[Senate Hearing 107-622]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-622
TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTION: THE MOSCOW TREATY
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 9, 17, 23, and September 12, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing of July 9, 2002
Powell, Hon. Colin L., Secretary of State........................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Secretary Powell by the Committee.............................. 50
Hearing of July 17, 2002
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.... 89
Prepared statement........................................... 90
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense................... 76
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers by the Committee.......... 115
Hearing of July 23, 2002
Adelman, Hon. Ken, Former Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Host of DEFENSECENTRAL.com................. 145
Christiansen, Father Drew, S.J., Counselor, International
Affairs, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops................... 163
Gaffney, Frank J. Jr., President and CEO, Center for Security
Policy, Washington, D.C........................................ 180
Prepared statement........................................... 185
Habiger, Gen. Eugene E., USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command, United States Air Force..................... 138
Prepared statement........................................... 142
Nunn, Hon. Sam, Co-Chair and Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear
Threat Initiative.............................................. 127
Prepared statement........................................... 133
Paine, Christopher E., Co-Director, Nuclear Warhead Elimination
and Nonproliferation Project, Natural Resources Defense Council 166
Prepared statement........................................... 171
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
Hon. Sam Nunn by the Committee................................. 198
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to
General Eugene E. Habiger by the Committee..................... 200
Hearing of September 12, 2002
Goodby, Hon. James E., Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
Studies, the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C............ 226
Prepared statement........................................... 229
Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose, Senior Associate, Russian and Eurasian
and Global Policy Programs, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C........................... 218
Prepared statement........................................... 220
Holdren, John P., Ph.D., Teresa and John Heinz Professor of
Environmental Policy and Director, Science, Technology, and
Public Policy Program, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University............................................. 235
Prepared statement........................................... 239
Ikle, Hon. Fred C., Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, D.C..................... 207
Prepared statement........................................... 208
Perry, Hon. William J., Berberian Professor and Senior Fellow,
Institute for International Studies, Stanford University....... 205
Prepared statement........................................... 206
Sokolski, Henry D., Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, Washington, D.C.............................. 247
Prepared statement........................................... 249
Appendix
Documents Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, Signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002
Text of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions........... 263
Letter of Transmittal............................................ 266
Letter of Submittal.............................................. 268
Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions........................................... 270
TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS: THE MOSCOW TREATY
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TUESDAY, JULY 9, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:32 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., [chairman] presiding.
Present: Senators Biden [presiding], Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Nelson of Florida, Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, and Allen.
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. It is a
genuine pleasure to have the Secretary of State back before us.
I might state for the record that I have been here for a lot of
Secretaries of State and seven Presidents, and this is a man
who when he tells you he is going to do something he does it.
He said he would be available to the committee. Obviously, this
hearing is something for which any Secretary of State would be
available. I just want the record to show that I personally
appreciate not only his willingness to testify as often as he
has, but also his ability to help the hearing reporter. There's
a Secretary of State, I tell you.
Secretary Powell. I do not want him to miss a word.
The Chairman. The thing I am most happy about is he is not
running for the U.S. Senate in Delaware.
But I do want to thank you personally, Mr. Secretary. Never
once have I ever called you and you have not responded. You
always are available and keep me and the committee informed. So
let me say again good morning and welcome.
Today the committee begins its consideration of the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which the
President submitted to the Senate on June 20 for its advice and
consent to ratification. On July the 17 we will take testimony
from the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General
Richard Meyers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Later
hearings on July 23 and September 12 will feature outside
experts.
The treaty signed in May by Presidents Bush and Putin is a
very important step forward in U.S.-Russian relations and
toward a more secure world. Cutting the number of each
country's deployed strategic nuclear warheads from
approximately 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 moves us another
step away from the cold war preparations for massive nuclear
exchange. I applaud the Secretary in particular and President
Bush in particular for their leadership on this issue and the
President for his partnership with President Putin and his
willingness to codify this agreement in a binding treaty, as
the ranking member Senator Helms and I had encouraged.
I must note to my colleagues anecdotally, when we were at
the Police Memorial function which the President attended, I
was on the stage and as the President walked up after having
signed the treaty, he grabbed my hand, and said ``Well, you got
your treaty. Now you owe me.'' That's the reason why he is not
only a good President, but a very good politician.
I do not think I owe him, but I thank the President and the
Secretary of State for making the case this should be in the
form of a treaty. A lot of people forget now this was a
question at one point.
At the same time, there are aspects of the treaty that I
would like very much during these hearings to explore. For
example, the treaty allows the Russians to place multiple
warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, which is
contrary to longstanding U.S. arms control goals. Multiple
warhead ICBM's are a cheap way to maximize Russian forces, but
they are vulnerable because an attacker can destroy those
warheads with only one or two of its own. Russia therefore is
likely to keep those missiles on hair trigger. I would like to
talk about why that seems not to be as relevant as it was
earlier.
The treaty sets no schedule for reductions and provides no
new tools to verify each side's compliance. Russia cannot
afford, as we all know, to maintain the strategic forces, but
without U.S. transparency, however, a weakened Russia could
fear a U.S. attack and keep a nervous finger on the remaining
launch buttons. I would like to talk a little bit about that.
Mr. Secretary, as you see, I have some concerns, and we
have discussed them privately. Senator Lugar and I had a chance
to talk to the President of the United States for about an hour
or so, he and the Vice President, and we raised different
concerns and some of the same concerns about the nature of the
treaty, what it contains, what it means, and what it does not
do.
For example, why does the treaty have no verification
provisions? What is the meaning of Article II, which appears
only to acknowledge the obvious existence of the START Treaty?
How does the administration expect each party to verify the
other party's reductions? What implications flow from the lack
of any timetable in the treaty for reductions prior to December
31, 2012? Since the treaty is scheduled to expire on the first
day that its force reduction requirement takes effect, how
binding will it be in practice?
Why does the treaty not limit tactical nuclear weapons,
which are the most susceptible to theft? Finally, should the
United States help Russia secure and eliminate its warheads
downloaded from delivery vehicles pursuant to this treaty under
the auspices of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
something that Senator Lugar, as they say, has forgotten more
about than most people know, and I think has raised in other
contexts.
Should we provide such assistance even if Russia, like the
United States, chooses not to eliminate many of its warheads?
I would remind our audience, since Secretary Powell is well
aware, that the testimony that he will give today, as well as
the letters and analysis that the President provided to the
Senate with the treaty, will become part of the authoritative
record regarding the meaning and legal effect of the text of
this treaty. For the last decade, the Senate has insisted upon
this understanding with both Republican and Democratic
Presidents.
President Bush, by signing the Treaty on Strategic
Offensive Reductions, has given us a good start, but I believe
this is only a first step in fulfilling the promise for a more
secure future. It is my hope that today's hearing with
Secretary Powell and following hearings that the committee will
hold this month and in September will enable the Senate and the
administration to chart a clear path to strategic stability,
arms reductions and nonproliferation in the coming decade.
In the interest of time, I will stop here; but again thank
the Secretary for his good work. It is my intention, Mr.
Secretary, as I told the President, to move as expeditiously as
we can. I would like very much for the Senate to have this up
before it and to vote on it and ratify this before we leave for
this cycle, and that is my hope and my expectation. I thank you
for being our first witness.
I yield to Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for beginning the
committee's review of the Moscow Treaty in such a timely
manner. The treaty was signed on May 24, transmitted to the
Senate on June 20, and the committee's consideration is
beginning a little more than 2 weeks later. If we continue at
this pace, surely ratification and exchanges of instruments of
ratification are possible before the end of the year.
On May 1, 2001, in a speech at the National Defense
University, President Bush signaled his intention to forge a
new relationship with Russia. The President called for a new
strategic framework to transform our relationship with Russia
``from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on
common responsibilities and common interests.''
Less than 8 months later, President Bush announced his
intention to reduce our nuclear levels unilaterally and invited
Russian President Putin to implement similar reductions. This
was the beginning of a process that led to a treaty signing
during the summit in Moscow. The Moscow Treaty reduces
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level
between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012, and this is a
tremendous accomplishment. It deserves the full support of the
Senate and the Russian Duma. I believe this treaty marks an
important step toward a safer world.
I remember well visiting the START I and START II treaty
negotiations. The U.S. and the Soviet Union faced off against
each other across conference tables for years and they produced
multi-volume treaties and verification annexes that describe in
minute detail the requirements mandated by the treaties. The
Moscow Treaty recognizes that the U.S.-Russian relationship has
turned the corner and our countries are no longer mortal
enemies engaged in worldwide cold war. Our agreements need not
be based on mutual suspicion or an adversarial relationship. We
are partners in the war against terrorism. We continue to build
a strong military and security partnership. The Moscow Treaty
reflects the changing nature of that relationship.
In the past critics of international treaties have sought
to circumscribe treaty provisions they alleged would weaken and
unduly expose U.S. security. Critics of the Moscow Treaty have
chosen a different tactic. They suggest the treaty has not gone
far enough and claim an opportunity was lost. The lack of a
voluminous verification system, the absence of requirements to
dismantle warheads under the treaty, the lack of a reduction
schedule, the failure to address tactical nuclear weapons are
often cited as critical flaws.
To be sure, the treaty could have been more expansive,
rigid, and demanding and we could have followed the cold war
template for arms control negotiations and entered into a
multi-year discussion process. But that did not serve the
interests of either side.
Furthermore, the treaty cannot be the answer to all the
challenges we face. If we had sought to construct such an
agreement, it would surely have been crushed under its weight.
I share some of the concerns and fears expressed by the
critics. For instance, what happens to the nuclear warheads
taken from dismantled Russian delivery systems? I am confident
in U.S. storage and appreciate the flexibility it permits in
our strategic systems, but I am concerned with the parallel
Russian process. We must work with Russia to make certain that
these dangerous weapons do not fall into the wrong hands.
However, there are readily available means to address those
deficiencies. Furthermore, without U.S. assistance Russia
cannot meet the timetable of its obligations under this treaty.
The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing weapon levels
set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by
warhead security will be in my judgment the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Without Nunn-Lugar it is
unlikely that the benefits of this treaty will be realized.
My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded,
unfortunately, by the current impasse we face over the Nunn-
Lugar certification process. Each year our President is
required by law to certify to Congress Russia is committed to
goals of arms control. This year the administration requested a
waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved concerns
in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult.
In the meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and
projects may continue, but no new projects can be started and
no new contracts can be finalized. President Bush has requested
a permanent annual waiver so that Nunn-Lugar can continue its
important work. There are some in Congress who prefer just a 1-
year waiver or no waiver at all. Without a permanent waiver,
the President would be forced to suspend dismantlement
assistance each year on the pending issues and on the Moscow
Treaty as I read it, until Congressional action came to
activate the waiver.
This could lead to delays of up to 6 months or more, as we
are experiencing this year. Let me assure my colleagues this is
not a hypothetical situation. It is happening right now. It has
been more than 5 years since the United States and Russia each
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, but no Russian
chemical weapons are being destroyed. It is 5 years later.
There are submarines awaiting destruction at the Kola
Peninsula, regiments of SS-18's loaded with 10 warheads apiece
standing in Siberia, almost 2 million rounds of chemical
weapons in relatively small and discrete shells awaiting
elimination at Shchuchye.
But can Nunn-Lugar hire American firms to dismantle these
weapons? The answer is no. We must wait, watch these dangerous
weapons systems sit in their silos, float next to the docks, or
sit on the tarmac while the conference process between the two
houses of Congress continues on the defense authorization bill.
Without the granting of a permanent waiver, the current
situation will recur frequently in the years ahead. This could
delay full implementation of the Moscow Treaty far beyond the
envisioned 10-year time period. If Nunn-Lugar is suspended for
6 months each year, it could take 20 years, not 10, to
dismantle the Russian weapons covered by the treaty.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the treaty is important. It is
a tremendous step in the right direction. The treaty alone is
insufficient to meet our security needs. As you pointed out, we
were blessed by a meeting with the President, the Vice
President, Condoleeza Rice, Andy Card, and the two of us in
which we discussed these issues in the same way that I am
discussing them publicly today.
The Chairman. You were even a little more forceful then.
Senator Lugar. I would simply say that I share the
enthusiasm of the Chairman to work with you and with the
President for ratification of this treaty. At the same time, we
pointed out to the President that the treaty is not self-
enforcing and will not happen by chance, and that the methods
of bringing it to a conclusion are important, and that we
appreciate very much your appearance today in giving your
views.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I want the record to reflect
that I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the
Senator from Indiana. My instinct is that there are many in the
administration who feel as strongly as he does and maybe we can
talk about that as we go down the line here.
The floor is yours, Mr. Secretary. Again, welcome. It is an
honor to have you back.
STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL,
SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Powell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee. It is always a pleasure to appear
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I thank you
for your warm welcome.
I am accompanied by members of my staff as usual, but I
particularly want to single out Under Secretary John Bolton,
who is here with me this morning and who was a principal
negotiator on the Moscow Treaty, and through this means to
thank John and the members of his staff, many of whom are
present here, for the fine work that they did in bringing this
treaty into being.
I am pleased to appear before the committee to seek its
support for the treaty between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, known
as the Moscow Treaty, signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002. The
Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the
United States and Russia. The treaty codifies both countries'
commitment to make deep strategic nuclear weapons reductions in
a flexible and legally binding manner.
The treaty transitions us from strategic rivalry to a
genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual
security, trust, openness, cooperation, and predictability. The
Moscow Treaty is one important element of a new strategic
framework which involves a broad array of cooperative efforts
in political, economic, and security areas.
Let me take a moment and outline for you the essential
parts of the treaty. The United States and Russia both intend
to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest
levels possible consistent with our national security
requirements, alliance obligations, and reflecting the new
nature of our strategic relations.
The treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce
and limit our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by December 31st, 2012, a
reduction of nearly two-thirds below current levels. The United
States will implement the treaty by reducing its operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200
through removal of warheads from missiles in their launchers
and from heavy bomber bases and by removing some missile
launchers and bombers from operational service.
For purposes of this treaty, the United States considers
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry
vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles and their
launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic
missiles and their launchers on board submarines, and nuclear
armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage
areas of heavy bomber bases.
In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear
warheads are located at heavy bomber bases. The United States
does not consider these spares to be operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads. In the context of this treaty, it
is clear that only nuclear reentry vehicles as well as nuclear
armaments are subject to the 1,700 to 2,200 limit.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, continues in
force unchanged by this treaty. In accordance with its own
terms, START will remain in force until midnight December 5,
2009, unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or
extended. START's comprehensive verification regime will
provide the foundation for confidence, transparency, and
predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. As
noted in the May 24 joint declaration on new strategic
relationship, other supplementary measures, including
transparency measures, may be agreed in the future.
The treaty also establishes a bilateral implementation
commission, a diplomatic consultative forum that will meet at
least twice a year to discuss issues related to the
implementation of the treaty. This commission will be separate
and distinct from the consultative group for strategic
security. This group was established by the joint declaration
of May 24 and will be chaired by foreign and defense ministers,
with the participation of other senior officials, and will be a
broader forum to discuss issues of security significance and to
enhance mutual transparency.
The treaty will enter into force on the date of the
exchange of instruments of ratification. It is to remain in
force until December 31st, 2012, and may be extended by
agreement of the parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent
agreement.
The treaty also provides that each party, exercising its
national sovereignty, may withdraw from the treaty upon 3
months written notice to the other party.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the Moscow Treaty is fully
consistent with the President's promise to achieve a credible
deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons
consistent with our national security requirements. The treaty
reduces by two-thirds the number of strategic nuclear warheads
available for ready use while preserving America's ability to
respond promptly to changing future situations.
These nuclear force reductions will not be accomplished
within the old cold war arms control framework. Instead, the
Moscow Treaty reflects the emergence of a new strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia. We
understand that this new relationship is still a work in
progress. Russia is an emerging partner with the United States
on a broad range of issues where we have increasingly shared
interests and values.
But Russia's relationship with the United States is not yet
comparable to the relationship America has with its nuclear-
armed allies, Britain and France. Russia's transformation to a
democracy and a market economy still faces a number of
challenges, and its interests and those of the United States
may not always coincide.
We understand there is work to be done if we are to fully
implement the joint declaration. But our new strategic
relationship gives us a strong foundation to stand upon, one
that will allow us to discuss our differences candidly and work
to resolve them in a constructive manner.
The Congress also has an important role to play in
furthering development of a new strategic relationship with
Russia. There are a number of issues where we need the
Congress' help in doing our part. We need the Congress to end
Jackson-Vanik's application to Russia, to authorize permanent
normal trading relations status for Russia, and to waive
Cooperative Threat Reduction certification requirements that
are so important to the programs that Senator Lugar just spoke
to.
The Senate's approval of the Moscow Treaty will also make
an important contribution to the strengthening of our new
relationship.
Mr. Chairman, by deeply reducing our strategic nuclear
warheads while preserving both Russia's and America's
flexibility to meet unforeseen contingencies, the Moscow Treaty
will enhance the national security of both countries and I
strongly recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent
to its ratification at the earliest possible date.
Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement which I would like
to provide for the record, and with your permission I would
also like to add another little personal P.S. to this opening
presentation.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Secretary Powell. Mr. Chairman, this is a different treaty
in a different world than the world I knew so well as a
soldier. Last night I was trying to remember how many times I
have appeared before this committee on the ratification of a
treaty and I got lost somewhere between four and five times:
INF, CFE, START I, Protocol to PNET, Protocol to TDBT, a number
of agreements that I have come up here and spoke to.
What all of those agreements had in common was that they
were products of the cold war, a reflection of the cold war, a
reflection of the world that I knew as a soldier for 35 years,
a world that I could summarize for you with a little anecdote
of my experience as a corps commander in Germany. I commanded
75,000 soldiers and I was astride the Fulda Gap, the narrowest
corps area in all of NATO from the north to the south, right in
the center of Germany.
I was opposed across the Fulda Gap by the Eighth Guards
Army of the Soviet Union, commanded by Major General Achelov.
Achelov knew me and I knew Achelov. We had our pictures on each
other's desks, we determined later when we got to know each
other in a more informal manner. I knew exactly what his plans
were and he knew how I would try to defend my Fifth Corps in
central Germany from his attack, because his army would be
followed by another army and then a third army and then
additional armies that would come in from Russia. I only had my
one corps, waiting to be reinforced by units coming from the
United States.
It was a war that would be intense. It would start out
conventionally, and if I did not succeed in those first few
days, the first week or so, in stopping General Achelov's
Eighth Guards Army and the reinforcing armies behind his, then
he and those reinforcing armies might reach Frankfurt, my corps
headquarters. Once they got to Frankfurt, it was an easy shot
down the river to the bridges across the Rhine at Weisbaden,
and at that point NATO would have been split pretty much in
half.
My plan was to defend conventionally with the two divisions
and the cavalry regiment I had to the best of our ability. We
were going to give it a hell of a fight. But we fully expected
that somewhere before that first week was up I would start to
have to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order
to break up those formations that were coming at me.
I had tactical nuclear weapons within my corps. I also had
plans to ask for the release of not only those weapons, but
other weapons, the GLCM's and the Pershings that we had put in
there in the early eighties, knowing that sooner or later, if
this continued up this horrible chain of circumstances, it
could result in thermonuclear exchange of the highest order,
strategic weapons going across the Atlantic to the East and
coming back to the West from the Soviet Union.
It was a scenario that I had to live with, we all had to
live with, we all had to work with. But it was a terrifying
scenario and one that no person in his right mind, soldier or
civilian, could have ever wanted to see unfold. It was a
disastrous situation.
We contained it. We managed it. We deterred, both sides
deterred the other. In fact, it was us who were deterring the
Russians and they thought they were deterring us. At least that
was their story and they were sticking with it. But it was
really the other way around.
After leaving my corps and then coming back and going to
work for President Reagan as his Deputy, then National Security
Advisor, I watched that whole world go up, just go away, with
the realization that they would never defeat us militarily and
they were losing economically. So the Soviet Union came to an
end.
But during all those years as we tried to manage this, as
we tried to contain this, it was always a matter of getting a
balance of horror between the two sides. It was always a matter
of matching each other--countervalue, counterforce, tactical
nukes, going to strategic nuclear exchange. It was all a matter
of managing that.
So we always had to match each other in one way or another.
But then the cold war ended and we could do new things we never
would have dreamed of. The INF Treaty was the first step in
that direction, eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons on
both sides. Then we moved into START I with significant
reductions, began START II with even more significant
reductions.
You may recall, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
when President Bush unilaterally got rid of all of our tactical
nuclear weapons except for a fairly small number of tactical
nuclear weapons retained in the Air Force. We did that in just
a matter of weeks because of the new environment presented to
us by President Gorbachev and the situation that existed in the
early nineties.
So the nineties came and the nineties went, and President
Bush came into office and we found a situation where both sides
still had too many nuclear weapons for the kinds of dangers
that one might see out there. President Bush gathered his
advisers around him and he instructed us as follows: Find the
lowest number we need to make America safe, to make America
safe today and to make America safe in the future. Do not think
of this in cold war terms, don't think in terms of how many
more weapons do we have to have in order to make the rubble
bounce even more.
Don Rumsfeld and his colleagues in the Pentagon, my buddies
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and out in Omaha and the other
headquarters and the theater commanders went to work on this,
and they studied this simple proposition, this simple question
posed by the President for months and they came up with an
answer in the fall of last year.
In the mean time, as Senator Lugar noted, President Bush on
the 1st of May at the National Defense University last year
gave a clear statement of his desire for a new strategic
framework with the Russians that would involve strategic
offensive reductions, missile defense activities, and the
elimination of the ABM Treaty, which essentially was the
barrier to a new strategic framework because we could not do
missile defenses.
It was a controversial speech, but it laid out a vision
that really has come full circle and full flower. In the fall,
the Pentagon produced their answer: somewhere between 1,700 and
2,200 operationally deployed strategic weapons would serve U.S.
interests now and into the future. We can safely go down to
that level over a period of time while we watch a still
uncertain world unfold before us.
The important thing to remember here, we did ask the
Russians, what number do you want to go to? We did not ask the
Russians or say to the Russians: We are going to this number;
do you want to go with us? We knew that the Russians were
facing the same kind of challenge, and President Putin had
indicated informally and in some statements that he was looking
at a number even lower than that, down to 1,500. But it was not
a matter of negotiation between the two sides as to what number
we were going to come out at.
What President Bush said when he got the number from the
Pentagon and all the advisers agreed to that number and said
this makes sense, he said to President Putin: This is where we
are going. We are going there unilaterally. Come with us or
not. Stay where you are or not. This is what the United States
needs and it does not need it because you are an enemy; it
needs this because of the nature of the world we live in, and
we see you as a partner. So you can do whatever you think you
have to do for your security. You can MIRV your missiles, you
can keep more, you can go lower. Do what you think you need.
This is what we know we need and we are going to this level.
The Russians took all of this aboard. We had the most
serious and intense discussions between the two parties, and in
due course, a month after the Washington summit, President
Putin responded. He responded a week or so after I had visited
with him and told him that President Bush intended to announce
his termination of the ABM Treaty. President Putin accepted
that, did not like it, disagreed with it, thought it was the
wrong decision, but accepted it.
He said to me: We are nevertheless going to go forward and
find a new strategic framework. We do not feel threatened by
your leaving the ABM Treaty.
We announced our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the
very next day President Putin expressed his disagreement and
displeasure that we had done that, said nevertheless he did not
feel threatened, also said that he was anxious to develop a new
strategic framework, and then matched the number by saying he
too wanted to go down to 1,700 to 2,200.
