- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

[Senate Hearing 107-696]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 2225

AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL
STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

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PART 3

READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

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FEBRUARY 28 AND MARCH 21, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003--Part 3 READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

S. 2225

__________

PART 3

READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

__________

FEBRUARY 28 AND MARCH 21, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
43-526 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2002
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

David S. Lyles, Staff Director

Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director

______

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MAX CLELAND, Georgia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

(ii)
?

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Department of Defense Installation and Environmental Programs
february 28, 2002

Page

DuBois, Raymond F., Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Environment)................................ 6
Fiori, Hon. Mario P., Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Installations and Environment)................................ 17
Johnson, Hon. H.T., Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Installations and Environment)................................ 34
Gibbs, Hon. Nelson F., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations, Environment, and Logistics).................... 53

Readiness of U.S. Armed Forces for all Assigned Missions
march 21, 2002

Mayberry, Dr. Paul W., Ph.D., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Readiness).................................................... 124
Newbold, Lt. Gen. Gregory S., USMC, Director for Operations (J-
3), The Joint Staff............................................ 130
McKiernan, Lt. Gen. David D., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5
(Operations and Plans)......................................... 137
Krol, Rear Adm. Joseph J., Jr., USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations, Chief of
Naval Operations............................................... 145
Bedard, Lt. Gen. Emil R., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Plans,
Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps.......................................................... 152
Wald, Lt. Gen. Charles F., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air
and Space Operations, Headquarters............................. 163

(iii)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2002

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTALLATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in
room SR-232, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K.
Akaka (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Akaka, E. Benjamin
Nelson, and Inhofe.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Maren Leed, professional
staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: George W. Lauffer,
professional staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda Sue Fife,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans, assistant to
Senator Byrd; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator
Akaka; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson;
Christopher J. Paul and Dan Twining, assistants to Senator
McCain; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum;
and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert and Daniel K.
Goldsmith.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA, CHAIRMAN

Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee on Readiness and Management
Support will come to order. Good afternoon, everyone. This
subcommittee meets today to review the fiscal year 2003 budget
request for military construction, family housing, and
environmental and other installation programs of the Department
of Defense. This afternoon we will hear from Raymond DuBois,
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment, and from the assistant secretary responsible for
installations and environmental matters for each of the
military departments. Present from the Department of the Army
is the Honorable Mario Fiori; from the Department of the Navy,
the Honorable H.T. Johnson; and from the Department of the Air
Force, the Honorable Nelson Gibbs.
This is the first appearance before this subcommittee for
Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and Secretary Gibbs since
their confirmations. We welcome you and look forward to working
with you in the future. I was happy to have a chance to sit and
talk with you.
Today we will ask our witnesses to provide an overview of
the budget request for the military construction (MILCON) and
family housing programs and the environmental restoration and
compliance programs. I hope that you will be able to outline
for the subcommittee not only the funding levels and major
programs in this budget, but also the philosophy and priorities
you used for this budget request.
The fiscal year 2002 budget made a substantial investment
in the Department's facilities, an area that has been too low a
priority within the Department of Defense for too long. Last
year, I said that the fiscal year 2002 budget request for
installation programs was a step in the right direction, but
that both the Department of Defense and Congress had to make a
sustained effort to address these issues in the coming years,
because a one-time increase is not enough to bring our
installations up to the appropriate standard.
I am disappointed that the fiscal year 2003 budget request
for military construction is $1 billion below the fiscal year
2002 administration request and more than $1.5 billion below
the level Congress provided last year. This budget assumes that
we will achieve the goal of recapitalizing our facilities at
less than 100 years, but only if we achieve unprecedented
levels of investment, more than double the amount requested
this year, in the future.
Relying on large funding increases in the future is a risky
strategy. I hope that we can achieve a more realistic and
sustainable funding path for military construction.
In general, this budget fully funds a stable DOD
environmental program. However, I do have two areas of concern:
the lack of any significant funding for cleanup of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) and a falloff in funding for cleanup of closed
bases and formerly used defense sites.
I look forward to working with Senator Inhofe, other
members of the subcommittee, and with the Department of Defense
to enhance the quality of life of our military service members
and their families; respond to increasing requirements for
force protection at our installations; fund a steady,
sustainable path that will get the quality of our installations
to the level it should be; and carry out our training and other
activities in a way that protects the environment and earns the
trust of the American people, especially those who live on and
near our installations.
I would like to recognize Senator Inhofe for any statement
he may have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared
statement which I will submit for the record, but I would also
like to make several comments. First of all, I agree with
Senator Akaka; I was disappointed in the amount in the budget
for military construction.
I do want to thank you, Secretary Gibbs, for the time you
gave me in working on some of these issues. I am looking
forward to working with all of you.
When we had our August hearing, I congratulated the
administration on the robust military construction and family
housing funding request. Even after the $48 billion came along
and after September 11, it did not come out that way. We end up
now nearly $1 billion lower than the fiscal year 2002. This is
something that is of great concern to me.
As our chairman knows, I have taken the time to go out and
visit virtually all of these installations, and we really need
to be concentrating on making improvements to military housing.
Much of the funding that is in the budget is in the out
years, and history shows us that the out years never get here.
So that is a great concern for me.
But I think the most disturbing thing is the Department's
justification for the reduction. Rather than tell the American
public that they reduced the MILCON budget to support higher
priority projects, the Department blames the reduction on the
delay in base realignment and closure (BRAC), the presumption
being that the Department did not want to spend money on bases
that might be closed in the future. It reaffirms the belief
that the BRAC process is flawed and subject to the political
whim of both sides of the river.
We have all talked about another BRAC round and the effects
it would have. The only thing that I see that we know is that
in the first 3 or 4 years, a closed base costs money. Right now
we are in desperate straits, even with the additional $48
billion in the defense request. It does not have anything in
there for MILCON--it is actually reduced. Force strength is
also left out.
I think anything that would cost money now is something
that should be delayed. The other argument is that we do not
know what the force structure is going to look like so we do
not know what infrastructure is going to be excess.
We have talked about encroachment problems and we need to
all bring this up. I would like to have all of you address this
problem. We are running out of ranges. We have environmental
problems and suspected habitat of endangered species in many
places. The more we do to accommodate the more suspected
habitats there are, Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune being examples
of this, the more of a problem this becomes.
Finally, I am very concerned about the Navy's claimed
ability to find an alternative equivalent training facilities
to replace Vieques. Vice Admiral Amerault, said a May 2001 Sea
Power interview: ``Encroachment is a serious problem. There is
a potential to lose the use of our ranges on Vieques Island and
that could have a very serious readiness impact.'' That is the
bell ringer for us. On the heels of that, even as we are
fighting to keep Vieques as a viable training activity and
resource, we are finding it increasingly difficult to train our
sailors effectively at other locations due to the overly broad
legal requirements combined with commercial and urban
encroachment.''
I know about this firsthand. I took the time to go when the
U.S.S. Kennedy was getting ready for deployment. I was on the
U.S.S. Wasp and the U.S.S. Mount Whitney. All of them agree
that we are not doing a good job of training. In fact, they all
agree on a similar figure when I asked ``if live-fire is a ten,
what is your training?'' They all said ``five.'' If we lose the
fight on Vieques we are going to lose other ranges all around
the world.
These are things I would like to have all of you aware of
as my personal concerns. I think they are also the concerns of
our chairman, and I hope you will address them during our
hearing today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator James M. Inhofe
Thank you, Chairman Akaka.
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming back Mr. Ray DuBois, who
testified before the subcommittee last August, just weeks after his
appointment to the critical position as Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installation and Environment. I also join you in welcoming
his colleagues, Assistant Secretary of the Army, Mario Fiori; Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, H.T. Johnson; and Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force, Nelson Gibbs. We are fortunate to have individuals of your
caliber.
In my opening statement for the August 2001 hearing, I
congratulated the administration for the robust military construction
and family housing funding request. Regrettably, I cannot make the same
assessment of the fiscal year 2003 request. I find it ironic that
despite a $48 billion increase in the defense budget, the funding for
MILCON and family housing is more than $900 million lower that the
fiscal year 2002 request.
Mr. DuBois, last year in your opening statement you stated: ``Our
fiscal year 2002 budget initiates an aggressive program to renew our
facilities.'' The program you are presenting today is far from
aggressive. In fact, it is regressive. What is more disturbing is that
the budget builds expectations that there is funding in the out years
get the program back on track. History shows us that the promises made
for the out years are routinely supplanted by higher priorities.
Although I would like to believe the Navy will have a $2.9 billion
MILCON program in 2007, the reality is that it will be less than that
lofty number.
More disturbing is the Department's justification for the
reduction. Rather than telling the American public that they reduced
the MILCON budget to support higher priority projects, the Department
blames the reduction on the delay in base closure. The presumption is
that the Department did not want to spend money on bases that might be
closed in a future BRAC. It reaffirms my belief that the BRAC process
is flawed and subject to the political whim on both sides of the river.
During this hearing we will also review the Department's fiscal
year 2003 environmental programs. I would like to hear about the
actions taken to resolve the environmental encroachment problems. In a
series of hearings held last year, senior military witnesses alerted
Congress to the cumulative adverse impact of encroachment on military
readiness. My discussions with commanders confirm that encroachment
poses a serious threat to readiness.
At the Goldwater Range, Arizona, the Air Force and Marine Corps
operate with altitude restrictions because of noise impacts on
endangered Sonoran Pronghorn Antelope. Live-fire training at the Army
National Guard's Massachusetts Military Reservation has been suspended
since April 1997 because of groundwater contamination concerns. The
future of live-fire training at Makua Military Reservation, Hawaii,
remains questionable because of groundwater contamination, endangered
species, and cultural and natural resource issues. Finally, I am very
concerned about the Navy's claimed ability to find alternative,
equivalent training facilities to replace Vieques. In May 2001, Sea
Power interviewed Vice Admiral Amerault, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, Fleet Readiness and Logistics, who suggested this may not
be an achievable goal: ``Encroachment is a serious problem. There is a
potential to lose the use of our ranges on Vieques Island [Puerto
Rico], and that could have a very serious readiness impact. That's the
bell ringer for us. On the heels of that, even as we are fighting to
keep Vieques as a viable training activity and resource, we are finding
it increasingly difficult to train our sailors effectively at other
locations due to overly broad legal requirements combined with
commercial and urban encroachment.''
The services have primarily responded to environmental encroachment
through ``work-arounds'' that instill bad habits that may prove costly
in combat. Given the magnitude of the threat, it is critical that the
DOD and services seek resolutions that preserve quality training. Thank
You, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Akaka. Senator Inhofe, thank you very much for your
statement.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank our panelists for being here
today to help address concerns raised regarding the readiness
of our armed services. I appreciate your being here, and I
realize that all of you are concerned, as we are, with
providing our service men and women and their families with the
best and the most supportive installations we can afford.
Obviously, it is a complex formula when you have to assess
whether to construct new facilities in light of BRAC and
compete with the funds that may have to go the procurement or
operations and can be otherwise expended for worthwhile
purposes as well. So the competing issues of BRAC, being good
stewards of the environment, encroaching land development
around installations, providing for military families, and
ensuring that the services themselves have adequate training
areas to maintain proficiency and readiness, even including
such issues as Vieques, all makes for a tough job and I do not
envy what it is that you try to do.
I am concerned that at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska,
home for the largest wing in the Air Force, many of the airmen
have been operating a fire crash and rescue unit out of an old
unsatisfactory hangar, which is certainly not the kind of
housing arrangement they need for a fire station. But they are
currently doing a magnificent job with what they have.
I hope that today, not that you are going to tell me about
how you are going to take care of Offutt, that you address
concerns like these at the various installations all over the
world that are coming under some of the same challenges and
inadequacies.
I have some questions, but I will direct them at a later
time. Thank you for being here.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement.
I will call upon our witnesses for your statements. Without
objection, your entire statements will be included in the
record of this hearing.
We will begin with Mr. DuBois, who serves as the principal
adviser to the Secretary of Defense on issues affecting
military installations and environmental issues. I welcome you
back to the subcommittee and ask you to proceed.

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND F. DuBOIS, JR., DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

Mr. DuBois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission,
I will submit my written statement for the record. I do have a
few remarks to begin with.
As you indicated, this is the first appearance before your
subcommittee for the gentlemen on my right and left. We
constitute what the Secretary of Defense refers to as the
Installation and Environment Executive Committee of the
Department. We meet every Tuesday morning to share notes,
commiserate, prepare, and to try to figure out creative ways to
solve some of the problems which Senator Akaka, Senator Inhofe,
and Senator Nelson have raised today. I hope to touch briefly
upon them, as will my colleagues.
I am very proud to be a member of this executive team and I
can assure you, while it is inescapable the military
construction budget this year versus last is reduced, that the
folks who are facing you today have worked very hard within a
certain framework to come up with what we consider to be a
feasible and a fiscally responsible plan for getting our
facilities on a continuing path to recovery.
September 11 changed our Nation forever. We continue,
however, to transform our installations and our facilities and
maintain our commitment to quality of life for the people who
wear the uniform of this Nation. In the wake of September 11,
the Secretary of Defense's commitment and dedication to
reforming the way we do the business of national defense and
reshaping the way we manage our resources within this
enterprise has not diminished. He recognizes that transforming
the military also requires transforming our infrastructure.
Within that context, however, the quality of life issue and
the people issue remain very high priorities. While the issue
of basic allowance for housing is not the purview of this
subcommittee, we are eliminating out of pocket costs paid for
by the service members by 2005, which is very important to
recognize.
We also are increasing our reliance upon the private sector
for access to both existing quality housing and to privatized
housing, a program which up until a year plus ago was, I think,
at the level of 6,000 or 7,000 units privatized. While things
were already in the pipeline, since Secretary Rumsfeld took
office we have had upwards of 18,000 more units privatized.
We are grateful to Congress, to you gentlemen, for
extending our housing privatization authorization until 2012,
although we intend to meet the goal of eliminating inadequate
housing in the Department by 2007.
The continuing effort to fund MILCON for housing where
necessary means we are requesting an increase of $222 million
for family housing MILCON in fiscal year 2003. As I indicated,
the Secretary has pulled up the goal of eliminating all
inadequate housing from 2010 to 2007.
We are going to maintain our commitment to our
unaccompanied service men and women in Korea and elsewhere. In
fiscal year 2002, we constructed and revitalized about 16,000
barracks or bachelor officer and bachelor enlisted quarters
spaces. This year we plan to construct and revitalize another
14,000 spaces.
Let me talk a little bit about sustainment. The entire
portfolio of investment, the entire portfolio of Department of
Defense resources focused on infrastructure, not just in a
MILCON sense but also in an operations and mainenance sense. To
those outside of this world, it uses terms and words which
sometimes are confusing, but I think we all understand that
sustainment is a very important issue that we have not invested
to the level that we should.
I think that I just saw recently that sustainment in our
Services is going up. Of course, this is a new metric, one that
we have only used for the last 2 years. In 2002, every Service
will be at 89.4 percent; in 2003, we will be up to 92.6
percent; and in 2007, we will be up to a level of 96 percent.
The total MILCON program, as we both said, is down. But if
you look at that total facilities program in its context,
including sustainment, the budget request overall is only
reduced about 3 percent. Fully-sustaining our facilities this
year is our first priority. The fiscal year 2003 budget request
slows the deterioration of our facilities and, over time, we
will fully restore their readiness.
We have increased sustainment funding, as I said, to the 93
percent level from the 89 percent in last year's budget, and we
plan to increase those percentages over time and also in fiscal
year 2004.
Recapitalization, the so-called restoration and
modernization accounts, are clearly reduced year over year. I
agree with you, Senator Inhofe, that the excuse, and I use that
word somewhat advisedly, that the sole factor of BRAC is
incorrect. The Secretary has, in my view, tried to correct that
impression, although I do want to say that it is a factor, but
certainly not the factor. Each of us in our own way I think is
going to address that, and I am glad to answer it in more
detail in your questioning.
We still stand by our goal of achieving a 67-year
recapitalization rate by the end of fiscal year 2007, and the
current plan is to actually achieve it at the beginning of
fiscal year 2007. This issue is contentious and needs to be
addressed, whether or not we achieve a certain percentage of
infrastructure reduction.
I too am concerned, and I want to go on the record about
the funding necessary to achieve a 67-year recapitalization
rate. Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe, you are correct to be
concerned. There is a phrase called the ``hockey stick'' where,
whether it is a procurement account, operations and maintenance
account, or a research, test, development, and evaluations
account, you put things in the out years in your plan and you
are basically saying, ``I am committed to do that.'' We have
seen this before. We have seen the commitments not met. It is a
concern that all four of us at this table shoulder every day,
and we will commit to you to continue to fight for.
I am looking around the table, mentally going through the
votes on BRAC. This subcommittee was split on that issue, as
was the Senate. On behalf of Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to
thank you and all the members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee for your support, recognizing it was a tough vote for
many of you.
But the Secretary's effort to rationalize our total
infrastructure through a needed BRAC is very important, and the
authority to do so is very much appreciated. You gave us until
2005 to make those recommendations. We are going to take the
time to do this in a very deliberate, methodic, and
comprehensive way, and we hope that when it is all said and
done, the authority which you have given to us, we will have in
turn honored your trust to come out with an appropriate
rationalization.
Transformation requires rationalizing our base structure to
better match the force structure, which, as the Senator said,
is a work in progress. We are organizing and planning to
accomplish that analysis, as I indicated. But we have not
deferred projects in anticipation of BRAC. Our fiscal year 2003
budget request reflects what the Secretary, the Service
Secretaries, and Service Chiefs consider to be the highest
priorities identified by the Services to support their missions
as they are currently configured.
As we are just beginning to analyze the total DOD
infrastructure from the BRAC point of view, specific
construction projects for fiscal year 2003 are driven by
current military necessity and to support current mission-
critical requirements.
One more item that is very important, and an item that I am
spending an increasing amount of time on, is encroachment. When
Secretary Rumsfeld and I were in the Pentagon 30 years ago,
encroachment was not a word in our lexicon. Maybe it should
have been, because some of the installations today are
encroached upon to their fenceline.
We have an obligation for our successors. We have an
obligation for the next generation and the current generation
of men and women who wear the uniform of this country,
especially in terms of training and test ranges, to come up
with ideas and proposals that will relieve us of some of the
encroachment and environmental restraint.
We are in the process of completing environmental
remediation quickly and effectively. In excess of $4 billion in
last year's budget and in this year's request is devoted to
environmental programs of one kind and another.
With respect to encroachment, we are addressing that issue
and have been doing so ever since December when the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, established an
overarching integrated product team (OIPT) including the
gentlemen on my right and left, to address the test and
training mission needs of our military, regulatory
requirements, and issues of environmental statutes where we
believe that clarifications may be advisable.
The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of
Defense are awaiting the recommendations of that OIPT and we
intend to have a set of proposals in front of them in the very
near future, hopefully within the next couple of weeks.
In closing, I personally want to thank the three who are
here today and your colleagues who have advised me when I
travel out around the country. I have been to over 30 major
installations, most recently in Arizona, where I visited Davis-
Monthan Air Force Base and Fort Huachuca. The visits to these
installations, as well as the visits by my colleagues, provide
us with an absolutely important on-the-ground reality check.
We are all committed to providing and supporting healthy
installations, facilities, and housing. We must enhance
readiness and get back to training, test range, and
encroachment issues. We believe that we have addressed morale
and quality of life with plus-ups over last year. But it is not
just for our people in uniform. It is also the civilians, the
committed, dedicated, and loyal group of civil servants who
labor day by day to support our Nation's defense.
We look forward to working with you to help us do this job
better. I thank you personally, and I will now turn to
Secretary Fiori, the Assistant Secretary of the Army.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DuBois follows:]

Prepared Statement by Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense's fiscal
year 2003 programs supporting military installations and facilities and
the Department's environmental management. The Department's goal is to
restore the readiness of our installations and facilities--which are
the foundation for military operations and deployments. We are
continuing to improve the management of our installations and housing
to ensure that they can fully support the men and women who live and
work there in the accomplishment of their mission.
To begin, I would first like to recognize you and the subcommittee
for the support you continue to provide to the Department. In
particular, we appreciate this subcommittee's strong support for the
Secretary's effort to rationalize our infrastructure through a needed
round of base realignment and closure. We are also grateful for
Congress' willingness to extend our housing privatization authority to
2012. These actions support the key elements of the Department's
program to manage military installations and facilities more
efficiently.
Today, I will address: the current state of our facility assets and
the Department's revitalization plans; our sustainment, restoration,
and modernization programs; our management initiatives; and our
environmental progress.

REVITALIZING INSTALLATIONS

As Secretary Rumsfeld recently testified to Congress, ``. . .
September 11 changed our Nation forever.'' Our challenge today and in
the future is to accomplish three difficult missions at once: to win
the war on terrorism, to restore our military forces through
investments in procurement, people, and modernization, and to transform
our forces to meet future demands.
Last year, the Secretary of Defense undertook a series of
initiatives to transform our installations and facilities into those
required for a 21st century military. Our fiscal year 2003 budget, as
well as our current future years defense program, supports that
commitment. In the context of competing priorities resulting from the
events of September 11, we have developed a feasible and fiscally
responsible plan for getting our facilities on a path to recovery. Even
after the events of September 11, we are continuing to transform our
installations and maintain our commitment to our people by improving
their quality of life.
Installations' Vision
Military installations and facilities are an integral component of
readiness. Installations are the ``platforms'' from which our forces
successfully deploy to execute their diverse missions. However, they
are also places where our people live, work, and train. The
Department's sustainment, restoration, and modernization programs must
enhance military readiness, while also providing in adequate quality of
life an adequate working environment and provide for appropriate
military training.
Quality of life and quality of workplace are directly linked to the
quality of our infrastructure. Many surveys have shown that poor
quality facilities and services are a major source of dissatisfaction
for families and services members alike. Our aging and deteriorating
infrastructure has a direct impact on retention.
To address these long standing infrastructure problems in an
integrated fashion, the Department is aggressively pursuing a number of
approaches to benefit service members and improve their quality of
life. First, we will increase the basic allowance for housing to
eliminate the out-of-pocket costs paid by service members for private
sector housing in the United States. The fiscal year 2003 budget
request includes necessary funding to continue lowering service
members' out-of-pocket housing costs for those living off-base from
11.3 percent today to 7.5 percent in 2003. By 2005, the typical member
living off-base will have no out-of-pocket housing expenses.
Second, we will increase our reliance upon the private sector--
higher allowances will increase and enhance service member access to
existing quality housing. Higher allowances will also increase the
income available to private sector developers, facilitating increases
in the quantity and quality of privatized housing.
Finally, we will continue to fund military construction for housing
where necessary. Our fiscal year 2003 budget requests about $227
million more for family housing construction than last year. We have
also maintained our significant investment in barracks modernization.
The combination of increased allowances and continued use of
privatization will permit more efficient use of our military
construction funding. Increased availability of quality private sector
options will ease pressure for on-base housing, reduce the need to
maintain our current inventory, and allow us to spend our sustainment
funding more wisely.
The Defense Facilities Strategic Plan, published in August 2001,
defines our facilities vision for the future--healthy, productive
installations and facilities that are available when and where needed
with capabilities to support current and future military requirements.
At the same time, we must spend the taxpayer's investment wisely and
transform the way we do business to reduce the total operational cost
of ownership of our installations and facilities.
We must right size and locate our installations and facilities
based on military requirements. The recently authorized base
realignment and closure round in 2005 provides a key tool that will
allow the Department to align operational forces with the installations
best suited to their 21st century missions. Providing the right quality
installations and facilities also means we furnish quality living and
working environments that support the warfighters' missions while
enhancing quality of life for our service members and their families.
Through providing the right resources and leveraging that funding,
we will achieve the right size and quality of our installations and
facilities. We have developed analytical tools and metrics that allow
us to more accurately forecast our requirements and measure our
progress. Our tools, like the Facilities Sustainment Model, which
identifies facility sustainment requirements, and the Facilities
Recapitalization Metric, which assesses the rate of modernization
relative to the service life of the facilities' inventory, have
matured, and we have several new tools under development. For instance,
we are integrating the services' real property inventory databases to
guide and monitor management decisions. Accomplishing these goals will
ensure that the needs of the warfighters and military families are met.
Current State of Facility Assets
In fiscal year 2000, 42 Major Commands of the military services
collectively rated 69 percent of their nine facilities categories C-3
(have serious deficiencies) or C-4 (do not support mission
requirements) as reported in their Installations' Readiness Reports. At
the end of fiscal year 2001, with 43 Major Commands now reporting, this
percentage is 68 percent.
The first step to improve our readiness posture is to sustain what
we own. It will take some time to reach an acceptable state of
readiness. We are committed to sustaining our facilities appropriately
to avoid incurring substantial costs in later years. In the fiscal year
2003 budget request, the Department funds 93 percent of the
requirement. The fiscal year 2003 recapitalization rate for our
facilities has increased to about 150 years (121 if one factors in the
potential 20 to 25 percent reduction that could be achieved from base
realignment and closure). However, the fiscal year 2003 military
construction request is the second largest in the past 6 years. We plan
to invest over $20 billion from fiscal years 2003 through 2007 to
achieve our goal of a 67-year recapitalization rate by the end of the
Future Years Defense Program.
For fiscal year 2003, we are requesting a total of $9 billion for
military construction, family housing, and environmental remediation on
properties from the 1988 to 1995 base realignment and closure rounds.
Consistent investment levels over time will help us restore and
maintain readiness, stabilize, and reduce the average age of our
physical plant, reduce overhead costs, and maximize our return on
investment. Last year, the Department modernized its treatment of our
real property requirement. Our approach to sustainment (operations and
maintenance-like \1\ funds) and restoration and modernization (both
military construction and operations and maintenance funds), underscore
our focus on improving infrastructure management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes O&M as well as related military personnel, host
nation, and working capital funds.

SUMMARY OF REQUEST
[President's budget in billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Request
Funding Category -----------------------
2002 2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Footprint (MilCon).......................... 1.4 1.5
Restoration and Modernization (MilCon).......... 3.8 2.5
Restoration and Modernization (O&M-like)........ .8 .8
Sustainment (O&M-like).......................... 5.1 5.6
Family Housing Construction/Improvements........ 1.1 1.3
Family Housing Maintenance...................... 1.3 1.3
-----------------------
Total SRM, New Footprint, FH Const. & Maint... 13.5 13.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fully sustained, restored, and modernized facilities are more cost
effective in the long term and result in more prudent use of scarce
resources. It is more expensive to allow facilities to deteriorate,
which reduces service life and causes premature recapitalization
requirements. Further, deteriorated facilities contribute to mission
interruptions.

SUSTAINMENT

The first principle of sound installation management is taking care
of what you own, and our fiscal year 2003 budget request supports that
principle. Our fiscal year 2003 budget request of $5.6 billion
increases sustainment funding to 93 percent of the requirement, from 89
percent in last year's budget. Full funding of sustainment throughout
the program is an appropriate investment that will avoid significant
costs in the future by stabilizing facility conditions and preventing
further erosion.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request also includes $6.1 billion for
Real Property Services (RPS) which are must pay ``open-the-door'' costs
generally performed by contract. The RPS account includes purchase of
utilities, lease payments, custodial services, trash collection, snow
removal, and grounds maintenance.

RECAPITALIZATION

The Department is requesting $3.3 billion for recapitalization in
fiscal year 2003 (including both operations and maintenance and
military construction funds) to restore and modernize our facilities.
Recapitalization is important not only to restore the readiness of poor
facilities, but also to maintain the relevance of all facilities to
future missions of the Department. A consistent modernization program
tied to expected service life best accomplishes this. The Department
stands by its goal of achieving a recapitalization rate of 67 years. We
currently plan to achieve this goal by fiscal year 2007.
There may be concerns with the increased fiscal year 2003
recapitalization rate. However, our fiscal year 2003 budget request
represents a restructuring of our priorities to achieve a more fiscally
responsible program with lower costs over the long term. Sustaining
facilities up front will reduce the need for costly restoration of
facilities in the future, and we are requesting significant increases
to our sustainment budget to accomplish this. In addition, the majority
of the military construction budget projects (over 60 percent) are for
restoration and modernization of mission critical requirements.

COMPARISON OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND FAMILY HOUSING REQUESTS
[President's budget in billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Request
-----------------------
2002 2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Construction........................... 5,210 4,054
NATO Security Investment Program................ 163 168
Base Realignment and Closure IV................. 532 545
Family Housing Construction..................... 1,114 1,341
Family Housing Operations and Maint............. 2,940 2,877
Homeowners Assistance........................... 10 0
Family Housing Improvement Fund................. 2 2
-----------------------
Total......................................... 9,971 8,987
------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSING

Military housing is a priority for the President and the Secretary,
is an integral part of the Administration's Management Plan, and is
crucial to providing a decent quality of life for our service members.
We are investing $1.2 billion in the budget request to construct or
revitalize almost 14,000 barracks spaces for our unaccompanied service
men and women to continue improvements in their quality of life. The
services are making great progress toward meeting, or have already met,
the Department's goal for eliminating gang latrine conditions for
permanent party unaccompanied service members.
Our request of $4.2 billion for military family housing in fiscal
year 2003 will operate and maintain the Department's family housing and
enable us to eliminate most substandard housing by 2007--3 years
earlier than previously planned. Our family housing construction budget
request of $1.3 billion, up from the $1.1 billion requested in fiscal
year 2002, supports traditional approaches to military family housing
as well as the Department's plan to renovate, replace, or privatize
over 35,000 housing units. We plan to have privatized a cumulative
total of over 60,000 units by the end of fiscal year 2003. The
Department is also requesting $2.9 billion for operating and
maintaining almost 280,000 family housing units world-wide, (251,000
government-owned and another 29,000 leased), approximately 60 percent
of the government-owned units are considered inadequate.
The Department's use of housing privatization, aided by Congress'
extension of our authorities to 2012, continues to leverage our funding
and has allowed us, to date, to privatize over 17,500 housing units.
Our most recent projects have been at Fort Hood, Texas, where Army
personnel have been deployed to support Operation Enduring Freedom and
Naval Complex South Texas, which includes Naval Air Station Corpus
Christi and Naval Station Ingleside in Texas.
Privatizing military housing is a Presidential and Secretary of
Defense management priority and is recognized as a key item on the
administration's agenda to improve the quality of life for our service
men and women. Because decent, safe, and affordable housing is such an
important component of our service members' lives, we are taking steps
to ensure that the privatization projects we have already undertaken
remain fiscally and physically in good shape. To that end, we are
overseeing the legal and financial documents of these projects through
our internal oversight document called the Program Evaluation Plan,
which provides the Secretary of Defense with key information on the
services' portfolio management of these projects. We are using this
report to oversee the services' progress in project management, meeting
schedules for housing renovation and construction, customer
satisfaction, and overall financial management.
Privatization is intended to enable the military services to
revitalize their inventories of inadequate housing by leveraging
appropriations with private capital. Under privatization policy, the
services leverage appropriations to get at least three times the
housing they would get under traditional military construction
programs. In practice, the current 10 projects in our most recent
report have leveraged appropriations at a rate of six to one. In
addition, our data show that our initial ten projects allowed us to
build and renovate houses on our installations that would have cost
$600 million more had we used the traditional military construction
approach. By leveraging available resources, we can revitalize housing
on other military installations.
In terms of future steps, the Department plans to build on our
earlier privatization successes by simplifying the process,
accelerating project execution, and institutionalizing best practices
in the services' deals with the private sector. We plan to sharpen our
post-award management to ensure fiscal integrity and sound project
management.

IMPROVING BUSINESS PRACTICES

Our installations' management approach extends to improving our
business practices. The Secretary of Defense is committed to improving
the way the Department operates and reducing total ownership costs, and
one of the methods is through improved information technology (IT)
systems. The installations' community is a frontrunner in the
development and use of IT systems to improve the way we manage
facilities.
For example, in the fiscal year 2000 chief financial officer's
(CFO) financial statement, we estimated the funding requirements for
sustainment, since we had no system to capture or forecast sustainment
requirements. Now, using the Facilities Sustainment Model which applies
industry benchmarks for sustainment costs, we are able to precisely
identify the requirements. Thus, sustainment costs in financial
statements for fiscal years 2003 and beyond will be based on accurate,
verifiable information.
Many of our decision-making tools and financial systems are linked
to the Department's real property inventory databases. Currently, the
Department maintains many divergent systems that should be modernized
using the latest state of the art technology and improved business
processes. We recently began an effort to improve the availability and
accuracy of information on our physical plant. Our vision is to improve
our processes by developing a standardized real property inventory
information system called the Base Information System. The goal is to
develop new processes and systems for inventorying real property that
will allow users of real property information to easily share and gain
access to the information. During this fiscal year, we will develop an
enterprise architecture that will help us clearly identify our current
state and processes, develop a ``to-be'' process and, finally, develop
the road map for change.
In addition to our information systems, we are emphasizing several
management initiatives to improve the efficiency of our installations
and reduce total ownership costs. For example, the facilities
demolition program has eliminated almost 62 million square feet of
excess and obsolete facilities since its inception in 1998, and we
expect to exceed our goal to eliminate 80.1 million square feet by the
end of fiscal year 2003. The costs avoided by demolition will also free
up funding to sustain, restore and modernize other infrastructure in
our inventory. The demolition program was expanded to include several
defense agencies and will continue past its originally intended
completion in 2003.
We have actively solicited ideas to improve the operation and
management of our installations and are currently developing evaluation
criteria in order to determine if there are successful candidates for
the Efficient Facilities Initiatives pilot program authorized in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. The Department
continues to consider opportunities for enhanced-use leasing, and we
have established a working group to identify candidates and share
lessons learned. We anticipate these leasing projects will enable
better utilization of our infrastructure, reduce ownership costs,
foster cooperation between the Department and private industry, and
stimulate the local job market.
Joint use has been another effective way to better utilize our
facilities. For example, the Joint Mobility Center at Elmendorf Air
Force Base, Alaska, saved the Air Force and Army up to 20 percent of
the cost to build separate mobility facilities. In another recent case,
the joint Armed Forces Reserve Center at Gray, Tennessee combined three
construction projects for the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and
Marine Corps Reserve into a single facility project, saving millions of
dollars.

FUTURE BASE CLOSURES

Continuing to operate and maintain facilities we no longer need
diverts scarce resources that could be better applied to higher
priority programs, such as improving readiness, modernization, and
quality of life for our service members. We need to seek every
efficiency in the application of available resources to ensure we
maintain just what we need to accomplish our missions. In the wake of
the attacks of September 11, the imperative to convert excess base
capacity into warfighting ability is enhanced, not diminished. With
approximately 20 to 25 percent of our base infrastructure estimated to
be excess to our needs, a significant financial benefit can be realized
through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 infrastructure
reductions.
Prior BRAC actions have resulted in net savings to the Department
of approximately $16 billion, with annual recurring savings of
approximately $6 billion. We estimate that the next round of BRAC could
save an additional $4 billion in annual recurring savings if the
infrastructure reductions approximate the 12 percent reduction
experienced in the last two rounds in 1993 and 1995. Greater reductions
in excess capacity could produce greater annual recurring savings.
BRAC 2005 is our most important facilities rationalization
initiative. It will help the Department ultimately save several billion
dollars annually. But a financial return is not the only benefit--in
fact, it is not even the primary benefit. The authority to realign and
close bases we no longer need will be a critical element of ensuring
the right mix of bases and forces within our warfighting strategy as we
transform the Department to meet the security challenges of the 21st
century. Transformation requires rationalizing our base structure to
better match the force structure for the new ways of doing business,
and the Department will conduct this rationalization with an eye toward
ensuring we look at base capacity across the military services for the
best joint use possible.
The Department is currently engaged in the upfront process of
organizing and planning to accomplish the analysis and reporting
requirements. We are building on the experiences gained in previous
BRACs and using the additional time Congress has given us to finalize
our approach. However, we have not officially ``kicked off'' the
process.

UTILITIES PRIVATIZATION AND ENERGY MANAGEMENT

The Department seeks to reduce its energy consumption and the
associated costs, while improving utility system reliability and
safety. To accomplish this, DOD has developed an integrated program
that optimizes utility system management by conserving energy and
water, taking advantage of restructured energy commodity markets, and
privatizing our utilities infrastructure.
Conserving energy saves the Department money that can be invested
in readiness, facilities sustainment, and quality of life. Energy
conservation projects make business sense, historically obtaining about
four dollars in life-cycle savings for every dollar invested. This
dynamic becomes even more important when you consider that military
installations spent nearly $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to buy
energy commodities (almost $400 million more than the previous year--a
16 percent increase), despite reducing their energy use by about 3
trillion BTUs (a 1 percent reduction). We continue to make progress in
achieving the 2010 energy reduction goal for buildings of 35 percent
per square foot and have reduced consumption by over 23 percent since
1985.
The Department has a balanced program for energy conservation--
installing energy savings measures using appropriated funding and
private-sector investment-combined with using the principles of
sustainable design to reduce the resources used in our new
construction. The fiscal year 2003 budget contains $50 million for the
Energy Conservation Investment Program (ECIP) to implement energy
savings measures in our existing facilities.
The Department places a high priority on privatizing utilities.
However, we have found implementation to be more difficult than
originally envisioned. We have made progress and will continue to move
forward on the privatization of our utility infrastructure in areas
where it makes economic sense. Privatization allows the military
departments to focus on core defense missions by relieving them of
those installation management functions that can be done more
efficiently and effectively by non-Federal entities. Historically,
military installations have been unable to upgrade and maintain utility
systems fully due to inadequate funding and competing installation
management priorities. Utilities privatization will allow military
installations to benefit from private-sector financing and efficiencies
to obtain improved utility systems and services.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS

The Department's environmental program is focused on four
overarching principles. First, environment is a fundamental component
of our national power. We must be ever vigilant in ensuring lack of
attention to environment does not undermine or degrade our national
power. Second, environmental stewardship is a component of good
business management. The Department is fully committed to implementing
environmental management systems to improve efficiency and integrate
environment into day-to-day operations. Third, environmental
stewardship reflects the high ethical standards of our soldiers,
sailors, marines, and airmen. Fourth, completing environmental
remediation quickly, effectively, and safely, to protect human health
and the environment from the results of past contamination, is
important, both at our active and BRAC installations, as well as
formerly used defense sites (FUDS) and surrounding communities. We are
committed to continuing to be a leader in the Federal Government in
environmental management, and our fiscal year 2003 budget request,
highlighted in the table below, reflects this commitment to ensuring
environment fully supports our defense mission.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM--SUMMARY OF REQUEST
[President's budget in billions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal
Year 2002 Year 2003
Request Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cleanup......................................... 1,247 1,278
BRAC............................................ 491 520
Compliance...................................... 1,623 1,706
Pollution Prevention............................ 245 247
Conservation.................................... 138 152
Technology...................................... 211 205
-----------------------
Total......................................... 3,955 4,108
------------------------------------------------------------------------

To maintain our ability to defend our country against terrorism and
other security threats, our forces have conducted--and must continue to
conduct--training and operations on land, at sea, and in the air.
Environmental degradation can deny access to lands, undermine the
realism and effectiveness of training, limit operational flexibility or
productivity, and pose safety risks. Hence, cleaning up past
contamination is important to sustain the land we hold in the public
trust. Through the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, we are
working to cleanup past contamination in all 50 States, the District of
Columbia, and 8 U.S. territories. This program covers environmental
restoration activities at active installations, installations that are
closing or have had their missions realigned, and formerly used defense
sites.
Our environmental restoration request is $1.3 billion for fiscal
year 2003, slightly higher than in our fiscal year 2002 request. We are
proud of our cleanup successes, but acknowledge that we still have some
complex issues to address. The Department has built a strong
environmental cleanup program over the last two decades and is charting
a course for completing our environmental restoration requirements.
The environmental cleanup at current BRAC installations continues
to serve as a model for collaboration among Department cleanup and real
estate professionals, Federal and State regulators, and communities in
integrating reuse with cleanup. We have completed environmental cleanup
requirements under the Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) at 84 percent of land slated for transfer from
the Department. To continue the remaining environmental cleanup
required at previous BRAC installations, we are requesting $520
million, $29 million more than was requested last year.
We are also building on the requirements of Executive Order 13148,
Greening the Government Through Leadership in Environmental Management,
to improve our business practices. We have recently undertaken an
initiative to implement environmental management systems across all
missions, activities, and functions. Industry leaders have shown us
that effective environmental management systems will enable the
Department to leverage its environmental investment to reduce mission-
driven risks and associated compliance costs. We believe successful
implementation of environmental management systems in the Department is
essential to maintain and improve readiness, mission efficiency, and
environmental stewardship in light of the increasingly demanding
national security and environmental requirements of the 21st century.
The fiscal year 2003 environmental quality request for $2.1 billion
includes $1.7 billion for compliance, $250 million for pollution
prevention, and $152 million for conservation. This will allow us to
continue to comply with environmental laws and regulations and to
effectively reduce the amount of pollutants we generate in performing
the defense mission. These funds are a good defense investment. As of
the end of fiscal year 2001, the Department reduced the number of new
environmental violations received by 75 percent since 1992, reduced the
amount of hazardous waste generated by over 60 percent, and completed
Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans at the vast majority of
bases.
For several years, the Department has worked to integrate
environmental, safety, and occupational health considerations into
defense acquisition weapon system programs. We believe that smart
consideration of environmental concerns during the acquisition process
is the key to efficient, cost effective, and environmentally sound
weapon system performance.
We have revised the Directives that impact the major weapon system
acquisition programs for the Department. These changes clarify and
strengthen the management of life-cycle environmental issues by
integrating them into the overall acquisition program management
process. The new language also drives reduction in the procurement and
use of hazardous materials to ensure waste minimization and pollution
prevention are institutionalized in the acquisition process. In
addition, the program manager is required to assess the life-cycle
environmental impacts of the weapon system to identify opportunities
for source reduction and recycling to minimize these impacts. These
changes help reduce the cost and impact of these weapons systems on the
people who make them, use them, maintain them, and live around
installations where they are stationed. Such improvements in today's
weapon system acquisitions will have far-reaching positive impacts on
``green'' initiatives at all of our installations for many years to
come.
Since sound environmental policy is the foundation of future
improvement in environmental performance, we provided greater emphasis
on promoting teamwork between environmental and procurement personnel
to realize the benefit of affirmative procurement policy goals. All of
these changes have improved our performance of purchasing
environmentally preferable products, which has reduced our potential
environmental impact on both the communities around our installations
as well as our own personnel.
The Department is fully committed to military explosives safety--
protecting military members and the public from the adverse effects of
munitions. Last year, after an in-depth review, we divided our
challenge into two areas of responsibility: Operational Ranges and
Munitions Response Areas.
Our operational ranges are needed today and tomorrow. We fully
appreciate the need for good stewardship and, as a part of our Range
Sustainment Initiative, we are reviewing how we look at and manage our
operational ranges. Most immediately, the Department is clarifying our
operational range clearance policy. We are also developing the
protocols for determining and responding to any groundwater
contamination under our operational ranges. For our Munitions Response
Areas, which include all property which may have unexploded ordnance,
abandoned munitions, or munitions constituents, and we are building on
the authority provided to us with the Defense Environmental Restoration
Program. In so doing, the Department intends to fully comply with
sections 311, 312, and 313 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002, Public Law 107-107, which call for several
significant items, including a site inventories, cost projections, and
a technology roadmaps.

ENCROACHMENT

Civilian encroachment at active military bases and test and
training ranges can interfere with the ability of our military to carry
out their missions and can degrade the training and readiness of our
military personnel at a time we need them most. Encroachment involves
buildings and structures protruding into navigable air space;
residential development locating in noisy, high performance aircraft
approach and departure corridors or too close to gunnery ranges; or it
can be off-base electrical transmissions interfering with air and
ground communications. The presence of endangered species or their
critical habitats in or near gunnery and bombing ranges also
contributes to encroachment problems.
Urban growth and development is the most visible form of
encroachment and has the greatest impact on military operations,
training, and readiness. Encroachment of incompatible civilian
activities in whatever form--if allowed to go unmanaged and
unregulated--will continue to compromise the effectiveness of our
military forces. Since maintaining the readiness of our forces is one
of the highest priorities of the Department, we strive to maintain a
reasonable balance between test and training requirements, the concerns
of our neighbors near our test and training ranges, and the importance
of sound environmental stewardship. All of our military services are
prepared to work with appropriate State and local authorities to
control and hopefully curtail encroachment on both sides of the fence
line.
We are addressing encroachment by developing a comprehensive
strategy that will consider test and training mission needs, regulatory
requirements, community support, urban encroachment, and the current
and projected capability of our ranges to support the mission. The
Deputy Secretary of Defense established a full time Integrated Product
Team in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness to act as the Department's coordinating body for overall
range encroachment issues. This IPT, which reports to the Senior
Readiness Oversight Council, has been tasked with developing a
comprehensive set of proposals to address the encroachment issue.

ENABLING LEGISLATION

Consistent with our work to improve installations and environmental
business practices, we are developing specific military construction
legislation that will enable us to conduct our work more efficiently at
lower cost. The legislation Congress enacted during fiscal year 2002
greatly improved the Department's freedom to manage, and the
legislation currently under consideration by the Department will
continue that trend without diminishing our accountability.

CONCLUSION

Our fiscal year 2003 budget request for military construction and
for the Department's environmental programs supports the Department's
obligation to acquire and maintain facilities vital to our changing
missions and readiness. America's security, today and in the future,
depends on installations and facilities that support operational
readiness and changing force structures and missions. We have slowed
the deterioration of our facilities, and will, over time, fully restore
their readiness. With the Defense Facilities Strategic Plan as our
guide, we are committed to providing and supporting healthy
installations, facilities, and housing that will enhance readiness,
morale, and quality of life for our service members and civilians. This
installations' transformation will continue until all of our facilities
meet the requirements of a 21st century military.
We will also continue to identify opportunities to operate more
efficiently and leverage our resources through partnerships with the
private sector on housing and utilities privatization and competitive
sourcing initiatives. We are committed to divesting ourselves of
unneeded, underutilized facilities through the Efficient Facilities
Initiative, facilities demolition, outleasing, and other facility
reduction initiatives.
As a leader in environmental management, we will complete
environmental remediation quickly and effectively at both our current
and former installations and will protect our service members and
others from the results of past contamination. In addition, we are
developing a strategy to address encroachment that considers the needs
of everyone involved.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I sincerely thank you for providing me
this opportunity to describe the Department's plan for revitalizing our
installations and facilities and for your very strong support for a
robust military construction program. I look forward to working with
you as we transform our plans into actions.

Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIO P. FIORI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY (INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

Secretary Fiori. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to present the
Army's fiscal year 2003 budget for military construction and
the environmental program. I have provided a detailed written
statement for the record, but I want to comment briefly on the
highlights of some of our programs.
The Army has many challenges in front of it. Our goal is to
ensure that all our garrisons throughout the world have an
equal and outstanding level of services for our soldiers and
their families. When I visited selected Army installations, I
observed the progress that has already been made, and
attributed much of this success directly to the longstanding
support of this subcommittee and its staff.
The Army's overall budget request for fiscal year 2003
supports the Army vision--people, readiness, and
transformation--and the strategic guidance to transform to a
full-spectrum force while ensuring warfighting readiness. It
reflects a balanced program that will allow the Army to remain
trained and ready throughout fiscal year 2003 while ensuring we
fulfil our critical role in the global war on terrorism.
Our military construction budget request is $3.2 billion
and will fund our highest priority facilities and family
housing requirements. In fiscal year 2002 we presented a budget
that was a down payment on our goal to better support our
infrastructure.
When we developed this year's budget in light of the events
that took place last year, we had some very difficult decisions
to make. The need to fund military pay raises, Army
transformation, OPTEMPO, the war on terrorism, and increases in
health care and other key programs were all included in the
decision leading to our request. Thus, the Army budget provides
the best balance between all of our programs, including
military construction.
A few critical areas in our construction request are Army
transformation at Fort Lewis, Fort Wainwright, and Fort Polk.
We have eight projects for $195 million included in the program
to ensure transformation to continue to progress as envisioned
by our leadership.
Army family housing is a success this year. We are now on
target to eliminate inadequate family housing through
construction or privatization by 2007. Our budget includes $180
million for the Residential Communities Initiative and the
continued acquisition and transition of the 11 installations
currently underway and 7 new installations, for a total of
50,000 housing units. RCI is a great success story. I visited
Fort Carson on Monday and I am delighted to report that the
program is 3 months ahead of schedule. We now have 338 new
units occupied, 500 units renovated, and we are building 20 new
units a month and completing 40 renovations per month until we
get all 2,600 done at Fort Carson. Fort Carson will be
completed by 2004 instead of 2007.
The combination of privatization and construction will meet
our goal of fixing family housing 3 years earlier than was
reported to you last year. A portion of our Military
Construction and our family housing construction program this
year is dedicated to overseas construction: 75 percent of the
overseas military construction request will be used to provide
better barracks for almost 3,000 soldiers, mainly in Europe and
Korea.
We are also constructing the new facilities to support
Efficient Basing, East Initiative in Germany, which will
consolidate 13 smaller installations into a single installation
at Grafenwoehr. Two projects in our request will finalize the
Army's construction requirements for the Efficient Basing,
South Initiative in Italy, which will station a second airborne
infantry battalion in Vicenza. Each project is vital to
maintain a suitable working and living environment for our
soldiers and families overseas.
At the end of fiscal year 2003 we will have 106,000
permanent party single soldier barracks, or 70 percent,
modernized. Our strategic mobility program will be 100 percent
funded and we will have completed all base closures and
realignments and will concentrate this year on the final phases
of disposal of these properties. The Army National Guard
anticipates that 30 of the 32 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
Support Team facilities will be initiated.
Our sustainment, restoration, and modernization request is
$2.4 billion, which provides 92 percent of our requirements. In
1998, the Secretary of Defense set a goal to privatize,
whenever economical, all utility systems on military
installations by September 30, 2003. We are fully committed to
utilities privatization and, to date, the Army has privatized a
total of only 25 systems. For fiscal year 2002, we have
proposals for 109 systems, and we expect to complete
privatization of at least 35 of these 109 by the end of this
fiscal year.
Our enhanced use leases, real property exchanges, and
energy saving performance contracts all contribute to taking
care of our installations. This year, we initiated a pilot
program which Congress approved to contract out the first 5
years of maintenance in 3 of our military construction
projects.
The Army's fiscal year 2003 budget request for the
environmental program is $1.6 billion, which is sufficient for
our compliance, restoration, conservation, pollution
prevention, and environmental quality technology programs. The
environmental program fulfils a public trust to manage Army
lands by protecting natural and cultural resources in
accordance with Federal, State, and local laws. As we conduct
sound environmental management of our 16.5 million acres of
land, we will also provide our soldiers with tough, realistic,
and battle-focused training.
The Army does face significant environmental challenges as
we transform the Army. Our weapons systems will be more
maneuverable, have longer range firing capabilities, and this,
of course, results in a much more serious concern for
encroachment of our training facilities. We work closely with
the Federal, State, and local agencies and the local
communities to minimize the effects of encroachment.
Unfortunately, we are experiencing varying levels of success in
addressing restrictions on training ranges.
For example, the successful agreement with the Governor of
Massachusetts will allow the Army to use the Massachusetts
Military Reservation for training. However, the reservation is
the first active training installation that has had live-fire
training prohibited by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). We are still facing challenges at the Makua Military
Reservation, which is the only range facility in Hawaii that
accommodates company-level combined live-fire training.
Thus, the recent settlement agreement, which was a work-
around, allowed us to resume live-fire training, but in a
limited ability. Thus, to train the 25th Infantry Division, for
example, we will need to complete some of the company-level
training requirements in the Continental United States (CONUS),
at an annual cost of $6.6 million. But, more importantly, this
will require more of our soldiers to spend time away from home.
Similarly, the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and
potentially the U.S. Marines will not have access to Makua for
live-fire training.
The majority of the Army environmental program focuses on
the day to day environmental stewardship responsibilities of
our 184 major installations worldwide. We have had measureable
successes in creating environmental consciousness for the Army.
For example, we are not polluters. Even with increasing
regulatory inspections in 2001, our compliance record has
improved.
We are working toward fully implementing our environmental
management system using the ISO-14001 standard. We have
completed 85 of our active and 80 percent of our BRAC cleanup
sites.
Our management initiatives include comprehensive program
reviews, innovative contracting, increased partnering, and
stakeholder outreach. We have taken a cue from the private
sector and developed a military version of the U.S. Green
Building Council's Leadership in the Energy and Environmental
Design building and rating system (LEED). We call this the
Sustainable Project Rating Tool (SPRT) in the Army. This tool
is used to evaluate our military construction projects in terms
of their sustainability, how well we incorporate green building
techniques such as recyclable building materials, energy
efficiency, natural daylight, and compatibility with natural
surroundings.
The Army's conservation program is a crucial component of
sustaining our natural and cultural resources. We comply with
the National Historic Preservation Act and, with close working
relationships with the National Trust and State historic
preservation offices, we will manage our 77,000 buildings
achieving middle age.
We care for 170 threatened and endangered species on our
installations. Our cultural and natural resources management
plans will help us avoid future problems, reduce costs, and
meet our environmental responsibilities.
I want to conclude by telling you about one of the most
important initiatives in the facilities arena, the way in which
the Army will be managing installations. Last year, the
Secretary of the Army approved the concept of centralized
installation management through regional alignment. We will
implement this new management structure on October 1, 2002. A
top-down regional alignment creates a corporate structure with
a sole focus on efficient and effective management of all our
installations. It frees up our mission commanders to
concentrate on readiness. They will still have an influence on
important installation decisions, but not the day to day
headaches.
We believe centralized management will also enhance our
ability to integrate the Active and Reserve components and to
develop multifunctional installations to support the evolving
transformation of our forces.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing our
work in caring for our soldiers and their families. Thank you,
sir.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Fiori follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Mario P. Fiori

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
appear before you to discuss both the active Army and Reserve
components' military construction and the Army Environmental Program
request for fiscal year 2003. This request includes initiatives of
considerable importance to America's Army, as well as this
subcommittee, and we appreciate the opportunity to report on them to
you.
This budget provides resources in our construction and family
housing programs essential to support the Army's role in our national
military strategy. It provides resources to comply with environmental
regulations, to continue our efforts in cleaning up contamination from
past practices, and to sustain the land and natural resources so
important to the Army's training mission and the American people. The
budget supports the Army's vision and transformation strategy.
The program presented herein requests fiscal year 2003
appropriations and authorization of appropriations of $1,476,521,000
for military construction, Army (MCA); $1,405,620,000 for Army family
housing (AFH); $101,595,000 for military construction, Army National
Guard (MCNG); and $58,779,000 for military construction, Army Reserve
(MCAR). There is no request this year for the Homeowners Assistance
Fund, Defense.
In addition, the program requests fiscal year 2003 appropriations
and authorization of appropriations of $1,580,492,000 for the Army
Environmental Program.
At the turn of the century, the Army published its vision--people,
readiness, and transformation--that defined how we meet the Nation's
military requirements today and into the future. We started the arduous
task of selftransformation that will allow us to continue to dominate
conventional battlefields but also provide the ability to deter and
defeat adversaries who rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric
warfare to achieve their objectives.
Army transformation was already well under way when the attacks on
September 11, 2001, provided a new urgency to our efforts. By
accelerating transformation, we will provide additional capabilities to
the warfighting CINCs, enabling them to assure allies and friends;
dissuade future military competition; deter any threats; and, if
necessary, defeat any adversary.
To meet the challenges of accelerating transformation and carrying
out today's missions at home and abroad, the Army must sustain a force
of high quality, well-trained people; acquire and maintain the right
mix of weapons and equipment; and maintain effective infrastructure and
power projection platforms to generate the capabilities necessary to
meet our missions. Taking care of soldiers and families is a readiness
issue and will ensure that a trained and qualified soldier and civilian
force will be in place to support the Objective Force and the
transformed Army.
As the Army transforms, we must ensure that Army installations are
transformed to meet the needs of the force. Army installations, both
Active and Reserve component, must fully support our warfighting needs,
while providing soldiers and their families with a quality of life that
equals that of their peers in civilian communities.
To support the transformation of our installations, the Secretary
of the Army has approved the concept of centralized installation
management through a regional alignment. The implementation date of the
new management structure is October 1, 2002.
The regional alignment creates a corporate structure with a sole
focus on efficient and effective management of installations. Mission
commanders can concentrate on readiness but still influence critical
issues through the rating chain for Garrison Commanders and membership
on the Installation Board of Directors.
This approach will ensure standard and equitable delivery of
services from installation to installation. It will also ensure that
all tenants, including the Reserve components, are treated equally. It
enables the Army to resource to standards.
The future will increasingly trend toward multi-functional
installations. Supporting transformation, geographic-based regions
provide the maximum flexibility for the future. In the end, it will
allow improved facilities provided to soldiers and their families and
better permit us to implement our facilities strategy.

FACILITIES STRATEGY

The Army's Facilities Strategy (AFS) is the centerpiece of our
efforts to fix the current state of Army facilities over 20 years. It
addresses our long-term need to sustain and modernize Army-funded
facilities in both Active and Reserve components by framing our
requirements for both sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM)
and military construction (MILCON) funding. The AFS addresses
sustainment, recapitalization, quality and quantity improvements, and
new mission requirements so that the Army will have adequate facilities
to support our 21st century missions. SRM includes funds for annual
maintenance and scheduled repair--sustainment; and military
construction funding to repair or replace facilities damaged due to
failures attributable to inadequate sustainment or emergencies or to
implement new or higher standards--restoration and modernization.
The first pillar of the strategy requires us to halt further
deterioration of our facilities. Our sustainment funding, which comes
from the operation and maintenance (O&M) SRM accounts, has greatly
improved thanks to the support from Congress. We are funded at over 90
percent of our requirements in fiscal year 2003. This level of funding
may be sufficient to prevent further deterioration of Army facilities.
Our current C-3 conditions are a result of years of underfunding. We
must have sufficient O&M SRM resources to sustain our facilities and
prevent facilities from deteriorating further, or we put our MILCON
investments at risk.
The second pillar of the strategy is to tackle the enormous backlog
that has grown over numerous years of underfunding. Since we can't
afford a quick fix to buy down the SRM backlog, we will centrally
manage resources towards focused investments. This capital investment
requirement will primarily require MILCON funding, supplemented by O&M
SRM project funding. Our goal is to raise Army facilities from current
C-3 ratings to C-2 by the end of 2010 by bringing a focused set of
facilities to C-1 during that timeframe. Also, we plan to eliminate
facility shortfalls where they exist over the entire 20-year strategy.
These shortfalls are a result of facilities modernization not keeping
pace with our weapons modernization and supporting force structure.
We are basing the initial focused set of facilities on commanders'
ratings in our Installation Status Report. The facilities we chose to
modernize under this centrally managed program are critical to the
Army's mission and to our soldiers. It is essential that both the
sustainment (O&M SRM) and the capital investment (MILCON and O&M SRM)
pieces be funded as a single, integrated program.
The third (recapitalization) and fourth (new mission) pillars of
our strategy address improving recapitalization of our facilities to a
67-year cycle and ensuring adequate facilities keep pace with future
force structure changes and weapons modernization programs (such as
transformation). These four pillars will enable us to improve the
health of Army real property and its ability to successfully support
our worldwide missions and our soldiers.
In addition to implementing our facilities strategy, we continue
our policy of eliminating excess facilities throughout the entire Army
to allow us to use our limited resources where they have the most
impact. During fiscal years 1988-2003, our footprint reduction program,
along with the base realignment and closure process, will result in
disposal of over 200 million square feet in the United States. We
continue our policy of demolishing at least one square foot for every
square foot constructed. By 2003, with our overseas reductions
included, the Army will have disposed of over 400 million square feet
from its fiscal year 1990 peak of 1,157,700,000 square feet.
Additionally, we are pursuing innovative ways to modernize our
infrastructure and reduce the cost of our facilities. One example is
installation utilities systems. Our goal is to privatize all utility
systems in CONUS by 2003, where it is economically feasible, except
those needed for unique security reasons. We are also expanding the
privatization of military family housing in an effort to provide
quality residential communities for soldiers and their families.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, ARMY (MCA)

This year's MCA program focuses on six major categories of
projects: mission facilities, transformation, well-being, efficient
basing, installation support, and chemical demilitarization. I will
explain each area in turn.

MISSION FACILITIES

In fiscal year 2003, there are 10 mission facility projects to
ensure the Army is deployable, trained, and ready to respond to meet
its national security mission. Projects in this program conclude the
successful Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) to ensure deployment
within specified timelines; provide enhanced training via live-fire
ranges and simulators; and maintain equipment readiness by ensuring
Army vehicles are repaired and operational.
Army Strategic Mobility Program
The six mobility projects in our fiscal year 2003 budget request
facilitate movement of personnel and equipment from CONUS bases for
both the Active and Reserve components to meet Army and Defense
timelines for mobilization operations. They are part of an important
program started in the early 1990's to upgrade our strategic mobility
infrastructure, enabling the Army to maintain the best possible power
projection platforms. We are requesting $53.6 million. The fiscal year
2003 projects will complete the Strategic Mobility program. A follow-on
program, Army Power Projection Program (AP3), is being implemented as a
result of changes in force structure and stationing.
The six projects in our request include improving our deployment
capability by upgrading a deployment facility at Fort Stewart, Georgia;
constructing a truck loading/unloading facility at Fort Carson,
Colorado; and providing ammunition storage/outloading facility
improvements at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, Blue Grass Army Depot,
Kentucky, and Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania. In addition, to
improving fuel storage, we plan to consolidate multiple fuel points at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, into one modern facility.
Training and Readiness
To improve soldier training, we are requesting $23.8 million to
construct four training and readiness projects. Our request includes a
Modified Record Fire Range at Darmstadt, Germany, and a live-fire shoot
house at Fort Drum, New York. These ranges will provide our soldiers
with realistic, state-of-the-art marksmanship training. We are also
requesting a Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Urban Assault
Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, that will provide realistic urban
combat training necessary for many scenarios in today's environment. A
Tactical Vehicle Simulator facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is
requested to train new motor transport operators with our new vehicle
simulators.

TRANSFORMATION

Our budget contains $194.9 million for eight projects at three
installations, Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Wainwright, Alaska; and
Fort Polk, Louisiana, that support the deployment, training, unit
operations, and equipment maintenance and motor pool facilities of the
Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) new transformed force. These
projects include one maintenance facility for new vehicles, three
ranges, a Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility, a
Battle Simulator Center, and a Mission Support Training Facility to
ensure our forces are properly trained, and a Battalion Headquarters/
Company Operations Facility to provide a command and control facility
for the increased unit size. We will continue to identify and validate
additional requirements associated with transformation and will include
these projects in future budgets.

EFFICIENT BASING, EAST

The Army is requesting the first year of a 5-year plan to support
the Efficient Basing, East initiative in Germany. The initiative will
move a Brigade Combat Team to Grafenwoehr from 13 smaller installations
over a 5-year time frame. This year's budget requests three projects at
Grafenwoehr totaling $69.9 million. Army construction for the entire
initiative is expected to cost $596 million. The three projects in this
year's budget will complete the site preparation for the brigade,
construct infrastructure to and around the brigade complex, and
renovate existing barracks to the current Army standard. These projects
will support the Brigade headquarters element.

WELL-BEING PROJECTS

Fifty-four percent of our MCA budget is dedicated to providing for
the well-being of our soldiers, their families, and civilians. Although
our first priority is to move permanent party soldiers out of gang-
latrine type barracks, we are also requesting Phase II of the Basic
Combat Trainee barracks project at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, that
was authorized in fiscal year 2002. We are also requesting two child
development centers, one physical fitness center, and the expansion of
a community support center. These projects will improve not only the
well-being of our soldiers and families, but also the readiness of the
Army. We are requesting $796.8 million for well-being projects this
year.
Whole Barracks Renewal Program
Modernization of barracks for enlisted permanent party soldiers
continues to be the Army's number one facilities' priority for military
construction. It provides single soldiers with a quality living
environment. The new complexes provide increased personal privacy,
larger rooms, closets, new furnishings, adequate parking, and
landscaping. In addition, administrative offices are separated from the
barracks. With the approval of our budget, as requested, 77 percent of
our barracks requirement will be funded at the new standard for our
permanent party soldiers. Between fiscal years 2004 and 2009, we plan
to invest an additional $4.0 billion in MCA and host nation funds,
supplemented by $400 million in SRM funding to achieve our goal of
providing improved living conditions for all of our single soldiers by
fiscal year 2009. While we are making considerable progress at
installations in the United States, we will request increased funding
for Germany and Korea in future budgets to compensate for these areas
having been historically funded at lower levels than installations in
the United States. A large portion of the remaining modernization
effort, 41 percent, is in these overseas areas.
In fiscal year 2003, we are planning 21 barracks projects. This
includes 4 projects in Europe and 5 projects in Korea. The
installations with the largest investment are Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, with $100 million (2 projects), and Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii, with $91 million (2 projects). Large soldier populations and
poor barracks conditions require sustained high investment through
fiscal year 2008 at both of these installations to provide quality
housing. We are completing a complex at Fort Carson, Colorado, which
was authorized in fiscal year 2002; and we are continuing second phases
at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Fort Richardson, Alaska, which were also
fully authorized in fiscal year 2002. At Fort Campbell, Kentucky, we
are requesting authorization for all phases of a multi-phase barracks
complex; however, we are only requesting the appropriation needed for
the fiscal year 2003 phase. Our plan is to award each complex, subject
to subsequent appropriations, as a single contract to gain cost
efficiencies, expedite construction, and provide uniformity in building
systems. Barracks projects are also requested for Fort Hood, Texas;
Fort Riley, Kansas; Fort Benning, Georgia; and Fort Detrick, Maryland.
Basic Combat Training Complexes
We are requesting Phase 2 to complete the Basic Combat Training
complex at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, that was authorized in fiscal
year 2002. This project will provide a modern, initial entry basic
training complex that includes separate and secure housing to support
gender-integrated training, and provides for the administrative and
training functions that are organic to the mission of the basic
training battalion.
Community Facilities
Our budget request includes two new child development centers to
replace failing or inadequate facilities in Bamberg, Germany, and
Vicenza, Italy. To improve soldier physical fitness and community
wellness, our budget includes a physical fitness training center at
Camp Castle, Korea. The expansion of a Community Support Center at Fort
Detrick, Maryland, is also included in our request.

INSTALLATION SUPPORT PROGRAMS

This category of construction projects provides vital support to
installations and helps improve their readiness capabilities. We are
requesting one project for a Centralized Wash Facility at Schweinfurt,
Germany, $2 million. A classified project is also requested at $4
million.

AMMUNITION DEMILITARIZATION

The Ammunition Demilitarization (Chemical Demilitarization) Program
is designed to destroy the U.S. inventory of lethal chemical agents,
munitions, and related (non-stockpile) materiel. It also provides for
emergency response capabilities, while avoiding future risks and costs
associated with the continued storage of chemical warfare materiel.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense devolved the Chemical
Demilitarization Program to the Department of the Army in fiscal year
1999. Although Congress has consistently authorized and appropriated
funding for the Chemical Demilitarization Construction Program to the
Department of Defense, the overall responsibility for the program
remains with the Army and we have included it in this year's Army
budget.
We are requesting $167.6 million in the Army's fiscal year 2003
budget to continue the Chemical Demilitarization projects previously
authorized, and a Non-Stockpile Chemical Munitions Facility at Pine
Bluff, Arkansas. Table 1 summarizes our request:

TABLE 1--FISCAL YEAR 2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installation Type Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aberdeen PG, MD................... Ammun Demil $ 30,600,000
Facility, Phase V.
Blue Grass AD, KY................. Ammun Demil 10,300,000
Facility, Phase III.
Blue Grass AD, KY................. Support Facility, 8,300,000
Phase III.
Newport AD, IN.................... Ammun Demil 61,494,000
Facility, Phase V.
Pine Bluff AD, AR................. Non-Stockpile 18,937,000
Munitions Facility.
Pueblo AD, CO..................... Ammun Demil 38,000,000
Facility, Phase IV.
---------------
Total........................... .................. $167,631,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The destruction of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons is a
major priority of the Army, DOD, and the administration. These chemical
weapons must be destroyed to reduce the risk to the stockpile storage
communities and eliminate these weapons as potential terrorist targets.
The MILCON funding for the chemical weapons facilities is essential to
achieving this goal.

PLANNING AND DESIGN/UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION

The fiscal year 2003 MCA budget includes $119.8 million for
planning and design. The fiscal year 2003 request is a function of the
construction programs for 3 fiscal years: 2003, 2004, and 2005. The
requested amount will be used to design-build a portion of the fiscal
year 2003 program, complete design in fiscal year 2004, and initiate
design of fiscal year 2005 projects.
Host Nation Support (HNS) Planning and Design (P&D): the Army, as
Executive Agent, provides HNS P&D for oversight of Host Nation funded
design and construction projects. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
oversees the design and construction to ensure the facilities meet our
requirements and standards. Lack of oversight may result in an increase
in design errors and construction deficiencies that will require United
States dollars to rectify. Maintaining the funding level for this
mission results in a payback where $1 of United States funding gains
$36 worth of Host Nation Construction. The fiscal year 2003 budget
request for $23.7 million will provide oversight for approximately $850
million of construction in Japan, Korea, and Europe.
The fiscal year 2003 budget also contains $20.5 million for
unspecified minor construction.

ARMY FAMILY HOUSING

The family housing program provides a major incentive that is
necessary for recruiting and retaining dedicated individuals to serve
in the Army. Adequate and affordable housing continues to be a major
concern to soldiers when asked about their quality of life. We have
waiting lists at nearly all of our major posts and as of January 2,
2002, the out-of-pocket expenses for soldiers living off post were
approximately 11.3 percent of the total cost of their housing. The Army
supports the initiative to increase the Basic Allowance for Housing
(BAH) to eliminate the out-of-pocket costs being paid by service
members for off-post housing in the United States by 2005. Maintaining
and sustaining safe, attractive, and convenient housing for our
soldiers and families is one of our continuing challenges. This budget
represents an increase in the family housing program for family housing
improvements and expanded privatization. This increase will assist us
in providing improved housing quicker and to more of our military
families. Our current plan ensures we meet the Secretary of Defense's
goal of 2007 to provide adequate housing to all military families.
Privatization is an essential element in solving our acute family
housing problem. The Army's privatization program, Residential
Communities Initiative (RCI), utilizes the authorities granted by
Congress in 1996 and extended to December 31, 2012 to implement an
aggressive program to create modern residential communities in the
United States. The Army is leveraging appropriated funds and government
assets by entering into long-term partnerships with private sector real
estate development and management firms to obtain financing and
management expertise to construct, repair, maintain, and operate Army
family housing communities.
The RCI program includes projects at Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort
Hood, Texas; Fort Lewis, Washington; and Fort Meade, Maryland. Fort
Carson transitioned to privatized operations in November 1999, and Fort
Hood transitioned in October 2001. Forts Lewis and Meade are expected
to transition by mid-2002. The projects include over 15,000 housing
units. Army families have already moved into new and renovated housing
at Fort Carson and our experience to date has been very positive.
The program is expanding to 20 additional privatization projects
between fiscal years 2002 and 2004. These projects will privatize more
than 48,000 additional housing units. Using funds appropriated in
fiscal year 2002, the Army kicked-off nine projects. The 2003 budget
request will continue to expand the program, adding five projects
covering seven installations (Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Belvoir,
Virginia; Forts Eustis and Story, Virginia; Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri; and Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii).
The Army is using the development partners' experience and
resources, and market-based incentives, to bring about dramatic
improvements in the Army family housing and the quality of life for
soldiers and their families.
Our fiscal year 2003 request for Army Family Housing is
$1,405,620,000. Table 2 summarizes each of the categories of the Army
Family Housing program.

TABLE 2--ARMY FAMILY HOUSING
Fiscal Year 2003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facility Category ($000) Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Construction................................ 27,942 2
Post Acquisition Const.......................... 239,751 17
Planning and Design............................. 15,653 1
Operations...................................... 183,408 13
Utilities....................................... 212,432 15
Maintenance..................................... 485,257 35
Leasing......................................... 215,251 15
Privatization................................... 25,926 2
-----------------------
Total......................................... 1,405,620 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------

FAMILY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION

The total fiscal year 2003 request for construction is
$283,346,000. It continues the Whole Neighborhood Revitalization (WNR)
initiative approved by Congress in fiscal year 1992 and supported
consistently since that time. This successful approach addresses the
entire living environment of the military family. The projects are
based on life-cycle economic analyses and support the Department of
Defense's 2007 goal by providing units that meet current construction
and adequacy standards.
New Construction
The fiscal year 2003 new construction program provides WNR projects
at four locations. Replacement construction provides adequate
facilities where there is a continuing requirement for the housing and
it is not economical to renovate. All of these projects are supported
by housing surveys, which show that adequate and affordable units are
not available in the local community.
Post Acquisition Construction (Renovation)
The Post Acquisition Construction Program is an integral part of
our housing revitalization program. In fiscal year 2003, we are
requesting funds for improvements to 18,314 existing units at 9
locations in the United States, including privatization at 7
installations; 7 locations in Europe; and 1 site in Korea. Included
within the scope of these projects are efforts to improve supporting
infrastructure and energy conservation.

FAMILY HOUSING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE

The operations, utilities, maintenance, and leasing programs
comprise the majority of the fiscal year 2003 request. The requested
amount of $1,122,274,000 for fiscal year 2003 is approximately 80
percent of the total family housing budget. This budget provides for
the Army's annual expenditures for operations, municipal-type services,
furnishings, maintenance and repair, utilities, leased family housing,
and funds supporting the Military Housing Privatization Initiative.

FAMILY HOUSING LEASING

The leasing program provides another way of adequately housing our
military families. We are requesting $215,251,000 in fiscal year 2003
to fund existing section 2835 project requirements, temporary domestic
leases in the United States, and approximately 8,600 units overseas.
military construction, army national guard (mcng)
The Army National Guard's (ARNG) focus is on two categories of
projects: transformation and mission.

TRANSFORMATION

This year we continue converting twelve brigades and two division
slices to support the Army Division Redesign Study (ADRS). The ADRS is
a high priority for this budget. Eight facilities will be constructed
or converted to house the ARNG's Combat Support/Combat Service Support
structure. We are requesting $26.8 million for this transformation for
facilities in Alabama and North Carolina and two projects each in
California, Kansas, and Nebraska.

MISSION

In fiscal year 2003, the ARNG has requested $55.2 million for five
mission projects. Two projects are in Wisconsin and will replace part
of the existing United States Property and Fiscal Office complex made
up of 23 buildings, ranging in year built from 1895 to 1980. These new
facilities will permit all personnel to perform the necessary tasks
that will improve their own readiness as well as provide fiscal and
logistical support for the entire Wisconsin Army and Air National
Guard.
The first phase of a project for administrative buildings at
Barbers Point, Hawaii is also included. These units are currently
stationed in the Diamond Head State Monument area, in older, pre-World
War II facilities. The renovation of an existing building at Barbers
Point will help with the Diamond Head State Monument Plan, allowing the
Monument area to revert back to a semi-wilderness condition.
As part of the Army's Facility Strategy, we are requesting a
Readiness Center at Summersville, West Virginia, and phase one of a
joint facility with the Marine Corps Reserve and the Kansas Counterdrug
Office at Topeka, Kansas.

PLANNING AND DESIGN/UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION

The ARNG's fiscal year 2003 budget request contains $14.7 million
for planning and design and $4.9 million for unspecified minor
construction.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, ARMY RESERVE (MCAR)

The fiscal year 2003 MCAR budget focuses on mission facilities that
support the Army Reserve's mission of providing trained and ready unit
and individuals to mobilize and deploy in support of the National
Military Strategy.

MISSION FACILITIES

In fiscal year 2003, there are seven mission facility projects in
the Army Reserve's Military Construction program. These projects
provide four Army Reserve Centers (Lincoln, Nebraska; Oswego, New York;
Grand Prairie, Texas; and Fort Story, Virginia); four maintenance
facilities (Mare Island, California; Lincoln, Nebraska; Grand Prairie,
Texas; and Fort Story, Virginia); a battalion-size dining facility at
Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; and an alteration to an Army Reserve training
facility at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

PLANNING AND DESIGN/UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION

The fiscal year 2003 MCAR budget includes $6.965 million for
planning and design and $2.85 million for unspecified minor
construction.

SUSTAINMENT, RESTORATION AND MODERNIZATION (SRM)

In addition to military construction and family housing, the third
area in the facilities arena is the O&M SRM program. O&M SRM is the
primary account in the base support funding area responsible to
maintain the infrastructure to achieve a successful readiness posture
for the Army's fighting force. Installations and Reserve component
facilities are the platforms of America's Army and must be properly
maintained to be ready to support current Army missions and any future
deployments.
O&M SRM consists of two major functional areas: (1) facilities
sustainment of real property and (2) restoration and modernization.
Facilities sustainment provides resources for maintenance and repair
activities necessary to keep an inventory of facilities in good working
order. It also includes major repairs or replacement of facility
components, usually accomplished by contract, that are expected to
occur periodically throughout the life cycle of facilities. Restoration
includes repair and replacement work to restore facilities damaged by
inadequate sustainment, excessive age, natural disaster, fire,
accident, or other causes. Modernization includes alteration of
facilities solely to implement new or higher standards, including
regulatory changes, to accommodate new functions, or to replace
building components that typically last more than 50 years, such as
foundations and structural members.
Within the O&M SRM program, there are two areas to highlight: (1)
our Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) and (2) the Long Range Utilities
Strategy. The first area is our BUP program, which is the major
renovation and restoration of existing barracks and an integral part of
the Barracks Modernization program's goal to eliminate gang-latrine
barracks by 2008. However, due to the reallocation of central funding
of the BUP program in fiscal year 2002, we will now complete the
program in 2009. At the completion of the fiscal year 2003 program, as
requested, we will have funded, with MILCON and BUP, adequate housing
to meet or approximate the DOD 1+1 barracks standard for 77 percent of
our soldiers. The fiscal years 2004-2008 Military Construction program
will provide barracks for another 18 percent of eligible soldiers. We
will use O&M SRM resources to renovate barracks to an approximate DOD
1+1 standard for the remaining 5 percent of eligible soldiers. We are
committing an average of about $120 million per year in O&M SRM to
continue the efforts to upgrade housing for our single soldiers.
The second area to highlight within the O&M SRM program is our Long
Range Utilities Strategy to provide reliable and efficient utility
services at our installations. Privatization or outsourcing of
utilities is the first part of our strategy. All Army-owned electrical,
natural gas, water, and wastewater systems are being evaluated to
determine the feasibility of privatization. When privatization appears
economical, we use competitive contracting procedures as much as
possible. We continue to successfully privatize utility systems on Army
installations. Recent successes include privatization of the natural
gas system at Fort Benning, and the water and waste water systems at
Presidio of Monterey. Of the 320 Army systems available for
privatization since 1998, 24 have been privatized, 28 have been
exempted, and the remaining are in various stages of privatization. The
second part of the strategy is the utilities modernization program. We
are upgrading utility systems that are not viable candidates to be
privatized, such as central heating plants and distribution systems. We
have executed approximately $188 million in utility modernization
projects in fiscal years 1998 through 2001 and we plan to accomplish
$83 million in additional projects in fiscal year 2002 to complete the
program. Together, privatizing and modernizing utility systems will
provide reliable and safe systems.
We are making progress in upgrading barracks and improving utility
services, and funding for the basic maintenance and repair of Army
facilities has improved to 92 percent of the OMA, OMNG, and OMAR
requirement in fiscal year 2003. However, we still need to strive
toward fully funding sustainment to keep facilities from getting worse
and to protect the large infrastructure investment requested in this
budget. The Installation Status Report (ISR) shows Army facilities are
rated C-3 (not fully mission capable) due to years of under-funding. At
the end of fiscal year 2001, the ISR for the Army showed 28 percent of
our facilities were ``red''--mission failure; 42 percent were
``amber''--mission degraded; and only 30 percent were ``green''--
mission supported.

