[Senate Hearing 107-696]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2225
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 2
SEAPOWER
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MARCH 5, 19, APRIL 9, 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003--Part 2 SEAPOWER
S. Hrg. 107-696, Pt. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 2225
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
PART 2
SEAPOWER
__________
MARCH 5, 19, APRIL 9, 2002
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
?
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-923 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2002
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia,
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Seapower
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MAX CLELAND, Georgia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
JACK REED, Rhode Island SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Marine Corps Modernization Programs
march 5, 2002
Page
Jones, Gen. James L., Jr., USMC, Commandant, United States Marine
Corps; Accompanied by Lt. Gen. Robert Magnus, USMC, Deputy
Commandant of Programs and Resources........................... 4
Maximizing Fleet Presence Capability and Ship Procurement and Research
and Development
march 19, 2002
Wachendorf, Rear Adm. Miles B., USN, Director, Strategy and
Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations....... 61
Mullen, Vice Adm. Michael G., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments........ 83
Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition......................... 87
Navy Equipment Required for Fielding a 21st Century Capabilities-Based
Navy
april 9, 2002
Clark, Adm. Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............ 144
Whitlow, Maj. Gen. William A., USMC, Director, Expeditionary
Warfare Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs............... 165
Balisle, Rear Adm. Phillip M., USN, Director, Surface Warfare
Division, Department of the Navy............................... 172
Sullivan, Rear Adm. Paul F., USN, Director, Submarine Warfare
Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy......................................... 199
McCabe, Rear Adm. Michael J., USN, Director, Air Warfare
Division, Department of the Navy............................... 208
(iii)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
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TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MARINE CORPS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Kennedy, Sessions,
McCain, and Collins.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Gary M. Hall, professional
staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; and
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert and Andrew Kent.
Committee members' assistants present: Menda Fife and
Christina L. Martin, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Marsall A.
Hevron, assistant to Senator Landrieu; Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator
Collins; and Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Our chairman Senator Kennedy has asked me
to start this hearing on time. He will join us shortly. He is
chairing an important committee hearing on cloning and other
issues as chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions Committee.
So in the spirit of bipartisanship, which has really been
exemplified on this subcommittee by Senator Kennedy's
leadership, I want to welcome our subcommittee to the first
seapower hearing of this budget review cycle. We are delighted
to welcome the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Jim
Jones, to kick off our seapower hearings. It is my pleasure
once again to serve as the ranking member on this subcommittee.
I thank Senator Kennedy for his leadership. He has scheduled
hearings that will explore the key issues facing us while
exercising oversight of the many seapower procurement and
research and development programs.
It is prudent for us to begin our hearings by asking the
big picture question: What is it that our military forces are
supposed to be able to accomplish? The Secretary of Defense
answered this in September 2001 in the Quadrennial Defense
Review, which states the four defense policy goals as: assuring
our allies and friends; dissuading future military competition;
deterring threats and coercion against United States interests;
and if deterrence fails, decisively defeat. The Navy and Marine
Corps team are vital to carrying out all four of these policy
goals.
Seapower is another way to describe the capabilities the
Navy and Marine Corps have to meet the challenge described in
the QDR of ``projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant
anti-access environments.'' The Secretary of the Navy has
reaffirmed a commitment to remain forward-engaged while
developing future capabilities.
Forward presence enabled the regional commander to
initiate, on relatively short notice, Operation Enduring
Freedom using three aircraft carrier battle groups and two
amphibious ready groups with an embarked Marine Corps brigade
command element. The performance of our men and women in
uniform and from our government agencies in Operation Enduring
Freedom in fighting terrorism here at home has been superb.
There are a number of issues that I look forward to
exploring today with our witnesses, including the Marine
Corps's role in fighting terrorism, organic and naval gunfire
support, amphibious assault vehicles, and ships that provide
tactical lift, command and control, and logistics. In addition,
new Marine Corps concepts may require changes in equipment and
operational capabilities.
I remain committed to ensure the MV-22 Osprey program
implements the recommendations of last year's review panel to
incorporate safety, reliability, and maintainability fixes.
I join our chairman in welcoming General Jones, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, and express my sincere
appreciation to the Commandant for all the members of the
Marine Corps, active duty, Reserve, civilian, and supporting
family members for their sacrifices and continuing services to
our great country.
General Jones, thank you for being with us. This is the
first of a series of important hearings we will be having on
how we deal with seapower, of which the Marine Corps is a big
part. But first, if you would tell me, what is the state of the
Corps? How do you feel about the morale and readiness and just
the general feel for the Corps at this point in time?
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
It is my pleasure to serve, once again, as ranking member of the
Seapower Subcommittee. I thank Senator Kennedy for his leadership of
this subcommittee. He has scheduled hearings that will explore the key
issues while exercising oversight of the many Seapower procurement and
research and development programs.
It is prudent for us to begin our hearings by asking the big
picture question: What is it that our military forces are supposed to
be able to accomplish?
The Secretary of Defense answered this question in the September
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which states the four defense
policy goals are:
1. Assuring allies and friends.
2. Dissuading future military competition.
3. Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and
4. If deterrence fails, decisively defeat.
The Navy and Marine Corps team are vital to carrying out all four of
these policy goals.
The QDR also notes that ``access'' will be a key issue in the
future and our ability to use land-basing of forces may be limited. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps stated, ``Sea-basing affords us the
flexibility of employing robust air and ground forces at a time and
place of our choosing.'' The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet
recently stated, ``We can fight here or over there, I'd rather fight
them over there.''
Seapower is another way to describe the capabilities the Navy and
Marine Corps have to meet challenge described in the QDR of
``projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access
environments,'' in other words, fighting them over there. The Secretary
of the Navy has reaffirmed a commitment to remain forward engaged while
developing future capabilities.
Forward presence enabled the regional commander to initiate, on
relatively short notice, Operation Enduring Freedom using three
aircraft carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups with an
embarked Marine Corps brigade command element. It is noteworthy that
the Marine Corps brigadier general who commanded the brigade command
element, was the first Marine to command a naval task force, Task Force
58. This accomplishment is a testament to the close cooperation of the
Navy and Marine Corps leadership. The performance of our men and women
in uniform and from our government agencies in Operation Enduring
Freedom and fighting terrorism here at home has been superb.
The U.S.S. Kitty Hawk's serving as a forward operating base for
special operations forces and the ability of the Peleliu and Bataan
Amphibious Ready Groups and 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(Special Operations Capable) to use Marine Corps aircraft to lift sea
based Marines 400 miles into Afghanistan are excellent examples of
transformational forces and platforms.
However, the QDR and Operation Enduring Freedom are not the end,
they are the beginning. The Secretary of the Navy has been directed by
the Secretary of Defense to develop new concepts of maritime pre-
positioning, high-speed sealift, and new amphibious capabilities for
the Marine Corps. In addition, he has been tasked to shift some to the
Marine Corps' afloat pre-positioned equipment from the Mediterranean
toward the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf and to explore the feasibility
of conducting Marine Corps training for littoral warfare in the Western
Pacific. The Marine Corps has a memorandum of understanding with the
Special Operations Command which will provide the framework for future
development and strengthening of relations between the two
organizations.
There are a number of issues I look forward to exploring today with
our witness including the Marine Corps' role in fighting terrorism,
organic and naval gun fire support, amphibious assault vehicles, and
ships that provide tactical lift, command and control, and logistics.
In addition, new Marine Corps concepts may require changes in equipment
and operational capabilities. The Marine Corps' warfighting lab has led
the way in quickly evaluating methods and equipment to support
expeditionary maneuver warfare. Integrated logistics, strategic
agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility issues are
fundamental to understanding unique capabilities of the Marine Corps.
I am well aware of the validated requirement for the MV-22 Osprey,
and the improved capability it will deliver in speed, range, and
payload. However, I remain committed to ensure the program implements
the recommendations of last year's review panel to incorporate safety,
reliability, and maintainability fixes.
I look forward to exploring these issues with our witness today as
we review Marine Corps requirements for equipment and force structure
to meet today's and future challenges.
I join our Chairman in welcoming General Jones, the Commandant of
the Marine Corps, and I express my sincere appreciation to the
Commandant for all members of the Marine Corps: active duty, Reserve,
civilian, and supporting family members for their sacrifices and
continuing service to our great country.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, COMMANDANT, UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS,
USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES
General Jones. Thank you, Senator, very much for that kind
welcome. To you and the chairman, I want to express my
appreciation for the opportunity to be here today to talk about
marines and their families and how we feel about ourselves. If
you do not mind, I have a very short opening statement that
will address that question and I will ask that it be entered
for the record if that is okay with you.
Senator Sessions. That would be wonderful.
General Jones. Senator, in February some of the members of
this subcommittee and I had the privilege of attending a
conference on international security in Munich, Germany. I
remembered a statement uttered by the Secretary General of NATO
just before he gave his speech at this conference. He said:
``Diplomacy is a nation's first line of defense, but it is a
wise diplomat who pays attention to his nation's second line of
defense in case the first line fails.'' What we represent today
is the second line of defense and it is in that context that I
address you.
So I would like to talk a little bit about some of the
great things that have happened as a result of the 2002 budget
first and the actions of this subcommittee and the full
committee in the Senate authorization process. It was the best
readiness budget we have had in about 10 years and it really
impacted significantly on the health and vitality of marines
and their families.
As a result, marines today are extremely secure in their
identity, who they are and what they do. We see ourselves as a
sea-based rotational expeditionary combined arms force. Those
words are very important and each one of them has an awful lot
behind them, but that is who we are and that is what we do. We
are characterized by our association with our naval heritage
and the power of our teamwork with the United States Navy.
Together, we provide immediate response, a persistency of
application, and a sustainability of effort that is, in my
humble opinion, unmatched, unequalled in any other armed force
in the world.
The cornerstone of the Marine Corps's fighting capability
is found in the Marine Corps expeditionary brigade. This is the
central piece and central to our success in Operation Enduring
Freedom that you referred to just a moment ago.
Second, the Marine Corps is culturally stable, as proven
not only by our success in recruiting, but astoundingly
successful in retention for the professional portion of our
Corps. As I have mentioned before the full committee before, 60
percent of all marines are always on their first enlistment,
which means that the average age of a United States Marine is
always somewhere around 24 years old.
The 2002 budget also supported our families, and supported
our single marines. We have made great progress in revitalizing
our housing, our health care, and our pay and allowances, which
our troops and our civilians so well deserve.
Point three about the 2002 budget, it has emphasized, I
think, some unique characteristics that belong to the Marine
Corps. We draw our strength from our partnership with the Navy.
Operation Enduring Freedom dramatically highlighted the fact
that we are no longer just an amphibious force in the classic
World War II sense, but we are truly an expeditionary force
that can project combined arms up to and beyond 600 miles
inland in a landlocked country if necessary and sustain it for
a considerable period of time.
Operation Enduring Freedom answered the challenge to the
specters of the past on the issue of sovereignty, which is
going to be a difficult problem for us nationally in the future
as we pursue this global war on terrorism. Access is important
and naval platforms contribute to a solution to the access
challenge, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, and this was a
timely solution.
We also saw that the ability of all of our forces to
operate together is now a reality. Those who think that the
services spend so much time squabbling with one another over
resources that they do not get anything done in that context,
they are simply misinformed. This was a seamless integration
between Special Operations Forces, conventional forces, roles
and missions of each service being brought to the fore, and
partnership on the ground, that clearly resulted in strategic
and tactical successes that we should all take great pride in,
because it brought about enormously good results in a
remarkably short period of time.
The 2003 budget request for the Marine Corps is a budget
that was carefully put together in partnership with the
Secretary of the Navy and the CNO. It continues to take us down
the path of emergence from the years of failure to recapitalize
and modernize. It adds $1.3 billion to our military personnel
account, $1.5 billion to our procurement and R&D account, and
another $1.5 billion to operations and maintenance.
It is reduced by about $98 million from the 2002 MILCON
budget, but it is still better than the 2001 military
construction account and years preceding that. As a matter of
fact, we have been able to add 20 percent within our MILCON
budget for family housing, which we are very excited about and
will serve to modernize a lot of our housing throughout the
Marine Corps.
It also provides for a pay raise, a targeted pay raise,
career prepaid enhancements, reduces out of pocket expenses for
housing from 11.3 percent to 7.5 percent, with the goal of
achieving zero by 2005, which would be a tremendous
accomplishment for our sailors and marines. It provides for 25
percent real program growth over 2001 baseline for operating
forces, 11 percent real program growth over 2001 baseline for
our bases and stations, and it provides for 90 percent of the
Marine Corps' executable requirements for depot maintenance. So
it is, in fact, a budget that not only sustains modernization,
but also gets us to the transformation aspect of the Secretary
of Defense's programs.
So in summary, Senator, it is a great time, I think, to be
a United States Marine. We very much appreciate this
subcommittee's support and clear support that will enable the
Marine Corps to do its share with regard to transformation,
which I would be happy to talk about in some detail if you
would like. Your support gives us a clear sense that marines
are appreciated. It translates very clearly to a joyous
homecoming such as we had in California yesterday with the
return of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special
Operations Capable, that returned from its involvement in
Afghanistan. We continue to feel that the Corps is on the move
in the right direction and we are eagerly awaiting the future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. James L. Jones, Jr., USMC
Chairman Kennedy, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
subcommittee; it is my pleasure to report to you on the state of your
Marine Corps. On behalf of all Marines and their families, I want to
thank the subcommittee for your continued support. Your commitment to
increasing the warfighting and crisis response capabilities of our
Nation's Armed Forces and to improving the quality of life for our men
and women in uniform is central to the strength of your Marine Corps.
As a result, your Corps was ready when called upon on September 11,
2001. We thank you for your effort in ensuring that Marines and their
families were poised to respond to the Nation's call in the manner
Americans expect of their Corps.
The direction of the Corps is confident, clear, and unambiguous.
The Corps understands its role as a force in readiness but also
realizes that the world is changing. For 226 years, Marines have always
been innovators in order to be ready for the next war. To assure
success, we continually strive to be capable of rapidly adapting to new
circumstances inasmuch as we recognize that the future is
unpredictable.
The President's Fiscal Year 2003 Budget enables the Navy-Marine
Corps Team to fight today's war on terrorism and transform itself to be
ready for future challenges. This budget funds our 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade anti-terrorism efforts, includes pay raises and
new combat uniforms for our marines and provides increased health care
for our retirees. It also allows us to harness the new capabilities
found in tilt-rotor technology and Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing
aircraft. We have increased funding for our operating forces in day-to-
day operations, training, equipment maintenance, and force protection.
Additionally, our bases and stations are sustained by the President's
budget, which improves such critical areas as family housing and
bachelor quarters. Furthermore, this budget's investments in ground
equipment, ammunition and research and development will help us recover
from prior year shortfalls.
Marines have a vision for the future, and we are moving forward
with the modernization and transformational efforts needed to make this
vision a reality. We fully understand that our vision cannot be
achieved independently of our sister Services. Each of us has our own
critical role to play in providing for our collective security. It is
important that each of our contributions be, simultaneously, both
unique and complementary. In particular, the Corps stresses the
importance of our key partnership with the Navy. The Navy-Marine Corps
Team has never been stronger, nor more necessary for our country. In
fact, the essence of our combined power is our teamwork.
Americans have relied upon the Navy and Marine Corps Team to
protect and promote the interests of the Nation since our creation by
the Continental Congress in 1775. After helping to win American
independence, Naval Services acted time and again to ensure our freedom
and set in motion the ascendancy of our Nation as a global power under
the banner of democracy and its potential. During the darkest hours of
our history, the Navy and Marine Corps Team has remained the most
useful and most frequently used expression of our Nation's interests in
forward presence and crisis response. Those of us who are privileged to
serve in the Naval Services today have inherited a legacy that we are
dedicated to preserving. Together we will continue to flourish, due to
steadfast appreciation of our heritage and a commitment to a tradition
of continuous innovation and change.
Teamwork is the bond that forever joins our Services and is the key
to our enduring success. We have progressed from wooden ships of sail,
with embarked Marines, to modern networked Naval expeditionary strike
forces that are forward deployed and full spectrum capable. We are a
combined-arms force capable of ensuring America's access, including
sustainable forcible entry operations to distant inland areas and
austere locations. Always moving forward, we are incorporating advanced
technologies to increase our capabilities to include exploiting the
tremendous potential of sea control and power projection. Our
innovation is not limited to equipment and weapons systems but is also
reflected in the development of new operational concepts and
organizational evolution. When crises emerge, the Nation can depend on
the Navy and Marine Corps Team.
Today, I will describe the Marine Corps' relevance to the current
security environment as well as our future role as America's sea-based,
expeditionary, combined-arms force. I will also address the Marine
Corps' role as the Nation's medium-weight expeditionary force, bridging
the gap between America's Special Operations Forces and the Army's
critical land war-winning capability. The preponderance of this
statement will focus on the Marine Corps' transformation plans and our
vision for the 21st century.
I. The Marine Corps' Relevance: Power Projection from the Sea-base
For the United States to provide its citizens with security and
prosperity at home and abroad it must continue to lead the effort in
maintaining international stability. One only need consider the events
of September 11, and the fact that 30 percent of the United States
Gross Domestic Product is directly related to global trade, to realize
that America's well-being is inextricably linked to the international
order. America must continue to establish and lead efforts to maintain
stability around the world. This challenge requires the integrated
application of all elements of national power--economic, political,
diplomatic, cultural, intellectual, technological, and military.
Working in concert with the other components of national power, our
Armed Forces perform a vital role in establishing and maintaining
conditions that directly affect global stability and America's security
and prosperity. History shows that our men and women in uniform play a
pivotal role in our Nation's international credibility. It is not an
exaggeration to claim that our Nation's most important gift to world
order is found in the service of our young men and women in uniform.
Before anything good happens in the world, they are there establishing
the framework for peace and stability.
Inasmuch as global stability is intrinsically tied to America's
relationship with other nations in the world community, the United
States benefits significantly from military to military relationships
around the globe. However, as nations continue to raise issues of
sovereignty, especially during a crisis, we must find new ways to
conduct our Nation's necessary engagements and have the means to
respond to crisis without being excessively restricted by geo-political
issues. In the 21st century, we are likely to see a change in the
number and type of large, quasi-permanent American bases around the
world as defined by the post-Cold War era. We must begin to develop
alternatives to ensure that we are able to maintain our peacetime
presence and our crisis response capabilities. 21st century basing
initiatives are issues that will have to be addressed in the near
future.
We cannot deter aggression, nor defeat future adversaries, solely
with military capabilities based at home. Regional engagement requires
presence, and there is no such thing as truly effective ``virtual
presence.'' The inherent mobility and flexibility of Naval forces in
providing off-shore basing options is an effective counter to
increasing limitations to access and basing rights. America's
stabilizing influence overseas is contingent upon our ability to
deploy, employ, and sustain persistent military forces from the sea.
Indeed, the Navy-Marine Corps Team's sea-based power projection
capabilities are a cornerstone of our military's contribution to our
enduring security and that of our allies.
Sea-based capabilities provided by the Navy-Marine Corps Team are
an important means for America to cultivate its relationship with the
world, providing the advantage, both in peacetime and in crisis
response operations, of being able to control the size of our
``footprint'' ashore. Sea-basing also provides the operational
advantages of force protection, operational maneuver space, and the
sanctity of sovereign platforms from which we can engage adversaries.
The Navy-Marine Corps Team's sea-based capabilities have been re-
validated over the past several months. In Afghanistan, sea-based Naval
forces provided a significant portion of tactical air sorties and the
initial deployment of major, sustained ground force presence, reaching
over 600 miles inland. [See Figure 1]
Operation Enduring Freedom has also proven the value of the Navy-
Marine Corps Team as an important element of a Joint Force.
[Figure 1]
Important contributions were made through Marine integration with
Special Operations Forces, the Army, and the Air Force in the areas of
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities to long-
range strike and close air support capabilities. The Marine Corps has
demonstrated that the Marine brigade--a flexible, medium-weight,
combined arms, expeditionary force--is not only responsive, but also a
full and effective partner in Joint and Coalition operations.
II. The Marine Corps' Role: A Scalable, Sustainable, Forcible Entry
Force
The Marine Corps provides our Nation and its Joint Force Commanders
the full scope of military capabilities required to respond to the
broad spectrum of threats and potential missions that confront
America's Armed Forces today and in the future. For 6 percent of the
Department of Defense's budget, the Marine Corps provides 20 percent of
our Nation's ground combat maneuver battalions, tactical fixed-wing
aircraft squadrons, and attack helicopter squadrons, as well as one-
third of its active duty combat service support.
If there is a lesson to be learned from ongoing operations in
Afghanistan, it is that there is tremendous power and capability in the
diversity of our Armed Forces today. Joint Force Commanders must have
the fullest possible range of options and capabilities available in
order to apply the desired effects, both lethal and non-lethal, in any
given scenario. Indeed, the flexibility and robustness of America's
Armed Forces is a product of the varied and unique capabilities each
Service contributes to our Nation. Accordingly, our capabilities need
to be complementary, not duplicative, if we are to provide the diverse
and versatile capabilities needed to confront the uncertain threats of
the future. Together, our Joint force forms a mosaic of integrated
capabilities to defeat the myriad threats and challenges we may face
today and tomorrow. Enhancing these capabilities across the force is in
the national interest.
Marine Air-Ground Task Forces have proven their utility in meeting
challenges and exploiting opportunities. The versatility of the Marine
Expeditionary Brigade is emblematic of the scalability of our Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces. In size and capability, these brigades are
midway between our ``light'' Marine Expeditionary Units and our
``heavy'' Marine Expeditionary Forces. Furthermore, our Marine
Expeditionary Brigades can either deploy on amphibious shipping or be
airlifted into a theater of operations to link up with equipment and
supplies aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships.
While the global war on terrorism has demonstrated the current
capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps Team, our continuous
transformation and modernization promise even greater future
capabilities for the Marine Corps. Transformation is an ongoing
process, however, not an end-state. It spans decades of innovation and
experimentation. It is also not limited to technology, but includes
change in our organizational structure, operational concepts, and
business practices.
The Marine Corps has always been at the forefront of transformation
and innovation. Throughout our history, the Marine Corps has changed
and evolved--from ship security, to naval constabulary, to light
infantry, to an amphibious assault force, to an air-ground
expeditionary team. In the past, our development of close air support,
amphibious warfare, vertical envelopment, Short Take-Off and Vertical
Landing technology, and maritime prepositioning have benefited our
Joint warfighting capability. Today, the Marine Corps remains true to
its warrior culture and continues in a tradition of change. Drawing on
our history of transformation, the Marine Corps is moving forward with
new concepts, innovation, and exciting experimentation. Our focus is on
the creation of new capabilities, which will yield the operational
advantages we seek to have in dealing with future conflicts.
III. The Marine Corps' Transformation: Concepts, Technologies, and
Organizations
Although many think of transformation primarily in terms of weapons
systems, true transformation results from a synthesis of new
technologies with strategic vision, revolutionary operational concepts,
and agile, adaptive organizations. Clearly, we must harness the
potential military benefits of rapid advances in technology. The V-22
Osprey is but one example of the potential of proven transformational
technology. The path to transformation involves a robust program of
experimentation with new concepts, capabilities and operational
prototypes while actively pursuing forward-looking science and
technology efforts. As we experiment and introduce new capabilities, we
will rapidly mainstream the changes into our ready forces. [See Figure
2]
[Figure 2]
A. Transformation of Operational Concepts and Better Business
Practices
Technological innovation plays a paradoxical role in military
transformation. With each problem it solves, technological innovation
tends to introduce new challenges and opportunities. Operational
concepts can offset these tensions by finding the means to capitalize
on technological strengths and also guard against creating new
weaknesses. In light of heightened fiscal awareness and the need to be
effective with our resources, we must reform our business practices to
maximize available resources and develop more expedient means of
fielding programs and equipment. With this in mind, the Marine Corps is
committed to transforming its operational concepts and business
practices.
The ongoing process of conceptual change is embodied in the recent
publication of our overarching concept, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.
It is the foundation for the way the Marine Corps will conduct
operations in the 21st century. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is the
union of our core competencies, maneuver warfare philosophy,
expeditionary heritage, and the concepts by which we organize, deploy,
and employ forces. It emphasizes the unique and proven capabilities the
Marine Corps provides Joint Force Commanders and the synergy created
when leveraged with the complementary capabilities of other Services
and agencies. These capabilities translate into power projection
designed to promote global security and reassure our allies and
friends, while deterring and defeating adversaries and potential foes.
Central to our conceptual transformation is the potential power
represented in a future integrated sea-base. At-sea arrival and
assembly, selective off-load, and at-sea reconstitution capabilities
stand to revolutionize the way Naval forces project power and influence
around the globe. Our evolving logistics concepts promise indefinite
sustainment of Marine forces, both afloat and ashore. As well, Marine
forces afloat typically rely upon the Command, Control, Communications,
and Computer (C\4\) capabilities aboard amphibious shipping to provide
critical reach-back connectivity to deployed elements of the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force, and communications with Joint and multinational
forces. These afloat C\4\ capabilities are crucial to the success of
sea-basing and to achieving the full potential of Naval power
projection.
The Marine Corps' sea-basing strategy is yet another illustration
of continued transformation in operational concepts. Recognizing the
increasing limitations on future basing potential of American forces
overseas and the simultaneous need for the United States to maintain a
forward presence, the Navy and the Marine Corps are developing a
forward presence strategy as an extension and augmentation of our
concept of sea-basing. Sea-basing is the formation of Joint assets at
sea to project and sustain combat power ashore, while reducing or
eliminating our landward logistics footprint during combat operations.
The sea-based presence strategy boosts forward engagement during
peacetime by increasing the number of countries that we may visit
without being permanently stationed at large fixed-bases in host
nations. Marines can deploy from country to country and advance
diplomatic and informational efforts through military-to-military
relations, small unit training, liaison exchanges, and exercises. III
Marine Expeditionary Force's annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and
Training in the Asia-Pacific region is an illustration of this concept.
In addition to codifying overarching conceptual innovations, the
Marine Corps is adjusting its tactics, techniques, and procedures to
better support conceptual change. Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics
Squadron-1 is adapting tactics, techniques, and procedures for the
employment of aviation operations in urban terrain--a vital, yet
challenging environment today and in the future. Advancements have been
made in target selection and tracking, weapon selection and employment,
friendly unit position identification, command and control, and staff
planning. Likewise, the Marine Corps is actively engaged in the
development of the underlying concepts of Network Centric Warfare for
Naval expeditionary forces. We are exploiting state-of-the-art
information and networking technology to improve situational awareness
and to integrate widely dispersed sensors, forces, and weapons. Network
Centric Warfare will allow commanders to achieve mission objectives
rapidly and decisively by concentrating the combined fire and maneuver
of Naval forces afloat and ashore at decisive locations and times.
Similarly, the Marine Corps led Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate is
forging the way for the development of non-lethal technologies, as well
as the tactics, techniques, and procedures for effectively employing
their effects. Congressional funding of the Non-Lethal Technology
Innovation Center at the University of New Hampshire will continue to
provide further stimulus for the experimentation and formulation of
doctrine that guides the tactical use of these new weapons.
Just as it is transforming its doctrine, the Marine Corps is also
transforming its business practices. Our readiness is a reflection of
balancing the demands of current requirements around the globe with the
imperative to invest and be prepared for the future. This balance can--
over the long haul--be achieved only if resources are reallocated from
overhead and support activities to our fighting forces. To accomplish
this reallocation of resources, we are adopting better business
practices to achieve greater cost-effectiveness. There are several
different avenues that the Marine Corps is taking to make this happen.
We are streamlining organizations to eliminate redundancy and maximize
integration. We are also reducing excess support structures to free
resources and focus on core competencies.
To transform our business practices, the Marine Corps must
increasingly rely on business intelligence and associated technologies
promoting access to information. We consider information to be a
strategic asset, and by assuring access to information, we will improve
the operational agility of the Marine Corps. Our efforts to promote
enterprise management of information technology confirm our need for a
common infrastructure that includes a shared data environment,
realignment and consolidation of many of our information systems, and
the search for cost-effective strategies.
Commercialization, privatization, and out-sourcing are among the
methods the Marine Corps has used to reduce costs, but ultimately it is
competition between public and private sources that has led to
increased savings. The Marine Corps has initiated competition between
government sources and private sector commercial sources for a broad
number of activities, best seen in the Marine Corps' application of
such competition vis-`-vis its bases and stations. To operate our 15
major installations--essentially providing the range of support
services typical of a municipality--a labor force of approximately
20,000 marines and 14,000 civilians are employed. One of the processes
we have used in these competitions to save money is Activity-Based
Costing and Management. This process provided our installation
commanders information that enabled them to save over $30 million last
year by analytically measuring the costs of particular work and
evaluating the performance of that work.
Another example of turning to the private sector and using
competition to bring down costs is the success of our new camouflage
utility uniform. The uniform was created, tested, produced, and fielded
by the Marine Corps--with the use of a new digital camouflage design
technique--through a single source vendor, yielding a product that is
superior in quality, comfort, and cost to that in existence today. We
are extremely pleased with this innovative uniform that not only costs
less in the long run, but is a product improvement benefiting our
marines. All of this was achieved within a 1 year period.
Just as the Marine Corps' new utility uniform is an example of both
tactical and business innovation, so too the transformation of
operational concepts and business practices are seen together in our
Integrated Logistics Capability. The Integrated Logistics Capability is
redefining and realigning our supply and maintenance process by
providing our logisticians with greater awareness of equipment status,
increasing their capacity to more rapidly and effectively respond to
logistical requirements on the battlefield. The simple objective of our
Integrated Logistics Capability is to avoid weighing down the
warfighters with the requirement to haul, protect, and administer
massive amounts of supply material. The foundation of this concept and
business practice is a revolutionary change in military methodology:
shifting from massive inventories to small inventories. With the use of
new technologies and practices, proven in the private sector, the Corps
will, in essence, create a ``new order'' for its logistics enterprise
and undertake the revolutionary changes necessary to ensure that it
continues to be the premier fighting force in the world. Second Force
Service Support Group at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, is currently
testing many of these new processes in a year long ``proof of concept''
to validate the direction in which we are heading. These efforts will
allow Marine logisticians to support the battlefield of the 21st
century with a smaller logistical footprint in a more cost-effective
manner.
B. Transformation and Modernization Through Harnessing Technologies
With the foundation of requirements drawn from its new concepts,
the Marine Corps is transforming its weapons systems and assets
throughout the five elements of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces--our
ground, aviation, logistics, and command elements, as well as our
supporting establishment. The following examples are but a few of our
transformational and modernization efforts. Many of our investments
involve modernization of existing capabilities vital to effectively and
efficiently fulfill our core competencies. A more comprehensive
description of the Marine Corps' entire acquisition program can be
found in the Marine Corps' Concepts & Issues: Forging the Future Marine
Corps.
Amphibious Shipping for Sea-basing
We are a maritime nation and we must capitalize on this part of our
national character to ensure that we are ready for the challenges that
are over the horizon. The requirement for our amphibious shipping
remains the linchpin of the Corps' ability to influence the
international security landscape, project power, and protect the
Nation's interests during peacetime and crises. While it has long been
recognized that we require an amphibious ship force structure capable
of simultaneously lifting the assault echelons of three Marine
Expeditionary Brigades, today's amphibious lift can support only two-
thirds of this requirement in certain aspects of the lift footprint. I
strongly recommend that we commit to redress this shortfall as a matter
of urgent priority.
We are grateful for your support in replacing four classes of older
ships with the new LPD-17 San Antonio amphibious ship class. Delivery
of these 12 ships to the fleet is currently planned to be complete in
2015. However, we remain concerned about further schedule slippage in
the LPD-17 program. Such delays compromise our ability to fulfill our
global forward presence responsibilities and must be avoided.
Similarly, we are concerned with replacing the LHA-1 Tarawa-class
ships. Considering the extended time-frame for ship design,
construction, and delivery, we need to ensure now that we are ready to
replace the Tarawa-class when they reach the end of their 35 year
service life starting in 2011. [See Figure 3]
[Figure 3]
The leases of our current fleet of Maritime Prepositioning Ships
(MPS) will expire in fiscal year 2009, fiscal year 2010, and fiscal
year 2011. The development of advanced Maritime Prepositioning
capabilities, High Speed Vessel platforms, and new lighterage vessels,
will significantly increase the strength and flexibility of our sea-
based expeditionary operations. The marriage of a modern amphibious
fleet with modern Maritime Prepositioning Shipping capable of hosting
at-sea arrival and assembly of forces will minimize the requirement for
access to secure ports and airfields, and give our Nation an unmatched
asymmetrical advantage in projecting power.
Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
The V-22 Osprey remains the Corps' number one aviation acquisition
priority. Recent actions in Central Asia have only reinforced the
immediate need for this truly transformational capability. [See Figure
4]
[Figure 4]
Tilt-rotor technology holds the promise to revolutionize aviation--
we should not be afraid to embrace this promise. Both the Department of
Defense's Panel to Review the V-22 Program and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration's Tiltrotor Aeromechanics Phenomena Assessment
Panel concluded that tilt-rotor technology is sound and that mishaps
have been the result of engineering deficiencies that can be solved.
The V-22 will radically increase the Marine Corps and Special
Operations Command's operational reach and tactical flexibility. The
Osprey's superior range, speed, and payload will give Marines and
Special Operations Forces the ability to accomplish combat missions and
other operations from distances previously unattainable, with response
times far faster than possible with other airframes. The battlespace of
the future will demand capabilities that provide rapid and effective
maneuver. Through the use of the V-22's increased speed and range, we
not only improve our ability to influence the tempo of operations, but
we provide our forces with greater survivability. These capabilities
are the foundation for how we have planned to transform our operational
concepts and intend to reorganize our force structure.
We are aware of the challenges associated with the Osprey but are
pleased that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics has announced that a new comprehensive flight
test program for the V-22 will start this Spring. This flight test
effort will be ``event-driven,'' as opposed to being ``time-driven.''
Both the Secretary of the Navy and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will periodically review flight
test results to assess progress.
Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing Aircraft
In late October 2001, the contract was awarded for the Joint Strike
Fighter, signaling a new era in naval aviation. The advantages of a
stealthy strike fighter capable of taking off from an expeditionary
base on land or at sea, fly in supersonic cruise, accomplish its
mission with advanced sensors and weapons, then return to its
expeditionary site are dramatic. This aircraft will transform the very
foundations of tactical air power. It will provide the reliability,
survivability, and lethality that our forces will need in the years
ahead. Moreover, the Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing Joint Strike
Fighter variant provides operational access to more than three to five
times the number of airfields available around the world that are
currently capable of supporting our so-called ``legacy'' aircraft. The
Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing Joint Strike Fighter can also
operate from both conventional carriers and amphibious assault ship
decks, effectively doubling the number of shipborne platforms available
for operations. As these highly capable aircraft move from sea-based
platforms to expeditionary airfields, they can effectively decrease
response time for missions by 75 percent and increase time-on-station
by 50 percent. These capabilities represent a significant increase in
strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility over
conventional aircraft.
Fire Support Systems
Of critical interest to our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces is the
status of our fire support systems on land, at sea, and in the air. We
currently have an acute shortage of fire support. It is vital for us to
move ahead with existing programs to provide our marines with this
important warfighting enhancement. Indeed, the funding, testing, and
development of our systems are vital. The Lightweight 155 Howitzer is
needed to replace our aging ``legacy'' field artillery weapons. The
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, moreover, promises to be rapidly
deployable and will be a key part of our expeditionary operations,
firing both precision and area munitions under all weather conditions,
as well as extending our ground-based fire support umbrella to 60
kilometers. In addition to these fire support systems, we need the
Ground Weapon Locating Radar to protect our forces against our
adversaries' counter-battery fires. We should also continue to invest
in Naval Surface Fire Support. Remedying the fire support shortfall we
have lived with for much of the last two decades is crucial.
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles
The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program remains the Corps'
highest ground acquisition priority and promises to allow high-speed
surface maneuver from ship-to-shore as well as on land. This vehicle
will be able to deploy to objectives from over the visual horizon, 25
miles and beyond, and will allow our ships to remain beyond the range
of many threat weapons and surveillance systems. It will help off-set
an enemy's anti-access strategies and bolster expeditionary operations
from the sea. Furthermore, the Bushmaster II 30mm cannon will give the
vehicle a lethal direct fire capability. The Advanced Amphibious
Assault Vehicle will be a decisive expeditionary warfare tool for
operations in littoral areas world-wide.
High Speed Vessel
High-speed, intra-theater sealift, catamaran vessels provide
phenomenal increases in speed and tactical flexibility for our Navy-
Marine Corps Team. Building on operational use of the Royal Australian
Navy's HMS Jervis Bay, our Joint Venture High Speed Vessel promises to
reap new developments that will lead to new capabilities. Additionally,
leasing the 331-foot commercial catamaran Austal West Pac Express, III
Marine Expeditionary Force has demonstrated the viability of such
vessels, using it to transport marines and their equipment to training
exercises through out Asia--lifting 950 marines and 550 tons of
materiel per trip, the equivalent of 14 to 17 military cargo aircraft.
The Navy-Marine Corps Team's current requirement is for a craft that
can transport 400 tons of cargo, travel 1,200 miles without refueling,
and achieve a speed greater than 40 knots. We are confident in the High
Speed Vessels capacity to deliver these capabilities and transform our
intra-theater mobility.
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have already seen extensive action in the
war against terrorism and their use is expanding. This technology's
potential, combined with its ability to conduct dangerous missions
without the risk of personnel casualties, making this a truly
transformational asset. The Navy and Marine Corps' Vertical Take-Off
and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Engineering Development Model
program is designed to test and evaluate various sensor packages and
the Tactical Control System architecture for use in future Tactical
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In the interim, Marine Corps Pioneer systems
will be upgraded to perform Unmanned Aerial Vehicle functions
(Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition). Presently,
Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are preparing to deploy to
Central Command's area of responsibility.
Aerial Refueling
Replacement of our aging KC-130 Hercules fleet with KC-130J
aircraft is necessary to ensure the viability and deployability of
Marine Corps Tactical Aircraft Refueling and Assault Support well into
the 21st century. The KC-130J's performance features include increased
cruising airspeed, night vision compatible interior and exterior
lighting, enhanced rapid ground refueling capability, digital avionics,
and powerful propulsion systems. These strengths promise lower life-
cycle expenses and eliminate the need for costly KC-130F/R Service Life
Extension Programs. In sum, the KC-130J gives us the aerial refueling
capability required to meet our current and future tactical aerial
refueling demands.
Maritime Prepositioning Shipping Support Facility
Supporting the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Shipping, the
Blount Island facility in Jacksonville, Florida, is truly a national
asset that must be secured for long-term use. Its peacetime mission to
support the Maritime Prepositioning Force has been of exceptional value
to the Corps, but its wartime capability of supporting massive
logistics sustainment from the Continental United States gives it
strategic significance. The purchase of Blount Island is planned for
fiscal year 2004, when our current lease of the facility will expire.
Command and Control
Command and Control technologies being introduced into Marine
operating forces are key to making Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare a
reality. Marine forces once ashore will utilize the Lightweight Multi-
band Satellite Terminal, Tactical Data Network, and High Frequency
Automatic Link Establishment Radios to link widely dispersed forces
into the Network Centric environment. These technologies will result in
capabilities that will greatly increase the operational agility of your
Marine Corps.
C. Transformation of Organizational Structure
The transformation of our weapons systems and equipment as well as
our operational concepts and business practices is a difficult task.
Transforming how we organize ourselves is even more difficult.
Nonetheless, building on its institutional legacy of adapting to match
the threats and missions of a given time, the Marine Corps is
reorganizing its structure. Furthermore, at the core of transforming
our organization, is the optimizing of our greatest asset, our marines.
One of our leading examples of transformational reorganization is
the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism). The 4th MEB (AT)
combined our Marine Security Guards stationed at America's embassies
around the world, Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Teams, and Chemical
Biological Incident Response Force with an organic aviation component,
combat service support element, and specialized anti-terrorism infantry
battalion, as well as a command element with dedicated planners,
coordinators, and liaison officers for anti-terrorism operations. The
4th MEB (AT) has had an immediate impact, deploying to our re-opened
embassy in Kabul, as well as supporting anthrax decontamination at the
Capitol and security at the Olympics and the State-of-the-Union
address. In the near future, all deployable units will deploy with an
anti-terrorism capability.
In addition to standing up the 4th MEB (AT), we are looking at
other organizational transformation initiatives. We are looking at
additional ways to optimize our forces by realigning outdated
structures to reflect new realities. Now is the time to consider how to
best organize our forces to meet the needs of this transformational
era.
Similar self-examination has led to successful change in our
supporting establishment. Three illustrations of this are Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity in
Quantico, Virginia, and Materiel Command in Albany, Georgia. By
reorganizing the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, we have
redefined its role in supporting Marine Operating Forces and the
Service Headquarters. It has emerged as the Corps' home for long-range
thinking and has taken on the role of coordinating requirements with
the Navy as well as facilitating the Marine Corps' relationship with
Joint Forces Command. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, likewise,
has been highly successful in validating our intelligence reach-back
concept. Exploiting both new command relationships and connectivity,
the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity is providing timely, accurate
intelligence to our globally deployed tactical forces. Similarly, by
establishing Materiel Command, we have created a unity of effort and
streamlined processes for the Marine Corps' acquisition and logistics
support functions and ground weapons/equipment life cycle management
processes. Material Command transformation initiatives for materiel
readiness improvements and increased visibility of total ownership
costs will achieve significant future cost avoidance and savings. This
allows the Installations and Logistics Department at Headquarters
Marine Corps to more effectively concentrate on policy decisions and
support to the operating forces and the regional combatant commanders.
In each of these reorganizations, optimizing efforts of the men and
women who serve our Corps has been our primary intent.
Our People
Our highest priority remains unchanged: Marines, their families,
and our civilian workforce. The most advanced aircraft, ship, or
weapons system is of no value without highly motivated and well-trained
people. People and leadership remain the real foundations of the Corps'
capabilities.
It is important to note that the Marine Corps operates as a Total
Force, including elements of both Active and Reserve components. We
continue to strengthen the exceptional bonds within our Total Force by
further integrating the Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing operations
and training. Both Marine Expeditionary Force Augmentation Command
Elements, two infantry battalions, two heavy helicopter squadrons, two
aerial refueler transport detachments, as well as other units have been
mobilized to support Operation Enduring Freedom. Called to duty, over
3,000 Marine Reservists are providing seamless support from operational
tempo relief at Guantanamo Bay to augmentation at Camp Pendleton and
Camp Lejeune.
Because our people are our number one priority, safety in the
Marine Corps is a critical concern. While it is essential to
maintaining our readiness, it is also a vital element of the quality of
life that we provide our marines and their families. I am pleased to
report that 2001 was a banner year for safety in the Marine Corps. The
Aviation community set a record, posting the lowest Class A mishap rate
in the Corps' history. Through education, vigilance, and command
involvement we reduced privately owned vehicle fatalities 39 percent
last year. Overall, we had our second lowest mishap fatality rate in 14
years. These are all very positive signs in our quest to safeguard our
most precious assets, our marines.
One factor contributing to our safety challenge is that we are a
young force. The average age of our marines is 24, roughly 6 to 8 years
younger than the average age of the members of the other services. This
is part of the culture of the Corps as our unique force structure shows
68 percent of our marines being on their first enlistment at any one
time. The nature of our force structure requires us to annually recruit
41,000 men and women into our enlisted ranks. To fill this tremendous
demand, our recruiters work tirelessly and have consistently met our
accession goals in quality and quantity for over 6\1/2\ years. The
performance of our recruiters has been superb.
Retention is just as important as recruiting. We are proud that we
are meeting our retention goals across nearly all military occupational
specialties. Intangibles--such as the desire to serve the Nation, to
belong to a cohesive organization, and to experience leadership
responsibilities through service in the Corps--are a large part of the
reason we can retain the remarkable men and women who choose to stay on
active duty. Concrete evidence of this phenomenon is seen in our
deployed units, which continually record the highest reenlistment rates
in the Corps. The Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program has been an
additional, powerful tool to meet our retention goals. Increases for
the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program, as well as the targeted pay
raise initiative, will go a long way toward meeting our retention goals
and helping take care of our marines and their families.
While we recruit marines, generally, we retain families. The
effectiveness of our marines is dependent, in large measure, on the
support they receive from their loved ones. Our families are therefore
vital to our readiness. Increased pay, as well as improved housing and
health care, directly influence our families' quality of life and, in
turn, enhances the readiness of our units. Your support of our
families' quality of life has greatly contributed to our retention
success. We are extremely thankful for the enactment of much-needed
improvements to the TRICARE system for our active duty personnel and
for our retired veterans. Thank you, as well, for continuing to support
increases in the Basic Allowance for Housing that help our marines meet
the rising costs of rent and utilities within the limits of their
housing allowances.
This committee has provided considerable support to our marines and
their families and the Marine Corps has also improved services to our
families in hopes of further enhancing their quality of life. We have
established Marine Corps Community Services aboard our installations to
better provide for both our marine families as well as our single
marines, who constitute nearly 60 percent of our total active force. We
have also sought to recognize and support our marines and families with
special needs and I am proud to say that both the Marine Corps'
Exceptional Family Member Program and the Military Committee for
Persons with Disabilities were the recipients of the 2001 S. Robert
Cohen Annual Achievement Award for their commitment to facilitating and
coordinating support and services to families with special needs.
Similarly, seeking to be more responsive to our marines and to
enhance their career opportunities, we have undertaken a number of
manpower reforms to better manage the force. Through the personal
involvement of commanders, career planners, and leaders throughout the
chain of command, we have been able to meet our retention goals,
stabilize our force, and reduce the burden on our recruiters. We are
investing considerable resources to successfully recruit, develop, and
retain the civilians who work alongside our marines. Our strategic plan
in this regard is to develop civilian career programs that integrate
and advance technical and leadership competencies.
We are also investing in our marines by improving how we train and
educate them. We believe the old adage, ``you fight the way you
train.'' Because of this, our training exercises are becoming
increasingly joint and combined to provide our marines with the
experience that they will need when they are called upon to respond to
crises that require them to work alongside our sister services and
partners from other nations. Our ability to effectively operate in both
joint and coalition environments was clearly evident in the experiences
of the Marines of Task Force 58 in Afghanistan. However, we are
increasingly finding that the training and mission effectiveness of our
marines is degraded by the many forms of encroachment on our bases and
stations. We need your continued support to ensure that the growing
complexity and expense of encroachment issues do not curtail our
efforts to conduct meaningful training. Encroachment issues will
continue to be a 21st century problem.
Experience, in tandem with education, is the best foundation for
dealing with both difficulty and fortuity. Accordingly, we are not
solely focused on training our marines, but on educating them as well.
We have expanded our non-resident education programs to ensure that
greater numbers of marines have the opportunity to better themselves.
We are also adjusting our policies to better accommodate family
realities--such as spouses with careers or children with exceptional
needs--when selecting officers to attend various schools that require a
change in duty station. We have instituted a ``National Fellows
program'' for competitively selected junior officers and staff non-
commissioned officers to experience the corporate world, think tanks,
non-governmental organizations, and the workings of Congress. The
experiences they receive will broaden perspectives and provide valuable
insights that will strengthen our capacity to innovate and adapt in the
years to come.
The Marine Corps' commitment to training and education, as well as
our commitment to our ``warrior culture,'' is reinforced in our
recently instituted martial arts program. We have developed a
discipline unique to the Corps and we are in the process of training
every marine in its martial skills. This program promotes both physical
prowess and mental discipline. Successive levels of achievement are
rewarded with different colored belts reflecting a combination of
demonstrated character, judgment, and physical skill. This training
will benefit marines in the complex missions we face; especially in
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations where physical stamina and
mental discipline are vital to success. At its heart, our martial arts
training is fundamentally focused on mentoring our young men and women
and helping them to understand that the keys to mission accomplishment
are often a matter of combining intelligence, strength, and self-
control to influence circumstances, rather than simply resorting to the
application of deadly force. The warrior ethos we instill in our
marines, transforms them into intelligent and disciplined warriors, and
mirrors the Marine Corps' own transformation in equipment, doctrine,
and structure.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, the Marine Corps' transformation is a synthesis of new
operational concepts and better business practices, leap-ahead
technologies, and realigned organizations. This transformation promises
to exponentially increase the Corps' sea-based capabilities as
America's medium-weight expeditionary force in the years ahead. Our
capabilities, combined with those of our sister Services, form an
integrated array that provides America with the diversity and
versatility she needs to confront different threats and environments
and accomplish disparate missions. In close partnership with the Navy,
we are proud of what our Corps contributes as America's forward
engagement and expeditionary combined-arms force. We are grateful to
you for your leadership and for the unwavering support you provide to
your Corps of Marines.
Senator Sessions. Well, we think you are, too. The
recruiting and retention does remain exemplary. I think that
speaks well for the morale and sense of fulfillment that the
men and women have who serve in the Marine Corps. You are to be
congratulated for that. I know you have undertaken a number of
changes in martial arts and other things that have worked well
and I hear good things about.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sessions. I frequently sit on airplanes with
marines and I learn a lot that way.
General Jones. I will have to check the passenger
manifests.
Senator Sessions. It is very informative, and morale is
good.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sessions. The quality is good.
Just for example, I was with a young man who went to a
superb college, had worked several years in the Atlanta real
estate market, was a very capable young man, and decided that
he wanted to go in the service and joined the marines and he
wanted to be a pilot. It was very impressive.
Also, I just would note that in the State of Alabama, we
lost Marine Gunnery Sergeant Steven Bryson in the KC-130 crash,
one of those crew members. His mother and the family were well-
supported by the marines with a memorial service in California.
There was a lot to be done to accommodate the needs of that
family and you once again demonstrated the kind of tight
fellowship that you have in taking care of that family. I want
to say thank you for that.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Jones, we have received testimony
that the preponderance of weapons used in Enduring Freedom have
been precision guided. We have also noticed that the Marine
Corps has asked for additional Hellfire missiles which now is
an unfunded requirement. Can you comment on the present
utilization and utility of precision guided weapons in the war
on terrorism and particularly where we are with regard to the
Hellfire missile?
General Jones. Yes, sir. If you do not mind, I will keep my
comments in the unclassified realm here. But in general, one of
the transformational aspects of warfighting between the 20th
and 21st century, frankly if you really want to be more
precise, since Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm, has been
the enormous progress that the United States has made in being
able to deliver precision guided munitions. When you think that
you have B-52s now that are almost in a close air support role,
you really do have some transformational aspects of warfighting
that are ongoing. I think that that is to be celebrated. It is
an asymmetric advantage that U.S. technology has permitted us
to achieve. It enables us to commit smaller forces on the
ground, for example, which will have the capability of
achieving missions that would, in the 20th century, have been
unthinkable.
So with that kind of transformation both in the technology
field and the application of that transformational capability
in precision guided weapons, you have a capability that will
save lives, American lives on the field and lives of our
allies, and bring about a swift resolution to our stated
objectives on the ground in any future conflict much earlier
than before and at far less of a human cost. So I think that is
certainly to be celebrated.
With regard to the Marine Corps, we have obviously been
involved in the air campaign and had the marines on the ground
and we have expended our share of ordnance. In general terms, I
would say that we have done those things that are required to
recapitalize those accounts where we have had a serious
expenditure of munitions. I think that those programs for
recapitalization are well under way.
Senator Sessions. But it does appear that the budget that
has been submitted to us leaves some of your requirements
unfunded for one of your more valuable precision weapons, like
the Hellfire. Where are we on that and how significant is this
unfunded mandate? Frankly, I am concerned because if we are in
a much more prolonged engagement than we have been in
Afghanistan and we have these very expensive platforms, very
expensively trained and skilled pilots and crew, but we do not
want them not to have the weaponry, the bullets to fire in the
gun.
General Jones. Exactly. We were asked to submit a list of
unfunded priorities. Perhaps ``priorities'' is the wrong term.
These are programs that had we had the resources available we
would have submitted, but the line was drawn at a certain
place. So they are unfunded programs. In the case of the
Hellfire, it was $105 million and that would buy about 1500
missiles. That stands as something we would like to have, but
it did not make the cut in the request, so we will keep working
on it.
Senator Sessions. In your preparation of the budget
request, I suppose you could have made a decision in favor of
the weaponry. How do you make those decisions? I would just
express to you my concern that throughout the precision weapons
area that we may not be maintaining the numbers that we need in
all branches of service. I know it would require some tough
decisions but, frankly, maybe having enough rounds to fire is
more important than how many guns you have.
General Jones. Absolutely. We are always interested in
replenishing our accounts, and as a member of the Joint Chiefs,
we have talked about these expenditure rates across the
inventory and I believe that we have addressed those with the
industry and Congress. From a Marine Corps perspective, it has
to do with how much is in your inventory and what is your
sense, what is our sense really, of our future expenditure
rates and do we have enough. So based on that, we submitted at
the right level and the priority; if it were much more
critical, my voice would have been much more animated.
So is it something that we would like to do? Certainly. But
did it reach the level of critical must-do? Based on our
inventory and our estimate of our usage rate, we think we are
probably okay.
Senator Sessions. I think we got thinner than we should
have been in the Afghanistan effort and, okay, we are
restocking rapidly in a lot of our precision weapons. But I
think it has been a lesson for us. Rather have too many than
too little.
General Jones. I think you make a good point. What happened
I think in Afghanistan was that--for example, in Operation
Desert Shield-Desert Storm, 10 percent of the weapons that we
used were precision guided munitions. In Afghanistan, it was 90
percent. We really crossed over the threshold of seeing what
precision guided munitions can do.
But our theology, if I can use that word, was to
essentially use precision munitions in the first few days and
use all of the stealthy equipment that we needed and take down
all the air defenses and then get it into an environment where
you could use less precision munitions. But because of the
enormous success that we had, we kept on using the precision
guided munitions. So as a result, across the board, we saw the
attrition and we jumped in and we dealt with it as best we
could.
But it is an astounding reversal between two conflicts
spaced by about 11 years.
Senator Sessions. Well, it is. Would you say just in terms
of economics, are you getting more impact on the enemy dollar
per dollar with a precision weapon than with a dumb bomb? Even
though they cost more each, you can put them----
General Jones. In the aggregate, you are going to probably
achieve your stated goals in a shorter period of time and you
are going to make less mistakes. You are going to have less
unintended consequences. For example, if you go back to the
Vietnam conflict, I remember being a second lieutenant and
watching B-52s deliver Arclights and the rule of thumb for an
Arclight was that you did not want to be within 5,000 meters of
wherever the Arclight was going and you could feel the ground
shake as they delivered the bombs. Now that same B-52 is
delivering ordnance where you can be within 1,000 meters and
still think that you will be okay. It is an amazing
transformation in terms of capability.
I do think that our delivery systems are getting more and
more accurate. Just since Kosovo, for example, we have had,
what I think, one of the things that really dramatically
highlighted the return of the infantryman, if you will, and the
value of boots on the ground, apart from showing national
commitment; but that soldier or sailor or airman or marine on
the ground can really multiply the force capability because by
giving strong eyes on target and guiding the precision weapons
to their intended objective with a degree of clarity that is
lacking if you are just doing it from the skies. That has
clearly been a big change as opposed to Kosovo, where we had
nobody on the ground and you were relying on everything that
you could get from imagery and intelligence and so on and so
forth.
So I think we have celebrated the return, I think, of the
infantryman and the value of having eyes on target, boots on
the ground, and getting real human and real-time tactical
intelligence that translates immediately to being able to
deliver precise ordnance at the right place and at the right
time.
But it is more expensive. I think in the future we will get
the price down, and I think that is the wave of the future.
Senator Sessions. I think the price does not necessarily
have to be too much more than conventional weapons.
Let me ask you this. I know you have made a lot of changes.
I know you have adjusted substantially to this change in
technology that alters the face of the battlefield. But are you
satisfied that you are at the level you need to be in terms of
coordinating with Air Force or other services in coordinating
marines on the ground with air? Is there more yet to be done?
General Jones. I think one of the great things that I was
happy to see was how well this idea of close air support has
permeated throughout the United States military. It was
developed long before Special Operations Command even became an
entity, but it is clear that Special Operations Command has
done some remarkable, remarkable things with being able to
deliver close air and just basic bombing missions, so to speak.
One of the things that I alluded to in my opening statement
was that we should really celebrate how far the idea of joint
interoperability at the fighting force level has come. This was
really something that was very impressive and I think is one of
the clear lessons learned or lessons observed, I should say,
from how the U.S. forces performed.
Whether it was a naval platform flying TACAIR missions or
whether it was the Air Force bombing or whether it was Special
Operations or marines or the Army on the ground, wherever we
put troops together they seemed to be able to pick up
immediately and interoperate and do very, very well.
Senator Sessions. Well, I thought that, too. I guess I
would just like to pursue it a little further. My thought is
the further you get away from your Special Ops, your most
highly trained units, in all the services--do you think we are
where we need to be? Do we still need some more commitment to
reaching the highest possible level of coordination,
particularly using precision weapons?
General Jones. The best way to fight and win on the
battlefield is to practice the way you fight. In that regard, I
am a supporter of the efforts that Joint Forces Command is
doing towards bringing the forces together and achieving true
interoperability.
But Senator, I would say that one of the most valuable
things that the services bring to the joint war-fight is our
service cultures. We have to be careful that we do not try to
make everybody become too much the same. In peacetime, we bring
different things to the table, different viewpoints, and it is
the melding of all those capabilities that transforms the force
and makes it even more exponentially viable on the battlefield.
So I think we should be very pleased with the progress of
how the services get each of their forces to the joint, what I
call the joint line of departure, because once they cross that
line of departure and are actually into a real world situation;
this is not time for practice, this is time for putting into
practice what you have been doing in peacetime. I think we have
done extraordinarily well.
Now, there is certainly more improvement we can make. For
example, how we do logistics has got to be transformed in a
way. We can do things better than stockpiling big ammunition
dumps and supply dumps like we used to do in the 20th century.
All the services are working, but not in isolation. We are
sharing good ideas. What works in one service is being shared
with another.
That is why we are seeing a situation where you can put
small amounts of people on the ground and have them survive,
because of that tremendous reach-back capability, whether it is
to reach up to an overhead platform, reach back for
intelligence, reach back for logistics. The command element of
the brigade headquarters that led two marine expeditionary
units into Afghanistan was 56 people. That would have been 356
people 15 years ago, but because of the reach-back capability
and the technology and the changes that we have made to how you
command and control forces on the ground, we are now putting
fewer people at risk with greater protection and able to do it
over tremendously long distances. I think that is to be
celebrated.
Senator Sessions. I think it is, too. We should celebrate
the transforming commitment of our military. Militaries have
been considered to be very conservative and slow to change in
the history of the world and that is pretty much true. But I am
not sure any military in peacetime or quasi-peacetime has been
as rigorous in change and innovation as ours. I am sure there
has been none. Certainly it appears that no other military in
the world is modernizing itself, taking advantage of new
capabilities as rapidly as we are. That is why we were able to
wreak a lot of damage on our enemies with a relatively small
amount of loss to ourselves. So I salute you for that.
I am delighted that Senator Collins has joined us. She has
shown great interest and fidelity to this subcommittee, has
mastered the intricacies of it, and we would be glad to have
you ask any questions or have any opening statement that you
might have. Senator Kennedy will join us as soon as he is free.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. I
very much appreciate your being here today and carrying the
burden for all of us who are committed to this subcommittee.
There are a lot of different hearings going on today that we
are trying to cover and I have just come from one that Senator
Kennedy is chairing.
General Jones, your testimony highlights the acute
shortfall of fire support and the need to continue to invest in
naval surface fire support. I believe that the Advanced Gun
System and the Extended Range Guided Munition technologies
which are scheduled to be incorporated into the DDX will make
significant advancements toward addressing this shortfall.
Would you please comment on these two specific technologies and
the capabilities that they will provide to the Marine Corps?
General Jones. Senator, thank you very much for raising
what has been a consistent worry of mine since I have taken
office. Both on land and at sea, we have a shortfall in terms
of fire support capability. The Marine Corps, in partnership
with the Navy, has long depended upon naval fire support for
successful amphibious operations of the 20th century. In fact,
our history is scattered with loads of battles that have been
won with the combination of the Navy and Marine Corps team,
with strong fires coming from the sea and marines projecting
ashore to secure an objective.
What has happened since World War II is essentially a
capabilities transformation. I talk about the Marine Corps now
not in terms of necessarily an amphibious force, but as a sea-
based force that is expeditionary in nature. That expeditionary
quality and the ensuring technologies that have developed have
allowed us now to project that force over much longer
distances.
It is important that the fire support systems, both on land
and at sea, accompany that capability. We currently have a
shortfall in both sea-based and land-based capability. So in
partnership with the CNO, who also recognizes this shortfall,
we are anxious to be proceeding with the development of
precision weaponry over extremely long distances that can, in
fact, correct that shortfall.
I might add parenthetically that, on land, the Lightweight
155 is at a pivotal moment in its program life. This year, we
should, in my opinion, commit to fully supporting the
acquisition of that particular program.
The naval programs are a little bit more complex and a
little bit more transformational, because of the precision that
goes into it. But we fully support the program. We fully
support the advanced systems that we hope will be resident in
our future surface platforms. We are working assiduously with
the Navy to bring this about.
Senator Collins. Would you please comment on the challenges
that the Navy and the Marine Corps face in operating in the
challenging littoral environment and how the DDX and its family
of ships would help you better address those challenges?
General Jones. Yes, ma'am. The value of the naval
expeditionary force is that you are not as encumbered with
access as you are if you are moving the landward piece of our
national capability. In fact, in an operation like Enduring
Freedom, the overwhelming majority of the TACAIR was delivered
from naval platforms. Two marine expeditionary units were
delivered over 400 miles in a landlocked country and
maintained. Not only were they maintained, but when they
arrived, they operated, ready to fight.
In the future, the CNO and I are very, very interested in
developing advanced sea-basing concepts with the DDG, with the
future family of amphibious ships, and with our experiments
with high-speed vessels. We believe that, particularly in the
global war on terrorism, most of the potential areas that we
would operate in are in and around the littorals. That
capability of that naval expeditionary force, which will look
differently in the future, will be accompanied by DDGs, and
will have amphibious ships and a carrier that is committed to
the support of the operation, which will result in greater
integration of Naval and Marine Corps aviation. This is a
capability that is a national treasure and should be carefully
invested in over the years to come.
Senator Collins. I was surprised that your written
statement did not address the DDX and its family of ships. So
just for the record, are the Marine Corps and are you still in
strong support of proceeding with the DDX shipbuilding program?
General Jones. I am in complete support with the CNO's
program. The Marine Corps and the Navy budgets are combined to
form the Department of Defense's budget. Generally in my
statement, you would not necessarily see a shipbuilding
characterization because that is usually done elsewhere. But I
can assure you that I am a vocal supporter of the Navy
programs. I believe that I am on record as saying that we need
to recapitalize our shipbuilding accounts to start turning our
Navy around so that we can build more ships in the future.
The Secretary of Defense has said publicly that he regrets
that we were not able to do as much as we wanted to this year,
but it is certainly something that is on his calendar. He is
very aware of it and within the limitations of our budgetary
process we did what we could to invest what we needed to this
year. But it is not a subject that is lost on us in terms of
its importance.
Senator Collins. General, section 211 of the Fiscal Year
2002 National Defense Authorization Act conference report
requires the Secretary of Defense to carry out an assessment of
the requirements for naval surface fire support of ground
troops operating in the littoral environment. That report is
due at the end of this month. Could you tell us what the status
of the report is and could you provide us with any insights on
its conclusions?
General Jones. If I could provide that for the record, I
would appreciate that. I am not exactly sure as to what the
exact status is at this point. I will be happy to do that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The report is being reviewed within Plans, Policies, and Operations
(PP&O) of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps and will be returned to my
office around the beginning of June. The report concludes that the
combination of near- and far-term programs described therein will
collectively provide the required range, lethality, accuracy and
responsiveness to meet Marine Corps requirements for Naval Surface
Fires.
I concur with the report's conclusion that these programs can meet
the requirements of the Marine Corps, but only if procured in
sufficient quantities to provide sustained fire support to forces
operating in the littorals. Obviously, fielding a capability (achieving
an Initial Operational Capability) does not mean that a requirement has
been met; that capability must be sufficiently proliferated to meet the
needs of the supported force. The report does not address the
quantities of munitions or weapon systems that will be procured through
this plan, and I am concerned that these quantities will fall short of
meeting the requirement to provide sustained, all-weather fire support
from the sea.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
Senator Kennedy [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
Collins. I just turned around and I saw you at the same hearing
we were at, and here you got ahead of me once again.
I want to thank my friend Senator Sessions for opening this
hearing. Senator Collins and I were both at a very important
hearing with a witness, Christopher Reeve, who is challenged
physically from being paralyzed from the neck down. So that
hearing, although it was supposed to be in the morning,
necessitated a change to the afternoon. He has a particularly
pressing schedule. So I apologize to Senator Sessions. I thank
him very much for opening the hearing.
I want to thank you, General Jones, for being here. I think
anyone that is meeting with the leaders, let alone the members,
of the armed services today, in any day in recent times, has to
extend their extraordinary condolence through you to the
others, not just in the Marine Corps, but in the Special Ops.
Certainly the marines have been out there at the cutting edge
in Afghanistan, and all of us are very mindful of the loss of
those lives, particularly in the last 36 hours. So I am sure
you have a keen appreciation for the very strong admiration and
respect that all of us have for the marines and for others who
are facing a very challenging and difficult task and performing
extraordinarily well and suffering the casualties. Since you
are the representative here today, we hope that you will
understand that that is the way that we feel and that we are
grateful, obviously, to you for all of your service.
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. In the hearing today, the subcommittee has
worked diligently with the Marine Corps and the Department of
the Navy to address some important problems involving: the fire
support capability, including the organic Marine Corps fire
support and Navy shore support; enhancing the tactical mobility
of the Marine Corps; and augmenting the mine countermeasures. I
will note for the record that this subcommittee has taken the
lead in Congress in ensuring the Navy and Marines improve the
existing capability in these areas, in many cases over the
objections of senior Defense and Navy Department officials.
Unfortunately, we have seen early signs that the Navy
Department may be lapsing into previous unacceptable behavior.
Some of the instances that may be forming a pattern are the
cancelling of the Land Attack Destroyer, the DD 21, program
that was intended to be a multi-mission ship, but was primarily
aimed at meeting the Navy surface fire support requirements of
the Marine Corps. DD 21 was to have been the first ship in a
class of 32 ships with delivery starting 2010. Marine Corps
officials have previously testified that nothing short of the
capability of the planned DD 21 with two 155-millimeter guns
would meet their fire support requirements.
With the new DDX program, there is no firm commitment in
near the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to build anything
other than a demonstration ship using R&D funding. It is not
clear when, if ever, the FYDP would lead to meeting Marine
Corps fire support needs. That is number one.
Second, the terminating of the fire support missile
program, Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM). The LASM was a
program designed to use old surface-to-air missiles to provide
some fire support capability, particularly at longer ranges. It
was intended to be an interim system that would have been
replaced by the new system, the ALAM.
Last year, it appeared the Navy was canceling the ALAM.
However, we could not tell for sure since the budget request
did not give any information about fiscal years after 2002.
This year, it is clear that the Navy is canceling both
programs.
Third, cancellation of the shallow water minefield
breaching system. The Navy decided last year to terminate the
Shallow Water Assault Breaching System (SABRE) and Distributed
Explosive Technology (DET) shallow water mine clearance
systems. In part, they based their decision on the fact that
the systems are too bulky to be carried continuously aboard
ship, and that the lanes cleared through the minefields would
not be wide enough.
The Navy made this cancellation decision in spite of the
fact the Navy has no near-term alternative to provide the
capability. It is hard to understand why having no capability
in this area would be better than at least having some
capability, whatever the shortcomings.
Then they have the retiring of the U.S.S. Inchon mine
command and control ship. Several years ago, with significant
pressure from this subcommittee, the Navy decided they needed
to have a large aviation-capable ship that would be dedicated
to mine countermeasures support. They converted an older
amphibious ship, the U.S.S. Inchon, to the duty. While the ship
served the purpose for which it was intended, the fact it was
an older ship and was probably not the highest on the Navy's
maintenance priority list caused an erosion in material
condition.
Within the last year, the crew experienced a fire in the
ship with one person killed. Because the Navy has decided that
fixing the ship would be too expensive, they are retiring the
ship with no immediate replacement. Navy officials have said
that, in the interim, they would use one of the amphibious
ships in the regular fleet in case they need to conduct
dedicated minesweeping operations. This was the position we
were in before this subcommittee began pressing the Navy to
make significant mine warfare improvements in the early 1990s.
Unfortunately, there are other examples that I can cite,
but in the interest of time, I will not. Each of these actions
taken individually may have an explanation. However, taken as a
whole, I fear they are part of a pattern of the Navy
Department's walking away from their funding of the very
capabilities that make the Navy and Marine Corps team so
relevant to today's world.
If there is a new military strategy that is charting a new
course for the Navy-Marine team, we need to hear about and
understand it. If there is not, then we need to ensure that the
Department of the Navy does not march down a path of
incrementally divesting its capability without a thorough
understanding of where these actions will take us.
So I would hope that perhaps, General Jones, you would give
us your reaction to this set of circumstances.
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In 1995 I was
privileged to serve for a year as the director of expeditionary
naval warfare on the staff of the CNO and one of my
responsibilities during that time was appearing before this
subcommittee to testify on mine countermeasures and the
direction of the mine warfare program.
The commitment that was made at that time was to try to
leave our legacy systems, which were developed, in theory,
many, many years ago during the Cold War, when the United
States structured itself to have a home port breakout
capability. The fear was that enemy mines could be placed
around our ports so that we could not actually put our ships at
sea. We had structured ourselves to do that.
While I was the director of expeditionary warfare, we, I
think, made some progress towards transitioning from this
legacy system to an organic capability. The thinking started to
emerge that the naval expeditionary force of the future must
have an embarked organic capability in order to deal with the
mine threat, not at our home ports, but in the littorals or in
the areas of operation that we were interested in around the
world.
We have invested a significant amount of money in bringing
some capabilities to the fleet, albeit not completely done. But
the idea was to try to get away from the fleet being dependent
on the arrival of the Inchon, which would be home ported back
in the continental United States, and, without knowing exactly
where the problem would be they have to, basically, go to full
stop waiting for the mine warfare community to arrive on-
station because there was no organic capability.
So we have taken the leadership of this subcommittee
seriously, because I remember how serious it was during that
period. We recognize that during that time we had not
sufficiently paid attention to the intent of Congress in this
matter, and we fashioned some budget requests that were
inviolate for the following 3 or 4 years in terms of mine
warfare. In other words, mine warfare was fenced in the United
States Navy for several years.
As a result, they were able to make some exciting changes
in trying to get to that organic capability. The shallow water
mine countermeasures program, affectionately known as SABRE and
DET, was not something that we walked away from without
considerable experimentation and observation. It is a
capability that gives you some utility, but it is very slow, it
is extremely heavy, and it is not what I would consider an
expeditionary program that we want to peg our future on.
We have a target date, an IOC of 2005, to arrive at organic
mine countermeasure capability within the carrier battle
groups, and I believe that it is going to be exciting to get
there. Now, in the mean time, are we going to have to accept
some risk? Yes. But are we going to save some money by rolling
up some legacy programs in order to get to where we want to go?
Clearly.
I would also say that one of the things that we should
remember about mine warfare, particularly with the amazing
technologies we have this year, is that, by virtue of our air
cushion landing craft, some of our high-speed landing craft,
and the range that technologies such as tilt rotor technology
will bring to the expeditionary forces, we are not channelized
nearly as much as we were in the 20th century to coming across
a certain beach at a certain time simply because that is the
only place we can land.
We have access now to 85 percent of the world's landing
beaches. We do not go up in the face of the enemy.
Expeditionary maneuver warfare takes us to do just the
opposite. So in many cases, finding out where the mines are is
the first half of the puzzle, because we can go so many places
where the mines are not.
Now, clearly in-stride breaching is something that we want
to bring into the United States Navy. No battle group should be
held up because there is a floating mine that is detected in
the water. We should be able to neutralize that mine.
In that context, I would also offer that the progress in
naval mine warfare outstrips the progress that we have made in
land mine warfare considerably at this point. So not perfect,
but certainly getting there.
Senator Kennedy. Well, let me just remind--you do not need
any reminder. I remember during the Iraq War being over in the
Gulf and seeing those helicopters dragging the big chains in
front of American resupply ships that were going three knots.
We had American ships that were hitting those mines. Some of
those mines were World War I mines. World War I mines! Now, we
have been after this subcommittee, Senator Cohen and I, to talk
about how we were going to get some help.
Last year, I asked Admiral Fallon, what we were doing about
it. Remember the difficulties. I mentioned the problems of mine
warfare. We apparently believe that mines continue to present a
threat to the Navy and the Marine force. So Admiral Fallon went
on to say, ``We have a program in place that we are working in
the area of new technology and, frankly, we are waiting to see
how these things deliver.''
I went on: ``I was interested in why the Navy was altering
or redirecting funding on the SABRE shallow mine breaching
system when it has no near-term alternative to field. I
understand that it was done because they have testing problems.
Do you want to explain?''
He gave a long explanation: ``The recommendation is to
pursue other technologies to try and do the job.''
I want to know the assessment when he said we have new
technology and we are waiting to see how things deliver. Well,
we are a year later. I want to know how they are delivering. We
are a continuing body and I am not satisfied with answers that
come up every year: ``well, we are looking at this and we are
looking at new technologies.'' Here we have the Admiral saying
we have new technologies and we are going to assess them. Now,
I guess we will ask the Admiral when he comes in here
specifically. This is what they said a year ago and we want to
know what they have been doing on it.
I mean, that is the only way we are going to get any
accountability. It is not as though we are all starting over
every single year. That is what it always seems to be every
single year. We are starting over and that is not acceptable. I
would think you are the ones that would be the people that
would be the most concerned about this priority in terms of
what it is going to mean for your people. It was a matter of
enormous concern to marines when I was out there. LaBootie, who
you know well, has talked about this, about the limitations in
terms of how the Americans were going to be able to deal with
the limitations and how the marines were going to be able to
land and perform in shallow waters on this.
This is something that goes on every single year. I think
that this is something that we have got to try and find out.
Maybe we will go talk to the Navy about it, but it is something
that is a matter of concern.
Let me just go back to what I was talking about in terms of
the firepower. We had heard testimony over the past the only
solution to meeting the Marine Corps' surface fire would be the
introduction of the capability that was going to be available
in the DD 21, the two, as I mentioned, gun batteries. Now, Navy
has outlined the DDX program and that will be 2005.
So, has the Marine Corps changed its longstanding
requirement for naval surface fire support?
General Jones. Sir, we have not, and that is an
identifiable shortfall that I identified in 1999 in my
confirmation hearing. Not only is there a shortfall at sea,
there is a shortfall on land. On land, which are the programs
that I have the most facility to affect, we will bring,
hopefully, on line within a very short period of time the
Lightweight 155 and, finally, a replacement mortar, the 120-
millimeter mortar, that will significantly help remedy the
paucity of fire support that is critical to the operation of
our land forces.
At sea, we are further away from a capability that will
reach out over the distances that we can now project forces.
But nonetheless, it is a commitment that we must bring to bear
and bring into the inventory as quickly as possible.
Senator Kennedy. Well, this is an important issue and you
have been eloquent on it. You wonder whether there is any
prospect the Navy will be able to meet your fire support
requirements during the current and future years in the defense
program. I mean, that is a serious question. Given the actions
that the Navy has taken, it is still very much up in the air.
Now, let me indicate where this leads. If we are not really
serious about the creditable forcible entry capability, we have
a limited ability in fire support now, and the actions taken in
the last year give little hope the Navy will be able to meet
the Marine Corps fire support requirements in the foreseeable
future. So, if we are not really serious about maintaining or
improving the capability, it raises more questions about
whether we need the traditional amphibious shipping or other
Marine Corps systems.
I mean, why should the subcommittee conclude the Department
is really serious about maintaining and improving the forcible
entry capability in view of the various programmatic decisions
that appear to be eroding that capability over time?
General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that the
naval gunfire support has been historically important to us and
it will be important to us in the future. But I would be remiss
if I left the subcommittee with the impression that that is the
only thing that gives us a forcible entry capability. The
current range of the 5-inch 54 is about 14 nautical miles. The
Advanced Gun System has a threshold of 60-plus nautical miles
and the Objective Gun is over 100 nautical miles, and that is
transformational capability.
Some years ago, the Marine Corps, recognizing that
battleships were disappearing and naval gunfire systems were
attriting and not being replaced, committed to remedying that
shortfall through heavy investment in its air-delivered
ordnance systems. We have invested heavily in close air support
and the Marine Corps has pioneered it as far as I am concerned.
So the utility of forcible entry with the combined arms
force of the Marine Corps, I maintain, still is very important
to the operational flexibility of the national command
authority. Naval platforms give you an access capability that,
as we saw in Operation Enduring Freedom, countries that do not
wish for you to use their bases or put a price tag that is so
high that you cannot ever operate from there because you do not
want to invent a Marshall Plan all over the world. It gives you
the access capability and the forcible entry capability that we
need.
Clearly, naval surface fires need to be addressed. I
believe that is recognized. Is it going fast enough? Probably
not as fast as we would have liked, but it is a recognized
requirement and shortfall. The good news is on the ground side;
we are remedying it. We need to do more on naval guns and we
will work with the Navy to do that. I think it is recognized.
Senator Kennedy. Let me move along. We want to give focus
in both of these areas and follow closely and we will continue
to do so. We want to work with you on this in terms of the
priorities of the committee because of the reasons you have
expressed very eloquently.
Let me go to the V-22 program. The subcommittee was
notified recently that the Navy is paying the contract team to
store 19 of the V-22 aircraft already built while the fixes are
identified and tested. So, as I understand it, we have, I
guess, it will be 30. Is that right, 30?
General Jones. Yes, sir, about 30, 32.
Senator Kennedy. I think at the outset, we want to get it
right. Here is someone who wants to get it right. We do not
want the marines, not that you would, cutting corners to try
and--I recognize you have the backlog and the pressures on
this. I think we want you and the marines and the Defense
Department to get this thing right and take the time to get it
right. That is the basic point that I want to make.
Now, having said that, what can you tell us about this
fact? We are getting all of these now--we have 30. All are
going to have to be adjusted and changed now to deal with
whatever kinds of changes that are going to be necessary. We
want to try and keep the line on track, obviously, in terms of
production. We have these realities that are coming up and we
want to hear from you about how you see this current situation
and what you can tell the committee.
General Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The V-22 has
survived because of the support of this Congress over the
years. It has been--I believe, I continue to believe it to be
truly a transformational capability. It was thoroughly looked
at by the defense panel and NASA, two independent bodies that
rendered the judgment that the problems with the program were
not due to technology being immature, but due to engineering
changes that had to be effected in the aircraft.
For most of the past year, we have been working on making
those corrections, the engineering corrections. We have been
consulting on a daily basis with the experts in industry, with
the best minds that we can put against this problem. We have
essentially done a major rework of the hydraulic system to
eliminate the chafing problems that have been discovered in the
previous V-22's that were built, and we have rectified the
software problems that caused the flight control anomalies in
the last crash.
We are now to the point where probably some time in April
we can resume testing. This is an event-driven scenario, not
time line-driven. I have stated for the record, along with the
Commander-in-Chief of Special Operations Command, that had we
been able to use this technology in Afghanistan, we probably
would have not had a considerable number of helicopter
accidents that we have had, simply because of the range, the
capability, the altitudes, the speed that this technology
offers.
Let me be very clear that I think that this is so
transformational in terms of military capabilities that it is
really the departure point for helicopters, who are struggling
in Afghanistan at the heights that we are asking them to
perform and causing us to be very creative in how we get our
helicopters to the area of operations from the standpoint of
fuel, maintenance, etcetera.
So where we are is we are about to return to a testing
mode. We will do that carefully. I would like--with your
permission, I have just two charts that I would just like to
show you.
Senator Kennedy. Sure.
General Jones. If I could have the first one, please.
Just from a sense of perspective--and this is only for
naval aviation--this chart shows is naval aviation mishap
rates, which is calculated based on 100,000 flying hours. You
can see--and hopefully you have a copy before you--that in
1954, as a result of a very high mishap rate, in naval aviation
776 aircraft were destroyed as a result of mishaps in 1954. In
2001 the number was 15.
So, this basically shows what tremendous progress we have
made over the years in terms of flying more safely, recognizing
that, sadly, it is never zero, but it certainly has gotten
better.
The second chart, though, shows you by type the accident
rates for production aircraft within the first 5 years non-
combat-related, starting with the F-8 on the left and all the
way over to the V-22. I want to say these are production
aircraft class A mishaps, not testing and evaluation. You see
that historically speaking the V-22 is generally in the same
envelope of performance, if not slightly better than, most of
the other aircraft.
This is just to simply say that aviation is still dangerous
and, despite the progress of science, we still will make
mistakes. But I think that we are going to be within a very
acceptable envelope, recognizing that zero is our target.
So we are anxious to try to bring this capability aboard.
We have a plan with industry to retrofit the production
aircraft that have already come off the line with the changes.
I have personally visited Amarillo. Just recently, I have
talked to the leaders of Bell and Boeing. I have talked to the
program manager. The Secretary of the Navy is very involved.
Mr. Aldridge, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, has given us his support to resume
test flights and we are excited about the prospect of bringing
this capability into our National inventory.
Senator Kennedy. So, obviously, it is going to have to be
tested and then, if it sort of works, they make the assessment
about how the changes will be made in terms of the current
production lines and how you retrofit the past.
General Jones. The test aircraft will have all the changes
in it.
Senator Kennedy. We hope that you have a continuing
invitation to keep our subcommittee advised as to where it is
moving.
General Jones. Thank you, sir. I will do so.
Senator Kennedy. On the LHD stability issue that you are
familiar with, the subcommittee has been informed there will be
a ship stability issue on the LHD-1-class ships if the marines
choose to replace the current air group with one-for-one
replacements, the MV-22s, and Joint Strike Fighters, replacing
the helicopters and AV-8B. Is this one of the reasons for the
continuing discussion about the details for the LHA
replacement?
General Jones. Yes, sir. The LHAs are reaching the end of
their service life and need to be replaced. So, as we do, that
problem will certainly take care of itself over time.
Senator Kennedy. Well, as I understand, it they will be
replaced over the next decade or two.
General Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. The LHD-8 would presumably replace one of
them. I understand the Department of the Navy has not come to a
decision on the requirements for the rest of the replacement
programs. The reports indicate that the size of the replacement
ships range from 40,000 tons to as large as 75,000 tons. Why is
there such a difference in the displacement among the options?
General Jones. Well, the LHD is a significantly more
capable ship from the standpoint of being able to accept new
aircraft. Of course, the Joint Strike Fighter STOVL version and
the V-22 figure in our transformational objectives. The
Department remains committed to a 12 amphibious ready group
capability as a floor and we, the Secretary, the CNO, and I,
are very supportive of the follow-on programs to replace the
LHD.
Now, there is some discussion currently ongoing about the
right size for the LHD of the future in order to make sure that
we can accommodate all of the things that we want that ship to
do. But fundamentally, it will still be an LHD.
Senator Kennedy. Well, given the uncertainty, does it make
a lot of sense to have advance procurement funding for the LHD-
9 when we have not decided that configuration?
General Jones. I think I should defer to the shipbuilding
community with regard to whether that is a wise course of
action. I think that the fundamental design of the ship will
not change. What is at issue here is whether there will be a
plug in it to make it a little longer or a little bit wider.
Senator Kennedy. You mean the difference between 40,000 and
75,000 tons----
General Jones. I am not sure what the spectrum of
difference is, but I would be surprised----
Senator Kennedy. Well, the only point is if we are going
for--I would think we would want to get the final decision on
the size of it before we do much advanced procurement funding.
General Jones. I have General Magnus here, sir, who is more
deeply involved in the specifics.
General Magnus. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to answer
the question for you. First off, the amount of money that you
were referring to, Senator, was a small amount of RDT&E
funding. This summer, approximately the June-July time frame,
we are going to report out on the analysis of alternatives
which covers the range of ship hull forms that you talked
about, ranging from about a 45,000 ton ship to about a 73,000
ton ships.