It would have been fine if both sides had proceeded
unilaterally to go to those numbers. The Russians felt strongly
that if it was a new relationship then let us make sure this
relationship would exist over time, and therefore let us make
this a legally binding agreement between the two nations. Let
us make it last beyond one Presidency, let us make it last to
some period in the future, let us give some confidence to our
people that these are the acts, not just of two Presidents, but
of two countries, two governments; let us have our two
legislative bodies in whatever way they choose ratify this and
make it binding in international law.
That is what President Putin felt was appropriate. We
considered it and President Bush in his desire to have this
kind of strong partnership with the Russian Federation and with
President Putin, agreed with that proposition and instructed me
and Secretary Rumsfeld and his other advisers to work to
accomplish that objective.
We worked over a period of several months. As Senator Lugar
and others have noted, it did not take forever. It is not 53
volumes thick. It was straight and it was to the point. Its
simplicity is reflective of the new world we are living in,
simplicity in that it merely says these are the levels that
both of us are going to, we each have declared what this level
is and we will meet that level on December 31, 2012.
Each of us will decide, based on our own needs, how we will
get to that level, what the glide path will be. Maybe we will
get to it much earlier than that. Maybe the Russians will go
below it. Each side is able to choose and each side is able to
decide how they want to distribute this number. It will be a
finite number between 1,700 and 2,200 at some point. Maybe it
will float in that range, but sooner or later it will be a
number that settles between 1,700 and 2,200. They will decide,
each side will decide, how to get there.
We have the verification provisions of START which continue
through 2009 and they are subject to be extended if both sides
agree to that. So the verification provisions of the original
START Treaty give us a lot with respect to transparency, with
respect to what is going on, with respect to consultative
bodies that discuss these issues, with respect to inspections.
On top of that we have created in this treaty a bilateral
implementation committee that will meet twice a year, or more
often as necessary, to see how we are doing, to see what your
plans are, to exchange plans, to exchange ideas, to see if we
need more transparency to give us confidence.
Then on December 31, 2012, the treaty will go out of
effect, having on that date hit the limit. Now, it is unlikely
it will unfold that way. I suspect before then we will have
found out what that new limit is and will have worked down to
it, and both sides might believe it useful to extend it beyond
that 10-year period. So I would not focus so much on that
particular day, because we have the opportunity to do more
beyond that day.
It is a treaty that I think makes sense. It is reflective
of the new environment. There are things that it does not do.
For example, it does not specifically eliminate warheads. No
previous arms control treaty has done that. INF did not do it;
START I did not do it; START II would not have done it if it
had come into effect. So warhead accountability and destruction
and disposition is an extremely complex matter that was not
solved by previous, much more intensive arms control
negotiations, and we did not try to solve it here.
We believe that the Russians will act in the same way that
we are going to act, and that is as we bring these warheads off
these missiles or take these armaments away from their bombers
we will store them securely as possible using hopefully even
more money that we will get from Nunn-Lugar CTR actions as well
as the new 10 plus 10 over 10, whatever else it takes to help
the Russians make sure that theirs is secure.
From that stockpile of secured warheads, many will be
destroyed. I do not think there is any incentive on the part of
either party to keep warheads that are not going to be needed,
either as replacement warheads as warhead life expires or for
whatever testing may be necessary to make sure the stockpile,
non-explosive testing, to make sure the stockpile is safe and
secure, or just to make sure that you have some little hedge in
case something goes wrong.
But I think it will be a safer and more secure world. The
first step in the destruction of any warhead is take it off its
missile, take it off its bomber, and then secure it as tight as
we can to make sure it does not become a proliferating problem.
Then we slowly get about the task of getting rid of those that
are not needed, getting rid of the cost of maintaining an
inventory that we do not need.
There is no incentive to keep weapons we do not need, and I
think that pressure will be there and certainly this committee
and the other committees of Congress are in a position to apply
the pressure.
We did not deal with tactical nuclear weapons in this
treaty because the treaty was not intended to do that. Tactical
nuclear weapons remain an issue. Secretary Rumsfeld is
particularly interested in this issue because, while we have
not many left and we have complied with what we said we were
going to do on a unilateral basis back in 1991 and 1992, the
Russians still have quite a few in various states of repair,
disrepair, need of maintenance, and operational. We will be
pressing them in discussions. In the four-party discussions
that I will be having with Secretary Rumsfeld and the two
ministers Ivanov, Sergei Ivanov defense minister, Igor Ivanov
my foreign ministry counterpart, these are the kinds of issues
we will start the talk about: how can we get into the problem
of theater nuclear weapons and how do we get a handle on this
issue as well?
This is more of a problem of proliferation, I would say,
than are the strategic warheads. So all of these issues will
have to be worked as part of moving forward. But this is a good
treaty. It makes sense. It is reflective of the new
relationship that exists between the Russians and the
Americans, and it should be seen in that light and not measured
against the cold war light, where everybody was trying to make
sure we were absolutely in sync.
Just keep in mind, what we are doing in this treaty we were
going to do anyway. If there is something that has been gained
from this treaty, it is whereas we have enormous transparency
because of our open system and because of Congress watching and
oversighting what our Pentagon and our defense activities do
with respect to these kinds of programs, it was not quite the
same thing on the Russian side. But with this treaty we
probably have gained an opportunity for greater transparency
and get a better handle on what they may be doing and enhance
predictability.
So I think this is a good treaty in that it serves both
parties. Both parties get an advantage from this treaty; both
parties benefit from the treaty. But above all, the world
benefits, because no later than 31 December 2002 the levels
that we now see will have been reduced to no more than the
limits shown in this treaty, at least a two-third reduction,
and nothing prevents either side from going lower should that
be their choice.
Mr. Chairman, with that I will stop and take your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Colin Powell
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, this is my tenth hearing
since January. So you know how much I value these exchanges--and I am
confident that you do as well.
My appearance before your committee on this particular occasion has
a more formal character than the previous nine. On this occasion I am
pleased to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee to seek its
support for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions--the Moscow
Treaty--signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002. By long tradition, the
Secretary of State is the first member of the Administration to testify
in support of treaties submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent.
The Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the
United States and Russia. It codifies both countries' commitment to
make deep strategic offensive reductions in a flexible and legally
binding manner. It facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to
a genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual
security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. The Moscow
Treaty is one important element of a new strategic framework, which
involves a broad array of cooperative efforts in political, economic
and security areas.
On May of last year, even before his first meeting with President
Putin, President Bush outlined his vision of this new framework in a
speech at the National Defense University (NDU). The President stated
that, while the United States may continue to have areas of difference
with Russia, we are not and must not be strategic adversaries. In that
regard, President Bush said that he wanted to change our relationship
from one based on a nuclear balance of terror, to one based on common
responsibilities and interests. The strategic nuclear dimension of the
framework the President laid out had several elements.
The President made a commitment to achieving a credible deterrent
with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our
national security requirements, including our obligations to our
allies, and stated that his goal was to move quickly to reduce our
nuclear forces.
He made clear his desire to leave behind the constraints of an ABM
Treaty that not only was outdated but also perpetuated a relationship
with Russia based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. President Bush
declared that we should work together with Russia to replace the ABM
Treaty with a new cooperative relationship that would leave behind the
adversarial legacy of the Cold War.
A little over fourteen months later, and after five meetings with
President Putin, the President has acted on all of the elements of the
strategic framework he proposed during his NDU speech and he has acted
in a way that has significantly advanced our overall relationship with
Russia. Let me briefly review that relationship to illustrate the
broader context in which it now exists.
The tragic events of September 11 brought to the forefront a major
shared objective of the United States and Russia to combat terrorism.
Pursuing that objective has had a positive impact on our relationship.
President Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush on
the morning of September 11. Less well known is the degree of trust and
cooperation that was manifest that day, and in subsequent days, in our
strategic interaction. The events of September 11 resulted in the
United States briefly raising the alert, or DEFCON, level of our
strategic forces, and, for a longer period, increasing Force Protection
levels at our military bases, including those bases where our strategic
forces are located. During the Cold War, any increase in alert levels
by one side was likely to engender a reaction in kind because of mutual
suspicions and distrust. It is a measure of the degree of transparency
and trust that has developed in the United States-Russian relationship
that President Putin felt no such need. In fact, to ensure there would
be no miscalculation, the Russians let us know they were voluntarily
suspending major elements of an ongoing strategic forces exercise and
later agreed to our request to suspend temporarily some inspection
activities under the START Treaty at bases that were placed under a
heightened state of alert.
The developing strategic relationship between the United States and
Russia was also evident on December 13 of last year, when President
Bush announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM
Treaty. Although Russia did not agree with our decision to withdraw,
President Putin's response that same day was pragmatic in tone and
recognized that the U.S. decision did not present a threat to Russia's
security.
As the United States-Russian relationship has broadened and
deepened, the significance of U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has
diminished. Our withdrawal has not spurred an arms race or undermined
strategic stability. In fact, President Putin also used his December 13
statement to call for reductions in strategic offensive weapons to
between 1,500 and 2,200, thus responding positively to President Bush's
announcement during the Washington/Crawford Summit that the United
States would reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade.
Since December 13, Russia has focussed on how to move our bilateral
relationship forward. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic
Relationship Between the United States and the Russian Federation that
was signed on May 24 in Moscow reflects not only our agreement to deep
reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, but also records our
agreement to implement a number of steps aimed at increasing
confidence, transparency, and cooperation in the area of missile
defense.
Moreover, strategic issues are only a part of the broader 21st
Century relationship we are developing with Russia. Very early on
Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that our new relationship would be
broadly based--encompassing political, economic, and security
components. The Joint Declaration reflected the significant progress we
have made in all of these areas.
On political issues we are already acting as partners in addressing
many of the challenges we both now face. For example, the United
States-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan has been invaluable in the
war against terrorism. Its mandate has now been expanded to include
other geographical areas and new and related threats and, as such, it
has been renamed the Working Group on Counterterrorism.
The United States and Russia are cooperating to transform
Afghanistan into a stable and viable nation. To illustrate, the degree
of cooperation with Russia on our efforts in Central Asia has been
unprecedented. Moscow's support has included intelligence sharing,
search and rescue assistance, and endorsement of Central Asian states'
decision to accept our troop presence on their territories. Russia has
even dispatched two military liaison officers to U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM). We are also working together constructively to resolve
regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the
Middle East and, most recently, in South Asia.
Russia and NATO are also increasingly allied against regional
instability and other contemporary threats. At the May 28 NATO-Russia
Summit in Rome, we inaugurated a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) which
will allow NATO member states and Russia to work as equal partners in
areas of common interest. The NATO Allies and Russia are ready to begin
work in earnest on all of the NRC agenda items approved at the Rome
Summit. Initial successes in the NRC will lay a basis for further
expanding cooperation between NATO and Russia.
The United States and Russia are also cooperating effectively on
transnational issues other than terrorism such as dealing with illegal
drugs and combating organized crime. For example, the entry into force
of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters earlier
this year was a welcome step forward on the issue of fighting organized
crime.
Our cooperation in the economic sphere, and encouraging the
development of an efficient market economy in Russia, are also high on
our mutual agenda. We want to expand economic ties between the United
States and Russia and further integrate Russia into the world economy
with full rights and responsibilities. We support Russia's accession to
the World Trade Organization. By holding Russia to the same standards
we would any country seeking to join the WTO, we are reinforcing
Moscow's broader economic reform efforts and helping Russia prepare for
a larger role in the global economy. Success in our bilateral economic
and trade relations also demands that we move ahead. The Department of
Commerce's recent decision to treat Russia as a market economy under
the provisions of U.S. trade law is an important step forward.
Mr. Chairman, the Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our increasingly
broader, cooperative relationship with Russia. Just as our relationship
now has a fundamentally different basis, so the Moscow Treaty also
represents a new way of doing business in the strategic nuclear realm.
Let me take a moment and outline for you the essential parts of the
Treaty.
reduction requirements
As I indicated, the United States and Russia both intend to carry
out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels
consistent with our national security requirements and alliance
obligations, and reflecting the new nature of our strategic relations.
The Treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce and limit
our strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by
December 31, 2012, a reduction of nearly two-thirds below current
levels. The United States intends to implement the Treaty by reducing
its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700
and 2,200 through removal of warheads from missiles in their launchers
and from heavy bomber bases, and by removing some missiles, launchers,
and bombers from operational service.
For purposes of this Treaty, the United States considers
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry
vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their
launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments
loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy
bomber bases. In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear
warheads are located at heavy bomber bases. The United States does not
consider these spares to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads. In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only
``nuclear'' reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject
to the 1,700-2,200 limit.
relationship to start
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in force
unchanged by this Treaty. In accordance with its own terms, START will
remain in force until midnight December 5, 2009, unless it is
superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.
START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the
foundation for confidence, transparency and predictability in further
strategic offensive reductions. As noted in the May 24 Joint
Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, other supplementary
measures, including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future.
the bilateral implementation commission
The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC),
a diplomatic consultative forum that will meet at least twice a year to
discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The BIC will be
separate and distinct from the Consultative Group for Strategic
Security, established by the Joint Declaration of May 24, which will be
chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers with the participation of
other senior officials and which will be a broader forum to discuss
issues of strategic significance and to enhance mutual transparency.
entry into force, duration, and right of withdrawal
The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification. It is to remain in force until December
31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded
earlier by a subsequent agreement.
The Treaty also provides that each Party, in exercising its
national sovereignty, may withdraw from the Treaty upon three months'
written notice to the other Party.
status of start ii treaty
The START II Treaty, which was signed in 1993, and to which the
Senate gave its advice and consent in 1996, never entered into force
because Russia placed unacceptable conditions on its own ratification
of START II. Russia's explicit linkage of START II to preservation of
the ABM Treaty and entry into force of several agreements, signed in
1997, which related to ABM Treaty succession and ABM/TMD demarcation,
made it impossible for START II to enter into force. With signature of
the Moscow Treaty, however, the United States and Russia have now taken
a decisive step beyond START II that reflects the new era in United
States-Russia relations.
how we arrived at what you have before you
Mr. Chairman, the Treaty you have before you is different from Cold
War arms control agreements because:
It does not call for exact equality in numbers of strategic
nuclear warheads. It is no longer appropriate to size our
military capabilities against any single country or threat, and
the end of superpower competition and adversarial style arms
control negotiations has removed any political requirement for
strict parity.
It does not contain any sublimits or bans on categories of
strategic forces. The need for a highly regimented strategic
forces structure was the product of now outdated concepts of
strategic stability that were necessary when we needed to
regulate the interaction of the strategic forces of two hostile
nations to reduce the structural incentives for beginning a
nuclear war. Now we have nothing to go to war about.
The Treaty does not contain its own verification provisions.
United States security and the new strategic relationship with
Russia do not require such provisions.
What you have before you is a Treaty that is both simple and
flexible. Article I contains the single central obligation of the
Treaty which is for the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic
nuclear warheads to no more than 1,700-2,200 for each side. The Treaty
deliberately focuses on strategic nuclear warheads. It does not limit
the number of ICBMs and SLBMs or their associated launchers; nor does
it limit the number of heavy bombers. From the outset, our objective
was to reduce dramatically the number of strategic nuclear warheads
available for immediate use, and the Moscow Treaty clearly meets this
objective.
The Treaty is also highly flexible. Article I, by referencing the
individual statements of Presidents Bush and Putin, makes clear that
the Parties need not implement their reductions in an identical manner.
President Bush made clear on November 13 of last year that the United
States will meet the 1,700 to 2,200 limit by reducing our number of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. This is a departure
from the way in which warheads are counted under the START Treaty, but
one that more accurately represents the real number of warheads
available for use immediately or within days.
During the course of the negotiations, we proposed a detailed
definition of ``operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads,''
but we did not achieve it and so the Treaty does not contain such
detail. Nor did President Putin state explicitly how Russia intends to
implement its reductions. During the negotiations, the Russians
suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by eliminating or
converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers in a manner similar to
the counting concepts in the START Treaties. Should Russia elect to
achieve the 1,700-2,200 warhead level in this way, or by using the U.S.
method, the result in either case will limit the number of strategic
nuclear warheads available for immediate use. Russia is also free to
choose another method for making its required reductions.
Some have expressed concern that the Moscow Treaty does not require
the destruction of warheads. No previous arms control treaty--SALT,
START or INF--has required warhead elimination. Contrary to what was
frequently reported in the press, the Russians did not propose a regime
for verifiable warhead elimination during the negotiations. Given the
uncertainties we face, and the fact that we, unlike Russia, do not
manufacture new warheads, the United States needs the flexibility to
retain warheads removed from operational deployment to meet unforeseen
future contingencies and possible technical problems with the
stockpile. That said, the Moscow Treaty does not prevent the United
States and Russia from eliminating warheads and we anticipate that both
Parties will continue to do so. For our part, some of these warheads
will be used as spares, some will be stored, and some will be
destroyed. Economics, our new strategic relationship with Russia,
obsolescence, and the overall two-thirds cut in U.S. and Russian
inventories mandated by the Treaty will undoubtedly result in continued
warhead elimination.
The Treaty is also highly flexible in other ways. Within the bounds
of the aggregate limit on numbers of strategic nuclear warheads, each
side is free to determine for itself the composition and structure of
its strategic offensive arms. As I noted earlier, the Treaty does not
limit the total number of strategic delivery vehicles or contain either
numerical sublimits or bans on categories of forces. We saw no
strategic need for such limits given our new relationship with Russia
and the low levels of forces to which both sides will reduce. But today
Russia is not our sole concern.
The international system is no longer bipolar. It has become more
fluid and unpredictable. We cannot forecast with confidence what
nation, combination of nations, or non-state actors may pose a threat
to our vital national interests or those of our friends and allies in
the years to come. Nor can we tell what WMD capabilities and delivery
systems such adversaries may be armed with. We must maintain the
freedom to determine the composition and structure of our nuclear
forces. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers will be able to discuss
with you in more detail the approach the Department of Defense has
adopted to planning our strategic nuclear capabilities when they
testify before this Committee next week.
The Treaty provides flexibility in another regard. Article IV
permits either Party the ability to withdraw from the Treaty upon three
months written notice to the other Party. This period is shorter than
has been typical in previous arms control agreements. The Moscow Treaty
thus allows greater flexibility for each side to respond to unforeseen
circumstances, whether those circumstances are technical problems in
the stockpile, changes in the international environment, or the
emergence of new threats.
In negotiating the Moscow Treaty, the Administration did not seek
any new verification measures. As the President stated last November
13, the United States intended to carry out its reductions
unilaterally, no matter what action Russia took. President Putin's
welcome decision to reciprocate, and the recording of these reduction
commitments in a legally-binding Treaty, is a welcome sign of our new,
cooperative strategic relationship--a relationship that does not depend
on our ability to verify Russian reductions.
That said, Article II of the Treaty recognizes that the START
Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. The START
Treaty's provisions do not extend to the Moscow Treaty, and its
verification provisions were designed with START's different counting
rules in mind. However, we believe that the START verification regime,
including its data exchanges, on-site inspections, and provisions
concerning telemetry, conversion, and elimination, and mobile missile
forces, will continue over the course of the decade to add to our body
of knowledge regarding the disposition of Russia's strategic nuclear
warheads and the overall status of reduction in Russia's strategic
forces.
Most importantly, however, I would point once again to our new
strategic relationship with Russia. The Preambles to both the Moscow
Treaty and the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship
Between the United States and Russia state that this new relationship
will be based on a number of principles, including mutual security,
trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. These are principles
that help to define a normal relationship between two countries that
now consider themselves to be partners.
The verification regimes that have accompanied our previous arms
control agreements with Russia have, in contrast, been the product of
two countries suspicious and distrustful of one another--two countries
that considered each other as a strategic threat. I have submitted to
the Congress a report required by Section 306 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act on the verifiability of the Moscow Treaty. In that
Report, I conclude that the Treaty is not constructed to be verifiable
within the meaning of Section 306, and it is indeed not. A treaty that
was verifiable under the old Cold War paradigm was neither required nor
relevant in this case.
As I indicated earlier, the Joint Declaration signed in Moscow
establishes a Consultative Group for Strategic Security, to be chaired
by Foreign and Defense Ministers, that will become the principal
mechanism through which the United States and Russia will strengthen
mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans,
and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest across a broad range of
international security issues.
The first meeting of the Consultative Group will take place in
September on the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting in New
York. When we prepare for this meeting, we will consider whether to
pursue expanded transparency as one of the early issues the Group will
address. I believe the new strategic relationship will continue to
mature over time, and over the lifetime of the Moscow Treaty, and that
openness and transparency will become an accepted and normal part of
all areas of our new strategic relationship.
anticipating some of your questions
As we went about negotiating the Moscow Treaty, one of the
questions foremost in my mind as a former soldier and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, was how will we address tactical nuclear
weapons?
We continue to be concerned about the uncertainties surrounding
Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), and I believe we should
discuss inventory levels of NSNW with the Russians and press Moscow to
complete the reductions it pledged to make in 1991 and 1992.
The United States has made very significant changes to its nuclear
policy and force structure since the end of the Cold War. Since 1991,
the types and numbers of NATO non-strategic nuclear forces have been
reduced by approximately 85 percent, including the elimination of
entire categories of NSNW. The Russians have also made significant
parallel unilateral reductions in their NSNW.
Through NATO, we are now focusing on developing confidence building
and transparency measures with Russia. NATO has presented Russia with
four proposals for nuclear Confidence and Stability Building Measures
(CSBMs) as part of a process established by the April 1999 NATO
Washington Summit. These proposals are intended to enhance mutual trust
and to promote greater transparency. I believe that NATO and Russia
both have recognized the value of consultations on non-strategic
nuclear forces. The Russians have agreed to continue to engage in this
process.
Moreover, in addition to unilateral reductions and confidence
building and transparency measures, the many ongoing Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs with Russia are designed to improve the safety and
security of all Russian nuclear weapons--including NSNW.
Mr. Chairman, again as a former military professional, I also
wanted to know about Multiple, Independently Targetable Re-entry
Vehicles, or MIRVs. In short, does the Moscow Treaty allow the Russians
to restructure their strategic forces through a greater use of MIRVs,
and if so, is this in the United States' interest?
The Moscow Treaty does not restrict a Party's decisions as to how
it will implement the required reductions. The Treaty states that
``Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure
of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate
limit for the number of such warheads.'' Each Party will thus have
flexibility in structuring its forces to reach these new low levels for
strategic nuclear warheads. Specifically stated, the Moscow Treaty does
not place restrictions on Russia's potential to restructure its
strategic forces by using MIRVs. We are convinced that this will not
adversely impact U.S. national security. Since neither the United
States nor Russia has any incentive to launch nuclear weapons at each
other, we no longer view Russian deployment of MIRVed ICBMs as
destabilizing to our strategic relationship.
Mr. Chairman, some committee members may want to question the ten-
year deadline in the Moscow Treaty. Why is there such a distant
deadline in the Treaty when it would appear that both the United States
and Russia could reduce weapons much quicker? Also, why does the treaty
end at the deadline for meeting its objectives?
The Treaty will take the United States and Russia along a
predictable path to substantial reductions--from the current levels of
5,000-6,000 warheads to 1,700-2,200 warheads. For the United States,
the reduction process will include deactivating all 50 ten-warhead
Peacekeeper ICBMs and removing four Trident submarines from strategic
nuclear service.
The process will also involve additional, yet-to-be-determined
steps to reduce the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads to the 1,700-2,200 level. These reductions will be
part of the development and deployment of the New Triad that was
established by the 2001 United States Nuclear Posture Review.
These substantial United States and Russian reductions will entail
careful planning and execution on both sides, and, therefore, will
require considerable time to complete. Our best judgement is that
allowing ten years for this process to be completed will give both
Parties time to complete these actions in a sound, responsible, and
sustainable manner.
Moreover, we can extend the Treaty at any time that both Parties
agree to do so, just as either Party can leave the Treaty
expeditiously. Likewise, over the duration of the Treaty, much can
happen that could alter or modify our strategic analysis. As a
consequence, we feel that the timeframe and the deadline are just what
they should be.
