[Senate Hearing 107-609] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] S. Hrg. 107-609 LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ATTACK ON U.S.S. COLE, ON THE REPORT OF THE CROUCH-GEHMAN COMMISSION, AND ON THE NAVY'S JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL MANUAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTACK, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. MILITARY SERVICES ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ MAY 3, 2001 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 81-231 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri MARK DAYTON, Minnesota Les Brownlee, Staff Director David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority (ii) C O N T E N T S __________ CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES Lessons Learned from the Attack on U.S.S. Cole, on the Report of the Crouch-Gehman Commission, and on the Navy's Judge Advocate General Manual Investigation into the Attack, Including a Review of Appropriate Standards of Accountability for U.S. Military Services may 3, 2001 Page Shelton, Gen. Henry H., U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.......................................................... 9 Clark, Adm. Vernon E., U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations...... 23 Robertson, Gen. Charles T., Jr., USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command......................................... 27 (iii) LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ATTACK ON U.S.S. COLE, ON THE REPORT OF THE CROUCH-GEHMAN COMMISSION, AND ON THE NAVY'S JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL MANUAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ATTACK, INCLUDING A REVIEW OF APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR U.S. MILITARY SERVICES ---------- THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2001 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Warner, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Bunning, Levin, Landrieu, Bill Nelson, and E. Benjamin Nelson. Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel. Professional staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, Edward H. Edens IV, Gary M. Hall, George W. Lauffer, and Joseph T. Sixeas. Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, minority staff director; Richard D. DeBobes, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; and Creighton Greene, professional staff member. Staff assistants present: Kristi M. Freddo, Shekinah Z. Hill, Thomas C. Moore, and Suzanne K.L. Ross. Committee members' assistants present: Dan Twining and Mark Salter, assistants to Senator McCain; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to Senator Smith; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning; Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene [B.G.] Wright and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman Warner. This hearing will come to order. The committee meets this morning to continue the committee's review of the October 12, 2000, terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, resulting in the deaths of 17 brave American sailors. This attack was a vivid reminder of the risks our men and women in uniform face on a daily basis in much of the world. They do so to protect our freedom and that of our allies and friends around this troubled world. The attack was also a warning of the ever-prevalent reported threat to our forces and the urgent need, constant need, to monitor and to improve force protection measures to deter and hopefully combat that threat. The committee began its series of hearings on the issues related to the Cole on October 19. That day we received testimony from the former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command, General Zinni, who was indeed commander at the time the decision was made at the end of 1998 to use Yemen as a refueling stop for U.S. naval ships. In those early days following the attack, the committee and indeed many Americans were asking the question, why Yemen? Questions remain to this day, why Yemen? On October 20 the committee conducted a closed hearing to receive testimony from the intelligence community, followed by an open and closed hearing on October 25, during which time Congress received its first public testimony from administration witnesses on this tragedy. Note that one of our witnesses this morning, Admiral Clark, was a witness during the closed portion of the hearing on October 25. As I said during these earlier hearings on the Cole, Congress and this committee has constitutional responsibility for the safety and the welfare of the men and women of the Armed Forces, as well as their families, wherever they are in the world. The oversight hearings we have conducted and continue to conduct regarding the attack on the Cole are a vital part of this process. This morning the committee will receive testimony from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark; and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Transportation Command, General Robertson. We welcome you this morning. In the immediate aftermath on the U.S.S. Cole, two primary investigations were launched by the Department of Defense: first, an investigation of the actions of the commanding officer and crew of the Cole, conducted by the Navy under the Manual of the Judge Advocate General, called the JAGMAN investigation; and second, a lessons learned inquiry conducted by General Crouch and Admiral Gehman at the request of Secretary of Defense Cohen. Both of these reviews were completed in January, just prior to the change of administrations. While the committee has had a number of closed briefings on the Crouch-Gehman report, today is the first open congressional hearing to look into the results and also to receive the comments from our distinguished panel of witnesses this morning. A primary focus of this committee's efforts is on the lessons learned from the attack on the Cole: what went wrong and how can we lessen, indeed if not prevent, the recurrence of a similar tragic attack in the future, whether at sea or on land? The Crouch-Gehman report summed up the main lessons learned by stating: ``The attack on U.S.S. Cole (DDG-67) in the port of Aden, Yemen on 12 October 2000 demonstrated a seam''-- that is s-e-a-m; it is an unusual word, but I am quoting it-- ``a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely in transit forces.'' The report lists 30 findings and associated recommendations intended to ``reduce those vulnerabilities.'' We look to our witnesses to give us their assessment of the recommendations contained in the Crouch-Gehman report, as well as a status report on the implementation of those recommendations and any others that have been identified subsequently. An important element of any lessons learned review is an accurate and thorough examination of the actions of all the individuals involved in the given incident, both those at the scene and those within the chain of command. If there were actions incompatible with accepted standards, individuals must be held accountable. Without such proper accountability, we run the risk of repeating such tragedies and sending the wrong message to our commanding officers and all their subordinates. If we are to expect commanders to demand the highest standards of themselves and those serving in their command, do we not have to ensure that institutional values and expectations are consistently and fully applied? Naval services have traditions that go far back into history. The ship is an island of the sovereign nation whose flag it proudly flies. The commanding officer throughout history has been given unquestioned authority and the concomitant of unquestioned accountability. It was understood that the commanding officer of a ship was responsible and ultimately held accountable for anything that happened on his or her watch. I guess the fundamental question we have this morning--and I say so most respectfully--has that standard changed from these generations of our naval service? Clearly, every situation is unique and has to be judged on its individual merits. Just as clearly, military personnel in positions of responsibility must be accountable for their actions or their failure to act if we are to maintain the order and discipline essential to successful military operations, as well as, most importantly, the safety of all those in uniform. Again, has that changed? In the case of the Cole, the report of the JAGMAN investigation officer was clear, it was precise, and in my personal judgment it was a professional job. Well done. The report found that instructions, directives, and orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Central Command had been violated. In fact, the report stated the failure by the commanding officer to implement half of the required 62 force protection measures. Further, according to the investigating officer there were 19 force protection measures that could possibly have prevented or at a minimum mitigated the effect of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. Of these 19 measures, only 7 were implemented by the commanding officer of the Cole and his crew. In accordance with the JAGMAN instructions, these findings were reviewed by Admiral Moore, Central Command's Naval Component Commander, Admiral Natter, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and the distinguished Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark, as well as the Secretary of the Navy, and indeed the Secretary of Defense. In the process of the review by the aforementioned experienced professionals, there appears to me to have been a progressive disagreement with the initial findings and recommendations of the investigating officer. In fact, Admiral Natter stated that even if all of the force protection measures had been implemented, the measures ``would not have detected, deterred, or thwarted the attack on the U.S.S. Cole.'' A purpose of this hearing is to review this series of professional judgments and to receive your views. Are actions by a commanding officer not in compliance with rules, regulations, and military orders acceptable as long as a subsequent determination can be made that such actions did not cause the incident under investigation? That seems to me to be the fundamental question. Is this the proper standard to use in judging the performance of a commanding officer? What message does that send to the commanding officers and their subordinates operating on the high seas the world over? Indeed I think this case is viewed by all services and those in command, so it is not just restricted to the Navy. As Congress and the American people review the results of the Navy's JAGMAN investigation and the subsequent review process by senior officials, we ask what is the level of accountability that was or was not established? Again, have our standards changed from this long history of American men and women in uniform? Seventeen sailors lost their lives. Families are left to bear grief. A heavily damaged ship is being repaired at a high cost to the American taxpayer. So many shortfalls in the performance of those aboard the Cole were identified, and the CNO indeed stated, and I quote you, Admiral: ``I am not completely satisfied with the commanding officer's performance.'' We do not find--and we are subject to being corrected--a single disciplinary action of any kind was taken in this incident. Secretary Cohen indeed issued a statement as his last action in office essentially declaring shared accountability for all those with responsibility for force protection on the Cole. Is the net effect, I ask respectfully, of these actions by these reviewing officials to hold no one accountable? While it is not directly the subject of this hearing, the accountability determination in the Greeneville case is relevant. Despite the finding of a substantial number of irregularities and failure to follow established procedures and regulations on the part of the commanding officer, the CO of the Greeneville received only a letter of reprimand, an honorable discharge, and he retained his full retirement benefits. Again the question, is there adequacy of this level of accountability in this case and is it consistent with the traditions of the accountability of ship captains for generations? This is not a hearing that any of us have looked forward to, but it is the responsibility of this committee and indeed Congress, as a co-equal but separate part of this government, to review the actions of the Executive Branch taken as a consequence of these two tragic accidents. It is our constitutional duty and responsibility to do that. We have that obligation, which we are going to try and fulfill as fairly, as objectively, and as impartially as we can today. At this point, I would like to include for the record the statements of Senator Thurmond, Senator Santorum, and Senator Sessions. [The prepared statements of Senator Thurmond, Senator Santorum, and Senator Sessions follow:] Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole was one of the most heinous attacks against the United States and our military personnel. Unfortunately, history shows us that as long as the United States is engaged around the world, especially in the troubled spots, we will be subjected to these types of attacks. Our responsibility in this regard is two-fold. First, we must ensure that our citizens, both in and out of uniform, are adequately protected. Second, we must not succumb to these threats and shirk our global responsibilities. Mr. Chairman, after the Beirut bombing, the Khobar Towers attack, and now with the U.S.S. Cole incident, there have been in-depth investigations and extensive lists of lessons learned. Although each of these tragic events resulted in significant improvements in protecting our service members, investigations of subsequent attacks always determined lapses in security, as did the Crouch-Gehman Commission, when it stated: ``The attack on U.S.S. Cole. . . demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces.'' In my judgment, protecting our forces against a determined terrorist is virtually impossible. However, instilling a constant sense of awareness of the threat is possible. To instill that awareness requires leadership and responsibility. I believe that the most important lesson that we should have learned from the Cole incident is that an organization does well only those things that the leader checks. To again quote from the U.S.S. Cole Commission Report: ``Conducting engagement activities in higher threat areas in support of National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy requires completely coordinated priorities, policies and oversight at all levels.'' I repeat ``at all levels.'' Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from General Shelton and Admiral Clark on how they will carry out the lessons learned from the U.S.S. Cole attack. I am confident that the steps they take will improve the security of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. However, all these improvements will be for naught until we hold accountable those individuals at all levels in whose hands we trust the well-being and safety of this Nation's greatest treasure, the young men and women in uniform. Regrettably, I have not seen such accountability. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ______ Prepared Statement by Senator Rick Santorum Chairman Warner, thank you for scheduling this important hearing on the lessons learned from the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole. I know that members of this committee appreciate the insight to be offered by General Shelton, Admiral Clark, and General Robertson on ways to improve our antiterrorism and force protection capabilities. The committee also looks forward to hearing from General Shelton and Admiral Clark on the issue of accountability with respect to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole. As Admiral Clark indicated in his prepared remarks, our Nation's forward deployed forces operate in a dangerous environment. This is a regrettable but realistic assessment. The United States cannot hope to support our national security requirements and foreign policy objectives without the benefit of forward deployed forces. I believe that Admiral Clark is correct in assuming that it is only a matter of time until the next terrorist attack is attempted against our military forces. Therefore, we need to be vigilant in addressing our antiterrorism and force protection deficiencies. We need to provide our commanders with the tools and the intelligence necessary to thwart these asymmetric threats. The work of General Crouch and Admiral Gehman has helped all of us focus on those force protection areas most in need of attention. Their review of the attack on the U.S.S. Cole was particularly insightful with respect to the need to provide force protection to in-transit forces and with respect to doing a better job of tailoring intelligence information to meet the specific needs of our military commanders. I look forward to the testimony of General Shelton and his assessment of where we are with respect to the fielding of new technologies to help our commanders mitigate against terrorist threats. I am eager to learn if General Shelton believes we are making appropriate science and technology program investments to counter current and future terrorist threats. I also look forward to General Robertson's assessment of how we can better provide force protection for our Military Sealift Command vessels and crew members as well as those Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement commercial carriers--carriers that provide crucial air and sealift capabilities for our military forces. Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for convening this hearing and I look forward to the testimony of today's distinguished panel of witnesses. ______ Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions The U.S.S. Cole was attacked, in port Aden, Yemen without warning on October 12, 2000. I want to thank General Shelton, Admiral Clark, and General Robertson for taking the time out of their busy schedules to testify before us today. General Robertson, I also want to thank you for the testimony you provided to the Seapower Subcommittee just 2 weeks ago. It is good to see you again. First, and most importantly, I want to express my sympathy to the families, shipmates, and friends of those men and women who were killed and injured by the cowardly attack on the U.S.S. Cole. The crew's heroic actions after the attack prevented their ship from sinking. They also administered the first aid that saved the lives of many injured shipmates. The crew's dogged determination and courageous actions were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Naval service. The Cole stopped in Aden to refuel en route to the Persian Gulf. When attacked, U.S.S. Cole was in the Commander in Chief of the Central Command's area of responsibility and was under the immediate command of the Commander of the Abraham Lincoln Battle Group, Task Force 50, who in turn, reported to the Commander of the Fifth Fleet, the Naval Component Commander for the CINC of the Central Command. We will be exploring issues today to clarify questions that remain so we can fulfill our oversight responsibilities for future systems and policies. The overall accountability and standards of performance for commanders which have been brought to world-wide attention by both the U.S.S. Cole and the U.S.S. Greeneville investigations, concern me. It appears that standards of personal accountability are drifting away from the age-old rule of determining if an individual and the people he or she is responsible for carried out legal orders, followed established procedures, and reported with utmost integrity. There appears to be an emerging new standard of assessing the results of an incident and then overlaying a range of performance parameters both of which cloud the lines of accountability and responsibility. There are a number of troubling questions that remain to be answered, and I hope the committee will get at these issues today.
Why wasn't the Judge Advocate General Manual investigation being conducted by an 0-6 elevated to a board of inquiry by officers senior to the operational commanders responsible for U.S.S. Cole? Although the Commander of the Fifth Fleet stated in his endorsement to the investigation, ``other investigative queries and additional crew interviews will undoubtedly establish a fuller picture of the events . . .'' and the Chief of Naval Operations stated in his endorsement, ``separate action will be taken to assess the accountability of others in the chain of command,'' it is not apparent that any follow-up was done to assess the accountability of the operational commander who made, Commander of Fifth Fleet assessed, a ``perfunctory . . . review'' of the Cole's force protection plan. Has U.S.S. Cole's operational chain of command's responsibility and accountability for force protection been assessed? During my recent visit to the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, I observed two extremes in force protection: the high end was the Marine Corps Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team and the low end was a pier sentry from a U.S. Navy ship that had poorly- fitting equipment and did not project a well-equipped sentry that would be a deterrent to a terrorist. Who is the Navy tasking to provide force protection duties? Are they trained and equipped for that role or are they sailors with good intentions that are highly skilled technicians who should be repairing equipment? In sharing responsibility and accountability, has the chain of command provided the training, equipment, and personnel required to minimize the opportunity for attacks on our men and women and material? Have damage control lessons learned been fed back to fleet units and training facilities? Have ships been provided the equipment needed for force protection or have the ships had to sacrifice ship maintenance funds to buy equipment? Has the chain of command ensured that the ships that provided U.S.S. Cole with emergency equipment and expendable material have replaced that equipment and are carrying their full complement of damage control equipment and expendables? Are damage control equipment problem areas specific to U.S.S. Cole or are they applicable to other ships? If the problems are applicable to other ships, what is being done to prevent reoccurrence? My task as Seapower Subcommittee chair, along with other members of our subcommittee, is to ensure the Cole lessons learned are reflected in ship construction requirements, ship modification requirements, and force protection equipment requirements for Navy ships. Then it is our task to assess the Navy's intentions to meet those requirements. We do not presently have the information required to make those assessments. The Navy has not been forthcoming with the information in these areas to do the preliminary work needed prior to reviewing the fiscal year 2002 budget request. I thank the chair and our witnesses for appearing before us today. Chairman Warner. Senator Levin. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing takes place 3 days after the release of the State Department's report called ``Patterns of Global Terrorism for the Year 2000.'' Secretary Powell noted in his report: ``The year began on a positive note, with the thwarting of an attempt by international terrorists to carry explosives across the U.S.-Canadian border, thus averting a millennium-related attack.'' But tragically, as the year drew to a close we experienced the loss of 17 sailors and injuries to 42 others in the October 12 terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole. The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, told the committee earlier this year that: ``Terrorism remains the most significant asymmetric threat to our interests at home and abroad. This threat will grow as disgruntled groups and individuals focus on America as the source of their troubles. Our overseas military presence and our military's status as a symbol of U.S. power, interest, and influence can make it a target.'' In his transmittal letter to the President on the report of the Downing task force assessment of the June 25, 1996, attack on Khobar Towers, then-Secretary of Defense Bill Perry wrote: ``To face threats of this sophistication, all our leaders, civilian and military, must adopt a radically new mind set with regard to international terrorism.'' Despite that statement, as then-Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen noted in his memorandum of January 19 regarding the attack on the U.S.S. Cole: ``In this instance none of us in the chain of command fully appreciated the danger that our in-transit naval forces faced from a waterborne threat in restricted waters, such as during a port call or refueling stop.'' Now, with those statements as background, I think it is surely obvious that we must ensure that we learn the proper lessons from the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and that we commit ourselves to do everything in our power to deter and, if necessary, defeat attempts at terrorist attacks on our military forces, including our transitting military forces. We have to ensure that such a commitment is not mere words, but a true, lasting, and effective commitment. One important way of learning the lessons involved in this or any other incident is to conduct a comprehensive investigation to ascertain what was done and what was not done at each level of command and to determine accountability as appropriate. In that regard, I am concerned that in this case, despite a high-powered commission and a Navy investigation, that there was no comprehensive effort to look at the actions or inactions of several layers of command above the ship itself. Finally, we are indebted to General Crouch and Admiral Gehman for the outstanding job that they did in assessing the lessons from the attack on the U.S.S. Cole and in making recommendations for the way ahead. They did not focus on accountability. That was not their job. They looked at lessons learned to try to prevent these kind of future tragedies. They provided us a classified briefing some time ago and impressed us all with their cogent and wise assessment and recommendations. So I want to join our chairman in stating just how important this hearing is today. The subjects are of extreme import. I cannot think of any issues that are really more important than trying to assure that we have accountability so that our men and women in service are protected from these kind of attacks. I know our witnesses are the first to join in that belief. I do not know of any witnesses who feel more keenly about the kind of responsibility and accountability that is so essential if we are going to carry out our missions with maximum safety for our forces. I want to welcome all of these witnesses today. At this time, I would like to submit for the record a statement by Senator Landrieu. [The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:] Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. As we sit in this hearing room today, I think it's important that we remember why we are here. On October 12 of last year, 17 brave men and women gave their lives for their country. They were victims of a vicious terrorist attack. In the months since, many armchair quarterbacks have gotten a lot of publicity by commenting on what was or was not done to prevent this from happening. None of those comments can take away from the bravery and dedication of all our men and women in uniform, and particularly those 17 brave souls who made the ultimate sacrifice for their country. Now, almost 7 months after the attack, several of the investigations are complete, however the criminal investigation is still ongoing with no end in sight. But enough time has passed to answer some simple questions: First, ``What happened?'' Second, ``What systemic and personal failures contributed to the success of the attack?'' Last, ``Where do we go from here?'' I've been on this committee since 1999. Since then, I've attended numerous hearings and briefings where various components of the Department of Defense tried to answer those questions in response to various accidents and crises. In every case they presented ``Lessons Learned.'' This committee has already been briefed on some of the lessons learned from the Cole tragedy and I'm sure we'll hear some more today. I am particularly committed to ensuring they do in fact become ``Lessons Learned'' because it seems to me that, all too often, we have ``Lessons Taught.'' That distinction is important because we keep hearing the same lessons over and over again, and it is the responsibility of the leadership--some of whom sit before us today--to ensure that those lessons are institutionalized and truly become ``Lessons Learned.'' Everyone in this room knows that terrorism is a complex and challenging threat whose very nature makes it impossible to plan for. We live in a world with risks and, if America is to remain engaged in the world, we incur those risks as the cost of doing business. Those risks can never be completely eliminated, but we can take actions to minimize them. The military trains daily for the most dangerous business there is, war. There is always risk in war, and a prudent commander is negligent if he or she doesn't do everything possible to try and minimize that risk. We should make no mistake about it--terrorists around the world are at war with the United States today. Just like a traditional war, Americans expect their commanders to do what they can to minimize the risk to their sons and daughters, but they understand that risk can never be eliminated and that the mission must always come first. If we do anything else, we abandon our role as a superpower and I believe the world would become a far more dangerous place. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this important hearing, and I look forward to the valuable testimony of the witnesses. Chairman Warner. So ordered. Thank you, Senator Levin. General Shelton, you may proceed. Also, would you identify for the committee the role to be played by General Robertson. You decided overnight, as I understand, to include him. We welcome him today. I am not sure whether his testimony parallels you or should we go to the Chief following you. If you will give us guidance, we will be glad to follow that. STATEMENT OF GEN. HENRY H. SHELTON, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF General Shelton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today before this committee to share with you the work that is being done to address the findings of the Crouch-Gehman Commission. Let me thank Congress and especially the members of this committee for your enduring and significant support of America's Armed Forces and for your deep concern for the safety and well-being of our men and women in uniform. The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole was a tragic event and obviously a stark reminder of the risks that our great men and women in uniform face as they carry out their many missions day in and day out, doing the things that we ask them to do on our behalf. Our condolences collectively go out to those who lost a loved one aboard the U.S.S. Cole last October. All Americans I am sure share in this heartbreaking loss. But no one should mistake America's resolve. The reprehensible act of terrorism against the U.S.S. Cole will not cause this Nation to retreat from its commitments to our allies and it will not keep our military from performing its duties and responsibilities to defend U.S. interests around the globe. Attacks such as this reinforce the importance of improving our ability to deter and defeat terrorists, and we certainly owe it to those who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces to provide them with the very best protection possible. In that regard, I want to acknowledge the tremendous work that has been done by the intelligence community and the FBI, specifically Director Freeh, with the cooperation of the Yemeni government, to bring to justice those that are responsible for this act. Our approach to dealing with the threat of terrorism requires a sustained inter-agency approach. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, in addition to my testimony, Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Tony Robertson, the Commander in Chief of United States Transportation Command, are both with me here today. General Robertson is a leading innovator for in-transit force protection. He has to be because he has the responsibility to coordinate the force protection of a number of assets that are routinely in transit, operating around the world, around the clock, in fact even as we speak here this moment. All of us will be happy to take your questions after our prepared remarks. In your invitation to the hearing today, Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Levin asked the Joint Chiefs to provide an assessment of our antiterrorism force protection program. We welcome the opportunity to update you on what we have been doing to implement the findings of the Crouch-Gehman Commission. But before I address what we are doing to implement their findings, let me emphasize one key point. Following the Cole tragedy, we reviewed systemic problems with our force protection program, as well as examined the accountability for such things as the failure to provide adequate warning or implement appropriate security measures. In this effort, let me stress that we must be clear about the difference between responsibility and accountability for the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole. The parties responsible for the Cole tragedy are the terrorists and those who trained and equipped them, not anyone within our Armed Forces. It was clearly an act of premeditated murder. However, accountability is a function of command, and this matter was addressed up and down the chain of command within DOD, by the Navy, by the Commander in Chief, and then Secretary of Defense Cohen. As I said last October, those who perpetrated this act of terrorism should also never forget that America has a long memory and our reach is even longer. The goal of the Crouch-Gehman Commission was to review the processes and the procedures in place and look for systemic gaps within our existing force protection program. General Crouch and Admiral Gehman, two very distinguished officers, and the members of their Commission are to be commended for their thoroughness as well as the quality of their judgment in making recommendations to improve our vital force protection program. As you indicated, Mr. Chairman, their commission report was very comprehensive, containing 30 findings and 53 recommendations. As we meet, commands around the globe are hard at work implementing the commission's recommendations and exploring other ways to improve their security posture. Given that many of our adversaries cannot compete with the United States militarily, they try to exploit perceived weaknesses and strike at us in what we call asymmetric means to achieve their goals. Bombings such as Khobar Towers, the embassy attacks in Africa in 1998, and the U.S.S. Cole last October are unfortunate examples of this asymmetric threat. Defending against this type of threat remains a top priority of the combatant commands, each of the services, and commanders everywhere and at every level. Of course, we must keep in mind that terrorists are adaptive adversaries who constantly look for ways to strike where their victims are most vulnerable, what we call the weak link. While we can never fully eliminate the possibility that terrorists will strike against us, we are doing our utmost to ensure the security of our forces so they can carry out their important missions at minimum risk. Our goal is not only to reduce the exposure of our in- transit ships and planes, a shortcoming which was exposed by the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, but also to ensure that our antiterrorism force protection program remains dynamic, thus reducing our vulnerability to terrorists. On October 12, 2000, a bomb exploded in the port side of U.S.S. Cole while the ship was moored at a refueling ``dolphin'' in Aden, Yemen. The explosion, as you have said, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, killed 17 sailors, wounded 42, and severely damaged the vessel. In this incident, terrorists were able to exploit control measures and perimeter security vulnerabilities associated with waterside approaches to our ships while they are in port. However, the Crouch-Gehman Commission findings and their recommendations go far beyond waterside security improvements. As I said, the Department of Defense is aggressively implementing the commission's recommendations. So let me spend the remainder of my time highlighting the findings and recommendations and providing a status of our actions thus far. As I mentioned earlier and as reflected on the chart to your left or right and the advance copy that we placed in front of each of you, the commission made 30 findings and 53 recommendations, divided into 5 categories as shown on this slide. They addressed organization, antiterrorism and force protection, intelligence, logistics, and training. In the first category of organization, the Crouch-Gehman Commission saw the need for better unity of effort among the offices and the agencies of DOD that provide the policy, the resources, and the oversight involved with combatting terrorism. The commission also recommended better coordination of our engagement activities across the U.S. government agencies, including developing security capabilities of host nations to protect U.S. forces. As a result, I have recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense align policy and resource responsibility under one OSD office. With regard to host nation cooperation, I have asked the geographic CINCs to continue their coordination efforts with host nation counterparts to gain increased security support. Secretary of State Powell has aided in this important cause by instructing the chiefs of mission to assist in coordinating DOD security requirements with host nations. The second category, antiterrorism and force protection, is where the commission made the lion's share of its findings and recommendations. To summarize, the commission advocated: proactive antiterrorism techniques to complement our defensive actions; better coordination of the transfer of units between theaters of operation; and use of risk management tools to support antiterrorism and force protection planning and execution. The combatting terrorism readiness initiative fund provides immediate assistance to our CINCs for emergent requirements that cannot wait for the normal budget process. The commission strongly supported increasing the amount committed to this fund and I agree. We also now allow the fund to cover not only the initial purchase of requirements, but also to include the next year maintenance funding until the services can assume maintenance responsibility for follow-on years through the normal budget process. We are already benefiting from these changes. For example, Central Command (CENTCOM) was funded to buy patrol boats for port security in Bahrain, and I had a chance to see these boats already in action when I visited there about 2 months ago. In Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) they were funded for bunkers to better protect their forward operations in support of Plan Colombia. I should also mention that in fiscal year 2001 we received an additional $100 million for antiterrorism funding. We would anticipate an increase in the President's budget in 2002 as well. I also want to add that European Command (EUCOM) is aggressively working with General Robertson at Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) on its highly successful joint risk assessment management program within its Air Force component. I believe that all CINCs will benefit from this initiative. SOUTHCOM's tactics, procedures, and techniques in support of safe passage through the Panama Canal have been adopted by the country of Panama. In CENTCOM, they are working closely with Egypt to provide additional security for U.S.