[Senate Hearing 107-640]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-640
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 28, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
Les Brownlee, Staff Director
David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority
______
Subcommittee on Strategic
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina JACK REED, Rhode Island
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire, ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization
march 28, 2001
Page
Fogleman, Gen. Robert R., USAF (Ret.), Commissioner; Accompanied
by Robert V. Davis, Hon. William R. Graham, Gen. Thomas S.
Moorman, Jr., USAF (Ret.), and Hon. Malcolm Wallop............. 3
(iii)
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Allard, Smith, Inhofe,
Sessions, Reed, Akaka, and Bill Nelson.
Professional staff members present: L. David Cherington,
George W. Lauffer, and Eric H. Thoemmes.
Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
minority counsel, and Creighton Greene, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie and Thomas C.
Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Margaret Hemenway,
assistant to Senator Smith; Douglas Flanders, assistant to
Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning; Elizabeth
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi,
assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; and Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN
Senator Allard. I am going to go ahead and call the
Strategic Subcommittee to order. I would like to welcome the
panel we have before us. A minority member will be showing up
here shortly, and I do like to keep a reputation of starting on
time, in this case maybe even a couple of minutes early, and I
think that everybody gets in the habit sometimes of showing up
late, so at least when I am chairing things we are going to be
going on time.
I thought one of the first hearings we ought to have as we
move forward into the new Congress is to hear from the Space
Commission, and what all your folks have to report to us on
national security space management and organization. I am
looking forward to your testimony. Many things which you
recommend can be done without legislation, but I could not
think of a better time to begin to highlight many of these
issues just at the time when we have a new administration and
new appointees moving into their various positions in the
Department of Defense.
The Strategic Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony
from the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization. The commission's report to
Congress was submitted on January 11, 2001. We are pleased that
a significant number of the commissioners are able to appear
today, and we look forward to hearing your views.
The Space Commission was established pursuant to the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 under
the leadership of Senator Bob Smith. The Strategic Subcommittee
played the leading role in formulating the legislation that
established the commission. The subcommittee continues to be
extremely interested in all facets of national security space
and will work with the new administration in implementing the
commission's recommendations.
For a number of years, this committee has expressed
concerns regarding the United States national security space
management and the adequacy of investment in space programs and
research and development. I believe that the commission has
done an excellent job of describing why space is so important
to the U.S. national security and how we can improve our
ability to exploit space and enhance our security.
Although Secretary Rumsfeld was not able to remain with the
commission beyond the point when he was nominated to serve as
Secretary of Defense, I want to acknowledge the excellent job
he did as chairman of the commission for most of its duration.
Fortunately, the remaining commissioners possess impressive
professional depth and diversity which facilitated a successful
conclusion to the commission's efforts. I hope that Secretary
Rumsfeld in his position will continue to promote national
security space issues to the same extent he did while serving
on the commission.
Let me welcome our witnesses today. We have with us Senator
Malcolm Wallop, who is the Chairman of Frontiers of Freedom,
and served as a U.S. Senator from my neighboring State of
Wyoming from 1977 to 1995.
Dr. William R. Graham is Chairman of the Board and
President of National Security Research, Incorporated. Gen.
Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., retired Air Force, is a partner in Booz
Allen Hamilton. Robert V. Davis is President of R.V. Davis &
Associates. Gen. Robert R. Fogleman, retired Air Force, is
President and CEO of the B. Bar J Cattle & Consulting Company,
Durango Aerospace, Incorporated, and a partner in Laird &
Company, LLC.
At the time of his retirement in 1997, General Fogleman was
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. I now have the high honor of
having the General as a constituent living in Durango,
Colorado.
I understand General Fogleman will lead off with some
prepared remarks, and that the other commissioners will then
make observations. We will then have an opportunity to open it
up for questions and answers after recognizing General Fogleman
for his opening statement.
First, let me recognize Senator Inhofe, if he has an
opening statement, and then Senator Reed, if he has a statement
he would like to make, and then move forward with testimony
from there.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have an
opening statement, but I am here because of the significance of
what is going on today. I recognize that the future wars are
going to be won or lost in space. I recognize that we probably
have superiority at this time, but I am not sure, on the track
we have been going the last few years, it is going to remain
that way. I chair the Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee, and our readiness is in a crisis today, but I do
like to look ahead.
I can remember in the 1997 Defense Authorization Bill two
of the elements that dealt with space, Clementine II and the
Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite program. Both of them were line
item vetoed, which sent an erroneous message around the country
that we do not recognize the significance of space today, but
this one Senator does, and so I am here to lend support to see
where we are going to go here.
It is good to see our old colleague Malcolm Wallop, and my
old friend General Fogleman, and by the way, one of the reasons
I have to leave here is our own friends from ALTIS are here in
town today, so we have to take care of that.
Senator Allard. OK. Let us go ahead and proceed with the
testimony. I would just warn the panel that we could have a
vote coming up in about 10 minutes or so. We will just go as
far as we can, and if we have to take a break to go vote, we
will come back if we have to.
Before we have the panel testify, and without objection, I
will place in the record Senator Thurmond's statement.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Mr. Chairman, I want to join you in welcoming the distinguished
members of the Space Commission. They are without doubt the most
qualified group of individuals ever assembled to look into an issue
that is critical to the security of this Nation and its future in
space. I especially want to welcome my old friend and colleague,
Senator Wallop, he has a long association with space and has been one
of the strongest advocates for our Nation's role in space.
In my judgment, the commission's report provides a blue print to
the future use of space both for intelligence and non-intelligence
functions. The timing of the report is fortuitous in that Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld is conducting a strategic review of Department of
Defense activities. I would strongly urge the Secretary to carefully
consider the commission's findings and recommendations as he
reorganizes the Department to meet the challenges of the new century.
There is no question that we have the technology to maximize the use of
space. However, we are missing the leadership to tie together the
various organizations and technologies and bring a focus on the
potential that space offers to ensure the security and warfighting
ability of this Nation.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the commission's report and again
want to express my appreciation to the commissioners for their
dedication to this Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. We will now proceed. General Fogleman,
please begin.
STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT R. FOGLEMAN, USAF (RET.),
COMMISSIONER; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT V. DAVIS, HON. WILLIAM R.
GRAHAM, GEN. THOMAS S. MOORMAN, JR., USAF (RET.), AND HON.
MALCOLM WALLOP
General Fogleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
members. It is our pleasure to appear before the subcommittee
today to report the findings of the Commission to Assess
National Security Space Management and Organization, which I
will refer to as the commission from this point forward.
The commission was established in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, and it was directed to
consider near-, medium-, and long-term changes in the
management and organization of our national security space
program. We were specifically directed to assess several items
in the legislation. In the interest of time, I would ask, Mr.
Chairman, if I could have that portion of the prepared
statement entered into the record.
Senator Allard. Without objection, so ordered.
General Fogleman. I would like to go right to the scope of
the commission's assessment, if I could. Our charter was to
assess the organization and management of space activities that
support U.S. national security interests. Because we focused on
national security space, our review centered on the Department
of Defense and intelligence community space activities.
However, we also considered civil and commercial activities to
assess their relationship to and effect on national security
space.
The commission examined the role of organization and
management with respect to national security space in
developing and implementing national level guidance,
establishing requirements, acquiring and operating systems,
planning, program, and budgeting, and meeting the needs of the
national leadership and the military.
We focused on near- and mid-term organization and
management changes that will enable the United States to
realize the longer-term interest in space. It is important to
note that we were not asked to evaluate specific space programs
and capabilities. However, we examined several programs as case
studies to understand how organizational and management issues
affect national security space programs.
The members of this commission were appointed by the
chairmen and ranking minority members of the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees and by the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. We met 32 times over the course of the 6-month life of
the commission.
To augment our own experience in national security space we
met with 77 present and former senior leaders in national
security space in Congress, the Department of Defense, the
intelligence community, NASA, and the aerospace industry. In
addition, we met numerous times with the members of other
commissions such as the NIMA and NRO commissions. The
Department of Defense and the National Reconnaissance Office
provided the commissioners access to a number of classified
space programs.
Moving to the commission's conclusions, findings, and
recommendations, Mr. Chairman, the commission reached a number
of unanimous conclusions regarding our national security space
program. From those conclusions, we developed specific findings
and recommendations, and I would like to begin by summarizing
our broad conclusions for the subcommittee.
The commission concluded that the security and well-being
of the United States, its allies, and friends depend on the
Nation's ability to operate in space. We believe it is in the
U.S. national interest to promote the peaceful use of space,
use our potential in space to support U.S. domestic, economic,
diplomatic, and national security objectives, and develop and
deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts
directed at U.S. space assets and against the use of space in
ways hostile to U.S. interests.
The pursuit of our national interest in space requires
active involvement by the President and responsible senior
officials. We urge an early review and, as appropriate,
revision of the national space policy. The policy should
provide direction and guidance to departments and agencies of
government to first employ space systems to help speed the
transformation of the U.S. military into a modern force able to
deter and defend against evolving threats directed at the
American homeland and its forward-deployed forces, its allies,
and its interests abroad and in space.
Further, this guidance should help develop revolutionary
methods of collecting intelligence from space to provide the
President the information necessary to direct the Nation's
affairs, manage crises, and resolve conflicts in a complex and
rapidly changing international environment. Additionally, it
should shape the domestic and international legal and
regulatory frameworks for space to assure U.S. national
security interest and to enhance the competitiveness of our
commercial sector and the effectiveness of the civil space
sector.
Additionally, it should promote government and commercial
investment in leading-edge technologies to assure the U.S. has
the means to master operations in space and compete in the
international markets, and finally, create and sustain within
the government an educated and trained cadre of military and
civilian space professionals.
The U.S. Government is becoming ever more dependent on the
commercial space sector to provide essential services for
national security operations. To assure the United States
remains the world's leading spacefaring Nation, the government
has to become a more reliable consumer of U.S. products and
should invest in technologies to field systems one generation
ahead of what is available commercially in the U.S. and enable
unique national security requirements to be met.
Additionally, we should encourage the U.S. commercial space
industry to field systems one generation ahead of international
competitors.
Now, the relative dependence of the United States on space
makes our space systems attractive targets. Many foreign
nations and entities such as international consortia are
pursuing space-related activities. Those hostile to the United
States possess, or can acquire on the global market, the means
to deny, disrupt, or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking
the satellites in space, the communications links to and from
the ground, or the ground stations themselves that command the
satellites and process their data.
Therefore, the United States must dedicate sufficient
intelligence collections and analysis resources to better
understand the intentions and capabilities of potentially
hostile states and entities. We must take seriously the
possibility of an attack on elements of U.S. space systems.
Today, such an attack may seem improbable and even
reckless. However, as political economist Thomas Shelling has
pointed out, ``There is a tendency in our planning to confuse
the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not
considered looks strange; what looks strange is thought
improbable; and what is improbable need not be considered
seriously.''
I need not remind folks that history is replete with
instances in which warning signs were ignored and change
resisted until an external, improbable event forced resistant
bureaucracies to take action. The question is whether the
United States will be wise enough to act responsibly and soon
enough to reduce U.S. space vulnerability. If our leaders
ensure the Nation's vulnerability is reduced, and that the
consequences of a surprise in space are limited in their
effects, we are less likely to experience a space Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Chairman, these are our broad conclusions. What I would
like to do now is report our main findings and recommendations.