Another question that may arise is how the Moscow Treaty squares
with Article VI of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). In other words,
in what ways does the Moscow Treaty promote implementation of the
Parties' nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT?
The Committee members know that the NPT is the centerpiece of the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime. It plays a critical role in
efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including to
terrorists and states that support them. The NPT's value depends on all
parties honoring their obligations. The United States places great
importance on fulfilling its NPT undertakings, including those in
Article VI related to nuclear disarmament.
The elimination of nuclear weapons is a key goal of the NPT, but
one that will not be reached quickly or without enormous effort. All
states have a responsibility to work toward this goal. It can be
achieved only though a step-by-step process. Article VI of the NPT
reflects this reality and sets no timelines or specific milestones.
The Moscow Treaty represents an historic step in that process. It
will take the United States and Russia down to the lowest levels of
strategic nuclear warheads seen in decades. It is an important
achievement and the actions called for under the Moscow Treaty
represent significant progress in meeting the obligations set forth in
Article VI of the NPT.
Finally, as the Treaty itself suggests, where do we go next?
Of course the next step, if the Senate gives its advice and consent
to the Moscow Treaty and it enters into force, is to implement that
Treaty. It will take time and resources on both sides to carry out the
planned reductions by Dec 31, 2012.
More broadly, and covering strategic issues in general, we will use
the Consultative Group for Strategic Security, chaired by the Foreign
and Defense Ministers, to strengthen mutual confidence, expand
transparency, and share information and plans, as I indicated earlier.
The Moscow Treaty was intentionally designed to give the United
States and Russia flexibility in how each implements its obligations.
Our changed strategic relationship, and the uncertainties of external
conditions, dictated this. Throughout the duration of the Treaty, we
will closely monitor developments and assess their implications for the
Treaty's implementation and for the question of its extension. In
addition, not later than one year prior to START's expiration date
(December 5, 2009), the START Parties will have to meet to address the
question of whether to extend that treaty.
President Bush made it clear from the outset of this Administration
that he intended to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons to the lowest number
consistent with U.S. and allied security requirements. Based on the
Nuclear Posture Review, he determined that a strategic nuclear force in
a range of 1,700-2,200 warheads provides the flexibility and
responsiveness necessary to counter known and expected threats and
hedge against surprise, technical or other developments.
I don't want to speculate about the more distant future; but as far
out as I can see, nuclear weapons will continue to play an important
role in U.S. and allied security. Right now, I think we have enough
work before us to implement the agreement we have, to solidify the new
strategic framework we are building with Russia, and to curb the spread
of nuclear weapons and other WMD to other states.
summary
Mr. Chairman,I believe the Moscow Treaty is fully consistent with
the President's promise to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest
possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national
security requirements. It reduces by two-thirds the number of strategic
nuclear warheads available for ready use while preserving America's
ability to respond promptly to changing future situations.
These nuclear force reductions will not be accomplished within the
old Cold War arms control framework; rather the Moscow Treaty reflects
the emergence of a new strategic relationship between the United States
and Russia. We understand that this new relationship is still a work in
progress. Russia is an emerging partner with the United States on a
broad range of issues where we have increasingly shared interests and
values. However, our relationship with Russia is not yet comparable to
the kind of relationship we have with our nuclear-armed allies, Britain
and France. Russia's transformation to a democracy and a market economy
still faces a number of challenges, and its interests and those of the
United States may not always coincide. We understand there is work to
be done if we are to implement fully the Joint Declaration on the New
Strategic Relationship. But our new strategic relationship gives us a
strong foundation to stand upon--one that will allow us to discuss our
differences candidly and work to resolve them in a constructive manner.
The Congress also has an important role to play in furthering the
development of our new strategic relationship with Russia. There are a
number of issues where we need the Congress' help in doing our part--
ending Jackson-Vanik's application to Russia, authorizing Permanent
Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status for Russia, and waiving
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) certification requirements so those
important programs can continue, are all high priorities. The Senate's
approval of the Moscow Treaty will also make an important contribution
to the strengthening of our new relationship.
Some have said the Moscow Treaty will be the last arms control
agreement with Russia. I won't go that far. But it will be an important
indicator of the continued advancement of our relationship if it is the
last Treaty that is the centerpiece of a Presidential Summit and if
such agreements become increasingly less central to the United States-
Russian relationship.
Mr. Chairman, by deeply reducing strategic nuclear warheads while
preserving both Russia's and America's flexibility to meet unforeseen
future contingencies, the Moscow Treaty will enhance the national
security of both countries. I strongly recommend that the Senate advise
and consent to its ratification at the earliest possible date.
Thank you, and I am pleased to take your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We are going to do 10-minute rounds so we can actually get
some serious questioning in. I will begin.
You stated very clearly what, quite frankly, the President
has said publicly as well as privately to me and to others, and
that is this was in a sense not a negotiation, this was a
decision made where we could go and we basically said to the
Russians: This is where we are going; if you want to come
along, come along.
I assume that the decision was made to make it a treaty in
part to avoid the dilemma we found when his father made the
same enunciation relative to tactical nuclear weapons: This is
where we are going, we are going to eliminate. They came along
and said: We are, too. Yet we had nothing in place and
constantly, particularly from those who oppose arms control
agreements, the argument was made: You see, the Russians are
not keeping their agreement; we kept ours, there was no formal
agreement. And we got into this whole issue of now whether or
not they have anywhere from a few thousand to 10,000 tactical
nuclear weapons deployed in various states, as you said.
Now, the one thing that I am a little bit perplexed about
is the assertion, which is true, that no previous treaty
required the destruction of warheads. So in this sense it is no
different. What I respectfully suggest is it is very
different--maybe I have been here too long--in that no treaty
required warheads being destroyed, but it required the launch
vehicles to be destroyed.
So the theory was if you took an America missile out of a
silo, took the warhead off of it and crushed the canister, you
could not rapidly reload that onto anything that was out there.
I remember Mr. Bolton and a lot of his friends coming up and
testifying that the reason why that was a bad idea is because
we did not know whether the Russians were going to take all
these warheads they had and store them in garages and hide them
in barns and do all these things so that they would be able to
rapidly reload them or rapidly pull out things out of the barn.
Here we have a situation where you take the warhead off,
the launcher stays in place--whatever the form of launcher
was--and you have the launcher here and you have the warhead
here, and the theory is at least you could rapidly marry them
up again and use them.
So I am not suggesting that that is right, wrong, or
indifferent, but it is different then. It is different than
previous treaties, where you took the warhead off and you
destroyed the canister, you cut the wings off of Backfire
bombers, you broke up the submarine, et cetera, and we were
able to verify more easily because you can identify how many
subs there are by national technical means, at least with a
great degree of certainty.
So my concern here--not concern. My question is, if the
impetus for this treaty was going down to 1,700 to 2,200,
related to the bottom line of what our consensus in our
government said we are going to need for our security, and the
rationale for the treaty was in part to avoid this kind of
debate that took place over tactical nuclear weapons, then it
sort of reflects that this is what the President thinks are the
most important things to proceed on relative to nuclear
weapons.
Does he think that dealing with the tactical nuclear
weapons are not that relevant or that important now, or that
things as they are relative to tactical nuclear stockpiles are
OK? Talk to me about that? You understand where I am going? He
said this is what we want to go to because we want to get down.
There is a new relationship and this new relationship we have
there, if it is so new and there is no new cold war, why are we
keeping the warheads? Why are we in this ready reload
circumstance?
Secretary Powell. As you know, we are actually destroying
or converting some of our launchers. Some of our subs will be
converted and some of the missiles are being not only
downloaded, but taken out of service. So they are not really
that reloadable.
With respect to the--let me start with the beginning of
your comment, Senator. When President Bush 41 decided to get
rid of most of our tactical nuclear warhead inventory, I think
it was a correct decision and it has been borne out to be a
correct decision. The fact that it was not entirely
reciprocated in terms of what the Russians did is regrettable,
but I do not think it has made us in any more vulnerable
position.
The Chairman. I do not think it has either.
Secretary Powell. It is not a war-fighting position.
Really, it is an inventory control problem. If the Russians
were smart, they would take even more of the money that is out
there to get rid of this kind of weapon that is of no practical
utility for their purposes any more in the kind of world that
they are living in and what they need.
The Chairman. When you have a total budget of $30 billion,
there is not a lot of money to pay for this.
Secretary Powell. There is not a lot of money. So I think
there is going to be enormous incentive to try to get rid of
launchers or get rid of launchers that are no longer needed, as
opposed to try to keep them in some kind of maintainable
condition in order to have ``a breakout.'' I do not see that
the case.
I remember CFE, the same kind of argument: They are going
to have all these tanks east of the Urals waiting to come
splashing back into Weisbaden. I used to watch them as chairman
every few weeks to see this tank park, and I realized after a
while that what I was watching was not a tank maintenance park,
but the biggest junkyard in the world, with no maintenance,
nothing going on. The incentive was to get rid of this stuff,
not hold onto it, and I think that is still the incentive.
The President is still very interested in theater nuclear
weapons, tactical nuclear weapons. So this is going to be an
area of discussion with the Russian side. It has been discussed
in all our meetings, but it was not ready for the kind of
deliberations and the kind of decisions that we are prepared to
make with respect to the strategic part of it.
So yes, he is interested. Yes, we are concerned, concerned
with them more from the standpoint of we really do not want
these nukes loose anywhere and as a proliferation problem more
so than a war-fighting problem It is almost a disposal problem
more so than a war-fighting problem.
The Chairman. Let us talk about our side of the equation
for a minute. I have been around here a long time, as some of
my colleagues have as well, and one of the constant debates--
and I am not asking to get into the numbers--was what the SIOP
called for, as you said, how high you make the rubble bounce
and how many times, etcetera. There has been--Democratic
presidents, Republican presidents, it does not matter--an
overwhelming reluctance to fundamentally reduce the number of
armed nuclear vehicles, that is nuclear warheads able to be
delivered, because of the number of targets out there and the
need for redundancy.
Now, since what I think you just said makes a lot of sense,
which is that notwithstanding the fact that the Russians are
not required, nor are we, to destroy launchers here, the
practical fact of the matter is they are going to end up having
junkyards like the tanks.
Secretary Powell. And START does require.
The Chairman. And START does require. But beyond START----
Secretary Powell. When you go below the 6,000.
The Chairman [continuing]. To get us down to these numbers.
Secretary Powell. Right.
The Chairman. To get down to these numbers, they are not
required, to go from the START numbers to these numbers, they
are not required to destroy launchers.
You are of the view, and I share the view, that their
ability to maintain both the decapitated launcher, that is the
warhead stored over here, and the launcher is going to be a
difficult problem for them financially and they are probably
going to destroy or let atrophy some of these launchers.
Is the reason why we did not write in destruction of
launchers because of resistance here unrelated to them?
Secretary Powell. No.
The Chairman. Is it resistance here saying, look, we need
to have this ability overnight to get back up to 6,000 warheads
that we can launch? Or is it because--I mean, what is the
reason? It just seems such a logical step to have taken.
Secretary Powell. Within the numbers that both sides
decided upon, 1,700 to 2,200, each side has the flexibility to
decide how to distribute those warheads.
The Chairman. I got that.
Secretary Powell. So if the Russians want to keep all of
them on land-based ICBM's and they want to MIRV them, fine. You
have got to remember, Senator, because I have got to break the
logic trail you were taking me down, cut that trail off,
because you are saying are we not worried about that they could
have more. They can have more now.
The Chairman. No, that is not what I am saying.
Secretary Powell. If they had said, OK, you are going to
1,700 to 2,200, we are going to stay at 6,000, the START I
level, or we are not going to go below 3,500, the proposed
3,000 to 3,500, the START II level, President Bush would have
said, fine, I am safe with 1,700 to 2,200, do what you think
you have the do. That is what he said.
One other point, if I may.
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Powell. I simply have to take you to task, with
all due respect, sir.
The Chairman. I am used to being taken to task.
Secretary Powell. I worked on that target list for 4 years
as Chairman----
The Chairman. I am confident that is true.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. With Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney. It was scrubbed, it was reduced, targets were dumped. I
cannot get into the details of this, of course. Fundamental
changes were made in targeting philosophy and we were no longer
chasing, get me more targets because I have more weapons. We
did make significant reductions.
When I was Chairman, the first day I became Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 1st of October 1989, there were
something like 13,000 strategic offensive nuclear warheads
available. Now we are passing on, we are heading down to the
START I level of 6,000 and we are going to go right on down
past that and taking this down to 1,700 to 2,200.
So with all due respect, there has not been a reluctance as
chairman, and the succeeding chairmen who followed me. We have
every incentive to reduce the number. These are expensive. They
take away from soldier pay. They take away from O and M
investments. They take away from lots of things. There is no
incentive to keep more than you believe you need for the
security of the Nation.
The Chairman. I am not suggesting, Mr. Secretary, you did
not take the target list down. I am only suggesting that in all
the years I have been here there has been an overwhelming
reluctance to either, A, inform anybody what the SIOP was--no
one knows up here--No. 1; and No. 2, when this started 4 years
ago, it was difficult to get the Pentagon to sign off on 1,700
to 2,200.
Secretary Powell. Four years ago, sir?
The Chairman. Four years ago, 3 years ago, 2 years ago. It
was not an easy job. So let us not kid each other. We are
friends, OK. This was not an easy job to get this number down
to this number, whomever got it down, the President.
My point is not my worry about how many weapons the Soviets
have left to use against us. My worry is the same as Senator
Lugar's. They have them left, and are they available to bad
guys to get them because they are not secure. My concern is not
that we are going to 1,700 or 2,200, but we maintain the
capacity to go back to 5700 to 6200 and what the rest of the
world reads from that and what everyone else thinks their
requirements are.
But I will get back to that later. My time is up.
Secretary Powell. Just a quick point. The Russians have
made that same calculation. They know--they are very
sophisticated and they know a great deal about force structure
and they know a great deal about our plans, and they fully
understand that as we go down to 1,700 to 2,200 from the
current level of in the neighborhood of let us say 6,000 plus
or minus, they know that there will be warheads freed up. They
also know we are not building any new launch systems and they
have a pretty good idea of what the reconstitution capability
might be inherent in that kind of a glidepath going down.
With all that absolutely known to them, they have agreed to
go to the same level, and in fact they would have gone I think
perhaps even to a lower level.
Secretary Powell. But there is going to be like China and
others. But I will get into that later. I will get into that
later.
The Chairman. Can you tell me how many--give me an idea of
the percentage, what percentage of the targets in the SIOP have
been reduced since 1990?
Secretary Powell. No, I would not do that in this hearing,
and I would yield to my friends in the Defense Department for
that information.
The Chairman. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will get back.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement you mention that
you continue to be concerned about uncertainties surrounding
Russian non-strategic weapons, and you mentioned it again in
your response to Senator Biden, that you hope the Russians
might visit with us about pledges they made in 1991 and 1992.
This is also a concern with many of our NATO allies who are
much closer to the tactical weapons than we are. The allies are
extremely hopeful that our negotiations will be pursued.
Further on that page, you mention that there are many ongoing
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with Russia designed to
improve the safety and security of all Russian nuclear weapons,
including the non-strategic nuclear weapons.
This the first time I have heard in official testimony that
the Cooperative Threat Reduction might address non-strategic
nuclear weapons. I am very pleased that you have listed that
because that is going to be reassuring not only to Americans
but also to our allies, who have hoped that we were not drawing
too fine a point on what Nunn-Lugar can do.
You have mentioned that the treaty lasts until 2012, but
the START I verification regime only lasts until 2009. Now at
that point you said the parties may discuss extending START I.
Elsewhere you point out that the verification regime under
START I gives a lot of comfort and transparency to both sides.
This gap of 3 years could be problematic. I am wondering
whether even prior to ratification of this treaty we should
address the issue.
Was it a point of the negotiations or discussion with
Russian counterparts or did things just simply fall this way
calendarwise?
Secretary Powell. We thought that long before we got to
2009, as a result of the work of the bilateral implementation
committee and because of additional work that had been
undertaken but not completed yet with respect to transparency
measures and other things we can do in the area of confidence-
building and transparency, that by the time we got to 2009 we
would know what we needed to know, and if not then we could
suggest some time long before 2009 that it might be in the
interest of both parties to extend those provisions of START.
But it did not seem to be something that was pressing at
the moment. We had some 7 years to find an answer to that
question.
Senator Lugar. Very well. It just strikes me at the
beginning that we know that the Moscow Treaty brings that gap
to the fore. It may not be consequential by 2009, but on the
other hand it may, and so I wanted to raise the issue.
Secretary Powell. It is an issue out there that will have
to be dealt with in due course.
Senator Lugar. Senator Nunn and I visited Russia just as
President Bush and you were departing. We went out to Kartaly,
which was the home of an SS-18 millile field, to participate in
a ceremonial demolition of one of the silos. The missile had
long since been removed.
Even then, for members of our delegation, some members of
the Senate and the House that had not experienced such a thing
before, it was quite an emotional experience. Just as you are
describing your own experience in the Fulda Gap, our delegation
realized that here was a silo holding a missile aimed at the
United States that would never again threaten the lives of
Americans. The finality of it blowing up and the pieces flying
in the air was a dramatic conclusion. Those pieces are still
laying there because of START I requirements that national
technical means have an opportunity to verify that it happened.
I mention this point because as we proceeded in our trip to
chemical and biological weapons facilities the certainty of
security here becomes questionable, quite apart from any
program of destruction. This was the point that I tried to make
during my conversation with the President, regarding the
importance of these efforts in the war against terrorism. Again
and again the President has said we are going after al-Qaeda,
all the associated cells, all the countries they may be in,
trying to eliminate the threat they pose to our security. But
the bottom line is these people cannot get their hands on
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, biological, chemical. We
have to at all costs prevent that, even at the risk of going to
war with some countries that do not yield to inspection and
verification.
This is very much on our minds, all of us. At the very
moment we are saying that Russia has built these monumental
stocks of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons but now do
not have the budget or any hope of a budget to ensure their
control the safety and ultimate elimination.
The threat posed by these weapons is the reason why the
Departments of Defense, Energy, and State are working to
safeguard and destroy the weapons while attempting to find
peaceful employment for the scientists who created them.
The dilemma here is that we need to do more of this,
quicker and in a more comprehensive manner if we are addressing
the potential threats in our new relationship with Russian.
Now, we are back in Washington still debating about how
much we want to help and whether we can do anything at all,
given this waiver problem that we are attempting to address.
That is the problem that I tried to lay before the President.
He was very concerned.
Now, maybe I used a term that I should not have. I said,
Mr. President, somewhere in your administration there are
worker bees at work here. You may not know or appreciate
exactly what is occurring, but here we are talking about a new
treaty to dismantle additional weapons; but we cannot do so,
because you have to wait for a waiver. Russia does not have the
money to guard the weapons or, if the are dismantled, to guard
the fissile material inside them. We have an opportunity to
make real progress, but we cannot constantly be revisiting the
current situation.
I said, the irony is that at the very moment that in the
rhetoric at least of the Moscow summit you are talking about
the fact that we were prepared to do these things unilaterally,
without verification of what the Russians are doing. We
suddenly are seized this particular year with the absolute
certainty that arms control treaties are being met fully.
I said, it is ironic. You can read the language if you wish
to and reach that conclusion. But the new strategic
relationship takes us down a different trail, in which we have
a new relationship and furthermore each one of us is going our
own way with a lot of this, without destruction, without strict
verification, and so forth.
Well, the President was immediately aware of the disconnect
of this situation and so he committed to look into the issue
and consult with advisors. I would say in fairness that the
National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, leapt to the
defense of whoever in the administration has created this
problem and said that it occurred at high levels and so forth.
The President said: What do you want me to do about it? I
said: Mr. President, you ought to waive the whole business, get
on with the destruction of these materials. That is the
security of America. It is not a bureaucratic flailing about
behind closed doors.
Now we are in the process hopefully in the Defense
Authorization Bill negotiations, if we ever get it done, of
getting the President the waiver that he now seeks. But why in
the world you ever put yourselves in this predicament as an
administration I do not know.
I make such a to-do about it because I hope this will be
the last time. If it is not, this treaty is really in jeopardy.
It is interesting, but nevertheless it is going to be up for
grabs year after year as we hassle here in the Congress whether
you can work at it for 3 months, 6 months, or whatever may be
our pleasure. I think you understand that. You have asked in
your testimony for rapid action by the Congress. I pray that
will occur. It might occur in two circumstances, but it has not
yet.
For that reason, a lot of material is at risk in the war
against terrorism and needlessly so in my judgment. So if there
is some way even now we can cut through all of this, I pray we
would do so.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator Lugar. As I think you
know, I am the strongest supporter of comprehensive threat
reduction activities. I am a solid supporter, as is the
administration, on giving it all the funds the Congress is
willing to provide it. I am a strong supporter of the Nunn-
Lugar initiatives of the last decade. We were strong supporters
of this idea of 10 plus 10 over 10, and Under Secretary Bolton
played an instrumental role in Cananakis 2 weeks ago in
bringing it along.
The Russians have been part of the problem in terms of
giving us what we need to know and to have in order to help
with this problem. But I do not think it takes anything away
from the value of this treaty or other treaties. What you are
talking about really is a very troubling stockpile inventory
problem, how do we secure this material and how do we get rid
of it.
I will do anything I can to help with this problem, to
request the money, to defend the money, to appear before
Congress, to work with the Russians, as we have at every one of
our meetings, in order to get them to be even more receptive to
the kinds of controls that we have to have on the money and the
kinds of access we need and not allow them to take advantage of
our generosity.
It was fascinating at some of our ministerial meetings
lately to have other countries that have money in hand now
ready to give the Russians if only the Russians would meet
certain minimum standards and conditions.
So we are with you on that 100 percent.
With respect to the waiver, I need that waiver badly and I
implore the Congress to give us permanent waiver as soon as
possible. The reason I could not certify is because Congress
put the certification requirement on me that I could not meet
with respect to Russian activities. It was not that I did not
certify them or I did certify them. I did not have enough
information to form the basis of a certification. So I was
forced into the situation where I could not certify and it was
essentially a neutral position. That is why we need this
waiver.
So I implore the Congress to not waste any more time on
this, give us a permanent waiver, and let us not go through the
Perils of Pauline every 6 months and meanwhile the weapons are
sitting there with canisters rusting, with guards getting
bored, with other things going on that we do not like to see
going on, and with the possibility of proliferation of this
kind of material.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you for that strong statement
about the need for the waiver. I would just say respectfully
for the 10 years since the Nunn-Lugar Act has been going on
somehow or other we have been able to certify every year. This
was the first year we could not. How ironic at the very moment
the new relationship has come and in the midst of the war
against terrorism to suddenly find a problem at this point.
But that is water over the dam. I hope your prophecy is
correct about a permanent waiver and the President finally and
you and Secretary Rumsfeld are able to go about guarding this
stuff, destroying it, without inhibition.
Thank you.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, unsolicited advice. All the
President has to do is pick up the phone and call some of our
more recalcitrant colleagues on one side of the aisle and say:
I want this waiver. We will get it to you overnight. But he has
to engage, because there are still serious people up here who
think this is fungible money and somehow we should not be
helping the Russians. But that is another issue. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, welcome and thank you for
taking the time to be with us here.
I would just underscore what Senator Lugar has just said. I
heard you say that you are not sure that you see any way in
which this treaty adversely affects that. I think I would
respectfully disagree with you because there is a non-
verifiable destruction process which, in the absence of the
support that Senator Lugar is talking about, merely increases
the capacity for materials to fall into the hands of
terrorists, and I think that is perhaps the most gaping hole in
this treaty, is the lack of verification, traceability,
accountability and requirement for destruction and
permissiveness for rearming. There is sort of a huge
contradiction in this treaty.
