[Senate Hearing 107-696]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2225
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
----------
MARCH 6, 12, APRIL 10, 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2225
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 5
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
__________
MARCH 6, 12, APRIL 10, 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Nonproliferation Programs of the Department of Energy and the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense
march 6, 2002
Page
Crouch II, Hon. J.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy.................................. 18
Brooks, Ambassador Linton F., Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 23
Special Operations Military Capabilities, Operational Requirements, and
Technology Acquisition
march 12, 2002
Holland, Gen. Charles R., USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 57
Schulte, Harry E., Acquisition Executive, Special Operations
Acquisition and Logistics Center, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 68
Technology for Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
april 10, 2002
Sega, Hon. Ronald M., Director, Defense Research and Engineering. 114
Marburger III, Hon. John H., Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy.............................................. 125
Klein, Dr. Dale, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs............. 139
Younger, Dr. Stephen M., Director, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency......................................................... 144
Waldron, Robert E., Assistant Deputy Administrator for
Nonproliferation Research and Engineering, National Nuclear
Security Administration........................................ 149
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 6, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mary L.
Landrieu (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Landrieu, Carnahan, and
Roberts.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
minority counsel; Edward H. Edens IV, professional staff
member; and Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Thomas C. Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda S. Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S.
Wiener, assistants to Senator Landrieu; Peter A. Contostavlos,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; David Schanzer, assistant to
Senator Carnahan; John Gastright, assistant to Senator
Thurmond; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek
Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU, CHAIRMAN
Senator Landrieu. Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to
our hearing. This hearing will be on the Department of Energy's
nonproliferation programs and the Department of Defense's
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs.
Senator Roberts and I are very pleased to have both of our
witnesses with us today. I think in both cases, it is your
first time before this subcommittee, but neither one of you is
new to this very important work.
We have Ambassador Linton Brooks, now Deputy Administrator
for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). Ambassador, it is good to see you again.
We look forward to your testimony. J.D. Crouch, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,
welcome.
Today we are here because of the very real threat of
nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons finding
their way into the hands of our enemies. The evidence of such a
threat has prompted this administration to set up shop for high
level officials in weapons of mass destruction or WMD-proof
facilities so that they can resume control of the Nation should
an attack occur.
I think the public would want to know that Senators on this
committee and throughout Congress are taking every possible
step to neutralize this threat so as to ensure that America is
safe from such a dire scenario.
Let me begin by referring to excerpts from this week's Time
magazine. Time reports that ``for a few harrowing weeks last
fall, a group of U.S. officials believed that the worst
nightmares of their lives--something even more horrific than
September 11--was about to come true. In October, an
intelligence alert went out to a small number of Government
agencies, including the Energy Department's top-secret nuclear
emergency search team (NEST), based in Nevada. The report said
that terrorists were thought to have obtained a 10-kiloton
nuclear weapon from the Russian arsenal and planned to smuggle
it into New York City.''
The report came from a very reliable field agent, and
coincided with statements from a Russian general who said he
might be missing a missile.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Landrieu. Fortunately, this information was not
accurate, but the chance of such an event occurring in the
future is certainly in the realm of possibility. A 10-kiloton
weapon, according to Time, would have killed 100,000 New
Yorkers and irradiated an additional 700,000.
For well over a decade now, Senators Nunn and Lugar and a
few others have recognized the potential of the threat posed by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Russia
and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Unfortunately, they faced,
in some instances, powerful opposition, opposition unwilling to
either recognize the threat or all too eager to characterize
nonproliferation programs as foreign aid. Compared to the
critics who claimed that these programs did not belong in the
DOD budget, and did not appreciate the reality of this threat,
Senators Nunn and Lugar may have been ahead of their time, but
their assessment of this threat was, I think, 100 percent
accurate.
In President Bush's State of the Union speech, the
President stated, ``Our Nation will continue to be steadfast
and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great
objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt
terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. Second, we
must prevent the terrorist regimes who seek chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United
States and the world.''
I completely support these goals and agree with the
President. I intend to lead this subcommittee in support of
these endeavors.
The fiscal year 2003 request represents a 35 percent
increase over last year's budget request for these programs,
and it is 5 percent over what this Congress, in a bipartisan
fashion, appropriated last year. We must sustain and enhance
this level of funding for DOE and DOD nonproliferation programs
in order to meet their worthy goals and objectives.
But adequate budget funding is only the first step. We must
dedicate these additional resources and current resources to
the best possible ways to prevent proliferation, retain Russian
and former Soviet scientists, and turn their offensive weapons
training into tools for peace and prosperity. We must lock down
and account for nuclear, chemical, and biological stockpiles
with greater effectiveness and efficiency. We must create
opportunities for Russian and former Soviet scientists to
collaborate with American scientists in research and
educational institutions to share knowledge that can assist our
medical and public health professionals to effectively counter
chemical and biological attacks or outbreaks, and we must be
creative in thinking how to develop new and innovative efforts
to quickly neutralize this threat. We simply do not have time
on our side.
To illustrate how real this threat is and how imperative it
is that we act now, I would like to share some shocking reports
coming out of one of the newly independent Russian states. Just
recently, on February 25, a Newsweek article tells of accounts
where workers at the premier bioweapons facility from the
Soviet era now state that keeping track of the pathogens stored
there is ``next to impossible.''
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Landrieu. Vials of anthrax are kept in coffee cans,
which are stored in a 40-year-old refrigerator, secured with a
simple padlock. Drunken thieves have broken into this facility,
and the article goes on. Fortunately, they knew not of the
trove of toxins in front of them and only stole some spare
parts. But imagine what could happen if more deliberate thieves
with more devious intentions breached this facility.
Most shocking are the stories Russian and former Soviet
scientists have to tell. These well-trained and capable
scientists were approached, according to this article and
others, by al-Qaeda to work in Afghanistan. Fortunately, U.S.
intelligence believes these scientists refused these overtures.
Nevertheless, there is no way to tell how long these
scientists, many of whom are now unemployed, making less than
$2,000 a year, can refuse lucrative offers such as these.
There are simply too many stories of destitute Russians and
former Soviet biological and chemical engineers, very brilliant
people with doctoral degrees, driving cabs or peddling cheese
and vegetables to make a living. When a Russian general cannot
account for the whereabouts of a warhead, we must take extreme
caution, pay extreme attention, and make every effort to
neutralize this particular threat.
We must also provide opportunities so that these scientists
can peacefully make a living and use their keen minds to better
this world. To fail to take these efforts jeopardizes our
security.
So, in closing, I just want to ask a few questions--and I
will have more for the record. How can we best allocate our
resources to prevent nuclear, biological, and chemical
proliferation? How can we best account for Russian and former
Soviet stockpiles? How can we improve the living conditions of
these scientists via peaceful means? How can we collaborate
more with Russian scientists and American scientists to expand
fellowship and create peaceful means and peaceful approaches?
Finally, what new ideas or programs may be effective toward
this important end?
I hope you will also let us know about parts of the
programs under your jurisdiction that you do not find are
working well or find not effective, because we do not have the
time or the money to work on programs that are not actually
increasing our security and minimizing these threats.
So, to summarize, I believe the threat is real. I believe
that we need to make these programs more robust, and I plan to
lead this subcommittee in that way. But I also want to make
sure that the money that we are spending is truly minimizing
the risk and increasing our security, and that we will not be
at all hesitant to scrap a program if it is not working so that
we can put the money where it will work. The American people
deserve no less, and I think they are expecting our best
effort.
Senator Roberts may have an opening statement, and then we
will take our usual round of questions after hearing your
testimony.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Senator Landrieu, and I would
like to associate myself with your remarks. Some of my remarks
will be repetitive, but I will try to get through them in an
expedited fashion.
I want to extend a very warm welcome to Dr. Crouch and to
Ambassador Brooks. As the distinguished Madam Chairman has
indicated, this is the first time that I think both of you have
testified before this subcommittee on these programs, so we
appreciate your taking time out of your very valuable schedule
and we look forward to your remarks.
Today, we are in a different world since this subcommittee
last met, in our review of the budget request for these very
critical threat reduction programs. Many of the emerging
threats we identified in previous years' subcommittee hearings
are now the established threats of today. They are no longer
emerging. No one, and certainly not this subcommittee, could
have imagined the events of September 11, but this subcommittee
did, in fact, really identify with almost unthinkable accuracy,
the threat posed by a biological weapon and our abilities to
deal with it.
So, today we find ourselves the victims of bioterrorism.
While we feared that such a weapon might be a product of the
Soviet-era bioweaponized strain, I do not think any of us in
the Hart Senate Office Building ever imagined that it might be
homegrown. That story still has to be told and the
investigation is ongoing.
Now we are concerned that a dirty bomb--that is how it is
described in the press at least--will be the next threat on the
horizon. If we all sat down and listed 100 things, Madam
Chairman, that we thought the terrorists would do, they would
probably do 101. But once again, our fears are that the Soviet-
era nuclear materials might be the ingredients of such a
device. I hope this remains a theoretical threat and not one
that will be played out anywhere in the world.
Now, the administration has demonstrated its full support
for these programs with the President's fiscal year 2003 budget
request. On December 27, 2001, the President stated, ``This
administration is committed to strong, effective cooperation
with Russia and the other states of the Former Soviet Union to
reduce weapons of mass destruction and prevent their expansion
and proliferation.''
This spirit of cooperation was also demonstrated by
Presidents Putin and Bush in a November 2001 joint statement
when they said, ``Both sides agree that urgent attention must
continue to be given to improving the physical protection and
accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and
preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.''
I share these views. I support these programs. These
programs warrant the best management and implementation and
oversight possible to ensure that they achieve their missions
and protect us from terrorist acts.
So, I look forward to working with you to ensure that you
have the tools you need to effect good management and execute
solid implementation.
With my cough and frog in my throat, I think I will simply
ask that the rest of my statement be put in the record. I will
get a glass of water and we can move to the testimony and the
questions and we will sum up at that time. Thank you, Madam
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts
Thank you, Senator Landrieu. I would like to extend a warm welcome
to you, Dr. Crouch, and to you, Ambassador Brooks. I believe this is
the first time both of you have testified before this subcommittee on
these programs. I appreciate the time you have taken to prepare, and I
look forward to receiving your remarks.
Today we are in a different world since the subcommittee last met
to review the budget requests for these critical threat reduction
programs. Many of the emerging threats we identified in previous years'
subcommittee hearings are now the established threats of today. While
no one, and certainly not this subcommittee, could have imagined the
horrific events of September 11, this subcommittee did in fact identify
with almost unthinkable accuracy the threat posed by a biological
weapon and our abilities to deal with it. Today, we find ourselves
victims of bioterrorism. While we feared that such a weapon might be a
product of a Soviet-era bio-weaponized strain, we never imagined that
it might be home grown. Now, we are concerned that a ``dirty bomb''
will be the next threat on the horizon. Once again our fears are that
Soviet-era nuclear materials might be the ingredients of such a device.
I hope this remains a theoretical threat and not one that will be
played out anywhere in the world.
The administration has demonstrated its full support for these
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs with the President's
fiscal year 2003 budget request. On December 27, 2001, the President
stated that the ``administration is committed to strong, effective
cooperation with Russian and the other states of the Former Soviet
Union to reduce weapons of mass destruction and prevent their
proliferation.''
This spirit of cooperation was also demonstrated by Presidents
Putin and Bush in a November 2001 joint statement, ``Both sides agree
that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the
physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all
possessor states, and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.''
I share these views and support these programs. I believe these
programs warrant the best management, implementation, and oversight
possible to ensure that they achieve their missions and protect us from
terrorist acts. I look forward to working with you to ensure that you
have the tools you need to effect good management and execute solid
implementation.
I hope you will be able to provide the subcommittee today with a
clear and detailed discussion of how your budget requests meet your
mission and what you expect to accomplish with these requested funds
for fiscal year 2003. I believe you are doing critical work in
protecting our Nation and I commend you for your perseverance and
dedication. I thank you for the time and attention you have placed in
preparing your remarks for this hearing.
Senator Landrieu, thank you for holding this hearing. This
concludes my opening remarks.
Senator Landrieu. Well, with his cough and my sniffles, we
are both hoping to get through this hearing, but we are very
interested in what you have to say. Mr. Secretary, please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Dr. Crouch. Madam Chairman and Senator Roberts, it is a
pleasure to be here today. Thank you for giving the Defense
Department an opportunity to review CTR programs with the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.
I have a longer statement which I would ask that you might
consider putting in the record, and I am just going to briefly
summarize it here.
Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
Dr. Crouch. By holding this hearing so soon in the
legislative year, I think the Senate is sending a high profile
message that the CTR program is important to the United States,
and the Department of Defense and the administration could not
agree more. Over the last decade, the CTR program has made
important contributions to U.S. national security by
dismantling some 795 ballistic missile launchers, 92 heavy
bombers, 21 ballistic missile submarines, and 729 ballistic
missiles. The CTR program also contributed to our
nonproliferation goals by improving the security around former
Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities.
There is more to do.
With that in mind, we appreciate Congress' decision to
fully fund the President's fiscal year 2002 request and urge a
similar commitment in fiscal year 2003.
September 11 and the anthrax attacks here in the United
States have prompted the Defense Department to consider how the
CTR program might contribute to the global war on terrorism.
You will note that our budget request includes a new program
area called ``weapons of mass destruction proliferation
prevention.'' This new area is intended to help programs
managed by the State Department and the Department of Energy to
enhance capabilities among non-Russian former Soviet states to
deter, detect, and interdict unauthorized movement of weapons
of mass destruction and related materials across their
respective borders.
CTR assistance would help to train military forces, border
guards, customs, and other security personnel in the techniques
and tactics necessary to secure their borders against
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
CTR would also help train these forces to respond
effectively to terrorist incidents at their borders.
The CTR program has made considerable strides by
establishing cooperative relationships with our partners and
helping them dismantle strategic delivery vehicles as soon as
they are removed from operational systems. We have tried to
leverage that success by recasting both the objectives and the
management structure of the CTR.
With respect to management, we have brought CTR's policy
making office under a new deputy under secretariat, though it
will still report through my office to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. The new Office of Deputy Under Secretary
for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation will be
responsible for the Department's input to the interagency
export licensing process through DTSA, the Defense Technology
Security Administration, as well as development of the
Department's counterproliferation policies.
We believe that there are crosscutting national security
issues among these areas, technology security,
counterproliferation and nonproliferation, and cooperative
threat reduction, that we can better address when the
Department's expertise in these areas is under one management
structure.
We expect CTR to play a key role as we try to realize
policy and management synergies across these three areas.
To go further, we have recast CTR's objectives to sharpen
the focus on emerging WMD and proliferation threats and the
individual scientists whose skills are a part of that threat.
We are particularly focused on the growing threat of biological
weapons and bioterrorism. A significant portion of the funds
requested for the biological weapons proliferation prevention
program will be used for targeted, collaborative biological
research, to encourage higher standards of openness, ethics,
and conduct among scientists, and preempt the potential brain
drain of former BW scientists to rogue states.
DOD will partner with international science and technology
centers to initiate projects with scientists in Russia,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Georgia. This
collaborative research will help enhance the transparency of
Former Soviet Union biological weapons facilities.
Through this type of effort, DOD has developed continuous,
routine access to bench-level scientists and leveraged their
expertise to develop measures to counter bioterrorism. We want
to do more in this regard.
In the past, I would also note, these projects have been
thoroughly reviewed by experts from the National Academy of
Science, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID) and the intelligence community. In light of
September 11, we have directed that all these projects and all
future projects will be vetted to prevent access to information
or technology that might be useful to terrorists.
We intend to expand research cooperation with the
ministries of health in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and
Ukraine to build infectious disease surveillance networks in
areas once closed to the West. Such networks will improve our
ability to detect, characterize, and monitor disease outbreaks
with natural or bioterrorist origins. This has taken on greater
importance with the deployment of U.S. forces in Central Asia
and their potential exposure to emerging infectious diseases,
some of which are poorly understood in the West.
Within current authorities and with congressional support
for new flexibility, there is a range of emerging opportunities
for CTR. Planned program activities already help support the
new strategic framework with Russia and can be leveraged to
increase transparency. There are also potential vehicles for
promoting new codes of conduct in the developing U.S.-Russia
relationship.
In the new security environment, CTR's technical and
regional expertise offers a potentially valuable resource in
emergency situations involving the proliferation of WMD or
related matters. We want to work with Congress to determine
whether the current range of authorities and notification
structures permit CTR to be as flexible as it might be in an
emerging crisis. Whether it be responding to a specific
proliferation threat, keeping WMD and related technologies out
of terrorists' hands, or other scenarios, CTR may well have a
key role to play in securing U.S. interests after September 11.
In this and all other CTR endeavors, the Department looks
forward to working with Congress and with this committee in
particular which has played such an important role in founding
and improving this program.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Crouch follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. J.D. Crouch II
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991--the Nunn-Lugar
Act--charged DOD with establishing a program to assist the Soviet Union
and any successor states to destroy, safeguard, and prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Department of
Defense created the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to
implement the Nunn-Lugar Act. This program continues as an important
element of our national security strategy of the 21st century. The
administration's review of nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance to Russia concluded that CTR has significantly contributed
to U.S. national security. Through CTR, the U.S. has assisted states of
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to dismantle, consolidate, and secure
weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery systems,
infrastructure, and technology. Similarly, CTR's defense and military
cooperation with the states of the FSU has also supported the objective
of preventing proliferation.
Based on sustained support from Congress, DOD has obligated nearly
$3 billion since 1992. This investment has produced real dividends.
Moreover, the DOD CTR program helped deactivate 5,829 nuclear warheads
and eliminate 797 ballistic missile launchers, 92 heavy bombers, 21
ballistic missile submarines, and 736 ballistic missiles. Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
in 1993 and 1994 based on promises of United States assistance to rid
their countries of nuclear weapons. [Note: Belarus and Kazakhstan
acceded to the NPT in 1993; Ukraine in 1994.] The CTR program helped
fulfill this promise by 1996. CTR has also helped: (1) eliminate WMD
infrastructure; (2) improve accountability for, and storage and
transport security of, Russian nuclear warheads; and, (3) provide
secure storage for weapons grade fissile material.
Five years ago, CTR initiated a biological weapons (BW) threat
reduction and proliferation prevention program. The massive, highly
covert Soviet offensive BW program left a legacy of vulnerable
technology, pathogens, and expertise. Our first project in this area
was the dismantlement of the Stepnogorsk anthrax production and
weaponization facility in Kazakhstan. This facility was built to
produce and weaponize over 300 tons of agent during a wartime
mobilization period. Today, its dismantlement is nearly complete. In
cooperation with the U.S. Departments of State, Energy, Agriculture,
and Health and Human Services, DOD has been cooperating with biological
research and production centers in Russia and Kazakhstan. These
research projects have given us greater insight into the scope and
magnitude of the FSU's BW program and are intended to prevent the
proliferation of BW expertise to rogue states and terrorists. The BW
proliferation prevention program has grown to include securing
dangerous pathogen collections and dismantlement of additional former
Soviet BW production and research facilities.
CTR has enjoyed sustained bipartisan congressional support since
its inception. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request includes
$416.7 million for DOD's CTR program, a slight increase over the $400
million fiscal year 2002 appropriation.
recasting ctr
September 11 offered a vivid illustration of what a motivated
terrorist organization can accomplish. The specter of terrorists armed
with chemical or biological weapons is especially chilling. In the post
9/11 environment, we need to ensure projects are vetted especially well
from both counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism perspectives.
CTR's current focus and organizational history lend themselves to
addressing the new challenges we face in the post-9/11 environment. CTR
needs evolve if it is to remain relevant to the most pressing national
security threats facing the U.S. With continued support from Congress,
we believe this important program can serve national security in the
future as well as it has since its inception.
In this regard, we have recast both the objectives and the
management structure of CTR. With respect to management, we have
brought CTR's policy-making office under a new deputy under
secretariat, though it still reports through my office to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. The new office is the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and
Counterproliferation. This office is responsible for the Department's
input to the interagency export licensing process, through the Defense
Technology Security Administration, as well as development of the
Department's counterproliferation policies. We believe that there are
cross-cutting national security issues among the areas of technology
security, counterproliferation and nonproliferation that we can better
address when the Department's expertise in these areas is under one
organic management structure.
We expect CTR to play a key role as we try to realize policy and
management synergies across these three areas. To go further, we have
recast the objectives of the CTR program to sharpen the focus on
emerging WMD and proliferation threats.
recast objectives for the ctr program
DOD has revised CTR program objectives to reflect high priority
security and proliferation concerns in the FSU. These overarching
objectives are to:
1. help dismantle Former Soviet Union WMD, delivery systems, and
associated infrastructure;
2. help consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and
materials;
3. help increase transparency and encourage higher standards of
conduct; and
4. help support defense and military cooperation with the objective
of preventing proliferation.
dismantling fsu wmd delivery systems and associated infrastructure
The potential proliferation of FSU nuclear weapons, delivery
systems and related technologies continues to pose a threat to U.S.
national security. Several CTR program areas assist the FSU in
dismantling these items at their sources.
The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $70.5
million for the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) program
area to assist Russia in reducing its strategic nuclear delivery
systems. While this is a reduction from previous years, we have
significant unobligated balances that we plan to apply to SOAE. One of
the larger areas under SOAE--elimination of strategic nuclear
submarines--will require only about $15 million to $20 million total
funding per year in fiscal year 2003 and the future. Russia has fewer
than 20 strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) remaining to
dismantle, and we expect their launchers will be eliminated and the
SSBNs dismantled at the rate of about two per year. In fiscal year
2001, DOD helped Russia eliminate 4 SSBNs, 80 SLBM launchers, 99 SLBMs,
24 SS-18 launchers, and 29 ICBMs.
In addition, Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination projects have
eliminated all of Ukraine's START-accountable nuclear delivery system
launchers and are helping to dismantle WMD infrastructure and delivery
systems (i.e., SS-24 missiles, Tu-22M bombers, and Kh-22 nuclear
capable air-to-surface missiles).
This year, DOD initiated a CTR project with Uzbekistan to eliminate
the Soviet biological weapons testing complex on Vozrozhdeniye Island
and to destroy anthrax that the Soviet military buried there. In
addition, DOD is helping dismantle the former Soviet chemical weapons
research, development, and testing facility at Nukus. In fiscal year
2001, this project dismantled and removed all pilot plant reactors,
vessels, and piping along with lab equipment, filtration systems, and
ducting.
The administration's review of nonproliferation and threat
reduction assistance to Russia endorsed the construction of a CW
destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. Therefore, DOD is requesting $133.6
million for the Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction program in Russia.
These funds also will continue demilitarization of a former CW
production facility in Russia. DOD is assessing whether the Secretary
of Defense can certify CW destruction facility assistance for Russia in
accordance with requirements of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act. In the past 2 years design and site preparation have
moved forward. This has permitted completion of construction
procurement packages for over $200 million worth of work. Thus, once
Russia meets the six conditions, DOD will be able to obligate the
requested funds for this project promptly.
In addition, we have completely eliminated all strategic arms from
Kazakhstan. The fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $8.8 million
for the WMD Infrastructure Elimination-Kazakhstan program to continue
efforts to consolidate and secure fissile and radioactive material,
destroy equipment and facilities that were used to support the
deployment and operation of Soviet WMD and delivery systems, including
liquid missile propellant and a chemical weapons production facility.
consolidate and secure fsu wmd and related technology and materials
DOD's CTR and the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs
support U.S. efforts to prevent the proliferation of FSU WMD and
related technology by consolidating and securing nuclear weapons,
fissile material, chemical weapons, and dangerous pathogen collections.
DOD is seeking $19.7 million for the Nuclear Weapons Transportation
Security program with Russia to continue assisting in consolidation of
nuclear weapons from Russia's Ministry of Defense (MOD) operational
sites to Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) nuclear weapons
dismantlement facilities. In fiscal year 2001, DOD funded 53 rail
shipments designed to carry nuclear warheads to dismantlement sites. We
also funded the maintenance of 79 Russian railcars and contracted for
specialized emergency response vehicles and nuclear weapons recovery
equipment to support MOD training for accidents or incidents involving
nuclear weapons.
We continue to be concerned with the potential for theft or
diversion of Russian nuclear weapons. The $40.0 million for the Nuclear
Weapons Storage Security program area is significantly lower than
requested each of the last 2 years as a result of significant
unobligated prior year balances. We need to complete integration of
enhanced storage site security systems, as well as secure better access
to sites under Russian law. We hope Russia revises its existing
statutes by summer 2002, at which time the program will be able to
obligate funding. During fiscal year 2001, we completed testing and
finalized selection of a suite of security equipment to be installed at
weapons storage sites. We think that the installation of physical
security measures--preferably those which can be utilized without
extensive training--is a good interim solution, pending eventual
dismantlement of nuclear weapons stocks.
While the fiscal year 2003 budget requests no additional funds for
the Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak, Russia, we anticipate
completing construction of this facility in calendar year 2002. Once
operational, it will provide centralized, safe, secure, and
ecologically sound storage of up to 50 metric tons of weapons-grade
plutonium and 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) removed
from nuclear weapons. Russia plans to begin loading it with fissile
material from dismantled nuclear weapons in late 2002 or early 2003.
Increased cooperation with former biological weapons designers and
engineers in the FSU has enabled us to identify and gain access to
research and production centers that house dangerous pathogens,
technology, and expertise. The fiscal year 2003 budget request includes
$55 million for the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP)
program area to consolidate, secure, or eliminate dangerous pathogen
collections at former Soviet biological research and production
centers, and to dismantle former Soviet BW research and production
facilities. In fiscal year 2001, DOD continued four ongoing pathogen
bio-security projects and developed bio-security projects at six
additional sites; continued dismantlement of the former BW production
facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan; and initiated dismantlement of the
former BW test facility at Vozrozhdeniya Island.
increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct
A significant portion of the funds requested for the BWPP program
area will also be used for targeted collaborative biological research
to encourage higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct among
scientists and preempt potential ``brain drain'' of former BW
scientists to rogue states. DOD will partner with State Department's
International Science and Technology Centers to initiate projects with
scientists in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.
This collaborative research will enhance the transparency of FSU BW
facilities. Through this effort, DOD has developed continuous, routine
access to bench-level scientists, and leveraged their expertise to
develop measures to counter bio-terrorism.
DOD intends to expand research cooperation with Ministry of Health
institutes in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Ukraine to build
infectious disease surveillance networks in areas once closed to the
west. Such networks will improve our ability to detect, characterize,
and monitor disease outbreaks with natural or bio-terrorist origins.
This has taken on greater importance with the deployment of U.S. forces
in Central Asia and their potential exposure to emerging infectious
diseases poorly understood in the west. Additionally, such networks
will assist public health officials in the affected republics.
support defense and military cooperation with the objective of
preventing proliferation
The fiscal year 2003 budget requests $40 million for a new
initiative designed to enhance non-Russian FSU military, internal
security forces, border guards and customs agents capabilities to
prevent, deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and
related materials, and to respond effectively to trafficking incidents
at the border. This initiative will provide training, equipment, and
infrastructure designed to enhance recipient countries' capabilities to
prevent WMD or related materials from falling into the hands of
terrorists and rogue states.
emerging opportunities for ctr
Within current authorities, and with congressional support for new
flexibility, there are a range of emerging opportunities for CTR.
Planned program activities already help support the new strategic
framework with Russia and can be leveraged to increase transparency.
They are also potential vehicles for promoting new codes of conduct in
the developing U.S.-Russia relationship.
In the new security environment, CTR's technical and regional
expertise offer a potentially invaluable resource in emergency
situations involving proliferation of WMD or related matters. We want
to work with Congress to determine whether the current range of
authorities and notification structures permits CTR to be as flexible
as it might be in an emerging crisis. Whether it be responding to a
specific proliferation threat, keeping WMD and related technologies out
of terrorists' hands, or other scenarios, CTR has a key role to play in
securing U.S. interests post-September 11.
In this and all other CTR endeavors, we look forward to working
with Congress, which has played such an important role in founding and
improving this program.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Ambassador Brooks. Thank you. Like my colleague, I have a
longer statement, which I would appreciate being placed in the
record, and I will summarize it.
Senator Roberts. Super. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Brooks. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you to talk about the National Nuclear Security
Administration's nonproliferation programs.
As Senator Roberts mentioned, this is my first opportunity
to testify before this subcommittee. I am conscious of the
great support that we have received from this subcommittee in
the past as we try to stem the spread of nuclear weapons,
nuclear materials, and nuclear knowledge. I look forward to
continued close cooperation.
I also want to note at the beginning that our progress has
benefitted immensely from a cooperative relationship with
Russia that President Bush has forged. In this new
relationship, we have also benefitted very strongly from the
personal involvement and leadership of the Secretary of Energy.
Secretary Abraham and the Minister of Atomic Energy in Russia
have worked together to accelerate our protection efforts to
try to remove bureaucratic roadblocks. We have been very
fortunate in the support that we have received from both the
Secretary and from the NNSA Administrator, General Gordon.
That is particularly important because, as it is to
everybody in this room, in the aftermath of September 11, it is
clear to me just how complex the threat environment is. The
sophistication required to carry out the September 11 attacks
make some of the threats that we are trying to guard against in
Russia look a little less far-fetched.
We have made enormous strides in Russia in securing nuclear
materials and in protecting nuclear technology and expertise.
But the unfortunate fact is that only a relatively small amount
of HEU or plutonium is necessary for a nuclear device.
Therefore, we cannot allow our guard to drop. We have to
continue to accelerate these efforts because it is very clear
that the people who perpetrated September 11 would not hesitate
to use nuclear weapons if they were able to get them.
The programs in the National Nuclear Security
Administration are one element--in our view obviously an
important element--of U.S. efforts to reduce such threats. We
are built around four pillars: technology research and
development, promotion of international nuclear safety, threat
reduction efforts in Russia and elsewhere, and finally general
support for international nonproliferation regimes.
Our budget request for these initiatives is $1.3 billion.
It is a 36 percent increase from the last budget of the
previous administration. I make that point only because I hope
that there will be nobody in the room who will have any doubt
of this administration's firm commitment to stemming
proliferation and supporting these important programs.
Let me turn now and review briefly the programs.
Our research and development effort is built around
detecting proliferation, monitoring for nuclear explosions, and
responding to biological and chemical attacks. We are
requesting $283 million for these initiatives. They improve
existing detection capabilities and response times for a wide
variety of chemical threats. For example, we developed the
prototype biological agent system that was deployed at the
Olympics. We developed the system recently demonstrated in the
Washington Metro for detecting and responding to chemical
attack. We are developing a new generation of nuclear
detonation sensors that will fly on global positioning system
satellites. It is easy to ignore research and development
because it does not contribute to solving today's problem, but
it is absolutely crucial if we are to prevent tomorrow's
problem.
We have also been accelerating, particularly since
September 11, nuclear material protection programs in Russia.
These programs are based on the philosophy of low technology,
high pay-off solutions; low technology so that they can be
effectively maintained. With the full funding of our request,
we expect to complete all the scheduled work in Russia by 2008.
That is 2 years earlier than we would have expected to complete
it 6 months ago. We will also be accelerating the Second Line
of Defense program. This is a program to install monitors to
detect nuclear materials at border crossings and is intended to
provide a second line of defense if material in the Russian
Federation and elsewhere comes into the hands of terrorists or
other rogues. In fiscal year 2003, we will install new
equipment at 21 additional sites in Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine.
Senator Roberts mentioned the notion of so-called dirty
bombs. Our fiscal year 2003 request includes an effort to look
at so-called radiological dispersal devices. We have not looked
at them in the past because they are not directly
nonproliferation related, but they do have a use for
terrorists, and we will look to see whether there is something
useful that can be done to secure them in the Russian
Federation.
Our budget requests $39 million for programs to prevent the
migration of knowledge from Russia. We have combined the
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) and the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP) into a new program called
Russian Transition Initiatives. The programs now share a common
manager and common procedures while preserving their separate
focus on scientists and on infrastructure. We are pleased with
the success we have had with finding peaceful employment for
former weapons scientists. We are seeing a number of commercial
initiatives that are directly relevant to how we address
terrorist threats.
On the Nuclear Cities portion, 2 weeks ago we negotiated an
agreement to ensure access to the closed cities. This builds on
the written agreement of last fall to cease all nuclear weapons
work at the Russian facility, Avangard, and we look forward now
with some of these bureaucratic obstacles out of the way to
increased effectiveness on this program.
In another new effort for me, the administration, as a
result of its review of nonproliferation programs, has decided
to transfer the responsibility for shutting down plutonium
production reactors in Russia from the Department of Defense to
the Department of Energy. These reactors are still producing
plutonium. They are also producing heat and light for their
associated communities. We will provide replacement heating and
lighting capability, and based on our budget request, we hope
to have all of these reactors shut down by 2007. We believe it
is important to move forward with this effort. We are working
to have unobligated prior year balances transferred from the
Department of Defense in the amount of $74 million. Some of
that money comes encumbered with some restrictions on fossil
fuel plants, and we will be working with the committee to find
a way to lift those restrictions.
In nonproliferation and international security, we will
continue our export control activities, our support for the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and our efforts to
safeguard nuclear materials outside of Russia. We will also
continue efforts to explore how technology can work to improve
regional stability and thus reduce demand for weapons of mass
destruction.
Finally and perhaps the most spectacular new part of this
budget, our fiscal year 2003 request would fund the program to
dispose of surplus weapons grade plutonium through the
irradiation of mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel in commercial nuclear
reactors. This was the result of a major review of this program
conducted beginning last spring. Our revised program will
confirm our commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons of
plutonium, and match that commitment with the disposition of a
comparable amount of Russian plutonium. It will result in a
savings of about $2 billion over the next 20 years compared to
the previous program. It will result in less technical risks,
lower peak year funding, and a 3-year acceleration of the
program.
We are now working with the Russians to seek comparable
efficiencies in their own program and with other countries to
provide financial assistance to Russia in meeting their
obligation.
With the end of the Cold War and especially since last
September, all of us have had to think hard about security,
especially nuclear security. It is the administration's view
and my view that we attack the problem on many fronts, working
with our colleagues in the Defense Department and our
colleagues in the State Department to cut off the supply of
materials and tighten international borders. It will take a
sustained effort to meet these objectives. That is why I am so
honored to have these new responsibilities where I hope to help
make a difference. In doing that, I will benefit, I hope, in
the future, as my predecessors have benefitted in the past,
from the support of this committee.
Thank you very much for your attention and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brooks follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Good morning, and thank you, Madam Chairman, for the opportunity to
come before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of
the Senate Armed Services Committee to discuss the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) nuclear
nonproliferation programs. This is my first opportunity to address this
subcommittee since assuming my responsibilities as the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. Before addressing
our specific programs, I want to say how important I consider this
subcommittee's contribution as the United States works to establish
sound approaches to stemming the spread of nuclear weapons, materials,
technology, and expertise. I appreciate the subcommittee's support and
I look forward to continuing working together in the future.
For all Americans, the events of September 11 were a rude
awakening. The attacks forced the United States to come to grips with
its own vulnerability. Americans now have to accept just how
dramatically the threat has changed. At this somber moment, there is
some reason for optimism. The good news is that the Cold War is over;
President Bush has been masterful in moving this Nation beyond that
conflict once and for all, and establishing a new, cooperative
relationship with Russia. As the President has said, ``We're
transforming our relationship from one of hostility and suspicion to
one based on cooperation and trust, that will enhance opportunities for
peace and progress for our citizens and for our people all around the
world. Russia and America share the same threat and the same resolve.''
As we transform our relationship, there are few better examples of
our success than our cooperative nonproliferation programs with Russia.
Here we have benefited from the support and leadership of the Secretary
of Energy, Spencer Abraham. No one has been more energetic and
dedicated than Secretary Abraham in putting into action the President's
vision. He has established a strong partnership with his counterpart,
Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev. Shortly after
the Crawford summit, the Secretary and Minister Rumyantsev agreed to
accelerate our material protection efforts in Russia, to work together
to foster international cooperation in protecting nuclear material and
to enhance the international nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime,
and establish a process to ensure that their subordinates followed up
on their decisions.
As a result of the Secretary's efforts, our Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program has been accelerated, and we're
enjoying unprecedented access in Russia--better than we've ever
experienced. The Department has also been in the forefront of
international efforts to improve the physical protection of nuclear
materials. Since September 11, the Secretary has addressed the
International Atomic Energy Agency twice--including an unprecedented
appearance before the IAEA's Board of Governors. We are fortunate to
have the strong support of both the Secretary and NNSA Administrator
General Gordon.
So I feel confident about where our relationship with Russia is
headed. But President Bush had it right: Even with the collapse of the
Soviet empire, the United States is hardly ``out of the woods.'' We
need to be concerned about the new threats our country faces--nations
acquiring nuclear weapons technologies, as well as terrorist networks
and entities that will apparently stop at nothing in their pursuit of
WMD. These are threats that are immediate and, in many ways, more
dangerous than what the United States experienced in the past. The
terrorists with whom we are at war do not appear to perceive the same
constraints that Russia demonstrated during the Cold War. Their wanton
disregard for the value of human life has been amply demonstrated. They
are prepared, in fact determined, to use the most destructive weapons
available to them--deterrence is not yet a word in their vocabularies.
The events of September 11 have given this discussion a very real
and immediate meaning. As the NNSA develops and implements its non-
proliferation activities, we've also had to think hard about how
counterterrorism activities are integrated into what we do. In some
ways, there are strong correlations; in other ways, the linkages are
not as immediately clear, but there nonetheless.
The problem that we confront--at the heart of the relationship
between our nonproliferation and counter-terrorism concerns, is two-
sided--it has a supply and demand side component. There are now any
number of actors--so called ``rogue'' states, as well as terrorist
organizations--that are seeking somehow to attain WMD capabilities and
expertise. The international community sees a crisis in the fact that
accelerated measures are needed to improve the physical protection of
nuclear materials worldwide, to improve control and accounting over
this material, and to strengthen export controls and prevent illegal
trafficking and handling of nuclear materials. But these rogue actors
view this crisis as an opportunity.
In Russia and elsewhere, enormous strides have been made in
securing this material. But the fact remains that the theft of only a
few kilograms of HEU or plutonium, the deadly ingredients needed to
fashion a nuclear device, would be enough for a weapon. This under-
secured material--the supply side of the problem--is just too tempting
a potential target of opportunity for those who would seek to use it
against the civilized world. Indeed, the IAEA reports that in the last
decade alone, there have been almost 200 attempts to illicitly acquire
such material, and that's just the known cases.
So these are the risks that our programs are trying to address. The
prospect that weapon-usable material could be stolen or sold to
terrorists or hostile nation states, and used against American citizens
is a clear and present danger that cannot be underestimated.
NNSA is working hard to reduce this threat. Our programs are key
elements to U.S. efforts to reduce terrorist threats, while denying
opportunities for rogue actors to acquire materials that can make WMD.
These programs are designed to detect the proliferation of WMD
worldwide; prevent the spread of WMD material, technology, and
expertise; and reverse the proliferation of WMD, while at the same time
improving nuclear safety and security worldwide. We pursue these
objectives through technology research and development; promotion of
international nonproliferation and security objectives and nuclear
safety; and our non-proliferation programs with Russia.
Before I turn to specific details, let me make one overriding
point. There was concern on the part of some last year that the
administration was not committed to non-proliferation. I believe that
critics confused prudent review of programs with lack of interest. In
any event, the budget before you--which is 36 percent above the last
budget of the previous administration--should resolve any lingering
doubts of the seriousness with which we are approaching these important
issues.
technology research and development
NNSA nonproliferation and verification research and development
initiatives advance the U.S. ability to detect proliferation, monitor
for nuclear explosions, develop biological and chemical response
technologies, and conduct demonstrations that will help find the means
to detect potential threats to national security more quickly.
As this description indicates, the charter for our R&D work goes
beyond nuclear nonproliferation and includes important work in areas
such as biological and chemical detection. Over the past year, for
example, NNSA deployed a prototype biological agent detection system
used at the Winter Olympics, demonstrated a prototype chemical agent
detection and response system in the Washington Metro, began to operate
a new generation of nuclear detonation detection sensors on GPS
satellites, and continued to demonstrate highly accurate thermometry
from space, with the DOE Multispectral Thermal Imager satellite that
was launched in March 2000.
Looking ahead, our research and development programs will emphasize
efforts that will produce direct near-term applications that can be
fielded in 2 years or less. Our request of $283,407,000 will allow us
to advance our efforts to develop and test technologies for detecting
terrorist and proliferation activities involving WMD and transition
those capabilities to responsible user agencies; perform increased DNA
sequencing and assay development for an increased number of biological
agents, and develop the concomitant detection capabilities, improve
existing detection capabilities and response times for a wide range of
chemical threat agents; and improve the sensitivities of nuclear
explosion monitoring capabilities.
international nonproliferation programs: a fresh look
As you likely know, the administration recently completed a
comprehensive and detailed review of its nuclear nonproliferation
programs with Russia. This review was exhaustive and took some months
to complete. We felt it important to take the time necessary to do it
right, and to ensure that these programs were thoroughly considered for
their continued usefulness and viability.
I could not be more pleased with the outcome of that review, which
reaffirmed the fundamental importance of our programs and concluded
that most U.S. programs to assist Russia work well, are focused on
priority tasks, and are well managed. The review recommended expansion
of some programs, adjustment of others, and in some cases,
consolidation. We are actively engaged in implementing the
recommendations of that review.
The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
program is already a success story and gives us much to build upon. The
program provides high payoff, low-tech solutions to the pressing
problem of under-secured nuclear materials in Russia. Security upgrades
have been completed or are underway on about a third of the estimated
600 metric tons of Russia's weapons-usable material; hundreds of trucks
and railcars have been made more secure through hardening and other
measures; steps are being taken to consolidate nuclear material at
fewer locations, reducing its vulnerability to theft or sabotage; and
our experts are working with their Russian counterparts to more
effectively respond to any terrorist threat.
With full funding of our request, NNSA will complete this program
by 2008--2 years ahead of schedule. NNSA will work to accelerate the
rapid and comprehensive security upgrades on at-risk plutonium, highly
enriched uranium, and naval nuclear weapons at over 40 Russian Navy
sites. This is real threat reduction.
We are planning to complete the transition of the Material
Consolidation and Conversion Pilot Project to a full-scale program.
Under that program, which has already converted 1.2 metric tons of HEU
to low-enriched uranium (LEU), we hope in fiscal year 2003 to eliminate
an additional 2.9 metric tons of HEU the same way. We will also work to
harden an additional 70 trucks and 9 railcars, in order to reduce their
vulnerability to attack or sabotage.
In related efforts, NNSA will accelerate the Second Line of Defense
program, installing radiation detection equipment at 21 additional
strategic transit and border sites in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
The fiscal year 2003 budget requests $39.3 million to fund NNSA
programs to prevent the adverse migration of WMD expertise from the
former Soviet Republics. The Nuclear Cities Initiative has been
refocused and consolidated with its highly successful sister program,
the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, under a new program
called Russian Transition Initiatives. The two programs share a common
senior manager, and both now focus on projects with commercial
applications. Last year, IPP successfully garnered an additional $56
million in private investment funding to further augment its technology
commercialization efforts. No other nonproliferation program in the
U.S. Government has been as successful attracting private equity funds
to help commercialize its own efforts.
By finding commercial, peaceful employment for former Russian
weapons scientists, we not only create commercial opportunities for
U.S. industry, but we also dramatically reduce the talent pool
available to those states that would employ those individuals for their
own evil ends.
These scientists are involved in any number of programs that will
play a big role in how we address today's threats. Needle-free injector
systems for mass inoculations; light-weight radiation detectors to
detect smuggling of nuclear materials; and other innovative projects
will have direct relevance to our counter-terrorism efforts--what a
tremendous resource to have on our side, as we seek innovative
solutions to the threats that confront us today.
NCI also had a highly successful year. It negotiated a written
commitment from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) to end
nuclear weapons work at the Avangard plant by the end of 2003, and
successfully negotiated and signed an access arrangement with MinAtom
to regulate the terms of access to closed nuclear cities. This
arrangement should provide a significant impetus to NCI efforts.
Indeed, it is fair to say that NNSA is in its strongest position it has
ever enjoyed, with respect to the access we stand to gain and our
ability to facilitate the downsizing of Russia's nuclear complex.
As part of its review, the administration has decided to transfer
from the Department of Defense to the Department of Energy
responsibility for the elimination of weapons-grade plutonium
production in Russia. This will lead to the eventual shutdown of
reactors in Russia that are still producing plutonium, and the
provision of required heating and electricity for the local communities
with fossil fuel plants. Beginning with the fiscal year 2003 request,
DOE will assume responsibility for obtaining the required funding and
for accomplishing this important nonproliferation objective by the end
of 2007. We believe it is important to move forward with this, through
the transfer and use of the DOD unobligated prior year balances in the
amount of $74 million. We will need legislative help on this, as well
as with removing restrictions against the use of this money for the
construction of the fossil fuel plants.
Our Nonproliferation and International Security request of $93
million is essential to help attack the demand as well as the supply
side of the proliferation problem. This includes our efforts to address
under-secured nuclear materials worldwide, provide opportunities for
regional security programs that may help to reduce proliferation
incentives, support the International Atomic Energy Agency, and
strengthen international nonproliferation problems. It will support
NNSA efforts to develop capabilities to help monitor warhead
dismantlement efforts in Russia, and develop lab-to-lab contacts with
Russia to support U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. This budget funds
efforts to accelerate work with known and emerging nuclear suppliers to
control the export of dual-use and nuclear technologies, and to provide
support for work to improve foreign regulatory, legal, and industrial-
level export control systems.
The fiscal year 2003 request would fully fund the program to
dispose of surplus U.S. weapons-grade plutonium through the irradiation
of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. This reflects
an important decision of the Bush administration: After considerable
study, we have reaffirmed our commitment to dispose of 34 metric tons
of U.S. surplus weapons-grade plutonium, while an equal amount is
disposed of in Russia. The United States will turn this material into
MOX fuel for use in commercial nuclear reactors.
Some challenged this program because of the cost of U.S. disposal.
By revising our plans to focus excusively on MOX (thus dropping the
companion immobilization program proposed by the previous
administration), we've scaled back the cost for U.S. disposal to $3.8
billion over 20 years, a savings of almost $2 billion over the life of
the program. We've also reduced peak year funding, accelerated the
completion of the program by 3 years, and reduced technical risk. The
United States is also working with other countries to provide
assistance to Russia in meeting its obligations.
As a result of these efforts, Russia will eliminate enough
plutonium to make over 4,200 nuclear weapons. We are working closely
with Russia to improve the efficiency of Russia's program, and we are
working with our allies to secure adequate international support.
conclusion
It's now impossible to separate nonproliferation and counter-
terrorism concerns, and I hope it is clear from my comments today that
NNSA understands how the threat has evolved, and is taking proactive
steps to address it.
With the end of the Cold War, all Americans have had to re-think
their concepts of security--including nuclear security. For me
personally, I have come to the conclusion that security from
proliferation and terrorist threat is only attainable if we attack the
problem on many fronts, from many directions. The U.S. needs to cut off
the supply of dangerous materials, as our programs to improve the
security of weapons-usable material in Russia seek to do. We have to
reduce the demand, by reducing the motivation for proliferation and
squashing the power centers of those that would want to harm us. We
have to make it more difficult for these materials to leave Rusia and
other places by tightening international borders, and we have to
tighten our own borders, as our programs carried out in conjunction
with the Coast Guard seek to do.
This is a multi-faceted task, and it's not one that will be
completed overnight. It will take a long, sustained effort. That's why
I'm so honored to be in my current position, where I have the
opportunity under General Gordon to help make progress on all these
fronts. It will be difficult, but I have no doubt that we have the will
and the determination to get the job done.
I hope I've given you a broad sense of our budget priorities, and I
look forward to working with you over the coming year to advance our
common interest in reducing proliferation threats.
I'll be happy to take your questions.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you very much.
We have been joined by Senator Carnahan. We have given
brief opening statements, but if you would like to submit an
opening statement, Senator, or make any remarks at this time,
please go ahead.
Senator Carnahan. I have a brief opening statement, if that
is all right. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I also want to welcome this distinguished panel today. I am
looking forward to hearing the witnesses' testimony and their
answers to questions on the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, as well as the Department of Energy's nonproliferation
programs.
The newspapers in recent days have been filled with
troubling stories about the deployment of nuclear detection
devices and the existence of a shadow government to take over
should a nuclear attack cripple our capital city. The nuclear
threat is very real and we need to address this issue on as
many fronts as possible.
Our nonproliferation programs are, as former Defense
Secretary William Perry said, ``defense by other means,'' and
for the amount we spend on them, we buy a lot of prevention. It
is far more effective to destroy weapons on site than to deal
with them once they have fallen into the hands of the enemy. It
is far more effective to provide security for nuclear materials
across the globe than to try and detect this material when
terrorists attempt to smuggle it across our borders.
Our threat reduction programs generally enjoy bipartisan
support, but there are some detractors who believe these
programs are needless foreign aid. They are not. The programs
are essential to our national security.
The questions before this subcommittee are how much of our
defense budget should be dedicated to these programs and should
the programs be expanded to address the new threats facing our
Nation.
Madam Chairman, failure is not an option. We want the
history books 20 years from now to say that we did everything
in our power to prevent terrorists from gaining access to
nuclear or radiological devices. We do not want them bemoaning
the road not taken.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your
efforts on this subcommittee.
We are going to have a round of questions of 6 minutes and,
if we have time, come back for a second round.
Let me begin by asking a question about border control.
Both of you mentioned this in your opening statements, and in
this budget before us, DOE has worked with Russia now for many
years to install, as you mentioned, sophisticated, rugged
radiation detection devices. In this budget, DOD has proposed
to use as much as $80 million for a similar program. Have you
two discussed these programs? Is something being done jointly
on similar technologies or some coordination of these efforts,
or is that necessary? If so, why? If not, why not?
Dr. Crouch. I would just say that the answer is yes. There
is a very effective, I think, interagency process that looks at
all of these initiatives. I work very closely with Ambassador
Brooks on these issues, as well as with colleagues at the State
Department and the National Security Council staff. So, all of
our new initiatives, as well as their new initiatives, have
been vetted from an interagency standpoint, and we plan to make
sure that we are not duplicating efforts. I know that one of
the things the subcommittee is concerned about, and certainly
that I am concerned about as somebody who works for the
taxpayer, is that we do not do that. So, that is uppermost in
our minds. But we do think that there are additional
opportunities for promoting border security in these areas, and
that is why we thought it was an area on which the Department
would be able to help.
Senator Landrieu. Ambassador?
Ambassador Brooks. I agree with Dr. Crouch.
We coordinate closely. To ensure that continued
coordination, I have recently assigned a member of the Senior
Executive Service full-time to work for the Director of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), who implements many of
the defense programs to make sure that we are coordinated at
the working level and the implementation level. We operate
under a division of labor approach. My programs are technology
detection programs. Dr. Crouch spoke also of training. We are
also in different countries. His program is in several
countries that I am not. Our efforts in the coming years are
concentrated in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
Senator Landrieu. I appreciate that. I think this
cooperation is very important not only because I do think it is
critical that we save money where we can but also so that we
can spend it in places where we really need it. The cooperation
I think is important, and I appreciate your statement.
Let me ask this. Since there are always better ways to
manage and better ways to restructure all of our work, could
you both mention just briefly what are some of the roadblocks,
either large or small, that you have seen in implementing some
of the programs under your jurisdiction as effectively and as
efficiently as you would like? Do any come to your minds,
either large or small?
I will give you an example of a small one. We understand
the process of processing travel requests in a timely manner
through the State Department is a real problem in terms of some
of the programs that we are trying to implement for scientists
moving backwards and forwards. That would be an example of a
roadblock. Do any others come to mind, large or small?
Ambassador Brooks. First, let me address specifically the
question you mentioned about travel. If you recall, the Baker-
Cutler report, which was a review of the Department of Energy
programs issued about 13 months ago, explicitly looked at that
area and found that there were weaknesses. We have done a
number of things to improve that process.
First of all, when I was confirmed, there was in progress
an ongoing review of working arrangements between the
Department of State, Department of Energy, and the Moscow
embassy. We reviewed and implemented the results of that
review.
Second, I have assigned an experienced nonproliferation
officer to the cognizant bureau in the Department of State
full-time, working on a variety of issues to improve our
coordination but also ensuring that travel issues are promptly
processed.
Third, I have assigned my deputy to work with the
Department of State to make sure that we do not have policy
differences. These mostly come about because of some tension
between our wanting to send enough people to get the job done
and the Moscow embassy not wanting to overload the system.
Since that assignment a few months ago, there has been in my
view a complete improvement.
Fourth, we have established an office of international
operations reporting directly to my deputy that, among other
things, manages travel for all of my programs and is intended
to centralize and speed up the program.
Finally, I conducted a review of travel procedures which is
going to result within the next few days in some mandated
simplification to our DOE procedures. Most of this will not
actually happen now. It will just go to cumbersome bureaucracy,
but cumbersome bureaucracy turns into a speed issue. So, I
think that particular problem we have recognized and I am
reasonably pleased we have attacked it.
With regard to other obstacles, there is a growing
authority in Russia from the security services. A growing power
and influence on the part of the Russian security services, the
Federal Security Bureau (FSB) in particular.
What this means is that access that used to be easy is more
difficult than it was 2 or 3 years ago. That's the reason why
the access agreement we signed in September on material
protection and the access arrangement was signed last month on
nuclear cities are so important to us because we now need that
to allow those in Russia who want to work with us to satisfy
the requirements of their security bureaucracy. That is also
why Secretary Abraham made such a point in his meeting with the
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy to reach an agreement that
they personally would hold their subordinates accountable for
removing obstacles. I cannot speak for the Minister of Atomic
Energy, but it is very clear to me that the Secretary is
serious about that.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. My time is expired.
Dr. Crouch. It sounds to me like Ambassador Brooks has
spent more time on the travel issue than I have.
Ambassador Brooks. I needed to.
Dr. Crouch. We have not experienced, I do not think, the
same level of difficulty in that particular area, so I do not
really have a lot to say on that particular issue.
I would underscore one thing, that this is a cooperative
threat reduction program, and that means that we have to
cooperate with the countries that we are dealing with. In some
cases--he mentioned the issue of the increasing power of the
FSB--we have to negotiate, in many ways, our way to get access
to particular things. In Russia, this continues to be a problem
and it is something that we bring up at high levels with the
Russians when we meet with them, pushing transparency not just
in this program, but across the board. So, this continues to be
an obstacle, particularly in Russia, and we are trying to get
them to come around to seeing the benefits of giving us the
kind of transparency and access that we need to be really
accountable to you and to the taxpayer for the expenditure of
these funds.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairman.
I have an overarching question for both of you that I think
has keen implications for our national security, and prior to
asking it, I want to underscore again my very strong support
for the CTR programs, working closely with Senator Lugar and
having personal visits with Senator Nunn. It is a special
program. It is a unique program that has very unique standing
now.
We have worked hard in this subcommittee and in a
bipartisan way to obtain the Russian commitments that you have
just outlined. I think that they have come a long way in good
faith, or at least the participants, in regards to the program,
although I am troubled to some extent, Ambassador Brooks, about
the influence of the security departments over in Russia or the
security forces. We have worked hard for international support.
We have worked hard for transparency. We have worked hard for
access. We have worked hard for cost-benefit criteria that make
sense. We have worked hard to make sure that the actual dollars
go to the programs in Russia as opposed to agencies in the
United States simply for planning purposes, although some of
that is needed. So, I am a very strong supporter of these
programs. As a matter of fact, I can report that since we have
the broad jurisdiction, Madam Chairman, there are usually five
or six from the House side that would be expressing some
reservations, and we were able over several years to answer
those concerns.
Now, for my questions to both of you. What level of effort
is your office undertaking to ensure that any money that is
provided to Russia is not diverted to the Russian modernization
of its military capability? With what degree of confidence can
you assure us that no U.S. money provided under the CTR program
is being used for Russian military modernization, and further,
what would be required to state with confidence that no
diversion is actually occurring? Feel free, either one of you,
to respond.
Dr. Crouch. That is a very serious question, Senator. I
think it is certainly a question that we think about in the
Department of Defense all the time when we look at these
programs. I think there are, first of all, two different ways
of looking at it. Is money directly going or is money
indirectly going? I am going to assume that your main concern
is the direct funding.
Obviously, money is fungible. For example, if we were to
cut up a submarine under the CTR program that the Russians
would be required under START I to cut up, there is no doubt
that we are saving the Russian federal budget money when we do
that. Now, we believe that that is in our interest to do that,
and so we have supported doing that.
But I think a more serious issue is direct funding, and it
is one of the things that we look at very closely when we look
at programs, whether or not, for example, in the biotech area,
could we possibly be indirectly funding biotech research. I
mentioned in my prepared statement that not only do we have the
National Academy of Sciences and the USAMRIID, as well as the
intelligence community, look at those projects individually, on
all future projects we are now having our export control people
monitor those, as well as we are looking at them from a
counterproliferation standpoint. What might be learned, for
example, that we would not want learned about our own
counterproliferation capabilities?
In terms of assurances, I think it would be very difficult
to assure you, the way I think your question was phrased, that
no money is going for modernization. I do not know that I would
ever be able to assure you of that. But I think that the way we
have reorganized the office, the way we are paying attention to
this potential, I think we have a pretty high confidence that
there is little or no money for modernization. In fact, one of
the things that is exceptional about the CTR program is the
fact that we focus on specific projects. We are not providing
money per se most of the time. We have a very strict auditing
process. There are a lot of Americans involved in that process.
So, we have a pretty good idea across the board that the things
that we want to spend that money on, the money is actually
being spent on.
Ambassador Brooks. We have a comparable philosophy. We
focus project by project. For each project, we conduct an
internal review that involves the intelligence community to
make sure that we are not providing improvements in military
capability. We have turned down things where we have judged a
possible military benefit--improved communications systems, for
example, where you can see a benefit for safety and security,
but you can also see a benefit for military readiness, and we
have chosen to turn them down.
In general, most of what we fund in terms of protection, I
am not sure the Russians would fund. So, it is not quite the
same situation as with the things they are obligated to do
under START, but still the dollars that we spend are fungible.
So, in that sense, any help has some benefit to them.
We use a contract system which involves, among other
things, not paying until the work is done and verified by U.S.
personnel so that we are reasonably confident that we are
getting what we pay for, and we involve U.S. personnel both in
the design and the oversight of the work, although the work
itself is mostly done in Russia by Russians.
So, I think that that combination gives us reasonable
assurance that the bulk of the money is going where we want it
to and it is improving material protection. But like Dr.
Crouch, 100 percent assurance of anything in Russia I think is
not feasible--I cannot tell you that there is not a dollar that
went in the wrong place. I can tell you there are not a lot of
dollars that went in the wrong place.
Senator Roberts. Madam Chairman, my time is expired. I do
hope we have an opportunity for a second round, as I have some
additional questions. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. We will.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Ambassador Brooks, it is hard to imagine
how the tragedy of September 11 could have been any worse, but
at the same time many of us have wondered what the devastation
would have been like had the terrorists used nuclear or
biological weapons, if they had had these on the hijacked plane
that crashed that day.
Since that time, greater attention has been focused on
terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction. What has your
agency done differently since September 11 and have you
developed additional programs that seek to address these new
threats?
Ambassador Brooks. In most cases what September 11 did for
us, Senator, was give us a renewed sense of urgency. We were
seeking to prevent materials and weapons from coming into the
control of people we do not want to have control of them and
whether those people are terrorists or rogue states does not
much matter to the gate and the security system.
Specifically, however, we have placed more emphasis on
chemical and biological detection research. I mentioned that we
have an experimental biological detection system called BASIS
that was deployed at the Winter Olympics.
We are also proposing in this budget to look at whether or
not there is something we can do in Russia to secure
radiological devices and things like radiographic sources.
Those are things that are useful in making so-called
radiological weapons which are interesting weapons to
terrorists but not particularly interesting weapons to rogue
states. We are suggesting spending about $15 million on it in
2003.
But I think that the real difference after September 11 is
a renewed sense of urgency about the protection programs.
Senator Carnahan. Our nonproliferation programs have a
remarkable record in curbing the spread of nuclear material
throughout the world. Recently, the Energy Department
instituted upgrades to its security programs in Russia, helping
to install gates and train guards and to board up facility
windows. These upgrades were relatively low-cost initiatives,
but I believe they are essential for enhancing security at
former Soviet nuclear facilities.
Would you describe these upgrades and explain their
importance to the subcommittee?
Ambassador Brooks. Certainly, Senator. We use a two-phase
system in the work that we do. There is a division of labor
between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense.
I do materials in the custody of the Ministry of Atomic Energy
and I do weapons and unused fuel in the custody of the Russian
navy, and the Department of Defense does the national strategic
sites.
We use an approach that starts with so-called rapid
upgrades. Those are things that improve doors, improve tamper
seals, relatively quick efforts. We have completed, for
example, of the 53 Navy sites, rapid upgrades on 48 of them. We
will complete four more this year and the final one next year.
Then we move to much more expensive, several-million-
dollars-a-site, comprehensive upgrades. This uses more
technology, and focuses on more sophisticated material
controls. There we have only completed about a third of the
sites and we will be completing more in the coming years.
The emphasis here, however, continues to be on technology
that is supportable locally. That is why we sometimes refer to
this as a low-tech solution because ultimately the maintenance
of this is a Russian responsibility and we need to make sure
that we are not just putting in technology that can only be
supported in the United States.
Senator Carnahan. One final question, Mr. Ambassador. As
you stated in your testimony, our nonproliferation programs
have been quite successful in Russia and the Former Soviet
Union, and these upgrades are simple and they are low-cost and
low-tech. Are there ways to expand these efforts in a
cooperative manner to other countries in the world that have
nuclear facilities?
Ambassador Brooks. Senator, we already do comparable
efforts in some other countries. For example, in the former
Soviet republics, we already worry about protection of unused
reactor fuel or spent fuel that might be suitable for
reprocessing.
With regard to broader efforts, the most obvious question
is the question of the Indian subcontinent, but once again, you
will note, as Dr. Crouch said, we speak of cooperative
programs. Although I think the Secretary of State has publicly
said that we would be happy to assist if there were something
for us to do, thus far those governments have not chosen to ask
for assistance.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Let me begin the second round with a question about Voz
Island, which is, you may be aware, in the Aral Sea. It is
partly controlled by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The island was
a Soviet open-air biological weapons test site. At one time
about 800 people lived and worked and tested weapons there.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, this island was
mothballed. We know that the Soviet Union used it to dispose of
the anthrax virus, and we also know that we have been asked by
the Government of Uzbekistan to help resolve the future of this
island.
Dr. Crouch, do you have any comments about our status on
that project? Is it something that you think is important? Have
we been asked to lead any research in terms of the disease in
the surrounding population or the current dangers associated
not just with their population, of course, which is one point,
but the materials that are still there and located on that
island?
Dr. Crouch. At this point we are still examining
specifically what we are going to do at Voz Island. At the
request of the Government of Kazakhstan, we have already
removed the containment and production equipment in the
production and support buildings, and those have been
destroyed. Currently we are negotiating a contract to dismantle
the buildings there. The mutual U.S. Government and Government
of Kazakhstan goal is to basically greenfield the area occupied
by this production complex.
As you, I think, alluded to, there is also a lot of other
material around there, and we are currently in the process of
looking at that. We have done some studies to see what, if
anything, we might want to do in that area beyond the things we
have already done.
Senator Landrieu. Let me ask about the Nuclear Cities
Initiative. I realize there has been a restructuring and this
is just a small program overlaying our larger program. But
could you clarify for the record, either one of you, how many
cities are we specifically talking about? Are we confident of
the list? You touched on it in your opening statement, but just
a little bit more detail for the record in terms of the
effectiveness of that program, how many cities, and just give
us some more information, if you would.
Ambassador Brooks. We have been concentrating our work on
the City of Sarov and the Avangard plant there. In terms of an
accurate listing of other cities, I wonder if I might submit
that for the record just to make sure that I do not overlook
something.
[The information referred to follows:]
There are 10 closed, nuclear cities under aegis of Russia's
Ministry of Atomic Energy: Sarov (Arzamas-16); Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-
70); Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarks-26); Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45);
Novoural'sk (Sverdlovsk-44); Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65); Seversk (Tomsk-
7); Trekhgornyy (Zlatoust-36); Zarechnyy (Penza-19); and Zelenogorsk
(Krasnoyarsk-45). We are confident of this list of 10 cities because
the Russians have shared this information with us and it corresponds to
what we have learned from other sources.
We are currently working in only three of these cities: Snezhinsk,
Zheleznogorsk, and Sarov. Our kidney dialysis project with Fresenius,
which I will discuss in greater detail, is located in Sarov. In
Snezhinsk our projects include, among others, an Open Computing Center;
ITEC, which is a successful company that provides identification
devices for a wide range of industrial facilities, including nuclear
facilities, and supplies a broad range of security services; and an
International Development Center. In Zheleznogorsk, our projects
include, among others, a Software Development Center, Atomlink
Telecommunications, which builds modern, business telecommunications
infrastructure and which is developing an Internet service provider
company in the city; and the development of a Technopark Business
Incubator and Industrial Site.
Ambassador Brooks. With regard to the effectiveness of the
program, we have some examples of good success. The one that we
have mentioned to this committee before is the production of
kidney dialysis equipment through a partnership with a company
called Fresenius. They will be visiting the Avangard Plant
Technopark next week, I think.
We have also seen some projects on commercialization of
anti-terrorist equipment such as irradiation devices for
screening material. We have seen an open software development
center which we expect to employ about 100 people on a
sustained basis.
So, I think that we are beginning to see some very concrete
successes. We have, as I alluded, made some changes to that
program, putting a common manager in charge of Nuclear Cities
and IPP, so that they can feed off of each other, and we have
eliminated some of the community development efforts that were
part of the program a couple of years ago so that we can focus
really on things that are taking the technological
sophistication of the Russian scientists.
Dr. Crouch. Senator, if I may say that I think I gave you a
full and complete answer to the wrong question. I was talking
about Stepnogorsk instead of Voz Island when I gave you that
information.
Basically the end of my answer is correct, which is that we
are still doing environmental reviews and other things to look
at what we might do at Voz Island. The description I gave you
was for what we have done at Stepnogorsk which is another BW
production facility.
Senator Landrieu. I appreciate your clarifying that because
it is a very important issue and one of the larger sites that
we would like to stay focused on.
Let me just ask about our storage sites, and you have
touched on this. We expanded our work to upgrade the security
of the storage sites. Are there efforts underway to consolidate
these storage sites under the CTR program and what is being
done along those lines? Consolidation of the storage sites, if
there is any information, nuclear weapons storage sites.
Dr. Crouch. I am going to have to take that one for the
record. I am not sure.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Department of Defense, through the CTR program, is working
closely with the Russian Federation (RF) to help consolidate nuclear
weapons storage sites. Under applicable international agreements, we
are working with the RF Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) to eliminate
strategic offensive arms. Specifically, CTR is assisting the RF with
the elimination of road-mobile, rail-mobile, and silo intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers at the SRF bases and sea-launched
ICBM launchers from RF Navy strategic Submarine bases, as well as with
the transportation of nuclear warheads from the bases to consolidation
sites, such as central storage sites, and dismantlement facilities.
Senator Landrieu. If you would just give us an update so we
can have this for our review. We had pushed for a consolidation
of some of these sites, and just for the record, if you would
submit that, that is fine.
Ambassador Brooks. On the materials side but not the
weapons side, we are seeing some consolidation. Most of it is
in the sense of you have these very large sites and we are
trying within those sites to consolidate material in a smaller
number of buildings so you only have to protect a smaller area.
But that effort is primarily on the fissionable materials side
rather than on the warhead side.
Senator Landrieu. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairman. You would
actually think that we have been working together on this. I am
going to back to the Stepnogorsk issue and Voz Island.
I am glad for the clarification, Secretary Crouch, in
regards to what you plan there with your continued study of the
environmental situation.
Staff who sits right behind me went to the Voz Island
recently, and in that complex they have a dilapidated center.
Nobody lives there. The sea is drying up. She was fascinated to
find a copy of the American Journal of Veterinary Research
simply lying around, along with several bottles. I had meant to
bring two bottles to give to both of you that held either
anthrax or tularemia or ebola or the plague. [Laughter.]
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Landrieu. But I would not allow him because we
really want you all to stick around and help us on this
problem, so I discouraged that. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. We got some soap and a toothbrush and some
hydrogen peroxide and everything was going to be fine. Actually
they were not the bottles that held this. They were bottles in
storage, but it certainly indicated something that you want to
look at in the description of the evil empire.
But here is a book from the American Veterinary Medical
Association with all sorts of studies in regards to sheep,
cattle, pigs, poultry, cats, and beagles. You can only imagine
the things that went on in regards to some of the research that
was going on at Voz Island.
Here is an advertisement for a product that would help the
pork industry called Entrogen.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Roberts. I am not even sure that that is on the
market now. But it is from Lenexa, Kansas, which is something
to note.
But if, in fact, this is simply a place where you have some
dilapidated buildings and nobody lives there and the sea is
drying up, other than conducting the environmental impact
statement, why would we want to make it a greenfield?
Dr. Crouch. The greenfield response was focused on
Stepnogorsk.
Senator Roberts. Deservedly so, there.
Dr. Crouch. Yes. I do not think we have made a decision one
way or another on that. Recently DOD and the Ministry of
Defense of the Government of Uzbekistan signed an agreement
under which we would provide some assistance to destroy
equipment and structures at that complex. Beyond that, it may
well be--again, we have not made any final determinations on
this--that it is best to leave things the way they are and
maybe establish better security as opposed to trying to raze
what might be under those greenfields.
Senator Roberts. That was the point I was going to make
next. I think you pretty well answered that.
Let me talk about your new CTR project for border control,
and please, Ambassador Brooks, jump into this if you feel that
you might offer some substance here, which I am sure you can.
In the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the CTR program is
initiating a new project whose objective is to provide WMD
equipment and training to improve border control capabilities,
along the lines that Senator Carnahan was talking about in
regards to various detection devices. I think somebody in their
testimony pointed out that other agencies are also involved in
the border control projects, which is now getting a lot of
press.
My question to you is, if we have many agencies of the
Federal government working to stop bioterrorism, how do we
avoid any duplication and what about the efficacy of the
equipment? Especially DOE, because I think, at least from what
I have been able to understand, if you do not have the best,
you are on the crest of the wave in regards to detection
devices.
Then in addition, if it is basically in regard to anything
that would be nuclear, are you also going to attempt to provide
equipment that addresses the chemical and biological smuggling
as well? It is my understanding this detection is not as
refined, but at least we know because of the threats or when we
ask all the experts, ``what keeps you up at night,'' why
obviously, they list those as well.
So, to avoid duplication and to get better coordination and
avoid the possibility of having five, six, or seven different
devices out there, where are we on this?
Ambassador Brooks. Let me address the nuclear part. First,
my programs are, in this area, exclusively nuclear, although
while we have done some research on external detection of
chemical and biological work--for example, if you have two
identically appearing shells, I can tell you which one has
chemical and which one has high explosive in it. We have not
thus far tried to put that kind of capability into the border
work we are doing in the Russian Federation.
With regard to biological weapons, I am unaware of any
technology right now that is likely, without incredible
intrusiveness, to keep people from walking through border
checkpoints with vials in their pockets. There is technology
that will detect this stuff, but I do not think it is anywhere
near the stage where it can be deployed. So, let me just
concentrate on the nuclear.
You said one thing, Senator, and I need to make sure I did
not give an improper impression. We are the high-tech
department, but we are using the same philosophy with these
border detection devices in Russia that I referred to on
material protection. That is, we are not deploying the best
thing that I could make at Los Alamos and keep functioning with
Los Alamos scientists. We deploy the best thing that I can
build with Russian equipment and keep functioning with Russians
at remote locations.
Senator Roberts. But the transferability on our own borders
is what I am interested in. I know we need to have that
capability over there and we are doing the best we can under
that kind of a situation. But it is my understanding that
Customs, DOD, State, DOE, and probably DEA have similar
devices, similar programs.
Ambassador Brooks. Oh, yes, sir. I am sorry. I
misunderstood the question. We are working with Customs in at
least two ways. We are working technologically to make sure
that we make available to Customs the results of the work done
at the national laboratories. One thing, for example, which we
hope will be funded in the 2003 budget, is research on how you
detect radioactive materials in crates without slowing down the
processing in large ports where containers go through at a very
great rate. For example, we are looking at a sensor that might
be mounted on a crane so that, since you have to lift these
things with cranes anyhow, at the same time you would be
checking. So, we are sharing that knowledge with Customs.
We also have an agreement with the Customs Office of Anti-
terrorism to share what we have learned in monitoring overseas
as they increase their efforts in monitoring in the United
States. We are going to do about six small training courses for
a little over 100 of their field offices. So, we are very
conscious of the importance of making sure that the information
that we gain about protection abroad is shared with those
responsible for protection here.
Senator Roberts. My time has expired, but let me just
summarize: The United States spends close to $90 million on
assistance to combat any nuclear material smuggling in about 30
countries, mainly in the Former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe. Assistance includes the radiation detection
equipment and the conventional inspection tools and training.