-flag vessels transitting the Suez Canal. General Robertson is prepared to discuss several other examples of force protection initiatives that he is implementing at TRANSCOM. To summarize, DOD is resolving a wide range of recommendations in this area, including enhancing antiterrorism and force protection procedures, resource allocation, technology development, as well as risk management. In the third category, intelligence, the commission recommended, and members of the Joint Chiefs have publicly expressed their support for, a reprioritization of resources for collection and analysis, including human intelligence and signals intelligence against terrorists. The commission also stated that individual units must be better trained and resourced to meet requests for intelligence support. OSD is reviewing options for reprioritizing intelligence support and has asked for comments from all intelligence agencies. The geographic CINCs are also looking at reprioritizing their intelligence assets within theater and they have already provided vulnerability assessment augmentation and tailored intelligence support for in-transit units. CENTCOM has developed a country vulnerability assessment team concept. Assessments will move beyond fixed sites to include exercise areas, ports, and airfields used by DOD personnel. EUCOM has established an in-transit tracking cell for all ships, aircraft, vehicles, and ground forces at its joint analysis center, which is located at the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Molesworth in the United Kingdom. This cell provides these forces with current intelligence and situational awareness. With regard to both human and signals intelligence, we are constantly reviewing the allocation of these important and scarce resources and have completed some reallocations. For the longer term, the intelligence program review group is reviewing and validating the need for additional capability and that review is due to be completed this month. In the fourth category, logistics, the Crouch-Gehman Commission concluded that the current level of combat logistics force replenishment ships is sufficient. Their position was based on the fact that the current percentage of combat logistics force ships relative to the battle force is 6.6 percent, which is within the historical range of 5.6 to 7.3 percent that has been used since 1980. The commission did see the need for geographic CINCs to have greater logistics flexibility that would minimize exposure to threats, and the CINCs have already incorporated this recommendation into their logistics planning. Finally, in the fifth category of training, the commission recommended that DOD elevate antiterrorism and force protection training to the same priority as training for warfighting. The commission also recommended increased emphasis in training for commanders and antiterrorism officers. Each of our services is aggressively developing more comprehensive unit predeployment recurring training curriculums, pre-command and antiterrorism officer courses in response to this very important and certainly appropriate observation. The Joint Staff is dedicating additional funding for improvement in training and is developing the capability to better evaluate trends, as well as lessons learned, from its vulnerability assessment reports. In Korea, our CINC there, General Tom Schwartz, has begun employing teams that assess antiterrorism readiness by looking at a base from the perspective of a potential terrorist. These programs, which we call red teaming, are an important component of a successful force protection program at all levels. Meanwhile, Pacific Command incorporated a significant antiterrorism focus into its recent exercise on reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, or RSOI, which took place in countries throughout the Pacific theater. This increased antiterrorism focus included the joint rear areas through which many of our in-transit assets move. In summary, we continue to make considerable progress in our antiterrorism and force protection program. Our people are better protected today than in the past. I am very proud of these dedicated force protection professionals that contribute to the safety and security of our people day in and day out. Our efforts have resulted, I believe, in a much higher level of antiterrorism readiness both here at home as well as abroad. With the assistance of the Crouch-Gehman Commission report, we are now reducing vulnerabilities associated with in-transit units and have already completed 31 of the 53 recommendations made in the report. The bottom line is that we have an aggressive program that commanders up and down the chain of command take very seriously and are actively involved in. While the Cole tragedy has focused our efforts to discover additional seams in the program, we are casting a net much wider than merely reducing the vulnerabilities of our in-transit assets. Let me cite just one example. We are preparing now in the event that the terrorist threat evolves from explosive devices to standoff weapons, such as hang gliders, mortars, or also weapons of mass destruction. We are not standing still. But let there be no mistake. Even with the implementation of the Crouch-Gehman recommendations and the other actions that we are pursuing, we are not and never will be totally immune to terrorism. Whenever I talk with troops and their leaders, I stress to them that the question to ask about a terrorism attack is not if, but when and how it will occur. Still, we must put this in perspective. The United States is a global power. We have global responsibilities. We should neither let this threat overwhelm us nor deter us. If we shrink or pull back, our loss may ultimately be far greater than the tragic loss of life aboard the U.S.S. Cole and would have in essence allowed the terrorist to accomplish his goals. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to meet with the committee today and to share our views with you. We look forward to amplifying on our comments and more fully addressing your concerns, either here or in a closed session, as appropriate. Thank you very much, and I will be followed by Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations. [The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:] Prepared Statement by Gen. Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army introduction On behalf of the Joint Chiefs, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to provide an assessment of our AntiTerrorism Force Protection (AT/FP) program and share with you the specifics of work being done to address the findings of the Crouch- Gehman Commission. The bombing of U.S.S. Cole was a tragic event and a stark reminder of the risks that our great men and women in uniform face as they carry out the many missions, day in and day out, we ask them to do on our behalf. My condolences go out to those who lost a loved one on board Cole last October. All Americans share in their heartbreaking loss. However, no one should mistake America's resolve. The dastardly act of terrorism against Cole will not cause this great Nation to retreat from its commitments to our allies, and it will not keep our military from performing its duties and responsibilities to defend U.S. interests around the world. Attacks such as this reinforce the importance of improving our ability to deter and defeat terrorists who threaten our great Nation's welfare. We owe it to all the patriots who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces to provide them the very best protection possible. First, I want to acknowledge the great work the intelligence community and the FBI are doing, with the excellent cooperation of the Yemeni government, to find and deliver into justice those who were involved in this heinous act. Overcoming the pernicious threat of terrorism requires a robust and sustained interagency effort. Let me also thank Congress, and especially the members of this Committee, for your enduring and significant support of America's Armed Forces and your deep concern for the safety and well-being of our great men and women in uniform. Whether Active Duty, Reserve, or Guard, wherever our troops deploy, antiterrorism is a top priority for our commanders. The tragic bombing of the U.S.S. Cole serves as a stark reminder that the terrorists of the world can strike anywhere, and at any time. Our adversaries, unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily, spend millions of dollars each year on terrorist organizations that target U.S. citizens, property, and interests. Consequently, our Combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and the Services continue to focus on antiterrorism issues as a first order priority. We have learned through our national tragedies that terrorists are indiscriminate killers who attack where and when their victims are most vulnerable. Most recently, on October 12, 2000, a bomb exploded along the port side of U.S.S. Cole while the ship was moored at a refueling ``dolphin'' in Aden, Yemen. The explosion killed 17 sailors, wounded 42, and severely damaged the vessel. In this incident, terrorists were able to exploit access control measures and perimeter security vulnerabilities associated with waterside approaches to our ships while they are in port. Given that many of our adversaries can't compete with the United States militarily, they try to find and exploit perceived weaknesses, striking at us using what we call ``asymmetric means'' to achieve their goals. Bombings, such as Khobar Towers, the embassy attacks in Africa in 1998, and U.S.S. Cole last October are unfortunate examples of this asymmetric threat. Defending against this type of threat remains a top priority of the Combatant Commands, each of the Services, and commanders everywhere. Of course, we must keep in mind that terrorists are adaptive adversaries who constantly look for ways to strike where their victims are most vulnerable. While we can never fully eliminate the possibility that terrorists will strike against us, we are doing our utmost to ensure the security of our forces so that they can carry out their important missions at minimum risk. Our goal is not only to reduce the exposure of our in-transit ships and planes--a shortcoming exposed by the bombing of U.S.S. Cole--but to ensure our antiterrorism/force protection program remains dynamic, thus reducing our vulnerability to terrorists. crouch-gehman commission Secretary of Defense Cohen commissioned General Crouch, USA (Retired), and Admiral Gehman, USN (Retired), to lead a review of lessons learned from the U.S.S. Cole attack. The goal of this commission was to review the processes and procedures in place within our existing force protection program. General Crouch, Admiral Gehman, and the members of their Commission are to be commended for their thoroughness, as well as the quality of their judgment, in making recommendations to improve our vital force protection program. Their U.S.S. Cole Commission Report was quite comprehensive, containing 30 findings and 53 recommendations. The Department of Defense is now aggressively implementing those recommendations. A DOD Working Group representing both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff was formed to complete all recommendations. DOD's Antiterrorism Coordination Committee (ATCC) and ATCC Senior Steering Group meet frequently and regularly to guide Working Group actions. A majority of the recommendations were completed within 30 days of approval of the Working Group's Plan. The remaining actions have been divided into 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month completion timelines. crouch-gehman commission findings and recommendations The Commission's findings and recommendations are contained in five categories: Organization; Antiterrorism/Force Protection; Intelligence; Logistics; and Training. I will briefly summarize these categorical findings and recommendations as well as DOD actions that are in progress. In the area of ``Organization,'' the Crouch-Gehman Commission saw the need for better ``unity of effort'' among the offices and agencies in DOD providing antiterrorism resources, policy, oversight, and direction involved with combating terrorism. The Commission also recommended better coordination of our engagement activities across U.S. Government agencies, including developing the security capabilities of host nations to help protect U.S. forces. As a result, I recommended that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) align policy and resource responsibility under one OSD office. With regard to host nation coordination, I have asked the Geographic CINCs to continue coordination efforts with host nation counterparts to gain increased security support. We are working closely with the State Department in developing and implementing force protection measures. Secretary of State Colin Powell has aided in this important cause by instructing all Chiefs of Mission to assist in establishing and coordinating DOD security requirements with host nations. In ``Antiterrorism/Force Protection,'' the Commission advocated proactive AT techniques to complement defensive actions, to better coordinate the transfer of units between theaters of operation, and to adopt a risk management model in support of AT/FP planning and execution. DOD is resolving the wide range of recommendations in this area, including revision of AT/FP procedures, resource allocation, technology development, and risk management. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides immediate assistance to our CINCs for emergent requirements that cannot wait for the normal budget process. The Cole Commission strongly supported increasing the amount committed to this fund and I agree. Because of your support, this fund has been increased. In addition, we now allow the fund to cover not only initial purchase of emergent requirements, but also to include associated ``next year'' maintenance funding, until the Services can assume maintenance responsibility for follow-on years through the normal budget process. We are already benefiting from the additional allocation, for example: U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) will be provided funding for patrol boats for port security in Bahrain and funding for their newly organized Country Vulnerability Assessment Team. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) will be funded for necessary bunkers to better protect their Forward Operating Locations in support of Plan Colombia. I should also mention that for fiscal year 2001, we increased antiterrorism funding $100 million to $3.5 billion. Other recent CINC initiatives are enhancing antiterrorism/force protection. U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is aggressively working a Joint Risk Assessment Management Program, which has already been highly successful at its Air Force Component level. All CINCs will benefit from this initiative. USSOUTHCOM's tactics, techniques, and procedures in support of safe passage through the Panama Canal have been adopted by the country of Panama. Also, USCENTCOM is working closely with Egypt to provide additional security for U.S. flag vessels transiting the Suez Canal. For the category ``Intelligence,'' the Commission recommended, and the Joint Chiefs support, a reprioritization of resources for collection and analysis, to include human intelligence and signal intelligence, against the terrorist threat. Individual units must also be better trained and resourced to meet appropriate requests for intelligence support. OSD is reviewing options for reprioritizing intelligence support and has asked for comments from all Intelligence Agencies. At the same time, geographic CINCs are evaluating a reprioritization of intelligence assets within their Theaters and have already provided vulnerability assessment augmentation and tailored intelligence support for in-transit units on independent missions until additional resources become available. Already, USCENTCOM has developed a Country Vulnerability Assessment Team concept. The concept expands assessments beyond fixed sites to include exercise areas, ports and airfields used by DOD personnel. Also, USEUCOM has established an in-transit tracking cell for ships, aircraft, and vehicles and ground forces at its Joint Analysis Center (JAC), Molesworth, UK. This cell provides these forces current intelligence and situational awareness. With regard to Human Intelligence and Signals Intelligence, we are constantly reviewing the allocation of these important and scarce resources and have already completed some reallocation. Also, as previously mentioned, USCENTCOM will be receiving additional funding for intelligence analysts. For the longer term, the DOD Intelligence Program Review Group is reviewing and validating the need for additional capability. I expect the review to be completed later this month. In support of ``Logistics,'' the Crouch-Gehman Commission concluded that the current level of Combat Logistics Force replenishment ships is sufficient. The Commission view is based on the fact that the current percentage of Combat Logistic Force ships relative to the Battle Force is 6.6 percent--within the historical range of 5.6 to 7.3 percent since 1980. The Commission did see the need for geographic CINCs to have greater logistic flexibility to minimize exposure to threats. CINCs have incorporated this recommendation into their logistics planning. Finally, with regard to ``Training,'' the Commission recommended elevating Antiterrorism/Force Protection training to the same priority as their warfighting requirements training. The Commission also recommended increased emphasis in our training for Commanders and Antiterrorism Officers. Our Services are aggressively developing more comprehensive unit pre-deployment and recurring training curriculums and more comprehensive pre-command and AT Officer courses in response to this important observation. The Joint Staff also is dedicating additional funding toward improvements in ``General Awareness,'' AT Officer; Pre-Command; and Executive Level training support and developing the capability to better evaluate trends and lessons learned from its vulnerability assessment reports. U.S. Forces, Korea has developed a ``Red Team'' concept to better assess the antiterrorism readiness of its bases. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) incorporated a significant antiterrorism focus into its recent Reception Staging Onward-Movement Integration (RSOI) exercise. RSOI took place in multiple countries throughout the USPACOM Theater and the antiterrorism focus included the Joint Rear Areas. I also want to add that immediately following the Cole bombing, the Geographic and Functional CINCs, and the Service Secretaries and Chiefs met with the Secretary of Defense and me to determine what actions could be taken to enhance AT/FP immediately. A majority of their recommendations were subsequently proposed by the Crouch-Gehman Commission. Those that were not in the Commission Report were added to our plan for prompt action. These include the development of ``Red Teams;'' the need for vetting criteria for host nation contractors supporting our units during higher Threat Conditions; and the need to conduct Vulnerability Assessments at all ports and airfields visited by DOD units. additional antiterrorism/force protection initiatives In all, we've made monumental progress in our AT/FP efforts in the 4\1/2\ years since the attack on Khobar Towers. I'll briefly highlight a few of our most significant initiatives. The Joint Staff Combating Terrorism Directorate, (J-34), continues to provide superb support to our program. It provides unity of effort on the Joint Staff for all matters pertaining to combating terrorism, and assists the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs with their force protection responsibilities. To accomplish these objectives, J-34 works closely within the interagency process to integrate emerging AT/ FP technologies, develop AT/FP doctrine, policy, standards, and training programs, and enhance coordination with our allies for combating terrorism. The Combating Terrorism Directorate is organized into four divisions designed to synchronize operations and intelligence, develop plans and policies, integrate programs and requirements, and coordinate training, doctrine development, and vulnerability assessments. Our six Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) Teams continue to assess Antiterrorism/Force Protection readiness. These teams visit designated military installations worldwide, both CONUS and OCONUS, to assess intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities, physical security measures, infrastructure support and structural vulnerabilities, and the installation's ability to respond to a terrorist incident. Because the terrorist weapon of choice today remains a large vehicle bomb, our JSIVA Teams emphasize the importance of sound perimeter security, thorough access procedures, adequate building standoff, and comprehensive response plans for incident damage mitigation. However, because we also must anticipate the potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the future, we have added WMD experts to two of our teams to better prepare today for terrorist use of WMD tomorrow. We've completed 327 assessments since the program's inception in 1997 and will complete an additional 96 by the end of this calendar year. Our geographic CINCs and Service Chiefs have also organized their own assessment teams to evaluate installation readiness and assist installation commanders in refining existing plans. In addition, these teams provide assessment ``lessons learned'' which are made available to all commands. To enhance Antiterrorism Force Protection readiness and assist installation commanders develop viable AT/FP plans, we've refined our AT/FP Installation Planning Template (and Weapons of Mass Destruction Appendix), that provides the Installation Commander a step-by-step guide in developing a thorough and inclusive AT/FP plan. The Template is now available as an interactive CD-ROM. We also place considerable emphasis on, and continue to improve AT/ FP Training. The four-tiered training program consists of: A basic level training curriculum for all DOD personnel and their families; An advanced level curriculum to train Antiterrorism Force Protection Officers; Antiterrorism Force Protection education at Commanding Officer ``command pipeline'' training; and An executive-level seminar for senior officers & DOD civilian leadership. Additionally, we continue to work hard to ensure the inclusion of AT/FP issues in all appropriate Department of Defense planning and policy documents. Defense planners include Combating Terrorism among their very top priorities. The Joint Service Capabilities Plan, Contingency Planning Guidance, and CINC Theater Engagement Plans now include ``successfully countering terrorism'' as one of their highest tier ``vital objectives.'' We recently updated the DOD instruction ``Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence,'' which provides comprehensive guidance in the development of all aspects of antiterrorism programs. We are also updating our ``Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness,'' a consolidation of key reference material which assists commanders in executing their AT programs. We have made significant advances in identifying available technologies with AT/FP application, and have in place two organizations that are vital to our ``leveraging technology'' efforts. The Physical Security Equipment Action Group coordinates DOD efforts in acquiring all physical security equipment, including Commercial-Off- The-Shelf technology that has AT/FP applicability. Another organization, the Technical Support Working Group, focuses on rapid prototype technologies in the AT/FP arena. The Technical Support Working Group provides support to the entire interagency team. Key technology enablers, such as threat analysis and warning, explosive device detection, and early detection of Weapons of Mass Destruction, greatly enhance our ability to protect against terrorism. The Combating Terrorism Directorate also hosts a Force Protection Equipment Demonstration (FPED) to showcase state-of-the-art technologies possessing AT/FP applications. Over 400 vendors with over 1,000 new products will be attending the May 2001 FPED at Quantico, VA. Items showcased at this demonstration are ready for evaluation and can be ``in the hands'' of our Service members within weeks of the FPED. The Combating Terrorism Directorate also provides resource support to the CINCs and Services. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CbT RIF) resources those emergent and emergency AT/FP requirements that can not wait for the normal Service Program Objective Memorandum process. As a result of Cole Commission findings, the fund has already been programmed to increase. Additionally, we oversee the planning, programming, and budgeting process to ensure adequate emphasis on AT/FP programs. We are also working closely with our allies including NATO. We are currently supporting the efforts of NATO's High Level Steering Group to enhance Antiterrorism/Force Protection for NATO forces, including our DOD personnel assigned to NATO. Despite our accomplishments, we are always convinced we can do more. In 1999, we commissioned a 6-month ``Best Practices Study'' to compare and assess the AT/FP practices of Israel and the United Kingdom, two countries that have lived with the terrorist threat for many years on a continuous basis. The products and concepts of this study provide a measure for comparison and the basis for future initiatives to improve the commander's ability to shape the environment and protect our forces. conclusion We continue to make considerable progress in our antiterrorism/ force protection program and our people are better protected today than in the past. I am very proud of the efforts of our dedicated force protection professionals. Our efforts have resulted in a high level of AT readiness of our forces and at military installations--here and abroad. That same level of attention must now be--and is being-- directed at reducing vulnerabilities that exist at our ``seams'' to include seaports and airports. Despite our many successes, however, we face a dedicated, well- financed, and determined adversary. The question concerning terrorist attack is not ``if'' but ``when.'' Our challenge is to anticipate the threat and take appropriate countermeasures. I want to conclude by underscoring the fact that we are being extremely proactive in our approach to reducing antiterrorism vulnerabilities. We are also preparing now should the terrorist threat evolve from explosive devices to standoff weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction. We will continue to focus our attention to protect our people, our installations, and our national interests. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. Admiral Clark. STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the committee: Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Navy's antiterrorism and force protection program. We will be saying ``ATFP'' many times today. I say thank you, Mr. Chairman, because I note your comments about the role of the Senate and this committee, the role of oversight, the issue of the proper protection of the men and women who volunteer to serve in our Armed Forces, and for me particularly in the Navy, the importance of this body having the right information so that you can make decisions and provide that oversight role. I also thank you so that you, the people of America, and the people in my Navy can hear what is said about the situation on the U.S.S. Cole, the actions that have been taken. Certainly, as General Shelton has said, the terrorist attack on the Cole was a shock, a terrible shock to us, and a sharp and a tragic reminder that our forces are on the point and face danger every day, sometimes, oftentimes, in hostile, potentially lethal environments. The events of the 12th of October of the year 2000 began a series of real changes in our Navy and the way we plan and execute self-defense. We have done a lot since then. The details of these are outlined in my statement submitted and my comments here will be brief, and we can refer to those as you desire. Chairman Warner. All your full statements will be admitted into the record. Admiral Clark. Thank you, sir. We have done a lot. We are seeing changes. More importantly, our people, from sailors to the civilian sector-- and they are both involved--from the deckplates to our headquarters, are thinking more and with a new focus about antiterrorism and force protection. ATFP is becoming more a part of our institutional mind set. I think it is important to reiterate and agree with and reemphasize General Shelton's comments. The threat is not going to go away. Indeed, it may be even growing in size and sophistication. I expect that it is. There are some people who do not want us in their part of the world and they have made it their mission to drive us out. I am making it clear to our people that operations forward will never be risk-free and that we must do everything that we know how to do to deter attack and to limit the damage in case deterrence fails. Specifically, in accordance with the recommendations of the DOD Cole commission report and the Navy task force on force protection, numerous complementary initiatives are under way in our Navy to improve ATFP and, as I indicated, some of these, some, are detailed in the report that I have submitted to you. These include major improvements in the way we conduct port visits overseas and protect naval forces at home, in the way we are organized to plan and execute antiterrorism programs, and the way we train for antiterrorism and force protection proficiency and awareness. In short, we are taking actions to improve the manning, the training, and the equipping of naval forces to better realize a warfighting approach to physical security, with ATFP as a primary focus in every mission and activity that we execute. Central to this effort is greater emphasis on inter-agency and joint teamwork, to include seamless--that word again, Mr. Chairman--seamless operations among the armed services, increased inter-agency cooperation with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the FBI, and the CIA, and assertive diplomatic engagement abroad. We are making progress in each of these areas, and we will continue to invest in them in the years to come. Providing timely and accurate intelligence is another area of critical importance in which we are hard at work. The goal is to arm our men and women with the most relevant information--``relevant'' is a key word--possible. As part of that effort, naval and national intelligence agencies are working more closely together and sharing their information better than we have done in the past. I want to emphasize that we are in this for the long haul and we know it. These changes are important, but they are here to stay. I firmly believe and I know in fact that these initiatives will help our commanding officers better prepare to counter the asymmetric threat that they face in the world today. That is important because our commanding officers retain full responsibility and accountability for their actions and their units. We have a responsibility to do our utmost to support them. They are the best that we have and we owe it to them. So in summary, I want to assure the committee that the United States Navy, the people in the Navy, and the assets in the Navy are better protected today than they have ever been before. We will continue to improve our antiterrorism and force protection measures while staying focused on our forward operations and the challenges involved in support of the national security strategy, enhancing regional stability, responding to crises, and winning our Nation's wars. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do look forward to the questions from the committee. [The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:] Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, U.S. Navy introduction Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Senate Armed Services Committee with this update of the Navy's actions to improve our Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) program. The attack on U.S.S. Cole was a terrible tragedy and dramatic example of the type of threat our military forces face worldwide on a day-to-day basis, emphasizing the importance of force protection both today and in the future. The Navy has taken action at home and abroad to meet this challenge, undergoing a sea change in the way we plan and execute self-defense. We have enhanced the manning, training, and equipping of naval forces to better realize a warfighter's approach to physical security, with AT/FP serving as a primary focus of every mission, activity, and event. Additionally, we are dedicated to ensuring this mindset is instilled in every one of our sailors. Key to implementing force protection are multiple, complementary initiatives to deter and prevent terrorist attack. First, we employ operational security to decrease the ability of an enemy to target our forces. Second, in accordance with international law, we depend on host nations to execute their responsibility to provide protection for ships and units visiting and training in their countries. Third, our commanders employ standoff zones around their ships and aircraft to protect them, including the employment of concentric assessment, warning, and threat zones. fleet action Aggressive action has been taken by our fleets to strengthen force protection, including the issuance of detailed guidance regarding weapons posture and Rules of Engagement, the creation of dedicated AT/ FP units, the institution of more robust training, and the development and deployment of additional equipment. Operationally, port and airport vulnerability assessments are now conducted in the United States and overseas prior to every visit. All fleets have substantially increased the amount of pre- deployment training devoted to force protection. Every battle group staff and unit conducts realistic exercises during ensuring which commanders must consider all threat axes for possible terrorist action, including small boat, swimmer, airborne, and land-based attacks. For example, the Enterprise Battle Group, which departed for deployment on April 25, 2001, received scenario-driven training on recognizing and countering improvised explosive devices, small boat attacks while entering and leaving port, swimmer attack, and large vehicle (i.e. truck) bombs. Additionally, while underway, they were trained in countering airplane and waterborne threats. Fifth Fleet, the naval component commander for Central Command, has created a Maritime Ship Security Augmentation Force. This team deploys to ports in advance of ship arrivals to ensure the site is secure, including the vetting of pilots and service boats. It enhances ship safety during harbor entry, while pierside, and when transiting back to sea. The team is comprised of an advance element that conducts liaison with host nation police and security personnel, as well as support service providers and husbanding agents. It also includes pier and patrol boat sentries, explosive ordnance disposal technicians, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) physical security specialists, military working dogs and handlers, corpsman, and a command and control element. Additionally, members of the team embark in the ships prior to arrival and remain aboard for the duration of the port visit while the remainder of the force provides waterside security in conjunction with the host nation. Further security for deployed naval forces is provided by U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Antiterrorism Support Teams (FAST). FAST is a rapidly deployable force specially trained in force protection. Currently U.S. European Command, Pacific Command, and Central Command have permanently deployed FAST teams. Immediately following the Cole bombing, an additional FAST team, a Reserve Naval Coastal Warfare Unit, and a Coast Guard Port Security Unit were deployed to the Middle East to provide security augmentation for the ongoing investigation in Yemen as well as enhance security aboard civilian-manned Military Sealift Command ships operating in the area. We are leveraging technology to better equip our forces. All deploying units have received a significantly improved allowance of AT/ FP equipment, to include body armor, hand-held searchlights, riot control agents, collapsible batons, explosive detection kits, and water-filled barriers. Recently, the Naval Operations Other Than Warfare Technology Center in Dahlgren, Virginia conducted a demonstration to validate available systems, including electro-optic infrared detection systems, non-lethal weapon systems, miniature bomb detection systems, and electronic access control systems. As part of this effort, the Navy is working closely with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia to develop next-generation non-lethal AT/FP technology. Close coordination between the Departments of State and Defense is vital to the ultimate success of these endeavors. Country teams from both departments are increasing the dialogue with host nations and to more fully assert articulate U.S. security needs. In cases where host nations lack the ability or desire to meet this increased security level, we are negotiating to allow U.S. forces to provide such measures. This may include allowing our sailors to conduct armed patrols around U.S. assets. A joint Department of Defense and Department of State cable was recently released directing U.S. diplomats to request this cooperation. training, education, and doctrine development We are cultivating enhanced AT/FP awareness via a continuum of initiatives. These include the development of new warfare doctrine, the issuance of specific tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the accomplishment of basic and advanced training in the fleet, the schoolhouse, and by computer learning. As recommended in the Crouch- Gehman report, the new curricula incorporate realistic scenarios to better educate our sailors and airmen. We have updated the training provided to all Prospective Commanding Officers (PCOs). This training is taught during the Command Leadership Course in Newport, Rhode Island, addressing the use of force and rules of engagement. Type commanders also provide PCOs with platform force-specific AT/FP training en route to their commands. Concurrent with that effort, the Surface Warfare Development Group has published improved fleet guidance on force protection. These publications address new methods of defending against future terrorist attacks and are essential in institutionalizing the warrior AT/FP mindset required in today's Navy. organizational change The Navy has instituted important organizational changes in the wake of the Cole attack. The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) established a task force comprised of subject matter experts from the Navy and from external organizations to review and take prompt action to enhance our force protection posture and identify required actions in the mid- and long-term. The task force findings were in close alignment with the Department of Defense Cole Commission report issued by General Crouch and Admiral Gehman, including recommendations for improving departmental organization, antiterrorism/force protection programs, intelligence, logistics, and training. The SECNAV Task Force is being transitioned to become a permanent Force Protection Council. To ensure it receives the necessary level of attention, the council is chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and includes senior flag officers high-ranking representatives from each of the principal branches within the Navy. The council monitors the status of initiatives and charts the course of future AT/FP programs. It oversees the resourcing of AT/FP, monitors the continued development of naval AT/FP doctrine, and encourages the inclusion employment of advanced technologies. One significant weaknesses identified by the SECNAV Task Force's personnel working group was the size of the Navy's security force. To correct this problem, we are converting collateral duty Masters-at-Arms to full-time security professionals. 330 security force billets have been programmed for fiscal year 2001 to fill this emergent security need, working toward a goal of 6,000 permanent naval security billets by 2003, up from approximately 4,000 billets prior to the Cole bombing. at/fp resources These improvements to the Navy's AT/FP posture have incurred significant cost. To the greatest extent possible, we have funded them from existing accounts. However, the long-term program to provide adequate security for our forces will require additional money. We diverted approximately $50 million from existing accounts at the fleet level in fiscal year 2001 to address our most immediate AT/FP requirements. We have also identified additional AT/FP requirements in fiscal year 2001. To further streamline and focus our budget process for AT/FP, we have consolidated from nine resource sponsors on the OPNAV staff to two, one for ashore and one for afloat. This will ensure Navy AT/FP programs receive the proper level of attention and support. intelligence support Better intelligence is vital to enhanced AT/FP. The intelligence community is working to ensure our commanding officers receive the most accurate and complete intelligence picture prior to arrival in port. As identified in the Crouch-Gehman report, only a small percentage of the Nation's intelligence resources are currently directed against terrorism. To correct this problem, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, and theater intelligence centers are now working more closely together to ensure the best all-source intelligence is provided to our commanding officers. Importantly, the intelligence community has modified the dissemination of human intelligence to provide wider availability and greater timeliness. Office of Naval Intelligence is working to increase this collection requirement. They have modified the restrictions on dissemination of human intelligence collection reporting to provide wider availability. The NCIS has also increased the deployment of agents overseas to meet increased fleet requirements. These agents are engaged in providing on-scene intelligence reporting and vulnerability assessments for ships' port visits and aircraft stopovers. command accountability While all of these programs are aimed at strengthening our ability to deter and react to terrorist acts, ultimate responsibility for the safety of naval units remains with the Commanding Officer. In the Cole bombing, the Navy conducted a Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) investigation into the actions taken before, during, and after the terrorist attack. As a reviewing authority of the investigation, I agreed with the conclusion of a prior reviewer, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, that the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Cole acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself when the ship arrived in Yemen to refuel. In assessing the accountability of the Commanding Officer, reviewing authorities focused on two significant issues. First, were the decisions made and the actions taken by the Commanding Officer reasonable and within the range of performance we expect of our commanders? Second, would any of the force protection measures not implemented by U.S.S. Cole have deterred or defeated this determined attack if they had been implemented? The conclusion of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet--agreed to and supported by me as well as then-Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig and then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen--is that the Commanding Officer's decisions were reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances, and that even full implementation of all force protection measures specified under the existing threat condition, i.e., Threat Condition Bravo, would not have prevented or deterred this attack. Based on a thorough review of the JAGMAN investigation, the chain of command agreed that the facts did not warrant punitive action against the Commanding Officer or other members of the Cole crew. The investigation and endorsements of reviewing authorities have been posted on Navy websites. These endorsements explain in detail the rationale underlying the decisions made by reviewing authorities in assessing accountability. conclusion The attack on U.S.S. Cole was a powerful reminder that our Nation's forward deployed forces operate in a dangerous, potentially lethal environment. This will not change as we look to the future. The asymmetric threat is growing and constantly searching to exploit the vulnerabilities of our military forces, friends, and allies. It is only a matter of time before the next attack is attempted and we must be prepared. Constant awareness of this fact, coupled with exhaustive training and quality equipment, will help reduce the risk from the asymmetric threat and, if deterrence and prevention fail, limit the damage from such an attack. We must keep our focus on mission accomplishment--namely the employment of naval forces to stabilize various regions of the world, respond to crises, and prepare for war--while we implement the AT/FP initiatives described in this statement. Retrenchment and a bunker mentality are inappropriate and imprudent responses to the asymmetric threat. U.S. Navy sailors and assets are better protected today than ever before. Nevertheless, we will strive to continually strengthen our antiterrorism/force protection program as we operate forward in support of America's defense. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Admiral. General Robertson. STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES T. ROBERTSON, JR., USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND General Robertson. Sir, if I might, I have also submitted a written statement. Chairman Warner. Without objection, it will be submitted. General Robertson. Thank you, sir. A proper question you asked is why did the chairman choose to have me at his side here today, as opposed to one of the regional CINCs perhaps, or one of the other service chiefs. I think there are probably two reasons I would postulate that I am here today. First, of all the CINCs, of all the commanders in chief around the world, at United States Transportation Command we manage the missions. The missions we execute around the world every day are probably the examples that are used most often as in-transit units. If you stop to consider, nearly 1,200 aircraft flying some 1,700 missions per week, 3 sorties per mission, that is about 4,500 sorties a week around the world, to an average of 52 countries around the world; 22 chartered military ships visiting ports in some 22 countries around the world; 36 other government-owned or chartered prepositioned ships sitting and waiting, laden down with military cargo, ready to respond around the world on a moment's notice; and dozens upon dozens of small Air Force, Army, and Navy teams numbering anywhere in size from one to 100--tanker airlift control elements, deployment support teams--that move from port to port, from seaport to seaport, from airport to airport around the world, making arrangements to receive or to throughput military cargo or military passengers in support of the warfighting CINCs around the world. This is our mission. We do it every day. We do it usually in force sizes of one, one aircraft, one ship, operating below the threshold of what used to be the CINC's force protection responsibility, in places that you have probably never even heard of. We will go in, spend a couple of hours, and depart. But we take seriously our responsibility for force protection of those assets. The second reason I think the chairman wanted me here today is because, as he said, we are often held up as the example of the force protection innovators, the proactive end of the force protection business, and an example of force protection excellence in the Department of Defense. This makes me very uncomfortable because whatever we have done, it is probably because we are also the most vulnerable of all of the CINCs in the Department of Defense because of the global nature of our mission. If we have good programs in the United States Transportation Command, it is because we always recognize the unique vulnerability of the forces and the assets that we manage around the world, as I said most often operating in groups of one, at places that you would have to look up in the atlas to figure out where they are. Because of this, we have taken very seriously our responsibility for force protection. In summary, to paraphrase the old country and western song, at the United States Transportation Command, we were into force protection before force protection became cool, and we do take it very seriously. The men and women of TRANSCOM, 148,000 military, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guardsmen, take it very seriously because we have to. Our commercial partners, who are probably responsible for at least 50 percent of the work that we do around the world--the U.S. flag airlines and airlift partners, our U.S. flag sealift incidents, the merchant mariners and the crews that operate those ships and aircraft--also take it very seriously, and we bring them in under our umbrella of force protection. We do our best to maintain the very highest of standards wherever we operate around the world, standards of antiterrorism, force protection. Occasionally, as a result, we frustrate the customers we serve, those warfighting CINCs, and their host nation security forces, because we demand such high standards for our forces. That said, though, when you take the collective lessons learned from Khobar, for example, from the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the lessons learned from the Cole, I sincerely believe that as a joint force we are headed in the right direction. Force protection will be better tomorrow than it is today. But I echo the chairman's words and I echo Admiral Clark's words: We are vulnerable. We are very vulnerable and we will always be vulnerable. It is a race against the terrorist to see who gets to the next target first and whether deterrence wins out over his determined efforts to attack us. Sir, I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of General Robertson follows:] Prepared Statement by Gen. Charles T. Robertson, Jr., USAF introduction Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you as Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), to discuss the ``U.S.S. Cole--Implications and Implementation of Lessons Learned''. Today, America and the international community depend on the U.S. military to perform a wide range of warfighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions. That said, no matter what the mission, whether at home or abroad, it is this country's Defense Transportation System (DTS) which enables America to quickly extend its ``hand of friendship'' or ``fist of war'' to whatever location on the globe it chooses to become involved. In fact, America's DTS, with its people, trucks, trains, aircraft, ships, information systems, and infrastructure, provides the U.S. the most responsive strategic mobility capability the world has ever seen. USTRANSCOM's responsibility is to manage this global mobility system. USTRANSCOM's ``sole source'' responsibility as the exclusive heavy lift provider to the U.S. military (as well as to a host of other U.S. agencies), coupled with its responsiveness and global reach, keep the command in a constant state of motion. At every moment of every day, at hundreds upon hundreds of locations around the globe, USTRANSCOM's superb soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians are making our vision of world class joint global mobility a reality. For example, during a typical week, USTRANSCOM operates an average of 1,669 strategic air mobility missions transiting an average of 52 countries, operates 22 military ocean ports in 13 countries, and has 20 chartered military ships underway. Thirty-six additional government-owned and chartered vessels, loaded with military cargo, are strategically prepositioned around the world, significantly increasing the responsiveness of urgently needed U.S. military equipment and supplies during time of crisis. USTRANSCOM does all of this as a total- force team of Active Duty, Guard and Reserve personnel, civilians, and commercial partners, bringing the total synergy of U.S. military and commercial transportation resources to bear in time of peace and crisis, wherever in the world they may be required. The above ``picture'' is drawn not to impress anyone with the tremendous scope of the USTRANSCOM mission, but more, to try to illustrate the vulnerability of the various elements of the DTS--ships, trucks, trains, and planes, each typically operating as a single entity wherever on the globe USTRANSCOM's mission may take it--to the challenges posed by today's terrorist element. With USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands--AMC, MSC, and MTMC--serving as today's classic example of ``units in transit,'' there is no organization in the Department of Defense today with a greater interest in antiterrorism and force protection (AT/FP) than the United States Transportation Command. recent operations USTRANSCOM's daily global CINC-support mission, coupled with DOD's joint exercise program, gives USTRANSCOM the opportunity to ``plan and execute'' regularly with the regional CINCs and their Service component commands and staffs. Additionally, it gives the command an opportunity to exercise surge shipping, prepositioned afloat stocks, military air and sea ports, air mobility crews and staffs, Reserve component forces, and the staff at USTRANSCOM. Last year, USTRANSCOM participated in 117 joint exercises worldwide. These exercises not only allow us to revalidate current capabilities, they also allow us to test new capabilities, as well as to improve the processes we use to move Department of Defense (DOD) cargo within the worldwide transportation network. USTRANSCOM is a ``high tempo'' command. In fact, the command's operational pace during peacetime--especially that of our Air component--has increased dramatically since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As an example, let me describe USTRANSCOM's contributions to our most noteworthy mission since I last testified before this committee . . . that being our support for combat operations in the former Yugoslavia. Beginning in February 1999, AMC tanker and airlift aircraft began leading the deployment of combat and combat support aircraft to Europe in support of increasing the military capability available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the theater. In March of that same year, Operation Allied Force began in earnest, with an air campaign that lasted 78 days . . . a campaign which ultimately required USTRANSCOM and its Component Commands to split their capabilities three ways to simultaneously support the three distinct mobility missions which emerged through the multiple phases of Allied Force. For example, at the commencement of Allied Force, USTRANSCOM's first missions were in support of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) and NATO strategic deployment of combat and combat support aircraft to European bases. In this phase, AMC air refueling aircraft established an air bridge across the Atlantic to deploy combat, combat support, and airlift aircraft . . . with our airlift aircraft deploying accompanying support personnel and equipment. Additionally, AMC deployed a Major Theater War (MTW)-sized air refueling force . . . augmented by forces generated through a Presidential Reserve Call-up of Guard and Reserve Forces . . . to bases in Europe to support theater air operations. MSC and MTMC simultaneously began deploying ammunition from the U.S., through European ports, onward to NATO airbases. As the air campaign intensified, two new missions evolved requiring substantial USTRANSCOM support. The first occurred when refugees streamed across Kosovo's borders into Albania and Macedonia. AMC supported NATO's relief efforts with military and commercial contract airlift missions, providing emergency assistance to refugees. The second additional mission was deployment of the U.S. Army's Task Force Hawk from continental United States (CONUS) and Central European bases into Albania. All USTRANSCOM components supported this effort, with AMC providing airlift and air refueling support, MTMC operating seaports in Italy and Albania, and MSC providing sealift. It was during this phase that the C-17 became the ``workhorse'' airlifter of the campaign by operating as both an intertheater and intratheater airlifter, flying 430 missions into Albania. The aircraft performed superbly and offered the combatant commander a new capability with its large capacity and ability to land and operate at very short, austere airfields. Finally, as the air campaign ended, USTRANSCOM supported Operation Joint Guardian, the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces into Kosovo by air, land, and sea. Support to Allied Force was a total force effort by USTRANSCOM. AMC tanker aircraft, placed under the operational control of USEUCOM, performed nearly 7,000 air refueling missions, greatly extending the range and ``on-station time'' of U.S. and allied combat and combat support aircraft. An additional 654 strategic air refueling missions were performed in support of the various deployments. AMC also flew 1,108 strategic airlift missions and contracted for an additional 66 commercial airlift missions in support of Allied Force. Simultaneously, MTMC operated at two U.S. seaports and eight European seaports in support of the deployment and onward movement of unit equipment, supplies, and ammunition. As NATO air strikes began against Serbia, MTMC began transshipment operations at seaports closest to the strike area. The cargo was transported in vessels managed and directed by MTMC in support of Task Force Eagle and Task Force Shining Hope, the military and humanitarian programs (respectively) to aid Kosovar refugees. The first major evidence of this support came in the form of the SS Osprey, which arrived May 2 in Durres, Albania. The Osprey's arrival signaled a critical surface transportation benchmark in the fielding and supply of American forces in Albania. The Osprey, a MSC charter, carried 60 vehicles, or 11,000-square feet of Air Force cargo. It was loaded by MTMC's 839th Transportation Battalion, Livorno, Italy and unloaded in Durres by MTMC's 840th Transportation Battalion, Izmir, Turkey. Unloading of the Osprey took place without incident. Within a week, MTMC initiated regular ferry operations from Brindisi, Italy, to Durres. For example, some 35,000- square feet of equipment and supplies were moved into Albania between May 7th and 11th. After arriving at Brindisi by rail from Germany, the freight was loaded aboard an Adriatic Sea ferry--chartered by MSC--and shuttled northeast by east, from Brindisi to Durres, in four ferry runs. A critical shift in surface transportation support took place with the cessation of hostilities, as MTMC shifted gears and began to focus on the movement of the Army task force assigned to perform peacekeeping duties in Kosovo. In the initial entry, MTMC delivered three shiploads of combat equipment from the 1st Infantry Division via Thessaloniki, Greece, on the northern edge of the Aegean Sea. The ship cargoes included hundreds of combat vehicles and scores of shipping containers with equipment to support the 7,000 soldiers of Operation Joint Guardian. Strategic sealift also played a key role in supporting the combat forces involved in Kosovo operations. MSC supported Allied Force with 34 strategic sealift ships to include three prepositioning ships. Additionally, MSC tankers carried most of the fuel products used in support of the operation, totaling more than 300 million gallons. MSC supported 29 strategic lift movements, including movement of U.S. Army combat forces from Bremerhaven, Germany to Thessaloniki, Greece. Sealift carried over 1.2 million sq. ft. of vehicles and equipment; 245,280 sq. ft. of ammunition; plus equipment and supplies to assist the more than 400,000 ethnic Albanian Kosovo refugees. Following Allied Force, USTRANSCOM supported a fairly steady series of special ``headline'' missions and humanitarian deployments around the world. For example, AMC airlifted two Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) teams to Kosovo in July and August of 1999 to assist in investigations of war crimes. In July 1999, an AMC C-141B aircraft, supported by two air refueling tankers, airdropped medical supplies over Antarctica to aid an ill American doctor. On 16 October 1999, an AMC New York Air National Guard (ANG) ski-equipped LC-130 airlifted this same physician from Amundsen-Scott South Pole Research Station to McMurdo Naval Air Station on Antarctica's northern coast. Only Air Force airlift aircraft and aircrews had the capability to accomplish this challenging and lengthy mission during the bitterly cold Antarctic winter. A world away, USTRANSCOM continued its support of those in need following a massive August 1999 earthquake in Turkey. To aid Turkish recovery efforts, an AMC C-5 deployed 70 members of the Fairfax County, Virginia Urban Search and Rescue Team to Istanbul on a nonstop flight sustained by two air refuelings. All in all, AMC completed 20 airlift missions in support of Turkish relief efforts. A subsequent Turkish earthquake in November of 1999 claimed over 400 lives and injured over 3,000. AMC and USTRANSCOM relief efforts for this earthquake mirrored the earlier efforts. In September 1999, USTRANSCOM responded to another earthquake, this time in Taiwan. Again, AMC deployed a rescue team from Fairfax County, Virginia and again, a C-5 aircraft deployed the team direct, nonstop to Taipei. This flight lasted 18 hours and required two air refuelings. The year 2000 found USTRANSCOM supporting flood relief in South America and East Africa. In Venezuela, USTRANSCOM flew eleven C-17 and five C-5 missions, transporting 189 passengers and over 527 short tons of food, water, blankets, water purification systems, and other supplies. These missions helped the people of Venezuela recover from a devastating flood that left almost 400,000 people homeless, 20,000 to 30,000 dead, and destroyed 23,000 homes. In Mozambique, a 3-month relief operation resulted in the formation of Joint Task Force Atlas Response. During Atlas Response, USTRANSCOM aircraft flew 29 missions, carrying 720 passengers and 910 short tons of cargo to aid the almost 1 million people made homeless by the rising floodwaters from Cyclone Elaine. In our own country, on 2 February 2000, AMC flew a nine-person team and 160,000 pounds of Navy search equipment to California to assist in the recovery operations for Alaska Airlines Flight 261 off the California coast. This past summer saw the worst western wildfires in 50 years. USTRANSCOM and AMC flew 30 missions and deployed 3,682 Army and Marine passengers, and 206.7 short tons of equipment to battle the fires. During this same time period, USTRANSCOM completed the first rotation of U.S. forces supporting Task Force Falcon in Kosovo via airlift and sealift. The redeployment returned the original participants to U.S. and European bases and deployed replacements from U.S. bases to Kosovo. In April 2000, AMC flew over 130 Polish troops and 102.5 short tons of their equipment into Kosovo, marking the first time Polish forces had been transported aboard a U.S. aircraft in support of NATO requirements. Also, for the first time, USEUCOM used trains to transport peacekeeping troops and equipment from Germany through Bulgaria and Macedonia into Kosovo. This rail-overland approach saved 7 days from the normal 12-day sea-overland method previously used. USTRANSCOM also supported the sixth rotation of U.S. forces to the International Stabilization Force in Bosnia with strategic lift. In October 2000, the Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) System provided Strategic AE support to the 39 sailors injured during the U.S.S. Cole bombing in the waters off of Yemen. The injured sailors were returned to the United States during a 2-week period utilizing strategic airlift coordinated by the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center, located in Ramstein Germany and the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center, which is located at Scott Air Force Base (AFB). Additionally, USTRANSCOM and AMC relocated our Denton Humanitarian Cargo receiving and shipping hub from Pope AFB, North Carolina, to Charleston AFB, South Carolina, offering more direct access to strategic airlift and sealift to better support this important program. Utilizing military airlift and sealift, the Denton program moved over 2.5 million pounds of humanitarian cargo from 86 donors to 39 countries in the year 2000 alone. The events just described are only a ``snapshot'' of the missions USTRANSCOM performed or participated in since USCINCTRANS last testified before this committee. Though sometimes small in scale, the FBI deployments, Antarctic airdrop/rescue, earthquake relief, flood relief, airline crash recovery support, and wildfire support efforts demonstrate the tremendous reach and responsiveness unique to USTRANSCOM's airlift forces. They are also representative of the myriad of tasks mobility forces must be prepared to execute, most often on very short notice. Several points are important to note in assessing these events. For one, America's mobility force is often as busy in ``peace'' as it is in war. Even though responses to events such as Hurricane Mitch are not as large or sustained as Allied Force, such operations are conducted within peacetime manning and materiel constraints. At the same time, USTRANSCOM continues support for Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional CINC-sponsored exercises, ongoing operations such as Northern and Southern Watch, and channel airlift missions worldwide. As a result, the command's peacetime force structure must routinely surge to wartime operational levels. For aircrews alerted on short notice to fly relief support to disaster areas, move fighter and bomber squadrons to Southwest Asia or Europe, or replace deployed crews in moving channel cargo, the tempo can be very similar to wartime. The more frequently we do these missions, the more our people look and feel as if they are on a wartime footing during peacetime. The past few years have brought one deployment after another, hence the observation that USTRANSCOM is often as busy in peace as in war. All the above aside, although USTRANSCOM is heavily committed around the globe conducting a wide variety of critical peacetime missions, our ability to support the warfighter during two nearly simultaneous MTWs is our paramount indicator of command readiness. at/fp intelligence efforts USTRANSCOM is unique among DOD's CINCdoms in that it has no specific geographic area of responsibility (AOR); that said, TRANSCOM's assets daily transit DOD and commercial ports around the globe, frequenting, over the course of a typical year, facilities in almost every one of the world's countries. This simple fact--the ``mission driven'' inevitability of TRANSCOM's daily global presence . . . and concomitant daily vulnerability . . . drives its own kind of special challenge . . . one we think about and work to minimize everyday. As the tragic bombing of the U.S.S. Cole demonstrated, assets bearing the U.S. flag are potential targets of terrorism at any time and any place they may operate. In fact, U.S.S. Cole ``lessons learned'' highlighted a long-standing seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces. Well before the U.S.S. Cole tragedy and the Commission's identification of the AT/FP seams for in-transit forces, the intelligence and counterintelligence efforts of USTRANSCOM focused heavily on ensuring our component commands were covered under the force protection umbrella of the areas being transited. This focus existed not only within the command but also with our partners at the various geographic CINC and national agency headquarters. For example, USTRANSCOM's counterintelligence staff office is dedicated to collection against, and dissemination of, information on the threats posed by foreign intelligence services and the increasingly menacing pool of terrorists capable of threatening USTRANSCOM assets. This small office works hand-in-hand with our Joint Intelligence Center- Transportation (JICTRANS), which provides me, my staff, and component commanders a 24-hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week Indications and Warning (I&W) capability. Because of the unique intelligence needs of a system of single aircraft and ships, operating independently, daily, at ``off-line'' locations around the world, we are also very, very dependent on a robust and responsive national and defense intelligence system beyond USTRANSCOM. We rely heavily on the analysis of our counterparts in the geographic commands' Joint Intelligence Centers and Joint Analysis Centers, but we also know that daily, we operate through many locations in their AORs which are otherwise very low on their priority lists. Analysis and collection from our national intelligence agencies are equally critical for us. Frequently, the ``last piece of information'' we require to make our analysis ``whole'', may come from a U.S. Defense Attache in an African capital, a CIA clandestine source with knowledge of the Middle East, a tip-off from a National Security Agency (NSA) intercept, or a National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) analysis of an airfield image provided by a national system launched by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The point is, without the entire gamut of intelligence resources at our disposal, our ability to protect our forces could be severely degraded. In recent months we have raised the (already) number one priority of intelligence support to force protection to an even higher level. For example, the command is engaged in an aggressive customer outreach program where representatives from our Intelligence, Force Protection, and Operations Directorates are taking ``our story'' to the geographic CINCs, their components and our area commands in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs). The fact that mobility assets often travel in smaller numbers and with lower operational visibility has mandated for years that