[Senate Hearing 107-593]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-593
PORT SECURITY
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HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
APRIL 4, 2002--SEATTLE, WA
__________
Printed for the use of the Committees on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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______
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
TOM HARKIN, Iowa PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HARRY REID, Nevada MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CONRAD BURNS, Montana
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Terrence E. Sauvain, Staff Director
Charles Kieffer, Deputy Staff Director
Steven J. Cortese, Minority Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Minority Deputy Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies
PATTY MURRAY, Washington, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
HARRY REID, Nevada CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
TED STEVENS, Alaska
(ex officio)
Professional Staff
Peter Rogoff
Kate Hallahan
Wally Burnett (Minority)
Paul Doerrer (Minority)
Administrative Support
Angela Lee
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Senator Patty Murray........................ 1
Statement of Rear Admiral Erroll Brown, Commander, 13th Coast
Guard District, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Transportation. 3
Captain Michael Moore, Port of Puget Sound, Washington, U.S.
Coast Guard, Department of Transportation...................... 3
Prepared statement of Rear Admiral Erroll M. Brown............... 5
Statement of Rear Admiral Vinson E. Smith, Commander, Navy Region
Northwest...................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Navy regional security actions following 11 September............ 11
Progress on near term issues..................................... 11
In the long term................................................. 12
Statement of Robert S. Coleman, Jr., Seattle District Director,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice.. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Seattle District overview........................................ 12
September 11, 2001, the INS role................................. 13
Cooperating with other agencies.................................. 13
Seattle District overview........................................ 15
September 11, 2001, the INS role................................. 15
Cooperation with other agencies.................................. 15
Statement of Thomas Hardy, Director, Northwest Great Plains, U.S.
Customs Service, Department of the Treasury.................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Statement of Michael Thorne, CEO, Washington State Ferry Service. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Coast Guard's traditional missions............................... 22
Container security............................................... 23
Screening ship's crew members.................................... 24
International cooperation........................................ 24
Naval force protection........................................... 26
Statement of Andrea Riniker, Executive Director, Port of Tacoma,
Washington..................................................... 33
Statement of Steve Sewell, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Port
of Seattle, Washington......................................... 35
Statement of Charles Wellins, Director, Pacific Northwest Region,
Maersk, Inc.................................................... 37
Statement of Richard Softye, Vice President, Compliance Programs,
Holland America Line........................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Statement of Del Bates, President, International Longshore and
Warehouse Union, Local 19...................................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Postion Paper on Seaport Security for Container Terminal
Facilities..................................................... 47
Definitions...................................................... 48
Container terminal facility access............................... 48
Credentialing standards.......................................... 48
Credentialing system requirements................................ 49
Obtaining credentials............................................ 49
Containerized cargo security..................................... 49
Local security plans............................................. 50
Funding.......................................................... 50
Government efficiency............................................ 50
Limitations on liability......................................... 50
Statement of Jon Hemingway, Chief Executive Officer, Stevedoring
Services of America............................................ 50
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Additional submitted statements.................................. 61
Prepared statement of Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police
Department, City of Seattle.................................... 61
Scope of problem................................................. 61
Services provided................................................ 61
Letter from Fred Felleman, MSc., NW Director, Ocean Advocates.... 63
Letter from Dale Jensen, Program Manager, Spill Prevention,
Preparedness, and Response Program, Department of Ecology,
State of Washington............................................ 66
Federal Port Security Grant Application, April 2002.............. 66
Prepared statement of the Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO,
Puget Sound Ports Council...................................... 69
Prepared statement of the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) 71
PORT SECURITY
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THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Transportation,
Committee on Appropriations,
Seattle, Washington.
The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in the Commission Chambers,
Port of Seattle, Pier 69, Hon. Patty Murray (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senator Murray.
opening statement of senator patty murray
Senator Murray. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come
to order, and I appreciate everybody being here today, and I
apologize. Although I thank the port for allowing us to use the
facility, I apologize that there is not a window view and that
we are all inside today, but do not blame me. We will thank the
port for allowing us to be here, but we wish we had a window
for such a gorgeous day.
The tragic events of September 11 have taught us a lot
about what we need to do to make our country safer and to
protect our lives and liberties. At the Federal level we have
been working every day to find our vulnerabilities and to
eliminate them.
Today we are going to explore the unique security concerns
facing our ports. I am pleased that we have many distinguished
experts from the port community and government agencies to
share their insights with us today. I have been working on port
security for several months now, and last year I worked with
the Navy and the Coast Guard to obtain additional ships, boats
and people to patrol and protect Puget Sound.
