[Senate Hearing 107-609]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-609
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ATTACK ON U.S.S. COLE, ON THE REPORT OF THE
CROUCH-GEHMAN COMMISSION, AND ON THE NAVY'S JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
MANUAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTACK, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF APPROPRIATE
STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. MILITARY SERVICES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 3, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
Les Brownlee, Staff Director
David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Lessons Learned from the Attack on U.S.S. Cole, on the Report of the
Crouch-Gehman Commission, and on the Navy's Judge Advocate General
Manual Investigation into the Attack, Including a Review of Appropriate
Standards of Accountability for U.S. Military Services
may 3, 2001
Page
Shelton, Gen. Henry H., U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 9
Clark, Adm. Vernon E., U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations...... 23
Robertson, Gen. Charles T., Jr., USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S.
Transportation Command......................................... 27
(iii)
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ATTACK ON U.S.S. COLE, ON THE REPORT OF THE
CROUCH-GEHMAN COMMISSION, AND ON THE NAVY'S JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
MANUAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTACK, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF APPROPRIATE
STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. MILITARY SERVICES
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, Roberts,
Allard, Sessions, Bunning, Levin, Landrieu, Bill Nelson, and E.
Benjamin Nelson.
Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff
director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; and Scott W.
Stucky, general counsel.
Professional staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
Edward H. Edens IV, Gary M. Hall, George W. Lauffer, and Joseph
T. Sixeas.
Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, minority
staff director; Richard D. DeBobes, minority counsel; Peter K.
Levine, minority counsel; and Creighton Greene, professional
staff member.
Staff assistants present: Kristi M. Freddo, Shekinah Z.
Hill, Thomas C. Moore, and Suzanne K.L. Ross.
Committee members' assistants present: Dan Twining and Mark
Salter, assistants to Senator McCain; Margaret Hemenway,
assistant to Senator Smith; George M. Bernier III, assistant to
Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator
Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; Derek Maurer,
assistant to Senator Bunning; Menda S. Fife, assistant to
Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene [B.G.] Wright and Erik Raven,
assistants to Senator Byrd; William K. Sutey, assistant to
Senator Bill Nelson; and Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. This hearing will come to order. The
committee meets this morning to continue the committee's review
of the October 12, 2000, terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole in
the port of Aden, Yemen, resulting in the deaths of 17 brave
American sailors. This attack was a vivid reminder of the risks
our men and women in uniform face on a daily basis in much of
the world. They do so to protect our freedom and that of our
allies and friends around this troubled world.
The attack was also a warning of the ever-prevalent
reported threat to our forces and the urgent need, constant
need, to monitor and to improve force protection measures to
deter and hopefully combat that threat.
The committee began its series of hearings on the issues
related to the Cole on October 19. That day we received
testimony from the former Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Central Command, General Zinni, who was indeed commander at the
time the decision was made at the end of 1998 to use Yemen as a
refueling stop for U.S. naval ships.
In those early days following the attack, the committee and
indeed many Americans were asking the question, why Yemen?
Questions remain to this day, why Yemen?
On October 20 the committee conducted a closed hearing to
receive testimony from the intelligence community, followed by
an open and closed hearing on October 25, during which time
Congress received its first public testimony from
administration witnesses on this tragedy. Note that one of our
witnesses this morning, Admiral Clark, was a witness during the
closed portion of the hearing on October 25.
As I said during these earlier hearings on the Cole,
Congress and this committee has constitutional responsibility
for the safety and the welfare of the men and women of the
Armed Forces, as well as their families, wherever they are in
the world. The oversight hearings we have conducted and
continue to conduct regarding the attack on the Cole are a
vital part of this process.
This morning the committee will receive testimony from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton; the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark; and the Commander in
Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command, General Robertson. We
welcome you this morning.
In the immediate aftermath on the U.S.S. Cole, two primary
investigations were launched by the Department of Defense:
first, an investigation of the actions of the commanding
officer and crew of the Cole, conducted by the Navy under the
Manual of the Judge Advocate General, called the JAGMAN
investigation; and second, a lessons learned inquiry conducted
by General Crouch and Admiral Gehman at the request of
Secretary of Defense Cohen.
Both of these reviews were completed in January, just prior
to the change of administrations. While the committee has had a
number of closed briefings on the Crouch-Gehman report, today
is the first open congressional hearing to look into the
results and also to receive the comments from our distinguished
panel of witnesses this morning.
A primary focus of this committee's efforts is on the
lessons learned from the attack on the Cole: what went wrong
and how can we lessen, indeed if not prevent, the recurrence of
a similar tragic attack in the future, whether at sea or on
land? The Crouch-Gehman report summed up the main lessons
learned by stating: ``The attack on U.S.S. Cole (DDG-67) in the
port of Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000 demonstrated a seam''--
that is s-e-a-m; it is an unusual word, but I am quoting it--
``a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely
in transit forces.''
The report lists 30 findings and associated recommendations
intended to ``reduce those vulnerabilities.'' We look to our
witnesses to give us their assessment of the recommendations
contained in the Crouch-Gehman report, as well as a status
report on the implementation of those recommendations and any
others that have been identified subsequently.
An important element of any lessons learned review is an
accurate and thorough examination of the actions of all the
individuals involved in the given incident, both those at the
scene and those within the chain of command. If there were
actions incompatible with accepted standards, individuals must
be held accountable. Without such proper accountability, we run
the risk of repeating such tragedies and sending the wrong
message to our commanding officers and all their subordinates.
If we are to expect commanders to demand the highest standards
of themselves and those serving in their command, do we not
have to ensure that institutional values and expectations are
consistently and fully applied?
Naval services have traditions that go far back into
history. The ship is an island of the sovereign nation whose
flag it proudly flies. The commanding officer throughout
history has been given unquestioned authority and the
concomitant of unquestioned accountability. It was understood
that the commanding officer of a ship was responsible and
ultimately held accountable for anything that happened on his
or her watch. I guess the fundamental question we have this
morning--and I say so most respectfully--has that standard
changed from these generations of our naval service?
Clearly, every situation is unique and has to be judged on
its individual merits. Just as clearly, military personnel in
positions of responsibility must be accountable for their
actions or their failure to act if we are to maintain the order
and discipline essential to successful military operations, as
well as, most importantly, the safety of all those in uniform.
Again, has that changed?
In the case of the Cole, the report of the JAGMAN
investigation officer was clear, it was precise, and in my
personal judgment it was a professional job. Well done. The
report found that instructions, directives, and orders issued
by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Central Command had
been violated. In fact, the report stated the failure by the
commanding officer to implement half of the required 62 force
protection measures.
Further, according to the investigating officer there were
19 force protection measures that could possibly have prevented
or at a minimum mitigated the effect of the attack on the
U.S.S. Cole. Of these 19 measures, only 7 were implemented by
the commanding officer of the Cole and his crew.
In accordance with the JAGMAN instructions, these findings
were reviewed by Admiral Moore, Central Command's Naval
Component Commander, Admiral Natter, Commander in Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, and the distinguished Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Clark, as well as the Secretary of the
Navy, and indeed the Secretary of Defense. In the process of
the review by the aforementioned experienced professionals,
there appears to me to have been a progressive disagreement
with the initial findings and recommendations of the
investigating officer. In fact, Admiral Natter stated that even
if all of the force protection measures had been implemented,
the measures ``would not have detected, deterred, or thwarted
the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.''
A purpose of this hearing is to review this series of
professional judgments and to receive your views. Are actions
by a commanding officer not in compliance with rules,
regulations, and military orders acceptable as long as a
subsequent determination can be made that such actions did not
cause the incident under investigation? That seems to me to be
the fundamental question.
Is this the proper standard to use in judging the
performance of a commanding officer? What message does that
send to the commanding officers and their subordinates
operating on the high seas the world over? Indeed I think this
case is viewed by all services and those in command, so it is
not just restricted to the Navy. As Congress and the American
people review the results of the Navy's JAGMAN investigation
and the subsequent review process by senior officials, we ask
what is the level of accountability that was or was not
established? Again, have our standards changed from this long
history of American men and women in uniform?
Seventeen sailors lost their lives. Families are left to
bear grief. A heavily damaged ship is being repaired at a high
cost to the American taxpayer. So many shortfalls in the
performance of those aboard the Cole were identified, and the
CNO indeed stated, and I quote you, Admiral: ``I am not
completely satisfied with the commanding officer's
performance.''
We do not find--and we are subject to being corrected--a
single disciplinary action of any kind was taken in this
incident. Secretary Cohen indeed issued a statement as his last
action in office essentially declaring shared accountability
for all those with responsibility for force protection on the
Cole. Is the net effect, I ask respectfully, of these actions
by these reviewing officials to hold no one accountable?
While it is not directly the subject of this hearing, the
accountability determination in the Greeneville case is
relevant. Despite the finding of a substantial number of
irregularities and failure to follow established procedures and
regulations on the part of the commanding officer, the CO of
the Greeneville received only a letter of reprimand, an
honorable discharge, and he retained his full retirement
benefits. Again the question, is there adequacy of this level
of accountability in this case and is it consistent with the
traditions of the accountability of ship captains for
generations?
This is not a hearing that any of us have looked forward
to, but it is the responsibility of this committee and indeed
Congress, as a co-equal but separate part of this government,
to review the actions of the Executive Branch taken as a
consequence of these two tragic accidents. It is our
constitutional duty and responsibility to do that. We have that
obligation, which we are going to try and fulfill as fairly, as
objectively, and as impartially as we can today.
At this point, I would like to include for the record the
statements of Senator Thurmond, Senator Santorum, and Senator
Sessions.
[The prepared statements of Senator Thurmond, Senator
Santorum, and Senator Sessions follow:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole was one of the most heinous attacks against the United States and
our military personnel. Unfortunately, history shows us that as long as
the United States is engaged around the world, especially in the
troubled spots, we will be subjected to these types of attacks. Our
responsibility in this regard is two-fold. First, we must ensure that
our citizens, both in and out of uniform, are adequately protected.
Second, we must not succumb to these threats and shirk our global
responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, after the Beirut bombing, the Khobar Towers attack,
and now with the U.S.S. Cole incident, there have been in-depth
investigations and extensive lists of lessons learned. Although each of
these tragic events resulted in significant improvements in protecting
our service members, investigations of subsequent attacks always
determined lapses in security, as did the Crouch-Gehman Commission,
when it stated: ``The attack on U.S.S. Cole. . . demonstrated a seam in
the fabric of efforts to protect our forces.'' In my judgment,
protecting our forces against a determined terrorist is virtually
impossible. However, instilling a constant sense of awareness of the
threat is possible. To instill that awareness requires leadership and
responsibility. I believe that the most important lesson that we should
have learned from the Cole incident is that an organization does well
only those things that the leader checks. To again quote from the
U.S.S. Cole Commission Report: ``Conducting engagement activities in
higher threat areas in support of National Security Strategy and
National Military Strategy requires completely coordinated priorities,
policies and oversight at all levels.'' I repeat ``at all levels.''
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from General Shelton and
Admiral Clark on how they will carry out the lessons learned from the
U.S.S. Cole attack. I am confident that the steps they take will
improve the security of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
However, all these improvements will be for naught until we hold
accountable those individuals at all levels in whose hands we trust the
well-being and safety of this Nation's greatest treasure, the young men
and women in uniform. Regrettably, I have not seen such accountability.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum
Chairman Warner, thank you for scheduling this important hearing on
the lessons learned from the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole. I
know that members of this committee appreciate the insight to be
offered by General Shelton, Admiral Clark, and General Robertson on
ways to improve our antiterrorism and force protection capabilities.
The committee also looks forward to hearing from General Shelton and
Admiral Clark on the issue of accountability with respect to the attack
on the U.S.S. Cole.
As Admiral Clark indicated in his prepared remarks, our Nation's
forward deployed forces operate in a dangerous environment. This is a
regrettable but realistic assessment. The United States cannot hope to
support our national security requirements and foreign policy
objectives without the benefit of forward deployed forces. I believe
that Admiral Clark is correct in assuming that it is only a matter of
time until the next terrorist attack is attempted against our military
forces. Therefore, we need to be vigilant in addressing our
antiterrorism and force protection deficiencies. We need to provide our
commanders with the tools and the intelligence necessary to thwart
these asymmetric threats.
The work of General Crouch and Admiral Gehman has helped all of us
focus on those force protection areas most in need of attention. Their
review of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole was particularly insightful
with respect to the need to provide force protection to in-transit
forces and with respect to doing a better job of tailoring intelligence
information to meet the specific needs of our military commanders.
I look forward to the testimony of General Shelton and his
assessment of where we are with respect to the fielding of new
technologies to help our commanders mitigate against terrorist threats.
I am eager to learn if General Shelton believes we are making
appropriate science and technology program investments to counter
current and future terrorist threats. I also look forward to General
Robertson's assessment of how we can better provide force protection
for our Military Sealift Command vessels and crew members as well as
those Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement commercial carriers--carriers that provide crucial air and
sealift capabilities for our military forces.
Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for convening this hearing and I look
forward to the testimony of today's distinguished panel of witnesses.
______
Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
The U.S.S. Cole was attacked, in port Aden, Yemen without warning
on October 12, 2000. I want to thank General Shelton, Admiral Clark,
and General Robertson for taking the time out of their busy schedules
to testify before us today. General Robertson, I also want to thank you
for the testimony you provided to the Seapower Subcommittee just 2
weeks ago. It is good to see you again.
First, and most importantly, I want to express my sympathy to the
families, shipmates, and friends of those men and women who were killed
and injured by the cowardly attack on the U.S.S. Cole. The crew's
heroic actions after the attack prevented their ship from sinking. They
also administered the first aid that saved the lives of many injured
shipmates. The crew's dogged determination and courageous actions were
in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval service.
The Cole stopped in Aden to refuel en route to the Persian Gulf.
When attacked, U.S.S. Cole was in the Commander in Chief of the Central
Command's area of responsibility and was under the immediate command of
the Commander of the Abraham Lincoln Battle Group, Task Force 50, who
in turn, reported to the Commander of the Fifth Fleet, the Naval
Component Commander for the CINC of the Central Command. We will be
exploring issues today to clarify questions that remain so we can
fulfill our oversight responsibilities for future systems and policies.
The overall accountability and standards of performance for
commanders which have been brought to world-wide attention by both the
U.S.S. Cole and the U.S.S. Greeneville investigations, concern me. It
appears that standards of personal accountability are drifting away
from the age-old rule of determining if an individual and the people he
or she is responsible for carried out legal orders, followed
established procedures, and reported with utmost integrity. There
appears to be an emerging new standard of assessing the results of an
incident and then overlaying a range of performance parameters both of
which cloud the lines of accountability and responsibility.
There are a number of troubling questions that remain to be
answered, and I hope the committee will get at these issues today.
Why wasn't the Judge Advocate General Manual
investigation being conducted by an 0-6 elevated to a board of
inquiry by officers senior to the operational commanders
responsible for U.S.S. Cole?
Although the Commander of the Fifth Fleet stated in
his endorsement to the investigation, ``other investigative
queries and additional crew interviews will undoubtedly
establish a fuller picture of the events . . .'' and the Chief
of Naval Operations stated in his endorsement, ``separate
action will be taken to assess the accountability of others in
the chain of command,'' it is not apparent that any follow-up
was done to assess the accountability of the operational
commander who made, Commander of Fifth Fleet assessed, a
``perfunctory . . . review'' of the Cole's force protection
plan. Has U.S.S. Cole's operational chain of command's
responsibility and accountability for force protection been
assessed?
During my recent visit to the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain,
I observed two extremes in force protection: the high end was
the Marine Corps Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team and the low
end was a pier sentry from a U.S. Navy ship that had poorly-
fitting equipment and did not project a well-equipped sentry
that would be a deterrent to a terrorist. Who is the Navy
tasking to provide force protection duties? Are they trained
and equipped for that role or are they sailors with good
intentions that are highly skilled technicians who should be
repairing equipment?
In sharing responsibility and accountability, has the
chain of command provided the training, equipment, and
personnel required to minimize the opportunity for attacks on
our men and women and material?
Have damage control lessons learned been fed back to
fleet units and training facilities?
Have ships been provided the equipment needed for
force protection or have the ships had to sacrifice ship
maintenance funds to buy equipment?
Has the chain of command ensured that the ships that
provided U.S.S. Cole with emergency equipment and expendable
material have replaced that equipment and are carrying their
full complement of damage control equipment and expendables?
Are damage control equipment problem areas specific to
U.S.S. Cole or are they applicable to other ships? If the
problems are applicable to other ships, what is being done to
prevent reoccurrence?
My task as Seapower Subcommittee chair, along with other members of
our subcommittee, is to ensure the Cole lessons learned are reflected
in ship construction requirements, ship modification requirements, and
force protection equipment requirements for Navy ships. Then it is our
task to assess the Navy's intentions to meet those requirements. We do
not presently have the information required to make those assessments.
The Navy has not been forthcoming with the information in these areas
to do the preliminary work needed prior to reviewing the fiscal year
2002 budget request. I thank the chair and our witnesses for appearing
before us today.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This hearing takes place 3 days after the release of the
State Department's report called ``Patterns of Global Terrorism
for the Year 2000.'' Secretary Powell noted in his report:
``The year began on a positive note, with the thwarting of an
attempt by international terrorists to carry explosives across
the U.S.-Canadian border, thus averting a millennium-related
attack.'' But tragically, as the year drew to a close we
experienced the loss of 17 sailors and injuries to 42 others in
the October 12 terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole.
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice
Admiral Thomas Wilson, told the committee earlier this year
that: ``Terrorism remains the most significant asymmetric
threat to our interests at home and abroad. This threat will
grow as disgruntled groups and individuals focus on America as
the source of their troubles. Our overseas military presence
and our military's status as a symbol of U.S. power, interest,
and influence can make it a target.''
In his transmittal letter to the President on the report of
the Downing task force assessment of the June 25, 1996, attack
on Khobar Towers, then-Secretary of Defense Bill Perry wrote:
``To face threats of this sophistication, all our leaders,
civilian and military, must adopt a radically new mind set with
regard to international terrorism.'' Despite that statement, as
then-Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen noted in his memorandum of
January 19 regarding the attack on the U.S.S. Cole: ``In this
instance none of us in the chain of command fully appreciated
the danger that our in-transit naval forces faced from a
waterborne threat in restricted waters, such as during a port
call or refueling stop.''
Now, with those statements as background, I think it is
surely obvious that we must ensure that we learn the proper
lessons from the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and that we commit
ourselves to do everything in our power to deter and, if
necessary, defeat attempts at terrorist attacks on our military
forces, including our transitting military forces. We have to
ensure that such a commitment is not mere words, but a true,
lasting, and effective commitment.
One important way of learning the lessons involved in this
or any other incident is to conduct a comprehensive
investigation to ascertain what was done and what was not done
at each level of command and to determine accountability as
appropriate. In that regard, I am concerned that in this case,
despite a high-powered commission and a Navy investigation,
that there was no comprehensive effort to look at the actions
or inactions of several layers of command above the ship
itself.
Finally, we are indebted to General Crouch and Admiral
Gehman for the outstanding job that they did in assessing the
lessons from the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and in making
recommendations for the way ahead. They did not focus on
accountability. That was not their job. They looked at lessons
learned to try to prevent these kind of future tragedies. They
provided us a classified briefing some time ago and impressed
us all with their cogent and wise assessment and
recommendations.
So I want to join our chairman in stating just how
important this hearing is today. The subjects are of extreme
import. I cannot think of any issues that are really more
important than trying to assure that we have accountability so
that our men and women in service are protected from these kind
of attacks. I know our witnesses are the first to join in that
belief. I do not know of any witnesses who feel more keenly
about the kind of responsibility and accountability that is so
essential if we are going to carry out our missions with
maximum safety for our forces.
I want to welcome all of these witnesses today.
At this time, I would like to submit for the record a
statement by Senator Landrieu.
[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. As we sit in this
hearing room today, I think it's important that we remember why we are
here. On October 12 of last year, 17 brave men and women gave their
lives for their country. They were victims of a vicious terrorist
attack. In the months since, many armchair quarterbacks have gotten a
lot of publicity by commenting on what was or was not done to prevent
this from happening. None of those comments can take away from the
bravery and dedication of all our men and women in uniform, and
particularly those 17 brave souls who made the ultimate sacrifice for
their country.
Now, almost 7 months after the attack, several of the
investigations are complete, however the criminal investigation is
still ongoing with no end in sight. But enough time has passed to
answer some simple questions: First, ``What happened?'' Second, ``What
systemic and personal failures contributed to the success of the
attack?'' Last, ``Where do we go from here?''
I've been on this committee since 1999. Since then, I've attended
numerous hearings and briefings where various components of the
Department of Defense tried to answer those questions in response to
various accidents and crises. In every case they presented ``Lessons
Learned.'' This committee has already been briefed on some of the
lessons learned from the Cole tragedy and I'm sure we'll hear some more
today. I am particularly committed to ensuring they do in fact become
``Lessons Learned'' because it seems to me that, all too often, we have
``Lessons Taught.'' That distinction is important because we keep
hearing the same lessons over and over again, and it is the
responsibility of the leadership--some of whom sit before us today--to
ensure that those lessons are institutionalized and truly become
``Lessons Learned.''
Everyone in this room knows that terrorism is a complex and
challenging threat whose very nature makes it impossible to plan for.
We live in a world with risks and, if America is to remain engaged in
the world, we incur those risks as the cost of doing business. Those
risks can never be completely eliminated, but we can take actions to
minimize them.
The military trains daily for the most dangerous business there is,
war. There is always risk in war, and a prudent commander is negligent
if he or she doesn't do everything possible to try and minimize that
risk. We should make no mistake about it--terrorists around the world
are at war with the United States today. Just like a traditional war,
Americans expect their commanders to do what they can to minimize the
risk to their sons and daughters, but they understand that risk can
never be eliminated and that the mission must always come first. If we
do anything else, we abandon our role as a superpower and I believe the
world would become a far more dangerous place.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this important
hearing, and I look forward to the valuable testimony of the witnesses.
Chairman Warner. So ordered. Thank you, Senator Levin.
General Shelton, you may proceed. Also, would you identify
for the committee the role to be played by General Robertson.
You decided overnight, as I understand, to include him. We
welcome him today. I am not sure whether his testimony
parallels you or should we go to the Chief following you. If
you will give us guidance, we will be glad to follow that.
STATEMENT OF GEN. HENRY H. SHELTON, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
General Shelton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Levin, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for the opportunity to appear here today before this
committee to share with you the work that is being done to
address the findings of the Crouch-Gehman Commission. Let me
thank Congress and especially the members of this committee for
your enduring and significant support of America's Armed Forces
and for your deep concern for the safety and well-being of our
men and women in uniform.
The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole was a tragic event and
obviously a stark reminder of the risks that our great men and
women in uniform face as they carry out their many missions day
in and day out, doing the things that we ask them to do on our
behalf. Our condolences collectively go out to those who lost a
loved one aboard the U.S.S. Cole last October. All Americans I
am sure share in this heartbreaking loss.
But no one should mistake America's resolve. The
reprehensible act of terrorism against the U.S.S. Cole will not
cause this Nation to retreat from its commitments to our allies
and it will not keep our military from performing its duties
and responsibilities to defend U.S. interests around the globe.
Attacks such as this reinforce the importance of improving our
ability to deter and defeat terrorists, and we certainly owe it
to those who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces to provide
them with the very best protection possible.
In that regard, I want to acknowledge the tremendous work
that has been done by the intelligence community and the FBI,
specifically Director Freeh, with the cooperation of the Yemeni
government, to bring to justice those that are responsible for
this act.
Our approach to dealing with the threat of terrorism
requires a sustained inter-agency approach. As you noted, Mr.
Chairman, in addition to my testimony, Admiral Vern Clark, the
Chief of Naval Operations, and General Tony Robertson, the
Commander in Chief of United States Transportation Command, are
both with me here today. General Robertson is a leading
innovator for in-transit force protection. He has to be because
he has the responsibility to coordinate the force protection of
a number of assets that are routinely in transit, operating
around the world, around the clock, in fact even as we speak
here this moment. All of us will be happy to take your
questions after our prepared remarks.
In your invitation to the hearing today, Mr. Chairman, you
and Senator Levin asked the Joint Chiefs to provide an
assessment of our antiterrorism force protection program. We
welcome the opportunity to update you on what we have been
doing to implement the findings of the Crouch-Gehman
Commission.
But before I address what we are doing to implement their
findings, let me emphasize one key point. Following the Cole
tragedy, we reviewed systemic problems with our force
protection program, as well as examined the accountability for
such things as the failure to provide adequate warning or
implement appropriate security measures. In this effort, let me
stress that we must be clear about the difference between
responsibility and accountability for the bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole.
The parties responsible for the Cole tragedy are the
terrorists and those who trained and equipped them, not anyone
within our Armed Forces. It was clearly an act of premeditated
murder. However, accountability is a function of command, and
this matter was addressed up and down the chain of command
within DOD, by the Navy, by the Commander in Chief, and then
Secretary of Defense Cohen.
As I said last October, those who perpetrated this act of
terrorism should also never forget that America has a long
memory and our reach is even longer.
The goal of the Crouch-Gehman Commission was to review the
processes and the procedures in place and look for systemic
gaps within our existing force protection program. General
Crouch and Admiral Gehman, two very distinguished officers, and
the members of their Commission are to be commended for their
thoroughness as well as the quality of their judgment in making
recommendations to improve our vital force protection program.
As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, their commission report was
very comprehensive, containing 30 findings and 53
recommendations. As we meet, commands around the globe are hard
at work implementing the commission's recommendations and
exploring other ways to improve their security posture.
Given that many of our adversaries cannot compete with the
United States militarily, they try to exploit perceived
weaknesses and strike at us in what we call asymmetric means to
achieve their goals. Bombings such as Khobar Towers, the
embassy attacks in Africa in 1998, and the U.S.S. Cole last
October are unfortunate examples of this asymmetric threat.
Defending against this type of threat remains a top priority of
the combatant commands, each of the services, and commanders
everywhere and at every level.
Of course, we must keep in mind that terrorists are
adaptive adversaries who constantly look for ways to strike
where their victims are most vulnerable, what we call the weak
link. While we can never fully eliminate the possibility that
terrorists will strike against us, we are doing our utmost to
ensure the security of our forces so they can carry out their
important missions at minimum risk.
Our goal is not only to reduce the exposure of our in-
transit ships and planes, a shortcoming which was exposed by
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, but also to ensure that our
antiterrorism force protection program remains dynamic, thus
reducing our vulnerability to terrorists.
On October 12, 2000, a bomb exploded in the port side of
U.S.S. Cole while the ship was moored at a refueling
``dolphin'' in Aden, Yemen. The explosion, as you have said,
Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, killed 17 sailors, wounded 42,
and severely damaged the vessel. In this incident, terrorists
were able to exploit control measures and perimeter security
vulnerabilities associated with waterside approaches to our
ships while they are in port. However, the Crouch-Gehman
Commission findings and their recommendations go far beyond
waterside security improvements.
As I said, the Department of Defense is aggressively
implementing the commission's recommendations. So let me spend
the remainder of my time highlighting the findings and
recommendations and providing a status of our actions thus far.
As I mentioned earlier and as reflected on the chart to
your left or right and the advance copy that we placed in front
of each of you, the commission made 30 findings and 53
recommendations, divided into 5 categories as shown on this
slide. They addressed organization, antiterrorism and force
protection, intelligence, logistics, and training.
In the first category of organization, the Crouch-Gehman
Commission saw the need for better unity of effort among the
offices and the agencies of DOD that provide the policy, the
resources, and the oversight involved with combatting
terrorism. The commission also recommended better coordination
of our engagement activities across the U.S. government
agencies, including developing security capabilities of host
nations to protect U.S. forces.
As a result, I have recommended that the Office of the
Secretary of Defense align policy and resource responsibility
under one OSD office.
With regard to host nation cooperation, I have asked the
geographic CINCs to continue their coordination efforts with
host nation counterparts to gain increased security support.