Clearly, we have to do the cost effectiveness trades to
determine at that range of effectiveness and wide range of
capabilities. Until the analysis of alternatives report is out,
we believe that, basically, we have a place-holder with a small
amount of RDT&E. If, in fact, it is simply an LHD-8 type hull
with a 100-odd foot plug in it, there would be less amount of
development required. If it is a new hull form, such as a twin
hull 70,000 ton displacement ship, a significant amount more
development would take place.
These ships are not only required to replace the LHA-1
class, which the first ship would normally retire about 2011,
but, in fact, the CNO was on board Bella Wood just a few weeks
ago, a 24-year-old ship, and he was quite surprised in a
negative sense about the material condition of the ship. So, we
would prefer not to have to wait until these ships have to be
retired. We want to get under way with a decision on the
development, sir.
Senator Kennedy. That is good. I think you have it about
getting the decision on the development so that it will move
along. I just have some concerns about putting out a good deal
of additional funds now without the final judgment and
decision.
I just had a couple. My colleague has been extremely kind
and patient here. I have just really two more areas that I
would like to mention. One is the new prepositioning ship
program and the modernization of the prepositioning force
ships. We all know about the importance of those prepositioned
ships. I understand there has been continuing discussions in
the Navy and DOD about the set of requirements on that. If
there is anything that you want to----
General Jones. Sir, thank you very much.
Senator Kennedy. I just heard the concept is something
else. About how long is that ship going to be anchored? It is
unbelievable. I will not take a lot of time here, but it is
something else; what you are planning?
General Jones. Yes, sir. The MPS program, which was funded
some years ago as a concept, has turned out to be
extraordinarily useful to the marines and to the joint force in
terms of not only projecting but maintaining the combat power.
Just to give you a perspective, it would take 2,000 C-17
equivalent lifts to bring to bear the same amount of equipment
that the ships of amphibious squadron, MPS squadron, bring to
the fight.
It is a tremendous capability. The three squadrons are
located strategically around the globe. They are bought and
paid for. It is a leasing program actually, and the leases run
out as I recall, between 2009 and 2011. So the reason we are
discussing the follow-on family of ships is that around that
time we will have to have come up with the solution for how to
do the MPS of the future.
One of the fundamental requirements of the program is a
basing function or a basing capability. We have such a
capability in a place called Blount Island in Florida right
now. Blount Island has been the home port for all of our
amphibious squadrons, our prepositioned squadrons.
The thing I want to stress about this capability is that it
is available to the warfighter immediately on arrival. Not only
is it available on arrival, it is loaded in such a way that the
warfighter can say, I need a certain capability, let us say 200
light armed vehicles. Those ships are so well-constructed that
inside it we can roll off 200 light armored vehicles fully
manned, operational, ready, gassed up, ready to go and without
having to offload the entire ship.
We also have an in-stream offloading capability. We have
added a hospital capability. We also have a capability of
building expeditionary airfields--all contained, all paid for.
There is not any warfighting commander in chief who is
contemplating using marines that does not want to bring the
maritime prepositioned ships into the fight.
So this is a very important program for us. It will need to
be addressed in the years ahead. As I said, the leases run out
on these ships starting in 2009.
Senator Kennedy. Do they still use that cosmolene? Do they
still wrap those old weapons in cosmolene that takes hours to
try and get off?
General Jones. I do not think, not on our ships. Whatever
is on those ships is ready to go.
Senator Kennedy. Just finally, General. This is on the LST
retirement: this committee intervened in 1994 to keep the Navy
Department from selling or leasing all of the tank landing
ships, the LSTs. Otherwise the Navy's overall amphibious lift
capability would drop below the ability to carry the 2.5 MEBs.
Although we have been technically maintaining 2.5 MEB lift, not
all of the ships will be immediately available.
The LPD-17 class of ships is intended to eliminate the
problem. This year the Navy plans to get rid of one or more of
the Navy's LSTs, which would mean losing the vehicle-carrying
capability an LST represents. I remember Admiral Boorda felt
strongly about this.
Was the Marine Corps consulted in this decision?
General Jones. Yes, sir. We have one LST left and it is
scheduled to be retired this year. We have, with some concern
in the aggregate, a stated requirement of being able to lift
the amphibious echelon of three marine expeditionary brigades.
The fiscally constrained reality is that we have been for the
last 8 to 10 years, I would imagine, at about 2.5 marine
expeditionary brigades assault echelon lift capability and
sliding a little bit below that.
So in the aggregate, that is a concern. But the CNO and the
Secretary are faced with the serious situation that shows that
the ships and the airplanes of the Navy, of the Navy
Department, are aging at the same time, but aging in an
accelerated way. Of the two, the aircraft in the Navy are
significantly older than the ships are. So because we neglected
to recapitalize and modernize for so long, all of the principal
end items are becoming obsolete at the same time or aging at
the same time.
So what we have tried to do is stop the bleeding, to use a
medical term. By that is to rid our inventories of legacy
systems. There are some LPD-4 class ships, for example. I have
a son who is a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps and he
will sail on the U.S.S. Denver. I sailed on the U.S.S. Denver
when I was a captain in 1975. So we still have some legacy
amphibious ships that simply have to be let go before we can
recapitalize.
The cost of maintenance on old airplanes and old equipment
is going through the roof and we simply cannot afford it. The
longer we hang onto them, the longer we delay being able to
turn around and do something.
Senator Kennedy. But we want to work with you on that
issue. We will be in touch with you.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kennedy. I want to thank again my friend and my
colleague, Senator Sessions. I am very grateful to him for
chairing the hearing.
General Jones. Thank you, sir.
Senator Sessions. We have a $48 billion increase in defense
spending this year, which is the largest we have had in 15, 20
years, I suppose. But we committed a lot of that for salary and
health and other things. Do you know what that leaves us
fundamentally for procurement and new systems after Congress
has mandated the pay raises and the other things that we felt
we needed to do? How much actual new money you got to spend for
procurement?
General Jones. In procurement for the Marine Corps, it is
about $465 million.
Senator Sessions. You did better than your fellow services
in terms of procurement budget, I believe; did you not?
General Jones. I do not have the comparison in front of me,
but this from fiscal year 2002 to 2003 it is a significant
increase for us.
Senator Sessions. Well, I do not think we got an overall
net increase in procurement. If it did, it was not much. It was
just because we made a lot of other commitments and we have
some increase in research and development, but, overall, we are
not where we need to be. The marines have done I think the best
in those categories, but you are small compared to the other
services also, much smaller. You are beginning at a point much
below the others.
General Jones. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Let me ask briefly before I close up. The
Quadrennial Defense Review directed the Secretary of the Navy
to develop new concepts of maritime prepositioning and high
speed sealift and amphibious capabilities for the Marine Corps.
What are you taking with these new concepts? Are you satisfied
where we are going, and what are your hopes for the future?
General Jones. Senator, I am very excited about this
concept. I think it is wrapped up in some discussions that I am
looking forward to having with members of the committee and the
staff and also in partnership with the Navy. It is wrapped
around what I think is going to be a 21st century issue around
sea-basing and how the United States is going to have to come
to grips with this issue.
Simply put, it is my feeling that our access to large land
bases in the 21st century is liable to be less than it has been
in the 20th century in the way we have traditionally done it.
We have seen the rise of sovereignty issues around the globe,
nations that jealously guard their national sovereignty, and
sometimes make it very difficult for us to position our forces
and, if we do position our forces, use our forces in the way we
would want to.
Sea-basing gives you a mobility and a sustainability piece
that, if done right, will offset those sovereignty issues that
are in the land-based side of the house. It will go beyond the
current configuration of the fleet. It will include a family, I
believe, of high-speed vessels. Currently we are experimenting,
as an example, with a high-speed vessel in Okinawa. Instead of
waiting for strategic airlift, which is very short and very
expensive and in great demand, as you might imagine, we can
now, as a result of a leased ship that we obtained from
Australia, take an entire marine battalion and all of its
equipment, put it on a high-speed vessel, and, at a speed of 50
knots, be in the mainland of Japan the next morning, or we can
be in Guam a day later than that, at a significantly lower
cost.
So looking at this concept of sea-basing and looking at
some of the things that were discussed in the mid-1990s, put
aside the opportunity to build perhaps mobile offshore bases
when you have a culture that is expeditionary like the Navy and
the Marine Corps, where a 6-month rotation is the standard for
our culture. If we had sea bases to go to and project our
influence and our sovereignty around the world, I think you can
have an exponentially different way of doing business.
So I am very excited about the whole concept of sea-basing.
Senator Sessions. I think that has great potential and the
high speed movement by ship has great potential. Also, our
subcommittee deals with airlift, too, and we know how tight
that can be. To me, if we could supplement it significantly in
this fashion we would be making a step forward.
General Jones. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Senator McCain, I think I am
acting chairman here again. So I am glad to recognize you. I
have finished up. It is all yours.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Thank you, General Jones, for being here. Thank you for
your leadership of the Marine Corps and thank you for the
changes that you are making in the Marine Corps to help meet
these new and very difficult challenges that I think we just
learned in the last day or so are still quite significant.
General Jones, could I ask you about the issue of the
aircraft carriers. I and eight other members of the Senate went
on a trip to Central Asia a month or so ago, including
Afghanistan and several other countries. But, on the way back,
we took the opportunity to go out on board the Theodore
Roosevelt. The Theodore Roosevelt at that time was one of four
aircraft carriers that were in the region. They were on their
113th day of deployment without having been into port and they
were going to have some more weeks of deployment.
That is a very long time to be at sea. It is something that
the officers and enlisted men and women were very enthusiastic
about because they clearly thought they were making an
important contribution to freedom and combatting the war on
terrorism. But I do not think you can do that very long and
very often and maintain men and women in the all volunteer
force.
As I mentioned, there were four aircraft carriers. My
understanding is there are 11 operational aircraft carriers and
one training carrier. Four of the 11 were on station at that
time.
Do you not think it would be very difficult to maintain
that kind of OPTEMPO over an extended period of time?
General Jones. Senator, I think the CNO and I have talked
about those things and that is clearly a difficult, very
challenging, and very stressful thing to do. In addition to the
carriers, there were six amphibs that have been out there for a
considerable period of time. I know the CNO has taken that into
consideration and meeting General Franks' request for the
support and the presence.
Interestingly enough, the preponderance of TACAIR that was
delivered and still continues to fly over the skies of
Afghanistan are coming from those naval platforms, simply
because of the difficulty to project TACAIR over those
distances. But your point is well taken. It is something that
as a percentage of our total fleet, and if you examine the
potential requirements of the global war on terrorism and the
role that the naval expeditionary force will play in
prosecuting that war, then we have to make sure that we do not
break either the capability of the ships or the capability of
the force to sustain those operations.
That is why we are working very hard to make sure that
those ships get rotated in a timely manner, so that it is not
an indefinite deployment, recognizing that 6 months straight is
an awfully long time.
Senator McCain. It just seems to me that perhaps we are not
looking at the requirement for additional aircraft carriers--I
am talking about big carriers--if that indeed is the case,
which I think that statistics prove that it is carrier-based
air that is carrying the majority of the load. It always seems
to at the initial phases of conflict, until the land bases are
established. I know we will, working with Kyrgystan,
Uzbekhistan, etcetera, build bases that land-based air can
operate from.
But it seems to me that we need to consider what the
threats are and whether we have sufficient carrier capability
in light of the requirement for carriers to undergo
maintenance, training, etcetera. As proud as those men and
women are of serving, I do not think you can send them too many
times on 6-month deployments and maintain the reenlistment
rates. Would you agree with that?
General Jones. Over time, committing that percentage of the
force for that length of mission will probably cause
difficulties in the services. But for now, because of the fact
that we are at war, we are, in fact, dependent on them to
provide that force from those platforms. There is not really
any good other alternative. So I think we, recognizing the
challenges and the stresses that places on the force, also
celebrate the courage and dedication of those crews that are
just doing astoundingly good work.
But your point is well taken, that how we go on in the
future; it just cannot be assumed that we can operate at that
tempo forever. That is why we really have been working hard to
make sure that we just do not do indefinite deployments,
either, 8, 9, 10 months. That is not supportable.
Senator McCain. Obviously and unfortunately, some of that
is dictated by the nature of the threat as opposed to planning.
General Jones. I mentioned earlier, Senator, that the 15th
MEUSOC, for example, which just completed almost a 7-month
deployment, was the first marine unit to go into Camp Rhino and
just returned home yesterday at San Diego, and we celebrate
that return and their great contribution. But it is time for
those ships and the equipment on those ships to get some tender
loving care and maintenance, and it is time to get the next
unit ready to go out. That is what we are about.
Senator McCain. There was an article January 28th entitled
``Responding to Lott, DOD Starts Funding LHD-9 and One More
DDG-51,'' by Chris Castelli, in a publication ``Inside the
Navy.'' The article states: ``At the urging of Senate Minority
Leader Trent Lott, the Pentagon has made last-minute
adjustments to the Navy shipbuilding plan in the Bush
administration's fiscal year 2003 budget. The Pentagon put $74
million more towards a third DDG-51 destroyer and allocated $10
million to advanced procurement for a ninth amphibious ship,
LHD-9, that was not previously in the budget.''
General Jones, was a ninth LHD-9 in the Navy's budget, in
the Navy's PBD, do you know?
General Jones. I am sorry, Senator?
Senator McCain. Was an LHD-9 in the Navy's PBD?
General Jones. The advanced procurement of it was.
Senator McCain. Was it in the Navy's PBD? I think I have a
document here that shows that it was not.
General Jones. It was not.
Senator McCain. It is interesting. According to the article
this decision was made by the comptroller, which I do not
expect you to comment, it is just bizarre. I have never heard
of the comptroller making these kinds of decisions. It makes
one wonder what kind of decision-making process is taking place
over there, particularly in light of other decisions, such as
the procurement of--not procurement, certainly not
procurement--leasing of Boeing aircraft without even the
Secretary of Defense knowing that that decision was being made.
Are you aware of an effort going on by the Department of
the Navy to look at an analysis of alternatives to replace the
current LHA with an LHA-R, and are you aware that the OSD
Comptroller's Office deleted the funding for the study on the
AoA, cutting $16 million from the RDT&E effort for the LHA
replacement?
General Jones. We have supported the advanced procurement
of the LHD-9. I think that is something that we need to do. We
can accommodate any changes for the design recommendations as
they come about. This is an ongoing discussion and we will have
to see where it takes us.
Senator McCain. Well, thank you, but my question was are
you aware that there was an analysis of alternatives that was
cut from the RDT&E effort?
General Jones. I am not aware of that, Senator.
Senator McCain. Finally, tell me about the Osprey, please,
and what your vision is, what it is going to cost, what needs
to be done, and what is your degree of optimism is? Just give
me a 2-minute blurb on the Osprey, please.
General Jones. Two major independent panels, NASA being one
and the Secretary of Defense's independent panel, concluded
that the problems associated with the V-22 had more to do with
engineering than mature technology. So, the technology was
validated as being sound. Since that time we have been working
very closely with industry to fix the engineering problems and
re-engineer, for example, the hydraulic system, eliminate the
chafing that was taking place within the titanium fuel lines,
and to fix the software deficiencies that contributed to the
anomalies that caused the last accident. We have received the
support of the Under Secretary of the Defense for the
Acquisition.
Senator McCain. How about the comptroller? Have you got his
support?
General Jones. The funding line is satisfactory. We expect
to resume test flying some time in April.
Senator McCain. So you are optimistic?
General Jones. I am optimistic that the technology is
sound. To the extent that an infantry officer can understand
the aeronautics and the physics of tilt-rotor technology, I
have spent a lot of time with industry. I have walked the
assembly plant and I have talked to the squadron. I have talked
to the senior leadership in both Bell and Boeing who are
partnering in this project.
I am personally convinced that the recommendations of the
two independent panels were persuasive, and the Secretary of
the Navy has also been persuaded and we are planning a return
to flight that is event-driven, not timeline-driven. Despite
the operational need for this, what I think is a
transformational capability that will, initially, be given to
the Marine Corps and the Special Operations Command, I think
that we have the potential of bringing something into our
combat capability that will in the case of another Afghanistan
completely transform the way we do business. Had we had it this
time, and it is clear that we would not have had the number of
mishaps that were caused by altitude and very, very demanding
flight profiles that our helicopters are simply not well
equipped to do.
Senator McCain. What happens to the capabilities of the
Marine Corps if the Osprey program were cancelled?
General Jones. Then we very clearly are returning to a
dependence on rotary wing, and we do have a general plan for
that eventuality if it should happen. But it will clearly mean
a step backward in terms of the potential of transformation. It
will be essentially a modernization of existing capabilities
that will have generally limited reach, range, and payload
capability. But that is what we will have to do.
Senator McCain. Is your rotary capability aging?
General Jones. It is beyond aging in the CH-46 capability,
which preceded my time in the service in terms of when it came
into the inventory. So the CH-46 capability must be replaced in
any eventuality. The 53-Echoes are a little bit--are
considerably younger, but we definitely have to address the
workhorse of the fleet, the CH-46, which has an average age of
33 years as we speak. They last for a service life of 30 years,
roughly.
Senator McCain. So, if the Osprey were cancelled, you would
have to make some very difficult decisions?
General Jones. The solution that we would have to go to
would be a rotary wing solution, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. With a fleet that would have to be
modernized?
General Jones. Certainly, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Well, I thank you, General Jones. I hope
that you will see your way clear to stop out at the Marine
Corps Air Station Yuma before the weather gets too warm. You
are welcome. You are always welcome out there. Even non-
aviators are welcome.
General Jones. Sir, I appreciate that. I was there 2 weeks
ago and I talked to all the commanders, the XOs, and the
sergeants major on the subject of safety.
Senator McCain. I hope that you talked to them about the
quality--do not talk to them about the quality of their
representatives in Washington in the United States Senate.
I thank you, General Jones, for appearing before us and I
thank you for the job that you continue to do.
Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
If there is nothing else, we are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
UPDATING TRANSPORTATION
1. Senator McCain. General Jones, you know that I traveled to
Afghanistan with other members of this committee. While there, I heard
from several Navy and Marine Corps officers that the number one concern
for replacing the LHA is safety because of a stability problem or high
center of gravity issue, especially with deployed aircraft. Their
concern was that even with some minor fixes with fuel compensation
systems, the problem will be exacerbated when the Service deploys
larger aircraft, such as the Osprey (MV-22) and the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) which are replacements for the CH-46 and AV-8B
respectively. I am told that the MV-22 is twice the weight of the CH-46
and that the JSF is believed to be about twice the weight of the AV-8B.
With this in mind, would you agree that the problem could be
exacerbated with the planned future aircraft and vehicles envisioned
for the Marine Corps?
General Jones. In discussions with the Navy, the Fuel Oil
Compensation Ship Alteration significantly improves LHA-1 class damaged
stability. With this alteration, the LHA can accommodate MV-22
integration, with aggressive control of future weight growth. The
capability of these ships to handle JSF and associated support has not
been determined. The LHD-1 class has improved stability characteristics
due to design differences relative to LHA-1 class. LHD-1 class can also
accommodate MV-22 integration with aggressive weight control measures.
The Fuel Oil Compensation Ship Alteration is necessary in early
numbered ships of the LHD ship class to accommodate JSF integration.
LHD-7 has already received the Fuel Oil Compensation Ship Alteration in
new construction and has the growth allowance available from a
stability standpoint to accommodate MV-22 and JSF integration.
2. Senator McCain. General Jones, is the LHD a transformational
replacement for the LHA class of ships, considering that the ship does
not meet the requirement in planned future vehicles and aircraft for
the Marine Corps or our special operations community and considering
the amphibious lift requirement of 2.5/3.0 MEB?
General Jones. The ongoing LHA Replacement Analysis of Alternatives
is addressing whether the LHD is a good replacement for the LHA class.
Continuing to build LHDs, as well as ship design modifications to
enhance the capability to operate with the new generation amphibious
systems such as the Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22 Osprey, Advanced
Amphibious Assault Vehicle and Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement are
currently being examined. The Analysis of Alternatives is also
investigating the optimum way to reach the fiscally constrained
amphibious lift capability of 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades. It has
long been recognized that the Marine Corps requires an amphibious ship
force structure capable of simultaneously lifting the assault echelons
of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB AE). The Analysis of
Alternatives is expected to report out later this year and will present
its conclusions at that time.
3. Senator McCain. General Jones, it seems to me that the LHD is
not a very transformational program, especially considering that it is
the exact same hull of the current LHA class that is based on a 1950s
design. It seems to me that if the LHA(R) class ship is built to have a
life span of 50 years with no further research and development (R&D)
invested, then LHD-9 will be a 100-year-old design when it is
decommissioned in the 2050 time frame. Are you concerned with the level
of R&D funding in the fiscal year 2003 budget for a major amphibious
ship like LHA(R)?
General Jones. In discussions with the Navy, there were programmed
research and development funds for LHA Replacement to address new
hullforms and other transformational issues in the fiscal year 2002 and
2003 budgets. Subsequently, fiscal year 2003 and 2004 research and
development funding was deleted. The Navy is addressing the fiscal year
2004 funding issue as part of the ongoing budget process. Additionally,
the Navy will need to increase the research and development funding
line for LHA(R) if the results of the Analysis of Alternatives support
a ship with more capabilities than the current LHD class.
The LHD hull is actually a modified version of the LHA hullform.
Although the hull structure is similar, there have been improvements
made in the LHD hull over the LHA. Additional transformational
improvements have been made throughout the construction of the LHD
class. The original hullform of the LHA and LHD classes were
constrained by a requirement to transit the Panama Canal. That
requirement was removed in 1996 and could permit significant hull
improvements to be made in the planned LHA(R) class. The planned life
of the LHA(R) class, like the LHD class, will be 40 years.
SHORT TAKE-OFF TACTICS
4. Senator McCain. General Jones, you have stated that a JSF
capable of flying from an expeditionary airfield will transform the
very foundation of tactical air power. How important is a Short Take-
Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of the JSF to the Marine
Corps? Could marine tactical aviation continue to thrive without the
STOVL JSF?
General Jones. Marine tactical aviation would continue to
accomplish its mission without the STOVL JSF but only at a 1980s
technology level. STOVL JSF is critical to the transformation of marine
aviation and provides the Marine Corps the only option to affordably
reconstitute the bulk of our tactical aircraft, while providing the
survivability, lethality, flexibility and supportability necessary to
deal with the threat of 2010 and beyond. STOVL JSF's capability will
provide marine aviation the tool to support the Marine Air-Ground Task
Force in the execution of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Without the
STOVL JSF the Marine Corps and the Nation will suffer a tremendous loss
of capability.
Why Short Takeoff Vertical Landing (STOVL)?
Transformation
In 1957, General Randolph Pate, the 21st Commandant of the Marine
Corps, committed us to the vision of becoming an all STOVL force. Such
a revolutionary transformation will provide the Corps with unparalleled
flexibility and enhanced operational capability. Beginning in the early
1980s, the USMC embarked upon a neck-down strategy of reducing the
number of type, model, and series of our fixed wing and rotary wing
aircraft. The strategy reduces our fixed wing strike aircraft from
seven types to one in the 2020 timeframe. Over the next decade, General
Pate's vision will become reality as the Corps fields the STOVL Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF), culminating our efforts to neck-down our fixed
wing strike aircraft and to complement our MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor
aircraft. Today, the USMC is committed to an All-STOVL force and has
foregone the purchase of a follow-on legacy aircraft to invest in the
next generation of tactical fighter aircraft.
Expeditionary Ethos
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW), the Marine Corps' capstone
concept for the 21st century is built on our core competencies and
prepares the Marine Corps, as a total force, to meet the challenges and
opportunities of a rapidly changing world. EMW is the union of our
maneuver warfare philosophy, expeditionary heritage, and the concepts
by which we organize, deploy, and employ forces. Expeditionary forces
must be adaptable, with the capacity to commit to a specific mission,
while remaining ready to rapidly shift to an entirely different one.
They must also be capable of rapidly increasing or decreasing the
combat power available in an area of operations. Without a STOVL
capability, Marine Expeditionary Forces cannot fully exploit the
advantages of our EMW concept. The STOVL JSF represents the future of
the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) in Marine Expeditionary Forces. Our
long-term strategy is to replace our Harriers and F/A-18 Hornets with
the STOVL JSF. The performance characteristics of the JSF will enable
it to operate from the decks of both amphibious ships and aircraft
carriers, as well as from expeditionary airfields located well forward-
close to the ground troops it will support. Most recently, we proved
the validity of STOVL aircraft in a tactical role with the AV-8B
Harrier's forward deployment into Kandahar, Afghanistan. Our Harriers
launched from Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) shipping and forward
based at Kandahar to provide close air support to coalition ground
forces.
Spectrum of Conflict
Since 1990, Naval forces have averaged one contingency response
every 5 weeks. These crises have ranged across the entire spectrum of
operations, from peacekeeping and disaster relief to regional conflict.
With STOVL JSF deployed with our Navy/Marine Corps team, we stand ready
to respond across the full spectrum of conflict from humanitarian
operations to major theater war. Because the hardware and software
architectures of our current TACAIR platforms are over a decade old,
they have a very limited ability to integrate new technology being
developed to deal with emerging threats. While threat systems
capabilities increase, the combination of stealth, advanced
countermeasures, and improved pilot situational awareness provide the
JSF the ability to fight and survive against the rapidly emerging
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) threat. Specifically, as the SAM threat
continues to evolve and proliferate, stealth will become important to
aircraft survivability.
Affordability
The purpose of the JSF Program is to affordably develop the next
generation strike fighter weapons system to meet an advanced threat
(2010 and beyond). A 1980 Naval Air Engineering Center Sea-Based Air
Master Study concluded that STOVL aircraft require 30 percent less deck
space for operations. Additionally, the study reported that an Air Wing
equipped with STOVL aircraft would generate 30 percent more sorties for
targets out to 300nm and 15 percent more sorties for targets out to
700nm. These findings have direct implications on affordable future
ship design for the CVN and LHA replacement classes. The Cost and
Operational Performance Trade Studies used in requirement development
and the independently conducted Analysis of Alternatives have shown
that JSF has struck the right balance between performance and
affordability. Commonality across the family of JSF variants is the key
to affordability. All of the variants will share a common avionics
architecture, a common airframe, and a common core propulsion system--
greatly reducing the manufacturing/procurement costs. JSF will replace
almost 3,000 aircraft within the USAF, USN, and USMC and is the
affordable solution to the TACAIR inventory obsolescence problem that
we currently face.
Conclusion
The STOVL JSF incorporates leap ahead technology with developing
concepts such as Joint Vision 2020 and our overarching concept of
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare to establish a truly CINC-relevant
aircraft of choice. STOVL JSF is critical to the success of the Marine
Corps in the 21st century, as it will solve the significant problems of
age and attrition currently facing Marine TACAIR. The STOVL JSF will
provide the Marine Corps with a stealthy, state-of-the-art, high
performance, multi-role jet aircraft that can operate within the
expeditionary environment. The Marine Corps begins receiving JSFs in
2008 with a fully operational, deployable squadron scheduled for stand
up in 2010. The combination of stealth, basing flexibility, and
superior performance will revolutionize air warfare and Naval Aviation
well into the 21st century.
TRAINING RESTRICTIONS
5. Senator McCain. General Jones, the Marine Corps success in
Operation Enduring Freedom has shown the importance of proper training
for the air/ground team, especially close air support. With serious
encroachment issues facing many military training ranges today,
including land, airspace, and bandwidth, and restrictions being placed
on training such as on Vieques Range, how has the relevance in air and
ground combat training for Navy and Marine Corps aircrews been affected
at the Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR)? What prospects do you see for
even greater use of the BMGR in the future?
General Jones. My most important responsibility as Commandant of
the Marine Corps is to ensure that our marines and sailors are well
trained and ready for the dangerous missions we routinely ask them to
perform. This is not an abstract requirement. For the Atlantic Fleet
Navy and Second Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) units, the most
rigorous, realistic training that allows us to certify our forces as
combat ready is provided at the training range on and around the island
of Vieques, Puerto Rico.
Recently, marines and sailors from the 2,200 strong 26th Marine
Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEU SOC) played an
integral role in air and ground combat operations during Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For these units, Vieques provided
vital predeployment training such as naval gunfire shore fire control
party training and other supporting arms coordination exercises. In
addition to performing other mission essential tasks, this training
routes aircraft from a holding position to a marine infantry unit on
the ground that needs close air support fires. To provide this service
requires detailed coordination. In Vieques, marine air support elements
are truly able to master their skills. From communications with
numerous Navy ships to controlling and directing dozens of aircraft
into an objective area and safely out again, marines gain immeasurable
experience and confidence in their abilities.
If the training opportunities at Vieques are lost permanently, the
Navy can still conduct naval gunfire training using the IMPASS system,
an array of sonobuoys at sea. Unfortunately, this system does not
provide the opportunity to train naval gunfire control parties, as this
is an acoustically cued correction system vice a visually cued
correction system. In combat, naval gunfire observers make adjustments
onto a target using direct visual impact observations. This degradation
of combined arms training due to encroachment will have a deleterious
effect on our marines' combat readiness.
The western portion of the Barry M. Goldwater Range is part of the
Yuma Training Range Complex (YTRC), which also includes the Chocolate
Mountains Aerial Gunnery Range (CMGR), and approximately 10,000 square
miles of associated Special Use Airspace in Southwest Arizona and
Southeast California. The BMGR supports intermediate and advanced level
training in all six functions of marine aviation: assault support,
control of aircraft and missiles, offensive air support, electronic
warfare, tactical air reconnaissance, and anti-air warfare. Training
conducted at BMGR provides tactical employment of MEF units and
individual combat skills training in a high-stress, simulated high-
threat, realistic environment. Other services also train on the range
to include Navy, Air Force and National Guard units.
Current capabilities of the BMGR West allow for: (1) accurate
scoring of inert ordnance delivery on a circular raked range, unscored
inert ordnance delivery on a realistic target complex, and simulated
ordnance deliveries in realistic target complexes; (2) sufficient
maneuver airspace for fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft to conduct
tactical maneuvering; (3) response to third generation threat emitter
systems (Fourth generation EW emitters are only available for students
during WTI courses. The emitters are rented at high cost.); (4)
tracking events on Tactical Air Combat Training System (TACTS) from
medium altitude (5,000 feet above ground level) to high altitude
(80,000 feet above ground level); and (5) limited debrief capability of
aircrew counter-threat response effectiveness.
Desired future capabilities for the BMGR include: (1) integration
of BMGR East (Air Force) and West (Marine Corps) aircraft tracking
systems; (2) tracking aircraft to the surface and vehicles; (3) fourth
generation threat emitters; (4) target systems with multi-spectral
cuing; and (5) use of advanced weapons systems such as Joint Strike
Fighter, MV-22 Osprey, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and Joint
Stand Off Weapons (JSOW). Intrinsic to these future capabilities are
myriad unfunded upgrades, such as secure communications, high capacity
fiber optics, communications and data relays, etc.
The nearby Chocolate Mountains Aerial Gunnery Range in California
supports live fire integration of aviation and supporting arms. The
Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTFTC) in Twenty-nine
Palms, California closely integrates the full compliment of
capabilities for aviation and ground combat units in a live fire
combined arms training environment. As at Vieques, San Clemente Island
off the coast of Southern California provides for naval gunfire support
training.
Although the relevance of aircrew training in the BMGR will
increase as a result of lost training opportunities at Vieques,
prospects for greater use of the BMGR in the future are limited due to
the effects of encroachment. Encroachment upon Marine Corps properties
is principally due to regulatory requirements that place the burden of
compliance/action on military installations and environmental groups/
commercial interests. They want the government to either accept
environmental mitigation on our land or preserve existing on-base
conditions to the detriment of current and future mission capability.
BMGR currently provides habitat for two species listed under the
Endangered Species Act--the Sonoran Pronghorn antelope (designated) and
the Flat-tailed horned lizard (proposed). The presence of these
protected species places significant restrictions on approximately
320,000 acres (46 percent) of the BMGR West. Similarly the Sonoran
Pronghorn occupies 445,000 acres (42 percent) of the BMGR East, which
is under U.S. Air Force control but is also used by fleet marine units
and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1).
Although civilian recreational use and the two protected species have
not prevented required training mission accomplishment, they limit use
of certain portions of the range. For example, when Pronghorn antelope
are present in a target area, fighters laden with ordnance and fuel
must loiter until the antelope leave, or, cancel the sortie without
completing their assigned mission.
Marine Corps installations manage training areas and ranges such as
the BMGR, and provide logistical support for all levels of the Marine
Corps organization from the individual rifleman/aviator, all the way to
the MAGTF. Additionally, other services deploy to our installations and
train on Marine Corps ranges. The ability to ``train as we fight'' in
the air, on land and sea has continually diminished since the post-
World War II era as a result of encroachment. During the post war
period, the complexity, range, and destructive force of weapons and
weapons delivery systems increased exponentially. This difficulty is
further compounded by the fact that our World War II installations and
training areas generally did not expand as weapons increased in range,
destructive force and lethality.
Encroachment issues are many, complex, and involve multiple
Federal, state and local agencies, as well as Congress and the public.
The impact of encroachment is also broad--affecting our ability to
execute realistic air, ground, and amphibious training across the
Nation, as well as beyond its borders. In spite of the many
encroachment pressures facing our ranges, we are dealing with the
situation in order to support the current aviation training
requirements in the BMGR. This is in no small part due to overwhelming
support from the community, state and local government who have taken
affirmative action, within their means, to protect DOD installations in
Arizona from encroachment.
The cumulative impacts of encroachment, however, cause operational
and training restrictions. These restrictions result in less realistic
training, which in turn degrades combat readiness. All forms of
encroachment that restrict land, airspace, and bandwidth use degrade
combat readiness.
NAVAL SURFACE-FIRE SUPPORT
6. Senator McCain. General Jones, with the cancellations of the
Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM) program and the Navy's DD 21 land
attack destroyer program, what are your concerns for the future of
naval surface fire support?
General Jones. My concerns regarding the near-term Naval Surface
Fire Support enhancements are two-fold. First, there is no current
program of record that adequately addresses the Marine Corps'
intermediate range fire support requirements. The LASM was the system
being developed to address this requirement. The Tactical Tomahawk
(TACTOM) missile, although technically capable of at least partially
meeting this requirement, is foremost a strike weapon system and is
likely to be employed in a fire support role only in extreme
situations.
I am also concerned that the planned procurement of Extended Range
Guided Munition (ERGM) projectiles will be insufficient to provide
sustained fire support for the Nation's expeditionary maneuver forces.
At the current planned procurement rate, there will exist less than two
ship fills of this munition per ERGM-capable ship delivered in the
FYDP.
My principle concern for the far-term is that DD(X) will be fielded
with less capability and in fewer numbers than previously planned in
the DD 21 program. Just as DD 21 was to be the key element in fully
meeting our Naval Surface Fire Support requirements, so now is DD(X)
and its associated weapons systems a vital element in realizing the
full potential of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. The Advanced Gun
System (AGS), with a family of extended-range 155mm projectiles, and
the Advanced Land Attack Missile (ALAM) are essential elements of the
fire support system that will provide responsive, all-weather fire
support ``from the sea'' in support of forces operating throughout the
depth of the littoral battlespace.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
EQUIPMENT OPTICS AND DESIGNATION
7. Senator Smith. General Jones, in the Marine Corps Times on
February 18, 2002, there was an article by Christian Lowe about the
Corps' Combat Assessment Team. I want to applaud you and the Corps
about your efforts to critique quickly and accurately, and improve your
own performance in the war on terrorism. Candid and unfettered
introspection is important to get good ``lessons learned'' from combat.
This introspection, followed by progress in fixing the problems, is
even more impressive. The article highlighted some immediate fixes your
assessment team may have facilitated to better support your marines in
the field.
One issue I do have a concern with is the marines' continued
ability to locate, designate, and hand off targets for attack
aircraft--a subject mentioned in the article--and the growing
importance of night vision devices and laser target designators for the
individual ``trigger pullers'' who are on the line each and every day.
I understand you are actively working to better improve your ties with,
and coordination with, Special Operations Forces, who have definitely
``earned their pay'' in Afghanistan by working in these areas and with
this type of equipment. I would expect that to work with these forces,
you, too, need comparable equipping of your marines.
Can you please explain the Corps' plan to improve these two
battlefield functional areas?
General Jones. The war against terrorism highlighted the
complementary capabilities of crisis response forces, the Marine Corps,
and forces assigned to the United States Special Operations Command
(SOF). Restraints imposed by today's environment magnify their
contribution because they are unencumbered by the requirements for
extensive regional infrastructure. Moreover, as demonstrated during the
recent campaign, the surgical precision of SOF coupled with the
combined arms punch of forward deployed amphibious-based Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces prove not only their individual utility, but
illustrate the synergy in overcoming specific challenges such as:
the remote and austere nature of the battlefields
where forces prosecute our Nation's campaign against terrorism.
host nation concerns regarding the presence of
American forces within their borders.
the need to conduct strike operations while
maintaining increased operational security.
The recent events highlighted the need to establish service-level
links between SOCOM directorates and their counterparts within the
Marine Corps to develop detailed areas of mutual interest spanning the
entire continuum of service level concerns. We believe this will
enhance the mutual support our two organizations can provide one
another. Through a recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between the USMC and SOCOM, the focus of effort will be to:
examine current capabilities and missions in order to
leverage the unique capabilities of each organization, thus
enhancing interoperability.
establish and continue the interface between CONUS-
based and theater-based SOF and deploying Marine Air-Ground
Task Forces.
synchronize USSOCOM and USMC warfighting developments,
as well as material research and procurement initiatives.
We believe the USSOCOM-USMC Board is a forum for Special Operations
Forces (SOF) and the Marine Corps to interface and coordinate with
regard to common mission areas and similar procurement initiatives.
How will we continue to improve target identification and
designation using night vision devices and laser target designators?
There is one program of record: Target Location, Designation, and Hand-
off System (TLDHS). TLDHS is a Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE)
replacement with an IOC of 4th Quarter, fiscal year 2004. TLDHS can
both target locate and designate and has night thermal capability. The
Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) is looking at an interim Laser
target location fix through a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution
that could make a binocular type device available this summer. An
interim designator COTS solution would take 11 months manufacturers
lead time to produce.
As a result of 15th MEU Aviation Command Element (ACE) Operation
Enduring Freedom lessons learned and back briefs from the Marine Corps
Combat Action Team, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, signed a Statement of Need (SON) for the immediate
procurement of 180 precision targeting systems. Presently, the Marine
Corps employs the AN/GVS-5 Laser Observation Set to assist fire support
observers in determining distance to a target. The AN/GVS-5 does not
determine azimuth or inclination, which are critical in determining an
accurate target location (target grid coordinate generation). It does
not possess a data interface capability. Operating force feedback and
experimentation have identified the deficiencies of this legacy system.
MCSC has a funded program called the Advanced Eye-Safe Laser
Rangefinder (AEROS), which addresses the same requirement; however,
programmatics dictate a system will not be fielded until fiscal year
2005. Through market research, MCSC has identified a COTS solution
(Leica Vector/Viper II) to meet the SON (also being used presently by
SOCOM in response to their Combat Mission Needs Statement). While this
solution does not completely meet the requirements spelled out for
AEROS, it is immediately available in mass quantities and does meet the
requirements of the SON. MCSC evaluated this system the week of 25
March 2002. If funding could be identified and a production decision
reached, the Leica Vector could be available to the operating forces as
early as June 2002. The PTS-180 program will also serve as a test bed
for the AEROS program, providing feedback on current capabilities and
impacting future operational requirements. AEROS is not a redundant
program to TLDHS. AEROS is a separate program meant to compliment TLDHS
capabilities.
EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPPING--INDIVIDUAL PERSONNEL
8. Senator Smith. General Jones, one aspect of your testimony that
I find heartening is your stated ``highest priority''--your marines,
their families, and civilian workforce. The ``people vs. equipment''
balance is one of the Marine Corps hallmarks: take care of the marines,
and the marines will take care of the mission. In this view, I would
like to know if the current proposed budget meets the needs for some of
the basic items--initial equipment issues, individual gear
improvements, cold weather clothing, special use items, and so on--that
will improve the quality of life for the marines in the field and thus
further improve their performances.
General Jones. The proposed budget for fiscal year 2003 meets the
currently identified needs of the Marine Corps in the area of initial
equipment issues over the course of the FYDP. As a result of the
balancing required-to-fund competing requirements across all of the
Marine Corps appropriations, many items will not be fully fielded until
fiscal year 2008 or later, thus, additional funding would accelerate
acquisition of the initial issue items. With new and improved gear,
marines will gain a significant advantage in terms of their lethality,
survivability, and mobility. Funding these equipment requirements will
ensure that marines will maintain a competitive advantage over the
enemy by being more mobile, lethal, comfortable, rested, and ready to
fight.
9. Senator Smith. General Jones, I have seen several press accounts
indicating that we may not have had sufficient numbers of linguists
trained in the languages spoken in Afghanistan, such as Dari and
Pashto, to communicate with the locals as quickly as we would have
liked. As a force provider who works for and with the regional CINCs,
and in preparing expeditionary units ready to respond around the world,
do you have enough foreign language speakers in the appropriate
language skills to provide the essential link between your forces and
the native populations? Would you have liked to have more, and do we
need more language training programs?
General Jones. In 1996, Headquarters Marine Corps established the
8611 Additional Military Occupational Specialty (AMOS) to identify
marines with critical heritage foreign language skills to serve as
interpreter/translators. In 1999, Headquarters Marine Corps initiated
an aggressive effort to more accurately screen and identify all
heritage foreign language speakers as they entered our ranks. The early
identification of heritage speakers in ``less-commonly taught''
languages such as Dari, Urdu, and Pashto and the assignment of these
heritage language speakers as translators were essential in allowing
the Marine Corps to meet emerging contingency foreign language
requirements.
Under the Marine Corps' Language Identification Program (LIP),
marines are screened during the recruiting process. Those determined to
have heritage foreign language skills then have their language
proficiency validated for potential future assignment. The success of
this effort over the last 2 years has been demonstrated by the
identification of thousands of native speakers who can be temporarily
assigned additional duty as translators/interpreters, thereby ensuring
that foreign language skilled marines in Intelligence billets can
remain focused on their assigned primary mission.
During 1998, in an effort to stabilize manning of the Intelligence
Occupational Field, Headquarters Marine Corps temporarily doubled the
number of basic language seats at the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
As a result, the Marine Corps currently has approximately 320 Modern
Standard Arabic (MSA) speakers in the active Force. MSA is a common
language linking the myriad extremist groups targeted in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This robust inventory of Marine MSA
speakers is a considerable asset that can be leveraged in response to
emerging OEF foreign language requirements.
The Marine Corps continues to search for more efficient ways to
identify, screen and train Marines with foreign language skills to
support operational and intelligence requirements. The Marine Corps'
foreign language requirements are identified by the Marine Operating
Forces in response to planning guidance via the assignment of
appropriate Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) billets on unit
Tables of Organization (T/O). Given the constraints of authorized
Marine Corps end-strength and the large set of languages required to
meet projected military missions, the Marine Corps has traditionally
focused its foreign language training program on those core languages
spoken in areas where large-scale military action is either planned or
anticipated. The small population of marines with heritage foreign
language skills in the ``less-commonly taught'' languages such as Dari,
Urdu, and Pashto has been augmented through the Headquarters Marine
Corps directed action of selectively cross-training existing linguists
at the DLI, and through the conduct of un-programmed contract language
courses in a subsequent language. Additionally, as requirements are
validated, marines are selectively recruited and cross-trained in these
``less-commonly taught'' languages during lateral moves into a new MOS
or during reenlistments.
During 1999, Headquarters Marine Corps initiated a comprehensive
review of the Marine Corps' foreign language requirements. As a result
of this review, the Marine Operating Forces were directed to determine
their existing and anticipated foreign language requirements in an
effort to better identify and project both the number of speakers and
the variety of languages they require. In March 2001, the Director of
Intelligence (DIRINT) approved a plan to restructure the Intelligence
occupational field to meet the increase in requirements for speakers in
``less-commonly taught'' languages. Implementation of the plan in
February 2002 resulted in the Headquarters Marine Corps directed
modification of unit T/Os, leading to the addition of 122 intelligence
linguist billets in a variety of ``less-commonly taught'' languages.
The Marine Corps is now executing a 5-year plan to recruit and train a
sufficient number of marines to fill thesenewly identified billets.
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States,
the Secretary of Defense tasked the Services to identify emerging
language training requirements to support the OEF campaign.
Headquarters Marine Corps compiled a list of projected language
requirements and, in cooperation with the DLI, implemented a training
plan in December 2001 to satisfy the identified training shortfalls.
The aggressive assignment of heritage language speakers as translators,
combined with the quick response of DLI in setting up language training
courses to meet the Marine Corps' contingency training requirements,
has allowed the Marine Corps to successfully meet its current
operational language requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
WEAPONS--GRENADE LAUNCHER
10. Senator Collins. General Jones, the Marine Corps Warfighting
Lab has been a great asset to introduce and prove out innovative
technologies for the Corps and our Armed Forces. I am familiar with the
Advanced Lightweight Grenade Launcher/Striker program (MK47Mod 0),
which is currently being tested at the Warfighting Lab. What can you
tell me about the Marine Corps' desire to deploy this launcher?
General Jones. The final configuration of the MK47 has just been
baselined this month and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) took
delivery of its first two fully capable prototype MK47 ``Striker''
grenade launchers on 5 April 2002. These guns are of the same
configuration as those scheduled for Operational Assessment (OA) by
USSOCOM forces at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in May 2002.
The Marine Corps, via MCWL, will experiment with our two weapons
and monitor the USSOCOM OA in order to collect the data needed to
adequately assess and evaluate the MK47's potential to increase the
combat power of marine units.
The decision on whether we will deploy the MK47 in the Marine Corps
will be influenced by: (1) the performance of the MK47 during USSOCOM's
OA; (2) U.S. Marine infantry units' operational assessment of the MK47s
during 4th quarter fiscal year 2002 and 1st quarter fiscal year 2003;
(3) successful development of the air-burst capability for the 40mm
ammunition for the MK47; and (4) the level of support for the weapon
from the Marine Corps Infantry Operational Advisory Group.
The role MCWL plays in the Expeditionary Force Development System
(EFDS) is to find technology that appears to have potential for
increasing combat capabilities, then prove through experimentation,
whether or not that technology is worth pursuing. Once experimentation
and assessment determines the MK47's potential, the decision will be
made on whether the weapon is a candidate for acquisition and
deployment.
[Whereupon, at 5:11 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MAXIMIZING FLEET PRESENCE CAPABILITY AND SHIP PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Kennedy, Landrieu,
Reed, Warner, Sessions, and Collins.
Majority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Gary M. Hall, professional staff
member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Thomas L.
MacKenzie, professional staff member; and Carmen Leslie Stone,
special assistant.
Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith and Andrew
Kent.
Committee members' assistants present: Brady King and
Christina L. Martin, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick
M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Marshall A. Hevron,
assistant to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to Senator Warner;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine
Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Maurer,
assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN
Senator Kennedy. The subcommittee meets this afternoon to
discuss Navy shipbuilding programs intended to meet Navy and
Marine Corps future operational requirements.
We will also discuss actions that the Navy might take to
maximize fleet presence capability in support of theater combat
command requirements to have naval forces on station and
operating in the areas of responsibility.
We will hear from two panels of witnesses today. Rear
Admiral Miles B. Wachendorf, Director of the Strategy and
Policy Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
will discuss the options for increasing forward presence on the
first panel.
On the second panel, we will hear from two witnesses about
Navy shipbuilding and research and development (R&D) programs:
The Hon. John Young, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition, and Vice Adm. Michael
Mullen, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources,
Requirements, and Assessments.
While some may put the primary emphasis on the shipbuilding
portion of today's hearing, you should give due attention to
the important matters of ways to provide the forward deployed
forces that our area combat commanders need to support their
operations.
For the shipbuilding portion of the hearing, the focus will
be on the modernization of the Navy fleet. I believe that the
fundamental problem that we must deal with in this subcommittee
is achieving the proper level of modernization to support
tomorrow's readiness.
Without adequate modernization, we could be faced with a
situation of having forces without necessary capabilities, or
we could even be in a position of trying to support theater
combat commander requirements with forces that are too small to
meet their requirements.
We all know that our men and women in the Armed Forces will
respond admirably in any crisis, just as they are doing to
support the operations in Afghanistan. However, over the long-
term, we cannot count on making up for inadequate shipbuilding
investment by asking our troops to stay on much longer
deployments. They are spending less time at home with their
families between deployments.
This leads the subcommittee to the desire of ensuring that
we are getting the most forward presence capability from our
fleet, whatever the number of ships in the fleet. We owe it to
our sailors and marines to ensure that we are doing all we can
to avoid resorting only to longer deployments or reduced at-
home time when we are trying to meet forward presence
requirements.
We also owe it to the taxpayers to ensure that they are
getting the maximum presence capability for every dollar
invested in the Navy. To that end, Senator Sessions and I sent
a letter to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations asking them to review the question of whether
additional operational days could be made available to the
regional commanders in chief without increasing the number of
ships and without increasing the length of 6-month deployments.
Without objection, we will include a copy of that letter in the
record of the hearing.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Kennedy. We will look forward to hearing first from
Admiral Wachendorf on our range of options that we might
consider for increasing the level of forward presence for a
given fleet size.
On the second panel, we will hear from John Young and Vice
Admiral Mullen on the shipbuilding construction and development
program's fiscal year 2003 budget request.
Everyone can agree that we will continue to need strong
naval forces to protect our interests in many areas overseas.
We may have to change our approaches in some areas, but we will
still need to ensure that we do not lose the very real
advantages that our Navy and Marine Corps so skillfully
provide.
Within that context, there are a number of issues,
programs, and areas that we should discuss with the witnesses
today including: attack submarine programs and force levels,
including the option of converting the Trident ballistic
missile submarines to submarines that carry the cruise
missiles; aircraft carrier modernization efforts, including the
Navy's evolutionary development of new capabilities and
technologies to increase future capability and reduce demands
on our personnel and a planned delay of the CVN(X) program;
surface combatants, including the DDG-51 Aegis destroyer and
the Navy's program to field the next generation of combatants
and DD(X) program; amphibious ships, including the delays and
cost increases in the LPD-17 amphibious transport dock program;
and the budget request to continue the incremental funding for
the LHD-8 amphibious assault ship.
These are all important issues, and we will look forward to
hearing your testimony today and working with you as we work
our way through them.
Before I recognize the witnesses, I would like to recognize
Senator Sessions.
Also, it is a great pleasure to welcome the Ranking Member
of the full committee, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Whenever a Navy flag goes up, John Warner
is present. Any of us who think we have any authority or power
around here are always reminded that John Warner was the
Secretary of the Navy. [Laughter.]
As good a job as he does in making sure we have a strong
national security defense, we always know that he tips a little
toward the United States Navy. We are always glad to have him
here.
Senator Warner. I am thankful for the very generous remarks
of my Chairman. [Laughter.]
You and I have jockeyed in the position of Chairman and
Ranking Member of this subcommittee for many years.
Senator Kennedy. Right.
Senator Warner. I miss it. But I am here today to follow
this with great interest, and I thank you for the introduction.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Senator Warner. We are delighted to have our friend here,
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. I welcome the chance to work with you on
this subcommittee and enjoy the chance to work with Senator
Sessions on this subcommittee, as well as Senator Collins, who
is a fellow New Englander.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Senator Kennedy, thank you for your
leadership. We are, indeed, sharing some basic insights from
this side of the table about ``How can we improve the Navy?'' I
think it can be boiled down to this. We are going to need to
increase the number of ships that we are building. We simply
cannot maintain the level we are at over any extended period
without substantially reducing our Navy.
At the same time, hopefully today, we will have some
questions answered. I believe we can expect to have some ideas
that we could utilize more efficiently with the ships that we
have.
We all know that it is critical that the United States be
able to project its power around the world. We have not been
able to do that at any time within recent years without the
Navy's power helping us to do that, or really being the
cornerstone of it.
I believe it is an investment we need to make. I will just
note that the 2001 QDR states that the baseline force was
assessed across several combinations of scenarios on the basis
of a new defense strategy. The capabilities of this force were
judged as presenting moderate operational risk, although
certain combinations of warfighting and smaller-scale
contingency scenarios present high risk.
The 2001 QDR, of course, which carries with it that
moderate or high risk includes the following ships: 12 aircraft
carriers, 12 amphibious ready groups, 55 attack submarines, and
108 surface combatants. I hope that the witnesses today can
reveal the additional risk incurred by proposing a Navy ship
force in this budget which is lower than the moderate to high
risk included in the QDR.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
I thank our Chairman, Senator Kennedy, for scheduling today's
hearing to explore Navy and Marine Corps ship requirements, research
and development, procurement, and improving the operational days
underway for the ships in service.
The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that the
baseline force ``was assessed across several combinations of scenarios
on the basis of the new defense strategy and force sizing construct,
and the capabilities of this force were judged as presenting moderate
operational risk, although certain combinations of warfighting and
smaller-scale contingency scenarios present high risk.'' The 2001 QDR
force which carries with it that moderate to high risk includes the
following ships:
12 Aircraft Carriers
12 Amphibious Ready Groups
55 Attack Submarines
108 Active Surface Combatants
8 Reserve Surface Combatants
However, the fiscal year 2003 budget request and accompanying
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) would not build sufficient ships to
recapitalize the QDR force level both in the near- and long-terms. The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) calculations indicate that the
average number of ships required to be procured to maintain the QDR
force of about 300 ships will rise to 11.2 per year starting in 2008 if
the proposed number of ships in the FYDP are procured. That average
would increase from the present benchmark of 8.9 ships per year. This
vividly points out that instead of progressing toward recapitalizing
the fleet, the proposed budget request has the opposite effect. I hope
our witnesses today can reveal the additional risk incurred by
proposing a Navy ship force which is lower than the moderate- to high-
risk force included in the QDR.
Navy witnesses have testified before the full committee that
because the average age of ships is about 19 years, ship
recapitalization is not the highest Navy recapitalization priority.
Aircraft recapitalization is the highest Navy recapitalization priority
and recapitalization of both aircraft and ships is a lower priority
than readiness. It should be considered that using average age to make
investment decisions may not be prudent because problem areas may be
masked. For instance, there are ships in the Navy being used past their
projected service life while others are retired well before the end of
their projected service life. The average age calculation does not
include shortfalls such as the fact that the Navy has fewer ships than
required by the QDR.
Given the budget request for new ship construction and a general
agreement that the proposed funding is not adequate to recapitalize the
fleet, we should look for ways to maximize future investments while
ensuring we get the most out of investments already made. Senator
Kennedy and I sent a letter to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief
of Naval Operations asking them to explore ways to increase the number
of days that ships can operate. We suggested that, at a minimum, the
Navy should explore the following four focus areas to determine if
additional operational days could be provided to the regional
Commanders in Chief:
Assign additional ships and submarines to homeports
closer to their areas of operation. This is sometimes referred
to as forward homeporting.
Assign a ship to remain in a forward area of
operations and rotate crews. This is sometimes referred to as
dual crewing, such as occurs with ``blue'' and ``gold'' crews
on ballistic missile nuclear powered submarines (SSBN).
Retain ships to the end of their full service life.
This could support a Navy that is a capability and presence-
based force rather than a threat and presence based force.
Preposition additional ships in a forward operating
areas.
Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection, I would like our letter of
March 1, 2002 entered into the record of this hearing.
In addition to maximizing operational days for ships in the fleet,
we should look for ways to maximize the impact of investments in this
budget request. There are eight specific issues that we should evaluate
as possibilities for maximizing the investment impacts.
First, decommissioning ships which still have combat capability 10
years prior to the end of their service life generates a requirement to
build about eight more ships than are included in the CRS calculations
for ship construction requirements. Therefore, we should consider the
possibility of retaining these ships to the end of their service lives.
Second, although Congress put in place a law that authorizes the
Navy to save taxpayer dollars by buying submarine components in
economic order quantity, this request does not propose such savings
measures. Therefore, we should explore possible problems with the
enacted legislation and additional possible legislation to maximize the
Navy's buying power.
Third, this request delays procurement of CVN(X) resulting in a 1
year slip and a higher cost of the ship. Therefore, given the recent
reminder of how valuable these ships are, and to save taxpayers
dollars, we should explore a funding profile to save dollars and
restore the 2013 delivery of the ship.
Fourth, it is questionable whether or not the destroyer industrial
base, including second and third tier vendors, can be maintained with
the proposed destroyer construction included in this request.
Therefore, we should review the requirement to maintain the industrial
base and, if required, consider action to ensure its viability with a
thorough understanding of implications for the cost of DDG-51 ships and
future destroyers.
Fifth, this FYDP misses an opportunity to take advantage of a
construction option for a required auxiliary ship. This missed
opportunity could lead to higher costs and/or stretched-out delivery
dates. Therefore, we should explore possible fiscal year 2003 action
that would ensure the Navy exercises the option if taxpayer dollars
would be saved.
Sixth, the proposal for a construction start for a new class of
command and control ships does not appear to take advantage of
established ship production lines of similar ships. Therefore, the
subcommittee should determine what funding is required in fiscal year
2003 to ensure the Navy has the information required to adjust the
construction to a schedule most advantageous to the taxpayers while
providing the ship at the required time.
Seventh, it is not clear whether or not taxpayers are paying twice
for technology efforts for future ships that are funded out of separate
ship programs. Therefore, we should explore ways to remove restrictions
that may exist and/or provide the means to ensure information on like
efforts is shared between programs.
Eighth, the delay in DD 21/DD(X) further delays providing required
fire support for the Marine Corps. Therefore, the subcommittee should
explore alternatives for rapidly fielding the 155 millimeter shipboard
gun.
Transformation is a continuous effort which is inherent in the
research and development for future platforms and equipment, how
equipment is used, the approach to training, and the mind-set of
personnel. Although there are specific programs that can be described
as transformational, this type of description is only applicable for a
given point in time. Therefore, while being aware of transformation
aspects of programs, our overarching focus should be on how the
programs will contribute to carrying out the defense policy goals of:
Assuring allies and friends;
Dissuading future military competition;
Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests;
and
If deterrence fails, a decisive defeat.
The Navy and Marine Corps team are vital to carrying out all four
of these policy goals and ships are the means by which the Navy and
Marine Corps meet the challenge described in the QDR of ``projecting
and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access environments.''
The performance of our men and women in the war on terrorism across
the globe and their dedication to do what it takes to complete their
mission is inspiring and we owe them, each day, our continuing
gratitude and full support.
I welcome our witnesses today and look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership.
To follow my statement, I ask that Senator Collins'
statement be inserted into the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Susan Collins
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Seapower is among the most essential
components of our national security posture and an important part of
ensuring the U.S. meets its global commitments. Currently, our naval
forces are providing immediate access and forward deployed combat power
24/7 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Further, our naval
forces are the United States' only sovereign global warfighting
capability. As Admiral Clark so eloquently stated, ``Our naval forces
do not need a permission slip to operate worldwide.''
These capabilities, and the fact that two-thirds of the world's
surface is covered by ocean, make a compelling case for robust naval
forces. Forward presence, however, requires that the ships are
available and ready to deter, fight, and win.
The facts are clear--the U.S. Navy has shrunk from a fleet of 594
ships in 1987, to approximately 318 ships today. During this same
period, ship deployments have increased more than 300 percent. Navy
officials have repeatedly warned that the fleet is stretched perilously
thin and needs to be increased to at least 360 ships to meet its
present mission requirements. The CNO has candidly testified that there
is a strong and justifiable cause to increase our naval force structure
to around 375 ships.
These factors coupled with the global war on terrorism and
defending America's national security, demand that we recapitalize our
Navy today. President Bush and his administration have identified this
global war on terrorism and homeland security as our highest
priorities. As we in Congress work with the Bush administration to
defend freedom, I will continue to encourage the replenishment of our
naval fleet as the cornerstone of this global defense.
The fiscal year 2003 budget provides $48 billion in overall defense
increases, yet the Navy's budget provides for the procurement of fewer
ships than last year. The SCN procurement numbers speak for
themselves--$11.96 billion in fiscal year 2001, $9.5 billion in fiscal
year 2002, and $8.19 billion in fiscal year 2003. The CNO's written
statement before the full committee clearly states the problem,
``Current aircraft and ship procurement rates will, if continued,
result in a Navy numerically smaller than today's, and significantly
smaller than that needed to sustain the war. Such a fleet would be an
invitation to greater operational risk and international instability.''
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) warns us that at the
present rate of procurement, we are facing a 47 ship-deficit and we
will not be able to sustain the QDR critical force levels. The fact is
that we must procure 8.9 Navy ships per year to maintain, not grow, a
310 ship-Navy. Uneconomic procurement rates, including only two DDG-51s
in the fiscal year 2003 budget, increase costs to the Navy and
jeopardize our industrial base and its skilled workforce. If we are not
committed to reversing the decline in shipbuilding rates this year, in
a year of a $48 billion increase, then when?
We cannot continue to defer this investment year after year. We are
just slipping deeper and deeper into a procurement hole, and that is
why I have proposed to look at all of the resources available in the
Department of the Defense's budget, including the Defense Emergency
Response Fund (DERF), or contingency fund, to begin to address this
egregious shortfall.
As I have stated before, numbers do matter. The number of new
construction ships under contract 10 years ago was 110, while only 36
ships are under construction today--this is a 66 percent decline in
ship construction. Furthermore, while the number of ships authorized to
be built 10 years ago was 15, today the budget request before us
authorizes a mere 5 ships, a continued decline over the last 4 years.
In recent years, we have been consistently under funding the naval
shipbuilding and research and development accounts--the future force is
at risk. Therefore, I am convinced there will be a need for even
greater reliance on our naval forces as joint operations emerge to
provide sovereignty to our fighting forces. Proof is in our current
operations in Afghanistan. For these reasons and many others, I share
the view of many of my colleagues that we must recapitalize our fleet
to ensure that America retains her maritime power in the 21st century.
I look forward to working with each of you in the weeks and months
ahead to bring the procurement rate to an adequate number that will
meet the needs of our Nation's security and provide more stability for
our critical but increasingly fragile naval shipbuilding industrial
base. I welcome any thoughts or comments you would care to offer the
subcommittee on these complex issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Admiral, we will be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MILES B. WACHENDORF, USN, DIRECTOR,
STRATEGY AND POLICY DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Wachendorf. Thank you, Chairman Kennedy, Senator
Sessions, Senator Collins, Senator Warner, and members of your
staff. It is a pleasure to be here.
My name is Admiral Ben Wachendorf. I am the Director of
Strategy and Policy on the CNO staff. I'm here to discuss with
you some alternatives, some of which are already being
implemented, to increase the presence of Navy combatant ships
in forward areas, and to discuss other issues that are being
studied.
I have submitted a written statement for your review and,
subject to your approval, I would like it to be a part of the
record. It includes some answers to questions that were asked
in my invitation to testimony.
It also includes some information concerning some manning
initiatives we are doing. Those were included because some of
the ways to get more ships into forward areas longer is to
increase the manning. We want to do that as a zero sum gain
without asking for end strength increases. So we are trying to
be smarter about the way we use our sailors.
I would also like to just thank you and the committee
personally for your support of the men and women of the United
States Navy. The support Congress has given our most valuable
asset, our people, is heard loud and clear on the deck plates
of the United States Navy. I am very grateful for it.
Subject to any other questions you have, I will be happy to
answer any questions you have for me.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Wachendorf
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Miles B. Wachendorf, USN
Chairman Kennedy, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of
this sub-committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It
is a privilege to report to you on the status of several initiatives
the Navy is either undertaking or exploring to increase our forward
naval presence, and we appreciate your continuing support.
Today, over 32 percent of our naval force is deployed in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as well as normal deployments to
maintain our global presence. Our sailors and marines continue to
reflect the best of what America has to offer, and we are extremely
proud of their efforts. Today more than ever we need to explore
potential alternatives for enhancing our ability to fulfill
requirements placed on our naval service. Earlier this month the Vice
Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. William J. Fallon, discussed several
initiatives the Navy is exploring to alleviate the strain on our
current OPTEMPO. OPTEMPO has an important impact on current readiness.
U.S.S. John C. Stennis deployed weeks early in order to support
maritime operations in the Arabian Sea and U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt,
recently spent 160 consecutive days at sea without a port visit. This
increased OPTEMPO is a concern because over time it could yield
negative effects on retention, as well as increased wear and tear on
equipment. While our commitment to limiting deployments to 6 months in
peacetime remains firm, we recognize that we are in a war of
indeterminate duration. Therefore, we currently are exploring plans to
ameliorate the effects of this increased OPTEMPO by a variety of means.
My goal today is to provide background information on several
deployment posture and manning initiatives. While some are in the early
stage of development and others have been studied at length, we are
encouraged that several initiatives have the potential to improve not
only OPTEMPO, but also our ability to provide additional forward
presence with the current force:
Issues addressed:
1. Assign additional ships and submarines to homeports closer to
their areas of operations. This is sometime referred to as forward
homeporting.
Not a new alternative, but one that must be considered is the
homeporting of naval forces overseas. The largest example of this is
our forward deployed naval force (FDNF) homeported in Japan. The Kitty
Hawk battle group, with her embarked airwing and support ships along
with the Essex amphibious ready group (ARG) are designed to provide a
nearly continuous presence in the Western Pacific capable of executing
missions across the entire spectrum of conflict from peacetime presence
to major war. Over the past few years, there have been numerous studies
completed that have looked at other potential ports within WESTPAC, the
Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf to homeport naval forces. The results of
these studies are all similar; there are numerous ports throughout the
region that have the capability and infrastructure to conduct port
calls, but the required infrastructure to support the permanent
homeporting is not available and would require substantial investment
by the U.S. and the host nation. The studies also reflect zero
potential to increase the size of the force that is forward deployed to
Japan. Additionally, required training facilities and formal schools
are not available overseas to meet all the requirements. The workup
training opportunities such as fleet exercises with an aircraft carrier
and battle group would be greatly diminished by homeporting away from
the majority of the fleet. Exercises are the backbone for preparing
ships and crews to conduct required operational missions. Finally, the
loss of stateside quality of life would be significant for those
families, both civilian and military who would be required to relocate.
This could have an adverse impact on retention.
However, the U.S. territory of Guam offers a near-term potential to
increase our forward presence in the Western Pacific. Beginning in
September 2002, the first of three refueled 688-class submarines will
be homeported in Guam. This will provide approximately 90 additional in
theater mission ship days per year over what could be provided by three
submarines homeported in the Eastern Pacific. Ship and maintenance
support is in place with the submarine tender currently homeported in
Guam. Pier facilities and weapons support facilities are adequate. The
housing and family support facilities on Guam will quickly support the
first homeported SSN, and will require minor upgrading in addition to
the current renovation plans to support all three newly assigned
submarines.
Personnel/training requirements will result in flying portions of
each crew to Pearl Harbor or to Yokosuka for schools and team trainers
at a cost of about $300,000 annually per submarine. Crew maximum tour
length is set at 3 years and is within existing overseas assignment
guidelines. Submarines will need to shoot exercise torpedoes about
every 15 months to maintain proficiency. This may be accomplished by
transit back to Pacific Missile Range Facility, Hawaii (cost is about
15 days of operations and engagement) and by scheduled exercises in
Seventh Fleet. Additional transits to Hawaii maybe required for nuclear
maintenance or dry-docking. Currently, the U.S.S. Frank Cable transits
to Japan in support of Seventh Fleet ships three times per year for a
period of about 1 month each time. With Frank Cable's current manning
she cannot continue this level of support outside the submarine force
and take on the support of homeported submarines in Guam. In order for
her to support her current Seventh Fleet level of effort, Frank Cable's
repair and weapons department manning will be increased to meet the
additional requirements resulting from the additional three SSNs.
Current naval forces stationed in Guam include:
Three SSNs to be completed by calendar year 2004.
One tender (U.S.S. Frank Cable).
Four Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships.
Helicopter Combat Support Squadron FIVE (HC-5).
Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD) One.
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Group One.
Five pre-positioning ships off Saipan
2. Assign a ship to remain in a forward area of operations and
rotate crews. Although not typically rotated in forward areas, the dual
crewing or ``blue/gold'' crews on SSBN are an example.
Crew rotation (sometimes referred to as ``Sea Swap''): Extending
ship deployment length while swapping crews in mid-deployment appears
to offer significant potential for improving on-station time without
increasing either OPTEMPO, PERSTEMPO, or to a great extent, ship wear
and tear. Rotational crewing/sea swap is a variation on the multi-
crewing themes referred to as ``Horizon'' suggested by the CNO
Strategic Studies Group, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and others.
The primary difference is that where most multi-crewing options involve
more crews than ships; for example: 3 for 2 (CNA), 5 for 4 (Horizon), 2
for 1 (SSBN) (``Blue/Gold''), or several for 2 (MCM-1), the basic unit
of crew rotation (1 for 1) is two or more similarly configured ships
with an equal number of similarly trained crews.
The crew rotation scheme would extend individual ship deployments
from 6 months to a nominal 11.5 months or longer while holding crew
deployments at 6 months. At the 5.5-month point in the cruise, a relief
crew from a sister ship is flown into theater to man the deployed ship.
After turnover, the relieved crew is flown back to CONUS where it mans
the non-deployed unit of the operational pair. The deployed unit
remains deployed for a total of 11.5 months or longer before being
relieved on station in traditional fashion. Essentially, sea-swapping
crews reduces ship transit--using instead airlift to replace the crew.
The 6-month PERSTEMPO limit is not exceeded for any crew.
In the case of deployments from the West Coast to the Arabian Gulf,
eliminating every other transit provides an additional 2 to 2.5 months
of on-station time for each pair of ships without necessarily changing
turnaround ratio or OPTEMPO for either crew or ship. Three pairs of
ships in sea swap can create up to 20 additional on station ship months
over 4 years when compared to the current deployment methods. The
advantages of this concept are:
Significantly improved efficiency in meeting CINC
requirements for forward deployed units;
No crew is without a ship and no ship is without a
crew. This should improve training opportunities and
contingency surge capability;
Crews stay with the same ship for approximately 2
years and with same operational pair throughout their sea tour,
providing an improved sense of ownership compared with other
rotational crewing plans;
Ships return to CONUS often enough to reduce or
eliminate the need to do major maintenance overseas;
The capability to do major maintenance and upgrades
(without disrupting deployment schedules) improves because
ships enjoy longer periods in CONUS between cruises;
Turnaround ratio--Ship 2.91:1/Crew 2.75:1; Deployment
time--Ship 11.5 months/Crew 6 months; and
Additional ship months generate opportunities for
multi-ship action groups to meet emerging challenges or
additional ship availability for employment opportunities to
support Homeland Security/Defense.
The Navy is currently developing a pilot program to employ the
``crew swap'' concept in an effort to determine the true costs and
potential savings, while developing lessons learned to provide a firm
analytical basis for recommendations to either expand the concept or
look for other alternatives. In maintaining the focus on the fleet and
the impacts that a shift in deployment methods may have, Commander,
Surface Forces Pacific has been designated the lead for development and
implementation of the pilot program. The current plan will employ
Spruance-class destroyers beginning this summer with the deployment of
the Lincoln CVBG and then expand to Arleigh Burke-class guided missile
destroyers later this fall with the deployment of the Constellation
CVBG. Both plans have the potential to gain an additional 100 days on-
station for a net gain of 200 days. This will reduce total transits to
four for six ships which cover four battle group deployment cycles. It
is from these two experiments that we will be able to determine
recommendations.
3. Retain ships to the end of their full service life by investing
in the support funding needed to keep them serviceable. For example, we
might decide that keeping DD-963s in active service might make sense
for the capabilities they provide (such as presence and ASW
capability), rather than retiring them because they are not adequate to
meet certain threats (because they do not have the very latest anti-air
warfare systems).
Force Structure
The Navy must balance between transforming and building the future
Navy to meet emergent warfighting requirements and operating the
current force to meet existing missions, while remaining within the
President's budget. While new ship procurement decisions dominate force
structure recapitalization, the retention or decommissioning of ships
has the greatest near-term impact on force structure size and
composition. The key element in decisions to extend or contract the
service life of a ship class is affordability versus capability.
Service Life Considerations
The service life of our warships has a significant impact on force
structure. Extending service life by delaying decommissionings can
maintain or increase force structure and, correspondingly, accelerating
decommissioning can reduce force structure. The decision to extend or
accelerate decommissioning of a class of ships is based on a cost/
benefit analysis that focuses on the affordability of the platform and
what warfighting capabilities it brings to the joint commander's tool
box. In some cases, such as Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers and
Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates, it is considered prudent to invest in
conversion and modernization of ships to extend their service life. In
other cases, such as Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers, it makes more
sense to decommission the ships.
Historical Service Life vs. Estimated Service Life
Sophisticated combat systems must keep pace with advancing threat
technology. As the combat systems and the hull, mechanical and
electrical (HM&E) systems of a platform age both must be maintained and
upgraded, but the combat systems upgrades tend to be more extensive and
expensive. Additionally, as ships age, the cost of operating and
maintaining the ships can increase depending on the overall condition
of the vessel. For example, if a ship has had a number of maintenance
actions deferred over the course of its operating life, and it has
experienced high OPTEMPO, the cumulative effects on the ship can lead
to higher operating and maintenance costs. This must be considered in
investment decisions. In making service life decisions, warfighting
capability gained from an upgrade is compared to the cost of the
upgrade and the operations and maintenance cost of the ship. Unless
modernized, a surface combatant class' historical service life (HSL) is
shorter than the estimated service life (ESL) established via
instruction. For destroyers, HSL is 20 years compared to an ESL of 35
years. In the case of frigates, HSL is 20 to 22 years compared to an
ESL of 30 years.
Cruiser Conversion
The Navy has made the commitment, through the conversion program
for Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class cruisers. The program will upgrade the
Aegis combat systems and install warfighting improvements including
area air defense commander (AADC) capability, and upgrades to the Aegis
baseline to accept sea based ballistic missile defense capability
(pending Missile Defense Agency (MDA) approval and funding of
development), land attack, and force protection. Additionally, service
life extension work including smart ship upgrades all electric
alteration, weight and moment adjustments, and distributive systems
improvements. Modernizing these ships will make them more capable to
project theater-wide offense and defense while providing an additional
20 years of service life beyond the HSL.
Frigate HM&E and Self-Defense Upgrades
In the fiscal year 2003 budget submission, Perry-class frigates
will receive HM&E upgrades to reduce their operating costs and extend
their service life. Additionally, the combat systems will be upgraded
with selected ship self-defense technology. These ships with their
relatively small crew size and low operating costs provide affordable
warfighting capability.
Destroyer Decommissionings
DD-963 class is expensive to maintain because of its large crew
size, age, and provides only marginal warfighting capability due to the
ship's older and more focused mission combat system. These ships had an
earlier modernization with the introduction of the vertical launch
system (VLS), which extended the combat system relevant life beyond the
historical 20 years. However, while the ships still provide some
warfighting capability with two 5,,/54 guns and an anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) suite, the higher manning requirements and operational
costs do not justify additional funds for further modification or
extended service life. New DDG-51 class ships being introduced to the
fleet provide substantially more capability and an ample number of VLS
tubes to support current Tomahawk inventory. It is not cost effective
to keep the DD-963 class in the inventory. The currently structured
decommissioning schedule will save the Navy about $1.25 billion over
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) that can be applied to
transformational efforts such as electric drive, advanced networks and
stealth technology which will bring new warfighting capabilities to the
fleet.
However, we are funding the LPD-4 extended sustainment program.
This program was developed to improve the dependability of HM&E systems
and living conditions for the sailors and embarked marines.
Additionally, it is expected that LHAs will be required to serve a
median 42 years, significantly beyond their ESL of 35 years, before
being replaced by the LHA(R) ships currently being studied.
The requirement for amphibious ships is driven by two factors,
amphibious ready group (ARG) deployment cycle and Marine Corps lift
requirements. Today's 12 ARGs are the minimum required to meet presence
requirements and each ARG consists of an LHA/LHD, LPD, and LSD. Overall
lift is currently below the 2.5 Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) lift
programmatic goal and full requirement of 3.0 MEB lift. LPD-4s (Austin-
class) will be required to serve an average of 41.5 years, well beyond
their original ESL of 30 years, in order to meet amphibious
requirements until the LPD-17 class ships deliver.
4. Preposition additional ships in forward operating areas that
would be maintained by very small crews during normal circumstances.
This concept would be analogous to the manner in which certain Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) ships are kept ready to begin operations in just a
few days.
The current Ready Reserve Force is maintained in a 10-20 day
activation status, with no caretakers on board. The ships undergo a sea
worthiness inspection by USCG every 2 years. The ships in a Reduced
Operating State (ROS) have 4-5 day windows, as well as 30-45-90 windows
for underway; the 4-5 day ships are manned with civilian mariners to
maintain the ships propulsion system. The role of these ships is to
support U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and sealift for current
OPLANS. The ROS and RRF ships do not have complex C\4\ISR systems or
weapon systems that are maintained. The time required to develop
minimum standards of crew proficiency for combat operations will take
longer than the transit time saved.
5. Other Studies and Initiatives:
Manning Initiatives
The ability to optimize the manning of our ships also will provide
efficiencies. Within OPNAV and the fleet we are in the process of
exploring several alternatives that will enhance our ability to man our
ships and squadrons at optimum levels during the inter-deployment
training cycle (IDTC) and scheduled deployment. These efforts involve
or will involve the units within two CVBGs/ARGs and six other ships
affecting additional CVBGs. The number of sailors directly involved or
temporarily moved by these initiatives will exceed 2000 as manning
levels for each are adjusted to the requirements for their respective
initiative. These initiatives will span timelines from 15 months to 36
months as the concepts are formulated, execution strategies developed,
plans executed, and final data analysis is complete. The fleets are
aggressively exploring these manning alternatives to address such
issues as requirements determination, retention and personnel
development, and increased operational flexibility. These efforts
highlight the transformational research that the fleets are doing to
help identify the true requirement.
Fleet Manning Experiment (FME) led by Commander, Atlantic Fleet
(CLF) and Commander, Pacific Fleet (CPF)
The CLF/CPF FME is a bottom-up fleet review of manpower
requirements, which identifies the true manning requirement in today's
infrastructure and warfighting environments. The FME is not an exercise
in shipboard manning reduction. The period of this effort is from July
2001 to July 2003. FME test units are contained within the U.S.S.
George Washington CVBG and Nassau ARG. These units (and the CVBG/ARG as
a whole) will be evaluated during their IDTC, deployment and post
deployment maintenance periods for the effects of these changes.
Manning adjustment began in January 2002. In order to achieve the FME
levels for rating/Navy enlisted classification (NEC) and pay grade on
the test units, about 570 sailors are being moved within the CVBG,
where possible. As an example of the cooperation and success of these
efforts, general detailed (GENDET) manning for the three players
requiring the majority of additional non-designated personnel will be
met in May of this year. This has been an exceptional effort to
identify the true requirements by all involved and will have
significant impact on the way we determine manpower requirements for
our sea units in the future.
Optimal Manning Project (OMP) led by Commander, Naval Surface Force
Pacific (CNSP)
The CNSP OMP is a bottom-up review of the billets authorized (BA)
on a DDG and smart CG in an effort to develop, from the fleet
perspective, the ship class manning requirements for the future
including minimal manning concepts. Reductions will be based upon
policy and procedural changes (internal and external), technology
insertions and shore infrastructure changes. Although most of its
assumptions are the same as the FME, it explores a number of potential
shore infrastructure changes that can be used to reduce overall at sea
manning requirements. The most significant changes involve the current
day functions and workloads associated with maintenance and personnel
administration. The period of this effort is roughly the same as the
FME. The OMP test units will also be evaluated during their IDTC,
deployment and post deployment maintenance periods for the effects of
these changes as in the FME. OMP manning reduction resulted in a
decrease of 95 billets. Manning reductions to the OMP levels began in
November 2001.
Mobile Bay (CG-53) and Milius (DDG-69) are on track in the IDTC and
have operated successfully at sea. An ashore maintenance detachment,
which was established in October 2001 using consolidated OMP-BA excess,
is supporting additional ship maintenance periods other than their
parent commands. An administrative detachment using consolidated OMP-BA
excess is conducting pay and personnel issues from ashore.
Accelerated Sailor Achievement Program Pilot (ASAP) led by
Commander, Atlantic Fleet and Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP)
ASAP is directed at improving GENDET attrition and retention by:
(1) by starting the sailor mentorship process early in the recruiting
phase and continuing it through the sailors first sea tour and; (2)
providing an absolute advanced school opportunity following a 24 month
initial sea tour. Early association of the new sailors to a final
parent command will begin as they are recruited for a specific CVBG/
ARG, assigned earlier in the process to units within that CVBG/ARG and
personally and professionally developed during their at-sea time for
successful application to an advanced training school of their choice.
We believe that this early incorporation of the young sailor into his
first at-sea team with a very tangible reward at its completion will
provide significant gain in this area as well as exercise our covenant
leadership responsibilities to them. The time period for this effort
will extend for about 36 months. The ASAP test units are tentatively
within the Truman CVBG.
a. Initial manning analysis indicates that 300-350 young sailors
will participate in this pilot.
b. This pilot holds great promise in getting at the heart of GENDET
losses: early mentoring, command concern for the individual's well
being and personal and professional development. It addresses near-term
and long-term readiness by investing in our people at a point where
career decisions are made. Although too early to tell whether this
pilot will be a success, from a leadership perspective, this seems like
a winner. In the final assessment, our determination of return on
investment (ROI) should not be limited to a straightforward cost
analysis.
Long Deployment Initiative
This concept involves deploying a unit for 9 months while rotating
a contingent (about a quarter of the crew) back stateside every 2\1/4\
months so that we can maintain our forward commitments while not
bearing the entire burden on the backs of our sailors. This concept
requires an increase in assigned personnel of 25 percent. The time
period for this effort will extend for about 15 months. This concept
has the potential to define the way ahead in sailor employment. By
manning sea-going units to 125 percent of current levels, we keep
sailors at sea while providing the ship with the excess capacity to
allow their sailors the time to pursue their personal and professional
development. At the current level of 160,000 sailors at sea in combat
units, 40,000 billets would need to be realigned from other activities.
We could increase sea tours for our sailors without adversely affecting
their quality of life (QOL) or careers. Longer sea tours would increase
unit readiness through crew stability, increased experience level,
surge capacity, and increase skill sets onboard through shore side
training opportunities, etc. QOL for these sailors would improve with
additional manpower to address shipboard duties, additional opportunity
to fully participate in the transformation envisioned by the Navy's
Task Force Excel, training opportunities to improve shipboard skills
with temporary additional duty (TAD) assignments to base security
units, ship intermediate maintenance activities (SIMA), personnel
support detachments (PSD), clinics, etc.
I hope the background information provided today on several
deployment posture and manning initiatives was helpful. Some
initiatives are in the early stages of development and others have been
studied at length. I remain optimistic that the initiatives presented
will improve OPTEMPO and our ability to provide additional forward
presence with the current force.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral, the Navy has said it has to have
these 7.6 aircraft carriers in the active fleet in order to
support one carrier on-station full-time in the Northern
Arabian Sea. This reflects assumptions of keeping the CNO-
mandated operational tempo goals for down times, among others.
The Navy also indicates that having the carrier homeported
in Japan allows the Navy to have only 1.7 carriers in the
active fleet providing a continuous presence of one carrier in
the Western Pacific.
So in your discussion of forward homeporting options, you
discussed a number of vessels such as submarines and other
support ships in Guam. However, you made no mention of
relooking at options to homeporting carrier battle groups in
locations other than the current group in Japan. I would say
there are numerous ports throughout the region that have that
capability and infrastructure. You have ports of call, but
required infrastructure to support current and homeports, if
unavailable, would require substantial investments by the U.S.
and the host nation.
Could you give us some idea what the estimates are and what
the costs would be required to establish the appropriate
infrastructure?
Admiral Wachendorf. Sir, I'll take that to give you the
exact numbers for the record, if I may.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Navy has conducted some preliminary studies to determine the
infrastructure support required to homeport a carrier battle group
(CVBG) in locations other than Japan. These studies estimate that the
range of construction costs are from $3 to $6 billion, requiring
between 7 and 10 years to complete the necessary environmental studies
and subsequent construction. Upgrades to existing civil infrastructure
such as roads, power, water, and waste disposal to support the
approximately 25,000 military sailors, civilian personnel, and
dependents could add billions more. These estimates did not account for
the cost of land acquisition, so the availability of land was a
constraining factor in some locations.
