[Senate Hearing 107-696]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2225
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
----------
PART 4
AIRLAND
----------
MARCH 14, 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2225
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 4
AIRLAND
__________
MARCH 14, 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-925 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002
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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Airland
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
MAX CLELAND, Georgia RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Army Modernization and Transformation
march 14, 2002
Page
Brownlee, Hon. Les, Under Secretary, United States Army.......... 7
Keane, Gen. John M., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army 10
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
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THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Airland,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
ARMY MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Lieberman, Warner,
Inhofe, and Santorum.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr.,
professional staff member; and Creighton Greene, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Patricia
L. Lewis, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member; and Scott W. Stucky, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer and Nicholas W.
West.
Committee members' assistants present: Frederick M. Downey,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; George M. Bernier, III, assistant to Senator Santorum;
Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Michele A.
Traficante, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway, II,
assistant to Senator Sessions; Derek Maurer, assistant to
Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Lieberman. The subcommittee will come to order.
Thanks to our witnesses for being here.
Secretary Brownlee, first off, it is a great pleasure just
to address you with that title and to have the long view of you
as opposed to having you back here. [Laughter.]
It is great to have you back in this hearing room in your
new capacity as Under Secretary of the Army and, if I may put
it this way, to continue discussions that you and I had when
you were on the committee staff about Army modernization and
transformation.
General Keane, it is always good to see you as well. Your
testimony last year was very helpful in this regard. I will
look forward to a similarly rewarding and productive discussion
today.
Since this is the first Airland Subcommittee hearing of the
second session of Congress, I want to acknowledge how much of a
pleasure it continues to be to work with Senator Santorum as my
ranking member. This is the fourth session, actually, we have
worked together as chair and ranking member of this
subcommittee; each of us having a stint in both positions. It
has been a real pleasure to share these responsibilities with
someone who shares the same concerns I have for the Army and
the same determination to help the transformation that is
ongoing to be a successful one.
This subcommittee, I am proud to say, has been a strong
supporter of the Army's effort to transform since the first
budget request submitted after General Shinseki announced his
transformation initiative in October 1999, which was the fiscal
year 2001 budget request. That year the Department presented an
Army budget that had decreased in real terms by 1.5 percent.
At that time, General Shinseki submitted an unfunded
requirements list of $10 billion, which was double that of
General Reimer from the year before. The Army had cancelled
seven major acquisition systems and restructured many others to
shift $1 billion to begin research and development (R&D) on the
Objective Force and to begin the procurement of the Interim
Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT).
The Airland Subcommittee responded to this problem by
adding over $1 billion--$1.1 billion, to be exact--to the
modernization budget, including an additional $46 million for
Future Combat Systems (FCS) R&D; and the additional funding
requested to restore the Chief of Staff's top two modernization
priorities, which were the Wolverine Heavy Assault Bridge and
the Grizzly Obstacle Breacher.
In fiscal year 2002, the first Bush administration budget
request, the Army budget increased slightly, but procurement
funding continued to decrease by $630 million in real terms,
while R&D increased only slightly by $200 million.
At that time, General Shinseki submitted an unfunded
requirements list of $9.5 billion; $2.7 billion of which was
under the purview of this subcommittee. That year, we once
again responded, adding over $500 million, covering the entire
Objective Force shortfall of $43 million, funding $20 million
of the $100 million IBCT shortfall, adding $53 million in
digitization requirements; and putting $238 million toward
aviation modernization and recapitalization.
While supporting Army transformation, this subcommittee did
express some concerns and take issue with certain aspects of
the Army's strategy to get there. In particular, we had, and I
think it is fair to say still do have, some concerns that the
Army proposes spending nearly $10 billion of scarce resources
to field six IBCTs.
Many questions we asked, honestly, have not yet been
answered fully. Consequently, in the fiscal year 2001 defense
authorization bill, Congress mandated that the Army conduct a
side-by-side operational comparison of the planned interim
armored vehicle with the medium armored vehicle currently in
the inventory to determine whether a cheaper alternative for
the IBCTs was feasible and desirable.
Last year, at the request of the Secretary of the Army,
this subcommittee inserted language in the defense
authorization conference report to grant the Secretary of
Defense authority to waive the IAV-M113 side-by-side comparison
requirement subject to certain clarifications.
The legislation also mandates a formal experimentation
program leading to the Objective Force, including a linkage of
the IBCTs to that process. The legislation requires a full
spectrum operational evaluation of the first IBCT and prohibits
both its deployment outside of the U.S., and an obligation of
funds for more than three IBCTs, until the IBCT is deemed
operationally effective and suitable. That is one of the issues
I hope we can discuss today.
Now, I wanted to briefly go through that history today,
because we have been very much involved with you and have
wanted to be supportive. This year the Army's overall budget
increased by $9.9 billion, a 10 percent real increase, while
the procurement budget increased by 13.7 percent. So this is
movement in a good direction.
In contrast, the R&D budget, while less than last year's
appropriated level, increased by less than 1 percent when
compared to last year's budget request level.
Even with that increase, and this is the dilemma that you
are facing and in that sense, we are facing together, the Army
still found it necessary to cancel another 18 acquisition
programs, including some such as that Wolverine Heavy Assault
Bridge, which the subcommittee had restored just 2 years before
at the strong urging of the Army. The Army also reduced the
number of Legacy Force systems it intends to recapitalize, and
curtailed other programs.
Once again, although receiving that additional $9.9 billion
over last year's level, General Shinseki has submitted an
unfunded requirements list of $9.5 billion. So this gives us
some sense of the pressures on the Army, as it tries to do all
that we are asking it to do and it feels it has to do.
To say that challenges to a successful transformation still
abound would, I think, be an understatement. I understand that
the Army leadership considers the Objective Force to be the
highest priority, and I agree with that.
I note that the Army intends to accelerate the development
and fielding of the Objective Force by 2 years for an initial
operational capability in fiscal year 2010. I strongly support
that initiative.
But I remain concerned that the level of research and
development funding may not allow that to happen. Even though
the Army is focusing 97 percent of the science and technology
(S&T) funding toward the Objective Force, the unfunded
requirements list that the Army has submitted contains a $190
million S&T shortfall, and a $200 million research,
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) shortfall for the
Future Combat Systems in the Objective Force.
Now, that is something we cannot allow to happen. So the
bottom line is, we have to work together so that the Army can
find the resources to fully fund the Objective Force. It
appears to me that the Army has to make some very hard
decisions to free up the resources to make that transformation
happen, and you need our help to do that. Of course, if we are
to help, we need to understand that the Army has made specific
decisions and will stick to them.
Aviation programs that are critical, really, to the future,
remain a concern. The future Air Combat System, particularly
the Comanche, is still in development after nearly 20 years of
effort. Two prototypes are built, and only one is flying.
Now, we understand that the Army must contend with a nearly
$1.7 billion developmental cost overrun. Similarly, the
recapitalization and upgrade of the Chinook into the Improved
Cargo Helicopter, which is another element vital to the
Objective Force, is facing a so-called Nunn-McCurdy breach for
unit production cost increases of over 25 percent. The Army has
not yet begun a program to develop the Joint Transport Rotor
Craft, which could be the Objective Force replacement for the
Chinook.
Apart from the Objective Force funding concerns are the
questions of: What is the appropriate organizational design
doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedure? Where should we
look for the resources to fully fund the transformation to the
Objective Force, including the aviation systems vital to its
success?
That brings me back to that $10 billion for the Interim
Force, which is over $1.6 billion for each brigade. That does
not include many of the other costs associated with that force.
The $276 million shortfall for the Interim Brigade MILCON, and
the $283 million shortfall for the Interim Brigade training on
this year's Army unfunded list gives you some sense of the
magnitude of the problem here.
So I raise the question, respectfully: Can the Army truly
afford six brigades, especially when the sixth one is fielded
in the same year that the Army plans to begin equipping the
first unit of the Objective Force? Would a smaller number
adequately fill the perceived capability gap, and would the
risk be worth taking to ensure full funding for the
transformation to the Objective Force?
Of course, we have to come back and ask: What about the
Legacy Force? The Army plans to recapitalize and selectively
modernize the three divisions and the armored cavalry regiment
of the heavy counter-attack corps.
Unfortunately, while many of the major combat systems such
as the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle are
targeted for upgrade, many of the supporting systems are not.
Also, none of the modernized tanks and infantry fighting
vehicles are scheduled to go in a pre-positioned equipment set,
which could result in less modernized forces, which fall on to
that equipment, being first to the fight versus the modernized
counter-attack corps, which will deploy by sea.
As with the Interim Brigades, can the Army afford to
modernize three and one-third heavy divisions and still get to
the Objective Force? Would a smaller number suffice and allow
the Army to modernize and recapitalize the support systems as
well as the combat systems in a fewer number of heavy divisions
and brigades?
These are not easy questions. I know that there is some
risk implied in their implementation, but I do think to help
you move to the Objective Force, which you want to do as
quickly as possible, and I think we need to do, we have to ask
those questions.
With apologies for the length of my opening statement to my
colleagues and you, I look forward to your testimony and your
counsel on these questions.
Senator Santorum.
Senator Santorum. Mr. Chairman, I will yield a minute or
two to the ranking member of the full committee to comment
about one of our witnesses.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I believe this is your first appearance as a witness for
the Department of Defense, Secretary Brownlee.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. We welcome you.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you.
Senator Warner. We salute you for the recognition the
President has given you and the trust that you now have. We
have full confidence in your ability to discharge these
obligations.
I also note, I believe, you are either the first or very
close to the first of the civilians to visit the region in
Afghanistan.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. You visited the Army, which you, frankly,
love so much, and the troops. Well done.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. I am going to urge this subcommittee to
look very carefully at the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
(FMTV) program. I think that fact has been communicated to you.
I do not raise FMTV in any way as to prejudice the varied
parties that have interests in this program. But I do believe
it is a matter of concern. Unusual pieces of information have
come to this committee and to us individually about that
program and, therefore, it bears scrutiny by this subcommittee.
On that subject, I will have more to say later on, perhaps.
We will share that information with you, of course, Mr.
Secretary and General.
There is an old adage that the Army travels on its stomach,
but it also travels with its trucks. You have had a lot of
experience in that program prior to your appointment as Under
Secretary. I am sure you can make a fair and objective
evaluation. If there is a remedy, then we are prepared to
provide that remedy.
Thank you.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you for
that. The subcommittee will be involved in trying to respond to
the questions you raised.
Senator Santorum.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICK SANTORUM
Senator Santorum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just let me say
a couple of things: First off, it has not just been 4 years
that we have worked together. It is 4 years on this
subcommittee.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Senator Santorum. But 2 years prior to that, we worked on
the old Acquisition and Technology Subcommittee. It has been
really one of the singularly most gratifying working
relationships that I have had, working with you on all of those
subcommittees.
In listening to your opening statement, I would just say
that I will sign my name under that statement, every word of
it.
I have the exact same concerns as Senator Lieberman, and I
want to thank you, General, and you, Mr. Secretary, for coming
here. I am looking forward to a very frank and fresh discussion
about these issues.
I think Senator Lieberman and I--we have responsibility not
just for the Army here, but other programs and other services--
I think I can say that we have the most concern about how the
Army is dealing with its move into transformation and its
relevancy in the fighting structure of our country.
Most concerns are principally driven not entirely by
differences of opinion on how that direction takes, but I think
probably more driven by how you pay for it all.
I think that is what Senator Lieberman was trying to
articulate. We sit here and look at this budget, and we look at
what you are trying to accomplish. You are taking a very
significant risk, and I think Senator Lieberman and I would
say: Congratulations. We know you have to take that risk, but
the risk seems to be pretty much loaded on the Legacy Force,
and not the modernizing, and I think Senator Lieberman laid out
that situation very well.
But even with taking all that risk, where 97 percent of
your funds are going into the Objective Force and you are
spending all the new money--at least a big chunk of the new
money--on the Interim Combat Teams, you are still short. You
are still very short. Regarding Army aviation, the Senator laid
out how short you are in getting to your objectives.
You are still short in the research dollars you need and
the programs, whether it is military construction (MILCON) or
others, to field these Interim Brigades and to field the
Objective Force.
That is to make the assumption, which maybe you do, maybe
you do not, that somehow more money is going to fall out of the
sky and all this is going to happen, and at the same time, you
can have this level of risk with respect to the Legacy Force
and not modernizing, because you really are not doing a heck of
a lot of modernization. The Senator is right. We need to flesh
this out and understand the levels of risk and what decisions
are being made.
I have a lot of specific questions about how we are moving
forward on several systems and several programs, which I will
reserve for my question time, but suffice it to say that
Senator Lieberman and I are very concerned about this. We want
to be helpful.
We support you fully and I think we have backed it up with
more money from this subcommittee than from the last two
administrations, this one and the prior one. We have put our
money where our mouth is.
We have been compliant in waiving requirements. I will ask
you about how that waiver process is going. We want to be
helpful, but we want to see that this is a realistic plan that
does not have too much risk associated with it, where down the
road we could be ending up with an unmodernized Legacy Force,
an Objective Force that is not ready, and an Interim Brigade
that may or may not work. Then where are you?
That is a real concern. I am not as eloquent as the Senator
from Connecticut in laying out all these things, but that is
sort of my gut reaction as to where we are.
Senator Lieberman. But right to the point. Well said. Thank
you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
statement, but I agree with everything that is being said here.
While you have been exchanging accolades on this committee, I--
--[Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. Would you like to throw a dart at us?
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. I served a few years as the chairman and
then the ranking member of the Readiness and Management Support
Sucommittee. The issues are the same. Everything you are
talking about here is a readiness issue.
It bothers me when I see the very things you are talking
about, that we are going to be moving into some kind of a
force, but we are not sure what it is. In the meantime, we are
at war, at least in one place and I think more than one place.
We have to have the capability today. We have to have it
during this interim period. This is a life or death issue. It
is a readiness issue. Are we ready?
With the resources we have right now, we are not ready to
the level that I think we should be ready. That is the way I
will be approaching it in this committee.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Inhofe. You tempted me
to say that if you concentrate on the pressures on the Army,
you could actually make a case--you could probably do it with
the other services, as well--that though the $48 billion
increase proposed for the DOD budget is large, you can make a
case to go higher than that. Or you have to really squeeze and
make some of the tough decisions internally with regard to
either the Legacy Force or the Interim Brigades, in this case,
the combat teams, to find money to get to where you want to go
and where you really need to go. So I echo what my colleagues
have said.
We are from Congress and we are here to help. Truthfully,
we start with great admiration for the Army. General Shinseki
took a real turn here in a very admirable direction, and so we
want to help to make it happen.
Gentlemen, it is all yours. Secretary Brownlee.
STATEMENT OF HON. LES BROWNLEE, UNDER SECRETARY, UNITED STATES
ARMY
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Santorum, Senator Inhofe.
First, let me just thank all of you for the opportunity to
come and testify here this afternoon, on behalf of both General
Keane and myself.
Mr. Chairman, General Keane and I would like to request
that our joint written statement be entered into the record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection.
Secretary Brownlee. With your permission, sir, we both have
short oral statements, which we would like to present.
Senator Lieberman. Please proceed.
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, I could not come back here for
the first time and not make some comment about what an honor it
is for me to come here and testify before this subcommittee,
which I had the honor of serving on as a professional staff
member for many years, contributed something to the naming of
it, and have watched over the years. I just have to say that
the statements and comments by the members today indicate that
the level of knowledge of the members and staff of this
committee always exceeds the expectations of anybody who sits
here.
I promise you it does. So I believe that is good for us. I
know it is good for the committee. It is a tribute to both the
members and the staff that serve on this wonderful committee.
Having spent some 18 years and many hours in this room, I
have a lot of memories here. I have to tell you that since I
left about 4 months ago, I miss the work. I miss the people,
both members and staff. I will always be proud to say that I
was a member of the staff of this committee.
If you would be kind enough to indulge me, Mr. Chairman,
for just a few moments: In the job I had previously, I had the
opportunity to observe General Keane on many occasions and I
had a very high admiration for him based on those observations.
Until I had the opportunity to work next to him on a daily
basis and observe what he brings to the Army, I just did not
realize how invaluable what he does is for the Army.
The management expertise, the dedication and loyalty, and,
probably most of all, the leadership that he brings to the Army
is absolutely invaluable. The Army is extremely well served by
that; and the American people are fortunate that he serves the
Army in the capacity that he does.