Secretary of State Powell has aided in this important cause by
instructing the chiefs of mission to assist in coordinating DOD
security requirements with host nations.
The second category, antiterrorism and force protection, is
where the commission made the lion's share of its findings and
recommendations. To summarize, the commission advocated:
proactive antiterrorism techniques to complement our defensive
actions; better coordination of the transfer of units between
theaters of operation; and use of risk management tools to
support antiterrorism and force protection planning and
execution.
The combatting terrorism readiness initiative fund provides
immediate assistance to our CINCs for emergent requirements
that cannot wait for the normal budget process. The commission
strongly supported increasing the amount committed to this fund
and I agree.
We also now allow the fund to cover not only the initial
purchase of requirements, but also to include the next year
maintenance funding until the services can assume maintenance
responsibility for follow-on years through the normal budget
process. We are already benefiting from these changes. For
example, Central Command (CENTCOM) was funded to buy patrol
boats for port security in Bahrain, and I had a chance to see
these boats already in action when I visited there about 2
months ago. In Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) they were funded for
bunkers to better protect their forward operations in support
of Plan Colombia.
I should also mention that in fiscal year 2001 we received
an additional $100 million for antiterrorism funding. We would
anticipate an increase in the President's budget in 2002 as
well.
I also want to add that European Command (EUCOM) is
aggressively working with General Robertson at Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM) on its highly successful joint risk
assessment management program within its Air Force component. I
believe that all CINCs will benefit from this initiative.
SOUTHCOM's tactics, procedures, and techniques in support
of safe passage through the Panama Canal have been adopted by
the country of Panama. In CENTCOM, they are working closely
with Egypt to provide additional security for U.S.-flag vessels
transitting the Suez Canal. General Robertson is prepared to
discuss several other examples of force protection initiatives
that he is implementing at TRANSCOM.
To summarize, DOD is resolving a wide range of
recommendations in this area, including enhancing antiterrorism
and force protection procedures, resource allocation,
technology development, as well as risk management.
In the third category, intelligence, the commission
recommended, and members of the Joint Chiefs have publicly
expressed their support for, a reprioritization of resources
for collection and analysis, including human intelligence and
signals intelligence against terrorists. The commission also
stated that individual units must be better trained and
resourced to meet requests for intelligence support.
OSD is reviewing options for reprioritizing intelligence
support and has asked for comments from all intelligence
agencies. The geographic CINCs are also looking at
reprioritizing their intelligence assets within theater and
they have already provided vulnerability assessment
augmentation and tailored intelligence support for in-transit
units.
CENTCOM has developed a country vulnerability assessment
team concept. Assessments will move beyond fixed sites to
include exercise areas, ports, and airfields used by DOD
personnel. EUCOM has established an in-transit tracking cell
for all ships, aircraft, vehicles, and ground forces at its
joint analysis center, which is located at the Joint Analysis
Center (JAC) Molesworth in the United Kingdom. This cell
provides these forces with current intelligence and situational
awareness.
With regard to both human and signals intelligence, we are
constantly reviewing the allocation of these important and
scarce resources and have completed some reallocations.
For the longer term, the intelligence program review group
is reviewing and validating the need for additional capability
and that review is due to be completed this month.
In the fourth category, logistics, the Crouch-Gehman
Commission concluded that the current level of combat logistics
force replenishment ships is sufficient. Their position was
based on the fact that the current percentage of combat
logistics force ships relative to the battle force is 6.6
percent, which is within the historical range of 5.6 to 7.3
percent that has been used since 1980.
The commission did see the need for geographic CINCs to
have greater logistics flexibility that would minimize exposure
to threats, and the CINCs have already incorporated this
recommendation into their logistics planning.
Finally, in the fifth category of training, the commission
recommended that DOD elevate antiterrorism and force protection
training to the same priority as training for warfighting. The
commission also recommended increased emphasis in training for
commanders and antiterrorism officers. Each of our services is
aggressively developing more comprehensive unit predeployment
recurring training curriculums, pre-command and antiterrorism
officer courses in response to this very important and
certainly appropriate observation.
The Joint Staff is dedicating additional funding for
improvement in training and is developing the capability to
better evaluate trends, as well as lessons learned, from its
vulnerability assessment reports.
In Korea, our CINC there, General Tom Schwartz, has begun
employing teams that assess antiterrorism readiness by looking
at a base from the perspective of a potential terrorist. These
programs, which we call red teaming, are an important component
of a successful force protection program at all levels.
Meanwhile, Pacific Command incorporated a significant
antiterrorism focus into its recent exercise on reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration, or RSOI, which took
place in countries throughout the Pacific theater. This
increased antiterrorism focus included the joint rear areas
through which many of our in-transit assets move.
In summary, we continue to make considerable progress in
our antiterrorism and force protection program. Our people are
better protected today than in the past. I am very proud of
these dedicated force protection professionals that contribute
to the safety and security of our people day in and day out.
Our efforts have resulted, I believe, in a much higher level of
antiterrorism readiness both here at home as well as abroad.
With the assistance of the Crouch-Gehman Commission report, we
are now reducing vulnerabilities associated with in-transit
units and have already completed 31 of the 53 recommendations
made in the report.
The bottom line is that we have an aggressive program that
commanders up and down the chain of command take very seriously
and are actively involved in. While the Cole tragedy has
focused our efforts to discover additional seams in the
program, we are casting a net much wider than merely reducing
the vulnerabilities of our in-transit assets.
Let me cite just one example. We are preparing now in the
event that the terrorist threat evolves from explosive devices
to standoff weapons, such as hang gliders, mortars, or also
weapons of mass destruction. We are not standing still.
But let there be no mistake. Even with the implementation
of the Crouch-Gehman recommendations and the other actions that
we are pursuing, we are not and never will be totally immune to
terrorism. Whenever I talk with troops and their leaders, I
stress to them that the question to ask about a terrorism
attack is not if, but when and how it will occur.
Still, we must put this in perspective. The United States
is a global power. We have global responsibilities. We should
neither let this threat overwhelm us nor deter us. If we shrink
or pull back, our loss may ultimately be far greater than the
tragic loss of life aboard the U.S.S. Cole and would have in
essence allowed the terrorist to accomplish his goals.
Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to meet with
the committee today and to share our views with you. We look
forward to amplifying on our comments and more fully addressing
your concerns, either here or in a closed session, as
appropriate. Thank you very much, and I will be followed by
Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army
introduction
On behalf of the Joint Chiefs, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this committee to provide an assessment of
our AntiTerrorism Force Protection (AT/FP) program and share with you
the specifics of work being done to address the findings of the Crouch-
Gehman Commission. The bombing of U.S.S. Cole was a tragic event and a
stark reminder of the risks that our great men and women in uniform
face as they carry out the many missions, day in and day out, we ask
them to do on our behalf. My condolences go out to those who lost a
loved one on board Cole last October. All Americans share in their
heartbreaking loss.
However, no one should mistake America's resolve. The dastardly act
of terrorism against Cole will not cause this great Nation to retreat
from its commitments to our allies, and it will not keep our military
from performing its duties and responsibilities to defend U.S.
interests around the world. Attacks such as this reinforce the
importance of improving our ability to deter and defeat terrorists who
threaten our great Nation's welfare. We owe it to all the patriots who
volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces to provide them the very best
protection possible.
First, I want to acknowledge the great work the intelligence
community and the FBI are doing, with the excellent cooperation of the
Yemeni government, to find and deliver into justice those who were
involved in this heinous act. Overcoming the pernicious threat of
terrorism requires a robust and sustained interagency effort.
Let me also thank Congress, and especially the members of this
Committee, for your enduring and significant support of America's Armed
Forces and your deep concern for the safety and well-being of our great
men and women in uniform.
Whether Active Duty, Reserve, or Guard, wherever our troops deploy,
antiterrorism is a top priority for our commanders. The tragic bombing
of the U.S.S. Cole serves as a stark reminder that the terrorists of
the world can strike anywhere, and at any time. Our adversaries, unable
to confront or compete with the United States militarily, spend
millions of dollars each year on terrorist organizations that target
U.S. citizens, property, and interests. Consequently, our Combatant
Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and the Services continue to focus on
antiterrorism issues as a first order priority.
We have learned through our national tragedies that terrorists are
indiscriminate killers who attack where and when their victims are most
vulnerable. Most recently, on October 12, 2000, a bomb exploded along
the port side of U.S.S. Cole while the ship was moored at a refueling
``dolphin'' in Aden, Yemen. The explosion killed 17 sailors, wounded
42, and severely damaged the vessel. In this incident, terrorists were
able to exploit access control measures and perimeter security
vulnerabilities associated with waterside approaches to our ships while
they are in port.
Given that many of our adversaries can't compete with the United
States militarily, they try to find and exploit perceived weaknesses,
striking at us using what we call ``asymmetric means'' to achieve their
goals. Bombings, such as Khobar Towers, the embassy attacks in Africa
in 1998, and U.S.S. Cole last October are unfortunate examples of this
asymmetric threat.
Defending against this type of threat remains a top priority of the
Combatant Commands, each of the Services, and commanders everywhere. Of
course, we must keep in mind that terrorists are adaptive adversaries
who constantly look for ways to strike where their victims are most
vulnerable. While we can never fully eliminate the possibility that
terrorists will strike against us, we are doing our utmost to ensure
the security of our forces so that they can carry out their important
missions at minimum risk. Our goal is not only to reduce the exposure
of our in-transit ships and planes--a shortcoming exposed by the
bombing of U.S.S. Cole--but to ensure our antiterrorism/force
protection program remains dynamic, thus reducing our vulnerability to
terrorists.
crouch-gehman commission
Secretary of Defense Cohen commissioned General Crouch, USA
(Retired), and Admiral Gehman, USN (Retired), to lead a review of
lessons learned from the U.S.S. Cole attack. The goal of this
commission was to review the processes and procedures in place within
our existing force protection program. General Crouch, Admiral Gehman,
and the members of their Commission are to be commended for their
thoroughness, as well as the quality of their judgment, in making
recommendations to improve our vital force protection program.
Their U.S.S. Cole Commission Report was quite comprehensive,
containing 30 findings and 53 recommendations. The Department of
Defense is now aggressively implementing those recommendations. A DOD
Working Group representing both the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Staff was formed to complete all recommendations. DOD's
Antiterrorism Coordination Committee (ATCC) and ATCC Senior Steering
Group meet frequently and regularly to guide Working Group actions. A
majority of the recommendations were completed within 30 days of
approval of the Working Group's Plan. The remaining actions have been
divided into
3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month completion timelines.
crouch-gehman commission findings and recommendations
The Commission's findings and recommendations are contained in five
categories: Organization; Antiterrorism/Force Protection; Intelligence;
Logistics; and Training. I will briefly summarize these categorical
findings and recommendations as well as DOD actions that are in
progress.
In the area of ``Organization,'' the Crouch-Gehman Commission saw
the need for better ``unity of effort'' among the offices and agencies
in DOD providing antiterrorism resources, policy, oversight, and
direction involved with combating terrorism. The Commission also
recommended better coordination of our engagement activities across
U.S. Government agencies, including developing the security
capabilities of host nations to help protect U.S. forces. As a result,
I recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) align
policy and resource responsibility under one OSD office. With regard to
host nation coordination, I have asked the Geographic CINCs to continue
coordination efforts with host nation counterparts to gain increased
security support. We are working closely with the State Department in
developing and implementing force protection measures. Secretary of
State Colin Powell has aided in this important cause by instructing all
Chiefs of Mission to assist in establishing and coordinating DOD
security requirements with host nations.
In ``Antiterrorism/Force Protection,'' the Commission advocated
proactive AT techniques to complement defensive actions, to better
coordinate the transfer of units between theaters of operation, and to
adopt a risk management model in support of AT/FP planning and
execution. DOD is resolving the wide range of recommendations in this
area, including revision of AT/FP procedures, resource allocation,
technology development, and risk management.
The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides
immediate assistance to our CINCs for emergent requirements that cannot
wait for the normal budget process. The Cole Commission strongly
supported increasing the amount committed to this fund and I agree.
Because of your support, this fund has been increased. In addition, we
now allow the fund to cover not only initial purchase of emergent
requirements, but also to include associated ``next year'' maintenance
funding, until the Services can assume maintenance responsibility for
follow-on years through the normal budget process. We are already
benefiting from the additional allocation, for example: U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM) will be provided funding for patrol boats for port
security in Bahrain and funding for their newly organized Country
Vulnerability Assessment Team. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) will
be funded for necessary bunkers to better protect their Forward
Operating Locations in support of Plan Colombia. I should also mention
that for fiscal year 2001, we increased antiterrorism funding $100
million to $3.5 billion.
Other recent CINC initiatives are enhancing antiterrorism/force
protection. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is aggressively working a
Joint Risk Assessment Management Program, which has already been highly
successful at its Air Force Component level. All CINCs will benefit
from this initiative. USSOUTHCOM's tactics, techniques, and procedures
in support of safe passage through the Panama Canal have been adopted
by the country of Panama. Also, USCENTCOM is working closely with Egypt
to provide additional security for U.S. flag vessels transiting the
Suez Canal.
For the category ``Intelligence,'' the Commission recommended, and
the Joint Chiefs support, a reprioritization of resources for
collection and analysis, to include human intelligence and signal
intelligence, against the terrorist threat. Individual units must also
be better trained and resourced to meet appropriate requests for
intelligence support. OSD is reviewing options for reprioritizing
intelligence support and has asked for comments from all Intelligence
Agencies. At the same time, geographic CINCs are evaluating a
reprioritization of intelligence assets within their Theaters and have
already provided vulnerability assessment augmentation and tailored
intelligence support for in-transit units on independent missions until
additional resources become available.
Already, USCENTCOM has developed a Country Vulnerability Assessment
Team concept. The concept expands assessments beyond fixed sites to
include exercise areas, ports and airfields used by DOD personnel.
Also, USEUCOM has established an in-transit tracking cell for ships,
aircraft, and vehicles and ground forces at its Joint Analysis Center
(JAC), Molesworth, UK. This cell provides these forces current
intelligence and situational awareness.
With regard to Human Intelligence and Signals Intelligence, we are
constantly reviewing the allocation of these important and scarce
resources and have already completed some reallocation. Also, as
previously mentioned, USCENTCOM will be receiving additional funding
for intelligence analysts.
For the longer term, the DOD Intelligence Program Review Group is
reviewing and validating the need for additional capability. I expect
the review to be completed later this month.
In support of ``Logistics,'' the Crouch-Gehman Commission concluded
that the current level of Combat Logistics Force replenishment ships is
sufficient. The Commission view is based on the fact that the current
percentage of Combat Logistic Force ships relative to the Battle Force
is 6.6 percent--within the historical range of 5.6 to 7.3 percent since
1980. The Commission did see the need for geographic CINCs to have
greater logistic flexibility to minimize exposure to threats. CINCs
have incorporated this recommendation into their logistics planning.
Finally, with regard to ``Training,'' the Commission recommended
elevating Antiterrorism/Force Protection training to the same priority
as their warfighting requirements training. The Commission also
recommended increased emphasis in our training for Commanders and
Antiterrorism Officers. Our Services are aggressively developing more
comprehensive unit pre-deployment and recurring training curriculums
and more comprehensive pre-command and AT Officer courses in response
to this important observation. The Joint Staff also is dedicating
additional funding toward improvements in ``General Awareness,'' AT
Officer; Pre-Command; and Executive Level training support and
developing the capability to better evaluate trends and lessons learned
from its vulnerability assessment reports.
U.S. Forces, Korea has developed a ``Red Team'' concept to better
assess the antiterrorism readiness of its bases. U.S. Pacific Command
(USPACOM) incorporated a significant antiterrorism focus into its
recent Reception Staging Onward-Movement Integration (RSOI) exercise.
RSOI took place in multiple countries throughout the USPACOM Theater
and the antiterrorism focus included the Joint Rear Areas.
I also want to add that immediately following the Cole bombing, the
Geographic and Functional CINCs, and the Service Secretaries and Chiefs
met with the Secretary of Defense and me to determine what actions
could be taken to enhance AT/FP immediately. A majority of their
recommendations were subsequently proposed by the Crouch-Gehman
Commission. Those that were not in the Commission Report were added to
our plan for prompt action. These include the development of ``Red
Teams;'' the need for vetting criteria for host nation contractors
supporting our units during higher Threat Conditions; and the need to
conduct Vulnerability Assessments at all ports and airfields visited by
DOD units.
additional antiterrorism/force protection initiatives
In all, we've made monumental progress in our AT/FP efforts in the
4\1/2\ years since the attack on Khobar Towers. I'll briefly highlight
a few of our most significant initiatives.
The Joint Staff Combating Terrorism Directorate, (J-34), continues
to provide superb support to our program. It provides unity of effort
on the Joint Staff for all matters pertaining to combating terrorism,
and assists the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs with their
force protection responsibilities. To accomplish these objectives, J-34
works closely within the interagency process to integrate emerging AT/
FP technologies, develop AT/FP doctrine, policy, standards, and
training programs, and enhance coordination with our allies for
combating terrorism. The Combating Terrorism Directorate is organized
into four divisions designed to synchronize operations and
intelligence, develop plans and policies, integrate programs and
requirements, and coordinate training, doctrine development, and
vulnerability assessments.
Our six Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA)
Teams continue to assess Antiterrorism/Force Protection readiness.
These teams visit designated military installations worldwide, both
CONUS and OCONUS, to assess intelligence collection and dissemination
capabilities, physical security measures, infrastructure support and
structural vulnerabilities, and the installation's ability to respond
to a terrorist incident. Because the terrorist weapon of choice today
remains a large vehicle bomb, our JSIVA Teams emphasize the importance
of sound perimeter security, thorough access procedures, adequate
building standoff, and comprehensive response plans for incident damage
mitigation. However, because we also must anticipate the potential use
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the future, we have added WMD
experts to two of our teams to better prepare today for terrorist use
of WMD tomorrow. We've completed 327 assessments since the program's
inception in 1997 and will complete an additional 96 by the end of this
calendar year. Our geographic CINCs and Service Chiefs have also
organized their own assessment teams to evaluate installation readiness
and assist installation commanders in refining existing plans. In
addition, these teams provide assessment ``lessons learned'' which are
made available to all commands.
To enhance Antiterrorism Force Protection readiness and assist
installation commanders develop viable AT/FP plans, we've refined our
AT/FP Installation Planning Template (and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix), that provides the Installation Commander a step-by-step
guide in developing a thorough and inclusive AT/FP plan. The Template
is now available as an interactive CD-ROM.
We also place considerable emphasis on, and continue to improve AT/
FP Training. The four-tiered training program consists of:
A basic level training curriculum for all DOD
personnel and their families;
An advanced level curriculum to train Antiterrorism
Force Protection Officers;
Antiterrorism Force Protection education at Commanding
Officer ``command pipeline'' training; and
An executive-level seminar for senior officers & DOD
civilian leadership.
Additionally, we continue to work hard to ensure the inclusion of
AT/FP issues in all appropriate Department of Defense planning and
policy documents. Defense planners include Combating Terrorism among
their very top priorities. The Joint Service Capabilities Plan,
Contingency Planning Guidance, and CINC Theater Engagement Plans now
include ``successfully countering terrorism'' as one of their highest
tier ``vital objectives.'' We recently updated the DOD instruction
``Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism
and Political Turbulence,'' which provides comprehensive guidance in
the development of all aspects of antiterrorism programs. We are also
updating our ``Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness,'' a
consolidation of key reference material which assists commanders in
executing their AT programs.
We have made significant advances in identifying available
technologies with AT/FP application, and have in place two
organizations that are vital to our ``leveraging technology'' efforts.
The Physical Security Equipment Action Group coordinates DOD efforts in
acquiring all physical security equipment, including Commercial-Off-
The-Shelf technology that has AT/FP applicability. Another
organization, the Technical Support Working Group, focuses on rapid
prototype technologies in the AT/FP arena. The Technical Support
Working Group provides support to the entire interagency team. Key
technology enablers, such as threat analysis and warning, explosive
device detection, and early detection of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
greatly enhance our ability to protect against terrorism.
The Combating Terrorism Directorate also hosts a Force Protection
Equipment Demonstration (FPED) to showcase state-of-the-art
technologies possessing AT/FP applications. Over 400 vendors with over
1,000 new products will be attending the May 2001 FPED at Quantico, VA.
Items showcased at this demonstration are ready for evaluation and can
be ``in the hands'' of our Service members within weeks of the FPED.
The Combating Terrorism Directorate also provides resource support
to the CINCs and Services. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative
Fund (CbT RIF) resources those emergent and emergency AT/FP
requirements that can not wait for the normal Service Program Objective
Memorandum process. As a result of Cole Commission findings, the fund
has already been programmed to increase. Additionally, we oversee the
planning, programming, and budgeting process to ensure adequate
emphasis on AT/FP programs.
We are also working closely with our allies including NATO. We are
currently supporting the efforts of NATO's High Level Steering Group to
enhance Antiterrorism/Force Protection for NATO forces, including our
DOD personnel assigned to NATO.
Despite our accomplishments, we are always convinced we can do
more. In 1999, we commissioned a 6-month ``Best Practices Study'' to
compare and assess the AT/FP practices of Israel and the United
Kingdom, two countries that have lived with the terrorist threat for
many years on a continuous basis. The products and concepts of this
study provide a measure for comparison and the basis for future
initiatives to improve the commander's ability to shape the environment
and protect our forces.
conclusion
We continue to make considerable progress in our antiterrorism/
force protection program and our people are better protected today than
in the past. I am very proud of the efforts of our dedicated force
protection professionals. Our efforts have resulted in a high level of
AT readiness of our forces and at military installations--here and
abroad. That same level of attention must now be--and is being--
directed at reducing vulnerabilities that exist at our ``seams'' to
include seaports and airports.
Despite our many successes, however, we face a dedicated, well-
financed, and determined adversary. The question concerning terrorist
attack is not ``if'' but ``when.'' Our challenge is to anticipate the
threat and take appropriate countermeasures. I want to conclude by
underscoring the fact that we are being extremely proactive in our
approach to reducing antiterrorism vulnerabilities. We are also
preparing now should the terrorist threat evolve from explosive devices
to standoff weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction. We will continue to
focus our attention to protect our people, our installations, and our
national interests.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Admiral Clark.
STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished
members of the committee: Good morning and thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the Navy's antiterrorism and force
protection program. We will be saying ``ATFP'' many times
today.
I say thank you, Mr. Chairman, because I note your comments
about the role of the Senate and this committee, the role of
oversight, the issue of the proper protection of the men and
women who volunteer to serve in our Armed Forces, and for me
particularly in the Navy, the importance of this body having
the right information so that you can make decisions and
provide that oversight role. I also thank you so that you, the
people of America, and the people in my Navy can hear what is
said about the situation on the U.S.S. Cole, the actions that
have been taken.
Certainly, as General Shelton has said, the terrorist
attack on the Cole was a shock, a terrible shock to us, and a
sharp and a tragic reminder that our forces are on the point
and face danger every day, sometimes, oftentimes, in hostile,
potentially lethal environments.
The events of the 12th of October of the year 2000 began a
series of real changes in our Navy and the way we plan and
execute self-defense. We have done a lot since then. The
details of these are outlined in my statement submitted and my
comments here will be brief, and we can refer to those as you
desire.
Chairman Warner. All your full statements will be admitted
into the record.
Admiral Clark. Thank you, sir.
We have done a lot. We are seeing changes. More
importantly, our people, from sailors to the civilian sector--
and they are both involved--from the deckplates to our
headquarters, are thinking more and with a new focus about
antiterrorism and force protection. ATFP is becoming more a
part of our institutional mind set.
I think it is important to reiterate and agree with and
reemphasize General Shelton's comments. The threat is not going
to go away. Indeed, it may be even growing in size and
sophistication. I expect that it is. There are some people who
do not want us in their part of the world and they have made it
their mission to drive us out.
I am making it clear to our people that operations forward
will never be risk-free and that we must do everything that we
know how to do to deter attack and to limit the damage in case
deterrence fails. Specifically, in accordance with the
recommendations of the DOD Cole commission report and the Navy
task force on force protection, numerous complementary
initiatives are under way in our Navy to improve ATFP and, as I
indicated, some of these, some, are detailed in the report that
I have submitted to you.
These include major improvements in the way we conduct port
visits overseas and protect naval forces at home, in the way we
are organized to plan and execute antiterrorism programs, and
the way we train for antiterrorism and force protection
proficiency and awareness. In short, we are taking actions to
improve the manning, the training, and the equipping of naval
forces to better realize a warfighting approach to physical
security, with ATFP as a primary focus in every mission and
activity that we execute.
Central to this effort is greater emphasis on inter-agency
and joint teamwork, to include seamless--that word again, Mr.
Chairman--seamless operations among the armed services,
increased inter-agency cooperation with the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, the FBI, and the CIA, and
assertive diplomatic engagement abroad. We are making progress
in each of these areas, and we will continue to invest in them
in the years to come.
Providing timely and accurate intelligence is another area
of critical importance in which we are hard at work. The goal
is to arm our men and women with the most relevant
information--``relevant'' is a key word--possible. As part of
that effort, naval and national intelligence agencies are
working more closely together and sharing their information
better than we have done in the past.
I want to emphasize that we are in this for the long haul
and we know it. These changes are important, but they are here
to stay. I firmly believe and I know in fact that these
initiatives will help our commanding officers better prepare to
counter the asymmetric threat that they face in the world
today. That is important because our commanding officers retain
full responsibility and accountability for their actions and
their units. We have a responsibility to do our utmost to
support them. They are the best that we have and we owe it to
them.
So in summary, I want to assure the committee that the
United States Navy, the people in the Navy, and the assets in
the Navy are better protected today than they have ever been
before. We will continue to improve our antiterrorism and force
protection measures while staying focused on our forward
operations and the challenges involved in support of the
national security strategy, enhancing regional stability,
responding to crises, and winning our Nation's wars.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do look forward to the
questions from the committee.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]
Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, U.S. Navy
introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Senate Armed Services
Committee with this update of the Navy's actions to improve our
Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) program.
The attack on U.S.S. Cole was a terrible tragedy and dramatic
example of the type of threat our military forces face worldwide on a
day-to-day basis, emphasizing the importance of force protection both
today and in the future. The Navy has taken action at home and abroad
to meet this challenge, undergoing a sea change in the way we plan and
execute self-defense. We have enhanced the manning, training, and
equipping of naval forces to better realize a warfighter's approach to
physical security, with AT/FP serving as a primary focus of every
mission, activity, and event. Additionally, we are dedicated to
ensuring this mindset is instilled in every one of our sailors.
Key to implementing force protection are multiple, complementary
initiatives to deter and prevent terrorist attack. First, we employ
operational security to decrease the ability of an enemy to target our
forces. Second, in accordance with international law, we depend on host
nations to execute their responsibility to provide protection for ships
and units visiting and training in their countries. Third, our
commanders employ standoff zones around their ships and aircraft to
protect them, including the employment of concentric assessment,
warning, and threat zones.
fleet action
Aggressive action has been taken by our fleets to strengthen force
protection, including the issuance of detailed guidance regarding
weapons posture and Rules of Engagement, the creation of dedicated AT/
FP units, the institution of more robust training, and the development
and deployment of additional equipment. Operationally, port and airport
vulnerability assessments are now conducted in the United States and
overseas prior to every visit.
All fleets have substantially increased the amount of pre-
deployment training devoted to force protection. Every battle group
staff and unit conducts realistic exercises during ensuring which
commanders must consider all threat axes for possible terrorist action,
including small boat, swimmer, airborne, and land-based attacks. For
example, the Enterprise Battle Group, which departed for deployment on
April 25, 2001, received scenario-driven training on recognizing and
countering improvised explosive devices, small boat attacks while
entering and leaving port, swimmer attack, and large vehicle (i.e.
truck) bombs. Additionally, while underway, they were trained in
countering airplane and waterborne threats.