Six agencies now provide assistance, and this was the basic
question that I had and the concern that I had. The Department
of Energy has installed radiation detection equipment in
Russia, and that is what you are talking about, which is
basically the second line of defense. The Department of State
and Department of Defense provide radiation detection equipment
to countries other than Russia. The U.S. Customs Service and
the U.S. Coast Guard and the FBI provide other equipment and
training for customs and border guard and law enforcement
agencies.
My concern is it seems to me what we learn in one part of
the world, we obviously can share in other parts, and I am not
too sure we need six agencies to do this. I am also of the
opinion that we probably use different detection devices. I do
not know, with the six agencies involved, who has the oversight
responsibility to say this particular device works best. Now,
it could well be that you could have two or three for certain
missions, but six agencies and $90 million and maybe six
different detection means--I am not sure about that. I think we
need to get a better handle on that. That was basically what I
was concerned about.
Secretary Crouch, do you have any comments?
Dr. Crouch. Number one, our interest in this border
security goes beyond the detection devices. We are involved in
training programs. One of the reasons we are involved in this
program is that we have some special relationships with
specific countries. In some cases, we are working directly with
ministries of defense because those are the agencies that
happen to be responsible in those countries as opposed to their
customs agencies. So, we think we have to be a little bit more
flexible in how we deal with specific countries based on a
country-by-country basis.
I do not know the answer to whether there are six different
devices or six different technologies for radiological
detection.
Senator Roberts. Well, we will find that out here fairly
quickly.
Dr. Crouch. Our program is also looking at the smuggling of
CW and BW as well and is trying to provide tools and training
for people working those borders to be able to identify those
problems.
Senator Roberts. We are going to have a report in the not
too distant future--I am not sure about the exact date--from
the GAO on this question, and I thought if there was any
advance information--I have a whole series of questions that I
may submit for the record. I know that it is 4 o'clock.
Senator Landrieu. We have a little bit more time. I would
like to ask just a few questions to wrap up and perhaps Senator
Roberts would have one or two more, and then the rest we could
submit for the record.
I want to say that I think that the Senator raises a really
good point on detection devices. The same question could be
asked on every single aspect of homeland defense. Now we have
many agencies and many departments getting ready to expend and
invest millions, if not billions, of dollars in this effort.
Our success in strengthening our security in large measure is
going to be about how careful we are about not duplicating our
efforts. While we could never hope for a seamless situation
because you have all these many different agencies looking at
the various aspects, but I think our committee has a real
opportunity, as well as a responsibility, to really focus on
this coordination and minimizing duplication, therefore
stretching that dollar and increasing our security.
Let me ask a follow-up on a similar question that Senator
Carnahan asked when she asked about your thoughts on the
possible expansion of the cooperative threat reduction in a
little different way. She asked about the possibilities for
expansion into other countries or other geographic areas and
you all have commented for the record.
But is there a way, post September 11, that we could think
even more smartly about expanding this program to not just
minimize the risk of attack but to use this program to maximize
our ability to respond should such an attack occur, in other
words, focusing more on lifting the knowledge of these
scientists wherever they are, not just to keep them from
harming us, but to help us set up more strategic defenses?
To me this is a real opportunity that maybe we are not
taking as we should because we have a lot of people in the
world, our allies and partners, who could help us. It would
seem to me that it would be a wise thing for us to be more
aggressive in taking that knowledge and helping us to stand up
our defenses against biological, chemical, and other threats.
Do you have anything to say along that line? Would you
agree with that or not?
Dr. Crouch. I absolutely agree with it. I think the
President has been very clear. We cannot let this come to us.
We cannot wait around for the WMD equivalent of September 11.
I will give you two examples. One of the things that we are
very focused on is the biological threat, not minimizing the
nuclear threat, but we just think because of its dual-use, low-
tech nature, relatively speaking, it is a weapon of choice, if
you will, for a bioterrorist. So, there are two things that we
are doing now. I am sure that there are others that we can do.
One is, I think, in the past we have focused on getting
into facilities, tearing facilities down, that sort of thing.
That is useful, but I think we need better and more access to
scientists, and that is one of the things that we have
increased money for in our budget. It is going to be hard
because in some cases, particularly in Russia, getting access
to those scientists who are involved in the defense programs is
going to be a very difficult problem.
The other thing I mentioned is the idea of setting up
disease surveillance networks. There is a lot of data out
there. One of the things the former Soviet countries were
actually pretty good at was keeping records, not only on these
kinds of things, but on their own people. So, consequently we
can mine some of that data, try to set up databases and network
those databases in a way where we may be able to identify
problems or identify strains, for example, or particular
problems very early, and that will help our first responders,
our emergency response to some kind of bioterrorist incident.
So, there is more we can do but I think that we are headed
in that direction.
Senator Landrieu. Not to make light of it, and I want to
hear your comment in a minute, but when we had anthrax in the
Hart building where I think both my office and Senator Robert's
office are, I thought to myself we could have used some
scientists that really understood this. While we had some on
our side, we could have used some more expertise, given what we
went through and the lack of definitive information given out
over quite a long period of time. So, that is just an example
of what I am talking about.
Ambassador?
Ambassador Brooks. Madam Chairman, I think you have asked
for a mountain and I am going to describe a small hill. But we
have a couple of things that we are doing that are directly in
that area. We have established a mechanism between our research
and development people to look at where there are things that
we would like to know, and we are trying to get particularly
under the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, where we go
and commission projects from scientists to focus some of these
on counterterrorism--the Russian Kurchatov Institute, for
example--has come up with several interesting ideas, some of
which may have benefit in the United States and the threat. So,
we are trying to start that effort.
We are also working jointly with our colleagues in the
Department of Defense. There is a program called the Warhead
Safety and Security Exchange which has a provision for doing
collaborative efforts in counterterrorism. It is not under Dr.
Crouch's part of the Department. It is shared between me and
the technical side of DOD. We are looking to revitalize that
effort once again because we share your assessment that there
are a lot of smart people out there who we want to go think
about something. They may as well think about things that will
help us. But I think we are, at least in my Department, in the
relatively early days of having that in a structured process,
but we have started it in the last couple of months.
Senator Landrieu. What was the name of that program for the
record? I did not catch it.
Ambassador Brooks. There are two. The Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention is the program that is under my
control, and then the Warhead Safety and Security Exchange. We
are just beginning to see some counterterrorism projects there.
Senator Landrieu. I would really encourage you both along
that line.
I have one more question and then Senator Roberts has a few
to wrap up. This is on our plutonium reactor shutdown program.
It has been transferred from DOD to DOE. The program is
designed to provide an alternative power source for the last
three Russian plutonium producing reactors. There has been
considerable opposition in the House on this program. Primarily
these objections were to DOD carrying out the program. As a
result, there have been a number of prohibitions and
restrictions placed on the funds from previous years.
Ambassador, can you give us an update? Have some of these
objections been addressed? What should we do to move forward
since this is an important project?
Ambassador Brooks. I want to be very careful not to speak
for the House. At the staff level, we have discussed this issue
with the House. I hope that the House will be sympathetic to
removing the restrictions. It is an important program. We have
$74 million that has come to us from the Department of Defense.
We need to be able to go forward with that funding.
Senator Roberts. Where are you with that?
Ambassador Brooks. Well, we just assumed responsibility for
the program about 6 weeks ago. We are in the process of
discussions with the Russians on exactly the mechanism for
going forward. The agreement under which this work will be done
is obsolete because it was written at a time when we were using
a different technical solution. So, we are working with the
Department of State and the Russians to modify that.
Senator Roberts. But you are not having any trouble with
the Department of Defense?
Ambassador Brooks. Oh, no. The Department of Defense has
been hugely cooperative. As I understand the restriction, it is
on actually building things. So, nothing is slowing me down
right now. Right now I am doing planning and integration. There
will come a time when I am going to need to spend that money to
actually build things, and we will be working with the staffs
of the relevant committees to remove the existing restrictions.
Senator Roberts. But in your statement you said you were
requiring some legislative assistance. If, in fact, DOD is
being a nice guy, like Secretary Crouch, are you talking about
legislative assistance in working with the House then?
Ambassador Brooks. Legislative assistance may have been a
poor choice of words. I need whatever will let me spend this
money without looking like I am thwarting the will of Congress.
Senator Landrieu. But let me ask the question again then
because may not understand I, and if Senator Roberts does, he
could help me out here. The House objected to DOD building the
plant, and so we transferred it to DOE?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Landrieu. So, were there other objections we do not
know about?
Ambassador Brooks. Not that I am aware of.
Senator Landrieu. So, it looks like we can go forward.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, Madam Chairman. But I do not intend
to start out my association with Congress by taking Congress
for granted, so I just need to make sure that there are no
remaining issues. I did not mean in the statement to imply I
thought this was a big problem, but I did want to make it clear
that I think we need to move forward with this.
Senator Landrieu. Well, I am going to send Senator Roberts
over to the House.
Senator Roberts. No. I think Senator Landrieu can do much
better.
Senator Landrieu. Senator Roberts does a good job over
there.
Senator Roberts. She has a much more positive attitude. She
is not obstreperous.
Senator Landrieu. No. Now, you see he thinks flattery will
get him everywhere.
Senator Roberts. She can handle Curt Weldon far better than
I can. [Laughter.]
Senator Landrieu. We will do that together.
That ends my line of questioning. Is there something you
have, Senator Roberts?
Senator Roberts. Shchuch'ye and the conditions tied to that
destruction project in the 2002 Defense Authorization Act, it
had six conditions the Secretary must certify. Only two remain
outstanding, basically that the Russians certify the complete
destruction of their chemical stockpile, not just that, but all
over, and that the Secretary could certify that. Can you give
me any status report on that Secretary Crouch?
Dr. Crouch. Obviously, the Department fully supports the
President's December 2001 decision to accelerate the
construction of the Shchuch'ye facility. At this point, the
Secretary is not in a position to be able to certify all of
those conditions. We are working through that. We are working
with the Russians on it, and we will be getting back to you
when we can. But at this point, he has not done so and we are
not in a position to do so.
Senator Roberts. Well, four out of six is not too bad. You
can get back to us.
Ambassador Brooks, one final question. You started off the
hearing by saying that the only thing that has changed in some
of your work is an increase in the involvement of the security
folks over in Russia. That gets me back to the first question I
asked you, which I am not going to repeat. Do you want to
amplify on that a little bit?
Ambassador Brooks. It is our impression--and I think this
is a shared impression with our colleagues in the Department of
Defense--that the Russian security services are more powerful
in all aspects of Russian life. Where that spills over into my
programs is a much greater interest in restrictions on access,
a much greater tendency to have x days in advance notification.
This incident is trivial, but it is an example. One of the
things that we do is we monitor the blending down of HEU that
is being sold to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation. We had to go
and do a routine source change-out of an instrumentation
source. We used the identical procedures that we used last year
in requesting that visit, but this year the request was denied
because security services wanted to see a technical analysis
that it really took 10 days instead of, say, 8.
So, what we are seeing is a greater willingness on the part
of the Russian Federation to defer to the security services
even when that means slowing down cooperation. I think that is
a part of what I think most of us observe who watch Russia, a
greater influence of security services in all aspects of
Russian life.
That does not invalidate the programs. That is just a fact
that has to be managed. But you asked what are some of the
problems and that is clearly a problem.
Senator Roberts. Well, it is a paradox of enormous irony
because they come to us with goodwill to try to meet the
requirements that we thought were reasonable in regards to
access and transparency, only to find out that we may be moving
in the other direction. I hope that is not the case.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
I would like to close with a quote from the same Time
magazine article I quoted earlier: ``In the days after
September 11, doomsday scenarios like a nuclear attack on
Manhattan suddenly seemed plausible. But during the 6 months
that followed, as the U.S. struck back and the anthrax scare
petered out and the fires at Ground Zero finally died down, the
national nightmare about another calamitous terrorist attack
went away. The terrorists did not.'' The article goes on to say
that the terrorists are real, they have expanded, they are in
many countries. So our work is very important.
I thank you for your testimony today and look forward to
supporting your efforts.
Dr. Crouch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ambassador Brooks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Landrieu. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
future work with biological scientists
1. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Crouch, for several years the CTR program
has been providing funding to support research for biological weapons
scientists in the Former Soviet Union. These projects have, for the
most part, been small, and yet they serve their function in providing
work to these scientists, many of whom are paid either very little or
intermittently, and some are not paid at all. As the CTR program
enlarges the scope of its biological work, and as we learn more about
the biological weapons work of the Former Soviet Union, I would like to
explore the possibility of expanding the scope of the cooperative
research with these scientists, particularly those in Central Asia and
the newly independent countries. In expanding the scope of the CTR
program, can we also make this program more focused and more tailored
to broader U.S. and world goals?
Dr. Crouch. An important component of the CTR Biological Weapons
Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) program engages scientists in
cooperative biodefense research. This program is intended to increase
transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct among biological
scientists. We intend to expand research cooperation with the
Ministries of Health in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Ukraine to
build infectious disease surveillance networks to enhance the ability
of the United States and CTR eligible countries in Eurasia to detect,
characterize, and monitor disease outbreaks with natural or
bioterrorist origins. DOD and the National Academy of Sciences advisory
committee will actively solicit and develop research projects tailored
to this goal. With the deployment of U.S. forces to Central Asia, the
need to monitor and diagnose infectious diseases endemic to this region
is very important to the health of our forces.
As we expand this program, we also will expand the scope of our
peer review process and initial review of projects to ensure that
vulnerability and technology security assessments are conducted to take
into account counterterrorism concerns.
2. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Crouch, what are your thoughts on
developing a broad-based vaccine research program?
Dr. Crouch. Vaccines, where available, represent the single most
effective element of our defense against many natural diseases as well
as those under intentional development by potential adversaries. Many
areas of the Former Soviet Union are experiencing a devastating
resurgence of infectious disease incidence, which not only drives down
regional life expectancies, but also potentially affects the rest of
the world through human and animal travel opportunities. Therefore, CTR
initiatives that address the development of safe and effective vaccines
against acute infectious diseases will serve to protect both the local
populations as well as deployed U.S. forces. Finally, advances in
vaccine development and production technology gained through CTR
initiatives can also assist our domestic vaccine capabilities and
directly enhance U.S. healthcare in general.
3. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Crouch, are there any other opportunities
to have a more organized approach to research?
Dr. Crouch. I believe there are. We are currently developing a
comprehensive strategic plan for the entire biological aspect of the
CTR program.
4. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Crouch, how can U.S. industry and
universities partner with these scientists?
Dr. Crouch. We are reviewing possibilities for such partnering as
part of the development of our strategic plan.
joint counter-terror work with russia
5. Senator Landrieu. Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Crouch, President
Bush has indicated a desire to work with Russia in a cooperative and
joint way to address terrorism. From your perspectives, what is being
proposed for nonproliferation programs to carry out this goal?
Ambassador Brooks. Technical cooperation under the U.S.-Russian
Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement has been underway with
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and Ministry of Defense for the
past 7 years. Joint cooperation to address nuclear threats has always
been a part of the Agreement, and interactions and technology
development have focused predominantly on the safety, security, and
transparency of nuclear warheads. After September 11, however, U.S. and
Russian national laboratories re-engaged on the topic of nuclear
threats and have now generated dozens of project proposals focused on
counter-terrorism technology development. These technologies will be
developed to help both U.S. and Russian security specialists detect,
manage, and mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks. Other joint
counter-terrorism analysis and information sharing is also being
considered. In addition, a variety of counter-terrorism projects are
planned or underway as part of our Russian Transition Initiatives
(which includes the Nuclear Cities Initiative and Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention programs).
Dr. Crouch. The Department of Defense under the CTR program has
been destroying, consolidating, and enhancing security for weapons of
mass destruction and related materials to prevent them from falling
into the hands of terrorists. The CTR programs in Russia specifically
carrying out these efforts under applicable international agreements
are as follows:
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination,
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security,
Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security,
Chemical Weapons Destruction,
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention, and
Fissile Material Storage Facility (being completed
with prior year funds).
6. Senator Landrieu. Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Crouch, is there
anything in the fiscal year 2003 budget request to support this goal?
Ambassador Brooks. We have requested a total of $24.5 million in
the fiscal year 2003 budget to support counter-terrorism initiatives
with Russia. Of this amount, the Office of International Material
Protection and Cooperation has requested $16 million to begin to
improve security on vulnerable international stockpiles of material
that could be used as a dirty bomb. The other $8.5 million, requested
by the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, will
accelerate joint counter-terrorism technology development under the
Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreement. Additional funding
would enhance and mature technical counter-terrorism cooperation.
Additional counter-terrorism-related projects are being considered for
funding under the Russian Transition Initiatives.
Dr. Crouch. The budget request includes several CTR program areas
that will provide assistance to Former Soviet Union states that will
help prevent terrorists and others from gaining access to weapons of
mass destruction, related materials and expertise:
$40 million for Nuclear Weapons Storage Security
(Russia),
$19.7 million for Nuclear Weapons Transportation
Security (Russia),
$133.6 million for Chemical Weapons Destruction
(Russia),
$9.0 million for Weapons of Mass Destruction
Infrastructure Elimination (Kazakhstan),
$55.0 million for Biological Weapons Proliferation
Prevention (FSU), and
$40 million Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation
Prevention (non-Russia FSU).
7. Senator Landrieu. Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Crouch, how does
this statement transition from rhetoric to programmatic application?
Ambassador Brooks. In the area of joint U.S.-Russian counter-
terrorism technology development, we have already secured formal
Russian agreement to pursue 3 important projects and have selected 10
additional projects from the dozens proposed by Russian national
laboratories to meeting our most urgent needs. During the next few
months, we will finish scoping these projects and securing formal
Russian agreement to pursue them through the Warhead Safety and
Security Exchange Agreement. Fiscal year 2003 funding will ensure that
these projects begin as soon as possible in October 2002.
Dr. Crouch. Under applicable international agreements and through
the CTR program, we expect to apply the requested fiscal year 2003
funds in the following fashion to prevent terrorists from obtaining
known weapons of mass destruction, and related materials, and
expertise:
$40.0 million for Nuclear Weapons Storage Security
will provide comprehensive security upgrades at five to seven
Russian nuclear weapons storage sites and seek to increase the
effectiveness and reliability of Russian guard forces.
$19.7 million for Nuclear Weapons Transportation
Security will transport approximately 84 trainloads of
deactivated nuclear weapons to centralized storage or
dismantlement facilities, provide maintenance and certification
for nuclear weapons transport railcars, and provide security
support materials.
$126.6 million of the $133.6 million request for
Chemical Weapons Destruction will be used, once
congressionally-mandated conditions have been met, to begin
construction of a nerve agent chemical weapons destruction
facility at Shchuch'ye to eliminate the enormous Russian
stockpile there of nerve agent artillery warheads and missile
munitions.
$9.0 million for the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Infrastructure Elimination (Kazakhstan) program area will help
secure radioactive sources and fissile material, begin
elimination of the former chemical weapons production facility
at Pavlodar, and continue to eliminate nuclear weapons
infrastructure.
$55.0 million for Biological Weapons Proliferation
Prevention program will dismantle former Soviet BW research and
production facilities; consolidate and secure or eliminate
dangerous pathogen collections at biological research
facilities; and target collaborative research to encourage
higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct at the
scientist level and preempt potential ``brain drain'' of
scientists to terrorists and rogue states.
$40.0 million for Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention will provide equipment and training to
enhance the capability of non-Russian FSU states to deter,
detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related
materials.
Additionally, using previously budgeted funds, we expect to
complete construction of the Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak
by the end of calendar year 2002. This facility will be capable of
securely and safely storing up to 50 metric tons of plutonium and 200
metric tons of highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons. We
anticipate that Russia will begin loading this facility in early 2003.
We also are implementing comprehensive security upgrades for the
Shchuch'ye and Kizner chemical weapons storage facilities for nerve
agent-filled artillery and missile munitions using previously budgeted
funds.
expanded ctr
8. Senator Landrieu. Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Crouch, Russia and
the Former Soviet Union are not the only nations in the world with
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, materials, and
knowledge that might be attractive to terrorists or others with
terrorist goals. Are we doing enough in Russia and the new republics to
protect and secure materials, weapons, and knowledge?
Ambassador Brooks. With regard to the scope of our efforts in
Russia and former Soviet states, there are several areas where we are
accelerating and expanding. Recently signed access agreements will
facilitate our efforts to reduce the size of Russia's ``nuclear
footprint'' through the Nuclear Cities Initiative, as well as the
expansion of our MPC&A upgrades work in the MinAtom Weapons Complex,
where the bulk of MinAtom's nuclear material resides. I also want to
expand the scope of our Material Consolidation and Conversion program
in order to close more buildings and sites storing excess weapons
usable materials across Russia. We have increased efforts to
dramatically accelerate the installation of equipment at Russian
borders to detect and prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear
material. Expansion of our efforts to convert Soviet-origin research
reactors from high to low enriched fuels will lead to elimination of
highly enriched uranium stocks in the new republics. In the Newly
Independent States and the Baltics, we are also expanding our programs
to enhance security and are reviewing past security upgrades against
the latest IAEA guidelines, which now include sabotage. In Uzbekistan,
for example, we have enhanced a previously installed security system to
increase protection of the site against terrorist attacks.
We are also working very hard to increase the pace of program
implementation. In fact, accelerating existing programs to secure
materials, weapons, and knowledge has been a primary goal since
September 11. With the significant supplemental budget received this
year for our material and warhead security program, we are signing
additional contracts for security upgrades at more Russian warhead and
material storage sites and border crossings. We have reduced program
schedules on the order of 2 to 3 years due to these acceleration
efforts.
Beyond Russia and the former Soviet states, we continue to develop
and foster positive relationships both bilaterally and multilaterally
through the IAEA to support programs to enhance physical protection of
nuclear material and facilities abroad. The United States has been and
will continue to be a strong supporter of the IAEA's new initiatives to
counter nuclear terrorism and its efforts to strengthen the
international framework for the physical protection of nuclear material
and facilities.
We are accomplishing more than ever before--and many of our
implementation schedules have been shortened because of the
supplemental budget and the renewed, high-level attention our programs
have received from the Bush administration and Congress over the last
year.
Dr. Crouch. The Department of Defense, through the CTR program, is
working closely with appropriate government agencies in Russia and
other new states to enhance their ability to provide adequate
protection and security for weapons of mass destruction and related
materials in order to prevent their proliferation. The U.S. Government
is spending roughly $1 billion annually on nonproliferation and threat
reduction programs in the Former Soviet Union.
Nuclear Weapons: Through the CTR program, DOD is assisting the
Russian Ministry of Defense by providing: physical security upgrades at
weapons storage sites; equipment and training to enhance the
effectiveness of guard forces; drug and alcohol screening equipment and
training to ensure the reliability of guard force members and
applicants; an automated system for accounting and tracking deactivated
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; rail shipments of nuclear
weapons to secure storage and dismantlement facilities; and reliable
and secure nuclear weapons transport rail cars. DOD's efforts through
the CTR program were cited as having helped Russia improve the security
of its nuclear weapons by the National Intelligence Council's February
2002 Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian
Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces.
Progress in implementing comprehensive security enhancements at
weapons storage sites had been hindered by the previous Russian
Federation refusal to allow DOD access to the sites for project
implementation and oversight. Based on a recent decision by the Russian
Prime Minister to allow DOD access to these sites, we hope to proceed
quickly with a variety of security enhancement measures at 10 priority
sites.
Biological Weapons/Materials/Knowledge: Through the CTR Biological
Weapons Proliferation Prevention program in Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Uzbekistan, DOD is consolidating and securing, or eliminating,
dangerous pathogen collections at biological research institutes;
dismantling former Soviet biological weapons research and production
facilities (including an anthrax production facility in Kazakhstan and
an open-air testing complex in Uzbekistan); and targeting collaborative
research to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons expertise
to rogue states and terrorists through the employment of former Soviet
BW scientists on peaceful, non-military endeavors.
Chemical Weapons: In February 2002, DOD's CTR program completed
immediate security enhancements at the Russian chemical weapons storage
facilities at Shchuch'ye and Kizner to safeguard nerve agent munitions
that are susceptible to theft. We are completing the design work for a
more comprehensive security upgrade based on equipment developed for
Russian nuclear weapons storage sites at the Security Assessment and
Training Center in Sergeiv Posad. Selected equipment will be integrated
to meet site-specific security requirements. Once design work is
complete, we will begin equipment installation and testing. Project
completion is expected in fiscal year 2003.
Fissile Material: DOD, through the CTR program, is constructing a
fissile material storage facility at Mayak, Russia that will provide
centralized, secure, safe, and ecologically sound storage of up to 50
metric tons of plutonium and 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium
removed from nuclear weapons. We anticipate that the project will be
completed by the end of calendar year 2002 and the Russians will begin
to load the facility in early 2003.
9. Senator Landrieu. Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Crouch, do we have
an opportunity now to do cooperative work with other countries to
secure and protect their materials and knowledge?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, we continue to work aggressively to develop
cooperative relationships with other countries to improve the security
of nuclear material. Such cooperation is implemented on a bilateral
basis and also through the International Atomic Energy Agency's
International Physical Protection Advisory Service. This cooperation
often includes assistance in making physical protection improvements at
facilities and training in physical security and material control and
accounting practices, concepts, and procedures.
We are continuously analyzing existing or emerging threats to
nuclear material and facilities. We are continuously analyzing existing
or emerging threats in this area. We have and will continue to ensure
that countries exhibiting these vulnerabilities are engaged to maximum
extent possible and that, barring legal prohibitions, the only
limitation on provision of assistance is the recipient's willingness to
work with us towards a common goal.
Dr. Crouch. The essence of CTR is that it is a cooperative program.
This requires, at a minimum, other countries to accept a CTR presence
at very sensitive research or military facilities. There may be
opportunities to develop these types of relationships, but we must
recall that the CTR program has taken nearly a decade to reach its
current level of involvement in states of the Former Soviet Union. In
addition, under current authorities, the Department of Defense can only
provide CTR assistance to former Soviet states.
nuclear weapons destruction
10. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Crouch, President Putin has said that he
expects Russia to go to a 1,500 strategic nuclear warhead inventory at
some point in the future. They currently have far more warheads, and an
undetermined number of tactical warheads, in their stockpile. Is there
an opportunity to work with Russia to dismantle warheads?
Dr. Crouch. In the past, DOD offered through the CTR program to
assist the Russian Federation in processing and packaging fissile
material from dismantled nuclear weapons. The RF, however, would not
agree to engage in such a cooperative project due to security
considerations. There is no indication today that Russia would allow
even more intrusive CTR assistance with actual dismantlement work. On
the other hand, DOE has the expertise and is working with the Ministry
of Atomic Energy of Russia in related areas. Therefore, it may be
possible at some point in the future to resolve the issues that have
constrained assistance in this area.
11. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Crouch, does our decision not to
dismantle any warheads, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review,
discourage Russia from dismantling warheads, particularly the tactical
warheads?
Dr. Crouch. There has been no decision by the U.S. Government not
to dismantle any nuclear warheads; some warheads will be eliminated.
The U.S. cannot produce new nuclear warheads. This is why some warheads
will be retained to provide the option to increase operationally
deployed force levels if the international security environment compels
us to do so. The U.S. and Russia are in asymmetrical circumstances in
this regard. While we cannot produce new nuclear warheads, and must
therefore retain weapons in reserve, Russia retains the ability to
produce new nuclear warheads at Cold War levels. Hence, there is no
need for Russia to store warheads. Moreover, Russian warheads cannot be
stored for long periods of time for technical reasons.
[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 12, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MILITARY CAPABILITIES, OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m. in
room SR-222, Senator Mary L. Landrieu (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Landrieu, Bill Nelson,
and Roberts.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional
staff member; Carol M. Hanna, professional staff member; and
Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer and Daniel K.
Goldsmith.
Committee members' assistants present: Craig E. Bury,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S.
Wiener, assistants to Senator Landrieu; Robert Alan McCurry,
assistant to Senator Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant
to Senator Hutchinson; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator
Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU, CHAIRMAN
Senator Landrieu. Our meeting of the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee on the Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) will come to order. Our subcommittee meets this
afternoon to receive testimony from General Holland, our
Commander in Chief of our U.S. Special Operations Command, and
Mr. Harry Schulte, Acquisition Executive at Special Operations
Command.
I just wanted to begin by noting that, as we sit here
today, our Special Operations Forces are deployed in our war
against terrorism in Afghanistan in Central Asia, in the
Philippines, all over the globe in fact, supporting Operation
Enduring Freedom and conducting other missions to further U.S.
national security.
The battles, as usual, have not been without casualties.
Your forces, General Holland, are fighting for a just cause, to
defend our citizens here and abroad. Some of them have made the
ultimate sacrifice. In fact, since September 11, 25 special
operators have been killed in action or in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom and 60 have been wounded.
The losses of each of these has hit us all very hard. This
committee, in fact, has been touched in a very personal way by
the recent accident, the death of 10 Special Operations Forces
in the Philippines when their helicopter crashed. Our staff had
just visited Echo 160th Aviation Company in January and had
come back to report to the Senator and I how highly impressed
they were with Major Curtis Feistner, Captain Bartt Owens, and
Chief Warrant Officer Jody Egnor. They all perished in the
crash February 22.
General Holland, Senator Roberts and I want to convey to
you on behalf of our whole committee our deep and heartfelt
appreciation for the work that you do. If you would please
communicate to the men and women under your command that this
committee, all of us, but this committee is particularly
heartbroken over it, and commend you for your professionalism
and your dedication.
This committee has a long tradition of interest in Special
Operations. In 1986 the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the Goldwater-
Nichols Defense Reorganization Act established the Special
Operations Command within the Department of Defense and the
position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The creation of the
command and the assistant secretary position reflected this
committee's interest in ensuring that Special Operations Forces
and policies are integrated with conventional strategies and
forces and that they are properly funded. Unfortunately, the
position of assistant secretary sits vacant at this time.
Congress mandated 2 years ago in the Defense Authorization
Act that the Department of Defense centralize its combating
terrorism activities under one assistant secretary of defense.
The Department of Defense informed us that the Assistant
Secretary for Special Operations would be that official.
However, Secretary Rumsfeld did not fill the position before
September 11 and after September 11 he appointed the Secretary
of the Army as interim coordinator.
Both Senator Roberts and I have expressed at different
times the importance of filling that position. Perhaps we can
talk a bit about that today, because 6 months later there is
still no permanent coordinator in this important position.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine Special
Operations capabilities, operational requirements, and
technological acquisition. Unlike conventional military forces,
who are charged with countering a range of military threats,
Special Operations, which you oversee, General, are organized,
trained, and equipped for narrowly focused missions. We have
seen how Special Operations Forces have utilized these
extraordinary special capabilities, radioing close air support
from horseback to B-52s flying over the skies of Afghanistan.
We are witnessing how the success of Special Operations
Forces is spawning new missions in the Philippines, Georgia,
and Yemen, just to name a few. Just yesterday President Bush
declared that we would train militias everywhere.
Yet, as Special Operations Command is handed more missions
it is incumbent upon those of us who fund these missions and
who provide legislative oversight to the Department to explore
some fundamental questions: Are Special Operation missions
becoming more relevant and necessitating increases in the total
number of Special Operations Forces? Or, should the
conventional forces adopt some of the Special Operations Forces
roles and missions? If so, which ones, and how should that
integration or coordination take place and how should it be
funded in the future?
Can we improve upon the integration of Special Operations
Forces into conventional military plans based on lessons
learned in Afghanistan? Is funding for training, education, and
ongoing missions sufficient and appropriate, given the
increased demands and dangers, of the critical mission
involved?
Are we taking sufficient steps to recruit and retain Active
and Reserve special operators? Perhaps more important, how does
the proposed budget address concerns that Special Operations
families have regarding housing and other benefits so that the
morale will be high, families can be happy, as well as the
soldiers and combatants involved?
Finally, what can we do to improve Special Operations
technology development and acquisition to better support the
men and women in the field?
Today our special operators are making use of technologies
that were developed with small but significant investments in
science and technology in the past. Investments that have led
to more precise weapons, better night vision gear, and lighter,
more capable radio and communications equipment, to name just a
few examples.
This subcommittee notes that the budget request for Special
Ops research and development includes, unfortunately, only a
very small increase for next year and, in fact, a decrease in
the longer term research programs, despite the critical role
that I have just outlined.
The subcommittee would like to learn from you, General
Holland and Mr. Schulte, about your current technology
development activities and how they support current operations.
But more importantly, we would like to learn about any
shortfalls in the budget, including in areas that impact upon
training, education, recruitment, and retention of your fine
soldiers. We also want to explore some other important elements
that I have outlined earlier in my opening statement.
At this time, let me recognize Senator Roberts for opening
remarks and then we will hear your testimony and go into a
round of questioning. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I join you in
welcoming these two very distinguished witnesses from the U.S.
Special Operations Command and I applaud your forward thinking
in holding this important hearing.
Some of my remarks are going to be repetitive of the
distinguished chairman, but I think they bear repeating. We
have all been extremely thankful for the initial success of our
Armed Forces in Afghanistan and around the world in this global
war against terrorism. While much will be debated in the months
and years ahead about the relative value of air power, sea
power, ground operations, in what we call Operation Enduring
Freedom, one thing is very clear: The quiet warriors of Special
Operations in the air, on the sea, and on the ground were
trained and ready--and have performed in magnificent fashion.
General Holland, you and your predecessors deserve a great deal
of credit for this high level of readiness, and the committee
thanks you.
Now, before I proceed, I want to acknowledge not only the
tremendous contribution that Special Operations Forces are
making to the struggle, but, as the chairman has indicated in
very eloquent terms, the sacrifice they are making as well.
From my standpoint and as the chairman has already indicated,
on behalf of the subcommittee, and I would add the full
Committee on Armed Services, please convey our sympathies, our
condolences, and our gratitude to the families, units, and
friends of those special operators who have lost their lives in
this important global war against terrorism.
Their loss defending America and freedom reminds us of the
dangers our men and women in uniform face every day around the
world. Our Special Operations Forces are truly the tip of the
spear.
As the chairman indicated, almost 15 years ago some
forward-thinking members of Congress recognized that our
capabilities in the area of unconventional warfare, low
intensity conflict, and special operations were not where they
should be and convinced their colleagues to create a new
Special Operations Command as part of a larger Department of
Defense reorganization.
The increasingly successful and sophisticated joint
operations--and I emphasize, joint--joint operations our Armed
Forces are able to conduct, including the seamless inclusion of
your Special Operations, is a tribute to the joint warfighting
concepts that were envisioned by the architects of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. As the chairman has indicated,
the world has been amazed, absolutely amazed, at the pictures
of soldiers on horseback directing 21st century weapons with
devastating precision. We see images of the C-130, AC-130
gunships, firing at ground targets identified by unmanned
aerial vehicles. We see silhouettes of parachutes through night
vision goggles descending on distant airfields. This is the
face of Special Operations. This is our first line of defense
that has been quietly fighting terrorism around the world for
years. These are the forces on which we will increasingly
depend to confront the emerging unexpected unconventional
threats of the future.
I am going to be brief, Madam Chairman, as it is most
important that we proceed to the testimony of General Holland
and his staff. I look forward to hearing General Holland's
assessment of the performance of Special Operations Forces to
date. More importantly, however, I am most interested in his
view of the future. What do our Special Operations Forces need
to be prepared for? You highlighted the budget shortfalls. What
can we, Congress, do to help him? I am especially interested in
how the Special Operations Forces fit into the whole field of
jointness.
As we begin deliberations on the fiscal year 2003 budget
request, SOCOM is in a unique position to provide us some
insights into the future of warfare, how to rapidly develop and
acquire the capabilities we need to deter, to detect, and to
defeat the emerging threats we face today.
I look forward to working with you, General, to ensure that
our Special Operations Forces really continue to be the very
best in the world and really continue to be truly special.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
General Holland.
STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES R. HOLLAND, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
General Holland. Madam Chairman and Senator Roberts: I
submitted a statement for the record, but I have just a few
remarks I would like to make at this time. Thanks for this
opportunity to report on the state of the ``Quiet
Professionals,'' our Nation's Special Operations Forces (SOF).
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on our country
underscored the need for an increased emphasis on America's
ability to combat terrorism.
As you well know, SOF have been very heavily engaged in
support for the global war on terrorism. We have executed
nearly every mission Congress spelled out for SOF almost 15
years ago when it passed the Nunn-Cohen amendment. As a result
of that legislation, the Department of Defense has a
headquarters in the United States Special Operations Command
that provides SOF for the successful conduct of worldwide
special operations, civil affairs, and psychological
operations, during peace and war.
The command also conducts strategic planning, provides
operational support and oversight, allocates resources, and
manages acquisition to ensure that SOF are prepared to carry
out their assigned missions.
The support of the services is critical to our ability to
provide the Nation with a Special Operations capability. The
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps work with us on matters
such as service common equipment and personnel manning, as well
as other areas of mutual interest. We have a solid relationship
with each service and continue to cooperate on a variety of
projects.
I am pleased to report that SOF are ready and healthy due
to the wisdom of the legislation that gave us the tools to do
our jobs and the leadership and dedication of extraordinary
Americans. I must tell you that we could not be more proud of
our men and women. They have demonstrated their training skills
by teaming with the best warfighters the world has seen. From
the European Command-led campaign in Kosovo to the Pacific
Command support to counterinsurgency in the Philippines, and to
combined training and exercises with our allies in the Republic
of Korea, to Central Command's combat during Operations Desert
Storm and Enduring Freedom and counternarcotics programs in
Southern Command, the range of operations we have effectively
prosecuted bodes well for the future fight against
transnational terrorists.
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) stands
ready to provide SOF around the world in support of theater
commanders in chief (CINCs) and American ambassadors. During
this fiscal year Special Operations Forces have operated in 122
countries and foreign territories. In Afghanistan, USSOCOM's
Air Force special tactics teams and air crews, Navy SEALs, Army
and Air Force Psychological Operations, and Army Special
Forces, Rangers, and air crews, and civil affairs are executing
complex missions during limited visibility in climatic extremes
and over rough, unfamiliar terrain in support of the United
States Central Command.
A large part of the reason that we can support our global
commitments is that several SOF truths are embedded in our
philosophy of how to train and deploy. The SOF truths are:
humans are more important than hardware; quality is better than
quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced;
and competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after
emergencies occur.
In addition, the establishment of Major Force Program-11,
which gives the Special Operations Command service-like
responsibility with a budget and procurement authority, has
ensured that we can get SOF-peculiar equipment to our warriors
so that they have the tools needed to conduct Special
Operations. Timeliness is important to our ability to resolve
many of the challenges of transnational threats, as is
mitigating the potentially catastrophic damage that can be
caused by acts of terrorism, to include the use of weapons of
mass destruction.
We find that all the elements of national power--
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--are applied
at the same time to reach a fast near-term resolution of a
particular crisis. A well-designed and dynamic collaborative
environment allows us to properly share whatever is needed,
whenever it is needed to defeat the next foe. At USSOCOM we are
striving to develop collaborative structures and tools that
afford timely, simple, and appropriate procedures to make
certain that all of us on this joint interagency team can share
resources and information and still maintain the necessary
protective measures to guarantee that we do not compromise
operations, personnel, or tactics, techniques, and procedures.
In closing, I want to reiterate two points: First, we
provide the Armed Forces and our Nation with unique one-of-a-
kind capabilities. We have been able to develop them because of
the foresight of Congress in creating this command and
providing it with the tools to get the job done.
Second, we must protect our people, provide for the
professional development, give them the tools they need for
their job, and remember those and their families who have given
the last full measure.
With continued support from Congress and key investments in
quality people, readiness, and modernization, we will continue
to have the best Special Operations Force in the world, one
that is ready, responsive, and relevant to the challenges of
the 21st century. I believe that the SOF warrior is one of our
Nation's great assets, superbly trained, physically tough,
culturally aware, and an independent thinker--a quiet
professional.
Madam Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to tell the
Special Operations story and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Holland follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Charles R. Holland, USAF
Madam Chairwoman and members of the committee, I am privileged to
report to Congress on the state of the USSOCOM. In early September last
year, the Nation was suddenly and brutally confronted with a new type
of world war, waged against them on U.S. soil by terrorists. These
terrorists, driven by an implacable hatred for Western conceptions of
basic individual rights, and whose principal targets were civilians,
have since had their own sudden, and yes, harsh awakening to U.S.
resolve. The entire command is proud that SOF could play a part in
their wake-up call.
The success of the campaign plan against this threat has been
dramatic, but is not surprising. The superb team constructed at the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) under General Tommy Franks demonstrated
the quality, professionalism, and determination of U.S. Forces and our
staunch coalition partners. The successes in the campaign in
Afghanistan in the global war on terrorism demonstrate again the wisdom
of the joint warfighting construct initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act in 1986.
The recent action in Afghanistan is a prominent and exciting
example of how joint warfighting has evolved from the Goldwater-Nichols
legislation to a powerful and precise tool to support the Nation's
vital interests. This success is not isolated; the ability to win
across the spectrum of military operations requires tight teamwork, and
Special Operations Command USSOCOM forces are privileged to team with
the best warfighters the world has seen. From the European Command
(EUCOM)-led campaign in Kosovo, to the Pacific Command's (PACOM)
support to counterinsurgency in the Philippines and combined training
and exercises with our allies in the Republic of Korea, to CENTCOM's
combat during Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom, and
Counternarcotics programs in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the range of
operations we have effectively prosecuted bodes well for the future
fight against transnational terrorists.
The support SOF gets from the functional combatant commanders has
been first rate: Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM)'s ability to get
our warriors and equipment where they are needed fast, Space Command's
(SPACECOM)'s warning and Information Operations expertise, and
Strategic Command's (STRATCOM)'s absolutely vital help in cracking one
of our most ambitious missions counterproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and hard and deeply buried targets. Finally, Joint
Forces Command (JFCOM) provides a critical means to enhancing this
team's ability to tackle enemies no matter their weaponry, tactics, or
strategy. JFCOM's leadership in joint experimentation has made the
advancement in joint warfighting sustainable.
The jointness of the current war provides a lesson in our
dependence on all services for their crucial abilities. Early in the
prosecution of the conflict in Afghanistan, we had to stage Special
Operations Forces from Naval Carriers off the Pakistani coast. On the
ground in Afghanistan, Air Force trained combat controllers (CCT) in
our Special Operations Liaison Elements provided the direct connection
needed for Navy, Marine and Air Force pilots to accurately target
Taliban and al Qaeda positions and assets. This direct link allowed our
Army SF teams to integrate the anti-Taliban cavalry charges with
precision bombing runs with devastating effect.
The close relationship between our Special Operations Liaison
Element and the Joint Force Air Component Commander's staff has allowed
us to enhance allied combat effectiveness and minimize fratricide. The
introduction of conventional Marine and Army forces with SOF
strengthens U.S. capability and influence in the theater. The concept
of combined conventional and unconventional units leverages the fact
that they are trained for a mutually supporting frameworks, that
significantly improves improving their joint warfighting effectiveness.
SOF's complimentary relationship with the Air Force and Navy
conventional forces has already shown what a truly potent force a joint
force is to reckon with.
The battlefield successes in the campaign against terrorism further
reveal the insight of Congress in the creation of USSOCOM the year
following the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. That legislation, the
Nunn-Cohen Amendment (codified in Title 10, Section 167, U.S. Code, USC
167), created USSOCOM and consolidated all SOF under one command.
Forces making up SOF include Army Special Operations Aviation, Special
Forces, Rangers, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations forces;
Air Force special operations aviators and special tactics teams; and
Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Teams and Special Boat Units.
The Nunn-Cohen Amendment also provides USSOCOM with its own Major
Force Program 11 (MFP-11) funding. This legislation provides USSOCOM
with the authority, direction and control of funds that allows us to
develop and acquire Special Operations peculiar equipment to prepare
SOF to carry out our assigned missions. In turn, this legislation
provides the warfighter with the tools necessary to fight not only the
most committed industrial age power, but also the means to fight
entities that would and could wield influence through terror by any
means.
USSOCOM's Fiscal Year Total Obligation Authority (TOA) is $4.9
billion, just 1.3 percent of the overall defense budget. This figure
includes nearly $2 billion for our 47,000 military personnel (USSOCOM
programs for these funds and the Services execute them) and $1.7
billion for Operations and Maintenance. Modernization, which consists
of $777 million for Procurement and $431 million for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation, is $1.2 billion of the TOA and the
remaining $63 million is for Military Construction (MILCON).
USSOCOM's MFP-11 Fiscal Year 2003 request represents an $854
million increase over fiscal year 2002, the result of additional
funding to address USSOCOM's modernization issues. This type of
departmental support of Service and SOF resources greatly enhances the
effectiveness of our Nations' SOF and our ability to meet the
operational requirements expected. Yet these limited SOF resources
greatly enhance the effectiveness of conventional military forces by
providing essential leveraging capabilities while ensuring that ``must
succeed'' special operations are completed with the absolute certainty
and professionalism the Nation demands. The Fiscal Year 2003
President's budget makes important additions to SOF programs to begin
meeting new challenges confronting SOF and the Nation.
Joint warfighting is not the only major success in this conflict:
early in the planning process, CENTCOM planners were able to sort
through the rush of international support to identify how best to use
the variety of strengths offered by our allies. Important to our
planners were the offers of SOF from around the globe. The legendary
capabilities of the British Special Air Service (SAS) and Australian
SAS, as well as special operations forces from other nations provide a
unique, but not unfamiliar, combined special operations environment for
us. This cooperative engagement with the best the world has to offer in
fighting asymmetrically will assist us in the long battle ahead.
ussocom support to the secretary's and chairman's way ahead
USSOCOM is in full support of both the policy goals as voiced in
Secretary Rumsfeld's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and of Chairman
Myers' goals as offered to this committee, the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC), in recent weeks. Chairman Myers presented three
objectives to the SASC: to win the global war on terrorism, to improve
joint warfighting capabilities, and to transform to be ready to face
future challenges. In our view these objectives provide a temporal
roadmap to the goals of Secretary Rumsfeld's Defense Strategy as
envisioned in the QDR. USSOCOM directly supports the defense policy
goals of assure, dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat across the
spectrum of conflict.
SOF's role as ``global scouts'' serves to assure allies and friends
of U.S. Government resolve. Our participation in the Combatant
Commander in Chief (CINC) Theater Security Cooperation Plans, Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Humanitarian, Mine action,
Counterdrug and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) provides tangible
training benefits while building rapport with our friends and allies.
SOF's regionally-oriented, culturally aware forces provide a depth
of expertise not available to the conventional forces. Through Civil
Affairs (CA) operations and peacetime Psychological Operational (PSYOP)
programs, U.S. interests are advanced at minimal cost in resources. As
``warrior diplomats'' and through recurring interaction with current
and potential allies and friends they are able to influence situations
favorably towards U.S. national interests.
SOF's presence and unique capabilities dissuade potential
adversaries by complicating their planning and providing the President
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) a wider array of options in dealing with
them. By having the capability to operate ``in the seam'' between peace
and war, SOF can address transnational and asymmetric threats by
synchronizing the activities of the military and interagency partners.
SOF can help shape the pre-conflict environment to set conditions
favorable to the U.S. and can also provide a strategic economy of force
by covering areas of the world left uncovered by the commitment of
conventional forces to other contingencies. Forces organized, trained,
and equipped to execute our highest priority principal missions of
Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP/WMD) and
Combating Terrorism (CT) also provide an effective deterrent against
other asymmetric threats. SOF operating in conjunction with
conventional forces provides a mutually beneficial warfighting
relationship. SOF provides increased security for conventional forces
because of our ability to operate within the host nation environment,
which they offers a valuable source of intelligence and acts as an
outer perimeter of security for conventional force operations.
Conventional forces, in turn, provide a ready means to conduct large-
scale combat operations if a greater commitment of U.S. military force
proves necessary.
SOF's clandestine insertion capabilities, specialized tactics and
techniques provide additional means to our military commanders to allow
them to set the time, place, and manner of victory and decisively
defeat any adversary. Other SOF principal missions such as Direct
Action, Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, and
Psychological Operations contribute to the warfighters' ability to
achieve decisive victory by optimizing his forces' combat power at the
decisive right place and time. The perfect example of this capability
is the recent success that our Air Force Special Tactics and Army
Special Forces units have had integrating close air support from allied
aircraft with Northern Alliance ground force operations. In this case,
SOF is acting as the critical enabling link between the conventional
forces and the mission at hand.
The current state of SOF capabilities is strong, but to meet the
evolving weaponry and tactics of potential adversaries, we must invest
now to remain a reliable support for the Defense Strategy. USSOCOM's
aim in pursuing transformation is to guarantee our forces remain
relevant to any fight necessary, and ensuring we minimize risk to our
Nation's vital interests. To do this, our intent is to transform to
better support the Defense Policy Goals as described below.
assure allies and friends
Presence: Forward presence of SOF pledges U.S. commitment to allies
and friends; promotes access, improves interoperability and
intelligence cooperation; expands the range of pre-conflict options to
counter threats; deters aggression; influences positive behavior;
mitigates the development of asymmetrical threat capabilities; and
allows the U.S. to prosecute the war on its terms.
To provide presence in critical regions worldwide, USSOCOM must
depend on the securing of Status of Forces Agreements with new and
potential coalition partners in order to enhance interoperability and
build a combined force far stronger than its components. USSOCOM will
accomplish this through an array of joint, combined, and interagency
experimentation programs designed to simulate actual combat--the final
result being a global combat-ready ``plug-n-fight'' force.
Participation in Theater CINC joint training activities provides near-
term benefits to our national security and also builds rapport with our
friends and allies to weather future challenges.
Anti-Access Environments: SOF's global access is a capability key
to preserving national security. SOF must have the ability to access
and operate anywhere in the world, in any mission environment, from
overt to clandestine and from benign to hostile (including Chemical,
Biological, and Radiological (CBR)). In much of the world, SOF
maintains this access and an understanding of local issues through
regional orientation and continued engagement, which is formalized in
Theater Security Cooperation programs. However, to provide access to
most parts of the world, SOF must retain and improve the capability to
operate where U.S. forces may be unwelcome or opposed. Potential
adversaries are acquiring weapons and developing asymmetrical
strategies aimed at denying U.S. forces access to critical theaters of
operations during a crisis. As the first responders, ``door openers,''
and spearhead for decisive follow-on operations, ``SOF access'' sets
the stage for assuring allies and friends. As a strategic asset SOF
derives its value from its ability to operate independently or
integrally as a vital key component of a conventional Joint Task Force
(JTF).
Force projection is another critical element to the Defense
Strategy's goal of assuring allies and friends. In a world of
unpredictable and asymmetric security threats, low-intensity conflict
has emerged as a pervasive mode of warfare. It is imperative that SOF
remains a flexible, mobile and quickly deployable force able to react
to, but more importantly, help mold the international environment. The
ability to project power rapidly and to operate in small teams under
austere conditions is a cornerstone of SOF operations. To enhance our
force projection capabilities, DOD must continue to invest in programs
to improve strategic mobility, sustainment, and information dominance.
Surrogate Warfare: A long-standing SOF mission that has received
deserved new attention is Surrogate Warfare: ``Great powers remain
great if they promote their own interests by serving those of others.''
Stemming and reducing Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO), limiting hazardous
exposure of U.S. forces, smart utilization of low density/high demand
(LD/HD) assets, and increasing the SECDEF's options are goals that can
be achieved through a re-emphasis on a long-standing SOF strength: the
training of surrogate forces to gain results favorable to our
interests. In fact, the greatest contribution that surrogate warfare
has had in Afghanistan is to achieve strategic objectives that were
unobtainable with any other capability in the Armed Forces today.
Al Qaeda is a worldwide trans-national terrorist group that cannot
exist without some form of popular support. The strategic Center Of
Gravity (COG) for al Qaeda is their relationship with the world's
Muslim population. Without active support from a sizeable minority of
the Muslim population and the passive support of a greater number, al
Qaeda would fold. They rely on popular support for both their
recruitment and freedom of action. If we ignore this strategic COG, all
our tactical and operational success will be for naught.
Osama bin Laden's consistent message to the Muslim world has been
that the U.S. intends to invade Islamic territory and slaughter Muslims
in a new crusade. He wanted a confrontation with massive U.S. ground
formations while U.S. airpower rained down on Muslim populations. Such
a scenario would have justified his rhetoric and provoked the Muslim
backlash he desired. We chose a strategy that didn't play into his
hands. By working with a surrogate Muslim force, we neutralized his
plans.
The most telling results of this campaign come from press reports
concerning the hundreds of Pakistani youths who had flooded into
Afghanistan to support the Taliban. Many of these ``would-be martyrs''
returned to Pakistan and turned on the fundamentalist clergy that had
sent them off to war. They had been told that they would be fighting a
jihad against American invaders. Instead they saw no Americans and
found themselves fighting ``brother'' Muslims in violation of the
Koran.
Instead of helping al Qaeda increase its popular support, we have
opened the first cracks of a rift between al Qaeda and the general
Muslim populace and have demonstrated the President's intent--that this
is not a war on Muslims, but a war waged on terrorists who are using
Islam as a ruse to justify murder. This is one of the most important
strategic outcomes of our operations in Afghanistan to date, and the
capability to conduct surrogate warfare resides in our country's
special operations forces alone.
The original foundation of the SOF approach to warfare was to
organize and train friendly foreign forces to help them contend with
hostile challenges. Increased emphasis in this area can multiply our
influence globally without requiring a standing-force presence in a
multitude of locations. The success of our JCET deployments, and
support for the State Department's African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI) are just two examples illustrating the effectiveness of a series
of short-term education programs. They enhance the professionalism of
third-world nations' armed forces, foster the growth of responsible
regional-based forces, and promote U.S. values and interests. These
initiatives are popular with host nations. They provide valuable
training for our forces, enhance morale, and promote host nation
stature within the region. Such programs increase U.S. influence and
the likelihood that these new friends will be able to resolve crises
peacefully, and in a manner advantageous to our national interests with
minimal U.S. support.
Security Assistance: In assuring our allies and friends, SOF will
continue to monitor, and if necessary engage, weak and failing states
in Asia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere where there is an absence of
responsible governments. Working in concert with State Department
personnel on these Security Assistance missions improves the U.S.
government unified approach to better address the security interests of
these friends and allies and provides cost efficiencies in applying
Title 22 funding.
We will project and sustain SOF in distant anti-access or area-
denial environments. If we are to project SOF, we must invest in
infrastructure in the continental U.S. (CONUS) to reverse the erosion
of SOF training range infrastructure and ensure that ranges are
sustainable, capable, and available. We must also invest outside the
CONUS and secure funding for host nations to build temporary facilities
and training ranges for SOF conducting interoperability and security
assistance training, FID and exercises within the host nation.
OPTEMPO: Assuring allies and friends through forward presence, and
involvement in small-scale contingencies, combined with SOF support to
national mission requirements results in a heavy OPTEMPO. SOF can be
consumed as quickly and completely by these missions as they are in
major theater wars. To ensure that our LD/HD capabilities are available
for urgent missions, we are working to mitigate force management risk,
operational risk, institutional risk, and future challenges through
OPTEMPO and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) controls. Tailoring forces to
task, exploiting our Reserve and National Guard forces, transitioning
non-SOF missions to the services, and outsourcing when the mission
allows are just a few examples of actions we're pursuing at this time.
Total Force: We are working to ensure SOF Reserve components are
properly resourced, trained, organized, equipped and postured. As an
example, we are upgrading our PSYOP broadcast capability by
transitioning it from older C-130s to new EC-130Js. This will
strengthen these vital Reserve assets so that SOF will be available to
assure our allies and friends as future challenges arise.
dissuade future military competition
Experimentation: Successes demonstrated in our current engagements
make one thing certain: the adversary will work to find ways to
circumvent SOF strengths on the battlefield. CENTCOM planners, through
a brilliant use of joint and combined warfighting doctrine, deftly
avoided the expected quagmire of the Afghan battle. SOF must build on
the lessons learned from this campaign to enable the creation of a
range of capabilities and warfighting options. These enhanced
warfighting methods dissuade competitors by forcing them to develop
responses stretching their limited resources or choosing the high-risk
option of focusing their efforts on a subset of SOF warfighting
options, leaving themselves vulnerable to others.
Research and Development: We must continue to invest in making our
SOF more capable in austere environments. One lesson of the recent
Afghan campaign was that seemingly small investments in equipment could
be devastating in the hands of a prepared SOF operator. Two such
successes were the Multi-band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR) and the
SOF Programmed Laser Target Designators. The MBITR enabled our
operators to--with a single light weight device--replace several
existing radios. This substantial lightening reduced the combat weight
carried by our soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the field and improved
their ability to coordinate via radio. The SOF Programmed Laser Target
Designators dramatically improved the precision of our aerial assaults
on Taliban and al Qaeda positions.
We intend to work on an array of improvements from better body
armor and chemical protection, to advances in gunship armaments, to
developing and leveraging Information Operations (IO) tools. USSOCOM's
primary generator of success is has always been to ensure we select the
best and train for innovation: we are equipping the warrior, not
manning the equipment. We clearly recognize that the modern battlefield
is comprised of land, air, sea, space and the virtual domains. IO has
the potential to help SOF operators remain undetected and unlocated in
hostile territory--a critical element for several of our principal
missions. We intend to actively pursue IO capabilities and develop
standing authority to employ these capabilities when needed. This will
improve SOF effectiveness and access to previously denied environments,
and dissuade potential competitors from engaging even if they perceive
quantitative advantage.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR): USSOCOM is continuously
striving to leverage information technology and innovation concepts to
develop an interoperable, flexible joint C\4\ISR architecture and
capability that allows rapid sharing of analysis and time sensitive
information between the joint, interagency, and international
communities. Recently, the command established a new element within our
Joint Intelligence Center, the Special Operations Joint Interagency
Collaboration Center (SOJICC), to provide data mining across multiple
security classification domains and visualization tools to effectively
display that information to support deliberate planning for all
assigned SOF missions. By collaborating with national and theater
intelligence organizations, as well as the Interagency Community, we
hope to improve ``knowledge discovery'' and data sharing in combating
trans-national and trans-regional threats. At the same time, we must
also pursue and leverage a collaborative investment strategy and
migration plan for integrated, cost-effective mix of intelligence
collection platforms that are interoperable and responsive to future
collection needs and challenges.
To foster an environment that lessens competitors' proclivity to
develop threatening capabilities and postures, we must leverage our
allies' and friends' influence to strengthen and stabilize regimes
vulnerable to both state and non-state coercion. In combating the
evolving terrorist threat, one promising avenue is to enhance
Department of Defense (DOD) and interagency coordination INTERPOL to
provide a more pervasive understanding of the threat.
Role of Civil Affairs (CA): CA manages the civilian dimension of
operations for the combatant commander to gain support of the local
government and populace, to provide legitimacy for military operations
and to accomplish required objectives in support of the National
Military Strategy. The transformation of CA will require additional
training and equipment to meet and defeat the critical demands of
current and future asymmetrical threats and to ensure full spectrum
dominance over all adversaries, in all civil-military environments.
CA transformation is critical to ensure their status as a ready and
relevant SOF resource in any dynamic operational environment. We must
continue to address training and sustainment of language skills and to
refine issues that develop and improve collaborative interagency and
multi-national efforts to ensure efficient and optimum use of CA
assets. CA also possesses the unique capability to effect crucial
components of the combatant commander's campaign plan that help
countries formally in conflict to establish or reestablish viable
democratic institutions, capable of self-governance.
Role of Psychological Operations (PSYOP): USSOCOM is focusing on
SOF PSYOP forces with the objective of further improving their
capability to sew the seams between the national strategic and regional
influence initiatives, and military operations. Today, PSYOP is playing
a critical role in the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and our
global war on terrorism (GWOT). Our PSYOP soldiers took radio
programming that was produced at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to support
Operation Enduring Freedom, digitized those programs, and transmitted
them to our EC-C130E PSYOP platform, Commando Solo. As a result of this
innovation, we are leveraging our robust CONUS production and analysis
resources. These assets have minimized our deployed footprint and the
corresponding logistics demands, and have provided hundreds of hours of
``influence'' oriented commercial radio broadcasts to Afghani target
audiences. To continue such success, we are reevaluating the SOF PSYOP
force structure and assessing future capabilities required to meet an
increasing U.S. need to favorably influence behaviors, attitudes, and
actions globally.
As a first step toward real transformation of the joint PSYOP
forces, we are developing a clear joint PSYOP vision and operational
concept which will soon provide a common framework for enhancing the
joint PSYOP force structure and making key investments for modernizing
PSYOP capabilities.
Our emphasis on PSYOP is a cornerstone of our Nation's Influence
Operations strategy. From a USSOCOM perspective, it is not
inconceivable that in the near future, the battle may be fought over
television, radio or the Internet rather than the traditional linear
battlefield.
deterring threats and coercion against u.s. interests
Presence: Increased peacetime forward SOF presence establishes
relationships which can later prove vital to gaining access to
otherwise denied areas. This was recently demonstrated by the
relatively smooth manner in which SOF were granted access to the
Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan early in the Afghan conflict.
Within the last year, CENTCOM tasked SOF to conduct military-to-
military contacts with some of the same decision-makers that sped this
agreement. Forward presence also provides critical information on
adversaries, strengthens deterrence in critical areas, provides rapid
strike capability, augments global intelligence, and limits the
complexity of infrastructure protection for follow-on forces.
Improved Deterrence Through Transformation: The Defense Strategy
envisions an improved deterrent posture by ramping the capabilities of
the forward-deployed forces to lessen the size of reinforcement
required to counter even the most intense conflicts. These
transformational initiatives improve the forward-deployed SOF and
conventional forces' deterrent effect and free forces now dedicated to
reinforcement for other missions.
Operational Preparation of the Battlefield: USSOCOM is continually
evaluating the potential for new technologies to improve the
preparation of operational space. The command sees this as one area
that can significantly assist in combating asymmetric approaches. For
USSOCOM our battle-space goes well beyond the traditional battlefield.
The use of data mining and ``links and nodes'' analysis capabilities
with multiple databases and multiple agencies in a collaborative
environment provide a better assessment of the future battlefield. With
the product of this effort we can campaign plan for effects-based
targeting, not only of traditional targets, but, also more focused or
discrete ones, and other asymmetric threats.
Seamless C4: USSOCOM shares the DOD vision for a Global Information
Grid (GIG) that will provide all forces a seamless network to provide
the uninterrupted exchange of information necessary to achieve decision
superiority. Over the past several years, the command has created and
refined the SOF Information Enterprise (SIE) as our part of the GIG.
The SIE provides a standard ``enterprise'' approach to not only our
information infrastructure, but also the systems, applications,
policies, processes, and knowledge required by our forces to prepare
for and conduct special operations across the spectrum of military
operations from daily staff functions to war. This enterprise approach
has created standard tactics, techniques, and procedures on how we plan
and execute missions in a collaborative way. The key to this has been
our SOF Mission Planning Environment which is standardizing our mission
planning applications and the use of web technology to share common
functional area information, such as intelligence, logistics, and
deployment information. The Web Information Center or WIC has been very
successful in providing a common web view to our warfighting forces at
the theater SOCs.
Critical to our warfighting capability is our dependence on
satellites. We strongly concur with the recommendations of the SPACECOM
led Senior Warfighter Forum to synchronize the space platforms with our
ground terminals and to get the mobile user satellites in place in the
2010 time frame. Our resource requests for information technology match
our most critical needs, such as individual radios, tactical local area
networks (TACLAN), continued sustainment and modernization of our
garrison and deployed networks, and continual training of our
information professionals--all of which are crucial to our capabilities
in meeting the threat of global terrorism. SOF C\4\ systems greatly
improve our warfighting capability and provide the foundation for our
transformational efforts.
Targeting Speed: SOF units benefited greatly from the improvements
over the past decade to surveillance assets. The War in Afghanistan
illustrates that persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement
of adversary forces is critical to enable SOF to react to surprises and
to help pre-empt ``bolt from the blue'' attacks.
Innovations in tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as
oncoming technologies will allow SOF to exercise extreme time sensitive
targeting. USSOCOM's TACLAN program will enable deployed forces to
receive the latest intelligence at all security levels down to the
``last tactical mile.'' The Special Reconnaissance Capability program
(SRC) will provide the remote sensors and tagging/tracking capabilities
to further enhance our ability for rapid targeting.
An increased overall DOD HUMINT program will enhance not only
traditional force's capabilities, but also SOF capabilities. The rapid
response and pre-emptive capabilities made possible by these
transformation initiatives provide a strong deterrent to our
adversaries, serving as a means to impose the commander's will rapidly
to any threatening action.
Advertise: USSOCOM must ensure that the high profile SOF has
enjoyed in its efforts alongside the conventional forces in Afghanistan
is used to better its effectiveness. Our Nation's SOF are well known to
most of our allies and our potential adversaries. SOF can be used to
improve understanding of non-allied foreign governments in how improved
relations with the U.S. can help their nation, improve their people's
lot, and enhance their stature in their region of the world.
Even more surprising is that many of our foreign friends, and many
U.S. government agencies are unaware of what capabilities SOF can bring
to a collaborative effort through both DOD and Department of State
avenues. USSOCOM expects to improve its combined SOF and interagency
programs, benefiting both DOD and the interagency in accomplishing
their objectives.
if deterrence fails, decisively defeat an enemy
Capabilities-Based Transformation: As we look to the most critical
capability, being able to defeat any adversary, transformation is not
only important, it can be the difference. USSOCOM is intent on
transforming SOF to a capabilities-based force. To gain this objective,
SOF will focus more on how an adversary might fight versus who the
adversary may be or where the war might occur. Having the necessary
capability to confront an enemy regardless of circumstances enhances
the SOF ability to adapt to surprise.
Force Protection/Situational Awareness: As we commit our forces,
one of our greatest responsibilities is that of their protection. Force
protection demands a robust HUMINT program to provide the first line of
defense. At the tactical level, exploitation of advanced signals of
interest and the capability to receive analyzed and fused intelligence
from national and theater broadcast systems is a critical requirement
to provide credible threat warning. Our Joint Threat Warning System
(JTWS) will provide this critical SIGINT capability tailored for all
our components.
C\4\ISR: USSOCOM is pursuing an investment strategy that focuses on
providing communications and intelligence in support of SOF missions
deep in hostile environments. The C\4\ISR programs I've discussed have
been programmed in the current POM. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
has highlighted increased requirements for these programs and a need to
accelerate their development and procurement. The command must provide
our teams with interoperable global reconnaissance, special
reconnaissance and command and control assets; making them globally
available to receive real-time intelligence enroute to advise forward
and surrogate forces.
Theater Security: The global war on terrorism demonstrates that the
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plans now under development provide
an opportunity to address a transnational threat not engaged by the
predecessor to the TSC, the Theater Engagement Plans. In the TSC
process, the DOD can now synchronize the Theater Security Cooperation
Plans, ensuring that transnational threats that straddle CINC theaters
are addressed in a coordinated manner.
War to Peace Transition: SOF must revise ``SOF-to-conventional-
force'' transition plans in order to relieve our LD/HD capabilities
from non-SOF missions as soon as the threat allows. SOF expects to be
called on early in the conflict to provide a force that has trained
aggressively for politically sensitive missions. Their capability to
handle unforeseen missions branches will continue to make SOF a scarce
asset; because commanders will always want to minimize the risk of a
mission's failure by employing such capable forces. When transition
allows, we must ensure it is done smartly, to allow the employed SOF to
reconstitute and prepare for the next challenge.
Improved mission capabilities: USSOCOM is working to improve SOF
capabilities to prosecute Unconventional Warfare and Foreign Internal
Defense programs to better support friends and allies. The value of
these programs, demonstrated in the Afghanistan campaign, can be
particularly useful in stabilizing countries and regions vulnerable to
terrorist infiltration.
Realignment: For the past several months, USSOCOM has been
exploring the current posture of our Theater Special Operations
Commands to find areas where we can improve our responsiveness,
regional expertise, and training. This study has been conducted in
response to the SECDEF's Quadrennial Defense Review direction, and has
uncovered some interesting possibilities for the future of SOF force
structure, forward basing, and mission capabilities. We are still
exploring the obstacles and advantages to these ventures, but hope will
soon to provide the SECDEF with a set of recommendations to improve the
responsiveness and effectiveness of SOF.
critical issues for the command
As in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's statement, there
can be only one number one issue for any commander. For USSOCOM, the
``SOF Truths'' drive what we consider critical. These SOF Truths are:
Humans are more important than hardware
Quality is more important than quantity
Special Operations Forces can't be mass produced
Competent Special Operations Forces can't be created
after an emergency occurs
The message that we take away from these truths agrees with that of
the Chairman's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee several
weeks ago: People are the most important asset we have. Quality SOF are
the toughest asset for this command to replace. Our primary concern
echoes the Chairman's: we need to take care of our people by improving
pay and compensation, health care, housing, infrastructure, and base
support programs. Our most cost- and mission-effective path is to keep
the tremendous people we have as long as possible.
SOF, like the services, is experiencing shortages of personnel with
critical skills, in both the officer and enlisted ranks. The SECDEF's
call for a sweeping overhaul of longstanding Pentagon personnel
policies to enhance retention will go far in correcting this downward
trend. USSOCOM continues to pursue innovative recruiting and retention
programs and reinforcing our efforts to improve morale. Recruitment and
accession of minority personnel into the Special Operations community
continues to be a challenge for us. This issue is certainly considered
relevant, given the nature of Special Operations missions and the value
that people of different races, backgrounds, cultures, and language
skills can bring to SOF units. During the period September 1994 to
September 2001, minority representation in Army Special Operations
Forces grew from 11.6-15.1 percent, with all groups more or less
showing equal growth.
While women have made significant gains within the officer warfare
communities, there was virtually no change in overall ethnic/race and
female composition within Navy SOF over the same period. Gains within
the Air Force SOF community mirror those of the Service, with the
largest gains in the African American population. AFSOC minorities rose
from 16.7-20.6 percent during this period. AFSOC has the highest
representation of females in SOF due to their inclusion in fixed wing
SOF aircraft.
It is important to note that not all military personnel can meet
the stringent requirements for joining SOF, and women have been barred
from most SOF units due to the restrictions of combat exclusion.
However, both SOF personnel and minorities polled outside our community
voiced strong opposition to the establishment of quotas or devaluation
of standards to achieve greater diversity. We are keenly aware of this
issue and monitor it closely. It remains an item of special interest
for SOF component commanders. Gains in this area, though not
significant, have been realized and show a positive trend.
Some other issues that have continued to be of concern to SOF over
the past year are addressed below.:
Mobility: We must guarantee the SOF Air Force component rotary-wing
capabilities remain secure until a replacement aircraft (CV-22) with
the required capabilities is fielded. We recommend re-capitalizing our
MH-53 helicopters with modifications to ensure airworthiness and
defensive system capabilities to fly in the threat environments of the
future, well beyond the currently scheduled retirement date of 2007.
CV-22: The CV-22 may seem like a long-range issue, but it is one we
need to keep our eyes on. Extending the MH-53 helicopter force
structure to fill the capability gap created by the CV-22 program slip
is a temporary solution. The command is committed to the CV-22 and the
unique capabilities it will bring to the fight. The long-range, high
speed, vertical lift CV-22 fills a long-standing SOF mission
requirement not met by any other existing fixed or rotary wing
platform.
MH-47E/60K. Our limited fleet of Army Special Operations Aviation
assets must also be closely monitored. We are concerned about the
battle-damaged and destroyed aircraft now missing from this fleet and
how quickly they can be recapitalized.
ASDS: The Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) is a specially
designed combatant submarine that will provide clandestine undersea
mobility for SOF personnel and their mission support equipment. The
ASDS is capable of operating in a wide range of environmental extremes
and threat environments, providing increased range, payload capacity,
robust communications, loiter capability, and protection of SOF
personnel from the elements during transit. The ASDS provides a quantum
leap in our undersea mobility capability.
USSOCOM is closely linked with the Navy in support of the SSGN
Trident conversions, which will provide a host platform for Navy SEALs
to conduct their crucial maritime missions. SOF may also require afloat
staging bases to provide operational presence in international waters
during periods of potential conflict or in the initial phases of combat
operations.
Transformation: USSOCOM's approach to transformation is an
integrated conceptual, organizational, and process based. It provides
an effective yet efficient framework for SOF to institutionalize change
and ensure SOF is prepared to meet future challenges.
USSOCOM is institutionalizing a Long-Range Planning Process (LRPP)
which will provide the systemic programmatic methodology for applying
resources towards transformation. The LRPP will provide the required
cyclic senior level review and assessment of SOF transformation
azimuths and power settings to ensure that SOF transformation is
properly funded. USSOCOM is committed to transformation, the tenets of
Joint Vision 2020, and to ensuring SOF remains a full spectrum force.
Transformation Roadmap. At the direction of the SECDEF, USSOCOM,
the Services, and the Defense Agencies are developing Transformation
Roadmaps that will establish the way markers for each respective
transformation efforts. The USSOCOM roadmap will integrate the
transformation efforts of Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF with emerging
revolutionary technologies such as the CV-22, the Advanced SEAL
Delivery System (ASDS), the SSGN (Trident Conversion), and the SOF
Information Enterprise (SIE). These integration efforts will ensure
that USSOCOM always provides the best trained and equipped SOF in the
world. Additionally, this roadmap will be the keystone for linking
SOCOM transformation efforts with the Services.