The annual recurring costs to operate and support the CVBG would
also be significant. The Navy has not entered into any formal
discussions with potential host nations so the political feasibility of
alternate sites cannot be determined yet.
In general, the infrastructure required to support a
carrier is much larger than for the submarines. In the case of
Guam, we do presently have sufficient infrastructure with the
submarine tender there that is capable of also supporting
surface combatants, to accommodate three nuclear attack
submarines: the first of which will arrive in September of this
year, the second in October, the third to be decided, but soon
after.
I have discussed this with Admiral Fargo, Commander of the
Pacific Fleet, as recently as last week. He is of the opinion
that no further infrastructure would be needed to accommodate
those and perhaps a few more submarines and a squadron of
surface combatants, perhaps with missile defense capabilities,
as those issues come online.
For the aircraft carrier, however, there is a lot more
infrastructure and dredging that would be required. We
certainly could do that, but it is our intention right now to
substitute with modern ships, whether they be aircraft carriers
or amphibious or cruiser/destroyer force ships, in Japan with
the latest technology, but to maintain in Japan the same number
of ships we have there.
A pure, very extensive support facility was built in
Singapore, and we are now using that as a good place for ships
to resupply. For some of the manning concepts to increase
presence, we are considering crew swapping alternatives. It is
our opinion that we would not need to locate a lot of intensive
industrial support or maintenance facilities in places like
Singapore or other locations, but we could change out the crews
there if the ships could stay longer. That would have the
increased presence.
Senator Kennedy. Coming back to the aircraft carriers, you
gave me a good survey answer about the issue. But let us just
take the aircraft carriers now. In terms of looking at other
kinds of ports, this is not a new issue.
Admiral Wachendorf. No, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Looking at decisions back in 1993, we had
the Defense Department doing studies at that time. They were
non-responsive to these kinds of things. We have additional
pressures now, particularly with this budget and with this
administration.
So I am interested in what the costs are in terms of the
forward part. What are we looking at? There are a number of the
old options. We looked at Rota, which was around for a number
of years. Crete was there, along with Perth, Australia. These
are all harbors or ports that we had talked about at other
times.
I am just wondering if you are looking at this, the options
of forward porting and, if so, what are the cost
considerations? If not, why not? How is this balanced against
the development of the battle carrier group? It is around $20
billion.
What are the kinds of thinking that is going on? How would
you evaluate it? When was the last time you did evaluate it?
What are the costs out there? Is it the instability in those
regions? Is it a greater kind of danger, or is it just cost?
What are the factors when we have the extraordinary figures in
Japan of 1.7 carriers versus 7.6 we are keeping in the Northern
Arabian Sea.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir. Your numbers are exactly
correct, sir. I would point out that we have maintained a 2.0
carrier presence, at times 3.0 including the carrier from
Japan, in the war on terrorism off of Afghanistan. We have
plans to surge more carriers. To answer your question more
specifically, there are some regional stability concerns.
Japan has no more room for additional carriers in their
infrastructure.
Senator Kennedy. I understand that.
Admiral Wachendorf. So we would have to look at places like
Guam. It was the fleet commander's assessment that they are not
ready to accommodate something the size of a carrier itself,
but they could accommodate the surface combatant squadron and
the squadron of submarines.
The next leading contender would probably be Australia,
because we could leverage some of their naval bases, which have
existing facilities. We would still have to expand on them to
accommodate our nuclear carriers, which Australia does not
have. But they have expressed a willingness to do so.
Senator Kennedy. Well, I know that Perth was at least one
of the options.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. But what I am looking for or asking is
whether we have done a review or whether this is an ongoing and
timely review.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir. It is the----
Senator Kennedy. It would seem to me that you would want
both the review in terms of the costs in this versus what are
going to be the costs outside of it.
I would think you are also looking at whether you need the
length of time in these particular regions. Do you know what it
costs in terms of keeping the aircraft battle group in the
Indian Ocean for 12 months? Why 12? Should it be nine?
What are the capabilities in those regions? Do you need all
the battle group, or some or less? Do you need all the
personnel on those aircraft carriers with the particular
challenges they are facing, or somewhat less?
What I am interested in, sir, is what kind of thinking is
going on in the Navy as we are looking at these budgets so that
it is not just a bottom line, which we are already conscious
of, in terms of what is happening in shipbuilding, but also
these other kinds of alternatives as well.
I am wondering whether the Navy is looking at these kinds
of factors and how they are evaluating them to see if they are
even sure there are good reasons.
Some may be good reasons to do it, other reasons why they
should not be done; what I am most of all looking at is to see
whether that kind of process has been moving----
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy.--ahead. I am somewhat troubled that I am
not sure that it has been.
Admiral Wachendorf. Two comments on that, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Admiral Wachendorf. The Center for Naval Analyses did some
exact studies with those costs, and I will make sure they are
available to you for homeporting options and the costs that
would be incurred for different locations and the
infrastructure required. I do not have that information in
front of me.
[The information referred to follows:]
The following costs are provided for homeporting a four ship
surface action group in Guam. These cost are the very lowest estimate.
Due to Guam being a territory and infrastructure is already established
it is the least expensive of the western pacific ports. Costing data
for other areas in the Western Pacific are not currently available and
are assumed to be much greater than the below Guam costs.
[In millions of dollars]
Family Housing............................ 109 (100 percent renovation)
Bachelor Quarters......................... 90
Ship Repair Facilities.................... 0 (Ship repairs in Japan/HI/
CONUS)
Wharf Upgrade............................. 10
Utilities................................. 4
Dredging.................................. 20
Supply.................................... 16
Ordnance.................................. 18
Morale Welfare and Recreation............. 5
Schools................................... 17
-----------------------------
Total................................... 374 to 375
The following is a breakdown of cost areas.
Family Housing (FH) (625 Units)
Renovation cost = $175,000 per unit
625 = $109 million (includes infrastructure upgrades)
Bachelor Quarters (BQ) (625 PN = 6-100 Personnel BQs)
$144,000 per space 625 PN = $90 million
Ship Repair Facility (SRF) (Renovation required =
Assume 50 percent of Plant Replacement Value (PRV) of existing
building. No new construction required)
-50 percent of PRV $289 million = $145 million
(does not include drydock; wharf & utilities upgrades
addressed separately)
Wharf Upgrades (Romeo, Sierra, Tango)
From Regional Shore Infrastructure Plan (RSIP)
Waterfront Study, P-433 Bilge Oil Water Treatment
System, Steam, fiber optics, (Romeo/Sierra): $7.1
million
Underwater Inspection Report (1998) identified
$1.2 million for structural repairs; factor for new
finds, deterioration, escalation (100 percent): $2.4
million
Utilities
Electrical--Sierra & Romeo piers renovated in
1999. Tango pier damaged by earthquake and has no
electrical. Electrical power, lighting, communications
as follows: Romeo $0.2 million, Sierra $0.6 million,
Tango $1.7 million. Total = $2.5 million
Water/sewer: $1.0 million
Supply
Cold storage--Increase 1700 sm: $7.7 million
Warehouse--Increase 2700 sm: $7.8 million
Fuels--Assume ok
Ordnance
-3 new missile magazines @ $6 million: $18
million
Morale Welfare and Recreation
Increase 20 percent (club, Child Development
Center (CDC), gym, theater, bowling alley)
Assume 1 new CDC for 94 children = $2 million
Assume 20 percent expansion of gym = $3
million
Schools
Increase 20 percent of MCON for High School
(HS) and Elementary/Middle School (ES/MS),
HS: Current MCON is $35 million 20
percent = $7 million
ES/MS: Current MCON is $50 million
20 percent = $10 million
Total = $17 million
Another piece, sir, you mentioned it in your comment about
longer deployments, one of the concepts we are looking at looks
very attractive in theory. In practice, there are some
challenges to overcome.
If we were to take the traditional deployment length, which
your numbers of 7.6 assume for 6 months, it takes about a month
for a West Coast ship, surface, submarine or aircraft carrier,
to get to the Strait of Hormuz if that is the area of interest,
and it certainly is one of them.
Then it takes a month to get it back. So that leaves 4
months of operating time in a 6-month deployment, because 2
months are spent in transit. If we were to increase the length
of that deployment to 9 months and spend the same transit time
over and the same transit time back, the on-station time would
be increased from 4 to 7 months. That is a 75 percent increase
in on-station time.
One of the concepts that I discussed in my statement is to
increase the manning of the ship by 25 percent and every
quarter of a 9-month cycle, about every 10 weeks, rotate a
quarter of the crew through, so that the concerns that you
mention in your opening statement could be addressed with
respect to family separation and others.
That would allow a 75 percent increase in on-station time
for a 25 percent manpower increase. That would make that very
attractive.
There are some problems here, because of the training that
has to be done--the specialized equipment that these sailors
and officers have to operate--but that experiment is going to
be initiated this fall, sir.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up, but I will be coming back
to the Horizon Program, the----
Admiral Wachendorf. Sir, that came out of the Horizon
study, which was conducted by the War College, sir.
Senator Kennedy. OK.
Admiral Wachendorf. The Horizon concept is a little
different. There it involves an extra crew for a given number
of ships. We are looking at implementing that in the mine
countermeasures force, because the crew sizes for those ships
are smaller, sir, and we will get better data as we rotate
those around.
Senator Kennedy. I am going to come back to this later on.
If you could then, let us know what you are thinking and
what you see as the advantages and disadvantages of these. If
you have Blue/Gold or Horizon, whatever suggestions you do
have. I understand there are a number of other kinds of
options, which are also being looked at. We would like to know
what your thinking is.
Is it cost-related? Are we going to balance off these costs
versus the OPTEMPO in terms of the personnel? At the
grassroots, we want to be able to make some judgments on these
as well.
Maybe it would be best if either Senator Sessions and I
were to try and frame this in the form of a letter so you have
a more precise inquiry and we could get as good information as
we can get.
But the point I just want to mention is that I think it is
important for us to know what these various options are, what
is your own evaluation of them, and what these costs are
entailing.
We are always mindful, obviously, of the amount of time
personnel are away from home. They obviously need the training
and they need it to be efficient, but we would be very
interested in that.
Have you considered the length of time that you leave these
carrier battle groups on station? Is there some greater
advantage in having 12 months, or 9 months, or is this
difficult because of both strategic and tactical defense kinds
of issues?
Do you need the same ships in each of the battle groups
when they go to the different places in the world? I mean,
there is obviously different threats that come from Iran and
Iraq, and missiles that come from them and capabilities than
you might have from other places.
Do you look at those when they actually assign these battle
groups? Is that a consideration of it? If so, why? If not so,
why not? Maybe I can define that a little bit as well. If you
want to make a brief comment, then I will yield to the next
Senator.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir. I will make a short answer to
that. You are correct, sir. One of the challenges we must
overcome here is the diversity of within the surface combatants
and other ships of the Navy. For example, there are 22
different baselines of weapon systems on surface combatants in
the Navy today.
So as we rotate ships around and modernize that ship in
Japan right now, the Kitty Hawk, it is 47 years old. It is one
of the oldest ships in the Navy, but it has state of the art,
what we call, C\4\ISR electronics, so it would allow it do the
work that it did during the war on the whole setting up of
Kandahar and that SOF mission there. She is getting ready to go
back again with the airwing embarked instead of the rotary wing
SOF forces that operated out there just a couple of months ago.
So those ships that go, we try to make sure to have the
best we can, the same common architecture of electronics. But
we have too many different ones. It costs us too much overhead
in the systems commands to maintain those.
One of the things as we go toward the future--and Admiral
Mullen can tell you more about this--is striving for open
architecture, where the human interfaces, the displays, and the
button pushing are more or less constant. It is the software,
as technology grows, because we want to harvest our strategic
advantage in information superiority, that is what changes.
That will allow more interoperability.
One other comment, sir. The traditional view was when a
battle groups goes, they stay together and we do not change out
components. One of the initiatives that we are going to be
starting this summer does exactly that. It breaks that paradigm
by taking three 963 destroyers, leaving one, the U.S.S.
Fletcher, forward deployed for 18 months, and then taking two
other crews, not extra crews, from two other like ships with
the same capabilities, and rotating them through at 6 month
intervals.
When we do that over an 18 month period, we change, let's
say, four of those transits, each a month long or 122 days of
presence time over 18 months. There are some cultural things,
that traditionally a crew thinks their ship is the best in the
whole Navy. That is what we train them to do, and that is a
good thing. So they are going to have to get used to thinking
this other ship is a pretty good one, too, because there are
other challenges.
But we are trying to break that up to get more efficiency
out of the force we have, sir. I will be glad to take for
action, as you discussed, a more detailed response.
[The information referred to follows:]
The carrier battle group (CVBG) is a combat formation of ships and
aircraft, which comprises a principal element of our national power
projection capability. It is the essential foundation of our ability to
conduct operations as envisioned in the most recent edition of our
strategic concept. It includes capabilities sufficient to accomplish a
variety of situations short of war. Simply put, our mission in
peacetime is to conduct forward presence operations to help shape the
strategic environment by deterring conflict, building interoperability,
and by responding, as necessary, to fast breaking crises with the
demonstration and application of credible combat power.
Tasks which are critical to the success of initial crisis response
missions are assumed to be undertaken in non-permissive environments
characterized by multiple threats including, but not limited to,
advanced anti-ship missiles, third/fourth generation fighter/attack
aircraft, advanced electromagnetic sensors and jammers, modem cruise
missile-equipped surface combatants, and attack submarines (both
nuclear and diesel types). The CVBG is intended to be a flexible naval
force that can operate in shallow, and narrow, waters or in the open
ocean, during day and night, in all weather conditions, and under
restricted emission control.
The primary objective in defining the CVBG capabilities and
composition is to provide the combatant commanders with adequately
balanced capabilities to deal with a variety of present and future
threats. The objective is to train and equip forward deploying forces
which are balanced, sustainable, flexible, and, most importantly,
responsive to the requirements of the supported commanders and able to
carry out tasking from the Secretary of Defense.
Most CVBGs are constructed nearly identical to ensure the right
mixes of capabilities to respond to any threat, regardless of the
geographical location. Training focuses on the most likely areas where
the ships will be operating, but the skill sets ensure all are flexible
enough to operate anywhere in the world on short notice when so tasked
by the Secretary of Defense or President.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Admiral Wachendorf, did I correctly interpret what you are
saying, that the Navy is, in fact, giving increased emphasis on
these kinds of potential savings that this is something
unusual, other than just a normal routine constant evaluation
that I know you do?
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir. Once before, I believe about
5, 6 years ago, we tried a variation of the Horizon concept
that Senator Kennedy referred to. It did not work out very
well. I attribute that to faulty leadership. It was not the
sailors on the crews. It just was not managed well. We had
those left behind, those forward deployed, there was too much
segregation, and other management problems. We are learning
from those experiments, and we are moving forward with this DD
experiment in the fall and a similar one with the Arleigh
Burke-class later in the year, sir. So in my 30 years of
uniformed service to the country, I have never seen that
before.
Senator Sessions. I have no doubt it will get a lot of
complications. I just believe that in the modern world we are
in, at the level our private sector's sophistication, they
achieve and utilize the resources that are given to them. If
you work at it as you will, we can gain some advantage, whether
it is 5 percent, 10 percent, in the number of actual ships out
there available in an emergency, ready for action in the areas
of the globe that we need to be in with the current structure.
Then that still does not keep us up where we need to be in
terms of the total number of ships. One of the things that is
interesting is your testimony indicating that a cost benefit
analysis has led the Navy to the conclusion that Spruance-class
destroyers should be decommissioned prior to their reaching 35
years of service life as they were projected to serve. Yet
decommissioning those ships brings the Navy below the 116
surface combatants which the QDR states are needed to provide
moderate to high-risk national security.
My question is: would you provide the subcommittee by the
end of this month, if possible, the cost/benefit analysis
regarding the Spruance-class destroyers, the Ticonderoga-class
cruisers, and the Oliver Hazard Perry-class, too.
Second, I am concerned that the Navy is not maintaining the
QDR base force structure while it decommissions these ships
that do still have life. This generation will have a
requirement to build additional ships.
Did your cost/benefit analysis determine the additional
risk to the national security associated with dropping to 108
surface combatants?
Admiral Wachendorf. Sir, for your first action, we will
have all of it to you by the end of the month, sir. We have
done that, as you may know.
[The information referred to follows:]
The cost-benefit analysis regarding Spruance-class destroyers, the
Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates based
on annual programming costs for ships operations and support follows:
CG $34.8 million; DD $28.3 million; FFG $20.5 million. Therefore, it
costs approximately $8 million per year more to operate a DD over an
FFG.
The decision to reduce the service life of the DD-963 class was
based on affordability in the context of today's threat environment.
DD-963 class ships are significantly less capable than the more modern
and more survivable, Aegis-equipped DDG-51 class ships. The higher
manning requirements and operational costs are a main driver in the
decision process. The current average age of the DD-963 class is over
20 years and the DDG-51 average age is 6 years. The DD-963 is more
costly to maintain from a purely maintenance perspective, not to
mention combat system modernization costs to make the class effective
against today's threats. The decision to drop below to 116 was a short-
term reduction to allow for the development and construction of more
capable ships. Although in the short term we drop below the QDR force
level of 116 we emerge with a more capable force beginning in fiscal
year 2010.
The cruisers and the FFG-7 class are being extended to the
maximum life. You are also correct that the cost benefit
analysis indicated in the case of the 963s that it was not
affordable to do so. We will put that in writing to you. A
brief summary of that has to do with the operating costs of
those ships.
They have 50 percent more crew than the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard
Perry-class does. They also have five feet more draft. What we
found is that the FFG-7 class is very valuable to us for
tailored missions like maritime interdiction operations that we
are doing in the northern part of the Gulf where the water is
quite shallow. They also have helicopter capability, which is a
valuable asset and their fuel costs are lower.
One of the liabilities of both those ships is that they do
not have a volume search radar like the cruisers do. So we want
to take as much money as we can afford to invest--and Admiral
Mullen will correct anything I say improperly--but to have a
strategic plan that looks towards the future where we can have
reduced manning ships, or crews of a smaller size.
The DD(X) has approximately one-quarter of the crew size of
the current 963 ship. We need to get there and get to the
common architecture of combat systems that I mentioned before.
Another factor is stealth. We need to bring the enemy that
we know is going to come after us in close where our defensive
systems can be most effective. To do that, we have to minimize
the acoustic, the radar, the electromagnetic, and other
signatures that these ships put out. It would be cost
prohibitive to do that to the 963 class.
We are using the FFG-7 class as a tailored mission ship
until the littoral combatant ship comes online, and DD(X). We
are using the cruisers for air defense and air radars. But we
will go into more detail for you as you requested, sir.
Senator Sessions. Well, have you analyzed the most
effective way to stay with the QDR number of 116 ships? Are you
sure you have made the best analysis to try to meet that
requirement? If we cannot get enough new ships, why are we
decommissioning the serviceable ships?
We saw one, the O'Brien, that served ably in the Persian
Gulf, that is set to be decommissioned soon.
Admiral Wachendorf. Senator, you are exactly correct. These
are hard choices to make. One point that comes in and weighs
this investment balance of today versus tomorrow is the life-
cycle cost of these ships.
When the Coast Guard was doing an in-depth study of the
deep water project, looking for their future, they determined,
and Navy data supported, that on almost all warships, 60
percent of the life-cycle cost is manpower, historically.
We are trying to reduce the cost of operating our Navy by
going towards smart ship technologies and reduced manning
initiatives, as I discussed in my testimony, to bring that cost
down, so that we can make a better investment on our available
resources. To do that, that is part of this analysis, but we
will put that all in writing for you, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
Smart ship is the introduction of commercial technologies for
reduced ship manning. The results of implementing seven smart ship
technologies has led to the reduction of 21 personnel with an annual
cost savings of $1.01 million per ship. Currently there are six Aegis
cruisers that have smart ship integrated ship control consists of
integrated bridge system, damage control quarters, machinery control
system, wireless internal communications system, fuel control system,
integrated condition assessment system, fiber optic local area network
and on board trainer for engineering, damage control, and voyage
management.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I do not know the answer to
that. It may be that you are correct, that celebrating the
transition to the more modern ships is worth the decline in the
short-term of our combatants on the sea. But I think it is a
question we have to ask.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. I mean, we are looking at a rather
substantial reduction in life expectancy of those ships we are
running now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Landrieu.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for calling this hearing and I appreciate having this
opportunity. I have a full statement for the record, but I
would like to excerpt a few things, just for comments, and then
I have a couple of questions.
With 32 percent of our naval force deployed in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom and deployments to maintain our
global presence, it is evident to me and to many Senators,
actually, Senator Collins has spoken about this before many
times, that we need to maintain a more robust shipbuilding
program.
The Navy has given the U.S. the ability to project forces
in the most inhospitable lands, and that is only going to
continue. It is the duty of this subcommittee, under the able
leadership of our Chairman and Ranking Member, to equip our
sailors and marines with a modern fleet to conduct this war.
It is crucial that the Navy increase its ship procurement
program to bring it in line with the minimum needed to maintain
a fleet of 300 ships or more. But it seems to this Senator that
no matter who is in the White House, when the Navy comes before
Congress, they state that the Navy plans to address the
shortfall in ship procurement the next year or the year after.
Unfortunately, it seems like the outyears never quite come.
I know that there are budget constraints, but I am going to
submit this, Mr. Chairman, to the record in hopes that we can
continue with your leadership to push on this shipbuilding
program, because it is very important for us even as the
threats change and emerge. It becomes almost more important to
be able to operate in inhospitable areas, as well as to deploy
pretty quickly.
[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
I would like to thank the Chair for holding this hearing today on
such an important topic. I would also like to thank the panel for
taking the time to come here today and testify.
Thousands of years ago, when the Greeks were facing an imminent war
with the Persians, they were advised to build a wall of wood to protect
the city of Athens. The walls of wood were not walls surrounding a
city, but the wooden navy of Athens. The Greeks embarked on a robust
shipbuilding program, and soon had a Navy that was superior to the
Persians. Their victory over the Persians ultimately came at sea, with
the Greek navy forming an invincible wall of wood around the Greek
homeland.
Today, we find ourselves like the Greeks did so many years ago.
Instead of a wall of wood, America depends upon a wall of steel to
protect her from her enemies. This wall of steel is the United States
Navy. Time and again, it has been the Navy and the Marine Corps that
has erected an unbreakable wall around us. But defense is only half of
the Navy/Marine Corps equation. The Navy projects American power to far
away and inhospitable lands. If we do not embark on a robust
shipbuilding program, gaps will develop in our wall of steel. As we
increase the operational tempo of our Navy, we are decreasing the
amount of funds allocated for ship procurement. This creates a great
danger to America as it executes a long and difficult war on terrorism.
No nation on Earth can equal our Navy, and it is the duty of this
subcommittee to keep it that way.
Current funding for the Navy's shipbuilding program is creating a
growing gap in that wall of steel, which will threaten our ability to
project sea power in future years. For the past few years, the Navy has
not met its own goal of procuring 8 to 10 ships per year. In the last
fiscal year, the Navy only procured 6 ships, and in fiscal year 2003
the Navy is only procuring 5 ships. This is half the number of ships
required to sustain our present force levels and is $5 billion below
the Clinton administration's 2001 request of $11 billion for 8 ships.
According to current projections, this gap in our defenses will not be
effectively plugged until fiscal year 2007, when the Navy is projected
to procure 11 ships.
With over 32 percent of our Naval force deployed in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom and deployments to maintain our global
presence, it is evident that we need to maintain a robust shipbuilding
program. The Navy has given the U.S. the ability to project forces in
the most inhospitable lands. It is the duty of this subcommittee to
equip our sailors and marines with a modern fleet to conduct this war.
It is crucial that the Navy increase its ship procurement program to
bring it in line with the minimum needed to maintain a fleet of 300
ships. Each year, it seems that no matter who is in the White House,
the Navy comes before Congress to state that the Navy plans to address
the shortfall in ship procurement next year, or the year after.
Unfortunately the outyears never come.
I would like to close by simply pointing out that our current
procurement levels create a gap in our wall of steel. Because it is
difficult for our enemies to confront us conventionally, they must look
for weaknesses in our defense. No doubt they will identify this gap in
our naval wall, and they will exploit it. We must embark on a robust
shipbuilding program to ensure that these gaps do not occur, and to
maintain a modern naval fleet.
Senator Landrieu. I have one or two questions. I wanted to
follow up on your crew swapping pilot----
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Landrieu.--and just to lend my support for that
concept.
I know that all change is difficult, and there are cultural
changes associated, but on the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee and on some other subcommittees, Mr. Chairman, we
have really tried to focus on maximizing our deployments while
giving people enough time at home, enough time resting, which
is really a quality-of-life issue, as our marines and sailors
struggle to find time with their families and to have some real
down time with the increased operations.
I want to say that I really encourage that kind of
creativity in terms of ways that we can get our guys and gals
home and give them a little more time with their families and
some down time. If that would work, I would encourage you to
continue it.
In addition, I want to commend you for your comments about
trying to, and I may be paraphrasing here, but standardizing
your hardware----
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes.
Senator Landrieu.--so that we can continue to take the best
of our research and development and take some things off-the-
shelf. But if our hardware stays the same, it cuts down on our
training and really makes our whole operation more efficient.
We are seeing those efforts made across the board, and I really
do commend you for that.
I would just ask a question, given the new thrust of our
efforts in terms of really facing this new and emerging threat,
different than the threats that we faced in the past, because
fighting this war on terrorism requires new strategies, new
equipment.
How did the Navy argue to the administration, or how did
you help to frame the debate about what the Navy needs to,
basically, position itself to be a real tool in our arsenal to
fight terrorists? What were the arguments that you are making
either to us or to the administration or to the general public?
Because I would like, for one, to hear some more about that.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your kind
words. I think the short answer to your question is that we are
no longer in the threat-based environment. We argue for a
capabilities-base. Our strategy is such that we do not know
exactly where we are going to fight. We do not know what the
rules of engagement are.
I am struck by a classmate of mine from the Naval Academy
who is an admiral. Who would have thought that on Labor Day a
year ago, this admiral would be riding horseback with 800
people, 700 miles inland, going up against fixed machine guns
and rocket propelled grenades? He is the SOF commander for
CENTCOM. Thank goodness that he had four F-14s right in front
of him mowing the grass in a cavalry charge that prevailed in
Mazar-e Sharif.
Senator Kennedy. Well expressed.
Admiral Wachendorf. We cannot predict that kind of thing.
But we want to make sure that we have combat credible forces as
we did 24 hours after the planes hit the Pentagon and the World
Trade Center. We had two carrier battle groups, and we had a
classified number, but an impressive number, of Tomahawk
missiles, and an amphibious readiness group on-station ready to
strike. So that is the kind of capability we want to go after.
One other comment, Senator, about the common combat systems
and why that is important not only for crew swapping and
interchangeable kind of things, but in reducing the overhead I
spoke of in our systems command and training commands and
elsewhere, it facilitates the use of simulators. The Navy is
going to be world class in simulators so that we can still
maintain the quality of life as best we can for our sailors who
spend long times away from home.
But when they come back to their homeports, and this is
part of the infrastructure question which related to Senator
Kennedy's question, we want to have the facilities. There is no
substitute for going to sea. I do not want to leave you with
that point.
But we could do a lot better job at training our sailors on
the state-of-the-art skills they need to go into harm's way
right in their own home port without taking the whole carrier
battle group underway. That is part of this crew swapping and
the Horizon concepts.
Senator Landrieu. My time is up, but I do want to tell the
Chairman that I have heard a lot of this discussion about
switching from threat-based to capability-based. I really think
we need to be really clear about what that means, and if we can
actually afford what we are talking about. I am just very
interested in pursuing that.
I have heard this now on several subcommittees. We have
always based our budgets on what we perceive the threats to be,
because we have to be careful and focused with our resources--
--
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Landrieu.--ready to defend in whatever ways we can,
but focused based on good intelligence and good information and
using your brain about where the threat might come from, so our
resources are there. It is a little worrisome that I hear about
this capability-base, because I do not know if we are trying to
budget to be capable to fight anything, anywhere, anytime,
terrorists, two theater wars at the same time. So I just want
to say that.
Also I would like an update on Vieques when we can get to
it, but I will come back on the second round.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, if I might interrupt, that is
an important question. Why does he not put in the record
exactly what that definition means from the shipbuilding
perspective?
Senator Landrieu. What the difference is when we ask,
because this is facing us in all of the committees.
Senator Warner. Sure.
Senator Landrieu. I mean, we are either building a Navy to
address the threats as we perceive them, or we are building a
Navy based on this new term I keep hearing, ``capabilities.''
But I have always thought we need to build a Navy based on
the threat that we perceive, and that threat changes and grows.
We are seeing that before our eyes, and in order for us to make
you as strong as possible, we have to agree on what that threat
is. Then I would just like to ask you that, for the record.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, ma'am. Both Senators raise
excellent points, and I will take that for action. We will
staff through a better answer.
But a short one to your question about the capabilities
that I could give you now is, the Navy has a program, global
naval force presence policy (GNFPP), which specifies exactly
what kind of presence quantitatively in surface combatants, in
amphibious readiness groups, in carrier presence, in Tomahawk
strike capability, these come in different flavors, what the
commanders in chief, the warfighters need on-station, and that
is the capability that we are assigning up to execute.
When I suggested that we were going away from a threat
base, I did not mean to suggest that we were being amorphous,
or just everything everywhere all the time. We could not do
that.
But what we do want to do is support the CINCs, and they do
describe what their requirements are. That is what we are
meeting, and we can address that more fully in an answer for
the record, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report outlined a new defense
strategy that is built around the concept of shifting to a
``capabilities-based'' approach to defense. That concept reflects the
fact that the United States cannot know with confidence what nation,
combination of nations, or non-state actors will pose threats to vital
U.S. interests or those of our allies and friends decades from now. It
is possible, however, to anticipate the capabilities that an adversary
might employ to coerce its neighbors, deter the United States from
acting in defense of its allies and friends, or directly attacking the
United States or its deployed forces. Moving to a capability-based
force requires the United States to focus on emerging opportunities
that certain capabilities can confer on the U.S. military over time.
This applies to shipbuilding, as well. We must focus our ship
development programs on realizing a transformed maneuver and
expeditionary force able to overcome anti-access and area denial
threats.
The Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) influence both the
requirements and programming process. They propose mission need
statements, which identify deficiencies requiring material solutions to
resolve and review every requirement--document for adequacy during
document staffing prior to approval. The Joint Requirements Board and
Joint Requirements Oversight Council routinely visit the CINCs
providing an opportunity for direct CINC input into warfighting
requirements issues. Additionally, each CINC submits issues for
consideration into the Chairman's annual program assessment and
recommendations, as well as provides an annual integrated priority list
requiring response and consideration in each Service's respective
budget submission.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. Could the Senators give me their attention
for a moment--the purpose of our next hearing, which is on
April 9 at 2:30, is to receive testimony on Navy equipment
required for fielding a 21st century capabilities-based Navy in
review of the Defense Authorization Request. So that is going
to be the subject of that hearing on April 9 at 2:30.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I want to follow up on the first question raised
by my friend from Louisiana. The proposed Navy budget would
take our surface combatants, the amphibious warships, the
combat logistics ships, and the mine countermeasures warfare
ships below the QDR critical force structure levels.
This leaves the Navy's regional commanders short on
available naval assets, increases the OPTEMPO, and results in
even further strain on our already-stretched fleet. Now, the
CNO has very candidly testified that the naval force structure
ideally should be in the neighborhood of 375 ships, and today
instead we are at about, I think it is 318 ships.
This leads me to the conclusion that the Navy is going to
have difficulty in meeting the CINC's current commitments. You
said in your testimony that you are exploring several
initiatives to alleviate the strain on our current OPTEMPO. You
are looking at different manning requirements, different
configurations.
But in the final analysis, the real problem is that we do
not have enough ships. In the final analysis, the fact is that
numbers matter. I guess I would ask you, as much as I admire
what you are doing to try to deal with the problems that are
created by past and current and future budgets, what are we
going to do to ensure that our naval forces can reach our
recapitalization goal of eight to ten ships per year by the end
of the Future Years Defense Program?
Admiral Wachendorf. Well, ma'am, you are exactly right. We
do not have enough ships. I do not want to leave you with the
impression that these manning alternatives are going to solve
the problem and that we can live with the shipbuilding rate
that we are at right now and get to 375 or get a Navy that has
the same fighting punch as 375 ships. Vice Admiral Mullen will
follow me and give you more information on that.
We want to be right up front and clear that these manning
things get improvements and efficiencies. I mentioned 4 months
out of 18, 10, 15, 20 percent improvements. We want to do that
regardless of the number of ships in the Navy, because that is
our job to be good stewards to public trust and get the most
bang for the buck we can.
We also have to be considering the surge requirements,
because it is not just what we rotate through 365 days a year.
If we execute a major operation, that number of aircraft
carriers as we have in the past could be expected to increase
significantly, more than double.
We are ready to do that. It was just last week at the all-
flag officer conference, Admiral Natter, the commander of the
Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, mentioned that the investment
that the Navy has made in readiness, both aircraft and ships,
to eliminate the degradation that ships and planes experience
coming back from deployment, has allowed us to make that surge
right now.
We are ready; it is a classified number which we could pass
to you separately, but to greatly increases our Navy presence,
because those ships are maintained and ready to go.
Tough choices were made, which Admiral Mullen can give you
a better answer on than I. But that is one of the factors that
went into this shipbuilding decision that we are at right now,
because we knew we had to fix our readiness problem.
Admiral Clark has gone on record as saying for a large
number of years, the Navy has deliberately understated
requirements and then deliberately underfunded understated
requirements for readiness accounts, and we have fixed that.
Senator Collins. I understand those tough choices, but what
I am worried about is, until we tackle the underlying problem
that we are not building enough ships, it does not matter how
creative we are with the manning requirements.
I mean, it is encouraging that on the horizon with the
DD(X) program, that we are looking at potentially greatly
reduced manning requirements that are going to be helpful. But
let me go on to another issue.
There is great concern in the community that while the
morale of our sailors and airmen is now very high among all the
Armed Forces, that sustained deployments with increased OPTEMPO
is ultimately going to yield a negative effect on retention, as
well as increased wear and tear on equipment.
You mentioned, in your written statement, the U.S.S.
Theodore Roosevelt, which recently spent 160 consecutive days
at sea without a port visit. Senator Reed and I visited this
aircraft carrier in January as part of our trip to Central
Asia. At that point, the carrier had been at sea for 113
consecutive days.
One of the naval officers came up to me, and I thought he
put it very well. He said, ``We are proud and we are happy to
break the record this time, but we cannot do it over and over
and over again.''
As dedicated and patriotic as our sailors are, there is a
limit to what we can ask of them. I would ask you, what change
do you foresee as the most promising of the ones that you have
looked at to ensure that increased operational days are
available to the CINCs, and yet we are not ultimately affecting
the quality of life for our sailors to the point where we are
going to see recruitment and retention problems once again?
Admiral Wachendorf. Senator, you are exactly correct. I
agree with everything you say.
There was a young lieutenant that just checked into my
office who came off the Enterprise. She was one of the carriers
that was on station when this war started. The Enterprise
stayed out there for 7 months. They were headed home, and then
went right back on station.
This young lieutenant is a female graduate of the Naval
Academy and was the Tomahawk strike planning officer for the
airwing. She put 84 rounds right on target. Every one of them
hit. She is better than I ever was as a lieutenant.
I do not know where we find these people. They are great,
let me tell you that. When she came back off of deployment, she
normally would be allowed some stand down or R & R time.
Because my office in the Pentagon lost 28 people out of the 42
Navy dead, we were hurting for replacements, and she gave all
that up just to come in and work with us and helped prepare for
this brief, as a matter of fact.
So that is not a direct answer to your question, but I
wanted you to know that. When I say that people are our
greatest asset, they really are, better than they ever were. We
better take care of them.
I think a more direct answer to your question, Senator,
refers to the use of simulators. In the past, when we would go
through this readiness degrade coming back from these long
deployments, we would take engines out of airplanes so they
could not fly. We would not give the ships the steaming hours
they needed to practice their skills, and there would be a
normal rotation of people.
We train as a team, not individuals. So to get the team
together, we would have to get the aircraft carrier, the
destroyers, and every submarine, everybody to scene, to rehone
their skills.
The use of simulators in network-centric warfare where we
can link up--actually in port, the U.S.S. Coronado is doing
this in fleet battle experiments right now, using joint
services--is not unique to the Navy. With integrating overhead
sensors and other classified programs, we can get great
training value and we can do it in an 8-hour working day. Then
they can come home, so they do not have to spend so much time
away from home. I think that is the key to the future.
The DD(X) with the standard combat and advanced network-
centric warfare concepts, littoral combat ship (LCS), the new
attack submarines, CVNX and LPD-17 are all leveraging this
technology as best we can. It is very important to the quality
of life of our sailors.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just one
question on Admiral Wachendorf's testimony.
Could you summarize the one or two major points that have
already emerged from your review of the current operations and
how it impacts on the fleet presence in the future?
Admiral Wachendorf. The war on terrorism, sir?
Senator Reed. Yes.
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, sir. We are still studying those.
As a matter of fact, we have a meeting tomorrow with the CNO
and with Admiral Mullen and the leadership of the Pentagon. It
might be a little premature for me to say these are the final
lists. There are certainly many, and we continue to study them.
One of them is the importance of combat credible forward
based naval forces. Sir, I saw you just come in, but we had two
carriers, expanded to three, an amphibious readiness group, a
large strike force, and Tomahawk-capable platforms on station
that were not used. I am sure there is a lot of reasons as to
political decisions to engage were made, but they were ready 24
hours after the tragic events of September 11.
They were not tied to a host nation's port, or flying over
countries or the need to operate off of air bases. That can be
a problem as we look at different scenarios here. So that is
one of the lessons.
Sovereign combat-credible naval forces are something that
are a value in this war, and as we look to the future in the
war on terrorism, that will continue to be the case.
The other, perhaps less--and this is my personal opinion,
sir, which will be refined by my chain of command, I am sure--
is the readiness bathtub. Part of that bathtub of readiness is
we underfunded the ordnance accounts. Precision-guided
munitions were 75 percent of all the munitions dropped in this
engagement. That was the right thing to do. But we do not have
enough of them. We need to buy more. There are all types.
The good news is this is a joint ordnance thing, so we can
get some economic order quantity procurement advantages with
the Air Force and the Marines. That would be my second one,
sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. John, do you want to----
Senator Warner. Oh, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to go ahead and hear the next panel.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Admiral Wachendorf. Thank you, sir.
Senator Kennedy. You will be hearing from us and we will
appreciate your responses.
Admiral Wachendorf. My pleasure, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, Admiral Mullen, we will
be glad to hear from you at this time.
Admiral Mullen, if you want to proceed.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR RESOURCES, REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS
Admiral Mullen. Senator Kennedy, Senator Sessions, Senator
Warner, Senator Landrieu, Senator Reed, and the supporting
staff, I greatly appreciate the opportunity today to appear
before you and to discuss the extremely important subject of
shipbuilding.
Secretary Young and I have prepared a joint statement and
would ask that it be submitted for the record. I would thank
you for the opportunity for a brief set of opening remarks.
As I sit here today, I could not be prouder to be in the
uniform of our Nation's Navy. I consider it a privilege to
still be able to serve and do so at such a critical time for
our country and, indeed, in many respects, the world.
The performance of our young men and women from all of the
services has been truly spectacular. In particular, the sailors
and marines of our modern naval forces have truly made a
difference in the global war on terrorism and will continue to
do so.
As naval forces always are, we were ready on day one and
provided the winning combat power from the sovereign decks of
our ships that enabled initial and continuing success in the
war in Afghanistan.
The mobility, flexibility, and striking power of our
carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups were war-
winning capabilities without which this country could not
prosecute this war. As has been the case since ships went to
sea, we did not have to ask permission from anyone. No visa was
required.
Let me elaborate with a few key statistics. As of
yesterday, carrier-based naval aviation, Navy and Marine Corps,
have flown 6,399 sorties over Afghanistan, over 77 percent of
all the sorties flown. Most of these sorties were possible only
through Air Force tanker support. These strike sorties have
been as long as 10 hours and have averaged up to 7 hours, the
equivalent of taking off in Washington, striking targets in St.
Louis, and flying back.
About 84 percent of these sorties that delivered ordnance
hit a target; and about 87 percent of the ordnance delivered
from the Navy was precision-guided, which is a complete
reversal of where we were in Operation Desert Storm.
Something like 80 percent of the Navy sorties delivering
ordnance did it against targets unknown to the pilots when they
launched. Naval aviation, combined with Army special forces
ground forward air controllers, proved an unbeatable
combination against real-time targets.
Naval aviation provided 24/7 strike sortie coverage for our
troops on the ground. Marines at Kandahar, one of the most
remote cities in a landlocked country far away, were never
without Navy top cover.
Had I been in the position to testify before you last year,
and had I predicted our Navy strikers would be on missions up
to 10 hours long, flying over 1,200 miles round trip, and our
Marines would be taking objectives over 400 miles inland from
our ships at sea, I suspect my testimony, let us just say,
could have possibly have had some healthy skepticism.
But this is just another example of what I have learned in
my 33-plus years of service. Give sailors and marines clear
goals and good robust tools and they will move mountains. In
Afghanistan, moving mountains has been the order of the day.
Our ability to execute this mission is eloquent testimony
to the long-standing support provided by you and this
Committee, for which I, on behalf of our sailors and marines,
are very grateful.
Likewise, our execution is testimony to the vision of
Secretary England and Admiral Clark. In this budget, they have
continued to tackle the immediate priorities of manpower and
current readiness. As a direct result, sailors are reenlisting
at record rates, and our naval forces are operating in full
support of the joint campaign with our Air Force and Army
counterparts with truly awe-inspiring combat prowess.
Committing the Navy to these priorities required tough
choices, which were not painless. A long-term war on terrorism
will certainly pose additional fiscal challenges, which you are
just beginning to grasp now. Increased munitions usage,
increased flying hours and steaming days, increased
materialization rates are being factored into our programming
efforts, and this budget begins to do just that.
More to the point today, manpower and current readiness
priorities have, in part, prevented us from investing in our
future accounts, including both aircraft and shipbuilding
procurement. Almost 80 percent of our topline increase was
budgeted in these two accounts.
Our goal has been to pay for the Navy we have today in
order that we can fight and win today. It is doing so now. When
Admiral Clark testified before the full committee on March 7,
he indicated that the total acquisition funding stream was
about $23 billion short, and that it needed to be about $33
billion in order to recapitalize the entire fleet, aircraft,
ships, submarines, at a rate that will maintain the Navy the
Nation needs. It will not surprise you when I say that Admiral
Clark is correct in his estimate.
Admiral Clark also testified to a Navy that requires about
375 ships. As we look to a future fleet of about this size, it
reflects a transformed Navy with a universal situational
awareness in a fully netted environment, a Navy with
persistence as a byword for all of our capability from
surveillance to strike, a Navy characterized by cycle times
reduced by an order of magnitude in acquisition, in speed of
command, and in strike.
It is a Navy with fast, lethal, dispersed, netted force
components, which can bring deadly combat capability to bear
within seconds of contact, a Navy which will offer increased
global presence and engagement around the world, and a Navy
with what it takes to win.
Such a Navy will include an expeditionary strike force
concept that provides additional fire support and striking
power organic to our amphibious ready groups in the form of
surface ship and submarine escorts with 155 millimeter guns and
Tomahawk missiles; the introduction of squadrons of littoral
combat ships to tackle the difficult missions of mine warfare,
anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare; surface action
groups with ballistic missile defense capability available
early in the conflict; and SSGNs capable of strike and special
operating forces campaigns.
Meeting the requirement and finding that extra $10 billion
for this kind of Navy is my clear charter along with the rest
of the Navy leadership.
I am in the midst of deliberations for the fiscal year 2004
budget right now, and I am committed to find a large chunk of
that money and use it to recapitalize our Navy, particularly in
the area of shipbuilding.
While the future is always very difficult to predict, as
you pointed out, Senator Landrieu, I will do all in my power to
ensure we will build more than five ships next year.
Our current budget sets a firm foundation for the future
that I am confident we can build on. We continue building the
excellent Arleigh Burke-class DDGs. The wide-ranging utility of
this platform is being validated daily. We have achieved
production line maturity even as we have built more capability
into later flights of the class.
Our global war on terrorism campaign analysis and
transformational concept of operations for the future that it
requires indicates a solid need for more DDGs. This is also a
platform that will potentially embed the important capability
of area ballistic missile defense. This was a program cancelled
in this budget.
The warfighting requirement as stated last August by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is still a critical
capability, which we need to restore as soon as possible.
This budget will get the DD(X) program on track, building
on a solid research and development base with an executable
plan to transition seamlessly to ship procurement with a spiral
development strategy, which keeps these ships ahead of the
technology, capability and cost curves at the same time.
The DD(X) spiral technology development enables the most
efficient insertion of high payoff technologies into the future
and in service ships with the least amount of risks. CG(X), the
follow-on cruiser, will share a common hull form and propulsion
plan architecture with DD(X) and will use many of the same
innovative technologies to reduce crew size, increase joint
command and control connectivity, and reduce operating and
support costs.
The littoral combat ship will benefit from DD(X) technology
development by taking advantage of advanced automation
technologies, high-density propulsion plans, and increased
nodal and plants C\4\I connectivity.
In-service surface combatants will receive technology
upgrades to be modernized that will extend their combat
capabilities and their service life and keep them at the
leading edge of combat effectiveness.
Together, the family of ships, DD(X), CG(X), and LCS, along
with in-service Aegis ships, will extend the Navy's combat
reach to from the upper limits of the Earth's atmosphere to the
clutter, confusing and treacherous shoals of the littoral.
Both of these programs speak to the ongoing transformation
of the Navy. Transformation issues we propose investing in are
wide-ranging, driven by our strategy of projecting sovereign
combat power forward and have clear objectives in terms of
delivering capability to our warfighters. Building our network-
centric operations, our expeditionary posture and culture, and
our technological prowess, they promise to deliver a revolution
in warfare from the sea.
To sum up, I want to thank you again for your continuing
support of our Nation's Navy. I look forward to tackling the
challenges ahead, confident in the ability of sailors and
marines to overcome any obstacle, to move any mountain, given
the right tools. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
Secretary Young. Chairman Kennedy, Senator Warner, Senator
Landrieu, Senator Reed, and my colleagues on the staff, thank
you. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify on
shipbuilding programs for fiscal year 2003 and the Navy's
budget request.
In 2001, the Navy and Marine Corps team represented U.S.
interests and provided a presence throughout the world. In
September of last year, that presence became an immediately
available response capability. You all know well the central
role played by naval forces in Operation Enduring Freedom by
carriers, amphibious ready groups, sea-based aviation, and
Marine ground forces. The people and their equipment have
performed magnificently, delivering combat power from the sea
against our enemies in a landlocked nation.
The fiscal year 2003 budget preserves this demonstrated
capability, placing first priority on sailors and marines,
their training and the readiness of their equipment.
Next, the budget addresses the current readiness of our
Navy and Marine forces through investment in spare parts and
repair activities for current systems, modernization of
existing platforms, and procurement of new weapons, aircraft,
and ships.
Finally, the Navy increased the research, development,
test, and evaluation account to make investments in new systems
in technologies for our naval forces of the future. Within the
available dollars, the fiscal year 2003 budget strikes a good
balance among many competing demands. Your Navy and Marine
Corps team are working hard to make sure that every acquisition
dollar buys the maximum amount of capability.
A number of key principles are guiding our efforts to
improve and change how the Navy and Marine Corps buys advanced
technology for weapons and platforms. First, we must improve
and leverage the equipment that we now have and will use for
years to come. Improving sensors, installing data links and
networking the command and control systems on these ships
allows our current assets to fight more effectively.
Secretary England has testified before this committee about
the quantum improvements in warfighting effectiveness that come
by coupling evolutionary improvements and existing systems to
new operational concepts and tactics.
Second, we are working to properly fund and carefully
manage the ongoing modernization programs. To enable the
transition to new capabilities, we must first have a solid,
stable funding foundation for our ongoing programs as well as a
more business-like approach to acquisition.
These same principles are also guiding our shipbuilding
strategy. First, we are improving and leveraging the equipment
that we now have and will use for years to come. Installing
systems such as cooperative engagement capability and naval
fires network will dramatically enhance the performance of our
current ships.
Second, we are working to properly fund and carefully
manage the ongoing shipbuilding programs. As we transition to
new capabilities, we will have this solid foundation beneath
our programs.
Our first priority within the shipbuilding program has been
to control cost growth and eliminate the costs of prior year
bills on ships. Many factors have contributed to the cost
growth: continual configuration changes; unanticipated
engineering challenges with lead ships; unforeseen growth in
shipyard labor rates, cost increases for material and
equipment; inflation and fiscal constraints; budget reductions
or rescissions; and over-aggressive budgeting to optimistic
targets.
In the fiscal year 2003 budget we have taken several steps
to forcefully address these issues. We have fully funded
shipbuilding programs to the current CAIG, Cost Analysis
Improvement Group, estimate or the program manager estimate.
We have taken a round turn on change orders. Once we
baseline a ship, any subsequent changes will be thoroughly
reviewed for cost and schedule impacts. This applies to both
shipbuilding programs and programs for the equipment that goes
into these ships. We will not add changes until there is full
concurrence with funding and justification.
In conjunction with industry, we are reevaluating the
efficiency of procuring small ship classes from multiple yards.
We have also worked hard to stabilize the DDG-51 shipbuilding
profile to allow smooth transition to DD(X) and CG(X).
Finally, we are placing greater emphasis on understanding
the potential for technology or requirements changes to grow
the costs of our existing acquisition programs. Spiral
development and backfitting of technologies may be the best
approaches to ensure that we avoid cost growth and make the
proper trades between competing current investment priorities.
All of these steps are critical to our ability to build a
ship within the planned budget. Cost growth on ship
construction contracts has reduced the confidence of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and Congress in our ability to
manage these capital programs and eroded our sound business
foundation.
The Navy is committed to restoring that confidence and
building stable programs to ensure force structure requirements
are sustained. Looking ahead, the Navy continues to focus on
building new and transformational ships to meet our future
needs. Our fiscal year 2003 budget request calls for
construction of five ships, two DDG-51 class destroyers, one
Virginia-class submarine, one San Antonio-class LPD-17
amphibious transport ship, and one Lewis & Clark T-AKE
auxiliary cargo and ammunition ship, plus incremental funding
for the fiscal year 2002 LHD-8 and two SSGN conversions.
There are 36 ships presently under contract. We also
requested advanced procurement funding for the sixth and
seventh Virginia-class submarines, advanced procurement for the
CVN-70 refueling complex overhaul, the service life extension
of three LCAC, landing craft air cushion, and one Los Angeles-
class submarine engineered refueling overhaul, ERO.
The budget request also fully commits the Navy to the
conversion of all four Ohio-class SSBNs into SSGNs, by
providing the necessary ERO funding and conversion funds for
the four-ship program. Finally, the budget funds the
development of the DD(X) family of ships.
In the fiscal year 2002 budget, Congress played a critical
role in providing the budget resources necessary to keep this
stable foundation under our current programs, and the
Department is grateful for your support.
The fiscal year 2003 budget builds on that foundation and
these principles to prepare the Navy and Marine Corps for the
future. Today, the forces of the Navy and Marine Corps remain
forward deployed and are protecting America's strategic
interests near and far as an essential part of our Nation's
joint force. We have the finest naval force in the world.
While we face a number of challenges, such as
recapitalizing an aging infrastructure and combatting both
symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, we are clear of purpose
and focus on the future.
Thank you again for allowing me to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much. Without objection,
your joint statements will be placed in the record.
[The prepared joint statement of Vice Admiral Mullen and
Assistant Secretary Young follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by John J. Young, Jr. and Vice Adm. Michael
Mullen, USN
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of
the Navy's fiscal year 2003 ship programs budget. The United States has
always been a maritime nation, and our mastery of the seas, sustained
by forward-deployed U.S. naval forces, ensures our access to our
economic, political, and security interests overseas. Our economic
prosperity, now more than ever before, is inextricably tied to the
global economy--a global economy that is totally reliant upon maritime
trade to sustain its growth. The oceans are, therefore, the ``great
commons'' of this economy: with public access to all, and so used by
all. The United States Navy and Marine Corps ultimately guarantee this
freedom.
The need for continuing our mastery of the seas was revalidated by
the events of September 11, 2001. The United States Navy provided the
sovereign soil to project power and protect our national interests when
nations could not support hosting our land-based military. During
Operation Enduring Freedom, carrier-based Navy and Marine aircraft have
provided the preponderance of combat sorties, while Tomahawk cruise
missiles fired from surface ships and submarines struck communications
and air defense sites. Marines from amphibious ships provided the first
large U.S. ground presence in Afghanistan and were supported ashore by
naval construction battalions which restored runways and enhanced the
conditions of forward operating bases far inland.
Command of the seas, provided by U.S. sovereign power deployed
forward, provides a tangible demonstration of our commitment to shared
interests, and underwrites our political alliances and friendships
across the globe. It is important to say that we will be there when
needed to maintain the freedom of these shared global commons, deal
effectively with shared problems and to respond quickly to acts of
aggression . . . but, it means even more to be there beforehand.
Finally, the success of future joint combat operations will require
us to have immediate and sustained military access wherever and
whenever it is needed. Command of the seas--which are fully two-thirds
of the world's surface--provide that global access, which is a
priceless strategic advantage for our Nation.
We are building upon our tradition of expeditionary operations as
we transform into ``network-centric''and ``knowledge-superior''
services. Knowledge superiority is the achievement of a real-time,
shared understanding of the battlespace by warriors at all levels of
command. This in turn, will facilitate our ability to remain forward by
providing the means for timely and informed decisions inside any
adversary's sensor and engagement timelines.
To support this strategy and our forces, the President's fiscal
year 2003 budget request increases the amount of research, development,
and overall procurement investment critical to maintaining our Navy and
Marine Corps team as the pre-eminent combat force in the world. We seek
an agile, flexible force, that can counter both the known and the
unforeseeable threats to our national security.
STRATEGY
After years of under funding, the fiscal year 2003 budget request
represents a significant improvement for the Department of the Navy
(DoN). Although the DoN still had to make difficult priority decisions,
the final request represents the best mix possible among competing
priorities. The highest priority items are directed at our most
valuable asset, our people. The Navy and Marine Corps are committed to
our people and their training as well as the readiness of their
equipment. As the next priority, we have funded systems such as
cooperative engagement capability (CEC) and the naval fires network
(NFN) to enhance the performance of the current warfighting systems.
Finally, we have sought to fully fund our ship and aircraft production
programs while adding funds to develop new capabilities such as the
family of surface combatants led by DD(X), the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) and SSGN.
I believe current combat capability is healthy and the fiscal year
2003 budget request provides a stable foundation from which the Marine
Corps and Navy will continue to work with the other military services
to determine the best path to transformation and the best aggregate
warfighting capabilities for our country.
Completion of Prior Year Shipbuilding Contracts
A key component of our effort to build a stable foundation has been
a strong emphasis on adequately estimating and managing program costs.
During the past year, no other single issue has received more
management attention by the top levels of the DoN than the completion
of prior year shipbuilding account. Cost growth on ship construction
contracts has eroded the confidence of the Defense Department and
Congress in our estimating, budgeting, and execution process for
current and future procurements. The Navy is committed to restoring the
confidence of Congress and building stable programs to ensure force
structure requirements are sustained.
Many factors have contributed to the cost growth of current ships
under contract, including:
Configuration changes;
Unanticipated challenges with the design and
production of lead ships;
Unanticipated growth in shipyard labor rates;
Low rate procurement of vendor material and government
furnished equipment;
Inflation and fiscal constraints; and
Budget reductions/rescissions.
All of these factors, but particularly fiscal constraints, resulted
in programs being aggressively budgeted. Congress provided over $700
million in fiscal year 2002 to address those ships contracted in 1995
to 2001 in order to deliver ships with relevant capability to the
fleet. The fiscal year 2003 budget requests $645 million to address
similar shortfalls in order to deliver ships appropriated in 1996 to
2001. Also visible in the Navy's budget request are the known
requirements through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to address
similar issues for ships appropriated through 2001. The Department will
soon be submitting a formal report to Congress on this issue, but I
will briefly outline the management actions taken to mitigate the
existing condition and to prevent a reoccurrence of the situation for
ships requested in fiscal year 2003 and future budget submissions. To
prevent further increases to the prior-year-completion funding
shortfall, the Navy has instituted the following corrective actions:
In fiscal year 2003 and beyond, shipbuilding programs
have been budgeted to the Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(CAIG) or program manager (PM) estimate.
Change order budgeting levels have been established to
reflect maturity of respective programs.
Shipbuilding and government furnished equipment (GFE)
program managers have been directed to limit changes to a small
number of critical safety issues.
The Department has reestablished the Ship
Configuration Improvement Panel (SCIP) to ensure required
changes are validated and fully funded.
The Department further motivated industry cost
performance through incentives in fiscal year 2002 contracts.
Prior decisions regarding workload splits among
multiple yards have been reevaluated in light of the increased
cost of having multiple ``lead'' ships.
If costs continue to rise in spite of these management efforts, the
Department is prepared to descope or delay capability to maintain a
funded, executable program.
Shipbuilding Plan
Recapitalization of the naval force structure demands
implementation of a shipbuilding strategy that is robust with respect
to the capabilities of the ships and warfare systems fielded,
innovative with respect to design, technology, funding mechanisms and
industry participation, and stable with respect to the annual
investment and the essential industrial base. This shipbuilding
strategy must produce a recapitalization plan that is not just a plan
for the next year, but a plan that is supportable and executable across
the FYDP and sustainable into the foreseeable future. What has been
done too often in the past, using the recapitalization funds for battle
force ships as a surge tank to attempt to balance a wide array of Navy
programs, can not continue.
Our fiscal year 2003 budget request calls for construction of five
ships and the conversion of two submarines in fiscal year 2003: two
DDG-51 class destroyers; one Virginia-class submarine; one San Antonio
(LPD-17)-class amphibious transport dock ship; one Lewis & Clark (T-
AKE) auxiliary cargo & ammunition ship; and incremental funding for the
fiscal year 2002 LHD-8, resulting in 36 new construction ships under
contract. In addition, we have requested funding for advance
procurement of the sixth and seventh Virginia-class submarines, advance
procurement for the CVN-70 refueling complex overhaul, the service life
extension for three landing craft air cushion (LCAC) craft, and one Los
Angeles-class submarine engineering refueling overhaul (ERO). The
budget request fully commits the Navy to the conversion of four Ohio-
class SSBNs into SSGNs by providing the necessary funding for the ERO
and conversion needed to execute the four-ship program. When the four
conversions are completed, these submarines will provide
transformational warfighting capability, carrying up to 154 Tomahawk
cruise missiles, support sustained deployed special operating forces,
and sustain our submarine force structure. As we move forward, there
are four key elements to our shipbuilding strategy.
Establish Core SCN (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy) Program--
First, is the need to properly price and fund the systematic
recapitalization of primary battle force ships. This can best be
accomplished by using full funding in each year with a stable
investment for quantities of known needed ships. The mix of ships must
provide the minimum essential force structure to meet warfighting
requirements and the minimum essential industrial base workload to
sustain needed capacity. This systematic recapitalization forms the
core of the shipbuilding and conversion strategy, a core that does not
change with every budget cycle, a core that is not used as a bill payer
for shortfalls in other appropriations. The core may be added to in any
given year in order to build-up force structure numbers, but the core
investment must not decrease.
Leverage Creative Funding Methods--Second, ships need to be bought
smartly and, where appropriate, creatively, allowing exploration and
leveraging of the use of funding mechanisms which produce industrial
effectiveness and efficiency. There are several such mechanisms that
when applied judiciously will allow stabilized investment and reduce
the periodic funding spikes and cost overruns that plague efforts to
maintain a balanced, stable industry workforce and material acquisition
strategy. Specifically, advanced construction in conjunction with
advanced procurement may prove to be advantageous in smoothing out the
periodic spikes associated with high cost capital ships, the big deck
ships, that serve to disrupt the systematic recapitalization of other
battle force ships and the efficient level loading of the industrial
base. The use of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
appropriations for the lead ship of a class at each shipbuilder can aid
in stabilizing a new construction program through better management of
the inherently higher risk and capitalizing on the opportunity for
industry collaboration. Furthermore, yearly review of RDT&E budgets
will improve the fidelity in the execution year budget requirement and
allow flexibility to adjust outyear budgets if critical technologies
are delayed or require additional maturation. In an era of teaming with
industry, leveraging of the opportunity provided by these developmental
efforts and investments must be pursued.
Another area that we need to look at closely is our process of
budgeting for ships, particularly their electronic systems. The Navy is
currently building the fiscal year 2004 budget request. Thus, the Navy
is now estimating the cost of ships that will be authorized and
appropriated about 18 months from now. Those ships will take 4 to 7
years to build. So today, program managers have to select and estimate
the cost of electronic systems that will not be installed for 2 to 4
years. We are baselining information-technology systems for a ship 2 to
4 years before the need for these systems. Baselining the electronics
in a ship in year one almost guarantees that those systems will change
over the course of the ship's construction.
The program manager is faced with two choices. Buy the systems that
were budgeted, building early obsolescence and capability limits into
the ship or alternately, budget a greater amount for changes to allow
the ship's information technology (IT) systems to be changed to pace
technology. However, the system resists budgeting adequate funds for
changes or management reserve.
We are working to find more efficient ways to proceed. We cannot
let contracts and the fear of losing money drive us to make bad
procurement decisions. I hope to urge a review of budgeting practices
to allow phasing of money to be more consistent with when the funds are
required.
Implement Cost Saving Measures. Third, it is essential to pursue
those actions that will reduce the cost of ships. The factors that will
achieve cost savings, or simply provide more capability per dollar, are
understood within the industry and need to be applied by the Navy with
discipline. Stability in design and production with reasonable cost
targets are the most important aspects of reducing ship cost. Prior
year shipbuilding cost increases are severely jeopardizing the ability
to recapitalize battle force ships. The Navy and industry need to work
together to achieve cost savings where possible and ensure that the
cost of ship procurements are properly estimated and budgeted, and then
executed within the established budget.
Insert Key Ship System Technology. Fourth, implementation of
processes that provide for the modular insertion of rapidly evolving
technology, so that warships remain capable in the face of emergent
threats, is needed for key ship systems. These processes must provide
the ability to insert new technologies into ship classes at planned
points without disrupting shipyard production or increasing cost. Such
planned spiral development, that exponentially increases capability
through periodic upgrades, requires the efficient and expeditious
transition from rapid prototype to production systems. Controlling cost
while decreasing the cycle time for technology insertion will require
the use of open architectures, module interface standards, commercial
processors, etc. in conjunction with strict configuration control.
Shortening this cycle time will require simultaneous acceleration of
requirements and acquisition processes and changes to how programs and
budgets are developed for these systems.
In combination, these elements of the shipbuilding strategy will
provide for needed capability increases in the warfighting force and
stability in the industry that is the key to the future
recapitalization of the naval force structure. Such combat capability
and shipbuilding stability can only come from a Navy commitment to
define and stay the course.
Our fiscal year 2003 shipbuilding plan provides the best available
balance between the Department's requirements and available resources.
The innovative teaming strategy approved by Congress for the
construction of Virginia-class submarines, advance procurement for
future Virginia-class submarines, and the next DDG-51 multiyear
procurement contract all highlight acquisition strategies aimed at
lowering costs, reducing disruptions from hiring and layoff cycles,
while level loading employment, and encouraging capital investments.
Our shipbuilding plan maintains the LPD-17 program and the auxiliary
cargo & ammunition ship (T-AKE) program that will help the auxiliary
vessel manufacturers capitalize on past and current program
efficiencies.
In addition, the Department's fiscal year 2003 budget plan adds six
DDG-51 class destroyers across the FYDP to the procurement profile to
sustain the industrial base and future surface combatant force
structure during the transition to DD(X) production. These actions
constitute the Navy's near-term effort to ensure the long-term ability
of the shipbuilding industry to support our future construction
programs.
Submarine Force Structure
The fiscal year 2003 budget requests $360 million for the refueling
of U.S.S. Norfolk (SSN 714) at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and for
advance planning funding for future Los Angeles- and Ohio-class
refueling overhauls and Trident D5 backfits. This refueling overhaul
will provide important near-term attack submarine force structure. Los
Angeles-class submarine refuelings provides the quickest and most
affordable means of fulfilling submarine mission requirements met by
fast attack submarines. The Navy's budget submission provides a
submarine refueling plan for all but two of the Los Angeles-class
submarines. Refueling Los Angeles-class submarines uses the nominal
remaining 15 years in hull life on those submarines that do not have
life-of-hull reactors. The Navy is continuing to identify options,
which will support refueling the two remaining hulls.
The Navy is equally committed to the conversion of four Ohio-class
submarines into strike warfare and Special Operational Forces support
platforms as transformational SSGN submarines envisioned by the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). When refueled, these ballistic
missile submarines will each provide an additional 21 to 23 years of
service. When converted to guided missile submarines (SSGNs), these
submarines will fulfill Tomahawk land attack missile and Special
Operations Forces mission requirements. The fiscal year 2003 budget
request also funds the ERO planning for U.S.S. Michigan (SSBN 727) and
U.S.S. Georgia (SSBN 729) to be conducted in fiscal year 2004.
PROGRAMS
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-Class Destroyer
The DDG-51 class guided missile destroyer program remains the
Navy's largest surface ship program. The fiscal year 2003 budget
request includes $2.37 billion for the procurement of two DDG-51-class
destroyers. The request adds six additional destroyers to the
procurement profile, two additional ships per year in fiscal year 2005
through fiscal year 2007. The addition of the six DDGs addresses three
issues: mitigates the industrial base gap between DDG-51 production and
DD(X) construction from prior budgets; better stabilizes the surface
combatant build rate as we transition to DD(X); and stabilizes future
surface combatant force structure by 2012. A new 4 year, fiscal year
2002 through fiscal year 2005, multiyear procurement contract
solicitation was recently released. I anticipate a contract will be
awarded for these eight ships, plus options, this summer.
The two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers procured in fiscal year 2003
will be Flight IIA ships configured with the Baseline 7 Phase I Aegis
combat system, which we introduced on the third ship in fiscal year
1998. This baseline incorporates new integrated mission capability and
makes these ships more capable in the littoral than any other combatant
in the world. The upgrades include the SPY-1D(V) radar system,
cooperative engagement capability, the 5,,/62 gun and a remote mine
hunting system capability. Additionally, the DDG-51 destroyers of the
fiscal year 2002 multiyear procurement will be forward fit with
Baseline 7 of the Mk 41 vertical launching system, the tactical
tomahawk weapons control system and the ability to accommodate the MH-
60R helicopter variant.
U.S.S. Ronald Reagan (CVN-76)
The delivery of the ninth ship of the Nimitz-class, Ronald Reagan
(CVN-76), is planned for 2003 at Northrop Grumman--Newport News.
Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier--CVN-77
The CVN-77, the tenth and final ship of the Nimitz-class, has a
contract delivery date of March 31, 2008, to replace the U.S.S. Kitty
Hawk (CV 63). CVN-77 remains the future carriers' transition ship to
CVN(X). CVN-77 will include a flexible island design that will
facilitate warfare system upgrades as needed during the ship's service
life. Propulsion plant improvements include centralized electric plant
controls and integrated propulsion plant controls. The fiscal year 2003
budget request includes Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,
Navy (RDT&E, N) funding of $92 million to continue the development of
the integrated warfare system, incorporating critical transition
technologies into CVN-77. Technology demonstration for this effort will
be conducted in the new Virginia Advanced Shipbuilding and Carrier
Integration Center at Northrop Grumman--Newport News to prove new
technologies before installation in the ship.
San Antonio-Class Amphibious Transport Dock Ship--LPD-17
The San Antonio-class of amphibious transport dock ships represents
a critical element of the Navy and Marine Corps future in amphibious
warfare, and is a cornerstone in the Department's strategic plan. The
12 ships of the San Antonio-class will functionally replace four
classes of amphibious ships. This plan will not only modernize our
amphibious forces, but will also result in significant manpower and
life cycle cost savings. Despite the challenges confronted in program
execution, the Navy remains committed to the vital role the LPD-17
class will play in the 21st century.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $604 million to fully
fund the construction of the fifth ship of the class when coupled with
advance procurement funds provided in fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year
2002. Only one LPD-17 class ship is requested in the fiscal year 2003
budget, compared to previous plans for two ships. Appropriation
requests for the final three ships of the 12-ship class are planned
beyond the FYDP. Cost growth and schedule delays caused the Navy to
revise the procurement plan to one per year. Current metrics indicate
the LPD-17 program team is now performing in a predictable and
disciplined manner.
Detail design of the lead ship is completing and fabrication has
started on over two-thirds of the lead-ship construction units. LPD-18
construction began in February 2002 and LPD-19 construction commenced
last summer.
Last fall, the Navy formally adjusted the contract delivery date
for LPD-17 by 14 months (for a total delay of 24 months) to November
2004 and adjusted the contract delivery dates for the other three ships
under contract accordingly. Production progress in fabrication,
assembly and erection of LPD-17 construction units supports the revised
schedule.
We are currently reviewing the efficiency of constructing this
relatively small quantity of a single class of ships in two separate
yards, essentially supporting two lead ships. In conjunction with our
industry partners, we are evaluating whether there are better ways to
load our shipyards across the entire spectrum of our shipbuilding
efforts to provide greater efficiencies and lower costs.
Amphibious Assault Ship--LHD-8
LHD-8 is a gas turbine powered amphibious assault ship based on the
successful LHD-1 class. The gas turbine propulsion with all electric
auxiliary systems being included in LHD-8 will result in an estimated
total ownership cost savings of $350 million--$420 million for this
ship over its 40-year estimated service life. The Navy awarded a
contract for detail design of the propulsion plant in July 2000.
Procurement of long lead material and advance construction of
components as authorized by Congress was awarded in May 2001. The
contract for LHD-8 construction is in negotiation for a fiscal year
2002 award. The fiscal year 2003 request includes incremental funding
of $253 million toward the total projected LHD-8 program costs of $1.9
billion.
Auxiliary Cargo & Ammunition Ship (T-AKE)
We are replacing the aging ammunition and dry stores ships (T-AEs
and T-AFSs) with the T-AKE auxiliary cargo & ammunition ships. The
ships that T-AKE will replace are already over 30 years old. The fiscal
year 2003 budget request includes $389 million for the fourth ship of
this 12-ship class. Last fall, the Navy awarded a contract for T-AKE
lead ship detail design and construction. Lead ship delivery is
scheduled in fiscal year 2005.
Virginia (SSN-774)-class Attack Submarines
Construction on the Virginia, Texas, Hawaii, and North Carolina is
progressing on schedule. The fiscal year 2003 budget request includes
$2.2 billion for the fifth ship and advance procurement for the sixth
and seventh ships of the Virginia-class. The fifth and follow-on ships
will continue to be built under the unique construction-teaming plan
approved by Congress in 1998. The teaming plan remains unaltered by the
merger of Newport News and Northrop Grumman. This teaming approach
provides a cost effective low rate production while maintaining two
capable nuclear submarine shipbuilders. The teaming arrangement also
helps both shipbuilders achieve level manning and more economic
material buys.
The fifth ship is the first of the new contract the Navy is
preparing for the next five Virginia-class submarines. The Department
considered various contracting strategies such as the multiyear
procurement and block buy with economic order quantity (EOQ) material
purchases, but they were considered unaffordable because of the large,
front-loaded budget requirements. The Department continues to assess
contracting strategies and may revisit these alternative approaches in
future budget submissions.
During the past year, the Department has raised its management
focus on three critical issues for Virginia-class program execution:
identifying the causes for cost growth for submarines under contract,
mitigating the effects of these unforeseen cost factors, and ensuring
that the fiscal year 2003 budget request fully accounts for all known
factors. The execution funding shortfall is primarily the result of the
effects of low rate ship production on the shipbuilder and submarine
vendor base which was inaccurately budgeted, and were fully realized as
the shipbuilders took delivery on much of the ship equipment and
material. The cost of these contractor furnished equipment items was
much higher than procurement inflation indices and other cost
estimating techniques that the Department used to budget for these
submarines in 1997. Unbudgeted effects of labor disputes, which
occurred after the lead ship was appropriated, contributed to the
execution shortfall. Other significant factors included design
performance, government furnished equipment cost growth, overhead, and
rates. Our fiscal year 2003 budget lays out a funding plan to address
the shortfall across the FYDP and covers the immediate funding
requirements for the first three submarines. The cost of the fourth
ship was addressed in the fiscal year 2002 appropriation.
The Virginia program continues to incorporate warfare improvements
as a result of past and on-going R&D investments as budget allows. The
fiscal year 2003 submarine incorporates shipboard local area network
(LAN) improvements, which will improve quality of work and advanced
processor builds for the combat system, which will improve warfighting
performance and reliability.
U.S.S. Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)
The Seawolf-class submarine program has delivered two of her three
submarines. The U.S.S. Seawolf and U.S.S. Connecticut have completed
deployments to the Arctic, the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
The third and final Seawolf-class submarine, Pre-Commissioning Unit
Jimmy Carter (SSN-23), is being modified with additional volume to
accommodate advanced technology for naval special warfare, tactical
surveillance, and mine warfare operations. The design modification is
nearly complete and construction of the new module is on schedule.
Overall ship construction is more than 70 percent complete, and
delivery is targeted for 2004.
Strategic Sealift
The strategic sealift program is providing 19 large, medium-speed,
self-sustaining, roll-on/roll-off ships. These ships provide for
strategic sealift of Army unit equipment and supplies from the U.S.
mainland for pre-positioning in the vicinity of potential objective
areas throughout the world. Two of the three remaining ships of this
class will deliver in fiscal year 2002, with the final ship delivering
in mid-2003.
Joint Command and Control Ship--JCC(X)
JCC(X) will be the first new afloat command and control capability
in over 30 years directly supporting the joint command and control
elements of both the operational goals and transformational pillars of
the 2001 QDR. It will be built around a robust, advanced C\4\ISR
mission system that can be tailored to meet specific mission
requirements and can rapidly and affordably incorporate new technology
necessary to meet the demands of sustained operations at sea. The
program entered concept exploration and definition in November 1999.
The Navy is evaluating the best course of action based on the analysis
presented.
Experimental Destroyer--DD(X)
DD(X), with its transformational technologies, will be the
cornerstone for a family of next-generation surface combatants. These
combatants must be affordable to produce and less costly to operate.
They must be designed from the keel up to enable dramatic, 50-70
percent, manpower reductions. Automated damage control systems will
help, as will improved human interfaces and a total-ship computing
environment.
Equally important, the next-generation of surface combatants will
be designed to reduce signatures across the full spectrum--radio
frequency/radar, magnetic, acoustic, and infrared. This reduced
signature will have implications for tactics, systems, and self-defense
requirements.
As for transformation, no Navy ship currently employs electric
drive, though it is becoming common in the commercial world. Electric
drive propulsion greatly improves design flexibility--the engine
compartments are no longer tied to a mechanical shaft. We can disburse
the turbines throughout the ship, improving redundancy, reliability,
and survivability. We can also improve efficiency by allowing the crew
to match power generation to power consumption. Finally, an integrated
power system will enable a new generation of advanced weapons systems
and sensors by increasing the amount of power available at any one
time.
Many of these technologies were intended to be incorporated into
the DD 21 program. However, the DD 21 program allowed very little
technical risk reduction though many of the technologies are quite
transformational. With DD 21, we were taking a single step to full
capability. There was a success-oriented assumption that everything
would proceed on schedule and cost. There were limited opportunities
for prototyping and no room for error. In the end, these factors
resulted in a program at risk of significant cost growth. Thus, DD(X)
was formulated to employ a broad range of strategies to make our entire
family of next-generation surface combatants more affordable.
To mitigate the high technical risk; the restructured DD(X) program
adds several land-based and sea-based prototypes for the key
technologies. This provides an excellent means of reducing risk within
each area. The Navy will see potential problems earlier in the process,
providing us a better chance to solve them. This strategy improves the
chances of delivering a functional destroyer within cost and schedule.
Additionally, the Navy plans to produce the lead ship using RDT&E
funds. The program manager will be required to demonstrate progress on
an annual basis to defend his budget. The Navy can react to problems
without the risk of resorting to prior-year completion funding. The
program manager can focus on establishing an efficient process for
manufacturing the DD(X) class and avoid trading away producibility
initiatives when costs increase. Being able to adjust the RDT&E budget
for the lead ship provides the best chance to control costs and define
a production process that allows the Navy to affordably build the
entire class of these next-generation surface combatants.
As you all recognize, construction of the lead ship in RDT&E is a
significant change in the Navy's approach to shipbuilding, which the
Navy hopes the committee will support.
Using a spiral development approach will allow technologies to be
fielded when they are ready through a flight approach, forged to
capture cutting edge initiatives. As DD(X) drives the development of
technology in many areas, we will look for opportunities to backfit
advancements on existing platforms. Carefully focused upgrade and
conversion programs will ensure the existing core of surface combatants
maintain the capability for battle space dominance.
Littoral Combat Ship
Included in the family of multi-mission surface combatants is the
development of a littoral combat ship (LCS). LCS will provide focused-
mission warfighting capabilities. We are actively investigating many
innovative hull designs that provide both the stability and speed
necessary to enable an LCS to be effective in the littorals. LCS will
be outfitted with network-centric capabilities, like the multi-mission
combatants, to make this ship a combat multiplier. LCS' modular design
will provide significant flexibility in both displacement and combat
capability. These qualities may make it a good candidate for
coordination with the Coast Guard's Deepwater program.
Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier--CVN(X)
CVN(X) 1 is the next step in the evolution of improved aircraft
carriers following CVN-77. Specifically, CVN(X) 1 will build on the
CVN-77 design and incorporate an improved nuclear propulsion plant,
nearly tripling electrical power generation capacity to replace
manpower intensive steam auxiliary systems. The combination of a highly
automated nuclear plant and the elimination of steam auxiliaries will
reduce the manpower and lifecycle costs. Equally important to reducing
lifecycle costs are the lower manning and maintenance requirements for
the electro-magnetic launching system (EMALS), which will also reduce
lifecycle costs on carrier aircraft due to reduced wear and tear.
The next step in this spiral development effort will be CVN(X) 2,
which will provide further improvements in flight deck performance,
survivability enhancements, service life allowance, and continued
reduction in total ownership costs.
In order to support other Navy funding needs and to allow for
further technology maturation of CVN(X) systems, the fiscal year 2003
budget submission delays CVN(X) detailed design, construction start,
and delivery by 1 year and split funds CVN(X) 1 construction between
fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008. The decision to delay the
program is not attributable to program execution performance issues.
Following Milestone I, the Navy awarded the first increment of
CVN(X) 1 design development work. The fiscal year 2003 budget request
provides funding required to support future CVN(X) construction in
fiscal year 2007.
Guided Missile Submarine--SSGN
The Navy is committed to the conversion of four Ohio-class
submarines into strike warfare and Special Operations Forces support
platforms as transformational SSGN submarines envisioned by the 2001
QDR. The fiscal year 2003 budget includes over $1 billion in
procurement and R&D funding to start the engineering refueling
overhauls (EROs) of the first two Ohio-class submarines in preparation
for their conversion to SSGNs. This also funds attack weapons system
design and begins procurement of long lead-time material for all four
submarines. We are balancing rapid delivery of this capability with a
fiscally responsible, business-like approach and exploring
opportunities for public-private partnering.
Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement--LHA(R)
LHA(R) is planned as the next generation large deck amphibious
assault ship to replace the aging LHAs. The mission need statement was
validated in March 2001 and Milestone A decision reached in July 2001.
The analysis of alternatives (AoA) is still in progress and should
complete this summer: Options being considered are a repeat LHD, a
modified LHD (slightly longer and wider) as well as a totally new
design. Following completion of the AoA, Navy will select a preferred
alternative and proceed through the acquisition process.
The first LHA will be replaced in approximately fiscal year 2007 by
LHD-8. We anticipate replacing the remaining LHAs by 2024. Average age
for the 5 ships of the Tarawa-class will be 39.2 years at
decommissioning (4.2 years average past estimated service life (ESL)).
Ship Modernization and Technology Insertion
While building new platforms for the future is a prime priority,
maintaining and modernizing our current platforms enables them to
continue to be valuable warfighting assets in the years ahead while
concurrently trying to mitigate escalating support costs of aging
equipment. As technological cycle times are now shorter than platform
service life, it is fiscally prudent and operationally imperative to
modernize the force through timely upgrades and technology insertion.
In support of this priority, we plan to modernize the Ticonderoga-class
cruisers, conduct planned maintenance and refueling of our Nimitz-class
aircraft carriers and extend the service life of our air cushion
landing craft. Our technology insertion efforts include the Smartship
initiatives and a spectrum of new capabilities for both existing and
in-development submarines.
Ticonderoga (CG-47) Cruiser Conversion Plan--The Navy plans to add
new mission capabilities and extend the combat system service life of
the Ticonderoga-class cruisers. The fiscal year 2003 budget request
includes $104 million in all procurement accounts to continue the
engineering efforts and to procure systems for the first installation
in fiscal year 2006. The upgrade of these ships will add new, and
enhance existing, combat system capabilities for land attack,
cooperative engagement capability, and area air defense commander
missions. These new mission capabilities will dramatically improve the
ability of these warships to operate in joint and coalition warfare
environments. The program is essential to maintaining a mission-
relevant force surface combatants.
Aegis Open Architecture--While not quite DD(X) or LCS, one step
that sets the stage for the Aegis fleet in the future is the upgrade of
the Aegis weapon system into a fully open architecture. Key features of
this Baseline upgrade will be:
Improvements to reduce operator workload and manning;
Upgraded radar processing; and
A software architecture that allows for rapid and cost
effective commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology insertions
needed to pace the threat.
This new Aegis baseline will reduce the punitive costs of
maintaining multiple baselines across the fleet. The result will be a
common Aegis baseline that will carry the Aegis-equipped fleet well
into the 21st century.
Landing Craft Air Cushion Service Life Extension (LCAC SLEP)
Program--LCAC SLEP continues in fiscal year 2003 through the award of
options on the second production contract. The Navy plans to award a
second production contract this year with options for up to nine craft
over the next 3 fiscal years. LCAC SLEP combines major structural
improvements with command, control, communications, computer, and
navigation upgrades, while adding 10 years to the service life,
extending it to at least 30 years. In fiscal year 2003, LCAC SLEP is
funded at $68 million and will extend the service life of three craft.
The SLEP is planned for 74 craft.
SUBTECH--The Navy continues to pursue a strategy of increasing the
capabilities of the Virginia-class submarine force through the
insertion of advanced technology into new construction and follow-on
ships. The fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $107 million in
RDT&E funding for advanced submarine technology development emphasizing
capability improvements in sonar and major electrical/mechanical
systems. Additionally, the Navy is pursuing R&D in other areas of
submarine technology that address a spectrum of new capabilities for
existing submarines, planned construction, and future submarine
classes. The eighth Virginia-class submarine (fiscal year 2006) is
targeted to receive a new composite advanced sail, which will provide
space and volume for payloads and sensors. Separate efforts are
advancing both payloads and sensors under development by two industry
consortia for bringing revolutionary and new capabilities to the
submarine force for battleforce access, sharing knowledge, projecting
stealthy power from the littoral. As these technologies mature and
prove value for submarine enhancement, they will be added to Virginia-
class submarines.
Both submarine shipbuilders are playing important roles by
assisting the Department's efforts to identify additional technologies
for insertion opportunities and by identifying design changes that
bring a life cycle cost avoidance benefit. Last year the shipbuilders
submitted seventeen design improvements for consideration of which
eight were approved for further development and evaluation. Forty new
technologies are being developed by the submarine community to provide
these new capabilities. Two industry consortia, representing over 50
industry partners, are currently working under a Navy agreement to
pursue specific areas of future advanced submarine research and
development. These efforts are a result of the 1998 Defense Science
Board study recommending revolutionary capability advances to the
submarine force by harnessing future technologies. In fiscal year 2001,
these consortia began working on actual prototype demonstrations of
selected technological concepts in an effort to mature the most
promising advances for insertion into the submarine force. Fiscal year
2003 should see a continuation and expansion of these demonstrations to
further develop technologies needed to provide additional capabilities
to the submarine fleet by 2020.