I am grateful every day for the opportunity to work with
him, and I am honored to accompany him here today to talk about
this very important subject of the Army's transformation.
General Keane and I certainly appreciate the support of
this committee over the years and especially, not just for the
Army, but for all of the Armed Services.
We would also like to thank you for the support shown by
the significant increase in funding in the fiscal year 2002
budget, expressed in your authorization bill that the Army
received, and we hope to continue to earn your support in the
future.
As Senator Warner indicated, I had the privilege a few
months ago of visiting our soldiers in Germany, Italy, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. I had the great
fortune of spending Christmas Eve and Christmas Day with our
troops in Bagram, Afghanistan. They truly are the very best in
the world, and they deserve the very best that we can give them
in weapons and equipment.
Today's threats to our Nation's interests are more complex
and diverse than at any time in our history. There are dangers
on the home front as well as on the war front.
As the world and the nature of warfare transforms, so must
the Army. In fact, with the encouragement and assistance of
Congress and the administration, the Army is doing everything
possible to accelerate the pace of Army transformation.
However, the pace and challenges we are now facing make the
transformation process more difficult and perhaps more
important than at any other time during the Army's 226-year
history. Successful transformation requires a clear vision.
Secretary White, General Shinseki, and General Keane have
provided that vision. We will continue to refine it as the
development of the Objective Force continues.
Some have argued that the Army is not transforming, that we
are only modernizing our force. Yet few can disagree that there
is a revolution underway in information technology. We are at
the advent of the information age, and we are embedding
critical information technology in the Army. It is this
information technology, and the management of the information,
which leads to the radical changes that characterize
transformation.
When I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee
last November at my confirmation hearing, Senator Levin asked
for my thoughts on priorities in transformation among the
Legacy, Interim and Objective Forces. I told the committee then
what a very wise division commander told me once, that there
are no priorities among essentials, that we will have to
carefully balance the allocation of resources among the
essential endeavors of readiness, recapitalization and
transformation.
After 4 months on the job, I now can add an additional
challenge: The management of the risks associated with this
transformation. There are two areas of risks that must be
carefully managed.
First, we must manage the risk to readiness brought about
by refocusing our resources to support the Army's development
of the Objective Force. Second, we must manage the Army's
programmatic risks.
Our first priority to the Nation will always be the Army's
readiness to respond immediately when called to fight and win
our Nation's wars. However, we have accepted some near-term
risk in order to free up needed resources for transformation.
This required the Army to make some tough decisions. Twenty-
nine programs have been identified for termination in the
Army's fiscal years 2001 through 2003 budget request.
One of the ways we are managing risk to readiness is
through our recapitalizion program. General Keane deserves
enormous credit for initiating and managing the Army's
recapitalization program.
Seventy-five percent of our major combat platforms today
already exceed their expected half life. In order to maintain
operational readiness and to stabilize the growth in operating
and support costs of our aging weapons systems, the Army will
recapitalize and selectively modernize 17 critical combat
systems.
During the Army's recapitalization process, the programs
selected for recapitalization were thoroughly analyzed. I just
want to say that when I came to the Pentagon and received a
briefing on recapitalization, I was more impressed by this
briefing than any I had seen. General Keane initiated and led
this effort, and the Army literally put a dollar at a time on
the modernization and recapitalization of these selected
systems. So this is a very finely balanced process that we have
here.
It is good in the sense that we are not spending money that
we should not be spending to recapitalize systems beyond the
period that we would expect to use them. But it has the risk
that if the schedule changes, then we will have to go back and
reinvest in these systems to ensure that the Legacy Force does
not deteriorate prematurely.
The second type of risk with which we will cope is
programmatic risk. We are clearly pushing the envelope of high
technology in order to achieve the lethality, survivability,
tactical mobility, and improvements in strategic deployability
envisioned for the Army's Objective Force. Therefore, the Army
must closely manage Objective Force programmatic risks. We are
working to address the critical issue of fielding systems
within budget, on schedule, while meeting the requirements the
soldiers deserve.
However, we must also be realistic about the probability of
success for these programs when we evaluate these risks. We
will no longer refer to programs as just low, medium, or high
risk. We will now also estimate the probability of success of a
program with a schedule, with the resources and with the level
of technology as we can best estimate. We will look for ways to
mitigate these risks to give these programs every chance for
success.
We may want to decide to mitigate these risks by providing
more time, more resources, a review of requirements, or we may
want to pursue a spiral development or block fielding approach.
If we do not properly address these risks, our programs may
become chronically underfunded, behind schedule, and not
perform as expected for our soldiers. Therefore, while we are
pushing the envelope of technology, we will simultaneously do
everything we can to identify risks, reduce those risks, and
optimize our chances for success. Managing both types of
risks--readiness and programmatic--is critical to the
achievement of our vision for the Objective Force.
Finally, the Army will pursue its goals of transformation
while conducting the current war on terrorism at the same time.
One thing is certain in this uncertain environment: We will
need a broad range of capabilities to meet this challenge.
General Eisenhower, years after World War II, when asked
where the next war might occur said, ``I hope there will be no
more warfare. But if and when such a tragedy as war visits us
again, it is always going to happen under circumstances at
places and under conditions different from those you expect or
plan for.''
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,
I would like to thank you again for this opportunity to return
here to this distinguished committee in this wonderful room to
discuss this important issue.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Secretary Brownlee. You are
off to a very good start on that side of the table. I
appreciate it.
General Keane, I look forward to your testimony now.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. KEANE, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY
General Keane. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman, Senator Santorum,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am also honored to
be here today, and I am particularly honored to be here with
Secretary Brownlee, my new teammate, who has taken hold of his
responsibilities faster than anybody else I have ever observed.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear, again, before the
subcommittee to discuss Army transformation and modernization.
Thank you for your great support of the 2002 budget. We
sincerely appreciate your support for Army readiness, the pay
increases for our soldiers, and, of course, Army
transformation. I truly appreciate your thoughtfulness and your
concern for Army programs.
Our Nation has been at war for almost 6 months now. The
performance of the United States military clearly indicates
that we have the best trained and best equipped military in the
world. Our soldiers and leaders have performed magnificently
from the outset.
From the attack on the Pentagon, with the outright heroism
that was so vital to saving so many lives, to the fortitude and
commitment of our work force, both military and civilian, that
returned to work the next day despite the horrific loss of
their co-workers; to our 30,000 Active Guard and Reserve
soldiers, who are defending Americans at home--a black beret
has come to symbolize security in America--to the 4,400
soldiers who provided security at the Olympic Games.
A pleasant footnote to that is we had 11 soldiers
participating as athletes in the Olympic Games. One received a
gold medal, another a silver medal, and 3 received bronze
medals--not bad for 11 Army soldiers. But we are all proud of
all of our American Olympians.
To the 27,000 soldiers in Enduring Freedom--as we speak,
soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne
Division, our special operation forces, are taking the fight to
the al Qaeda network in the mountains of Afghanistan--their
courage and their commitment are nothing less than
inspirational.
I have visited our soldiers in Afghanistan, as has Les, and
I just came from visiting a number of them yesterday, over here
at Walter Reed. I will tell you, in wearing this uniform for 35
years, there is a distinct difference.
First of all, in my 35 years, we have never done anything
directly and operationally for the American people. It has
always been to relieve a beleaguered nation, where some thug is
imposing his will on his people or somebody else's people. When
you see our soldiers today doing what we are asking them to do,
there is an edge out there that is different.
Their morale has always been high on any operation they
have conducted that I have ever observed. But today there is an
intensity and a determination there that is just a little
different. If you pay close attention to them, you can see it
and you can clearly feel it.
Tommy Franks showed me a message he received from a
captain, an Air Force special forces officer, who is 30 years
of age, and he is advising a general in the Afghani military
who is commanding some 7,000 troops, and this general is 15
years his senior. He said, ``We have little water and much less
food, haven't eaten much in the last 3 days; hardly any sleep
in the last two. Our Afghani soldiers have less than ten rounds
per man. We are attacking. We are attacking'' That was the end
of message.
A soldier I ran into in the hospital last night took a
bullet wound in his leg that fortunately went clear through his
lower extremity without a lot of damage. When he landed in his
landing zone (LZ) as a soldier in the 10th Mountain Division,
he took fire from an altitude higher than his, and his
organization was caught in the crossfire. They were a platoon,
and their stated purpose was to provide security for the
battalion commander and his staff, who were also in this LZ.
So they were brought under fire and they had mortars
impacting in the area as well as direct fire. What the soldier
was so proud of is--he said, ``Sir, just as we did in
training,'' he said, ``we immediately began to respond.'' He
said, ``Without any commands by anybody, we knew that we were
going to take the fight to them despite the fact we were
outnumbered. We could easily have gone over the ridge behind
us. Nobody stood up to move to that ridge. We took the fight to
them.''
About 14 of them were wounded. They did not suffer any
fatalities. They killed somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 or
50 of the enemy, which numbered in the hundreds. The enemy made
3 attacks against them that night over a 12-hour fight, and the
soldiers never budged.
He said, ``Our mission there was to fight, not to protect
ourselves. We were prepared to fight right there, to kill these
guys. If it meant our lives, we were going to do it.''
You cannot buy that kind of devotion and that kind of
spirit, you cannot put a price tag on it. It is about young
Americans who reflect the values of the American people. They
truly understand what this war is about.
They are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice to do what
is right for our people. So we are all honored, who are in
leadership positions, just to be a part of a force like that
and an attitude like that.
As to the President's 2003 budget, in my view, it is a down
payment on unaddressed requirements. It does go a long way
toward funding the Army's priorities, which are winning the war
on terrorism, preparing for transformation, and certainly
taking care of our people.
It does not fund everything, as we all know. We have had to
make some tough decisions. Les mentioned the programs that we
have had to kill, and 18 of them surround this budget and the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). We also are reducing our
helicopter fleet by 1,000, and we are reducing our headquarters
at the headquarters level by 15 percent.
It does represent a $10 billion increase over the 2002
request. It is a balanced program, in our view, that will allow
the Army to remain trained and ready throughout the year 2003,
while ensuring our force is protected and we execute the war on
terrorism and also to prepare for future wars.
In terms of preparing for future wars, obviously we define
them as transformation. The world has changed and it is
changing, and the Army must adapt. General Shinseki and the
Secretary have made the commitment to that change, and it is
exciting to be a part of it. ``Transformation'' is the only
word that could adequately describe what our Army is doing. We
are fundamentally changing the way the Army will fight and how
the Army will deploy.
We intend to begin fielding the Objective Force this
decade. It is ambitious. There is risk in it, but we are
committed to it. Gone, as far as we are concerned, are the
acquisition cycles of the past, which are 15, 20 years in
length, and we are using new approaches to bringing this
Objective Force in.
Instead of the linear sequential operations of the past,
the Objective Force will fight in a distributed, dispersed
manner. We will be highly responsive and deploy rapidly as a
result of reduced platform weight and small logistical
formations and footprints. We will arrive early to a crisis to
dissuade and deter conflict, or, if necessary, fight.
Superior situational awareness and integrated command and
control systems will allow us to identify and attack critical
enemy capabilities and key vulnerabilities throughout the depth
of a battle space, without the massed formations of the past.
The budget supports the development of these capabilities by
dedicating 97 percent of our science and technology to the
Objective Force and, of course, funding Comanche.
The 2003 budget also supports the Objective Force by
funding selective recapitalization and modernization of our
Legacy Force. Not well understood by many is the fact that 66
percent of the Legacy Force modernization will transition to
the Objective Force to include the CH-47 Chinook, UH-60 Black
Hawk, Army Battle Command System, Patriot, and HIMARS, just to
name a few.
We have also fully funded Crusader, which will provide the
Army significantly enhanced indirect fire support capabilities
well into the 21st century. In my judgment, it will contribute
to the development of our Future Combat Systems.
The Interim Force is a transition force, and it represents
a much needed capability that will combine the best
characteristics of the Army's current heavy and light forces
organized into Interim Brigade Combat Teams. It will leverage
today's technology with selected capabilities of the Legacy
Force to fill an operational shortfall and serve as a link to
the Objective Force.
The first of these six Interim Brigades will begin fielding
this year a company in August, a battalion in December, and a
brigade operational capability in May. The second IBCT, also at
Fort Lewis, Washington, is funded in the 2002 budget. The 2003
budget funds the third Interim Brigade in Alaska. Three
additional IBCTs are programmed for Louisiana, Hawaii, and
Pennsylvania.
The third element of transformation is the legacy of the
current force. That is the force that is at war today. By
selectively modernizing and recapitalizing existing systems, we
will guarantee the Army's near-term war fighting readiness
through the transformation process. A portion of this force
will be with us until 2020.
In conclusion, just let me say that maintaining a trained
and ready Army now and for the future is a shared
responsibility. With your help, we will remain fully prepared
to defend against any near threat. With your help, the Army
will transform to face the challenges that lie ahead.
We appreciate your continued support and I will look
forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared joint statement of Under Secretary Brownlee
and General Keane follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Under Secretary Les Brownlee and Gen. John
M. Keane, USA
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we thank
you for this opportunity to report to you on the status of Army
transformation.
On behalf of every soldier, civilian, and Army family member we
would first like to thank this subcommittee, and Congress as a whole,
for the considerable increase in funding associated with the fiscal
year 2002 budget. With that budget came a compelling message to the
entire Army--America appreciates the commitment that every soldier and
civilian has to the defense of our Nation.
Your support provided pay increases of at least 5 percent across
the board for soldiers and 3.6 percent for the civilian work force.
Additionally, targeted pay increases for selected skills and mid-grade
officers, upgraded single-soldier barracks, and improvements to our
residential communities have done much to enhance the quality of life
throughout the Army.
We also appreciate your continued support of our Army's
transformation goals. With your help, the Army is able to fully fund
the second Interim Brigade Combat Team and commit greater resources
toward science and technology, significantly enhancing our efforts to
accelerate implementation of the Objective Force.
the war--the need to transform
Today, we are engaged in a global war on terrorism. The conduct of
our Army throughout this war clearly indicates that we are trained and
ready to fight and win the Nation's wars. Our simultaneous commitment
to a significant number of smaller scale contingencies and stability
operations throughout the world underscores our military capability and
state of readiness. These same missions also illustrate the need for an
Army that is more strategically responsive, deployable, and versatile.
The Army has no illusions about the challenges it faces. We must
help our sister services win the global war on terrorism and
simultaneously prepare for future wars by effectively using the
resources you provide us. With the continued support of Congress and
the administration, the Army will continue to fulfill its role in the
war on terrorism, maintain our near-term readiness for unexpected
challenges, and rapidly transform to fight and win our future
conflicts.
transformation
Transformation is the key to the Army's ability to meet our
obligations and challenges. It changes the way we fight and the way we
deploy. The transformed Army will be as survivable, as lethal, and as
tactically mobile as our heavy forces, but far more strategically
deployable. We will transform to a more strategically responsive force
that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations.
Developments in technology and our pursuit of network-centric warfare
will provide us with unprecedented situational awareness, enabling Army
formations to maneuver with greater precision and dispersion. We will
know where the enemy is and where our own people are, and we will be
able to impose our will on the enemy at the time and place of our
choosing. We will exploit vertical envelopment to avoid large movements
along predictable lines of communication and focus our efforts on the
enemy's strategic centers of gravity.
In effect, we intend to break our ties with the Cold War formations
that relied on the principle of mass and the build-up of large forces.
With the implementation of change throughout its doctrine, training,
leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier systems, the
Army is taking a holistic approach to transformation--the result will
be a different Army, not just a modernized version of the current Army.
Transformation consists of 3 interrelated elements--the Objective
Force, the Interim Force, and the Legacy Force. We will develop
concepts and technologies for the Objective Force while fielding an
Interim Force to meet near-term requirements and bridge the operational
gap between our heavy and light forces. The third element of
transformation--the Legacy Force--refers to the selective modernization
and recapitalization of existing systems to provide enhanced
capabilities that will guarantee our readiness through the
transformation process.
the legacy force
The Legacy Force--the force that is at war today--will guarantee
the Army's near-term warfighting readiness for the next 10 to 15 years
and is critical to the development of the Objective Force. The leaders
and soldiers of today's Army will advance the tactics, techniques and
procedures for network centric warfare using enhanced Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) systems on modified Legacy platforms. They
will help to identify the Soldier-Leader skills required in the
Objective Force and assess our current ability to cultivate those
skills.