Military Construction Investment Program: Lastly and related to
readiness, quality force, and effectiveness is our continuing need to
modernize the infrastructure that supports our SOF capabilities. Our
military construction investment program directly contributes to the
training, readiness and operational capabilities of our Special
Operations Forces. Separate from the SOF budget, the Services provide
quality family housing, barracks and community support facilities for
our forces and their families. We applaud Congress' support for these
programs to enhance the quality of life for all soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines.
conclusion
As USSOCOM moves into the 21st century, we are evolving to meet
future challenges and sustain the relative capability advantage we
enjoy today. USSOCOM is already considering new and innovative methods
of assessing and developing people; is debating possible changes in
doctrine, roles, missions, and force structure; is preparing an
investment plan for modernization and streamlined acquisition that
leverage the Revolution in Military Affairs and Business Affairs; and
is examining new operational concepts for the conduct of special
operations in future environments. USSOCOM is meeting this challenge;
transitioning from a traditional military staff to an Information Age
staff that is matrix-shaped around core functions more flexible and
better postured to resource and support global SOF requirements.
We cannot know with certainty who our foes will be or precisely
what demands will be placed on us in the future. However, in a time of
both uncertainty and opportunity, USSOCOM will continue to provide our
Nation with the means special capabilities to protect our interests and
promote a peace that benefits America and the democratic ideals that we
cherish.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, General.
Mr. Schulte.
STATEMENT OF HARRY E. SCHULTE, ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE, SPECIAL
OPERATIONS ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS CENTER, U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND
Mr. Schulte. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is an honor and
a privilege to report to you on the topic of Special Operations
Forces acquisition and technology.
Congress, through Title 10 U.S. Code, chapter 6, section
167, empowered the USSOCOM to develop and acquire Special
Operations-peculiar equipment, material, and services. We have
implemented streamlined and cost effective processes to provide
our SOF soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the technology and
equipment they need to execute their warfighting and
peacekeeping missions.
Our fundamental acquisition philosophy in USSOCOM is to
field in an expedited manner an 80 percent solution while
working with our warfighters and industry to address the
remaining 20 percent of the requirement. We leverage the three
services, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA),
the Department of Energy, and other agency research and
development programs to look for technologies to apply to our
SOF warfighter needs. We survey industry and use a buy and try
approach for government and commercial off-the-shelf items. Our
warfighters perform early user evaluations of these potential
systems, then we modify, test and field acceptable products.
We enjoy an exceptionally close working relationship with
our SOF operational users. They are willing and anxious to
accept a timely increase in capability provided by an 80
percent solution and their high state of training and
experience enables us to accept risk in our fielding decisions.
This process enables USSOCOM to shorten the typical acquisition
cycle and rapidly insert technology to provide our SOF-critical
warfighting advantages.
The acquisition organization's collocation with
headquarters USSOCOM, daily contact with our warfighters, our
relatively small size and short decision cycles, and the
support we receive from the services, the Department of Defense
and Congress are major contributing factors to our
effectiveness.
I will briefly discuss the acquisition of one of our recent
successes, the Multi-Band Inter-Team Radio (MBITR), which I am
holding in my hand right now. The MBITR is currently fielded
with our Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. The MBITR
acquisition program was completed in less than 3 years. This
significant acquisition timeline compression was accomplished
primarily because of the close government, industry, and
operational user relationships established very early in the
program.
Dialogue between the program office and candidate
developers led to definition of suitable technologies to
satisfy the MBITR requirements. A competitive cost-sharing
development contract with production options was awarded to
Thales Communications of Clarksburg, Maryland. USSOCOM accepted
cost accountability for the management and the contractor
assumed the risk for the functional design, including the
software.
After contract award, contractor, operational users, and
other government agencies participated in a joint integrated
product team. This team ensured strict adherence to multi-
service customer requirements, interoperability standards, and
joint technical architecture. USSOCOM used extensive early user
evaluations of prototype radios to eliminate any test incidents
that you would normally find later on in operational test and
evaluation (OT&E). Prototype radios were released to the Joint
Interoperability Test Center, Navy Special Warfare, and Marine
Corps force reconnaissance units for evaluation in mission
scenarios.
The evaluators employed the MBITR in diving, high altitude
parachuting, and ground operations. During these evaluations,
the contractor was allowed full visibility, thereby shortening
the development learning curve and facilitating rapid
modification of these test articles prior to formal OT&E. The
close working relationship among program stakeholders minimizes
the acquisition cycle time and produced a top-notch product for
the warfighter.
It turns out MBITR replaces six to nine other radios. You
will see some of them sitting on a table over your left
shoulder, basically radios that are talking from ground to
air--three or four different kind of radios from ground to
air--and also ground to ground communications.
Over 8,000 MBITR radios have been fielded to SOF, other
service users, and coalition users at this time. Our
warfighters in Afghanistan report that this new radio is
proving to be exceptionally effective in joint operational
requirements.
I want to thank the committee for the support that you have
provided USSOCOM for the MBITR program over the last few years.
Madam Chairman, with your consent I will conclude my
remarks at this point and submit my remaining statement for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schulte follows:]
Prepared Statement by Harry E. Schulte
I'm Harry Schulte, Acquisition Executive for the United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is an honor and a privilege to
report to you on the topic of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
acquisition and technology. Congress, through Title 10 U.S. Code,
Chapter 6, Section 167, empowered the USSOCOM to develop and acquire
Special Operations-peculiar equipment, material, and services. We have
implemented streamlined and cost effective processes to provide our SOF
soldiers, sailors, and airmen with the technology and equipment they
need to execute their warfighting and peacekeeping missions.
Our fundamental acquisition philosophy in USSOCOM is to field, in
an expedited manner, an 80 percent solution while working with our
warfighters and industry to address the remaining 20 percent of the
requirement. We leverage the three Services, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), Department of Energy (DOE), and other agency
research and development programs to look for technology to apply to
our SOF warfighter needs. We survey industry and use a ``buy and try''
approach for government and commercial off-the-shelf items. Our
warfighters perform early user evaluations of these potential systems;
then we modify, test and field acceptable products. We enjoy an
exceptionally close working relationship with our SOF operational
users. They are willing and anxious to accept the timely increase in
capability provided by the 80 percent solution, and their high state of
training and experience enables us to accept risk in our fielding
decisions. This process enables USSOCOM to shorten the typical
acquisition cycle and rapidly insert technology to provide our SOF
critical warfighting advantages. The acquisition organization's
collocation with headquarters USSOCOM, daily contact with our
warfighters, our relatively small size and short decision cycles, and
the support we receive from the Services, Department of Defense and
Congress are major contributing factors to our effectiveness.
acquisition process example
I will briefly discuss the acquisition process for one of our
recent successes, the Multi-Band Inter/Intra Team Radio (MBITR). The
MBITR is currently fielded with our Special Operations force in
Afghanistan. The MBITR acquisition program was completed in less than 3
years. The significant acquisition timeline compression was
accomplished primarily because of the close government, industry, and
operational user relationships established early in the program. Dialog
between the program office and candidate developers led to definition
of suitable technologies to satisfy MBITR requirements. A competitive,
cost sharing development contract with production options was awarded
to Thales Communications, Inc., of Clarksburg, Maryland. USSOCOM
accepted cost accountability for management and the contractor assumed
total risk for the functional design.
After contract award, the contractor, operational users and other
Government agencies participated in a joint Integrated Product Team
(IPT). The IPT ensured strict adherence to multi-service customer
requirements, interoperability standards, and the joint technical
architecture. USSOCOM used extensive early user evaluation of prototype
radios to limit test incidents typically experienced in Operational
Test and Evaluation (OT&E). Prototype radios were released to the Joint
Interoperability Test Center (JITC), Navy Special Warfare and Marine
Corps Force Reconnaissance units for evaluation in mission scenarios.
The evaluators employed the MBITR in diving, high altitude parachute,
and ground operations. During these evaluations, the contractor was
allowed full visibility, thereby shortening the development learning
curve and facilitating rapid modification of the test articles prior to
OT&E. The close working relationship among program stakeholders
minimized acquisition cycle time and produced a topnotch product.
Over 8,000 MBITR radios have been fielded to SOF, other service
users and coalition users. Our warfighters in Afghanistan report this
new radio is proving to be exceptionally effective in the joint
operations environment.
our challenge
Although our people are certainly SOF's most important asset,
maintaining and improving materiel capabilities remains SOF's most
difficult challenge. SOF must keep its equipment up to date, while
keeping the cost for sustaining its warfighting systems under control.
SOF depends on leading-edge technology to provide the critical
advantage and to support participation in a growing number of
technologically complex missions and operations. Our challenge is to
find ways to modernize or sustain legacy systems when it makes sense,
while developing technological bridges with our industry, service,
interagency, and international partners.
I will now briefly discuss our Urgent Deployment Acquisition (UDA)
process and a few of the standout technologies used in Operation
Enduring Freedom. Then, I'll discuss how we invested Defense Emergency
Response Funds (DERF); what's new in the budget and, promising
technologies for the future.
operation enduring freedom
Our current top priority is supporting Special Operations Forces
engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom. We have implemented processes to
identify, validate, and rapidly acquire Special Operations--peculiar
materiel solutions to emerging requirements of our SOF warfighters. The
regional CINCs forward Combat-Mission Needs Statements (C-MNS) to
USSOCOM. The USSOCOM staff forms a rapid response team to validate the
mission need and develop a plan of action. This team provides their
recommendation to our Deputy CINC within 48 hours. When the DCINC
approves a C-MNS, resources are identified, and I initiate a program to
address the warfighter's need. Our streamlined acquisition procedures
are further streamlined as fielding warfighter C-MNS solutions is our
top priority. These UDA programs are yielding exceptionally positive
results. I'll briefly highlight three of them.
Laser Targeting Devices. In 7 days we were able to contract,
acquire, and deliver into the area of operations an initial operating
quantity of new technology laser targeting devices. These binocular-
like electro-optical devices are being used by SOF ground forces to
observe and precisely measure the three-dimensional coordinates of
distant targets such as cave entrances. Through our joint
communications systems, our forces on the ground relay those
coordinates to Air Force and Navy flight crews for delivery of
precision guided munitions. This system has proven to be a significant
combat multiplier.
Aerial Leaflet Delivery Bomb. We are fielding an aerial bomb
leaflet delivery system for deployment of PSYOP leaflets by F-16 and F-
18 fighter aircraft. At the request of CINCCENT, we initiated the
project in October and will accomplish an initial operating capability
in theater later this month.
Man-portable UAVs. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are providing
significant capabilities and value. Technology has matured to the point
where man-portable UAVs can provide ground forces an organic capability
to remotely conduct local reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
This capability will allow operators in small teams to look over the
next hill and assess enemy activity and avoid unplanned engagements
with larger enemy forces. We are continuing to explore sensor and
miniaturization technologies to enhance this combat multiplier.
defense emergency response funds
In response to the September 11 terrorist attack, the Secretary of
Defense authorized Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) obligation
authority to resource immediate requirements. These critically needed
funds are used to resource our urgent deployment acquisitions and
accelerate current programs prioritized by Theater Special Operations
Commands and USSOCOM Component Commanders. Some of these DERF programs
are:
Night Vision Electro-optical Equipment. SOF enjoys a decided
advantage in this area . . . it has been said, on numerous occasions,
``SOF owns the night.'' While this is currently true, similar
commercial technology is becoming readily available throughout the
world and it is very likely that our ``ownership of the night'' will
erode over time unless we continue to push the envelope. More
importantly, we need to carefully control release of our technologies
to other countries and keep pushing the envelope on precision laser
targeting, thermal imaging, thermal weapon sights, and night vision
device technologies.
Aircraft Survivability and Capability Enhancements. Accelerated
efforts include directional infrared countermeasures, enhanced
situational awareness, and several MH-53 sustainment modifications. To
enhance AC-130 Gunship capabilities, the Air Force recently integrated
a capability to allow direct real time streaming of Predator UAV video
data to the gunship. This rapid technology insertion improved gunship
effectiveness by shortening the engagement chain, enabling our crews to
place fire and steel precisely on target in a very short time.
Other DERF efforts include: deployable secure local area networks;
blue force tracking devices; all terrain vehicles; remote observation
sensors; U.S. rifles modified to fire foreign ammunition; standoff
explosive detection systems; man-portable chemical decontamination
equipment; joint interoperable SOF radios; body armor; lightweight
environmental protection combat uniforms; and, joint threat warning
systems for operators and platforms.
As we expand to other areas in our global war on terrorism, USSOCOM
will continue to acquire technologies that provide our forces the
ability to fight and win in varied environments. We have the process in
place to accomplish this task.
what's new in the budget
Key transformation initiatives in our budget focus on air and
underwater capabilities to infiltrate and exfiltrate SOF into denied
areas and survivability of our platforms and forces. Our flagship
programs continue to be the CV-22 Osprey and Advanced SEAL Delivery
System. Other major initiatives are: maintaining our MH-53 fleet
through fiscal year 2007; a 20 year service life extension program for
the MH-47; enhancing psychological operations capabilities; adding up
to 4 AC-130Us to our fleet of gunships; development of a directed
energy weapon for the gunship; and multiple programs to enhance SOF
aircraft survivability.
technologies for the future
On the horizon we see promising technologies maturing that will
help keep SOF on the cutting edge. USSOCOM is working closely with
industry, labs, and academia to insert those into our technology thrust
areas: signature reduction; high bandwidth/reachback communications;
underwater communications; unmanned systems; batteries/fuel cells;
remote sensing; advanced training systems; bioengineering; and,
directed energy weapons. These thrust areas address the technology gaps
we see and offer USSOCOM the greatest opportunity for technological
payoff.
conclusion
The DERF resources you provided enabled USSOCOM to rapidly acquire
and deliver high technology products to our deployed forces that made
an immediate difference. Without DERF, and the flexibility it gives us,
many of our urgent deployment acquisitions, which have proven to be
effective combat multipliers in Afghanistan, would still be program
plans awaiting approval and resourcing.
USSOCOM has worked hard to wisely use its modernization resources
to sustain systems when it makes sense, to integrate new technologies
into legacy systems, and to acquire new technically advanced systems
that are enabling our combatant CINCs to win the war on terrorism. We
intend to continue our focus on modernization and transformation
challenges to ensure our ability to rapidly adapt to changes in
technology, the operational environment, and ensure we always provide
our SOF operators with the decisive advantage.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Schulte.
The Senator and I were just discussing, since that radio
has worked so well on the battlefield, perhaps we might use it
to communicate better in Congress. We need all the help we can
get up here.
But I am glad you raised that issue because I wanted to say
before I get to my questions that I am very proud of the action
of this committee last year that plussed up your budget for
those radios. I hope that the cameras could actually get a good
shot of that radio that you have in your hand and what it
replaced.
But it is not just the equipment that it replaced. It is
the lives it saved, the confidence it has built, the bravery
that it encouraged because people could go into a battle
relying on their equipment, knowing that they could operate as
they have been trained. So it was not a lot of money, $14
million, but it was an important investment. I think that is
what Senator Roberts and I want to convey, that it is not just
the amount of money, but it is the way it is directed into what
you would say is a relatively simple, yet revolutionary idea.
That actual people on a battlefield could really communicate to
each other. So I think that is a good lesson for us and for our
staff to see, and I thank you for bringing that up.
Mr. Schulte. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Let me start then with my first question.
We will go through this in rather an informal way, but we do
have quite a few questions we want to get on the record.
General, you mentioned in your opening statement that we
have given you the tools, or the predecessors of this committee
gave you the tools, to do your job. What are the most useful
tools in your toolbox? If you could just restate for the record
again so that we can continue to give you more of those kinds
of tools and not burden you with things that do not work.
General Holland. Madam Chairman, to really answer that
question I could probably go through an exhaustive list. But
just let me go back onto what we just talked about, the MBITR,
because MBITR is a great example. The Operational Detachment
Alpha commander made a comment: It did not matter what he wore,
as long as he had a good radio he would be successful. Because
of the support that we got from Congress last year, our people
have that in their hands.
This is all about equipping the man, not manning the
equipment. In our business what we try to make sure of is that
our people who go out forward, we ensure that they have the
right equipment to be successful. That is not only to include
what they need from an intelligence perspective, but it is also
the weapon and it is also the mobility platform that will take
them into that part of the battle.
It is a very comprehensive list of items that we need, and
we would look forward very much to having you come and visit
and see up close and personal the type of equipment that we
talk about.
Senator Landrieu. Our committee is looking forward to that.
We are scheduled, in just a few weeks to get that done. Would
you also argue that it is the discretion that you have within
your budget, or the special designation of your budget, that
allows you to sort of plus-up or step-up and coordinate and
integrate to achieve a result that you have just shown us? Is
that part of the method or mechanics that helps you to be as
successful as you obviously are?
General Holland. Yes, ma'am. I think you hit the nail on
the head. It is our opportunity that when we see the mission
need statement that comes in from our people that are forward--
and during the war in Afghanistan on Operation Enduring Freedom
we have had a dozen or so requirements that have come to us--as
those requirements come into our headquarters, we have a way to
rapidly turn those around.
In the statement for the record that Mr. Schulte has
provided to the subcommittee, it gives those examples of how we
can rapidly meet the requirement of our people in the field.
That is what this is all about. It is the timeliness, it is the
ability to affect the outcome. Obviously, we want to stay on
the inside of the decision cycle of the enemy. Because we have
the money, Major Force Program 11, to be able to accomplish
those tasks, that is what continues to steady us, to keep us on
the forefront in our war against terrorism.
Senator Landrieu. Let me back up if I could to a broader
question. This was also addressed to some degree in your
opening statement. But SOF's Command Publication-1 it states
that, ``Special Ops must select emerging targets or threats
that either cannot be engaged effectively by conventional
forces or be dealt with better by small, highly specialized
units. Similarly, as conventional forces add capabilities and
become able to attack targets that previously belonged solely
to SOF, Special Operations units must re-orient themselves
toward targets that will be vulnerable to their special
capabilities.''
Given this most recent experience--and we are continuing to
experience it daily--what missions do you believe should now be
moved to conventional forces, if any? Where does Special Ops
need to further improve their capabilities? Could you just give
us a little bit more on the record about that integration?
Senator Roberts had indicated this is about your future
vision, based--and building--on the experiences that we have.
How is this integration between Special Ops and conventional
going to work in the future, do you think, General?
General Holland. To answer the question, I think the first
statement I would make is obviously that people are very
important in this equation. When we reflect back on Operation
Enduring Freedom and we think about our people who first went
forward into Afghanistan, the global scout, the ability of our
people to go into a strange country, to understand the
language, to understand the culture, to be able to develop a
trust and confidence with someone from an opposition group,
that to me is something that we continue to need to steady our
focus.
That aspect of it will continue to be very key. Now, the
other aspects, as we continue on into the process, we have to
determine where those capabilities are in the services. This is
a comment that we had in our earlier discussion, that we work
very closely with the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. We
have recently just signed a memo of agreement with the Marine
Corps, to establish what capabilities we have in Special
Operations Forces and what the capabilities are that exist
within each of the services and where can we build the bridge,
where can we sew the seam.
It is those capabilities that will allow our Special
Operations people to then come off of that particular mission,
turn it over to the conventional forces, which allows our
people to come back, retool, refit, retrain, rehearse, and get
ready for the next operation. It is not necessarily all about
more; it is really about how we can exploit the capabilities
that we have, not only within SOF, but also within the
services, so that we can better come together on the
battlefield and be mutually supportive of each other.
Senator Landrieu. That is helpful.
Let me get back to a question about research and
development. The budget has been plussed-up in a fairly
significant way from last year to this year. Special Ops still
remains, however, despite the very significant budget request
for an increase in defense spending, only 1.3 percent of the
total budget. It was 1.3 percent 3 years ago and it has
maintained that flat. Although the dollar amounts have gone up,
the position has remained rather constant.
Under that flat 1.3 percent, our research and development
effort seems to be slightly decreased. I do not know if either
one of you might want to comment about any concerns you would
have about that, what sort of promising research and technology
do you think that is fairly urgent, given our current
experiences and what the likely threats are out there? Is there
something that our committee should know about where we can try
to help you?
General Holland. Madam Chairman, let me take the first part
of the question. Then I would like to turn it over to Mr.
Schulte for him to talk about what those plus-ups actually
mean.
Think about our 2002 budget, which was about $4 billion,
and our 2003 budget which is $4.9 billion. Now, the personnel
account and the operation and maintenance (O&M) account
basically have stayed about the same. Of course, we have gotten
additional money to help out on those additional deployments
that were not part of the plan. However, where the big increase
has been is in our modernization account, and that is what is
key.
That key is really what I would like to have Mr. Schulte
explain, because that is what gives us these tools that we
talked about into the hands of our operators that go forward.
Mr. Schulte. Yes, ma'am. I am looking at the numbers
between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 for the budget.
Our research and development (R&D) numbers did go up about 10
percent. Our request is about 10 percent higher than it was in
2002, to about $430 million for R&D. But the big increase, as
the CINC said, has gone to procurement. We are up about $350
million in procurement. In the short-term, that is where our
problem is.
We have developed some systems over the last few years that
we have not had the procurement money to buy out the inventory
objective. This is going to help us do that kind of thing. For
instance, with the help that your committee provided last year
we were able to buy a lot of the MBITR radios with some of the
funds that just came in, quite frankly, in February, I think.
We have them all on contract now. So every MBITR radio, all
10,000 of them that we required, is on contract basically now
and we will have them delivered out probably in 12 months,
something like that.
This procurement money is going to help us buy out a lot of
things that we have been buying in small quantities and handing
out to the guys as we got them. This is really going to help
quite a bit.
But let me get back to your R&D question. We are up a
little bit on R&D in 2003. We are happy about that. The kinds
of things that we are looking at, the kind of areas we are
trying to get into in R&D a little bit more, are the area of
signature reduction, not just for platforms like aircraft or
even boats, but individual signature reductions for the
individual soldier. High bandwidth communications is important
to everybody in DOD and this is important to USSOCOM,
especially if we have somebody forward and there are
observation posts or the like and we need high bandwidth to
bring the data back to the command center.
One of the big increases in the budget in 2003 is for
directed energy. The Advanced Tactical Laser Advanced Concept
Technology Demo (ACTD) has been moved into the USSOCOM account
beginning in 2003. We will be managing that Advanced Tactical
Laser ACTD starting next year, basically I think because the
ultimate user if that technology were to pan out, would be
something like a future gunship. So the Department moved the
money over to USSOCOM starting next year. That was where you
had some of the increase in the account, too.
So we have a number of things like remote sensing that we
are looking at. More research in batteries and fuel cells,
which is very important to the soldier. The batteries--no
matter how good your batteries are, they are never as good as
you would like them to be. You would like them to last longer,
you would like them to be lighter, you do not want to carry as
many as you have to carry. If you are carrying batteries, you
are not carrying water or food or ammunition, all of which are
very important to the soldier.
Unmanned systems, we are looking at some very simple
unmanned systems that are man-packable, something you can put
in a rucksack and a guy can carry and then maybe hand-launch
and it would go over the next hill with some video and take a
look at what is over the next hill, those kinds of things.
Those are the areas that we are focusing on with our R&D
money. We basically have taken all the SOF requirements and
boiled them down into these thrust areas.
One of the things I would like to bring up just quickly is
that there is a conference going on, it actually started today.
It was co-sponsored by DARPA and USSOCOM, called ``Scientists
Helping America.'' I spoke at the conference this morning. The
idea was to go after scientists from industry and academia that
maybe are nontraditional R&D people as far as the government is
concerned. Many of these people have never worked with the
government before, and yet there are some great ideas out
there.
Basically, I went down nine technology thrust areas that
are needs in the command and set them up, and they are going to
break into nine different seminars to come up with ideas on how
they would solve this kind of thing and then come back to us.
So we are working these nine thrust areas very hard and that is
where the plus-up in R&D will help us, work some of these
areas.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Schulte. I am very happy
to hear about that conference you spoke about. There was a
tremendous amount of discussion in our systems last year in
terms of trying to get better technology quicker to the
Pentagon, to get it working on the battlefield, by going
through nonconventional methods. We never could agree between
the House and the Senate about how to do that. So perhaps you
can give us some good ideas this year about that.
My time has expired.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. One thing I wanted to do is go over again
what the General has indicated are SOF truths in your
testimony. Number 1, humans are more important than hardware;
number 2, quality is more important than quantity; number 3,
Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced; and number
4, competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after
an emergency occurs.
I think the message we take away from these truths agrees
with that of the chairman's testimony to the Armed Services
Committee here just a short time ago.
During his recent testimony before the full committee, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Jim Jones, testified he
had signed an agreement with you folks that would greatly
expand the cooperation and interaction between the Marines and
Special Operations Forces. You have referred to that in your
testimony. In what areas do you anticipate increased
cooperation?
The second part of that is, there have been marines
assigned to headquarters elements of the Special Operations
Command, but there is not a marine component of USSOCOM. Should
SOCOM have a marine component? That is a question from an old
marine, but go ahead. [Laughter.]
General Holland. OK, sir. Can I start with your first part
of your question?
Senator Roberts. Certainly.
General Holland. I think the agreement that General Jones
and I signed, the important part, is to ensure that the Marine
Corps and Special Operations are, in fact, coordinating in
those areas where we really need to be coordinating. Example:
The amphibious readiness group (ARG). As they depart and go to
sea, before they depart we need to have a sharing of
information, their capabilities, where they are going to be, so
that we have that in a plan in case something happens, so we
understand that there could be mutual support that would be
provided wherever that location would be.
The second part is, once the ARG gets into a theater we
have the theater Special Operations Commands. Say, if it were
going into the Mediterranean, then to have a Special Operations
Command Europe (SOCEUR) liaison officer interface with the
commander to ensure that they each give updates on, number one,
the marine capability that they have with the ARG and the
Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capability
(MEUSOC) as it comes into location, but also to have the SOCEUR
staff brief them on where they see potential hot spots in that
particular area. There can also be a sharing of intelligence on
what it is that each could be expected to do.
The next piece that we discussed was acquisition. There are
a lot of things that Mr. Schulte works within our office that
we need to be sharing with those people who would have people
employed in similar circumstances.
Senator Roberts. Do you mean that the United States Marine
Corps, that bailing wire outfit that I served in, could have
equal access to a radio like that?
Mr. Schulte. They do, sir.
Senator Roberts. Not haul 200 pounds of batteries around
with this outfit back here?
Mr. Schulte. The Marine Corps is buying the MBITR, sir, not
our contract.
Senator Roberts. They do not have that radio now, or do
they have that radio now?
Mr. Schulte. Some of them do. There are some radios in the
Marine Corps now.
Senator Roberts. So certain units do have that radio? What
about the Tenth Mountain Division in the Army?
Mr. Schulte. I do not think so.
Senator Roberts. But that is the kind of blueprint that you
are talking about under that jointness doctrine you are
developing?
Mr. Schulte. Yes, sir.
General Holland. Then the other part that is important is
that we look to our future, and both of us have a future as we
look at tilt-rotor technology. As the CV-22 and the MV-22 come
into our inventory, there are going to be a lot of areas where
we will need to be sharing.
Just over in Afghanistan, as we are talking about what we
have been accomplishing together, they have KC-130s, they have
Marine helicopters, and we are also seeing that there are many
areas that, even when you get to the crisis----
Senator Roberts. Very old helicopters, I might add.
General Holland. --the joint task force commander is going
to take a look at what resources are available and how can he
put them together in such a manner so that they can be
successful on the target. What it is going to take is for a
mutual understanding of what each other's capabilities are and
then to see what is that next step.
I have people on our staff that are working closely with
General Jones' staff and we are going to be getting together
later in the year to go over some of these initiatives that I
just talked about.
Senator Roberts. Now, you do not have a warfighting lab per
se. I know the Marines got into that several years ago at my
and some others on the committee's insistence. I suppose this
is for Mr. Schulte, but the subcommittee is concerned about the
Department of Defense's ability to effectively transition
technology from the lab to the warfighter, and your statement
reflects that and your response, General, also reflects that.
Special Operations Command appears to be unbelievably
successful, from the standpoint of a marine, at finding
technological solutions and quickly applying them in the field.
My series of questions were these and you can just sum up:
What lessons learned from your transition success can be shared
with other services? You have already spoken to that, because
now we are trying to share that information.
How is the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a new system
basically communicated back to the Special Operations Command?
What works, what does not? Does a similar communication
mechanism exist for informing the services about any particular
systems which they are also working on? It is a two-way street.
Would you care to comment?
Mr. Schulte. I think I appreciate the comment that we have
been successful in transitioning technology. I would not tell
anyone whether we are better than the services or not on this,
but it is a little different. The services start with basic
research and basic research takes a while before it comes up
with the technology and then eventually leads into a product,
kind of the front-end of the process.
Well, a little bit on the front-end of the process, I have
to admit we cherry-pick. We are looking across the Air Force,
the Navy, the Army, the Department of Energy, DARPA, and
anybody else we can find, for promising technologies that are
going to solve an itch that we have. We will jump in when we
think there is something ready to prototype or something ready
to----
Senator Roberts. You could buy off-the-shelf.
Mr. Schulte. We can go to any of those places and we can
get whatever we need. So the front-end of the process might
look a little bit shorter because we kind of wait to see for
the promising things that are a little bit farther along. I am
not looking necessarily 10 or 12 years out. I am looking maybe
a year or 2 years out where I can take something and get it
into a product for the warfighter in the near-term.
Senator Roberts. Well, 10 or 12 years out you may not need
it.
Mr. Schulte. That is exactly right, sir.
The front-end is we jump in a little bit later and take
advantage of what the other services have done. The back-end of
the process is, how do we get it to the warfighter? What helps
is that we have a very close relationship with the warfighter.
USSOCOM is relatively small. We work very closely with these
units and we get them involved at the very beginning in the
acquisition process.
So we will get something prototyped, we will get it to the
guys at Fort Bragg. They will take it out to the field. They
are very, very candid about what they like and what they do not
like about equipment, and we will get that turned around and we
will get it back. So you get very rapid feedback and you can
get things to the field a lot quicker.
Senator Roberts. See what you can do about a new microphone
while you are at it.
Senator Landrieu. It was such a good idea it blew the
system.
Senator Roberts. I think the chairman has a question here.
Senator Landrieu. It is not a question; I just want to
interject. I really hope that Senator Roberts and I continue to
work as a good and effective team and accomplish many things.
If there could be one thing that we could really make a
contribution to, it would be on this point. We sit on a variety
of subcommittees and I think to zero it down--Special Ops seems
to be very sort of customer-focused in the sense that your
customers are your warfighters. You ask them what they need,
what they want, and then you just do your best to get it to
them.
If you can get it through traditional R&D through the
Department, that is great. If you can go to a store and buy it
off-the-shelf, whatever they need. I wish, Senator--if we had
more of that attitude, in this Senator's opinion, throughout
the whole Department, I think we would be better served. Not to
be overly critical, but just to raise the point that there are
better ways, and you are really showing us a better way and I
just wanted, Senator, to interject that. But I do not want to
take your time.
Senator Roberts. Well, we have enough time here with the
stunning attendance that we have here to ask any questions that
we have.
This may or may not be an accurate analogy, but it is my
prejudice, so bear with me. Staff and myself, others, attended
an exercise with the Marine Corps out in Monterey, as I recall,
called Urban Warrior. The exercise was based on the new
doctrine that General Charles Krulak gave, the former
Commandant, who could give quite a lecture on asymmetrical
warfare and the warfare of the future. I hope everybody paid
attention. I know I did and others did as well.
I was trying to figure out as these marines were conducting
an exercise, and it was about 85 degrees, and they were still
carrying 75-80 pounds worth of gear, slugging along with the
little squatty bodies in the rear, just panting away, carrying
batteries for this kind of a radio. We were trying to figure
out from the warfighting lab standpoint, wait a minute. If this
is the cutting edge, had it been 100 degrees you know what
would have happened. There would have been about 50 pounds of
gear on the ground.
I asked one of the people who was a casualty--not a real
casualty, obviously--how much gear are you wearing? Then I
picked it up, old man that I am, and tried to put it on. The
helmet, which you cannot sit on and you cannot cook in it and
it is a little different, and you probably want to get it off
your head if you are in the littoral and you are fighting in an
urban arena and your opponent is wearing a ball cap, a Madonna
tee shirt, and a pair of Nike tennis shoes. Sight, vision, it
seemed to me was extremely important.
It bugged me as to why we could not get more off-the-shelf
equipment and get a marine that was truly a modern warfighter.
Now, obviously at that particular time we did not have 9-11, we
were not in Afghanistan, and we did not have the joint
operations we have today. We were not sharing this so that
radio can replace these batteries and this radio or at least
you can communicate with them.
Now, I am making a long-winded speech. Let me ask you,
General, we were talking about the horseback cavalry and the
members of your cavalry who were not quite as adjusted as the
trail riders. They came from Texas to Abilene, Kansas, in
regard to their skills on horseback, and the gear that they
were wearing, and then the difference between the Afghan that
was riding next to them at full gallop.
Can you tell me sort of the difference there? Not that we
are going to have a cavalry ride again, although you never
know. But you see what I am driving at in terms of being a
highly mobile, highly flexible unit, buying off-the-shelf for a
specific mission that really demands a very unique kind of
weaponry for the warfighter.
General Holland. Yes, sir. That whole story is a great
story to hear and we would look forward to giving that
particular vignette to you in one of your future visits.
But as you talk to our Special Operations soldiers that
were on not only the horseback, but also had mules there to
carry a lot of their equipment, one thing that did come from
the opposition group was that they started realizing that
things like radios and Special Operations Forces Laser
Acquisition Markers (SOFLAMs) also could make the difference.
So a lot of the equipment that our people carried, they soon
realized the importance of what that equipment could do,
especially if it could call in say B-52s, close air support, or
the other fighters, both Marine, Navy, and other Air Force
fighters.
So the equipment is obviously something that we continue to
look at. That is why we continue to look at what is the weight.
That is why we continue to look at how can we get smaller
batteries that last longer, because we have to continue to
worry about what goes into the rucksack and how we can reduce
that load.
You talk about the temperatures. In Afghanistan look at the
terrain. Most of all these operations that currently are
ongoing are at 10,000 feet, so you are at 10,000 feet, heavily
laden, rough terrain, and how do you maneuver? So this is
something from a technology standpoint we need to continue to
push, on how we can lighten the load of what our people carry
and still be effective and accomplish the mission.
I have to admit that at this point, yes, we are not there
yet. But making sure that that soldier, sailor, airman, or
marine have the right equipment will continue to be very
important for all of us, to include our services.
Senator Roberts. Well, we may not be there yet, but we are
singing the same hymn in the same church pew.
My time has expired. I am assuming we will rotate back and
forth.
Senator Landrieu. Yes, we will. We will go back and forth.
But it is a very excellent line of questioning, and again we
look forward to helping you to achieve that goal.
Let me move from research and development back to one of
the central truths, which I think is important, that people are
the most important. General, if you could just elaborate on
that essential truth in how can our committee best focus our
efforts in terms of strengthening those people, helping improve
the quality, supporting them, their families, those quality of
life issues, and retention? Could you go on the record and
elaborate in more specifics about how we could make that truth
even more of a reality and support that truth?
General Holland. Yes, Madam Chairman. The quality of life,
I think that is important first. Both of you have made comments
about the people that we have lost. Now, the people that we
have lost have families and we think about their quality of
life. The services have the responsibility to provide the
quarters and all the different, support structure that we have
at all the bases. Obviously we from Special Operations Command
vigorously support the services in their endeavors to increase
the quality of life for all of our people, regardless of where
they are located, in which service.
So any time that you see a quality of life, you can see the
impact that it makes to that particular individual. It really
makes an impact when that individual is deployed and he or she
knows that their families are being taken care of with the
right support structure, the right housing, the right pay, and
that list goes on. The quality of life piece, obviously we all
feel very strong about that, and that is the reason that we are
able to retain people.
There is a comment that we have often said, that we recruit
the military member, but we retain the family. The people that
we have in our business, these are not necessarily the people
that just come in for a first term. They are people that are
very well experienced. A lot of our Special Operations soldiers
served in other units prior to coming into Special Forces. To
have a seasoned Special Forces soldier takes usually about 8 to
10 years.
Unfortunately, when you think about Nate Chapman, he was
the first military person that was killed by the enemy during
Operation Enduring Freedom, who was 31 years old. You think
about what Nate had accomplished up to that point he had served
in Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Storm, Haiti, and
this was his fourth major operation.
So the amount of investment that we make in training and
the personnel cost, it is not something that you can really put
a dollar figure on when these people are asked to go forward
and to give that last full measure.
Senator Landrieu. General, let me press this issue just a
minute. I know that our men and women do not serve for the
paycheck, which is obvious. But pay and compensation are
important. Special Operators, since they go through such
rigorous training--for every 50 applying and only 1 is
accepted--are career people who have made this choice. It is
really an extraordinary sacrifice and gift to the country. In
your opinion, are we compensating them? Is there a
differential, and if so, is it what you would see as
appropriate?
In the range of quality of life issues, is it the housing
or the health care that the services provided to family
members? Could you try to be a little bit more specific? I
mean, we would like to do it all. Let me state for the record
that I think the MILCON budget is flat, which is a lot of where
this comes out of in terms of housing and construction, at
least for that part of quality of life. So I would like to see
some additional help there.
Can you try to give us some more of your own personal views
on that?
General Holland. Well, one other comment that you made was
about special pays. Our people, whether they are scuba or
different types of qualifications, they do get additional pay.
One thing that I have requested of my Command Master Chief Rick
Rogers, who is sitting here behind me, is to get with all of
the senior enlisted, the command chief master sergeant from the
Air Force Special Operations Command, the command master chief
from the Navy Special Warfare Command, and also the command
sergeant majors from both the United States Army Special
Operations Command and Joint Special Operations Command and
come together and really look at what our people need. Because
that enlisted person, that Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), when
you think about the people that are on point, that are doing
our job for us, it is our NCOs.
There are so many stories about our NCOs just doing great
things and making a difference. We need to make sure that we
are doing everything we can for them. So he is going to be
championing this cause, and from there we are going to come up
with what we feel are the right places where we need to go
through our Department to get support for our people that
answer the call.
Senator Landrieu. I appreciate that. We would be very
interested in that information, because this committee believes
in that and wants to support you in that effort.
Let me ask about some budget numbers regarding the
estimated cost of missions in Georgia, Yemen, and elsewhere. We
have expanded our view. I think the President is right and I
have supported him, and most of the members, both Republican
and Democrats, in terms of going after terrorists wherever they
are, recognizing they are just not all in one place or one
country. This is going to be a fairly long, complicated, and
very challenging operation. We want to make sure that the
budget numbers are there to support it.
Can you give us any information about what it looks like to
you in terms of the need for funding for the expanded missions
that you see? I know we cannot predict the future, but what you
can see that we will be doing in the next 6 to 8 months.
General Holland. The problem that I have, Madam Chairman,
is that I do not have a deployment order. So the details are
continuing to be worked out on exactly what our involvement is
and to what level. I would say that maybe we can take that one
for the record. Once these details are worked out, then we can
put together some type of estimate. I can be talking with the
two theater CINCs that are involved with that particular
operation and get into their minds, what do they expect.
But at this point I do not have a deployment order for our
people to go forward. So the details are being worked out. Once
the details are worked out, we would be pleased to provide that
data to you.
Senator Landrieu. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Prior to the beginning of these operations
in Afghanistan, what was the average strength of Special
Operations Forces compared to the authorized strength? Where
were you?
General Holland. Senator Roberts, what I would like to do
is give you some detail on that by each of our units. Overall
we were in fairly good position. Our SEALs were around 97
percent. The Special Tactics, though, were at 80 percent. Our
Special Forces enlisted were around the middle 80s and officers
were up in the 90 percent. Depending upon the types of people
and which ones you call upon, there is a different number.
What I would like to do for the record is provide you all
the data where we were on September 11 before we deployed, and
then we can come up with an overall percentage of where we are
for our manning.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prior to 11 September 2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF)
assigned to authorized strength was as follows, by Service Component:
(Specific SOF communities mentioned by General Holland are broken out).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strength
Authorized Assigned (Percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army SOF............................ 15,231 13,961 92
SF Officers....................... 634 574 91
SF Warrants....................... 385 340 88
SF Enlisted....................... 3,983 3,446 87
Navy SOF............................ 5,094 3,972 78
SEALs............................. 2,123 2,016 95
Air Force SOF....................... 8,846 8,911 101
Special Tactics................... 520 374 72
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 11 September 2002, active component strength has remained
relatively the same. However, personnel increases to support
requirements for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom have come
through the mobilization of 3,836 Reserve and Guard Forces from all the
Services as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserve Guard Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army................................ 1,180 1,648 2,828
Navy................................ 153 N/A 153
Air Force........................... 742 113 855
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*It is important to note that not all mobilized forces are purely SOF,
but consist of a wide range of support personnel as well, to include
force protection, medical, public affairs, personnel, etc.
Senator Roberts. I think that will be fine.
What are the challenges you face in finding and retaining,
and I emphasize both, qualified personnel to fill the Special
Operations requirements? As the chairman has pointed out, this
is a rather unique set of criteria for only a chosen few.
General Holland. Yes, sir, it is a continuing challenge. We
have a very aggressive program. Obviously, we recruit from the
services, and not everyone wants to sign up to do what we ask
them to do.
Senator Roberts. But on the other side of it, your culture
is special, and if I am any judge, that weighs in as to the
number of people who would be willing to be recruited or to
volunteer.
General Holland. Yes, sir. What we are trying to do is----
Senator Roberts. I mean, they are doing what they want to
do, is what I am saying.
General Holland. Yes, sir.
We have done some studies, and especially from a
psychological standpoint, what are the types of people that are
successful when they come into Special Operations? Then, taking
that the particular data, and go out for the recruiting. Where
are these types of people? The good thing is, when you
represent only 1.3 percent of Defense Force Structure--and this
goes back to one of the SOF truths, quality is better than
quantity.
Senator Roberts. Right.
General Holland. But what we want to make sure of is that
we maintain the same standards we have in the past, because I
think you and the American people, when you look at involving
SOF in an operation, you expect it to be a success. As long as
we keep our same standards, then we will be able to continue
doing the job the way you would expect us to be doing it.
Senator Roberts. As we look at the future threat of
asymmetrical warfare, there are some that have suggested that
we need to increase the size of Special Operations Forces. Can
you give me an estimate of an optimal size that you think would
be sufficient? I realize this sort of dovetails into the
chairman's question. Until you get your mission and we figure
out where we are on this transnational war against terrorism,
that is a little tough to suggest.
But in terms of optimal size and role of the Special
Operations Force in our overall force structure, you are 1.5
percent. Do you think it ought to be increased?
General Holland. Sir, the way I would like to answer you is
I want to make sure that those authorizations that we have in
all of our forces, that we fully man and equip them. As I
mentioned, a lot of our forces are at the 80 percent level, so
we need to get them to their maximum levels with the proper
amount of equipment.
I think we continue to need this initiative that I talked
about earlier, working the seams with the Services on their
capabilities and then seeing what are these missions, if there
are any, after we go through this review that we could then
convert to conventional operations, thereby keeping our numbers
stable where they are at this juncture.
These are the parts of this question that we are continuing
to work with. There is a study right now that we are in view of
and that is on SOF realignment, where should SOF be in the
world, and with that, what is the right amount of force
structure. This is a study that we are preparing for the
Department of Defense.
Senator Roberts. You have not mentioned your Reserve
Special Operations groups to sustain the current operations
tempo, how you feel about their capability, their training
level, to fulfil these obligations.
General Holland. Yes, sir. They are magnificent. I would
say that we probably have the best examples of the total force
working together as an integrated team. As you well know, the
193rd Special Operations Wing out of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania--
the only capability that we have in our military today to do
what Commando Solo does--is with the Air National Guard.
Our Guard units that we have right now recently deployed.
The reason they have been called up--and we have strong faith
and confidence in their ability to accomplish the job--and the
reason we need them is so we can give the existing active duty
Special Forces Group back (which was deployed in October)
retool, refit, and then get ready for their next operation.
Every place we look, we see the Reserves and the Guard
doing yeoman's work in supporting us. The other part that I
will add is the civil affairs piece. When you look at that
particular organization, about 90 percent is made up of reserve
forces, and they have answered the call and they are doing it
well.
Senator Roberts. You have two major flagship programs on
research, development, and procurement. You have quite a few
programs, but the two flagship ones: the Advanced Seal Delivery
System (ASDS) and the CV-22 tilt rotor aircraft, I have a
special interest in. Can you give me the current status of each
of these flagship programs as you understand them and are you
satisfied that the safety, maintainability, and reliability
goals associated with each of these programs will be achieved?
General Holland. Sir, let me do that in two parts. I will
do it real quick on the front-end and then I will let Mr.
Schulte talk because, on the CV-22, he is part of the executive
committee which gets into the details of the CV-22 program.
Also, he has just been briefed recently on the Advanced SEAL
Delivery System.
I will say from the top level that we are firmly committed
within United States Special Operations Command to bring both
of those weapon systems on board. We feel very strongly that we
need tilt rotor technology. We need the technology that comes
with the CV-22. I am even more convinced after seeing the
operations in Afghanistan on how a CV-22 would best fit.
It is always great to have more options for a joint task
force commander. When you are operating above 10,000 feet--in
fact, our MH-47s have operated at 17,000 feet. Helicopters do
well low to the ground, but when the terrain is as high as it
is in Afghanistan that adds additional peril not only to the
pilots but also to the capabilities of the equipment they are
using.
So think about a CV-22 in that environment. Is it safe,
reliable, maintainable--that is the part I have talked about--
not only before these committees, but also in other speeches I
have given, is that we can have a capability that will
definitely help us as we go to other places in the world.
On the Advanced SEAL Delivery System, we owe it to our
SEALs to be able to get them to an environment before they do
the assault in a dry environment. If any of you have never had
an opportunity to be on the current SEAL delivery vehicle, I
know they get excited every time I visit our SEAL units, to put
me in one because it is small, it is very contained, it is
cold, it is wet, and there is really no opportunity for the
team to really get together and think about their assault plan
once they get to a target or whatever the mission is that they
would have at that juncture.
Senator Roberts. General, I do not know about Senator
Nelson. I am sure he probably has done this. He is sort of a
snake-eater type.
Senator Landrieu. We could send him. He has gone before.
Senator Roberts. I have been there, done that, and had the
wet tee shirt. They were doing me a great favor, my staff,
which is amazingly still with me after this experience, in
saying we are going to go out a little ways and then we are
going to take your picture. I said, why not just take the
picture here. We went out a little ways and the SEAL that was
in charge indicated: Sir, we only have 2 more miles to go and
we are going to hit a little rougher water. I indicated: No, I
think we are heading back now. [Laughter.]
If you have ever been in a church pew during a particular
baptismal in one of the more demonstrative churches jumping up
and down, that is a lot like what it is holding on. This has
nothing to do with the question, Madam Chairman. [Laughter.]
Senator Landrieu. Well, I hope the others act more bravely.
Senator Roberts. If you do not have to do that--there is a
whole list of things that some of us do not want to do any more
and that is one of them. So I am for whatever kind of delivery
system. Mr. Schulte, what are you going to provide that I can
ride in? [Laughter.]
Senator Landrieu. Do not feel obligated to respond.
Mr. Schulte. We will talk about both the CV-22 and the
ASDS.
Senator Roberts. I have already ridden that one.
Mr. Schulte. OK.
Senator Roberts. That was amazing, and that was even before
the problems. I hope everybody listens to you, General, because
that is something the Marine Corps and you folks must have, and
I have every confidence we can do that.
I am sorry.
Mr. Schulte. Of course, I want to talk about ASDS. As
General Holland said--let me give you a quick status on ASDS.
That would be a good one to ride in, by the way, because you
could stay dry. But, we have the first boat. It is kind of an
R&D boat, but it is also going to be the first operational
boat. It has some battery difficulties. It has silver-zinc
batteries that we have been having some difficulties with.
Congress gave us some money this year to work on the next
generation of lithium batteries, which is hopeful, but it is
not there yet. It may be ready for the second boat. It may not.
We may have to go with another set of the silver-zinc batteries
and try to work out the shorts and things that we have had with
those.
Largely the ASDS meets the mission requirements. It has
some noise difficulties, which we knew, because there have been
some commercial pumps and things like that on there that we are
probably going to have to change out. That is probably not a
large item to do, but we have to do it. So the noise and the
batteries are what we are working on now, and we have another,
oh, maybe less than a year, of host ship testing that we need
to do yet. We have some scheduling difficulties with the
Greenville right now, but basically ASDS is moving along.
So those are our problems. The problems are in the noise
and the problems are in the batteries.
On the CV-22, of course, the airplane has been grounded now
for 14 or 15 months. The Navy and the Marine Corps have been
going through a very exhaustive process of what is it going to
take to fix all the different recommendations that came out of
all the different panels that have been reviewing the V-22
program, the blue ribbon panel and all the other ones. It is a
very exhaustive review. They have gone through every one. There
are 186 recommendations. They have tracked every one down. In
fact, I think there is a report that is either just coming to
Congress or is about to come to Congress that is required from
the program.
It is going through a flight readiness review process right
now. It will go to the three-star level review next Thursday.
There will be a four-star level review I think the first week
of April. If all goes well--and it appears to be going very
well--it is a very disciplined, very deliberate process to
return this aircraft to flight. Everybody is concerned about
the same thing. It has to be safe, it has to be reliable before
we put people in the back of it.
The first flight is scheduled for the end of April for the
MV-22. If everything goes well on that, probably the first
flight for our CV-22s--there are two test airplanes that have
been modified to a CV type of a test configuration; they are
out at Edwards Air Force Base--they should fly in July.
So if we get back--it is kind of a crawl, walk, run test
program, which it needs to be at this point in time until we
get it back--it will be about 2 years of testing. So the
program has slipped. You talk about the year it has slipped or
so because it has been grounded, and it will go back into
flight testing, pick up a lot of flight testing that was never
done the first time around, and be a much more thorough
process. I think by the time we get into a full rate production
decision in a few years, we will know a whole lot more and we
should feel very good about making a full rate production
decision down the road.
Senator Roberts. Let me just say, Madam Chairman, before
you turn to Senator Nelson--and I apologize, Bill--we had a
full Armed Services Committee hearing following the various
tragedies in regards to this aircraft and in the audience we
had the pilots, the crew chiefs, and the families of the
victims. While it was a very emotional hearing, we asked them
to come up and testify: What do you think, is this a doable
technology, is this aircraft something as you work with you
feel confident in?
One hundred ten percent yes. The biggest thing that they
said is, we will save marine lives, special ops lives, with
this aircraft; let us do our work. They were of the opinion
that they could continue to fly the aircraft as they were
making the modifications. Obviously, they had an attitude
situation where you would expect that to some degree, or maybe
you would not expect that.
Afterwards we went out in the audience and talked to some
of the families of the victims and to a person, with tears in
their eyes, said keep going, keep going with this aircraft,
this is what my husband really believed in and fought for. I
have about that much of testimony that I sent to some in the
media after it that had been very critical of this program.
Unfortunately, they did not see fit to print that. But it was
very telling testimony, very moving testimony.
I am sorry.
Senator Landrieu. That is a very important point.
We have been joined by Senator Nelson. Senator, we gave
opening statements and had a round of questions. I do not know
if you have a few questions at this time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Most of my questions I would like to
save for the closed session, but I would like to ask in the
open session your ideas about arming the Predator with the
Hellfire. It looks like it is having some obvious success, so
do you need some help getting that going?
General Holland. Yes, sir. Senator Nelson, as you well
know, the Predator is not a SOF piece of equipment. However, we
have been exploiting the technology from the Predator and not
only having the ability to use the Predator, to pick out a
target, which I am sure if you talk to General Franks--that
having that capability and being able to very readily identify
and kill a target--is something that is very important.
From our standpoint at Special Operations Command, we are
now taking streaming video from the Predator and providing that
to the AC-130 gunship, and that is significant. The
significance is that as you come into the target, you enter an
orbit and you evaluate the target, and all this is happening
while you are over top of what could be an enemy stronghold.
Whereas with the Predator, we are providing information back to
the gunship as it is enroute to the target. They are able to
then determine where the actual target is. They are also able
to determine whether or not there is enemy in the area and also
if there are any AAAs that they have to be concerned about.
So the ability of all the forces to be able to exploit what
Predator is bringing to the fight, and then of course Global
Hawk, I think this speaks well for the UAVs and what UAVs will
add to the fight of the future.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that.
Let me get back to another issue regarding the C-130s. The
unit conducting the Commando Solo broadcast missions had
planned to modernize, which entails purchasing a new C-130
every year. We are currently halfway there, but the Air Force
did not include this in their budget. Can either one of you
explain what ramifications this omission might have and give us
your perspective on how this will compromise or how we are
going to live with this particular decision? Mr. Schulte?
Mr. Schulte. Let me talk about that. The unit at Harrisburg
basically has six Commando Solos and two kind of straight C-
130s, all of which are probably the oldest in the fleet. Today
Congress has provided five C-130Js to be cross-decked with the
current mission equipment onto these C-130Js and so right now
we have five of the eight aircraft scheduled to be replaced.
Obviously, eventually we would like to see all eight aircraft
replaced, six Commando Solos and two--which would end up being
two of the Super Js (not Commando Solo)--would just be slick
airplanes.
So that is what we would like to see. It did not make it
this budget. We would like to see it in some budget eventually
where we can modernize that whole unit.
Senator Landrieu. Well, maybe we can try to help make that
happen.
Now, you have brought another piece of equipment. We have
talked a lot about the radio. Can you share with us about these
field binoculars that you brought. Maybe talk to us about how
it is used, but also the research and development that played a
part in developing it?
Mr. Schulte. This is one of, I think, our success stories
in process. Can the command respond to a SOF warrior when he
really has a need? This was an example. We got a combat mission
need statement in from Afghanistan, I think it was in probably
mid- to late-October, and they basically said: We need a
different laser range finder.
Basically, we have a very nice unit that SOF bought several
years ago called the SOFLAM. General Holland talked about it
and it is a Laser Acquisition Module. So basically what SOFLAM
does is allow the SOF operator to designate a target and hold
that designation on the target for a laser-guided bomb to come
in and hit the target. It works very well, at ranges out to
about 10 kilometers. They love it.
However, in Afghanistan, while they were using laser-guided
bombs, they were mostly using Joint Direct Attack Munitions,
JDAMs, GPS-guided bombs. So putting a laser on a target does
not help a JDAM. What you have to do with JDAM is you need a
laser range finder that can do a laser ranging to the target
and then compute the GPS coordinates of the target.
That is what this device here is. This is a Leika Viper. It
is a commercial off-the-shelf item that is made by a company in
Switzerland. We were able to get 20 of these items. From the
time the requirement was approved, which was within 2 days of
us getting it, we had 20 items in Karshi-Khanabad in 7 days.
They were into Afghanistan within days after that.
Basically, what this does is like a set of binoculars, it
has a laser-range finder, it has a magnetic compass in it. It
has a cord that plugs into a normal GPS that the soldiers
already have. What it does then is it lases to the target, it
gives you the range, elevation, and azimuth with the electronic
compass, and then that information goes into the GPS receiver
and it computes, because it knows where it is. It now knows
relatively where the target is and it computes the GPS
coordinates.
This is how--then they could use the MBITR and call the
coordinates up to the B-52 or F-18 or F-14, or whatever
happened to be overhead at the time, and then call the targets
in.
So the process that USSOCOM has to react very quickly to a
combat mission need statement--48 hours from the time the
command gets it, the DCINC approves or disapproves a combat
mission need, 48 hours. In this particular case, this was the
first one that came in. Our guys know what is out there at all
times, whether we own it yet or not. We know what is in the
marketplace, and they were able to go out and get these 20
units to the warfighter in 7 days.
Then we got another--I think we bought a total of 96 of
them before the end of the year, and all but 20 I think went
over there.
Senator Landrieu. I would glean two things from what you
said and if this is too simple, correct me. I am really
determined to find a better process or to perfect the process
we use, because I truly believe it will save lives and make our
Nation much more secure. You have identified that one thing you
do, is ask the warfighter what they need, and then you are very
aggressive, you have a team of people very aggressive in
knowing what is out there. When you mean what is out there, not
only what we have developed internally, not only what
traditional contractors have or plan to develop, but what
literally is on the shelf, not just in the United States but in
the world, in terms of technology that could be applied to that
request, that plea. It really is a plea. It is more than a
request; it is, please, give me what we need to win this war.
That is basically the system you use and you have shown
this as an example of that. Is that oversimplifying things?
Mr. Schulte. I think that is very accurate. I think the
warfighter in this case--we knew about this piece of equipment,
but so did the warfighter. They came back and said, this is
what we need and we need it right away. Laser-guided bombs
probably cost $50,000 or $100,000 a kit to put onto a bomb and
a JDAM is $18,000, so it is also cost effective from the
warfighter's viewpoint.
But our guys said, hey, what we really need is this kind of
a thing and there is a couple of them out there and this is the
one we are interested in; how fast can you get it? Well, we can
get it pretty fast.
One of the things we did when Operation Enduring Freedom
first broke--and I give a lot of credit to my contracting
people--is that we wrote a blanket justification and
authorization (J&A) for sole source procurement for urgent and
compelling need for any requirement to support Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. So as soon as a requirement
came in, as soon as it got approved, our program managers and
contracting people could go right out and buy it. We did not
stop. We did not even stop to compete anything. If it was an
urgent and compelling requirement for a soldier on the ground,
then that is what it was and they were cleared to go.
We got all of our priorities raised in the defense
logistics system. We went to the front of every line in the
priority system and did this J&A in order to speed the process,
and it worked very well.
Senator Landrieu. I think that is excellent, very powerful
testimony and I hope that we can use that.
Senator Roberts may have a few more questions. Senator
Nelson may have a few more questions. I do not know if it is
necessary to go into closed session, so if the Senators would
focus any of their comments. Now, if they do require a closed
session we have provided the opportunity for one and you all
could let me know through the staffs.
But Senator Roberts, there are a few more questions that
you might have.
Senator Roberts. USSOCOM mission: to provide U.S. Special
Operations Forces to the National command authority, regional
combatant commanders, and American ambassadors and their
country teams for successful conduct of worldwide Special
Operations and civil affairs. Let us take the civil affairs
piece. There has been a lot of commentary and I think anybody
involved in this knows that if we are going to be successful in
the worldwide war against terrorism, we are going to have to
assess the needs of the local populations and assist in regards
to the infrastructure and provide stability. There has been
quite a bit of emphasis in news coverage about this.
Civil affairs units following the Vietnam War for you folks
were placed in the Reserve components. My question to you is do
you have the civil affairs expertise available to meet these
current requirements? Where are we?
General Holland. Yes, sir, we are improving. We are
definitely getting better. When I came on as Commander in
Chief, USSOCOM when I looked at the qualifications of our
people in civil affairs and it was about 58 percent. We have
done much to go the next step. The first thing that the United
States Army Special Operations Command has done is to make sure
that they have the right equipment. We went through a period of
time where our civil affairs people would get that equipment
that was left over after we took care of all the Active-Duty
Force, and if you have noticed what we call it is a BOIP. It is
a basis of issue plan (BOIP). We have now expanded that to
include our civil affairs people, to ensure that they have the
right type of equipment that they need to do the job.
We have also doubled the training opportunities there at
Fort Bragg. The last word I had is we were over 70 percent on
our mission qualifications. So over this past year we have put
an increased emphasis on this because, just as you said,
Senator, we need to have that capability. As you start at the
front-end of a warfight, as you transition, you need to have
people that understand democracies and infrastructure and how
we can work with the international community to go to the next
step, the expertise that they bring to that is very important.
Senator Roberts. Is that unique to Special Operations? That
is one heck of a broad challenge. Some people even think it
cannot be done. You have to make the effort. But is that unique
to you in terms of the other services?
General Holland. Yes, sir. The civil affairs is located
within United States Special Operations Command. However, the
Marines do have a small capability that is embedded within the
Marine unit as well.
Senator Roberts. But it happens anyway.
General Holland. But it happens, yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. It would seem to me that we are going to
have to really focus on that if over the long term you are
going to be successful.
Senator Landrieu. Could I interject something here?
Senator Roberts. Yes, certainly. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Landrieu. It occurs to me that while we are
thinking about that we could maybe apply the same methods we
used to get the best technology to the warfighter to get the
best human potential to our civil affairs by thinking a little
creatively outside of the box. We need a new paradigm about
getting the right kind of people with the right kind of skill
sets, since we have had so much success with getting the right
kind of people to the battlefield. I believe that civil affairs
is going to be a growing, important part of Special Operations,
not only to win the war but secure the peace so the war was
worth fighting for first. Second, to get civil affairs involved
perhaps to prevent the destruction that happens on a
battlefield if your civil affairs is successful, which is
another very important way of looking at why that investment,
if done correctly, could be so crucial to the saving of lives
and winning the wars before they start.
But General, I do not know if you or Mr. Schulte want to
comment about that general thought. Then the Senator has
another question, I believe, on another subject.
General Holland. Let me just make a few comments. When you
talk about civil affairs, many of the times we have operated as
a joint task force and after we had engaged the target, we
would then call in civil affairs. What we find is that we need
to have civil affairs, they need to be involved at the
beginning, because how do they know what needs to be the end
game? They need to be involved up front.
We also realized that we had a shortfall on the active duty
side because we cannot continue to come back and keep engaging
our Reserve civil affairs people. So we have now plussed up the
active duty. Right now we also have an initiative with General
Shinseki in the Army to see what the next step would be.
But the amount of increase is about 1,100 more civil
affairs people on the Reserve side and, in active duty people I
think it is about 300 or 400 people because we understand
exactly what you just said. We also see a probable increased
role of civil affairs. We also need to make sure that they have
the right equipment so that they can do their job.
Senator Roberts. Is that in the budget or is that on the
unfunded list?
General Holland. No, sir, we did this last year. This was
something that we had worked and we were able to cross-walk
those over.
Senator Roberts. We have, finally, a Joint Forces Command's
first major joint field experiment. It is called Millennium
Challenge 2002, short MC02, as of this summer. I am taking it
for granted that you are going to be a part of that. What role
will you play in that and what role do you envision for Special
Operations in future joint experiments?
General Holland. Yes, sir. I see a very active role on our
part. We are working very closely with General Buck Kernan,
because a lot of this has to do with getting the information to
the warfighter. It is also how do we operate better in a joint
environment and how we can share joint capabilities better than
what we have in the past.
A lot of the experimentations were put into it--and I will
let Mr. Schulte talk that part of it. But as I talk to all of
our commanders, I want to ensure that we are there as we go
through the actual Millennium Challenge 2002, because for our
future it is going to be very important we understand how this
joint warfight is going to work even better, especially when
you talk about interagency, the collaboration, and how can we
break down stovepipes and be able to use all the information
that is available to be able to then focus that information to
where it needs to be once we get into the crisis.
Senator Roberts. Madam Chairman--pardon me, Mr. Schulte--we
have tried to get this funded and found opposition. Not only in
this body but more especially in the House, to any Joint Forces
Command exercises, thinking that they were not needed--well,
``not needed''; they did not rate top priority, as opposed to a
service-oriented exercise, which I understand. It is more
traditional. It has been like heels dragging to finally get
this done in terms of the Joint Forces Command, and it took a
war and the realization that everything will be joint that I
can possibly imagine in any exercise in the future. So I
certainly applaud your statement.
I think I have reached the end of the questions that I
would like to ask.
General Holland. Senator Roberts, I think Mr. Schulte would
like to continue on on the experimentation.
Senator Roberts. I am sorry. Please proceed.
Mr. Schulte. We are participating in Millennium Challenge.
There is a Pathfinder ACTD, advanced concept technology
demonstration, that is going to work with robotics and remote
sensors and things like that. We are very interested in
Pathfinder, and we are working with the Marines on that. The
Marines are also very interested in the robotics and remote
sensors kind of thing. So that is one if the things
specifically we hope to get out of Millennium Challenge for us.
That is all I have.
Senator Landrieu. Great. Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Our troops performed very well on this
most recent battle, but there were some surprises: the enemy
troop strength, their willingness to fight, the amount of
ammunition that they had, and the fact that we relied on a lot
of the Afghan fighters to take the initiative. We had to
compensate for a lot of surprises, and we did it exceptionally
well and are still doing it very well, which certainly speaks
well of all of our operation there.
My question to you is what do we need to do so that we do
not have those surprises?
General Holland. Senator Nelson, I would like to say that
we will never have any surprises, but, as you well know, I
think there are always going to be surprises on the
battlefield. Obviously, we can never underestimate the enemy,
and especially this enemy, because this enemy is very well
committed.
But I think as we continue to look at--this goes back to
the experimentation, the things we are doing with Joint Forces
Command. How do we get better intelligence? In any operation,
it always comes down to do you have the actual intelligence to
go to the next step. This is one of those issues on
intelligence, and having the right intelligence at the right
place at the right time and, if we have that intelligence, to
ensure that the people who need it that are forward have it so
they can either adjust their course of action or realize that
there is a better way to accomplish the mission.
But as far as our people in that particular operation, I do
agree with you they performed superior in the eyes of what
happened. We appreciate your comments and I know that General
Franks feels good about the way that they operated.
Senator Bill Nelson. They certainly did. They performed
superbly. My question for closed session, Madam Chairman, is
why did we not have the intelligence. As I understand it, you
are not going into closed session, so we will submit that in
writing.
Senator Roberts. Could I have a follow-up on that? Without
the closed session, but part of what we do on the Intelligence
Committee as we overlook September 11 in a joint effort with
the House is to go back several years, all of the warnings that
we had from all of the commissions, the Bremmer Commission, the
Gilmore Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the CSIS study,
and all those folks who gave us the warnings that I repeated
and that other members of the subcommittee repeated.
As we went through Khobar Towers and the embassy bombings
and the U.S.S. Cole and the bombing of the Khartoum chemical
plant, what I described as the ``Oh my God'' hearings, how did
this happen, it seemed to me that our collection capability was
simply outstanding--the leap-ahead technology that we are now
using, which perhaps we did not before, but there were some
hurdles there and I think we have overcome those hurdles. But
the analysis, the productive analysis, thinking out of the box,
avoiding risk aversion, seems to me to be the area where we
were deficient.
That is the area where it took place, an example being the
India-Pakistan nuclear testing. The new party that took control
of the government there had that as their number one campaign
promise, and yet when we asked the people that allegedly were
experts in the field, why on earth did you not think they would
do that, well, we just did not think that they would do that.
As you well know, with this kind of an enemy, we could list
100 different things, Madam Chairman, on what we think would
happen next and they would do 101.
So what is your opinion in regards to where we are now,
Special Operations-wise, with the productive analytical ability
of the intelligence we have, not so much the collection but the
analysis part of it?
General Holland. This is one area, Senator, I think that we
need to continue to keep in focus. We have established the
Special Operations Joint Inter-Agency Collaboration Center, and
this is really about collaboration, where everyone shares the
information above the table on exactly what everyone is seeing
at a particular location and then having the operators involved
with that to be able to make the assessments that you talk
about.
Now, I think we are better than we have been in the past. I
see more collaboration going on today than what I certainly saw
either 4 or 5 years ago when there were other operations that
we were involved with. So we are getting better. Are we as good
as we need to be? No, but I think this goes back to the
experimentation, Joint Forces Command, because this is one area
that will also be highlighted during the Millennium Challenge
2002.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate that very much. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Let me follow up, just two questions. The
hearing has been very good and I thank you for your time. But
along that same line, some of these joint training programs,
this particular combined exchange program called JCETS,
something that has to be vetted through the State Department,
only working with countries that we approve of their human
rights records. My question for the record is can you comment
on the quality of cooperation and responsiveness the State
Department is giving you in terms of vetting the training
programs? Are these requests, your requests, being properly
expedited in your opinion?
General Holland. Madam Chairman, I think the way that I
would like to answer that is when we originally had the
restrictions, it was very much what were the procedures and how
do we come up with the procedures to meet the compliance of the
law. Since we have been in the business of the Joint Combined
Exchange Training under that new system and I know that since I
have been in command, we have not had one that has been
disapproved because of the human rights vetting restrictions.
But it is an area that we are going to continue to work. It
is an area that we are going to continue to make sure that if
there are some countries that maybe we need to be involved with
and work a plan through the Secretary of Defense to make sure
that we are at the right places--as I made the comment earlier,
we are in 122 countries. Have we been in the right 122
countries over the last year? That is a question that I think
each of us need to pose.
It goes back to what Senator Roberts had talked about, when
you talked about maybe there are 100 things that we see that
they are doing and they do the 101. How many of us ever
predicted that we were going to be in Afghanistan? How many
ever predicted when we went into Iraq? How many predicted when
we went into the Balkans and Kosovo?
So it appears that every time that we get together and we
think, well, this is the place where we need to be prepared
next, we end up going to another location. It is an area we
need to continue to put emphasis on. The Joint Combined
Exchange Training provides a wealth of experience for our
people, not only in the cultural awareness, the language
capabilities, the opportunity to operate with another nation
but in developing the trust and confidence that they would need
to be able to do what we did in Afghanistan.
So it is the same process and they learn that process in
another country. Yes, they applied it well as they went into
Afghanistan. But it is those types of programs that are going
to continue to be very important for us as well as the regional
commanders in chief. Each of those combined exercise training
scenarios come from the theater CINCs and they want us to be
involved and we work that back through the theater CINC on our
security cooperation in those areas.
Senator Landrieu. Let me follow up. You said you have not
yet been denied, but my question was are requests properly
expedited in your opinion. Are your requests expedited? Are you
losing time through the process that we have established, or
should we be concerned at all about that?
General Holland. I think there have been some that maybe
have slowed, but it is not something that I think that at this
point I want you to worry about until we look into it, because
I think we are better in the process than we were. We
understand what is needed and we are complying with that. If
that becomes an issue, then we will certainly get back to you
and the committee.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. My final question is, because
the chairman of our committee is very interested in these
Standoff Explosive Detection Systems, which have shown some
promise, Mr. Schulte, and could protect our soldiers in the
battlefield as well as protect our homeland and our civilians
here. Can you just give us a brief update of the efforts, how
is it proceeding, what kind of potential do you see for such
technology?
Mr. Schulte. Actually, we are working a combat mission
needs statement for a standoff explosive system right now. It
came out of Karshi-Khanabad very early on, probably in early
November. We are almost finished with this. What we are trying
to do is marry up a robotic kind of a system with a sensor that
you could send this out, for example to a truck that might be
coming onto the post or something. In this case it was Karshi-
Khanabad, but it could be anyplace.
We are pulling that together now. We should have that
pretty much ready to go here in the next month or so. So we are
working those kind of systems. The warfighter is saying, hey, I
need this for force protection to try to do that. But we can
always use and will always continue to work on better sensors.
How close do you have to get in order to be able to sense that
there is an explosive there or any of that kind of stuff? It
has been something that we have been working on and we will be
delivering a system here in the next couple months.
Senator Roberts. How many agencies are involved in this?
Mr. Schulte. I do not think I can answer that, sir.
Senator Roberts. There are six.
Mr. Schulte. OK.
Senator Roberts. Six agencies. One of the things that I
think that the chairman and I will be interested in is what
happens with the GAO report when we try to take a look at early
detection and sensors in regards to how many agencies are
involved and where, how, and at what cost.
But you are pretty confident in regards to your specific
needs or your missions that you are on the right track?
Mr. Schulte. Yes, sir, for this limited capability that has
been requested by the warfighter.
Senator Roberts. I see.
Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. That finishes our round of
questions. Again, it has been a great hearing. We have learned
a lot of important truths I should repeat for the record:
Humans are more important than hardware; quality is better than
quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced;
and competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after
emergencies occur.
We have also learned that we need batteries, light, long-
lived and reliable, and we are looking for some.
Thank you all. We have had a good hearing. We are
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
procurement
1. Senator Landrieu. General Holland, much of the procurement
funding in your budget request is allocated for upgrading helicopters
and purchasing and modifying AC-130 gunships. What is the requirement/
rationale for two new AC-130s?
General Holland. The requirement for the AC-130U gunship was
established through the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), titled
AFSOC 06-87-I-III, AC-130 System Operations Requirements Document
(SORD), dated April 10, 1989. The ORD was revised in 1994. The current
title is AFSOC 06-87-I-III-A, AC-130U Gunships, dated January 4, 1994.
When this ORD was written, the Air Force Special Operations Master Plan
called for [deleted] worldwide. The requirement is based on theater
engagement plans and included conventional and unconventional missions.
Due to USSOCOM resource constraints, only 13 AC-130Us were procured.
The current requirement for the number of AC-130s is established
through our 2 year Strategic Planning Process (SPP). During this
process USSOCOM determines the ``Objective Force'' needed to meet
theater CINC requirements. During fiscal year 1999-2000 the SPP
determined the AC-130 Objective Force for fiscal year 2002-2007 to be
25. Due to fiscal constraints, USSOCOM did not attempt to increase AC-
130 force structure from 21 aircraft to 25 in the fiscal year 2002
President's budget. The latest SPP conducted in fiscal year 2001-2002
revalidated the AC-130 Objective Force of 25 aircraft for fiscal year
2004-2009.
2. Senator Landrieu. General Holland, what is the plan for
employing the AC-130s and for servicing them with spares and additional
crew?