In many ways, I think this is a treaty that, with the
exception of what Senator Lugar has just articulated, many of
us would say, well, of course we want to vote for something
that reduces from 6,000 to 1,700 to 2,200. It is common sense.
We would like to move in that direction.
But there are several very significant contradictions in
it, it seems to me, not the least of which is that if this new
relationship with Russia is what you say it is, which leaves
you then only Iraq, North Korea, conceivably Iran, Libya, and
perhaps China--and I find it hard to explain how China would
fit in that--it is inconceivable what kind of threat from any
of those entities mounts to 1,700 warheads.
This treaty should be measured, not by sort of where we
have been historically, but by where we want to go. Where are
we trying to go here? It seems to me where we are trying to go
is to a place where we have greater levels of accountability,
more transparency, more verification, and less capacity for
accident, unauthorized launch, etcetera, which is why we are
now pursuing the missile defense capacity.
One of the contradictions is that this treaty leaves in
place what START II would have destroyed, which was the ability
of the Russians to have an SS-18 with 10 warheads on it. It was
always a goal of ours to try to reduce that because that is
always perceived of as a more destabilizing weapon because of
the use-or-lose theory.
So I would ask, first of all, why we have left in place
their capacity to arm an SS-18, even to build one, to have more
SS-18's, with more MIRVed missiles, as long as it remains
within the level of the 1,700 to 2,200? That also provides much
greater difficulties in the long run for whatever the
capacities of missile defense may be.
But even a larger question, Mr. Secretary, and that is that
you have announced, your administration, a doctrine of
preemption and you are talking about conceivably having
military action against Iraq based upon the doctrine of
preemption because the assumption is that you cannot have a
leader pursuing the goal of achieving nuclear weapons because
they might pass them on to terrorists.
That doctrine in and of itself flies completely in the face
of the notion of why you would leave permissibility for 1,700
to 2,200 warheads in the long term. If we are going to pursue a
doctrine of preemption and the Russians are such good new
friends, why can you not go below 1,700? What is the rationale
for having 1,700? What would be the rationale from having 900
under those circumstances?
So it seems to me that the goal of accountability,
verifiability, mutual destruction of weapons, and ultimately
sort of moving to a more stable regime without the SS-18 out
there has been completely neutered simply to arrive at sort of
some agreement that says we are going to have in 10 years less
warheads on a missile, but not necessarily undestroyed or
unavailable for future use.
In fact, I am told--and I pose the question to you in
totality--I am told that, in addition to the 2,200 limit on
deployed strategic nuclear warheads, if you add in the
substantial number of non-deployed active and inactive reserve
warheads and the substantial number of tactical nuclear
weapons, we in fact would have numbers way in excess of the
2,200 in reality. So there is a certain fiction here in
addition.
So could you sort of help me see the logic based against
this question of preemption doctrine particularly and the
dangers of these undestroyed warheads without the verification?
Secretary Powell. I would set the preemption doctrine aside
in this kind of discussion, Senator. Preemption has always been
something that was available to us as a Nation with the power
that we have. The President highlighted the preemption concept
in his speech at West Point, but it was not something that was
brand new. We have always had the option of preemption because
of the nature of the forces we have and our ability to project
power.
With respect to the SS-18's----
Senator Kerry. But in fairness, is not the doctrine of
preemption based specifically now and restated on the notion
that we cannot bear the risk of nuclear materials because of
the dirty bomb theory, that we cannot have nuclear materials
falling into the hands of al-Qaeda? And if there is somebody
out there refusing to live by the standards of international
inspection, that threat drives the notion of preemption.
That is the essence of what is driving potential military
action against Saddam Hussein. So you cannot just brush it
aside.
Secretary Powell. I do not believe that is something new
and revolutionary. I view that as something the President said
and said clearly, and he has made that point clearly, but it is
not some new concept with respect to how military force might
be used.
Senator Kerry. But it has come into a new reality and in
that new reality, Mr. Secretary, it bears significantly on the
numbers of nuclear weapons we might or might not need to
maintain for the long term in order to protect this country.
Secretary Powell. The Department of Defense under the
direction of the President made a judgment that, based on the
fact that there are nuclear-armed nations out there and, even
though Russia is in a new relationship with us, a new
partnership with us, it has thousands of strategic nuclear
weapons still and will continue to have them for some years to
come, and there are other nations that have nuclear weapons,
not in any great number, and there are those who are trying to
acquire nuclear weapons, and there may be more who join that
club. Do not know.
But in this period of change, with new partnerships, but
with still a great number of unknowns out there, as a result of
a very long study and taking a look at what would ensure us
with a high degree of confidence in our ability both to deter
or to fight, God help us, if it should come to that, the
Defense Department made a judgment that we could safely in
their view go down to a range of 1,700 to 2,200.
Why not a thousand? Why not 500? Take your pick, but this
was the analysis that they did. It was done over a long period
of time, some 8 months almost, I guess about that, and they
came to this answer.
I long for the day--I know what day I want to see----
Senator Kerry. I am not looking for the long. I am looking
for the reality.
Secretary Powell. The reality is we are on a glidepath from
over 6,000 down to, with this treaty and without this treaty,
down to 1,700 to 2,200. That is what we believe we can safely
go to based on what we can see of the 10-year future in front
of us.
Senator Kerry. But here is my point. I think you have just
in a sense made the argument. You have left out here sort of
old thinking, which is the potential of Russia being an
opponent that would require a nuclear exchange. That is
juxtaposed to the new thinking, which is the relationship that
you have described that says we can move in this direction.
Secretary Powell. Right.
Senator Kerry. In between, you have made the argument for
why, if indeed there is the potential of that threat, it is a
hedge. We are keeping these weapons as a hedge. Then that makes
the argument that you should have the verification that is
absent here and you should have the process of destruction.
Secretary Powell. With respect to the first 7 years, there
is a great deal of verification that is inherent in the START
agreement and all those provisions continue over and can be
used. They are not a part of this treaty, but can be used to
help us with this treaty.
We will be looking through the bilateral implementation
committee for other ways of gaining transparency so that we can
see each other. The warhead destruction problem was a problem
for every previous strategic arms control agreement and the INF
agreement and was not dealt with, and it is not dealt with in
this treaty.
It seems to me that the imperative on both sides, the
pressure on both sides, is to get rid of any warheads you do
not need. There is no need to carry around a large inventory of
unneeded warheads. The reality is, though, even if you had a
regime that we could figure out the accountability of warheads,
how many there actually are, where they are, their disposition,
and we were satisfied that we knew exactly all of those facts,
you could still only destroy them at a very slow rate because
of the inherent limitations on both our side and their side.
So we are going to be left with stockpiles of nuclear
warheads for many, many years to come, which is what makes
Senator Lugar's point that it is so important to make sure that
they are secured properly, guarded well, and accounted for, and
then ultimately pass through the destruction system. So I do
not think that the fact that we did not try to deal with all of
that in this treaty takes away from the value of this treaty.
Senator Kerry. Well, Mr. Secretary, as you well know--and
my time is up unfortunately--but there are more questions
raised by that, because the START process has a different set
of definitions----
Secretary Powell. Yes.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Counts weapons differently. And
we do not know even what the specific duties of the binational
commission are going to be or how those will be counted here.
So the verification issue is really hanging out there and the
greater issue remains this question of the capacity of the
Russia that Senator Lugar has described to adequately contain
the very materials that might in fact take us into military
action against Iraq. That is the greatest danger in the world
today and it is the most singular gaping hole in this treaty.
Secretary Powell. This treaty has nothing to do with that
problem. The problem you just described is being dealt with
with Nunn-Lugar programs, Cooperative Threat Reduction----
Senator Kerry. It could have had something to do with it.
Secretary Powell. If I may, sir. Cooperative Threat
Reduction efforts--the President working with his G-8
colleagues put down on the table and they agreed to it in
Cananakis 2 weeks ago $10 billion from the U.S., $10 billion
from our other G-8 partners, over a 10-year period to help with
these kinds of problems of weapons of mass destruction,
chemical, biological. As I said in my statement, Senator, I
believe we should use this money for all of these kinds of
weapons, to include tactical nuclear weapons.
With respect to your comment on START, the reductions in
START will continue down to the START levels with the START
counting rules. But the verification system associated with
those START counting rules also gives us transparency as we go
below those START levels.
So we have a pretty good basis upon which to work, and the
bilateral implementation committee will be looking for new ways
to enhance transparency and give us the kind of insight we need
to have.
With respect to the SS-18's, we will see whether the
Russians find that there is any utility in this. But if that is
the way they want to use their allocation of warheads, that is
the choice they could make under the treaty. I do not think
they would--if they would ask me and if I was their chairman, I
would tell them that is not a very wise choice, and I am not
sure it is a choice they are going to make.
Senator Kerry. But to my recollection--and I will end on
this because I do not want to abuse the time. But to my
recollection, there is nothing in the START process that gets
to the warheads themselves.
Secretary Powell. Right, just the launchers.
Senator Kerry. Is there anything here that gets to the
warheads in verification?
Secretary Powell. No.
Senator Kerry. That is my point.
Secretary Powell. That is right, and neither did START or
INF.
Senator Kerry. But it should not be measured by what we did
not achieve in START. It should be measured by what we need to
achieve today.
Secretary Powell. The reason it was not achieved in START
is because it was too difficult a thing to achieve in START and
it was still not something we were going to achieve at this
point. So it was decided to go ahead with operationally
deployed warheads, principally because the Russians were
anxious to have what both sides were doing unilaterally put
together in a binding agreement between the two sides.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Thank you very much.
Congratulations to you, Mr. Secretary, and Secretary Bolton
and others who crafted this significant accomplishment, and we
appreciate it.
Would you explain in a little more detail the relationship
between the Moscow Treaty and the declaration? It might
overlap, Mr. Secretary, into some of the previous conversations
and questions, because it seems to me, if I understand this a
little bit, that it was signed with some intent to deal with
these more peripheral common interests that the Russians have
with the United States for world security. So I think it would
be helpful if you could develop that.
Secretary Powell. Exactly. They were signed at the same
time, the same table in the Kremlin. The Moscow Treaty is
exactly that, a legally binding agreement under international
law upon ratification that dealt specifically with reducing the
number of operationally deployed strategic warheads. The
political declaration that was signed there was a much broader
document and it is a political document, not one in
international law, where the two Presidents committed
themselves to work together on programs having to do with
economic cooperation, counterterrorism activity, a whole gamut
of issues which the two nations are interested in. In order to
further that dialog, they created this consultative committee
that I sit on along with Don Rumsfeld and with our counterparts
on the Russian side.
The treaty itself has a bilateral implementation committee
that will be composed of representatives of the Defense
Department, the State Department, and other interested
agencies, which deals specifically with the implementation of
the treaty itself and the treaty limits itself.
So the joint declaration, a political document laying out a
full range of actions that the two sides wish to take with each
other on economic, trade, security, counterterrorism, drugs, a
variety of issues; the treaty rather specific with respect to
reducing the number of operationally deployed warheads.
Senator Hagel. Would that cooperative effort include what
many of us believe, and I suspect you have some real sense of
this, one of the great threats of our time, and that is
tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries? We
talked today about tactical weapons in the hands of the
Russians and the United States, but the other countries out
there that have these weapons, some we are not sure if they
have them. I would be interested in your development of that
theme, because I think that represents as much a threat to the
security, not only of this country, but of the world, than
anything else out there today.
Secretary Powell. I agree with you entirely, Senator. In my
preliminary conversations with Foreign Minister Ivanov, we have
already set the date for the first meeting of the four of us in
September at the time of the United Nations General Assembly.
One of the items for discussion will be proliferation of not
only nuclear weapons, but other weapons of mass destruction.
As you know from my previous testimony here, we have spoken
to the Russians in rather direct terms about some of the
actions they have undertaken over the years that might assist
certain nations in developing this kind of technology,
specifically Iran.
Senator Hagel. The bilateral implementation commission that
you mentioned in your statement, and you went into some detail
for the record, stating that the START verification regime
would provide the foundation for confidence, does that mean
that we will use the START verification regime essentially as
the regime for verification for this treaty?
Secretary Powell. It continues to be the regime for
reductions under the START treaty. The START treaty brings us
down to that 6,000 level and the START treaty deals with
platforms. But by the regime that we have put in place for
START, not only do you get insight into the platforms, you get
insight into the warheads as well. So you get a good insight
into Russian strategic offensive forces, technology,
developmental efforts, launchers, platforms, warheads. So it
gives you a body of information that will be helpful and very
supportive of our efforts to implement this treaty.
Additional procedures may be required. There may be
additional items we discover as we move forward that we need to
know about, and that is what the bilateral implementation
committee will look at. They may want to find out more about
what we are doing that they do not think they know enough about
as a result of the START verification regime or just watching
our open activities.
Senator Hagel. You mentioned also in your statement, I
believe at the beginning, some of the areas that we are seeing
significant cooperation in with the Russians. You mentioned
specifically in your statement Afghanistan. Could you bring us
up to date on what the Russians are doing in Afghanistan to
assist us militarily, economically, diplomatically,
humanitarian-wise?
Secretary Powell. They have been helpful from the very
beginning with respect to exchange of intelligence and
information. Within the limits of their ability, they have
provided humanitarian support, medical support to Afghans early
on after the fall of the Taliban. Diplomatically, they have
supported our efforts on Bonn when we had the Bonn conference
at the end of last year in order to create the political
arrangement that is now being implemented. They were very
helpful.
In fact, I remember one evening when it was all hung up and
I called Foreign Minister Ivanov and he was able to inject the
right energy level to some of the participants in the
conference to make sure that we got an agreement and the
conference did not blow up.
Diplomatically they have been very helpful; politically, we
have stayed in close touch with them. We have told them that we
do not want the great game to break out again, and I think they
understand it is not in their interest to have a destabilized
Afghanistan again and face the situation they faced a couple of
decades ago. So I think they have been helpful within the
limits of their financial ability.
Senator Hagel. Do they have any troops in Afghanistan?
Secretary Powell. They may have some presence. They may not
be combat troops. But I would rather give you the answer for
the record. Initially they sent in some civil engineers and
some medical personnel. I do not know what they may have there
now. But they were anxious--nobody was going to welcome Russian
combat troops back into Afghanistan, you can be sure of that,
or we would have, as they say, we would have us a brand new
ball game. But they did provide some civil type presence--
airfield construction and some humanitarian efforts. But I
would rather give you a more precise answer for the record
because they may not be combat--I am sure they are not combat
troops, but I am not sure what they are.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
scheduling this excellent hearing on this important treaty. I
welcome you, Secretary Powell.
I am very pleased that the Presidents of the United States
and Russia have taken this important step of signing a binding
treaty that affirms the goal of reducing the arsenals of deadly
strategic offensive nuclear weapons that are currently deployed
by the two countries. While this brief, three-page document is
a step in the right direction, Mr. Secretary, I am concerned
that it does not address the vital issues of compliance and
verification, that it does not include a timetable for these
reductions, and, as others have pointed out, it does not
actually require that any nuclear warheads actually be
destroyed.
Only by dismantling and destroying these devastating
weapons can we truly achieve the goal of meaningful nuclear
arms reduction.
In addition, I am troubled by the language contained in
Article IV of the treaty regarding the process by which one of
the parties may withdraw from the treaty. As you may know, Mr.
Secretary, I found the President's decision to unilaterally
withdraw the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty troubling on both policy and constitutional grounds.
I think the Senate has a constitutional role to play in
terminating treaties. The Constitution requires the advice and
consent of the Senate for the United States to enter into a
treaty, such as the one that we are beginning the consider here
today. And the Constitution gives treaties the same status as
laws. The Senate at a minimum should be consulted on
withdrawing from a treaty, and especially from a treaty of the
magnitude of the ABM Treaty, the termination of which could
have lasting implications on the arms control and defense
policy of this country.
I do not think a law can be declared to be repealed by the
President alone. Only an act of Congress can repeal a law.
Action by the Senate or the Congress should be required to
terminate a treaty.
This treaty, the Moscow Treaty, contains troubling language
that would allow either party to withdraw in exercising its
national sovereignty with all 3 months written notice. It does
not require that either party cite extraordinary circumstances
that jeopardize its supreme national interests. It does not
require that any reason for the withdrawal be given at all.
This treaty requires only 3 months notice in writing. Most arms
control treaties require at least 6 months written notice, as
did the ABM treaty.
So, Mr. Secretary, I look forward to exploring ways to
protect the Senate's prerogatives on treaty withdrawal as the
committee continues its consideration of this treaty. In that
regard, as I suggested, I am troubled by the way the
administration handled the withdrawal from the ABM treaty. I am
concerned that the administration did not really consult with
the Senate prior to the President's announcement of the planned
withdrawal in December and that, of course, the administration
did not seek approval from the Congress for this action.
So I guess what I would like to know from you is what steps
will you take to ensure that this administration at a minimum
consults with the Senate prior to any future abrogation of
existing treaties?
Secretary Powell. With respect to the ABM treaty, Senator,
I think that the President not only in the campaign for
election but in his first year as President made it clear that
the ABM treaty was an impediment, an impediment to protecting
this Nation through the pursuit of missile defense. I do not
think there was any secret about this. I think we talked to the
Congress on a regular basis about our concerns. I think in
every hearing I had up on the Hill we discussed this.
It was quite clear what we were discussing with the
Russians. The Russia view was also well known. After
considering all of our options and offering to the Russians the
we have a bilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which they
did not agree with, the President believed it was in the
interest of the Nation to move forward and leave the ABM
treaty.
With respect to the law on this, there are differences of
opinion, as you well know, Senator Feingold, and we believe
that we were operating quite correctly under the Constitution
by the President exercising the right of withdrawal on a basis
contained in the treaty, supreme national interest. We do not
believe it was necessary to get Congressional approval for the
exercise of that prerogative, although I know there is a
different point of view which you just expressed.
Senator Feingold. Is it the administration's position that
with regard to this treaty that there would be no need for
Senate approval of a withdrawal? I am speaking of the Moscow
Treaty now.
Secretary Powell. Yes. When the President left the ABM
treaty because he believed it was his authority to do so and
the Congress was made aware of the fact that he was going to do
it and they were aware that he was moving in that direction, if
it was appropriate for that treaty and if any other treaty has
similar provisions with respect to abrogation and withdrawal,
it would be the position of this administration that he would
exercise that if the conditions determined that he should.
Now, I will not speak for future presidents, but I believe
that is the position of this President.
With respect to the article in this treaty that has to do
with that, 3 months and national sovereignty is what the two
sides agreed to and believed appropriate to this treaty at this
time.
Senator Feingold. So I take it, Mr. Secretary, the
administration's position is that there would be no need for
Senate approval of withdrawal from this Moscow Treaty?
Secretary Powell. Yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. I am concerned about also the vague
language in the treaty regarding the process by which one of
the parties may withdraw from it. Could you explain how the
negotiators arrived at the treaty withdrawal language in
Article IV, section 3? In other words, why 3 months notice
instead of 6, and why does not this section require a party to
cite extraordinary circumstances for withdrawal?
Secretary Powell. As the treaty was being negotiated and
the two sides discussed this issue, they saw a future that was
promising in the sense that there was a new relationship
between Russia and America, but at the same time it was still
an uncertain future. We saw other nations that were developing
nuclear weapons. We were concerned that we might face a
different kind of strategic environment. We hoped that would
not be the case.
But as we worked our way through this question of are we
betting correctly on this treaty, both sides felt that there
was an appropriate need to make sure that the standard that had
to be met if either side determined that they were now at
strategic risk was a reasonable standard and national
sovereignty, the agreement of both sides, seemed to be a
reasonable standard. It is not that easy to define what you
mean by that, but nor was ``supreme national interest'' in
earlier treaties.
With respect to 6 months and 3 months, this was a
compromise position arrived at as both sides tried to make sure
that, in the event of a strategic situation coming along that
was fundamentally different than the situation that existed at
the time the treaty was being negotiated, signed, and ratified,
3 months seemed to be an appropriate amount of time to give
notice to the other side.
Would 6 months have been wrong or 2 months have been wrong?
Any one of those might have been quite acceptable, but after a
process of discussion and negotiations both sides found that 3
months was reasonable and appropriate.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Secretary, I would just like to
comment that the combination of these two answers, the one with
regard to the Senate not having a role in withdrawing from a
treaty and the very flexible circumstances in which either
party could withdraw, I am very troubled about what kind of
role the administration thinks the Senate has in this process.
It leaves me or others who may agree with me virtually no
choice but to question this up front, this process, of the
administration not taking the Senate's role seriously where it
cannot be disputed, our role in approving treaties. I really do
believe from a historical point of view and a legal point of
view that this is a trend that really is not in the interests
of the country and it is not--I do not think there is any real
value in the President not making his case to the Senate. I am
quite confident the President would have won overwhelmingly had
he sought Senate vote to withdraw from the ABM treaty and I
suspect on this treaty as well.
I think this is a dangerous road and I would just suggest
that it at some point certainly will lead to an unnecessary
conflict with regard to the prerogatives of the Senate.
Secretary Powell. Senator, I think the President has the
greatest respect for the role that is played by the Senate and
that is why I am here today. Our understanding of the
constitutional process is that the President signs a treaty,
but then he has to, as we are now doing, defend it before the
U.S. Senate to receive the Senate's advice and consent to the
exchange of instruments of ratification of that treaty.
We hope it will be a clean decision on the part of the
Senate, but the Senate has the right and authority to
interpret, to put reservations, whatever you so choose,
incident to the instrument of ratification. But I hope it will
be clean. We are looking for a clean response from the Senate.
But I must say that my understanding of our constitutional
history and my understanding of the law and my understanding of
the way treaties have been dealt with the last 200-odd years is
that there is no constitutional requirement and no requirement
of law that to abrogate a treaty with these kinds of clauses
and articles for abrogation in it requires either consultation
or the approval of the Senate or the Congress as a body.
Now, I am a great believer in sharing ideas and discussing
these issues, and I think the administration did a good job in
letting the American people, in letting the U.S. Congress, know
the direction in which we were heading. I have got to say to
you, Senator, that I worked very, very hard last fall with my
Russian colleagues to see if there was negotiation some way--we
understood the importance of this treaty to the Russians. We
knew how this was viewed by many people in the world.
We worked hard to see if there was not some way that we
could go forward with our missile defense within the context of
the treaty. But the treaty really was designed to keep missile
defense from going forward and we simply could not bridge that
difference. We tried every way imaginable.
So we said to the Russians: Look, you need to understand we
are committed to missile defense; we are going forward. And if
we cannot go forward within the treaty and you do not want to
bilaterally abrogate the treaty, that is your choice, we will
have to unilaterally abrogate the treaty. We believe we did
that appropriately. We believe we did that with, if not the
kind of consultation you might have wished, Senator Feingold,
but we do not believe there was a requirement or that, but
certainly with the knowledge of the Senate. We believe we
followed our law, our traditions, our practice, and we were
consistent with the constitutional requirements.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Secretary Powell, for taking time to join with us and update us
on this significant treaty that you have negotiated. I also
want to commend you on the magnificent job that you and your
team are doing on a multitude of issues all around the world
that are cropping up, and for providing security for our people
here at home as well as our troops abroad.
Before I begin, I do want to commend you most specifically,
you and your team, on your brilliant diplomatic efforts in
defusing the most recent conflict between Pakistan and India
over Kashmir. Here is an example that had the potential of a
disastrous nuclear interchange. It has been presently defused.
I did write the President recently on how we need to stay
involved with Pakistan and India over Kashmir and cannot allow
the future of Kashmir to be hijacked by international
belligerents and terrorist organizations.
Now, this dispute between the two nuclear powers, Pakistan
and India, highlights the need to develop treaties and
agreements that will limit the potential for nuclear attacks
among nations. I believe that by signing the Moscow Treaty on
Strategic Offensive Reductions the United States and Russia may
have actually set some example. We are the only countries that
seem to have such agreements and hopefully this would be an
example for others to follow.