Fifth Fleet, the naval component commander for Central Command, has
created a Maritime Ship Security Augmentation Force. This team deploys
to ports in advance of ship arrivals to ensure the site is secure,
including the vetting of pilots and service boats. It enhances ship
safety during harbor entry, while pierside, and when transiting back to
sea. The team is comprised of an advance element that conducts liaison
with host nation police and security personnel, as well as support
service providers and husbanding agents. It also includes pier and
patrol boat sentries, explosive ordnance disposal technicians, Naval
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) physical security specialists,
military working dogs and handlers, corpsman, and a command and control
element. Additionally, members of the team embark in the ships prior to
arrival and remain aboard for the duration of the port visit while the
remainder of the force provides waterside security in conjunction with
the host nation.
Further security for deployed naval forces is provided by U.S.
Marine Corps Fleet Antiterrorism Support Teams (FAST). FAST is a
rapidly deployable force specially trained in force protection.
Currently U.S. European Command, Pacific Command, and Central Command
have permanently deployed FAST teams. Immediately following the Cole
bombing, an additional FAST team, a Reserve Naval Coastal Warfare Unit,
and a Coast Guard Port Security Unit were deployed to the Middle East
to provide security augmentation for the ongoing investigation in Yemen
as well as enhance security aboard civilian-manned Military Sealift
Command ships operating in the area.
We are leveraging technology to better equip our forces. All
deploying units have received a significantly improved allowance of AT/
FP equipment, to include body armor, hand-held searchlights, riot
control agents, collapsible batons, explosive detection kits, and
water-filled barriers. Recently, the Naval Operations Other Than
Warfare Technology Center in Dahlgren, Virginia conducted a
demonstration to validate available systems, including electro-optic
infrared detection systems, non-lethal weapon systems, miniature bomb
detection systems, and electronic access control systems. As part of
this effort, the Navy is working closely with the Marine Corps
Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia to develop next-generation
non-lethal AT/FP technology.
Close coordination between the Departments of State and Defense is
vital to the ultimate success of these endeavors. Country teams from
both departments are increasing the dialogue with host nations and to
more fully assert articulate U.S. security needs. In cases where host
nations lack the ability or desire to meet this increased security
level, we are negotiating to allow U.S. forces to provide such
measures. This may include allowing our sailors to conduct armed
patrols around U.S. assets. A joint Department of Defense and
Department of State cable was recently released directing U.S.
diplomats to request this cooperation.
training, education, and doctrine development
We are cultivating enhanced AT/FP awareness via a continuum of
initiatives. These include the development of new warfare doctrine, the
issuance of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the
accomplishment of basic and advanced training in the fleet, the
schoolhouse, and by computer learning. As recommended in the Crouch-
Gehman report, the new curricula incorporate realistic scenarios to
better educate our sailors and airmen. We have updated the training
provided to all Prospective Commanding Officers (PCOs). This training
is taught during the Command Leadership Course in Newport, Rhode
Island, addressing the use of force and rules of engagement. Type
commanders also provide PCOs with platform force-specific AT/FP
training en route to their commands.
Concurrent with that effort, the Surface Warfare Development Group
has published improved fleet guidance on force protection. These
publications address new methods of defending against future terrorist
attacks and are essential in institutionalizing the warrior AT/FP
mindset required in today's Navy.
organizational change
The Navy has instituted important organizational changes in the
wake of the Cole attack. The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) established
a task force comprised of subject matter experts from the Navy and from
external organizations to review and take prompt action to enhance our
force protection posture and identify required actions in the mid- and
long-term. The task force findings were in close alignment with the
Department of Defense Cole Commission report issued by General Crouch
and Admiral Gehman, including recommendations for improving
departmental organization, antiterrorism/force protection programs,
intelligence, logistics, and training.
The SECNAV Task Force is being transitioned to become a permanent
Force Protection Council. To ensure it receives the necessary level of
attention, the council is chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
and includes senior flag officers high-ranking representatives from
each of the principal branches within the Navy. The council monitors
the status of initiatives and charts the course of future AT/FP
programs. It oversees the resourcing of AT/FP, monitors the continued
development of naval AT/FP doctrine, and encourages the inclusion
employment of advanced technologies.
One significant weaknesses identified by the SECNAV Task Force's
personnel working group was the size of the Navy's security force. To
correct this problem, we are converting collateral duty Masters-at-Arms
to full-time security professionals. 330 security force billets have
been programmed for fiscal year 2001 to fill this emergent security
need, working toward a goal of 6,000 permanent naval security billets
by 2003, up from approximately 4,000 billets prior to the Cole bombing.
at/fp resources
These improvements to the Navy's AT/FP posture have incurred
significant cost. To the greatest extent possible, we have funded them
from existing accounts. However, the long-term program to provide
adequate security for our forces will require additional money. We
diverted approximately $50 million from existing accounts at the fleet
level in fiscal year 2001 to address our most immediate AT/FP
requirements. We have also identified additional AT/FP requirements in
fiscal year 2001.
To further streamline and focus our budget process for AT/FP, we
have consolidated from nine resource sponsors on the OPNAV staff to
two, one for ashore and one for afloat. This will ensure Navy AT/FP
programs receive the proper level of attention and support.
intelligence support
Better intelligence is vital to enhanced AT/FP. The intelligence
community is working to ensure our commanding officers receive the most
accurate and complete intelligence picture prior to arrival in port. As
identified in the Crouch-Gehman report, only a small percentage of the
Nation's intelligence resources are currently directed against
terrorism. To correct this problem, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Naval Intelligence, and theater intelligence centers are now working
more closely together to ensure the best all-source intelligence is
provided to our commanding officers. Importantly, the intelligence
community has modified the dissemination of human intelligence to
provide wider availability and greater timeliness. Office of Naval
Intelligence is working to increase this collection requirement. They
have modified the restrictions on dissemination of human intelligence
collection reporting to provide wider availability. The NCIS has also
increased the deployment of agents overseas to meet increased fleet
requirements. These agents are engaged in providing on-scene
intelligence reporting and vulnerability assessments for ships' port
visits and aircraft stopovers.
command accountability
While all of these programs are aimed at strengthening our ability
to deter and react to terrorist acts, ultimate responsibility for the
safety of naval units remains with the Commanding Officer. In the Cole
bombing, the Navy conducted a Manual of the Judge Advocate General
(JAGMAN) investigation into the actions taken before, during, and after
the terrorist attack. As a reviewing authority of the investigation, I
agreed with the conclusion of a prior reviewer, Commander in Chief,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, that the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Cole acted
reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his
assessment of the situation that presented itself when the ship arrived
in Yemen to refuel.
In assessing the accountability of the Commanding Officer,
reviewing authorities focused on two significant issues. First, were
the decisions made and the actions taken by the Commanding Officer
reasonable and within the range of performance we expect of our
commanders? Second, would any of the force protection measures not
implemented by U.S.S. Cole have deterred or defeated this determined
attack if they had been implemented?
The conclusion of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet--agreed
to and supported by me as well as then-Secretary of the Navy Richard
Danzig and then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen--is that the
Commanding Officer's decisions were reasonable and appropriate under
the circumstances, and that even full implementation of all force
protection measures specified under the existing threat condition,
i.e., Threat Condition Bravo, would not have prevented or deterred this
attack.
Based on a thorough review of the JAGMAN investigation, the chain
of command agreed that the facts did not warrant punitive action
against the Commanding Officer or other members of the Cole crew. The
investigation and endorsements of reviewing authorities have been
posted on Navy websites. These endorsements explain in detail the
rationale underlying the decisions made by reviewing authorities in
assessing accountability.
conclusion
The attack on U.S.S. Cole was a powerful reminder that our Nation's
forward deployed forces operate in a dangerous, potentially lethal
environment. This will not change as we look to the future. The
asymmetric threat is growing and constantly searching to exploit the
vulnerabilities of our military forces, friends, and allies. It is only
a matter of time before the next attack is attempted and we must be
prepared. Constant awareness of this fact, coupled with exhaustive
training and quality equipment, will help reduce the risk from the
asymmetric threat and, if deterrence and prevention fail, limit the
damage from such an attack.
We must keep our focus on mission accomplishment--namely the
employment of naval forces to stabilize various regions of the world,
respond to crises, and prepare for war--while we implement the AT/FP
initiatives described in this statement. Retrenchment and a bunker
mentality are inappropriate and imprudent responses to the asymmetric
threat. U.S. Navy sailors and assets are better protected today than
ever before. Nevertheless, we will strive to continually strengthen our
antiterrorism/force protection program as we operate forward in support
of America's defense.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Admiral.
General Robertson.
STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES T. ROBERTSON, JR., USAF, COMMANDER IN
CHIEF, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Robertson. Sir, if I might, I have also submitted a
written statement.
Chairman Warner. Without objection, it will be submitted.
General Robertson. Thank you, sir.
A proper question you asked is why did the chairman choose
to have me at his side here today, as opposed to one of the
regional CINCs perhaps, or one of the other service chiefs.
I think there are probably two reasons I would postulate
that I am here today. First, of all the CINCs, of all the
commanders in chief around the world, at United States
Transportation Command we manage the missions. The missions we
execute around the world every day are probably the examples
that are used most often as in-transit units. If you stop to
consider, nearly 1,200 aircraft flying some 1,700 missions per
week, 3 sorties per mission, that is about 4,500 sorties a week
around the world, to an average of 52 countries around the
world; 22 chartered military ships visiting ports in some 22
countries around the world; 36 other government-owned or
chartered prepositioned ships sitting and waiting, laden down
with military cargo, ready to respond around the world on a
moment's notice; and dozens upon dozens of small Air Force,
Army, and Navy teams numbering anywhere in size from one to
100--tanker airlift control elements, deployment support
teams--that move from port to port, from seaport to seaport,
from airport to airport around the world, making arrangements
to receive or to throughput military cargo or military
passengers in support of the warfighting CINCs around the
world.
This is our mission. We do it every day. We do it usually
in force sizes of one, one aircraft, one ship, operating below
the threshold of what used to be the CINC's force protection
responsibility, in places that you have probably never even
heard of. We will go in, spend a couple of hours, and depart.
But we take seriously our responsibility for force protection
of those assets.
The second reason I think the chairman wanted me here today
is because, as he said, we are often held up as the example of
the force protection innovators, the proactive end of the force
protection business, and an example of force protection
excellence in the Department of Defense. This makes me very
uncomfortable because whatever we have done, it is probably
because we are also the most vulnerable of all of the CINCs in
the Department of Defense because of the global nature of our
mission.
If we have good programs in the United States
Transportation Command, it is because we always recognize the
unique vulnerability of the forces and the assets that we
manage around the world, as I said most often operating in
groups of one, at places that you would have to look up in the
atlas to figure out where they are. Because of this, we have
taken very seriously our responsibility for force protection.
In summary, to paraphrase the old country and western song,
at the United States Transportation Command, we were into force
protection before force protection became cool, and we do take
it very seriously. The men and women of TRANSCOM, 148,000
military, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guardsmen, take it very seriously because we have to. Our
commercial partners, who are probably responsible for at least
50 percent of the work that we do around the world--the U.S.
flag airlines and airlift partners, our U.S. flag sealift
incidents, the merchant mariners and the crews that operate
those ships and aircraft--also take it very seriously, and we
bring them in under our umbrella of force protection.
We do our best to maintain the very highest of standards
wherever we operate around the world, standards of
antiterrorism, force protection. Occasionally, as a result, we
frustrate the customers we serve, those warfighting CINCs, and
their host nation security forces, because we demand such high
standards for our forces.
That said, though, when you take the collective lessons
learned from Khobar, for example, from the embassy bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania, the lessons learned from the Cole, I
sincerely believe that as a joint force we are headed in the
right direction. Force protection will be better tomorrow than
it is today. But I echo the chairman's words and I echo Admiral
Clark's words: We are vulnerable. We are very vulnerable and we
will always be vulnerable. It is a race against the terrorist
to see who gets to the next target first and whether deterrence
wins out over his determined efforts to attack us.
Sir, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Robertson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Charles T. Robertson, Jr., USAF
introduction
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
this opportunity to appear before you as Commander in Chief, United
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), to discuss the ``U.S.S.
Cole--Implications and Implementation of Lessons Learned''.
Today, America and the international community depend on the U.S.
military to perform a wide range of warfighting, peacekeeping, and
humanitarian missions. That said, no matter what the mission, whether
at home or abroad, it is this country's Defense Transportation System
(DTS) which enables America to quickly extend its ``hand of
friendship'' or ``fist of war'' to whatever location on the globe it
chooses to become involved. In fact, America's DTS, with its people,
trucks, trains, aircraft, ships, information systems, and
infrastructure, provides the U.S. the most responsive strategic
mobility capability the world has ever seen. USTRANSCOM's
responsibility is to manage this global mobility system.
USTRANSCOM's ``sole source'' responsibility as the exclusive heavy
lift provider to the U.S. military (as well as to a host of other U.S.
agencies), coupled with its responsiveness and global reach, keep the
command in a constant state of motion. At every moment of every day, at
hundreds upon hundreds of locations around the globe, USTRANSCOM's
superb soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
civilians are making our vision of world class joint global mobility a
reality. For example, during a typical week, USTRANSCOM operates an
average of 1,669 strategic air mobility missions transiting an average
of 52 countries, operates 22 military ocean ports in 13 countries, and
has 20 chartered military ships underway. Thirty-six additional
government-owned and chartered vessels, loaded with military cargo, are
strategically prepositioned around the world, significantly increasing
the responsiveness of urgently needed U.S. military equipment and
supplies during time of crisis. USTRANSCOM does all of this as a total-
force team of Active Duty, Guard and Reserve personnel, civilians, and
commercial partners, bringing the total synergy of U.S. military and
commercial transportation resources to bear in time of peace and
crisis, wherever in the world they may be required.
The above ``picture'' is drawn not to impress anyone with the
tremendous scope of the USTRANSCOM mission, but more, to try to
illustrate the vulnerability of the various elements of the DTS--ships,
trucks, trains, and planes, each typically operating as a single entity
wherever on the globe USTRANSCOM's mission may take it--to the
challenges posed by today's terrorist element. With USTRANSCOM and its
transportation component commands--AMC, MSC, and MTMC--serving as
today's classic example of ``units in transit,'' there is no
organization in the Department of Defense today with a greater interest
in antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) than the United States
Transportation Command.
recent operations
USTRANSCOM's daily global CINC-support mission, coupled with DOD's
joint exercise program, gives USTRANSCOM the opportunity to ``plan and
execute'' regularly with the regional CINCs and their Service component
commands and staffs. Additionally, it gives the command an opportunity
to exercise surge shipping, prepositioned afloat stocks, military air
and sea ports, air mobility crews and staffs, Reserve component forces,
and the staff at USTRANSCOM. Last year, USTRANSCOM participated in 117
joint exercises worldwide. These exercises not only allow us to
revalidate current capabilities, they also allow us to test new
capabilities, as well as to improve the processes we use to move
Department of Defense (DOD) cargo within the worldwide transportation
network.
USTRANSCOM is a ``high tempo'' command. In fact, the command's
operational pace during peacetime--especially that of our Air
component--has increased dramatically since Operations Desert Shield
and Desert Storm. As an example, let me describe USTRANSCOM's
contributions to our most noteworthy mission since I last testified
before this committee . . . that being our support for combat
operations in the former Yugoslavia. Beginning in February 1999, AMC
tanker and airlift aircraft began leading the deployment of combat and
combat support aircraft to Europe in support of increasing the military
capability available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in the theater. In March of that same year, Operation Allied Force
began in earnest, with an air campaign that lasted 78 days . . . a
campaign which ultimately required USTRANSCOM and its Component
Commands to split their capabilities three ways to simultaneously
support the three distinct mobility missions which emerged through the
multiple phases of Allied Force.
For example, at the commencement of Allied Force, USTRANSCOM's
first missions were in support of the United States European Command
(USEUCOM) and NATO strategic deployment of combat and combat support
aircraft to European bases. In this phase, AMC air refueling aircraft
established an air bridge across the Atlantic to deploy combat, combat
support, and airlift aircraft . . . with our airlift aircraft deploying
accompanying support personnel and equipment. Additionally, AMC
deployed a Major Theater War (MTW)-sized air refueling force . . .
augmented by forces generated through a Presidential Reserve Call-up of
Guard and Reserve Forces . . . to bases in Europe to support theater
air operations. MSC and MTMC simultaneously began deploying ammunition
from the U.S., through European ports, onward to NATO airbases.
As the air campaign intensified, two new missions evolved requiring
substantial USTRANSCOM support. The first occurred when refugees
streamed across Kosovo's borders into Albania and Macedonia. AMC
supported NATO's relief efforts with military and commercial contract
airlift missions, providing emergency assistance to refugees. The
second additional mission was deployment of the U.S. Army's Task Force
Hawk from continental United States (CONUS) and Central European bases
into Albania. All USTRANSCOM components supported this effort, with AMC
providing airlift and air refueling support, MTMC operating seaports in
Italy and Albania, and MSC providing sealift.
It was during this phase that the C-17 became the ``workhorse''
airlifter of the campaign by operating as both an intertheater and
intratheater airlifter, flying 430 missions into Albania. The aircraft
performed superbly and offered the combatant commander a new capability
with its large capacity and ability to land and operate at very short,
austere airfields. Finally, as the air campaign ended, USTRANSCOM
supported Operation Joint Guardian, the deployment of NATO peacekeeping
forces into Kosovo by air, land, and sea.
Support to Allied Force was a total force effort by USTRANSCOM. AMC
tanker aircraft, placed under the operational control of USEUCOM,
performed nearly 7,000 air refueling missions, greatly extending the
range and ``on-station time'' of U.S. and allied combat and combat
support aircraft. An additional 654 strategic air refueling missions
were performed in support of the various deployments. AMC also flew
1,108 strategic airlift missions and contracted for an additional 66
commercial airlift missions in support of Allied Force.
Simultaneously, MTMC operated at two U.S. seaports and eight
European seaports in support of the deployment and onward movement of
unit equipment, supplies, and ammunition. As NATO air strikes began
against Serbia, MTMC began transshipment operations at seaports closest
to the strike area. The cargo was transported in vessels managed and
directed by MTMC in support of Task Force Eagle and Task Force Shining
Hope, the military and humanitarian programs (respectively) to aid
Kosovar refugees.
The first major evidence of this support came in the form of the SS
Osprey, which arrived May 2 in Durres, Albania. The Osprey's arrival
signaled a critical surface transportation benchmark in the fielding
and supply of American forces in Albania.
The Osprey, a MSC charter, carried 60 vehicles, or 11,000-square
feet of Air Force cargo. It was loaded by MTMC's 839th Transportation
Battalion, Livorno, Italy and unloaded in Durres by MTMC's 840th
Transportation Battalion, Izmir, Turkey. Unloading of the Osprey took
place without incident. Within a week, MTMC initiated regular ferry
operations from Brindisi, Italy, to Durres. For example, some 35,000-
square feet of equipment and supplies were moved into Albania between
May 7th and 11th. After arriving at Brindisi by rail from Germany, the
freight was loaded aboard an Adriatic Sea ferry--chartered by MSC--and
shuttled northeast by east, from Brindisi to Durres, in four ferry
runs.
A critical shift in surface transportation support took place with
the cessation of hostilities, as MTMC shifted gears and began to focus
on the movement of the Army task force assigned to perform peacekeeping
duties in Kosovo.
In the initial entry, MTMC delivered three shiploads of combat
equipment from the 1st Infantry Division via Thessaloniki, Greece, on
the northern edge of the Aegean Sea. The ship cargoes included hundreds
of combat vehicles and scores of shipping containers with equipment to
support the 7,000 soldiers of Operation Joint Guardian.
Strategic sealift also played a key role in supporting the combat
forces involved in Kosovo operations. MSC supported Allied Force with
34 strategic sealift ships to include three prepositioning ships.
Additionally, MSC tankers carried most of the fuel products used in
support of the operation, totaling more than 300 million gallons. MSC
supported 29 strategic lift movements, including movement of U.S. Army
combat forces from Bremerhaven, Germany to Thessaloniki, Greece.
Sealift carried over 1.2 million sq. ft. of vehicles and equipment;
245,280 sq. ft. of ammunition; plus equipment and supplies to assist
the more than 400,000 ethnic Albanian Kosovo refugees.
Following Allied Force, USTRANSCOM supported a fairly steady series
of special ``headline'' missions and humanitarian deployments around
the world. For example, AMC airlifted two Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) teams to Kosovo in July and August of 1999 to
assist in investigations of war crimes. In July 1999, an AMC C-141B
aircraft, supported by two air refueling tankers, airdropped medical
supplies over Antarctica to aid an ill American doctor. On 16 October
1999, an AMC New York Air National Guard (ANG) ski-equipped LC-130
airlifted this same physician from Amundsen-Scott South Pole Research
Station to McMurdo Naval Air Station on Antarctica's northern coast.
Only Air Force airlift aircraft and aircrews had the capability to
accomplish this challenging and lengthy mission during the bitterly
cold Antarctic winter.
A world away, USTRANSCOM continued its support of those in need
following a massive August 1999 earthquake in Turkey. To aid Turkish
recovery efforts, an AMC C-5 deployed 70 members of the Fairfax County,
Virginia Urban Search and Rescue Team to Istanbul on a nonstop flight
sustained by two air refuelings. All in all, AMC completed 20 airlift
missions in support of Turkish relief efforts. A subsequent Turkish
earthquake in November of 1999 claimed over 400 lives and injured over
3,000. AMC and USTRANSCOM relief efforts for this earthquake mirrored
the earlier efforts.
In September 1999, USTRANSCOM responded to another earthquake, this
time in Taiwan. Again, AMC deployed a rescue team from Fairfax County,
Virginia and again, a C-5 aircraft deployed the team direct, nonstop to
Taipei. This flight lasted 18 hours and required two air refuelings.
The year 2000 found USTRANSCOM supporting flood relief in South
America and East Africa. In Venezuela, USTRANSCOM flew eleven C-17 and
five C-5 missions, transporting 189 passengers and over 527 short tons
of food, water, blankets, water purification systems, and other
supplies. These missions helped the people of Venezuela recover from a
devastating flood that left almost 400,000 people homeless, 20,000 to
30,000 dead, and destroyed 23,000 homes. In Mozambique, a 3-month
relief operation resulted in the formation of Joint Task Force Atlas
Response. During Atlas Response, USTRANSCOM aircraft flew 29 missions,
carrying 720 passengers and 910 short tons of cargo to aid the almost 1
million people made homeless by the rising floodwaters from Cyclone
Elaine.
In our own country, on 2 February 2000, AMC flew a nine-person team
and 160,000 pounds of Navy search equipment to California to assist in
the recovery operations for Alaska Airlines Flight 261 off the
California coast.
This past summer saw the worst western wildfires in 50 years.
USTRANSCOM and AMC flew 30 missions and deployed 3,682 Army and Marine
passengers, and 206.7 short tons of equipment to battle the fires.
During this same time period, USTRANSCOM completed the first
rotation of U.S. forces supporting Task Force Falcon in Kosovo via
airlift and sealift. The redeployment returned the original
participants to U.S. and European bases and deployed replacements from
U.S. bases to Kosovo. In April 2000, AMC flew over 130 Polish troops
and 102.5 short tons of their equipment into Kosovo, marking the first
time Polish forces had been transported aboard a U.S. aircraft in
support of NATO requirements. Also, for the first time, USEUCOM used
trains to transport peacekeeping troops and equipment from Germany
through Bulgaria and Macedonia into Kosovo. This rail-overland approach
saved 7 days from the normal 12-day sea-overland method previously
used. USTRANSCOM also supported the sixth rotation of U.S. forces to
the International Stabilization Force in Bosnia with strategic lift.
In October 2000, the Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) System provided
Strategic AE support to the 39 sailors injured during the U.S.S. Cole
bombing in the waters off of Yemen. The injured sailors were returned
to the United States during a 2-week period utilizing strategic airlift
coordinated by the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center,
located in Ramstein Germany and the Global Patient Movement
Requirements Center, which is located at Scott Air Force Base (AFB).
Additionally, USTRANSCOM and AMC relocated our Denton Humanitarian
Cargo receiving and shipping hub from Pope AFB, North Carolina, to
Charleston AFB, South Carolina, offering more direct access to
strategic airlift and sealift to better support this important program.
Utilizing military airlift and sealift, the Denton program moved over
2.5 million pounds of humanitarian cargo from 86 donors to 39 countries
in the year 2000 alone.
The events just described are only a ``snapshot'' of the missions
USTRANSCOM performed or participated in since USCINCTRANS last
testified before this committee. Though sometimes small in scale, the
FBI deployments, Antarctic airdrop/rescue, earthquake relief, flood
relief, airline crash recovery support, and wildfire support efforts
demonstrate the tremendous reach and responsiveness unique to
USTRANSCOM's airlift forces. They are also representative of the myriad
of tasks mobility forces must be prepared to execute, most often on
very short notice.
Several points are important to note in assessing these events. For
one, America's mobility force is often as busy in ``peace'' as it is in
war. Even though responses to events such as Hurricane Mitch are not as
large or sustained as Allied Force, such operations are conducted
within peacetime manning and materiel constraints. At the same time,
USTRANSCOM continues support for Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional
CINC-sponsored exercises, ongoing operations such as Northern and
Southern Watch, and channel airlift missions worldwide. As a result,
the command's peacetime force structure must routinely surge to wartime
operational levels. For aircrews alerted on short notice to fly relief
support to disaster areas, move fighter and bomber squadrons to
Southwest Asia or Europe, or replace deployed crews in moving channel
cargo, the tempo can be very similar to wartime. The more frequently we
do these missions, the more our people look and feel as if they are on
a wartime footing during peacetime. The past few years have brought one
deployment after another, hence the observation that USTRANSCOM is
often as busy in peace as in war.
All the above aside, although USTRANSCOM is heavily committed
around the globe conducting a wide variety of critical peacetime
missions, our ability to support the warfighter during two nearly
simultaneous MTWs is our paramount indicator of command readiness.
at/fp intelligence efforts
USTRANSCOM is unique among DOD's CINCdoms in that it has no
specific geographic area of responsibility (AOR); that said, TRANSCOM's
assets daily transit DOD and commercial ports around the globe,
frequenting, over the course of a typical year, facilities in almost
every one of the world's countries. This simple fact--the ``mission
driven'' inevitability of TRANSCOM's daily global presence . . . and
concomitant daily vulnerability . . . drives its own kind of special
challenge . . . one we think about and work to minimize everyday. As
the tragic bombing of the U.S.S. Cole demonstrated, assets bearing the
U.S. flag are potential targets of terrorism at any time and any place
they may operate. In fact, U.S.S. Cole ``lessons learned'' highlighted
a long-standing seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces,
namely in-transit forces. Well before the U.S.S. Cole tragedy and the
Commission's identification of the AT/FP seams for in-transit forces,
the intelligence and counterintelligence efforts of USTRANSCOM focused
heavily on ensuring our component commands were covered under the force
protection umbrella of the areas being transited. This focus existed
not only within the command but also with our partners at the various
geographic CINC and national agency headquarters. For example,
USTRANSCOM's counterintelligence staff office is dedicated to
collection against, and dissemination of, information on the threats
posed by foreign intelligence services and the increasingly menacing
pool of terrorists capable of threatening USTRANSCOM assets. This small
office works hand-in-hand with our Joint Intelligence Center-
Transportation (JICTRANS), which provides me, my staff, and component
commanders a 24-hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week Indications and Warning (I&W)
capability.
Because of the unique intelligence needs of a system of single
aircraft and ships, operating independently, daily, at ``off-line''
locations around the world, we are also very, very dependent on a
robust and responsive national and defense intelligence system beyond
USTRANSCOM. We rely heavily on the analysis of our counterparts in the
geographic commands' Joint Intelligence Centers and Joint Analysis
Centers, but we also know that daily, we operate through many locations
in their AORs which are otherwise very low on their priority lists.