General Holland. The new AC-130s will be added to the current
Special Operations fleet at Hurlburt Field, Florida, and will be
integrated into the existing AC-130U squadron, the 4th Special
Operations Squadron. Employment of the AC-130s will follow employment
guidelines for the existing fleet, that is in the following roles:
Close Air Support/Troops in Contact; Armed Reconnaissance;
Interdiction; Convoy Escort; and other missions. The current
infrastructure at Hurlburt Field (maintenance, supply, and training
infrastructure) will support the additional aircraft, their servicing
requirements, spares, associated crewmembers, and support personnel.
Additional spare parts will be procured along with the additional
aircraft. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget added the necessary
flying hours and manpower to sustain and operate the additional
aircraft. Growing the additional crew force and maintenance personnel
necessary to fly and fix these additional aircraft will take time, but
can be accomplished to meet the delivery timeline for the aircraft.
3. Senator Landrieu. General Holland, the associated funding for
crews and spares included in the budget request is sufficient for how
many additional AC-130s?
General Holland. The funding provided in the fiscal year 2003
President's budget is sufficient to add aircrew, maintenance personnel,
flying hour costs, and contractor logistics support (CLS) for four
additional AC-130U gunships. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget
also contains funding to procure two new C-130Js for the Air Force in
exchange for two C-130H2s, which will be modified to the AC-130U
configuration. The modification costs for these two aircraft are also
contained in the fiscal year 2003 President's budget. Additionally,
related funding designated in the ``Cost of War'' account is sufficient
to procure two more new C-130Js for the Air Force in exchange for two
C-130H2s, which will also be modified to the AC-130U configuration. The
Cost of War account also includes the modification costs for these two
aircraft. Together, the fiscal year 2003 President's budget and Cost of
War account fund a total of four additional AC-130Us, support costs,
and associated force structure.
4. Senator Landrieu. Mr. Schulte, special operators have complained
perennially about the quality of the rucksacks they carry on missions.
In addition, most Special Operations Forces would prefer to be able to
purchase cold weather and other personal gear off-the-shelf. What is
being done to address complaints about rucksacks?
Mr. Schulte. The Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics
Center is conducting research on obtaining better rucksacks. In March
of 2002, the Program Executive Officer for Special Programs gave the
Special Operation Project Office at the Natick Labs, Research and
Development Division, $100,000 to conduct preliminary research for
rucksack improvements or replacement. Concurrently, we are working with
our component commands to better define the requirement from the users.
As with all personnel equipment, it is very difficult to find solutions
every operator can agree on, however, the current rucksacks have
received across-the-board complaints. The United States Special
Operations Command has not waited for a formal requirement change to
the current rucksack and has begun looking for improvements.
5. Senator Landrieu. Mr. Schulte, what are the restrictions on
purchasing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment?
Mr. Schulte. There are no specific regulatory restrictions on
purchasing COTS items. In general, decision-makers, users, and program
managers first consider the procurement of commercially available
products, services, and technologies, or the development of dual-use
technologies, to satisfy user requirements. Urgency, highly sensitive
mission requirements, or unique specifications challenge and restrict
the USSOCOM's ability to exclusively acquire commercially developed
items. Through market research and analysis, USSOCOM determines the
availability, suitability, operational supportability,
interoperability, and ease of integration of existing commercial
technologies and products and of non-developmental items prior to the
commencement of a development effort.
6. Senator Landrieu. Mr. Schulte, is the Command pursuing such an
option on COTS purchasing? How is this reflected in the budget request?
Mr. Schulte. Definitely yes. The USSOCOM has a very active process
of finding and purchasing COTS and non-developmental item (NDI)
hardware and software satisfying our operational requirements. USSOCOM
conducts market surveys and combat evaluations (where we try samples of
items before buying in quantity), and hosts an annual Advanced Planning
Briefing to Industry (attended by over 240 companies) where we share
our requirements and the companies share their projects and
capabilities with our commanders and operators. USSOCOM issues
announcements for sources sought for SOF requirements and holds
industry days to explain SOF requirements and obtain industry input.
Recent examples of successful COTS/NDI purchases that have been
delivered to the troops on the ground in Afghanistan include nearly 100
4x4 trucks and all-terrain vehicles, 8 portable video teleconference
sets, and nearly 100 hand-held laser targeting devices. Other examples
of COTS purchases that are greatly shortening our acquisition delivery
cycle include off-the-shelf computers and peripherals required for
tactical local area networks in our TACLAN program, and the off-the-
shelf hull and engine we are procuring for our Special Operations
Craft-Riverine (SOC-R) program. USSOCOM continually seeks COTS/NDI
sources for all of its non-developmental requirements, however the
purchase of COTS is not specifically reflected in the budget request.
There is no unique appropriation specifically identified for the
purchase of COTS/NDI.
7. Senator Landrieu. Mr. Schulte, in addition, Air Force special
operators working in the field with Army special forces and Navy SEALS
state that they have lower quality night vision devices and smaller
SATCOM antennae. How does the budget request address these
discrepancies?
Mr. Schulte. All components of the USSOCOM are fielded with the
most advanced night vision devices technology has available. The world
of visual augmentation is rapidly changing and the advances in
technology are an evolutionary process. Systems fielded this year will
not appear to be as capable to those fielded next year, but the systems
that are procured, fielded, and maintained within all SOF components
are in compliance and meet the stated requirements at the time of
production. The same goes for SATCOM antennae. Initially fielded
versions may not be as capable as our most recent procurements, but
both meet the stated requirements at the time of procurement. The real
question posed here is whether the budget request adequately addresses
the perceived discrepancies, to which the only solution is providing
enough funding to completely outfit SOF with the same item in the same
year. As long as we have fiscal constraints and the advancements in
technology continue, however, there will always be various versions of
equipment with inherently different capabilities as systems are
procured over several fiscal years. That is the nature of the
evolutionary acquisition cycle and technology insertion process. We
strive to maintain a high state of readiness, provide our SOF operators
with the best equipment available, and field to our components in
accordance with approved, prioritized fielding plans.
8. Senator Landrieu. Mr. Schulte, will omni-directional antennae be
available to more Special Operations Forces units?
Mr. Schulte. Omni-directional antenna are provided with all SOF
fielded tactical radios such as the Multi-Band Intra Team Radio (MBITR)
or Multi-Band Multi-Mission Radio (MBMMR). Tactical antenna present
design trade-offs, with antenna weight and cube constraints [``must fit
in rucksack''] often-compromising optimum performance. Single-antenna,
when operated in wide-band radios, usually offer performance that is
adequate across the entire frequency band, yet may not optimize
performance across the entire band. Presently, SOF acquisition is
staying apprised on new antenna technologies on omni-directional
antenna for use with our current and future multiple frequency bands
radios to improve antenna efficiency and effectiveness. To date, the
USSOCOM has no new requirements or funding to procure any SOF unique
omni-directional antenna. SOF Intelligence applications with omni-
directional antenna include the following systems:
Privateer
MK-V: Bobcat Omni-Directional ELINT Antenna; MA-717 Omni-
Directional Whip COMINT Antenna
Patrol Coastal: Bobcat Omni-Directional ELINT Antenna; AS-4293
Omni-Directional COMINT Antenna; AS-145 Omni-Directional HF Antenna
Sentinel: Currently there is no Omni-Directional Antenna installed/
associated with the Sentinel system, however, an Omni-Directional DF
Antenna will be installed on the AC-130H, AC-130U, and MC-130H
aircraft. The current schedule for the Production Installation is as
follows: MC-130H: March 2003; AC-130U: June 2004; AC-130H: September
2004.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jean Carnahan
accelerating technology development
9. Senator Carnahan. Mr. Schulte, the Special Operations
acquisition staff and troops they serve share something in common: the
ability to move with impressive speed. The time it takes for you to go
from technology development to acquisition is faster than that of any
other command in our military. Why is this ``accelerated technology
transition'' so important to SOCOM? Perhaps more importantly, describe
how SOCOM is able to accomplish it--in other words, how is it you are
able to bring technology ``from concept to combat'' so rapidly?
Mr. Schulte. The USSOCOM considers itself to be a ``user'' of
technology rather than a ``developer'' of technology. We, as an
institution, have become most adroit at adapting and modifying the
technology developed by others within the government and commercially
to meet SOF needs. Additionally, we use our relatively small size to
our advantage. For instance, our chain of command isn't nearly as long
or complicated as the Services. Because it is shorter we can get to the
user, the Ranger or the Special Forces troop, the individual SEAL, or
Special Tactics airman quickly to test, evaluate, or get/give input on
specific technology. Moreover, the urgent strategic/sensitive nature of
our missions, coupled with extremely short preparation time before
execution (of operations), dictates we maintain a technological edge
over our adversaries. Most of the technology we adapt is already in the
BA 2 (Applied Research)/BA 3 (Advanced Technology Development)
category. We also accept the 80 percent solution, use rapid prototyping
techniques and manage risk with trained managers to further expedite
the technology push. Lastly, we can field equipment faster than the
services in that most SOF equipment is low-density--tens or hundreds
vice tens of thousands.
10. Senator Carnahan. Mr. Schulte, Special Operations Forces have
always performed impressively on what sometimes appears to be a ``shoe-
string'' budget. You will see an increase in your 2003 budget; however,
some items will be decreased. Your budget for earlier stage development
of new technologies has been cut by more than half. It drops from $14
million to just $6.7 million. This must have some effect on future
capabilities. Describe the impact this significant decrease in early
stage development funding will have upon your ability to execute your
mission.
Mr. Schulte. In fiscal year 2002 our budget request for ``Applied
Research'' Special Operations Technology Development (SOTD) was $7.606
million. We did, however, receive $12.9 million in Congressional Plus-
Ups in fiscal year 2002 for the SOTD program. Our projected budget for
SOTD in fiscal year 2003 is $6.741 million, a reduction from the base
program of some $860,000 for the upcoming fiscal year. The reduction
will force the USSOCOM to reduce its level of effort on SOTD projects
so it can focus on higher priority, nearer term needs. We must
carefully prioritize, on-going projects and future technology
nominations. We must also place more emphasis on forecasting which
technologies offer the biggest ``bang for the buck'' for the operating
SOF. Lastly, this reduction will delay the development of some key
technologies, such as, enhanced technologies for SOF weapons (e.g. the
M4 carbine), night vision and imaging capabilities (e.g. video imaging
device, day/night sniper scope) and improvements in SOF deep
penetration air and maritime mobility platforms (e.g. aircraft
camouflage/visual and IR signature reduction).
expanding roles require new technologies
11. Senator Carnahan. General Holland, the war on terrorism has
required that we expand the role of our Special Operations Forces. It
has also required Special Operations Forces to perform this role in an
increasing number of countries known to harbor terrorists. As we
increasingly rely upon our Special Operations Forces, what new
technologies will they rely upon to perform their mission?
General Holland. The war on terrorism will indeed expand the role
of SOF around the world in the coming months and years. SOF are simply
the right forces . . . at the right time. These forces, and the
equipment they will carry, must be the best this country has to offer.
It is incumbent upon those of us charged with providing them the very
best equipment to focus on those areas that seem to hold the most
promise or provide the greatest hope of technological payoff. Last year
the USSOCOM published two planning documents in this area. One of these
publications was entitled ``Special Operations Technology Objectives
(SOTOs),'' discussing 40 diverse technologies having SOF interest.
These spawned yet a further distillation of ideas with the development
of the Technology Thrust Areas (TTAs). The TTAs are a synthesis of the
40 SOTOs into specific areas of SOF interest and offer USSOCOM the
greatest opportunity for ultimate operational pay-off by defining and
addressing significant technological gaps within the SOF arena, while
at the same time identifying opportunities to apply technology in an
evolutionary acquisition framework. Defining characteristics include:
(1) they are important to a broad range of SOF operators; (2) they are
solutions to compelling operational shortfalls; (3) they represent
substantial technological opportunities; (4) they represent leap-ahead,
non-linear advances in SOF operations; (5) they are difficult but
achievable; (6) they are responsive to articulated user needs (U.S.
Army Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, Air
Force Special Operations Command); (7) they are SOF peculiar/SOF
unique; and (8) USSOCOM is a willing financial partner in collaboration
with industry, academia and/or service labs.
There are a total of nine TTAs. Wide bandwidth/reachback
communications key in the SOF arena because the uniqueness of the
forces and broad mission requirements place a premium on high wide
bandwidth and low probability of interception/low probability of
detection communications. They must be extremely long range and possess
reliable ``reach back'' capability so a field operator anywhere in the
world can tap into both Defense and civilian databases.
Additionally, signature reduction of both personnel and platforms
is key, for SOF personnel and aircraft operating in the enemy's back
yard undetected.
Underwater communications must link into existing communications
architectures while allowing the operator to communicate with other
support platforms thereby enhancing the overall operational situational
awareness of each swimmer or platform.
Unmanned systems are increasingly more important. For example,
operators will use the entire spectrum of unmanned systems from
microsystems to large national assets on air, sea, land and in the
future space.
Batteries and fuel cells are another area of concern. For example,
the energy sources of the future must be high power, long lasting, give
off little or no signature, and provide SOF operators extended
operating capabilities without requiring resupply.
Remote sensing is a huge effort within the SOF community. Sensors
must be capable of detecting all electronic, acoustic, magnetic, RF,
CBR, IR, and electro-optic and electro-magnetic targets in all climates
and environments.
Advanced Training Systems must provide the latest in high fidelity,
virtual reality mission rehearsal systems for air and maritime platform
crews as well as ground operators.
Bioengineering offers the future SOF operator whole new worlds of
advanced medical techniques, improved drugs, whole blood substitutes,
bio-compatible material for implants, and nano-scale sensors for
detection of disease as well as Nuclear, Biologic, and Chemical (NBC)
agents.
Directed Energy applications will allow SOF to deliver a tunable
(lethal to non-lethal) force against hard and soft targets in any
environment.
12. Senator Carnahan. General Holland, in your estimation will the
proposed 2003 budget sufficiently address our future needs in this
counter-terrorist campaign?
General Holland. While fiscal constraints obviously prevent fully
funding every agency's complete needs, we feel the 2003 budget will go
a long way toward satisfying the USSOCOM's most pressing needs required
to meet our objectives in the global war on terrorism. Both Congress
and the Department have been very supportive of USSOCOM's requirements
to date and we look forward to this continued level of support.
acquiring technology from other services
13. Senator Carnahan. Mr. Schulte, the Special Operations Command
is comprised of troops from all branches of the services. Likewise, you
depend upon these other commands and services to provide you with
various equipment and weapons. For example, I understand that Special
Operations Command has requested two additional AC-130 gunships. The
regular Air Force will provide the aircraft, and it will be up to
USSOCOM to provide additional technology upgrades. What challenges do
you still face in acquiring these large platforms from the major
services?
General Holland. The Services have been very supportive of our
initiatives and have provided excellent support when we've needed it.
Using the additional AC-130s as an illustrative point, we've been
closely engaged with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) via the Integrated
Product Team (IPT) process. An IPT was formed early on and they are in
the process of working many of the salient issues with their service
and command counterparts. Leaning forward, USAF already established a
process for identifying the specific C-130Hs that will be modified to
the AC-130U configuration. The modification program will be managed for
USSOCOM by the Aeronautical Systems Center's Special Operations Program
Office at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The challenges that
the USSOCOM faces in this particular instance are more product-oriented
than major Service focused. The challenges in this effort are vanishing
vendors, parts availability, fleet commonality, and identification of
``donor'' aircraft to be modified.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman
unfunded shortfalls
14. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, what are Special Operations
Forces' unique unfunded shortfalls, by programmatic detail, for RDT&E,
procurement, and O&M for counterproliferation over the FYDP?
General Holland. Thanks, in large part, to the outstanding support
we have received from the Department and Congress, the command has
funded all critical Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(CP-WMD) issues in the budget and program years. If we received any
additional funding, we would seek out, and attempt to take full
advantage of, possible emerging technology opportunities.
15. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, what are Special Operations
Forces' unique unfunded shortfalls, by programmatic detail, for RDT&E,
procurement, O&M and military construction to defeat hard and deeply
buried targets over the FYDP?
General Holland. As is the case with counterproliferation, the
command has funded all critical Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT)
issues in the budget and program years. No military construction funds
are required. If we received any additional funding, we would seek out,
and attempt to take full advantage of, possible emerging technology
opportunities in this area as well.
navy seals
16. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, can you please explain the
mission requirement for the Advanced Seal Delivery Vehicle and frame
that in the current maritime mobility needs for Special Operations?
General Holland. [Deleted.]
17. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, would you please explain
your plans for a future coastal patrol ship? It is my understanding
that the current platform has been returned to the blue water Navy yet
it has been a mainstay of the SEAL community for the past 40 years.
General Holland. In 1998, due to fiscal constraints, the USSOCOM
decided to reduce the patrol coastal (PC) inventory from 13 ships to 7
by 2004. Subsequently, the USSOCOM Board of Directors approved zeroing-
out the complete PC inventory by the beginning of fiscal year 2003.
This decision was based on the PC ships continual dedication to a
USSOCOM collateral mission (Counter Drug operations) and the dependency
on the Navy for protection, command and control, and the ships'
manning. The SOF primary mission return on our dollar investment was
minimal and therefore relegated the PC program to a financial drain we
no longer considered fiscally prudent.
USSOCOM does not currently plan to replace the PC. Our Navy
Component, the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command, is still working on
its Integrated Mobility Assessment for 2010-2030, and will address this
issue in its final volume late this summer. One preliminary finding is
concurrence among all of the Theater commands, Commanders in Chief,
Theater Special Operations Commands and Fleet forces of the need to
explore two potentially different concepts: a long-range maritime
mobility asset, and a mobile forward-operating base (or mother ship).
Recent operations in the global war on terrorism have also identified a
requirement for all U.S. Navy combatants to be better prepared to host
NSW mobility assets.
dod/civilian intelligence interaction
18. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, Special Operations Forces
are the critical bridging element between the traditional DOD and the
civilian intelligence community. Traditionally, this interface was
shunned by the conventional military. Our 21st century conflicts show
that this interaction will be more highly valued than in the past. How
does Special Operations Forces envision itself in the future
interacting with the operational elements of the civilian intelligence
community?
General Holland. SOF will continue to team with its intelligence
community counterparts to prepare the battlespace for future conflicts,
both conventional and asymmetrical. The intelligence community often
provides access to hostile areas and the means to collect actionable
intelligence. SOF brings the special military skills to set the
operational conditions for success of follow-on main forces through
reconnaissance, force reception, terminal guidance, and other advance
force activities. The USSOCOM is also seeking to expand its own
capabilities to conduct unilateral sensitive special operations abroad,
when directed, with minimal reliance on other government agencies. This
will involve the development of clandestine infiltration means to gain
access to areas otherwise inaccessible to military forces.
19. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, are there any specific
organizational shortfalls in deploying Special Operations Forces to
support civilian intelligence missions or vice-versa?
General Holland. Lessons learned in the global war on terrorism
thus far indicate SOF need additional personnel and delivery systems to
both meet its standing commitments and augment the operational elements
of the civilian intelligence community. Particularly acute is the
shortage of aircraft capable of operating in harsh environments across
the spectrum of special operations. Operators fluent in Arabic and
Middle Eastern languages remain a chronic shortfall. Also, the USSOCOM
has a shortfall in certain sensitive tradecraft resources necessary to
conduct clandestine activities.
20. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, are there any changes in
existing law that would facilitate, under proper oversight, the
integration of Special Operations Forces to support civilian
intelligence community missions and vice-versa?
General Holland. Generally speaking, SOF are able to support
civilian intelligence community missions and vice-versa without any
unacceptable legal impediments from Executive Order 12333 (U.S.
Intelligence Activities), Title 50 USC 413 et seq (Accountability for
Intelligence Activities), or Title 50 USC 1541 et seq (War Powers
Resolution). Although we interpret Title 10 to provide SOF with its own
unilateral, non-intelligence role in preparing the battlespace prior to
a crisis, the above provisions are sometimes perceived as inhibitors to
that mission. It is also unclear the extent to which sensitive special
operations may be conducted abroad under the authority of Title 10
alone.
operational shortfall
21. Senator Bingaman. General Holland, Special Operations Forces
are at peak operational tempo and have been since the 1990s. What
military personnel levels, in grade, by service, would you recommend
over the next 10 years to alleviate this operational shortfall?
General Holland. Thank you for the opportunity to address your
concerns about SOF force structure. Among the USSOCOM's most important
Service-like responsibilities, is building and programming the force.
USSOCOM has developed a Strategic Planning Process (SPP) that parallels
the procedures used by the Services. Our force structure development
begins with National and Defense planning guidance and Illustrative
Planning Scenarios (IPS) used by the Services. At the conclusion of the
force structure build phase of the SPP, USSOCOM publishes the Objective
Force list. The Objective Force, though constrained, is USSOCOM's
stated force structure requirements throughout the Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP). This process is repeated every 2 years and looks out 5
years. I have a high level of confidence that the information provided
below will accurately address your question. Table A layouts the
current force structure for Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 2002-
2007. Table B is a compilation of validated requirements identified
from the USSOCOM SPP 2004-2009 and recent force structure requests from
our Component Commands. A detailed listing of the type units is at TAB
A. We are working closely with the Services to incorporate several of
these force structure initiatives into the POM 2004-2009 submission.
The POM 2002-2007 programmed force combined with the force structure
identified in Table B will close the gap between the current force and
the Objective Force for all major combat and combat support units. We
believe that given this level of resourcing, USSOCOM will be better
postured to meet the long term demands of prosecuting the global war on
terrorism and relieve some long standing OPTEMPO/DEPTEMPO pressures.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Mil Type -----------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Officer............................ 6,085 6,164 6,166 6,168 6,168 6,168
Army Enlisted........................... 20,719 21,182 21,280 21,373 21,373 21,373
Air Force Officer....................... 1,945 1,960 1,994 2,340 2,076 2,086
Air Force Enlisted...................... 8,562 8,775 8,977 9,323 9,517 9,562
Navy Officer............................ 1,083 1,041 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050
Navy Enlisted........................... 5,277 5,043 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100
Marine Officer.......................... 24 24 24 24 24 24
Marine Enlisted......................... 25 25 25 25 25 25
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Totals................................ 43,720 44,214 44,616 45,403 45,333 45,388
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table A depicts current programmed force for fiscal year 2002-2007.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Mil Type -----------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army Officer............................ 274 376 424 510 510 619 619 824
Army Enlisted........................... 788 1,480 1,638 1,912 1,912 2,636 2,636 4,217
Air Force Officer....................... 61 61 61 161 161 161 161 161
Air Force Enlisted...................... 43 43 43 943 943 943 943 943
Navy Officer............................ 33 33 51 51 51 51 51 51
Navy Enlisted........................... 262 262 373 373 373 373 373 373
Marine Officer.......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marine Enlisted......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................. 1,461 2,255 2,590 3,950 3,950 4,783 4,783 6,569
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B depicts additional USSOCOM force structure requirements.
TAB A--Additional USSOCOM Force Structure Requirements:
Army Active Component
U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
Instructors
1 x Special Operations Aviation Battalion
1 x Special Operations Aviation Battalion
Ranger Regiment (Snipers/Medics)
Joint SOF Command and Control (C2) Headquarters Requirements
1 x Special Operations Support Battalion (Reserve Component)
Special Forces Group Redesign
112th Special Operations Signal Battalion (TO&E)
Special Forces Group Chemical Detachments
2 x Regional Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Companies
2 x Civil Affairs Companies
Headquarters U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Corps SOCCORD
Army Reserve Component
4 x Regional PSYOP Companies
Special Operations Support Battalion
U.S. Air Force
Special Operations Liaison Element
Weapons Instructors Course
Air Crew Training Operators Course
Language Training Course
10 x MC-130 Tankers
U.S. Navy
2 x Mission Support Center
2 x Combat Service Support Teams
1 x Regional Survey Teams
1 x SEAL Team
1 x Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) Platoon
Advanced SEAL Training
Advanced Combat Crewman Training
Advaned SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Training
Joint SOF
USSOCOM buyback of 15 percent Headquarters Reduction
Full support to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) command and
control initiative
Special Operations Command-Central (SOCCENT) Forward Detachment
Initiative
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Rick Santorum
193rd special operations wing of the pennsylvania air national guard
22. Senator Santorum. General Holland, the 193rd Special Operations
Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard was one of the first units
to be engaged by the National Command Authority in the current war on
terrorism, and is flying combat missions daily in Afghanistan. The
``Commando Solo'' mission spearheads the administration's coalition on
public diplomacy in the coordinated effort by the Department of State
and Department of Defense in the war against terrorist organizations
worldwide, enhancing security at home.
With its unique electronic warfare capability, the 193rd Special
Operations Wing at Harrisburg International Airport is the most highly
deployed flying unit in the entire Air National Guard. The unit
conducts information warfare missions such as psychological operations;
civil affairs radio/television broadcasts; command, control,
communications, countermeasures; and limited intelligence gathering.
The current EC-130E fleet consists of six aircraft configured for
``Commando Solo'' and two for another mission, ``Senior Hunter.'' These
highly modified C-130Es have been in service for 30 years, and at the
current operational tempo are rapidly reaching the end of their service
life. Leadership within the Pennsylvania Air National Guard have
concluded that the C-130J--in the EC-130J configuration--is the best
platform to replace the EC-130E aircraft.
How important is the 193rd Special Operations Wing to the war
ongoing in Afghanistan?
General Holland. Commando Solo aircraft conducted psychological
operations (PSYOP) to include broadcasts in AM, FM, and military
communications bands. A typical mission consists of a single-ship orbit
offset from the desired target audience. Commando Solo aircraft were
used effectively to broadcast daily PSYOP programs designed to change,
persuade, and influence the Afghanistan populace. Additionally,
Commando Solo aircraft were the only platforms in the theater of
operations with the capability to conduct airborne psychological
operations and to do so within the first 2 weeks of the war in
Afghanistan. Commando Solo aircraft conducted daily broadcasts during
their deployment to the CENTCOM Area of Operations in support of OEF.
Commando Solo aircraft continued broadcasting PSYOP programs until late
March of this year and were relieved only when land-based PSYOP-
specific broadcast equipment could be installed and were fully
operational in-country.
23. Senator Santorum. General Holland, how important is the mission
of the 193rd Special Operations Wing to U.S. Special Operations
Command?
General Holland. Commando Solo aircraft are the only specially
equipped EC-130E aircraft operated by the Pennsylvania Air National
Guard's 193rd Special Operations Wing for the specific mission of
broadcasting PSYOP world-wide. Commando Solo aircraft possess the only
military capability to communicate to remote and isolated target
audiences regardless of terrain and infrastructure limitations. With
this aircraft PSYOP messages can be disseminated worldwide in near real
time without the ground presence of U.S. forces.
24. Senator Santorum. General Holland, what will be the impact to
the mission of the 193rd Special Operations Wing if replacement of the
older EC-130E aircraft is not aggressively pursued? That is, can the
193rd Special Operations Wing perform its mission with these older EC-
130E aircraft?
General Holland. Under the original EC-130J program plan, the 193rd
Special Operations Wing (SOW) was estimated to be in split fleet
operations (operating EC-130Es and EC-130Js simultaneously) for
approximately three years. The current Air Force plan to procure
additional aircraft will put the 193rd SOW in split fleet operations
for at least 6 years. Extended split fleet operations will be felt in
the units training, readiness, and deployment signature (logistics).
Although there will be impacts, the unit, in concert with its parent
headquarters, Air Force Special Operations Command, will work
aggressively to maintain the combat readiness of the unit. The 193rd
SOW can and will continue to perform the mission with both aircraft
until the conversion finishes.
25. Senator Santorum. General Holland, is an additional EC-130J
aircraft on the U.S. Special Operations Command unfunded priority list?
General Holland. No sir. This does not mean that the need for
additional aircraft is not important to the Command, it is just a
matter of limited resources and the knowledge of possible offsets that
this Command cannot absorb at this time.
26. Senator Santorum. General Holland, to what extent does the Air
Force's C-130 modernization plan help or hinder the acquisition of
additional EC-130J aircraft for the 193rd Special Operations Wing?
General Holland. The United States Air Force (USAF) and the USSOCOM
are taking steps to remedy the disconnect between the traditional EC-
130J procurement method (through Congressional adds) and future
procurement programs. The new USAF C-130J procurement program helps the
acquisition of additional EC-130J aircraft in that no new aircraft were
programmed by USAF or USSOCOM in previous years. USAF is helping
USSOCOM finish an effort that was started by Congress. It must also be
noted that finishing the conversion of the 193rd Special Operations
Wing will generate additional modification and sustainment requirements
that must be resourced by both USAF and USSOCOM.
socom research (6.1)
27. Senator Santorum. Mr. Schulte, it is my understanding that
USSOCOM has no basic research (6.1) program of its own. Instead,
USSOCOM leverages basic research programs in the services, Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), national laboratories, and
Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) programs. Does USSOCOM have
an opportunity to provide input during the annual budget process each
of the services conducts? That is, can USSOCOM provide any direction or
comment on both the type of research being done at the 6.1 level and
the level of funding allocated by the services?
Mr. Schulte. In the review of the 1992 Defense Appropriations Bill,
the Senate Appropriations Committee noted that ``USSOCOM must be able
to provide their validated SOF peculiar requirements to DOD and other
Government technology base development communities for consideration in
competitive resourcing, and to enter into cost sharing relationships
with the same.'' In fact, we have not been fully successful in
establishing a process to input SOF requirements directly into Service
funded science and technology development efforts. We make indirect
inputs through our Service Science Advisors as well as a Department of
Energy (DOE) representative, who in turn provide indirect input into
their respective agency/Service annual budget submission. Also, members
of the Advanced Technology Directorate are invited members of various
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for such entities as the Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Joint Services Small Arms Program, the National Systems
Support to SOF (Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
[TENCAP]), Air Force Research Program (specifically the Special
Operations Forces Technology Planning IPT). Our input into the Office
of Naval Research (ONR) and their Future Naval Capabilities is made
through the Navy liaison in the Advanced Technology Directorate.
Additionally, directorate members are active in the U.S. Army's
Technology Base Executive Steering Committee, the DOE Advanced
Technology Program (through the DOE liaison officer) and the Defense/
DOE Munitions Technology Development Program. Although we have had
success on a ``one-on-one'' basis, our formal involvement is generally
limited to one of review and comment, rather than making direct
contributions in planing and shaping these science and technology
efforts. We believe USSOCOM could benefit substantially if we were to
become institutionally involved with the Defense Secretariat level
Science and Technology (S&T) planning process led by the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering. This would significantly improve our
capability to influence Defense S&T and would allow the command to have
direct input into development of the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan, the
Defense Technology Objectives in addition to participating in the
Technical Area Review and Assessment process. Furthermore, membership
on the S&T Executive Council would establish USSOCOM's role in Science
and Technology by providing us direct high-level visibility of our
critical needs. We rely heavily upon leveraging the science and
technology efforts of the Services, Defense, and other government
agencies. If USSOCOM were able to more directly focus even a small
portion of the technology base on SOF peculiar needs, our leveraging
efforts would be much more efficient and USSOCOM's acquisition center
more effective in providing advanced technology to the SOF warfighter.
advanced concept technology demonstration
28. Senator Santorum. Mr. Schulte, the Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) initiative enables the evaluation of a
technology's military utility before committing to a major acquisition
effort; permits the development concepts of operation for employing the
new technology; and allows the retention of a low-cost residual
operational capability. Can you provide information on whether SOCOM
has the flexibility to perform advanced technology demonstrations and/
or rapid prototyping of technologies to meet needs unique to Special
Operations Forces?
Mr. Schulte. The USSOCOM has always had the philosophy of ``try
before you buy.'' This philosophy carries over in USSOCOM's aggressive
involvement with ACTD topic selection and in demonstrations
specifically relating to SOF. We are, however, a relatively small
Defense entity and must shepherd our limited personnel resources. We
seek, therefore, to leverage the Services' ACTD efforts and demonstrate
and evaluate equipment that can specifically respond to SOF peculiar-
SOF unique needs. The command does possess, on a very modest scale, an
advance technology demonstration program similar to those sustained by
the services, but again we rely primarily upon the services to provide
the venues where SOF unique equipment may be demonstrated. Our rapid
prototyping has limited funding and is executed under the Special
Operations Special Technology Program (S200).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
advanced lightweight grenade launcher/striker program
29. Senator Collins. General Holland, I am familiar with the
Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher/Striker Program (MK47Mod 0), and
I am aware it is included on your fiscal year 2003 unfunded
requirements list. You may know that it is also currently being tested
at the Marine Corps' warfighting lab. What can you tell me about the
value of this program in terms of meeting mission requirements for the
Special Operations Forces?
General Holland. The Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher/Striker
Program (ALGL) is of great operational value in terms of meeting
mission requirements for Special Operations Forces. The ALGL will
provide the special operators a first round on target capability with a
40mm grenade from 400 to 2,000 meters. This is a significant
improvement over the current systems. The ALGL addresses three USSOCOM
Desired Operational Capabilities: personnel survivability, sensory
enhancements, and versatile weapons. The ALGL will be compatible with
an advanced air-burst, pre-programmable, high explosive fragmentation
grenade that will provide a capability to fire behind covered
positions.
The ALGL provides the capability to engage personnel and motorized
or lightly armored material targets with suppressive and destructive
fires. The greater lethality of the ALGL system (compared to the MK-19)
is a significant force multiplier for SOF. A significantly lighter
weapon, the ALGL can be man-packed and readily employed by dismounted
elements in offensive and defensive operations. Moreover, the first-
burst hit capability of the ALGL eliminates the requirement to use 60
to 70 percent of SOF's 40mm ammunition loads for targeting.
30. Senator Collins. General Holland, can you also tell me if the
Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher/Striker is, in fact, 40 percent
of the weight of the current MK 19 Grenade Launcher, and 10 times more
lethal against dismounted targets?
General Holland. The ALGL does weigh 40 percent less than the MK-
19. The ALGL weight is 100 pounds versus 168 pounds for the MK-19.
Combining the increased probability of hit and reduction in engagement
times greatly improves the lethality of the ALGL. The accuracy of the
MK-19 is ineffective in that it provides only a 25 percent probability
of one round or more of a three-round burst hitting a small armored
vehicle (BMP) sized target at 1,000 meters. This ineffective accuracy
requires additional bursts to eliminate the target, with at least two
to three more engagements on the original target for a complete kill.
The ALGL must have an 80 percent probability of hitting five stationary
BMP targets from 300 to 1,000 meters within 2 minutes. The first round
hit capability and air-burst round greatly increases the lethality of
the weapon system against dismounted targets. Dismounted targets will
have no warning they are being targeted and therefore no time to seek
cover. Bracketing the rounds into the target will be eliminated. The
air-burst round will improve lethality as the round does not have to
make impact with the target and will have a higher kill radius than
current rounds.
vessel or shallow water craft
31. Senator Collins. General Holland, how important is a vessel or
shallow water craft in meeting the surface, submerged, and semi-
submerged operations of Special Operations Forces? Please provide
specifics on how the following craft can meet those particular
operational needs: the Surface Planning Wet Submersible (SPWS); the
Integrated Bridge System (IBS) for Special Operations Forces Combatant
Craft; and the Integrated Command and Control System (IC\2\S) for
Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Vehicles.
General Holland. Based on the current and future signature
detection capabilities of potential adversaries, the technology for a
craft to conduct surface, submerged, semi-submerged missions is
essential to insert and extract SOF assets. The SPWS combines the
benefits of a SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) and a SOF insertion/
extraction maritime platform into one efficient versatile craft. The
capabilities of the craft are currently being evaluated by this command
and we expect the knowledge gained from testing of SPWS to contribute
to future applications.
The IBS is being developed for SOF combatant craft. The IBS
increases the situational awareness as well as integrates the
navigation, communication, and propulsion equipment into one display
for the combatant craft crew. IBS hardware consists primarily of
marinized computers and display screens. SOF platforms must be capable
of providing near real time intelligence to the operator while enroute
to the target. The IBS incorporates this essential capability while
reducing the cockpit instrumentation. Combatant craft platforms will
have a centralized call-up display with holistic mission information to
increase the probability of mission success.
The IC\2\S is the next generation combat data integration, display,
monitoring, and control system being developed by the Naval Surface
Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division, Dam Neck Detachment for the
USSOCOM's SOF. USSOCOM's SOF mobility platforms (land, air, and sea
assault vehicles) require a system that seamlessly integrates various
command and control capabilities and allows for their intuitive
display, immediate access, and user friendly function. IC\2\S will
integrate those multiple systems of the individual land, air and sea
SOF into a single integrated, scalable, modular system that will allow
for a ``plug-and-play'' capability of those components required for
unique mission assignments. IC\2\S will be developed such that the
system is configurable, transportable, and operational in both SOF
airborne and ground vehicle platforms.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
TECHNOLOGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mary L.
Landrieu, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Landrieu, Carnahan, and
Roberts.
Committee staff member present: Gabriella Eisen,
nominations clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard
W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine,
general counsel; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member;
and Christina D. Still, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Edward H. Edens IV,
professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; and
Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert and Leah C.
Brewer.
Committee members' assistants present: Marshall A. Hevron,
assistant to Senator Landrieu; Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistant to
Senator Landrieu; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Neal Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Robert Alan
McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; Kristine Fauser, assistant to
Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator
Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU, CHAIRMAN
Senator Landrieu. Good morning. Let me welcome all of our
panelists this morning and say that we are very pleased and
enthusiastic about this hearing that we think is very
important.
Senator Roberts will be joining us in just a few minutes.
He is on his way, as are several other members of the
subcommittee.
Unfortunately, because of a double schedule of meetings
this morning, I am going to have to leave at 10:00, so I am
going to try to shorten my remarks. We will get as much of the
panelists' presentations in as possible and also some questions
because this hearing, hopefully, will lay some groundwork for
some very important legislation in the authorization bill that
we hope to put forward here in this committee.
So, with that, let me just begin with a brief opening
statement to say that there are many important things that we
can do to combat terrorism, and this country is greatly
challenged by what is before us. In my opinion, not only as
chair of this subcommittee, but as a member of Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees, I think one of the great ways
that America can position its defenses is to strengthen our
technology initiatives. Last October someone sent the deadly
biological agent, anthrax, through the mail to various
locations, including right here to the Senate. Our Nation now
understands that these horrific actions represent a new
generation of threats, very frightening to our security:
terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction
by terrorists in carrying out their attacks.
This has added a new and, I might say, urgent element to
our national security efforts: protecting ourselves at home as
well as our troops overseas. This complex homeland security
mission involves military and civilian agencies at the Federal,
State, and local levels and is now, in many large and small
ways, a great challenge to the way that we have traditionally
been organized.
Let me just share a chart that I really think we should
kind of blow up and have in color to show the great challenges
ahead of us.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Landrieu. I am sorry it is rather small. But when
an agency was asked to chart all of the agencies of the Federal
Government in charge of homeland security, this is what it
looks like and some people thought this was a joke, but it is
actually not. It is quite real. When you think about our
challenges before us to coordinate not only our Federal
agencies but our State and our local agencies across many
different levels of government, as well as coordinating that
effort among all of the funding agencies, you can see the great
challenges ahead. It was not even easy to coordinate that
within the Defense Department, but now homeland security gives
us even greater challenges.
One of our Nation's great strengths, however, in war or
peace is our ability to develop and deliver new and effective
technologies to the marketplace or to the battlefield. We have
seen an impressive demonstration of this in our current
military efforts to defeat terrorism, including unmanned aerial
vehicles, laser-guided precision weapons, and instantaneous
global communications. New technologies will also play an
important role in homeland security.
Today's hearings will focus on two topics related to
technology. First, we will consider the Pentagon's Science and
Technology (S&T) research and development programs. These
efforts serve as a foundation for technology and weapons that
our military use today. I would note that these programs have
also been the source of technologies we use in our everyday
lives, which has been more than a dual benefit to our Nation,
including the Internet, cell phones, and you could go on with a
long, long list of such technologies.
Second, we will look specifically at the technology we have
developed, and are still developing, to combat the two most
serious threats we face: not only terrorism, but the potential
use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by terrorists
or rogue nations. We are particularly interested to know what
the Pentagon has done since September 11 to step up such
efforts.
We have a very large and distinguished panel of witnesses
today. I thank you all for being a part of it. Dr. Ronald Sega
is Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) at the
Pentagon. He is responsible for the Department's S&T programs.
Dr. John Marburger is Director of Office of Science and
Technology Policy, which oversees all Federal science and
technology efforts, including defense.
Dr. Dale Klein is the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, a
position responsible for the Department's efforts to combat
offensive weapons of mass destruction.
Dr. Steve Younger is Director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is focused on reducing threats
from weapons of mass destruction. This agency provides support
to warfighting commanders in getting technology and weapons to
the battlefield.
Finally, Mr. Robert Waldron is the Assistant Deputy
Administrator for Nonproliferation Research and Engineering in
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).
We will ask Dr. Sega to begin the testimony. I hope that
you will address several important issues to include: the
proper level of investment for these programs, given the great
challenges before our Nation today; how we reach out to a
larger community of small businesses to get the best new
technologies to the Department of Defense and to the
battlefield and to our homeland; and how to make sure that we
are providing the best defenses that the American people would
anticipate and expect.
After giving your oral testimony, we will have some
questions for you that are intended to help us prepare for the
upcoming authorization bill. Then Dr. Marburger, we hope that
you will follow with your line of testimony. We have some
questions prepared.
I also want to mention that we have asked the science and
technology representatives from the military services and from
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to submit
written testimony so that we can add to this record.
As I said, I am going to have to leave the hearing at 10
o'clock, but Senator Carnahan has agreed to chair this hearing
in my absence.
Before I turn it over to your testimony, let me just also
say for the record--and again, I wish I had this blown up and
in color. This is the Federal counterterrorism research and
development breakdown by agency. The Department of Defense has
a large share of that. It is $353 million.
But I also call attention to the Department of Health and
Human Services which has $451 million committed to this cause.
In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE), with $194 million,
are the three largest agencies, and the Department of
Agriculture at $195 million for homeland defense and combating
terrorism.
So, again, there are great challenges for coordination.
This is a lot of money, perhaps not as much as necessary, but a
lot. Getting the research and development dollars up to the
levels and using that technology in smart and effective and
nonduplicative ways, I think, is what this panel is about; to
help us to fine tune our authorization and legislation to make
sure that end is accomplished.
So, with that, Dr. Sega, if you will begin. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD M. SEGA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING
Dr. Sega. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the Department's science and
technology program. I have a prepared statement I would like to
submit for the record and spend a few minutes discussing our
overall research and engineering direction. Following that, it
is my understanding that I will also make some remarks on
combating terrorism, in particular, after we have the first
session on science and technology.
First, I would like to thank the subcommittee for the
leadership it has had in supporting science and technology for
the Department of Defense.
The Department's goal of funding science and technology, as
stated by Secretary Rumsfeld and Under Secretary Aldridge,
remains at 3 percent of the Department of Defense budget. We
support moving toward this goal, balanced with the needs of the
Department, as reflected in the President's submitted fiscal
year 2003 budget.
As DDR&E, as I started last August, we have approached
science and technology in an integrated way, to look at the
research across the services and agencies in the Department of
Defense and reaching out to other Government agencies, to
universities, and to small and large businesses.
We have looked at aligning our science and technology
investment with the Quadrennial Defense Review operational
capabilities and within that, looking at a balance between
basic, applied, and advanced research so that the capabilities
will continue on in the future, that we are, in a sense,
loading in generations of technology from those that can be
fielded in the very near future to those that we are preparing
on a fundamental science base for the longer term.
In the area of transformation, we are moving in several
areas but there are three main areas that cross the Department
of Defense. I have aligned them in the following way. One is in
surveillance and knowledge systems, and that includes sensors,
Unmanned Aerial Vechicles (UAV), biosensors as one example, and
high bandwidth communications, information assurance, knowledge
and management systems in cyber warfare.
A second area is in power and energy. I believe this is an
enabler across the board, moving toward a more electric force.
In this area, power generation, whether it starts as nuclear,
diesel, jet, or solar rays to go to electric power, and I think
an enhanced emphasis on fuel cell work. Energy storage is
important in terms of batteries, flywheels, capacitors,
energetics, power management and control, energy conversion,
catapults and the like, as well as directed energy, lasers,
microwave, millimeter waves.
The third area is in a national aerospace technology area
which includes hypersonics, access to space, and advanced space
technologies.
Crossing those three are areas that form a base such as
materials, nanotechnology and electronics. There are service-
specific areas. I believe many of those were addressed in the
testimony from the Departments.
On the September 19, we formed a DOD Combating Terrorism
Technology Task Force. It included members from each of the
services, special expertise for chem/bio defense, such as Dr.
Anna Johnson Winegar, who is here today; an expertise in
science and technology, Dr. Charlie Holland is here. In the
weapons area, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/
LIC), special access programs, Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence (C\3\I), DARPA, and DTRA are
all represented to look at what technology could bring to our
efforts to combat terrorism. I would like to speak more about
that in the second half, but I would like to present one
example that came out of that effort.
We met regularly for the fall time about twice every week,
and 2 days after the first meeting of the 19, December 21,
identified 150 technologies that were candidates to be brought
to the field, whether in the U.S. or outside the U.S., within
roughly a month or so. Three of those were accelerated on that
second day. One of those was a thermobarics weapon program.
I have a film that I would like to show to sort of
illustrate the flight test which occurred on December 14. This
is a program under the leadership of Dr. Ruth Dougherty and her
team at the Naval Surface Weapons Center at Indian Head that
brought the chemistry forward with leadership of Dr. Steve
Younger and his folks at DTRA for the integration of it, with
the United States Air Force and Department of Energy, to go
through a series of steps from fundamental chemistry, based on
a good S&T base--and that is very important--to testing in the
laboratory during the month of October, to static testing in
Nevada during the month of November, to a full-up flight test,
which is the subject of this film, on December 14, with the
certification occurring a few days later, bringing science and
technology to the field in 90 days.
If we could have the film. [Video.]
This illustrates a couple points. Technology transition can
and should occur rapidly. Collaboration among agencies and
services is the right way to go.
This is an F-15 Eagle, Strike Eagle. The explosive is
inside of the main body, which is called a BLU-109. It normally
holds tritonol. In this case, it is the thermobaric replacement
explosive, now redesignated as a BLU-118B. The front end is a
laser-guided system, and it is being lased off of a second
aircraft. It is a GBU-24, and it will be going into a tunnel
structure in the Nevada test site.
The next view of this will also be from the aircraft. It is
an entrance into this tunnel complex that you see the cross
hairs on. There will be some venting in the black in the middle
of the screen, and then the tunnel is a U-shape and continues
around sort of symmetric with the entrance to cover over a
three football field length of tunnel area. Another view of the
same kind of thing. So, it is going from the right to the top
and out to the left. There was another area.
So, the propagation of the pressure and blast through the
tunnel structure--if we could have the volume up, that would be
great--is significantly higher than that of the standard
tritonol fill.
So, from that initial detonation, then the propagation
continues down the tunnel. This is a high-speed film, so it is
slow motion, somewhat of a delayed fuse, so it goes in the
structure. To the upper left, you will see that venting area,
some black smoke coming up.
This is an advance that we have to increase the effect in
enclosed structures. In the open area, it is actually not as
effective. So, if you missed the enclosed structure, it
actually causes less collateral damage. So, it gives the
commander another option.
Now, the next view is from inside of the tunnel structure.
The tunnel is that square area on the right. You get a sense of
it propagating and continuing to combust down the tunnel
structure. This is the back side. You can still see some force
even after that distance of the tunnel that you would not see
in a standard system. It started to snow that same day on
December 14, in Nevada, and you could sort of imagine that same
scene in another place.
But the main point here is technology transition, the value
of a strong S&T base, and the value of collaboration, in this
case the Air Force, the Navy, DTRA, and the Department of
Energy and the contractor community.
This is an example of a quick reaction type of activity.
Now it has transitioned into an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) to further upgrade the chemistry and
optimize the thermobaric explosive. So, you can evolve from
something that is current year to something that is probably
optimized further, but you have obtained an 80 percent solution
right away, and you continue to work on the acquisition. So,
partnerships are clearly important.
Another example I would like to present is this small
infrared (IR) camera. It is an uncooled IR technology,
developed by DARPA and then through the Army's Night Vision
Laboratory, and finally through collaboration through a dual-
use program with the Indigo Systems Corporation out of
California. Now, I believe this is the smallest imaging IR
system that we have today. There is a connector, RC-32, out the
back side, so you can look at it either from an adaption onto a
set of goggles or another imaging device. But this is now
available in the commercial market for fire fighters. I believe
that there were articles in the press over the last 3 or 4
years. One was the Bethesda Chevy Chase Rescue Squad using this
here locally, as well as the soldiers in the field. So, going
through areas that have a lot of smoke or fire types of things,
this is very effective. It is being produced commercially so it
lowers the cost to the Department of Defense as a buyer as
well. But it was developed through the S&T programs of DARPA
and the Army. It is a great little camera.
The final point I would like to make is on laboratories and
people. We believe it is important to revitalize our laboratory
efforts and oversight within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD). The only office that I have initiated since
August has been the Office of Laboratories and Basic Sciences,
headed up by a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD), and
Dr. John Hopps is the DUSD for Laboratories and Basic Sciences.
He also has the responsibility for universities and work force.
His background is as a faculty member at Ohio State and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), extensive
experience at Draper Laboratories, the National Science
Foundation, and his most recent position as the provost at
Morehouse College. So, he understands laboratories. That will
be our focal point within DDR&E and an increased focus on this
very important effort, revitalizing laboratories in terms of
people and infrastructure. We really thank you for the support
the Federal authorities provided in those areas.
The people part is very important. Without the people,
there is not innovation, and that is our future.
I thank you for this time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Ronald M. Sega
Madam Chair and Members of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the DOD Research and Engineering (R&E) Program with particular emphasis
on Combating Terrorism.
introduction
First, I would like to provide you with an overview of the current
Research and Engineering (R&E) Program in the Department of Defense
(DOD). Many of the capabilities and systems that are in the field today
are the result of a conscious decision, years ago, to invest in Science
and Technology (S&T) programs. The future security and safety of our
nation depends in part on a strong research and development foundation.
The DOD R&E program is being crafted as an integrated science and
technology approach to align with the desired operational capabilities
described in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). One of the goals set
forth in the QDR is to shift the basis of defense planning from the
``threat-based'' model that has dominated thinking in the past to a
``capabilities-based'' model for the future. This capabilities-based
model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than who the
adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes that
future security threats include more than large scale conventional.
Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to
deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and
asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. Consequently, we are
shaping our S&T program to focus on transformation, the need for
``Jointness,'' and a capabilities-based planning.
Investments in S&T programs are necessary today to broaden the
range of options available to the warfighter tomorrow. Advantages we
now possess in key technology areas must be maintained, while pursuing
new technologies. Our S&T investment must transcend specific
requirements. For example, our efforts in advanced electronics should
dramatically improve the performance of avionics, regardless of whether
the aircraft is manned or unmanned. Missile guidance and targeting
should be precise and accurate, regardless of the launch platform or
target. Materials will need to be both lighter and stronger--to protect
delicate instrumentation in a satellite or the personnel inside a
vehicle. Nanotechnology will have application across many of our
desired capabilities and our expectations are very high for this
emerging technology. Whereas it is science that fuels the generation of
technology, and it is the application of technology that enhances
capabilities, it is our efforts in technology transition that take
technology from the laboratory to the field in an efficient manner.
s&t supporting transformation
S&T is a key enabler of transformation. It not only provides the
technology for future warfighting capabilities, but provides
opportunities for changing doctrine that govern the way future forces
fight. We are focusing on the areas of knowledge, speed, agility, and
lethality to change the face of war. We must, through our S&T
investments, continually enhance our technological advantage to provide
significantly advanced capabilities to deter future threats and when
deterrence fails, ensure that our response is effective with few U.S.
and allied casualties and minimal collateral damage. The war in
Afghanistan has gone well, but this is no consolation for the families
of the military members who have lost their lives during the current
conflict. The decisions we are asking you to make regarding investments
in S&T programs will be important today and into the future--a future
which we cannot predict, but a future for which we can be prepared.
combating terrorism
Combating Terrorism technologies were a key component of our S&T
program prior to the attack that occurred on September 11. However,
since September 11, our effort in this area has dramatically
intensified. Fortunately, the Department's S&T program had numerous
program activities well underway, such as ACTDs, that when accelerated,
helped to meet critical warfighter needs. I would like to briefly
describe what we have accomplished in the aftermath of September 11, in
providing combating terrorism technology capability to the warfighter.
First, we established a DOD Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force
(CTTTF) on September 19, that rapidly identified, prioritized, and
integrated DOD S&T initiatives to help with combating terrorism. The
Task Force included technology leaders from the Services and the
Defense Agencies, with participation of the Joint Staff, the Department
of Energy, and other federal organizations. Under Task Force direction,
four working groups were established to identify needs and technology
opportunities that crossed the spectrum of combating terrorism
requirements. The working groups were functionally organized into four
broad areas of combating terrorism: (1) Deterrence and Indications and
Warning; (2) Survivability and Denial; (3) Consequence Management and
Recovery; and (4) Attribution and Retaliation. Working groups
identified applicable technologies that could help to mitigate
capability shortfalls and potential remediation programs. Shortfalls
and remediation programs were identified by the users who generated
prioritized lists of investment strategies for near-, mid-, and long-
term technologies.
Two of the projects identified for immediate investment were
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) Detection Systems and Thermobaric
Weapons.
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology was developed by the
Naval Research Laboratory and is being used by the Federal Aviation
Administration for detection of bulk explosives. There are many
advantages of NQR over x-ray detectors but of particular significance
is that little interpretation is required. The existing technology is
now being modified for use in examining ``bulk'' packages.
A thermobaric explosive weapon system was accelerated, tested, and
certified from the concept stage within 90 days. From ``chemistry-to-
weapon,'' the thermobaric explosive was developed and tested in a
laboratory setting in October 2001, successfully flight tested in
December, and made available to the warfighter earlier this year. This
is an example of a successful collaborative effort that included the
United States Navy, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the United States
Air Force, the Department of Energy and industry.
We also responded with assistance on the home front. A few weeks
after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, letters
containing Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax) spore powders were sent to
several locations in the United States. An interagency technology
working group was assembled to address the issues of Anthrax and the
Postal Service. DOD expertise and facilities were made available to
support this effort. Representatives from the Department of Defense,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Food and Drug
Administration, and the House Mail Office met at the Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) to discuss the use of radiation
to kill the anthrax spores. AFRRI had established radiation kill data
on surrogate spores such as Bacillus anthracis type Sterne, a vaccine
strain. The spores of the B. anthracis Sterne are very similar, if not
identical, to the B. anthracis Ames spores that were recovered by the
FBI from the contaminated letters. Extending the previous radiation
kill work for ``Sterne'' and other anthrax surrogate spore types, they
confirmed the radiation sanitizing dose for the lethal ``Ames'' strain
of anthrax.
Our Combating Terrorism activities continue and are reflected in
planning efforts of the Services and Defense Agencies with continuing
support of the Task Force.
initiatives supporting the qdr
As we further analyzed the QDR from the S&T perspective, we
identified three particular areas that warrant special attention to
support transformation; (1) integrated national aerospace framework;
(2) surveillance and knowledge systems; and (3) energy and power
technologies. The technology programs in these areas have broad
application towards transformation. They also have intrinsic jointness
characteristics. Additionally, we have identified information
operations, space, robotics, hard and deeply buried targets, advanced
energetics, advanced electronics, hypersonics, and military medical as
other joint areas of importance. Within our fiscal year 2003 request,
you will see many programs that form the foundation for these efforts.
In the coming months, we will work with you to fund a balanced S&T
program to enable continuing transition of needed technologies to our
warfighters.
I have been working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, other Government
organizations, universities, and industry to develop technologies to
protect the critical defense infrastructure. For example, many of the
targets for cyberattack are in private hands: electric power and
telecommunications grids, and financial and transportation systems. We
must match the pace brought forth by the information age with
persistent work towards reducing vulnerabilities and mitigating
consequences. Viruses and denial-of-service attacks are examples of the
pervasiveness of the threat, and the extent of our interconnection.
Every gain, every achievement, and every breakthrough in information
technology should be accompanied by the notion that it is or could be a
target. Our nation must pursue cybersecurity aggressively--to protect
not only our military systems and capabilities, but our critical
infrastructure as well.
planning and execution
We continue to seek ways to strengthen the S&T strategic planning
process. Components of this process include the Joint Warfighting
Science and Technology Plan and the companion Defense Technology Area
Plan and Defense Technology Objectives. These documents represent the
collaborative efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Staff, the military services, and the defense agencies in
planning the S&T program. These documents and the supporting individual
plans of the military services and defense agencies guide the annual
preparation of the DOD budget and program objective memoranda.
Technology development is normally recognized by the end products,
but is managed as an investment continuum that spans basic research
through advanced development with close attention to technology
transition. We must seek a balance across this continuum. Basic
research lays the foundation for tomorrow's innovative development.
That part of basic research conducted in the colleges and universities
pays dual dividends--providing not only new knowledge but also
producing the scientists and engineers for the future. At each level
through applied research and advanced development, we make investment
decisions in pursuit of the most promising payoff areas.
technology transition
Technology transition has been the topic of much discussion, within
the Department and Congress. The rate of change of technology
influences our program, and at the same time, that creates unique
technology transfer and transition opportunities. A ``Quick Reaction''
ability to respond to an immediate need would be an important addition
to the array of tools we have to support technology transition.
During my confirmation process last summer, I was told of a program
Dr. John Foster established when he was the DDR&E to respond quickly to
the unknown. In the fiscal year 2002 budget request, the Quick Reaction
Special Projects (QRSP) was submitted to address this goal, but was not
funded. Over the last 6 months, I have met with many of you and your
staff to discuss the merits of the program, and I think we all have a
better understanding now of proposed quick reaction support program and
of its need. There are three potential triggers for invoking this
program: (1) to take advantage of technology opportunities in rapidly
evolving disciplines; (2) to reduce the unanticipated risk in
acquisition programs, such as information technology or biotechnology;
and (3) technology maturation in support of urgent real-world DOD
needs. Nothing echoes the need for such funding better than September
11, 2001. For example, the only immediate option we had available at
that time to transition the Thermobaric Weapons and the Nuclear
Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) Detection Systems from developers to the
users was to reprogram/decrement existing programs. We could better
accommodate changes in technology and the world situation with
additional execution budgetary flexibility. We have requested the Quick
Reaction Special Projects again in fiscal year 2003, and I urge your
support.
The ACTD program is a ``mid-term'' tool supporting transition.
These demonstrations involving the CINCs, Service Users, and
Technologists are a formal preplanned part of the S&T program that
facilitates the rapid transition of cutting edge technologies into
defense acquisition systems. The Predator, which originated in the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), is a product of the
ACTD program and is in use today in Afghanistan. On March 5, 2002, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Pete Aldridge announced the fiscal year 2002 selection of 15 new ACTDs.
Large acquisitions follow the process described in the Department's
5000 series acquisition policy documents. The S&T Program is being
called upon to fulfill an important role in the acquisition decision
making process. In the acquisition policy documents, the S&T community
is viewed not only as a source of technology and capabilities, but a
source of expertise for determining the technical maturity of key
system technologies. Prior to Milestone B and Milestone C decisions,
the acquisition program offices and the S&T community prepare and
submit to OSD for review a technology readiness assessment. This
requirement not only provides important information for decision
making, but necessitates an increased collaboration between the
technologists and the developers. This collaboration is strengthening
the communication between the two communities and we believe this will
contribute to shortening the acquisition cycle time. For example, the
Joint Strike Fighter used the technology readiness assessment as part
of the decision making process.
The Services' S&T Executives and their Service laboratories provide
a stable, mission-oriented (Service specific) focus to the Defense S&T
program. The mission of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) is to support high-risk, high-return research that bridges the
gap between fundamental discoveries and military use. A DARPA role is
to predict what a military commander might need in 20 years, and then
create that future by changing people's minds about what is possible.
Over 50 percent of our basic research is conducted at universities,
another 30 percent in federal laboratories and the balance by industry
and nonprofit institutions other than universities. As we move forward
through our applied research efforts, our federal laboratories take a
more prominent role, and in the advanced research phase, industry
becomes the major player. The fact that our laboratories have some
participation in all three phases is also key to providing them with
the technical agility to facilitate technology transition. Throughout
the process we leverage international S&T where feasible to meet the
Department's needs as well as ensuring strong defenses for our allies.
science and technology workforce
The quality of our S&T workforce and the management of the
laboratory infrastructure in which they work are very important factors
in the overall R&E equation. They too are critical elements for
transformation. Our S&T workforce has been downsized considerably in
the last 12 years. This has left us with a very knowledgeable
workforce, but one that is also reaching retirement age. We are at a
critical point that requires a focused effort to bring stability to the
workforce that will attract and retain talent. To lead this effort, I
have established an office, reporting directly to me, for Laboratories
and Basic Sciences. We are applying our energies to ensure we are
capitalizing on the authorities you have given us to demonstrate
innovative ways for improving the workforce. The issue is not people
alone. Also, the infrastructure supporting these men and women is in
need of updating. We are in the early stages of developing a
comprehensive plan to address the total workforce. Over the next
several months, we will work closely with you as we develop a plan that
will ensure we have the workforce and supporting infrastructure
required to maintain technological superiority.
partnerships
The Department's R&E program is dependent upon active partnerships
with activities internal and external to the Department. Our customer
partners are the warfighter and the Joint Staff. Our focus is on their
known needs and the technology developments we must invest in today to
ensure their future needs are met. The internal DOD partnerships
include the Services, Defense Agencies, and other OSD organizations
that guide and execute the S&T program as well as critical external
interactions with other government agencies, universities, industry,
international partners, and Congress.
outreach
In response to the September 11 attacks, the Department released a
Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) that was open from October 23 through
December 23, 2001. The BAA sought ideas in the areas of combating
terrorism, location and defeat of hard or difficult targets, protracted
operations in remote areas, and countermeasures to weapons of mass
destruction. Anyone, from individuals to large corporations, was
encouraged to apply. The Department received approximately 12,500
responses, including approximately 1,200 from 85 other countries. The
DOD Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) has completed their review
of the Quad Charts submitted, and have requested approximately 600
White Papers that will be considered for contract award. Announcements
from the TSWG are posted on the Web at www.bids.tswg.gov.
Broader opportunities for supporting the Department's science and
engineering programs are announced as Requests for Proposals or
Requests for Quotations on a wide array of subjects . They are
published in Federal Business Opportunities; the government's
designated point of entry on the Internet for providing public access
to notices of procurement actions. FedBizOpps is found at
www.fedbizopps.gov. The appropriate points of contact (POC) for
submitting unsolicited proposals are available in the handbook,
``Selling to the Military.'' The handbook is available at:
www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/publications/selling.
closing
As stated in the Quadrennial Defense Review, ``a robust research
and development effort is imperative to achieving the Department's
transformation objectives.'' It further states that ``the Department
must maintain a strong science and technology (S&T) program that
supports evolving military needs and ensures technological superiority
over potential adversaries.'' Funding of the fiscal year 2003
President's budget request for S&T is needed to support these
objectives that help provide for the future security and safety of our
nation. We have appreciated your previous support and look forward to
working with you on this request. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Dr. Sega. I really appreciate
your bringing some examples on film and actually here to give
us a real feel of the kinds of things that are being developed.
They let us see the effectiveness by which the research and
development dollars and what we fight for actually translates
into victory on the battlefield and victory here at home, which
is important.
Let me ask, and then we will start our second part of the
panel, but I would just like to get two or three questions to
you for the record.
Last year, you are probably familiar with the legislation
that this committee and the Senate passed and the version of
the technology bill that was passed by the House in an effort
to try to improve the ways that the Department of Defense can
make sure it is getting the very best technology, whether it is
developed in-house or taken off the shelf.
We never could resolve the differences between the Senate
approach and the House approach. I think the Department of
Defense had initially supported the Senate's version and then
pulled back its support. As a result, after a lot of work over
many, many months and a lot of diligent negotiation, we ended
up without a bill.
So, could you help us understand why the Department pulled
its support of that effort, what you would like to see this
committee propose in terms of this transitioning issue so that
we can be better prepared this year for that debate?
Dr. Sega. Madam Chairman, as I understand, the question is
in and around technology transition?
Senator Landrieu. Yes.
Dr. Sega. Technology transition has many facets to it. I
believe that we are moving forward in a very positive direction
where the communication between those developing the
technology, those acquiring the technology, those who will be
eventually responsible for the logistics and maintenance, the
testing community, and the users are engaged from day one until
the end of the life of a particular system. That part is very
important.
Now, there are several mechanisms, depending on the size
and complexity of the system. The DOD 5000 series, which is
continuing to evolve, is looking at some of the larger systems,
longer-term systems, such as the Joint Strike Fighter. In this
case, the science and technology community was asked to do a
technology readiness assessment prior to a Milestone B decision
of the Joint Strike Fighter. That program also brought
technologies that were being developed, both inside of DOD and
outside, forward until they had to make a decision on what to
pick for the selection of the Joint Strike Fighter. It is also
planned at the beginning that technologies will spiral into
that during its development so that if there are good ideas--
and there are, and we need to seek those good ideas out,
regardless of where they start from--that there is an avenue of
doing that. I believe one of the issues was the mechanism by
which we bring those new ideas in, not that it was not a good
idea.
The second nearer-term part is those that involve ACTDs,
advanced concept technology demonstrators. An example of that
would be the Predator vehicle where that is 1 to 5 years in
duration, and then a question is how does that then transition,
after it is demonstrated, to a fielded system in sufficient
numbers to help the combatant commanders.
The third period is the current year efforts and in that
time frame recommending the support of the quick reaction
special projects fund. It would take care of things such a
thermobaric weapons that we did not anticipate during the
budget cycle of 18 months or so, or information technologies
that evolve very rapidly or biotechnology kinds of things or
our work for doing the anthrax kill curves out at AFRRI, which
was done through Dr. Jack Marburger's committee and brought the
Postal Service and other people together. So, the flexibility
to act quickly is important.
We also initiated a broad area announcement through the
Technical Support Working Group, and we received 12,500
submissions from the opening of this broad area announcement on
October 23, to its closing on December 23. This is an
interagency announcement, and we have gotten through about
three-quarters of those by this point. Some of them were not
directly in the Department of Defense's area, and we referred
those to the National Institutes of Health, for example.
So, we have talked since that time of how do we take the
ideas--and many of those were from small companies, some of
them from universities, some of them from individuals, large
companies. They came from everywhere, including outside the
United States. So, there is a positive energy out there to
create new ideas and bring them forward.
So, I would ask, as we work together with the committee and
the staffs, that we allow the speed, agility, and knowledge
that we are trying to get out of our systems to also be part of
the process by which we allow these technologies to enter into
our system.
A quick reaction type of approach would favor those that
have the innovation and the speed in which to react. That tends
to be the smaller businesses. So, I think a mechanism that
allows that and an expanding of the quick reaction special
projects fund would be at least one good step in that direction
so we could move quickly.
In fact, my role as DDR&E is evolving toward a chief
technology officer role for the Department of Defense. So, it
is looking at a broader range of technology issues. So, I feel
responsible as well.
Senator Landrieu. Let me just commend you and say that I am
very pleased to hear that you understand the great need. You
also understand the enthusiasm with which the American people
are responding to your call, which was open just a short period
of time, and you had somewhere between 12,000 and 13,000
responses.
Now, the challenge is how do we take those ideas, submitted
as you said by some very small companies, some individuals, and
translate them into tapes that we saw right here, things that
actually work to save lives or destroy the enemy or meet our
military goals both abroad and at home. There is some urgency
about that. If we could identify the right things, we could
save a lot of money, save a lot of time, a lot of lives, and
bring security to the American people, which they are really
longing, to think that they are prepared to the highest level
for whatever might occur.
So, the great challenge for us is to design an
authorization or initiative to help you to design something
that can wade through those new ideas. To have a process where
we just do not have to open it and close it, but it remains
open so we bring all these new ideas.
In my view, I think the Department of Defense should try to
position itself because I know the Department does not think it
is always very well funded. However, in comparison to other
agencies that struggle with budget numbers, I think, it
particularly at this time, will be given a lot of support to
help coordinate that effort and then push out some of the
technologies that are not specific to defense to Health, to
Energy, to other Departments, such as Agriculture.
So, if you would, not to take much time, but if you would
agree this morning to help work with us on some legislation,
submit some ideas, build on the work that was done because
there is a great push in the House and the Senate to open this
up to small businesses, to get these ideas quickly, and then
turn them into things like that camera or the cave-busters that
we saw on the video.
Dr. Sega. Madam Chairman, you have my enthusiastic support.
Senator Landrieu. Great. Thank you so much.
Let's begin with the second panel.
The staff is reminding me I have to ask something about the
personnel. You mentioned about the challenges of maintaining
high level personnel, that this is part of the challenge of
technology transition. Over the last few years, this committee
has created a set of pilot programs so that DOD can cut red
tape, adopt more businesslike practices and hire adequately
paid scientists so that our DOD labs can perform their mission
of supporting the Armed Forces.
It is my understanding that in 3 years almost nothing has
happened, although everyone seems to think the programs are a
good idea, but we just have not been able to move off first
base.
Can you explain why it seems like to us--and maybe it is
not true--that there has been a lack of progress, and if not,
what progress has been achieved in those particular areas?
Dr. Sega. First I would like to thank the subcommittee for
the leadership in providing those legislative authorities.
If I could read just a sentence out of a memorandum for the
Secretaries regarding section 245. This is June 21, of last
year from Under Secretary Aldridge, Under Secretary of Defense
Chu, and Acting Director for Operational Test and Evaluation
Fraim, in which it says, ``The purpose of this memorandum is to
remove, to the extent permitted by law, any existing DOD and
component impediments, including regulations, policies,
procedures, and practices that impede one key to achieving this
goal, the exercise of expediting hiring authority by the
directors of the laboratories and test and evaluation centers
selected to participate in the section 245 program.'' So that
is one indication that we are serious.
The second indication, in my opinion is providing increased
focus into that area with Dr. John Hopps' position as the DUSD
for Laboratories and Basic Sciences. We are moving forward on
this review and implementation. I have forwarded a request
through our Department's staffing process to extend section 245
of the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. So,
we are taking this seriously and we are moving out.
Senator Landrieu. I do think it is very important. It is
clear to me from what I have researched and been told that we
just are not making the kind of progress we should in that
area.
I would like to ask you, Dr. Marburger. You used to run a
Department of Energy lab in New York. How does the Department
of Energy handle these hiring issues? What are some of the ways
or strategies that you have used to hire them? Also, I would
like to ask Mr. Waldron for any of your comments on keeping the
talent and expertise that we need.
Dr. Marburger. The situation is somewhat different in the
Department of Energy laboratories because they are operated by
contractors who have a different regulatory environment and
different sets of restraints on hiring practices. I believe
that although there are difficulties in attracting the best
talent to these laboratories, they are probably somewhat
different in character from those in the Department of Defense
laboratories.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Waldron.
Mr. Waldron. Our problem is similar to Defense in that we
are not in the private sector like the laboratories are. We do
have some authorities with excepted service that the Department
is using. Within the National Nuclear Security Administration's
enabling legislation, we were provided with, I believe it was,
300 excepted service positions that we are embarking on filling
to try and bring some more additional expertise into the
Department.
Senator Landrieu. But how many have you filled to date
since that act was passed?
Mr. Waldron. I do not know, ma'am. I can check and get that
back to you.
Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, do you know how many positions
you filled to date in the last 3 years using that new
authorization?
Dr. Sega. There are several authorizations that I am
familiar. In section 342, I believe in DARPA, for example,
there were 40 authorizations provided. Today they have 28
filled and 2 have been made offers. So, in the case of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, we are at about the
three-fourths level of those new authorizations. They are
appreciated I assure you. We could not do our work without them
at DARPA. I can get back with you on the service numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]
To date, none of the service positions have been filled. The
Department and the Military Departments have been working to define the
requirements as well as specific locations for each of the positions
authorized. We are nearing completion of this necessary first step and
will soon be in the process of recruiting and staffing these critical
positions before the end of the year.
Please note the reference to section 342 on page 33 of the April
10, 2002 testimony is incorrect. The correct section is 1101 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
Senator Landrieu. OK. I know there are several programs.
That is good to hear that of that program we have 28 positions
out of 40 filled, but we understand there are other programs
where there has been absolutely no filling of those positions
in 3 years. So, we have to think about new systems of using our
private contractors in the appropriate way, while having the
in-house expertise to really mobilize the private sector small
business community that is out there and individuals with these
new ideas moving this technology in and then moving it out for
the defense of this Nation. Truly there is some urgency in
regard to this and we just have to be hitting on all cylinders.
If there is something that we need to do in a better way to
help you, then we will, and if not, then we are going to just
urge you--and direct, if we have to--to get these positions
filled and to get these agencies stood up the way they need to
be.
Let us begin the next panel. Dr. Marburger, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. MARBURGER III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
Dr. Marburger. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chairman and members
of the subcommittee for the opportunity to speak to you today
about the efforts of Office of Science And Technology Policy
(OSTP) in the Executive Office of the President in combating
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
I agree that the challenge of coordination of the
activities of many agencies in these tasks is very great, but
it is not impossible.
You have already mentioned the budget allocations for the
war against terrorism, counterterrorism activities. I will just
recall that out of the President's $2.1 trillion proposed
budget for fiscal year 2003, $112 billion is for R&D, the
largest research and development budget ever proposed, and
$37.7 billion is devoted to homeland security. The R&D portion
of the combating terrorism budget is estimated to be $3
billion, which is as much as triple the level of comparable
terrorism R&D for the previous year 2002. At $2.4 billion, the
largest portion of this funding is devoted to the area
determined to be in the greatest need, and that is protection
against biological weapons.