As we do enter this treaty, we will need to ever mindful of
the importance of transparency and verification. The U.S.
continues to pursue, obviously, as you know, the battles
against terrorists all over the world. During these campaigns
we have found evidence--and some of this we will not bring up
here, but in some of our Top Secret briefings--good evidence
that some of these terrorist organizations are seeking to
purchase or develop nuclear devices.
You mentioned in answers to someone's questions here
previously or maybe in your remarks how, with the Nunn-Lugar
and the payments and the disposal of nuclear warheads, that
there are others with plenty of cash who would like to acquire
it, and those are not necessarily the type of people we would
want to acquire this technology.
So as we and obviously the Russians dismantle their nuclear
arsenals, I think it is of the greatest importance that
components from those weapons do not fall into the hands of
terrorist organizations or potentially belligerent countries.
It is under these circumstances that I think verification and
transparency is absolutely necessary and both nations must be
given assurances that the armaments are being reduced and
disposed of in an agreeable and safe manner. I think it is not
only required for Russia, but it is for us and actually all the
rest of the world ought to be interested in it.
So what I would like to do, Mr. Secretary, is followup in
greater detail on what Senator Hagel was asking in this regard.
It is my understanding that during the trip, President Bush's
trip to Moscow, President Bush expressed his concerns with
President Putin over Russian proliferation of nuclear and
ballistic missile technology to Iran. Now, how, if you could
share with us if that did come up, and how this Moscow Treaty
could influence a dialog on these issues?
Secretary Powell. Yes, sir, it did come up. It comes up at
every meeting between the two Presidents and every meeting
between me and my colleague Igor Ivanov and Don Rumsfeld and
his colleague Sergei Ivanov. I think we have made some
progress. At their last meeting in Moscow, President Putin made
the specific point at one of the press conferences that we have
agreement from both sides, both the United States and Russia,
that they recognize the danger in proliferation and they want
to do everything to keep Iran from developing these kinds of
weapons.
There are some issues that we are still in disagreement
over with the Russians, but we have made progress since the
Moscow summit, made progress since the G-8 meeting in Cananakis
a couple of weeks ago, and we think that we are on the right
path to making sure that the Russians do not continue to engage
in this kind of activity. We have not solved the problem yet,
but we believe we have made some progress.
I would like to thank you for your comments on India and
Pakistan as well. We have worked very hard to keep these thing
from blowing up or boiling over on us. I spent an enormous
amount of time on the telephone with the two sides. I spoke to
President Musharraf again yesterday. I spoke to the new Indian
foreign minister on Sunday. Deputy Secretary Armitage I think
did yeoman's work when he went over, Secretary Rumsfeld when he
went over. I expect to be visiting there before the end of the
month to keep this process going along.
Senator Allen. That is good. I am glad to hear it. I do
think--well, I am not going to get into the Kashmir issue right
now, but I do think there needs to be a goal that all parties
can aspire to, and in this instance the United Nations
resolution I think is a good guiding path for us.
Secretary Powell. It is a very difficult issue. What we are
trying to do now is to make sure that both the Indians and the
Pakistanis understand that the United States is interested in
them beyond this crisis. We want a good relationship with India
on every aspect of that relationship--economic, trade,
cooperation, military cooperation. The same thing with
Pakistan.
We are anxious to get through this crisis and see a dialog
begin between the two sides so that we can start to move
forward to find a solution to the problem in Kashmir
ultimately. They have to find the solution.
Senator Allen. Obviously, a peaceful solution.
Secretary Powell. Obviously.
Senator Allen. Back to the proliferation issue. This newly
formed consultative group for strategic security is to be
continued. How do you see that group being helpful or that
collaboration being helpful as far as the nuclear proliferation
issue in the future?
Secretary Powell. I think it will be very important, a very
useful group. Foreign Minister Ivanov and I meet on a very,
very frequent basis. I think we have met something like 23
times in the last 18 months, and we talk on the phone at least
3 times a week. Don also, Don Rumsfeld, also has a good
relationship with his colleague, Sergei Ivanov.
In this group the four of us will come together. For the
first time in September, we will come together as a group. We
have been talking about the agenda for this first meeting to
carry forward the political declaration that our two Presidents
signed. You can be sure that on that agenda for the meeting in
September will be proliferation and, to be very frank,
proliferation focused on the Iran question. That will be an
item on the agenda.
It is good to have the four of us in the room, both the
foreign policy part of it and the defense part of it.
Senator Allen. As you mentioned, economic and terrorism and
drugs, I would hope that you will make this a priority, saying,
look, if you want assistance in economics and so forth that--I
am not saying that you--I am not going to tell you how to
negotiate, but I would make this----
Secretary Powell. They understand the importance of this
issue to us.
Senator Allen. Mr. Secretary, in closing, can you outline
the type of resolution of ratification that the administration
is requesting for this treaty, so we have our road map?
Secretary Powell. I think it should be, in the spirit of
brevity, to the point, and as uncluttered as the treaty itself.
I think a simple sentence would do.
Senator Allen. A simple sentence. Well, hopefully we can
draft that simple sentence without too many phrases.
Secretary Powell. I am prepared to help you in any way that
you might need help.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I believe Secretary Rumsfeld and General Meyers, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also be testifying on the
treaty?
The Chairman. That is correct. They will be coming on the
17th, I believe.
Senator Chafee. I am curious, as the Nation's top diplomat,
can you let me know what the reaction around the world has been
to this treaty?
Secretary Powell. It has been excellent.
Senator Chafee. The elimination of the warheads, has that
been----
Secretary Powell. It is not a subject of great discussion.
People kind of understand. The average person I think around
the world understands that there will be two-thirds fewer
warheads sitting on something that can deliver those warheads.
That is what the average person sees.
We do have a continuing issue of where do the warheads go,
how do we protect them, how do we get rid of them, how can we
increase the capacity to destroy warheads. We are wondering as
to how many we can get rid of every year. All those are
important issues, but they are kind of related to the treaty,
but stand on their own merit as issues to be debated.
For example, with Senator Lugar's question, Nunn-Lugar,
Cooperative Threat Reduction, the certifications that I have to
make, all of that says to the Russians: You have got to tell us
more, you have got to show us more, we have to have more
information so that we can help you get rid of this kind of
stuff.
So I think that is important. But it has been well received
around the world, particularly in the context of the
President's speech of 1 May 2001 to the National Defense
University, when he proposed a new framework that included
significant strategic offensive reductions, missile defense,
and getting beyond the constraints of the ABM treaty. As we
negotiated this through the fall and as people realized we were
serious about getting beyond the constraints of the ABM treaty,
people were deeply concerned when the President announced that
we were going to leave the ABM treaty that at that point an
arms race was going to break out, that there would be all sorts
of difficulties around the world, that all of our friends would
be stunned and shocked and taken aback.
But the next day President Putin said: There is not going
to be any arms race. I do not like your leaving the ABM treaty,
I think you made the wrong choice, it is not the thing you
should have done, but it does not threaten us, he said. He told
me that 2 weeks ago, earlier, sitting in the Kremlin. He said,
you should not do this, but it does not threaten us; we have
done our analysis and your missile defense programs do not put
our strategic offensive capability and deterrent capability at
risk. So let us find a new framework and, by the way, I am
going to match you. I call your bet. We are both going down to
1,700 to 2,200.
What happened to the arms race? It went away. The people of
the world were relieved. Now, 6 months later, the ABM treaty
went out of effect, I think it was the 13th of June or
thereabouts, and it was not noted very much, and we have this
new framework and it is demonstrated by this treaty that we
have put before the Senate.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Of the comments of nations that have weighed in, such as
China, Japan, or European nations, what were the concerns of
those nations about the treaty?
Secretary Powell. The country that I was concerned about
the most with respect to a reaction was China. Throughout all
of last year in all of my meetings with my Chinese colleagues,
Foreign Minister Tang especially, we gave them the most in-
depth briefings we could on what we were thinking about with
respect to missile defense, how we did not think they should
see it and view it as a threat. We sent briefing teams.
When we made a determination that we had to leave the ABM
treaty, we notified the Chinese. I called Foreign Minister
Tang. When we signed the Moscow Treaty, the next day I called
Foreign Minister Tang, explained it to him.
The Chinese have taken it all aboard. They are modernizing
their force. That is what I would expect them to do, their
nuclear forces, and they are doing it over a rather extended
period. But I have received no suggestion that the Chinese are
in some way threatened by either the elimination of the ABM
treaty or the Treaty of Moscow. I see no suggestion that an
arms race is going to break out because the Chinese are going
to make quantum increases in the number of strategic weapons
available to them. They may go up somewhat as they modernize
their force, but I see no suggestion that they are trying to
break out by creating a new strategic threat to the United
States.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we will just keep you a few
minutes longer. I have two questions, and I do not know whether
my colleagues have any further questions.
But two things that I keep being drawn back to here. If the
cold war is over with the Russians, why do we need 1,700 to
2,200 warheads with the ability to rearm 4,000 ``reduced''
warheads that are in storage? Are not most of those warheads
still required primarily for possible Russian targets?
Secretary Powell. Some of those warheads--and I think
Secretary Rumsfeld will be able to speak to this in greater
detail. But the study determined, the nuclear posture review
determined, that based on the fact that there are nuclear-armed
nations out there, particularly Russia, even though it is a new
relationship, a new partnership--they will have nuclear weapons
for many, many years to come, and one cannot predict the future
with certainty. So therefore it is wise for us, in view of that
in view of other nations that have nuclear weapons and those
who are trying to acquire them, an absolute assurance for us
would be in this range of 1,700 to 2,200 with a stockpile of
additional warheads that are there as replacement warheads to
deal with failures that might occur in one of our fleets, the
land-based or sea-based or air-based fleet, and to give us a
hedge.
But the President's intention is to go straight down this
ramp to those numbers. But we have insured ourselves in this
period ahead that could have some surprises in it, we have
insured ourselves by the way in which this treaty has been
structured and by the nuclear posture review that if something
comes along during this period of going down we do have the
capacity to respond to that new circumstance.
But it is the President's intention to go down that ramp.
It will not be a linear ramp. I am not sure how Secretary
Rumsfeld and his successors will go down that ramp, but to go
down that ramp to the lowest number that protects this Nation
in a way that is indisputable and obvious to all. The number
that Secretary Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff came up
with was 1,700 to 2,200, with some hedge for stockpile
rejuvenation, weapons that might be needed to take apart to
test, and I suspect most of those weapons, but this is a
question to be put to Don Rumsfeld, will be put into the queue
for ultimate destruction.
The Chairman. Well, I hope that that is the case because,
since this was essentially a unilateral decision where we said
to the Russians, by the way, you want to come along, and as you
said they then matched, the Pentagon, or somebody, concluded
that we could not comfortably in a permanent sense go below
6,000 warheads. We could go down to 1,700 to 2,200, but we have
got to keep these up to 4,000 available in storage.
So we are still kind of at the 6,000 number--you know what
it kind of reminds me of? It kind of reminds me of the decision
made by the President to not target existing ICBM's. Again, I
think it is a useful thing. I just want to make sure we have a
perspective here, I have a perspective anyway, that I do not
want to make this more than it is and raise expectations, and I
do not want to make it less than it is.
But right now it seems to me that where we are is you have
gotten an agreement. I quite frankly think the most significant
thing you have got is you have got the Pentagon to agree to
come down, which nobody else has been able to do so far. And
they have come down in a sense tentatively. They want 4,000 in
reserve just in case some exigency occurs.
Now, did anybody ever explain or can you explain to us what
some of those exigencies might be that would require us to have
up to--granted, we may destroy a bunch of them--4,000 nuclear
warheads in reserve that could be loaded back up on launchers
that are not being destroyed? What are the kind of concerns?
Secretary Powell. First, the number is not 4,000. It is
much less. The most you could get up to with the 1,700 to 2,200
is 4,600, roughly 4,600 total, including those that are on
launch vehicles or armaments on bombers.
The Chairman. I just rounded that off. If we go down to
2,000, you are at 6 now. START takes you down to 6, right?
Secretary Powell. Yes.
The Chairman. And so this, the next agreement in the queue,
is this one, the Moscow agreement, and that says over 10 years
down to 1,700 to 2,200.
Secretary Powell. Right.
The Chairman. So if you get down to 2,000, you could still
keep 4,000 in reserve, right?
Secretary Powell. The total number that I believe you will
hear from Secretary Rumsfeld of both deployed and in reserve is
somewhere around 4,600.
The Chairman. OK, that is new, but the Moscow Treaty would
allow you to have more than that?
Secretary Powell. The treaty would allow you to have as
many warheads as you want.
The Chairman. Got you.
Secretary Powell. What the treaty says is that on December
31, 2012 you will only have, and you will demonstrate to us on
that day that there are, only 1,700 to 2,200, some number, some
discrete number that you have decided on, deployed,
operationally deployed, meaning that if I go to your missile
fields, if I go to your submarines, if I go to your bombers,
this is what I will see. The bombers are a little different
there because there are some extra ones that are there for
storage, but that is not a big deal.
But some of these platforms that people are worried about
being available to be suddenly reloaded will not be there. Four
submarines are being converted to other purposes.
The Chairman. Look, I am not suggesting I am worried about
it. At this point I am just trying to figure it out. I am just
trying to figure out what it means. You have just told me
something I find very encouraging, that the Defense Department
is going to tell me that at the end of the day there is going
to be only the possibility of having 4,600.
Secretary Powell. Let me give that to you in a very
tentative way because I think Don Rumsfeld should really give
you that definitely.
The Chairman. Good. When Secretary Rumsfeld does that, that
means if we stick to that we are clearly going to destroy at
least a thousand of these warheads and up to 1200, maybe more.
Secretary Powell. I would, and I do not want to speak for
Secretary Rumsfeld or any Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. That would be inappropriate. But it seems to me all the
pressure and all the incentive will be to get rid of the
warheads that you do not need either to be operationally
deployed or to be kept in this stockpile.
The Chairman. I agree.
Secretary Powell. The real trick is to find a way to get
rid of them.
The Chairman. Right.
Secretary Powell. You know how many can go through
Amarillo.
The Chairman. No, I got it. I got it. That is why I am
trying to figure out what is being contemplated, not what is
decided, what is being contemplated, so I get a sense of the
overall value of this treaty. I start off, valuable, worth
doing. Now, I want to get a sense for me as to how valuable
this is.
Secretary Powell. We have pressurized the system the take
the first step in elimination of a warhead and that is to get
it off the bomber and get it off the top of a missile.
The Chairman. I got that part.
Secretary Powell. Put it into storage, and then it is in
storage for one of several purposes. We need it as a spare, it
is needed for whatever examination or testing to make sure that
the stockpile is safe. I do not mean explosive testing. Finally
then, if it is not needed for that or for some hedge that the
Pentagon will be able to explain to you, then it ought to be in
queue for dismantling and ultimately destruction down to its
physics package and done away with.
The Chairman. Well, I plan on pursuing this with the
Defense Department as well. But just so you understand, because
you and I have known each other a long time and the one thing I
think we have been is completely straight with each other, is
what I am trying to get at is the rationale behind what is
happening here and what is likely to happen, so I know what the
nature of the debate is.
Let me explain what I mean a little more about that. The
verification regime in START I does allow us to go in and
count. We can go in and say, we want to see this vehicle, an
SS-18, and we can count, does it have ten warheads on it and no
more than ten, because that is the deal you made with us here,
and we can count it.
That helps us and is a positive step in that it is almost
an indirect verification of whether or not we are getting to
the Moscow Treaty number, 1,700 to 2,200.
Now, there is a gap here and I, like you, expect that it
will never get to the gap, which is this: that that treaty
verification regime expires, expires 3 years before this goal
of 1,700 to 2,200 has to be met. So if in fact they do not do
anything for the period where START is not in place, then there
is no verification regime that is left to determine whether
they have gone down to that range after that fact or whether
they have gone beyond the range, after the fact.
There must have been a rationale as to why you did not
extend, or maybe there is not a rationale as to why you did not
extend the verification portions of START II until the
culmination of this treaty, the Moscow Treaty. So what I am
trying to get at here is why were there not any milestones put
in here? Is it because it does not matter--I am not being
facetious. Because it does not matter much what they do from
our perspective? Or is it because you could not get agreement
from them, which would go to their notions of motivation? Or is
it because there is resistance here?
Why no milestones and why this gap?
Secretary Powell. We did not really want milestones. We did
not want to have to meet milestones every year with respect to
the rate at which we are coming down. We wanted the flexibility
to come down in a way that made sense to us and not sense to
the arbitrary measures or arbitrary milestones you might have
put in the treaty.
We believe that we needed 10 years to come down to that
level. It may be a step function, every year come down a
certain number. You are the one who is going to be--excuse me.
I say this with all due respect. It is the Congress that will
be able to have insight as to how it is coming down as the
Pentagon comes forward every year with its budget request and
through the normal processes of examining what the Pentagon is
doing.
Whether it is linear, a step function, the same number
every year, or whether it will be a much more non-linear
function is up to both sides to determine. That seemed to us to
be the better way to do it, rather than put in something which
is rather arbitrary and does not really comport to the
circumstances you might find every year. That is the reason for
that.
Ten years is what was needed. Anticipating when this might
be ratified and solved, we decided that December 31, 2012 was
roughly the 10 years needed. It was 3 years and 3 weeks, if I
am exact--I think December 5, 2009, is when START expires. But
it is a 3 year 3 week gap. We did not think it was necessary at
this point to try to go back and renegotiate START I in order
to cover a gap that does not occur for another 7 years.
Also, a lot is going to happen in that 7 years. We do
believe that this bilateral implementation committee will
succeed in coming up with other ways of finding out, what are
you guys doing? How do you plan to meet this December 31, 2012
goal? What do we say to our ministers when they meet for their
sessions under the political declaration?
So we think that there will be more than ample opportunity
to find ways to see what the other side is doing, just as they
want to see what we are doing. Then there is a whole range of,
not verification procedures and regimes, but everything that is
down under Nunn-Lugar and CTR. All of that requires
transparency and information that we are insisting on before we
start giving them the money.
So I believe there will be a body of information and a body
of evidence that will give the future President in 2012 the
assurance that he knows what the Russians have done at that
point.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, I am going to yield to
my colleague if he has a closing questions or question. But I
think this is a good treaty. I think that if things go as
rational people hope they will it may turn out to be a great
treaty. It could lead to significant reductions. It could also
be of marginal value. I think the jury is out on that. That
does not mean we should not ratify it. I am for ratifying it.
I would just like to make one point on your closing comment
about we have to know more about what they are doing to know
whether to give them money on Cooperative Threat Reduction. The
fact is we are hardly giving them any money. We are sending
American contractors, paying them over there to do this.
You and I have often talked about, and you have talked in
both your writings as well as your speeches, about family and
the things we have learned from family. My mom has an
expression I would like you to keep in mind, God love her. She
just had her 85th birthday. She and my dad are living at home
with me, my dad is dying and my mom is taking care of him, and
she is a font of wisdom.
From the time I was a kid she said something that I hope
Under Secretary Bolton will listen to, and that is, she said,
``Joey, do not bite your nose off to spite your face.'' I hope
to God we do not decide that, even though we do not have every
single piece of information we want relative to their
stockpiles, that would stop us from destroying stockpiles they
are willing to allow us to destroy now, because we are doing it
with our money, our personnel, and our direction. But that is
another issue.
I appreciate your time and I appreciate--and I mean this
sincerely. I do not want to hurt your reputation, but I
appreciate your influence in what is a legitimate debate about
where to move and the fact that the President has chosen this
route.
I thank you and I yield to my colleague.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just affirm the last comment. I think both of us feel
very strongly the State Department under your leadership has
gained new vitality and stature, and it is not by chance and it
is lots of small things you do as well as the large ones.
Let me just pick up on the milestones idea, because I do
not think the public as a whole and the Congress as a whole
understands, for example, the point I was making with regards
to the Chemical Weapons Convention. That was to be a 10-year
deal in which we destroyed all of our chemical weapons. We
decided to do that anyway in an earlier era unilaterally
because the efficacy of the weapons was dubious.
But nevertheless, both Russia and the United States
ratified a treaty. Today, we are almost to half-time in the
treaty, and the Russians have not destroyed more than 4 or 5
pounds of 40,000 metric tons and that may have been just for
experimental purposes.
That is our dilemma, I think, with this treaty, that
certainly by 2012 a lot is to happen. As you say, much depends
upon the bilateral commission, upon the relationship with
Russia, the strength of the Russian state itself and the
finances, and other allies that come in. The Norwegians, the
Germans, the English are now prepared to contribute to
dismantle operations at Shchuchye and elsewhere. The Duma
itself is doing more this year. So there are some encouraging
signs.
I just suspect, however, we are still dealing here in both
the chemical and nuclear issues, with relationships and how
well diplomacy is able to work. This is separate from the
ironclad treaties and all the verification procedures.
Having said that, as a practical matter, with respect to
nuclear warheads taken from Russian missiles, I had an
experience 2 years ago in which General Kuenning of the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program and I were allowed to go
into a storage vault at an installation. The rest of our party
was shunted aside to do tourism. The Russian government at the
highest level decided to permit the two of us to go in there.
Our visit was the first since General Habinger had visited some
years before.
The fact is that we got there by coming through a train
station, very well fortified to take care of weapons that might
be coming in transit. None had passed through for a while and
none were expected for a while, but nevertheless we marveled at
the security.
The problem was the country road which was not very well
secured that connected the station to the installation. There
were four or five security barriers before you could enter the
vault. Inside were nuclear warheads lying like they were in
coffins, is the best thing I can think of, similar to a
mortuary. Now, each one of them had a service history. It was
in Russian script, so I could not read it. I had to take on
faith when I asked this Russian general what it was.
It gave the history of this particular warhead: when it was
built, what servicing it had received, when it was deactivated,
how old it was, and so forth. There also were estimates of the
efficacy, of how long this one might be reliable.
Now, beyond that--and this gets into sheer conjecture on
the part of the Russian general, quite apart from myself--some
estimate as to when the weapon might become dangerous. That is,
due to lack of proper maintenance or natural aging of the
warhead might become unsafe, not necessarily to the U.S., but
certainly to the surrounding area.
There is a very strong reason why Russians want to get rid
of warheads. It comes down to age. Now, there are arguments
about this, that somehow they are almost as inert as a piece of
wood and therefore could just sort of sit there forever. But
the Russians I was talking to in that bunker did not share that
point of view.
So the thought was that at some point this warhead was
going back up the country road, into the railway station,
because it cannot be destroyed there at that facility. At that
point they must have the technicians and the funds to take it
apart and remove the fissile material, to eliminate a potential
tragedy.
But the prospects of this occurring are very remote, given
the money shortages, the technician shortage, and so forth.
Ultimately it depends upon the United States and others we may
be able to enlist who will work with Russia to extract those
warheads I saw in the vault and to remove and safeguard the
fissile material before they threaten Russia or anybody else.
There are so many of them, the potential menaces are
daunting. This is what I see as the value of the treaty, that
if it leads to this kind of dialog, if people are meeting at
least twice a year to discuss these problems. It is not the
question so much of the numbers. All of these weapons as they
age have some problems attached to them that are recognized by
most people. Ours do, too, and this is why we are prepared to
try to, for our own safety's sake, watch the aging and watch
the mechanics, and we work to ensure all of ours do not have
unexpected events.
In a country where the technicians are few and the
servicing is dubious, if nonexistent, this is an awesome
problem for Russia. We would not have gone into the vault if
the Russians had not believed that. There was no reason. They
might have been there for years. No treaty demanded we go in
there.