Analysis and collection from our national intelligence agencies are
equally critical for us. Frequently, the ``last piece of information''
we require to make our analysis ``whole'', may come from a U.S. Defense
Attache in an African capital, a CIA clandestine source with knowledge
of the Middle East, a tip-off from a National Security Agency (NSA)
intercept, or a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) analysis of
an airfield image provided by a national system launched by the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The point is, without the entire
gamut of intelligence resources at our disposal, our ability to protect
our forces could be severely degraded.
In recent months we have raised the (already) number one priority
of intelligence support to force protection to an even higher level.
For example, the command is engaged in an aggressive customer outreach
program where representatives from our Intelligence, Force Protection,
and Operations Directorates are taking ``our story'' to the geographic
CINCs, their components and our area commands in their respective areas
of responsibility (AORs). The fact that mobility assets often travel in
smaller numbers and with lower operational visibility has mandated for
years that USTRANSCOM take steps to ensure movements of these assets
are included in the overall force protection efforts of the appropriate
geographic CINCs. The Cole bombing only underscored the importance of
our efforts . . . and added a new ``sense of urgency'' to our focus.
From an intelligence perspective, the Cole Commission reported: ``. . .
theater JICs and component intelligence organizations must place a
greater priority on supplying relevant intelligence tailored to the AT/
FP and intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) requirements
for units transiting their area of operations''. Through the positive
support of all involved, we are closing seams and effecting a
significant improvement in the lash-up of TRANSCOM assets with theater
joint intelligence centers and component ``threat watches'' around the
world.
at/fp challenges and responses
USTRANSCOM aircraft, ships, Tanker Airlift Control Elements
(TALCEs), and crews operate daily in significant or higher threat level
areas, and are for the most part unarmed. Only through close
coordination with embassy country teams and the geographic CINCs, and
the extensive efforts of our own threat working groups, are we able to
approach mitigation of the threat. That said, there are still
significant vulnerabilities we deal with every day, to include host
nation restrictions regarding arming of our security teams,
restrictions on the use of our Aircraft Defensive Systems (ADS) in
certain locations, and reliance upon host nation contracts for services
performed.
Probably my greatest concern--every day--is the threat posed by the
increasing global proliferation of man portable air defense systems
(shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles) or MANPADs. Additionally,
increasing numbers of potential adversaries have developed, or are
developing, sophisticated integrated air defense systems (IADS). We
know that MANPADs are available and are likely in the hands of our
terrorist adversaries. According to a 1997 CIA Report, over the
preceding 19 years, the global proliferation of MANPADS has resulted in
over 400 casualties in 27 incidents involving civil aircraft alone. As
an unfortunate modern-day ``fact-of-life'', this proliferation has
forced air mobility planners to frequently select less than optimal
mission routes due to lack of defensive systems on airlift aircraft. In
fact, most recently, during Operation Allied Force, concerns about the
Yugoslav air defense system, especially their mobile launchers and
MANPADS, forced these types of mission route changes on a regular
basis. To counter threats such as these, in the future, AMC and the Air
Force are developing a Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM)
system designed to protect mobility aircraft required to operate in
such environments.
Some, but not all, of our organic airlift fleet is equipped with an
early generation aircraft defensive system (ADS). Unfortunately, this
version of ADS, the only system currently capable of providing even
minimal protection for large aircraft, is very sensitive and, as a
consequence, will occasionally cue on light sources in the same
spectrum as the surface-to-air missiles it is designed to protect
against, and can launch flares inadvertently, even though the aircraft
is not actually being targeted by a MANPAD or other system. Although
our flares pose no actual risk to anyone or anything on the ground, the
political sensitivity of inadvertent flare launch has led several
nations to deny ADS use in parts of their airspace. A new generation of
ADS, one which AMC will field over the next several years, will reduce
the likelihood of inadvertent launch. That said, current funding only
supports equipping a fraction of the airlift fleet while retaining the
current, older systems for the remainder. Of course, none of our
commercial contract carriers are ADS equipped. We rely on their
commercial profile and markings, blending them in with other commercial
air traffic, to mitigate their risk. In the meantime, I'm encouraged by
the State Department's direction to our ambassadors to work with our
geographic CINCs and respective host nations to increase their
responsiveness to our need to protect our forces and thereby reduce
sensitivity to ADS use. This direction focuses on allowing U.S. forces
maximum opportunity to protect themselves, as well as on the
requirement for host nation security forces to better protect our
people and resources while in, or transiting, their countries.
Much like the U.S.S. Cole, the strategic sealift fleet of
USTRANSCOM's Navy component, Military Sealift Command (MSC), is also
vulnerable to terrorist or asymmetric attack. MSC's merchant vessels
are essentially defenseless, yet they carry large volumes of high value
DOD cargo during contingencies, and are vulnerable to attack in port,
at anchorage, and in-transit through disputed waterways and choke-
points worldwide. Since they may operate independent of naval escorts,
and since they are typically operated by small, lightly armed (if armed
at all) civilian crews, we are reviewing options to ensure their
protection from a growing number of asymmetric threats including piracy
and terrorism. Of course, our primary reliance is, and must be, on the
geographic CINCs and their component commands to provide port and
waterside security. In this regard, both the Navy and the regional
commanders have significantly increased their involvement in providing
protection for all naval vessels. That said, in my view, due to the
relatively small size of the crew complement aboard these merchant
ships, technology must be the additional ``force multiplier'' that
provides us the capability to detect, identify, and deter threats. For
example, MSC is developing a ship defensive system that will use
thermal imaging and intrusion detection devices to help protect the
merchant shipping used by DOD. In the end it is our expectation that
the combination of an increased awareness by all parties, coupled with
wise investments in modern detection and defensive technologies, will
provide our ships, in the future, with the level of deterrence and
protection they require.
The land element of USTRANSCOM's strategic mobility triad is MTMC,
our Army component. MTMC's port handlers are deployed to high threat
locations on a daily basis. Operating as small teams, most often
without the benefit of other U.S. forces present, they too, in their
own way, are vulnerable. To the maximum extent possible, we tie these
personnel into the force protection plans of the closest U.S. military
facility or American Embassy to which they are operating. These
soldiers and civilians are well-trained in individual protective
measures and employ these measures to reduce their profile and
therefore their vulnerability.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks by terrorist groups, and
state-sponsored or non-state actors, pose an ever increasing threat
around the world. Nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapon attacks
on enroute or arrival airfields and seaports during a major deployment
would significantly reduce throughput, dramatically slowing the arrival
of combat forces and/or sustainment supplies into the respective CINC's
AOR. Again, in-transit mobility forces would rely on the appropriate
geographic CINC for the major portion of their WMD force protection.
That said, our military aircraft and ships are prepared to (and would)
operate, as required, in contaminated environments. On the other hand,
our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) commercial carriers are not obligated to proceed into
such areas, and given today's increased threat, we are doing everything
possible to provide reasonable protection for our commercial crews who,
despite all precautions, could be trapped in a port, and exposed
inadvertently to contamination while supporting a deployment.
Additionally, AMC is developing and testing a procedure designed to
protect commercial aircraft and personnel by transloading cargo from
commercial aircraft onto military aircraft. This procedure will allow
AMC to keep the commercial side of its lift effort moving forward, as
far as possible, into protected areas, and by transloading that cargo
onto organic (military) aircraft, continue its last leg of movement
into the higher-risk areas. This will hopefully ensure, in time of
crisis, a near uninterrupted flow of personnel and cargo into a
theater.
Significant progress has been made in improving the protection
posture of our merchant mariners. Five of six Maritime Union Schools
have been certified to teach chemical, biological, and radiological
(CBR) defense courses and three of seven maritime academies are
preparing to teach MSC-sponsored CBR defense courses. Today, all Fast
Sealift Ships (FSSs), Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships
(LMSRs), and prepositioning ships are CBR defense equipped. Recently,
MSC also received funding to begin purchasing CBR defense equipment for
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships and, to date, $987,000 has been
obligated to fully outfit 36 of 76 RRF vessels.
Progress is also being made in providing protection for our Civil
Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) aircrews. Although we would never require
a civilian crew to operate in a known hazardous area, AMC stores and
maintains protective clothing and equipment for issue to civilian
aircrews prior to their entry into even potentially hazardous areas.
This equipment is currently stored at a central location for inventory
and replenishment reasons and stands ready for immediate issue.
ustranscom at/fp initiatives
USTRANSCOM possesses only limited physical AT/FP capability
itself--provided by security forces under our direct command. In fact,
the sole organic defensive capability available to USTRANSCOM units is
Air Mobility Command's (AMC's) PHOENIX RAVEN program. Under the
direction of AMC's Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), these forces
are specially trained and equipped for the close-in defense of
individual aircraft and crews. At the recommendation of the AMC Threat
Working Group (TWG), PHOENIX RAVENS deploy as part of the aircrew in
two to four-person teams to augment security provided by supported CINC
and host nation forces. Though an extremely successful program, it is
imperative to understand that PHOENIX RAVENS are intended only to
augment existing forces and not to relieve geographic CINCs or Chiefs
of Mission of their AT/FP responsibility.
The cornerstones of our AT/FP processes at USTRANSCOM are oversight
and coordination. To facilitate the oversight process, the USTRANSCOM
force protection office developed the Force Protection Oversight
Program (FPOP). This web-based program tracks compliance with all 31
DOD antiterrorism standards for each of the component commands, down to
their individual units. This program gives our commanders the ability
to report their compliance status and to provide details of shortfalls,
``get well'' plans, and resource requirements. Through this program, my
staff and I have immediate access to the status of all forces under our
purview, down to the unit level.
Obviously, USTRANSCOM relies heavily on the geographic CINCs for
force protection support. That said, we recognize that the constant
movement and relatively low profile of some of our assets make such
support a significant challenge, one for which we share a great deal of
the responsibility for success. Along this line, we think we are making
significant progress in mitigating the force protection vulnerabilities
of our assets. The AMC Threat Working Group (TWG) process, which is
essentially an ``operational risk management'' system, has long been
the benchmark for U.S. Air Force AT programs and is clearly a potential
blueprint for one element of an enhanced Navy Port (and ``transiting
ship'') AT program. Even before the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, AMC was
conducting daily, individual assessments of each and every mission into
significant or higher threat level locations. This robust TWG process
evaluates a number of factors, to include terrorist threats against
force protection posture at airfields, then recommends additional
measures (if required) for implementation by the TACC and/or by our
crews. In some cases, their recommendations require requests for
additional supported CINC and/or host nation security forces. The TWG
process covers missions by both Air Force aircraft, as well as missions
by our commercial contract carriers. While not unique in structure,
this coordinated effort of Intelligence, Security Forces, and
Operations is certainly among the most comprehensive programs of its
kind in DOD. Furthermore, AMC's robust and successful TWG process is
now being replicated in other theaters. At USTRANSCOM, we have also
created a similar ``Force Protection Triad'' of intelligence, force
protection and operations staffs to ensure inter-theater, unified
command oversight of all potential threats and corresponding counter-
measures for all CINCTRANS missions, be they by air, sea, or on the
ground.
With regards to USTRANSCOM's maritime assets, I'm encouraged by
what I see going on around the world to provide increased protection
for MSC's ships, especially in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Our
MSC theater units are now linking with theater threat working groups,
and theater intelligence centers are working to ensure increased
visibility for USTRANSCOM maritime assets. Along these lines, our
Counterintelligence Office and JICTRANS are aggressively engaged with
our components, working to ensure an effective federated risk
management process is supported across geographic areas of
responsibility as well as across our operations, intelligence, and
logistics functional mission areas, to achieve 100 percent coverage.
Furthermore, we are working with the intelligence and force protection
offices for each USTRANSCOM Component Command to ensure they have the
necessary connectivity to receive all pertinent threat data.
The enhancement of our force protection posture and capabilities is
one requiring constant attention and increased resources. USTRANSCOM's
responsibilities span the globe, hence any threat to American
interests, anywhere, is at least a collateral threat to our people and
our assets. There are many good news stories out there, such as the
U.S. Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom dedicating a new
position on their 24/7 watch to focus solely on transiting forces. Also
noteworthy are our intensified actions to ensure ``eyes-on'' tracking
of the lower profile MSC vessels, and small numbers of MTMC personnel
moving in and out of relatively unknown ports. Still, the challenges
are great and only through the continued and increased teamwork of the
entire intelligence and counterintelligence communities can we hope to
remain successful.
conclusion
The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole was a tragic event--in fact, the
latest in a long series of tragic events--that only serves to remind
all Americans of the risks our brave service men and women face
everyday as they carry out the myriad of missions we ask them to
perform. Our hearts go out to those who lost loved ones or were injured
in the U.S.S. Cole bombing. Yet, while we grieve with the families of
the U.S.S. Cole victims, USTRANSCOM is working diligently to mitigate
the risk of future attacks on U.S. forces.
That said, in closing, let me reiterate some of the key steps
USTRANSCOM has taken, and/or is taking, to reduce the vulnerability of
our forces operating daily around the globe. First, the command
individually reviews each strategic air and sealift mission into
significant or higher threat areas and coordinates specific mitigating
measures with the supported CINC or Chief of Mission to ensure adequate
FP is provided for these ``in-transit'' forces. Additionally, I reserve
the right to ``veto'' any mission into a ``significant'' or higher
threat location where adequate FP cannot be provided, attempting in
such cases, where it is at all feasible, to move the mission into a
nearby alternate airport or seaport where FP is adequate to counter the
threat. USTRANSCOM is also continuing coordination with the geographic
CINCs for increased security ``vetting'' and/or escort of Host Nation
and/or Third Country National contract personnel who service AMC
aircraft, MSC or MARAD ships, and MTMC port operations. Finally, we
will continue to pursue programs like LAIRCM (and similar defensive
technology efforts), as well as the funding that goes with them, to
improve the self-protection capabilities of our resources.
The ``quiet heroes'' of the U.S. Transportation Command, who I am
so proud and honored to command, stand ready daily to perform their
critical mobility mission in support of the full range of tasks
assigned. Realizing the tremendous value of our transportation assets,
as well as the critical importance of our global mission, we constantly
strive to ensure the best possible protection for our active and
Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, as well as for our
civilian employees, commercial partners, and our equipment, against
terrorist attack or any other asymmetric threat. Making the best
possible use of currently available intelligence, counterintelligence,
and physical force protection information and assets, the command will
continue to do everything we can to enhance AT/FP and to seek new
opportunities for cooperation with others in the DOD community. Let me
close by saying thank you, once again, for this opportunity--to present
USTRANSCOM and its ongoing AT/FP efforts to this committee.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
We will proceed to a 6-minute round of questioning.
General, I am going to digress from the principal subject of
our hearing to ask you a question about China. Yesterday the
Secretary of Defense issued what I believe is a quite correct
admonition that he will examine on a case-by-case basis the
relationships between our military and the Chinese military. I
do not wish to get into today the need for a correction
midcourse, but I want to know what your view is with regard to
the Secretary's action yesterday.
I support it. I think it is a prudent one, given the
circumstances, and particularly the manner in which the Chinese
military in my judgment did not professionally handle, respond,
or otherwise conduct themselves from beginning to end in this
incident involving our aircraft which was forced to land in
China.
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, I just returned last evening
from abroad, have not had a chance to discuss this memorandum
that you are referring to, I believe, with the Secretary.
However, I would tell you that I think in a very prudent manner
the Secretary has been actively involved since the EP-3
incident in reviewing our posture, reviewing our plans, and
making decisions on a case-by-case basis as to activities,
military-to-military, which would proceed and which ones might
be suspended, which ones might be deferred, etcetera.
I echo your comments. I think he has done that in a very
prudent manner.
Chairman Warner. Now returning to the inquiry at hand, the
Crouch-Gehman report I think definitely brought to a full
awareness needs to make and take corrective actions. But the
inherent question is as we read through that report we have to
say to ourselves, why did it take a tragic accident to force us
to do that type of thinking and to institute those
recommendations? I realize that hindsight is a valuable thing,
but as we read through them they seem to me to be a very
prudent and thoughtful recitation of steps that should be
taken. I ask most respectfully, why had we not thought of those
things beforehand, certainly some of them, and implemented
them?
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, to address that I would like
to use a quote that comes from Thomas Schelling in the foreword
to Roberta Wohlstetter's book about Pearl Harbor. He said: ``It
is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl
Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just
expected wrong. It was not our warning that was most at fault,
but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through
some obvious Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against
the choice that they actually made. There is a tendency in our
planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.''
I think that in the process what we had really--in the
process of looking at force protection, what we had
concentrated most on in the interim were the larger fixed
sites, places where we had lots of lives at risk, and had
become target-fixated, if you will, to some respect with these
larger types of targets, driven probably by the attack on
Khobar Towers, on the Beirut barracks incident, as well as the
attack on our embassies.
Having never experienced the in-transit, it was not that it
was ignored. For example, I think as you heard from testimony
from General Zinni and from General Franks, General Zinni had
personally visited Yemen, one of the in-transit sites, to make
sure that he was satisfied that we were providing the proper
security, the proper contracts were in place, etcetera. It had
also been visited by Admiral Moore from Fifth Fleet to make
sure that he felt comfortable. As a result of those visits, in
fact, the ship was moved from in-port refueling out to the
refueling dolphin, which would add a greater standoff and hence
better protection for our ships.
So again, it was a matter of not having ignored it, but
probably not having paid as much attention to our
vulnerabilities, to the seams that the terrorist could find,
for the in-transit units that we probably should have been
paying attention to.
Chairman Warner. I have here the report that was written in
1993, ``Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against
Active Terrorism and Political Turbulence,'' February 1993,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Ops. He has a whole
section right here titled ``Waterside Security'' on how to
protect ships' berth. I find a striking parallel between the
contents of this and the Crouch-Gehman report. But there is a
7-year interval.
It seems to me that if these steps had been followed
perhaps--and again, it is hindsight--perhaps this situation
would not have happened.
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, I think that some of the
steps that are recommended you would find, in fact, if not all,
have been incorporated into the plans. However, the threat
levels that are in the area you are operating in drives the
types of conditions that you operate under. In this case, we
were operating at Threat Condition Bravo, which required the
skipper of the ship to carry out these 62 types of force
protection measures, those that were applicable for shore.
If it had been a higher threat level, had we had
indications of a specific threat within Yemen, it would have
driven that threat condition up and maybe even gone up to
Delta, which has a whole other set of requirements that go with
protecting your force.
Chairman Warner. General, thank you. I'll proceed to my
final question. That is the fundamental one that I asked in my
opening statement. First, your role in reviewing these two
incidents by the Navy, first the Cole and second the
Greeneville; and do you concur in the actions that were taken,
the levels of accountability that were established by the two
commanding officers? In your judgment, do these actions reflect
any change in the longstanding history in our country of
accountability of military officers?
General Shelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me answer the
last part of the question first. The answer is no, they do not
reflect a change. Let me also say, I have not had a chance and
have not had a role in the Greeneville report, so I will have
to limit my comments to the Cole.
I have a statutory role to provide the Secretary of Defense
with advice as his principal military adviser. I am sure that
you understand that for me to properly fulfill my role, I try
to do that in private. But having said that, let me address the
accountability issue from my perspective as I reviewed both the
JAGMAN as well as the Crouch-Gehman report.
Whenever I deal with accountability issues at any point, in
previous times as a commander or now as the chairman, I begin
with the premise that I must know all the facts before I
proceed to judge another person or to make a decision when I am
a commander or a recommendation as the chairman that could end
in either criminal penalties against the individual or in a
move that could end that particular career. I start off, and I
am certain that every time that we have an accident that occurs
or Americans are killed as a result of premeditated murder, as
we had in the case of the Cole, that the Americans that are
responsible for them are not the individuals that caused the
deaths in the case of a premeditated murder, and that we in
fact have to make sure that we have all the facts and that we
consider the facts associated with each case before we render a
judgment.
In addition, there are various levels of accountability,
Mr. Chairman. We have punitive, we have administrative, we have
personal and professional. Accountability encompasses that
whole range and the consequences that go with it in ways, are
not all always visible to the general public.
In this case I had the benefit of being able to read the
JAGMAN investigation. I not only read it, I had a team of my
own which included some members of the Crouch-Gehman Commission
that went through and reviewed the voluminous materials that
were associated with the Crouch-Gehman, not just the final
report, but some of the other data as well.
I did the same thing with the JAGMAN. I went through it in
great detail and I had other members of my staff go through it
and give me their recommendations.
I believe that the findings were appropriate.
Chairman Warner. Were appropriate, they were appropriate?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. In terms of the Crouch-Gehman,
they did not specifically address accountability. That was not
their charter.
Chairman Warner. Correct.
General Shelton. But as you look at the very thorough
reports that came out of them, particularly when you combine
the JAGMAN, the findings of that report, with the Crouch-
Gehman, we find that you can, in fact, make some I think
informed judgments and decisions based on accountability--or
about accountability.
I will let Admiral Clark address the JAGMAN later in the
interest of time. But I felt that the judgments that were
rendered by the chain of command, in this case, as you
mentioned, by Admiral Natter, by Admiral Moore, and by Admiral
Clark, the CNO, were the correct judgments. As for others in
the chain of command, from what I got out of Crouch-Gehman and
the JAGMAN, starting with the intelligence community, the
attack on the Cole was not the result, in my opinion, of an
intelligence failure. I just quoted Roberta Wohlstetter. We
failed to anticipate what appeared to be the improbable or the
weakest link in the chain.
The community I think provided the best available and most
relevant information that they had at the time. The Cole
Commission makes numerous recommendations that deal with how we
can probably do that better in the future, and I firmly believe
that we can and in fact have a recommendation with the
Secretary now as to the way that I think we can significantly
enhance our intelligence ability or our intelligence
community's capability to deal with these asymmetric and
transnational threats, which obviously, we are going to face
more and more in the future, as I think all intelligence
estimates I have seen indicate we will face.
In terms of CINCCENT, as I indicated earlier and as you
heard General Zinni testify before this committee, General
Zinni, in fact, was involved in the choice of Aden. He in fact
visited Aden. He felt that after he ordered a vulnerability
assessment of Aden and after reviewing all of this, that Aden
was okay for a refueling site. I find nothing in General
Zinni's decisions or in his comments, nor in those of General
Franks, who subsequently looked at Yemen, that was directly
related to an attack on the Cole or contributed to the attack
on the Cole.
When you look at Admiral Moore, his naval component
commander, Admiral Moore was personally also involved in the
selection of Aden as a refueling site, personally involved in
the force protection decisions of his component forces. The
Cole Commission found when they looked at his operation and his
force protection program that ``it was thorough and robust.''
Although I think in retrospect probably Admiral Moore would
tell you that he wishes he would have paid even more specific
attention to what the Cole was planning to do, there was no
doubt, we had no reason, he had no reason to doubt that the
Cole had a good plan in place, that the Cole was going to carry
out that plan, and that it was adequate given the force level,
and threat levels that the Cole would be operating in when he
went in for his brief refueling stop.
Finally, there was CTF-50, the Carrier Task Force 50; had
been in theater a little less than a month, had been actively
involved in maritime interdiction operations, was actively
flying almost on a daily basis in our Operation Southern Watch.
He reviewed the report that was submitted to him by the Cole
prior to going in and had no reason to doubt, when the Cole
skipper submitted that report, that it would not be carried out
and that those actions were in fact sufficient, given the
threat level that he faced.
So finally, I think that when you look at the entire chain
that I have just gone through and then bring it right on up
from the CINC up to the Secretary and myself, I think that we
all realized that we could probably, everybody in the chain of
command could have done better. As you said earlier, maybe we
should have been thinking more out of the box than we were.
However, I think that as you look at the chain there was no
dereliction and there was certainly no criminal intent or any
criminal actions or anything else that warranted punishment,
from the CINC right on down to the skipper.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Admiral Clark, this is a book that is written by, co-
authored by Admiral William P. Mack. I was privileged to know
this great naval officer. When I was Secretary of the Navy he
was Superintendent at the Academy, and I must tell you that he
reflects to me then, as he does today, the conscience of the
Navy. As a matter of fact, I was a young man when I had that
job and I made my share of mistakes, and he very courteously
but firmly dressed me down, and properly so, on one occasion.
But he writes in this book, and I will quote from it: ``The
accountability of command. In navies in general and in the U.S.
Navy in particular, strict accountability is an integral part
of command. Not even the profession of medicine embraces the
absolute accountability found at sea. A doctor may lose a
patient under trying circumstances and continue to practice.
But a naval officer seldom has the opportunity to hazard a
second ship. There have been times and those who questioned the
strict and undeviating application of accountability in the
Navy, but those that have been to sea have always closed ranks
against the doubters.''
On the next page: ``In each case, as well as in other
instances of the mishandling of ships at sea, the doctrine of
full accountability has been strongly enforced in the U.S. Navy
and will continue to be at the very heart of command at sea.''
I presume you concur in those observations of a great
sailor. My simple question to you, as you look back, as
difficult as it is, at this case, have the judgments that have
been rendered by yourself and others in any way changed that
doctrine that has been at the heart of our Navy since its very
inception?
Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, in my view, absolutely not.
Let me say that I received as a gift that book when I went to
my first command as a lieutenant. I devoured it. I understand
and I believe in the whole fundamental principle of
accountability of our commanders.
Going back to the first sentence that you read, it talked
about the accountability of command. It did not say the
punishment of command. It is my view that we have in this case
held all of the parties accountable for their actions. There
are some who believe that because they were not punished
somehow they were not held accountable, and I do not agree with
that. Let me say why that is so.
The criteria that I used, Mr. Chairman, was this----
Chairman Warner. Could I interject. You and I know each
other quite well. I think the record should reflect, of all
those on active duty now, you have probably had more time as a
ship's captain at sea than any other. I checked that. So I
think you speak with considerable authority.
Admiral Clark. Well, I would say that I thank you for
pointing that out. It is not all ships. It is groups and fleets
and destroyer squadrons. But I believe that to be true, yes.
My criteria was this, Mr. Chairman. First, I make a
judgment about accountability based upon--and I included this
in my endorsement. I wanted the world to know. I wanted my Navy
to know. I added emphasis to that in a message that I sent
later, that we can talk about if you would like, on exactly the
way I intended for my Navy to interpret this, but that I would
judge this commander first of all on the premise that, did this
commander conduct himself within the standards that we expect
of our commanding officers? The quotation that you cite and the
words in your opening statement, it is a long part of our
heritage and culture that we believe in giving-- because of
where we send our ships, into the far corners of the earth,
where they have to act independently, we give them a lot of
responsibility and we give them all the authority that they
need to take the actions that are required of them to command
their ship.
So within this, with this criteria, what is the spectrum of
the standard? Some operate at the high end of that standard and
some in the middle and so forth. They are not all the same. But
there is a band of acceptability, and it was my judgment that
first and foremost in that band of what is expected of our
commanding officers one of the things I expect them to do is I
expect them to make independent judgments. This commanding
officer did, and some of those judgments involved the setting
aside of some of the measures.
First and foremost, he was willing to step forward and make
the kind of judgments that I expect commanding officers to
make.
The second part of the criteria that I used in my
accountability assessment was this. We specified, the system
specified, specific things that he was supposed to do. The
base, the initial investigation, does a tally of numbers, he
did this, he did not do this, and so forth. Some of those he
set aside intentionally and so forth. Then judgments are made
about the efficacy of those that were accomplished.
My criteria was this, and it is for every commanding
officer, Mr. Chairman: Would any specific actions that we
directed him to take, if he had taken them and he did not, and
the system, his command structure, told him to do that, would
it have prevented this attack? All of the endorsers in the
chain of command and those that reviewed this investigation
above me agreed with my conclusion that they would not have
changed the outcome, that this attack would have been
conducted.
Now, this is an open statement, open session kind of a
statement. In closed session I would be happy to get into the
rules of engagement and the way you make, how individuals make
judgments and what kind of warfighting tactics and principles
would be required to stop the attack.
I do not mean to imply that the attack could not have been
prevented, but I do mean to say very succinctly that they could
not have been prevented with the measures that were prescribed
for this commanding officer. So my judgment was that,
fundamental to accountability, is the accountability of the
chain of command and those superiors, that I judged this fairly
and based upon the facts, and this particular case was about an
attack being conducted on the ship. In my judgment, this
commanding officer was held accountable and I judged him.