Finding number 1. Because our national security depends on
our ability to operate successfully in space, U.S. space
interests must be recognized as a top national priority. Only
the President has the authority to set forth the national space
policy and provide the guidance and direction senior Government
officials need to ensure the United States remains the world's
leading spacefaring Nation. Only presidential leadership can
assure the necessary cooperation of all space sectors,
commercial, civil, defense, and intelligence.
The commission made two recommendations to enhance
presidential attention to national security space matters.
First, the President should consider establishing space as a
national security priority. Second, the President should
consider the appointment of a presidential space advisory group
to provide independent advice on developing and employing new
space capabilities.
Finding number 2. The United States Government is not
properly organized to meet the national security space needs of
the 21st century. After examining a variety of organizational
changes, the commission concluded that a number of disparate
space activities should be promptly merged, chains of command
adjusted, lines of communication opened, and policies modified
to achieve greater responsibility and accountability.
Only then can the necessary tradeoffs be made, the
appropriate priorities be established, and the opportunities
for improving U.S. military and intelligence capabilities be
realized. Only when properly managed with the right priorities
will the United States' space programs both deserve and attract
the funding that is required.
The commission made several recommendations regarding
management and organization in the national security space
arena. First, the President should direct that a senior
interagency group for space be established and staffed within
the National Security Council structure. The current
interagency process is inadequate to address the growing
number, range, and complexity of space issues. We need a
standing interagency process to focus on policy formulation and
coordination of space activities pertinent to national
security, and to ensure that representation on domestic and
international forums effectively reflects U.S. national
security and other space interests.
Second, we recommend that an Under Secretary of Defense for
Space, Intelligence, and Information should be established.
Until space organizations have more fully evolved, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense would benefit from having a senior
level official with sufficient standing to serve as the
advocate for space within the Defense Department. This official
would be assigned responsibility to oversee research and
development, acquisition, launch and operation of space
intelligence and information assets, coordinate the military
intelligence activities within the Department, and work with
the intelligence community on long-range intelligence
requirements for national security.
Third, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense should
end the practice of assigning only an Air Force pilot to the
position of CINCSPACE and CINCNORAD, and assign responsibility
for the command of Air Force Space Command to a different four-
star officer. This will allow CINCSPACE to focus on providing
space-related services to include computer network defense and
attack missions in support of the operations of other CINCs,
and national missile defense.
A further recommendation was that the Air Force should be
assigned Title 10 responsibility for space and designated the
executive agent for space within DOD, and the Air Force should
realign headquarters and field commands to more effectively
organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained space
operations. This involves bringing together the Air Force
organizations responsible for requirements, research and
development, acquisition, and operations for space systems into
a single organization.
Organizing, training, and equipping for military operations
is the responsibility of a military service. In the future, a
space corps, or a separate space force may best meet this
responsibility. In the near term, the commission believes that
a realigned, rechartered Air Force is best suited to organize,
train, and equip space forces. The Army and Navy should
continue to establish requirements and develop and deploy space
systems unique to their services.
A further recommendation was to assign the Under Secretary
of the Air Force as the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, and designate the Under Secretary of the Air Force as
the acquisition executive for space.
We believe the Department of Defense would benefit from the
appointment of a single official within the Air Force with
authority for the acquisition of space systems for both the Air
Force and the NRO based on best practices of each organization.
Our final recommendation under this finding was that the
Secretary of Defense should establish a Major Force Program
(MFP) for space. An MFP would give the Department of Defense
better visibility into the level and distribution of fiscal and
personnel resources, thereby improving management and oversight
of space programs.
Finding number 3. The Secretary of Defense and the Director
of Central Intelligence are the two officials primarily
responsible and accountable for a national security space
program. They must work closely to set and maintain the course
for numerous and complex space programs, and to resolve the
differences that arise between their respective bureaucracies.
The commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence meet regularly to address
national security space matters.
Finding number 4. Every medium of transport--air, land, and
sea--has seen conflict. Space will be no different. The broad
outline of U.S. national space policy is sound, but the United
States has not yet taken the steps necessary to develop the
necessary capabilities to maintain and ensure their continuing
superiority.
Space is not simply a place from which information is
acquired and transmitted, or through which objects pass. It is
a medium, much the same as air, land, and sea. The United
States conducts operations to, from, in, and through space in
support of its national interest both on the earth and within
space. As with national capabilities in the air, on land, and
at sea, the United States must have the capabilities to defend
its space assets against hostile acts, and to negate the
hostile use of space against U.S. interests.
Explicit national security guidance and defense policy is
needed to direct development of doctrine and concepts of
operations for space capabilities, including weapons systems
that operate in space, and that can defend assets in orbit and
augment current air, land, and sea forces. This requires a
determined strategy for space which in turn must be supported
by a greater range of space capabilities.
Space offers advantages for basing systems intended to
affect air, land, and sea operations. It is possible to project
power from space in response to events anywhere in the world.
For example, during a conflict, a military space vehicle could
attack distant targets within a very short period. Unlike
weapons from aircraft, land forces, or ships, space missions
could be carried out with almost no transit, weather, or other
delay. Having this capability would give the United States an
extraordinary military advantage.
Finding number 5. The United States must increase
investment in science and technology resources. The U.S.
Government needs to play an active, deliberate role in
expanding and deepening the pool of military and civilian
talent in science, engineering, and systems operation that the
Nation will need. The government also needs to sustain its
investment in enabling and breakthrough technologies needed to
maintain national technological leadership.
The commission made two recommendations to improve science
and technology. First, the Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence should direct the creation of
an office of strategic reconnaissance to conduct research,
development, and demonstration efforts on breakthrough
technologies.
Second, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency and the military service
laboratories to continue to develop and demonstrate innovative
space technology for military missions.
Mr. Chairman, those are our findings and recommendations.
In brief conclusion, the commission believes that its
recommendations, taken as a whole, will enable the United
States to sustain its position as the world's leading
spacefaring Nation. Presidential leadership and guidance,
coupled with a more effective interagency process, and
especially with improved coordination between the Department of
Defense and the intelligence community are essential if the
Nation is to promote and protect its interest in space.
We thank the subcommittee for its interest and leadership
in this important arena. We look forward to working with you in
the future as you consider the implementation of our
recommendations.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
[The following four documents: (1) prepared statement of
General Fogleman; (2) ``Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and
Organization''; (3) ``Executive Summary, Report of the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization''; and (4) ``Appendices: Staff
Background Papers, Report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization''
follow:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Robert R. Fogleman
introduction
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it is our pleasure to
appear before the committee today to report the findings of the
Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and
Organization, which I will refer to as the ``Commission'' from this
point forward.
This Commission was established in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and was directed to consider
near-, medium- and long-term changes to the management and organization
of our national security space program. We were specifically directed
to assess:
(1) The manner in which military space assets may be
exploited to provide support for United States military
operations.
(2) The current interagency coordination process regarding
the operation of national security space assets, including
identification of interoperability and communications issues.
(3) The relationship between the intelligence and defense
aspects of national security space . . . and the potential
costs and benefits of a partial or complete merger of the
programs, projects, or activities that are differentiated by
those two aspects.
(4) The manner in which military space issues are addressed
by professional military education institutions.
(5) The potential costs and benefits of establishing:
(A) An independent military department and service
dedicated to the national security space mission.
(B) A corps within the Air Force dedicated to the
national security space mission.
(C) A position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
(D) A new major force program, or other budget
mechanism, for managing national security space funding
within the Department of Defense.
(E) Any other change in the existing organizational
structure of the Department of Defense for national
security space management and organization.
Shortly before the Commission began its work, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 amended the Commission mandate,
asking us also to consider the advisability of:
(1) Ending the requirement for specified officers in the United
States Space Command to be flight rated that results from the
dual assignment of such officers to that command and to one or
more other commands for which the officers are expressly
required to be flight rated;
(2) The establishment of a requirement that all new general or
flag officers of the United States Space Command have
experience in space, missile, or information operations that is
either acquisition experience or operational experience; and
(3) Rotating the command of the United States Space Command
among the Armed Forces.
scope of the commission's assessment
Our charter was to assess the organization and management of space
activities that support U.S. national security interests. Because we
focused on national security space, our review centered on Department
of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence Community space activities. However,
we also considered civil and commercial activities to assess their
relationship to and effect on national security space. The Commission
examined the role of organization and management, with respect to
national security space, in:
Developing and implementing national-level guidance;
Establishing requirements;
Acquiring and operating systems;
Planning, programming, and budgeting; and
Meeting the needs of the national leadership and the
military.
We focused on near- and mid-term organization and management
changes that will enable the U.S. to realize its longer-term interests
in space. It is important to note that we were not asked to evaluate
specific space programs and capabilities. However, we examined several
programs as case studies to understand how organizational and
management issues affect national security space programs.
The members of this Commission were appointed by the chairmen and
ranking minority members of the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees, and by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence. We met 32 times over the course of
the 6-month life of the Commission. To augment our own experience in
national security space, we met with 77 present and former senior
leaders in Congress, Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community,
NASA, and the aerospace industry. In addition, we met numerous times
with the members of other Commissions, such as the NIMA and NRO
Commissions. The Department of Defense and National Reconnaissance
Office provided the Commissioners access to a number of classified
space programs.
commission conclusions, findings, and recommendations
Mr. Chairman, the Commission reached a number of unanimous
conclusions regarding our national security space program. From those
conclusions we developed specific findings and recommendations. I would
like to begin by summarizing our broad conclusions for the committee.
The Commission concluded that the security and well-being of the
United States, its allies, and friends depend on the nation's ability
to operate in space. We believe that it is in the U.S. national
interest to:
Promote the peaceful use of space;
Use our potential in space to support U.S. domestic,
economic, diplomatic and national security objectives; and
Develop and deploy the means to deter and defend
against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against
the use of space in ways hostile to U.S. interests.
The pursuit of our national interests in space requires active
involvement by the President and responsible senior officials. We urge
an early review and, as appropriate, revision of the national space
policy. The policy should provide direction and guidance for
departments and agencies of government to:
Employ space systems to help to speed the
transformation of the U.S. military into a modern force able to
deter and defend against evolving threats directed at the
American homeland, its forward deployed forces, its allies, and
its interests abroad and in space.
Develop revolutionary methods of collecting
intelligence from space to provide the President the
information necessary to direct the nation's affairs, manage
crises, and resolve conflicts in a complex and rapidly changing
international environment.
Shape the domestic and international legal and
regulatory frameworks for space to assure U.S. national
security interests and to enhance the competitiveness of the
commercial sector and the effectiveness of the civil space
sector.
Promote government and commercial investment in
leading-edge technologies to assure that the U.S. has the means
to master operations in space and compete in international
markets.
Create and sustain within the government an educated
and trained cadre of military and civilian space professionals.
The U.S. government is becoming ever more dependent on the
commercial space sector to provide essential services for national
security operations. To assure the United States remains the world's
leading space-faring nation, the government has to become a more
reliable consumer of U.S. products and should:
Invest in technologies to field systems one generation
ahead of what is available commercially in the U.S. and enable
unique national security requirements to be met.