This is why I am hopeful, and I take your words and your
P.S. testimony, that this is what finally happens. I am hopeful
that you will continue, as you have today, to express that it
is this growing relationship which is our best hope, because
ultimately we will do what needs to be done.
But even we have to be safe with our own weapons and be
sure how we store them, how we maintain them. It is very
expensive. As you say, it always comes at the expense of
something else we want to do in terms of our security or our
troops or Social Security or Medicare or other things that are
important to us.
I thank you very much for your testimony, your patience in
moving with us all the way through the lunch hour, and we thank
you for coming.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. We have one more questioner, with your
permission and indulgence, Mr. Secretary. But before I
recognize him, I just want you to know the factual basis on
which I am operating when we talk about these things. I am told
that the total budget for the entire Federation of Russia is
$30 billion a year and their defense budget is around $7.5
billion per year.
If we are off by 50 percent, 100 percent, 200 percent, our
Defense budget is $390 billion some and our entire budget is a
couple trillion. We should be. But I just think it emphasizes
the incredible difficulty that you know maybe better than
anyone except Senator Lugar, that you know is a very difficult
problem to manage for them here. I just hope we do not wait
until everything is aligned before we do anything.
But let me yield to the Senator from Florida and give him a
round here and thank you for hanging on, and then we will let
you go.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.
I bring you greetings from Secretary Eagleburger, who I had
to leave and go visit with concerning these European insurance
claims for Holocaust era victims' families and the survivors,
and that is still going on, as you know.
I would just like to clarify a question about the funding.
As I understand, you all have already discussed some funding
issues, but I want it clear in my mind. Is the administration,
in addition to what you propose--and by the way, your statement
was one of the most compelling that I have heard, when you went
back there talking about being a corps commander and bringing
us all the way up through your negotiations.
But you are taking the weapons off the ICBM's, which is
clearly a step in the right direction. What is this
administration committed to in the way of funding for then
pursuing the destruction of those weapons?
Secretary Powell. I may have to give it to you for the
record, but let me answer in a general way. We are asking for
roughly $1 billion a year in various programs associated with
the destruction of weapons of mass destruction in the Russian
Federation.
The Chairman. In the Russian Federation.
Senator Nelson. Now, Mr. Chairman, maybe you can clarify
it. How does that compare when Baker-Cutler's report called for
$30 billion? How do you compare apples to apples, his $1
billion a year to their call for $30 billion?
The Chairman. Well, if you read that report, they, former
Senator/Ambassador Baker, and former White House Counsel
Cutler, in their report indicated that it would cost about $8
billion a year to deal with just the nuclear side of the
equation, not the chemical, not a lot of other things. So it
does not come close.
But I thought you were asking the question, how much is it
going to cost us, the United States of America, to comply with
our plan to decommission these weapons.
Secretary Powell. I cannot break out----
The Chairman. Got you.
Secretary Powell [continuing]. Exactly what the requirement
would be or how much we have got in our budget now, focusing on
the nuclear part of it.
The Chairman. But the billion dollar number you cited did
not relate to U.S. costs on U.S. systems, did it?
Secretary Powell. No. It is the U.S. funds going to the
Russian Federation to help them with their weapons of mass
destruction decommissioning and elimination.
Senator Nelson. Well, I will tell you, one of the most
memorable days I have had was when Senator Baker and Mr. Cutler
were here talking about what needed to be done. How do we
convince you?
Secretary Powell. You do not have to convince me, Senator.
We are working on this diligently. We had some success in
Cananakis with the 10 plus 10 over 10 program, which the
Russians we were not sure were going to accept until the day
that they did accept it in Cananakis. So we are doing a lot.
But we certainly do not yet have the kinds of funds that my
good friend Senator Baker suggested would be appropriate at a
rate of $8 billion just for the nuclear piece.
The Chairman. Let me clarify. Baker's estimate depended on
how many years. If it would take 8 to 10 years, it would be $3
to $4 billion per year, just for the nuclear piece.
Secretary Powell. We are getting closer anyway.
The Chairman. It depends on the number of years. At any
rate, it is 30 billion bucks.
Secretary Powell. It is a big bill, Senator, and we really
ought to help them with it.
Senator Nelson. Because of the enormous expertise that you
have available to you in the person of the Senator seated to
your left----
The Chairman. He is a hell of a staff guy, I will tell you.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. It seems to me that this is a
very legitimate question that we need to continually bring to
the forefront, because there is an awful lot at stake here.
Senator Lugar. We brought it to the attention of the
President, that the billion dollars that Secretary Powell is
talking about is for the programs we are doing now, and this
treaty is new. All of the destruction, the separation, the
safety has to be in addition. My own advice respectfully to the
President is that he ought to begin a line item for several
years because to have continuity in this we will require that
kind of money.
The Chairman. It costs a lot of money to take roughly 4,000
warheads off of something and store them.
Secretary Powell. We are being creative. $10 billion is
also worked out with the debt relief.
Senator Lugar. In fairness under that, when I was in Europe
just following the time that we talked on the telephone and
what have you, when I talked to other Europeans they were very
skeptical as to whether the Europeans were going to come
through with their 10.
Secretary Powell. We are not there yet.
Senator Lugar. No. So if you get that, that is a very big
breakthrough in terms of substantial diplomacy.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, I do want to thank you.
I should warn you that we are going to be holding hearings to
begin a public dialog about Iraq. I was pleased--I am not
trying to make it a doctrine, but this so-called preemption
doctrine, hearing a very brief explanation of the preemption
doctrine, which as I understood it, that is the President's
speech about the right to preemptively act, which is, the way
you have stated it as I understood it, it is not something
fundamentally new.
Secretary Powell. My concern with the way Senator Kerry
asked the question, it was as if all other strategies and
doctrines have gone away and suddenly preemption is the only
strategy doctrine. That is just not the case.
The Chairman. Well, as you can see, there is some confusion
among well-informed people in and out of the Congress on that.
But we are going to you to ask you to come up and talk to us
about Iraq, as we will others, not just you, but you would be
our lead witness. I discussed it briefly with my friend Senator
Lugar and as many Republicans as Democrats have indicated we
should have a serious hearing on this issue to talk about the
parameters. I just want to warn you ahead of time that that
will be the case.
We are going to not in any way slow down the process of
moving on the Moscow Treaty. As usual, you always do a good job
and we appreciate your being here.
We stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the
committee was adjourned.]
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record to Secretary
Powell by the Committee
Question. What are the implications of not specifying in this
Treaty what is to be done with the warheads that are to be ``reduced?''
Answer. The Treaty's flexibility regarding warhead disposition is
consistent with previous arms control treaties and has several positive
implications. First, it recognizes that the United States and Russia
have fundamentally different stockpile maintenance practices. Key to
the difference is that Russia continues to produce new warheads while
the United States has no production capacity. Second, stored weapons
must serve for non-explosive tests and other aging and surveillance to
check and understand the continuing reliability of our aging nuclear
stockpile. If this testing indicates a technical problem with a part of
the stockpile, stored weapons provide an essential replacement source
to maintain the U.S. deterrent. Finally, given that we do not have the
capability to manufacture new warheads, a capability all other nuclear
powers have, we must also maintain a reserve of weapons as a hedge
against unanticipated changes in the international security
environment.
Beyond these immediate benefits, the absence of treaty constraints
on warhead disposition allows the United States and Russia to proceed
with warhead eliminations in a manner that is unhindered by artificial
requirements, and responsive to changing national security needs. The
effect is to enhance our ability to undertake reductions while
maintaining responsive upload potential and commensurate stockpile
sizing in a dynamic world.
Question. Your Letter of Submittal to the President states that
this Treaty ``facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to a
genuine strategic partnership.'' Does that mean that Russia, too,
wanted maximum flexibility to re-arm? Or did Russia want the strategic
offensive reductions to be irreversible?
Answer. Initially, Russian officials made public statements calling
for ``irreversibility'' by destroying warheads removed from launchers.
From the onset, U.S. negotiators noted that the concept of
``irreversibility'' is flawed because, given time and money, any
reductions can be reversed. In the actual negotiations, Russia did not
propose any measures related to warhead dismantlement, instead taking
the position that reductions should be made by eliminating launchers.
The United States made clear that such an approach was completely
incompatible with our needs to make cost-effective use of our existing
strategic forces, particularly those that have dual conventional-
nuclear use capabilities in certain cases.
In the end the two Parties agreed on a flexible approach to
reductions in the Treaty, which allows each Party to determine for
itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms
within overall limits on strategic nuclear warheads.
Since Treaty signature, senior Russian officials have stated
publicly that the Treaty's flexible approach will serve Russia's needs
and interests.
I want to emphasize that neither country is seeking opportunities
to re-arm. Both countries intend to carry out strategic offensive
reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with our respective
national security requirements and those of our allies. Both countries
ultimately sought to avoid overly restrictive provisions in the Treaty,
so as to enable each Party to structure its forces as it deemed
necessary in light of the strategic situation over the next ten years.
Question. You testified that some U.S. weapons will be earmarked
for destruction. How many U.S. warheads or delivery vehicles are
currently slated for elimination or for irreversible conversion to
other uses over the next decade? If some U.S. warheads or delivery
vehicles will, in fact, be eliminated, why not reach agreement with
Russia on a joint commitment to secure, dismantle and eliminate agreed
numbers of warheads and/or delivery vehicles?
Answer. As discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the first
planned step in reducing U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads will be to retire 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident
submarines from strategic service, and no longer maintain the ability
to return the B-1 to nuclear service. This will reduce the number of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by about 1,100
warheads by the end of Fiscal Year 2007 in a manner that as a practical
matter would be very difficult to reverse.
Additional reductions beyond 2007 will involve decreasing the
number of warheads on ballistic missiles and lowering the number of
operationally deployed weapons at heavy bomber bases. These plans,
however, will evolve over time. Retirement or downloading of certain
systems may be accelerated or pushed back depending upon the overall
force requirements. Some warheads that are to be removed will be used
as spares, some will be stored, and others will be destroyed or
dismantled. Exact determinations as to which warheads will be destroyed
or dismantled have not been made.
The Moscow Treaty balances deep reductions with flexibility to meet
the future's uncertain security environment. As a result, U.S.
obligations under the Moscow Treaty deals only with operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warhead levels, not with launchers, force
structure, or the disposition of non-deployed warheads. Since
flexibility was a key U.S. objective during the negotiations, we did
not want to reach any agreement which would require a commitment to
secure, dismantle or eliminate agreed numbers of warheads or delivery
vehicles. Retention of force structure is critical to maintain an
ability to respond to unforeseen circumstances and to retain
conventional weapon delivery capability.
Question. Unlike the START II treaty that never came into force,
this treaty allows Russia to keep its 10-warhead SS-18 ICBMs and its 6-
warhead SS-19 missiles. If Russia were to keep those missiles in
service, or to build a new missile capable of carrying several
warheads, would the United States still be content to count only
operationally deployed warheads? Or would we worry about the risk posed
by Russian cheating or break-out scenarios?
Are we putting too many eggs in the basket that says, ``Russia
can't afford to maintain its force levels?''
If Russia were to keep its MIRVed ICBMs in service, how would that
affect strategic stability in a crisis? Given Russia's great reliance
upon MIRVed ICBMs, might it not take a ``use it or lose it'' approach?
Given the degraded state of Russia's missile warning network, would
Russian reliance on MIRVed ICBMs increase the risk of an accidental
war?
Is there no way to reach agreement with Russia on eliminating
MIRVed ICBMs?
Is there any way to limit the number of warheads that a MIRVed ICBM
could carry? Why not require that missiles from which warheads have
been downloaded be outfitted with a new RV ``bus''--the device that
holds and dispenses the reentry vehicles--that could hold only the new
number of warheads, so as to make it harder for either Party to break
out of the Treaty by quickly putting more warheads back on its
missiles?
Answer. The Moscow Treaty will not place new restrictions on
Russia's potential to deploy MIRVed ICBMs. It affords Russia the same
force planning flexibility that we ourselves require. We are not overly
concerned with hypothetical ``break-out'' scenarios (as we were during
the Cold War), as shown by the fact that we decided to reduce to 1,700-
2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads before the
Moscow Treaty was negotiated, regardless of what the Russians opted to
do.
Regardless of whether Russia retains its SS-18 or SS-19 ICBMs or
builds a new MIRVed missile, Russia's deployment of MIRVs has little
impact on U.S. national security under current conditions. The issue of
Russian MIRVed ICBMs was considered in the Nuclear Posture Review and
during the negotiations. Since neither the United States and its allies
nor Russia view our strategic relationship as adversarial, we no longer
view Russian deployment of MIRVed ICBMs as destabilizing to this new
strategic relationship.
Having a Treaty means we are not ``putting all our eggs in one
basket'' of assuming Russia can't afford to maintain its force levels.
The Moscow Treaty legally obligates Russia to reduce its strategic
nuclear warheads. If Russia retains MIRVed ICBMs, it will be required
to have fewer missiles than if each carried only one warhead. However,
we do not believe that Russia will retain its current inventory of
MIRVed ICBMs. Russia is already deactivating its 10-warhead rail-mobile
SS-24 force for age and safety reasons. We expect that most of the SS-
18 heavy ICBMs and six-warhead SS-19 ICBMs will reach the end of their
service life and be retired by 2012.
Under the Moscow Treaty, we will retain a nuclear force
sufficiently flexible for our national security and that of our friends
and allies. Additionally, we will continue to work with Russia to
better understand their planning process and intentions. We expect that
continued improvement in our relationship with Russia will provide
greater transparency into the strategic capabilities and intentions of
each Party.
It is important to realize that we have entered into a new
relationship with Russia that is no longer adversarial. Therefore, the
question of reconstitution capability no longer has the significance it
had during the Cold War.
Our new strategic relationship with Russia is no longer based on a
nuclear balance of terror. Because of this new relationship, we cannot
conceive of any credible scenario in which we would threaten to launch
our strategic forces at Russia. The scenario you describe of Russia
believing it faced a ``use it or lose it'' situation with its force of
MIRVed ICBMs is therefore not a credible concern.
While we have no plans to re-load warheads on missiles from which
warheads have been removed, a requirement to physically remove warhead-
carrying capability from missiles by outfitting them with a new RV
platform would add significant unnecessary costs to U.S. strategic
forces and restrict flexibility in an unpredictable future threat
environment.
Question. Should bombers that are converted to a non-nuclear role
be readily convertible back to use with nuclear weapons? If so, why?
Answer. Other than the B-1, we are not planning to convert any
additional bombers to purely a conventional role. A fundamental U.S.
objective in negotiating the Moscow Treaty was to preserve our
flexibility to implement the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and its
prescribed future force structure. Cost was also a major consideration.
It would likely cost billions of dollars to replace weapons dispensing
devices on our bombers. Therefore, this makes the NPR's call to
preserve the ability of nuclear-capable bombers to deliver conventional
weapons and vice versa an imperative. The B-52H bombers and B-2 bombers
that will make up the bomber portion of the NPR force structure must be
able to carry out both nuclear and conventional missions.
The B-1 bomber, on the other hand, was removed from a nuclear role
in 1997 and is now only used to conduct conventional operations. The
NPR concluded that it is no longer necessary to maintain the ability to
return the B-1 force to nuclear service because the numbers of B-52s
and B-2s will be adequate to support our nuclear requirements.
Question. Your testimony and your Letter of Submittal to the
President state that the United States stores ``a small number of spare
strategic nuclear warheads . . . at heavy bomber bases'' which it does
not count as ``operationally deployed.'' How many ``spare'' warheads
does this Treaty permit Russia to store at its heavy bomber bases?
Your Letter of Submittal to the President speaks of ``a genuine
strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual security,
trust, openness, cooperation and predictability.'' How much
predictability does either Party get from provisions that allow
``reduced'' nuclear bombs to be stored wherever each Party pleases, and
bombers to be readily convertible back to a nuclear role?
Answer. The Treaty does not restrict a Party's decisions regarding
how it will implement the required reductions in strategic nuclear
warheads. Consistent with this it does not address the number of
``spare'' warheads that either Russia or the United States is permitted
to store at heavy bomber bases. The Article-by-Article Analysis notes
that the United States has characterized this number as small.
Practically speaking, the fact that the Treaty is legally binding
provides predictability that each Party will fulfill its commitment to
reduce strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012.
It is the number of strategic nuclear warheads available for use that
really matters, and this is the number that is being reduced.
If we believe Russia is not taking appropriate steps to meet the
2012 deadline, we can raise this issue in the Bilateral Implementation
Commission. The issue of hypothetical ``break-out'' scenarios no longer
has the significance it had during the Cold War when our relationship
with Russia was one based on a nuclear balance of terror. We concluded
before the Moscow Treaty was negotiated that we could and would safely
reduce to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads, regardless of what the Russians did. That said, information
obtained through START's verification regime, including its data
exchanges and short-notice on-site inspections, and U.S. national
intelligence resources will continue over the course of the decade to
add to our body of knowledge regarding the size and disposition of
Russia's strategic forces and the overall status of reductions in
Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, the work of the
Consultative Group for Strategic Security and the Treaty's Bilateral
Implementation Commission will provide transparency into Russia's
reduction efforts.
Question. Is there any way to limit what can be done with
``reduced'' strategic nuclear warheads?
Will the United States press Russia to provide secure, transparent
storage for ``reduced'' warheads?
Why not agree that ``reduced'' warheads will be stored some agreed
distance away from the vehicles that would carry them?
Answer. The Moscow Treaty balances deep reductions with flexibility
to meet the future's uncertain security environment. For the United
States, the Treaty will not affect decisions that will be made with
respect to force structure, launchers, or the disposition of non-
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
Decisions related to these issues are left to each nation's
discretion as a matter of deliberate choice. Some of the U.S. warheads
removed from operationally deployed status will be scheduled for
destruction; others will be used as spares and some will be stored. For
example, warheads removed from Peacekeeper ICBMs as that system is
deactivated will be used to modernize the Minuteman III ICBM force.
Nevertheless, many specific decisions still need to be made related
to the disposition of individual types of warheads as we carry out the
reductions stemming from the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the
Moscow Treaty. These specific decisions will be shaped by
infrastructure constraints--such as limits on our capacity to dismantle
warheads in a given period, by technical and operational concerns--and
the capabilities that we require in balancing retention of our more
modern warheads with avoiding complete dependence on the reliability of
a few warhead types, and by uncertainties about future technical and
strategic developments. Given the uncertain strategic environment and
the fact that we are not manufacturing new warheads, the United States
needs the flexibility to retain warheads to meet unforeseen
contingencies. It is therefore not in the U.S. interest to limit what
can be done with non-operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
Although Russia's stockpile maintenance practices differ from those
in the United States, as far as we can determine, the Russian position
is not dissimilar to the U.S. position. Contrary to the impression
created by some press reports, the Russians did not table any proposals
for nuclear warhead dismantlement during the negotiations on the Moscow
Treaty. Nor did either side express interest in developing the kinds of
complex provisions that would be needed to verify warhead dismantlement
or limits on warhead stockpiles.
In September, Secretary Rumsfeld and I are scheduled to meet with
our Russian counterparts in the newly established Consultative Group
for Strategic Security (CGSS). We plan to take advantage of this
opportunity to discuss, among other things, ways in which we can
strengthen mutual confidence and expand transparency related to U.S.
and Russian nuclear weapons. We do not want to prejudge the outcome of
these discussions on nuclear transparency and confidence building
measures.
In addition, we intend to continue to work with Russia, under the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, when and to the extent
permitted by law, to make its warhead storage facilities more secure.
Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian
warheads made excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty. This assistance
increases the physical security of Russian warhead storage facilities
through better fencing and alarm systems, enhances the reliability of
warhead security personnel and improves the accounting for Russian
nuclear warheads. (CTR assistance cannot be provided to Russia or any
other country of the former Soviet Union in any year unless there has
been a certification under 22 U.C.S. 5952(d) of the commitment of that
country to certain courses of action. Russia was not certified in 2002,
but the President has waived the certification requirements for the
balance of FY 2002 under authority included in the recently enacted
supplemental counter-terrorism appropriations legislation.)
Question. What needs and opportunities will this Treaty present for
U.S. assistance to Russia through the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program or our non-proliferation assistance programs?
Answer. It is possible that the Russian Federation may need
additional non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance as it
reduces its strategic nuclear warheads under the Moscow Treaty. If
requested by the Russian Federation, and subject to laws related to CTR
certification, the Administration would be prepared to provide
additional assistance for removing, transporting, storing, and securing
nuclear warheads, disassembling warheads and storing fissile material,
dismantling surplus strategic missiles, and disposing of associated
launchers. The United States has already constructed a number of
facilities in the Russian Federation to conduct such work under our
current assistance programs, thus additional assistance would serve to
take further advantage of capabilities and capacities already in place.
Question. The National Intelligence Council's annual report on
Russian nuclear security states:
Russia employs physical, procedural, and technical measures
to secure its weapons against an external threat, but many of
these measures date from the Soviet era and are not designed to
counter the preeminent threat faced today-an insider who
attempts unauthorized actions.
Absent U.S. assistance, would the security of stored Russian
warheads be up to U.S. standards? Or would increased levels of Russian
warhead storage increase the risk of diversion to rogue states or
terrorists?
Answer. U.S. assistance helps to improve the security of Russia's
nuclear weapons by improving their physical protection (fencing,
sensors, communications); accounting (improved hardware and software);
personnel reliability (better screening); and guard force capabilities
(more realistic training).
These improvements are particularly important because Russia faces
a difficult threat environment--political instability, terrorist
threats, and insider threats resulting from financial conditions in
Russia.
The total number of warheads in Russian storage facilities may
increase over the next ten years, in part due to Russia's inability to
sustain larger number of deployed forces. A Russian decision to
increase the number of stored warheads will be governed by a number of
factors related to what Russia determines is in its national security
interests, including the number of warheads Russia decides to dismantle
rather than store. Even if Russia decides to store additional warheads
under the Moscow Treaty, however, we are confident U.S. assistance will
continue to increase the security of such weapons.
Question. Should the United States help Russia to implement the
reductions required by this treaty? Should we do so even if Russia,
like the United States, chooses not to eliminate many of its warheads
or delivery vehicles, but rather to store excess warheads, while
keeping its bombers and MIRVed missiles in service?
Answer. The Russian Federation committed to strategic nuclear
reductions under the Moscow Treaty. Its obligations are not conditioned
on U.S. assistance and we are confident Russia will meet its Treaty
obligations.
We provide assistance to eliminate Russian strategic delivery
systems and associated infrastructure, facilitate the elimination of
Russian warheads, and secure and reduce Russian nuclear material,
because cooperative threat reduction efforts are in the national
security interests of the United States.
Any Russian decision to store, rather than eliminate, excess
warheads will be made on the basis of its assessment of Russian
national security needs. Regardless of how that decision comes out, it
is in our own security interests to help ensure that remaining warheads
are stored as safely and securely as possible to protect them from
terrorist or third-country theft.
Question. Should the United States help Russia to maintain tight
security over the warheads it removes from delivery vehicles pursuant
to this treaty? Should we do so even if Russia, like the United States,
chooses not to destroy many of its warheads?
Answer. The United States is providing assistance to increase the
security of all non-deployed Russian warheads. Such assistance will
also increase the security of the Russian warheads made excess by the
Moscow Treaty.
This assistance increases the physical security of Russian warhead
storage facilities through better fencing and alarm systems, enhances
the reliability of warhead security personnel and improves the
accounting for Russian warheads.
Any Russian decision to store, rather than eliminate, excess
warheads will be made on the basis of its assessment of Russian
national security needs. Regardless of how that decision comes out, it
is in our own security interests to help ensure that remaining warheads
are stored as safely and securely as possible to protect them from
terrorist or third-country theft.