The Army's first digitized division, the 4th Infantry Division, has
already established the significant role of the Legacy Force in the
development of the Objective Force. During two Division Capstone
Exercises, the 4th Infantry Division demonstrated quantum leaps in
capability and indicate the significant progress we have made toward
implementing the warfighting concepts outlined in the Army's new
operations field manual (FM-3).
the interim force
The Interim Force is a transition force that will combine the best
characteristics of the Army's current heavy and light forces. Organized
into Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), it will leverage today's
technology with selected capabilities of the Legacy Force to serve as a
link to the Objective Force. Most importantly, the Interim Force will
allow exploration of new operational concepts relevant to the Objective
Force. The Army will field six of these new, more responsive IBCTs.
These units comprise an Interim Force that will strengthen deterrence
and expand options for the field commanders.
Over the past 2 years, we have organized two brigades at Fort
Lewis, Washington, with additional IBCTs programmed for Alaska, Hawaii,
Louisiana, and Pennsylvania. The Army is working to develop wide-
ranging changes to doctrine, training, logistics, organizations,
materiel, and soldier systems required to field and employ the Interim
Force. The first IBCT has completed brigade and battalion level
headquarters training with the Army's Battle Command Training Program.
Additionally, this IBCT has completed company-level maneuver live fire
training and will attain its first incremental war fighting
capability--an infantry company--in August of this year. The IBCT will
achieve battalion-level capability in December 2002 and full initial
operational capability in May 2003.
Training of the Interim Force is proving that the practice of
combining heavy and light cultures results in more adaptable and
capable leaders and soldiers. The Army has learned from experimentation
that technology such as digitization allows the integration of
intelligence data with tactical and operational information and gives
our leaders and soldiers the ability to seize and retain the
initiative, build momentum quickly, and win decisively.
the objective force
The end result of transformation is a new, more effective, and more
efficient Army with a new fighting structure--the Objective Force. It
will provide our Nation with an increased range of options for crisis
response, engagement, or sustained land force operations. Instead of
the linear sequential operations of the past, the Objective Force will
fight in a distributed and non-contiguous manner. Objective Force units
will be highly responsive, deploy rapidly as a result of reduced
platform weight and smaller logistical footprints, and arrive early to
a crisis to dissuade or deter conflict. With superior situational
awareness, Objective Force soldiers will identify and attack critical
enemy capabilities and key vulnerabilities throughout the depth of the
battle space. For optimum success, we will harmonize our transformation
efforts with similar efforts by other services, business and industry,
and our science and technology partners.
By focusing much of its spending in science and technology, the
Army will create a new family of ground systems called the Future
Combat Systems (FCS). This networked system-of-systems--a key to
fielding the Objective Force--will allow leaders and soldiers to
harness the power of digitized information systems. The FCS will allow
commanders to bring a substantial, perhaps even exponential, increase
in combat capabilities to the joint force without a large logistics
footprint. Newer technologies will be inserted into the FCS as they
become ready. The Army recently awarded the solicitation for the FCS
Lead Systems Integrator (LSI). In coordination with the Army and DARPA,
the LSI will select the ``best of breed'' technologies, components, and
sub-components through maximum competition among the sub-contractors.
The LSI is a new solicitation and acquisition strategy that will
accelerate Army transformation. In the fiscal year 2003 budget, we
invested 97 percent of our science and technology resources toward the
design and development of the Objective Force and enabling
technologies--technologies that will take us to the system development
and demonstration phase for the Future Combat Systems. With this
funding level, the Army will begin fielding the Objective Force this
decade.
We owe our soldiers the best tools and equipment so they are not
put at risk by obsolete or aging combat support systems. The Comanche
helicopter, the Objective Force Warrior system, and C\4\ISR initiatives
are integral components of the network-centric operations of the
Objective Force. They are the infrastructure that allows soldiers to do
what they do best--fight and win our Nation's wars. Comanche will
provide an armed aerial reconnaissance capability critical for
gathering intelligence for coordinated attacks against targets of
opportunity, and the fiscal year 2003 budget supports continued
development and flight testing. The Objective Force Warrior system will
provide quantum improvements over our current soldier systems in
weight, signature, information exchange capabilities, ballistics
tolerance, and chemical, biological, and environmental protection for
individual soldiers on the battlefield.
Terrestrial systems alone will not enable full spectrum dominance.
Space is a vertical extension of the battlefield and a key enabler and
force multiplier for land force operations. Objective Force commanders
will access and integrate the full spectrum of C\4\ISR and information
operations capabilities, to include national agencies, strategic and
operational units, tactical organizations, and joint or multinational
forces. In short, commanders will draw upon a wide array of
capabilities that enable not just overwhelming force projection, but
the ability to out-think our adversaries.
Transporting and sustaining the Objective Force will require
capabilities that are cost effective, adhere to rapid deployment
timelines, and have a smaller logistical footprint over longer
distances without jeopardizing readiness. Materiel readiness will be
maintained at reduced costs by increasing inventory visibility and
integrating automated systems.
funding transformation
The Army has made difficult choices in the last three budgets in
order to resource those programs that will enable the Army to
accelerate transformation with a goal of beginning to field the
Objective Force this decade. In concert with increased funding, we have
altered our investment strategies, terminated programs, focused our
science and technology, and targeted selective systems for
modernization and recapitalization--measures that balance near-term
readiness with the timely development and fielding of the Objective
Force
investment strategy
Beginning in 1999, the Army's investment strategy reflects a
significant shift from resourcing legacy capabilities to resourcing the
Objective Force. The Army terminated heavy ground combat systems such
as the Command and Control Vehicle and the Grizzly obstacle breaching
vehicle, but kept lighter and Objective Force capable systems such as
the Land Warrior, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System, Crusader, and Comanche. Crusader represents an
example of a system that we have modified by significantly reducing its
weight while retaining its dominant range and firepower. The Crusader
will provide critical indirect fire support to the Army for the
foreseeable future.
The Army generated more than $13 billion in transformation funding
by terminating, or restructuring 29 different research, development,
and acquisition programs over the past 3 years. These cost savings, in
concert with Congressional and OSD funding increases, enabled the Army
to fund our key transformation priorities.
recapitalization and modernization
Recapitalization is the cornerstone of the Army's strategy to
sustain its warfighting capability throughout the fielding of the
Objective Force. We are compelled to pursue this course of action
because 75 percent of the current force exceeds its expected half-life
and is becoming increasingly expensive to maintain. Our strategy is to
selectively rebuild or upgrade 17 systems that will remain in the
inventory for the next 15 to 20 years and achieve an average fleet age
of no more than half of a system's expected service life. These systems
include the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, AH-64 Apache,
UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook. If sufficiently resourced, this
investment in future readiness will sustain warfighting capabilities,
reduce the cost of ownership, and extend the service life of systems
until the Objective Force is fielded throughout the Army.
Aviation modernization and restructuring will eventually reduce our
helicopter inventory by 25 percent and allow the Army to retain only 3
types of helicopters. The plan calls for the divestiture of 1,000
helicopters (all Vietnam-era UH-1 Iroquois) by fiscal year 2004 and
permits savings in training and logistics to be used in support of the
recapitalization of our remaining fleet--the AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black
Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook.
risk management
For transformation to be successful, we must balance the boldness
of our desire for an Objective Force with the requirement to be ready
to fight a major conflict at any time between now and the fielding of
that Objective Force. Our investment strategy, however, does entail a
certain degree of risk--a risk we must accept to fund transformation.
Our first concern is to balance the requirement to remain ready
while we transform. The Army has made tough decisions in terminating or
restructuring many programs during the past 3 years, accepting near-
term risk to free up resources for transformation. A portion of those
savings is paying for modernization and recapitalization of the Legacy
Force.
The Army has accepted risk by funding the Legacy Force
modernization and recapitalization at only 60 percent of its validated
requirement. Our recapitalization program, however, is based on in-
depth analysis to determine the right systems and levels of
modernization for the 17 selected systems. This process will enable the
Army to make essential adjustments if the schedules for either the
IBCTs or the Objective Force change significantly.
In the case of the Objective Force, we are truly embarked on a
process of transforming the Army. Our efforts will push the
technological envelope in order to achieve the lethality,
survivability, tactical mobility, and improved strategic deployability
the Army seeks. Some of these acquisition programs are clearly high
risk. While we are pushing the envelope of transformation, we will do
everything possible to reduce risk and give these programs every chance
for success.
conclusion
For over 226 years, the Army has kept its covenant with the
American people to fight and win our Nation's wars. In all that time,
we have never failed them and we never will. The war on terrorism, the
requirement to secure the homeland, and the need to maintain readiness
for possible near-term contingencies have validated the need for a new
kind of Army--a capabilities-based ground force that can fight and win
battles across the full spectrum of military operations.
The Army cannot predict what other changes the future will bring,
but what will not change is the need for our Nation to have the best
trained, best led, and best equipped soldiers on the ground, deployed
rapidly at precisely the right time, the right place, and with the
right support structure as part of a joint military team.
Building and maintaining an Army is a shared responsibility between
Congress, the administration, those in uniform, and the American
people. Working with Congress, we will keep the Army ready to meet
today's challenges and continue to make significant strides toward
achieving the vision announced in 1999.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, we thank
you once again for this opportunity to report to you today on the state
of your Army. We look forward to discussing these issues with you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General Keane.
Let me begin with the broad question that is implicit in
our opening statements. How, in a resource limited
environment--even though it is increasing, it is still limited
in terms of the demands on you--do you prioritize among the
requirements to develop and field the Objective Force, to field
the Interim Force, and to selectively modernize and
recapitalize the Legacy Force? What is the overview of values
that you apply in that tough job?
Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, one of
the critical challenges is maintaining the right balance here.
Again, I look back to the recapitalization program that General
Keane had the Army put together to ensure that we were not
spending any more dollars than we had to on the Legacy Force,
but that it, in fact, was ready to go to war.
Second, the Army has been encouraged and has received the
assistance from Congress and the administration to try to
transform itself into something that is totally different than
the force we all know today. That is why we are looking toward
this Objective Force, described to most of us as a system of
systems.
The Interim Force, as you indicated in your statement, sir,
will hopefully provide a touchstone for the Army to get to the
Objective Force, while at the same time providing badly needed
forces that are more deployable and yet still more effective
than the light forces--to be more deployable than the heavy,
still more effective than the light.
So the Army is, as I have indicated, incurring high risk
here. The alternative is, as Jack indicated, to use the old
acquisition programs and to throttle back into a schedule that
is not high risk. But it does require careful management, so
that at points in time decisions can be made and if, for some
reason, the schedule changes and the Objective Force might slip
to the right, then we are going to have to make the decision to
go back and reinvest in some of the Legacy Force and to ensure
that it is ready to go.
Senator Lieberman. General Keane, does the balance mean
that there is equal priority given to the three elements:
Legacy, Interim, and Objective Force?
General Keane. Certainly. Clearly in terms of priority the
future of the Objective Force is the most important, because it
redesigns and reorganizes the Army and it changes the way we
fight.
Senator Lieberman. So you would say that would be the
priority?
General Keane. In terms of a future----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Keane.--future readiness. But the thing that we
always have to--and this problem has been faced by our
predecessors as well--is you have to balance against the
readiness of the current force.
Now, what is aggravating our situation certainly is the
pace at which that current force is demanded for use, which is
a little different than what many of our predecessors had to
face post-World War II.
Senator Lieberman. Sure.
General Keane. That is a reality that is here. So when you
look at our budgets, you will see that as we receive the
increased money, when you take a look closely at that money,
most of it goes to direct the programs. So what the Army had to
do to maintain its readiness account, we moved money into those
readiness accounts. So the killing of those systems was not
just for transformation, but was also to keep the current force
ready.
It is the same dilemma that our predecessors have been
dealing with for close to 14, 15 years, as you are painfully
aware of.
The bill payer for all of that has always been two places--
one, our installation support accounts, and also our
modernization accounts. Obviously, we are still doing some of
the same, but in the same regard, we are attempting to conduct
the transformation.
Now, we had choices, and we have made those choices. We
revisit those choices continuously.
The first choice that we had to make as it pertains to
transformation was we recognized we have had an operational
shortfall for a number of years in terms of moving this force
more responsibly and getting it to respond with good, effective
tactical mobility and yet be survivable, to have the
characteristics of the light force combined with the heavy
force. So we knew that problem has been there. We knew we had
to solve it.
We know that the Objective Force will solve that problem
for us. But do we do something about it in the near term? That
was choice one. Choice one for us is that in our minds we
have--just to be frank with you, and we have had frank
discussions before--we have already waited too long to solve
that operational shortfall problem.
We felt we could ill afford to continue to not give the
National Command Authority this capability to employ so that
they have choices themselves to make when it comes to employing
forces, deterring conflict or fighting, if necessary. That was
choice one, and that was Interim Brigade.
Then what is the requirement with what we looked at? We
took a hard look at that requirement. You have to balance the
war fighting requirements and those are to the major MTWs. We
would deploy these initially there.
Remember the shortfall we had in the past. It was very
obvious in Desert Storm when we put the 82nd in, and we did not
have this kind of capability to deploy early on. We have solved
some of that problem there, because we have prepositioned
equipment there. But in other places of the world where we may
fight, we still do not have that capability that we would like
to have. So one, war fighting requirements.
We also know that as you deploy this force to meet the
operational requirements in peace time, you have to have some
rotational base to deploy that force. In other words, if you
deploy an IBCT, you have to have the capability to rotate
another one in there. You cannot keep those soldiers there
indefinitely in a peace time rotation.
So we took war time requirements and also looked at the
rotation base that we have to have, and that is how we arrived
at the number six.
Senator Lieberman. All right.
General Keane. Actually, we could use more than that. But
we watered that down to six also because we are always making
decisions based on what we believe are fiscal constraints as
well.
The second choice we had was the Objective Force. How fast
do we go after this? Our examination on this thing was that--
and we said to ourselves, having looked at this for years--
first of all, the FCS, as a concept and a system, was out in
2020 by our predecessors. We brought that into 2010.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Keane. We said, ``We can ill afford to continue an
acquisition cycle like that. Let us put pressure on this system
as much as we can.''
Our own acquisition people who work with industry were
bellyaching over this in a big way right from the beginning,
and truth be known, they still do it. They just do not do it to
our faces anymore.
The fact of the matter is that we have to change this
acquisition system. The use of the lead system integrator is a
step in that direction.
We learned from watching BMDO as it proceeded with the
national missile defense and their lead system integrator, how
it has helped them in their process. So we are hopeful. We have
never done it before. We think it is a risk that is acceptable
to us to help to get this system in faster than what it is.
So those were tough decisions we have made. What we are
attempting to do in each budget year that we are facing is
balance the program across those requirements--the requirements
of a trained and ready force, and also the requirement to
prepare for future readiness by transformation.
We intend to do that each succeeding year, so we will have
tough choices in the future as well, and we understand that.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up on this round. I wonder if
I can indulge myself, I guess, and ask my colleagues'
indulgence and ask you to see if you can give me a brief
answer.
Maybe you have answered this, but it leads me to say that
this is the third year since the Army launched its
transformation effort that the budget has come to Congress with
unfunded requirements for Future Combat Systems; in this case,
$190 million for S&T, and $200 million for RDT&E.
So the question is: How did the process you have
described--and I understand you are trying to squeeze a lot
into not as much as you should have. Why did it end up not
fully funding the Objective Force?
General Keane. That specific point was--it dealt with
affordability, and it dealt with what we thought we could
accept as risk.
Ninety-seven percent of our S&T account is in there. That
money was actually offered to us by our people who are in
charge of acquisition and said to us in our own budget council
meetings we were having, that ``We think this is an acceptable
risk,'' and gave that money back to us to use in other places.
I was not even asking for it.
So we think we are okay there, Senator. It is a risk that
is bearable, as far as we are concerned.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Thanks very much.
Senator Santorum.
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, if I could just add to that?
Senator Lieberman. Yes, sure.
Secretary Brownlee. Of course, what is in the unfunded
requirements (UFR) list is not in the present budget, of
course, but anything that would be added in that sense might
help to reduce some of the risk. So that is the reason I think
the rationale was to put it in.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Senator Santorum.