HOMEOWNERS ASSISTANCE FUND, DEFENSE

The Army is the executive agent for the Homeowners Assistance
Program. This program provides assistance to homeowners by reducing
their losses incident to the disposal of their homes when military
installations at or near where they are serving or employed are ordered
to be closed or the scope of operations reduced. For fiscal year 2003,
there is no request for appropriations and authorization of
appropriations. Requirements for the program will be funded from prior
year carryover and revenue from sale of homes. Assistance will be
continued for personnel at 7 installations that are impacted with
either a base closure or a realignment of personnel, resulting in
adverse economic effects on local communities.

BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Our facilities strategy strives to meet the needs of today's
soldiers while also focusing on the changes required to support the
Army of the 21st century. For BRAC in fiscal year 2003, we are
requesting appropriations and authorization of appropriations of $149.9
million. This budget represents the Army's budget required to continue
unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal, environmental restoration, and
property management of those facilities not yet disposed from the first
four rounds of BRAC. In fiscal year 2001, the Army began saving $945
million annually upon completion of the first four rounds of BRAC.
Although these savings are substantial, we need to achieve even more,
and bring our infrastructure assets in line with projected needs. The
Army supports the need to close and realign additional facilities and
we appreciate Congress' authority to have an additional round in fiscal
year 2005.
The Army is now in the first year of exclusively care taking and
completing the remaining environmental restoration activities at BRAC
installations. The Army implemented innovative approaches to
environmental restoration at BRAC sites in fiscal year 2001, which will
support the early transfer of several properties. The Army will
continue to support early property transfers in fiscal year 2002 and
beyond and requests $149,878,000 in fiscal year 2003 to continue this
important work. These funds allow us to properly care take these
properties and to continue environmental and ordnance removal efforts
that will facilitate economic revitalization and will render these
properties safe. Our efforts will make 24,854 acres of property
available for reuse in fiscal year 2002 and complete restoration
activities at 7 additional locations. This budget includes the
resources required to support projected reuse in the near term and to
continue with current projects to protect human health and the
environment.
Although the extensive overseas closures do not receive the same
level of public attention as those in the United States, they represent
the fundamental shift from a forward-deployed force to one relying upon
overseas presence and power projection. Without the need for a
commission, we are reducing the number of installations by 70 percent,
roughly equal to the troop reductions of 70 percent. Your support of
our Efficient Basing, East, military construction project will allow us
to continue reducing the number of installations in Europe. In Korea,
the number of installations is dropping 20 percent. The total number of
Army overseas sites announced for closure or partial closure since
January 1990 is 680. Additional announcements will occur until the base
structure matches the force identified to meet U.S. commitments.
The significant challenges posed by the removal of unexploded
ordnance, the remediation of groundwater, and the interface of a
variety of regulatory authorities continue to hinder the disposal of
property. A number of innovative approaches for environmental
restoration were recently developed in an effort by the Army to
expedite the transfer of property, while ensuring the protection of
human health and the environment. Two innovative mechanisms are being
utilized to complete environmental restoration efforts: Guaranteed/
Fixed Price Remediation (G/FPR) Contracts and Environmental Services
Cooperative Agreements (ESCA). A G/FPR Contract obligates BRAC funds
necessary for regulatory closure of specified restoration activities.
The Army retains responsibility for completion of the environmental
restoration, overseeing the contractor and ensuring that regulatory
closure of the property is obtained. An ESCA is a different mechanism,
authorized under the environmental restoration program that obligates
Army BRAC funds and apportions some amount of liability to a
governmental entity representing the reuse interests of the particular
BRAC installation, in exchange for specific environmental restoration
services outlined in the ESCA.
We remain committed to promoting economic redevelopment at our BRAC
installations. We are supporting early reuse of properties through
economic development conveyances as well as the early transfer of
properties along with cooperative agreements to accelerate the
completion of remaining environmental remediation. The Army is also
making use of leasing options approved by Congress and awarding
guaranteed fixed price remediation contracts to complete environmental
cleanup to make properties available earlier. Real property assets are
being conveyed to local communities, permitting them to quickly enter
into business arrangements with the private sector. Local communities,
with the Army's support and encouragement, are working to develop
business opportunities that result in jobs and tax revenues. The
successful conversion of former Army installations to productive use in
the private sector benefits the Army and ultimately the local
community.
The BRAC process has proven to be a viable method to identify and
dispose of excess facilities. The closing and realigning of bases saves
money that otherwise would go to unneeded overhead and frees up
valuable assets for productive reuse. These savings permit us to invest
properly in the forces and bases we keep to ensure their continued
effectiveness. We request your support by providing the necessary BRAC
funding to continue environmental restoration and property management
in fiscal year 2003.

THE ARMY ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENT

The Army's Environmental Program budget request for fiscal year
2003 totals $1,581,085,000 for its Compliance, Restoration,
Conservation, Pollution Prevention, and Environmental Quality
Technology Programs. This figure includes $146,156,000, reflecting the
environmental portion of the total BRAC budget request. In addition,
this figure reflects the Office of the Secretary of Defense budget
request of $212,102,000 for the DOD Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS)
program for which the Army is the DOD Executive Agent.
The Army Environmental Program supports readiness and improves the
quality of life for our soldiers and their families. It fulfills the
public trust to manage Army lands by protecting natural and cultural
resources, in accordance with Federal, State, and local laws. The Army
is fully committed to complying with laws and regulations, conserving
natural and cultural resources, and cleaning up active, BRAC, and FUDS
sites. We are continuing to integrate pollution prevention practices
into all that we do, and we have expanded the focus of our technology
program to address environment, safety, and occupational health needs
comprehensively and cost effectively. By dedicating our efforts to
these activities, we will become increasingly successful in identifying
efficiencies to support the Army's core business practices; developing
creative solutions to support our environmental stewardship efforts;
protecting the health and safety of our soldiers, civilians, and
communities; and helping to fulfill the Army's commitment to support
and execute the National Military Strategy.
We are further determined to accomplish our environmental program
tasks with effectiveness and resource efficiency. Restoration and
compliance still require the majority of our budget dollars. Programs
in conservation, pollution prevention, and innovative technology
provide venues for primary investments to reduce future compliance and
restoration requirements and recapture dollars for the Army's core
missions. Overall, our fiscal year 2003 budget request provides for a
lean, but effective, program implementation and investment in both
corrective and preventive actions to continue eliminating past problems
and preventing future ones.

RANGES AND MUNITIONS

The Army must provide our soldiers with tough, realistic, battle-
focused training in preparation for a wide variety of mission essential
warfighting scenarios ranging from desert to tropical to cold region
operations. Ensuring our soldiers have access to the most realistic
training possible is a challenge for both our operations and
environmental communities.
As part of that effort, we are developing integrated sustainable
range management strategies to cut across functional lines to support
the Army's livefire requirements and ensure our range capability into
the future. The Army Range Sustainment Integration Council was
established to work across operational, environmental, and installation
management areas to develop solutions for sustaining continued training
and testing on Army ranges. The Army also is making prudent investments
in environmental quality technology to improve its ability to detect,
identify (discriminate), and respond to unexploded ordnance (UXO), and
to reduce costs in the future.
Our environmental programs support the Army's core training mission
by conserving training lands, preventing pollution, complying with laws
and regulations, partnering with local communities, and cleaning up
contamination at Army installations.

COMPLIANCE

The Army requests $640,931,000 for the compliance program in fiscal
year 2003. This is a $43 million increase from last year's request and
can be attributed to increased funding for the Massachusetts Military
Reservation response activities, and manpower for the environmental
program. This investment makes it possible for the Army to comply with
applicable Federal, State, and local environmental laws, regulations,
and Executive Orders, as well as international agreements and Final
Governing Standards overseas.
The Army's compliance goals are to attain and sustain cost-
effective compliance with all applicable Federal and State regulations.
The Army's long-term compliance objectives are to: (1) integrate
environmental compliance into all aspects of installation operations to
support sustainment of the mission and promote the well-being of
soldiers, family members, civilian employees, and citizens of
neighboring communities; and (2) sustain compliance costs within fiscal
years 2002-2007 funding levels by shifting emphasis to pollution
prevention solutions as a means for helping to achieve compliance.
The Army focuses on achieving environmental compliance through
strong command emphasis and use of effective environmental management
systems, pollution prevention, diverse training, new tools and
technologies, audits and better metrics, new and improved processes,
tracking development of new environmental laws, and regulations to
ensure timely compliance, and developing strong partnerships.
Since environmental laws and regulations are designed to protect
human health and the environment, compliance with them is vital to
maintaining the well-being of our soldiers, civilian personnel, their
families, and our neighboring communities. We have steadily improved
our environmental compliance posture over time. Although the number of
regulatory inspections increased slightly in fiscal year 2001, the
number of new enforcement actions the Army received decreased by 15
percent. Following major reductions the previous 2 years, we achieved a
further reduction of 6 percent in open Enforcement Actions (ENFs) in
fiscal year 2001 and continue to resolve ENFs more quickly.
A key element necessary for the Army to meet our long-term
environmental goals and strategy is the use of an internationally
recognized Environmental Management System (EMS), or ISO 14001. The
Army will use ISO 14001 processes at all levels to build trust and
better cooperation with regulators and the community. Our goal is to
use EMS to integrate environmental considerations across Army planning
and operations.
Army investments in Regional Environmental Offices are paying big
dividends through improved relations with Federal and State
environmental regulators. This is evidenced by negotiation of effective
air emission requirements at Fort Leonard Wood, reduced hazardous waste
fees in New Mexico, improved communications with the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous partnering endeavors with
regulators and other Federal and State agencies.

POLLUTION PREVENTION

Pollution Prevention (P2) supports the Army by enabling our
compliance with current and future laws and regulations, promoting good
environmental stewardship of the lands entrusted to the Army, and
developing new technologies and partnerships with industry. The Army
requests $39,676,000, which is a decrease of $6 million from last
year's request. Nonetheless, we will continue to realize significant
savings from our investments in pollution prevent efforts.
One of our major challenges is compliance with existing
environmental laws and regulations. Achieving and maintaining
compliance through development and implementation of pollution
prevention strategies is a good business practice and a cost-effective
way for the Army to meet its environmental goals.
The Army is continuing with its efforts to fundamentally change its
operations through incorporation of a centralized hazardous materials
management program, which is designed to reduce or eliminate processes
and activities that generate wastes or emissions. The Army is a leader
in the reduction of chemicals in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). In
1994, the Army reported a total of 2.4 million pounds of releases to
the environment. By 1999, a 71 percent reduction of baseline releases
was achieved. Today, the total releases for all installations combined
is now less than the emissions of just one Army industrial facility in
1994.
Solid Waste Minimization efforts reduce costs while promoting
recycling efforts. The goals for the solid waste management program are
to minimize the generation of solid wastes, develop cost-effective
waste management practices, protect public health and the environment,
and recycle to conserve natural resources. The Army currently reuses
and recycles 21 percent of all solid waste generated. Our recycling
efforts significantly extend the life of existing landfills and
resulted in a savings of approximately $18.1 million in solid waste
disposal costs in fiscal year 2001.
The Army has also taken a cue from the private sector and developed
a military version of the Sustainable Project Rating Tool (SPiRiT).
This model is being used to evaluate our military construction projects
in terms of their sustainability, or how well they incorporate
``green'' building techniques, such as recyclable building materials,
energy efficiency, natural daylight, and compatibility with the natural
surroundings. This initiative is a common sense design and building
practice that is intended to reduce life cycle costs while helping the
Department support other Federal goals.
The Army's vision is not one of mere compliance with laws and
regulations, but rather a vision of environmental excellence through
pollution prevention.

CONSERVATION

The Army's Environmental Conservation program is a crucial
component in sustaining the land used for the Nation's military
mission, as entrusted by the American people. Environmental
requirements are increasing at the same time the Army's use of current
land capability is reaching capacity. Also, aging infrastructure is
stretched beyond its life expectancy. The National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA), Sikes Act, and the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) are the primary drivers for increased cultural and natural
resources requirements on Army training lands and base areas.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request of $93,651,000 reflects a $16
million increase over last year's funding level. The increase will
enable the Army to continue its good stewardship of the land by
implementing viable management plans that outline how the Army will
continue to protect cultural resources, manage threatened and
endangered species, integrate environmental land management, and comply
with applicable Federal and State natural and cultural resource laws.
The Sikes Act Improvement Act (SAIA) further defines DOD's stewardship
responsibilities, in the context of the military mission. In addition
to our mission requirements, the Army must provide for the conservation
and rehabilitation of natural and cultural resources, sustain
multipurpose use of the resources, and grant public access to the
extent that safety and security allow.
The most significant statutory requirement for Army-owned historic
properties is the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and its
implementing regulation. The current scope of Army historic building
management and compliance requirements is enormous, and will
substantially increase over the next 10 years. As our Cold War-era
infrastructure reaches the 50-year mark, it triggers compliance under
the NHPA. The Army currently has 50,557 buildings over the 50-year
mark, 63,155 archeological sites, and 17 National Historic Landmarks,
all subject to NHPA regulation. By 2010, nearly two-thirds of all
buildings on Army installations in the United States (77,613 of
129,059) will be at least 50 years old and subject to NHPA
requirements.
In addition to the maintenance of cultural and historic resources,
the Army is charged with the stewardship of its training lands, natural
resources, and endangered species that reside on Army installations.
One of the Army's most significant natural resource challenges relates
to the use of training land, which is vital for national defense and
readiness, while simultaneously maintaining compliance with the
Endangered Species Act.
There are 170 distinct threatened and endangered species on 94 Army
installations. The increased operational tempo of Army activities is
placing an increasing demand on land use. Additionally, urban
development is further isolating the natural habitats located on Army
installations. As critical habitat is destroyed on unprotected private
lands adjacent to Army installations, training areas and ranges provide
the only remaining large areas of habitat in many regions.
Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans are serving as good
tools to help the Army avoid future problems and reduce costs of
repairing disturbed soil, vegetation, and wildlife habitats. These
plans not only help us manage threatened and endangered species
habitat, but also continue the long-standing tradition of providing
outdoor recreation opportunities for soldiers and their families.

RESTORATION

The Army's commitment to its restoration program remains strong as
we continue to make progress toward our goals of reducing risk and
restoring property for future generations. With our regulatory and
community partners, we are exploring ways to improve and accelerate
cleanup. Achieving site closure and ensuring long-term remedies are
challenges we are prepared to face. Improved business practices,
partnerships, and innovative technologies, have enabled us to provide
sound stewardship of the environment and taxpayer dollars.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request for Army Restoration is
$395,900,000, and this funding level will meet our legal agreements and
the Defense Planning Guidance goal of fiscal year 2014. Also reflected
in the total Army Environmental Program budget request is $146,156,000,
which represents the environmental portion of the total BRAC budget
request. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has
requested $212,102,000 for the Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS)
program.
The Army's environmental restoration program addresses active,
BRAC, and FUDS properties that became contaminated due to past
practices. Protection of human health and the environment is the
primary goal for the Army's restoration programs. Another Army goal is
to restore sites to productive use and move sites into ``response
complete'' phases as quickly as possible. Examples of initiatives to
meet these goals are Scranton Army Ammunition Plant, the first military
installation to complete cleanup under the Pennsylvania-DOD Multi-Site
Agreement, and Sudbury Training Annex, the cleanup of which has
resulted in its deletion from EPA's National Priorities List.
By the end of fiscal year 2001, the Army completed response at 85
percent of active sites, 80 percent of its BRAC sites, and 57 percent
of its FUDS sites. We continue to move forward in our goal of
completing environmental restoration and disposal/transfer of
activities.
The Army is expanding its efforts to focus on completion, thereby
freeing up much needed resources for our warfighting mission. We are
accomplishing this through management initiatives that emphasize
comprehensive program reviews--scrutinizing remedies, applying new
technologies, providing additional technical expertise and training,
and resource optimization--focusing resources on selected
installations; and increased partnering and stakeholder outreach--
enabling us to accelerate the cleanup by reaching agreement early in
the process.
The Army has several review tools that have made significant
improvements across programs, primarily through measuring cost-
effectiveness. Groundwater Extraction Treatment Effectiveness Reviews,
Principles of Restoration Workshops, Focused Technical Review, and Exit
Strategy Meetings are all designed to take a close look at a specific
portion of the program and hold it up to intense scrutiny.
For example, the Groundwater Extraction Treatment Effectiveness
Review has optimized efficiencies directly through the implementation
of the Groundwater extraction and Treatment Evaluation Review program
since 1999. To date, this program has reviewed over 20 existing and
proposed groundwater remedies at Army installations across the country
and has identified approximately $45 million potential life cycle cost
avoidances at those installations during the past year alone.
An innovative contracting mechanism that is significantly different
from the standard cost-plus type environmental restoration contract is
the Guaranteed/Fixed Price Remediation (G/FPR) contract. Although it is
currently being used only at BRAC sites, active sites, and FUDS,
properties may also use G/FPR contracts more frequently in the near
future. A G/FPR contract was awarded for Fort Gordon in fiscal year
2001, and one is scheduled for award at Fort Leavenworth in fiscal year
2002. Under a G/FPR contract, the Army maintains ownership of the site
while the contractor performs the cleanup, negotiates with regulators,
and guarantees regulatory closure for a fixed price. The fixed price
element of the contract protects the Army from costly overruns
associated with any unknown contamination found on a site and transfers
the risk of cost overruns to the contractor. The contractor, in turn,
obtains private insurance to protect from costs associated with the
cleanup of previously unknown contaminants.
The Army is currently piloting the concept of a regionalized long-
term monitoring/long-term operation contract in EPA Region VII. The
intent of a regionalized contract is to gain efficiencies in conducting
similar efforts in bulk. The current pilot covers Long Term Management/
Long Term Operation (LTM/LTO) activities at active installations, BRAC
installations, and FUDS properties. If successful, regionalized
contracts may be implemented in other regions and may include
environmental compliance activities.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY TECHNOLOGY

The Army's Environmental Quality Technology (EQT) Fiscal Year 2003
budget request is $52,669,000, which is an increase of $19 million over
the fiscal year 2002 budget request. This will fund continuing Army
research, development, and test and evaluation to address the Army's
high priority EQT requirements, and the request supports the increased
investment in range sustainability, reduction of ownership costs, and a
high rate-of-return on investment of limited EQT resources.
Illustrative of our fiscal year 2003 programs are initiatives like
range sustainment and the identification and discrimination of UXO. The
Army EQT training range-related programs use a holistic approach to
resolve environmental issues that impact military readiness. The
program addresses a comprehensive suite of historic and emerging range-
related environment and safety issues that include UXO, impacts of
explosives, contaminated soils and groundwater, dust control, and land
rehabilitation. In addition, sustainability of ranges is an overarching
concept, which incorporates appropriate sustainable design elements
into planning, design, construction, and operation and maintenance
functions to enhance and balance total life cycle costs affecting
environmental, safety, and occupational health issues impacting
soldiers, installations, and adjacent communities.
Unexploded ordnance and munitions' constituents present a
significant challenge to installations seeking to manage and clean up
their test and training ranges, sites designated for BRAC, and FUDS.
Current technologies used to identify, discriminate, and address clean
up practices for UXO and munitions constituents are, for the most part,
neither cost nor time efficient. Development of new technologies
capable of detecting UXO with high detection rates and low false alarm
rates to drastically reduce the cost of site characterization and
cleanup are needed. Development of these technologies is among the
highest priority for the EQT Program, and the DOD community. The Army
has recognized the importance of this problem and has fully funded its
UXO technology program that seeks to resolve the detection and
discrimination problem.
The EQT Program is an increasingly robust vehicle for
identification of Army requirements. Because of its inherent fiscal
accountability, the program provides senior leadership the confidence
to champion its programs. Through this program, the Army continues to
establish environmentally compatible installations and weapons systems
through development and exploitation of technology, without
compromising mission readiness or training. The Office of the Secretary
of Defense has placed the Army EQT process in the forefront as an
appropriate model to be used to identify, prioritize, and resolve high
priority EQT requirements.

FISCAL YEAR 2003 SUMMARY

Mr. Chairman, our fiscal year 2003 budget is a balanced program
that permits us to execute our construction programs; provides for the
military construction required to improve our readiness posture;
provides for family housing leasing, operations, and maintenance of the
non-privatized inventory; and initiates privatization at seven
additional installations. This budget request further provides for
protection of training lands, environmental compliance with Federal and
State regulations, restoration of contaminated sites, and important
technology and pollution prevention initiatives in support of Army
infrastructure, material systems, and operations and training. This
request is part of the total Army budget request that is strategically
balanced to support both the readiness of the force and the well-being
of our personnel. Our long-term strategy can only be accomplished
through sustained, balanced funding, divestiture of excess capacity,
and improvements in management and technology. We will continue to
streamline, consolidate, and establish community partnerships that
generate effective relationships and resources for infrastructure
improvement, continuance of services, and improved quality of life for
soldiers, their families, and the local communities of which we are a
part.
The fiscal year 2003 request for the active Army is for
appropriations and authorization of appropriations of $2,882,141,000
for military construction, Army and Army Family Housing.
The request for appropriations and authorization of appropriations
is $101,595,000 for military construction, Army National Guard and
$58,779,000 for the military construction, Army Reserve.
The request for appropriations and authorization of appropriations
is $1,580,492,000 for the Army environmental program.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you.

Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement. As I said
earlier, your full statements will be placed in the record, and
the chair would appreciate it if you could abbreviate your
statements.
Secretary Johnson.

STATEMENT OF HON. H.T. JOHNSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

Secretary Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members of the subcommittee. I am H.T. Johnson, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment, and I
will try to abbreviate my comments.
We have done well in the current budget in installations.
We have $9.3 billion associated with installations, versus $8.9
billion last year. Overall we have increased in MILCON, as I
will point out in a moment.
Our Secretary and our services believe in quality of
service, which has two components: quality of life and quality
of performance. We have tilted our funding this year on quality
of life for our marines, sailors, and their families. We are
also concerned about the quality of performance and life for
our civilians and contractor teams associated with the
Department of the Navy.
We have increased our housing construction and improvement
by 15 percent. This has allowed us to build 1,147 new homes and
renovate over 3,000 others. We have also funded a lot for
bachelor housing. Many of you might not realize that 31,000 of
our sailors do not have a room ashore. When their ship is in
home port they have to sleep on the ship. We have a commitment
to provide rooms for them. We will need your help in some of
those areas. Since 5,000 of those sailors are in Japan, we will
convince them to fund that part. However, we have 26,000 to
take care of and we hope to have everybody ashore provided a
room by 2008.
We have also added $269 million to better sustain our
facilities. This is 15 percent above last year's enacted level.
Unfortunately, our military construction is down to $948
million for the Active and Reserve Forces. This is the second
highest. Last year was higher, about $1.1 billion, so we are
down a little bit there. But as Mr. DuBois mentioned, BRAC was
not even mentioned in this process to my knowledge. It
certainly did not play a role.
We are fully funding our environmental compliance,
conservation, and pollution accounts. We have made great
strides, which are explained fully in our statement for the
record. We have cleaned up more than we had planned and we are
ahead of schedule. The former BRAC bases were fully funded last
year, and next year we have even increased funding by 22
percent to $261 million.
We are making good progress on closing out these BRAC
bases. I have a personal interest in closing them out, not just
cleaning them up and holding onto them, and our Secretary
supports that very strongly.
As Mr. DuBois mentioned, Secretary Rumsfeld reduced the
time line to get quality housing for family members to 2007.
The Navy meets that goal and the Marine Corps beats it by 2
years, so we are in good shape there.
We have been very fortunate in the housing privatization
process. The public-private ventures or partnerships have
worked very well. We have a total of 6,600 that have been
completed, 1,800 under way, and another 12,000 at 7 locations
that we are looking at.
I believe we have great opportunity to take that same
principle and carry it into homes for our bachelors. We have
not always taken good care of our bachelors, and we believe
this is a way that we can make good homes a self-sustaining
entitlement for our families as well as our bachelors.
It would not be proper if I did not take credit for the
Department for the great job that our marines and sailors have
done in our energy program. Last year there were four awards at
the national level. We got two of the four, and that just
speaks on the dedication our individuals have. One of those was
in southern California, and certainly last year they had
challenges there.
One major challenge that we continue to face and one that
Mr. DuBois mentioned is encroachment. We have put a lot in our
statement about encroachment. We are taking it on as a
Department, and more importantly, we are working to make sure
that we can provide realistic combat training on land and in
the air for our troops, as well as testing new equipment.
We are getting good cooperation from other agencies. I have
been very impressed by that.
We never seek blanket environmental exceptions from
military needs. From the deck plate to the training range, we
will continue to abide by all of the National, State, and local
environmental standards. We do want to try to work some balance
into some of the areas that we have difficulty on regarding
encroachment, such as the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory
Bird Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. This is a
complex issue and we are dedicated to face it. We realize that
as time goes on this encroachment issue will grow larger.
We have looked at Camp Pendleton ad nauseam for the last
few months. It separates Los Angeles and San Diego and there is
not much on each side, so we have a great problem.
We share your desire to earn the trust of the American
people. I believe that DOD is a recognized leader in
environmental stewardship. We are the ultimate defender of our
environment as well as our Nation, and we have to find the
right balance to prepare for that ultimate mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Johnson follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. H.T. Johnson

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am H.T. Johnson,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment). I
appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today on the Department of
the Navy's shore infrastructure and environmental programs.
We are all justifiably proud of the way this Nation's military
forces have responded to the September 11 terrorist acts in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, DC. From providing increased security for
homeland defense at airports and port facilities against future
potential threats, Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from ships and
submarines, and carrier-based Navy and Marine Corps aircraft providing
80 percent of the combat sorties over Afghanistan, sailors and marines
have served proudly and with distinction to eliminate terrorist threats
in what was previously considered a landlocked sanctuary. In Operation
Enduring Freedom and the global war on terrorism, on-station Naval
Forces were first to respond, fight, and secure U.S. interests.
It takes highly trained and motivated individuals, using advanced
technologies and weapon systems, to successfully pursue U.S. military
objectives. Our bases and stations provide direct and indirect support
to forward-deployed Naval Forces. Perhaps more importantly, such
installations are the means by which Naval Forces are formed, trained,
maintained, and housed. Our environmental programs help ensure our
continued use of military training areas on land and at sea, while also
complying with national and international environmental standards.
The Secretary of the Navy has repeatedly said people are our most
important asset. Military pay and benefits are obviously important. But
members of this subcommittee know that a modern, well maintained
infrastructure is a very strong ``people'' program; it's the pier,
hangar, warehouse, and where sailors, marines, civilian employees, and
contractors report to work; it's the classroom and the training range
where they learn and hone their skills; it's the nice home in a good
neighborhood where our military members and their families live. It's
also the commitment to effective safety and occupational health
programs that protects them from the daily hazards they face, whether
on the job or off. The military mission is inherently a dangerous one.
Whether it is training for the mission, carrying out the mission, or
preparing the weapons and weapon systems that may be employed, we need
to, and are, pursuing a vision of zero mishaps for the future by
institutionalizing operational risk management, embracing best business
practices, and adopting key safety technologies.
I will begin by summarizing our fiscal year 2003 budget request,
and follow with more details in each program area.

THE FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET

Shore Infrastructure Budget
The Department of the Navy shore infrastructure budget includes
these appropriations: military construction, Navy; military
construction, Naval Reserve; family housing, Navy and Marine Corps;
Base Realignment and Closure; and the operations and maintenance
accounts which provide base support and sustainment, restoration, and
modernization.

Our fiscal year 2003 infrastructure budget request continues the
progress we have made in last year's budget. Our budget request of $9.3
billion represents a 4.5 percent increase over the enacted fiscal year
2002 level of $8.9 billion. While maintaining the overall forward
momentum, we have emphasized housing and the sustainment of our
existing facilities, consistent with the priorities of the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps. There are notable gains in these
areas.
Housing is a cornerstone of our efforts. The fiscal year 2003
family housing construction request totals $376 million, a 15 percent
increase over the fiscal year 2002 enacted level of $328 million. This
funding will allow us to build 1,147 new homes (all but 65 are
replacement construction) and renovate 3,137 existing homes. Included
in this improvement request is $33 million for privatization at Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii. Our family housing operations and maintenance request
totals $868 million, a 4 percent reduction below the fiscal year 2002
enacted level. This reduction is due to a net reduction of
approximately 5,000 government owned homes, primarily the result of
privatization efforts.

Our military construction request for the active component totals
$895 million, consisting of 43 Navy and 19 Marine Corps projects. The
facts are that there are other pressing requirements, most of which are
associated with the conduct of the war on terrorism. After the
September 11 attack, the Department was required to make some difficult
choices to pursue the war on terrorism. The Secretary had to achieve
balance across many competing needs. This military construction budget
request is the second largest in 6 years. It is exceeded only by our
fiscal year 2002 request, and is considerably larger than previous
requests. We are planning to use some of the funds allocated for anti-
terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) from the Defense Emergency Response
Fund (DERF) toward military infrastructure. These additional funds are
not included in any tables or other discussion in this statement.
Nearly three-quarters of the military construction request is for
restoration and modernization projects. Consistent with our focus on
solving housing needs, the active military construction request
includes a robust bachelor housing effort totaling $275 million to
construct, improve and replace 4,360 bachelor-enlisted quarters beds.
There is also $69 million for six Navy and two Marine Corps quality of
life projects, including fitness centers and dining facilities. We have
included $69 million for planning and design efforts, and raised our
request for unspecified minor construction to $23 million under the
expectation that further AT/FP efforts will be needed.

Our military construction, Reserve request totals $52 million,
about the same as the fiscal year 2002 enacted level. There are six
Navy (including a bachelor enlisted quarters for 92 spaces) and three
Marine Corps projects totaling $48 million, $2.5 million for planning
and design, and $1 million for unspecified minor construction.
Our prior Base Realignment and Closure request totals $259 million,
a 20 percent increase over the fiscal year 2002 enacted level of $215
million. This funding supports caretaker functions and cleanup of
contamination at base closures under the four previous rounds (i.e.,
BRAC 1988, BRAC 1991, BRAC 1993, and BRAC 1995). This request meets all
current regulator and community expectations for cleanup at our BRAC
bases. I am pleased to report we have resolved our fiscal year 2002
shortfall as a result of the additional funds provided by Congress, the
availability of land sale revenue, and the use of prior year BRAC funds
which we have determined are no longer needed for their original
intended purpose. These prior year BRAC funds are being reallocated to
fund fiscal year 2002 BRAC cleanup needs.
Our sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) funded by
operations and maintenance accounts request totals $2,066 million, a 15
percent increase over the fiscal year 2002 enacted level of $1,797
million. This $269 million increase in funding allows the Marine Corps
to achieve 92 percent, and Navy 84 percent, of the sustainment
requirement for the existing facilities inventory based on the current
requirements model. This provides the highest level of sustainment
funding achieved using this metric, considerably higher than the
estimated 80 percent for Marine Corps in fiscal year 2002, and the
estimated 71 percent Navy average over the 3 previous years.
Environmental Budget
Our environmental budget request totals $1.2 billion, the same as
the fiscal year 2002 enacted level of $1.2 billion. Environmental
quality is the single largest portion of the environmental budget.
Funding for this function is contained in a number of different DON
accounts: the active and Reserve operations and maintenance
appropriations for Navy and Marine Corps; other procurement, Navy;
military construction, Navy; military construction, Naval Reserve;
research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy; and Navy working
capital fund. This level of funding supports the basic environmental
compliance, conservation, and pollution prevention functions at our
bases, e.g., personnel salaries, environmental permits and fees,
environmental sampling and laboratory analysis, and hazardous waste
disposal costs. It also funds all known one-time compliance projects to
meet fiscal year 2003 Federal, State, and local environmental standards
such as the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act,
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and Act to Prevent Pollution
from Ships.

The environmental restoration program, also called the cleanup
program, is designed to clean up contamination at current active Navy
and Marine Corps bases. Cleanup funding at active bases is on par with
last year, and provides sufficient funds to meet all legal agreements
now in place with EPA and the States while continuing consistent
progress to program completion in 2014.
The budget request continues a large environmental research and
development effort, primarily aimed at resolving current and future
marine environmental issues for our ships. For example, the budget
request includes $10 million for marine mammal research to better
understand behavior, habitat, and sensitivity to sound generated in the
water.
The Navy is approaching the end of a 10-year effort to clear
ordnance at Kaho'olawe, a small, uninhabited island in Hawaii that
served as a naval bombing range for over 50 years. The fiscal year 2003
budget request of $25 million is the same as the fiscal year 2002
budget request. Although the clearance effort will not achieve full
clearance of unexploded ordnance, it has already met the goals of
Public Law 103-139 to allow public access for cultural, religious, and
educational purposes. In accordance with this statute, the Navy will
conclude its clearance efforts, and turn over access control of
Kaho'olawe to the State of Hawaii in November 2003. We are grateful for
the close cooperation we have received from the Kaho'olawe Island
Reserve Commission on behalf of the State of Hawaii.
I would now like to address specific program areas in more detail:

HOUSING

We have two overarching housing principles:

Our sailors and marines, and their families, are
entitled to quality homes; and
Housing that we provide, either directly through
ownership or indirectly through privatization, must be self-
sustaining over the long term. ``Self-sustaining'' means that
we must ensure that the resources are there to operate,
maintain, and recapitalize the home throughout its life.
Family Housing
Our family housing strategy consists of a prioritized triad:

1. Reliance on the Private Sector. We rely first on the local
community to provide housing for our sailors, marines, and their
families. Three out of four Navy and Marine Corps families receive a
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and own or rent homes in the
community. Our bases have housing referral offices to help newly
arriving families find suitable homes in the community.
2. Private Financing through Public/Private Ventures (PPVs). With
the strong support from this subcommittee and others, we have
successfully used statutory PPV authorities enacted in 1996 to partner
with the private sector and meet our housing needs, in part, through
the use of private sector capital. These authorities, which I like to
think of in terms of public/private partnerships, allow us to leverage
our own resources and provide better housing faster to our families. We
are aggressively seeking additional opportunities to meet our housing
needs through the use of PPVs.
3. Military Construction. Military construction will continue to be
used where PPV authorities don't apply (such as overseas) or where they
don't make financial sense for the Department.

Some years ago, the Secretary of Defense established a goal to
eliminate inadequate military family housing units by fiscal year 2010.
Secretary Rumsfeld recently accelerated that goal by 3 years, to fiscal
year 2007. Through a combination of increased funding and increased use
of PPV authorities, I am pleased to say that the Navy and Marine Corps
have stepped up to the challenge: the Navy will meet the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) goal and eliminate their inadequate family
housing by fiscal year 2007. The Marine Corps will exceed the goal and
eliminate their inadequate housing by fiscal year 2005.
Bachelor Housing
Our budget request continues the emphasis on improving living
conditions for our unaccompanied sailors and marines. While we are
nearing the achievement of our goal for improving family housing, our
track record in addressing the housing needs of our single members has
been uneven. One of our top priorities is to focus attention and
resources on improving bachelor housing. There are three challenges:

1. Provide Homes Ashore for our Shipboard Sailors. There are
approximately 31,000 sailors worldwide who are required to live aboard
ship even while in homeport. This situation is unacceptable. The recent
change in law allowing E4s to receive BAH is a step in the right
direction. Under current levels of funding, the Navy estimates that it
will be able to achieve its ``homeport ashore'' initiative by fiscal
year 2008. Our fiscal year 2003 budget includes two ``homeport ashore''
projects that will provide homes ashore to 764 shipboard sailors at
Norfolk, VA and Bremerton, WA. Through continued emphasis on military
construction and the use of private financing authorities for bachelor
housing, I strongly believe we can, and must, do even better.

2. Ensure our Barracks Meet Today's Standards for Privacy. We are
continuing our efforts to construct new and modernize existing barracks
to provide increased privacy to our single sailors and marines. The
Navy applies the ``1+1'' standard for permanent party barracks. Under
this standard, each single junior sailor has his or her own sleeping
area and shares a bathroom and common area with another member. To
promote unit cohesion and team building, the Marine Corps was granted a
waiver to adopt a ``2+0'' configuration where two junior marines share
a room with a bath. Both configurations allow for more private quarters
for our senior sailors and marines. Our fiscal year 2003 request
reflects a recent change in OSD criteria that gives the services
flexibility to adjust the proportion of living area and common space
within an overall limitation of 66 square meters (710 square feet) per
module. The Navy will achieve these barracks construction standards by
fiscal year 2013; the Marine Corps by fiscal year 2010.
3. Eliminate gang heads. The Navy and Marine Corps remain on track
to eliminate the inadequate barracks with gang heads for permanent
party personnel.\1\ The Navy will achieve this goal by fiscal year
2008; the Marines by fiscal year 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Gang heads remain acceptable for recruits and trainees.

Family Housing Privatization
We are using a two-step approach for PPV. The first step (Request
for Qualifications (RFQ) phase) allows a list of proposers to be
narrowed to those who are judged to be highly qualified on the basis of
their experience, financial capabilities, and vision for meeting our
needs. Those proposers judged to be ``highly qualified'' (typically
four to six) are then invited to submit technical and financial
proposals to achieve our project objectives. We then select a preferred
developer with whom we enter into exclusive negotiations. In all PPV
projects, we have established the following objectives:

Self-sustaining projects that provide for necessary
recapitalization over the long-term without additional
infusions of cash;
A legally recognized voice in key decisions made over
the life of the agreement;
Flexibility to accommodate unforeseen changes over the
life of the agreement; and
Protection of government interests and minimization of
government exposure in case of default, poor performance, or
non-performance.

We have now awarded eight PPV projects totaling 6,583 homes.
Through the use of these authorities we have leveraged $135 million in
DON funds with $478 million in private sector capital for a combined
investment of $613 million in homes for our sailors, marines, and their
families. We have effectively expanded our buying power by stimulating
over $4.50 of construction for each $1.00 we have contributed. We
currently have two additional projects in procurement (not yet awarded)
and another eight projects in planning. All told, the projects, either
in procurement or planning, total 13,792 homes.

Private Financing Alternatives for Bachelor Housing
I believe that there are real opportunities for applying PPV
authorities to our barracks needs. We held an industry forum last
November with developers, lenders, and property managers. We learned
that there is a potential to use private sector financing to improve
bachelor housing. We are developing three bachelor housing pilot
projects--Hampton Roads, VA; Camp Pendleton, CA (Del Mar); and
Quantico, VA (Basic School). We look forward to bringing these
proposals to the subcommittee in the near future.
Housing Issues
We appreciate Congress extending the military housing public/
private venture authorities to 2012. DOD is considering additional
legislative changes to improve our efforts in family housing and remove
obstacles for the application of these authorities to bachelor housing,
such as combining family and bachelor housing privatization accounts
into a single fund to facilitate joint projects.

FACILITIES

Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization
With this budget, the DON is implementing the new DOD methodology
for facilities maintenance and repair. Sustainment is the amount of
funding required for scheduled maintenance and facility component
repairs over the expected service life of the facility. It does not
improve the condition or readiness of the facility. It is calculated
using the DOD Facilities Sustainment Model (FSM), which considers
facilities quantity data (most often square feet), and unit cost
factors (most often dollars per square foot) derived from private
industry. The calculated sustainment requirement is unique to the DON
infrastructure inventory and adds consistency and audit ability in
determining our requirement. FSM projects inventory gains (new
construction) and losses (demolition, privatization, excess facilities)
to arrive at a total sustainment requirement. The sustainment metric is
the percentage funded of the FSM generated requirement. While competing
budget pressures precluded us from doing better, this budget request
meets more than 85 percent of the Department of Navy FSM calculated
requirement--much better than in previous years.

Restoration and modernization (R&M) is the portion of SRM that goes
beyond sustainment to improve the condition and readiness of the
facility, using operations and maintenance as well as military
construction funds. The operations and maintenance funds help to
correct poorly rated facilities and to recapitalize the inventory. R&M
requirements are based on an investment level to achieve a DOD average
67 year recapitalization rate, with all facilities satisfactorily
sustained. Over the FYDP, R&M (O&M and MILCON) is funded to eliminate
facility deficiencies by 2013. The fiscal year 2003 recapitalization
rate is 122 years and the FYDP (03-07) average is 83 years.
Anti-terrorism/Force Protection
Every installation has increased its security posture since the
attacks of September 11. Additional security personnel, technology
(security systems, detection devices), security fencing, barriers,
security boats, and training are being used to enhance our AT/FP
posture. The SRM budget includes $147 million in AT/FP projects. These
measures include shatter resistant windows, structural reinforcement,
and building hardening.
The military construction budget request has incorporated AT/FP
measures within the scope of each project, where appropriate. These
measures include standoff distances, shatter resistant windows,
structural reinforcement and building hardening. These features account
for $17.5 million within the projects requested in the fiscal year 2003
MILCON program.
There are seven military construction projects totaling $107
million that support specific AT/FP enhancements and/or improvements.
These projects were identified after the September 11 attacks:

Advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training
Facility, Eglin AFB, FL--$6.4 million;
Shoreline Security Fencing, Naval Station, Norfolk,
VA--$2.0 million;
Installation Services Support Center, Naval Support
Activity, Bahrain--$26.0 million;
Parking Garage and Perimeter Security Upgrade, Naval
Air Station, Sigonella, Italy--$19.6 million;
AT/FP Improvements, Naval Shipyard, Kittery, ME--$11.6
million;
AT/FP Improvements, Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, VA--
$19.7 million; and
AT/FP Improvements, Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound,
Bremerton, WA--$21.7 million.
Building Demolition
Our centralized demolition program remains a success story. Defense
Reform Initiative Directive 36 directed the Navy and Marine Corps to
dispose of excess facilities over the period of fiscal year 1998
through fiscal year 2002. Navy will exceed its goal of 9.1 million
square feet (MSF) in fiscal year 2002. The Marine Corps met its goal of
2.1 MSF in fiscal year 2000. Both Services will continue the demolition
program. Our fiscal year 2003 budget request continues this effort,
with Navy planning to spend $42 million on 50 projects to demolish 2.0
MSF and Marine Corps planning to spend $5 million on 15 projects to
demolish 0.5 MSF. The Navy has expanded the use of the central account
funds to allow limited relocation and repair costs to consolidate
functions before demolishing the vacated building. These actions will
eliminate obsolete excess facilities, and further reduce SRM needs.
Energy and Utilities Privatization
To comply with Executive Order 13123 goals, Federal agencies must
reduce energy consumption 30 percent by fiscal year 2005 and 35 percent
by fiscal year 2010, using fiscal year 1985 as the baseline. I am
pleased to report that we have reduced consumption by nearly 25 percent
through fiscal year 2001, exceeding our target of 24 percent. To meet
these goals, we are implementing energy efficient technologies,
conducting energy awareness programs, and using private sector
expertise. I am delighted that the DON energy program received two of
the four government wide Presidential Energy Awards presented by the
Vice President at a ceremony on October 18, 2001.
We are also expanding the use of geothermal energy production at
Naval Air Warfare Center China Lake, CA and Naval Air Station Fallon,
NV. This gives us a cost efficient method to use private sector
financing to generate additional energy in the western U.S. while using
our land for military training needs.
Defense Reform Initiative Directive 49 directed the services to
privatize their natural gas, water, wastewater, and electrical systems
except where uneconomical or where precluded by unique security
reasons. Privatization is expected to reduce total ownership costs
while upgrading the reliability of our utility systems. The DON is
continuing efforts to privatize, where economically beneficial, 704
systems at 122 activities worldwide by fiscal year 2005. Proposals are
now being evaluated to privatize utility systems at the Marine Corps
base at Twentynine Palms, CA, and Navy and Marine Corps installations
in the Great Lakes and Washington, DC regions.
Facilities Issues
The DOD is considering a number of facilities related proposals,
including:

Reduction in long-term facility maintenance costs.
Expands the demonstration program under Section 2814 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, now
limited to the Army, to allow a single contractor to design,
build, operate, and maintain facilities funded with military
construction funds. It would allow additional demonstration
projects that seek to reduce life cycle costs for facilities
within the DOD.
Conveyance of surplus real property for natural
resource conservation purposes. Allows the transfer of
environmentally sensitive property with endangered species
habitat to a non-governmental organization. This type of
property can now only be transferred to governmental entities.
This proposal would expand the field of potential recipients,
expanding the opportunity to dispose of excess property that
has limited commercial development potential.
Amend 10 U.S.C. 2810 Construction Projects for
Environmental Response Actions. Based on Congress' new
definition of repair, the Services are not able to continue to
define environmental restoration of soil as repair. The
unintended consequence of this redefinition is that these
cleanups would have to be classified as MILCON, with all of the
necessary approvals inherent with that funding source. This
proposal would return the status of environmental restoration
projects as repair and allow these cleanup projects to be
funded from the environmental restoration accounts in the DOD
Appropriations Bill. Notification would be submitted for
projects estimated over $10 million.

PRIOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

Status
We are now in the home stretch to complete environmental cleanup
and property disposal from the four prior rounds of BRAC, 1988 under
Public Law 100-526 and 1991, 1993, and 1995 under Public Law 101-510.
We were authorized to implement a total of 178 actions consisting of 46
major closures, 89 minor closures, and 43 realignments. We have
completed closure and realignment of all bases except one move from
leased space to government owned space.

Our focus is now on cleanup and property disposals for 595 parcels
at 90 installations. I am pleased to report that to date we have
transferred 354 parcels comprising over 69,000 acres. Conveyance
actions are complete at 60 of the 90 installations. Still to go are 241
parcels at 30 installations. Completing environmental cleanup is
generally the critical path to conveyance. The fiscal year 2003 budget
is sufficient to meet all regulator requirements and commitments to
local redevelopment authorities.
A Look Ahead
We have ambitious plans for property disposals during the remainder
of fiscal year 2002 and into fiscal year 2003. At Mare Island we have
signed early transfer agreements that will convey approximately 3,670
acres to the city of Vallejo and the State of California for economic
use and development. At Hunters Point, the Secretary of the Navy signed
an agreement with the city of San Francisco to work with a public/
private partnership to accelerate the conveyance of this property. At
the former Oakland Naval Hospital, we have initiated action with the
General Services Administration to sell the 174-acre property by public
sale. We are nearing conveyance of the final parcels at each of the
following locations: Annapolis, Long Beach, Louisville, Naval
Activities Guam, New London, and Orlando, with another seven locations
working toward planned transfer in fiscal year 2003.
I will now discuss our environmental efforts, particularly with
respect to mounting concerns about our ability to sustain military
readiness.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

Sustained Readiness
Military readiness is essential to the security of the United
States, to the protection of the lives and well-being of our citizens,
and to the preservation of our freedoms, economic prosperity, and our
national heritage. A well-trained military is a principal component of
military readiness. To be well-trained and prepared, sailors and
marines must train in the same manner as they fight. Military lands and
training ranges (including land, sea and air training and operating
areas) exist to ensure military preparedness by providing realistic
training opportunities, including the use of live ordnance.
Having experienced combat first-hand, I can assure you that there
is no substitute for training. In a world where advanced weapons and
sensors are available for the right price, no amount of technology,
hardware, personnel, or leadership can substitute for realistic
training. When ground forces ashore call for gunfire or close air
support in future combat, we cannot afford to have the ship or aircraft
crew learn on the job.
Population growth, economic development, increased land use,
expansion of conservation and recreational areas, and urban and
suburban sprawl, along with State and Federal environmental laws and
regulations, have significantly restricted the military's access to and
use of military lands, training ranges, and at-sea operating areas
(OPAREAS), and limited its ability to engage in live-fire training.
This phenomenon--sometimes referred to as ``encroachment''--has
markedly restricted the military's ability to train realistically and,
unless checked, promises to produce further restrictions in the future.
Access restrictions have already negatively affected military
readiness and will continue to erode it unless this trend is reversed.
In some cases, the application of certain environmental laws and
regulations to military lands and training ranges challenges their
primary mission as locations for military training.

Our goal is to enhance readiness, not to roll back environmental
protection. We are not looking for an exemption for everything the
military does, but a balanced approach between environmental concerns
and unique military readiness needs.
Among the elements of our national heritage protected by the shield
of military readiness is our Nation's environment--our land, air, and
water as well as the fish, wildlife, and plant species that inhabit
them. In addition to defending against foreign threats, the military
acts as trustee, helping to protect the environment by its prudent and
conscientious management of natural resources. Largely as a result of
this stewardship, military lands present favorable habitats for plants
and wildlife, including protected species.
The DOD is a recognized leader in environmental stewardship and
will continue to protect the Nation and the environment. We must have
the flexibility to use military lands and OPAREAS for national defense
as the first priority. There are numerous examples of environmental
considerations that limit training opportunities, and increase the
challenge of sustaining readiness.
The designation of critical habitat under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) can undermine the purposes for which military lands have been
set aside. Under the ESA, if an agency action may affect critical
habitat, that agency is required to ensure that its action does not
destroy or adversely modify designated habitat. We believe that
designation of critical habitat on lands under military control will
adversely affect military readiness. The courts have held that critical
habitat is intended for species recovery. Once critical habitat is
designated, such lands must be used first for species recovery. Hence,
the designation of critical habitat is a bar to any land use that
diminishes the value of that land for species recovery.
The DOD is already obligated under the Sikes Act to develop
Integrated Natural Resource Management Plans (INRMP) for lands under
military control. These INRMPs address management of natural resources
in the context of the military mission for which the lands were placed
under the control of the military services. Because INRMPs are prepared
in cooperation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and State
agencies, these agencies recommend ways for DOD installations to better
provide for species conservation and recovery. The Sikes Act, however,
preserves the principal purpose of providing the military with lands on
which to test, train, and support military readiness.
Nowhere is the potential impact of critical habitat designation on
the use of military lands for military training more apparent than in
Southern California, especially with respect to Marine Corps bases in
that locale. In February and March 2000, FWS proposed designation of
16,000 acres (more than half) of Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar for
critical habitat. Areas proposed for designation included runways and
other structures, although the runways and facilities themselves were
not included. FWS also proposed critical habitat designation on about
57 percent of Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, an installation of
126,000-acres. At Miramar, the Marines were able to convince FWS that
the INRMP provided sufficient species protections therefore no formal
critical habitat designation was made. At Camp Pendleton, FWS
determined that the harm to military readiness was greater than the
value of critical habitat designation, and scaled back its designation.
Non-Federal entities are unhappy with these results, however, and are
challenging these decisions in court.
If the challenges are successful, critical habitat designation at
Miramar could impede the construction and use of ground support
facilities, such as a rifle range. The Marine Corps will also have to
consult with FWS for the use of existing runways and other aviation
support facilities. At Camp Pendleton, a loss could require the Marine
Corps to consult on training on 57 percent of the base. The Corps is
already modifying training on that portion of the base currently
designated as critical habitat: Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
amphibious landing exercises are seasonally restricted to only one
beach at Camp Pendleton. In March 2000, the 13th MEU was restricted to
500 yards out of 17 miles of beach because of a number of encroachment
restrictions, including endangered species. Instead of a realistic
night time amphibious landing, units coming ashore on Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCACs) vehicles were off-loaded at the LCAC facility before
moving inland to continue the exercise. They did not go through the
full kinds of training required to prepare to take a hostile beach.
This was a very serious degradation of training.
The Navy has worked hard to ensure that its training needs and
those of endangered species such as the Western Snowy Plover can co-
exist. Naval Air Base (NAB) Coronado has been home to Navy frogmen and
SEALs since their inception in World War II. All of the basic skills
from diving to hydrographic reconnaissance have been taught on the
beaches and in the bays surrounding the base. Since 1996, the Navy has
spent about $675,000 per year on conservation and management programs
for the birds. That effort has successfully increased nesting by almost
300 percent. Nonetheless, the Navy's stewardship efforts resulted in
the loss of training area. Due to encroachment, including the increase
in the Western Snowy Plover and the Least Turn population, and the
designation of critical habitat for the Pacific population of the
Western Snowy Plover by FWS in December 1999, NAB Coronado has lost the
use of over 80 percent of its training beaches. The Navy has had to
substantially alter training activities or to conduct them elsewhere,
both of which disrupt training cycles, increase costs and the already
considerable time sailors must spend away from their families before
leaving for 6-month deployments.
Rather than allowing successful stewardship to evolve into an
infringement on training, there must be incentives that encourage
continued conservation efforts. The Navy implemented a protection
program for the endangered California Least Tern and Western Snowy
Plover at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, CA. Nests were relocated or
marked, and areas with marked nests were avoided during training
exercises. Over the period of 1993 through 2001, the number of Least
Tern nests increased 600 percent and the number of Snowy Plover
increased 300 percent. However, the FWS has allowed the Navy to take 10
Least Tern nests and one Snowy Plover nest annually. The Navy has had
to move, scale back or drop its amphibious training exercises because
of the potential to exceed the number of takes allowed. The Navy has
requested an increase in the number of takes. This would allow more
effective training, and provide an incentive to continue a program that
is manpower intensive and costly.
Litigation under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) may result in
restrictions on training at ranges and operating areas. MBTA was
enacted more than 80 years ago to regulate commercial duck hunting and
conservation of migratory birds. Since a U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruling, the MBTA has been viewed by some as a vehicle for regulating a
wide range of activities that affect nearly every species of bird.
Based on the Circuit Court decision, third parties have filed suit
challenging the unintentional taking of migratory birds incidental to
military training. The Navy has been sued over its use of a small,
uninhabited island in the Western Pacific as a target range because the
Navy does not have a permit to take migratory birds. We are concerned
by the impact of the MBTA on training ranges and activities and are
working within the administration to address this issue.
The basic competition between military and conservation interests
in the use of on-base resources highlights one area where we have a
strong common interest: preservation and enhancement of undeveloped
off-base land, water, and air resources. Both military and conservation
interests have a major stake in preserving and enhancing the remaining
open space surrounding military installations. Recognition of this
common interest has led to discussions with State and local
governments, as well as non-governmental organizations to develop a
partnership approach to addressing our mutual concerns.

Access for military purposes is an issue at sea as well as ashore.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act's definition of ``harassment'' has
been a source of confusion since the definition was included in 1994
amendments to the statute. The statute defines ``harassment'' in terms
of ``annoyance'' or the ``potential to disturb,'' vague standards that
are difficult to interpret. The definition of harassment and its
application are pivotal because an authorization to harass marine
mammals must be obtained in advance of any activity that would be
deemed to constitute harassment. The Navy has had to alter or halt its
training and research efforts to eliminate even the possibility that a
training event will disturb a marine mammal to avoid the delays and
uncertainty with getting a permit under this ambiguous standard. A
clearer definition of harassment is needed. We are working with other
interested Departments on a legislative proposal to clarify the
definition of harassment. The recent recommendations of the National
Research Council that focus harassment on significant disruptions to
behaviors critical to survival and reproduction may be a worthy
approach for this administration to consider. Military training plans
could then incorporate these standards in a consistent, balanced
manner.
The DOD is working within the administration to identify ways to
sustain the readiness of our forces. We must ensure the appropriate
balance between military readiness and the environment, clarifying
ambiguous statutory and regulatory requirements, finding more flexible
ways to protect the environment, and working with conservation
organizations to protect the environment within as well as outside the
fence of our bases.
Section 1041 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002 directs the Secretary of Defense to prepare a report to the
President and Congress on the need for a ``Defense Impact Review
Process.'' This process would, if enacted, provide the DOD the
opportunity to review the proposed actions of other Federal agencies in
order to identify those actions which may have an adverse impact on
national defense. We believe that just as the DOD must consider
resource protection and conservation when formulating programs or
actions, so should other Federal agencies consider national defense
considerations. We are working with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the other services to prepare the required report.
Munitions/UXO
The Department has an aggressive program to manage munitions and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) at operational, closed, and transferred
ranges. At operational ranges, it is vital that we train our people in
the same manner and under the same conditions that they would fight. We
also need to ensure that range operations do not present an
unacceptable risk to human health or the environment. We plan to
conduct comprehensive environmental assessments at each of our
operational ranges to ensure there are no environmental threats. To
ensure long-term viability of our ranges, Sustainable Range Management
Plans will be developed for all Navy and Marine Corps ranges. For
closed ranges and properties to be transferred from DOD ownership, we
plan to use DOD explosive safety authorities and the procedures
prescribed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to take appropriate actions
(e.g., munitions removal, limiting access) and to cleanup munitions
constituents. As part of the DOD Munitions Response Committee, we are
discussing the special nature of clearance and cleanup for munitions
with State and Federal regulators. The subcommittee has set a goal to
develop a collaborative decision-making process for clearance and
cleanup of properties with munitions and munitions related
contaminants. One of the models for this approach is the successful
munitions clearance and cleanup at Adak, AK. The Navy, EPA Region IX,
and the State of Alaska worked together to reach agreement on a risk-
based process for investigation, clearance, and remediation of the
Navy's property at Adak.
Installation Restoration
The installation restoration program, also called the cleanup
program, is focused on the investigation and cleanup of contamination
at sites located on active Navy and Marine Corps installations. There
are 3,656 sites on 200 installations--129 of these installations have
on-going cleanup activities while 71 installations are completed.
We have established the following operating principles for the
program:

We will evaluate, and ultimately close out all sites
in the program;
We will use relative risk evaluations and risk
management to determine priorities for action within available
funding;
We will maintain a stable funding profile at a level
that protects human health and the environment, and makes
progress toward fulfilling our legal obligation to address and
reach decisions at all sites;
We will plan, prioritize, and execute the program in
open dialogue with regulators and public stakeholders, and
ensure meaningful involvement of affected communities; and
We will expedite cleanups by using formal partnering
and the flexibilities and lead agency responsibilities
described in Executive Order 12580 and the National Contingency
Plan for Oil and Hazardous Substances Spills.

By the end of fiscal year 2001, we had ``remedies in place'' or
``responses completed'' at 61 percent of the active Navy and Marine
Corps sites. I am pleased to report that fiscal year 2001 was a
particularly successful year for us: we improved our process and
cleaned twice as many sites while doubling the number of installations
where all cleanup actions have been completed, compared to what we had
planned to accomplish. Contributing to this success were major
improvements in our site management database. More importantly, we have
developed formal partnering arrangements with State and Federal
regulators. This has led to a more streamlined process with fewer
disagreements, which should hold us in good stead for the future.
In 1995, we created a Cost to Complete Index. This index tracks the
total remaining cost to complete the program, the cumulative amount
invested and the cost avoidance achieved through the implementation of
various management initiatives and the application of new technologies.
The cost to complete for the program has been reduced from $5.23
billion in fiscal year 1995 to $3.31 at the end of fiscal year 2001,
including $570 million in cost avoidance. One of the initiatives that
have paid dividends is the Navy's Alternative Restoration Technology
Team, which seeks out new technologies and helps our field divisions
apply them to site cleanups.
The Navy is working with State and EPA partners on an innovative
method to ensure long-term management for land use controls. Land use
controls are used to protect public health where residual contamination
remains. The Navy has participated in a pilot project where land use
controls would be managed by a non-profit, private trust specifically
established for this purpose. There are significant advantages for all
parties. Transferring responsibility for land use controls would allow
the DOD to essentially privatize this function, and allow economies of
scale since all land use controls in a State or region, from both
public and private parties, could be managed together. It provides a
degree of assurance to regulators and the public that the controls will
be monitored and enforced.
Shipboard Environmental Program
The Navy is a world recognized leader in environmental activities,
and has invested about $775 million in the last 5 years to identify,
develop, test, buy, and install environmentally compliant equipment on
its ships. The goal is to ensure that Navy ships are environmentally
benign. The Navy will complete the installation of pulpers and
shredders to process solid waste on all surface ships this calendar
year.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 prohibited the commercial
production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that are used by the Navy as
shipboard refrigerants and the commercial production of Halons that are
used by the Navy as firefighting agents. The Navy has developed
alternative shipboard systems that do not rely on the CFCs and Halons
whose production has stopped.\2\ The Navy is replacing CFC-12 in its
shipboard cooling systems with ozone-friendly hydrofluorocarbon (HFC)-
134a. The Navy will convert over 900 CFC-12 cooling systems to HFC-134a
by the year 2005. At the end of fiscal year 2001, 261 of 316 total air
conditioning plants have been converted and 451 of 655 refrigeration
plants have been converted. These conversions make 192 ships CFC-12-
free! We have sufficient funding to convert an additional 25 ships in
fiscal year 2002. Our fiscal year 2003 budget request would convert an
additional 29 ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Defense Logistics Agency maintains a reserve supply for
mission critical needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fleet-wide conversion of shipboard CFC-114 air-conditioning
plants to use ozone-friendly HFC-236fa is underway. The converted
cooling systems will incorporate redesigned compressors and
microprocessor-based monitoring and control that will enhance
troubleshooting and reduce the workload on sailors assigned to operate
and maintain the plants. Testing indicates that these converted plants
perform better and are quieter. As of the end of January 2002, a total
of 35 plants have been converted aboard 9 ships. Under the current
conversion schedule all 103 surface ships in the program would be
completed by 2013. An additional 10 ships will be converted in fiscal
year 2002. Our fiscal year 2003 budget request converts 13 more ships.
Under the current conversion schedule, all 103 surface ships in the
program would be completed by 2013.
Newly built ships such as the Navy's newest destroyers (Flight IIA
of Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class), the new San Antonio (LPD 17)
amphibious class, the CVN 76 aircraft carrier, and all future
shipbuilding programs will incorporate Navy designed and tested
advanced shipboard air-conditioning and refrigeration plants that also
use HFC-134a.
Approximately 70 percent of hazardous waste handled by Navy
homeports originates from used or excess hazardous materials offloaded
from ships. The Navy is buying commercial off-the-shelf pollution
prevention equipment to reduce the shipboard use of hazardous
materials. The goal is to reduce the need for hazardous material on
ships by up to 35 percent. Savings will accrue not only to reduce
environmental costs for hazardous waste disposal, but also areas
outside the environmental budget, e.g., material procurement costs,
labor, and safety. At the end of fiscal year 2001, 32 ships have been
outfitted with pollution prevention equipment. Plans are to convert 40
more in fiscal year 2002, and the fiscal year 2003 budget request
provides sufficient funds to convert 36 more. The Navy expects to
complete this effort by the end of fiscal year 2005.
The Navy has been working with the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency to establish uniform national discharge standards not currently
regulated for naval vessels. These standards will establish standards
for armed forces vessel discharges that are not currently regulated.
Phase I was completed with publication in the Federal Register in May
1999 for 25 identified ship discharges that require marine pollution
control devices or other management control efforts. The next step is
to establish performance standards for these 25 to-be-regulated
discharges. This step has proven to be more complicated than originally
thought. There are numerous combinations of vessel types, discharges,
and control devices that must be considered. Navy and EPA are working
to simplify this process by prioritizing the vessels and discharges of
most concern and using a sequential rulemaking process. We will be
updating the appropriate congressional committees on our progress later
this year with a modified schedule for the Phase II rulemaking.
Environmental Quality
The Environmental Quality program is focused on ensuring that Navy
and Marine Corps activities support fleet and fleet Marine readiness
requirements in full compliance with U.S. environmental laws and
regulations.\3\ Our environmental quality strategy emphasizes pollution
prevention (P\2\) as a means to meet environmental compliance standards
in a cost-effective manner. P\2\ eliminates the contaminant ``at the
source'' through process changes and substitution of non-hazardous or
less hazardous materials. Money invested in P\2\ can avoid permitting,
sampling, testing to ensure that permit standards are met, and
hazardous waste disposal costs. It can also improve safety and
occupational health in the workplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ At overseas locations, environmental standards are based on
Final Governing Standards which, in turn, are based on host nation
standards, Status of Forces agreements, or application of U.S.
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I believe our infrastructure is well positioned for
the future. We are accelerating the solution to long-standing housing
shortfalls for Navy and Marine Corps families and enlisted personnel.
We are making real progress on family housing PPV, and look to apply
these tools to bachelor housing. Funding to support our prior BRAC
efforts is on track, and we have a strong environmental cleanup and
property disposal plan for this year and next.
We are working within the administration to identify ways to
sustain the readiness of our forces. Although military commanders do an
outstanding job of protecting and restoring natural resources in the
areas used to train our people, urbanization and rigid application of
some environmental requirements threatens our ability to train our
sailors and marines to be ready for combat when the President calls. We
need to ensure the appropriate balance between military readiness and
the environment.
This concludes my statement. I look forward to working with the
subcommittee and staff to best support our sailors, marines, and our
Nation.

Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement.
Secretary Gibbs.

STATEMENT OF HON. NELSON F. GIBBS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE (INSTALLATIONS, ENVIRONMENT, AND LOGISTICS)

Secretary Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of the Air Force's fiscal year 2003 budget request
for military construction, family housing and dormitories,
environment programs, and realignment and closure programs.
The Air Force's total military construction and family
military housing programs play a vital role in supporting the
Air Force's operational needs, workplace productivity, and
quality of life. This subcommittee's support for those programs
has remained steadfast over the years. Last year, the Secretary
of Defense made a commitment to transform the Department of
Defense's installations and facilities into those required for
a 21st century military.
Given the ever-present competing priorities, the Air Force
has developed an executable and fiscally responsible plan for
getting its facilities on a path to recovery. The Air Force's
top priorities within this year's President's budget are to
sustain the facilities that already exist; enhance quality of
life by improving housing for both single and married members;
complying with existing environmental statutes; and supporting
new missions and weapons systems.
For fiscal year 2003, the Air Force is requesting over $4.2
billion to invest in Air Force facilities and infrastructure,
approximately the same level as was submitted in the fiscal
year 2002 request. This includes nearly $2 billion for
sustainment, restoration, and modernization to maintain our
existing infrastructure and facilities, an increase of over
$360 million from fiscal year 2002.
This budget request also reflects the Air Force's continued
commitment to take care of its people and families. Their
welfare is a critical factor to overall Air Force combat
readiness and the family housing program, dormitory program,
and other quality of life initiatives reflect a commitment by
the Air Force to provide its people the facilities they
deserve.
The Air Force is requesting $1.5 billion for family
housing, of which $700 million is to replace more than 2,100
worn-out units at 23 bases and improve more than 1,700 units at
11 bases. This request also supports privatization of more than
4,500 units at five bases.
To improve the quality of life for the unmarried junior
enlisted members, the Air Force is requesting $135 million for
its fiscal year 2000 dormitory program, which consists of 11
enlisted dormitory projects, 10 stateside and one overseas.
The fiscal year 2003 request also includes $500 million for
Active Force military construction, $50 million for the Air
National Guard, and $30 million for the Air Force Reserves.
Included in those numbers are 33 new mission projects totaling
over $350 million. The Air Force has been a leader and intends
to continue to be a leader in environmental stewardship by
focusing on its principles of enhancing operational readiness,
being a good neighbor, and effectively applying its resources.
To reach these goals, the Air Force has built an
environmental program around four key pillars: cleanup,
compliance, prevention, and conservation. The Air Force's
compliance program strives to ensure compliance with all
environmental law as it conducts its mission, and the Air Force
is proud of its record on open enforcement actions, having
reduced the total from 268 in 1972 to 17 in 2001. The
environmental compliance military construction program in
fiscal year 2003 includes four projects totaling $50 million in
support of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
In conclusion, I wanted to thank the subcommittee for its
continuing strong support of the Air Force military
construction, family housing, and environmental programs. With
the subcommittee's assistance and support, the Air Force will
meet the most urgent needs of commanders in the field while
providing quality facilities for the men and women who serve in
and are the backboard of the most respected air and space force
in the world.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gibbs follows:]

Prepared Statement by Hon. Nelson F. Gibbs

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and discuss the
Department of the Air Force's fiscal year 2003 military construction
program, and the department's environmental and realignment and closure
programs. Today, I will discuss with the subcommittee our investment
strategies for facilities, housing, environmental programs, and utility
systems.

OVERVIEW

The Air Force's total force military construction and military
family housing programs play a vital role supporting Air Force
operational needs, work place productivity, and quality of life. This
subcommittee's support for those programs has remained steadfast over
the years, and the Air Force is grateful. In recent years, the
subcommittee's support for innovative programs such as privatizing
military family housing has given the Air Force additional tools for
improving the quality of life for its members, and that support has
been appreciated.
As Secretary Rumsfeld recently testified to Congress, ``. . .
September 11 changed our Nation forever.'' The Air Force's challenge is
to simultaneously accomplish three difficult missions: to win the war
on terrorism; to restore the force through investments in procurement,
people, and modernization; and to transform the force to meet 21st
century demands. In the area of installations and facilities, this
transformation began last year with the fiscal year 2002 budget.
Last year, the Secretary of Defense made a commitment--to tranform
the Department of Defense installations and facilities into those
required for a 21st century military. Given the competing priorities
resulting from September 11, the Air Force has developed an executable
and fiscally responsible plan for getting its facilities on a path to
recovery.
While the Air Force acknowledges the importance of robust funding
for facility sustainment and modernization, other priorities and
insufficient Department of the Air Force topline have not permitted it
to fully address the problems associated with an aging infrastructure.
In fiscal year 2002, this administration proposed a significant
increase in military construction and housing programs--to $2.7
billion, the largest in the last decade. That increase was supported
and, in fact, enhanced by this subcommittee and other members of
Congress, and was welcomed by the Air Force.
For fiscal year 2003, the Air Force is requesting over $4.2 billion
to invest in Air Force facilities and infrastructure. This request
includes $2.3 billion for total force military construction and
military family housing, including $644 million for active force
military construction, $1.5 billion for military family housing, $54
million for Air National Guard military construction, and $32 million
for Air Force Reserve military construction. In addition, the Air Force
has increased the request for operations and maintenance sustainment,
restoration, and modernization (SRM) funding by $360 million over the
fiscal year 2002 request, bringing the total force facility investment
request to the same level as submitted in the fiscal year 2002 budget
request.
These Air Force programs were developed using a facility investment
strategy with the following objectives:

Accommodate new missions;
Invest in quality of life improvements;
Continue environmental leadership;
Sustain, restore, and modernize our infrastructure;
Optimize use of public and private resources; and
Continue demolition of excess, uneconomical-to-
maintain facilities.

Air Force missions and people around the world clearly depend upon
this subcommittee's understanding of, and support for, the Air Force
infrastructure programs. That support has never wavered, and for that
the Air Force thanks you.

ACCOMMODATE NEW MISSIONS

New weapon systems provide the rapid, precise, global capability
that enables combat commanders to respond quickly to conflicts in
support of national security objectives. The fiscal year 2003 total
force new mission military construction program consists of 33
projects, totaling $339 million.
These projects support the initial basing of a number of new weapon
systems; two of special significance are the F-22 Raptor and the C-17
Globemaster III. The F-22 Raptor is the Air Force's next generation air
superiority fighter. Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, will house the F-
22 flying training program. Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, will be the
location for F-22 follow-on operational test and evaluation. Langley
Air Force Base, Virginia, will be home for the first operational
squadrons. The requirements for F-22 related construction at Tyndall
were funded in the fiscal year 2002 military construction program. The
fiscal year 2003 military construction request includes one F-22
project at Nellis for $3 million, and three F-22 projects as Langley
totaling $40 million.
The C-17 Globemaster III aircraft is replacing the Air Force's
fleet of C-141 Starlifters. The C-17 provides rapid global mobility by
combining the C-141 speed and long-range transport capabilities; the C-
5 capability to carry outsized cargo; and the C-130 capability to land
on short, forward-located airstrips. The Air Force will base C-17s at
Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina; Altus Air Force Base,
Oklahoma; McChord Air Force Base, Washington; McGuire Air Force Base,
New Jersey; and Jackson Air National Guard Base, Mississippi. Thanks to
support from this subcommittee, construction requirements for
Charleston, Altus, and McChord were all funded in prior-year military
construction programs. The request for fiscal year 2003 includes a $25
million facility at McGuire Air Force Base, two facility projects for
$35 million at Jackson International Airport, and $31 million for C-17
facilities at a soon to be announced location.
Other new mission requirements in fiscal year 2003 include
supporting the Air Force's Global Strike Task Force by building B-2
aircraft hangars at Royal Air Force Fairford, United Kingdom, and B-2
aircraft parking pads at Diego Garcia. To support the Space/C\2\ISR
Task Force the Air Force will build facilities to base the Global Hawk
unmanned aerial vehicle at Beale Air Force Base, California and to
support the Defense Satellite Program and future SBIRS at Buckley Air
Force Base, Colorado. Finally, to support the Global Response Task
Force the Air Force will build facilities to support Combat Search and
Rescue aircraft at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, C-130J
aircraft at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, and expand aircraft
parking at Naval Station Rota, Spain, and Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

INVEST IN QUALITY OF LIFE

The Air Force is committed to taking care of its people and their
families. Quality of life initiatives acknowledge the increasing
sacrifices airmen make in support of the Nation and are pivotal to
recruiting and retaining the Air Force's most important resource--its
people. When members deploy, they want to know that their families are
stable, safe, and secure. Their welfare is a critical factor to overall
Air Force combat readiness, and the family housing program, dormitory
program, and other quality of life initiatives reflect a commitment by
the Air Force to provide its people the facilities they deserve.

FAMILY HOUSING

The Air Force Family Housing Master Plan provides the road map for
meeting the Department of Defense goal of providing safe, affordable,
and adequate housing for our members. The Air Force has increased its
fiscal year 2003 housing request by $132 million over the fiscal year
2002 request.
The $677 million fiscal year 2003 military family housing
replacement and improvement program replaces more than 2,100 worn-out
units at 23 bases, improves more than 1,700 units at 11 bases, and
supports privatization of more than 4,500 units at 5 bases. The Air
Force housing privatization program will be covered in more detail
later. The fiscal year 2003 housing operations and maintenance program
totals $844 million.

DORMITORIES

Just as the Air Force is committed to provide adequate housing for
families, it has an ambitious program to improve the housing for its
unaccompanied junior enlisted personnel. The Air Force's dormitory
master plan is a comprehensive, requirements-based plan, which
identifies and prioritizes dormitory military construction
requirements. The plan includes a three-phased dormitory investment
strategy. The three phases are (1) fund the replacement or conversion
of all permanent party central latrine dormitories; (2) construct new
facilities to eliminate the deficit of dormitory rooms; and (3) convert
or replace existing dormitories at the end of their useful life using
the Department of Defense ``1+1'' room standard. Phase 1 is complete,
and the Air Force is now concentrating on the final two phases of the
investment strategy.
The total requirement is 79,400 Air Force dormitory rooms. There is
currently a deficit of 12,700 rooms, and the existing inventory
includes 3,900 inadequate rooms. It will cost approximately $1 billion
to execute the Air Force Dormitory Master Plan and achieve the fiscal
year 2009 Air Force goal to eliminate the deficit and replace the worst
existing dormitories.
The fiscal year 2003 dormitory program consists of 11 enlisted
dormitory projects at ten CONUS bases and one overseas base, for a
total of $135 million. On behalf of all the airmen benefiting from this
important quality of life initiative, I want to thank the subcommittee
for its continued support of this critical quality of life effort.

FITNESS CENTERS

Other quality of life investments include community facilities,
such as fitness centers, vital in the effort to attract and retain high
quality people and their families. A strong sense of community is an
important element of the Air Force way of life, and these facilities
are important to that sense of community as well as to the physical and
psychological well-being of the airmen. The fiscal year 2003 military
construction program includes fitness centers at Andersen Air Force
Base, Guam; Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; and Royal Air Force
Lakenheath, United Kingdom.

OVERSEAS MILCON

The quality of overseas installations continues to be a priority
for the Air Force because of the impact it has on both individual and
family morale. Even though the majority of Air Force personnel are
assigned in the United States, 14 percent of its forces are serving
overseas, including 33,000 Air Force families. The Air Force overseas
base structure has stabilized after years of closures and force
structure realignments. At this level, the overseas infrastructure
still represents 19 percent of the total Air Force physical plant. The
fiscal year 2003 military construction request for European and Pacific
installations is $233 million totaling 14 projects. The program
consists of infrastructure and quality of life projects in Korea, the
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain as well as critical
facilities on Guam, Diego Garcia, and Wake Island. The subcommittee's
support for these operational and quality of life projects is equally
as important as its support for stateside projects.

PLANNING AND DESIGN/UNSPECIFIED MINOR CONSTRUCTION

The Air Force will request $53 million in planning and design for
fiscal year 2003. These funds are required to complete design of the
fiscal year 2004 construction program, and to start design of the
fiscal year 2005 projects. The Air Force is also requesting $21 million
in fiscal year 2003 for the total force unspecified minor construction
program, which is the primary means of funding small, unforeseen
projects.

OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE INVESTMENT

To sustain, restore, and modernize what it owns, the Air Force must
achieve a balance between military construction and operations and
maintenance programs. Military construction restores and re-capitalizes
facilities. Operations and maintenance funding ensures the Air Force
can perform facility sustainment activities, without which facilities
would fail prematurely. Without proper sustainment, facilities and
infrastructure wear out sooner. Operations and maintenance funding is
also used to directly address many of the critical restoration and
less-expensive recapitalization needs. Without these funds, commanders
in the field are unable to address facility requirements that impact
their near-term readiness.
With last year's ``shot in the arm'' provided to military
construction, the Air Force is now in a position to restore its
operations and maintenance balance. In fiscal year 2003, the
sustainment, restoration, and modernization share of the Air Force
operations and maintenance funding is $2.0 billion--meeting the
required sustainment level for the first time in many years. Included
in this amount is $159 million in operations and maintenance programmed
for restoration and modernization work.

OPTIMIZE USE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESOURCES

In order to accelerate the rate at which it revitalizes its housing
inventory, the Air Force has taken a measured approach to housing
privatization. It started with a few select projects, with the goal of
identifying successes and ``lessons learned'' to guide follow-on
initiatives. The first housing privatization project was awarded at
Lackland AFB, Texas, in August of 1998, and all 420 of those housing
units are constructed and occupied by military families. There are
three additional projects under construction that will result in 1,900
privatized units at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; Elmendorf Air Force
Base, Alaska; and Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. In addition, the Air
Force is on track to award eight projects in the next 12 months that
will result in an additional 9,000 privatized units across the Air
Force. On average, the Air Force has realized a five to one leverage on
the military construction investment for housing privatization, and
this kind of favorable ratio is expected to hold steady or even
increase on other projects in the outyears. As mentioned earlier, the
fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $7.8 million to support the
privatization of more than 4,500 units at five bases: Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama; Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Cannon Air Force
Base, New Mexico; Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina; and F.E. Warren
Air Force Base, Wyoming.
The Air Force continues to pursue privatization of utility systems
at Air Force installations. The goal is to privatize utility systems
where it makes economic sense and does not negatively impact national
security. The Air Force has identified 434 of 513 systems as potential
privatization candidates, and has released requests for proposals for
242 systems and have completed the process on 161 systems.