Research & Development (R&D)
Identifying future capabilities for naval forces will require
robust experimentation involving systems, platforms, organizations, and
tactics. The Department must continually examine and question how we
operate in various strategic environments and what the future might
entail. Extensive use of simulations, modeling, joint test facilities,
and actual forces is necessary to maintain our technical advantage and
continual command of the seas. Technology will never substitute for
presence; rather, it should always address a mission requirement of
making naval forces more effective.
Twenty-first century technology offers enormous opportunities to
enhance our warfighting abilities. Emerging technologies must be
embraced, both to mitigate risk and to take advantage of new
possibilities. Seizing these opportunities at a reasonable cost
requires efficient organizational alignment, resolution of difficult
interoperability and integration problems, systematic innovation using
improved business practices, and the steady pursuit of promising
scientific and technological initiatives.
Electric Power for Ships--Specifically, the Department will fund
development and at-sea demonstrations of: innovative superconducting
and permanent magnet motor technologies for podded propulsors; advanced
prime power, including high speed superconducting generators and fuel
cells; and electrical auxiliaries such as electromagnetic aircraft
launch system for CVN(X).
Littoral Support Craft (LSC(X))--The Navy and Marine Corps will
research advanced hull forms, cutting edge propulsion, and material and
modular payload technologies for use in a littoral support role.
Demonstration efforts are underway on several different vessels,
predominantly catamaran designs. The Navy needs to expand this work and
look at additional hull designs in order to support our future
decisions on LCS.
Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs)--The Navy's science and technology
efforts are focused on FNCs, which address many aspects of future
shipbuilding. In the areas of sensors, weapons, communications and
radar, the Navy continues to make progress transitioning methods and
equipment that allow leap-ahead technologies to better fight our ships
while protecting our sailors and marines. The Navy is also pursuing
many human systems technologies to make the man/machine interface more
efficient in order to reduce manning on future ships. To better address
the network-centric aspects of future warfighting, the Navy has
combined two FNCs to bring hardware and software communities together
in a more integrated approach. The most important leap-ahead technology
for the future of naval warfare will be electric warship. The Navy is
standing up a new FNC to address all aspects of electric warship to
include the propulsion, sensors, auxiliaries and weapons.
The Navy's science and technology (S&T) program is focused on 12
FNCs:
1. Autonomous Operations
2. Capable Manpower
3. Electric Ships and Combat Vehicles
4. Knowledge Superiority and Assurance
5. Littoral Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW)
6. Littoral Combat and Power Projection
7. Missile Defense
8. Organic Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
9. Platform Protection
10. Time Critical Strike
11. Total Ownership Cost Reduction
12. Warfighter Protection
The largest near-term beneficiaries of the Navy's S&T program are
the DD(X) and CVN(X) programs. S&T investments in electric drive and
integrated electric architecture provide the basis for similar
``electric ship'' technology insertions in future ship programs. Other
examples of technology insertions that will benefit future warships
include alternative hull forms for high-speed combatants and
incorporation of integrated and federated apertures for improved C\4\I
and signatures performance. The benefits for the 21st century sailor
range from improved automation to improved quality of life. The
benefits for the 21st century Navy are improved life-cycle costs to
improved combat performance.
National Shipbuilding Research Program Advanced Shipbuilding Enterprise
(NSRP ASE)
The Navy's NSRP ASE continues in fiscal year 2003, building on
previous efforts initiated under DARPA's MARITECH program (1993-1998).
Productivity improvements achieved under MARITECH have helped stimulate
commercial business opportunities such as construction of crude
carriers, cruise ships, and trailer ships at three U.S. shipyards. NSRP
ASE is an innovative approach in public/private cooperation involving
11 companies associated with the Navy shipbuilding and repair industry
to jointly fund R&D for technologies critical to the Navy's ability to
reduce shipbuilding, ship repair, and total ownership costs.
Naval Surface Fires Support
We are executing a two-phase plan to develop new weapons systems,
advanced munitions and a naval fires control system to provide improved
naval surface fire support (NSFS) capability. These new developments
will provide long-range, time critical, accurate, and lethal fires in
support of ground forces in amphibious and littoral operations through
a combination of advanced guns, precision gun ammunition and precision
land attack missiles.
In the first phase, the Navy developed a 5,,/62-caliber gun and is
currently developing the associated extended range guided munitions
(ERGM) to engage targets between 41 and 63 nautical miles. These
weapons and the naval fires control system will be installed on 28 new
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyers and on Baseline 1 and 4
Ticonderoga-class cruisers scheduled for modernization beginning in
fiscal year 2006.
The Navy was developing the land attack standard missile (LASM) to
provide a NSFS capability out to 150 nautical miles. However, LASM
development was terminated in the fiscal year 2003 budget request. Even
though LASM was on track to meet all its stated program requirements,
it would not have provided a lethal capability against all target
types, including mobile and hardened targets.
The second phase, to be introduced to the fleet with the DD(X) in
fiscal year 2011, is intended to fully meet Marine Corps naval surface
gunfire support requirements for range, accuracy, and lethality. It
includes developing a longer range, higher volume, larger caliber
advanced gun system (AGS), the associated increased lethality long-
range land attack projectile (LRLAP) and a long-range, increased
lethality advanced land attack missile (ALAM). The AGS and associated
magazine will be fully automated and be able to deliver 12 precision-
guided LRLAP munitions per minute to ranges up to 100 nautical miles.
Congressional support for the DD(X) program is critical to development
of the AGS and the LRLAP munition to lower the risk to our ground
forces operating inland from the beachhead. Although the Navy's fiscal
year 2003 request has no funding for the ALAM program, it provides the
last, long-range piece to the NSFS plan. ALAM is intended to deliver
various tactical payloads to counter mobile and armored targets at
ranges of over 200 nautical miles. The Navy intends to fund the ALAM
program in its fiscal year 2004 request. These ``second-phase'' weapons
programs will fully satisfy all Marine Corps fire support requirements
for operational maneuver from the sea/ship to objective maneuver.
SUMMARY
We are institutionalizing reforms that make acquisition success a
common occurrence. We continue to communicate fully and openly with
Congress, industry, our warfighters, and our acquisition professionals,
and are doing everything it takes to make sure our sailors and marines
are provided with the safest, most dependable, and highest performance
equipment available within fiscal constraints. We appreciate the
support provided by Congress and look forward to working together with
this committee toward a secure future for our Nation. Mr. Chairman, the
Navy and Marine Corps acquisition team is continuing to work very hard
to build the best shipbuilding acquisition programs that maximize our
current benefits while buying smart for the future.
Senator Kennedy. Now, this is directed toward both of you.
I believe the official requirement for the DDG-51 program is to
build a total of 59 ships. In the current shipbuilding plan,
you find a total of 64 DDG-51 destroyers or 5 more ships.
This is presumably related to the desire to keep a
destroyer industrial base until the DD(X) or some other such
ships starts production. The Navy's own destroyer industrial
base analysis indicates the industrial base would be at severe
risk of production level of two ships per year without
substantial additional work.
Based on the lack of prospects for substantial additional
work in the two shipyards, it would not appear that the Navy's
program could be executed. Further, there is no explicit
commitment to build more than the one DD(X) in this budget,
nor, indeed, in the Future Years Defense Program.
So this raises several questions. Since the plan would
appear to fall short in support of the industrial base, why are
we building more DDG-51 destroyers than the requirement?
Then there seems there is no commitment to a continuing
DD(X) program. Then what is the bridge on industrial base, and
how do we expect to be purchasing these things?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, I will address the requirement piece
specifically. What we have seen in the last 2 to 3 years of
warfighting analysis is in just about every war game, there is
an increased need for ballistic missile defense-capable ships.
Having them there available early is key, and that, to some
degree, ties back to the overseas homeport that you were
talking about with the previous witness.
Each time we looked at that, the requirement comes in at
about 64 DDGs. Now it is in combination with the cruiser
conversion program, which is also in the budget; and the need
to clearly restore the missile defense program that was
cancelled this year, but that warfighting requirement is very
real. We see from the standpoint of the overall DDG
requirements to have 64 to be about right.
In a previous life, I was the sponsor for DD 21 and what
has now evolved to DD(X). There has been over time, a very
concerted effort to try to look at how we fare our way both out
of DDGs and into the new ship, meeting the new ship
requirements, which DD(X) now represents.
In that regard, clearly there have been long-term concerns
with respect to the industrial base, and I will actually ask
Secretary Young to take the industrial base aspect of this
particular question.
Secretary Young. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to
comment on this issue. When I came to the Pentagon, what we had
was a program that had DDG purchases through fiscal year 2004,
one DD 21 in fiscal year 2005, and three DD 21s in fiscal year
2007.
I would submit to you there is no way the industrial base
would survive that profile. The budget has been built and
submitted to you in fiscal year 2003 includes two DDGs per year
in fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007.
I think some of the previous industrial base studies do not
consider factors that are ongoing in our industrial base. One
factor is the companies have recognized that there may be a
period of low rate procurement, and they are working to size
their yards for that low rate procurement. So I think those
studies are flawed in an element of assuming that the yards
have to stay at the same size, and therefore they have to build
a certain amount of product to that size.
Senator Kennedy. That may be true, but I want to see what
your studies are, that they show that that is not the case.
Secretary Young. OK. I have familiarized myself with one of
the previous studies, it assumes no LPD work is done at
Ingalls, and presently, under the Northrop Grumman acquisition
of Avondale and Ingalls, LPD work is being done at Ingalls.
This is good news, in my view, because Ingalls is bringing
skills and manpower to an LPD program that is adding confidence
in our ability to deliver that ship.
So I believe the industrial base, that our current
shipbuilding profile has the ability to provide enough work to
get the yards through this period as we transition to new
ships.
Senator Kennedy. Now, you have studies that show that
obviously, and you are going to make those available to us?
Secretary Young. I will make whatever analysis available to
the committee.
Senator Kennedy. You have studies that deal with it, or you
would not have done it. I mean, you have something that
counters the earlier industrial base studies. Maybe not, but
that is just what your earlier answers indicated that those
were not----
Secretary Young. I am saying the earlier studies do not
countenance the way industry is doing business right now, as
well as how----
Senator Kennedy. OK. So you have other studies that show
that the industrial base is not going to be reduced?
Secretary Young. I can--I did not----
Senator Kennedy. Do you have studies or not? You can just
say, ``No, we do not, Senator. That is my conclusion.'' Then we
can go on to----
Secretary Young. Senator, I do not have a current study
that looks at the industrial base.
Senator Kennedy. So you do not have studies that override
the other studies that have been provided to our committee with
regard to what is necessary in terms of industrial base for
that? You do not have those. You do not have other kind of
studies that sustain your position that you are telling us,
but----
Secretary Young. I do not have----
Senator Kennedy.--you believe that to be the case, but you
do not have that.
Secretary Young. I do not have new studies, but I
definitely have assumptions, and the original studies have
changed the way we are doing business now, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Yes. But you can provide that, any
information on this. We are very concerned about the industrial
base. This decision and the DDG is going to be the best ship in
terms of the missile defense; that decision has been made or--
--
Admiral Mullen. Sir, the program that was cancelled, the
area theater ballistic missile defense program, which was
cancelled prior to this budget cycle, is a capability that--
again, the warfighting requirement remains out there.
The plan at that time, at the time of cancellation, was to
embed this in the DDGs, which is what I spoke to in my opening
remarks, that that warfighting requirement is still there, and
as Admiral Blair testified last week, needs to be met.
If I could, Senator, I would like to address the DD(X)
issue, if I may?
Senator Kennedy. Admiral, please.
Admiral Mullen. As the resource individual in the Navy, one
of the things we did in this budget was we put an additional
six DDGs in the last 3 years of the future program,
specifically to reserve the option of DD(X) maturing and then
moving that money from DDGs into the DD(X) as it matures.
From a long-term warfighting requirement, the DD(X) program
is a very important one to us, not just specifically for that
platform, but also for the littoral combat ship and for
incepting the technology evolution to the follow-on cruiser.
Secretary Young. Could I add to that, Senator? I was going
to comment----
Senator Kennedy. When would you expect to be replicating
your building after that? The DD(X) will be completed then--
when?
Admiral Mullen. It is due to hit the waves in fiscal year
2011. It is currently a 2005 ship. So certainly my expectation
would be that between that time frame, we would be turning to
the production of additional ships, and actually Secretary
Young can speak on that.
Senator Kennedy. How many years, between 5 and 11?
Secretary Young. Senator, the understanding I----
Senator Kennedy. I am just trying to find out what your
plans are with regard to industrial base now and also with
regards to the whole issue of the extended range guided
munition that is so important to the Marines. That has been a
surface fire support program that has slipped with this
decision on the DD(X). So that has slipped as well. So we just
want to get a good idea as to what is being planned out there.
I will send you a more precise, entire question and more
specifics, because I am getting around the edges here, I think.
I want to make sure we have a complete answer.
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Reed. Or John, do you want to----
Senator Warner. No, I think I will follow the regular
order.
Senator Kennedy. All right.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much, though, for the offer.
Senator Kennedy. All right.
Senator Warner. I will follow you, Senator.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, thank you.
As I understand it, the Navy plans for an accelerated
development of the Navy's unmanned underwater vehicle program,
specifically the Navy plans to accelerate the multi-mission
reconfigurable UUV and upgrade the AN/BLQ-11 long-term mine
reconnaissance system.
Can you elaborate in some details about these plans,
because they are, I think, very important for the future in
terms of employing more and more unmanned undersea vehicles.
Admiral Mullen. Certainly, the future of warfighting is we
view as a very critical piece to us is the entire spectrum of
unmanned and autonomous remote vehicles, in the air, on the
surface, and under the sea.
I am not intimately familiar with this program. I know it
has been in development for some time, and there is a very
strong Navy commitment to this program. As far as the details
of acceleration, I would have to take that for the record and
get back to you specifically. But I want to strongly state the
Navy's commitment to this kind of capability in the future.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Navy has plans to upgrade the baseline AN/BLQ-11 long-term mine
reconnaissance system (LMRS) with improvements to the forward-looking
sonar and the side-looking sonar. The improvements to these sensors are
currently under development and will be transitioned to LMRS upon
successful demonstration.
The 21,, variant of the mission reconfigurable UUV (MRUUV) is the
next generation, fully autonomous UUV. Current funding dictates an
initial operational capability (IOC) in fiscal year 2009. Both the
Office of Naval Research and industry are conducting UUV research and
development efforts that can be leveraged to delivery MRUUV prior to
fiscal year 2009. The milestone is being evaluated against other
priorities within the Navy as part of POM04.
Senator Reed. Are you aware of any collaboration with the
Coast Guard in homeland defense in terms of using unmanned
underwater vehicles for port surveillance and port security? Is
that something that you would be considering also, Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. I am not aware of that, Senator Reed, at
this point. But one of the things that happened September 11th,
Admiral Loy is fond of saying, the second call he got was from
Admiral Clark. It has really energized both services in working
together to support the future and the changing mission of
homeland security and homeland defense.
So we are paying a lot of attention to the Coast Guard
developments. One possibility is to look at the development for
the littoral combat ship and the Coast Guard deepwater program
and how they will work together.
Certainly, initiatives like you are talking about would be
ones that, if they have applicability, and certainly it sounds
like they do, we would want to try to participate in it.
Secretary Young. Senator, we are working on a memorandum of
understanding between, particularly, the LCS, DD(X), CG(X)
programs and the deepwater, and as the Admiral said, the LCS is
one of the first potential opportunities for cooperation,
depending on whether it has a place in deepwater.
Then we are looking to expand that into exactly what you
said, both not only underwater vehicles, but also
communications and sharing data, tracking ships, and other
factors.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, it
is my understanding that the first step in converting the SSGNs
is for refueling, and this work will be done in public yards at
Puget Sound and Norfolk.
Has a decision been made on whether conversions will also
take place at--well, let me ask it this way. After the
refueling is completed, will these ships be moved to other
positions for the construction and the renovation, if that is
the right term?
Secretary Young. There has been extensive discussion in the
Department about that. The current plan and the program of
record would be to refuel two submarines at Puget and convert
those submarines there and refuel two submarines at Norfolk.
We have staggered the two submarines at Norfolk and
preserved an opportunity to discuss where those submarines are
converted, whether there might be a public or private
competition for that and other factors.
There is also a strategy to try to take Electric Boat tiger
teams and assign them to the submarines. The staggering is an
approach to let that tiger team move between each conversion
and give ourselves a chance to have some learning curve benefit
and to control, to the maximum extent possible, the costs on
the SSGN conversions.
Senator Reed. Thank you Mr. Secretary, this also raises the
question that is asked every year. We have been struggling to
meet the requirements of the warfighters, to have a
sufficiently sized submarine fleet, and that ultimately
requires going to two-submarines-a-year production.
Can you comment about whether the horizon is within sight,
that we will get to two submarines a year?
Secretary Young. Senator, you are well aware, in the fiscal
year 2003 budget, the Navy made an effort to add 688 refuelings
to try to sustain forces at the 55 submarine requirement.
The President's budget supports the potential for three
submarines in 2008. Those programs are continually under review
again with my comments about ``What is the business-smart way
to do that?''
But there is a goal to get to two submarines per year, and
people would like to get there as quickly as possible if
resources and the business plans allow that.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, if I may ask one question. In
your statement, you talk about the ways you are going to try to
more accurately project and control costs in fulfilling the
program, and then you have a line that says, ``If costs
continue to rise in spite of these management efforts, the
Department is prepared to de-scope or delay capability to
maintain a funded executable program.''
Can you elaborate in more detail about what precisely that
means?
Secretary Young. OK. The prior completion account has
grown. This year, the request is $646 million. That is critical
to the Navy. If we are not provided those funds, we will have
to take scope out of other programs. It will not necessarily
have to be in shipbuilding. It relates to the comment I made in
my opening statement about making trades with the whole of the
picture in mind.
So if a ship cost grows, and if there is a change option
and we do not have a way to pay for it, I think we will try to
resist making that change until a future point when we have the
funds and know what capability we would put on board.
I think a perfect example of that is CVN-77. There was an
option: MFR and VSR. The VSR became a high-risk, if not
impossible, option for CVN-77. The next option down was
potentially to put a SPY-1 radar on the carrier. There were
estimates that said the cost of that were over $300 million,
and that would have been a prior year completion bill for that
carrier.
Right now, we are going to put the legacy radars on that
carrier, design the island in a smart flexible forward-looking
manner so that in a future availability, or a next opportunity,
we can install MFR and VSR on that carrier. But we cannot
afford either the costs or the risks to put that on right now.
So some would argue that is a good business decision, and some
would argue that is de-scoped capability.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Admiral.
Secretary Young. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome.
Admiral Mullen. Good to see you, sir.
Senator Warner. I am fascinated to hear you talk about your
respective responsibilities with such enthusiasm. Not much has
changed since I had the same challenge that you have.
Managing the shipbuilding account for the United States
Navy is one of the most difficult jobs. We are fortunate, Mr.
Young, that you bring an institutional memory of this
institution as we go through our deliberations here. I think
you have a profound respect for the old adage that the
President proposes and Congress disposes and I am going to come
to that momentarily.
Admiral Mullen, I judge that your career is owing to three
things: hard work, solid family, good luck--and maybe the
fourth one is Joe Lopez, is that correct, Admiral Lopez?
[Laughter.]
Admiral Mullen. Well, he does stay in touch. [Laughter.]
Senator Warner. He is a wonderful man.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. This morning, our committee was briefed by
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I think by any
objective viewpoint, this country is heading into some very
uncertain waters in the years ahead. As I reflect on the
threats that our previous witness talked about with respect to
a capability versus threat-based environment, some of us old-
timers are still very conscious of this threat and have to
determine what you mean by ``capability-based.''
Nevertheless, one capability that we have relied on, I
think, more heavily than ever before is the carrier force. We
saw that in the Afghanistan operations, where you actually
loaned out one of your carriers to the Army as an airfield,
which served very well in its mission.
As you look to the future and at the uncertainties of the
future, I frankly can see absolutely no basis for anyone to say
that the carrier is not going to remain, if not increase, in
its importance in terms of not only protecting our forces, but
also deterring conflict.
Of course, this brings me to the decision on the CVN(X). I
am going to read from your testimony. You say, ``In order to
support other Navy funding needs and to allow for further
technology maturation of CVN(X) systems, the fiscal year 2003
budget submission delays CVN(X) detailed design, construction
start, and delivery by 1 year and split funds CVN(X)-1
construction between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008. The
decision to delay the program is not attributable to program
execution performance issues.''
Now, with all due respect, I am seriously reviewing,
initially with this subcommittee and then to the full
committee, a restoration of funds so that that program can be
restored to its original posture in previous FYDPs.
I am going to frankly ask you if Congress were to authorize
and approve a dollar amount, and we could possibly discuss
that, such that you could then execute, which is the will of
Congress; can you do it, and how would it be done?
We will start with you, Mr. Young.
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. You are quite familiar with the process
here.
Secretary Young. Yes, sir. I appreciate your kind comments,
Senator, and on this one, I think I can answer you fairly
specifically.
The current program in fiscal year 2002 assumed that we
would hire approximately 50 designers and engineers a month,
starting in January and do so each month thereafter and
maintain that engineering work force as we built up to be able
to accomplish the design of CVN(X).
When the fiscal year 2003 budget decision was made, the
budget before you, is for a year and decreases some of the
engineering of the R&D funds for the design of that carrier.
The program office looked at what they had in fiscal year 2003
and recognized that if they ramped up as planned, they would
potentially, with the fiscal year 2002 funding, have to ramp
down.
Senator Warner. Well, presumably Congress would find the
dollars.
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. So I ask you to start with the assumption
that it is not a dollar issue, because Congress would add those
funds from wherever we so desire.
Secretary Young. It is----
Senator Warner. So then take it back again to what you can
do if you have been authorized those funds.
Secretary Young. I probably would have to seek a middle
ground. I can tell you that there is a number that, if
additional funds were authorized and appropriated in fiscal
year 2003----
Senator Warner. For this purpose.
Secretary Young.--for this purpose, the carrier, they could
attempt to recover----
Senator Warner. Who is ``they''?
Secretary Young. The program office. Admiral Knapp and the
program office.
Senator Warner. All right. I want to be specific.
Secretary Young. Yes, sir. They could try to recover some
of the lost schedule in the program. I am told there is an
estimate that says the carrier right now would deliver under
the program of record, with the budget as submitted, in
September 2014 and that could be pulled back to March, with the
addition of funds in fiscal year 2003 and each following year.
Whether that carrier could be pulled back a little further,
if people assumed additional funds authorized and appropriated,
there might be even more acceleration potential.
But right now the program office is taking a business-like
approach. I think you can understand. They do not want to hire
people and then, if no additional funds are authorized and
appropriated, have to lay those people off. That is a spike
they do not want to manage.
They are managing to the assumption that there may be only
the President's budget level of fiscal year 2003 funds; if
there are additional funds in fiscal year 2003 provided, there
is that potential to pull the carrier back.
Senator Warner. Now, let us go to the phrase ``maturation
of systems,'' which means maturity as they come along and can
be integrated contemporaneous with the maturing of that system.
Address that issue, because I think somehow we can work the
labor force issue, or the hiring, and the money, but I want to
talk about that aspect of it.
Secretary Young. Sir, the reactor components have already
been advance appropriated. Therefore, there is a certain level
of maturity, in the propulsion system of the carrier. We do
need work on the EMALS, the electromagnetic aircraft launch
system, and other technologies. But that is affected by this
desire not to spike and then layoff people; I think it is, as
much as anything, a money-driven process.
Time will help us with that maturity and it will put less
risk in the program, because we would like to see EMALS launch
a plane today and you cannot do that. So adding funds and
pulling it back will put back some risk in the program, but I
cannot tell you it is an unacceptable level of risk.
Senator Warner. From a technical standpoint?
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Admiral, your views on this and particularly, as a future
fleet commander, or whatever the case may be in the years to
come, suddenly you are short a carrier out in this time frame
of when this was to be delivered. We saw this with the Kennedy.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. It was for reasons other than this, but the
carrier schedule is just as precise as any schedule there is
that exists in the Pentagon.
Admiral Mullen. Actually, I would say it is probably more
so than schedules that exist in the Pentagon, from the
standpoint that carrier schedules really drive everything else
in the Navy and have for many years. Certainly, this choice, as
has been testified to by Admiral Clark, was an affordability
issue more than anything else.
Senator Warner. I examined Clark in detail.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. What I am asking you is, on the assumption
that Congress does restore funds to enable the Navy to go back
to try and recoup some of this time and also, a subsidiary
question, the work force, can you do it and will you do it?
Admiral Mullen. In terms of if it can be executed, we
certainly would accept the carrier back in 2013 rather than
2014. We seem to be at, as well as we can predict, March 2014
right now. It is that other 6 months that gets it back to its
original schedule that Secretary Young was speaking about
specifically.
The value of the carriers. My last job was down in Norfolk
as the fleet commander. Certainly from there as I watched the
debate last year about the value of carriers. It was fairly
vocal on both sides, but has certainly gone away, as it should
have in my view, because of the value of these particular
platforms.
It is clearly something we will watch very carefully and
want to manage and have as much of that capability as we
possibly can.
The other option we have on the front end of this--given
the time between now and that the CVN(X) is basically supposed
to replace the Enterprise--is to carefully manage her nuclear
fuel. Basically, the driver for her is the nuclear fuel that
she has.
We cannot always do that because of the needs and she may
have to go faster than we anticipated at certain times. But we
have the opportunity to manage that on the front end, as well
as to try to make this work.
Senator Warner. Now, she has four reactors, by the way?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. That is quite a program.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one other
point here.
Senator Kennedy. Yes.
Senator Warner. I was fascinated with how you worked out a
sharing of the labor force with Newport News and the Norfolk
Naval Shipyard because of workload in the Newport News Shipyard
you took the carrier, and put it into Portsmouth under an
arrangement where that work force could work on it. Yet it is
still, let us say, under the command of Newport News
Shipbuilding. Now, that is quite an interesting innovation to
balance that work force.
Is that something we will likely see in the future, and is
it working to your satisfaction?
Secretary Young. Do you want me to comment?
Senator Warner. Either one.
Secretary Young. Go on.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I think from the standpoint of
the critical requirement to have that capability within our
country and in particular, the specific skills tied to the
nuclear industry, that kind of innovation and work-sharing
piece is a very important part of both our current capability
and our ability to maintain that capability in the future. Yes,
sir.
Secretary Young. If I could, sir, we would like to take
advantage of that at every opportunity possible. As you well
know better than I, Norfolk Naval Shipyard has some very unique
facilities.
Senator Warner. Indeed it does.
Secretary Young. We are able to let the private sector come
in and perform work on ships within dry docks that nobody else
has in the world. At every opportunity where it makes sense
from a labor cost and an overall cost to the project point of
view, we are trying to take advantage of those opportunities.
Senator Warner. I think it is, and perhaps it even lends
itself to the creation of more jobs between the two yards,
given that.
By the way, the record should reflect port, starboard,
fore, aft, four reactors. Fore, aft, port, starboard, eight
total, correct?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. I am glad we got that straightened out.
Senator Warner. Yes, sir, I am too. [Laughter.]
Particularly when it comes to the Navy and their terms.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Mullen. I knew what you meant, Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator Kennedy. To my friend and colleague, Senator
Sessions, if I may.
Senator Sessions. Of course.
Senator Kennedy. In February, during the posture hearing,
Secretary Rumsfeld talked about the naval forces study. Could
you give us an idea of when that is going to be ready?
I do not know whether that this is out of the blue, and you
did not know you were going to get asked that. So if you want
to, you can provide it for the record. But if you can let us
know either way.
Secretary Young. Secretary Aldridge was asked this question
at a previous hearing, and he has indicated within the next
couple of months they will try to provide the results of that
study.
Admiral Mullen. We, in the Navy, are participating in that.
Senator Kennedy. Is this going to be before we mark up the
authorization bill? It would be worthwhile to have that prior
to the time of the authorization, it seems to me, just in terms
of our own information.
I know, as the Chairman, if we can get that in a timely
way, I think it would be very helpful at least for our
committee. Hopefully, we can.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Secretary Young, can you tell
us what the answer is to the $48 billion increase in spending
for defense, and how it is that the Navy shipbuilding is
sliding? What are the factors?
I know some of them, but just for the record, what would
you tell an American citizen who might ask that question?
Secretary Young. Can I take a couple of minutes to do that,
sir?
Senator Sessions. Please.
Secretary Young. From the start, I would tell you, the
Secretary likes to say, we went through with the monies that
were made available and filled up the pots, and the pots that
were placed in order were----
Senator Sessions. First, let me ask you: The Navy budget,
how much did it go up?
Secretary Young. I understand it went up about $9 billion,
$9 billion of the $48 billion.
So the Secretary talks about filling up the pots and they
were in priority order, the manpower pot to pay our people, the
readiness pot to train people, provide spares for them and have
the equipment ready to perform. We had health bills that we had
to pay.
In fact, I could be fairly specific. There was $4 billion
of the increase that went to the Navy that was asked for
military personnel salary, health, sea pay, housing allowances;
$3.4 billion went into steaming hours, flying hours and spares;
$1 billion went into munitions; and then, about $1.1 billion
went into RDT&E, which would include increases for programs
like the joint strike fighter and DD(X).
So when we filled all those pots with the monies were given
us, we did everything we could with the monies that were
available, and we certainly could have used more. So then the
question becomes, ``Okay. Why did you not buy ships?'' The
answer is, ``We certainly would have liked to have bought
ships.''
But let me add some detail to that, and I am going to start
back a little on the history here. A couple of years ago, two
LPDs were requested and they were taken out, because the
program was not mature enough in people's view to fully fund
the program.
Last year, fortunately, we did get full appropriation for
our T-AKE, but there was a chance we would lose a T-AKE. The
picture I am painting to you is: we have to think about what
can be authorized and appropriated in Congress and we can
reasonably request.
We have four LPDs fully funded right now and advanced
procurement for two more. We have four Virginia-class
submarines fully funded in advanced procurement. We have three
T-AKEs funded.
Each of these, Senator, are new classes of ships. So we are
transitioning from older production to new production classes,
and we are struggling, as I said in the beginning, to try to
build our confidence and your confidence in our ability to
deliver those ships.
In each of those cases, I think it would be premature to
have made the first priority to increase the rates in those
programs in fiscal year 2003. That is not the case in fiscal
year 2004 and out. As Admiral Mullen testified, we will be
working aggressively in the fiscal year 2004 program budget
development process with the programs that we now have more
confidence in and can come to you and tell you we can deliver,
to look at increasing those quantities.
But it seemed incumbent on us to build your confidence in
the programs we have now. We do have ships in the pipeline in
these new programs, and we just have to deliver them to you.
But in fiscal year 2004 and out, I hope we will be
testifying that we have great confidence in LPD, Virginia-
class, and T-AKE, and I hope we will bring you a program that
has additional ships.
Senator Sessions. When you look at about 300 or so
requests, you wanted to do 8.9 a year. That is the QDR number,
right?
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. So we were at six last year; six this
year; five, 2003; five, 2004; seven, 2005; seven, 2006. Is that
about right?
Secretary Young. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. So, Admiral Mullen, I guess you have had
to deal with balancing these issues, too. Do you have any
thoughts about where we are? Are we making the right decisions
on this budget? If you were given more money, in your view,
should it go to increasing the number of the ships, or do you
have other readiness or research and development issues that
would still take priority over ships?
Admiral Mullen. I would like to take just a second to
commend Secretaries England and Young. I have been working with
both now for the last half year. I have been in and out the
shipbuilding business, coming out of the building since 1995,
and I really do applaud the business approach that Secretary
Young and Secretary England have taken to try to get this
right, because we have sometimes bit off more than we can chew.
We need the ships. There is no question about that. The
indication, as I specifically testified, is I am working very
hard in the 2004 budget right now to find a way to come over
here with more ships.
That said, both the Secretary and the CNO have stated that
their first dollar would both go to aircraft or airplanes; and
the next dollar after that would go to ships.
I do not want to draw too thick a line through those two,
because both of those are required for us to recapitalize the
Navy. So the efforts that are ongoing right now are to find
funds to commit to both of those procurement accounts, so that
we can get well above what we are right now.
Senator Landrieu stated earlier that things always seem to
be brighter in the outyears, and so I do understand that. I do
not want to be Pollyannaish about what is available to us in
the outyears. I just want to restate my commitment to work very
hard in the 2004 budget to make sure that we have the direction
headed that we are going up, and then we do not show up over
here a year from now talking to you about five ships.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, I believe the CNO
indicated at a previous hearing that he was having to pay down
some carryover expenses, such as air time and training time
that were not made part of the fiscal year budget that should
have been. Therefore, it was behind and there were other
factors. Is that something that you are going to? Does this
budget end that?
Are we going to be able to pay, in this year's time frame,
our training and other obligations and not to carry that over
as an obligation in the future? If we were paying that off, I
believe he said in the next 2 years, will that not free up some
money for our budget as intended?
Secretary Young. I think Secretary England has shared the
CNO's view, and I think Admiral Mullen would like to comment on
this.
The thing I would tell you is, once you agree to sustain a
force at a level, and you have decided it requires a certain
amount of funds in terms of personnel, pay, flying hours,
training hours, and spares that you do not buy it and then take
a holiday on that.
We are undertaking a review of our programs and processes,
and I have asked all the SYSCOMs to take a hard look at what we
are doing now that maybe we do not need to do. How can we do
business more smartly? I think we need to find ways to save
money within our resources and within our programs to try to
enable what Admiral Mullen is talking about, which is buy
airplanes and ships.
I do not know what we will find, but we will look for
savings in the training budget and other segments of the budget
to try to do things smarter everywhere, not just in
acquisition.
Senator Sessions. Well, the simulators have some potential
for saving, do they not----
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. --both in ships and aircraft?
Admiral Mullen. Correct.
Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, there appears to be
ships ready to buy. Your unfunded priority list indicates there
are ship programs to buy, a DDG-51, plus Virginia-class advance
procurement, and you delayed the CVN(X) due to funding. So do
you not have ships that do require more funding for 2003?
Secretary Young. Yes, sir. Secretary England has testified
that one of his high priorities, if additional funds were made
available, would be to buy an additional DDG. We have worked
hard to put at least some advanced procurement with the
advanced procurement that Congress provided in fiscal year 2002
towards a third DDG in 2003, if you will. So that is his
highest priority.
Then likewise as I mentioned to you, I think our confidence
in LPD-17 and in Virginia-class is going up substantially.
Could those programs--I cannot tell you--I can just tell you
that our confidence is getting to the level that they will be
part of our discussion in the fiscal year 2004 budget bill,
whether we need to go back and look at two a year, particularly
in LPD-17, which replaces ships that are 35-plus years old.
Senator Sessions. Let me just ask and see if your answer to
this is yes and if you have a figure, that would be fine. If we
were to contract, with absolute brilliance and good foresight,
and knew what we wanted to buy and set about to buy that, and
we bought it and bid it, over our sustained building program,
could we get more ships for less money? Could we get more bang
for our buck than we are? Or are we still losing money because
of up and down spending, delayed contracts, not following
through on things, and those kinds of things?
Secretary Young. I think there are a couple of cases where
that is true, and we are working to change some of that.
Senator Sessions. Would you say that it has cost us more as
a result of delays?
Secretary Young. There is no question LPD-17 would have to
lead the list, sir. I regret that your colleagues are not here,
but in that case, it has been discussed in the media and we are
talking to the companies. If everybody can agree, we will work
hard to create a situation where we build all the LPDs at
Avondale and Ingalls; and in exchange for the four LPDs: two
that are known right now, i.e, within the current program that
move south, if you will, two DDGs will move north.
We will still have both yards, Ingalls and Bath, build
DDGs, but we will offset the loss of LPD work at Bath with DDG
work. I think it is more efficient to build 12 ships when you
have a small class at a single yard.
Right now, we are in the process, because of the delays in
LPD-17, of essentially building two lead ships, LPD-17 in the
south and LPD-19 in the north, if you will.
There are significant inefficiencies in that class of
ships, and if the companies can agree this is a reasonable
business proposition for them, I hope we will reach this
agreement.
Senator Sessions. Well, ideally we should be able to plan
those things out and get a kind of quantity order that can get
us the cheapest buy on the product possible. Let me mention one
more thing, and that is our precision-guided munitions.
I believe we have learned one thing and that is the older
platform with a superior munition is probably superior to a
more modern platform with an old outdated munition. Would you
agree with that?
Secretary Young. Absolutely.
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. The fact that you got $1 billion extra
for precision-guided munitions gives me some comfort, but is
that enough to keep you where you think you need to be in
precision-guided munitions?
We do not want to be in an Afghanistan-type conflict that
is more sustained and has more targets; they do not even have
targets in Afghanistan. We really need a lot of precision, and
we do not have enough. To what extent is the Navy responsible
for purchasing in your budget? Whose budget supplies most of
these?
Admiral Mullen. We recognize this as a serious deficiency
in the previous budgets, and we have taken a significant round
turn in that investment with respect to the future. We have
been well-supported by you and your colleagues here on the Hill
with respect to the emergency funds, with respect to the war.
It is known fairly widely and publicly that we did not have
all the munitions we wanted when this started. We have
committed in the budget--and it is back to the very painful
choices we had to make that included the current readiness, in
which we have actually purchased a significant increased
quantity of precision munitions, in particular laser guided
bombs and JDAMs, as well as Tomahawks, which are the three
leading munitions right now that we need to make sure our
magazines are full.
That includes ramp-ups at the contractors, investments to
do that, to get to a maximum production capability, that tied
to your shipbuilding question earlier, will get us the best
price for each one of those units. We are on the other end of
that spectrum.
Senator Sessions. Let me just ask you. These older ships
are properly equipped and can project our forces exceedingly
well. Would that not be a cost effective way to help get our
numbers up, through using the most sophisticated weaponry even
if we have to use an older platform?
Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, and I think this speaks to the
decision in this budget to decommission the 963s, and you had
talked about your time on O'Brien, which you were impressed,
and rightfully so.
Clearly, that was a trade we made to take some near-term
risk in terms of being able to garner about $1.5 billion in the
DD-963 program, people and program, and invest that in the
future, in the kinds of future ships that we need to invest.
That was an internal decision to accept risk there. The
specific capability----
Senator Sessions. Sure, but was that an attempt to do what
the President suggested, leap a generation? Are you taking a
chance to leap forward?
Admiral Mullen. Clearly, into the----
Senator Sessions. But is it a good risk?
Admiral Mullen. I think it is a good risk, yes, sir, into
not just DD(X), but also the littoral combat ship and the
technology and the real warfighting mission needs we have in
anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and surface warfare that
that ship will provide.
Additionally, the precision capability that the 963s can
also be provided by many other ships. The trade, very
specifically, is about the same number of vertical launch cells
or Tomahawk cells for the SSGN investment as we bring those
online towards the end of FYDP, and the Spruances are retired.
But the Spruances have become a very expensive platform for us
to operate.
Senator Sessions. I have some questions along those lines
that I would like to submit to you.
Admiral Mullen. Sure.
Senator Sessions. We thank you very much for your candid
and thoughtful comments. There are no easy answers; there is no
free lunch.
Any initiative you take when you have a limited number of
dollars means some other initiative did not get advanced like
perhaps its defenders would like.
We are trying to ask, Senator Kennedy and I are, two
things: can we build more ships, and how can we find the money
to do so? Can we avoid inclining our numbers to at least some
degree through forward deployment, through keeping all the
ships? Maybe there is a skeletal troop situation on the forward
deployed ships that we could have people back home with their
families, but if a crisis occurred, they could be immediately
moved out to move forward.
I just think you are apparently making some rather historic
efforts to evaluate those kinds of possibilities, which I would
support, and, I believe, Senator Kennedy supports.
So thank you for your service. Thank you for the effective
way you have helped us be successful in Afghanistan.
Do you have anything that you would like to add for the
record or otherwise at this point?
Admiral Mullen. No, sir.
Secretary Young. No, sir.
Senator Sessions. All right. There are no other questions
and no other members here, so we are adjourned.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Young. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
CARRIER HOMEPORTING
1. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Wachendorf, the Navy has said that the
Navy has to have 7.6 aircraft carriers in the active fleet in order to
support one carrier on station full-time in the Northern Arabian Sea.
This reflects assumptions about keeping the CNO-mandated operational
tempo goals and maintenance down times, among others. The Navy also
indicates that having the carrier homeported in Japan allows the Navy
to have only 1.7 carriers in the active fleet provide a continuous
presence of one carrier in the Western Pacific.
In your discussion of the forward homeporting options, you
discussed a number of vessels such as submarines and other support
ships in Guam. However, you made no mention of re-looking at options to
homeporting carrier battle groups in locations other than the current
group in Japan, other than to say, ``There are numerous ports
throughout the region that have the capability/infrastructure to
conduct port calls, but the required infrastructure to support the
permanent homeporting is not available and would require substantial
investment by the U.S. and the host nation.'' Could you give us some
estimates of the costs that would be required to establish the
appropriate infrastructure?
Admiral Wachendorf. Initial estimates for building the required
port facilities and supporting infrastructure to homeport a CVBG, with
an air wing assigned, in Guam would cost approximately $3 billion.
2. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Wachendorf, how recent are these
estimates?
Admiral Wachendorf. These estimates were developed in September
2001.
3. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Wachendorf, how would these costs
compare with the costs of the number of carrier battle groups that
would have to be maintained in the inventory to provide equivalent
forward presence?
Admiral Wachendorf. It would take three to five times the number of
carrier battle groups based on the west coast and Hawaii to provide the
same presence and crisis response capability as is currently provided
by the forward deployed naval forces (FNDF) in Japan. The procurement
cost of one CVN alone exceeds the initial cost estimates for
homeporting a CVBG and air wing in Guam.
DD-963 WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY AND RETIREMENT
4. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Wachendorf, your statement would appear
to minimize the contribution of the DD-963. You said in the prepared
statement that the DD-963 ``provides only marginal warfighting
capability due to the ship's older and more focused mission combat
system.'' These destroyers have been providing a significant
contribution to the Navy's ability to maintain the required number of
Tomahawk missiles in theaters to support requirements of the theater
commanders in chief under the global naval force presence policy
(GNFPP). In fact, I believe that several DD-963s just returned from
operations in the Afghanistan operations, having fired a number of
Tomahawk missiles against priority targets. Since there is no chance
that the Navy will have additional Tomahawk missile carrying capability
in the near-term, isn't this action going to complicate the Navy's
ability to maintain the required number of Tomahawk missiles in
theaters to support requirements of the theater commanders in chief
under the Global Naval Force Presence Policy?
Admiral Wachendorf. The DD-963 class destroyers are contributors to
both our current operations and the GNFPP. DD-963 class ships do not
have the flexibility that the newer Arleiqh Burke-class DDGs have, but
DD-963 class ships will continue to deploy, carry Tomahawk missiles and
be counted in the GNFPP. The DD-963 class ships will continue to be
major contributors to our operations until decommissioned. With the
decommissioning of the DD-963-class ships, the Tomahawk missile
requirements in the GNFPP will be carried out, by the more flexible and
newer Burke-class DDGs as well as cruisers and submarines. The Navy
will be able to maintain requisite quantities of Tomahawk missiles in
theater to support the requirements of the theater commanders in chief
under the GNFPP, given the current DD-963 decommissioning schedule. The
Navy is commissioning new DDG-51 class destroyers through the FYDP.
These ships have launcher capacities of 96 Tomahawk-capable, vertical
launch cells, as opposed to the 61-cell capacity of the DD-963 class
ships. The current DDG-51 program of record commissions five ships in
fiscal year 2003, three in fiscal year 2004, four in fiscal year 2005,
and two in fiscal year 2006, for a net gain of 1,344 launcher cells by
the end of 2006. This schedule produces a yearly net increase of
launcher cells, and an overall net gain of 185 Tomahawk-capable,
vertical launch cells by the end of DD-963 class service.
5. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, Admiral Wachendorf raised the
issue of the early retirement of the DD-963 destroyers. These
destroyers have been providing a significant contribution to the Navy's
ability to maintain the required number of Tomahawk missiles in
theaters to support requirements of the theater commanders in chief
under the GNFPP. What steps is the Navy going to have to take to make
up for the loss of the missile launchers in trying to meet the GNFPP
requirements?
Admiral Mullen. Due to the continual commissioning of DDG-51 class
destroyers as replacements for the DD-963 class destroyers, Navy incurs
no net decrease in missile launcher cells under the program of record
(PB 03). Navy will experience a minimal, 1-year launcher cell loss
under a worst-case accelerated decommissioning-schedule, but will
continue to be able to meet the GNFPP requirement. If all DD-963 class
ships are decommissioned by the end of 2004, there will be a net
launcher cell loss of 391 cells which will be recovered, through DDG-51
commissionings by the end of 2005.
Navy currently maintains a reserve capacity in the launchers of
most deploying DD, DDG, and CG class ships. Increasing the TLAM loads
on the remaining deployers will maintain theater GNFPP levels until the
net launcher cell loss is recovered without negatively impacting other
weapons loads.
``BLUE/GOLD'' CREWS--``HORIZON'' CONCEPT
6. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Wachendorf, in your statement you
mentioned the Horizon concept, which is similar to Blue/Gold manning on
Trident ballistic missile submarines where there are two crews for one
submarine. However, you did not appear to give the Horizon concept much
consideration as a viable alternative for crew manning to support
presence requirements. While I am not ready to recommend the Horizon
concept as THE answer, I am concerned that, if we try to meet our
national security requirements with a smaller fleet that is implied by
the current shipbuilding plan, or even try to meet increased
requirements associated with the war on terrorism with our current
force, we may be trying to do this at the expense of our sailors and
marines.
I know that our men and women in the services will make sacrifices
in defense of the country, but I do not believe that we should base our
plans on the expectation that they should continue to make such
extraordinary sacrifices for the foreseeable future. Is there a firm
Navy plan for fleshing out these analyses that would provide more
thorough reviews of such approaches as the horizon concept and other
options for increasing forward naval presence?
Admiral Wachendorf. Yes, the Navy is fleshing out these theories by
conducting two pilot programs in the Pacific Fleet employing the
deployment of Spruance-class destroyers beginning with the Abraham
Lincoln battle group and Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers
beginning with the Constellation battle group. Both groups of ships
will swap crews at approximately 5.5 months deployed. The crews will
again swap once more at the 10.5 month deployed point. At the end of
these pilots, various factors concerning crew morale, welfare, and
effectiveness as well as ship performance and maintenance, will be
evaluated to ensure that our attempt to relieve OPTEMPO stress on our
sailors ship is, in fact, accomplished. If we find our pilot did not
meet our expectations, we will discontinue this initiative.
DE-SCOPING TO REMAIN WITHIN BUDGET
7. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, your prepared statement on page
three says that the Navy is prepared to live within the budget for a
ship program by de-scoping or delaying capability to maintain the
funded, executable program. How is this statement consistent with
statements by the Chief of Naval Operations that we need to build the
correct numbers of ships, but we also need to ensure that they have the
right capabilities as well?
Admiral Mullen. I am in complete agreement with the Chief of Naval
Operations when he stated that we must build the correct number of
ships with the right capabilities. However, both the CNO and I also
recognize that until we have fully institutionalized plans to control
cost growth and achieve stability in our shipbuilding programs, we may
have to resort to descoping or delaying capability to deliver our
ships. We are taking appropriate management actions such as funding
shipbuilding programs to realistic, independent cost estimates,
properly budgeting change orders and working closely with industry to
mitigate the growth of costs in our shipbuilding programs and to
prevent a recurrence of the creation of prior year bills for ships,
requested in fiscal year 2003 and future budget submissions. If costs
continue to rise in spite of these management efforts, the Department
is prepared to descope or delay capability to maintain an executable
program within budget constraints.
DDG-51 REQUIREMENTS
8. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, you indicated that the
requirement for buying DDG-51 destroyers had been raised to meet a
requirement for providing missile defense capability. Is there an
official requirements document that has been vetted through the Navy
Requirements Oversight Council or the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council to validate this requirement?
Admiral Mullen. The additional requirement for DDG-51s stems from 3
years of OPNAV warfare analysis. This analysis was driven, in part by
the requirement (as stated in the 2003 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG))
for Navy to study the forward basing of ballistic missile defense (BMD)
(formerly theater ballistic missile defense) capable surface
combatants. Capability shortfalls identified in these analyses
(amphibious ready group/combat logistics force escort, as well as BMD,
littoral anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare) are those normally
delivered by multi-mission surface combatants (e.g., DDG-51).
The Navy is developing a new concept of operations that provides a
global response capability by adding surface escorts to the amphibious
ready group (forming the expeditionary striking force) and by standing
up dedicated surface action groups (strike/land attack in the near-
term, becoming BMD capable as weapons and technologies mature). These
additional DDGs (Aegis) are required in order to support the carrier
battle group, expeditionary striking force, and surface action groups
that form the key force elements of this concept.
9. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, since the Defense Department
has canceled the Navy area missile defense program, I presume that your
requirements for missile defense capability are tied to meeting the
sea-based mid-course program requirements within the Missile Defense
Agency's portfolio? Has the Navy chosen the DDG-51 as the preferred
platform to carry the sea-based mid-course missile defense capability?
Admiral Mullen. No. DPG 2003 calls for the ability to provide
mobile, projected missile defense, a capability that can only be
delivered by ships. While the increased number of DDG-51s could
possibly provide this capability, the necessity for ensuring access in
light of the evolving BMD threat, as well as ensuring a global presence
and response capability drives the number of DDGs required.
The current sea-based mid-course program is undergoing an extensive
concept definition review to characterize the system that will
transition to the Navy. Current plans are to deploy sea-based mid-
course capability on cruisers. Although the Navy area program planned
for deployment on cruisers and destroyers was canceled, the requirement
remains for a Navy terminal defense capability. Missile Defense Agency
is evaluating alternatives for a sea-based terminal defense capability.
DESTROYER SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE
10, 11. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, during the hearing we
discussed the prospects for maintaining the destroyer industrial base
with the current Navy shipbuilding plan that includes only two DDG-51s
per year through fiscal year 2007, and a DD(X) in fiscal year 2005. I
believe you indicated that we should perhaps discount the conclusions
of the previous Navy studies since they contained flawed or out-of-date
assumptions about the shipyards or the workloads in the shipyards.
Could you tell which assumptions you believe are flawed?
Is it the Navy's assessment now that the current shipbuilding plan
is adequate to support the destroyer industrial base?
Secretary Young. The Navy's November 2000 Update to the 1993 DDG-51
Industrial Base Study reaffirmed that both DDG-51 class shipyards can
rcmain viable with the shared, annual workload of three new procurement
DDG-51s, plus additional work. The report was based on the PB01 budget
profile and pointed out a severe risk due to the workload problem
during the transition from the DDG-51 program to the DD 21 program.
There have been changes both in shipbuilding budgeted quantities
and corporate structure since the last update that need to be taken
into account when assessing the adequacy of the shipbuilding plan to
support the destroyer industrial base.
Quantitative Assumption Changes Since the Last Update:
PB02 increased the DDG quantity procured in fiscal
year 2002 to three.
PB02 provided incremental funding for LHD-8 starting
in fiscal year 2002 in lieu of the PB01 planned date for LHA(R)
in fiscal year 2005.
PB03 added six DDGs and deleted three DD 21 surface
combatants from the PB02 surface combatant profile. That helped
to mitigate effects on the industrial base of the PB01 profile.
Ingalls and Bath Iron Works have both implemented
leanmanufacturing programs to manage efficiently at low rate
production.
The U.S.S. Cole that was repaired at Ingalls, created
significant unplanned work.
The addition of six DDGs to the shipbuilding profile in PB03 has
stabilized and somewhat mitigated the severe industrial base transition
risk to DD(X).
Also, since the respective mergers with General Dynamics (GD) and
Northrop Grumman (NG), Bath Iron Works (BIW), and Ingalls (ISI) can no
longer be treated as stand-alone companies. Today, General Dynamics and
Northrop Grumman are treating BIW and ISI as part of their larger
shipbuilding divisions and are working hard to mitigate workload
imbalances by allocating work across their entire shipbuilding
operation, taking advantage of the centers of excellence that exist
within those companies.
Examples of Industry Action to Mitigate Workload Imbalances
Northrop Grumman has transferred some LPD-17 module
construction and outfitting from Avondale to Ingalls to take
advantage of the experienced and under utilized combatant
workforce.
It is anticipated that some additional work will go to
Ingalls, if the Navy moves all LPD-17 work to NG.
GD is exploring the merits of using their state-of-
the-art Quonset Point steel fabrication facility to support BIW
surface ship construction.
Both corporations are examining steps required to
``right size'' their surface ship workforce for a low rate
production environment of two per year reflected in PB03.
Both companies are also aggressively incorporating
lean manufacturing techniques and processes that should improve
their production efficiencies in years of lower production
rates.
GD has invested in construction of a state-of-the-art
land-level fabrication facility, which will facilitate enhanced
construction efficiency and reduce the man hours historically
required to construct surface combatants.
However, a two ships per year DDG procurement rate is not without
cost to the Government, which will pay increased unit costs.
Furthermore, once the shipbuilders have downsized to accommodate low
rate production, additional non-recurring costs would likely be
incurred to restore an increased level of production if surface
combatant procurement rates increased outside the FYDP.
DD(X) IN R&D
12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, your new strategy for buying
the DD(X) is to purchase a ship in fiscal year 2005 using research and
development funds. Using this approach, you said that, ``Being able to
adjust the RDT&E budget for the lead ship provides the best chance to
control costs and define a production process that allows the Navy to
affordably build the entire class of these next-generation surface
combatants.'' It would appear that this would entail waiting until
building the lead ship is fairly advanced in the production process to
ensure that follow-on production efforts realize the benefits of these
developments on the first ship. Under this approach, when would you be
ready to start building the follow-on production ships?
Secretary Young. A follow-on DD(X) ship production decision will be
based upon several factors, including the maturity of the technology
prototype development, component/system testing and progress of the
ship's design. Progress in these areas will be assessed through the
preliminary and critical design process, balanced against the
validated, time-phased operational requirements document, which in turn
will facilitate an informed follow-on ship start of production
decision.
13. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, how would this differ from
current practices of providing a single gap year between lead ship and
the first follow ships?
Secretary Young. Funding the lead ship in RDT&E provides greater
program flexibility than the current practice of providing a gap year
between the lead ship and first follow ship, both funded in SCN. There
will be opportunities with funding the lead ship in RDT&E, for annual
reviews and adjustments to program capability and associated funding
requirements, based upon the status and schedule for technology
development and component/system testing. Depending on acquisition
strategy and ship quantity profile, it may also be useful to fund the
first follow ship in RDT&E. For example, this approach may be used if
there is a lead yard/follow yard acquisition strategy or the first
follow ship is procured in the year immediately following the lead
ship.
14. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, there would appear to be no
explicit commitment to building more than the one DD(X) in R&D in the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Is there any specific commitment
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to build more than one
DD(X) if the technologies in the DD(X) research and development program
yield capabilities that can be fielded?
Admiral Mullen. The number of DD(X)s that will be built has not yet
been determined. The size of the DD(X) class will be based on several
factors, such as current force structure requirements, rate of
decommissioning other surface combatants and the budgetary balance
between fleet maintenance and force recapitalization requirements. The
FYDP submitted with the fiscal year 2003 President's budget provides
research and development funding for construction of the first DD(X)
commencing in fiscal year 2005. In order to provide an orderly
transition to DD(X), as its technology matures, the fiscal year 2003
President's budget includes an additional six DDG-51s in fiscal years
2005 to 2007. The funds set aside for these destroyers in the FYDP
could be transitioned to build DD(X)s in the outyears.
NAVY'S FIRE SUPPORT CAPABILITY
15. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, the subcommittee has heard
testimony over the past several years that the only solution to meeting
the Marine Corps' surface fire support requirements would be the
introduction of the capability that was going to be available on the DD
21, specifically the two 155 millimeter gun batteries that DD 21 was
supposed to provide. Now the Navy has outlined a DD(X) program that
would build a demonstration ship in R&D in fiscal year 2005, with no
explicit plan to buy any more new design DD(X) vessels after that. We
also know that the extended range guide munition has slipped again, the
Navy has canceled the land attack standard missile, and there is no
funded plan to build the advance land attack missile. Is there any
prospect that the Navy will be able to meet the Marine Corps' fire
support requirements during the current FYDP? If so, when would that
be?
Admiral Mullen. No, the Navy will not fully meet the Marine Corps'
requirements for NSFS until outside the FYDP when DD(X) enters the
fleet. DD(X) will have the capacity to carry the variety and volume of
offensive, precise firepower that will enable our United States Marine
Corps and light mobile United States Army Forces to complete their
littoral missions. The 155mm advanced gun system (AGS), with ``fully
automated'' ammunition handling system and a family of munitions/
propelling charges, will achieve ranges of up to 100 nautical miles.
With AGS, DD(X) will have the ability to deploy a high volume of
affordable, precision-guided munitions with significantly improved
ranges, accuracy, volume, firing rates and response times compared to
the current generation of NSFS systems. Additionally, the Navy is
assessing the affordability of submitting a future budget request for
an ALAM program, which would be fielded with DD(X).
LPD-17 PROGRAM RESTRUCTURE
16. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Young, you mentioned during the
hearing that the Navy and the LPD-17 contracting team is considering
moving LPD-17 construction from General Dynamics (Bath) to Northrop
Grumman (Avondale and Ingalls). In consideration for this, construction
of one DDG-51 would be transferred from Northrop Grumman to General
Dynamics for each LPD-17 shifted.
You indicated that it might be more efficient to build all LPDs in
the Northrop Grumman yards. What wasn't clear from your testimony was
what is required from the Federal Government's side to make this
agreement work. Does your analysis of what is more financially
attractive to the Navy include the costs of any extra DDG-51s that are
not in the current shipbuilding plan that might be necessary to make
this transfer work?
Secretary Young. There is no Federal Government action required to
shift the LPD-17 class ship construction work from General Dynamics to
Northrop Grumman, since the contractual arrangement for LPD-17 class
ships built by BIW is between Northrop Grumman and BIW. However,
because of the different rates/workforce mix at Northrop Grumman, the
Government would negotiate a contract modification to its contract with
Northrop Grumman to establish a new cost/incentive structure for
construction of the BIW ships transferred to Northrop Grumman.
Our analysis did not include the costs associated with any DDG-51
ships that are not in the current shipbuilding plan. However, the Navy
will benefit from these additional ships, which are necessary to
maintain surface combatant force structure and benefit the industrial
base.
LHA REPLACEMENT PROGRAM DECISION PROCESS
17. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, the five amphibious assault
ships in the LHA class will have to be replaced over the next decade or
so. LHD-8 would presumably replace one of them. I understand that the
Department of the Navy has not come to a decision on the requirements
for the rest of the LHA replacement program. Reports indicate, for
example, that the size of a potential replacement ship ranges from
roughly 40,000 tons to as large as 75,000 tons. Why is there such a
difference in displacement among the options that are under
consideration?
Admiral Mullen. The DOD acquisition process for major new systems
is designed to ensure careful consideration of mission requirements,
system capabilities, and costs. The process includes specifying the
mission need for a new system, considering a broad range of alternative
systems in a formal analysis of alternatives (AoA), and specifying
goals and thresholds for key performance parameters in an operational
requirements document (ORD) that is reviewed by the Services and CINCs,
and ultimately approved by the JROC.
AoAs are intended to consider a wide range of alternatives in terms
of capabilities and costs. The LHA(R) AoA is considering broad
categories of alternatives including a repeat LHD-8 (with fact-of-life
changes), a modified LHD, and new ship designs. There is a fairly broad
range in the full-load displacement of the alternative ship designs,
which is due to differences in the following factors: amphibious lift
capacity, aviation capabilities, service life allowances, habitability
standards, and survivability features. The AoA will show how variations
in these types of factors affect the size and cost of the system and
its ability to carry out the types of missions identified in the LHA(R)
mission need statement (MNS), and thereby provide DON and DOD decision
makers with clear and consistent information on cost and operational
effectiveness for a range of choices. This information is intended to
help them understand the choices and execute sound judgment on the
appropriate balance of capability and affordability, taking into
account the many competing requirements and budgetary demands. LHA(R)
AoA results are due in summer 2002.
18. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, when can we expect to see some
resolution of the issues behind such a disparity in sizes of potential
LHA replacement ships?
Admiral Mullen. LHD-8 will replace one of the aging LHA-class ship.
The other four LHAs will be replaced by LHA(R). The ongoing LHA(R) AoA
process is considering a range of options including a repeat LHD-8
(with fact-of-life changes), a modified LHD, and new ship designs.
Based on the analysis presented in the AoA, results of which are due in
summer 2002, the Navy will determine the optimal alternative for the
LHA(R).
19. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Mullen, why should we be budgeting
advance procurement funding in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy for
LHD-9 when we have not decided on a configuration for the LHA
replacement program, and when we have not paid off the rest of the $500
million+ we will owe on LHD-8 even after the funds in the fiscal year
2003 budget for LHD-8 are provided?
Admiral Mullen. The LHA replacement analysis of alternatives is
ongoing and will report out later this summer. The configuration for
LHA(R) will not be determined until then.
The $10 million in SCN AP funding was shifted to LHD-9 by the
Undersecretary of Defense Comptroller's office during the fiscal year
2003 OSD budget review process. Full funding of the LHD-8 in fiscal
year 2003 is a high priority item on the CNO's Unfunded Requirements
List.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
INNOVATIONS IN MANPOWER
20. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Wachendorf, the portion of your
testimony that deals with crew swapping is very interesting to me. I
have always urged the various services to find innovative ways to
increase operational tempo (OPTEMPO) where needed. I am excited to hear
that Vice Admiral Lafleur is undertaking the first pilot program in
this area. Does the Navy view crew swapping as a long-term plan to
increase OPTEMPO or is it meant to meet the needs of our current
situation in the war on terror?
Admiral Wachendorf. The general area of increasing presence via
alternative manning concepts was being studied prior to September 11.
As such, it is potentially part of a long-term plan to increase OPTEMPO
without the negative impacts on individual OPTEMPO. It could also be
viewed as a means of maintaining pre-September 11 presence levels with
a smaller force structure. The crew swaps described are two pilot
programs in the Pacific Fleet employing the deployment of Spruance-
class destroyers with the Abraham Lincoln battle group and Arleigh
Burke-class guided missile destroyers with the Constellation battle
group. Both groups of ships will swap crews at approximately 5.5 months
deployed. The idea is to take Fletcher (a Spruance-class destroyer in
the Lincoln battle group) and replace that crew with the Kincaid crew
(a Spruance-class destroyer in Constellation battle group). The ship
(Kincaid) would not deploy, but the (Kincaid) crew would fly out to
Australia, Singapore or another location to take over the ship from the
currently deployed crew. The Oldendorf crew from the Nimitz battle
group will relieve the Kincaid crew. There may be one more iteration
with a ship from the Vinson battle group.
Similarly the crew of Higgins (a DDG in the Constellation battle
group) will be relived on station by the crew of John P. Jones (Nimitz
battle group) and then by Benfold (Vinson battle group).
At the end of these pilots, various factors concerning crew morale,
welfare, and effectiveness will be evaluated to ensure that our attempt
to relieve individual OPTEMPO stress on our sailors ship is; in fact
accomplished. If we find our pilot did not meet our expectations, we
will discontinue this initiative.
21. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Wachendorf, even though crew swapping
will result in a longer period of time in port between cruises that
will allow maintenance and necessary upgrades to be done, will the
longer time at sea put more wear and tear on our ships and increase
operations cost?
Admiral Wachendorf. Although the crew swapping initiative will
reduce time spent transiting to and from forward areas, the anticipated
longer times at sea and the longer times between homeport periods may
put additional wear and tear on our ships and increase operations
costs. This is one of the aspects of the pilot program that will be
evaluated before the Navy makes a decision regarding expansion and/or
adoption.
HISTORICAL SERVICE LIFE VS. ESTIMATED SERVICE LIFE
22. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Wachendorf, in your testimony, you
point out that there is a disparity between the historical service life
of a ship and the estimated service life. I think this is a difficult
fact to stomach, as it seems to indicate that we are consciously making
rosy estimates for a ship's length of service. If this is so, something
must be done to bring our estimated service life even with the
historical service life. You do point out that this disparity is mainly
present in ships that have not been modernized. When one of our ships
does receive the necessary upgrades, does it, in fact, fill out its
estimated service life or does it still fall short?
Admiral Wachendorf. With appropriate upgrades and modernization
packages, many of our ships have met or exceeded estimated service life
(ESL). For example, having undergone periodic scheduled maintenance and
upgrades, Austin-class amphibious transport dock ships will have served
nearly four decades when they are replaced by LPD-17. Other ship
classes such as Farragut and Adams-class guided missile destroyers,
which were retired at 31 to 33 years of service, benefited from a
series of planned combat systems upgrades. The new threat upgrade (NTU)
package was considered for these ships, but was terminated since
modernization would not have been cost effective given the limited
service life remaining. Most destroyer classes, including Spruance-
class with vertical launch system capability added, have been
modernized to last 29 to 30 years, just short of the 35 year ESL.
Generally, the decision to retire a ship early or to modernize it to
reach ESL is a function of the continued relevance of its combat
systems to emergent threats versus modernization, operational and
support costs.
23. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Wachendorf, is this disparity taken
into consideration when the Navy projects fleet strength for future
years?
Admiral Wachendorf. Estimated service life is the primary factor
used for long-term estimates of fleet strength. The referenced
disparity between estimated service life and historical service life is
a fact of life resulting from a ship's operational tempo, maintenance,
and most significantly the continued relevance of installed technology
to emergent threats that cannot be accurately estimated very far into
the future. Typically, near-term investment decisions are based on
warfighting capability to be maintained or gained versus acquisition
and operational costs.
NEW OVERSEAS BASES
24. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Wachendorf, when you discussed the
augmentation of Navy presence at pre-established installations, you
only mentioned the Pacific. Did you consider increasing U.S. presence
in any other theaters, specifically, the Atlantic/European region?
Admiral Wachendorf. Requirements for augmentation of Navy presence
at pre-established installations in the Pacific were developed in
concert with the Joint Staff and CINCs and were based on regional
stability concerns throughout the world.
OVERALL SHIP PROCUREMENT
25. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen, your
budget for ship procurement requests just $6.1 billion for five ships.
This is half the number of ships required to sustain your present force
levels and is $5 billion below the Clinton administration's plan for
fiscal year 2003 request of $11 billion for eight ships that was
included in the fiscal year 2001 request. Each year, no matter who is
in the White House, the Navy comes before Congress to state that the
Navy plans to address the shortfall in ship procurement next year, or
the year after. Unfortunately the outyears never come. Would you please
submit for the record a copy of the Navy's shipbuilding plans included
in the Future Years defense Program for each of the last 8 years?
Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen. Navy's shipbuilding plan is
reviewed annually and programmed quantities can vary widely from year
to year as funding priorities change. For a given year, the following
table compares the projected quantities of new ship construction when
first programmed in the FYDP versus the actual budgeted quantities for
that year.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Quantity of Ships -----------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projected............................... 10 9 8 6 7 7 6 5 6
Budgeted................................ 4 3 4 4 6 6 6 6 5 \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Requested.
26. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen, if
additional funding were available, what would your priorities for
shipbuilding be?
Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen. If additional funding were
available for shipbuilding, Navy would invest in a combination of new
construction, conversions, and overhauls to maintain force structure
and required warfighting capabilities, as well as to provide workload
stability in the shipbuilding industry. The Department's priorities for
shipbuilding are as follows:
DDG-51: Add third ship in fiscal year 2003.
DDG-51 AP: Add AP for third DDG in fiscal year 2004.
LPD-17: Add second ship in fiscal year 2003.
Submarine Engineered Refueling Overhauls (ERO): Add
one ERO in fiscal year 2003.
LHD-8: Fully fund the ship in fiscal year 2003
(liquidates fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2006 incremental
funding tail).
Virginia-class Submarine AP: Procure an additional
ship set of nuclear AP and non-nuclear AP for a future ship.
CVN-69 RCOH: Fund $24 million of work removed from the
original overhaul package due to funding constraints. (Assumes
congressional support for $59 million ``cost of war'' request
contained in Fiscal Year 2002 Supplemental Request.)
CG Conversion: Fund two Baseline four conversions and
non-recurring engineering costs in fiscal year 2003.
LPD-17
27. Senator Landrieu. Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen, it seems
to me one of the reasons the shortfall for readiness funding is so high
is that we are stuck operating ships with higher operating and manning
costs. The 12 ship LPD-17 class is scheduled to replace 41 older
obsolete ships. The LPD-17 class will operate with roughly one third
the manpower (4,344 sailors versus 13,000 sailors). Can't we get our
operations, maintenance, and personnel costs under control by
continuing to move forward with modernization programs like LPD-17?
Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen. You are correct that moving
forward with our ship modernization program will have a dramatic affect
on operations, maintenance, and personnel costs. In the specific
example you bring up, the LPD-17 functionally replaces four classes of
ships (LKA-113, LPD-4, LSD-36, and LST-1179 classes) resulting in a net
savings to the Navy of almost 9,000 sailors and an operations and
support cost avoidance of over $4 billion once the final LPD-17 ship is
delivered.
In the particular area of ship personnel reductions, modernization
will pay large dividends for all our programs with the side benefit of
improved quality of life for sailors. The DD(X), JCC(X), and CVN(X)
platforms will operate with 20-50 percent fewer sailors per ship
compared to the ships they will replace.
ADEQUATE TRAINING
28. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Wachendorf, I understand that Admiral
Natter and Admiral Fargo have developed a schedule to sustain two
carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups in the war zone,
but that is being done by shrinking the inter-deployment training
cycle. I am concerned that, over time, this will result in our
deploying forces being less well-trained. What force structure of
carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups is required to
maintain this level of presence without shortening the inter-deployment
training cycle or extending deployment lengths beyond 6 months?
Admiral Wachendorf. Navy is capable of maintaining two aircraft
carriers in the war zone with the current fleet composition (12 CVBGs
and 12 ARGs) by changing most peacetime assumptions to those
appropriate for combating the war on terrorism. These changes include:
increasing transit speeds to theater; compressing training and
maintenance timelines; and reducing at home and at sea quality of life
stand-downs and port visits. Although the benchmarks of peacetime
PERSTEMPO, 6-month deployments and two to one turn-around ratios are
maintained; the maintenance, training, and personnel costs associated
with the increased OPTEMPO will grow.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
VIRGINIA-CLASS SUBMARINES
29. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what are the savings that
could be achieved for Virginia-class submarines fiscal year 2003
through fiscal year 2007 by applying multiyear procurement?
Secretary Young. The savings associated with multiyear procurement
of Virginia-class submarines varies from about $70 million per ship,
based on a five-ship contract, to about $115 million per ship, based on
a seven-ship contract. The savings are dependent on the use of material
and equipment buys in economic order quantities (EOQ).
30. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what are the savings that
could be achieved for Virginia-class submarines fiscal year 2003
through fiscal year 2007 by buying equipment in economic order
quantities?
Secretary Young. The saving associated with a ``block buy''
procurement of Virginia-class submarines with EOQ ranges from about $35
million per ship, based on a five-ship contract, to about $60 million
per ship, based on a seven-ship contract.
31. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what is the acquisition
strategy for the Virginia-class submarines included in the budget
request, and if not using economic order quantity authority provided in
fiscal year 2002 legislation, why not?
Secretary Young. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request
was based on procurement of one ship as part of a five-ship block buy
procurement through fiscal year 2007. The submarines would be built by
Electric Boat with Newport News Shipyard as a major sub-vendor in
accordance with their teaming agreement. The fiscal year 2003 request
includes advance procurement for 2-year long lead-time material for one
ship in fiscal year 2005 and 1-year advance procurement for one ship in
fiscal year 2004. EOQ investment was not included because the magnitude
of the offsets required to fund this strategy was not affordable within
the Department's fiscal year 2003 budget request.
SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT
32. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what amount of advance
procurement would be required in fiscal year 2003 to initiate a
multiyear procurement for the next 5 submarines?
Secretary Young. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request
includes advance procurement (AP) in fiscal year 2003 of $706.3 million
for long-lead-time materials (LLTM) for the fiscal year 2004 and fiscal
year 2005 ships. It assumes a block buy contract approach for the next
five submarines built at a rate of one per year.
To initiate a multiyear contract that includes economic order
quantity (EOQ) procurement of material for the next five submarines,
additional AP in the amount of $300 million is required in fiscal year
2003. Additional EOQ funding increments are required in the outyears to
fully fund the material ordered in fiscal year 2003. The material
ordered in quantity in fiscal year 2003 would be valued at
approximately $500 million per ship.
33. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what amount of advance
procurement would be required in fiscal year 2003 to initiate a
multiyear procurement for the next 7 submarines?
Secretary Young. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request
included AP in fiscal year 2003 of $706.3 million for LLTM for the
fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 ships. It assumes a block buy
contract approach for the next five submarines built at a rate of one
per year. A multiyear contract, by statute, cannot be for more than 5
years. Therefore, if the number of ships in a 5-year multiyear were
increased to 7, additional AP funding for LLTM would be required for 2
years and 1 year prior to the increase (i.e., in fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005 for an additional fiscal year 2006 ship).
To initiate a multiyear contract that included EOQ procurement of
material for the next seven submarines, additional AP in the amount of
$400 million is required in fiscal year 2003. Additional EOQ funding
increments are required in the outyears to fully fund the material
ordered in fiscal year 2003. The material ordered in quantity in fiscal
year 2003 would be valued at approximately $500 million per ship.
T-AKE AND COST IMPLICATIONS
34. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, if the Navy does not
exercise the option for the second option T-AKE ship in fiscal year
2004, what is your assessment of the cost implications for that ship?
Secretary Young. The estimated cost impact of delaying the second
option ship in fiscal year 2004 is an increase of approximately $30
million to the cost of that ship. The cost increase is due to inflation
and the impacts to shipyard contracts with suppliers and shipyard
production.
The contract impacts result from the shipyard renegotiating
supplier subcontracts due to the stretch in schedule. Currently all
vendor solicitations include option quantities timed to reflect the
contract option exercise schedule. Changing the procurement schedule
for the ship necessitates a change in the vendor procurement schedule
causing an increase in the associated subcontract.
The production impact results from the sub-optimal workload in the
shipyard. The current design and construction schedule under contract
results in an evenly distributed workload that matches National Steel
and Shipbuilding, Co., production capacity. Disturbing the even
distribution results in inefficiencies and higher costs.
The contract and production impacts affect more than just the
second fiscal year 2004 ship option, since the remaining ships bear the
increase in costs associated with disturbing the evenly distributed
workload. The total impact on the T-AKE program procurement costs due
to anticipated changes to contract delivery schedules is an increase of
between $50-$70 million.
JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL SHIP
35. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, when will you have the
information required to ask for proposals to acquire the joint command
and control ship?
Secretary Young. The President's fiscal year 2003 budget request
includes a lead ship in fiscal year 2006 and two ships in fiscal year
2007. The acquisition strategy currently under development plans an
initial request for proposal for preliminary design efforts in early
fiscal year 2003 to support a competitive award for detail design and
construction in fiscal year 2006.
36. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, is there adequate funding in
this request for gathering that required information?
Secretary Young. Efforts are currently underway to support
requirement definition for the joint command and control ship and
adequate funding exists in the PB03 request to support an award for
preliminary design efforts in fiscal year 2003.
37. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what type of acquisition
strategy will the Navy pursue?
Secretary Young. The acquisition strategy is currently in
development, but will include a competitive procurement. Due to the
limited planned quantities for this class, the winning competitor is
envisioned to build all the ships.
SHIPBUILDING COSTS--TRADE-OFF
38. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, how will you ensure that
program managers do not trade-off capability to avoid creating a prior
shipbuilding cost?
Secretary Young. Control of prior year shipbuilding cost growth is
one of the Department's top priorities. I have provided specific
guidance to all shipbuilding program managers delineating their
responsibility for executing the complete scope of the program within
budget, specifically configuration control of the approved baseline.
The guidance is very specific on what changes to the program baseline
that the program manager may approve. It is anticipated that this very
detailed direction and guidance will enable the program managers to
operate within established change order budgets. Any increased cost
change to the baseline that does not meet the criteria of an approvable
change will be submitted to the Ship Characteristics Improvement Panel
for consideration and must be accompanied by funding recommendations.
Through this tight control of changes or upgrades to the approved
baseline, it is expected that increased change order requirements will
not be a source of prior year shipbuilding cost growth. Before program
managers are allowed to descope warfighting capability to avoid
creating a prior year bill, senior civilian and uniformed Navy
leadership would meet and agree on any deleted capability.
39. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, does the Navy intend to
obtain congressional approval prior to changing (cost/capability trade-
off) a congressionally appropriated and authorized configuration for
ships?
Secretary Young. Congress will be informed of significant changes
to the cost/capabilities of authorized and appropriated ships through
Selected Acquisition Reports, the annual budget review briefings and
whenever information is requested.
t-5
40. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, on the T-5 tanker buy-out
proposal, what other alternatives did you consider other than buying
out the T-5 tanker leases and what savings do you expect from the buy-
out?
Secretary Young. Various alternatives were examined. First, we
considered the costs of letting the current leases run their course
through 2005 and 2006 and replacing the ships by going to the tanker
charter market after that. Second, we considered extending the current
charters for an additional 5 or 10 years. Lastly, we looked at a
construction program for replacement tankers.
Assuming the ships can be used for an additional ten years, we
estimate that exercising the Navy's purchase options will save $440
million (net of purchase price) over the life of the ships as compared
to the first alternative. We estimate that both an extension and a new
construction program would yield half of that.
41. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, have thorough surveys of
these ships been completed to determine what the maintenance costs will
be once these ships are owned by the Navy and that they are worth
buying?
Secretary Young. These ships are under a continuous survey program
through the American Bureau of Shipping. Each of the five ships
involved in the purchase have been surveyed in the past year and all
were determined to be in very good condition. The Navy has directly
reimbursed the maintenance of these ships over the years and we believe
that they are, and will continue to be, in very good condition. In our
analysis, we presumed that maintenance costs would gradually rise as
the ships get older and our savings estimates account for those rises.
SHIPBOARD FIRE SUPPORT
42. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, has the Navy considered
alternatives which would enable the Navy to deploy the shipboard fire
support required by the Marine Corps and resident in the 155 mm gun by
the original fiscal year 2009 target date?
Secretary Young. Due to the large increase in weight from current
guns to the 155 millimeter advanced gun system (AGS), it does not
appear to be practical to install AGS on any existing surface combatant
without significant ship modification. As such, there does not appear
to be an opportunity to deploy the capabilities inherent to AGS until
it enters the fleet with DD(X) in 2012.
To illustrate, the AGS with 600 (long range land attack projectile)
rounds would weigh approximately 400 tons. With two AGS guns with one
600-round magazine each on DD(X), the weight would total 800 tons. In
order to accommodate this significant load, DD(X) has been designed as
a total ship system with gun placement a primary consideration in the
ship architecture. In comparison, the 5,,/62-caliber Mark 45 Mod 4 gun
with 232 extended range guided munitions rounds and 210 conventional
rounds currently weighs approximately 60 tons.
43. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what investment would it
take to take advantage of a wider application of spiral development to
push forward with the new hull, gun, and radars for the first 10 ships
and move up the delivery date of the DD(X) destroyer?
Secretary Young. Spiral development is the defining characteristic
of the restructured DD(X) program. However, preliminary and critical
ship design timelines and the schedule for engineering development
modules prototype risk reduction testing make it impractical and risky
to start construction of the lead DD(X) any earlier than fiscal year
2005. Spiral development will play a key role in defining the level of
warfighting capability that will be delivered with the first flight of
DD(X) in fiscal year 2011, but the Navy believes that the current
program schedule provides the best balance between program development
risk and future fleet force structure requirements.
BUDGET MANAGEMENT
44. Senator Sessions. Secretary Young, what processes and policies
prevent two or more program managers from developing like capabilities
resulting in the taxpayer paying twice for the same technology?
Secretary Young. We certainly don't want to pay twice for
developing the same technology. However, we often want to develop
different technologies that achieve a similar capability. Pursuing
families of technologies is prudent, and we do it intentionally. It
reduces risk and gives the taxpayer the best return on investment.
To avoid buying the same technology twice, the Office of Naval
Research (ONR) uses a five-step oversight cycle:
1. Division heads exercise administrative oversight of the program
officers.
2. Department heads exercise administrative oversight of their
divisions and program officers.
3. ONR's Program Council exercises routine corporate-level
oversight by approving individual awards.
4. The Departments' boards of visitors--distinguished groups of
outside expert who function a bit like university accreditation teams--
provide an external review of our programs.
5. At the DOD level, we participate in the Department-wide planning
and assessment process (Defense S&T Reliance) which provides the same
oversight coordination desired above for the entire DOD.
Finally, we not only want to avoid duplication of effort, but we
also want to be able to take advantage of advances and opportunities
across a broad spectrum of scientific fields. Tracking specific awards
within our overall scientific strategy helps ensure communication
between program officers, and helps ensure multidisciplinary
integration occurs.
SURFACE COMBATANTS
45. Senator Sessions. Admiral Mullen, what will be the impact on
the remaining 108 surface combatants of decommissioning ships early?
Admiral Mullen. The 2001 QDR presented a force structure of 108
active and 8 Reserve surface combatants. This force structure was
assessed across several combinations of scenarios on the basis of the
new defense strategy and force-sizing construct, and the capabilities
of this force were judged as presenting moderate operational risk.
The Navy's goal is to continue to maintain current OPTEMPO
standards while accepting moderate operational risk to recapitalize the
force during this time to meet future requirements, achieving 116
surface combatants by 2010.
This strategy is the groundwork for the onset of the family of
ships transition that bridges the gap between existing force structure
and future ships. This does reduce the number of ships, in the near-
term, but includes the additional enhanced warfighting capability that
the multi-mission DDG-51-class has over the retiring DDs. Adding more
DDG-51s and introducing initiatives, like sea-swap in the DDs and DDGs,
to improve OPTEMPO and on-station time, reduces the risk by adding more
strike, force protection, and undersea warfare capability to the
existing force both forward deployed and at home.
46. Senator Sessions. Admiral Mullen, what additional funding would
be required, by fiscal year, to keep a base force of 116 surface
combatants throughout the FYDP, and what would be the recommendation
for composition of that base force by fiscal year?
Admiral Mullen. The actual composition of the force would depend on
multiple assumptions (dominated within the FYDP by decommissionings
versus new construction) and funding options. However, one option to
reach 116 surface combatants would be to maintain the current mix of
CGs, DDGs, and FFGs and postpone the scheduled decommissioning of 16
Spruance-class destroyers:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Class --------------------------------------------
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- NRF-FFG.......................................................... 8 8 8 8 8
- FFG.............................................................. 22 22 22 22 22
- DD-963........................................................... 16 16 13 9 5
- CG-47............................................................ 27 27 27 27 27
- DDG-51........................................................... 39 43 46 50 54
--------------------------------------------
Total............................................................ 112 116 116 116 116
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cost to crew, maintain, and operate a Spruance buy-back plan
that yields a surface combatant force level of 116 is $1.2 billion as
articulated by the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Total Savings ------------------------------------------------------------ Total
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- Ship Operations....................... 14.9 48.3 74.8 68.4 46.5 252.9
- Maintenance........................... 23.9 41.0 87.1 81.3 67.0 300.3
- Manpower.............................. 13.6 117.8 192.5 201.2 134.6 659.7
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................. 52.4 207.1 354.4 350.9 248.1 1,212.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Spruance decommissioning decision is driven by affordability.
Under the program of record, the force level decreases over the FYDP
largely due to the decommissioning of the more costly (manpower and
maintenance), less capable (older technology) DD-963 class ships.
However in fiscal year 2010, the force will exceed the 116 goal with
the continued commissioning of new DDGs and the first DD(X). Although
in the short-term the force level drops below the QDR level of 116, the
Navy emerges with a more capable and more affordable force beginning in
fiscal year 2010.
47. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, did the Navy's cost/
benefit analysis on reducing surface combatant force structure
determine the additional risk to national security associated with
dropping to 108 surface combatants? If so, provide the determination,
and if not, what is the Navy's current assessment?