Encourage the U.S. commercial space industry to field
systems one generation ahead of international competitors.
The relative dependence of the U.S. on space makes our space
systems attractive targets. Many foreign nations and entities such as
international consortia are pursuing space-related activities. Those
hostile to the U.S. possess, or can acquire on the global market, the
means to deny, disrupt, or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking the
satellites in space, the communications links to and from the ground,
or the ground stations that command the satellites and process their
data. Therefore, the U.S. must dedicate sufficient intelligence
collection and analysis resources to better understand the intentions
and capabilities of potentially hostile states and entities.
We must take seriously the possibility of an attack on elements of
U.S. space systems. Today such an attack may seem improbable, and even
reckless. However, as political economist Thomas Schelling has pointed
out, ``There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar
with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered looks
strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable
need not be considered seriously.'' History is replete with instances
in which warning signs were ignored and change resisted until an
external, ``improbable'' event forced resistant bureaucracies to take
action. The question is whether the U.S. will be wise enough to act
responsibly and soon enough to reduce U.S. space vulnerability. If our
leaders assure that the nation's vulnerability is reduced and that the
consequences of a surprise in space are limited in their effects, we
are less likely to experience a `Space Pearl Harbor.'
Mr. Chairman, these are our broad conclusions. I would now like to
report our main findings and recommendations:
Finding 1
Because our national security depends on our ability to operate
successfully in space, U.S. space interests must be recognized as a top
national security priority. Only the President has the authority to set
forth the national space policy, and provide the guidance and direction
to senior government officials, needed to ensure the United States
remains the world's leading space-faring nation. Only Presidential
leadership can assure the necessary cooperation of all space sectors--
commercial, civil, defense, and intelligence.
The Commission made two recommendations to enhance Presidential
attention to national security space matters:
First, the President should consider establishing
space as a national security priority.
Second, the President should consider the appointment
of a Presidential Space Advisory Group to provide independent
advice on developing and employing new space capabilities.
Finding 2
The U.S. Government is not properly organized to meet the national
security space needs of the 21st century. After examining a variety of
organizational changes, the Commission concluded that a number of
disparate space activities should promptly be merged, chains of command
adjusted, lines of communication opened, and policies modified to
achieve greater responsibility and accountability. Only then can the
necessary trade-offs be made, the appropriate priorities be
established, and the opportunities for improving U.S. military and
intelligence capabilities be realized. Only when properly managed, with
the right priorities, will U.S. space programs both deserve and attract
the funding that is required.
The Commission made several recommendations regarding management
and organization in the national security space arena:
The President should direct that a Senior Interagency
Group for Space be established and staffed within the National
Security Council structure. The current interagency process is
inadequate to address the growing number, range, and complexity
of space issues. We need a standing interagency process to
focus on policy formulation and coordination of space
activities pertinent to national security, and to ensure that
representation in domestic and international forums effectively
reflects U.S. national security and other space interests.
An Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence,
and Information should be established. Until space
organizations have more fully evolved, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense would benefit from having a senior-level
official with sufficient standing to serve as the advocate for
space within the Defense Department. This official would be
assigned responsibility to oversee research and development,
acquisition, launch and operation of space, intelligence and
information assets; coordinate the military intelligence
activities within the Department; and work with the
Intelligence Community on long-range intelligence requirements
for national security.
The Secretary of Defense should end the practice of
assigning only an Air Force pilot to the position of CINCSPACE
and CINCNORAD, and assign responsibility for the Command of Air
Force Space Command to a different four star officer. This will
allow CINCSPACE to focus on providing space-related services,
to include computer network defense and attack missions in
support of the operations of the other ClNCs, and national
missile defense.
The Air Force should be assigned Title 10
responsibility for space and designated the Executive Agent for
space within DOD; and the Air Force should realign headquarters
and field commands to more effectively organize, train, and
equip for prompt and sustained space operations. This involves
bringing together the Air Force organizations responsible for
requirements, research and development, acquisition, and
operations for space systems into a single organization.
Organizing, training, and equipping for military operations is
the responsibility of a military service. In the future, a
Space Corps or a separate Space Force may best meet this
responsibility. In the near term, the Commission believes that
a realigned, rechartered Air Force is best suited to organize,
train, and equip space forces. The Army and Navy should
continue to establish requirements and develop and deploy space
systems unique to their Services.
Assign the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. Designate the
Under Secretary as the Air Force Acquisition Executive for
Space. The Department of Defense would benefit from the
appointment of a single official within the Air Force with
authority for the acquisition of space systems for both the Air
Force and the NRO based on the ``best practices'' of each
organization.
The Secretary of Defense should establish a Major
Force Program (MFP) for Space. An MFP would give the Department
of Defense better visibility into the level and distribution of
fiscal and personnel resources, thereby improving management
and oversight of space programs.
Finding 3
The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
are the two officials primarily responsible and accountable for the
national security space program. They must work closely to set and
maintain the course for numerous and complex space programs and to
resolve the differences that arise between their respective
bureaucracies.
The Commission recommends that the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence meet regularly
to address national security space matters.
Finding 4
Every medium of transport--air, land, and sea--has seen conflict.
Space will be no different. The broad outline of U.S. national space
policy is sound, but the U.S. has not yet taken the steps necessary to
develop the necessary capabilities and to maintain and ensure their
continuing superiority.
Space is not simply a place from which information is acquired and
transmitted or through which objects pass. It is a medium much the same
as air, land, or sea. The U.S. conducts operations to, from, in, and
through space in support of its national interests both on the earth
and in space. As with national capabilities in the air, on land, and at
sea, the U.S. must have the capabilities to defend its space assets
against hostile acts and to negate the hostile use of space against
U.S. interests.
Explicit national security guidance and defense policy is needed to
direct development of doctrine and concepts of operations for space
capabilities, including weapons systems that operate in space and that
can defend assets in orbit and augment current air, land, and sea
forces. This requires a deterrence strategy for space, which in turn
must be supported by a greater range of space capabilities.
Space offers advantages for basing systems intended to affect air,
land, and sea operations. It is possible to project power from space in
response to events anywhere in the world. For example, during a
conflict a military space plane could attack distant targets within a
very short period. Unlike weapons from aircraft, land forces, or ships,
space missions could be carried out with almost no transit, weather, or
other delay. Having this capability would give the U.S. an
extraordinary military advantage.
Finding 5
The U.S. must increase investment in science and technology
resources. The U.S. government needs to play an active, deliberate role
in expanding and deepening the pool of military and civilian talent in
science, engineering, and systems operations that the nation will need.
The government also needs to sustain its investment in enabling and
breakthrough technologies needed to maintain national technological
leadership.
The Commission made two recommendations to improve science and
technology.
First, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence should direct the creation of an Office of
Strategic Reconnaissance to conduct research, development, and
demonstration efforts on breakthrough technologies.
Second, the Secretary of Defense should direct the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the military
service laboratories to continue to develop and demonstrate
innovative space technology for military missions.
conclusion
The Commission believes that its recommendations, taken as a whole,
will enable the U.S. to sustain its position as the world's leading
space-faring nation. Presidential leadership and guidance, coupled with
a more effective interagency process and especially with improved
coordination between the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community, are essential if the Nation is to promote and protect its
interests in space. We thank the committee for its interest and
leadership in this important area and look forward to working with you
in the future as you consider the implementation of our
recommendations.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Allard. Thank you, General. I have some members
here that have shown up. I want to recognize my ranking member,
Senator Reed, for an opening statement if he so wishes.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I will put my statement in the
record.
Prepared Statement by Senator Jack Reed
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to join with Senator Allard in
welcoming the members of the Space Commission to the Armed Services
Committee. I, too, want to thank each of you here today, as well as
your colleagues who were unable to be here, for your service to
Congress and the Department of Defense by sitting on this commission.
Charged with examining the management and organization of space for
today and the future, the commission looked both at national security
space organization and issues, as well as the interactions between the
military and the larger space community.
The unanimous organizational recommendations of the commission's
report would, if implemented, set the Defense Department on a course to
have a more integrated, far more independent, space community. We look
forward to discussing these organizational recommendations and the pros
and cons of implementation.
We are already aware of discussion and debate on several of the
recommendations dealing with the organization and management of space
including:
the recommendation to have two acquisition executives
for the Air Force;
the recommendation to have the Air Force be the
executive agent for space and have Title 10 responsibility to
organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained offensive
and defensive operations in air and space; and
the recommendation to create an Under Secretary of
Defense for Space, Intelligence, and Information.
Other recommendations appear to be less controversial such as:
assigning responsibility for command of the Air Force
Space Command to a four-star officer other than CINCSpace/
CINCNORAD; and
ending the practice of assigning only Air Force
flight-rated officers to the position of CINCSpace/CINCNORAD.
The commission recognizes that both the military and civil uses of
space will increase and that the U.S. Government's reliance on space
for national security will become more closely tied to commercial space
assets. As a result, the United States must prepare for this growing
global dependence and reliance on space. Potentially, one of the most
important recommendations in the commission's report is the need for
the United States to participate actively in shaping the space legal
and regulatory environment. The commission concluded that in order to
protect the country's interest, the United States must promote the
peaceful use of space, monitor activities of regulatory bodies, and
protect the rights of nations to defend their interests in and from
space.
The commission examined United States objectives for space and how
to organize and manage for future national security space issues. We
look forward to discussing all of the commission's conclusions and
organizational recommendations.
Senator Allard. Senator Smith, my predecessor on this
subcommittee, I wonder if you have any comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB SMITH
Senator Smith. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
your continued leadership on space issues. I certainly thank
the members of the commission.
Senator Wallop, it seems funny to see you on that side of
the table. How does it feel over there?
Senator Wallop. A little bit freer. [Laughter.]
Senator Smith. Although this happens to be the Armed
Services Committee, space offers so much more to the Nation, as
you all know, than just defense. Over the years we have seen
commercial products as simple as velcro spin out of the space
program, so we have come a long way. Global Positioning System
(GPS) is another. I'm sure Senator Akaka, who is a member of
the Armed Services Committee, would be very interested in how
he might be able to get to Hawaii in 45 minutes on a space
plane.
There is all kinds of domestic application, but militarily,
after 42 years as a spacefaring Nation, I think it is time that
we stepped back and assessed our space organization just in
terms of how it affects the national security and, as your
report points out, we know from history that every medium--air,
land, and sea--has seen conflict, and reality indicates space
will be no different, and that is true.
The candlemakers opposed Edison, and so I expect that we
will probably have a lot of opposition, but we are on the
cutting edge. We are right; I think we will look back at this
time 20 or 30 years from now, and we will then be proven right.
We have accomplished a great deal from what is ultimately the
high ground. Ronald Reagan certainly led the way in terms of
the military application, but as we posture for the future
there is a lot more we need to do.
We need to defend our space-based information superiority,
we need to deny our adversaries that same capability to use
against us, and we need to develop better ways to leverage the
potential of space to be more capable and cost-effective, and
most of all we need a strong advocate for military space.