CONTINUE DEMOLITION OF EXCESS, UNECONOMICAL-TO-MAINTAIN FACILITIES

For the past 6 years, the Air Force has pursued an aggressive
effort to demolish or dispose of facilities that are not economical to
sustain or restore. From fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001, the
Air Force demolished 9.6 million-square feet of non-housing building
space. It expects to demolish an additional 4.4 million-square feet in
fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003, for a total reduction of 14
million square feet. This is equivalent to demolishing six Air Force
bases equal to the combined square footage of Whiteman, Goodfellow,
Moody, Brooks, Vance, and Pope Air Force Bases. Air Force demolition
efforts continue to be a success story enabling it to reduce the strain
on its infrastructure funding by eliminating unneeded facilities.

ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP

The Air Force has remained a leader in environmental stewardship by
focusing on its principles of enhancing operational readiness, being a
good neighbor, and effectively applying its resources.
To reach these goals, the Air Force built its billion-dollar a year
environmental program around four key pillars--cleanup, compliance,
pollution prevention, and conservation. It is now moving to the next
level of excellence by beginning implementation of an environment,
safety, and occupational health management system, based on the
International Standard ISO 14001, to continually improve its mission
performance by systematically reducing environment, safety, and
occupational health risks and costs.
The Air Force has made great strides in the cleanup of land and
resources impacted by its operations, ensuring that it protects human
health and the environment. Its strategy is to work with community
stakeholders and evaluate relative risk, and then to cleanup or lower
the risk at the worst sites first. The Air Force is on target to reach
Defense Planning Guidance goals for cleanup of all ``high relative
risk'' sites by 2007, and all ``medium relative risk'' sites by 2011.
Staying the course will be a challenge as new cleanup standards are
proposed for chemicals such as perchlorate and trichloroethylene. These
new cleanup standards may cause both costs and timelines to change.
The Air Force supports recommended changes to the military
construction reporting process recommended by the Department of Defense
for constructing remediation facilities to prevent delays and carry out
its cleanup responsibilities.
The Air Force's compliance program ensures compliance with
environmental law as it conducts its mission activities. The Air Force
is proud of its record on Open Enforcement Actions, having reduced them
from 263 in 1992, to 17 in 2001. Its environmental compliance military
construction program in fiscal year 2003 includes four projects
totaling $47 million in support of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
Through its pollution prevention program, the Air Force has
successfully reduced or eliminated pollution at the source. Its program
allowed the Air Force to better the Department of Defense goal of 50
percent reduction in hazardous waste between 1992 and 2000, achieving a
50 percent goal by 1996, and then reaching a 66 percent reduction by
2000.
The Air Force's conservation programs offer some of the most
visible and rewarding results of its commitment to being a good steward
of its resources. Land set aside decades ago for the Air Force to
conduct its military mission has also allowed unique American plant and
animal species to flourish, and important American cultural resources
and historic structures to remain preserved and appreciated.
Ironically, it is precisely its commitment to conservation that now
threatens the Air Force's ability to carry out its primary mission of
protecting national security. Military installations, and test and
training ranges, occupy land ``zoned'' for military operations and
training. Additional demands from growing local communities, the
resident plant and animal species now rare outside the installation
boundaries, the installation's historic structures made significant due
to past military successes, or the preserved relicts of early
Americans, now create other land-use designations and limitations
overlaid on land designated for military purposes. In most cases, these
potentially competing requirements can be accommodated. The Air Force
is working closely with the Department of Defense to develop its
comprehensive strategy to address this issue of encroachment.
The Air Force's environmental compliance military construction
program in fiscal year 2003 includes four projects totaling $47 million
in support of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. The program includes
upgrading two coal-fired power plants in Alaska to meet environmental
air emissions requirements. In addition, the Air Force is upgrading the
water distribution and stormwater drainage systems at Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California, to comply with environmental standards. All of
these projects satisfy Department of Defense Class-1 requirements,
which refer to conditions or facilities currently out of compliance
with environmental laws or regulations, including those subject to a
compliance agreement, or refer to projects and activities which, if not
corrected, would result in an out of compliance situation in the
current program year.

REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURES

This summer the Air Force lowered the flags at Kelly and McClellan
Air Force Bases, its two most complex closure actions resulting from
the Base Realignment and Closure Act. The Air Force has now completed
all 39 of its base closure and realignment actions (22 closures and 17
realignments). As part of the closure process, the Air Force has worked
with the local reuse authority at each base to minimize the impact on
the local community from the closure. This effort has led to the
creation of over 48,000 jobs and an annual payroll of $1.4 billion in
the affected communities.
While these facilities are being returned to their respective
communities, the Air Force has a continuing responsibility for
environmental clean up from past industrial activities. The Air Force
takes this responsibility seriously, having spent $ 2.4 billion since
1991 in environmental clean up at closing bases. For fiscal year 2003,
the Air Force is requesting $119 million to continue the clean up.
Although past base closure rounds have reduced its infrastructure
footprint, the Air Force still retains excess infrastructure.
Maintenance of this excess infrastructure forces the Air Force to sub-
optimize use of available operations and maintenance funds. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 provides the
Air Force an opportunity to divest itself of this unneeded
infrastructure. In preparation for the 2005 base closure round, the Air
Force will focus first on sizing its force, and then on sizing the
infrastructure to support that force.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I again thank the subcommittee for its strong
support of Air Force military construction, family housing, and
environmental programs. With the committee's assistance and support,
the Air Force will meet the most urgent needs of commanders in the
field while providing quality facilities for the men and women who
serve in and are the backbone of the most respected aerospace force in
the world.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
I have several questions.
Mr. DuBois, was the likelihood that any particular base
might be the subject of a future base closure action used as a
criterion in deciding what bases would receive military
construction funding for new facilities or sustainment funding
for current facilities in assembling the fiscal year 2003
budget request?
Further, will such criteria be used by this administration
in the preparation of the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 budget
requests?
Mr. DuBois. Mr. Chairman, as I tried to indicate in my
opening remarks, there was no involvement because there is no
current analysis that would yield categories of where excess
capacity currently exists by force structure or fighting plans.
I think it is important, as I indicated, to recognize that the
only way to rationalize infrastructure is through BRAC, and we
appreciate that authority. But a short answer to your question
is no, we did not use the MILCON appropriation on the basis of
certain bases getting one project or another.
The Secretary of Defense testified that he and the Service
Secretaries and Service Chiefs were focusing on mission
critical requirements, highest of the high priorities. They
funded competing priorities. With respect to the
infrastructure, at OSD's level, and I think this is also true
for the services, the decisions were made in a macro sense. If
a particular installation received an investment for
infrastructure, sustainment, restoration, or modernization, it
was driven by requirements and was not facilities-centric.
Senator Akaka. The Department of Defense has stated that we
have 20 to 25 percent excess capacity in our facilities. Will
the Department make every effort to use the existing capacity
to house a new Commander in Chief for homeland defense, called
the Northern Command (CINCNORTH), before requesting funds to
build new headquarters facilities?
Mr. DuBois. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the CINCNORTH,
that proposal is in front of the President, the so-called
unified command plan. The physical location of the headquarters
of CINCNORTH, the responsibility being Canada, U.S., and
Mexico, homeland security if you will, has not been determined.
In point of fact, the Secretary only recently asked me to begin
to think about what the options are, not just physical space. I
want to just touch upon that in a second--what is available,
where, and why.
You can rest assured that at this time the Secretary is
inclined to put the headquarters of such a CINC on current
military reservation land. We do not intend to go and buy land,
build, or lease space for it. It may be that we have to build
something on a current military installation.
The other issue is what are the criteria that one ought to
follow to satisfy the requirements of such a CINC, given the
mission? We are in the process of thinking that through.
Homeland security within the Department of Defense is a new
concept and one that drives us toward a new set of requirements
for the CINC's physical location.
Senator Akaka. I would ask each one of the three service
witnesses to give us their assessment of the status of your
facilities overseas, especially in Germany and Korea, and how
the quality of the facilities our forces live and work in
overseas compares to the facilities here in the United States.
May I hear from all three service witnesses?
Mr. DuBois. If I might just introduce their answers: The
military construction and family housing budget,
percentagewise, is 77-23, 77 percent in the United States, 23
percent overseas. In terms of total DOD spending it is 79
percent in the United States, 21 percent overseas. Each service
has a slightly different cut on that.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Gibbs.
Secretary Gibbs. As in the United States, the foreign
facilities run the gamut from some that are in very good shape
that we are justifiably proud of and others that are not and
need to be enhanced. In setting its priorities both for the
housing activities and for military construction, the Air Force
takes those into consideration. It ranks its projects
notwithstanding their physical location and we believe we are
working on those with the greatest need around the world.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori.
Secretary Fiori. Yes, sir. As we look at both in the United
States and overseas, our overall condition of our
infrastructure is what we consider C-4 in our installation
reporting status. In our housing area it is C-3 to C-4, which
is not the highest in the world. Overseas housing, in general,
is even poorer than what we have here and consequently,
particularly in Korea, we are concentrating on putting new
barracks in as rapidly as we can.
As I mentioned, we are reorganizing in Germany to get to
one facility instead of 13 facilities, and in consonance with
that we are going to have a fairly major construction project
for infrastructure housing and also the normal MILCON
facilities. That should provide a significant improvement.
Our other concern, particularly in Korea, is that we do not
have much family housing, and that has affected the morale of
our people on unaccompanied tours. We have goals to increase
accompanied tours to 25 percent by 2010, and to get about half
our families there by 2020.
We have a decent plan to improve family housing overseas
and we are certainly committed to executing it.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Secretary Johnson.
Secretary Johnson. We believe that overseas facilities are
equal and in some cases better than the U.S. facilities. As you
well know, we get strong support in Japan and we have a large
presence there. I talked about the home port ashore program.
They will build those 5,000 rooms for us when the time comes.
We have also invested heavily in Italy at Sigonella and
other places. As you well know, we have not had a choice but to
invest in Bahrain because of the activities there. In this
year's budget we have $188 million in fiscal year 2003 for
overseas MILCON and family housing together. We have stressed
quality, and we have also gotten some support from the host
nations.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Let me now call on my colleague for his questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to build a little bit on something you brought up. I
was not going to, but I think it is significant. We are saying
that it is just about three-to-one in terms of CONUS versus
overseas, and we all know the reason for that. A major
contributing reason is that there is no constituency overseas.
I think it is natural that we at this table would be a little
more concerned about things in our State than we are someplace
else, everything else being equal.
This is a serious problem. Every year we have gone through
this thing. I just got back 2 weeks ago from looking at housing
facilities in Baumholder, Germany. It is about as bad as I have
ever seen in terms of the on-base family housing.
Secretary Fiori, have you actually been there and seen that
particular one?
Secretary Fiori. No, sir.
Senator Inhofe. I hope that you get a chance to see it.
That has to be the poster child for the very worst, including
stairwells where they have to walk up to the sixth floor and
then walk all the way down to the basement to do laundry. It is
something that should not have been tolerated. I am not blaming
anybody. This is what you are inheriting and it is something we
need to address.
Secretary Fiori. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Also, while there is some very good stuff
that I have seen overseas, it seems like there is no plan for
improvements.
Secretary Gibbs, you have talked about how our retention is
moving up due to September 11. I think we all understand that.
But where are we going to be a few months or a few years from
now? I can tell you right now that in terms of quality of life
and retention the facility I mentioned just has to be
addressed. We found some others almost that bad in different
places.
I would like to ask the four of you what ideas are out
there to overcome this political obstacle of prioritizing
things at home as opposed to overseas?
Mr. DuBois. Senator, you clearly point out one of our
problems.
Senator Inhofe. Which is our fault, not yours. But how do
we overcome it?
Mr. DuBois. One of the interesting statistics is, as I
said, that 77 percent of the MILCON is U.S., 23 percent
overseas, with approximately 25 percent of our forces overseas.
I think there are several ways we are going to try to deal
with this. I have had several conversations with General
Schwartz in Korea, as well as General Ralston, who I understand
testified today. I spent nearly an hour with him when he came
in from Europe to talk specifically about this issue.
With respect to the two areas in particular, Korea and
Europe, we have a land partnership program to reduce our
footprint program. We are doing this because we have never
supported adequately the infrastructure of our military in
either place. We have to reduce that and use those precious
MILCON and investment dollars in operations and maintenance,
for sustainment, restoration, and modernization on a reduced
amount of real estate and infrastructure.
That is one way that we think we can better manage the
appropriation which you make to our Department. I think the
second thing has got to be privatization. You have heard a lot
about privatization in the United States. We have a similar
program in Europe called build to lease. These programs
leverage private capital in Europe to build appropriate and
adequate housing for our personnel, wherein we then lease it
back.
Similar to privatization in the U.S., we use the Bachelor
Allowance for Housing (BAH) as the cash flow to attract private
investment. It was a pilot project over the last several years
and now it has proven itself.
Senator Inhofe. There are some places where that is working
quite well, too.
Mr. DuBois. Yes, sir. I intend to work with my colleagues
to try to make that happen in more places.
Senator Inhofe. Rather than have our other three witnesses
respond now, please do it for the record in writing, unless
there is something you would like to add now.
[The information referred to follows:]

Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force facility investment strategy
concentrates resources on its Total Force top priorities. The Air Force
integrates Total Force MILCON requirements into a single priority list
and funds the most urgent needs of the Total Air Force within budget
constraints. Urgency of need takes precedence over ``fair share.''
Geographic location is not a consideration. Because of the general
condition of its overseas infrastructure, the Air Force is seeing
greater portions of its budget request for overseas projects.
In the fiscal year 2003 request, 32 percent of the Air Force's
MILCON program is overseas, including 22 percent at permanent overseas
locations and the additional 10 percent supporting warfighting missions
at other than permanent locations (e.g., Diego Garcia). In fiscal year
2003, 23 percent of the Air Force's family housing request is for
overseas installations, consistent with the 22 percent of the total
family housing inventory that is overseas.
Secretary Johnson. To date, all of our attention has been focused
on privatizing military family housing. We are now in a position to
build on our experiences and apply the principles of privatization to
address our critical bachelor housing needs. In November 2001, we held
an industry forum with representatives from the development, property
management, and financial segments of the private sector. Although
bachelor housing privatization presents unique challenges, the
consensus was that bachelor housing privatization can work. Finally,
although Title 10 provides authority for bachelor housing
privatization, there are some legislative obstacles that prevent
implementation. We are prepared to work with the committees to address
these considerations.

Secretary Fiori. I did want to say two things. First, I
said we wanted 50 percent of our families in Korea in 2010. It
is 25 percent in 2010, 50 percent by 2020. Second, in Korea and
in our request for Grafenwoehr, Germany, we are addressing many
of these problems and we are doing the lease-build situation in
Grafenwoehr as we consolidate. We need the support. This budget
requests approximately $600 million through 2009 or 2010 just
in Germany. It is a serious problem to get those resources, but
we are going to work on it.
Senator Inhofe. Building on something that our chairman
brought up, let me ask a question in a different way: Are all
of you saying that the delay in base closure is not related to
the problems that we are having in getting these units funded?
Do you all agree with that?
Secretary Fiori. Yes, sir, I do.
Secretary Johnson. I agree, sir.
Secretary Gibbs. Yes, Senator. I went back and checked with
the people who deal with the details and I am convinced that
there was not a BRAC consideration in the determination of
prioritizing the Air Force's request.
Senator Inhofe. I am looking at the comptroller's report
dated February 2002, which says in regards to modernization of
infrastructure: ``Rate slowed by base closure dates.'' Is this
incorrect?
Mr. DuBois. As I tried to indicate, it is inescapable that
we will have less infrastructure at some point after 2005 than
we do today. Did that enter into the macro decision with
respect to the five major accounts in defense? What was the
only account to be less this year than the President's request
last year? It was MILCON.
Did BRAC delay, defer, imply, or impact to a measurable
extent that the MILCON would go down by a specified amount? The
answer is no. But it is inescapable that it is out there. I do
not want to say that Dr. Zakheim was wrong. I want to say quite
frankly that from my point of view the emphasis on BRAC was
incorrect. As the three Assistant Service Secretaries have
said, decisions were made on the basis of mission critical
requirements, not installation-specific requirements.
Senator Inhofe. If it was not a consideration, I will
accept that and forget about this report.
Let me just clarify my position. I have been supportive of
the process. I was elected to the House in 1986 and Dick Armey
came up with this idea and it was one that had to be addressed.
You had to take politics out of it. I did support it and I
supported it through the four BRAC rounds. It was not until the
fourth one, the last one, when politics entered into it, the
very thing that gave birth to the concept of having a non-
political BRAC process.
We have closed 96 major installations, 150 total. BRAC has
worked well, but it fell apart this last time and that is what
is creating the problem right now.
The other problem is that we know from this meeting today
and from previous hearings that even though we have had an
increase of $48 billion, it is still inadequate in terms of
taking care of the needs that we have out there. My feeling is
we need to have access to as much money to take care of the
immediate problems, some of those that we are talking about
today.
One thing we know for sure is that when you close an
installation it costs money, for a period of 2 to 4 years,
depending on the type of installation.
I do not want you to think that I have always opposed the
process. I was a supporter of the process. I also have to say
that Oklahoma is the only State that has actually benefited
from all four rounds, so that says something about Oklahoma.
I am not going to overextend my time, but I briefly want to
raise the concern I have had over a long period of time over
the Vieques problem. I do not think any of you or anyone at
this side of the table can remember a time or a place in
history when we allowed a bunch of illegal trespassers to kick
us off a range that we had.
I have one of the largest ranges in my State of Oklahoma,
Secretary Fiori, and it is one that they call the ``Sound of
Freedom.'' We are talking about a huge range there. But this
being the case, we wrote into the defense authorization bill
last year provisions addressing Vieques, anticipating this may
become a political issue and there may be politicians trying to
cater to the Hispanic vote, whether that person at that time
could have been Al Gore, George Bush, or John McCain. We
actually wrote that certain things are going to happen if that
became a reality.
One of the things we wrote in to law is the closure of two
major installations in Puerto Rico: Roosevelt Roads and Fort
Buchanan. I would hope, and if you want to make any comment,
that many of these benefits that have gone to the island are
going to cease because they are there by virtue of the fact
that we had that opportunity to use that range.
Any comments on that in the panel as to that?
Secretary Johnson. Certainly, sir. If we pull out of
Vieques other activities that support it at Roosevelt Roads and
so forth would be downsized accordingly. We certainly have not
looked at the level of downsizing, whether we would have
remaining missions there or not. But we agree with you that if
you come out of Vieques you come out of the support base also.
Senator Inhofe. That level actually is written into the
law, so you might go back and look at that, because it is
pretty specific. We had to do that because I did not want to be
the bad guy coming along afterwards saying we have to revoke
certain benefits.
I would like to hear from Secretary Fiori and Secretary
Gibbs. Vieques is critical for integrated training of marines
and sailors, and as recently as 2 weeks ago I looked at the
substitute they are using for that training. Everybody agrees
it is not adequate. We have already had one accident in Kuwait
that has cost six lives, five of which were American lives, as
a result of not having live-fire training.
I would like to know from the Army and the Air Force
perspective, recognizing this is not just a Navy problem. If we
allow Vieques to close, it is going to happen to other ranges.
I would like to have you share with us the potential
encroachment you might see from some of your ranges as a result
if they are successful in closing Vieques.
Secretary Fiori. Sir, our most recent experience are on
encroachment was in the Massachusetts area and that had to do
with the fact that the water was contaminated. We did have an
agreement with the State that we could use the facility, but we
cannot do live-fire training. So that certainly is a major
handicap, but we believe we have sufficient ability and space
there that we can do a certain number of work-arounds.
Obviously, when you need live-fire training you are going to
have to go to one of our facilities and that is going to take
people away from their families.
Similarly, in Hawaii we have only 37 allowable exercises a
year and we have a need, just for the Army, for at least 18
more per year. As I mentioned to you, that eliminates the
access for our National Guard, our Reserves, and also the
marines that were using our these facilities.
We are looking at expanding our National Training Center.
The encroachment there has more to do with environmental issues
and time-distance. As I mentioned to you, we need some larger
spaces if we are going to move faster.
Senator Inhofe. You also have some protest encroachment
there, too.
Secretary Fiori. Yes, sir. Right now we are working around
it. I visited Fort Hood and saw some training there. They are
doing a good job of using creative means to train their
soldiers in live firing. They have been innovative in their
safety procedures. They always want to guarantee safety in live
firing, but there are some very innovative ways that our
soldiers have figured out how to use the geography of the place
and not always firing to the same hole in the ground. There are
some very imaginative ideas going on but it is a constant
concern.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gibbs.
Secretary Gibbs. Secretary Fiori used the phrase that we
hear a lot in the Air Force: work-around. We work each
situation individually and have been successful in most
situations to avoid substantive diminution in the training. But
we are beginning to become concerned as people get closer to
some of the reservations.
I think you are aware of the Nellis Air Force Range. There
is an innovative solution there. We have a load-out area off
the end of the runway. We have airplanes taking off with live
weapons headed to the range and developers wanted to come in
and develop that area. We are working with the Department of
the Interior to do a land swap to give the developer some other
lands so that we can get that.
We are managing the problem at this point, but we watch it
very carefully.
Senator Inhofe. As someone who has been involved in this
issue for a long time, let me just be sure that you understand
that right after the Vieques issue came up, all of a sudden
there was a new way to close a range: protest and do things
that are illegal. I was in Capo Teulada in southern Sardinia
and there were articles in the newspaper saying, ``If they get
by with that, why are we going to let them come over here and
bomb our beach?'' The same thing in Cape Wrath in northern
Scotland. I can show you the newspaper articles.
So it affects all ranges. I know I have abused my time, but
maybe for the record, Secretary Johnson, since I cannot stay
for another round, you could address the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) thing. We know the NEPA process takes
generally 18 to 24 months, but in case of ranges it takes 2 to
3 years. If we are going to have a substitute we are going to
have to go through that process. Is it safe to say that we have
not started that process anyplace right now?
Secretary Johnson. We certainly have been thinking.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but thinking does not help. If you are
going to be closing it down in 2003 and it is going to take 2
to 3 years to go through that process before an alternative
comes up, that is a serious problem.
Secretary Johnson. We have been thinking and we are
progressing on some of the ranges that we can expand. We do not
have an actual NEPA that has been signed yet, but we are
preparing them.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Secretary--Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much. I have enough
trouble being a Senator right now, Mr. Chairman. I am not ready
to take on a secretary role as well. But thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Particularly after today.
Senator Ben Nelson. Particularly after today, exactly.
I have two temptations right now. The first is to raise the
questions of how you can decide what your needs and base
support are before you have decided where you are going. But
that is for another day if it comes back up, particularly in
light of all the debate today and all the discussion about
homeland security. I think the cart's clearly before the horse
on this. I think it ought to be about base realignment.
Voting for BRAC has created more opportunities for
consultants to run around the country and help themselves as
they work with communities and others to try to tell people how
to keep from having their base closed. You can tell from my
comment how I voted. But again, that is for another day.
My second temptation is to commend you on the 3 percent
budget reduction. But before I do I want to satisfy myself that
it is not just a cost-cutting measure. I think it was George
Will who said that in Washington if you want to get out of a
10-foot hole this is the one place you can assume that you have
an 11-foot ladder.
Remember the fire station I talked about at Offutt,
Secretary Gibbs? If you want to put things off and call it a
hockey stick or if you want to force things out into year 2005,
where I understand that that may be, then the question is, are
you really dealing with the needs? I remember a year ago
looking at all the leaky roofs and pipes, and so I have to ask
myself and then maybe ask you the same, how can we suddenly
with the budget process do more with less?
As a former governor, I used to try to do that and I
commend it when people do. I do not want to be critical of
people who are trying to do that, if that is what the case is.
But if it is just a matter of cost-cutting to show less in this
budget so that there can be more money spent on other
priorities, which I think are also important, then I raise a
question of whether or not it is truly good budgeting process.
I question if it is just making the numbers work out in the
bottom line after you have decided what the bottom line is and
work your way back.
Maybe you can help me come to the conclusion that the leaky
roofs are going to get taken care of. Senator Inhofe was
concerned about what he saw. I just spent a night at K2 in
Uzbekistan. I do not expect you to take care of the issues over
there right now. That is temporary.
Mr. DuBois. Not this year, at least.
Senator Ben Nelson. That is exactly right. But I do know
from my own personal experience of having seen the evidence of
infrastructure not being taken care of that it is hard for me
to believe that you can do all that job and still cut the
budget 3 percent. It is also hard for me to believe that it
does not have something to do with BRAC somewhere along the
line.
I think the extension of BRAC to 2005 threw a monkey wrench
into a lot of this, because I do not know how you do decide to
spend money on facilities without thinking if they will be
around. I have done budgeting in the past myself, so I know the
challenges. I am a friend of the court. I am not your enemy.
But I do think I have the obligation to ask the difficult
questions.
Mr. DuBois. They are very difficult questions, Senator
Nelson, and there are days, perhaps more days than not, when I
think I have an 11-foot hole and only a 10-foot ladder.
Senator Ben Nelson. Could be.
Mr. DuBois. The issue of leaky roofs and pipes and broken
windows are issues that are dealt with through the sustainment
account. The sustainment, that is to say trying to maintain
what we have now as best we can, is what, quite frankly, this
budget is all about. It is true that last year we had an
enormous increase in MILCON, as well as sustainment, with your
help.
I do want to point out that this year's MILCON request is
the second largest in 6 years. Last year was the largest. But
with respect to sustainment, what we call the operations and
maintenance sustainment, is up year over year 2 percent for the
Army. The Navy and the Marine Corps are up year over year 14
percent. The Air Force is up year over year 18 percent.
Sustainment was our number one priority, but it is true that on
the restoration and modernization account, the account that
would be used to replace a 20-year roof was drawn down.
I was trying to explain this to my wife last night, and I
said it would be as if you lived in Nebraska and in Washington,
DC, and you maintained two homes. You have been here for some
time and now you and your wife have decided that 3 years from
now you are going to move to one or the other places. In the
meantime, both houses have 20-year roofs, and their life is 20
years. You probably are not going to replace the roof on either
house until you have made the decision 3 years from now as to
which house you are going to end up living in.
The artificiality of my metaphor is obviously that in the
case of the military we do not get to sell one of those houses.
It is not like investing to get a higher return when I
eventually sell the house or make the decision of which one to
sell. I must give one of those houses to a nonprofit, in the
case of the military, a no-cost economic conveyance. It is that
kind of decision that creates the framework within which we
live.
To continue my analogy, while we might not replace the
roof, we would repair all the windows, leaky pipes, and the
garage door opener that is busted. I apologize that it is
somewhat simplistic, but there is a certain similarity to the
difficult decision that we face.
Senator Ben Nelson. That is why I wondered about extending
BRAC. If we are going to do BRAC, it seems to me that they
ought to do it at the earliest possible moment, not extend it.
You only extend the problem that much longer. Incidentally,
keep the facilities in Nebraska because, if you are like we
are, the hail took care of our roof last year and we have a
brand new one.
Mr. DuBois. I will make a note of that.
Senator Ben Nelson. I understand the nature of the problem
and that is why I say I want to be a friend of the process
here. But I think we have to ask the difficult questions about
whether or not BRAC is playing a big role in the concept. It is
hard for me to believe it is not, but I take your word on it.
I have been known as being tight as three coats of paint.
As a matter of fact, part of the budget woes in Nebraska are
due to the fact that I cut taxes. That is what somebody said
the other day, which I think is fine.
But I think it is important to put the money where it needs
to be when it needs to be there, and I think increasing the
amount in this area to take care of not just leaky roofs, but
the other needs, is a good expenditure of money.
Mr. DuBois. Yes, sir. I concur. Any of my colleagues want
to comment?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. We intentionally placed our
emphasis on quality of life and sustainment, as opposed to some
of the MILCON. We're doing what you talked about. But we also
placed a great emphasis, as did the other departments, on
destroying buildings that are no longer needed on
installations.
We spend $45 million destroying buildings. I cannot imagine
the savings we achieved. If you leave a building up, someone
finds a use for it. So if we do not need it, we destroy it.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force went through a lengthy
debate in terms of how to use the construction funds and the
conclusion was that we have to support that which we have
first. They are deteriorating. When I first came on and got
last year's installation readiness report (IRR), I was somewhat
appalled. I got the next one 6 months later and it was not any
better.
So the Air Force has very specifically made the
determination to put money into sustainment. We have also had
the opportunity to spread it around better because the projects
are smaller and we can cover more areas. In the new MILCON
budget, the decision was principally in those cases where we
have to be prepared to take on new missions and new weapons
systems. As I said, over $350 million of the $500 million in
new MILCON is for that. The remainder, which is only seven
projects, are really for items that just had to be replaced.
That was really the requirement. If we have something that has
to be replaced, we put it in. If we can live with it another
year, we are going to do that, and we are going to spread the
money around.
As it relates to your comment on BRAC, if you do not mind
my taking a moment, I would agree with you that sooner would
have been better, but that is not reality. Once the Air Force
has made an overt decision, we will not be talking at all in
calendar year 2002 regarding individual facilities. That time
is going to be taken to do the force structure study, which is
required to identify what must be based and generally or
generically where it may be based. It is not relative to any
individual facility. We will not start that process until 2003.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement.
Since it has come up, I want to pursue the issue of
encroachment. I am concerned that some in the Department view
the so-called encroachment problem as one that is mainly caused
by environmental statutes. In my view, the problem is much more
complex and any effective solution must recognize and address
the complex reality. We cannot single out one statute like the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), if we want to seriously address
this issue.
The Department of Defense should not seek solutions that
exempt it from the laws that others must follow. Any workable
solution will require consultation and cooperation with other
communities and interested parties.
Last year, this subcommittee held a hearing on the impact
of various factors that can affect military training, which
some have called encroachment issues. At that hearing witnesses
representing the three military services agreed that it was
important for the Department to address environmental issues in
partnership with States, local communities, and regulatory
authorities. For example, General Robert Van Antwerp, the Army
witness, explained that addressing these issues will ``require
a partnership, strong emphasis on outreach, on community
involvement. It means partnership with our friends and
neighbors who border our installations. It means partnership
with other agencies, the regulatory agencies that have the
ability to govern and to determine what are the areas that
should be set aside for threatened and endangered species and
regulatory things.''
I would like to ask would you agree that it is important
for the Department to work in partnership with local
communities and regulatory agencies to address encroachment
issues, and will your Departments meet with other agencies and
outside groups to attempt to reach consensus on any statutory
or regulatory changes that may be proposed?
Mr. DuBois. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, the Deputy
Secretary in December of last year set up an integrated team to
represent each service and to represent various disciplines
within the Department to assess the impact on realistic combat
training and readiness. With respect to the term
``encroachment,'' encroachment is, as you have pointed out, not
necessarily an issue which is solely focused on endangered or
threatened species or environmental legislation of the past.
We have a 30-year legacy in this country. In fact, I
believe this is the 30th anniversary of the Clean Water Act.
The Department of Defense recognizes its responsibilities with
respect to environmental stewardship. I think that it has been
documented and testified to by members of the Department, the
Nature Conservancy, the EPA, and others, that the Department
does a superb job, perhaps even second to none, when it comes
to the maintenance of natural resources.
Spectrum competition, urban density, and air space
management all go into the encroachment basket. We are and we
have been for the past several months in discussions in an
informal and lower level way. It was not at the Cabinet level
by any means, with EPA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Department of Interior, and the Fish
and Wildlife Service, on issues that are of concern to us.
I personally have met with Secretary Norton, Administrator
Christie Todd Whitman, and the head of NOAA, Vice Admiral
Lautenbacher, to discuss generalities and issues in this arena.
I also want to address your very important point that all
politics is local. The local land trusts, governments, and
chapters of the Nature Conservancy are the entities with which
we have worked in the past and continue to work in the future
to expand, not contract, critical habitat in and around our
military installations. As you probably know, at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, there is an active program with the Nature
Conservancy and the Fish and Wildlife Service to allow property
and lands around Fort Bragg to come under their control. In
this case, this is so the critical habitat of the red-cockaded
woodpecker is not solely within the fence line of the base, but
rather extends outside the fence line, allowing us an
opportunity to train effectively at Fort Bragg.
Fort Hood, a military installation that is a corps
headquarters with two divisions and an air cavalry regiment,
has nearly 200,000 acres, of which 154,000 are devoted to
training. Of that 154,000 acres, however, only 45,000 are
unrestricted. The other 105,000 plus have some form of
environmental restriction.
We are trying to determine an appropriate balance. We are
not making in any way, shape, or form a suggestion that
amendments to environmental legislation is the way to go.
However, there are administrative and regulatory actions which
we are considering asking the administration to consider. The
House Armed Services Committee has called a hearing to
specifically focus on this issue. We are trying to determine
how the Defense Department and the executive branch responds to
these very appropriate questions.
We know and recognize that in the final analysis we must
work with the local communities to determine what is best for
managing natural resources, including endangered and threatened
species, on our current military installations.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for that.
I want to make a statement and hear how you feel about it.
I must say that Makua, Hawaii, has been a model of how these
issues can be resolved.
Mr. DuBois. I agree with that, sir.
Senator Akaka. I commend the services for the way they
worked it out and for taking into consideration the community
and their traditions. I thank you for that.
Are there any further comments to make on that issue?
Secretary Gibbs. I do not have any.
Secretary Fiori. I do not.
Secretary Johnson. I certainly support the joint effort.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
I would like to ask the assistant secretaries of each of
the military departments whether your operation and maintenance
amounts fully fund 100 percent of your sustainment
requirements, that is the amount needed to keep your facilities
in current condition, in fiscal year 2003. If not, then how
much additional funding would each department require to fully
fund facilities sustainment?
Do your sustainment requirements include all current
facilities or are you basing your requirements on less than
your current inventory in anticipation of the 2005 base closure
round?
Mr. DuBois. If I just might set the stage for my
colleagues. As I indicated, facilities sustainment, both
funding and requirements, is focused on our current footprint.
It is not focused on some artificiality that we only want to
sustain 20 percent less than what we really have. For all the
services the requirement in fiscal year 2003 is $6.021 billion.
We are sustaining it at $5.578 billion for a 92.6 percent
level.
Mr. McCord and Mr. Lauffer can do the mathematics, but the
issue here is it is not 100 percent. The services range from
the Air Force at 97.6 percent to the Navy at 83.9 percent. But
there is also an uneven level of current conditions, if you
will, in the services and therefore they have different levels.
But all services were at a 92.6 level, an all-time high.
It is true there is a delta and the delta is in the
vicinity of $300 or $400 million. Would it be executable? I
would have to defer to my colleagues. Perhaps Secretary Johnson
wants to go first.
Secretary Johnson. We certainly have to make tradeoffs as
we build our budget and we intentionally did not go over 90
percent on sustainment due to execution. Would we like to have
more money? Of course we would, but there are other areas that
probably would come first if we had discretionary funds.
On sustainment, I am not sure I would ever want to do 100
percent.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Gibbs.
Secretary Gibbs. I have a slightly different number than
Mr. DuBois does. I do not know if it is in the numerator or the
denominator, but the Air Force believes it funded 100 percent
of the sustainment using the OSD model this year. That is an
internal decision that we had made on sustaining what we have,
and that was the guidepost that we used. I do not know whether
there are more facilities that popped up late, but we believe
we funded 100 percent.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori.
Secretary Fiori. We set our Active, National Guard, and
Reserves all at 92 percent. I think that is an achievable goal
this year and we will be able to carry it out. We are still
looking at the importance of barracks, strategic mobility, and
transformation in the order of priorities as we established our
budget for 2003.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, the Army has announced the
locations of four of six Interim Brigade Combat Teams. One of
these will be the Second Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division
at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Of course, I have supported the
Army transformation effort. It is important that the Army
provides the funding needed to make both these interim brigades
and its larger transformation goals successful.
The first question is what is the total funding required in
terms of military construction, land acquisition, and related
costs to modify the host installations for these new brigades?
How much of that funding is in the fiscal year 2003 budget
request and FYDP? Finally, how many of the six brigades does
the funding in the FYDP support?
Secretary Fiori. Yes, sir. For the fiscal 2003 budget we
have $195 million. For fiscal year 2004 and out we are
predicting a total amount of approximately $763 million for the
six interim brigade combat teams. We will start spending on the
Schofield Barracks brigade in 2004.
For this year we have Fort Lewis, Fort Wainwright, and Fort
Polk, where we are continuing to finish those facilities. The
total amount for these six brigades from the very beginning was
about $958 million. The total amount that will be at Schofield
is $308 million.
Senator Akaka. I am particularly interested, as I said, in
knowing how we are coming along with the brigade combat teams
and your plans of funding in the FYDP. That is the reason for
the question. I understand that you are planning the funding
for the six brigades in the FYDP.
Secretary Fiori. Yes, sir, we are. I could give more detail
for the record.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Interim Brigade Combat Team Funding

The total validated requirements for fiscal years 2002-2009
military construction (MILCON), includes land acquisition, planning and
design, operation and maintenance (O&M), environmental, and information
infrastructure for all Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) is over
$2.37 billion.
The requirements for each brigade are:

Fort Lewis, WA (IBCTs 1 & 2)--$324.8 million;
Forts Wainwright and Richardson, AK (IBCT 3)--$672.8
million;
Fort Polk, LA (IBCT 4)--$216.7 million;
Schofield Barracks, HI (IBCT 5)--$615.1 million;
Pennsylvania Army National Guard (IBCT 6)--$317.8
million (includes requirements in PA and VA); and
Planning and Design (P&D) for all IBCTs--$174.1
million.

The Army has funded in fiscal year 2002, or programmed in the
Future Years Defense Plan over $1.2 billion for the IBCTs.
The funded and programmed amounts for each brigade are:

Fort Lewis, WA (IBCTs 1 & 2)--$285.7 million;
Forts Wainwright and Richardson, AK (IBCT 3)--$299.1
million;
Fort Polk, LA (IBCT 4)--$171.9 million;
Schofield Barracks, HI (IBCT 5)--$326.7 million;
Pennsylvania Army National Guard (IBCT 6)--$99.9
million; and
Planning and design (P&D) for all IBCTs--$39.9
million.

All six brigades are supported by the programmed amounts in the
President's Budget FYDP.
The Army is addressing shortfalls between requirements and
currently programmed amounts in the fiscal year 2004-2009 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM).

Senator Akaka. The Army had been funding the cleanup of
formerly utilized defense sites (FUDS) at a level that would
lead to remedies in place by 2014. This year the Comptroller
arbitrarily stretched the program out to 2020 to reduce the
funding level required. At best, however, the Army expects to
have remedies in place for unexploded ordnance problems by
2089. I would like to ask this question to Mr. DuBois and
Secretary Fiori. Do you believe that 2089 is an acceptable goal
for addressing problems with unexploded ordinance at formerly
utilized defense sites? If not, do you plan to seek additional
funds for UXO?
Mr. DuBois. Mr. Chairman, let me be clear about this. The
FUDS funding levels are determined at OSD level. The United
States Department of the Army is the executive agent and
executes the program. I want to compliment them. They have
executed very well. But I do not want to place the burden on
them for certain decisions that were made at OSD level.
It is a very difficult program, make no mistake about it.
We are on track to complete the requirements of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, section 313,
which requires us to provide a plan, an assessment, a schedule,
and a cost estimate for the FUDS program to Congress by April
2003. As you indicated, the DOD Comptroller, Dr. Zakheim,
adjusted the FUDS goal from 2014 to 2020 in large measure
because of the strong fiscal realities we currently face in the
Department.
The one thing that I can say to you now, having worked with
Dov Zakheim for the past year, is that he is very committed and
insistent on as honest a portrayal of programmatic issues as
possible as they translate into financial requirements over
time.
I do not know whether 2089 is correct. I share with you a
hesitancy to embrace such a number. It is so far away. But as
we all know the characterization of ranges, active, closed,
closing, or transferred, is a difficult task. However, we are
committed to doing better job of that. As I indicated, we will
report to you by April 2003, as required under section 313. In
that regard, one of the first letters that I drafted when I
took this job last spring, I believe Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
signed it to Congress, admitted that we do not have good
software or characterization data for transferred or closed
ranges with UXO. It is difficult. We intend to honor our
commitment and obligation to report to you by April 2003.
The money involved, which is rather large over time, is
still yet to be determined. We are doing the best we can within
the fiscal constraints.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. DuBois, I understand that the
DOD Comptroller has determined that, contrary to the
Department's longstanding practice, only military construction
funds may be used for environmental projects costing more than
$750,000. Several members of the panel have made reference to
this problem. The question is do you expect to propose
legislation to address this issue? If you do, then when can we
expect to see it?
Mr. DuBois. I would like to take that question for the
record, sir. But I want to just have, if I might, a
clarification. Are we talking about the $750,000 MILCON
threshold below which we do not have to identify, or are we
talking about an issue pertaining to environmental programs?
Senator Akaka. These would be those used for environmental
projects that cost more than $750,000.
Mr. DuBois. I will take that question for the record, and
report back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
Use of MILCON for Environmental Restoration Requirements
Mr. DuBois. Yes, the proposed legislation addressing this issue was
submitted with the MILCON bill last month. The issue arose as a
consequence of the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, amendment to section
2811, of 10 U.S.C., which included a definition of repair. This change
was in response to what Congress perceived as abuses connected to the
environmental restoration program. The new definition does not permit
the services to continue to define repair as including environmental
restoration of the installation's soil. This was an unintended
consequence of the amendment. Consequently, all environmental
restoration account funded environmental restoration that fits the
definition of construction must now be classified as military
construction.
As MILCON, such projects are now subject to all the paperwork that
MILCON requires, including individual notifications to Congress. This
will significantly increase the number of such notifications as well as
cause delays in the restoration program while those packages are
processed. Because of the need to ensure communications to Congress are
accurate, such notifications require extensive time to prepare and
review before approval. Such notifications delay environmental
restoration actions, drain resources that would otherwise be applied to
environmental restoration, and are redundant given the annual
restoration reports already provided to Congress.
Our legislation proposes changes to section 2810 of 10 U.S.C.,
which would return the status of environmental restoration projects to
virtually the same position they had prior to the enactment of the
statutory definition of ``repair'' provided in the amendment to section
2811 of 10 U.S.C.

Senator Akaka. The House energy bill contains a provision
that would require all Federal buildings to be metered within 5
years. I understand that the Department of Defense considers
the provision to be burdensome and unworkable. Yet metering is
acknowledged to be an important tool for understanding and
controlling energy costs. Is the Department prepared to put
together an alternative to the House provision which would
contain realistic objectives and timetables and still
accomplish the objective of encouraging energy conservation
through the use of metering within the boundaries of DOD
facilities?
Mr. DuBois. The answer is somewhat complicated, as most
answers in this arena are. I have on my desk, as a matter of
fact, a views report that I read yesterday. I edited it. I will
re-edit it when I get back tonight.
DOD installations are metered. But many, in fact most, of
the DOD buildings are not metered. Let me put this into two
baskets if I can. We are committed to metering family housing,
especially family housing that is being privatized, built, or
rehabilitated, because we want to, obviously, inject some
discipline in the system. It is estimated that it will cost
$1.5 billion to meet a mandatory metering requirement. That is
a lot of money.
We recognize that metering can play a useful role in energy
conservation, but we would suggest that it is not necessarily a
universal solution.
On the issue of energy consumption reduction, I think the
Defense Department has a very good record. All four services,
all three military departments, have a very good record. I come
from a background wherein I devoted a number of years to energy
conservation in the industrial sector. You are absolutely
right, metering is a wonderful discipline. But it is not the
only discipline that one can use to reduce energy consumption
per financial unit.
I will recommend to the Deputy Secretary that he sign this
views letter back to you. It does address the H.R. 4 and S.
1766 issues raised both with respect to mandatory metering
provisions and other provisions, such as the royalty schedule
for geothermal production on military property. We will provide
answers in that views letter, but as a practical matter at this
point it is a very expensive proposition to meter at every
building that we have.
The square mileage of lands and buildings owned by DOD is
in excess of the State of Pennsylvania. This is all the more
reason to do everything that we can to conserve energy and to
use renewable energy, too. That is the best answer I can give
you right now, and we will continue to give you more refined
answers in the future.
I do not know if any of my colleagues want to address the
energy issue.
Secretary Johnson. We have been very successful, as I
mentioned in my opening comments, with energy conservation. We
agree on metering, but our people are really committed to
conserving energy and doing a tremendous job.
Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, in your written statement
you state the Navy's position that it has met the goals of the
legislation passed by Congress to allow public access for
cultural, religious, and educational purposes on the island of
Kaho'olawe, Hawaii, which was utilized as a bombing range. This
is despite the Navy's inability to meet the goals in the
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the State of Hawaii,
which addressed the clearance of UXO on Kaho'olawe.
I fully understand the difficulties associated with
clearing ordnance on this island. However, I also know that the
Navy's ability in the eyes of the Hawaiian community to fulfill
its obligations with respect to Kaho'olawe will have a major
impact on the willingness of the local communities in Hawaii to
work with the military on difficult issues. What are the Navy's
plans to meet its obligations with respect to the clearance of
ordnance on the island of Kaho'olawe, and would an increase in
funding assist the Navy in meeting the goal set forth in the
MOU agreed to in 1994?
Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. At the beginning of this year
we were at 43 percent of the goal, and I think it is the same
on the MOU. I gave a copy to your staff, and would like to come
visit with you and the experts to go over the goals versus the
MOU. At the current funding level we will be at 62 percent when
we finish in 10 years. That is November 2003. If we have
continued adds, as we have in the past, we can get up to 80
percent, and we would like to ensure that we are meeting the
MOU as you and the State of Hawaii want us to. We would bring
the contractor as well as the engineering experts.
Senator Akaka. I thank you very much for that.
The Navy has continued to clear Kaho'olawe and it is coming
to a point now where the Navy will be passing it to the State
of Hawaii, and I am particularly interested in the clearance.
Secretary Johnson. We would like to talk to you about what
happens in November 2003, whether you want the Navy and our
contractor team to continue or if you want to have a
relationship with the States.
Senator Akaka. I know this has been a long hearing now. I
thought that was the right time. [Laughter.]
Mr. DuBois. It does not seem that long, sir.
Senator Akaka. I thank you so much. You have been so
responsive to our questions. I would like to thank all of the
witnesses for your testimony. This subcommittee looks forward
to working with you to address the difficult issues we have
discussed today and others that will be facing us.
With respect to encroachment, the Department needs to
continue to work with the local communities, States, and
organizations to address these issues. Similarly, it is
important that the Department fulfill its obligations as it
reflects the credibility of the Department. I look forward to
working with all of you in the days ahead, and I want to wish
all of you well in your responsibilities. We are doing the best
for our great country as we face today's challenges.
A person made a remark to me that I was surprised about,
and it made me think. The person asked, ``Are we in a war?'' We
are. We have certainly declared war on terrorism. As the
President said, it is going to be a long one, but we are in
that situation. As such, we are trying the best we can, and you
are too, to continue to provide the best quality of life for
our troops, wherever they are, and give them the best training.
In the future, I hope we can also help them with further
compensation and pay increases.
All of us we need to think about the future. Again, I want
to thank you. I do not know whether you have any closing
comments you want to make.
Secretary Fiori. No, sir. Thank you.
Mr. DuBois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE

1. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, the Army has been funding the
clean-up of BRAC sites at a level that would lead to remedies in place
by 2005. The Army has excluded Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) problems from
this effort, providing only a minimal level of funding for UXO. As a
result, facilities with significant UXO problems will not meet the 2005
clean-up goal. Do you believe that it is acceptable to set aside UXO
problems at BRAC facilities to be addressed at a later date, or should
the Army be addressing these problems now?
Secretary Fiori. The Army is addressing UXO problems as part of its
overall effort to ensure that BRAC properties are suitable for
transfer. The Army is providing funds to perform munitions responses,
which includes the removal of UXO, at its BRAC installations. As of the
end of fiscal year 2001, the Army has spent approximately $90 million
on munitions responses at BRAC sites. This fiscal year, the Army plans
to spend an additional $20.2 million. The Defense Planning Guidance
(DPG) for BRAC properties establishes a goal for complete cleanup for
hazardous and toxic wastes by fiscal year 2005, but the DPG does not
currently establish goals for munitions responses. Nevertheless, the
Army is committed to performing adequate responses at its properties.
Because of the complexity and multitude of challenges associated with
the conduct of munitions responses, properties with significant
munitions-related issues will not be ready for transfer by fiscal year
2005. Some of these challenges are: gaps in existing UXO identification
and discrimination technologies; the collective inability to quantify
risks posed by UXO; and overlapping Federal and State environmental
laws and regulations. The Army and the Department of Defense, in
coordination with other Federal agencies, the States, and the Tribes,
are actively addressing these challenges.

REPLACEMENT FOR VIEQUES

2. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, Secretary England has stated
that the Navy plans to find a replacement for Vieques by May 2003. Any
funds needed to prepare an alternative location by that date would have
to be expended in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. Has the Navy requested
any funding in the fiscal year 2003 budget to set up an alternative
site or sites for east coast training? If not, how can the Navy hope to
meet Secretary England's goal?
Secretary Johnson. Funding was not included in the fiscal year 2003
President's budget. Different alternatives are being considered in
development of the FYDP in fiscal year 2004 as the fleet requirement
solidifies. A funding profile has not been finalized, but Navy intent
is to support the validated requirements for interim and long-term
measures to support infrastructure improvements and environmental
documentation for some of our east and gulf coast facilities and Range/
OPAREA complexes that will ensure fleet readiness.

3. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, has the Navy prepared an
estimate of how long it is likely to take and how much it is likely to
cost to get a replacement training range up and running?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy anticipates that a combination of
alternative training sites, methods, and various advance technologies
using simulation will provide the required mix of training
capabilities. The Navy is waiting for the CNA study, which will provide
recommendations on future training options. In addition, the Navy is
developing a strategy to repair and upgrade existing training ranges
supporting Atlantic Fleet pre-deployment training and to build
cooperative efforts with other services. The strategy will provide the
resources to reverse degradation of range infrastructure and associated
support facilities, improve realism of pre-deployment training, and
take advantage of available technology to further enhance training. It
is envisioned that the strategy will increase the capacity and
capability of ranges supporting Atlantic Fleet commanders and improve
their flexibility in reacting to disruptions such as weather, periodic
reduction, or loss of access to a particular range facility without a
resulting loss in training fidelity. This strategy, however, has not
been finalized.

POLICY ON LAND ACQUISITION

4. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, it is my understanding that any
request by the military departments to acquire more than 1,000 acres of
land, or any land worth over $1 million, must be approved in advance by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I also understand that the
services generally have not considered acquiring land they do not
actually plan to train on because they have no specific military use
for it. Acquiring such buffer zones to provide space between training
areas and the local communities, or perhaps to provide critical habitat
that is not also a critical training area, might be useful in
preserving key training ranges. Is the Department of Defense
considering this as one approach to preserve key training areas?
Mr. DuBois. The Department recognizes that targeted land
acquisitions can be very useful in preserving key training ranges, and
the proposed legislation includes a provision that would enhance the
Department's ability to preserve open space in the vicinity of military
installations. This proposal would authorize the Secretary of each
Military Department to enter into agreements with any private
organization that has the conservation, restoration, or preservation of
land and natural resources, or a similar objective, as its stated
principal organizational purpose or goal, to preserve high-value
habitats or forestall incompatible development.

HOUSING PRIVATIZATION IN HAWAII

5. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson and Secretary Fiori, both the
Navy and the Army are contemplating housing privatization in Hawaii. To
date, this privatization of military housing has not been attempted in
Hawaii, in part due to the issue of ceded lands. What are your
Department's plans for housing privatization in Hawaii, and how do you
plan to deal with the unique land ownership issues there?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy and Marine Corps' family housing master
plans include privatization of existing military family housing on the
island of Oahu. Funding for the first phase is included in our Fiscal
Year 2003 budget request. None of the housing identified for the first
phase is sited on ceded lands. We will review records to determine
what, if any, housing in future phases may be on ceded lands.
Secretary Fiori. The Army plans to privatize 8,178 homes in Hawaii
(3,045 housing units at Fort Shafter and 5,133 units at Schofield
Barracks) during 2003. Major milestones include:

Notify Congress of Solicitation......... June 15, 2002
Conduct Industry Forum/Issue August 28, 2002
Solicitation.
Notify Congress of Community Dev & Mgt January 2003
Plan (CDMP) Award.
Select Developer to Prepare CDMP........ February 2003
Notify Congress of Project Execution.... October 2003
Issue Partner Notice to Transition/ November 2003
Proceed.
Transfer Operations and Assets to March 2004
Developer.

A majority (60 percent) of Army family housing in Hawaii is located
on ceded lands. However, the Army's approach to privatization will
minimize legal concerns regarding ceded lands because, the Army retains
title to the land. Additionally, the Army retains a vested interest in
the project, as a member of a Limited Liability Corporation (LLC).
Finally, the land and improvements will continue to be used to house
military families. In February 2002, the Army's privatization team met
with the local Hawaiian congressional delegation and Chamber of
Commerce Military Advisory Committee to discuss the Army's
privatization efforts in Hawaii. Coordination will continue among all
key stakeholders. At the recommendation of the local congressional
delegation, the Army plans to contact the State's Attorney General
office to brief the Army's military housing privatization program and
discuss any legal issues or questions they may have.

PRIVATIZATION OF BACHELOR ENLISTED HOUSING

6. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, your statement mentioned the
Navy's interest in attempting to privatize the operation of bachelor
enlisted quarters in the Navy. Although this authority has existed for
several years, no such projects have been attempted. Why does the Navy
believe this approach is now more likely to succeed?
Secretary Johnson. To date, all of our attention has been focused
on privatizing military family housing. We are now in a position to
build on our experiences and apply the principles of privatization to
address our critical bachelor housing needs. In November 2001, we held
an industry forum with representatives from the development, property
management, and financial segments of the private sector. Although
bachelor housing privatization presents unique challenges, the
consensus was that bachelor housing privatization can work. Finally,
although Title 10 provides authority for bachelor housing
privatization, there are some legislative obstacles that prevent
implementation. We are prepared to work with the committee to address
these considerations.

7. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, what impact would
privatization have on the character of such facilities, including their
role in promoting unit cohesion?
Secretary Johnson. I strongly believe that the privatization of
bachelor housing is compatible with service goals, such as unit
cohesion and team building. We expect that service bachelor housing
assignment policies, which are based on these goals, can carry over to
privatized housing.

FORCE PROTECTION

8. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, is the Department of Defense
attempting to assess the requirements and costs of the higher force
protection standards we are implementing, and may well be using for the
foreseeable future, at our facilities around the world? Is the
Department of Defense attempting to fund such construction costs,
including the relocation or significant renovation of existing
facilities, in the near-term using emergency funds, or will this mostly
be a long-term effort built into future military construction budgets?
Mr. DuBois. The ``DOD Anti-Terrorism Standards for Buildings,''
establishes the minimum requirements for force protection. We perform
vulnerability assessments at 80 to 100 installations per year. The
installation commanders take that information and determine the level
of protection required. As a result, some projects may require higher
than minimum standards. Based on the fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year
2003 military construction programs, we are predicting a 3 to 5 percent
increase in costs. This varies, depending on the type of project,
whether it is new construction or renovation, and the percentage of
renovation. In the fiscal year 2002 program, the added costs ranged
from 1 percent to 28 percent.
The Department is requesting emergency funds only for those
projects with an immediate need for force protection. Upgrading all
Department of Defense facilities according to our force protection
standards will be a long-term process. We expect these costs to be part
of future military construction programs.

ARMY INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

9. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, the Army is planning a new
installation management structure under which the funds needed to run
and maintain Army bases would be placed under your control and would no
longer be available to the division commanders to deal with unexpected
training needs without the approval of senior Army leaders. How would
division commanders work with the garrison commanders (who will report
to you and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management) to
set requirements and priorities, and deal with real-world changes,
under this new structure?
Secretary Fiori. I fully expect division commanders and the
garrison commanders will continue to work together as they are now.
Garrisons commanders, by the nature of their command, are charged with
servicing the needs of their Army community. However, execution of
training remains the responsibility of division commanders. Our
garrison commanders have flexibility with their base support funding,
and we will also retain flexibility at the Installation Management
Agency to address unforeseen circumstances within the garrison
commander's area of responsibility.
To ensure mission commanders are closely involved in setting
installation management requirements and priorities, we are placing the
senior mission commander in the rating chain for our garrison
commanders. The division commander at a division post, such as
Schofield Barracks or Fort Drum, will be the garrison commander's
senior rater. In the Army culture, that is the best means to ensure
satisfactory customer service to senior commanders. To provide further
influence at a senior level, commanding generals will sit on our new
Installation Board of Directors, helping to set priorities and
strategies for Army installations.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

10. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, does the Department of Defense plan
to use any military construction funding for construction of a national
missile defense system, and if so, does the fiscal year 2003 budget or
Future Years Defense Program contain military construction funds for
this program?
Mr. DuBois. No military construction funds are requested in fiscal
year 2003 for Ground-Based Midcourse (GMD) (formerly National Missile
Defense) construction. All construction funds are in RDT&E. In fiscal
year 2002, the Administration requested, and Congress approved,
legislation that stated the following: ``(1) The Secretary of Defense,
using funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for RDT&E for
fiscal years after fiscal year 2001 that are available for programs of
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (now MDA), may carry out all
construction projects, or portions of construction projects, including
projects for the acquisition improvement, or construction of
facilities, necessary to establish and operate the Missile Defense
System Test Bed; and (2) The authority provided in subsection (a) may
be used to acquire, improve, or construct facilities at a total cost
not to exceed $500,000,000.''
In fiscal year 2002, $281 million of RDT&E funds was appropriated
for GMD construction. The budget request for fiscal year 2003 for GMD
construction is $137 million.

NAVY ENCROACHMENT STRATEGY

11. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, your prepared statement
focuses on critical habitat when discussing concerns about training.
However, a Department of Defense issue paper identifying encroachment
issues that the Navy currently faces at various bases found that at 8
of the 14 bases, the problems came from noise, airspace restrictions,
or unexploded ordnance, rather than from environmental constraints.
What steps is the Navy taking to develop a comprehensive encroachment
strategy that addresses all of the many factors that have an impact on
Navy training?
Secretary Johnson. The DON and DOD have developed a comprehensive
approach to improve and manage DOD ranges, including encroachment
issues. The Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC) identified
recapitalization, modernization, and sustainability as the key issues
in improving and maintaining DOD ranges. The SROC is addressing
recapitalization and modernization of ranges separately and has
established an Encroachment Integrated Product Team (IPT) to coordinate
all issues of encroachment. The IPT is developing action plans to
address specific encroachment issues, and oversees their
implementation. Another important group reporting to the SROC on
encroachment issues is the Operational and Environmental Executive
Steering Committee for Munitions (OEESM). OEESM has developed the DOD
Munitions Action Plan (MAP) addressing life-cycle management of
munitions for range sustainment. DOD also manages issues on a regional
basis, specifically the Southern California/Arizona region. The
strategy will engage stakeholders and range managers to identify issues
and develop solutions to regional encroachment that will be applied
nationally if successful. In addition, DOD has established planning
goals, and DON is budgeting for comprehensive range sustainability
studies at Navy and Marine Corps ranges. These studies will include
Range Complex Management Plans, regulatory compliance evaluations, on-
site contaminant assessments, and encroachment vulnerability analyses.
DOD and the services are actively communicating the importance of a
balance between military readiness and environmental stewardship with
environmental groups, the public, other stakeholders, and members of
Congress and their staffs.
In addition to these programmatic solutions to encroachment, DOD
and the military services have been in discussions with OMB, the
Council of Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Fish and Wildlife Service at the Department of Interior, and
the National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) at the
Department of Commerce. Together, as a team, and with the help of
Congress, we will work to find solutions. If the administration decides
to pursue statutory clarifications, we are ready to work closely with
the appropriate congressional committees on any necessary
clarifications.

CONTRACTS WITH ENRON

12. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, please provide a list of the
contracts for the provision of energy services or any utility
privatization contracts that the military departments and the defense
agencies had with the Enron Corporation at the time it declared
bankruptcy; a description of whether the services the government
contracted for are still being provided; and in any cases where there
was a default, how those services are now being provided.
Mr. DuBois. The Department has contracted directly with Enron or
its subsidiaries in three areas--utilities privatization, natural gas
procurement, and renewable energy purchases.
The Army awarded Enron Federal Solutions Inc. (EFSI) the contract
for privatization of the water, wastewater, natural gas, and electric
systems at U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Hamilton, NY. The contract called
for EFSI to upgrade these utility systems prior to conveyance. EFSI
made the capital investments to upgrade most of the utilities
infrastructure, but has stopped performing the operations and
maintenance functions. The operations and maintenance services are
currently being provided by an existing base operating support
contract. The Army filed a stipulation with the bankruptcy court to
obtain permission to terminate the contract and is expecting funds from
the performance and payment bonds to support completion of some of the
contracted work. The Army plans to competitively re-solicit the
privatization contract.
The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) awarded Enron Corporation
contracts to supply natural gas to Federal customers at various
locations. These contracts were terminated for default on December 1,
2001, because Enron was unable to deliver the gas. The customers were
able to revert to gas supplied by the local utility, so there was no
interruption of service. DESC has since awarded new contracts to other
suppliers.
In May 2001, the Air Force contracted with Enron to supply
renewable power to Edwards AFB. This contract was part of the
Department's plan to reduce electricity demand from the commercial
power grid in the western U.S. Although Enron is still providing power
under this contract, it is uncertain that this will continue much
longer. DFAS is holding payment in abeyance pending a ruling by the
bankruptcy court. If necessary, Edwards AFB will procure electricity
from the local utility supplier--the Western Area Power Administration
(WAPA)--at the tariff rate. WAPA is soliciting for a new supplier.
Additionally, there are two instances where DOD was procuring
electricity from Enron indirectly.
The Navy entered into an interagency agreement with WAPA in March
2001 to obtain 80-megawatts of electricity for 12 Navy and Marine Corps
installations in the San Diego region. WAPA then procured the
electricity from Enron. Although Enron has continued to supply the
electricity as contracted, WAPA has made arrangements with the
California Independent System Operator to ensure no interruptions of
service occur, should Enron fail to deliver.
Hanscom AFB, MA, has an agreement to purchase electricity from the
General Services Administration (GSA), which obtained the power from
Enron. GSA has already awarded a replacement contract to another
supplier.

CENTRAL COMMAND FACILITIES

13. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, are emergency funds being used at
this time only for temporary needs related to Operation Enduring
Freedom, or also to construct facilities that U.S. forces intend to use
on a long-term basis?
Mr. DuBois. The fiscal year 2003 Defense Emergency Response Fund
request is designed to respond to, or protect against, acts or
threatened acts of terrorism against the U.S. The majority of military
construction projects are for construction of perimeter security and
gates, providing increased security in the long-term. Some of the
projects may be used on a short-term basis, but most will be used for
the foreseeable future.

CORROSION PREVENTION

14. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, studies now being prepared for submission to Congress
have found that the Department of Defense incurs at least $20 billion
each year in damage to equipment and weapon systems because of
corrosion. Are you aware of similar studies, analyses, or reports on
the effects and costs of corrosion for military infrastructure and
facilities?
Secretary Fiori. The Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and
Development Center (ERDC) is aware of many studies including the
following recent study of the national cost of corrosion by CC
Technologies and the National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE)
International: ``Corrosion Costs and Preventive Strategies in the
United States,'' Report to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),
Office of Infrastructure Research and Development, Report FHWA-RD-01-
156, September 2001. This report concluded that the national direct
cost of corrosion in the U.S.A. was $276 billion. The total annual
direct cost of corrosion incurred by the military services for systems
(military equipment and hardware) and infrastructure is approximately
$20 billion. For DOD facilities, this study concludes the following:
``Information on corrosion-related costs for these DOD assets was not
available; however, based on other studies described in this report, it
is reasonable to assume that these costs are on the order of several
billion dollars annually.''
Secretary Johnson. We are not aware of any service-wide study of
the cost of corrosion for military infrastructure and facilities. About
5 years ago, Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC)
conducted a sampling of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT) claimant level efforts and determined that sustainment and
restoration projects to address operational waterfront facility
corrosion problems has cost CINCPACFLT approximately $5 million per
year. Considering a similar impact for Commander in Chief, Atlantic
Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) would create a requirement in excess of $10 million
for the fleet. This does not account for corrosion projects to correct
problems related to non-critical facilities such as building exteriors,
fences, antennas, or other metal structures.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force is not aware of any such studies
related to corrosion for military infrastructure and facilities.

15. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, how much of your facility maintenance budgets are
dedicated to fixing or preventing corrosion-related damage?
Secretary Fiori. Our sustainment requirement does not separately
identify costs for corrosion. The operation and maintenance (O&M)
funding is allocated to the major commands and installations to repair
our most critical readiness requirements that includes corrosion as a
component of the total project.
Secretary Johnson. Based on the NFESC study, the annual cost of
corrosion for the Naval Shore Establishment is estimated to exceed $10
million for critical facilities. Corrosion prevention in facilities is
normally addressed as part of the installation recurring maintenance
and thus more precise estimates are not readily available.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force does not distinguish between the
annual cost of corrosion damage/maintenance (Question 18) and how much
of our facility maintenance budgets are dedicated to fixing or
preventing corrosion-related damages (Question 15). Additionally, the
Air Force does not specifically track day-to-day maintenance (including
man-hours expended) to prevent or fix corrosion damage, nor does the
Air Force track the annual cost of corrosion control or related damages
to Air Force facilities and infrastructure.
The Air Force does have corrosion control programs established at
each installation and have been successful in reducing and preventing
our corrosion maintenance requirement. For facilities, those programs
are multi-faceted in scope, generally centered on protective coatings,
cathodic protection, and industrial water treatment.
Facility requirements to restore or prevent corrosion-related
damage to facilities compete for available funds with other facility
needs based on their impact to the installation mission. The amount
will therefore vary from year to year. However, these requirements are
primarily accomplished by contract when funded.

16. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, what initiatives are you taking to reduce corrosion
maintenance costs?
Secretary Fiori. The following initiatives currently underway help
to reduce corrosion related maintenance costs:
(a) Army Corps of Engineers sponsored PROSPECT Training in
Corrosion Control has been conducted annually since 1975;
(b) Army Corrosion Control Technology Program at select
installations demonstrates and implements emerging corrosion control
technologies; and
(c) All new construction of underground distribution systems or
storage tanks use nonmetallic materials where appropriate. Where
nonmetallic materials are technically impractical or not life cycle
cost effective, coatings and cathodic protection systems are provided
to eliminate or minimize external corrosion. Hydronic heating and
cooling systems often include automatic systems for the chemical
treatment of water to minimize or prevent internal corrosion.
Secretary Johnson. Corrosion initiatives initiated through Naval
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) include:

Establishing corrosion control technical expertise at
the Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC);
Conducting periodic base corrosion surveys. Work done
by the technical experts, NAVFAC Engineering Field Division
(EFD) corrosion managers, or by contract;
Activity, EFD, and NFESC personnel collaborate to
determine corrosion control requirements for POL facilities for
programming by the Defense Energy Support Center Corrosion
Control Program;
Periodic waterfront underwater assessment surveys
managed by technical experts at the NFESC;
Revision of outdated design criteria to install proper
corrosion control during initial installation to avoid
unnecessary maintenance costs;
Corrosion control training classes, as requested, are
conducted periodically throughout the Naval Shore
Establishment;
The NAVFAC Engineering Network (ENET), as well as
corrosion technical expert web sites, are established to
identify Navy personnel knowledgeable in corrosion control,
transfer lessons learned, and help field personnel obtain
assistance with corrosion control problems; and
Research and development investments into corrosion
resistant paints and application techniques, as well as
corrosion control practices.

Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force's intent is to reduce corrosion
maintenance requirement through effective corrosion prevention
programs. For facilities, those programs are multi-faceted in scope,
generally centered on protective coatings (exterior facility painting),
cathodic protection (protecting underground metal piping and above
ground storage tanks), and industrial water treatment (internal
treatment of heating and cooling systems). In recent years, the Air
Force has outsourced the majority of these operations. In those cases,
it has found the use of blanket purchase agreements and requirements
contracts as an effective way to reduce its contract costs.

CORROSION CONTROL

17. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, corrosion control and prevention is an essential
element of a maintenance program. However, because of its nature,
corrosion has been simply accepted as a normal degradation of military
equipment. In planning for maintenance, the military services and the
Department of Defense have done little to train their technicians and
have not specifically allocated funding to address corrosion of
facilities and equipment. When formulas are developed to project
military maintenance costs, corrosion is rarely considered. Do you
document the impact of corrosion on your facilities? If so, who
provides the information? Where is that information stored? Is it used
in resource planning and determining facility maintenance requirements?
Is such information made available and shared with others? If you do
not document the impact of corrosion, why?
Secretary Fiori. The Army has documented the impact of corrosion on
its facilities via Army-wide corrosion surveys until 1998.
This information is currently stored at the U.S. Army Engineer
Research and Development Center (ERDC) Construction Engineering
Research Laboratory (CERL) in Champaign, Illinois.
It has been used in research resource planning and determining
maintenance requirements.
It is made available and shared with Army Installations, Major
Commands (MACOMs), and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation
Management (ACSIM).
Secretary Johnson. The impact of corrosion is documented in
individual reports of corrosion control surveys conducted under
NAVFACENGCOM and Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) Corrosion Control
Programs. These survey reports are stored either at activities,
NAVFACENGCOM Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs), or at DESC. This
information is being used to identify corrosion related projects, and
to some extent, prioritize such projects. As an example, at their
request CINCPACFLT and the NFESC have collaborated in developing a
single report summarizing cathodic protection (one major method of
corrosion control) status at all CINCPACFLT activities and prioritizing
the deficiencies at each activity. DESC uses information from surveys
conducted under their program to develop their execution plans.
Secretary Gibbs. Facility maintenance programs are managed by
engineers at each Air Force installation. Those engineers conduct
recurring facility inspections, during which they gather and document
maintenance requirements in databases stored at each installation.
Corrosion management is part of these recurring facility inspections.
As each installation develops its annual budget request for facility
maintenance, it considers corrosion prevention and maintenance
requirements (along with all other facility maintenance requirements).
As funds are appropriated by Congress and made available to each
installation, installation commanders then execute their facility
maintenance programs.

18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, what is the annual cost of corrosion damage/
maintenance for your military facilities?
Secretary Fiori. The annual direct cost of corrosion/maintenance is
not provided for in the budget process and is not available.
Secretary Johnson. Based on the NFESC study, the annual cost of
corrosion for the Naval Shore Establishment is estimated to exceed $10
million for critical facilities. These costs are part of the
installation's recurring maintenance and thus more precise estimates
are not readily available.
Secretary Gibbs. See answer to question no. 15.

19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, where do you receive your guidance for corrosion
management?
Secretary Fiori. The Army Corps of Engineers and my office, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and
Environment), provide technical and policy guidance, respectively. In
general, the installations use industry standards and practices via
contract support.
Secretary Johnson. A Tri-Service Committee develops all guidance
for the Department of Defense. In response to the Appropriations
Conference Report 105-247 and the DOD Installation Policy Board
directive of January 13, 2000, the Tri-Service Committee on Unified
Design Guidance was formed. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
the Army Corp of Engineers, and Air Force Civil Engineering Support
Agency develop all new DOD facility guidance jointly. One example of
this in the corrosion control area is the Unified Facility Criteria
(UFC) document UFC 3-570-06 which provides Tri-Service guidance on
maintenance and operation of cathodic protection systems, and which is
under final review by the Air Force.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force works together with the other
services, service laboratories, and the private sector corrosion
maintenance industries, including both the National Association of
Corrosion Engineers (NACE) International and the Steel Structure
Painting Council (SSPC), to collect and implement guidance on corrosion
prevention and maintenance.

20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, do you provide guidance to your military units on
corrosion management? If so, in what format and to whom?
Secretary Fiori. The Army provides guidance to the Army
Installation's Director of Public Works (DPW) staff on corrosion
mitigation through Technical Manuals and Bulletins.
Secretary Johnson. Guidance is provided through various methods
including:

NAVFACENGCOM Design Criteria and Instructions.
Criteria are updated periodically and distributed to Navy
Design and Public Works Departments. A NAVFACENGCOM corrosion
control program instruction is currently being revised.
NAVFACENGCOM corrosion control technical experts at
NFESC and Engineering Field Divisions provide guidance to field
personnel through technical reports, training classes, and
electronic and telephonic means.

Secretary Gibbs. Yes. The Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency
(AFCESA) at Tyndall AFB, FL is the lead agency for providing facility
corrosion maintenance technical assistance to Air Force installations.
They do so on an as-requested basis. In addition, AFCESA publishes
technical papers and operating guidance made available to the field via
various forms of electronic media. When requested and practical, AFCESA
personnel visit installations to provide on-site technical assistance.

21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, do you conduct periodic inspections of facilities to
ensure they are being maintained to published standards? Do these
inspections include the analysis of the impact of corrosion? If not,
why?
Secretary Fiori. The Army uses an annual report, the Installation
Status Report (ISR), as a tool in determining the quality and quantity
of facilities Army-wide. The ISR uses Army-wide standards developed by
the Army staff to measure the condition of facilities.
Occupants of the buildings do the inspection using rating sheets
and booklets. Several of the booklets, especially those pertaining to
medical facilities, include specific corrosion reporting items. As a
result of these inspections, the condition of the facilities are
classified as red, amber, or green. Sustainment, renovation, or
construction costs are then developed.
ISR does not separately analyze the effects of corrosion. This type
of inspection would require technical analysis. Corrosion within pipes
is a difficult check since it requires shutting down the system and
dismantling the pipes. This causes disruption of service to a
customer's facility and is usually only discovered when repairs are
being done.
Secretary Johnson. Yes, Navy and Marine Corps activities conduct
periodic inspections of the facilities and document deficiencies:

Activities conduct some specialized inspections/
maintenance of corrosion control systems either in-house or by
contract;
NFESC/EFD technical experts conduct periodic base wide
corrosion and waterfront underwater inspection surveys that
include analysis of corrosion control systems such as cathodic
protection; and
Periodic surveys of POL systems at Navy activities are
conducted under a Defense Energy Support Center corrosion
program when such a requirement has been justified.

The inspections conducted by the NFESC/EFD technical experts and
the inspections conducted under the DESC program will most often
include analysis of the impact of corrosion. Activity specialized
inspections will sometimes include such analysis.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force does not conduct any centrally
directed formal inspection program for corrosion maintenance at its
installations. However, each Major Command conducts installation visits
to inspect installation infrastructure, including the different aspects
of corrosion maintenance. Each installation commander is responsible
for performing recurring facility inspections, gathering and
documenting facility maintenance requirements, and utilizing available
resources to best meet those requirements.

22. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, do you receive guidance from the Department of Defense
on corrosion management? If so, from what office? If not, from whom
would you expect to provide this guidance?
Secretary Fiori. We do not receive specific guidance for corrosion
management from the Department of Defense. My office, the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment),
provides policy guidance and the Army Corps of Engineers provides
technical guidance for construction projects.
Secretary Johnson. The Office of Under Secretary of Defense
(Installation and Environment) provides guidance on corrosion control
developed by the Tri-Service Committee on Unified Design Guidance.
Currently, Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) document UFC 3-570-06, which
provides Tri-Service guidance on maintenance and operation of cathodic
protection systems, is under final review by the Air Force.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force does not receive specific guidance
from DOD on facility corrosion prevention and maintenance, nor does it
require it. The Air Force works with the other services and industry to
develop the corrosion prevention and maintenance guidance it needs.

23. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, how do you ensure that your corrosion-related
maintenance is safe for the environment and the personnel who perform
the maintenance?
Secretary Fiori. All procedures and chemicals used by installations
are in compliance with applicable Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, and State and local
regulations.
Secretary Johnson. The Department has safety and environmental
offices at the Navy and Marine Corps headquarters down to the
individual installations that monitor compliance. Environmental
personnel are involved in the design and review process of these
projects. Corrosion technical experts participate in military and
private sector committees developing military criteria and industry
standards to ensure environmental compliance. They keep abreast of
changing environmental and safety requirements from such agencies as
EPA, Office of Underground Storage Tanks, and the Office of Pipeline
Safety. Updated information is sent to field personnel through criteria
updates, technical reports, project reviews, and electronic/telephonic
means.
Secretary Gibbs. Corrosion maintenance-related environmental
guidance is established and distributed by the Air Force Civil Engineer
Support Agency, based on its crossfeed with the other services and the
corrosion maintenance industry. Further, the environmental protection
and safety experts on each Air Force installation work with the
installation maintenance and contract personnel to ensure only
environmentally/occupationally safe products are used on the
installation.

24. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, if you were able to reduce the frequency of corrosion-
related maintenance, what benefits, including cost savings, would you
project for military resources and the environment?
Secretary Fiori. While we are unable to project cost savings, it is
expected that the major benefit is that the life cycle costs are going
to be significantly lower because of life extension of facilities and
equipment. The reliability and readiness of facilities will also be
increased, which is critical for systems that contain or transport
substances that could harm people or the environment, such as natural
gas or transportation fuels.
Secretary Johnson. Reduced frequency of corrosion-related
maintenance would allow sustainment resources to be applied to other
requirements. Corrosion control systems that are properly designed,
installed, and maintained could result in significant cost avoidance.
For example, a pipeline with a properly designed coating and cathodic
protection system will be free of leaks for the designed service life.
The cost to install and maintain the corrosion control system is
usually much less than it takes to periodically replace or perform a
major repair to the pipeline. One major fuel leak could result in
environmental cleanup/penalty costs of $500,000 to $2,000,000. In
addition, by prolonging the lives of facilities, the costs for
premature major repairs or replacements will be avoided.
Secretary Gibbs. In addition to the cost savings from avoided
material replacement, the Air Force expect benefits would include
manpower savings and a reduction in hazardous waste generation.

25. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, for corrosion-related facilities maintenance, who does
the work? What are the annual costs? How many man-hours are expended
annually on corrosion repairs?
Secretary Fiori. The Installation Department of Public Works staff
and contractors perform the corrosion related maintenance work. The
Army does not track or have records which report maintenance work
specifically for corrosion control or repairs.
Secretary Johnson. A mixture of in-house and contract personnel
accomplish corrosion-related facilities maintenance work. The mixture
is dependent on the extent of the work and the capability of the in-
house force. Costs and man-hours are not specifically collected for
corrosion repairs, and are thus not readily available.
Secretary Gibbs. See answer to question no. 15.

26. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, can you provide an analysis of the return on
investment from corrosion repairs or preventative measures?
Secretary Fiori. We are unable to provide specific information on
return on investment from corrosion repairs or preventive measures.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the return on investment resulting
from a properly executed corrosion control program for utilities and
facility components is between 10 to 1 and 100 to 1.
Secretary Johnson. Economic analyses have been used to justify many
corrosion control projects, but historical return on investment numbers
have not been kept.
The cost of implementing corrosion control typically amounts to
about 15-20 percent of the total facility construction, depending on
the type of construction. Corrosion systems would also require some
small amounts of annual investment for operation and periodic
maintenance. A properly designed and maintained corrosion control
system can extend the life of a structure for 15-20 years, and if the
corrosion control systems are replaced every 15-20 years, the
structural life can be extended indefinitely. The maintenance,
operation, and periodic system replacement costs far less than major
repairs or replacement of a structure caused by uncontrolled corrosion.
Other impacts that can be avoided as a result of preventing
corrosion are:

Downtime and disruption of service;
Expensive loss of product (fuel);
Environmental and safety hazards and costs;
Decreased system capacity (e.g. loss of a storage
tank); and
Adverse impacts on operational readiness.

Secretary Gibbs. No, the Air Force does not currently track
separate investments made on separate corrosion repairs or preventative
measures, as these are embedded in each installation's other
infrastructure maintenance and repair programs.

27. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, for your corrosion maintenance, do you use materials,
techniques, and processes prescribed by military commands or
laboratories, or are you using commercial products and processes? Are
they safe? Are they effective? Do they provide a savings to the
government?
Secretary Fiori. The materials, techniques, and processes for
corrosion maintenance are generally prescribed by manufacturers and
suppliers. The laboratories assist in the proper selection and
evaluation of materials and technologies. Judiciously selected
materials, techniques and processes for corrosion control are widely
accepted as safe and effective, and have been shown to reduce costs of
operations and maintenance.
Secretary Johnson. Occasionally, the Department will use techniques
and processes prescribed by military commands when they are found to be
superior to commercial products or where commercial standards are too
general or vague to ensure the required quality. For the most part, the
Department uses commercial products for facility corrosion maintenance.
For example, in September 2001, Tri-Service Paints and Coatings
Guide Specification was revised to replace all references to Federal
and military coating standards with Non-Government Standards (NGS)
coating standards. The NGS's reference commercial, off-the shelf
products instead of the combined formulation/performance requirements
of the Federal and military standards. Application techniques and
processes utilized in guide specifications also reference NGS
standards. The NGS standards are created/developed and maintained by
committees of field experts so they are the safest and most effective
techniques possible. Using these standards saves government dollars by
not having to develop and maintain MIL specifications.
Navy technical experts also work with environmentally concerned NGS
organizations to set goals and standards that meet, and preferably
exceed regulatory requirements. This is done to meet the intent of
Executive Order 13101: Greening the Government Through Waste
Prevention, Recycling, and Federal Acquisition.
Secretary Gibbs. In general, products prescribed by the military
commands and laboratories are the same as the commercial products and
processes used in industry. The Air Force continually interfaces with
the private sector and academia, most commonly through industry forums,
and thus tries to stay current with and take advantage of the latest
technologies whenever possible. The products and processes used by the
Air Force for corrosion maintenance are as safe and effective.

CORROSION CONTROL--ROLE OF LABS AND ACADEMIA

28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, each of the military services has a laboratory system
that provides technical leadership on materials and corrosion. The
laboratories are limited in their capabilities as related to corrosion
and most often seek help from the academic community. How does your
service seek to leverage the expertise in academia and the private
sector on corrosion prevention and remediation?
Secretary Fiori. The Army laboratories continually seek
opportunities to leverage the expertise in academia and the private
sector through partnering, conferences and joint research efforts.
Secretary Johnson. By using up to date techniques and processes
available through Non Government Standard (NGS) organizations, our
corrosion technical experts leverage academia and private sector
expertise into Naval working documents. This meets the intent and
spirit of OMB Circular No. A-119: Federal Participation in the
Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity
Assessment Activities. Projects focused on specific corrosion
preventive efforts also lead to cooperative efforts between the labs
and academia and private sectors. Many specialized corrosion control
studies are contracted with the private sector.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force leverages the expertise in academia
and the private sector through participation in corrosion-related
industry forums, including the services co-hosting an annual corrosion
seminar with the National Association of Corrosion Engineer (NACE)
International. Very often, scholars from academia participate (and are
featured) in these forums, and it is an excellent means for the Air
Force to gather information and discuss its corrosion-related issues
directly with industry.

29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, how do your services' efforts relate to those ongoing
in the other services? Do you see opportunities for further
collaboration, both within the military community and with those
outside of it?
Secretary Fiori. The Army/Army Engineer Research and Development
Center (ERDC) staff is dynamic in coordinating Tri-Service activities
through collaboration and participation in the Annual National
Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) Corrosion Conference, Annual
Tri-Services Corrosion Workshop, and other related Tri-Services
meetings. The Army is continually seeking improved leveraging
opportunities for collaboration both within and outside of the military
community because of funding constraints.
Secretary Johnson. Navy corrosion technical experts actively
participate in Tri-Service committees formed to foster communication,
collaboration, technical training, and technology transfer on
facilities related maintenance issues between the services, especially
with regard to corrosion prevention measures. The committees cover
paints and coatings, LBP (lead based paint), cathodic protection,
fuels, water, and other areas of concern.
Their continued participation on non-government committees and
industry organizations further leads to many cooperative efforts that
benefit the Department, the Tri-Services in general, and private sector
applications.
Secretary Gibbs. The services co-host an annual corrosion seminar
with the National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE)
International to bring together corrosion personnel from all levels of
the service's engineering organizations, service laboratories, and the
private sector corrosion maintenance industry to collect and implement
guidance on corrosion prevention and maintenance.

30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, do you seek guidance from your military laboratories
to solve corrosion issues? If so, do they satisfy your requirements? If
not, why?
Secretary Fiori. We look to our laboratories to provide technical
guidance and support to solve corrosion issues. The laboratories
satisfy our requirements.
Secretary Johnson. Yes, military laboratories (NFESC, US Army CERL,
NRL, etc.) have been and are still consulted to help solve corrosion
issues.
Secretary Gibbs. Yes. The Air Force works with the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers and the U.S. Navy labs, as well as the Air Force Research
Laboratory. These relationships meet the Air Force's requirements.

HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

31. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, how much of the basic allowance for
housing funding in the military personnel accounts for fiscal years
2002 and 2003 is dedicated specifically to payments related to housing
privatization?
Mr. DuBois. In fiscal year 2002, we project approximately $135
million of the basic allowance for housing funding in the military
personnel accounts will be used by members to pay rent at housing
privatization projects. The new impact of privatization in fiscal year
2002 will be approximately $68.3 million. The $68.3 million reflects
the number of service members who, prior to privatization of their
housing, were living on-base or in MILCON housing and not receiving
BAH, but now are. For those service members who were receiving BAH to
pay for housing off-post or in the private sector, that impact on the
BAH account should be transparent as they move into privatized housing.
In fiscal year 2003, we project approximately $448 million of the
basic allowance for housing funding in the military personnel accounts
will be used by members to pay rent at housing privatization projects.

UTILITY PRIVATIZATION

32. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, are the services still being
directed to complete the privatization of utility systems by the end of
fiscal year 2003?
Mr. DuBois. In December 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
directed the services to privatize all utility systems by September
2003, except those needed for security reasons or when uneconomical.
As of October 1, 2001, the services have privatized 26 systems. Two
hundred five systems were determined to be uneconomical to privatize or
exempt due to security reasons.
The program has turned out to be more complex than when initially
conceived and has taken much longer to implement than anticipated. We
are currently reviewing the September 2003 completion milestone.
Meanwhile, the services are proceeding with efforts to execute the
program.

HOMEPORT ASHORE PROGRAM

33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, I understand that in the
Norfolk area barges fitted for berthing are being used to provide
berthing for sailors in port. What role do you believe such barges
should play in the homeport ashore program?
Secretary Johnson. Junior shipboard sailors should have homes
ashore, just like their more senior or shore based counterparts. The
use of berthing barges as they relate to the homeport ashore program
will continue for uninhabitable ships undergoing overhaul when bachelor
housing space is not available, until more permanent housing can be
provided.

EMERGENCY FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

34. Senator Akaka. Mr. DuBois, Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson,
and Secretary Gibbs, please provide a list of all infrastructure
projects funded through the Defense Emergency Response Fund using the
$40 billion appropriated by Public Law 107-38 and the supplemental
included in Public Law 107-117, to include both military construction
projects as well as projects involving the improvement of existing
facilities for purposes including anti-terrorism or force protection.
Mr. DuBois. The projects funded through the Defense Emergency
Response Fund and Supplemental are below. There were no defense agency
projects in these appropriations.

[In millions of dollars]
P.L. 107-38:
Dover AFB Mortuary....................................... 18.8
Guantanamo Naval Base Detention Facility (PH I).......... 20.6
Guantanamo Naval Base Detention Facility (PH II)......... 13.4
Classified Project....................................... 75.0

P.L. 107-117:
Thurmont, MD--Road Construction.......................... 2.0
Fort Detrick, MD Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection......... 9.1
Army classified project in Utah.......................... 7.0
Army classified project.................................. 4.6
Air Force classified projects............................ 46.7
Various locations worldwide--Weapons of mass destruction 35.0
enhanced security.......................................

Secretary Fiori. The Defense Emergency Response Fund provided funds
for infrastructure improvement projects both above and below the $1.5
million life, health, and safety, threshold for military construction
funded projects. The Army does not have visibility on access control
projects below the threshold that were accomplished by installation
commanders' decisions. The list of known projects follows:

[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State/Location Project Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active Army
Maryland
Fort Detrick...................... AT/FP High Risk 4,950
Facility Hardening.
Fort Detrick...................... Perimeter Security 1,350
Fence.
Fort Detrick...................... Remote Delivery 2,800
Facility.

Utah
Dugway Proving Ground............. Classified Project.... 7,000

Inside the U.S.
Various........................... Security Measures for 35,000
WMD.

Outside the U.S.
Various........................... Classified Project.... 4,600

Army Reserve
New Jersey
Fort Dix.......................... Install Lighting...... 120
Install Perimeter 1,050
Fence.

Pennsylvania
Oakdale (99th RSC)................ Repair Fence and 190
Install Lighting.

Wisconsin
Fort McCoy........................ Install Perimeter 1,050
Fence.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Secretary Johnson. The following military construction projects
were funded through the Defense Emergency Response Fund:

[In millions of dollars]
P.L. 107-38:
Military Construction:
Guantanamo Bay Cuba--Detainee Facility I............... 20.6
Guantanamo Bay Cuba--Detainee Facility II.............. 13.4
P.L. 107-117:
Military Construction:
Thurmont, MD--Road Construction........................ 2.O

Funding totaling $75.3 million from P.L. 107-38 was used to
increase the security posture at various installations. Anti-terrorism
force protection projects at these installations included fencing,
perimeter lighting, gate houses, concrete barriers, intrusion detection
systems, waterside security, flight-line barriers, pop-up gate
barriers, installation of window film, and building hardening.
Secretary Gibbs. A list of Air Force infrastructure projects funded
with the $40 billion Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Emergency Response Fund
follows:

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Dayton

ENERGY SAVINGS PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS

35. Senator Dayton. Secretary Gibbs, I understand that the Air
Force currently has six regional energy savings performance contracts
in place covering Air Force facilities throughout the United States. I
have been told that some of these contracts are now approaching their
ceiling prices, and that the Air Force does not plan to perform any
more work under these contracts until they can be recompeted, a process
that could take a year or more. Do you support the use of energy
savings performance contracts to make Air Force facilities more energy-
efficient and reduce the Department's energy costs?
Secretary Gibbs. Yes, the Air Force supports the use of energy
savings performance contracts as one of the primary tools it has to
identify and implement energy saving measures. The Air Force has
engaged in the use of these contracts in each of its six regions,
awarding over $250 million to date in task orders funded by the
respective Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) against these six
contracts. The Air Force reimburses the ESCO up front cost over time
from annual energy cost savings associated with each task order. The
Air Force plans to continue the use of these six contracts and is
currently considering an additional $350 million in task orders
identified by the ESCOs.

36. Senator Dayton. Secretary Gibbs, do you believe that it would
be appropriate to raise the ceiling prices on existing contracts to the
extent necessary to avoid a gap in performance during the period in
which these contracts are being recompeted?
Secretary Gibbs. Currently, the Air Force does not anticipate any
gap in awarding new energy saving measures. The existing contracts are
approximately 4 years old, and each has a term of 25 years. The Air
Force is in the process of procuring a new contract in one region where
the awards to the ESCO have reached 80 percent of the original $250
million ceiling available for that region. That new contract should be
in place by the end of this fiscal year. However, the Air Force does
not anticipate reaching the ceiling on that contract or in any other
region before a new contract has been awarded.

37. Senator Dayton. Secretary Gibbs, will you review the Air
Force's current contracting effort and report on the extent to which
this contracting mechanism is or is not being used today?
Secretary Gibbs. I have reviewed the current Air Force effort. The
Air Force has pursued energy savings performance contracting and to
date has approved and implemented more than $250 million in energy
saving performance task orders funded up front by the ESCO, and
reimbursed over time from Air Force energy cost savings. In addition,
the Air Force is currently considering contractor proposals for another
nearly $350 million in task orders across the six regions.

38. Senator Dayton. Secretary Fiori, I understand that the Army
currently has two energy savings performance contracts covering Army
facilities throughout the United States. I have been told that the Army
has stopped placing work orders under these contracts. Do you support
the use of energy savings performance contracts to make Army facilities
more energy-efficient and reduce the Department of Defense's energy
costs?
Secretary Fiori. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville
Center, awarded two sets of energy savings performance contracts
covering Army facilities throughout the United States for a total of
eighteen contracts. In addition, the Army Medical Command awarded nine
contracts for use in its medical facilities, and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, European District, has awarded several contracts for use in
Europe. Army installations are also using Department of Energy
contracts at some locations. All of these contracts permit the
contractor to develop multiple energy saving projects.
We have not stopped placing work orders against any of these
contracts. We have suspended the use of energy savings performance
contracts in Army family housing units that are part of the Army's
Residential Communities Initiative effort due to some extremely complex
coordination issues.

39. Senator Dayton. Secretary Fiori, will you review the Army's
current contracting effort and report on the extent to which this
contracting mechanism is or is not being used today?
Secretary Fiori. The Army is using energy savings performance
contracts extensively. The Army awarded 23 projects in fiscal year 2000
with an investment value of $107 million and 15 projects in fiscal year
2001 with an investment value of $135 million. So far in fiscal year
2002, we have awarded three projects with an investment value of over
$12 million.

40. Senator Dayton. Secretary Fiori, does the Army have adequate
resources to manage and administer these programs?
Secretary Fiori. Yes.

41. Senator Dayton. Secretary Fiori, is there a funding shortfall
in terms of managing this effort?
Secretary Fiori. No.

42. Senator Dayton. Secretary Fiori, could the Army execute more
energy savings performance contracts with additional administrative
support?
Secretary Fiori. No. New technology and renewable energy projects
are often not cost effective under energy savings performance contracts
and cannot be accomplished. Direct funding to reduce the private sector
investment will increase the use of renewable energy sources.

43. Senator Dayton. Secretary Gibbs and Secretary Fiori, how much
has been saved by energy savings performance contracts since the
inception of the program?
Secretary Gibbs. Because of the structure of the contracts and the
timeframes involved, it is difficult to quantify savings at this point.
Each awarded task order is funded up front by the ESCO who is
reimbursed by the Air Force over time according to the specific annual
energy savings identified in the task order. Payback periods may range
from 1 to 25 years. After the task order is reimbursed, continuing
savings revert to the Air Force, and will accumulate indefinitely after
payback. To date, the Air Force has awarded $250 million in task
orders, all of which will be reimbursed to the ESCO by 2023, and
contribute to Air Force savings.
Secretary Fiori. Since the inception of the program in 1996, the
Army has awarded 85 projects with over $400 million in investment at
our installations. These projects are expected to reduce energy
consumption by 3 million MBTUs of energy (approximately equal to 20
million gallons of oil) each year. Virtually all the dollars saved are
used to pay for the private sector investment.

44. Senator Dayton. Secretary Gibbs and Secretary Fiori, could
additional savings be generated? If so, how much?
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force works with the ESCOs to identify
additional savings opportunities. Good ideas are cross-fed across
installations and regions to take advantage of successful projects.
While the ESCOs continue to identify additional savings opportunities,
the future unidentified potential cannot be quantified.
Secretary Fiori. Most of our installations have executed projects
using energy savings performance contracts. We expect to award an
additional $200-$250 million in projects over the next 5 years, with an
estimated savings of 1.5 million MBTUs of energy (approximately equal
to 10 million gallons of oil per year).
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

BASE TRANSFERS

45. Senator McCain. Mr. Dubois, in a letter on January 16, 2002, I
raised the fact that the David W. Taylor Research Center in Annapolis,
Maryland, selected for closure in 1995, had not yet been transferred to
the local reuse authority. Secretary Aldridge responded on February 19,
2002 suggesting, ``a pending court decision regarding a private
citizen's lawsuit'' was the ``critical issue'' holding up the transfer.
Department of Defense officials have since informed my staff that this
lawsuit is not relevant to the Navy's transfer of the David W. Taylor
Research Center. Are you now of the understanding that the process to
fully close the David W. Taylor Research Center and transfer the
property to the local reuse authority will move forward expeditiously?
Please provide me with a timetable for the transfer of this property.
Mr. DuBois. The referenced civil suit, while one of several local
issues, is not delaying Anne Arundel County from accepting title to the
property. Rather, the County Executive cannot close on the David Taylor
transfer documents without authorization from the County Council. This
local authorization requires agreement between the master developer,
the County, and the Navy. Most provisions necessary for the local
legislative process to proceed have been ironed out and the County
expects property settlement and transfer by September 30, 2002.

46. Senator McCain. Mr. Dubois, what steps is the Department of
Defense taking to review the caseload of bases awaiting final transfer
and what resources have been devoted to ensure this effort happens in a
timely manner?
Mr. DuBois. I have directed the military services to identify
impediments to transfer, and to propose remedies at all BRAC sites with
some outstanding property. I will routinely review the progress we are
making in the transfer of these properties with the military services
and seek remedies to any impediments as they are encountered. This
review will include the development of an updated transfer schedule for
each installation, and validation of budgets to ensure adequate
resources are dedicated to these efforts. Each military service is
responsible for the disposition of this property and it is within each
service that the preponderance of resources are being expended to
facilitate the remaining transfers.
Among the actions OSD is undertaking include:

A complete review of the environmental programs
presently underway for time/cost-saving opportunities;
A review of sites where transfers appear to be impeded
due to the community reluctance to accept transfer, or the
consideration of alternative transfer options; and
Direct the military services to review their existing
procedures to ensure the timely preparation of transfer
documents and funding of necessary actions to facilitate
transfer.

It should be recognized that not all property can be transferred
since there are some installations at which ongoing DOD missions after
BRAC will delay property transfer for several years, e.g. chemical
demilitarization operations at Pueblo and Umatilla Army Depots, and a
Missile Defense Agency mission at Ft. Wingate.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

DOD RECAPITALIZATION RATE

47. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, last year you announced with great
enthusiasm the Department of Defense's 67-year recapitalization cycle.
Congress provided a level of funding to support an 83-year cycle. This
year's request funds a 121-year cycle. What funding levels are required
to achieve the 67-year cycle and when do you intend to provide the
funds to support this goal?
Mr. DuBois. In fiscal year 2003 dollars, and given our current
inventory forecast, we need about $6.4 billion annually in restoration
and modernization funding, using a combination of military construction
and operations and maintenance funds, to achieve a 67-year rate. In
addition, we have to fund full sustainment levels in the O&M accounts,
or the facilities will not last the required 67 years on average. The
fiscal year 2003 President's budget includes funds to achieve the 67-
year recapitalization cycle by fiscal year 2006 or fiscal year 2007
depending on the inventory that remains at that time. Sustainment
levels improve and reach 97 percent in fiscal year 2007.

48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, assuming there is no increase in military
construction, sustainment, restoration, or modernization funding over
the fiscal year 2003 request, what is a realistic goal for achieving
the 67-year recapitalization goal?
Secretary Fiori. The current funding level in 2003 reflects a
recapitalization rate of 123 years. We have programmed additional
funding in the FYDP and are on track to reaching the 67-year cycle by
2010.
Secretary Johnson. Attainment of the 67-year recapitalization rate
is predicated on increased funding programmed in FYDP. However, given
the uncertainty presented by BRAC 2005, which would eliminate the need
to recapitulate some unknown fraction of the DON infrastructure, it
would be conjecture to estimate an alternate timeframe. The DON
recapitalization rate included in the fiscal year 2003 President budget
is 122 years.
Secretary Gibbs. Based upon the present fiscal plan, the Air Force
reaches the 67-year recapitalization rate goal in fiscal year 2007.
However, competing fiscal priorities and the need to balance
sustainment of existing infrastructure with the need for new
construction may impact that schedule.

OVERSEAS MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

49. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, last month I traveled to Germany
and received a briefing on the Efficient Basing East Program. I
understand that our forces in Korea through the Land Partnership Plan
have a similar effort to reduce the number of installations from 41 to
21. Although I support these efforts since they benefit our forces and
reduce cost, these plans are also a benefit to the host nations. What
are Korea and Germany doing to support these efforts?
Mr. DuBois. At this point, German reaction to the Efficient Basing
East (EBE) initiative is unknown, since the U.S. Embassy in Berlin just
began host nation consultations with the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG). It is possible that the affected states within Germany may have
different reactions--the losing state may be concerned about job
losses, while the gaining state may react very positively. The FRG has
the opportunity to raise any concerns during the host nation
consultation process. After consultations are completed, the Secretary
of Defense will make the final decision on the complete return of 12
installations and the partial return of one installation. Assuming he
decides to return the affected installations, the Department plans to
accomplish certain construction projects supporting EBE through
payment-in-kind compensation provided by the Germans as reimbursement
for U.S.-funded improvements on returned facilities.
The Land Partnership Plan reflects substantial support from the
Republic of Korea. Of the entire Land Partnership Plan cost, only 13
percent ($297.6 million) will come from the United States through
already programmed military construction projects. The remaining 87
percent ($1.07 billion) will be paid from Republic of Korea funded
construction, and additional host nation funding produced by sales of
returned, high value land.

50. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, what are your plans for expansions
and/or reductions to the infrastructure in Southwest Asia?
Mr. DuBois. The combatant commanders are currently assessing their
overseas basing structure. The study will be provided to Congress when
it is completed.

51. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, what support is the United States
getting to maintain or build new facilities from the various countries
in the region?
Mr. DuBois. The current level of support provided by each country
is outlined in the Status of Forces Agreements and burdensharing
agreements applicable to that country. The burdensharing report will be
published soon, and we are exploring additional opportunities to
increase burdensharing by our Allies.

F-22 BEDDOWN

52. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gibbs, the Air Force is requesting
$42.8 million for the beddown of the F-22. This is a follow-on to $54
million appropriated last year. How much additional funding will be
required to provide for the beddown of the F-22 and how much of your
budget is dedicated to new mission programs?
Secretary Gibbs. Based on the current F-22 production schedule, an
additional $36.9 million in fiscal year 2004, $43.2 million in fiscal
year 2005, $60.1 million in fiscal year 2006, $96 million in fiscal
year 2007, $83.5 million in fiscal year 2008, and $16.4 million in
fiscal year 2009 is required to beddown the F-22. This allows unique F-
22 facility requirements to be met at all beddown locations.

EFFICIENT BASING EAST PROGRAM

53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, during my last visit to
Germany, I received a briefing on the Army's Efficient Basing, East,
Program. Although I support the plan, I understand that the $350
million cost has risen significantly. What is the projected cost for
moving the Brigade Combat Team and their families to Grafenwoehr,
Germany? What are the efficiencies you expect from this relocation?
Secretary Fiori. The total construction cost is estimated at
approximately $695 million. This cost is comprised of military
construction, Army (MCA) of $596 million and military construction,
Defense-Wide of $100 million for non-Army construction (DODEA, DECA,
AAFES, and Defense Medical). There has been no increase in the cost of
this program.
The initiative is necessary and efficient. Efficient Basing, East
consolidates a heavy Brigade Combat Team from 13 small, scattered
installations to a single installation. It is good for soldiers, it
will improve operations and training, and it saves money. Soldiers will
be located next to their major training area, work in facilities built
to support their job most efficiently, and housed in modern barracks
and family housing, properly sized and outfitted to today's standards.
This initiative saves money because, in the long run, it is cheaper to
build new in a single location than rehabilitate and refurbish old
outmoded facilities in a dispersed World War II footprint.

PRIVATIZATION OF BARRACKS

54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, I understand that the Navy
is considering the privatization of barracks to meet its goal of
providing dormitory space to shipboard sailors. What is the incentive
behind your program, especially when earlier attempts to privatize
barracks were rejected?
Secretary Johnson. It will be a number of years before we are able
to address our critical bachelor housing needs through traditional
military construction funding. Based on our successful experience with
family housing privatization, we believe there is a potential to
similar leverage our resources to improve living conditions for single
sailors and marines much faster. Although there are unique challenges
posed by bachelor housing, such as extended deployments, we are
developing pilot projects that, we believe, will address these issues
and remain compatible with service operational objectives such as unit
cohesion and team building.

ANTI-TERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION

55. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, although anti-terrorism and force protection measures
have been on the forefront for some time, the tragic events of
September 11 dramatically demonstrated the need to provide additional
protection to our military installations. Although protective measures
are important, the greatest defense measure is standoff distance from
the surrounding community. In the past we have discussed the impact of
encroachment on our training environment. What is the impact of
encroachment on our ability to protect our installations? What are we
doing to resolve this matter?
Secretary Fiori. There are Army installations where the
encroachment of the civilian community on the installation's perimeter
is unavoidable. The impact of encroachment creates challenges for
installation commanders, and requires a balance between community
development and force protection. Each installation commander performs
a risk analysis to make effective decisions on force protection and the
impact on the installation and the surrounding communities. The Army,
working with the local community leaders and boards, can achieve a
balance with community development and force protection.
Currently, revised standards for minimum standoff distances are
being written and will apply to all new and existing structures. Where
those distances are not available, the structure will be analyzed by an
engineer experienced in blast-resistant design and hardened as
necessary.
In addition, open communication, community interaction, and a
thorough information campaign assist in protecting and reassuring both
the installation and the community on security issues. The key to this
is the involvement of public affairs officers and liaison activities
with leaders in local government, public agencies, civic organizations,
and the local public media.
Secretary Johnson. Just as encroachment at training ranges impacts
our process for assuring combat readiness, encroachment on our
installations contributes to a myriad of security challenges for Navy/
Marine Corps installations and can compromise the security of our
civilian and military personnel. Inadequate standoff distance around
our installations associated with encroachment has several impacts
including: inadequate setback for blast protection; compressed security
force response time; opportunities for close surveillance of military
operations by adversaries; communications challenges as civilian use of
the frequency spectrum competes with military training, security, and
communications requirements; and increased threat to flight and other
military operations. September 11, also highlighted the accessibility
of our installations from threats from the air, the sea, and through
various existing easements, highways, and railroads that pass through
our installations (e.g. I-5 at Camp Pendleton).
Every installation has increased its security posture since the
attacks of September 11, 2001. Additional security personnel,
technology (security systems and detection devices), security fencing,
barriers, security boats, and training are all being provide to enhance
our antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) posture. The military
construction (MILCON) projects in the fiscal year 2003 budget request
have incorporated AT/FP measures within the scope of the project. These
measure include standoff distances, shatter resistant windows,
structural reinforcement, and building hardening. There is
approximately $107 million in Navy MILCON projects to support this
objective.

[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AT/FP Project
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EGLIN AFB FL NAVSCLEO....... 903 ADV EXPL ORD 6,350
DISP TRAINING
FAC.
BAHRAINNAVSUPPACT........... 911 INSTALLATIONSVC 25,970
SUPTCNTR.
NORFOLK VA NS............... 469 SHORELINE 2,O30
SECURITY
FENCING.
SIGONELLA ITALY NAS......... 625 PARKING GARAGE. 19,560
KITTERY ME PORTSMOUTH NSY... 904 AT/FP 11,600
IMPROVEMENTS.
PORTSMOUTH VA NORFOLK NSY... 902 AT/FP 19,660
IMPROVEMENTS.
PUGET SOUND WA BREMERTON NSY 903 AT/FP 21,670
IMPROVEMENTS.
------------
Total..................... 106,840
------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to the above projects that specifically address AT/FP
enhancements and/or improvements, each of our MILCON projects has AT/FP
construction features (appropriate to the type and function of the
project). These features account for $17.5 million or approximately 3
percent of the projects requested in the fiscal year 2003 Navy MILCON
program.
DON is also exploring various land use controls measures that may
assist in restricting development of lands surrounding our
installations from uses that are incompatible with military
requirements. Initiatives such as the Joint Land Use Study (JLUS)
program, an initiative sponsored by the Office of Economic Adjustment
and Air Installations Compatible Use Zones can facilitate joint
planning between DOD and local communities to protect military
operations and public safety.
Secretary Gibbs. To date, urban encroachment has not been an issue
impacting the Air Force's ability to protect its installations.
The objective of the Air Force anti-terrorism program is to reduce
the vulnerability of personnel and facilities while balancing defensive
measures with mission requirements and available resources. The Air
force goal is not to fortify the installation, but make it a less
attractive target. This is achieved by incorporating flexible and
common sense protection through appropriate base development planning.
As the Air Force works to enhance its urban encroachment program, asset
and force protection will be one of many issues that it addresses.

MAINTENANCE AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES

56. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gibbs, at virtually every hearing,
the service chiefs testify that the aging equipment in our military is
impacting readiness due to heavy maintenance requirements. I was
therefore surprised to see that funding for maintenance and production
facilities in the Department of Defense's request was down almost 60
percent from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002. The Air Force's request is down almost 80 percent from last year.
How does the Air Force intend to provide adequate maintenance and depot
support at these funding levels?
Secretary Gibbs. The year-to-year distribution of facilities
funding varies by facilities categories. The Air Force does not budget
to maintain a level investment for each facility category. It budgets
with a wider viewpoint--while the military construction request for
maintenance and production facilities is lower this year, the
sustainment budget for all Air Force facilities has been increased from
fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2003.
The Air Force is requesting over $4.2 billion in total to invest in
Air Force facilities and infrastructure in fiscal year 2003, the same
level as submitted in the fiscal year 2002 budget request. The Air
Force's focus in fiscal year 2003 will be to sustain the facilities
that already exist, investing nearly $2 billion for sustainment,
restoration, and modernization, an increase of over $360 million from
fiscal year 2002.

REPAIR OF FACILITIES

57. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, I have a special interest in the training of our
military personnel and take a special interest in operation and
maintenance (O&M) funding. Last year, your services reported that you
allocated more that $370 million for 31 building repair projects. That
number reflects only those projects costing more than $7.5 million. I
am concerned that you are using training dollars to support the
military construction (MILCON) program. What criteria are you using to
decide whether or not a project should be funded using MILCON or O&M?
What is the source of the O&M funding you are using for these projects?
Secretary Fiori. The Army appropriately uses O&M funds to repair
facilities that require immediate attention, overhauling or replacing
failed or failing components or materials. The condition of these
facilities must be addressed quickly to prevent accelerated
deterioration and potential unsafe conditions and cannot wait for long-
term MILCON programming to correct. The use of O&M funds for repair
projects may include some associated minor construction that may not
exceed a new cost limitation of $750,000. If this minor construction
corrects a deficiency that is life, health, or safety threatening, then
the cost limitation for associated construction is $1.5 million. Any
repair project that has associated minor construction that exceeds
these cost limitations must be considered and programmed for either
Unspecified Minor Military Construction, Army (UMMCA), or Military
Construction, Army (MCA). Repair projects exceeding a total cost of
$7.5 million are reported to Congress.
The Army distributes O&M funds to the Major Army Commands (MACOMs),
who in turn, distribute to the installations. Amounts for these funds
are specified for use in training, operational costs, and for
sustainment, restoration, and maintenance costs.
Secretary Johnson. The Department does not use funds programmed for
military personnel training to repair buildings or construct new
buildings. Title 10 U.S.C. Chapter 169 provides the criteria to
determine if a project should be MILCON funded. The Navy and Marine
Corps have implementing guidance on O&M funded repair and minor
construction projects, OPNAVINST 11010.20F and MCO P11000.5. O&M funds
are requested in the budget for sustainment, restoration, and
modernization (SRM). These funds are programmed for repair of real
property facilities.
Secretary Gibbs. To sustain, restore, and modernize its
infrastructure, the Air Force must achieve a balance between military
construction and operations and maintenance programs. Military
construction restores and re-capitalizes facilities. Operation and
maintenance funding ensures the Air Force can perform facility
sustainment activities, without which facilities would fail
prematurely. Operation and maintenance funding is also used to directly
address many of the critical restoration and less-expensive
recapitalization needs. Without these funds, commanders in the field
are unable to address facility requirements that impact their near-term
readiness.
When the Air Force builds its annual budget request, it projects
the requirement for operations and maintenance and program funds in the
O&M facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization line. Once
appropriated by Congress, these are the funds we use to address our O&M
facility repair requirements.

FAMILY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

58. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, the Department of Defense plans to
privatize about 100,000 family housing units over the next several
years. Based on the latest report, which reflects data since 1996, the
Department of Defense has less that 30,000 units awarded or pending
award. Although this is a major improvement over the fiscal year 2001
report, there is still a great deal of work ahead to achieve the
100,000 goal. Are you satisfied that each service now has a housing
privatization program that will support the Department of Defense's
privatization goals?
Mr. DuBois. The Secretary of Defense accelerated the Department's
goal for eliminating inadequate housing (which totals about 168,000
units) from 2010 to 2007. At this point, all the services, with the
exception of the Air Force, met the 2007 goal (Air Force is now using
2010). Accordingly, we are accelerating housing privatization, but
working to implement this program in a manner that ensures high quality
construction and operation of military family housing.
As I noted in my testimony before the House Appropriation
Committee, Subcommittee on Military Construction on March 13, 2002
regarding the DOD housing privatization program, we awarded 10 projects
in 5 years (fiscal year 1996-2001), producing about 7,000 privatization
units. Only 1 year later, we have awarded a cumulative total of 16
projects (7 Navy, 1 Marine, 4 Air Force, and 4 Army) producing about
25,000 privatized units. The six privatization projects awarded over
the last year more than tripled the number of units already privatized.
Through the experience of creating, awarding, and executing the
first 16 Military Housing Privatization Initiative projects, the
services have developed internal expertise and capacity in disciplines
important to housing privatization. Each service now has experienced
privatization teams in-place with expertise in project management,
acquisition, financial management, personnel, legal, and real estate/
housing management. This expertise can be found at the installation,
command, and headquarters levels of each service. I believe the program
has momentum, and service project privatization plans are moving
forward to achieve our 2007 goal. Assuming our congressional support
and funding remain stable the Department will: privatize 35,000 units
in fiscal year 2003; award a cumulative total of 60,000 units
privatized by the end of fiscal year 2003; and continue that
acceleration through fiscal year 2004-2007.

CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM

59. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, Congress has appropriated $1.3
billion for the construction of chemical demilitarization facilities.
This year, the Army budget includes an additional $167 million. What
have the taxpayers received for this huge investment?
Secretary Fiori. The military construction funds financed design
and construction of large scale industrial disposal facilities, depot
infrastructure support projects, and a training facility. Funds have
been used to design and construct the Tooele, Umatilla, and Anniston
Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities. Funds have also been used to design
and continue construction at Pine Bluff, Aberdeen, and the Newport
Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities. In addition, military construction
funds are used at each of the sites to construct depot infrastructure
upgrades that are required to support the chemical agent disposal
facilities such as utility and road upgrades. A training facility was
also built to support to chemical demilitarization destruction program.
Construction at Tooele was completed in 1993, and the facility is
now in agent operations. To date, Tooele has destroyed 44 percent of
the chemical agent and 81 percent of the munitions stored at the
Deseret Chemical Depot. In addition, Johnston Island has completed 100
percent destruction of all the chemical munitions stockpile stored on
the island and is in the closure process. Construction at Anniston and
Umatilla was completed in 2001, and these two facilities are currently
in the systemization-testing phase with planned disposal operations to
start in fiscal year 2003. Construction is currently ongoing at Pine
Bluff (83 percent complete), Aberdeen (25 percent complete), and
Newport (26 percent complete). The Aberdeen, MD, facility has
accelerated the neutralization process by as much as 2 years for
disposal of mustard bulk agent. The Army is evaluating a similar option
to accelerate disposal of the bulk VX nerve agent stockpile at Newport,
IN, and will continue to evaluate options at other sites. As permitted
by law, depot upgrade contracts that are technology neutral have also
been started at Pueblo Chemical Depot and Blue Grass Army Depot to
support the planned chemical disposal facilities at those locations.
The training facility in Edgewood, MD, was completed in 1991 and is
used to provide initial and refresher training of systems contractor
personnel in a hands-on replica of a functioning disposal facility.
The Non-Stockpile Product is continuing construction of the
Munitions Assessment and Processing System at Aberdeen, MD, which will
be used to destroy recovered munitions.

60. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, how much additional military
construction funding is programmed to complete facilities?
Secretary Fiori. In addition to the $167 million programmed for
fiscal year 2003, a total of $537.5 million is also programmed in
fiscal year 2004 ($187.7 million), fiscal year 2005 ($180.5 million),
fiscal year 2006 ($115.6 million), and fiscal year 2007 ($53.7
million). These funds are to complete the construction at Newport
($88.0 million) and to fully fund the construction of the disposal
facilities at Pueblo ($201.3 million) and Blue Grass ($248.2 million).
Start of construction at Pueblo and Blue Grass disposal facilities will
begin once process technology decisions are made and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Action (RCRA) permits are approved. A
technology decision for Pueblo is planned for the third quarter fiscal
year 2002 and Blue Grass is planned for the first quarter fiscal year
2003.

61. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, will the Army meet the 2007
treaty-imposed deadline to destroy the unitary chemical stockpile?
Secretary Fiori. The Army is exploring all viable options to safely
destroy the chemical stockpile at the earliest possible date. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has completed a major program
review (September 2001) that resulted in the recognition that the
existing stockpile destruction milestones would not be met. The largest
contributor to this is the incorporation of our chemical agent
destruction experience at Johnston Island and at Tooele, Utah, into
realistic forecasts for other disposal sites.
The Army is accelerating the effort to neutralize the chemical
agent stockpile at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and is studying the
feasibility of a similar effort at Newport, IN, and will evaluate
similar options at other sites. Using the accelerated neutralization
process, the Army will eliminate these two stockpiles before the treaty
deadline.
The Non-Stockpile Product Program continues to execute the disposal
of the U.S. chemical warfare materiel that is not part of the unitary
chemical stockpile, in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). The non-stockpile program is on schedule to meet the 80 percent
CWC deadline (April 2005), and the 100 percent CWC deadline (April
2007) for the destruction of Schedule 1 Chemical Weapons Production
Facilities.

GUAM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

62. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, due to the inadequacy of Guam's
education system, the Department of Defense directed the Department of
Defense Education Agency (DODEA) to establish a school system on
Anderson Air Force Base and Naval Station Guam. Congress supported the
decision by authorizing funding to provide interim facilities. However,
it was agreed that the Department of Defense would include funding in
future budgets to build new facilities. To date only the middle school
at Anderson Air Force Base has been completed. I understand that
funding for the construction of the new high school is in the Future
Year Defense Program, but nothing has been programmed for the Navy
middle school. I understand that the condition of the Navy middle
school is deplorable and that it is not compliant with the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The Navy's decision to homeport new ships in
Guam will only aggravate the situation and cause further hardship on
the students and faculty. Since this is a critical quality-of-life
issue, when will the Department of Defense provide the funding to DODEA
for the construction of the Navy middle school?
Mr. DuBois. The Department of Defense is examining all restationing
efforts, to include the Guam restationing. The Guam Elementary/Middle
School is a priority and will be reprioritized to meet the educational
needs of our students. The construction of a new middle school is
needed with or without the influx of population from the restationing
effort.

DEFENSE IMPACT REVIEW PROCESS

63. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Dubois, Section 1041 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 directs the Secretary of
Defense to prepare a report to the President and Congress on the need
for a Defense Impact Review Process. This process would provide the
Department of Defense with the opportunity to review the proposed
actions of other Federal agencies in order to identify those actions
that may have an adverse impact on national defense. This report is due
June 2002. How will the Section 1041 Defense Impact Review Process be
beneficial for the Department of Defense in addressing encroachment
issues? Has the Department started preparing the report? Will it be
here on time?
Mr. DuBois. Secretary Mayberry and I are directing the effort to
prepare the Section 1041 Report and that effort has begun. We do
believe that action agencies should be required to consider military
readiness impacts during any regulatory or administrative process that
may result in an action that has the potential to affect military
testing, training, or operations. Action agencies could be required to
prepare formal ``defense impact analyses,'' much as they routinely
prepare environmental impact analyses today. Other mechanisms under
consideration that would be beneficial ensure that DOD is given: (1)
advance notice of proposed agency actions that have the potential to
affect military testing, training, or operations; (2) a reasonable
opportunity to bring DOD's concerns, if any, to the action agency's
attention; (3) assurance that DOD's readiness concerns will be given
appropriate consideration; and (4) an opportunity for DOD to raise its
concerns within the Executive Office of the President should the action
agency decide it must act notwithstanding DOD's concerns. The
Department will submit its report in June 2002.

64. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, it is expected that the input of the military
departments will be a critical aspect of the review process and report
preparation. What role has the military departments played in the
Defense Impact Review Process? Do you anticipate that this process will
help to address your departments' environmental encroachment concerns
in a substantive manner?
Secretary Fiori. The Army has actively participated with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and our sister services in the development
of the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to the President. The Army
is evaluating the probable benefits of a formalized National Defense
Impact Review Process against the potential costs and administrative
burden that such a process may create.
Federal agencies sometimes take actions, particularly at the local
and regional level, without adequate consideration of the effects those
actions will have on national defense. These actions often affect or
have the potential to affect our ability to train soldiers and ensure
military readiness. In large part this is due to the fact that there is
no process through which we can ensure national defense concerns are
identified and considered, and the appropriate balance between defense
and other important national policies is achieved. The Army believes
that such a process should consist of five critical elements:
notification of proposed agency actions, reasonable opportunity for DOD
to comment, consideration of Defense Department views, consultation to
resolve disagreements, and submission of an annual report to OMB.
Secretary Johnson. The Office of the Secretary of Defense asked
each military department to report on the impact of federal regulatory
and administrative actions on defense activities consistent with the
requirements of Section 1041 of the Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense
Authorization Act. The Department of Navy tasked the Navy and Marine
Corps to survey their bases and provide specific examples of how
military activities were being impacted or restricted by other federal
actions. The services reviewed their files and documented specific
cases where the services had raised concerns about the potential impact
of federal regulatory actions on military readiness but those concerns
were not addressed by the acting agency. In the Department of Navy's
response to the Department of Defense, we will provide a summary of the
examples that we have found and recommendations on how best to address
military needs in the regulatory process.
The Defense Impact Review Process provides an important vehicle for
addressing regulatory impacts on military readiness. Based on this
review, DOD will recommend needed changes in the process to help ensure
military readiness is given appropriate consideration in the federal
regulatory process.
Secretary Gibbs. OSD has requested, and the Air Force has provided,
examples of encroachment related to other Federal agency actions for
OSD's report to Congress. The Defense Impact Review Process can assist
the Administration in minimizing gaps in interagency cooperation to
prevent potential mission impacts.
Currently, the Air Force's only formal means of addressing impacts
is as a cooperating agency under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) when other Federal agencies perform environmental impact
analyses. Generally, other agencies do not request military departments
to be a cooperating agency; therefore this tool is not always used
effectively.
When not a formal cooperating agency, the Air Force provides
comments and input on potential readiness issues on an ad hoc basis.
The Air Force reviews environmental analyses for other agency's
proposals when provided the opportunity; when the Air Force identifies
other agency proposals via the Federal Register; or when other agencies
provide copies of their environmental documentation as a matter of
routine (not necessarily an active engagement). These efforts often
fail to identify readiness impacts as an issue, thus the Defense Impact
Review Process can be of significant benefit.

ALTERNATIVES TO VIEQUES

65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, in his March 20, 2001,
testimony before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee,
Vice Admiral James F. Amerault stated, ``Encroachment is a serious
problem--we are finding it increasingly difficult to train our sailors
effectively at other locations due to overly broad legal requirements--
we are witnessing a loss of training realism. . . .'' Given the Navy's
expressed intent to find equivalent training facilities to replace
Vieques, how do you propose to address the continuing environmental
encroachment pressures that diminish the quality of training at
alternative ranges?
Secretary Johnson. We have identified several encroachment issues
that if allowed to go unmanaged and unregulated will continue to
compromise the effectiveness of all our training and testing missions.
DOD and the military services have been in discussions with OMB, the
Council of Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Fish and Wildlife Service at the Department of Interior, and
the National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) at the
Department of Commerce. Together, as a team, and with the help of
Congress, we will work to find solutions and we will properly address
the challenges of encroachment on all of our ranges. We are hopeful
that we can find long-term solutions rather than ``work-arounds'' to
the pressures of encroachment that will allow the Navy to sustain range
operations.

66. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, regarding Vieques, the Navy
maintains that by May 2003 they will be able to identify ``one or more
alternative training facilities--to provide an equivalent or superior
level of training for units of the Navy.'' A number of land- and sea-
based ranges on the east coast are being considered as alternatives to
Vieques. Has the Navy begun its National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) analysis regarding the use of these alternative training
facilities? When will that NEPA analysis likely begin and end? Will
training be interrupted pending the completion of the NEPA analysis?
Secretary Johnson. Independent of replacing Vieques, Navy has begun
environmental analysis to support enhancement of training capabilities
at individual land and sea-based ranges on the east coast. Some of
these site-specific analyses are already complete; others will require
more time. This process of site specific analyses is designed to
optimize training opportunities at individual locations and provide
flexibility to operational commanders so they can adapt unit and battle
group training needs in response to a dynamic mission, training
schedule, and natural environment. We anticipate that some of these
sites could accommodate training currently done on Vieques. While much
has been accomplished in planning for alternative training sites, we
have not formulated a final plan to replace the training opportunities
now available on Vieques.

67. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, given the fact that
environmental encroachment issues already exist at ranges all along the
east coast, what would the Navy propose to do if, after May 2003, the
NEPA analysis reveals that many of the alternative ranges cannot
support additional training?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy anticipates a training strategy that
will use a combination of existing ranges, methods, and advanced/
improved technologies to meet future training requirements. The intent
of the strategy will be to ensure no single range complex becomes a
point of failure for the training strategy as a whole.

68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, the community has already reacted very negatively to the
possibility of serving as a training alternative to Vieques. How does
the Navy propose to deal with such inevitable community reactions?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy is, and will continue to be, a good
environmental steward of the properties entrusted to us. The
appropriate level of analysis will be prepared pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to ensure that Navy decision makers and
the public are fully informed about potential environmental impacts
associated with training alternatives.

GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENCROACHMENT ISSUES

69. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson,
and Secretary Gibbs, the military departments have primarily responded
to environmental encroachment issues through the development of ``work-
arounds'' or training constraints imposed as a result of legal
requirements. Other than ``work-arounds,'' what specifically is each of
the military departments doing to resolve these issues to ensure
realistic training now and in the future? How is the Department of
Defense facilitating the services' efforts in this area?
Mr. DuBois. Last December, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and myself
to form an Integrated Product Team (IPT) to act as the Department's
coordinating body for all encroachment issues on ranges, operating
areas, and other training locations. The IPT is formally working these
issues. It has formed two groups, an Overall Integrated Product Team
(OIPT), which Dr. Mayberry and I chair with Department principals, and
a working IPT, which includes staff members from both OSD and the
military departments. Although we have many initiatives underway, they
can be categorized under five broad headings: leadership and
organization, policy and plans, programs and funding, outreach, and
legislation and regulation. The IPT is working under the broad guidance
of the Department's Senior Readiness Oversight Council, which is
chaired by the Deputy Secretary. The IPT has begun work on key elements
of the problem, and we have significant initiatives planned and
underway.
Secretary Fiori. The Army is working internally and with other
agencies with environmental regulatory responsibilities to mitigate the
effects and potential effects that encroachment has on our training and
readiness. Our principal internal effort is the Sustainable Range
Program (SRP). The objective of SRP is to maximize the capability,
availability, and accessibility of ranges and training land to support
doctrinal training and testing requirements. SRP is based on three
tenets:
(1) Scientifically defensible information. Develop and maintain
complete data on all aspects of ranges--operational characteristics of
training facilities, physical characteristics of real property, and
data on the range as part of the natural and cultural environment.
(2) Integrated management. Integrate across the four disciplines
that directly affect ranges: range operations and modernization;
facilities and installation management; explosives safety; and
environmental management.
(3) Outreach. Inform political leadership, regulators, and
communities and improve understanding of the Army's need for training
and testing and the Army's more sophisticated range management
approach. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the
services to develop overarching Department policy for sustainment of
ranges and operating areas. This policy will support the long-term
planning and programming necessary to ensure our ranges and training
areas meet mission needs now and into the future.
Secretary Johnson. DOD and the military services are pursuing
programmatic solutions, administrative fixes, and regulatory changes.
We have developed a comprehensive range sustainment approach to manage
encroachment issues. The approach includes the development of
comprehensive Range Complex Management Plans, efforts to establish
regulatory clarifications, public outreach and education, dialogue and
negotiations with regulatory agencies, and regional and national
initiatives. The SROC established an Encroachment IPT to coordinate all
issues of encroachment within the services. The IPT developed action
plans to address specific encroachment issues, and oversees their
implementation. Another work group has developed the DOD Munitions
Action Plan (MAP) addressing life-cycle management of munitions from
acquisition through demilitarization. DOD is also working on an
encroachment strategy for the Southern California/Arizona region. The
strategy will engage stakeholders and range managers to identify issues
and develop solutions to regional encroachment that will be applied
nationally if successful. DON is budgeting for comprehensive range
sustainability studies at Navy and Marine Corps ranges. These studies
will include Range Complex Management Plans, regulatory compliance
evaluations, on-site contaminant assessments, and encroachment
vulnerability analyses.
We have engaged OMB, CEQ, EPA, DOI, and DOC in discussions
regarding encroachment issues. In some instances, however, legislative
changes may be required. In some cases, the requirements that must be
amended or clarified are in existing legislation so legislation
provides the best vehicle to address the issue.
Secretary Gibbs. Several policies and initiatives ongoing in the
Air Force will be of assistance to avoiding readiness impacts in the
future. First, the Air Force is working to develop effective metrics to
better define readiness requirements and vulnerabilities. A better
understanding of the problem will allow better solutions. Second, the
Air Force will continue the practice of investing in scientific
research and analysis to better inform regulatory decision makers and
avoid unnecessary readiness limitations.
The military departments also participate continually in
legislative and regulatory processes to craft solutions for readiness
and the environment. The Air Force has developed standardized language
for proposed wilderness bills to preserve access and overflight of the
lands proposed as wilderness in support of our military mission, while
training in a manner compatible with the wilderness designation.
Finally, the Air Force is working closely with the Federal Aviation
Agency (FAA) on the National Airspace redesign efforts, and is
emphasizing pollution prevention initiatives in operational activities.

70. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson,
and Secretary Gibbs, the ability to conduct live-fire training at
military ranges is at risk because of a broad spectrum of environmental
encroachment issues. I am aware of the training restrictions imposed at
Massachusetts Military Reservation and the threats to live-fire
training at Makua Military Reservation and other ranges throughout the
Department of Defense. In light of these issues, what macro resolutions
are being sought to preserve quality training throughout the Department
of Defense?
Mr. DuBois. Draft legislation will be provided to Congress to
clarify and amend existing legislation that will contribute toward
preserving quality training throughout the Department of Defense.
Because maintaining the readiness of our forces is one of the
Department's highest priorities, it is critical that we strive to
maintain a ``measured balance'' between our test and training
requirements and sound environmental stewardship. We aim to seek this
balance in a way that considers the concerns of the neighboring
communities near our ranges and operating areas. Some of the issues may
be amenable to regulatory fixes or even to administrative policy
solutions. As the administration pursues statutory clarification, we
are ready to work closely with appropriate congressional committees to
fully apprise these committees of the basis for and objectives of any
necessary clarifications. I am convinced that the goals of
environmental stewardship and realistic military training are not
mutually exclusive.
Secretary Fiori. As I stated in response to your previous question,
the Army is working internally and with other agencies with
environmental regulatory responsibilities to mitigate the effects and
potential effects that encroachment has on our training and readiness.
Our principal internal effort is the Sustainable Range Program (SRP).
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the services to
implement a Department wide policy for the sustainment of ranges and
operating areas.
Although we believe that our efforts will minimize the impacts of
encroachment on our ranges and training lands, we also recognize the
need to clarify the application of several environmental laws to
military testing and training. The Army has been working with our
sister services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop
initiatives that clarify our responsibilities under a variety of
environmental statutes. These initiatives focus on supporting our
training activities and allow flexibility to consider impacts to
military readiness in the implementation of environmental statutes.
Secretary Johnson. The Department of Defense is subject to a great
number of environmental requirements, and is looking toward both micro
and macro resolutions. Micro resolutions are typically done at specific
sites or throughout a region. The Department is also working with OMB
and other Federal agencies on macro, or nation-wide solutions. Where
specific issues cannot be resolved through policy or regulatory
actions, the Department will seek the support of Congress for
legislative clarifications.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force is implementing a variety of
solutions to preserve quality of training on its ranges. These include
effective readiness metrics; good science; legislative and regulatory
interface; and investment in pollution prevention. Other macro level
efforts include using the Integrated Natural Resource Management Plan
(INRMP) process to engage local, State, and Federal wildlife officials
to resolve many of the management issues at Air Force ranges. The Air
Force is also working to ensure its weapon system acquisition processes
address encroachment issues such as noise in the design and production
phases to limit impacts when aircraft or ordnance are deployed.

ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION

71. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, growing urbanization has
transformed many military training ranges into ``islands of
biodiversity'' that contain endangered species and critical habitats.
Fleet operations have also been effected by concerns related to marine
species and the sustainability of the maritime environment. During the
hearing, it was noted that there are some legislative proposals that
under consideration within the Department. Could you describe the
nature and status of these proposals in more detail?
Mr. DuBois. Yes, the Department intends to submit draft legislation
to Congress. The major elements are:
Endangered Species Act (ESA): Confirm an existing policy (under
court challenge) that provides that DOD cooperation with the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service on natural resource management may make the
designation of critical habitat on DOD lands unnecessary.

This legislation confirms existing policies of the
last two administrations.
The legislation explicitly requires that the Defense
Department continue to consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service under Section
7 of the ESA; the provisions of the ESA, as well as other
environmental statues such as the National Environmental Policy
Act, would continue to apply.

Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA): Follow the National Research
Council's recommendation that the current, ambiguous definition of
``harassment,'' of marine mammals, which includes ``annoyance'' and
``potential to disturb,'' be focused on more biologically significant
effects.

The legislation confirms existing practices of the
last two administrations, endorsed by the National Research
Council.
Although excluding transitory, biologically
insignificant effects from regulation, the MMPA would remain in
full effect for biologically significant effects--not only
death or injury but disruption of biologically significant
activities.
DOD currently funds much of the most significant
research on marine mammals, and will continue this research in
the future.

Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA): Reverse a March 2002 court
decision interpreting the MBTA to prohibit training at the Farallon de
Medinilla (FDM) range in the Western Pacific due to concerns about even
low numbers of bird deaths.

The legislation restores the legal and regulatory
status quo as it existed for over 80 years, until the FDM
decision in March 2002.
The FDM case was brought in the DC Circuit, which has
jurisdiction over all DOD activities. As a result, the FDM case
puts at risk military aviation, military telecommunications,
and live-fire training nationwide.

Clean Air Act (CAA): Maintain DOD's commitment to CAA standards
while providing flexibility to meet State air quality policies and
training and readiness requirements.

The CAA currently prevents DOD from beginning
readiness activities involving even relatively minor increases
in emissions until it can demonstrate immediate compliance with
State clean air plans.
Without greater flexibility, the conformity
requirement could be a significant obstacle to basing military
aircraft in any Southern California location, as well as a
potentially serious factor in siting the Joint Strike Fighter
and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.
The legislative proposal reaffirms DOD's obligation to
meet State air requirements but allows DOD and State regulators
more time to ensure full compliance.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
commonly known as Superfund: Confirm that the cleanup of military
munitions is not required so long as munitions remain on the
operational ranges. DOD's obligation to cleanup off-range munitions and
munitions causing imminent danger on-range would remain unchanged.

The legislation does not modify DOD's cleanup
responsibilities under CERCLA or RCRA at Formerly Used Defense
Sites; closed, closing, or transferring ranges; or currently
operational bases that close in the future.

Cooperative buffer zone acquisition authority: Allows military
departments to enter into agreements with third parties--such as
private land preservation organizations--to prevent urban development
that threatens testing and training. The proposal would assist DOD with
preserving ``buffer zones'' between ranges/bases and urban areas.
Buffer zones provide critical habitat for endangered and threatened
species.
Conveyance of surplus property for conservation purposes: Allows
DOD to convey surplus property to a State or local government, or to a
nonprofit conservation organization. The proposal allows the transfer
of land only if it is used for conservation purposes in perpetuity.

72. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson, and
Secretary Gibbs, growing urbanization has transformed many military
training ranges into ``islands of biodiversity'' that contain
endangered species and critical habitats. Fleet operations have also
been effected by concerns related to marine species and the
sustainability of the maritime environment. During the hearing, it was
noted that there are some legislative proposals that under
consideration within the Department. What, if any, impediments are each
of you experiencing regarding these proposals?
Secretary Fiori. I would not characterize the efforts to develop
our legislative clarification proposals as ``impediments.'' Rather, the
Department is working internally and with other agencies within the
administration to refine and focus the proposals to just those needed
to preserve military readiness without reducing the level of protection
to human health and the environment. When the Department provides the
legislative clarification proposal to Congress it will be a fully
coordinated administration position that serves both military readiness
and environmental protection requirements.
Secretary Johnson. We have worked closely within the Department of
Defense and other federal agencies, including the Department of
Transportation, the Department of Commerce, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the President's council on environmental quality
to craft a carefully tailored legislative package that provides us with
the flexibility and balance we need to meet mission requirements while
still protecting the environmental values that we as a nation cherish.
This debate has taken more time than expected, but we feel that
important to present a fully vetted administration proposal to
Congress.
Secretary Gibbs. Several proposals to clarify the implementation of
environmental laws to military readiness activities were developed by
the Department of Defense and are currently under consideration by
Congress as the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative.

73. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson,
and Secretary Gibbs, during this session of Congress the Senate is
expected to resume debate on comprehensive energy legislation.
Apparently, the Department of Defense and the services have concerns
regarding both the House and Senate versions of this legislation. Could
you explain those concerns and how you propose to address them with
Congress?
Mr. DuBois. The attached Statement of Administration Policy from
the Secretary of Energy reflects the Department of Defense's position
as well.

Secretary Fiori. The Army concurs with the views expressed by Mr.
DuBois. The Army is committed to reducing its energy consumption since
lower energy costs free up resources for more critical items, it
reduces our reliance on foreign energy sources, and it benefits the
environment.
While the Army supports comprehensive energy legislation, we
believe that there are provisions in the proposed legislation that will
adversely affect national security, and our ability to meet energy
reduction goals.
The proposed legislation changes the performance standards for
energy reduction goals and the baseline from 1985 to 2000. This creates
different baseline performance standards than those used in Executive
Order 13123 and Fiscal Year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act,
doubling the Army's tracking and reporting requirements. The new
performance goals also penalize the Army for pursuing energy
conservation aggressively since 1985. The Army has achieved a 27.1
percent reduction since 1985, and is on track to meet the current
fiscal year 2010 goal.
The proposed legislation requires that all Federal buildings be
metered or sub-metered by October 2002. All Army installations are
metered, but few buildings are separately metered. Initial cost to
meter every building is estimated at $500 million, with continuing
costs to read and maintain. Metering buildings will divert resources
from readiness, quality of life, and facilities sustainment, and weaken
efforts to make the most effective use of our energy conservation
dollars. Metering can be useful in energy conservation, but does not
save energy by itself.
The Army is also interested in protecting its ability to develop
geothermal energy resources on Army land. The pending amendment to the
Senate bill threatens the Army's ability to manage and control
geothermal energy production on its lands. Such provisions will also
restrict the Army's ability to ensure continuous and effective use of
its lands for their primary functions: testing of weapons systems and
mission essential training of soldiers.
Secretary Johnson. While the Department of the Navy supports
comprehensive energy legislation, there are several provisions that we
believe will affect national security adversely, while other provisions
could be modified to better support our energy efforts. This bill would
require the Department to expend fiscal resources needed for more
critical programs. Some examples of specific issues are:
The House version of the energy bill, and a pending amendment to
the Senate bill, threaten the Department's ability to manage and
control geothermal energy production on its lands. Such provisions will
also restrict the Department's ability to ensure continuous and
effective use of its lands for their primary functions: testing of
weapons systems and mission essential training of pilots. Also, the
revenues from the geothermal energy programs are used by the military
departments to offset the costs of managing the programs and are re-
invested in various renewable energy programs (e.g., solar and wind
energy). Provisions impacting the Department of Defense's geothermal
program will adversely impact the development of additional geothermal
energy at Naval installations.
Both bills propose that all Federal buildings be metered or sub-
metered. Metering for the Department is done at the installations
level. However, only some of the Department's individual buildings are
metered. The cost to meter all buildings is estimated at $500 million
and is cost prohibitive. Metering buildings would divert resources from
readiness, quality of life, and facilities sustainment, while
undermining efforts to ensure the most effective use of our energy
conservation dollars. Metering can play a useful role in energy
conservation, but is not a universal solution. Recommend continuing
metering decisions based on life cycle cost.
Proposed legislation would change the performance standards for
energy reduction goals and the baseline from 1985 to 2000. This creates
a different baseline and performance standards than used in Executive
Order 13123 and fiscal year 2002 Defense Authorization Act (PL 107-
107), effectively doubling the Department of Defense's tracking and
reporting requirements. The new performance goals are a 20 percent
reduction by 2011 from a 2000 baseline, as compared to the existing 30
percent reduction by 2005 and 35 percent reduction by 2010 from a 1985
baseline. The section also penalizes the Department for pursuing energy
conservation aggressively since 1985. Agencies with less aggressive
programs, which consumed more energy in 2000, will find it easier to
meet the new standards. Recommend retention of current Executive Order
13123 and fiscal year 2002 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 107-
107) goals and retention of fiscal year 1985 baseline.
The proposed legislation will require the Federal government to
purchase at least 3 percent of its electricity from renewable sources
by fiscal year 2003, 5 percent by fiscal year 2005, and 7.5 percent by
fiscal year 2010. The Department of Defense currently purchases less
than 1 percent of its electricity from renewable sources, primarily
because purchasing renewable energy usually requires a premium over
standard rates. Increasing demand ahead of the available supply will
only exacerbate this problem and force the Department to divert
resources from readiness, facilities sustainment, and quality of life
to meet this requirement. Essentially, the Department of Defense will
be indirectly subsidizing the renewable electrical energy industry.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force has prepared position papers
addressing key provisions of concern. All the services coordinated on
the papers, which were also provided to OSD. The Navy and Air Force
Secretariats will be communicating the concerns via respective
legislative liaison functions.

BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES

74. Senator Inhofe. Mr. DuBois, Secretary Fiori, Secretary Johnson,
and Secretary Gibbs, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002 authorized an additional round of base realignments and
closures (BRAC). Previous congressional opposition to BRAC was
influenced by many factors, including the Department of Defense's
inability to accurately quantify cost savings, the lack of
accountability for unexpended cleanup funds, inadequate funding for
environmental cleanup, criticism regarding delayed property transfers,
concerns regarding political intervention in the 1995 BRAC round, and,
more recently, questions related to the infrastructure necessary to
support the war on terrorism. How are the services addressing these
concerns, particularly as an additional round of BRAC is considered
within the Department of Defense?
Mr. DuBois. The Department estimates that, through 2001, the four
BRAC rounds have generated almost $17 billion in net savings, with over
$6 billion in annual recurring savings thereafter. The General
Accounting Office has consistently stated that BRAC generates
significant savings. Their latest report validates these costs and
savings estimates. The Department recognizes, as has the GAO, that
these savings, while significant, are difficult to track with
precision. To improve the process for estimating savings for a BRAC
round in 2005, the Department will develop a Defense-wide systematic
approach for the periodic updating of initial base closure savings
estimates.
Regarding the management of unexpended cleanup funds, the
Department is taking steps to ensure all BRAC funds are both obligated
and expended in a timely manner. The military services are recovering
prior year funds that are no longer required and are applying these
funds to current requirements. Over 90 percent of the Department's
fiscal year 2001 appropriation was obligated during the first year.
Through February 2002, the military services have expended or
liquidated 99 percent of all obligations of fiscal year 1996 and prior
year BRAC appropriations, as reported by the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service. The Department will be closely monitoring these
resource management issues in the future and applying lessons learned
to the management of BRAC 2005 resources.
Regarding the perception of inadequate funds for environmental
cleanup of BRAC properties, the fiscal year 2003 BRAC environmental
President's budget request is $29 million higher than the fiscal year
2002 request. The funding request is based on current requirements and
capacity to execute and ensures funding to meet legal obligations.
To improve performance in transferring these properties, I have
directed the military services to identify impediments to transfer, and
to propose solutions for all BRAC sites at which property awaits
transfer. I will routinely review the progress we are making in the
transfer of these properties with the military services and seek
solutions to impediments as they are encountered. This review will
include the development of an updated transfer schedule for each
installation and validation of budgets to ensure adequate resources are
dedicated to these efforts. Each military service is responsible for
the disposition of this property and it is within each service that the
preponderance of resources is being expended to facilitate the
remaining transfers.
The BRAC process has proven to be a fair and open process.
Specifically, the selection criteria will be open to public comment; an
independent commission will review the Secretary's recommendations,
conduct their own analyses and hold public hearings to maintain
fairness throughout the process; finally, Congress will have the
opportunity to act on the President's recommendations for base
realignments and closure. In response to BRAC 1995 implementation
concerns regarding privatization, Public Law 107-107 specifies
conditions under which privatization-in-place may be used.
A future BRAC round will enable the Department to eliminate excess
base infrastructure, currently estimated at 23 percent, and to
rationalize base structure to better support the force structure. The
BRAC statute requires the Department to develop a Force Structure Plan
based on probable threats to national security over the next 20 years,
which includes the threats posed by terrorism. Based on that Force
Structure Plan and other statutory requirements, the Department
develops selection criteria with military value as the primary
consideration. In this way the needs of the Department to support the
war on terrorism (and to address other probable threats to national
security) are considered in the BRAC analysis.
Secretary Fiori. The Army's inability to accurately quantify
savings: The savings achieved through BRAC are significant and have
been verified by the Congressional Budget Office, the General
Accounting Office, and the Army Audit Agency. The Army has closed 112
installations and realigned an additional 26, which has generated
annual savings of $945 million for other Army priorities such as
readiness and transformation.
The Army's lack of accountability for unexpended cleanup funds:
Regarding the management of unexpended cleanup funds, the Army is
taking steps to ensure all BRAC funds are both obligated and disbursed
in a timely manner. The Army is recovering prior year funds that are no
longer required and applying these funds to current requirements. Over
94 percent of the Army's appropriation was obligated during the first
year. Through March 2002, the Army disbursed 99 percent of all
obligations of fiscal year 1996 and prior year BRAC appropriations, as
reported by Defense Finance and Accounting Service. The Army will be
closely monitoring these resource management issues in the future and
apply lessons learned to the management of BRAC 2005 resources.
The Army's inadequate funding for environmental cleanup: In the
first four rounds, the Army has spent more than 40 percent of all BRAC
funds on environmental cleanup. This significant commitment of funds
represents total spending of $2.3 billion for environmental restoration
through fiscal year 2003. These funds have allowed the Army to complete
environmental restoration efforts at 90 of the 116 installations in the
BRAC program through fiscal year 2001. The Army is also programming
funds to support the remaining (cost to complete) environmental
requirements, which are now estimated at $889 million. These funds will
support cleanup efforts at the remaining 26 installations and the
continued environmental monitoring and operation of engineered remedial
systems. This aspect of the program presents the most challenges and
has delayed reuse of some BRAC properties. Recent successes are
steering efforts towards privatized cleanup efforts, use of
environmental insurance, and forming cooperative agreements with the
local communities to complete environmental cleanup. We remain
adaptable to innovative methods of cleanup and redevelopment.
The criticism regarding delayed Army property transfers: BRAC
property transfers have been delayed for many reasons, and each
property has a unique story. The Army has successfully transferred more
than 117,000 acres, which is about 47 percent of the total acres made
excess through the BRAC program. The Army is currently working with
several local communities to move additional property into local reuse.
The Army expects to transfer an additional 18,000 acres during fiscal
year 2002, which includes the transfer of Oakland Army Base in
California, Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal in New Jersey, and
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center in Colorado. The Army will continue to
support all authorized options for transferring property as early as
possible to the affected local communities.
The concerns regarding political intervention in the 1995 BRAC
round: The Department of Defense has not yet established the criteria
for selecting additional BRAC installations in the round authorized to
begin in fiscal year 2005. According to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Congress has required the
Secretary of Defense to publish the proposed criteria in the Federal
Register by December 31, 2003. The selection criteria ensures that
military value is the primary consideration in making recommendations
for the closure or realignment of military installations.
The concerns related to the infrastructure necessary to support the
war on terrorism: The Army continues to reassess our CONUS based
infrastructure requirements in terms of present and future threats and
mission requirements. We will need to update the 20-25 percent excess
capacity that was published in the 1998 report to Congress and take
into consideration: ongoing stationing decisions, which include unit
transformations; surge requirements and threat scenarios; and forces
returning from overseas. BRAC 2005 is a new opportunity; it provides us
the opportunity to analyze future Army stationing requirements and
determine excess capacity.
Secretary Johnson. Studies by the General Accounting Office and
other federal agencies have consistently confirmed that BRAC savings
are real and substantial. The most recent GAO report of April 5, 2002
validates this conclusion. The Department of the Navy estimates that
savings began to exceed costs to close and realign in 2001, and will
result in approximately $2.5 billion in annual recurring savings. The
Department of the Navy will be working with the Department of Defense
to more precisely track and update base closure saving estimates, with
a view toward more accurately projecting costs and savings in the BRAC
round in 2005.
Regarding the management of unexpended cleanup funds, the Naval
Audit Service recently completed an audit of prior year BRAC
unobligatated and unexpended funds. The Department of the Navy is
recovering prior year funds that are no longer required and have
applied the funding to fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002
environmental cleanup needs. These prior year funds, along with
additional BRAC cleanup funds provided in the fiscal year 2002 Military
Construction Appropriations Act, have resolved the fiscal year 2002
BRAC cleanup funding shortfall. The fiscal year 2003 BRAC request meets
all current regulator and community expectations for cleanup.
The Department of the Navy has completely transferred 60 of the 90
bases that were closed and were to be transferred to new owners from
the first rounds of BRAC. Almost 50 percent of the parcels on the
remaining 30 bases have been transferred, and as noted above, we have
increased BRAC environmental funding to accelerate cleanup of the
remaining parcels. We plan to reach a point where a cleanup remedy is
in place and operating properly at seven additional bases in fiscal
year 2002 and five in fiscal year 2003, which will allow transfer of
those properties. We also have successfully used the early transfer
authority to convey property at Mare Island, CA and Oakland, CA, and
are actively seeking to move as much property as possible off the
federal rolls and quickly as possible.
The Department of the Navy expects that base infrastructure that
may be necessary to support the war on terrorism will be fully
considered as part of BRAC 2005. The fiscal year 2002 Authorization Act
amendment to the 1990 Base Closure and Realignment Act contains a
number of provisions to ensure that all bases are considered fairly and
equally, with military value as the primary consideration in making
closure or realignment recommendations, and with independent checks and
balances in place throughout the process. Congress specifically
provided minimum criteria that DOD must consider. Those minimum
criteria include preservation of military installations in the United
States as staging areas for homeland defense missions. The Department
of the Navy is working with the Department of Defense and the other
Military Departments on specific guidance for conducting BRAC 2005.
Secretary Gibbs. The Air Force will conduct an analysis in
accordance with the provisions of the Base Closure and Realignment law,
selection criteria that Department of Defense is mandated by the law to
promulgate, and the Secretary of Defense's policies and procedures. The
Air Force will initiate its analysis when directed to do so by the
Secretary of Defense.

UNIFORM NATIONAL DISCHARGE STANDARDS PROGRAM

75. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, the Uniform National
Discharge Standards (UNDS) Program is an effort to provide a
comprehensive set of standards for controlling the incidental discharge
from Navy vessels. Phase I of this program identified 25 discharges
that will require control based upon the potential for adverse
environmental impacts. There are indications, however, that only a few
of these 25 discharges have been, or are programmed to be, explored in
the Navy's research and development program, which should determine the
most operationally effective and cost effective solutions. What is the
present schedule for completion of Phases II and III of the UNDS
Program?
Secretary. Johnson. Phase I of the program was completed in June
1999. This phase took longer than expected because about 7,000 Armed
Forces vessels had to be divided into vessel classes and then the
discharges characterized. The characterization included determining
flow rates, constituents, concentrations, and some sampling. Thirty-
nine discharged were characterized and it was determined that 25
discharges were of sufficient environmental consequence that control
may be warranted. Phase II has proven to be even more complex. Each
potential pollution control device passing an initial screening must
undergo detailed feasibility and environmental effects analyses. The
term feasibility analysis is in itself complex, requiring combined
analyses of operational impact, practicability, and cost. Finally, all
information from these analyses is summarized in a discharge assessment
report that leads to the development of recommended pollution control
devices. We came to the conclusion that conducting these analyses for
all 25 discharges at once is not possible with available resources and
staffing. Navy and EPA are discussing a ``batch'' rulemaking whereby
the top four or five priority discharges would be handled first. Our
current estimate is September 2005 to complete the Phase II rule for
these discharges. We are working with EPA to expedite the rule
development process. However, the process could take longer depending
on the resolution of issues such as cumulative impact analysis,
endangered species consultation, and peer review. If phased and
developed in batches of about 4-5, Phase II would be completed for all
discharges in February 2011. Phase III could be completed approximately
1 year after each ``batch'' of discharges completes Phase II.

76. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, is there a detailed Phase II
Program Objective and Milestone (POAM) for each of the discharges
requiring control?
Secretary Johnson. Not Yet. We have a preliminary schedule showing
September 2005 for the first four discharges. A detailed POAM will be
developed pending resolution of a number of rulemaking issues.

77. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, what is the Navy's preferred
pollution control device for each of the 25 discharges?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy and EPA have identified numerous
potential marine pollution control devices (MPCDs). The ``preferred''
MPCD for each discharge will not be known until the environmental and
feasibility analyses are completed.

78. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, what are the adverse
consequences of potential Phase II candidate pollution control devices
with respect to ship impact, shipboard operations, procurement and
installation costs, and other compliance costs?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy and EPA have identified numerous
potential MPCDs for evaluation in Phase II. Any adverse consequences of
employing particular MPCDs will be determined as part of the
feasibility analysis associated with each discharge. However, some
devices with obvious adverse consequences (e.g., too large for a war
ship) are screened out initially. Only devices passing the initial
screening are fully analyzed.

79. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, what tests or demonstrations
have been performed by the Navy to ensure that proposed pollution
control devices are effective, do not unduly hamper the mission, and
are affordable from an acquisition, installation, life-cycle cost, and
manning perspective?
Secretary Johnson. The UNDS legislation mandates consideration of
operational impact, feasibility, and cost in identifying potential
MPCDs. While tests and demonstrations of all potential MPCDs are not
required by the UNDS legislation, or currently planned, the Navy and
EPA consider all available performance data from commercial and
government sources during their analyses and deliberations.

80. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, what data has been gathered
or presented to the Environmental Protection Agency to justify the
Navy's current status regarding UNDS?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy and EPA are working jointly on UNDS.
Substantial detailed data on the nature of discharges was reviewed in
Phase I. In Phase II, the Navy and EPA have completed some technical
and feasibility analyses for priority discharges and have developed a
draft performance standard for one discharge. In addition, data on
numerous MPCDs has been reviewed.

81. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, is there a POAM for Phase
III of the rulemaking?
Secretary Johnson. Not at present. A POAM will be developed to
support Phase III once the Navy and EPA promulgate performance
standards for the Phase II discharges.

82. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, what transitions have been
planned for systems that have been developed for the treatment of gray
water discharges?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy constantly keeps abreast of existing
and developing technologies in the area of gray water treatment. The
selection of a treatment technology and the transition of related
systems to the fleet will be contingent on the completion of UNDS
rulemaking for gray water.

SHIPBOARD WASTE MANAGEMENT

83. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, the Navy research and
development (R&D) program has identified a membrane filtration
polishing technology that can be added to meet oil discharge
requirements. However, it is only being implemented on new
construction. While the cost of this particular technology may be
prohibitively expensive to back-fit into the entire fleet, there is
still a need to upgrade the existing systems so that they meet the
present discharge requirements. Is the Navy's R&D program developing
alternative, cost-effective ``add-on'' polishing technologies that can
meet performance standards? If not, why?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy is not currently developing alternative
polishing technologies. Additional expenditures of RDT&E program funds
to develop and test more polishing technologies are not required for
the following reasons: (1) Navy vessels are currently in compliance
with domestic discharge regulations for bilge water; (2) Navy has
already identified the best polishing technology that meets the Navy's
requirements for new construction ships; and (3) a joint EPA-Navy
rulemaking process, called Uniform National Discharge Standards (UNDS),
is currently evaluating all bilge water treatment technologies.

84. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, the Compensated Fuel Ballast
program is being terminated without developing the necessary design
guidance that would eliminate oil discharges when refueling. Why has
the program been terminated? How will the need for design guidance be
addressed?
Secretary Johnson. The Navy has completed RDT&E for implementing
Compensated Fuel Ballast System improvements. Modeling tools and basic
design guidance for compensated fuel ballast systems to reduce
inadvertent fuel discharges and reduce water intrusion have been
transitioned to new ship construction programs from the Shipboard
Environmental Protection Program. Additionally, the fleet has
implemented stringent fuel transfer requirements on existing ships with
compensated fuel ballast systems to minimize the risk of oil discharges
during refueling operations. Finally, the UNDS rule-making process will
determine future standards of performance for military compensated fuel
ballast system discharges.

85. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, the Plasma Arc Waste
Destruction program is not being transitioned to the Advanced
Development Program in spite of the potential interest of future
aircraft carrier programs. Why is the Plasma Arc Waste Destruction
program not being transitioned?
Secretary Johnson. There is no legal or regulatory requirement for
development, test, and installation of a Plasma Arc Waste Destruction
System (PAWDS) on a Navy vessel. The present fleet is in compliance
with applicable solid and plastic waste discharge regulations. New
construction ships will also be in compliance. Although the Shipboard
Environmental Protection Program is not funding development of plasma
arc systems for ships, the future aircraft carrier program office is
supporting development of PAWDS for the CVN(X).

86. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, the Navy has existing
shipboard waste management systems and equipment used for addressing
solid waste, sewage, gray water, and bilge water. What is the condition
of the Navy's shipboard waste management systems and equipment with
respect to compliance, functionality, maintainability, supportability,
and affordability?
Secretary Johnson. The present fleet is in compliance with existing
domestic discharge regulations on solid waste, sewage, gray water, and
bilge water utilizing installed equipment that is fully functional
maintainable and supportable. Affordability issues are fully reviewed
during the developmental stage of all shipboard waste management
equipment to ensure procurement of the most cost effective equipment,
having the least operational impact, and requiring minimal staffing.

87. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Johnson, have the total actual
ownership costs of existing shipboard waste management systems and
equipment been tracked to determine the cost and affordability of
future solutions? If not, why?
Secretary Johnson. Total actual ownership cost studies for
individual shipboard waste management systems and equipment have not
been done nor are they required. However, procurement, installation,
and developmental costs are tracked. Affordability issues are always
considered early in the acquisition process, along with operational
impacts. The goal is to select equipment with the optimal combination
of factors such as acquisition costs, maintenance costs, environmental
impact, staffing requirements, and operational impact.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

FORMERLY USED DEFENSE SITES BUDGET

88. Senator Allard. Mr. DuBois and Secretary Fiori, there are at
least 60 formerly used defense sites in Colorado with environmental
contamination that have been identified by the Corps of Engineers for
restoration under the Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS) program. The
Corps has been working on FUDS for almost 20 years, yet has failed to
clean up any of the high priority sites in Colorado--sites with
uncontrolled environmental toxins threatening drinking water sources
and hazardous unexploded ordnance contamination. Over the last few
years, the FUDS cleanup budget has been under funded in Colorado and
nationally to complete even high risk and high priority sites. What are
your plans and schedule for funding FUDS cleanup in Colorado and
nationally?
Mr. DuBois. There are approximately 60 properties on the Corps of
Engineers' FUDS Inventory List for the State of Colorado. The Corps
estimates that fewer than half of those sites are contaminated or
potentially contaminated, and necessitate cleanup under the FUDS
program. The Corps has completed the following FUDS projects in the
State of Colorado: AF Finance and Accounting Center; Denver Ordnance
Plant; F.E. Warren AFB Sites 9 through 12; Fort Logan; Granada
Relocation Center; La Junta Army Airfield; Lowry S-1 Complexes 1A and
1B; and Pueblo Army Air Field. The Corps of Engineers is currently
working with the State of Colorado to develop a schedule for cleanup,
or statewide management action plan (MAP), for FUDS in Colorado. The
MAP will identify cleanup, projected schedules, and overall project
funding requirements for each FUDS within the State.
Secretary Fiori. There are approximately 60 properties on the Corps
of Engineers' FUDS Inventory List for the State of Colorado. The Corps
estimates that less than half of those sites are contaminated or
potentially contaminated and eligible for cleanup under the FUDS
program. The Corps has completed the following FUDS projects in the
State of Colorado: AF Finance and Accounting Center; Camp Hale; Denver
Ordnance Plant; F.E. Warren AFB Sites 9 through 12; Fort Logan; Granada
Relocation Center; La Junta Army Airfield; Lowry S-1 Complexes 1A and
1B; and Pueblo Army Air Field. The Corps of Engineers is currently
working with the State of Colorado to develop a schedule for cleanup,
or a statewide management action plan (MAP), for FUDS in Colorado. The
MAP will identify cleanup, projected schedules, and overall project
funding requirements for each FUDS site within the State. Nationally,
the President's Budget request provides funding for all legal
requirements and includes an increase over last year's budget request
specifically targeted to address unexploded ordnance requirements.

89. Senator Allard. Mr. DuBois and Secretary Fiori, how much
funding would you expect to need annually to be able to complete the
FUDS cleanup in the next 20 years?
Mr. DuBois. The cost to complete estimate for the FUDS program has
increased dramatically in the last 3 years. The increase is largely
attributable to conservative assumptions concerning possible future
actions that may be required to address potential UXO-related problems,
and is generally based on preliminary information. We currently do not
know the extent of the requirement, but are in the process of
developing estimates and potential remedies. The President's budget
request provides funding to meet all currently established cleanup
schedules and includes an increase over last year's budget request
specifically targeted to address known UXO requirements.
Secretary Fiori. FUDS program requirements have increased
dramatically in the last 3 years primarily as the result of the
addition of new FUDS sites and munitions response requirements. Long-
term cost estimates for FUDS cleanup are generally based on preliminary
information and largely attributable to conservative assumptions about
possible future actions that may be required to address potential UXO-
related problems. Thus, the UXO-related cost estimates, in particular,
are not robust enough to be reflective of funding requirements.
Additionally, regardless of the cost, the Department does not believe
it is technically feasible to complete required munitions responses in
20 years. The Department is working diligently to determine the full
extent of munitions response requirements, assess the technology for
such, and then to move forward as expeditiously as possible to complete
required munitions responses. In recognition of this, the President's
fiscal year 2003 budget request provides funding to meet current
schedules. It also includes an increase of $22 million, over last
year's budget request, that is specifically targeted for munitions
responses.

90. Senator Allard. Mr. DuBois and Secretary Fiori, how do you
propose to maintain stable and consistent funding for the life of these
projects without delaying costs into the out years?
Mr. DuBois. We believe strongly in the concept of stable funding
for the environmental restoration program. By stable funding, we mean
manageable increases or decreases consistent with project requirements.
Execution capabilities dependent upon staffing, contracting, and other
resource considerations can be severely affected, both by wide
fluctuations in funding and by the inability to predict future funding
levels. DOD continues to seek stable funding and will work within the
bounds of such funding from year-to-year. The President's budget
request is in line with the concept of stable funding.
Secretary Fiori. We believe strongly in the concept of stable
funding for the environmental restoration prograrn. By stable funding,
we mean manageable increases or decreases consistent with project
requirements. Execution capabilities depend on staffing, contracting,
and other resource considerations and are severely and adversely
affected, both by wide fluctuations in funding and by the inability to
forecast and rely on future funding levels. DOD continues to seek
stable funding and will work within the bounds of such funding from
year to year. The President's budget request is in line with the
concept of stable funding.

FORMER LOWRY BOMBING AND GUNNERY RANGE

91. Senator Allard. Mr. DuBois and Secretary Fiori, the Department
of Defense has been working on the cleanup of unexploded ordnance at
the Former Lowry Bombing and Gunnery Range (FLBGR) for several years.
The cleanup is way behind, the budget has been cut in half, and the
cleanup schedule extended almost 30 years. Under the settlement
agreement reached with Colorado in 1998, cleanup of the site was
expected to be complete in about 5 years. Several new subdivisions,
6,000 new homes, and a high school are being built adjacent to a site
on the range where simulant filled and inert chemical warfare munitions
have been recovered. Budget cuts and cleanup schedule delays have
already delayed construction at several new subdivisions. The high
school is scheduled to open in August 2003. How much is in your budget
this year to address cleanup at FLBGR?
Mr. DuBois. The Corps of Engineers initially discussed a fiscal
year 2002 budget of $4 million with the State of Colorado. A fiscal
year 2002 plus-up allowed the Army to increase the FUDS budget for
Colorado to $6 million. The Corps will add an additional $2 million in
fiscal year 2002. Extending the cleanup schedule to almost 30 years
would be necessary if the project were funded at only $4 million per
year. At $8 million annually, cleanup can be completed in approximately
10 years.
Secretary Fiori. The Corps of Engineers initially discussed a
fiscal year 2002 budget of $4 million with the State of Colorado. A
fiscal year 2002 plus-up allowed the Army to increase the FUDS budget
for Colorado to $6 million. The Army will add an additional $2 million
in fiscal year 2002, restoring the original budget of $8 million.
Extending the cleanup schedule to almost 30 years would be necessary if
the project is funded at only $4 million per year. At $8 million
annually, cleanup can be completed in approximately 10 years.

92. Senator Allard. Mr. DuBois and Secretary Fiori, can you assure
us that cleanup will be completed in time for the new high school
opening?
Mr. DuBois. No, the cleanup of the Jeep and Demolition Range site
is not expected to be completed by August 2003 due to the recent
discovery of potential munitions at the site, and the possibility that
the area may be designated as a chemical warfare material site. In
2001, the Corps of Engineers discussed ordnance hazards with the local
school and the Colorado Department of Public Health and the
Environment. The Corps notified the school that in the event of an
incident the evacuation distance could extend to the entrance of
school. The co-chair of the Corps-sponsored citizen Restoration
Advisory Board recommended that the school consider delaying
construction. Notwithstanding this information, the school board
announced its plan to continue with construction and to open the school
on schedule, noting bond issues and current overcrowding of existing
facilities.
Secretary Fiori. No, the cleanup of the Jeep and Demolition Range
site is not expected to be completed by August 2003 due to the recent
discovery of potential munitions at the site and the possibility that
the area may be designated as a chemical warfare materiel site. In
2001, the Army discussed ordnance hazards with the school and the
Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment. The Army
notified the school that in the event of an incident the evacuation
distance could extend to the entrance of the school. Notwithstanding
this information, the school board announced its plan to continue with
construction and to open the school on schedule, noting bond issues and
current overcrowding of existing facilities.

93. Senator Allard. Mr. DuBois and Secretary Fiori, what are your
plans and schedule for funding completion of the FLBGR cleanup?
Mr. DuBois. Details of the schedule for completion of the cleanup
are provided in the Management Plan, dated March 2001. At a funding
level of $8-$10 million per year, we expect to complete the
conventional ordnance clearance activities by 2010. Chemical warfare
material issues, however, may increase both the cost and time required
to complete the cleanup.
Secretary Fiori. Details of the schedule for completion of the
cleanup are provided in the Management Plan, dated March 2001. At a
funding level of $8-$10 million per year, we expect to complete the
munitions response activities for sites containing conventional
munitions by 2010. However, chemical warfare materiel issues may
increase the cost-to-complete the cleanup.

CAMP HALE

94. Senator Allard. Mr. DuBois and Secretary Fiori, a news article
from last week's Denver Post quotes state officials as saying it will
take the Corps of Engineers 10 years or longer to clean up Camp Hale,
Colorado. Hikers, hunters, and recreational forest users are finding
dangerous live unexploded ordnance in the National Forest at Camp Hale.
The Camp Hale area is one of the must heavily used national forest
areas in the country. The Forest Service had to close 1,400 acres of
the forest 2 years ago, including a popular group campground and a
segment of the Continental Divide National Scenic Trail because of
unexploded ordnance contamination. The State was informed that there is
not enough funding in the FUDS budget to address the site. How long do
you expect the investigation and cleanup of Camp Hale to take?
Specifically, what are your plans and schedule funding for the
investigation and cleanup?
Mr. DuBois. The Corps is currently budgeting approximately $1
million per year for Camp Hale cleanup. At this time, there is not
enough information available about the nature and extent of the hazards
at the site to accurately estimate the cost to complete the cleanup.
The Corps is currently working in partnership with the Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) and the USDA Forest
Service (USFS) to characterize the site. Once the Corps completes the
characterization, it will undertake the appropriate response action at
the site.
Camp Hale is a very large site (up to 247,000 acres), with varying
terrain (mountainous, forest, etc.) and multiple uses. The Corps plans
to focus characterization efforts in areas known to have hosted
ordnance related activities, which will help reduce the time required
to complete cleanup. The Corps anticipates that characterization will
be completed by fiscal year 2004.
Secretary Fiori. The Corps is currently budgeting approximately $1
million per year for the Camp Hale cleanup. At this time, there is not
enough information available about the nature and extent of the hazards
at the site to accurately estimate the cost-to-complete the cleanup.
The Army is currently working in partnership with the Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment and the Forest Service to
characterize the site. Once the Army completes the characterization,
they will undertake the appropriate response action at the site. Camp
Hale is a very large site (up to 247,000 acres) with varying terrain
(mountainous, forest, etc) and multiple uses. The Army plans to focus
characterization efforts in areas known to have hosted munitions
related activities, which will help reduce the time required to
complete response activities. The Army anticipates that
characterization will be completed by fiscal year 2004.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003

----------

THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 2002

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

READINESS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES FOR ALL ASSIGNED MISSIONS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K.
Akaka (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Akaka, E. Benjamin
Nelson, and Inhofe.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Maren Leed, professional staff member; and Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: William C. Greenwalt,
professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff
member; George W. Lauffer, professional staff member; Thomas L.
MacKenzie, professional staff member; Ann M. Mittermeyer,
minority counsel; and Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer and Daniel K.
Goldsmith.
Committee members' assistants present: Erik Raven,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka;
Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Michele Traficante, assistant
to Senator Hutchinson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Our hearing will come to order. Our
chairman, Senator Akaka, is going to be a little bit late, so
we thought we would go ahead and start our first panel. First
of all, I have been honored to visit with each one of you in my
office, except for my good friend General Wald because I was
unable to be there. I still cannot believe that it was 5 years
ago that we were together in Aviano, Italy.
I would like to go ahead and try to abbreviate the witness
statements and move into a closed session, so we will try to
expedite this.
We appreciate everybody being here. I have to say that when
the control of the Senate went from the Republicans to
Democrats it really did not change much of what we are doing.
It happens that Danny Akaka and I are very close friends. We
were in the same Bible study for 15 years. We have a spirit of
cooperation that I think exceeds that in any other committee.
Let me begin by expressing my sympathies and condolences to
the families, units, and friends of our service men and women
who were killed or injured yesterday morning during military
training at Fort Drum, New York. This accident is a vivid
reminder of the dangers involved in military training. I
understand that representatives of the Army's Safety Center
have begun an investigation into the cause of this tragedy. I
will ask the Army to update the subcommittee during the course
of the investigation and immediately forward the results to
this subcommittee when it is completed.
The Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support meets
this morning to discuss the readiness of our Armed Services. It
is our goal to specifically examine the impact of Operations
Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle on the readiness of the total
force and their ability to conduct their missions. The
subcommittee will also review the Department's risk assessments
associated with the revised defense strategy, the status of
Department's efforts to improve readiness measurements and
reporting, and the adequacy of the Department's budget request
for fiscal year 2003 to support both the immediate and the
long-term readiness goals.
Along those lines, I would ask, as I did of all of you in
my office, to be very straightforward. My personal feeling is
that the budget is inadequate. I think it is probably the best
that we could get through at this time, but I would like to
have you talk about those areas that you feel are inadequate or
not funded properly.
Let me welcome our witnesses and thank them for
participating in this hearing this morning. Dr. Paul Mayberry
has had a distinguished and diverse career in the Defense
Department and is well prepared for his current
responsibilities.
Also, each of the flag officers testifying this morning
brings a wealth of personal and professional experience with
them. Collectively, they represent our ability to defend our
interests in the air and on the land and sea. They have also
participated in important aspects of military training, an
integral component of readiness, and I hope they will be able
to share their perspectives on that as well.
Like few other times in recent history, our Nation is
united with the President in our resolve in the war on
terrorists. In only 6 months, we have destroyed and disrupted
terrorist networks and liberated a nation held hostage by a
fanatical regime of terrorists. None of this would have been
possible without the professionalism and the skill of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
I am concerned, however, that the level of readiness and
the capabilities that have led to the successes in Operation
Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle may not be
sustainable. In fact, the capabilities that the services are
using today may only represent a limited surge capacity of the
forces and not the readiness required to sustain a long-term
war on terrorism and prepare for other challenges to our vital
national interests.
We need to do both. Inaction against terrorists is no
longer an option. We must address the readiness deficiencies
that we created during the last decade. Our goal was clear
before September 11: to restore the readiness and vitality of
the military services to defend all vital U.S. security
interests. The Clinton administration significantly stressed
the readiness of the services for nearly a decade. They cut the
funding while at the same time increasing the deployments of
our troops and sailors. They virtually stopped funding
modernization, and this is something that we are going to have
to overcome.
Then, of course, along came the war. As the war on
terrorism continues, restoring readiness and sustaining the war
is becoming more and more difficult. According to the Commander
of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Air Force
strategic transport has been unavailable for rotational unit
support due to war deployments. Two training rotations have not
deployed their AH-64 attack helicopter units due to the
nonavailability of the C-17 and C-5 airlift.
We are really wearing out our airlift capacity, and this is
something that we hear in every hearing that we have. It is
going to have to affect where we go from here. I am strongly
supporting increasing our C-17 fleet. The C-17 was criticized
during its development, but it has now proved its worth as an
effective lift vehicle.
The administration has requested approximately $98 billion
in funding for fiscal year 2003 for operations and maintenance
of the services. This averages an approximate increase of over
9 percent over the amount appropriated in fiscal year 2002.
With the multitude of tasks the American people are requiring
of our military, we have to ask ourselves, is this truly
enough? Can we do more to support the men and women in uniform?
Lastly, President Bush is right on the mark when he
encourages Congress, as he did last week, to make funding for
the military services our highest priority. I agree. I will
work with Senator Akaka to forward the recommendations of this
subcommittee with all due haste and diligence. The degree to
which we can expedite this funding is just one more way we can
demonstrate our strong support for the men and women in
uniform.
This morning the witnesses will testify in two panels: Dr.
Paul Mayberry, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Readiness), and Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, the Director of
Operations (J-3) Joint Staff, will comprise the first panel.
The second panel will be comprised of the directors of
Operations for each of the services. Due to the substance of
the testimony and the subsequent questions, it may be necessary
for a portion of this hearing to be held in closed session. We
will have to make that determination after the chairman gets
here.
It is important for us to understand that there was a
wakeup call to the American people. I felt very good about the
changes in attitude after that horrible tragedy of September 11
took place. I think there exists the recognition, as tragic as
it was in New York City and at the Pentagon, that if the
terrorists had had their weapon of choice, a nuclear warhead on
a missile, the TV screen that showed the tragedy of the two
towers would show nothing but a piece of charcoal.
While this is something that we have faced since the early
1990s, it is something that the American people did not really
appreciate. I know because I went out and tried to explain this
problem. General Wald, you can remember because we talked about
this in Aviano. I now think that we are in a position to do a
better job for the American people, but we must do so with all
haste.
Dr. Mayberry, we will start with your statement. As is
always the case, your entire statements will be made a part of
the record. Dr. Mayberry.

STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL W. MAYBERRY, Ph.D., DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (READINESS)

Dr. Mayberry. Good morning. Thank you very much, Senator. I
am privileged to be here before you today to address the issues
of military readiness and the Department of Defense.
Let me start by saying that our Armed Forces are ready to
meet the challenges facing our Nation. Our forces, as you said,
are agile, capable, and well led. From prosecuting the global
war on terrorism to protecting our Nation's airways, the
uniformed men and women of our Nation, reinforced by the
Department's civilians, stand ready to execute the missions
assigned to them by our Commander in Chief. This readiness is
not possible without your continued support for our critical
defense needs.
You asked us to discuss several issues, and I would
respectfully request that we do defer some specific discussions
in terms of the impact of current operations on our readiness
to conduct other missions to a closed session.
Senator Inhofe. Let me just interrupt at that point. I
think it is important on that subject to do as much as you can
in open session. America needs to know our deficiencies, where
we are, where we are going to be, and where we have to
concentrate our efforts and our scarce dollars. So while I know
there are some sensitive topics, I would hope that as much as
possible could be handled in open session.
Dr. Mayberry. I understand and we will do that.
You also asked that we take a look at the way that we are
going about revising our readiness reporting system, as well as
both the Department's budget request for immediate- and long-
term readiness issues. Let me begin by highlighting some of our
ongoing efforts in the readiness assessment and reporting
process.
One of the most essential elements of our reporting system
in the Department has been the active involvement of our senior
DOD leadership in resolving these types of readiness issues.
The Department's Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC),
which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, meets
routinely to review and discuss the most pressing readiness
needs. Recently, this council met to focus on actions to
address the growing threats of encroachment on our air, land,
and sea training ranges.
A second issue that the SROC addressed has been the
modernization and transformation of our major combat training
centers. Finally, it recently met to evaluate the stresses on
our forces resulting from the global war on terrorism and the
unique training, personnel, and equipment demands that that
campaign imposes on our forces.
With respect to the improvements that we seek to address in
the current readiness reporting process, the Secretary has
asked me to specifically focus upon the ability of our Armed
Forces to execute fully the missions that they have been
assigned. We are working closely with the Services, Joint
Staff, and with the combatant commands to identify these needed
improvements.
Our study has basically been completed and concludes that
the Department should implement a new capabilities-based
readiness system that would provide timely and accurate
information on the readiness of our forces, as well as their
supporting infrastructure. This information would be readily
available in the deliberate planning process, in responding to
emerging crises, and also in aiding decisionmaking even during
hostilities.
A broad spectrum of real-time information provided by a
variety of sources, including the combatant commanders, the
Services, and the defense agencies--will be available to aid
both defense planners and decisionmakers. The system would be a
source of valuable information on the readiness of our forces
to execute their joint mission essential tasks, as well as to
address the issue of sustainability of our forces over time.
That is something that we do not do completely well now.
We believe that this improved readiness system can be
achieved using existing personnel, training, and logistics
databases, and that it would reduce or even eliminate some of
the workload and errors associated with the manual input
systems that we have today. The system would also provide
information that reveals broad readiness trend information in
the resource areas of personnel, unit training, equipment,
supply, and ordnance. It will capture the military judgments of
unit leaders as well, which is a critical piece of readiness
reporting as well.
Senator Inhofe. Our chairman is here now, and we agree that
you should go ahead and finish before his opening statement so
we will not lose your train of thought. Not that you will, but
we might.
Dr. Mayberry. Thank you.
Our plans are to publish guidance from the Secretary in the
next couple of months, field the initial readiness system for
operational use in the 2004 time period, and have a full
operational capability achieved in 2007.
Maintaining the readiness of our Armed Forces and ensuring
the well-being of our men and women in uniform are the top
priorities of the leadership in the Department. These
priorities are reflected in our fiscal year 2003 budget
request. Our Armed Forces are the best trained, best equipped,
and most effective military force in the world and we intend to
keep them that way.
The President has emphasized the importance of reversing
past declining trends in readiness and the 2003 budget is a
beginning step in that direction. This budget improves military
readiness by increasing the top line by some $48 billion over
fiscal year 2002 levels, accelerates critical transformation
programs, funds the war on terror, and also provides for
critical programs related to the war.
But perhaps most importantly, it invests in the
Department's greatest assets: our people. We are seeking
across-the-board pay raises and 4.1 percent targeted pay raises
in the range of $300 million for mid-grade officers and
noncommissioned officers. It improves military housing and puts
the Department on track to eliminate substandard housing by the
2007 timeframe.
The request also puts us on track to eliminate average out-
of-pocket expenses for individuals living off base by 2005. The
budget also requests nearly $23 billion, an astounding amount,
to cover realistic military health care costs. These
investments are critical to ensuring the quality of our forces
and their families as well as the environments in which they
live and work.
The budget also provides for the training of our forces. We
included $140 billion for the operation and maintenance
accounts (O&M). This includes substantial funding for our unit
training, as well as operational readiness accounts to cover
tank miles, steaming days, and flying hours for the services.
We have increased funding for critical Army training enablers,
providing resources to ensure the operations of training ranges
and simulation centers are covered in the management of ground
maneuver and live-fire training ranges.
In the Air Force, we are seeing some positive readiness
trends that indicate that we may have turned the corner on
chronic problems associated with parts shortages.
The budget also improves maintenance and sustainment of
equipment and facilities and increases the availability of
spare parts. In conclusion, I want to emphasize that our total
forces, Active, Reserve, and civilians, are ready to meet the
challenges facing this Nation. We robustly fund the readiness
of our forces, as well as transforming to meet future
challenges. We are improving the ways that we measure our
readiness and transforming our training to meet new strategy.
We appreciate the continued support of this subcommittee
for our Armed Forces that ensures that they remain the best
manned, equipped, and trained military in the world.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before
you today and I look forward to addressing your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mayberry follows:]

Prepared Statement by Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, Ph.D.

Good morning, Chairman Akaka, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished
members of this subcommittee. On behalf of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S.C. Chu, I am
privileged to speak before this subcommittee on the state of military
readiness in the Department of Defense. With me today is the Director
of Operations for the Joint Staff, Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold of the
United States Marine Corps.
Let me start by saying that your Armed Forces are ready to meet the
challenges facing this Nation. Our forces are agile, capable, and well
led. From prosecuting a Global War on Terror to protecting our Nation's
airways, the uniformed men and women of this Nation, reinforced by the
Department's civilian staff, stand ready to execute the missions
assigned to them by our Commander in Chief. This readiness would not be
possible without the continued support of this subcommittee for our
critical Defense needs.
For this testimony, you asked that I discuss the risk assessed
against our new defense strategy and the impact of current operations
on our readiness to conduct other missions. Today's strategic setting
presents a number of new challenges that we must be ready to address.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review provided a new risk framework for
the Department to assess these challenges in four dimensions--
operational, force management, institutional, and future or
transformational challenges. I respectfully request we move our
discussion of these points to a closed session.
You also asked that I discuss our progress in revising the
Department's readiness reporting system and the adequacy of the
Department's fiscal year 2003 budget request in supporting immediate
and long-term readiness needs. I will focus on these two issues--
readiness reporting and the fiscal year 2003 budget request--in open
session.

READINESS REPORTING

I would like to begin by highlighting the status of our ongoing
efforts to enhance the Department's readiness assessment and reporting
system.
One of the most essential elements of our readiness reporting
system is the active involvement of the senior DOD leaders in resolving
readiness issues. The Department's Senior Readiness Oversight Council,
which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, meets routinely to
review and discuss the most pressing readiness issues. Recently, the
council met to focus on actions to address growing threats of
encroachment on our air, land, and sea training centers and ranges. I
believe the Service operations deputies panel will echo the importance
of this issue later today.
I am convinced that our success in future military operations will
depend on having a modernized joint training infrastructure that
supports realistic, combined arms, force-on-force training for our
military. Unlike Operation Desert Storm, where we had many months to
prepare, deploy, and stage forces for an overwhelming attack against
Iraqi forces in Kuwait--tomorrow's conflicts are likely to be short-
notice, ``come-as-you-are'' events. A lesson clearly emerging from
Operation Enduring Freedom is that we must fight joint. This is the
current reality and the future of warfare--we must train that way. To
this end, we have recently completed a strategic plan for transforming
our training that will serve to guide the Department in ensuring our
forces remain the best trained and most capable in the world.
The Senior Readiness Oversight Council has also evaluated the
stresses on our forces resulting from the global war on terrorism. This
campaign imposes some unique training, personnel, and equipment demands
upon our forces--particularly so as we continue to provide for homeland
defense and work to preserve our readiness for other missions. For
example, to date, we have mobilized over 93,000 Reserve and National
Guard members. These soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are
integrated into nearly every aspect of Operation Noble Eagle and
Operation Enduring Freedom.
In terms of the system we use to report unit readiness, we
undertook a project last year, at the direction of the Secretary, to
improve the way we both assess and report unit readiness. The Secretary
asked us to specifically focus upon the readiness of our Armed Forces
to execute fully their assigned missions. Over the last few months, we
have been working closely with the services and the combatant commands
to identify possible improvements to the current system. We expect our
study will be completed in the next several weeks, and anticipate
publishing implementing instructions for a revised system soon after.
Our study results suggest that the Department should implement a
new ``capabilities-based'' readiness system to provide timely and
accurate information on the readiness of our forces and supporting
infrastructure. This information would be readily available for our use
in deliberate planning, responding to emerging crises, and to aid
decision-making during hostilities.
In our charter for the study, we envisioned a system capable of
providing real-time readiness information on the Department's ability
to execute strategic missions and respond to crises. A broad spectrum
of relevant information--provided by the combatant commands, Services,
and defense agencies--will be available to aid both defense planners
and decision-makers. The system will include valuable information on
the readiness of forces to execute assigned joint mission essential
tasks as well as the sustainability of the force over time.
Given the uncertainties in the strategic environment, we are
planning for a flexible and adaptive readiness reporting system that
will reduce the likelihood of the Department being surprised by
unforeseen readiness challenges in the early stages of crisis planning.
The system will support assessments of force management and
operational risk as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review. We
believe that this improved reporting and assessment can be achieved by
using existing personnel, training, and logistics databases. By
incorporating information from existing transactional databases, we can
reduce or eliminate workload and errors associated with manual input of
data. This will further aid our goals of reducing the reporting burden
and responding more quickly to requests for readiness information.
The system will also provide information that reveals broad
readiness trend information in the resource areas of personnel, unit
training, equipment, supply, and ordnance, and will capture the
military judgement of the unit commander in his assessment of his
unit's readiness.
Our plan is to field the initial readiness system for operational
use in fiscal year 2004, with full operational capability achieved by
fiscal year 2007.

RESOURCES

I will now turn to the fiscal year 2003 budget. Maintaining the
readiness of our Armed Forces to defend the nation's interests, and
ensuring the well-being of our men and women in uniform, are the
highest priorities of the leadership in the Department of Defense.
America's Armed Forces are the best-trained, best-equipped, and most
effective military force in the world, and we intend to keep them that
way.
The President emphasized the importance of reversing our Armed
Forces' decline in readiness. The fiscal year 2003 budget helps to
improve our military readiness by increasing the defense topline by $48
billion over fiscal year 2002 levels. It accelerates critical
transformational programs, funds the war on terror, and provides for
critical programs related to the war. Perhaps most importantly, it
invests in the Department's greatest asset: its men and women in
uniform.
The President's fiscal year 2003 budget requests over $94 billion
for military pay and allowances, including an across-the-board 4.1
percent pay raise, and $300 million for the option of targeted pay
raises for mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers. It
improves military housing and puts the Department on track to eliminate
most substandard housing by 2007--years sooner than previously planned.
The request also lowers average out-of-pocket housing costs for those
living off-base from over 11 percent to 7.5 percent in 2003--putting us
on track to eliminate all out-of-pocket housing costs for the average
person in uniform by 2005. The budget also includes $10 billion for
education, training, and recruiting, and nearly $23 billion to cover
the most realistic cost estimates of military healthcare. These
investments are critical to ensuring that the smart weapons we develop
are placed in the hands of smart, well-trained soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines.
We must maintain the training readiness of our forces to fight the
wars of today and tomorrow. The fiscal year 2003 budget also provides
for the training of our forces, and of the equipment with which they
will train and fight. We requested $140 billion for operation and
maintenance accounts in fiscal year 2003. This includes substantial
funding for our unit training and operations readiness accounts.
This budget funds the services' training and operations accounts--
tank miles, steaming days, and flying hours for the services. It
preserves crucial training and operating activities essential to the
safety and well being of our troops, and their ability to successfully
accomplish their missions. As outlined by the Secretary of Defense in
his recent budget hearings, the Department increased the funding for
these readiness accounts, to include:

Aircraft operations/flying hours: $11.8 billion, up
from $11.3 billion in fiscal year 2002;
Army OPTEMPO: $3.7 billion, up from $3.3 in fiscal
year 2002;
Ship operations: $2.4 billion, up from $2.3 in fiscal
year 2002;
Depot maintenance: $4.8, up from $4.5 billion in
fiscal year 2002; and
Training: $10.0 billion, up from $9.4 billion in
fiscal year 2002.

We have increased funding for critical Army ``training enablers''--
providing resources to sustain the operation of training ranges,
simulation centers, and the management of ground maneuver and live-fire
ranges. Adequately funding these enablers reduces unit-training funds
to pay these infrastructure bills. In the Air Force, we are seeing some
positive readiness trends that indicate that we may have turned the
corner on chronic parts problems and shortages.
In conjunction with the DOD Comptroller, we have also initiated an
effort to improve our ability to resource and manage unit training and
readiness. The Operations Readiness working group, co-chaired by my
office and the comptroller, with representatives from each Service, the
Joint Staff, and defense agencies, is a new forum to address unit
training needs. This initiative was chartered to develop a more
comprehensive approach to ensuring our budgets and programs adequately
address unit-training requirements. The group has just finished its
first quarterly review of flying hours, steaming days, and tank mileage
including dollar execution, and promises to tighten the linkage between
funding and unit readiness goals.
The Department has also added resources in fiscal year 2003 budget
to address other pressing readiness issues, such as those in support of
homeland defense and the Global War on Terror. This budget enhances our
abilities to protect our forces against biological and missile attack.
The budget also improves maintenance and sustainment of equipment and
facilities. It increases the availability of spare parts and engines--
keeping ahead of the increasing costs due to equipment age and heavy
use in current operations.
In conclusion, I want to emphasize that our forces--our total
forces--are ready to meet the challenges facing this nation. We are
robustly funding the readiness of forces and transforming to meet
future challenges. We are improving the ways we measure our readiness
and transforming our training to meet the new strategy. We appreciate
this subcommittee's continued support of our Armed Forces, and of the
programs that ensure they remain the best manned, equipped and trained
forces in the world. This concludes my statement. I look forward to
discussion and any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

Senator Akaka [presiding]. I want to thank my friend and
colleague, Senator Inhofe, for beginning this hearing. I want
to welcome the witnesses this morning, and offer my condolences
to the families at Fort Drum.
Senator Nelson, do you have a statement to make?
Senator Ben Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to make
comments in the process of asking questions rather than start
with an opening statement. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. I also want to state that I will place my
full statement in the record in the interest of time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

The Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee meets this
morning to hold a hearing on the readiness of United States forces to
meet all of their current missions. Of course, the topic in the news
and on everyone's mind is our current war on terrorism, and especially
our operations in Afghanistan. Forces from all four of our military
services have performed magnificently in these operations, and have
clearly demonstrated at least two important facts.
First, our Armed Forces are capable and powerful, but even more so
when they act in concert with each other and complement each other's
strengths. Their collaboration and creativity has been astounding, and
has inspired awe not only here at home, but in the capitals of our
allies, and perhaps even more importantly, those of our potential
enemies.
Second, the collaboration that exists between the services has been
paralleled by cooperative relationships with other countries that are
pushing new bounds. Seven months ago, it would have been hard to
imagine that our government would be working, on many levels, with some
of the countries who have joined us in our fight against a common
enemy, terrorism. It is my sincere hope that we can continue to build
upon these relationships in the future.
Our military members and those of our allies are fighting valiantly
on our behalf against the scourge of terrorism, and we are grateful.
But while our attention is focused on those efforts, it is sometimes
easy to forget that many other military members are conducting other
important national missions, and there are still others who support the
forces we have deployed or are preparing to relieve them.
These men and women are the topic of today's hearing. We have asked
our witnesses here today to review our other ongoing military
commitments, and to make us aware of some of the strains that our
current war is placing on all of our forces' ability to train for and
carry out the full range of their assigned missions. Further, we ask
our witnesses to help us take a longer perspective and alert us to
future readiness challenges, so that we can better prepare for them.
Our military is proving how years of the best training and leadership
have made them ready to take on our enemies of today, but we must
sustain these capabilities to help protect us against our enemies of
tomorrow. Finally, we look forward to testimony on how DOD is improving
our ability to measure readiness and identify future challenges.
I believe this is the first time that any of our six witnesses are
testifying before our subcommittee, and I want to extend a warm welcome
to all of you. We greatly appreciate your insights and expertise, which
add so much to our efforts here in Congress.

Senator Akaka. General Newbold, we look forward to your
statement. I had hoped to see a more substantive written
statement from you, given the importance of the issues we are
addressing in today's hearing, and would appreciate your other
witnesses providing additional detail in answers to questions
this morning.
I will also be submitting questions for the record for you
to address and look forward to your prompt response to them.
General, will you please proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. GREGORY S. NEWBOLD, USMC, DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS (J-3), THE JOINT STAFF

General Newbold. Mr. Chairman, I would like to also thank
the subcommittee for having a hearing on a critical topic. I
would like to submit my written statement for the record. In
deference to the important subject, what I would like to do is
preserve the time for questions and answers and go into depth
on them. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Newbold follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold, USMC

Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to provide this written
statement with my views on the readiness of America's Armed Forces and
their ability to execute our national military strategy. I look forward
to the opportunity to appear before you.
I must first acknowledge and thank Congress for its sustained and
significant support to the men and women of our Armed Forces. We have
made considerable progress these past several years in several key
readiness areas: increasing pay and allowances for the force; efforts
to reform TRICARE; providing adequate military housing; and, most
importantly, arresting and turning around the decline in near-term
readiness. I would like to commend this subcommittee, in particular, as
your support for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines has been
instrumental in our forces' impressive performance over the past few
months.
On September 10, tens of thousands of U.S. forces were deployed
around the world engaged in operations such as Northern Watch, Southern
Watch, and the Balkans. As had been the case for years, they provided a
deterrent effect against crisis in virtually every corner of the globe.
The nondeployed forces were focused on being prepared to respond to any
other emerging threats to our national interest. Then, on September 11,
our Nation was subjected to a terrorist attack that changed our notion
of security. Your Armed Forces reacted and refocused remarkably well.
Within minutes we had aircraft in the air to protect our nation's
skies. Thousands of Active and Reserve Forces deployed throughout the
country to provide protection to air travel and critical
infrastructure. In the days following September 11, our adaptability
and flexibility effort was evident, and a testimony to the training,
readiness, and quality of our force.
Today, we are engaged in wide-spread operations against terrorists
and tyrants as well as defending the homeland. These operations have
validated our previous readiness assessments provided to this
subcommittee through the Quarterly Readiness Reports to Congress. Our
``first-to-fight'' forces are ready and clearly executing well.
Moreover, our forces have shown they are not only ready for major
combat operations, but also demonstrated flexibility to meet emerging
and unusual mission requirements. In truth, though, if confronted with
another simultaneous major crisis, we will face challenges in several
areas, including both traditional readiness issues voiced by the
services, and joint readiness issues reported by the combatant
commanders. Furthermore, we have concerns with the potential readiness
impacts of sustaining, for extended periods, our current pace of
operations. Aging equipment, spare parts, disrupted maintenance cycles,
shortages of analysts and linguists, increased demand for radio-
frequency bandwidth and spectrum, and the stress on our individual
soldiers are but a few of the areas we are monitoring closely. Lastly,
as the Department's Homeland Defense roles and responsibilities are
fully defined, the readiness implications of this growing mission must
be better assessed.
While these concerns are focused largely on near-term readiness and
near-term solutions, we are also pursuing long-term remedies. The
Department is working the details of a new National Military Strategy
to implement the vision of the Quadrennial Defense Review, which will
help better articulate the capabilities the Department must have and
missions we need to be ready to undertake. At the same time,
modernization and transformation efforts are expected to achieve
increased military effects without necessarily increasing the size of
the force. New concepts, new ideas, and new equipment may mitigate many
of our readiness concerns over the longer term.
The period since September 11 has re-validated the requirement that
our forces will be regularly called upon to operate across a wide
spectrum of operations--from peace enforcement and homeland security to
major, intense combat operations. You, the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must know how
ready are we to undertake different tasks; therefore, we are examining
better ways to assess the department's readiness. In turn, an improved
readiness reporting and assessment tool will help us determine where we
can best utilize the resources provided by Congress, and better
articulate the risks we are assuming in executing our national military
strategy. Our goal is to provide commanders an effective means to
report their readiness and allow rapid, accurate assessments that
support both operational and resourcing decisions. While there is
confidence that we can derive accurate assessments from our current
readiness reporting, improvements are necessary in order to add to the
system's efficiency and effectiveness.
Finally, experience has proved that readiness can be a fragile
commodity. If not maintained it can quickly erode. Congress' support
over the past years has made dramatic, positive impact on the readiness
of the force, and our ability to effectively ``meet the call.'' Key to
maintaining readiness is this continued commitment and the timely
reimbursement for contingency operations. I look forward to your
questions.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Dr. Mayberry, on page 5 of your statement you recommend a
capabilities-based readiness reporting system. How will this
differ from the current system? For example, would units report
their capabilities to perform both their most stressful wartime
missions for major theater wars as well as their ability to do
peacekeeping and other missions? How would that differ from the
current readiness reporting system where the training element
is measured against specific wartime tasks?
Dr. Mayberry. Our military strategy is now transitioning
from a threat-based approach to being more capabilities-based.
This offers unique challenges, as you have highlighted here, to
overall readiness assessment. Our forces must be able to
respond in this new strategic environment of uncertainty and
surprise, and this means that we must be trained and ready with
our forces to be able to respond with specific competencies and
capabilities that are not tied to specific exact geographical
locations or against an explicit enemy.
As the global war on terrorism clearly illustrates, we do
not necessarily know who our next enemy will be or where we
will engage them. The basis for this capabilities-based
assessment will be on the ability of our units to conduct their
assigned mission-essential tasks. This contrasts to our current
readiness approach that is focused more on inputs of people,
equipment, and training, but does not necessarily focus on the
outputs or the quality of those measures.
The focus will be on assessing the ability of the unit to
conduct its assigned mission-essential tasks related to, for
example, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
We have a way to go as we transition to this new military
strategy, and we have already begun thinking through and
working through what the implications will be for our readiness
assessment as well.
Senator Akaka. An additional question on that: why will it
take until 2007 before this new readiness reporting system will
become operational?
Dr. Mayberry. What we are doing now is going through and
determining the characteristics that we and the Secretary will
put forward, working with the Joint Staff and the services as
well as the combatant commands, to put this type of structure
in place. Within the next several months, we will publish
guidance from the Secretary that will then allow the services
to work through their particular plans.
Our office will be developing operational prototypes that
get at more of the real-time nature of working with the
transactions databases that currently exist, to bring these all
together as a proof of principle even within this year. What we
see is that by 2004 we will be again carrying this process
along to be able to make incremental improvements, because a
lot of what we do today is building upon and not starting anew.
It is going to take a while as we bring a more
comprehensive readiness assessment process together.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Mayberry.
General Newbold, when you and your staff were coordinating
forces to supply to General Franks, what role did Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS) reports or other
readiness reporting data play in your decisions? If you did not
rely primarily on these reports for indications of unit
preparedness, what does this imply about their utility?
General Newbold. Sir, the SORTS and other readiness
reporting systems apply differently at a variety of different
levels of command. At the lowest unit level, they have an
immediate assessment value and importance.
In the case of sourcing units for General Franks, the Joint
Forces Command receives the requests for forces from us and
distributes them based on information that would come out of
SORTS. They would derive which units are the most ready and
which units need more time to get ready, so readiness reporting
systems like SORTS would be of value to them.
On the Joint Staff, we use the same reporting systems in a
supplemental way to that. We use it, for example, to make
decisions on future procurement and the development of budgets.
We also use it to identify specific weaknesses and stress
against war plans and use that information to in make
adjustments. In sourcing specific units, though, we rely on
Joint Forces Command and the services to make sure that the
units they send out are the most ready to fight.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Dr. Mayberry, your testimony notes the creation of a new
working group to help clarify the relationship between funding
and unit readiness, which just finished its first quarterly
review of OPTEMPO funding. What were the results of that review
and what milestones have been set for future actions by the
working group?
Dr. Mayberry. The Operations Readiness Working Group, or
OPTEMPO working group, is something that we are working on in
conjunction with the DOD Comptroller. We have initiated this
effort to really improve our ability to resource as well as
manage unit training and readiness.
Each of the services have representatives on this group, as
well as the Joint Staff and the defense agencies, as we all
play a role in addressing training needs. The initiative has
been chartered to develop a comprehensive approach to ensuring
that our budgets and our programs adequately address the unit
training requirements. We have just finished, as you said, our
first quarterly review of the flying hours, steaming days, and
tank mileage, including the dollars and execution. This
promises to tighten the linkage between readiness and funding.
That truly is an ongoing effort to make sure that we
monitor the execution of dollars that we invest in unit
training, as well as making sure that those result in the types
of readinesses that we funded within those existing programs.
So this is an ongoing and continuing effort, but we also will
be addressing the metrics of OPTEMPO, seeking to make
improvements by the end of this fiscal year as well.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Mayberry.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One year ago, nobody believed anything like this could be
happening today. We are in a different kind of war than we ever
anticipated. It is very difficult to anticipate what is going
to happen a year from now, 2 years from now, or 3 years from
now.
I would like to have you discuss the lessons you have
learned, now that we are into something that nobody ever
dreamed we would be in a year ago. I would also like you to
address the capabilities needed to meet the challenges that
come with this new war, specifically in terms of equipment,
modernization, and endstrength.
Dr. Mayberry.
Dr. Mayberry. This is truly the first war of the 21st
century, and I believe that this validates the past investments
that this country has made in high-quality people and
equipment. It also demonstrates our ability to adapt, create on
the fly, and to operate in a strategic environment of
uncertainty and surprise in Afghanistan.
In my opinion, I think one of the primary lessons learned
is that combat effectiveness is truly a result of our
jointness. It brings capabilities and uniquenesses of each of
the services together, and allows us to be greater than our
individual parts.
To be able to achieve the degree of jointness we have now
in wartime requires that we build upon it in peacetime. We need
to train the way we will fight.
Afghanistan also represented, I think, a very expanded
definition of jointness, not just the traditional notion of
services working among themselves. It also reflects that this
is a multinational coalitional type of fight. This will again
be the wave of the future, the inter-agency piece, and the
dynamic with other government organizations, as well as the
interoperability continuing piece that we need to focus on
within our military services. We saw soldiers on horseback
calling in precision munitions. We have seen maritime forces
operating hundreds of miles inland. We have seen old bombers
delivering new weapons. We have seen unmanned vehicles not only
delivering and gathering intelligence, but delivering a punch
as well.
All of those are the types of new concepts I think we are
going to have to train to in the future. I think that we are
going to have to build upon these concepts of jointness to be a
critical part of individuals' careers throughout their service
experiences as well as their joint assignments.
Senator Inhofe. General Newbold, any comments on lessons
learned from your perspective?
General Newbold. Yes, Senator. Some of the lessons were
relearned and some of them were predictable. The quantity of
forces we had to fly to the Afghan theater required the same
stresses and strains we would have used in another theater, and
they came up with some of the same issues you have articulated:
the strain on airlift; strain on ISR platforms; and the strain
on some of the assets we knew that were in short supply, like
intelligence analysts.
These were predictable beforehand, and certainly were
validated by what we have done over there. There were some
surprises in my view, because the mission is truly global, and
because of the requirements for the use of our military here in
the United States. Our fundamental responsibility is protecting
the United States and the Combat Air Patrols we have flown over
the United States were essential, but were not as predictable
in scope or scale as we are having right now.
The assignment of National Guard and Reserve Forces has
been critical, but not always as predictable. So there have
been missions that were required which caused us to think in
new ways. The use of unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicles
has played a critical role in what we have achieved.
Dr. Mayberry has talked about individuals as well, like
Special Forces, that have had a wonderful part to play, and did
not achieve the same visibility as others, but have been
critical to the success in Afghanistan. Frankly, the agility of
the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine has been
something we expected and has proven to be the decisive factor.
Senator Inhofe. Secretary Rumsfeld said our priorities were
wrong and we did not buy enough of what we needed. I think
there is no way to predict in the future what our needs are
going to be. When you talk about platforms, the V-22 technology
comes to mind. I have worked on the V-22 issue since 1987, and
I think of the tragedy that took place in a tough battle at
high altitudes with the CH-47 helicopter and the loss of eight
people.
Would that have been a good place for that technology? If
we had had that available, would that have been used in that
environment?
General Newbold. Sir, the V-22 fully developed and fielded
would have been a wonderful platform because of what it brings.
That is my view. We do not currently have the capabilities to
operate at certain distances, and this would have benefited not
only the marines, obviously, but also the United States Special
Operations Command.
Sir, a lot of the equipment of all the services has aged,
and having a newly fielded system would have provided some
sustainment that would have been good.
Senator Inhofe. I think that is right. We could be talking
about other platforms, too, and of course, the other services.
We go through such a difficult time when we are trying to build
new platforms. There is always criticism out there. We all
lived through the C-17 and B-2 development criticisms, and both
of them have performed well.
Dr. Mayberry, my concern is about your statement that we
are the best trained and equipped. I question if we are really
the best equipped, because there are some things that we have
that are not the best. For example, there are five countries
that make a better artillery piece than our Paladin in terms of
range and rapid fire.
What I am hoping is that you and the service people on the
next panel take those lessons learned and do as much as
possible to make sure that 5-10 years from now, as well as
today, service members going out to do the job have the very
best. This goes for strike vehicles in the air, as well as
artillery and such things as the V-22.
Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank both of the panels of witnesses for
being here today. I appreciate your preparation to visit with
us on the readiness of our Armed Forces. I appreciate very
much, General Newbold, your comment about lessons learned and
relearned, because that is clearly the important point that
needs to be made. For us to be ready, we certainly have to have
learned lessons from the past to project for the future.
I think it is also important for us to recognize that for
our services to be ready, they obviously need to have the
resources necessary to meet the standards in personnel and
equipment that are required. In order to continue to fight
battles that we are faced with today, battles that 6 or 7
months ago we could not have predicted exactly how they would
play out, we have to be prepared.
Based on the testimony that I heard yesterday, we have
flown over 19,000 domestic sorties since September 11 and over
20,000 sorties in Afghanistan. I think these are astounding
statistics, given the fact that the airframes being flown are
19 years old. Many are way beyond their retirement years, but
they certainly stood up. I would also like to commend the
quality of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who were
engaged in these activities. I certainly want to stress that it
appears from all indications we were ready.
In February, I had the privilege of visiting our troops in
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. Clearly, our troops have
done a significant amount of work in a short period of time. I
am pleased to point out that from my experience troop morale
was high. They believe that what they are engaged in is the
right action and that they are very strongly supportive and
appreciate the American people's support and the friends that
we have developed worldwide in this process.
Given the significant effort of troop deployment in such a
short period of time, it seems that we should say we were
ready. There is no hook in this worm. I am not building up to
let you down.
There was a concern raised regarding rotation, certainly
among those who are there on a temporary basis coming from
Reserve or from Guard units. While I understand that the
Central Command has a 179-day rotation period for nearly all
the troops in the region, the question is, has that policy been
adequately communicated to our troops there? There seemed to be
some question as to whether or not there was a policy and while
they had heard about a policy, it had not been communicated
directly to them.
The only question about readiness I think is about the
ability to rotate troops in order to continue to have the
freshest troops available for the battles that are ongoing and
that may be in the future. We recognize that the war is not
over in Afghanistan, it is certainly not over against al Qaeda,
and it is not over against terrorism at large.
Can we do a better job of communicating with our troops
about readiness and are we able to redeploy fresh troops? Are
we going to have to rely on troops that are there 12 hours on,
12 hours off, 7 days a week?
General Newbold. Yes, sir. It is a good question. The
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can sustain almost
anything as long as they know what the policy is and that there
is predictability. It really is an excellent point. Central
Command does not have a formal rotation policy that they impose
on their components. Three of the components have a 179-day
policy, one of them has a 90-day policy. Some of the forces are
rotating out--I could get into specifics if you like, sir--
because they are pushed very hard.
It applies in Afghanistan. It applies elsewhere in the
Central Command area of operation. It applies to the Military
Police guarding places around Washington, DC, who work long
shifts. All of them deserve to know how long they will be doing
it so they can adjust mentally to a predictable life pattern.
That has been communicated, sir, and it will be done. They all
need to know that and they will, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. I think you also made the point that if
we know something we can almost always adjust to it. If there
is certainty in their minds, that is better than the
uncertainty of something that just seems to be the indefinite
game, sort of like the movie ``Groundhog Day.'' There was no
low morale related to it, but there was a question, and
questions unanswered can ultimately affect morale. So that was
why I was concerned.
I appreciate very much your attention. I have raised it on
previous occasions, but I think it is important to be able to
stress to the troops there is a plan and we are going to try to
meet it.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. I want to thank Dr. Mayberry and General
Newbold for your statements. We will talk to you later in a
closed session today.
Let us move to our second panel.
Dr. Mayberry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. This panel includes operations deputies from
each of the four services: Lieutenant General McKiernan, the
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5, for the Army; Lieutenant General
Emil Bedard, the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for
Plans, Policies, and Operations; Lieutenant General Wald, the
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Air and Space
Operations; and Rear Admiral Krol, Assistant Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Plans, Policies, and Operations. I would
like to welcome them, as well as students from Oklahoma and
from the island of Molokai, Hawaii, who are in our audience
today.
Thank you all for being here today. As the senior
representatives from each of your services who are tasked with
delivering trained and ready forces to our regional commanders,
you all are uniquely suited to give us some insight into
current and future readiness challenges. We look forward to
your testimony.
Let me say that we will include all of your statements in
the record, but because we are pressed for time please be as
brief as you can to summarize your remarks.
General McKiernan.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. DAVID D. McKIERNAN, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF, G-3/5 (OPERATIONS AND PLANS)

General McKiernan. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman and Senator
Inhofe, I am honored to be here today and be able to report to
you that our Army is trained and ready.
Let me first thank you for your sentiments on the tragic
artillery incident yesterday at Fort Drum, New York, where
several soldiers were injured and two have deceased at this
point. I would tell you that our Army Safety Center is on the
ground up there conducting a thorough investigation into the
cause of that incident, and we will report back to you once we
find out that information.
On behalf of our soldiers and civilians, I would also like
to express our deep appreciation for everything that you have
done this past year. You have improved pay and benefits,
enhanced quality of life, and provided the resources to ensure
a trained and ready force that is second to none.
As our fighting men and women continue to make incredible
sacrifices, they look to us to demonstrate the Nation's
appreciation and commitment to them and their families. It is a
commitment that you have honored well, and they are grateful.
There is no doubt that we are an Army at war. As we sit
here today, over 200,000 soldiers are forward stationed or
deployed around the world on contingency operations defending
freedom and American ideals. Even before September 11, the Army
was very much engaged in doing the Nation's business on a full
spectrum of missions around the globe. Sometimes it is easy to
forget that our soldiers have been on the ground keeping the
peace in the Balkans for 6 years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
for 11 years, and in the Sinai for 19 years. Our soldiers have
been in Europe and Korea for over 50 years, ensuring peace and
stability, while at the same time providing the Nation with a
rapid deployment capability to potential trouble spots near
those theaters of operation.
Since the attacks, the Army's mission profile has expanded
even further. Over 27,000 Guard and Reserve soldiers have been
mobilized for Federal service. At home, the Army has continued
its long tradition of support to homeland security. Almost
11,000 soldiers are on duty, patrolling our borders, securing
our critical infrastructure sites, and serving at Ground Zero
in New York City alongside U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
We have now certified 27 weapons of mass destruction civil
support teams, which have trained over 28,000 civilian first
responders in 105 cities. Throughout the anthrax crisis, the
Army has provided critical expertise and deployed chemical and
biological defense elements to protect key assets.
Additionally, the Army has responded to dozens of requests for
support from civilian authorities with unique capabilities and
thousands of soldiers.
Abroad, our Army has been at the forefront of the global
war on terrorism. Today, there are over 17,000 soldiers in the
U.S. Central Command area of operations. In Afghanistan, Army
special operators teamed with anti-Taliban conventional forces
to compel the enemy to mass so that the significant
capabilities of our air-delivered munitions could be brought to
bear.
More recently, in the harsh Shahikot region Operation
Anaconda has demonstrated the enduring value of land power in a
tough, close-in fight. These victories were not accidental, nor
were they easily won. They represent a commitment to high
standards, hard work, and superior training, honed by real-
world experience in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, our
combat training centers, and many other mission sets.
Mr. Chairman, we are winning a conflict that few foresaw or
predicted a year ago. But it should be recognized that this
places a certain degree of stress on the force. Our new century
is marked by uncertainty and it is difficult to predict where
and when we will be needed next. All we know is that it will
happen, and our Army will need to maintain full spectrum
capabilities.
In the past decade, the number of Army deployments has
increased by 500 percent. Our soldiers, civilians, and families
willingly accept this challenge. That is why we are here, to do
America's heavy lifting so that we as a Nation can continue to
enjoy the freedoms we all hold so dear.
Because the Army operates in the domain of human conflict,
it is no surprise that people are our centerpiece in our
formations. Every day they represent America to people around
the world. Whether deployed or training, supporting or
shooting, Active component or Reserve, they demonstrate the
best that America has to offer on a daily basis.
They take on our risks and go into harm's way. Some shed
their blood, and some that we have recently buried at Arlington
Cemetery have made the ultimate sacrifice. Through all this,
their determination and resolve is not only unbowed, but
strengthened. Allow me to quote Sergeant Michael Ericson of the
101st Air Assault Division, whose message to the enemy was
clear and succinct, and I think probably echoes our feelings
here today: ``Don't sneak into my back yard and bomb me and
then expect me not to come after you, because we're coming.
We're coming.''
I am here today to answer your questions concerning the
Army's readiness. The fiscal year 2003 budget you are
considering supports the Army's critical needs in the near-
term. Our priorities remain unchanged. First, we are dedicated
to winning the current fight; in this we shall not fail.
Second, we must continue to prepare for the next fight,
whenever and wherever that occurs. This means maintaining the
momentum of transformation and making the tough choices between
current and future readiness. Third, we are committed to being
effective stewards of the resources provided by you that are
required to accomplish the first two priorities.
Thank you very much for having me here today and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McKiernan follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, USA

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to report to you on the United States Army's
readiness to provide for our Nation's security today and in the future.
Our Nation and the Army have a great and common heritage. Throughout
our Nation's history, the Army has continually demonstrated that it is
America's decisive ground combat force able to perform full spectrum
operations anytime, anywhere, under any condition, and as we have
recently shown in Afghanistan, against any enemy.
We are a Nation at war. Nowhere has the Army's ability to conduct
full spectrum operations been more evident than in Operations Enduring
Freedom and Noble Eagle. Today, as I appear before you to discuss Army
operations and readiness, soldiers--Active and Reserve component--are
forward stationed and deployed around the globe, performing
magnificently as they fight the war on terrorism and defend our
homeland. In the months since the attacks of September 11, Army Special
Forces working in conjunction with other special operations forces, our
joint partners, and forces of the Northern Alliance, ran Taliban and al
Qaeda forces from power in Afghanistan. Most recently, during Operation
Anaconda, soldiers from the 101st Air Assault Division and the 10th
Mountain Division, along with Afghan forces and air support from our
sister services, closed with and destroyed Taliban and al Qaeda forces
in close combat.
At home, our support for Operation Noble Eagle has enhanced the
safety and security of millions of Americans. From chemical and
biological detection teams working in Washington, DC, to the Corps of
Engineer's tremendous efforts at Ground Zero in New York, to the
thousands of soldiers protecting critical infrastructure and providing
peace-of-mind to passengers at America's airports, the Army--Active,
National Guard, Reserve, and civilians--has been, and will continue to
be, present for duty.
Although filled with pride at our ability to serve the Nation, the
Army harbors no illusion about the challenges it faces. To help win the
global war on terrorism and prepare for future wars and conflicts, the
Army must effectively use the resources you provide us to transform.
With the continued support of Congress and the Administration, our
soldiers will continue to do their part to help America win the current
war, protect the homeland, support our friends and allies, rapidly
transform the Army to fight and win future conflicts, and maintain our
readiness for the unexpected and unpredictable challenges that lie
ahead.
The attacks of September 11 demonstrate that the world remains a
very dangerous and unpredictable place. One thing, however, is clear:
America and her interests are now and will continue to be under attack
from a myriad of threats for the foreseeable future. Moreover, our
soldiers will continue to be involved in smaller-scale contingencies
around the globe, but will never be far removed from the potential for
large-scale conventional combat operations.
Recent operations at home and abroad reaffirm with absolute clarity
and certainty the enduring value of ground forces. Specifically, the
value of soldiers, operating in a joint and usually combined
environment, capable of creating an imposing physical and materiel
presence, ready to search a cave or destroy an armor column, willing to
guard an outpost or provide humanitarian assistance, has never been
more apparent than it is today. To ensure decisive victory across the
spectrum of conflict, our soldiers must be capable of prompt and
sustained land operations against any and all enemies in any and all
environments. We are fighting today, and through the transformation of
our force we will be prepared to fight on different battlefields
against new and different enemies in the future.

A NEW ENVIRONMENT

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) established a new
strategic framework for the defense of the Nation that struck a balance
between near-term readiness and the Army's ability to transform to meet
the requirements of current and future conflicts. The report delineated
a balanced assessment of our near-term warfighting needs. It moved away
from the need to fight and win in two major theaters of war nearly
simultaneously and articulated a new operational concept that gives
continued priority to homeland defense, promotes deterrence through
forward presence, and asks that we maintain the ability to conduct both
smaller-scale contingencies and large scale high-intensity combat
operations simultaneously. As the Army works with the Department of
Defense and the other services to further define the emerging
requirements outlined in the 2001 QDR, we anticipate that some elements
of current operations will become part of our new posture and emerge as
additional force structure requirements for which we may need more
resources. We expect that other elements, such as airport security and
support to the Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
and Customs Agency will eventually conclude.
As we have demonstrated previously in Panama, the Gulf, Haiti,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and more recently in Afghanistan, soldiers can defeat
enemy armies, seize and control terrain, and control populations and
resources with minimal collateral casualties and damage. They can
operate across the spectrum of military operations, from full-scale
conventional conflicts to asymmetric conditions, from fighting
terrorists to setting the conditions for humanitarian assistance. In an
era of precision weapons, nothing is more precise and discriminating
than the U.S. Army soldier.
It is important to note that wherever the Army goes, it usually
stays. Theater support to regional Commanders in Chief, major combat
operations, smaller-scale contingencies, and post-hostilities
activities all take their toll. The U.S. Army has been in Europe for
almost 58 years, in Korea for 52 years, in the Sinai for 19 years, in
the Persian Gulf for 12 years, in Bosnia for 6 years, and in Kosovo for
nearly 3 years. Despite 10 years of downsizing, that saw a 33 percent
reduction in military personnel including the loss of 37 percent of the
Active-Duty Force and a 44 percent decrease in civilian personnel, the
Army has accomplished all missions to the highest standards. Even
before September 11, 2001, we were doing more with less, and the strain
on the force was real. Since then, our mission profile has grown.
Thankfully, our soldiers, imbued with an ethos of service to the
Nation, continue to give us more in operational readiness than we have
resourced.
The Army has plans to alleviate some of this strain as we continue
to prosecute the war on terrorism at home and abroad. To address the
disparity between our mission profile and our resources, we will grow
our endstrength by no more than a modest 1 to 2 percent this year. This
number, something approaching 4,000 to 5,000, is well within
congressional authorizations. Moreover, given our strong performance in
recruiting the last 2 years, it represents an achievable objective to
relieve some of the strain on our force.

SOLDIERS--ON POINT FOR THE NATION

Around the world, Army soldiers reassure our allies, build trust
and confidence, restore and promote regional stability, encourage
democratic reforms, and deter conflict. Operating as part of a joint
military team, the Army provides our leaders and commanders with a wide
range of capabilities. Our core competency of deliberate and crisis
action planning, that begins with the five paragraph field order we
teach to junior officers and non-commissioned officers and culminates
with the theater campaign planning process we teach our senior leaders,
provides the Army, various CINCs, and the Joint Staff with a nearly
unique ability to match warfighting resources to objectives. Our
unparalleled theater-opening capability sets the conditions for the
rest of the joint force to follow and provides theater-level support to
the commander. In the conflict in Afghanistan, Army expertise in long-
range communications and theater logistics, as well as force protection
for airfields and other assets, established the proper foundation upon
which to build our joint forces. Ultimately, the Army, with both
conventional and unconventional capabilities, closed with and destroyed
a very determined enemy. It is important to remember that neither
weather, altitude, nor terrain dissuades those capabilities that the
Army brings to the fight. As we have seen in today's conflict, we
cannot win without the human dimension on the battlefield. Be it
gathering intelligence, challenging an adversary's ability to hide,
protecting innocent civilians, searching a cave, or battling the enemy,
it is the inherent flexibility of the soldier on the ground that
provides commanders the ability to decisively defeat our foes. During
combat operations, the American soldier remains the ultimate arbiter of
victory.

ON DUTY AROUND THE GLOBE

Today, the Army--active, ARNG, and USAR--has over 124,000 soldiers
and 38,000 civilians forward stationed in 110 countries around the
world. On any given day last year, over 27,500 soldiers were deployed
to 60 countries for operations and training missions. Currently, as the
war on terrorism expands, there are more than 58,000 soldiers deployed
around the globe serving America's interests.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The Army fully embraces its role in the global war on terrorism. As
part of Operation Enduring Freedom, there are over 16,000 soldiers
deployed to the CENTCOM AOR from Egypt to Pakistan, Kenya to
Kazakhstan, including nearly 5,000 in Afghanistan. These conventional
and special operations soldiers from all three components--Active, Army
National Guard, and the Army Reserve--are conducting a myriad of
critical tasks. From advising local tribal leaders to designating
targets, from securing airfields to providing logistics, from calling
in fire to flying transport helicopters at night under adverse
conditions to climbing mountains to attack enemy positions and
providing close air support with Apache helicopters time and time again
while under heavy fire, our soldiers, fighting alongside members of the
other services and our allies, have seized the initiative, met every
challenge head on, and vanquished every foe.
Similarly, in the Philippines, Army forces have joined with other
joint forces in advising the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on
their efforts to root-out terrorism in their country. In addition to
logistical support elements, Army Special Operations Forces are working
alongside special operators from other services in their work with the
AFP. Due to our unique training program that aligns regional expertise
with training and warfighting skills, our Special Forces are
particularly well positioned to support JTF-510 and, in fact, make up
over a third of that joint force.

OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE

At home, in addition to the nearly 12,000 Reserve component
personnel that are supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, the Army is
providing 25,000 soldiers to support Operation Noble Eagle, the war on
terrorism in the United States. The vast majority of those soldiers are
also from the Reserve component. A great many of those soldiers are
guarding critical elements of our Nation's infrastructure--power
plants, dams, tunnels, bridges, water sources, command and control
facilities, and even the Capitol building. Perhaps most noticeable and
familiar are the 6,500 soldiers providing security and assisting local
officials at 441 airports across the country.
Not counted in that number are the 4,000 soldiers that provided
force protection, explosive ordnance expertise, personnel and equipment
screening, and helicopter support to the Winter Olympics. Soldiers are
still in Utah providing similar support to the Paraolympic Games.
Soldiers ensured that this National Security Special Event (NSSE)--like
the Super Bowl and many others before it--occurred without incident.
Most recently, the Army has provided over 1,500 soldiers to the
Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Customs
Service to assist them in their duties in 13 border states. Less
noticeable, but no less important, are the other smaller groups of
soldiers and civilians, many with specialized expertise, that provided
linguistics support, chemical and biological forensics analysis, HAZMAT
training and assistance, biological detection capability, weapons of
mass destruction civil support team training for 26 teams in 25 States,
and technical escort services to several key facilities including the
Capitol complex.

ARMY READINESS

The Army has demonstrated its high state of readiness. This is
largely due to the sustained support from the Nation, Congress, and the
administration. We have a non-negotiable contract with you and the
American people to fight and win our Nation's wars--decisively. As our
mission profile expands, we will require your strong support to ensure
our continued readiness and ability to meet the terms of that contract.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request supports our readiness and provides
funding to maintain our current facilities at an acceptable level.
Fiscal year 2003 funding improves on fiscal year 2002 levels in terms
of maintaining a stable training base to develop quality leaders and
soldiers. The Army has funded its top priorities. Resources have been
aligned to ensure our forces are trained, equipped, and ready to fight.
In addition, funding is provided to enhance unit training and
deployability, another positive element of overall readiness. Finally,
while this budget advances the Army's campaign plan to transform the
force for the future, concerns remain in some areas, including
recapitalization, depot level maintenance, munitions, Active and
Reserve component manning, acceleration of transformation, and
destruction of our chemical stockpiles.

IMPACT OF CURRENT OPERATIONS

Our current operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere have provided
the Army with several lessons. The first lesson is that our training
program works and we must continue to fund training and training
resources, to include the expansion of our range capacity. The Army
OPTEMPO budget is a top priority. Although currently funded at
approximately 97 percent, the Army plans to execute a full ground
OPTEMPO program of 800 M1 Abrams Tank miles at home station and a
complete Flying Hour Program of an average of 14.5 live flying hours
per aircrew per month for the Active component, and nine live aircrew
hours for Reserve components. As the skill of our Apache pilots in
battle in Afghanistan attests, the quality of our pilot training
program, not to mention the quality of our airframes, is one of the
jewels in our crown. We must ensure we continue to train to standard.
We have scheduled 10 brigade rotations (9 Active component and 1
Army National Guard) through the National Training Center at Fort
Irwin, California, and 10 brigade rotations (9 Active component and 1
Army National Guard) through the Joint Readiness Training Center at
Fort Polk, Louisiana. The Battle Command Training Program headquartered
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will conduct two corps warfighter
exercises and train six division command and staff groups, an increase
of one divisional staff training exercise in fiscal year 2003.
Additionally, funding for training enabler support has been increased
20 percent from fiscal year 2002 levels.
Tough, demanding training supported by an infrastructure that
allows us to train, sustain, and deploy is essential to readiness.
History has shown that the higher the quality of training, the better
the leaders and warfighters we produce. We must fully modernize
training ranges, combat training centers, and training aids, devices,
simulators, and simulations to provide adequate and challenging
training. In addition to live field training, the Army has funded the
integration of virtual and constructive training capabilities. Yet,
despite all the advantages of virtual and constructive training we
expect to gain, there is no substitute for training in the field. As
the quality of our forces, our equipment, and our network-centric
command and control operations continue to advance our forces will
operate with ever-greater dispersion. Maintaining sufficient maneuver
areas for training these extended formations will become even more
critical. Those areas are increasingly being encroached upon,
intensifying environmental constraints and operational limitations that
place unnecessary limits on testing and training facilities. The Army
is one of the best stewards of the environment. To improve on our
stewardship, we are implementing a sustainable program that integrates
operational needs, land management, explosives safety, and
environmental concerns into the lifecycle management of our ranges.
The second lesson from Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle
is that we have outstanding Reserve component forces, but our
mobilization of those forces is still cumbersome and takes too long
despite advances since Operation Desert Storm. Our goal is to rapidly
transition soldiers to Active Duty while ensuring that they have
sufficient time to prepare at home station for extended absences.
Adequate Full-Time Manning and Military Occupational Skill (MOS)-
qualified Reserve component soldiers are key to setting the right pre-
mobilization conditions.
The third lesson, and one we have learned before, is that our
forces are ready to fight when they arrive, but we must continue to
work with the Air Force and Navy as well as the Joint Staff and
TRANSCOM to ensure that they arrive in theater faster. The Army fully
supports continued purchase of C-17 aircraft and fast sealift to ensure
the joint force can get us to where the Nation needs us, when it needs
us.
The fourth lesson is that the war in Afghanistan reinforces the
Army's transformation efforts and demonstrates a clear need to
accelerate both the fielding of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams
(IBCTs) and the Objective Force. These capabilities are needed on
today's battlefield and would have had a significant impact on the
conduct of the battles fought to date. Fielding the lighter and more
lethal IBCT and Objective Force also reduces the requirement for lift.
The extent, duration, and variety of current and potential future
operations, however, have presented us with some challenges. As
necessary and beneficial as it is to have soldiers on the ground
creating a presence and furthering the Nation's interests in a variety
of combat and non-combat operations, there comes a point where the
force is stretched beyond what seems prudent. The Secretary of Defense
is examining the Nation's role on the multinational observer force in
the Sinai. We support his efforts, but will stand our post until
properly relieved.
Others have questioned why American ground forces remain in the
Balkans. Perhaps at some point, it will be prudent to turn that mission
over completely to our European friends and allies. However, today and
for the foreseeable future, it is the American flag and the presence of
American soldiers that in large measure brings stability to the region.
Moreover, those same forces are performing several critical tasks in
support of our global war on terrorism. Specifically, they are
conducting surveillance and collecting intelligence on suspected
terrorists who are known to be active in the area and when directed are
supporting the interdiction and arrest of these individuals. To
withdraw completely and immediately would not only risk a return to
instability, but also significantly reduce our counter-terrorism
efforts.
Finally, the Army does not think short-term. As this century has
shown, the Army not only wins wars, but it also bears the preponderance
of the responsibility for post-hostility operations. We fully
anticipate that beyond the destruction or surrender of our enemies, the
Army will be present to conduct a series of post-hostilities and non-
combat operations that solidify the hard-fought gains of battle.
Another area in which the extent, duration, and variety of
operations may pose a challenge is the service and support of our
combat forces. The likelihood for multiple, non-linear, distributed,
and possibly overlapping operations around the globe has the potential
to further exacerbate existing shortfalls in our combat service support
forces. With 70 percent of our combat service support coming from a
Reserve component that is already beginning to feel the strain of
supporting the war on terrorism, it may be necessary to develop a way
to bridge the gap. Additional support for Full Time Manning, enhanced
recruiting and retention, and purchase of necessary equipment and
repair parts would help to improve readiness in those units.
The Army is ready, and one element of readiness we have been
working hard to improve is our reporting system. Our current system is
based on lagging indicators, and while satisfactory, it does not
provide senior leaders with the ability to influence readiness in a
proactive manner. Our new Strategic Readiness System (SRS) will
leverage information available through existing reporting systems while
providing a more objective, scalable, and timely measure of the Army
across all its domains (operating force, institutional force, and
infrastructure). Initial prototyping was completed last year, and we
are currently finalizing our measures of merit with field testing and
initial integration at selected installations scheduled for this year.

TRANSFORMATION

Transformation is about changing the way the Army thinks, trains,
and fights in order to win the Nation's wars in a dominating and
decisive manner. It is inextricably linked to the readiness of our
forces. The emerging character of 21st century warfare clearly
highlights the need for Army transformation; the strategic environment
demands that we accelerate it. The goal of transformation is to see
first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively by leveraging
technology to gain greater situational awareness of the battlefield
than our opponents. With superior awareness, soldiers and leaders can
understand first and devise appropriate strategies for dealing with the
enemy. Through the advent of information dominance and network-centric
operations, the Army will act first to seize and retain the initiative,
attacking the enemy where he is weak while protecting our
vulnerabilities, and using rapid maneuver and precision fires to defeat
our adversaries decisively.
Military institutions are often criticized for looking backward and
preparing for the last war instead of looking forward and preparing for
new and emerging dangers. With the Army's transformation, nothing could
be further from the truth. Our transformation is based on a decade's
worth of self-study and examination that began in the early 1990s with
simulation studies at our battle labs that were field-tested in
Advanced Warfighting Experiments at Fort Hood, Texas, as well as at the
National Training and the Joint Readiness Training Centers.
To understand Transformation is to understand that the Army is
undertaking a holistic and monumental change while simultaneously never
wavering from its mission to be ready to fight and win the Nation's
wars. We are changing our doctrine, training, leader development,
organization, materiel, and soldier systems across the Active
component, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve.
Transformation will result in a different Army, not just a modernized
version of the Army that won the last war. Combining the best
characteristics of each element in our current force, the transformed
Army will possess the rapid deployment mentality and toughness of our
light forces, the lethality and speed of our heavy forces, and the
unmatched precision and combat capabilities of our special operations
forces. Transformation will field the best, most combat effective, most
lethal soldier and organization in the world.
The Army, like all of our joint partners and the Department of
Defense, is a large enterprise. Change on the magnitude envisioned with
Army transformation does not happen quickly, nor is it safe to change
everything at once. This is particularly so when the Army and the
Nation are fully engaged protecting citizens at home and fighting
terrorism on multiple fronts abroad. In order to facilitate change,
while simultaneously remaining ready to defend America's interests, the
Army designed its transformation plan with three interrelated
elements--the Objective Force, our main effort this decade; the Interim
Force, our near-term operational bridge between our existing heavy and
light forces; and the Legacy Force, our immediate warfighting
capability to ensure the continued safety of the American people and
the continued security of American interests.

THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

The Objective Force breaks the mold. Instead of the linear,
sequential operations of the past designed to overpower an enemy with
sheer weight and volume, the Objective Force will fight in a
distributed, non-contiguous, and network-centric manner oriented on
physically and psychologically disorienting, disarming, and decisively
defeating any foe in any environment. The speed, stealth, and advanced
sensor-to-shooter technology planned for the Comanche helicopter
characterize the capabilities necessary for this new form of combat.
Reduced platform weight and a smaller logistical footprint will permit
Objective Force units to deploy more rapidly than today's Legacy Force.
Able to conduct vertical maneuver and execute anti-access operations,
these forces will descend upon multiple enemy points of vulnerability
and through superior situational awareness, identify and attack
critical enemy capabilities throughout the depth of the battlefield. To
ensure we have maximized our opportunity for success in fielding the
Objective Force as quickly as possible, the Army invested 97 percent of
our fiscal year 2003 science and technology budget toward the design
and development of the Objective Force and enabling technologies. We
have recently selected our Future Combat System Lead Systems Integrator
and with your continued support will begin fielding the Objective Force
before the end of the decade.

INTERIM FORCE

The Interim Force is the Army's transition force designed to bridge
the near-term gap between the capabilities of our heavy and light
forces. It blends the best characteristics of our heavy, light, and
special operations forces into a medium weight, full spectrum force
with increased operational and tactical flexibility. Organized into
Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), it leverages today's technology
with selected Legacy Force capabilities to serve as a link to the
Objective Force. A combat ready force, the Interim Force will allow
exploration of new concepts relevant to the Objective Force. The Army
currently plans to field six of these new, more agile and responsive
combat teams. The first two IBCTs are organized at Fort Lewis,
Washington and are undergoing extensive training in all environments,
including urban and restrictive terrain. The first of these brigades
will attain its first incremental warfighting capability--an infantry
company--in August 2002 with its full initial operational capability
shortly thereafter in May 2003. Follow-on fieldings are planned for
Alaska, Louisiana, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania. Moreover, the Department
of Defense has asked us to examine stationing an IBCT in Europe. Very
soon, the IBCT will be an immensely responsive, highly deployable, and
increasingly lethal operational reality ready for combat operations in
support of our joint commanders worldwide.