Admiral Wachendorf. The cost/benefit analysis to reduce the number
of surface combatants to 108 was primarily based on affordability in
the context of today's threat environment. The decision to drop below
116 was a short-term reduction to allow for the development and
construction of more capable ships. Although in the near-term we drop
below the QDR force level of 116, we emerge in fiscal year 2010 with a
more capable force. This more capable force includes over 60 DDGs, 27
Aegis cruisers, and a more common architecture of combat systems with
capabilities specific to the threat of 2010 and beyond. In addition,
the restructuring of the force will allow for new ships to be built to
a reduced manning standard and will improve life cycle management costs
well into the future. This incurs a moderate risk associated with a
near-term drop in ship structure to allow for a long-term capability
growth in the force.
POTENTIAL BASES
48. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, are there any overseas
locations that have been analyzed to provide a forward base for quick
reaction missile defense, maritime interdiction, and/or Tomahawk
capability of a few ships that would not be attached to a battle group
such as the ships in the Persian Gulf that perform those duties on a
rotational basis?
Admiral Wachendorf. There are several alternatives for homeporting
3-4 surface combatants in WESTPAC to provide a forward base for quick
reaction missile defense. Singapore, Darwin, Australia and Chinhae,
South Korea are all politically amenable to having strong U.S. force
presence. They all have piers and harbor facilities that can
accommodate Aegis ships. However all of these ports would need
significant infrastructure improvement to properly support the
stationing of U.S. ships. For example, pier electricity, CHT waste
facilities, oily waste, refueling storage and delivery, NIPRNET/SIPRNET
connectivity and all of the required base support services such as
housing, medical, schools, exchanges and maintenance facilities would
need to be constructed and manned. Additionally, land would need to be
purchased to support basing options. Since there are no U.S. facilities
in place in these harbors, it would be a large investment to develop
the infrastructure to support 3-4 ships.
Japan has several ports that can facilitate U.S. ships. There would
be significant political opposition to increasing forces anywhere in
Japan. Yokosuka, Japan, is the current homeport for the forward
deployed naval forces (FDNF) carrier battle group. The Yokosuka Naval
Base is jointly operated by the U.S. and Japan. It possesses the
infrastructure for basing and maintenance, but lacks the pier space to
support additional ships. Ship changes are done on a one-for-one basis.
The Japanese government provides support each year to offset costs.
The Japanese are under an economic strain and would like to reduce the
amount they contribute towards supporting all U.S. forces. The local
Japanese workforce is extremely well disciplined and skilled; the
maintenance they provide is equal or superior to that found stateside.
Logistics support for U.S. forces is enshrined in Japanese law, and a
massive infrastructure for dependents-support and R&R has been
established.
Guam as a U.S. territory also provides potential. It is the United
States' only guaranteed failsafe against the loss of basing rights in
East Asia. The revenue increases to Guam would be a significant benefit
for its economy. Housing and amenities for U.S. personnel/dependents
are adequate, though expansion and renovation (of existing housing
stock) would be required. Since Guam was a large naval base in the past
and already has infrastructure to support U.S. forces, it was used as a
model to benchwork costs for forward basing ships. With the exception
of Japan, costs in all other areas would exceed projected costs in
Guam. In addition to infrastructure upgrades, a costly environmental
impact assessment would need to be conducted. Estimated timeframe to
achieve environmental approval and build the necessary typhoon/
earthquake hardened infrastructure is a minimum of 7 years. A major
concern in achieving upgrades to infrastructure overseas is the ability
to divert the workforce. In addition to the local workforce, both
skilled and unskilled labor would have to be brought into the country
to support efforts.
Excluding Japan, Guam is the most cost effective location to
station additional combatants with TMD capability and closest to
support East Asian missions. The Guam decision would reverse a 1995
BRAC decision to reduce facilities. Japan is the most cost effective
and closest location to support a TMD mission in East Asia. We already
have established facilities to support ships and personnel. The quality
of life available in Japan is far superior to that offered in other
WESTPAC locations. Training opportunities already exist in Japan.
EMPLOYMENT ALTERNATIVES FOR SSGN
49. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, what operational
employment alternatives is the Navy considering to get the maximum
operational days out of the SSGN converted submarines?
Admiral Wachendorf. Four Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN) are funded for refueling and conversion to SSGN.
These submarines will have a 70 percent operational tempo allowing them
to spend 14 years of their remaining 20 year lifetime forward deployed.
In other terms, their high operational tempo will allow between two and
three SSGNs to be in theater continuously for 20 years beginning in
2007/2008. This operational tempo is achievable by employing the
following concept of operations:
SSGNs will retain the two-crew concept currently
employed onboard our SSBNs and leverage off the training and
maintenance infrastructures already in place in Kings Bay,
Georgia and Bangor, Washington.
Crew exchange and limited scope maintenance evolutions
will be conducted ``in theater'' (e.g. at forward bases) to the
maximum extent. SSGNs will only return to CONUS (Bangor or
Kings Bay) for long-term maintenance, the frequency of which is
under review.
``INCREASE THE MISSION CAPABILITY OF THE ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE''
50. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, what are the Navy's
comments regarding the conclusions of the Congressional Budget Office
March 2002 study ``Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack
Submarine Force''?
Admiral Wachendorf. Although not fully exploring all of the details
of each area, the CBO study provides an informative analysis of SSN
force structure and recommends three options to improve the
effectiveness of our submarine force. Each of these recommendations
have already been implemented in various degrees as follows:
1. Conversion of four Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines
to SSGN. This is a funded program today for delivery of SSGN starting
in 2007. A future SSGN/SSN force will meet today and future mission
requirements will be studied over the next several years.
2. Multi-crew manning of attack submarines. There are several
unique issues that are not fully explored by the study. Dual/multi-
crewing of SSNs is challenging for several reasons. An independent
study that provides more depth is in the final stages of development.
Of note, the submarine force has experience with dual-crewing onboard
single mission SSBNs and is currently working through how this concept
will transition to multi-mission forward deployed SSGNs.
3. Forward-basing attack submarines in Guam. The force will be
basing SSNs in Guam for the first time starting in 2002. By early 2004,
three SSNs will have been refueled and moved to Guam. The three SSNs
are all first flight 688s that will have sufficient fuel to allow them
to be operated at a higher OPTEMPO until their end of life. Over the
next several years as the SSNs are operated from Guam, the submarine
force will further explore the lessons and benefits from this type of
force employment and its applications to other classes of submarines.
These three SSNs will leverage off the current base infrastructure in
Guam. Homeporting additional SSNs in Guam would require upgrading the
base facilities at significant expense to the government.
51. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, would applying the
applicable concepts to surface combatants have a similar effect on
their operational days?
Admiral Wachendorf. In line with the CBO study on ``Increasing the
Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force,'' Navy is conducting
two pilot ``crew swap'' projects programs in the Pacific Fleet whereby
individual ship deployments would be extended to 11.5 months or longer
while holding crew deployments at 6 months. In essence, crews would
swap at mid point of the ship's deployment. Through the pilot programs,
Navy hopes to determine the true costs and potential savings, while
developing lessons learned to provide a firm analytical basis for
recommendations to either expand the program or look for other
alternatives.
HISTORICAL LIFE V. ESTIMATED SERVICE LIFE
52. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, is the Navy the using
historical life or estimated service life in the calculations for
determining required investment to maintain about 300 ships?
Admiral Wachendorf. Estimated service life (ESL) is one of several
criteria the Navy uses to determine when and how much to invest in
recapitalization to maintain our force structure. We also consider
average age of the fleet and acquisition rates required to maintain
core warfighting capabilities. Based on ESL alone, assuming a fleet-
wide average ship service life of about 35 years, the Navy needs to
procure about 8.9 ships per year at a cost of about $12 billion per
year to maintain about 310 ships.
53. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, what is the impact on the
annual number of ships the Navy will have to build and the resulting
annual investment required if historical instead of estimated service
life is used, and which should the Navy use to calculate their
investment requirements?
Admiral Wachendorf. Based on actual decommissioning data for all
battle force ships over the last 10 years and projected service life of
ships in commission, average historical service life (HSL) is about 30
years versus an average ESL of 35 years. Using the average HSL to
determine shipbuilding requirements, the Navy would have to procure
about 10.3 ships per year and invest about $12-$14 billion per year to
maintain a 310 ship fleet.
Service life by itself is not used to determine investment
requirements. Needed warfighting capabilities, projected investment
requirements to maintain/operate existing fleet assets, sustaining the
shipbuilding industrial base and the available Navy TOA in addition to
service life are variables Navy relies upon in determining when and how
much to invest.
TRAINING ON TRANSIT
54. Senator Sessions. Admiral Wachendorf, your written testimony
regarding pre-positioning ships in forward operating areas suggests
that combatants could not be pre-positioned because they have complex
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) and weapons systems aboard
and that a crew flown in would have to take time to develop
proficiency. This time would negate the time gained in not having to
transit with the ship. Are there ships in the Navy for which this
concept would be applicable such as auxiliary and support ships; and
for combatants, whether or not the concept would provide a capability
to the Navy, if the crews that flew out to man the ships were trained
in a similar platform in the U.S. prior to flying out to the ship?
Admiral Wachendorf. Unit readiness depends on both the ability of
sailors to perform their individual specialties and on their
integration into a proficient team that is able to fully employ the
capabilities of their ship. This proficiency is developed through
training during the inter-deployment training cycle and transit. Ship
configurations are not identical; there are differences in both the
individual skill requirements and the mix of specialties even between
ships of the same class. As a result, some period of familiarization
and team training on the systems unique to that ship will be required
to achieve full crew proficiency on any new ship. In general, the less
complex the ship systems and smaller the differences between the old
and new ship, the less training will be required on arrival. The
training required to achieve full crew proficiency would likely be less
for auxiliary and support ships than for combatants. For all ship
classes, having crews trained on similar platforms in the U.S. prior to
joining the ship would reduce, but not eliminate, the time required to
develop proficiency once onboard.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
SENATOR LOTT'S ROLE IN THE SHIPBUILDING PLAN
55. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in a January 28, 2002 article
``Responding to Lott, DOD Starts Funding LHD-9 And One More DDG-51'' by
Chris Castelli in the publication Inside the Navy, the article states:
``At the urging of Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott
(Republican--Mississippi), the Pentagon has made last minute
adjustments to the Navy's shipbuilding plan in the Bush
administration's fiscal year 2003 budget. The Pentagon put $74
million more toward a third DDG-51 destroyer and allocated $10
million in advance procurement for a ninth amphibious ship--LHD
9--that was not previously in the Navy's budget.''
Is this true, yes or no?
Admiral Mullen. The OSD Comptroller made two late changes to the
Navy's fiscal year 2003 shipbuilding budget request by adding $74
million in advance procurement funding for a third DDG-51 destroyer in
fiscal year 2004, and shifting $10 million for advance procurement
funding for a fiscal year 2008 LHD-9. Any specific questions on the
factors that precipitated the decision for these shifts should be
referred to the OSD Comptroller.
AOA IN CONCERN TO LHA REPLACEMENT
56. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, can provide the status of the
AOA to replace the current LHA with an LHA(R)?
Admiral Mullen. The LHA replacement [LHA(R)] AoA is scheduled to
complete in the summer of 2002. The AoA is evaluating several
alternatives including a repeat LHD-8, a modified LHD-8, and an
entirely new ship design.
57. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, are you also aware that the
Comptroller in the Office of the Secretary of Defense deleted the
funding for the study on the AOA-cutting $16 million from the RDT&E
effort for the LHA replacement?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, the Department is aware of this situation.
During the November 2001 review of the Navy's Fiscal Year 2003 budget,
the OSD Comptroller's office deleted fiscal year 2003 and 2004 research
and development (R&D) funding for the LHA(R) program.
LHA(R) R&D funding throughout the FYDP was briefed to and approved
by OSD (including the OSD Comptroller) at milestone A as the minimum
R&D funding necessary to support the least expensive LHA(R) AoA
alternative--a repeat LHD-8. Since the AoA completes in fiscal year
2002, this fiscal year 2003-2004 research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) deletion does not directly impact the AoA study, the
AoA final report or the Navy's ability to decide which LHA(R)
alternative to pursue. However, the Department of the Navy will select
a preferred alternative based on the results of the AoA and adjust
RDT&E and SCN profiles as required to move forward.
58. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, does the $10 million in advance
procurement for LHA-9 that was added by the OSD Comptroller according
to the Castelli article predetermine the results of the AOA?
Admiral Mullen. No. The results of the LHA(R) AoA are not
predetermined. The preferred alternative may or may not be based on the
LHD-8. The LHA(R) AoA is ongoing and will report out in summer 2002.
Alternatives being considered include: repeat LHD-8 with evolutionary
modifications, modified LHD-8 upgraded to enhance the ability to
operate the larger and/or heavier new generation amphibious systems,
and new ship designs spanning a wide range in size and capability.
Based on the analysis presented in the AoA, the Navy will determine the
optimal alternative for the LHA(R) as part of the LHA(R) program. The
$10 million in the fiscal year 2003 budget request allows the Navy to
begin refining the AoA selected alternative's detailed capabilities/
characteristics and other developmental work.
COMPARING LHA TO LHD
59. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, you know that I have traveled
to Afghanistan with other members of this committee. While there, I
heard from several Navy and Marine Corps officers that the number one
concern for replacing the LHA is safety because of a stability problem
or high center of gravity issue, especially with deployed aircraft.
Their concern was that even with some minor fixes with fuel
compensation systems, the problem will be exacerbated when the Service
deploys larger aircraft, such as the Osprey (MV-22) and the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) which are replacements for the CH-46 and AV-8B
respectively. I am told that the MV-22 is twice the weight of the CH-46
and that the JSF is believed to be about twice the weight of the AV-8B.
Does the LHD class have similar stability problems as the LHA class?
Admiral Mullen. The seven ships of the LHD class have improved
stability characteristics over the LHA class and, therefore, do not
experience weight and center of gravity issues to the same extent as
the LHA. For example, LHD-7, commissioned in 2001, has greater than the
required 1000 long tons of service life weight growth allowance.
60. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, would you agree that the
problem could be exacerbated with the planned future aircraft and
vehicles envisioned for the Marine Corps?
Admiral Mullen. LHDs have the growth allowance to accommodate MV-22
and JSF with aggressive weight control measures and the fuel oil
compensation ship alteration although LHDs have less vehicle storage
space (square footage) than LHAs.
The Navy's five LHAs need to be replaced as soon as possible, as
they are rapidly reaching the end of an already extended service life.
The LHA(R) AoA was initiated to ensure that both Marine Corps and Navy
21st century requirements are addressed, including the issues the
Senator raises regarding the impact of heavier and larger aircraft/
vehicles and overall amphibious force vehicle storage area. An LHD
repeat is just one of several alternatives being considered in the
LHA(R) AOA to meet requirements.
61. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what growth percentages are
currently planned for the LHD class of ships?
Admiral Mullen. The CNO-specified minimum service life allowance
for the LHD class at delivery from the building yard is 0.5 feet KG (KG
= ship's center of gravity above the keel) and 1,000 long tons of
displacement service life (about 2.5 percent). The requirement is
documented in the LHD class top level requirements document of August
2, 1991.
62. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, is the LHD a good replacement
for the LHA class of ships, considering that the ship does not meet the
requirement in planned future vehicles and aircraft for the Marine
Corps or our special operations community and considering the
amphibious lift requirement of 2.5/3.0 MEB?
Admiral Mullen. Among several alternatives, the ongoing AoA is
addressing whether the LHD is a good replacement for the LHA class.
Continuing to build LHDs, as well as ship design modifications to
enhance the capability to operate the larger and heavier new generation
amphibious systems such as the Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22 Osprey,
advanced amphibious assault vehicle and medium tactical vehicle
replacement is currently being examined. The AoA is also investigating
the optimum way to reach the fiscally constrained amphibious lift
requirement of 2.5 Marine expeditionary brigades. The AoA is expected
to report out later this year.
63. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, because of the well deck inside
the LHD, isn't the LHD available square footage less than the LHA?
Admiral Mullen. LHD available vehicle stowage space is
approximately 4,500 square feet less than the LHA. Both ship classes
have large well decks, which are approximately the same length.
Modifications to the LHD well deck design allow LHDs to carry two
additional landing craft air cushion (LCACs) compared to the LHA. While
giving up vehicle stowage space in the LHD, other design changes were
made to improve the aviation capabilities and provide more protection
for critical command and decision spaces in the LHD.
R&D FUNDING
64. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, it seems to me that the LHD is
not a very transformational program, especially considering that it is
the exact same hull of the current LHA class that is based on a 1950s
design. It seems to me that if the LHA (R) class ship is built to have
a lifespan of 50 years with no further R&D invested, then LHD-9 will be
a 100-year old design when it is decommissioned in the 2050 timeframe.
Would the Navy develop an aircraft carrier (CVN), destroyer (DD), or
submarine (SSN) without a robust R&D effort?
Admiral Mullen. No, the Navy would not build a new ship class
without a robust R&D effort. The LHA replacement AoA is ongoing and
will report out later this summer. The Navy plans to use the $10
million added by OSD for LHD-9 in the fiscal year 2003 President's
budget request to initiate engineering development of the LHA(R) AoA
preferred alternative, regardless of which alternative is selected. In
addition, RDT&E resources will need to be adjusted to reflect the
preferred alternative.
65. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, where is the R&D funding for a
major amphibious ship like LHA(R)?
Admiral Mullen. R&D funding was deleted from the fiscal year 2003
budget under the misconception that Navy was leaning toward an LHD-8
repeat as the preferred replacement for LHA-class ships and would not
require as much R&D and not until later in the FYDP. If the results of
the AoA support a modified repeat LHD or new ship design, additional
RDT&E funds will be required. At that time, it may be necessary to
revisit the current plan to use the $10 million in fiscal year 2003 SCN
AP for a LHD-9.
66. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, are you not relegating the
amphibious Navy to non-transformational status?
Admiral Mullen. No. While the LHA(R) hull shape may be close to the
original, its combat systems suite, communications gear and information
technology set up will be state of the art. What we envision for
LHA(R)--advanced command and control capabilities, network centric
warfare systems, Joint Strike Fighter, onboard targeting--will enable
LHA(R) to support expeditionary maneuver warfare in a manner that was
not imaginable when the LHAs were designed. The planned service life of
the LHA(R) class, like the LHD class, will be 40 years.
BUYING T-5 TANKERS
67. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, on February 8, Rear Admiral
Church, USN, delivered to Congress the Department of the Navy's
``Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Overview.'' On page 18 of the Navy's budget
brief is a slide called ``Promote Better Business Practices, Managing
the Department in a Business-like Manner.'' I noticed a bullet that
states ``T-5 Tanker Buyout.'' Will you please tell the me why the Navy
has decided in its fiscal year 2003 budget to buy the T-5 tankers
rather than to continue to lease them as was the plan several years
ago?
Admiral Mullen. The T-5 tankers were leased in the early eighties
rather than purchased because of the budgetary circumstances that
existed at the time. When the ships were leased, the Navy negotiated
for favorable purchase options that, conditions permitting, could be
exercised at the appropriate time. Those conditions exist and that time
is now. We have a continuing need for these vessels beyond their lease
terms, which end in 2005 and 2006. If we let our options expire, we
will end up chartering (leasing) higher cost replacement tankers.
PURCHASING CRUISE SHIPS
68. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, there are reports that the Navy
is being approached to purchase a pair of unfinished cruise ships at
the Northrop Grumman Shipyard in Pacagoula left behind when American
Classic Voyages went bankrupt for use as mobile housing or hospital
ships. Is the Navy in any way interested in purchasing such ships?
Admiral Mullen. The Maritime Administration, which now ``owns'' one
of the two ships due to the default on Title XI loans, has inquired
about the Navy's interest in acquiring the incomplete passenger cruise
ships available as a result of the bankruptcy of American Classic
Voyages, Inc. The Conference Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2002
Department of Defense Appropriations Act also addressed this issue.
A team of Navy engineers recently visited the partially completed
passenger ships in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and concluded that the
ships are not suitable for use as command and control ships due to
their structural design and lack of military survivability features. We
also explored the ship's utility for other non-combat ship missions and
found that while it may be technically feasible to modify the ships for
use as hospital, recreational, or berthing vessels, the Navy does not
anticipate a requirement for additional ships of this type.
Accordingly, the Navy has declined the offer to acquire or use the
cruise ships under construction.
69. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, is there a need for such ships?
Admiral Mullen. No. We looked at the ships' utility for non-combat
ship missions and found that while it may be technically feasible to
modify the ships for use as hospital, recreational or berthing vessels,
the Navy does not have a requirement nor the need for any more of these
ship types today.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
THE VALUE OF DD(X) AND FAMILY OF SHIPS
70. Senator Collins. Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen, DD(X) is
expected to make a significant contribution in the Navy's ability to
achieve affordability breakthroughs with dramatic reductions in fleet
O&M including personnel costs, and DD(X) should allow the Navy to field
a fleet of highly capable and affordable warships. Would you discuss
the value that you believe DD(X) and its family of ships will provide
the Navy team, and further comment on the criticality of the $961
million investment proposed in the fiscal year 2003 budget for this
family of ships?
Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen. Maritime dominance in the 21st
century requires a naval force capable of projecting power and
defeating anti-access threats. U.S. naval forces will be required to
project power forward, provide assured access in the littoral
environment and support a wide variety of joint and combined
operations. Defeating and deterring future national threats will
require a wide range of capabilities provided from a family of ships.
These ships will be required to provide:
Precision strike and volume fires;
Anti-access littoral missions; and
Missile defense.
In order to accomplish these complex and challenging missions, the
future surface naval force will consist of four elements:
Advanced, multi-mission destroyers, DD(X), capable of
providing precision strike and volume fires,
Advanced cruisers, CG(X), providing sustained air
superiority against air-breathing and ballistic threats,
Agile littoral combat ships (LCS) capable of defeating
enemy littoral defenses including mines, small boats, and
diesel submarines, and
In-service Aegis-equipped surface ships.
Transformation of the future naval force starts with the DD(X)
technology development effort. Many of the cutting edge and future
technologies that will assure maritime dominance are being developed
under the DD(X) program for the future family of ships.
The fiscal year 2003 budget request for DD(X) supports provides
funding to support the downselect to a single design agent in Spring
2002 and the development of transformational systems. The DD(X) design
agent will focus on the development of engineering development models
(EDMs) during fiscal year 2003 including:
Advanced gun system and magazine;
Integrated power systems;
Radar suite (multi-function radar/volume search
radar);
Total ship computing environment;
Advanced vertical launch system;
Integrated deckhouse and apertures;
Autonomic fire suppression system;
Infrared mock-ups;
Hull form scale model; and
Integrated undersea warfare system.
In fiscal year 2003, the design agent will also perform design
studies to support the spiral design review/requirements revalidation
and the integration/evolution of the overall DD(X) ship design. Full
funding is critical to achieve the innovation and transformational
technologies that DD(X) will bring to the fleet.
DDG-51 AND FF6-7
71. Senator Collins. Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen, please
delineate the Navy's plans for funding near-term efforts on the DDG-51
destroyer optimized manning initiative and for FF6-7 frigate
modernization. In the case of DDG-51, the plan to implement optimized
manning initiative can enhance operational readiness and significantly
but safely reduce crew-size. This initiative, I understand, has great
potential to dramatically reduce Navy ship O&S costs, while at the same
time enhancing sailor quality of service, and in the case of FF6-7
modernization--an acceleration of planned activities, including force
protection upgrades. The plan would maintain mission functionality,
improve reliability/maintainability and safety, and upgrade combat
detection and ship self-defense capabilities. This initiative, I
understand, is crucial given Navy leadership's decision to maintain the
remaining 33-ship FFG force, in part because of the expectation these
ships may have roles related to the evolving homeland defense mission.
Please comment on the more general question of whether investing in or
accelerating both initiatives is likely to pay larger dividends in
terms of a more capable and affordable surface force in the long-term.
Secretary Young and Admiral Mullen. Last year, N76 tasked Program
Executive Office Theater Surface Combatants (PEO TSC) to ``. . .
examine technologies, both current and prospective that have a
potential of reducing the manning of the DDG-51-class combatants'' and
``. . . examine policies and procedures that could also affect
manning.'' In response, PEO TSC chartered a DDG-51-Class Manning
Assessment Panel to begin defining and evaluating options to reduce
manning on Arleigh Burke-class combatants. Their initial findings and
recommendations are currently being briefed to Navy leadership. In
parallel with this undertaking, each fleet CINC is conducting an
``experiment'' to reduce manning on one cruiser and one DDG in their
respective fleets. This ``experiment'' is ongoing and two of the ships
should deploy soon. The goal is to take lessons learned from these
reduced manning experiments and evaluate the results in conjunction
with the studies being conducted by the DDG-51 Manning Assessment Panel
to determine the best long-term solution for DDG manning. Once these
evaluations are complete the most beneficial technology projects could
be considered for funding. Preliminary findings to date, however, make
it clear that any one technology application alone will not
significantly reduce manning, but can act as an enabler.
The Navy has committed to modernizing the FFG class by upgrading
both its hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) as well as topside
combat system enhancements for 24 ships in the class. Through 1999
efforts, the Navy determined its lead maintenance concerns with the
class and is moving forward with contract awards to address those
concerns. These HM&E efforts include: re-engine the ships service
diesel generators; 6,800 GPD reverse osmosis desalinization capability;
and replacement of the rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) davit with a
slew arm davit (SLAD) to improve both RHIB launch safety and decrease
the high maintenance cost of the existing davit. Additional
enhancements include installation of self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA) and ventilation modifications to the ships main spaces.
Combat system improvements include installation of the close-in
weapons system block 1B with surface firing capability and the
installation of Nulka anti-ship missile decoy launching system.
Fielding for both of these modernization efforts will take place
between fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2007. Additional modernization
efforts for the remaining ships in the class are being carried above
core during the fiscal year 2004 budget development process. Force
protection upgrades have been recently defined as an additional MK-38
25mm chain gun and the installation of two additional .50 caliber
machine gun (MG) mounts with their associative ammunition storage
lockers and communications circuits required. Costs to install those
defensive systems are being developed and should mature in time for
installation during the timeline for the above-mentioned modernization
efforts.
A THIRD DDG
72. Senator Collins. Secretary Young, the President's fiscal year
2003 budget request proposes making an additional down payment on a
third fiscal year 2003 DDG. The $74 million advanced procurement added
to the $125 million appropriated by Congress late last year provides a
meaningful commitment and another building block to funding and
executing a shipbuilding contract for a third fiscal year 2003 DDG-51-
class ship this year. Also of note is the fact that the Navy's unfunded
requirements list for fiscal year 2003 includes full funding of the
third fiscal year 2003 DDG-51-class ship and AP for a third ship in
fiscal year 2004 as very high priorities to the Navy leadership. How
high a priority is funding a third DDG in the shipbuilding unfunded
request?
Secretary Young. Adding a third DDG in fiscal year 2003 is the most
appropriate candidate for additional new shipbuilding construction
funding in fiscal year 2003.
73. Senator Collins. Admiral Mullen, the Navy's fiscal year 2003
unfunded requirements list recently provided to Congress, placed a very
high priority on adding funds to sustain the three-DDG procurement rate
in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. The rationale provided in the
Navy's UFR for increasing funding for the third fiscal year 2003 DDG-51
destroyer states that these funds are necessary to: ``support
recapitalization of the Surface Combatant Force, and to maintain
surface combatant industrial base.'' You may be aware that the CNO and
Navy Secretary have gone on record expressing strong support for
addition of a third fiscal year 2003 DDG, and I believe it is critical
that this issue be considered in terms of meeting military
requirements, and as it relates to efforts to preserve the specialized,
but fragile surface combatant industrial base. Please describe the
operational, force structure, and multi-mission value of our front-line
DDG-51 Burke-class Aegis destroyers. Specifically, how are they
contributing to military effectiveness and force flexibility today and
why do you believe is it important to ``support recapitalization of the
Surface Combatant Force''--as noted on the Navy's UFR?
Admiral Mullen. The mission of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer
(DDG-51) is to project power simultaneously in multiple dimensions of
naval warfare. These include the destruction of enemy cruise missiles,
aircraft, surface ships, and submarines and to attack land targets in
support of joint or combined operations .
The DDG-51 class destroyer is designed to be a battle group asset
and a multi-purpose surface combatant capable of sustained operations
in threat areas outside the umbrella of battle group operations
including the littorals. They feature extraordinary seakeeping and low
observability characteristics. Today, we are seeing this multi-mission
platform conduct maritime interdiction operations (MIO) in the Arabian
Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean, Tomahawk strikes, and battle group
defense all in support of the war on terrorism.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) revalidated the
requirement for 116 surface combatants to meet all expected peacetime
and warfighting missions. However, this force structure, which
contained only 57 DDG-51 class destroyers, was considered a moderate
operational risk. Adding more DDG-51s would reduce that risk by adding
more strike, force protection and undersea warfare capability to the
existing force. Additionally, due to the accelerated retirement of less
capable and more costly to operate Spruance-class destroyers and the
transition to DD(X), additional DDGs are needed and can be delivered
more rapidly in the near-term than other shipbuilding programs thus re-
capitalizing the surface combatant force in both numbers and improved
capability. Re-capitalization of the force is necessary if we are to
maintain both a quantitative and qualitative edge and support a
diminishing industrial base.
DELAYS IN SHIPBUILDING
74. Senator Collins. Secretary Young, the CNO testified that the
fiscal year 2003 proposed priorities invest in current readiness for
our naval forces. However, I am aware that there have been some
deferred depot maintenance periods due to current operations (i.e.,
combating terrorism) on the Los Angeles-class submarines in fiscal year
2002, which will impact fiscal year 2003 and outyear workload
schedules, placing the fleet ready submarines at risk to meet future
missions as required by the CINCs. These delays can not only adversely
affect fleet readiness, they can also cause dramatic workload
imbalances at our shipyards. I am concerned that continued shifts in
the workload to future years will place undue stress on the fleet and
the yards. Therefore, I would like your commitment that your workload
plans will be adjusted to maintain a stable workload and workforce at
the shipyards.
Secretary Young. Ship depot maintenance plans are continuously
updated to incorporate actual execution, operational impacts, and
financial resources. Availabilities are deferred only after the risk to
Fleet readiness associated with deferring the work is determined and
deemed acceptable.
The Navy actively works to refine and schedule ship depot
availabilities for effective shipyard execution. Keeping the shipyard
workload level is essential to efficient operation and is a key
consideration in scheduling availabilities.
A skilled and motivated shipyard workforce is essential to maintain
the Navy's high state of material readiness. Recognizing that many in
the public shipyard workforce are rapidly approaching retirement
eligibility, a primary focus of the Navy's depot maintenance program is
maintaining a stable workforce with the skills we need. In view of
these needs, we appreciate the support Congress has given the naval
shipyard apprentice programs which will provide the skilled workers we
will need in the future.
LCS CONCERNS
75, 76. Senator Collins. Admiral Mullen, I have been recently
hearing discussions that the Navy may be accelerating the littoral
combat ship (LCS) to deploy ahead of the development of DD(X). DD(X),
as I understand it, is to be the engine and the lead shipbuilding
program that will drive the rest of the family of ships. While LCS may
indeed have a unique, contributory niche role in that future netted
force, I am concerned that the Navy may be getting ahead of itself in
ascribing characteristics to LCS for which a requirements assessment
has yet to be conducted or a concept validated. Has the Navy performed
the traditional analysis of alternatives requirements on the LCS ship?
Can you respond to my concerns regarding this member of the DD(X)
family?
Admiral Mullen. The Navy has not yet conducted a traditional AOA
for the LCS.
However, the Navy is developing a draft surface combatant family of
ships capstone requirements document (CRD). This document will be an
overarching requirements document from which the individual operational
requirements documents for the DD(X), CG(X), and the LCS will be
derived. Although a traditional AOA has not been conducted, the Navy is
leveraging off the CRD and a number of studies to help define the LCS
requirements.
The Navy is in the early process of exploring technologies and
potential characteristics for the LCS. As an example, the Naval War
College (NWC) was tasked to recommend characteristics best suited for
LCS; and, if the technology exists, or will exist in the near-term, it
will support these characteristics. The Navy plans to use the data from
these studies as contributory material in the development of the ORD to
support the LCS acquisition. A formal ORD development and validation
process, along with the required supporting analysis, is beginning.
This will be a necessary part of the acquisition documentation needed
for LCS Milestone decisions.
FACTORY EFFICIENCY
77. Senator Collins. Admiral Mullen, the submarine factory workload
is seeing a rise in anticipated future requirements, particularly in
light of the Trident submarine conversions and the increased number of
Los Angeles-class refuelings over the next few years. I believe that
this influx of work should be providing additional opportunities across
the submarine factory. However, the yard located in my state is at risk
of seeing dramatic peaks and valleys in its workload during fiscal year
2003 and fiscal year 2004. This is simply unacceptable. Are you looking
into ways that the Navy can more efficiently utilize the yards
supporting the submarine factory to ensure a level workload at all of
the naval shipyards is implemented to ensure that the submarine factory
is operating at it maximum efficiency?
Admiral Mullen. The contribution provided by the workers of the
naval shipyards is important to the Navy and the Nation. The innovation
and dedication to quality submarine maintenance by the workers at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) is greatly appreciated by the
Department.
The fiscal year 2003 workload phasing challenge at PNSY is
primarily driven by the difficult decision to delay the U.S.S.
Annapolis depot modernization period (DMP). Delaying this DMP was
considered the best available option to fund Navy operational
priorities. This option limited the effect to a single submarine.
The Navy is continuously evaluating the scheduling of ship
availabilities to achieve the highest state of readiness balanced
against shipyard workload and efficiency considerations. In formulating
the fiscal year 2003 budget the Navy carefully considered workload at
PNSY. The budgeted workload is consistent with fiscal year 2002
budgeted levels. The Department considers several factors when
assigning submarine availabilities. They include:
a) Assignment of effort to an industrial facility near the ship's
homeport;
b) Maintaining reactor servicing skill levels; and
c) Avoiding, to the extent practical, major shifts in workload
levels across all the shipyards.
The Department is in the process of evaluating availability
assignments through the FYDP. All four of the naval shipyard commanders
are part of the planning process. Their inputs are extremely valuable
as the Department goes through the difficult effort of achieving the
optimum balance between fleet readiness, fiscal realities, and shipyard
workloading.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2003
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Seapower,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
NAVY EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR FIELDING A 21ST CENTURY CAPABILITIES-BASED
NAVY
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Kennedy, Reed, Warner,
McCain, Sessions, and Collins.
Committee staff member present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member; and Christina D. Still, professional
staff member.
Minority staff members present: Judith A. Ansley,
Republican staff director; Edward H. Edens IV, professional
staff member; Gary M. Hall, professional staff member; Ambrose
R. Hock, professional staff member; and Thomas L. MacKenzie,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Daniel K. Goldsmith and Andrew
Kent.
Committee members' assistants present: Brady King and
Christina L. Martin, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick
M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King,
assistant to Senator Reed; Benjamin L. Cassidy, assistant to
Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator
McCain; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek
Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN
Senator Kennedy. Senator Sessions will join us shortly and
we will proceed. The subcommittee meets this afternoon to
discuss the Navy-Marine Corps equipment issues and needs in
order to meet their future operational requirements. We will
hear from two panels of witnesses. The subcommittee invited
Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, to discuss
the overall strategic context in which the Navy Department is
making specific hardware choices in the budget and the future
years defense program and how the Navy budget supports fielding
a 21st century capabilities-based Navy.
On the second panel we will hear from four witnesses about
the specific equipment programs that will support the
Department of the Navy's 21st century capabilities: Major
General William Whitlow, Director of the Expeditionary Warfare
Division; Rear Admiral Phillip Balisle, Director of the Surface
Warfare Division; Rear Admiral Paul Sullivan, Director of the
Submarine Warfare Division; and Rear Admiral Michael McCabe,
Director of the Air Warfare Division. I welcome each of our
witnesses and look forward to their testimony.
I believe the world we face will continue to be one of
uncertainty and unrest. Therefore, I continue to believe that
greater emphasis should be placed on lighter, more lethal
forces and on mobility forces. We have seen proof during the
last year that this is a job at which the Navy and Marine Corps
excel.
However, we must not let the outstanding performances by
the Navy and Marine Corps distract our attention from some very
real problems that face the sea services. This subcommittee has
been working diligently with the Department of the Navy to
address some of the very important problems, including
improving fire support capability, organic Marine Corps fire
support and Navy shore fire support, and augmenting our mine
countermeasures capability both for sea and land combat.
I note for the record this subcommittee has taken the lead
in Congress in ensuring that the Navy and Marine Corps improve
existing capabilities in these areas, in many cases over the
objections of senior Defense and Navy Department officials.
Unfortunately, we are seeing early signs that the Navy
Department may be lapsing into previous unacceptable behavior.
Some of the instances that may be forming a pattern are:
Cancelling the planned and attack destroyer,
the DD 21 program. DD 21 was intended to be a multi-
mission ship. It was primarily aimed at meeting the
Navy surface fire support requirements for the Marine
Corps. DD 21 was to have been the first ship in a class
of 32 ships, with delivery starting fiscal year 2010.
Marine Corps officials had previously testified that
nothing short of the capability of the planned DD 21
with two 155-millimeter guns would meet the fire
support requirements.
With the new DD(X) program, there is no firm
commitment in the new future years defense program to
build anything other than a demonstration ship using
reseach and development (R&D) funding. It is not clear
when or if the future years defense program (FYDP)
would lead to meeting the Marine Corps fire support
needs.
Terminating the fire support missile program,
the Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM). The LASM
program was a program designed to use old surface-to-
air missiles to provide some fire support capability,
particularly at longer ranges. LASM was intended to be
an interim system that would have been replaced by a
new system, the advanced land attack missile (ALAM)
system. Last year it appeared that the Navy was
cancelling ALAM. However, we could not tell for sure
since the budget request did not give any information
about fiscal years after 2002. This year it is clear
the Navy is cancelling both the ALAM and the LASM.
Cancellation of the Shallow Water Minefield
Breaching System. The Navy decided last year to
terminate the Shallow Water Assault Breaching System
and distributed explosive technology, the Shallow Water
Mine Clearance System. In part, they based this
decision on the fact that the systems were too bulky to
be carried continuously aboard ship and the lanes
cleared through the minefield would not be wide enough.
The Navy made this cancellation in spite of the fact
that the Navy has no near-term alternative to provide
this capability. It is hard to understand why having no
capability in this area would be better than at least
having some capability, whatever the shortcomings.
Retiring the U.S.S. Inchon mine command and
control ship. Several years ago, with significant
pressure from this subcommittee, the Navy decided they
needed to have a large aviation-capable ship that would
be dedicated to mine countermeasures. They converted an
older amphibious ship, the U.S.S. Inchon, to this duty.
While the ship served the purposes for which it was
intended, the fact that it was an older ship and was
probably not the highest on the Navy maintenance
priority list caused an erosion in the material
condition.
Within the last year, the crew experienced a fire on
the ship, with one person killed. Because the Navy has
decided that fixing this ship would be too expensive,
they are retiring the ship with no immediate
replacement. Navy officials have said that in the
interim they would use one of the amphibious ships in
the regular fleet in case they need to conduct
dedicated minesweeping operations.
This was the position we were in before the subcommittee
began pressing the Navy to make a significant mine warfare
improvement in the early 1990s.
Unfortunately, there are other examples I could cite, but
in the interest of time I will not. Each of these actions taken
individually may have an explanation. However, taken as a
whole, I fear they are part of a pattern of the Navy
Department's walking away from their funding of the very
capabilities that make the Navy and Marine Corps team so
relevant in today's world.
If there is a new national military strategy that is
charting a new course for the Navy-Marine Corps team, we need
to hear about it and understand it. If there is not, we need to
ensure that the Department of the Navy does not march down a
path of incrementally divesting capability without a thorough
understanding of where these actions would take us. I hope we
can explore these and other issues with Admiral Clark today.
During the second panel we will hear from individual
warfare area sponsors more specifically about the capabilities
that this budget supports.
Before we begin with Admiral Clark, I would be glad to
recognize Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very
brief.
I welcome Admiral Clark and the next panel of witnesses.
Admiral, I am very concerned from a macro sense the lack of
proposed increases in shipbuilding. I had the privilege along
with nine of my colleagues to visit the U.S.S. Theodore
Roosevelt and I was proud of the fact that their morale was so
high. It was an exhilarating experience. We also know that they
set a record for longest time at sea.
If you believe that there is a possibility of further
crises like this around the world in the war on terrorism, it
seems to me it has been made obvious that we do not have enough
aircraft carriers. I hope in your remarks you can address that
issue. Admiral Blair, I believe, made similar comments recently
as we were left uncovered in certain areas as far as a carrier
presence is concerned.
So I am concerned about the rate of overall shipbuilding
and I will have some specific questions. But I think there are
many lessons we have learned from this latest conflict and one
is that there needs to be air power from ships available for
the area commanders to use when absolutely necessary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. We always welcome the former chairman of
our committee and now the ranking member, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I join you in welcoming our witnesses.
Senator Kennedy. We welcome any comments that you would
like to make. Before you begin, Admiral Clark, I would like to
recognize our subcommittee's ranking member, Senator Sessions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
I thank our Chairman, Senator Kennedy, for scheduling today's
hearing and join him in welcoming Admiral Clark, the Chief of Naval
Operations, and his requirements officers.
Our men and women of the Navy will depend on the strategy,
doctrine, and equipment that we will be discussing today to carry out
their missions. The strategy and doctrine must be sound. The equipment
must be the best we can provide and it must be provided in sufficient
quantities to make a difference.
We have a great challenge before us. The Department of Defense
decided during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to adopt a
capabilities-based approach to planning instead of using a threat-based
approach. Tomorrow's force must have the capability to handle the most
challenging scenarios of the future. While it is prudent to understand
the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm, previous conflicts,
and of the current war on terrorism, it is imperative that we resist
the temptation to equip tomorrow's forces based solely on lessons of
the past. We do know from experience that the one thing we cannot
predict is the nature of the next conflict.
We also know, from over two centuries of operations, that a strong
Navy and Marine Corps are vital to national security. The American
people have seen vivid images on their televisions and in newspapers
and magazines of the Navy and Marine Corps conducting strikes in
Afghanistan. These vivid images underscore, once again, the importance
of ships and marines at sea that can respond quickly to the operational
commander's requirements and conduct continuous joint combat
operations.
The Navy and Marine Corps team's ability to provide forcible entry
and to strike quickly and with deadly accuracy deters potential
adversaries from taking offensive action. The men and women of the Navy
and Marine Corps require information superiority to carry out the full
range of missions from forward-deployed presence to full scale war.
This information superiority provides strategic and tactical advantage
and enables rapid, precise, and effective action.
Presence, and the resulting information superiority, is possible
through our ships and aircraft exercising freedom of navigation in the
littorals and on the high seas throughout the world. Forward deployed
ships provide the sovereign territory from which power can be projected
on short notice. They provide the regional commanders in chief a
rapidly scalable and sustainable range of options to support our
national interests.
The requirements for equipment on those ships and aircraft are
researched, developed, tested, and then procured to support anticipated
Navy and Marine Corps missions. Every development and procurement
program attempts to provide what is needed to meet a valid military
requirement. Decisions on the capabilities and reliability provided by
a given program are often made years before the equipment is fielded.
Requirements officers and program managers face a number of
challenges in providing the required equipment. They must decide
whether to: upgrade aging equipment or buy new; develop equipment or
buy off-the-shelf; provide exact specifications or provide performance
parameters; design the equipment to accept rapid technology changes or
delay procurement to provide added capability; and fix the cost for
development or provide cost incentives for improved development
performance. They look for ways to shorten the acquisition cycle and
leverage funding from other programs.
The requirements officers' newest challenge is to adjust their
programs to provide a specific capability rather than to provide a
counter for a specific threat. Our challenge is to review the
development and procurement proposed in this budget request to ensure
our forces are adequately equipped for future operations. The most
common way to evaluate programs for this type of review is to compare a
future capability requirement to the program cost and performance
indicators. Although it is easiest to make evaluations from the
perspective of the individual program or its specific warfare area,
future operations require us to broaden our perspective to include
evaluation of how the capability supports joint, coalition, and other
warfare specialty operations.
The following are key questions which will assist us in these
reviews and evaluations:
1. Will Navy and Marine Corps plans for mine warfare capabilities
enable timely access for joint operations?
2. What is the Navy's plan for ensuring P-3 and SH-60 aircraft
capabilities and availability for joint and coalition forces?
3. Is the plan for modernization adequate to support the tempo and
nature of expected operations, given the lagging plans to buy new ships
and aircraft?
4. What capabilities directly support joint and coalition
operations, and should the proposed capabilities include seamless
communications and operations with Navy and Marine Corps operational
units?
5. Can the Navy's plan to provide land attack weapons in support of
joint operations be accelerated?
Again, welcome to our witnesses today. I look forward to their
testimony.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I also have a statement
from Senator Collins.
[The prepared statement of Senator Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Susan Collins
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the distinguished
chair and ranking member for calling this very important hearing on the
topic of Navy equipment required for fielding a 21st century
capabilities-based Navy. As we predicted, the battleground and
warfighting requirements are changing and so must the naval forces of
today. As I have stated many times, seapower is among the most
essential components of our national security posture and an important
part of ensuring the U.S. meets its global commitments.
Currently, our naval forces are providing immediate access and
forward-deployed combat power, 24/7, in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom, but our current capabilities and equipment must evolve as the
threat continues to evolve. Our naval forces of tomorrow must stand
ready to assure access and to project joint and combined power in
support of national policy.
The fact is that we will face a variety of challenges in the 21st
century. These challenges, such as cyberwarfare, weapons of mass
destruction, and continued international terrorism, define not only an
unpredictable future, but one that will require our naval forces to
operate with new deterrence options and require a significant
investment in next-generation research and development capabilities and
platforms. These platforms and capabilities will have to be survivable,
cost effective, and agile enough to allow for a highly capable, easily
maintained, and modernized force for years to come.
These capabilities, and the fact that two-thirds of the world's
surface is covered by ocean, make a compelling case for robust naval
forces. Forward presence, however, requires that our ships, subs, and
aircraft are available and ready to deter, fight, and win. I have said
and will continue to state, that in order to meet the challenges of the
21st century we must recapitalize and invest in the naval forces of
tomorrow today!
America's national security demands that we recapitalize our Navy
today. President Bush and his administration have identified this
global war on terrorism and homeland security as our highest
priorities. As we in Congress work with the Bush administration to
defend freedom, I will continue to encourage the replenishment of our
naval fleet as the cornerstone of this global defense.
We cannot continue to defer this investment year after year, as we
are just slipping deeper and deeper into a procurement hole, and that
is why we must look at all of the resources available in the Department
of the Defense's budget, including the Defense Emergency Response Fund
(DERF), or contingency fund, to begin to address this egregious
shortfall.
If we continue to underinvest in our critical naval forces--i.e.,
our naval shipbuilding and research and development accounts--the
future force is at risk. Therefore, I am convinced there will be a need
for even greater reliance on our naval forces as joint operations
emerge to provide sovereignty to our fighting forces. Proof is in our
current operations in Afghanistan. For these reasons and many others, I
share the view of many of my colleagues that we must recapitalize our
fleet today to ensure that America retains her maritime power in the
21st century.
I will close by welcoming each of the distinguished witnesses to
the committee, and I look forward to working with each of you in the
weeks and months ahead, to not only bring the procurement rates of our
platforms up, but also to ensure that we are investing in the force of
tomorrow. I look forward to your testimony this afternoon. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Admiral Clark, I enjoyed
getting a chance to talk with you recently and valued those
conversations and insights. We welcome you here before the
subcommittee and look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Clark. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
McCain, and Senator Warner. Good to see you this afternoon.
Speaking on behalf of the rest of the team in Panel Two which
is going to be here in a few minutes and the members of our
staff, we appreciate the chance to come up and see you this
afternoon.
Mr. Chairman, I have submitted an extensive statement that
addresses a number of the things that you spoke about and, with
your concurrence, I would ask that we submit that for the
record. Since I appeared before the full committee on March 7,
I will keep my opening comments brief.
Senator Kennedy. Without objection, that is so ordered.
Admiral Clark. I want to start by just saying that it is
clear to me, reinforcing Senator McCain's comments, that our
success in Operation Enduring Freedom has been caused first and
foremost by the dedication and the professionalism of the men
and women who are serving in our Navy, certainly the finest
navy in the world, second to none.
Second, I believe that our success in Operation Enduring
Freedom is the result of the significant investments that have
been made in current readiness and manpower, improvements to
those accounts, and those changes supported by this committee
and the rest of Congress.
I also believe that this war on terrorism is certainly a
powerful demonstration of why our country needs a navy. I
believe that it is a vivid illustration of the relevance of
operating from the maritime domain, the need for maritime
dominance. We are taking our Nation's sovereignty to the far
corners of the Earth, specifically off the coast of Pakistan
and Afghanistan, and the beauty of that is that we are doing it
without a permission slip. We are doing it without getting the
permission of some country that can say yes, you can, or no,
you cannot.
To me that means that ``anywhere, any time'' is not just a
bumper sticker. In the case of the United States Navy and its
number one partner in jointness, the United States Marine
Corps, it is a reality.
Now, when I appeared before the full committee on March 7,
I talked about the fact that the Navy and Marine Corps team had
been a key player, and I am sensitive to the use of words that
sound self-aggrandizing, that sound like we think that we might
be able to do it all by ourselves. I think I want to emphasize
that none of the services in my view can do it all by
themselves and certainly we cannot.
But I do believe that Operation Enduring Freedom has been
an excellent example of the things that I have already spoken
to and have demonstrated, that the United States Navy and its
ability to operate out of the maritime domain has made it a key
factor in the successes that we have realized in operations in
Afghanistan. From the issues of tactical strike to being a lead
player in overland manned surveillance, not something that you
would normally think about when you talk about the United
States Navy, a key player on the ground side--many people are
unaware of the fact that we had 750 Navy people on the beach,
central to the Special Operations Forces mission, from Kitty
Hawk to our own Special Forces.
Then, of course, we are a leader in the maritime coalition.
At times there have been upwards of 105 ships, Navy ships from
the various nations, present in those operations. They want to
be partners, first and foremost, with one Navy, and that is the
United States Navy.
Moreover, I believe that this war has been showcasing what
it means to be a capabilities-based Navy. It is highlighting
our flexibility, precision, reach, and persistence. Admiral
Mullen spoke before this subcommittee a few days back and
talked about the fact that 80 percent of the Navy strike
sorties, the operations conducted, when the sorties were
launched the pilots were unaware of the specific targets that
they were going to hit; that 93 percent of Navy TACAIR ordnance
was precision guided--certainly reemphasizing the importance of
the decision to focus on precision after Operation Desert
Storm.
Then, more significantly, there is the issue of combat
reach. The average sorties have been 7 hours in the cockpit for
fighter pilots flying missions over Afghanistan, sometimes as
long as 12 hours.
Then the whole issue of persistence, one of my favorite
words these days, focusing on the importance of being there,
the importance of being able to respond at a moment's notice,
and especially when you have thousands of Americans committed
to a particular operation.
This year's budget, the budget that we are here to talk
about today, was constituted with some real tough choices, I
believe the correct choices, given the top line that we had to
work with. It does prioritize current readiness. It does
prioritize investments in manpower. When somebody asks the
reason why, as I talked about some on March 7, it is because
our Navy must be ready to go to sea, fight and win on a
moment's notice. That is what these priorities do.
That being said, it is very clear still that we have to
keep our eye on the future. We must understand that in order to
have a Navy in the future we have to have ships and we have to
procure aircraft. Clearly, this budget does not have us where
we would like to be and where we would desire to be, and that
is the biggest challenge that we face in the procurement side
in our Navy today.
I do want to say that I do not believe that it is all about
numbers. I do believe that numbers count, numbers have a
quality all their own. There is no question about that. But it
is more important that we buy the right kinds of capabilities
in the ships that we are procuring in the future; and that is
what we need to focus on and ensure that we are doing.
We are fully engaged in transforming this Navy into a 21st
century fighting force, and to that end we have terminated some
programs. Mr. Chairman, you have mentioned some of those in
your opening remarks. We have terminated 7 programs and
restructured 12 others over previous years. We have done this
to capture efficiencies, but also to prioritize the investment
in the areas that we believe will produce for us the most
warfighting capability.
When I think about the future and I think about where our
Navy is going in the future--and this is not tomorrow's Navy,
but it is a Navy of a generation away--I think about a Navy
that has more of the kinds of capabilities that I think that we
are demonstrating today in Afghanistan. That is about
flexibility and precision and combat reach and persistence and
expeditionary mobility.
I believe the future is about Joint Strike Fighter, the
Littoral Combatant Ship, and DD(X), and I believe that these
platforms will play huge and important roles in increasing our
ability to dominate a battle space in the future and improve
our combat effectiveness. It is about CVN(X) and it is about F/
A-18E and it is about the new submarine programs. It is about
research and development into our future.
I would just say that, with regard to DD(X), the output
from the research and development in this program will produce
a family of ships that is going to define what the United
States Navy is all about for, in my opinion, the next four
decades, and it is of utmost importance and we solicit your
support in this regard.
I believe that DD(X) and the R&D that is in DD(X) will also
help our maritime partner, the United States Coast Guard, in
its modernization and transformation efforts.
Further, to the greatest extent possible, new technologies
developed along the way must be incorporated into legacy
platforms, ensuring that we transform the hulls that we own
today. I think it important to point out that over 60 percent
of the hulls that we own today will be in our Navy in the year
2020. We must ensure that we take the steps to modernize that
capability so that they are viable throughout their lifetime.
So for the future, I see a Navy that is all about being
able to climb into the ring with an enemy. We are about
ensuring access. It means that we must be able to climb in the
ring with an enemy and operate in high-risk environments, and
the littoral can be a high-risk environment, with robust mine
warfare and shallow water ASW capabilities.
I see a Navy in the future that works more smoothly and
effectively with our number one partner, the United States
Marine Corps, in our newly designated expeditionary strike
groups. I hope that we get a chance to talk more about that in
the question and answer session.
I see a Navy that plays a key part in homeland security and
missile defense, and I see a Navy that is fully networked, with
all the implications that suggests even more responsive and
even more lethal in the future.
In short, I see a Navy more effective than the Navy that we
have today, a capabilities-based Navy that, like today, is
preeminent in the maritime domain and can fight and win to
preserve the blessings of peace that we enjoy in our country
today and that we want to enjoy in the future for our children
and our children's children.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for the chance to be with
you today and I look forward to responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]
Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, USN
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you. Your support of America's Navy has
been vital to accomplishing our missions around the world--including
swift and effective response to the attacks of 11 September 2001--and I
thank you.
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
The global war on terrorism is America's first war of the 21st
century. Violent horizons lie before us, harboring profound challenges
including the threat of cyberwar, weapons of mass destruction,
continued international terrorism, and the havoc accompanying failed
states. Importantly, such threats do not replace the specter of state-
on-state conflict. They add to the danger and uncertainty, providing
new sparks to already combustible situations.
This terrorist-filled world is more dangerous in many ways than
that which existed when we faced the global strike and sea denial
capabilities of the Soviet Union. We no longer counter a peer adversary
that maintains order within its geopolitical orbit. Rather, the
international landscape today is comprised of multiple actors whose
interests form a complex pattern of interwoven and explosive tensions.
Potential adversaries today include other states, informal
alliances of states, and terrorist elements that range from state-
sponsored to state-opposed. Such terrorists may be local actors or
integrated into global federations dedicated to the export of killing.
Catalysts motivating potential enemies include religious fervor,
political ideology, aspirations of regional dominance, dedication to
fomenting domestic revolutions and, conversely, efforts at sustaining
domestic order by deflecting internal tensions outward.
Little is certain in this new world beyond the fact that such
tensions can be expected to lead to repeated crises, quite often with
minimal warning or predictability regarding size, location, or
intensity. It can also be presumed that given America's peerless
military power, strikes against our Nation, people, or interests will
be delivered in an asymmetric manner, such as the attacks that took
place last September in New York and Washington, or the previous
October in Yemen against U.S.S. Cole.
THE NAVY'S ROLE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Forward deployed naval forces will continue to be a vital part of
America's defense as we move into the 21st century, a time during which
the range of threats will in all likelihood grow in volatility and
unpredictability. Thus America's Navy must remain prepared to conduct
combat operations anytime, anywhere with maximum effectiveness and
minimum risk.
Yet accomplishing our missions has become steadily more
challenging. Our Navy's force structure declined 41 percent since 1991,
from 538 to 315 ships, while the global war on terrorism has increased
the call for forward-deployed naval forces. The introduction of a new
class of smaller combatant--the Littoral combat ship (LCS)--will help
ease the strain and could lead to a war-sustaining fleet of
approximately 375 ships.
The current pace of operations is very high. Approximately half of
the fleet is at sea every day. Nearly one-third of the fleet is
deployed forward around the world, while the remainder is operating off
our coasts, conducting training or homeland defense missions with the
United States Coast Guard.
In view of this taxing requirement, we are exploring innovative
methods of increasing the presence and striking power of naval forces.
One construct is to complement amphibious ready groups with surface
combatants and submarines, producing expeditionary strike groups
equipped to destroy terrorist elements wherever they may be found.
We are also experimenting with flexible manning techniques to
produce greater efficiencies in conducting prolonged on-station
missions, such as guarding international straits or other locations of
exceptional strategic value.
At home, fleet commanders are taking measures to minimize the loss
of readiness that traditionally occurs between deployments.
Historically, deployed readiness has been achieved at the expense of
the non-deployed segment of our force structure. That is no longer
acceptable and, thanks to Congressional support, we have made
significant progress over the past several years in correcting long-
standing shortfalls in spare parts, munitions, and training.
Fiscal year 2003's budget submission continues that trend, adding
$2.7 billion to manpower accounts, $2.8 billion to operations and
maintenance accounts, over $1 billion to research and development, and
over a half billion dollars to procurement. We have also programmed
$2.6 billion to buy munitions and $1.3 billion for homeland defense.
NAVY TRANSFORMATIONAL CONCEPTS
Sustaining warfighting effectiveness in this uncertain strategic
environment will require continued global presence by sovereign naval
forces that are prepared to counter whatever capabilities the enemy may
bring to bear. Quantity has a quality all its own in this regard, and
our Navy will remain on-station around the world, prepared to fight and
win.
The dynamic and unpredictable nature of potential enemies demands
that we continually develop new and more effective capabilities to
prevent crises and--should deterrence fail--project offensive and
defensive power ashore. The 21st century Navy must be strategically and
operationally agile, technologically and organizationally innovative,
networked at every level, highly joint, and effectively integrated with
allies.
Three core operational concepts are key to achieving Navy
transformation: the application of precise and persistent global
striking power, the ability to assure access to the littorals and
project defense overland, and the capability to conduct sustained
operations from sea bases.
Precise and persistent global striking power is the offensive
element of the 21st century Navy. Its effectiveness is derived from
network-centric operations in which platforms and sensors are fully
integrated to form seamless warfighting knowledge. Situational
awareness generated from this network provides rich understanding of
the adversary that enables the tailored application of power, allowing
our forces to sustain the initiative, disrupt enemy timelines, and
deliver operational success.
Concurrently, the ability to assure access to the littorals and
project defense overland provides battlefield dominance, assuring
allies and deterring adversaries. Such battlefield dominance exploits
expeditionary sensor grids that sweep from seabed to space, cueing
coordinated air, surface and subsurface combatants to neutralize enemy
threats. This element of naval power relies upon control of the seas,
allowing us to guard the flow of trade while identifying, tracking, and
intercepting threats long before they reach our shores.
Finally, leveraging the mobility and security of ships on the vast
oceans in the form of sea basing assures the effective projection of
sovereign American power. At the operational level of war, sea basing
serves as a secure foundation from which to project expeditionary
warfare, while minimizing the requirement to stage vulnerable forces
and supplies ashore.
Achieving Navy transformation will include both new procurement and
aggressive modernization. Nearly 60 percent of the ships in the Navy
today will be in the fleet in 2020. Thus a significant portion of
Navy's transformation will occur within existing hulls, placing an
emphasis on new systems and capabilities that can be inserted through
modernization. These upgraded platforms will complement new ships and
aircraft joining our fleet.
Examples of exciting new technologies that will accelerate our
transformation toward a fully networked Navy include the DD(X)
destroyer and its related family of ships, Joint Strike Fighter,
unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles, Tactical
Tomahawk, advanced gun system, theater ballistic missile system,
cooperative engagement capability, Navy-Marine Corps intranet, and SSGN
strike submarine, among others. These systems, in turn, will be
employed in innovative ways via concepts validated in the fleet battle
experiment series coordinated by the Navy Warfare Development Command
in Newport, Rhode Island.
As it progresses, the process of Navy transformation will yield a
dispersed and networked fleet that enhances deterrence, assures access,
conducts precision strikes, gathers real-time intelligence, exercises
joint command and control, and leverages the priceless advantage of sea
control. In short, it will be a fleet that serves as the leading edge
of America's defense--around the world, around the clock.
NAVY READINESS AND PROCUREMENT
As promised in previous testimony, the Navy's budget funds manpower
and current readiness first and fullest because those accounts are key
to mission accomplishment around the world. Our operational success in
Afghanistan is a direct reflection of these investment priorities, as
supported by Congress.
To sustain the size of the current fleet, we would need to buy an
average of 180-210 aircraft and 9 ships a year. We are currently
procuring significantly less than that. The fiscal year 2003 budget
will, if approved as submitted, provide just 5 ships and 83 naval
aircraft.
Harvesting efficiencies within our Navy is key to increasing
procurement and we will focus a major effort toward that goal over the
next 2 years. Failure to free such resources would have a profoundly
negative effect on the fleet.
Naval aviation, in particular, would suffer as that community faces
the greatest near-term challenges. Our current aviation force contains
the oldest mix of type/model/series aircraft in naval history. Yet
these aircraft are being tasked to unprecedented levels in on-going
conflict. The F/A-18 force, for example, has been flown well in excess
of planned utilization rates and more than 300 F/A-18 aircraft will
require service life extensions earlier than planned. The best way to
address such problems is to introduce new aircraft into the fleet as
soon as possible
While our surface and subsurface combatant fleet is, on average,
fairly young, the rate of ship recapitalization bears watching. The
following chart illustrates the dramatic decline in authorized ships
since 1980.
The impact of the current low procurement rate goes beyond force
levels. It adversely affects the stability of our defense industrial
base, and we are paying a premium in program cost due to the small
number of units being built.
On a more positive note, maintenance and modernization efforts are
progressing well due to solid increases in current readiness funding
over the past several years. The fiscal year 2003 budget requests the
following additional dollars over the fiscal year 2002 budget: $804
million for ship operations and maintenance, $119 million for flying
operations and maintenance, $276 million for combat and weapons
support, and $310 million for base support.
Additionally, the ships and aircraft being developed are superb and
will serve us well as the core capability of our force in the coming
decades. DD(X), CVN(X), JSF, F/A-18E/F, LPD-17 and the Virginia-class
SSN present impressive technological leaps in warfighting capability,
innovation, and reliability. Program specifics include:
DD(X)/CG(X)/LCS. Maritime dominance in the 21st century requires a
naval force capable of projecting power and defeating anti-access
threats. To accomplish these missions, the future surface naval
combatant force will consist of four elements: DD(X) advanced multi-
mission destroyers that provide precision strike and volume fires;
CG(X) advanced cruisers to achieve sustained air superiority against
airborne threats and ballistic missiles; agile Littoral combat ships to
defeat enemy defenses such as mines, small boats, and submarines; and
today's Aegis fleet kept current through the insertion of developing
technologies. Cutting-edge systems integral to this family of ships
include the advanced gun system, multi-function radar/volume search
radar, integrated power system electric drive, and revolutionary hull
forms.
CVN(X). The fiscal year 2003 budget provides RDT&E and advance
procurement for the first CVN(X). CVN(X) will replace U.S.S. Enterprise
in fiscal year 2014 when that ship is in her 53rd year of commissioned
service. Design objectives for the CVN(X) class include a significant
reduction of total ownership costs during the carrier's 50-year
expected service life, reduced manning, and incorporation of a flexible
infrastructure that will allow the insertion of new capabilities as
they evolve.
JSF. The Joint Strike Fighter contract was signed in 2001. It will
provide an aircraft with unprecedented stealth and range to the fleet
as part of a family of tri-service, next-generation strike aircraft
with an emphasis on commonality and technological superiority at an
affordable price. The fiscal year 2003 budget supports procurement of
the initial variant in fiscal year 2006.
F/A-18E/F. The F/A-18E/F will replace older F/A-18s and all F-14s.
There is extensive commonality of weapons systems, avionics, and
software between F/A-18 variants, and the infrastructure supporting the
Super Hornet builds upon existing organizations.
LPD-17. Although we have experienced design and production
difficulties with the lead ship, we remain fully committed to this key
program. LPD-17 supports vital littoral warfighting requirements and
promises relief from the escalating costs of our aging amphibious
ships. The LPD-17 class will replace four older classes of ships and
serve as a central element of future amphibious ready groups/
expeditionary strike groups. We need to accelerate development of these
ships as rapidly as design and production facilities will allow.
Virginia-class submarine (SSN-774). This class will replace Los
Angeles-class (SSN-688) attack submarines as they leave the fleet. SSN-
774s are designed for multi-mission littoral operations, as well as
traditional open-ocean anti-submarine and anti-surface missions. They
will also incorporate new technologies as they become available,
ensuring future effectiveness. The fiscal year 2003 budget procures one
submarine per year and continues RDT&E. This pace of procurement will
have to be increased beyond the current FYDP to maintain the required
attack submarine force level over the long term.
SAILORS: OUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET
Winning the global war on terrorism is our primary goal, and Navy's
fiscal year 2003 budget prioritizes manpower and current readiness
above future readiness and infrastructure needs for that reason. As
noted earlier, the fiscal year 2003 budget submission adds $2.7 billion
to manpower accounts over fiscal year 2002 levels and an additional
$2.8 billion in operations and maintenance funding.
Thanks to the unequivocal support of Congress--including increases
to base pay and bonuses, retirement reforms, and better medical
benefits--sailors are staying Navy in record numbers. In 2001, we
retained 58 percent of all eligible sailors at the end of their first
enlistment, 67 percent of sailors with 6-10 years of service, and 83
percent of sailors with 10-14 years of service. Additionally, 1,512
more sailors were advanced in 2001 than the year before.
The Navy also met our overall recruiting goals in fiscal years
1999, 2000, and 2001, and this year we are well ahead of the record-
setting pace of fiscal year 2001. Thanks to these successes, battle
groups are deploying better manned than ever before.
We are winning the battle for people, but important challenges
remain. Officer retention in most line communities is below required
levels and recruiting shortfalls exist in officer specialty areas and
critical enlisted ratings.
We are also dedicated to continuing the fight against attrition.
The annual attrition rate for first-term sailors has been reduced from
over 14 percent to 10 percent since 1998, retaining thousands of young
men and women for service. Yet we can--and will--do better. Concerned,
involved leadership is central to minimizing attrition without
compromising standards. To make this happen, I have directed Navy
leaders to take every measure to ensure our people succeed and prosper.
Key to achieving that goal is cultivating a command climate
throughout the Navy that offers plentiful opportunities, encourages
participation, and is conducive to personal and professional growth. We
are striving to minimize the increased wartime operational tempo of the
fleet via careful planning and innovative training. This is the first
time in modern history that the Services have faced a prolonged
conflict with an all-volunteer force, and we must protect the integrity
of our fleet.
Two initiatives have been launched during the past year to help us
fully utilize our sailors' potential:
Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through our Commitment to Education
and Learning) is making impressive progress in developing processes,
policies, and structures to fully realize the capabilities of every
sailor. Seventeen ratings are currently under review to find ways to
expand professional learning, earn certifications that are recognized
by the civilian community, and enhance personal growth. The goal is to
provide a comprehensive development plan for every sailor based upon
education that takes place in the classroom and on the internet as part
of a culture of continual learning.
Project SAIL (Sailor Advocacy through Interactive Leadership) is a
new program that will have a major impact on how the Navy assigns our
personnel. Using a team detailing process that includes sailor
advocates, enhanced internet connectivity, and billet incentivization,
Project SAIL will strengthen efforts to find the best set of orders for
every one of our sailors, leading to assignments that are both
professionally rewarding and personally fulfilling.
The shared focus of these initiatives is an appreciation that
combat success in the 21st century will rely heavily on knowledge
management derived from a highly educated and motivated volunteer
force, a force that is empowered in their career decisions and
encouraged to contribute to a climate of warfighting excellence.
CONCLUSION: A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY
Our national leaders have repeatedly told the American people that
the war against terrorism will be neither easy nor short. In addition
to targeting international terrorist networks, the President has
singled out states sponsoring terrorism for military action should they
threaten international peace.
This struggle promises to be global in scope and simultaneous in
execution. It will require the full might of America's armed forces. In
pursuing victory, the United States Navy--forward-deployed, highly
capable, and poised for action--will play a leading role.
I thank the subcommittee for your continued strong support of our
Navy and our sailors. Working together, I am confident that we will win
the global war on terrorism, leading to a more stable and peaceful
world.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Admiral Clark.
I ask Senator Sessions if he wants to say a word.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I
missed the beginning.
I would just say that we know that we did not achieve as
much as we would like in shipbuilding, new ships, and that the
QDR rate is not being met. You made a decision under the
circumstances that I suspect was the right decision, which was
to focus on readiness and other matters, not to cut that in
order to build a new platform. So I guess our hearing today
will be how are you doing? Are you actually improving your
readiness, new equipment, technologies and enough? Or is that
just one more thing that we are not reaching the appropriate
level?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and thank
you for your leadership in general. I know you care about this
issue. You have studied it for many years and we appreciate
you.
Senator Kennedy. I will ask the staff to time 7-minute
rounds for questions if you would, please.
Admiral, in our conversation that we had yesterday I talked
with you about the fire support capabilities for the Marines.
That was outlined to this subcommittee a number of years ago
and we have tried to follow this issue closely during this time
and during the time when Senator Cohen was the chairman of the
subcommittee. There was a great reliance on the DD 21 in terms
of the fire support for the Marines.
But nonetheless, we saw the cancellation of the DD 21, now
it is the DD(X). It is going to be later, uncertain as to what
is going to be the follow-on, and that is going to take us down
into the out years, 2011 to 2012, in terms of the DD(X).
What can you tell us? Those requirements are still there.
They are enormously important, obviously, in terms of the
Marines and their effectiveness. What can you tell us about
this? The requirements have not changed. With the Navy program
in terms of its support or filling that requirement, the 155-
millimeter gun batteries which were on the DD 21, what can you
tell us about how you intend to meet that particular
requirement?
Admiral Clark. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe
that DD(X) is vital to our future, as I said in my very brief
opening remark. One of the key reasons is because of the
existence of the new technology that exists in the gun system.
When Admiral Balisle testifies on panel two he can talk to some
of the detailed specifics of the programmatics. If you want to
talk dollars and those kind of things, I do not have those kind
of things with me.
But let me talk about the broader strategic approach to
this. The requirements are valid. The Marine Corps has stated
what kind of combat reach that we need. Today from our gun
systems--and thinking about what we would do in an open session
like this, our gun systems are incredibly--in DD(X) has an
incredible improvement in combat reach, one of those
characteristics that I discussed in my opening statement.
We need that capability. I have every expectation that we
are going to down-select that ship this month. The acquisition
executive has testified earlier to that objective, to down-
select in April. That down-selection will lead to the
development and the building of a ship that in this case will
be done in research and development. But as our acquisition
executive said recently, as this ship moves along successfully
we fully expect it to then transition into a class of ships
that we need in these new expeditionary strike groups that I
talked about.
I believe that today's amphibious ready group does not have
enough striking power in it. It needs the capability that we
are going to bring to it by bringing cruisers or DDGs into it
that have the ability to reach and strike with Tomahawks, that
have the ability to better defend itself from air-to-surface
attack; we are bringing submarines into the group that have the
same type of capability.
It is all about responding to the challenges that exist to
us in the future. Now, when we look at future systems--and you
mentioned the cancellation of LASM--I believe that we have to
look at the array of systems that we have available to us.
General Jones has indicated that he very much would like to see
us procure a system that the Army has for the Marine Corps and
that is the gun system in the 130s, which brings that kind of
artillery capability to the air and able to apply it in the
battlefield.
We have Tomahawks and we are going to have the Advanced Gun
System in DD(X). So one of the issues is how many systems do
you need? My fundamental conviction is that we were
overprogrammed. We had more programs than we can deliver. The
analysis of LASM was that it was that it did not have the kind
of combat effects that we needed to continue to invest in it.
I believe, in response to your question, that the
requirement has not changed one bit. We have to have the kind
of reach that we are going to deliver in DD(X) and other
systems that are in the program.
Senator Kennedy. Well, clearly with regard to DD(X) this is
going to provide that kind of support. The real question is
what is going to happen in the interim period. I guess I
understand from your response that you believe, and as I
understand speaking for the Marines believe, that you have
sufficient kind of variety of support from other systems to
meet that particular requirement.
That has been a requirement that the subcommittee has taken
very seriously over a long period of time. It was one of the
principal aspects of the DD 21 as well as the DD(X). My
question really relates to what happens in this interim period
of time to the support. It is a matter of concern to us.
A broader issue would be the general capability for what we
call the forcible entry capability. In my opening statement, I
listed a number of the program cancellations and restructurings
that would cause one to conclude that we may be moving
incrementally away from the credible forcible entry capability.
We have limited ability to conduct fire support now. The
actions taken last year, including the DD 21 cancellation, give
little hope the Navy will be able to meet the Marine Corps'
foreseeable fire support requirements.
We also raise the questions about the implications of the
actions in terms of the mine warfare and where we are on this
program, which has been something that we have talked on in
terms of the mine warfare deficiencies as well.
I am just interested in whether we ought to be drawing any
kind of conclusions if we say that the shore fire capability
immediately is of continuing concern certainly to the Marines,
and that the mine warfare still is very much up in the air. We
have had responses that we have new technologies that we are
looking at, but we have not heard very much of anything in this
committee about real progress in that area other than some
observations that, with the high altitude bombing now, we may
be effective in bombing particular pathways in the entrance
into certain kinds of areas. I do not know whether that is the
answer.
But I suppose the question is, is there some flagging in
terms of the determination for the forcible entry capability?
If there is, then obviously that leads to other kinds of
questions about the need for other kinds of advanced amphibious
assault vehicles and amphibious assault ships and whether we
could not buy other ships that are a lot cheaper, like cargo
ships for example.
I am interested in hearing you out just on that issue
perhaps for another minute or two, and then my time is up.
Admiral Clark. Well, certainly it is a fundamental
requirement, I believe, for this Nation to have a forcible
entry capability, and I believe that the capability the United
States Marine Corps brings to this Nation is vital. When you do
not have, as we do not today, a long-range gun system, a system
with the kind of combat reach we are envisioning in DD(X), it
forces you to an approach, and that is what a capabilities-
based force is all about. You bring whatever capability you
have to whatever task that you have been given.
But it has required us to then utilize aircraft and in
effect, if you talk to the Marine Corps, they will tell you
they gave up their artillery years ago and substituted Marine
air, because you did not have the kind of reach that they
believed that they needed in order to execute forcible entry.
The joint world we operate in today, the Marines are going
to be supported by combat air when forcible entry operations
are required. So we are not flagging from that requirement. To
the contrary, I want my comments to be interpreted that it is a
priority that we fund and deliver DD(X) and that DD(X) becomes
a class of ships that supports our expeditionary striking
groups, that gives us the kind of capability that you speak to.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Just to follow up on the DD(X), we went
from DD 21, which had plans to move forward, to DD(X), which is
more research, I suppose. Can you tell us whether or not the
proposed ship is going to be better for this transition to
DD(X) than it would have been with the DD 21?
Admiral Clark. Well, I do not know how to answer that,
Senator, because in the down-select and in the decisions we
have made in tradeoffs in the program, I do not know how to
distinguish specific equipments and components. For example,
the analyses of the number of gun systems and so forth. I just
do not, I have no way to predict what those are going to be.
But I have every expectation of tradeoffs, and they are being
done by a committee. I am not involved in that. It is part of
the acquisition process.
But validating the requirement is for effective combat
reach with the gun system. I have every reason to believe that
the gun system is going to be there. I have every reason to
believe--and I have testified to this statement--that the spec
calls for this to be a ship with a very low radar cross-
section. That is going to make it extremely difficult for an
enemy to deal with. It has been talked about, a radar cross-
section that is smaller than a fishing boat; that with a
signature that it is so quietly operated that it is going to be
like a 688 submarine, that the transformation to all-electric
power is going to open up potentials for the future that we do
not even see yet.
I have every reason to believe that this is going to be the
ship with the technology that is going to deliver and that the
ship is going to be the definer of the next four decades of
what our Navy looks like.
Senator Sessions. I guess we have a delay in moving forward
with it, which is a billpayer of sorts and is not totally
insignificant. But you cannot say at this point that we are
going to have a better vessel because of it?
Admiral Clark. I have every reason to believe that it is
going to be a great ship and it is going to deliver the
capability that we need. I regret the delay, Senator----
Senator Sessions. Let me go back. I understand we are all
confronted with realities.
The general concept for my thinking is that an older
platform with a newer and better weapon system may be, at least
financially, more critical for us than new platforms. How are
we in terms of our equipment making sure that our existing
aircraft and vessels are equipped with the latest technology,
and are you satisfied with our present stocks of weaponry? If
we do not have bullets to fire in the gun, the gun is not very
valuable. I am talking about the precision-guided munitions.
Admiral Clark. Let me take the first part of that first
question. There are limits to what you can do with an old
platform. A good case would be to look at the alternative. If
you decided that you were not going to build DD(X) and you were
going to continue to build or you were going to invest in our
older cruisers and meet the need with that kind of a system,
you could not ever have the gun systems. But let us say you
were going to try to do that.
As we move to the future and we study science and
technology applications, one of the clear issues is that future
solutions are going to require great power. As we look to
potential breakthroughs in technology, power is always a
limiting thing. So power limits what you are able to do in
older platforms.
Then other things wear out inside of a ship. I have had the
privilege and the challenge of steaming around when my first
ship was a World War II destroyer.
Senator Sessions. I think you were responding realistically
to the question I asked, but I will be a little more specific
about it. I guess my concern is in the next year, in the next
18 months, do we have in place on ships that are going to be in
the inventory for some years to come the capabilities that we
ought to have on them, considering the funding problems we
have?
Admiral Clark. We have the systems on that we can have. We
cannot create systems anew in a year, a year and a half. Your
question gets to the heart of the readiness challenge: Are the
ships going to be ready? They are, and let me tell you that we
are eating away at a maintenance backlog that we had in the
accounts, and the current readiness budget is allowing us to do
that.
The second part of your question had to do with munitions.
This budget expands the production capability so that we can
buy the munitions, the precision munitions, that we need, and
we earnestly need the support of Congress in the approval of
that. Some of that has been done in the 2002 emergency funding
and we need to continue that application of funding in the 2003
budget.
Senator Sessions. Well, they say that we may be moving to
capacity at our plants for munitions, but why can we not build
new plants if we need to? Are we at what we need for a
sustained military operation? The world is looking awfully
dangerous right now. We could find ourselves in a prolonged
conflict with a lot more targets than we found in Afghanistan
to utilize.
Do we need to think bigger, much bigger, in terms of what
we need in terms of precision-guided munitions?
Admiral Clark. I believe that, first of all, do we need to
think bigger? We have and are making changes and the emergency
funds are being applied to do that. So we are increasing our
capacity. It is very important that we do that because we did
not have enough capacity to meet, in my estimation, the needs.
The judgment of the leadership supports that because the
investments are being made to increase our ability to produce
precision rounds.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, you have to have the
bullets and the gun. We have the capability. We do not want to
find ourselves in some very serious matter and not have all the
munitions we could have.
In terms of the size of a $379 billion, a couple of billion
dollars more to make sure that our stocks are very ample and
would be a good investment, I think.
Admiral Clark. If I could just follow up, there was an
article that I saw in the paper today that went into some
detail about JDAM, that we did not have enough, and it related
to Kosovo operations. We need to make wise investments for the
Nation, too. JDAM just came on line when we started in Kosovo.
So a ramp-up is clearly the way this is going to be produced.
You cannot suddenly have zero one day and then have 5,000 of
them the next day.
So the investment being made has to be one that makes sense
that we do not create a capability that then is going to go
idle also. We need to reach the balance between the requirement
and ramping up at a smart and effective rate that meets the
requirement. I believe the investments that are being made
today have us on that ramp. We must continue to analyze that to
be sure.
Senator Sessions. I am thinking we need to leap up, not
ramp up.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral Clark. The Navy has a daunting challenge
with legacy systems to try to harmonize them. But at least
going forward, is your RDT&E consciously trying to make all of
our new platforms interoperable, and not just within the Navy
and the Marine Corps, but also with the other services,
principally I would assume by information technology? Is that
something that is conscious, deliberate, proceeding forward?
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Senator Reed. Can you comment on some of the aspects of
that or some of the challenges that you face in that regard?
Admiral Clark. Well, I can certainly. Interoperability--in
order to take advantage of the technological advantage that the
United States of America has, it is about information becoming
knowledge. For us to do that, our systems have to be
interoperable, and they are not all interoperable today. By
that I am talking now about the power of second and third order
interoperability.
For example, we certainly have interoperability in our
forces today, but we see things that we could do in the future
that will make us much more effective. For example, a pilot
flying over Afghanistan that gets input from a Special Forces
operator on the ground, that lases the target, and all this
action takes place that we saw happen in Afghanistan.
The future will allow us to do this with the touch of a
button, as opposed to verbal orders and those kinds of things.
That is where we all want to go. We have to do this with web-
based capability. We have mandated in our Navy, for example,
that we are not going to spend money on applications that are
not web-based in the future. You cannot afford to do that. The
taxpayers' investment in our warfighting capability has to
produce that kind of interoperability and that is where we are
all going.
Senator Reed. What is your perception of the other services
in terms of linking up?
Admiral Clark. A common objective. We have challenges with
legacy systems and the issue always becomes how much do you
spend on the legacy system to bring it up to how you would
deliver it if you were procuring it today; it is a case-by-case
basis, Senator.
Senator Reed. Also, Admiral, you are experimenting with new
types of hull designs, particularly for the littoral ships, the
logistical vessels. Can you comment upon how that is going and
what you see in the next several years about the deployment of
these innovative hulls, like catamarans, etcetera?
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir. Well, I believe I mentioned DD(X)
and the family of ships and this concept has us spiraling the
research and development result into three platforms; one of
them is the Littoral Combatant Ship, the other will be the
follow-on missile defense cruiser, the CG(X). Very clearly, we
need a platform--and this gets to the chairman's concern and
interest in mine warfare--that is able to operate in a near-
land area that can take this on directly.
We have in the program the ability and we are working
toward the availability of organic mine warfare capability in
our battle group by 2005. But my view was that we needed a
class of ships that goes on and takes on this asymmetric threat
that we are going to be dealing with in the 21st century. I am
not sure what this hull looks like exactly. I am not sure it is
going to be steel, aluminum, a composite, what it is going to
be.
What I want is an effective combat capability that will
enable us to go in there and take on the enemy and fight and
win. So we have leased a couple of these vessels. We are
conducting experiments and they are going very well. We have
one that has now been turned over for Army use. We took it to
Europe. It is now conducting operations there and it will be
operating in other parts of that part of the world.
Senator Reed. One of the other aspects of mine warfare, and
I share the chairman's concern, is the rapid use of unmanned
undersea vehicles, not only in mines but also in other types of
operations. I know that you are planning to accelerate the
Multi-Mission Reconfigurable unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV)
and also the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System, the LMRS.
Specifically with those systems and in general about UUVs, your
comments about where you are now?
Admiral Clark. I think with unmanned vehicles, there is a
great future and we should be exploring this kind of technology
under the water, on the surface, and in the air. It is also
clear to me that the Littoral Combatant and the marriage of
unmanned vehicles, potentially manned vehicles also, but
unmanned vehicles to do certain missions that I believe the
future in technology will prove to us that is better done by
unmanned vehicles and the ability to do off-base, off-hull,
off-the-ship kind of sensor operations that will tremendously
advance our warfare and combat capability.
So I see the LCS delivering--delivering and introducing--
this into the capability as rapidly as possible in a hull form
that will enable us to conduct these kinds of operations. I
believe it will be required for mine warfare as well as near-
land ASW.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you again for being here today. Admiral,
last month the OSD Comptroller, Dr. Zakheim, testified before
the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support that the
decision to begin funding LHD-9 in the 2003 budget was done
completely in conjunction with the Navy. Were you involved in
those discussions?
Admiral Clark. You mean specifically with Dr. Zakheim?