We appreciate all the work of the commission. You are the
Nation's experts. As a matter of fact, I talked to your former
chairman, the Secretary of Defense, this morning about this
very thing. It was a very interesting conversation. I am proud
of your efforts and look forward to working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership.
Senator Allard. Thank you for your leadership in this
issue.
Senator Sessions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Just briefly, I think I can recall what
Secretary Rumsfeld said at the hearing, the question was
something like, do we really have to take warfare to space, and
he said, ``We have had warfare on the land, we have had warfare
on the water, we had warfare in the air, and we are going to
have warfare in space, and we need to be prepared to prevail in
space, and we have that capability, and we must maintain
superiority there.''
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing, and I
look forward to hearing the testimony.
Senator Allard. I thank the Senator from Alabama.
I want to start the questioning with a general question. I
just want to ask the members of the commission what they
thought was the most problematic aspect of the current approach
to U.S. national security space management and organization.
General Fogleman. The most problematic?
Senator Allard. Yes.
General Fogleman. Does anybody want to take that before I
do?
Mr. Graham. I have one comment on that. I remember reading
the history of the Army Air Corps developing in the Army, and
the struggles they had in the 1920s and 1930s being recognized
as an important discipline to our national security, at the
same time they were developing aircraft technology tactics and
strategy for aerial warfare. I think today we face some of the
same challenges with space, which is now largely embedded in
the extremely competent part of our military forces, the U.S.
Air Force, but one that has come from origins of air warfare
and is still largely developed and devoted to air warfare.
We are very fortunate we do have such a competent fighting
force. At the same time, they necessarily have an ambivalence
on the role of space because of that, and because of their
focus historically on air power. Therefore we believe it is
very important, I believe, at least, that it is very important
that the Air Force also acknowledge the necessity of developing
a cadre of officers competent in space and space-related
activities: tactics, research and development, systems and so
on, and that the Air Force nurture and promote that cadre.
To do that we suggest that the Air Force look to the model
of the nuclear Navy. The nuclear-propulsion Navy inside the
U.S. Navy is not a corps, and it certainly is not a separate
service, but it is very much a distinct cadre of extremely
competent and capable people. We thought the Air Force might
use that as a guide to develop the space capability along with,
and not to diminish, but in parallel with its air-fighting
capability.
To my mind, even though I am an engineer and a scientist, I
thought that was one of the most important concerns we have
today, and one of the most important recommendations of the
commission.
Senator Allard. Thank you. In light of this question, maybe
I ought to give other commission members an opportunity to make
any comments they may want to have as far as the commission
report is concerned.
Senator Wallop.
Senator Wallop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Smith.
Thank you for having the foresight and energy to essentially
establish this commission, because I think it was a help. What
we found was the Nation with all kinds of space skills and no
space focus, no place, no organizational structure around which
it could focus, no place for a champion. Congress reflects
that. Minimally it requires six committees to get anything
approved for space, as many as 16, it can be, and Congress is
merely a reflection of the executive branch's lack of focus on
it.
Most of the commission's recommendations go towards
streamlining that and putting sites of attention in place,
beginning with the Office of the President, because absent the
strong advocacy from the Office of the President, the same
chaos we currently have will prevail.
But one of the things that has not been mentioned and needs
to be is, there is a little bitty paragraph in here about
Congress. I was anxious to be more aggressive in that, but my
colleagues were more tender-hearted towards those who had
established us. But seriously, Congress does need to look at
how it views space and how it organizes itself to do that,
because there is no space champion.
I mean, Senator Smith, you have been, but there is--the
ability for Congress to focus between the two Houses, let alone
within each House, is virtually nonexistent. You have the
Budget Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate
Appropriations Committee, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Commerce Committee, and on and on, all of which have slightly
different views.
If the Nation is going to come together, and what we hope
will reflect what comes out of the executive branch, Congress
needs to look inward and see if it can't perhaps establish a
little, joint commission or committee between the two Houses to
make recommendations to the major committees.
But my own view would be that, having served on both the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed
Services Committee, I believe the Senate Armed Services
Committee ought to be the sole authorizing body, that the
Select Committee on Intelligence ought to be oversight, and
that there ought to be cross-fertilization of membership that
would make it possible for those who are on the Intelligence
Committee to be heard in the process of authorization and
appropriations. But we just have to streamline this process.
Senator Allard. General Moorman, did you have any comments
on problematic aspects of what is happening now, or maybe even
on the commission report generally?
General Moorman. General Fogleman covered the breadth of
our report pretty comprehensively. I thought I might touch on a
couple of thematics to put into context our findings and
recommendations, and one of them speaks to what Senator Wallop
said. Given the criticality, dependency, our vulnerability, and
the absolute importance to space for our economy, as well as
our national security, a way of thinking about our
organizational recommendations and our themes is that in all
cases we raise the level at which space was considered within
the bureaucracy.
As Senator Wallop spoke to, it starts with the President
and the national space policy, but that is an extremely
important theme. We concluded that there was not focus, and the
focus certainly was not at a high enough level.
Another thematic, which I personally believe needed
attention, was the issue of the interdependency of the various
space sectors. It is a part of the criticality of space to the
country that Senator Smith pointed out in spades, and that is
that we have four space sectors: military, intelligence, civil,
and commercial.
Our commission primarily addressed the military and the
intelligence sectors, but our group was fairly critical of the
interagency process that we have seen over the course of the
last 10 years or so in addressing critical space issues that
affect all four of those sectors. If you consider those sectors
as in a Venn diagram, they are all converging, and almost all
issues have some implication across those four sectors. We have
to do a better job in working the intra-agency process.
A third issue or thematic that I would like to emphasize
General Fogleman spoke to, that is the issue of the science and
technology resources of the country and the industrial base of
the country. The words that we use in the report are, the U.S.
Government must pay attention to stimulating the industry and
ensuring we have the proper training and talent to continue to
be the premier spacefaring nation in the world. We saw in the
course of our study some significant erosion in that position
over the past several years.
Finally, space in a strictly military sense is absolutely
crucial to the transformation of the U.S. military. I think
over the course of this congressional cycle you are going to
hear a lot about transformation and a lot about revolution in
military affairs and those kinds of things. Every one of the
vision documents and every one of the concepts of operations
all depend upon space as the enabler for information or
decision superiority.
So again, I want to join General Fogleman and Senator
Wallop in commending you, Senator Smith, for getting this going
and Congress for shining a bright light on this crucial issue.
Senator Allard. Mr. Davis, did you have anything you would
like to add?
Mr. Davis. Yes, sir, just a few comments. The conclusions
of the commission were unanimous. I am as appreciative as
anybody else for work that Senator Smith and this committee
took. It is important for the country.
But I am a little concerned as we look across the four
sectors of space, military, intelligence, defense, and civil.
General Moorman mentioned the civil and the interagency
process, we are maybe not focusing enough on the commercial
sector. I say that because we are a commission that focused on
the organization and management of the U.S. Government side of
all this. The Defense Department and the intelligence community
do not invent technologies, they do not design satellites, they
do not build space hardware. Increasingly the commercial world
is operating space hardware on a contract basis for the Defense
Department, and that is fine, but that is a critical role for
the commercial sector.
I went through the report, and these are just simply quotes
straight out of our report in terms of our conclusions with
regard to the commercial sector, and they are not presented as
such in one place, but when they are taken together, I think it
is a fairly compelling statement.
The first quote is that ``the U.S. Government has no
comprehensive approach towards incorporating commercial and
civil space capabilities into its national security space
architecture.''
Second, ``the U.S. Government does not have well-defined
policies to enhance the competitiveness of the commercial and
civil industries.''
Third, ``privatizing the maintenance and operations of the
launch infrastructure is a valid consideration as long as the
U.S. Government retains control of certain governmental
functions such as critical safety decisions.''
Fourth, ``the U.S. industry deserves timely responses from
the U.S. Government in the approval or denial of licenses.
Unfortunately, the current process produces long delays in
licensing approval. Delay is damaging to U.S. industry in
today's fast-paced international markets.''
Fifth, ``DOD builds capabilities that could be perhaps more
economically provided by the commercial sector. DOD should buy
commercial services and products unless a unique requirement
can be justified.'' There is imagery, communications, launch
infrastructure, several areas.
Finally, and it basically summarizes all of these, ``the
U.S. Government as a consumer, a regulator, or an investor is
currently not a good partner to the national security space
industry.''
So my point in all this is that we were not invented to go
address the relationship of the commercial sector. As Congress
and this committee in particular are considering the approaches
that must be taken and the legislation that must be passed to
implement the commission's findings, you must pay special
attention to how these are going to play out, because
ultimately the government can structure itself however it
wants, but industry is going to have to go build and operate
much of what the government needs in the future.
General Fogleman. Sir, I would just very briefly say the
following. There were problematic issues on two levels. One was
a strategic level, the other a tactical. On the strategic level
it has been stated across the table here from the commissioners
there was just a lack of high-level focus at the national level
to bring this together.
If you go look at our space program, an analogy for an
aviator is that in terms of national attention and focus, this
thing is on auto pilot. It is what is going on within each
stove pipe. There is no real focus, and we try to address that.
On the tactical level, and here we get down within the Air
Force, I think there was a real lack of appreciation of the
uniqueness of space, and it was not that anybody was trying to
be evil. I think it was that folks were trying very hard to
integrate space and air operations, but again, it is analogous
of what happened with the U.S. Army Air Corps and the United
States Army in the 1920s and 1930s. We all know the stories.
Aviators were looked upon just the same as any other officer,
or any Army officer. There were years that they still had to
wear their spurs when they went to fly or they were out of
uniform.
Well, we think we picked up on a few of those kinds of
things, and so on that level this appreciation of the
uniqueness of space was really what drove us to make some
recommendations relative to organization and management.
Senator Allard. Mr. Graham, I expanded the question a
little bit after you made your comments. Did you have anything
further you wanted to say?
Mr. Graham. No, Senator.
Senator Allard. Let me go ahead and call on Senator Reed
now to ask questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your great work on the space commission. Let me
raise a general question, and ask you to respond. Is it your
recommendation that the United States should have the ability
to develop and deploy the means to defer and defend against
hostile acts directed at our space assets, and also against the
use of space hostile to the United States and our national
interests? Many might read this as a mandate or a strong
recommendation to weaponize space. Is that your conclusion that
we do that? General Fogleman, you might start, or General
Moorman.
General Fogleman. Tom, do you want to start?
General Moorman. No, we do not see it in the context of a
mandate. I think Senator Smith mentioned it and others. We made
a major point in our findings to take a historical sweep and
look at the fact that every medium has been an arena for
conflict, and if that is in the future, and because of our
tremendous dependency and our vulnerability, we must develop
the capability to deter and to defend. In the view of the
commission, it is irresponsible not to worry in that kind of
context.
But no, the emphasis in our report was not weaponization of
space, but rather to make sure that we can deter and defend our
critically vulnerable assets now, and things which we are
tremendously vulnerable.
Senator Allard. General Fogleman.
General Fogleman. Yes, Senator. I think what we were really
trying to do here was alert people to the fact that the ability
to restrict or deny freedom of access to operations in space is
really no longer limited to global military powers. This
capability can be bought. This capability is being talked about
by folks today.