As you said in your statement, I found some things that I
think he could have done better. But I do not believe that
those things rise to the level of warranting punishment, to
courtmartial him, or something. I did not believe that that was
the case, and that was the way I made my judgment, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Chief.
I am going to put into the record at this juncture your
message to all commanding officers following the incident.
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Chairman Warner. I am also going to put into the record the
recitation from the Khobar Towers report about Waterside
Security. I think in parallel they should be judged.
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Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. First, the chairman asked a question about
China, General Shelton, and I want to follow that up with the
following question. There were two changes in our policy
relative to military-to-military meetings within the last 24 or
48 hours. First, military-to-military meetings were suspended
or contacts were suspended. Then I understand that that was
changed to a case-by-case review of those contacts.
You indicated you were apparently not personally involved
in the memoranda which were discussed in the media today
revising the policy, apparently twice. My question is this: Do
you know if the Vice Chair of the JCS or other members of the
JCS or Admiral Blair, who is Commander in Chief of the Pacific
Command, were consulted or involved in either revision of the
policy?
General Shelton. Senator Levin, for the record I actually
saw the memorandum this morning, the 30 April one you are
referring to now. There has been involvement in terms of the
review of the military-to-military on a case-by-case basis all
along the way. I cannot really address--I have not had a chance
to talk to the Secretary about the memorandum, so I cannot
address that second part of your question right now.
Senator Levin. As to whether or not anybody----
General Shelton. I am not sure what--that was not a
memorandum that was signed by the Secretary, and I am not aware
of what coordination might have gone into that. I also
personally was on the road at the time. So I will have to
provide you the answer for the record.
Senator Levin. Would you let us know whether or not your
Vice Chair or any member of the JCS was involved or consulted,
or a commander or a CINC was involved in the preparation of or
approval of or involved with the memorandum that you just
referred to as the April 30 memorandum?
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
With regards to the first question, the U.S. Pacific Command,
members of the Joint Staff, and I were all consulted and involved in
discussions that lead to the revision of the policy involving military-
to-military contact with the Peoples Republic of China in the weeks
following the EP-3 incident.
With regards to the 30 April 01 memorandum signed by Mr. Chris
Williams from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Admiral Blair (USCINCPAC) did not coordinate on the
memorandum prior to its release on 30 April 01. Furthermore, we were
not involved in the decision to later rescind the memorandum.
Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, I would like to ask you a
couple of questions about your accountability standards. This
goes to General Shelton, I guess first, and then to you,
Admiral, I do not believe that either the Crouch-Gehman
Commission or the JAG Manual investigation were charged with
looking at the levels of command above the commanding officer
of the Cole. Now, they might have in the process of their
charge made some comments on it. But am I correct to say that
the levels of command above the commander and the crew of the
U.S.S. Cole were not looked at in terms of accountability,
either by Crouch-Gehman or by the JAG Manual?
Let me start with General Shelton.
General Shelton. I will let the CNO talk about the JAG
Manual. But Bill Crouch and Hal Gehman were not charged to look
at accountability by their charter. When their report came back
in, however, it became quite obvious that the detail of this
report--and they looked at the issue from the skipper of the
ship right on up through the CINC--rendered enough information
that you could make judgments in accountability all the way
down the chain through, as I indicated, CTF-50.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Clark. That states the case for Crouch-Gehman. The
case for the JAG Manual specifically was an inside the lifeline
examination of the conduct and the performance of the
commanding officer and the crew of the U.S.S. Cole. So it did
not address specific responsibilities of the chain of command
above the commanding officer.
Senator Levin. What was the reason why it was not? Should
it not have looked at the chain of command above the commander
and the crew?
Admiral Clark. I can only judge the actions inside the
lifelines. I cannot speak for the decisions or the reasoning
that went into the discussions with the principals in the
Crouch-Gehman, and I will defer to the Chairman on that. I
would just pass to you that from the very moment that this
occurred--and I recall the first session, a matter I guess of 3
or 4 hours into the event, that we sat down with the Secretary
and discussed the issue, and I informed him that by our
standards we would be conducting an investigation of activity
on the Cole.
Then the discussion turned to the requirement for a broader
investigation, and the Chairman can talk about the way that
came to be.
Senator Levin. In any event, no one was charged with the
accountability assessment above the commander and crew of the
Cole; is that accurate?
Admiral Clark. I believe that, as the Chairman stated, that
that is a correct statement.
Senator Levin. All right. Now, I was very much taken by
your description of accountability, by the way, and I have only
really one question about that. Your testimony and I think in
the other document which the chairman put in the record, you
say the following; that in assessing the accountability of the
commanding officer, the reviewing authorities focused on two
significant issues. First, were they reasonable within the
range of performance; and second is the following: would any of
the force protection measures not implemented by the Cole have
deterred or defeated a determined attack?
Now, it would seem to me that that may be too easy,
slightly too easy a standard. I say this with some trepidation,
given my admiration for you and your background, knowledge, and
experience. But nonetheless, I will ask the question anyway.
Say that the force protection measures which were not
implemented might have deterred or defeated the attack. Would
you think then that that standard should be met?
Admiral Clark. I think that I certainly should have
considered it and it would depend on not just the measure, but
the tactics that would be employed to execute the measure.
Senator Levin. But my emphasis is the following. Instead of
using a standard ``would have,'' because then you can say,
well, you cannot say that they would have, but what happens if
you conclude they might have? You cannot conclude that they
would have deterred, but you think they might have deterred.
Should there not be an accountability for that? Should that not
be the right standard?
Admiral Clark. Well, I cannot make a statement like that,
Senator.
Senator Levin. No, I am not asking you to make it about the
Cole. I am talking about a standard in general. I am saying if
a force protection measure not taken in general, in some
generic way, might have deterred an attack, should that not be
sufficient?
Admiral Clark. I believe that there could be measures that
I would come down and I might make that judgment. But ``might''
is an awfully loose word. So it is too loose a word for me to
make these kind of judgments. When we say to our people, we are
going to send you forward--when the chairman read the statement
from ``Command at Sea,'' it talked about mishandling his ship,
or her ship in today's world, not like when ``Command at Sea''
was written. It talked about those kind, that kind of action--
dramatically different than being attacked by a terrorist.
So I believe that the criteria of something that might have
happened, ``might'' is an awfully loose word.
Senator Levin. Might have happened, might have deterred.
Admiral Clark. ``Might have deterred'' is awfully loose. So
I would say I would have to make that judgment based on what
that specific was and the tactics used to implement the action.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Admiral.
My time is up.
Chairman Warner. I would like to put into the record at
this point documents which I think could possibly be slightly
different than what you said about Admiral Moore's
responsibility. I am going to ask you to review it. You can
then seek what clarification may be necessary.
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Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
continuing to follow the tragic attack on the U.S.S. Cole and,
more particularly, the lessons learned from that event.
I want to thank all the witnesses. I want to thank you for
your service, your leadership, your commitment, as we all try
to do better. I am going to wear two hats today, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to wear my Intelligence Committee hat, as well as my
Armed Services Committee hat.
I want to continue to focus on the intelligence aspect of
the Cole attack, because it seems to me if we fail to solve the
intelligence problems and challenges that face us in this
asymmetric threat environment, we are going to be back again
trying to figure out why we missed the signals available to us
following some other attack on our forces.
This is not a simple problem. It is very complex. It is
very difficult, but solutions must be found. I am going to
state, if the intelligence community walks away from the Cole
and believes they did everything--and I emphasize the word
``everything''--possible and are comforted by the fact there
was no smoking gun specifically, outlining an attack on the
Cole on 12 October of last year, then I say again we will be
back with another investigation of the loss of lives of
American servicemen and women.
Now, General Shelton, you just stated that, in terms of
intelligence available--and that is the key word,
``intelligence available''--that it was pertinent, there was no
failure, it was the best possible. I am concerned about that
statement. I tend to agree, but I have some real concerns. Let
me explain.
The first step it seems to me is to critically look at each
of the terrorist attacks against our forces and see what might
have been a critical piece of information that was not given
the weight it deserved. Every indication available to me
suggests that we do not have a problem in regards to
collection. I think we are doing a great job in that regard.
But it also seems to me that when we get into the business of
analyzing that information and then a formal warning report to
the warfighter, that is where we need some improvements.
Now let me just make two quotes. The DCI, George Tenet,
said before the Intelligence Committee that the DCI has stated
he was hired not to observe and comment, but to warn and
protect. The intelligence community defines and identifies the
goal of warning as follows. Warning is sounding an alarm, an
alarm giving notice. It denotes urgency and implies the need to
act. Warning demands diligence and requires constant
questioning of conventional wisdom. The goal of the process is
for the intelligence community to provide strategic warning
that gives our leaders time to either avert a crisis or at
least be prepared to deal with one.
Let me quote our former Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen,
who told reporters that U.S. intelligence needed to be
improved, and he noted that conspirators had watched for a year
prior to the Cole attack to see how U.S. warships refueled in
Aden. I am quoting here from ABC News, that says: ``The morning
after a terrorist told of the planned attack, August 26, 1998,
the FBI sent out a classified message under FBI Director Louis
Freeh's name warning of a plot to attack the U.S. Navy ship in
Yemen.'' We are still trying to figure out why that dropped
between the slots.
Second, it seems to me we must look to technology to assist
in the analysis of the massive amounts of information
collected, and I can go into that a little bit later. If the
CINCs and the unit commanders have a prayer of a chance of
taking the appropriate defensive action to detect and deter a
terrorist act against our forces, then it seems to me our
intelligence community must not be comfortable, must not be
complacent, and must not accept that they did not have enough
specific information to issue a warning that might have
prevented or certainly mitigated the attack on the Cole.
Now, let us use 20-20 hindsight. That is always the case.
Admiral Clark, General Shelton, and General Robertson, say we
are all in a room together. If you knew that in August 1998 a
known terrorist and bin Laden associate stated that a U.S.
warship would be attacked in Aden with a Katusha rocket in the
next several months; and if we knew that on 3 January, 2000, an
attack on the U.S.S. The Sullivans was aborted only because the
small boat laden with explosives sank; and if there was
relevant--and I emphasize the word ``relevant''--terrorist
information available, a storm warning, if you will, with clear
possibilities of lightning strikes in the general region; and
if we knew that the Israeli and the Palestinian situation was
really boiling over, what different action would we have taken
prior to the arrival of the U.S.S. Cole or any other ships to
the harbor in Aden?
All four events are true. Two were known before the Cole
and the attack on The Sullivans was known shortly after the
explosion. I submit the fact that the attack on The Sullivans
was not known, only adds to the assertion that the intelligence
community should not rest easy.
Now, my question is this: Would you discuss what actions
each of you, as well as you can in this open forum, have taken
to improve our ability to analyze, analyze the threat
information, and then proceed to a warning in regards to our
warfighters? In this same vein, what is your view on issuing an
intelligence warning with less than perfect data?
I am not comfortable with our ability and what went on with
the U.S.S. Cole, and you can date that back several years in
regards to other incidents.
Please feel free to answer as you see fit.
General Shelton. Senator Roberts, let me say first of all I
agree with almost everything that you said. My indication was
that, based on the best available--and I want to make sure the
word ``intelligence'' is in the record, not information. One of
the problems that our CINCs, our operational chain of command,
deals with is being flooded with information: spurious hits, a
lot of information that comes in, information which in some
cases is almost worthless unless it is combined with all the
other things that are going on and, as you indicated, it is
analyzed and then turned into what amounts to intelligence,
actionable intelligence, something that will drive you to take
action.
For example, the 1998 report on attacking a ship with a
rocket, you have to go back and look at, was it one report, was
it a credible report, was it from a reliable source, etcetera,
and what else then starts to indicate over the next 2-year
period of time that this is a part of the terrorist
organization's plan?
As we indicated and as Crouch-Gehman said, we do need to
reprioritize some of the assets within the intelligence
community. We need to have probably more emphasis on the SIGINT
piece and the HUMINT piece, which is what is most valuable to
you when you are dealing with terrorist organizations. But I
believe that we also have to be concerned when we look at
terrorism, being a trans-national threat, that has to have an
organization that can deal with this voluminous amount of
information that may go across all CINCs' AOs.
Let me use one example. You deal with an organization like
Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda organization, which operates out
of 55 different countries or more. Then he is planning this
attack possibly in Afghanistan, communicating with an outfit
that maybe is over in Admiral Blair's AO in the Pacific, for an
attack that maybe is going to transpire in General Ralston's
area. So each one of these may be getting spurious bits of
information or intelligence, as some would refer to it, but it
does not form a complete picture.
So I believe that our intelligence community has to be able
to focus, focus on the threat that is coming out of this
organization, looking at what is going on and the threads that
tie this information in to what is going to be an attack in one
of the areas. I have had a chance to discuss this with the DCI,
Mr. Tenet, and we are working right now on an initiative that
will help us do that. In fact, we have a good example of one of
those working right now in the commander in chief area of
operation.
But I personally would like to see that in each one of our
CINCs' AOs, so that we are in fact able to provide them with
detailed information. The analysis is what is key to it.
Information in itself inundates. If you look at the Cole, the
skipper of the Cole, he does not have the wherewithal, the
staffing, the intelligence analysts, and the all-source
intelligence, if you will, that will enable him to really focus
and see what he has--as you move up, the CINC should have that,
and it should be a push system that goes down, not them having
to pull and having to look for it.
Certainly that would then lead us to a warning once we saw
that developing, which would increase our threat conditions,
which would raise the level of awareness and consequently allow
us to deal with that threat in a manner that we will have to be
prepared to deal with it if we are to preclude an incident like
we have had with the Cole.
Admiral Clark. The first part first, what have we done?
Senator, there are a number of things that have happened, some
of which we really should talk about in closed session, and I
look forward to that. It really is crucial to our progress in
this area.
Each of the large fleets, and I am talking about the large
Navy component commanders in Europe and in the Pacific and in
the Fifth Fleet, they have taken action to strengthen their
ability to synthesize and help warn. For example, in Europe
there is a team designated full-time that is working this
process, and then they have established a system called a Blue
Dart program to get warnings out. This is a focus issue, but it
is also people working full time synthesizing. It gets back to
your fundamental point: There is an awful lot of information
out there.
So that is taking place. Then General Shelton, the
chairman, talked earlier about things that have happened at the
national and service military level, and we ought to talk about
that later.
Part two of your question has to do with releasing
information, preliminary information. I would say that the
scenario you described with those four events, those four kind
of events that happened, a couple of those really give me pause
and would have really made a difference. But I will tell you
that a couple, at least one of them, I would have gone and
checked out.
But because at the time of this incident--and we have
talked about this in some other forum before. But a commander,
the amount of information out there is so overwhelming. I know
you know that, but I know that a lot of people do not know
that. So the commander when he reads a report, it needs to be
synthesized for him, because the number of false alarms--false
alarms over time actually reduce the readiness. That is the
challenge that we face.
So I agree with your fundamental posture completely, that
we have to have an apparatus, not just to collect, but to put
this together in a meaningful way. The case that you cite with
regard to the attempt in January on the U.S.S. The Sullivans,
there is a clear case where if that information had been
available everything in the theater would have changed. I do
not just mean in Aden. All of the operations related to how you
would get ships from point A to point B, all of that would have
been affected, and we did not have that information.
I make one point in closing. I think one of the things that
we have learned, Senator--and I have had a continuing dialogue
with my Navy component commanders, the component that I provide
in this case to General Franks in the CENTCOM AOR. I was
speaking to him this week and we have to understand that we
cannot presume perfect knowledge. That has had a fundamental
effect on the measures and the tactics that we have put into
place, because if we believe that we will have perfect
knowledge it will dramatically change the way we establish
response mechanisms.
His point to me was when I was talking this week, was we
cannot take the position that, because we see an intelligence
brief and it is on the chart, that that is 100 percent of all
truth. It is always going to be a challenge to the intelligence
community to do the collection piece of it, no question about
that.
But on our side, for every user of intelligence we have to
make sure we understand that if we expect perfect knowledge we
are setting ourselves up for a potential fall.
General Robertson. Sir, if I might, let me try to explain
to you how it happened yesterday and happened today in my piece
of the business. I mentioned earlier that we fly about 1,700
missions a week on the air side of the United States
Transportation Command. We have been living with this plethora
of information for years and have developed an apparatus to
synthesize and digest it, agreeing 100 percent with your vision
that it ought to be certainly more focused.
But for each one of those 1,700 missions that I fly every
week, I have a joint intelligence center on the Transportation
Command side and a threat working group on both sides. They
take the information and sift through the port information, the
aerial port of embarkation, debarkation, and the seaport of
embarkation, debarkation, for threat-related information
associated with the ports that we operate through. They take
that information and apply it to every sortie that we fly every
day based on the inputs from my representatives from DIA, CIA,
NIMA, and the National Security Agency, and make an assessment
per mission of what mitigating measures are required for those
missions.
Then we bounce that off of the theater CINC and his JIC as
to what we think, and off of his operations and force
protection staff as to the mitigating measures that we deem
most appropriate. Then we make an assessment of whether he can
meet those mitigating measures, and if he cannot then is the
mission so important that we need to continue anyway, basically
a risk assessment.
If you take that back to the very beginning, I am totally
dependent on the quality of the intelligence that is given to
me when I start. Now, that is long-term intelligence, near real
time intelligence, and real time intelligence. Because of the
communications capabilities that I have, I can move very
rapidly to launch an airplane, or not launch an airplane. We
have a list of countries that we put on a list, that we call
the real time launch list, and the aircraft commander has to
call in 30 minutes before he launches into that country to
check the latest intelligence. We have a cell responsible for
telling him that it is changed or the same and that he is clear
to go or not to go.
But obviously the point that you would make, and the point
that I second, is that it is the quality of the intelligence
that drives our assessment of risk, wherever we fly, throughout
the world, and the same is true on the sealift side.
Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, my time has long expired. I
apologize to both Senators Nelson.
I am not for threat fatigue. I understand that. But I think
we are lacking in regards to the analytical ability. I might
say, Mr. Chairman--this will be the final thing I say --that
Samuel Huntington wrote a book a couple of years ago called
``The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.''
I do not know if you have all read that. You do not have time
to read it, but I would encourage you to do so.
He pointed out that we are at war. We are in a quasi-war
with certain segments of the Islamic world. So you start from
that premise. If, in fact, we are 14 percent short in regards
to authorized billets, 1,400 no-shows to the intelligence
community, most of them are all-source analysts that we do not
have. We have tried to authorize and appropriate that, we are
lacking, gentlemen. Yet we have this--I feel there is this
connotation that the intelligence community, with all due
respect--love the intelligence community in terms of the
collection effort--we are not doing the job. We should not rest
easy, or we are going to be right back here again.
I thank the chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Just as an administrative announcement, the Secretary of
Defense is coming up to Capitol Hill. I am going to meet with
him now, regarding China and budgetary and other matters. It is
very important that the work of this committee be done in
parallel with his decisionmaking on behalf of the President for
the 2001 supplemental, which is now to be done, as well as such
2002 modifications that we have to make.
So in my absence, Senator Roberts, if you would conduct the
hearing.
Now, if Senator Nelson will indulge me, that is a very
impressive statement you made, General Robertson, about the
actions that you are taking daily to prepare and update your
pilots and aircraft as they transit in and out of these many
areas of the world. Is that being done in the other military
departments, General? More specifically, Admiral, do you feel
that you have a comparable setup in the Navy? Because you point
out the difficulty of distilling for a commanding officer the
enormity of this daily influx of information.
Admiral Clark. General Robertson as a CINC has his own
intelligence structure, as compared to the component commanders
in theater. They operate under what is typically a joint
intelligence command inside each CINC-dom. But what we do have
is that we have the NCIS, Naval Criminal Investigative Service,
is now deployed more worldwide. I do not want to get into
specifics. I do not want to let anybody know----
Chairman Warner. Can you answer in general terms.
Admiral Clark. Yes, I can. Let me say that before any of
our ships go in anyplace now, they are on the ground. They are
checking out the local landscape. I spoke to Senator Roberts
about the increased push kind of teams that have been
established. So one of the reasons--TRANSCOM is a model and
Crouch-Gehman pointed out this was not just about ships. This
is about transient activity. Theirs is a good model and we are
learning everything we can from the way they do it.
Chairman Warner. You are going to try and incorporate. Of
course, the Navy operates with all the CINCs, so to speak.
General Shelton. All of our CINCs, Mr. Chairman, have a
similar program. As I indicated earlier on, General Roberts on
has one of the very best.
Chairman Warner. I think it is important, because it is a
very impressive statement he made.
Thank you. Senator Ben Nelson, would you now proceed with
your questions. Senator Nelson was here a little early, in fact
the first member to arrive.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
would like to thank our friends in the military for being here
today and for presenting your findings on the U.S.S. Cole
incident. Clearly, the tragedy was a reminder that our deployed
forces face the threats that, as you say, they cannot often see
and they certainly cannot expect as to the particulars.
General Shelton, in your written testimony you discuss the
findings of this commission's report and one of the
recommendations under the category of organization includes
developing the security capabilities of host nations to help
protect U.S. forces, recognizing that if we bring partners into
the process and into the development of those practices and
capabilities that we probably can do better.
Could you give us just a little bit more information about
what you have in mind, maybe without too many particulars, but
with some generalizations as to what you might expect to happen
in certain locations around the world?
General Shelton. Certainly, Senator Nelson. Of course, any
time we are operating in another nation's territory we are
dealing with sovereignty issues and the rules that they impose
on our operations within that area. Engaging them early on and
ensuring that they in fact are willing to accommodate the force
protection measures that we feel are essential under each of
the threat conditions or identifying those areas where they are
not willing without either negotiation or maybe in some cases
not allowing us to do, which then feeds back into the CINC's
assessment as to whether or not he will in fact use that port
or that facility.
You heard General Robertson, and I will let him talk to it
in just a minute, make assessments in terms of the threat
levels and whether or not these pieces are in place, whether or
not we have the properly vetted people, whether or not they are
willing to allow the posting of armed guards so that the boats
in the water, in the case of one of our ships going into a
port, provide that perimeter. These are the types of things
that have to be worked out with each one of the countries in
some type of a memorandum of agreement or understanding, and we
have to do that in conjunction with the State Department, with
our defense attaches in each location.
That is an ongoing effort. We are making good progress on
that right now. But it is a continuing effort.
Senator Ben Nelson. General Robertson.
General Robertson. Sir, if I might, the chairman
characterized it very well. We depend to a great degree around
the world on host nation security. We make an assessment in
conjunction with that theater's particular CINC as to whether
that host nation security is adequate or whether we need point
security for our aircraft or for the ships that I have
Operational Control (OPCON) for, whether we need to contract
out security, whether we need to contract, for instance, patrol
boats and things like that, divers, or whether we need to bring
in our own, or whether, for an aircraft, whether I need to
bring in my own specially trained security forces.
It carries over also to the contracts that we use for
loading and unloading in my case, loading and unloading ships
and aircraft, because for the most part those are host nation
contractors. So I have to make a determination in conjunction
with that CINC and whatever intelligence I have, whether those
contractors and the people that they employ have been properly
vetted from a security standpoint as to be reliable or
unreliable, or whether again I have to bring my own loading and
unloading people into the country.
But we are getting more mature. When we talked to General
Crouch and Admiral Gehman at United States Transportation
Command, this was the seam that we expressed concern about
because of our uncertainty over this vetting process, and over
our uncertainty as to the relationship between the CINC and the
host nation security forces. As a result, we have come a long
way in the CINCs vulnerability assessments of each of the ports
and fields that we operate in, in being able to say yes, no,
maybe, we need to do more, or we are satisfied with what we
have.
It is an area that we have attacked aggressively, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. In conjunction with the vetting
process, I would imagine it would be far more difficult to do
the vetting of foreign nationals located around the world than
it is to vet our own forces. How comfortable are you that we
can get the vetting process to the point where we can trust the
security capacity that we are going into in terms of memoranda
of agreements and the like?
General Shelton. From my perspective, Senator, we probably
never will have that assurance that we would all like to have.
I think that the real answer is it varies by nation in terms of
what we are having to deal with. But we also take that into
account because where necessary in some of the areas where the
threat, particularly if we anticipate it as being higher, there
is an augmentation requirement for U.S. forces moving into
there, where the CINC may actually deploy his own people.
Let me use as an example, if he has--and I do not want to
go into too much detail about specifics here; we could do that
in closed session. But if he has concerns in a particular port,
he might elect to fly in an augmentation force that would
provide that inner security, have his own boats in the water,
etcetera, to make sure as close to 100 percent as we can that
we have the proper protection for the aircraft or for the ship
in this case.
Senator Ben Nelson. Contracting security in conjunction
with the protection of a building in downtown Washington might
be an entirely different prospect in another country.
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Senator Roberts [presiding]. Senator Bill Nelson.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I wanted to follow up your line of questioning on the
question of intelligence. General Shelton, according to the
joint force doctrine, who is responsible and therefore
accountable, who is in command for providing intelligence for
forces moving along the strategic pipeline from the U.S. to the
regional CINCs and between the regional CINCs?
General Shelton. As those forces move between, as they
leave the U.S., they chop to the CINC at a certain point in
time. Otherwise they would belong to the component that was
sending them into that particular area. If you have a force
operating, if you take the Persian Gulf area, coming out of the
Med, as the Cole was, there is a chop point en route where he
passes from the control of CINCEUR into the control of CENTCOM,
and it is a designated specific point that he chops.
Admiral Clark may want to address it further.
Senator Bill Nelson. He has the responsibility or the
command for intelligence, and is that joint force doctrine, is
that clear--the inquiry that Senator Roberts made with regard
to intelligence information--so that that is shared and we then
have someone we know is accountable because he was in command?
Is that clear in the joint force?
General Shelton. The chain of command is clear. Each of the
CINCs has a joint intelligence center. They have an ability to
analyze the information that is coming in from various and
sundry locations. It may be a Defense Intelligence Agency
report, it may be a Central Intelligence Agency report, it may
be an NSA cut. They have the capability to look at all this,
focus it, and provide that to the commander.
My concern and the way that I think we need to address it
and which I addressed in my answer to Senator Roberts is where
this information is--and I will call it information--is popping
up in different CINCs' AOs and appears to be related to their
area, but maybe is tied into this transnational organization,
into another CINC's area, that we do not have any seams or gaps
in here. I think we can do a better job there in the future
than we have been able to do in the past with our current
structure.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Roberts, this might be a
question for you to get in on here. Who had possession of that
information with regard to the U.S.S. The Sullivans and how was
that not transmitted up the chain of command to the commanders?
Can anybody answer that question?
Admiral Clark. I can answer it. At the time on the 12th of
October, nobody in the U.S. intelligence apparatus had that
information. That information was developed over the course of
the investigation by the FBI. That is why I said to Senator
Roberts--he listed four particular pieces of data and the other
pieces of data he talked about was a different circumstance.
This particular piece of data we did not have, and it was the
statement about the ability to collect and the time frame and
the exposure of this intelligence and so forth. That
information was developed in the course of the investigation.
Senator Roberts. If the Senator would yield.
Senator Bill Nelson. Just following this, did the FBI have
that information?
Admiral Clark. To the best of my knowledge, that
information was not available until after the explosion. It was
developed by the FBI in the course of their investigation.
Senator Bill Nelson. But there is some doubt?
Admiral Clark. That is my understanding of the
circumstance.
Senator Bill Nelson. If, in fact, the FBI had the
information, then we have----
Admiral Clark. They developed it and disclosed that to us
in the course of the investigation. So it is my belief that
they did not have that on the 12th of October.
Senator Bill Nelson. Could you get a definitive answer for
us.
Admiral Clark. I will take that, yes, for the record.
Senator Bill Nelson. If your understanding is correct, we
need to know that. But if it is not, then we clearly need to
know that, too.
[The information referred to follows:]
The information on the planned attack against the U.S.S. The
Sullivans was gathered during the course of the U.S.S. Cole
investigation. It was not obtained prior to the attack on the U.S.S.
Cole, 12 October 2000.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Roberts, I yield to you.