Senator McCain. Yes.
Admiral Clark. No, sir, I do not recall any discussions on
LHD-9, no.
Senator McCain. I see.
Admiral Clark. I would say, Senator, I do not know if he
said me in particular or if he said the Navy.
Senator McCain. Oh, no, he just said done completely in
conjunction with the Navy, which one might assume that that
would be the Chief of Naval Operations.
Admiral Clark. No, sir, I did not have those discussions.
Senator McCain. So the first you heard of it was when it
became published in the media?
Admiral Clark. Well, in the closing days as we were putting
this budget to bed, we were dealing with major and a large
number of issues, Senator, as you can well imagine--you have
been through this--dealing with a number of ships and billion
dollar kinds of things. Frankly, that issue did not come up at
all. When I heard about it, it was in response to what was this
particular funding line about, and it was my belief and the
belief of those members of my staff that it was all about the
replacement for the amphibious assault ship (LHA); that that
was the intent.
Senator McCain. I see. I appreciate that.
You and I have discussed what I feel is a shortage of
carrier presence during this crisis. If you had your choice,
would you rather have an LHD-9 or a CVN?
Admiral Clark. Well, if all things were equal, certainly I
would love to have another carrier.
Senator McCain. How do you feel about this shortage?
Because when you look back at the last several crises we have
been in recently, we have had to uncover a certain area,
whether it be the Western Pacific or, in the case of the P-3
incident that took place with China, we had to uncover the
Mediterranean, I believe.
How do you feel about that? What are the Navy's plans for
additional carrier construction?
Admiral Clark. Well, first of all let me answer the second
part, how do I feel about future construction. Certainly CVN(X)
I believe brings the kind of technology along that we need in
the future, because it brings a lot of----
Senator McCain. When would you like to see that happen?
Admiral Clark. Well, it is in the existing budget. It is a
2007 and a 2008 kind of a funding line. That program slipped,
principally for affordability issues. It did not have enough
top line to keep it where it was before.
With regard to how I feel about these challenges, every
time one of these challenges comes up I make a judgment and a
recommendation on how we in the Navy can surge to meet a
particular requirement. We have been operating at a fairly
intense rate for routine, maintaining two carriers in the
Indian Ocean. We could certainly get more carriers there.
But the key to our Navy is that we are a rotational force,
and we continue to have that presence there. So you were not
here at my confirmation hearing, but it was in this room,
Senator, and I said that day, and I believe the same rule
applies today, the Nation decides how much of this Navy they
are going to have and what kind of Navy that they are going to
have.
With a 12-carrier force, we can be in a place, the number
of places where 12 carriers will allow us to be represented.
Obviously, if we had more it would change that calculus.
Senator McCain. You would agree with me, though, it is
wonderful to have a carrier break the record for the longest
period of time at sea, I guess since World War II, is that
right, the Theodore Roosevelt?
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator McCain. But is it wonderful to force a number of
other aircraft carriers to break that same record?
Admiral Clark. No, sir, it is not, certainly not.
Senator McCain. Is it possible to retain qualified men and
women? I note there were 800 women on board the U.S.S.
Roosevelt. Is it possible to retain qualified men and women in
the Navy when you are asking them to stay for over 6 months at
sea?
Admiral Clark. Well, that is difficult for me to project,
but I believe that--you were on the ship and you know how----
Senator McCain. Senator Collins was with us on that trip.
Admiral Clark. I remember the discussion, the discussion I
had with the battle group commander, because I was over there
shortly after you were: When are you taking this ship into
port? He said: They want the record. They were proud of what
they were doing. That does not discount your concern.
Senator McCain. Yes, but my question was do they want it
twice.
Admiral Clark. No. I understand your point and that is
where I am. This is not something that we want to be doing on a
routine basis.
Senator McCain. If you go through these crises, if history
is any guide, you are going to have more of them in the future,
and then you are going to have continued inordinate amounts of
time at sea and away from home in an all-volunteer force.
Admiral Clark. We have done some analysis to figure out
what the people impact is. I believe that one of the reasons we
have been so successful in our retention, recruiting, and
objectives, Senator, is that our people really do understand
service. We have been studying, and I recall during the Vietnam
campaign that my first deployment was 9 months. It is a long
time.
We know that if you get in the habit of having those kinds
of deployments, people are going to vote with their feet. So
this is a decision that the national leadership makes about how
they are going to commit the force, sir.
Senator McCain. There are reports that the Navy is being
approached to purchase a pair of unfinished cruise ships at the
Northrop Grumman shipyard in Pascagoula, left behind when
American Classic Voyages went bankrupt, for use as mobile
housing or a hospital ship. Is the Navy in any way interested
in purchasing these ships?
Admiral Clark. We were asked about these ships. We sent our
engineers down to look at the ships. The ships are not suitable
for the kind of platforms that we need and we are not
interested in them.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I thank the chair.
Chief, my good friend, I will get directly to the point, a
follow-on to the very good questioning you had with your fellow
sailor, Senator McCain, about the carriers. It is my
expectation, I hope, that a recommendation which I will be
forwarding to the chairman and ranking member of this
subcommittee to find the funds to restore the carrier to the
original position it once had in our budget process.
I do so by no means to be confrontational with the
Secretary and/or yourself. You had your framework of decisions.
But as you recognize, being a coequal branch, we have our
framework of decisions. It is my hope and expectation that
eventually this subcommittee and the full committee will
restore those funds.
My direct request to you, assuming that it becomes a part
of the authorization bill, would you be willing to support that
law and go forward with the restoration of that program as it
once was?
Admiral Clark. Well, of course I am going to implement the
law.
Senator Warner. Good.
Admiral Clark. May I comment further?
Senator Warner. No, I do not know that there is any need.
[Laughter.]
The question was very clear and the response was equally
clear. But I hope that in doing so that you feel that it is
consistent with your goals as the top sailor in the Navy to put
our carrier force in the strongest position possible to again,
if necessary, carry out the missions it has here in the last 90
to 120 days.
Admiral Clark. The move on the CVN(X) was an affordability
issue.
Senator Warner. We have been all over that.
Admiral Clark. We have.
Senator Warner. The record is clear on that. I thank you
for your responses.
I thank the chairman and members of the committee.
Senator Kennedy. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Clark, welcome. It is a pleasure to have you here
today. I was very pleased to hear your strong statement of
support for the DD(X) and the family of ships that its
technology will support. In the last year, there has been a lot
of focus on the technology associated with the DD 21 or the
DD(X), but less discussion about the need for this next
generation destroyer.
So just to underscore what you have said today, it is not
just the technology the you need. You need a new generation,
next generation destroyer. You need DD(X). Is that correct?
Admiral Clark. Absolutely.
Senator Collins. The second question I want to ask you,
though, has to do with some manning initiatives for the DDG-51
and the FFG-7 frigate modernization program. One of the
advantages of the DD(X), of course, is that it could operate
with a much smaller crew size. Would you discuss for a moment
the Navy's need for an optimized manning initiative for the
DDG-51 and for the FFG-7 and talk about the advantages of
perhaps investing such that we could reduce the crew sizes for
those, which are particularly important in view of the Navy
leadership's decision to maintain the remaining 33-ship FFG
force, in part because of the expectation that these ships may
have a new role to play in homeland security?
Admiral Clark. Well, first of all, Senator, one of the
actions that we took immediately after September 11 was I had
an FFG that was scheduled to be decommissioned. We put that on
hold because of the very point that you make, that this has a
potential role to play in homeland defense. So I think that
there is no question that the FFGs have a role to play.
Point two, what am I doing with the optimum manning
experiment? It is just exactly that. I have been at sea, I have
been in the Navy for 33 years. I have to be the CNO and I had
the conviction that I was on some ships that I did not think
the manning document was laid out correctly. I put out in my
guidance this year that we are going to zero-base every billet
that we have in the whole Navy and that on particular ships, I
want to run some experiments making sure that we have made
moves to adjust the manning after we have made policy changes
that changed the requirements.
So that is what that particular experiment is about. Do we
have it right and, if there is a question, let us run the test
and then adjust, not just jerk the people off. Run the test and
see what happens.
Point three, I think, is about an investment to reduce
manning. That is something that I believe. We need to capture
technology. I believe that when I talked about what tomorrow's
Navy looks like, it is a Navy that is a more senior Navy. It is
a Navy that is very high tech with high tech people. Frankly, I
want every job that we have to offer people to be a very
rewarding and challenging one, and I want to get rid of jobs
that are not that way to the maximum extent that I can.
This will include investing in technology that would allow
us to get rid of some of those less rewarding and fulfilling
assignments.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
The third issue I want to raise with you really piggybacks
on some of the concerns that Senator Warner has raised with you
about the low level of ship procurement. I know that you have
been very frank with your concerns about the low procurement
rates. It obviously has an adverse impact on the stability of
our industrial base as well as the size of our fleet.
I also think that the Navy is paying a premium in program
costs due to the small number of units being built. Could you
discuss perhaps, to follow up on Senator Warner, what your
priorities would be if additional funding is forthcoming, for
example for the need to procure three DDG-51s this year rather
than two, as put forth in the budget? How high on your priority
list of unmet needs is that?
Admiral Clark. I do not remember, Senator. I sent an
unfunded list over here and I had the DDG on it and it is near
the top. I do not remember the exact number, but it is very
near the top.
Let me just go on record once again with this comment. I
have stated that we need to be investing $12 billion a year in
new ship construction. I do not know how to make it any clearer
than that, so I say it again. We should be doing $12 billion a
year in new construction, not just SCN. SCN can be repair and
modernization, for example, refueling overhauls and so forth.
That is my belief.
My analysis shows that that is what we need to sustain the
force. I could not get there. I also told you all on the first
day that I came to this very room that I was going to pay the
current readiness bill. I told you that is what I was going to
do, because I had lived in a Navy where it was not done that
way and I am not going to be the CNO of a Navy that does not
stand up and make that claim. I am not going to send the young
men and women of this Nation out to serve on ships and aircraft
that are not ready.
So I did not have enough money to get there and that is why
we do not have $12 billion in the account and in the program.
Senator Collins. I think many of us on this subcommittee
are committed to helping you get there because we are truly
concerned about the impact of the low procurement rate. I
understand you had a lot of very difficult choices to make, but
I hope we will be able to make some adjustments to deal with
the shipbuilding budget as well.
Finally, Admiral, and I know my time is about to expire, I
want to let you know that yesterday I was at the Portsmouth
Kittery Naval Shipyard on the border in Maine. The Supreme
Court has finally settled that issue once and for all and we
now call it the Portsmouth Kittery Naval Shipyard. The men and
women working there just set two national records for
completing the overhaul and refueling of two Los Angeles-class
submarines in record time. I wanted to share that
accomplishment with you and it suggests that we should keep
that shipyard very busy because the work load for that shipyard
is troubling over the next couple of years, and yet they are
setting performance records that have not been matched by any
other shipyard. So I am very proud of the work they are doing.
Thank you.
Admiral Clark. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Kennedy. Just a final question on my part, Admiral.
This is on the issue of aircraft carrier homeporting options.
We know the relationship, 7.6 carriers in the northern Arabian
Sea, 1.7 to keep one for the Western Pacific. I asked the
Admiral at the last hearing about forward homeporting options
and he talked about submarines and other support ships in Guam,
but he made no mention about looking at other options for
homeporting carrier battle group.
I am just wondering if you can give us assurance the Navy
will give serious attention to all the options for increasing
forward presence. Senator Sessions and I wrote you a letter I
believe earlier this year and we would be interested in
assurances from you that you are going to look at the range of
different options.
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir. I do not remember if your letter
prompted the particular guidance that I put in my 2002 guidance
to our Navy or not. I have to go back and check the time line.
But looking at options, we will this year, and it is in the
guidance that I put out to our Navy, commence again experiments
to look at alternative manning concepts. These are
fundamentally to reduce the amount of time spent in transit and
increase the time that is forward. We are going to do that
starting this summer.
We have not looked at the carrier specifically because it
is much more difficult because of the size of the carrier to
do. There are huge implications in this. We do it now with
blue-gold crews on submarines. You are very aware of that. I
will not take up all the time to explain what the issues are,
but they are training and maintenance specifically.
I intend to continue those experiments and to look, and the
guidance that I have given our Navy is challenge every
assumption that we have ever made about the way that we do
this.
Senator Kennedy. We would appreciate that. We outlined in
our letter at least some of these policy issues. We welcome
making sure that you will, which I am sure you would, that you
will give your full focus and attention to it.
Are there other questions from our subcommittee members?
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Yes, briefly.
When is the next carrier coming on line? When do we
project, do you recall?
Admiral Clark. I will have to get the specifics, but the
Ronald Reagan delivers next. The next panel will give you the
specifics.
Senator Sessions. But is it the firm plan now to take the
Kitty Hawk out of the fleet as soon as the Reagan comes on
line?
Admiral Clark. The next ship out is the Constellation.
Senator Sessions. The Constellation.
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir. We have done the analysis to see
what it would take to retain her in terms of finances.
Senator Sessions. So if you could maintain that ship you
would have an additional carrier.
Admiral Clark. That is correct.
Senator Sessions. If we got back on line with the
commitment, the QDR level I guess, on the carriers that we cut
back on in this budget, I understand it would be about $239
million additional funds we would have to come up with this
year?
Admiral Clark. I have to check the number, Senator. I would
be happy to provide it for you, but I do not have it here.
[The information referred to follows:]
The correct amount to get CVNX back ``on line'' is $229 million.
The CVNX-1 PB02 program of record schedule (fiscal year 2006
construction start/later fiscal year 2013 delivery) would have required
Northrup Grumman Newport News (NGNN) to start their design team ramp up
on January 2002. However, adjustments made to the CVNX-1 program of
record in PB03 delayed the start of construction until fiscal year 2007
and, as a result, NGNN has not started their design team ramp up. If
Congress were to provide additional funding in fiscal year 2003 for
CVNX-1 and implement the revised funding profile, the earliest CVNX-1
could be delivered would be March 2014 due to the 9-month loss of
design team ramp up in fiscal year 2002.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. If there are no further questions, thank
you very much.
Admiral Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a
pleasure to appear before the subcommittee.
Senator Kennedy. We appreciate it very much.
Admiral Clark. We very much appreciate your support.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Our next panel, Major General Whitlow, Rear Admiral
Balisle, Rear Admiral Sullivan and Rear Admiral McCabe.
We will start off with General Whitlow. We will hear a
brief presentation from each of the panelists. We will file the
statements in the record, and then proceed to the questions.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. WHITLOW, USMC, DIRECTOR,
EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS AND PROGRAMS
General Whitlow. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, I
have a very brief statement if you would allow me.
Senator Kennedy. Fine.
General Whitlow. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
the Seapower Subcommittee, I am Major General Bill Whitlow,
Director of Expeditionary Warfare Division. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. I must warn you, I just
had a root canal and some oral surgery, so if I appear to be
drooling I am going to use that as my excuse and will stick
with it.
Senator McCain. Would you rather have the root canal than
be here? [Laughter.]
General Whitlow. I am truly on drugs, sir.
But seriously, to maximize operational effectiveness, we
have pursued programs that enhance our capability to be fast,
flexible, and lethal. Underpinning these operational
imperatives is the requirement for the amphibious lift. By
doctrine and prudent analysis, execution of our Nation's
military strategy relies on the availability to deploy three
marine expeditionary brigades.
As this committee knows, we have not been able to meet the
3.0 marine expeditionary brigade requirement because of fiscal
constraints and instead have focused on the less capable goal
of maintaining lift for 2.5 marine expeditionary brigades. This
is a deficiency that must be addressed and strikes at home in
our shipbuilding accounts.
The ability to conduct expeditionary warfare is tied to the
size and composition of our naval force. The amphibious fleet
remains the oldest in the Navy and must be enhanced. Key to
this effort is the LPD-17 program. According to the current
ship construction plan, the 2.5 marine expeditionary brigades'
worth of lift capability will not be achieved until the
delivery of the twelfth LPD-17, now estimated for delivery in
the year 2015. As such, the Navy is forced to retain the aging
and increasingly unreliable 35-plus year old LPD-4 class of
ships, ships that are plagued with problems of poor
habitability and deteriorating working conditions. These
conditions have a direct impact on the morale and effectiveness
of their assigned personnel.
Another initiative that impacts every aspect of
expeditionary warfare is the LHA replacement program. An
ongoing analysis of alternatives is due to be completed 2
months from now during June and should lead to the selection of
a design of an LHA replacement. The LHA replacement ship class
will be multi-functional and highly versatile. It is prudent to
improve the baseline capability of the LHD-8, a transition ship
with limited capacity for future growth. A smooth transition
from LHA to LHD-8 to the LHA replacement is critical if we are
to leverage technology to garner adequate ground combat power
in order to maintain forcible entry capability. Unless we like
playing home games, which I do not believe we do, forcible
entry capability is at the heart of this Nation's national
strategy.
Navy leadership has openly discussed the difficulties
associated with mine countermeasures warfare operations,
especially in the surf zone, as the chairman has articulated
earlier. Unfortunately, recent efforts to develop a mine
clearance, mine destruction system in the surf zone proved
unsuccessful. That was the shallow water assault breaching-
distributive explosive technology (SABRE-DET) previously
mentioned. That is not to say that we do not have a surf zone,
very shallow water capability. Unfortunately, we are forced to
conduct such operations using special warfare divers and
mammals.
As this committee knows, a decision was made to terminate
development of the SABRE and DET systems, two R&D programs that
early on demonstrated great potential. To remedy this
unsatisfactory situation and provide a badly needed capability,
the Navy has instituted a corrective three-track program. These
tracks seek to improve systems for immediate possible use as
well as develop more capable systems in the near and long-term.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am
standing by for your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Major General Whitlow follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. William A. Whitlow, USMC
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Seapower Subcommittee, I
am Major General Bill Whitlow, Director of the Expeditionary Warfare
Division. It is truly an honor to represent the men and women of your
United States Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary team. As head of the
division that identifies and validates resource requirements necessary
to conduct expeditionary warfare, I provide this testimony on their
behalf.
History is replete with incidents that galvanize a nation. The
events that took place 7 months ago stunned our sense of domestic
tranquility. They also aroused our collective anger, eliciting a
national call to arms to eliminate a vengeful enemy eager to wreak
carnage onto the American public. Our military response has been
powerful, yet focused; lethal, but mindful of the ideals that form the
foundation of our Nation. Over the years, this committee has supported
and provided valuable guidance on many of the systems now being
employed in defense of our country. You should take great pride, as I
do, in the sailors and marines who are faithfully and professionally
performing their assigned duties overseas today. Their performance is a
reflection of the support they have received from their countrymen and
elected leaders.
It is worthy of our time to pause and examine how our Nation has
chosen to respond to the war on terror. Well before my tenure as
Director of the Expeditionary Warfare Division, Navy and Marine Corps
leaders have spoken of the operational advantages of possessing a force
that is lethal, flexible and self-sustaining. Events in Afghanistan
have demonstrated that the maritime strategy ``forward . . . from the
sea'' is valid even when conducting warfare in a country that is
landlocked and located 400 miles from a major body of water. Despite
Afghanistan's isolation, the first sustained U.S. military operation
ashore was conducted by the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units,
an expeditionary force that was deployed, organized and launched from
the U.S.S. Peleliu and U.S.S. Bataan amphibious ready groups (ARGs). As
you recall, the mission of these two MEUs was to seize the first in-
country staging base (Rhino), secure the Kandahar airport and establish
a base from which quick-reaction operations could be conducted to
further track down Taliban and al Qaeda forces.
The MEUs' conquest is simply the latest example of a long history
of expeditionary warfare. The term ``expeditionary'' refers to a menu
of forces (air, ground, and sea) that are forward or rapidly deployed
to achieve a specific national security objective. These forces are
trained and configured to respond to the full spectrum of military
operations, from humanitarian assistance to small-scale contingencies
through major theater war. To be effective in these different and
challenging operations, expeditionary warfare forces must be capable,
mobile and extremely versatile. While the concept of ``expeditionary
warfare'' may seem new or revolutionary, in reality it is how this
Nation's sea services have operated for all of its 226-year (plus)
history.
To maximize operational effectiveness while minimizing the threat
to safety, we have pursued programs that enhance our capability to be
fast, flexible and lethal. Underpinning these operational imperatives
is the requirement for lift. Lift drives everything. It permits us to
respond quickly, decisively, and without first having to obtain host
nation support. Lift also allows us to be on station to monitor and
hopefully deter events before they escalate. The naval amphibious
assault ships that provide the critical lift are designed to conduct
sea-based operations with a minimal reliance on host or allied nation
support. Amphibious ships with embarked Marine forces are one of the
most formidable power projection capabilities in the world and
represent our Nation's only sustainable forcible-entry capability.
By doctrine and prudent analysis, execution of our Nation's
military strategy relies on the availability and readiness to deploy
three Marine expeditionary brigades (MEB) assault echelons, the so-
called ``3.0 MEB lift.'' However, it should be emphasized that the 3.0
MEB requirement is based on a single major theater war (MTW) scenario
and this force is not intended to act as a swing force in the event of
a second contingency or second MTW. As this committee is aware, we have
not been able to meet the 3.0 MEB requirement because of fiscal
constraints and instead have focused on the less capable goal of
maintaining 2.5 MEB. The fiscally constrained 2.5 MEB goal was supposed
to be a temporary situation; a ``strategic pause'' permitted following
the end of the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm. It was not intended
to replace, nor should it be seen as an acceptable alternative to, the
3.0 MEB requirement. Unfortunately, I must report that we have not been
able to maintain the 2.5 MEB capability in the active force. Today,
your expeditionary forces are only equipped at 2.1 MEB lift equivalent
with the corresponding risk and dangers inherent in such a reduced
posture. I want to emphasize that a 2.5 MEB capability is neither
dependent on, nor significantly affected by, changes to the two MTW
strategy.
So what? So why should Congress and the American public be
concerned if our military falls even further from the required 3.0 MEB
lift? Among the capabilities that expeditionary forces--and in many
cases, expeditionary forces alone--provide is assured access. As the
number of overseas U.S. bases has decreased, the importance (and
difficulty) of gaining and sustaining entrance into foreign hotspots
has increased. Expeditionary warfare, with its diverse, tailored
packaging of forces represents our Nation's only forcible entry
capability as well as the enabling force for the introduction of
heavier and more specialized forces into a theater conflict. As such,
without adequate amphibious shipping we run the risk that access will
be blocked or achieved only at great human cost.
The ability to conduct expeditionary warfare is tied to the size
and composition of our naval force. The amphibious fleet remains the
oldest in the Navy and must be replaced and enhanced. Key to this
effort is the LPD-17 program. The LPD-17 San Antonio-class ship is a
highly versatile, wet-well platform that is capable of conducting both
air and landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) operations. According to the
current ship construction plan, the 2.5 MEB lift capability will not be
achieved until delivery of the twelfth LPD-17, now estimated for the
2015 timeframe. As such, the Department of the Navy is forced to retain
the aging and increasingly unreliable LPD-4 class of ships. All of
these ships are currently 31-37 years old and are not expected to be
decommissioned until they reach an average age of 41.5 years--6.5 years
beyond their expected service life. Not surprisingly, the LPD-4 Austin-
class ships are plagued with problems of poor habitability and
deteriorating working conditions that have a direct impact on the
morale and effectiveness of assigned personnel. Additionally, these
ships require costly C\4\I upgrades to be interoperable with other C\4\
advances being implemented throughout the fleet.
I cannot stress enough the importance of maintaining, if not
accelerating, the construction schedule of the LPD-17. Relative to the
LPD-4s, delivery of LPD-17s will have a direct and immediate increase
in our warfighting capability. The LPD-17s will provide increased
vehicle and LCAC capacity, improved aviation and C\4\I capability,
improved survivability, and improved shipboard quality of life. They
are a vital asset and a prudent investment.
Another initiative that impacts every aspect of expeditionary
warfare is the LHD-8/LHA Replacement (LHA(R)) program. The five Tarawa-
class LHAs are rapidly approaching the end of their service life and
face block obsolescence at the rate of one per year from 2011-2015.
Under the recapitalization plan, we project that some of the LHAs will
not be retired until they are as much as 10 years beyond their 35-year
service life. LHD-8 (Wasp-class) is scheduled to begin construction in
fiscal year 2002 with an expected delivery during fiscal year 2007.
Once operational, LHD-8 will replace one of the Tarawa-class LHAs. Yet,
as this committee well knows, the LHD-8 is a ``transition'' ship--a
ship designated to develop and demonstrate technology that will be
incorporated into the follow-on LHA replacement ship. An ongoing
analysis of alternatives (AoA) is due to be completed in June 2002 and
should lead to the selection of a design for the LHA(R). As the
centerpiece of the amphibious ready group, the big deck LHA(R) ship
will be multi-functional and highly versatile. It is prudent, however,
to improve the baseline capability of the LHD-8 and leverage technology
to garner more vehicle and air capacity. A smooth transition from LHA
to LHD-8 to LHA(R) is reliant on continued funding of the LHA mid-life
sustainment program. This upgrade program extends to 35 years the
useful life of the aging LHA-class ships and provides the time
necessary to pursue the LHA(R) in a fiscally responsible manner.
From an operational point of view, lift (and the ships that
constitute our lift) is necessary to transport and sustain the
expeditionary amphibious triad. The triad consists of LCAC, the
advanced amphibious assault vehicles (AAAVs), and the MV-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft. The versatile LCAC is the primary platform for high speed,
over-the-horizon transport of troops, vehicles and material. The LCAC's
high speed and ability to access over 70 percent of the world's
coastlines (compared to 17 percent for conventional landing craft) is
key to our ability to execute the maneuver warfare doctrine of seeking
out and landing at the enemy's weakest point. The LCAC fleet is
undergoing a service life extension program (SLEP) to correct hull
fatigue and corrosion, extending the hull life up to 20 years. In
addition, the SLEP includes an upgrade to its command/control/
communication/computer and navigation (C\4\N) suite and enhanced
engines that will increase its interoperability and performance. I'm
pleased to report that in December 2000, the Navy received its first
successful SLEP craft, LCAC 91, providing a good template for future
LCACs. This program makes good business sense and is widely endorsed by
fleet commanders. Our conventional landing craft now average 35 years
of age. The LCU replacement program is on track for a fiscal year 2005
start to replace these craft.
The attack on the World Trade Centers, preceded by the 1999 attack
on the U.S.S. Cole, illustrate the type of asymmetric threat our
sailors and marines face as they carry out their duties in support of
our national objectives. All of our commanders place the protection of
their sailors and marines on top of their priority lists, and it is my
task to provide the support necessary to optimize their ability to
deter and counter such an attack and to minimize the consequences
should one occur. The solution lies in a combination of complimentary
efforts, ranging from doctrine and training to manpower and equipment.
While there is no single program that can entirely eliminate our
vulnerability to a terrorist attack, there are several ongoing
initiatives within expeditionary warfare that will improve our ability
to both deter and defeat terrorist attacks.
For the past year and a half, our naval coastal warfare forces
(NCWF) have been called upon to conduct expeditionary harbor defense
and coastal surveillance at critical locations throughout the globe. It
is important to note that the NCWF is almost completely manned and
managed by Naval reservists and is a prime example of the integration
between active duty and Reserve Forces. Using their core elements of
mobile inshore undersea warfare units, inshore boat units, and Harbor
Defense Commands, the naval coastal warfare forces have provided us the
flexibility and capability to tailor units to meet specific
requirements based on the deployment location and threat. These
deployments, however, have revealed critical readiness shortfalls,
primarily in equipment deficiencies, that have accumulated since their
last major employment during Operation Desert Storm. Providing
sufficient resources to attain sustainable readiness for this small but
essential force is one of my most immediate priorities.
This group of highly motivated naval reservists has largely
volunteered to defer their personal and professional lives so that they
may contribute to our Navy's immediate security. This increased force
protection posture, however, is not indefinitely achievable solely
through a Reserve Force, however motivated. To that end, we have
resourced the establishment of an active duty ``mobile security force''
that will provide our naval commanders with a flexible, rapidly
deployable, and immediately available capability. This force is
designed to provide defensive security augmentation during heightened
force protection conditions in locations where the U.S. or the host
nation's security infrastructure is inadequate to meet the temporary
heightened requirement. This new force has been fully resourced to the
identified requirement. The first detachment is expected to reach
initial operational capability early in fiscal year 2003, and all 12
detachments will become fully operational by fiscal year 2005. While
this new Active-Duty Force will not replicate the robust surveillance
and command and control capability of our Reserve naval coastal warfare
force, it will relieve them of the security augmentation role they have
been filling, allowing us to sustain heightened force protection
requirements and conduct extended harbor security and overseas littoral
surveillance operations.
Equally important to our ability to maintain a heightened security
posture in locations where our expeditionary forces operate, is the
requirement to detect, identify and defeat weapons most commonly
employed by terrorist organizations. Such weapons include the full
spectrum of chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological (CBNR) and
enhanced explosive devices. This difficult task lies primarily with
another of our Navy's small but critical forces: explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) units. To improve the capabilities and safety of these
highly specialized forces, we are developing unmanned ground and
underwater vehicles to assist in conducting dangerous EOD operations at
sea or on land, in hostile and contaminated environments. We are also
funding increased EOD force levels as the demand for these uniquely
skilled operators increases across the spectrum of naval operations.
The Navy is not the only service feeling the increased demand for EOD
capabilities. As the single manager for joint service EOD technology
and training, the Navy is expanding and improving the curriculum for
joint service advanced improvised explosive device training and
developing technologies to further enhance the joint service capability
to detect, identify and defeat terrorist devices.
While much of the current discussion of asymmetric threats involves
terrorist activities, perhaps the greatest asymmetric threat to
expeditionary operations continues to be the anti-ship mine. To address
the challenges posed by sea mines, the Navy-Marine Corps team is
maintaining a dedicated mine countermeasure (MCM) force while
simultaneously developing and introducing new organic MCM capabilities.
Dedicated and organic assets are complimentary and are designed to
address two different missions. Organic MCM systems are being developed
to permit naval forces to operate/transit in a mined environment
without having to await the arrival of dedicated MCM forces. Focusing
primarily on the area that stretches from deep water to the 40-foot
curve, organic assets will provide a highly capable, albeit reduced,
capacity across the MCM requirements spectrum. Specifically, the
carrier battle group commander will have a full range of organic MCM
capabilities embarked as an integral part of the battle group. These
ship-borne assets will give forward-deployed forces the ability to
conduct timely MCM operations, allowing for unencumbered transit and
minimizing the operational delay or impact of mines on a mission.
Dedicated MCM forces are equipped, manned and trained to provide a
sustainable capability for larger missions such as detecting and
clearing mines in a broad geographical area. Dedicated forces will
continue to provide highly capable assets in sizes and quantities that
effectively address the sustained, large area MCM efforts required for
creating areas necessary for both fleet operations (e.g. large carrier
operational areas or major Q-route shipping lanes) and amphibious task
force operations (principally large landing architectures). It is the
Department of the Navy's position that both organic and dedicated
forces are needed to safely and efficiently prosecute MCM missions.
The Navy leadership has openly discussed the difficulties
associated with MCM operations. Contained in the Fiscal Year 2003 U.S.
Naval MCM Certification Plan is the admission that, ``given the
complexity and proliferation of the mine threat and the myriad of
environmental influences on MCM system performances, mine
countermeasures represents one of the Navy's most significant
operational and tactical challenges.'' To address these challenges the
Navy has developed a plan that seeks to maintain current assets while
aggressively developing and fielding new capabilities. The overarching
goals of this plan are to (1) shorten the MCM tactical timeline and (2)
reduce and eventually eliminate manned MCM operations in mine threat
areas.
Current capabilities are well established in the ``blue water''
operational area. These capabilities are resident in the current MCM
triad force of surface mine countermeasures (SMCM) ships, airborne mine
countermeasures (AMCM) helicopter squadrons, and underwater mine
countermeasures (e.g., EOD MCM detachments and marine mammal systems).
This multi-faceted force operates synergistically and is well suited
for mine hunting and minesweeping in deep waters. The Triad offers not
only a capable force, but also a sustained high capacity to conduct
large area and long endurance MCM efforts. These forces are
collectively known as ``dedicated MCM.'' In many respects, this
capability is the legacy of efforts begun in the late 1980s and early
1990s to reconstruct a viable world-class U.S. MCM force. Specifically,
the Avenger-class MCM ships, Osprey-class MHC ships, and the MH-53E Sea
Dragon aircraft were all introduced or in procurement prior to
Operation Desert Storm.
These combined forces possess the requisite capability to
successfully hunt and neutralize or sweep mines from the deepest ASW
weapons to those threats generally employed in the vicinity of the 40-
foot curve. However, inside the 40-foot point the efficacy of these
dedicated sensors and platforms, particularly SMCMs and their systems,
can be significantly impacted by a number of factors.
Unfortunately, recent efforts to develop a mine clearance/mine
destruction system in the surf zone (defined as the area from 10 feet
of water depth to the high water mark) proved unsuccessful. As this
committee knows, a decision was made in the summer of 2000 to terminate
development of the shallow water assault breaching (SABRE) and
distributive explosive technology (DET) systems, two R&D programs that
early on demonstrated great potential. Knowing Congress's and this
committee's keen interest in these programs, we have attempted on
several occasions to outline and explain the rationale to terminate.
Ultimately, the decision was made because the military utility of these
programs was judged too low to justify the cost. Studies proved that
these programs were ineffective against specific threats, could not be
operated in the presence of even light obstacles, required an extensive
number of LCAC missions to employ, proved problematic to handle onboard
ship, and required the displacement of an unacceptable quantity of
combat power to embark aboard amphibious shipping. While cancellation
of these two programs was clearly the right thing to do, it also left
the Navy-Marine Corps team without an effective assault breaching
system. As such, the Navy's current capability in the surf zone is
deemed unsatisfactory. To remedy this unsatisfactory situation and
provide badly needed capability in the critical surf zone area, the
Navy has instituted a corrective ``three track'' program.
Track one is known as the operator's track. Under this track the
Navy seeks to identify, refine, and improve existing breaching and
clearance tactics that currently provide limited surf zone mine
countermeasure capability (SZ MCM). Beginning in December 2001,
commanders of the Navy amphibious groups and Marine expeditionary
forces began briefing N-75 staff on current concept of operations for
SZ MCM. With a thorough understanding of the fleet's current tactics,
budgetary resources will be focused to support and enhance these
capabilities with the aim of maximizing their effectiveness. While a
complete solution is not expected from this track, it is anticipated
that a better, more realistic approach can be developed that can
immediately be employed should the need arise.
Track two, known as the near-term track, seeks to develop and
exploit a ``family of capabilities''. At a minimum, desired/required
capabilities include: enhanced ISR tools, data fusion applications,
mine-obstacle detection and location systems, precision navigation &
maneuvering systems, area/lane/object marking systems, mine-obstacle
kill mechanisms, and common C\4\I systems.
Within 18-24 months, existing technology promises to provide
answers to some of these requirements. For example, the Navy is
confident that current commercial off-the-shelf/government off-the-
shelf (COTS/GOTS) technology exists to equip landing craft/vehicles
with precision navigation systems. Further illustrating the potential
of this approach is the airborne laser mine detection system (ALMDS), a
program that is already under development and represents the next
generation of airborne mine hunting systems. ALMDS has demonstrated
that, with certain modifications, it will be capable of rapidly
detecting mines in the very shallow water region.
Recent efforts by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) further
demonstrate our belief that evolving technology can provide a robust,
near-term MCM capability. In January 2002, ONR released a broad agency
announcement (BAA) soliciting technology concepts from industry,
government labs, and academia. Paramount to concept submission was the
requirement that the proposed technology must be demonstrated within 18
months of contract award and fielded to the fleet 3 years thereafter.
Thirty ``white papers'' were received in response to the BAA. A
comprehensive evaluation panel involving fleet operators met and
selected three promising concepts to pursue. Full proposals are due
from these three in mid-May with funding for the 18-month development
phase commencing in fiscal year 2003. If successfully demonstrated, a
mine and obstacle kill capability could be fielded to the fleet by
2006.
The third track is a long-term approach and is based upon a
standard acquisition model (normally 10-15 years) for developing and
fielding mine-obstacle ``kill'' mechanisms. This process encompasses
early science and technology (S&T) development work and concept
demonstration, and involves clearly delineated milestones such as a
full ``mission area analysis'' (MAA), a subsequent ``mission needs
statement'' (MNS), an ``analysis of alternatives'' (AoA), and
eventually an ``operational requirements document'' (ORD). This process
ensures that the testing, acquisition, and fielding of a system will
meet ORD/Fleet requirements.
In December 2001, the Navy established a MAA team, instituted an
over-arching O-6-level oversight board and initiated an integrated
process team for the purpose of developing required operational
capabilities for a family-of-systems to perform amphibious MCM by 2015.
The MAA is on track to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2003 and
will lead into a fiscal year 2004 AoA. Aircraft and ship-based concepts
are currently being examined through the S&T and concept demonstration
phase and will be evaluated during the AoA process.
While expediting the overall process is a key priority of this
track, particular care will be taken to ensure acceleration does not
result in a quick but unsatisfactory product. This track is expected to
result in acquisition of the final MCM piece--obstacle and mine kill
mechanisms--which, with the other required capabilities, will complete
the MCM tool set.
As stated in the Navy's Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG),
establishing an ``organic capability of surface forces to detect, avoid
and/or neutralize mines within operationally acceptable timelines and
with acceptable levels of operational risk'' is a top Navy priority.
The MH-60S, next generation MCM systems, the remote mine hunting system
(RMS) deployed from surface combatants, and the submarine-based long-
term mine reconnaissance system (LMRS) address this priority.
The RMS represents the most effective mine hunting system ever
carried onboard a non-MCM Class ship. The RMS, an unmanned surface
vehicle (USV) towing an AQS-20X sonar system (practically identical to
the system operated from the MH-60S), will provide long-duration
unmanned operations under the direction of host ship operators or in a
pre-planned autonomous mode. The USV ``tow vehicle'' is almost entirely
submerged with only a snorkel/antenna piercing the surface of the
water. As such, the RMS is considered to be ``low-observable'' and very
tolerant of sea states that can adversely effect other USVs.
The LMRS is an autonomous UUV system that will be operated from
both Los Angeles-class submarines (SSN-688) and Virginia-class
submarines (SSN-774). Using mine detection and classification sonars,
the LMRS will be used at extended ranges as a clandestine, forward-
deployed asset, to determine the extent and size of the mine threat, as
well as to determine the safety of anticipated operating areas.
It should be noted that in addition to fielding the MH-60S AMCM
aircraft as an organic asset, the Navy is evaluating whether to
transition its dedicated AMCM force from the MH-53E to the MH-60S. One
advantage of transitioning from the MH-53E to the MH-60S is airframe
commonality between the dedicated and organic fleet AMCM force
operations, training, and logistics. Many significant issues are being
evaluated including the ability of the MH-60S to conduct the AMCM-
required missions as well as the total cost of completely
recapitalizing the force into an MH-60S dedicated force. We expect a
decision in PR-05.
As this subcommittee is well aware, the Navy converted U.S.S.
Inchon (LPH-12) to serve as a mine countermeasures command and support
ship (MCS-12) in 1994. The intent was to use this ship, the last of her
class, to bridge the Navy to a future MCS platform prior to 2005. The
rapid aging of U.S.S. Inchon, particularly its engineering plant and
equipment, resulted in sub-optimal material readiness and high
operating/repair costs. Ongoing safety concerns and a recent major fire
in its engineering spaces further reduced the ship's utility. Already
planned for decommissioning in 2005, the Inchon's age, difficulty in
effecting repairs while in homeport, and the immediate need for
extensive engineering upgrades combined to lead the Navy to a decision
to accelerate the decommission plan to fiscal year 2002.
In the absence of a dedicated MCS platform, the Commander, Fleet
Forces Command (formerly Commander, Atlantic Fleet) coordinated a plan
with the numbered fleets and Commander, Mine Warfare Command to employ
large deck amphibious ships (LHAs and LHDs) in a surrogate MCS role.
Upon decommissioning of MCS-12, various key operational capabilities
inherent to U.S.S. Inchon will be retained in expeditionary
detachments. This plan has already been promulgated and will be
exercised on a regular basis. Use, however, of amphibious shipping as
surrogate MCS will pose additional constraints on MEB AE lift
requirements. When embarked, MCM assets will greatly increase the size
of the naval support element and will encroach on aviation and vehicle
storage space--a situation that must be watched and managed closely.
Concurrent with the employment and refinement of this interim MCS
concept, the Navy is conducting a MCS mission area analysis (MAA) with
Johns Hopkins University. This MAA will lead to a refined mission need
statement supporting an analysis of alternatives for a follow-on MCS
platform. Additionally, the Navy continues to experiment with
transformational concepts like the high speed vessel to understand how
such a concept/platform might serve in an MCS role.
In closing, I first want to echo and reinforce what General Jones
stated to this committee on March 5, 2002. The long recognized
requirement for the amphibious force structure is the ability to lift
the assault echelons of three Marine expeditionary brigades. Today, we
can barely lift two brigades--a mere two-thirds of the requirement. I
second the commandant's recommendation that we recapitalize our
amphibious fleet as a matter of urgent priority. Two programs that I
have testified about today will move us closer to meeting this critical
requirement. We need delivery of at least 12 LPD-17s and replacement of
the LHAs as they approach the end of their expected service life.
Second, I want to reemphasize the need to ensure the safety and welfare
of our sailors and marines. The way to do this is to ensure that the
equipment and shipping they use is modern, capable and habitable.
Again, LPD-17 and LHA(R) address these priorities, as does our
continuing endeavor to remove the ``man and mammal from the
minefield.'' We can ill afford not to fully exploit these programs. The
gain far exceeds any short-term financial pain caused by investing in
the safety and welfare of our most precious asset--our sailors and
marines. I am grateful for your support and look forward to supporting
you and the American people in the years to ahead.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral Balisle.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. PHILLIP M. BALISLE, USN, DIRECTOR,
SURFACE WARFARE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Balisle. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2003 surface
warfare systems budget. I would also like to thank the
committee for your strong and enduring support for surface
warfare programs and, more importantly, for your support of our
truly outstanding surface warriors. These young men and women
who stand watch today on ships and at support bases around the
world in the defense of freedom are the heart and soul of
surface warfare and are the key to our success.
Surface warriors and our systems have played a key role in
the recent successes in the war on terrorism. The status of
surface warfare today is healthy and improving. We have a
credible combat-ready force that emphasizes forward-deployed
operations. This year's budget submission shows real progress
in fiscal year 2003 and through the future years defense plan
in support of our strategy to provide a robust warfighting
capability necessary to pace the threat and support worldwide
assured access for joint forces.
We are focused on providing the greatest flexibility for
the least investment. For our fiscal year 2003 budget, we seek
improvement in current and future readiness, with emphasis on
transformational technologies and concepts, to provide
affordable solutions to our warfighting requirements. More
importantly, we will endeavor to get those solutions rapidly
into the fleet.
My written testimony describes our investment strategy and
details the impact of this budget submission on the full range
of surface warfare programs. But I would like to very briefly
highlight our efforts in three important areas: readiness,
network-centric warfare, and the future fleet.
This year we are making solid progress in addressing
longstanding readiness issues, thanks to the leaders and
sailors in the fleet and the support of this Congress. Surface
warfare manpower, training, and maintenance accounts have
recently posted significant levels of improvement, an
achievement reflected in the persistent performance of our
ships in the ongoing war on terrorism. The fiscal year 2003
budget submission continues this improvement trend in these
critical readiness areas.
The Navy's cornerstone warfighting concept of network-
centric warfare derives maximum force warfighting potential
through rapid and robust networking of diverse, well-informed,
and geographically dispersed warfighters. The Navy's
cooperative engagement capability (CEC) system and the naval
fires network are leading the way in making network-centric
warfare a reality in the fleet.
The John F. Kennedy battle group deployed with CEC last
month and we added in this budget submission significant
funding to accelerate fielding and further development of CEC
and other sensor-netting technologies.
The naval fires network digitally connects sensors through
decision makers to shooters. This provides time-critical strike
and time-critical targeting capabilities and enhances every
area of our warfare missions. Using the Defense Emergency
Response Fund provided by Congress this year, we have
accelerated deployment of this vital system and our current
budget request ensures continued rapid deployment and
development of this significant situational awareness and time-
critical targeting capability.
The report of the Quadrennial Defense Review study and the
Navy's leadership have recognized that assuring access to key
regions abroad and projecting power in its various forms
requires a broad range of naval capabilities. To achieve this,
our 21st century Navy must be comprised of affordable force,
reflecting state-of-the-art capabilities and technologies.
The cornerstone of this force is the timely fielding of the
DD(X) destroyer as the lead ship of an evolving class of multi-
mission threat-capable, and cost-efficient surface combatants.
The application of a proven Spruance-to-Aegis evolutionary ship
development approach in a new class of 21st century combatants
is absolutely essential for tomorrow's Navy. Together with the
cruiser conversion program and the upgrade of our DDGs, these
future ships will provide the joint force commander with a
toolbox of capabilities he needs.
In conclusion, sir, once again I would like to thank you
and the members of this committee on behalf of the surface
warriors in our Navy. I want to offer my sincere thanks for
this opportunity to speak before you today and I stand by for
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Balisle follows:]
Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Phillip Balisle, USN
Chairman Kennedy, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
Senate Seapower Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address
you today on the status of the surface Navy. I greatly appreciate the
excellent and continued support your committee has given the surface
Navy which has allowed our Surface Warriors to contribute significantly
to America's Navy's accomplishment of our missions around the world--
including the swift and effective response to the attacks of last
September--while continuing to advance our strategy to transform the
Surface Forces to meet the challenges of the future.
THE UNITED STATES NAVY--PRESENCE . . . POWER . . . PRECISION
Our Navy's response to the events of September 11 highlights the
mobility, lethality and reach of naval forces.
On the home front, aircraft carriers, Aegis cruisers and
destroyers, and numerous other ships rapidly responded to take station
off the east and west coasts of the United States to guard the air and
sea approaches to our shores in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard
and other military and civilian agencies ashore.
Forward deployed, U.S. naval forces were first on the scene and led
the way for the joint force effort in Operation Enduring Freedom.
Tomahawk shooters suppressed enemy air defenses while carrier strike
aircraft projected power with precision munitions hundreds of miles
beyond the sea. Marines, Navy SEALS, Seabees, and Special Operations
Forces sustained by Navy forces from the sea all played key roles in
freeing Afghanistan from the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda terrorist
network.
The extraordinary warfighting flexibility demonstrated by U.S.
naval forces this year is the result of the dedicated service of our
active and Reserve Sailors and Marines and their civil service team
members. It is a testament to our commitment to mission accomplishment.
The U.S. Navy is ready to fight and win.
Forward deployed combat forces provide this nation with speed of
response to an emerging crisis from forces that can be immediately
employed from within a region. Before the most recent action in
Afghanistan, naval forces had provided the same type of timely response
on 86 occasions in the last decade alone, including 11 different combat
operations. In fact, even before the events of September 11, the last
10 Navy carrier battlegroups to deploy, a span that began in 1998, have
engaged in combat as part of Operation Allied Force in Southeastern
Europe and/or operations in the Middle East. Additionally, in that time
span, naval forces conducted non-combatant evacuation operations,
conducted thousands of boardings in support of U.S. drug policy and
United Nations sanctions, and participated in numerous humanitarian
assistance operations. During crisis or conflict, forward-deployed and
forward-based naval forces are positioned for timely response. The
Navy-Marine Corps team stands ready, at the ``tip of the spear,'' to
assure access and to project joint and combined power in support of
National policy.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND NAVY TRANSFORMATION
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) sets clear goals to
assure allies and friends that the United States is a reliable security
partner, to dissuade future military competition from potential
adversaries, to deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests and
decisively defeat any adversaries who have not been deterred from
attempting to impose their will on the U.S., its allies or its friends.
The QDR requires that we restore and then improve current readiness
while transforming to address the circumstances of the 21st century. To
support these goals, our sovereign naval forces must be able to enhance
deterrence and, should that fail, assure sea-based joint force access
to project offensive and defensive power ashore to defeat all
adversaries.
New challenges, including the threat of cyberwar, weapons of mass
destruction, continued international terrorism and the havoc wrought by
failed states, define a most unpredictable future. These and other
emerging threats will call for new deterrence options spanning the full
range of threats facing our Nation. Technical advances in area-denial
forces including mines, small boats, diesel submarines, sophisticated
anti-ship cruise missiles, land-based aircraft and ballistic missiles
have expanded the challenge in the littoral areas where naval forces
must operate in order to maintain the ability to project power in
support of national objectives.
To counter these challenges in the littoral, robust Surface Force
warfighting capabilities must be maintained to guarantee the Navy's
ability to sail into harm's way, and enable our assured access in the
littorals throughout the world. These capabilities are achieved through
multi-layered defense-in-depth, active and passive measures, teamwork
and force synergy. The evolution of our warfighting systems must be
kept ``lock step'' ahead of the emerging threat. As the threat evolves
and becomes more capable, so must the Navy's combat systems. To remain
ahead of this evolving threat we must field state-of-the-art
capabilities as we continue to invest in next-generation research and
development.
The Navy will meet the challenge of an uncertain future by
continuing to transform our concepts, organizations, doctrine,
technology, networks, sensors and platforms, weapons systems, training,
education and our approach to manning. At the heart of this wide-
ranging transformation is the implementation of network-centric
warfare. This integration of sensors, information systems, platforms
and weapons to achieve major increases in warfighting effectiveness
will provide the framework for a transformed, balanced total force that
will provide the Joint Force Commander with the ``tool box'' of
capabilities necessary to fight and win against current and emerging
threats.
The Surface Warrior's contribution to the joint commander's ``tool
box'' of capabilities supports a family of shaping, offensive and
defensive missions including assurance and deterrence, maritime
strategic fires, expeditionary maneuver warfare, maritime strategic
defense, ship self-defense, undersea warfare, and homeland security.
Assurance and Deterrence--The enduring Navy-Marine
Corps contribution to national security is combat-credible
forward presence. surface Navy forces present and engaged
forward--where our most vital economic, political, and military
interests are concentrated--routinely provide a framework of
security and stability that helps other instruments of national
power to assure our allies and friends and to dissuade
potential military competitors.
Maritime Strategic Fires--The surface Navy provides
cruise missile precision strike and naval surface fires
capabilities vital to integrated joint operations across the
spectrum of warfare.
Maritime Strategic Defense--The surface Navy with a
variety of existing and developing capabilities is postured to
project defense over sea-based and land-based U.S. and Allied
forces including theater air defense and theater ballistic
missile defense.
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare--surface Navy forces
play a vital role on the Navy-Marine Corps team that stands
ready to project sea-based power ashore in support of joint,
naval, or multi-national operations.
Ship Self-Defense--This capability enhances the
ability of all fleet units to survive and operate in an enemy
area-denial environment and is at the core of the sea-basing
concept that affords sustained access to naval forces and
supports maneuver along the length and breadth of the joint
littoral operations area unconstrained by political or
sovereignty issue.
Undersea Warfare--Command of the seas in both the open
ocean and in the littorals is a pre-requisite for sea-basing
and the surface Navy fields an array of existing and developing
capabilities in anti-submarine and mine warfare to ensure
freedom of maneuver, access, and freedom of trade on the sea.
Homeland Security--The surface Navy is coordinating
with numerous other government and military agencies,
especially the Coast Guard to defend the air and surface
approaches to our coast, ports, and waterways.
A CONTINUING CHALLENGE
The status of Surface Warfare today is healthy and improving. We
are still the greatest Navy in the world. We have a credible, combat
ready force with our primary emphasis on deployers. This year's budget
submission shows real progress for fiscal year 2003 and through the
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in support of our strategy to
provide the robust warfighting capabilities necessary to pace the
threat and support assured access. We are focused on providing
warfighting capability and on providing the greatest flexibility for
the least investment.
The Nation must continue to have a credible sea-based warfighting
capability in the 21st century, ships that can go in harm's way and
accomplish the mission to support the National Security Strategy. We
must have sufficient force structure in both quantity and quality and
be able to put the right mix of ordnance in sufficient numbers on
target.
We have made progress over the last year in many areas but there is
still significant work to be done. We will continue to seek improvement
in current and future readiness with emphasis on transformational
technologies and concepts to provide affordable solutions that will
allow us to execute all of our missions and requirements. More
importantly, we will endeavor to get those solutions rapidly into the
fleet.
In my testimony below, I will first review our progress in
maintaining and improving readiness before discussing our contribution
to the Navy's network-centric warfare concept and our progress in
support of the vital mission areas: maritime strategic fires, maritime
strategic defense, ship self-defense, undersea warfare, and homeland
security.
READINESS--MANPOWER, MAINTENANCE, AND FUTURE FLEET
We are making solid progress in addressing long-standing readiness
issues thanks to the leaders and sailors in the fleet and the support
of the American people and Congress. Manpower, training, and
maintenance posted significant levels of improvement over the last year
and continued improvement is supported in the fiscal year 2003 budget
submission. Although maintaining force structure will be a challenge,
the Surface Ships joining the fleet today are the best in the world and
we have a solid plan for the future with the DD(X) family of ships.
MANPOWER/TRAINING
Manpower is our biggest investment, comprising nearly one-fourth of
our allotted budget. We must continue to look for economical and
efficient methods for manning our ships. The surface Navy has no
alternative but to transition from manpower- and workload-intensive
ships to ships such as DD(X) and the LCS (which will be introduced in
next year's budget submission) that will leverage new technologies to
expand our warfare capabilities while optimizing manning levels.
Roughly two-thirds of our community billets are at sea and the
preponderance of these billets are in our Aegis ships. This coupled
with the relatively long life expectancy of the Aegis Fleet has guided
us to introduce the Smartship program into the fleet and our Aegis
force. The Smartship program, which takes advantage of select
technological enhancements to reduce manning requirements, is a useful
vehicle to facilitate this transition from today's manpower intensive
fleet to the optimally manned fleet of the future, designed around the
principles of human-centered design (HCD) and human systems integration
(HSI).
TRAINING STRATEGY
In addition to researching and adopting technologies to achieve
optimal manning, and critical to our retention efforts, we must focus
on development of our most valuable resource, the sailor. We are still
engaged in a battle for people. To win this battle, we must deliver
educational and personal growth opportunities for our sailors.
The surface Navy has adopted a strategy to reverse a trend that has
seen training facilities and equipment become increasingly outdated and
ineffective. The ultimate objective of this strategy is to provide
optimally trained sailors to the fleet at the right time, establish and
maintain their proficiency, and promote personal and professional
development throughout their careers. This strategy focuses on tailored
training, robust integrated training systems, mission area training and
distance support. Through detailed billet and watch station task
analysis and the installation and use of modern re-configurable
trainers, we will be able to properly train sailors while at the same
time replace outdated technical training equipment, rapidly update
curricula, and phase out outdated training methodologies. Emphasis on
mission area training will address fleet training requirements at the
earliest stages of system design and acquisition, an approach that has
proven successful for Aegis combat system training. Distance support
will be essential for providing training ``on demand'' to support
sailors' personal and professional development and to move all training
administration off the ship.
To achieve these objectives, in the fiscal year 2003 budget
submission we have accelerated installations of our principle shipboard
tactical team trainer, Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT), and
invested significantly in training re-engineering projects that will
lead to replacement of costly and out-of-date technical training
equipment in our technical schools, earlier qualification of our junior
officers as surface warfare officers and increased navigation, ship
handling and seamanship proficiency training in our fleet concentration
area schoolhouses as well as onboard the ships themselves.
JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION
Junior officer retention is critical to the future of surface
warfare and, though we are pleased with recent progress, there is still
significant work to be done in this critical area. Junior officer (JO)
retention remains at the top of our manpower concerns.
We monitor JO retention by comparing the number of officers that we
accessed in a particular year with the current inventory for that same
``Year Group.'' Our retention requirements are thus different for each
Year Group, generally falling between 34 and 38 percent of officers
remaining on active duty in the surface community at about the 7-year
point. Our shipboard department head requirements are relatively
stable. We require 245 officers to become department heads every year
to fill our at-sea requirements without significantly over-touring
these officers and gapping billets elsewhere in the Navy. To avoid
confusion among different retention percentage requirements for
different Year Groups, I will tailor my remarks to discuss our ability
to meet the relatively stable at-sea requirements of 245 department
heads per year for each Year Group.
In recent years, just under 200 officers a year were electing to
continue their service as department heads. This led to increasing
department head tour lengths to an average of 40 months and in some
instances to as much as 50 months in order to cover all of our
requirements. These extended tours led to significant junior officer
dissatisfaction and worked further against our retention goals. To
break this negative cycle, we established several innovative programs.
Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) offers significant
financial incentives to remain on active duty in the surface warfare
community through two department head tours. 1,699 of the 1,713
available SWOCP contracts offered over the past 2 years were accepted,
additionally 161 of the 275 contracts available this year have already
been completed. Additionally, our ``early roller'' program accelerated
careers of outstanding division officers to department head tours to
cover some of these critical sea-going requirements. 115 outstanding
young Division Officers have stepped forward and participated in this
program to date.
We believe our strong commitment to graduate education for surface
warfare junior officers is having a positive retention effect as well.
We have increased the numbers of junior officers participating in
graduate programs from 155 in fiscal year 2000 to 200 in fiscal year
2001, and already have 133 officers participating in fiscal year 2002.
In addition, we have allocated funds to support 40 Graduate Education
Vouchers (GEV), paying officers tuition up to $20,000 per year for 2
years. Our assessment to date indicates that graduate education and
SWOCP are a powerful retention tools, and we continue to monitor our
retention progress closely.
These efforts have been effective in reversing our declining Junior
Officer population trends of recent years and we are approaching our
goal of 245 officers per Year Group continuing their service through
two Department Head tours. The average number of department heads
produced by YGs 91 through 94 was 179--much lower than the goal of 245.
YGs 95 and 96 on the other hand already have 219 and 223 contracted
department heads. Except for the early rollers, these officers can be
expected to start their department head tours over the next 2 years.
We are also continuing an aggressive resignation withdrawal
campaign that has borne much fruit over the last several years. 27
officers have reconsidered their resignations in the first 3 months of
fiscal year 2002. This is particularly significant when added to the
163 officers that withdrew their resignation requests over the previous
2 years.
We are not meeting our junior officer retention requirements yet,
but we are trending in the right direction. Junior officers are our
future; we will continue to focus our energies and innovations in
retaining our best. We believe the future of the surface warfare
community is at stake.
FLEET MAINTENANCE
Fleet maintenance is a pillar of current readiness. Recent world
events have reinforced the need to maintain our ships mission ready to
sail in support of national tasking. This is not an easy task in
today's fiscal environment as we continually strive to balance the
needs of today's Navy with the requirement to modernize and re-
capitalize our fleet. With our smaller force, we must also focus on
maintaining our ships with minimal disruption to ships' operational
schedule to provide the maximum flexibility to our Fleet Commanders.
Our ability to predict ship maintenance requirements continues to
improve. The Maintenance Requirements System (MRS) is in its third year
of use and has matured considerably since its introduction. This system
uses historical return costs and documented deferred maintenance to
project future maintenance requirements. Under the guidance of the MRS
Alliance, MRS is yielding a firmer, more rigorous requirement. This
more credible requirement provided the needed rationale to increase our
investment in depot maintenance in fiscal year 2003 budget submission.
Condition-based maintenance (CBM) processes and our ships' class
maintenance plans further define our surface ship maintenance
requirements. The maintenance support community has embraced CBM and is
working hard at improving water-front maintenance assessment processes
and our ability to determine maintenance requirements based on evidence
of need. Material condition information from these assessments is
directly fed back into the programming process to ensure adequate
resources are devoted to ship maintenance. This information is also
being used in new ship design efforts to reduce overall lifetime costs.
Programs such as Capital Investment for Labor (CIL) and Cost Reduction
and Effectiveness Improvement (CREI) are also investing in new
technologies and ways of doing business that will directly affect
maintenance requirements and sailor workload. A recent example of this
is our fiscal year 2003 budget submission investment in magnetic
couplings, a new technology that eliminates the requirement for our
sailors to perform a time consuming alignment procedure. In the
President's budget submission, we are planning to procure and install
176 magnetic couplings per year for the next 4 years. This initiative
not only has a high maintenance return on investment, but also
significantly reduces the sailor workload. This is a win-win for both
the sailor and the maintenance community and demonstrates our
commitment to reducing sailor workload and improving quality of
service.
In the fiscal year 2003 budget submission, we funded depot
maintenance to 91.6 percent and intermediate maintenance to 95 percent
of the OPNAV assessed requirement. Although deferred maintenance is
expected to grow when funded at less than a 100 percent investment
level, MRS captures this shortfall and includes a portion of the
deferred maintenance in the annual continuous maintenance (CM)
requirement.
We remain committed to providing ships that are supported to a
realistic and executable maintenance requirement and ready to respond
to operational tasking.
BUILDING THE FLEET OF THE FUTURE
As the Chief of Naval Operations has pointed out in his previous
congressional testimony, the surface combatant fleet is, on average,
relatively young, but the rate of ship recapitalization bears watching.
We must procure an average of nine ships per year in the later years of
the FYDP to sustain today's fleet and to provide stability for our
defense industrial base. As VADM Mullen, DCNO for Resources,
Requirements and Assessments, stated in his previous congressional
testimony, Navy leadership is committed to improving the
recapitalization rate of the Navy, particularly in the area of
shipbuilding. Our current budget sets the foundation for the future by
investing in impressive programs that will comprise the core
capabilities of our force in the years to come. The continuing
production of Arleigh Burke destroyers, the planned production of a
family of new surface combatants--the advanced destroyer, DD(X), the
advanced cruiser, CG(X), and the LCS--the Ticonderoga Cruiser
Conversion program, and the Joint Command and Control Ship JCC(X)
program present impressive technological leaps in warfighting
capability, innovation, and reliability.
DDG-51
The DDG-51 class guided missile destroyer program remains the
Navy's largest surface ship program. The fiscal year 2003 budget
request includes $2.29 billion for the procurement of two DDG-51 class
destroyers. The request adds six additional destroyers to the
procurement profile, two additional ships per year in fiscal year 2005
through 2007. The addition of the six DDGs addresses three issues:
mitigates the industrial base gap issue between DDG-51 production and
DD(X) construction that was evident in prior budgets; better stabilizes
the surface combatant build rate as we transition to DD(X); and
stabilizes future surface combatant force structure in the 2012 time
frame. A new 4 year, fiscal year 2002 through 2005, multiyear
procurement contract solicitation draft has been recently released. It
is anticipated that a contract will be awarded for these eight ships
plus options this summer.
The two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers procured in fiscal year 2003
will be Flight IIA ships configured with the Baseline 7 Phase I Aegis
combat system, which we introduced on the third ship in fiscal year
1998. This baseline incorporates new integrated mission capability and
makes these ships more capable in the littoral than any other combatant
in the world. The upgrades include the SPY-1D(V) radar system,
Cooperative Engagement Capability, and a 5,,/62 gun. Additionally, the
DDG-51 destroyers of the fiscal year 2002 multiyear procurement will be
forward fit with Baseline 7 of the Mk 41 Vertical Launching System, the
Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System and the ability to accommodate
the MH-60R helicopter variant.
THE FAMILY OF SHIPS
The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Study and the Navy's
leadership have recognized that assuring access to key regions abroad
and projecting power, in its various forms, requires a broad range of
naval capabilities. These disparate capabilities can best be satisfied
by a family of ships, each of which, while capable of multiple missions
as necessary and prudent, is optimized to perform a key function:
- Advanced Multi-mission Destroyer, DD(X), for delivery of
precision strike and volume fires to support assured access and
maneuver warfare.
- Advanced Cruiser, CG(X), to provide air superiority against
cruise missile and ballistic missile threats over the total
force.
- Littoral combat ship, LCS, capable of defeating littoral
defenses including mines, fast small boats and diesel
submarines. (fiscal year 2004 program start)
Power projection ashore at the high end of the spectrum of conflict
(as well as concomitant force-protection and assured-access
requirements) demands the high-volume firepower, long-range precision-
strike capability, ample magazine capacity, and enhanced endurance of
sizeable multi-mission combatants.
However, the intricacies of the littorals demands more expansive,
detailed ``coverage'' inshore which, as currently envisioned, may be
satisfied by a multiplicity of smaller, high-speed, and highly
maneuverable ships working in close concert with a distributed, netted
force of multi-mission ships.
DD(X) and CG(X) will be larger, multi-mission warships, with
specialized mission systems and significant ordnance payloads. They
will be optimized to deliver ``fires for effect'' in both land attack
and high-end force protection. They will be designed to be highly
survivable in expeditionary operations and will provide defense-in-
depth for smaller focused-mission ships.
LCS will be a smaller ship with an advanced hull design, optimized
specifically to operate close inshore. Key attributes of LCS will be
stealth, speed, and maneuverability. Missions envisioned for LCS
include mine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare
against quiet diesel submarines. LCS will be capable of operating self-
sufficiently for extended periods in a low-threat environment,
including homeland security/defense missions in conjunction with USCG
forces. LCS is a new program that will be addressed in the fiscal year
2004 budget submit. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to address it in
this fiscal year 2003 supporting testimony as it will play a
significant role in the 21st century Navy force structure.
In-service Aegis ships, also within this family of ships, will be
upgraded through evolutionary upgrades and back fit of technologies in
the DDG-51 production line and by back fit of CGs in the Cruiser
Conversion program to keep them current and viable in the littoral for
their entire life span.
SPIRAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Using a spiral development approach will allow technologies to be
fielded when they are ready through a flight approach and lessons
learned/technology sharing between programs, forged to capture cutting
edge initiatives. As DD(X) drives the development of technology in many
areas, we will look for opportunities to backfit advancements on
existing platforms. Carefully focused upgrade and conversion programs
will ensure the existing core of surface combatants maintain the
capability for battlespace dominance. The spiral technology development
process of DD(X) and LCS will enable the most efficient insertion of
high pay-off technologies into the Family of Ships with the least
amount of risk. DD(X) and LCS will be developed in parallel and on
complementary time lines.
- CG(X) will share a common hull form and propulsion plant
architecture with DD(X) and will use many of the same
innovative technologies to reduce crew size, increase joint
C\4\I connectivity, and reduce operating and support costs.
- LCS will benefit from the DD(X) technology development by
taking advantage of advanced automation technology, high
density propulsion plants and increased nodal and C\4\I
connectivity.
- In-service Aegis surface combatants will receive technology
upgrades that will extend their combat capabilities and keep
them at the leading edge of combat effectiveness.
DD(X) ADVANCED DESTROYER
DD(X) will introduce a wide range of technology for naval ships
but, moreover, it will be the first deploying combatant ship of a new
family of 21st century multi-mission ships. DD(X) will integrate
advanced command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems to achieve an unprecedented level of
knowledge of the battlefield. To ensure effective operations within the
littoral, DD(X) will employ state-of-the-art sensors combined with
unsurpassed radar, acoustic, magnetic, and infrared signature
reductions exceeding those of all previous warships, including DDG-51.
Active and passive self-defense systems, as well as cutting edge
survivability features (including modular ship systems and in-stride
mine avoidance) will enable DD(X) to fulfill the full spectrum of
battlegroup missions assigned to our destroyers today, and to fight
through damage.
DD(X) will have the capacity to carry the variety and volume of
offensive, precise firepower, which will enable our Marine Corps and
light, mobile Army forces to complete their missions. These systems
include Tactical Tomahawk and the Long Range Land Attack Projectiles
(LRLAP) with a range of 100 miles, and will have the growth potential
to include an ALAM. DD(X)'s ability to deploy a high volume of
precision-guided munitions will provide Joint Force Commanders with
significantly improved ranges, accuracy, volume, firing rates and
response times compared to current-generation ships.
In order to ensure the ship's ability to perform its primary naval
fires mission, the DD(X) design is structured to incorporate several
``leap ahead'' technological advances. This represents a ``win-win''
investment for the Navy as many of DD(X)'s advanced technology
developments will benefit other ship classes. DD(X) will be the
catalyst for:
- Integrated Power System (IPS)/Electric Drive: All-electric
architecture that provides electric power to the total ship
(propulsion and ship service) with an integrated plant.
Benefits include reduced operating costs, improved warfighting
capability, and architectural flexibility.
- Advance Gun System: 155mm gun with ``fully automated''
ammunition handling system and a family of munitions/propelling
charges specified to achieve ranges of up to 100 nautical
miles. AGS will provide high rate-of-fire (approximately 12
rounds per minute) with a magazine capacity sufficient in size
to meet USMC operational requirements. Features of the AGS
design will provide the basis for future naval gun systems.
- New Radar Suite (Multi-Function Radar (MFR)/Volume Search
Radar (VSR): MFR provides DD(X) and other applicable surface
combatants with affordable, high performance radar for ship
self-defense. The MFR will greatly enhance ship defense
capability against all threats envisioned in the littoral
environment. VSR provides DD(X) and other applicable surface
ships with an affordable, high performance air search radar.
Both MFR and VSR should reduce manning and life-cycle costs
compared to the multiple systems that perform these functions
today.
- Optimized Manning through Automation: Use of initiatives,
such as advance system automation, robotics, human centered
design methods, and changes in Navy personnel policies, will
allow DD(X) to meet mission requirements with significantly
reduced crew size while improving the sailor's quality of
service. Lessons learned from DD(X) can be applied to future
surface ship and submarine designs.
- Total Ship Computing/Software Development: Key to meeting
optimal manning requirements is affordable open systems
architecture technology insertion/upgrades to future ships. By
taking advantage of commercial advances in computer processing
power, distributed/integrated data networks and software
development, total ship computing enables a ``plug and play''
environment for all internal and external user systems.
- Integrated Apertures: In addition to reducing the ship's
radio frequency (RF) signature, shared apertures will reduce
topside antenna crowding, decrease topside weight, and simplify
antenna maintenance. Shared aperture technology has the
potential to benefit many other Navy programs.
- Survivability: DD(X) is developing system and protection
concepts that are intended to reduce vulnerability to
conventional weapons and peacetime accidents under reduced
manning conditions. Development areas include damage control
computer-based systems that provide rapid systems restoration,
fire protection devices that improve probability of survival
with a reduced crew ship, and ship protection concepts that
reduce magazine and commercial equipment vulnerability.
- Stealth: Operations in the littoral battlespace has made
stealth an essential element of new combatant design,
particularly radar cross-section reduction. The lessons learned
by DD(X) will provide new insight toward all aspects of ship,
sensor and weapons design.
The DD(X) family, with its transformational technologies, will be
the cornerstone for a family of next-generation surface combatants.
These combatants must be affordable to produce and less costly to
operate. They must be designed from the keel up to enable dramatic, 50
to 70 percent, manpower reductions.
Many of these technologies planned for DD(X) were intended to be
incorporated into the DD 21 program. However, the DD 21 program allowed
little technical risk reduction, though many of the technologies are
quite transformational. With DD 21, we were taking a single step to
full capability. There was a success-oriented assumption that
everything would proceed on schedule and cost. There were limited
opportunities for prototyping and little room for error. In the end,
these factors resulted in a program with unacceptable cost growth risk.
Thus, DD(X) was formulated to employ a broad range of strategies to
make our entire family of next-generation surface combatants, the
DD(X), CG(X) and LCS, more affordable.
To mitigate the high technical risk; the restructured DD(X) program
adds several land-based and sea-based prototypes for the key
technologies. This provides a practical means of reducing risk within
each area. The Navy will see potential problems earlier in the process,
providing us a better chance to efficiently solve them. This strategy
improves the chances of delivering a functional destroyer within cost
and schedule.
Additionally, the Navy plans to produce the lead ship using RDT&E
funds. RDT&E funding recognizes that the lead ship design will mature
during the design and construction process and may require a more
flexible funding medium than SCN to compensate for technology
development or schedule issues. This approach is supported by ASN (RDA)
and USD (AT&L).
The Navy can react to problems without the risk of resorting to
prior-year completion funding. The program manager can focus on
establishing an efficient process for manufacturing the DD(X) class and
avoid trading away production initiatives if costs increase. Being able
to adjust the RDT&E budget for the lead ship provides the best chance
to control costs and define a production process that allows the Navy
to affordably build these next-generation surface combatants.
Construction of the lead ship in RDT&E is a significant change in
the Navy's approach to shipbuilding, which the Navy hopes the committee
will support.
Navy's fiscal year 2003 shipbuilding program also provides
flexibility for a smooth transition in DD(X) production. Given
production approval by Navy and OSD, SCN funds allocated to fiscal year
2006/fiscal year 2007 DDG-51 class destroyers may be reallocated in
future budget submissions to provide uninterrupted follow-on class
production of the fiscal year 2005 RDT&E lead ship.
CG(X) ADVANCED CRUISER
The CG(X) will be built with the same hull and propulsion plant as
DD(X). The combat system will take advantage of emerging technologies
to provide sustained, theater-wide strategic defense against aircraft,
anti-ship cruise missiles, and theater ballistic missiles.
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS)
The LCS will be a focused-mission ship. Built on a time line
complementary to, but shorter than, that of the DD(X)/CG(X) family, it
will be a practical, significantly smaller surface combatant capable of
performing focused missions in places where it would be impractical or
unwise to commit a larger, multi-mission surface combatant. Commercial
hull technologies will be leveraged to develop these modular mission
package platforms, primarily focused on missions related to battle
space access.
In a sense, this is new ground and a significant opportunity, as we
will be building our 21st century surface combatant fleet from the keel
up with the full awareness that it will operate as a netted,
distributed force. We will need the focused-lethality of the Littoral
combat ship to accomplish specific missions, while the multi-warfare,
multi-mission DD(X) and CG(X) platforms provide the wide area battle
space dominance for which they are uniquely suited. Away from home
waters and particularly in water space immediately adjacent to
adversarial coastlines, access will be a challenge. Area denial
defenses close to land will be neutralized by multi-mission surface
combatants working in close coordination with specially designed,
netted and configured Littoral combat ships, exercising the capability
to counter mines, small surface combatants and the shallow water
warfare threat posed by diesel submarines.
Importantly, with its size, speed and modular design
characteristics, LCS has the potential to serve as a platform for
mutual development with the United States Coast Guard's Deepwater
Program. In this capacity LCS may provide the foundation for the
Nation's interoperable U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard force engaged in
homeland defense. We are continuing to explore these possibilities with
the Coast Guard as we both move forward with these important ship
development programs. LCS will also be particularly suitable for
foreign military sales, potentially providing our coalition partners
with a state-of-the-art surface combatant that will ensure continuing
interoperability among our navies. In fiscal year 2003, the LCS program
consists of the analysis of several ongoing experimental ship efforts.
Development and production funding will be addressed in the fiscal year
2004 budget submission.
CRUISER CONVERSION
While building new platforms for the future is a prime priority,
maintaining and modernizing our current platforms enables them to
continue to be valuable warfighting assets in the years ahead while
concurrently trying to mitigate escalating support costs of aging
equipment. As technological cycle times are now shorter than platform
service life, it is fiscally prudent and operationally imperative to
modernize the force through timely upgrades and technology insertion.
In support of this priority, we plan to modernize the Ticonderoga-class
cruisers. Our technology insertion efforts include the Smartship
initiatives and a spectrum of new capabilities on other combatants for
both existing and in-development ships to be used to extend the combat
system service life of these vital multi-mission platforms. The fiscal
year 2003 budget request includes $104 million in RDT&E funds to
continue the engineering efforts to meet the schedule for the first
installation, which will occur in fiscal year 2006. The upgrade of
these ships will add new, and enhance existing, combat system
capabilities for maritime strategic fires, cooperative engagement
capability, force protection, and area air defense commander missions
as well as increase service life with hull, mechanical, and electrical
upgrades. These new mission capabilities will dramatically improve the
ability of these warships to operate in joint and coalition warfare
environments and the littorals. The program is essential to maintaining
a mission-relevant force of approximately 116 surface combatants over
the next 20 years.
JCC(X)
JCC(X) will provide the JFC and staff with enhanced mission
capability for joint campaign management. It will also provide naval
component commanders with capabilities for operational control of
assigned naval and allied forces. JCC(X) will support planning and
command and control of a full spectrum of joint and multi-national
efforts including:
- Major Theater War
- Forward Presence/Peacetime Engagement
- Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement
- Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
- Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
The program entered concept exploration and definition in November 1999
and has developed a range of alternatives which will be used to decide
the controlling characteristics of the ship. The fiscal year 2003
budget request supports construction of the JCC(X) within the FYDP. The
final definition of the program will be addressed in the fiscal year
2004 budget submission.
NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
The Navy's cornerstone warfighting concept of network-centric
warfare derives maximum force warfighting potential through rapid and
robust networking of diverse, well-informed and geographically
dispersed warfighters. This requires the integration of systems,
weapons and communications networks in which the right information is
available to the right system or operator at the right time. Naval
forces, dispersed or concentrated, with shared awareness of the battle
space and a solid understanding of the commander's intent, are prepared
to exploit opportunities as they arise without reliance on centralized
control procedures. The command and control environment of the future
must be capable of contending with the complexity of the battle space.
Network-centric operations are based on a robustly networked system
of sensors, decision aids, weapons, warriors, and supporting systems to
support joint and naval forces in their execution of missions across
the entire range of military operations. FORCEnet is the Navy's
overarching, integrating concept through which network-centric
operations will be implemented by Naval forces. It will provide the
architecture of networks, the joint infostructure, web-based
infrastructure, and network security for the conduct of network-centric
warfare.
The surface Navy's cooperative engagement capability (CEC) system
will contribute significantly to the force level integration that
FORCEnet is introducing and ensuring interoperability of this and other
systems at the battle group, fleet, and joint levels is a major
initiative to support network-centric operations. Sea-based joint
command and control is another pillar of the FORCEnet concept and the
area air defense commander (AADC) program and the naval fires network
(NFN) program are prime examples of the type of transformational
systems the Navy is fielding to advance our goal of universal
situational awareness. We have made significant progress in CEC,
interoperability, AADC, and NFN over the last year and, through the
fiscal year 2003 budget submission, we are postured to continue to
advance these revolutionary capabilities.
COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY
Cooperative engagement capability is a system, in the fleet today,
which provides a revolutionary capability in force-level integration
for area defense and ships self-defense. Given increased speed and
kinematics of the evolving threat, CEC integrates existing sensors and
weapons more effectively across the force. The sensor netting approach
employed by CEC allows many sensors throughout the force to work
together to form a single composite track for each target in the battle
space. As a result, CEC delivers significant improvement in force level
detection and tracking, including improved track identification (ID)
continuity, improved track accuracy, and improved situational awareness
for all ships and aircraft in the force. Additionally, because CEC
generates real-time fire control quality tracks, it brings significant
engagement improvements including increased depth of fire, engagement
of targets not held by own ship sensors, increased reaction time and
maximized performance against the most stressing targets. As the only
system based on shared fire control quality information, CEC provides
the cornerstone to build the single integrated air picture (SIAP). This
capability not only contributes to the ship self-defense of the
platforms on which it resides, it also protects all naval units by
``buying back'' battle space, the capability of greatest value in
countering a fast moving threat. It provides time for alertment,
decisions and actions and allows our weapons to shoot to the maximum
flight capability of the missile rather than to the limit of one ship's
sensors.
Over the past 2 years, CEC has been rigorously tested to ensure
full integration across current fleet combat systems and data links.
The system successfully completed the largest operational evaluation
conducted by the Navy to date in the spring of 2001 and was found both
operationally effective and operationally suitable by the Commander,
Operational Test and Evaluation Force. This highly robust and
operationally realistic test series consisted of 10 underway test
events over 2 years involving 10 warships, hundreds of aircraft sorties
in support of challenging test scenarios, and nearly 30 missile
firings.
Subsequently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has
re-validated the system's operational requirements and we have
continued to work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to ensure compatibility with the evolving global information grid (GIG)
architecture. The GIG architect has concurred that CEC is compliant
with the 2003 GIG architecture although some work remains to ensure
that CEC keeps pace as the GIG continues its evolution. Further, we are
currently anticipating a favorable decision from the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) that approves full-rate production of our
surface-based CEC units and continues low rate initial production of
the airborne units for the E-2C Hawkeye aircraft.
The way ahead for this vital system consists of continuing the
spiral development of CEC as we increase the number of cooperating
nodes in the CEC sensor network (potentially including joint assets);
examine CEC's potential as the foundation of the joint composite
tracking network that will facilitate the development of a single
integrated air picture (SIAP); ensure continued compliance with the GIG
architecture; and examine alternative, potentially bandwidth-reducing,
technologies. In short, Navy stands ready to field a system that is and
will remain:
- Operationally effective
- Operationally suitable
- GIG-compliant
- JROC-validated
CEC is a dramatic improvement in area and ship self-defense for
multiple ship classes.
There is also growing international interest in this revolutionary
new capability. This past summer, the U.S. Navy signed a memorandum of
understanding with the United Kingdom that will ultimately lead to CEC
being installed on Royal Navy frigates and destroyers. Additionally,
other Allied Nations including Australia, Spain, Italy, Germany,
Netherlands, and Japan have also expressed interest in CEC. Specific
requests by these nations will be handled on a case-by-case basis.
The CEC program has been a success story this year. The John F.
Kennedy battle group deployed with CEC last month and we added
significant funding to accelerate fielding and further development of
CEC and sensor netting technologies in this budget cycle. This
revolutionary capability will now be installed in most battle groups by
fiscal year 2007.
FORCE INTEROPERABILITY--DISTRIBUTED ENGINEERING PLANT
The force-level integration generated by systems like CEC provides
vast improvements in ship self-defense by buying back battle space that
allows extra time for decisions and actions in today's challenging ASCM
environment. The integration of multiple systems in a force with
different levels of capability creates a challenge to ensure
interoperability between all the units in a force. The objective of the
Navy's force interoperability program is to engineer interoperability
into our systems. Improved interoperability brings significant
warfighting capability through increased situational awareness,
enhanced weapons coordination, and reduced fratricide, enabling our
combat systems to operate at their full design performance level and
contributing to the development of a SIAP. This is critical to close-in
ship self-defense but even more critical to timely engagement of the
``archer'' vice the ``arrow'', the ultimate ship self-defense
objective.
The Navy's force interoperability program is divided into three
functional areas: assessments, readiness, and warfare systems
engineering. The foundation of this effort has been the establishment
of a series of a land-based test sites that support testing of
essential fleet combat system upgrades before they are introduced in
the fleet. By networking these sites together into a distributed
engineering plant (DEP), we can conduct rigorous force wide
interoperability testing and engineering among different combat
systems, including the examination of specific battle force
configurations, before the software is deployed at sea. The DEP
continues to evolve, leveraging existing engineering infrastructure to
transform the Navy. Since 1998, when the Navy initially linked existing
land-based combat system facilities together to conduct realistic
battle force interoperability testing, the program has evolved to
include tailored interoperability testing for every deploying battle
group. This testing has enabled the development of interoperability
measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and the ability to relate these MOEs
to operational performance in terms of extended warfighting battle
space.
The Navy has initiated the correction of the prioritized
interoperability deficiencies found during DEP testing. Beginning in
fiscal year 2003, we have ``closed the loop'' from identification of
deficiencies, to collection and analysis of data, to identification of
root causes, to implementation and follow-up testing of prioritized
fixes which yield the greatest warfighting return on our investment.
As we draw lessons from the interoperability testing of today's
combat systems, we are simultaneously feeding the results into the
development of tomorrow's combat system baselines. As we explore the
transformation of the existing Aegis Baselines into an open
architecture, distributed processing combat system, we intend to build
these interoperability enhancements into our new systems from the
ground up. Following the successful transition to a complete COTS
computing environment on our new construction Aegis DDGs, Aegis
baseline development will introduce an open architecture, high
performance, interoperable and network ready software architecture,
which will eliminate many of the interoperability limitations of
today's combat systems.
As the DEP has continued to mature and expand, it has become
evident that the role of this powerful engineering tool must be
expanded to support the Navy acquisition process, in addition to the
deploying forces. From its inception in 1998 through 2000, the full
efforts of the DEP remained focused on battle group interoperability
testing. However, beginning in 2001, the DEP team established new
initiatives--in addition to full battle group testing operations--to
help program managers find and resolve problems earlier in the
acquisition cycle. In fact during 2001, for the first time, 45 percent
of DEP utilization was dedicated to supporting development work. For
example, the cooperative engagement capability program, which has
rapidly become the DEP's second largest user, has been able to test 46
percent of CEC's interoperability requirements in the DEP,
substantially reducing requirements to do live shipboard testing, and
therefore shifting this burden from the fleet to the shore
infrastructure.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission continues to support this
most important interoperability testing and engineering development
effort.