Senator Santorum. Okay. I mentioned in my opening remarks
that I was going to ask you for a status report on your ability
to obtain a waiver of the side-by-side. I just wanted to know
how that was proceeding.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. Sir, the Army is working as
we speak to put together a package to comply with the
provisions that were put into law last year by this committee
in conference. That package, once it has been reviewed, will be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
The information that is within that package will comply in
every sense with both the spirit and intent of the law. It will
describe what might be yielded from a comparative evaluation,
that the information provided in there would be complete, and
that other useful information would not be.
It will provide sufficient information to the Secretary of
Defense so that he can make those certifications that are
required by law so that those waivers can be enacted.
Senator Santorum. Okay. I appreciate that.
I have an additional concern with the Interim Force, and
the Interim Brigade Combat Team. It's my understanding that you
have declared your intent to go to IOC before you go through
Inital Operations Test & Evaluation (IOT&E).
Now, that is--at least to the members of the staff here,
this is a new idea. I just have to say that I am a little
concerned that we are sort of moving things out of the way to
get to where we need to go and not looking at what is, whether
we are really ready to move forward.
General Keane. Yes, sir. Can I take that?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Santorum. Is that a waiver? Do you need to get a
waiver to do that, or you can just go ahead and do it?
General Keane. Well, we are prepared to do it, and for a
couple of reasons. We gave that a lot of thought and here is
our rationale behind it.
First of all, the vehicles that we are acquiring, in the
sense--except for the MGS, the mobile gun system--are not
developmental items. The vehicles that we are acquiring, the
IAVs and its eight variants, are vehicles that have basically
existed before.
That was one of the reasons to go with this program in the
beginning. We wanted to shorten the time when we can get this
operational capability into the force. So we did something
historically that we have not done in the Army, which is to go
some place else and find vehicles that other people were
already using.
Essentially, that is what we have done here. So that is
point one. The commonality among these vehicles is very
significant.
The other thing is we are not being the least bit cavalier
about this. As we speak, safety, survivability, and lethality
tests are being conducted on the vehicles.
Senator Santorum. You say they are being conducted on these
vehicles. Are these the vehicles that meet the weight
limitations that you are talking about, or the vehicles that do
not meet the weight? Because we have a problem with weight on a
lot of these vehicles.
General Keane. Yes.
Senator Santorum. So what are we testing?
General Keane. Let me deal with weight as a separate issue,
because if there is something that has been completely
misunderstood about weight, it is that, and I can deal with it.
Senator Santorum. Okay.
General Keane. So we believe we are taking a calculated
risk here. It is very acceptable to us because right now we are
finishing the live fire testing on these vehicles, as an
example.
The IOT&E takes place after we have certified the
operational concept of the vehicles and we will go back and do
some further testing on the platforms themselves. We feel very
comfortable, because it is a non-developmental item, and we are
putting government equipment on those vehicles that we have
already tested. We are going to be in pretty good shape here.
So the IOT&E, while it comes after the operational
certification of the vehicles, which is in April and May, does
not present a problem to us.
The weight of the vehicles, sir, is misunderstood. There
was a Defense News article, I think, that has led to the
misrepresentation. We have established the C-130 as the
crucible for this vehicle for a lot of reasons.
One is that it is a way of slimming down the whole Army.
That is one. Two, operationally, we want to be able to move
this vehicle into unimproved landing strips and so on
throughout an operational battle space to give us huge
flexibility. The requirement that we assign to ourselves is
that we want to at least be able to move the vehicle 1,000
nautical miles in the C-130.
For it to move 1,000 nautical miles, it cannot weigh more
than 38,000 pounds. We can get the IAV and all of its variants,
except the MGS, underneath that 38,000 pounds. We can do that.
Now, if we add the nine infantry soldiers and add all the
ammunition that is going to be required for a 15-day operation
and fully upload the vehicle with fuel, then the vehicle will
go over the 38,000 pounds--true statement. That is what got
misrepresented in that article, and it is an unfortunate
misrepresentation.
Senator Santorum. But is it a misrepresentation if the
whole objective of this force is to have force projection in a
very easily and quickly deployable fashion?
General Keane. Sure.
Senator Santorum. Well, if that is the objective, how can
you leave all this stuff out and deploy this and meet your
objective?
General Keane. Well, no. We would not leave it out. What I
am suggesting to you is that we could still move it the 1,000
nautical miles. It will take you more airplanes to do it. All
of that would not fit in that single airplane. That is the
issue.
Now, the MGS is 3,000 pounds overweight. It cannot fit in
a--what our standard is of 38,000 pounds. We are going through
some tests and studies to get that weight down, changing the
hatches and a few other things.
We are looking at about 190 different pieces on the MGS.
What I think will happen as a result of that, frankly, is that
some of that study will work. We will probably take it and
apply it not only to the MGS but to some of the other vehicles
as well.
Senator Santorum. Okay. Let me ask you about the Objective
Force, and a couple of my concerns there. I just have to tell
you, just from the seat of the pants looking at this, and one
of the concerns I have in looking at General Shinseki's famous
chart that he wished he had never put together----[Laughter.]
--is: Now I am beginning to think that what may be
happening as you take what I think and maybe, as you have
explained, you are not taking, additional risk on your S&T
budget for the Objective Force.
But it sounds to me like you are moving it up dramatically,
and yet you have programs like Comanche that keep getting
pushed back dramatically, and you talk about the life cycles of
programs, and you say ``We are going to shorten them.''
Well, you do not have a very good example in this case of
shortening development cycles. You have a pretty bad example
here of how that is not being done on one of the most crucial
elements of making this whole system work. So I have doubts.
Now, you are accelerating from 2020 to 2010, now to 2008.
We are not funding it as robustly as some have suggested. What
I fear is that this interim combat system becomes the Objective
Force, that what we are doing here is just tweaking it a little
bit at the end and we are going to declare this as our
transformation.
Now, that may well indeed be where we end up. My time is
up, and I know Jim has a round of questions. It's probably best
if I just hold this thought.
Senator Inhofe. Go on.
Senator Santorum. You sure you are okay?
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Go ahead.
Senator Santorum. My concern is that you have a lead system
integrator--and I think that is great. Now, I commend you for
going in that direction, and I think it is wonderful that you
are going to have some outside eyes who are not interested in
procuring the product look at it.
I just want to make sure that these folks can look at what
is available in technology, and what is out there in the next 5
to 7 years, and can make the determination that, you know what?
There is not a leap forward right now that we can do.
Is that something they can come back with? Is that an
option that is available to them? I am concerned we are pushing
this thing and not putting the resources behind it to get to
where we want to go. That is my concern; and that we are going
to end up with just an Interim Brigade that will be your
Objective Force.
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, if I can respond, I certainly
agree that when we accelerate programs like this, we tend to
increase the risk in the program. That is one of the reasons
that I have asked the Army staff now whenever they brief the
Secretary and myself, the Chief and the Vice, and they come in
and they tell us a program is high risk. They now have to also
tell us the probability of success of that program on that
schedule with that amount of money, with the technology as we
know it.
So not only will they say ``This is high risk,'' then they
will have to give an estimate of the overall probability of
success. It will be a subjective estimate in many cases. They
are trying to struggle now for the best way to quantify it.
But that way if they tell us that it is high risk and the
probability of success is .5 or .25, then that provides the
opportunity for us to consider at that point ``What can we do
to mitigate this risk?''
There are decision points and milestones during the concept
development stage, which is what we are about to enter right
now. It is a 16-month program wherein the lead systems
integrator in conjunction with the DARPA, who is very much
involved in this, and the Army, will work to develop
operational requirements documents, specifications,
architectures, and integrations. Keep in mind this is not
buying one vehicle or one radio or one weapon. This is buying a
system of systems.
You might say, and I have said, ``Does that not increase
the risk also?'' It may. But it also, I think, provides more
justification for the process.
I said in my statement that the Army was pushing to
accelerate the pace of transformation as much as possible. I
believe that is true. But everybody involved understands that
there are milestones here, where we have to make what I would
call cold-blooded and hard-bitten decisions.
If we get to the point where, as you assert, the technology
may not be there, then we will have to look at what we do at
that point. It may be that we adopt a block fielding approach.
It may be that the first iteration of the Objective Force is a
threshold capability. It may be that that threshold capability
may not offer obviously a lot more capability than you would
have in the IBCT. But it is a threshold capability.
As we move to future blocks, then it would be more capable.
So yes, it is ambitious. Yes, it is high risk.
The alternative is to throttle it back and give it more
time and use some of the older ways of doing things. The Army
has chosen to move forward at this pace, and I can assure you
that there will be some of us in the process who are looking
very closely--I know General Keane and myself have discussed
this--to watch this process and be sure that as we proceed from
point to point, we not only ensure that, as near as we can
determine, the technology is there and there is a good chance
for success; but if there is not, we have to go back and look
at the other force.
General Keane. Senator, your comments are--it is like you
have been eavesdropping on our meetings, because we have----
Senator Santorum. As a matter of fact--no. [Laughter.]
General Keane. We have much of the same concerns ourselves.
We express them to ourselves. I think we are intimately aware
of our track record, and some of that is painful to look at.
Certainly, the Comanche is no exception to that. Much of
the problem with the Comanche is the Army, if we are honest
with ourselves about it, in terms of delays that we incurred
and so on. We do have a management structure problem with
Boeing and Sikorsky now. We brought both of those CEOs in and
sat them down. We think we have solved that problem.
But in terms of the technology, that is a great question,
and 2 years ago, we asked the Defense Science Board to go out
and look at the advanced technologies that were available to us
and come back and give us some sense of whether we really are
doing something here that is not realistic, or are we grounded
in technology that is truly going to help us? What is out
there?
Their report to us was very encouraging. In the lethality
area, dealing with kinetic energy, with two and three times
lethality that we currently have, we can dramatically reduce
the weight of our systems, cut it by more than half for sure,
by reducing the weight that is associated mainly with
survivability, using advanced ceramics. Some of the programs
are classified and we cannot discuss them, but it deals with
low observable technology and stealth.
We are very encouraged by those technologies. Also we, like
others, wanted to move away from fossil fuel. The technology
will not permit us to do that, not in the next 10 years or so.
But we can go to hybrid-electric systems that are clearly out
there and being used in other places very successfully, but not
all that much by the military. We are excited by the prospects
of doing that as well.
So in terms of technology indicators, we keep very close
contact with this. We will make a technology decision in June
of 2003, which will be a key decision point for us that Les
Brownlee was referring to.
In June of 2003, we will make this technology decision as
to whether we can proceed on the schedule that we have outlined
to you, and that will take place in June. It will be based
primarily on the available technologies and our capacity to
bring them into the Objective Force on a timeline that we think
we can.
Senator Santorum. Yes. Thanks.
Secretary Brownlee. Might I add to that, Senator?
Senator Santorum. Okay.
Secretary Brownlee.That decision Jack referred to, which
would be a decision to proceed to the next step of systems
development, the decision maker in that case is actually the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Mr. Aldridge, who
is the final decision authority.
Senator Santorum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe, you have been very gracious and tolerant.
Senator Inhofe. I have learned a lesson too, you see.
[Laughter.]
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just approach this whole subject from a different
perspective. I am just one member of the United States Senate,
and I look at some of the programs and the systems that are in
the United States Army, and I think the Army has gotten the
short end of it.
I could announce to you right now, as I did in my office
yesterday, that another Army veteran and myself are going to
form the Army Caucus. We are going to try to focus a little bit
more on what the Army is doing, about what they have and what
they do not have.
I can remember when we were going through this same
discussion about a side-by-side competition with the IAV and
the M113. So I decided since I could not seem to get any
consistency in the reports I was reading, to go out and do my
own side-by-side competition.
So I went to Fort Lewis, Washington. Mr. Chairman, I did my
own side-by-side comparison. Now, they did not have an IAV.
They had an LAV-3, which is the Canadian version, which I
believe is essentially the same thing. It was the closest thing
we had at that time.
So I spent that time and came back thinking it just did not
seem reasonable to me that we would be sending our kids out
there with something that was not as good as the potential
adversaries had. I would say the same thing about the Crusader.
There are right now five countries that are building
artillery pieces that are better than the Palladin, in terms of
rapid fire, rate of fire, and range. Yet, the Crusader has been
under attack for years now.
We have something out there--everyone I have talked to in
the Army said ``We have to have the Crusader.'' Here they are
out there right now with the Palladin, which is inferior in
most ways to what the competition had.
I took the time a couple of weeks ago to go to Germany and
get a comparison with the PZH2000 so I could see how that
compares to the Crusader. The Crusader is better.
We have to have something that is better. So they said,
``Well, it is going to have to be lighter.'' So what do we do?
We cut it down from 60 tons to 40 tons.
It is lighter now. It does the job that needs to be done.
Now, we are in this very complicated discussion as to: What is
Interim Force? What is Objective Force?
I do not care if the Objective Force does end up as a
modernized Interim Force. I just want to be sure that as we are
going along--here we are in war, and we have equipment that is
not as good as the opposition has.
Now, I would like to ask both of you your opinions--and let
us just stay with, for a minute, the Crusader. What would have
been different so far in Afghanistan and what we are doing in
Afghanistan and planning to do in Afghanistan if we had had the
Crusader?
General Keane. Well, that is a good question. What we could
do if we had the Crusader, particularly in this last fight
where we employed conventional forces south of Gardez, with the
Crusader you can put two of them in a C-17, so we could
obviously bring them into Kandahar and then transit them up
also to Bagram, probably three or four of them, drive them down
the road with security to Gardez, all of which was secure. We
had no difficulty moving ground forces down there. Gardez was
relatively secure, and it is a flat area.
We could have used Crusader in support of our troops who
were attacking in the mountains and get responsive artillery
fire with that degree of precision at considerable range and
distance that we cannot do with any of our other systems.
The other systems we had to get considerably closer to the
mountains than what we can today, and we would have had more
forces to protect them.
The problem up in the mountains also is that when you are
fighting at 8,000 to 10,000 feet, the amount of weight that you
can carry on the aircraft, trying to move artillery pieces, is
a challenge. So the weapon of choice in those mountains are 120
mm mortars, 81 mm mortars, and 60 mm mortars.
But we could have kept the Crusader, with that kind of
range that it has, outside of the immediate battle area in a
secure area and it could still range it. I mean, the truth is
we can put it on the Beltway out here and it can hit between
homeplate and the pitcher's mound in Camden Yards.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Keane. The range of the system is pretty
significant as well as its accuracy.
Senator Inhofe. I know it is difficult to quantify risk,
but would it have a fairly dramatic effect on what you had
perceived to be the risk that was out there if we had had that
piece of equipment?
General Keane. Well, we had to use our Apache helicopters a
lot more to provide close air support for our ground forces,
particularly in that fight I was just telling you about that
that youngster was in.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Keane. That is a tough, rugged airplane, and thank
God that it is.
Senator Inhofe. Go ahead, Secretary Brownlee.
Secretary Brownlee. I just might add one point, sir. I
think Jack has covered it very well, except one point, and that
is that there were cases due to weather when the aircraft were
limited in what they could do. But artillery is not limited by
weather.
Senator Inhofe. That is right. Yes. That is right. In fact,
as I recall from our previous conversations, it was about 50
percent, was it not?
Secretary Brownlee. It was 50 percent of the time in this
last battle that we had challenges with close air support and
weather impeding on the capacity to bring close air support to
ground troops, correct.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. I guess what I am saying--and both of
you in your opening statements talked about, you know, the
quality of our troops and the commitment that they have.
I went there 3 weeks ago, I guess. I was at nine different
training facilities in both the Balkans and in Europe, went to
Landstuhl, talked to all of them that were there. You talk
about Walter Reed, but the ones--before they got to Walter
Reed, they were there.
Without exception, each one of them--and some of them had
gone down in that helicopter--said that they were anxious to
get back to their unit. They all said they are going to make a
career. All of them, every one of them.
Now, you look at those guys and gals that are out there
doing that and it is inconceivable to me that when they go into
a combat environment, they do not have the very best with them.
That is the reason I bring this up.
I think, Mr. Chairman, it is going to have to cost more if
we have that commitment that we are going to send them out with
the best. This is not just the Army. The same thing is
happening in the Air Force right now. We have potential
adversaries that have better air-to-air and air-to-ground
capability than we have with the F-15 and the F-16.
So we are going through problems as we develop new
platforms, the same ones we went through with the C-17. Now,
look how it is proving itself. So I have strong feelings that
we need to give them the very best that they have, and I know
everyone on this committee feels the same way. Frankly, I think
it is going to cost more.