LEGACY FORCE

The Legacy Force is the guarantor of the Army's immediate
warfighting readiness. Through selective recapitalization and
modernization, the Legacy Force enables the Army to meet today's
challenges, while providing the time and flexibility to complete our
Transformation--effectively managing risk without sacrificing
readiness. Through our Prioritized Recapitalization Program, the Army
has identified and fully funded the refurbishment of 17 systems in
selected units. These systems include the AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black
Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook helicopters that were so important during
Operation Anaconda; the M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley fighting vehicle
that dominated the deserts of Iraq a decade ago and that combine the
best of shock and firepower today; and the Patriot Advanced Capability-
3 missile defense system, a significant upgrade from the system that
saved many a soldier in Operation Desert Storm and that is guarding the
frontiers of freedom in Korea and Kuwait today.
Modernization of this force links it to the Interim and Objective
Forces. The Crusader self-propelled howitzer will solve a current
shortfall in fire support and provide our soldiers the ability to call
for the best fire support available anywhere. Additionally, Crusader
robotics and other advanced technologies will inform the continued
development of the Objective Force. Although after fiscal year 2003 the
Army will not buy another heavy tank, the modernization of our M1/A2
SEP tanks and M2/A3 Bradley fighting vehicles retains our present
ability to defeat any adversary while training soldiers on the same
network-centric situational awareness skills necessary in the Interim
Force. Army Aviation modernization will further enhance our current
readiness by reducing our helicopter inventory by 25 percent while
returning savings in training and logistics that will be used to
recapitalize the remainder of the fleet. To support these and other
priorities, the Army terminated 18 systems and restructured another 12
in this budget cycle.

THE ARMY--PERSUASIVE IN PEACE, INVINCIBLE IN WAR

The Army is trained and ready and wholly dedicated to preserving
freedom and defending American interests at home and abroad. As we have
done many times over the last two centuries, and are doing today in
Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Balkans, the Middle East, and
countless other places around the globe, the Army will continue to win
the Nation's wars and serve its interests. The United States Army--
Active, Army National Guard, and Reserve--is the most respected ground
combat force in the world. Our current training and readiness programs
along with the Army's transformation will ensure we remain the world's
most respected force now and in the future. Today's emerging security
requirements, particularly since the attacks of September 11 have
intensified the demands we place on the backs of our young men and
women. Defending freedom abroad and securing the homeland, while
preparing for potential near-term contingencies has increased the
competition for scarce resources and reduced our ability to invest in
people, systems, platforms, and research and development. Unless
redressed, risks incurred from this resource shortfall could undermine
the Army's ability to adequately satisfy evolving national security
requirements. These same requirements call evermore loudly and urgently
for an acceleration of the Army's transformation. No one can predict
what the future holds, but what is certain is that our Nation must have
the best trained, best led, and best equipped soldiers on the ground,
capable of deploying rapidly at precisely the right time to the right
place and with the right support structure to influence conditions and
achieve victory as part of the joint military team.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for your continued support of the Army, transformation, and most
importantly, our soldiers. Over 2 years ago, we joined together and
began this effort committed to ensuring that the Army remains dominant
today and prepares for combat in the future. The magnitude of what we
have accomplished together is staggering. Our actions in Afghanistan
and elsewhere have demonstrated with absolute clarity the enduring
value of Army ground forces. Your continued support will ensure those
forces remain the most valued and most respected in the world. Thank
you again for this opportunity to report to you on the readiness of
your Army. I look forward to discussing these issues with you.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for being brief. I just
want to remind you again that your full statements will be
placed in the record, and ask you to continue to summarize your
statements.
Admiral Krol.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOSEPH J. KROL, JR., USN, ASSISTANT
DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR PLANS, POLICY, AND
OPERATIONS, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral Krol. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and Senator
Nelson, I want to thank you for the opportunity to be with you
today. It is certainly a privilege to report on the status of
our great Navy. I thank you for your continuing support of our
fleet and sailors.
Because readiness is at the top of our agenda, September 11
found the Navy well-equipped, superbly trained, and forward
deployed to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations. The
day after the attacks on our Nation, 2 carrier battle groups,
25 ships, 177 aircraft, and 18,000 members of the Navy-Marine
Corps team were on station in the northern Arabian Sea.
The Navy's contributions to the global war on terrorism
have highlighted the value of projecting force deep inland from
the sovereign and secure operational base provided by naval
combatants. The Navy's response at home to the attacks on New
York City and the Pentagon were uniquely indicative of our
culture of readiness.
The tempo of deployed surface ships has increased 50
percent during Operation Enduring Freedom, and flying hours
have been up over 100 percent at their peak. However, thanks to
strong Navy leadership and the support of this subcommittee,
the high operational pace has not significantly degraded
readiness. Key metrics such as aircraft cannibalization rates,
material casualty reports, and personnel readiness are stable,
and number of deployed units reporting the highest rating for
overall readiness has actually increased slightly.
However, we have significantly depleted our inventories of
precision guided munitions and aircraft engines. This
subcommittee's support will be vital as we address these
readiness shortfalls.
Finally, the wear and tear associated with more frequent
operations may not be fully apparent until deployed units are
available for thorough inspection after deployments. The Navy
is assessing its ability to sustain various levels of war
effort and developing innovative options to provide combat
power more effectively, efficiently, and responsibly to the
regional combatant commanders. This includes alternative
manning and task force organizations as well as initiatives to
compress the inter-deployment training cycle.
The Navy is ready to sustain the recent operational tempo,
which is similar to a routine peacetime force posture, as the
global war on terrorism continues. Maintaining this pace will,
however, imply greater costs for operating and maintaining our
ships and aircraft, require us to carefully manage our
deployments, and could place our future readiness programs,
including modernization and transformation, at greater risk.
Should the operational tempo increase above recent levels,
we might eventually need to purchase more aircraft, modify the
way we crew our ships, and expand our military, industrial, and
maintenance infrastructures. The Navy remains capable of
surging several carrier battle groups, as it did during the
first months of Operation Enduring Freedom. However, a level of
effort significantly above our current commitment cannot be
sustained and would require a period of reconstitution after
the surge operations were completed.
The Navy's response to September 11 is a testament to the
agility, lethality, and reach of maritime forces, and to the
dedication and professionalism of our sailors. The Navy can
sustain the recent pace of operations for several years and is
developing and implementing ways to cope with higher
operational tempos should they be required as the war
continues. The Navy will, with the continued support of this
subcommittee, meet whatever challenges lie ahead in the defense
of America.
On behalf of our sailors and their families who proudly
serve our Nation, thank you very much for your support.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Krol follows:]

Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Joseph J. Krol, USN

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Akaka, Senator Inhofe, and other distinguished members of
this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be with you today.
It is a privilege to report to you on the status of our great Navy. I
thank you for your continuing support of our fleet and sailors.
Operation Enduring Freedom has demonstrated that America has the most
responsive and combat capable Navy in the world. Because we place
readiness at the top of our agenda, September 11 found the Navy well
equipped, superbly trained, forward deployed, and ready to conduct
prompt and sustained combat operations in defense of America. The day
after the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, two carrier battle
groups (CVBGs), 25 ships, 177 aircraft, and 18,000 members of the Navy-
Marine Corps team were on station. The Navy's contributions to the
global war on terrorism (GWOT) have highlighted the value of projecting
force deep inland from the sovereign and secure operational base
provided by aircraft carriers and other naval combatants. This
autonomous capability is increasingly important in an era of precarious
access to terrestrial military bases.
The Navy has been at the forefront in taking the fight to America's
adversaries. On day one of Operation Enduring Freedom, submarines and
surface ships crippled enemy air defenses with Tomahawk cruise
missiles, while carrier strike forces launched long-range attacks
against al Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban regime. Flying 80 strike
sorties a day at the peak of Operation Enduring Freedom, carrier-based
F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft accounted for more than 70 percent of all U.S.
strike missions. We were able to disrupt terrorist organizations,
destroy critical enemy infrastructure, and prevent further attacks on
America and her allies. Operation Enduring Freedom has illustrated that
we have clearly moved into a new era of effects-based warfare, in which
military success is best measured by the timeliness and value of
targets destroyed and not by the mass of ordnance expended.
While naval strike forces were projecting U.S. power hundreds of
miles into Afghanistan, other combatants were controlling the seas and
performing vital operations around the globe. An unprecedented number
of interceptions and inspections were conducted to interdict the
maritime avenue of flight for terrorist leaders and restrict the flow
of terrorist materials. Naval aircraft have conducted the vast majority
of manned airborne reconnaissance flights in the Afghan theater and
Navy SEALS have provided approximately half of our SOF capabilities on
the ground. All of these operations are being well supported by our
hard-working replenishment ships.
The Navy's response at home to the attacks on New York City and the
Pentagon was equally indicative of our culture of readiness. Off
America's coasts, aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers rapidly
took station to protect the maritime and air approaches to the United
States in the wake of September 11, 2001. Within view of ``ground
zero'' in New York, the hospital ship USNS Comfort and the auxiliary
USNS Denebola provided food, berthing, and medical care for the heroic
first responders ashore.
While protecting America's interests overseas and providing
additional security at home, the Navy has also implemented more
stringent Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection measures to safeguard our
people and infrastructure. More than 5,000 reservists are reinforcing
the security of our ships, naval bases, and other military
installations. The Navy's response to the events of September 11 is
testimony to the dedicated service of our sailors and to the agility,
lethality, and reach of our naval forces.
Thanks to our Navy's civilian and military leadership and the
strong support of the American people and Congress, we have made solid
progress over the last few years in addressing long-standing readiness
issues. As a result of our priorities and this subcommittee's support,
fiscal year 2002 was the best readiness budget in a decade. The fiscal
year 2003 budget will likewise flow more resources where they are most
needed: to warfighters in the fleet. However, the ongoing global war on
terrorism has the potential to stress our fleet considerably and there
is little elasticity in our force structure to permit growth in the
naval missions required to take the fight to the enemy while protecting
the maritime approaches to the United States.
In my testimony, I intend to describe the impact of recent and on-
going operations on Navy readiness, provide a qualitative assessment of
the Navy's ability to continue the conflict, and discuss how the Navy
is planning to manage its resources and risks to maintain a high state
of readiness as the global war on terrorism continues.

IMPACT OF THE GWOT ON NAVY READINESS

The Navy routinely maintains a forward-deployed expeditionary
posture. This posture, combined with the fact that we have added nearly
$5 billion to our key readiness accounts over the past 2 years, has
minimized the impact of the war on current readiness. Since September
11, approximately one-third of the fleet has been deployed on any given
day. This percentage of deployed units is similar to our historic
peacetime profile, with 40-50 percent of our fleet underway, and
approximately 30 percent of our forces forward deployed to support the
requirements of regional combatant commanders in areas such as the
Persian Gulf, Europe, and the Pacific Rim. In order to meet these
commitments, we have a rotational force in which ships, air wings, and
personnel are either on deployment or in the process of preparing
themselves for the next deployment.
Although the number of ships underway and deployed has not
dramatically increased during Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble
Eagle, the OPTEMPO of deployed front-line units has. For example,
U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt recently completed a record-setting 159
consecutive days at sea and U.S. surface combatants, in general, are
steaming 50 percent more days per quarter than they would during a
normal deployment. The increased amount of time at sea translates into
fewer port calls and maintenance availability periods. The greater
operational demands have been felt even more acutely by carrier air
wings that were flying 250 hours per day at the peak of operations, and
are still flying approximately 190 hours per day compared to an average
of about 115 hours during a typical peacetime deployment.
Despite this high operational tempo, we have not yet observed a
significant degradation in readiness. Since September 11, we have
actually witnessed a slight increase in the percentage of units
reporting the highest level (C1) for overall readiness. Most key
metrics of current readiness have remained stable since the GWOT began.
The Mission Capable rates of naval strike aircraft remain comparable to
historic averages, at around 70 percent. The cannibalization rate of
naval aircraft in fiscal year 2001 was the lowest in 5 years; this
trend does not appear to be reversed. The rates that our deployed units
are reporting mission-critical material failures (CASREPs) have also
not increased appreciably. However, the pools of spare aircraft engines
and our inventories of precision-guided munitions have been depleted
significantly. We are taking steps to address these negative readiness
trends.
It is too soon, however, to have a complete grasp of the total
impact that higher OPTEMPO will have on readiness. More frequent
operation of ships and aircraft entails additional wear and tear. For
example, the F/A-18 has been flown well in excess of planned rates, and
more than 300 of these aircraft will require service life extensions
earlier than planned. The consequences of greater usage may not be
fully apparent until these units are available for more thorough
material inspections and assessment. In summary, there is no
overwhelming evidence that the higher OPTEMPO required by the GWOT has
significantly degraded material readiness, but we must closely monitor
our key readiness metrics as the war continues.
Personnel readiness has improved significantly over the last few
years and this trend has not been reversed by the war. These gains are
largely attributable to recent increases in base pay, housing
allowances, and career sea pay. Last year's retention of first-term
sailors was the best in more than 30 years and the first months of
fiscal year 2002 were on a similar pace. Although we have not observed
an increase in recruiting success since September 11, neither have we
seen a downturn. However, sailors are spending a greater percentage of
their time at sea, especially on deployment and this could eventually
have a negative impact on manpower. We continue to manage personnel
tempo carefully while meeting war exigencies.

SUSTAINING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

It is quite probable that the global war on terrorism will continue
for several years at a pace similar to, and perhaps periodically
greater than, that required to date for Operation Enduring Freedom.
Based on this probability, we are in the process of assessing our
ability to continue the war at various levels of effort, as well as
studying what change would be required to sustain those levels. The
Navy would be able to sustain the recent pace of operations for the
next few years with greater funding for operation and maintenance (O&M)
and a few adjustments to how we normally maintain, train, and operate
the fleet. O&M requirements will grow commensurately with increased
steaming days, flying hours, and a higher demand for parts and depot
maintenance. Mission Capable/Full Mission Capable Rates for aircraft
will probably decline slightly and fewer aircraft will be available for
the training of non-deployed carrier wings during the Inter-Deployment
Training Cycle (IDTC). From a geo-political standpoint, focusing
available carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) on
one or two regions will often mean that other key areas, not directly
implicated in the GWOT, will have fewer forces available for presence
and engagement missions.
Operating slightly above our current level of effort is
sustainable, even with periodic surge requirements. Sustaining this
OPTEMPO would require additional increases in O&M funding for labor and
for higher costs required to reduce the wait time for parts.
Deployments would likely be extended, in some instances, beyond the
Navy peacetime goal of 6 months, and turn-around times shortened
between the deployments of certain combat units. Although additional
surface combatants would not necessarily be required to sustain this
operational pace, we might have to increase the inventory of aircraft
to concurrently meet the demands of forward-deployed units and those of
air wings in the IDTC. Finally, it is likely that the increased OPTEMPO
of our ships and aircraft would result in less frequent non-operational
periods, which would increase the already large and growing amount of
deferred maintenance and retard key modernization plans to equip our
ships and aircraft with improved sensors, avionics, information
systems, and weaponry.
Operating the Navy at a pace slightly above that required so far in
the GWOT may also have personnel implications. Special care and
management will likely be necessary to ensure that civilian workers
with special skills, a group already in short supply, are recruited,
trained, and retained in our shipyards and intermediate maintenance
activities. We are currently analyzing our civilian and military
manpower needs for the war.
Expanding the commitment of naval forces significantly beyond our
current level is possible for short periods of time, but not
sustainable without changes to our force structure, manpower, and
infrastructure. As we demonstrated during the first months of Operation
Enduring Freedom, the Navy can surge its forces to place four aircraft
carrier battle groups on station. While this peak level of effort would
again be achievable in the future, it requires a significant period of
reconstitution and cannot be sustained on a routine basis with our
current fleet. Sustaining this high OPTEMPO would require more
resources and, more importantly, might require an expansion of our
industrial infrastructure.

MANAGING RESOURCES AND RISK IN A WAR TIME NAVY

The events of September 11 have proven that we live in a new
security environment that demands a reassessment of how the United
States trains, equips, organizes, and operates its military. The Navy
is conducting that review, and exploring the best methods to manage
resources to sustain the global war on terrorism while minimizing
risks.
Manpower
Manpower remains the Chief of Naval Operation's top priority.
Although gains have been made in improving recruiting, retention, and
attrition, these advances are perishable and we must continue to
provide the best possible quality of service to our sailors and
civilian workforce. Since the attacks on the Pentagon and New York
City, we have mobilized more than 10,000 Reservists to ease the burden
on our active duty personnel. About half of these sailors are helping
implement more stringent Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection measures. The
other half brings key expertise to the fleet and major staffs in the
areas of intelligence, logistics, construction, meteorology, and base
support. However, paying Reservists to remain on active duty is costly
and may require additional funding as the war continues. In order to
minimize this impact, we are currently validating the jobs being filled
by Reservists with an eye toward demobilizing those who are not
essential.
We are also studying several options to provide alternative manning
to the fleet. These possibilities include rotational crewing that would
allow ships to spend more of their time in forward areas without
reducing the quality of service of our sailors. The Navy has a
successful history of providing rotational crewing to ballistic missile
submarines. These models should help us develop the right plans to
provide more ships-days to our regional CINCs.
Compressing the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC)
Meeting a higher demand for deployed naval assets may require a
compression of the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle. The typical 24-
month deployment cycle consists of the following:

6 month deployment overseas;
1 month post-deployment leave and upkeep period;
6 month intensive maintenance period;
10 month training period; and
1 month of leave, upkeep, and stores load-outs prior
to deployment.

The nominal cycle provides 18 months between 6-month deployments
for a turn-around ratio of 3. Although that number can be reduced, the
CNO has established a minimum turn-around ratio of 2.0. Two major
activities comprise the period between deployments: training and
maintenance.
Our Navy is the best largely because of our most important
asymmetric advantage: highly trained sailors. Developing the range of
skills required to operate safely at sea and conduct combat operations
entails training at sea and in port. In order to improve quality of
life, the at-sea training required during the IDTC has already been
reduced by about one-fourth over the last 5 years. Simulators and other
applications of information technologies are being speeded to the
fleet, but can only replicate and replace a portion of the real-world
drills and exercises that give us an edge in combat. Our recently
established Fleet Forces Command, located in Norfolk, is working with
our operational forces to develop ways to decrease the training periods
required in IDTC as well as to tailor them more closely for missions
demanded by the GWOT. However, we do not expect to achieve a
significant compression of the training requirements. We must also
remember that reductions in the training of our air and ship crews may
imply a risk to safety and combat effectiveness, especially in
scenarios more challenging than the GWOT.
As we consider compressing training between deployments, the need
to ``train as we fight'' will increase. However, some environmental
laws and urbanization increasingly impact this warfighting imperative.
When urban encroachment and environmental concerns restrict our use of
training ranges, our sailors miss out on valuable training
opportunities that can improve combat effectiveness and reduce risks on
the battlefield. In order to guarantee that in the future we'll be
ready for the first day of combat, we must all recognize the value of
our training ranges and provide for their continued use, including the
use of live-fire training. We are analyzing the feasibility of relying
more upon simulators that should reduce costs and training time, as
well as decrease wear and tear on ships and aircraft. Although
simulators and non-live-fire exercises are an important part of
military training, there simply is no adequate substitute for live-fire
training.
Maintenance is the second component of the IDTC. There are two
major options for reducing the time required to perform maintenance
between deployments. The first involves deferring maintenance that is
not absolutely essential to ship operations and combat effectiveness.
However, we already have deferred maintenance amounts whose growth we
have recently slowed, but not stopped, with increased funding. Although
we are developing options to increase the capability to conduct
forward-deployed repairs, all maintenance availabilities, whether
conducted stateside or overseas, reduce the number of days that our
combat platforms can operate and fight at sea.
Another option is to speed up the pace of maintenance performed
between deployments. It is, however, an expensive proposition to
provide the around-the-clock shifts necessary to shorten maintenance
periods. Additionally, the pool of qualified laborers, especially
regarding the skills required to maintain nuclear propulsion plants,
has little over-capacity and is fairly inelastic. The acceleration of
maintenance is also often constrained by the limited availability of
suitable shipyards, dry-docks, and other key components of our
maintenance infrastructure. Finally, our sailors accomplish much of our
ship and aircraft maintenance and retesting themselves, and increasing
the pace of repairs could degrade their quality of service and training
opportunities during the IDTC.
Much of our ship maintenance revolves around our propulsion plants.
Reducing or accelerating the maintenance on propulsion systems is often
simply not prudent due to stringent, time-tested procedures and
retesting requirements. In all cases, the deferment of maintenance or
the taking of shortcuts can put readiness at risk at critical moments
during combat operations.
Changing the Way We Organize and Deploy Our Forces
We are also studying alternatives on how we provide combat-ready
ships and naval aircraft to the regional CINCs. Although the carrier
battle group will remain the preeminent naval task force, we are
looking at options to provide responsive, sustainable, and long-range
strike forces composed of fewer and different units than those in our
CVBGs. One construct is to complement ARGs with cruise missile capable
surface combatants and submarines, producing ``Expeditionary Strike
Forces'' tailored and equipped to destroy terrorist elements. These
forces would provide distributed firepower when and where they are
required by the regional CINCs.
Replenishing Inventories of Precision-Guided Munitions
Precision-guided munitions represented a fairly small fraction of
the air-dropped weapons employed during the Persian Gulf War. Over the
last decade, they have developed into the weapon of choice. The high
demand for these weapons during Operation Enduring Freedom has depleted
our inventories. To address this issue, we have added $973 million to
procure more PGMs. However, our ability to replenish our inventories
will depend primarily upon the ability of industry to meet the growing
demand as well as upon usage rates in the future. Increasing the
production rate will take time and there is no quick fix to this
challenge. The Navy is committed to working through these challenges
and obtaining the full wartime requirement for precision-guided
munitions.
Managing Long-Term Risks
As this committee well understands, there always exists a tension
between funding current readiness today and investing in future
readiness for tomorrow. This tension is likely to increase as the GWOT
continues. In fiscal year 2003, the Navy plans to purchase 83 new
aircraft, build 5 new ships, and reconfigure 2 ballistic submarines as
SOF-capable SSGNs. This procurement pace is well below what would be
required later in the FYDP in order to maintain the fleet's present
strength above, on, and beneath the world's oceans. We will need to be
careful, and maintain the appropriate balance between the funding of
current readiness and investing in tomorrow's fleet.
The modernization of our ships and aircraft is vital to maintaining
our edge in combat since about 60 percent of the ships steaming today
will still be in the fleet in 2020. The Navy's modernization plan could
be placed at risk by two factors as we continue to protect America and
its allies from terrorism. Similar to recapitalization, we must guard
against under-funding modernization in preference to funding the GWOT.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the higher expected OPTEMPO
of our combat platforms means that there will be fewer opportunities to
upgrade them with advanced sensors, avionics, offensive and defensive
weapons systems, and information technology.
Meeting the imperatives associated with our near-term security
needs could put the Navy's transformation plans at greater risk. The
events of September 11 and the lessons learned during Operations
Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle demonstrate that we clearly are faced
with a new security environment that demands fundamental changes in our
military cultures, doctrine and tactics, and combat systems. As with
the other key components of future readiness, we must make every effort
to ensure that we can operate in defense of America's freedoms today
while concurrently preparing the Navy for an uncertain and extremely
challenging future.
Finally, we must ensure that funds remain available for the
recapitalization of the Navy's infrastructure. Quality infrastructure
is a vital part of ensuring both current and future readiness.
Unfortunately, the Navy's shore infrastructure condition is less than
satisfactory. While the fiscal year 2003 budget makes modest increases
in sustainment, restoration, and modernization and military
construction accounts, there remains much to be done. We are studying
this problem and working on a plan to provide out-year funding to help
mitigate these significant challenges. While funding the war, we must
not forget about the infrastructure that sustains our sailors and
ships.

CONCLUSION

The global war on terrorism has clearly demonstrated that the U.S.
Navy is the world's best, and that our focus must remain on current
readiness. The Navy's response since September 11 is a testament to the
agility, lethality, and reach of maritime forces and to the dedication
and sacrifice of our sailors. Because the Navy operates as a rotational
expeditionary force, makes current readiness a top priority, and has
had the strong support of this subcommittee, we can sustain the current
pace of operations for the foreseeable future. The Navy can also surge
forces quickly and maintain that level of effort for a few months.
However, should the pace of the GWOT accelerate, we would be required
to modify our deployment cycles and reexamine many of our plans and
programs in light of the changing security environment. If we increase
the war effort at sea, we would need to make some hard choices that
might put the fleet's recapitalization, modernization, and
transformation programs at greater risk. While not ignoring the future,
a Navy at war must focus on maintaining current readiness. The Navy
will, with the continued support of this committee, meet whatever
challenges lie ahead in defense of America. On behalf of our sailors
and their families who proudly serve our Nation, thank you for your
support.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Lieutenant General Bedard.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. EMIL R. BEDARD, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR PLANS, POLICIES, AND OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS

General Bedard. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and Senator
Nelson, it is my privilege today to report on the state of
readiness of America's Marine Corps. The theme that runs
through all of our core competencies is readiness. If I may
recall some language from the 82nd Congress, ``Your Marine
Corps is designated and designed to be the most ready when the
Nation is least ready.''
With the continuing help of Congress and certainly this
subcommittee, the United States Marine Corps and our Navy
partners have always been ready to do just that. We were ready
on September 10th; we were ready in November when we secured
Rhino in southern Afghanistan; we were ready when we moved in
to secure Kandahar in a long-range air and ground maneuver; and
we were ready to move elements of the Fourth MEB Anti-Terrorism
Brigade into Kabul, as well as into our Nation's capital. We
are ready today and we will remain ready tomorrow.
Readiness is comprised of training, equipment, and people.
Training must produce combat-ready organizations. Our unique
Marine air-ground task forces that are prepared to deploy
quickly into austere environments, sustain themselves
effectively over time, and as the culmination of this process,
fight and win.
Our service in Afghanistan attests to the capabilities of
our forces better than any words could ever attempt to do. When
the President called, our Marines provided themselves well,
showed they were trained, adequately equipped, and up to any
challenge. Our equipment, though aging, was superbly maintained
and accomplished the mission. Our doctrine of maneuvering from
the sea base to objectives well inland has been evolving for a
decade and showed itself to be extraordinarily effective over
the depth of the battlefield.
The last and most important element of readiness in both
peace and war is our people: marines, sailors, civilians, and
their families. We must ensure they are properly equipped in
accordance with our focus of expeditionary maneuver warfare,
and ensure they will be treated fairly and compassionately by
this country that they so eloquently serve.
On behalf of the Commandant, I express my appreciation to
this committee for your consistent support to the Corps. I also
express our appreciation through you to the American people for
their unflagging support. The small business people and
corporations that have provided an opportunity for our
Reservists to serve in this time of national crisis provide a
valuable example that we all serve, both in uniform and out.
I will close by observing that in combat sustaining is
critical to winning. The same is true for the continued
financial and readiness well-being of the Marine Corps. We
depend on that sustainment provided by this subcommittee and
Congress as a whole. This is a good time to be a United States
Marine. My written statement addresses the issues of the Corps
where your continued support is required to maintain our
readiness and effectiveness.
I welcome the opportunity of your questions and I
appreciate being here today.
[The prepared statement of General Bedard follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Emil R. Bedard, USMC

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Akaka, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is my privilege to report on the state of readiness of
America's Marine Corps.
September 11 was a tragedy unlike any this Nation has faced. Never
before have our citizens been so maliciously targeted, and with such
catastrophic effects. We've been attacked before, but never have we
faced an enemy who operates without a homeland. We've been attacked by
pirates and terrorists before, but never by ones who intentionally
target civilians with weapons of mass effects.
The world is, now more than ever, uncertain and dangerous. Now,
more than ever, the Marine Corps seeks to be a certain force in an
uncertain world. For generations, the Marine Corps has trained and
prepared to be ready to defeat America's enemies on short notice. When
the trumpet sounded on September 11, the Nation's force in readiness
answered the call.
There are times when our devotion to readiness puts the U.S. Marine
Corps at a disadvantage in the continuing transformation and
modernization dialogue inside the Beltway. Being ready at a moment's
notice requires focus, dedication, and flexibility. Being ready across
the full range of conflict requires organizational scalability. Our
enemies, as we have seen, are unpredictable and deadly. Providing a
full range of options to the combatant commander has tremendous utility
in today's environment. What we are, and will always be with your help,
is ``ready.'' Prior to September 11, it may have been difficult for
America to understand the value of forward deployed ready forces. I
know that the distinguished members of this subcommittee understand the
value of ready forces today, and have always understood; we've seen
that through the strong support you've always provided. I believe that
everyone outside this committee, and outside this city now understands.

READINESS--WHY THE MARINE CORPS EXISTS

Let me describe for you the state of Marine Corps readiness as I
see it from my position.
Our first priority is, and will continue to be, readiness. Our
sequence of priorities is ``mission first, marines always.'' Our
service in Afghanistan attests to the state of that readiness better
than my words could ever attempt to do. When the President called, our
marines proved themselves to be well-trained, adequately equipped, and
up to any challenge. Our equipment, though aging, was superbly
maintained and accomplished the job. Our doctrine of maneuvering from a
seabase to objectives well inland has been evolving for a decade, and
has shown itself to be extraordinarily effective on the modern
battlefield.

VALUE OF FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES

We have once again shown the value of forward deployed forces. In
this era of renewed focus on defense of the American homeland, it is
perhaps important to reemphasize that defense of that homeland begins
not on our shores, but on the far shore. Our forward deployed role is
comparable to a fire warden in a national forest. It is far easier to
have a fire warden already on scene, see the lightning-caused brush
fire, and put it out while still small and manageable than it is to
mobilize national assets once the initial flames become an inferno.
At times, we will be forced to act in ways that don't impact the
sovereignty of those in the vicinity of our intended action. Forward
deploying those ready forces at sea frees us from dependence on access
to bases in theater or on the permission of a host government. The
flexibility of a true seabase (as contrasted to units simply embarked
on shipping) offers immense advantages. A U.S. Navy warship in
international waters is sovereign U.S. territory. We need ask no one's
permission or acquiescence in the use of facilities to position and
employ U.S. forces. When combined with the force protection advantages
inherent in being underway at sea, forward deployed forces operating
from a seabase in international waters provides an invaluable option
for the Joint Force Commander.
operations in afghanistan--employing operational maneuver from the sea
In operations in Afghanistan, the Navy-Marine Corps team, and as
full members of the joint force, conducted the longest amphibious
assault in the history of warfare. This proved our concepts of
operational maneuver from the sea and ship-to-objective maneuver and
was quite unlike the historic amphibious assaults at Tarawa or Inchon.
We operated from a seabase, reducing our footprint ashore and thereby
minimizing our force protection requirements and allowing us to operate
with minimal basing in theater. We supported Special Operations Forces,
we established bases, we seized and secured facilities. When called
upon, we did our part to engage and defeat America's enemies.

The Marine Corps, like everyone else, was surprised by the
September 11 attacks, but we were not surprised by the nature of the
threat. Over the past decade we have defined a world more chaotic and a
future strategic environment of increasing uncertainty. We saw the
premium that would be placed on speed, precision, and lethality; speed
not only in movement, but also in the ability to respond--to be truly
expeditionary. We published a new operational concept in January 1996,
Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and the tactical implementation of
that concept, Ship to Objective Maneuver later in the same year. In
November 2001, we published Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, a capstone
concept that melded our expeditionary culture, warfighting ethos, and
organizational concepts within the context of seabasing and our support
to the Joint Warfighter. Instead of the traditional amphibious assault
which essentially required seizing a forward operating base on the
beach and then building up supplies and reorganizing from landing teams
to combat formations, decisive operations across the entire spectrum of
military operations from humanitarian assistance to amphibious assaults
can now be launched directly from the seabase. The seabase will
transform the way we project power and influence. The integrated
seabase provides a sanctuary from which fires, command and control, and
sustainment can flow when and where required without the threats
presented by land-based forward operating bases.

NEW SYSTEMS FOR NEW CONCEPTS

The new systems we have pursued in measured fashion since the 1980s
are the keys to executing these concepts in the future. Several of the
key systems and platforms, production of which has been delayed by the
procurement holiday, are very close to coming on line and they will
revolutionize how both the Marine Corps and the Joint Force Commander
do business.
In Afghanistan, using our new operational concepts executed with
aging equipment, marines conducted an operational maneuver from the
seabase, at distances previously thought to be unattainable. We were
able to sustain the force primarily from the seabase, freeing us from
the requirements of force protection in a large rear area. With your
help, as new systems come on line, we will be free of the need for
intermediate staging bases that are now required because of the short
legs of our aging helicopter fleet. In effect, we will have created the
``maritime'' staging base. With the V-22 Osprey, the Short Takeoff and
Vertical Landing variant Joint Strike Fighter (STOVL JSF), Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), and the Expeditionary Fire Support
System (EFSS), we would have been able to move directly from the
seabase to Khandahar airport and have a full range of expeditionary
fires to organically conduct the full range of military operations.
This will be a revolutionary leap in capability for the Joint Force
Commander, combining the freedom and sustainment of coming from the sea
with the long ranges of tilt-rotor and STOVL aviation. Combine our
traditionally flexible organization, the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF), with these new systems and platforms and you will see a fully
transformed Marine Corps. This transformation didn't start as a result
of the QDR, but rather two decades ago, and these systems and platforms
will soon be ready for fielding through transformational business
practices in support of our changing concepts, organizations, and
doctrine.

SUSTAINING THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL TEMPO

Because we consistently deploy forces forward to various theaters,
the Marine Corps has not had to radically change how we operate in
order to support the global war on terrorism. The cost of employing
these ready forces that you fund is minimal when compared to other
options for achieving like capability. We have slightly adjusted
deployment departure and return dates in order to maintain the current
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)]
presence in the Afghanistan area of operations, but we have not had to
deploy units out of their normal sequence or without critical training
time. There have not been significant PERSTEMPO increases for our
marines. Of the almost 5,600 marines participating in Operation
Enduring Freedom, fully 90 percent were already forward deployed or
scheduled to deploy.
The Marine Corps can sustain this level of operations indefinitely.
The real issue for us, as I will address shortly, is the amount of wear
and tear we are putting on our aging equipment, and ultimately, the
potential for reduced time between deployments that could impact
training.
Our operational commanders are working on contingency plans to
increase, if necessary, the number of forward deployed units, and to
support larger contingencies. When needed, our Reserve establishment
can, as we have already done, assist the Active Marine Corps component
in supporting ongoing operations. We have seamlessly integrated both
Marine Expeditionary Force Augmentation Command Elements, two infantry
battalions, two heavy helicopter squadrons, two aerial refueler
detachments, and critical skill individuals.

HOW YOU CAN HELP

Having said how well prepared we are, your natural question is
where, if anywhere, do we need your help? In a phrase, ``modernization
and transformation,'' and in terms of platforms, amphibious shipping
and aircraft.
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is the Nation's premier,
medium weight, combat credible, sustainable, forcible entry capability.
Today's amphibious MEB possesses capabilities that no other combat
force in the world (either on-call today or envisioned for the future)
has. The ability to prevail in an anti-access environment with a
forcible entry, then conduct high tempo, full spectrum operations in
support of U.S. national policy is unique to the MEB.

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING

Our amphibious lift requirement has been consistently validated at
3.0 MEB assault echelons that, in terms of today's ships, equates to
approximately 45 amphibious ships. We understand the fiscal realities
we operate within, and have thus adapted to a fiscally constrained
amphibious lift capability of 2.5 MEB assault echelon equivalents.
While we cannot achieve 2.5 MEB AE equivalents with current Active Duty
shipping, use of reserve shipping in the Amphibious Lift Enhancement
Plan (ALEP) gives the 2.5 MEB AE within 180 days of ALEP activation.
Unfortunately, as the events of September 11 have shown, we don't
anticipate the luxury of having a 180-day response time.

We will be able to achieve our 2.5 MEB lift requirement with an
all-active force upon delivery of the 12th LPD-17 amphibious ship.
Ultimately, we see the amphibious fleet consisting of 12 LHDs/LHAs or
their replacements, 12 LSDs, and 12 LPD-17s in the 2015 time frame.
While currently short of the 3.0 MEB AE goal, this is a force that will
provide us, at some risk, the necessary capability to project power in
an anti-access environment in the near- and mid-term.
Delivery of the 12 LPD-17 San Antonio-class ships is currently
scheduled to be completed in 2015. We are concerned about potential
further slippage in the LPD-17 program. Such slippage could cause us to
fall well below the 2.5 MEB lift level and leave us without the lift
required to meet the Nation's needs. We are also concerned with
replacing the LHA-1 Tarawa-class ships. They will begin to reach the
end of their 35-year service life in 2011, and considering the time to
design and build a replacement ship, we need to begin the process now.
The overall age of the amphibious fleet is also a concern. The average
fleet age of an amphibious ship is 25 percent older than the average of
all other Navy ships.

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING AVERAGE AGE/SERVICE LIFE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service life Latest scheduled
Type Number in class (Including SLEP) Oldest/Youngest decommissioning
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LPD................................. 11 40 37/32.6 2012
LSD 36.............................. 3 35 33/29.9 2005
LSD 41/49........................... 12 40 17.1/3.9 2038
LHA................................. 5 35 25.7/21.9 2015
LHD................................. 7 40 12.8/0.6 2041
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF)

Another equal but unique partner in seabasing that will help us
project power and influence, and counter an adversary's anti-access
strategy and the persistent shortage of strategic sea and airlift is
the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). Today, this
force, loads leased commercial shipping with a MEB's worth of ground
equipment and 30 days of supplies and prepositions the shipping in
strategically located ports around the world. The forces flow into
theater through a mix of strategic airlift and sealift. The forces
``marry up'' with the prepositioned equipment and provide the CINC with
a sustainable, combat capable force. By minimizing the requirement to
use strategic airlift to flow marine units to theater, utilizing MPS
saves thousands of sorties of strategic lift. The CINC is thus able to
employ those sorties elsewhere to speed the deployment of other vital
members of the joint force.
Unfortunately, the leases on our ships expire in fiscal years 2009,
2010, and 2011. We need National Defense Sealift Resources to replace
this most flexible and cost effective asset. We have developed the
concept of MPF Future and with your help we will replace the existing
program. Meeting MPF Future requirements will allow at-sea arrival and
assembly of forces, selective offload of equipment and supplies, and
relieve us of the need for ports and airfields, revolutionizing joint
force deployment and employment. We request your support in continuing
the MPF Future program and truly transforming the seabase and the
capabilities for joint force power projection.

V-22 OSPREY--OUR TOP AVIATION PRIORITY

The V-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one aviation priority.
With it, marine forces operating from the seabase will be able to take
the best of long-range maneuver and strategic surprise, and marry it
with the best of the sustainable forcible entry capability.
We are certainly aware of the challenges associated with the V-22,
but are pleased that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has announced that a new comprehensive flight
test program for the Osprey will commence this spring. This flight test
effort will be ``event driven,'' as opposed to being ``time driven.''
Both the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will periodically review flight
test results to assess the progress of this program. Of this we are
certain: the V-22 will revolutionize expeditionary aviation and
represents a mature technology ready for today's environment.

STOVL JSF--A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS

In late October 2001, the contract was awarded for the Joint Strike
Fighter, signaling a new era in fielding naval aviation. The advantages
of a stealthy strike-fighter capable of taking off from an
expeditionary base on land or sea, flying in supersonic cruise,
accomplishing its mission with advanced sensors and weapons, and
returning to its expeditionary site are truly revolutionary. This
aircraft will transform the very foundations of tactical airpower. The
Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing Joint Strike Fighter (STOVL) variant
provides operational access to over three to five times the number of
airfields currently available worldwide capable of supporting our
legacy aircraft. The STOVL JSF can operate from both conventional
carriers and amphibious assault ship decks. This effectively doubles
the number of shipborne platforms available for operations. As these
highly capable aircraft shift from seabased platforms to expeditionary
airfields, they can effectively decrease response time for missions by
75 percent and increase time on station by 50 percent.

MODERNIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION

The Marine Corps has always prided itself on taking care of the
equipment and property with which we are entrusted. We think we've been
good stewards of both. We are now at the point with some of our
equipment and some of our property where it must be replaced.
Most of the equipment and weapons systems in our command elements,
ground combat forces, and combat service support units have reached or
exceeded their programmed service lives. The procurement holiday of the
past decade was based on the assumption of a strategic pause coincident
with the end of the Cold War in which we could skip a generation of
procurement and recapitalize with modern, transformational equipment.
The global war on terrorism has marked the end of any strategic pause
and has caused us to operate our equipment at an even higher rate than
anticipated, as the overall tempo of operations increases.
The cost of maintaining old equipment is often much higher than
maintaining a similar piece of more modern equipment. Spares are harder
to find and manufacturers are less willing to produce components based
on old technology. The result is much higher costs both in dollars and
man-hours.
The majority of our key aviation equipment is older than the
marines who use it. Our KC-130s are 19 years past their scheduled
retirement. President Kennedy was in office when our first KC-130F
rolled off of the assembly line. Our CH-46Es and CH-53Ds are over 30
years old.
This is expensive equipment to maintain. For example, on our CH-46
aircraft, replacement airframe parts do not exist. Every airworthy
airframe is still in service; there are no retired airframes to use for
parts. Airframe parts have to be hand-made by a master artisan. Once
crafted, because the Naval Aviation Depot has never previously
fabricated the part, it must go through a test procedure. We have the
same problem with our UH-1N and AH-1 aircraft. One small panel from the
UH-1 tail costs as much as $5,000 to fabricate and stubwings for AH-1s
cost $4,700 apiece for temporary repairs.
The man-hour requirements are even more striking. While our
maintenance numbers have held fairly constant, it has been on the backs
of our young marines. The marines who keep our CH-46s flying have had
to spend as many as 37 maintenance man-hours per flight hour to keep
them mission ready. Hours spent maintaining aging aircraft are hours
that are not spent in training or valuable off-duty time. The quality
of life implications are significant.
The fiscal year 2003 budget allows the Marine Corps to begin to
make more robust levels of investment in ground and aviation
modernization and transformational programs that we have outlined as
vital to future readiness. However, until this new equipment is
fielded, we will continue to ensure the readiness of our legacy
systems. We will continue to take maximum advantage of Service Life
Extension Programs (SLEPs) that enable us to improve the reliability
and availability of our legacy systems, as we will be forced to
continue to invest increasing levels of resources--manpower and
dollars--in the maintenance of our aging equipment. We ask for your
support of the increases in our fiscal year 2003 budget request for
spares, corrosion control and depot maintenance.

FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET

The fiscal year 2003 budget request will, with your help, allow us
to increase levels of investment in modernization of command and
control, aviation, and ground equipment such as:
command and control
Exploiting the capabilities offered by long-range aircraft, long
range fires, operating from a seabase and with full connectivity to our
Joint and coalition partners poses enormous command and control
challenges.

The Unit Operations Center (UOC) is comprised of
Combat Centers and Combat Operation Centers and will provide a
centralized facility to host command and control functionality
for the Command Element, the Ground Combat Element, the Air
Combat Element, and the Combat Service Support Element. The COC
is scalable and supports command echelons for battalion and
above.
The Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S)
will provide a capability that allows operators to integrate
marine aviation into joint and combined air/ground operations
in support of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Ship-to-Objective
Maneuver, and other operations. It will specifically provide a
common suite of tactical facilities, equipment, and interfaces
for a system that will replace the legacy command and control
equipment currently associated with the Tactical Air Command
Center, the Tactical Air Operations Center, Air Traffic
Control, Direct Air Support Center, Direct Air Support Center
(Airborne), and the Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion.

INCREASED TACTICAL MOBILITY

V-22 Program

The MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor is a revolutionary, advanced
technology vertical/short takeoff and landing, multi-purpose
tactical aircraft being procured to replace the current fleet
of Vietnam era CH-46E and CH-53D aircraft. The MV-22's design
incorporates the advanced, but mature, technologies of
composite materials, fly-by-wire flight controls, digital
cockpits, airfoil design, and manufacturing. The Osprey is
capable of carrying 24 combat-equipped marines or a 10,000
pound external load. It has strategic self-deployability with a
2,100 mile range with a single aerial refueling. Procurement of
the MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one aviation
acquisition priority.

Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV)

The AAAV remains the Marine Corps' number one ground
acquisition priority. The AAAV will allow marines to eliminate
the battlefield mobility gap and, for the first time in the
history of naval warfare, maneuver ashore in a single, seamless
stroke giving both the ships and landing forces sufficient sea
space for maneuver, surprise, and protection.

FIRES

With the increased range and speed of the AAAV and the V-22, the
breadth and depth of the battlefield are increased immensely. We must
have weapons systems with greater range, lethality, and tactical
mobility. The LW 155 is one key piece of this new family of fire
support systems and in conjunction with increased range of the High
Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), we will have full spectrum,
all weather fires across the depth of the expanding battlefield.
HIMARS, a very lightweight and mobile system, has the capability of
delivering very high volumes of rocket artillery in support of the
ground scheme of maneuver. The family of improved mortars, including a
new 120mm mortar for the infantry battalion, greatly extends the reach
and punch of the infantry. Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) systems
such as the Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM), the 5''/62 gun, the
Advanced Gun System, and the Naval Fires Control System will provide
essential fire support during the early phases of the expeditionary
operation and long-range all-weather fire support during operations
ashore. Naval Surface Fire Support can spell the difference between
success and failure in the early phases of expeditionary operations.
Filling the gap between organic and aviation delivered fires, NSFS is
vital to all-weather, day and night, precision application of naval
fires. With enhanced Naval Surface Fire Support and with the
implementation of the Expeditionary Fire Support System now in initial
research and development, we will have a truly expeditionary range of
all weather, day, and night fires. The Ground Weapon Locating Radar is
necessary to protect our forces from our adversaries' counter-battery
fires. Again, using Afghanistan as an illustration, mobile operations
in mountainous terrain place a premium on indirect fires. We, more than
any of the other services, place great emphasis on the power of close
air support. Because of our familiarity with close air support, we also
understand what it can't do. Surface based, indirect fires, whether
from the land or the sea, are irreplaceable when forces are joined in
close combat, particularly in the early phases of a seabased operation.
Nothing else is as responsive to the commander's needs, or as reliable.
They are not weather or facility dependent. As such, they are a key
component in continuing to extend the reach and lethality of our ground
forces. These new ground-based systems, and the seabased fires under
development by the Navy in combination with STOVL JSF and the upgraded
Cobra and Huey helicopter provide the Marine Corps a complete family of
integrated sea, air, and land based fires.

HIMARS

High on our priority list is to marry precision maneuver with
precision fires. We require ground-based fire support which is
lethal, mobile, and with long range. HIMARS, the High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System, fills this need. The HIMARS will
provide ground-based, responsive, General Support, and General
Support Reinforcing indirect fires that accurately engage
targets at long range, with high volumes of lethal fire, under
all weather conditions and throughout all phases of combat
operations ashore. It will fire both precision and area
munitions and has a maximum range of 60 kilometers.

LW 155

The Lightweight 155mm towed howitzer is needed to replace the
M-198 howitzer that is at the end of its service life. It is a
joint USMC/U.S. Army system that will meet or exceed all the
requirements of the current M-198 system while reducing the
weight from 16,000 to 9,000 pounds. The maximum range using
unassisted projectiles is 15 miles and 18 miles using assisted
projectiles.

Naval Surface Fire Support

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare places unprecedented
requirements for long-range, accurate, timely fires in support
of the maneuver force. Systems such as the Extended Range
Guided Munition (ERGM) will ensure the continuous availability
of surface based fires firing during an expeditionary
operation. ERGM is a guided projectile fired from cruiser and
destroyer guns out to a maximum range of 63 miles. Development
of land attack missile technologies will provide a supersonic
surface-to-surface missile that will have a range far in excess
of naval guns. Combined, they will provide a highly responsive,
accurate, all-weather means of attacking critical targets and
providing support to deployed marines beyond the range of naval
guns.

Fixed Wing Aircraft

The STOVL JSF will be a single engine, stealthy, supersonic
strike-fighter aircraft capable of short takeoffs and vertical
landings. It will combine the basing flexibility of the AV-8
with the multi-role capabilities, speed, and maneuverability of
the F/A-18 to fulfill both the air-to-ground and air-to-air
requirements of the Marine Corps.
KC-130J will bring increased capability and mission
flexibility to the planning table with its satellite
communications system, survivability enhancements, night
systems, enhanced rapid ground refueling, and improved aircraft
systems. The KC-130J has 21 percent increased speed and 35
percent increased range over current versions of the KC-130.
The KC-130J will replace our aging fleet of KC-130Fs, Rs, and
Ts.

EQUIPPING THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE

We believe the deadliest weapon on the battlefield is a well-
trained, well-led, and motivated U.S. marine equipped with the finest
service rifle available. We are seeking to upgrade our service rifle to
better ensure ``every marine a rifleman'' remains more than an
institutional belief. Despite my testimony on expensive programs and
futuristic systems, we remain committed to ``equipping the marine'' not
manning the equipment, especially in a weapon system, as fundamental as
the service rifle.

TRAINING

We can have the best, most modern equipment in the world, but
without highly trained marines to operate and maintain it, we'll have a
parking lot full of expensive gear. The key to the Marine Corps'
success is no secret; it's our marines. They are fit, smart, well-
trained, and motivated. They are devoted to their training, their
country, and their Corps. For over 200 years, they have achieved
victory over our foes.
Ensuring these marines' skills are honed to a razor's edge is an
enduring mission of the Marine Corps. We train hard and efficiently,
trying to achieve as much combat training as possible at home station
in order to be efficient with our time and money. Time spent in transit
to distant training areas is lost training time. A lost training minute
is never regained. With our forward deployed posture, there is no time,
nor are there training areas, to retrain and refresh marines prior to
committing them to either contingency or combat. They leave their home
stations ready, and we seek to ensure they maintain that readiness
during their forward deployments through an aggressive exercise
schedule. These exercises, conducted while forward deployed, hone
coalition building skills and enhance interoperability with allies and
coalition partners.

TRAINING--ENSURING SUCCESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

There are few things regarding battle of which I'm certain, but I
know that combat is chaotic and confusing. I'm also confident that the
weapons systems and equipment you provide are the best and most lethal
in the history of warfare. It is essential that we conduct rigorous,
realistic training to ensure the safety of our marines and ensure we
impose our will on our enemies. This rigorous training demands we place
our marines, as closely as possible, under the same stresses, chaos,
and confusion we envision they will face in combat.
Rigorous, realistic training can be accomplished in a variety of
ways, but the best method we've found simulates the way we fight and
combines live-fire and maneuver. We accomplish this most effectively
for our service combat training at the MAGTF Training Center at
Twentynine Palms, California. We must retain the areas where we train,
particularly those where we train in combined arms in conjunction with
our Navy teammates. If we can't retain the areas we currently use, we
must replace them with like or better facilities.
Realistic, challenging joint exercises are equally important to
ensure marine forces are fully capable of integrated joint operations.
As a combined arms force of both ground and air forces, and with our
close relationship to the U.S. Navy, the Marine Corps fully appreciates
the synergy inherent in the joint fight and is an active participant in
these challenging exercise programs. Providing well-trained, service
unique capabilities is the greatest contribution to joint warfighting
capabilities and is our Nation's truly asymmetric advantage.
One of the most important things we can provide our forward
deployed Navy-Marine Corps teams is confidence in their ability to
employ all weapons systems at their disposal. Confidence that the
forward air controller is going to coordinate an effective and safe
mission, that the ground forces will suppress enemy air defenses and
direct the trajectories of their projectiles in directions which don't
hazard the aircraft and that the strike aircraft, will hit the target.
We can learn the elements of this training in parts, and in multiple
sites, but that works on the skills and techniques in piecemeal
fashion, and does not necessarily engender the critical level of
integration essential for combat readiness. It is absolutely critical
that the Navy and Marine Corps maintain areas where they can combine
naval gunfire, artillery, air, and ground maneuver forces
simultaneously.

ENCROACHMENT--THE DOMINANT READINESS PROBLEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

We note with appreciation the subcommittee's interest in the
degrading effects of encroachment on combat readiness. Marine Corps
Base Camp Pendleton is cataloging the combined effects of multiple and
overlapping regulations and restrictions and how they impact our use of
our training areas. The United States Marine Corps is proud of our
record as good stewards of the environment.
We are prepared to work through the Secretary of the Navy to
exploit all available measures to ensure our continued access to our
training areas. We do have concern about two areas. The first is the
ever-increasing number of regulations based upon the Endangered Species
Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Air Act. Subsequent
designation of Marine Corps training areas as ``critical habitat''
poses a great potential for loss of accessible training areas and could
potentially reduce readiness and increase the cost, in lost time and
money, for training. The second area of concern is urbanization,
further limiting the four dimensions essential for training: ground
areas, air and sea space, and access to the electro-magnetic spectrum.
Encroachment issues are emerging as one of the dominant readiness
problems in the 21st century.

TAKING CARE OF OUR MARINES AND THEIR FAMILIES

The greatest single contributor to Marine Corps readiness is the
motivation and desire of our young marines to be the very best in the
world. We have 212,000 marines today, 172,600 in the Active Forces and
39,400 in the Reserve. With your help, we have made significant
progress in taking care of these young men and women and their
families. Increases in military pay and benefits, especially basic
allowance for housing increases, improvements in health care, and
improvements in on-base housing are key enhancements you have made
reality. While we recruit marines, we retain families. The young men
and women we don't retain return to society as solid American citizens.
They will uphold their responsibilities, and their families are as much
their responsibilities as their military duties. Medical care for sick
children, good schools, a chance to save for a child's college
education are as vital to ensuring our marines' readiness as ensuring
there is adequate ammunition. A focused marine elicits the best from
his training, and knowing that his family is well taken care of allows
a marine to focus.

THE MARINE CORPS--A TOTAL FORCE

It is important to note that the Marine Corps operates as a total
force, including elements of both Active and Reserve components and
depends on total force readiness. Our Reserve component is organized on
exactly the same lines as our Active Force; we have not transferred a
horizontal capability from the Active to the Reserve Forces. Our
posture as forward deployed, forces in readiness does not allow us to
have combat support or combat service support functions primarily in
the Reserve structure. Accordingly, we strive to ensure our Reserve
Forces are as well-trained and ready as our Active force. We integrate
the Marine Corps Reserve Forces into ongoing exercises and training.
Two Combined Arms Exercises per year are conducted entirely by Reserve
Forces today. In support of the global war on terrorism, we have
activated both Marine Expeditionary Force Augmentation Command
Elements, two infantry battalions, two heavy helicopter squadrons, two
aerial refueler transport detachments, as well as other staff
augmentation individuals and units. I would personally like to express
my gratitude and appreciation for the business owners, companies and
government offices at all levels who have made it possible for our
Reserve marines to train and to mobilize in support of our efforts
against terrorism.

SAFETY

I personally believe deeply in the concept of the Marine Corps
family. Just as any parent is concerned with his family's safety, our
Commandant and every marine leader are focused on safety. As our 13th
Commandant General John Lejeune stated, ``In the Marine Corps, the role
of senior to subordinate is not one of master to servant, but rather
one of teacher to student, father to son.'' I believe that deeply. It
therefore pains me every time one of our marines is hurt or killed. It
is especially painful when that injury or death was the result of a
preventable accident.
One of our greatest challenges in this area of safety is the basic
composition of the Marine Corps. Two of three marines are under the age
of 25, roughly 6 to 8 years younger than the average age of the members
of the other services. We are a young force, and this is part of the
culture of the Corps. Our unique force structure has fully 68 percent
of our marines on the first enlistment at any one time. While 2001 was
a banner year for safety for the Marine Corps, I cannot say we have
done as well recently. I am personally focused on this issue, as are
all marine leaders. We have not found a common thread or pattern in our
ongoing analyses. Please rest assured that the Marine Corps as an
institution, and I personally, will not rest until we reduce the level
of preventable accidents to zero.

CONCLUSION

Marines were the first conventional ground combat forces in
Afghanistan. We accomplished that feat with superbly trained marines
and impeccably maintained equipment. While well maintained, that gear
is old and aging fast due to the higher usage rates caused by the
ongoing war. We were able to defeat our enemies in Afghanistan because
we were ready when called. This remains our focus, and our number one
mission. We need your help in keeping up our old gear, modernizing
where we can, and taking care of our marines and their families.
What you saw in Afghanistan is just the beginning of what America
and the world will see from a fully modernized and transformed Marine
Corps. Marines moved 600 miles inland with 30-year-old helicopters and
35-year-old cargo aircraft C-130s. Our marines are ready, our doctrine
works, and with the new hardware ready to come on line, you're going to
get a Marine Corps that's leaner, more lethal, and even more ready,
just like you've expected for 226 years. Only then, it will come with a
1,000 mile reach. We know that we're really just beginning the hard
work of the global war on terrorism; the tough targets are in our
windshield, not our rearview mirror. We need your help to be ready for
the tough fights ahead. We think we've proved worthy of your continued
support and ask that you continue to support your Marine Corps as you
always have. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to address
readiness--an issue critical to marines and our Nation.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General.
General Wald.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CHARLES F. WALD, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS

General Wald. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, Senator Nelson:
Thank you. In the interest of time, I will defer my prepared
comments, but I would like to make just a couple personal
observations. First of all, I would like to thank you and the
members of the subcommittee for the continued support we have
in our readiness in the United States Air Force. As the
commander in Afghanistan for the air war for the first 2
months, I was a recipient of tremendous readiness of our forces
and can tell you that we were ready on September 25 to start
the operation in Afghanistan, which I think is probably
unprecedented in the history of our military.
I attribute that to the great support you have given us and
to the great joint effort that our services have made in both
this effort and our training in the past.
I would like to tell you on behalf of the men and women of
the United States Air Force that we thank you very much for
your continued support and, now that I am a force provider, I
look forward to working with the subcommittee in the future to
sustain our readiness as it is today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Wald follows:]

Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Charles F. Wald, USAF

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to provide you with the status of Air Force readiness. As
the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, I want
to thank you for your continued focus on the readiness challenges
facing the men and women in our great Air Force today. We have the most
respected air and space force in the world, and we are transforming our
service into the new century while maintaining global readiness and
warfighting capabilities to support America's National Security
Strategy.

OVERALL

From the Korean Peninsula to Kabul, across every continent and over
all bodies of water, Air Force civilian, Active Duty, Guard, and
Reserve Forces continue to execute their global missions. We had a busy
year. The Air Force flew over 1,000 sorties over the former Yugoslavia,
enforcing no-fly zones. In Southwest Asia, a continuous steady-force
presence of more than 8,000 airmen supported Operations Northern Watch
and Southern Watch, flying 70 percent of all coalition sorties. The Air
Force continued support in the ongoing war on drugs over the Caribbean
and South America, contributing to the seizure of over 75,000 kilos of
narcotics. Natural disasters in India, Central America, South America,
and the United States saw Air Force personnel and equipment
transporting relief supplies, providing medical support and assisting
in engineering projects.
The Total Air Force Team was one of the very first to respond to
the attacks of September 11, and that response continues unabated. Both
Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom have seen airmen along with
our sister services successfully providing humanitarian, combat, and
support operations.
Operational demands on the Air Force before September 11 were
significant. Although we reached significant milestones in terms of
reducing the effects of high tempo operations, the advent of war
impacted many of those gains.
Our situation is more complicated since our aircraft fleet is older
and more expensive to maintain. Recapitalization of our airframes and
weapons systems is a partial solution. The Air Force is hoping to
upgrade our infrastructure and physical plant, which includes
sustainment, restoration, modernization, transportation, support
equipment, and communications systems. With the help of Congress, we
have made considerable progress in addressing pay, benefits, and
quality of life issues--improved investments for our people.
We are hopeful that our readiness rates bottomed out in February
2001 at 65 percent. Fortunately, we've improved to 71 percent this
year. While this is a marked increase, there's more to do. Whether it's
well-stocked bins, improved depot maintenance, or available state-of-
the-art equipment, improvements are needed. The Air Force is pursuing
improvements across all core competencies, for our equipment,
organizations, and personnel. A readied force is the key to meeting the
threats and challenges of the future.

AIR AND SPACE SUPERIORITY

The Air Force is investing in a range of systems encompassed in the
entire Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess (F2T2EA) kill chain. Our
legacy air-to-air platforms continue to be key to this process. We
continue to pursue modernization of F-15 and F-16 radars, engines, and
enhanced combat capability to ensure near-term fleet maintenance and
air superiority in the air-to-air combat environment. We have made
advances with the Joint Helmet Mounted Sight and the AIM-9X and AIM-120
next-generation air-to-air missiles. Our greatest advantage with
current systems is our robust training and exercise program and access
to 41 combat ranges, essential to our airmen for effective training,
equipment development, and experience building.
Several electronic warfare programs support self-defense against
enemy air defense systems. For example, the Comet Pod infrared (IR)
countermeasures system will provide pre-emptive protection for the A-10
against IR surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), enhancing survivability in
the A-10's low-altitude close air support role. The Air Force is also
addressing multiple Combat Mission Needs Statements and accelerating
ramp-up for production of an IR flare, responding to today's air war
threat in Afghanistan, and providing protection to special operations
aircraft in combat zones. The Air Force is putting much emphasis on
countermeasures to protect fighters and bombers from advanced SAM
threats while increasing the viability and lethality of current
platforms to conduct operations in the modern radio frequency (RF)
threat arena. We have numerous, much-needed enhancements on the horizon
for the critical Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission.
The Air Force is the designated Executive Agent for Space and has
begun integrating systems acquisition with operations. To aid in this,
the Air Force realigned the Space and Missile Systems Center from Air
Force Materiel Command to Air Force Space Command. The Air Force
accomplished the first National Security Space Program Assessment and
will use it to draft our first National Security Space Plan later this
year.
The Spacelift Range System modernization program is replacing aging
and non-supportable equipment, improving reliability and efficiency,
and reducing the cost of operations at the eastern and western launch
ranges. Coupled with the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
program, the Air Force will meet the future launch demands of national
security, civil, and commercial payloads.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Success in achieving information superiority requires an effects-
based approach, superior battlespace awareness, well-integrated
planning and execution, and properly trained and equipped information
operations (IO) organization. These ensure our information systems are
free from attack while retaining the freedom to attack an adversary's
systems. In coordination with joint forces, the Air Force engages in
the daily conduct of IO functions across the spectrum of military
operations, providing security to our Air Force commanders, joint
forces CINCs, and multinational forces.
Our operational and tactical command and control (C2) airborne
platforms and ground assets are in great demand and are in various
upgrade stages. Our Air and space Operations Centers (AOC), with their
decentralized component Control Reporting Centers (CRC) and Theater
Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS), create a comprehensive
awareness of the battlespace so that the Joint Forces Air and Space
Component Commander (JFACC) can task and execute the most complex air
and space operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. During
Operations Noble Eagle (ONE) and Enduring Freedom (OEF), TBMCS was
rapidly deployed to support both CENTCOM and NORAD operations centers.
TBMCS will evolve into an open-ended architecture capable of
interfacing with a variety of joint and coalition databases, displays,
and links.
Throughout 2001, the Air Force aggressively addressed the need to
standardize C2 of air and space forces. Our focus is to refine the AOC
into a standardized weapon system with properly trained operators,
improving its ability to meet worldwide requirements. Supporting ONE
and OEF validated our strategic vision for C2 systems. We will continue
to develop the AOC, keeping it on course to revolutionize the
operational level of warfare.
The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) remains our premier
air battle management and wide-area surveillance platform. Several
upgrade programs are necessary to address aging aircraft issues,
obsolete technologies, and the proliferation of advanced adversary
systems. This year, one third of the AWACS fleet completed an improved
radar system upgrade, which will reach full operational capability in
fiscal year 2005. The next upgrade will replace 1970-vintage processors
and a satellite communications access program will improve connectivity
with regional and national C2 centers.
Our limited numbers of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems are in high demand. The RC-135 Rivet
Joint, U-2, Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), and Predator and
Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have proven indispensable
during OEF and the expanding war on terrorism by providing real-time
target data, threat warning, and battle damage assessment. The Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) will see significant
upgrades to its computer systems by 2005, while recapitalization and
modernization efforts promise to keep the RC-135 Rivet Joint and U-2
viable well into the 21st century.
We are committed to the production and fielding of Global Hawk as
the next-generation high altitude airborne ISR platform. In the spring
of 2001, Global Hawk successfully completed a deployment to Australia,
supporting maritime reconnaissance and achieving the first trans-
Pacific crossing. Global Hawk was also deployed in support of OEF and
with advanced sensor development underway, will be able to better
support the time-critical targeting mission. Demands for the older
Predator UAV remain high. In fiscal year 2002, the Air Force will
double Predator aircraft production, accelerating to two aircraft per
month, adding 40 additional aircraft to the current inventory. The Air
Force will also stand up a third Predator squadron and begin
weaponizing the fleet.
The Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP)
will allow larger and enhanced air-to-ground surveillance capabilities
on a variety of platforms, to include Global Hawk, and potentially a
NATO-manned platform variant.
Achieving information superiority depends considerably on the
availability of a robust worldwide communications capability.
Tremendous efforts are underway to modernize Military Satellite
Communications (MILSATCOM) systems to keep up with demands. The scope
and speed of joint operations, including OEF, simply would not be
possible without MILSATCOM systems such as the Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) and the Military Strategic and Tactical
Relay System (MILSTAR). The Air Force awarded a System Development and
Demonstration contract in November 2001 to design the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite system, an eventual
replacement for the MILSTAR constellation beginning in 2006.
The Air Force is combining efforts with the other services to form
the joint Global Information Grid (GIG), allowing warfighters,
policymakers, and support personnel access to information on demand.
During OEF operations, deployable communications packages were
successfully connected to the GIG to support combat operations.

GLOBAL ATTACK

The Air Force creates desired effects within hours of tasking,
anywhere on the globe, including locations deep within an adversary's
territory. Our B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers provide the global rapid
response, precision and standoff strike capability, 24/7 battlespace
persistence, and a time-critical targeting capability. These platforms
now carry the highly accurate 2000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM) and are being fitted to carry new standoff precision guided
weapons. Future integration will see inclusion of smaller precision
weapons. Until the F-22, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) become an operational part of the
inventory, the Air Force continues to rely on its legacy fighters (F-
15, F-16, F-117, and A-10) to provide the air-to-air and air-to-ground
capability.
Consistent with recent DOD Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) direction,
the Air Force is providing for long-term sustainment of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities. Minuteman III
(MMIII) ICBMs will be deployed through 2020 and supported by on-going
life-extension programs, while Peacekeeper (PK) ICBMs will be retired
beginning this year. As the PK system is deactivated, the Air Force
intends to transfer some warheads currently on PK to the MMIII, thereby
avoiding a costly life-extension program on certain MMIII warheads.

PRECISION ENGAGEMENT

The Air Force made significant progress in developing and fielding
a new generation of weapons that can attack and destroy pinpoint,
hardened, and relocatable targets at night and in most weather
conditions while greatly reducing the risk to operators. By rapidly
adapting new technology employed under actual combat conditions in
Operations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom, we now have an array of
precision weapons that can be employed from nearly all our combat
aircraft. These programs include the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW),
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and Wind Corrected Munitions
Dispenser (WCMD).
From the Balkans to Kabul, combatant commanders required precision
capability, not large-scale conventional operations. However, this
demand reduced our large Cold War reserve munitions stockpiles. OEF
requirements have depleted preferred precision munitions stockpiles.
The President's budget for fiscal year 2002 together with supplemental
requests provided over $1 billion to increase the industrial capacity
to produce precision weapons and to procure additional weapons. The
fiscal year 2003 program/budget review also added funding to ensure
that this increased production would be sustained. It is unlikely that
we will be forced to source assets from other theaters, which would
increase the risk to potential operations elsewhere. The Air Force is
working to increase precision-guided munitions (PGM) capabilities over
the next several years.
Precision strike, however, is more than simply very accurate
munitions. It is also the ability to generate precise effects other
than destruction. The Air Force is investing in various non-lethal
weapons, offensive information warfare capabilities, and directed
energy weapons to enable our military to affect targets without having
to destroy them.

RAPID GLOBAL MOBILITY

Airlift and tanker aircraft give the United States the ability to
swiftly reach out and influence events around the world. OEF and ONE
have again shown the utility of rapid global mobility. We witnessed the
potential need to provide critical tactical lift capability for
immediate response at home. Air Mobility Command is undergoing
comprehensive review of the air mobility force structure as part of an
on-going effort to assess airlift requirements.
The procurement of additional C-17s will ensure the Air Force's
ability to support its 54.5 million-ton miles per day airlift
requirement. The Air Force needs at least 180 C-17s and will award a
follow-on multiyear procurement contract to reach that number. Beddown
plans will be conducted by Active, Reserve, and Guard forces.
The average age of our KC-135 tankers is now over 41 years and
operations and support costs are escalating due to a variety of
factors. Pacer CRAG (compass, radar, and global positioning system) is
a major overhaul project underway for all Air Force KC-135s, meeting
the congressionally mandated requirement to install GPS in all Defense
Department aircraft. The ongoing war on terrorism is further stretching
the tanker fleet, motivating consideration of accelerating replacement
options. The Air Force is focused on acquiring the world's newest and
most capable tanker while increasing availability, fuel load, and
reliability all with far lower cost.
Modernization of the C-5 and C-130 fleets is a top priority.
Avionics modernization, re-engining programs, and multiyear testing
will bring the fleet up to an improved standard while determining the
need for additional C-17s or alternatives. New C-130Js will replace EC-
130Es, the most worn-out C-130E combat delivery aircraft, Commando Solo
platforms, and several WC-130H aircraft throughout the Active Duty,
Guard, and Reserve units.
Additional upgrades and improvements to counter-measure defenses,
CV-22, and VIP Special Air Mission/Operational Support Airlift are also
planned.

AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT

Much of the deployment strain in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom has fallen on our expeditionary combat support forces. Some
high-demand support areas have exceeded their on-call capabilities in
current AEF rotation cycles as a result of our surge mode activities,
which are likely to continue for some time. Some Expeditionary Combat
Support career fields, particularly Security Forces, Combat
Communications, and Fire Fighters, are highly stressed. Consequently,
we are continuing to make gains in right-sizing deployment teams so
that they are postured efficiently and effectively for expeditionary
needs.
The fielding of the Integrated Deployment System at all wings has
improved the readiness of the wing deployment process. The CSAF's
Logistics Review (CLR) and ongoing logistics transformation are
reengineering our logistics processes to achieve an agile, effective,
and well-integrated logistics chain responsive to AEF requirements.
Other initiatives within the nuclear-biological-chemical and medical
units are producing meaningful results.

PEOPLE

People are the most critical component of readiness and our most
vital resource. As they perform Air Force missions around the world,
the demands we place on them require highly motivated, highly skilled,
professional airmen. Continued positive momentum in areas of
compensation, benefits, recruiting and retention ensure the investment
in our people.
The Air Force has enhanced responsive force packaging and provided
a more stable and predictable deployment and home station scheduling
environment through implementation of the Expeditionary Air and Space
Force (EAF). Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve participation has
steadily increased since Desert Storm, which has created challenges for
Guardsmen and Reservists balancing civilian careers with increased
military requirements. Trends show demand for air power will only
increase; EAF holds promise by giving airmen predictability and
stability.
The increased operations tempo resulting from OEF and ONE are also
reducing necessary training opportunities for the force and are raising
long-term readiness challenges. Many of our low density/high demand
assets have limited flying training capacity. For example, operational
demands have diminished RC-135 Rivet Joint, CSAR, and E-3 AWACS
airframe, simulator, and instructor availability. The increased number
of fighters and mobility assets now on alert and unavailable for
continuation/readiness training could have a serious impact on long-
term readiness.
Retention will continue to be a priority and a challenge. Stop loss
and the increased tempo of ONE and OEF may have a negative effect on
retention--offsets are already being explored. Aggressive campaigns are
being worked to ``re-recruit'' the force, addressing especially Battle
Managers and other critical skills. While cockpits are now fully
manned, rated pilot staff manning has fallen to 51 percent. The USAF
pilot shortage is expected to continue for at least the next eight
years until the effects of the 10-year Active Duty service commitment
for undergraduate flying training are fully realized. ``Re-recruiting''
efforts should also help alleviate the shortage sooner.
The Air Force Reserve exceeded command retention goals for their
enlisted airmen during fiscal year 2001. Seventy-eight percent of the
enlisted skills are now receiving re-enlistment bonuses. The
authorization to pay officer and enlisted critical skills retention
bonuses should help retain individuals in high demand by the civilian
sector. The Air National Guard's number one priority is to increase the
traditional pilot force, which has held steady at 90 percent. Through
various incentive pay programs, the Guard and Reserve continue to
pursue substantial enhancements to increase retention in the aviation
community as well as attracting and retaining individuals to aviation.
Today, less than 10 percent of Air Force civilians are in their
first 5 years of service. In the next 5 years, more than 40 percent
will be eligible for optional or early retirement. In addition,
downsizing over the past decade skewed the mix of civilian workforce
skills, compounding the loss of corporate memory and lack of breadth
and depth of experience. It's critical to maintain the right mix of
civilian skills to meet tomorrow's challenges. Several initiatives are
underway to do just that.

