help, and I am prepared to work with
    you to this end. I have a detailed plan of how to proceed. Dollars
    alone, while vital, are only one part of the solution. As significant,
    possibly more, is my plan to bring focus, process, rigor, and
    accountability to our work of recovering our facilities and
    infrastructure. Facility management is a standard business practice of
    most major organizations. It is being reengineered within the NNSA. We
    have established an office to manage the facilities and infrastructure
    of the nuclear weapons complex. We are refocusing on long term
    planning, establishing the processes--absent too long--that will
    institutionalize the procedures, standards, and expectations for the
    complex.''
        General Gordon's message was heard, understood, and decisively
    responded to by Congress. Some $8.7 million was provided in the fiscal
    year 2001 Supplemental Appropriation. The Fiscal Year 2002 Energy and
    Water Development Act provided $200 million to the NNSA's Facilities
    and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP). At the same time,
    the NNSA is furnishing visibility and accountability in the execution
    of these resources, which serve as the basis for its corporate
    management approach to restoring the weapons complex to an acceptable
    condition.
        This significant funding, which you have provided, allows us to
    begin the long, tough effort to restore, rebuild, and recapitalize the
    nuclear weapons complex. My objective today is to provide you an
    explanation, in some detail, of what actions we in the NNSA have put in
    place over the last year. Since General Gordon last discussed his
    facilities and infrastructure requirements with you, he has directed a
    series of major changes to ensure that we will successfully and
    responsibly manage this major undertaking.

                                 REORGANIZATION

        As explained in the February 25, 2002, Report to Congress on the
    Organization and Operations of the NNSA, a new organizational
    component, Facilities and Operations, which I head, has been
    established to ensure the vitality and readiness of the nuclear
    security enterprise. Facilities and Operations have a series of wide-
    ranging responsibilities, which will allow the requisite attention to
    be placed on the physical assets of the nuclear weapons complex. Some
    of these responsibilities include: institutionalize professional and
    accountable corporate facilities management activities throughout the
    NNSA; setting policy and guidance for facilities management, and
    assessing the implementation of these across the complex; advocating
    that the programs provide appropriate resources to restore the
    infrastructure of the complex; and developing and managing the
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program, which I will
    explain in more detail a bit later. Responsible corporate facility
    management within the NNSA is built upon common industry practices of
    successful facility programs throughout the government, academic, and
    private sectors. Possibly the most important changes General Gordon has
    effected is to bring focus to the condition of our facilities and
    infrastructure, and tasking my organization to be ``the empowered
    advocate for the stewardship of the complex.'' This, together with my
    membership on the NNSA Management Council, ensures that decisions made
    concerning the physical assets of the complex are founded in fact, with
    understanding and agreement of the risks and benefits, so that we are
    truly managing our $25 billion physical plant as a corporation.
        To assist me in managing this undertaking, NNSA established within
    my component the Office of Infrastructure and Facilities Management.
    This office specifically oversees the implementation of corporate
    facilities management, and is the program manager for the
    recapitalization of the complex. To lead the program, the NNSA has
    selected a seasoned, experienced, leader--Bruce Scott. Mr. Scott
    trained outside the Department and has a proven track record. He is
    chartered with establishing a robust corporate facilities management
    process across the complex. I have charged him with the responsibility
    for establishing the proper level of resources necessary to restore the
    complex to a condition that supports the deterrent value of the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program. His staff represent some of the finest
    facilities professionals we have across the complex at all levels of
    seniority, and are a welcome blend of headquarters and field, with
    significant weapons program knowledge. The office clearly understands
    the support role of its mission, where its efforts are, from a
    strategic sense, to ensure a nuclear weapons complex of acceptable
    capacity and capability.
        The NNSA has initiated a corporate rededication to our core values,
    mission, and vision. NNSA has formalized this in our recently published
    Strategic Plan of February 2002. Within this plan is a strong statement
    as to the importance of our facilities. We note, ``substantial effort
    is required to restore our facilities to ensure adequate capability . .
    .'' NNSA has codified its expectations that we are corporately
    committed to professionally manage our facilities and infrastructure.
    In the Strategic Plan infrastructure and facilities are addressed by
    Strategic Goals 4: ``Ensure the Vitality and Readiness of the NNSA's
    Nuclear Security Enterprise.'' Our strategy is to ``Provide state-of-
    the-art facilities and infrastructure supported by scientific and
    technical tools to meet operational and mission requirements''. To
    support this strategy are two strategic indicators: ``Ensure facilities
    are available to perform our mission'' and ``Implement NNSA's
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program.''
        The NNSA reorganization has also significantly improved our
    corporate planning, programming, and budgeting. The reorganized budget
    processes provide significant benefit to our recovery efforts for the
    complex by ensuring a focused and corporate approach. You are aware of
    our efforts at establishing a longer term funding plan for the NNSA
    enterprise, codified in our FYNSP. Within this plan are included our
    specific direction for our recapitalization of the complex, the
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP), which I
    describe below. We have laid out a credible and responsible funding
    program for the FIRP:

                                      FUTURE YEARS NATIONAL SECURITY PLAN ESTIMATES
                                                [In millions of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         Fiscal Year
                                                                        --------------------------------------------
                                                                           2003     2004     2005     2006     2007
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program.............      243      290      340      390      440
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The fiscal year 2002 funding of $200 million provided a start-up
    that was large enough to make a clear positive impact across the entire
    complex, yet also manageable for a beginning program. I would add that
    the $8.7 million supplemental at the end of fiscal year 2001 was an
    excellent device to allow us to pilot in a hands-on manner, to prepare
    to execute professionally the current program. We have requested a
    ramp-up of some $50 million annually which we think is mandatory to
    effectively recover the complex. This ramp-up will allow NNSA to ensure
    processes are in place across the complex so that we demonstrate to you
    credible deliverables, efficiently managed, and fiscally accountable.
    It is easy to throw money at projects, it is hard work to manage them
    responsibly, and harder still to infuse accountability in an
    organization, which has been criticized for many years for weaknesses
    in this area.
        So far, I have explained the NNSA organizational restructuring that
    allows a professional focus on our facilities, and the near-term
    funding we have planned to begin the recovery of the complex. I'll now
    address the specifics of the recovery plan itself.
       the facilities and infrastructure recapitalization program (firp)
        The Recapitalization Program is established to ensure that the
    NNSA's contribution to the administration's strategic goal of
    maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrence is fully
    supported. Its mission is to restore, rebuild, and revitalize the
    physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. The base
    maintenance and infrastructure efforts at NNSA sites are primarily
    funded within Defense Programs' Readiness in Technical Base and
    Facilities and through site overhead allocations. These efforts focus
    on ensuring that facilities necessary for immediate programmatic
    workload activities are maintained sufficiently to support that
    workload. Given the divergent requirements of programmatic issues, this
    funding has not been able to focus on improving the condition of a
    deteriorating nuclear weapons complex. Sustained, incremental, and
    preventive and other maintenance and infrastructure investments above
    this base are needed to extend facility lifetimes, reduce the risk of
    unplanned system and equipment failures, increase operational
    efficiency and effectiveness, and allow for recapitalization of aging
    facility systems. This is the specific focus, attention, and management
    responsibility of the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization
    Program. It will apply new, increased, direct appropriations to address
    an integrated, prioritized list of maintenance and infrastructure
    activities, above current operating levels, that will significantly
    increase the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the NNSA
    weapons complex sites. FIRP activities are intended to increase the
    operational effectiveness of the entire sites and will recognize NNSA's
    landlord responsibilities at these multi-user sites: the Lawrence
    Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories; the Nevada
    Test Site, including the North Las Vegas Facility; the Kansas City,
    Pantex, and Y-12 Plants and the Savannah River Tritium Facilities. The
    FIRP alone will not refurbish the complex, but it performs a vital
    function to help size the complete set of requirements necessary to
    restore the complex to an acceptable condition. It is key to
    maintaining the health of the facilities that house the activities
    conducted in support of the life extension programs. These programs are
    supported by the Defense Department as vital to deterrence and the
    strategic force multiplying effect it has regarding the stockpile.
        The program has three interlocking and complimentary components.
    The major effort identifies recapitalization projects, which will
    significantly improve both facility condition and facility mission
    availability. Criteria for the selection of these projects are those
    maintenance backlog and infrastructure activities, currently unfunded,
    that will significantly improve the physical conditions and mission
    availability, as well as address the infrastructure responsibilities,
    of the NNSA nuclear weapons complex. These activities are vital to the
    accomplishment of program, yet they are not tied to a specific Campaign
    or Directed Stockpile Work. Because of their cross cutting nature, they
    have not previously achieved priority within strictly programmatic
    budget reviews, with adverse impact to the complex. Recapitalization
    targets specific, individual projects to ensure clear visibility of
    improvements: discrete backlogged maintenance projects; non-
    programmatic General Plant Project (GPP) improvements and construction;
    capital equipment purchases; etc.
        An additional important consideration of the program is the
    inclusion of projects that provide cost saving and investment payback.
    NNSA's analysis of facilities and infrastructure identified in their
    assessment report--2000 that, too frequently, due to the absence of
    preventive maintenance, facilities were being run to failure. Projects
    in this program provide an immediate positive effect on the condition
    of a given facility, and result in the saving of maintenance dollars--
    in the long term, preventive maintenance costs are significantly less
    than corrective maintenance actions.
        The second component, Facility Disposition, provides funds to
    dismantle and dispose of excess non-process contaminated facilities.
    Disposition reduces environmental, safety and health, and safeguards
    and security challenges, and thus costs for those deactivated
    facilities and infrastructure that are excess to current and future
    mission requirements. These actions are taken at the end of the life of
    a facility to retire it from service, to reduce the overall footprint
    of the complex, and to reduce safeguards and security requirements and
    long-term costs. These actions will improve our ability to manage the
    facilities portfolio. They enable the necessary footprint reduction of
    the complex. The Fiscal Year 2002 Energy and Water Development
    Appropriations Act conference report directed the NNSA to allocate 25
    percent of the appropriated dollars for the recapitalization program to
    reduce the NNSA footprint by the elimination of excess facilities.
        The third component, facility planning, ensures the requisite
    planning for next year Recapitalization and Disposition projects, to
    include project base lining and readiness to obligate funds. It also
    funds assessments to support the prioritization of backlogged
    maintenance and facility consolidation efforts. Finally, it provides
    for planning and conceptual design of high priority general
    infrastructure projects. Within this effort is the development of
    analytical methods and tools for establishing credible restoration
    plans for each NNSA site using the newly-revised 10-year comprehensive
    site plans; infrastructure assessments to support the FIRP
    prioritization of maintenance and facility consolidation efforts; and
    planning and conceptual design activities for future priority landlord
    infrastructure line item construction projects, specifically targeting
    utilities improvements.
        With the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program at
    work, the nuclear weapons complex is on the verge of realizing
    improvements, upgrades, and facility life extensions that can be
    measured. Nuclear deterrence through capability is established on the
    bedrock of a reliable complex. Possibly for the first time within the
    NNSA, corporate facility management is coming on line; it has the
    potential to enable and empower governance and stewardship of the NNSA
    for the physical complex.

     FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM EXECUTION FOR
                                FISCAL YEAR 2002

        The principal objective of the fiscal year 2002 FIRP is to arrest
    the deterioration of the nuclear weapons complex occurring this year.
    The NNSA has identified 81 recapitalization projects for execution in
    fiscal year 2002, costing $137.7 million. The principal thrusts of the
    fiscal year 2002 program are to attack the areas of failed roofing;
    correct urgent atmosphere control, water, and electrical system
    repairs; and address a significant level of deferred maintenance
    issues. Upgrading and replacing HVAC systems for essential laboratory
    and manufacturing facilities are planned. We begin general plant
    construction projects; and renovation of mission essential buildings to
    permit more efficient operations and consolidation of personal are
    undertaken. Some specific examples, site-by-site, follow:

             Kansas City Plant--Replace and upgrade chillers, air
            handling, and dehumidification systems supporting essential
            production buildings. These projects provide environmental
            controls related to manufacturing processes, in support of
            reservoir and Lifetime Extension Programs for the W-76 and W-80
            weapons programs. Execute the new Tri-Plant Roofing Partnership
            for repairs to Kansas City, Y-12, and Pantex roofs.
             Los Alamos National Laboratory--Construct four new
            buildings that consolidates laboratory and support functions
            into modern, safe, and efficient spaces and removes costly, old
            temporary structures.
             Pantex Plant--Undertake the most critical of a large
            backlog of essential roofing repairs for vital production
            buildings. Begin to work down the large deferred maintenance
            backlog throughout the plant; and complete repairs and upgrades
            to essential emergency and life safety systems. These projects
            support the Life Extension Programs, High Explosive Operations,
            and the W-76 and W-80 weapons programs.
             Sandia National Laboratory--Refurbish three critical
            laboratory and test facilities, including their structural,
            utility, and power systems and test equipment. These facilities
            were at risk of losing capabilities supporting the Defense
            Programs mission in weapons qualifications, development,
            investigation, modeling, and simulation.
             Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--Building
            improvements include the replacement and upgrade to mechanical
            systems, including HVAC units, air conditioners, air handlers,
            fans, HEPA filters, and fan controls; electrical systems, and
            other components. Process improvements include an upgrade to
            the operational capability at the S-300 high explosive
            facility, to improve the processing of high explosive parts,
            and the integration of new computer controls. These projects
            also provide for improved machine tool reliability, new high
            explosives equipment and tools in support of mission essential
            weapons qualifications activities.
             Nevada Test Site--Projects concentrate on improvements
            to communications and safety systems. Older communications
            systems are being replaced with fiber optic cable, and upgrades
            are planned for emergency, fire, and remote radiation alarms at
            test facilities.
             Savannah River Site--Projects at the Savannah River
            Site include the improvement to the telecommunications
            distribution network within the tritium area. These projects
            also replace and upgrade the hydride bed portion of the thermal
            cycling absorption process necessary for tritium production.
             Y-12--Large scale roof repairs and addressing the
            significant maintenance backlog throughout the site are
            underway. Other repairs and improvements will be made to
            incinerators, steam coils, power panels, oil storage
            facilities, transformer stations, lighting, and flooring
            systems. Specific facilities upgraded include the nitric acid
            pickling tank, and the replacement of bond strand piping, which
            transports waste effluents from the steam plant to the
            treatment facility. The concrete spalling from the ceiling of
            part of the production complex, discussed as a striking example
            of our facility concerns by General Gordon in his earlier
            testimony, is being addressed. These activities support, among
            others, the W-87 Weapons Programs, and production work for the
            Joint Test Assemblies.

        We have scheduled 19 infrastructure planning projects, costing
    approximately $9.2 million. These are high priority FIRP
    recapitalization and facility disposition projects scheduled for
    execution in fiscal year 2003. A representative sample of these
    projects includes: design of chilled water, steam, and condensate
    piping systems at Kansas City; corrective maintenance projects for Los
    Alamos; Sandia is designing HVAC, reactor cooling system replacements
    and upgrades. At the Nevada Test Site, major improvements are planned
    for the Test Site water system, including refurbishing multiple tanks
    representing some 2 million gallons of potable water, replacing
    pipeline and upgrading electrical support services, and addressing
    seismic and structural issues. Savannah River projects include
    electrical component replacements and communications upgrades.
        The FIRP is conducting 33 facility disposition projects this year,
    at an estimated cost of $50 million. The funding level is directed by
    the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act. Execution of
    these projects reduces the footprint of the overall NNSA holdings by
    some 500,000 square feet. The projects selected will remove about 217
    buildings and structures. The largest footprint reductions will be at
    Y-12 and the Nevada Test Site. One-third of the facility disposition
    funding was allocated to Y-12 ($17 million) given the NNSA's commitment
    to aggressively reduce the footprint at that site. Security
    improvements at Y-12 and Pantex accrue due in part to a smaller
    ``limited area.'' At Savannah River Site, Sandia National Laboratory,
    and Los Alamos National Laboratory, footprint reductions free up key
    locations. Once cleared new programmatic needs will be satisfied and
    facility consolidation can occur. Reductions to environmental, safety,
    and health risks are achieved at Nevada Teat Site (reducing worker
    exposure to rodent borne Hanta Virus), Y-12 (safety issues due to
    deteriorating structures), and at Lawrence Livermore and Sandia
    National Laboratories (structural roofing concerns). In addition,
    savings will begin to accrue for many sites as the disposition of
    excess facilities reduces the NNSA's burden of surveillance and
    maintenance operations currently required to ensure these excess
    facilities remain in a safe condition.

                        INTENTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

        The NNSA is shaping the foundation for a professionally managed
    infrastructure. Many aspects of our approach to corporate facility
    management are undergoing process improvement. This includes those
    processes used to manage the Recapitalization Program. The successful
    implementation of 10-year comprehensive site plans (TYCSP) forms the
    foundation for bottoms-up recommendations for recapitalization
    projects. Looking ahead, in fiscal year 2003, the program plans to
    undertake the following:

             Fund the recapitalization component at about $180
            million, which will begin the stabilization of the overall
            condition of the nuclear weapons complex. Projects will be
            funded from an integrated, prioritized list using the fiscal
            year 2003 TYCSP inputs from each site.
             Planning conducted in fiscal year 2002 will be
            executed in fiscal year 2003, allowing acceleration of the pace
            of conducting the recapitalization projects (e.g. long lead
            materials are ordered, cost estimates are more accurate,
            management is in place).
             Facility Disposition will continue at the same pace as
            fiscal year 2002, supporting a further footprint reduction of
            some 500,000 square feet of excess facilities.