As part of last year's defense supplemental appropriations
bill, I added funds to locate a new marine safety and security
team here in Puget Sound. I am pleased to report to you today
that that unit will be commissioned this summer here. I also
wrote to Admiral Fargo, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, and got him to agree to provide additional boats to
protect our naval facilities. In addition, I have used my
position as chair of this subcommittee to review our
government's security efforts. I have held hearings to examine
the proposed budgets for the Coast Guard and for the new
Transportation Security Administration. Two weeks ago in the
Senate, I held a hearing on cargo security.
Today's hearing will examine the unique challenges we face
in improving port security in our region. What we learn here
today will help inform the debate that is taking place in
Washington, D.C. and will help me in my oversight
responsibilities.
As I begin this hearing, I want to emphasize the critical
role that our ports play. Simply put, they are the life blood
of our region's economy. Our ports move billions of dollars of
goods each day and generate tens of thousands of good-paying
jobs that help support families throughout our State. Their
economic impact affects virtually every interest in our State
from mom-and-pop businesses like restaurants and gas stations
to our major manufacturing firms like Boeing.
Our ports have remained competitive because of the hard
work of the entire port community, the shipping industry, their
workers and the Federal and State agencies that oversee port
activities. Together they have ensured that goods move rapidly
to meet the ever-increasing demands of customers both in the
United States and in Asia.
In the wake of the events of September 11, our port
community and government agencies must now rise to yet another
challenge, the challenge of eliminating security
vulnerabilities in our ports. Our response must be
comprehensive, and it must not endanger the progress we have
made in improving productivity and efficiency. All partners in
the port community will have to step up and take responsibility
if we are to eliminate the weaknesses and links in our security
regimen without pushing cargo and jobs to other ports and
originations.
In the Puget Sound area we have to tackle some unique
security challenges. 1.8 million containers pass through this
region each year. We have important Department of Defense
installations that share our waterfront, and we have the
largest ferry system in the United States. Our solutions will
have to take those unique factors into account.
We know a great deal about the number of containers that
enter Puget Sound, and we know a great deal about how to move
these containers efficiently, but what we do not know as much
about is who packed those containers, and we do not know as
much about what is inside them. Some of the things that we do
know are disturbing. We know that a certain number of
containers that pass through our ports each year originate in
countries that have known terrorist activity, and we know that
more than 90 percent of the containers that enter our ports are
never inspected.
At same time, we know that subjecting a much higher
percentage of containers to physical inspection could seriously
hamper the efficiency of the port.
So it is both urgent and essential that we address new
solutions to improving the security of our ports. Those
solutions will require new burdens that will have to be shared
by all partners in the port community, Federal Government,
State Government, shippers, operators, shipping companies, and
all the people that work in and around the port community each
day. We need to remember that intelligence and communication
are critical to any effort to improve security. Intelligence
and communication must flow from the bottom up, not just from
the top down. The longshore workers, the operator engineers,
the electrical workers and all the other members of the marine
labor community are the eyes and ears that monitor what moves
into our ports everyday. At the same time leadership must come
from our Federal intelligence agencies and the Coast Guard in
determining which ships and which containers require added
scrutiny.
Just as our partners will have to share the burden of
improving security, I am sure that all partners will also have
to share the costs. How we split the costs is a critical issue
that the Bush Administration and this Subcommittee will have to
address.
In this regard, I am very concerned about the
Administration's budget for the upcoming fiscal year, for the
Coast Guard. I am happy to say the Administration has requested
a significant increase in funding to address enhanced readiness
to tackle the port readiness challenge. Unfortunately, as we
uncovered in a hearing earlier this year, the Administration's
budget assumes that the Coast Guard's increased work on port
security will come at the expense of other critically important
missions such as Marine Environmental Protection and Fisheries
Enforcement.
I am also disturbed by how the Administration's budget
handles direct grants for port security. The Administration's
budget zeros out funding for direct security grants to our
Nation's ports.
Last year we provided almost $100 million to help ports
meet those security needs, and at the time, we envisioned it as
a down payment, an initial down payment. Now the Administration
is asking us to abandon that program.
So I hope our Subcommittee can engage this Administration
in a more productive dialogue on how we should allocate, not
just the responsibilities, but the resources that will be
necessary to improve the security of our ports, both here in
Puget Sound and across the Nation.
It is clear that we have some critical issues to discuss
today. So I again want to thank all of our witnesses and
everyone else who has come here today to help improve our
security and maintain the critical economic benefits that our
ports provide.