Let me just take one other subject----
Senator Lieberman. More than happy to let you.
Senator Inhofe.--because--and this is more of a readiness
issue, but still I think it is pertinent to this hearing.
Last year at a similar hearing, I asked General Kernan a
question about end strength of the Army, and General Shinseki
had just been quoted in a newspaper article stating that ``The
Army could use another 40,000 troops in order to accomplish the
current mission in profile.''
Well, we are talking about an escalation in the number of
missions. Our deployments, instead of an average of one every 4
years, have been, what, one every 14 weeks or something like
that.
What I have observed out there is the toll it is taking on
our Guard and Reserve, and knowing full well that they cannot
continue. It is not a lack of patriotism. It is not a lack of
desire, but they cannot do it and hold onto their jobs. The
very nature of the Reserve component is that they are to be
called in the case of an all-out war.
I would like to hear you respond to what I consider to be a
real serious end-strength problem in the United States Army and
how it is affecting the Reserve component. Do you have any
comments to make on that?
Secretary Brownlee. Well, Senator, first of all, in
addressing that, I ran into the same situations you did.
Obviously when I was out, going from place to place here and I
went to about 10 locations in 11 days, I found Reserve
components in places that I never dreamed they would be
serving.
The first thing I would want to say is how very lucky we
are that we have these kinds of citizen soldiers and the
employers that they have who support them in what they are
doing.
Now, you make the point of asking how long can that go on?
I think there is a limit to it, but I did find some young
soldiers out there, Reserves and National Guard, whose
employers were paying their full salaries while they were
deployed on duty or who were at least making up the difference
between their military pay and the pay they would have been
receiving at home. So----
Senator Inhofe. But that is right now.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. Yes. That is what I am
saying. I think that there is a limit to that. Sooner or later,
just because of bottom line and businesses are in business to
make money, there is a limit to that. I think we will be facing
that. I do not know when, but certainly at some time in the
future.
Senator, the end strength problem is, of course, a very
difficult one. Some of the solutions that have been talked
about would be to try to get us out of some of the commitments
that the Army has. Nobody has been able to do that.
All I can say is the Army is stretched very thin, and
almost everywhere I went I found the 10th Mountain Division and
I know they also had a battalion in the Sinai.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Since 1990, the Persian Gulf War, the
Army has been cut by more than 34 percent and they are
undergoing a 300 percent increase in mission rates, and so, it
is just something I would like to get into the record at any
committee hearing that we have.
Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to get off into another subject,
but it is one that I think is very significant.
Senator Lieberman. No problem.
Secretary Brownlee. Could I add one thing to that, Senator,
because I think it is important when you start talking about
the Army's strength and force structure and sometimes we do
focus on end-strength, but I guess one of the lessons I hope we
have learned from the war in Afghanistan is that the Army is
pretty thin, as you indicated, but it does have a set of
capabilities.
It has an Airborne division. It has an Air Assault
division. It has a light division. Then it has heavy forces. It
also has the special operating forces, which consists of
Rangers. It consists of Delta Force. It consists of special
forces, who can do direct action, who can do strategic
intelligence, and also the unconventional warfare capability to
go behind the lines and work with indigenous forces.
Now, quite honestly, that capability had not been used by
the Army or the special forces for several years. There are
always people around town, in think-tanks and otherwise, who
speculate about going into the Army's force structure to pay
for other bills.
Some of them use what I call the cleaning-out-your-closet
method of force structuring, ``If you have not used it in 2
years, get rid of it.'' These kinds of capabilities cannot be
recreated in weeks or months. They take years.
We found, when we got on the ground in Afghanistan, the
indispensable element was the Army's special forces
unconventional warfare capability to go behind the lines and
work with these indigenous forces in the sense of the vignette
General Keane described. Their ability to do that is what
enabled the success in that war.
So I only make the point that the force structure is
important, the end-strength is important, the capabilities that
the Army has--we have to have this broad range of capabilities,
because as General Eisenhower said, ``We do not know where we
are going next, but it will probably be in a place, under
conditions for which we are not prepared.''
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Secretary Brownlee, you sort of took me off the train on
which I was going to go with my next series of questions, but I
cannot resist asking you, having heard this answer, whether the
Army intends to convert completely to the Objective Force in
the future or whether there will still be roles for special
operations and Airborne, Air Assault, and light infantry forces
in the transformed Army.
General Keane. Yes. That is a great question, Senator. I
think our thoughts will probably evolve over time as well. But
our current thoughts are that the role for special operations
forces will continue in the future.
We are certainly going to keep those forces as modern and
as enhanced as we possibly can. We are looking at some end-
strength increases for those forces based on the demand and
needs for them.
Second, in terms of airborne and parachute forces, we still
see a need to have that capability. That is our forced entry
capability to seize a piece of ground or terrain that you need
at very long strategic distances and be able to achieve at
least operational and tactical surprise in doing that. So we
will continue to maintain Ranger forces and parachute forces to
do that.
Our thinking right now dealing with the Air Assault
division is to keep it in its current configuration. However,
as we evolve over time, we think we are going to do more
vertical envelopment in the United States Army, not less.
How we evolve in terms of vertical envelopment in the Army
remains to be seen. So we will have some future decisions to
make in reference to that. But those unique capabilities that
you describe right now we intend to keep in the force.
Senator Lieberman. So the transformation to the Objective
Force will not mean that the Army will be totally the Objective
Force or only the Objective Force?
General Keane. That is correct. We think those forces that
I just described obviously will be enhanced to a degree that
they will also have C\4\ISR capabilities and do network-centric
warfare and operate considerably more dispersed than they
currently have the opportunity to do.
So all of the attributes that we value in the Objective
Force we will try to embed in those forces as well. Except for
the special operations forces, because they are so unique
themselves.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Let me raise a few of the
questions with you directly that I asked in my opening
statement.
I am sure it is obvious from our point of view of accepting
and embracing the vision that you had in the Army of the
Objective Force and trying to play a role as advocates, if you
will, and to ask why some of those tough decisions--these are
all tough decisions, and they are not being made, which would
free up more resources to fully fund the Objective Force and
move to it more rapidly.
You began to talk a little bit about this, General Keane, a
little bit earlier, but not in terms of the numbers. You talked
about the recommendation of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams,
the obligation or responsibility to National Command Authority
to give this kind of capacity before we got to the Objective
Force.
My question is: Do we really need six, particularly since
we have moved the Objective Force date up closer and that is a
bold and constructive move? Why not field fewer than six of the
IBCTs to free up resources for the future combat systems, or
even for aviation priorities?
General Keane. That is a good question, Senator. I was
trying to answer it before. Let me see if I can do a little
better job with it.
The number six was derived from the warfighting
requirements we believe we have and also the rotation base
requirements, the war fighting requirements to respond to MTWs
or also small scale contingencies that require immediate war
fighting. But we also know we do other kinds of operations.
In the Army, we pay a disproportionate bill for stability
operations post-conflict. I mean, we are 55 years in Europe. We
are 50 years in Korea. We are 16 years still in Honduras, of
all places. We are down in the Sinai some 19 years, and 11
years in Southwest Asia, and the list goes on, 6 years in
Bosnia and close to 3 years now in Kosovo.
So we are painfully aware of post-conflict operations as it
impacts on the Army, and our tendency to stay for a number of
years. So we must maintain a rotational base to be able to do
that.
We also know that the IBCTs will be ideal forces to put
into some of these contingencies that we are doing in the post-
conflict stage, as they are in the conflict stage. To do that
in peacetime, we have to have a rotation base, if we expect the
follow-on force to have the same capability as that one does.
So that contributed to it.
There are two other factors. One is we also felt the
National Guard should play a role in this, that they should be
a part of transformation. We are committed to them not just in
the Interim Force, but also in the Objective Force. So we
wanted to bring them into the picture as well.
Then the last issue dealt with--the sixth one in a sense--
is that we are really cleaning up old business here. We have a
cavalry regiment that is assigned to the 18th Airborne Corps,
the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment. It has been improperly
organized, improperly designed and equipped for a number of
years, ever since it used to be a heavy armored cavalry
regiment and we made it a light cavalry regiment.
Essentially, all it has in it are Humvee TOW missiles with
which to fight. That is not an assault capability. It has been
a pregnant problem for us for years.
We are using the IBCT concept to design an organization
with the equipment in the IBCT and form something we describe
as the Interim Cavalry Regiment. That is the sixth one of these
as well. It will look a little different, but all the equipment
strategies will be the same.
That will give the 18th Airborne Corps the capability that
they truly need, that we have been depriving them of for a
number of years. That is how we settled on the number six.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. So the bottom line in balancing
the risk, in what I know is your desire to get to the Objective
Force, you do not feel you can cut that below the six IBCTs?
General Keane. No, we do not, not to meet the operational
shortfall and to be able to give the National Command Authority
the options we believe they should have.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask the other question. Why would
it not make more sense to limit modernization to fewer than the
three and a third divisions in the counter-attack corps, and,
again, take that money and fully fund the Objective Force?
Either one of you.
Secretary Brownlee. Jack, go ahead.
General Keane. Well, first of all, that is the counter-
attack corps, as you well know, and that was a major decision
that we made. We are obviously taking some risk by not
recapitalizing some of the equipment that would go to the other
forces in the Army.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Keane. But with the strategy of the Objective Force
and when it comes on, we believe that we are maintaining a
strategic hedge, and therefore an acceptable risk by recapping
that counter-attack corps and selectively modernizing the
equipment. We have gone through all of the equipment strategies
to do that.
The three and a third divisions, the third is the armored
cavalry regiment for the corps, will maintain a hedge for us up
until 2024 when that organization also goes into the Objective
Force.
We think it is reasonable that we are doing it. It was one
of the tougher decisions that we had to make, and it is
frustrating, because there is always tension around these
decisions.
On the one hand, we get criticized for maintaining too much
of our Legacy Force. People do not recognize what we are doing
to it, and the risk that we are accepting with that Legacy
Force, that the selective recapitalization only applies to
about 30 percent of it.
Senator Lieberman. Sure. Thanks, General. My time is up on
this round.
Senator Santorum.
Senator Santorum. I just want to follow up an what Senator
Lieberman was saying. I would take the other side of that
question, which is I think a question I have asked in the past.
Maybe I do not remember the answer, but if you give me such a
good answer this time, I will remember it.
What happens to the other six and two-thirds that, as we
move forward with the Objective Force, and we move forward with
digitization, as we move forward with upgrades, who would
basically just get left behind? What relevance do they have to
your capability to do your mission?
General Keane. Well, I think that is where the risk is that
we are accepting--we are saying to ourselves that the strategic
hedge will be one of the last forces to transform to the
Objective Force. It is not 2024, by the way. It is 2020. So I
was mistaken in that.
The IBCTs at some point will transform as well. The
planning figure for that is 2028. So the issue for us then is:
With those organizations, can we accept the risk in the near
term, while we are waiting for the Objective Force to begin to
arrive in 2010?
Senator Santorum. My question is: What is the relevance of
those forces now? Going forward, what is the relevance of all
of these forces that are not being recapitalized?
General Keane. If the issue is ``Are they trained and ready
to fight,'' the answer is yes. If we had to get involved in
conflicts larger than what we are currently involved in, I
think you would see those forces being employed and doing very
well against the threat that is out there.
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, we have equipment, pre-
positioned and afloat. If, in fact, heavy divisions had to fall
in on that equipment, some of those divisions might be the
first ones to fall in on that equipment. The counter-attack
corps would come behind them with its own more digitized modern
equipment.
But they might be the first forces to fall in on that
equipment, because it will not be digitized and have the kind
of capabilities that the counter-attack corps will have. So
they would be very relevant in that fight. In fact, they might
be the first forces on the ground.
Senator Santorum. Okay. A question about UFRs, and the
close to $10 billion on your UFR list. You have killed, going
through my papers here--how many programs is it? Eleven
programs, I guess, with seven programs in the FYDP.
My question is: Are there any programs which are
terminating that are also on the UFR list? Are there any
programs that you have terminated that you changed the
requirements so they are not on the UFR list?
General Keane. No. The answer to that is that the programs
we killed or terminated--and some obviously, we restructured--
our plan is to not come back and make a request of you in the
following year to initiate that as an unfunded requirement, so
they are not on the UFR list.
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, could I add one thing here?
While it is not the same program, there are capabilities that
we clearly need in the aircraft survivability equipment area,
and we have asked for additional funds to do more in that area.
The program that we terminated is terminated. But actually,
it is not. The special operations forces are going to buy a
little bit out of it before it is terminated, through the end
of the year. The Army is going to continue to manage that.
But recognizing that we still need to modernize our
aircraft survivability equipment, the money that you see
requested in that UFR, I understand, is----
Senator Santorum. Is for a different program or for----
Secretary Brownlee. Well, it is to pursue whatever
capabilities we can.
Senator Santorum. Something. Obviously with what is going
on, what we have seen is the vulnerability that we have, which,
obviously, seems to be something we need to be pursuing.
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. We want to be careful here,
in that the aircraft that were hit in Afghanistan were hit by
small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) primarily, not
by any of the kind of sophisticated systems that these kinds of
aircraft survivability equipment would defend against.
The facts are that in that program, the Army was in an
aircraft survivability equipment. It was a joint program.
Technical difficulties arose. The Navy and the Air Force pulled
out of the program. It left the Army with the cost of the
system being doubled for the Army. It went from $1.4 million to
$2.4 million. So the Army simply could not afford that alone.
That is per system.
So the Army is now going to, if they can come up with any
additional money, they would pursue other alternatives. They
have a little money to do that, but this would allow a more
robust effort. I believe that is true.
General Keane. That is true. There is----
Senator Santorum. Is that a request to us?
Secretary Brownlee. It is on the UFR, sir.
Senator Santorum. Right. But is that----
General Keane. Aircraft survivability is very important to
us, obviously. There was the fact that there were material and
design problems with that program that led us to back away from
it. The other two services have, as well.
I will say to you in fairness to it, though, that they
appear to be making some progress with it. So we are going to
be taking another look at it when we start building our 2004--
--
Senator Santorum. The old program or a new system, or----
General Keane. It is the new program that we terminated. It
appears that they may be solving some of the technical
solutions and material problems that they were having with that
program. It was called Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures
(ATIRCM).
If that, in fact, is the case, we may be taking another
look at it as we go into the next budget cycle. To do that, I
think that to be frank about it, we will have to get our sister
services involved on here to get the bill down as well, and get
them back into it and get interested in it. If the solutions
are there, they will be interested.
Senator Santorum. Okay. There are two people here who are
very interested in Comanche. Why do you not just, if you can,
give us sort of an update of where we are on that program? Then
I will sort of pick at you from there.
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, the Comanche program is one
that, as you know, has a long history. Some of it is very
troubled. The program got in trouble and Congress took some
money out, and the Army took some money out. It has a long
history of trouble.
I know that it has the Secretary's and the Chief's
attention, and it certainly has the Vice Chief's and my own, as
well as our new acquisition executive, Claude Bolton. We have
all conferred on this program and we have some very intense
work going on right now in that program.
There are some decisions to be made in the next few months
that I think are critical to that program. Some of the troubles
that it has had are self-induced by the Army. Some of them are
contractor problems. Some of them are things like software
development.
But I believe the Army is going to make some key decisions
on that aircraft over the next several months. When we have
some of those things worked out, we will certainly be up here
to discuss it with you.
Senator Lieberman. Well, let me follow up. Obviously, I
appreciate----
Senator Santorum. I am not too sure that told me a whole
lot. [Laughter.]
Can you be a little clearer as to what----
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, one of the problems with the
system is that we are looking at some alternatives, and one of
those may be a block fielding approach, as I discussed earlier.
The original Comanche was intended to be a scout reconnaissance
helicopter.
When the Army decided to make it a scout attack helicopter,
that meant that we were going to put a Longbow radar on it, and
hang Hellfire missiles on it. That has created some
capabilities so that the vertical rate of climb of that
helicopter, because of the power/weight ratio--this is
primarily a weight problem now--is on the margin.
We have had some discussions about the desirability of
fielding a helicopter with an engine that is already on the
margin. So if I went further than that, I would be going
further than what we have really decided to do here. But I can
only tell you that these are the kinds of evaluations that are
being made.
We are going to work, of course, closely with the
contractor, and with the people in Congress up here. But I do
believe that this is the year of decision for Comanche. It is
possible that with a block fielding approach, at least the
first versions of this may only be scout reconnaissance.