JOINT INTEROPERABILITY
In addition to the Navy's force interoperability program, last year
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) established the Office
of the SIAP System Engineer, modeled after the Navy's SIAP Engineer
effort, to begin working interoperability issues across the Services.
The office has been established as a Navy-led joint program office,
whose initial focus will be resolving interoperability issues currently
existing in the tactical data links used by all the Services. Navy
remains closely aligned with this joint initiative as we move forward
in addressing interoperability issues.
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
Installing new or improved weapons systems and integrating them at
the shipboard and force level will dramatically improve naval forces
ability to project power and to provide area and ship self-defense. New
and innovative command and control systems will significantly enhance
warfighting effectiveness by reducing confusion and coordinating the
efforts of all the units in a force. Examples of such command and
control systems are the area air defense commander program and the
naval fires network program which have both been accelerated over the
last year and are fully supported in the fiscal year 2003 budget
submission.
AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER
The area air defense commander (AADC) program will provide naval
forces significant new joint integrated air defense (JIAD) capability
and buy back more battle space and decision time. The objective of AADC
is to provide an essential joint air defense planning and execution
tool. AADC provides a means to conduct detailed and comprehensive air
defense planning, including air space deconfliction and the optimal
stationing of air defense and theater ballistic missile defense assets.
AADC is being developed to be fully interoperable with the Army and Air
Force air defense planning systems. Through high-resolution displays
and robust communications, the AADC module also provides the capability
to serve the air defense commander through the entire range of conflict
from minor crisis to major theater conflict.
In the wake of the September 11 attack, we identified AADC as one
of the systems that would better enable our forces to conduct forward-
deployed operations and homeland defense and re-baselined the program
to develop and deliver a system to the fleet today vice the scheduled
fiscal year 2005 introduction date. Through this realigned program, we
installed one unit this year on U.S.S. Blue Ridge and intend to
continue installs into next year and across the FYDP, significantly
accelerating the delivery of this revolutionary warfighting capability
to the fleet and, potentially, joint forces. This rapid fielding
strategy increased planned unit procurements by an additional 6 units
to a total of 17 units across the FYDP.
NAVAL FIRES NETWORK
Within the specter of command and control enhancements, the naval
fires network (NFN) was developed to provide the network-centric
infrastructure and processing capability (software and hardware)
required to support CVW strike, surface strike, land attack,
expeditionary fire support, and anti-submarine missions in support of
joint and coalition forces. NFN will be integrated into all phases of
the time-critical strike/targeting (TCS/TCT) process, connecting the
sensor grid, information grid, and weapons grid. NFN's overarching
goal, integrated with the distributed common ground station (DCGS)
architecture, is to collect, process, facilitate fusion of and
disseminate data from a variety of disparate, geographically-separated,
dissimilar joint sensors (including space-based sensors) and provide it
to the warfighting community in a timely enough manner to identify,
target, engage (re-engage, if necessary), and destroy enemy targets.
NFN's multiple sources of fused intelligence, distributed throughout
the battle-space, ultimately builds commanders' confidence,
facilitating rapid decision-making. This common picture, the basis for
engagement decisions, is electronically linked to mission planning and
engagement systems. NFN digitally connects sensors, through decision
makers, to shooters. This provides a TCS/TCT capability and enhances
our deliberate targeting ability in every area of warfare including
ship self-defense. NFN provides the commander with time critical
intelligence, yielding enhanced situational awareness and therefore,
better force posturing for self-defense.
Using the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) provided by
Congress, we have accelerated deployment of this vital system. Our
budget request ensures continued rapid deployment of this significant
situational awareness and time critical targeting capability.
MARITIME STRATEGIC FIRES--PROJECTING PRECISION FIRES
Our Navy continues to be a ready and relevant offensive maritime
force, with increased emphasis on precision strike and naval fires as a
vital, emerging mission area to support joint and expeditionary
warfare. We will continue to develop our long-range precision strike
arsenal, and be capable of conducting precision land attack in concert
with joint and coalition forces.
This naval fires mission area includes several existing and new
capabilities, such as long-range strategic precision strike provided by
the Tomahawk cruise missile, and precision naval surface fire support
to Marines and other ground forces delivered by a combination of gun
systems.
Our surface naval fires programs are addressing Navy, Marine Corps,
and Army needs for today, tomorrow, and the future. Naval fires include
a combination of guns, projectiles, and missiles to meet expeditionary
maneuver warfare and Army transformation force requirements. These gun
and missile capabilities complement each other and together will
continue to improve and meet Marine Corps and Army requirements in
terms of range, lethality, accuracy, and responsiveness.
TOMAHAWK
Since the success of the initial 1991 Operation Desert Storm
firings, Tomahawk has transformed our Nation's tactical approach to
modern warfare. Today, Tomahawk is a vital CINC asset--the Nation's
premier deep strike weapon. Tomahawk provides long-range, highly
survivable, unmanned, all-weather precision strike capability from
warships at sea. As a result, the Nation has come to rely on Tomahawk
to meet an ever expanding number of key warfighting mission
requirements, including suppression of enemy air defenses, destruction
of vital C\4\I nodes, proportionate and surgical destruction of
critical warfighting infrastructure, and engagement of time-critical
targets.
With an average of over 100 Tomahawk missiles expended each year in
conflict, Congress approved a 1998 reprogramming of existing Tomahawk
funds to field the Tactical Tomahawk (Tactom) weapon system--the
follow-on to the Block III missile. Applying modern manufacturing
technologies to Tomahawk's core competencies, Tactical Tomahawk reduces
unit production cost ($569,000 in fiscal year 1999 dollars) while
lowering life cycle cost and increasing the weapon's tactical
flexibility. Tactom improves responsiveness and flexibility by
providing an improved anti-jam GPS capability, a satellite data link,
reduced mission load and alignment times, increased accuracy, improved
reliability, the capacity to loiter and then engage on demand, an
ability to flex via the data link to a preplanned alternate target or
to a real-time emerging target, and a flexible design that can carry
alternate payloads in the future. Tactom, the associated Tactical
Tomahawk weapon control system (TTWCS) and the Tomahawk planning system
(TPS) will ensure Tomahawk continues to expand in capability to meet
tomorrow's land attack warfighting challenges head on.
Commencing with the first Tomahawk wartime expenditures during
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Navy has fired more than 1,100
Tomahawk missiles in combat. Most notably, the Navy fired over 600
missiles in fiscal year 1998/1999 during Operations Desert Fox and
Allied Force and recently, more than 80 Tomahawk missiles in the first
phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. Approximately 90 percent of all
Tomahawk missiles expended in Operations Desert Fox and Allied Force
and 70 percent fired in Operation Enduring Freedom were launched from
surface ships. These surface ship expenditures represent approximately
20 percent of the total Tomahawk inventory produced to date.
As a direct result of the high combat expenditures in Operations
Desert Fox and Allied Force--and in recognition of Tomahawk's
increasingly important contribution towards achieving our warfighting
objectives--Congress provided a fiscal year 1999 emergency supplemental
of $431 million. This supplemental funded the conversion of 424 Block
II missiles to the preferred Block III GPS variant as well as the
remanufacture of 200 Tomahawk anti-ship missiles (TASM) to the Block
III configuration. The induction of these missiles into the depot
commenced October 1999. This effort, known as REMAN I, will complete in
May--7 months early.
Earlier this year, as a result of actual and anticipated Enduring
Freedom expenditures, a second conversion/remanufacturing effort was
funded with $350 million from the fiscal year 2002 emergency
supplemental. This effort, known as REMAN II, will convert the
remaining Block II missiles and will remanufacture additional TASM and
former surface nuclear Tomahawks missiles. REMAN II will deliver the
first of 450 additional Block III missiles in January 2003, completing
approximately 15 months later. Approximately 330 TASM and former
surface nuclear missiles will remain as candidates for a third
remanufacture effort if funding becomes available this year or next.
In the wake of the 11 September attack, we also increased the
Tactom procurement profile. We added 362 missiles to the 1,353 missiles
funded by the fiscal year 2002 profile. The PB03 profile now procures
1,715 Tactom missiles through the FYDP. The first of these Tactom
missiles delivers in May 2004.
We are also teaming with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to
field a Tactical Tomahawk penetrator variant (TTPV). TTPV will address
a substantial portion of the weapons of mass destruction hardened and
deeply buried target set. The initial buy is programmed for 130
missiles, with an IOC scheduled for fiscal year 2005.
The two Block III remanufacture efforts, coupled with the increased
PB03 Tactom missile procurement profile, will increase missile
inventory to approximately 2/3 of the Navy's Tomahawk requirement by
fiscal year 2009--assuming no future expenditures. While this approach
of combining Remans and Tactom is clearly the best way ahead, current
funding does not yet fulfill warfighting requirements.
Just as Tomahawk has provided the national strike weapon, Tactical
Tomahawk, with its capabilities for loiter and in flight retargeting,
will also provide a significant land attack weapon, especially suited
for targets beyond the 100 nm range of future guns.
NAVAL GUN SYSTEMS
The Navy's approach for tomorrow's fleet is to develop a set of
NSFS weapon systems to install in existing Aegis ships. These weapon
systems include the 5,,/62-caliber gun and the extended range guided
munitions (ERGM). These NSFS capabilities are expected to meet USMC
requirements in accuracy, lethality, and responsiveness.
5,,/62-CALIBER GUN
The 5,,/62-caliber gun is already installed in eight Arleigh Burke-
class ships, commencing with U.S.S. Winston S. Churchill (DDG-81). The
gun was successfully tested during a firing exercise in DDG-81 in fall
2001. This new gun will provide significantly better reliability,
require less maintenance, and will fire the ERGM to an objective range
of 63 nm.
As mentioned above, the 5,,/62 gun is already in the fleet on
recently commissioned DDG-51 class ships and the fiscal year 2003
budget request supports installation of 5,,/62 guns on all following
DDGs. 5,,/62 installation is also planned for some Ticonderoga-class
cruisers as part of cruiser conversion.
EXTENDED RANGE GUIDED MUNITIONS (ERGM)
ERGM has overcome significant technical challenges and stands as a
most important naval surface fires system program. A December 2001
controlled vehicle test shot yielded successful rocket motor
performance and proper functioning of the ERGM's guidance package which
uses GPS to guide to target. Testing continues during 2002.
Navy made a recent decision to change ERGM's payload to a unitary
warhead vice the originally planned submunitions, improving lethality
against the target set. The ERGM IOC will shift to fiscal year 2006 to
support development of the unitary warhead, and will provide precision
fires in support of expeditionary maneuver warfare. ERGM extends gun
ranges to 63nm--a significant improvement over the 13nm range afforded
by conventional 5'' rounds.
ADVANCED LAND ATTACK MISSILE
To meet the full set of USMC NSFS requirements,--an AoA for an ALAM
was conducted. We envision that ALAM will be fielded in DD(X) as a
spiral development and may be backfit in our current Aegis ships, and
potentially submarines. The AoA provided Navy and OSD leadership with
potential technical options. We anticipate ALAM will completely address
the full NSFS target set, including mobile/moving targets, and hardened
and deeply buried targets. Competing priorities precluded inclusion of
ALAM in the fiscal year 2003 budget submission. Navy is addressing the
initiation of an ALAM program in the fiscal year 2004 budget
development process. As an interim effort to meet near term NSFS
requirements, the fiscal year 2003 budget submission fully funds the
Tactical Tomahawk program, providing the most efficient balance for
strike and NSFS requirement.
NAVAL FIRES CONTROL SYSTEM
In order to safely and effectively employ long-range, precision-
guided weapons in support of complex amphibious and joint land battle
operations, we are developing the naval fires control system (NFCS).
NFCS is a battle management system that will automate NSFS functions
and be the enabler for surface land attack in net-centric warfare. NFCS
will support mission planning for the 5,,/62-caliber gun, ERGM, as well
as conventional rounds, and support evolving expeditionary warfare
capabilities, tactics, and doctrine. NFCS will be interoperable and
consistent with joint C\4\ISR systems. NFCS ties the Navy into the
digital battlefield, and will be completely interoperable with the Army
and Marine Corps' advanced field artillery tactical data system
(AFATDS). NFCS will IOC in fiscal year 2003. The first NFCS suite was
installed in U.S.S. Lassen (DDG-82) in September 2001.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission supports installation of
NFCS on DDG-81-108, and selected CGs as part of cruiser conversion.
FUTURE NAVAL FIRES SYSTEMS
For the future, DD(X) will have the capacity to carry the variety
and volume of offensive, precise firepower, which enable our Marine
Corps and light mobile Army forces to complete their missions. These
systems include the Tactical Tomahawk (Tactom) and the advanced gun
system (AGS), firing the long-range attack projectile (LRLAP) to
distances of 100 miles. DD(X) will also have the growth potential to
include the ALAM. DD(X)'s ability to deploy a high volume of precision-
guided munitions will provide joint force commanders with significantly
improved ranges, accuracy, volume, firing rates, and response times
compared to current-generation ships.
The 155mm gun, with fully automated ammunition handling system and
a family of munitions/propelling charges, is specified to achieve
ranges of up to 100 nautical miles. AGS will provide high rate-of-fire
(approximately 12 rounds per minute) with a magazine capacity
sufficient in size to meet USMC operational requirements. The AGS
design will provide the basis for future naval gun systems.
MARITIME STRATEGIC DEFENSE--PROJECTING AREA DEFENSE
Building on the ``backbone'' of CEC to network fire control quality
data throughout the battleforce and Standard missile enhancements,
surface combatants will be able to conduct lethal engagements of large
numbers of cruise missiles and aircraft over water around the sea base
and, in selected cases, over land around joint forces ashore. Combining
the track data from CEC with that of other services in a joint single
integrated air picture will permit profound advances in tactical
decision speed and accuracy.
To achieve synergy at a local level, combat systems are integrated
at a shipboard level by systems designed to network sensors and systems
within the lifelines. Programs that support this shipboard-level
integration effort include the ships self-defense system (SSDS) and the
Aegis Weapons system. Combined with the Standard missile program, data
link systems and CEC, these cutting edge combat systems form the basis
for area air defense that is expanding to the kinetic range of our
missiles.
JOINT INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE
The readiness of naval forces to perform joint integrated air
defense (JIAD) missions remains a central focus for surface warfare.
The objective of JIAD is to ensure assured access and projected defense
as our military forces move essential combat and logistic forces
through the littoral and into the sea and air ports of debarkation
(SPODs and APODs). The Navy's forward presence, strategic and tactical
mobility, and ability to conduct sustained sea-based combat operations
form the basis for our significant contributions to JIAD and are
essential to support U.S. national strategy.
Today's naval forces remain positioned to lead the JIAD effort with
systems such as CEC, naval fires network (NFN), and area air defense
commander (AADC). Our ability is also tied to the robust warfighting
capability inherent in combat systems such as the Aegis weapons system
and the ship self-defense system which continue to pace the emerging
threat, in parallel with focused major modernization programs such as
cruiser conversion, DDG-51 shipbuilding and force interoperability
enhancement programs.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE SYSTEM (SSDS)
The ship self-defense system (SSDS) is the combat system of the
future for all Nimitz class aircraft carriers and LSD-41, LHD-1, and
LPD-17 ship classes. SSDS is a physically distributed, open
architecture computer network consisting of commercially available
hardware. It includes operator consoles using the Navy's AN/UYQ-70
standard display family for human-machine interface, commercially
available circuit cards and fiber optic cabling. SSDS, significantly
expands the capability of both advanced combat direction system (ACDS)
Block 0 and Block 1, performing the integration function for detection
and engagement as well as performing automated detection and quick
reaction functions, emphasizing performance in the littoral
environment. SSDS also serves as the integration point for the
cooperative engagement capability (CEC) and the tactical data links
(TADILS) on these ships.
Following operational requirements approval in 1995, SSDS
development began for the LSD-41 class ships. Designated SSDS Mk 1,
this system provided integration and automated operation of the combat
system elements of these ships, including the SPS-49 radar, SLQ-32
electronic warfare system, close-in weapon system, and the rolling
airframe missile Block 0. Following a successful OPEVAL in 1997, the
system was approved for full rate production, and has subsequently been
fielded on all 12 ships of the class, providing them with a robust
anti-ship cruise missile defense capability.
After the successful deployment of SSDS Mk 1, the Navy began the
development effort to expand the SSDS system to meet the evolving
requirements of aircraft carriers and large deck amphibious ships.
Designated SSDS Mk 2, this system will integrate additional weapons and
sensors including the SPS-48E air search radar, the SPQ-9B ASCM radar,
re-architectured NATO Sea Sparrow missile system (NSSM), and RAM Block
1. Additionally, SSDS Mk 2 provides the integration of the cooperative
engagement capability and the tactical data links (TADILS) for these
ships, providing a powerful ASCM capability as well as enhanced command
and control capabilities to embarked Battle Force commanders.
The Navy has increased its investment in the SSDS program to ensure
complete combat system integration, testing, and certification for
U.S.S. Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and U.S.S. San Antonio (LPD-17). These
new construction ships will be the first built with the SSDS Mk 2
combat system, ensuring their ability to pace the increasingly lethal
anti-ship cruise missile threat. Additionally, funds were added to
equip land-based training sites on both coasts as well as to initiate a
technology refresh process for this COTS-based system.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission adds funds to accelerate
fielding of this important combat system.
AEGIS SYSTEM
The Aegis weapons system brings immense warfighting capability to
defeat the emerging threat and represents the backbone of the surface
fleet. Over 50 percent of today's surface combatants are Aegis ships
and by 2010, that figure will grow to 75 percent. Additionally, the
profound role of Aegis lies in new advances in warfighting capability,
including TBMD, CEC, and expanded land attack capabilities, which will
all be introduced through the Aegis combat system.
AEGIS BASELINE CONSOLIDATION AND OPEN ARCHITECTURE
As the number of Aegis ships grows and new capabilities are
introduced, the complexity of the combat system is increased, and we
are faced with rising life-cycle costs. If not addressed, these costs
have the potential of eroding warfighting readiness. Additionally, a
threat to Aegis warfighting readiness stems from costs necessitated by
replacement of COTS computing hardware. As industry has incorporated
new hardware to meet the advanced computing requirements of our new
Aegis combat systems, the myriad of computer boards and processors
needed to drive the sophisticated Aegis combat system have become
increasingly COTS based. Because this COTS hardware technology
continuously changes as the marketplace rapidly introduces new
computing technology, we must conduct COTS refresh of our shipboard
systems every 2 to 5 years on average to avoid component obsolescence.
Available data indicates that these COTS refreshes will come at a cost
of $60 to $75 million per Aegis baseline. This cost is unavoidable due
to the extensive research and development effort required to integrate
COTS hardware with other existing Aegis combat system software and
hardware interfaces.
The surface Navy is exploring new ways to mitigate these spiraling
life-cycle costs. One way that offers the most potential is
transitioning the Aegis combat system to an open computing system
architecture. Open architecture would transition the existing Aegis
centralized software and interfaces to a software design using a modern
commercial language and software development techniques. Once in an
open architecture configuration, changes to the Aegis combat system
hardware and software, whether required due to component failure or
age, or to support expansion of the system to perform new warfighting
capabilities, could be done much more quickly and cheaply than with
today's legacy architecture. In a real sense, open architecture is the
key to maintaining the warfighting readiness of the Aegis combat
systems over the life of these ships. Additionally, as we explore the
transition of the existing Aegis baselines into an open architecture,
distributed processing combat system, we intend to build in
interoperability enhancements from the ground up, as well as
integrating new capabilities to fully enable the transformation to
network-centric warfare operations of the future.
SPY-1D (V) RADAR SYSTEM
The AN/SPY-1 radar system is the primary air and surface radar for
the Aegis combat system installed in the Ticonderoga (CG-47) and
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class warships. It is a multi-function, phased-
array radar capable of search, automatic detection, transition to
track, tracking of air and surface targets and supporting missile
engagements. The third variant of this radar, AN/SPY-1D(V), known as
the littoral warfare radar, will improve the radar's capability against
low altitude, reduced radar cross-section targets in heavy clutter
environments and in the presence of intense electronic countermeasures.
SPY-1D(V) will be fielded on DDG-91 and follow-on DDGs. It will be
delivered to the Navy in October 2003. SPY-1D(V) will go through land
based developmental and operational testing during the summer of 2003,
followed by shipbuilder trials in the fall. When netted with other
ships through the cooperative engagement capability system, this radar
will improve the self-defense capabilities of all the ships in the
network.
FUTURE AIR DEFENSE RADARS
The multi-function radar (MFR) and the volume search radar (VSR)
are crucial stepping-stones to the future theater air and missile
defense (TAMD) radar and will allow us to neck-down our family of in-
service radars and illuminators. As an integrated radar suite, MFR/VSR
will provide radar functionality for a wide range of ship classes at
the best overall value to the Navy. The suite will generate significant
space and weight savings and reduce shipboard radar signature.
MULTI-FUNCTION RADAR
Before the fleet can engage with weapons systems, we must first
detect hostile aircraft and missiles. Among the detection systems under
development in the DD(X) program is the multi-function radar/volume
search radar (MFR/VSR). This radar suite provides a high power, solid
state, wideband (X-Band for MFR and L-Band for VSR) active phased array
radar system suite optimized for the littoral mission. It will replace
up to nine in-service radars and illuminators, while providing
autonomous horizon search, long-range volume search, and fire control
tracking. MFR is also designed for surface search, periscope detection,
and navigation. MFR will enable counter-fire support, electronic
protection, and air traffic control/air intercept control functionality
for the close approach control function required of air capable ships.
As the primary ship defense AAW radar element of the host combat
system, the MFR will conduct automatic detection, ID, tracking, and
illumination of low altitude anti-ship cruise missiles in adverse
(multi-path, lobing, and ducting) propagation conditions typically
found in littoral environments. It will provide missile uplink and
terminal homing illumination for ESSM and SM, as well as non-
cooperative target recognition (NCTR) and kill assessment. MFR brings
all this capability to the combat system in littoral clutter, heavy sea
state, rain, and difficult radar propagation environments. It will do
this with less manpower, lower life cycle costs, and a higher
operational availability than current systems. MFR is designed to be
scalable for possible future applications and, along with VSR, has
application for a wide range of ship classes.
VOLUME SEARCH RADAR
The volume search radar (VSR) is an L-band active phased array
radar using COTS based technology. It will provide long-range
situational awareness with above horizon detection, and air control
(marshalling) functionality. The VSR will replace the functionality of
today's SPS-48E, SPS-49, and SPN-43 radars. Additionally, because it
will be a non-rotating phased array radar, VSR will provide the
required track revisit times to deal with fast, low/very low
observable, high diving missile threats as well as reducing ships
signature. VSR will provide cueing for MFR to conduct functions above
the horizon. It too is designed to reduce ship manning and life cycle
costs.
STANDARD MISSILE (SM)
The Standard missile (SM) is a primary defense-in-depth weapon in
the ship self-defense family of capabilities, providing hard kill self-
defense at two levels. At the area air defense level, SM-2 Block IV can
be used at extended range to engage the ASCM carrying aircraft. Closer,
but still at significant range, SM-2 Block III, IIIA, and IIIB variants
of the missile have significant ASCM capability as well as improved
capability against surface targets. These missiles, historically
limited in performance to the range of their own ship organic sensors,
are now, in conjunction with cooperative engagement capability (CEC),
able to engage targets at considerably greater ranges, markedly
enhancing defense-in-depth and multiple engagement opportunities.
EXTENDED AREA AIR DEFENSE
The Navy has an ongoing effort to deploy next-generation extended-
range AAW capability which adds a robust outer layer to fleet air
defenses. The SM-2 Block IV is a kinematics improvement of the proven
Standard missile family, incorporating a thrust-vector-controlled
rocket booster, a more robust airframe, and guidance and control
modifications for improved altitude/range/cross-range coverage against
high-performance, low radar cross-section threats in an electronic
countermeasures (ECM) environment.
The SM-2 Block IV has been delivered to the fleet and is presently
deployed in small quantities to the Arabian Gulf and Mediterranean.
Block IV production was terminated at the end of low rate initial
production (LRIP) in favor of Block IVA development.
SM-2 Block IVA, cancelled in December 2001, was to have added
endoatmospheric theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) and improved
air defense capabilities to the proven Block IV baseline. In the
Acquisition Decision Memorandum which cancelled the Navy Area TBMD
program and the SM-2 Block IVA, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics recognized a continuing
requirement to ``address the need for extended-range anti-air warfare
capability against cruise missiles and aircraft in light of this
cancellation.'' While the details of the extended-range advanced AAW
follow-on missile are still being defined, this missile could build on
the proven airframe and propulsion stack developed for the SM-2 Block
IV/IVA missiles.
STANDARD MISSILE--ASCM DEFENSE
A robust area air defense missile is a prerequisite for maintaining
forward naval presence, operating in the littorals, and projecting and
sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial
environments. The Standard missile-2 (SM-2) is the Navy's primary
weapon for anti-ship missile defense and theater air warfare. Deployed
SM-2 Block III, IIIA, and IIIB configurations are all-weather, ship-
launched, medium-range surface-to-air missiles employed by all Aegis CG
and DDG ships.
Each of the blocks is progressively more capable against more
challenging threats and in more difficult electronic countermeasures
(ECM) environments. SM-2 variants employ inertial mid-course guidance
with command updates from the shipboard fire control system with an
ECM-resistant monopulse receiver for semi-active radar terminal homing.
Block IIIA features significantly enhanced performance and lethality
against sea-skimming threats due to a new warhead and fuze design in
addition to enhanced trajectory shaping. Block IIIB builds on the Block
IIIA improvements by adding an infrared (IR) guidance mode capability
to improve performance in a stressing electronic countermeasures
environment. Blocks IIIA/IIIB will be the heart of the SM inventory for
the next decade.
Block IIIB is the only variant presently in production for the U.S.
Navy, although Block IIIA is still produced for foreign military sales.
Block IIIBs are being produced as new all-up rounds, and as upgrades
from older Block II and III missiles. The fiscal year 2003 budget
submission for SM-2 Block IIIB begins an increase in SM production
which promises to nearly double procurements through the FYDP compared
with fiscal year 2002 projected levels.
The loss of the SM-2 Block IVA development poses a significant
challenge in achieving an extended-range air defense capability for
naval forces which will have to be addressed in the fiscal year 2004
budget submission.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE
Ship self-defense is integral to a layered defense concept that
evolves as naval assets move toward and establish presence and sea base
in the littorals. Force defense starts with preemptive strikes by
airborne assets such as Tomahawk cruise missiles and strike aircraft to
neutralize the threat. As ships move closer, defense migrates to
defensive aircraft and area defense assets such as Aegis cruisers and
destroyers. Finally, as naval assets move in closer to the threat,
protection is based on ship self-defense systems. Ship self-defense is
a fleet wide requirement and all ship types, including aircraft
carriers, surface combatants and amphibious ships, are included in our
strategy. Ship self-defense for anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare
will be discussed in the Undersea Warfare section below so this
discussion will focus on systems that support self-defense and close-in
defense of naval assets against aircraft, the anti-ship cruise missile
(ASCM) threat and small fast surface combatants.
ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE (ASCM) DEFENSE
Our ASCM defense strategy involves enhancing the capabilities of
our existing ship self-defense weapons and introducing new ship self-
defense systems while simultaneously integrating these systems within
the ship and among ships throughout the force to achieve exponential
levels of improvement in our capabilities. All three levels of
integration--stand alone system, ship-level integration and force-level
integration--are important and are being advanced in this year's budget
submission. Current and near-term programs will be discussed first at
all three levels of integration before moving on to a general
discussion of future programs.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS--HARD KILL
Hard kill systems are designed to detect, engage, and destroy ASCMs
or small surface craft. The Navy significantly increased funding for
hard kill ship self-defense weapons in the fiscal year 2003 budget
request. A common theme in our effort to increase our hard kill
capabilities was to ramp up funding of missiles to achieve economic
order quantity as soon as feasible. This allows us to buy missiles more
efficiently, meaningfully address our ship fill requirements and
optimize the use of available funds. Specific examples of this
investment are explained below.
ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE (RAM)
In terms of capability and performance, the RAM is our premier
close-in hard kill system. RAM is deployed aboard 39 U.S. ships,
including LHAs, LHDs, LSDs, DDs, and CV/CVNs and is planned to be
installed aboard LPD-17 class ships. The RAM Block 0 missile is a
highly capable missile with low altitude capability and dual RF/IR
guidance that does not require fire control illuminators. RAM Block I
adds an IR all-the-way capability and a helo/air/surface (HAS) mode
which should begin to enter the fleet next year. This HAS mode will
allow RAM Block I to engage single engine propeller aircraft,
helicopters, and small coastal patrol surface craft, while preserving
point defense ASCM mission priorities. This missile has exceeded
expectations since its successful operational evaluation (OPEVAL)
aboard the self-defense test ship with a record of 181 successes out of
192 firings, including 23 of 25 firings of the most advanced Block I
missile. RAM Block 0 ships will complete upgrade to Block I over the
FYDP. The RAM development program is an example of the benefit of
international cooperation. It was developed in cost-effective
partnership with Germany with the U.S. paying only 50 percent of the
development cost.
In the fiscal year 2003 budget submission, the procurement profile
for RAM includes the purchase of both all-up round RAM Block I missiles
and RAM alteration kits (converting existing Block 0 missiles to Block
1) that will result in a significant increase in the RAM inventory over
the FYDP.
EVOLVED SEA SPARROW MISSILE (ESSM)
NATO Sea Sparrow, the forerunner of the ESSM, still provides ample
self-defense against the significant preponderance of the near-term
threat and is one of the world's most widely deployed ship self-defense
systems. It is currently deployed on 50 U.S. ships and 110 other ships
worldwide. It has an all-environment engagement capability against non-
emitting, non-radiating, non-cooperative targets, including low-to-high
speed surface vessels, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, and low radar
cross-section anti-ship cruise missiles in a regime from sea level to
an altitude of 25,000 feet.
The ESSM has its roots in the NATO Sea Sparrow and is another
example of the Navy's ability to take advantage of international
cooperation to defray the cost of improving and upgrading hard kill
self-defense systems. Ten Sea Sparrow Consortium nations have invested
in the ESSM with the U.S. paying less than half the development costs.
A new rocket motor, tail control, and warhead have improved the ESSM's
speed, range, and lethality. ESSM is delivered in a quad-pack canister
container of four missiles, with each quad-pack designed to be inserted
into a single Mk 41 vertical launcher system (VLS) cell. Follow-on
launcher options are being examined for application on non-VLS equipped
ships (CVN/LHDs). The program has enjoyed a most successful year of
development and testing, highlighted by highly successful land-based,
live-fire testing completed last December at White Sands Missile Range.
Low rate initial production approval was granted in early March.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission improves the fielding
profile for ESSM, supporting installation on 17 ships across the FYDP,
including CVN-77, cruiser conversions, and DDG backfit (DDG-79-84).
fiscal year 2003 ESSM missile procurement was increased by nearly 50
percent over fiscal year 2002 projections.
CLOSE-IN WEAPONS SYSTEM (CIWS) UPGRADE
Another hard kill system that has matured to meet both the evolving
threat and the changing tactical environment of the littorals is the
CIWS. After nearly 20 years of CIWS service, the Navy continues to
upgrade the CIWS to expand capability and improve maintainability and
reliability. The Block 1A variant of CIWS, introduced to the fleet in
1996, possesses new high order language computer hardware and software
to counter maneuvering targets, providing increased firing rates,
better receiver sensitivity, electromagnetic interference (EMI)
hardening, and other significant improvements. In the fiscal year 2002
budget and the fiscal year 2003 budget submission, the Navy has
accelerated upgrade of the CIWS system to the Block 1B variant. CIWS
Block 1B continues the evolutionary upgrade of this system with the
incorporation of a thermal imager, an automatic acquisition video
tracker, and a stabilization system for the tracker to provide threat
detection both day and night. The thermal imager improves the accuracy
of angle tracking information, and the fusing of radio frequency (RF)
and electro-optical (EO) sensor systems provides a marked improvement
in anti-air warfare (AAW) capability, including increasing the number
of hits per engagement, extending initial hit range, and countering the
effects of multi-path propagation. Block 1B is outfitted with an
optimized gun barrel (OGB) and is able to fire enhanced lethality
cartridges. Most notably, CIWS-1B brings a day and night surface mode
capability (PSuM) to this proven air defense weapons system, allowing
highly responsive engagement of threats such as small boats, jet skis,
and floating mines out to a range of 4,000 yards.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission initiates a CIWS Block 1B
procurement and conversion program geared to expeditiously deliver
significantly enhanced ship self-defense and terrorism/force protection
to our amphibious ships, surface combatants and carrier force. Our
fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 funding plan is postured to
``jump start'' conversion of CIWS gun mounts to Block 1B and our
objective is to provide Block 1B capability across the surface force
within the FYDP.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS--SOFT KILL
Layered force defense is made more robust by the combination of
soft-kill systems with the hard kill systems. These systems defeat the
ASCM electronic systems through jamming or deception. In the fiscal
year 2003 budget submission the Navy significantly accelerated the
fielding of the highly effective Nulka decoy system and funded moderate
upgrades of the AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare system while continuing
development of the next-generation advanced integrated electronic
warfare system (AIEWS).
nulka off-board decoy/advanced integrated electronic warfare system
Another success story of international cooperation to speed
development and reduce unit cost is the Nulka active, off-board, ship-
launched decoy system. Developed in cooperation with Australia
(Australia paid half the development cost) to counter current and
future radar-guided, anti-ship cruise missiles, Nulka employs a
broadband radio frequency repeater mounted atop a hovering rocket
platform. Nulka radiates a large, ship-like radar cross-section while
flying a trajectory that seduces and decoys incoming ASCMs from their
intended targets. Nulka is planned for installation in CG-52 through
73, DD(X), DDG-51, LPD-17, and LSD-41 class ships. During recent
testing Nulka provided impressive protection against multiple missile
attacks.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission adds funding to upgrade 20
FFGs with Nulka and continues funding for the installation on new
construction ships and procurement for an ongoing backfit program
throughout the fleet.
AN/SLQ-32 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM UPGRADES
The soft kill ``workhorse'' of the fleet is the AN/SLQ-32
electronic warfare system. The AN/SLQ-32(V) electronic countermeasures
set is a family of modular radar warning receivers and jamming systems
that support the three anti-ship missile defense (ASMD) elements of
detect, control, and engage. Ships use AN/SLQ-32(V) to detect and
identify threat radars and, in later variants, to engage or jam these
radars or deploy decoys against them. AN/SLQ-32(V) program started in
1973 and resulted in five variants of AN/SLQ-32(V). Variants (V)1 and
(V)2 are computer controlled, radar warning receiver systems that
detect, sort, classify, identify, and indicate the presence of enemy
and friendly radars. Variants (V)3, (V)4, (V)5 include all of the
receive capability of variants V(1) and (V)2 and add integrated radar
jamming equipment. All variants of the AN/SLQ-32(V) interface directly
to the Mk 36 or Mk 53 decoy launchers. Through this interface, the AN/
SLQ-32(V) controls and coordinates the launching of off-board
countermeasure decoys. Off-board countermeasures include radio
frequency (RF) chaff, Nulka (rocket-propelled, active jamming decoy),
and infrared (IR) decoys.
This year we have added funding to upgrade the AN/SLQ-32 to address
shortfalls in the threat emitter library. Additionally, we are
assessing new technologies developed in the advanced integrated
electronic warfare system for potential insertion into the AN/SLQ-32
system.
ADVANCED INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM (AIEWS)
As with hard kill systems, soft kill systems also must pace the
threat, which is becoming smaller, faster, lower, and more
maneuverable. Next generation soft kill technologies are being explored
in the AIEWS program. These technologies include an advanced display,
improved emitter processing, enhanced combat system integration, a new
receiver capability, and improved emitter identification. The AIEWS
program has provided ``leading edge'' technology development that is
providing an exceptional array of technologies with significant promise
to improve surface electronic warfare capabilities in the legacy and
future systems.
REDUCED RADAR SIGNATURE
Reducing the radar signature of our combatants buys battle space by
complicating threat targeting and acquisition. The DDG-51 class hull
and superstructure were designed to significantly reduce radar
signature to enhance survivability in an ASCM environment. Building on
this concept which lowered the DDG radar cross-section to less than
that of a FFG, the DD(X) is being designed to further reduce radar and
IR signatures. Through integrated topside design (ITD) and new hull
forms making use of the latest technologies including composite
materials and aperture control, DD(X) is expected to achieve
significant multi-spectral signature reduction that will greatly
enhance self-defense and survivability in the littoral. Such signature
reduction provides dramatic advantages on the battlefield but, more
over, makes future self-defense systems markedly more affordable and
practical to build.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE SENSOR SYSTEMS
Complementary to our hard kill and soft kill weapons programs, the
Navy is developing and upgrading selected sensor systems to enhance
ships self-defense. These systems include improvements to the AN/SPQ-9B
search and gunfire control radar, the SPY-1D radar system, the Mk 46
optical sight and the thermal imaging sensor system.
AN/SPQ-9B GUN CONTROL RADAR
The AN/SPQ-9B is state-of-the-art detection system being developed
to counter the emerging air and missile threats. AN/SPQ-9B detects and
tracks low-flying, high speed, small radar cross-section anti-ship
cruise missiles in heavy littoral clutter. It detects and tracks small,
high speed maneuvering surface craft in sea clutter as well. The result
is a significant extension of a ship's battle space to conduct self-
defense engagements. The first unit was installed aboard U.S.S.
Oldendorf (DD-972) and has met all requirements with impressive
results. Its configuration is based on the original Naval Research
Laboratory design with a parabolic reflector antenna that is larger and
heavier than the antenna of the AN/SPQ-9A. In a mid-deployment report,
Oldendorf stated AN/SPQ-9B was an excellent development in radar
systems and the improvement of the 9B over the 9A was ``tremendous''
noting ``the AN/SPQ-9B has become Oldendorf's premier radar.'' To
provide installation flexibility, we have completed development of a
rotating slotted array lightweight antenna designed to provide
comparable performance to the antenna deployed on Oldendorf but with
significantly lower topside weight.
This year we have added funding to procure additional AN/SPQ-9B
systems to backfit fleet units and will install AN/SPQ-9B on all
cruisers as part of the cruiser conversion program.
MK 46 OPTICAL SIGHT
Mk 46 optical sight system is a central component of the Mk 34 gun
weapon system, providing electro optical/infrared detection and
tracking capability in support of gun engagements. Ancillary uses
include night/low visibility surveillance, navigation/ship handling,
search and rescue, and in-port security. Over 40 Mk 46 optical sights
are fielded in the DDG-51 class.
In the fiscal year 2003 budget submission, we commenced the
fielding of Mk 46 upgrades, including an eyesafe laser range finder, 3-
5 micron FLIR, and azimuth motor upgrade, that will significantly
enhance system reliability and performance. These warfighting
improvements will provide Aegis DDGs increased ship self-defense and
force protection capabilities.
THERMAL IMAGING SENSOR SYSTEM
The thermal imaging sensor system (TISS) also provides ships with a
24-hour visual surveillance capability to be used for situation
awareness, target detection and identification, and critical
capabilities for challenging littoral environments. Efforts are
underway for integration of this system into current and future combat
systems for both fire control and target identification. TISS is
currently deployed in limited numbers in the fleet, but the response
from crews of ships with this system has been enthusiastic. TISS is a
beneficial anti-terrorism/force protection asset. In the Arabian Gulf,
TISS is the system of choice for monitoring and identification of
shipping in our maritime interdiction operations (MIO). TISS's
detection and surveillance capabilities are also of great benefit to
units conducting counter-drug operations in this hemisphere. As funds
permit, we are continuing a systematic program directed to outfit every
forward-deployed ship in the fleet with a low light surveillance (EO/
IR) system like TISS.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission maintains support for this
significant sensor capability at fiscal year 2002 projected levels.
FUTURE SHIP SELF-DEFENSE SYSTEMS
To pace the threat, continued development of future ship self-
defense systems is incorporated in the spiral design of DD(X) which
will be developed as one of a family of ships that will also include
two other future surface combatants, the advanced cruiser CG(X), and
the LCS. The DD(X) program in fiscal year 2003 is fully funded with
emphasis on risk mitigation and timely deployment. The combination of
the stealth characteristics gained in signature reduction technology
and state-of-the-art radar technology will significantly enhance the
self-defense capabilities of the DD(X) and, through netting, the other
ships in the force. The LCS, to be built from the start as a networked
and distributed platform with open, modular architecture, will rely on
networks, speed, stealth and maneuverability to enhance its own self-
defense, while, through those same capabilities and its organic sensors
and weapons, contributing to the self-defense of other ships of the
force. This is network-centric warfare in a most tangible and
meaningful way.
MULTI-FUNCTION RADAR/VOLUME SEARCH RADAR
As discussed above, multi-function radar (MFR) and volume search
radar (VSR) associated with the DD(X) program are optimized for the
littoral environment and will provide autonomous horizon search, long-
range volume search, and fire control track. MFRs have the ability to
provide surface search, periscope detection and navigation and enable
counter-fire support and electronic protection in ship self-defense.
MFR will automatically detect, ID, track and illuminate low altitude
anti-ship cruise missiles in littoral environments. It will support
ESSM and SM and provide non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) and
kill assessment. The VSR will provide long-range situational awareness
and the required track revisit times to deal with fast, low/very low
observable, high diving missile threats to enhance ship self-defense.
INFRARED SEARCH AND TRACK (IRST) SYSTEM
The Navy is investing in electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR)
detection and tracking systems to provide a key capability to
complement traditional radar and RF systems. The integration of
multiple, layered force defense systems allows a ship to defeat a wide
variety of threat missiles across the spectrum of radar cross-sections,
IR signatures, and seeker types. Each system is affected differently by
weather, environment, or ducting. A performance null experienced by one
type of system due to its environment can be filled by another system's
capability.
The IRST system is a sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile
detection system that adds significant improvements to the shipboard
sensor suite. It improves ship survivability by providing 360-degree
passive horizon surveillance, automatically detecting and tracking
subsonic and supersonic threats.
The developmental system will provide ships with a 24-hour visual
surveillance capability to be used for situational awareness and target
detection and identification. Additionally, tests have been conducted
to integrate this system into current and future combat systems for
both fire control and target identification. The first developmental
model was successfully tested aboard the self defense test ship in 1997
and 1998, and on U.S.S. O'Bannon (DD-987) in 1999.
In the fiscal year 2003 budget submission we have added funding to
complete a second engineering development model of the IRST system.
SHIP SELF-DEFENSE--PATROL BOATS AND SMALL, FAST SURFACE CRAFT
Small, fast surface combatants are a serious threat in the littoral
environment. The guided missile patrol boat (PTG) is a vessel generally
between 50-70 meters and capable of carrying 4-8 ASCMs. The surface
Navy possesses adequate capability to counter both the PTG and their
associated missiles. Significantly smaller boats, 5-27 meters and armed
generally with shoulder-fired and/or smaller weapons, are an emerging
threat. In numbers, these boats could present a challenge to single
ships operating in close-in littoral waters. Situational awareness, air
assets (organic or shore based), and netted multi-ship formations
mitigate this challenge. Our strategy to counter this threat parallels
our efforts to pace the ASCM threat, including the layered defense
concept of operation, and hinges largely on leveraging the same weapons
systems and integration advantages that were discussed above for the
ASCM threat. As previously mentioned, several weapons developed for
ASCM self-defense also have surface capability, most notably Standard
missile, ESSM, and RAM against the PTG and RAM Block 1 (HAS) and CIWS
1B against the smaller boats. Additionally, the new LCS will be
designed specifically to counter this threat, leveraging networks,
speed and agility.
Immediate measures to respond to the small surface craft threat
include, providing additional 23mm chain guns, installing TISS systems
on deployers and introducing organic armed helicopters to surface
combatants. Each 23mm chain gun-equipped ship will be provided with two
gun mounts to ensure 360-degree coverage for this anti-surface weapon.
The TISS system, described above, is being fielded on our ships
deploying into high threat areas such as the Arabian Gulf. We have also
already deployed light airborne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) SH-60
helicopters with Hellfire missile capability into the fleet. In the
near-term, we are accelerating the conversion of CIWS mounts to the
Block 1B variant and providing the HAS capability to the RAM capable
ships.
Future enhancements that will continue to improve our anti-small
boat capability include introduction of the AN/SPQ-9B, the Multi-
Function Radar (MFR) and the LAMPS MH-60R helicopter. The AN/SPQ-9B
gunfire control radar, described above, is specifically designed to
provide better detection of small surface craft and to allow the 5,,/54
gun system to engage them. The MFR, designed to function in the
littoral, will provide the automatic tracking, auto-identification and
periscope-level sensitivity necessary to detect, track and target
small, fast surface craft. Though not possessing the requisite
algorithms for periscope detection, in certain environmental
conditions, AN/SPQ-9B has demonstrated promising capability during at
sea testing. Finally, the MH-60R helicopter, employed from in-service
cruisers, destroyers and frigates or future platforms like LCS, and
armed with Hellfire missiles, offers considerable capability against
small surface craft.
The LCS is being developed to conduct this type of difficult,
focused littoral mission as a complement to our current and future
multi-mission surface combatants in the balanced total force. As part
of a netted and distributed force, the LCS will use its speed and
agility to enhance its own self-defense and contribute to the self-
defense of other platforms in the network. We are leveraging work in
other programs to start work on LCS related technologies now and expect
to formally fund the program next year.
UNDERSEA WARFARE
Undersea warfare (USW), which includes antisubmarine warfare (ASW)
and mine warfare (MIW), is and will remain a Navy core competency and
is critical to assured access. The littoral environment provides a
challenge for ASW. The proximity to coastal waterways, harbors, and
shipping lanes increases ambient noise and significantly complicates
the already difficult challenge of undersea acoustic detections. This
continued acoustic space complicates the problem of sorting legitimate
target echoes from random background echoes. Littoral sonar performance
and prediction are highly problematic. Now more than ever, ASW requires
a team effort as the harsh littoral requires exploitation of each
detection opportunity.
In our shipboard sonar program, we are pursuing an aggressive two-
pronged strategy. First, we intend on taking full advantage of the
enormous advancements in computing power and networking. We have
targeted these technologies for the AN/SQQ-89(V)15 and the AN/SQQ-
89A(V)15 with the multi-function towed array (MFTA) undersea warfare
suite. Through analysis we have learned that our best payoff is gained
by employing active sonar in conjunction with active acoustic
processing techniques and optimizing our passive sonar arrays to
operate in the noisy and complex waters of the littoral. Second, we are
investing in systems that afford surface combatants mine hunting
capability. History has shown time and again that mines are the most
effective asymmetric threat in the littoral environment. Their vast
diversity and increased proliferation, coupled with abundance of mine-
like clutter, present in the littorals demand that we equip our Fleet
with the ability to find and avoid this threat. The concept in which we
are engaged is called remote mine hunting and, when executed
successfully, will allow us to sail in seas heretofore closed to us,
simply because mines might be present. Add to the ASW sensors described
above, improvements in ship torpedo defensive systems, the improved MH-
60R helicopter program, and the new Mk 54 lightweight hybrid torpedo,
and it is clear this budget submission is focused to enhance surface
combatant ASW effectiveness.
AN/SQQ-89 PROGRAM
In the near-term, our ASW focus centers on upgrading the existing
AN/SQQ-89 sonar suites to meet future undersea challenges. The upgrade,
designed to counter the quiet diesel-electric submarine threat in the
littoral, enhances existing capabilities for shallow-water prosecution
and adds new, robust capabilities such as torpedo recognition and
alertment, and cross-layer active detection using broadband waveforms.
The system will capitalize on open system network architecture, and
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) functional enhancements to reduce
procurement and development costs, and also simplify future capability
upgrades. The AN/SQQ-89 undersea warfare control system provides a
fusion point for sonar data, bottom topography, and non-acoustic
sensors. With the AN/SQQ-89, surface warriors will have superior data
fusion and processing, combined with more effective sensor coverage.
Critical to future ASW is the multi-function towed array (MFTA),
developed in concert with the submarine and IUSS communities, it will
provide warfighters with a below-layer active/passive detection sensor
and a torpedo detection receiver optimized for shallow water
environments. Unlike previous towed arrays that were restricted to
deeper water, the MFTA is designed to serve as a receiver for the hull
mounted AN/SQS-53 sonar, extending the reach of the hull sonar away
from own ships noise. Additionally, surface combatants will receive the
MH-60R with its advanced ASW suite, including the AQS-22 airborne low
frequency sonar (ALFS). The SQQ-89(V)15 working in a coordinated manner
with the MH-60R carrying the new Mk 54 digital torpedo will give
surface warriors a powerful ASW capability in any ASW environment.
The fiscal year 2003 budget submission represents a significant
change of strategy for SQQ-89A(V)15 fielding. Under this new strategy,
these systems will now be installed in Ticonderoga-class cruisers as
part of the cruiser conversion program in addition to the installation
plans for DDGs. OPN funding levels were revised downward as part of
this budget to reflect the shift of funds to the CG Conversion SCN
account.
MK 54 TORPEDO
As the shallow waters of the littoral environment have become
better understood, it is clear that ASW acoustic torpedoes require more
robust detection and signal processing capabilities to further enhance
performance in littoral environments. With defense-wide fiscal
constraints prevailing, a new ``bottom up'' development program has not
been feasible. The determination was made that state-of-the-art COTS
processors combined with technologies and performance features already
incorporated into the Mk 50 lightweight torpedo and Mk 48 (ADCAP)
heavyweight torpedo, if effectively adapted to inventory units of the
Mk 46, provide the most cost-effective alternative to counter today's
threat. In 1995, the Mk 54 lightweight hybrid torpedo program was
initiated to provide a cost-effective shallow water performance upgrade
to the lightweight torpedo inventory of Mk 46 and Mk 50 torpedoes.
For the Mk 54 the incorporation of non-developmental item
technologies from existing weapons and commercial industry has resulted
in a significantly improved shallow water performance while reducing
total ownership cost. Extensive use of COTS and open systems
architecture enables the Mk 54 to be readily upgraded via technology
insertion and software upgrades to counter future threats. CG-47, FFG-
7, and DDG-51 class combatants, the SH-60B/F, MH-60R, and the P-3
aircraft will all employ the Mk 54.
The Mk 54 is planned to IOC in fiscal year 2003, with full rate
production commencing in that year. We significantly accelerated the
procurement of the Mk 54 in the fiscal year 2003 budget submission to
achieve significant savings through procurement at economic order
quantities (EOQ), and to obtain a significant improvement in capability
within the FYDP.
AN/SLQ-25A
The advances in computing technology have allowed an increased
sophistication and enhancement to our underwater defensive systems,
specifically the AN/SLQ-25A. Central to our future undersea defensive
systems will be a focus on the existing AN/SLQ-25A, which will be
enhanced with state-of-the-art acoustic sensors and automated
processing.
The AN/SLQ-25A system is currently a soft-kill countermeasure
system that acts as a decoy to confuse incoming homing torpedoes. It is
the most widely used torpedo countermeasure system fielded on our
ships. The AN/SLQ-25A is a towed system that operates at all times when
the ship is at risk of torpedo attack, and unlike some of the more
sophisticated countermeasure systems, the AN/SLQ-25A in its current
state does not rely on cueing from an anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
system.
TORPEDO RECOGNITION AND ALERTMENT
If a ship is to react to a torpedo fired against it, there must be
a way for the ship to detect the torpedo. Our surface combatants, using
input from both the hull sonar and towed arrays, employ a processor and
display system to gain alertment and recognition of torpedo acoustic
emanations. The alertment and recognition system is used in conjunction
with ship maneuvers to evade the torpedo and deployable countermeasures
to effect a soft-kill of the incoming torpedo. The AN/SQQ-89 anti-
submarine warfare combat system torpedo recognition and alertment
functional segment (TRAFS) will detect and localize torpedoes at
tactically significant ranges when torpedo acoustic noise is received
by the towed array or the hull sonar. In the development of this
important system, recent advances in acoustic sensors and computing
have provided promise that the AN/SLQ-25 can be adapted to provide a
significant improvement to torpedo alertment.
ANTI-TORPEDO TORPEDO (ATT)
The ATT is the only near-term, hard kill countermeasure that
promises to be effective against all threat torpedoes. The ATT will
soon complete a fiscal year 2001 advanced technology demonstration
(ATD). The Navy Staff has worked very closely with the Office of Naval
Research on further development of this promising weapon system, as
well as the potential to integrate this capability into shipboard
systems for torpedo defense. The torpedo detection programs previously
discussed lay the foundation for introduction of an ATT capability as
it materializes.
REMOTE MINEHUNTING SYSTEM
While it is preferable to avoid mined areas (using our knowledge
superiority), military objectives may require operations in close
proximity to mined waters. The Navy will continue to aggressively
research and prepare mine countermeasure (MCM) systems to ensure
effective operational capability in littoral waters in support of land
campaigns. Countermeasure technology must keep pace with the increased
sophistication in mine fusing and stealth technology.
For surface combatants, a new addition to the AN/SQQ-89 USW suite
will be the AN/WLD-1, remote minehunting system (RMS). The first RMS
deployment is presently planned for DDG-91 in fiscal year 2005 and
represents the first generation of organic mine countermeasures (OMCM)
systems for surface combatants. RMS is a semi-submersible vehicle that
tows a mine hunting sensor suite to detect, classify, locate, and
identify mines in the water column and on the sea bottom. RMS can
operate autonomously and maintain a radio frequency link to the ship to
allow sufficient forward deployment from the host ship, thereby
reducing risk and minimizing interference with other ship missions.
Through the AN/SQQ-89 and global command and control system-maritime
(GCCS-M), RMS will communicate mine location information to the rest of
the fleet, supporting the integration of organic and dedicated mine
warfare forces. RMS represents leading edge technology in organic mine
hunting which must be leveraged into our future ships to provide
optimum operational capability and flexibility.
MH-60R LIGHT AIRBORNE MULTI-PURPOSE SYSTEM (LAMPS)
An important piece of undersea warfare and force protection is the
LAMPS SH-60B and its next generation, the MH-60R helicopter. These
helicopters play a significant role in our ``assured access'' strategy.
The MH-60R will provide improved capability in littoral--specifically
in improving to situational awareness and providing defense against an
increasing threat from small surface combatants and quiet diesel
submarines. The MH-60R will bring an inverse synthetic aperture radar
(ISAR) capability, the advanced ALQ-210 EW suite, and an integrated
AQS-44 FLIR capability to our surface force. The MH-60R and its AQS-22
dipping sonar, along with an improved COTS-based acoustic processor
will enable the execution of multi-static ASW, contributing to our
ability to detect threats in harsh littoral environments. In addition
to these significant mission avionics capability upgrades, the decision
was made last year to shift to a new manufacture program geared to
directly improve the readiness and operational availability of these
helicopters. This program provides a critical warfighting component for
our surface combatants.
CONCLUSION
Our surface Navy remains a pre-eminent maritime fighting force in
an ever changing and dangerous world that continues to be characterized
by instability, uncertainty and ever increasing asymmetric threats.
Today's Navy possesses the mix of capabilities required to carry out
our Nation's maritime strategy. But we must do more to pace tomorrow's
inevitable challenges. The surface Navy we are building for the 21st
century will be characterized by speed, agility, strategic reach, and
an enhanced ``toolbox'' of capabilities all designed to assure access,
project power and project defense. The ``family of ships'' in our 21st
century surface Navy will be truly transformational and will dominate
the battle space, undersea, on the surface and in the air. This
``family of ships'' will be a force designed from the keel up to
operate as a distributed, netted force. Today, we are on our way to
realizing the full benefits of network-centric warfare with
capabilities such as CEC, AADC and NFN operating at sea, and we will
build upon our successes to move towards the more enhanced and
transformational networked architecture of FORCEnet.
In a challenging world, our surface Navy remains a critical force
in defending U.S. interests abroad and our citizens at home.
On behalf of surface warriors and our Navy, I want to offer my
sincere thanks for your continued support and thank you for this
opportunity to speak before you on the state of surface warfare. We
have met and are meeting the challenges of the Cold War, the conflicts
of the 1990s and now the first war of the 21st century, the War on
Terrorism. In doing so, the message is clear: be prepared for the
unexpected. We continue to strive earnestly to do just that.
Senator Kennedy. Admiral Sullivan.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. PAUL F. SULLIVAN, USN, DIRECTOR,
SUBMARINE WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Sullivan. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
the Seapower Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to
discuss submarine shipbuilding acquisition programs. Thank you,
too, for your continued strong support of our sailors, their
families, and our submarine force.
To understand the important contributions our force is
making in defense of our freedoms, we need to look no further
than the role that submarines played in the early phases of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Following the attacks of September
11, the U.S.S. Providence and her sister ship, U.S.S. Key West,
were among the first on the scene.
Providence is particularly an excellent example of the
success of recent congressionally-funded submarine programs and
initiatives. Providence was at the end of a 6-month deployment
and on her way home when the attacks occurred. Upon receiving
word of the attacks, the skipper and his crew were directed to
return to station off the coast of Afghanistan at best speed.
The very next day, the well-trained crew of Providence was
on station preparing the battle space for upcoming naval combat
operations and stood ready to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Providence positioned close in, providing important cuing to
the Enterprise and Vinson battle groups, recorded and forwarded
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information, and
rapidly executed time-critical strike missions when called
upon.
Recent modernization initiatives, including the submarine
high data rate antenna, the ARCI sonar system, the advanced TB-
29 towed array, and IT-21 local area network, were all critical
to her success. These initiatives, combined with the strong
long-term maintenance plan, provided Providence the endurance
to stay on station well beyond the normal 6-month deployment
and launch nearly one-third of the initial strike weapons while
conducting surveillance activities ashore and at sea.
With the increased demand signal from the warfighting
combatant commanders since September 11 and a present force
structure of only 54 attack submarines, how do we ensure
similar success in the future? The key is to continue to deploy
similar capabilities on all our submarines--SSNs, including
future Virginia class submarines, SSBNs, and future SSGNs.
Therefore, it is imperative that as a top priority we
maintain a core modernization plan for our ships that utilizes
COTS equipment and open architecture systems whenever possible
to allow the ability to rapidly update. With this as a
priority, we will be best positioned to handle the biggest
challenges today involving access to littoral waters when
threatened by mines and quiet diesel submarines.
As a result of the post-September 11 successes and
recognizing the need to transform for the future, our PB03
budget focuses on investing in upgrades such as sonar, ARCI and
its annual programs, command, control, communications,
computer, intelligence systems, including our common submarine
radio room, improved antennas, as I mentioned the high data
rate antenna, and the new OE-538 antenna, combat control
systems, which are envisioned to be more than just fire control
systems, but provide tactical control and information
management systems, periscopes and imaging----
Senator Kennedy. Admiral, I am going to have to just recess
for just a moment. As you can see, there is a vote over in the
Senate. I will go over and vote, and then we will go ahead with
the remainder of your testimony here, Admiral.
The committee will be in recess. [Recess from 3:50 p.m. to
4:09 p.m.]
We will come to order. Admiral Sullivan, I recognize you.
Admiral Sullivan. Yes, sir. I was discussing the
investments we are doing to upgrade our ships' capabilities. I
left off with we are investing considerably in updating our
periscopes and ability to do imaging through some automatic
low-intercept radars, some infrared imaging.
We are also investing in signals intelligence to allow us
to conform to the threat.
Away from submarines, we are also integrating or updating
our integrated undersea surveillance systems, both the fixed
systems and the advanced deployable systems.
With all this, we are continuing to emphasize our
maintenance, force protection, and our payloads, particularly
the tactical Tomahawk and undersea unmanned vehicles.
On the strategic side of our business, the recent Nuclear
Posture Review clearly reinforced the importance of the
survivable sea-based deterrence provided by the Trident SSBNs.
Recently the U.S.S. Alaska was backfitted to accommodate the
Trident II D5 missile and completed a highly successful
demonstration and shakedown operational missile test.
We also are investing in D5 missile life extension programs
to ensure adequate missile inventory for the life of our
Trident submarine programs.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the privilege of
testifying today. The capabilities we are building into our
ships and undersea systems are critical to meeting the threats
of today and those of the future. Innovative modernization of
our current SSNs and SSBNs, continued development of the superb
Virginia class, transformation of the four Ohio class fleet
ballistic missile submarines to SSGNs, and a robust yet focused
research and development investment will ensure the U.S.
remains the preeminent submarine force.
With your continued support, we will be able to modernize
and maintain our platforms as the most advanced technologically
sophisticated submarine force in the world.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Sullivan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Paul F. Sullivan, USN
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Seapower
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss submarine force
non-shipbuilding acquisition programs. Thank you too for your continued
strong support of our sailors, their families, and our submarine force.
As the Navy's Director of Submarine Warfare, it is my principal job
to determine the capabilities required of our undersea forces across a
wide spectrum from peace through deterrence to conflict. Inherent in
this job is the responsibility to ensure the programs and initiatives
we are pursuing are an efficient and effective use of limited defense
resources. My remarks today will include a description of the enduring
characteristics of nuclear powered submarines, the strategic concepts
that form the submarine force's vision for the future and the
capabilities we are pursuing for our systems.
The focus of our acquisition programs in Presidential budget 2003
is to improve the joint warfighting effectiveness of our submarines and
undersea systems to meet current and future Commander in Chief (CINC)
and National requirements. In addition to shipboard programs, I will
also discuss submarine rescue systems, fixed acoustic arrays and other
off-hull undersea warfare sensors and systems for which I am
responsible.
To understand the importance of today's submarine force, we need
look no further than the contributions of our submarines during the
early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Following the attacks
of September 11, U.S.S. Providence (SSN-719) and her sister ship U.S.S.
Key West (SSN-722) were among the first on the scene. Recent submarine
force initiatives including the high data rate (HDR) antenna, acoustic
rapid COTS insertion (ARCI) sonar system, advanced TB-29 towed array
and IT-21 local area network were critical to the successes of these
ships in preparing the battle space, providing anti-diesel cueing to
the U.S.S. Enterprise and U.S.S. Carl Vinson battle groups, recording
and forwarding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
information and rapidly executing time-critical strike missions. I will
include a discussion of each of these acquisition programs and
initiatives later.
ENDURING SUBMARINE CHARACTERISTICS
The ability of our submarines to conduct surprise operations has
been critical to success during the War on Terrorism and will prove a
key capability in unforeseeable future conflicts involving mobile
adversaries operating without regard to national borders. Our
submarines make use of their unique stealth, endurance, and agility to
provide critical and irreplaceable capabilities, in support of joint
forces, against the emerging threats and challenges of today and
tomorrow.
Stealth. Uniquely undetectable and survivable, U.S.
submarines can operate covertly or overtly, creating surprise,
fear, and uncertainty among adversaries and assuring access for
friendly naval and joint forces. Of the five military domains
(land, surface-sea, undersea, the atmosphere and space),
undersea operations are the least visible and therefore the
stealthiest. U.S. submarines remain virtually undetectable by
other forces and their sensors, enabling them to operate with
impunity--covertly when required, or overtly if desired--inside
an adversary's threat envelope in advance of less survivable
joint forces. Their stealth also gives them inherent protection
from precision-guided missiles, electro-magnetic pulses (EMP)
and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced
high explosive (CBRNE) weapons. Under stealthy cover, the
submarine's ability to deliver payloads in hostile or denied
areas is singularly unique, providing the CINCs with survivable
ground-truth sensors inside the enemy's battlespace as well as
credible combat power for use against naval and land-based
targets.
Endurance. U.S. submarines conduct sustained,
independent operations within an enemy's battlespace. They
often operate alone in areas where detection or risks from
hostile forces prevent other forces from operating. Their
endurance, combined with their stealth, enables them to operate
with no defensive or logistics support from other forces for
months at a time. With their advanced sensors and precision
firepower, they have a remarkably high ``tooth-to-tail'' ratio.
Agility. Robust in capability and highly maneuverable,
U.S. submarines carry out unique national, operational and
tactical missions across the spectrum from peace to deterrence
to war. Their ability to surge between theaters with sustained
speed is a key capability in providing responsive, forward-
deployed forces. Often ``first in and last out,'' they provide
presence, 24/7 intelligence collection and improved situational
awareness through special operations during peacetime and pre-
hostility phases. Able to transition to emerging missions on
station, they also provide credible conventional deterrence,
dominant undersea warfare and early and covert precision strike
when conflicts arise. A single U.S. nuclear submarine can
conduct a wide range of missions in one deployment.
SUBMARINE FORCE JOINT STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND VISION FOR THE FUTURE
The submarine force's vision is to leverage the unique attributes
of our ships to provide critical and irreplaceable capabilities, in
support of joint forces, against the emerging threats and challenges of
today and tomorrow. To support this, we emphasize four strategic
concepts:
U.S. submarines assure access for joint forces.
Our submarines operate ``out front'' and prepare the battle
space in denied, hostile or sensitive areas. Because they can
operate where other platforms cannot, submarines neutralize
enemy anti-access systems or operate in spite of them, often
enabling attacks against time-sensitive targets. Information
provided by submarines, in conjunction with that available via
integrated undersea surveillance systems (IUSS) and Surtass
ships, provides valuable expeditionary capability for assuring
access for joint forces.
U.S. submarines exploit their unique access to develop
and share knowledge.
Able to operate undetected very close to a potential
adversary's forces or territory, our submarines collect
information and provide real-time high data rate reporting
about adversaries and their capabilities that other assets
cannot--improving national and theater-level situational
awareness.
Stealth, access, knowledge, and firepower make U.S.
submarines a potent deterrent.
In addition to strategic nuclear deterrence, our submarines
provide the CINCs and the Secretary of Defense with
unlocatable, close-in presence in support of diplomatic and
military objectives. Accurate and timely knowledge combined
with early and unpredictable conventional attack capabilities
from our submarines strengthen our leaders' deterrent options
against aggression.
Undetected presence and access enable U.S. submarines
to project power with surprise from close-in.
Stealthy and survivable, our submarines provide an early and
rapid precision strike capability against time-sensitive
targets, as well as attack capabilities within contested or
sensitive areas.
PURSUING A CAPABILITIES-BASED FORCE
Armed with this vision, the submarine force, in close coordination
with industry and government laboratories, is moving forward to
identify and invest in programs and technologies that bring the needed
capabilities to our submarines and undersea systems. Through an
enduring and comprehensive process, this consortium of warfighters,
shipbuilders and technologists share ideas and a consistent focus. This
process, called SUBTECH, ensures all current and future submarine
program efforts are geared toward achieving our vision for the future.
The capabilities that we are pursing can be summarized under three
themes; extended reach, fully netted, and greater adaptability:
Extended reach to increase the submarine's tactical
horizon and collection capabilities, enabling better
penetration of hostile or inaccessible areas to improve
situational awareness and provide more information in support
of CINC and national tasking. Current initiatives include the
upgrade and modification of existing shipboard acoustic and
command, control, communications and computer (C\4\) ISR
systems and development of off-board sensors.
Submarine information systems fully netted with
national and theater level assets to improve processing
capabilities and provide integrated data for onboard and off-
hull interpretation and knowledge sharing. Fully netted systems
allow the data collected by submarines and their organic and
off-board sensors to be distributed to joint forces and
national agencies, while also allowing real-time reach-back
from submarines deployed in forward regions to central
intelligence and cueing resources.
Greater adaptability to provide the submarine force
with more mission flexibility and volume of firepower to adapt
to emerging threats and technology. The development of modular
concepts and designs and incorporation of interoperable COTS
technology that can be rapidly upgraded and/or reconfigured
will aid in supporting this concept.
irreplaceable submarine missions and joint warfighting
Leveraging their enduring characteristics and guided by the above
strategic concepts, submarines and undersea systems play a unique and
thus irreplaceable role in joint warfighting and in fulfilling CINC and
National requirements in the following primary areas: undersea
superiority, battlespace preparation (including ISR and SOF), covert
early strike, and global deterrence. I will now discuss our President's
budget 2003 programs and initiatives in the context of these four
mission areas. Although many of the programs and initiatives are
applicable to more than one mission area, I will only include each
under its primary mission area.
Undersea Superiority
U.S. submarines penetrate conventional enemy defenses to ensure
undersea superiority and sea control, defeating enemy area denial
capabilities. Our submarines are critical to the Navy's ability to
wrest control of the sea from a determined enemy employing mines,
cruise missiles and/or quiet, advanced diesel submarines. They can
disrupt and destroy our adversaries' military and commercial operations
at sea, ensuring maritime dominance for the U.S. or its allies. Over a
number of years, our submarines have established unparalleled anti-
submarine and anti-surface capabilities. Armed with significantly
improved sensors and weapons, today they provide an even greater
ability to locate, track and if necessary destroy submarines, surface
ships and shipping in both the open ocean and the littorals.
Undersea superiority enables the safe arrival and employment of
joint forces in distant theaters of operations. Our submarines and
other undersea surveillance assets (e.g. integrated undersea
surveillance systems (IUSS)) are critical to the Navy's ability to
ensure freedom of the seas and the flow of forces in support of joint
operations in the face of an adversary's maritime threat.
President's budget 2003 acquisition programs and initiatives to
support continued undersea superiority include the following:
Underwater Acoustics
Acoustic superiority over modern diesel and advanced nuclear
submarines is fundamental to control of the seas, underwater
dominance and assured access for our naval and follow-on
forces. Current initiatives include use of a standard sonar
system (TB-29 towed array with COTS technology) for all
submarine classes, integrated undersea surveillance systems
(IUSS) and Surtass ships, and continued development and
installation of acoustic rapid COTS insertion (ARCI) sonar
systems to maximize collection of acoustic data.
Annual updates via the advanced processor build installation
and management plan have proven effective in steadily
maintaining ARCI systems up to date. Shipboard installations
are being done in a 2-year cycle to best fit submarine
deployment and operational schedules.
All deploying SSNs will have towed array ARCI (Phase II) by
October 2003 and hull mounted ARCI (Phase III/IV) by October
2005. All SSBNs will have towed array ARCI by October 2006 and
hull mounted ARCI (Phase III) by October 2010. SSGNs will have
towed array and hull mounted ARCI installed after conversion.
Submarine Weapons
Submarine-launched torpedoes provide essential combat power
for sea control missions. Submarine-launched Mk 48 advanced
capability (ADCAP) heavy-weight torpedoes are the most
effective anti-shipping weapons in the Navy. Advancements in
submarine weapons to ensure continued undersea superiority and
sea control in response to emerging threats in the littoral
waters include the following:
Improvements to the Mk 48 ADCAP. Modifications are in
progress to upgrade the current inventory of ADCAPs from Mod 5
to Mod 6, yielding significant improvements in weapon guidance/
control and propulsion systems and improved performance in the
difficult littoral environment. The Mod 6 guidance and control
section has four times the memory and processing speed of its
predecessor to support continual software updates for enhanced
weapon performance. These software improvements, coupled with
hardware developments that support installing updates onboard
the submarine, will enable improved capability at a reduced
cost. Propulsion system improvements include sound-quieting to
reduce weapon operating noises and reduce target alertment,
yielding a significant tactical advantage for our submarines.
Development of the common broadband advanced sonar
system (CBASS) torpedo as the next improvement to the Mk 48
ADCAP. CBASS takes advantage of improved sonar technologies and
processing capabilities and is deliberately designed to defeat
the submerged adversary of the future (very quiet, low
operating speed, diesel or air independent propulsion (AIP)
platform, capable of high speed evasions, deploying
countermeasures, operating in a high noise, high contact
density, very shallow water environment). Initial operational
capability (IOC) for CBASS is 2007.
Submarine Countermeasures. Work continues on making
submarine countermeasures uniform in dimension so every
submarine can fire all countermeasures in the inventory. The
new 6,, countermeasures offer increased performance and
endurance over the previous generation. Additionally, progress
continues on the anti-torpedo torpedo, a joint submarine and
surface force weapon, with first at-sea testing scheduled in
2006.
Submarine Combat Control Systems (CCS) Modernization
Current CCS enhancements will enable full capability for
tactical Tomahawk (Tactom) and use of the IT21 communications
system, deliver significant improvements in high contact
density littoral areas and enable periodic improvements in
capability. The program implements an open architecture system
similar to ARCI sonar that is more conducive to competition for
software and hardware development.
Today's CCS integrate two different functions: contact
tracking and management and control of weapons. Our ultimate
goal is to split these functions so that contact management
upgrades are not tied in with costly and time-consuming testing
requirements for upgrades to weapon control systems. We fully
intend to apply the lessons learned from our experience with
the ARCI sonar system in developing the architecture and the
advanced processor build process for the CCS.
Equally important is the installation of phase 2 of the
tactical integrated digital system (TIDS), a mission critical
digital network incorporating the Navy's first on-board
tactical network. It will provide robust, survivable servers
and network hardware that will serve as a ready host for a wide
range of future applications. It is a fundamental building
block to achieving network-centric warfare capability on
submarines. The first installations have been completed, and
the program is aiming to complete fleet wide installation
within the FYDP.
Off-board Sensors
Recent efforts have accelerated experimentation, development
and fielding of UUV, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and
deployable systems to expand the submarine's payload and reach.
Autonomous, off-board vehicles and sensors deployed from
submarines will allow covert penetration of denied/hostile
areas with leave-behind persistent intelligence collection
capabilities in support of the warfighting CINCs. Off-board
vehicles and sensors will improve the situational awareness and
multiply the operational impact and flexibility of their host
platform--and the supported joint forces--at significantly
reduced risk.
The long-term mine reconnaissance system (LMRS) is an
autonomous UUV currently under development that will enable our
submarines to search for mines in denied littoral waters and
other areas while remaining covert and out of danger. LMRS is
scheduled for IOC in 2005.
The mission reconfigurable UUV (MRUUV) is a next-
generation UUV that will provide the ability to greatly extend
the range and variety of off-board sensors. MRUUV will be the
Navy's first fully autonomous vehicle that has specified
interface standards to enable acceptance of a wide array of
sensor payloads.
Cueing provided by the integrated undersea
surveillance system (IUSS) is essential to the Navy's undersea
warfighting capability. Current fixed and mobile systems
provide persistent maritime surveillance worldwide.
IUSS fixed systems, the legacy sound surveillance
system (SOSUS) and the newer fixed distributed system (FDS),
provide long-term, forward-deployed covert surveillance. Cost
of these systems is typically shared with our allies.
For our mobile IUSS component, SURTASS ships will be
even more capable with the installation of highly effective TB-
29A twin line arrays, with first installation scheduled to
occur in fiscal year 2004. Additionally, after receiving
authorization from the National Maritime Fisheries Service, we
expect to begin low frequency active sonar operations this
year.
Development of advanced deployable system (ADS), a
transformational system that provides rapid deployability,
continues with initial delivery of an operational system to the
fleet in fiscal year 2005. For the future, we are developing a
variant of ADS that will not require a cable link to shore.
Submarine Rescue
Following the sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk and
subsequent loss of lives, the Navy conducted a thorough
analysis of the safety and habitability of our submarines
following a major casualty. While we had already taken a
proactive role in this area including installing new escape
equipment and developing a new rescue system, fiscal year 2003
provided an opportunity to further improve our capability. The
Navy has increased funding to procure and install new carbon
dioxide removal equipment to allow sailors to survive until
escape or rescue. Additionally, we have accelerated the
installation of an improved escape suit by 2 years from 2007 to
2005 and are pursuing initiatives to re-establish pressurized
escape training for our sailors.
Battle Space Preparation, including ISR and support of Special
Operation Forces (SOF).
ISR. Space-based and airborne signals interception is
complemented in critical ways by our submarine intercepts. Our
submarines can position themselves to capture electromagnetic
emissions or observe maritime activities or tests that would
elude other sensors and systems. They are critical assets in
ensuring comprehensive, persistent surveillance of many
information domains (visual, acoustic and electronic), ensuring
complete situational awareness and precluding enemy sanctuary.
Submarines also provide sole-source ``tip-off'' information,
which enables the intelligence community to optimally allocate
other collection assets.
U.S. submarine-gathered intelligence focuses military
planning and operations and minimizes threats to national
assets. Operating closely and continuously to observe
activities without the adversary's knowledge, submarines
provide battle group and joint force commanders real-time
information that helps define and prepare the battle space.
Intelligence gleaned from such operations ranges from the
highly technical details of military platforms to knowledge of
a potential adversary's military doctrine and intentions. Their
non-provocative and non-escalatory presence also enables them
to gain ``ground-truth'' intelligence that aids diplomatic
efforts and helps anticipate (and preclude) hostilities.
Programs and initiatives to enhance submarine ISR
capabilities include the following:
Submarine Communications
The submarine IT21 communications suite significantly
improves connectivity via wideband (128 kbps) and narrowband
(32-48 kbps) internet protocol (IP) technology. IT21
communications provide secure, covert connectivity in the
littorals and more efficient use of limited satellite resources
while enabling our submarines to be fully netted with the
carrier battle group. Submarine IT21 is being outfitted on all
submarines deploying with the battle group; and, to date
approximately 20 percent of the SSN fleet has this capability.
The goal, as supported by the program of record, is for all
submarines (SSN, SSBN, and SSGN) to be modernized with this
capability by the end of fiscal year 2007.
Submarine Imagery and Signals Intercept
Current efforts in the areas of tactical imagery and visual
intelligence (VISINT) will significantly advance the
submarine's capability from World War II era optics to state-
of-the-art imaging technologies. Efforts include real-time
rangefinding, continuous video output (both visual and
infrared) and digital still camera imaging. This high quality
digitalization of imagery will enable the submarine to gain
greater tactical control while operating at periscope depth in
high contact density, littoral areas and also provide high
resolution VISINT to theater and national intelligence networks
quickly.
Submarine operations since September 11 have highlighted the
critical importance of sensitive, state-of-the-art signals
intelligence (SIGINT). To ensure maximum capability in this
area, we have greatly accelerated procurement and installation
of the state-of-the-art AN/BLQ-10 SIGINT suite which provides
our submarines the capability to exploit the entire spectrum of
signals.
Submarine Geospatial Information
The submarine force continues to pursue improvements in
precision position/attitude/time determination and geographic
reference that are critical to exchanging relevant contact
information in a tactical or national network. Nearly all
operational SSNs have been upgraded to the AN/BPS-15(H)
integrated radar and digital chart system, which has
significantly enhanced ship's safety during surfaced and
submerged operations in high contact density environments. All
remaining SSNs will be upgraded to the AN/BPS-15(H) by 2004.
The AN/BPS-15(H), in conjunction with ring laser gyro
navigator, the replacement for the legacy electronically
suspended gyro navigator, will provide seamless integration
with geospatial standards and will meet Navy goals for
electronic navigation.
SOF. U.S submarines are excellent platforms to deploy
and retrieve covert forces. Our submarines' inherent stealth
and endurance--as well as their sophisticated communications
equipment, sensors, and navigation suites--make possible the
secure, precise and reliable insertion and extraction of SOF
(SEALS, Rangers, and Recon Marines) close to shore objectives.
These covertly placed personnel can plant remote sensors,
collect intelligence, exploit and/or disable weapons and
communication systems and perform other classified missions
inside denied areas. OEF has demonstrated conclusively the
importance of being able to deploy SOF quickly and covertly in
places and situations that cannot be anticipated.
The submarine force has always had the capability to insert
SOF, but the recent decommissioning of U.S.S. Kamehameha has
limited our capability to short duration employments with small
teams of special forces. SSGN, in combination with the advanced
seal delivery system funded by SOCOM, will enable us to achieve
a quantum increase in our capability to insert and support
Special Forces from submarines. The prospects are exciting, and
we are beginning to lay the foundations for reaping significant
operational capability benefits from the synergy of SSGN and
SOF. To support this, we have updated nearly all of our non-
shipbuilding procurement programs to give SSGN the same
capability as SSNs in acoustics, imaging, combat control and
communications.
Covert, Early, Conventional Strike
Submarine-launched land-attack missiles provide essential
combat power for strike missions. U.S. submarines provide
combat-credible presence with responsive and reliable
delivery--early strike, with surprise, from close-in. Littoral
access and survivability enable unique strike capabilities with
reduced risk to personnel.
Our submarines are not threatened by area denial weapons such
as coastal cruise and tactical ballistic missiles or weapons of
mass destruction, thus delivering a conventional punch with
impunity. They can execute attack operations against targets
that might otherwise be alerted by a visible naval presence.
Historically, submarines have deployed one-third of the Navy's
Tomahawk land-attack missiles, and submarines launched nearly
38 percent of all Tomahawk cruise missile strikes during the
first phase of OEF.
The development of Tactom will enable our submarines to
project power more swiftly with precision against defensive
systems and other time-sensitive targets. In the future, SSGN,
loaded with deployable sensors (e.g. unmanned vehicles),
Tactoms, future land-attack missiles and miniature air-launched
decoys and jammers, will provide robust capability to destroy
an integrated air defense system (IADS) or any other anti-
access system from within the adversary's threat envelope.
Global Deterrence
U.S. submarines fulfill a unique role in our Nation's ability
to deter aggression. Asymmetric in concept and capability, our
submarines provide an unlocated but certain strike capability--
both nuclear and conventional--whose time and place of
employment is completely uncertain in the mind of a would-be
adversary. The survivable offensive strike weapons carried by
our nuclear submarines play a pivotal role in achieving global
deterrence as part of the Nation's new strategic triad.
Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are our Nation's choice
for nuclear deterrence. Our SSBNs are virtually undetectable.
They comprise greater than 50 percent of our Nation's nuclear
deterrent, and 100 percent of our Nation's survivable
deterrent, using only 34 percent of our strategic budget and
less than 1.5 percent of our naval personnel.
The Presidential Budget for Fiscal Year 2003 fully
funds a service life extension program to match the life of D5
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) to the recently
extended 44-year life of Ohio-class SSBNs. This program
refreshes the missile guidance and electronics systems to
prevent obsolescence and procures additional missiles for
required flight testing. The D5 life extension program will
ensure maximum weapon system reliability and accuracy for this
critical strategic deterrent.
In addition to traditional strategic deterrence provided by SLBMs,
Tomahawk cruise missiles carried onboard Los Angeles- and Seawolf-class
attack submarines (and Virginia-class submarines, when delivered)
provide a capable conventional deterrent. SSGN will add up to 154
Tomahawk or future Tactom cruise missiles per platform to advance our
capabilities in this area.
ENDURING PROCESSES FOR INNOVATION AND TRANSFORMATION
The submarine force has incorporated innovative processes to ensure
our submarines have the necessary tools to meet the challenges of today
as well as those of the future.
As I have already referred to, SUBTECH is a collaborative
organization comprised of OPNAV, industry, acquisition community and
fleet representatives developed to identify and prioritize promising
technologies consistent with the submarine force vision. Working hand-
in-hand with SUBTECH, the submarine force's Experimentation Working
Group ensures our vision is pursued through an end-to-end process that
guides concept development, war gaming, science and technology,
experimentation and research and development to deliver the required
fielded capabilities to the fleet and transform the force vision into
reality.
The payloads and sensors program uses the above processes,
leveraging and integrating technologies developed by others, to
identify submarine payloads and sensors for the future. The SSGN
payloads and sensors program will make use of SSGN's large ocean
interface--22 large-diameter, 44-feet tubes--to develop future payloads
and sensors to be deployed by SSGN. Additionally, SSGN will serve as
the transformation ``bridge'' to provide these and future advanced
joint payloads, including mission-specific weapons and sensors, via the
technology insertion program, to Virginia-class submarines with
reconfigurable torpedo rooms, advanced sails and large payload modules.
CONCLUSION.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the honor of testifying today. I would
like to close by reiterating the critical need for submarine-delivered
capabilities as a vital component of our Nation's defense. The
capabilities we are building into our ships and undersea systems today
and those that are planned for tomorrow are crucial to meeting the
threat today and in the future. Our submarines are stealthier and more
capable than any ships in the world. Our relevance in regional peace or
conflict enabled by our stealth and combined with the endurance and
agility that nuclear power brings are absolutely necessary to support
CINC and National mission tasking.
Innovative modernization of our current submarines, continued
development of the superb Virginia-class and transformation of four
Ohio-class fleet ballistic missile submarines to SSGNs will ensure the
U.S. remains the preeminent submarine force. With your support, we will
continue to upgrade and maintain our platforms as the most advanced,
technologically sophisticated submarines in the world.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Admiral McCabe.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MICHAEL J. McCABE, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR
WARFARE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral McCabe. Senator, I am honored to be in front of you
today and have a chance to talk about naval aviation. I have a
short statement for the record I would like to submit.