One of the things that we quote was a July 2000 news agency
report that China's military is developing methods and
strategies for defeating the U.S. military in high-tech and
space-based future wars. We went back and looked, for instance,
at the pager incident here in the United States, and while we
have no reason to believe that that was a hostile act,
interestingly enough we have no way to prove that it was not.
We talked to the Commander in Chief of the Space Command, he
confirmed that that is the situation today, and we think that
this is unacceptable.
I think if you were to ask us to prioritize what are the
things that we want to do first to start us down this path, the
first thing that we believe, and I think I speak for the entire
commission here, is that we need to improve our space
situational awareness. That used to be called space
surveillance, but it is the idea that the United States of
America ought to know any time anybody sends something into
space, what it is, what its function will be, and we ought to
be able to track that at all times. That is the beginning,
situational awareness.
Senator Reed. How far are we away from that capability?
General Fogleman. I would tell you again, based on
testimony, this is a capability that is eroding every day. We
have a space surveillance system. It is inadequate because, of
course, more and more objects are being put into space. It is
taxing old technology and, quite frankly, again, General
Moorman and others here may have more technical knowledge of
this, but this to me is an area in which we need to invest some
money.
General Moorman. Can I approach that for a bit, Mr.
Chairman? You asked a question, a pretty provocative question
at the beginning about what is problematic. In my view, the
thing I worry the most about in this context is exactly what
General Fogleman is talking about. That is that right now,
because our space situational awareness has eroded, and it
never was all that great, our tendency will be to explain away
events as natural phenomena. As General Fogleman points out,
the ability of a multitude of countries, or non-state actors to
interfere with these assets is here today.
I just want to reinforce what General Fogleman said. I
worry that we will not be able to do that without significant
investment. If I had to put at the top of the list the thing
that you want to do to be able to go down that path to better
deter and defend, it is to understand what is going on up
there, and what the threats are to your systems.
Senator Wallop. Senator, could I just make a few quick
observations on that, because it is a good question, and the
language of it is always troublesome, but the right of self
defense has never been argued in this world in any of the
treaties or any other place.
We have seen, I think General Fogleman or General Moorman
mentioned, that the Chinese had it in the papers, that they
were going to try to develop the ability to interfere with our
military capacity, but this country's dependence on space for
its civilian commercial status is enormous, to say nothing of
its military status.
We see, for example, the Russians marketing a little thing
that--there are photographs of it--that can neutralize GPS. It
does not have a big area of effect, but if you were to walk
into the middle of Kennedy Airport and affect GPS, you would
play havoc with the stuff, our banks, our stock markets, our
telecommunications, all kinds of other things, so the more
dependent we are, the more vulnerable we are, the more certain
it is we are going to have to find the means to defend these
assets.
Going way back to Eisenhower, there has always been the
statement that we will not yield sovereignty. An attack on any
of our assets in space would be viewed as an attack on national
sovereignty. It is the same thing we do in the seas. We talk
about the peaceful oceans and provide it by use of our military
powers. We secure it for a lot of other nations besides
ourselves.
At some moment in time we are going to have to realize our
dependence on it has grown to such an extent that, were we to
walk away from it, we would create a vulnerability the likes of
which this country has probably never known.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, might I add one comment to that?
There is an American in space right now as we are sitting here,
and unless the universe as we know it changes drastically there
may well be an American in space from here on out with the
space station up there.
I think it is in the American psyche that, wherever we are
in the world, as long as we are law-abiding citizens and going
about our business, that if we get in trouble the State
Department will show up to ask a question about us and, if
necessary, the Rangers or somebody will be sent in to get us,
and that is the typical American attitude, I think, if you go
out and talk to somebody on the street.
How do we do that in space? It is an issue to grapple with.
There is an American there now, and most likely will continue
to be an American there.
Weapons in space does not necessarily mean a physical
weapon in space. When we talked about space in the commission,
we talked about end-to-end, ground-to-ground, and it is into,
through, and from space. The simplest solution to a space
problem may be to attack a ground station here on earth, or
some other approach to some system problem that affects space,
so it is simply not necessarily ordnance in space when you talk
about the ability to protect American interests, but that is a
problematical issue, Mr. Chairman, as you define it.
Mr. Graham. Senator, I think Senator Wallop has put this in
the right context, first, that the U.S. does have both an
obligation and a right to protect ourselves from hostile uses
of space and, second, in drawing the analogue with our Navy,
one can argue that our blue water Navy has militarized the
oceans. I would not object to that characterization, but I
certainly would point out that the safest regions of our oceans
and the international oceans generally are where our U.S. Navy
has a presence, and the most dangerous regions of the oceans
are where they have the least presence. I believe space will be
much that way as well.
In fact, for example, if the Iraqis had been able to
observe, from space or otherwise, the left hook formation that
we used in the Persian Gulf War so successfully, that would
have been a much more bloody battle with questionable outcome
had they had the assets to observe that from space, I would at
least have argued that we should have taken them out, either by
ground communications or by space systems, if necessary.
So I come to the view that having the U.S. able to protect
its interests is the dominant issue, and that has, in fact,
served the purpose of the peace for going on two centuries now,
and that we should do that in space, and that may from time to
time require placing weapons in space, and in those
circumstances we should by all means do it.
Senator Reed. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
General.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Graham, let me just pick right up on that. I think, I
guess, we might take the view that if somebody's going to
militarize space, it might as well be us, since we know that we
will use it for peaceful purposes as opposed to the purposes of
some other aggressor nation.
I think we also have to be careful to draw a distinction,
as I think we always do--we talk about weaponization of space
between defensive weapons and offensive weapons. It may come to
offensive, but what we are looking for right now for the most
part in the immediate future are defensive, such as the space-
based laser which can nail a missile in the boost phase, and I
think, I guess, as we talk about those types of capabilities, I
think we need to look at whatever impediments there may be in
international law on that and maybe the panel could speak to
that.
Senator Wallop, I have heard you speak to it before, but do
you see any impediments in international law that would cause
us to have problems even in defensive weapons in space?
Senator Wallop. The answer is, no, but we come perilously
close to it on a number of occasions. Most of the treaty
regimes that control the peaceful use of space and other things
are essentially arms control, and arms control is for the
prevention or the hoped-for prevention of hostilities, but
there is nothing in arms control that says that if it does not
control, and hostilities break out, that a nation must submit
to defeat rather than defend itself.
Going back to Eisenhower, they asserted that there is no
prohibition on nonaggressive military activity in space, and
that was after the Soviets launched Sputnik, which they claim
to have done us a great favor, because there was an argument as
to whether your sovereign space was directly over your
territory or whether, like in the sea, you have a 5-mile limit
or something, and when the Soviets launched Sputnik and it went
around the world, it automatically said that space is an ocean.
It is a free place.
The ABM treaty has limits. The outer space treaty all talk
to it, but they do not prohibit military activity in space that
is nonaggressive, and the commission is not sitting here
suggesting that we start putting or posting nuclear weapons in
space. Those are prohibited, but military weapons in space,
defensive ones are not prohibited.
Senator Smith. I think just to elaborate on that point a
little bit, when you look at some of the technology we have in
space satellites, commercial satellites, weather satellites,
military satellites, you have them all up there, and if
somebody has the capacity, whether it is Saddam Hussein--if
Saddam had had that capacity in the Persian Gulf War, we could
have been in some deep trouble, so I think we have to be
careful in terms of the definition of offensive and defensive,
in terms of, for example, to incapacitate some capability that
Saddam Hussein or any other world leader might have to mess
around with our communications.
Senator Wallop. Senator, if I could just interject, the
Indonesians, using stuff that is said to have been purchased at
Radio Shack, are able to disable a Chinese satellite going over
them on its routine daily cycle, so if we were to be denied the
capacity of our surveillance satellites for warfare or for the
prevention of warfare, that would clearly be of great concern.
Senator Smith. Thank you. I wonder if I could just ask one
more question, and see if I could ask if each of you could give
me a specific response.
You made a very strong point in your report that a big
problem that we face today is a lot of catch-up budget
shortfalls across the gamut, from readiness--you name it,
military pay, all of it--and we have to make up that ground,
and when you are trying to move forward into the future and get
started, you talked about the budget shortfall, and you also
talked about consolidating management, but to consolidate
management is not enough, obviously.
I wonder if you could give me a specific recommendation on
what we would do to move--assuming we could consolidate
management--that is, I suppose a big assumption, but assuming
we could, pretty quickly, where should we go with dollars now,
knowing that those dollars are going to be competing with other
dollars out there now for the other priorities? Where should we
go right now to try to get us started to get where Billy
Mitchell was 70, 80 years ago, and move forward, to get our
foot in the door budgetarily?
Senator Wallop. Can I just have one quick word? Others are
far more skilled than I am in the appropriations process, but
the chairman, now Secretary, was frequently able to say in the
middle of our hearings, you say that you do not get any money
for space, but I am sitting here and asking the question, money
for what?
Part of it is, the lack of focus has never been able to
bring us to the point where we went to OMB and said, we need
money for this thing, to do this civic purpose, and a big part
of the failure has been that we were not able to define what it
was we would achieve out of that which we hoped to get
appropriations for, and his feeling was much like the movie,
Field of Dreams: ``If you build it, they will come.'' If we
define it and can make the case for its use, we can probably
get it approved and appropriated.
General Fogleman. I have already, Senator Smith, alluded to
one area that I think, if we are able to achieve savings, or
even if there is additional money that comes clearly once there
is national attention and priority and some focus on this
people will see the departure point has to be this space
information superiority idea, this idea that you have to know
what is up there.
That is a departure point for everything, and then you go
from there, so I think improving the space situational
awareness, at least from my standpoint and my background, would
be the first place that I would start to put some dollars.
Senator Smith. Good answer.
Mr. Graham. Senator Smith, I would certainly look at some
of the systems capabilities that space presents us. For
example, ballistic missiles are already offensive weapons that
transit space, so in that sense, space was weaponized by Werner
von Braun and the Third Reich in 1944.
However, space presents the opportunity to defend ourselves
against those weapons, and I would certainly put much more
emphasis on the space component of ballistic missile defense
than has been put on to date.
I would also try to extend our reconnaissance coverage of
critical areas of the earth to a continuous surveillance so
that we know what is going on not only on periodic revisits but
on a continuous basis, making denial, deception, and so on much
more difficult, but underlying all of this I would come back to
the cadre issue.
The first dollar I would put towards space from this point
forward would be in making sure that I had a cadre of the best
students our schools had to offer, with the best experience
that our country has to provide them, to oversee and operate
and develop our space systems. I think very good people can
make a lot of things work--a lot of organizations and a lot of
challenges, but if you do not have the best people there on a
long-term basis, all the money in the world is not going to
help.
General Moorman. I want to concur with what my colleagues
have said, particularly on the space surveillance area, and Dr.
Graham's comments about a space cadre, and paying attention to
the people issue, if I think about it in a programmatic and a
non-programmatic or non-hardware context.
I will add one on non-hardware that I think goes hand-in-
glove with General Fogleman's comments on situational
awareness, and that is on the people side of putting more
emphasis on the analytical and assessment process of what is
going on in space.