                               CORPORATE APPROACH

        The NNSA approach to management of its facilities and
    infrastructure is corporate. Dr. Beckner has described his programmatic
    approach, and the use, which he makes of his Readiness in Technical
    Base and Facilities funding. I have just covered my Facilities and
    Infrastructure Recapitalization Program. He is the line program manager
    for the sites, I support his program needs. Our efforts meld well
    together for the improvement of NNSA's corporate governance. For
    facilities especially, our programs are truly complimentary. The FIRP
    provides the ability to plan in advance which major projects the sites
    can undertake on an annual basis, without the risk of internal
    reprogramming to non-facility issues. It makes significant, visible,
    and very positive differences at the sites, supporting program and
    mission. This is a major improvement in the management of facilities.
    Previously, sites could rarely undertake large scale improvement
    efforts because the dollars to do so never seemed to make the priority
    ``cut.'' Since FIRP is a stand alone program, directly focused on
    facility improvements, it compliments Defense Programs activities.
    Close cooperation exists among the field professionals, headquarters,
    and with the scientific and production program offices of Defense
    Programs and Facilities and Operations to corporately restore the
    complex. This is as true in my corporate facility management
    responsibilities as it is with the funded programmatics such as FIRP
    and RTBF. A specific example will be illustrative.
        TYCSPs are the foundation for NNSA complex-wide facilities and
    infrastructure strategic planning, and the cornerstone of the effort to
    restore, revitalize, and rebuild the complex. The TYCSPs focus
    management attention on current and future facility and infrastructure
    needs at each site in support of Directed Stockpile Work and campaign
    programmatic requirements. It provides a resource-constrained plan
    consistent with site-specific funding profiles provided by the NNSA
    from the FYNSP for meeting these needs. We have not really had credible
    site planning tools before. These TYCSPs are one of a series of
    corporate facility management processes which my organization is
    bringing on line as part of the NNSA reorganization. It allows NNSA to
    make comparisons and informed corporate planning; and empowers the use
    of metrics, benchmarks, and performance objectives complex-wide. The
    ability to realistically plan and execute toward the desired and
    intended complex of the future is possible. Formal feedback between
    headquarters, field, and the contractors, linking budget realities with
    technical requirements, allows NNSA to begin managing our physical
    complex as a corporation. Institutionalizing the TYCSPs into NNSA's
    business ethic across the complex is a major step toward corporate
    governance and accountability. I mentioned that this is a corporate
    approach: The TYCSPs provide both Dr. Beckner, who has the line
    responsibility for the sites, and myself, who provides support and
    manages the FIRP, information we both need in our separate areas. I
    manage the TYCSP process, and Defense Programs is the major customer of
    the deliverables. There are close working partnerships between our
    organizations throughout the TYCSP process. This allows each to focus
    on our areas of expertise, and is truly a success for the NNSA.

                             FIRP--THE PATH FORWARD

        I have explained the significant efforts the NNSA has underway to
    address the recapitalization of the nuclear weapons complex. Let me lay
    out the path ahead, as we see it today. The various assessments, both
    ours and of independent parties, clearly describe the general long-term
    financial commitment and management effort required to establish a
    capable and credible physical complex to support the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program. These assessments make a strong case for a minimum
    effort of some additional $500 million annually for 10 years or more.
    Our efforts with the FIRP recovery program to date fall in line with
    this programmatic level of effort. It is quite apparent that our
    program this year, our $200 million, will probably arrest the
    deterioration we see occurring on an annual basis. Over the next
    several years of the ramp-up of the FIRP program, we will ensure the
    stabilization of the condition of the complex, and in places begin to
    make marked improvements in discrete areas. As an example, we need to
    target the significant deferred maintenance backlog which we have built
    over the last several years. This area costs us dearly in corrective
    maintenance and threatens unacceptable mission downtime. It is the
    price we now pay, along with many other undesirable effects, from large
    scale chronic underfunding of facilities. It is the NNSA's intent to
    stabilize our deferred maintenance backlog by fiscal year 2005, and
    aggressively reduce it to within industry standards by fiscal year
    2009. This is not just a funding issue, it is also a significant
    management effort to address this competently--but without the funding,
    no management program would succeed. We want to return our facility
    conditions, for our programmatic facilities and specific other
    important infrastructures at a minimum, to an assessment level of
    ``good to excellent.'' Likewise, we need to dedicate the resources to
    maintaining the new facilities we are bringing on line at that same
    assessment level. We must continue the efforts we have underway to
    reduce our significant amount of excess facilities. Beyond the costly
    surveillance and maintenance bills that accrue, and the long-term risks
    and hazards involved, we owe our work force, our most valuable
    resource, a professional working environment in which to carry out the
    national security mission. Finally, but most important, we will have
    institutionalized responsible and accountable facility management
    processes, including budgetary ones, so that the NNSA does not revert
    to the practices of the past that have given us the results currently
    seen at Y-12, Los Alamos, Pantex, and others.
        The NNSA feels that this program will be able to execute the above
    deliverables within the funding levels and timeline we propose. We will
    close out this program, merging it into the core NNSA funding
    components, when we accomplish our mission. I must caution that this
    undertaking is only in its infancy. We have the situation currently,
    the major recovery challenge, because of long-term inattention. It will
    take long-term attention, managed on a day-to-day basis, to recover. I
    would offer that until we truly begin to turn the corner on the
    recovery of the complex, any more specific plans on the end game, as it
    were, for this program would be premature.

                                     ISSUES

        The issues that face the NNSA as it executes the Facilities and
    Infrastructure Recapitalization Program are typical of any large
    corporation undergoing change. Principal among them is the challenge of
    changing the culture of the past. We are dedicated to the principle
    that the past is not prologue to the future. As outlined, policies,
    plans, and actions are being put in place to embed the culture of
    professional corporate facility management. The new NNSA offices that
    manage this effort are populated with dedicated facility professionals.
    For the most part, this program is being embraced. Among some, a wait-
    and-see reaction is manifest. General Gordon's commitment to you is
    that we are prepared to prevail over our critics, and maintain the
    program at a very high level for a very long time. I am confident that
    through demonstrated performance, corporate facility management will
    thrive.
        However, the most challenging issue facing us is to convince you
    and your colleagues that despite the expense and length of the FIRP,
    the NNSA is earning and warrants your continued support. Simply stated,
    the NNSA has critically assessed itself: the complex was determined to
    be failing. We have taken responsible action by citing the problem and
    providing a reasoned and thoughtful solution. Money, though very
    important, is not the complete solution. Management, if not broken, was
    certainly unfocused and inattentive, having lost sight of the
    importance of maintaining the weapons complex. Today, we report that
    responsible management practices are established, operating, and
    showing results. Fiscal visibility and accountability are in place to
    husband scarce resources. Close cooperation with the programs serves as
    a check and balance on proposed project priorities. Metrics are in
    place to determine progress. Finally, the merging of all this combines
    to a solid program of corporate facilities management comparable, we
    believe, to the best programs in government.

                                    SUMMARY

        The nuclear weapons complex is a vital component of our national
    nuclear security strategy. In its current condition it is potentially a
    weak link, which is receiving immediate attention. Congress has taken
    the first restorative steps. The NNSA is organized to manage the
    challenge. Long-term funding support is crucial to our success. We
    expect to be held accountable. Thank you for the opportunity to report
    our progress and make the case for the future.

        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Erickson.
        We will engage in at least one 6-minute round of questions.
    Let me begin by asking a question of Dr. Beckner. In your
    formal testimony you state that NNSA has started an advanced
    concept initiative because current nuclear weapons in the
    stockpile cannot ``hold at risk a growing number of targets
    deeply buried in tunnel facilities.'' Is the Robust Nuclear
    Earth Penetrator (RNEP) the first of the projects in this
    initiative?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes.
        Senator Reed. What do you mean by the term ``hold at
    risk,'' Dr. Beckner?
        Dr. Beckner. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) has
    determined, after receiving input from various parts of the
    Government, that a target set, generally defined as deeply
    buried and hardened, cannot presently be held at risk with the
    arsenal that is available, or you might say is not easily held
    at risk with that present arsenal, and has instructed the
    laboratories through the NNSA and the Air Force as the DOD
    agent should explore the modification of two existing weapons
    to determine if they could be used against such targets
    effectively.
        That is the program that has been authorized by the NWC and
    the one that we are presently contemplating getting started.
        Senator Reed. It seems, if you listen to the response,
    doctor, that you defined ``held at risk'' as ``hold at risk.''
    Are we talking about totally destroying a target? Are we
    talking about closing the earth so that whatever is down there
    cannot emerge?
        Dr. Beckner. You are getting into an area that we do not
    normally take responsibility for. Generally, we are requested
    to develop the understanding of the performance of a nuclear
    device under certain conditions. The effectiveness of that
    device against a particular target is ``not our business.''
    What is our business is responding to the requirements that are
    specified to us.
        In this case, the requirements are that such a weapon would
    be able to penetrate to a certain depth in a certain form of
    earth and still operate successfully.
        Senator Reed. Do you have other projects that will be
    included in this initiative?
        Dr. Beckner. Not at this time. It is quite specific as to
    what they have asked us to do.
        Senator Reed. Now, I know your response was essentially
    that you have been given some very specific parameters and you
    are really modifying a weapon to conform to those parameters.
        Dr. Beckner. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. But certainly this whole project raises an
    issue that, if a conventional weapon could not either
    penetrate, destroy, or seal an underground passage, would a
    relatively small nuclear weapon, one kiloton or less, be able
    to address the problem? I presume that is the range you are
    operating in.
        Dr. Beckner. No, it is not. The two weapons (B61, B83) that
    we have been asked to consider are both relatively higher yield
    weapons. They are not low-yield weapons.
        Senator Reed. But again, from your response, the specific
    target or the effect on the target is something that you just
    do not know? It is not part of your responsibility?
        Dr. Beckner. That is not part of what we have been assigned
    to do at this time. This is specifically to explore the ability
    to survive the environment as specified and to function.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Dr. Beckner, turning for a moment to the Nuclear Posture
    Review, there are various categories of nuclear weapons. They
    have been discussed generally, and indeed the stockpile is
    generally divided into two broad categories, active and
    inactive. Can you define the active stockpile from the DOE
    perspective, and are there differences between the number of
    warheads in the active stockpile according to the 1994 review
    and the number of warheads in the active stockpile in the
    December 2001 review?
        Dr. Beckner. Well, there are certainly differences in that
    the category that was previously described as active, I think
    within the context of today's understanding of the NPR, is
    larger than what we would now identify as operationally
    deployed. It has more or less been put into two parts, one part
    being operationally deployed and the other part being the
    responsive force. In the past, we might have viewed those as
    all part of the active stockpile. Then as you say, there is yet
    a third part, described as inactive; and finally, those weapons
    that are retired. But the difference that has occurred as a
    result of the NPR is largely in the distinction between those
    that are operationally deployed and those that are in the
    responsive force.
        Senator Reed. Well, perhaps another question. The active
    stockpile, they will be fully maintained, modernized, and
    loaded with tritium?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes.
        Senator Reed. Will there be any subcategories, any
    differences in the active stockpile, or they will all be
    treated the same?
        Dr. Beckner. Let me answer in a fairly complicated way. For
    the active, the operationally deployed, those will be fully
    prepared, tritium, everything ready to function. In the case of
    the responsive force, it is our understanding that there would
    be some flexibility, depending on the time required for those
    weapons to be moved from the responsive force back to the
    delivery system that they are associated with, if that were
    required.
        In some cases that would be a very short period of time and
    in other cases it is a rather long period of time, due to the
    nature of the way those weapons are uploaded. In either case,
    if they were called upon they would have to be fully
    functioning at the time they were mated with the delivery
    system. So the task that is put to us is to be able to meet
    that requirement, and it is a little different depending on
    which delivery system you are talking about.
        Senator Reed. Without getting into any specifics,
    obviously, it seems that the response force will have various
    response times.
        Dr. Beckner. Yes.
        Senator Reed. You have to be prepared in your planning to
    accommodate those response times.
        Dr. Beckner. Yes.
        Senator Reed. Some of those weapons systems will have
    relatively short response times, so in effect they will be
    fully modernized?
        Dr. Beckner. As far as the requirements that would be
    placed on us to supply tritium and other components, the answer
    to that is yes.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me turn to Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me ask a question about your shipping of nuclear
    material and weapons. When you are shipping your nuclear
    material and weapons, what are the goals of NNSA when you try
    and determine the best routes? Then a second part to that, are
    there certain driving conditions NNSA tries to avoid?
        Dr. Beckner. First let me say that, as I believe you know,
    we do not publicize the routes that we use, for obvious
    reasons, when shipping weapons or weapons parts. We do select
    routes that are the safest possible. They might not be the
    shortest routes. So we make those kind of decisions.
        We also do planning so that we do not have to conduct
    shipments into areas at the wrong time of year, for instance
    shipments into the northern midwest in the winter time. We just
    plan to do those in the summer rather than the winter because
    it is a better idea.
        So all in all, we make those choices so that the shipments
    will be safe, so that the routes are the safest possible. We
    try to avoid congested areas so that we do not get
    inadvertently stopped for long periods of time when we were not
    planning on such things, and generally try to keep ourselves in
    a position so that the mission will be successful.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Erickson, I do not want you to feel
    neglected over there. We have not asked you any questions. You
    are next.
        Mr. Erickson. Not a problem.
        Senator Allard. Has the funding authorized and appropriated
    for fiscal year 2002 been used in a productive manner according
    to NNSA's plan for improving the facilities and infrastructure?
        Mr. Erickson. Yes. We have obligated all those funds to
    date and the plants and labs who have received funds are in the
    process of executing the projects to go along with that.
        Senator Allard. So there will not be anything left over at
    the end of this year?
        Mr. Erickson. All the money has been obligated. It probably
    all will not be spent, simply because of delivery of material,
    authorization of contracts, and the fact that the second $100
    million was held until we delivered a report to Congress in
    February. Therefore, those monies were not available to us to
    obligate or to begin costing until that time.
        So all the money will be obligated, all $200 million.
    Certainly not all $200 million will actually be costed. It will
    flow over into the succeeding fiscal year.
        Senator Allard. How do you envision this program proceeding
    over the next 10 years in light of the Foster panel
    recommendation and the administration's request within the
    Future Years National Security Program, as the program is often
    referred to, FYNSP?
        Mr. Erickson. We have a sustained growth over that period
    of time, over the FYNSP period of time, taking us to what we
    believe are acceptable levels of the program. It is a reasoned,
    well-planned approach. It goes up approximately $50 million a
    year for each of those years, allows us to establish a good
    program, a process in place to effectively and judiciously
    spend that money.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Dr. Beckner, concerning shipping plutonium and other
    special nuclear materials, can we be sure that NNSA will keep
    the shipping of plutonium and other special nuclear materials
    from EM sites on schedule? Then has the NNSA prepared a
    realistic plan to keep up with the anticipated schedule of
    shipments within both Defense Department and EM during the next
    several years?
        Dr. Beckner. We do have a plan. In fact, we have more than
    one plan because of the uncertainty about the date when
    shipments may start from Rocky Flats. The situation is getting
    to be difficult as time goes by and those shipments do not
    begin. At this time we see every passing week as additionally
    troublesome.
        We will do our very best to meet the schedules of both our
    military customers as well as moving the waste out of Rocky
    Flats. However, I must say that the conflict becomes more
    obvious, rather pressingly so, during the next 2 months, and
    beyond that there is no question there would be serious
    conflicts between those two programs.
        So on a week-by-week basis this is getting to be a more
    difficult problem. At this time we believe it is manageable,
    but it will not be manageable indefinitely. There will have to
    be selection made on how those assets would be used one program
    versus the other if this delay goes on much longer.
        Senator Allard. Now, on the issue of safeguards and
    security, do you intend to request additional security funding
    from Congress for fiscal year 2003? Can you give us an idea of
    how much and for which sites?
        Mr. Erickson. Senator, if I may, actually safeguards and
    security falls under my purview.
        Senator Allard. OK.
        Mr. Erickson. In answer to your question, we do not intend
    at this time to ask for additional funds.
        Senator Allard. Well, how is this going to affect security
    at the various sites?
        Mr. Erickson. We are in the process of going through a
    rather extensive review at our sites to evaluate the changes
    due to September 11, the activities and the safeguard and
    security responsiveness at those sites. That review is under
    way at our various sites. We will have a better feel for that
    towards the summer, the latter part of the summer. At that
    point in time, it will be what it will be and we will have to
    make a judgment at that point in time.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has
    expired.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Erickson, one of the issues that is of great concern to
    me is the fact that the United States is the only nuclear power
    in the world that has no capability of producing a nuclear
    weapon today. While I am not advocating that we need to produce
    a weapon now, I do find it disturbing that we do not have the
    capability to produce one if the President determined that such
    production was in the national interest due to some emergency.
        I have heard testimony this year and in the Foster report
    of 2000 that it will take between 10 and 15 years to design and
    build a new Modern Pit Facility which would give us the
    capability to build a new weapon. The Nuclear Posture Review
    calls for the design and construction of a Modern Pit Facility.
    The Nuclear Posture Review called for that.
        My question is, can you explain the decision in the fiscal
    year 2003 budget submission to postpone the critical decision
    on mission needs, also known as CD-0, by 1 year? Why was that?
        Dr. Beckner. If I could, sir, I think I should try to
    answer that question.
        Senator Sessions. All right.
        Dr. Beckner. In fact, we are moving ahead with those
    decisions. There are ways, utilizing existing facilities at Los
    Alamos, to produce a limited number of pits. We are in the
    process of proving that out now around the program for the W88
    warhead where we need to provide additional pits.
        Having gone through that process, as long as the production
    requirements were quite modest, we could produce other pits for
    other weapons, I believe. In the long run, however, I think we
    all agree we need a better capability. That does call for a
    Modern Pit Facility or some capability that is substantially
    beyond any that exists today.
        So we are setting about to make those decisions and to get
    that program underway, and we will be making the first of those
    decisions within the next few weeks.
        Senator Sessions. Well, is that not the purpose of the CD-0
    plan?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes, it is. We are going to move ahead with
    that decision.
        Senator Sessions. But this would be a delay?
        Dr. Beckner. No.
        Senator Sessions. In what we expected?
        Dr. Beckner. I know that we are going to make the decision
    within the next several weeks and move ahead with the early
    work on that facility.
        Senator Sessions. Since we have such a long lead time if we
    were developing a new pit facility, in one sense it seems we do
    not have much to worry about, that takes a long time. But in
    another sense, every year that goes by delays even further,
    does it not?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes, it does.
        Senator Sessions. Could the gap, the delay period, be
    shortened?
        Dr. Beckner. There is no question that if we must build a
    new facility that it will take more than 10 years from today to
    completion. It is probably closer to 15 years than 10 years. As
    long as the stockpile is as presently configured and as large
    as it presently is, and as long as we have to contemplate the
    possibility of replacing some large number of those pits over
    the next 20 or 30 years--and as yet we do not know if that is
    necessary, but we have to believe that we should be prepared
    for it--then I think that does call for a new facility.
        So we will set about to go through the National
    Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process within the next 2 to 3
    years, to get site selection, and to move ahead with a design.
        Now, should the stockpile become much smaller, then I would
    say we would rethink some of that, and there is the opportunity
    to do that. But, based on the present planning, we will go
    ahead.
        Senator Sessions. It is this CD-0 study that is supposed to
    guide us on that?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes. There are two things that it would do, it
    starts the NEPA process and conceptual design.
        Senator Sessions. I understood that there was a delay by
    one year in the decision, postponing the decision on mission
    need.
        Dr. Beckner. It might have been--I confess, I have not been
    around long enough, that I do not quite bridge all of the
    history here. There may have been a delay from a previous date
    that might have been planned. I cannot say for sure. But I do
    know what our present plan is. Our present plan is to go ahead
    with that decision within the next several weeks.
        Senator Sessions. All right, that is good.
        Now, if we decommission or dismantle an existing nuclear
    weapon--either one of you can answer this--is the pit
    preservable?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes, it is.
        Senator Sessions. Unless we destroy it.
        Dr. Beckner. Yes, it is.
        Senator Sessions. The President has decided to maintain
    those pieces, at least so they can be reassembled if needed,
    but to decommission the weapon otherwise; is that the way you
    understand it?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes. There has been a large number of weapons
    already disassembled and the pits are indeed in storage right
    now.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think that points to the
    criticality of this whole circumstance, in which we are the
    only nuclear power that does not have the capacity to go
    forward, and we cannot afford to place ourselves at risk by
    destroying all the component parts. So we can decommission,
    certainly fulfilling, I believe, the spirit of our commitment
    to reduce nuclear weapons, but at the same time say to a
    potential adversary: If you think you are going to take
    advantage of our freeze and reduction, do not think you can get
    ahead of us just because we do not have a production
    capability.
        So I just think we are stuck. I think the President is
    correct on that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Dr. Beckner, the NPR directs improvements in the test
    readiness posture, and I understand that you are studying the
    test readiness posture. When you conduct this study, I presume
    also you are including the cost of various options, the
    benefits to the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and also
    essentially whether or not the time limits or time frames are
    appropriate.
        Can you comment on that, your current review of the test
    readiness?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes. The present posture is that we would be
    able to conduct a test, if so instructed, within 24 to 36
    months. There has been some criticism of that by various
    learned bodies. The Nuclear Posture Review suggested that we
    should take a fresh look at that situation and decide if that
    is the appropriate posture or not, to do the proper analyses,
    to assess the cost-benefit of changing it. Almost certainly, if
    it were to be changed it would be shortened. The suggestion has
    been made by some that it should be as short as perhaps a year
    or a year and a half or 2 years. So that is what we will study.
    There are costs associated with changing that configuration and
    so it will in effect become a cost-benefit tradeoff. We will
    develop the information and we will provide it to the people
    who have requested it, and some new decisions will be made as
    to what that future readiness state will be.
        But indeed, we have been instructed to begin those studies
    and we will do them.
        Senator Reed. So you have not--you are not evaluating any
    specific time frame? You are simply looking at a whole range of
    options, is that fair?
        Dr. Beckner. Well, we will probably select three or four
    that seem to be the most obvious and work on those. There is a
    limit on the short side as to what is possible. So you will
    start with the possible and move up from there. You have to
    realize the purpose of this would be to put ourselves into a
    configuration across our facilities so that we could execute
    whatever that new response time might be. Those costs get to be
    considerable if you shorten it greatly.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, doctor.
        Mr. Erickson, so that you will not be totally neglected by
    my questioning: You received your new facilities and
    infrastructure account full funding in the fiscal year 2002
    budget, but you had about a year to plan for it. As a result,
    your office was ready to begin almost from the day the money
    was available. When did you get the release from DOE to begin
    the work?
        Mr. Erickson. We got our release on the first $100 million,
    as I said in my earlier answer, in November. Obviously, because
    of the appropriations process, it was later than October 1. We
    received that and began to immediately start to send out the
    work authorizations to the sites. That has added a little bit
    to, as I say, the reason why we are not going to cost all of
    the money. We will have it all obligated, but not costed. So
    there was a delay.
        Senator Reed. But you will fully obligate the funds, the
    2002 funds?
        Mr. Erickson. They are fully obligated today.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        On the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Dr. Beckner, are we
    adequately funding the key weapons program activities, namely
    the directed stockpile work and the science-based campaigns?
        Dr. Beckner. We believe we are. If you look in detail at
    the profiles of those programs, comparing, for instance, the
    2002 budgets to the 2003 budgets and then the out-years as
    well, since we have provided 5-year profiles, what you see is
    more growth in the directed stockpile work than in the science
    program. That is the choice we have made. We believe it is
    proper. We know it is necessary in order to maintain the
    schedules that we are committed to on the directed stockpile
    work and we believe the science programs are adequate to
    support those. It is a tight fit, but we believe it is
    adequate.
        Senator Allard. So you spent twice as much on the science-
    based stewardship actually in your budget as compared to your
    stockpile work; is that correct?
        Dr. Beckner. We have to be a little careful. Much of what
    is in the science programs is in direct support of the
    stockpile program. You essentially have the several budget
    areas that we like to manage by. But much of the work down in
    those science programs in fact specifically supports the
    directed stockpile work, so that you can get the work done at
    the time that it is required. So there is a lot of mixing of
    the budget from those two areas.
        Senator Allard. From what I have seen as far as our
    educational efforts, we are graduating more and more
    individuals that are trained in what I would call the leisurely
    sciences and fewer and fewer people graduating as engineers in
    the hard science degrees. I do not think they are meeting the
    demands out there for a lot of our scientific endeavors
    throughout the country.
        What is DOE doing to make sure that it attracts, trains,
    and provides the experience for the next generation of
    technicians and engineers and whatnot within the weapons
    programs?
        Dr. Beckner. The main attraction, quite honestly, is the
    facilities that are available and the opportunities to do the
    work that are there as a result of those facilities. In many
    cases we have capabilities at the laboratories and at the
    plants which are unmatched anywhere else in the country. For
    instance, take the NIF that is presently under construction.
    That is a one-of-a-kind in the world.
        Take the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro Test (DARHT) facility
    that has just been completed at Los Alamos. That is
    unparalleled in terms of its capabilities. You can go to each
    of the laboratories and you will find that kind of capability,
    due to the foresight, I think of this subcommittee and others
    in Congress to provide those facilities. That is the real
    attraction and that is what makes it possible to hire great
    people, is if they have a good place to work and the
    opportunity to do challenging work. The reality is it works
    very well.
        Senator Allard. Now, in December of 2001 the DOE Inspector
    General report criticized DOE for ``not meeting internally
    established time frames for initiating and conducting
    investigations of defects and malfunctions in nuclear
    weapons.'' Then, the DOE IG went on further to state that ``If
    these delays continue, the Department may not be in a position
    to unconditionally certify the aging nuclear weapons
    stockpile.''
        What are the DOE and NNSA doing to address those concerns
    raised by the DOE Inspector General?
        Dr. Beckner. Indeed we are concerned by that report. We are
    concerned by the fact that in some cases the delays were
    unnecessarily long. We expect to have a lot of so-called SFIs,
    significant findings investigations, from the program. That is
    the purpose of it, to find things and then set about to correct
    them. The part that was not getting as much attention as needed
    was the part of setting about to correct them. We have put new
    emphasis upon that. We are developing a schedule to more
    rapidly close those SFIs and get on top of the problem. I think
    by the time we are here next year the record will show that we
    have done that. It has our attention and the situation will
    change.
        Senator Allard. Apparently one of the problems is having
    somebody who will centrally track the investigative process. Do
    we have somebody who is going to be tracking, be using a
    central tracking system?
        Dr. Beckner. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I am finished.
        Senator Reed. Senator Sessions, do you have additional
    questions?
        Senator Sessions. Well, I just noticed that the fiscal year
    2002 funding for Modern Pit Facility was $4 million. The 2003
    request is $2 million. Does that indicate a slowing down of
    interest or more delays out there?
        Dr. Beckner. No, I think it just recognizes the fact that
    there are a lot of things going on here in parallel. I would
    encourage you to look at several elements of the pit
    fabrication and certification program in combination with the
    Modern Pit Facility. Look at all of those budget lines in
    combination. We are taking all of those parts and looking out
    over the next 5 years and fit them together so that this
    program will proceed. I know you look at a budget and you see
    one number smaller than the other one and you think the program
    must be slowing down. It is not.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we certainly do not believe that
    money means that we are making progress. Sometimes money does
    not mean that.
        Dr. Beckner. Well, that is right. But we are entering a
    point here where much of what will be going on is the
    initiation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
    process and getting started on the initial design studies.
        Senator Sessions. When do you think you might start the
    NEPA process?
        Dr. Beckner. As soon as we get the CD-0 decision, which
    does require the full action on the part of the DOE, which is a
    bit of a big deal within the building. But we expect that in
    the next several weeks and that will kick it off. We require
    that before we can begin the NEPA process and before we can
    begin the conceptual design. But once we have that, we are on
    our way.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I know Congress has an interest in
    getting moving along. The report language in last year's
    defense bill authorized $10 million in report language if you
    chose to move this project forward.
        So I just hope that do not let it slip and we keep our eye
    on the ball and keep it moving.
        Dr. Beckner. I agree.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Allard, did you have a comment?
        Senator Allard. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I understand you are
    getting close to concluding this hearing. First of all, I
    wanted to thank you and your staff. I know that you personally
    are interested in improving the environment in the country and
    particularly have been supportive of trying to get sites
    cleaned up throughout the country, not just in Colorado. You
    have been very supportive of my particular project and I
    appreciate that, and so has your staff.
        I just want to recognize in a public way your commitment to
    getting these sites cleaned up and your working with your
    staff, and I appreciate that very much.
        I also wanted to recognize Senator Strom Thurmond, who
    represents the State of South Carolina. He has been a mediator
    in our negotiations with what is happening at the Savannah
    River Site and the Governor there. Again, he understands
    basically that all these sites interact and when you have
    problems at one site there is a chain effect and it spreads all
    over the country. He has been very sensitive and taken a view
    that I think has been very responsible from a national
    perspective, and he has indicated how important it is to have
    cooperation among the various States.
        So Senator Thurmond has been spending a considerable amount
    of time working between our two staffs as a mediator and I just
    wanted to recognize his efforts, too.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. I have a joint
    statement from Senators Thurmond and Sessions, for the record.
    Without objection, I will place it in the record.
        [The joint prepared statement of Senator Thurmond and
    Senator Sessions follows:]