SUMMARY

Air Force capabilities provide America with a unique set of
strengths--asymmetric advantages. However, today's technological
advantage is no guarantee of future success. Maintaining the current
leadership position requires addressing aging infrastructure,
modernizing outdated weapon systems and harnessing technology to
achieve our vision.
In closing, today more than 725,000 highly skilled, professional,
Air Force men and women are proudly supporting freedom's cause. We
appreciate all this committee has done in helping to address these
critical issues and look forward to working with you in the future.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement.
General Wald, your fiscal year 2003 unfunded priority list
includes $163 million for critical maintenance repairs for the
B-1B, the B-2, and the F-15. Your justification states that if
funding is not provided some aircraft will be grounded and
suggests that there may be serious safety concerns as well.
What higher priority does the Air Force have than ensuring the
safety of its pilots and maintaining the ability of its
aircraft to fly? Why was this funding not included in the
budget? If additional funding is not provided, what will the
Air Force do about these problems?
General Wald. As you stated, there is no higher priority
than the safety of our people in combat. But in the incidents
that you stated, the B-1, the B-2, and the F-15, all three of
those problem areas have arisen since September 11. The B-1 has
been flying in heavy combat since October 7. There has been a
structural problem material-wise with the pivot bolt in the
wing that has been identified since last year's budget.
On the B-2 in October, an area of cracking has once again
been identified behind the engine exhaust as something that
needs to be replaced. We are working on a fix for that as we
speak.
On the F-15 flight control problem, the stabilator
delamination once again has exacerbated itself in recent months
and, due to the OPTEMPO of that aircraft for homeland defense,
it is critical for us to maintain the mission-capable rate on
that particular aircraft as well.
So we will put money into those three systems based on our
operational tempo and the need for those three systems in the
near-term. But ironically, most of those problems have been
identified just recently.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General McKiernan, you mentioned the Army's new Strategic
Readiness System (SRS), which is intended the improve the
Army's ability to proactively address readiness concerns. Can
you provide additional details about the system and how
specifically it will achieve those ends?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir. We are very excited about
Strategic Readiness System, because it addresses a challenge
that the Army has had in assessing readiness of our units. We
have historically looked backwards at previous time frames to
assess readiness and only for that specific unit. With SRS,
which will be a network system, commanders at all levels will
be able to go into existing databases to look at readiness
metrics, not only in that unit, but in effect take it from the
foxhole back to industrial base or recruiting base.
It allows commanders to look much more holistically at
current readiness and predictive readiness of those units.
Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, your testimony discusses
the shift in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review away
from the requirement to fight and win two nearly simultaneous
major theater wars to the new requirement to conduct small
scale contingency and high intensity operations simultaneously.
I would like each of you to describe what impact this shift has
had, if any, on your service's requirements, and in particular,
on what you tell your forces to be ready for and how you assess
readiness against the new strategy.
General McKiernan.
General McKiernan. Yes, sir. In the strategic guidance
provided to us by OSD, it does go away from the old paradigm of
two near-simultaneous major theaters of war to a much more
flexible strategy that talks in terms of swiftly defeating an
enemy, as well as several smaller-scale contingencies.
First of all, what that means to the Army as we look at
the adequacy of our structure is that, we, like everybody, have
to go to a capabilities-based approach, so that forces are
globally capable of responding to the strategy; and second, as
we look at the adequacy of our structure, in some cases we find
we have to either move some capabilities in terms of structure
elsewhere. It certainly does not decrease our need for forces.
Senator Akaka. Admiral Krol.
Admiral Krol. Yes, sir. In general, the major forces that
we have are capable of supporting the new strategy. The biggest
difference that the Navy has is that we are a rotational force,
and as long as we maintain our 12 carrier battle groups with
the associated support ships and the 12 amphibious ready
groups, our rotational force can support the new strategy.
Senator Akaka. General Bedard.
General Bedard. Sir, from a standpoint of the Marine Corps,
we believe that our forces have to be capable of fighting
across the spectrum of conflict. So from a standpoint of change
to the new strategy and how that affects our forces, we do not
believe it does.
The other comment that I would like to make goes back to
the earlier testimony on readiness: the forces that the Marine
Corps employed in Afghanistan left the United States before
September 11, and were certified and trained to carry out 23
different missions. They were trained and certified to do these
missions in any place that we might commit them to around the
world.
We feel our expeditionary forces have to be capable of
worldwide deployment and that is the way we train.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
General Wald.
General Wald. I agree with General Bedard. The Air Force
maintains a high state of readiness for all of our forces,
whether they are Active Duty, Guard, or Reserve. I think the
new strategy and what we have witnessed since September 11 has
proven out the fact that our forces will be called upon,
sometimes unannounced, rapidly around the world.
As we go through this high OPTEMPO based on the September
11 change in the world situation, the issue we will have to
watch closely will be how do we continue to train our forces
for the various missions we will do around the world, not just
the ones they are committed to now? I think we can fulfil the
strategy with our readiness levels that we demand for our
forces. We will have to look closely at how we continue to
train those forces under the current OPTEMPO.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are so many
things to talk about, and I know we are not going to be able to
get to all of them, but I do not want to overlook this one.
While we are all talking about the war that is going on that is
so visible to the public, there is another war that has been
going on for 3 years. I refer to that as the battle of Vieques.
Admiral Krol and General Bedard, you are very familiar with
this. First of all, I have spent a lot of time recently going
to the U.S.S. JFK and the battle group that was deployed from
the east coast. I was interested in the type of revised
training they had since they were not able to do live-fire.
They were able to initially do some training on Vieques, but
not the integrated training that they wanted to.
I talked to Commander Rothingham and Colonel LeFebure on
the U.S.S. Wasp. In fact, they were kind enough to meet with us
late at night and to go over some of the problems that they
might have in training. I asked the question, if live-fire is a
10 in terms of quality of training, what is inert? The response
was fairly consistent that it is a five.
We have a commitment to do the very best job of training
our troops when they deploy. General Bedard, most of your time
has been on the west coast, except, of course, when you were at
Camp LeJeune when I was down there. But in terms of this
training, I would like to have you tell us in each of your
perspectives what you think about the quality of training that
we have now as opposed to what we would have if we had the
live-fire training that we should be having on that range that
we own. Admiral Krol.
Admiral Krol. Yes, sir. First, I agree with you completely
about live-fire training, and I agree with what you were told
from the ARG-MEU perspective, that live-fire training is,
without a doubt, a 10 on a scale of 10. We have been prohibited
from doing live-fire since we had the tragic accident in 1999.
We continue with that prohibition on live-fire.
In the recent months, discussion of live-fire has again
come up. Of course, the CNO and the Commandant have been
committed to returning to live-fire training. The real issue
that we have been wrestling with post-September 11 is the
accelerated deployment of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy and the
upcoming U.S.S. George Washington battle groups. These have
really curtailed our ability to fully utilize Vieques because
of the steaming time and the need to get those battle groups
and their associated ARG-MEU on their way.
The other aspect that makes things difficult is the
bureaucratic requirements, if you will, that it would take to
reinstitute live-fire training.
Senator Inhofe. Admiral, I did not want to get into that,
because I am fully aware of all of that. I am just talking
about the quality of training. That is the question.
Admiral Krol. There is no question that for the air wing
and naval surface gunfire support, and I will let General
Bedard answer for the Marines, that the live-fire training is a
10 out of 10.
Senator Inhofe. Unified?
Admiral Krol. Unified, yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. That is what your air guys tell me. I was
on the carriers and they said, ``We can have the best-trained
men and women in all these different areas, but if they do not
scrimmage together it is not going to be the team that we need
to be able to deploy.''
Admiral Krol. Integrated Joint Taskforce Exercises (JTFX)
training in Vieques is the best training we can offer.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
General Bedard. Senator, as we discussed, I ran our live-
fire maneuver training site at Twentynine Palms, California. I
will just unequivocally say that nothing replaces live-fire.
Our ability as a combined arms team to be able to train and
integrate all of the fires that are capable of being produced
by our naval expeditionary forces and to be able to integrate
them with maneuver is something that is tied inextricably to
the readiness of the force. It is something that needs to be
done before our forces deploy anywhere from the continental
United States, because we cannot assume they are going to have
an opportunity to train somewhere else. They could be committed
from the day they leave here.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that, because I have gone to
other places, such as Cappo del Lata in southern Sardinia and
Cape Rath in northern Scotland. They are watching what is going
on. I want to bring the Air Force and the Army in on this,
because encroachment is a huge problem right now. We have
talked about this, and certainly you are all aware of that.
If we allow a bunch of law-breaking terrorists to close
down a range that we own, that is going to have a domino effect
on all ranges, domestic and foreign. I would ask both of you
for your thoughts about your current situation with ranges and
the deterioration from encroachment of all kinds and how you
see this in the future.
General McKiernan. I will begin by echoing everything that
has been said about live-fire training. There is probably not a
skill in my mind that is more important than a soldier being
able to expertly fire his weapon individually and up through
all the collective levels.
In the Army, we feel that we have been good stewards of the
environment. We are concerned about encroachment.
Senator Inhofe. See, and that is the problem. You have been
too good stewards. In Camp LeJeune, you do such a good job
protecting the red cockaded woodpecker that there are more and
we have more areas that are off limits now. Is that not
correct?
General McKiernan. Yes, sir, that is true.
Senator Inhofe. Maybe you should not do such a good job.
General McKiernan. Sir, in my most recent experience as a
division commander at Fort Hood, Texas, we have a bird down
there, the Vireo, not a particularly attractive bird, but it
takes up about 33 percent of the maneuver and live-fire space
at Fort Hood. This space cannot be used. We are not in favor of
that, and we will really follow the OSD lead in working with
Congress on encroachment issues. We are fully supportive of
some of the initiatives that are being worked.
General Wald. I agree with my colleagues. We have 41 ranges
that we use in the United States Air Force today, and we are
working closely with government agencies to ensure that those
ranges remain open. They will be even more critical in the
future in areas that we had not really thought of before.
The frequency spectrum area becomes critical as well in the
future because of high technology weapons. Some of the
unintended consequences of a shrinking frequency spectrum
become issues for the Air Force as well. But I could not agree
more that without our people trained up in live-fire before
they go to combat we are going to be not ready to go.
As we start going back to September 11, we are expected to
be ready within hours. The United States Air Force has most of
its force ready to deploy within 72 hours of a crisis. The
maintenance of a high state of readiness on a day to day basis
is critical to us and those ranges are critical to us.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Since we are going to be going into a closed session, let
me just ask a question of each of you to be answered for the
record at a later time. But it is very critical right now that
each of you address this in one way or another. With the
exception of you, General Bedard, the new budget does not
really enhance the force structure. I was concerned just after
the Balkans that the OPTEMPO of the Guard and Reserve meant we
might be losing critical military occupational specialties
(MOSs). Now, of course, they are great people and they are
willing to serve, but there is going to become a time when the
employers and these people are not going to be able to handle
the OPTEMPO that the Reserve component is handling right now.
There was a statement in the from an unidentified senior
Air Force official who said that the Air Force needs an
additional 30,000 people. It was broken down between 22,000
Active, 6,000 Guard, and 2,000 Reservists to meet the future
requirements. I would like to have each of you respond for the
record. In the Air Force's case, you might just see whether or
not you agree with those figures, because this is something we
are going to have to be dealing with.
I know we are doing the best we can, but the budget is
inadequate in two major areas: endstrength and MILCON. If you
could address that for the record for me, I would appreciate it
very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]

General McKiernan. The current operational environment places
additional demands on the Army that were previously unrealized. Post-
September 11 events have only increased demands placed on the force and
the Army will likely require an endstrength increase to fully meet
these demands.
The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process will determine the size and
composition of the Army within a constrained budget. The current
effort, TAA 09, is not complete, but will account for the additional
emerging requirements in the area of homeland security and the GWOT.
To address the immediate need, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2002 permits the Department of Defense to allow the
services to exceed their endstrength by 2 percent in any fiscal year in
which there is a war or national emergency. Taking full allowance of
this provision would allow the Army to increase its Active component
endstrength to 489,600.
The Army can realistically increase recruiting by an additional
4,000 soldiers per year in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and address the
most immediate needs of the GWOT and homeland security, provide relief
for Reserve component soldiers, and allow more time to analyze enduring
requirements.
The global war on terrorism has validated many of our past
investments, which are now paying dividends in terms of a trained and
ready force. But it has also identified some shortfalls where
additional resources will be needed to sustain a long-term effort and
guarantee the safety and security of future generations. From that
perspective, the Army's immediate military construction (MILCON)
requirements to support current and future operations total about $735
million. These projects span a range of areas from force protection to
enhanced training facilities.
We continue to review and validate force protection MILCON
requirements, but the current list of qualifying projects totals about
$110 million. Those projects are comprised of perimeter security,
access control points, and facilities upgrades to meet specific force
protection standards for blast mitigation and standoff distance. The
projects reside in all three MILCON appropriations, with about $45.4
million in military construction, Army (MCA), $51.6 million in military
construction, Army Reserve (MCAR), and $13 million military
construction, National Guard (MCNG).
Current force protection requirements also include about $113
million worth of unfunded projects that the Army had intended to fund
with the fiscal year 2002 Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). These
projects are predominantly cantonment area perimeter fencing which
complement the upgrade and construction of new access control point
facilities.
The global war on terrorism has also intensified the importance of
other projects that are necessary to insure the readiness of
operational forces and permit rapid and efficient projection of those
forces into the fight. Range operations and training enablers such as
urban assault courses, close quarters combat facilities, and infantry
squad battle courses are extremely important to the readiness of our
forces. Current requirements for these training enablers total about
$114 million.
Projects necessary for force projection, such as deployment
facilities, currently total about $88 million. In addition, other
specific projects that are needed are projects to comply with
environmental mitigation requirements at Kwajalein Atoll. These
projects total about $14 million.
Finally, in order to be able to react swiftly and decisively in all
future operations, several projects totaling about $276.4 million are
required to support Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) fielding. These
requirements continue to be revised in light of emerging operations and
training issues and the refinement of the various scopes of work, but
are accurate as of the date of this hearing.
Admiral Krol. The Navy is deeply committed to providing adequate
funding to (1) sustain our facilities in a current state of acceptable
readiness and (2) replace and modernize those facilities, which have
outlived their useful life and function. This year's budget request
focuses on providing funding for sustaining facilities in a C1/C2
condition readiness. Although the fiscal year 2003 MILCON budget
request is lower than last year's budget, it is the second largest
MILCON budget request in 6 years. The Navy is developing its future
year's MILCON program such that the Navy can achieve the DOD goal of a
67-year recapitalization rate by fiscal year 2007.

Senator Akaka. Thank you. I thank you very much for rapidly
moving on this. Let me ask this question and then we will move
into the next part of our discussions.
I have appreciated the concerns you have expressed about
encroachment. As you have noted, a number of factors contribute
to the problem, including noise, air space, frequency,
environmental, cultural artifacts, birds, and other
constraints. What steps are your services and the Department
taking to identify a comprehensive solution to the issue of
encroachment that attempts to address all of these concerns?
How will all of these elements be reflected in the
legislative proposal that you will be submitting later this
year?
General McKiernan.
General McKiernan. Sir, first of all, we are working with
OSD, who has the particular group that is approaching the
issues of encroachment. We support all the initiatives that
they will bring forward to Congress to ease some of those
restrictions on our training, not only our live-fire training,
but also our maneuver training. I am sure that it will come
shortly.
In the meantime, in my opinion, we have to maintain our
effective stewardship of our resources or we will run the risk
of not being able to train in several of these locations at
all. But this is really a team effort with all the services and
OSD.
Senator Akaka. Admiral.
Admiral Krol. Mr. Chairman, the General Counsel of the Navy
is spearheading an effort to identify areas of concern and
encroachment and put together a legislative package in
conjunction with OSD. That is the long-term effort. The short-
term effort is that the Navy has a large number of people that
are working on a daily basis with organizations like the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
National Marine Fisheries Service, and others. It is a constant
give and take, and we are trying to show those organizations
our good stewardship and interests in this area.
But I think it is going to take legislative relief to
establish some boundaries.
Senator Akaka. General Bedard.
General Bedard. Sir, we have a task group together at this
time that is doing a number of things. First and foremost, we
are trying to come up with a very valid assessment of what
encroachment is doing to our training across the Marine Corps
at our various installations. Of course, we are working with
OSD to bring our facts to the table.
Also, we have developed an outreach program at each of our
facilities and installations showing what we are doing to, in
fact, enforce those regulations that are placed upon us and are
trying to be as forthcoming as we can as to the impact of these
regulations on our forces.
Senator Akaka. General Wald.
General Wald. We, too, are working with local communities
to ensure that they understand the mission and our effect on
the environment. Along with OSD, we have a task force to work
on ensuring that the range encroachment issue does not affect
our training.
We have been working with the Department of the Interior,
as well as the Federal Communications Commission, to ensure
that spectrum encroachment, which is more subtle, is well
understood. We appreciate the subcommittee's support as we go
forward with legislation through our General Counsel this year
to ensure that spectrum is not encroached upon in our training.
Senator Akaka. Thank you all for your testimony. Your
insights today have helped to give us a better understanding of
the challenges we face in ensuring the readiness of our
military forces now and in the future.
While the world focuses on Afghanistan, we have a
responsibility to take both a broader and deeper view, broader
in the sense that we must be mindful of the full range of our
current commitments and deeper in the sense that we must
balance what we do now against what we want to be able to do
over the long-term.
The tragedy on September 11 shifted our national priorities
and added missions to responsibilities which were already
demanding for our service men and women. The situation forces
difficult choices, and we all must grapple with the tradeoffs
and make responsible decisions to ensure that our forces have
what they need to do what their country asks them to do today,
tomorrow, and beyond. We appreciate your sharing your expertise
with us.
We are now going to move into closed session, which will
begin in SR-222 in about 3 or 4 minutes.
Thank you very much.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

PLAN TO TRANSFORM TRAINING

1. Senator Akaka. Dr. Mayberry, your written statement says that
the DOD has ``recently completed a strategic plan for transforming our
training that will serve to guide the Department in ensuring our forces
remain the best trained and most capable in the world.'' I am
interested in what this strategy entails, how it might differ from
current training methods, and whether any additional resources are
required to support this strategy. What is the new strategy, what is
required to make it work, what training problems is it intended to
address, and how will it improve our training?
Dr. Mayberry. What is the new strategy? The Training Transformation
(T2) Strategic Plan identifies the high-level goals and broad steps
needed to transform DOD training to meet the needs of the 21st century
military. The Department's vision for T2 is to provide dynamic,
capabilities-based training for the Department of Defense in support of
national security requirements across the full spectrum of service,
joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
The strategic goals are to:

Provide comprehensive and systematic ``joint''
training focused on the operational requirements of the
combatant commanders (CINCs) and linked to readiness
assessment.
Develop a robust, networked, live, virtual, and
constructive training and mission rehearsal environment that
enables the Department of Defense to build unparalleled
military capabilities that are knowledge-superior, adaptable,
and lethal, and predicated upon service, interoperability, and
CINC training requirements.
Revise acquisition and other supporting processes to
identify interfaces between training systems and acquisition,
logistics, personnel, military education, and command and
control processes, and ensure that these processes and systems
are integrated.

The training concepts outlined in the Training Transformation
Strategic Plan are significantly different from those used to conduct
training today. The approach emphasizes the mission requirements of the
combatant commanders--the CINC is the customer. The intent is to be
more output-focused in terms of the training needed to support the
CINCs' requirements, missions, and capabilities, while preserving the
ability of services to train on their core competencies. The focus of
training transformation is to better enable joint operations in the
future, where ``joint'' has a broader context than the traditional
military definition of the term.
What is required to make it work? Significant change often requires
top down leadership and incentives to reward innovation and proactive
realignment of resources. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
and Readiness [USD(P&R)] will organize and chair a T2 Implementation
forum that will: (1) identify and track the progress of the specific
tasks, responsibilities, resources, and timelines needed to carry out
the near-, mid-, and long-term actions listed in the T2 Strategic Plan;
and (2) establish a T2 Investment Strategy and oversee an Incentive
Fund that encourages joint innovation, initiative, and substantive
change. Specific costs of implementing T2 will be defined in greater
depth in the next 12 months and incorporated into the defense budget.
What training problems will it address? Joint training must be able
to support a broad range of roles and responsibilities in military,
multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental contexts, and the
Department of Defense must provide such training to be truly flexible
and operationally effective. Training readiness will be assessed and
reported, not only in the traditional joint context, but also in view
of this broader range of ``joint'' operations. Today, the Department
does not formally plan, assess, and report joint and interoperability
(service-to-service) training on a broad scale. Joint training and
education will be recast as components of lifelong learning and made
available to the Total Force--Active, Reserve, and DOD civilian. The
Department will expand efforts to develop officers well versed in joint
operational art. The interfaces between training systems and the
acquisition process will be strengthened, so that training is not
considered an afterthought or a bill payer. A forcing function will be
established to cause explicit consideration of training throughout the
acquisition cycle.
How will it improve our training? The Strategic Plan establishes
the Department's vision, strategic goals, and major steps needed to
launch and implement the overarching training transformation. The
lessons from combat teach us that if we are to be joint in wartime, we
must be joint in our preparation for war. To do so effectively, we must
transform the way we educate and train the men and women of the Armed
Forces to ensure they have the knowledge and skills needed for 21st
century military operations. Transforming training will require a
higher-level focus--one that is driven by the CINC's operational needs.
It will also require a different type of education and training
environment--one that is highly adaptable, globally distributed, and
synchronized with C\4\ISR [Command, Control, Communications, and
Computers (C\4\), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR)]. The goal of transforming training won't happen over night, but
we can do some things in the near-term that will amount to a quantum
leap in warfighting capability. Additional benefits of investing in
training transformation will also be far reaching, since training
provides the foundation for attaining the Department's broader
transformation objectives.

CAPABILITIES-BASED READINESS REPORTING

2. Senator Akaka. Dr. Mayberry, on page 5 of your statement you
recommend a ``capabilities-based'' readiness reporting system. How,
specifically, will this differ from the current system? For example,
would units report their capabilities to perform both their most
stressful wartime missions for major theater wars as well as their
ability to do peacekeeping and other missions? How would that differ
from the current readiness reporting system where the training element
is measured against specific wartime tasks? Please give specific
examples of how capabilities would be both identified and then
measured.
Dr. Mayberry. The new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is
based on all DOD components reporting their readiness to meet mission
essential tasks (METs) or like indicators. This construct requires all
units to report readiness for their assigned missions, from the
combatant commander down to the supporting Defense components. Once
implemented, this approach will allow the Department to review specific
force readiness to execute a given mission. These missions range from
high intensity warfighting to peacekeeping operations. For example, a
unit may be training on 6-to-12 mission essential tasks to support its
assigned missions. Under DRRS, units are required to report their
training readiness for each of these essential tasks. A unit could
report they are not trained in METs supporting a high intensity war
fight, but are fully trained in those essential tasks required for
peacekeeping. That information will be visible to the combatant
commander, who may be depending on that specific unit to execute
elements of his war plan. The combatant commander could then adjust his
war plans or call for a substitute unit that is fully trained and
ready. As such, the DRRS can use this information to identify specific
risks in executing assigned missions. This differs from the current
system in a number of ways. Perhaps most significantly, the new DRRS
covers all DOD components, meaning that readiness to meet mission
assignments is reported not only by the Military Departments, but also
by the combatant commanders and the defense agencies. Furthermore, DRRS
enables a clean trace of METs to missions, and a near real time
capability for readiness assessment. For the DRRS, ``capabilities'' are
defined by collections of units and METs.

READINESS INITIATIVES

3. Senator Akaka Dr. Mayberry, your testimony notes the creation of
a new working group to help clarify the relationship between funding
and unit readiness. You state that it just finished its first quarterly
review of OPTEMPO funding. What were the results of that review?
Dr. Mayberry. The results of the first quarter review of OPTEMPO
execution did not show any major OPTEMPO execution or unit training
issues.

4. Senator Akaka. Dr. Mayberry, what milestones have been set for
future actions by the new working group?
Dr. Mayberry. We are in the process of redefining the group
memebership to include more senior representation (General Officer/
SES). With the new membership, we expect to facilitate the task of
standardizing the OPTEMPO program and vetting potential new training
metrics.

READINESS EVALUATIONS

5. Senator Akaka. General Newbold, you testified that you are
providing your views on the readiness of our Armed Forces to meet the
national military strategy. Yet the current strategy was issued in
1997--although it is, as you noted, under revision. Are you, in fact,
evaluating readiness against a 1997 military strategy, or against some
other yardstick, or both?
General Newbold We began last fall to adjust our readiness
assessment processes to the Secretary of Defense's direction on
national military strategy as it was unfolding, even though we did not
have an approved new strategy. The most current readiness assessment
cycle assessed the readiness of our Armed Forces to meet the strategy
outlined in the Secretary of Defense's final draft Contingency Planning
Guidance and the Chairman's draft Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. As
the strategy is further refined, I fully expect that our readiness
assessment process will make appropriate adjustments.

SPARE PARTS SHORTAGES

6. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, please provide the latest information you have about
shortages in critical spare parts, including engines and engine
components, batteries, etc., as well as your assessment of how the
funding in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental (if approved as requested)
and the fiscal year 2003 budget request will address any shortfalls.
General McKiernan. Critical spare parts shortages continue to
threaten the readiness of soldiers and equipment. Spare and repair
parts issues are beginning to show up in the Unit Status Reports. Of
greater concern is the long lead-time associated with repairing and
acquiring new spare parts. We began this year with a $1.3 billion spare
parts shortfall, which we are working with Department of Defense (DOD)
to fund. We have obtained a $300 million Obligation Authority since
then and expect an additional $200 million in April 2002. However, we
currently have a $215 million unfunded requirement (UFR) for the top
100 aviation spares and $100 million UFR for the top 54 non-aviation
spares. In addition, we have a $450 million UFR for other readiness
requirements, $300 million for critical long lead-time parts for the
fiscal year 2003, and $200 million for future readiness requirements.
The $300 million provided to date has financed the fiscal year 2003
recapitalization efforts, and the additional $200 million will be spent
on aviation parts. We have a resourcing plan for the remaining $800
million, which will cover the UFR for the non-aviation critical spares
and other readiness spares, to include funding to increase and
accelerate production for a critical battery shortage.
We do not use the term ``readiness'' lightly. A recent Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) study commissioned by the Army indicates a
decline in readiness of our aviation fleet and significant increases in
non-mission capable rates. Demand is growing beyond the anticipated
rate of sales. There has been a $350 million growth in backorders from
1997 to present. At the same time, Army Working Capitol Fund buying
power is eroding. We are working internally and with Office of the
Secretary of Defense to resolve our shortfall in a number of different
ways in fiscal year 2002. Whatever part of our fiscal year 2002
readiness spares requirement is left unsatisfied will carry over to
fiscal year 2003. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has
plussed up the fiscal year 2003 budget by $100 million through a
Program Budget Decision; however, it does not go far enough to address
the significant spares funding shortfall or build essential inventory.
General Bedard. For fixed wing assets, radar and targeting systems
have provided the greatest challenge for sustainment of spare parts.
For our rotary wing assets, transmissions, rotor heads, and hub
assemblies have been the most challenging to sustain. All of these
components are critical readiness degraders. Their availability
requires a combination of a consistent funding stream along with a
responsive system to meet fleet demands.
With regard to aircraft engines, parts shortages continue to affect
various engine programs. In addition, an insufficient inventory of
engines has affected some of our communities, in particular our F/A-
18As, F/A-18Ds, EA-6Bs, AV-8Bs, and CH-46Es. We are focusing on
improving our methods of forecasting demands to ensure timely receipt
of spare parts. Continued investments in engineering, logistics, and
spare components/modules in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003, with
out-year continuances, should yield significant paybacks in improved
engine availability in fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2008, with
reduction in required repair dollars in fiscal year 2008 beyond.
Marine Aviation funds the replenishment of spare parts from Flight
Hour Program (FHP) account. In both fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year
2003, the FHP was funded to the stated CNO goal of 89 percent. Our APN-
6 account, which provides funding for new allowances and increases in
spare parts, is funded at 98.5 percent in the fiscal year 2003
President's budget. We expect this level of APN-6 funding to provide
more robust support for our deployable units. CONUS units have suffered
from recent spare shortfalls, as we direct spare allowances to forward
deployed units.
The combination of additional fiscal year 2002 funding and
requested fiscal year 2003 President's budget funding will enable
Marine Aviation to improve the spare deficiencies and lead to improved
readiness rates.
Regarding our inventory of ground equipment, the Marine Corps does
not currently have a shortfall with regard to funding of depot level
repairables at the wholesale inventory level. Additionally, the retail
inventory level should not experience significant shortfalls based on
their current inventory level and financial resources due to the
recently completed Integrated Logistics Capability Centralized
Management of Secondary Repairables initiative, which established
required retail stock levels. The Marine Corps has experienced
difficulty in obtaining certain repairables, primarily in the
communications and electronics commodity, due to diminishing
manufacturing and/or repair sources. Additional funding may be required
to alleviate shortages in critical repair parts until new replacements
are in stock and fully integrated into the supply pipeline. If
additional funding is needed, it will be identified through our
resource requirement processes.
General Wald. Improved spares funding is making a positive
operational impact in the Air Force. The Air Force requested an
additional $222 million in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental to
reimburse the Air Reserve Forces for incremental flying hours flown to
support the war on terrorism. Flying hour spares requirements received
substantial funding for fiscal year 2003, to include $450 million to
address both consumables and depot level repairable spares issues
associated with supporting aging aircraft. In addition, the fiscal year
2003 budget includes additional dollars for 11 spare engines for the C-
17, and 4 spare fighter engines, 2 each for the F-15 and F-16. This
funding will allow the Air Force to see continued improvements in
readiness indicators.
Admiral Krol. The most pressing need for Navy spares falls into two
categories: spares to support equipment installed on Navy ships and
spares to support Navy aircraft. Projected spares requirements
following September 11 were approximately $435 million. $150 million
was received in DERF funds, leaving a balance of $285 million which
remains unfunded. Requirements reflected in the $34 million
supplemental request are considered ``must funds.'' These must funds,
if received, will be used primarily for incremental requirements driven
by the war on terrorism. Whatever remains as an unfunded after the
supplemental is received, the Navy will need to assess the criticality
of each requirement against other competing requirements and may need
to reprogram funds accordingly.
Spares are placed aboard ship to support installed equipment. This
is done so that repairs may be initiated and completed immediately.
Without these spares, requisitions must be sent off-ship. Every time a
requisition is sent off-ship and/or off site, the warfighter
experiences some degree of customer wait time. This waiting means that
the weapon system in question is either down or degraded to some
extent. Simply put, readiness is degraded when waiting for a part.
Supporting the range and depth of shipboard allowances improves
readiness, surge capability, and sustainability.
Supplemental funding would also be used to purchase aviation spare
parts. This includes spares for such aircraft as the E-2C Hawkeye and
F/A-18 Hornet. Both aircraft are flying longer hours and experiencing
higher demand for spares. Ensuring we provide the warfighter sufficient
spares to sustain deployed forces, as well as non-deployed, is
paramount to Navy's readiness and surge capabilities.
Without sufficient funding, readiness degradation will first occur
among non-deployed forces since protecting our deployed units is our
first priority. Consequently, protecting deployed readiness when
insufficient funds are available has historically resulted in fewer
parts to support the inter-deployment training cycle for future
scheduled deployments.

COMPREHENSIVE LESSONS LEARNED

7. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, our military operations in the post-Cold War world
have proven to be diverse and challenging in many ways. What lessons
have you begun to derive from our ongoing operations in the global war
against terrorism, and perhaps more importantly, how do these relate to
the lessons that we have learned from other major operations in the
last 10 years?
General McKiernan. Our review of the war on terrorism--and the
diverse set of real challenges faced over the past decade--underscores
our analysis that complex and compelling threats to our national
security remain on the strategic horizon. These threats take a variety
of forms and possess a diverse array of dangerous capabilities. Threats
range from irresponsible state actors armed with potent conventional
forces and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to more amorphous but no
less threatening non-state entities pursuing their objectives outside
the boundaries that long govern state behavior. The most recent
undertaking indicates that the Nation will likely confront a multitude
of stacked challenges occurring in rapid succession in discrete, often
isolated, theaters. Each successive event will compound the complexity
of the strategic choices facing civilian and military decision makers.
Our lessons from operating in this environment over the past decade
brings five valuable strategic lessons to the forefront: (1) The world
looks to the United States for leadership in a crisis even to the point
of hazarding inaction without our participation; (2) Only the U.S.
possesses the requisite capabilities to undertake sustained, large-
scale military operations worldwide to affect decisive resolutions; (3)
U.S. interests will increasingly be threatened by complex state and
non-state challenges leveraging asymmetry, ungoverned sanctuary and
finally, unconventional methods, capabilities, and command structures;
(4) Securing interests, influence, continued prosperity, and the safety
of the American population requires dominant, robust, and responsive
full-spectrum forces; and (5) The U.S. gains significant advantages by
working closely with allies and friends to build strong relationships
and common approaches to complex problems.
Our recent past and current circumstances confirm the conclusions
arrived at in the most recent joint vision. Today, ``fighting and
winning the Nation's wars'' implies far more than a large-scale joint
combat operations against capable conventional military opponents.
While this remains the most compelling and challenging joint
requirement, it only represents a single point on a broader spectrum of
conflict. In an increasingly complex security environment, populated by
a diverse range of opponents, ``fighting and winning'' more accurately
implies dominating the full-spectrum of threats and challenges-from
peace to war. Full-Spectrum Dominance seeks to prevail decisively over
every possible opponent, mastering every step an adversary might
attempt in escalation. Doing so requires the capability to operate
under a variety of challenging conditions and in a number of complex
competitive arenas. A full-spectrum dominant force must be as capable
of replacing an irresponsible and aggressive regime, as it is
comprehensively destroying a complex non-state entity or assisting in
the decisive reduction of ungoverned sanctuary. Not only must the joint
force be capable of swiftly defeating the initial efforts of
irresponsible actors but further, it must retain the capability to
undertake sustained, combat operations to decisively defeat full-
spectrum opponents and establish and maintain the security conditions
necessary for enduring crisis resolution.
Recent experience--with its increasingly apparent demand for full-
spectrum forces--confirms the imperative to transform. Transformation,
however, must be undertaken not with a view of prevailing against those
opponents we would prefer to confront but rather, to defeat those
adversaries we will certainly be required to confront to secure the
Nation's interests into the future. The Army is 3 years into a
transformation focused on optimizing land forces for decisive action
across the range of military operations. This transformation is driven
by the demands of a complex environment and is enabled by leveraging
innovation, leadership, the power of each individual, and advanced
technology to create a deployable, versatile, lethal, survivable,
agile, and supportable land force--dominant across the full-spectrum.
Army transformation is underpinned by cultural changes as well-changes
in the way we fight, in the way we are organized, and in the way we
conduct our business practices--in short, changes that will
institutionalize Army transformation as a continuous process.
Our most recent experiences in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the
Balkans, the Philippines, and our own homeland prove unequivocally that
the nature of war remains unchanged--fundamentally, a contest of human
will, waged in pursuit of power and control over territory,
populations, resoures, and ideas. Further, it is clear that today's war
on terrorism is not an aberration but rather a clear indication of the
persistent conflict that will increasingly encroach on the security of
the United States and its interests. The Nation and its Armed Forces
are discovering that while it is imperative that we remain prepared to
defeat those threats applying decidedly conventional approaches to
warfare, our responsibilities further demand that we optimize to
confront threats across a broader spectrum. The Army understands that
our first priority is winning large-scale combat operations against
capable state opponents. However, the war against terrorism has proven
unambiguously that paramilitaries, factions, sects, and tribes vice
traditional armies are just as likely to threaten American interests in
strategically significant ways. Therefore, the Nation demands a joint
force comprised of versatile units capable of sustained operations to
affect their decisive defeat as well. While there is an allure to
leveraging platforms over people, a decade of experience has shown that
the vast majority of antagonists leverage people as their comparative
advantage. Therefore, only robust full-spectrum forces, properly
trained and equipped, are likely to master the wide variety of
challenges the Nation is likely to face.
General Bedard. Lesson 1: Our plans for transformation are on
track, based on the feedback we have gathered from Marines throughout
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). We were previously asked if
our transformation plans had been altered by what we had learned to
date in the global war on terrorism, and our response there applies
aptly to this question as well. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has
solidified our view that Marine forces are uniquely suited for the type
of enemy encountered during Operation Enduring Freedom. Our
expeditionary warfare capability gave the Nation the ability to
immediately meet the enemy, operate from his terrain, and defeat him.
Marines relied heavily on our expeditionary ethos, maneuver warfare
philosophy, and naval heritage, resulting in an ability to operate
miles from the battlefield, deep inland, without the reliance on static
land bases. Sea-basing Marines and their assets gave commanders a
secure platform from which to operate and a reliable source of support.
Our planned transformation, identified a decade ago and adjusted from
operational experiences since then, improves dramatically the
capabilities showed during OEF.
Lesson 2: Marine forces are a genuine joint force enabler,
providing the joint force commander a wide variety of service-unique
assets for immediate tasking. During OEF, the Marine Corps arrived in
theater quickly with a capable force, fully prepared for integration
into the joint environment. Marine units provided helicopter support
for U.S. Army units and Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Marine
fixed-wing aviation operated jointly with carrier-based Navy aircraft.
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), containing elements from all
warfighting areas--command and control, aviation, ground combat, and
combat service support--provided combat forces for operations,
logistical support for other service forces on the ground, and command
and control functions for a joint task force. The Commandant of the
Marine Corps (CMC) has thoroughly addressed this issue in a recent
article entitled ``Strength in Diversity,'' published in the April 2002
issue of the Armed Forces Journal, saying that the services must
continue to provide unique and complimentary capabilities to preserve
the Nation's warfighting advantage. As pointed out by the CMC, CINCs
will continue to look to employ Marine forces when the joint force is
faced with an objective area with limited infrastructure, lack of fixed
ports and bases, and austere conditions.
Lesson 3: Joint commanders need a rapidly deployable and dedicated
anti-terrorism force. In response to this requirement, the Marine Corps
established the Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism)
[4th MEB (AT)], a powerful combined-arms team prepared for worldwide
anti-terrorism operations. The 4th MEB (AT) provides dedicated
personnel with the requisite expertise to deter, detect, defend, and
conduct initial incident response to combat the threat of worldwide
terrorism. The 4th MEB (AT) merged the existing capabilities of the
Marine Security Guard Battalion, Marine Corps Security Forces
Battalion, and Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, and added
an organic air component, combat service support element, and an
infantry battalion, as well as a command element with dedicated
planners, coordinators, and liaison officers. The 4th MEB (AT) is
capable of conducting missions worldwide and is intimately woven into
the ongoing homeland defense effort.
Lesson 4: USMC support of Special Forces was limited due to
insufficient training with one another prior to OEF. The Aviation
Combat Element (ACE) of the MEUs had not trained with SOF units prior
to arriving in theater. The ``workarounds'' to this situation included
the units briefing their capabilities and limitations to each other and
the use of individuals functioning as liaison officers. To fully
develop the relationship between the ACE and SOF units, deploying MEUs
may introduce SOF integration training as part of the MEU (SOC) pre-
deployment training package (PTP).
Lesson 5: Precision Guided Weapons/Munitions were the weapons of
choice for Operation Enduring Freedom, specifically the novel use of
JDAM as a close air support (CAS) weapon. Although generally effective,
the use of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) had a number of
limitations that will require immediate attention. There were several
fatal friendly fire incidents, most involving JDAM CAS. Many Tactical
Air Control Parties (TACP) did not expect to use JDAM for CAS, let
alone CAS at ranges considered ``danger close,'' and TACPs were not
thoroughly familiar with the procedures used by other services to
report friendly locations, enemy locations, and direct the final
approach of bomb-laden aircraft. Additionally, Marine TACPs have
reported a requirement for an improved, lighter-weight device for
designating targets for precision-guided munitions. The Marine Corps
will continue to work with the other services on a joint tactics,
techniques, and procedures manual that addresses the lessons learned
from OEF. Finally, the Marine Corps will continue to work to improve
live opportunities for close air support with all services and
aircraft, using combat munitions, tactics, and procedures.
General Wald. We have learned that unprecedented persistence and
speed of execution can deny sanctuary to terrorists. In this particular
environment and against this enemy, we also acknowledge the challenge
will be more difficult against a more modern and sophisticated air
defense and in jungle or urban terrain. But, our success addresses one
of the six key Quadrennial Defense Review Transformation initiatives:
``Deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance,
tracking, and rapid engagement.''
This persistence of air and space power in Afghanistan is
unprecedented. Since the earliest aerial engagements, airmen have
always sought to attain air superiority as the enabler for the freedom
to maneuver and the freedom from attack from above. In the Afghanistan
area of operations, coalition air forces quickly achieved air
superiority--literally within the first few hours. Once the coalition
destroyed enemy fighter aircraft and ground-based radars and related
air defense threats, the Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander
(C/JFACC) began to exploit the advantage. He optimized ingress and
egress routes for fighters and bombers, allowed aerial refueling
aircraft and other high-value aircraft to orbit much closer to the
action than otherwise, and extracted leverage from technological
advances that expedite the sensor-to-shooter ``kill chain.'' The
results are unprecedented persistence over the battlespace and speed of
execution as reflected in the nearly constant presence of overhead
platforms capable of sensing enemy actions and reacting within minutes
to produce an intended effect. There are intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance platforms overhead, some manned and others unmanned,
as well as fighters or bombers loaded with precision-guided weapons and
fully capable of loitering or maneuvering-literally with impunity. This
unprecedented persistence enables the C/JFACC to make targeting or
attack decisions, or when necessary, to make recommendations to
appropriate authorities, within minutes. As stages of the familiar OODA
loop (observe--orient--decide--act) are compressed to permit faster,
more agile decision-making, the C/JFACC is a direct beneficiary. Just
as importantly, various other attributes contribute to success under
persistent air superiority.
Air and space superiority remains the key enabler for persistent
ISR and precision strike capabilities. Key to a sanctuary denial
strategy was our ability to loiter high-value assets, like AWACS, Rivet
Joints, Joint Stars, U-2s, and UAVs, as well as tankers, bombers, and
fighters persistently over the battlespace. We were also able to
infiltrate, support, and exfiltrate entirely by air. Our special
operations forces behind enemy lines conducted strategic
reconnaissance, direct attack, and unconventional warfare missions
directly supporting the larger ISR and precision strike efforts. Air
and space superiority enabled not only that strategy, but also those
missions.
Near seamless integration of targeting-quality information sharply
reduces the ``kill chain.'' Our investment strategies for ISR,
communications, ground- and air-based sensors, coupled with efforts to
organize, train, and equip the combined air operations center (CAOC) as
a ``weapon system'' have resulted in unprecedented speed of execution.
Our ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA)
emerging targets is vastly improved . . . enhanced even more by special
operations forces. We expect further improvement by relying more on
machine-to-machine horizontal integration of sensors and shooters.
A combination of ``eyes on the ground'' and all-weather weapons at
their command enables rapid and precise surveillance, tracking, and
target engagement. Air Force combat controllers working with Army
special forces and other personnel proved to be an important enabler.
Enhanced bombing effectiveness, demonstrated resolve, compliance with
rules of engagement (ROE), immediate battle damage assessment (BDA),
and airspace control were some of the key benefits ultimately resulting
in a regime change. Versatile all-weather global positioning system
(GPS) satellite-guided 2,000-pound class JDAMs greatly reduced weather
and underground sanctuaries. Moreover, we had ``airmen'' on the ground
empowered to execute and command other ``airmen'' in support of
counterland missions to achieve specific effects.
A versatile, flexible, and expeditionary force can rapidly deploy,
seize the initiative, defeat a regime, disrupt key terrorist activity,
and deny sanctuary. By relying upon the Air Force's expeditionary
aerospace force (EAF) concept, and by pursuing effective recruiting and
retention initiatives, the expeditionary forces are postured for
success.
In comparison to other major operations of the last 10 years, such
as Operation Allied Force, we fought these operations with a different
U.S. Air Force--in terms of strength, equipment, force deployment, and
other factors. We underscored the success of these operations with
modernization and extraordinary acquisitions in new weapon systems. The
Global Hawk, extended tether to U-2s, Predator's streaming video feeds
to AC-130s and elsewhere, ability to exploit Blue Force Tracker and
other capabilities made a substantial difference in our ability to
prosecute this exceptional operation. Cross-cueing between several
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors and weapon
system platforms has widened perspectives and enhanced operational
decision-making. The C-17 has again confirmed its exceptional
contribution to air mobility by relying upon its capabilities of reach,
airlift capacity, and flexibility. Delivered by long-range bombers and
tactical fighter aircraft, the joint direct attack munition, guided by
global positioning satellites, provided uncanny accuracy and enough
precision to deny sanctuary to the Taliban and al Qaeda--despite caves,
weather, dirt cover, or difficult locations in urban centers. Over the
last decade, the favorable trend continues; we have developed greater
and greater capability to deny the enemy sanctuary--regardless of his
location or cover and in any kind of weather.
We have stood up Task Force Enduring Look to gather data and
information and to learn lessons that will apply in future operations.
But, our Air Force Chief of Staff often quotes the U.S. Navy Chief of
Naval Operations, who said, ``This war is like this war. It ain't like
the last one, and it ain't like the next one. It is like this one.''
Admiral Krol. While we continue to study and analyze the lessons
from OEF, early analysis indicates that this is a war where the Navy
was crucial to every facet of operations, all in this land-locked
country, far from the sea.

Lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom have highlighted that
this was:

A strike war where carrier-based airpower was the lead
player in tactical strike.
A SOF war where Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces at
times constituted the majority of U.S. Armed Forces in country;
A coalition war where the Navy led the maritime
coalition of 11 nations, and the Naval Special Warfare Group
led coalition SOF in Afghanistan as Task Force K-Bar.
An expeditionary war where the Navy's immediately
deployable and employable nature was a major factor in the
ground war in this land-locked country. For example, for a
period of time there were more sailors in Afghanistan, a land-
locked country hundreds of miles from the sea, than there were
soldiers, airmen, or marines. Besides Naval Special Warfare,
other Navy forces contributed significantly to operations
ashore:

Carrier-based HH-60s were deployed ashore to
provide Combat Search and Rescue capabilities to joint
forces;
The Navy's rapidly deployable and full-mission
capable Explosive Ordnance Disposal were the EOD force
of choice;
The Navy provided the first significant
medical capability in Bagram and Kandahar;
Navy Construction Battalions (SEABEEs) built
up the runway at Bagram and repaired the runway at
Kandahar to facilitate the ingress of forces from the
other services, and built the detainee facility at
Kandahar;
Mobile Communications Teams supported Naval
units around the country; and
For a significant period in the war, the Navy
provided tactical weather services for all in-country
forces.

Hence, like the ``Sand Pebbles'' days of old, this war
marked the return of the ``Expeditionary Sailor.''

The Navy was also a critical player in several turning points of the
war, including:

Navy TACAIR supporting Dostam's taking of Mazar e
Sharif and motivates other warlords to move out.
The Navy/Marine Corps team (Task Force 58) inserting
into Camp Rhino, breaking the Kandahar stronghold stalemate.

In the first 6 months, the Navy contribution has been enormous. As of
early April 2002:

More than half the active carrier force (6 of 11) has
deployed and been engaged in combat operations (Enterprise,
Vinson, Kitty Hawk, Theodore Roosevelt, Stennis, and Kennedy);
4 of 12 Amphibious Ready Groups have been engaged
(Peleliu, Bataan, Bonhomme Richard, and Wasp);
60,000 sailors and marines have deployed to CENTCOM
cumulatively (with about 31,000 present today);
13,000 Navy and Marine reservists have been mobilized;
The Navy has flown 7,000 strike sorties (and has flown
11,000 total sorties);
The Navy dropped 5,000 PGMs, 600 unguided munitions,
and shot 88 Tomahawks;
The Navy conducted more than 6,900 Maritime
Interdiction Operations and Leadership Interdiction Operations
``queries''; and
The senior U.S. military official on the ground in
Afghanistan for almost a month was a Navy admiral.

But the war also brought its share of challenges:

Although the percentage of naval forces underway and
deployed have remained near historic averages, with 40-50
percent underway and about 30-35 percent deployed, the
operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of deployed units is up sharply, with
steaming days up about 50 percent (from 54 days/quarter to over
80), and flying hours of deployed units peaking at about 250
hours/day, and averaging about 115 hours/day; and
The strike effort has stressed our precision-guided
munitions (PGM) inventories and aircraft engine pools.
Comparing Lessons Learned From Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Allied Force
The Navy comparison of OEF lessons learned with Operation Allied
Force (OAF) lessons learned indicates that the Navy has effectively
implemented most of the lessons from the earlier conflict.

Areas where the Navy has improved significantly since OAF:

Navy forces leveraged TACAIR responsiveness inside the
Air Tasking Order planning cycle;
The Navy contributed significantly to airborne
surveillance and reconnaissance in Afghanistan; and
The Navy developed several TACAIR doctrine
modifications to allow us to use carrier-based air in ways
never before envisioned, including through-the-weather weapons
delivery, Navy fighters passing target coordinates to Air Force
bombers, and coordinated remote lasing tactics.

However, there are still some lessons from Operation Allied Force
that have not yet been adequately addressed. Some will require years of
effort to fix, while others can be improved upon in the near-term:

The United States still does not possess enough UAVs,
and the Navy does not possess organic UAVs. Even if the number
of UAVs is increased, the U.S. military does not have
sufficient bandwidth to take advantage of the number of UAVs we
would need to replace even a modest number of manned aircraft;
We need to improve interoperability with allies for
networking, particularly aboard ship;
There is still a shortage of GPS munitions;
There is still a shortage of linguists, targeteers,
and analysts;
There continues to be a competition between conflict
and war-time reserve munitions; and
The single significant limiting factor to conducting
operations in both wars was a lack of timely intelligence of
sufficient granularity to identify and seize key leaders or
make informed operational decisions. This kind of action
requires people on the ground--national systems do little to
provide the kind of information needed to apprehend bright
people who don't want to be caught.

As I said earlier, the Navy continues to analyze lessons learned
from OEF. Although this work is expected to continue for some time,
some early themes are emerging:

We need to improve ISR to both theater decision-makers
and trigger-puller;
We need to establish Maritime Interdiction Operations
as a core competency, to better prepare crews for conducting
these vital operations;
We need to continue to improve the integration of
joint Special Operations Forces with Navy conventional forces;
We need to continue to improve coalition
interoperability;
We need to adjust training somewhat for emerging
missions;
We need to improve the expeditionary sailor's
deployability, uniforms, and equipment;
We need to continue to work with the Joint Staff and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to improve joint command
and control capability;
We need to improve the sustainability of Naval forces;
and
We may need to make organizational alignments to
better support the warrior forward.

STRATEGIC READINESS SYSTEM

8. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, please provide additional
details on how the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) differs from
current readiness assessment metrics, what costs are associated with
implementing the new system, and how, specifically, it will improve
visibility into readiness.
General McKiernan. The current readiness reporting system provides
an incomplete picture of readiness because it covers only the combat
units at a snapshot in time. Our current system is based on the ability
of our operational or combat units to perform their wartime missions;
it provides a lagging measure of the status of resources and
performance; and the information is limited to specific resource and
training indicators of these units. The SRS will revolutionize the way
we view readiness across the entire Army, both operational and
institutional, by operating on two levels. The first level identifies
the strategic objectives and key processes in a unit. It is based on a
``balanced scorecard,'' a tool that requires each Army unit at the
division/separate brigade level and higher to enumerate its strategic
objectives and performance measures and align them with the Army
scorecard. Each unit will then monitor its readiness against the Army
scorecard. The second level of SRS is data collection. After units from
across the Army identify what is important, software collects the data
that indicates the level of an organization's readiness toward
achieving the Army's strategic goals. The cost for this year is set at
$6.756 million to develop and implement SRS across the Army. Within
industry, the sound business practice of a ``balanced scorecard'' has
strategically focused the organization and data collection on what is
important, in near real-time, in a leading or predictive manner that
allows leaders to make policy and resource decisions before an issue
becomes a crisis.

9. Senator Akaka. General Wald, the Joint Staff reports that the
DOD will reduce combat air patrols (CAPs) over the United States from
post-September 11 levels. Can you please discuss how these reductions
will be implemented? Also, the fiscal year 2003 budget request included
$1.2 billion to continue to fly CAPs at the higher levels. What will
the fiscal year 2003 costs be now that CAPs are to be reduced?
General Wald. In April 2002, Commander, NORAD, in conjunction with
the Joint Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, established a
tiered response system for aerospace defense of the United States. Each
tier in the system specifies the number of intercept, tanker, and
airborne early warning aircraft. Additionally, each tier identifies the
response time of alert aircraft, number of locations, and timing to
achieve a higher level of response. As the assessed threat decreases,
the corresponding tier employed by NORAD changes accordingly and the
number of tasked bases, aircraft, and personnel decreases. From post-
September 11, 2001, until April 2002, NORAD had a single level of
response. The current NORAD response posture and the specific number of
bases, aircraft, and personnel tasked are classified. Based on the
approved concept of operations supporting a reduced level of combat air
patrols over the United States, the Air Force has revised its $1.2
billion fiscal year 2003 budget request for CAP to $522 million.

10. Senator Akaka. General Wald, your testimony notes the major
role the Air Force has played in Operation Noble Eagle by flying CAP
missions. What has been the impact of flying those missions on the Air
Force's normal rotational deployment plans for Expeditionary Air
Forces? What have been the effects on the ability of the pilots to
conduct combat training, on the aircraft themselves, and on the Reserve
components?
General Wald. The leading indicators of overall readiness are
showing signs of decline. As of June 1, 2002, overall Air Force
readiness declined 5 percentage points since September 1, 2001.
However, major combat unit readiness decreased 1 percentage point over
this same period. Regarding how this effects the Air Expeditionary
Force (AEF) rotation, the combination of multiple crisis operations and
our ongoing steady state commitments has placed extraordinary stress on
the Expeditionary Air Force and our resources. In some stressed
functional areas, requirements exceed available AEF cycle forces. The
Air Force is committed to finding solutions to relieve the stress on
these career fields. However, at this time, not all of the Air Force
personnel in these stressed career fields can rotate to fill all
current requirements
Although the number of Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) taskings is
decreasing, the long-term impacts are now beginning to manifest
themselves in the total force, primarily affecting our Air Reserve
component. These units continue to bear the majority of the burden for
CAP taskings and are experiencing decreased training opportunities for
major weapon systems involved. Our Air National Guard commanders are
prorating training requirements in order to maintain combat mission
ready status for aircrews. These units are placing priority on
maintaining currency and employing a back-to-basics approach to
preserve mission ready status. For the aircraft, additional spare parts
funding had a positive impact; however, the increased OPTEMPO is
working against readiness. The OPTEMPO increased support requirements
resulting in significant utilization rate increases on high-demand
Mission Design Series. Likewise, it has strained and overtasked a
workforce that was short in S-level manning (and over-manned three
levels) across critical maintenance Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs).
Nevertheless, our maintainers accomplished their mission. Additionally,
CAP taskings are also affecting retention rates within the Reserves.
The longer the Reserve Forces remain activated, the lower the retention
rate. A lower retention rate will require more training to reconstitute
the unit. The Air Force is aggressively examining ways to use the AEF
construct, DOD directed training transformation, and the accompanying
budgeting process to mitigate the effect of high OPTEMPO on readiness.
Sufficient and sustained congressional support would facilitate the
essential readiness and other improvements the Air Force needs to
continue to train quality combat pilots, and remain the world's
preeminent air and space force.

BALANCING MISSIONS

11. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, one of the main objectives of this hearing was to
learn more about how you are managing the task of performing the new
missions of the war on terrorism on top of all your existing missions.
We have discussed the resulting short-term strains you encounter today.
As we look out over the longer term, I see three possible ways forward:
cutting back on other missions or activities; increasing our
capabilities; or some mix of the two. What are your thoughts about the
direction in which we should head?
General McKiernan. It is probably a mix of the two. Successful
prosecution of the war on terrorism requires the capabilities the Army
contributes to the joint force. Executing the national security and
military strategies over the previous decade of the 1990s required a
greater number and type of deployments for the Army. The emerging
defense strategy seeks to focus our efforts and resources on those
activities that best support our national interests, especially as they
contribute to the war on terrorism. Threats today range from
potentially dangerous state actors armed with potent conventional
forces and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), to non-state entities
pursuing their objectives outside the boundaries that govern state
behavior. In the Balkans, the mission has scaled back in size to more
manageable and predictable rotations with some decrease in operations
tempo (OPTEMPO), and we anticipate this trend may continue. The
Multinational Force and Observer mission in the Sinai has been at
steady state for quite some time and not all of the force requirements
for this mission are rotational. Deployments to Central Asia in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom have begun to stabilize, as have security
missions in the homeland. As the war continues, if and when we are
called upon to execute other missions, we will ensure the Army is
capable of meeting those requirements. The Army is closely managing its
deployments and rotations to support the combatant commanders. As we
proceed over time in this campaign to defeat terrorism on a global
scale, the Army will incorporate the lessons learned into our processes
in building and sustaining the total force. Likewise, we are already
taking actions to increase our special operating force capabilities,
intelligence assets, and conventional force capabilities required for
securing the homeland, and will continue to do so. The Army's ability
to increase capabilities to dominate across the spectrum of operations
over the long-term will be accomplished through a comprehensive Army
transformation.
General Bedard. Currently, we have over 32,000 marines forward
based, stationed, or deployed throughout the world. Each one of these
marines is employed in direct support of either the combatant
commander's immediate requirements (to include the war on terrorism) or
his regional engagement program that contributes to the maintenance of
long-term security within the Area of Responsibility. The Marine Corps
is not reducing our current commitments, and with our forward deployed
Marine Expeditionary Units, we are fully supporting the war on
terrorism.
The Marine Corps has and will continue to pursue programs which we
feel will allow us to increase our capability to maintain a robust
forward presence, operate in a joint or multinational environment, and
act as a force multiplier for the combatant commanders. It is important
that we maintain our forward engagement strategy with our Marine
Expeditionary Units and our forward deployed marines. Coupled with
future innovations, this will allow the Marine Corps to perform our
current missions as well as new missions which will surface in the war
on terrorism.
General Wald. Prior to the attacks of September 11, the USAF
maintained a number of worldwide steady-state responsibilities,
including enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq, patrolling the skies
over the Balkans, supporting counterdrug efforts, and conducting
humanitarian operations worldwide. After the attacks, the war on
terrorism has added a new series of demands, including stateside combat
air patrol, combat operations and related support, and
counterterrorism-related missions worldwide. This high OPTEMPO is being
inflicted on a force structure that was not built to handle this level
of worldwide tasking, which may adversely affect recent gains made in
readiness, and will certainly have an impact on both hardware and
people. Unprecedented demands are being placed on our aircraft and
people, necessitating the use of stop loss and increased reliance on
the Reserve component. In order to handle a new ``steady-state'' demand
level, the Air Force will either have to cut back on the number and
types of missions that we do worldwide, or increase our force structure
to accommodate the new demand. A determination will have to be made
with respect to the new steady state or long-term demand on the USAF,
and then we will have to examine the force structure in the context of
the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Air Force transformation roadmap
and modernization plans, and national security strategy.
Admiral Krol. We need to seek a mix of increased capabilities,
while closely examining our current missions and activities for
possible efficiencies. Recognizing that resources are limited and we
can't afford everything, we must continue to seek new technology to
improve our capabilities while making some hard choices on missions and
activities we no longer can support at current levels.
First and foremost is the Navy and Marine Corps team's unique
position as a forward deployed force. We were already forward deployed
when the war on terrorism commenced and as a result had forces in
theater ready to respond immediately. We initially refocused those
assets on the CINC's tasking, while at the same time readying
additional assets for deployment. Our intention is to remain a forward
deployed force in the future.
Our current global war on terrorism planning effort in support of
CINC requirements includes numerous scenarios and contingencies,
including how to sustain the war effort. This has resulted in a mix of
prioritizing military efforts around the globe due to finite resources
and analyzing how to improve our capability to support potential future
additional tasking. Some CINC plans, if executed, would require a
cutback on current missions to divert additional resources.

12. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, General McKiernan's testimony suggests that we might
cut back our support for the multinational observer force in the Sinai,
or in the Balkans. Are there other activities that we might reduce?
Conversely, what additional capabilities might be required?
General McKiernan. As mentioned, the Army's requirements in the
Balkans continue to be reduced. These reductions are a result of
periodic mission requirement reviews in which we and our allies and
partners have determined that the current situation requires less force
to successfully execute the military missions. As the war on terrorism
progresses, the Army in concert with other services, allies, and
partners will continue to assess the situation within our operating
areas to determine the feasibility for reducing force requirements
without risking our ability to successfully execute our assigned
missions. These assessments may reveal that reductions are not feasible
and increases are required. It is difficult to identify these
adjustments without a clear understanding of new missions. But, the
Army's ability to tailor for diverse missions across force capabilities
and to employ a mix of Active and Reserve component forces remains an
inherent strength of this service.
General Bedard. In my statement, I commented on the value of
forward deployed forces. The expeditionary nature of forward deployed
marine forces provides combatant commanders with a focused, versatile,
and responsive capability during crisis situations. While certain
situations may require marine forces to conduct sustained land
operations, these operations are traditionally conducted by our
Nation's war-winning Army. Since marines have had limited, short
duration involvement in multinational and United Nations missions, it
would be more appropriate for others to comment on the types of
activities that could be reduced.
With respect to additional capabilities, we created our 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) to address the requirement for a
rapidly deployable and employable anti-terrorism capability both within
the United States and overseas. By combining our State Department-
focused Marine Security Guard Battalion, our Marine Security Force
Battalion, which is under the operational control of the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, and by
converting an infantry battalion to an anti-terrorism battalion, the
Marine Corps is realizing a synergy of capabilities that provides a
bonafide anti-terrorism capability to our Nation. So pressing was this
need, in fact, that the Marine Corps asked for an endstrength addition
of 2,400 marines for fiscal year 2003. This was one capability where we
identified that additional support was required to meet an emerging
requirement.
General Wald. The United States must beware of open-ended
deployments that continue to stress the force when combined with
emerging contingencies. The presence of the observer force is an
example of a deployment that has lasted for more than two decades and
may have outlived its usefulness. U.S. deployments in both Kosovo and
Bosnia may also be examined to see if their size and nature is
appropriate. Consideration should also be given to the stake held in
certain regions by our allies: NATO support has been critical to the
stabilization missions in the Former Yugoslavia, and given the
increased global demands on U.S. forces it might be reasonable to ask
allies to shoulder more of the burden for peacekeeping-like duties. It
is also important to exercise caution with respect to ``activities''
suitable for cutting--it would be dangerous to cut training and
exercise activity.
Admiral Krol. Neither the multinational observer forces in the
Sinai nor the Balkans are heavy draws upon naval forces. Other
requirements for naval forces have to be evaluated in a global context.
By design, the Navy is a forward deployed force and as such is prepared
and on scene to respond when required by CINCs worldwide. The aggregate
of global requirements has to be continually prioritized and evaluated
against finite resources. During this continuous process the tasking
with the least priority is at risk to not be supported. Decisions are
routinely vetted with the Joint Staff. Additional ships and aircraft
would relieve stress and provide additional capabilities to support
CINC requirements.

FLYING HOURS REQUIREMENTS

13. Senator Akaka. General Wald, a March 4 article in the Air Force
Times describes Air Combat Command standards for how many training
sorties pilots of various skill levels must fly annually to retain
their mission capable (MC) status--for example, that junior pilots must
fly 120 training sorties each year to be MC. Does your budget request
fully support all of the training sorties that your current mix of
pilots, both experienced and inexperienced, need to fly in order to
meet the Air Force's MC goals in fiscal year 2003?
General Wald. The Air Force fiscal year 2003 flying hour submission
for combat coded training hours includes the appropriate hours per crew
per month required to train line pilots to the level that will meet Air
Force combat mission ready goals and fully support the warfighting
CINCs.

AIRCRAFT CANNIBALIZATION

14. Senator Akaka. General Wald, Admiral Blair recently testified
before this committee about the continuing challenges facing aircraft,
in particular in Pacific Command. He specifically cited shortages in
repair parts and stated that 80 percent of Pacific Air Forces' aircraft
did not meet standards for cannibalization rates in 2001. Do you share
Admiral Blair's concerns? Does the fiscal year 2003 budget take steps
that will improve this situation, or is something more required to
increase our air readiness?
General Wald. Analysis reveals Pacific Air Force (PACAF) aircraft
indeed have cannibalization rates higher than the Air Force average.
However, in all but one weapons system (F-15E) there were reductions in
the fiscal year 2002 cannibalization rate for Pacific Air Force
aircraft. The improvements in PACAF cannibalization rates follow a
similar trend in Air Force aggregate cannibalization and supply rates.
The Air Force aggregate cannibalization rate reached its zenith in 1997
at 12.7 cannibalizations per 100 sorties and has consistently improved
to 10.1 cannibalizations per 100 sorties in 2002--a 20 percent
reduction in cannibalizations. Likewise, the Air Force supply metric,
Total Not Mission Capable for Supply (TNMCS), has improved from a 14.3
percent high in 2000 to 11.8 percent in 2002. It is important to
emphasize that there are other factors in addition to spares
availability that influence cannibalization rates. Ultimately,
cannibalization actions are just the symptoms of much larger concerns
such as aging aircraft, spares shortages, system reliability
shortfalls, and retaining experienced mechanics. Consequently, the Air
Force has implemented a multi-faceted strategy of increased spares
funding, policy, and organizational initiatives, which continue to
reduce cannibalizations:

Beginning in fiscal year 2000, depot reparable spare
parts funding at 100 percent of the known requirement;
Increased Direct Support Objective (DSO) authorization
levels in Readiness Spares Packages (RSP) to a surge of 83
percent for deployed fighter units;
Implemented the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF),
providing stability and planning to units preparing to deploy;
and
Created theater Regional Supply Squadrons to track
assets further reducing cannibalization actions.

All indications are that the Pacific Air Forces will continue to
follow the positive Air Force aggregate trend in cannibalization and
supply rates, further extending their positive fiscal year
cannibalization trend.

ENCROACHMENT

15. Senator Akaka. Dr. Mayberry, you noted in your testimony on
March 14, 2002, before the House Armed Services' Military Readiness
Subcommittee that finding work-arounds to encroachment challenges
drains dollars from operations and maintenance accounts, further
degrading readiness. Please provide the Department's best estimate of
how much money has been directed in those accounts (by service and
agency) to pay for training work-arounds. Please further delineate
these expenses by the causes of encroachment for which they were
compensating, e.g., environmental, noise, airspace, spectrum, etc.
Dr. Mayberry. As I have testified in other hearings on the subject
of encroachment, work-arounds associated with encroachment are a
serious issue for the Department, but the costs involved are not well
understood. The services have been able to identify costs incurred to
modify training in certain specific instances. For example,
restrictions on the use of Vieques for training Naval Gunfire Spot
Teams create a need to send 3-man teams to Norway to accomplish this
same training, costing over $36,000 per team trip. On a larger scale,
prior to 1991, II MEF stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, spent
approximately $1.2 million annually to transport tank and Light Armored
Reconnaissance units to Fort Pickett, Virginia and Fort Knox, Kentucky
for live training unavailable at Camp Lejeune. However, the costs for
such examples are not readily obtained, and DOD does not presently have
a good tracking and reporting system for aggregating encroachment
problems and impacts and isolating their costs. As you observe, work-
around costs are typically covered within an installation's or
service's overall operations and maintenance accounts, making them very
difficult to track or delineate. DOD understands the importance of
better work-around cost estimation, and we plan to address this
deficiency as part of our ongoing range sustainment initiative.

16. Senator Akaka. General Bedard, General Wald, and Admiral Krol,
there has been a long-standing concern that readiness levels do not
have a very direct relationship to budget requests. The Army has the
most straightforward justification, with a training strategy tied to
tank miles driven and flying hours per crew per month. What are other
services doing to improve visibility into the relationship between
readiness and funding?
General Bedard. Field commanders cost out their training
requirements, submit these costs to Headquarters, Marine Corps for
submission via the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.
Training programs are executed according to approved operating budgets.
While specific non-monetary training metrics have yet to be developed,
we extensively scrutinize all USMC requirements based on cost benefit
using a committee-based process of subject matter experts from
throughout the USMC. The Marine Corps is exploring different means of
connecting funding and readiness. We are looking into development of
various types of metrics that can be used in both the readiness
reporting process and in the budgeting process.
General Wald. The Air Force's readiness levels do, in fact, have a
direct relationship to our budget requests. Our readiness picture is
much more complex than focusing on one or two service metrics to
reverse downward readiness trends of the 1990s. Some examples of
metric-type indicators used to measure our readiness are aircraft
mission capability rates, recruiting, and retention rates of our
military and civilian workforce, and a facility investment metric for
our infrastructure. These and other metrics provide the Air Force
senior leadership tools that influence the decision process during
programming and budgeting cycles. For instance, we budget for spares,
supplies, and fuel to support a requirements-based flying hour program
for aircrew training, which ultimately translates to readiness.
Likewise, the investment in spare parts during the past 3-4 years has
paid off through higher aircraft mission capability rates. Our budgets
also factor quality of training into readiness requirements. As an
example, aircrews derive the greatest training benefit from sorties/
events that encompass the right mix of day/night, variable terrain,
electronic warfare, etc. We continuously evaluate and adjust our
resources to meet Air Force readiness requirements.
Admiral Krol. The Navy Flying Hour Program is also directly linked
to readiness levels. The flying hour requirements are derived from the
training requirement in hours per crew per month over the course of the
Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC). This training matrix is used to
evaluate the training rating that is reported in the Status of
Resources and Training System (SORTS). Training, along with equipment,
supply, and manpower, are the elements that drive our overall SORTS
rating. Over the course of the past few years, Navy and Congress have
placed more money in this O&MN account, and between fiscal year 2000
and fiscal year 2001, our average overall SORTS rating improved by
approximately 8 percent across the IDTC. The ships and submarine
operations account requirement is under review to establish a similar
linkage between the training and operational steaming requirement and
the subsequent SORTS ratings achieved by those units.

IMPACT OF CURRENT OPERATIONS ON EQUIPMENT

17. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, one of the longer-term impacts of Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle is increased wear and tear on
equipment. In your opinion, do your fiscal year 2003 budget requests
take these effects, including equipment reaching the end of its service
life earlier than anticipated and higher than usual maintenance needs,
into account in ways that will not harm the readiness of our forces?
General McKiernan. The Department of Defense has budgeted Defense
Emergency Response Funding (DERF) as supplemental funding for fiscal
year 2003 in support of the global war on terrorism. The Army is
pursuing this source of additional funding for the war's incremental
costs beyond our 2003 budget. DERF funds are designed to cover
incremental repair and maintenance costs, and costs for replacement of
crash or battle damaged equipment resulting from increased operating
tempo. As the war continues, we will continue to identify incremental
repair and maintenance costs as well as additional equipment costs to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for DERF reimbursement. Should
DERF reimbursement not be available in the fiscal year 2003 defense
appropriation, we will request supplemental funding to ensure the
continued readiness of our forces.
General Bedard Fiscal year 2003 budget requests do not currently
account for all the increased wear and tear of equipment reaching the
end of its service life earlier than anticipated and/or due to higher
than usual maintenance needs resulting from OEF/NE. Additional funding
may be required and, if needed, will be identified via our resource
requirement processes to ensure maintainability of older equipment
until new replacements are online and fully integrated into the supply
pipeline. The foremost problem impacting Marine Corps aging ground
equipment in theater has been the harsh environment. Sand, dust, and
wind along with the cold weather conditions have caused scheduled
preventive maintenance to be expedited. Rolling stock, such as the
HMMWVs, have suffered more mechanical failures than expected. Fuel
system problems have also been experienced. However, due to experience
and service interoperability, Marine Corps maintenance personnel at
Forward Operating Base Rhino were able to overcome equipment failures
and even assisted the Navy with their mechanical problems.
Survivability of equipment in harsh environments continues to be a
major area of concern when conducting operations. Additional analysis
is required on equipment as it returns, since operations are ongoing.
General Wald. Yes, flying hour spares requirements received
substantial funding for fiscal year 2003, including approximately $380
million to address spare parts issues associated with aging aircraft
support. In the event that required maintenance is not funded we will
be forced to resort to extraordinary measures to be borne by the
maintainers in order to keep the system in operation. Cannibalization
rates will increase. Delayed entrance into Program Depot Maintenance
(PDM) has the added negative effect of driving significant inspections
and maintenance in the field. The Special Inspections designed to keep
aircraft airworthy beyond their scheduled PDM input dates serve only to
provide temporary relief from a grounding condition. These inspections
increase in complexity and become significantly more labor-intensive,
ultimately resulting in the weapon system being grounded. When the
aircraft do come into PDM the cost will be higher and the flow time
longer. Operating systems beyond their planned service interval have
the added risk and potential to increase the failure rates which may
result in Emergency Action Time Compliance Technical Order Inspections/
repairs. Ultimately we will keep the equipment operating, but it will
come at the expense of the men and women who must accomplish this
additional work with fewer resources. This in turn will also have a
negative impact on our ability to retain skilled technicians.
Admiral Krol. The Navy's fiscal year 2003 budget does not take into
account the wear and tear on equipment (i.e., reconstitution costs)
that has occurred because of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) contingency operations. The fiscal year
2002 executable equipment reconstitution costs for aircraft, ships,
deployed expeditionary medical facilities, and mobile construction
battalions deployed in support of ONE and OEF are included in the
Department's fiscal year 2002 Supplemental request. The OSD-submitted
fiscal year 2003 DERF Budget includes $10 billion in additional funding
for ONE/OEF operations without specific definition of costs to be
covered. The intention is for this funding to be executed as a transfer
fund based on actual service execution costs. The level of operations
in fiscal year 2003 has not yet been conveyed to the services, so
projecting reconstitution costs using forecasting methods is
inappropriate. However, the Department intends to seek reconstitution
cost reimbursement from this $10 billion transfer fund as these costs
are incurred or expected.

COST OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

18. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, please provide the amount in the fiscal year 2003
budget request for contingency operations (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo,
Northern Watch, etc)
General McKiernan. The Army budgeted $574 million for Bosnia, $919
million for Kosovo, and $279 million for Desert Spring in the fiscal
year 2003 budget request.
General Bedard.

[In millions of dolloars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military
Operation Location Total Personnel O&M
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Forge............................... Bosnia....................... $1.6 $.4 $1.2
Joint Guardian............................ Kosovo....................... 4.7 3.4 11.3
Northern Watch............................ SW Asia...................... 0.5 0.2 0.3
Southern Watch............................ SW Asia...................... 0.8 0.2 0.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Wald. The fiscal year 2003 budget requests the following
amounts to execute Air Force contingency operations:

[In thousands of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Personnel O&M
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bosnia...................... $ 32,999 $120,537
Kosovo...................... 1,782 53,491
Northern Watch.............. 26,700 122,474
Southern Watch.............. 95,042 582,734
-------------------------------------------
Total..................... 156,523 879,236
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Admiral Krol. The funding in the Navy's budget request for
contingency operations in fiscal year 2003 is as follows:

Bosnia
Joint Forge--$12.3 million
Deliberate Forge--$20.6 million

Kosovo
Joint Guardian--$13.3 million

Southwest Asia
Northern Watch--$21.9 million
Southern Watch--$248.3 million

ARMY AMMUNITION

19. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, a recent study by the
Association of the United States Army stated that the Army has
projected an $820 million shortfall in funding for training ammunition
over the next 5 years. Is this report accurate? If not, what is the
current shortfall, if any, in training munitions? If so, what are the
readiness implications of this shortfall, and what actions does the
Army expect to take to correct it?
General McKiernan. The Association of the United States Army study
was accurate at the time the information was gathered for publication.
The Army has placed additional funds into the training account and the
fiscal year 2003 Defense Emergency Response request contains $27
million for the Army. Additionally, sufficient funds have been
programmed through fiscal year 2007 to eliminate the projected
shortfall over the next 5 years. In the light of recent events, new
training strategies are being developed and staffed. These new training
strategies are producing new requirements that will be addressed in the
fiscal year 2004 budget. The Army continues to place the highest
priority on training ammunition and will make the maximum effort to
fully resource these requirements. However, current world events may
unexpectedly deplete stocks and training funding requirements can
increase.

105MM AMMUNITION FOR MGS

20. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, does the Army currently have
sufficient stocks, or have resources planned to acquire sufficient
stocks, of 105mm tank ammunition in order to supply the Interim Brigade
Combat Teams' Mobile Gun System when it comes on line in 2004? If not,
what actions are planned to make up for any shortfalls?
General McKiernan. The U.S. Army currently has sufficient stocks in
four of seven required Mobile Gun System (MGS) ammunition cartridges.
We are in the process of procuring three cartridge types by 2004 to
meet MGS requirements. First, we are re-procuring high explosive and
companion training cartridges (M393A3 and M467A1) to meet the MGS's Key
Performance Parameter. The new service cartridge will replace the aging
M393A2 High Explosive Plastic cartridge. Second, we will develop and
procure the M1040 Canister cartridge to meet the Mobile Gun System's
anti-personnel requirement. The U.S. Army has sufficient stocks of M900
Armor-Piercing, Fin-Stabilized, Discarding Sabot anti-tank cartridges,
and m456a2 high explosive anti-tank cartridges to meet mobile gun
System self-defense requirements, along with appropriate training
ammunition (M724A 1 and M490A 1).

AIRLIFT SHORTFALLS

21. Senator Akaka. General Newbold, in his testimony earlier this
month, Admiral Blair stated that Pacific Command forces ``are beginning
to face regular shortages of airlift and aerial tankage,'' and that
these shortages are both increasing costs as they contract for civilian
airlift and complicating training efforts. Are other commands
experiencing similar shortfalls?
General Newbold. PACOM, like the other commands, is experiencing
reduced levels of organic air-refueling and airlift support for those
requirements not directly supporting the GWOT. The JCS priority system
is used to adjudicate who gets organic support when requirements exceed
capacity. (GWOT air-refueling and airlift requirements are currently
validated at JCS priority one.) In an attempt to support worldwide air-
refueling requirements, air mobility command (AMC) has nearly tripled
daily tanker aircraft/aircrew taskings. Commercial passenger and cargo
aircraft are used to supplement the organic fleet when loads are
compatible. For this reason, the use of commercial aircraft more than
doubled during the first quarter of current year 2002.

22. Senator Akaka. General Newbold, can you provide the additional
costs that our regional commands are incurring because of airlift
shortages?
General Newbold The significant commitment of military aircraft in
support of the ongoing contingency means that they are not available to
fly all support, exercise, and training missions. When military
aircraft are not available, support flights and exercise missions are
being flown using commercial aircraft. The channel customer is not
affected by the change in aircraft type. The support flights customer
pays for the person or cargo being moved, regardless of the type of
airlift provided. The exercise customer, however, pays for airlift by
flying hours used to support the mission. The only instance that a
customer would incur increased cost due to commercial augmentation
(contract for civilian airlift) would be if there was a need to
contract for more capacity than is required to move the customer's
requirement. In today's environment, this is sometimes the case as
additional force protection personnel and equipment are added to the
planned event. Also, in the case of training, there are training
missions that cannot be supported and training can be lost.

23. Senator Akaka. General Newbold, are there mechanisms available
either to improve airlift management and/or mitigate training impacts
that we could take right now to reduce the negative short-term effects
of current operations?
General Newbold. The very dynamic nature of the war on terrorism
has placed unanticipated demands on mobility assets. However, AMC has a
very specific set of procedures by which organic airlift shortfalls are
identified. This triggers a request to purchase commercial airlift
augmentation to support warfighting CINCs whose lower priority missions
would otherwise be nonsupported. Users can/should be advised that
commercial aircraft will likely be used, and they should plan
accordingly to minimize impact to their operations. If commercial
aircraft are filled to capacity, the charges incurred (which are based
on weight, not aircraft type) would be the same as when organic lift is
provided. This would eliminate additional expense during this long-term
shortage of organic lift capacity. If military or commercial air is not
available, training options available to the user in the short-term
include reducing the scope of the exercise, using virtual, computer-
based training, where feasible, or conducting training at locations
that minimize the need for airlift support. While these are not the
preferred solutions, they do allow the user to conduct needed training.

INTER-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING CYCLE

24. Senator Akaka. Admiral Krol, if the Navy decides to extend its
deployments beyond the 6 months that is typical, what impact will this
have on the maintenance and training that takes place in between
deployments?
Admiral Krol. Maintenance impact: In both short-term and long-term,
the effect of extended deployments on maintenance will be felt mostly
on the ship's hull, mechanical, and electrical systems that have a
historically defined limit of operating hours before requiring an
overhaul or repair. Many of these systems, like gas turbine and diesel
engines, high and low pressure air compressors, and pumps of all types
already display high downtime, and high operating cost trends. These
systems operate almost continuously when the ship is deployed,
resulting in predictable wear and tear and eventual failure in
operation. In the long-term, the maintenance capabilities of the ships
crew must be upgraded. Navy Afloat Maintenance Training System and the
Battle Force Intermediate Maintenance Activity (NAMTS/BFIMA) programs
support this.
Training impact: The CNO has established two baselines for
deployment of naval forces. First, prior to deploying again, each unit
should spend twice the time in a non-deployed status as time deployed.
This is known as Turnaround Ratio (TAR). Two-to-one is the minimum
established goal. With adequate TAR, the proper mix of maintenance and
individual, unit and coordinated training can be achieved. Second, the
CNO has established the policy that sailors should be in their
homeports 50 percent of the time over any 3-year period. Adequate TAR
and underway training supports this personnel tempo goal. Shortened TAR
can be accommodated over the short-term if required to support
increased presence; however, maintenance and training will not be at
the same ideal tempo and will suffer over the long-term. Increased
deployment length may have no impact on TAR. However, with a given
(constant) presence or TAR, increasing the deployment length will
increase the IDTC length, which would be additional IDTC time for
training and maintenance.

25. Senator Akaka. Admiral Krol, how much ``flex'' currently exists
that will allow for additional compression of these already tight
timelines?
Admiral Krol. Flexibility remains in the Inter-Deployment Training
Cycle (IDTC) as timelines become compressed, but it comes at a cost.
Compressing the IDTC requires reductions in maintenance, and negatively
impacts training and crew quality of life. Maintenance scheduling is
frequently the driver in IDTC scheduling. Changing or compressing long-
lead time maintenance periods increases cost and adversely impacts
other planned maintenance.
Compressing schedules also results in reductions in the amount of
time allotted to training as well as the quality of that training for
the sailors involved. Shorter training periods force more qualification
and certification events to occur at an increased pace to insure units
are ready to deploy.
The true cost of compressing schedules and reducing maintenance and
training periods is the negative effect on quality of life and the
long-term negative effects on ship and aircraft readiness as a result
of not conducting required maintenance. The Navy is also forced to
compromise or postpone modernization that is conducted during
maintenance periods and provides the basis for transformation for the
force of the 21st century.

26. Senator Akaka. Admiral Krol, do you have any concerns, in
either the short- or the longer-term, about the impact of such
compression on the fleet, both from an equipment and a personnel
perspective?
Admiral Krol. Equipment impact: By extending deployments and
compressing the IDTC, the scheduling of required maintenance becomes
more compressed. To get the same (or higher) number of manhours
accomplished in a shorter amount of time, either the maintenance
infrastructure must grow or the existing infrastructure must work
longer hours. Either option will add to maintenance costs. Additional
wear and tear on the ships distributed systems due to lengthened
operating time will also drive the maintenance requirement up while the
ship is in port. There are other periodic requirements such as
preventive maintenance, calibration, inspections, and assessments that
will either be deferred or waived due to ships operations. Finally,
ships' modernization must be more strictly controlled, as there is
minimal time to install and train on new equipment and systems.
Incomplete upgrades and equipment alterations will be even more
intolerable with less time to groom between deployments.
Personnel impact: In the short-term, gains in retention, attrition,
and recruiting have improved overall fleet sea duty manning from 89.5
percent some 2 years ago to 97 percent at present. This makes it
feasible to satisfactorily man our ships and squadrons for deployment
with only minor personnel actions necessary to replace unplanned losses
or satisfy other critical skill shortfalls.
For the long-term, continued commitment to fund quality of life and
compensation initiatives is essential to offset the negative impact
higher OPTEMPO/ITEMPO will have upon retention, attrition, and
recruiting. It is also important that efforts to establish firm
employment schedules as early as possible. This enables the Navy
personnel system to conduct advanced planning for timely replacements;
it also supports the personal planning of our sailors.

REGIONALIZATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT

27. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Abrams testified
before the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2002, that
regionalization of installation management will pose challenges for
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mission commanders. He
stated that the loss of flexibility to move funds from base operations
to more urgent training needs increases the importance of fully funding
training requirements, beginning in fiscal year 2003. Are TRADOC's
training needs fully funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request?
What is your assessment of the impact of this regionalization on
training and readiness, not just in TRADOC but for all of the Army's
warfighting units?
General McKiernan. TRADOCs current training needs are adequately
funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, with acceptable risk. We
support base operations regionalization, now termed Transformation of
Installations Management (TIM), as a means to improve standard base
operations services across all Army installations, and thus improve
quality of life for soldiers and their families. Although we have
concerns, it is difficult to fully assess training and readiness
impacts before implementation. The Army is committed to ensuring that
certain mission activities, i.e., training enablers, force protection,
and airfield operations, are fully supported under the TIM
organization. These include our range and training land operations and
modernization programs, and our battle simulation centers, which
directly support training and operational tempo. My office is currently
developing an Organization and Operations Plan for those programs for
which I am the functional proponent, which will lay out how these
programs will be executed. We will work closely with the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Installation Management to ensure that mission
commanders are directly involved in the prioritization, implementation,
and control of these functions at all levels.