On the programmatic side, I would add to the statements
that have been made that our continued competitiveness in the
space business on the commercial side is tied in many respects
to the cost of getting into orbit. Right now it's
extraordinarily expensive, and we have been very slow in being
able to drive that cost down. There are programs on the books,
but we continue to have to work on that, I believe.
Then an area which is not a high-value thing, but has not
had a lot of emphasis, and that is trying to protect your space
assets. In this case I'm talking about space across the board,
from the ground assets, to the launch, to the command and
control, to the actual satellite, to the processing. We have to
try to protect a little bit against what I would consider the
cheap shot, or the inexpensive asymmetrical threats.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, one other comment on that. I agree
with General Moorman, especially on launch, and there are some
things in the budget this year like orbital express and a small
DARPA program, some innovative things I would encourage you to
take a look at. But one area, I think is important, and back to
my earlier comments, putting more with industry and relying on
industry more, and I believe some funding increases initially
will eventually pay for themselves in both communications and
imagery.
It is very difficult for military organizations to feel
comfortable up front taking the chance of saying no, I'm not
going to rely on military imaging, no, I'm not going to rely on
military communications to support military operations, so the
funds don't flow to purchase communications and commercial
imagery as they should for the system to rely and say yes, in
fact, we can rely on this, and take the Government assets and
go be truly innovative and spend the savings to go do things
that really push the state-of-the-art.
So one of the places we need to consider putting some more
money up front--and I know there is a proposal, and the money
got diverted elsewhere, especially in imagery, was to go
purchase more commercial imagery that is out there. There are
some really tremendous commercial technologies out there that
the Department just at the moment cannot take advantage of.
Senator Allard. Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
say hello to the witnesses here, and it is good to see all of
you here, and good to see Malcolm back on the Hill in a
different capacity.
I want you to know that in my tenure in Congress, when I
was a Member of the House, I have taken an active interest in
our space programs. As a matter of fact, I was a member of the
House Space Caucus, and a chairman of the caucus, and Newt
Gingrich replaced me as chairman of the caucus in the House,
and so I am pleased to see that this report focuses on
organization and management as a first step in assessing our
current space policy with respect to national security.
If I made any mark in the House, one was in the space
program, and the bill that was passed when President Reagan was
there was commercializing space activities, and it was a time
when we were running out of money, and so the way to do it was
to get the private sector involved in that, so this has been my
interest in space, and it is now on this subcommittee.
Of course, I am interested in national security, and how it
can be worked into space programs. The commission report
mentions several ways in which a nation or a terrorist group
might restrict or deny access, or use of space, and currently
available methods include denying access to ground-based
reconnaissance targets, or masking their signatures, or
attacking ground stations or jamming satellite communications,
and this is my question. If we have limited resources, which
threat should we focus on the most, low-tech risks, mentioned
above, or space-based threats such as micro satellites or
nuclear detonations in space? Can you respond to that?
General Fogleman. Senator, I will take it initially, if
that is good, and then I will ask my colleagues.
I think that the primary area that we would probably want
to start with is in this area of threat analysis. There simply
has not been enough threat analysis done so that we can
prioritize these threats. We can postulate how perhaps some
nation that has a ballistic missile capability and a crude
nuclear weapon could put a nuclear weapon into space and
disrupt through radiation the ability of a whole range of
satellites to operate.
There is the terrorist-based threat, if you will, and so
there are a variety of threats that have been described in
general terms but, quite frankly, the hard analytical work
really has not been done. It starts to tell you what is most
likely, how should I go about starting to spend my dollars to
defend that. I would put that out and see if any of the other
commissioners have any specifics.
Mr. Graham. I would agree with that very much, and say that
it is going to be an issue of balance when it is worked out
finally. This is chess, and when we move in one direction, our
adversaries will move in another. As we make one aspect of our
space capability secure, they will look for other areas where
they are not so secure, and it will be our challenge as a
country to keep a balance across our space assets both for
survivability and redundancy and back-up capabilities and
others, so that we do not have an Achilles heel in our space
infrastructure.
General Moorman. Senator, I had mentioned earlier a point
that General Fogleman made about the analysis. I guess I would
use an illustration to really hit this home, having been in
this business my entire military career.
During the Cold War, ironically enough we had a very large
stable of space intelligence analysts, and it was all focused
towards the former Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the
Chinese. The irony--and that was a fairly unambiguous threat,
if you will, a fairly understandable, discrete threat. Today,
as has been pointed out by the commissioners, we have tens of
countries that have very sophisticated different kinds of
threats which are ambiguous, often, and the number of people
who worry that issue has decreased to only a handful, a
relative handful, so in this constrained budget arena, I want
to add my voice to General Fogleman's, this is a good
investment and something to understand.
The second point is to reinforce what I said earlier; I
would, given what Dr. Graham said, given that this is a never-
ending spiral of action and reaction, that our first threat,
once I understood the threat a little bit better, I would go
after protecting against what I consider the easiest things for
an enemy to interdict or threaten you and try to fix them. In
many cases they may be relatively low cost, but we have not
done that, that assessment in that kind of manner, and we need
to do that.
Senator Wallop. Just briefly, and it is not quite an answer
to your question, but it bears paying some mind to, one of the
recommendations of the commission is to find a way to become
more dependent on the commercial sector, and the commercial has
some interest in security because of the loss of payload and
because of other kinds of reasons. If we are going to use them,
we are going to have to either make it in their interests to
have some security, or find out how to replace it should we
lose it, and that is part of the analysis, but necessary if we
are going to be increasingly dependent on the private sector
for some of the things we need.
General Fogleman. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might be able
to come back and address--I know I spoke first on this issue,
but if I could raise another issue that perhaps I failed to
emphasize enough in my initial remarks, we as a commission
believe very strongly that one of the biggest threats to future
space capability may be the unintended consequences of well-
intended people signing up to certain treaties and restrictions
today that in and of themselves seem to be very innocent, and
as you go down the road they could end up tying our hands in
ways that would very much limit our ability to continue to be
dominant.
We talk about the fact that one of the reasons we are
pushing for an interagency group of some sort that could
actually formulate and coordinate activities is to ensure that
our representatives that go to domestic international bodies
that deal with these kinds of things really have a
comprehensive feel for what the impact may be. We make that as
a specific recommendation of one of the areas of interest that
should be in there.
General Moorman. If you will permit me, every time I hear
something, it reminds me of something to illustrate the point.
General Fogleman mentioned the signing up for treaties. In
this same area of interagency, we need to be very mindful that
there are periodically international fora that address critical
space issues. We might be denied capability just because we got
out voted, or did not prepare properly. I am thinking of things
like frequency allocation, where we could have lost GPS
frequencies, or orbital assignments, orbital placement, orbital
slots, which get assigned internationally, and that is part of
this process, of this interagency process that needs to address
things. A shot is not fired, or an overt hostile action does
not look apparent, but the impact of some of these decisions in
the international fora has every bit the same effect.
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We just had
the pleasure of meeting with your chairman earlier today, now
our new Secretary of Defense, and that was a pleasure.
Mr. Chairman, are we going to have an opportunity to go
into any kind of executive session, where we could ask some
more sensitive questions?
Senator Allard. In this particular hearing we will not be
going into executive session. I think later on, probably in the
format of the full committee under Chairman Warner,
particularly when we get into the authorization of our defense
structure, we will move more and discuss some of those things
under an executive format.
Senator Bill Nelson. I have a number of questions in that
area, then, but for purposes of this hearing. In your report,
you say, ``to develop and deploy the means to deter and defend
against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against
the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests.'' Tell me about
what you mean, and what ought to be the provisions in the
budget.
We are starting to mark up the budget next week, and there
is some concern. I have already discussed with Senator
Domenici, the Chairman of the Budget Committee, as to whether
or not we are going to have enough allocated in this markup for
defense, so whatever you could share with us at this point
would be most helpful.
General Fogleman. Again, Senator Nelson, this is a question
that was asked, but not precisely in that manner, but when
asked what would be the first place you would want to spend
some money if you wanted to get started on being able to
provide this capability that you have pointed out that we spoke
of, we believe if you are talking programmatically, from a
hardware capability standpoint, that we must improve our space
situation awareness, or what we have called space surveillance
capability. That is, the ability to understand what it is that
people are putting into space, what that spacecraft is intended
to do, can do, etc.
While we have a space surveillance system today, it is
deteriorating. It is not keeping up. It is not giving us the
kind of information that would allow national leadership to be
able to discriminate between perhaps a space weather phenomenon
and a hostile act, and it could then force you into a
situation, as General Moorman earlier stated, where you intend
to be springloaded, to assume that it was some kind of a
natural act, or a non-hostile act, and that may get you into
trouble.
This is really starting to come out in our space wargames.
We are beginning to see the more ambiguity that is associated
with something that happens to vital overhead systems, the more
likely that the participants will escalate and go to the next
level more quickly, and so I think this whole area of space
situational awareness, what we used to call surveillance, so
that we can discriminate and understand what is really
happening, would be an area that we would encourage money to be
spent.
Mr. Davis. Just a brief comment. I agree with everything
General Fogleman said, and there were some comments about
perhaps attacking the launch issue and getting launch costs
down earlier, that General Moorman had brought up, but I just
want to make a comment and be a little bit careful. The
commission itself did not make any recommendations with regard
to funding of any specific programs, and we talked about that.
We spent many hours talking about that, as a matter of fact, so
what you get today is a collective, probably unanimous opinion,
but I just want to make the distinction that the commission did
not recommend any specific funding adjustments in the budget.
I would defer to General Fogleman here as our spokesman,
but as the Government gets better organized and better managed
there will be efficiencies and economies, and the better
programs will bubble to the top and be candidates, would be the
rationale.
Senator Bill Nelson. What we have to do is make sure we
have the resources to have the assets and the replacement for
the assets there, and that decisionmaking process is starting
immediately.
Let me ask you this. After we lost Challenger, the whole
idea of using the space shuttle for launching of payloads that
you needed the man in the loop was changed, so that with
expendables we would put up all of those payloads that you did
not have to have the man in the loop.
Recently, someone has suggested to me that that policy may
be rethought, to start using the space shuttle again for
defense payloads. Do you know anything about this and could you
share any of your thoughts about it, as to why we ought to
change the policy?
General Fogleman. I would like to refer this particular
question, Senator, to General Moorman, who was at the center of
that decision process. I remember very well, because we were in
the Pentagon at the time that the Challenger accident occurred,
and it fell on his shoulders to sort through with NASA and with
the Department of Defense and the people in the White House to
come up with that, so I think he is best qualified to speak to
it.
General Moorman. With that lead-in, I am a little nervous
to say I am not sure I know what is going on in the building
today on that particular issue, but you have accurately stated
the background, and you lived it. A lot of your constituents
are very involved in that business. I do not know where that is
now.
There was a movement when I was still on active duty to
bring a specific payload onto the shuttle and one of the things
that made it desirable, and I guess the only thing I can add to
the debate, not being informed today what is going on, but the
thing that made that desirable is that particular payload had
been designed to be dual-capable. I think you know the
background of that.