      Joint Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator Jeff
                                    Sessions

        Sustaining our nuclear weapons at the highest state of readiness is
    central to the Nation's security and military strategies of deterrence.
        However, for the past 3 years the Panel to Assess the Reliability,
    Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, better
    known as the Foster Panel, has produced alarming reports that stated in
    part, ``we already see worrisome signs of deterioration in some nuclear
    components.'' Even Gen. John Gordon, of the NNSA, highlighted the
    concerns associated with this deterioration when he testified before
    this subcommittee that ``unanticipated events could include the
    catastrophic failure of a deployed warhead type.''
        Although the Foster Panel provided a series of recommendations, its
    primary recommendation each and every year has been to immediately
    begin conceptual design of a full-scale plutonium pit production
    facility for the long-term support of the stockpile. Unfortunately, the
    Department of Energy has delayed action on this matter at every
    opportunity. This year, DOE has again deferred conceptual design until
    fiscal year 2004 with fiscal year 2003 funding used to continue
    manufacturing concepts.
        The Panel consistently recommends immediate action on conceptual
    design for a number of reasons. First, design and construction of this
    facility will take between 10 and 15 years. Even if the most basic
    conceptual design activities began today, this full-scale facility
    would not be ready at the earliest until April 2012.
        Second, the facts are that our nuclear components are aging, and we
    have no capability to replace them. As the Panel's 2000 Report stated,
    ``the missing production capabilities . . . leave us even more
    concerned about our ability to respond to crisis.'' The report
    continued, ``we can significantly increase our readiness with
    relatively small expenditures on needed conceptual design.''
        Third, in this year's Foster Report, the Panel noted that,
    ``Restoration of complete production capability has a strategic import.
    We can more confidently build down if we know that we can build back if
    necessary. Restored production capability might be the enabling
    condition for some future stockpile reductions.''
        With these factors in mind, the Foster Panel, for the third
    straight year, recommended that the ``NNSA expeditiously produce an
    approved design, make a site decision, complete safety studies, and
    obtain environmental permits for pit production and secondary
    production facilities.''
        Mr. Chairman, it is time we heed the warning of the Foster Panel
    and direct the NNSA to immediately begin conceptual design of a full
    scale plutonium pit production facility. We owe it to our Nation as
    well as the security of future generations to do so.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Dr. Beckner, Mr. Erickson, thank you very much. The hearing
    is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                           COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS

        1. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, recently there have been press
    reports questioning the Department of Energy's (DOE) ability to comply
    with the various compliance agreements under the budget as requested
    for each site. If the Environmental Management (EM) program received
    the funding that has been requested, other than the cleanup reform
    funds, would the DOE be able to comply with all of its agreements other
    than the agreement with the State of Washington for the tanks at
    Hanford?
        Secretary Roberson. I believe the base budget meets the legal
    commitments in our environmental compliance agreements. However, we
    can't continue to do business as usual under any funding scenario. We
    must be focused not only on meeting our legal commitments, but also on
    addressing our other environmental obligations to the communities and
    the American taxpayer. With the additional funding from the EM Cleanup
    Reform Account, we will be able to pursue cleanup approaches that will
    produce more real risk reduction, accelerate cleanup, or achieve much
    needed cost and schedule improvements, as well as maintain compliance
    with legal requirements.

        2. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, would the DOE have to
    renegotiate the various agreements and consent orders with the States
    and the EPA if the funding requested by the DOE for fiscal year 2003 is
    the amount authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 2003?
        Secretary Roberson. If funds are authorized and appropriated
    consistent with our request, we would not anticipate the need for
    renegotiation of our legal agreements. However, our request is
    structured to provide an incentive for our sites and regulators to
    review the cleanup approach to ensure it is focused on reducing risks
    and accelerating cleanup. As a result of this effort, it may be
    necessary to work with DOE's regulators to modify the milestones and
    commitments in some agreements and orders to reflect new cleanup
    approaches.

        3. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, what are the DOE's liabilities
    if it intentionally asks for less money than is needed for
    environmental compliance?
        Secretary Roberson. Compliance with environmental requirements is a
    primary consideration and high priority for the Department in
    formulating its budget request. The Department includes in its budget
    requests to the Office of Management and Budget sufficient funds to
    comply with applicable environmental requirements. Moreover, the
    Department generally is subject to the same types of enforcement
    actions, including fines and penalties in many cases, as private
    entities that fail to comply with environmental requirements.

                              OPERATING CONTRACTS

        4. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, over the course of the past 2
    to 3 years, the DOE has renegotiated or entered into new contracts at
    almost all EM sites. These contracts were designed to provide
    incentives to the contractors to do more work with less money, but were
    all predicated on a predetermined funding profile. It now appears that
    one requirement for participation in the cleanup reform fund is to
    renegotiate or even recompete the existing contracts. Has the decision
    been made to terminate for convenience and recompete any or all of the
    existing contracts? What sites and what contracts are included in this
    decision?
        Secretary Roberson. We have decided to recompete the Mound Site
    contract. We do not anticipate that a wholesale renegotiation of all
    current EM contracts will be necessary; however, most will require
    modification. Any decision to recompete a contract will be made on a
    case-by-case basis.

        5. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, has a cost analysis been
    conducted to determine that the cost savings achieved from
    recompetition exceeds the cost to terminate the contracts early?
        Secretary Roberson. In making a decision to re-compete a contract,
    DOE would consider any additional costs that would be incurred should a
    termination for convenience be required. It can be difficult to
    estimate the cost of changing to the new contract. If the incumbent
    contractor wins the award, the current contract may be modified, and a
    termination action would not be necessary. If a new contractor wins the
    award, the incumbent contractor would present a termination for
    convenience proposal, and the government will audit it and negotiate a
    fair and equitable settlement. However, a decision to recompete is not
    taken lightly and is made to achieve specific results. A decision to
    recompete will be made for three possible reasons:

            1. the current contract expires;
            2. the desired or necessary changes are so significant that
            competition is warranted; and
            3. confidence in and performance under the current contract is
            such that it does not appear that continuing the contract will
            render the necessary results.

        6. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, does the DOE have to modify
    the terms and conditions of some or all of these contracts if fiscal
    year 2003 funding is appropriated at the requested level?
        Secretary Roberson. It may be necessary to modify existing
    contracts to reflect not only any differences in the funding level
    compared to anticipated levels when the contract was initially
    negotiated, but also to properly align the scope of work and
    performance incentives with the cleanup approach that results from our
    discussions with regulators.

        7. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, has this renegotiation process
    started?
        Secretary Roberson. While some of our contractors have been
    involved in discussions and planning for accelerated cleanup
    approaches, we would not begin formal discussions to modify a contract
    until it is clear what the resulting funding appropriation level and
    performance requirements for fiscal year 2003 will be.

                               SURPLUS FACILITIES

        8. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, do you have any plans to stop
    taking contaminated surplus buildings and facilities from other
    components of the DOE?
        Secretary Roberson. We do not have plans to stop taking
    contaminated facilities into EM. However, for those contaminated excess
    facilities currently managed by other programs, acceptance into the EM
    program will be a very conscious decision. Any additional facilities
    added to the EM program will be clearly identified and segregated from
    the current baseline, cleanup costs and schedules for those facilities
    will be determined, and cleanup of those facilities will be prioritized
    according to the principles of the Top-to-Bottom Review.

        9. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, the budget request for fiscal
    year 2003 does not appear to include funds for EM to accept any new
    excess facilities, is this correct?
        Secretary Roberson. In fiscal year 2003, the Tritium Systems Test
    Assembly (TSTA) at Los Alamos National Laboratory will transfer from
    the Office of Science to EM. The fiscal year 2003 budget request
    therefore for EM includes $460,000 for surveillance and maintenance for
    TSTA to support this transfer. No funding to decontaminate and
    decommission the facility is requested in fiscal year 2003.

                              EXISTING COMMITMENTS

        10. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, does the EM budget for fiscal
    year 2003 continue to fund previous commitments to manage newly-
    generated wastes?
        Secretary Roberson. The EM fiscal year 2003 budget request
    continues to fund previous commitments to manage newly-generated wastes
    at Oak Ridge, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Pacific
    Northwest National Laboratory. Although EM may consider negotiating the
    transfer of responsibility for newly-generated waste back to the
    generator program(s), the fiscal year 2003 congressional request does
    not assume these transfers.