These funds, of course, have been requested by the
President on behalf of the agencies that will carry out the R&D
programs that address the needs of the homeland security
effort, including of course the Department of Defense.
Immediately after September 11, the key science agencies
assessed their capabilities and began implementing programs
that responded to needs that were immediately apparent at that
time. Dr. Sega has already described how the Department of
Defense mobilized its science and technology capabilities very
rapidly and effectively, and we continue to work with them and
take advantage of structures such as the Technical Support
Working Group.
OSTP's role is to track and coordinate such cross-cutting
activity, and this morning I will describe very briefly how
that has been done. My written testimony will have more detail,
and I will just hit the highlights here. In the rest of this
morning's panel, you will hear more examples of techniques and
systems under development. There is a very intriguing tabletop
full of hardware here to my right that I am sure will be of
interest to all of us.
While our office plays an essential role in helping the
President ensure coordination among agencies conducting R&D
applicable to national security, our efforts do reach beyond
the Federal Government. My staff and I work not only with the
White House, Congress, and Federal agencies, but also with the
science community, higher education, the private sector, and
State and local governments. OSTP has worked to define
effective relationships with each of these sectors in
connection with the war against terrorism.
Since the inception of the Office of Homeland Security,
OSTP has accepted responsibility to coordinate the various R&D
activities associated with the homeland security mission. My
Assistant Director for Homeland and National Security in OSTP
has also filled the post of Senior Director for Research and
Development within the Office of Homeland Security. This
reporting relationship brings the resources of the science and
technology community to bear on homeland security issues in an
efficient and timely manner.
The Office of Homeland Security also has access to all of
OSTP's scientific networking and talents, while OSTP can stay
abreast of the issues confronting the Homeland Security Office.
We also facilitate research and development across Federal
agencies primarily through the mechanism of the National
Science and Technology Council. Following the terrorist attacks
of September 11, I created a rapid response team within this
structure which draws on technical experts within relevant
Federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, to
address critical, time-sensitive technical issues. The best
early example of this was our assembling of a technical team to
assist the United States Postal Service in evaluating the
effectiveness of various proposals for sanitizing mail
contaminated with anthrax spores. Dr. Sega mentioned important
participation by AFRRI, the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research
Institute, in producing the kill curves for anthrax for that
effort.
I also established an Antiterrorism Task Force under the
National Science and Technology Council structure which has
four working groups: one on biological and chemical
preparedness; one on radiological, nuclear, and conventional
detection and response; one on the social, behavioral and
educational aspects of terrorism; and finally one on vulnerable
systems infrastructure. That last working group is intimately
connected with coordination efforts of Special Advisor to the
President for Cyberspace Security, Richard Clarke, and together
we co-chair a research and development working group focused on
this important homeland security mission.
Madam Chairman, these are examples of the kind of
interagency coordination that OSTP provides. There are many
other interagency groups that we often form ourselves and
participate in, including the Non-Proliferation and Arms
Control Technology Working Group, led by the Department of
State, and the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee,
chaired by the Department of Defense. These groups serve to
coordinate programs in the treaty verification and
counterproliferation areas. Both of these groups have developed
expertise that is relevant to the war against terrorism.
My office and I, however, are also working closely with the
Nation's science and technology community. Our Antiterrorism
Task Force is deliberately designed to be compatible with a
similar structure formed last fall by the National Academy of
Sciences. This arrangement allows OSTP to communicate
effectively with some of the best and most experienced
scientists in the Nation, many of whom had been thinking about
domestic terrorism prior to September 11.
The President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology, which I co-chair with Floyd Kvamme from the private
sector, is identifying ways in which the Nation's private R&D
sector can be better engaged in the fight against terrorism. I
believe we do face a tremendous challenge in incorporating the
excellent ideas that are pouring forth from the private sector
into a coherent homeland defense strategy.
We also maintain regular contact with numerous science,
engineering, and technology societies, as well as with higher
education organizations, establishing points of contact and
giving them information about how to couple into this complex
array of Federal programs.
As these examples indicate, OSTP is fully engaged with the
White House, the Federal agencies, and the Nation's science and
technology community in coordinating the range of science and
technology efforts underway. Although sobered by the threats we
face and the battle we are engaged in, I am optimistic that by
relentlessly pursuing our objectives, the Nation and the world
will be made not only safer and more secure, but also better
and more productive.
I appreciate the long history of support that you and this
subcommittee have afforded this enterprise and I look forward
to working with you in the future. Thank you very much for this
opportunity to appear before you today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John H. Marburger III
Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in combating terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction.
introduction
The federal research and development (R&D) budget is an important
tool for accomplishing national objectives in the war on terrorism. The
President's proposed budget for 2003 calls for total federal spending
of $2.1 trillion. Of that amount, $112 billion is for R&D and $37.7
billion is devoted to homeland security. The R&D portion of the
combating terrorism budget is estimated to be $3 billion, which is as
much as triple the level of comparable combating terrorism R&D for
fiscal year 2002. At $2.4 billion, the largest portion of this funding
is devoted to the area determined to be in greatest need--protection
against biological weapons.
These funds have been requested by the President, on behalf of the
agencies that will carry out the R&D programs that address the needs of
the homeland security effort. Immediately after September 11, the key
science agencies assessed their capabilities and began implementing
programs, some of which are mentioned below, that responded to needs
that were immediately apparent. OSTP's role is to track and coordinate
such cross-cutting activity, and I will describe how that has been
done. Before I discuss these organizational details, let me draw your
attention to a few areas of technology that are relevant to combating
terrorism. Other speakers today will provide more concrete detail.
A major role for technologies in combating terrorism is the
detection of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or
conventional weapons of mass destruction. In order to protect against
them, or respond to their use quickly enough to mitigate their
consequences, we need sensitive, effective, and affordable detection
systems. We need detectors that show a high probability of detecting
threats, while at the same time low rates for false alarms. These
systems should be cost-effective, and easy to operate and maintain, if
we are to deploy them in large numbers and in civilian venues. We have
some capability today, but significant performance improvements are
needed.
An example of technology being developed includes work at the
Department of Energy on new detectors and algorithms focused on nuclear
weapons material. This new technology can detect nuclear materials,
while at the same time suppressing the effect of background radiation
that leads to false alarms in current detection systems.
Another example where cutting-edge science is being used to combat
terrorism is in the detection of biological agents. Substantial efforts
are underway that use ``polymerase chain reaction'' techniques in very
sensitive and highly selective detectors. This technique multiplies the
DNA of specific pathogens in order to detect their presence in even a
very small sample.
There are, of course, many other important and technologically
exciting areas where the rich scientific and technological base within
the United States is being deployed in the war on terrorism. These
include better vaccines, treatments and decontamination methods to
combat biological weapons, new methods for mitigating the health
consequences associated with the use of radiological weapons, and
biometric techniques that address the need to authenticate the identity
of foreign visitors at our borders. The testimony of my colleagues from
agencies where the actual work is done will provide many more examples
of techniques and systems under development.
role of ostp in coordinating federal r&d
While OSTP plays an essential role in helping the President ensure
coordination among agencies conducting R&D applicable to national
security, our efforts reach beyond the federal government. My staff and
I work not only with the White House, Congress and federal agencies,
but also with the science community, the private sector and higher
education. OSTP has worked to define an effective relationship with
each sector.
The White House and the Office of Homeland Security
Since the inception of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), OSTP
accepted responsibility to coordinate the various R&D activities
associated with the OHS mission.
My Assistant Director for Homeland and National Security has filled
the post of Senior Director for Research and Development within OHS.
This provides OHS seamless reach-back into the scientific talent
resident in OSTP staff, and provides OSTP awareness of the various
issues OHS is confronting, while bringing the resources of the science
and technology community to bear on homeland security issues in an
efficient and timely manner.
Working closely with OHS, an interagency working group called the
Counter-Nuclear Smuggling Working Group has been created to develop a
fully coordinated program for addressing the threat of nuclear
smuggling across borders, both overseas and in the United States.
This working group will develop a strategic plan with a unified set
of program goals and priorities, including within its scope the
programs that implement and deploy current capabilities, as well as
programs that research and develop new capabilities. This group is co-
chaired with the National Security Council and has been constituted
under the Office of Homeland Security's Research and Development Policy
Coordinating Committee.
The Federal Agencies and the National Science and Technology Council
OSTP facilitates R&D across federal agencies primarily through the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, I created a Rapid Response Team within the
NSTC structure. This team draws on technical experts within relevant
federal agencies to address critical time sensitive technical issues.
An example of this was OSTP's assembling of a technical team to assist
the United States Postal Service in evaluating the effectiveness of
various proposals for sanitizing mail contaminated with anthrax spores.
I also established an Antiterrorism Task Force under the NSTC. That
Task Force has produced four working groups:
The Biological and Chemical Preparedness Working Group
coordinates federal antiterrorism R&D efforts and is
responsible for setting a 5-year research agenda in that area
by August 1 of this year;
The Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional Detection
and Response Working Group performs the same function within
its focus areas;
The Social, Behavioral and Educational Working Group
addresses social science R&D relevant to terrorism; and
The Protection of Vulnerable Systems Working Group is
concerned with the Nation's physical infrastructure and is
intimately connected with the coordination efforts of the
Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security
Richard Clarke. Together, we co-chair a Research and
Development Working Group focused on this important homeland
security mission.
In support of this activity, at my request the RAND Corporation is
conducting a survey of each agency to create an inventory of
antiterrorism activities. This survey will provide a snapshot of
efforts underway throughout the federal enterprise, identifying gaps or
duplication of effort.
OSTP also is engaged fully in such interagency groups as the Non-
Proliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group, led by the
Department of State, and the Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee, chaired by the Department of Defense. These groups serve to
coordinate programs in the treaty verification and counterproliferation
areas.
The Science and Technology Community Outside of the Federal Government
My office and I are working closely with the Nation's science and
technology community to bring its resources to bear on national and
homeland security issues. For example, NSTC's Antiterrorism Task Force
is deliberately designed to be compatible with a similar structure
formed by the National Academy of Sciences. This arrangement allows
OSTP to communicate effectively with some of the best and most
experienced scientists in the nation--many of whom had been thinking
about domestic terrorism prior to September 11.
I also am working with Floyd Kvamme of the President's Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology, which we co-chair, to study ways in
which the Nation's private R&D sector can be better engaged in the
fight against terrorism.
OSTP also maintains regular contact with numerous science,
engineering and technology societies, as well as with higher education
organizations, such as the American Council on Education and the
Association of American Colleges and Universities.
As these examples indicate, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy is fully engaged with the White House, federal agencies, and the
Nation's science and technology community in coordinating the variety
of science and technology efforts underway.
closing
As noted earlier, current interagency processes, whether through
the NSTC, the OHS Policy Coordinating Committees or other existing
structures within the executive branch, are intended to avoid
unnecessary duplication, while allowing for the exploration of
alternative approaches to the complex problems associated with homeland
security. Within the Nation's overall homeland and national security
enterprise, I expect that science and technology will continue to play
a pivotal role; it represents our ``asymmetric'' advantage. Although
sobered by the threats we face and the fight we are in, I am optimistic
that by relentlessly pursuing this advantage, the nation and the world
will be made not just safer and more secure, but also better and more
productive. I appreciate the long history of support you have afforded
this enterprise, and I look forward to working with you in the future.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Let me say that there is a vote ongoing. I am going to
leave at 10:00 to go vote and Senator Carnahan will be here to
conduct the last hour. Again, the reason that I have to leave
is we have an Appropriations Committee hearing on homeland
defense and it is compulsory attendance this morning. As a
member of Appropriations, though it was scheduled after this
one, I just have to go.
But, Doctor, let me ask you. All that you shared with us is
encouraging. In some ways though it is a little daunting to see
how the White House efforts under your direction are being
coordinated among different agencies and, considering we have
now a Director of Homeland Defense, how the technology and
research under homeland defense is being coordinated with your
position at the White House.
Given that you outlined general categories that were
different than the original three outlined by Dr. Sega, which
were surveillance, power and energy, and aerospace--and I am
assuming if I asked the Department of Energy their broad
categories of combating terrorism for research and development,
it would yet again be a different set of categories--how really
is it going to be possible for our small business community and
general community to coordinate the submission, evaluation, and
distribution of these new technologies to get it to the
battlefield, whether abroad or here at home?
So, my question is, what are you doing not so much under
your own jurisdiction, but how are you coordinating
specifically? Maybe if you could give us a specific example, it
would be helpful.
Dr. Marburger. First of all, in my written testimony, I
mention a task that the RAND Corporation is undertaking for us
to produce an inventory of programs and activities in each
Federal agency that relate to terrorism both at home and
abroad. They are creating a taxonomy of these programs that is
comprehensive and will enable us to identify overlaps and gaps
in our coverage.
The categories, however, are defined to be compatible. Each
agency has its own expertise and its own set of missions that
must be accomplished in support of the overall, let us say,
homeland security mission. It is expected that their categories
will focus on those missions, but they are encompassed within
the more general categories under which we have divided the
tasks in our very high level coordinating task forces. The
complexity can be arranged hierarchically, and we have
representatives in OSTP who help us to understand the agency-
specific missions that we coordinate. So, I believe that
although the activities are complex, one can navigate through
them, and part of our task is to help the private sector
identify where to plug in.
The most important mechanism that we have discovered at
this point is the Technical Support Working Group, and I
believe Dr. Sega can describe its operation very well.
Senator Landrieu. If you would briefly, and if the other
panelists would want to just add anything to this challenge of
coordination. For the record, if you could submit those mission
statements and those categories so that we can share those as
we continue this effort to really bring an understandable
framework across at least the Federal level, and then in
addition to the local and State officials responsible. Doctor?
[The information referred to follows:]
Dr. Sega. Yes, thank you. The three overall technical areas
that I described were for the entire Department's science and
technology program.
In the areas of combating terrorism, the task force that I
described earlier identified four categories: deterrence and
indications and warning, survivability and denial, consequence
management and recovery, and attribution and retaliation. So,
we focused on those areas to look at near, mid, and longer-term
investment strategies.
When we released the first broad area announcement, the
scope was divided into four areas so that the investigators or
the small businesses, universities and so forth would know what
areas that this pertained to. The first was combating
terrorism. The second was location and defeat of hard or
difficult targets. The third, protracted operations in remote
locations. The fourth, countermeasures to weapons of mass
destruction. I believe we have submitted and released the
second broad area announcement. It will have a slightly
different focus. Then a third is planned. So, we bring together
more focus in each of these areas for the broad area
announcements so we can work through the submitted proposals,
but we tie them back to those four areas of combating terrorism
that are cross-cutting, and they align reasonably well with the
activities that we have joined in with OSTP.
Senator Landrieu. Well, I just think it is a very important
effort and we will continue to explore those details with you.
Dr. Klein?
Dr. Klein. Let me give you an example of some of the
coordination. Obviously, as the Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, we look at a
lot of weapons of mass destruction activities to protect the
warfighters and the military installations, equipment, and so
forth. We have had a lot of meetings with Homeland Security to
find out where we can take applications that we have on the
military side that can assist on the civilian side. So, we work
closely with General Lawler at the Office of Homeland Security
and others in terms of how can we take technologies that are
already on the military side and communicate those and
transform those to the civilian side.
We have two programs that are underway, one that is handled
by Dr. Younger on some sensors that we can put in civilian
activities through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and
others within the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. So,
we serve on a lot of panels and we have a lot of communication,
and we are trying to coordinate.
I think just generally speaking I believe the coordination
among the Federal agencies is probably among the best that they
have been for a long time. I think the events of 9/11 enhanced
that. We have a ways to go and we are continually working on
that problem to make it better.
Senator Landrieu. Anyone else? Dr. Younger or Mr. Waldron?
Dr. Younger. No.
Mr. Waldron. No.
Senator Landrieu. I am going to excuse myself and go over
to vote. I have been joined by my most able ranking member,
Senator Roberts, who chaired this subcommittee for many years
very ably and has been very interested and focused on the
science and technology and coordination issue, particularly as
it relates to combating terrorism. So, I am going to leave this
subcommittee in his able hands and will be in touch with you
all.
Senator Roberts. Before you do, I would ask unanimous
consent that my statement be made part of the record and any
questions that I may be unable to ask be submitted for the
record.
Senator Landrieu. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts
Good morning and thank you Madam Chairman for calling this
important hearing. Before I proceed with my opening statement, I would
like to take a moment to extend my sincere appreciation to our
witnesses.
Each of you have found yourself in the service of our government at
an extremely important time in our Nation's history. We realize that
since September 11, many of you have been working long and exhaustive
hours coordinating and executing the war on terrorism. Your
contributions to this war have been substantial. It is with our most
sincere appreciation of your service that we welcome you and look
forward to your testimony.
Since September 11, this committee has been focused on a number of
issues vital to the global war on terrorism. This morning's hearing
provides us with the opportunity to examine an area of critical
importance to both our national defense and the global war on
terrorism--technologies to combat terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction.
Often new technologies are showcased as simply ``gee whiz''
capabilities of our soldiers. But the important story lies beneath the
wizardry.
The real story is the commitment of our nation to a strong and
sustained technology base and a thriving culture of innovation. In
order to stop terrorists, who have proven to be unconventional in their
delivery, nimble and patient, our technological efforts must be agile,
imaginative and exploit the best minds in the world.
September 11 demonstrated what many knew all along and that is: the
threat has changed. This requires the way we do business to change as
well.
The Department of Defense can no longer rely on the
standard of being technologically superior, it must be
technologically agile.
The Department can no longer rely on the slow
maturation of technologies to combat terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction, it must exploit technologies at all stages of
development.
Maintaining a culture of discovery and innovation is more important
than ever to our national security. In addition, we must begin to
understand not only the technologies necessary to combat terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction, but also the technologies required to
protect our homeland, our prosperity and our way of life.
It is apparent by the breadth of witnesses before us today that the
technologies required to effectively combat terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction reside in numerous defense agencies and across the
Federal research agencies. I look forward to your testimony regarding
the fiscal year 2003 budget request for your respective agencies and
the coordination efforts underway in order to leverage breakthrough
technologies.
Again, thank you Madam Chairman for calling this important hearing.
Senator Roberts. Is it your wish, Madam Chairman, to simply
go ahead with the testimony? I think Dr. Younger or Mr. Waldron
still have to testify. Is that correct?
Senator Landrieu. Dr. Klein and Dr. Younger and Mr.
Waldron, yes.
Dr. Sega needs to finish. He has some wrap-up testimony
that he is going to share.
Senator Roberts. Right. So, it would be your wish that we
proceed with their testimony, then move to the second round of
questions, and then the distinguished Senator from Missouri
will return. Is that correct?
Senator Landrieu. That is correct.
Senator Roberts. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Dr. Sega.
Dr. Sega. In the earlier testimony, I talked about the DOD
Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force and the membership
that it contained within the Department of Defense. I want to
also emphasize that the task force was joined with
representation from the Joint Staff for a user perspective,
from the Department of Energy and the intelligence community,
and we reached out to other organizations outside of the
Department of Defense because we believe that is very important
and also outside of the U.S. in certain partnerships. In fact,
we hosted a NATO research and technology organization meeting
on combating terrorism. So, the effort started as a core, but
within just a couple of weeks went beyond the Department of
Defense to other Federal agencies and then began to encompass
folks in the United States and then outside.
There are some examples of combating terrorism technologies
that I would like to show very briefly just to emphasize the
work that is being done and how these apply not only inside the
Department of Defense but some have tremendous applicability
outside.
The first is a result of an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration, and it is kind of like a palm pilot. I will turn
it on and then pass it around. It is a rapid terrain
visualization, and it brings together imagery from a flying
aircraft in this case to the point where it processes it and
you have a detailed high definition image in three dimensions.
It was used at the World Trade Center to understand the debris
volume, and the geometry there was such that it had worked
itself kind of more in the subterranean area. It was also used
in Salt Lake City in support of the Winter Olympics. It can be
used also in the field, which was the initial design, to
understand terrain, and we continue to evolve that for linkage
to other systems such as global positioning systems. So, this
is an example that came out of an Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration. There are currently 30 ACTDs in use in Operation
Enduring Freedom or Operation Noble Eagle and another 8 have
been accelerated into kind of a more of a quick reaction
program.
Three others that I have on the table are DARPA related
efforts. One is a translator, and this has the ability to
translate into Pashto.
Senator Roberts. I am still looking at the world. Pardon
me. [Laughter.]
Dr. Sega. Urdu, Dari.
Senator Roberts. There is a message here from your wife, if
you want to hear it. [Laughter.]
Dr. Sega. That is very good. I will see if I can bring it
up on this one as well. [Laughter.]
Arabic. So, this was actually in Afghanistan roughly 72
hours ago.
Senator Roberts. What is that again? I am sorry.
Dr. Sega. This is a translator. So, it translates into
these languages. As I pass this on, the one that is highlighted
happens to be, ``The doctor will be here soon.'' But one pushes
the button, and when it is set up, it will read back the phrase
in the particular language. You can scroll through and look at
the different phrases that are in there. We are rapidly
expanding that to have a number of languages that are input
into the system. So, communication to people in a different
language is now enabled by a system such as this.
Senator Roberts. So, if the problem was in the Balkans and
Bosnia and/or Kosovo the lack of language specialists to do
certain things, with this gizmo--pardon me for referring to it
as a gizmo--you could use this, i.e., ``the doctor will be here
soon,'' ``turn around slowly''--[Laughter.]
Dr. Sega. Some of these you do want to get right.
[Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. It says, ``Welcome, Senator Carnahan''
here. [Laughter.]
You can turn around as fast as you want, Senator.
[Laughter.]
But at any rate, with this, with almost any language in the
Mideast where we are having a lot of difficulty obviously with
linguistics--what is this called? This is from DARPA?
Dr. Sega. Yes, and it is a translator.
Senator Roberts. Right. We have these now being used in
Afghanistan.
Dr. Sega. Yes, 28 units are currently in Afghanistan.
Senator Roberts. We in Kansas could use this for
translating what the Missourians are up to. [Laughter.]
Dr. Sega. The next item. We would have liked to bring one
that was used in Afghanistan, but the folks in the field would
not let the DARPA person bring them back because they were of
such utility. This is a disinfectant pen. The way this works,
there is a salt but it is a mixed chemical oxidant solution
that either kills or inactivates microbial pathogens. From a
container of water--and it can be a canteen--putting the water
in here--and we could do that if you wanted--and then screwing
it on the top here, and then shaking it a few times and then
one complete shake here, and then bringing this back out, this
small quantity of water, and back into the canteen itself and
just a little shake of the canteen and set it for 15 minutes,
the water is potable. This container will do and repeat that
for about 300 canteens. So, this is very important for the
folks in Afghanistan. I believe 20 have been delivered and the
current cost is about $700, but we are looking at bringing this
cost down hopefully down to around $100. But this is an
impressive technology as well that is being used.
Senator Roberts. Is there a time frame there where this
will be made available to the troops in the field? I know it is
available.
Dr. Sega. Yes, and I think they have the capacity to go up
to about roughly 500. So, I think they are in the process of
ordering additional numbers of these.
But this came out of a very rapid acceleration of a DARPA
effort to bring this item, among others, to the field quickly.
So, it is more of the prototype residuals that we are trying to
produce and then bring it into a more aggressive manufacturing
mode.
The third is a micro air vehicle. I believe that this has
100 or 200 hours on it. This vehicle can fly for about 30
minutes at a top speed of about 50 knots, and it uses a fuel
very similar to radio-controlled models. The next version will
be able to fly for about an hour, perch, stare, and operate
autonomously for about 200 hours. The following one will use
not the fuel that I just described of radio-controlled
modelers, but rather either diesel fuel or JP-8 and the
electronics will have batteries. So, this has had significant
field testing and it will provide again the soldier a look in
the vicinity to fly above and around. So, they have their own
UAV, if you will, for supporting primarily a lowest level
fighting team, a platoon or a squad.
I hope that we removed the fuel from it so the inadvertent
switch throws will have it remain on the tabletop. [Laughter.]
Senator Roberts. Well, we have made our water potable up
here. So, this will be the second step. I will just hang on,
Jean, and we will go to the top. [Laughter.]
Dr. Sega. Another follow-up. At the very end of the fiscal
year 2002 budget process, $15 million was added to quick
reaction munitions funds, and I would just like to report work
is being done and the static test was performed on Monday of
application of the thermobaric effort which we showed a film
earlier on to application of the Hellfire missile, as well as
work on infrared sensor seeker technology for the 2.75-inch
Low-Cost Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR). It actually uses some
of the work that was developed by the automotive industry. So,
we are moving forward rapidly and I think putting those funds
to good use.
I would like to now pass on the discussion on combating
terrorism to Dr. Klein.
STATEMENT OF DR. DALE KLEIN, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Dr. Klein. Thank you. Madam Chairman, Senator Roberts, I
would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today. I currently serve as Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs,
and in that capacity, I serve as the principal staff advisor to
the Secretary of Defense on nuclear, chemical, and biological
defense matters. I am responsible for the following Department
of Defense areas: chemical and biological defense programs,
nuclear matters, and the Nuclear Weapons Council, nuclear
treaty programs, counterproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, chemical stockpile demilitarization, and operation
of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
Dr. Steve Younger, the Director of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, will discuss some ongoing activities in his
agency momentarily.
I am here today to focus primarily on the committee's
interest on the research and development efforts to combat
chemical and biological terrorism. If you have questions
regarding our nuclear activities, I will certainly be happy to
address those as well.
Let me just say that the unprecedented events of September
11 have clarified the threat of terrorism to both civilians and
the military. For several years, the Department of Defense has
played an active role in developing countermeasures to
potential terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass
destruction. The anthrax-contaminated letters focused attention
on the use of biological weapons as an instrument of terrorism.
In my written testimony, which I wish to submit for the
record, I discuss the Department of Defense chemical and
biological defense program, the science and technology
programs, and key initiatives intended to combat terrorist
attacks as identified in the fiscal year 2003 budget request.
Detailed information is also available in the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress.
In addition to research and development programs, the
Department of Defense is working closely with other Federal
agencies as defined in the Interagency Federal Response Plan to
ensure a well-coordinated response to terrorist threats. We are
working closely with these agencies to provide unique science
and technology resources which support both warfighting and
homeland security needs.
The Department of Defense is exploring an array of
scientific approaches to counter biological warfare, biological
terrorism threats, chemical warfare and chemical terrorism
threats which can have application to homeland defense. We will
continue to work closely with other agencies to ensure that the
warfighter is protected with the best available technologies
and that U.S. citizens are provided as great a degree of
protection as possible.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today, and I
will be happy to respond to your questions. I believe Dr.
Younger will also comment on the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Dale Klein
introduction
Madam Chairman and distinguished committee members, I am Dr. Dale
Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear and Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs). I serve as the principal staff advisor to
the Secretary of Defense on nuclear, chemical and biological defense
matters. My office is the single focal point within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense responsible for oversight, coordination, and
integration of the joint Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
The unprecedented events of September 11 have clarified the threat
of terrorism to both civilians and the military. For several years, the
Department of Defense has played an active role in developing
countermeasures to potential attacks by terrorists using weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). The anthrax contaminated letters focused
attention on the use of biological weapons as an instrument of
terrorism. In my testimony today, I wish to discuss the Department of
Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program, and focus on the
science and technology programs and key initiatives intended to combat
terrorist attacks as identified in the fiscal year 2003 budget request.
Specifically, I will address the following topics:
The Department's technology priorities and objectives
for combating terrorism and WMD.
The capabilities the Department is trying to achieve
with these technology programs.
How technology priorities are established and how the
relevant organizations play in this process.
Major technology challenges we face and how we are
addressing them.
dod technology priorities and objectives for chemical and biological
defense
The vision of the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program
(CBDP) is to ensure U.S. military personnel are the best equipped and
best prepared force in the world for operating in future battlespaces
that may contain chemically and biologically contaminated environments.
The capabilities developed and fielded by the CBDP focus on addressing
the needs of the warfighter. As the events of the past few months have
shown, the future battlespaces for our warfighters are evolving.
Likewise, civilian organizations may increasingly turn to the
Department of Defense to leverage technology development efforts to
support the needs of homeland security. The fiscal year 2003
President's Budget Request for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense
Program includes $933 million for research, development, test, and
evaluation (of which $576 million is for the science and technology
base) and $436 million for procurement for a total of $1.369 billion.
The specific funding allocations are detailed in the Annual Report to
Congress on the Chemical and Biological Defense Program as well as in
the detailed budget requests submitted to Congress. This funding
provides support for essential research and development activities to
address future warfighting needs.
The objective of the CBDP is to ensure our forces can maintain
freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while
providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all
levels. Programs for chemical and biological defense are categorized
broadly under three operational principles: Contamination avoidance,
protection, and restoration. Contamination avoidance provides automated
capabilities to detect, locate, identify, quantify, sample, and plot
the extent of all suspected threat agent hazards, and medical
surveillance capabilities. Protection includes all medical and non-
medical means taken to protect the warfighter primarily from biological
agent hazards and to a lesser degree, chemical agent hazards while
maintaining normal operational mission tempo. The focus of protection
is to prevent exposure or the effects of exposure, and includes medical
capabilities, such as vaccines, and nonmedical capabilities such as
masks for respiratory protection. Restoration capabilities include
medical and non-medical measures required to restore the joint force,
units, facilities, and equipment to near-normal operating conditions
after being challenged by a biological or chemical agent hazard. These
measures include non-hazardous decontamination operations, effective
supply and sustainment of all defense assets, and effective medical
diagnostics and post-exposure countermeasures required to allow rapid
determination of agent exposures and subsequent treatment. Battlespace
management supports all three principals. Battle management includes
capabilities to use medical and non-medical information throughout the
joint battlespace; and to analyze this information; to predict current
and future operational impacts of hazards and to model mission
operations within the context of the contaminated environment.
dod technology initiatives for combating chemical and biological
terrorism
The administration has provided a significant addition of funds for
two key initiatives--(1) Biological Counterterrorism Research Program,
and (2) Biological Defense Homeland Security Support Program. These two
initiatives will be implemented by the Department of Defense in support
of the President's direction and the overall interagency effort. In
DOD, funds for these initiatives are in addition to the core programs
of the CBDP. Another key effort is the CB Defense Force Protection and
Homeland Security Initiative.
Biological Counterterrorism Research Program
This defensive program will establish a biological terrorism threat
assessment research center for biological counterterrorism at the U.S.
Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, Fort Detrick, Maryland. A
panel of senior scientists from DOD, federal labs, academia, industry
and intelligence communities will develop concept and scope of threat
assessment research. The research program will initiate competitive
extramural contracts during design and construction phase. The unique
facilities at Fort Detrick will support DOD and national requirements
for analysis of emerging biological threats and assessment of
countermeasures against those threats. The fiscal year 2003 program
will:
Conduct a technology survey and identify gaps.
Award extramural research with emphasis on
identification of virulence factors, pathogenic mechanisms and
structural biology.
Establish research programs in aerobiological
research, forensic genomics and certified forensic biological
threat agent capability.
Initiate planning and concept development for
necessary infrastructure.
Develop applied microbial threat assessment research
to assist in the development of the Counter Terrorism Research
Program and to establish a management element for the Program;
develop program policy, strategic plan, short through far term
investment strategies.
Develop environmental and access control point
monitoring.
Develop enhanced medical surveillance technologies.
Demonstrate an enhanced signatures database and
conduct baseline studies.
Develop improved biological defense data mining,
fusion, and analysis architectures.
Conduct Baseline Self Assessment (BSA), Mission Area
Assessments (MAAs), and Requirements Analysis and Process
Development.
Biological Defense Homeland Security Support Program
This program initiates a comprehensive program to build a National
Biological Defense System. It aims to create and deploy a national,
multi-component, multi-organization defense capability targeted to
urban areas, other high-value assets, and special events. It seeks to
provide an integrated homeland security capability to detect, mitigate
and respond to biological-related incidents. Capabilities would
include:
Enhanced biological detection capabilities and the
fusion of medical surveillance systems, wide-area environmental
sensors, access control points and information systems.
Deployed systems will exploit existing technology
supplemented with new capabilities resulting from accelerated
development.
DOD Force Protection and Homeland Security Initiatives
In addition, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program plans to
establish a fully-equipped DOD test-bed in an urban environment, an
enhanced monitoring system for the National Capital Region and an
initial capability in two additional urban areas in order to enhance
the protection of DOD assets against terrorist attacks with chemical or
biological weapons. Specific research and development activities in
fiscal year 2003 include:
Enhanced biological detection capabilities and the
fusion of medical surveillance systems, wide-area environmental
sensors, access control points and information systems.
Requirements analysis, system integration, and program
support for DOD installation and urban test beds.
Environmental and access control point monitoring for
the integration of point, standoff, and transportable detection
technologies.
Demonstrate initial mining, fusion, and analysis
module, incorporate modeling and analysis of threat transport
prediction, adopt command, control, and communications
infrastructure, and integrate information networking.
DOD test bed design, environmental testing, and test
bed trials.
Initiate the integration of point-of-care diagnostics,
syndromic reporting and medical surveillance mining.
Integration of signature source term cataloging into
system of system technology architecture.
Consequence Management in support of the National
Guard's Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-
CSTs), including initiating evaluation, purchase, and testing
of commercial-off-the-shelf products for the Table of
Distribution & Allowances (TDA) for WMD-CSTs.
Integration, demonstration, and testing of: (1) CB
collection, detection, and identification technologies, (2)
reagents and antibodies for biological detection, and (3) an
automated biological agent testing laboratory.
Initiate systems engineering studies for deployment of
sensors in the National Capital Region.
Conduct Ambient Breeze Tunnel testing and
characterization of system and components.
Conduct background aerosol and indoor building flow
character and testing.
Conduct wargames/tabletop exercises for Concepts of
Operations (CONOPS) development.
In support of Consequence Management--Initiate
development of a Unified Command Suite (UCS) and Mobile
Analytical Laboratory (MAL) block upgrades to support WMD-CSTs.
This program also provides resources in the DOD Chemical and
Biological Defense Program to complete fielding and modernization of
(1) Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, and (2) Reserve
Component Reconnaissance and Decontamination Teams. Full funding
includes the following in the fiscal year 2003 budget:
Type-classified protection, detection, and training
equipment.
Development and fielding of upgraded analytical
platforms for the detection, identification, and
characterization of CB and radiological agents used by
terrorists in a civilian environment.
Development and fielding of communication capabilities
that are interoperable with other federal, state, and local
agencies.
Testing and evaluation to ensure that the systems are
safe and effective.
Program management funds to successfully execute the
CBDP Consequence Management RDA program.
Another key element of the Biological Defense Homeland Security
Support Program is the Joint Service Installation Protection Project
(JSIPP). The JSIPP is a Pilot Project designed to increase CB defense
capabilities at DOD Installations. The JSIPP is intended to provide a
robust CB defense capability integrated into installation force
protection and anti-terrorism plans. The project will refine concepts
of operations and resource requirements for expansion across DOD. The
two key components of this project are the: (1) Chemical Biological
Installation Protection Program, and (2) Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives(CBRNE) Emergency First
Response Program. The project will equip nine diverse DOD Installations
with:
Contamination Avoidance, Protection, and
Decontamination Equipment Packages.
Emergency response capability for consequence
management.
Integrated Command and Control Network.
Comprehensive training and exercise plan.
Finally, the fiscal year 2003 budget includes procurement funds to
support homeland security biological defense. Procurement will support
the following:
First Responders--procures emergency first-response
capability for consequence management--supports organizing,
equipping, training, and conducting exercises for first
responders.
Installation Force Protection Equipment--procures CBD
equipment packages for nine installations; buys Dry Filter
Units, Joint Portal Shield biological agent detectors,
Automated Chemical Agent Detectors, Remote Data Relays,
Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device (RAPID), and
operational fielding support.
WMD Civil Support Teams--procures new equipment
training support, required equipment and required Operational
Assessments for 32 WMD-CSTs.
Homeland Security Initiative--procures a dual-use
operational capability for integrated bio-surveillance,
detection, and alerting in the National Capitol Region within
12 months.
dod interagency coordination on chemical and biological-terrorism
related research and development
Within DOD, the key organizations responsible for the management
and transition of science and technology efforts for chemical and
biological defense are (1) the Joint Science and Technology Panel for
Chemical and Biological Defense, and (2) the Joint Medical Chemical and
Biological Defense Research Program. These organizations help to ensure
effective coordination of efforts among the Service Laboratories and
Defense Agencies, including the Biological Warfare Defense program of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). In addition to
management responsibilities, DOD provides many unique resources that
can be used in the development of countermeasures to biological
terrorism. Some of these unique resources include high containment
(biosafety level 4) laboratories, aerosol exposure test chambers, live
agent test facility, simulant test grids, and personnel with
exceptional scientific expertise.
The Department of Defense has established a set of requirements for
the successful completion of military operations in chemical and
biological environments. We submit an Annual Report to Congress
documenting our progress in meeting these requirements. My office
regularly coordinates its efforts with the Department of Energy and the
intelligence community through the Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee, which reports annually to Congress on its progress (provided
as a classified document to Congress).
In order to meet the challenge of biological warfare across the
spectrum, our program must address the need for both materiel
improvement and operational concepts to use the new and improved
equipment. In order to address the issue of bioterrorism, we have
documented gaps in previous exercises and these will be the focus of
reprioritized efforts within the Department of Defense. One of the
lessons of previous exercises was that to work effectively during an
actual crisis, various governmental agencies must actually exercise
beforehand or their ``cultural differences'' will overcome any plan. We
will continue to work with the Office of Homeland Security and other
agencies to ensure good working relationships. One specific area we
will focus on is to help define what support the Department of Defense
can provide and work with other agencies to define what support they
request and need.
While the DOD can provide unique expertise and materiel support, it
is not charged with lead Federal agency responsibilities as described
in the interagency Federal Response Plan. In the area of domestic
terrorism medical response, the Department of Health and Human Services
takes charge and requests support as needed. However, the Department of
Defense provides materiel support to other organizations.
Congress has provided a number of statutory methods for the
Department of Defense to support other federal, state, and local
agencies in preparing for and responding to weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) terrorism. Requests may come to the department for operational
support or for the purchase of equipment. These requests are approved
on a case-by-case basis. My office has responded to a number of
requests from other-federal agencies for individual and collective
protective equipment and access to vaccines, while the operational
support provided by the Department is coordinated through the Secretary
of the Army. The Department will continue to provide this support
within statutory and regulatory limits and balance requests against the
readiness of military forces to accomplish their warfighting mission.
DOD can offer many of its systems, either those in the field or in
development, and expertise that may prove useful to civil agencies.
DOD's chemical and biological detection equipment could be applied in
civilian situations, as can many of our medical countermeasures.
However, the provision of materiel alone does not enhance capability,
it needs to be accompanied by valid operational concepts, training, and
maintenance.
Our Armed Forces are trained primarily to fight foreign
adversaries. However, our forces also maintain significant capabilities
to support homeland security, through such operational units as the
Chemical and Biological Rapid Response Team, the Technical Escort Unit,
the WMD-Civil Support Teams, and the Marines' Chemical and Biological
Incident Response Force (CBIRF).
In order to enhance our Nation's overall capabilities the
Department of Defense participates in programs to support the
transition of military equipment and concepts to civil agencies.
Specifically,
The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), rapidly
prototypes emerging technologies for high priority federal
interagency requirements;
The Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization
and Interoperability (known as the IAB), is a partnership with
federal, state, and local agencies focused on the capabilities
necessary for fire, medical, and law enforcement responses to
WMD terrorism;
The Domestic Preparedness Program (now a Department of
Justice program), mandated under the 1997 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
legislation, trained and equipped municipalities to address WMD
terrorism;
Interagency agreements with Department of Justice's
Office Domestic Preparedness to purchase equipment; and
Medical training programs from the U.S. Army Medical
Research Institutes of Infectious Diseases and Chemical
Defense.
These efforts represent the Department's procurement and research
support to address bioterrorism. As federal agencies assess their
needs, DOD anticipates additional requests for support.
conclusion
For operational responses to biological terrorism, the Department
of Defense is working closely with the lead federal agencies as defined
in the Federal Response Plan to ensure a well coordinated response. As
I discussed, the Department of Defense is exploring an array of
scientific approaches to counter biological warfare and biological
terrorism threats. We are working closely with several other federal
agencies to provide science and technology resources to support
warfighting and homeland security needs. We will continue to work
closely with other agencies to ensure that the warfighter is protected
with the best available technologies and that U.S. citizens are
provided as great a degree of protection as possible. Thank you for the
opportunity to speak here today, I would be happy to respond to any
questions.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN M. YOUNGER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY
Dr. Younger. Thank you, Madam Chair and Senator Roberts for
the opportunity to share with you some of the contributions of
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to our Nation's warfighting
capability. I will summarize my written statement and just
include a few remarks now.
The mission of DTRA is simple to understand but it is
critically important, and that is, to reduce the threat of
weapons of mass destruction. That is what we do. We reduce the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, or so-called WMD. The
events of September 11 demonstrated very graphically that the
urgency for this mission has increased since the end of the
Cold War. Any country with even a minimal technological
capability can produce certainly chemical weapons and probably
biological weapons, and we know that there are a number of
countries who are still pursuing nuclear weapons. It is no
longer a case of WMD ``over there.'' Our job is to make sure
that these weapons are not used against us, and if they are,
that the consequences of their use is minimized.
We are a combat support agency. That means we are the near-
term integrator between people in the laboratory and people who
wear muddy boots. That is, we connect existing technology with
near-term warfighter needs. The combatant commands look to us
for assistance in dealing with the full range of WMD needs,
chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological and large
quantities of high explosives. Studies have shown that it is
hard for the individual combatant commands to provide all of
the expertise that they need in responding to WMD and that is
where we come in. We have liaisons with all of the CINCs and
rapid connection back to the expertise that we have in DTRA and
other parts of the Department of Defense and the Government. We
are a team player. We bring together expertise from across the
DOD and other U.S. Government entities, industry, academia, and
also our allies and friends around the world to meet those
needs.
Our products range from consequence prediction, what would
happen if one of these weapons was used, to consequence
management, from targeting to the development of the weapons
that are used on those targets. Within hours of the attacks on
September 11, we were providing data on the smoke plumes from
the attack, and within weeks we had accelerated the development
of the thermobaric weapon and other weapons that are currently
in Afghanistan.
WMD is a complicated topic and we have a complicated tool
box to respond to that. We do the arms control inspections to
make sure that other countries are doing what they told us they
were going to do when they signed treaties. We execute the
cooperative threat reduction program to help countries of the
former Soviet Union take apart weapons. We have an
uncooperative threat reduction program consisting of the
development of new warheads particularly for hardened and
deeply buried targets. Then in case something gets through, we
help execute the chemical and biological defense program to
make sure that our forces can operate in a chemical or
biological environment. Finally, we help to ensure that our
Nation's nuclear arsenal, that ultimate deterrent against
aggression, is ready if it is required.
Here are few examples of what we have accomplished
recently. We have a hard and deeply buried targeting cell at
the Defense Intelligence Agency, so we have assisted in
targeting in the Balkans, in Iraq, and more recently in
Afghanistan. I should add we have had people on the ground in
Afghanistan going through caves, looking at possible weapons of
mass destruction activities there.
We led the development of the thermobaric warhead and you
have seen the movie on that. But we also did the conventional
air-launched cruise missile penetrator, the advanced unitary
penetrator, and the hard target smart fuze that knows where it
is in the structure and knows when the warhead should blow up.
By the way, we also build bunkers so that we understand
what the enemy target looks like, what kind of construction
techniques are used, and then we put a weapon on it to make
sure that we can blow up the kind of bunker that they are
building.
We provide support to the warfighter and more recently
support to homeland security in predicting the spread of WMD
agents and we have recently done a study of the effect of a
nuclear, a chemical, or a biological attack on American cities.
I have to say that the results of those studies have been
sobering.
We are fielding an unconventional nuclear warfare defense
test bed at four military installations that eventually will
prove technology and integrate it into a working protective
system capable of detecting a terrorist nuclear device.
We are working with the warfighters to develop means for
ensuring the continued use of ports and airports despite
potential enemy use of chemical or biological weapons.
We do vulnerability assessments of key leadership
facilities, including a number of facilities on Capitol Hill. I
am particularly proud that the force protection technology that
we developed helped save lives at the Pentagon on September 11.
We are a combat support agency, but there is a lot that we
can bring to homeland security. We are applying training and
planning related to nuclear weapons accident response to
broader WMD terrorism scenarios. I mentioned that we had
simulated what would happen in the event of a nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapon used in an American urban area.
Well, we found that a lot of these scenarios follow the same
track. So, we are developing a set of play books. What should
you do, what is going to happen, what is the sequence of
events, what is the State government going to do, the local
community, the first responders, some of the things the first
responders should not do? If it is a nuclear accident, heroic
firemen should not rush into the high radiation area because
they will not be able to do anything and they will themselves
be irradiated. But there are other things we can do. We are
looking at education of the population and various other kinds
of things based on the experience we have in dealing with
nuclear weapons accidents.
Finally, I will touch on our budget. Thanks very much for
supporting our full fiscal year 2002 request. In 2003 we are
looking at $1.17 billion, which is a slight rise in combat
support and radiation hardened electronics and hardened target
defeat programs.
Thanks very much for allowing me to be here today, and I am
proud to lead a great team that we think is doing important
work for the country.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Younger follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Stephen M. Younger
Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be
here today to testify on the contributions of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) to our Nation's warfighting capability. I will
summarize my statement and ask that it be included in its entirety in
the record.
DTRA Reduces the Threats Posed by WMD
The mission of DTRA is simple to understand but critically
important to the nation and indeed to the whole world--to reduce the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, or ``WMD.'' As the events of
September 11, 2001 and what followed amply demonstrated, the urgency
for this mission has only increased since the end of the Cold War.
Whereas during the Cold War we had a small number of potential
adversaries to worry about, today we face clear and present threats
from many nations and groups who see weapons of mass destruction as a
means to level the playing field against the United States and our
interests. Any country or group with minimal technological capability
can manufacture chemical and biological weapons and an increasing
number of states are pursuing a nuclear capability. The awful events of
September 11 showed that terrorists will use our own strengths against
us. It is no longer a case of WMD ``over there.'' The job of DTRA is to
reduce the threat of WMD against us, and that if they are used against
us, that we contribute to minimizing the consequences.
Organizationally, we report to Dr. Dale Klein, the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense
Programs), but we work closely on a day-to-day basis with OSD, the
Chairman of the JCS, the CINCs and the Services. To make sure that we
are coupled into the needs of the CINCs, we have liaison officers
assigned to the commands allowing real time reachback to DTRA
capabilities.
DTRA Is A Combat Support Agency
DTRA is a combat support agency. We are the near term interface
between the laboratory and people who wear muddy boots. Sometimes our
timelines are as short as a few hours, as is the case when we model the
effects of a WMD event on a specific location using real time weather
and geography. At other times we execute development programs that span
several years. The Combatant Commands look to us for assistance in
dealing with and overcoming the full range of WMD threats--chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive. Recent studies
confirm that it is difficult for every command and the Services to have
all of the WMD expertise that it needs to carry out its mission. DTRA
provides essential support for the needs of the CINCs and the services.
DTRA Integrates and Focuses WMD Expertise from All Sources
We do this by integrating and focusing WMD expertise from all
sources--the Department of Defense, other U.S. Government entities,
industry, academia, and from our allies and friends--into products that
meet their needs. Our products range from consequence prediction to
consequence management, from targeting to the weapons that are being
used on target. We provide WMD expertise, technology, and support to
plans and operations. For example, within hours of the attacks on
September 11 we were providing data on smoke plumes from the World
Trade Center. Within weeks we had accelerated the development of the
new thermobaric weapon so that it would be ready for use in
Afghanistan. We have people on the ground in that country looking for
WMD activities in caves. We have people in laboratories and test ranges
figuring out what to do if or when we find such activities.
Although the Agency was established in 1998, it was built upon
organizations with decades of experience in nuclear weapons effects,
chemical and biological agent defeat, weapons effects against hardened
facilities, the protection of structures against high explosives
attacks, vulnerability assessments, and implementation of arms control
treaties and other cooperative threat reduction programs. This blend of
expertise positions DTRA at the crossroads of WMD threat reduction.
As an integrator of technology and operational concepts, DTRA works
closely with the required expertise wherever it may reside. We work
very closely with the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) organizations of the Services. We have many enduring and
emerging partnerships with the Department of Energy and its National
Labs. We also depend very heavily upon the talent and skills of the
private sector and academia. Virtually every DTRA RDT&E program employs
a team approach.
The development of the thermobaric warhead exemplifies the benefit
of this team approach in accelerating development of technology needed
by the warfighter. This program originated as a response to the
terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. DTRA was tasked by OSD to form
and lead an interagency team to produce a thermobaric weapon that would
hold tunnels and caves at greater risk, thereby eliminating sanctuaries
for terrorists in Afghanistan. The DTRA-led team produced, tested, and
delivered a very effective capability in a mere 60 days. DTRA's proven
experience with ACTDs was key to precisely choreographing the various
program partners through the developmental process. Team members in
addition to DTRA included Navy, Air Force, and DOE organizations. DTRA
integrated all efforts and coordinated the testing activities. The
Navy's explosive experts at the Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC),
Indian Head, MD, provided an effective new composition explosive fill
that significantly enhanced blast pressure and range. The Air Force
Precision Strike Program Office at Eglin AFB, FL, led the Air Force
team performing weapon system integration, safety, and flight
clearances. They also produced a modified fuze for a new warhead. NSWC
Indian Head conducted static testing of the new fuze/weapon
configuration to demonstrate reliable initiation of the new explosive.
Static and flight tests were conducted in full-scale tunnel facilities
at DOE's Nevada Test Site. The Air Force 422nd Test and Evaluation
Squadron at Nellis AFB, NV, flawlessly executed the flight test to
demonstrate the viability of the new weapon in a dynamic environment.
Since then, the Air Force has completed verification and validation
of technical data and operational flight clearances required to field
the BLU-118 warhead. A small number of these weapons is now available
for operational use.
DTRA Spans the Full Spectrum of WMD Threat Reduction
DTRA is unique in that it spans the full spectrum of WMD threat
reduction. We do the on-site inspections to make sure that other
countries are abiding by their agreements. We execute the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program to help countries of the Former Soviet Union
dismantle weapons. We support the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program to ensure proper protection for our forces. We develop new
technology, such as advanced penetrators, a sort of ``non-cooperative
threat reduction program.'' DTRA is the center of expertise for our
understanding of weapons effects, especially nuclear effects. For
example, our understanding of the science of blast and shock effects on
rock and concrete provides the basis for developing more effective
bunker and tunnel defeat weapons--as well as for the operational
concept for using such weapons in combat. We build bunkers just like
the adversary and then develop the best way to destroy them. We are the
glue that binds together WMD expertise from all sources into focused
programs that provides accelerated responses to the needs of the
warfighters.
We also help to ensure that our Nation's nuclear arsenal--the
ultimate deterrent against aggression--is safe and effective. DTRA
performs nuclear safety and surety assessments, assists with emergency
response capabilities, and provides targeting support. In partnership
with the U.S. Strategic Command and the Services, we developed the DOD
Nuclear Mission Management Plan that serves as a guide for managing
DOD's nuclear responsibilities.
DTRA Is Making A Difference
I would like to give you several examples of how DTRA has improved
the combat capability of our Nation. My examples will include offensive
and defensive contributions, and programs that have dual applicability
to homeland security.
DTRA assisted the CINCs in identifying and
successfully striking hardened and deeply buried targets in the
Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
DTRA led the development of new hardened target defeat
weapons including the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile
penetrator, the Advanced Unitary Penetrator, the Hard Target
Smart Fuze, and the Thermobaric warhead.
DTRA provides direct support to the warfighter in
predicting the spread of WMD agents following the use of such
weapons against our forces--or the release of an agent
following an attack by U.S. forces on enemy facilities.
DTRA is fielding an unconventional nuclear warfare
protection system at four military installations. This project,
to be completed in 1 year, will take currently available
technology and integrate it into a working protective system
capable of detecting a terrorist nuclear device.
DTRA is working with the warfighters to develop the
means for ensuring the use of ports and airfields despite enemy
use of chemical and biological agents.
DTRA performs vulnerability assessments of key
leadership facilities and military bases. Recently, we
performed vulnerability assessments of Capitol Hill for various
terrorist threats. I am particularly proud of the fact that
force protection technology developed by DTRA saved lives at
the Pentagon on September 11.
DTRA Is Contributing to Homeland Security
Although DTRA remains focused on the needs of the warfighter, much
of our expertise is applicable to homeland security. We are applying
training and planning related to nuclear weapon accident response to
broader WMD terrorism scenarios. In particular, we are developing
``play books'' that will aid civilian leadership in preparing for and
responding to the issues and events following the use of WMD in urban
areas. We are supporting the Office of Homeland Security to develop a
near-term biological defense system. Consistent with our approach of
harnessing national WMD expertise to address challenges, we are
developing a program for near-term improvements in detection of
biological agents and consequence management.
Other DTRA activities that can contribute to homeland security
include support to operational responses following detection of WMD
weapons, prediction of WMD agent dispersal, consequence management,
vulnerability assessments, integrated WMD training and exercises, and
contingency planning.
Where We Are Headed
DTRA's focus remains on combat support--providing technology,
operational concepts, and other support for the warfighters' response
to WMD. We continue to support the U.S. nuclear deterrent. We will
develop new technologies and means for dealing with unconventional
nuclear threats; develop enhanced lethality, long-range precision
strike weapons; expand support to contingency planning and current
military operations; and develop the means for ensuring the use of
ports and airfields in WMD environments.
Thank you Madam Chair, for the opportunity to be here today. I am
proud to lead a great team on an important mission for the nation. I
would be happy to answer your questions and to provide additional
material at your request.
Senator Carnahan [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Younger.
Mr. Waldron.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. WALDRON, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FOR NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Waldron. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Senator Roberts.
For the record, I am Robert Waldron. I am the Assistant Deputy
Administrator for Nonproliferation Research and Engineering at
the National Nuclear Security Administration, and I will
briefly summarize my statement.
The environment is considerably different from when I
testified before you last year in terms of both the national
security posture and our budget request. Last year we discussed
the potential of a terrorist act, while now it is a shocking
reality. Thanks to the administration and to Congress, our
budget request this year is up $113 million over last year's
request in terms of actual R&D funding, an increase of 66
percent.
The NNSA's nonproliferation and verification research and
development program develops technologies for application by
the operational users whose mission it is to strengthen the
United States' response to current and projected threats to
national security posed by the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and the diversion of special
nuclear materials. The technologies are developed for a wide
range of government users, including the DOD and the
intelligence community.
Our laboratories possess the vast majority of our Nation's
expertise in nuclear weapons design and production. Because of
this expertise, the labs have historically supplied the
technical capability for the U.S. Government to detect and
characterize nuclear weapons and materials. The goal of our R&D
program is to conduct the applied research needed to develop
the technologies necessary to detect WMD while maintaining the
required technology base. A robust technology base is key to
our ability to have the flexibility to respond to other
agencies' changing operational requirements and changes in
national policy.
The importance of stemming proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the NNSA's role in related technology
development is unquestioned. The nonproliferation and
verification R&D program fills a gap between basic research and
users' application-specific acquisitions, as well as providing
the nuclear technical expertise not resident in many agencies
charged with homeland security.
Our tie to the operational community is strongest in the
nuclear explosion monitoring area where we have an almost 40-
year history of close cooperation. We provide remarkably
capable and robust hardware for space systems and are enabling
the Air Force Technical Application Center's modernization of
their seismic monitoring capability.
In addition to connections to individual operational
organizations, we also work very closely with our friends at
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Our collaborations with
DTRA include a variety of cooperative mechanisms from
developing joint technical road maps for chem/bio to
characterizing gamma ray detectors and discerning specific
radiation signatures to support DTRA's base and port defense
demonstration project as part of our homeland security
initiatives.
While we have very close ties to individual developers and
operational users within the DOD and the intelligence
community, we have reinvigorated a previous relationship with
the U.S. Customs Service because of homeland security. The goal
is to support their development of operational concepts to
interdict nuclear materials at international borders with new
and existing radiation detection and transportation security
technologies.
An area of significant multi-agency homeland security
collaboration is in genetic sequencing of microbes with
possible terrorism implications. The effort is being
coordinated through OSTP's Interagency Microbe Project Working
Group. It involves the National Science Foundation, the
National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control,
Department of Energy, DARPA, USAMRIID, Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Department of Agriculture. This is a real
success story as multiple agencies are pooling their resources
to attack a specific part of the bioterrorism threat in a
coordinated effort.
Another success story of our chem/bio program has been the
transition of decontamination technology we developed to the
private sector. Commercial vendors now produce the
decontamination foam that was used to clean up some of the
House offices.
We are also working on transitioning technology developed
for nonproliferation applications to support the warfighter. We
are finalizing a classified Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with multiple DOD organizations for a joint user and
multispectral demonstration program using our multispectral
thermal imager demonstration small satellite.
The NNSA nonproliferation and verification R&D program
remains essential to the agencies responsible for non- and
counterproliferation and now homeland security being ready to
fulfill their operational missions. The program is well
coordinated with individual users and other developers.
There is no simple solution to the problem and we alone
cannot solve it. With the continued support of Congress and
through collaboration with DOD and others and the necessary
advances in technology and analysis techniques, we will make
the necessary improvements in our ability to detect and
understand these threats and to protect the American people.
I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Waldron follows:]
Prepared Statement by Robert E. Waldron
Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify again this year on the Department of Energy
(DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA)
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program. The
environment is considerably different this year in terms of both our
national security posture and our budget request. Where last year we
discussed the potential of a terrorist act, it is now a shocking
reality. Thanks to administration and congressional action our budget
request this year is up $113 million over last year's request in terms
of actual R&D funding--an increase of 66 percent.
The NNSAs Nonproliferation and Verification Research and
Development (R&D) Program develops technologies for application by the
operational users whose mission it is to strengthen the United States
response to current and projected threats to national security posed by
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
diversion of special nuclear material. The technologies are developed
for a wide range of government users including the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community.
Our laboratories possess the vast majority of our Nation's
expertise in nuclear weapons design and production. Because of this
expertise, the labs have historically supplied the technical capability
for the U.S. government to detect and characterize nuclear
proliferation activities in their early stages. The goal of our R&D
program is to continue to provide the technical solutions to enhance
U.S. national security. In order to meet this goal, the emphasis is on
maintaining the technology base and conducting the applied research
needed to develop the technologies necessary to detect and deter
nuclear proliferation, to meet U.S. nuclear explosion monitoring goals,
and to develop and demonstrate chemical and biological detection and
related technologies to enable us to better prepare for and respond to
the threat of domestic chemical and biological attacks. To address the
broad array of mission challenges our program objectives are to:
Develop and demonstrate technologies needed to
remotely detect the early stages of a proliferant nation's
nuclear weapons program.
Develop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies to
detect, locate, identify, and characterize nuclear explosions
underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, and in space.
Develop and demonstrate technologies to improve our
national capability to detect nuclear materials, to counter
nuclear smuggling, and to identify the origins of nuclear
materials.
Develop and demonstrate technologies and systems that
dramatically improve our ability to detect the proliferation or
use of chemical and biological agents, and to minimize the
consequences of potential terrorist use of chemical or
biological agents.
collaboration
The importance of stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and the NNSA's role in related technology development is
unquestioned. The Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program fills a
gap between basic research and users' application-specific acquisitions
as well as providing the technical expertise not resident in many
agencies charged with homeland security. Longer term technology needs
are not always well understood nor well documented, but are based upon
DOD or Intelligence Community realization that there are gaps in
capability and that current technology will eventually become obsolete
and/or understood by adversaries, thus new capabilities must be
constantly pursued.
As I noted earlier, maintaining the nonproliferation technology
base is a goal of our program. It is key to our ability to respond to
other agencies' changing operational requirements and changes in
national policy. With our emphasis on the technology base and not
having day-to-day operational mission responsibilities, we are able to
take a longer-term focus and stay the development course while maturing
the technology and to pursue revolutionary, higher risk solutions that
frequently push the state of the art. Having NNSA fund this type of R&D
allows us to marshal multi-disciplinary, inter-laboratory teams from
the national laboratories to address these very challenging technical,
science, and engineering problems.
Leveraging our past nuclear testing program, NNSA has the
responsibility to apply the scientific understanding gained during
testing to develop the sensor capability for the U.S. national nuclear
explosion monitoring system to meet U.S. goals to detect very low yield
nuclear explosions underground, in the atmosphere, in the oceans, and
in space with space-based and ground-based sensor systems. Our
commitment to this responsibility was recognized during a recent U.S.
Nuclear Detonation Detection System National Review where senior
members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Strategic Command,
Space Command, State Department, multiple Air Force Organizations, and
NNSA recommended that all space-based nuclear explosion detection
sensor work be funded by a single organization. This budget request
reflects that recommendation with a $15 million transfer from the Air
Force to our program to produce the electromagnetic pulse sensor for
the next generation of Global Positioning Satellites.
Our tie to the operational community is strongest in the nuclear
explosion monitoring area where we have an almost 40 year history of
working together. We provide remarkably capable and robust hardware for
space systems, as well as expert advice in analyzing the data they
produce, and are enabling the Air Force Technical Applications Center's
modernization of their seismic monitoring capability. Our relationship
with the operators of the space and ground nuclear explosion monitoring
systems is close and productive, and they acknowledge us as critical to
the success of their efforts.
In addition to our connections to individual operational
organizations, we also work closely with other developers like the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Our collaboration with DTRA
includes a variety of cooperative mechanisms from developing joint
technical roadmaps for chem/bio to characterizing gamma ray detectors
and specific radiation signatures to support the DTRA base and port
defense demonstration project as part of our homeland security
initiatives.
While we have very close ties to individual developers and
operational users within the DOD and the Intelligence Community,
because of homeland security issues we have reinvigorated a previous
relationship with the U.S. Customs Service. The goal is to support
their development of operational concepts to interdict nuclear
materials at international borders with new and existing radiation
detection and transportation security technologies. Part of our support
includes the establishment of a nuclear testbed to evaluate detection
concepts and technologies against actual nuclear materials in maritime
and airborne shipping containers. Technologies developed and
demonstrated to detect nuclear weapons can also detect less
catastrophic, but equally disruptive, radiologic dispersal devices.
An area of significant multi-agency homeland security collaboration
is in genetic sequencing of microbes with possible terrorist
implications. The effort is being coordinated through OSTP's
Interagency Microbe Project Working Group. All agencies (NSF, NIH, CDC,
DOE, DARPA, USAMRIID, CIA, and Agriculture) doing genetic sequencing
are participating and agreeing on what should be sequenced, to what
level and quality, and who will do the sequencing. This is a real
success story as multiple agencies are pooling their resources to
attack a part of the bioterrorism threat.
Another success story of our chem/bio program has been the
transition of some decontamination technology we developed to the
private sector. Commercial vendors now produce the decontamination foam
that was used to clean up some of the House offices.
We are also working on transitioning technology developed for
nonproliferation applications to support the warfighter. We are
finalizing a classified MOU with multiple DOD organizations for a
Multispectral Thermal Imager Joint User Multispectral Demonstration
program using our MTI technology demonstration small satellite.
technology challenges
I have noted a few of our successful transitions and
collaborations, now let me briefly highlight some of the technical
challenges we face.
Nuclear Explosion Monitoring: The primary challenges we face are in
our ability to detect smaller nuclear detonations and discriminate them
from natural and industrial activity. This challenge is extreme as the
potential for false alarms goes up significantly as we lower our
detection threshold. Most of the solutions are very computationally
intensive whether ground-based processing or satellite on-board
processing.
Homeland Defense: In the chem/bio area, the chief challenge facing
researchers is biological detection, specifically distinguishing a
threat pathogen from its harmless, very close relatives. This is a key
reason why the interagency microbe sequencing collaboration is so
important. As these distinctions are developed, we must develop
detection methods to exploit these differences and rapidly identify
threat pathogens.
For the nuclear realm, the ability to detect plutonium and highly
enriched uranium at stand-off distances and with sufficient speed so
that commerce is not impeded is driving us to explore not only new
radiation detection materials, but also new detection system concepts.
In addition to new detectors and materials, we are confronted with the
need to develop new concepts for networking a collection of sensors
into an integrated architecture for layered defense networks and
perimeter monitoring systems.
Proliferation Detection: Now let me move to our technology
supporting national efforts to detect and understand WMD proliferation
at its source. The challenge is to catch clandestine WMD programs at
the earliest stage of development. Potential adversaries, terrorist or
nation states, are well aware of our traditional monitoring methods and
have taken steps to disguise suspect activities. Our challenge is to
obtain sufficient information to enable us to distinguish steps in a
weapons production program from closely related legitimate industrial
activities. New sensors that detect new kinds of signatures are
necessary, and advanced processing and exploitation methods must be
developed to make sense of this data.
Our ability to successfully address these challenges is rooted in
the technology base that this program maintains at the DOE national
laboratories. Its foundation comes from the historical expertise of the
DOE's nuclear weapons program and intimate involvement with both DOD
organizations and the Intelligence Community. This technology base
ensures that we can respond rapidly to solve urgent needs and to
changing national priorities.
conclusion
The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program remains
essential to the agencies responsible for non/counterproliferation, and
now homeland security, being able to fulfill their operational
missions. The program is well coordinated with individual users and
other developers.
Our technology will get even better--because it must. Rogue
countries, terrorists and the suppliers of the nuclear, biological, and
chemical tools of their trade are using increasingly sophisticated
means to evade detection. Our methods and technology must outpace this
growing threat.
There is no simple solution to this problem, and we alone cannot
solve it. With the support of Congress and through continued
collaboration with DOD and others and the necessary advances in
technology and analysis techniques, we can make a quantum leap in our
ability to detect and understand these threats to the American people.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Waldron and all of you,
for being here today. This is an unusually large turnout for a
committee hearing, and that shows the importance of the topic
on which we are working today.
I will make an opening statement, after which Senator
Roberts will ask a few questions. He has to leave. So we are
glad to have him do that before he leaves, and then we will
return to the questioning.
Senator Carnahan. Long before September 11, Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld announced his intention to transform the
military into a lighter, faster, and more lethal fighting
force. This process has only become more essential as the
United States combats terrorists around the globe. We are
battling an obscure enemy, waging a shadowy war, both at home
and abroad, and it is important that our national defense
address these so-called asymmetric threats.
To meet these new challenges, it is imperative that our
Armed Forces be well equipped with the latest technology
available. This will take sizeable investment in science and
engineering research and, with it, a strong commitment to
supporting our Nation's laboratories, universities and research
businesses. It is essential that the United States prepare its
military capabilities with an eye to the future. We are only in
the initial stages of development in such important fields as
cyber warfare, chemical, biological, and nuclear defense,
nanotechnology, unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy
lasers.
Since assuming office, Secretary Rumsfeld has been an
advocate for research and development. In fact, he has said
that science and technology accounts should total at least 3
percent of the Nation's defense budget. But this year, the
proposed 2003 defense budget came up short on this goal,
accounting for only 2.6 percent of the budget, and the
Pentagon's 5-year projections for the science and technology
budget are cut even more dramatically. By 2007, the science and
technology budget is expected to account for only 2.28 percent
of the budget.
I recently worked with Senators Conrad and Nelson to
highlight this serious problem in the 2003 budget resolution.
This legislation now calls for the science and technology
account to reach Secretary Rumsfeld's goal of 3 percent in the
next 5 years. This will give the research community the tools
needed to develop the high-tech defense we need against
America's enemies.
Years ago I recall newspaper accounts describing the
ominous glow of Russia's Sputnik as it orbited the earth. This
specter of the Soviet superior technology blind-sided our
political and military leaders and sparked a tremendous
revolution in America's space and military science efforts. We
were not going to let our enemies challenge us either from the
heavens or from any corner of the earth.
Today we face a new enemy. Advances in technology are just
as important now as they were then. Last October, we in the
Senate observed firsthand America's vulnerabilities to emerging
threats. When letters filled with anthrax were mailed to
Members of Congress, 50 of my Senate colleagues and I, as well
as our staffs, were displaced from the Hart Building for over 3
months. Experts from several governmental agencies responded to
the attacks, but the technologies they used were both arcane
and time consuming. To detect the presence of anthrax, adhesive
strips were laid out to conduct spore counts. To decontaminate
the building, decades-old equipment was used to spread chlorine
dioxide gas throughout the building. The cleanup of the
building took months and even more months were needed to be
certain that it was safe for reentry. We must, in the future,
be better prepared.
Because it still takes years for high-tech tools and
weapons to evolve from concept to use, we need a system in
which new technologies can rapidly progress through the
acquisition system. One pace-setter in this effort is Clean
Earth Technologies in St. Louis, Missouri. This small business
is developing cutting edge decontamination equipment that will
eradicate chemical and biological agents quickly and
effectively. This morning I look forward to learning of other
emerging technologies, many of which you have already shown us
today, and how they can be used to detect, deter, and, if
necessary, destroy weapons of mass destruction.
Thank you very much.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
for an excellent statement.
Many are called, few are chosen. Thank you, gentlemen, for
the job you are doing. You are making a difference. Prior to
September 11, this subcommittee had a series of hearings
inviting the previous administration's people in charge. Some
of you I have already visited with in the past, and I want to
thank you for the progress that we are making. Obviously, we
would like to do more, but I do want to thank you for your
efforts.
I have a table of organization question for Dr. Sega, Dr.
Klein, and Dr. Younger. You are the DOD posse that has come
down to testify here today, and for some time I have been
concerned that we do not have somebody who would be in charge
of SO/LIC, an Assistant Secretary, if you will. I think the
official question prepared by staff says as follows. Each of
you play an important role in the overall Department of Defense
combating terrorism program. What official in the Department is
responsible for providing you with overall guidance,
priorities, goals, and budgets with regard to your
responsibilities in the area of combating terrorism?
I asked a previous panel about 2 years ago to sit in the
order of their rank, and nobody knew where to sit. I am still
concerned about that. I understand that the Secretary of the
Army may have this responsibility, but I know John White is
very busy running the Army. I know that Doug Feith is the Under
Secretary of Policy. His plate is full. Who do you report to?
How do you feel about that? This is a little touchy question I
presume, but do you feel that you have a sense of confidence in
terms of direction in regards to policy? I will start here with
Dr. Sega. I will pick on you first.
Dr. Sega. Senator Roberts, the short answer to your
question is: it is evolving. The task force that is currently
under policy to develop doctrine in the Department of Defense
is a work in progress, and it is anticipated that will
interface with our national efforts on the doctrine side.
On the technology side, the establishment of a DOD
Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force, which included SO/
LIC, the agencies, DARPA and DTRA, special focus areas in the
chem/bio area, in the weapons area and science and technology
area, the service executives were brought together in that
forum to make sure that we had no unintended redundancies of
effort in the areas of developing the technologies for
combating terrorism. We included people from the Joint Staff to
make sure that we had that input. I personally have been down
to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and met with the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the area of
integrating technology into the effort.
The combating terrorism piece is part and parcel of what we
do. So, some of the areas may not be absolutely identified as
combating terrorism, such as establishing robust networks upon
which we can put surveillance detectors. They may be invisible.
They may be near-IR. They may be chemical, biological, or
radiological kinds of things. So, I think it is important that
we have an integrated approach to developing the capacity to
combat terrorism within the context of the greater efforts so
that there are the proper synergies, so we do not have the
duplication on this combating terrorism technology.
Senator Roberts. Pardon me for interrupting.
Dr. Sega. Sure.
Senator Roberts. I have no doubt that you are doing an
excellent job. It is just I want to know who you report to.
Dr. Sega. It is easy for me directly. It is to Under
Secretary Aldridge in terms of acquisition, technology, and
logistics.
Senator Roberts. Dr. Klein, who do you report to?
Dr. Klein. I also report to Under Secretary Aldridge.
But let me answer your question a little bit. I think one
of the areas that might have led to some frustration for you
last year is that my position had not been filled for about
3\1/2\ years.
Senator Roberts. That is true.
Dr. Klein. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. So, I have
now been on my job since November 15, and it has been a
challenge.
But I think my guidance and my direction is quite clear. My
office is responsible to address the weapons of mass
destruction. DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, reports
through me. So our guidance, our mission, our functions, our
roles are quite clear.
On nuclear matters, I also have the charter of going
directly to the Secretary of Defense if there are safety and
security issues on the nuclear issues according to the charter.
So, I think my guidance, who I report to, what the job requires
is quite clear.
I think it is less clear as we are trying to get better
coordination and a better handle on how the Department of
Defense interfaces with the Office of Homeland Security. I
think to support the warfighter, to support our missions on the
Department of Defense, I know exactly what my role,
responsibilities, and duties are and who I report to. We always
need to do better coordination than we probably do, but my
mission is quite clear and I know what the charge is.
On homeland security, we are trying to understand how do we
interface in that area. Mr. Cambone in policy is coordinating a
group to get the Department of Defense--and he reports to Mr.
Feith--to see what role the Department of Defense should play
and could play in homeland security.