USTRANSCOM take steps to ensure movements of these assets are included in the overall force protection efforts of the appropriate geographic CINCs. The Cole bombing only underscored the importance of our efforts . . . and added a new ``sense of urgency'' to our focus. From an intelligence perspective, the Cole Commission reported: ``. . . theater JICs and component intelligence organizations must place a greater priority on supplying relevant intelligence tailored to the AT/ FP and intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB) requirements for units transiting their area of operations''. Through the positive support of all involved, we are closing seams and effecting a significant improvement in the lash-up of TRANSCOM assets with theater joint intelligence centers and component ``threat watches'' around the world. at/fp challenges and responses USTRANSCOM aircraft, ships, Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs), and crews operate daily in significant or higher threat level areas, and are for the most part unarmed. Only through close coordination with embassy country teams and the geographic CINCs, and the extensive efforts of our own threat working groups, are we able to approach mitigation of the threat. That said, there are still significant vulnerabilities we deal with every day, to include host nation restrictions regarding arming of our security teams, restrictions on the use of our Aircraft Defensive Systems (ADS) in certain locations, and reliance upon host nation contracts for services performed. Probably my greatest concern--every day--is the threat posed by the increasing global proliferation of man portable air defense systems (shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles) or MANPADs. Additionally, increasing numbers of potential adversaries have developed, or are developing, sophisticated integrated air defense systems (IADS). We know that MANPADs are available and are likely in the hands of our terrorist adversaries. According to a 1997 CIA Report, over the preceding 19 years, the global proliferation of MANPADS has resulted in over 400 casualties in 27 incidents involving civil aircraft alone. As an unfortunate modern-day ``fact-of-life'', this proliferation has forced air mobility planners to frequently select less than optimal mission routes due to lack of defensive systems on airlift aircraft. In fact, most recently, during Operation Allied Force, concerns about the Yugoslav air defense system, especially their mobile launchers and MANPADS, forced these types of mission route changes on a regular basis. To counter threats such as these, in the future, AMC and the Air Force are developing a Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) system designed to protect mobility aircraft required to operate in such environments. Some, but not all, of our organic airlift fleet is equipped with an early generation aircraft defensive system (ADS). Unfortunately, this version of ADS, the only system currently capable of providing even minimal protection for large aircraft, is very sensitive and, as a consequence, will occasionally cue on light sources in the same spectrum as the surface-to-air missiles it is designed to protect against, and can launch flares inadvertently, even though the aircraft is not actually being targeted by a MANPAD or other system. Although our flares pose no actual risk to anyone or anything on the ground, the political sensitivity of inadvertent flare launch has led several nations to deny ADS use in parts of their airspace. A new generation of ADS, one which AMC will field over the next several years, will reduce the likelihood of inadvertent launch. That said, current funding only supports equipping a fraction of the airlift fleet while retaining the current, older systems for the remainder. Of course, none of our commercial contract carriers are ADS equipped. We rely on their commercial profile and markings, blending them in with other commercial air traffic, to mitigate their risk. In the meantime, I'm encouraged by the State Department's direction to our ambassadors to work with our geographic CINCs and respective host nations to increase their responsiveness to our need to protect our forces and thereby reduce sensitivity to ADS use. This direction focuses on allowing U.S. forces maximum opportunity to protect themselves, as well as on the requirement for host nation security forces to better protect our people and resources while in, or transiting, their countries. Much like the U.S.S. Cole, the strategic sealift fleet of USTRANSCOM's Navy component, Military Sealift Command (MSC), is also vulnerable to terrorist or asymmetric attack. MSC's merchant vessels are essentially defenseless, yet they carry large volumes of high value DOD cargo during contingencies, and are vulnerable to attack in port, at anchorage, and in-transit through disputed waterways and choke- points worldwide. Since they may operate independent of naval escorts, and since they are typically operated by small, lightly armed (if armed at all) civilian crews, we are reviewing options to ensure their protection from a growing number of asymmetric threats including piracy and terrorism. Of course, our primary reliance is, and must be, on the geographic CINCs and their component commands to provide port and waterside security. In this regard, both the Navy and the regional commanders have significantly increased their involvement in providing protection for all naval vessels. That said, in my view, due to the relatively small size of the crew complement aboard these merchant ships, technology must be the additional ``force multiplier'' that provides us the capability to detect, identify, and deter threats. For example, MSC is developing a ship defensive system that will use thermal imaging and intrusion detection devices to help protect the merchant shipping used by DOD. In the end it is our expectation that the combination of an increased awareness by all parties, coupled with wise investments in modern detection and defensive technologies, will provide our ships, in the future, with the level of deterrence and protection they require. The land element of USTRANSCOM's strategic mobility triad is MTMC, our Army component. MTMC's port handlers are deployed to high threat locations on a daily basis. Operating as small teams, most often without the benefit of other U.S. forces present, they too, in their own way, are vulnerable. To the maximum extent possible, we tie these personnel into the force protection plans of the closest U.S. military facility or American Embassy to which they are operating. These soldiers and civilians are well-trained in individual protective measures and employ these measures to reduce their profile and therefore their vulnerability. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks by terrorist groups, and state-sponsored or non-state actors, pose an ever increasing threat around the world. Nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapon attacks on enroute or arrival airfields and seaports during a major deployment would significantly reduce throughput, dramatically slowing the arrival of combat forces and/or sustainment supplies into the respective CINC's AOR. Again, in-transit mobility forces would rely on the appropriate geographic CINC for the major portion of their WMD force protection. That said, our military aircraft and ships are prepared to (and would) operate, as required, in contaminated environments. On the other hand, our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) commercial carriers are not obligated to proceed into such areas, and given today's increased threat, we are doing everything possible to provide reasonable protection for our commercial crews who, despite all precautions, could be trapped in a port, and exposed inadvertently to contamination while supporting a deployment. Additionally, AMC is developing and testing a procedure designed to protect commercial aircraft and personnel by transloading cargo from commercial aircraft onto military aircraft. This procedure will allow AMC to keep the commercial side of its lift effort moving forward, as far as possible, into protected areas, and by transloading that cargo onto organic (military) aircraft, continue its last leg of movement into the higher-risk areas. This will hopefully ensure, in time of crisis, a near uninterrupted flow of personnel and cargo into a theater. Significant progress has been made in improving the protection posture of our merchant mariners. Five of six Maritime Union Schools have been certified to teach chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) defense courses and three of seven maritime academies are preparing to teach MSC-sponsored CBR defense courses. Today, all Fast Sealift Ships (FSSs), Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off Ships (LMSRs), and prepositioning ships are CBR defense equipped. Recently, MSC also received funding to begin purchasing CBR defense equipment for Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships and, to date, $987,000 has been obligated to fully outfit 36 of 76 RRF vessels. Progress is also being made in providing protection for our Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) aircrews. Although we would never require a civilian crew to operate in a known hazardous area, AMC stores and maintains protective clothing and equipment for issue to civilian aircrews prior to their entry into even potentially hazardous areas. This equipment is currently stored at a central location for inventory and replenishment reasons and stands ready for immediate issue. ustranscom at/fp initiatives USTRANSCOM possesses only limited physical AT/FP capability itself--provided by security forces under our direct command. In fact, the sole organic defensive capability available to USTRANSCOM units is Air Mobility Command's (AMC's) PHOENIX RAVEN program. Under the direction of AMC's Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), these forces are specially trained and equipped for the close-in defense of individual aircraft and crews. At the recommendation of the AMC Threat Working Group (TWG), PHOENIX RAVENS deploy as part of the aircrew in two to four-person teams to augment security provided by supported CINC and host nation forces. Though an extremely successful program, it is imperative to understand that PHOENIX RAVENS are intended only to augment existing forces and not to relieve geographic CINCs or Chiefs of Mission of their AT/FP responsibility. The cornerstones of our AT/FP processes at USTRANSCOM are oversight and coordination. To facilitate the oversight process, the USTRANSCOM force protection office developed the Force Protection Oversight Program (FPOP). This web-based program tracks compliance with all 31 DOD antiterrorism standards for each of the component commands, down to their individual units. This program gives our commanders the ability to report their compliance status and to provide details of shortfalls, ``get well'' plans, and resource requirements. Through this program, my staff and I have immediate access to the status of all forces under our purview, down to the unit level. Obviously, USTRANSCOM relies heavily on the geographic CINCs for force protection support. That said, we recognize that the constant movement and relatively low profile of some of our assets make such support a significant challenge, one for which we share a great deal of the responsibility for success. Along this line, we think we are making significant progress in mitigating the force protection vulnerabilities of our assets. The AMC Threat Working Group (TWG) process, which is essentially an ``operational risk management'' system, has long been the benchmark for U.S. Air Force AT programs and is clearly a potential blueprint for one element of an enhanced Navy Port (and ``transiting ship'') AT program. Even before the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, AMC was conducting daily, individual assessments of each and every mission into significant or higher threat level locations. This robust TWG process evaluates a number of factors, to include terrorist threats against force protection posture at airfields, then recommends additional measures (if required) for implementation by the TACC and/or by our crews. In some cases, their recommendations require requests for additional supported CINC and/or host nation security forces. The TWG process covers missions by both Air Force aircraft, as well as missions by our commercial contract carriers. While not unique in structure, this coordinated effort of Intelligence, Security Forces, and Operations is certainly among the most comprehensive programs of its kind in DOD. Furthermore, AMC's robust and successful TWG process is now being replicated in other theaters. At USTRANSCOM, we have also created a similar ``Force Protection Triad'' of intelligence, force protection and operations staffs to ensure inter-theater, unified command oversight of all potential threats and corresponding counter- measures for all CINCTRANS missions, be they by air, sea, or on the ground. With regards to USTRANSCOM's maritime assets, I'm encouraged by what I see going on around the world to provide increased protection for MSC's ships, especially in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Our MSC theater units are now linking with theater threat working groups, and theater intelligence centers are working to ensure increased visibility for USTRANSCOM maritime assets. Along these lines, our Counterintelligence Office and JICTRANS are aggressively engaged with our components, working to ensure an effective federated risk management process is supported across geographic areas of responsibility as well as across our operations, intelligence, and logistics functional mission areas, to achieve 100 percent coverage. Furthermore, we are working with the intelligence and force protection offices for each USTRANSCOM Component Command to ensure they have the necessary connectivity to receive all pertinent threat data. The enhancement of our force protection posture and capabilities is one requiring constant attention and increased resources. USTRANSCOM's responsibilities span the globe, hence any threat to American interests, anywhere, is at least a collateral threat to our people and our assets. There are many good news stories out there, such as the U.S. Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom dedicating a new position on their 24/7 watch to focus solely on transiting forces. Also noteworthy are our intensified actions to ensure ``eyes-on'' tracking of the lower profile MSC vessels, and small numbers of MTMC personnel moving in and out of relatively unknown ports. Still, the challenges are great and only through the continued and increased teamwork of the entire intelligence and counterintelligence communities can we hope to remain successful. conclusion The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole was a tragic event--in fact, the latest in a long series of tragic events--that only serves to remind all Americans of the risks our brave service men and women face everyday as they carry out the myriad of missions we ask them to perform. Our hearts go out to those who lost loved ones or were injured in the U.S.S. Cole bombing. Yet, while we grieve with the families of the U.S.S. Cole victims, USTRANSCOM is working diligently to mitigate the risk of future attacks on U.S. forces. That said, in closing, let me reiterate some of the key steps USTRANSCOM has taken, and/or is taking, to reduce the vulnerability of our forces operating daily around the globe. First, the command individually reviews each strategic air and sealift mission into significant or higher threat areas and coordinates specific mitigating measures with the supported CINC or Chief of Mission to ensure adequate FP is provided for these ``in-transit'' forces. Additionally, I reserve the right to ``veto'' any mission into a ``significant'' or higher threat location where adequate FP cannot be provided, attempting in such cases, where it is at all feasible, to move the mission into a nearby alternate airport or seaport where FP is adequate to counter the threat. USTRANSCOM is also continuing coordination with the geographic CINCs for increased security ``vetting'' and/or escort of Host Nation and/or Third Country National contract personnel who service AMC aircraft, MSC or MARAD ships, and MTMC port operations. Finally, we will continue to pursue programs like LAIRCM (and similar defensive technology efforts), as well as the funding that goes with them, to improve the self-protection capabilities of our resources. The ``quiet heroes'' of the U.S. Transportation Command, who I am so proud and honored to command, stand ready daily to perform their critical mobility mission in support of the full range of tasks assigned. Realizing the tremendous value of our transportation assets, as well as the critical importance of our global mission, we constantly strive to ensure the best possible protection for our active and Reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, as well as for our civilian employees, commercial partners, and our equipment, against terrorist attack or any other asymmetric threat. Making the best possible use of currently available intelligence, counterintelligence, and physical force protection information and assets, the command will continue to do everything we can to enhance AT/FP and to seek new opportunities for cooperation with others in the DOD community. Let me close by saying thank you, once again, for this opportunity--to present USTRANSCOM and its ongoing AT/FP efforts to this committee. Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. We will proceed to a 6-minute round of questioning. General, I am going to digress from the principal subject of our hearing to ask you a question about China. Yesterday the Secretary of Defense issued what I believe is a quite correct admonition that he will examine on a case-by-case basis the relationships between our military and the Chinese military. I do not wish to get into today the need for a correction midcourse, but I want to know what your view is with regard to the Secretary's action yesterday. I support it. I think it is a prudent one, given the circumstances, and particularly the manner in which the Chinese military in my judgment did not professionally handle, respond, or otherwise conduct themselves from beginning to end in this incident involving our aircraft which was forced to land in China. General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, I just returned last evening from abroad, have not had a chance to discuss this memorandum that you are referring to, I believe, with the Secretary. However, I would tell you that I think in a very prudent manner the Secretary has been actively involved since the EP-3 incident in reviewing our posture, reviewing our plans, and making decisions on a case-by-case basis as to activities, military-to-military, which would proceed and which ones might be suspended, which ones might be deferred, etcetera. I echo your comments. I think he has done that in a very prudent manner. Chairman Warner. Now returning to the inquiry at hand, the Crouch-Gehman report I think definitely brought to a full awareness needs to make and take corrective actions. But the inherent question is as we read through that report we have to say to ourselves, why did it take a tragic accident to force us to do that type of thinking and to institute those recommendations? I realize that hindsight is a valuable thing, but as we read through them they seem to me to be a very prudent and thoughtful recitation of steps that should be taken. I ask most respectfully, why had we not thought of those things beforehand, certainly some of them, and implemented them? General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, to address that I would like to use a quote that comes from Thomas Schelling in the foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter's book about Pearl Harbor. He said: ``It is not true that we were caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. Rarely has a government been more expectant. We just expected wrong. It was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some obvious Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made. There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.'' I think that in the process what we had really--in the process of looking at force protection, what we had concentrated most on in the interim were the larger fixed sites, places where we had lots of lives at risk, and had become target-fixated, if you will, to some respect with these larger types of targets, driven probably by the attack on Khobar Towers, on the Beirut barracks incident, as well as the attack on our embassies. Having never experienced the in-transit, it was not that it was ignored. For example, I think as you heard from testimony from General Zinni and from General Franks, General Zinni had personally visited Yemen, one of the in-transit sites, to make sure that he was satisfied that we were providing the proper security, the proper contracts were in place, etcetera. It had also been visited by Admiral Moore from Fifth Fleet to make sure that he felt comfortable. As a result of those visits, in fact, the ship was moved from in-port refueling out to the refueling dolphin, which would add a greater standoff and hence better protection for our ships. So again, it was a matter of not having ignored it, but probably not having paid as much attention to our vulnerabilities, to the seams that the terrorist could find, for the in-transit units that we probably should have been paying attention to. Chairman Warner. I have here the report that was written in 1993, ``Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Active Terrorism and Political Turbulence,'' February 1993, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Ops. He has a whole section right here titled ``Waterside Security'' on how to protect ships' berth. I find a striking parallel between the contents of this and the Crouch-Gehman report. But there is a 7-year interval. It seems to me that if these steps had been followed perhaps--and again, it is hindsight--perhaps this situation would not have happened. General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, I think that some of the steps that are recommended you would find, in fact, if not all, have been incorporated into the plans. However, the threat levels that are in the area you are operating in drives the types of conditions that you operate under. In this case, we were operating at Threat Condition Bravo, which required the skipper of the ship to carry out these 62 types of force protection measures, those that were applicable for shore. If it had been a higher threat level, had we had indications of a specific threat within Yemen, it would have driven that threat condition up and maybe even gone up to Delta, which has a whole other set of requirements that go with protecting your force. Chairman Warner. General, thank you. I'll proceed to my final question. That is the fundamental one that I asked in my opening statement. First, your role in reviewing these two incidents by the Navy, first the Cole and second the Greeneville; and do you concur in the actions that were taken, the levels of accountability that were established by the two commanding officers? In your judgment, do these actions reflect any change in the longstanding history in our country of accountability of military officers? General Shelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me answer the last part of the question first. The answer is no, they do not reflect a change. Let me also say, I have not had a chance and have not had a role in the Greeneville report, so I will have to limit my comments to the Cole. I have a statutory role to provide the Secretary of Defense with advice as his principal military adviser. I am sure that you understand that for me to properly fulfill my role, I try to do that in private. But having said that, let me address the accountability issue from my perspective as I reviewed both the JAGMAN as well as the Crouch-Gehman report. Whenever I deal with accountability issues at any point, in previous times as a commander or now as the chairman, I begin with the premise that I must know all the facts before I proceed to judge another person or to make a decision when I am a commander or a recommendation as the chairman that could end in either criminal penalties against the individual or in a move that could end that particular career. I start off, and I am certain that every time that we have an accident that occurs or Americans are killed as a result of premeditated murder, as we had in the case of the Cole, that the Americans that are responsible for them are not the individuals that caused the deaths in the case of a premeditated murder, and that we in fact have to make sure that we have all the facts and that we consider the facts associated with each case before we render a judgment. In addition, there are various levels of accountability, Mr. Chairman. We have punitive, we have administrative, we have personal and professional. Accountability encompasses that whole range and the consequences that go with it in ways, are not all always visible to the general public. In this case I had the benefit of being able to read the JAGMAN investigation. I not only read it, I had a team of my own which included some members of the Crouch-Gehman Commission that went through and reviewed the voluminous materials that were associated with the Crouch-Gehman, not just the final report, but some of the other data as well. I did the same thing with the JAGMAN. I went through it in great detail and I had other members of my staff go through it and give me their recommendations. I believe that the findings were appropriate. Chairman Warner. Were appropriate, they were appropriate? General Shelton. Yes, sir. In terms of the Crouch-Gehman, they did not specifically address accountability. That was not their charter. Chairman Warner. Correct. General Shelton. But as you look at the very thorough reports that came out of them, particularly when you combine the JAGMAN, the findings of that report, with the Crouch- Gehman, we find that you can, in fact, make some I think informed judgments and decisions based on accountability--or about accountability. I will let Admiral Clark address the JAGMAN later in the interest of time. But I felt that the judgments that were rendered by the chain of command, in this case, as you mentioned, by Admiral Natter, by Admiral Moore, and by Admiral Clark, the CNO, were the correct judgments. As for others in the chain of command, from what I got out of Crouch-Gehman and the JAGMAN, starting with the intelligence community, the attack on the Cole was not the result, in my opinion, of an intelligence failure. I just quoted Roberta Wohlstetter. We failed to anticipate what appeared to be the improbable or the weakest link in the chain. The community I think provided the best available and most relevant information that they had at the time. The Cole Commission makes numerous recommendations that deal with how we can probably do that better in the future, and I firmly believe that we can and in fact have a recommendation with the Secretary now as to the way that I think we can significantly enhance our intelligence ability or our intelligence community's capability to deal with these asymmetric and transnational threats, which obviously, we are going to face more and more in the future, as I think all intelligence estimates I have seen indicate we will face. In terms of CINCCENT, as I indicated earlier and as you heard General Zinni testify before this committee, General Zinni, in fact, was involved in the choice of Aden. He in fact visited Aden. He felt that after he ordered a vulnerability assessment of Aden and after reviewing all of this, that Aden was okay for a refueling site. I find nothing in General Zinni's decisions or in his comments, nor in those of General Franks, who subsequently looked at Yemen, that was directly related to an attack on the Cole or contributed to the attack on the Cole. When you look at Admiral Moore, his naval component commander, Admiral Moore was personally also involved in the selection of Aden as a refueling site, personally involved in the force protection decisions of his component forces. The Cole Commission found when they looked at his operation and his force protection program that ``it was thorough and robust.'' Although I think in retrospect probably Admiral Moore would tell you that he wishes he would have paid even more specific attention to what the Cole was planning to do, there was no doubt, we had no reason, he had no reason to doubt that the Cole had a good plan in place, that the Cole was going to carry out that plan, and that it was adequate given the force level, and threat levels that the Cole would be operating in when he went in for his brief refueling stop. Finally, there was CTF-50, the Carrier Task Force 50; had been in theater a little less than a month, had been actively involved in maritime interdiction operations, was actively flying almost on a daily basis in our Operation Southern Watch. He reviewed the report that was submitted to him by the Cole prior to going in and had no reason to doubt, when the Cole skipper submitted that report, that it would not be carried out and that those actions were in fact sufficient, given the threat level that he faced. So finally, I think that when you look at the entire chain that I have just gone through and then bring it right on up from the CINC up to the Secretary and myself, I think that we all realized that we could probably, everybody in the chain of command could have done better. As you said earlier, maybe we should have been thinking more out of the box than we were. However, I think that as you look at the chain there was no dereliction and there was certainly no criminal intent or any criminal actions or anything else that warranted punishment, from the CINC right on down to the skipper. Chairman Warner. Thank you. Admiral Clark, this is a book that is written by, co- authored by Admiral William P. Mack. I was privileged to know this great naval officer. When I was Secretary of the Navy he was Superintendent at the Academy, and I must tell you that he reflects to me then, as he does today, the conscience of the Navy. As a matter of fact, I was a young man when I had that job and I made my share of mistakes, and he very courteously but firmly dressed me down, and properly so, on one occasion. But he writes in this book, and I will quote from it: ``The accountability of command. In navies in general and in the U.S. Navy in particular, strict accountability is an integral part of command. Not even the profession of medicine embraces the absolute accountability found at sea. A doctor may lose a patient under trying circumstances and continue to practice. But a naval officer seldom has the opportunity to hazard a second ship. There have been times and those who questioned the strict and undeviating application of accountability in the Navy, but those that have been to sea have always closed ranks against the doubters.'' On the next page: ``In each case, as well as in other instances of the mishandling of ships at sea, the doctrine of full accountability has been strongly enforced in the U.S. Navy and will continue to be at the very heart of command at sea.'' I presume you concur in those observations of a great sailor. My simple question to you, as you look back, as difficult as it is, at this case, have the judgments that have been rendered by yourself and others in any way changed that doctrine that has been at the heart of our Navy since its very inception? Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, in my view, absolutely not. Let me say that I received as a gift that book when I went to my first command as a lieutenant. I devoured it. I understand and I believe in the whole fundamental principle of accountability of our commanders. Going back to the first sentence that you read, it talked about the accountability of command. It did not say the punishment of command. It is my view that we have in this case held all of the parties accountable for their actions. There are some who believe that because they were not punished somehow they were not held accountable, and I do not agree with that. Let me say why that is so. The criteria that I used, Mr. Chairman, was this---- Chairman Warner. Could I interject. You and I know each other quite well. I think the record should reflect, of all those on active duty now, you have probably had more time as a ship's captain at sea than any other. I checked that. So I think you speak with considerable authority. Admiral Clark. Well, I would say that I thank you for pointing that out. It is not all ships. It is groups and fleets and destroyer squadrons. But I believe that to be true, yes. My criteria was this, Mr. Chairman. First, I make a judgment about accountability based upon--and I included this in my endorsement. I wanted the world to know. I wanted my Navy to know. I added emphasis to that in a message that I sent later, that we can talk about if you would like, on exactly the way I intended for my Navy to interpret this, but that I would judge this commander first of all on the premise that, did this commander conduct himself within the standards that we expect of our commanding officers? The quotation that you cite and the words in your opening statement, it is a long part of our heritage and culture that we believe in giving-- because of where we send our ships, into the far corners of the earth, where they have to act independently, we give them a lot of responsibility and we give them all the authority that they need to take the actions that are required of them to command their ship. So within this, with this criteria, what is the spectrum of the standard? Some operate at the high end of that standard and some in the middle and so forth. They are not all the same. But there is a band of acceptability, and it was my judgment that first and foremost in that band of what is expected of our commanding officers one of the things I expect them to do is I expect them to make independent judgments. This commanding officer did, and some of those judgments involved the setting aside of some of the measures. First and foremost, he was willing to step forward and make the kind of judgments that I expect commanding officers to make. The second part of the criteria that I used in my accountability assessment was this. We specified, the system specified, specific things that he was supposed to do. The base, the initial investigation, does a tally of numbers, he did this, he did not do this, and so forth. Some of those he set aside intentionally and so forth. Then judgments are made about the efficacy of those that were accomplished. My criteria was this, and it is for every commanding officer, Mr. Chairman: Would any specific actions that we directed him to take, if he had taken them and he did not, and the system, his command structure, told him to do that, would it have prevented this attack? All of the endorsers in the chain of command and those that reviewed this investigation above me agreed with my conclusion that they would not have changed the outcome, that this attack would have been conducted. Now, this is an open statement, open session kind of a statement. In closed session I would be happy to get into the rules of engagement and the way you make, how individuals make judgments and what kind of warfighting tactics and principles would be required to stop the attack. I do not mean to imply that the attack could not have been prevented, but I do mean to say very succinctly that they could not have been prevented with the measures that were prescribed for this commanding officer. So my judgment was that, fundamental to accountability, is the accountability of the chain of command and those superiors, that I judged this fairly and based upon the facts, and this particular case was about an attack being conducted on the ship. In my judgment, this commanding officer was held accountable and I judged him. As you said in your statement, I found some things that I think he could have done better. But I do not believe that those things rise to the level of warranting punishment, to courtmartial him, or something. I did not believe that that was the case, and that was the way I made my judgment, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you, Chief. I am going to put into the record at this juncture your message to all commanding officers following the incident. [The material referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. I am also going to put into the record the recitation from the Khobar Towers report about Waterside Security. I think in parallel they should be judged. [The material referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. Senator Levin. Senator Levin. First, the chairman asked a question about China, General Shelton, and I want to follow that up with the following question. There were two changes in our policy relative to military-to-military meetings within the last 24 or 48 hours. First, military-to-military meetings were suspended or contacts were suspended. Then I understand that that was changed to a case-by-case review of those contacts. You indicated you were apparently not personally involved in the memoranda which were discussed in the media today revising the policy, apparently twice. My question is this: Do you know if the Vice Chair of the JCS or other members of the JCS or Admiral Blair, who is Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command, were consulted or involved in either revision of the policy? General Shelton. Senator Levin, for the record I actually saw the memorandum this morning, the 30 April one you are referring to now. There has been involvement in terms of the review of the military-to-military on a case-by-case basis all along the way. I cannot really address--I have not had a chance to talk to the Secretary about the memorandum, so I cannot address that second part of your question right now. Senator Levin. As to whether or not anybody---- General Shelton. I am not sure what--that was not a memorandum that was signed by the Secretary, and I am not aware of what coordination might have gone into that. I also personally was on the road at the time. So I will have to provide you the answer for the record. Senator Levin. Would you let us know whether or not your Vice Chair or any member of the JCS was involved or consulted, or a commander or a CINC was involved in the preparation of or approval of or involved with the memorandum that you just referred to as the April 30 memorandum? General Shelton. Yes, sir. [The information referred to follows:] With regards to the first question, the U.S. Pacific Command, members of the Joint Staff, and I were all consulted and involved in discussions that lead to the revision of the policy involving military- to-military contact with the Peoples Republic of China in the weeks following the EP-3 incident. With regards to the 30 April 01 memorandum signed by Mr. Chris Williams from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Blair (USCINCPAC) did not coordinate on the memorandum prior to its release on 30 April 01. Furthermore, we were not involved in the decision to later rescind the memorandum. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your accountability standards. This goes to General Shelton, I guess first, and then to you, Admiral, I do not believe that either the Crouch-Gehman Commission or the JAG Manual investigation were charged with looking at the levels of command above the commanding officer of the Cole. Now, they might have in the process of their charge made some comments on it. But am I correct to say that the levels of command above the commander and the crew of the U.S.S. Cole were not looked at in terms of accountability, either by Crouch-Gehman or by the JAG Manual? Let me start with General Shelton. General Shelton. I will let the CNO talk about the JAG Manual. But Bill Crouch and Hal Gehman were not charged to look at accountability by their charter. When their report came back in, however, it became quite obvious that the detail of this report--and they looked at the issue from the skipper of the ship right on up through the CINC--rendered enough information that you could make judgments in accountability all the way down the chain through, as I indicated, CTF-50. Senator Levin. Thank you. Admiral. Admiral Clark. That states the case for Crouch-Gehman. The case for the JAG Manual specifically was an inside the lifeline examination of the conduct and the performance of the commanding officer and the crew of the U.S.S. Cole. So it did not address specific responsibilities of the chain of command above the commanding officer. Senator Levin. What was the reason why it was not? Should it not have looked at the chain of command above the commander and the crew? Admiral Clark. I can only judge the actions inside the lifelines. I cannot speak for the decisions or the reasoning that went into the discussions with the principals in the Crouch-Gehman, and I will defer to the Chairman on that. I would just pass to you that from the very moment that this occurred--and I recall the first session, a matter I guess of 3 or 4 hours into the event, that we sat down with the Secretary and discussed the issue, and I informed him that by our standards we would be conducting an investigation of activity on the Cole. Then the discussion turned to the requirement for a broader investigation, and the Chairman can talk about the way that came to be. Senator Levin. In any event, no one was charged with the accountability assessment above the commander and crew of the Cole; is that accurate? Admiral Clark. I believe that, as the Chairman stated, that that is a correct statement. Senator Levin. All right. Now, I was very much taken by your description of accountability, by the way, and I have only really one question about that. Your testimony and I think in the other document which the chairman put in the record, you say the following; that in assessing the accountability of the commanding officer, the reviewing authorities focused on two significant issues. First, were they reasonable within the range of performance; and second is the following: would any of the force protection measures not implemented by the Cole have deterred or defeated a determined attack? Now, it would seem to me that that may be too easy, slightly too easy a standard. I say this with some trepidation, given my admiration for you and your background, knowledge, and experience. But nonetheless, I will ask the question anyway. Say that the force protection measures which were not implemented might have deterred or defeated the attack. Would you think then that that standard should be met? Admiral Clark. I think that I certainly should have considered it and it would depend on not just the measure, but the tactics that would be employed to execute the measure. Senator Levin. But my emphasis is the following. Instead of using a standard ``would have,'' because then you can say, well, you cannot say that they would have, but what happens if you conclude they might have? You cannot conclude that they would have deterred, but you think they might have deterred. Should there not be an accountability for that? Should that not be the right standard? Admiral Clark. Well, I cannot make a statement like that, Senator. Senator Levin. No, I am not asking you to make it about the Cole. I am talking about a standard in general. I am saying if a force protection measure not taken in general, in some generic way, might have deterred an attack, should that not be sufficient? Admiral Clark. I believe that there could be measures that I would come down and I might make that judgment. But ``might'' is an awfully loose word. So it is too loose a word for me to make these kind of judgments. When we say to our people, we are going to send you forward--when the chairman read the statement from ``Command at Sea,'' it talked about mishandling his ship, or her ship in today's world, not like when ``Command at Sea'' was written. It talked about those kind, that kind of action-- dramatically different than being attacked by a terrorist. So I believe that the criteria of something that might have happened, ``might'' is an awfully loose word. Senator Levin. Might have happened, might have deterred. Admiral Clark. ``Might have deterred'' is awfully loose. So I would say I would have to make that judgment based on what that specific was and the tactics used to implement the action. Senator Levin. Thank you, Admiral. My time is up. Chairman Warner. I would like to put into the record at this point documents which I think could possibly be slightly different than what you said about Admiral Moore's responsibility. I am going to ask you to review it. You can then seek what clarification may be necessary. [The material referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts. STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for continuing to follow the tragic attack on the U.S.S. Cole and, more particularly, the lessons learned from that event. I want to thank all the witnesses. I want to thank you for your service, your leadership, your commitment, as we all try to do better. I am going to wear two hats today, Mr. Chairman. I am going to wear my Intelligence Committee hat, as well as my Armed Services Committee hat. I want to continue to focus on the intelligence aspect of the Cole attack, because it seems to me if we fail to solve the intelligence problems and challenges that face us in this asymmetric threat environment, we are going to be back again trying to figure out why we missed the signals available to us following some other attack on our forces. This is not a simple problem. It is very complex. It is very difficult, but solutions must be found. I am going to state, if the intelligence community walks away from the Cole and believes they did everything--and I emphasize the word ``everything''--possible and are comforted by the fact there was no smoking gun specifically, outlining an attack on the Cole on 12 October of last year, then I say again we will be back with another investigation of the loss of lives of American servicemen and women. Now, General Shelton, you just stated that, in terms of intelligence available--and that is the key word, ``intelligence available''--that it was pertinent, there was no failure, it was the best possible. I am concerned about that statement. I tend to agree, but I have some real concerns. Let me explain. The first step it seems to me is to critically look at each of the terrorist attacks against our forces and see what might have been a critical piece of information that was not given the weight it deserved. Every indication available to me suggests that we do not have a problem in regards to collection. I think we are doing a great job in that regard. But it also seems to me that when we get into the business of analyzing that information and then a formal warning report to the warfighter, that is where we need some improvements. Now let me just make two quotes. The DCI, George Tenet, said before the Intelligence Committee that the DCI has stated he was hired not to observe and comment, but to warn and protect. The intelligence community defines and identifies the goal of warning as follows. Warning is sounding an alarm, an alarm giving notice. It denotes urgency and implies the need to act. Warning demands diligence and requires constant questioning of conventional wisdom. The goal of the process is for the intelligence community to provide strategic warning that gives our leaders time to either avert a crisis or at least be prepared to deal with one. Let me quote our former Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, who told reporters that U.S. intelligence needed to be improved, and he noted that conspirators had watched for a year prior to the Cole attack to see how U.S. warships refueled in Aden. I am quoting here from ABC News, that says: ``The morning after a terrorist told of the planned attack, August 26, 1998, the FBI sent out a classified message under FBI Director Louis Freeh's name warning of a plot to attack the U.S. Navy ship in Yemen.'' We are still trying to figure out why that dropped between the slots. Second, it seems to me we must look to technology to assist in the analysis of the massive amounts of information collected, and I can go into that a little bit later. If the CINCs and the unit commanders have a prayer of a chance of taking the appropriate defensive action to detect and deter a terrorist act against our forces, then it seems to me our intelligence community must not be comfortable, must not be complacent, and must not accept that they did not have enough specific information to issue a warning that might have prevented or certainly mitigated the attack on the Cole. Now, let us use 20-20 hindsight. That is always the case. Admiral Clark, General Shelton, and General Robertson, say we are all in a room together. If you knew that in August 1998 a known terrorist and bin Laden associate stated that a U.S. warship would be attacked in Aden with a Katusha rocket in the next several months; and if we knew that on 3 January, 2000, an attack on the U.S.S. The Sullivans was aborted only because the small boat laden with explosives sank; and if there was relevant--and I emphasize the word ``relevant''--terrorist information available, a storm warning, if you will, with clear possibilities of lightning strikes in the general region; and if we knew that the Israeli and the Palestinian situation was really boiling over, what different action would we have taken prior to the arrival of the U.S.S. Cole or any other ships to the harbor in Aden? All four events are true. Two were known before the Cole and the attack on The Sullivans was known shortly after the explosion. I submit the fact that the attack on The Sullivans was not known, only adds to the assertion that the intelligence community should not rest easy. Now, my question is this: Would you discuss what actions each of you, as well as you can in this open forum, have taken to improve our ability to analyze, analyze the threat information, and then proceed to a warning in regards to our warfighters? In this same vein, what is your view on issuing an intelligence warning with less than perfect data? I am not comfortable with our ability and what went on with the U.S.S. Cole, and you can date that back several years in regards to other incidents. Please feel free to answer as you see fit. General Shelton. Senator Roberts, let me say first of all I agree with almost everything that you said. My indication was that, based on the best available--and I want to make sure the word ``intelligence'' is in the record, not information. One of the problems that our CINCs, our operational chain of command, deals with is being flooded with information: spurious hits, a lot of information that comes in, information which in some cases is almost worthless unless it is combined with all the other things that are going on and, as you indicated, it is analyzed and then turned into what amounts to intelligence, actionable intelligence, something that will drive you to take action. For example, the 1998 report on attacking a ship with a rocket, you have to go back and look at, was it one report, was it a credible report, was it from a reliable source, etcetera, and what else then starts to indicate over the next 2-year period of time that this is a part of the terrorist organization's plan? As we indicated and as Crouch-Gehman said, we do need to reprioritize some of the assets within the intelligence community. We need to have probably more emphasis on the SIGINT piece and the HUMINT piece, which is what is most valuable to you when you are dealing with terrorist organizations. But I believe that we also have to be concerned when we look at terrorism, being a trans-national threat, that has to have an organization that can deal with this voluminous amount of information that may go across all CINCs' AOs. Let me use one example. You deal with an organization like Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda organization, which operates out of 55 different countries or more. Then he is planning this attack possibly in Afghanistan, communicating with an outfit that maybe is over in Admiral Blair's AO in the Pacific, for an attack that maybe is going to transpire in General Ralston's area. So each one of these may be getting spurious bits of information or intelligence, as some would refer to it, but it does not form a complete picture. So I believe that our intelligence community has to be able to focus, focus on the threat that is coming out of this organization, looking at what is going on and the threads that tie this information in to what is going to be an attack in one of the areas. I have had a chance to discuss this with the DCI, Mr. Tenet, and we are working right now on an initiative that will help us do that. In fact, we have a good example of one of those working right now in the commander in chief area of operation. But I personally would like to see that in each one of our CINCs' AOs, so that we are in fact able to provide them with detailed information. The analysis is what is key to it. Information in itself inundates. If you look at the Cole, the skipper of the Cole, he does not have the wherewithal, the staffing, the intelligence analysts, and the all-source intelligence, if you will, that will enable him to really focus and see what he has--as you move up, the CINC should have that, and it should be a push system that goes down, not them having to pull and having to look for it. Certainly that would then lead us to a warning once we saw that developing, which would increase our threat conditions, which would raise the level of awareness and consequently allow us to deal with that threat in a manner that we will have to be prepared to deal with it if we are to preclude an incident like we have had with the Cole. Admiral Clark. The first part first, what have we done? Senator, there are a number of things that have happened, some of which we really should talk about in closed session, and I look forward to that. It really is crucial to our progress in this area. Each of the large fleets, and I am talking about the large Navy component commanders in Europe and in the Pacific and in the Fifth Fleet, they have taken action to strengthen their ability to synthesize and help warn. For example, in Europe there is a team designated full-time that is working this process, and then they have established a system called a Blue Dart program to get warnings out. This is a focus issue, but it is also people working full time synthesizing. It gets back to your fundamental point: There is an awful lot of information out there. So that is taking place. Then General Shelton, the chairman, talked earlier about things that have happened at the national and service military level, and we ought to talk about that later. Part two of your question has to do with releasing information, preliminary information. I would say that the scenario you described with those four events, those four kind of events that happened, a couple of those really give me pause and would have really made a difference. But I will tell you that a couple, at least one of them, I would have gone and checked out. But because at the time of this incident--and we have talked about this in some other forum before. But a commander, the amount of information out there is so overwhelming. I know you know that, but I know that a lot of people do not know that. So the commander when he reads a report, it needs to be synthesized for him, because the number of false alarms--false alarms over time actually reduce the readiness. That is the challenge that we face. So I agree with your fundamental posture completely, that we have to have an apparatus, not just to collect, but to put this together in a meaningful way. The case that you cite with regard to the attempt in January on the U.S.S. The Sullivans, there is a clear case where if that information had been available everything in the theater would have changed. I do not just mean in Aden. All of the operations related to how you would get ships from point A to point B, all of that would have been affected, and we did not have that information. I make one point in closing. I think one of the things that we have learned, Senator--and I have had a continuing dialogue with my Navy component commanders, the component that I provide in this case to General Franks in the CENTCOM AOR. I was speaking to him this week and we have to understand that we cannot presume perfect knowledge. That has had a fundamental effect on the measures and the tactics that we have put into place, because if we believe that we will have perfect knowledge it will dramatically change the way we establish response mechanisms. His point to me was when I was talking this week, was we cannot take the position that, because we see an intelligence brief and it is on the chart, that that is 100 percent of all truth. It is always going to be a challenge to the intelligence community to do the collection piece of it, no question about that. But on our side, for every user of intelligence we have to make sure we understand that if we expect perfect knowledge we are setting ourselves up for a potential fall. General Robertson. Sir, if I might, let me try to explain to you how it happened yesterday and happened today in my piece of the business. I mentioned earlier that we fly about 1,700 missions a week on the air side of the United States Transportation Command. We have been living with this plethora of information for years and have developed an apparatus to synthesize and digest it, agreeing 100 percent with your vision that it ought to be certainly more focused. But for each one of those 1,700 missions that I fly every week, I have a joint intelligence center on the Transportation Command side and a threat working group on both sides. They take the information and sift through the port information, the aerial port of embarkation, debarkation, and the seaport of embarkation, debarkation, for threat-related information associated with the ports that we operate through. They take that information and apply it to every sortie that we fly every day based on the inputs from my representatives from DIA, CIA, NIMA, and the National Security Agency, and make an assessment per mission of what mitigating measures are required for those missions. Then we bounce that off of the theater CINC and his JIC as to what we think, and off of his operations and force protection staff as to the mitigating measures that we deem most appropriate. Then we make an assessment of whether he can meet those mitigating measures, and if he cannot then is the mission so important that we need to continue anyway, basically a risk assessment. If you take that back to the very beginning, I am totally dependent on the quality of the intelligence that is given to me when I start. Now, that is long-term intelligence, near real time intelligence, and real time intelligence. Because of the communications capabilities that I have, I can move very rapidly to launch an airplane, or not launch an airplane. We have a list of countries that we put on a list, that we call the real time launch list, and the aircraft commander has to call in 30 minutes before he launches into that country to check the latest intelligence. We have a cell responsible for telling him that it is changed or the same and that he is clear to go or not to go. But obviously the point that you would make, and the point that I second, is that it is the quality of the intelligence that drives our assessment of risk, wherever we fly, throughout the world, and the same is true on the sealift side. Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman, my time has long expired. I apologize to both Senators Nelson. I am not for threat fatigue. I understand that. But I think we are lacking in regards to the analytical ability. I might say, Mr. Chairman--this will be the final thing I say --that Samuel Huntington wrote a book a couple of years ago called ``The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.'' I do not know if you have all read that. You do not have time to read it, but I would encourage you to do so. He pointed out that we are at war. We are in a quasi-war with certain segments of the Islamic world. So you start from that premise. If, in fact, we are 14 percent short in regards to authorized billets, 1,400 no-shows to the intelligence community, most of them are all-source analysts that we do not have. We have tried to authorize and appropriate that, we are lacking, gentlemen. Yet we have this--I feel there is this connotation that the intelligence community, with all due respect--love the intelligence community in terms of the collection effort--we are not doing the job. We should not rest easy, or we are going to be right back here again. I thank the chairman. Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Just as an administrative announcement, the Secretary of Defense is coming up to Capitol Hill. I am going to meet with him now, regarding China and budgetary and other matters. It is very important that the work of this committee be done in parallel with his decisionmaking on behalf of the President for the 2001 supplemental, which is now to be done, as well as such 2002 modifications that we have to make. So in my absence, Senator Roberts, if you would conduct the hearing. Now, if Senator Nelson will indulge me, that is a very impressive statement you made, General Robertson, about the actions that you are taking daily to prepare and update your pilots and aircraft as they transit in and out of these many areas of the world. Is that being done in the other military departments, General? More specifically, Admiral, do you feel that you have a comparable setup in the Navy? Because you point out the difficulty of distilling for a commanding officer the enormity of this daily influx of information. Admiral Clark. General Robertson as a CINC has his own intelligence structure, as compared to the component commanders in theater. They operate under what is typically a joint intelligence command inside each CINC-dom. But what we do have is that we have the NCIS, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, is now deployed more worldwide. I do not want to get into specifics. I do not want to let anybody know---- Chairman Warner. Can you answer in general terms. Admiral Clark. Yes, I can. Let me say that before any of our ships go in anyplace now, they are on the ground. They are checking out the local landscape. I spoke to Senator Roberts about the increased push kind of teams that have been established. So one of the reasons--TRANSCOM is a model and Crouch-Gehman pointed out this was not just about ships. This is about transient activity. Theirs is a good model and we are learning everything we can from the way they do it. Chairman Warner. You are going to try and incorporate. Of course, the Navy operates with all the CINCs, so to speak. General Shelton. All of our CINCs, Mr. Chairman, have a similar program. As I indicated earlier on, General Roberts on has one of the very best. Chairman Warner. I think it is important, because it is a very impressive statement he made. Thank you. Senator Ben Nelson, would you now proceed with your questions. Senator Nelson was here a little early, in fact the first member to arrive. STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank our friends in the military for being here today and for presenting your findings on the U.S.S. Cole incident. Clearly, the tragedy was a reminder that our deployed forces face the threats that, as you say, they cannot often see and they certainly cannot expect as to the particulars. General Shelton, in your written testimony you discuss the findings of this commission's report and one of the recommendations under the category of organization includes developing the security capabilities of host nations to help protect U.S. forces, recognizing that if we bring partners into the process and into the development of those practices and capabilities that we probably can do better. Could you give us just a little bit more information about what you have in mind, maybe without too many particulars, but with some generalizations as to what you might expect to happen in certain locations around the world? General Shelton. Certainly, Senator Nelson. Of course, any time we are operating in another nation's territory we are dealing with sovereignty issues and the rules that they impose on our operations within that area. Engaging them early on and ensuring that they in fact are willing to accommodate the force protection measures that we feel are essential under each of the threat conditions or identifying those areas where they are not willing without either negotiation or maybe in some cases not allowing us to do, which then feeds back into the CINC's assessment as to whether or not he will in fact use that port or that facility. You heard General Robertson, and I will let him talk to it in just a minute, make assessments in terms of the threat levels and whether or not these pieces are in place, whether or not we have the properly vetted people, whether or not they are willing to allow the posting of armed guards so that the boats in the water, in the case of one of our ships going into a port, provide that perimeter. These are the types of things that have to be worked out with each one of the countries in some type of a memorandum of agreement or understanding, and we have to do that in conjunction with the State Department, with our defense attaches in each location. That is an ongoing effort. We are making good progress on that right now. But it is a continuing effort. Senator Ben Nelson. General Robertson. General Robertson. Sir, if I might, the chairman characterized it very well. We depend to a great degree around the world on host nation security. We make an assessment in conjunction with that theater's particular CINC as to whether that host nation security is adequate or whether we need point security for our aircraft or for the ships that I have Operational Control (OPCON) for, whether we need to contract out security, whether we need to contract, for instance, patrol boats and things like that, divers, or whether we need to bring in our own, or whether, for an aircraft, whether I need to bring in my own specially trained security forces. It carries over also to the contracts that we use for loading and unloading in my case, loading and unloading ships and aircraft, because for the most part those are host nation contractors. So I have to make a determination in conjunction with that CINC and whatever intelligence I have, whether those contractors and the people that they employ have been properly vetted from a security standpoint as to be reliable or unreliable, or whether again I have to bring my own loading and unloading people into the country. But we are getting more mature. When we talked to General Crouch and Admiral Gehman at United States Transportation Command, this was the seam that we expressed concern about because of our uncertainty over this vetting process, and over our uncertainty as to the relationship between the CINC and the host nation security forces. As a result, we have come a long way in the CINCs vulnerability assessments of each of the ports and fields that we operate in, in being able to say yes, no, maybe, we need to do more, or we are satisfied with what we have. It is an area that we have attacked aggressively, sir. Senator Ben Nelson. In conjunction with the vetting process, I would imagine it would be far more difficult to do the vetting of foreign nationals located around the world than it is to vet our own forces. How comfortable are you that we can get the vetting process to the point where we can trust the security capacity that we are going into in terms of memoranda of agreements and the like? General Shelton. From my perspective, Senator, we probably never will have that assurance that we would all like to have. I think that the real answer is it varies by nation in terms of what we are having to deal with. But we also take that into account because where necessary in some of the areas where the threat, particularly if we anticipate it as being higher, there is an augmentation requirement for U.S. forces moving into there, where the CINC may actually deploy his own people. Let me use as an example, if he has--and I do not want to go into too much detail about specifics here; we could do that in closed session. But if he has concerns in a particular port, he might elect to fly in an augmentation force that would provide that inner security, have his own boats in the water, etcetera, to make sure as close to 100 percent as we can that we have the proper protection for the aircraft or for the ship in this case. Senator Ben Nelson. Contracting security in conjunction with the protection of a building in downtown Washington might be an entirely different prospect in another country. General Shelton. Yes, sir. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much. General Shelton. Yes, sir. Senator Roberts [presiding]. Senator Bill Nelson. STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I wanted to follow up your line of questioning on the question of intelligence. General Shelton, according to the joint force doctrine, who is responsible and therefore accountable, who is in command for providing intelligence for forces moving along the strategic pipeline from the U.S. to the regional CINCs and between the regional CINCs? General Shelton. As those forces move between, as they leave the U.S., they chop to the CINC at a certain point in time. Otherwise they would belong to the component that was sending them into that particular area. If you have a force operating, if you take the Persian Gulf area, coming out of the Med, as the Cole was, there is a chop point en route where he passes from the control of CINCEUR into the control of CENTCOM, and it is a designated specific point that he chops. Admiral Clark may want to address it further. Senator Bill Nelson. He has the responsibility or the command for intelligence, and is that joint force doctrine, is that clear--the inquiry that Senator Roberts made with regard to intelligence information--so that that is shared and we then have someone we know is accountable because he was in command? Is that clear in the joint force? General Shelton. The chain of command is clear. Each of the CINCs has a joint intelligence center. They have an ability to analyze the information that is coming in from various and sundry locations. It may be a Defense Intelligence Agency report, it may be a Central Intelligence Agency report, it may be an NSA cut. They have the capability to look at all this, focus it, and provide that to the commander. My concern and the way that I think we need to address it and which I addressed in my answer to Senator Roberts is where this information is--and I will call it information--is popping up in different CINCs' AOs and appears to be related to their area, but maybe is tied into this transnational organization, into another CINC's area, that we do not have any seams or gaps in here. I think we can do a better job there in the future than we have been able to do in the past with our current structure. Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Roberts, this might be a question for you to get in on here. Who had possession of that information with regard to the U.S.S. The Sullivans and how was that not transmitted up the chain of command to the commanders? Can anybody answer that question? Admiral Clark. I can answer it. At the time on the 12th of October, nobody in the U.S. intelligence apparatus had that information. That information was developed over the course of the investigation by the FBI. That is why I said to Senator Roberts--he listed four particular pieces of data and the other pieces of data he talked about was a different circumstance. This particular piece of data we did not have, and it was the statement about the ability to collect and the time frame and the exposure of this intelligence and so forth. That information was developed in the course of the investigation. Senator Roberts. If the Senator would yield. Senator Bill Nelson. Just following this, did the FBI have that information? Admiral Clark. To the best of my knowledge, that information was not available until after the explosion. It was developed by the FBI in the course of their investigation. Senator Bill Nelson. But there is some doubt? Admiral Clark. That is my understanding of the circumstance. Senator Bill Nelson. If, in fact, the FBI had the information, then we have---- Admiral Clark. They developed it and disclosed that to us in the course of the investigation. So it is my belief that they did not have that on the 12th of October. Senator Bill Nelson. Could you get a definitive answer for us. Admiral Clark. I will take that, yes, for the record. Senator Bill Nelson. If your understanding is correct, we need to know that. But if it is not, then we clearly need to know that, too. [The information referred to follows:] The information on the planned attack against the U.S.S. The Sullivans was gathered during the course of the U.S.S. Cole investigation. It was not obtained prior to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, 12 October 2000. Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Roberts, I yield to you. Senator Roberts. What the Admiral said is exactly correct. This was a fact that came out during the initial investigation, which was joint with the Armed Services Committee and the Intelligence Committee, which was a matter of obvious concern. In regard to what General Shelton has pointed out concerning the CINCs' ability with their intelligence command or their command center, if you get into a transnational situation, which was obviously the case in regard to the U.S.S. Cole and it has been the case in regard to Khobar Towers and will continue to be the case, that it seems to me is the responsibility of the CIA, national center, the DIA, and everybody else, and the Navy. That is why we have the national centers. That is why I am so concerned in terms of the analytical ability that, if we are into this new world of asymmetrical threats--and it is not exactly new, but it is certainly more urgent--we really have to concentrate on the analytical ability. I think your point is well taken. Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Roberts, I want to follow up on the very fine hearing that you had the day before yesterday, since we are on the subject of intelligence. But that was intelligence with regard to activities here at home. I think General Shelton needs to hear about this, because the Inspector General in the Defense Department--my time has expired. Mr. Chairman, may I have additional time? Senator Roberts. The distinguished Senator should know as a veteran of the House of Representatives that time expires in that house and time seldom expires in this body. Senator Bill Nelson. I thank the chairman. There is an audit report here from the Inspector General of the Department of Defense on the subject of the management of the National Guard weapons of mass destruction civil support teams. The opening sentence is: ``The weapons of mass destruction civil support team program is intended to help prepare the United States against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction and is commonly referred to as a homeland defense measure.'' The conclusion of this report is as follows, General Shelton: ``The Consequence Management Program Integration Office did not manage this program effectively.'' That was a disturbing report to us a couple of days ago in a hearing chaired by Senator Roberts on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. Again it comes back to the same question: Who is in control? Who is accountable? Who is in command? In this case, you have a bunch of civilian and defense-related activities that are all trying to prepare what we are trying to prepare for here on a discussion today about terrorism abroad. That is talking about terrorism here at home, all of which happens to be under the subject of the defense of this country. I wanted to call this to your attention because we were not at all happy campers on what we heard and their not getting their act together. It needs some command authority from above to get them swinging into action. Senator Roberts, I would love to have your comments as well, because I think General Shelton needs to hear this. Senator Roberts. I think the General is very fully aware. We have had discussions when he has been kind enough to come by my office for a courtesy call from time to time. He is extremely busy, but, as the General knows and I think most on at least the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee know, in regards to domestic terrorism or homeland defense-- which now is a very top threat and decidedly so by the administration, the past administration, and any number of think tanks--that we tried to plus up or to increase the number of RAID teams, they are called, CST teams. Yesterday Senator Byrd had another acronym that spelled out ``Byrd,'' that I think that was interesting at least. But at any rate, we had 10, we went up to 17, up to 25, up to 32, so that there would be a professional DOD team on the scene within 4 hours anywhere. As you indicated, sir, it is not a matter of if, but when. Unfortunately, about the same time that we were getting some very positive reports from Secretary Cohen and those within his office, it was precisely the same time that the IG later said: Well, wait a minute; we have some real management problems. The testimony yesterday indicated that that was the case. Again with 20-20 hindsight, we look back. Senator Nelson asked the obvious question, who is responsible now. We are not quite sure yet. Under the terrorism banner, that is very difficult to ascertain. As a matter of fact, May 8, 9, and 10 we have appropriators, authorizers, Intelligence, Armed Services, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, all asking 46 Federal agencies to come down and see if we cannot get our arms around the terrorism threat. All three of you know I have been very active in this in the DOD side, certainly expressing some suggestions. My take on the subcommittee hearing was that, while it is not fixed and we do not have that one person, like say General McCaffrey as the drug czar or Admiral Rickover, that we are making some progress and that hopefully the training will be forthcoming, the equipment will be better than it was, and that we will have a RAID team within the National Guard 4 hours from anybody to link up the communications that will be absolutely necessary if in fact we have a domestic incident. That is my long take on a short take question and I appreciate very much Senator Nelson's cooperation and his interest. I think the time requested by the distinguished Senator has expired. I will now yield again to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska. Are you aware there is going to be a ``terrorist threat'' in Lincoln about October by a purple gang that is going to come there from Kansas State? Senator Ben Nelson. We have force protection in place. [Laughter.] General Shelton. Senator Roberts, could I comment? Senator Roberts. Yes, sir. I am sorry to not give you an opportunity to respond. General Shelton. Sir, first of all to thank you for your interest and your support in what I think is a critical area that this Nation could face in the future. Our effort within Defense was to form this joint task force for civil support underneath our Joint Forces Command only from a standpoint of knowing within the Department where our assets were, how well- trained they were, and what capabilities they had, so that if one of the other civilian agencies of our government needed help from the Department to underscore, or underpin their effort, we could do that in a very fast manner, always though in support of the civilian agency that was in the lead. So that was the idea behind it. I was made aware just a few days ago of some continuing issues that relate to Senator Nelson's concern about the command and control aspect. Of course, the National Guard from my perspective, our Reserves, are ideally suited for this mission because they are located out in the areas, they are under the control of the governor under Title 32 early on. He could use them as he saw fit. Then at some point, if it is a large enough effort, they may be placed under Title 10 and then come right under Joint Task Force Civil Support, who should train with them, as they are doing now, so that we have a first class or a world class effort in this regard, because consequence management, I think, is something that this Nation expects us to be prepared to do as a government. I applaud your efforts, particularly as it relates to the 46 different entities in this area and focusing the Nation's efforts. Senator Roberts. We are going to be asking again all 46 to come in May 8, 9, 10. I say that publicly. Senator Stevens, Senator Byrd, and Senator Inouye from the Appropriations Committee, Senator Gregg, who has the Subcommittee on Justice, State, Commerce, and they are the lead dog agency in this regard according to the presidential directive. While I initially thought that was a mistake and thought that maybe DOD should take charge, I am now convinced that was the right decision. Then we have Senator Shelby and Senator Gramm of the Intelligence Committee, myself. It is the first time I think the Senate has tried to eliminate some of the stovepipes that we have, quite frankly. We have eight committees and seven subcommittees dealing with this issue. We are going to try to get our arms around this to say basically, OK, what is your mission, who do you report to, and what do you really do. If we can do that, it seems to me we can be in concert with the new administration and also DOD. I apologize Ben for interrupting. Go ahead. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Shelton, in terms of the kind of threat possibilities that are out there today, ranging from the Cole, Oklahoma City, the potential suitcase bomb, weapons of mass destruction, and the delivery of those, what are your thoughts about theater missile defense or national missile defense, particularly in light of your comment about, I think you said, target fixation, that if we spend our time fixated on targets are we going to be able to do the objective work of figuring out what kind of defense we need overall? General Shelton. Sir, from our standpoint, first of all, I would like to just underscore the fact that within the continental United States the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, of course has the lead for intelligence reports related to potential terrorist attacks within the continental United States and action thereof. Of course, they are also very active, as I just saw on my visit yesterday over in Greece, in their efforts in various and sundry places, but in that particular case with the November 17 organization that operates in Greece. So obviously, we need to make sure that we have an integrated system that also takes advantage of some of the great work that they do in collecting intelligence overseas that feeds back into the system. They have a different focus, obviously. It is on evidentiary type information, and intelligence. But often in cases, as was the case in the interrogation after the attack on the Cole, they shared the information with us about the threat that had been made against the The Sullivans earlier. When it comes to theater missile defense, that is another area that we need to be concerned about, missile defense in general and theater missile defense in particular. As we sit here today, we have 38,000 troops in Korea roughly and a large number in Southwest Asia, both elements potentially subject to being hit with missiles, as well as chemical, biological types of warheads. So that has been one of the Joint Chiefs' very highest priorities now for a number of years, to develop this theater missile defense. I think we also recognize that, with the proliferation of technology today and particularly as fast as it can move and fill the gaps, the voids, that missile defense in general for the citizens of this Nation is something that we also have to be quite concerned about. As the President has said, he is proceeding with that. The Joint Chiefs fully support that. The technology to do it, some of it, is being worked very hard. What form that will take, what the architecture will be, what the final will be for fielding it, are all questions that will be determined in the process of aggressively pursuing a defense for our Nation. But all of that is the right thing to do in view of the threats that we face, not only abroad but at home. Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Roberts. Senator Levin. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Shelton, I think about a year ago or so you gave us a threat spectrum. You and I have talked about that a few times. General Shelton. Yes, sir. Senator Levin. Does that look familiar to you [indicating]? [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] General Shelton. Sir, that is a version. We had a couple of them, but that one looks familiar, yes, sir. Senator Levin. Can you tell us whether since your most recent threat spectrum there has been any change in that, or is that still your assessment? General Shelton. Sir, that is still my assessment, yes, sir. Senator Levin. We talked about the accountability issue on the Cole and I just want to ask you about the Greeneville accountability issue, because this is a hearing that is looking at accountability in a broader sense than just on the Cole. My understanding of Navy policy is that civilian guests are taken out on submarine cruises only on regularly-scheduled training missions and that submarine visits, even for a short time, are not scheduled solely for the purpose of taking civilian guests on a cruise. Is that basically correct, Admiral? Admiral Clark. That is correct. Senator Levin. Now, the administrative hearing into the Greeneville accident determined that the Greeneville was not conducting a scheduled training cruise the day of the accident and that the reason for leaving port that day was solely to entertain the civilian guests on board. My question is this. Whoever made that decision, that that cruise should go without a training mission--is there any accountability that has been looked at for that decision that, even though the policy of the Navy was that civilian guests be taken out only if there is a regularly scheduled training mission, that nonetheless, even though there was not such a mission that day, that that cruise should occur anyway? Was there an assessment of accountability on that? Admiral Clark. I have not read the entire transcription of events, but I did not have to read it to get to this issue. They had planned to have training activities going on that day and the visit was set up, and the Greeneville had been conducting training, and this is the way it has been briefed to me: that they completed the training in advance of the date of the guest sail. So the commander knew this, but the rest of the chain of command did not, was unaware of this. We have restated the policy that ships will not get under way to take guests to sea. That is inappropriate. We have restated that policy. We fundamentally did that before, before the court of inquiry was even complete. Senator Levin. So that the commander made that decision to proceed on his own? Admiral Clark. That is my understanding. But I say, I have not read the transcript. If you want me to go back and check that for the record, I will do that. Senator Levin. That would be great. [The information follows:] Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Greeneville (SSN 772) had broad discretion and authority in deciding whether to get his ship underway on 9 February 2001, the day U.S.S. Greeneville collided with M/V EHIME MARU. U.S.S. Greeneville was scheduled originally by Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), to commence an underway period on 9 February for crew training, and the ship was assigned to conduct a civilian guest embarkation in conjunction with such training. The commanding officer later requested a modification to the schedule so that the ship could remain in port Pearl Harbor for the weekend of 10-11 February. After assessing the ship's training progress, Commander Submarine Squadron ONE (COMSUBRON ONE) decided to permit U.S.S. Greeneville to remain in port during that weekend and notified COMSUBPAC's Operations Department of the schedule change. After its revision, COMSUBPAC's schedule still reflected that U.S.S. Greeneville would be at sea on 9 February for a civilian embarkation. When the commanding officer learned that the assigned civilian group traveled to Hawaii from the mainland, he enthusiastically accepted the assignment and proceeded to sea on 9 February. Contrary to Navy policies that restrict getting ships underway only to accommodate guests, both COMSUBRON ONE and COMSUBPAC's Operations Department allowed U.S.S. Greeneville to execute the revised schedule, which resulted in her getting underway solely to perform a civilian embarkation. In his testimony at the Court of Inquiry, COMSUBRON ONE indicated that he was not aware of that restriction before the mishap. The Court of Inquiry found that the Navy's guidance on embarkation of civilian visitors is vague, confusing, and internally inconsistent. A review of pertinent embarkation policies has been initiated. In correcting the noted deficiencies, we will clarify the approval authority to civilian embarkations and reemphasize pertinent restrictions. The Navy's Distinguished Visitor Embarkation program directly enhances public awareness of the Navy and should continue to be fully supported. Senator Levin. But as far as you know, the commander on his own made the decision. Admiral Clark. As far as I know that is the case, that is correct. Senator Levin. The Cole had been operating in the Mediterranean and then after transitting the Suez Canal was on its way to, was transitting the Red Sea on the way to the Persian Gulf. In the Mediterranean the Cole was under the operational control of the Sixth Fleet commander and was required to follow the force protection measures which were promulgated in a Chief of Naval Operations message. That was the force protection, it was your message or the CNO's message. Now then, when the Cole was chopped to the Fifth Fleet on October 9, 2000, it then was required to follow the force protection measures that had been promulgated by the Fifth Fleet command's operation order, which is based in turn on a Joint Publication No. 3-07.2, which was issued by the Joint Chiefs. Interestingly enough, the Fifth Fleet force protection measures contain two measures that are not included in the Sixth Fleet force protection measures. Are we together so far or have I lost you? Admiral Clark. Yes, we sure are. Senator Levin. I have not lost you yet. I will keep trying. Admiral Clark. Yes, sir. Senator Levin. One of the two additional measures which the Fifth Fleet was required to take was something called Joint Publication Measure 31, which had to do with preparing boats and placing crews on 15-minute alerts and designating and briefing picket boat crews and a number of other things. Then there was something called Joint Publication Measure 33, which was to man signal bridge or the pilot house and ensure that flares are available to ward off approaching craft. But nonetheless, there are some substantive differences here. I am not going to suggest that those two differences were causally related to the attack's success on the U.S.S. Cole. But the point here is just a generic question: Should there not be one authoritative set of force protection measures for use by our Armed Forces? I guess here I should really, since I framed the question that way, I would ask you first, General Shelton: Should there not be one set of force protection measures for our Armed Forces? Here we had a different set in the Sixth Fleet than we did in the Fifth Fleet. Then I would ask you, Admiral, as well. General Shelton. I would agree in principle that certainly we need to have a set of common force protection measures. However, I would stop short of saying that we should not allow commanders to supplement those where they feel that they are appropriate for the particular area and the situation which they are having to operate. Senator Levin. I would totally agree with that. Subject to that, should we not have the same set of force protection measures? Admiral Clark. Certainly it would make the training problem and the challenge much easier to deal with. In an ideal world, it would be best if we could do that. But I could not support the chairman's position any more strongly that we cannot inhibit a commander's ability to apply additional measures if he deems it appropriate. I would like to just add, if I could. These measures have changed in the aftermath of the Cole and they are now all in a classified vein and so we would not discuss them in an open hearing, although all those from before and on the 12th of October certainly were unclassified. But one of the issues for us is to synthesize these and make them common to the maximum extent possible. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Roberts. I think the Senator has touched on a very important point, in that the relevant intelligence information I referred to in my opening statement pretty much was confined to the Sixth Fleet area, and obviously Aden is in the Fifth Fleet area. But as General Shelton has indicated, this is a transnational threat. So I think the Senator has touched on something extremely important. The San Antonio Express-News reports today that Fort Sam Houston has closed five of its gates and now restricts access to four more, to increase security post the Cole incident. That is the reference. I hesitate to say this, but I do not have a base sticker on my car and I do not ordinarily drive around with a U.S. Senate tag. But I am waved through at most of the bases. I am not Carl Levin or John Warner. They do not recognize me. Senator Levin. If you borrowed my glasses, you could be recognized immediately. Senator Roberts. If I had stripes I might be Admiral Clark, but I do not. At any rate, I am waved through. I want to know from each of you very quickly, what actions have been taken since the Cole to increase security at U.S. facilities? I am worried about that. General Shelton. From my perspective, Senator Roberts, it varies right now, and I think as you have indicated, it varies by service, it varies by installation. It is tied into the threat level and the raising of the threat conditions at the installation. I can give you an example. The place that I live at Fort Myer, on a day in and day out basis when you go in you are checked. You have to have a registered sticker, etcetera. Then on certain days you have to show an ID card. It gets tighter and tighter as the theater level goes up to get on the installation. Other places that I am familiar with happen to have as many as two or three public highways that run through the installation. So as to the threat level, and the intelligence or threats develop, they raise their protective measures, still allowing the public to go through, but in some cases, as you saw here, closing that access, checking people as they come through, and in other cases securing key facilities on the installation that would be most vulnerable to attack, etcetera. Senator Roberts. A one size fits all. General Shelton. So there is not a cookie-cutter answer to it, yes, sir. Senator Roberts. We are going to go to the closed session in 222, unless Senator Levin has additional questions. I understand you have some information that will be relevant to us, and we will try to make that as fast as possible because I know it is getting late here. The first finding and recommendation of the Crouch-Gehman Commission concerns the coordination of combatting terrorism-- this gets back to Senator Nelson's comments--in the DOD. According to Crouch-Gehman, combatting terrorism is so important it demands a complete unity of effort at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The commission report goes on to recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop an organization that more cohesively aligns policy and resources within DOD to combat terrorism and designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense to oversee these functions. General Shelton, this committee initiated legislation in last year's defense authorization bill that requires just such a reorganization to take place. In the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee last year, we had four people come up to testify and I was being a little mischievous and I said, could you sit in order of your authority, and nobody knew where to sit. So I have a piece of intelligence that we collected and we have analyzed, that you, sir, are ready to make a recommendation in that regard. Are you in that status or have we analyzed that wrong? General Shelton. Sir, I think you have good intel, and I mean more than just information. But I have provided a series of recommendations to the Secretary based on those recommendations made in the Crouch-Gehman. I know they have been working them very hard and I think his Assistant Secretary is about ready to go forward with those recommendations to the Secretary now. Senator Roberts. So you are not quite ready to say which ASD should be assigned this important responsibility, or could you share that with us? General Shelton. Sir, from my perspective, where they place the ASD would be of course the Secretary's call. But combining the policy and the resources into one would appear to make eminently good sense. Senator Roberts. I appreciate that and I agree with it. Gentlemen, thank you very much, and we will proceed to the closed session in room SR-222. The hearing is adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner engagement strategy/host-nation support 1. Senator Warner. General Shelton, it is clear from what we have learned in the wake of the attack on U.S.S. Cole that our regional commanders in chief have been actively pursuing an engagement strategy throughout their AORs, often without full, interagency involvement--as was clearly the case with Yemen. The Crouch-Gehman Commission found that better coordination is needed for our engagement policy. My particular concern is with having firm agreements in place--up front-- for the host nation to either provide security for our forces, or to allow our military to take the necessary actions to protect themselves while in a foreign country. Are changes being made to ensure that these security measures are negotiated before our troops go into a foreign nation? General Shelton. The Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense (DOD) are committed to an interagency process to provide overall coordination of U.S. engagement. DOS and DOD are developing an approach with shared responsibility to enhance host-nation security capabilities that result in increased security for transiting U.S. forces. Earlier this year, DOS instructed Chiefs of Mission to work with host-nation governments to cooperate with increased force protection measures involving visits and transit by U.S. ships, aircraft, and other military units. I also discussed this issue with the Combatant Commanders at the February 2001 ``CINCs' Conference'' and recommended they work closely with their foreign nation military counterparts to increase host-nation security support. We have made considerable progress, but additional work in this area remains. In my view, however, completion of these host-nation security negotiations should not necessarily be prerequisite to sending troops into foreign countries or pulling existing forces out. The decision on whether or not to maintain forces in a country should be based on the overall force protection capability, both U.S. and host nation, balanced against the importance of the mission. host-nation support 2. Senator Warner. General Shelton, one of the findings of the Crouch-Gehman Commission was that ``negotiations with the host nation must authorize the unit commander to implement force protection measures that provide the necessary time and space to react to hostile intent.'' What is being done to implement this recommendation? Will you assure the committee that U.S. forces will not be allowed into a foreign nation until and unless such agreements are reached? General Shelton. Our Ambassadors and our CINCs are working closely with host-nation counterparts to implement the necessary force protection measures that allow the necessary time and space to react to hostile intent. The Navy has developed a ``security zone'' approach to assist ships to determine hostile intent and take necessary defensive action. Under this approach, at a predetermined distance, the ship commences warning the approaching vessel to remain clear. Should the vessel continue toward the ship, despite the warnings, various additional and escalatory warning measures are employed. Should the vessel continue despite continued and escalatory warnings, thereby demonstrating a hostile intent, the ship can engage the vessel. This is an important issue in our negotiations with host nations. However, the host nation is responsible for exercising security authority over its territorial seas, including the water surrounding our ships in their ports. Initiatives such as the ``security zone'' approach requires host-nation approval, and will likely take time to sort out the details. As I stated in my response to a previous question, completion of these host-nation security negotiations should not necessarily be prerequisite to sending troops into foreign countries or pulling existing forces out. The decision on whether or not to maintain forces in a country should be based on the overall force protection capability, both U.S. and host nation, balanced against the importance of the mission. resources needed to implement crouch-gehman recommendations 3. Senator Warner. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, many of the 30 recommendations made by the Crouch-Gehman Commission will require additional resources and additional personnel dedicated to force protection. What is your plan for funding these force protection improvements and for getting the additional personnel which will be needed? General Shelton. Approximately $3.4 billion was spent on antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) in fiscal year 2000 and we anticipate that $3.5 billion will be spent on AT/FP in fiscal year 2001. Approximately 90 percent of funding is spent on manpower (military, civilian, and contractor personnel) for law enforcement as well as AT/FP staff positions. The remaining 10 percent is spent on physical security equipment, physical security site improvements, physical security management and planning, security and investigative matters, and research and development. We anticipate antiterrorism- related funding will be increased for fiscal year 2002 although we do not have the exact number. The Joint Staff (J-34), in conjunction with Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) staff elements having resource and program oversight, will review the adequacy of resources proposed by the Services and DOD agencies to meet DOD AT/FP objectives. Concerns are brought to my attention (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the attention of appropriate Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) authorities. Also, last year the Department approved a resource prioritization and justification process to enable the Services to work more closely with the CINCs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff to identify high-priority requirements to fund programs critical to AT/ FP preparation and response. The goal is to have interaction early to better support Service program development and consider the CINCs' important unfunded requirements. In my view, the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense are providing the necessary oversight to ensure antiterrorism priorities are being met. Admiral Clark. The Navy's Antiterrorism Force Protection Task Force provided input to Office of the Secretary of Defense requesting additional funding for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 force protection improvements based on the Commission's recommendations. The Department of Defense requested supplemental funding for fiscal year 2001, which included a portion of the Navy's force protection request. Pending availability of supplemental appropriations, the Navy is funding many force protection initiatives with below threshold reprogramming. The Navy's initiatives to improve personnel retention have been proving successful and are resulting in additional personnel available to meet increased antiterrorism/force protection requirements. command investigation versus court of inquiry 4. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, the Navy's Manual for Judge Advocates (JAGMAN) states that for a ``major incident''--which is defined as an incident with ``multiple deaths, substantial property loss'' that ``greatly exceeds what is normally encountered in the course of day-to-day operations,'' and may be ``accompanied by national public and press interest and significant congressional attention''--a court of inquiry--the most formal type of JAGMAN investigation--should be conducted. Why did you decide that a court of inquiry was not appropriate in this case and instead endorsed a command investigation? Admiral Clark. Although this tragedy was a major incident, the Navy's Manual for Judge Advocates (JAGMAN) leaves discretion to the cognizant Commander to determine the type of inquiry warranted in a specific case. In this case, after carefully considering all the pertinent circumstances, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Vice Admiral Moore determined that a single-officer Command Investigation, rather than a Board or Court of Inquiry, was warranted. The factors weighing in favor of a single-officer Command Investigation included: Avoiding interference with the ongoing damage control efforts required to keep U.S.S. Cole afloat. Significant security and logistical issues in Aden Harbor. Avoiding interference with the FBI investigation. Knowledge that there was a DOD inquiry planned, which would review the issues external to the ship. Finally, the scope of the JAGMAN investigation was limited to examining the actions of the ship's crew before, during, and following the attack. Although the type of JAGMAN investigation warranted for the U.S.S. Cole incident was Vice Admiral Moore's decision, he consulted with me prior to making that decision. Given the limited scope of the investigation and considering all the pertinent circumstances, I concurred with Vice Admiral Moore's decision. failure to implement required security measures 5. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, you stated that it was correct that the Cole's commanding officer did not deem it appropriate to implement all of the security measures that he was responsible for executing. Were these measures discretionary? Admiral Clark. Threat condition measures set the minimum force protection requirements for all combatant and non-combatant ships. They are not situation specific and some of the measures may not apply to specific operating environments. We rely on the judgment of individual commanding officers to determine those elements necessary to best protect his crew based on the location and the threat information available to him. Commanding officers must, however, notify higher authority if they believe it is imprudent or impossible to complete specific force protection measures. accountability of other commands/responsibility for cole safety 6. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, in your endorsement to the investigation, you noted that separate action will be taken to assess the accountability of others in the chain of command. Which individuals or commands are you referring to specifically? Admiral Clark. I was referring generally to personnel senior in the chain of command to the Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Cole. This included Commander, Task Force Five Zero and Commander, Fifth Fleet/ Commander, Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command. 7. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, by what method has/will this accountability be assessed? Admiral Clark. This assessment was completed on January 19, 2001, by then-Secretary of Defense Cohen. On January 9, 2001, Secretary Cohen directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide his ``assessment of operational and administrative matters associated with [the U.S.S. Cole] incident, including issues of accountability, as well as any other matter you deem appropriate.'' On January 19, 2001, after receiving General Shelton's advice, Secretary Cohen, in both a written memorandum and a briefing, identified the shared accountability of the entire chain of command, including myself, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and himself. assessment of damage control equipment and procedures 8. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, as part of his review of the JAGMAN, Admiral Natter, CINCLANT Fleet, directed an assessment of the Cole damage control equipment and procedures. It is my understanding that the fleet has not received damage control lessons learned report from the Navy. Why is this taking so long? Weren't there any ``quicklook'' results that could have been shared with the fleet by now? Admiral Clark. Damage control assessments were conducted as part of the initial JAGMAN, interviews by the Afloat Training Group (ATG) Atlantic and the follow on detailed ship assessment through March 2001. The information from those assessments have been incorporated in a more extensive overall lessons learned briefing that has been given to members of the U.S.S. Cole, COMDESRON 22, and other CO's of his squadron, COMNAVSURFLANT and members of his staff, members of the CINCLANTFLT staff and the senior Navy leadership. A classified lessons learned message to the fleet is scheduled for release in the early July timeframe. Specific DC lessons learned have been incorporated into ATG DC training, SWOS PCO/PXO, Department Head, Division Officer and DCA curriculums, and is being included in the Senior Enlisted DC school curriculum. force protection/antiterrorist equipment funding 9. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, feedback from naval units in Norfolk indicate that only 40 percent of the required funding is being provided for the additional force protection and antiterrorist equipment they are now required to buy in the wake of the Cole attack. The committee has been told that the balance of the required funding is being taken out of ship maintenance funds, which is causing deferral of required repairs. How is the Navy planning to pay for the additional force protection equipment and provide additional personnel for the requirements that have been levied since the terrorist act against the U.S.S. Cole? Admiral Clark. The Navy's Antiterrorism Force Protection Task Force provided input to Office of the Secretary of Defense requesting additional funding for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 force protection improvements based on the Commission's recommendations. The Department of Defense requested supplemental funding for fiscal year 2001, which included a portion of the Navy's force protection request. Pending availability of supplemental appropriations, the Navy is funding many force protection initiatives with below threshold reprogramming, however ship maintenance funds have not been used to satisfy these requirements Because we have been able to retain more personnel that we originally had envisioned, we have been able to meet our additional personnel requirements. confusion with threat levels 10. Senator Warner. General Shelton, the Crouch-Gehman Commission report discussed the confusion caused by the terms ``threat level'' and ``THREATCON,'' and also expressed concern over varying threat levels that can be declared within the same country by different agencies. Are you satisfied that all forward deployed forces and transiting units now have unambiguous knowledge of the threat level in their specific location and destination and clearly understand the minimum force protection measures they need to implement to ensure the safety of their units? General Shelton. With regard to confusion between ``threat level'' and ``threat condition'' terminology, brought to light by the Crouch- Gehman Commission, the Secretary of Defense has approved changing the term ``threat condition'' to ``force protection condition.'' This recent change has been promulgated in the 14 June 2001 revision to DOD Instruction 2000.16, ``Antiterrorism Program Standards.'' With regard to the issue of setting threat levels, as you are aware, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has overall responsibility for setting threat levels worldwide. Combatant commanders with geographic responsibilities also have responsibility for setting the threat levels within their areas of responsibility. CINCs have the authority to increase the threat level set by DIA, but not lower it. The Crouch-Gehman Commission recommended that the CINCs have overall responsibility for setting threat levels and DIA have a supporting role. This was one of the very few recommendations that I did not agree with, and after careful review with the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff and CINCs, we decided not to implement the Commission recommendation. CINC and component staffs are redoubling their efforts to remove ambiguity at the unit level over threat levels and ``force protection conditions.'' I am satisfied with their current level of effort. force protection improvements 11. Senator Warner. General Shelton, in your prepared statement, you highlight actions various regional commanders in chief have taken to enhance force protection, situational awareness, and antiterrorism. For example, you mention Country Vulnerability Assessment Teams in CENTCOM and an in-transit tracking cell in EUCOM. Obviously, each geographic region has unique circumstances and requirements, but I am concerned about appropriate uniformity of effort worldwide. Are you satisfied that relevant, theater-level force protection support for deployed forces is being implemented in a timely, comprehensive manner worldwide? Is Joint Forces Command developing the appropriate doctrine and training standards for deploying forces? General Shelton. First, I am satisfied that the Department of Defense is ensuring antiterrorism/force protection ``unity of effort'' worldwide. Back in 1996, concerns over unity of effort following the Khobar Towers bombing led to my designation as ``principal advisor and focal point to the Secretary of Defense for all DOD AT/FP issues,'' and the establishment of the Combating Terrorism Deputy Directorate within the Joint Staff. Recently, the Secretary of Defense consolidated policy and resource/programmatic responsibilities under one Assistant Secretary of Defense office. Also, formal DOD guidance in designating antiterrorism duties and responsibilities and our promulgation of antiterrorism program standards underscore our concern for maintaining unity of effort. Most recently, our responses to Crouch-Gehman Commission recommendations were implemented after close coordination, Department-wide, and following consensus on the appropriate corrective action. Second, with regard to your specific concern about doctrine and training, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Services to develop and resource credible deterrence standards, deterrence-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures and defensive equipment packages for all forms of transiting forces. Additionally SecDef directed the Services to ensure that predeployment training regimes include deterrence tactics, techniques, and procedures and antiterrorism/force protection measures specific to the area of operation. DOD Instruction 2000.16, ``Antiterrorism Program Standards,'' 14 June 01, revision directs Service compliance. With regard to Joint Forces Command force protection initiatives, USJFCOM's Joint Warfighting Center has incorporated force protection issues in joint exercises, ``Capstone'' senior leader courses, and Joint Task Force Headquarters Training. Additionally, USJFCOM is working in concert with the Services to elevate the priority of antiterrorism/force protection training within our joint training programs. uscentcom/problems with no headquarters in aor 12. Senator Warner. General Shelton, unlike other regional commands, CENTCOM's headquarters and joint intelligence center are not located in or near the area of operations. Does the lack of a robust permanent Joint Task Force or Theater Command Element forward hamper effective force protection/antiterrorism support to deployed or transiting forces in CENTCOM's AOR? General Shelton. In my view, not having USCENTCOM's headquarters in its area of responsibility does not adversely affect the CINC's ability to maintain adequate antiterrorism/force protection support to his forces. We have come a long way in our command, control, and communication capability, and all of USCINCCENT's component commanders are either located within the area of responsibility or have forward elements in theater. additional intelligence support 13. Senator Warner. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, the Crouch- Gehman Commission specifically recommended an increase in the number of counterintelligence and counter-surveillance assets available to component commanders to conduct vulnerability assessments, and to provide in-transit augmentation for transiting units. Have the Services authorized and manned additional CI/CS assets in support of component commanders? Have any host nations objected to advance visits or vulnerability assessments of transit facilities? General Shelton. As the Crouch-Gehman Commission accurately pointed out, we must better tailor intelligence to our in-transit units and improve our counterintelligence capability, including human intelligence and signals intelligence. The Secretary of Defense has requested intelligence agency input regarding this recommendation, to include, if required, options for reprioritizing intelligence support. With regard to human and signals intelligence, we are constantly reviewing the allocation of these important and scarce resources and have already completed some reallocation. For the longer term, the Intelligence Program Review Group will be reviewing and validating the need for additional capability. The review will be completed in the next few months. The CINCs are concurrently reviewing ways to better tailor intelligence within their areas of responsibility. We have had some objections by host nations to certain sensitive areas being looked at by our country vulnerability assessment teams. However, in most cases we have not encountered objections. Admiral Clark. Yes. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) has deployed additional counterintelligence and countersurveillance (CI/CS) assets to overseas commands in support of ongoing fleet operations. In addition, NCIS is in the process of adding additional permanent billets to overseas theaters. These billets are designated to provide up to the minute situational awareness to arriving naval units. They conduct liaison with local authorities in addition to their own CI/CS responsibilities. No host nation has denied a naval advance team visit or vulnerability assessment. In fact, most host nations have been very cooperative with U.S. efforts to enhance our required security. There have been occasional discrepancies and miscommunications in this process. However in every case, we have been able to work through the issues and accomplish our objectives. force protection staff increases 14. Senator Warner. General Shelton, after-action reviews revealed force protection duties at U.S. Navy Central Command were additional duties for assigned operational personnel. The Crouch-Gehman Commission recommended that component commanders have full-time force protection staffs. Do component commanders in high-risk areas now have full-time force protection staffs? When do you expect this recommendation to be fully implemented? General Shelton. This important issue involving full-time antiterrorism officers and staffs is being worked aggressively by DOD. The revised DOD Instruction 2000.16, ``Antiterrorism Program Standards,'' reissued 14 June 2001, now mandates that all component commands employ antiterrorism officers full time. Approximately 80 percent of component command staffs currently have full-time AT officers. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Services have formed a working group to address the remaining AT officer manning shortfalls and to develop a methodology to assist the Services in meeting this new requirement to man these important billets. security assessment teams 15. Senator Warner. General Shelton, you currently have six Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams to assess antiterrorism/force protection readiness. Is this an adequate number of teams to properly carry out this critical mission? Do the six current teams have any funding or personnel shortfalls? General Shelton. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Joint Staff's ``field agent'' for funding and staffing Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) teams, has no funding or personnel shortfalls. In fact, DTRA was recently successful in hiring two additional personnel with weapons of mass destruction expertise, thereby expanding the breadth of JSIVA capability. conduct of accountability investigation 16. Senator Warner. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, earlier incidents in the Central Command--such as the attacks involving the Stark and the Vincennes--were investigated through the operational chain of command. I note that the recent accident on the training range in Kuwait is also being investigated through the operational chain of command--i.e. CENTCOM. Why was the decision made in the case of Cole to have accountability/disciplinary matters investigated through the Service, rather than the operational chain? General Shelton. As a matter of historical perspective, I would like to note that there is no written directive with application to unified commanders concerning the conduct of investigations into incidents such as the U.S.S. Cole and Udairi Range. In addition, USCENTCOM reviewed investigations into previous incidents both in the Central Command area of responsibility and other regions. From that review USCENTCOM determined that there is no set practice for investigations that include both Service and joint entities. The investigation included Khobar Towers, Secretary of Defense-appointed Downing Commission; Stark and Vincennes, USCINCCENT convened; Marine Barracks, Lebanon, Secretary of Defense-convened commission; Black Hawks, Secretary of Defense-directed USCINCEUR to investigate (USCINCEUR delegated to U.S. Air Forces Europe); U.S.S. Saratoga, U.S. Navy and SIXTH FLEET; U.S.S. Iwo Jima, convened by U.S. Navy (Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic (although the incident occurred in Bahrain)); U.S.S. Iowa, U.S. Navy (incident occurred in the Caribbean); USAF plane crash in Croatia of plane carrying Secretary Ron Brown, USAF; Cavalese cable car, USMC (incident occurred in Italy with NATO implications). As U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (USNAVCENT) is located in the theater, and as the U.S.S. Cole incident involved only naval forces, the determination was made that USNAVCENT should proceed to investigate Cole. Because of Bahrain's proximity to Yemen, Vice Admiral Moore was able to have an investigation team on site in about 12 hours from the time of the incident. By comparison, the Udairi Range incident occurred on a bombing range used for joint and combined training and involved U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Forces, as well as Kuwait and New Zealand forces. For this reason, USCINCCENT decided to convene the investigation. At USCINCCENT's direction, Lt. Gen. DeLong, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, coordinated with the involved Services to put together a joint and combined investigating team that included the appropriate mix of specialties and Kuwait and New Zealand participation. The report of investigation was forwarded to USCENTCOM component commanders to take action with regard to recommendations contained therein. Admiral Clark. The purpose of the JAGMAN was to investigate the actions of the crew before and during their brief stop for fuel in Yemen. With the exception of the initial decision to use Yemen as a fueling port, the entire focus of the JAGMAN was on the Navy crew's actions. Through conversations with Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, it was determined that the Navy was in the best position to conduct an investigation into the actions taken by the ship's crew. The Crouch-Gehman report addressed the issues outside the lifelines of Cole. The Udairi Range bombing mishap, on the other hand, occurred during a joint/combined exercise under the Unified Commander's authority. Navy, Army, Air Force, as well as Kuwaiti and New Zealand forces were involved in that mishap. Consequently, it was more appropriate for the operational chain of command to investigate the Udairi Range mishap. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond maintaining focus 17. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, I congratulate you on your timely response to the Crouch-Gehman Commission recommendations. Although your actions will certainly improve the security of our forces, I am concerned that as time passes there will again be relaxation of security measures. How do you maintain a constant state of heightened security awareness? General Shelton. Maintaining a reasonable and constant state of security awareness and avoiding what I refer to as the ``sine wave effect,'' where antiterrorism awareness increases after an incident then diminishes over time, is one of the DOD Antiterrorism Program's most difficult challenges. Accordingly, Antiterrorism Program standards specifically address requirements to maintain AT awareness. Antiterrorism awareness is also a key assessment focus of our Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Program. A key component of our antiterrorism training program includes mandatory, periodic awareness training for all DOD personnel and for all dependents over the age of 14 years old on overseas assignments. Our AT training program also includes formal seminars to our most senior DOD leadership to ensure proper awareness and support at the highest levels. Also, I personally encourage commanders at all levels to promote antiterrorism awareness when I address them at conferences and other venues. As I have stated many times including in my written statement before this committee, it's not a matter of ``if'' but ``when'' the next terrorist attack will occur; therefore, we must remain vigilant. antiterrorism funding 18. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, you indicate that in fiscal year 2001, the Department increased antiterrorism funding from $100 million to $3.5 billion. Do you anticipate that this level of funding will be sustained over a period of time or was this a one-time increase? General Shelton. In fiscal year 2001, we expect $3.5 billion is being spent on AT across the DOD, an increase of $100 million over the $3.4 billion spent in fiscal year 2000. For fiscal year 2002, while we do not yet know the specific dollar amount, we anticipate it will be greater than the fiscal year 2001 amount. We expect this level of funding will be sustained over time. assessment teams 19. Senator Thurmond. General Shelton, I have been told that your Vulnerability Assessment Teams do a great job in identifying vulnerabilities and offering suggestions on how to improve security. However, when it comes time to implement the improvements, the organization, which is already fiscally constrained, may not be able to fully comply with the recommendations. What are the funding mechanisms to support these security improvements? General Shelton. The Department of Defense has two primary funding mechanisms available to fund security improvements. The first funding mechanism is the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund resources emergent and emergency antiterrorism requirements that cannot wait for the normal Service Program Objective Memorandum process. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages this fund and only combatant commands are eligible to receive funding from it. We now allow the fund to not only cover initial purchase of emergent requirements but to also include associated ``next year'' maintenance funding until the Services can assume maintenance responsibility for follow-on years through the normal budget process. The second funding mechanism is the normal budget process. The Joint Staff (J-34), in conjunction with Office of the Secretary of Defense, staff elements having resource and program oversight, reviews the adequacy of resources proposed by the Services and DOD agencies to meet DOD AT/FP objectives. Concerns are brought to my attention (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for discussion with the Secretary of Defense. Last year, the Department approved a resource prioritization and justification process to enable the Services to work more closely with the CINCs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff to identify high-priority requirements to fund programs critical to AT/FP preparation and response. The goal is to have interaction early to better support Service program development and consider the CINCs' important unfunded requirements. flow of information 20. Senator Thurmond. General Robertson, one of the concerns repeatedly raised is that commanders are flooded with information regarding threats and they have a difficult time determining the real threat. How do you avoid this problem within your command? General Robertson. Senator Thurmond, let me first thank you for your support for the women and men of United States Transportation Command and for your superb leadership in the United States Senate as President Pro Tempore. The global nature of our transportation mission challenges us to provide the right information to just the right people, but it is a challenge we actively engage. Geographic Commanders in Chief (CINC) coordinate antiterrorist matters with us as a functional command. My responsibility as a functional Commander in Chief is to initiate timely coordination of these matters with the geographic CINC to assure my commanders have the right information to support decision-making. It is through this coordination that we work to avoid ``flooding'' commanders with information. Well-established and effective command and control procedures minimize potential confusion. Our Joint Intelligence Center-Transportation (JICTRANS) and our Counterintelligence Staff Office (CISO) dedicate a great deal of energy to reviewing threat data for potential impact on USTRANSCOM operations, paying special attention to any resources transiting areas presenting potential threats. We engage with our component commands to work these issues, and coordinate as necessary with the responsible geographic CINC's Force Protection infrastructure. Always cognizant of the potential for information overload, we limit the information shared to that with direct application, while taking care not to apply too strong a filter and perhaps withhold vital information. We rely heavily on the geographic CINC's organizations to share the most current data with us. Air Mobility Command (AMC) operates a robust Threat Working Group (TWG) to support their assets in transit from one geographic region to another. On a daily basis, the AMC TWG weighs planned missions against the known threats and makes risk assessment recommendations to commanders--everything from continuing business as normal, to temporarily halting the airflow in specific geographic areas. Since Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) do not have robust intelligence organizations, we put special emphasis on reviewing threat data for them. Our USTRANSCOM intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection elements coordinate with counterparts within the geographic CINCs to ensure relevant threats are recognized and understood. Since the Cole tragedy, a number of initiatives are underway to strengthen already established relationships between our component commanders, their supporting intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, and counterparts in the geographic CINCs. Constant awareness of the vulnerability of our global transportation resources mitigates against the threat. changes in operations 21. Senator Thurmond. General Robertson, since the tragic attack on the U.S.S. Cole, what operational changes have you made in the steaming schedule for our preposition ships? It seems to me that these high dollar vessels are lucrative targets for any sea borne terrorist. General Robertson. Senator Thurmond, I am reminded of a quote by a 20th century American philosopher, ``Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it.'' George Santyana, 1905. Rest assured, United States Transportation Command embraces the lessons of history . . . our force protection plans cover our entire force from our most agile aircraft to our prepositioned assets. I agree with you that our preposition ships are high-value assets and do not dispute their potential for becoming a lucrative target. To ensure these ships do not become easy targets, we have exploited (and will continue to exploit) the mobility inherent in sea borne forces so that we routinely keep these ships in low-threat areas or augment their defenses when a mission requires them in a higher threat area. Since the attack on U.S.S. Cole, preposition ships have received increased attention to integrate force protection into their operational employment. Specifically, four operational changes can be identified. First, some ships were re-positioned within their assigned areas of responsibility away from higher-threat areas. Second, despite increasing cost by 15-20 percent, some in port maintenance periods have been re-scheduled to lower-threat areas. Third, some port visits have been canceled or postponed until the information to support a proper risk assessment is available. Finally, the risk-management procedures implemented via in port security plans (submitted by the ships and involving their operational chain-of-command for approval) have been emphasized and reinforced. maintaining security awareness 22. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, you indicate that the Navy is dedicated to instilling an antiterrorist and force protection mindset in every one of your sailors. We all know that the difficult task will be to maintain such a mindset; what are your plans to continually reinforce this concern? Admiral Clark. We have made antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) a daily part of every sailor's life. We have developed a new warfare doctrine publication and prepared standardized tactics and doctrine for combating terrorism. We conduct training at every level, from the individual sailor to the entire battle group. Every individual is required to receive Level One AT/FP training on a reoccurring basis. Every command is required to have an AT/FP officer who has been through advanced training and is certified to provide Level One training to his or her command. Commanding and executive officers receive intense AT/FP training during their training pipelines. We will be requiring individual commands to report AT/FP readiness status on their Status of Readiness and Training reports. Ships are required to meet immediate superior in command-based AT/FP standards of readiness and demonstrate them as an individual unit and as a part of a battle group during pre- deployment operations. Individually manned watches are receiving more intense weapons training as well as improved equipment and oversight to better enable them and increase the level of vigilance. These are all elements that have been incorporated in the training and operational continuum to reinforce and demonstrate the importance of AT/FP in the Navy. The overall goal is to instill a sea change in the mindset of the individual sailor and be better prepared to meet this continuing threat. personnel augmentation 23. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, although I applaud your action to increase your permanent security billets by 2,000 personnel, I wonder what other areas will be understaffed to provide these additional personnel. Is this a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul and as a result is this impacting readiness in other areas? Admiral Clark. Congressional support coupled with the Navy's initiatives has resulted in higher retention. This additional strength has lowered gaps at sea by 15-20 percent, increased manning of critical skills, and improved overall Navy personnel readiness. The increase in security billets also contributed to higher end strength, which, although exceeding the fiscal year 2001 end strength authorization, remains within the 1 percent flexibility allowed by law. Consequently, the Navy will be seeking relief through a supplemental appropriation and/or reprogramming to support additional end strength for fiscal year 2001. impact on operations 24. Senator Thurmond. Admiral Clark, how have the changes you have implemented in response to the U.S.S. Cole attack impacted your mission accomplishment both in terms of funding and timeliness of operations? Admiral Clark. The new minimum AT/FP requirements I have placed on the Navy have been costly. It has required the fleets to purchase new equipment, such as non-lethal technologies and patrol boats. We have placed greater training requirements on our sailors, including advanced exercises and drills during the pre-deployment workup cycle. The Navy has not received additional funding earmarked for AT/FP to fund these initiatives. Money has been reprogrammed, often at the cost of alternative programs. Fortunately, we have managed to implement this new security baseline without affecting the timeliness of our operations. We continue to deploy all of our assets on schedule to meet national security requirements. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Bunning funding force protection measures 25. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, are you planning on requesting additional funds in the budget to implement improved force protection measures, and if so, how much? General Shelton. In fiscal year 2000, approximately $3.4 billion was spent on antiterrorism across the Department of Defense. Approximately 90 percent of the budget funds manpower (military, civilian, and contract personnel). The remaining funding is associated with physical security items. In fiscal year 2001, it is expected that $3.5 billion is being spent on AT across the DOD, an increase of $100 million. For fiscal year 2002, while we do not yet know the specific dollar amount, we anticipate it will be greater than the fiscal year 2001 amount. 26. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, the Commission Report recommended increasing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund. Would that increase include funds to allow upgrade of a ship's close-in weapons system to give it the ability to target and destroy close-in surface craft and slow flying aircraft? General Shelton. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CbT RIF) resources emergent and emergency antiterrorism requirements that cannot wait for the normal Service Program Objective Memorandum process. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manages this fund and only combatant commands are eligible to receive funding from it. We also, now, allow the fund to not only cover initial purchase of emergent requirements, but to also include associated ``next year'' maintenance funding until the Services can assume maintenance responsibility for follow-on years through the normal budget process. The Vulcan Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS), however, is a Navy-sponsored weapon system program, and therefore upgrades and modifications to that system would not qualify for CbT RIF funding. engagement policy 27. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, it has been stated that one of the reasons Cole was refueling in Aden was part of a policy of engagement with Yemen. It is my understanding that this policy was begun after coordinating with the State Department. Was the State Department the primary advocate for this engagement policy? General Shelton. In 1997, Central Command viewed engagement with Yemen as a stabilizing opportunity for regional security. In 1998, the U.S. State Department removed Yemen from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Once off the list, USCINCCENT made a decision to increase engagement with Yemen. The U.S. Ambassador to Yemen also encouraged U.S. military assistance in improving relations with Yemen. 28. Senator Bunning. General Shelton, were the risks to U.S. forces considered when formulating this plan of engagement, and was the viability of this plan reevaluated when the threat to our troops increased? General Shelton. Risks to U.S. forces are a primary factor when formulating and executing engagement plans. Engagement activities are always carefully reevaluated when the threats to our troops increase. close-in force protection 29. Senator Bunning. Admiral Clark, currently, Navy ships do not have an automatic, stabilized weapons system capable of destroying close-in surface craft or slow flying aircraft. This would not have made a difference in the case of the U.S.S. Cole where identification of the threat was the issue, but easily could in other circumstances. Do you intend to add funds to the Navy's budget request for a weapon system capable of this kind of close-in force protection to address this deficiency? If not, why not? Admiral Clark. Navy ships employ a multi-layer ship self defense capability. This layered defense includes the 5,, Gun system which can engage contacts out to 11 miles, the Rolling Airframe Missile with the Helo Air Surface mode (to be fielded in fiscal year 2002), the CIWS Block 1B and other similar systems, and small caliber guns. The Navy is evaluating ways to improve close-in self defense capability including the CIWS block 1B which would be an upgrade to the over 350 CIWS mounts in the U.S. fleet, and the Mk 46 30mm chain gun which is being installed on the LPD 17 class. All of the options are fiscally constrained and will be evaluated in the overall funding priority as established by the Nation's leadership. jagman investigation 30. Senator Bunning. Admiral Clark, the original investigation into the Cole attack was a one-man, JAGMAN investigation. This is an administrative fact-finding procedure. In the aftermath of the attack, while the crew was still fighting to save the ship, it made sense to immediately send one man to conduct an investigation, to ensure that perishable information would not be lost in the confusion. However, there is only so much one man can do. Some of the major results of this JAGMAN were disapproved by the chain of command. There is disagreement over whether some of the defensive measures, required under the ship's force protection plan, but which were not taken, may have prevented the incident. Why has there not been a follow-up Board of Inquiry or Court of Inquiry to have a more thorough review of what happened? Admiral Clark. The JAGMAN investigation was a very thorough inquiry. It clearly documented all the pertinent facts before, during, and following the attack. The investigation gave the entire chain of command all of the information required to assess accountability and make the necessary decisions subsequent to the investigation. Regardless of the type of investigation, subsequent endorsers sometimes disagree with the investigating body's findings of fact, opinions, or recommendations. In this instance, there was no disagreement on the central findings of fact. 31. Senator Bunning. Admiral Clark, the JAGMAN investigation, in addition to faulting members of U.S.S. Cole's crew, also singled out the Cole's higher headquarters as having reviewed the ship's force protection plan in a perfunctory manner. Why has there not been any investigation to determine accountability at command levels above that of the ship? Admiral Clark. Such an accountability assessment was completed on January 19, 2001, by then-Secretary of Defense Cohen. On January 9, 2001, then-Secretary of Defense Cohen directed General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide his ``assessment of operational and administrative matters associated with [the U.S.S. Cole] incident, including issues of accountability, as well as any other matter you deem appropriate.'' On January 19, 2001, after receiving General Shelton's advice, Secretary Cohen, in both a written memorandum and a briefing, identified the shared accountability of the entire chain of command, including myself, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and himself. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin small units 32. Senator Levin. General Shelton, in your prepared statement you state that ``Our goal is not only to reduce the exposure of our in- transit ships and planes--a shortcoming exposed by the bombing of U.S.S. Cole--but to ensure our antiterrorism/force protection program remains dynamic, thus reducing our vulnerability to terrorists. In addition to ships and planes, we also have small units, mainly Army special operations and Navy SEALs, that not only transit several countries but perform operations like demining and conduct training, often in remote areas of host nations.'' Are you satisfied that appropriate attention is being paid to the force protection of those small units? General Shelton. The Cole attack and subsequent Crouch-Gehman Commission increased our awareness to the potential vulnerabilities of all our in-transit units, including the special operations units you mention. I am comfortable with the level of attention given to these smaller units and I am confident their force protection needs will not be overlooked. To cite just one example, we require deployment orders for these smaller units to contain force protection requirements and verify their force protection support before orders are approved. where was the chain of command? 