        11. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, does the fiscal year 2003
    budget request fund the new waste storage building at Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory, because our information is that the
    building has been completed but there is no money to move the wastes,
    which are currently stored outside, into the new building?
        Secretary Roberson. Yes, funds are available within the
    Environmental Management fiscal year 2003 budget request for Lawrence
    Livermore National Laboratory to initiate movement of waste into the
    new waste storage building, focusing as a first priority on removal of
    low-level waste currently stored in temporary structures.

                                 CLOSURE SITES

        12. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, the Closure Account was
    established to provide flexibility to sites that were closing by 2006
    to accelerate the closure where possible. As we approach 2006 and those
    sites are closed, does it make sense to establish a new closure account
    for those sites that will be closed in the 5 years following 2006 and
    to allow those sites that will be closing in that time frame the same
    flexibility afforded to those sites closing by 2006?
        Secretary Roberson. The fiscal year 2003 budget request was
    structured to provide incentives for DOE and its State and Federal
    regulators to reach agreement on new cleanup approaches to accelerate
    risk reduction and cleanup at all DOE sites. EM is making progress in
    our discussions with States. As of the end of May 2002, the Department
    has signed Letters of Intent with the appropriate regulators for
    accelerated cleanup of sites in the States of Washington, Tennessee,
    Idaho, New Mexico, and Nevada. We expect to sign letters for additional
    sites soon.
        Once we have completed cleanup acceleration plans at the sites, EM
    intends to re-examine the EM budget structure and to propose changes as
    appropriate so that the budget structure will correspond to the new
    cleanup plans. We will focus on a structure that supports acceleration
    and ensure it supports the needed integration. We are considering
    appropriation accounts that align with site closures in our accelerated
    cleanup program.

                                   MINI-NUKES

        13. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, there has been much recent
    discussion of mini-nukes. Is the NNSA working on anything, or have
    plans to work on anything, that could lead to a weapon (new or
    modified) that would be designed to produce a yield of less than five
    kilotons?
        Dr. Beckner. No. The NNSA has no validated requirement from the
    Nuclear Weapons Council to work on a new or modified weapon that would
    produce a yield of less than 5 kilotons.

        14. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is NNSA working on, or is there
    money in the fiscal year 2003 budget to work on new concepts in weapons
    that could have application to conventional weapons?
        Dr. Beckner. The President's fiscal year 2003 request for stockpile
    stewardship is focused on ensuring the continued safety, security, and
    reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. Applications of
    nuclear weapons technologies to conventional weapons are, of course,
    possible, but the NNSA weapons programs focuses its funds on nuclear
    weapons activities.

                                 TEST READINESS

        15. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, the NNSA has been criticized for
    having the ability to conduct a test in 24 to 36 months, even though
    this level of test readiness was approved by the Nuclear Weapons
    Council. The NPR directs the NNSA to improve its test readiness. What
    does a 24- to 36-month test readiness posture mean to you and how is it
    different from 20 to 32 months or 30 to 36 months or 18 to 24 months,
    and do these arbitrary time frames have any real meaning, i.e., does it
    make a difference what and how you test?
        Dr. Beckner. The NNSA, consistent with existing Presidential
    direction, is maintaining the ability to conduct a limited series of
    nuclear tests within 24 to 36 months of a Presidential order to do so.
    The purpose of this test readiness program is to identify and complete
    long lead-time items required to conduct a test, and to ensure that we
    maintain the key skills and capabilities that would be difficult to
    reconstitute. We have not identified a particular test and have not
    prepared specific devices or diagnostics in a test configuration.
        The NPR raised several concerns about the current test readiness
    posture. The NNSA's ongoing study is reviewing: (1) the shortfalls or
    additional steps required to continue to meet 24-36 month readiness;
    and (2) the actions and resources required to shorten the test
    readiness posture to 18 months or less.
        A 32-month program or 30- to 36-month test readiness program would
    differ little from the current posture. If the readiness time were
    shortened from 24 months to 20 or 18 months, the level of preparation
    would change. Substantial additional work would be required on long-
    lead items (field test neutron generators, authorization safety basis
    documentation and nuclear explosive safety studies) to ensure
    readiness. Some of these items are even required for 24 months (the
    short end of our current 24- to 36-month readiness) so we have begun to
    invest in those areas. Shorter times than 18 months would require the
    selection of a particular device to test and preparation of the device
    and diagnostics in a test-ready configuration.
        We believe that 18-month readiness is achievable for well-defined
    tests of weapons currently in the stockpile. But, historically, even
    with a vigorous testing program, a complex experiment could take well
    in excess of 2 years to prepare, so 18 months would not be achievable
    for every conceivable experiment. It does matter what we test.

        16. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, to conduct a nuclear test requires
    certain skills and abilities. Have you identified all of the needed
    skills and abilities and a plan to maintain them and what elements of
    the Stockpile Stewardship Program maintain these skills?
        Dr. Beckner. Subsequent to the initiation of the current test
    moratorium, we have made a considerable effort to catalog and archive
    procedures, capabilities, and personnel requirements to conduct an
    underground test. Those skills related to fielding a test at the Nevada
    Test Site are maintained through the test readiness program and
    substantially exercised through the execution of the stockpile
    stewardship experimental programs, in particular subcritical
    experiments, hydrodynamic testing at the laboratories, and a broad
    range of other experiments at both the laboratories and the Nevada Test
    Site. These experimental programs address both the required test
    execution skills and the diagnostics. Laboratory and plant skills
    involved in preparation of a test device are exercised through
    stockpile maintenance and stockpile life extension activities.
    Laboratory design and test analysis skills are exercised through
    experimental programs. The nuclear diagnostics capabilities will be
    partially exercised in the High-Energy-Density Physics program, as
    methods and techniques are similar. The principal skills that cannot be
    exercised are containment, radiochemistry, and some aspects of high
    speed nuclear diagnostics.

        17. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what is NNSA studying in the current
    review of test readiness and will this study include the costs of
    various options and the benefits to the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    of these options?
        Dr. Beckner. The NPR raised several concerns about the current test
    readiness posture. The NNSA's ongoing study is reviewing: (1) the
    shortfalls or additional steps required to continue to meet 24- to 36-
    month readiness; and (2) the actions and resources required to shorten
    the test readiness posture to 18 months or less. The results of this
    study will be shared with Congress once the administration has
    determined the best path forward.
        While test readiness is a part of the stewardship program, we must
    carefully balance the available financial and human resources to ensure
    that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable.

        18. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is there any real value gained from
    conducting mock test exercises?
        Dr. Beckner. We are considering the use of exercises to enhance
    certain aspects of test readiness, primarily those areas which are not
    practiced through the execution of the stockpile stewardship
    experimental programs. We expect to conduct exercises of some portions
    of the nuclear test process, such as drill-back for radiochemistry
    samples. Larger exercises that approach something related to a full
    underground nuclear test remain under study. We must weigh the research
    and readiness benefits against the resource costs.

                         DISMANTLEMENT RATES AT PANTEX

        19. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, I believe there is some confusion
    about the ability of the NNSA's Pantex facility to dismantle nuclear
    weapons. I have heard statements that Pantex has no ability now and
    could not in the future have an ability to dismantle nuclear weapons
    because of the pressures the Stockpile Life Extension Program places on
    the Pantex Plant. Could you please explain what Pantex is currently
    dismantling and what is the potential ability of Pantex to dismantle
    nuclear warheads between now and 2012?
        Dr. Beckner. The current production complex is limited in the
    number of weapons that can be processed at the Pantex Plant, with the
    work split among units undergoing surveillance, refurbishment, or
    dismantlement. Planned renovations of existing facilities at Pantex
    will expand capacity sufficient to meet the anticipated Nuclear Posture
    Review workload. During the period fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year
    2010, when three refurbishments (W80, W76, and B61) are underway, there
    would be a small reserve capacity available to address unanticipated
    problems in the stockpile, respond to new warhead production
    requirements, or handle a potentially increased dismantlement workload.
    That reserve capacity would increase after fiscal year 2014. Under
    current planning assumptions, NNSA would not define a firm schedule for
    dismantlements, rather it would ``load level'' the Pantex operation by
    scheduling dismantlements in a way that does not interfere with ongoing
    refurbishments or new production. Currently, Pantex is disassembling
    the W56 Minuteman II warhead (expected to be complete in fiscal year
    2005) and the W79 Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile (expected to be
    complete in fiscal year 2003). Pantex also has plans to disassemble
    some excess B61 bombs and all remaining B53 bombs in the next few
    years.

        20. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, could Pantex dismantle the W-62
    between now and 2012?
        Dr. Beckner. The decision to retire the W62 warhead by 2009 was
    reaffirmed by the Nuclear Posture Review. No further decisions were
    made on dismantlement. With the currently planned workload at Pantex,
    including three new refurbishments and facility renovations, there is
    insufficient capacity to dismantle all the W62 warheads between now and
    2012 without rearranging priorities. Instead some would have to be held
    in an ``inactive'' status in storage at either Pantex or in a military
    storage site until they could be dismantled.

           EFFECT OF NPR ON THE STOCKPILE LIFE EXTENSION REQUIREMENTS

        21. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, the decision in the December 2001
    NPR was to maintain all of the current stockpile of nuclear warheads.
    What does this decision do to the need to conduct life extensions on
    each of these nuclear warheads and the block approach?
        Dr. Beckner. The NPR which lays out the direction for this Nation's
    nuclear forces over the next 5 to 10 years reaffirmed NNSA's stockpile
    refurbishment plan (which includes the block upgrade approach) for the
    W87, W76, W80, and B61. The plan had been approved by the NNSA and the
    Department of Defense. Therefore, no changes are required as a result
    of the NPR.

        22. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what does this decision (to maintain
    all warheads) mean to the tritium supply?
        Dr. Beckner. The NPR does not change the current plan for the date
    when NNSA needs to begin irradiating tritium producing rods in the
    Tennessee Valley Authority's reactors. Irradiation will still begin in
    the fall of 2003 as currently scheduled, particularly because the
    initial core loads of tritium rods will be ``transition cores'' that
    will not contain nearly as many tritium rods as will be utilized for
    steady state production. The requirement to maintain a 5-year reserve
    has not been affected by the NPR. We have contracts with the TVA to
    produce tritium in the amounts required to support the NPR stockpile,
    whatever the details of that stockpile turns out to be.

        23. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what does this decision do to the
    cost of the Stockpile Stewardship Program in the near and long terms?
        Dr. Beckner. The workload direction in the NPR is consistent with
    current assumptions and is reflected in the fiscal year 2003-2007 FYNSP
    document provided to congressional committees in March 2002.

                             NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

        24. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, the committee has received testimony
    that the DOE and the DOD will continue to review the decisions made in
    the NPR. Is this or is this not the case?
        Dr. Beckner. Section 1041 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-398) required
    the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy,
    to ``conduct a comprehensive review of the nuclear posture of the
    United States for the next 5 to 10 years'' and to report to Congress on
    the results of the review. The December 2001 NPR establishes our
    strategic posture for the 21st century, preparing America for a new and
    rapidly-evolving international security environment. As such, the NPR
    is a foundation on which more detailed planning can be based; NNSA and
    the DOD are jointly engaged in fleshing out the details. Thus, our
    focus is not on reviewing the decisions made in the NPR but in
    implementing them.

        25. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, would it be fair to characterize the
    NPR as a living document?
        Dr. Beckner. The NPR, per congressional requirement, reviewed the
    nuclear posture of the United States for the next 5 to 10 years. The
    review established our strategic posture for the rapidly changing and
    unpredictable world in which we now live. The NPR provides high-level
    guidance for planning the direction and makeup of the strategic forces
    and capabilities the U.S. will need to assure our national security
    through this decade. Again, our focus is not on reviewing the decisions
    made in the NPR but in implementing them.

        26. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, what are the next steps in the
    review process?
        Dr. Beckner. The DOD and NNSA will, in coming months, jointly
    address, among other things, the size and makeup of the stockpile
    needed to support a force of 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads.
    NNSA will continue, as affirmed by the NPR, to maintain the nuclear
    stockpile through surveillance, refurbishment, production,
    dismantlement, transportation, and storage.

        27. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is there a schedule to re-examine
    the decisions and to make decisions to retire warheads or to destroy
    warheads?
        Dr. Beckner. The President announced in November that the United
    States would reduce its operationally-deployed strategic nuclear
    warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next 10 years. Some of the
    warheads removed from operational status will become part of the
    responsive force. Some will no doubt be retired and dismantled. We will
    be making decisions on these and related matters in coming months and
    years. Among other things, the NPR reaffirmed the earlier decision to
    retire the W62 warhead by 2009.

                        ACTIVE NUCLEAR WARHEAD STOCKPILE

        28. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, can you define the inactive
    stockpile from the DOE perspective?
        Dr. Beckner. From the DOE perspective, the inactive stockpile are
    those warheads in DOD custody in order to augment the active stockpile,
    if necessary; to replace active stockpile warheads withdrawn for
    surveillance testing; and to replace warheads of a particular type,
    should there be a serious degradation in their reliability.

        29. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, how will the nuclear warheads in the
    inactive stockpile be maintained, modernized, and loaded with tritium?
        Dr. Beckner. All inactive stockpile warheads have their limited
    life components (e.g., tritium bottles) removed upon expiration and not
    replaced unless the warhead is returned to the active stockpile.
    Inactive stockpile warheads typically remain in DOD custody and are
    refurbished (modernized) on a case-by-case basis.

        30. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, how does the total number of nuclear
    warheads relate to the tritium requirement and when must the NNSA
    resume tritium production to support the NPR and how will the size of
    the tritium reserve be determined?
        Dr. Beckner. NNSA must support all operationally deployed and
    augmentation (responsive) warheads with tritium. Some augmentation
    warheads may be in the inactive stockpile, but we must have enough
    tritium to support them in the event they are brought back to the
    active stockpile. The remainder of the inactive stockpile warheads do
    not require tritium support. The DOD and NNSA have not yet determined
    the exact number of warheads that will be in the active and inactive
    stockpiles. While the changes in the force structure impact the tritium
    ``need date'' and, therefore, the number of tritium rods that must be
    irradiated in the TVA reactors, the fall 2003 initial irradiation date
    is not affected. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the
    initial core loads of tritium-producing rods in each TVA reactor will
    be ``transition cores'' that will not contain nearly as many rods as
    will later be utilized for steady-state production. The requirement to
    maintain a 5-year reserve has not been affected by the change in force
    structure in the NPR.

                              NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS

        31. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, has the DOE been told by the Defense
    Department to work on the development of any new nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Beckner. The NNSA has no requirement from the Department of
    Defense to work on the development of any new nuclear weapons. Any new
    requirement to develop a new nuclear weapon would have to be approved
    by the Nuclear Weapons Council consistent with Section 3152 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.

        32. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, was this direction approved by the
    Nuclear Weapons Council?
        Dr. Beckner. If and when the NNSA is asked to work on the
    development of a new nuclear weapon it will be approved by the Nuclear
    Weapons Council consistent with Section 3152 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.

        33. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, is there money in the fiscal year
    2003 budget request for this work?
        Dr. Beckner. For fiscal year 2003, the NNSA has no requirements
    from the Department of Defense to initiate any development activities,
    including the design of a new nuclear weapon. However, funds are
    included to maintain a capability to explore technical options that
    would enhance the security posture of the United States.

        34. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, how much will the DOE spend in
    fiscal year 2002 on development of any new nuclear weapons or new
    nuclear-weapons concepts?
        Dr. Beckner. While there are no funds in fiscal year 2002 for the
    development of any new nuclear weapon or new nuclear-weapons concept,
    the NNSA is planning to spend $7.4 million (of which $500,000 is from
    USAF) in fiscal year 2002 from Directed Stockpile Work R&D to conduct a
    3-year study on the possibility of modifying either the B61 or B83,
    both existing warheads in the stockpile, to provide the United States
    with Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator capability. This research activity
    will be carried out because current weapons in the stockpile cannot
    hold at risk a growing category of potential targets: deeply buried in
    tunnel facilities, possibly containing chemical, biological, nuclear,
    or command and control facilities.

        35. Senator Reed. Dr. Beckner, there was no request for money for
    new weapons development in the fiscal year 2002 budget request. If 2002
    money is going to be used to begin work that leads to the development
    of a new nuclear weapon, when will the Department submit a
    reprogramming request seeking congressional approval for this new
    effort?
        Dr. Beckner. There are no plans to use fiscal year 2002 funds for
    the development of new nuclear weapons. The Department is planning to
    spend $7.4 million (of which $500,000 is from USAF) in fiscal year 2002
    from Directed Stockpile Work R&D to conduct a 3-year study on the
    possibility of modifying either the B61 or B83, both existing warheads
    in the stockpile, to provide the United States with Robust Nuclear
    Earth Penetrator capability. This research activity is within the scope
    for funds appropriated for stockpile R&D; however, we are also
    preparing a notification to congressional committees to keep them
    current and informed.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman

                          ADVANCED CONCEPTS INITIATIVE

        36. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Beckner, can you please explain what new
    warhead programs you are pursuing in the Advanced Concepts Initiative
    and how does this interface with the Nuclear Weapons Council
    requirements?
        Dr. Beckner. The NPR states that the number, composition, and
    character of the Nation's nuclear forces ought to reflect the reality
    that the Cold War is over and that nuclear deterrent capabilities may
    now need to be different. The NPR endorsed NNSA's Advanced Concepts
    Initiative that could provide the Nation with future options for
    meeting new or emerging requirements. This work also provides an
    opportunity for NNSA and its contractors to exercise critical skills
    necessary for the long-term sustainment of the Nation's defense.
        The initial focus of the Advanced Concepts program will be the
    Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), for which $15.5 million is
    requested in fiscal year 2003 as part of the Directed Stockpile
    Research and Development activity. This study was approved by the
    Nuclear Weapons Council, and in response to a JROC validated
    requirement. The 3-year RNEP feasibility study will assess the
    feasibility of modifying one of two candidate nuclear weapons currently
    in the stockpile to provide enhanced penetration capability into hard
    rock geologies and develop out-year costs for the subsequent production
    phases, if a decision is made by the Nuclear Weapons Council to
    proceed. This work complies with existing legislation, including
    Section 3136 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    1994. The fiscal year 2003 budget contains no other funds for Phase 6.X
    advanced concept study activities.