Senator Santorum. As a reconnaissance helicopter only?
Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. What does ``block fielding'' mean here?
Secretary Brownlee. I am sorry, sir?
Senator Lieberman. Explain ``block fielding.''
Secretary Brownlee. Block fielding means that the threshold
capability, the first sets of helicopters we would produce and
begin to test and maybe even deploy, would not have the full-up
capability. So if you had a helicopter and the first ones you
deployed were only scout reconnaissance helicopters, and then
later you solved the weight problem, then you could go back and
retrofit those and make the future models more capable. Perhaps
they could have the added capabilities of scout/attack. But we
are looking right now at alternatives of how to do that that
would be acceptable.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Let me ask--and I think the
question is still relevant. There is the $1.7 billion
shortfall, and I know that the Army put more money into this
fiscal year 2003 budget, $159 million to address part of the
shortfall. The other part of the proposal is to increase the
production rate by about 50 percent from 62 to 96 a year.
Can either of you talk a little bit about that, and whether
you think that is feasible to accomplish?
Secretary Brownlee. I think the increase in production rate
would not occur until 2007 or sometime around that. In my view,
Senator, that presumes that we solve the problems I just
described.
Senator Lieberman. General Keane, do you want to add
anything to that?
General Keane. Well, we have the money in a program we
believe we should have. The 96 production rate is only
something we want to go to because of the significant savings
that are involved and the production rate, because it just
makes sense to us.
We are not at that decision yet. But that is clearly where
we are heading, and I think some of the other decisions we have
to make about this program would also shape that decision. So
we have a few more months before we get to that point.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
General Keane. I do not want anyone to misunderstand that
the Army is very committed to the Comanche program. We are not
backing away from it one iota here. What we are committed to is
making certain that we solve some of the challenges that are in
that program.
Senator Lieberman. So you might put it up initially with
less than the fully desired capabilities. Is that what I am
hearing?
General Keane. Well, it would have the capabilities that
the Comanche program always started out with.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Which we----
General Keane. Be an armed reconnaissance helicopter, which
is very achievable.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Keane. Then what we started doing is what we have
been doing for many, many years, starting to ask more of that
system.
Senator Lieberman. Can it do more, yes?
General Keane. We were doing that obviously--looking at it
in terms of that being a multi-functional helicopter, which
would create some savings for us down the road if it could do
two functions at once. So it was economy that got us into
looking at that realistically. That thought, while initially
entertaining and attractive to us, under closer scrutiny is
going to cause us some trouble. We have to eventually make a
tough decision here.
Senator Lieberman. But you are also saying obviously that
that does not diminish the priority that the Army puts on the
armed reconnaissance function?
General Keane. Absolutely not. I am not----
Secretary Brownlee. No, sir. It is essential. That kind of
capability is essential to the Objective Force.
Senator Lieberman. To the Objective Force. Okay.
Let me ask about the Crusader, which we talked about
briefly. Do you see it now as part of the Legacy Force, the
Interim Force, the Objective Force or in some sense all three?
General Keane. Well, I think that is a great question.
Crusader has been a real challenge for us. It became, early on,
the poster child for what was wrong with the Cold War Army and
much of it has been misrepresented ever since.
To be frank with you, Senator, when I joined the Department
here, I had many of the perceptions that others have had
outside the Army. We put it on the chopping block to take a
look and see if we could cut it so we could do transformation
sort of things with it.
When I examined the requirements of where we were in
artillery and what we needed on the battlefield, it was
blatantly obvious that we needed the capability. So we
restructured it and we brought it down and cut the program in
half so it supports the counter-attack corps and also forces in
Korea.
Then I think we made another mistake with it, to be frank,
because we started billing it as a Legacy Force system, when
clearly it has such advanced technology in that turret that I
am convinced that that turret and its capabilities, which are
almost robotic, there will be a two-man crew in there. But it
is more like an aviation cockpit than an artillery turret in
terms of its capabilities.
That turret has advanced technologies and it will bridge us
to the Objective Force. I am absolutely convinced of it, that
there are much of the turret qualities we will find in an FCS
gun system of the future. That is step one.
The second thing is that, in responding to Senator Inhofe's
question, once Crusader is in the Army inventories and given
its rapid rate of fire and its precision and the range it fires
at, I cannot imagine us being in any conflict where we would
not throw a number of those things on C-17s and take them to
war with us to support the Interim Force, to support Legacy
Forces, regardless of type, whether they are heavy forces or
light forces, or initially even to support the Objective Force
as we are waiting to get more of the FCS gun systems into the
inventory.
So I think it will be with us and supporting all three of
those forces as we transition the Army. It was a mistake on our
part, I think, to not be clear about that and unsort our own
jargon on this issue.
Senator Lieberman. This tempts me--and I will go forward,
yielding to temptation, to ask you a provocative question, but
I do it only to get what I know will be your brilliant and
eloquent answer on the record.
There are some who might say that precision guided missiles
fired from the air have been so brilliantly successful in
Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, for instance, that we
do not need sophisticated artillery like Crusader anymore.
General Keane. That is true. We have heard it ourselves and
there has been enormous progress with precision weapons, just
in the ensuing 4 years since Kosovo. We can now put joint-
direct attack munitions (JDAMs) on virtually every type of
strike aircraft, versus only one that we did 4 years ago, so it
is a tremendous advance.
The other thing is that in Desert Storm, precision
munitions accounted for less than 14 percent of the bombs that
we dropped. Today, it is probably 80-plus percent.
All that aside, the fact of the matter is that when troops
are in close contact with the enemy, to be able to support
troops in contact with the enemy you need immediately
responsive fires, and the direct fire nets that we have with
artillery provides us that responsive fire.
We need it regardless of weather. We cannot wait. A half
hour could be an interminable amount of time to a force that is
engaged with a much larger force and that needs artillery
support.
So the qualities of a ground force are always tied to
artillery systems and those artillery systems will take the
form of tube artillery and also rocket munitions for
responsiveness. They are just integral to a ground force's
capacity to fight.
Senator Lieberman. Your answer was as convincing as I knew
it would be. Thank you, General. My time is up.
Senator Santorum. Thank you. I just want to----
Secretary Brownlee. Could I just make one point on that,
Senator?
Senator Lieberman. Please.
Secretary Brownlee. It is true that the precision guided
munitions did a terrific job over there. I think one has to
point out that there were not formidable air defenses there and
had there been, it might have changed the picture somewhat. The
artillery is unaffected by that.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Senator Santorum. Since we are on Afghanistan, let me just
follow up with a question on lessons learned from Afghanistan
and how they apply to the Interim Brigade. Can you envision how
you would utilize this new force that you want to create in
what seems to be an environment that may very well be the
future threat that faces us and the Army?
Secretary Brownlee. I think I will let Jack address it, but
I do want to go back to something I said earlier. As far as a
lesson learned from Afghanistan, again, I would indicate that a
lot of people, as I said, had already started to look at the
Army's unconventional warfare capability as not needed anymore,
because we had not used it for a few years.
When it became the indispensable element on the ground, it
was fortunate we had this proxy Army, these indigenous forces
on the ground, but that is when the air strikes became
effective. When they were able to move and the special forces
with them synchronized their movements with the air strikes,
that is when the air strikes began to be effective. As Jack has
said in meetings I have been in before, it caused the Taliban
and al Qaeda forces to have to mass to cope with these ground
forces. When they did that, then they became susceptible to the
air strikes.
Well, before we got the special operating forces on the
ground operating in that mode, the air strikes were not nearly
as effective, nor did we have the success on the ground that we
had when the movement of troops on the ground and the air
strikes were synchronized. This all happened because the
capability of the Army was retained. Thank God, it was
retained.
General Keane. I would add to that by saying, you know, we
have to stop beating ourselves up about lack of jointness. The
reality of this war was the uncommon goodness of jointness and
the integration of our capabilities. So we really, as a
military, should start taking some credit for this now.
We have turned the corner in a lot of our integration of
capability. Certainly noteworthy, as Les pointed out, was the
integration of special operations and conventional Army forces
and air power, a pretty remarkable achievement, and
particularly when you think that we were introducing special
operations forces to essentially strangers on the battlefield.
Within a matter of days, they built up trust and were able to
synchronize and coordinate their activities throughout all of
northern Afghanistan. That was a remarkable achievement.
This business of ground forces is a fascinating discussion
and it is one that is much misunderstood. Kosovo, I think, led
to a lot of the misunderstanding because, Milosevic, clearly
when he calculated the expulsion of the Albanians, and he moved
about a 40,000-man army in there to do that, knew that response
would probably get precision strike against his forces.
While he used mass to move out the Albanians, he quickly
reorganized those forces and distributed those forces in and
among the people and used advanced camouflage techniques to
hide from what he knew was inevitable precision strike
operations.
What is very different in Kosovo as compared to Afghanistan
is: He was very successful in doing that. The reason why he was
successful in doing that is there was no ground force there to
force his ground force to mass to protect the things that they
value. That would have required a ground force presence,
whether it was the KLA, who was not capable of doing it, or a
coalition ground force which would have forced those forces out
of those cities and out of those ridge lines that he was hiding
in to mass.
At that point, that force can be fixed by another ground
force and becomes very vulnerable to air power, and would be
summarily destroyed. That is what happened to the Taliban so
quickly. It is a lesson that people clearly do not understand
at times.
In terms of the IBCT, I think, if we had the IBCT force, we
clearly would deploy it. I think it would be ideally suited to
operate in Afghanistan, in all of the terrain that is in
Afghanistan, even in the mountainous terrain, because of the
presence of foot infantry that is in that force, and our clear
understanding that that force would be augmented with
helicopters, that we could move that infantry around in those
mountains.
So the IBCTs will be a very versatile force for us,
operating in different types of terrain and operating very
dispersed on the battle field, which Afghanistan clearly is.
Thank you for the question.
Senator Santorum. You are welcome. Regarding the Chinook,
we have a problem with a Nunn-McCurdy breach. How do you plan
to address that?
Secretary Brownlee. Senator, the Army is also committed to
the program. There was some contractor price increases that
really caused that. This program is critical, the CH-47F. There
simply are not any alternatives in the near term. While we have
taken some losses, is because we have used it so extensively in
Afghanistan.
It has truly been a workhorse there and some of the things
that have occurred with the Chinook, which Jack could probably
describe in much more detail than I, have almost been
miraculous--some of the ones that have flown out of difficulty
and flown after taking hits and things like that. This is a
good airplane that we need to upgrade and continue to buy.
Senator Santorum. Well, how are you going to address the
breach and is the breach going to have the impact on the----
Secretary Brownlee. Have what, sir?
Senator Santorum. What impact will it have on the low-rate
production?
Secretary Brownlee. I do not know yet, sir. I know that we
are in discussions with the office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) about it, and we are going to have to negotiate with the
contractor, but we are going to have to proceed with the
program, I believe. I know there was this breach and it has to
be reported and we are doing that. But there have been other
programs with these kinds of breaches that survived, and I
believe this one will.
General Keane. We do not see it as a major issue, Senator.
March 19 is our notification date to Congress on the Nunn-
McCurdy breach. It is due mostly to labor rates and we will be
continuing with that program as planned.
Senator Santorum. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. This has been a very productive
afternoon. It strikes me that I should say what I suppose is
self evident and--it has been said elsewhere--that we are
extremely grateful for the service that the Army has given in
Operation Enduring Freedom. On this committee, we say that we
are very proud of it.
Thank you for an important and very constructive discussion
here this afternoon. You are both very well informed and
responsive and we want to continue to work with you through
this subcommittee to help you, as best we can, to achieve what
you want to achieve and all we are asking you to achieve with a
limited number of dollars, large though they are, nonetheless
limited. So I appreciate it very much and we look forward to
continuing the dialogue.
The hearing is adjourned.
General Keane. Thank you for what you do for our soldiers,
sir. We appreciate it.
Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lieberman. You are quite welcome. Thank you, both.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senators Joseph I. Lieberman and Rick Santorum
research, development, test, and evaluation funding
1. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, the Army's
fiscal year 2003 $91 billion budget request--approximately 24 percent
of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget--represents a $9.9 billion
increase over fiscal year 2002 levels. The Army's share of the DOD
budget was not varied by more than 1.1 percent over the last 10 years
using a fiscal year 1992-2003 average of 25.1 percent. The procurement
portions of the budget has fallen from 20 percent over the last two
decades to just under 17 percent this year. Research, development,
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding has fallen from 21 percent to just
under 13 percent in the same time period. The Army's $9.9 billion
budget request increase includes a $1.7 billion addition to procurement
funding, a 14 percent increase, but RDT&E accounts were reduced $134
million compared to last year's appropriated level, and increased by
less than 1 percent relative to last year's requested level. Despite an
almost $10 billion increase, the Army was still required to terminate
11 programs in fiscal year 2003 and seven programs in the Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP). Despite submitting a $9.5 billion unfunded
requirements (UFR) list last year and receiving a $9.9 billion increase
this year, the Army has once again submitted a $9.5 billion UFR list.
How will the $134 million reduction in RDT&E affect Army
transformation--in particular, the development of the Future Combat
System (FCS) and the Mobile Gun System-variant of the Interim Armored
Vehicle?
Secretary Brownlee. The $134 million reduction in RDT&E will not
impact the Mobile Gun System-variant of the Interim Armored Vehicle.
For the Future Combat Systems, the President's budget submission
was delivered to Congress before the Army had received and costed
proposals from industry for the FCS Lead Systems Integrator agreement.
Subsequent cost estimates identified additional requirements over and
above what we requested in the President's budget. Consequently, the
Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a $390 million dollar unfunded
requirement request for science and technology and system development
and demonstration efforts to support FCS development. Because of this
situation, the Army is assuming additional risk to attain our goal of
fielding an FCS-equipped unit of action with threshold capability
within this decade. Regardless, we will continue to make the tough
decisions and tradeoffs in order to transform the Army within the
resources made available to us.
force structure implications of transformation
2. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, because the
Army's share of the Department of Defense's Total Obligation Authority
varies little from year to year, how do you expect to fund the Future
Combat Systems, Crusader, Comanche, and Interim Brigade Combat Teams
(IBCT) when these programs all reach production in roughly the same
time period? Do you see any force structure implications?
Secretary Brownlee. The fiscal year 2003 budget recently submitted
to Congress adequately funds all of the Army's known Interim and
Objective Force Transformation requirements. First, the budget, and its
associated FYDP, funds the procurement of six IBCTs and its associated
equipment. Next, the Army is funding over $8 billion in the FYDP for
science and technology, 95 percent of which is oriented on the
Objective Force. Additionally, the Army has fully funded Comanche,
Crusader, and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical.
The Army's force structure is driven by assigned missions and the
capabilities of the forces to carry out those missions. The Army
reexamines its force structure requirements in a biennial process
called Total Army Analysis and makes adjustments to its force structure
to execute assigned missions. As the Army moves forward with
transformation, it will have to make more tough funding decisions and
where possible, seek additional funding from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and Congress.
experimentation plan and future combat systems
3. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, the
Objective Force is the Army's future full spectrum force and the Army's
top transformation priority. The Army intends to achieve Initial
Operating Capability in fiscal year 20l0--a 2-year acceleration of the
program. The key component of the Objective Force is the Future Combat
Systems (FCS), a networked system-of-systems. The Army intends to make
a decision regarding technology maturation for the FCS in fiscal year
2003 versus fiscal year 2006. On March 8, 2002, the Army selected the
Boeing Company and Science Applications International Corporation as
the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) for the concept and development phase
of FCS. In the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Army invested 97 percent of
its science and technology (S&T) resources toward the design and
development of the Objective Force and enabling technologies. The
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 included a
provision which directed the Secretary of the Army to develop and
provide resources for an experimentation program that will provide
information as to the design for the Objective Force and a formal
linkage of the Interim Brigade Combat Team to that effort. What is your
current concept for Objective Force experimentation?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army's approach for Objective Force
experimentation is to enhance proven experimentation processes. These
processes are closely coordinated and synchronized through the
cooperative efforts of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), the Department of the Army, the Army Test and Evaluation
Command, and the Program Manager's Office. The Army exploits
operationally focused experiments to develop and refine operational and
organizational concepts, incorporating advances across doctrine,
training, leader development, organization, materiel, soldiers,
installations, institutions, and infrastructure (DTLOMS-I\3\).