IMPACT OF CURRENT OPERATIONS ON PILOT EXPERIENCE LEVELS

28. Senator Akaka. General Wald, General Johnston testified before
the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2002, that Operation
Noble Eagle will have the same long-term effect on pilot experience
that operations in Southwest Asia have had. Specifically, he stated
that ``flying time'' instead of ``range time'' has reduced the amount
of time available for realistic training and that, as a result, pilot
experience has been degrading over the 1990s. Is the Air Force
examining or planning any efforts to try to remediate these effects and
if so, what are the likely costs of any alternatives that are being
considered?
General Wald. The Air Force is aggressively examining ways to use
the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct, DOD-directed training
transformation, and the accompanying budgeting process to mitigate the
effect of high OPTEMPO on readiness. In the fiscal year 2003 budget and
beyond, a balanced and integrated approach that focuses on four
fundamentals--transformation, readiness, retention, and re-
capitalization--is key to the Air Force maintaining a quality aircrew
force whose size and readiness enable it to accomplish the mission
today and tomorrow. An increased training bill in the form of training
backlogs coupled with the need to maintain an aging fleet of aircraft
is inevitable but is difficult to quantify until OPTEMPO reduces and
total training shortfalls are reported. Sufficient and sustained
congressional support would facilitate the essential readiness and
other improvements the Air Force needs to continue to train quality
combat pilots, and remain the world's preeminent air and space force.

INCREASED MAINTENANCE COSTS

29. Senator Akaka. General Wald, your written testimony states that
your aging aircraft fleet is becoming more expensive to maintain.
Please provide any data you may have to illuminate trends in cost
increases, by airframe and model.
General Wald. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFlOC) database
with its integral On-Line Analysis Processing (OLAP) tool illustrates
trends in USAF aircraft maintenance from fiscal year 1996-2001. The
OLAP tool captures the gamut of aircraft maintenance cost elements,
i.e., maintenance personnel (organizational, intermediate, and
ordnance); consumable supplies; depot level repairables; intermediate
maintenance; depot maintenance; contractor logistics support; and other
maintenance. The following weapon systems are principal cost drivers:

IMPACT OF CURRENT OPERATIONS ON TRAINING

30. Senator Akaka. General Wald, your testimony describes decreased
training opportunities as a result of current operations, especially
for crews of low density/high demand aircraft. What solutions is the
Air Force exploring for this problem, which you note could have a
``serious impact on long-term readiness?''
General Wald. Currently, decreased training opportunities for
highly-utilized major weapon systems have resulted in a shift toward a
back-to-basics approach to ensure aircrews continue to receive the most
essential training. The Air Force has also ``fenced'' aircraft into the
training role to make them more available and rotated crews to maintain
proficiency. In the future, when training is impacted by limited
aircraft availability, distributed mission training simulator
technology promises to be a means to enhance readiness by simulating
large force employment via multiple simulator data-links.

IMPACT OF CURRENT OPERATIONS ON RETENTION

31. Senator Akaka. General Wald, you state in your testimony that
the implementation of stop loss policies and higher tempo associated
with Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom may negatively affect
retention, and that ``offsets are . . . being explored.'' What are
those offsets, and what factors are being used to evaluate options?
General Wald. We are still in the exploration stage as we look at
ways to reshape our force based on the new steady state requirements of
OEF/ONE. This will maximize the effective use of our limited military
resources and should free up military endstrength to crosstrain into
our stressed career fields (e.g. Security Forces, OSI, etc.) to
increase their manning and capability, thereby positively affecting
retention.

ARMY OPTEMPO FUNDING

32. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, the Army's training strategy
for fiscal year 2003 is based on 901 live, virtual, and combat training
center tank miles, and 14.5 flying hours per crew per month for
aircraft. Yet the fiscal year 2003 budget request does not fully
support this strategy. At the same time, the Chief of Staff of the Army
has directed units to fully execute the strategy, irrespective of
funding shortfalls. Where does the Army plan to obtain additional
resources to fully execute the training strategy? What do you think the
impact will be if additional training funds are not made available in
2003 and training is reduced?
General McKiernan. Yes, the Chief of Staff, Army has directed
commanders to execute the full training strategy. The funding reduction
was a disappointment. The Army's fiscal year 2003 requirement, as
submitted, included 754 ``live'' miles, 46 ``virtual'' miles (800 mile
total), and 103 ``National Training Center'' miles for a total tank
mile requirement of 903. The funding reduction was based upon
historical execution. The Army believes it was not given sufficient
credit for instituting effective management controls in fiscal year
2001 that restricted migration from OPTEMPO or for executing the
highest level of tank miles since Operation Desert Storm. These same
controls are in effect for fiscal year 2002 and will be continued into
fiscal year 2003.
Since our training strategy and guidance to the field has not
changed, the challenge is to identify sources of funding that will
enable us to execute that strategy. We are currently working with
departmental leadership to restore critical training funding. Should
the funding not be restored, we will closely scrutinize year of
execution obligation rates for our Major Commands and make program
adjustments as required. Training is critical for Army readiness. We
are committed to providing the resources required to meet our strategy
and the associated level of readiness.

HIGH SPEED VESSEL

33. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, the Army has solicited a
second high-speed catamaran, reportedly to support Operation Enduring
Freedom. Marine Corps forces on Okinawa are currently leasing a similar
vessel but have decided to use it only for training purposes, because
it lacks force protection. Is it the Army's intent to use this vessel
in current operations? If so, what steps will be taken to protect it,
the troops, and equipment that might be embarked? What are the expected
costs of this protection, and how confident are you that the security
will be adequate?
General McKiernan. The Army published an intent to solicit a second
high-speed catamaran. However, this requirement is currently under
review by Central Command (CENTCOM). The high-speed catamaran, also
known as the High Speed Vessel (HSV) HSV-X1, ``Joint Venture,'' is
under a joint Army and Navy lease and will deploy to the CENTCOM area
of operations to provide a high-speed shallow draft vessel capability
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
To ensure the protection of the vessel, troops, and equipment, the
HSV-X1 will have individual and crew served weapons on-board. The
weapons package reflects the normal weapons found on the U.S. Army's
Logistics Support Vessels, which are currently deployed in the CENTCOM
area of operations. The crew will also train on force protection battle
drills while in theater, maintain a 24-hour vessel watch and maintain
communications with the port facility. The port facility is fenced, and
has entry control points and host nation speed boats with small arms
weapons. Navy vessels under Naval Central Command will provide
additional levels of area force protection support to the HSV-X1 within
the area of operations. The costs associated with these force
protection measures do not exceed the normal daily operating costs of
the vessel because of the requisitioning offset of the individual and
crew-served weapons laterally transferred from units currently
inactivating. The Army is confident that these force protection
measures are adequate to protect the HSV-X1.

JOINT READINESS

34. Senator Akaka. General Newbold, Dr. Mayberry testified that one
of the clear lessons from Afghanistan ``is that we must fight joint.''
How well does our current readiness system capture units' readiness for
joint operations? Are there any efforts ongoing or under consideration
to improve visibility into joint capabilities?
General Newbold. Our current system does not capture a specific
unit's readiness for joint operations, it captures combatant commands
and service readiness to support and conduct the joint fight across
eight functional areas (personnel, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), special operations, mobility, logistics, and
sustainment, infrastructure, C\4\ and joint planning, and training).
The Chairman's readiness system is built upon two pillars. The first is
assessing the traditional readiness indicators: personnel, equipment
availability, supply, and training. The second is assessing the
combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize joint forces
to accomplish assigned mission. Inherent in that second pillar are
readiness indicators that shed light on our ability to execute joint
operations across the eight functional areas. The Chairman's system
takes these two pillars and massages them together into an overall
understanding of the Armed Forces' ability to execute the National
Military Strategy.
In the future, we are moving to a readiness assessment system that
will capture specific unit readiness for the joint fight through the
use of METs. The units will report their readiness to perform its
mission essential task. Those tasks correspond directly to combatant
commanders Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs), the tasks that the
combatant commander must accomplish to be successful in the joint
fight. These tasks are identified as the result of understanding the
specific mission a unit is assigned and articulated using the common
language of the Universal Joint Task List, which is a comprehensive
listing of joint tasks units may have to perform. Once that system is
in place, I believe we will be in an even greater position to
understand the impact of unit level readiness on the readiness of our
Armed Forces to conduct joint operations.

INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

35. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, your prepared statement says
the Army is looking at basing an Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in
Europe. If the IBCT is a central part of the Army's transformation and,
as you say on page 11 of your statement, ``would have had a significant
impact on the conduct of the battles fought to date'' in Afghanistan,
why is the Army merely planning to ``examine'' forward stationing an
IBCT in Europe? Why isn't forward stationing an IBCT in both the
European and Pacific theaters a high priority? Wouldn't that get your
forces to the fight sooner, while requiring less strategic lift?
General McKiernan. In July 2001, the Army announced the location of
the six IBCTs. This was based upon operational and strategic
considerations. These locations balance a need to forward deploy and
tightly manage a new and dynamic transformation process, provide an
upgrade to the capabilities of XVIII Airborne Corps, and make the
appropriate investment in a Reserve component brigade to guarantee the
successful transformation of the Army Reserve component to the
Objective Force.
The Army feels that its current stationing plan, which has a
Pacific focus but emphasizes global deployability, exploits the
advantages of forward deployment for the Pacific theater of operations
while maintaining the Army's flexibility to meet other requirements in
other critical and non-critical regions.
Defense planners tasked the Army to plan to station an IBCT in
Europe by the end of 2007. The Army leadership has presented a plan to
Office of the Secretary of Defense and is awaiting guidance.

AC/RC MIX

36. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, you testified that current
demands for combat service support (CSS) units are straining the
Reserve Component. Is the Army evaluating whether some CSS units ought
to be moved into the active component, and/or whether there are some
capabilities in the active force that might be moved to the Reserves?
General McKiernan. Yes. Today's evolving National Military Strategy
(NMS), the QDR, and other defense plans call for a somewhat different
force capability than that of the 1990s, which was designed to fight
and win two major theater wars (MTWs) nearly simultaneously. Under the
previous strategy the Reserve component (RC) was assigned an increased
priority for Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS)
missions.
The shift in the defense strategy dictates a detailed evaluation of
the force mix. The Army uses Total Army Analysis, an analytical process
that guides our force development within the constraints provided in
the military strategy and budget, to determine new force structure
requirements. We are completing our latest analysis that includes a
look at Army force structure requirements based on the new strategic
guidance. For the most part, the Army has the right composition of
forces to execute the assigned missions. However, there are a number of
CS and CSS capabilities that may need to be increased in the Active
component (AC) to carry out the defense strategy and emerging missions.
The Army is assisting the Department of Defense to identify a range of
innovative force capability options to address new challenges and
opportunities as part of a QDR and other defense plans DPG-directed
review of the AC/RC mix.

PERSONNEL READINESS

37. Senator Akaka. Admiral Krol, your written statement asserts
that personnel readiness has improved due to pay raises, increased
housing allowances, and higher levels of career sea pay. What evidence
exists to demonstrate the contributions of each of these factors to
higher personnel readiness levels?
Admiral Krol. Tables 1 and 2 show how Navy has, since fiscal year
1999, made impressive gains in both increasing enlisted retention
(i.e., sailors deciding to remain in the Navy at the end of an
enlistment) and lowering enlisted attrition (i.e., more sailors are
successfully completing enlistments), especially among sailors with
less than 10 years of service.

While there may be many factors that go into an individual sailor's
career decision, years of statistical studies have shown conclusively
that increases in pay have a significant effect on retention. The
results of improved retention are clearly shown in Table 3--battle
groups are deploying better manned than ever before, and, in turn, the
Navy is better able to prosecute the global war on terrorism.

It is too early to do a complete statistical analysis of the
retention/attrition impact of the 2002 boosts in pay and compensation
(i.e., most have only been in effect since January 1, and improvements
in Career Sea Pay went into effect only within the last 6 months).
However, we do know that these most recent improvements put substantial
dollars into sailors' pockets. For example, a Boatswains Mate Third
Class (E-4) serving in a deployable Norfolk-based ship and drawing
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) will make approximately $11,000 more
in 2002 than in 2001. The increase takes into consideration hikes in
basic pay, authorized BAH for qualified E-4 single shipboard sailors,
and the October 2001 increases in Career Sea Pay. These initiatives
have been met with overwhelming positive feedback from fleet sailors
and are making a tangible financial difference for sailors and their
families. As Gas Turbine Systems Technician (Electrical) First Class
(E-6) Heink Reisenbichler, a 15-year sailor, put it in a recent media
interview, ``Our most valuable assets are our people . . . the pay
itself will motivate people to stay, and especially reduce the
financial stress for the younger sailor.''
We are winning the battle for people, but important challenges
remain. Officer retention in most line communities is below required
levels and recruiting shortfalls exist in officer specialty areas and
critical enlisted ratings. This is the first time in history that the
services have faced a prolonged conflict with an all-volunteer force.
We must ensure our most valuable resource, Navy men and women, are
provided with the tools and leadership to succeed, including a
continued commitment to enhancements in compensation.

LENGTH OF WAR ON TERRORISM

38. Senator Akaka. Admiral Krol, you state that it is ``quite
probable that the global war on terrorism will continue for several
years at a pace similar to, and perhaps periodically greater than, that
required to date for Operation Enduring Freedom.'' On what basis have
you reached this conclusion? Have you received any guidance about the
length or level of commitment you should plan for from either your
civilian or military leadership?
Admiral Krol. The senior leadership in both the Defense Department
and White House has publicly stated the global war on terrorism may go
on for many years. Given the nature of our enemy and the very
unconventional nature of his tactics, the duration and intensity of the
global war on terrorism cannot be predicted with certainty. As with
conflicts in the past, various options are being carefully analyzed for
the continued prosecution of the global war on terrorism. Different
options entail different levels of commitment in material, time, and
manpower.

PRIMARY READINESS CONCERNS

39. Senator Akaka. Dr. Mayberry and General Newbold, what do you
believe is the most important future readiness challenge that is not
sufficiently appreciated, either within the DOD or by Congress?
Dr. Mayberry. One of our most important readiness challenges for
the future is to preserve and protect our training ranges and major
training centers. These assets are essential for assuring realistic
combat training for our military forces. We need to have the means to
protect these assets from the many forms of encroachment, and modernize
them to support tomorrow's warfighting needs.
General Newbold. While there are a number of programs, weapon
systems and transformational concepts that are vital to the Department
remaining the predominant military force on Earth, their value will be
greatly diminished if we do not have the right blend of talent, in the
right quantities and the right experience levels, to perform our future
missions.
Congress and the DOD are both aware of the importance of service
members, but the importance of the preserving the intangibles of
military service (camaraderie, cohesion, espirit, etc.) is often given
insufficient credit. Compensation will never match the demands and
risks we ask of our military members, so service must be unique and
transcendent. This comment is not intended to diminish the importance
of compensation. Compensation is an indication of the appreciation of
the country to the servicemember's sacrifice and is vitally important
both for this reason and so that our families basic needs can be met.
We ask a lot of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--arduous
training, sitting long hours on alert, long family separations, often
in dangerous environments that add to the overall stress to the family.
The vast majority of our force takes enormous pride in serving their
country, but they also have to meet their personal obligations. If long
separations are too frequent, if the pay differential with the
civilians community becomes too large, if benefits are sensed to be
eroding, we run the risk of not being able to retain--or recruit--the
highly intelligent, skilled personnel necessary to operate those new
weapon systems, concepts, and programs. We've made tremendous progress
in quality-of-life initiatives recently, but we must be ever mindful of
the needs--intangible and real--of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines.

OSD ORGANIZATION

40. Senator Akaka. Dr. Mayberry, your office is responsible for
oversight and policy for force readiness. As we have discussed already,
readiness is a complex equation, with many contributing elements. Key
among them, however, is logistics support, which falls under a
different under secretary. Do you feel that the current organization
and division of responsibilities within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense adequately support your efforts to coordinate and direct all
aspects of readiness? If not, what changes have you considered and/or
proposed?
Dr. Mayberry. There are always challenges in ensuring adequate
logistics support for our forces. In fact, this area presented enough
challenges to warrant the establishment of a Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness [DUSD(L&MR)]. I have met
regularly with the DUSD(L&MR), and our staffs work closely to ensure
the most important materiel readiness issues are addressed. I have no
concerns with the current organization.

FORCE PROTECTION

41. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, could you please quantify the additional force
protection requirements after September 11? What options, if any, are
you considering to alleviate the burden that meeting this requirement
might pose?
General McKiernan. Since September 11, the Army has mobilized
15,668 Reserve component (RC) soldiers and detailed a further 12,478
Active component (AC) soldiers to perform installation security duty
requirements that are mandated by the Department of Defense (DOD) Force
Protection Condition (FPCON) System. The majority of these soldiers are
utilized to perform installation access control, security patrols, and
the guarding of mission essential vulnerable areas.
The Army is pursuing several initiatives to alleviate this burden
upon our AC/RC soldiers. We are reducing the number of access control
points necessary to provide the best force protection possible while
minimizing the number of personnel required to perform installation
access control. The Army is exploring existing and forthcoming security
technology that would enhance our security capabilities and further
reduce manpower required to support FPCONs. Additionally, the Army has
recommended to Congress the modification of existing law to permit
commanders to contract for security guards to perform the force
protection duties currently being done by AC/RC soldiers.
General Bedard. While force protection (FP) is not the mission of
the Marine Corps, it is mission-essential. Our highest priority remains
unchanged: the protection of our marines, those serving with us, their
families, and our civilian marines. Our most advanced aircraft, ship,
or weapons system is of no value without highly-motivated and well-
trained people. People and leadership remain the real foundations of
the Corps' capabilities. Since September 11, force protection
requirements (both new and previously identified) have been addressed
in the enhancement of our organizational structure and anti-terrorism
capabilities.
A leading example of this enhancement is the creation of the 4th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism). The 4th MEB (AT)
combines our Marine Security Guard Battalion, Marine Security Force
Battalion (MCSF BN), and the Chemical Biological Incident Response
Force (CBIRF) with a specialized anti-terrorism infantry battalion, as
well as a command element complete with dedicated planners,
coordinators, and liaison officers for anti-terrorism operations. The
4th MEB (AT) has had an immediate impact, deploying marines within 60
days to our re-opened embassy in Kabul, supporting flight line security
in Incirlik, Turkey, as well as supporting anthrax identification at
the Capitol.
The fiscal year 2003 budget reflects an endstrength increase of
approximately 2,400 marines in support of the 4th MEB(AT). This
increase will enable the Marine Corps to maintain the operational and
unit integrity of our 24 active infantry battalions, and regimental
command elements. Additionally, an endstrength increase would provide
structure and resources to form the 3rd Fleet Anti-terrorism Security
Team (FAST) Company, thereby increasing our FAST capability from 13 to
20 platoons. This valuable asset is operationally controlled by the
Chief of Naval Operations and strengthens the Navy-Marine Corps Team.
Electronic Security Systems (ESS) are the technology centerpiece of
the Marine Corps AT/FP program. ESS core funding supports physical
security efforts to trade technology for manpower. Installation and
operating forces commanders have identified requirements for increased
ESS support for AT/FP, which includes increased surveillance capability
(closed-circut TV) and digital capture technology for access control
points; portable sensor technologies; access control capability; and
biometrics integration.
Our centrally managed Physical Security Upgrade program relieves
commanders of having to choose between physical security projects that
support AT/FP efforts and quality of life minor construction and repair
projects at the installation level. This program provides funding for
blast mitigation; emergency power generation; security force facilities
improvement; security lighting; ordnance facilities improvement;
emergency operation center upgrades; and installation perimeter
fencing. In addition to the above core requirements, we received
supplemental funding via PBD 810 and the Defense Emergency Response
Fund (DERF) to support Mass Notification/Personnel Alerting Systems,
communication interoperability with State and local emergency response
agencies, and emergency preparedness for installation first responders.
In summary, our anti-terrorism/force protection program is based on
our ability to leverage our scarce manpower resources with enhanced
technology and training.
General Wald. Based upon the increased terrorist threat, we
immediately implemented a higher FPCON at all our CONUS Active,
Reserve, and Guard bases. We mobilized Air Force Reserve and Air
National Guard security forces and implemented stop loss to help
sustain manning levels. It appears we will be in this situation for the
long haul as intelligence and law enforcement reports indicate the
terrorist threat to our operations and people are significant and
enduring. We continuously evaluate our FPCONs and employ random
antiterrorism measures to deter and counter the threat. We are
exploring various ways to improve our force protection capabilities and
reduce the manpower shortfalls and associated burden on our people.
These methods include improved technology, training, tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
Admiral Krol. September 11 obligated the Navy to undertake force
protection measures in the United States proper that had previously
been institutionalized overseas--including robust, post-U.S.S. Cole
waterside security measures. Given roughly two-thirds of the Navy's
operating bases are in the U.S., this increase in posture and readiness
precipitated a proportional increase in necessary security resources,
particularly manpower.
Prior to September 11, the Navy was the first service to develop,
over the course of 4 years, a rigorous, objective staffing process to
quantify manpower requirements for security forces. With this manpower
metric, the Navy determined that about 4,500 additional personnel are
required to support FPCON BRAVO staffing. Until adequate Active Duty
security manpower becomes available, this additional security staffing
requirement is being filled by mobilized Reservists, and Active Duty
personnel whose normal functions do not include force protection. Given
that FPCON BRAVO is a likely long-term domestic condition, neither
Reservists nor these temporary augments are viable over time.
The Navy is considering a number of options to alleviate these
post-September 11 burdens. We are examining several options for meeting
the increased personnel requirements: increasing our Active Duty
numbers devoted to force protection, using a mix of Active Duty and
civilian personnel, using contract security personnel (though this
would require a change in public law), or a combination. We are also
actively examining where technology could be used to reduce the number
of security positions by creating secure enclaves around piers and
airfields inside our bases. Solutions, tailored to each unique
individual facility, are under review.

IMPACT ON RESERVE COMPONENTS

42. Senator Akaka. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General Wald,
and Admiral Krol, what impact has the call-up of the Reserve components
for Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle to perform missions
such as CAPs, airport security, and force protection at installations
had on the ability of those Reserve components to conduct their normal
training? Does your service plan to conduct its normal Reserve
component training this summer? To date, has the current call-up had
any impact on Reserve component recruiting or retention?
General McKiernan. The call-up of the Reserve components to conduct
airport security and force protection missions in support of Operations
Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle has not impacted on their ability to
conduct scheduled training. Reserve component units that have not
deployed will conduct their normal annual training as scheduled.
Today, over 54 percent of the Army resides in the Reserve
component, a significant portion of which has been mobilized to fight
against terrorism. Over the course of the global war on terrorism, the
Army has mobilized over 30,000 soldiers to either support individual
states in a Title 32 or state Active Duty role or to provide Title 10
support to the Federal Government. The challenge now facing the Army is
to sustain this mobilization over time, as the majority of requirements
will continue with only a portion of those being feasible to transition
to civilian or contract support.
In addition to doubling the number of soldiers deployed since
fiscal year 2001, the Army has been particularly stressed in specific
high-demand/low-density Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) such
as military police, military intelligence, special operations forces,
and chemical personnel as well as specific unit capabilities that
primarily reside in the Reserve component. Currently, almost 80 percent
of the Army's military police force deployed around the world in places
like Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and in numerous locations
throughout the United States is coming from the Army National Guard
(43.4 percent) and the Army Reserve (36.2 percent). Similarly, the Army
has mobilized 62 percent of its Reserve component military intelligence
capability and has sought out linguists and soldiers with human
intelligence (HUMINT) expertise. At the unit level, the Army has
mobilized a significant logistics capability, over 70 percent of which
resides in the Reserve component, as well as half of its existing
Biological Detection System (BIDS) units.
To deal with the stress on high-demand/low-density personnel and
the shortage of specific unit capabilities, the Army enacted selective
stop loss to hold certain soldiers with selected skill sets on Active
Duty. The Army was also forced to mobilize large number of Reserve
component units and individuals. While the Office of the Chief of Army
Reserve reports that these actions have not had a negative impact on
recruiting or retention, it is important to note that stop loss and
mobilization may mask underlying issues in these areas. Moreover, it
may simply be too early to tell.
While the Army is fighting the current war on terrorism, it is also
developing plans to mitigate the shortage of specific personnel and
unit capabilities in the future. The Army is reexamining its Active and
Reserve component mix of forces, conducting a review of its overall
force structure through the Total Army Analysis process, and revisiting
its endstrength requirements.
The global war on terrorism, in potential scope and duration, is
unlike any previous American war with the possible exception of the
Cold War. During the Cold War, however, the Army had the majority of
its capability in the Active component. Today, that is not the case.
Given the ongoing and open-ended requirements of the war on terrorism
and the limited size of the Active component, the Army will continually
rely on the Reserve component and may have to revise its strategy for
recruiting and retention in order to maintain the critical capability
to fight and win this Nation's current and future wars.
General Bedard There have been no impacts on units and individuals
not activated. Activated units have been provided with greatly enhanced
training opportunities. For example, one of the first unit activations
sent two platoons from B Company, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marines to Naval
Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to assume the installation security mission.
To prepare for the mission the unit received extensive training in
anti-terrorism and force protection from Marine Corps Security Forces
Battalion. During their 4-month rotation in Cuba, they were also able
to conduct extensive additional training, including live-fire, not
normally available to Reserve units due to their limited training
availability. The remaining two platoons in the company were activated
in mid-February to provide relief for the same mission. They, too, are
getting all of the additional training which will benefit not only the
unit readiness, but the individual marines as well.
Since their call to Active Duty, 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines and
Headquarters Company, 25th Marine Regiment have been serving as part of
2nd Marine Division and participating in all the normal training
opportunities offered at Camp Lejeune. One recent training opportunity
gave the Reserve Marines a chance to test and utilize new field
equipment. The 25th Marine regiment is one of only three regiments in
the Marine Corps (along with 6th and 8th Marines) to receive and train
with the new Combat Operations Center Command and Control equipment.
The opportunity to test new field equipment rarely comes to the reserve
units.
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 772 was activated to support 2nd
Marine Aircraft Wing and is currently at MCAS New River. This CH-53
squadron will reinforce Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 as part
of the air combat element for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which
deploys this summer. The squadron is undergoing extensive training to
be designated ``special operations capable,'' a first for a Reserve
squadron. Across the board, Marine Reserve units activated for the
global war on terrorism are performing their designated missions and
gaining superior training, which will enhance the versatility,
flexibility, and adaptability of the reserves to react, reinforce, and
augment the Active Forces.
The Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) activated thus far
are working in the pre-designated billets that they normally drill.
Those IMAs not activated are expected to continue to participate in
training with their operational sponsors. The Individual Ready Reserve
(IRR) members who have been activated are either working in their
Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), thus maintaining their
proficiency, or, for those who volunteered to fill a billet outside of
their MOS, gaining new skills. Those working installation security have
benefited from additional training in anti-terrorism and force
protection.
There have been no significant modifications to the MarForRes
Training Exercise and Employment Plan, so all previously scheduled
events will take place. Units not activated will continue to execute
their training plans as previously scheduled, and units that remain
activated will not be required to conduct annual training.
Marine Corps Reserve recruiting and retention behavior thus far in
fiscal year 2002 is not significantly different than we experienced in
fiscal year 2001. The complex nature of the current conflict, coupled
with the resulting unknowns concerning its extent and duration make it
impossible to predict the long-term impacts on recruiting and
retention. Long-term impact on recruiting will be tied to the role of
the particular service involved, public perception, and overall
progress in achieving the objectives of the conflict. Long-term impact
on retention will be tied to two critical factors. First, the job
satisfaction experienced by Reserve members who are mobilized will
determine the extent of continued interest in maintaining Reserve
affiliation once these members have met their call up responsibilities.
The second critical retention factor will be determined by the impact
of their post-Active Duty transition and assimilation back to their
local communities. Those members who experience difficulty in family or
personal life, reemployment and civilian careers, and related economic
impacts could have a significantly decreased interest in continued
participation in a Reserve capacity. It is important for leaders and
policy makers at all levels to watch these areas closely and to
evaluate any adverse impact experienced by our Reserve members, both
during Active service and after they have resumed their pre-
mobilization careers and family life. Because we have not demobilized a
significant number of marines initially called to Active Duty in
support of the current mobilization, the overall impact on retention
for recalled members is undetermined at this point.
General Wald. AFRC personnel proudly serve in continuing
deployments in support of our present war on terrorism, and other
contingency and humanitarian operations. This higher OPTEMPO has
resulted in less training time in some areas. For example, personnel
who deploy in support of taskings outside of their units are getting
valuable operational experience; however, in some cases, they are not
taking care of some of the recurring training requirements which would
have been accomplished had they performed home station duty. The full
scope homeland security associated requirements and mission are still
evolving and related additional training requirements will be addressed
concurrently. Air Force Reserve members will be expected to complete
their statutory annual tour requirements for the fiscal year. However,
given the current number of mobilized Reservists it's expected that the
number of personnel available to actually perform annual tours will be
diminished. In accordance with current policy, Inactive Duty Training
(IDT) requirements are fulfilled and members are considered
``constructively present'' while on Active Duty. The member's commander
or program manager should determine when IDT/Annual Training (AT) is
required and may waive training requirements when appropriate.
Admiral Krol. There has been minimal impact on the training regimen
to date. Naval Coastal Warfare units are currently serving in both
CONUS and OCONUS force protection roles, a mission that is closely
aligned with their war time mission and serves to sharpen unit
surveillance and water-borne surface ship interception skills.
Likewise, aviation units are serving in a capacity that ultimately
improves skills and readiness. Currently plans are being developed to
address force sustainment, both Reserve and Active capability, to deal
with long-term force protection needs.
Additionally, current plans are to continue normal training and to
meet exercise commitments. All non-mobilized Selected Reservists will
be eligible to perform annual training.
Since September 11, the Navy's retention rate has risen
substantially, resulting in fewer qualified veterans leaving Active
Duty and therefore available for Reserve affiliation. Of those
personnel who have made the decision to leave Active service during the
war, their awareness of Reserve mobilization has impacted their
decision for Reserve affiliation. The result is that affiliation of
Navy veterans appears to have decreased to some extent. Retention
appears to have increased due to stop loss, and the inability of a
mobilized Reservist to separate. We expect attrition to increase and
retention to decrease as a result of demobilization. In an attempt to
fill the gap, Naval Reserve recruiting has significantly increased the
accessions of non-prior service personnel.
______

Questions submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

TRAINING RANGES--VIEQUES

43. Senator Inhofe. General Bedard, you note in your written
testimony on page 22 that ``it is absolutely critical that the Navy and
Marine Corps maintain areas where they can combine naval gunfire,
artillery, air, and ground maneuver simultaneously.'' Is Vieques one of
these areas to which you are referring?
General Bedard. It is essential for naval forces to have access to
a live-fire training environment that allows for simultaneous live-fire
integration of all naval fires, including Marine direct and indirect
fires (small arms, machine guns, mortars, and artillery), Naval Surface
Fire Support, and aviation delivered fires. Vieques represents the only
training location on the east coast that possesses the ability to
accommodate the full range of naval fires. The loss of Vieques live-
fire training will degrade the ability to adequately train and prepare
Marine Air Ground Task Forces on the east coast for combat.

44. Senator Inhofe. General Bedard, the Army and the Air Force
indicate that they have unfunded requirements in support of their
training ranges for fiscal year 2003. The Navy does not identify an
unfunded requirement for training ranges. Is the Marine Corps fully
resourced to support training ranges, including Vieques, in fiscal year
2003?
General Bedard. Our fiscal year 2003 budget allows us to meet our
basic requirements in support of training ranges, although a number of
deficiencies exist which we are trying to address. While our ranges are
generally in adequate condition, we have been unable to modernize them
to provide for advanced fire and maneuver. We must compete our training
range enhancements in the POM process against the same funding lines
that procure our warfighting systems and equipment and, most
frequently, this process leaves training range modernization behind. In
particular, the operation and maintenance (O&M) funding provided for
range maintenance is subject to prioritization with other projects in
the same category and frequently falls short when competing with family
housing maintenance and other base support functions.
Our most significant limitations and shortfalls are targetry and
infrastructure to contribute to more advanced training. Realistic
targets that provide feedback to the shooter, instrumentation that
tracks positions over time, and threat emitters that stimulate aircrews
to take appropriate action while flying training missions are examples
of upgrades that would facilitate more advanced training. Once again,
these programs have to compete against other critical deficiencies and
therefore may not receive the necessary funding, or may take much
longer than desired to field.
Finally, we cannot comment on the level of fiscal support for
Vieques, since operations and maintenance funding for these ranges is
provided by the U.S. Navy, not the Marine Corps.

45. Senator Inhofe. General McKiernan, General Bedard, General
Wald, and Admiral Krol, in addition to the well-publicized issues
surrounding U.S. Navy/Marine Corps use of the Vieques training range,
the services face growing restrictions on the use of other military
ranges throughout the United States. It is expected that the problem
will be magnified by the introduction of faster and more lethal weapon
systems that require larger air, surface, and subsurface training and
operating areas. The protection of endangered species on military lands
has been particularly challenging for the military departments. The DOD
property supports, on a per capita basis, about four times the number
of endangered species as the Departments of Agriculture and Interior
lands. The DOD has about 26 million acres of land and about 300
endangered species. Most of the acreage is in training areas. Adding to
the challenge is the success of military environmental stewardship.
Like most things, when you ask the military to do something, it's going
to get done and it's going to get done right. In the case of the
environmental stewardship program, the success of the program has
resulted in increased encroachment--a Catch-22. Please give examples of
specific training ranges where encroachment is particularly
problematic. How much of the training ranges are not usable because of
environmental or other types of encroachment?
General McKiernan. In the vast majority of cases, encroachment at
our training ranges is the sum of incremental restrictions to the way
the Army would train under unconstrained conditions. There are very few
incidents of range areas that are entirely unusable due to these
constraints. Rather, a given area may be subject to a number of
restrictions on things like the location, duration, and timing of
training events or the weapons and equipment that can be used in
training. The cumulative effects of these incremental constraints are
sometimes subtle but unquestionably result in sub-optimal training
conditions.
Examples of installations experiencing encroachment issues include:

Fort Hood, TX: The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS)
biological opinion, issued under the ESA for both the Golden Cheeked
Warbler and the Black Capped Vireo, restricts training on over 66,000
acres (38 percent) of training land. These restrictions include no
digging, no tree or brush cutting, and no ``habitat destruction''
throughout the year on the entire core and non-core area. During March
through August, vehicle and dismounted maneuver training is restricted
to established trails, and halts are limited to two hours in designated
endangered species ``core areas.'' (55,000 acres of the 74,000 acres
are designated ``core areas.'') Artillery firing, smoke generation, and
chemical (riot control) grenades are prohibited within 100 meters of
the boundaries of the designated ``core areas.'' Use of camouflage
netting and bivouac are prohibited across the entire ``core area''
during these months. Unit commanders are forced to develop and
implement work-arounds that result in sub-optimal training conditions.
An example of such a work-around is the use of tape or ribbons to
delineate fighting positions in lieu of digging entrenched fighting
positions. These restrictions primarily affect Fort Hood's eastern
training/maneuver corridor and concentrate training impacts on the
western corridor. Concentration of training impacts, coupled with
cattle grazing, is causing severe erosion and rapid training land
degradation on the installation.
Fort Richardson, Alaska: In a lawsuit against the Army at Fort
Richardson, Alaska, plaintiffs allege that munitions used for their
intended purpose (fired in training) are solid waste under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and are subject to corrective action
(clean-up), a pollutant discharge under the Clean Water Act requiring a
permit, and a discharge of hazardous substances under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund)
requiring reporting and remediation. Plaintiffs have filed a motion for
a preliminary injunction in their complaint seeking to halt live-fire
training pending resolution of the case. At a minimum, results of this
litigation will impact Forts Greeley and Wainwright in Alaska because
they have similar physical conditions and conduct similar military
range operations. A negative ruling in this case may result in the
broad application of these statutes to all the military services' live-
fire training.
Hawaii (including Makua Military Reservation and Pohakuloa Training
Area): Training at Makua Military Reservation was halted for nearly 3
years during negotiations associated with the National Environmental
Policy Act and endangered species issues. Under terms of a settlement
agreement, the Army must complete an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) by October 2004. The EIS must address the potential impacts of
military training at Makua and related environmental studies. Because
the lawsuit settlement allows less than the required 18 Combined Arms
Live Fire Exercises (CALFEXs) per year, the 25th Infantry Division
(Light) [ID(L)] must complete the additional requirements for Company
CALFEXs during deployments to Continental United States (CONUS)
training facilities. Also, it is likely that other DOD components
(i.e., U.S. Marine Corps, Army Reserve, and National Guard) will not
have access to Makua for live-fire training during the next 3 years,
since the restrictions of the lawsuit settlement does not allow the
25th ID (L) to meet its own training requirements without out-of-state
deployments. Terms of the biological assessment and biological opinion
for threatened and endangered plants and animals at Makua impose
restrictions on the uses of training aids, the uses of areas, and the
intensity of uses. The Army constructed a Multi-Purpose Range Complex
at Pohakolua Training Area (for nearly $25 million). The Army has never
fully utilized the range due to very restrictive, and expensive,
environmental mitigation measures that resulted from consultation with
U.S. Fish and Wildlife. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is under
court order to designate critical habitat for 245 plant species in
Hawaii. These designations are in various stages of completion. Current
data indicates that 5 critical habitat designations for animals, and 58
upcoming designations for plants have the potential to negatively
impact Army training lands and ranges in Hawaii. These adverse impacts
may include training restrictions, administrative burden, and access
limitations to certain areas. At Makua Military Reservation, under
terms of a settlement agreement, the Army must complete an EIS by
October 2004, or military training may suspended until the EIS is
complete.
General Bedard. There are a number of proposals under consideration
to better identify, quantify, and report the impacts of encroachment at
both the OSD and Marine Corps level. At the service level, there is a
USMC proposal to create a range database that would link Individual
Training Standards (ITSs) and collective training standards to specific
ranges/range complexes. This metric would enable the USMC to articulate
the impact of the loss or degradation of a specific range. This metric
would by extension help identify range shortfalls and provide the
foundation for a range management roadmap. Ultimately, the range
management database will lend itself to a much-improved ability to
articulate encroachment impacts in terms of readiness standards and
costs.
The following list is a sample of specific training ranges where
encroachment is particularly problematic from each coast and Hawaii.
This list does not include all of our military installations. It is,
however, representative of the encroachment problems we face and the
causative factors resulting in training limitations.
Southern California--Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar--
Endangered Species Act (ESA): Miramar supports nine listed species.
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) proposed designating
critical habitat for three species covering 65 percent of the base,
including the containment area. USFWS decided not to designate any
habitat on the station as the Station's Integrated Natural Resources
Management Plan (INRMP) provided suitable species management, obviating
the need for habitat designation. The decision to not designate
critical habitat on Miramar was challenged by the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) and the California Home Builders Association
(CAHBA). In response to the CAHBA case, USFWS decided to withdraw the
rule until a new economic analysis could be prepared. It is anticipated
USFWS will designate habitat such that the concerns of CAHBA are
accommodated. Finally, it is anticipated that NRDC will refile their
complaint and seek to overturn the decision that excludes military
installations from critical habitat designation.
Air Quality: Miramar is located within the South Coast Air Quality
District, which is a severe non-attainment area. Meeting air quality
standards during basing of the MV-22 Osprey, the Marine Corps' number
one aviation acquisition priority, will be challenging.
Airspace: The San Diego area airspace is facing encroachment from
Tijuana, Mexico's Rodriguez airport, affecting operations at all San
Diego area air stations. In addition, San Diego-area military
installations face continuing pressure to provide space for a civilian
international airport to replace Lindbergh Field.
Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton--ESA: Camp Pendleton
supports 18 listed species. USFWS proposed designating critical habitat
for six species covering 57 percent of the base, including all 17 miles
of beach and a portion of the impact area. USFWS decided to not
designate much of the base as the harm to readiness would be greater
than the benefit to the species. Areas designated for critical habitat
include the area leased to the State of California for use as a state
park. The decision to not designate critical habitat on Camp Pendleton
is being challenged in court by NRDC and CAHBA. In response to the
CAHBA case, USFWS decided to withdraw the rule until a new economic
analysis could be prepared. It is anticipated USFWS will designate
habitat such that the concerns of CAHBA are accommodated. Finally, it
is anticipated that NRDC will refile their complaint and seek to
overturn the decision that excludes military installations from
critical habitat designation.
The State of California is proposing the creation of Marine
Protected Areas, including one off the coast of Camp Pendleton. The
Marine Corps objects to this designation as it would restrict the
ability to conduct amphibious operations.
Urban Development: Interstate Highway 5 and a parallel railroad
track serve as barriers for tactical movement from the beach to inland
fire and maneuver areas. While several underpasses exist, only one
underpass can accommodate all tactical vehicles used by the Marine
Corps, thereby limiting manuever throughput. A State park and nuclear
power plant on the base remove about half of the beach area for
training. Development up to the fence line is resulting in increased
local populace noise complaints due to live-fire exercises conducted
aboard the base. The base has been identified, over the objection of
the Marine Corps, by the San Diego area governments as a potential site
for a new international airport. Over the objection of the Marine
Corps, the USFWS, United States Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA), and LA District Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) are requiring
the Federal Highway Administration to consider alternative highway
route alignments through Camp Pendleton.
Airspace Restrictions: San Onofre nuclear power plant has airspace
restrictions.
Air Quality: Camp Pendleton is located within the South Coast Air
Quality District, which is a severe non-attainment area. Meeting air
quality standards during basing of the Advanced Amphibious Assault
Vehicle (AAAV), the Marine Corps' number one ground acquisition
priority, will be challenging.
Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego--Base Urban
Encroachment: MCRD San Diego continues to experience significant urban
development around its facilities with increasing competition for use
of MCRD property by local airport authorities.
Arizona--Yuma Training Range Complex (YTRC), Arizona--Chocolate
Mountains Aerial Gunnery Range--ESA: USFWS designated about 175,000
acres north of the ridgeline as critical habitat for the Desert
Tortoise.
Noise: Target arrays are prohibited from about 200,000 acres south
of the ridgeline due to noise concerns of Niland, CA, residents. Noise
and ESA concerns will make creation of new target arrays difficult;
this adversely affects training for units such as the Naval Special
Warfare Task Units (SEALs), who require new target arrays.
Mineral Resources: Oil, mineral, and gas development options on
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) withdrawn land, if exercised, would
affect ability of this installation to support military training.
Western portion of the Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR)--ESA: BMGR
currently provides habitat for two species protected under the
Endangered Species Act. Specifically, the Sonoran Pronghorn antelope
which as been designated as endangered and the flat-tailed horned
lizard which has been proposed to be designated a threatened species.
The presence of these protected species places significant restrictions
on approximately 320,000 acres (46 percent) of the BMGR West.
Similarly, the Sonoran Pronghorn occupies 445,000 acres (42 percent) of
the BMGR East, which is under U.S. Air Force control but is also used
by fleet Marine units and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron
One (MAWTS-1). Although civilian recreational use and the two protected
species have not prevented required training mission accomplishment,
they limit use of certain portions of the range. For example, when
Pronghorn antelope are present in a target area, fighters laden with
ordnance and fuel must either loiter until the antelope leave or cancel
the sortie without completing their assigned mission.
North Carolina--MCAS Cherry Point--Environmental and property issue
with State of North Carolina over water targets: Concerns include
unexploded ordnance (UXO), noise, and water quality.
Frequency spectrum encroachment: The band used for Tactical Air
Combat Training System (TACTS) range may be lost to commercial
interests.
MCB Camp Lejeune--Urbanization: The area around the base is
experiencing explosive growth due to the nearby beach economy. Planning
for development of a 2,500-acre parcel adjacent to the base's tank
range, explosive ordnance disposal range, and rifle range as a golf
course community supporting 4,500 units of housing is underway. The
potential for noise complaints is staggering.
Hawaiian Islands--MCB Hawaii--ESA and Cultural Resources/Makua
lawsuit: Prior to October 2001, the Army and Marine Corps were enjoined
from conducting live-fire training exercises in Makua Valley on Oahu.
The Army has regained limited access to the range for training.
However, sufficient access to accommodate Marine Corps training was not
forthcoming.
Explosive Safety Arcs: Previously compatible land use has been
converted to commercial development, impeding ability to maintain
explosive safety arcs.
General Wald. The Air Force has about 79 endangered species on its
ranges and installations. Currently, the range most seriously affected
by restrictions due to endangered species is the Barry M. Goldwater
Range (BMGR) in Arizona. The BMGR, the adjacent Wildlife Refuge, and
National Monument are the last remaining habitat for the Sonoran
Pronghorn antelope. The Air Force routinely redirects or cancels 30
percent of our live-drop missions every year to avoid the antelope.
Currently, at the other ranges, there are no major restrictions on
testing or training. However, we have seen large increases in
population around several bases that are associated with our largest
ranges, such as Nellis AFB, Nevada, and Luke AFB, Arizona. It is this
developing trend that has led the DOD to seek clarification on specific
legislative and regulatory requirements. Our goal is to maintain our
capability to test equipment, train military forces, and simultaneously
protect the environment to the greatest extent possible.
Admiral Krol. Nowhere is the impact of encroachment more apparent
than in Southern California and especially with respect to Marine Corps
bases in that locale. In February 2000, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS) proposed designation of over one-half of the 12,000
acres that comprise the Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar as critical
habitat for several species. The designation included runways and other
aviation related structures. At the same time, USFWS also proposed
critical habitat designation on about 65 percent of Marine Corps Base,
Camp Pendleton, an installation of 126,000 acres. At Miramar, the
Marines were able to convince USFWS that the Integrated Natural
Resources Management Plan provided sufficient species protections, and
at Camp Pendleton, USFWS determined that the harm to military readiness
was greater than the value of critical habitat designation, resulting
in a scaled back designation. Parties unhappy with these results,
however, are challenging USFWS's decisions in court. If the challenges
are successful, critical habitat designation at Miramar will prevent
the construction and use of ground support facilities, such as a rifle
range, military family housing, and utility support facilities. The
Marine Corps will also have to consult with USFWS for the use of
existing runways and other aviation support facilities. At Camp
Pendleton, a loss would require the Marine Corps to consult on training
on 57 percent of the base. The Corps is already modifying training on
the 10 percent of the base currently designated as critical habitat.
For example, Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) amphibious landing
exercises are seasonally restricted to only one beach at Camp
Pendleton. In March 13, 2000, the MEU was restricted to 500 yards out
of 17 miles of beach because of endangered species and other
encroachment restrictions. In consequence, instead of accomplishing a
realistic nighttime amphibious landing, units coming ashore on Landing
Craft Air Cushion (LCACs) vehicles were off-loaded at the LCAC facility
before moving inland to continue the exercise. They did not go through
the full kinds of training required to prepare to take a hostile beach.
This was a very serious degradation of training.
About 175,000 acres of the northeastern portion of the Chocolate
Mountains Aerial Gunnery Range has been designated as critical habitat
for the desert tortoise. About 300,000 acres of the southwestern
portion of the range has been designated as a no-drop area due to noise
concerns. Accordingly, establishment of new target arrays is extremely
difficult. The Navy SEALs would like to establish a new range, but will
likely not be able to due to endangered species and noise concerns.
The Navy was not as successful in avoiding the designation of
critical habitat on the Naval Amphibious Base (NAB), Coronado, CA. The
USFWS designated critical habitat for the Pacific population of the
Western Snowy Plover in December 1999 on portions of the base. NAB
Coronado has been home to Navy frogmen and SEALs since their inception
in World War II. All of the basic skills from diving to hydrographic
reconnaissance have been taught on the beaches and in the bays
surrounding the base. For decades, SEALs, marines, beachmasters, and
Amphibious Construction Battalions conducted amphibious landings on
Coronado's beaches. Ironically, the Navy's successful conservation
efforts at NAB Coronado have resulted in additional limits on training.
In the early 1980s, the Navy began moving Eastern Snowy Plover and
Least Tern nests across the highway to a more protected area in order
to avoid any damage from tracked vehicles and foot patrols. As the bird
populations grew in this conservation area, however, the birds extended
their habitat back to the ocean beaches, forcing the Navy to cease most
over-the-beach amphibious landings. Since 1996, the Navy has spent
approximately $675,000 per year on conservation and management programs
for the birds, increasing nesting by almost 300 percent. Navy's
successful stewardship program, however, has resulted in the loss of
training area, and NAB Coronado has lost substantial areas of its
training beaches to encroachment. The response has been to
substantially alter training activities or to conduct them elsewhere,
which disrupts training cycles, reduces access to training areas, and
increases costs and the already considerable time sailors must spend
away from their families before leaving for 6-month deployments. The
Navy has been working currently with the USFWS to alleviate the
situation but, again, these procedural modifications are open to
litigation from environmental groups.
The Navy has run into similar problems on the Vieques Range in
Puerto Rico. On Vieques, Navy implemented a turtle protection program
that required daily patrols for endangered sea turtle nests. Under the
program, where possible, eggs in nests that could be at risk were
removed to a hatchery. Over 20,000 turtle eggs were saved through this
program, with a successful hatching rate of 80 percent (far higher than
turtles in the wild). Notwithstanding the Navy's contribution to sea
turtle conservation, the incidental take statement in USFWS's
biological opinion on Navy training at Vieques allowed the Navy to take
only one turtle in the course of training. This low number of
authorized take forced the Navy to expend more effort and funding on
turtle surveys. On average, the Navy spends several days and $100,000
per battle group training exercise cycle to conduct turtle surveys.
Additionally, the low number of authorized incidental takes has forced
the Navy to expend more time on planning training exercises that
utilizing the beaches. In some instances, exercises have been moved to
other parts of the beach where there are fewer turtles. At other times,
exercises have been severely curtailed. For example, amphibious warfare
training exercises have been moved, scaled back, or dropped only
because of their potential to take more than one turtle.
At Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar, California, plaintiffs filed
suit in 1997 challenging the adequacy of Clean Air Act documentation
supporting the Base Realignment and Closure realignment of helicopters
and fixed-wing aircraft from Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro and
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin to the former Naval Air Station,
Miramar. The Miramar realignment involved replacing 22 squadrons of
Navy fixed-wing aircraft with 9 squadrons of Marine Corps fixed-wing
aircraft and 8 squadrons of Marine Corps rotary-wing aircraft, totaling
approximately 256 aircraft. The case continues to proceed under a
settlement agreement, which includes a Marine Corps commitment to
complete a new air quality analysis. Over 20 construction projects,
valued at approximately $400 million, have been completed at Miramar,
and both Marine Corps jets and helicopters are now operating there.
Military operations and training continue to be at risk, however,
unless conformity can be demonstrated and survive judicial scrutiny.

46. Senator Inhofe. General Wald, recently Senator Bill Nelson of
Florida has been speaking on the use of Eglin Test Range as a viable
alternate to live-fire training at Vieques. What impact would moving
the naval training to Eglin have on the ability of the Air Force to
train? What impact would this have on the readiness of Air Force
Special Operations Command forces?
General Wald. The Navy is working on a strategy to delineate their
requirements for fleet training in the future. Their Training Resource
Strategy would validate current and future Navy requirements. For the
east coast, the Navy is focusing on the use of existing DOD test and
training infrastructure on the coast and in the Gulf of Mexico,
including the Eglin range in Florida, the largest range in the east.
The Air Force has six major commands operating in that area, including
the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Combat Command,
Air Force Material Command and Air Force Special Operations Command,
and Air Education and Training Command. We are committed to ensuring
that all our units in the region continue to get the training they need
to maintain the highest level of readiness possible.
The subject of east coast training has been a frequent source of
discussion between the Air Force and Navy. With many key Air Force and
Navy missions on the east coast and the Gulf of Mexico, we are taking
these discussions very seriously. Our goal is to establish a framework
for a cooperative and integrated approach to joint training issues and
effective range utilization.

47. Senator Inhofe. General Wald, if the Navy ends live-fire
training at Vieques, has the Air Force considered what might be the
implications for Air Force training ranges? What might they be?
General Wald. The Air Force operates two ranges in the southeast
that can accommodate live weapons training--Shelby Range, Mississippi,
and the Eglin Range, Florida, the largest range in the east. Other non-
live-fire ranges operated by the Air Force in the east include: Dare
County Range, North Carolina; Poinsett Range, South Carolina; Townsend
Range, Georgia; Grand Bay Range, Georgia; and Avon Park Range, Florida.
The Air Force is actively working with the Navy to develop a
framework for a cooperative and integrated approach to range use. This
framework will address equities involved in an effort to best
accommodate the needs of all users and the local communities. We have
opened a dialogue with the U.S. Navy and we are reviewing the training
needs and facilities of both our services. As this review process
matures, we will better understand how their needs can best be
integrated with ours. We are committed to ensuring that our units
continue to get the training they need to maintain the highest level of
readiness possible.

48. Senator Inhofe. General McKiernan, if the Navy ends live-fire
training at Vieques, has the Army considered what might be the
implications for Army training ranges? What might they be?
General McKiernan. It is very difficult to predict the implications
to Army ranges associated with the cessation of live-fire training at
Vieques. The combination of conditions at Vieques makes for a complex
social and political environment. The Navy faces issues of perceived
public safety hazards, Clean Water Act compliance, Noise Control Act
compliance, and very visible political activism. There are a number of
Army installations with similar concerns stemming from potential for
environmental enforcement and encroachment. Our concern is that if the
Navy can not justify the use of the only range available for the
Atlantic Fleet to conduct vital pre-deployment combined arms training,
it will be difficult for any military service to justify the use of any
live-fire range. This situation illustrates the power associated with
the use of environmental laws and social activism to stop vital
military training anywhere.

49. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, the Army and the Air Force
indicate that they have unfunded requirements in support of their
training ranges for fiscal year 2003. The Navy does not identify an
unfunded requirement for training ranges. Is the Navy fully resourced
to support training ranges, including Vieques, in fiscal year 2003?
Admiral Krol. Fleet training, and training ranges in particular,
can benefit from additional funding. In fiscal year 2002, $30 million
above original programming has been provided to Commander in Chief,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet to support increased range usage and increased
flexibility in IDTC needed for ``surge'' CVBG deployments and the
reduced turn-around ratio associated with Operation Enduring Freedom.
This provides ``mission based'' pre-deployment training including
future weapon systems employment by incorporating the best available
technologies into Battle Force Team Training, to support current and
anticipated missions. An additional $16 million has been requested in
the DOD fiscal year 2002 Supplemental Request for that purpose. A
similar effort to identify where our training infrastructure requires
upgrade will also be done in the Pacific Fleet area of responsibility.
Where it is appropriate, we will reprioritize our training funding to
continue this effort in fiscal year 2003.
Also, considerable effort is in progress to better define our fleet
training and training range requirements Navy-wide. We are being
careful to focus on providing the fleet with the capability, capacity,
and flexibility to support fleet training requirements, not only for
peacetime sustained operations, but in surge or wartime environments.
The initial results of this work will be reflected in our fiscal year
2004 budget inputs and will continue to mature in future years.
Within the competing resource requirements, the fiscal year 2003
budget provides adequate funding to support training range operations
and meet deploying force training requirements.

50. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, in a meeting prior to the
hearing, we discussed the problems of environmental compliance for the
Navy to begin live-fire training at Vieques. According to Navy
documents, the environmental issues facing the Navy are procedural,
and, given a dedicated level of effort and proper management by the
Navy, these issues could be resolved. Last fall, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) and the Commandant wrote a letter to the Secretary of
the Navy requesting the use of Vieques to conduct live-fire training
for the John F. Kennedy battle group. Was the Navy staff prepared to
dedicate the personnel and resources necessary in the fall of 2001 to
satisfy the environmental compliance procedural issues for the John F.
Kennedy battle group live-fire Vieques operations requested by the CNO
and the Commandant?
Admiral Krol. In the fall of 2001, the Navy had defined the
environmentally related steps needed to resume training with explosive
ordnance while complying with pertinent environmental laws and
regulations, and was prepared to pursue them when tasked to do so
higher authority. A decision has not yet been made to resume explosive
ordnance training.

51. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, according to press reports, the
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet has initiated a Training
Resources Strategy (TRS) to ``spread battle group training across many
installations.'' What is the purpose of the TRS? On what date will the
TRS be implemented?
Admiral Krol. The purpose of the TRS is to provide the fleet a
comprehensive and coherent program to link tactical training resources
to readiness requirements. The program will provide multi-site training
and multi-dimensional flexibility throughout the Navy's overseas
deployment training process (IDTC). The TRS, as envisioned, will
leverage existing DOD resources and will enhance training capabilities
when and where there is greatest potential to improve combat readiness.
Additionally, the Training Resources Strategy will permit naval and
joint future technology enhancements to adjust the balance of live,
virtual, and constructive (LVC) components of training as improvements
in technology and simulation are fielded. The program is being
implemented incrementally and is currently underway. As an example, the
TRS plans delivery of the first Virtual At-Sea Training Deployable
Pototype (VAST/DP) system in October 2003. With this technology, Navy
surface ships will eventually be able to conduct NSFS qualification at
sea, independent of a fixed land range. The TRS also proposes more
extensive cross-service coordination of training conducted at various
DOD range facilities, as is currently being negotiated between the Navy
and the Air Force for ranges in Florida. Throughout the Atlantic Fleet
area of operations, multi-site, multi-dimensional, and technology-
enhanced training will add tactical depth and flexibility, provide
surge capacity and share the benefits of capital investment to conduct
concurrent CVBG/ARG-MEU operations and enhance training capabilities.
The TRS is an evolutionary process that will provide direction to
improve the Navy's readiness resourcing policy.

52. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, what level of funding is required
to support the Training Resources Strategy in fiscal years 2002 and
2003? Please itemize by fiscal year and purpose.
Admiral Krol. The TRS will require approximately $45.452 million in
fiscal year 2002 and $109.988 million in fiscal year 2003.
Anticipated expenditures include the following:

Facility construction and upgrades: $23.237 million
NAP Key West hangars and maintenance building, inspection, and
maintenance of Tactical Aircrew Combat Training System (TACTS) Towers,
maintenance dredge to ship channel at Key West and Pensacola, upgrades
to mine warfare capability at AUTEC, upgrades to Navy Dare County
Range, Cherry Point Range, and upgrades to FACFACS Va Capes to provide
an Exercise Control Group Cell.

Feasibility studies for range enhancements: $920,000
Naval Underwater Warfare Center (NUWC) studies at TACTS tower
ranges and AUTEC for expanded fleet operations, mobile missilex
capability study.

Environmental studies and NEPA documentation: $6.3 million
NEPA and site studies at Key West, Open Ocean (At-Sea
Documentation, Virtual at Sea Training Deployable Prototype (VASTDP)
and Avon Park Live Fire.

Large Area Tracking Range (LATR): $1.5 million
Upgrades the frequency tracking from 141MHZ to 433MHZ to comply
with the remainder of the fleet's LA TR sites.

Forward Area Combined Degaussing Acoustic Range (FACDAR) Range: $5.3
million
Provides a magnetic/acoustic sensing instrumented range to measure
all ships for Mine Warfare vulnerabilities.

Berry Island Mine Cable: $1.8 million
Provides for the manufacture of an 8-mile cable to connect the
instrumented tactical training mine field located at Berry Island,
Bahamas to Little Stirrup Key, Bahamas to establish a permanent
telemetry site for recording usage at the mine field.

FACFACS Va Capes/Jacksonville ADSi Installation: $1.8 million
ADSI provides LINK-16 surface picture from participating surface
units operating in the east coast warning areas. Provides real time
location of surface units which will enhance safety of range operations
involving ordnance, aircraft, and ships and provide exercise control
groups greater capability to conduct exercise injects with opposition
forces.

C/D Antenna for G1 Aircraft: $350,000
Antenna will provide capability to relay control data for aerial
drones in support mobile missile exercises for fleet training.

Exercise Support: $1.315 million
Provides fleet support with use of the boat Gosport which is used
in large integrated exercises to launch BQM-74 drones, provide GPS
suppression, act as an enemy vessel laying mines or provide a platform
for navy and SEAL teams to practice hostile boarding of vessels. Also
supports providing hulls for large sinking exercises (SINKEX).
Present estimates for fiscal year 2003 TRS requirements include:
Key West upgrades: $59 million
Construction and additional existing building repair,
infrastructure upgrades to fuel, electrical and water lines, and
maintenance dredge of Key West.

AUTEC Range upgrades: $5.894 million
Berry Island minefield cable installation and permanent Ship Self
Radiated Noise Measurement (SSRNM) facility installation.

Environmental: $6.5 million
NEPA compliance at Eglin AFB, NAS Pensacola, Avon Park Live Fire
(only if contract cannot be awarded in fiscal year 2002), and Vieques
clean-up.

Exercise Support: $17.449 million
Funds for the use of Eglin AFB, SSRNM portable until fixed site can
be installed, mobile boat support (Gosport), mobile threats, and mobile
at-sea missilex support.

Instrumentation upgrades at Cherry Point: $530,000
Provides support for coastal and ground threats and Beaufort TACTS
tower support.

Civilian personnel support for TRS: $381,000
Provides for civil service and contractor support at CINCLANTFLT
and Eglin AFB for the TRS.

Mid Atlantic Electronic Warfare Range (MAEWR) and Cherry Point threat
upgrades: $13.17 million
Provides electronic threat emitters, mobile EW threat emitters,
shipboard EW threat emitters, and communications/data links.

Other OPN upgrades: $6.839 million
Provides funding for the installation of hyqrophones at Beaufort
TACTS towers for Naval Surface Gunfire Support (NSFS) systems, and
fixed and mobile land target acquisition.

53. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, does the Training Resources
Strategy consider the use of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training
Facility (Vieques range) in Puerto Rico for Navy training in fiscal
year 2002?
Admiral Krol. Yes.

54. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, does the Training Resources
Strategy consider the use of the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training
Facility (Vieques range) in Puerto Rico for Navy training in the first
and second quarters of fiscal year 2003?
Admiral Krol. Yes.

55. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Mayberry, on page three of your written
statement you describe the importance of having a training range
infrastructure that ``supports realistic, combined arms, force-on-force
training for our military,'' and that this is important because
``tomorrow's conflicts are likely to be short-notice, `come as you are'
events, and we will need to fight joint and fight interoperable on a
moment's notice.'' I couldn't agree with you more. In fact, I would
suggest--and I know the CNO, the Commandant, and other warfighters
agree--that Vieques fully supports joint operations under the most
realistic conditions--the criteria that the Senior Readiness Oversight
Council (SROC) has found deficient in other military ranges. What were
the findings of the SROC with respect to Vieques? If the SROC did not
evaluate Vieques, why not?
Dr. Mayberry. The Department is committed to preserving the
readiness and accessibility of the air, land, and sea test and training
ranges that provide our forces with realistic, combined arms, force-on-
force training opportunities needed to execute our defense strategy.
The SROC has addressed Vieques repeatedly in recent years. In September
1999, the SROC evaluated the importance of Vieques to the training
readiness of the Atlantic Fleet. In December 1999, the SROC highlighted
the impact of continued non-availability of Vieques on deploying
carrier battle groups and Marine amphibious ready groups. The SROC
reviewed and approved the Navy's implementation of temporary
workarounds to meet minimum Atlantic Fleet training requirements--
without access to Vieques. In May 2000, the Navy briefed the SROC on
its experiences training the U.S.S. Eisenhower and U.S.S. George
Washington carrier battle groups using alternate ranges. While the use
of alternate sites achieved minimum training requirements for the Navy,
limitations and training artificialities tremendously devalued training
realism. Loss of the Vieques live-fire training area was addressed in
several SROCs addressing encroachment of our test and training ranges.
In June 2000, the SROC reviewed service readiness issues resulting from
the encroachment of test and training ranges, and set direction for the
development of a comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy for addressing
these issues. The SROC approved a comprehensive strategy in November
2000 and assigned appropriate responsibilities for its implementation.
In January 2002, the SROC reviewed some administrative, legislative,
and regulatory actions which would help preserve the sustainability of
our test and training ranges.

56. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Mayberry, if the Navy ends live-fire
training at Vieques, have you considered what might be the implications
for training ranges operated by the Navy and the other military
services? What might they be?
Dr. Mayberry. The important training opportunities that Vieques has
provided our forces must be provided somewhere. Given Vieques' existing
limitations and anticipated closing, the Navy and Marines have begun to
conduct more of their training at other existing facilities. While we
have not conducted live-fire training at Vieques for some time now, we
continue to deploy ready battle groups and amphibious ready groups. The
Navy and Marines are emphasizing the use of a variety of training
ranges and operating areas in order to reduce reliance on a potential
single point of failure during the Inter-deployment Training Cycle.
This flexible approach should ensure access to necessary training,
providing force readiness into the future.
The impact at other range/operating area (OP AREA) complexes has
been a small increase in the amount of live-fire activity they are
being asked to support. The services and DOD will continue to evaluate
how such changes in operations might impact the ranges and their
surrounding communities, and will adapt accordingly. The Department's
Sustainable Ranges Initiative is intended to ensure that, from here on
out, we maintain needed access to important training and testing ranges
and operating areas while sustaining the human and natural environment
there.

AIR FORCE WEAPONS SCHOOL

57. Senator Inhofe. General Wald, Major General L.D. Johnston,
Commander of the U.S. Air Force Air Warfare Center at Nellis Air Force
Base, testified before the House Armed Services Committee on the
proficiency of students attending the Air Force Weapons School. He
stated that the ``caliber of students . . . has decreased somewhat, as
measured by student failure rates.'' General Johnston continued, ``This
indicates a slow degradation of high quality combat training and
experience levels over the years. Since 1991, our high deployment rates
have reduced the amount of time aircrews have spent in realistic
training, i.e., preparing for combat. Although per person `flying time'
is approximately the same, a significant portion of that time has been
spent conducting `no-fly' operations in Southwest Asia. There is an
important distinction between flying time and range time. Operation
Noble Eagle will have the same long-term effect.'' What are your
thoughts on your colleague's comments? What is the relevancy of his
comments when you are determining which units to deploy in support of
commander in chief requirements?
General Wald. Due to the type of flying required of aircrews in
Southwest Asia and ONE, our crews are indeed flying at a comparatively
slightly higher rate but with less mission-related training for a given
sortie. In addition, less training has resulted in a shift toward a
back-to-basics approach between deployments to ensure aviators continue
to receive the most essential training to meet Commander in Chief
(CINC) requirements. This has the effect of producing an aviator with
the hours one might expect of a weapons school candidate, but not
necessarily the experience level the school has seen in the past. When
participating in the very demanding weapons school program these
aviators may experience some difficulties and require additional
training to meet standards, particularly if they attend the weapons
school shortly after a long deployment. Nevertheless, our weapons
instructor courses continue to produce enough graduates to meet the
demands of the Combat Air Force (CAF) requirements. General Johnston's
comments are relevant in determining not so much which units will
deploy, but how the Air Force approaches the training of units to
support CINC requirements in the face of reduced training
opportunities. The Air Force carefully tracks pilot flying time and
combat unit readiness and with very few exceptions our combat units are
maintaining required readiness levels. In addition, the Air
Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct provides the units approaching a
deployment the opportunity to gain proficiency in the basic skills
needed to perform the core-flying mission in support of the CINC. These
efforts, and the provision of enablers such as flying hours and
airspace availability, will remain critical to the Air Force's ability
to deploy and employ weapons with unparalleled accuracy.

IMPLEMENTING THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

58. Senator Inhofe. General Wald, the QDR outlined several
decisions by the Department that impact the services. Specifically, the
QDR stated that, for the Air Force, requirements are to increase
contingency basing in the Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as in the
Arabian Gulf. The Air Force will also ensure sufficient en route
infrastructure for refueling and logistics to support operations in the
Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific areas. What is the progress within
your department to implement these decisions?
General Wald. The Air Force conducted regional contingency basing
studies, and presented the results to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
in March 2002. These results proposed basing options to project force
into and sustain logistics through the Pacific and Persian Gulf
regions.
The recommended advanced basing concept supports a range of
operations from small humanitarian relief operations (HUMRO) through
sustained projection of combat forces to support the Secretary of
Defense's four defense policy goals of: assuring allies and friends;
dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion
against U.S. interests by developing and maintaining capability to
swiftly defeat attacks; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating
any adversary. The concept also supports OSDs Theater Security
Cooperation plans.
We are currently conducting more detailed analysis to determine the
costs, in general terms, of implementing some of the options. Planning
for refueling and logistics infrastructure is critical to successful
execution of contingencies in any region, and our studies include those
considerations.
After we identify the costs of implementing the options under
consideration we'll be in a better position to recommend specific
basing arrangements, recognizing that significant additional or
alternative basing would require significant expenditures.

59. Senator Inhofe. General Wald, what has been the impact of the
war on terrorism on implementing these decisions?
General Wald. The impact of the war on terrorism has been to
highlight the need to engage countries well in advance of contingency
operations, ensuring expeditious deployment and operations. As an
expeditionary force, the war on terrorism has not hampered the Air
Force's short notice, rapid commitment capability. We continue to move
forward in implementing QDR and defense policy goals. We remain
committed and capable of protecting and advancing U.S. national
interests and, if deterrence fails, swiftly and decisively defeating
threats to those interests.

60. Senator Inhofe. General Wald, is the Air Force adequately
resourced in the Future Years Defense Program to implement these
decisions?
General Wald. Because the Air Force is in the process of building
the fiscal year 2004 to 2009 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), it is
difficult to answer whether or not the Air Force is adequately
resourced over the FYDP to increase its contingency basing in the
Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf. The Air Force is currently
conducting a cost analysis of the various options for basing in those
regions.
After clarifying costs for selected contingency basing options, the
Air Force will be able to better determine whether resources will meet
requirements in this important area. Once specific basing and
infrastructure requirements have been identified and validated by the
appropriate commander in chief commands, the Air Force will fully
assess resources to implement changes to our posture. While it is
almost certain that a new basing posture would require significant
resources, these new requirements will compete for funding later this
year as part of the normal budget development process.
Tide the on-going war against terrorism has impacted resources and
Air Force contingency basing. The nature of the war on terrorism has
put a new, even higher premium on the value of expeditionary forces
that are readily employable and expeditionary basing that is readily
available. This has been a resource challenge in terms of normal budget
cycles, but one that with Congress' help we have been meeting
adequately.

61. Senator Inhofe. General McKiernan, the QDR outlined several
decisions by the Department that impact the services. Specifically, the
QDR stated that the Army will accelerate the introduction of the
forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) to strengthen
deterrence and improve U.S. strategic responsiveness on a global basis.
What is the progress within your department to implement this decision?
What has been the impact of the war on terrorism on implementing this
decision? Is the Army adequately resource in the Future Years Defense
Program to implement this decision?
General McKiernan. Defense plans for fiscal years 2003-2008 tasked
the Army to conduct a study and develop a plan to station an IBCT in
Europe by the end of 2007. On February 20, the Army Chief of Staff
briefed the Deputy Secretary of Defense on the study's findings and
provided OSD USD-P with a report on March 1, 2002. The Army fully
funded the fielding of six IBCTs, and is currently waiting for the
publication of the fiscal years 2004-2009 defense plans to determine if
programming an IBCT in Europe is required. Currently, the Army has not
funded an IBCT in Europe. With respect to the war on terrorism, the
Army initiated several studies analyzing lessons learned from Operation
Enduring Freedom and impacts from the global war on terrorism. It is
too early to say what impact these lessons will have on the fielding of
the IBCTs, but the Army will closely examine the results of these
studies and determine what impacts, if any, there are.

62. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, the QDR outlined several
decisions by the Department that impact the services. Specifically, the
QDR stated that the Navy will increase aircraft carrier battlegroup
presence in the Western Pacific and will explore options for
homeporting an additional three to four surface combatants and guided
cruise missile submarines in that area. What is the progress within
your department to implement these decisions?
Admiral Krol. Carrier Battlegroup presence: Prior to September 11,
the Navy began building the long-range carrier schedule to meet the
additional requirement in the Western Pacific. The global war on
terrorism required Navy to modify the carrier battlegroup deployment
schedule to meet the emerging operational requirements. We continue to
develop long-range schedules that will meet the operational
requirements.
Homeporting three to four surface combatants in the Western
Pacific: The Navy staff conducted an extensive study as directed by the
fiscal year 2003-2007 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) on homeporting
three to four TBMD-capable surface combatants in the Western Pacific.
The study concluded that the only feasible locations would be Japan and
Guam. With respect to Japan, there is no excess available to increase
the overall presence. Guam is capable of homeporting the additional
ships. However, the cost of $750 million required to facilitate the
additional ships may not be cost effective for the additional presence
gained. The Navy is though in the process of home porting three attack
submarines in Guam. The first two ships will arrive later this fall
with the third SSN to arrive in calendar year 2003.
Homeporting Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) in the Western
Pacific: The Navy also conducted a DPG-directed study on the
homeporting of the SSGNs once they reach Initial Operating Capability
(IOC). START I limits SSGN homeport alternatives to Bangor, Kings Bay,
and Guam. Final homeport decision will be made prior to SSGN IOC in
fiscal year 2007.

63. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, what has been the impact of the
war on terrorism on implementing these decisions?
Admiral Krol. As stated above, the decision to increase the overall
presence in the Western Pacific has been impacted by the war on
terrorism. The ability to homeport additional surface combatants and
SSGN in the Western Pacific will not be directly impacted by the war.
The decision to execute those decisions will be impacted by the other
issues addressed above.

64. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, is the Navy adequately resourced
in the Future Years Defense Program to implement these decisions?
Admiral Krol. Carrier Battlegroup presence: Assuming that the
global war on terrorism will not permanently change the carrier
battlegroup deployment schedule, the Navy is adequately resourced in
the FYDP to implement this decision. The Navy will be able to complete
the development of the long-range carrier schedule begun prior to
September 11.
Homeporting three to four surface combatants in the Western
Pacific: This study concluded that there were only two feasible
locations to homeport three to four TBMD combatants--Japan and Guam.
With respect to Japan, there is no excess availability to increase
overall presence. Guam is capable of homeporting the additional ships,
but there is a $750 million cost required to facilitate the additional
ships. No decision has been made. There are no funds in the FYDP to
implement this initiative.
Homeporting Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN): This study is still
ongoing. A decision will be made prior to SSGN IOC in fiscal year 2007.
There are no funds in the FYDP to implement this initiative.

65. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, will implementing the direction
from the Department require a modification/change to the Global Naval
Forces Presence Policy?
Admiral Krol. Inherent strengths of naval forces are that they are
maneuverable, flexible, sustainable, and combat credible with little or
no outside support. The Current GNFPP policy that identifies peacetime
presence requirements and the apportionment of the force to meet those
requirements has been adjusted, and GNFPP schedules will continue to be
modified to meet the emerging operational requirements and to meet
future operational requirements.

TRAINING RESOURCES

66. Senator Inhofe. The Army has budgeted training for 10 rotations
at the National Training Center (NTC) in fiscal year 2003. However, the
commanding officer of the NTC has testified that the unavailability of
strategic lift this year has had a significant impact on the quality of
training being conducted at the NTC. He said, ``Two training rotations
have not deployed their AH-64 attack helicopter units due to non-
availability of C17/C5 airlift.'' Given the pace of current operations,
will the Army be able to accommodate shortfalls in training resources,
such as strategic lift, in order to conduct all of the planned
rotations in fiscal year 2003 to the required standard?
General McKiernan. The Army is closely monitoring the ability to
conduct fiscal year 2003 Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations.
Currently, the CTC program is funded at 84 percent of validated
requirements but at 100 percent of requirements considered critical.
This is sufficient to conduct rotations to standard, but will require
deferment of some program support and CTC sustainment projects.
Real world operations will continue to impact the availability of
strategic lift, especially airlift. This has an impact on the ability
to move rotary wing aviation assets, such as the AH-64, from some
Continental United States locations (such as Fort Stewart, Fort Bragg,
and Fort Campbell) to the NTC. Regardless of strategic lift
availability, the training for the ground maneuver brigades will
continue to standard, but with potential diminished fidelity for air-
ground coordination and Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2).

TRAINING AT FARALLON DE MEDINILLA

67. Senator Inhofe. Admiral Krol, the Center for Biological
Diversity (CBD), an environmental group based in New Mexico, filed suit
in Federal district court in the District of Columbia on December 21,
2000, against the Secretaries of Defense and Navy alleging that use of
Farallon de Medinilla (FDM) by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force as
a live-fire training range violates the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA). The CBD asserted that the Navy never obtained a permit under
the MBTA for the unintended killing or harming of migratory birds on
FDM (the original permit request was denied by the Fish and Wildlife
Service). The CBD also asserts that, pending issuance of a valid
permit, the Navy should be enjoined from conducting future training
exercises at FDM. Recently, the court concluded that the Navy had
violated the MBTA and requested further briefs on whether an injunction
is the appropriate remedy. FDM is the only air-to-ground target range
under the control of the United States in the Western Pacific.
According to the CINC of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, readiness would
deteriorate to unacceptable levels within 6 months without a
replacement for FDM. If the Department of Defense is ordered to stop
training at FDM, how will this impact readiness? Do you agree with the
assessment of the Seventh Fleet CINC? Is there a need for legislative
relief?
Admiral Krol. Both the Navy and the Air Force use Farallon de
Medinilla (FDM), a small (about one-third square mile), uninhabited
island in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), as a
bombing range. The island, leased from CNMI, is the only U.S.-
controlled live-fire range in the Western Pacific and is currently in
daily use as various units train for the war against terror. Because
the island was inhabited by an endangered bird species, the Navy took
extensive steps to protect that species by clearing another island of
predators so the species could establish itself there. At the same
time, the Navy carefully delineated the safest locations for targets
and prohibited incendiary and carpet bombing by the Air Force on FDM,
which principally protected migratory birds that use the island. The
training at FDM has been further modified by reducing aircraft
altitudes and dispersing birds with a low altitude flight before each
sortie. To monitor the effects of military use of FDM, the CINC of the
Pacific Fleet staff sends a biologist to the island monthly.
Notwithstanding these costly measures, which reduce the effectiveness
of training, the Navy has been sued by the Center For Biological
Diversity, which demands that the Navy cease use of the island because
the Navy does not have a permit under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA) for any takes of migratory birds. The Navy sought such a permit
from the USFWS, but was denied, because permits are not available for
incidental (unintended) takes. Loss of use of this island would have a
severe impact on training for Naval forces stationed in the Western
Pacific and on Air Force long-range bomber training.

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]