                        ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR

        37. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Beckner, regarding the Robust Nuclear
    Earth Penetrator, what specifically are you doing to the B83 bomb, are
    any of the warhead components besides the casing being modified, and
    could it eventually require testing?
        Dr. Beckner. The potential modifications to both the B61 and the
    B83, based on the limited analysis done in 1999 entail case
    modifications and structural reinforcement of various portions of the
    weapons package (nuclear explosive package and associated weaponization
    subsystems such as the bomb electrical system) to improve their impact
    survivability. The specific modifications required will not be known
    until the Feasibility Study (6.2) is completed. Guidance to the labs
    from the start has been that no envisioned modification can require an
    underground nuclear test to certify the modified weapon system. There
    will be no modifications to specifically alter yield.

                    A-76 PROGRAM AT ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE

        38. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Beckner, why does the DOE have an A-76
    program to reduce to Albuquerque Field Office when your reorganization
    plan is also reducing it and what staffing levels do you expect when
    all this is done?
        Dr. Beckner. President Bush has challenged all agencies to review
    functions that are not an inherently governmental function and subject
    them to an ``A-76'' review process, to assess whether these functions
    can be done more effectively and efficiently by the private sector. The
    functions that the DOE has identified for review include information
    technology, human resources, and financial services. These functions
    are present at the Albuquerque Field Office.
        We are supporting the overall crosscutting review of these
    functional areas throughout the DOE. We would expect that this review
    will feed into our reengineering efforts for the specific functions
    being reviewed under A-76. Until these reviews are complete the impact
    on staffing levels cannot be determined.

              LONG-TERM WASTE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

        39. Senator Bingaman. Secretary Roberson, who is going to conduct
    the long-term waste management research and development?
        Secretary Roberson. The Department's Office of Science (SC), that
    has been partnering with EM on this activity since 1996, will conduct
    the basic research that addresses the environmental cleanup mission. We
    believe this will result in more efficient research management and
    better leveraging of other basic science tools within SC. SC and EM
    will continue to work closely to ensure the research supports cleanup
    as it evolves.

        40. Senator Bingaman. Secretary Roberson, I understand it may be
    the Office of Science, but will the reduction in funds from your office
    be transferred to the Office of Science or will they pick up an
    unfunded mandate?
        Secretary Roberson. No, in developing the fiscal year 2003 budget
    request, funds were effectively transferred from EM, so that SC will
    not acquire an unfunded mandate. The request for the Environmental
    Management Science Program, which now appears within SC's budget, fully
    satisfies funding commitments on multiyear projects that extend into
    fiscal year 2003. However, it does not provide for any new research
    projects.

        41. Senator Bingaman. Secretary Roberson, will you continue to use
    the National Academy of Sciences for outside scientific peer review of
    the waste management program?
        Secretary Roberson. Yes, it is the Department's intent to continue
    to commission the National Academy of Sciences for outside, independent
    reviews on environmental scientific and technical matters.

                               CLEANUP AT SANDIA

        42. Senator Reed. Secretary Roberson, as recently as 2 years ago in
    its fiscal year 2001 budget request, the Department of Energy committed
    to finish the cleanup of the Sandia National Laboratories site in New
    Mexico by the end of fiscal year 2003. This year's DOE request is
    silent on the issue of a completion date. It appears to me that DOE
    plans to extend the cleanup date indefinitely. As you know from your
    experience at Rocky Flats, delaying cleanup schedules is in the long
    run more expensive than applying the extra resources needed to get the
    job done on schedule. Could you please explain why the Department has
    backed away from its commitment to clean up the Sandia site, and why
    the Department believes this is a cost-effective approach?
        Secretary Roberson. Please be assured that the Department of Energy
    is fully committed to the cleanup of the Sandia National Laboratory
    (SNL), as well the other large cleanup project in New Mexico at the Los
    Alamos National Laboratory.
        During the past 2 years, SNL has aggressively pursued the
    excavation of several major landfills. During these cleanups,
    additional quantities of contamination than what were thought to be
    present were discovered. This type of uncertainty is unavoidable at
    landfill excavations regardless of how thoroughly the landfill is
    characterized. Because of this increase in the scope of the project,
    the fiscal year 2003 cleanup completion date for the Sandia site that
    you referred to could not have been achieved.
        One of the recommendations included in the Top-to-Bottom Review is
    to ``accelerate the closure of small sites.'' On May 30, 2002, the
    Department, the State of New Mexico officials, and EPA signed a Letter
    of Intent that establishes goals and identifies activities that would
    complete cleanup at Sandia National Laboratories by 2006.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond

                INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

        43. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, Section 3008 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 requires the Secretary
    of Energy to prepare an infrastructure plan for the Nation's nuclear
    weapons complex. Although the report is not due for some time, what is
    your current assessment of the adequacy of the complex to support the
    current and future nuclear stockpile requirements?
        Dr. Beckner. NNSA's ability to support the nuclear weapons
    stockpile depends upon renewing industrial and engineering capabilities
    across the complex. Much of the infrastructure of the national security
    enterprise was built during the era of underground nuclear testing, and
    has eroded to the point that we are no longer able to perform some
    essential tasks. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget address
    supports our industrial base in two key ways: a request of $1.7 billion
    for Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities, a 10 percent increase
    supporting the operations of weapons complex facilities; and, a $243
    million request for the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization
    Program to continue this important multiyear initiative into its third
    year to help restore the weapons complex.

        44. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, the Department of Defense uses
    the Installation Status Report to identify the condition of its
    facilities. What are the DOE's installation measurement tools?
        [Dr. Beckner did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.]

                                SERVICE CENTERS

        45. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, the Department plans to
    eliminate a layer of management and oversight by establishing eight
    site offices collocated with the eight NNSA contractors. How will these
    eight offices differ from the field offices that the Department
    previously used to manage operations?
        Dr. Beckner. As described in the ``Report to Congress on the
    Organization and Operations of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, February 25, 2002,'' the NNSA is significantly changing
    its field structure. In the past, operations offices managed, on behalf
    of NNSA, field offices whose basic role was operations, particularly
    occupational safety and nuclear safety. Most other functions in support
    of Defense Programs were performed within the operations offices and
    headquarters. A primary change will be that the field offices will
    assume a role in overseeing the execution of programs. Another
    significant change will be the further empowerment of the site manager
    through delegation of significant contracting authorities. On the other
    hand, operations offices will transform into service centers, whose job
    will be to provide support to the field offices and the weapons complex
    more broadly, primarily in administrative, financial, and contracting
    areas. These and other changes will be clearly mapped through an
    extensive re-engineering activity, now underway, which will complete
    this fall.

                                   WORK FORCE

        46. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, you testified that the
    Department is aggressively starting a program to retain highly-skilled
    employees, retrain employees with skills mismatches, and recruit the
    right technical skills. What programs does the Department have to
    recruit graduate students who will be the seed corn for developing and
    maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons technology?
        Dr. Beckner. The DOE/NNSA has two programs that are utilized to
    employ college students and graduates. The Career Internship Program
    (CIP) and the Student Career Experience Program (SCEP) are critical to
    NNSA work force recruitment and retention efforts. CIP is utilized more
    throughout the weapon complex as it is designed to employ recent
    college graduates in scientific and engineering entry-level positions.
    The program trains and develops the interns in special skills and
    knowledge that are required to fill critical positions such as weapon
    program engineers and weapon program management. These positions have
    the responsibility to develop and maintain the U.S. nuclear weapon
    technology.
        Weapon program engineers oversee all aspects of the development,
    production, and modifications of components in support of the Nation's
    nuclear weapon stockpile. Program management positions oversee the day-
    to-day construction of the facilities to include reviewing and
    approving engineering plans and specifications for NNSA owned nuclear
    and non-nuclear facilities. The CIP ensures that DOE's corporate
    structures and functions are learned through a comprehensive training
    program, which includes rotations through offices in nuclear weapons,
    program management, and environmental safety and health. These
    rotations can be between 2 to 6 months in duration, thus allowing the
    interns to work on projects and shadow senior engineers and scientists.
    Another important program is the SCEP. This program allows student to
    be employed during 2 years of college and allows for conversion to a
    full time federal position after graduation. The students are given
    projects and are encouraged to shadow technical staff.

        47. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, in its recruiting efforts does
    the Department of Energy face the same anti-military sentiments on some
    university campuses as the Department of Defense? If so, what are your
    suggestions on how to overcome this problem?
        Dr. Beckner. The DOE's corporate recruiters face anti-government
    sentiments on college campuses across the Nation. In light of the
    terror attacks, DOE is focusing its recruitment strategy and building
    on the Nation-wide sense that serving the Government is honorable and
    noble. Our office is exploring a partnership with the new non-profit
    organization ``Partnership for Public Service.'' The organization is
    dedicated to recruiting and retaining excellence in Federal service.
    The organization encourages qualified men and women to choose Federal
    service for some or all of their career.

                              MODERN PIT FACILITY

        48. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, last year this committee
    expressed great concern about the lack of progress being made with
    regard to a Modern Pit Facility. The Panel to Assess the Reliability,
    Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile, or simply,
    ``the Foster Panel,'' provided striking evidence that we must take
    aggressive action in this regard. In fact, in both the 1999 and 2000
    reports, the Foster Panel made as its most significant recommendation
    that the United States must ``Immediately begin conceptual design of an
    adequate pit production facility.'' In response to this compelling
    evidence, this committee included in the report accompanying the Fiscal
    Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act the following guidance:
    ``The committee notes the panel's estimate that it will take 10 or more
    years to build an adequate pit production facility. The pending NPR is
    expected to outline such critical concerns as the size of the future
    arsenal and mix of weapons. . . . Conceptual design should proceed at
    the conclusion of this study to facilitate a timely decision on
    facility construction.'' Furthermore, the committee recommended ``an
    additional $10 million be available to select an architect-engineering
    organization to begin the conceptual design and report process, in
    order to keep the new pit production facility on schedule.''
    Unfortunately, your fiscal year 2003 budget calls for the design of
    this facility to be ``deferred until fiscal year 2004 with fiscal year
    2003 funding used to continue manufacturing concepts.'' Do you disagree
    with the findings of the Foster Panel with regard to a Modern Pit
    Facility?
        Dr. Beckner. NNSA is currently taking steps to proceed with an MPF
    including formal approval of mission need, Critical Decision-0 (CD-0),
    which is required to start conceptual design of a MPF. Following CD-0
    approval by the Department, anticipated yet this month, the NNSA will
    initiate a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process to obtain a
    formal Record of Decision that is required to both select a site for an
    MPF and to proceed with a detailed facility design after completing
    conceptual design. The NNSA will expedite the NEPA process while
    simultaneously developing technology required to evaluate conceptual
    designs for an MPF.

        49. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, why was the design of the Modern
    Pit Facility deferred to fiscal year 2004?
        Dr. Beckner. Although the Senate Armed Services Committee
    recommended an additional $10 million in fiscal year 2002 for the MPF,
    only $4 million was appropriated. Based on this $4 million
    appropriation and consistent with direction provided by the Senate
    Armed Services Committee, the NNSA has completed pre-conceptual
    planning activities and is prepared to start conceptual design of an
    MPF following approval (spring 2002) of Critical Decision-0, mission
    need.

                          NEED FOR MODERN PIT FACILITY

        50. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, in 1996 the DOE called for
    developing a contingency plan to establish a large scale pit
    manufacturing facility within 5 years. Does your research on the
    deterioration of nuclear components support your decision to delay the
    1996 plan? Do you have new evidence contradicting the concerns of the
    Foster Panel with regard to the ``worrisome signs of deterioration in
    some nuclear components?''
        Dr. Beckner. Research to date on plutonium aging and pit lifetimes
    does not show significant deterioration that would raise concern about
    the safety, security, or reliability of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
    The weapons laboratories are continuing to conduct experiments at the
    laboratories and the Nevada Test Site to further improve our
    understanding of the lifetime of nuclear components such as pits. At
    the same time the NNSA is proceeding, on a prudent pace, supported by
    the Nuclear Weapons Council, with plans to develop a Modern Pit
    Facility that will meet the needs of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
        NNSA is aggressively monitoring the aging phenomenon through the
    core surveillance program and enhanced surveillance campaign. An
    ambitious refurbishment program to replace some of the components of
    the weapons systems that have higher risk to safety or reliability has
    been instituted. These life extension programs (LEPs) have extremely
    high priority and management attention at NNSA, the design
    laboratories, and the production plants. As a direct result of input
    from the core surveillance program and the enhanced surveillance
    campaign, the strategy and tactics for the LEP implementation have been
    focused to address the concerns of an aging stockpile.

                     MIXED OXIDE FUEL FABRICATION FACILITY

        51. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, last year you assured me that
    the mixed-oxide (MOX) plant was your top nonproliferation priority.
    Thank you for all you have done with regard to moving this program
    forward. However, a few matters need to be resolved in order to
    guarantee the success of the program. Specifically, I have been
    informed that you are currently negotiating with the Governor of South
    Carolina to achieve a mutually satisfactory agreement for the DOE and
    South Carolina. While a number of my colleagues addressed this matter
    at today's hearing, it was my understanding that this agreement may
    require legislation. Do you believe that it would require legislation
    to implement it?
        Dr. Beckner. The administration supports a legislation approach
    designed to assure the people of South Carolina that there will be a
    path for surplus plutonium to be shipped to its Savannah River Site.
    The administration considers Section 3182 of S. 2514 adequate to
    achieve this objective.

        52. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, would you please provide
    suggested legislative language? As this is a time-sensitive matter,
    could you accommodate this request immediately?
        Dr. Beckner. The Department supports the legislation introduced by
    Congressman Lindsey Graham and Senator Strom Thurmond. I believe that
    this legislation addresses all of the concerns the State of South
    Carolina has raised regarding the plutonium disposition program.

                   CURRENT PLANS FOR MOX FABRICATION FACILITY

        53. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, you are no doubt aware that a
    MOX lead test assembly (LTA) program is needed before the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC) will approve the use of significant
    quantities of MOX fuel. The initial plan for the fabrication of these
    units--fabrication at LANL--was terminated by the DOE in May 2000,
    reportedly due to cost and schedule concerns. I have been informed that
    there is a possibility that there may be a lag between the MOX
    fabrication facility startup and large scale use of MOX. The potential
    startup delays would mean that large scale use of MOX fuel would not
    begin until 2012, 2013, or later. Consequently, the lag between MOX
    Fuel Fabrication Facility and full production requires maintaining the
    facility with no production for a number of years, a cost impact to the
    taxpayer of potentially $200 million. Can you detail the current plan
    as well as the schedule of that plan? Can you assure me that there will
    be no delay due to LTA approval delays?
        Dr. Beckner. The options for fabrication of MOX lead assemblies are
    still under consideration. One option the Department is currently
    examining is the early fabrication of MOX lead assemblies in Europe.
    The Department is meeting with European Government officials to
    determine the necessary measures to pursue this option. Detailed plans
    will be developed if an agreement can be reached by all parties.
        If successful, lead assemblies will be fabricated and irradiated
    before the completion of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, and the
    Department's contractor, DCS, should be able to obtain Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission approval for large-scale use of MOX fuel in the
    Duke energy reactors on the desired schedule.
        I am optimistic that there will be no significant delays in Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission approval of the lead assemblies. However, it is
    simply not possible to guarantee that there will be no delays as the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission exercises its statutory responsibilities
    to confirm the safety of the use of lead assemblies in licensed
    reactors.

                               FULL-TIME MANAGER

        54. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Beckner, I believe it would be helpful
    and assuring to have a DOE manager to take charge of the MOX fuel LTA
    project on a full time basis to perform DOE activities, coordinate
    interagency activities, such as Department of State, Department of
    Defense, etc., as well as oversee contractor activities. I also believe
    a full time manager could open and maintain a dialog between the United
    States, France, and Belgium, initiate National Environmental Policy Act
    activities, and prepare an export license application to the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission. Do you believe these activities could be better
    managed by a full-time manager, and if so, will you support creating
    such a position?
        Dr. Beckner. The Department has assigned a full-time engineering
    manager at headquarters with the primary responsibility for lead
    assembly activities. One of the priorities for this position involves
    coordinating lead assembly activities and maintaining communication
    between the various agencies and contractors involved in this effort.

                              ACCELERATED CLEANUP

        55. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roberson, I fully support the
    Department's initiative for accelerated cleanup of the DOE sites. My
    concern is that you will not have sufficient resources to fulfill all
    the expectations. What assurance can you provide us that once the
    additional $800 million allocated for the program has been committed,
    you will be able to obtain additional funding to support the program?
        Secretary Roberson. The administration is prepared to support a
    request for additional funds, up to $300 million, if needed for cleanup
    reform. I am personally committed to the success of this initiative to
    refocus and accelerate the cleanup and will work within the
    administration and with Congress to ensure that the Department receives
    the funding that is needed to carry out agreements that will
    successfully accelerate risk reduction and cleanup.

        56. Senator Thurmond. Secretary Roberson, what is the status of the
    program in regard to the Savannah River Site?
        Secretary Roberson. The Department has developed a number of
    specific initiatives for the Savannah River Site that could potentially
    be funded from within the cleanup reform appropriation. These
    initiatives would enable a significant acceleration in the timetable
    for completion of EM's cleanup work at the site with a corresponding
    significant reduction in risk and in the overall cost of cleanup. We
    have been discussing these initiatives with state officials and their
    Citizen's Advisory Board. In parallel, we have developed a draft
    performance management plan in support of implementing the accelerated
    cleanup program to effectively manage this work. We are working closely
    with State and Federal regulators to reach agreement on an accelerated
    cleanup plan, and I am optimistic we will reach that agreement soon.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Bunning

                             PUBLIC LAW 105-204 \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ S. 2316, ``A bill to require the Secretary of Energy to submit
    to Congress a plan to ensure that all amounts accrued on the books of
    the United States Enrichment Corporation for the disposition of
    depleted uranium hexafluoride will be used to treat and recycle
    depleted uranium hexafluoride.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        57. Senator Bunning. Congress passed P.L. 105-204 in 1998. The
    intent of the bill was to ensure that the construction of DUF6
    conversion facilities would be built at two sites, one at Paducah and
    one at Portsmouth, and that by 2004 cleanup of the DOE's depleted
    uranium hexafluoride would be completed. The DOE has now decided not to
    select a contractor for this project and to delay the selection until
    October 2003 to study whether two facilities are necessary. I know that
    the OMB has refused to provide funding for this project. I believe that
    two facilities are necessary to eliminate the hazardous waste at the
    sites. Will the intent of P.L. 105-204 be followed by constructing two
    DUF6 facilities, one at Paducah and one at Portsmouth?
        Secretary Roberson. After careful consideration of options, the
    Department has decided not to make a selection decision or to award the
    contract to design, build, and operate DUF6 conversion facilities at
    both the Paducah and Portsmouth sites at this time. Rather, the
    Department plans to consider alternatives in the number and location of
    conversion facilities before continuing with the evaluation of
    proposals and subsequent award of a contract. We plan to make that
    decision by January 2003.