My personal opinion is that we have a lot of technologies
in the Department of Defense developed to support the
warfighter, the men and women in uniform, that can be
transferred over to the civilian side, but we have to
understand what role and how we do that. So, there is a working
committee. We are in five groups on how we organize and how we
perform in the homeland security. SO/LIC is a part of that.
Policy is a part of that. Dr. Sega's group is part of that.
DTRA is a part of that. So, we are all looking at that role.
But I think in terms of weapons of mass destruction for the
warfighter, men and women in uniform, our task is clear.
Senator Roberts. Dr. Younger, do you want to add anything?
Dr. Younger. I report to Dr. Klein; I work with Dr. Sega.
We chair the Counterterrorism Technology Task Force, and speak
frequently with SO/LIC. As a matter of fact, I am talking with
them today, and we coordinate with Secretary White's office.
Senator Roberts. Dr. Sega, you mentioned in your earlier
comments something about NATO and working with NATO. Senator
Lugar, the distinguished Senator from Indiana and one of the
godfathers of the CTR program and a foreign relations expert,
went over and made a speech--I am not sure where he made it, he
made it overseas--to NATO--referred to the November expansion
meeting and indicated that it was his hope that NATO would step
up to the challenge of terrorism. If they did not step up, then
all the other issues that we had talked about before that we
thought were rather nettlesome, or at least a challenge,
expansion and the investment on the part of the NATO countries,
a collective defense, what does Article 5 mean, and do we go
outside the region, et cetera, et cetera, pale in comparison to
the need for better cooperation and understanding of the
challenge of international terrorism.
With the strategic concept of NATO that was adopted--what--
2 years ago, now encompassing everything from crime, drugs,
environment, an incredible array of things that NATO is
allegedly in charge of, how do you see this in terms of NATO?
What was the response? You mentioned NATO and that really
perked up my interest. Are they on board? Is it a cooperative
kind of attitude? Where are we with this?
Dr. Sega. The results of that 3-day workshop on combating
terrorism--the final report should be out soon--aligned fairly
closely to the categories of deterrence, indications and
warnings, survivability, denial and consequence management and
recovery that we had set up earlier in the Department of
Defense. So, there was enthusiasm for sharing technical
information on systems such as detector systems and
surveillance systems and working together on the technical
level. Again, the scope of that meeting was restricted to
research and technology, and it was a positive meeting. We need
to take the next steps in technology, but that was the focus of
the workshop.
Senator Roberts. I am going to ask Dr. Marburger a question
in regards to a GAO report that will be forthcoming in about a
month. The GAO report dealt with primarily a number of programs
that we are involved with in combating the illicit trafficking
of the special nuclear materials and any kind of radiological
materials. The GAO will report--it is not final yet, but
basically that we have six Federal agencies, the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State, Customs
Service, FBI, and Coast Guard, that all spent approximately $90
million over 8 years from 1993 to 2001 to assist 30 different
countries in this area. Assistance included radiation detection
equipment, mobile x-ray vans, inspection tools, patrol boats,
training, and then obviously after September 11 there is a very
renewed focus on detecting the transport of these materials
into and within the United States.
The preliminary findings of this report are not that we
have a better system in Russia than we do in this country. It's
that we have a situation where we have asked, and some of the
responses may be classified in regards to what kind of
smuggling has gone on, where it has gone on in other countries,
but we are going to get into a real dichotomy of public
awareness--and that is the best way I can describe it--if we
have assisted to the tune of 90 million bucks over 8 years with
six different Federal agencies and a hodge-podge--and I do not
mean to be using that too much as a pejorative--and then we
find we have these kind of systems in different countries, but
in our own country, we are not even close. We have not started.
Now, I understand that you, Dr. Marburger, and others
within the Office of Science and Technology Policy, OMB, CIA,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), DOD--
some of these acronyms I do not even know--et cetera, et
cetera--we have a whole bunch of people who are participants--
have now set up a working group to try to get at this problem.
Can you just touch on this? I am going to try to talk the
chairman into having a hearing on this as soon as the GAO
report comes out. But can you indicate to us how things stand?
I understand you are on top of this. You are aware of this
problem. It is a problem of real concern, but you set up a
working group and you are well on your way toward addressing
this concern.
Dr. Marburger. That is true. This is an area in which a lot
of agencies have capabilities to bring to bear and part of
their mission is to address it. Coordination is required. I
would, in answer to your question, draw attention to the bottom
of page 2 of my written testimony. I did not mention this in my
oral testimony. But let me just read that section on this part
of the record.
Senator Roberts. All right.
Dr. Marburger. ``Working closely with Office of Homeland
Security, an interagency working group called the Counter-
Nuclear Smuggling Working Group, has been created to develop a
fully coordinated program for addressing the threat of nuclear
smuggling across borders, both overseas and in the United
States.
This working group will develop a strategic plan with a
unified set of program goals and priorities, including within
its scope the programs that implement and deploy current
capabilities, as well as programs that research and develop new
capabilities. The group is co-chaired by OSTP and the National
Security Council and has been constituted under the Office of
Homeland Security's R&D Policy Coordinating Committee.''
This is the kind of interagency activity that OSTP does
create to provide for coordination, and I am confident that it
will bring increased coordination of these programs and
hopefully eliminate any duplication that may be discovered in
this process. So, we are clearly organized to address at least
some of the issues that were raised in the GAO report.
Senator Roberts. The report is not out yet. I understand
that, and we are trying to find out what is going to be
classified and what is not going to be classified. We will
probably have to have an open and closed hearing, if in fact we
get to that. But it is going to be of some note that our
Customs Service and other agencies that would be involved have
not installed any portal monitors at U.S. border crossings very
similar to what we do in the second line of defense programs in
installing them in Russia. That just does not add up. Now, I am
not blaming you for this. I am just saying we had six Federal
agencies, 90 million bucks, 30 countries. It is a hodge-podge,
and we are not doing in this country what we are doing in other
countries. That is not right.
I know you are on top of it. I know you have set up a
working group. I really appreciate it. I think this
subcommittee will obviously look into it further.
Madam Chairman, that is all my questions. Oh, I am sorry.
Mr. Waldron, you mentioned agroterrorism. No, you did not. You
mentioned the Department of Agriculture. I am mentioning
agroterrorism.
We had a hearing here 2 or 3 years ago where agroterrorism
was probably very high risk for the State of Missouri, for the
State of Kansas, and others, but very low probability. After
September 11 and additional intelligence reports, we think that
that probability is now pretty high. If you look at the 15
pathogens that the former Soviet Union was producing, 15 or 20
years ago for their plans on attacking the North American food
supply, and the security of those pathogens today, which is
very questionable, think how easy it would be for a terrorist
to use this kind of thing to attack the American food supply.
We are very concerned about that. USDA is reprogramming funds.
We have an agroterrorism section as part of the bioterrorism
bill.
Would you want to comment on that in any way? I am not
sure. You mentioned the USDA, so I am sort of picking on you
here. But I am very concerned about this. It would obviously
affect the DOD in terms of crisis management. We need a lot
more first responder training at our land grant schools. Would
you care to comment on that possible threat?
Mr. Waldron. My mention of the Department of Agriculture
was in the genetic sequencing of pathogens and how we have all
pulled together to work on prioritizing what pathogens will be
sequenced, a standard that everything will be sequenced to,
deciding whether or not we want to fully sequence certain
pathogens or if it is a near neighbor, they can just do a
partial sequence. It is everything from agricultural foot and
mouth--hoof and mouth disease----
Senator Roberts. We have foot in mouth up here. [Laughter.]
Mr. Waldron. Well, I had it here too.
But also wheat rust and things like that. So, it is a group
that is working together under OSTP's leadership to try and
sort out and really rationalize what it is we are doing in
terms of genetic sequencing. That is the only thing that I can
really comment on on agroterrorism. I know nothing else about
it other than----
Senator Roberts. Other than the fact you think it is a top
priority and we ought to pay very full attention to it.
Mr. Waldron. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. Anybody else have any comment on this? I
am a little far afield here.
Dr. Marburger. Well, I will just make a statement from
OSTP's perspective on agroterrorism. It is part of the general
topic of bioterrorism as we see it. The salience of this issue
is very high in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. I met with
and addressed an advisory group to the Department of
Agriculture just a few weeks ago, and this was the main topic
of their agenda. I believe that there is a good deal of
interagency cooperation on this issue. I have spoken directly
with the Secretary of Agriculture on the issue and I am aware
of what is being done. I think you would be pleased at the
amount of activity.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Dr. Marburger.
Senator Carnahan, I am concerned about this. We come from
farm country, and if you look at what could happen not only to
this year's crop but next year's crop and our Nation's food
supply, it would be economic chaos in our country. Think of
what would happen if we had the National Guard handing out food
supplies at supermarkets in the inner cities. It is that
serious. So, on that basis, I have a very strong interest in
agroterrorism and am very concerned about it.
I am now finally through with my questions, Madam Chairman,
and I thank you for your patience. I thank the panel. You are
making a difference and I appreciate it very much.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Senator Roberts, for adding
not only to the levity of the hearing, but also to the
usefulness of this occasion as well.
As has been pointed out earlier today, the budget
resolution calls for science and technology to account for 3
percent of the defense budget by 2007. Dr. Sega, this reflects
the stated goals of our Secretary of Defense, as well as the
recommendation of the 1998 Defense Science Board Task Force.
Could you please tell us how this 3 percent figure was
determined and how achieving this goal would help us to have
the lighter, faster, more lethal force that Secretary Rumsfeld
speaks of?
Dr. Sega. My understanding is the 3 percent number was
related to the Defense Science Board study of technology
industries, and their investment in science and technology was
roughly 3.4 percent of normal total revenues. So, they
benchmarked their activity in science and technology--and
sometimes it is a slightly different category of research and
development and exactly what is in research and development
against a number such as total revenues. That is from the
Defense Science Board. I believe from that report, the judgment
was made that about 3 percent is about right for the Department
of Defense in its efforts to make sure that we have
technological superiority for the future.
The current budget does represent about $1.1 billion more
from the requested figure in fiscal year 2002, the requested in
fiscal year 2003. I believe it is still the goal, as recently
stated by Under Secretary Aldridge last month, that we are
pursuing a goal of 3 percent of the DOD budget. We balance that
against needs in the Department, and we still hold that as a
target.
I think the investment needs to be done smartly. We are
aligning that with the goals and capabilities as outlined in
the QDR. We are paying special emphasis in the areas of science
and technology on combating terrorism, on aligning with the
transformational direction of the Department, and on joint
kinds of activities. So, where those three are intersecting, we
think that the value is the highest per dollar spent in science
and technology endeavors. That is where we are heading.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Dr. Klein, in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the
subsequent anthrax attacks, I offered an amendment to the 2002
defense authorization bill. This provision required that the
Defense Department develop plans to protect its members from
biological and chemical attack. September 11 certainly
demonstrated that today's battlefields are not just abroad and
we must be prepared to defend our personnel who are working at
the Pentagon, our military posts, and National Guard armories
throughout the country.
Could you please describe the distinction between
collective and individual protection and explain the importance
of such protection in the United States?
Dr. Klein. Senator Carnahan, I think as you pointed out 9/
11 brought the chemical and biological threat close to home.
From the Department of Defense's perspective, they have
maintained a fairly rigorous program for biological protection
and chemical protection for the warfighter for quite some time.
They have masks. They have procedures. They have chemical suits
and programs. We are always trying to move ahead into the
forefront of how to make it better, how to make it more
economical, and how to make the distribution better.
Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, who is behind me, is the Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the Chemical and
Biological Defense programs. We have a very active program both
on the science and technology side, as well as the acquisition
side. We have a program that approves specific equipment that
meets the needs for chemical and biological defense programs.
We are also active in the vaccine program, trying to develop
new techniques and new programs. Being from Missouri
originally, I am familiar with Fort Leonard Wood. I have talked
with Brigadier General Nilo at Fort Leonard Wood. So, we are
looking at all kinds of activities for which we can support the
warfighter in situations in which we may not expect.
We are also developing a lot of sensors. The sensor
technologies have application both for the military side, as
well as the civilian side. One of the things that we have asked
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to look at is what do you
do if a sensor goes off. How do you respond? What kind of play
books?
So, we have a very active program on chemical and
biological defense programs. We are moving on different fronts,
but I think as Secretary Rumsfeld indicated, we have to be
quicker, smarter, more reactive in today's threats.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
For either Dr. Sega or Dr. Klein, I note that the fiscal
year 2003 defense budget request has some significant research
and development increases that appear to be 1-year funding,
which means of course that the requested level of funding will
not be sustained in the out-years. The chemical and biological
defense program is one of those examples where a 1-year surge
of more than $380 million this year will drop next year, and
the funding level is planned to be more than a half a billion
dollars lower in fiscal year 2007. It appears that in order to
achieve results in research and development, it is important to
have a sustained funding level over time rather than these 1-
year injections of funding that will not be sustained in the
future.
Do you agree that predictable, sustained funding is needed
to achieve our objectives in science and technology
development? Could you explain what you expect to achieve with
this spiking of funds in fiscal year 2003 and why the research
and development funding is planned to be dropped by more than
half a billion dollars in fiscal year 2007?
Dr. Klein. Madam Chairman, it is obviously very clear that
I agree that we need sustained funding particularly when you
look at research and development activities. Spiked funding in
R&D is difficult to handle in particular programs that take a
long time to develop results.
What we are doing with the spiked funding for the current
fiscal year that is being provided in the area of the chemical
and biological defense program, we have two major programs that
are underway. Part of the program is handled by the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency. Part of it is being handled by the
Army and part of it by the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We have a
plan that addresses what we will deliver, what we will
accomplish if it is 1-year funding. But we would prefer to have
a sustained program so that we can develop technologies and
procedures that would carry us forward into the out-years.
For example, we are developing nine programs at some of our
defense facilities--three Army, three Navy, three Air Force--
where we will develop a sensor program. So, this is a definite
program of which we wanted to do a pilot study on how do we
detect and how do we respond to an event. So, we do have
certain things that we can accomplish, defined goals, but I
would support your comment that to have a long-term program, we
need sustained funding. Spiked funding is difficult for us to
hire the people to carry it out, and it is difficult to plan
long-term. So, I support a long-term approach.
Senator Carnahan. So, do you think this funding is going to
be able to be spent efficiently in such large amounts over such
a short period of time?
Dr. Klein. We have made sure that the answer to that
question is yes. We looked at what deliverables will we
accomplish for this 1-year funding, and we have definite
accomplishments that we intend to do. We are very aware of
that. We do not want to appear before a future committee and be
asked why we wasted the money. So, we have a plan for which we
will have deliverables and it will be spent wisely. I do
believe that if we had sustained funding in this area that we
would do a better job.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Dr. Marburger, every day since September 11 my staff and I
have been approached by small companies and inventors with
ideas on how to combat terrorism and to protect our Nation.
They have often been frustrated that we have not had a hearing
on this, that they get lost in the Government system, and they
just do not feel like their concerns are met.
What would you recommend we tell these interested parties
who often have very novel and new ideas on defense? Is the
bureaucracy, do you feel, adapting to handling these ideas?
Dr. Marburger. Senator Carnahan, I believe that the correct
word is ``adapting.'' I think we do have good mechanisms for a
fairly large subset of the issues that these companies are
bringing forward. Dr. Sega has referred to and described the
activities of the Technical Support Working Group which has a
screening process that pulls together panels of experts from
relevant agencies to look at these ideas. They have processed
literally thousands of these requests, and as we receive them
either directly to my office or through Homeland Security, we
do a preliminary check and pass on many of them to the
Technical Support Working Group, where they receive the same
treatment. So, there are other mechanisms that we are looking
at that would address some of the proposals that are not
appropriate for that Technical Support Working Group.
I must admit that we still are struggling to cope with very
generic or general proposals that are coming from the private
sector addressing the vulnerabilities of large systems such as
mail, or communications, or energy transportation around the
country. These are systems that do not readily yield to
individual technologies deployed on a small scale, and I
believe that we will have to wait for further strategic
planning to have an interface with companies that are bringing
forward these kinds of ideas.
However, we are quite receptive to them. I have visited
companies myself. We often arrange for meetings between
representatives of companies that seem to have good ideas and
agencies. At the present time, I would say that the best
interface for these companies are the traditional ones--the
agencies that do large procurements in these areas and that
have missions that are clearly related to the functions that
the industry would like to perform. So, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Energy, National Institutes of
Health all have funding programs and review processes that are
appropriate for many of these.
My office tries to sort these out and direct them to the
right places. At the present time, I would say that if a small
company has a problem interfacing, they should send a letter
describing their product and what they would like to do either
to the Office of Homeland Security or to us, and we will see to
it that it gets plugged into the right place.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Dr. Sega, do you have any comments you would like to make
on this?
Dr. Sega. Yes, Senator Carnahan.
Regarding the small companies, I think it is very important
that we have mechanisms and systems to bring forward the ideas
that they have. They also tend to be faster in terms of being
able to react. We have in the President's budget submitted
again a quick reaction special projects fund which is the
current year funding that can respond to ideas in technology
areas that we did not anticipate 18 months prior. I believe
that just by the very nature of these small companies, they end
up being much more competitive for needs that are fast, as well
as the generation of new ideas.
In the Broad Area Announcement, there are things that we
had never thought of that came forward, and we look forward to
continuing that process, but we also need a vehicle that allows
some of the flexibility to respond to things that we never
thought about.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Dr. Younger, your agency has a close working relationship
with the combatant commands, and they rely upon you for special
support. What are the capabilities that the combatant commands
most want or need help with? Are there one or two areas where
the need seems to be the greatest?
Dr. Younger. I think the most popular service we provide
today is vulnerability assessments. We send teams out who use a
consistent process to assess the vulnerabilities of
installations around the world to terrorists or other threats.
We have an increased number of requests for such assessments.
By the way, it is a quality measure that we are invited back to
do the assessments. This is a service that we provide rather
than a report card. So, that is probably the service that is in
greatest demand.
We perform a similar service called the balanced
survivability assessment, which can address whether you
continue to do your mission given some postulated threat or
given a chemical or a biological event, and we help suggest
ways that they can do better.
We have also provided a number of short-term modeling
studies of what would happen if there were a major chemical
event at a local facility or what would happen if there were an
event at a nuclear power plant. What would the consequences be?
How could I continue to operate? So, we have done a number of
modeling studies for the combat commands as well.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Mr. Waldron, your office in the NNSA funds work that is
designed in many instances to be used by others. Why does NNSA
fund this work rather than the user community itself?
Mr. Waldron. Well, I think a lot of that goes to the
expertise that is resident at the national laboratories. Also,
it is part of our mission in nonproliferation, developing
technologies. A lot of those we are able to spin off to other
agencies.
But I think another thing that we really bring by being the
agency that is funding these activities is that we are able
then to marshal these interdisciplinary teams that are at the
national laboratories as well as to pull together a combination
of laboratories to work on a single project. A lot of times
that is much more difficult for these other agencies to do, and
sometimes if the agencies go directly to a laboratory, it might
not be the prime laboratory that that I would suggest that they
go to. But it is the other agencies' prerogative to go to
whichever national laboratory they would like to get the work
for others, as we characterize it, done.
Senator Carnahan. How do you coordinate with the other
various agencies? How do you ensure that NNSA research meets
the user requirements?
Mr. Waldron. We coordinate through an awful lot of the
mechanisms that have been mentioned here. We participate on the
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group. I
am one of the co-chairs. We participate with the Technical
Support Working Group. I am on the standing committee with Dr.
Klein for the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee.
So, we have all those mechanisms as well as some MOUs that I
mentioned in my testimony. Also, I did not mention that we have
an MOU with various law enforcement agencies, Customs, FBI, et
cetera, and we get their needs, not necessarily firm DOD
requirements, but we get their needs for improved capability
from these various agencies. So, that is what helps formulate
our program and identifies the various capability needs that
people want.
One thing that we are doing right now that we have just
kicked off with Transportation and the Transportation Security
Administration and the Customs and Coast Guard is working with
them to do some modeling about how you can look at protecting
our land from nuclear materials coming in, and looking at maybe
a layered kind of defense where some of it is done overseas, as
well as here, and integrating the smart highway system into
these kinds of things.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
Dr. Klein, Fort Leonard Wood plays an important role in
deciding how our soldiers in the field use some of the
technologies that you develop. How do you work with them to
ensure that the Army's Chemical School is aware of new
technologies being developed, and how do you know what our
soldiers really want in new technologies?
Dr. Klein. Well, Senator, in terms of finding out what the
soldiers need and want, we have a lot of communication through
the various commanders. So, we get feedback. We have typically
a lot of meetings in the chemical/biological area.
In regard to Fort Leonard Wood, I personally met with
Brigadier General Patricia Nilo to find out what areas she is
involved in and what programs we might expand, where the skill
sets are.
So, we have a lot of meetings. We have our professional
staff go out to these various sites through communications. So,
I would say the way we find out what people need is they tell
us typically what they would like, and then we try to have a
science and technology base that will provide them the best
protection available.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of
you being here today. As one final thought, I might say that I
will be sponsoring a science and technology conference at Fort
Leonard Wood in August. I would appreciate any support your
offices could provide to get the right people and technologies
to the conference. You are all certainly welcome to send a
representative as well. I was hoping that you would be able to
lend your support to that effort.
Again, I thank you for being here and helping us to have a
better understanding of this critical and complex topic. I know
that there will be Senators who will be submitting questions
for the record, and we would appreciate your timely response to
those.
With that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[The prepared statements of Dr. Andrews, Admiral Cohen, Mr.
Engle, and Dr. Tether follow:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. A. Michael Andrews II, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Research & Technology
introduction
Madam Chairman and members of the committee thank you for the
opportunity to describe the fiscal year 2003 Army Science and
Technology (S&T) program and the significant role S&T has in
accelerating the pace of the Army's Transformation.
We want to thank the members of this committee for your important
role in making today's Army the world's preeminent land combat force
and your support of our Transformation goals. Your continued advice and
support are vital to our success.
transformation
We are a Nation and an Army once again at war. This new century
brings a new kind of war--the worldwide war against terrorism. Events
since September 11 have reinforced the need to continue and accelerate
the Army's Transformation to a more strategically responsive Objective
Force. The versatility, agility, lethality and survivability by our
forces in Afghanistan provide a glimpse of the full spectrum
capabilities we are seeking to achieve in the Objective Force. A clear
example of this is the new lightweight ballistic protection worn by our
soldiers during combat operations in Operation Anaconda. The new
Interceptor armor jackets, credited with saving many lives and
minimizing combat injuries, were produced through the Army
Manufacturing Technology (MANTECH) Enhanced Manufacturing Processes for
Body Armor Materials project, through the U.S. Army Natick Soldier
Center, Natick, Massachusetts.
The Army's Transformation is well underway and the S&T program is
in the third year of executing its focus on achieving Objective Force
capabilities and re-shaping Research and Advanced Technology programs
to support the Army Vision. We are transforming today's Army to an
Objective Force that provides the Joint Force Commander with versatile
early entry capabilities, without extensive logistics ``tails,'' fixed
forward bases but still having the combat power to ``finish quickly and
decisively.''
the role of army s&t
The goal of the Army's Science and Technology (S&T) program is to
provide technical solutions for the Army's Objective Force. We are
committed to providing this technology to accelerate the
Transformation. The largest single S&T program that we have is the
Future Combat Systems (FCS). FCS represents a true paradigm shift in
how we fight--perhaps as significant as the introduction of the tank or
the helicopter. FCS is the single largest S&T initiative, representing
over 40 percent of all S&T funding. In the Army's quest for true
innovation, it has partnered with the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) to explore innovative FCS concepts and
technologies. FCS is not ``a platform.'' It is a system of battlefield
capabilities in which the whole exceeds the sum of its parts. Fielding
FCS will blur current distinctions between heavy forces and lighter
forces, while providing lethal overmatch. Some of the key challenges
include:
Survivability: Survivability is the primary technology
challenge because our combat systems must weigh less than 20
tons to be rapidly deployable. This forces us to find new ways
to protect our soldiers. To survive a first round engagement,
to ``See First'' and ``Understand First,'' individual FCS
platforms will require advances in Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) as well as integrated platform
protection systems. Technology options under development
include advanced communications and sensor systems that will
increase situational awareness and allow us to ``see first''
and farther than the enemy; active protection systems which are
designed to degrade, deflect or defeat incoming threats before
they can hit our vehicles; signature reduction techniques that
will make us harder to see and therefore harder to hit; and
lightweight armor that weighs 1/4 of the current armor, but
provides the same protection.
Lethality: Although our systems will be lighter
weight, they must maintain the lethality overmatch of current
systems. Desired capabilities include lethal and non-lethal,
line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight, gun, missile and directed
energy weapons that will provide for the destruction or
incapacitation of multiple targets. Options under development
include the precision and loiter attack missile systems that
will allow us to conduct precision engagements against the
enemy at much greater ranges than he can; lightweight, lower
caliber guns and ammunition capable of precision direct and
indirect fire at long ranges, potentially enabling us to
combine capabilities of the traditional tank and artillery
piece into one system; extremely lethal compact kinetic energy
missiles that ensure overmatch against advanced protection
systems, and directed energy systems like lasers and high-power
microwaves for lethal and non-lethal applications.
C\4\ISR: Network centric operation is the linchpin for
FCS and the Objective Force, providing the foundation for
comprehensive situational awareness and the capability for
instantaneous prioritization, distribution and engagement of
multiple threats. On-the-move, distributed command and control,
multi-function sensors and sensor fusion algorithms, and
development of a seamless Tactical Internet among leaders,
soldiers, platforms, and sensors are critical to achieving
these goals. Options under development include digital, secure
on-the-move communications for collaborative planning and
execution, positive command and control, and shared situational
awareness; enhanced radar and sensor systems for longer range
detection, accurate identification and precise localization;
information assurance to counter information attack and avoid
deception, denial and disruption; and aided target recognition
to reduce the target identification and weapon engagement
timeline--the sensor to shooter latency.
Power Generation and Management/Electric Propulsion:
The Objective Force will require efficient power generation and
management systems to remain lightweight, but still function at
a fraction of the logistics burden of the current force.
Fortunately, the Army can leverage commercial investments, and
is engaging with industry to achieve mutual development
benefit. Options under development include hybrid electric
drive for high acceleration, design flexibility and increased
fuel efficiency; fuel cells for efficiency, quiet operation,
reduced environmental impact and potential water generation;
advanced diesel engines scaled for FCS-class vehicles with
higher power density and greater fuel efficiency; low power
demand electronics to increase energy efficiency; and efficient
power management designs.
Human Engineering: Future leaders and soldiers will
face increased challenges because of the variety of missions
and complexity of tasks that they must accomplish. We must
minimize this complexity while ensuring our soldiers are better
trained and rehearsed for the full spectrum of missions they
may be required to perform. Options under development include
human/machine interface designs that decrease task complexity
and execution times, improve performance levels, and minimize
physical, cognitive, and sensory demands; associate systems to
complement human operators, offload routine tasks and enhance
high priority task performance; and embedded/deployable
training and mission rehearsal environments.
unmanned systems
Over the past 2 years, the Army has increased its investment in
unmanned systems technology to support Congress' desire for fielding
substantial unmanned capability among future operational ground combat
vehicles. The Army has implemented a bold robotics technology
investment strategy to provide these unique capabilities for the
Objective Force. The Army has also structured the FCS program with
phased unmanned system upgrades to support the introduction of
progressively more robust unmanned ground combat capabilities.
As part of its on-going partnership with DARPA, the Army is
sponsoring the development of FCS concepts that involve significant
unmanned capabilities. The collaborative Army/DARPA FCS program will
define and validate FCS design and operational concepts, including the
role of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unmanned air vehicles
(UAVs). Further, in February of 2002, the Army has established a new
Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft technology development Memorandum of
Agreement. The Army strategy is to begin fielding substantial unmanned
capabilities through the FCS program and synergistically integrate
manned and unmanned systems throughout the Objective Force.
Additional Army technology investments that have direct relevance
for FCS and the Objective Force are being made with DARPA. They include
the Organic Air Vehicle (OAV) and a UAV rotorcraft with a large
payload, long endurance and a vertical take off and landing capability
(the A-160 Hummingbird), advanced command, control and communication
technologies, and novel sensor systems. These technologies hold the
potential to permit the FCS, and its associated dismounted forces, to
operate in complex terrain by exploiting organic, non-line-of-sight
fire capabilities through remote sensing and communications relays.
other s&t priorities
Beyond the FCS, our S&T program must continue to support the full
range of capabilities required for the remainder of the Objective
Force. Some key areas of investment include:
Objective Force Warrior: Integrated soldier system of
systems to provide leap-ahead capabilities for the dismounted
soldier with dramatic weight and power reduction--with a goal
of providing full warfighting capabilities at 40 lbs. or less.
The system of systems will provide seamless connectivity with
other soldiers, weapon systems, FCS, and robotic air/ground
platforms to achieve overmatch for the full spectrum of future
operations.
Medical Technology: Individual health monitoring,
medical and dental preventive treatments, including: vaccines
and drugs against malaria, hemorrhagic fever, and scrub typhus,
to significantly reduce Disease and Non Battle Injury (DNBI)
casualties. In addition, these technologies seek to reduce the
medical footprint. Innovative products include far-forward
stabilization and resuscitation, hemorrhage control, minimize
neural injury, decrease the mortality rate, and speed soldiers'
return-to-duty.
Advanced Simulation: Modeling and simulation
technology, such as an innovative partnership with the
entertainment and game industries through the University of
Southern California (the Institute for Creative Technologies or
ICT) to accelerate the development of compelling immersive
environments for training, mission rehearsal, and concept
development. Another project, the Joint Virtual Battlespace
(JVB) program, is an enabling technology for evaluating how FCS
contributes to the total capability of the Objective Force, and
how the Objective Force plays in a joint force. JVB, combined
with virtual prototyping, also seeks to provide an effective
means to take time out of the Operational Test and Evaluation
process.
Rotorcraft Technology: As the DOD lead for Rotorcraft
Science and Technology, the Army is investing in the critical
technologies to increase performance and reduce logistics
demands for both manned and unmanned rotorcraft. Most
significant is the new thrust to develop an Unmanned Combat
Armed Rotorcraft capability.
Micro Electro-Mechanical System Inertial Measurement
Unit (MEMS IMU): The Army has recently solicited 50 percent-
cost share proposals to develop a low-cost, gun hardened and
high accuracy MEMS IMU for gun-launched guided munitions,
tactical missile and other military applications. The focus is
to produce a MEMS IMU that will be bought by the DOD in bulk,
thereby giving the economy of scale necessary to yield an
inexpensive unit price. The goal is a military tactical-grade
IMU that meets 90 percent of DOD munition and missile needs at
a low-performance unit price, available from two, or more,
commercial contractors.
High Energy Lasers: As we move to a more all-electric
force this ``electric'' laser approach will be a key enabler to
achieve unprecedented combat overmatch on the battlefield. The
Army S&T program continues to investigate high energy solid
state laser technology options for potential application on the
tactical battlefield. In this effort, we are seeking to
identify the most promising solutions to ensure speed of light
engagement and laser weapon lethality throughout the spectrum
of battlefield environments of weather, dust, and obscurants.
Basic Research: As the Army's mission challenges have
increased, it has become even more important to maintain world-
class quality in the basic research program. Investment in
knowledge and understanding of fundamental phenomena to enable
future technological development includes: support for academic
research through the Single Investigator Program (e.g.
microturbines, materials science, solid-state physics);
investment in paradigm shifting centers (University Affiliated
Research Centers (UARCs) such as ICT); support of industry-led
centers through the Collaborative Technology Alliances
(Communications & Networks, Advanced Decision Architectures,
Power and Energy). A specific new thrust was added in 2002 with
the selection of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) to serve as the Army-sponsored University-Affiliated
Research Center (UARC) for the Institute for Soldier
Nanotechnologies (ISN). The ISN will provide the Army with a
corps of expertise in the development and application of
nanotechnology for the soldier; including the creation of
uniforms and materials that could help heal soldiers, protect
against bullets, chemical agents or monitor a soldier's life
support processes. Soldiers are at the center of Army
Transformation. New technologies and developments by ISN in
nanotechnology will bring significant progress in the Army's
transformation of soldier equipment. The 2003 budget request
includes funding for the creation of the Army Institute of
Biotechnology Center, to identify, conduct research and
transition militarily relevant biotechnology.
s&t workforce
We cannot achieve our goals without the top caliber scientists and
engineers (S&Es) who develop these technologies for our soldiers.
Recruiting and training S&Es remains a challenge. We are working to
identify innovative approaches to recruiting, retaining and refreshing
the Army S&E workforce. I will be sharing these insights across the
department. I want to assure this committee that I am committed to
ensuring the quality of our S&E workforce. Our soldiers depend on them.
The Army is responding to previous authorities such as Section
1113. There has been significant interest from our laboratories in the
positions available under this legislation. We have provided criteria
to the Army labs in concert with the needs of the Army transformation
in those technical areas of highest interest. The Army labs have
responded with candidate positions. We expect that the hiring of these
personnel will begin in May.
technology transition
Successful transition of Army Science and Technology is central to
enabling the Army vision. The Army S&T community has been challenged to
develop a revolutionary warfighting capability within an accelerated
timeframe. To accelerate technology transition, the Army adopted new
and aggressive management practices and methodologies to manage risk.
The Army has adopted Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) as the method
to measure the maturity of the technologies being developed. TRLs were
identified in the recommendations put forward in the 1999 General
Accounting Office Report\1\ citing best practices for the management of
technology development. The GAO stated that critical technologies and/
or subsystems should be at a high level of maturity prior to making the
commitment for development and production of a weapons system. The Army
has adopted this approach and is using TRLs to track and communicate
technology maturity levels to the acquisition community. We can take
time out of the transition process by maturing technology in the S&T
phase to TRL 7--system prototype demonstration in an operational
environment. By doing this, we spend more in S&T, but save time and
money in Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD), then proceed
faster to production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development
Can Improve Weapon Systems Outcomes,'' GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 1999.
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Risk management is another tool designed to improve the transition
of advanced technologies to the warfighter by providing the gaining
acquisition Program Manager with a risk assessment and risk mitigation
plan for S&T programs. While Technology Readiness Levels assess the
estimated maturity of a technology, the risk management process focuses
on identifying, tracking and managing potential cost, schedule and
performance risks. In fiscal year 2001, the Army Science & Technology
(S&T) community implemented a pilot program to perform risk management
on selected S&T efforts. Lessons learned from this pilot program will
be used to tailor the risk management process that will be applied to
all Science and Technology Objectives efforts preparing to transition
to acquisition.
promoting transition from non-traditional defense contractors
The Army is continuing in its efforts to promote technology
transition from non-traditional defense contractors. Legislation in
fiscal year 2002 directed the Army to establish a venture capital fund
similar to that established within the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to identify, develop, and field new technologies as rapidly as
needed to support the transformation. The Army has engaged the RAND
Corporation to assist the effort in establishing such a fund in concert
with the guidance from Congress. We expect that the Army will be ready
in short order to announce its approach to the congressional directive.
technology to combat terrorism
Defense Emergency Relief Funds will support S&T developments to
combat terrorism in the area of Deterrence, Indications and Warning
(DIW), and retaliation and recovery. Included are the development of
improved sensors, sensor suites and resultant operational modalities in
the following areas:
Remote/Perimeter Sensing--Increase the capability of
distributed remote sensor systems by the addition of extremely
compact day/night thermal imaging capability and improved long
range command, control and reporting capability. Camouflaged,
remotely emplaced imaging sensors capable of radio frequency
(RF) transmitting day/night ``snapshots.''
Urban/Cave Assault Kits--Develop and fabricate
individual soldier systems to allow soldier maneuverability and
weapon aiming in constrained areas in true dark. Based on micro
thermal imaging cameras mounted on soldier helmets and weapons
with imagery presented on a helmet-mounted display.
Blue Force Awareness--Develop and evaluate techniques
to improve soldier navigation and location capabilities in
complex urban and field environments. Included are dead
reckoning navigation and blue force situation monitoring in the
absence of viable Global Positioning System signals, ultra-wide
band tags for intra-unit soldier awareness and real-time blue
force identification of moving vehicles through modification of
existing radars for tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs).
Counter Terrorist Echelon Surveillance--Extend the
range of surveillance and identification of potential terrorist
activity at the individual soldier, light vehicle and airborne
platform (TUAV) echelons. Incorporate short wave infrared
imaging techniques to extend identification ranges out to
current detection ranges, automated gimbal scan electro-optical
imaging from ground vehicles fused with moving target indicator
(MTI) radar for faster cueing of suspect activity and
lightweight/high performance day/night thermal imaging from a
TUAV platform for wide area/change detection assessments
including recently deployed land mines.
conclusion
The Army must have a diverse S&T portfolio that is responsive to
current and future warfighter needs. The S&T community seeks
technological solutions that can be demonstrated in the near term,
explores the feasibility of new concepts for the midterm, and explores
the imaginable for an uncertain far-term future. Since the Army vision
was announced in October 1999, the Army S&T effort has been reshaped,
refocused and reinforced to speed the development of those critical
technologies essential to transform the Army into the objective force.
The Army S&T community has accepted the technical challenges embraced
in the Army Vision. We have committed our energies and our vital
resources to accelerate the pace of Army Transformation!
______
Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Jay M. Cohen, USN, Chief of Naval
Research, Office of Naval Research
Madam Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to discuss the use of Naval Science and
Technology for combating terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. You
and the other members of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities have been leaders in calling
attention, both nationally and in the Department of Defense, to the
changing nature of national security challenges facing our great
nation.
I would like to discuss the Navy's science and technology efforts,
especially programs developing new technologies to combat terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction, as well as our fiscal year 2003 budget,
our technology transition initiatives, and our plans to revitalize our
labs and retain our top notch personnel.
You have challenged us, and we have challenged ourselves, to
transform the Navy's ability to be even more responsive and more
capable of meeting any current and future crisis. In the war against
terrorism, S&T is the enabler which links innovative research to
warfighter and homeland defense requirements. From discovery to
deployment, innovation and experimentation facilitate the transition of
successful concepts from lab to Fleet/Force.
Science & Technology in the War Against Terrorism
The campaign in Afghanistan has already seen the use of new weapons
rapidly developed in the laboratory. For example, the PBXIH-135
thermobaric explosive developed at Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian
Head (an explosive that produces extremely high temperatures and blast
overpressures) was used to fill Air Force BLU-109 2000-pound bombs. The
Defense Threat Reduction Agency tested the new weapon at Department of
Energy ranges in Nevada, and it was ready in time to be used with
devastating effect against al Qaeda caves in Afghanistan. This is just
one example of how science and technology (S&T) organizations can
swiftly collaborate to provide concrete deliverables in a wartime
emergency. In addition, it shows how Naval science and technology
interact effectively with other services, defense agencies, and federal
departments.
The thermobaric weapon story is instructive in other ways. The labs
delivered it in less than 3 months. The call for new warfighting
capabilities was issued on September 19, 2001, and the weapon was sent
to the Afghan theater in mid-December. Such speed was possible because
the science was done before the need became urgent. This basic fact
about how science transitions to operational capabilities explains why
a relevant, balanced Navy and Marine Corps program plans to deliver
across three phases: (1) Today's Navy and Marine Corps (dominated by
emergent needs of the warfighter), (2) the Next Navy and Marine Corps
(defined by requirements), and (3) the Navy and Marine Corps After Next
(shaped by technological possibilities discovered through research in
areas of Naval relevance).
Another example of the benefit of Naval basic research is Nuclear
Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) Technology. NQR technology ``sniffs out''
explosives. The Naval Research Lab developed nuclear quadrupole
resonance, a technology that has now been adapted to the detection of
landmines, unexploded ordnance, and terrorist bombs. Because this
technology gives us the means of detecting explosives directly (and not
simply detecting metallic objects, as is the case in conventional
detection systems) we are now able to see through clutter that
presently obscures many mines and bombs from older sensors. The ability
to detect widely-used plastic explosives (RDX) was demonstrated in
Bosnia; and the Naval Research Lab has more recently demonstrated the
ability to detect TNT.
Another example highlighting the value of our long-term sustained
research investment involves an Office of Naval Research (ONR)-
sponsored scientist at the University of Wisconsin who was working on
high-frequency (terahertz) radar phenomena in the Naval basic research
program. The morning anthrax was detected in the mails, it occurred to
his ONR program manager that this technology had potential utility for
rapid detection of biological agents. At the program manager's
suggestion, the scientist quickly determined that in fact his high-
frequency radar could identify anthrax inside a sealed envelope in
real-time. This technology gives a go/no-go readout and can be
developed into a system for use by personnel with minimal training. The
DOD Counter-Terrorism Task Force has selected this system for
accelerated wartime development; we expect to deploy it by fall 2002.
Naval funded research also identified a polymer produced by marine
algae that, when used to dress wounds, can actually stop gushing
arterial bleeding. Since the polymer does not contain any of the
proteins normally associated with clot formation, it doesn't pose the
disease-transmission or immune response risk of other hemostatic
technologies. This lifesaving technology is the grail of combat trauma
medicine, and provides an excellent example of a basic research result
transitioning directly to the operational forces. The hemostatic
dressing has passed initial FDA trials and is being accelerated into
the military inventory under the DOD Counter-Terrorism Task Force.
In the aftermath of September 11, when the DOD Counter-Terrorism
Task Force solicited all military services and defense agencies for
warfighter/homeland defense enhancements deliverable in 30 day/1 year/
1-5 year timeframes, one-third of the funded programs (validated by the
Joint Staff) in each timeframe were Naval! This is a high return on
Navy sustained S&T investment.
Naval Science & Technology Investment Strategy
There is zero certainty that every research investment will pay the
dividends we desire. What is certain: if we do not invest in promising
research today, we guarantee that options and opportunities will be
severely curtailed in future years.
So how do we choose the research in which to invest? We are guided
by: (1) National Naval Responsibilities (fields in which Navy S&T is
the only significant U.S. sponsor, such as Naval Engineering, Ocean
Acoustics, and Underwater Weaponry); (2) S&T Grand Challenges (we
encourage the Nation's scientific community to achieve breakthroughs in
difficult but achievable technical challenges involving issues such as:
Naval Battlespace Awareness, Electric Power Sources, Naval Materials by
Design, and Multifunctional Electronics for Intelligent Naval Sensors);
and (3) Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs) (which complement our
commitment to achieve mid-term/long-term breakthroughs, by squarely
facing the immediate challenge of meeting today's warfighter
requirements).
With the focus of this hearing on some of our more immediate
requirements, I want to particularly emphasize S&T contributions to
enabling Navy transformation through achieving goals outlined in the
Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs). The key to achieving FNC goals is the
strong business partnership between S&T, Industry, Requirements,
Acquisition, and Fleet/Force stakeholders.
The FNC process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program
managers for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and
process improvements. With a total investment of $577.6 million in
fiscal year 2002 and over $600 million planned for fiscal year 2003,
FNCs support the Secretary of the Navy's goals to: (1) increase combat
capability; (2) enhance personnel performance; (3) introduce advanced
technology; and (4) improve business practices.
ONR devotes approximately two-thirds of its 6.3 (advanced
technology development) funds and about two-fifths of its 6.2 (applied
research) funds to FNCs. As I have reported to you previously, the
twelve currently approved FNCs (in no priority order) are:
Autonomous Operations--focused on dramatically
increasing performance and affordability of Naval air, sea,
land, and underwater unmanned vehicles;
Capable Manpower--focused on affordable human-centered
hardware and systems matching human capabilities, limitations
and needs, for use by individual sailors and marines in an
information rich battlespace;
Electric Warships and Combat Vehicles--focused on
revolutionary power plants that will permit new hullforms and
propulsors, reduce manning, streamline logistics, and enable
future high energy/speed of light weapons and sensors;
Knowledge Superiority and Assurance--focused on
developing capability to distribute integrated information in a
dynamic network with high connectivity and interoperability to
ensure Naval forces have knowledge superiority, common
situational understanding, and increased speed of command;
Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare--focused on enhancing
our capability to detect, track, classify, and engage enemy
submarines in a near-the-shore environment before they are
close enough to harm our Fleet/Force;
Littoral Combat and Power Projection --focused on
development of uniquely capable combat and logistics systems
necessary to deploy and sustain the Fleet/Force without
building up a large logistical infrastructure ashore;
Missile Defense--focused on developing capability to
detect, track, and engage ballistic, theater and cruise
missiles, as well as enemy aircraft, through a single
integrated air picture, composite combat identification,
distributed weapon measures, stealth and damage control;
Time Critical Strike--focused on achieving a
substantial reductions in the amount of time required to engage
critical mobile targets, theater ballistic missiles, weapons of
mass destruction, C\4\I centers and armored vehicles;
Total Ownership Cost Reduction--focused on ways to use
advanced design and manufacturing processes to significantly
decrease costs associated with acquisition, operations,
maintenance, manning, ensure environmental compliance, and give
Naval forces reliable cost estimating tools; and
Warfighter Protection--focused on protecting
Warfighters in the emerging Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare
battlespace through combat casualty prevention, care, and
management.
Technology Transition Initiatives
We are pursuing several initiatives to improve the transition from
discovery to deployment within the Navy by strengthening the
partnership between the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the schools,
universities, government laboratories and industry, as well as
nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Despite the world-class S&T
research conducted by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and all of
our other laboratories and warfare centers, we intend to avoid the
``Not Invented Here'' syndrome. We are not the font of all knowledge
and intend to take full advantage of the creative genius present in the
schools and private sector to meet Navy and Marine Corps requirements.
The Commercial Technology Transition Officer (CTTO) is my senior
Naval advocate for moving promising technology out of commercial
research and into systems procured for the Navy/Marine Corps. For the
last 2 years, we have sponsored an annual Naval-Industry Research and
Development Partnership Conference, where we attempt to address
regulatory, funding, and technology transition issues.
In addition, we have established a ``Swamp Works'' office, similar
in concept to the Lockheed-Martin Skunk Works office, but dedicated to
addressing critical blue/green Navy/Marine Corps problems with out-of-
the-box solutions. Swamp Works has already begun to show its value, for
example, in the initial deployment of its Sea Airborne Lead Line (Sea
ALL) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to the Fifth Fleet. The Navy's Sea
ALL UAV is derived from the Dragon Eye UAV, which was developed by ONR
for the Marine Corps. Dragon Eye is a small, camera-equipped, backpack-
size UAV designed to provide Marines with a portable airborne
reconnaissance capability. Sea ALL will similarly provide Navy ships
with reconnaissance capability while in port, as well as the potential
capability to employ remote sampling to detect chemical, biological and
explosive threats.
Swamp Works is also looking at blast mitigation. This program is
applying new materials and unique structural configurations to prevent
a blast from breaching a ship's hull--as happened to U.S.S. Cole. Two
concepts with advanced materials will be tested soon, and subsequent
system design will offer near-, mid- and far-term applications. The
near-term work will deliver a portable armor enhancement. The mid-term
focus will be on permanent enhancements that can be back-fitted to
existing ships. The far-term applications will be permanent
enhancements to the next generation of ships.
We have also supported the Naval Fleet/Force Technology Innovation
Office (NFFTIO) to strengthen communications between the Fleet/Force
and the Naval S&T community by assigning Naval Research Science
Advisors to serve with Fleet/Force commands. We also established the
Naval Research Science and Technology Action Team (NR-STAT) to provide
technology solutions (from all sources: government, military, industry,
academic, etc.) to problems identified by warfighters. Initially
exercised in July 2001, since September 11, NR-STAT has been a
principal conduit for technology proposals/solutions in the war against
terrorism.
S&T Labs and Personnel
Finally, let me describe some of our ongoing efforts to improve the
quality of defense labs and test centers, and improve the quality of
technical talent that can be attracted to these important facilities.
Congress has supported several legislative provisions have helped the
Service laboratories, especially Section 342 of the NDAA for fiscal
year 1995 and Section 1109 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2000. Section
1109 eliminated controls on high-grade scientific and engineering
positions, a move that has helped with retention of high-quality
personnel scientific and technical personnel.
Section 245 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2000 has been used to allow
participating Service laboratories and centers to implement, on a trial
basis, a one-time clearing of the Priority Placement Program (PPP)
registrants for professional science and engineering positions as soon
as the recruitment action reaches the Human Resources Service Center.
Preliminary indications are that this may be useful in reducing some of
the time and effort needed to recruit new personnel. Implementation of
Section 1113 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2001 is in process.
There are systemic problems facing the Service laboratories. In
light of this and the urgent need to address them, it appears that
incremental approaches and piecemeal legislative efforts may no longer
be sufficient and timely.
Since the end of World War II, Service laboratories, along with
private sector counterparts, have played a crucial role in providing
our military the technological superiority needed to counter potential
adversaries. This role is even more critical in the post-9/11 world,
where a wide range of new technologies are needed to fight terrorism,
protect the homeland, and enable defense transformation efforts.
Therefore, it may now be time to consider establishing a new governance
model within the Federal Government specifically tailored to the needs
of a military research laboratory. Such a system could be designed to
eliminate the need for piecemeal fixes, while retaining Federal status
and competence in science and technology as it relates to National
Defense.
Currently, a joint Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) study,
with panel representation from the Army Science Board and the Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board, and sponsored by the Director Defense
Research and Engineering, is examining the difficulty of the Service
laboratories in recruiting and retaining top-quality scientists and
engineers, as well as other issues related to their ability to remain
world-class research institutions. The panel is currently examining
recommendations from past studies of the laboratories, recent
legislative reforms, including those mentioned above, and input from
other experts, to develop a set of recommendations for improving the
ability of these laboratories to attract and retain the best and
brightest technical talent. The panel has just completed its visits to
labs and is currently developing its findings and recommendations. It
plans to submit a preliminary summary of its conclusions to the
Services and OSD in May 2002. A formal report will probably not be
completed until late summer 2002.
In conclusion, the pay off on S&T investment is clear. Naval
transformation depends on a long-term, stable, and sustained investment
in S&T/R&D, validated through on-going experimentation and transition
to the Fleet/Force in a never-ending cycle.
Again, let me tell you how greatly I appreciate your inviting me to
provide written testimony in your review of science technology to
counter terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
______
Prepared Statement by Hon. James B. Engle, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering
introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, and staff, I very much
appreciate the opportunity to provide written testimony on the Fiscal
Year 2003 Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program. The United
States Air Force is committed to a robust S&T Program that enables us
to achieve our vision of continuing our transformation to an integrated
air and space force capable of rapid and decisive global engagement. By
continuing our investment in transformational technologies that support
a reduced cycle-time, spiral development acquisition process, the Air
Force will retain its dominance of air and space in future conflicts
against both traditional and asymmetrical threats.
Innovation is a vital part of our heritage and is key to ensuring
the Air Force will meet the challenges of tomorrow. Transforming our
warfighting capabilities towards this end will involve continued
innovations in how we think about employing our forces to defend our
nation, as well as quantum leaps in our technology. We must be prepared
to counter the worldwide availability of advanced weapons, regional
instabilities, and other emerging and less predictable asymmetrical
threats. We are developing transformational technologies that permit
flexible forces capable of operating far from home, on short notice,
for extended time periods. We must also be able to afford these
innovations once we develop them in order to re-capitalize the Air
Force to fulfill our vision. To meet these objectives, we search out
the most promising and affordable technologies in order to win
decisively, protect our forces, and minimize collateral damage.
s&t budget
We have been faced with the reality of a fiscally constrained, but
operationally-demanding budget environment. The high operations tempo
the Air Force has sustained in support of peacekeeping operations and
conflicts, such as Afghanistan, has placed a great burden on our people
and resources and has strained our ability to maintain a balanced
investment between current readiness, short-term objectives, and the
long-term challenges that are enabled by our S&T Program.
In spite of these tight budgets, the Air Force is working hard to
increase S&T funding, while maintaining a balanced S&T portfolio. The
Air Force fiscal year 2003 President's Budget (PB) request was $1,659
million, an increase of approximately $280 million over the fiscal year
2002 PB. In conjunction with the PB increase, there has been a
significant increase in the involvement of the warfighting commands and
senior Air Force leadership in S&T planning, programming, and
budgeting. For example, we have established semi-annual S&T Summits
where the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and
the Air Force four-stars and other senior leaders review the S&T
portfolio. The latest S&T Summit focused on transformational
technologies that can be developed to assist in combating terrorism and
homeland defense.
The Air Force has increased its space technology investment by
initiating an advanced development program, Transformational Wideband
MILSATCOM, to develop and demonstrate laser communications
technologies. Laser communications could provide higher data
throughput, and higher frequencies that could transform our military
satellite communications infrastructure. Laser communications
technology promises to increase the data transfer rates at least
tenfold compared to current radio frequency communications systems.
Additionally, laser communications uses a narrow beam, which decreases
the likelihood of intercept and increases resistance to jamming. While
laser communications has a high potential to revolutionize satellite
communications, there are technical challenges to overcome such as
precision pointing and tracking, weather constraints, and adapting the
equipment for use in space. While we continue to work on the
challenges, we are conducting a study to determine the best
architecture for implementing laser communications technologies to
complement radio frequency-based systems. Transformational Wideband
MILSATCOM is the only project in Program Element 0603436F, and will be
executed at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center because of
the desire to rapidly transition this technology into operational use,
and the significant amount of manpower required to manage the effort.
s&t planning process
I am pleased to report that the S&T Planning Review we undertook
and completed in response to Section 252 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001, Public Law 106-398, was an
overwhelming success. We approached this review enthusiastically and
received the wholehearted support and participation of not only the Air
Force S&T community, but also the requirements, planning, logistics,
and user communities. Approximately 300 people were involved in this
review: 160 from the S&T community; 90 from the requirements, plans,
and logistics communities; and 50 from the user community. As required,
the Air Force identified short-term objectives and long-term
challenges. The short-term objectives identified include: Target
Location, Identification, and Tracking; Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence; Precision Attack; Space
Control; Access to Space; Aircraft Survivability and Countermeasures;
Sustaining Aging Systems; and Air Expeditionary Force Support. The
long-term challenges identified include: Finding and Tracking; Command
and Control; Controlled Effects; Sanctuary; Rapid Aerospace Response;
and Effective Aerospace Persistence. In addition, we defined technology
development roadmaps for each of these objectives and challenges.
Upon completion of the review, the Comptroller General of the
General Accounting Office (GAO) assessed the review's compliance with
the law. The recently released GAO report not only found the Air Force
in compliance with the requirements of the legislation, but was also
very favorable of Air Force efforts. The results of the S&T Planning
Review are now providing both a short-term and long-term focus to the
S&T Program. They are being incorporated into the Air Force S&T Plan,
the Air Force Strategic Plan, and are laying the foundation for future
Air Force S&T budget planning.
Subsequently, Section 253 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2002, Public Law 107-107, has directed the Air Force,
in cooperation with the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences, to carry out a study to determine the effect of
S&T program changes of the past 2 years. We expect to submit the
results of this study to Congress not later than the May 1, 2003,
deadline.
maximizing our s&t dollars
The Air Force continues to leverage technology to transform combat
effectiveness. Our strategy is to pursue integrated technology
solutions that support our warfighter's highest priority needs. We must
also pursue the fundamental enabling technologies that will transform
tomorrow's Air Force. As technological superiority is a perishable
commodity, we work hard to maximize the payoff of our S&T funding, by
not only developing transformational technologies, but also by speeding
the introduction of these new technologies into new capabilities for
our warfighters using spiral development and reduced acquisition cycle
times.
Aiding in the transition of technology to the warfighter is the Air
Force's newly established Acquisition Center of Excellence, which will
develop new acquisition processes and concepts for accelerating
development programs into operational use. This new initiative could
more highly focus the S&T Program on technologies that have a clear and
well-defined technology transition path into developmental and fielded
systems. The spiral development concept will be an important foundation
of this new Air Force acquisition initiative. In addition to the Air
Force's Acquisition Center of Excellence, another avenue that could
provide for transition of maturing S&T technologies is the
congressionally-directed Challenge Program. This program as described
in Section 244, ``Program to Accelerate the Introduction of Innovative
Technology in Defense Acquisition Programs,'' of H.R. 2586, directs the
Office of the Secretary of Defense to increase the introduction of
innovative and cost-saving technology in acquisition programs.
Since deployed technology may remain in use for decades, the Air
Force S&T Program not only focuses on enhancing performance, but also
on increasing our emphasis on the reliability, maintainability, and
affordability of weapon systems. Emphasizing affordability from the
very beginning through training of our management and engineering
staff, as well as through careful review of technology transition pilot
projects, increases our potential to reduce the costs of technology
early in the process and throughout a product's life cycle.
We are very selective about investing in high payoff technological
opportunities. We constantly seek opportunities to integrate Air Force
planning and leverage our S&T funds by cooperating with other Services,
Agencies, the private sector, and international partners. For example,
we rely on the Army as the lead Service for defensive chemical-
biological technology development. The Air Force also has strong inter-
Agency efforts, such as our program in aging aircraft, which is focused
on detection and management of corrosion and fatigue in aging
structures. It is closely coordinated with the civilian aging aircraft
research programs at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Finally, the Air
Force is involved in international technology cooperative efforts for
S&T, such as the software defined radio development, insensitive high
explosives, and aircraft battle damage repair efforts conducted with
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Another example of
international cooperation is the bi-lateral work we are doing with
Australia on testing small ordnance release and separation on aircraft
with internal weapon bays at subsonic and supersonic speeds.
combating terrorism
Since the September 11 attack on the United States, the Air Force
has responded to civil and military requests for assistance providing
both technology and scientists and engineers. For example, continental
United States air defense systems are positioned along our borders to
cover the air space from the shoreline to 250 miles outward. However,
September 11 brought with it a sudden military need to cover the
airspace over the United States as well. We sent scientists and
engineers, equipment, and radar fusion software to the Northeast Air
Defense Sector operations center, and integrated military and FAA radar
data for real-time situational awareness of all air traffic in the
Northeast United States.
In partnership with the MITRE Corporation, we mounted sensors on a
New York Police Department helicopter and on a Drug Enforcement Agency
aircraft. The helicopter and aircraft over flew ``ground zero,'' using
the video mosaic tool kit the Air Force developed to process Predator
data, to produce a current aerial map of New York City. The police and
fire departments used this map in their search and rescue efforts.
The Air Force Joint Defensive Planner program, an automated tool
recently developed to allow joint collaborative planning of theater air
defense, was modified for use by the North American Air Defense
Command. Air Force scientists and engineers modified the Joint
Defensive Planner databases to include a high-resolution topographical
map of the United States, plus the location and capabilities of all
military and FAA radars in the continental United States. This modified
planner was installed in the 1st Air Force CONUS Regional Operations
Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, and gave us the first ever,
complete picture of radar coverage of the continental United States.
Another technology that has been deployed to support Operation
Enduring Freedom is the Interactive Data Wall. Think of it as a very
large computer screen. The data wall starts at waist level, goes up 3
feet, and is 12 feet wide. It has very high resolution, with over 4
million pixels in the display, and can overlay multiple sets of
information and show several different displays simultaneously.
Anything that can be displayed on a computer or television can be
displayed on the data wall. You control the displays through voice
recognition software and laser pens. The Air Force has been
experimenting with data walls in joint exercises over the past 2 years
and has met with much success in learning how best to use them. In
December, the Commander of the Army 10th Mountain Division requested a
data wall for immediate deployment in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom with a second data wall to follow 90 days later. We delivered
the first data wall the next day and the second one in less than 90
days.
The Air Force technology has also been directly supporting
warfighters involved in Operation Enduring Freedom by providing fatigue
countermeasures to B-2 bomber crews at Whiteman Air Force Base,
Missouri, who are flying 44-hour missions to Afghanistan. The
Warfighter Fatigue Countermeasures technology program is focused on
optimizing warfighter survivability and combat capability during
sustained and continuous (24/7) operations. Our primary S&T objective
is to identify, develop, and transition tools and procedures that
prevent and delay cognitive performance deterioration caused by acute
and cumulative fatigue resulting from extended duty periods, disrupted
or irregular rest periods, and circadian dysrhythmia typical of
military operations today. Warfighter Fatigue Countermeasures research
products primarily impact the warfighter through improved procedures,
guidelines, and policy changes. These ``knowledge products'' derive
from a thorough scientific assessment of the human system and the
particular environment within which the human system must operate and
are most frequently delivered through operational consultations. We
also have software products in development that provide quick access to
our expert knowledge on fatigue and cognitive performance.
transformational technologies
There are many other Air Force technology areas that deserve
special mention. Let me highlight just a few additional examples. The
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV), designated the X-45A, is an area
that is generating increased excitement and could enhance warfighting
capabilities. The Air Force/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) X-45A joint advanced technology demonstration program has
entered its fifth year. Flight vehicle checkout, ground testing, and
high-speed taxi tests of the first demonstrator are underway, with
projected first flight in the spring of 2002. Test results to date have
been very good, and we fully expect continued success. We plan to
complete Phase II of the X-45A program by the fall of 2003 and the Air
Force is planning for a follow-on acquisition program.
To increase aircraft survivability and operational efficiencies,
the Air Force is developing both manned (F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter)
and unmanned (UCAV) flight vehicles that can carry and employ weapons
from both external and internal weapons bays. To increase the number of
weapons the flight vehicle can fit into their internal weapons bays,
part of our investment strategy focuses S&T funding on developing and
demonstrating smaller precision weapons.
One of the small munitions currently being flight demonstrated is
the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS). The LOCAAS is a 100-
pound class powered munition whose primary target set is moving and
relocatable targets. It will demonstrate the effectiveness and military
utility of this type of munition for the Lethal Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses, Theater Missile Defense Attack Operations, and Armor/
Interdiction mission areas. LOCAAS will integrate a radar precision
terminal seeker with autonomous target recognition algorithms, a multi-
modal warhead, Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System
midcourse guidance, and a miniature turbine engine with a fly-out range
of 100 miles. This advanced technology demonstration program has five
flight tests scheduled in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003,
culminating in an autonomous flight with active seeker and warhead
against a real target in fiscal year 2003. The first flight test was
recently held and demonstrated the LOCAAS ability to fly a programmed
flight path and perform high bank turns, while maintaining aerodynamic
stability.
To continue the trend of miniaturization of space platforms, DARPA
and the Air Force have provided funding to 10 universities to explore
the military utility of innovative, low-cost nanosatellites. These
nanosatellites, weighing 2 to 10 kilograms, will demonstrate such
experiments as formation flying, differential Global Positioning System
navigation, miniaturized sensors, and micropropulsion technologies.
The Air Force is also conducting the Experimental Satellite System
series to demonstrate increasing levels of microsatellite technology
maturity. The XSS-10, the first microsatellite in the series, is
scheduled to launch in fiscal year 2002. It will demonstrate semi-
autonomous operations and visual inspection in close proximity of an
object in space--in this case a Delta II upper stage. In fiscal year
2004, we will launch XSS-11, which will demonstrate autonomous
operations and provide experience with command and control in proximity
operations to another space object.
Hypersonics is another transformational technology of high interest
to Air Force S&T. Our HyTech program achieved major successes in fiscal
year 2001 with the first ever ground test demonstration of a scramjet
producing positive net thrust over the Mach 4.5 to Mach 6.5 flight
range. The engine was developed by Pratt & Whitney, in collaboration
with Air Force scientists and engineers, and was recently recognized by
Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine as a 2001 Laureate in
Aeronautics/Propulsion.
One of the most transformational and quickly deployable
technologies available today is command, control, and communications
technology, also known as information technology. This technology is at
the heart of our Moving Target Indicator Exploitation program, which is
developing web-enabled automated tools to exploit data from current and
future sensor systems such as the Joint Surface Target Attack Radar
System. The effort is focused on four technology areas: ground moving
target tracking; motion pattern analysis; behavioral pattern analysis;
and sensor resource allocation and scheduling.
workforce
The Air Force civilian and military S&T workforce is highly
motivated and productive. The Air Force is unique in that 20 percent of
its laboratory scientist and engineer (S&E) government workforce is
active duty military. This gives us a direct link to the warfighter.
Some of these military S&Es come directly from operational commands,
while others will serve in operational commands later in their careers.
The Air Force is committed to shaping its S&E workforce with the
vision to enhance excellence and relevance of S&T into the 21st century
and appreciates the support Congress has provided. This challenge
requires the Air Force to maintain a dominant edge in technology and
also requires us to provide clear direction and growth for our S&E
workforce. However, we as do others, find it is difficult to recruit
and retain S&Es. The Air Force has several initiatives that address
recruitment and retention issues.
The Air Force published a ``Concept of Operations for Scientists
and Engineers in the United States Air Force'' and baselined the
requirement for the Air Force S&E workforce. Upon analyzing the
baseline requirement, we found our military and civilian authorizations
to be about right, but our actual demographics are seriously short in
some key areas. We are, therefore, shifting our focus to retaining the
workforce we have and infusing it with the vitality of new S&Es to meet
tomorrow's need. During the next 7 years, we are investing nearly a
third of a billion dollars to support the containment and growth of our
technological workforce. We are encouraging this growth through
critical skills accession bonuses, critical skills retention bonuses,
recruiting, and re-recruiting efforts. As we grow our S&E workforce, we
are providing career guidance and mentoring that will enable us to meet
our 21st century challenge. Initiatives, such as the special hiring
legislation authorized by Congress, which provides ``DARPA-like''
hiring authority to the military departments, should also provide
positive results in shaping our S&E workforce. This authority has only
recently been delegated to the Air Force, but we are very optimistic
about its potential.
conclusion
The Air Force is in the midst of a technological and organizational
transformation that is radically changing air and space contributions
to the nature of war. Stealth and precision strike, in particular, have
injected leap ahead improvements into combat power unlike any we have
known since the introduction of the jet engine. We are also making
important strides in command and control, long-range power projection,
and mobility in support of an integrated Expeditionary Aerospace Force.
In conclusion, the Air Force is fully committed to providing this
nation with the advanced air and space technologies required to meet
America's national security interests around the world and to ensure we
remain on the cutting edge of system performance, flexibility, and
affordability. The technological advantage we enjoy today is a legacy
of decades of investment in S&T. Likewise, our future warfighting
capabilities will be substantially determined by today's investment in
S&T. As we face the new Millennium, our challenge is to advance
technologies for an Expeditionary Aerospace Force as we continue to
move aggressively into the realm of space activities. The Air Force is
confident that we can lead the discovery, development, and timely
transition of affordable, transformational technologies that keep our
Air Force the best in the world. As an integral part of the Department
of Defense's S&T team, we look forward to working with Congress to
ensure a strong Air Force S&T Program tailored to achieve our vision of
an integrated air and space force.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again, for the opportunity to present
written testimony, and thank you for your continuing support of the Air
Force S&T Program.
______
Prepared Statement by Dr. Tony Tether, Director, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency
Madam Chairman, subcommittee members and staff: I am very pleased
to submit this discussion of DARPA's fiscal year 2002 activities and
our fiscal year 2003 plans to continue to transform our military
through technological superiority. I will also describe what we are
doing to help win the war on terror in Operations Enduring Freedom and
Noble Eagle.
DARPA has occupied a special role and mission within the Department
of Defense since the time of Sputnik. Our mission is to provide the
research and development that bridges the gap between fundamental
discoveries and their military use. The work we support is necessarily
high-risk and high-return because we are trying to fill that gap. We
try to imagine what a military commander would want and accelerate that
future into being, thereby changing people's minds about what is
technologically possible.
The phrase, ``DARPA prevents technological surprise,'' also
characterizes our mission over the years. To do this, we work to fill
the gap between discovery and use before our adversaries can. However,
DARPA, at its very best, not only prevents technological surprise, but
creates technological surprise for our adversaries. An example of this
is DARPA's development of stealth--a dramatic technological capability
that continues to put our adversaries at a disadvantage.
Our mission in the Department creates a role that complements, but
is no substitute for, the work of the service science and technology
establishments. A DARPA program does not start with what a military
commander wants today. Instead, we look at what future commanders might
want. We look beyond today's known needs and requirements because, as
military historians have noted, ``None of the most important weapons
transforming warfare in the 20th century--the airplane, tank, radar,
jet engine, helicopter, electronic computer, not even the atomic bomb--
owed its initial development to a doctrinal requirement or request of
the military.'' \1\ None of them. To this list, DARPA would add stealth
and Internet technologies.
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\1\ John Chambers, ed., The Oxford Companion to American Military
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 791.
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At DARPA, we constantly focus on dramatically changing how we will
fight in the future. Our unique mission has made us the technological
engine of military transformation.
I returned to DARPA last June, having been a DARPA Office Director
in the 1980s. When I had my job interview with the Secretary of
Defense, I was given two charges: First, I was told to make DARPA like
it used to be--an entrepreneurial ``hotbed.'' Second, I was told that
DARPA was to give the United States military more robust capabilities
in space, so that our nation can maintain unhindered access to space
and protect United States space capabilities from enemy attack--one of
Secretary Rumsfeld's six transformational goals.
In his January speech on transformation at National Defense
University, the Secretary said that he needed the Department to take
``. . . a more entrepreneurial approach to developing military
capabilities, one that encourages people, all people, to be proactive
and not reactive, to behave somewhat less like bureaucrats and more
like venture capitalists; one that does not wait for threats to emerge
and be `validated,' but rather anticipates them before they emerge and
develops new capabilities that can dissuade and deter those nascent
threats.'' That is DARPA at its very best. I believe that the Secretary
had DARPA partly in mind when he said that. Also, the Section 1101
experimental hiring authority given to us by Congress is playing an
important role in allowing us to hire the people we need to stay
entrepreneurial.
Let me tell you more about what we're doing in our role as the
Department's technological engine of transformation. You are familiar
with our work in stealth and information technologies. DARPA has also
made major contributions in areas such as precision-guided munitions
and real-time command, control, communications, computers,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. So what are we doing today to build
on that legacy?
First, DARPA's vision is to fill the battle space with networked
unmanned vehicles. Political support from Congress, particularly in
this committee, top-level service and DOD leadership, and technical
progress are all coming together to make that happen. One of our
flagship efforts is the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, which has
major unmanned components. Under the leadership of U.S. Army Chief of
Staff General Eric K. Shinseki and his team, we will transform how the
Army fights.
The Future Combat Systems is the cornerstone of the Army's efforts
to create what it calls the Objective Force. The Objective Force will
respond to the full spectrum of land combat. It will be, in the Army's
words, ``responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survival,
and sustainable.'' Within the FCS program, we have been developing
concepts and technologies for a force that can deploy within 96 hours
and be highly lethal and survivable in the year 2010. FCS is conceived
of as a system-of-systems, and not a particular platform. What makes
FCS different is that we are starting with the network that will make
these goals possible--we're not starting with a specific platform, or a
set of platforms, which we then try to network together.
Within DARPA, our FCS portfolio of programs emphasizes command-and-
control, communications, sensors, the Netfires precision missile
system, and unmanned and semiautonomous ground and air vehicles. For
example, our A160 Hummingbird unmanned, long-duration helicopter had
its first flight in January of this year. Unmanned platforms and
vehicles enable the FCS system-of-systems to put fewer warfighters
directly in harm's way. Moreover, because unmanned vehicles do not
require heavy armor to protect people, they are lighter and easier to
deploy.
Afghanistan has given us a glimpse of how unmanned air vehicles may
shape the future. The Global Hawk, a DARPA program that transitioned to
the Air Force in 1998, has played a key role in Operation Enduring
Freedom by providing U.S. commanders with high-altitude, long-
endurance, unmanned aerial reconnaissance over the area of operations.
The Predator, which was originally unarmed and grew out of the 1980s
DARPA program called Amber, provides close-in combat surveillance and
can now be equipped with Hellfire missiles.
DARPA currently has three unmanned air combatant programs underway:
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) with the Air Force, UCAV-N with
the Navy, and Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft (UCAR) with the Army.
These innovative programs are focused on enabling the next revolution
in unmanned aerial weapon systems. We are not adding a weapons
capability to an existing platform. Rather, we are focusing from the
start on the technologies, processes, and system attributes that will
help transform each of the services: how the Air Force suppresses enemy
air defenses, how the Navy suppresses enemy air defenses and conducts
extended reconnaissance, and how the Army conducts armed reconnaissance
and attack.
The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle is a joint program with the Air
Force to develop an unmanned aircraft that can be used to suppress
enemy air defenses, thereby complementing piloted aircraft for
extremely dangerous missions, and/or to conduct strike missions. Our
current vision is that up to four UCAVs could simultaneously be
supervised by a single battle manager. The last sentence contains two
aspects at the heart of the UCAV revolution. First, UCAVs are not flown
as one flies a Predator or Global Hawk or any unmanned platform today.
Rather, the vehicles have sophisticated on-board adaptive mission
planning, which will allow them to conduct the entire mission without
continuous human oversight. Second, each of those vehicles is also
directly linked to its fellow unmanned wingmen and can perform multi-
ship cooperative targeting, tracking, attack, and assessment. UCAVs
will hunt for relocatable and mobile targets in ``four-packs'' under
the supervision of a skilled operator.
This is not about autonomous machines. It is about blending the
best traits of man and machine. There is always a person in-the-loop to
provide the timeless qualities of human judgment and insight to
supervise the unmanned systems and manage the battle. Operators will be
assisted by decision aids that allow them to focus on the operational
art of war, leaving the implementation details to the unmanned element
of this synergistic blend of man and machine intelligence.
While striving to mature these challenging command and control
concepts, the UCAV program has not lost sight of keeping this new
weapon system affordable. The program emphasizes making UCAVs low-cost
(roughly 50 percent lower purchase price than an F-16CJ and 75 percent
lower operating costs) and storable, unattended, for long periods of
time--the ``wooden round'' idea.