Question. Should the United States offer to fund the elimination of
Russian warheads and delivery systems, even though such eliminations
would not be undertaken pursuant to any arms control treaty? Should we
do so even if Russia builds new weapons (like the SS-27 missile), while
eliminating old ones (like the much larger SS-18 and the SS-19
missiles)?
Answer. We provide assistance to help eliminate Russian strategic
delivery systems, facilitate the elimination of excess Russian
warheads, and secure and reduce Russian nuclear material because these
cooperative threat reduction efforts are in the national security
interests of the United States.
One of the original motivations behind the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) assistance program was our understanding that Russia
lacked the resources necessary to eliminate expeditiously the huge
number of excess nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union.
We continue to believe this U.S. assistance serves to increase the
scope and accelerate the pace of Russian eliminations of strategic
nuclear weapons. Our participation in the CTR process also helps give
us confidence that Russia is carrying out its commitments.
Question. Has the possibility of U.S. assistance to Russia in
implementing this treaty been discussed with Russian officials? If so,
how have those discussions gone? Please provide the relevant portions
of the negotiating record to this committee.
Have any formal or informal understandings been reached with Russia
in this regard?
What plans has the Administration made for expanded assistance to
help Russia deal with the weapons that it ``reduces'' pursuant to this
Treaty?
What increased funding of Cooperative Threat Reduction and other
U.S. programs will be needed for this purpose?
Answer. The possibility of further CTR assistance in implementing
the Moscow Treaty has not been specifically discussed with the Russian
Federation. However, the CTR program already includes funding in the
outyears to support deep reductions in Russian strategic nuclear
delivery systems and their associated warheads. The Administration is
prepared to expand CTR assistance, as required, to support the secure
transport, storage and elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads
under the Moscow Treaty, although there are no requirements related to
this in the Moscow Treaty.
Question. The Treaty does not limit tactical nuclear weapons, even
though their limitation was adopted as a START III objective at the
Helsinki summit of 1997. Why was this issue dropped out?
Answer. The Moscow Treaty is based on the new strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia. It therefore starts
from a different premise and has different objectives than previous
U.S.-Russian arms control efforts.
The Moscow Treaty reflects President Bush's determination to
expeditiously reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic
nuclear weapons, and to reduce the time required to negotiate arms
control agreements.
Thus, the Treaty focuses on reductions in strategic nuclear
warheads. At the same time, we have made clear to Russia our interest
in non-strategic nuclear weapons, and in particular, in greater
transparency regarding those weapons. We will be pursuing these
questions with Russia.
Over the last decade, the United States and Russia have both made
significant reductions in their non-strategic nuclear weapons without a
formal arms control agreement.
However, we are concerned about the large number of Russian
tactical nuclear weapons and Russia's nuclear warhead production
capability.
Both Secretary Rumsfeld and I have raised these concerns with our
Russian counterparts. We put them on notice that we intend to address
these issues bilaterally. We plan to pursue transparency discussions on
tactical nuclear weapons as a priority matter in the Consultative Group
for Strategic Security (CGSS), which will convene for the time this
fall.
Many aspects of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons also involve
our NATO allies and our Alliance commitments, so it is an Alliance
matter in addition to a bilateral issue with Russia.
Accordingly, in the NATO-Russia channel, we will also continue to
focus on developing confidence building and transparency measures for
tactical nuclear weapons that complement our bilateral efforts.
In addition, ongoing Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs
and the Global Partnership Initiative Against the Spread of WMD (10+10/
10 initiative) will enhance the security of Russian nuclear warhead
storage and add a measure of transparency.
Question. Wouldn't it be in our national interest to have a
verifiable accounting of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons and
verifiable reductions in those weapons?
How many tactical nuclear weapons do we believe Russia retains?
Doesn't the record of uncertainty regarding Russian actions since
1991 and 1992, when [Soviet and] Russian Presidents Gorbachev and
Yeltsin promised massive reductions in tactical nuclear weapons,
illustrate the relevance of formal agreements in this area?
Answer. As I indicated in my testimony, we continue to be concerned
about the uncertainties surrounding Russian non-strategic (tactical)
nuclear weapons (NSNW). Therefore, it will be important to continue to
pursue transparency for NSNW. Under the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives (PNIs), Washington and Moscow issued parallel unilateral
statements of intent to make significant reductions in NSNW. Russia has
stated that most of the weapons Gorbachev and Yeltsin pledged to
eliminate have been eliminated and that it plans to complete
implementation of its PNIs by 2004 contingent on ``adequate
financing.'' We believe that Moscow has fulfilled many of its pledges,
but we have some concerns in this area and will press Moscow for
information regarding these reductions and for their completion. A
principal focus of our concern is on ``loose nukes.'' Developing and
negotiating an effective verification regime for NSNW stockpiles is
neither needed nor practical at this time. Information obtained through
transparency measures will help us to ascertain how best to assist
Russia to secure its NSNW from proliferation threats.
With regard to your third question, the U.S. decision in 1991 to
undertake a unilateral initiative on non-strategic nuclear weapons
(NSNW), rather than negotiate a formal agreement was the correct
decision. It was quickly reciprocated by Soviet President Gorbachev and
reaffirmed, and expanded upon, by Russian President Yeltsin in January
1992. As a result, without first negotiating and concluding a
complicated arms control agreement, thousands of Russian NSNW (many
from non-Russian republics) were withdrawn to central storage in Russia
and removed from surface ships and submarines. Unquestionably, this
unilateral approach made the world much safer than if we had waited for
the completion of protracted, formal arms control negotiations during
this uncertain period when the Soviet Union was disintegrating.
Over the last decade, the U.S. and Russia have both continued to
reduce their NSNW significantly without a formal arms control
agreement.
I do not want to prejudge my discussions with Russia, but we would
like greater transparency for Russian NSNW, implementation of the PNIs,
and for Russia's nuclear infrastructure in general. This is for both
security and nonproliferation reasons.
The United States and its NATO Allies have repeatedly expressed
their concerns about the uncertainties surrounding NSNW in Russia and
have called on Moscow to reaffirm the PNIs and to complete the
reductions it pledged to make.
I plan to raise these concerns with my Russian counterparts in the
newly formed Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS).
Question. How many tactical nuclear weapons do we believe Russia
retains?
Answer. Due to its SECRET classification, this answer has been
submitted under separate cover.
Question. You testified that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons
will be pursued in the Consultative Group for Strategic Security. Will
the United States be prepared to eliminate its remaining tactical
nuclear warheads or some of its non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads
in return for Russia's elimination of all or nearly all of its tactical
nuclear warheads?
Answer. We do not want to prejudge our discussions with Russia.
That said, it is important to note that NATO is committed to retaining
a credible nuclear deterrent. We must likewise recognize that Russia is
unlikely to eliminate ``all or nearly all of its tactical nuclear
warheads'' under foreseeable circumstances. Separate from the Moscow
Treaty, we will be pressing for greater transparency in Russian non-
strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) and in Russia's nuclear infrastructure
in general. This is directly relevant both to transparency about
security-related activities and to our nonproliferation concerns about
the control, safety, and security of Russian nuclear weapons and
fissile material.
Since 1991, the types and numbers of NATO sub-strategic nuclear
forces have been reduced by approximately 85 percent, including the
elimination of entire categories of weapons. We plan to press Moscow to
complete the implementation of, and provide more transparency
concerning, its 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI).
It is premature to talk about further NSNW reductions. For a host
of political and technical reasons, it would be difficult to subject
these warheads for non-strategic weapons to treaty provisions. For
example, most U.S. nuclear warheads for NSNW are designed for use with
dual-capable delivery systems that are maintained primarily for non-
nuclear purposes. These reasons, in fact, contributed to the decision
in 1991 to employ the PNI approach of parallel unilateral initiatives
rather than pursuing formal arms control negotiations.
In addition, with respect to U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in
support of NATO, these weapons continue to play a vital role in the
Alliance. Recent NATO statements have reaffirmed that the Alliance
continues to place great value on U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe
and committed to NATO, which provide essential political and military
linkage between the European and the North American members of the
Alliance. As recently as June 6, 2002, NATO Defense Ministers
reaffirmed the importance of the Alliance's nuclear forces for
preserving peace and preventing coercion and any kind of war.
Question. Will the United States be prepared to offer assistance in
accounting for, maintaining the security of, or eliminating Russia's
tactical nuclear weapons?
Answer. One of the original motivations for the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program was our belief that Russia lacked the resources
necessary to eliminate expeditiously the huge number of excess nuclear
weapons inherited from the Soviet Union and to maintain the remaining
weapons as safely and securely as possible.
We continue to believe this U.S. assistance serves to increase the
scope and accelerate the pace of Russian reductions in nuclear weapons.
Thus, when and to the extent permitted by law, the United States
will continue to offer CTR assistance to Russia to increase the
security of all of its non-deployed nuclear warheads, including
tactical or sub-strategic nuclear warheads. (CTR assistance cannot be
provided to Russia or any other country of the former Soviet Union in
any year unless there has been a certification under 22 U.C.S. 5952(d)
of the commitment of that country to certain courses of action. Russia
was not certified in 2002, but the President has waived the
certification requirements for the balance of FY 2002 under authority
included in the recently enacted supplemental counter-terrorism
appropriations legislation.)
CTR assistance increases the physical security of Russian warhead
storage facilities through better fencing and alarm systems, increases
the capabilities of guard forces, enhances the reliability of warhead
security personnel and improves the accounting for Russian warheads.
Our assistance also facilitates the dismantlement of Russian
nuclear warheads, including tactical or sub-strategic nuclear weapons
being reduced under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) of 1991
and 1992, by providing increased secure storage and paying for the
transportation of warheads to disassembly facilities.
Question. What transparency measures does the Administration seek
from Russia regarding the reductions required by this Treaty? What
transparency measures does the Administration plan to institute so as
to assure Russia that the United States is implementing the Treaty?
Answer. As was discussed in the Section 306 Report, the United
States will gain transparency into the disposition of Russia's
strategic nuclear warheads and the overall status of reductions in its
strategic forces through our own intelligence resources, bilateral
assistance programs, the START Treaty, and the work of the Consultative
Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) and the Treaty's Bilateral
Implementation Commission. We expect Russia to gain transparency in
much the same way. We have determined that specific additional
transparency measures are not needed, and will not be sought, at this
time. We recognize, however, that more contacts and exchanges of
information could be useful and that the Parties could decide to
develop additional transparency measures in the future. The CGSS will
meet in September to begin the dialogue. The Bilateral Implementation
Commission will meet after the Treaty enters into force.
Question. What specific transparency or verification measures did
each side propose during the negotiation of the treaty? Why were none
of these adopted?
Answer. During the initial stages of the talks, we exchanged views
on a moderate set of potential reciprocal transparency measures. Once
both countries agreed that the reduction obligations being codified
would preserve the flexibility for each side to take its reductions in
its own way, it appeared to the U.S. that there was no immediate need
to work out transparency measures applicable to this context. Among
other things, START's verification measures would continue to be
available until December 2009. Russia too agreed that the Moscow Treaty
need not include such measures. Accordingly, no specific transparency
or verification measures were negotiated.
However, as I made clear in my testimony, we are ready to discuss
transparency.
Question. What is the meaning of Article II, which appears only to
acknowledge the obvious existence of the START treaty?
Answer. The purpose of Article II is to make clear that the Moscow
Treaty and the START Treaty are separate. It clarifies that the START
Treaty's provisions do not extend to the Moscow Treaty, and the Moscow
Treaty does not terminate, extend or in any other way affect the status
of the START Treaty.
Question. How can START declarations and inspections be used to
verify compliance with commitments that use non-START definitions or
counting rules?
For example, START provided for ``reentry vehicle inspections of
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles
contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed
to them.'' But if a Party says that the missile contains fewer reentry
vehicles than the warhead attribution number, is there any obligation
to allow inspectors to verify that lower number? Will that be
technically feasible?
Answer. START's verification regime, including data exchanges and
inspections, will continue to add to our body of knowledge over the
course of the decade regarding the disposition of Russia's strategic
nuclear warheads and the overall status of reductions in Russia's
strategic nuclear forces.
As you point out, START provides for reentry vehicle inspections of
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles
contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed
to them. Although technically feasible, START does not require the
inspected Party to allow inspectors to verify that a missile contains
fewer reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to
missiles of that type.
The Moscow Treaty recognizes a new strategic relationship between
the United States and Russia based on the understanding that we are no
longer enemies and that the principles which will underpin our
relationship are mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and
predictability. This understanding played an important role in our
judgments regarding verification. Our conclusion, as we state in the
report submitted in accordance with Section 306 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act, was that, in the context of this new relationship, a
Treaty with a verification regime under the Cold War paradigm was
neither required nor appropriate.
Question. Experts have warned that the safest place to store
Russian warheads might be on their missiles, in their silos--rather
than in a storehouse that might be poorly secured. If Russia should
announce a decision to leave its warheads on their missiles, while
reducing its ``deployed'' warheads by disabling the missiles, how would
we know that Russia was actually doing that?
Would any provisions of this treaty or of the START Treaty require
Russia to show us proof of that?
Answer. Leaving warheads on missiles is not necessarily safer or
more secure than housing them in a well-guarded storage facility. The
nature of Russian warheads precludes their long-term storage in silos
or upon missiles. As a practical matter, the high costs associated with
maintaining warheads on missiles in a safe and secure manner precludes
the long-term use of this technique to make reductions. Russia simply
does not have the economic capability to maintain its current strategic
missile force. Eliminating these systems, particularly with CTR
assistance, is far more cost effective than maintaining them on
missiles in their silos.
There are no provisions in the Moscow Treaty or the START Treaty
that would require Russia to demonstrate how some of its missiles armed
with nuclear warhead(s) had been disabled to reduce the number of
strategic nuclear warheads under the Moscow Treaty. The Moscow Treaty
allows the United States and Russia to reduce their respective
strategic nuclear warheads by any method they choose.
Nevertheless, START's verification regime, including its data
exchanges, short-notice on-site inspections, and provisions concerning
telemetry, conversion and elimination, and mobile missile forces, will
continue to add to our body of knowledge over the course of the decade
regarding the disposition of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads and
the overall status of reductions in Russia's strategic nuclear forces.
Question. Why did you not take the opportunity to simply extend
START through 2012? Are there any circumstances in which the United
States would want to exceed the START limitations, either before or
after December 2009? If so, please explain.
Answer. The multilateral START Treaty could not have been extended
in the context of the bilateral Moscow Treaty. The START Treaty is in
place and will provide the foundation for confidence, transparency, and
predictability for strategic offensive reductions. There will be ample
time and opportunity over the next seven years to see how events unfold
and to determine whether there will be a need to seek agreement among
all five of the Parties to START. Moreover, as a result of work in the
Consultative Group for Strategic Security and the Bilateral
Implementation Commission, we will have a better sense of what, if any,
supplementary measures we may want in place to enhance transparency and
confidence regarding the Moscow Treaty reductions long before the START
Treaty's current expiration date of December 5, 2009. Therefore, we saw
no need to try to decide now whether and how START Treaty provisions
could support our future objectives, which will undoubtedly evolve over
the course of the next seven years.
While we cannot exclude the possibility that some future
circumstances may warrant increases in the number of operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads above 1,700-2,200, at the present
time we do not envision a circumstance that would necessitate an
increase that would require us to withdraw from the START Treaty and,
subsequently, exceed the final START limits. The Nuclear Posture Review
established that maintaining between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads would fully serve U.S. national
security interests now and in the future. In November 2001, President
Bush announced that, consistent with our national security and that of
our allies, the United States would unilaterally reduce its
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to that level over
the next ten years. The United States would not exceed the final START
limitations, which were reached by all START Parties on or before
December 5, 2001, without withdrawing from the START Treaty.
Question. Why did you not at least extend through 2012 the
verification provisions of START, for the purpose of verifying
compliance with this new treaty?
Answer. The START verification regime will provide the foundation
for transparency into the implementation of the Moscow Treaty. During
the negotiations, the United States and Russia did not elect to create
a mechanism to extend the multilateral START Treaty in the context of
the bilateral Moscow Treaty. In addition, at this time and in view of
the fact that START's expiration is some seven years in the future, it
was not pressing to resolve that issue during the negotiation of the
Moscow Treaty. As we implement the Moscow Treaty and evaluate the
information gained through START and other means, we will be in a
stronger position to determine whether it would be in the interest of
both Russia and the United States to extend bilaterally the
verification provisions of the five-Party START Treaty beyond 2009.
Question. In your prepared testimony, you referred to the U.S.
counting rules for warheads and declared: ``This is a departure from
the way in which warheads are counted under the START Treaty, but one
that more accurately represents the real numbers of warheads available
for use immediately or within days.'' This would appear to pertain
only, however, if the resulting count is verifiable. Absent additional
verification measures, if Russia were to adopt the U.S. counting rule
for its own reductions, would the United States have greater confidence
in the accuracy of that count, or of a count using START counting
rules?
Answer. President Bush stated last November 13 that the United
States intended to reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads unilaterally whether or not Russia followed suit. President
Putin's welcome decision to reciprocate, and the subsequent Treaty that
records these unilateral reduction commitments, is a sign of our new,
cooperative strategic relationship--a relationship that does not depend
on our ability to verify Russian reductions.
From the outset, the objective was to reduce the number of
strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level that would best meet
U.S. and Russian national security needs. The United States has stated
that it will meet the 1,700 to 2,200 limit by reducing its number of
``operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.'' During the
negotiations, Russia suggested that it anticipated reducing warheads by
eliminating or converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers.
However, Russia did not state conclusively during the negotiations how
it intends to carry out its reductions. Should Russia elect to achieve
the limit in this way or by using the U.S. method, the result in either
case will reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads available for
use below START Treaty levels.
Question. Has the Administration tasked the U.S. Intelligence
Community to monitor Russian compliance with the Treaty?
Will that require increased effort on their part, and are
sufficient funds budgeted for that?
Answer. The National Intelligence Estimate for the Moscow Treaty,
that discusses the Intelligence Community's (IC) ability to assess
Russia's implementation of the Moscow Treaty, addresses this issue.
While the content of this Estimate is classified, the document is
available to members of the Senate. To complement the U.S. national
intelligence resources, the implementation of the START Treaty will
continue to add to our body of knowledge over the course of the decade
regarding the disposition of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads and
the overall status of reductions in Russia's strategic nuclear forces.
The question regarding sufficiency of resources for the IC to
perform its monitoring tasks should be directed to the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Question. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship
states that the START Treaty's ``provisions will provide the foundation
for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further
strategic offensive reductions.'' Why is this statement in the Joint
Declaration, rather than in the Treaty?
Does either the Treaty or the Joint Declaration require that data
exchanges and inspections pursuant to the START Treaty be adjusted in
any way?
Answer. The Joint Declaration is a policy document, while the
Moscow Treaty is legally binding. The cited reference to START in the
Joint Declaration expresses the United States' and Russia's view of the
value of the START Treaty's verification regime for providing data and
access relevant to each Party's understanding of activities related to
the Moscow Treaty. It does not amend, or add to, the Moscow Treaty. It
also did not create any new rights or obligations with respect to
START, but merely recognized the effects of existing ones.
Consequently, the Declaration was the appropriate place for such
language.
Neither the Moscow Treaty nor the Joint Declaration requires that
changes be made to any START Treaty provisions, including its data
exchanges or inspection regime. Article II of the Moscow Treaty makes
clear that START continues in force unchanged by this Treaty and that
the START Treaty provisions do not extend to the Moscow Treaty. The
Joint Declaration also states that START remains in force in accordance
with its own terms. START notifications and inspections will continue
unaffected by either the Moscow Treaty or the Joint Declaration.
As I made clear in my July 9 testimony, the United States is ready
to discuss additional transparency measures relevant to the Moscow
Treaty. However, such measures would not change START obligations.
Question. How will the Administration build on the START
foundation? The Joint Declaration refers to ``other supplementary
measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.'' What
measures are contemplated, and when do you expect to achieve them?
Will these measures be adopted as amendments or protocols to the
Treaty, as executive agreements, or as new treaties?
Answer. One of the principal elements of the new strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia is that there is no
longer a need to regulate every step as we reduce our strategic nuclear
warheads. START provides us with a strong foundation for transparency
into reductions under the Moscow Treaty. In particular, START's
verification regime will continue to add to our body of knowledge over
the course of the decade regarding the disposition of Russia's
strategic nuclear warheads and the overall status of reductions in
Russia's strategic nuclear forces. However, until we know how Russia
plans to makes its reductions and the Moscow Treaty enters into force
and we acquire experience with implementing its provisions, it is
premature at this point to attempt to forecast what transparency
measures would be useful.
The form that any supplementary measure would take, and whether it
would be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, will be
determined by the nature and content of that measure.
Question. The Joint Declaration gives the Consultative Group for
Strategic Security a mandate as ``the principal mechanism through which
the sides . . . expand transparency.'' What role will that group have
in verification or implementation of this Treaty? How will this compare
to the role of the Bilateral Implementation Commission established in
Article III of the Treaty?
You testified that the Bilateral Implementation Commission would be
expected ``to see if we need more transparency to give us confidence''
and ``will be looking for new ways to enhance transparency and give us
the kind of insight we need to have.'' What authority will the
Commission have to recommend or adopt specific transparency measures?
Why wasn't this authority made clear in the Treaty itself?
Has Russia stated that it views the relative roles of the Bilateral
Implementation Commission and the Consultative Group for Strategic
Security in the same way that the United States does? Is that in the
negotiating record? If so, please provide the relevant portions of that
record to this committee.
Answer. The Administration believes that the different roles of the
BIC and the CGSS are made clear in the Moscow Treaty and the Joint
Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, respectively. The
Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) will be a diplomatic
consultative group chaired at the foreign and defense ministerial
level, with the participation of other senior officials. This group
will be the principle mechanism through which the sides strengthen
mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans,
and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.
The Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) will also be a
diplomatic consultative forum, which will meet at least twice a year
once the Moscow Treaty is in force to discuss issues related to
implementation of the Treaty. The Treaty specifies that the purpose of
the BIC is to assist in implementing the Treaty. The BIC thus has a
narrower focus than the CGSS, and will be separate and distinct from
the CGSS.
The Treaty provides no special negotiating authority for the BIC
because there was no need to do so. The nature of the Moscow Treaty is
such as to obviate any need for the expedited ``viability and
effectiveness'' changes procedure that the Senate accepted as
appropriate for other vastly more complex arms control treaties, such
as START.
If any additional agreements are concluded, their submission to the
Senate for advice and consent will depend on their nature and content.
Russia has not stated its views on the two groups' different roles.
Question. The Treaty does not specify any benchmarks for reductions
before December 31, 2012. Why did you choose that approach? Does the
United States intend to postpone a significant portion of the required
reductions until the last few years before the deadline?
Answer. The absence of interim reduction levels in the Treaty means
that each Party is free over the next ten years to retain the level of
strategic nuclear warheads it considers necessary for its own national
security, consistent with its obligation to meet the final deadline. It
gives each Party greater flexibility to make reductions on a schedule
that is cost-effective. This flexibility will allow us to adjust our
strategic posture to respond to unforeseen contingencies such as
emerging threats or system failures.
As discussed in the Department of Defense's Nuclear Posture Review
submitted to Congress earlier this year, by the end of Fiscal Year 2007
(FY07) the United States plans to retire all 50 of its ten-warhead
Peacekeeper ICBMs and remove four Trident submarines from strategic
nuclear service. This will reduce the number of U.S. operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads by almost 1100 warheads. The
specific additional reductions that will be made to meet the Treaty
limits have not yet been decided. They will be part of the development
and deployment of the New Triad established by the December 2001
Nuclear Posture Review.
Moscow Treaty reductions will entail careful planning and execution
on both sides. Our best judgment is that allowing ten years for this
process will give both Parties time to complete these actions in a
sound, responsible, and sustainable manner. We feel that the timeframe
and the deadline are just what they should be. If either Party should
have concerns about the other's progress towards meeting the Treaty's
reduction deadline, it can raise them in the Bilateral Implementation
Commission.