We have many witnesses who we are going to be hearing from
today, so I want to ask all of the witnesses to limit their
statements to 5 minutes, so that we can get through all of
them, and I want all of the witnesses to know that their full
written statements will be included in the record for the
Senate, and I want the public to know that we will leave the
record open for any individual who would like to submit written
testimony on this topic.
Senator Murray. With that, we will begin, and I would like
to first recognize Rear Admiral Erroll Brown, who is our Coast
Guard District Commander for the Pacific Northwest.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ERROLL BROWN, COMMANDER, 13TH
COAST GUARD DISTRICT, U.S. COAST GUARD,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAIN MICHAEL MOORE, PORT OF PUGET SOUND, WASHINGTON,
U.S. COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Admiral Brown. Good afternoon, Madame Chairman. As
Commander of the 13th Coast Guard District, I am pleased to
discuss the Coast Guard's efforts to improve port security here
in the Pacific Northwest.
Thank you for your support of last year's and last fall's
supplemental. It provided operational capability to carry out
our current homeland security activity and continue our most
important and traditional missions. I also ask for your
continued support for passage of the Administration's second
supplemental request and your leadership in approving the
fiscal year 2003 budget request.
In my written statement and in my statements today, you
will hear two recurrent themes, one is based upon the
ubiquitous threat we face. It requires an unprecedented
cooperation among all elements. As stated otherwise, it is an
all-hands war. The dual drivers of global competitiveness and
of global commerce and economic competitiveness demand that we
implement uniform security standards, while the uniqueness of
our ports argues for tailorable applications. So we have a
uniform over-structure for our unique ports mean that we have
to do things differently in different ports.
The Pacific Northwest waterways are critical gateways to
the global economy. The Marine Transportation System in this
region contributes substantially to the Nation's economic
growth, stability security and our citizens' quality of life.
Our vast geography and proximity to Canada presents unique
challenges for this region. From the open ocean, it is 123
miles to Seattle and 147 miles to Tacoma, which requires
significantly longer transit times than most other ports.
Additionally, Washington State and Canada share a 150-mile
international maritime border.
Following the September 11 attacks, we took immediate steps
to build upon an existing robust safety regime. Advance vessel
arrival notices were extended to 96 hours and included crew and
passenger lists to help us identify and screen high risk
vessels. We significantly increased safety and security
boarding of vessels. Higher risk vessels have either been sea
marshalled through United States waters, boarded and inspected
at sea or provided United States Coast Guard vessel escorts.
Around-the-clock vessel harbor patrols were conducted, while
vehicular patrols of waterfront facilities were also conducted.
Jointly, with Customs, we have inspected over 7,000
containers, which represents a quadrupling of the number of
containers typically inspected each year. To meet our security
oversight responsibilities, we conducted vulnerability
assessments to best focus our limited responses. Equally
important was our vigorous outreach at multiple levels to
improve our intelligence, information and field operational
effectiveness.
The greatest challenges we face are the potential threats
posed by vessel crews, passengers and dangerous cargo.
Containerization poses a major threat for smuggling drugs,
terrorists and potentially weapons of mass destruction. I
believe it is therefore important and more effective that
vessels be screened at their point of origin prior to departure
en route to the United States ports. In the interim, we must
rely upon our existing screening capabilities via the advance
notice of arrival requirement, our information networks, and to
jointly operate a United States/Canadian cooperative Vessel
Traffic System. All these are critical parts of our maritime
domain awareness capability.
We continue to work closely with port authorities, shipping
companies, terminal operators, the Washington State ferries as
well as trade and labor associations to enhance security.
Currently, using a vulnerability matrix, we independently
assessed facility security, and then conducted surveys with
terminal operators to identify and alleviate shore-side
security faults. Captain Mike Moore, the Coast Guard Captain of
the Port, Puget Sound, has in, collaboration with port
authorities, law enforcement and other stakeholders,
established 11 separate Port Security Committees in addition to
the existing Harbor Safety Committee.
Even before the 9/11 attacks, we were a partner with the
Navy to bolster the protection of strategic assets in this
region. We have now incorporated liaison personnel into our
command center operations to ensure appropriate coordination
and, of course, as you recall from your recent visit and joint
agency briefs, we continue to work closely with Customs and INS
to better target vessels and containers for inspection.
In conclusion, the Coast Guard of the Pacific Northwest is
an integral component of our Nation's homeland security
efforts, and we are a principal enforcement agency for our
maritime borders. We must nurture existing relationships with
all of our stakeholders including each of the agencies
represented on your panels today. The security of the multiple
ports of Puget Sound, particularly the ports of Seattle and
Tacoma has improved in the months following 9/11, but there
remains much to be done. In the maritime arena, we must set
standards and provide the oversight necessary to elevate the
security regimes of our ports and those who move people, ships
and cargo. Through our very effective and cooperative local
efforts, we will continue to make maritime security
improvements. These must be tailored to address our unique port
environment and remain consistent where appropriate with other
ports as the border, international and national security
policies are formulated and implemented.