33. Senator Levin. General Shelton, U.S.S. Cole was on deployment in Central Command's geographic area of responsibility, under the operational command of Central Command's naval component commander, operating under the threat condition set by Central Command and under force protection measures set out in Joint Pub 3-07.2. Nevertheless Central Command did not convene or review the investigation into the attack on U.S.S. Cole. By contrast, I recall the investigation into the incident in 1989 in which U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly and tragically shot down an Iranian Airbus was convened by Central Command staff, reviewed by CINC Central Command, who decided to issue a non-punitive letter to an officer on the ship, and routed to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, the recently completed investigation into the live fire incident at the bombing range in Kuwait was convened and reviewed by CINC Central Command. Why didn't Central Command convene and review the investigation into the terrorist attack on U.S.S. Cole? General Shelton. As a matter of historical perspective, I would like to note that there is no written directive with application to unified commanders concerning the conduct of investigations into incidents such as the U.S.S. Cole and Udairi Range. In addition, USCENTCOM reviewed investigations into previous incidents both in the Central Command area of responsibility and other regions. From that review USCENTCOM determined that there is no set practice for investigations that include both Service and joint entities. The investigation included Khobar Towers, Secretary of Defense-appointed Downing Commission; Stark and Vincennes, USCINCCENT convened; Marine Barracks, Lebanon, Secretary of Defense-convened commission; Black Hawks, Secretary of Defense-directed USCINCEUR to investigate (USCINCEUR delegated to U.S. Air Forces Europe); U.S.S. Saratoga, U.S. Navy and SIXTH FLEET; U.S.S. Iwo Jima, convened by U.S. Navy (Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic (although the incident occurred in Bahrain)); U.S.S. Iowa, U.S. Navy (incident occurred in the Caribbean); USAF plane crash in Croatia of plane carrying Secretary Ron Brown, USAF; Cavalese cable car, USMC (incident occurred in Italy with NATO implications). As U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (USNAVCENT) is located in the theater, and as the U.S.S. Cole incident involved only naval forces, the determination was made that USNAVCENT should proceed to investigate Cole. Because of Bahrain's proximity to Yemen, Vice Admiral Moore was able to have an investigation team on site in about 12 hours from the time of the incident. By comparison, the Udairi Range incident occurred on a bombing range used for joint and combined training and involved U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Forces, as well as Kuwait and New Zealand forces. For this reason, USCINCCENT decided to convene the investigation. At USCINCCENT's direction, Lt. Gen. DeLong, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, coordinated with the involved Services to put together a joint and combined investigating team that included the appropriate mix of specialties and Kuwait and New Zealand participation. The report of investigation was forwarded to USCENTCOM component commanders to take action with regard to recommendations contained therein. one osd office with policy and resource responsibility 34. Senator Levin. General Shelton, you note in your prepared statement that you have recommended, pursuant to a recommendation of the Crouch-Gehman Commission, that the Office of the Secretary of Defense align antiterrorism policy and resource responsibility under an OSD office. As a matter of fact, that recommendation dovetails nicely with a requirement in section 901 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that requires the Secretary of Defense to designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense to have the duty to provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for combating terrorism. Has Secretary Rumsfeld acted on your recommendation? General Shelton. The Secretary of Defense has officially directed that antiterrorism policy and resource responsibility be consolidated under the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. enhance host-nation security capabilities 35. Senator Levin. General Shelton, the Crouch-Gehman Commission recommended an interagency, coordinated effort to develop an approach whereby host-nation security responsibilities could be enhanced so that it could provide better security for transiting U.S. units. General Crouch and Admiral Gehman told us that they had in mind international military education and training and increased security assistance for host nation security forces for this purpose. Of course those areas are not within the jurisdiction of this committee and not under the control of the Department of Defense. Can you tell us if such an interagency effort is underway to try to bring this about? General Shelton. An interagency effort is underway, led by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)). ASD(SO/LIC) has already formed a working group with membership from the Department of State and Joint Staff. The purpose of the working group is to initially develop lines of communication between DOD and DOS to facilitate resolution of antiterrorism issues and with a longer-range goal of enhancing host- nation security capabilities. component commanders' or cincs' responsibility 36. Senator Levin. General Shelton, the Crouch-Gehman Commission recommended the component commanders be given the responsibility and resources to direct tailored force protection measures to be implemented at specific sites for in-transit units. In the Downing Report on the bombing of Khobar Towers in June 1996, General Downing criticized the assignment of such responsibilities to the component commanders, all but one of whom were and are located thousands of miles away from the area, and recommended that operational control of all combatant forces operating in the Gulf region be assigned to one headquarters. What is your view of the proper assignment of this responsibility? General Shelton. At the core of the recommendation from the Crouch- Gehman Commission was to place the responsibility of oversight for in- transit force protection with the command that has the cultural perspective, historical background, intimate knowledge, intimate knowledge of the area of operations, access both raw and fused intelligence--with analytical support, and adequate command and control. In their review, the Crouch-Gehman Commission found that, in most cases, the lowest level that that authority should reside was the Component Commander. What was changed since the Khobar Towers bombing is that we have more clearly defined command relationships in the area of responsibility, installed better command and control equipment and facilities, and increased our capacity worldwide to access intelligence information near real-time from remote locations. These improvements support the Crouch-Gehman recommendation to push the force protection oversight back to the component command in this area of responsibility. Each combatant command with geographic responsibilities and several functional combatant commands maintain robust force protection directorates which are in constant contact with their components. They perform the day-to-day administration of the overall force protection program throughout their areas of responsibility. Rarely will a force protection decision be made without first contacting the unified commander. In a sense, we have implemented both the recommendation of the Downing Commission and Crouch-Gehman Commission. uavs for explosives detection 37. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, we have seen press reports that indicate the Navy is considering the use of miniature unmanned aerial vehicles (so-called ``Micro UAVs'') to detect the presence of explosives at distances from vessels sufficient to prevent terrorists from repeating a Cole-type attack. Is this report true? Admiral Clark. Among the priority capabilities that fleet operators have requested is the ability to detect explosives at a standoff distance. In response to these requests, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) recently held a scientific experts' workshop to evaluate the current state of research in standoff detection of explosives. The focus of the workshop was to evaluate both potential sensor technologies to support this objective, as well as to review potential deployment methods for these sensors. The workshop was well-attended by government, industry, and academic researchers with current involvement in explosives detection and related efforts. With respect to sensor technologies, the workshop resulted in an assessment that, while there are some worthwhile technologies to pursue, there is no currently available device that could reliably perform standoff explosive detection. Because of the critical need for this technology, ONR will maintain a heightened awareness of government and industry sponsored research efforts in this area, and will provide guidance and resourcing, where appropriate, for standoff explosives detection. With respect to deployment, a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) would be evaluated as an option if a reliable sensor becomes available. ONR plans to provide a launch and recovery system, a command and display system, and two UAVs to 5th Fleet this summer for experimentation on ways to provide better tactical information. 38. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, do you have other technology approaches in mind in your efforts to solve this force protection problem? Admiral Clark. The Navy is investigating alternative technologies to better equip the fleet for dealing with the terrorist problem. These technologies encompass a wide range of capabilities including sensors, data fusion, non-lethal deterrents, security barriers, and protective materials. 39. Senator Levin. General Shelton, are you aware of any other Services or a Department-wide effort to enable our forces to be able to detect the presence of explosives at tactically significant distances? General Shelton. I am not aware of efforts to develop explosive detection devices with the capability to detect the presence of explosives at tactically significant distances, including use of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology for this purpose. However, efforts are underway to increase explosive detection distance. Also, our technology focus in this area includes use of ``backscatter'' X- ray-type technology and ``ion-sniffer'' technology. Also, military working dogs with explosive detection capability remain one of our best detection capabilities. Because present technology limits explosive device detection ranges, detection capabilities are utilized in conjunction with perimeter security and access control to ensure potential bomb-carrying vehicles and personnel are inspected at safe distances from personnel and buildings. command investigation versus court of inquiry 40. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, the Manual of the Judge Advocate General calls for the use of a court of inquiry or board of inquiry for the investigation of a major incident. Major incident is defined as ``an extraordinary incident occurring during the course of official duties resulting in multiple deaths, substantial property loss, or substantial harm to the environment where the circumstances suggest a significant departure from the expected level of professionalism, leadership, judgment, communication, state of material readiness, or other relevant standard. Substantial property loss or other harm is that which greatly exceeds what is normally encountered in the course of day-to-day operations. These cases are often accompanied by national public and press interest and significant congressional attention. They may also have the potential of undermining public confidence in the naval service. That the case is a major incident may be apparent when it is first reported or as additional facts become known.'' The call for the use of a more formal type of administrative investigation and the addition of a definition of ``major incident'' were occasioned by the criticism directed at the Navy over the failings of the investigation into the explosion on board U.S.S. Iowa in 1989. Why wasn't a court or board of inquiry convened to inquire into the attack on U.S.S. Cole? Admiral Clark. Although this tragedy was a major incident, the Manual of the Judge Advocate General leaves discretion to the cognizant Commander to determine the type of inquiry warranted in a specific case. In this case, after carefully considering all the pertinent circumstances, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, Vice Admiral Moore determined that a single-officer Command Investigation, rather than a Board or Court of Inquiry, was warranted. 41. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, what was the justification for the use of command investigation? Admiral Clark. The factors weighing in favor of a single-officer Command Investigation included: Avoiding interference with the ongoing damage control efforts required to keep U.S.S. Cole afloat. Significant security and logistical issues in Aden Harbor. Avoiding interference with the FBI investigation. Knowledge that there was a DOD inquiry planned, which would review the issues external to the ship. The scope of the investigation was limited to examining the actions of the ship's crew before, during, and following the attack. 42. Senator Levin. Admiral Clark, at what level of command was the decision made to conduct a command investigation into the attack and at what level was that decision reviewed? Admiral Clark. Although the type of Manual of the Judge Advocate General investigation warranted for the U.S.S. Cole incident was Vice Admiral Moore's decision, he consulted with me prior to making that decision. Given the limited scope of the investigation and considering all the pertinent circumstances, I believed that convening a single- officer Command Investigation was a good decision and I concurred with Vice Admiral Moore's decision. ______ Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu force protection as a priority 43. Senator Landrieu. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, since the attack I have heard the Department of Defense leadership, including some of you, make some very interesting public statements. I've heard ``force protection is a primary mission of every commander, we have prioritized funding and training to address force protection'' and most recently ``with AT/FP serving as a priority focus of every mission, activity, and event'' in the second paragraph of Admiral Clark's prepared testimony today. I am very concerned about the message being sent to the commanders in the field. I've talked to many of them--most recently just 2 weeks ago when I visited Barksdale Air Force Base. They tell me that they keep getting conflicting messages from their leadership as to what their priorities are. They tell me they have been told to make safety, retention, quality of life, force protection, community engagement, fiscal responsibility, and oh yes, mission accomplishment a priority. I'm here to tell you that can't be done. I looked up the definition of the word ``priority'' in my Webster's dictionary and this is what I found: PRIORITY, (1) superiority in rank, position, or privilege; (2) a preferential rating, especially, one that allocates rights to goods and services usually in limited supply; (3) something given or meriting attention before competing alternatives. I am disturbed by the fact that what commanders in the field--your subordinates--are hearing from their leadership is that every crisis or concern is to be made a priority, that their superiors are concerned about those issues and that they will be evaluated on their ability to comply. Even worse is the concept that ``force protection is a primary mission.'' If that's true, the best thing we can do is just keep our forces in garrison where they can be protected. The mission can be many things. It can be combat, presence, regional engagement, or even training, but it cannot be ``force protection.'' Force protection is an implied task of every unit--just like feeding and housing the troops, but it is most assuredly not a mission. I would like you to discuss for the record exactly what your expectations are with regards to force protection and address what actions if any, you intend to take to try to resolve this prioritization problem among your subordinates. General Shelton. Let me begin by saying that my top priority as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is and always will be ``mission accomplishment,'' followed immediately by ``taking care of our people.'' The issues of safety, retention, quality of life, community engagement, fiscal responsibility, and force protection, which you mention, are important means of achieving mission accomplishment and/or taking care of our people. Our commanders are charged with the important responsibilities for mission accomplishment and for the well-being of their people. Ultimately, it is the inherent responsibility of those commanders to set priorities on how to best discharge those responsibilities. There cannot be only one list of priorities. It is the responsibility of the commanders' operational and administrative chains of command to ensure that commanders have the necessary support, fiscal and otherwise, to accomplish the mission and take care of their people. With regard to the specific points raised about force protection, I agree completely with your view. Force protection is not, and cannot be the mission. Force protection enables our forces to complete their missions. I have stated in this forum and others that we cannot allow force protection to become the mission and cannot yield to a ``zero casualty'' mentality. Admiral Clark. Force protection is not a mission area in itself: it a mission enabler. Antiterrorism/force protection is a core competency that must be integrated into everything we do. Shortly after becoming the Chief of Naval Operations, I addressed a message to every member of the service where I stated my top priorities: manpower, current readiness, future readiness, quality of service, and alignment. Those priorities have not changed and should be clear to all commanders and sailors. Force protection certainly falls within the priority of readiness and it is by no means a new concept. Force protection applies to every naval activity, be it the conduct of war on the high seas, or in the execution of a port visit in a foreign country, or the planning of a command holiday party in a public setting. The welfare of our men and women in uniform will always be my top priority, regardless of the ever-changing nature and scope of the many missions that we ask them to do. systematic problems 44. Senator Landrieu. General Shelton and Admiral Clark, I have reviewed your prepared testimony, the Crouch-Gehman report, and the Cole JAGMAN and I remain troubled. In briefings here on the Hill and in press conferences we've heard comments about systemic failures and that the entire chain of command contributed to the Cole tragedy. Despite that, I can't clearly determine what was done wrong that let the attack slip through. Given the intelligence we had at the time, where was the breakdown? General Shelton, in your testimony you address implementation of the Crouch-Gehman recommendations. If the exact same attack were attempted today (and we had intelligence no different from what we had last October) would it succeed? Why or why not? General Shelton. The Cole Commission revealed that there was no threat intelligence available to indicate that an attack was imminent or that the threat had increased. Our intelligence did indicate the presence of a threat capable of large-scale attacks and the threat level in Aden, Yemen, at the time of the attack was ``significant.'' The Cole Commission underscored the need for our intelligence community to refocus and tailor its resources, including human intelligence and signals intelligence, to mitigate the terrorist threat for in-transit units and offered important recommendations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff are aggressively acting upon all those recommendations. In the case of U.S.S. Cole, terrorists were able to exploit perimeter security and access control vulnerabilities associated with waterside approaches to our ship while in port. Without adequate perimeter security and access control, commanders may be unable to determine hostile intent or a hostile act with sufficient time to react. Since the Cole attack, in the higher threat areas, we have mitigated perimeter security and access control vulnerabilities through use of U.S. military organic capability and host-nation support. While our efforts cannot guarantee that a similar attack will not be attempted in the future, our enhanced capability will better enable our commanders to determine hostile intent in sufficient time to take appropriate action. In situations where in-transit unit security is not adequate, as determined by the operational chain of command, visits are disapproved. Admiral Clark. The breakdown that allowed the attack on U.S.S. Cole can be divided into two areas. The first is a breakdown in our intelligence system. We did not have a clear and unambiguous warning that this attack would occur. The only way to get this type of warning is to expand our intelligence collection efforts and that is being carried out. Second, ships in the port of Aden were expected to carry out THREATCON Bravo measures based on the perceived threat. In hindsight we can see where there were gaps in the implementation of our THREATCON Bravo measures. The determination of the Navy's JAGMAN investigation was that even had all of the THREATCON measures been fully implemented, it is doubtful that the attack could have been averted. The threat measures were adequate to meet the threat, but not the tactics employed to properly execute these measures in the case of a waterborne attack. 45. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, do you agree with General Shelton's comments? Admiral Clark. We have greatly improved our tactics to prevent this form of attack from happening. The defense-in-depth concept allows commanders to better evaluate potential hostile contacts by designating concentric zones of assessment and threat. We have new technology to enable increased detection ability. We have improved the commanders' situational awareness and fostered greater host nation support and cooperation concerning port and base security. We are working to improve our intelligence collection ability. We have written new tactics and procedures and increased training to improve our force protection awareness and procedures. Our goal is to ensure the same type of attack would not succeed and we feel we have taken measures to ensure it does not. rules of engagement 46. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, one issue that was largely ignored by the press in the wake of the Cole attack is the subject of Rules of Engagement (ROE). Of course, ever since the attack on U.S.S. Stark our policy has been quite public--commanders have the authority and obligation to take defensive action against any unit that commits a hostile act or demonstrates hostile intent. I realize that there are classified modifications to that basic ROE, but they are not germane to my question. My understanding is that our current ROE and policy in the Middle East is to be generally ``de-escalatory,'' to prevent straining relationships with our friends in the region and to preclude a tragedy like the Vincennes incident or the downing of the Army Blackhawk helicopters. Given that policy and ROE, if a ship today was faced with what the Cole faced last year, would they be able to engage the boat? If so, what has changed that permits engagement? Admiral Clark. When the Crouch-Gehman Commission reviewed ROE, they determined the existing rules were adequate. Therefore, we have made no changes to the ROE. The real problem becomes determining the existence of hostile intent. The new procedures that we have implemented since the attack on U.S.S. Cole are intended to provide the crew with the ability to determine both the means and the intent of a unit that possesses the ability to conduct such an attack. The layering of defensive zones will allow us to approach, identify, and inspect suspect vessels to locate the means (bomb, biological hazard, etc). Furthermore, the use of escalating levels of non-lethal technology and weapons will also allow us to determine intent, while complying with the requirement to meet the threat with proportional force. The Navy is in the process of equipping its units with these state-of-the-art non- lethal technologies. The U.S.S. Cole did not have the advantage of being able to rely on these new tactics, techniques, and procedures. 47. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, is it likely that ship would prevent a determined attack by a suicidal terrorist? Why? Admiral Clark. An understanding of the terrorist's intent is essential. Suicide bombers are willing to die only in a successful attack. To die in an unsuccessful attack is not acceptable. We also know terrorist units conduct extensive pre-operational surveillance looking for potential seams to exploit. We continue to work to plug identified seams. We now possess a very visible and viable defense to deter potential aggressors from a future attack. Equally important, we have given our sailors the tools and training to successfully defend against a pending attack. While a terrorist attack is always possible, our new security baseline is designed to make a future attack like that on U.S.S. Cole unlikely. navy security forces 48. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, in your testimony you say that you are converting collateral duty Master-at-Arms to full-time security professionals. Does this mean that additional billets will be added to each ship to provide each ship with additional sailors in the MAA rating and prevent cutting other ratings? Admiral Clark. Collateral duty Master-at-Arms (designated by the Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC) 9545) are personnel serving primarily in sea-intensive ratings but who are assigned to shore duty to security-type billets. Personnel in the Master-at-Arms rating are full-time security professionals. In an effort to establish a viable full-time professional force, given heightened global force protection requirements, we are expanding our full-time security force. This is being accomplished both through conversion of personnel possessing the 9545 NEC to the Master-at-Arms, and through recruitment into the Master-at-Arms rating upon initial enlistment. Additional billets will not be added to each ship. The force protection mission is designed to support our ships when in port (Mobile Harbor Security Protection), at home and abroad, thereby detailing security professionals to shore and overseas shore billets. antiterrorism/force protection (at/fp) equipment 49. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, in your testimony you detail the AT/FP equipment all deploying units have received and mention some technology equipment that was tested in Quantico and Dahlgren. Do ships deploying today receive any equipment that is different than what the Cole deployed with? If so, what equipment? Admiral Clark. In response to lessons learned from U.S.S. Cole, the currently deployed Enterprise Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and Kearsarge Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) were outfitted with additional Allowance Equipage List (AEL) items to meet short-term antiterrorism/ force protection requirements. These include: inflatable boats/motors, portable generators, waterline security lighting, waterside markers, warning signs and tape, marine hailers, vehicle inspection equipment, tire spike sets, plastic/water-filled vehicle barriers and tents for fleet landings, mobile x-ray units, additional hand-held radios, hand- held and weapons-mounted tactical lights, walk-through metal detectors, and waterside video surveillance systems. In addition, we have increased the number of small arms and minor caliber weapons that each ship and submarine carries, and provided for rigid hull inflatable boat improvements. 50. Senator Landrieu. Admiral Clark, has any of this new technology been selected for deployment to the fleet? If so, what equipment and how much will it cost to equip every ship? Admiral Clark. At present, none of the new technology equipment being evaluated at the Naval Operations Other Than War Technology Center at Dahlgren has been selected for procurement. Evaluation of promising new equipment continues, along with developing related tactics, techniques, and procedures for integration with legacy current shipboard antiterrorism/force protection sensor and engagement systems. To fill gaps in fielding new technology to the fleet, other short-term initiatives are being pursued. For example, night vision device upgrades and high-intensity hand-held spotlights with night vision capability ($8 million) and hands-free encrypted radios and protected voice portable communication systems ($10 million) have recently been evaluated and are being procured for deploying forces in fiscal year 2001. Additional equipment, such as explosive ion detectors, will be added to the current carrier battle group/amphibious ready group Allowance Equipage List outfitting as soon as the evaluation is complete. Outfitting all ships will require at least $8.6 million applied over the next few years. defensive posture 51. Senator Landrieu. All of you have testified to the fact that we must remain engaged around the world. I believe Admiral Clark quite eloquently expressed that feeling in his testimony when he said ``Retrenchment and a bunker mentality are inappropriate and imprudent responses to the asymmetric threat.'' I agree with you and am on the record supporting our policy of engagement. It's the cost of doing business if we are to remain a superpower. With that in mind, I have a few questions. General Shelton, my understanding is that several port visits have been canceled since last October because the host nation security support was deemed to be inadequate. Is this correct? If so are we then putting force protection and that ``bunker mentality'' ahead of the engagement mission? General Shelton. Immediately after the Cole attack last October, a number of ship visits were, in fact, canceled because the available force protection, including security assistance by the host nations, was determined to be inadequate for the level of threat. In USCENTCOM, visits to all ports except Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates, and Mina Sulman, Bahrain, were canceled until port vulnerability assessments could be conducted (Jebel Ali and Mina Sulman were previously determined by USCINCCENT to have adequate security). In USEUCOM several visits, including port visits to Naples, Italy, were canceled until port assessments could be completed. We have had several instances where we have canceled port visits due to potential terrorist threats and lack of host nation security. In the case of port visits canceled due to a lack of adequate security, I view this as an education process with the host nation--lack of awareness of the new measures we require to be implemented, and the seriousness with which we take force protection. Port visits eventually resumed for all locations where it was determined that overall security was adequate for the level of threat. This action, however, should not be confused with a ``bunker mentality.'' Our servicemen and women will always be at some level of risk to terrorist attack because of the nature of their missions in support of our national interests. It is the responsibility of DOD leadership, however, to ensure everything possible is done to ensure their safety, and to mitigate the risks to them, including those posed by terrorists. 52. Senator Landrieu. General Robertson, my staff informs me that MSC ships, because of their civilian crews, are not required nor able to comply with the same force protection measures and policies as Navy ships. Is this true, and I believe it is, how do you justify the fact that MSC ships have far less security and far less restrictive security measures in everything from liberty regulations (including the buddy system and overnight liberty policy) to security force requirements? Admiral Clark, would you comment on this as well? General Robertson. You bring up an important area of concern of mine . . . protecting my civilian mariner partners. The differences in force protection measures and policies between civilian-crewed MSC ships and Navy ships with military crews are due primarily to legal considerations inherent with the civilian crews. Coordinated, Navy-wide force protection policies and measures that accommodate these differences have been developed; MSC ships comply with these policies and measures as a matter of routine. For example, MSC mariners who are government employees comply with liberty regulations (buddy system and overnight liberty policy) along with their military counterparts in the Navy. This is possible because MSC has negotiated agreements with unions representing civil-service mariners to impose liberty restrictions without penalty (cost to the government). MSC-contracted mariners who are not government employees are not obligated to comply with such liberty regulations. Cost- effective contract terms are being investigated with the various operating companies and unions involved. MSC ships are unarmed with the exception of a modest complement of small arms for a minimum of five qualified crewmembers. The civilian mariners (whether government or contractor employees) that operate MSC ships (whether government-owned or contractor-owned) are not members of the Armed Forces or Federal law enforcement. Accordingly, MSC civilian mariners are not governed by military Status of Forces Agreements and are restricted in use of deadly force to protect human life only and are not permitted to use deadly force solely for the protection or security of property. In accordance with their civilian status, civilian mariners may not be protected by Status of Forces rules of engagement or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The small crew size of MSC ships generally precludes the tasking of crewmembers for full-time security duties without impacting their primary mission (cargo operations, etc.). Accordingly, operational commanders augment MSC ships when, in their judgment, additional security measures are required. Due to the Navy/DOD-wide ``teamwork'' approach to security described above, security for MSC ships cannot be isolated, compared, and characterized as ``less'' or ``less restrictive.'' Civilian-crewed ships bring great efficiencies to the Navy and allow resources-- particularly military manpower--to be allocated more efficiently and effectively. The Navy has and will continue to coordinate the capabilities and limitations of civilian-crewed ships within the overall operations of Navy and DOD. Admiral Clark. The differences in force protection measures and policies between civilian-crewed Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships and Navy ships with military crews are due primarily to legal considerations inherent with the civilian crews. Coordinated, Navy-wide force protection policies and measures that accommodate these differences have been developed MSC ships comply with these policies and measures as a matter of routine. For example, MSC mariners who are government employees comply with liberty regulations (buddy system and overnight liberty policy) along with their military counterparts in the Navy. This is possible because MSC has negotiated agreements with unions representing civil-service mariners to impose liberty restrictions without penalty (cost to the government). MSC-contracted mariners who are not government employees are not obligated to comply with such liberty regulations. Cost- effective contract terms are being investigated with the various operating companies and unions involved. MSC ships are unarmed with the exception of a modest complement of small arms for a minimum of five qualified crewmembers. The civilian mariners (whether government or contractor employees) that operate MSC ships (whether government-owned or contractor-owned) are not members of the Armed Forces or Federal law enforcement. Accordingly, MSC civilian mariners are restricted in use of deadly force to protect human life only and are not permitted to use deadly force solely for the protection or security of property. In accordance with their civilian status, civilian mariners may not be protected by Status of Forces Agreements and are not governed by military rules of engagement or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The small crew size of MSC ships generally precludes the tasking of crewmembers for full-time security duties without impacting their primary mission (cargo operations, etc.). Accordingly, operational commanders augment MSC ships when, in their judgment, additional security measures are required. Due to the Navy and Department of Defense-wide ``teamwork'' approach to security described above, security for MSC ships cannot be isolated, compared, and characterized as ``less'' or ``less restrictive.'' Civilian-crewed ships bring great efficiencies to the Navy and allow resources-particularly military manpower--to be allocated most efficiently and effectively. The Navy has and will continue to coordinate the capabilities and limitations of civilian- crewed ships within the overall operations of Navy and DOD. [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]