Senator Roberts. What the Admiral said is exactly correct.
This was a fact that came out during the initial investigation,
which was joint with the Armed Services Committee and the
Intelligence Committee, which was a matter of obvious concern.
In regard to what General Shelton has pointed out
concerning the CINCs' ability with their intelligence command
or their command center, if you get into a transnational
situation, which was obviously the case in regard to the U.S.S.
Cole and it has been the case in regard to Khobar Towers and
will continue to be the case, that it seems to me is the
responsibility of the CIA, national center, the DIA, and
everybody else, and the Navy. That is why we have the national
centers.
That is why I am so concerned in terms of the analytical
ability that, if we are into this new world of asymmetrical
threats--and it is not exactly new, but it is certainly more
urgent--we really have to concentrate on the analytical
ability. I think your point is well taken.
Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Roberts, I want to follow up
on the very fine hearing that you had the day before yesterday,
since we are on the subject of intelligence. But that was
intelligence with regard to activities here at home. I think
General Shelton needs to hear about this, because the Inspector
General in the Defense Department--my time has expired. Mr.
Chairman, may I have additional time?
Senator Roberts. The distinguished Senator should know as a
veteran of the House of Representatives that time expires in
that house and time seldom expires in this body.
Senator Bill Nelson. I thank the chairman.
There is an audit report here from the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense on the subject of the management of
the National Guard weapons of mass destruction civil support
teams. The opening sentence is: ``The weapons of mass
destruction civil support team program is intended to help
prepare the United States against terrorist use of weapons of
mass destruction and is commonly referred to as a homeland
defense measure.''
The conclusion of this report is as follows, General
Shelton: ``The Consequence Management Program Integration
Office did not manage this program effectively.'' That was a
disturbing report to us a couple of days ago in a hearing
chaired by Senator Roberts on the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee. Again it comes back to the same
question: Who is in control? Who is accountable? Who is in
command? In this case, you have a bunch of civilian and
defense-related activities that are all trying to prepare what
we are trying to prepare for here on a discussion today about
terrorism abroad. That is talking about terrorism here at home,
all of which happens to be under the subject of the defense of
this country.
I wanted to call this to your attention because we were not
at all happy campers on what we heard and their not getting
their act together. It needs some command authority from above
to get them swinging into action.
Senator Roberts, I would love to have your comments as
well, because I think General Shelton needs to hear this.
Senator Roberts. I think the General is very fully aware.
We have had discussions when he has been kind enough to come by
my office for a courtesy call from time to time. He is
extremely busy, but, as the General knows and I think most on
at least the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee
know, in regards to domestic terrorism or homeland defense--
which now is a very top threat and decidedly so by the
administration, the past administration, and any number of
think tanks--that we tried to plus up or to increase the number
of RAID teams, they are called, CST teams. Yesterday Senator
Byrd had another acronym that spelled out ``Byrd,'' that I
think that was interesting at least.
But at any rate, we had 10, we went up to 17, up to 25, up
to 32, so that there would be a professional DOD team on the
scene within 4 hours anywhere. As you indicated, sir, it is not
a matter of if, but when.
Unfortunately, about the same time that we were getting
some very positive reports from Secretary Cohen and those
within his office, it was precisely the same time that the IG
later said: Well, wait a minute; we have some real management
problems. The testimony yesterday indicated that that was the
case. Again with 20-20 hindsight, we look back. Senator Nelson
asked the obvious question, who is responsible now. We are not
quite sure yet. Under the terrorism banner, that is very
difficult to ascertain.
As a matter of fact, May 8, 9, and 10 we have
appropriators, authorizers, Intelligence, Armed Services,
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, all asking 46 Federal
agencies to come down and see if we cannot get our arms around
the terrorism threat. All three of you know I have been very
active in this in the DOD side, certainly expressing some
suggestions.
My take on the subcommittee hearing was that, while it is
not fixed and we do not have that one person, like say General
McCaffrey as the drug czar or Admiral Rickover, that we are
making some progress and that hopefully the training will be
forthcoming, the equipment will be better than it was, and that
we will have a RAID team within the National Guard 4 hours from
anybody to link up the communications that will be absolutely
necessary if in fact we have a domestic incident.
That is my long take on a short take question and I
appreciate very much Senator Nelson's cooperation and his
interest.
I think the time requested by the distinguished Senator has
expired. I will now yield again to the distinguished Senator
from Nebraska. Are you aware there is going to be a ``terrorist
threat'' in Lincoln about October by a purple gang that is
going to come there from Kansas State?
Senator Ben Nelson. We have force protection in place.
[Laughter.]
General Shelton. Senator Roberts, could I comment?
Senator Roberts. Yes, sir. I am sorry to not give you an
opportunity to respond.
General Shelton. Sir, first of all to thank you for your
interest and your support in what I think is a critical area
that this Nation could face in the future. Our effort within
Defense was to form this joint task force for civil support
underneath our Joint Forces Command only from a standpoint of
knowing within the Department where our assets were, how well-
trained they were, and what capabilities they had, so that if
one of the other civilian agencies of our government needed
help from the Department to underscore, or underpin their
effort, we could do that in a very fast manner, always though
in support of the civilian agency that was in the lead.
So that was the idea behind it. I was made aware just a few
days ago of some continuing issues that relate to Senator
Nelson's concern about the command and control aspect. Of
course, the National Guard from my perspective, our Reserves,
are ideally suited for this mission because they are located
out in the areas, they are under the control of the governor
under Title 32 early on. He could use them as he saw fit. Then
at some point, if it is a large enough effort, they may be
placed under Title 10 and then come right under Joint Task
Force Civil Support, who should train with them, as they are
doing now, so that we have a first class or a world class
effort in this regard, because consequence management, I think,
is something that this Nation expects us to be prepared to do
as a government.
I applaud your efforts, particularly as it relates to the
46 different entities in this area and focusing the Nation's
efforts.
Senator Roberts. We are going to be asking again all 46 to
come in May 8, 9, 10. I say that publicly. Senator Stevens,
Senator Byrd, and Senator Inouye from the Appropriations
Committee, Senator Gregg, who has the Subcommittee on Justice,
State, Commerce, and they are the lead dog agency in this
regard according to the presidential directive. While I
initially thought that was a mistake and thought that maybe DOD
should take charge, I am now convinced that was the right
decision.
Then we have Senator Shelby and Senator Gramm of the
Intelligence Committee, myself. It is the first time I think
the Senate has tried to eliminate some of the stovepipes that
we have, quite frankly. We have eight committees and seven
subcommittees dealing with this issue. We are going to try to
get our arms around this to say basically, OK, what is your
mission, who do you report to, and what do you really do.
If we can do that, it seems to me we can be in concert with
the new administration and also DOD.
I apologize Ben for interrupting. Go ahead.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Shelton, in terms of the kind of threat
possibilities that are out there today, ranging from the Cole,
Oklahoma City, the potential suitcase bomb, weapons of mass
destruction, and the delivery of those, what are your thoughts
about theater missile defense or national missile defense,
particularly in light of your comment about, I think you said,
target fixation, that if we spend our time fixated on targets
are we going to be able to do the objective work of figuring
out what kind of defense we need overall?
General Shelton. Sir, from our standpoint, first of all, I
would like to just underscore the fact that within the
continental United States the Justice Department, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, of course has the lead for
intelligence reports related to potential terrorist attacks
within the continental United States and action thereof.
Of course, they are also very active, as I just saw on my
visit yesterday over in Greece, in their efforts in various and
sundry places, but in that particular case with the November 17
organization that operates in Greece. So obviously, we need to
make sure that we have an integrated system that also takes
advantage of some of the great work that they do in collecting
intelligence overseas that feeds back into the system.
They have a different focus, obviously. It is on
evidentiary type information, and intelligence. But often in
cases, as was the case in the interrogation after the attack on
the Cole, they shared the information with us about the threat
that had been made against the The Sullivans earlier.
When it comes to theater missile defense, that is another
area that we need to be concerned about, missile defense in
general and theater missile defense in particular. As we sit
here today, we have 38,000 troops in Korea roughly and a large
number in Southwest Asia, both elements potentially subject to
being hit with missiles, as well as chemical, biological types
of warheads.
So that has been one of the Joint Chiefs' very highest
priorities now for a number of years, to develop this theater
missile defense. I think we also recognize that, with the
proliferation of technology today and particularly as fast as
it can move and fill the gaps, the voids, that missile defense
in general for the citizens of this Nation is something that we
also have to be quite concerned about.
As the President has said, he is proceeding with that. The
Joint Chiefs fully support that. The technology to do it, some
of it, is being worked very hard. What form that will take,
what the architecture will be, what the final will be for
fielding it, are all questions that will be determined in the
process of aggressively pursuing a defense for our Nation.
But all of that is the right thing to do in view of the
threats that we face, not only abroad but at home.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Shelton, I think about a year ago or so you gave us
a threat spectrum. You and I have talked about that a few
times.
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Does that look familiar to you [indicating]?
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Shelton. Sir, that is a version. We had a couple of
them, but that one looks familiar, yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Can you tell us whether since your most
recent threat spectrum there has been any change in that, or is
that still your assessment?
General Shelton. Sir, that is still my assessment, yes,
sir.
Senator Levin. We talked about the accountability issue on
the Cole and I just want to ask you about the Greeneville
accountability issue, because this is a hearing that is looking
at accountability in a broader sense than just on the Cole.
My understanding of Navy policy is that civilian guests are
taken out on submarine cruises only on regularly-scheduled
training missions and that submarine visits, even for a short
time, are not scheduled solely for the purpose of taking
civilian guests on a cruise. Is that basically correct,
Admiral?
Admiral Clark. That is correct.
Senator Levin. Now, the administrative hearing into the
Greeneville accident determined that the Greeneville was not
conducting a scheduled training cruise the day of the accident
and that the reason for leaving port that day was solely to
entertain the civilian guests on board. My question is this.
Whoever made that decision, that that cruise should go without
a training mission--is there any accountability that has been
looked at for that decision that, even though the policy of the
Navy was that civilian guests be taken out only if there is a
regularly scheduled training mission, that nonetheless, even
though there was not such a mission that day, that that cruise
should occur anyway? Was there an assessment of accountability
on that?
Admiral Clark. I have not read the entire transcription of
events, but I did not have to read it to get to this issue.
They had planned to have training activities going on that day
and the visit was set up, and the Greeneville had been
conducting training, and this is the way it has been briefed to
me: that they completed the training in advance of the date of
the guest sail. So the commander knew this, but the rest of the
chain of command did not, was unaware of this.
We have restated the policy that ships will not get under
way to take guests to sea. That is inappropriate. We have
restated that policy. We fundamentally did that before, before
the court of inquiry was even complete.
Senator Levin. So that the commander made that decision to
proceed on his own?
Admiral Clark. That is my understanding. But I say, I have
not read the transcript. If you want me to go back and check
that for the record, I will do that.
Senator Levin. That would be great.
[The information follows:]
Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Greeneville (SSN 772) had broad
discretion and authority in deciding whether to get his ship underway
on 9 February 2001, the day U.S.S. Greeneville collided with M/V EHIME
MARU. U.S.S. Greeneville was scheduled originally by Commander,
Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), to commence an
underway period on 9 February for crew training, and the ship was
assigned to conduct a civilian guest embarkation in conjunction with
such training. The commanding officer later requested a modification to
the schedule so that the ship could remain in port Pearl Harbor for the
weekend of 10-11 February. After assessing the ship's training
progress, Commander Submarine Squadron ONE (COMSUBRON ONE) decided to
permit U.S.S. Greeneville to remain in port during that weekend and
notified COMSUBPAC's Operations Department of the schedule change.
After its revision, COMSUBPAC's schedule still reflected that U.S.S.
Greeneville would be at sea on 9 February for a civilian embarkation.
When the commanding officer learned that the assigned civilian group
traveled to Hawaii from the mainland, he enthusiastically accepted the
assignment and proceeded to sea on 9 February. Contrary to Navy
policies that restrict getting ships underway only to accommodate
guests, both COMSUBRON ONE and COMSUBPAC's Operations Department
allowed U.S.S. Greeneville to execute the revised schedule, which
resulted in her getting underway solely to perform a civilian
embarkation. In his testimony at the Court of Inquiry, COMSUBRON ONE
indicated that he was not aware of that restriction before the mishap.
The Court of Inquiry found that the Navy's guidance on embarkation
of civilian visitors is vague, confusing, and internally inconsistent.
A review of pertinent embarkation policies has been initiated. In
correcting the noted deficiencies, we will clarify the approval
authority to civilian embarkations and reemphasize pertinent
restrictions. The Navy's Distinguished Visitor Embarkation program
directly enhances public awareness of the Navy and should continue to
be fully supported.
Senator Levin. But as far as you know, the commander on his
own made the decision.
Admiral Clark. As far as I know that is the case, that is
correct.
Senator Levin. The Cole had been operating in the
Mediterranean and then after transitting the Suez Canal was on
its way to, was transitting the Red Sea on the way to the
Persian Gulf. In the Mediterranean the Cole was under the
operational control of the Sixth Fleet commander and was
required to follow the force protection measures which were
promulgated in a Chief of Naval Operations message. That was
the force protection, it was your message or the CNO's message.
Now then, when the Cole was chopped to the Fifth Fleet on
October 9, 2000, it then was required to follow the force
protection measures that had been promulgated by the Fifth
Fleet command's operation order, which is based in turn on a
Joint Publication No. 3-07.2, which was issued by the Joint
Chiefs.
Interestingly enough, the Fifth Fleet force protection
measures contain two measures that are not included in the
Sixth Fleet force protection measures.
Are we together so far or have I lost you?
Admiral Clark. Yes, we sure are.
Senator Levin. I have not lost you yet. I will keep trying.
Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. One of the two additional measures which the
Fifth Fleet was required to take was something called Joint
Publication Measure 31, which had to do with preparing boats
and placing crews on 15-minute alerts and designating and
briefing picket boat crews and a number of other things. Then
there was something called Joint Publication Measure 33, which
was to man signal bridge or the pilot house and ensure that
flares are available to ward off approaching craft.
But nonetheless, there are some substantive differences
here. I am not going to suggest that those two differences were
causally related to the attack's success on the U.S.S. Cole.
But the point here is just a generic question: Should there not
be one authoritative set of force protection measures for use
by our Armed Forces? I guess here I should really, since I
framed the question that way, I would ask you first, General
Shelton: Should there not be one set of force protection
measures for our Armed Forces? Here we had a different set in
the Sixth Fleet than we did in the Fifth Fleet. Then I would
ask you, Admiral, as well.
General Shelton. I would agree in principle that certainly
we need to have a set of common force protection measures.
However, I would stop short of saying that we should not allow
commanders to supplement those where they feel that they are
appropriate for the particular area and the situation which
they are having to operate.
Senator Levin. I would totally agree with that. Subject to
that, should we not have the same set of force protection
measures?
Admiral Clark. Certainly it would make the training problem
and the challenge much easier to deal with. In an ideal world,
it would be best if we could do that. But I could not support
the chairman's position any more strongly that we cannot
inhibit a commander's ability to apply additional measures if
he deems it appropriate.
I would like to just add, if I could. These measures have
changed in the aftermath of the Cole and they are now all in a
classified vein and so we would not discuss them in an open
hearing, although all those from before and on the 12th of
October certainly were unclassified.
But one of the issues for us is to synthesize these and
make them common to the maximum extent possible.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Roberts. I think the Senator has touched on a very
important point, in that the relevant intelligence information
I referred to in my opening statement pretty much was confined
to the Sixth Fleet area, and obviously Aden is in the Fifth
Fleet area. But as General Shelton has indicated, this is a
transnational threat. So I think the Senator has touched on
something extremely important.
The San Antonio Express-News reports today that Fort Sam
Houston has closed five of its gates and now restricts access
to four more, to increase security post the Cole incident. That
is the reference. I hesitate to say this, but I do not have a
base sticker on my car and I do not ordinarily drive around
with a U.S. Senate tag. But I am waved through at most of the
bases. I am not Carl Levin or John Warner. They do not
recognize me.
Senator Levin. If you borrowed my glasses, you could be
recognized immediately.
Senator Roberts. If I had stripes I might be Admiral Clark,
but I do not.
At any rate, I am waved through. I want to know from each
of you very quickly, what actions have been taken since the
Cole to increase security at U.S. facilities? I am worried
about that.
General Shelton. From my perspective, Senator Roberts, it
varies right now, and I think as you have indicated, it varies
by service, it varies by installation. It is tied into the
threat level and the raising of the threat conditions at the
installation.
I can give you an example. The place that I live at Fort
Myer, on a day in and day out basis when you go in you are
checked. You have to have a registered sticker, etcetera. Then
on certain days you have to show an ID card. It gets tighter
and tighter as the theater level goes up to get on the
installation.
Other places that I am familiar with happen to have as many
as two or three public highways that run through the
installation. So as to the threat level, and the intelligence
or threats develop, they raise their protective measures, still
allowing the public to go through, but in some cases, as you
saw here, closing that access, checking people as they come
through, and in other cases securing key facilities on the
installation that would be most vulnerable to attack, etcetera.
Senator Roberts. A one size fits all.
General Shelton. So there is not a cookie-cutter answer to
it, yes, sir.
Senator Roberts. We are going to go to the closed session
in 222, unless Senator Levin has additional questions. I
understand you have some information that will be relevant to
us, and we will try to make that as fast as possible because I
know it is getting late here.
The first finding and recommendation of the Crouch-Gehman
Commission concerns the coordination of combatting terrorism--
this gets back to Senator Nelson's comments--in the DOD.
According to Crouch-Gehman, combatting terrorism is so
important it demands a complete unity of effort at the level of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The commission report
goes on to recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop an
organization that more cohesively aligns policy and resources
within DOD to combat terrorism and designate an Assistant
Secretary of Defense to oversee these functions.
General Shelton, this committee initiated legislation in
last year's defense authorization bill that requires just such
a reorganization to take place. In the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee last year, we had four people come up
to testify and I was being a little mischievous and I said,
could you sit in order of your authority, and nobody knew where
to sit.
So I have a piece of intelligence that we collected and we
have analyzed, that you, sir, are ready to make a
recommendation in that regard. Are you in that status or have
we analyzed that wrong?
General Shelton. Sir, I think you have good intel, and I
mean more than just information. But I have provided a series
of recommendations to the Secretary based on those
recommendations made in the Crouch-Gehman. I know they have
been working them very hard and I think his Assistant Secretary
is about ready to go forward with those recommendations to the
Secretary now.
Senator Roberts. So you are not quite ready to say which
ASD should be assigned this important responsibility, or could
you share that with us?
General Shelton. Sir, from my perspective, where they place
the ASD would be of course the Secretary's call. But combining
the policy and the resources into one would appear to make
eminently good sense.
Senator Roberts. I appreciate that and I agree with it.
Gentlemen, thank you very much, and we will proceed to the
closed session in room SR-222. The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
engagement strategy/host-nation support
1. Senator Warner. General Shelton, it is clear from what we have
learned in the wake of the attack on U.S.S. Cole that our regional
commanders in chief have been actively pursuing an engagement strategy
throughout their AORs, often without full, interagency involvement--as
was clearly the case with Yemen. The Crouch-Gehman Commission found
that better coordination is needed for our engagement policy. My
particular concern is with having firm agreements in place--up front--
for the host nation to either provide security for our forces, or to
allow our military to take the necessary actions to protect themselves
while in a foreign country. Are changes being made to ensure that these
security measures are negotiated before our troops go into a foreign
nation?
General Shelton. The Department of State (DOS) and Department of
Defense (DOD) are committed to an interagency process to provide
overall coordination of U.S. engagement. DOS and DOD are developing an
approach with shared responsibility to enhance host-nation security
capabilities that result in increased security for transiting U.S.
forces.
Earlier this year, DOS instructed Chiefs of Mission to work with
host-nation governments to cooperate with increased force protection
measures involving visits and transit by U.S. ships, aircraft, and
other military units. I also discussed this issue with the Combatant
Commanders at the February 2001 ``CINCs' Conference'' and recommended
they work closely with their foreign nation military counterparts to
increase host-nation security support. We have made considerable
progress, but additional work in this area remains.
In my view, however, completion of these host-nation security
negotiations should not necessarily be prerequisite to sending troops
into foreign countries or pulling existing forces out. The decision on
whether or not to maintain forces in a country should be based on the
overall force protection capability, both U.S. and host nation,
balanced against the importance of the mission.
host-nation support
2. Senator Warner. General Shelton, one of the findings of the
Crouch-Gehman Commission was that ``negotiations with the host nation
must authorize the unit commander to implement force protection
measures that provide the necessary time and space to react to hostile
intent.'' What is being done to implement this recommendation? Will you
assure the committee that U.S. forces will not be allowed into a
foreign nation until and unless such agreements are reached?
General Shelton. Our Ambassadors and our CINCs are working closely
with host-nation counterparts to implement the necessary force
protection measures that allow the necessary time and space to react to
hostile intent.
The Navy has developed a ``security zone'' approach to assist ships
to determine hostile intent and take necessary defensive action. Under
this approach, at a predetermined distance, the ship commences warning
the approaching vessel to remain clear. Should the vessel continue
toward the ship, despite the warnings, various additional and
escalatory warning measures are employed. Should the vessel continue
despite continued and escalatory warnings, thereby demonstrating a
hostile intent, the ship can engage the vessel. This is an important
issue in our negotiations with host nations.
However, the host nation is responsible for exercising security
authority over its territorial seas, including the water surrounding
our ships in their ports. Initiatives such as the ``security zone''
approach requires host-nation approval, and will likely take time to
sort out the details.
As I stated in my response to a previous question, completion of
these host-nation security negotiations should not necessarily be
prerequisite to sending troops into foreign countries or pulling
existing forces out. The decision on whether or not to maintain forces
in a country should be based on the overall force protection
capability, both U.S. and host nation, balanced against the importance
of the mission.
resources needed to implement crouch-gehman recommendations
3. Senator Warner. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, many of the
30 recommendations made by the Crouch-Gehman Commission will require
additional resources and additional personnel dedicated to force
protection. What is your plan for funding these force protection
improvements and for getting the additional personnel which will be
needed?
General Shelton. Approximately $3.4 billion was spent on
antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) in fiscal year 2000 and we
anticipate that $3.5 billion will be spent on AT/FP in fiscal year
2001. Approximately 90 percent of funding is spent on manpower
(military, civilian, and contractor personnel) for law enforcement as
well as AT/FP staff positions. The remaining 10 percent is spent on
physical security equipment, physical security site improvements,
physical security management and planning, security and investigative
matters, and research and development. We anticipate antiterrorism-
related funding will be increased for fiscal year 2002 although we do
not have the exact number.
The Joint Staff (J-34), in conjunction with Office of the Secretary
of Defense (SecDef) staff elements having resource and program
oversight, will review the adequacy of resources proposed by the
Services and DOD agencies to meet DOD AT/FP objectives. Concerns are
brought to my attention (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the
attention of appropriate Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
authorities.
Also, last year the Department approved a resource prioritization
and justification process to enable the Services to work more closely
with the CINCs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff
to identify high-priority requirements to fund programs critical to AT/
FP preparation and response. The goal is to have interaction early to
better support Service program development and consider the CINCs'
important unfunded requirements.
In my view, the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense
are providing the necessary oversight to ensure antiterrorism
priorities are being met.
Admiral Clark. The Navy's Antiterrorism Force Protection Task Force
provided input to Office of the Secretary of Defense requesting
additional funding for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 force protection
improvements based on the Commission's recommendations. The Department
of Defense requested supplemental funding for fiscal year 2001, which
included a portion of the Navy's force protection request. Pending
availability of supplemental appropriations, the Navy is funding many
force protection initiatives with below threshold reprogramming.
The Navy's initiatives to improve personnel retention have been
proving successful and are resulting in additional personnel available
to meet increased antiterrorism/force protection requirements.
command investigation versus court of inquiry
4. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, the Navy's Manual for Judge
Advocates (JAGMAN) states that for a ``major incident''--which is
defined as an incident with ``multiple deaths, substantial property
loss'' that ``greatly exceeds what is normally encountered in the
course of day-to-day operations,'' and may be ``accompanied by national
public and press interest and significant congressional attention''--a
court of inquiry--the most formal type of JAGMAN investigation--should
be conducted. Why did you decide that a court of inquiry was not
appropriate in this case and instead endorsed a command investigation?
Admiral Clark. Although this tragedy was a major incident, the
Navy's Manual for Judge Advocates (JAGMAN) leaves discretion to the
cognizant Commander to determine the type of inquiry warranted in a
specific case. In this case, after carefully considering all the
pertinent circumstances, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command,
Vice Admiral Moore determined that a single-officer Command
Investigation, rather than a Board or Court of Inquiry, was warranted.
The factors weighing in favor of a single-officer Command
Investigation included:
Avoiding interference with the ongoing damage control
efforts required to keep U.S.S. Cole afloat.
Significant security and logistical issues in Aden
Harbor.
Avoiding interference with the FBI investigation.
Knowledge that there was a DOD inquiry planned, which
would review the issues external to the ship.
Finally, the scope of the JAGMAN investigation was limited to
examining the actions of the ship's crew before, during, and following
the attack. Although the type of JAGMAN investigation warranted for the
U.S.S. Cole incident was Vice Admiral Moore's decision, he consulted
with me prior to making that decision. Given the limited scope of the
investigation and considering all the pertinent circumstances, I
concurred with Vice Admiral Moore's decision.
failure to implement required security measures
5. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, you stated that it was correct
that the Cole's commanding officer did not deem it appropriate to
implement all of the security measures that he was responsible for
executing. Were these measures discretionary?
Admiral Clark. Threat condition measures set the minimum force
protection requirements for all combatant and non-combatant ships. They
are not situation specific and some of the measures may not apply to
specific operating environments. We rely on the judgment of individual
commanding officers to determine those elements necessary to best
protect his crew based on the location and the threat information
available to him. Commanding officers must, however, notify higher
authority if they believe it is imprudent or impossible to complete
specific force protection measures.
accountability of other commands/responsibility for cole safety
6. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, in your endorsement to the
investigation, you noted that separate action will be taken to assess
the accountability of others in the chain of command. Which individuals
or commands are you referring to specifically?
Admiral Clark. I was referring generally to personnel senior in the
chain of command to the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Cole. This
included Commander, Task Force Five Zero and Commander, Fifth Fleet/
Commander, Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command.
7. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, by what method has/will this
accountability be assessed?
Admiral Clark. This assessment was completed on January 19, 2001,
by then-Secretary of Defense Cohen. On January 9, 2001, Secretary Cohen
directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide his
``assessment of operational and administrative matters associated with
[the U.S.S. Cole] incident, including issues of accountability, as well
as any other matter you deem appropriate.'' On January 19, 2001, after
receiving General Shelton's advice, Secretary Cohen, in both a written
memorandum and a briefing, identified the shared accountability of the
entire chain of command, including myself, the Secretary of the Navy,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and himself.
assessment of damage control equipment and procedures
8. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, as part of his review of the
JAGMAN, Admiral Natter, CINCLANT Fleet, directed an assessment of the
Cole damage control equipment and procedures. It is my understanding
that the fleet has not received damage control lessons learned report
from the Navy. Why is this taking so long? Weren't there any
``quicklook'' results that could have been shared with the fleet by
now?
Admiral Clark. Damage control assessments were conducted as part of
the initial JAGMAN, interviews by the Afloat Training Group (ATG)
Atlantic and the follow on detailed ship assessment through March 2001.
The information from those assessments have been incorporated in a more
extensive overall lessons learned briefing that has been given to
members of the U.S.S. Cole, COMDESRON 22, and other CO's of his
squadron, COMNAVSURFLANT and members of his staff, members of the
CINCLANTFLT staff and the senior Navy leadership. A classified lessons
learned message to the fleet is scheduled for release in the early July
timeframe. Specific DC lessons learned have been incorporated into ATG
DC training, SWOS PCO/PXO, Department Head, Division Officer and DCA
curriculums, and is being included in the Senior Enlisted DC school
curriculum.
force protection/antiterrorist equipment funding
9. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, feedback from naval units in
Norfolk indicate that only 40 percent of the required funding is being
provided for the additional force protection and antiterrorist
equipment they are now required to buy in the wake of the Cole attack.