        58. Senator Bunning. Secretary Roberson, the DOE's new tactic with
    the contractor selection process appears to make it impossible to
    finish construction of the DUF6 facilities by 2004. Do you think
    construction of a DUF6 facility will ever begin and when do you think
    it will commence?
        Secretary Roberson. By January 2003, the Department plans to
    announce its decision as to the number and location of DUF6 conversion
    plants. DOE will evaluate its schedule requirements for construction as
    a part of its consideration of the number and location of plants.

        59. Senator Bunning. Secretary Roberson, in the President's fiscal
    year 2003 budget, the Paducah cleanup fund received $73.4 million,
    which is $20 million less than the fiscal year 2002 appropriated amount
    of $93.4 million. How do you plan to finish cleanup at the Paducah
    Plant in a timely manner if funding continues to be cut?
        Secretary Roberson. The Department is committed to cleanup of the
    Paducah site, and is working to identify ways to achieve more risk
    reduction and accelerate the cleanup. We do not view the fiscal year
    2003 budget as a budget cut for the Paducah site or for any other DOE
    sites. The total budget request of $6.7 billion, including the $800
    million requested for EM cleanup reform, is approximately equal to
    fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, the administration is willing to support
    up to 5,300 million more if needed for cleanup reform. We have
    structured the budget in a manner to provide the necessary incentives
    to revise the cleanup strategy at our sites to achieve an accelerated
    risk reduction strategy. The budget includes funding to continue
    ongoing cleanup work until an agreement on a revised cleanup strategy
    is reached. Once a new strategy is defined, we intend to provide
    additional funds as appropriate to those sites.
        Based on the results of the Secretary's Top-to-Bottom Review, the
    Department is developing an accelerated cleanup approach for the
    Paducah site that could significantly accelerate risk reduction. We are
    working with the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the EPA's Region IV on
    the proposal and, upon agreement with the regulators, the Paducah site
    would be eligible for additional funds from the EM cleanup reform
    account to implement the agreement. In addition, we will continue to
    look for ways to reduce costs and accelerate schedules through the use
    innovative technologies, fixed price contracting and improvements in
    project management.

        60. Senator Bunning. Secretary Roberson, do you plan for the
    Paducah Plant to be part of the DOE's proposed Accelerated Cleanup
    Program, and if so, how will this affect the time line for cleanup at
    the Paducah Plant, and if the Paducah Plant becomes part of the
    program, will it remain a cleanup priority for the DOE?
        Secretary Roberson. Yes, the Department has proposed an accelerated
    cleanup strategy for the Paducah site and, upon agreement and joint
    commitments by the regulators, the site would be eligible for
    additional funds from the EM cleanup reform account to ensure
    successful implementation of the strategy. This strategy, if accepted
    by the regulators, could complete EM's current cleanup scope of work at
    Paducah as early as 2006. Discussions with the State and U.S.
    Environmental Protection Agency are continuing.

        [Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2003

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2002

                                   U.S. Senate,
                             Subcommittee on Strategic,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

            INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Reed and Allard.
        Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    counsel; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
    Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and Christina D.
    Still, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; L. David Cherington, minority
    counsel; and Brian R. Green, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Thomas C. Moore and Nicholas W.
    West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; and Douglas Flanders, assistant to
    Senator Allard.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Reed. Let me call this hearing to order. The
    Strategic Subcommittee meets this afternoon to receive
    testimony on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    (ISR) programs of the Department of Defense. We will conduct
    this hearing in open and closed sessions. At the conclusion of
    the open session, we will adjourn and reconvene in room S-407
    of the Capitol for the closed session.
        Our three witnesses today are the Honorable John Stenbit,
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
    Communications, and Intelligence (C\3\I); Lieutenant General
    Gregory Newbold, Director of Operations for the Joint Staff,
    (J3); and Rear Admiral Stanley Szemborski, Deputy Director for
    Resources and Requirements for the Joint Staff, (J8). Welcome,
    gentlemen, and thank you for joining us this afternoon.
        Secretary Stenbit is responsible for enabling the military
    forces of the United States to use and share the information
    gathered by the formidable collection of intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance assets at our Nation's
    disposal. This is a difficult and extremely important task.
        General Newbold serves as the operational link between the
    commanders in the field and the National Command Authority. His
    responsibilities include positioning military forces,
    monitoring world-wide military conditions, and conducting
    operational briefings for the national leadership.
        Admiral Szemborski is the deputy in charge of the analysis
    and requirements developments arm of the Joint Staff. We have
    asked Admiral Szemborski to provide his insights into the
    current and future requirements for ISR systems.
        The ISR assets of this country have been instrumental in
    the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan,
    while continuing to support the wider needs of the Department
    of Defense and the intelligence community. They have performed
    very well, the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) being one
    of many high profile examples of success. Operation Enduring
    Freedom has also, however, demonstrated some of the limitations
    of the Nation's ISR assets when they are stressed and exposed
    in crisis.
        Following September 11, when the requirements for airborne
    surveillance were stretched beyond the limit of our current
    Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) fleet, our NATO
    allies came to our assistance. The NATO AWACS aircraft
    maintained surveillance over the United States helping to guard
    against further terrorist strikes when our aircraft were sent
    to support operations in Afghanistan. The attack of September
    11 itself tragically revealed that despite all of our ISR
    capabilities, significant weaknesses remain in our ability to
    detect and prevent the actions of terrorists acting alone or in
    small groups.
        We welcome all of our witnesses today and thank you for
    being here. Thank you also for your service to the country and
    to your respective service. Each of you is important to
    ensuring that the necessary ISR assets are in place, delivering
    information where and when needed. This hearing is an
    opportunity to discuss both our ISR strengths and weaknesses,
    and to ensure we are making the most of the former while
    improving on the latter.
        Senator Allard, at this time would you like to make an
    opening statement?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

        Senator Allard. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming
    the three distinguished witnesses from the Department of
    Defense, and applaud your forward thinking in holding this
    important hearing. Mr. Chairman, before I get to the formal
    part of my statement, I wanted to congratulate you on sticking
    to a very ambitious subcommittee schedule. I know how difficult
    it is and appreciate the fact that you have been fighting for
    times and dates to hold all these hearings. You have done a
    good job with your leadership of this committee, and I also
    appreciate your commitment and dedication to the subcommittee's
    work.
        When I think about my responsibilities on the subcommittee,
    we deal with nuclear programs, space and intelligence programs,
    and all those other uncontroversial items. So seriously, Mr.
    Chairman, while we do not always agree on these issues, I do
    want to publicly acknowledge you and acknowledge the working
    relationship that we have here.
        Also, I would like to acknowledge both our staffs for all
    their hard work over the last week to prepare these hearings.
    It is their dedication that allows these hearings to go as well
    as they have. So, to the staff--the professional staff and
    staff assistants and personal staff--a big thank you.
        Now, to get to the subject of this hearing. We are all
    thankful for the initial success of our forces in Afghanistan,
    and around the world in this global war against terrorism.
    While much will be debated in the months and years ahead about
    the relative value of airpower, seapower, and ground operations
    in Operation Enduring Freedom, one thing is clear: All our
    forces are dependent on timely, accurate information to
    succeed. The ISR assets available to the theater and
    subordinate commanders have done a remarkable job in delivering
    that information.
        We have often heard our civilian and military leaders in
    the Pentagon talk about the importance of information
    superiority in future warfare. We have now seen a pragmatic
    demonstration in Afghanistan. This has not always been the
    case.
        During the 1990s, the regional commanders in chief (CINCs)
    routinely acknowledged that they had significant concerns about
    the availability of ISR assets to support both their peacetime
    and wartime operations. Most of these concerns were focused on
    airborne reconnaissance assets, the manned and unmanned
    aircraft with various intelligence sensors that are allocated
    to theater commanders. The numerous global requirements
    combined with the very limited numbers of these aircraft led to
    their being designated as high-demand, low-density (HDLD)
    assets, requiring special intensive management by the Pentagon.
        Recently, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the very existence
    of the term high-demand, low-density assets means that our
    priorities were wrong, that we didn't buy enough of what we
    needed. Based on the testimony of the regional CINCs and
    various intelligence officials, Congress directed the
    Department of Defense to assess the adequacy of its ISR assets
    in fiscal year 2000. The Joint Airborne Reconnaissance
    Assessment, completed in 2001, concluded that additional assets
    were in fact needed, including additional Joint Surveillance
    and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Rivet Joint, and EP-3
    aircraft, and a well-defined unmanned aerial vehicle
    architecture.
        Similar reviews of our national intelligence needs have
    also been undertaken, examples are the NIMA and NRO
    commissions. All have recommended changes and enhancements to
    our overall ISR capabilities at the tactical, operational, and
    strategic levels. Our purpose here today is to better
    understand this complex ISR enterprise and determine if the
    investments we are making are adequate.
        Furthermore, we want to understand if the policies
    associated with these very essential and special assets are
    appropriate to ensure our warfighters and our national decision
    makers have the best possible information. Finally, we need to
    hear what progress you have made in implementing the prudent
    recommendations made by these various assessments and
    commissions.
        The world has been amazed at pictures of soldiers on
    horseback directing 21st century weapons with devastating
    precision. We see images of AC-130 gunships firing at ground
    targets identified by unmanned aerial vehicles. We see
    silhouettes of parachutes, through night vision goggles,
    descending on distant airfields.
        How did we find these targets, these threats to our
    national security? How will we know if Saddam Hussein plans to
    attack his neighbors again, or if al Qaeda terrorists begin to
    congregate in new locations? The answers to these questions
    reside in having a capable, well-coordinated ISR system. This
    is our first line of defense and it must detect current and
    future threats.
        I look forward to hearing our panel's testimony on the
    performance of our ISR systems, especially in support of
    Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on terrorism. I
    am also most interested in their view of the future, of what
    our ISR system needs to be prepared for. What gaps or
    challenges may be anticipated, and what can we Congress, do to
    help?
        As we consider the fiscal year 2003 budget request, we must
    be mindful of the critical role information superiority plays
    in our current and future military operations, and how
    intimately connected our ISR assets and weapons systems have
    become. This is clearly the future of warfare. We must ensure
    that our ISR systems continue to be the best in the world.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Allard, not only
    for your statement but for your very kind words. Let me say
    that it has been a pleasure working with you, and your effort
    together with your staff has been absolutely critical to
    meeting a very demanding schedule of hearings. If there is any
    praise, it has to be shared equally, and I thank you very much.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Stenbit, you are free to proceed.

       STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN P. STENBIT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

        Mr. Stenbit. Senator Reed, it is a pleasure to meet you and
    have the opportunity to be here this afternoon. Senator Allard,
    it is my pleasure to see you again. I appreciated your support
    in our hearings back not quite 9 months ago, when I was, in
    fact, before the committee for confirmation.
        I would like to summarize a bit of the big picture of where
    I am coming from. The closed statement for the closed session,
    which I have submitted, has some more details in terms of the
    answers to the questions that you asked. But it is always
    important in my mind to share also the context in which I am
    working. So with that, I will do a brief, open summary.
        First, I think it is important to recognize that the
    Secretary has identified three clear priorities, one of which
    is to deter and prevent other occurrences of terrorism against
    the U.S. and our interests wherever they are in the world. His
    number two priority is to improve the flow of information and
    intelligence and to make sure that these things are
    transformed. Then third, he talks about the transformation of
    the entire Department.
        I am happy to say that the goals that I have in my world
    are clearly aligned with all three, but in particular the last
    two. In that sense I too have basically three goals. I really
    want to get the Department to a network-centric view of the
    world, and I will describe that in a second.
        If I ever get us to a network-centric view of the world, I
    need to populate the network with good information. Then third,
    if I ever did both of the two, I need to make sure that we
    protect that information and protect the network, at the same
    time making sure we can keep somebody else from doing the same
    thing to us. So those are my three goals: Create a network,
    populate it with information, and make sure that we can depend
    on it and that nobody else can. That sounds, perhaps, a little
    simple but let me see if I can elaborate a bit.
        Point number one, with respect to the network, I was in the
    Pentagon in a job very close to the one I have now, 25 years
    ago. In those days in the communications business it was a
    telephone system. Somebody found something out from any kind of
    a system, whether it was a person, airplane, or whatever, in
    effect they had to dial up through a telephone system to tell
    somebody what they found.
        If you think about that for a while, that does not work
    because the person who is dialing needs to know the total state
    of the universe. He needs to know who might be interested in
    the information he has. What is their phone number? Who are
    they? How fast do they need it, with what kind of precision and
    so forth?
        We struggled mightily in that kind of a world because that
    was the technology we had in those days. We ended up with some
    really big problems, not the least of which was the ill-fated
    Pueblo capture in North Korea where we found out 4 days later
    that there were actually Marine Corps aircraft that were
    available that could have gone and intercepted that particular
    issue within the allotted time, but not 4 days later. We had a
    similar issue where the Israelis gave us 24 hours to move a
    ship off of their coast or they were going to sink it. It took
    us over 24 hours to get the order back to move, and when we got
    back there it was a wet order.
        So, those telephone-based systems just did not work. The
    key to all of this is that we adjusted and we made it all work
    by having the bureaucracy that found a target to be the
    bureaucracy that shot it. There just wasn't enough coordination
    capability to be able to separate those two--with the one
    exception of Strategic Air Command (SAC). When SAC was handed
    targets, they put together a war plan for the Air Force and the
    Navy, and it took 18 months. If we changed our mind it took 18
    months.
        That is not an acceptable tactical environment, to wait 18
    months to change the idea of who is going to shoot what target.
    In the intervening 25 years we have made a tremendous step
    forward with this general issue of distribution of information
    by going to broadcast means. Today, if you go into any active
    area, there are global broadcast systems, there are defense
    dissemination programs, there are multiple kinds of broadcast
    systems.
        If you think about a broadcast system, what it does is it
    allows that person who finds something out not to have to know
    to whom they may need to send the data. All they have to do is
    get it on the broadcast, because it is going to be broadcast to
    everybody and people who are interested will listen more than
    those that are not interested in it. That is the way our
    systems work today.
        It has held us in good stead. It came to fruition in the
    Persian Gulf War environment, and it really has come into
    fruition here recently. So, when we talk about a Predator we
    are talking about TV that is seen in multiple places around the
    world at the same time, including multiple places in
    Afghanistan, in the theater of operations. That is the
    broadcast, if you wish. The guy driving the Predator does not
    need to think about whom he must tell if he sees something. It
    is a broadcast system.
        Now, that leads to a whole bunch of things that we spend a
    lot of money and time on these days, called fusion centers.
    Because, the key here is that as you are listening to a
    broadcast in whatever form it is, mostly satellite-based, it
    gets broadcast. It gets broadcast once and then that is it. So
    you had better be listening to all the broadcasts at the same
    time, and then you had better be able to fuse together the
    information--this one, and that one, and this other one.
    Perhaps that is through intelligence. Perhaps that is by
    Service. Perhaps that is from different countries.
        But the point is we then gather all these broadcast sets of
    data, multiple channels if you wish, it is like when you watch
    football games on Sunday afternoon, you would like to have a TV
    that had six little boxes so you could see all of them at the
    same time. I mean, that is fusion. That is NFL fusion.
        The problem with that is we still have a very complex set
    of folks who decide what is important and what is not and then
    pass it on. They have to do it in real-time. Where I would like
    to go in a network world, is a pull-world, where everybody has
    access into a--think of it as an Internet--where the bandwidth
    is not a constraint, that it is a reliable system that people
    count on, that it is trustworthy, and the data are available
    whenever and wherever you want.
        You can call it power to the edge if you wish. That is one
    of the phrases I use. But the edge in this case is whoever does
    not know what they do not know, and they have a problem. They
    need to go find out what is available. They need to be able to
    reach out wherever they go to find it.
        Creating such an environment is one of the major
    transformational goals of both my office and the Department. We
    have in front of you, in the fiscal year 2003 budget,
    significant investments in laser-based communications, both on
    the ground and in space, to create the beginnings of this
    network. That is point number one, create a ubiquitous,
    trustworthy, dependable network where bandwidth is not a
    problem and people can, in fact, get the information they want
    wherever they are, whenever they need it.
        As I said, if you are going to do that you have to then put
    information on that network. There I would like to make two
    points. One, I cannot prove this, but my impression over the
    last 7 months, looking at what has happened over the last 15
    years or so in the ISR business, in the information gathering
    business, in the secrets stealing business, is we have not
    covered the depreciation of our assets, if I were to use a
    business term.
        Every time we use a secret to do something we start the
    process of somebody avoiding having that happen to them again.
    As such, there is a depreciation over time in the value of the
    information we gather, no matter what we do about it, because
    the more we use it the more people get used to our using it and
    the more they tend to avoid it. There are real businesses out
    there that warn people these days about when satellites are
    coming overhead, for example.
        So, one of the things we need to do to populate this
    network is to get back to the investment in new ways to steal
    secrets. This is not the appropriate forum for that, at this
    unclassified level, but there is a lot of money for programs in
    the 2003 budget to start this process of what I call
    recapitalizing the accounts to go steal secrets.
        Second, we can use the information we already have better.
    There is a lot of information that is available that is not on
    the network today. So one of the things I am trying to push is
    procedural changes. One of the big ones has to do with ISR,
    where there is a buzzword called TPED, task, process, exploit,
    and disseminate. I would like to turn that on its head and not
    use that word anymore. I would rather use a word I have
    invented which is TPPU, task, post, process, and use.
        By that, I mean anybody who has anything to say posts it to
    the network first, and then go process it. Somebody else might
    actually want to do something with it in addition to you. We
    actually had this the other day. We are making some progress, I
    am happy to say. Joanne Isham, who is the deputy at NIMA, came
    over and said, ``I have done it. I have done it. I am in your
    network world.''
        Somebody from CENTCOM called up and complained because they
    had called the NIMA analyst to help them with this image, to
    interpret it, and the NIMA analyst had not looked at it yet. So
    we are in this post before we process mode and that is good,
    because somebody at CENTCOM was able to have a different
    priority, a different tolerance for ambiguity or whatever, and
    was able to use the information.
        So with respect to populating the network, I think there
    are two things we need to do. We need to basically invest in
    the recovery of the depreciation of our ability to steal
    secrets. We need to post all the information we have so that we
    do not lose it in the flow. That applies equally to the
    business side of the Pentagon, no question about it. That is
    not only a targeting issue.
        The third, which is the protection of the systems that
    create the network and find the information, we have put
    resources in--for instance, to increase the jam resistance of
    the GPS satellites--the 2003 program. We have become very
    dependent on the GPS satellites. We might as well treat it as
    if we really need it and start to invest as if it really needed
    to be there. We need to do that for information assurance and
    some other issues with respect to the network and crypto-
    modernization. But more importantly, we also need to move
    forward with information operations to make sure we can
    preclude somebody else doing that to us.
        So that is the context that I deal with these issues. My
    closed statement goes into some more detail. I would be happy
    to answer questions as we move forward. But thank you for the
    opportunity to give you my big picture.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I would
    note that General Newbold and Admiral Szemborski have a
    combined statement. But I presume that both of you would like
    to testify this afternoon, so let me turn to General Newbold
    first.

      STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GREGORY S. NEWBOLD, USMC, DIRECTOR OF
                    OPERATIONS, J3, THE JOINT STAFF

        General Newbold. Sir, thanks, also we are honored to be
    here this afternoon to have an opportunity to testify. I would
    like to submit our statement for the record.
        Senator Reed. Without objection.
        General Newbold. Just a quick comment, sir, you have
    indicated the position I occupy is a linkage between the
    combatant commanders, the warfighters, and Washington. The role
    involves the distribution of assets, in this case very scarce
    and precious assets: intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance platforms.
        We have had some wonderful successes in Afghanistan, but we
    can expand it beyond Operation Enduring Freedom to successes in
    virtually every corner of the world, including the United
    States. We have also revealed some additional requirements, or
    some weaknesses. We have grown and adapted as we have learned
    quite a bit about our own systems and how we use them.
        The future is as Mr. Stenbit indicated, but we have to be
    agile enough to adapt today. I think we have shown some of that
    and we need to show a good bit more. So, our job in the
    operations department is to ensure that we are not content with
    the present and can adapt to the future. I look forward to
    questions, sir, and the opportunity to try and address them.
    Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General. Admiral
    Szemborski, your comments.

       STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. STANLEY R. SZEMBORSKI, USN, DEPUTY
      DIRECTOR FOR RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS, J8, THE JOINT STAFF

        Admiral Szemborski. Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, I am
    honored to be here today before this distinguished
    subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. In my current
    assignment, I am responsible to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs, General Myers, for requirements, acquisition, and also
    the program budget system. My job is to try to keep all three
    of those processes rolling in the same direction.
        In that assignment, I spend quite a bit of time working on
    bringing programs to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
    or JROC. I look forward to testifying today and I will forgo
    the rest of my oral statement. I am prepared to answer any of
    your questions. Thank you.
        [The combined prepared statement of General Newbold and
    Admiral Szemborski follows:]

    Combined Prepared Statement of Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, USMC, and Rear
                          Adm. Stanley Szemborski, USN

        Members of the Senate Armed Services Strategic Subcommittee, we are
    pleased to provide this statement regarding the status of our
    Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and their
    importance to the breadth of our military operations. We will address
    two general areas that I believe require particular attention: first,
    the means by which we allocate ISR assets among competing requirements;
    and second, the importance of the systems that process, analyze, and
    forward collected intelligence to our combatant forces.
        We must first thank Congress for its sustained support to our Armed
    Forces. This committee's support has been instrumental in our forces'
    impressive performance in recent operations. Your continued support is
    instrumental to our efforts in the war against global terrorism.
        Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination are more
    critical to operations today than ever. We rely on timely,
    comprehensive information collection complemented by rapid analysis and
    high speed distribution to optimize force employment. The 21st century
    has seen the warfighter's need for intelligence expand and delivery
    times shrink. Today, timeliness of intelligence is as important as its
    accuracy. Many of the targets we now face are small, mobile, and well
    concealed. Their fleeting nature often affords us scant opportunity for
    targeting. Successful ISR translates into proper use of precision
    weapons, focusing maximum destructive efforts and minimizing collateral
    damage.
        We utilize a scarce inventory of intelligence collectors ranging
    from national collection capability to airborne platforms such as the
    Air Force U-2, Rivet Joint and Predator UAV, Navy EP-3 and P-3, and
    Army Guardrail and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL), to ground-based
    collection and processing capability. We remain concerned about the
    effects of a sustained high operations tempo on the force and about
    shortages of ISR assets. With congressional support, the Department
    continues to address critical readiness concerns, (e.g. RC-135 Rivet
    Joint number 17 plus TC-135 and two RC-135 flight simulators, Predator
    systems numbers 6 through 12, and EP-3 numbers 12 through 16). As we
    address current ISR shortages, we are working to maintain an
    appropriate balance between near- and long-term readiness initiatives
    through incremental improvements which serves as a hedge against both
    near-term readiness shortfalls and failures of unproven technologies as
    we pursue more radical technologies to transform our forces for the
    21st century. A case in point are our UAVs.
        UAVs have validated their potential in Afghanistan for
    reconnaissance and surveillance and have demonstrated potential for an
    increased role in combat missions. We are continuing to experiment with
    additional roles and missions for these vehicles, improve their
    communications reach-back capabilities, and develop and acquire them at
    greater rates. The President's 2003 budget funds a number of
    transformational programs designed to help meet the objective. $141
    million is funded to accelerate development of UAVs with new combat
    capabilities. $629 million is funded to procure three Air Force Global
    Hawk high-altitude unmanned vehicles and accelerate improvements such
    as electronics upgrades and better sensors, and begin development of a
    maritime version.
        The President's 2003 budget also funds a number of transformational
    programs to address intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and
    reporting requirements. One such investment is $136.5 million for the
    next-generation joint ground system Automated Intelligence,
    Surveillance and Reconnaissance System.
        In the discussion of intelligence gathering, one must not overlook
    the critical contribution of human intelligence (HUMINT). Quite often,
    HUMINT proves to be an invaluable source of intelligence, unmatched by
    any other source.
        Our ISR forces provide support across the globe and are in
    extremely high demand. ISR support is usually the first request to come
    from the Combatant Commander. In addition to Operation Enduring
    Freedom, we are currently supporting Balkan operations, Operations
    Northern and Southern Watch, Korea, and operations in support of our
    forces in South America. These assets also help maintain awareness of
    potential threats in other areas around the globe. Most ISR assets are
    characterized as Low Density/High Demand--requirements exceed the
    current availability of platforms and/or personnel. AWACS, U-2s, and
    RC-135s are all examples of LD/HD assets.
        We seek to balance unified commanders' ISR requirements with
    sustainment of long-term capabilities. We achieve this through global
    military force policy or Service-specified employment limits that set
    limits for the maximum pace of operations that can be sustained without
    imperiling an asset's ability to train or surge for contingencies.
    These limits help decision-makers better understand the costs of
    employing these assets. As you may expect, post-September 11 operations
    have pushed some of our ISR LD/HD assets into maximum surge levels. To
    mitigate shortfalls in low-density/high-demand airborne ISR assets, the
    Department created, implemented, and is now refining a revolutionary
    process for matching intelligence requirements with existing airborne
    ISR assets during steady-state peacetime operations and emergent
    crises. The new methodology focuses on satisfying the commands' highest
    priority information requirements and allows us to assess various
    allocation options and the risk associated with requirements that
    cannot be met with available assets.
        This new process involves four distinct steps: First, each command
    identifies information requirements and submits them to the Joint
    Staff. Second, those requirements are prioritized based on criteria
    linked to existing policy directives and Joint doctrine. Third, all
    requirements undergo review from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
    National Security Agency (NSA), and National Imagery and Mapping Agency
    (NIMA) for potential satisfaction by other, non-airborne collection
    means. Fourth, the resultant prioritized requirements are matched to
    existing ISR assets based on a hierarchical system.
        Where appropriate, we actively coordinate the use of allied
    platforms in lieu of U.S. capabilities. In addition, since September
    11, we have deployed some assets outside their traditional role to
    satisfy unmet ISR tasking, freeing up other ISR assets.
        Employing the proper sensor at the right place is only part of the
    challenge. Just as important are the systems and personnel that support
    the transformation of raw sensor data into actionable intelligence. All
    systems must provide a comprehensive, flexible, and supportive analysis
    and dissemination architecture that gets our forces the information
    they need, when they need it. This doesn't come automatically. The
    communications channels that get information to the analysts and back
    out to the warfighter and the priorities assigned to this analysis
    effort must be well thought out before it is needed. Accurate and rapid
    interpretation of intelligence is a highly refined skilled that can
    take years to develop.
        Your continued support is imperative to the success of our ISR
    efforts. Our reliance on ISR capabilities, critical to today's
    operations, will only grow in the future. We look forward to your
    questions regarding the status of our ISR forces today and impact on
    current operations.