Senator Kennedy. Please.
Admiral McCabe. I would echo the comments of the CNO and
the prior witnesses on the challenges and the opportunities
facing the Navy today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral McCabe follows:]
Prepared Statement by Rear Adm. Michael J. McCabe, USN
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Seapower
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the state of
naval aviation, with specific emphasis on the programs and plans to
sustain and modernize our P-3 and MH-60 platforms and equipment.
When I appeared before this subcommittee last year, I spoke of how
the leading role played by naval expeditionary forces in responding to
crises pointed to an increasing demand for what the Navy-Marine Corps
team and naval aviation bring to the fight. Clearly in this past year,
this trend has continued--even accelerated--as our forward-deployed
carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups have served the
Nation's interests in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring
Freedom.
Our remarkable success in these operations validates the
requirement for unconstrained, sustained and forward naval maritime
forces. The lion's share of the credit rests with the sailors and
marines who serve with distinction and honor--meeting the challenge of
increased operations tempo despite the effects of a prolonged drawdown
of personnel and equipment. I appreciate the actions by members of this
subcommittee, the Senate, and the administration to meet our most
pressing personnel and readiness needs. I am mindful of the choices we
need to make to balance the modernization and recapitalization efforts
necessary to ensure naval aviation and naval maritime forces remain
capable of meeting the Nation's security requirements into the 21st
century and beyond.
MARITIME PATROL AND RECONNAISSANCE
Maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (P-3/EP-3) continue to
fulfill critical warfighting roles, including: undersea warfare;
surface warfare; electronic warfare; intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; maritime interdiction; littoral strike and targeting.
Enhanced connectivity and integration into battle group concept of
operations (CONOPS) places a premium on these aircraft as we move into
the future. A key modernization effort for both the maritime patrol and
reconnaissance fleet is the replacement of mission systems in our
legacy aircraft to give the warfighter the capability to conduct anti-
submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW) and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in the 21st century.
The P-3 ASUW improvement program (AIP) is an upgrade to the P-3
weapons system which was designed to provide a more robust anti-surface
warfare capability. The COTS sensor and connectivity improvements
allowed for rapid fleet introduction that proved their value during
multiple worldwide operations, most recently Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF). P-3 AIP-equipped aircraft collected, analyzed, and disseminated
time critical intelligence to joint and coalition forces in OEF, while
also participating in leadership interdiction and maritime interdiction
operations in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Our investment in AIP
is well leveraged, as this aircraft has performed well in unique roles
in the global war on terrorism, including overland and overwater ISR
operations, littoral surveillance, maritime interdiction operations,
and full support of joint task forces. AIP is a suite of sensor
upgrades that significantly and rapidly increases capabilities not only
in ASUW, but also for over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T); command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C\4\I); and
survivability. By protecting the battle group from surface and sub-
surface threats, our P-3 aircraft in conjunction with organic
helicopter assets, allowed the carrier air wing's tactical aircraft to
focus exclusively on power projection.
Our EP-3E electronic warfare and reconnaissance aircraft continue
to meet critical CINC ISR collection requirements. The primary mission
of these aircraft is to detect and report tactically significant
communication and radar signals then associate these signals with enemy
warfare activity or potentially hostile units. A P-3C to EP-3E
conversion program is in place and fully funded to meet the inventory
requirement of 16 aircraft. There are two planned upgrades to the EP-3E
force. The sensor system improvement program (SSIP) integrates and
installs new tactical communications, electronic signals monitoring
(ESM), and special signal processing and exploitation systems. The
second effort is the joint airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT)
architecture (JASA) block modernization program (JMOD). The JMOD
program is an extensive systems upgrade designed to keep the EP-3 ahead
of the projected threat and is the bridge to future Navy manned and
unmanned ISR programs.
MULTI-MISSION MARITIME AIRCRAFT
The multi-mission maritime aircraft (MMA) program plan presents a
path forward to recapitalize the capabilities currently provided by the
maritime patrol and reconnaissance force. The Navy has completed the
AoA, identifying a manned aircraft as the key element of the system.
The analysis also identified the potential application of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV). In the interim, the legacy P-3C force is going
to be kept viable through sensible modernization until the introduction
of MMA. This approach will enable the Navy to deliver more reliable and
capable replacement aircraft faster, minimize costs and technical
risks. Our schedule has the selection of the preferred alternative for
development in fiscal year 2004 with the goal for introduction to the
fleet in the 2010-2012 timeframe.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)
In August of this past year, the Secretary of the Navy announced
his intent to increase the Navy's emphasis on unmanned systems. With
increased emphasis on this key transformational area, the Navy and
Marine Corps re-examined their UAV requirements and priorities. The
resulting naval UAV strategy has both a short-term plan to capitalize
on existing systems and a longer term plan to develop a family of
unmanned vehicles.
The Navy has initiated an accelerated procurement of a Global Hawk
system as part of the broad area maritime surveillance (BAMS)
requirement to satisfy the Long-Dwell-Standoff ISR mission area. This
will be a two-phased process. Phase I will be procurement of an Air
Force production line Global Hawk system which will have modifications
to the existing sensor package to make it more compatible with a
maritime environment. A system will consist of two air vehicles with
payloads, a launch and recovery element and mission control element.
The system will be used primarily for experimentation and CONOPS
development leading to phase II. Phase II (now called BAMS UAV) will
leverage from the broad area maritime and littoral armed intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance mission needs statement and AoA to
competitively acquire high altitude, long endurance vehicles with
robust and fully capable maritime sensor payloads. The thrust of BAMS
UAV will be towards developing sensor/payload capability or identifying
existing sensor/payloads capable of performing BAMS missions. The Navy
intends to explore all non-developmental options for the vehicle. A
competition may result if multiple vendors can provide vehicles
appropriate to the Navy's requirement.
MH-60 HELICOPTERS
The CNO recently approved a fleet proposal to restructure our Navy
helicopter forces around the two linchpin airframes to the Helicopter
Master Plan, the MH-60R and MH-60S. This new concept of operations
(CONOPS) will align the leadership of helicopter aviation with the
carrier air wing and bring about warfighting efficiencies. Our
helicopter force will downsize from seven type/model/series to two,
while meeting our littoral warfighting requirements. Capitalizing on
efficiencies of singular maintenance, logistics, and training systems,
our plan satisfies the needs of both our Active and Reserve Forces.
The MH-60R multi-mission helicopter is the future aircraft for the
Navy's tactical helicopter community supporting surface combatants and
aircraft carriers. The MH-60R will eventually replace the Navy's
existing fleet of SH-60B and SH-60F helicopters. The warfighting
systems will provide an advanced multi-mode inverse synthetic aperture
radar (ISAR), the airborne low frequency (dipping) Sonar (ALFS), a
greatly enhanced electronic support measures and self-defense sensor
suite, and upgraded mission computers. In June 2001, the MH-60R program
received approval from ASN(RDA) to revise the acquisition strategy from
remanufactured airframes to new production aircraft. The acquisition
program rebaseline, incorporating this new manufacture strategy and
extension of the schedule to allow further subsystem testing and
maturity, has been approved.
The MH-60S multi-mission combat support helicopter is the future
aircraft for organic airborne mine countermeasures, combat search and
rescue, special operations, and logistics support. The MH-60S will
replace the Navy's aging fleet of H-46, H-1, H-3, and HH-60H
helicopters. This spring, we certified the fleet replacement squadron
``ready-to-train'' and we plan to introduce initial operational
capability of the MH-60S in the fall of 2002. Retirement of the CH-46D,
the Navy's logistic workhorse (in its 34th year of service) is targeted
for August 2004. Follow-on systems changes will introduce the network,
sensors, weapons and survivability suites necessary for the multi-
spectral battle group tasking.
SUMMARY
America's global security interests, recent world events and on-
going operations in the Northern Arabian Sea and Afghanistan are
validating both our past decisions with regard to aircraft, weapons and
personnel, as well as our commitment to sustaining the readiness of our
forces, which now routinely deploy in harm's way. Forward presence,
maritime dominance, and decisive landward power projection in the
littorals require modern aircraft and weapons systems capable of
responding rapidly to a wide range of missions in an increasingly
complex and demanding threat environment. We must plan, invest, and
equip our maritime forces so they are shaped to bring overwhelming
force to the fight. Naval aviation continues to make extraordinary
contributions to the Nation's defense. We are committed to keeping
naval aviation robust and relevant and we will keep faith with our
warfighters in the fleet to ensure they have the aircraft and equipment
necessary to engage in combat and prevail.
Senator Kennedy. Maybe I could talk, Admiral McCabe, about
the purchase of the F-18s. What is on the horizon now in terms
of that issue?
Admiral McCabe. We are very happy with the F/A-18E/F. The
first E-F squadron and F-18E squadron deploys on Lincoln this
June. The contractors provided for us exactly the airplane we
asked of them, so we are very happy with it. We would like to
buy it as fast as possible. With some of the challenges the CNO
talked about and the framework of decision we face with paying
for the manpower and then the readiness, we had to make some
late decisions on the quantities that we were buying. But it is
a top priority for us to buy that aircraft. We would like to
replace the F-14s as rapidly as possible. The F/A-18E/F is half
the cost of an F-14 to operate and so, while the F-14 has
performed brilliantly even in Operation Enduring Freedom, it is
time the move on to the new technologies. So we strongly
support that airplane, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. We might come back with you on that, on
that issue. I would be interested in the justification and the
changes that have been suggested.
Admiral McCabe, we are obviously saddened by the loss of
life in the V-22s over the last year. We heard from the panel
to review the V-22 last year during the time we were trying to
work out the problems. Can you describe now what the Navy and
Marine Corps will need to do to ensure that the CH-46 fleet
will support operating squadrons in the interim before we get
to the V-22?
Admiral McCabe. A great concern, more for the Marine Corps
than us. We are going to replace our H-46s with the MH-60S and
we will have our H-46s out of service by 2004 in September/
October. The Marine Corps because of the V-22 delays will have
to fly the H-46 for some time longer. Some of the engines in
the H-46 case have been overhauled as many as ten times and so
it is a concern. They have an engine improvement program, a
monitoring system that is in place. But based on some of the
recent challenges we have had, that bears close watch and it is
a concern because of the age of those aircraft. I believe
General Jones has said before there are H-46s that have been in
service longer than he has.
So it is something that NAVAIR SYSCOM pays very close
attention to, probably more than any of the other aircraft we
have.
Senator Kennedy. Can you give us the update on the V-22?
Admiral McCabe. Right now everything is on track for them
to resume flying. The directed inspections and the
improvements, the oversight----
Senator Kennedy. Resume flying when?
Admiral McCabe. I am not sure, Senator. I would have to----
Senator Kennedy. There was a squib in the paper recently
that it is very soon and we are interested in when that is
going to take place. Also, as you are aware, the Feingold
amendment required notification to Congress, I guess, 30 days
before the flight.
Admiral McCabe. Yes, sir. I do not believe they are that
close, but they are making progress. I will get back to you
with the specifics.
But I know that we meet regularly with a broad audience at
NAVAIR reviewing the progress of the airplane with oversight
from OSD and senior Department of the Navy officials.
Senator Kennedy. What is your conclusion on this? What is
the progress that has been made?
Admiral McCabe. I believe that the program manager is
making good, steady progress, but from my standpoint on the
Navy--the Marine Corps may have a different view--we need to
proceed very carefully here and not rush back into operations
and make sure that they have met every milestone and we are
very confident that they will be successful from this point on.
I do not believe we can accept any more failures.
Senator Kennedy. That is true. But you will let us know
about the time, because I understand that it is very soon. We
are interested in your assessment as well, obviously, of the
flight.
Admiral McCabe. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
As a result of two tragic mishaps that occurred, flight-testing was
suspended while the V-22 Osprey program underwent an extremely
rigorous, all encompassing USD(AT&L) directed review. This effort
included two safety mishap investigations, a Blue Ribbon panel, a NASA
independent review, and GAO and DODIG investigations and audits. These
investigation teams, which included aviator. and testing experts from
across industry, government agencies and academia, recommended many
improvements to the program. Through this process the V-22 program and
aircraft was modified to ensure safe flight operations. The return to
flight report was delivered to Congress by the Defense Department via
the acquisition chain of command on April 5, 2002, and the first flight
is currently scheduled for mid-May 2002.
After a detailed review of the program with the program manager and
other officials involved in the review process, I believe the systems
engineering approach established to address acceptable risk has been
scrutinized and is sound. Senior leadership from both the Department of
the Navy and Air Force have been following the review very closely and
have expressed unanimous support. An active executive committee, with
participation by Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps requirements and
acquisition executives, testing agencies, and safety centers, along
with industry representatives, has meet six times since June 2001 and
will continue to provide detailed oversight to the testing and
acquisition process. The consensus is that government and contractor
management teams are well qualified, well led and motivated to make the
program succeed.
The OSD-directed review was rigorous and included 7,800 hours of
scrutiny and analysis of the flight control system and 1,700 hours of
lab tests to include pilot-in-the-loop simulation. The process included
a ``triple lab'' analysis, which tied together a flight simulation lab,
avionics integration lab and a flight control systems integration rig.
This system, which tests actual flight control components in a
laboratory environment, has been so successful that the Boeing Company
plans to incorporate the process to verify flight control systems on
their other platforms.
Specific design changes incorporated as a result of the
investigations include modifications to the hydraulic system, flight
control system and software, and pilot emergency action procedures.
Modifications were made to the hydraulic system including re-routing
lines to improve clearances and reduce line chaffing. The system
includes triple redundancy equivalent to commercial airliners systems.
Modifications were made to the warnings, cautions and advisory
annunciations and all 147 pilot emergency procedures were revalidated.
The number of pilots involved in flight test has been reduced to
ensure they are receiving adequate flight time for improved proficiency
and a greater safety margin. The ground-testing program has been robust
and included over nine hours of rotor turn time to ensure all systems
are ready for flight. As a result of the depth and breadth of these
positive changes, I am confident that the flight test program is ready
to move forward.
My assessment of the program is that it's back on track and, if
they continue to meet cost, schedule and performance milestones safely,
should continue to receive service, OSD and congressional support.
Senator Kennedy. You have been following the progress and
your top people have been monitoring that as well. If there is
any difference in terms of it, we want to certainly know and
have your input on that as well.
Admiral Balisle, I want to talk a little bit about the ERGM
program. Two years ago the Navy was projecting the ERGM program
that would achieve initial operational capability in 2004. It
slipped some 2 years from the original course last year. The
Navy informed the subcommittee that ERGM will achieve IOC in
2005. I know this has been an important part of the plans for
improving fire support capability, but we seem to be
experiencing continuing delays in the program.
So how confident are you that the ERGM contracting team can
solve the problems and remain on schedule?
Admiral Balisle. Senator, ERGM is definitely a high tech
program and is a new technology for our gun-fired ordnance, and
it has had problems in the past as a result of that technology
edge. We think the program has made considerable progress in
the last year. It is now passing its tests. We believe that the
design is sound. We have recently made a change in the ERGM
projectile to go from a submunition to a unitary warhead, which
is a more lethal warhead for the target set and also reduces
risk, we feel, in that particular round.
We believe fiscal year 2005 in the program, the way it is
aligned now, is a reasonable target. But we certainly believe
that the technology base now is solid and we think it will be
successful.
Senator Kennedy. The obvious concern is whether down the
line we are going to have similar kinds of problems with the
155 mm gun on the new destroyer.
Admiral Balisle. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Are there lessons to be learned from this
that can be helpful so we can avoid problems?
Admiral Balisle. Sir, we certainly think there are lessons
to be learned. The technology in these rounds, GPS-guided
projectiles and projectiles that have to be fired at a very
high force when they come out of the gun, were all part of the
learning curve. They will be common problems for the 155 mm
gun. So it is our hope and belief that there will be a
significant learning curve as we go to that technology.
Senator Kennedy. Well, we want to keep abreast of that
because that has important implications down the road.
General Whitlow, on our mine warfare capability--as you
well know, our continuing interest in this issue--Admiral
Fallon indicated that the recommendation was to pursue other
technologies to do the job. He is not specific about the
program or programs that would meet the requirement. Your
prepared testimony mentions a three-track corrective action
program.
So could you describe in some detail what are the program
efforts under the three-track approach?
General Whitlow. Yes, sir. I truly appreciate, Mr.
Chairman, your continued interest in this very vital and
important area, in particular since we are so involved with the
littoral and shallow areas nowadays in our war on terrorism.
Basically, as I spoke to earlier, the SABRE-DET program,
very shallow, 10 feet and on, was cancelled for two reasons,
and I will highlight that. There is some confusion that we do
not have that type of capability, unfortunately. We do have the
capability to clear mines in that arena; it is just not the
capability we would like to have. We have to use special
warfare divers and EOD type of divers to clear as well as
mammals to work that region.
But what we have done on the three-track program is step
back once SABRE-DET was cancelled and look at where we were
across the mine warfare spectrum, in particular the very
shallow water. What we realized was, even if we would have been
able to successfully employ and deploy the SABRE-DET system,
which unfortunately while it was under development we did not
look at other systems, we did not have the navigation systems
in our assault craft to navigate down those lanes that we would
have cleared.
So the first track we are looking at is ensuring that we
have the proper precision navigation in our craft. That is
everything from the Marine Corps AAAV program to all of our
landing craft the LCAC and the LCU.
The second track we are looking at is exploring other
options. One of the options you mentioned earlier----
Senator Kennedy. Do you not have that? I mean, is that not
the whole GPS, accurate, sufficiently accurate now with the
progress made that it gives you an accuracy?
General Whitlow. Yes, sir, we have the accuracy.
Senator Kennedy. What is the problem, then?
General Whitlow. Well, the problem we are exploring through
the acquisition process, experimentation process, is delivery
mechanisms and the lane marking. Once we drop the ordnance to
clear such lanes, then marking those lanes so approaching
craft--and being familiar with the sea, you certainly
understand how difficult that can be. So sufficiently taking
care of the mines below the surface in very shallow and then
marking the lane at the same time to ensure that the aircraft
and the landing craft have the same type of coordinates and are
married up accurately enough not to put our combat forces in
danger.
The other area we are looking at is long-term and has
already been--Senator Sessions has mentioned earlier the
unmanned vehicles. That will be more long-term as we are just
coming into the realization of how to appropriately use and
deploy and retrieve if possible those types of systems. Such
systems as the LMRS and the remote mine-hunting system will
certainly help us along those ways to accomplish that mission.
So we have the near-term----
Senator Kennedy. How does that work, just conceptually?
General Whitlow. Well, sir, what we are looking at, the CNO
hit on it a little bit. We are looking at the littoral support
ship being a class of ships. One of those class of ships, it
would actually host a family of these systems, everything from
the RMS, which is a fairly large remote mine-hunting system,
would go out, deploy, and then it could possibly deploy sub-
crawlers, if you will, to go into the very shallow water, not
only to clear, detect and clear the mines, as well as mark the
lanes.
So we are looking at an entire family of systems. As I
said, that is more long term, but the littoral support craft,
if you will, will serve as the host to that. Those are
basically the three tracks we are looking at.
Senator Kennedy. The third one then is?
General Whitlow. Unmanned. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Then two is establishing the channels
going in?
General Whitlow. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. What is the third?
General Whitlow. It is the step marking the channels and
navigating the channel. Of course, the near-term third track is
not only the precision navigation, there are off-the-shelf
systems. If you fly a local Cessna, you can get a GPS system.
But we need something a little more precision than that, but
those types of systems for our landing craft.
Of course, our near-term answer is the countermeasure
systems we have now for neutralization, is our SEALs and EOD
divers and mammals in the water, which is what we are trying to
get away from as soon as possible.
Senator Kennedy. My time is up. We will continue to pursue
and follow. I must say, when I was out in the Gulf and I saw
those mammals. That is one of the most mind-boggling
experiences. Everyone sees those kinds of mammals down in the
sea lanes or take our children to them. But to see how they
were used at that time to be in patrol, for example, in order
to detect, protect ships, was just enormously impressive. I did
not know they were still using them.
General Whitlow. They are very effective. But we would like
to as soon as possible get them out of that business.
Senator Kennedy. Yes. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
constantly keeping an eye on the question of mines. I was in
the Persian Gulf last year on the mine countermeasures ship,
the Ardent, which I understand is forward-deployed. It
certainly would not be worthwhile to bring that rather slow
ship all the way back to the United States. But it has worked
well and I was impressed with that.
Yesterday on an airplane flying back to Washington, I sat
by a young Navy civilian who is also a naval reservist and
works at the Mine Countermeasures Research Center, in Panama
City.
I talked with him all the way coming back. He graduated
from Tuskegee Institute in Alabama and has done very well. I
was impressed with all they had ongoing.
First let me say I agree with Senator Kennedy. If there is
a breakthrough in the capability of mines against American
surface ships, then we have had a major strategic alteration of
our military power, and our ability to project our power around
the world as we would like.
Are you satisfied that you have the equipment and the
research funds necessary to make sure we stay ahead of that
threat?
General Whitlow. Yes, sir, I am. As you mentioned, the CSS
system down at Panama City is doing tremendous work. We are
funded correctly. The CNO has ensured that. The Secretary of
the Navy has ensured that. I am not satisfied and will not be
satisfied personally until we have solutions. But as far as
funding goes, Senator, we are funded correctly. If I put more
money toward the systems, frankly, I would probably be
overfunded, because we have some physics issues that we just
are not there yet, and some technology issues we just are not
there yet.
But as far as funding goes, we are funded correctly.
Unfortunately, physics is standing in our way. But there is
some tremendous progress and the remote vehicles as well as
remote sensing is showing tremendous progress. You mentioned
Panama City. That is where it is all taking place.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Sullivan, although operations in
the littorals are not new for submarines, the focus on
submarines operating as a part of a battle group in the
littorals is evolving. What is being done to address the
challenges in submarine weapon and combat system development to
make them more effective operating against littoral threats as
part of a battle group there?
Admiral Sullivan. Sir, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, one thing we are doing is with our sonar systems,
which are COTS-based, open architecture, and we are doing that
with all our combat systems, including our weapons.
If I could talk some about the LMRS, which is the mine-
finding system that I sponsor and pay attention to, I think
this is truly going to be the first autonomous vehicle that
will go off and do 40-hour missions and be able to pass its
data to the net, if you will, the satellites. You will be able
to reprogram it.
The sonar system that will be used to find mines is the
LMRS precision underwater mapper (LPUMA) system, which is a
high frequency, high resolution sonar system that we have
tested at sea, most recently on the U.S.S. Scranton. We have
had very good results with this. We are much further with the
computer power we have to look for mine-like objects. This, if
you will, is an underwater mapping system that has the
resolution to be able to navigate and relocate mines. You would
take this system and go survey areas. Particularly I would like
to think of it that one of the missions of an SSGN with its
payloads, it would be able to take a number of these vehicles
to sea, survey an area. Then say you come back in a number of
months and you want to use it for actual combat operations, you
could survey it again and have the technology to take the
difference, using a computer to see what was there before and
what has changed and be able to figure out where the mines are
so you could avoid them.
On the weapons side of the systems, clearly a slow
submarine or a submarine on the bottom is a very difficult
target in the littoral. That is where we have made significant
advances in the ADCAP Mod 5 and 6, which is more quiet and has
more advanced sonar. But the real key will be the development
of the CBASS torpedo, which will have a broad-band sonar to be
able to operate successfully much better against a low doppler,
a low, slow-moving target in the littoral. But that is clearly
the most difficult challenge for a heavyweight torpedo to take
out that type of target.
As far as working with the battle group, as I mentioned,
with our ability, submarines have always been considered
disadvantaged communicators. We never really had the bandwidth
or the ability to communicate with the battle group. As I
mentioned with the Providence in her operations off
Afghanistan, we really are not considered a disadvantaged user
anymore. With the high data rate antenna, we are able to
communicate on a par with the remainder of our surface forces.
So I look at this as it is a significant challenge. We
worry mostly, again, about the mine threat and also for the
slow diesel submarine, because we are all about access. We have
been making significant progress and the programs that we have
in place are the right ones and funded correctly.
Senator Sessions. As we focus this hearing to some degree
on funding and making sure we have the kind of equipment and
readiness that we desire, are you sufficiently funded to outfit
your submarines with the technologies that have proven
effective at this time?
Admiral Sullivan. Sir, of course the answer is a bit open.
You could always use more money, but I will use the ARCI as the
best example. That system costs about one-thirtieth of the cost
of the legacy systems. It has the equivalent of about 140 times
the capability of one given ship 5 years ago. With our present
programs, the last ship to deploy without that system on board
overseas, the last SSN, will be in the fall 2003.
So we have put a lot of money against our combat systems,
systems that have proven to give us much greater capability.
That is just one example, but we are pretty much on a good
track, about as fast as we can.
Another one is of course periscopes and digital systems. We
have put a lot of money against that to be able to operate in
the littoral among a lot of ships, a lot of fishing ships, a
lot of contact avoidance, and shallow water. So I feel good
about where we are, sir.
Senator Sessions. Good. I think it is important that as we
bring this new technology on. Oftentimes it is not that
expensive to actually place it on vessels and other ships and
vehicles, and we need to make sure we have that money.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit some additional
questions for the record.
Senator Kennedy. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just would like to ask Admiral McCabe a couple of
questions. I know this has been a long hearing. Admiral McCabe,
I understand there is a demonstration program in progress to
provide contract in-flight refueling for Navy tactical
aircraft. The Secretary of Defense in PBD-824 directed the Navy
to conduct a pilot program for aerial refueling, including
tanker aircraft.
Has the demonstration provided responsive tanking and would
you provide us with a few details?
Admiral McCabe. Senator, Omega Air is a commercial 707
reconfigured for tanking. It has been used primarily on the
East Coast for fleet exercises to support tanking during those.
We have used it for logistics flights nonstop from West to East
Coast with some EA-6Bs and in fact used it to take the E-F over
to the Singapore Air Show, to support that mission.
To date the study is supposed to conclude in December, with
a report back to us on the business case and effectiveness and
the cost data in the January-February time frame next year. But
I can report that the fleet is very happy with the performance.
They have met all their commitments and there have not been any
problems.
Senator McCain. I have been briefed that the cost per
flight hour is half the cost of an Air Force tanker. Is that
correct?
Admiral McCabe. I do not have specific cost data or
information myself yet, Senator. I can check on that.
Senator McCain. What has been the feedback from the fleet
users?
Admiral McCabe. Very positive. In fact, my EA is a former
air wing commander from the East Coast who had opportunity to
use that with his air wing and he was very positive about it.
Senator McCain. What would it require to, for example,
provide the required refueling capability throughout the Navy?
Admiral McCabe. Well, we have a different problem in terms
of the naval approach in tanking. We have used contract
services for jamming, for fleet exercises. We use range
clearance contract services. So close to the continental U.S.
we have a decidedly different approach than we do on
deployment, where we generally will use tanking. One of the
reasons we like the E-F is it brings back A-6-level mission
tanking and maxi-tankers. So we tend to tank carrier-based
unless there is a joint asset from the Air Force available.
Senator McCain. Would you provide for the record, please,
the cost per hour of this contracting out of refueling so that
we can compare it both with the Navy cost when the Navy is
providing these services and the Air Force?
Admiral McCabe. I would be happy to do that, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
The current study is scheduled to continue throughout this year,
concluding in December. The findings will be published early in 2003.
The cost of the commercial. tanker is relative to a United States
Air Force tanker. The dry cost (no fuel) is $6,145 per flight hour for
the Omega Air 707 versus $13,035 (with $2,125 of indirect support costs
included) per flight hour for the KC-135. Additional per diem and
travel costs for both are approximately equal while fuel consumption is
1,500 gallons per flight hour for the KC-135 (with its most efficient
engine) and 2,000 gallons per flight hour for the Omega Air 707. An
informal study of Navy organic aircraft carrier tanker support costs
provided by the S-3 Viking aircraft reveals a rough estimate of cost
per flight hour to be approximately $12,627. The basis for cost
comparison is difficult to fully rationalize due to the different
missions and profiles of the S-3 when measured against tanker aircraft
missions and profiles.
To date, Omega Air has flown 90 tanking missions providing 1,056
aircraft with 3.5 million pounds of fuel. They have met 100 percent of
their scheduled events including east coast fleet exercises, JTFEX,
COMPTUEX, Carrier qualification support, airwing repositioning cross-
country, and escorting two F/A-18E/F aircraft from the United States to
Singapore. All indications and reports from the fleet users are that
they are satisfied with the performance of Omega Air.
As I have mentioned, this study is incomplete as yet and the
numbers and dollar figures provided are subject to change when the
final report is issued. However, at this time this appears to be a very
positive experiment with potential for the fleet.
Senator McCain. I thank you.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.
Senator Kennedy. We want to thank all of you. We are very
grateful for your presence and your presentation. We will look
forward to working with you.
The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
LHA REPLACEMENT PROGRAM
1. Senator Kennedy. General Whitlow, 2 years ago at the request of
the Department of the Navy, Congress provided $25 million and directed
the Navy to conduct an AoA for replacing the aging Tarawa-class
amphibious assault ships (LHA-1). You state in your written testimony
that you expect to know the results on the AoA in June 2002, and yet
the DOD budget proposal contains $10 million for advance procurement of
LHD-9. Does this funding request prejudge the outcome of the AoA?
General Whitlow. No. The results of the LHA(R) AoA are not
predetermined. The preferred alternative may or may not be based on the
LHD-8. The LHA(R) AoA is ongoing and will report out in summer 2002.
Alternatives being considered include: repeat LHD-8 with evolutionary
modifications, modified LHD-8 upgraded to enhance the ability to
operate the larger and/or heavier new generation amphibious systems,
and new ship designs spanning a wide range in size and capability.
Based on the analysis presented in the AoA, the Navy will determine the
optimal alternative for the LHA(R) as part of the LHA(R) program. The
$10 million in the fiscal year 2003 budget request allows the Navy to
begin refining the AoA selected alternative's detailed capabilities/
characteristics and other developmental work.
2. Senator Kennedy. General Whitlow, have you any insight into the
findings of the AoA?
General Whitlow. At this time I do not have any details beyond
those mentioned above. But I can share my full confidence that the
process will yield a range of alternatives from which the Navy and
Marine Corps leadership can select the preferred solution that will
best meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps current and future
requirements.
P-3 MODERNIZATION
3. Senator Kennedy. Admiral McCabe, I believe that we need to
address the question of the P-3 community force structure. The P-3
forces that operated in Kosovo acquitted themselves very well, and
demonstrated the attractiveness of the anti-surface warfare improvement
program, or AIP. Once again in Afghanistan, the P-3 AIP aircraft were
star performers. Over the past decade, there does not appear to have
been a substantial commitment to supporting the resources required to
keep these aircraft forces modernized. Given how well these aircraft
have performed in recent operations, why has the Navy chosen to buy
only four P-3 AIP upgrade kits in the fiscal year 2003 budget?
Admiral McCabe. In spite of the acknowledged effectiveness of the
P-3C AIP in recent operations, competing priorities within naval
aviation continue to preclude funding AIP at optimal rates. The four
kits requested are viewed as representing the best balance attainable
between requirements and affordability. Navy is however, continuing to
examine funding options for this important capabilities upgrade. As an
indication of the importance placed on this program, AIP requirements
are included in the Chief of Naval Operations' Fiscal Year 2003
Unfunded Requirements List submitted on 20 February 2002.
MARINE CORPS HELICOPTER PROGRAM COST GROWTH
4. Senator Kennedy. Admiral McCabe, we understand that the program
to upgrade the Marine Corps' utility helicopter and attack helicopter
fleets has been experiencing cost growth again this year. It is not
clear whether this is just the engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD) portion of the program, or whether this may translate
into higher recurring procurement costs. This contractor is also one of
the prime contractors for the V-22 program. Can you describe what is
the extent of the cost and/or schedule problems in this program?
Admiral McCabe. The program has experienced an increase in both EMD
and production costs. The EMD cost growth of $256 million (TY$)
represents approximately 16 percent of the total program cost growth
($161 million) and includes funding for 10 months of additional
schedule, risk reduction for OPEVAL, and requisite support funding to
match the revised schedule. The production cost growth of $1,361
million (TY$) represents approximately 84 percent of the total and is
largely due to an update of the production estimate to reflect EMD
actuals and updated pricing for the bill of materials.
5. Senator Kennedy. Admiral McCabe, can you provide an assessment
of what impact the delay in the V-22 program will have on the utility
and attack helicopter upgrade program?
Admiral McCabe. The delay in the V-22 program did impact the
procurement of the AH-1Z/UH-1Y helicopters. However, the increased
engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort on V-22 provided
some offset to the reduction in V-22 aircraft quantities. The latest
forward pricing rate agreement (FPRA) provided by Bell included
adjustments supporting the current delay of the V-22 program. This FPRA
was utilized to accurately adjust the H-1 cost estimate. The fiscal
year 2003 budget has been adjusted consistent with the budgeted profile
for V-22.
DD-963 WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY
6. Senator Kennedy. Admiral Clark, Navy statements regarding early
retirement of ships have tended to minimize the contribution of the DD-
963. These destroyers have been providing a significant contribution to
the Navy's ability to maintain the required number of Tomahawk missiles
in theaters to support requirements of the theater commanders in chief
under the Global Naval Force Presence Policy (GNFPP). In fact, I
believe that several DD-963s just returned from Afghanistan operations
having fired a number of Tomahawk missiles against priority targets.
Since there is no chance that the Navy will have additional
Tomahawk missile carrying capability in the near-term, isn't this
action going to complicate the Navy's ability to maintain the required
number of Tomahawk missiles in theaters to support requirements of the
theater commanders in chief under the GNFPP?
Admiral Clark. The Navy will be able to maintain requisite
quantities of Tomahawk missiles in theater to support the requirements
of the theater commanders in chief under the GNFPP, given the current
DD-963 decommissioning schedule and the potential for further
acceleration of DD-963 decommissionings. The Navy is continually
commissioning new DDG-51 Class destroyers through the FYDP. These ships
have launcher capacities of 96 Tomahawk-capable, vertical launch cells,
as opposed to the 61-cell capacity of the DD-963 Class ships. The
current DD-963 program of record decommissions assets at a rate of six
ships per year. The last ship departs service in 2006 leaving the Navy
with a loss of 1,159 launcher cells. The current DDG-51 program of
record commissions ships in fiscal year 2003, three in fiscal year
2004, four in fiscal year 2005, and two in fiscal year 2006, for a gain
of 1,344 launcher cells by the end of 2006. This schedule produces a
yearly net increase of launcher cells, and an overall net gain of 185
Tomahawk-capable, vertical launch cells by the end of DD-963 class
service.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
LPD-17
7. Senator Landrieu. General Whitlow, in your prepared testimony,
you go to great length to stress the need to increase our amphibious
lift capabilities. You state that the Marine Corps will not reach the
2.5 MEB lift capability until the delivery of the 12th LPD-17. This is
still .5 under the 3.0 MEB capability required to fully meet the threat
of a major theater war. You comment that an acceleration of the LPD-17
program will immediately increase our warfighting capability. At what
rate would the LPD-17 program have to be accelerated in order to
achieve a discernable difference in our warfighting capability?
General Whitlow. Increasing the LPD-17 production rate to the
original President's budget 2001 rate of two per year (currently one
per year fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2009 with two ships in
fiscal year 2008) would allow earlier decommissioning of the LPD-4
class ships (five of which have already exceeded service life) and
increase amphibious lift capabilities to the 2.5 MEB-assault echelon
level by fiscal year 2012.
LANDING CRAFT AIR CUSHIONED
8. Senator Landrieu. General Whitlow, I am very pleased to see that
the LCAC is manufactured in New Orleans. The LCAC is, in essence, the
successor vehicle to the Higgins Boats, which made an important
contribution to victory in World War II, and was also manufactured in
New Orleans. Today the LCAC is the primary platform for high speed
transport of troops and equipment. With an ability to reach over 70
percent of the Nation's coast lines, the LCAC is the key to executing
expeditionary maneuver warfare. Currently, the President's budget calls
for putting three LCACs through the SLEP. Is this enough to meet the
Marine Corps' current needs, and, if not, how many more LCACs would
have to go through the SLEP program in order for the Marine Corps' need
to reach capacity?
General Whitlow. The LCAC will continue to be a vital leg of our
mobility triad providing high speed, over the horizon surface assault
ship-to-shore movement of troops and equipment. The LCAC delivers the
bulk of the rolling stock and combat equipment needed to generate the
necessary rapid buildup of combat power ashore. The speed, range, and
beach access afforded by the LCAC make it a key component in executing
maneuver warfare from the sea. The LCAC SLEP program will extend the
hull life of the craft to at least 30 years.
The fleet commanders have determined 74 active LCAC are required.
The Navy will concentrate its resources on ensuring a 30 year life can
be achieved as well as incorporating urgently needed communication and
navigation upgrades. The optimal time to SLEP the craft is between 18
to 20 years of service life. Congress has authorized and appropriated
four LCAC SLEPs through fiscal year 2002. The fiscal year 2003 request
is for SLEPs number five to seven. To SLEP the craft at the 18 to 20
years of service life point requires averaging between four to six
SLEPs per year over the next 13 years. The minimum factory economic
order quantity rate is four SLEP per year. Thus, an LCAC SLEP program
that builds up to a steady state of six craft per year is both
efficient and optimum for supporting the fleet commanders' needs.
PERSONNEL GEAR
9. Senator Landrieu. General Whitlow, most of our comments today
have focused on the larger systems that are necessary for conducting
war, but I think it is important that we focus on the personnel gear
that the individual sailor and marine is issued. In the Emerging
Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, we have heard testimony from
Special Operations Command on integrating off-the-shelf technology into
our forces. There have been news reports out of Afghanistan (Marine
Corps Times, February 18, 2002) that some of the new gear that the
Marine Corps has developed recently simply did not stand up to the
harsh conditions of the Afghan environment. Specifically, the new MOLLE
packs that have been put into the fleet were reported to fall apart in
the field. Is the expeditionary warfare Division aware of this problem
and is it taking the proper steps to ensure that our marines are
adequately equipped once they hit the ground?
General Whitlow. As a marine, I am concerned that the equipment we
develop, procure, and issue to our marines and sailors adequately meets
the demands of the mission and environment. As the Director of the
expeditionary warfare Division, I do not have influence or involvement
with the development, selection, or procurement of basic issue and
field equipment for our marines. However, I understand that Marine
Corps Systems Command is working in conjunction with all intra-Marine
Corps agencies to ensure all current and future equipment adequately
addresses our marines' requirements to accomplish the mission in any
assigned area or environment.
10. Senator Landrieu. General Whitlow, are you looking at acquiring
off-the-shelf technology to answer these problems?
General Whitlow. I am certain that these issues are currently being
addressed by Marine Corps Systems Command.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
NAVAL GUN FIRE SUPPORT FOR MARINES
11. Senator Sessions. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, the
Marine Corps requirements for gun fire support were clearly stated in a
1999 Marine Corps Development Center letter from General Rhodes to the
Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Balisle, your written statement is
unclear regarding the Navy's ability to meet the Marine Corps
requirements for fire support. Do you concur with previous Marine Corps
witnesses who testified that the 155 advanced gun system is the only
system that will meet all Marine Corps fire support requirements?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The Marine Corps position on
naval surface fire support (NSFS) requirements was recently updated in
a March 2002 letter signed by Lt. Gen. Hanlon, Commanding General of
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Navy concurs with
Marine Corps NSFS requirements.
The development program for the 155mm advanced gun system (AGS)
and munitions is focused on meeting Marine Corps NSFS gun requirements.
However, Marine Corps NSFS requirements also call for other NSFS
systems (missiles, rockets, other) with ranges objectively to 262nm in
the 2010-2019 timeframe. In the near term, Navy is meeting the sea-
based portion of the naval fires family of systems with the deployment
of the 5,,/62 gun on DDGs and CGs, the introduction of the extended
range guided munition in fiscal year 2005, and the introduction of
tactical Tomahawk in fiscal year 2004. To meet future requirements,
Navy will introduce the advanced gun system (AGS) and long-range land
attack projectile in DD(X) while also considering options for a follow
on ALAM.
12. Senator Sessions. Admiral Balisle, your written testimony
states that the 5,,/62-caliber gun and the extended range guides
munitions ``are expected to meet USMC requirements in accuracy,
lethality, and responsibility.'' Are there Marine Corps requirements
that the 5,,/62-caliber gun and the extended range guides munitions
will not meet?
Admiral Balisle. The combination of the 5,,/62-caliber gun
(presently being deployed on new construction DDGs and programmed for
backfit on CGs as part of cruiser conversion) and the ERGM, (IOC fiscal
year 2005) are Navy's programs to address Marine Corps near term and
mid-term naval surface fire support (NSFS) gun requirements. Marine
Corps NSFS requirements include responsiveness, range, accuracy, and
lethality. Marine Corps gun range requirements are provided in a table
below. 5,,/62 and ERGM meet Marine Corps NSFS requirements for
responsiveness, accuracy, and lethality. They will be deployed to meet
near and mid term threshold range requirements of 41nm and 63nm
respectively. The advanced gun system (AGS) and munitions, planned for
installation in DD(X), will focus on meeting all Marine Corps NSFS gun
requirements.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Near-term (fiscal Mid-term (fiscal Far-term (fiscal
year 2004-2005) year 2006-2009) year 2010-2019)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range.............................. Naval Guns............ Threshold............. 41nm................. 63nm................. 97nm
Objective............. 63nm................. 97nm................. Limits of Technology
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE FORCE
13. Senator Sessions. General Whitlow, your written testimony
points out there are ``critical readiness shortfalls, primarily in
equipment deficiencies'' in the naval coastal warfare forces tasked
with homeland defense. What are the shortfalls and how long will
reservists continue to man and manage these efforts?
General Whitlow. The naval coastal warfare force resides in the
Reserve component and is comprised of three types of commissioned,
hardware-equipped units that normally operate together as the NCW force
package. These units are: (1) harbor defense command units (HDCU) that
conduct command and control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (C\4\I) operations using the Reserve-mobile ashore support
terminal (RMAST) system; (2) mobile inshore undersea warfare units
(MIUWU) that conduct littoral surface and subsurface surveillance
operations using the radar-sonar surveillance center (RSSC) system with
mobile sensor platforms (MSPs); and (3) inshore boat units (IBU) that
conduct harbor patrol and interdiction operations using small boats.
Units of each type in the existing force structure lack major equipment
sets as indicated below.
The inventory objective for NCW major equipment to complete initial
outfitting of all units is as follows:
22 radar-sonar surveillance centers (RSSC V.4) systems
44 mobile sensor platforms (MSP) systems (2 per unit)
11 Reserve mobile ashore support terminal (RMAST)
systems (84)
IBU small boats (six boats per unit).
The inventory at the end of fiscal year 2003 is projected as
follows:
5 radar-sonar surveillance center (RSSC V.4) systems
17 radar-sonar surveillance center (RSSC V.3) systems
(*)
28 mobile sensor platform (MSP) systems
6 reserve mobile ashore support terminal (RMAST)
systems
64 IBU small boats.
* Note: RSSC V.3 van systems require upgrade to V.4 configuration
(HMMWV mounted)
The balance of the inventory objective to be completed by the end
of the FYDP is as follows:
17 radar-sonar surveillance centers (RSSC V.4) systems
16 mobile sensor platforms (MSP) systems
5 reserve mobile ashore support terminal (RMAST)
systems
16 IBU small boats.
Navy has funded and is currently in the process of equipping and
manning a new active capability within the naval coastal warfare
organization called the mobile security force. Once this new Active
component is fully stood up and ready for deployment Reserve NCW units
will no longer exclusively fill the homeland defense role but will
continue to assist in the naval coastal warfare mission.
14. Senator Sessions. General Whitlow, have the equipment
shortfalls been addressed either by the supplemental for fiscal year
2002 or this budget request?
General Whitlow. Part of the equipment shortfalls identified above
have been addressed by the fiscal year 2002 supplemental and the fiscal
year 2003 budget request. Specifically, $14.4 million in supplemental
Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) funds have been allocated to the
NCW program. These funds are being used to procure 36 small boats to
outfit inshore boat units (IBU) to the six-boat standard required for
sustained port security operations. Delivery of these boats should
begin in first quarter fiscal year 2003. Funding for an additional four
boats is included in the fiscal year 2003 budget request. Additional
funding will be needed for 16 boats to complete outfitting of all 14
IBU units. Funding for procurement of one additional mobile sensor
platform (MSP) is also included in the fiscal year 2003 budget request.
Funding for an additional 15 MSPs will be needed to complete outfitting
of all 22 MIUW units. No funding is available at present to address
shortfalls in RMAST systems or to provide for conversion of existing
RSSC V.3 van systems to RSSC V.4 HMMWV configured systems. These
shortfalls will be addressed in future budget requests.
COMMON REQUIREMENTS AND EQUIPMENT
15. Senator Sessions. General Whitlow, Admiral Balisle, Admiral
Sullivan, and Admiral McCabe, your divisions have requirements for
unmanned undersea vehicles and aircraft-towed unmanned vehicles. What
is done within your organizations and the corresponding field
activities to ensure that the taxpayer is not paying more than once for
development of common subsystems for unmanned vehicles and how do you
share information with the unmanned vehicle efforts from other
services?
General Whitlow, Admiral Balisle, Admiral Sullivan, and Admiral
McCabe. N70, the Warfare Integration and Assessment Division, has
responsibility for assuring coordination of unmanned vehicle activities
across all the Chief of Naval Operation divisions. This includes N75,
N76, N77 and N78. N70 oversight facilitates the sharing of program and
technology information in unmanned systems. A key example of this is
the tactical control system (TCS). TCS is a joint Service program
sponsored by N78 to provide a common software architecture for unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) ground control stations (GCSs). TCS, when fully
implemented, will allow UAV GCS personnel to operate and share data
from any of the Services' UAVs. This same architecture is now being
considered for application to naval unmanned surface vehicles (USVs)
and UUVs.
N78, the Air Warfare Division, is responsible for Navy UAVs and
aircraft-towed unmanned vehicles, which include decoys and a variety of
sensors used in undersea warfare. UAVs are vehicles that are controlled
from the ground and fly under their own power and are different from
towed decoys and sensors.
Based on a memorandum of agreement last year, N75, the
expeditionary warfare Division, transferred all their concerns and
responsibilities for UAV platforms to N78. Warfighters in N75 mission
areas will be users of common fleet UAV assets. N75 retains the
responsibility to set naval expeditionary warfare requirements that can
be fulfilled by N78-developed UAVs.
N75's requirements may also be met through the use of unmanned
surface or undersea vehicles. In very shallow water, N75 develops
programs for mission requirements in mine countermeasures (MCM) and
amphibious assault. N75 is developing man-portable very shallow water
(VSW) UUVs for EOD mission areas in MCM.
N75 is the sponsor for mine warfare systems in the fleet's
dedicated and organic MCM forces, including the semi-submersible remote
minehunting system (RMS), deployed by surface ships. As an example of
system interoperability, the RMS will tow the same AQS-20(X) sonar
system that is being developed for the MH-53E and MH-60S helicopters.
N75 coordinates transition plans for emerging platforms and payloads
through membership in the Organic Mine Countermeasures Future Naval
Capabilities Integrated Product Team. N75 develops the annual U.S.
Naval Mine Countermeasures Certification Plan, annually forwarded by
the Secretary of Defense to the Congress.
Although N76, the Surface Warfare Division, has requirements for
unmanned vehicles in future ships, the division has no unmanned vehicle
programs of its own. N76 intends to leverage the development of
unmanned vehicles from existing programs in the Navy and other
services.
N77, the Submarine Warfare Division, is responsible for unmanned
undersea vehicles. N77's UUV efforts include the long-term mine
reconnaissance system (LMRS) and the mission reconfigurable UUV
(MRUUV), both of which are unique systems satisfying specific
requirements. There are no other efforts among the Warfare Divisions
that duplicate these systems.
There are a number of other venues that the Navy and the other
Services use to share information, collaborate on joint efforts, and
avoid duplication of efforts in unmanned systems. DOD/Service
laboratories, System Commands, and other field activities participate
in all these venues. These include:
The Autonomous Operations (AO) Future Naval
Capabilities (FNC) Integrated Product Team (IPT) includes
membership from N76, N77, N78, the Marine Corps, and the Office
of Naval Research (ONR). The AO IPT provides senior level
oversight and direction to assure that exploratory and advanced
development investments made by ONR support warfighter needs.
Field activities such as the Naval Research Laboratory, Naval
Air Systems Command, Naval Sea Systems Command, Marine Corps
System Command, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
participate in the IPT and manage and perform the work efforts.
In addition to air, water surface, and underwater unmanned
vehicle systems, the IPT also addresses unmanned ground
vehicles (UGVs) in support of the Marine Corps. The focus of
the AO IPT is development of autonomous system architecture and
software, sensors, and advanced propulsion systems that have
applicability to all unmanned systems. Unmanned systems are
also addressed in other FNC IPTs including time critical strike
and total ownership costs.
In April 2000, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development, and Acquisition and the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations (VCNO) designated N77 as the primary point of
contact for unmanned undersea vehicles for the purpose of
developing synergy for the Navy's various UUV programs. N77 is
the chair of the UUV Executive Steering Group (UUV ESG) that
meets at least annually to provide a forum for coordination of
UUV issues within the Department of the Navy. N75, N76 and N78
are charter members of the UUV ESG.
At the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) level, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (USD(AT&L)) provides oversight management of Service
UAV and UGV programs to promote synergies in areas of common
interest and avoid duplication of efforts. In particular,
USD(AT&L) chairs the UAV Planning Task Force that is chartered
as the focal point to assure that UAV programs proceed in a
coordinated manner. The Planning Task Force has initiated a
number of IPTs addressing: communications; sensors; small UAVs;
airspace operations; tasking, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination; platforms; weaponization; technology, and
standards/formats. All the Services, the Joint Staff, the
Service Laboratories, and Defense Agencies such as the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National
Security Agency (NSA), and the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) participate in the IPTs. IPT results will be
incorporated into the next version of the OSD UAV Roadmap that
is expected to be published by the end of calendar year 2002.
UAV matters are also reviewed by the Joint Staff-
sponsored UAV Special Studies Group (SSG). The UAV SSG is a
two-star level group with representatives from all the Services
requirements organizations that meets on an as-needed basis to
address UAV requirements, areas of common interest, and issues
requiring resolution.
All unmanned system requirements having joint service
interest or potential interest are reviewed and validated the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC is four-
star level body consisting of the vice/assistant chiefs of all
the Services.
Lastly, in order to share technology and program
information and ideas with the unmanned systems industrial
base, the Navy sends representatives to public meetings of the
Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI).
AUVSI sponsors symposia and meetings that review unmanned
system programs and technology. Many of these symposia and
meetings are attended by over 1,000 government and industry
participants.
BATTLE GROUP COMBAT SYSTEMS TESTING
16. Senator Sessions. Admiral Balisle, it is not clear that the
pre-deployment battle group integrated combat system testing and
resulting correction plans are achievable given the expected compressed
inter-deployment cycles. What is the importance of integrated combat
systems testing through the Distributed Engineering Plant, and what is
the status of that testing for battle groups deploying in the next 18
months?
Admiral Balisle. Importance of Testing in the Distributed
Engineering Plant: In May 1998, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
assigned the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM)
responsibility for addressing interoperability issues within the
Systems Commands (SYSCOMs) and the Program Executive Offices (PEOs).
The CNO also tasked COMNAVSEASYSCOM with coordinating the resolution of
interoperability issues with the fleet. Specifically, COMNAVSEASYSCOM
was tasked to develop policy and architecture for battle force warfare
systems engineering, implement a common warfare systems engineering
process, and provide top level direction for fielding and support of
balanced combat systems for ships and submarines. COMNAVSEA has
responded with processes and tools that include:
The deployment minus 30 months battle force
certification process (D-30 Process)--a disciplined process to
maintain configuration management for deploying battle forces
The distributed engineering plant (DEP)--a nation-
wide, shore-based test network designed to test
interoperability at the battle force level
Battle force interoperability test (BFIT)--testing
which is executed on the DEP in an effort to identify and
characterize interoperability problems within the deploying
battle force
Battle force interoperability requirements (BFIR)--a
metric used to measure and predict the total force performance
and interoperability
BFIT Analysis Review Panel (BARP)--responsible for
analyzing BFIT results, and for the direct reporting of trouble
reports, workarounds, capabilities/limitations, and BFIR
performance metrics to each deploying battle force staff
Battle force capabilities and limitations (CAPS/LIMS)
document--a document which captures the results of BFIT
testing, supports the optimizing of system configurations and
supports warfighter training, based on realized capabilities of
systems and computer programs available within the BG/ARG/MEF
Operational Advisory Group (OAG)--the senior military
and civilian stewards of the Force interoperability problem
resolution process.
BFIT certification of deploying battle group configurations is
accomplished through the utilization of the Navy's distributed
engineering plant (DEP). The plant provides a shore-based operational
mock-up of combat systems located at multiple Navy land-based sites
connects them via asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) networking
technology. The DEP provides the only opportunity for comprehensive and
repeatable interoperability testing of combat system and command,
control, communications, and intelligence (C\4\I) items prior to
shipboard delivery for operational use in surface combatant platforms
and battle group units. Since its inception, the DEP, in concert with
these force systems engineering tools, has proven indispensable for the
development of interoperable and effective naval forces.
Interoperability and capability improvements to date have been
noticeable to the operators as well as quantifiable via the BFIR
metrics. Translated into operational terms, Navy can quantify, with the
DEP, battle space ``bought back'' through implementation of
interoperability fixes. Highly favorable fleet feedback has been
continuous and documented in many forms.
Status of Testing in next 18 Months due to Accelerated Deployments:
The DEP and BFIT testing process was established prior to the
implementation of CINCLANTFLT/CINCPACFLT Instruction 4720.3A which
instituted the D-30 process. The BFIT process, established against an
accelerated pace of deployments, stands ready to handle the dynamics of
the wartime tempo and has proven its ability to adjust to any level of
change. The DEP teams have dealt with changing dynamics of battle force
configurations since the first BFIT. Since the events of September 11,
2001, the DEP teams have successfully dealt with perturbations in
operating tempo of the following magnitude:
Major battle force composition changes 2 weeks prior
to DEP testing
Multiple battle force platform configuration changes
Three battle groups tested and reported in one BFIT--
included were the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-64) forward deployed
naval force, and the Lincoln and George Washington battle
groups (fall fiscal year 2001)
BFIT Regression test of the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy
(CV-67) battle group (December fiscal year 2001)
Two battle groups tested and reported in one BFIT
(Spring fiscal year 2002)
Numerous engineering and developmental events
conducted/supported
Preparation for U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68) BFIT in late
summer.
The upcoming battle force deployment schedules are no more
stressful than the schedule already encountered. Given the processes,
efficiencies and capabilities established by the DEP teams and the
associated force systems engineering teams over the past 4 years, the
outlook for the next 18 months of battle force deployments is certainly
achievable given sustained funding of the COMNAVSEA programs. COMNAVSEA
currently has an unfunded requirement on the fiscal year 2002
supplemental list for its efforts in response to the increased wartime
posture and tempo.
U.S.S. COLE DAMAGE CONTROL LESSON LEARNED
17. Senator Sessions. Admiral Balisle, the Senate report
accompanying our bill last year directed the Secretary of the Navy to
provide: (1) battery powered, long distance emergency communications
capability to all units before they deploy overseas; and (2) self-
contained emergency breathing apparatus to all vessels during their
next scheduled selected restricted availability. Also, recent feedback
from the an officer in the operating fleet indicates there have been no
U.S.S. Cole damage control lessons learned promulgated to ships. Has
the Navy complied with the Senate's direction on providing ships the
communications and emergency breathing equipment?
Admiral Balisle. Prior to U.S.S. Cole, OPNAV N6 procured 97
manpack-type UHF SATCOM or line-of-sight (LOS) capable battery powered
radio units (AN/PSC-5 produced by Raytheon and PRC-117F produced by
Harris) to augment the fleets communications ability. These units were
provided to the fleet CINCs for distribution as appropriate. Following
U.S.S. Cole, an additional 200 Iridium satellite-based telephones were
acquired and provided to the fleet CINCs for distribution as
appropriate.
Significant funding ($85 million fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year
2007) was added in PR03 to accelerate installation of SCBAs on USN
ships. Additionally, $4 million of fiscal year 2002 Defense Emergency
Response Fund (DERF) funds were provided to further accelerate this
Cole lessons learned item. This funding will allow all USN ships to be
outfitted with SCBAs by fiscal year 2008. The current funding profile
will not support installing SCBAs in every ship during its next SRA.
18. Senator Sessions. Admiral Balisle, what is the status of
promulgating damage control lessons learned including equipment to
ships?
Admiral Balisle. Cole survivability lessons learned were
promulgated via secret naval message in July 2001 (DTG 061824Z July
2001). Additionally, PEO (Theater Surface Combatants) provided a
detailed briefing to the following: NAVSEA, SURFLANT, SURFPAC, DESRON
22, CINCLANTFLT N43, SWOS, SPAWAR, selected congressional staffers,
LANTFLT Type desk DC, and Afloat Training Group (Norfolk, Mayport, San
Diego).
As a result of Cole lessons learned, several items were proposed to
either increase the ships outfitting or to provide a new capability in
order to increase crew safety and ship survivability. The Navy was
provided $6 million of fiscal year 2002 DERF for the procurement and
distribution of this equipment. The table below lists the items being
procured and the planned delivery date. These items will be delivered
to 122 ships in two separate ``kitted'' shipments with all material
being delivered by the end of fiscal year 2002.
Item Expected Delivery to Ships
1. Leather Palm Gloves................... June 2002
2. Forcible Entry Tool................... June 2002
3. Web Belt (Tool belt).................. June 2002
4. P100 Pump Adapter..................... June 2002
5. Reflective Marker Tape................ June 2002
6. Digital Camera........................ June 2002
7. Non-Skid for Escape Trunk............. August 2002
8. Damage Control Light Streamers........ August 2002
9. Diesel Generator...................... August 2002
10. Additional Emergency Egress Breathing August 2002
Devices (EEBD).
SURFACE SHIP SELF-DEFENSE/ADVANCE INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM
19. Senator Sessions. Admiral Balisle, what is your assessment of
the present electronic warfare ship self-defense capabilities and
programs, and have you adjusted any programs recently?
Admiral Balisle. Although aging, our EW self-defense capability is
sufficient to counter today's threat, which is becoming smaller,
faster, lower, and more maneuverable. The continued installation of the
Nulka active off-board decoy on our CGs/DDGs ensures our deploying
battle groups have an effective measure of self-defense against today's
deployed threats. Upgrades to the Nulka decoy payload will ensure we
remain ahead of the threat. We will additionally begin installations on
FFG and LPD-17 class ships. With respect to program adjustments, the
Navy has regretfully decided to cancel the AN/SLY-2 advanced integrated
electronic warfare system (AIEWS) program because of program
instability, cost growth, and development delays that were adversely
impacting the Navy's ability to field urgently needed surface EW
improvements to the fleet. The AIEWS program provided ``leading edge''
technology development, yielding an exceptional array of technologies
with significant promise to improve surface electronic warfare
capabilities in legacy and future systems. The Navy is instituting a
block upgrade improvement approach for surface ship electronic warfare
(EW) that will provide incremental upgrades to the fleet, using the
current AN/SLQ-32 (V) system as the starting framework. This strategy
will facilitate a greater number of ships receiving much needed EW
improvements in the near-term, while additional improvements will
continue to be competitively developed and fielded as both
technological advances and budgetary resources allow. This will consist
of block capability upgrades pacing the threat and developing an
advanced EW capability eventually replacing the AN/SLQ-32(V) system.
Preliminary planning is for five overlapping blocks. Block 1 will
provide improved human/computer interface (Q-70 consoles) and a new
computer for better processing. Block 1A will include specific emitter
identification (SEI) capability. Block 2 will include a new receiver
package that includes a special signal receiver and new computer
language. Blocks 3 and 4 will include receiver replacements and an
advanced RF and IR electronic attack subsystem with advanced offboard
countermeasures. This approach will feature an open system architecture
allowing the insertion of new technologies and capabilities without
major system redesign.
FIRE SUPPORT WEAPONS REPLENISHMENT AT SEA
20. Senator Sessions. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, the Navy
and Marine Corps have not previously agreed on the requirement to
replenish fire support weapons at sea. The 1999 Marine Corps
Development Center letter from General Rhodes to the Chief of Naval
Operations described the Marine Corps requirements for naval surface
fire support as follows: 63 nautical mile range, 2.5 minute response
time, ``high volume suppressive and neutralizing fire . . . there must
be a capability to provide inexpensive munitions that satisfy the high
volume of fire requirement,'' and the ``Marine Corps requires that all
surface fire support weapons be easily sustainable via underway
replenishment'' at sea. The Navy's position was never clear regarding
the replenishment capability for fire support missiles. What is the
current status of at sea replenishment requirements for fire support
weapons?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The ability to sustain surface
fire support systems via underway replenishment is an important
warfighting requirement. The Navy is very capable of at sea
replenishment of the naval gun ordnance needed to support the naval
surface fires mission, which includes support of marines ashore.
There are no research and development investments planned to fund
improvements to the replenishment systems currently fielded to support
UNREP of VLS celled missiles. There is, however, an ongoing future
naval capability (FNC) initiative to develop a heavier underway
replenishment (UNREP) lift capability from the existing 5,700-pound
system to 12,000-pound capability. Navy has also identified transition
funding to bring this capability into the logistics force ships,
starting with a backfit to the Lewis & Clark (T-AKE)-class combat cargo
and ammunition ship in the fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2009
timeframe. To optimize NSFS deployment, available near term funding is
being directed toward increasing ordnance inventory and fielding NSFS
systems. Development of an UNREP capability for NSFS missiles continues
to be assessed in terms of warfighting benefit and affordability.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
T-5 TANKERS
21. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark and Admiral Balisle, on February
8, Admiral Church, USN, delivered to Congress the Department of the
Navy's ``Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Overview.'' On page 18 of the Navy's
budget brief is a slide called ``Promote Better Business Practices,
Managing the Department in a Business-like Manner.'' I noticed a bullet
that states ``T-5 Tanker Buyout.'' Will you please tell why the Navy
has decided in its fiscal year 2003 budget to buy the T-5 Tankers
rather than to continue to lease them as was the plan several years
ago?
Admiral Clark and Admiral Balisle. The T-5 tankers were leased in
the early eighties rather than purchased because of the budgetary
circumstances that existed at the time. When the ships were leased, the
Navy negotiated for favorable purchase options that, conditions
permitting, could be exercised at the appropriate time. Those
conditions exist and that time is now. We have a continuing need for
these vessels beyond their lease terms, which end in 2005 and 2006. If
we let our options expire, we will end up chartering (leasing) higher
cost replacement tankers.
22. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark and Admiral Balisle, so let me
understand you--``it is cheaper to buy the tankers and MPS (maritime
pre-positioning ships) outright than it is to continue to pay the
lease''--is that correct? I think I agree with the Secretary of the
Navy and OMB Director Mitch Daniels who blames free-wheeling leases for
outlandish cost overruns in government programs in the past.
Admiral Clark and Admiral Balisle. Yes. Exercising our lease
options to purchase will provide significant cost savings. It is
cheaper to purchase these ships than to continue leasing. However,
purchase requires a large expenditure in the year that the ships are
purchased. Due to the nature of the Navy's T-5 purchase options, we get
the greatest overall savings if we buy the ships and end their leases
two years before the conclusion of the present 20 year terms--when that
is coupled with a continued use of the ships. The same is true for the
MPS, but their lease terms are 25 years and we estimate that their
optimum buyout point will be in fiscal year 2007. The key is to
purchase the ships when they are most affordable during the lease cycle
in order realize the optimal future stream of savings.
LHD-9
23. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, in a
January 28, 2002 article, ``Responding to Lott, DOD Starts Funding LHD-
9 And One More DDG-51,'' by Chris Castelli in the publication Inside
the Navy, the article states:
``At the urging of Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott
(Republican--Mississippi), the Pentagon has made last minute
adjustments to the Navy's shipbuilding plan in the Bush
administration's fiscal year 2003 budget. The Pentagon put $74
million more toward a third DDG-51 destroyer and allocated $10
million in advance procurement for a ninth amphibious ship LHD
9--that was not previously in the Navy's budget.''
Is this true, yes or no?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The OSD Comptroller made two
late changes to the Navy's fiscal year 2003 shipbuilding budget request
by adding $74 million in advance procurement funding for a third DDG-51
destroyer in fiscal year 2004, and shifting $10 million for advance
procurement funding for an fiscal year 2008 LHD-9. Any specific
questions on the factors that precipitated the decision for these
shifts should be referred to the OSD Comptroller.
LHA REPLACEMENT
24. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, can you
provide the status of the AoA to replace the current LHA with an LHA
(R)?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The LHA Replacement [LHA(R)]
AoA is scheduled to complete in the summer of 2002. The AoA is
evaluating several alternatives including a repeat LHD-8, a modified
LHD-8, and entirely new ship designs.
25. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, are you
also aware that the Comptroller in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense deleted the funding for the study on the AoA cutting $16
million from the RDT&E effort for the LHA replacement?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The Department is aware of
this situation. During the November 2001 review of the Navy's fiscal
year 2003 budget request, the OSD Comptroller's Office deleted fiscal
year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the LHA(R) program.
LHA(R) R&D funding throughout the FYDP was briefed to and approved
by OSD (including the OSD Comptroller) at Milestone A as the minimum
RDT&E funding necessary to support the least expensive LHA(R) AoA
alternative--a repeat LHD-8. Since the AoA completes in fiscal year
2002, this fiscal year 2003-2004 RDT&E deletion does not directly
impact the AoA study, the AoA final report or the Navy's ability to
decide which LHA(R) alternative to pursue. However, the Department of
the Navy will select a preferred alternative based on the results of
the AoA and adjust RDT&E and SCN profiles as required to move forward.
26. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, does the
$10 million in advance procurement for LHA-9 that was added by the OSD
Comptroller according to the Castelli article predetermine the results
of the AoA?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. No. The results of the LHA(R)
AoA are not predetermined. The LHA replacement analysis of alternatives
is ongoing and will report out in summer 2002. Alternatives being
considered include: repeat LHD-8 with evolutionary modifications,
modified LHD-8 upgraded to enhance the ability to operate the larger
and/or heavier new generation amphibious systems, and new ship designs
spanning a wide range in size and capability. Based on the analysis
presented in the AoA, the Navy will determine the optimal alternative
for the LHA replacement as part of the LHA(R) program. The preferred
alternative may or may not be based on the LHD-8. The $10 million in
the fiscal year 2003 budget request allows the Navy to begin refining
the AoA selected alternative's detailed capabilities/characteristics
and other developmental work.
27. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, you know
that I have traveled to Afghanistan with other members of this
committee. While there, I heard from several Navy and Marine Corps
officers that the number one concern for replacing the LHA is safety
because of a stability problem or high center of gravity issue,
especially with deployed aircraft. Their concern was that even with
some minor fixes with fuel compensation systems, the problem will be
exacerbated when the service deploys larger aircraft, such as the
Osprey (MV-22) and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which are
replacements for the CH-46 and AV-8B respectively. I am told that the
MV-22 is twice the weight of the CH-46 and that the JSF is believed to
be about twice the weight of the AV-8B. Does the LHD class have similar
stability problems as the LHA class, and would you agree that the
problem could be exacerbated with the planned future aircraft and
vehicles envisioned for the Marine Corps?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The seven ships of the LHD
class have improved stability characteristics over the LHA class and
therefore do not experience weight and center of gravity issues to the
same extent as the LHA. For example, LHD-7, commissioned in 2001, has
greater than the required 1,000 long tons of service life weight growth
allowance.
LHDs have the growth allowance to accommodate MV-22 and JSF with
aggressive weight control measures and the fuel oil compensation ship
alteration although LHDs have less vehicle storage space (square
footage) than LHAs.
The Navy's five LHAs need to be replaced as soon as possible, as
they are rapidly reaching the end of an already extended service life.
The LHA(R) AoA was initiated to ensure that both Marine Corps and Navy
21st century requirements are addressed, including the issues you raise
regarding the impact of heavier and larger aircraft/vehicles and
overall amphibious force vehicle storage area. An LHD repeat is just
one of several alternatives being considered in the LHA(R) AoA to meet
requirements.
28. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, what
growth percentages are currently planned for the LHD class of ships?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The CNO-specified minimum
service life allowance for the LHD class at delivery from the shipyard
is 1/2 foot for vertical center of gravity reserve and 1,000 long tons
(about 2.5 percent) of displacement service life reserve. The
requirement is documented in the LHD Class Top Level Requirements
document.
29, 30. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, is the
LHD a good replacement for the LHA class of ships, considering that the
ship does not meet the requirement in planned future vehicles and
aircraft for the Marine Corps or our special operations community and
considering the amphibious lift requirement of 2.5/3.0 MEB?
Because of the well deck inside the LHD, isn't the LHD available
square footage less than the LHA?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The ongoing LHA(R) analysis of
alternatives is addressing whether the LHD is a good replacement for
the LHA class. Continuing to build LHDs, as well as ship design
modifications to enhance the capability to operate the larger and
heavier new generation amphibious systems are currently being examined
as options. The analysis of alternatives is also investigating the
optimum way to reach the fiscally constrained amphibious lift
requirement of 2.5 Marine expeditionary brigades. The analysis of
alternatives is expected to report out later this year and will present
its conclusions at that time.
31. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, it seems
to me that the LHD is not a very transformational program especially
considering that it is the exact same hull of the current LHA class
that is based on a 1950s design. It seems to me that if the LHA (R)
class ship is built to have a lifespan of 50 years with no further R&D
invested, then LHD-9 will be a 100-year old design when it is
decommissioned in the 2050 timeframe. Would the Navy develop an
aircraft carrier (CVN), destroyer (DD), or submarine (SSN) without a
robust R&D effort?
Where is the R&D funding for a major amphibious ship like LHA (R)?
Are you not relegating the amphibious Navy to non-transformational
status?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. The Navy is currently
conducting an AoA for LHA(R). Numerous alternatives are under
consideration, including a LHD-8 repeat design. If the results of the
AoA support a mod repeat LHD or new ship design, additional RDT&E funds
will be required. At that time, it may be necessary to revisit the
current plan to use the $10 million in fiscal year 2003 SCN AP for a
LHD-9.
While the LHA(R) hull shape may be close to the original, its
combat systems suite, communications gear and information technology
set up will be state of the art.
WASP-CLASS LHD
34. Senator McCain. General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle, last
month, OSD Comptroller Dov Zakheim testified before the Senate Armed
Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support that the
decision to begin funding LHD-9 in the fiscal year 2003 budget was
``done completely in conjunction with the Navy.'' He also stated that
he doesn't ``like to blindside people. And [he] didn't blindside the
Navy.'' General Whitlow, as the resource and requirements sponsor for
amphibious ships, you no doubt were fully aware and closely involved
with this decision. Given the fact that a Wasp-class LHD provides less
lift capacity than the amphibious ship it would replace, would you
please explain why Congress should support advance procurement for LHD-
9? Admiral Balisle, would you care to comment?
General Whitlow and Admiral Balisle. As you are aware, the LHA(R)
AoA is being conducted to determine the most suitable platform to
replace the aging Tarawa-class LHAs. That study will report out in late
June of this year. LHD is one of many of the alternatives being
considered. If the advance procurement funding tied the Navy to a
repeat, ``straight stick'' LHD design, it would indeed be
predetermining the outcome of the AoA. However, I believe that the
advanced procurement funding you are referring to will be utilized to
conduct required R&D for the design determined to be best suited to
replace the LHA and meet the requirements of expeditionary assault
forces well into this century. That determination and decision is
pending.
PURCHASING CRUISE SHIPS
35. Senator McCain. Admiral Balisle, there are reports that the
Navy is being approached to purchase a pair of unfinished cruise ships
at the Northrup Grumman Shipyard in Pascagoula left behind when
American Classic Voyagers went bankrupt for use as mobile housing or
hospital ships. Is the Navy in anyway interested in purchasing such
ships and is there a need for such ships?
Admiral Balisle. A team of Navy engineers recently visited the
partially completed passenger ships in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and
concluded that the ships are not suitable for use as command and
control ships due to their structural design and lack of military
survivability features. We also looked at the ships' utility for other
non-combat ship missions. While the ships are viable with modifications
for use as hospital, recreational or berthing vessels, the Navy does
not have a requirement or need for any more of these ship types today.
Accordingly, the Navy has declined the offer to acquire or use the
cruise ships under construction.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
NAVAL SURFACE FIRES SYSTEM
36. Senator Smith. Admiral Balisle, when the Navy in 1992 shifted
to a ``brown water'' strategy from a ``blue water'' one, two Navy
missions loomed large: providing our troops in the littoral with
effective Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) and providing a forward
presence show of force. The Navy has failed on both counts. In the
meantime, we are in a state of war that could well bring us into a
littoral conflict. All we would have is air support which often is too
slow for tactical response and can be wiped out by bad weather (we saw
both happen in Kosovo, for example). In a September 2001 interview,
General Jones identified the ``absence of naval gunfire'' as the
Marines' number one issue. I believe that the solution to both of these
deficiencies is major caliber guns (12,, and above) and enough ship
survivability for a visible show of force in high threat situations,
which is especially important in our war on terrorism. What is the
status of the NSFS in the mid-term, 3-7 years?
Admiral Balisle. To address Marine Corps naval surface fire support
requirements in the next 3-7 years (2005-2009), Navy is developing and
fielding the following systems in the fiscal years indicated:
Fiscal Year 2002--The 5,,/62-caliber Mk-45 Mod 4 gun is an improved
version of the 5,,/54-caliber gun and incorporates structural
improvements to accommodate higher energies required to fire the ERGM.
In addition to firing the ERGM, the Mk-45 Mod 4 gun retains the
capability to fire the current inventory of conventional 5,, ballistic
ammunition. The Mk-45 Mod 4 gun is presently being fielded in Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers (DDG-81-112) and is programmed for backfit in
Ticonderoga-class cruisers as part of the cruiser conversion program.
Fiscal Year 2002--Naval fires network (NFN) is being deployed to
provide the network-centric infrastructure and processing capability
(software and hardware) required to support carrier strike, surface
strike, expeditionary, and fire support missions in support of joint,
allied, and coalition forces. Its overarching goal, integrated with the
distributed common ground station (DCGS) architecture, is to collect,
process, facilitate fusion, and disseminate data from a variety of
disparate, geographically separated, dissimilar joint sensors
(including space-based sensors) and provide it to the warfighting
community in a timely enough manner to identify, target, engage, and
destroy enemy targets.
Fiscal Year 2003--Naval fires control system (NFCS) is being
deployed to provide naval surface fires mission planning and fire-
support coordination functions to support the extended ranges and
precision accuracy of the improved Mk-45 Mod 4 (5,,/62-caliber) gun,
ERGM, and potentially advanced gun system (AGS) and ALAM. This system
provides the path and coordination functions for bringing naval guns
and land attack missiles into the realm of network-centric warfare by
receiving and executing digital fire missions directly from marines and
soldiers ashore, from the USA/USMC advanced field artillery tactical
data system (AFATDS) ashore and afloat, and from the Naval Fires
Network ashore and afloat. NFCS will be fielded in Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers (DDG-81-112) and backfit in Ticonderoga-class cruisers as
part of the cruiser conversion program.
Fiscal Year 2005--The ERGM is a 5,,, guided, rocket-assisted
projectile that is shot from a 5,,/62-caliber gun. Using the global
positioning system (GPS), ERGM receives target location and satellite
information prior to launch. During flight, the ERGM receives GPS
information and updates its inertial navigation system. ERGM far
exceeds the current range of ballistic projectiles (13nm) through the
use of rocket assisted propulsion, aerodynamic shape, glide and
increased initial velocity provided by a high energy propulsion charge
in a 5,,/62-caliber gun. ERGM will be fielded in Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers (DDG-81-112) and backfit in Ticonderoga-class cruisers as
part of the cruiser conversion program.
In the longer term, beyond fiscal year 20O9, DD(X) with the
advanced gun system/long-range land attack projectile (AGS/LRLAP) will
bring objective level naval fires capability to the force.
37. Senator Smith. Admiral Balisle, have you given consideration to
re-activating the U.S.S. Iowa and U.S.S. Wisconsin to fulfill this
critical task of national defense?
Admiral Balisle. The Navy has considered the relative advantages of
reactivating the two battleships, listed on the Naval Vessel Register.
However, the battleships do not meet future USMC naval surface fire
support (NSFS) requirements (attachment 1) for expeditionary maneuver
warfare. The Navy has undertaken an alternative strategy to better
address NSFS requirements generated by the new operational concepts of
operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) and ship to objective
maneuver (STOM). Future weapons and platforms will be expected to
routinely support operations hundreds of miles inland. The battleships
provide outstanding support up to 27 miles. The current concept of
operations for expeditionary warfare requires a much greater range to
support greater maneuver and lift capabilities of our modern Marine
forces.
Two battleships (U.S.S. Iowa and U.S.S. Wisconsin) could not
provide continuous world-wide, forward-deployed coverage, would not
meet the emerging needs of warfare in the 21st century, and would be
prohibitively expensive to operate, maintain, and support. Technology
insertions required to upgrade battleships for interoperability with
modern naval forces would be cost prohibitive. Battleships are manpower
intensive and require more than three to five times the manning of a
modern surface combatant. If reactivated, they would be unique in the
fleet (unique weapon systems, engineering plants, training
requirements, etc), and require an expensive infrastructure for support
of only two ships. Therefore, reactivated battleships would compete for
scarce funding with other critical surface Navy programs and reduce the
total force capabilities available for littoral land attack operations.
The high costs of operation, combined with limited battleship
capability versus current USMC NSFS requirements, make battleship
reactivation a high cost program of little military value.
The Navy is moving forward from World War II vintage battleship
capability with the following plan for developing systems to address
Marine Corps NSFS requirements and fielding those systems in the fiscal
years indicated:
Fiscal Year 2002--The 5,,/62-caliber Mk-45 Mod 4 gun is an improved
version of the 5,,/54-caliber gun and incorporates structural--
improvements to accommodate higher energies required to fire the ERGM.
In addition to firing the ERGM, the Mk-45 Mod 4 gun retains the
capability to fire the current inventory of conventional 5,, ballistic
ammunition. The Mk-45 Mod 4 gun is presently being fielded in Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers (DDG-81-112) and is programmed for backfit in
Ticonderoga-class cruisers as part of the cruiser conversion program.
Fiscal Year 2002--Naval fires network (NFN) is being deployed to
provide the network-centric infrastructure and processing capability
(software and hardware) required to support carrier strike, surface
strike, expeditionary, and fire support missions in support of joint,
allied, and coalition forces. Its overarching goal, integrated with the
distributed common ground station (DCGS) architecture, is to collect,
process, facilitate fusion, and disseminate data from a variety of
disparate, geographically separated, dissimilar joint sensors
(including space-based sensors) and provide it to the warfighting
community in a timely enough manner to identify, target, engage, and
destroy enemy targets.
Fiscal Year 2003--Naval fires control system (NFCS) is being
deployed to provide naval surface fires mission planning and fire-
support coordination functions to support the extended ranges and
precision accuracy of the improved Mk-45 Mod 4 (5,,/62-caliber) gun and
ERGM. This system provides the path and coordination functions for
bringing naval guns and land attack missiles into the realm of network-
centric warfare by receiving and executing digital fire missions
directly from Marines and Soldiers ashore, from the USA/USMC advanced
field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS) ashore and afloat, and
from the naval fires network ashore and afloat. NFCS will be fielded in
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG-81-112) and backfit in Ticonderoga-
class cruisers as part of the cruiser conversion program.
Fiscal Year 2004--The tactical Tomahawk (Tactom) weapons system
provides a precision, all weather, unmanned, deep strike capability,
and will greatly increase flexibility and responsiveness. The emerging
requirement to engage targets from 100 to 200 nm will be met with the
introduction of Tactom, as an interim NSFS missile solution. Tactom's
loiter and enroute re-targeting capabilities provide support over
extensive maneuver areas. New capabilities will include a two-way
satellite communications link. This communications link will enable
Tactom missiles to be redirected in flight. The data link will also
enable the missile to report its in-flight status and anticipated
impact accuracy. In addition, the missile will provide near real-time
lookdown battle damage imagery enroute to its target.
Fiscal Year 2005--The ERGM is a 5,, guided, rocket-assisted
projectile that is shot from a 5,,/62-caliber gun. Using the global
positioning system (GPS), ERGM receives target location and satellite
information prior to launch. During flight, the ERGM receives GPS
information and updates its inertial navigation system. ERGM, which
will achieve ranges over 50 nm, far exceeds the current range of
ballistic projectiles (13nm) through the use of rocket assisted
propulsion, aerodynamic shape, glide and increased initial velocity
provided by a high energy propulsion charge in a 5,,/62-caliber gun.
ERGM will be fielded in Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (DDG-81-112) and
backfit in Ticonderoga-class cruisers as part of the cruiser conversion
program.
In the longer term, DD(X) with the advanced gun system/long-range
land attack projectile (AGS/LRLAP) and an ALAM will bring objective
level naval fires capability to the force.
JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER VARIANT V/STOL
38. Senator Smith. Admiral McCabe, I would like to get your
response to a Wall Street Journal report and a Lexington Institute
report. The reports state that the Navy may be considering a 37 percent
reduction in the production and procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) from 1,089 aircraft to 680. Perhaps this cut is driven by a
desire to generate some sizeable cost savings as full production ramps
up at the end of the decade. However, the reports raise the specter
that the Navy may want to cut the Marine Corps V/STOL version of the
JSF due to some questions about its perceived differences--fuel load,
payload capacity, and so forth that were modified to get the V/STOL
abilities. What is the validity of this report, and what is the Navy
position on the Marine Corps V/STOL JSF variant?
Admiral McCabe. In response to Defense Planning Guidance, the
Department of the Navy has been hard at work on a study to analyze
efficiencies and effectiveness of integration of Navy and Marine Corps
tactical aviation. This study will provide valuable insight and a
method to challenge our assumptions of the past in order to formulate a
strategy for the future. The study's recommendations are under review
by the Department of the Defense. It would be inappropriate to comment
further until that review is complete.
SPACE USE
39. Senator Smith. Admiral McCabe, what is the general status and
intent of the Navy's plan for the use of space as an enabler and the
defense of these assets that are becoming more and more important as we
head into the era of netcentric?
Admiral McCabe. In today's environment, naval forces have to think
about many things in order to project power ashore: things like battle
space characterization, target recognition, location and targeting,
time critical strike, attack asset coordination and deconfliction,
weapon selection, and then battle damage assessment.
The Navy information technology for the 21st century (IT21)
initiative accelerates the transition to an intranet and PC-based
tactical and support warfighting network, enabling the reengineering of
Navy mission and support processes. This strategy provides secure and
unclassified internet protocol (IP) network connectivity for mobile
Naval forces using satellite communications (SATCOM), direct line of
sight communication paths, and commercial IT hardware and software.
This is a major step towards quickly achieving the goals and standards
of the global information grid, and a quantum leap forward into
creating the infrastructure necessary to embark on true network-centric
operations and knowledge management.
The naval network is the convergence of afloat and ashore networks
into a single, seamless network. This represents one of the first
evolutionary steps towards transformation to network-centric
operations. This network includes elements from the Marine Corps
networks, Navy-Marine Corps intranet (NMCI) outside of the continental
United States (OCONUS), and interfaces with the global information
grid.
The bottom line, we have to use assets in space to support naval
forces as well as forces ashore to provide high data rate
communications, meteorological and oceanographic support, navigation,
precise time and non-organic intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT).
Ensuring the freedom of space and protecting U.S. national security
interests in the medium are priorities for space use and space related
activities. U.S. space systems are national property afforded the right
of passage through and operations in space without interference in
accordance with applicable U.S. and international law.
Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as
an infringement on our sovereign rights. The U.S. may take all
appropriate measures, including, if directed by the President and
Secretary of Defense, the use of force, to respond to such an
infringement on U.S. rights, in accordance with applicable U.S. and
international law.
Consistent with applicable U.S. and international law, space
control capabilities will be developed, operated, and maintained to
ensure freedom of action in space for the U.S. and its allies and, if
directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These space
control capabilities will include capabilities for protection,
prevention, negation, surveillance of space and the supporting battle
management, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]