The committee has been told that the balance of the required funding is
being taken out of ship maintenance funds, which is causing deferral of
required repairs. How is the Navy planning to pay for the additional
force protection equipment and provide additional personnel for the
requirements that have been levied since the terrorist act against the
U.S.S. Cole?
Admiral Clark. The Navy's Antiterrorism Force Protection Task Force
provided input to Office of the Secretary of Defense requesting
additional funding for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 force protection
improvements based on the Commission's recommendations. The Department
of Defense requested supplemental funding for fiscal year 2001, which
included a portion of the Navy's force protection request. Pending
availability of supplemental appropriations, the Navy is funding many
force protection initiatives with below threshold reprogramming,
however ship maintenance funds have not been used to satisfy these
requirements
Because we have been able to retain more personnel that we
originally had envisioned, we have been able to meet our additional
personnel requirements.
confusion with threat levels
10. Senator Warner. General Shelton, the Crouch-Gehman Commission
report discussed the confusion caused by the terms ``threat level'' and
``THREATCON,'' and also expressed concern over varying threat levels
that can be declared within the same country by different agencies. Are
you satisfied that all forward deployed forces and transiting units now
have unambiguous knowledge of the threat level in their specific
location and destination and clearly understand the minimum force
protection measures they need to implement to ensure the safety of
their units?
General Shelton. With regard to confusion between ``threat level''
and ``threat condition'' terminology, brought to light by the Crouch-
Gehman Commission, the Secretary of Defense has approved changing the
term ``threat condition'' to ``force protection condition.'' This
recent change has been promulgated in the 14 June 2001 revision to DOD
Instruction 2000.16, ``Antiterrorism Program Standards.''
With regard to the issue of setting threat levels, as you are
aware, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has overall responsibility
for setting threat levels worldwide. Combatant commanders with
geographic responsibilities also have responsibility for setting the
threat levels within their areas of responsibility. CINCs have the
authority to increase the threat level set by DIA, but not lower it.
The Crouch-Gehman Commission recommended that the CINCs have overall
responsibility for setting threat levels and DIA have a supporting
role. This was one of the very few recommendations that I did not agree
with, and after careful review with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense staff and CINCs, we decided not to implement the Commission
recommendation.
CINC and component staffs are redoubling their efforts to remove
ambiguity at the unit level over threat levels and ``force protection
conditions.'' I am satisfied with their current level of effort.
force protection improvements
11. Senator Warner. General Shelton, in your prepared statement,
you highlight actions various regional commanders in chief have taken
to enhance force protection, situational awareness, and antiterrorism.
For example, you mention Country Vulnerability Assessment Teams in
CENTCOM and an in-transit tracking cell in EUCOM. Obviously, each
geographic region has unique circumstances and requirements, but I am
concerned about appropriate uniformity of effort worldwide. Are you
satisfied that relevant, theater-level force protection support for
deployed forces is being implemented in a timely, comprehensive manner
worldwide? Is Joint Forces Command developing the appropriate doctrine
and training standards for deploying forces?
General Shelton. First, I am satisfied that the Department of
Defense is ensuring antiterrorism/force protection ``unity of effort''
worldwide. Back in 1996, concerns over unity of effort following the
Khobar Towers bombing led to my designation as ``principal advisor and
focal point to the Secretary of Defense for all DOD AT/FP issues,'' and
the establishment of the Combating Terrorism Deputy Directorate within
the Joint Staff. Recently, the Secretary of Defense consolidated policy
and resource/programmatic responsibilities under one Assistant
Secretary of Defense office. Also, formal DOD guidance in designating
antiterrorism duties and responsibilities and our promulgation of
antiterrorism program standards underscore our concern for maintaining
unity of effort. Most recently, our responses to Crouch-Gehman
Commission recommendations were implemented after close coordination,
Department-wide, and following consensus on the appropriate corrective
action.
Second, with regard to your specific concern about doctrine and
training, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Services to develop
and resource credible deterrence standards, deterrence-specific
tactics, techniques, and procedures and defensive equipment packages
for all forms of transiting forces. Additionally SecDef directed the
Services to ensure that predeployment training regimes include
deterrence tactics, techniques, and procedures and antiterrorism/force
protection measures specific to the area of operation. DOD Instruction
2000.16, ``Antiterrorism Program Standards,'' 14 June 01, revision
directs Service compliance. With regard to Joint Forces Command force
protection initiatives, USJFCOM's Joint Warfighting Center has
incorporated force protection issues in joint exercises, ``Capstone''
senior leader courses, and Joint Task Force Headquarters Training.
Additionally, USJFCOM is working in concert with the Services to
elevate the priority of antiterrorism/force protection training within
our joint training programs.
uscentcom/problems with no headquarters in aor
12. Senator Warner. General Shelton, unlike other regional
commands, CENTCOM's headquarters and joint intelligence center are not
located in or near the area of operations. Does the lack of a robust
permanent Joint Task Force or Theater Command Element forward hamper
effective force protection/antiterrorism support to deployed or
transiting forces in CENTCOM's AOR?
General Shelton. In my view, not having USCENTCOM's headquarters in
its area of responsibility does not adversely affect the CINC's ability
to maintain adequate antiterrorism/force protection support to his
forces. We have come a long way in our command, control, and
communication capability, and all of USCINCCENT's component commanders
are either located within the area of responsibility or have forward
elements in theater.
additional intelligence support
13. Senator Warner. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, the Crouch-
Gehman Commission specifically recommended an increase in the number of
counterintelligence and counter-surveillance assets available to
component commanders to conduct vulnerability assessments, and to
provide in-transit augmentation for transiting units. Have the Services
authorized and manned additional CI/CS assets in support of component
commanders? Have any host nations objected to advance visits or
vulnerability assessments of transit facilities?
General Shelton. As the Crouch-Gehman Commission accurately pointed
out, we must better tailor intelligence to our in-transit units and
improve our counterintelligence capability, including human
intelligence and signals intelligence. The Secretary of Defense has
requested intelligence agency input regarding this recommendation, to
include, if required, options for reprioritizing intelligence support.
With regard to human and signals intelligence, we are constantly
reviewing the allocation of these important and scarce resources and
have already completed some reallocation. For the longer term, the
Intelligence Program Review Group will be reviewing and validating the
need for additional capability. The review will be completed in the
next few months. The CINCs are concurrently reviewing ways to better
tailor intelligence within their areas of responsibility.
We have had some objections by host nations to certain sensitive
areas being looked at by our country vulnerability assessment teams.
However, in most cases we have not encountered objections.
Admiral Clark. Yes. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)
has deployed additional counterintelligence and countersurveillance
(CI/CS) assets to overseas commands in support of ongoing fleet
operations. In addition, NCIS is in the process of adding additional
permanent billets to overseas theaters. These billets are designated to
provide up to the minute situational awareness to arriving naval units.
They conduct liaison with local authorities in addition to their own
CI/CS responsibilities.
No host nation has denied a naval advance team visit or
vulnerability assessment. In fact, most host nations have been very
cooperative with U.S. efforts to enhance our required security. There
have been occasional discrepancies and miscommunications in this
process. However in every case, we have been able to work through the
issues and accomplish our objectives.
force protection staff increases
14. Senator Warner. General Shelton, after-action reviews revealed
force protection duties at U.S. Navy Central Command were additional
duties for assigned operational personnel. The Crouch-Gehman Commission
recommended that component commanders have full-time force protection
staffs. Do component commanders in high-risk areas now have full-time
force protection staffs? When do you expect this recommendation to be
fully implemented?
General Shelton. This important issue involving full-time
antiterrorism officers and staffs is being worked aggressively by DOD.
The revised DOD Instruction 2000.16, ``Antiterrorism Program
Standards,'' reissued 14 June 2001, now mandates that all component
commands employ antiterrorism officers full time. Approximately 80
percent of component command staffs currently have full-time AT
officers. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and
Services have formed a working group to address the remaining AT
officer manning shortfalls and to develop a methodology to assist the
Services in meeting this new requirement to man these important
billets.
security assessment teams
15. Senator Warner. General Shelton, you currently have six Joint
Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams to assess
antiterrorism/force protection readiness. Is this an adequate number of
teams to properly carry out this critical mission? Do the six current
teams have any funding or personnel shortfalls?
General Shelton. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the
Joint Staff's ``field agent'' for funding and staffing Joint Staff
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) teams, has no funding or
personnel shortfalls. In fact, DTRA was recently successful in hiring
two additional personnel with weapons of mass destruction expertise,
thereby expanding the breadth of JSIVA capability.
conduct of accountability investigation
16. Senator Warner. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, earlier
incidents in the Central Command--such as the attacks involving the
Stark and the Vincennes--were investigated through the operational
chain of command. I note that the recent accident on the training range
in Kuwait is also being investigated through the operational chain of
command--i.e. CENTCOM. Why was the decision made in the case of Cole to
have accountability/disciplinary matters investigated through the
Service, rather than the operational chain?
General Shelton. As a matter of historical perspective, I would
like to note that there is no written directive with application to
unified commanders concerning the conduct of investigations into
incidents such as the U.S.S. Cole and Udairi Range. In addition,
USCENTCOM reviewed investigations into previous incidents both in the
Central Command area of responsibility and other regions. From that
review USCENTCOM determined that there is no set practice for
investigations that include both Service and joint entities. The
investigation included Khobar Towers, Secretary of Defense-appointed
Downing Commission; Stark and Vincennes, USCINCCENT convened; Marine
Barracks, Lebanon, Secretary of Defense-convened commission; Black
Hawks, Secretary of Defense-directed USCINCEUR to investigate
(USCINCEUR delegated to U.S. Air Forces Europe); U.S.S. Saratoga, U.S.
Navy and SIXTH FLEET; U.S.S. Iwo Jima, convened by U.S. Navy
(Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic (although the incident
occurred in Bahrain)); U.S.S. Iowa, U.S. Navy (incident occurred in the
Caribbean); USAF plane crash in Croatia of plane carrying Secretary Ron
Brown, USAF; Cavalese cable car, USMC (incident occurred in Italy with
NATO implications).
As U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (USNAVCENT) is located in the
theater, and as the U.S.S. Cole incident involved only naval forces,
the determination was made that USNAVCENT should proceed to investigate
Cole. Because of Bahrain's proximity to Yemen, Vice Admiral Moore was
able to have an investigation team on site in about 12 hours from the
time of the incident.
By comparison, the Udairi Range incident occurred on a bombing
range used for joint and combined training and involved U.S. Navy, U.S.
Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Forces, as well as Kuwait and
New Zealand forces. For this reason, USCINCCENT decided to convene the
investigation. At USCINCCENT's direction, Lt. Gen. DeLong, Deputy
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, coordinated with the involved
Services to put together a joint and combined investigating team that
included the appropriate mix of specialties and Kuwait and New Zealand
participation. The report of investigation was forwarded to USCENTCOM
component commanders to take action with regard to recommendations
contained therein.
Admiral Clark. The purpose of the JAGMAN was to investigate the
actions of the crew before and during their brief stop for fuel in
Yemen. With the exception of the initial decision to use Yemen as a
fueling port, the entire focus of the JAGMAN was on the Navy crew's
actions. Through conversations with Commander in Chief, U.S. Central
Command, it was determined that the Navy was in the best position to
conduct an investigation into the actions taken by the ship's crew. The
Crouch-Gehman report addressed the issues outside the lifelines of
Cole.
The Udairi Range bombing mishap, on the other hand, occurred during
a joint/combined exercise under the Unified Commander's authority.
Navy, Army, Air Force, as well as Kuwaiti and New Zealand forces were
involved in that mishap. Consequently, it was more appropriate for the
operational chain of command to investigate the Udairi Range mishap.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
maintaining focus
17. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, I congratulate you on your
timely response to the Crouch-Gehman Commission recommendations.
Although your actions will certainly improve the security of our
forces, I am concerned that as time passes there will again be
relaxation of security measures. How do you maintain a constant state
of heightened security awareness?
General Shelton. Maintaining a reasonable and constant state of
security awareness and avoiding what I refer to as the ``sine wave
effect,'' where antiterrorism awareness increases after an incident
then diminishes over time, is one of the DOD Antiterrorism Program's
most difficult challenges. Accordingly, Antiterrorism Program standards
specifically address requirements to maintain AT awareness.
Antiterrorism awareness is also a key assessment focus of our Joint
Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Program. A key component of
our antiterrorism training program includes mandatory, periodic
awareness training for all DOD personnel and for all dependents over
the age of 14 years old on overseas assignments. Our AT training
program also includes formal seminars to our most senior DOD leadership
to ensure proper awareness and support at the highest levels. Also, I
personally encourage commanders at all levels to promote antiterrorism
awareness when I address them at conferences and other venues. As I
have stated many times including in my written statement before this
committee, it's not a matter of ``if'' but ``when'' the next terrorist
attack will occur; therefore, we must remain vigilant.
antiterrorism funding
18. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, you indicate that in fiscal
year 2001, the Department increased antiterrorism funding from $100
million to $3.5 billion. Do you anticipate that this level of funding
will be sustained over a period of time or was this a one-time
increase?
General Shelton. In fiscal year 2001, we expect $3.5 billion is
being spent on AT across the DOD, an increase of $100 million over the
$3.4 billion spent in fiscal year 2000. For fiscal year 2002, while we
do not yet know the specific dollar amount, we anticipate it will be
greater than the fiscal year 2001 amount. We expect this level of
funding will be sustained over time.
assessment teams
19. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, I have been told that your
Vulnerability Assessment Teams do a great job in identifying
vulnerabilities and offering suggestions on how to improve security.
However, when it comes time to implement the improvements, the
organization, which is already fiscally constrained, may not be able to
fully comply with the recommendations. What are the funding mechanisms
to support these security improvements?
General Shelton. The Department of Defense has two primary funding
mechanisms available to fund security improvements.
The first funding mechanism is the Combating Terrorism Readiness
Initiative Fund. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund
resources emergent and emergency antiterrorism requirements that cannot
wait for the normal Service Program Objective Memorandum process. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages this fund and only
combatant commands are eligible to receive funding from it. We now
allow the fund to not only cover initial purchase of emergent
requirements but to also include associated ``next year'' maintenance
funding until the Services can assume maintenance responsibility for
follow-on years through the normal budget process.
The second funding mechanism is the normal budget process. The
Joint Staff (J-34), in conjunction with Office of the Secretary of
Defense, staff elements having resource and program oversight, reviews
the adequacy of resources proposed by the Services and DOD agencies to
meet DOD AT/FP objectives. Concerns are brought to my attention
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for discussion with the
Secretary of Defense.
Last year, the Department approved a resource prioritization and
justification process to enable the Services to work more closely with
the CINCs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff to
identify high-priority requirements to fund programs critical to AT/FP
preparation and response. The goal is to have interaction early to
better support Service program development and consider the CINCs'
important unfunded requirements.
flow of information
20. Senator Thurmond. General Robertson, one of the concerns
repeatedly raised is that commanders are flooded with information
regarding threats and they have a difficult time determining the real
threat. How do you avoid this problem within your command?
General Robertson. Senator Thurmond, let me first thank you for
your support for the women and men of United States Transportation
Command and for your superb leadership in the United States Senate as
President Pro Tempore.
The global nature of our transportation mission challenges us to
provide the right information to just the right people, but it is a
challenge we actively engage. Geographic Commanders in Chief (CINC)
coordinate antiterrorist matters with us as a functional command. My
responsibility as a functional Commander in Chief is to initiate timely
coordination of these matters with the geographic CINC to assure my
commanders have the right information to support decision-making. It is
through this coordination that we work to avoid ``flooding'' commanders
with information. Well-established and effective command and control
procedures minimize potential confusion.
Our Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation (JICTRANS) and our
Counterintelligence Staff Office (CISO) dedicate a great deal of energy
to reviewing threat data for potential impact on USTRANSCOM operations,
paying special attention to any resources transiting areas presenting
potential threats. We engage with our component commands to work these
issues, and coordinate as necessary with the responsible geographic
CINC's Force Protection infrastructure. Always cognizant of the
potential for information overload, we limit the information shared to
that with direct application, while taking care not to apply too strong
a filter and perhaps withhold vital information. We rely heavily on the
geographic CINC's organizations to share the most current data with us.
Air Mobility Command (AMC) operates a robust Threat Working Group
(TWG) to support their assets in transit from one geographic region to
another. On a daily basis, the AMC TWG weighs planned missions against
the known threats and makes risk assessment recommendations to
commanders--everything from continuing business as normal, to
temporarily halting the airflow in specific geographic areas.
Since Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Military Traffic
Management Command (MTMC) do not have robust intelligence
organizations, we put special emphasis on reviewing threat data for
them. Our USTRANSCOM intelligence, counterintelligence, and force
protection elements coordinate with counterparts within the geographic
CINCs to ensure relevant threats are recognized and understood.
Since the Cole tragedy, a number of initiatives are underway to
strengthen already established relationships between our component
commanders, their supporting intelligence and counterintelligence
agencies, and counterparts in the geographic CINCs. Constant awareness
of the vulnerability of our global transportation resources mitigates
against the threat.
changes in operations
21. Senator Thurmond. General Robertson, since the tragic attack on
the U.S.S. Cole, what operational changes have you made in the steaming
schedule for our preposition ships? It seems to me that these high
dollar vessels are lucrative targets for any sea borne terrorist.
General Robertson. Senator Thurmond, I am reminded of a quote by a
20th century American philosopher, ``Those who cannot remember the past
are doomed to repeat it.'' George Santyana, 1905. Rest assured, United
States Transportation Command embraces the lessons of history . . . our
force protection plans cover our entire force from our most agile
aircraft to our prepositioned assets.
I agree with you that our preposition ships are high-value assets
and do not dispute their potential for becoming a lucrative target. To
ensure these ships do not become easy targets, we have exploited (and
will continue to exploit) the mobility inherent in sea borne forces so
that we routinely keep these ships in low-threat areas or augment their
defenses when a mission requires them in a higher threat area.
Since the attack on U.S.S. Cole, preposition ships have received
increased attention to integrate force protection into their
operational employment. Specifically, four operational changes can be
identified. First, some ships were re-positioned within their assigned
areas of responsibility away from higher-threat areas. Second, despite
increasing cost by 15-20 percent, some in port maintenance periods have
been re-scheduled to lower-threat areas. Third, some port visits have
been canceled or postponed until the information to support a proper
risk assessment is available. Finally, the risk-management procedures
implemented via in port security plans (submitted by the ships and
involving their operational chain-of-command for approval) have been
emphasized and reinforced.
maintaining security awareness
22. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, you indicate that the Navy is
dedicated to instilling an antiterrorist and force protection mindset
in every one of your sailors. We all know that the difficult task will
be to maintain such a mindset; what are your plans to continually
reinforce this concern?
Admiral Clark. We have made antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP)
a daily part of every sailor's life. We have developed a new warfare
doctrine publication and prepared standardized tactics and doctrine for
combating terrorism. We conduct training at every level, from the
individual sailor to the entire battle group. Every individual is
required to receive Level One AT/FP training on a reoccurring basis.
Every command is required to have an AT/FP officer who has been through
advanced training and is certified to provide Level One training to his
or her command. Commanding and executive officers receive intense AT/FP
training during their training pipelines. We will be requiring
individual commands to report AT/FP readiness status on their Status of
Readiness and Training reports. Ships are required to meet immediate
superior in command-based AT/FP standards of readiness and demonstrate
them as an individual unit and as a part of a battle group during pre-
deployment operations. Individually manned watches are receiving more
intense weapons training as well as improved equipment and oversight to
better enable them and increase the level of vigilance. These are all
elements that have been incorporated in the training and operational
continuum to reinforce and demonstrate the importance of AT/FP in the
Navy. The overall goal is to instill a sea change in the mindset of the
individual sailor and be better prepared to meet this continuing
threat.
personnel augmentation
23. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, although I applaud your action
to increase your permanent security billets by 2,000 personnel, I
wonder what other areas will be understaffed to provide these
additional personnel. Is this a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul and
as a result is this impacting readiness in other areas?
Admiral Clark. Congressional support coupled with the Navy's
initiatives has resulted in higher retention. This additional strength
has lowered gaps at sea by 15-20 percent, increased manning of critical
skills, and improved overall Navy personnel readiness. The increase in
security billets also contributed to higher end strength, which,
although exceeding the fiscal year 2001 end strength authorization,
remains within the 1 percent flexibility allowed by law. Consequently,
the Navy will be seeking relief through a supplemental appropriation
and/or reprogramming to support additional end strength for fiscal year
2001.
impact on operations
24. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, how have the changes you have
implemented in response to the U.S.S. Cole attack impacted your mission
accomplishment both in terms of funding and timeliness of operations?
Admiral Clark. The new minimum AT/FP requirements I have placed on
the Navy have been costly. It has required the fleets to purchase new
equipment, such as non-lethal technologies and patrol boats. We have
placed greater training requirements on our sailors, including advanced
exercises and drills during the pre-deployment workup cycle. The Navy
has not received additional funding earmarked for AT/FP to fund these
initiatives. Money has been reprogrammed, often at the cost of
alternative programs. Fortunately, we have managed to implement this
new security baseline without affecting the timeliness of our
operations. We continue to deploy all of our assets on schedule to meet
national security requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Bunning
funding force protection measures
25. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, are you planning on
requesting additional funds in the budget to implement improved force
protection measures, and if so, how much?
General Shelton. In fiscal year 2000, approximately $3.4 billion
was spent on antiterrorism across the Department of Defense.
Approximately 90 percent of the budget funds manpower (military,
civilian, and contract personnel). The remaining funding is associated
with physical security items. In fiscal year 2001, it is expected that
$3.5 billion is being spent on AT across the DOD, an increase of $100
million. For fiscal year 2002, while we do not yet know the specific
dollar amount, we anticipate it will be greater than the fiscal year
2001 amount.
26. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, the Commission Report
recommended increasing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund. Would that increase
include funds to allow upgrade of a ship's close-in weapons system to
give it the ability to target and destroy close-in surface craft and
slow flying aircraft?
General Shelton. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund
(CbT RIF) resources emergent and emergency antiterrorism requirements
that cannot wait for the normal Service Program Objective Memorandum
process. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages this fund
and only combatant commands are eligible to receive funding from it.
We also, now, allow the fund to not only cover initial purchase of
emergent requirements, but to also include associated ``next year''
maintenance funding until the Services can assume maintenance
responsibility for follow-on years through the normal budget process.
The Vulcan Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), however, is a
Navy-sponsored weapon system program, and therefore upgrades and
modifications to that system would not qualify for CbT RIF funding.
engagement policy
27. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, it has been stated that one
of the reasons Cole was refueling in Aden was part of a policy of
engagement with Yemen. It is my understanding that this policy was
begun after coordinating with the State Department. Was the State
Department the primary advocate for this engagement policy?
General Shelton. In 1997, Central Command viewed engagement with
Yemen as a stabilizing opportunity for regional security. In 1998, the
U.S. State Department removed Yemen from its list of state sponsors of
terrorism. Once off the list, USCINCCENT made a decision to increase
engagement with Yemen. The U.S. Ambassador to Yemen also encouraged
U.S. military assistance in improving relations with Yemen.
28. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, were the risks to U.S. forces
considered when formulating this plan of engagement, and was the
viability of this plan reevaluated when the threat to our troops
increased?
General Shelton. Risks to U.S. forces are a primary factor when
formulating and executing engagement plans. Engagement activities are
always carefully reevaluated when the threats to our troops increase.
close-in force protection
29. Senator Bunning. Admiral Clark, currently, Navy ships do not
have an automatic, stabilized weapons system capable of destroying
close-in surface craft or slow flying aircraft. This would not have
made a difference in the case of the U.S.S. Cole where identification
of the threat was the issue, but easily could in other circumstances.
Do you intend to add funds to the Navy's budget request for a weapon
system capable of this kind of close-in force protection to address
this deficiency? If not, why not?
Admiral Clark. Navy ships employ a multi-layer ship self defense
capability. This layered defense includes the 5,, Gun system which can
engage contacts out to 11 miles, the Rolling Airframe Missile with the
Helo Air Surface mode (to be fielded in fiscal year 2002), the CIWS
Block 1B and other similar systems, and small caliber guns.
The Navy is evaluating ways to improve close-in self defense
capability including the CIWS block 1B which would be an upgrade to the
over 350 CIWS mounts in the U.S. fleet, and the Mk 46 30mm chain gun
which is being installed on the LPD 17 class. All of the options are
fiscally constrained and will be evaluated in the overall funding
priority as established by the Nation's leadership.
jagman investigation
30. Senator Bunning. Admiral Clark, the original investigation into
the Cole attack was a one-man, JAGMAN investigation. This is an
administrative fact-finding procedure. In the aftermath of the attack,
while the crew was still fighting to save the ship, it made sense to
immediately send one man to conduct an investigation, to ensure that
perishable information would not be lost in the confusion. However,
there is only so much one man can do. Some of the major results of this
JAGMAN were disapproved by the chain of command. There is disagreement
over whether some of the defensive measures, required under the ship's
force protection plan, but which were not taken, may have prevented the
incident. Why has there not been a follow-up Board of Inquiry or Court
of Inquiry to have a more thorough review of what happened?
Admiral Clark. The JAGMAN investigation was a very thorough
inquiry. It clearly documented all the pertinent facts before, during,
and following the attack. The investigation gave the entire chain of
command all of the information required to assess accountability and
make the necessary decisions subsequent to the investigation.
Regardless of the type of investigation, subsequent endorsers sometimes
disagree with the investigating body's findings of fact, opinions, or
recommendations. In this instance, there was no disagreement on the
central findings of fact.
31. Senator Bunning. Admiral Clark, the JAGMAN investigation, in
addition to faulting members of U.S.S. Cole's crew, also singled out
the Cole's higher headquarters as having reviewed the ship's force
protection plan in a perfunctory manner. Why has there not been any
investigation to determine accountability at command levels above that
of the ship?
Admiral Clark. Such an accountability assessment was completed on
January 19, 2001, by then-Secretary of Defense Cohen. On January 9,
2001, then-Secretary of Defense Cohen directed General Shelton, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide his ``assessment of
operational and administrative matters associated with [the U.S.S.
Cole] incident, including issues of accountability, as well as any
other matter you deem appropriate.'' On January 19, 2001, after
receiving General Shelton's advice, Secretary Cohen, in both a written
memorandum and a briefing, identified the shared accountability of the
entire chain of command, including myself, the Secretary of the Navy,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and himself.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
small units
32. Senator Levin. General Shelton, in your prepared statement you
state that ``Our goal is not only to reduce the exposure of our in-
transit ships and planes--a shortcoming exposed by the bombing of
U.S.S. Cole--but to ensure our antiterrorism/force protection program
remains dynamic, thus reducing our vulnerability to terrorists. In
addition to ships and planes, we also have small units, mainly Army
special operations and Navy SEALs, that not only transit several
countries but perform operations like demining and conduct training,
often in remote areas of host nations.'' Are you satisfied that
appropriate attention is being paid to the force protection of those
small units?
General Shelton. The Cole attack and subsequent Crouch-Gehman
Commission increased our awareness to the potential vulnerabilities of
all our in-transit units, including the special operations units you
mention. I am comfortable with the level of attention given to these
smaller units and I am confident their force protection needs will not
be overlooked. To cite just one example, we require deployment orders
for these smaller units to contain force protection requirements and
verify their force protection support before orders are approved.
where was the chain of command?
33. Senator Levin. General Shelton, U.S.S. Cole was on deployment
in Central Command's geographic area of responsibility, under the
operational command of Central Command's naval component commander,
operating under the threat condition set by Central Command and under
force protection measures set out in Joint Pub 3-07.2. Nevertheless
Central Command did not convene or review the investigation into the
attack on U.S.S. Cole.