Objective Force integrating centers composed of enhanced battle
labs execute these experiments. Additionally, the remaining traditional
battle labs provide support as the Army fully examines the cumulative
interactions across echelons of command, DTLOMS-I\3\, battlefield
operating systems, and Joint interoperability. These experiments can be
broadly defined in technical, systems, and operational experimentation
categories. Technical experimentation addresses emerging S&T to
determine its feasibility for application in the Army over the near
term. System experimentation looks at specific materiel solutions to an
identified requirement and determines its feasibility as a solution.
Operational experimentation allows the Army to look at emerging
concepts, new organizational designs, systems, and technologies in a
holistic manner. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology) is primarily responsible for S&T
experimentation. The LSI, in coordination with the Army, will be
primarily responsible for systems experimentation, while TRADOC is
responsible for the Army's Experimentation Campaign Plan and
operational experimentation.
Finally, operational testing of the Objective Force maintains two
key linkages. First, the Interim Brigade Combat Team will serve as the
``bridge to the Objective Force'' by providing live and simulated
headquarters and forces for operational experiments. Second, the
Objective Force experimentation plan is integrated into the Joint
Forces Command's (JFCOM) concept development and experimentation
strategy. All insights and lessons learned will be cross-walked between
the Army and JFCOMs concept development process, and JFCOM will have
the latest Objective Force concepts and capabilities represented in
their major events.
4. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, when can we
expect to see this congressionally-directed experimentation plan?
Secretary Brownlee. TRADOC is writing the Army's Experimentation
Campaign Plan. It is currently scheduled for TRADOC internal review
during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2002, with Headquarters,
Department of the Army and Joint/service staffing in the first quarter
of fiscal year 2003. We should have a final product by the end of the
first quarter of fiscal year 2003.
5. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, what
changes in S&T have led you to believe that there are sufficiently
mature technologies that allow you to accelerate the Objective Force?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army has carefully reviewed all FCS
technology efforts and focused resources on the highest priority
technologies that also have the greatest probability of being
transitioned in time for the FCS Milestone B decision. The Army has
requested $654 million in the fiscal year 2003.
The President's budget matures and accelerates FCS, enabling
technologies such as advanced armor and active protection, hybrid
electric vehicle drive components, advanced sensors, and signature
management.
Technologies still needed, but requiring further development and
continued investment for insertion into future versions of FCS include:
compact kinetic energy missile; extended range precision attack missile
and increased endurance loiter attack missile with netted inter-missile
connectivity; advanced multi-spectral payloads for unmanned aerial
vehicles; fully-autonomous unmanned ground vehicles; and multi-role
cannon with extended range ammunition suite.
6. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary, Brownlee, how will
the $190 million shortfall in S&T and the $200 million shortfall in
RDT&E affect the program?
Secretary Brownlee. The $190 million shortfall in S&T and the
additional $200 million shortfall in RDT&E for system development and
demonstration (SDD) may limit the Army's ability to accelerate
transformation to the Objective Force. The $190 million S&T shortfall
in fiscal year 2003 is attributable to the decision to accelerate the
fielding of the Objective Force this decade with first unit equipped
(FUE) and initial operational capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2008 and
fiscal year 2010, respectively. Advancing our transformation efforts by
2 years resulted in calling forward various technologies. Thus, without
the additional funding, the Army's acceleration in transformation will
result in less than desirable capabilities due to potential delays in
advancements for critical technologies and provide limited advancements
in lethality, survivability, versatility, and sustainment.
The $200 million SDD shortfall in fiscal year 2003 is based on the
LSI's initial assessment of funding required for FCS hardware and
software development, systems integration, test and evaluation, and
systems and operational architecture design. Without the additional
RDT&E funds, the program will be at risk of achieving the FUE in 2008
and our ultimate goal of attaining the IOC in 2010. Without the FCS
program, the Army will not have a strategically and operationally
deployable force capable of full spectrum operations this decade.
7. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, how will
the Army manage the LSI contract?
Secretary Brownlee. The agreement between the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/Army team and the LSI is not a
conventional contract. The contract type is an Other Transactions
Agreement Authority contract. The government will manage the LSI
through an integrated, collaborative, integrated product team structure
staffed by government and LSI personnel. The government will
participate as a full partner in all make/buy and subcontractor
competitive selection decisions. The government and LSI will implement
and maintain an earned value management system where we require monthly
cost and performance reports from both the LSI and appropriate
subcontractors. We will use this mechanism to provide program, DOD, and
congressional leadership the ability to track and manage the program at
all levels based on metrics focused on cost, schedule, performance, and
risk.
8. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, what will
be the LSI's role in the development of the Future Combat Systems and
the Objective Force?
Secretary Brownlee. The LSI is the government's partner that will
team with our requirement and material developers to design and build
the FCS supporting our mutual goal of fielding a FCS-equipped unit of
action by the end of this decade. Boeing, as the LSI, will have total
systems integration responsibility for designing, developing,
producing, fielding, and supporting the FCS systems of systems and will
employ best commercial practices in their performance. Specifically,
the LSI will assist the government to develop the system of systems
architecture for the FCS equipped unit of action and design the
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture necessary to provide a
robust near real-time communications capability. The LSI will develop a
material solution to satisfy the FCS organizational concept that is
both strategically responsive while providing a more versatile, agile,
lethal, and survivable combat system.
9. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, will the
LSI be precluded from developing and bidding on equipment for the FCS
or Objective Force? Please provide a summary of the Statement of Work.
Secretary Brownlee. There is no restriction precluding the LSI from
submitting an offer for Objective Force development or production.
Boeing's division of Advanced Space and Communications managing the
DARPA/Army Lead Systems Integration agreement is ``firewalled'' from
the rest of the corporation so they can compete in the process set up
by the LSI. The LSI will document and maintain a best value competitive
process to select major systems and subsystems. The government reserves
the right to participate in all program decisions, to include make/buy
and competitive selection decisions. The government reserves the right
to disapprove any action taken under that process.
The scope of the agreement between the DARPA/Army team is for
execution of the concept and technology development phase of the FCS
program. The LSI, in concert with the government, commits to provide
the demonstrations, documentation, and tests required for a successful
Milestone B decision accomplished in accordance with the statement of
objectives and agreement deliverable schedule to provide a smooth
transition into the SDD phase.
Subject to negotiation, the LSI agreement may be modified to
include the SDD of the FCS program.
the interim brigade combat team
10. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. General Keane, the Interim
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), equipped with a family of Interim Armored
Vehicles (IAV), is the centerpiece of the Interim Force. The Army has
fielded a portion of one IBCT using surrogate vehicles at Fort Lewis,
Washington, and is developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures
for operational employment of the IBCTs using the Fort Lewis IBCT. The
Army's fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $812 million for the
procurement of 332 IAVs for the third IBCT. The first IAVs should be
fielded in June 2002, the last in fiscal year 2008. The Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) recommended that an IBCT be stationed in Europe.
The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 included a
provision granting the Secretary of Defense the authority to waive a
side-by-side comparison of the IAV and the M113A3, the medium-weight
armored infantry carrier currently in the Army inventory, dependent on
several certifications, including an IBCT operational evaluation
(including deployment to the evaluation site and execution of combat
missions across the full spectrum of potential threats and operational
scenarios), prior to deployment and prior to obligating funds for any
more than three brigades.
The Secretary of Defense testified that part of the $48 billion
increase in the defense request was for ``realistic costing'' of
programs to meet the cost position of the DOD's Cost and Analysis
Improvement Group. Has the Army fully funded the IBCTs? How many IBCTs
has the Army funded?
General Keane. The Army has fully funded the procurement costs for
the six IBCTs.
11. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. General Keane, how do you
intend to resource the $276 million shortfall in IBCT military
construction and the $283 million shortfall in IBCT training identified
in the UFR list the Army provided Congress this year?
General Keane. We will utilize existing facilities and equipment on
which. we can train and convert IBCTs as we work toward the objective
requirements. In lieu of not receiving funds for our shortfalls, we
will look at opportunities to leverage any cost offsets and allocate
revealed resources toward our most critical requirements while
retaining a balanced budget.
12. Senator Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 included a
provision granting the Secretary of Defense the authority to waive a
side-by-side comparison of the IAV and the M113A3, the medium-weight
armored infantry carrier currently in the Army inventory, dependent on
several certifications, including an IBCT operational evaluation
(including deployment to the evaluation site and execution of combat
missions across the full spectrum of potential threats and operational
scenarios), prior to deployment and prior to obligating funds for any
more than three brigades. Can you describe the actions you have taken
in preparation for this operational evaluation and when do you expect
to conduct this operational evaluation?
Secretary Brownlee. We are currently developing our strategy for
the operational evaluation to assess the Stryker's operational
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. This strategy will
combine live testing, virtual simulation, constructive modeling, and
other data sources as required and will compare a Stryker-equipped unit
with a light infantry unit. Testing will be conducted in fiscal year
2003.
13. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, could you
describe, in general terms, how you plan the testing of the full
spectrum capabilities of the IBCT within the context of the operational
evaluation?
Secretary Brownlee. The Army plans to evaluate the capabilities of
the IBCT through the assessment of operational events, modeling and
simulation, and other events required for the acquisition of the
Stryker Interim Armored Vehicles, and the fielding, training, and
initial operational capabilities of the IBCTs.
14. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, is the
IBCT a separate brigade or is it part of a division? If it fights as
part of a division, will the division headquarters have adequate
digital communications resources to support IBCT operations?
Secretary Brownlee. In July 2001, the Army announced the
designation of the six IBCTs. This was based upon operational and
strategic considerations. The units designated were a combination of
divisional brigades, cavalry regiment, and separate brigade. The IBCT
can be task organized to operate as either a divisional brigade or as a
separate brigade. The Army is conducting analysis to determine the
appropriate command and control relationships for these five interim
brigades and the one interim cavalry regiment. During this analysis,
due consideration will be given to ensure that appropriate
digitization, logistical support, and command and control
infrastructure are in place to provide higher control and support to
each interim brigade.
15. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee, if it is a
separate brigade, how long can the IBCT sustain operations? Is the lBCT
fully equipped to perform as a separate brigade?
Secretary Brownlee. The support structure of the IBCT is purposely
austere to enhance deployability and force mobility. The IBCT is
designed to be capable of sustaining itself for 72 hours under combat
conditions. The IBCT is a divisional brigade that is designed to fill a
capability gap between the Army's heavy and light forces. It is
optimized for employment as an early entry combat force as well as for
a wide range of small-scale contingencies. However, it was not designed
to operate as a separate brigade and requires augmentation for
sustainment. In a major combat operation, the IBCT will participate as
a subordinate maneuver component within the division or corps.
legacy force systems
16. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, in the Army's plan, the Legacy Force will continue to provide
overmatch and near-term warfighting capabilities out to the 2030 time
frame. The Army estimates that 75 percent of its major combat platforms
exceed their service life. However, because of affordability concerns,
the Army has taken risk in the Legacy Force by limiting the focused
recapitalization program only to those systems supporting the three and
one-third divisions of the counterattack corps. In the fiscal year 2002
budget, the Army planned to recapitalize and selectively modernize 21
systems. In the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Army reduced that number
to 17. The Army's UFR list includes a $2.4 billion shortfall for force
modernization. Despite an almost $10 billion increase, the Army was
still required to terminate 11 programs in fiscal year 2003 and 7
programs in Future Years Defense Program. Most of the program
cancellations and restructuring is related to the ground component of
the Legacy Force.
Why did the Army find it necessary to reduce the number of Legacy
systems for recapitalization from 21 in fiscal year 2002 to 17 in
fiscal year 2003, in light of the $3 billion increase to Army
procurement accounts?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The four systems that were
removed from the recapitalization list are the M915 Line Haul Tractor,
Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV), D7 Dozer, and D7 Scraper.
All four systems were low priorities on our recapitalization list.
The M915 Tractor was removed from the recapitalization program because
it was more cost effective to purchase new tractors than to
recapitalize old vehicles. The Army decided to remove the SUSV from the
recapitalization list because it was a low-density fleet with no
immediate readiness issues or concerns. Additionally, funding was never
applied to establishing a recapitalization program for this fleet. The
D7 Dozer and Scraper were removed from the recapitalization list
because they were being adequately addressed in the construction
equipment service life extension program.
force modernization shortfall
17. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, the Army's unfunded priority list includes a $2.4 billion
shortfall for ``Force Modernization.'' Can you please describe what
constitutes this shortfall and the impact on the recapitalization
program if this funding were provided?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Critical force modernization
programs that appear on the Amy's unfunded requirements list include
MH-47 helicopters, soldier modernization, tactical radios, and others.
However, these requirements do not impact the Army's recapitalization
program or funding for recapitalization systems. All 17 of the Army's
recapitalization systems are funded.
modernization beyond the counter attack corps
18. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, while the Abrams and Bradleys in the Counterattack Corps will be
modernized, those that reside in Army Prepositioned Sets (APS) will not
be. How does the Army intend to mitigate this risk?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Army is committed to
making transformation as transparent as possible to the warfighting
commanders in chief (CINC). All facets of transformation are first
assessed against their impact on the Army's ability to support the
warfighting CINCs. The Army closely manages its prepositioned equipment
sets to ensure the timely arrival of an appropriate mix of forces to
deter an adversary or support the rapid halt of an enemy advance.
In addition to the decisive counteroffensive capability the
modernized III Armored Corps will have, the balance of the legacy heavy
forces will be selectively upgraded and will be available as early
deployers to ensure enemy forces do not achieve their initial
objectives. The upgrades planned for armored forces other than the
Counterattack Corps do not prevent them from falling into our
prepositioned sets. These selected upgrades will ensure the early
deploying force maintains combat overmatch in the regions where the
prepositioned equipment will likely be employed by taking the key
combat systems to a ``zero hour/zero mile'' status, not changing the
equipment types.
Forward deployed divisions and selected continental United States-
based units will maintain compatibility with prepositioned equipment
until they are transformed to the Objective Force. With the arrival of
more strategically responsive Objective Force units, the Army will
modify its prepositioned equipment sets based on emerging CINC
requirements.
19. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, will less capable forces which draw the APS equipment be first
to the fight before the modernized forces of the Counterattack Corps
which must deploy by sea?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The fully modernized
Counterattack Corps will deploy by sea with their equipment to provide
a decisive counteroffensive capability well into the Objective Force
timeframe. The equipment in our prepositioned sets provides a combat
overmatch capability for the foreseeable future and into the beginning
of the Objective Force timeframe. The early deploying heavy forces must
ensure enemy forces do not achieve their initial objectives. In
addition to the decisive counteroffensive capability, the fully
modernized Counterattack Corps will have the balance of the legacy
heavy forces will also be selectively upgraded and will be available as
early deployers.
20. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, in your joint statement you assert that ``the leaders and
soldiers of today's Army will advance the tactics, techniques, and
procedures for network centric warfare using enhanced command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) systems on modified Legacy programs.'' Do you
intend to digitize all platforms in the Legacy Force or will this
modernization initiative be limited to the Counterattack Corps?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The fiscal year 2003 Future
Years Defense Plan continues the Army's digitization program with
fieldings to the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and the
Counterattack Corps. While sustainment and improvement of legacy
systems will focus on the Counterattack Corps, information superiority
is a cornerstone of Army transformation across all of the Legacy Force.
21. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, is the digitization program fully funded to complete this
initiative?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. For the period covered by the
President's budget, the digitization initiative is fully funded and
provides for fieldings within the IBCTs as well as the Counterattack
Corps. Beyond this period, funding decisions have yet to be made in the
normal budget process.
22. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, if this applies only to the Counterattack Corps, how will units
not included in the digitization plan be incorporated into operations?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. While current funding only
supports platform level digitization in the networks for the
Counterattack Corps and IBCTs, C\4\ISR modernization continues across
all units. Information superiority ensures the translation of raw
information into superior knowledge through the integration of a
network-based C\4\ISR and target acquisition system-of-systems, so we
will bring digitization down to battalion level in all of our tactical
units. When operations require a mix of these forces, we will use a
variety of means to ensure interoperability. These include using semi-
automated systems-to-systems information exchanges, backwards
compatible messaging built into our most modern systems, liaison
officer teams, and other manual techniques and procedures to include
voice information to non-digitized platforms. This capability to work
across platforms will help maintain an ability to work with non-
digitized platforms and will also help maintain an ability to work with
non-digitized allies.
black hawk buy-out
23. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, we understand the contractor has proposed a plan to complete the
procurement of the remaining 102 Black Hawk helicopters requirement by
fiscal year 2006 vice the Army's schedule of fiscal year 2011. While
requiring an additional $428 million expenditure between fiscal year
2003-2005, that action would save the Army $126 million. Why would it
not make sense to fund this buy-out, if necessary, by shifting money
and delaying the planned recapitalization program for existing Black
Hawks to do so?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Delaying the UH-60M
recapitalization/upgrade (R/U), or the UH-60A-A recapitalization/
rebuild (R/R) programs to accomplish the early buy-out would have a
major impact on the Army's efforts to transform the utility fleet to a
digitized force and retard our efforts to reverse the aging trend of
the UH-60 fleet, which is currently at 15.2 years.