Question. Does this Treaty bar force increases before 2012, so long
as such increases do not breach another treaty? Has Russia stated that
it shares the U.S. interpretation of the Treaty in this regard? If so,
please provide the relevant statements or portions of the negotiating
record.
Answer. The Moscow Treaty does not bar force increases before 2012
as long as the required reductions are made by the December 31, 2012
reduction deadline. We have made this position clear to the Russian
Federation. If either Party has concerns about the other's progress
toward meeting the Treaty's reduction deadline, it can raise them in
the Bilateral Implementation Commission.
There are no relevant statements in the negotiating record.
Question. Article I of the Treaty requires each Party to ``reduce
and limit strategic nuclear warheads.'' What are the implications of
the words ``reduce and limit?'' Does this language bar any interim
force increases?
How can we be certain that Russia understands the implications of
this language as we do?
Answer. The words ``reduce and limit'' in Article I refer to the
reductions that must be made by the December 31, 2012 deadline and the
limitation (1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads) that would apply in
the event that the Parties were to extend the duration of the Treaty.
The Moscow Treaty does not bar force increases before 2012, as long
as the December 31, 2012 reduction deadline is met. However, if either
Party has concerns about the other's progress toward meeting the
Treaty's reduction deadline, it can raise them in the Bilateral
Implementation Commission.
We made these positions clear to the Russian Federation during the
course of the negotiations.
Question. Is there any reason why the United States could not or
should not accelerate its force reductions (for example, by removing
warheads)?
Answer. The 10-year deadline for reductions under the Moscow Treaty
allows flexibility for each side to implement the reductions in a
manner appropriate to its own circumstances. The United States will
make these reductions as part of the development and deployment of the
New Triad that was established by the December 2001 Nuclear Posture
Review.
Another factor is that these substantial U.S. and Russian
reductions will entail careful planning and execution on both sides,
and, therefore, will require considerable time to complete. Allowing
ten years for this process to be completed will give both Parties time
to complete these actions in a sound, responsible, and sustainable
manner. We will make our reductions consistent with our Treaty
obligations and our national security requirements.
Question. Is there any reason why the United States could not or
should not at least lower the operational status of forces slated for
later reduction (for example, by changing the alert status of missile
bases or the deployment patterns of submarines)?
The Helsinki summit of 1997 established a START III objective of
``placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles which will be eliminated by START II by December 31, 2003.''
Why was no provision of that sort included in this Treaty?
Answer. There would be little or no benefit to lowering the
operational status or launch readiness (sometimes called
``dealerting'') of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
before they are reduced, and there are a number of reasons not to do
so. The State Department would defer to the Department of Defense
regarding the particulars of those reasons.
In regard to the Helsinki Summit objective of early deactivation,
the Russians in fact subsequently resisted taking any steps to act on
that proposal. A requirement to deactivate missiles prior to reductions
would have burdened both our countries with arbitrary restrictions on
future force structure planning. This would be in diametric opposition
to the Treaty's intention to give each Party flexibility in how it
makes its reductions.
Question. Since the Treaty is scheduled to expire on the first day
that its only force reduction requirement takes effect, how binding
will it be in practice? If one Party should choose to ignore its
obligation, what will the other Party be able to do about it?
If this Treaty does not really bind each Party in practice, then
how does it contribute to the ``trust, openness, cooperation and
predictability'' that you cited in your Letter of Submittal to the
President?
Answer. After it enters into force, the Moscow Treaty will be a
legally-binding document. Each Party must accomplish the required
reductions and meet the Treaty limit by December 31, 2012. In practice,
to meet this Treaty's limit, reductions on both sides will begin long
before December 31, 2012. In addition, given the processes and
resources involved in reconstituting forces, neither Party is going to
be able to immediately reconstitute its forces after expiration of the
Treaty. Moreover, we can extend the Treaty if both Parties agree to do
so.
If either Party has concerns about the other's progress toward
meeting the Treaty's reduction deadline, it can raise them in the
Bilateral Implementation Commission. Moreover, either Party, in
exercising its national sovereignty, will have the option to withdraw
from the Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.
Though the United States, for its part, intended to make its
reductions with or without a treaty, the Treaty nonetheless serves as
an important, formal, and enduring demonstration of the new strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia.
Question. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship
states a joint ``intention to carry our strategic offensive reductions
to the lowest possible levels'' and it calls the Treaty ``a major step
in this direction.'' That implies an intent that our reductions could
go still further. Is that a correct interpretation of the Joint
Declaration?
What ``lowest possible levels'' is the Administration considering?
What further reductions are most likely?
Answer. Along with all other Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 (the NPT), we are
obligated by Article VI ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures related to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.'' The statement in the Joint Declaration of May 24, 2002,
therefore, appropriately reflects this commitment, as does similar
preambular language in the Moscow Treaty. The conclusion of the Moscow
Treaty takes a major step in this direction by codifying the two
Parties' intention to carry out reductions to the level of 1,700-2,200
strategic nuclear warheads.
The Moscow Treaty's 1,700-2,200 limit on strategic nuclear warheads
represents the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads that we have concluded is necessary to meet U.S. and allied
security requirements. Therefore, it is also the lowest possible level
the Administration is considering in the current and foreseen security
environment. Reductions beyond the 1,700-2,200 level have not been
planned, but the Department of Defense continually assesses the
military requirement levels for strategic nuclear warheads.
The United States and Russia both intend to carry out strategic
offensive reductions to the lowest levels possible, consistent with our
national security requirements, alliance obligations, and reflecting
the new nature of our strategic relations.
Question. Why are the reductions to 1,700-2,200 warheads, rather
than to a narrower range? Why does the United States need 500 more
operationally deployed warheads than Russia?
Answer. President Bush made it clear from the outset that he
intended to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons to the lowest number consistent
with U.S. and allied security requirements. Based on the Nuclear
Posture Review, he determined that U.S. forces in a range of 1,700-
2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) will
provide the capability and flexibility necessary to counter known
threats and hedge against surprise technical or other unforeseen
developments.
This range is not based on Cold War paradigms or on how many more
weapons we need over those possessed by any other specific country. The
Department of Defense identified this range of ODSNW as the lowest
number sufficient to meet U.S. national security needs now and into the
foreseeable future. The President has concluded that we can safely
reduce to that level over a period of time, while we watch a still
uncertain world unfold before us. As outlined in the NPR, the United
States had already, before negotiating the Moscow Treaty, decided to
unilaterally reduce the size of its strategic nuclear forces to the
level of 1,700-2,200 ODSNW. The NPR envisaged the 1,700-2,200 range of
ODSNW reflected in the Treaty; nothing in either the NPR or the Treaty
requires that the United States maintain 2,200 ODSNW, or that it have
more ODSNW than Russia does.
Question. Russia is a friend and not an enemy today because of the
reforms begun by former Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin and continued
by President Putin. Nevertheless, even after completing the reductions
called for in this treaty, Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to
annihilate American society. How certain are we that Russian
democratization is both wide and deep enough to insure against the
possibility of a return to dictatorship?
Answer. We have every reason to expect that the democratic and
market reforms carried out by successive Russian governments since the
late 1980's represent a fundamental break with Soviet totalitarianism.
Russia has accepted the principle of the legitimacy of political
leadership based on elections, which have been largely but not
completely free and fair. Basic freedoms--of speech, religion,
association and assembly--are guaranteed by the Russian constitution
and largely observed in practice. A nascent but vibrant civil society
continues to spread and gain influence. Many national and some local
media, while not completely free and independent, are able to comment
critically on government policy. To be sure, authoritarian elements of
state conduct persist in the Russian Government's treatment of
independent media, treatment of certain non-Orthodox religious
communities, issuing of questionable espionage indictments against
certain journalists and researchers, and in the conduct of its military
in Chechnya. However, we regard the possibility of a return to true
dictatorship in Russia--whether Soviet, nationalist-xenophobic, or some
other type--as remote.
Question. The Treaty calls for reductions in ``strategic nuclear
warheads,'' but contains no definition or counting rules for that term.
In your prepared testimony, you state that the United States proposed a
detailed definition of ``operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads,'' but failed to reach agreement with the Russians. What
definition did the United States propose?
What definitions, if any, did the Russian negotiators propose?
Why was the United States unwilling to apply the START counting
rules in this Treaty? What rigidities would those counting rules have
imposed on U.S. reductions?
Answer. The United States proposed the definition of
``operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads'' described in our
Article by Article analysis and made clear this is the definition the
U.S. intends to use in carrying out its obligations under Article I of
the Treaty. We consider such warheads to be ``reentry vehicles on ICBMs
in their launchers, reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers
onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or
stored in weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases.'' The United
States also made clear that a small number of spare strategic nuclear
warheads, including spare ICBM warheads, would be located at heavy
bomber bases and that the United States would not consider these
warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.
[THIS PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED UNDER SEPARATE CLASSIFIED
COVER.]
Our objective in the Moscow Treaty was to limit the number of
strategic nuclear warheads available for immediate use. The concept of
limiting operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads provides a
more accurate measure of this number than START counting rules while
also allowing us to carry out reductions in an effective, economical
manner and preserve our ability to utilize delivery systems for other
purposes, including as conventional weapons platforms. This balance of
interests is more appropriate given our new strategic relationship with
Russia and the need to maintain flexibility to respond, if necessary,
to a more fluid and unpredictable global security environment.
Strictly defined counting rules that do not reflect the actual
number of warheads deployed on delivery vehicles played an important
part in previous strategic arms control agreements to make
accountability absolutely clear in advance. However, these counting
rules came at the cost of complexity and arbitrariness.
Given the new U.S.-Russian strategic relationship, counting rules
were not needed for this Treaty. Moreover, counting rules restrict
flexibility. For example, attributing a number of ``warheads'' to each
bomber based on the maximum number of nuclear weapons it can carry
would have required the United States to drastically reduce the size of
our strategic bomber force, although these bombers and their weapons-
carrying capabilities are needed for non-nuclear missions.
An essential feature of the Treaty is to allow the United States
and Russia to reduce their respective strategic nuclear warheads by any
methods they may choose. While taking the important step of reducing
warheads available for immediate use, we need to retain the flexibility
to meet unforeseen contingencies.
Question. What definition or counting rules will Russia use?
Answer. In making its reductions, Russia will establish its own
definition of ``strategic nuclear warheads.'' Russia did not state
conclusively during the negotiations how it intends to carry out its
reductions. Our original decision to make reductions was not dependent
on whether Russia reduced its own forces to the same number, and we
believe Russia has compelling reasons of its own, unrelated to the
Moscow Treaty, to wish to reduce to the 1,700-2,200 range.
Question. How can we be certain that Russia understands the meaning
of the term ``strategic nuclear warheads'' as we do? Is there any
written or unwritten agreement on definitions?
The Article-by-Article Analysis states that ``Article I, by
referencing the statements of both Presidents, makes clear that the
Parties need not implement their reductions in an identical manner.''
Does this mean that each Party may use its own definition of the term
``strategic nuclear warheads,'' or only that each Party may take
different paths to achieving the required warhead numbers under a
common definition? If the former interpretation pertains, then where is
it made clear that each Party is required to meet only its own
definition of the reduction requirement?
Has the Russian Federation ever said explicitly that the United
States is free to adopt the definition and counting rules stated in
your Letter of Submittal and the Article-by-Article Analysis? Or is
there a difference of view between the two Parties on this matter?
What does the negotiating record say on this? Please provide to
this committee the relevant portions of that record.
Answer. There is no definition of the term ``strategic nuclear
warheads'' in the Treaty, nor is there any written or unwritten
agreement on definitions elsewhere. Each Party may define the term in
its own way and may reduce its strategic nuclear warheads by any method
it chooses.
When the United States proposed the final formulation for Article I
of the Treaty, senior U.S. officials explained that the purpose of the
formulation was to give each Party the flexibility to make reductions
in the manner best suited to its circumstances and the flexibility to
determine the structure and composition of its strategic nuclear
forces.
It was also made clear during the discussions leading to the Treaty
that the United States will reduce its forces in accordance with
President Bush's statement referred to in Article I of the Treaty;
i.e., that the United States would define its reductions in terms of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. While Russia is
under no obligation to reduce its strategic nuclear warheads in the
same manner, Russia does have an obligation to reduce to 1,700-2,200
strategic nuclear warheads.
By signing the Treaty, the Russian side signaled its agreement to
the flexible formulation of Article I and acceptance of the United
States' intended method for implementing Article I's requirement.
Question. According to the Article-by-Article Analysis, U.S.
negotiators noted to their Russian counterparts that the United States
would interpret, for the purposes of its own reductions, operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads as:
. . . reentry vehicles in ICBMs in their launchers, reentry
vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines, and
nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons
storage areas of heavy bomber bases. The United States also
made clear that a small number of spare strategic nuclear
warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) would be located at
heavy bomber bases and that the United States would not
consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads.
Please explain the distinction, for the purposes of implementing
this treaty, between a reentry vehicle and a missile warhead. Are they
synonymous terms? Or can the United States equip a strategic missile
such that the number of warheads would differ from the number of RV's?
Answer. Although the term ``missile warhead'' does not appear
anywhere in the Moscow Treaty, for the purposes of implementing the
Treaty, the term ``warhead,'' as it relates to ICBMs or SLBMs, is
synonymous with ``reentry vehicle.'' In contrast, heavy bomber nuclear
armaments are not technically the same as missile warheads and RVs. For
Treaty purposes, however, they are included in the term ``strategic
nuclear warheads.''
In the context of the Moscow Treaty, as the Article-by-Article
makes clear, only ``nuclear'' reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear
armaments, are subject to the 1,700-2,200 limit. Under this Treaty,
once such warheads are no longer operationally deployed, they will no
longer be included under that ceiling.
Question. How will the United States distinguish between ``spare
strategic nuclear warheads . . . located at heavy bomber bases,'' which
would not count as operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads,
and ``nuclear armaments . . . stored in weapons storage areas of heavy
bomber bases,'' which would count? How many spare warheads, other than
ICBM warheads, will be stored in this manner? What transparency
measures is the United States prepared to offer Russia to illustrate
this distinction?
Answer. No specific decisions have yet been made regarding spares
other than that the United States has a requirement to locate a small
number of spare strategic nuclear warheads at bomber bases. These may
well vary across the life of the Treaty, depending on future force
structure decisions, the assessed safety and reliability of the
stockpile, and the dynamic strategic environment. We refer you to DOE
and DOD for more information on this subject.
As noted in the May 24 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic
Relationship, the Consultative Group for Strategic Security will be the
principal mechanism through which the United States and Russia
strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information
and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest. Neither
Party has expresses interest in any specific types of transparency
measures.
Question. Your Letter of Transmittal to the President and the
Article-by-Article Analysis state: ``In the context of this Treaty, it
is clear that only 'nuclear' reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear
armaments, are subject to the 1,700-2,200 limit.'' What non-nuclear
reentry vehicles does the United States have for its strategic
missiles?
How will the United States demonstrate that a reentry vehicle is
non-nuclear, if one should be on a missile or at a storage site
inspected or visited by a Russian on-site inspector?
Answer. This issue would only arise if a Party deployed
conventional reentry vehicles on its ballistic missiles. The United
States does not deploy any non-nuclear reentry vehicles on its
ballistic missiles. The Moscow Treaty imposes no requirements for
demonstrations of whether reentry vehicles are non-nuclear, or for
inspections or visits to storage sites.
Question. The START Treaty allows a Party to withdraw, after giving
6 months' notice, ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.''
Why was it necessary to reduce the notice period to three months and to
delete the requirement for any justification for withdrawal?
Answer. The provision allowing withdrawal on three months', rather
than six months', written notice provides greater flexibility for each
side to respond in a timely manner to unforeseen circumstances, whether
those circumstances are technical problems in the stockpile, the
emergence of new threats or other changes in the international
environment.
The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the
likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes
unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We
believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved
strategic relationship with Russia.
However, both the withdrawal formulation typically found in Cold
War arms control treaties (``if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its
supreme interests'') and the Moscow Treaty's more general ``in
exercising its national sovereignty'' are legally similar in that both
allow each Party to determine for itself whether conditions requiring
withdrawal exist.
Question. How likely is it that the United States will discover a
need to breach these modest limits on such short notice?
Answer. Based on an extensive study by the Department of Defense of
our nuclear posture, President Bush announced that the United States
would reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a
level between 1,700-2,200 warheads. In indicating that the United
States was prepared to proceed unilaterally, and inviting President
Putin to implement similar reductions, President Bush made clear that
the United States could do this without jeopardizing U.S. security,
even without reciprocal Russian reductions. However, we cannot predict
what challenges may arise within the next decade. For this reason, the
withdrawal clause was carefully fashioned to allow flexibility for each
side to respond to unforeseen circumstances, whether those
circumstances are technical problems in the stockpile, the emergence of
new threats, or other changes in the international environment.
Question. Does the Administration anticipate a need to withdraw
from this Treaty for a lesser reason than that which is required in
START?
Answer. Unlike the withdrawal formulation found in the START Treaty
(``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests''), the
Moscow Treaty's more general withdrawal formulation (``in exercising
its national sovereignty'') is not tied to a Party's determination that
extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national interests
exist. Because the new strategic relationship between the United States
and Russia is based on common responsibilities and common interests
rather than a nuclear balance of terror, the Cold War formulation for
the withdrawal clause was not consistent with the different and more
cooperative approach to reductions embodied in the Moscow Treaty.
While it is possible that a Party might need to withdraw from the
Treaty because of unforeseen events, in this day and age such action
would likely be for reasons completely unrelated to the bilateral
relationship. Neither country can predict what security challenges may
arise within the next decade. For this reason, the withdrawal clause
was carefully fashioned to allow flexibility for each side to respond
to unforeseen circumstances, whether those circumstances are technical
problems in the stockpile, the emergence of new threats, or other
changes in the international environment. This is not a ``lesser''
reason than that envisioned in the START withdrawal clause.
Question. Since the Treaty imposes no limit until December 31,
2012, when the Treaty itself will expire unless extended, why is there
any need for a withdrawal provision before then?
The real impact of the new withdrawal provision would appear to be
to allow a Party to announce its intent to withdraw on September 30,
2012, thus nullifying the sole reduction requirement in the Treaty,
without giving--or needing--any justification. How will a treaty with
such a low standard for withdrawal produce the ``genuine strategic
partnership based on . . . predictability'' that you forecast in your
Letter of Submittal to the President?
Answer. Neither country can predict what security challenges may
arise within the next decade. For this reason, the withdrawal clause
was carefully fashioned to allow flexibility for each side to respond
to unforeseen circumstances, whether those circumstances are technical
problems in the stockpile, the emergence of new threats, or other
changes in the international environment.
Because both countries signaled their intent to undertake the
reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons that became embodied
in the Treaty, the likelihood either Party would delay beginning its
reductions until late in the Treaty's term, then withdraw without
having met its reduction obligations, is not plausible. Reductions on
both sides will begin long before December 31, 2012. If Russia is not
taking appropriate steps to meet the 2012 deadline, we can raise this
issue in either the Consultative Group for Strategic Security or the
Bilateral Implementation Commission.
Question. What role will the Congress have in any decision to
withdraw from this treaty?
Will the Administration agree at least to consult closely with this
committee before making any such decision?
Answer. While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the
Administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the Treaty
with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
prior to announcing any such action.
Question. Press reports indicate that Russian negotiators pressed
for general limits on future U.S. missile defense deployments, but that
this was rejected by the United States. The Russian side then
reportedly sought general language in the treaty that a future U.S.
national missile defense system would not threaten Russia's strategic
deterrent. The United States rejected this proposal as well. Why did
the United States resist the inclusion of general assurances in the
treaty that any future U.S. national missile defense system would not
threaten Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent?
Is there any thought that, in the future, a missile defense system
may well be deployed that would threaten Russia's strategic nuclear
deterrent?
Answer. The U.S. missile defense program is designed to deal with
limited rogue-state missile threats. We are talking about being able to
intercept handfuls, not hundreds, of missiles. U.S. missile defenses
will not threaten Russia's security.
With respect to the absence of any reference to missile defense in
the Moscow Treaty, the Administration's view is that missile defense
deployments are necessary to deal with the emerging third world missile
threat. We are not willing to agree to any limitations on our ability
to counter this threat. The Russian Federation and the United States
have moved beyond our Cold War relationship into a new strategic
framework built on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness,
cooperation and predictability rather than military confrontation. We
believe that placing missile defense limitations on ourselves or the
Russians in the Moscow Treaty would not have served our mutual goal of
moving beyond Cold War thinking. The Administration's view is that the
United States and Russia should not view their respective defense
programs in terms of each other in the manner we did when we were Cold
War adversaries.
While the Moscow Treaty does not address missile defense, that
subject is addressed in the U.S. and Russian Presidents' May 24, 2002
joint declaration on the new strategic relationship between the United
States and Russia. We agreed with Russia to implement measures aimed at
strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the missile
defense area. The declaration also notes our agreement to study
possible areas for missile defense cooperation.
Question. The sixth preambular paragraph in the Treaty cites the
Joint Statement by the two Presidents on Strategic Issues of July 22,
2001, which reads:
We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete
discussions of both offensive and defensive systems. We already
have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will
shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated
subjects of offensive and defensive systems.
Why was this citation included in the Treaty? What is its legal
effect?
Does the United States continue to believe that offensive and
defensive systems are ``interrelated subjects?''
How, if at all, will future developments regarding U.S. missile
defense systems affect the implementation of this treaty? How will they
affect any further reductions in, or agreements on, strategic offensive
forces?
Answer. The sixth preambular paragraph recognizes the Joint
Statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in Genoa on July 22, 2001,
and in Washington, DC on November 13, 2001, that detail the new basis
for relations between the United States and Russia. This preambular
language does not impose any restrictions or obligations relating to
missile defense programs.
Offensive and defensive systems are ``interrelated subjects'' in
that the development of effective missile defenses will reduce our
dependency on strategic forces for maintaining an effective deterrent.
Missile defenses will play an increasing role in the deterrence of WMD
attack. What is new is that our deterrence calculus has changed. We are
now working to transform our nuclear posture from one aimed at
deterring a Soviet Union that no longer exists, to one that is part of
a New Triad designed to deter new adversaries that may no longer be
discouraged solely by the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation. The
United States and Russia acknowledge that today's security environment
is fundamentally different from that during the Cold War; consequently,
they are taking steps to reflect the changed nature of the strategic
relationship between them, including possible areas for missile defense
cooperation.
Future developments in missile defense systems are not tied to, and
will not affect the implementation of, the Moscow Treaty.
The United States and Russia both intend to carry out strategic
offensive reductions to the lowest levels possible, consistent with
national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting
the new nature of our strategic relations. We believe U.S. missile
defenses capable of defending the United States, its friends and
allies, and our forces abroad, in conjunction with the development of
the new U.S. approach to strategic deterrence and an improved
relationship with the Russian Federation, will enhance the possibility
for further reductions in strategic offensive forces.
Question. Was your testimony coordinated with the other affected
departments and agencies of the Executive branch? If not, why not?
Answer. My July 9 testimony was coordinated with the other affected
departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, following standard
procedures for interagency coordination.
Question. Are there any related or side agreements with regard to
this Treaty which have not been submitted to the Senate? If so: please
explain and provide the relevant texts.
Answer. No side agreements of any sort exist with regard to this
Treaty. The Treaty stands alone.
Question. Are there any significant interpretive statements made by
an authorized U.S. official in connection with the negotiation of this
treaty, other than those submitted to the Senate with the treaty
itself, of which the Committee should be aware? If so, please explain
and provide the relevant texts.
Answer. No.