The first thing that I would ask if I were still in the
building and in that process is, are the military payloads
dual-compatible, because as you recall--and you lived all of
this as well--the cost to do the redesign for the shuttle is
exorbitant, but having the backup to be able to put them on the
shuttle is a desirable aspect, particularly if we have a series
of accidents like we experienced a couple of years ago with the
expendable launch fleet, but I apologize to you, sir, I am not
aware today as to what they are talking about.
Mr. Davis. Senator, there is a discussion I just happen to
know about, about putting a defense satellite on the shuttle,
and that is somewhat involved in how quickly the EELV is coming
online or not coming online, and how quickly the payload is
needed, but there are some things you need to keep in mind as
you are thinking about anything that is man-rated, putting
certain kinds of satellites in orbit.
When the shuttle was originally going to carry military
payloads there was a shuttle Centaur, and after the Challenger
accident the shuttle Centaur was canceled, which meant that a
lot of the geosynchronous orbit satellites simply could not get
up there with any other final stage because there was not
enough energy to go up there, so there are a whole host of
issues about, even with the best intent on both sides from NASA
and the Defense Department and the intelligence community, some
satellites probably cannot get to where they need to get with a
shuttle launch with the approval process that is in place right
now.
Then a second issue is, how much is it going to cost the
Defense Department to do that, are they going to be charged
only the incremental costs, are they going to be charged the
full amortization cost of it, and there are numbers that are
being--and these are part of the discussions going on in the
Pentagon right now, is it $100 million to launch this satellite
on a shuttle, or is it $250 or $300 million, and my guess is
the Pentagon interest is greatly different, depending on
whether it is a $100 million or $300 million answer.
Then just a final comment. When the Challenger had its
accident there were payloads that originally had been designed
to go on an expendable launch vehicle in the national security
community that then fairly large sums were spent to reconfigure
them and the design process to go on the shuttle, and then
there was the Challenger accident, and then additional large
sums were spent to move it back to expendable. There are still
people running around that remember that.
Second, there are still people running around that remember
the difficulties with not being able to have a shuttle Centaur,
and then having to go back and figure out how they get their
payloads into orbit, and then finally, the Defense Department,
most people do not realize that--you all would, but as a
defense supplemental, the Government-wide supplemental moved
through, about $1 billion was moved out of the Defense
Department and moved in to pay for the replacement, so there is
a long history there, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is why I raised the question,
really, to fire a shot across the bow that we do not need to be
going back and changing this policy back and forth unless the
national security is at stake, and then if that is the case,
then let us pony up. Let us do whatever we have to.
Senator Allard. Let me just interrupt here just a little
bit. I have been told by the staff that the only payload that
we had scheduled to go up was the DSP satellite, which was an
early warning satellite, and everything else now is scheduled
on the Titan IVs.
Also, Senator Nelson, you had some questions you wanting to
cover in a closed format. We can make arrangements, if you
like, for you to meet, not in this hearing but afterwards, or
at some other time. Then you could ask your questions, if you
would like, at that particular time, because time is running
out.
Senator Bill Nelson. I will just defer until that point.
Senator Allard. Very good.
We are back on a second round of questions, and now let me
ask this question about the role of the Air Force. Some people
felt that the space assets and our national security space
management issues were not that well-handled in the Air Force
because they were focusing on Air Force issues and not space.
Then in your recommendation you are recommending an
increase in the Air Force's role and authority on national
security management. Would you address that?
General Fogleman. It may be self-serving for me to take the
question, but I will start out, sir, if I could, because I
think that the commission's finding on this is really related
to the fact that we believe that space is eventually going to
become a medium for combat much like air, land, and sea.
We feel strongly that our Nation needs a military service
to organize, train, and equip, with organize, train, and equip
responsibilities for space if this is going to occur, the
military functions required for deterrence and defense of our
interest in space, and so for that reason I believe the
commission ruled out of assigning any kind of space
responsibility to a DOD agency or an Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space or anything of that nature.
Another option would have been for us to create perhaps a
Space Corps, or some kind of a new Space Department. We had a
lot of debate, a lot of discussion on this, but in the end I
think we came to a consensus that the step would have been
premature at this time, quite frankly because there just was
not sufficient space center mass, or the space cadre in place
to justify a corps or a department.
So that left us with the next best choice of assigning the
responsibility to an existing service and, since the Air Force
was the place that had over 85 percent of the resources in the
space business, they already reside there, we thought that what
we would do is focus on what it was that the Air Force needed
to do to perhaps be a better steward of space, and so I would
say that those were things that went into the decision.
I would also say that the commission agrees that the Air
Force's performance in space up to this point, there was a
legitimate question. Whether it was perceived or a reality,
there was a legitimate question, and so if the Air Force does
not step up to their responsibilities, and if it does not step
up to the recommendations in this commission report, then we
think that that will actually hasten the day in which there
will be a space corps, or there will be a separate department.
I think I spoke for the commission on that, and that is
fundamentally where we came from, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Does anybody else want to comment further
on that?
OK, then. I would like to have you comment a little bit
about the role within the Army and Navy as far as our space
assets. There is some concern within these two agencies about
their ability to protect some of their legitimate service base
equities, and how would you recommend that the DOD address
those concerns from the Department of the Navy and Department
of the Army?
General Fogleman. Again, I will field it and allow the
other commissioners to grade my answers, but we discussed this,
and I will tell you that one of the things that impressed all
of the commissioners about our chairman was that he was
meticulous in drawing out everyone's equity in this business,
and he wanted to make sure that these issues were discussed.
We had representation on the commission. We had two senior
Army officers, retired Army officers. We had a retired Admiral,
Dave Jeremiah from the Navy, so equities were represented
around the table, but more importantly, as we went through the
discussion we came to the conclusion that for the purposes of
stating requirements and developing unique systems for those
services, nothing would change. In other words, the Army and
the Navy would still have the requirement to go out and develop
their own requirements, develop their program.
The only thing that changes under what we recommended was
that their programs, if you will, would be reviewed by the
Under Secretary of the Air Force, the head of the NRO, who is
now the single acquisition authority within the Air Force and
NRO for space matters, so that they could rationalize timing.
For instance, one of our concerns has always been the Army
and the Navy, the Army more than the Navy because the Navy
does, in fact, involve itself with developing and launching
constellations. Normally, the Army's involvement is more in
terms of equipment to exploit satellites that are on orbit, and
so the idea was, we want to make sure that the programs are
synchronized, that when we put a satellite up there, that the
using service has, in fact, bought the equipment to utilize it.
So it was for that reason that we have this, not approval
authority, but a rationalization and coordination authority
that we recommended be part of this process. Bottom line,
nothing changes for the Army and Navy other than the fact that
they have to submit their programs for review.
Is there anything anybody else would like to add?
General Moorman. That is a comprehensive answer. I want to
reinforce the issue of being concerned about the equities of
the other services. We talked a lot about confidence-building
measures. Some of the things that we thought about and talked
about was the national security space architect function, which
under our report we recommend gets folded underneath the Under
Secretary of the Air Force and the DNRO.
That is a joint activity, and we even went down to the
point of getting joint credit for that activity to make sure
the Army and the Navy would be induced to want to participate
in that activity.
Another area is a movement probably to make all of the
common user satellite systems joint system program offices, and
offering those opportunities for the other services.
Finally, the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Space, Intelligence, and Information, if it were to be enacted,
gives the other services a court to bring their case below the
Secretary of Defense. When you have to raise it to that level
it gets a pretty high threshold.
So those are three of the things we did talk about, and I
agree with General Fogleman, is because other than the one
system the Navy builds today, the other services are primarily
in the application, and in the buying of the terminals, and
those still stay in their budget and still are totally within
their purview. The only thing that changes is a review process
through the Under Secretary, and Director, National Counsel's
office.
Senator Allard. Mr. Graham.
Mr. Graham. Senator Allard, I agree with my colleagues, but
I would reaffirm that what we tried to do with the Air Force
was really acknowledge in a somewhat more structured way the
authorities and responsibilities that the Air Force already has
in space. At the same time, the role of the other services, the
Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps in space was one of my
greatest concerns in the way we were structuring it.
It is not a small issue to address those concerns, and to
try to do what we could to keep the other services from
ignoring or underestimating the benefit that space could bring
to them, we attempted to recommend that the service-unique
capabilities, the ground equipment, or implementation
equipment, for example, ship equipment, should be left with the
services, the other services have the opportunity to propose
and even develop satellite systems in which they have the
majority of the equities, and that they also develop a cadre,
undoubtedly smaller than the Air Force, but nonetheless skilled
and experienced, in space-related activities.
They can do that both through their own programs and
through joint activities in the services, but personally one of
my greatest worries about our recommendation, for which I have
no solution, is that if we end up with an Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps that in the long run is clueless about space, we
are going to be greatly disadvantaged compared to what we could
be.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, the words my colleague used about
the Under Secretary of the Air Force was review of Army, Navy,
Air Force programs. I think that is the word. It is not
dictatorial. The Air Force Under Secretary will not have
authority over the requirements. Normal requirements process
will still take place through the JROC and the other mechanisms
that are there. I think one of the places in the report, we use
the word harmonized, that the Under Secretary of the Air Force
has the responsibility to harmonize.
If that individual is not happy, he should immediately go
to the Under Secretary of Defense to start working at the
Secretary of Defense level, but it will cut both ways, because
there have been instances in the past in the case of MILSTAR.
The Air Force was funding MILSTAR, and one of the other
services just unilaterally cut out the terminal money. Issues
like that need to get sorted out at the acquisition stage.
There is no point in buying a satellite if there are no
terminals, and those issues need to be bubbling up in the
process, and that is what this Under Secretary of the Air Force
should be able to do.
A second issue would be, one of the first programs, and we
did not talk about this as a part of the commission, but
clearly one of the first examples would be the Navy's MUOS
program. That is a common user DOD space communications system
who, under the new--if our recommendations are ultimately in
place, would be responsible for doing that.
There is nothing to preclude the Navy from saying, this
program is so important we will budget it, we will set up the
program joint office, and these offices are to be joint offices
for the common user systems, and we will provide the 06 as the
program manager, and that 06 would report, then, to the Under
Secretary of the Air Force, who is ultimately the acquisition
authority.
So the services can have as large a role as they want to
push in the system to do this, but it also works both ways,
that the Under Secretary of the Air Force should have some
clout, then, as the harmonizer of all these, to go back to the
fellow services and say, you are not buying the terminals to
step up to go with the satellite, if necessary.
Senator Allard. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Fogleman, you have made it explicitly clear that
you see space as a medium for combat. We might be in a unique
historical position, because to my knowledge we have not had
any classical combat yet in space, and that leads me to another
important recommendation of the commission, which is to shape
the regulatory and legal structures so that we have the
peaceful use of space, which means, I recognize non-aggressive
military use of space.
Can you talk about, and your colleagues talk about, some of
the proactive steps we can take to shape this legal and
regulatory structure to perhaps seize this unique moment where
we can set standards that will allow us to protect ourselves
but not to encourage, accelerate the combat in space?
General Fogleman. As you say, Senator Reed, I may be ill-
prepared to be an advocate for this particular thing. I am not
an advocate for combat in space, but my background is not
technical, it is military history, and so I am afraid I am a
bit of a pessimist, although I agree that we should seize
whatever opportunity we can to further the peaceful use of
space.