UCAV continues to make solid progress across the four major program
focus areas: first flight, coordinated multi-vehicle flight, system B
design, and acquisition planning. We have completed two of the three
series of taxi tests required before a safe first flight, which is now
planned for later this spring. Software is under development to support
the critical multi-vehicle flight demonstrations scheduled for next
summer, and we have begun designing the X-45B fieldable prototype,
which will take the next major step toward an operational system and
support future demonstrations of military utility and operational
value. Overall, the program is on the maximum acceleration path in
support of the congressional goal of fielding 30 systems by 2010. DARPA
has managed this program in close cooperation with the Air Force. In
fact, the early and sustained participation of Air Force warfighters
and developers has been a key factor in our success. DARPA is leading
the program until the critical multi-vehicle flight tests are completed
in Summer 2003, when we will transfer program management responsibility
to the Air Force.
The Navy's variant of the UCAV, the UCAV-N program, is at a much
earlier stage of development. In addition to the UCAV missions of
suppression of enemy air defense and strike, the UCAV-N will also be
tasked with extended surveillance. This additional requirement could
lead to a vehicle that is significantly (i.e., 50 percent) larger than
UCAV and it must be carrier-compatible and in-flight refuelable.
To date, DARPA's work on UCAV-N has been the preliminary design,
analysis, and technology risk reduction required under what we call
Phase I. Very shortly we expect to announce selections for Phase II, in
which the detailed design and actual fabrication of UCAV-N will take
place.
The Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft is the newest of the three
programs, with Phase I beginning this year. The goal of UCAR is an
unmanned, affordable, survivable armed vertical take-off and landing
system that can identify and attack targets farther in front of U.S.
ground forces--doing a dangerous and critical mission while putting
fewer soldiers in harm's way. Such a system would be an important
element of the Army's Objective Force and will build on what we're
learning about collaboration among unmanned vehicles in the UCAV
program. During Phase I of the program, we will do the necessary
studies to define the system concept, requirements, risk reduction
roadmap, and effectiveness and affordability goals.
A second area where DARPA is continuing to push transformation is
precision strike, building on a long tradition of work like Assault
Breaker in the early 1980s. The war in Afghanistan showed us how
precision strike, in the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
before this Committee, means ``. . . the bomb is no longer solely an
area weapon, but is going to be used like bullets from a rifle, aimed
precisely and individually.'' Timely, accurate, and precise delivery of
bombs and missiles helped us overthrow a hostile regime in short order
with very few American or unintended casualties. Yet our experience
there has also shown us that major challenges remain in target
detection, identification, and tracking.
To bolster our work in this area, I have recently established a new
office at DARPA, the Information Exploitation Office (IXO). IXO is
assembling the sensors and the information technologies needed to find
and destroy the right land targets in any terrain, in any weather,
moving or not, at any time.
Let me give you some examples of what we are doing. Currently, one
of the best ways for our adversaries to avoid being killed is to keep
moving. The Affordable Moving Surface Targeting Engagement (AMSTE)
program will demonstrate how, by making only minor modifications to
existing and planned systems, we can network and integrate multiple
stand-off radars and long-range weapons like Joint Direct Attack
Munitions and Joint Stand-Off Weapons to affordably, precisely, and
rapidly destroy individual moving surface vehicles.
Another example of our work in time-critical precision strike is
the Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology program (AT3). Enemy air
defense systems are using increasingly sophisticated tactics and
technology, and AT3 is aimed squarely at this threat. The overall
program goals are to target surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers to
an accuracy of 50 meters from 50 miles away within 10 seconds after the
enemy's radar turns on, a dramatic improvement over today's
capabilities.
The technology produced by AT3 will provide the precise coordinates
of an enemy air defense unit immediately after it turns on its radar.
Providing precise coordinates quickly will allow a weapon to destroy
the SAM threat before it can run and hide. AT3 employs non-dedicated
platforms, such as tactical fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, UAVs,
and UCAVs, to rapidly detect and locate enemy radars by sharing
measurements of radar signals using existing tactical data links.
A third program, Tactical Targeting Network Technologies (TTNT), is
developing the wireless communications technology needed for future
time critical precision strike by a system of systems network. TTNT
will provide the communications glue, if you will, allowing systems
like AMSTE and AT3 to achieve their full potential. TTNTs goals
include: real-time capacity allocation; high-priority messaging; data
rates high enough for secure video; low costs; and compatibility with
existing tactical data links such as Link 16.
Programs such as AMSTE, AT3, and TTNT will tear down the historical
separation between sensors and shooters, the separation between the J2
Intelligence staff and the J3 Operational staff. This is an
extraordinarily difficult problem, both technically and
organizationally. Our job here at DARPA is to answer those who say,
``It can't be done,'' by demonstrating that it can.
A third area we are transforming is how our systems will talk to
each other. The key to network centric warfare is secure, seamless,
high-data-rate communications, and DARPA is leading the way in
developing those technologies for both untethered, i.e. wireless, and
tethered networks.
In the wireless world, four programs illustrate our goals. The FCS
Communications program is prototyping the technologies needed for the
high bandwidth, low probability of intercept radio links crucial to
making FCS work. Our Small Unit Operations Situational Awareness System
is the first ad-hoc, mobile, all-terrain radio frequency network system
for dismounted infantry. The Terahertz Optical Reachback program will
provide high bandwidth optical networks to tactical units in theater.
Our Next Generation program will make 10 to 20 times more spectrum
available to our military by dynamically allocating spectrum across
frequency, space, and time; we call it ``tuning for daylight.''
For tethered networks, DARPA is working aggressively to counter
computer network attacks. For example, we are working on software
``wrappers'' that can enfold malicious incoming attachments and prevent
them from getting at the system resources they need to spread. Our
Autonomic Distributed Firewall technology places a firewall inside
every computer on a network--a firewall that can communicate with the
other firewalls--providing much more robust protection than a
traditional single network firewall.
A fourth area where we are continuing to help transform our
military is space. Recall that DARPA started off as a space agency,
when the shock of Sputnik caused Americans to believe that our Cold War
adversary had seized ``the ultimate high ground.'' Space continues to
be the high ground, it has recaptured our attention, and DARPA once
again is investing in that arena.
The ability to maintain unhindered access to space and to protect
our space capabilities from enemy attack is one of Secretary Rumsfeld's
six transformational goals. In order to do so, DARPA is pursuing
several new space programs.
First of all, to enable us to get to space and stay there, we have
our new Responsive Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch (RASCAL) and
the Orbital Express programs. RASCAL is designing and developing a low-
cost orbital insertion capability for dedicated, micro-size (50
kilogram) satellite payloads. RASCAL will provide flexible access to
space using a combination of reusable and low-cost expendable vehicle
elements. Orbital Express will demonstrate the feasibility of
refueling, upgrading, and extending the life of on-orbit spacecraft
using automated spacecraft. This will lower the cost of doing business
in space and will provide radical new capabilities for military
spacecraft, such as high maneuverability, autonomous orbital
operations, and satellites that can be reconfigured as missions change
or as technology advances.
If one is going to space, one needs to know what is in space--space
situational awareness. DARPA's new Space Surveillance Telescope program
is developing a ground-based, large-aperture optical telescope with a
very wide field of view using curved focal plane array technology. This
will facilitate the detection and tracking of very faint objects in
deep space. It is not intended as an imaging system, but, rather, as a
search-and-detect capability. Both detection sensitivity and search
coverage rate will be approximately an order-of-magnitude better than
current capabilities.
To use space-based assets to gather information about objects on
the ground, we are beginning the Innovative Space-based radar Antenna
Technology program. The physics of this mission calls for a much larger
antenna than has previously been considered. This drives the program's
development of novel technologies and conceptual designs aimed at
producing extremely lightweight, compact, and affordable space-based
radar antennas that meet the stressing requirements of continuous,
tactical tracking of ground moving targets for intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance.
Finally, to protect our space satellites DARPA is initiating
programs like the Satellite Protection and Warning/Space Awareness
(SPAWN) program. SPAWN will demonstrate the feasibility of using micro-
satellites to provide enhanced, near-field space situational awareness
for U.S. space assets in geosynchronous orbit.
Since September 11, the war on terrorism has been foremost in
everyone's minds. I want to take a few minutes to tell you about some
of the DARPA technologies that are being used to support Operation
Enduring Freedom.
In Afghanistan today, warfighters are using 6-inch-long, pen-sized
water purification kits developed by DARPA that consume plain salt
tablets and purify up to 300 liters of water on a single camera
battery. They're using hand-held phrase translation devices in the
field and at our embassy in Kabul that convert phrases spoken by our
soldiers directly into local, native languages such as Pashto, Urdu,
and Dari. Having worked with the Air Force to reduce critical Link 16
network shortfalls demonstrated in Kosovo, DARPA-developed software
tools are being used in Operation Enduring Freedom to reconfigure a
theater-wide Link 16 network for military aircraft in a few hours--a
task that previously took many weeks. Lastly, small ground robots
developed in DARPA's Tactical Mobile Robotics program deployed to
Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
On the American homefront, DARPA technology has been used in
homeland defense, Operation Noble Eagle. A commercial version of the
DARPA consequence management program, LEADERS, provided medical
surveillance for signs and symptoms of a biological attack in New York
State within 24 hours of the attack on the World Trade Center. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also used LEADERS to
monitor for specified syndromes from hospitals within in the New York
City area and report them back in real-time to CDC in Atlanta via the
Internet. Robots from the Tactical Mobile Robotics program were sent to
New York City to assist in search and rescue operations. Lastly, DARPA
personnel served as science advisors to the team responsible for the
anthrax decontamination on Capitol Hill. After analyzing the
decontamination technologies that might be used for the cleanup of the
Hart Building, the team selected the chlorine dioxide approach
developed under DARPA's ongoing Immune Building program; this
technology proved both effective and safe.
All these technologies were available to respond to the terrorist
attacks on our nation because Congress had provided years of patient
funding to develop them. Patience pays off.
DARPA has several ongoing programs to help prosecute the war on
terrorism. Since the mid-1990s, DARPA has had a significant program in
biological warfare defense, covering sensors to detect biological
agents, vaccines to prevent infection, therapies to treat people who
have been exposed, and decontamination technologies to recover the use
of contaminated equipment and locations.
An example of this work, and one that illustrates why it is so
exciting, is the Unconventional Pathogen Countermeasures program, which
is focused on developing therapies broadly useful across many classes
of biological warfare agents. For example, we are working on a new
class of drug designed to attack the DNA of bacteria, viruses, and
malaria, and that may eventually prove useful against threats ranging
from anthrax and plague to smallpox.
One of the great challenges in the war on terrorism is to know our
enemy--who he is, where he is, and what he's doing. In order to focus
our efforts, I established another new DARPA office, the Information
Awareness Office (IAO). IAO is developing the information systems
needed to find, identify, track, and understand terrorist networks and
vastly improve what we know about our adversaries. We will use the
light of information technology to take away the shadows they hide in.
For example, IAO's Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery program
is aimed at finding terrorist networks hidden in the mountains of
diverse data that we collect. The Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment
program is explicitly aimed at predicting the behavior of terrorist
groups in some detail, an extremely difficult challenge. Usually what
we do now is issue broad warnings to the public to be on guard, like
the several that were announced following September 11. Wargaming the
Asymmetric Environment seeks to move from those broad warnings to more
specific predictions. In short, we want to go from predicting the
terrorist ``climate'' to predicting the terrorist ``weather.'' Some
would argue that this is an outrageous goal, one that is not possible
to achieve. I agree it sounds outrageous, but what if we can do it?
That is why it is a DARPA program.
In addition, IAO's Total Information Awareness program is now
setting up a testbed at the Army's Intelligence and Security Command to
test our new technologies on real-world threat data.
I'd like to now discuss some of our investments in fundamentally
new technologies, particularly at the component level, that have often
been the technological feedstocks enabling quantum leaps in U.S.
military capabilities.
Building on our long tradition in cutting edge information
technology, DARPA is pursuing cognitive computer systems--computer
systems that know what they are doing. Our current information systems
are crucial to national defense, but are expensive to create and debug,
require us to adapt to them, cannot coordinate effectively with one
another, and are inefficient and prone to failure. We want to develop
computing systems that think--that are self-monitoring and self-
healing. Cognitive computers can reconfigure themselves as necessary,
generate their own code, respond to naturally expressed human
directives, and be configured and maintained by non-experts, and
therefore last much longer than current systems. We are developing
software, networks, components and full systems that are self-aware. We
don't expect to reach our ultimate goal for many years, but we are
starting now on the underlying technology.
Another traditional DARPA strength has been microelectronics,
including photonics and microelectromechanical systems (MEMS), which
continue to be core enablers for military systems. As the commercial
microelectronics world approaches the end of Moore's Law within the
next decade, the chips that emerge, containing trillions of nano-scale
complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) devices, will have a
revolutionary impact on chip-scale, high-speed digital processing for
future military systems. Integrating this advanced CMOS technology with
radio frequency and analog components, including photonic sources and
sensors and MEMS devices, will allow far more adaptable sensor and
actuation systems. We foresee intelligent chips that can adapt in real-
time, maintaining peak performance while tracking signals over a wide
spectral range, and MEMS-based resonators for compact chip-scale
oscillators with atomic clock precision. DARPA's goal is to create
chips that reason and adapt, enable smarter sensors, and achieve human-
like performance. Ultimately, our vision is a more adept human
warfighter who uses microelectronics to achieve machine-like precision.
In the last few years, DARPA has had a significant and growing
emphasis in the biological sciences, above and beyond what we're doing
in biological warfare defense. We are taking inspirations from biology
and combining these with DARPA's existing core competencies in the
physical sciences, information technology, engineering and materials,
to create new devices and systems for the warfighter that incorporate
the incredible capabilities of living systems. That is, they are more
adaptive, fault-tolerant, and dynamic in their response to an ever-
changing environment.
For example, we are looking to biological systems to enable us to
create better hardware. DARPA's Controlled Biological and Biomimetic
Systems program is designing shoebox-sized, legged robotic vehicles
that can clamber over rough and overgrown terrain where wheeled and
tracked vehicles can't. We are exploring the use of distributed animal
sentinels--foraging, social insects like honeybees--as environmental
sentinels to collect and report on bioagents and explosives. Living,
swarming sensors if you will.
We are also working to harness biology itself to directly enhance
the performance of our warfighters via several programs to make our
soldiers stronger and safer. For example, our Continuous Assisted
Performance program is looking for ways to prevent fatigue and enable
soldiers to remain awake, alert, and effective for up to 7 days
straight without suffering mental or physical deleterious effects. Our
Metabolic Engineering program is investigating whether naturally
occurring states such as hibernation might one day be temporarily
induced in soldiers who have been severely injured. DARPA's Persistence
In Combat program is looking for ways to take hospital-level emergency
trauma care to the farthest-forward battlefield area of operations,
i.e., directly to the individual, injured warfighter, by equipping him
with non-invasive therapeutics he can self-administer to control
bleeding and pain and dramatically accelerate wound healing. This will
enable all but the most severely wounded warfighters to stay in the
fight and reduce additional casualties among fellow soldiers who would
otherwise come to his aid.
Thus far in my testimony, I have dwelt on DARPA systems for which
the military applications are fairly clear. However, one of the most
exciting things about DARPA is our work on technologies whose exact
military uses are not clear, but their usefulness is. This is part of
what makes being the DARPA Director such a fun job.
For example, our Brain Machine Interface program has demonstrated
that a monkey can control a robot arm using only his thoughts. Let me
be clear about this: we are not tapping into the monkey's nerve
impulses that control his arm. Rather, we are monitoring his actual
thoughts and intentions: the monkey thinks about moving a robotic arm,
an implanted probe detects his brain's neurological impulses, those
impulses are wirelessly transmitted to a robotic arm located in another
room, and the robot arm moves. Simultaneously, the monkey's thought
signals are also sent out via another DARPA development, the Internet,
to a lab 700 miles away, where he simultaneously controls another
robotic arm. So the monkey also uses his brain to do mechanical work
via the Internet!
Thus, we are finding ways to turn thoughts into acts. We do not yet
fully understand the potential implications of this work. But imagine
how useful and important it could be for a warfighter to use only the
power of his thoughts to do things at great distances.
Think about our military commanders years from now. Envision them
commanding warfighters who then can do things merely by thinking about
them; who remain in action and effective for seven days and nights
without sleep; who, if injured, can self-administer rapid-healing
medications that enable them to stay in the fight, and who, if
seriously injured, could be placed in temporary hibernation to prolong
their lives until they can be evacuated to a hospital.
Will all these technologies work? We don't know yet. But I would be
willing to bet you this: if we pursue these technologies now, develop
them successfully, and get them into the hands of our future
warfighters, the U.S. military commander in the field years from today
will value them highly. Our Nation's adversaries will fear them.
Finally, I note the Department is frequently hampered by a
demanding set of statutory requirements, which restricts our
flexibility and, thus, our ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
I ask the Committee to support the President's ``Freedom to Manage''
initiative, so that we would be better able to efficiently and
effectively execute the programs you entrust us with.
Thank you for this opportunity to submit testimony to the
subcommittee.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
computer security/cyberterrorism
1. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, Dr. Marburger, and Dr. Younger, one
emerging terrorist threat is increasingly frequent attacks on computer
networks. What research and development is being done to protect
critical military systems from computer hackers? How is this knowledge
being used to help industry and private citizens at home?
Dr. Sega. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long-term
commitment to computer network security science and technology (S&T)
going back to the origins of the Internet. DOD is concerned with all
aspects of computer network defense, information assurance and critical
infrastructure protection as it impacts critical military systems,
including those owned and operated by the private sector upon which the
warfighter is dependent. DOD S&T investment in this area was $212
million in fiscal year 2001 and $222 million in fiscal year 2002.
Recognizing our increasing reliance on information systems and
potential susceptibility to attacks, our S&T program includes research
in Analysis and Assessment, Mission Assurance, Indications and Warning,
Threat & Vulnerabilities, Remediation, Mitigation Response and
Reconstitution. The rapid pace of advances in information and
communications technology continually brings new challenges and
vulnerabilities. Commensurate with these new challenges, protection of
information and networks will necessarily require even more vigorous
and focused research. This is especially true given DOD's unique
requirements for protection, which continue to be more demanding than
what the private sector requires. The primary responsibility of
orchestrating DOD S&T portfolio is assigned to the Director for Defense
Research and Engineering. A majority of this research is directed by
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National
Security Agency, and the Service Research Offices and Laboratories.
Potential adversaries have also recognized DOD's reliance on
networked computer systems, and the tremendous potential to use this as
an asymmetric threat to the detriment of our military effectiveness.
DOD is developing new methodologies to mitigate the consequences of a
successful attack and restoring its systems. Creating agile and self
healing networks is a key S&T objective. The faster we are able to
detect, isolate and restore a network to its intended purpose is
fundamental to warfighter effectiveness. The events of September 11
have provided DOD with important reasons to reconsider the most serious
national threats facing our nation. Because of the ubiquitous nature of
many of our critical infrastructures, increased cooperation between the
public and private sector is needed to advance the Nation's
cybersecurity posture. In order to achieve the high standard of
protection envisioned by Joint Vision 2020, it is necessary for DOD to
provide leadership in cybersecurity S&T investment in order to keep
pace with the growing threats and our changing environment.
DOD has four Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) in this area:
Information Assurance and Survivability Technology Base, Ultralog,
Information Dominance, and National Infrastructure Protection. These
DTOs are descripted in detail within the Defense Science and Technology
Strategy and Plans which has been previously provided to the Senate
Armed Services Committee. There is also a wide range of research
outside of the DTOs covering topics such as wireless information
assurance, steganography, security wrappers for commercial-off-the-
shelf software, cyberforensics, intelligent agents, intrusion detection
for mobile and high speed networks, situational awareness and network
management, active response, and models for assessing damage from
information attacks.
In 2001, my office established two new University Research
Initiatives focused on cybersecurity. Twenty six grants totaling $9.3
million were awarded in fiscal year 2001 ($16 million in fiscal year
2002) to academic institutions. These grants were designed to enhance
universities' capabilities to perform research related to critical
infrastructure protection and high confidence software to meet DOD
needs. In addition, $4.5 million was awarded in fiscal year 2001 for a
DOD Critical Infrastructure Protection and Information Assurance
Fellows program. These awards are intended to increase the number of
postdoctoral and faculty scientists and engineers conducting high
quality research computer defense and information assurance.
Technology transfer and widespread adoption by industry are
important elements of our efforts. We work with other departments
through the Information Security Research Council, a working group of
U.S. Government research sponsors. More formally, DOD actively
participates in the committee for Research and Development, chaired by
OSTP under Executive Order 13212, to coordinate Federal research and
development for protection of information systems for critical
infrastructures. The committee seeks a coordinated outreach policy for
private sector cybersecurity. DOD's Technology Transfer Program is
focused on creating partnerships between the defense laboratories and
the private sector, working through mechanisms like Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements, to transfer dual-use technology to
the private sector. DOD research has led to commercial spin-offs that
benefit private citizens. An example is the DARPA funded development of
the first firewalls, which are now in common use in the home and
businesses. My office oversees the Software Engineering Institute
(SEI). SEI's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) is a national
clearinghouse on computer vulnerability notifications, security best
practices preventive information, and incident warnings for viruses and
other threats. They have a strong program of training and education
available to private industry. The information available from the CERT
is used extensively by industry, is accessible to the public at large,
and reflects our commitment to ``raise the bar'' on computer security
nationally.
Dr. Marburger. The Department of Defense (DOD) has traditionally
supplied the lion's share of R&D support for critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) almost exclusively in the area of Information
Assurance. Total Federal CIP, R&D funding has been between $480-600
million over the last few years, with defense providing typically about
80 percent of the total funding in this area.
Recognizing the increasing reliance on information systems by other
critical infrastructures and their potential susceptibility to attacks,
DOD is engaged in a wide range of activities that focus on protection
of computer networks. Examples of some of the R&D activities currently
underway include:
Assurance Methodologies
(1) Detecting subtle information integrity attacks, developing
algorithms for self-repair, and creating techniques to map mission-
critical services to remaining trustworthy resources; and
(2) quantifying and analyzing security and survivability
requirements and assessing the degree of compliance and assurance
achieved.
Cyber Panel
(1) Designing attack detection sensors and sensor placement and
developing the correlation algorithms to detect highly sophisticated
stealthy distributed attacks spread out over time and space;
(2) allowing operators to monitor the operation and attack state of
information systems and networks on which they depend, at theater
scales and in operationally relevant terms, and to observe and
manipulate the operation of security and survivability features;
(3) modeling of system and application configuration and resource
requirements while accounting for dynamic characteristics such as
migration of mobile processing or operation of automatic load-balancing
or failover features,
(4) the creation of rich and general models of coordinated and
large-scale attacks, rather than the low level and anecdotal
representations that now exist; and
(5) validation of network monitoring and response research efforts.
Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems
(1) Ensuring the continued availability and graceful degradation of
the system under partially successful attacks, minimizing resources
available to attackers while maximizing the residual capacity available
to legitimate users;
(2) determining the difference between malicious and accidental
faults; and
(3) effectively integrating the resulting wide variety of intrusion
detection, correlation, intrusion tolerance, and response technologies
to provide the maximum possible protection while simultaneously
minimizing the performance degradation and additional cost incurred by
these mechanisms.
Fault Tolerant Networks
(1) Eliminating network services single points of failure;
(2) fortifying network elements to defeat or resist denial of
service attacks; and
(3) developing tools and techniques to restore degraded networks to
an acceptable operating level.
Several organizations exist that facilitate the exchange of
information regarding R&D activities across the Federal Government. One
such organization is the INFOSEC Research Council (IRC), a self-
chartered coordination body of U.S. Government sponsors of information
security research. The IRC has evolved from being primarily a DOD
oriented activity to a group that now spans a greater portion of the
Federal Government. In a more formal way, the DOD, CIP, and R&D efforts
are coordinated under Executive Order 13212. This Executive Order
established a Standing Committee for Research and Development, chaired
by OSTP, to coordinate a program of Federal Government research and
development for protection of information systems for critical
infrastructure.
With regard to your question about how the R&D knowledge is being
used to help industry and private citizens at home, I call your
attention to DOD's Technology Transfer Program. The Technology Transfer
Program is focused on creating partnerships between the defense
laboratories and the private sector, working through mechanisms like
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements, to bring commercial
technology into defense systems and transfer dual-use technology to the
private sector. Designated personnel within each Defense R&D facility
are responsible for seeking opportunities to match defense and
commercial technology needs. A Defense Technology Transfer Information
System has been established to help match.
Dr. Younger. DTRA is not involved in information operations. That
is out of the scope of our charter. We focus on Chemical, Biological,
Radiological Nuclear and High Explosives, a.k.a. Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD). Nevertheless, we do look at information operations
during our single point vulnerability assessments done under the
Balanced Survivability Assessment (BSA) program sponsored by the
Assistant Secretay of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence.
corrosion
2. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, the Department of Defense spends
billions of dollars annually in repairing corrosion damage to ships,
tanks, planes, and other facilities. What research and development is
being used so that future systems will not suffer the same rust and
corrosion problems of current systems? What is the current and planned
investment level in this area in each service and agency?
Dr. Sega. The Service Components and Office of the Secretary of
Defense have various science and technology (S&T) programs (6.1, 6.2,
and 6.3) investigating advanced means to detect, evaluate, and control
hidden and visible corrosion in platform structures and subsystems. The
S&T projects emphasize the sustainment of current aircraft, ships, and
ground vehicles as well as developing more corrosion resistant advanced
materials and processes, which are also inherently environmentally
benign. Four of our Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs), which are
focused and relatively near-term joint projects, directly support
corrosion control projects with high potential impact on materiel life
extension and affordable maintainability. These joint Service DTOs with
their associated fiscal year 2003 proposed funding are ``Nondestructive
Evaluation for System Life'' funded at $4.9 million, ``Materials and
Processes for Metal Cleaning, Corrosion Control, and Coatings'' funded
at $1.8 million, "Condition-Based Maintenance/Integrity Monitoring"
funded at $7.5 million, and ``Materials Technologies to Enable Enhanced
Life Management and Combat Readiness of Weapon System Assets'' funded
at $0.8 million. In addition to these very focused DTO programs, there
is enabling applied research and advanced technology development being
conducted by each of the Services and several agencies in projects such
as non-chromate primers, hydrolytically stable resin systems for
coatings, mission tailorable topcoats, stainless steel hull materials
and appropriate coatings, applique coatings, many sensor and wireless
communication projects for corrosion and health monitoring of
structures, and environmentally benign processes for coating removal
and disposal. The direct 6.2 plus 6.3 investment in these and related
research for fiscal year 2003 is $3.1 million for the Army, $9.6
million for the Navy, and $18.4 million for the Air Force. The total
basic research budget associated with corrosion and closely related
topics is robust and forward-looking with an annual investment
estimated at $8 million per year for advanced corrosion resistant
coatings, advanced detection techniques, and fundamental understanding
of corrosion and degradation processes. The Multidisciplinary
University Research Initiative (MURI), administered by my office,
regularly sponsors programs, usually nearly $1 million per year for 3
to 5 years, in corrosion and related areas. Most recently in fiscal
year 2000 a program on ``Science Underpinning Prime Reliant Coatings''
was begun. In fiscal year 1996 two MURI programs were funded
specifically addressing corrosion and one was begun on nondestructive
inspection. The Strategic Environmental Research and Development
Program, which is also administered by my office, supports several
projects to reduce environmental impact of corrosion control materials
and processes. Historically Strategic Environmental Research and
Development Program (SERDP) awards in the area of corrosion control
have been approximately $6 million annually and we anticipate there
will be no change in fiscal year 2003.
intellectual property/royalties
3. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, how much intellectual property
revenue does the Department of Defense generate from its past
technology developments? How can we work to ensure that the Department
generates revenue from the commercial spinoff of defense technologies?
How does the Department get a return on investment on its basic and
applied research funding?
Dr. Sega. The Defense Department has seen a gradual increase in its
royalty income from patenting and then licensing technology developed
for mission requirements. In fiscal year 2001, $6.3 million was
received in royalty income. This income is derived from technologies
patented in fiscal year 2001 as well as technologies developed within
the past 15 years. Commercialization of a technology can take years of
additional work after initial invention disclosure and because DOD
invests in basic and some applied research, many times significant
additional investment is required for commercial firms to be able to
fully utilize the technology in its product line.
The Defense Department differs from most other Federal Departments
because we are the customer for the technology we develop: our
investments are based on mission need and commercial application is a
secondary consideration. Having said this, we are working to educate
our scientists and engineers on the value of intellectual property (IP)
and the need to protect it before releasing it to the public. We are
developing an Intellectual Property Management Information System
(IPMIS) to allow us to better manage IP within the Department, in
valuing these assets, and in marketing it to the private sector.
Additionally, we have directed our partnership intermediary, TechLink,
to focus its primary efforts on assisting in licensing our patents.
The DOD's primary return on its investment in basic and applied
research funding is the ability to draw on technical expertise and new
capabilities for DOD systems. Teaming with our colleagues in industry
and academia allows DOD to get the ``best of the best,'' leverage
resources to accomplish our research and development, and transfer
technology/expertise/information into and out of the DOD.
global scientific leadership
4. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Marburger, Dr. Sega, and Dr. Younger, are
there any technology areas in which you feel that the United States is
trailing some of our global competitors? What would you recommend we do
to catch up in these areas? How do we keep track of which technology
areas are critical to the military? How do we monitor if the United
States has fallen behind in these areas?
Dr. Marburger. The United States retains preeminence in areas of
national security science and technology. Our scientific and
technological excellence spans the range of physical, chemical,
biological and engineering sciences. Noteworthy examples are U.S.
leadership in information technology and nanotechnology. Sustaining our
outstanding capabilities in science and technology that underpin our
global leadership will depend on continued judicious collaboration and
partnership with our military allies and other international partners.
Technology areas that are critical to our military excellence are
tracked through a number of mechanisms. One means is through the
deliberations of interagency working groups I established as part of
the Antiterrorism Task Force under the National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC). In particular, two of these working groups, co-chaired
by OSTP--the Radiological, Nuclear, and Conventional Detection and
Response Working Group and the Biological and Chemical Preparedness
Working Group--coordinate Federal antiterrorism R&D efforts and are
responsible for setting a 5-year research agenda.
In addition, OSTP also is engaged fully in such interagency groups
as the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group, led
by the Department of State, and the Counterproliferation Program Review
Committee, chaired by the Department of Defense. These groups serve to
coordinate programs in areas of treaty verification and counter
proliferation, and in doing so, monitor science and technology on a
global scale. OSTP also maintains awareness of innovation and the
global state of science and technology through its close interactions
with the National Academies, and, in particular, through the committee
on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy and the committee on the
Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism.
OSTP also interacts with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
to monitor the global state of science and technology for national
security and combating terrorism. The TSWG, also an interagency group,
rapidly develops technology and equipment to meet the high-priority
needs of the combating terrorism community, and addresses joint
international operational requirements through cooperative R&D with the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel.
Finally, as I stated at the American Association for the
Advancement of Science Symposium, our nation today is a science
superpower. The scope of our scientific activity, both basic and
applied, is breathtaking and unmatched. We are not, however, a science
monopoly, and we have much to learn from colleagues elsewhere in the
world. We cannot limit scientific interactions with other nations
without paying a scientific price.
Dr. Sega. There are a few notable capabilities, concentrated in
niche technical areas around the globe, where the U.S. trails. Many of
these are dual-use technologies whose development is driven by
commercial markets. Others are areas that we have elected not to
aggressively pursue in order to focus our research on higher value
areas. Additionally, some world class capabilities result from unique
situations and experiences. It is important we identify countries that
have equal or better capabilities in certain areas, particularly those
areas related directly to national security. The Department's
Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) is continually updated to
provide this information.
As a minimum, we need to continue to monitor world-wide technical
capabilities, assess the criticality of foreign technology leads and
focus research and development funds, as appropriate, to remedy any
critical technology gaps. In some cases we rely on the marketplace to
drive U.S. industry to catch up. In militarily critical areas we also
use cooperative research and development arrangements such as joint
project development arrangements and information exchanges to leverage
the technology advances of Allies and friendly countries.
In some cases, the U.S. may purchase commercially available
technologies, eliminating development costs in terms of time and money.
For example, three areas we are focusing on to increase research
and development are: hypersonics technologies; wide-band gap
semiconductor and material processing technologies; robotics, energetic
materials, and energy storage and generating devices.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency maintains the MCTL. The MCTL
lists two categories of technologies with potential military
application, weapons systems technologies and developing critical
technologies. Within each technology area critical parameters, critical
materials, unique test production, inspection equipment and unique
software are identified. Content of the MCTL is developed by the
Technology Working Groups (TWGs) comprised of representatives from
industry and academia as well as DOD research, development, test and
engineering facilities and the operational commands with DOD guidance
and approval. The Intelligence Community also tracks foreign technology
threats. This information is linked to U.S. military capabilities in
the MCTL via Intelligence Community participation in the TWGs.
The MCTL includes assessments of foreign technical capabilities in
the critical regions of each technology area. These assessments are
based on the expert knowledge of the members of the TWGs augmented with
additional information provided by knowledgable domestic and foreign
sources.
Additionally, the Department is actively engaged in international
cooperative activities with our Allies. Such engagements increase our
awareness of international capabilities. Also, the Military Departments
operate international field offices around the globe staffed with
technical experts who support cooperative activities and monitor
research and development within the regions they support.
Dr. Younger. The DOD maintains a MCTL that is a detailed compendium
of information on technologies that the Department of Defense assesses
as critical to maintaining superior U.S. military capabilities. Within
those technologies that are in the DTRA mission charter, we monitor and
sponsor research in academia, industry, allied countries, and through
the Intelligence Community we track progress by potential adversaries.
These sources permit us to maintain a good estimate of our relative
technological position, but we can never be fully sure that we will not
be surprised. The best way to avoid a surprise that results in damage
to our national interests is to maintain robust technology programs for
agility to respond quickly to mitigate emerging asymmetries. One area
in which the U.S. may trail others is in the area of energetic
materials. The Russians have made a considerable investment in this
area and we are learning more about the progress they have made.
actds
5. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, your testimony highlighted the
important role that ACTDs play in technology transition. However,
despite the elaborate approval process, some ACTDs do not transition
quickly or at all. Would the transition success rate of ACTDs be
improved by funding a smaller number of projects, but at more robust
levels?
Dr. Sega. We continue to work to improve technology transition
through ACTD. We have many transition successes for ACTDs, including 30
ACTDs contributing products that have participated in either Operation
Enduring Freedom or Operation Noble Eagle. Global Hawk and Predator,
two highly visible systems in recent combat operations, started as
ACTDs. Forty-eight ACTDs transitioned over 108 products including 36
that entered production. The 108 also includes a small number of ACTDs
that have been terminated and another small number returned for
additional technical development. I consider these terminations and
returns to the tech base as successes because if ACTDs do not have a
small, but measurable failure rate, we are not accepting enough risk.
We can and will do better on transition results, but we do not
necessarily achieve greater success by lowering the bar. In the past
year we established a dedicated transition office within our Advanced
Systems and Concepts organization. We are establishing Transition
Managers as a required element of new ACTDs and mandating an agreed
Transition Plan as a part of our management documentation. The purpose
is to have several people who know their job is to transition ACTD
products. We are also experimenting with a new funding profile that
will pay a higher percentage of funds overall and increase our share
(as compared to the Service/Agency funding) in the early and final
years of an ACTD. The early increase is designed to jump start an ACTD
when Service funding is already committed to other projects. The final
year funding increase is designed to enable successful ACTDs to develop
more of the necessary attributes of normal acquisition programs like
sustainability, maintainability and reliability.
The Department has set a goal of starting 15 new ACTDs per year,
though many more ACTDs are proposed annually. However, we will not
start an ACTD that does not have a combatant commander and a Service or
Agency as sponsors, that does not have adequate funding to complete a
demonstration, that does not have a plan for transition pending
successful demonstration, and that does not have Joint Requirements
Oversight Council validation as a military need. With the many
Departmental needs for joint solutions to warfighter problems, 15 ACTDs
per year is a goal towards which we should strive.
6. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, one of the issues in transitioning
ACTDs into follow-on acquisition programs is funding discontinuities.
There is often no funding programmed into follow-on programs to
leverage the concepts demonstrated by the ACTD. Why doesn't the
Department plan its budget assuming the success of ongoing ACTDs, so
that funding is available immediately when the ACTD is completed?
Dr. Sega. Funding discontinuities have been a challenge for ACTD as
well as for any Departmental program that attempts to rapidly move
important new technology to the warfighter. The budget system
essentially requires the Services to plan their funding programs 2
years in advance. When innovative technologies emerge through ACTDs or
experimentation, there is often a need for a funding bridge to enable
that technology to survive until the budgeting process can support it.
We are working hard to solve this problem.
We are experimenting with a new funding profile that will pay a
higher percentage of funds overall and increase our share (as compared
to the Service/Agency funding) in the early and final years of an ACTD.
The early increase is designed to jump start an ACTD when Service
funding is already committed to other projects. The final year funding
increase is designed to enable successful ACTDs to develop more of the
necessary attributes of normal acquisition programs like
sustainability, maintainability and reliability. The additional funding
requirements partially explain the department's increased budget
request for ACTDs in fiscal year 2003. We also insist that ACTD
transition managers are from the acquisition/program management side of
the Department to ensure successful ACTDs find a home early in
established programs.
Another argument against presuming the success of ACTDs and fully
budgeting for their transition from the start is that we want a small
percentage of ACTDs to fail or we are not accepting enough risk in the
ACTD program. One downside to having transition funding identified for
ACTDs at their commencement is this funding could negatively impact the
objectivity of the military utility assessment, since there will be
tremendous pressure to declare success so that follow-on funding will
not be placed at risk.
The Department has set a goal of starting 15 new ACTDs per year.
However, we will not start an ACTD that does not have a combatant
commander and a Service or Agency as sponsors, that does not have
adequate funding to complete a demonstration, that does not have a plan
for transition pending successful demonstration, and that does not have
Joint Requirements Oversight Council validation as a military need.
With the processes described above, the Department has the funding
flexibility to ensure successful ACTDs are able to transition into
acquisition programs.
test and evaluation
7. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, what science and technology efforts
are underway to improve our test and evaluation capabilities,
especially in new technology areas such as space, high energy lasers,
and unmanned systems?
Dr. Sega. The Department recognizes that weapons systems testing
and evaluation is an intrinsic part of the entire research,
development, and acquisition process. Modern weapons systems are
designed and fabricated with much more on-board sensing and diagnostic
tools and capability that assist in both the test and evaluation and
subsequent operation of the systems. We also realize that, as Defense
systems become more complex and need to operate more autonomously, the
technical sophistication of our testing and evaluation infrastructure
must be increased to match. To that end in fiscal year 2002, the
Department initiated a new program within the Office of the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) called Test and Evaluation/
Science and Technology (T&E/S&T), PE603941D8Z. This program is designed
to exploit new technologies and expedite their transition from the
laboratory into the test and evaluation community. The T&E/S&T program
will specifically focus resources on test technologies to support test
and evaluation of transformation initiatives such as the ones you
noted.
In fiscal year 2002 the program is investing in spectrum efficient
technologies, multi-spectral test technologies, and hypersonics test
technologies. Technologies pursued under these crosscutting focus areas
begin to address test shortfalls derived from the transformational
weapons technologies cited in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Additionally, a test technology investment-roadmap is being developed
that identifies the technical challenges to testing advanced weapon
systems and the required solution paths to meeting those challenges. My
office is working very closely with DOT&E and is co-hosting the
workshops to develop the needed investment strategy.
This T&E/S&T planning will be the foundation for building our
outyear budgets and will encompass the breadth of challenges that face
us, including testing directed energy weapons, space based systems,
unmanned systems, smart munitions, hard and deeply buried target
weapons, network centric warfare, and homeland defense systems.
Additionally, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, DOT&E, and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness are committed to better integration of test and
training facilities/events by pursuing new technologies leading to
embedded instrumentation and common control systems.
I fully support the need to accelerate the development of advanced
test technologies and integrated design for testability and believe
that a robust T&E/S&T program is critical to ensuring that we have the
capability to fully and completely test the weapons systems that are
fielded in the future.
8. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, the Department has set a goal of 3
percent of the President's budget dedicated to science and technology
in order to support transformation. A robust science and technology
program, research and development program, and procurement budget will
require a robust test and evaluation infrastructure. Should the
Department set a similar percentage goal for test and evaluation
capabilities?
Dr. Sega. No. Test and Evaluation is an integral part of Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation and should be budgeted accordingly.
jason
9. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Tether and Dr. Sega, what role has JASON
played in developing past science and technology goals and programs?
What is the status of the JASON contract? What is the proposed fiscal
year 2003 funding level for JASON? What types of questions will the
JASONs be tasked to analyze?
Dr. Tether. The JASONs have conducted numerous studies and analyses
since their inception. DARPA has used the group to investigate and
evaluate new technologies and concepts, to better inform DARPA
management's investment decisions.
DARPA did not use the JASONs to formulate programs, but used the
information provided by the JASONs as we put together our vision for
militarily useful and technically feasible programs.
Because DARPA does not intend to serve as sole sponsor for the
JASONs after fiscal year 2002, we did not include any funding in our
fiscal year 2003 President's Budget Request.
As I understand the situation, the JASONs are now under contract to
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. We do expect that we
will continue to use the JASONs' expertise for as yet undetermined
studies and analyses in the future. When we do, we will pay for the
study, as do all other users of the JASONs.
Dr. Sega. The JASONs, like other formal Department of Defense
advisory groups, have played an important role in providing
independent, outside review and advice to the Department's science and
technology program. A key role has been linking the Department to the
state-of-the-art theory, primarily in physics and engineering. By
providing advice on the technological feasibility of different proposed
solutions, JASONs provide input to DOD science and technology (S&T)
goals and programs, but do not formulate the goals directly.
A new contract was finalized and signed between the government and
MITRE in early May, running through December 31, 2002. MITRE acts as
the JASONs administrator. This new contract is for approximately $3.3
million, with DDR&E sponsorship of approximately $1 million. Other
government agencies, both within and outside the DOD, fund the JASONs
on a task-order arrangement under the Director Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) contract up to the ceiling of $3.3 million. We have
not yet created a separate budget item for the JASONs in fiscal year
2003, but intend to support them at about the same level of investment
in fiscal year 2003 as in fiscal year 2002 (approximately $1 million
from DDE) with additional funds coming from other government agencies.
This year, the DDR&E has asked the JASONs to conduct two studies.
The first is a study on technological feasibility of hypersonic flight
systems (to Mach 25), to include a review of current activity and
recommendations of future technology residules. The second study is an
assessment of technology available or planned that will reduce the
power and energy dependence of the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine
while examining best avenues for research and development into power
generation and energy storage systems. This will include an assessment
of the viability of devices such as fuel cells for the warrior, higher
energy density batteries, and so forth.
darpa strategic plan
10. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Tether, a recent Defense Science Board
study called for the development of a strategic plan for DARPA. Does
DARPA have a strategic plan? How is this plan developed? What other
defense organizations are involved in the development of this plan?
Dr. Tether. DARPA's strategy is described in my written testimony
and implements DARPA's role as DOD's central technology research and
development arm with the mission to conceive, explore, and demonstrate
the most advanced breakthrough concepts and technologies that will
ensure continuing U.S. technological superiority.
While my testimony describes our strategy, it admittedly does not
describe how it was developed.
The research priorities in my testimony are based on a number of
inputs that we receive from a host of sources. Since DARPA is
opportunity driven, our strategy is continuously updated.
Ideas for new warfighting capabilities are suggested to the DARPA
Office Directors, DARPA's Deputy Director and me from: (1) our Program
Managers; (2) industry and universities; (3) formal science boards such
as the Defense Science Board, Army Science Board, Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board, Navy Research Advisory Council; and (4) informal groups
such as Information Science and Technology Study Group and Defense
Science Research Council.
In addition, I personally learn which new capabilities are needed
from frequent meetings with the Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs,
Commanders in Chief of Joint Commands, Directors and senior leadership
of Defense Agencies such as National Security Agency, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, Defense
Information Systems Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, as well as the
Central Intelligence Agency, National Academy of Sciences, and the
National Science Foundation. My Deputy Director and DARPA's Office
Directors and Program Managers also do this outreach at all levels.
As stated in my testimony, a DARPA program does not start with what
a military commander wants today. Instead, we look at what future
commanders would need to maintain our forces' decisive superiority at
all levels of warfare.
DARPA looks beyond today's known needs and requirements. As
military historians noted, ``None of the most important weapons
transforming warfare in the 20th century--the airplane, tank, radar,
jet engine, helicopter, electronic computer, not even the atomic bomb--
owed its initial development to a doctrinal requirement or request of
the military.''\1\ None of them. To this list, DARPA would add stealth,
unmanned air vehicles, and the advanced military information systems
enabled by internet technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ John Chambers, ed., The Oxford Companion to American Military
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 791.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DARPA Office Directors and Program Managers are required to focus
on the ideas that would dramatically change how our forces would fight
in the future, to go after the capabilities that would enable U.S.
forces to dominate the battlefield. Our unique mission has made DARPA
the technological engine of military transformation, and that is what
DARPA's strategy is all about.
One of the major values for having a clear strategy is to
communicate what we think is important so that creative people who are
interested in working high risk, high payoff projects can recommend
ideas and concepts. DARPA is always open to new ideas, from any source.
We communicate our strategy in many ways. One important way is
through the written testimony I have provided. I am sure you realize
that your publication of the testimony will be studied by many who are
interested in science and technology projects here in the United States
and around the world.
Additionally, we brief our strategy when we are asked to appear
before a formal body or an industrial association.
Finally, DARPA has a major symposium approximately every 18 months
where our strategy is presented in great detail over several days. The
next time this will be done is DARPATech 2002, which is being held from
July 30 to August 3 in Anaheim, California. We expect well over 1000
attendees from industry, universities, other parts of DOD, and
Congress.
annual review of contracts
11. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Tether, DARPA has recently begun to
annually review contracts for renewal. This may have the effect of
driving research programs to focus on near-term deliverables, rather
than the revolutionary, long-term research that DARPA has excelled in.
This may be particularly difficult for university researchers who
employ and fund graduate students using DARPA funding. What is the
effect of the DARPA contract review and renewal policy on university
participation in DARPA-sponsored research?
Dr. Tether. Reviewing awards for renewal is not new at DARPA.
DARPA's multiple year efforts are incrementally funded and are reviewed
for renewal at the start of every fiscal year. Typically this renewal
requires a certification by the Program Manager that the contractor has
performed as expected and that the project is still worthwhile and
likely to benefit the Department of Defense.
More recently I have formalized establishing Go/No-Go milestones
for multiple year efforts. These milestones are not based on the fiscal
calendar but on what makes sense in the context of the project, which
usually seems to be approximately every 18 months.
The Program Manager, Office Director, and I jointly develop the Go/
No-Go milestones as a series of interim achievements required to
achieve the ultimate goals of the project. The milestones are then
communicated to all performers so they also know what needs to be done
by whom and by when.
Setting these expectations results in fewer misunderstandings and
more healthy relationships between DARPA and our performers. Our Go/No-
Go milestones will not make our work less revolutionary nor do I think
they will interfere with university participation in DARPA programs.
Instead, I view them as a technique for providing solid management and
accountability for the significant investments we make with taxpayer
dollars.
My experience has shown this to be a very effective way to manage
the development of technical capability that is truly revolutionary but
that may not be achieved for many years, perhaps beyond the tenure of
the current researchers. This technique allows progress to occur
quickly and keeps everyone focused on accomplishing goals they can see
happen yet that will still have a big long-term impact. Industry
understands this method because it is a technique used by the best
industrial managers for executing a difficult multiyear contract.
If a Go/No-Go milestone is not satisfied, one of several options
can occur.
Option 1. It may be that the effort to date proved that the
criteria could not be satisfied. In this case, there is no need to go
on since it was established at the beginning that this Go/No-Go was
necessary to reach the long-range capability.
Option 2. It may be that the effort showed that a technology that
was assumed to be available for use in the effort and satisfying the
Go/No-Go is not available. In this case, the effort might be re-
directed to further develop the required requisite technology.
Option 3. It may be that the effort initially estimated for
achieving the Go/No-Go was underestimated. In this case, the effort may
be continued but rather than going on to the next phase, the effort
would continue to work on satisfying the current Go/No-Go.
At a recent meeting I had with the deans of several prominent
engineering schools I explained the purpose of the Go/No-Go milestones;
I believe I received a ``buy-in'' from them. After all, it's analogous
to the process by which the ultimate goal of students is to graduate,
but they have to pass courses and take demanding tests all along the
way.
That said, I understand how researchers who may be more familiar
with grants awarded by National Science Foundation (NSF) or National
Institute of Health (NIH) might be uncomfortable with the more focused
demands DARPA places on them. NSF and NIH do an outstanding job
building scientific knowledge and capacity. Only a portion of DARPA
funding is awarded via a grant since we are in the business of creating
specific technical capabilities to transform our national security.
Accordingly we use a different set of management approaches, including
Go/No-Go milestones.
unfunded s&t priorities
12. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, Dr. Tether, Admiral Cohen, Dr.
Andrews, and Dr. Engle, if more money were to become available for
science and technology programs, in what technology areas would you
like the opportunity to make increased investment?
Dr. Sega. There are three particular areas that warrant special
attention to support transformation; (1) aerospace technologies; (2)
surveillance and knowledge systems; and (3) energy and power
technologies. The technology programs in these areas have broad
application toward transformation. They also have intrinsic
``jointness'' characteristics. I think we have an opportunity to
rapidly advance the Department's goal of transforming the military by
enhancing ``aerospace'' capabilities. I believe this can be
accomplished through an integrated technology development and
demonstration approach in three major aerospace areas: hypersonic
flight, access to space, and advanced space technologies. We are
currently in the process of developing an aerospace technology plan
within this framework which has parallel, synergistic thrusts across
these areas and is characterized by an aggressive ``stepping stone''
approach, to include flight demonstrations, in order to push technical
frontiers. This has the potential to offer new capabilities to the
warfighter incrementally through ``off ramps'' from the flight
demonstrations for fielding systems. This effort could develop and
demonstrate leap-ahead technologies providing enhanced knowledge,
speed, agility and lethality applicable to time critical targets; long
range strike options; efficient, affordable, and responsive access to
space; and new approaches to space control and missile defense.
The second area is surveillance and knowledge systems. The outcomes
from this research could provide joint and coalition forces an optimal,
persistent, common battlespace view for rapid decision making and
execution through seamless and timely exploitation of all surveillance
assets. The four technical thrust areas we plan to seek future funding
in are sensors and unmanned vehicles; high bandwidth communications and
information assurance; information/knowledge management systems; and
cyber warfare.
The third area is energy and power which should have a direct
bearing on future aerospace systems, enabling significant reductions in
size and weight of platforms while improving performance. Four
technical thrust areas we plan to seek future funding in are power
generation, energy storage, power management and control, and directed
energy. These areas impact transforming capabilities and should provide
much greater capabilities to generate, store, and supply electrical and
other forms of energy to nearly all air, ground, sea, and space
platforms.
Additionally, we have identified information operations, space,
robotics, hard and deeply buried targets, advanced energetics, advanced
electronics, and military medicine as other joint areas of importance.
Dr. Tether. The fiscal year 2003 President's budget provides for a
balanced science and technology program and correctly places much of
the Department's emphasis on transformation squarely on the shoulders
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. While transformation
can, and will, occur with existing resources, there are several
technology areas that offer substantial promise for the next generation
of warfighters and are areas that would benefit from increased funding.
The first area is space. Military leaders are always taught to seek
and defend the high ground, and space is the ultimate high ground.
The Secretary of Defense has directed DARPA to develop the
technologies necessary to ensure rapid access to space, protect U.S.
space assets, control adversary space-borne resources, and exploit the
unique advantages that space provides, particularly for surveillance
and response.
DARPA's fiscal year 2003 request funds a number of initiatives in
these areas within its topline but additional funds could be used to
develop a greater array of space capabilities and could also be applied
to existing efforts to accelerate their development.
Another exciting area is what DARPA terms ``cognitive computing.''
DARPA has been at the forefront of the information technology
revolution and has fostered a number of the technologies essential to
the information age.
DARPA envisions cognitive computing as the next ``leap'' in
information processing. It would enable direct linkage between mind and
machine, enable a computing system to gauge the physiological state of
the user and modify its presentation to suit the needs of that user,
and re-design computing system architectures to handle the kinds of
multi-variable and uncertainty-riddled problems that the current
linear/digital computer structures have trouble solving.
The initial phases of this technology development are funded in the
fiscal year 2003 request but greater funding would allow more expansive
efforts.
Biologically based technologies are another area that offers
significant promise to the future warfighter. If lessons from the
astounding survival of existing organisms could be adapted to the
warfighter, operations in extreme environments could be enhanced.
Precious and perishable supplies of organic substances like blood
could be safely stored and transported. The advanced concealment
techniques of animals could hold the promise of improved camouflage.
DARPA has established a new project in fiscal year 2003 whose focus
is development and demonstration of biologically based devices and
concepts. Additional resources would allow further attention to be
placed on programs in this area.
The House Armed Services Committee has proposed substantial
reductions in all three of the aforementioned areas. In this
environment, DARPA would be grateful if it could maintain the proposed
programs at the level requested in the President's budget.
Senate support of the budget requests for these three areas is
essential if the Department is to realize its transformation goals and
be prepared for the next generation of threats.
Admiral Cohen. Increased Navy investment opportunities for Anti-
Terrorism include:
[In millions of dollars]
Littoral Surface Craft/Experimental........................ 15
Force Protection........................................... 15
Free Electron Laser Weaponization.......................... 10
High Power Microwave....................................... 15
Hypersonic Weapon.......................................... 10
Affordable Weapon.......................................... 5
Hairy Buffalo.............................................. 9
Project M Shock Mitigation................................. 5
Naval fire Support Barrage Round........................... 5
Agile Vaccines............................................. 3
CINC-21 ACTD for FORCEnet.................................. 5
Dr. Andrews. Our first priority in Army science and technology
(S&T) is to accelerate technologies for the Future Combat Systems
(FCS). Specifically we would like to increase investments in hybrid
electric vehicle components, active protection system technologies, and
mission equipment packages for unmanned aerial vehicles, common (air/
ground) operating picture integration technologies, and Objective Force
Warrior (OFW) technology to synchronize these efforts with FCS
fielding. We also seek additional funding for modeling and simulation
technologies to speed concept and technology development for the FCS
and OFW system of systems development and acquisition approaches.
Dr. Engle. The results of the Fiscal Year 2001 Science and
Technology (S&T) Planning Review point to several technology areas that
warrant increased investment if additional funding were available. As
directed by Congress in the fiscal year 2001 National Defense
Authorization Act, this S&T review identified both Short-Term
Objectives and Long-Term Challenges. Two technology areas reflected in
the Short-Term Objectives are Information Technology and Advanced
Weapons. Key Information Technology efforts include Joint Battlespace
Infosphere (JBI), Effects-Based Operations (EBO), and Time-Critical
Targeting. Key Advanced Weapons efforts include High Power Microwaves
for Airborne Applications, Effects-Based Weapons, and Airborne Tactical
Lasers. In the Long Term Challenges arena increased emphasis is
highlighted in the nanostructure materials area. This has broad
applications to several transformational warfighter capabilites
providing improved performance in embedded sensors, self-diagnostic
structures, and electromagnetic shielding.
future combat systems
13. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Andrews and Dr. Tether, how has the
acceleration of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) schedule affected your
technology development efforts? What are some technology areas that are
not likely to be mature enough to include in FCS Block I? Are these
areas being funded adequately, so that they may be ready for future
versions of FCS?
Dr. Andrews. We have carefully reviewed all FCS technology efforts
and focused resources on the highest priority technologies that also
have the greatest probability of being transitioned in time for the FCS
Milestone B decision. The Army has requested $654 million in the fiscal
year 2003 President's budget to mature and accelerate FCS enabling
technologies such as advanced armor and active protection, hybrid
electric vehicle drive components, advanced sensors and signature
management.
Technologies still needed, but requiring further development and
continued investment for insertion into future versions of FCS include:
Compact Kinetic Energy Missile
Extended Range Precision Attack Missile and increased
endurance Loiter Attack Missile with Netted Inter-Missile
Connectivity
Advanced Multi-Spectral Payloads for Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles
Fully-Autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicles
Multi-Role (Direct and Indirect Fire) Cannon with
Extended Range Ammunition Suite
Dr. Tether. The acceleration affected some of our development
efforts.
Technologies are naturally maturing at differing rates. We have
divided the technologies into two categories. First, technologies that
will be ready for transition in FCS Block I. Second, those technologies
that require further development and definition for successful
deployment in Block II and later.
Technologies that have been accelerated to ensure sufficient
maturity for fielding under FCS Block I include NetFires, Organic Air
Vehicles, Small Unit Operations: Situational Awareness System, and FCS-
Communications.
Those technologies still undergoing development and design include-
A160 and the Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle concepts. These will be
ready for Block II.
The DARPA/Army FCS program is fully funded through fiscal year 2003
at levels that will allow us to meet the Army's desired fielding
schedule.
workforce
14. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, Dr. Marburger described the
Department of Energy's lab workforce issues as being very different
than DOD's. Would a similar system in which the DOD labs are
contractor-operated be useful in addressing workforce issues? Would
this model be consistent with the mission of the DOD labs?
Dr. Sega. The workforce issues of the DOD laboratories are
different from those of Department of Energy. I do not believe that
converting our DOD laboratories to contractor operated facilities is a
useful way to address our workforce issues. We currently have a
significant number of contractor personnel in our labs assisting the
civilian-military workforce in accomplishing the defense laboratory
missions. We also have strong collaborations between our laboratories
and universities. The DOD Laboratory Model is a good one, but
improvements are needed to insure they continue to produce the research
and technology successes needed by the Nation in the future.
15. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, would a pilot program that
authorized a limited number of excepted service personnel slots for
defense laboratories and test and evaluation centers help address the
issue of attracting and retaining the technical workforce? Would the
Department utilize such authority?
Dr. Sega. We have initiated action to implement a pilot program
under the authority provided in Section 1113 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2001. The Services have been given the authority
to proceed in filling their respective allocation of 40 positions in
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics). Once the pilot program in complete, and the results are
in, we will consider requesting additional excepted service personnel
slots as appropriate.
small business outreach
16. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega and Dr. Marburger, what
informational materials and programs are available to non-traditional
contractors who are seeking to understand the defense contracting
process?
Dr. Marburger. OSTP works closely with Department of Defense
science and technology organizations and with the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG) to ensure that anyone seeking to understand the
defense contracting process is provided an appropriate point of contact
for information and programs that are available to non-traditional
contractors. DOD and TSWG maintain a number of websites with
informational materials on solicitations that are also published in the
Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps).
Dr. Sega. There are numerous avenues available to non-traditional
small business firms seeking to understand the Defense contracting
process. The Department (DOD) has several publications designed to
assist companies interested in Defense work. Two such key publications
include the ``Guide to DOD Contracting Opportunities'' that outlines 10
key steps for a company interested in defense opportunities and
``Selling to the Military'' intended to assist a company in marketing
its product to the appropriate defense buying offices. These
publications and other information are available on the DOD Small
Business website: www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu. Additionally, the DOD posts
notices of all business opportunities on the Federal Business
Opportunities website: http://www.fedbizops.gov. The website has an
automatic notification feature that allows companies to be notified
electronically of a business opportunity related to the codes a company
enters describing their business and geographical areas of interest.
Small business firms involved in research and development are
encouraged to participate in the Small Business Innovation Research and
Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. These programs solicit
proposals on specific topics of interest to DOD. Through the submission
of a simplified proposal, research firms not only become acquainted
with the DOD contracting process but have the opportunity to
participate in DOD research programs in the developmental stage.
The DOD Mentor-Protege Program provides incentives to large DOD
prime contractors that mentor qualified small business proteges. Under
this program DOD develops the requisite capabilities within the small
business community to satisfy mission requirements at both the prime
contracting and subcontracting levels. Proteges are provided training
in procurement, quality, and technical areas to meet their individual
needs.
One excellent starting point for a firm interested in becoming
familiar with DOD contracting procedures and opportunities is through
its local Procurement Technical Assistance Center. These centers are
located within most states and are partially funded by DOD to provide
procurement assistance to firms interested in the Federal marketplace,
and DOD in particular. They offer training and one-on-one counseling as
needed by the individual firm. Once the firm has identified a target
market within DOD the small business specialists at the procuring
activity can assist small business firms in marketing to their
respective command.
17. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega and Dr. Marburger, what is the
process for evaluating unsolicited white papers and proposals submitted
to the Federal Government and, in particular, the Department of
Defense?
Dr. Marburger. OSTP has been working closely with TSWG, DOD and
other agencies to explore how best to evaluate unsolicited white papers
and proposals related to technologies for combating terrorism. As an
interim measure, we have been forwarding proposals received at OSTP to
TSWG, and TSWG has been referring some of these unsolicited proposals
to other agencies for review. For the longer term, OSTP has been
working with the Office of Homeland Security to develop a more
comprehensive, single point system for review of these proposals, and
we look forward to reporting back to your committee on this subject.
Dr. Sega. The DOD follows the process set forth in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), subpart 15.6, regarding unsolicited
proposals. The FAR establishes the criteria to be considered in
determining whether the proposal qualifies as a valid unsolicited
proposal. To qualify the proposal must be: (1) innovative and unique;
(2) independently originated and developed by the offeror; and (3)
prepared without Government supervision, endorsement, direction, or
direct Government involvement. The FAR also sets forth the procedures
for an initial review by the agency point of contact to determine
relevancy of the proposal to the agency mission and whether sufficient
information is included in the proposal for a comprehensive evaluation.
The FAR sets forth criteria to be considered during the comprehensive
evaluation. If a favorable comprehensive evaluation results and funding
is available, the contracting officer must make a final determination
that the sole source award is justified, synopsize and negotiate the
final price of the contract.
emerging threats from new science
18. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, how does the DOD science and
technology community plan to assess and evaluate the threats to our
national security from such new science initiatives as biocomplexity
and nanotechnology?
Dr. Sega.The Director of Defense Research and Engineering works
closely with the Defense Intelligence Agency's directorate for Policy
Support in the Pentagon, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, to
receive periodic assessments and evaluations of emerging threats to our
national security from rapidly developing new science areas such as
biotechnology, nanoscience, biocomplexity and information technology.
Such assessments enable us to devise innovative technology solutions to
defeat such potential threats to our national security should they
arise.
technology readiness levels
19. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Sega, the nine technology readiness
levels recently published by the DOD provide good descriptions of
performance, but do not mention whether it is possible to manufacture
or acquire the materiel in either prototype or larger quantities. Will
this capability be considered in describing technology readiness in the
future?
Dr. Sega. The maturity of manufacturing processes is an issue we
are currently looking at. Normally, prototype manufacturing processes
are developed by the industry sponsor for the weapon system during the
design and development stage of acquisition. Within our formal
acquisition process, manufacturing development and maturity is normally
assessed by our Integrated Product Teams as a system enters Milestone C
and low rate initial production. However, there is a growing
recognition that manufacturing readiness needs earlier consideration as
part of the technology maturity assessments. In fact, manufacturing was
a critical technology assessed by the Director Defense Research and
Engineering review team prior to the decision for the Joint Strike
Fighter to enter the System Development and Demonstration phase. We
found this to be of value to all participants, and anticipate
manufacturing will continue to be assessed in future technology
reviews, as needed. I expect to make adjustments in our processes and
polices as we gain more experience in using technology readiness
levels.
overdue report on vaccines
20. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Klein, Section 1044 of the Fiscal Year
2002 National Defense Authorization Act required the Secretary of
Defense to develop a long-range plan for the production and acquisition
of vaccines for the Defense Department. That provision also required
the Secretary to provide a report to Congress on the plan by February 1
of this year. Neither that report nor the plan have yet been submitted
to Congress. Can you explain the delay in the report, and can you
explain the Department's position on the question of vaccine production
and acquisition? Do you expect the Department to act alone on the
production of vaccines, or to join with other federal agencies for a
national effort?
Dr. Klein. The congressional language in Section 1044 requires DOD
to consult with ``the heads of other appropriate departments and
agencies of the Federal Government'' to generate this report. Thus, it
has been necessary for DOD to hold several meetings with the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), among others, in order to put together a far-reaching
plan for vaccine acquisition. The report was submitted to Congress July
12, 2002.
21. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Klein, when do you expect a decision on
how to proceed with the production of vaccines, and when would you
expect vaccines to be available from such new production?
Dr. Klein. The Department of Defense is in discussions with other
Federal agencies including the Department of Health and Human Services,
Centers for Disease Control, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
and the National Institute of Health to determine the best method for
meeting the Nation's need for biodefense vaccines. Discussion is also
ongoing with major pharmaceutical manufacturers regarding their
interest to assist the Nation to supply this vital requirement. It is
undecided at this time if DOD or other Federal agencies will call for
construction of a national vaccine production facility to augment
existing vaccine production capabilities. Therefore, no time line can
be given for production of vaccines from a new facility. Typically, the
total development time for research and development, production, and
FDA licensure for a new vaccine is 10-18 years.
vaccine testing capacity
22. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Klein, before vaccines can be licensed by
the Food and Drug Administration and produced for our military, they
must go through rigorous scientific testing and clinical trials to
demonstrate that they are safe and effective. Typically this process
takes years. Do we currently have sufficient capacity within Defense
Department facilities to conduct the necessary pre-clinical testing and
clinical trials of newly developed vaccines for defense against
biological warfare agents? If not, how can we remedy this situation?
Are there existing or planned facilities we could use for this purpose?
Dr. Klein. This is a critical question because it addresses the
costly and time consuming work that must be accomplished between
discovery of a new vaccine and the production of a licensed product. In
the past, the DOD had sufficient animal testing capabilities to
evaluate new products being developed. At the present time, they do not
have sufficient pre-clinical animal testing capacity to handle the
influx of new vaccines and drugs for DOD, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and industry. The Biosafety Level (BSL-3/BSL-4) animal
testing capabilities at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI), a
defense contractor, are currently the only locations where pre-clinical
animal testing of biodefense products can be performed at such exposure
levels.
There is no immediate solution for expanding animal testing
capabilities. However, the BMI is in the process of expanding its
animal capacity in West Jefferson, Ohio, which should be completed by
late 2002. In addition, the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel
Command is in the process of identifying solutions for increasing its
high containment animal holding capacity at USAMRIID until a more
permanent solution is available.
23. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Klein, the budget request proposes to
create a new facility at Fort Detrick for biological defense research.
Could that facility conduct the kinds of tests and trials needed for
developing vaccines for clinical trials and then demonstrating vaccines
before they are licensed?
Dr. Klein. Our $5.0 million military construction request contained
in the fiscal year 2003 President's budget is for the Countering
Biological Terrorism Research Center. The funding is intended to
support the determination of laboratory requirements, planning and
design for a facility in which to conduct RDT&E to support the proposed
Countering Biological Terrorism Research Program. This program includes
biological forensics, threat assessment research for biological agents
and emerging threats, demonstration of proof of principle for
countermeasures to emerging threats, and rapid assessment of emerging
countermeasures. The requirement and design specifications for this
facility are not yet determined.
Since submission of the budget request, the Army has become aware
of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) plan to construct a
biocontainment clinical vaccine testing laboratory at Fort Detrick. We
believe that it would be in the best interest of the Nation to develop
a coordinated effort with the NIH in planning and constructing
biological containment laboratory capabilities at Fort Detrick, to
include recapitilization of the USAMRIID and countering biological
terrorism research. Accordingly, the Army is planning to host a meeting
with NIH officials to develop a joint DOD/NIH strategic plan to clearly
identify biocontainment laboratory requirements and construction plans
for a biocontainment campus concept at Fort Detrick. If designed with
the appropriate capabilities, such a facility could support the kinds
of tests needed for developing vaccines and demonstrating their
efficacy prior to human clinical trials and licensure.
accelerated chemical demilitarization
24. Senator Landrieu. Dr. Klein, the Department of Defense approved
a plan for accelerated demilitarization of chemical agents, and
included a request for $300 million to implement this accelerated
demilitarization plan in its fiscal year 2002 Supplemental
Appropriations request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
However, the $300 million was not included in the final OMB-approved
supplemental request.
The funding would permit the Department to accelerate by up to 5
years the destruction of chemical agents at several chemical stockpile
sites, thus eliminating potential terrorist targets years ahead of
schedule. Acceleration would also reduce life-cycle demilitarization
costs by billions of dollars. In addition, accelerated demilitarization
would permit the United States to meet its Chemical Weapons Convention
treaty deadlines for interim agent destruction, and possibly to meet
the final destruction deadlines for most if not all stockpile sites.
How does the Department propose to fund the accelerated
demilitarization plan so as to achieve these numerous benefits as early
as possible?
Dr. Klein. The Department is currently looking at options to
resource the proposed accelerated chemical weapons disposal programs
for the Newport, Indiana and Aberdeen, Maryland stockpile sites.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
air force s&t budget
25. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Engle, funding for Air Force science and
technology has declined dramatically over the last 10 years while the
other service science and technology budgets have grown substantially.
Moreover, there is concern that the proposed Air Force science and
technology budget for 2003 includes a number of programs that are
inappropriately categorized as 6.3 programs. These are the
Transformational Wideband MILSATCOM, which is targeted to be funded at
$195 million and appears to have been categorized as 6.4 in the year
prior, and Special Programs, which is targeted to be funded at $97.3
million. When you remove these two programs, the Air Force has science
and technology cut by 13 percent. Please describe the nature of these
programs and how 6.3 priorities were shifted to pay for them. What is
the rationale for the insertion of these programs into 6.3? Where are
these programs being managed, and (if applicable) why are they not
being managed out of a research facility?
Mr. Engle. The Transformational Wideband MILSATCOM program
accelerates current Advanced Wideband MILSATCOM System efforts and
provides capabilities such as laser communications and additional
protection for tactical users. In fiscal year 2003, this program will
initiate an Advanced Wideband System that incorporates interoperable
laser communications and its planned first launch in fiscal year 2009.
This program addresses only acceleration of the design of the first two
satellites; acceleration of the procurement effort is not included
here.
Inclusion of the Transformational Wideband MILSATCOM program within
the Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program provides for
increased Air Force investment in space technology to develop and
demonstrate laser communications technologies. These efforts could
prove a number of attributes that could provide higher date throughput
and higher frequencies that could transform our military communications
infrastructure. While laser communications have a high potential to
revolutionize satellite communications, there are several critical
technologies that require maturation to reduce risk prior to fielding
an operational system. This maturation of technology can best be
accomplished within the S&T community. However, because of the overall
maturity of this concept we want to posture ourselves to be able to
rapidly move these maturing technologies to development.
For this reason, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC) is executing this reason, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC) is executing this in S&T not only because of the desire to
rapidly transition this technology into operational use, but also
because of the significant amount of manpower required to manage the
effort. SMC will be working closely with a consortium of government
labs, lead by the Air Force Research Laboratory.
Special Programs provide for classified S&T efforts.
Both of these programs came into the S&T Program with funding,
thus, increasing S&T topline funding. There was no requirement to shift
6.3, Advanced Technology Development, priorities to pay for these S&T
efforts.
26. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Engle, the Air Force Materiel Command
has set a funding target for science and technology at 2.0 percent to
2.4 percent of the total Air Force budget. The fiscal year 2003
President's budget request proposes to fund Air Force science and
technology at well below 2 percent. Does the Air Force leadership
subscribe to the Air Force Materiel Command's goal, and if so, how do
you intend to support it?
Mr. Engle. The Air Force investment strategy is to fund a broad
spectrum of different mission areas that support our warfighting
capabilities. This philosophy requires a flexible funding strategy that
can be readily changed as demands on the different mission areas
change. Therefore, as a matter of general policy, the Air Force does
not set a fixed funding percentage for any mission area, including the
Air Force Science and Technology Program. Having said that, we do
receive and follow guidance of this nature provided by OSD and when
specific percentage guidance is included, we will attempt to meet that
guidance. Finally, we permit our MAJCOMS to set their own goals during
their planning and programming process and they use these goals to make
arguments within a broader Air Force debate in the competition for
limited resources.
air force s&t leadership
27. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Engle, the Air Force has instituted
internal policy changes in response to criticisms that there has not
been sufficient advocacy and leadership support for science and
technology at the corporate policy and decision-making level. What is
your assessment of leadership support for science and technology, what
changes have been made, how effective have they been, and do additional
policies need to be developed to encourage leadership buy-in?
Mr. Engle. Air Force leadership is committed in its support of its
Science and Technology (S&T) Program. The S&T Planning Review, directed
by Congress in the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act,
helped bring S&T to the forefront and results of this review have been
incorporated into the current Air Force S&T Plan. In the last year or
so, we have also started a new process that brings the operational
user, the Product Centers, and the Air Force Research Laboratory
together early in the development process to identify those
technologies that are most important to warfighter capabilities. These
new Applied Technology Councils (ATCs) highlight S&T efforts and offer
great potential for improving our ability to rapidly and effectively
transition technologies into advanced capabilities. Additionally, the
Air Force has begun to use our semi-annual S&T Summits, where the
Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Air
Force four stars and other senior leaders review the S&T portfolio, to
increase the awareness of senior leadership of the technologies in
development that could provide new capabilities.