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. Let me begin a
    round of about 6 minutes, and then turn to Senator Allard.
        The Air Force plans on procuring some 50 Global Hawk
    unmanned aerial vehicles in the coming years, and this is
    something on which our committee has been very supportive. In
    fact, Senator Warner has been particularly encouraging in this
    regard. So we would commend the Air Force for this. In
    addition, the Navy now appears to be interested in acquiring a
    variant of Global Hawk.
        Each Global Hawk can gather a large amount of data, but
    typically all that data has to be sent via satellite to remote
    ground stations for processing, which raises the question, Mr.
    Secretary, can you tell us how you plan to ensure we have the
    satellite communications capability we will need to support the
    Global Hawks and other UAVs we plan on buying in the coming
    years? Is this capability, the satellite capability, properly
    phased with the UAV acquisition program which, as a final point
    I might add, seems to be accelerating rapidly with every
    Service and every contractor?
        Secretary Stenbit. Let's see, to go to your last question
    first, of course it's not properly phased but it's actually not
    that bad for a poor reason. I was chagrined to read in The Wall
    Street Journal yesterday a front page article talking about
    this subject. I was relatively pleased that somewhere around
    September 13 we actually did go out and have a competitive bid
    with CNN for satellite services. At that time, we obtained and
    still have today 500 megahertz of additional commercial
    channels which we use quite effectively to move the data from
    the Predators and other ISR assets in the theater. So, we were
    fortunate and it was part of the plan at the time that we would
    use surge capacity within the commercial satellite world.
        I think if we were to look at that plan today, seeing the
    financial stress--that is probably a kind word for the long
    haul telecommunications business--we would have to be less
    optimistic today that things like Iridium, ICO, Teledesic,
    AstroLink, CyberStar, and all of those programs that everybody
    thought were going to launch in the next 5 years will actually
    get there. So, part of the problem of the phasing over the next
    several years that the assumptions of how many companies will
    go bankrupt were too optimistic.
        On the other hand, the good news, which is not very good at
    all, is that that meant there was excess capacity. We were able
    to get 500 megahertz and we have. In fact, we put in play the
    ability to continue those services through the transition of
    the fiscal year. It is interesting to note how awkward our
    funding mechanisms are compared to businesses, because we have
    to do it by fiscal year, by appropriation, and making the
    peanut butter and jelly come out right is sometimes difficult.
        But we believe we are in good shape at approximately the
    level we are at now. We are going to launch three satellites
    called ``wideband gap fillers'' over the next 3 years, starting
    in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Those are follow ons to DSCS, which is
    the existing military wideband satellite, which has nowhere
    near enough capacity to handle Global Hawks and Predators and
    things like that.
        The wideband gap fillers have a lot more capacity. They
    have added one more frequency which is called the Ka-band,
    which is up at about 20 gigahertz, probably too much detail.
    But in any case, because it is a higher frequency, it has wider
    bandwidth and it can handle more information.
        In my summary of my statement, I talked about the use of
    laser technology, both on the ground and in space, as a
    transformational issue with respect to where we want to go.
    This is really for the end of the decade. But I was happy you
    asked the question because I think that is an extremely
    important issue.
        The commercial telecommunications people have learned how
    to put multiple colors of light down a fiber. So if you want
    some more bandwidth you add a color. It is called dense-wave
    division multiplex. We intend to equip about 90 facilities in
    the Defense and intelligence departments over the next 2 years,
    one color per facility. That is 10 gigabits per second. That is
    called an OC-192.
        We want to go to an all-optical, very wideband, as global
    as we can, ground-based network. The money for that is in the
    request. Half of it is in the request for 2003, and it is
    called the Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion program.
        We intend to use that same technology in space. By that I
    mean building laser crosslinks and laser communications to read
    from the Predator up to the satellite, laser from the satellite
    over to another satellite, and then a laser back down to the
    ground and into this network. Without doing that I think we
    will never solve the problem that you just described.
        I was at a review of that program the other day. They are
    making progress at bounding how many laser heads we can put per
    satellite and still maintain the communications capacity. It
    looks as if that particular transformation is going to be well
    within the technical state of the art and also feasible with
    respect to time and money.
        So, I believe we are moving forward and this network that I
    was describing is fundamental to the question you just asked.
    Because not only do we need the bandwidth, we need the people
    to be able to process the information. We cannot spray that all
    over the world in small little clumps. It just will not work.
        So part of the real advantage of this TPPU or the issue of
    building this network, is we can exfiltrate that data to
    wherever we need it. Then people can retrieve it as if it were
    an Internet, back through the same lasers and up to a radio in
    space and back down to their work stations. So we think that is
    probably the most transformational thing we can do in the
    Defense Department, let alone in the ISR world.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Related to your
    comments, Admiral Szemborski, you would, I assume, be
    responsible for the Joint Chiefs' developing the requirements
    first for the number of UAVs, and second how that is tied into
    the satellite architecture. If that is the case, can you
    comment upon this process and the requirements?
        Admiral Szemborski. Yes sir, the JROC has taken this on and
    over the last several years they have commissioned several
    studies, both in the satellite area and the UAV area, in trying
    to bring this together. We have been very involved in what the
    C\3\I staff is doing and we continue to assess it. We have also
    designated one joint warfighting capabilities assessment team,
    or JWCA team, to specifically look at this area.
        That team has been assigned over the next year to do a
    complete assessment and do an operational concept for this
    area. We believe that by starting with the operational concept
    and then going to an architecture below that, we will be able
    to identify the key communications nodes and the key
    interoperability requirements that will allow us to take a step
    forward to a more integrated infrastructure in the future. The
    JROC started this a couple of years ago with the JTAMDO
    organization, the Joint Theater Air Missile Defense
    Organization, for cruise missile defense. The benefits of that
    have just been tremendous so far.
        So with this effort that is going on right now, we believe
    that we will be able to really get a handle on the architecture
    of the future, be able to then hand that operational
    architecture over to the smart folks in C\3\I to be able to do
    the technical architecture. With that, bring together something
    that we think will lead to a much better capability for the
    warfighter in the future.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. In laying out this integrated ISR
    architecture, it looks to me like we have a huge task ahead of
    us. We have land, sea, and air, and then we have space on top
    of that. Then we have the tasking, the processing, and the
    communications parts of it. It is going to be a substantial
    undertaking.
        But I am not discouraged because I see things that are
    encouraging. Mr. Stenbit, what is your assessment of progress
    being made in development and implementation of this integrated
    ISR architecture?
        Secretary Stenbit. As I said, I think that the use of
    broadcast capability, and that is really what I did when the
    Air Force requested, and DISA did it, and I got my approval
    about the money, to get these satellite channels. I mean, we
    are now used to going into this broadcast mode. If we were not
    used to it and if we had not distributed common ground station
    programs to do interoperable analysis of it, and we did not
    have the wherewithal to use such information, we would have
    been dead.
        Senator Allard. Talk to me a little bit about the
    institutional barriers, the stovepiping and that kind of thing
    that may add to complications.
        Secretary Stenbit. I want to refer that to General Newbold,
    but my view is that the ISR assets, whether they are Service by
    Service or whether they are space or air or under the water or
    on top of the water, or whether they are intelligence or not,
    are actually being used in an integrated way. There is a
    process that is run by General Newbold that tiers those assets
    between that which is appropriately done at the theater level
    and that which is more appropriately looked at at a higher
    level.
        Actually, my personal observation is, given that we do not
    have enough of some of the things we would like to have, the
    allocation is done through a process which General Newbold is
    responsible for that looks to me like it works pretty well. It
    is not that we do not have disagreements, but there is a good
    management process to work them out.
        Senator Allard. Lieutenant General Newbold.
        General Newbold. Sir, I think the point is a very valid
    one. I think stovepiping seems to be human nature and we have
    to overcome cultural obstacles that lead to that dynamic. I
    think we are doing a good job of that. Things like Goldwater-
    Nichols made a step toward the cultural shift by making people
    understand things beyond their realm.
        We have to go beyond that as well. We slowly adapt to the
    potential of new systems and platforms. Predator is a good
    example but there are other ones. I would like to think that
    with the advent of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the way in
    which we support the warfighter encourages people to break down
    some of these barriers within the Department of Defense that
    would mean that the information does not get to the warfighter
    as rapidly as they might.
        I would submit as well, sir, that outside the Department of
    Defense, particularly with some of the other agencies in town,
    we have probably been more integrated than we ever have been in
    the past. Not good enough yet, very clearly, but I am in nearly
    daily communication with the Central Intelligence Agency, as an
    example. But I or my people are also in daily communication
    with the FAA, with the FBI, and the alphabet soup of other
    agencies. We are growing in this, but I think I would be
    dishonest if I did not say that those stovepipes still exist to
    some degree.
        Senator Allard. Let me move to commercial imagery. This
    year there was a proposal to include additional funding for
    commercial imagery in the budget request. I am concerned that
    perhaps we are not committed enough to going ahead with the
    commercial side as to what is happening in NIMA. It seems to me
    a fair amount of that can be contracted out. Does the
    administration still believe that encouraging the development
    of second generation commercial imagery satellites is
    important? Then the follow-up question would be, do you think
    these satellites could represent a useful ISR capability?
        Secretary Stenbit. Let me start from the budget request. We
    have come to the conclusion--which is not quite the question
    you asked, but let me at least say where we were--we would like
    to take value-added products from the industrial base that use
    commercial imagery as their source, as opposed to using our
    imagery as their source, and not do this middle-man thing,
    which is buy the picture and then hand it to somebody else to
    make a map.
        So where we are headed with the money that is on the table,
    and I believe that NIMA is with the program, is we are moving
    towards using the commercial imagery base as the source for
    value-added products, which are basically maps, charts, the
    TPED data base, and the program which I can never remember the
    old acronym nor the new one, but it is basically the
    computerized representation of the earth.
        It has turned out as well that some of the images coming
    from commercial satellites have been used for ISR purposes as
    well. So, that has been an interesting surge capability, but I
    think that probably is not the long-term stable way to use the
    industrial base. Now, do they need a second generation set of
    imagery satellites in order to provide the maps with the
    precision that we need is a technical issue? Certainly at the
    level where we have the job today, we can already do it with
    the existing systems.
        So, we are going to count on the existing systems being at
    least as good as and perhaps better into the future in order to
    accomplish this goal of having the value-added services come
    from commercial satellites.
        Senator Allard. Are you talking about the existing systems
    within NIMA or existing commercial systems?
        Secretary Stenbit. No, no, no, existing commercial systems.
    Maybe I over-listened to what you said.
        Senator Allard. No, you are right.
        Secretary Stenbit. We do need at least as good as we have
    now, but we are fully capable and have processes to accept now,
    through a measured process, that somebody can deliver maps at
    the required accuracy to meet the NIMA requirements. NIMA is
    now prepared to have people bring their processes forward to
    evaluate them, to do the quality control, and then take the
    maps from those people. So what we are trying to do is to get
    the people that do the processing of the images to make the
    maps or the charts, buy the commercial images from the
    companies, and that we end up with the maps. Because that is
    what we are after. We are after the maps, not necessarily the
    picture.
        That is where we are headed. That is the plan. We have a
    lot of money programmed both into the 2003 budget but also into
    the out years to really execute on that.
        Senator Allard. Thank you for your clarification of your
    answer. Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. General Newbold,
    Senator Allard in his opening comments touched upon the issue
    of these low-density, high-demand assets, for example JSTARS
    and other systems. Could you outline for us which ISR platforms
    were classified or would be classified as low-density, high-
    demand during Operation Enduring Freedom?
        General Newbold. Yes sir, the fact that we are using them
    in Operation Enduring Freedom leads them to have a global
    deficiency, so we look at it globally. Among those platforms,
    the two that trouble me the most are the AWACS and the U-2. The
    AWACS because, frankly we did not anticipate we would need 15
    AWACS in the defense of the continental United States. We have
    been fortunate to have the NATO AWACS supplement our
    requirements there.
        In the case of the U-2, it is not so much the platforms as
    the crews that are in short supply. We are about to alleviate
    that stress to some degree by bringing some of those assets
    home. We have other platforms that are in a surge or in fact
    even beyond the surge stage, above max-surge stage. They
    include things like the Rivet Joint aircraft, the RC-135.
        We have used more Predator systems than we had available at
    the beginning of the conflict. Of course, Global Hawk is still
    a developmental system, so the fact that it is deployed in a
    developmental status is straining the system. Other platforms
    include JSTARS, EP-3s, all of them used in innovative ways,
    non-traditional ways, in deployments that have exceeded the
    peacetime metrics. That is a main point I would like to
    emphasize in my response.
        When we establish metrics for low-density, high-demand
    assets we did it to be able to sustain the deployment of these
    assets during peacetime. So while our terminology is that we
    are above a surge capacity in those, in wartime the pilots, the
    maintainers, those that source them like a Service, and in fact
    the warfighting CINCs, all recognize that in wartime much of
    the traditional terminology that applies to surge status does
    not apply anymore.
        We have been able to maintain aircraft beyond our
    expectations, probably through the hard work of individuals. We
    have been able to keep assets deployed and people deployed more
    than we would on a peacetime basis. Over time, this will all
    cause us to pay a price.
        Fortunately, we have some more platforms that have been
    either requested, sir, that you have authorized, and over time
    will have less strain on the system. Of course, rising
    expectations may mean more requirements, but in essence we have
    a complete spectrum of assets that are in surge status. We are
    managing those and we will change the way we distribute these
    in the future.
        Senator Reed. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, following on the
    General's comments, over time you are going to have to develop
    a plan to address these surge assets. Could you give us an idea
    of your thinking in that regard now?
        Secretary Stenbit. There is actually quite a lot of
    activity, as I said, in the fiscal year 2003 budget and also in
    the planning for the out years, where in each of the cases that
    we were faced with in the Defense Emergency Reserve Fund (DERF)
    request and in the supplemental request and then the fiscal
    year 2003 budget, many of these kinds of questions come up
    about do we buy more of the old ones or do we get on with
    transforming to the new ones? We did our best to come to those
    kinds of conclusions.
        For instance, in the Rivet Joint case, the JCS wanted two
    of the old ones as fast as possible. We, not for bureaucratic
    reasons but I think for good sound reasons, split the baby in
    half and bought one old one and said the first new one is going
    to get there as fast as possible. That then begs the question
    about what platform does it go on? Is the platform the same for
    the Navy and the Air Force or can they be on different
    platforms?
        Those issues are really very vigorously under debate at the
    present moment. There is no question in anybody's mind that we
    are going to recapitalize the aircraft carriers of the ISR, and
    it will be a commercial system that has commercial kinds of
    maintenance and support issues. So we are not talking about
    whether we are going to build one or use a commercial version.
    Is it a 767? Is it a 737? Is it two of them? How does that go?
    What is the relation to the tankers, et cetera?
        Those are very real questions that cannot be answered
    instantaneously. But from my point of view, in the how do you
    put the things inside those airplanes that make them work, we
    have some major issues that we have been moving forward for a
    while. One is an upgraded radar which is called RTIP, and that
    is programmed to go into Global Hawks and other platforms and
    in the new ones as well.
        In the airborne SIGINT world we had a failure in the low-
    band subsystem and we are currently running a competition
    between the Army and the Air Force to determine which will be
    the lead Service to go get that thing back on track. But we do
    have a high-band system that can be the basis of an
    architecture to move forward. So, we are moving forward as the
    requirements are moving and as the platform choices are being
    made to make sure that there are the appropriate sensors and
    communications that go in those aircraft.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me ask one more
    question and then turn to Senator Allard for his round. General
    Newbold, I understand that the Services are the organizations
    which nominate these systems or these platforms to go on the
    list of low-density, high-demand assets. As a result, I am also
    told that the EP-3, which you mentioned, is not on the formal
    list, which raises the question: Are the Services the
    appropriate entities to make these nominations? Might it not be
    the CINCs or might it not be some other agency within the
    Department of Defense that could better do that?
        General Newbold. I'd like to provide a couple of comments
    in response. One of them is a very specific one, sir, and that
    is on the EP-3. The EP-3 has been nominated recently by the
    Navy to be an HD/LD platform.
        But the essence of your question is do we have a central
    authority who will look more broadly to establish what is in
    short supply or not? It could be, as a matter of fact I would
    submit, that it probably is the Joint Staff who has to take a
    more active role in management. In truth we have since
    September 11, sir.
        We need to formalize the expanded role that we have
    undertaken since then. The Services will always have an
    appropriate role in that. They have texture that we do not to
    the wear and tear on individuals because, sir, what goes into
    establishing the strain on a system is not only the degree to
    which we can sustain the platform, but the air crews. Beyond
    the air crews to the maintainers of the aircraft. For example,
    on the U-2 when we will upgrade the sensor package, and on the
    RC-135 when we will complete the engine rebuilds on those or
    replacement of the engines on that.
        So, I think it is a combination, sir. The Services have a
    role that we cannot duplicate. We need to take a more active
    role in defining the requirements from the CINCs, and probably
    in a collaborative way, sir, we will come up with a better
    system.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Where do you see the gaps in our ISR
    capabilities; and apply those to your fiscal year 2003 budget
    proposal. Where do you think the greatest shortfall might be in
    the fiscal year 2003 budget proposal? Lieutenant General
    Newbold, it looks like you are first.
        General Newbold. Yes, sir, I noticed that.
        Senator Reed. You have been nominated.
        General Newbold. The gaps--I am an authority--probably a
    surprise sir, first of all I'd like to mention something and
    then I will get to the detailed question as it relates to the
    ISR platforms. HUMINT, human intelligence, probably preoccupies
    my thoughts as much as any platform. I think there have been
    some notable improvements, and the Secretary of Defense has
    some initiatives under way to improve DOD capabilities in that
    regard. But, to supplement the enormously expanded capabilities
    we have in the air, space, and ground-based technology, there
    are some things we cannot accomplish, and human intelligence in
    that regard, native or U.S., has to be a robust capability.
        So, the obvious one beyond that in the technological realm
    is the UAV. A grand success story, not only in Operation
    Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, but of course before that
    going all the way back to the Persian Gulf War and to the Iraq
    units that surrendered to one to Operation Allied Force in
    Kosovo with the first use of the Predator. They have been
    invaluable in Afghanistan.
        Gaps and seams result from the paucity, the relative
    scarceness of those. That is being addressed, but there is a
    significant demand from the other combatant commanders in chief
    for UAVs in their areas, whether they are European Command,
    Southern Command, Pacific Command, and in fact in the United
    States. So, I would call the UAVs a gap which is being
    corrected.
        I would say that some of the satellite platforms, the
    fragility of that system concerns me a bit, sir. The airborne
    platforms, I think Mr. Stenbit talked about the replacement of
    the platforms themselves, not just the systems that go on them.
    I would like to start off with those off the top of my head,
    sir, and then pass it back.
        Senator Allard. Well, I am not at all surprised about your
    comments about HUMINT, considering what has happened over the
    last 3 or 4 years. But if you look at the 2003 budget, in your
    view, what do you think are the key shortfalls that we have,
    and please just pull one out that strikes you as perhaps a
    mistake that we should better fund.
        General Newbold. Sir, the 2003 budget is addressing
    adequately things like the UAVs. As a matter of fact, I think
    Admiral Szemborski will tell you that the production line is at
    capacity with the 2003 expectations. Frankly, sir, I think the
    2003 budget has done a good job of addressing the shortfalls in
    a reasonable way. Applying more money to some of the systems
    would not result in a cure.
        On the HUMINT side, the problem there, as you know better
    than I do, is the time it takes to grow capability. Although
    money is applied, it can take up to 5 years to have a
    reasonable expectation of a good capability on the ground.
        Senator Allard. We understand there is increased funding
    for UAVs, and also DOD has created a UAV planning task force.
    Can you share with this subcommittee the charter of this task
    force and what do you expect it to achieve?
        General Newbold. I am going to see if Admiral Szemborski is
    looking my way, sir. Stan, are you?
        Admiral Szemborski. Yes, let me start out by saying in the
    area of ISR, several years ago the JROC commissioned the ISR
    JWCA team to conduct a study called the Joint Airborne
    Reconnaissance Assessment. That assessment was completed before
    September 11, but the primary recommendations out of that
    assessment were that 18 Rivet Joints and 16 EP-3s are required
    to really source our assessment of what we needed in those
    areas. That was the primary recommendation.
        Between what was submitted in the fiscal year 2002
    supplementals and the fiscal year 2003 budget, we have
    submitted requests for those platforms to come on line. Now we
    are in the process of reassessing that entire study right now,
    post-September 11. We expect that that study will be completed
    around the July time frame.
        Now as far as UAVs go in this task force, there is a task
    force that has been formed by OSD in C\3\I to start that and we
    have teamed our JROC members with that study so that we can
    together assess where, from an operational and a technical
    standpoint, we can go with UAVs in the future. We are very much
    with C\3\I in that effort and expect in the next several months
    we will be able to come up with some conclusions from it.
        Secretary Stenbit. It is not only C\3\I, it is AT&L as
    well, because basically they worry about the platforms and we
    worry about what goes in them. But to get to your first
    question, in my opening statement I told you what I thought the
    big gap was, which is we have failed to spend money to
    recapitalize the depreciation on new ways to steal secrets.
    There is quite a list that is inappropriate at the open level
    to go through, but in the fiscal year 2003 budget and with some
    kicking off earlier in fiscal year 2002 through the DERF, we
    really did fund some of these new ideas. I would be happy to
    talk about that in a slightly different context.
        Almost all of the decisions on which I participated in the
    fiscal year 2003 budget came--went and looked down these
    items--some of them where we needed more of what we already
    have, we have talked about some of those. There were some
    satellite cases that have gone into the DSRP where the Defense
    Department felt that we needed more than what would have
    naturally have come out of the National Foreign Intelligence
    Program (NFIP), for instance. We put the money in for those.
        In the case of--whether it was UAVs or whether it was some
    of these other new systems, we really took a hard look at what
    would it take to do a reasonably aggressive program, but not be
    getting ourselves into too much of an over-hasty view of what
    we could accomplish. There is a lot of effort moving into
    addressing shortfalls in the sources of information.
        But I must second what General Newbold said about the human
    aspects, and I am not talking about the analyst part and I am
    not only talking about people out in embassies and doing
    spying. There are a lot of things that we need to be doing with
    people on the ground that we have not done as much as we should
    have. That is another big area where there is funding provided.
        Senator Allard. The Chairman has been very gracious with my
    time and I appreciate that. I want to wrap up with this
    question: You talked about your interest in maps as opposed to
    images, and my question is how will we get these commercial
    products without commercial imagery satellites? Are we going to
    be using satellites that are built and operated by American
    companies or foreign companies? How do we establish that?
        Secretary Stenbit. We cannot do it without the commercial
    satellites. The intent is that the infrastructure of people
    that NIMA has and their rather broad base of contractors who
    can, in fact, manipulate images to do maps. They used to do
    that by taking our pictures and doing it.
        What we are trying to do is to get them to go to Iconos and
    the newly launched one, which I forget the name of, which are
    both American-based and get their source material from those
    two companies. So the answer is yes, we definitely need the
    commercial imagery sources to do what I said. What we are
    trying to do is not buy the pictures and hand it to somebody,
    but let them buy the pictures.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. We have now
    concluded the open session of the hearing. The record will
    remain open until close of business Monday for any questions
    for the record that any members may wish to submit. We will
    adjourn and reconvene in S-407 in 10 minutes. Thank you.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nelson

                             CYBER ASSET PROTECTION

        1. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Stenbit, we have learned that
    China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and other nations are attempting to
    develop cyber-attack capabilities that could threaten our military's
    information technology on which many of our surveillance assets are
    based. Where do we stand on development of a more robust system to
    protect these assets and what is in this year's budget request that
    will help get us there?
        Secretary Stenbit. A cyber-attack on our military's information
    technology would not affect our surveillance assets. The systems that
    control the surveillance operations are tightly controlled and
    completely isolated from any outside connection that could provide a
    cyber-attack access to the system. In addition, the actual control
    links are encrypted with NSA approved, Type 1 cryptography, and
    commands are authenticated. During platform development, there is a
    significant system security engineering effort between NSA and NRO to
    make sure that all avenues of attack, including cyber-attack, are
    addressed and countermeasures developed.
        A cyber-attack on our military's information technology, though,
    would affect the ability to process, analyze, and report information
    collected from these assets. We have a number of efforts underway to
    develop protection, as well as detection, technology to help us address
    these concerns. Our Information Assurance and Information Operations
    programs are addressing just these issues. The Department is
    modernizing the strongest encryption technology to keep pace with the
    rapid changes in information technology. Network sensor development and
    deployment is helping us identify attacks before they cause us damage.
    Pervasive use of our defense-in-depth strategy, constructing defenses
    and safeguards in successive layers, is improving our protection from
    cyber-attack.
        Overall funding in the fiscal year 2003 President's budget for
    Computer Network Defense programs has increased more than 50 percent
    compared to fiscal year 2001. Cyber-attack prevention is one of the
    Department's highest priorities, which presents a formidable challenge.
    We will continue to work at meeting these challenges head-on.

                             BANDWIDTH CAPABILITIES

        2. Senator Ben Nelson. Secretary Stenbit, we need equipment that
    allows us to locate and maintain surveillance of the enemy while
    preserving American lives. It appears that a limiting factor in ISR
    equipment is bandwidth, as it was in Kosovo in 1999. We have the
    technology for the sensors, the surveillance platforms, and the
    munitions but the real problem is bandwidth, which has been hindered by
    a slowing satellite industry. What are we doing to increase our
    bandwidth capabilities and does this budget support increasing those
    capabilities?
        Secretary Stenbit. The 2003 budget contains significant investments
    in laser-based communications, both on the ground and in space, to
    create a ubiquitous, trustworthy, dependable network where bandwidth is
    not a constraint for users. The Global Information Grid (GIG) Bandwidth
    Expansion program will provide some key DOD sites with very wideband
    terrestrial-based capability starting in fiscal year 2003. When
    completed in fiscal year 2004, this initiative will provide assured,
    high bandwidth terrestrial network access to DOD's highest priority
    locations. The transformational communications satellites will provide
    the space-based part of this optical network. These investments, along
    with investments in Wideband Gap-filler and Extended Tether Program
    will ensure that bandwidth is not a limiting factor in ISR collection,
    processing, or dissemination capabilities in the future.

                                  RIVET JOINT

        3. Senator Ben Nelson. General Newbold, precision engagement
    technology and ISR assets rely heavily on the RC-135 (Rivet Joint) as
    well as other platforms. We await delivery of Rivet Joint numbers 17
    and 18 as well as their trainers. Does this budget support the high
    demand for this air frame?
        General Newbold. Yes. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget
    request, the fiscal year 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
    for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the U.S., and
    fiscal year 2002 Defense Budget provide significant investments in the
    RC-135 fleet. When taken together, these investments will yield long-
    term operational benefits and solve systemic training deficiencies.
        Consistent with the findings of the 2000 Joint Airborne
    Reconnaissance Assessment (JARA) and a subsequent Air Force report, the
    Department requested funding for two additional Rivet Joints in the
    first Combating Terrorism Supplemental. Congress agreed to the
    acquisition of one additional RC-135. Rivet Joint number 17 has been
    funded and is under construction. In addition to this welcome fleet
    increase, additional training resources were also fully funded. These
    training resources include one additional TC-135 training aircraft and
    a new full-motion simulator for flight crew training.
        The resulting fleet of Rivet Joint aircraft will be 17 RC-135
    mission aircraft and 3 training aircraft. The RC-135 program to re-
    engine aircraft should provide additional capacity. In the meantime, we
    will carefully manage the distribution of RC-135 aircraft to meet CINC
    demands.

        [Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m, the subcommittee adjourned.]