Moving 3 years of funds currently allocated to the R/U program--
which upgrades UH-60As and Ls to UH-60Ms--to accomplish the buy-out
would not equal a 3-year delay. The loss of momentum and the
institutional engineering knowledge incurred by shutting down the RDT&E
effort would likely add 2 to 3 years of effort to recover the lost
momentum, in addition to the 3-year slip. This could move the first
fielding out as far as 2012, rather than 2006 as currently projected.
Also, the UH-60 recapitalization programs include funds needed to
modify the overall UH-60 fleet and the Army's medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC) aircraft. To execute the buy-out and continue scheduled fleet
modifications would force us to look to other Army programs to cover
the difference between the recapitalization dollars and the early buy-
out requirements. We believe the amount required to execute the buy-out
is $482 million--by year, the contractor requested $150 million in
fiscal year 2003, $152 million in fiscal year 2004, and $180 million in
fiscal year 2005.
In fiscal year 2003, the UH-60 R/U program has a total of $141
million. $99 million of that is for UH-60M RDTE; the other $42 million
is going toward upgraded MEDEVAC kits, crashworthy external fuel tanks,
and other modifications required by the fleet. In fiscal year 2004 the
R/U program has a total of $234 million. Of that, $99 million is
earmarked for the UH-60M production line. $54 million is allocated to
UH-60M RDTE, $64 million to upgraded MEDEVAC kits, crashworthy external
fuel tanks, and other modifications required by the fleet. $17 million
is going toward upgrades of training aids, devices, and simulation
systems.
In fiscal year 2005, UH-60 R/U is budgeted for $263 million--$161
million for the UH-60M production line, $23 million for UH-60M RDTE,
and the remainder is for upgraded MEDEVAC kits, crashworthy external
fuel tanks, and other modifications required by the fleet.
The UH-60 recapitalization/rebuild program at Corpus Christi Army
Depot has been designed to extend the service life of the UH-60A fleet
until those aircraft can be inducted in the UH-60M upgrade program. The
Army currently has 364 aircraft that are at or beyond their 20th year
of service. Reprogramming the dollars allocated to the service life
extension of these aircraft would not only require us to pay the
increasing operations and sustainment costs associated with old
aircraft, but place soldiers in aircraft which have exceeded their
useful service life.
the battlefield combat identification system
24. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the Army has canceled
the Battlefield Combat Identification System initiated as a result of
the ``friendly fire'' fratricides of the Gulf War (now over 10 years
ago). Why was this program terminated and how will the Army address
this critical issue until the FCS is fielded?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Battlefield Combat
Identification System (BCIS) program was originally funded for one
division in the 2003-2007 Program Objective Memorandum. As structured,
the program was considered unaffordable, and funding was redirected to
higher priority programs. BCIS was designed as part of a dual approach
for combat identification, which includes through-the-sight target
identification and situational awareness.
In lieu of BCIS, the Army will continue to field the Counterattack
Corps with combat identification thermal panels, second generation
forward looking infrared, and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below. The BCIS millimeter wave technology will be evaluated for
inclusion into the Future Combat Systems and Objective Force. As the
technology matures and, if proven affordable, it will be considered for
retrofit as a combat identification capability in Interim and Legacy
Forces. This program strategy supports Objective Force priorities,
while currently providing limited combat identification capability for
the Legacy Force.
counterm1ne capability
25. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, the January 21, 2002 edition of Inside the Army quoted an
internal Army review that stated: ``The service faces countermine
capability `shortfalls' in four key areas: see and detect from stand-
off ranges; mine neutralization; force protection; and demining and
clearing.'' What capabilities do our soldiers have currently for
standoff mine detection from a vehicle or aircraft?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. U.S. soldiers do not
presently have a stand-off detection capability from a vehicle or
aircraft. The Army is assessing a stand-off detection technology from a
rotary wing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) known as a camcopter. This is
expected to be a limited capability for detection of changes in routes
that would indicate the presence of mining activity. Development of a
minefield stand-off detection capability from a UAV is slated to be
initiated in fiscal year 2003. Stand-off detection from a vehicle in a
pure sense is not achievable today. What is planned in the near term is
the use of an unmanned ground search platform to remove the soldier
from the vehicle during search operations. This is the Ground Stand-off
Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS) program under development today.
26. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, what is the fielding status of the Army's current next-
generation mine detection systems, the Ground Stand-off Mine Detection
System and the Handheld Stand-off Mine Detection System?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. GSTAMIDS is currently in
development with a planned transition to production for the Block 0
version to occur in February 2003. The Handheld Stand-off Mine
Detection System (HSTAMIDS) is currently in development with a planned
transition to production at the end of fiscal year 2003. As a result of
Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army initiated an acceleration of the
program to provide 200 production units of an interim variant to be
delivered by the end of calendar year 2002.
27. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, what measures has the Army taken to mitigate risk until these
systems are fielded?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Army has committed $29
million for urgent operational requirements in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom to mitigate risk until these systems are fielded. The
forces have deployed mine sniffing dog teams on the ground in
Afghanistan. D7 bulldozers have been equipped with armor protection for
use in clearance of some areas with mines. Tele-operated mini-flails
have been deployed to clear areas of antipersonnel mines. We have
procured state-of-the-art metal detectors from Australia that are more
effective in the highly mineralized soil conditions found in some parts
of Afghanistan. This is an interim measure until the HSTAMIDS mine
detectors are available.
28. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. Secretary Brownlee and General
Keane, what are the countermine capabilities for the IBCT?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. In addition to the HSTAMIDS
and GSTAMIDS systems, countermine capabilities for the IBCT consist of
a suite of equipment to be deployed with the Engineer Squad Vehicle
Variant of the Interim Armored Vehicle. Each engineer vehicle will be
equipped with lightweight rollers or lightweight full width blades. As
part of the ensemble, each vehicle will also be equipped with a
magnetic signature duplicator to deal with magnetic influence fuzed
mines. Six of the vehicles in the nine-vehicle engineer company will
also tow a Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC). The MICLICs will be
replaced starting in the fiscal year 2005 timeframe with the explosive
standoff mine clearance system, which is also known as Mongoose.
Mongoose will provide a more robust capability across the full spectrum
of the threat.
special operations
29. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. General Keane, Army
participation in Operation Enduring Freedom early on consisted of a
Delta Force and Ranger raid in the vicinity of Kandahar and the use of
Special Operations Forces in a traditional liaison and support role to
indigenous forces. New, of course, was the employment of high-tech
communications and targeting capabilities and improved sensor-to-
shooter linkages which allowed these forces to be even more effective.
Lately, in Operation Anaconda, conventional Army light infantry forces
from the 10th Mountain and 101st Air Assault Divisions have been
employed. One of the more striking aspects of that fight is the use of
the special operations version of the Chinook cargo helicopter (rather
than Black Hawks) to effectively conduct combat air assaults, and the
absence of field artillery indirect fire support to supplement fixed
wing, helicopter, and mortar fire support. Are there considerations for
expanding Army Special Operations Forces and Ranger battalions?
General Keane. The Army uses the biennial Total Army Analysis (TAA)
process to evaluate its force structure in light of the current or
changing strategy. During the last TAA, the Army recognized some key
shortages resulting from the move away from the two major theater war
strategy to a more inclusive strategy. Nearly one-quarter of the
proposed active force structure changes were increases to the special
operations forces. We are increasing their training base, adding
additional capabilities to the Ranger battalions and special forces
groups, building two new civil affairs and psychological operations
companies, and doubling the special forces logistical support
structures.
lessons learned from operation enduring freedom
30. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. General Keane, do lessons
learned from Operation Anaconda, or the overall Operation Enduring
Freedom, indicate that the Army should move more aggressively toward a
future transport rotorcraft?
General Keane. The Army strongly supports development and fielding
of a vertical or very short take-off and landing aircraft that can
deliver payloads in the 15 to 20 ton range. In Operation Enduring
Freedom, we entered an underdeveloped theater. Afghanistan lacks
adequate infrastructure on which to base ground lines of communication.
That presented a challenge to get into the areas we needed to put
significant forces and to keep those forces resupplied. Most of our
insertion efforts were by air. That meant using the limited airfields.
The available intra-theater airlift we have today requires a 2,500-
foot strip. We were not able to get the desired throughput into Bagram
or Kandahar because we had to repair the runways, and that takes time
as well as materials and equipment, which we could not get there
rapidly. In short, the hardware we have today limits our options and
ties us to inefficiencies. Army rotary wing aircraft are great but have
limitations, particularly in terms of the lift capacity and ``legs,''
or distance we can fly. A single material solution could perhaps
address both the Air Force mission (intra-theater airlift) and the Army
mission (tactical movement and resupply). The Army would support an
aggressive joint program to develop such a solution.
31. Senators Lieberman and Santorum. General Keane, do lessons
learned from the Afghanistan operations lead you to new insights into
low density/high demand items?
General Keane. Current operations in the war on terrorism have shed
some insight into our force structure, particularly high demand/low
density (HD/LD) forces. In exercising force management, the Army must
pay close attention to our HD/LD forces, such as special operations
forces, chemical/biological detection, and Patriot air defense forces
in order to balance current requirements with deliberate planning.
A key insight from Operation Enduring Freedom for the Army is the
increasing requirement for force versatility as we prepare for
tomorrow's challenges. We believe the current operations reinforce that
we are on the right course with Army transformation. As the OPTEMPO of
our Active component forces increases, the link to, and management of,
our Reserve component forces becomes critical to successful force
management.
The current operations clearly present a challenge, especially in
the allocation and usage of HD/LD forces, requiring the Army to very
carefully manage all of its forces. The force in existence today was
built over the last 10 years to fight under a different set of
assumptions than we have today. There are some mismatches in the
number, type, and component mix of forces that we need to sustain the
global war on terrorism, and the Army is addressing these issues to the
best of our ability. Some improvements to our HD/LD forces are already
occurring by selective increases to special operations aviation, civil
affairs, biological detection, and technical escort units, with more
planned over the next several years. In short, the Army is able to meet
its requirements by carefully managing and leveraging all of our forces
in both the active and Reserve components. We will continue to balance
near-term HD/LD challenges with the broader demands of the new
strategy.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
family of medium tactical vehicles dump trucks
32. Senator Warner. Secretary Brownlee and General Keane, recently
it was brought to my attention that engineer units in Afghanistan have
complained about some of the engineer equipment that is being used in
the Afghanistan operations. The vehicles that were identified as poor
performers were: the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 5-ton
dump trucks, the Light Medium Tactical Vehicle 2\1/2\ ton cargo
vehicle, the Deployable Universal Combat Earthmover (DUECE), and the
Tractor Dozer D5. What is the Army doing to address these complaints?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The challenge on any
deployment is to balance the size of equipment to best match the
limited transportation assets. The comments were not intended to imply
that the equipment did not perform as designed, but rather the smaller,
more transportable DEUCE and D5 were not the optimal pieces of
equipment for the missions, conditions, and environment given to the
engineer units.
When performing earthmoving and excavation missions in the most
extreme soil conditions, vehicle horsepower and weight become critical
to earthmoving operations--bigger is better. The comments need to be
taken in the context of comparing D7 dozers to the smaller DEUCE and D5
that are not as capable due to reduced size and horsepower.
33. Senator Warner. Secretary Brownlee and General Keane, do you
agree that there are problems with this equipment and if so, what are
the specific problems, and what is the Army's plan to address these
shortcomings?
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Army recognizes problems
with the older, A0 model FMTV dump trucks' ruggedness and truck bed and
payload capacity. The Army implemented a design upgrade in A1 model
production to include a thicker impact resistant bed, heavier duty rear
springs, adjusted hydraulic pressure for heavier loads, and changed the
dual swing tailgates from aluminum to steel for impact strength. The
phased upgrade should mitigate the problems that we experienced.
The 17 FMTV dump trucks of the 92nd Engineer Unit in Afghanistan
are :non-upgraded A0 model trucks that were deployed before the
upgrades. The concerns were about load spillage on the move, capacity,
and ruggedness. The Army has proposed two approaches to the unit to
improve their capability in Afghanistan: ship 12 new and upgraded A0
models from the United States; or ship 17 sets of upgrade kits with
support equipment and contractor personnel to Afghanistan to perform
the installation. We are also investigating improvements in operator
training and procedure. A decision on implementation of the options is
pending a decision by the theater and unit commanders. Please note that
the readiness rating of the FMTVs continues to be over the 96th
percentile, and the Army has confidence in the system as a whole.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
apache
34. Senator McCain. Secretary Brownlee and General Keane, the role
of the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter in the United States Military's
ability to project power was recently validated in Sha-e-Kot,
Afghanistan. The Apache performed remarkable feats in the close air
support arena for U.S. ground troops under fire from al Qaeda
positions. The skill and fearlessness exhibited by Apache aircrew were
directly responsible for saving countless American lives.
While the role of the Apache is not in question, I am concerned
with the damage those first 7 aircraft received during the battle of
Sha-e-Kot, especially given the concern by so many members of Congress
to the circumstances surrounding the Apache's deployment to Yugoslavia.
I am interested to know what you feel can be done to make the Apache
even more survivable. What are your plans to make the AH-64 Apache a
key weapon system in the Army's Objective Force.
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The close combat role of Army
aviation will, at times, require our helicopters to engage the enemy at
ranges much closer than our systems are optimized. The battle of Sha-e-
Kot is an excellent example. The Apaches in Afghanistan are AH-64A
models. The Apache's current survivability design of redundant systems,
30-minute ``dry run'' transmission, blast shields, and crew armor
plating provided the crews in Afghanistan the capability to complete
their mission, return unharmed, and get the airframes into the hands of
our maintenance personnel.
The AH-64 Apache is a ``Legacy to Objective Force'' airframe. The
RAH-66 Comanche will start displacing the Apache by fiscal year 2015.
The Army's plan to improve the Apache program is two-fold. First, we
are currently fielding the AH-64D Longbow Apache, which adds the
additional capability of the fire control radar and radar frequency
interferometer, increasing stand-off capability against armor and air
defense threats, as well as numerous system improvements. As a part of
the Army recapitalization initiative, the Apache recapitalization
program increases reliability, reduces fleet half-life and procures the
second-generation forward-looking infrared radar for the fleet. While
the AH-64A Apache continues to be the world's most lethal attack
helicopter, the Longbow Apache improvements increased the effectiveness
and survivability of the Apache as we transform to Objective Force.
35. Senator McCain. Secretary Brownlee and General Keane, what is
the level of effort with respect to the full complement of threat
countermeasure upgrades, such as infrared, radar, and laser detection,
to make this aircraft fully transformational.
Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. In the fiscal year 2003-
fiscal year 2007 Program Objective Memorandum, the Army zeroed out the
Army Procurement Appropriations funding for the infrared and radio
frequency countermeasures programs. The zeroing of these programs was
due largely to high cost and affordability issues. Additionally, the
Army did not fund the laser warning program. Research, development,
test, and evaluation funding for infrared and radio frequency was left
in place to develop cost-reducing mechanisms while further refining the
systems.
The Army recognizes the proliferation of surface-to-air missiles
and recently completed an aircraft survivability study that developed
cost-affordable options for defeating the threat. Although pre-
decisional, the Army is planning to counter infrared missile threats by
upgrading the Apache Longbow helicopter with a common missile warming
system, an advanced infrared countermeasures munition, and an advanced
threat infrared countermeasure. Radio frequency countermeasures will
remain as currently configured while the Army continues to review
solution sets in this spectrum for the Apache helicopter. In addition,
final fielding of an advanced laser warning system could be
accomplished by the end of fiscal year 2006. The net effect of these
actions will ensure that the modernized Apache fleet has a viable
threat countermeasure capability.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]