While many of these changes are still relatively new, we believe
that the S&T Study, directed by Congress in the Fiscal Year 2002
National Defense Authorization Act, should reflect the positive impact
these changes are having on the Air Force S&T planning process and
advocacy.
reducing air force operations costs
28. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Engle, the Air Force's explanation for
the lack of science and technology and RDT&E funding has been that
operations costs (the costs to repair and fly aircraft) have been
escalating and drawing away from other areas of funding. On the other
hand, the President's budget request for fiscal year 2003 would
eliminate certain programs that are designed to drive down operations
and support costs, such as the Aging Aircraft Systems Program Office
and the Productability, Reliability, and Maintainability programs. Why
are these programs being cut if they are intended to help reduce
operations costs--costs that are so high that they supposedly justify
draining funds that would otherwise go into science and technology?
Mr. Engle. During development of the Fiscal Year 2003 President's
Budget (PB), the Air Force had to make difficult decisions, balancing
near-term high priority mission requirements against long-term
investments. The fiscal year 2003 PB request reflects Air Force funding
priorities to meet near-term operational requirements within current
budgetary constraints. The Air Force structured its budget to maintain
a balance between the different investment accounts within Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and other investment areas.
The Aging Aircraft and Productivity, Reliability, Availability, and
Maintainability (PRAM) programs are thus funded at the highest level
possible given the fiscal constraints imposed by the need to fund
higher priority operational mission requirements.
air force restructuring initiatives
29. Senator Lieberman. Mr. Engle, there have been indications that
the Air Force is planning to implement workforce restructuring
initiatives. Can you describe these initiatives and what additional
tools or authority the Air Force needs to ensure their success?
Mr. Engle. The Air Force identified 27 civilian restructuring or
force shaping initiatives in the areas of hiring, development, and
retention/separation management and the legislation, funding, and
policy or regulatory changes required. In addition to attracting new
employees with critical skills, we also must manage the projected loss
of mid to senior-level personnel--approximately 42 percent of our
workforce will be eligible to retire by 2005. Air Force civilians
represent one quarter of the total force.
Your support and sponsorship of our fiscal year 2003 legislative
initiatives is critical for their passage. Specifically, we need to
streamline the hiring process, expand performance-based compensation
across larger parts of our workforce, and continue with separation
incentives to shape our civilian force. We also need to ensure we
invest in training and developing our current workforce to avoid losses
in institutional knowledge as our senior, technical and managerial
employees retire.
Senator Lieberman, the roles Air Force civilians play in
accomplishing the Air Force mission are, in and of themselves,
compelling reasons to invest in the civilian workforce. They are an
integral part of the complex system that keeps the fighters, bombers,
tankers and rockets flying as well as playing a critical role in DOD's
homeland security mission. However, we need your support to ensure that
we have the tools, authority, and funding necessary to ensure our
success with this effort. Thank you for your time and the opportunity
to present our vision for the future.
biological weapons attacks
30. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Klein, current DOD organizational
structures and capabilities do not appear to be well-suited for the
management of a major biological weapons attack such as smallpox or
other agents with similar capability to spread rapidly. Please provide
your views and opinions on this problem, as well as with current and
future plans for how it will be addressed.
Dr. Klein. The spread of a contagious disease, like smallpox, from
person to person presents unique public health issues for both DOD and
the Nation's public health structure. The most effective way to deal
with such diseases is by immunization with an effective vaccine while
at the same time developing both detection and diagnostic capabilities.
DOD has very active programs for both detection and diagnosis of
biological agents.
Two agents that are highly contagious are smallpox and plague. DOD
is currently developing vaccines to counter both threats, as well as
diagnostic capabilities. In addition, DOD is meeting regularly with
other Federal agencies (e.g., Department of Health and Human Services,
National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control, and Food
and Drug Administration) to develop a national immunization policy
should a smallpox outbreak occur in the U.S. At the present time, DOD
has not made any decision regarding a specific smallpox immunization
policy.
connections between agencies
31. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Klein, it appears that major ``fault
lines'' may exist between different levels of the DOD and government
(federal, state, and local), between the government and private sector,
among different institutions and agencies, and within the public and
private sector. These ``disconnects'' could impede situational
awareness and compromise the ability to limit loss of life, suffering,
and economic damage. Please provide your views and opinions on this
problem, as well as with current and future plans for how it will be
addressed.
Dr. Klein. There are numerous relationships between DOD and other
Federal agencies, and between the Federal Government and state and
local governments and agencies. While many of these relationships are
sound and effective there are also opportunities for improvement. In
order to ensure improved situational awareness and capabilities to
respond to a variety of threats to the United States, it is important
to emphasize that these relationships are ongoing processes, not static
achievements.
Many technologies under development through the Chemical Biological
Defense Program (CBDP) may have application for other than the
traditional warfighter mission. In order to ensure coordination on the
development and fielding of equipment for homeland security purposes,
DOD actively participates with several Federal, state and local
government organizations. These relationships include participation
from the private and public sector to leverage their capabilities for
the research and development. DOD has an established Memorandum of
Understanding with the Department of Energy (DOE). Through the DOE
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP), the DOE
National Laboratories are engaged in responding to the threat posed by
chemical and biological weapons to U.S. civilians.
The DOD is one of the funding departments for the Interagency Board
(IAB) for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability. The IAB is a
working group of state and local first responders, standards setting
organizations, and Federal Government agencies working cooperatively to
establish and coordinate local, state, and Federal standardization,
interoperability, and responder safety to prepare for, respond to,
mitigate, and recover from any incident by identifying requirements for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear or Explosive (CBRNE)
incident response equipment. Detailed information is available on the
IAB web site at http://www.iab.gov.
DOD largely funds the activities of the Technical Support Working
Group (TSWG). The TSWG is an interagency forum that rapidly develops
technology and equipment to meet the high priority needs of the
combating terrorism community, and addresses joint international
operational requirements through cooperative research and development
efforts with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel. TSWG membership
includes representatives from nearly eighty organizations across the
Federal Government. Policy oversight is provided by the Department of
State and execution oversight is provided by the Department of Defense,
specifically the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)). Detailed information is
available on the TSWG web site at http://www.tswg.gov.
In May 2000, the DOD participated in a series of exercises (known
as the top officials, or TOPOFF), which were combined interagency
exercises for all agencies who participate in the consequence
management of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorist event,
including officials from state, local, and Federal organizations. DOD
will also participate in a follow-on exercise, TOPOFF 2, in May 2003.
In summary, DOD is involved, and we continue to expand our outreach
between Federal agencies and state and local governments to increase
the level of knowledge and awareness, and increase our preparedness on
countering WMD attacks.
vaccines/biological weapons
32. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Klein, there does not appear to be a
surge capability in both the DOD and the U.S. health care and public
health systems, or the pharmaceutical and vaccine industries. This
institutionally limited surge capacity could result in both the DOD and
federal, state, and local hospitals being overwhelmed and becoming
inoperable; could impede public health agencies' analysis of the scope,
source, and progress of the epidemic, the ability to educate and
reassure the public, and the capacity to limit causalities and the
spread of disease. Do you think the DOD has sufficient stockpiles of
selected vaccines for all DOD personnel, distribution systems designed
to rapidly vaccinate DOD personnel, and capability/plans (on a large
scale/multi-state) to augment civil agencies in case of a major
biological weapons attack?
Dr. Klein. There is no simple answer to the issue of a sufficient
vaccine stockpile. BioPort is now manufacturing licensed anthrax
vaccine, which is accumulating pending a decision on an anthrax
vaccination policy. Our anthrax vaccine stockpile will continue to
increase as we purchase the BioPort output.
For smallpox vaccine, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
has announced there will be several hundred million doses of vaccine
available by fall 2002. The DOD is developing agreements with the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for access to this
stockpile. However, there is no Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
licensed smallpox vaccine in this stockpile; and the vaccine will have
to be administered with informed consent as an Investigational New Drug
(IND).
Finally, there is a question of a sufficient stockpile of other
biological defense vaccines that protect against lower profile agents.
The DOD is currently developing new vaccines against some of these
agents based on validated requirements.
IND vaccines against botulinum toxins, tularemia, and plague may be
available in the next 12 to 24 months, if these products demonstrate
safety and efficacy in early clinical trials. Like smallpox vaccine, we
can produce IND stockpiles for use with informed consent while we work
toward product licensure. We are evaluating requirements for
establishing these stockpiles.
DOD policy for vaccinating military personnel is clearly
established (DOD Directive 6205.3) and our ability to implement an
effective distribution system designed to rapidly vaccinate DOD
personnel was demonstrated through the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization
Program (AVIP). The policies for vaccinating the civilian population
are being widely debated. The Department of Health and Human Services
is the lead Federal agency for establishing such plans and policies. In
addition to the production issues discussed above, several other issues
need to be addressed before vaccinating the civilian population.
Physiological differences between the military and civilian population
need to be addressed. For example, the civilian population includes a
large pediatric and geriatric population, and it would include a larger
percentage of people who are immune suppressed or have medical
contraindications. Legal issues also need to be addressed. For example,
who would be liable for adverse effects associated with vaccines? Or
when should vaccines be administered to protect against diseases that
are not naturally occurring? In short, several issues need to be
addressed in order to initiate vaccinations of civilians against
biological warfare threats.
biological threat communication
33. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Klein, does the DOD possess the
capability to deal with the immediate challenges for all levels of DOD
and government that a significant biological weapons incident may cause
for information management and communication systems (e.g., dealing
with the press effectively, communication with citizens, and
maintaining the information flows necessary for command and control at
all institutional levels)? Other than FEMA serving as the backbone of
any major regional response which the DOD supplements, does the DOD
have an internal integrated information management and communications
system designed to either supplement or replace FEMA capabilities
should it not be able to respond and organize quickly enough?
Dr. Klein. The Department's present capability would be limited to
its existing command and control networks for military forces only. The
DOD is not structured to cope with the command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C\3\I) demands of a major biological
weapons incident or employment for all levels of both DOD and
government.
With respect to the second part of your question regarding
supplemental or replacement systems to FEMA, DOD has been working since
last November to address issues related to emergency response
information technology, to include information management and
communications systems. DOD and FEMA co-chair the Emergency Response
Network Initiative (ERNI), an interagency working group that was
established to coordinate and coalesce efforts to deliver an emergency
response network, collaboration tools, and information access for first
responders.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Energy
participate in the ERNI consortium. It is critical that DOD identify
and solve the coordination and communications challenges that exist at
the civil-military interface, and the ERNI consortium is our vehicle
for making progress in coordination with the other Federal partners.
multi-state biological threat
34. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Klein, in the event that a contagious
bio-weapon pathogen is deployed on U.S. soil, containing the spread of
disease will present significant ethical, political, cultural,
operational, and legal challenges starting with state and local
agencies and eventually requiring DOD involvement. The DOD may be
required to respond with not only soldiers to contain movement of
personnel but also with medical supplies and assistance. Do you believe
we have sufficient capability, plans, exercises, and protocols to
handle a multi-state situation like this?
Dr. Klein. With regard to supporting the effort to improve security
here at home, there are three circumstances under which the Department
of Defense would be involved in activity within the United States.
First, under extraordinary circumstances, which require the
department to execute its traditional military missions. In these
circumstances, DOD would take the lead. Combat air patrols and maritime
defense operations are examples of such missions. As with military
missions abroad, DOD has the lead role in the conduct of traditional
military missions in defense of the people and the territory of our
country. In these instances, DOD is supported by other Federal
agencies. Plans for such contingencies, to the extent possible, would
be coordinated, as appropriate, with the National Security Council and
with the Homeland Security Council.
Second, in emergency circumstances of a catastrophic nature--for
example, responding to an attack or assisting in response to forest
fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes and so forth. In these instances,
the Department of Defense may be asked to act quickly to provide
capabilities that other agencies simply do not have.
Third, missions or assignments, which are limited in scope, where
other agencies have the lead from the outset. An example of this would
be security at a special event, like the Olympics. Another example is
assisting other Federal agencies in developing capabilities to detect
chemical and biological threats.
The first of those three categories, extraordinary circumstances,
when DOD conducts military missions to defend the people or territory
of the United States at the direction of the President, falls under the
heading of homeland defense. In these cases, the Department is prepared
to take the lead.
The second and third categories are emergency or temporary
circumstances, in which other Federal agencies take the lead, and DOD
lends support. These are appropriately described as homeland security.
In these cases, Governor Ridge, as the President's adviser for homeland
security, coordinates the planning among civilian Federal agencies, as
well as state and local agencies. DOD is represented in these
deliberations of the Homeland Security Council and is prepared to
support the plans that are developed in this process.
In the event of multiple requests for DOD assets, whether domestic
or international, the President would be the one to make the allocation
decisions, using the coordinating mechanisms of the National Security
Council and the Homeland Security Council.
To take another example, in the case of an incident that might
exceed the capacity of a state or local authority to address such an
attack such as employing chemical or biological weapons, the Federal
response plan assigns to FEMA responsibility for coordinating and
directing the activities of Federal agencies. Under this plan,
resources of the Department of Defense could be made available to
support these activities. This could include the deployment of soldiers
to control crowds, assist in evacuation, the provision of
transportation, medical facilities and supplies, or communications
equipment.
In sum, the Department of Defense has two roles to play in
providing for the security of the American people where they live and
work. The first is to provide forces to conduct those traditional
military missions under extraordinary circumstances, such as the
defense of the Nation's airspace or its maritime approaches. The second
is to support the broader efforts of the Federal domestic departments
and agencies and indeed the state and local government, as coordinated
by and in cooperation with the Office of Homeland Security under
emergency conditions for special purposes.
dod health monitoring
35. Senator Lieberman. Dr. Klein, with respect to surveillance
detection systems and improved communication and warning systems, do
DOD surveillance systems provide information crucial to monitoring the
health of the DOD population, identifying DOD health problems and
priorities, taking DOD health action to prevent further illness, and
evaluating the effectiveness of these actions? Public health and DOD
sources of data for disease surveillance seem nearly as varied as the
diseases or conditions of concern. Because there are multiple data
sources, different information requirements, multiple, distinct users,
and different partners with whom the DOD may be required to collaborate
to obtain data for specific program areas, is there is a single
surveillance system that captures all the information required to
monitor DOD health?
Dr. Klein. DOD currently uses the ``Global Emerging Infections
System'' (GEIS) to detect and track potential infectious diseases on a
global basis. DOD-GEIS provides an early warning surveillance and
response system for emerging infections. It accomplishes this through
an integrated surveillance program involving six cooperative, host
nation/DOD medical research units and the operational surveillance
programs of the three military services. It is the only U.S. entity
that is devoted to infectious diseases globally and that has broad-
based laboratory capacities in overseas settings.
GEIS uses various means for global disease surveillance including
an ``electronic surveillance system for the early notification of
community-based epidemics'' known as ESSENCE. This system looks for
early detection of aberrant clinical patterns, rapid epidemiology-based
targeting of limited assets, provides leaders with outcome based
exposure estimates, and provides risk communication to reduce the
spread of panic and civil unrest. At the present time, ESSENCE has been
implemented for daily analysis of outpatient data from the Military
Treatment Facilities in the greater District of Columbia area. In the
future, GEIS plans to include other geographic areas, collaboration
with local civilian surveillance systems, and addition of other health
indicators (e.g., pharmacy usage, lab test ordering, school
absenteeism, etc.). Therefore, DOD is developing a more effective
surveillance system to monitor DOD health.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
new technology development
36. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Dr. Marburger, Dr. Klein, Dr.
Younger, and Mr. Waldron, since September 11, thousands of flowers are
blooming in American industry and universities eagerly developing
counter terror or counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
technologies. My office has been approached by nearly a dozen companies
or universities with ``breakthrough'' technology in the detection of
biological or chemical agents, systems for tracking contamination,
systems for alerting the nation, systems for consequence management,
and on and on. What are your selection criteria for prioritizing among
these technologies to ensure you meet the established requirements
across all service and agencies?
Dr. Sega. The Department of Defense continues to seek the best
available technology or concepts to counter weapons of mass destruction
from all available sources. Our recent Broad Agency Announcement
focused on Operation Enduring Freedom objectives and emergent homeland
security counter terrorism needs and included, in part, a solicitation
for new and novel approaches to counter weapons of mass destruction.
The overall solicitation was well received by academia and industry and
we collected over 12,000 responses. The individual requirements
selected for advertisement were prioritized by user subgroups within
the Technical Support Working Group. The vendor submissions were
reviewed against a combination of cost, schedule, technical risk, past
performance, and most importantly the ability to meet the needs of the
Department. The submissions were reviewed by user agencies and by
technical experts from the interagency community.
Dr. Marburger. Technology areas that are critical to our ability to
develop counter terror or counter weapons of mass destruction
capabilities are identified through a number of mechanisms. One means
is through the deliberations of interagency working groups I
established as part of the Antiterrorism Task Force under the National
Science and Technology Council (NSTC). In particular, two of these
working groups, co-chaired by OSTP--the Radiological, Nuclear, and
Conventional Detection and Response Working Group and the Biological
and Chemical Preparedness Working Group--coordinate both near-term and
long-term Federal antiterrorism R&D efforts and are responsible for
setting a 5-year research agenda.
In addition, OSTP's interaction with the Technical Support Working
Group (TSWG), is another interagency mechanism for identifying near-
term research and development priorities for science and technology for
combating terrorism. TSWG is a requirements-driven organization that
rapidly develops technology and equipment to meet the high-priority
needs of the combating terrorism community.
Dr. Klein. The Department of Defense continues to seek the best
available technology or concepts to counter weapons of mass destruction
from all available sources. Our recent Broad Agency Announcement
focused on Operation Enduring Freedom objectives and emergent homeland
security counter terrorism needs and included, in part, a solicitation
for new and novel approaches to counter weapons of mass destruction.
The overall solicitation was well received by academia and industry and
we collected over 12,000 responses. The individual requirements
selected for advertisement were prioritized by user subgroups within
the Technical Support Working Group. The vendor submissions were
reviewed against a combination of cost, schedule, technical risk, past
performance, and most importantly the ability to meet the needs of the
Department. The submissions were reviewed by user agencies and by
technical experts from the interagency community.
Dr. Younger. We consider urgency of requirements, gaps in
capability, technology feasibility, potential operational utility and
cost as criteria to select technologies that will provide the greatest
benefit to countering terror or weapons of mass destruction. One
illustration of how we address this situation can be taken from the
recent highly successful DOD Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force
(DCT3F) commissioned shortly after September 11 of last year. The Task
Force generated a number of technology candidate lists and obtained
multiple inputs across the DOD and other Federal agencies, both
technical and operational. The Task Force assessed each proposed
project against two criteria: utility and product. The utility
criterion reflected the extent to which the effort provided utility
across the full spectrum of the Nation's needs for combating terrorism.
The sub-criteria within utility were prevention, protection, and
response, weighed equally. The perspective of this analysis was
intended to consider combat support and homeland security. The product
criterion reflected the extent to which the product, report, or
deliverable was clearly defined. The Task Force obtained parallel
assessments from the Joint Staff using a quantitative method that
reflected the military utility and importance to combatant commands.
The Task Force made its final recommendations based on technology
feasibility, operational utility, and cost.
In addition to the Task Force, the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG) sponsored a call for proposals that generated over 16,000
responses. They are completing their process of selecting candidate
efforts for funding. In addition to the TSWG efforts, DTRA is reviewing
those entries to identify potential additional technology contributions
to countering terror and WMD. DTRA will use the criteria used in the
Task Force to evaluate the TSWG submittals since they are generally
offered as near-term solutions.
An example from our model development efforts is our hazard
predictions and consequence assessment models for release of chemical
or biological agents due to accidental, terrorist or targeting
activities. These models try to use the best technologies available,
based on time to deliver and cost/benefit. Ideas and proposals come
from various means--unsolicited proposals, conferences, and interagency
meetings. Examples include Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation
and Education Conference (I/ITSEC), Office of the Federal Coordinator
for Meteorology, and panel discussions on WMD. DTRA's prioritizations
are based heavily on inputs from the warfighting CINCs elicited during
extensive DTRA participation in exercises and war games. The annual
Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) users' conference is
a DTRA-sponsored forum specifically for identifying user needs and
priorities. All technologies are reviewed for new ideas, technology
gaps that need to be filled, and requirements. Our program plans and
budget are built to first meet stated requirements and then to look at
new technologies or integrate with existing technologies.
Our response thus far has emphasized selecting technologies that
would provide near-term solutions. The selection criteria we use to
evaluate potential longer-term efforts put greater emphasis on
potential operational utility while placing less weight on technical
risk.
Mr. Waldron. The National Nuclear Security Administration's R&D
Program for countering terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction is
focused on detecting nuclear/radiological and chemical/biological
weapons. We are evaluating ``breakthrough'' technologies for both of
these areas. We first look to the underlying science and engineering
and the proposed improvement in detection and identification
capability. Other criteria include: the ability to support multiple
users or applications; cost effectiveness of the mature technology or
system in terms of purchase price and operations; anticipated
reliability of the technology during operations--extremely low to no
false positives and long life time; and ease of operation.
37. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, clearly the research,
development, and acquisition of counter terror/counter WMD technology
is a management challenge within the Department of Defense.
Technological development is no less a total government challenge and
begs the question of how we are managing this laterally across Federal
agencies and vertically with state and local authorities. How are we
working to ensure that the counter terror/counter WMD systems that we
develop and procure in the DOD are interoperable with those among the
relevant Federal agencies, Office of Homeland Defense, and at the state
and local levels?
Dr. Sega. The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) was
established to support lateral integration across the government for
requirements and proof of technology projects in this area. TSWG has
nearly 80 members across the Federal, State and Local Government.
Interoperability of systems is but one area focused upon by the TSWG
process. Furthermore, a TSWG program manager is the current Co-chair of
the Technology Panel of the Interagency Board for Equipment
Standardization and Interoperability. This group, known as the
Interagency Advisory Board (IAB), provides a forum for coordinating
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requirements and setting standards
for equipment. The IAB is made up of Federal and Civilian responders
from across the country. Both the TSWG and the IAB support state and
local authorities by developing equipment to meet their requirements
and promulgating information to make them more effective. More
generally, the Department works within the framework of the National
Security Council and the Homeland Security Council, which provide for
top-level integration.
38. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Dr. Marburger, Dr. Klein, Dr.
Younger, and Mr. Waldron, the Nation is demanding protection from
terror and WMD right now and we are all working hard to get there.
Nonetheless, as is often the case in science and technology, additional
money does not necessarily mean that technological development will
progress toward procurement any faster. We are always in danger of
wasting a lot of money and time, but we have to try. With the
technologies that each of you are considering now, how long are you
estimating it will take to develop the systems that meet our protection
requirements--months, years?
Dr. Sega. Protection from terror and weapons of mass destruction is
a complex problem for which we must continually scan our research and
engineering program for opportunities. The time to develop systems
varies based on many factors such as technology maturation, system
complexity, etc. When feasible, we alter our investment to accelerate
urgently needed programs. Examples of this acceleration are two
projects identified for immediate investment following the September 11
terrorist attacks. They were Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR)
Detection Systems and Thermobaric Weapons.
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology was developed by the
Naval Research Laboratory and is being used by the Federal Aviation
Administration for detection of bulk explosives. There are many
advantages of NQR over x-ray detectors but of particular significance
is that little interpretation is required. The existing technology is
now being modified for use in examining ``bulk'' packages.
A thermobaric explosive weapon system was accelerated, tested, and
certified from the concept stage within 90 days. From ``chemistry-to-
weapon,'' the thermobaric explosive was developed and tested in a
laboratory setting in October 2001, successfully flight tested in
December, and made available to the warfighter earlier this year.
The Department's S&T program has numerous program activities well
underway, such as ACTDs, which will help to meet the near- and long-
term, critical warfighter needs. Other programs and technologies are
being developed to provide future options and capabilities. We are
focusing in areas such as counterterrorism and protection from weapons
of mass destruction, and working to balance the demands of today with
those of the future. The Department would benefit from additional
flexibility to carry new ideas rapidly through exploration,
development, and insertion into the field.
Dr. Marburger. Some of the technologies that are being considered
now will meet protection requirements in a period of months while other
technologies may not be ready for deployment for years. For example, in
the short term, there are a number of technologies available for
screening baggage at airports, including x-ray backscatter, neutron
activation, acoustic frequency-swept interrogation and radiometry. In
this area we have been working with the FAA, with the purpose of
ensuring that good candidate technologies are considered rapidly, but
without interfering with FAA's process for introducing new
technologies.
In the longer term, technologies for countering bioterrorism, such
as fast and cost-effective ways to detect specific pathogens and
development of new vaccines, may take years.
In some areas, we need improved tools with which to prevent,
detect, protect, and treat victims of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and conventional terrorist attacks.
Additionally, we will need new and improved tools to recover facilities
from attacks, should they ever occur. In many cases, this may call for
a ``systems approach,'' rather than simply perfection of a single
device.
In addition, we should remember that countering terrorism is a
constantly evolving process. Over time, terrorists develop new means of
imposing violence on their targets, and those who oppose terrorism must
anticipate and counter those means. We are engaged in a continual
process of thrust and counter.
Dr. Klein. Protection from terror and weapons of mass destruction
is a complex problem for which we must continually scan our research
and engineering program for opportunities. The time to develop systems
varies based on many factors such as technology maturation, system
complexity, etc. When feasible, we alter our investment to accelerate
urgently needed programs. Examples of this acceleration are two
projects identified for immediate investment following the September 11
terrorist attacks. They were Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR)
Detection Systems and Thermobaric Weapons.
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) technology was developed by the
Naval Research Laboratory and is being used by the Federal Aviation
Administration for detection of bulk explosives. There are many
advantages of NQR over x-ray detectors but of particular significance
is that little interpretation is required. The existing technology is
now being modified for use in examining ``bulk'' packages.
A thermobaric explosive weapon system was accelerated, tested, and
certified from the concept stage within 90 days. From ``chemistry-to-
weapon,'' the thermobaric explosive was developed and tested in a
laboratory setting in October 2001, successfully flight tested in
December, and made available to the warfighter earlier this year.
The Department's S&T program has numerous program activities well
underway, such as ACTDs, which will help to meet the near- and long-
term, critical warfighter needs. Other programs and technologies are
being developed to provide future options and capabilities. We are
focusing in areas such as counterterrorism and protection from weapons
of mass destruction, and working to balance the demands of today with
those of the future. The Department would benefit from additional
flexibility to carry new ideas rapidly through exploration,
development, and insertion into the field.
Dr. Younger. Because the terrorist and WMD threats are so urgent
and so broad in scope, we have pursued both near-term solutions to
enhance protection, and longer-term programs that will provide more
complete and higher confidence security. To provide transformational
advances in protection requires more than technology. It requires
creative ways of integrating and applying technologies to derive the
maximum protective improvements while imposing the least possible
disruption or diminution of the unique freedoms we Americans enjoy.
Some of the protection technologies may be available in months since we
are exploiting ``off-the-shelf'' material to develop protection
equipment. Others may be available in years as they are follow-on and
adaptations of the off-shelf equipment that is being currently
exploited. Specifically:
Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD)--
Congress appropriated $75 million in fiscal year 2002 for a
joint DTRA-NNSA program to demonstrate an installation nuclear
warfare protection system designed to have an operational
capability to detect, identify, respond, and prevent the threat
brought upon by stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear
devices (INDs), or radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) by
unconventional delivery methods. Congress directed four test
beds be established for this program. The first test bed to be
operational at Kirtland AFB by September 2002.
Terrorist Device Defeat (TDD) Program--This program is
designed to rapidly develop the technologies and operational
concepts to defeat the threat of nuclear terrorism in the form
of nuclear weapons, Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs) or
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs). Some of the technologies
and concepts developed are currently being tested and employed
by operational elements. They will be used in combating
terrorism, facility/site protection and to rapidly identify the
organization responsible for the weapon/device, if detonation
occurs. The program consists of three sub-programs: (1) Special
Nuclear Program (SNP) which is an operational-technical mix
that currently provides the regional CINCs with a militarized
capability to counter this type threat; (2) Improvised Device
Defeat (IDD) which is developing the capability to locate,
access and provide advanced diagnostics to defeat INDs in the
field in support of a classified Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS) plan; and (3) Domestic Nuclear Event Attribution
(DNEA)--A nuclear forensics capability using nuclear debris and
signature analysis tools to rapidly identify the organization
responsible for an unclaimed domestic nuclear event.
Remote detection of High Explosives--Following
September 11 DTRA helped field new technologies that allow
remote detection of high explosive materials, and more advanced
versions of the technology will follow in the next couple of
years.
Biodefense Initiative. Our biodefense initiative will
create a national multi-component, multiorganization biological
defense capability that will provide early detection and
characterization of biological terrorism, assist the
Metropolitan Medical Response System, and support the
Departments of Justice and Health & Human Services as they work
with state and local governments. In 2 years we will have a
prototype system of systems achieved by integrating existing
systems and fielding two next generation urban biological
detection systems by early fiscal year 2004.
For the longer term, we have two programs that are building our
knowledge of the critical infrastructures that are so important to the
well-being of our nation. The National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center (NISAC) is a cooperative effort between DTRA and
several of the National Labs. NISAC is building the databases on our
critical infrastructures so we can better assess the system
vulnerabilities and can determine how to mitigate these
vulnerabilities, both for the National well-being and for the
dependencies for military missions. A second infrastructure program,
the Mission Degradation Analysis Support (MIDAS) program is focused
specifically on the infrastructures needed to support military missions
and functions. Both of these infrastructure programs are designed to
provide tangible benefits within the next year, but will continue to
grow incrementally in their ability to analyze vulnerabilities of the
critical infrastructures.
Mr. Waldron. I believe the answer is a combination of both months
and years for some systems to be available. In the nearer term, we will
be providing technologies that require more human operation or
intervention and do not have the highest level of sensitivity. In the
longer term, we will be developing technologies that are more
autonomous and with greater sensitivity.
39. Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Sega, Dr. Marburger, Dr. Klein, Dr.
Younger, and Mr. Waldron, generally speaking, are counter terror/
counter WMD technologies sensitive to additional funding--that is will
additional resources mean we will develop technologies faster; or, is
the pace of development fairly limited such that the advantage of
additional money is really how many more technologies we can explore?
Dr. Sega. Technologies that are potentially useful in countering
either terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are widely
disparate, requiring the Department to consider the entire range of
possible investment strategies. For example, at the early or discovery
end of technology development, added resources always allow the
research community to explore more options, which aids good science. At
the other end of the development, medical technology for eventual
licensure has many rate-limiting steps, only some of which can be
accelerated by adding funds. It is important for the Department to have
stable funding for fundamental work while maintaining flexibility to
move quickly, as many technologies develop rapidly. In research and
development, new and innovative ideas ``arrive'' unexpectedly so we
need some flexibility to take full and timely advantage of them. When
preparing for uncertain methods from terrorist adversaries, the ability
to move quickly and smartly is especially critical if we are to provide
the Nation broader options for preempting or defeating the use of
terror or WMD. In this area as in others, flexibility within a balanced
program gives us the ability to invest in a wide array of possible
solutions as well as focusing resources on particularly promising
technologies.
Dr. Marburger. There is a need to achieve a balance between
innovation versus implementation in the war against terrorism. As I
have learned more about the challenges of terrorism, I've realized that
the means for reducing the risk and consequences of terrorist incidents
are for the most part already inherent in the scientific knowledge and
technical capabilities available today. Only in a few areas would
additional basic research be necessary, for example in research in
connection with bioterrorism. Beyond this, the greater challenge for us
is to define the specific tasks we want technology to perform, and to
deploy technology effectively throughout the diffuse and pervasive
systems the technology is designed to protect.
Dr. Klein. Technologies that are potentially useful in countering
either terrorism or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are widely
disparate, requiring the Department to consider the entire range of
possible investment strategies. For example, at the early or discovery
end of technology development, added resources always allow the
research community to explore more options, which aids good science. At
the other end of the development, medical technology for eventual
licensure has many rate-limiting steps, only some of which can be
accelerated by adding funds. It is important for the Department to have
stable funding for fundamental work while maintaining flexibility to
move quickly, as many technologies develop rapidly. In research and
development, new and innovative ideas ``arrive'' unexpectedly so we
need some flexibility to take full and timely advantage of them. When
preparing for uncertain methods from terrorist adversaries, the ability
to move quickly and smartly is especially critical if we are to provide
the Nation broader options for preempting or defeating the use of
terror or WMD. In this area as in others, flexibility within a balanced
program gives us the ability to invest in a wide array of possible
solutions as well as focusing resources on particularly promising
technologies.
Dr. Younger. Additional resources can accelerate some ongoing
programs. For example, the hazard prediction and consequence assessment
modeling is sensitive to additional funding. Model development, test,
and verification can be done faster. Detector technology, particularly
for biological agents can be accelerated. However, the largest benefit
for hardware development efforts would be to increase the breadth of
the technologies being worked. This would result in less risk in the
overall progress of solutions of Homeland Security tasks. Even with
additional breadth in the scope of technologies being examined, we may
be limited by the difficulty, time, skilled personnel and testing
required to integrate the new technologies into integrated systems that
are operationally suited to the need.
Mr. Waldron. Typical of most technology development programs, you
will find a mix of sensitivity to additional funding. Some technology
development projects can readily apply more funds to finalize
development sooner, and some development will not happen sooner no
matter how much money is applied. This is more typical of technologies
that depend upon a very thorough understanding of the supporting
science. The breadth of science and technology needs to expand to
maintain the flexibility to respond to future threats.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman
technical support working group budget
40. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Sega, you mentioned a recent broad agency
announcement (BAA) that attracted 12,500 responses through a web server
for combating terrorism. I've heard this amazing number in testimony to
this Armed Services Committee from other senior officials in the office
of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. I
assume you are talking about the Technical Support Working Group, or
TSWG. My office, like others on Capitol Hill, have been overwhelmed
with the responses from companies in our state that are looking for a
venue to have their ideas evaluated. We have steered all these
companies to the TSWG. We have steered our companies to the TSWG
because it has a long track record of fielding hardware that meets an
interagency requirements list on a short time frame with proven
utility. It is my understanding that this BAA has generated
approximately $176 million in new concepts. It is my understanding that
your office will commit only $30 million over 2 years to fund this
effort or $15 million a year. I find this response disappointing. The
reason I find this increase disappointing is that I am very aware of
the large budgets that agencies such as DARPA have received for
combating terrorism when they do not nearly have the experience of the
TSWG nor are they the National Security Council chartered forum for
combating terrorism. Why is there such a large unfunded requirements
gap between the TSWG as compared to DARPA? Would you be averse to
doubling the current budget of the TSWG? Doubling the TSWG's budget
would still fall short of that allocated to DARPA for combating
terrorism. Please explain.
Dr. Sega. Thank you for recognizing the outstanding work the TSWG
accomplished through the Combating Terrorism Technology Support (CTTS)
Program for rapidly providing hardware to meet interagency
requirements. The response to the BAA was overwhelming. Of the 12,500
submissions, approximately 150 are high priority areas for the DOD.
Over the next 2 years we plan to fund $30 million of these promising
high priority technologies.
This supplements a baseline investment of several hundred million
dollars already being invested in combating terrorism technologies
throughout the Department. While we received a significant number of
submissions, many were similar to efforts underway. Our focus was on
the ``golden nuggets'' that could be fielded quickly. Both Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA) have funding in their budgets supporting elements key to
combating terrorism and developing chem/bio technology. DARPA's funding
focuses on longer term revolutionary new approaches to biowarfare
defense vice the near term focus that enables rapid delivery of
capabilities into the hands of the warfighter. In addition to the
``quick hitting'' responses, there is also a compelling need for a
longer term integrated combating terrorism program, such as developed
by DARPA and DTRA. It is the balance we seek. The basic ground rules
for the BAA were that technologies proposed could be funded and fielded
within an 18 month timeframe. The more promising ideas identified
through the BAA evaluations will also be reviewed by both the TSWG
office and the Defense Agencies for funding considerations prior to
release of any additional general combating terrorism BAAs.
In June, as part of the annual review process, all programs are
reviewed to ensure current investments reflect the Department's
priorities. Findings and recommendations may include reallocation of
resources.
threat reduction budget
41. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Younger, what is your spending rate for
the CTR and other threat reduction programs with Russia and the newly
independent states? It is my understanding that some of these programs
have not had released their fiscal year 2002 funds. Is this true? Who
is issuing this hold and why?
Dr. Younger. The following shows the CTR obligation rates for the
current fiscal year and the two prior fiscal years:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Millions of Dollars
Fiscal Year Execution Obligated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002........................................... $ 59.7
2001........................................... 328.9
2000........................................... 459.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to underscore these are the execution rates for these years,
and involve multiple year funding ranging from fiscal year 1994 to
fiscal year 2001.
The obligation totals for the specific years of appropriation (i.e.
how much of the fiscal year appropriation has been obligated) are:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Millions of Dollars
Fiscal Year Appropriation Obligated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002........................................... $ 0
2001........................................... 80.7
2000........................................... 233.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before DOD can obligate CTR funds, the current legislation requires
several steps be completed. The first step is to certify that the
recipient country is committed to six courses of action including
complying with all relevant arms control agreements and forgoing any
military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements of the fiscal year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act
(Public Law 103-160). This certification must come from the President
(delegated to the Secretary of State) and normally occupies the first 3
to 6 months of each fiscal year. However, in considering whether to
certify Russia to receive CTR assistance this year, the administration
identified concerns with Russia's commitment to comply with the
Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Because of these concerns
in the face of the administration's desire to continue to provide
nonproliferation assistance to Russia, the administration has asked
Congress to amend the existing law to allow the administration to waive
the certification requirements when it deems it important to the
National security interest.
The second step is to submit any reports to Congress required to
remove any congressional constraints on obligation of funds for CTR
programs. Preparation and coordination of such reports is concurrent
with step one.
The third step is to prepare a notification of DOD intention to
obligate funds for CTR programs to submit to the Senate Armed Services,
Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees and the House Armed
Services, International Relations and Appropriations Committees, as
required by Section 1205 of fiscal year 1996 National Defense
Authorization Act (Public Law 104-106). The Secretary of Defense is
required to provide these notifications and Congress has up to 15 days
to comment on them before the Department may obligate funds. The
notification must follow the certification and reporting requirements.
Partial notifications are prepared and signed by the Secretary when
some of the recipient countries have satisfied the certification and/or
some of the reporting requirements have been met and the remainder is
judged to require additional time.
The fourth step is to amend the implementing agreements with the
recipient country. These documents are used to reaffirm through
individual Executive Agents (ministries) each recipient nation's intent
to continue to comply with the implementing agreement, and specify the
up to funding level available for agreed and notified tasks. These
amendments may take only a few weeks or, in some cases, many months.
The long delays are usually caused by internal issues within the
recipient country (e.g., a governmental reorganization that abolished
the Ministry of Economics in Russia, creating a delay while a new
Executive Agent was identified by Russia for the Strategic Offensive
Arms Elimination Program). Some program areas, such as Defense and
Military Contacts, do not require implementing agreements.
darpa funding
42. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Tether, the DARPA optoelectronics centers
have proven to be a wealth of innovation for providing new generations
of physical scientists in the area of photonics, electronics materials,
and information theory. These university centers of excellence, working
in concert with industry, provide innovative research fueling future
capabilities that include: high performance RF and digital
communications, complex information processing, and new and improved
sources, detectors, modulators, and storage, all of which are critical
for enhancing the effectiveness of military platforms providing
warfighter comprehensive awareness and precision engagement. This year
the budget for these centers decreases from an fiscal year 2002 amount
of $11.5 million to $5.7 million. Would DARPA have any issue with
providing essentially a level funding for these centers in fiscal year
2003 at $12 million?
Dr. Tether. Our current support for University Optoelectronics
Centers has been limited to a period of 36 months extended over 4
fiscal years. The University Optoelectronics Centers program has been
an outstanding success for DARPA.
The most recent program has generated a number of novel and
innovative technologies that are now ready for application to some of
DOD's most demanding problems. The fiscal year 2003 decrease in funding
for the University Optoelectronics Centers program reflects the fact
this will be the final year of funding as this program reaches a
successful conclusion.
The program is in the process of finishing efforts that are ready
for transfer to industry. This is a normal occurrence and consistent
with past practices in this type of development program.
However, the planned decrease in fiscal year 2003 of this single
program does not mean that DARPA's funding of university-based
optoelectronics research is declining. While it is still too early to
determine the exact extent of university involvement, we expect in
fiscal year 2003 to spend close to $25 million on optoelectronics
research at universities (over and above the amount allocated through
the University Optoelectronics Centers program).
Those institutions that have participated in the University
Optoelectronics program are in an excellent position to compete for
those funds should they choose to respond to DARPA's Broad Agency
Announcements.
Given the highly successful integration of university-based
optoelectronics research into so many of our mainstream programs, we
are evaluating several options in an effort to determine the best way
to move forward.
As we develop our fiscal year 2004 budget and Future Years Defense
Program, we will determine the most appropriate funding level for the
future.
I have no doubt that our future funding level for university-based
optoelectronics research will exceed the annual funding for the
University Optoelectronics Centers program.
chemical and biological defense spending
43. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Klein, it is estimated that the Chemical
and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) research and development
portfolio would jump 70 percent to $933 million, more than double the
fiscal year 2001 funding level. I am glad that the Department of
Defense is taking seriously the protection of the warfighter from these
asymmetric threats. Can you please explain your spending rates for
costing the fiscal year 2002 appropriation? Will you be able to
obligate the fiscal year 2003 request if provided in full?
Dr. Klein. The increase in the fiscal year 2003 budget request for
CBDP research and development is primarily due to two new initiatives
that evolved as part of the Department's response to the events of
September 11. The Office of Homeland Security, working with the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB), provided additional funds for the
Department to resource these initiatives, which were not part of our
fiscal year 2002 budget request. The ultimate goal of these initiatives
is to rapidly ramp up a capability to meet urgent chemical and
biological defense requirements supporting homeland security missions.
These two initiatives, the Biological Counter-terrorism Research Center
and the Biological Defense Homeland Security Support Program, contain a
fiscal year 2003 funding request of $385 million over and above the
core program R&D request.
The CBDP, working in close coordination and oversight with the
Office of Homeland Security, fully intends to obligate the full amount
of the additional funding if appropriated. Toward this goal, we are
currently developing the plans and strategies necessary to enable the
Department to begin execution of these programs as soon as fiscal year
2003 funds are made available. We view these initiatives as critical to
the overall objective of securing the homeland against biological
terrorist attacks and are committed to rigorous and expeditious
execution of these programs.
nuclear weapons council
44. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Klein, can you please explain the current
requirements from the Nuclear Weapons Council regarding any
modifications to the W-76 warhead?
Dr. Klein. The NWC conditionally approved Development Engineering
(Phase 6.3) for the W-76/Mk4 refurbishment (i.e., the Life Extension
Program (LEP)). The conditions were satisfied in December 2000 and the
unconditional Phase 6.3 is proceeding. The W-76 LEP will consist of
refurbishment activities required in the Nuclear Explosive Package and
in several of the non-nuclear components. A new transfer system is also
being deployed in the W-76 warhead. The LEP will eliminate most of the
existing production defects and most (but not all) of the aging
concerns.
45. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Klein, has the Nuclear Weapons Council
had any discussion that might lead to requirements for a nuclear
warhead as part of a missile defense system? If so can you please
provide me with a briefing on this issue.
Dr. Klein. This issue has not been discussed by the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
counterproliferation council
46. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Klein, do the activities of the
Counterproliferation Council receive adequate funding and contractor
support to adequately provide Congress with their annual report?
Dr. Klein. The Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC)
has had no funding since the transfer of all Office of the Secretary of
Defense Counterproliferation related funding to the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) as part of the Defense Reform Initiative. DTRA
has always supported the activities of the CPRC adequately in order to
provide Congress with the annual report. As you are aware, the
Department has recently submitted the CPRC report for 2002. Subsequent
to the events of September 11, an increased emphasis is evident within
the report on efforts to negate paramilitary and terrorist threats
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as part of the Department
of Defense's homeland defense initiatives. Within the current and
future reports, this emphasis on countering these paramilitary and
terrorist WMD threats will reflect changing mission requirements,
reorganizations, transformations, and research development and
acquisition programs in support of the homeland defense and homeland
security roles and missions of the CPRC's constituent membership. As in
the past, I am confident that DTRA will provide funding and contractor
support adequate to provide the annual report of the CPRC to Congress.
I will continue to monitor DTRA efforts in these and other related
areas in my role as principal staff assistant for DTRA activities in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
unfunded requirements for r&d
47. Senator Bingaman. Mr. Waldron, in your brief to Congress you
list four primary areas of research and development:
1. Develop and demonstrate technologies needed to remotely
detect the early stages of a proliferant nation's nuclear
weapons program;
2. Develop, demonstrate, and deliver technologies to detect,
locate, identify, and characterize nuclear explosions
underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, and in space;
3. Develop and demonstrate technologies to improve our
national capability to detect nuclear materials, to counter
nuclear smuggling, and to identify the origins of nuclear
materials; and
4. Develop and demonstrate technologies and systems that
dramatically improve our ability to detect the proliferation or
use of chemical and biological agents, and to minimize the
consequences of potential terrorist use of chemical or
biological agents.
Please list your unfunded requirements by category for items 1-3.
Mr. Waldron. Senator Bingaman, we do not have any unfunded
requirements. However, as is typical with R&D programs, we could
accelerate development of some technologies and explore new
technologies with additional funding.
protecting research by foreign students
48. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Marburger, please explain what efforts
your office has undertaken to protect the right to publish and exchange
basic research and attract the best foreign students in light of recent
terrorist events?
Dr. Marburger. Of the 30+ million international visitors who enter
the U.S. each year, roughly 500,000 students and research scholars
enter the U.S. on F, M, or J visas to attend U.S. universities or
learning institutions. Approximately 175,000 of these enter as science
students or scholars. The vast majority of these students are here to
gain knowledge that will benefit themselves and their homelands. But a
small number of international students may come with other motives,
seeking to gain unique, sensitive education and training that might
eventually be used against us in a terrorist attack.
To prevent uniquely available, sensitive education and training
from falling into the wrong hands, the President directed, through
Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-2, that, ``The Government
shall implement measures to end the abuse of student visas and prohibit
certain international students from receiving education and training in
sensitive areas, including areas of study with direct application to
the development and use of weapons of mass destruction.'' But the
Directive also cautioned that these measures should be implemented with
great care because, ``The United States benefits greatly from
international students who study in our country. The United States
Government shall continue to foster and support international
students.''
To fulfill the requirements of Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)-2.3, the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) established an
interagency working group which included members from the Departments
of State, Justice (headed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)), Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, the National
Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and
representatives from the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law
enforcement agencies. This working group labored over several months to
find the right balance between scientific openness and national
security in implementing the requirements of HSPD-2.
To address the concerns raised in HSPD-2.3, the administration will
create an Interagency Panel on Advanced Science and Security (IPASS) to
perform an enhanced review process for advanced students and visiting
scholars seeking education or training in uniquely available, sensitive
science and technology areas. The IPASS co-chairs would be appointed by
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, and the members would
be drawn from the State Department, the INS, Federal science and
technology agencies, and the intelligence, counterintelligence, and law
enforcement communities. The goal of the IPASS would be to ensure that
international students or visiting scholars do not acquire uniquely
available education or training in U.S. educational institutions or
facilities that may be used against us in a terrorist attack. The
Attorney General and the Secretary of State, along with OHS and OSTP,
will routinely monitor the work of the IPASS to ensure that the right
balance between scientific openness and national security is being
realized.
review criteria for basic research
49. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Marburger, please explain what efforts
your office has undertaken to independently evaluate the review
criteria for applied and basic research by the Office of Management and
Budget? It is my understanding that the DOE Office of Science received
one of the few green lights for management of basic research and
development and received virtually no increase in budget.
Dr. Marburger. OSTP is actively engaged with the relevant Federal
agencies and OMB in discussions aimed at developing and implementing
investment criteria for R&D, as mandated by the President's Management
Agenda. This effort includes a working group formed under the National
Science and Technology Council, which is staffed and chaired by my
office. This working group is actively discussing approaches to
implement the investment criteria. This forum provides input to the
implementation of the criteria, which will improve the management of
the Federal R&D process.
As a point of clarification, the DOE Office of Science received an
``effective'' rating for its overall program performance. Only NSF
received a ``green light'' in any of the management initiatives, and
that was for its financial management practices.
50. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Marburger, do you think this review of a
coveted green light is equitable when no increase is given?
Dr. Marburger. I do. The effectiveness ratings provide a tool to
help make funding decisions, but they do not directly correspond to
funding increases or decreases. Decisions on a funding level for a
particular program will depend on the specific circumstances of that
program, including reasons it is effective or ineffective. For example,
DOE's Office of Science was rated ``effective'' because it met or
exceeded expected performance within the resources available. In other
cases, a program rated ``ineffective'' might receive a funding increase
if it was determined that additional funding would be the best way to
improve program performance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
nuclear weapons effects
51. Senator Smith. Dr. Younger, in recent testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee, General Kadish reaffirmed that the WMD
threat, including adversarial use of nuclear weapons, has not abated.
It continues to evolve as our adversaries advance technologically. In
his recent foreword to the Nuclear Posture Review, Secretary Rumsfeld
points out that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear defense
infrastructure has atrophied. I am also aware of recent reports
confirming that the technical community that represents the total of
U.S. capabilities for understanding and mitigating atmospheric nuclear
weapons effects is at risk due to inadequate funding and management
neglect. At the same time, the U.S. military and civilian
infrastructure is becoming increasingly dependent on space assets for
communications systems, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and
precision targeting/precision strike. All of these systems rely on
satellites and ground-to-space links using evolving technologies which
can be vulnerable to the effects of nuclear weapons. It is my
understanding that significant vulnerability issues have not yet been
evaluated and mitigation strategies developed. The responsibility for
maintaining nuclear weapons effects capabilities rests with, DOD and
DTRA, as its agent.
As the new Director of DTRA, what is your position on the status of
the capabilities for modeling, predicting, and mitigating the effects
of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and space and what plans do you
have to address the growing evidence that increased funding and
management attention is required to maintain a critical level of
capability in this technical area?
Dr. Younger. As the world has changed since the end of the Cold
War, the nature of threats to the United States has become much broader
than the past. With a broader range of credible asymmetrical threats to
our nation's security, the resources we focused on nuclear weapons in
past decades are applied to a broader set of WMD technical issues.
Thus, we must rely on the decades of data collected from atmospheric
and underground tests, coupled with the expanding capability to conduct
ever more realistic simulations of nuclear weapons to maintain a core
expertise for nuclear weapons effects. Unfortunately, the state of our
government and industry team has been slowly eroding over the past
decade. Our challenge is to apply limited resources to maintain the
expertise on the effects of the traditional large nuclear weapons while
also working on the issues of the 21st century. There is not an easy
solution to the long-standing issue of the atrophying base of
expertise, but it is one that DTRA is addressing before the critical
mass of expertise vanishes. I have begun two efforts in nuclear weapons
effects. The first is a study of what is required to maintain an
understanding of relevant phenomena. This includes experimental and
test facilities, modeling, archiving of past data, and the training of
new technical experts. Secondly, I am working with industry, where
another source of expertise in nuclear weapons effects resides, to help
establish a sustainable nuclear base in this important area.
52. Senator Smith. Dr. Younger, I am aware of some discussion for
the establishment of the Nuclear Weapon Effects Institute, which, if
constituted correctly, appears at this level to be a viable long term
solution for maintaining a responsive national technical infrastructure
for nuclear weapons effects matters. However, I note that there is no
request for funding for the institute and I am not yet aware any effort
to address the fragile health of the nuclear weapons effects technical
community in the near-term. I am concerned that what remains of the
expertise in the current community, which will be required in the
establishment of a viable institute, will be lost.
How do you propose to address the funding and management
requirements for re-constituting the nuclear weapons effects technical
community in the near term while diverting funds to the establishment
of the Nuclear Weapon Effects Institute?
Dr. Younger. We are considering this among other alternatives but
have made no formal decision.
defense threat reduction agency
53. Senator Smith. Dr. Younger, the charter given by Congress to
DTRA (and its predecessor agencies) in nuclear matters calls for the
Agency to be the primary DOD resource for all information, research,
analysis, and technology relating to effects of nuclear explosions.
Nuclear weapon technologies have proliferated beyond the original
superpowers, and today we have grave concerns about nuclear threats
from a number of adversaries. Consequently, I believe it is important
that the DTRA program for nuclear weapon effects of many varieties be
actively pursued by the Agency. Can you summarize for the efforts the
Agency is currently undertaking in each of the following technical
areas:
1. Nuclear effects pertinent to mid-course missile defense
systems;
2. Nuclear effects pertinent to boost-phase and terminal
missile defense systems (quite different since detonations
associated with these systems would be in the atmosphere rather
than space);
3. Nuclear effects that impact the operations of
communications systems, the global position system used most
effectively for precision targeting and precision strike, and
space-based surveillance systems;
4. Nuclear effects that degrade or destroy satellite assets
through radiation effects;
5. Nuclear effects that relate to the survivability and
functionality of our offensive missile systems; and
6. Nuclear effects on the national infrastructure, including
effects such as electromagnetic pulse.
In your response, I would like to know the funding level for each
of these topic areas, along with an estimate of the number of DTRA
staff and technical contractor personnel involved.
Dr. Younger. The DTRA Nuclear Weapons Effects Technology supports a
wide customer base. Warfighters and weapon systems, including the
associated Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance equipment, missile defense and support
systems/equipment, must be able to survive and operate effectively
through a spectrum of hostile environments. DTRA efforts emphasize the
development and demonstration of innovative and cost effective
technologies to sustain the functional survivability of U.S. and Allied
Forces and systems when confronted with threats from advanced
conventional weapons, special weapons and limited nuclear attack.
The DTRA Nuclear Technology program constitutes the DOD's resident
S&T expertise in nuclear phenomenology and mitigation technology. It
develops and demonstrates affordable strategies and hardening
technologies for U.S. systems; transfers the technical products to
acquisition program offices; conducts component, subsystem, system and
end-to-end performance tests and assessments as requested by the
Services and CINCs; and provides support to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense on technical and policy matters that relate to the
acquisition of survivable systems and strategic system sustainment. The
program also provides the S&T basis for use of the nuclear stockpile as
a realistic deterrent against the use of VMD by foes of the U.S. and
our allies. DTRA's Nuclear Technology Program provides a balance
between direct response to specific customer needs and a rigorous R&D
program to provide technology solutions to anticipated future
requirements.
The DTRA Nuclear Technology has four major thrusts. First the
Radiation Hardened Microelectronics projects respond to DOD space and
missile system requirements for hardened microelectronics and photonics
technology to support mission needs. This activity is done in
coordination with the DOD, USD (AT&L) Radiation Hardened Electronics
Oversight Council (RHOC) roadmap to ensure coordination with DOD
program requirements. Second, the Nuclear Phenomenology projects
develop a full spectrum of analytical tools for evaluating battlefield
survivability and lethality; develops instrumentation to quantify risks
for warfighters in radiation environments; and captures, archives, and
adapts WMD knowledge to apply to emerging DOD challenges. Third, the
Simulation and Assessment Technology program develops technologies and
provides assistance to ensure system operability and survivability in
nuclear weapon effects environments. This is accomplished by providing
response models, radiation simulators, testable design protocols,
hardware-in-the-loop test technologies, and assessments for CINCs and
SPOs to determine operability in a nuclear environment. Finally, the EM
and Infrastructure Protection projects provide the science and
technology to ensure protection of military and civilian infrastructure
electronic systems against multiple electromagnetic (EM) environments,
including nuclear electromagnetic pulse and high power microwaves, as
well as WMD threats.
The following summarizes the efforts the Agency is currently
undertaking in each of the technical areas of interest by the
committee. Please note that there is extensive overlap of the nuclear
weapon effects programs (and resources) for the specified technical
areas. For example, our work on understanding and mitigating the
effects of electromagnetic pulses (EMP) spans the areas of missile
defense, communications systems, offensive missile systems, and the
National infrastructure.
1. Nuclear effects pertinent to mid-course missile defense systems.
Many of DTRA's nuclear weapons effects projects described above deal
with portions of the technical issues related to mid course missile
defense systems. These systems are required to operate in a potential
space nuclear environment and encompass the actual kill vehicles,
sensors, communications, and associated ground sites. The nuclear
environment includes effects from ionizing radiation, the
electromagnetic pulse, and disturbed environment effects. Portions of
the efforts from all four program areas relate to this technical area.
2. Nuclear effects pertinent to boost-phase and terminal phase and
terminal missile defense systems (quite different since detonations
associated with these systems would be in the atmosphere rather than in
space). The nuclear effects would be quite different since the ionizing
radiation from the burst would be absorbed by the surrounding
atmosphere (range for absorption very height/density dependent).
However, if the nuclear event is above about 20 kilometers, the gamma
rays interacting with the atmosphere would still produce an
electromagnetic pulse that could effect the supporting ground systems.
Therefore, parts of the program dealing with assessments of intercept
scenarios, the additional effects of Source Region EMP (if the nuclear
event is close enough to the surface that the fireball diameter touches
the ground), and phenomenology efforts related to the output of the
device, electromagnetic effects, and potentially other codes related to
blast, shock, and thermal effects (again depending upon the height of
the event) are relevant to this technical area.
3. Nuclear effects that impact the operations of communications
systems, the global position system used most effectively for precision
targeting and precision strike, and space-based surveillance systems.
The effects on these systems would be the result of a nuclear event at
any altitude, hence parts of all 4 areas in the nuclear program are
relevant and portions of the resources allocated, based upon judgment
of proportion for these specific systems.
4. Nuclear effects that degrade or destroy satellite assets through
radiation effects. Again, many of the programs described above include
effects on the supporting satellite systems related to a missile
defense system. While a missile defense scenario is normally concerned
with approximately a 30-minute window, there are also longer-term
effects from ``pumping'' the natural radiation belts that could produce
persistent effects on satellite assets for many months. This effect is
related to DTRA's phenomenology and hardened microelectronics efforts.
5. Nuclear effects that relate to the survivability and
functionality of our offensive missile systems. The offensive missile
system includes the entire end-to-end architecture from the space- and
land based sensors and radars, to the command, control, and
communications systems, to the actual delivery systems. These systems
must be survivable from nuclear bursts at any altitude. Hence, there is
again considerable overlap with the technical areas described in the
first two questions. Not only is their overlap in some of the
satellites and ground support facilities for both missile defense and
offensive systems, the related phenomena and effects are the same. In
addition to the above programs, efforts within the phenomenology
program relate to the effectiveness/functionality of the offensive
systems in producing the desired effects. Resources are allocated by
the estimated portions of the nuclear program described above dealing
with the offensive missile assets.
6. Nuclear effects on the National infrastructure, including
effects such as electromagnetic pulse. In addition to efforts focused
directly on EMP, the Electromagnetic Protection Technology Program
includes the Mission Degradation Analysis program and management of DOE
execution of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center. Both of these efforts are directed at various threats to the
National infrastructure and related networks, and can be extended to
include nuclear effects. Portions of the Phenomenology program dealing
with the electromagnetic pulse, as well as maintenance/upgrade of
existing codes dealing with blast/shock/thermal effects are included in
this area.
Due to the overlap of the four thrusts of the DTRA Nuclear
Technology Program in each of the six areas above, it is not possible
to precisely allocate the funding and personnel to each area. For
fiscal year 2003 President's Budget Request, the DTRA Nuclear
Technology RDT&E is $111 million and there are 51 government personnel,
20 support contractors and approximately 300 scientists and engineers
in industry supporting the program.
chemical demilitarization program
54. Senator Smith. Dr. Klein, although this is a subject not under
consideration at today's hearing, due to the national and international
importance of the chemical demilitarization program, I am compelled to
make the following inquiry and wish to solicit your response. In
December, the Secretary of Army announced the transfer of the chemical
demilitarization program from the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology (AS-ALT) to the Assistant Secretary for
Installations and Environment (AS-I&E), Dr. Mario Fiori. Currently, the
chemical demilitarization program is a Major Defense Acquisition
Program (Acquisition Category ID) with milestone decision authority
residing with OSD Under Secretary Aldridge. Moreover, in responding to
this committee's questions in November, you indicated that your duties
include oversight of this program.
Since this is an acquisition program under Under Secretary
Aldridge, why is oversight of the program within the Army and now
outside the acquisition elements of the Army (AS-I&E)?
Dr. Klein. The Milestone Decision Authority for the DOD Chemical
Demilitarization Program, as an Acquisition Category I-D program, will
continue to reside within the OSD acquisition community. I am actively
involved with senior Army officials regarding the chemical
demilitarization program [and currently meet with them each week] to
maintain program oversight. The December 2001 Army decision to place
AS-I&E in charge of the program is subject to Office of the Secretary
of Defense review and indeed is under review. It is premature to state
whether or not the program will remain outside the acquisition elements
of the Army.
55. Senator Smith. Dr. Klein, is it true that current Assistant
Secretary of Army for Installations and Environment, Dr. Mario Fiori,
is pursuing the transfer of this program away from the acquisition
oversight and authority completely?
Dr. Klein. I am of the firm view that the chemical demilitarization
program will remain under Office of the Secretary of Defense
acquisition oversight and authority. To this end, I currently meet
weekly with Dr. Fiori and other key staff members and the same
individuals will meet monthly with the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The Milestone Decision
Authority for the DOD Chemical Demilitarization Program, as an
Acquisition Category I-D program, will continue to reside within the
OSD acquisition community.
56. Senator Smith. Dr. Klein, do you support removing this program
from under the acquisition oversight authority? How would you view this
type of action?
Dr. Klein. I am of the firm view that the chemical demilitarization
program will remain under the Office of the Secretary of Defense
acquisition oversight and authority. The Milestone Decision Authority
for the DOD Chemical Demilitarization Program, as an Acquisition
Category I-D program, will continue to reside within the OSD
acquisition community. Accordingly, I would resist an effort to remove
OSD acquisition oversight authority from the chemical demilitarization
program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Hutchinson
vaccine acquisition
57. Senator Hutchinson. Dr. Klein, I have grave concerns about our
military's vaccine acquisition strategy. We do not have vaccines
available for a variety of biological weapons that we know are being
produced by our enemies. Iraq continues to develop increasingly
virulent pathogens. One of my greatest fears is that al-Qaeda, or
another terrorist group, utilizes these kinds of weapons against the
military or the American people. Do you agree that vaccination is the
best protection against biological weapons? Do we have access to
adequate vaccine stocks for ricin?
Dr. Klein. Vaccines offer the best protection in terms of
performance and cost, if we know a threat exists and have time to
immunize. For the surprise attack or untoward event, we need other
products that provide immediate immunity or protection. Vaccines,
drugs, and therapeutics are complementary, and the DOD must look at
protection against biological weapons from a systems standpoint. Newer
immune globulin preparations (e.g., monoclonal antibodies) and non-
specific immune stimulators may add to our arsenal. However, the costs
for these products are not cheap, and they will take time to develop
and license.
Ricin is an easily manufactured toxin by-product of the castor bean
industry. It is highly lethal when injected but far less effective when
inhaled or ingested. The DOD is currently funding applied research on a
new vaccine against ricin, however, a vaccine will not be available for
many years.
chemical/biological defense
58. Senator Hutchinson. Dr. Klein, the opening statements would
indicate that the DTRA is the singular DOD agency for defense from WMD
that is nuclear and chemical/biological defense. Given that Congress in
P.L. 103-160 directed the establishment of a Joint Services Chemical
and Biological Defense Program with the Army as Executive Agent, how
does this dominant DTRA role in chemical/biological defense fit within
the law?
Dr. Klein. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is a Combat
Support agency that provides support to the warfighting Combatant
Commanders for all aspects of chemical and biological defense. DTRA
currently works for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear,
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs) who also has responsibility,
mandated in P.L. 103-160, for the Chemical Biological Defense Program
(CBDP). DTRA works within the current framework of and supports the
CBDP to ensure an integrated chemical and biological defense research,
development and acquisition program is maintained.
59. Senator Hutchinson. Dr. Klein, how does the Secretary of the
Army's duties as Executive Agent for chemical/biological defense align
with the Director of DTRA's role? Is there a duplicative function
engendering confusion and unnecessary cost?
Dr. Klein. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) was
established by 50 U.S.C. 1522 in 1994. Since the inception of the CBDP,
there have been numerous changes in the worldwide environment regarding
chemical and biological threats resulting in its growth. As part of the
increased emphasis to address threats from weapons of mass destruction,
the DOD established the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on
October 1, 1998. DOD is analyzing and reviewing the functions of the
CBDP with the Army, as Executive Agent, and DTRA to ensure we have a
management structure that is streamlined and responsive to meet the
ever growing chemical and biological threat. Steps are being taken in
consultation with Army and DTRA officials to develop a management
structure that is more efficient.
60. Senator Hutchinson. Dr. Klein, the services, specifically the
Army, has had the lead role for chemical/biological defense for 85
years. The services have the chemical/biological defense force
structure, research and development infrastructure and acquisition work
force/resources to satisfy the Service Secretary's Title 10
responsibilities. Would it not make more sense for the responsibilities
to continue to be executed by the services with Army lead and OSD ATSD
(NCB) oversight to integrate the nuclear and chemical/biological
defense?
Dr. Klein. The Department of Defense is certainly aware of the
experience and breadth of expertise offered by the Army in the defense
against chemical and biological (CB) agents. Because of the increased
threat from CB agents and the increased scope and emphasis on CB
defense, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics) chartered a comprehensive analysis of the current management
structures supporting this effort. Once complete, the Under Secretary
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) will approve a
reorganization that will provide a streamlined and responsive program
while ensuring that the warfighters needs and Title 10 responsibilities
are addressed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu on Behalf of Senator
Conrad Burns
10 April 2002.
Senator Mary Landrieu,
Chairman, Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee,
Senate Armed Services Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Landrieu. On April 10, 2002, the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee held a hearing on technology for combating
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in review of the Defense
Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2003. I would appreciate it if
the following questions for the record that I have could be submitted
to The Honorable Ronald Sega, Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, for response.
Thank you for your continued support of our Nation's Armed Forces.
I look forward to working with you in the days and weeks to come. As
always, if I can be helpful in any way, please do not hesitate to let
me know.
Sincerely,
Conrad Burns,
United States Senator.
acquiring new technologies
61. Senator Burns. Dr. Sega, how is the DDR&E's Domestic Technology
Transfer Program helping the DOD to identify and acquire innovative
technologies for combating terrorism that are being developed by the
private sector?
Dr. Sega. The DOD Domestic Technology Transfer Program, managed
from my office, promotes transfer of DOD-developed technologies to the
private sector for commercial use, transfer of commercially developed
technologies into the DOD for military application, and joint
development of technologies for both military and commercial
applications. This is accomplished by the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies through a variety of technology transfer mechanisms
such as Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs),
Patent License Agreements (PLAs), Educational Partnership Agreements
(EPAs), testing agreements, and programs such as the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) program. While this is not an exhaustive
list, some examples where technology transfer tools are used to
identify and acquire innovative technologies for combating terrorism
are:
Army CRADA for technical evaluation of an optics-
based, rapid pathogen identifying device, designed to recognize
pathogens in real-time from food and water samples.
Army CRADA to conduct collaborative research and
development towards an optimal fermentation process for CC10, a
recombinant human protein, and to collaborate on related issues
such as scale-up, purification, characterization, and
biological activity.
Navy for nine licensed patents to produce an
explosives detection scanner for use in airports to detect
small quantities of concealed explosives in carry-on baggage.
Air Force CRADA to perform Research and Development
(R&D) on the production of reagents that facilitate detection
of anthrax in the environment and in biological systems.
Air Force CRADA to perform R&D on the testing and
evaluation of a prototype of an effective, yet economical,
glovebox designed for use in handling materials and/or objects
that are potentially contaminated with biological agents.
The Department's Dual Use Science and Technology (S&T) program also
plays a role in helping identify and acquire innovative technologies
being developed by the private sector that can be used for combating
terrorism. One example of the technologies with application to counter-
terrorism is the testing of the use of selectively permeable membrane
technology fabric systems for military and civilian clothing
applications (e.g., HAZMAT protective clothing). These selectively
permeable membrane based garments are extremely thin, lightweight,
flexible, waterproof, and allow water vapor through their membrane
structures thus minimizing heat stress to the users, while resisting
permeations of toxic chemical vapors and dangerous microorganisms in
liquid, vapor, and aerosol forms. Another example of a technology being
developed through the Dual Use S&T program is the world's smallest
infrared camera. The camera can be mounted on soldiers' weapons or
helmets and also has wide application by firefighters in smoke-filled
environments. The camera was used in part of the search and rescue
operation at the World Trade Centers.
commercializing dod development
62. Senator Burns. Dr. Sega, how successful has the Technology
Transfer Program been at commercializing new technology developed by
the DOD's research laboratories, so that this technology is cost-
effective and readily available for homeland security and the war on
terrorism?
Dr. Sega. DOD is actively working to encourage commercial
applications for technologies originally developed for military
applications. In line with 15 USC 3710(a) (2) and (3), and to encourage
participation in the technology transfer program, our scientists and
engineers job performance is based partly on their technology transfer
efforts. In addition to joint development with industrial partners
using Cooperative Research and Development Agreements CRADAs,
cooperative agreements, and other partnership vehicles, we have seen an
increase in DOD-held patents licensed to the private sector which
attest to the success of this program. In fiscal year 2001, there were
283 active patent license agreements for use of DOD-developed
technologies. Some examples of those which relate to homeland security
and the war on terrorism are:
Survival, Inc., in Seattle, WA, is working with the
U.S. Navy's Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, to
evaluate a Navy-developed bio/chemical decontamination compound
for use in cleanup of contaminated sites. Survival, Inc. plans
to license the technology and make it available to the U.S.
military and first-responders in the domestic market.
Quantum Magnetics, Inc., in San Diego, CA, signed
patent license agreements with the U.S. Navy's Naval Research
Laboratory for nine patents/patent applications for use in its
line of QScanTM explosive detection devices. Quantum
Magnetics QScan QR 160 is designed to detect small amounts of
explosives concealed in mail, briefcases, purses, carry-on
bags, and shoes. The QScan QR500 is designed to scan larger
items, such as mail bags, boxes, and large suitcases.
EnVirion, L.C. has licensed technology from the U.S.
Army's Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center to produce and
market a device and method for the detection and identification
of submicron particles.
The National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center Northeast and its Law Enforcement Analysis
Facility are using the Air Force Research Laboratory/
Information Directorate's Web Enabled Timeline Analysis System
(WebTAS). WebTAS is a computerized program which graphically
plots events and presents visual and statistical data on
timelines, graphs, tables, and maps. It can be used as a
predictor of behavior or events and, by using an algorithm
called the Temporal Transition Model, analysts take information
about a suspect's behavior and use it to predict what the
suspect might do next.
technology transfer and small businesses
63. Senator Burns. Dr. Sega, how successful has DOD's Technology
Transfer Program been at partnering U.S. small business with the DOD to
develop, test, and rapidly transition innovative new concepts into war-
winning capabilities?
Dr. Sega. The Department's technology transfer program focuses on
research and development of technologies for both military and
commercial applications. We have over 2,000 active Cooperative Research
and Development Agreements (CRADAs) with small and large business to
jointly develop technologies to improve our war-winning capabilities.
Approximately 40 percent of our CRADAs are with small business firms.
``The Influence of Federal Laboratory R&D on Industrial Research,'' a
paper prepared in response to the National Science Foundation grant,
states, ``Our results suggest that CRADAs may be more beneficial to
firms than other public-private interactions, precisely because of the
mutual effort that they demand of firms and government laboratories.''
In addition to CRADAs, the technology transfer program helps transition
new concepts into war-winning capabilities by licensing DOD-developed
technologies to U.S. companies that, in turn, commercially produce this
technology to support the DOD mission.
To give a brief example of recent successes, one DOD Technology
Transfer program partnership intermediary has facilitated 62 different
technology transfer partnerships between the DOD and U.S. companies in
a little over 2 years. These include 22 CRADAs and 11 patent licensing
agreements.
64. Senator Burns. Dr. Sega, how successful have DOD's partnership
intermediaries, such as the TechLink Center at Montana State
University, been at developing partnerships between the DOD and U.S.
small business for new technology development and commercialization?
Dr. Sega. The TechLink Center at Montana State University (MSU) is
the only Defense Department-wide partnership intermediary. The Air
Force has four partnership intermediaries and is the executive agent
for TechLink. Partnership intermediaries have been successful in
assisting the DOD and U.S. small business develop partnerships for new
technology development and commercialization. The TechLink Center at
MSU, in the 2\1/2\ years it has been supporting DOD, facilitated 62
partnership arrangements involving Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense
Agencies, including 6 company start-ups around DOD-related
technologies. TechLink has assisted 11 small companies in licensing DOD
technologies for commercial use and has facilitated 22 partnerships
between DOD laboratories and private sector companies in the
northwestern United States to jointly develop new technology with both
military and commercial applications. TechLink is helping small
companies succeed in the DOD Small Business Innovation Research
program. TechLink is encouraging small companies to submit summaries of
their research into the DOD Independent Research and Development
database, including technology for combating terrorism.
[Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]