I will defer to those who perhaps know more of the regimes
that we might want to enter into, but again I think there was a
very real, a very useful analogy made in which we talked about
how we are an advocate for the peaceful use of the sea, and
clearly there are protocols relative to the law of the sea,
what you do with territorial waters, what you do with
international straits, these kinds of things.
I think there are parallels for what goes on in space, but
I think first and foremost, as Senator Wallop said, one of the
things that we who are responsible for the defense of this
Nation need to make sure is that we do not find ourselves in a
position where we lose our right of self defense, so I think
whatever we would do we would want to keep that.
Having said that, I would give anyone who would have a
specific protocol, or whatever, that they would want to
address--quite frankly, during the commission deliberations,
and we did talk about this idea that we need to be proactive in
shaping the international, legal, and regulatory environment,
and we may have been a little remiss in not looking for what
are the opportunities to shape this positively, and we were a
little defensive about how, if we were not engaged, this
unintended consequence could come down on us, and somebody who
was well-intended, representing the United States Government
but not with a coordinated space position, would sign up for
something that in the end was detrimental to our country.
Having said that, are there any other comments, Bill?
Mr. Graham. Senator Reed, I think there are opportunities
for working to peaceful cooperation in space. I would put them
under a few categories, rules of the road being one, how to
deconflict orbits, and other activities in space.
Right now, when we fly the space shuttle, we keep an
imaginary volume around it and in front of it, and maneuver the
space shuttle as necessary so that it does not get too near
objects that are up there. Well, the fewer, or the less junk
that we and other countries put in space, the easier it will be
for everyone to navigate in space, not only the shuttle, but
all systems.
Similarly, allocation of scarce assets in space is
something we could have international cooperation on, orbital
slots, particularly for geostationary orbits. Frequencies that
are used for space communications are certainly a scarce asset.
Safety from space objects. The Mir space station reentry is a
good example of that. We cooperated with the Russians on the
reentry of Mir, and the Russians planned it in such a way that
they tried to avoid populated areas, and so on, and we helped
track that and predict its reentry.
I might mention as a footnote that, on the scarce assets, I
believe Indonesia and Tonga got in a dust-up over certain
geostationary slot asset allocations, and I think one of them
ended up jamming the other satellite until they got it sorted
out, so there has been a bit of a disagreement from time to
time, where such actions as I described could be helpful.
At the same time, personally, I would--and we did not
discus this at length, although we did make a general reference
to it--be very wary of getting into highly constraining arms
control agreements, because I believe many of our potential
adversaries do such agreements as, in fact, a vehicle of
asymmetrical conflict against the United States, wherein they
can be assured we will carry out any terms of these agreements
to the most precise legal definition that can be made, whereas
often they have no intention of adhering to these agreements.
Senator Reed. For the record, Dr. Graham, that was not part
of the commission's deliberations? That was not a conclusion of
the commission?
Mr. Graham. We concluded generally that the U.S. should be
very thoughtful and careful about finding itself entangled or
otherwise engaged in restrictive agreements, the implications
of which we neither had the ability, nor had otherwise thought
through carefully. I believe some of the space arms control
agreements certainly fall into that category.
Senator Wallop. If you look on the cover of our report, you
might see how that represents an object in space that is known
to exist, but I agree that our real purpose, as has been
stated, this rules of the road, there are arms control
agreements now which guide the peaceful use of space, but there
are no really rules of conflict, and I think we would be remiss
if we decided we wanted to sign up for those at those moment in
time.
Senator Allard. Here is the plan right now for the
subcommittee. We are 5 minutes into a 15-minute vote. Senator
Smith says he just has a very brief question. I think you have
about finished your questions, and then what I thought we would
do is go ahead and vote and then, Senator Nelson, give you an
opportunity to ask--we will let you get to a place with some of
the committee staff, and you can ask your questions that need
to be asked off the record.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator, I have a conflict that I have
to go to. I just want to ask one question for the record that
might be responded by their staff.
Senator Allard. Well, let us let General Fogleman quickly
finish his response.
General Fogleman. In one area that I am surprised my
colleague, Mr. Davis, has not responded, Senator Reed, which I
think is very important to help in the commercial arena, we
have seen the first case of a fairly large-scale commercial
constellation where the company has had financial failure, if
you will, and a tremendous amount of liability issues
associated with that. Who is responsible once you put that up
there to deorbit it? What does this really do?
I think these are areas where we could be very
constructive, and be engaged in developing rules of the road
not only for military, but in the commercial side of things, to
help move us along.
Senator Allard. Let me go ahead and call on Senator Smith.
Mr. Davis. Back to your comment, Senator, about we have not
had any conflict yet, General Fogleman pointed out earlier we
do not know, because the weapons may not be bullets and bombs
or photons and electrons, and that is critical that we are able
to detect that and assess it, and today we cannot really do it.
Senator Reed. I do not think anyone argues with your
situational awareness point. That is the most immediate thing
we can do and should do.
Senator Allard. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, given the time to the vote, I
would yield my time to Senator Nelson.
Senator Allard. Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, bless your heart, Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. You have had a little more experience in
space than I do.
Senator Bill Nelson. I would clearly yield it back, but
just the timeliness of this question because of the budget, on
page 28 of your report you say, ``appropriate investments in
space-based capabilities would enable the Department to
pursue,'' and then you list four things, ``improve space
situational awareness, enhance protection defensive measures,
modernize launch capability, and more robust science and
technology program,'' and you list a host of things, and then
you conclude by saying, ``providing those Departments the
additional resources to accomplish these new missions should be
considered as part of the U.S. national space policy,'' and if
you could get your staff to respond to us, quantify that with a
number, because we are going to be doing that next week, it
would be most helpful.
Thank you.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Now we will go ahead and adjourn the meeting. I understand
now you do not think you need this meeting.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is correct.
Senator Allard. But if at a future time you want to do it,
we will see what we can do.
I want to thank the subcommittee members. We tried to get
this moving along. I want to thank the panel for their hard
work, and I think this is a very helpful report, and the
subcommittee will be reviewing it extensively and using it as a
guideline. I expect the administration may very well want to
use it as a guideline. We will keep the hearing record open for
2 additional days for any other comments or questions that need
to be submitted, and unless there is anything else to come
before the subcommittee, we will go ahead and call the
subcommittee adjourned.
[Below are questions for the record submitted by
subcommittee members for this hearing. Due to the Commission to
Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization disbanding shortly before this hearing, answers
have not been supplied for the record.]
Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard
expanding air force dominance in space management
1. Senator Allard. Some have criticized the Air Force for not
adequately advocating the development of space capabilities and
organizations. The assertion is often heard that the Air Force does not
want space power to compete with air power. To what extent do you agree
with this view?
2. Senator Allard. In light of such concerns, how do you explain
the commission's recommendations to increase the Air Force's role and
authority in national security space management?
integration
3. Senator Allard. Recently, the Air Force has focused on ``air and
space integration'' rather than the development of a dedicated space
cadre. DOD and the Intelligence Community have also focused on
integration of air and space intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. How can we achieve the benefits of
integrating space capabilities with other warfighting capabilities
without diluting or undermining the unique aspects of space
capabilities?
space capabilities
4. Senator Allard. The commission's report concludes that, like
air, land, and sea, space will see conflict at some point in the
future. According to the report, ``the U.S. must develop the means both
to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This
will require superior space capabilities.'' Do you believe that we are
currently doing an adequate job in developing such superior
capabilities?
space as military power versus military support
5. Senator Allard. The United States has looked to space assets
primarily to support traditional warfighting capabilities rather than
to provide new warfighting capabilities. Although concepts for
deploying weapons in space are controversial--whether they be for
missile defense, space control, or projecting power onto the surface of
the earth--it may be essential for the United States to deploy such
systems in the future in order to retain its current technological
superiority. How important is it for the United States to develop such
capabilities, and what would be the consequences if we do not?
black-white space integration
6. Senator Allard. The commission made several recommendations to
facilitate closer integration between the intelligence community and
DOD. As a practical matter, how far would you envision such integration
going?
7. Senator Allard. Would you advocate a complete merger of ``black/
white'' space?
micro-satellite technology
8. Senator Allard. Micro-satellite technologies offer the promise
of changing the way we conduct a range of current space missions, and
may also help us develop a number of new capabilities. Did the
commission have a chance to examine the promise of micro-satellite
technology and the adequacy of the current DOD effort in this area?
space-based radar
9. Senator Allard. In my view, the United States has the
technological capability and the operational need to make significant
improvements in space-based surveillance and reconnaissance. Space-
based radar offers the possibility to have a global, 24-hour, all
weather, system for tracking and collecting imagery of many classes of
targets. Is this the kind of capability the United States should be
developing to maintain our ISR advantage?
commercial space
10. Senator Allard. I cannot agree more with your assessment, ``The
U.S. Government, as a consumer, a regulator, or an investor, is
currently not a good partner to the national security space industry.''
I also believe there is a disconnect between the rhetoric of the U.S.
Government for its support and the funding for buys from commercial
industry. I have seen your recommendations, but within those
recommendation what specific steps can we do to rectify this situation?
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
defense of space systems
11. Senator Thurmond. Although increased intelligence collection on
our adversaries' intention against our space platforms is critical, it
seems to me that the Nation has to be prepared to defend our space
systems. What priority should the Nation place on developing anti-
satellite systems to protect our critical space platforms?
international cooperation
12. Senator Thurmond. Although I strongly support international
cooperation on the use of space both for national security and
commercial purposes, I am concerned that the spread of space technology
will increase the risk to our country and our allies. Does the United
States have the necessary controls in place to preclude the inadvertent
loss of sensitive space technology?
immediate priority
13. Senator Thurmond. I want to congratulate the commission on its
series of findings. They are thought-provoking and focused on the
development of a long-range space program to support our national
security. Since the implementation of your recommendations will be a
significant challenge, which of your recommendations should have the
highest priority?
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel Akaka
14. Senator Akaka. Many of the revolutionary changes and advances
in technology called for in the commission report are parts of on-going
research and development efforts. Programs in new launch vehicles,
microsatellites, propulsion systems, and remote sensing are active.
What is the biggest obstacle to technical advances in these areas: more
funding, more people, or better management?
15. Senator Akaka. The commission report states that hostile
actions against space systems can be confused with natural phenomena.
Much research is being done to understand solar and geomagnetic
activity, their signatures, and how they affect spacecraft. This work
enhances our ability to predict and forecast potentially hazardous
events. This is done to distinguish the cause of spacecraft
malfunctions and mitigate adverse effects, as well as to simply
understand our near-earth environment. This is basic, mostly university
and national lab-based, research. This research not only advances our
knowledge and ability to use space, but also trains many space
scientists. Shouldn't this research have as much a priority as that
given in your commission report for new technology and applied research
and development?
16. Senator Akaka. The commission report places a large emphasis on
military and intelligence research and development, which is important
and vital to the Nation. But, a space policy and workforce will also
include civilian and commercial communities. Do you think that
emphasizing the military and intelligence aspect of U.S. space policy
will discourage people who might be attracted to a career in space but
do not want to work on military applications?
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]