By contrast, I recall the investigation into the incident in 1989
in which U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly and tragically shot down an
Iranian Airbus was convened by Central Command staff, reviewed by CINC
Central Command, who decided to issue a non-punitive letter to an
officer on the ship, and routed to the Secretary of Defense via the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the recently
completed investigation into the live fire incident at the bombing
range in Kuwait was convened and reviewed by CINC Central Command.
Why didn't Central Command convene and review the investigation
into the terrorist attack on U.S.S. Cole?
General Shelton. As a matter of historical perspective, I would
like to note that there is no written directive with application to
unified commanders concerning the conduct of investigations into
incidents such as the U.S.S. Cole and Udairi Range. In addition,
USCENTCOM reviewed investigations into previous incidents both in the
Central Command area of responsibility and other regions. From that
review USCENTCOM determined that there is no set practice for
investigations that include both Service and joint entities. The
investigation included Khobar Towers, Secretary of Defense-appointed
Downing Commission; Stark and Vincennes, USCINCCENT convened; Marine
Barracks, Lebanon, Secretary of Defense-convened commission; Black
Hawks, Secretary of Defense-directed USCINCEUR to investigate
(USCINCEUR delegated to U.S. Air Forces Europe); U.S.S. Saratoga, U.S.
Navy and SIXTH FLEET; U.S.S. Iwo Jima, convened by U.S. Navy
(Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic (although the incident
occurred in Bahrain)); U.S.S. Iowa, U.S. Navy (incident occurred in the
Caribbean); USAF plane crash in Croatia of plane carrying Secretary Ron
Brown, USAF; Cavalese cable car, USMC (incident occurred in Italy with
NATO implications).
As U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (USNAVCENT) is located in the
theater, and as the U.S.S. Cole incident involved only naval forces,
the determination was made that USNAVCENT should proceed to investigate
Cole. Because of Bahrain's proximity to Yemen, Vice Admiral Moore was
able to have an investigation team on site in about 12 hours from the
time of the incident.
By comparison, the Udairi Range incident occurred on a bombing
range used for joint and combined training and involved U.S. Navy, U.S.
Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Forces, as well as Kuwait and
New Zealand forces. For this reason, USCINCCENT decided to convene the
investigation. At USCINCCENT's direction, Lt. Gen. DeLong, Deputy
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, coordinated with the involved
Services to put together a joint and combined investigating team that
included the appropriate mix of specialties and Kuwait and New Zealand
participation. The report of investigation was forwarded to USCENTCOM
component commanders to take action with regard to recommendations
contained therein.
one osd office with policy and resource responsibility
34. Senator Levin. General Shelton, you note in your prepared
statement that you have recommended, pursuant to a recommendation of
the Crouch-Gehman Commission, that the Office of the Secretary of
Defense align antiterrorism policy and resource responsibility under an
OSD office. As a matter of fact, that recommendation dovetails nicely
with a requirement in section 901 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that requires the Secretary of Defense to
designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense to have the duty to provide
overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and
execution, and allocation and use of resources for combating terrorism.
Has Secretary Rumsfeld acted on your recommendation?
General Shelton. The Secretary of Defense has officially directed
that antiterrorism policy and resource responsibility be consolidated
under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
enhance host-nation security capabilities
35. Senator Levin. General Shelton, the Crouch-Gehman Commission
recommended an interagency, coordinated effort to develop an approach
whereby host-nation security responsibilities could be enhanced so that
it could provide better security for transiting U.S. units. General
Crouch and Admiral Gehman told us that they had in mind international
military education and training and increased security assistance for
host nation security forces for this purpose. Of course those areas are
not within the jurisdiction of this committee and not under the control
of the Department of Defense. Can you tell us if such an interagency
effort is underway to try to bring this about?
General Shelton. An interagency effort is underway, led by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). ASD(SO/LIC) has already formed a
working group with membership from the Department of State and Joint
Staff. The purpose of the working group is to initially develop lines
of communication between DOD and DOS to facilitate resolution of
antiterrorism issues and with a longer-range goal of enhancing host-
nation security capabilities.
component commanders' or cincs' responsibility
36. Senator Levin. General Shelton, the Crouch-Gehman Commission
recommended the component commanders be given the responsibility and
resources to direct tailored force protection measures to be
implemented at specific sites for in-transit units. In the Downing
Report on the bombing of Khobar Towers in June 1996, General Downing
criticized the assignment of such responsibilities to the component
commanders, all but one of whom were and are located thousands of miles
away from the area, and recommended that operational control of all
combatant forces operating in the Gulf region be assigned to one
headquarters. What is your view of the proper assignment of this
responsibility?
General Shelton. At the core of the recommendation from the Crouch-
Gehman Commission was to place the responsibility of oversight for in-
transit force protection with the command that has the cultural
perspective, historical background, intimate knowledge, intimate
knowledge of the area of operations, access both raw and fused
intelligence--with analytical support, and adequate command and
control. In their review, the Crouch-Gehman Commission found that, in
most cases, the lowest level that that authority should reside was the
Component Commander.
What was changed since the Khobar Towers bombing is that we have
more clearly defined command relationships in the area of
responsibility, installed better command and control equipment and
facilities, and increased our capacity worldwide to access intelligence
information near real-time from remote locations. These improvements
support the Crouch-Gehman recommendation to push the force protection
oversight back to the component command in this area of responsibility.
Each combatant command with geographic responsibilities and several
functional combatant commands maintain robust force protection
directorates which are in constant contact with their components. They
perform the day-to-day administration of the overall force protection
program throughout their areas of responsibility. Rarely will a force
protection decision be made without first contacting the unified
commander. In a sense, we have implemented both the recommendation of
the Downing Commission and Crouch-Gehman Commission.
uavs for explosives detection
37. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, we have seen press reports that
indicate the Navy is considering the use of miniature unmanned aerial
vehicles (so-called ``Micro UAVs'') to detect the presence of
explosives at distances from vessels sufficient to prevent terrorists
from repeating a Cole-type attack. Is this report true?
Admiral Clark. Among the priority capabilities that fleet operators
have requested is the ability to detect explosives at a standoff
distance. In response to these requests, the Office of Naval Research
(ONR) recently held a scientific experts' workshop to evaluate the
current state of research in standoff detection of explosives. The
focus of the workshop was to evaluate both potential sensor
technologies to support this objective, as well as to review potential
deployment methods for these sensors. The workshop was well-attended by
government, industry, and academic researchers with current involvement
in explosives detection and related efforts.
With respect to sensor technologies, the workshop resulted in an
assessment that, while there are some worthwhile technologies to
pursue, there is no currently available device that could reliably
perform standoff explosive detection. Because of the critical need for
this technology, ONR will maintain a heightened awareness of government
and industry sponsored research efforts in this area, and will provide
guidance and resourcing, where appropriate, for standoff explosives
detection.
With respect to deployment, a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
would be evaluated as an option if a reliable sensor becomes available.
ONR plans to provide a launch and recovery system, a command and
display system, and two UAVs to 5th Fleet this summer for
experimentation on ways to provide better tactical information.
38. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, do you have other technology
approaches in mind in your efforts to solve this force protection
problem?
Admiral Clark. The Navy is investigating alternative technologies
to better equip the fleet for dealing with the terrorist problem. These
technologies encompass a wide range of capabilities including sensors,
data fusion, non-lethal deterrents, security barriers, and protective
materials.
39. Senator Levin. General Shelton, are you aware of any other
Services or a Department-wide effort to enable our forces to be able to
detect the presence of explosives at tactically significant distances?
General Shelton. I am not aware of efforts to develop explosive
detection devices with the capability to detect the presence of
explosives at tactically significant distances, including use of
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology for this purpose. However,
efforts are underway to increase explosive detection distance. Also,
our technology focus in this area includes use of ``backscatter'' X-
ray-type technology and ``ion-sniffer'' technology. Also, military
working dogs with explosive detection capability remain one of our best
detection capabilities.
Because present technology limits explosive device detection
ranges, detection capabilities are utilized in conjunction with
perimeter security and access control to ensure potential bomb-carrying
vehicles and personnel are inspected at safe distances from personnel
and buildings.
command investigation versus court of inquiry
40. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, the Manual of the Judge Advocate
General calls for the use of a court of inquiry or board of inquiry for
the investigation of a major incident. Major incident is defined as
``an extraordinary incident occurring during the course of official
duties resulting in multiple deaths, substantial property loss, or
substantial harm to the environment where the circumstances suggest a
significant departure from the expected level of professionalism,
leadership, judgment, communication, state of material readiness, or
other relevant standard. Substantial property loss or other harm is
that which greatly exceeds what is normally encountered in the course
of day-to-day operations. These cases are often accompanied by national
public and press interest and significant congressional attention. They
may also have the potential of undermining public confidence in the
naval service. That the case is a major incident may be apparent when
it is first reported or as additional facts become known.''
The call for the use of a more formal type of administrative
investigation and the addition of a definition of ``major incident''
were occasioned by the criticism directed at the Navy over the failings
of the investigation into the explosion on board U.S.S. Iowa in 1989.
Why wasn't a court or board of inquiry convened to inquire into the
attack on U.S.S. Cole?
Admiral Clark. Although this tragedy was a major incident, the
Manual of the Judge Advocate General leaves discretion to the cognizant
Commander to determine the type of inquiry warranted in a specific
case. In this case, after carefully considering all the pertinent
circumstances, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Vice
Admiral Moore determined that a single-officer Command Investigation,
rather than a Board or Court of Inquiry, was warranted.
41. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, what was the justification for
the use of command investigation?
Admiral Clark. The factors weighing in favor of a single-officer
Command Investigation included:
Avoiding interference with the ongoing damage control
efforts required to keep U.S.S. Cole afloat.
Significant security and logistical issues in Aden
Harbor.
Avoiding interference with the FBI investigation.
Knowledge that there was a DOD inquiry planned, which
would review the issues external to the ship.
The scope of the investigation was limited to
examining the actions of the ship's crew before, during, and
following the attack.
42. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, at what level of command was the
decision made to conduct a command investigation into the attack and at
what level was that decision reviewed?
Admiral Clark. Although the type of Manual of the Judge Advocate
General investigation warranted for the U.S.S. Cole incident was Vice
Admiral Moore's decision, he consulted with me prior to making that
decision. Given the limited scope of the investigation and considering
all the pertinent circumstances, I believed that convening a single-
officer Command Investigation was a good decision and I concurred with
Vice Admiral Moore's decision.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
force protection as a priority
43. Senator Landrieu. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, since the
attack I have heard the Department of Defense leadership, including
some of you, make some very interesting public statements. I've heard
``force protection is a primary mission of every commander, we have
prioritized funding and training to address force protection'' and most
recently ``with AT/FP serving as a priority focus of every mission,
activity, and event'' in the second paragraph of Admiral Clark's
prepared testimony today. I am very concerned about the message being
sent to the commanders in the field. I've talked to many of them--most
recently just 2 weeks ago when I visited Barksdale Air Force Base. They
tell me that they keep getting conflicting messages from their
leadership as to what their priorities are. They tell me they have been
told to make safety, retention, quality of life, force protection,
community engagement, fiscal responsibility, and oh yes, mission
accomplishment a priority. I'm here to tell you that can't be done.
I looked up the definition of the word ``priority'' in my Webster's
dictionary and this is what I found: PRIORITY, (1) superiority in rank,
position, or privilege; (2) a preferential rating, especially, one that
allocates rights to goods and services usually in limited supply; (3)
something given or meriting attention before competing alternatives.
I am disturbed by the fact that what commanders in the field--your
subordinates--are hearing from their leadership is that every crisis or
concern is to be made a priority, that their superiors are concerned
about those issues and that they will be evaluated on their ability to
comply.
Even worse is the concept that ``force protection is a primary
mission.'' If that's true, the best thing we can do is just keep our
forces in garrison where they can be protected. The mission can be many
things. It can be combat, presence, regional engagement, or even
training, but it cannot be ``force protection.'' Force protection is an
implied task of every unit--just like feeding and housing the troops,
but it is most assuredly not a mission. I would like you to discuss for
the record exactly what your expectations are with regards to force
protection and address what actions if any, you intend to take to try
to resolve this prioritization problem among your subordinates.
General Shelton. Let me begin by saying that my top priority as the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is and always will be ``mission
accomplishment,'' followed immediately by ``taking care of our
people.'' The issues of safety, retention, quality of life, community
engagement, fiscal responsibility, and force protection, which you
mention, are important means of achieving mission accomplishment and/or
taking care of our people.
Our commanders are charged with the important responsibilities for
mission accomplishment and for the well-being of their people.
Ultimately, it is the inherent responsibility of those commanders to
set priorities on how to best discharge those responsibilities. There
cannot be only one list of priorities.
It is the responsibility of the commanders' operational and
administrative chains of command to ensure that commanders have the
necessary support, fiscal and otherwise, to accomplish the mission and
take care of their people.
With regard to the specific points raised about force protection, I
agree completely with your view. Force protection is not, and cannot be
the mission. Force protection enables our forces to complete their
missions. I have stated in this forum and others that we cannot allow
force protection to become the mission and cannot yield to a ``zero
casualty'' mentality.
Admiral Clark. Force protection is not a mission area in itself: it
a mission enabler. Antiterrorism/force protection is a core competency
that must be integrated into everything we do. Shortly after becoming
the Chief of Naval Operations, I addressed a message to every member of
the service where I stated my top priorities: manpower, current
readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and alignment. Those
priorities have not changed and should be clear to all commanders and
sailors. Force protection certainly falls within the priority of
readiness and it is by no means a new concept. Force protection applies
to every naval activity, be it the conduct of war on the high seas, or
in the execution of a port visit in a foreign country, or the planning
of a command holiday party in a public setting. The welfare of our men
and women in uniform will always be my top priority, regardless of the
ever-changing nature and scope of the many missions that we ask them to
do.
systematic problems
44. Senator Landrieu. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, I have
reviewed your prepared testimony, the Crouch-Gehman report, and the
Cole JAGMAN and I remain troubled. In briefings here on the Hill and in
press conferences we've heard comments about systemic failures and that
the entire chain of command contributed to the Cole tragedy. Despite
that, I can't clearly determine what was done wrong that let the attack
slip through. Given the intelligence we had at the time, where was the
breakdown?
General Shelton, in your testimony you address implementation of
the Crouch-Gehman recommendations. If the exact same attack were
attempted today (and we had intelligence no different from what we had
last October) would it succeed? Why or why not?
General Shelton. The Cole Commission revealed that there was no
threat intelligence available to indicate that an attack was imminent
or that the threat had increased. Our intelligence did indicate the
presence of a threat capable of large-scale attacks and the threat
level in Aden, Yemen, at the time of the attack was ``significant.''
The Cole Commission underscored the need for our intelligence
community to refocus and tailor its resources, including human
intelligence and signals intelligence, to mitigate the terrorist threat
for in-transit units and offered important recommendations. The Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff are aggressively acting
upon all those recommendations.
In the case of U.S.S. Cole, terrorists were able to exploit
perimeter security and access control vulnerabilities associated with
waterside approaches to our ship while in port. Without adequate
perimeter security and access control, commanders may be unable to
determine hostile intent or a hostile act with sufficient time to
react.
Since the Cole attack, in the higher threat areas, we have
mitigated perimeter security and access control vulnerabilities through
use of U.S. military organic capability and host-nation support. While
our efforts cannot guarantee that a similar attack will not be
attempted in the future, our enhanced capability will better enable our
commanders to determine hostile intent in sufficient time to take
appropriate action. In situations where in-transit unit security is not
adequate, as determined by the operational chain of command, visits are
disapproved.
Admiral Clark. The breakdown that allowed the attack on U.S.S. Cole
can be divided into two areas. The first is a breakdown in our
intelligence system. We did not have a clear and unambiguous warning
that this attack would occur. The only way to get this type of warning
is to expand our intelligence collection efforts and that is being
carried out. Second, ships in the port of Aden were expected to carry
out THREATCON Bravo measures based on the perceived threat. In
hindsight we can see where there were gaps in the implementation of our
THREATCON Bravo measures. The determination of the Navy's JAGMAN
investigation was that even had all of the THREATCON measures been
fully implemented, it is doubtful that the attack could have been
averted. The threat measures were adequate to meet the threat, but not
the tactics employed to properly execute these measures in the case of
a waterborne attack.
45. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, do you agree with General
Shelton's comments?
Admiral Clark. We have greatly improved our tactics to prevent this
form of attack from happening. The defense-in-depth concept allows
commanders to better evaluate potential hostile contacts by designating
concentric zones of assessment and threat. We have new technology to
enable increased detection ability. We have improved the commanders'
situational awareness and fostered greater host nation support and
cooperation concerning port and base security. We are working to
improve our intelligence collection ability. We have written new
tactics and procedures and increased training to improve our force
protection awareness and procedures. Our goal is to ensure the same
type of attack would not succeed and we feel we have taken measures to
ensure it does not.
rules of engagement
46. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, one issue that was largely
ignored by the press in the wake of the Cole attack is the subject of
Rules of Engagement (ROE). Of course, ever since the attack on U.S.S.
Stark our policy has been quite public--commanders have the authority
and obligation to take defensive action against any unit that commits a
hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent. I realize that there are
classified modifications to that basic ROE, but they are not germane to
my question. My understanding is that our current ROE and policy in the
Middle East is to be generally ``de-escalatory,'' to prevent straining
relationships with our friends in the region and to preclude a tragedy
like the Vincennes incident or the downing of the Army Blackhawk
helicopters. Given that policy and ROE, if a ship today was faced with
what the Cole faced last year, would they be able to engage the boat?
If so, what has changed that permits engagement?
Admiral Clark. When the Crouch-Gehman Commission reviewed ROE, they
determined the existing rules were adequate. Therefore, we have made no
changes to the ROE. The real problem becomes determining the existence
of hostile intent. The new procedures that we have implemented since
the attack on U.S.S. Cole are intended to provide the crew with the
ability to determine both the means and the intent of a unit that
possesses the ability to conduct such an attack. The layering of
defensive zones will allow us to approach, identify, and inspect
suspect vessels to locate the means (bomb, biological hazard, etc).
Furthermore, the use of escalating levels of non-lethal technology and
weapons will also allow us to determine intent, while complying with
the requirement to meet the threat with proportional force. The Navy is
in the process of equipping its units with these state-of-the-art non-
lethal technologies. The U.S.S. Cole did not have the advantage of
being able to rely on these new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
47. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, is it likely that ship would
prevent a determined attack by a suicidal terrorist? Why?
Admiral Clark. An understanding of the terrorist's intent is
essential. Suicide bombers are willing to die only in a successful
attack. To die in an unsuccessful attack is not acceptable. We also
know terrorist units conduct extensive pre-operational surveillance
looking for potential seams to exploit. We continue to work to plug
identified seams. We now possess a very visible and viable defense to
deter potential aggressors from a future attack. Equally important, we
have given our sailors the tools and training to successfully defend
against a pending attack. While a terrorist attack is always possible,
our new security baseline is designed to make a future attack like that
on U.S.S. Cole unlikely.
navy security forces
48. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, in your testimony you say that
you are converting collateral duty Master-at-Arms to full-time security
professionals. Does this mean that additional billets will be added to
each ship to provide each ship with additional sailors in the MAA
rating and prevent cutting other ratings?
Admiral Clark. Collateral duty Master-at-Arms (designated by the
Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC) 9545) are personnel serving
primarily in sea-intensive ratings but who are assigned to shore duty
to security-type billets. Personnel in the Master-at-Arms rating are
full-time security professionals. In an effort to establish a viable
full-time professional force, given heightened global force protection
requirements, we are expanding our full-time security force. This is
being accomplished both through conversion of personnel possessing the
9545 NEC to the Master-at-Arms, and through recruitment into the
Master-at-Arms rating upon initial enlistment.
Additional billets will not be added to each ship. The force
protection mission is designed to support our ships when in port
(Mobile Harbor Security Protection), at home and abroad, thereby
detailing security professionals to shore and overseas shore billets.
antiterrorism/force protection (at/fp) equipment
49. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, in your testimony you detail
the AT/FP equipment all deploying units have received and mention some
technology equipment that was tested in Quantico and Dahlgren. Do ships
deploying today receive any equipment that is different than what the
Cole deployed with? If so, what equipment?
Admiral Clark. In response to lessons learned from U.S.S. Cole, the
currently deployed Enterprise Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and Kearsarge
Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) were outfitted with additional
Allowance Equipage List (AEL) items to meet short-term antiterrorism/
force protection requirements. These include: inflatable boats/motors,
portable generators, waterline security lighting, waterside markers,
warning signs and tape, marine hailers, vehicle inspection equipment,
tire spike sets, plastic/water-filled vehicle barriers and tents for
fleet landings, mobile x-ray units, additional hand-held radios, hand-
held and weapons-mounted tactical lights, walk-through metal detectors,
and waterside video surveillance systems. In addition, we have
increased the number of small arms and minor caliber weapons that each
ship and submarine carries, and provided for rigid hull inflatable boat
improvements.
50. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, has any of this new technology
been selected for deployment to the fleet? If so, what equipment and
how much will it cost to equip every ship?
Admiral Clark. At present, none of the new technology equipment
being evaluated at the Naval Operations Other Than War Technology
Center at Dahlgren has been selected for procurement. Evaluation of
promising new equipment continues, along with developing related
tactics, techniques, and procedures for integration with legacy current
shipboard antiterrorism/force protection sensor and engagement systems.
To fill gaps in fielding new technology to the fleet, other short-term
initiatives are being pursued. For example, night vision device
upgrades and high-intensity hand-held spotlights with night vision
capability ($8 million) and hands-free encrypted radios and protected
voice portable communication systems ($10 million) have recently been
evaluated and are being procured for deploying forces in fiscal year
2001. Additional equipment, such as explosive ion detectors, will be
added to the current carrier battle group/amphibious ready group
Allowance Equipage List outfitting as soon as the evaluation is
complete. Outfitting all ships will require at least $8.6 million
applied over the next few years.
defensive posture
51. Senator Landrieu. All of you have testified to the fact that we
must remain engaged around the world. I believe Admiral Clark quite
eloquently expressed that feeling in his testimony when he said
``Retrenchment and a bunker mentality are inappropriate and imprudent
responses to the asymmetric threat.'' I agree with you and am on the
record supporting our policy of engagement. It's the cost of doing
business if we are to remain a superpower. With that in mind, I have a
few questions.
General Shelton, my understanding is that several port visits have
been canceled since last October because the host nation security
support was deemed to be inadequate. Is this correct? If so are we then
putting force protection and that ``bunker mentality'' ahead of the
engagement mission?
General Shelton. Immediately after the Cole attack last October, a
number of ship visits were, in fact, canceled because the available
force protection, including security assistance by the host nations,
was determined to be inadequate for the level of threat.
In USCENTCOM, visits to all ports except Jebel Ali, United Arab
Emirates, and Mina Sulman, Bahrain, were canceled until port
vulnerability assessments could be conducted (Jebel Ali and Mina Sulman
were previously determined by USCINCCENT to have adequate security). In
USEUCOM several visits, including port visits to Naples, Italy, were
canceled until port assessments could be completed. We have had several
instances where we have canceled port visits due to potential terrorist
threats and lack of host nation security. In the case of port visits
canceled due to a lack of adequate security, I view this as an
education process with the host nation--lack of awareness of the new
measures we require to be implemented, and the seriousness with which
we take force protection. Port visits eventually resumed for all
locations where it was determined that overall security was adequate
for the level of threat. This action, however, should not be confused
with a ``bunker mentality.'' Our servicemen and women will always be at
some level of risk to terrorist attack because of the nature of their
missions in support of our national interests. It is the responsibility
of DOD leadership, however, to ensure everything possible is done to
ensure their safety, and to mitigate the risks to them, including those
posed by terrorists.
52. Senator Landrieu. General Robertson, my staff informs me that
MSC ships, because of their civilian crews, are not required nor able
to comply with the same force protection measures and policies as Navy
ships. Is this true, and I believe it is, how do you justify the fact
that MSC ships have far less security and far less restrictive security
measures in everything from liberty regulations (including the buddy
system and overnight liberty policy) to security force requirements?
Admiral Clark, would you comment on this as well?
General Robertson. You bring up an important area of concern of
mine . . . protecting my civilian mariner partners. The differences in
force protection measures and policies between civilian-crewed MSC
ships and Navy ships with military crews are due primarily to legal
considerations inherent with the civilian crews. Coordinated, Navy-wide
force protection policies and measures that accommodate these
differences have been developed; MSC ships comply with these policies
and measures as a matter of routine.
For example, MSC mariners who are government employees comply with
liberty regulations (buddy system and overnight liberty policy) along
with their military counterparts in the Navy. This is possible because
MSC has negotiated agreements with unions representing civil-service
mariners to impose liberty restrictions without penalty (cost to the
government). MSC-contracted mariners who are not government employees
are not obligated to comply with such liberty regulations. Cost-
effective contract terms are being investigated with the various
operating companies and unions involved.
MSC ships are unarmed with the exception of a modest complement of
small arms for a minimum of five qualified crewmembers. The civilian
mariners (whether government or contractor employees) that operate MSC
ships (whether government-owned or contractor-owned) are not members of
the Armed Forces or Federal law enforcement. Accordingly, MSC civilian
mariners are not governed by military Status of Forces Agreements and
are restricted in use of deadly force to protect human life only and
are not permitted to use deadly force solely for the protection or
security of property. In accordance with their civilian status,
civilian mariners may not be protected by Status of Forces rules of
engagement or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The small
crew size of MSC ships generally precludes the tasking of crewmembers
for full-time security duties without impacting their primary mission
(cargo operations, etc.). Accordingly, operational commanders augment
MSC ships when, in their judgment, additional security measures are
required.
Due to the Navy/DOD-wide ``teamwork'' approach to security
described above, security for MSC ships cannot be isolated, compared,
and characterized as ``less'' or ``less restrictive.'' Civilian-crewed
ships bring great efficiencies to the Navy and allow resources--
particularly military manpower--to be allocated more efficiently and
effectively. The Navy has and will continue to coordinate the
capabilities and limitations of civilian-crewed ships within the
overall operations of Navy and DOD.
Admiral Clark. The differences in force protection measures and
policies between civilian-crewed Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships
and Navy ships with military crews are due primarily to legal
considerations inherent with the civilian crews. Coordinated, Navy-wide
force protection policies and measures that accommodate these
differences have been developed MSC ships comply with these policies
and measures as a matter of routine.
For example, MSC mariners who are government employees comply with
liberty regulations (buddy system and overnight liberty policy) along
with their military counterparts in the Navy. This is possible because
MSC has negotiated agreements with unions representing civil-service
mariners to impose liberty restrictions without penalty (cost to the
government). MSC-contracted mariners who are not government employees
are not obligated to comply with such liberty regulations. Cost-
effective contract terms are being investigated with the various
operating companies and unions involved.
MSC ships are unarmed with the exception of a modest complement of
small arms for a minimum of five qualified crewmembers. The civilian
mariners (whether government or contractor employees) that operate MSC
ships (whether government-owned or contractor-owned) are not members of
the Armed Forces or Federal law enforcement. Accordingly, MSC civilian
mariners are restricted in use of deadly force to protect human life
only and are not permitted to use deadly force solely for the
protection or security of property. In accordance with their civilian
status, civilian mariners may not be protected by Status of Forces
Agreements and are not governed by military rules of engagement or the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. The small crew size of MSC ships
generally precludes the tasking of crewmembers for full-time security
duties without impacting their primary mission (cargo operations,
etc.). Accordingly, operational commanders augment MSC ships when, in
their judgment, additional security measures are required.
Due to the Navy and Department of Defense-wide ``teamwork''
approach to security described above, security for MSC ships cannot be
isolated, compared, and characterized as ``less'' or ``less
restrictive.'' Civilian-crewed ships bring great efficiencies to the
Navy and allow resources-particularly military manpower--to be
allocated most efficiently and effectively. The Navy has and will
continue to coordinate the capabilities and limitations of civilian-
crewed ships within the overall operations of Navy and DOD.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]