Thank you for your continuing support of our Coast Guard.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Erroll M. Brown
Good afternoon Madam Chairman and distinguished members. My name is
Rear Admiral Erroll M. Brown and I am Commander of the Thirteenth Coast
Guard District headquartered in Seattle, Washington. It is my pleasure
to appear before you today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in cargo
and port security. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you for
your support of last fall's supplemental--it restored operational
capability that enabled us to carry out Homeland Security activities
and allowed us to return to traditional missions. I'd like to also ask
your full support and quick passage of the Administration's second
supplemental request and fiscal year 2003 budget request.
Protecting America from terrorist threats requires constant
vigilance across every mode of transportation: air, land, and sea. The
agencies within the Department of Transportation, including the U.S.
Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Highway
Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Transportation
Security Administration, and the Maritime Administration (MARAD), touch
all three modes of transportation and are cooperatively linked. This is
especially true of the maritime mode. Ensuring robust ports, waterways,
and coastal security is a national priority and an intermodal
challenge, with impacts in America's heartland communities just as
directly as the U.S. seaport cities where cargo and passenger vessels
arrive and depart daily. The United States has more than 1,000 harbor
channels, 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal and coastal waterways,
serving 361 ports containing more than 3,700 passenger and cargo
terminals. This maritime commerce infrastructure, known as the U.S.
Marine Transportation System, or MTS, has long been a Department of
Transportation priority. The U.S. MTS handles more than two billion
tons of freight, three billion tons of oil, transports more than 134
million passengers by ferry, and entertains more than seven million
cruise ship passengers each year. The vast majority of the cargo
handled by this system is immediately loaded onto or has just been
unloaded from railcars and truckbeds, making the borders of the U.S.
seaport network especially abstract and vulnerable, with strong,
numerous and varied linkages direct to our nation's rail and highway
systems.
Unique Challenges of Pacific Northwest Port Security
The waterways of the Pacific Northwest are critically important
gateways to the global economy, yet they are among the most vulnerable.
The marine transportation system in this region contributes
substantially to the economic growth and stability of our nation, the
quality of life of our citizens and our nation's security. The Pacific
Northwest is a gateway to Asia. Over 1.8 million containers move
through the combined ports of Seattle-Tacoma each year making it the
third largest container cargo complex in the United States. Annually,
over 12 billion gallons of oil move through the Strait of Juan de Fuca
to four major refineries that provide most of the petroleum products
used in the Pacific Northwest. Over 600,000 recreational boaters with
250,000 registered recreational boats enjoy the waters in and around
Washington State. The Washington State Ferry System transports over 25
million passengers and 11 million vehicles on about 150,000 transits a
year and is the largest ferry system in the U.S. Our growing cruise
industry, with over 230,000 passengers last year, is forecast to triple
in volume over the next few years. In addition, the Puget Sound is home
to one of the largest concentrations of U.S. Naval Forces in the
country. By all forecasts, use of these waterways for national defense,
commerce, fishers, commuters, travelers, and recreation will continue
to grow. Protecting our marine transportation system and critical
infrastructure including our ports and the cargo they convey from
terrorist activities is one of our highest priorities.
Compared to other U.S. ports, the distances and geography of this
region are significant. From the open ocean, it is 123 miles to Seattle
and 147 miles to Tacoma each direction, which equates to one-way
transit times of six to ten hours. Washington State and Canada share
approximately 150 nautical miles of maritime border accessible to
anyone with a waterborne craft ranging from a jet ski to a commercial
ship, complicating monitoring and enforcement of maritime laws. With
distances of 12 to less than three miles between Canada and the United
States, the San Juan Islands present a major challenge for law
enforcement officials providing an area where smugglers can quickly
cross the maritime border with illegal currency, drugs, weapons, and
migrants.
Significant smuggling potential also exists in the Puget Sound area
in the form of containerized shipments. The volume of all types of
shipments in our ports is expected to increase 50 percent by 2010.
Criminal exploitation of containerized shipments of goods poses a major
threat for importation of Southeast Asian heroin and marijuana and
South American drugs into the U.S. Seventy percent of all containers
arriving at ports on the Puget Sound are destined for transshipment to
destinations other than Washington. These containers are not inspected
by any U.S. authority at their origin and it is not unusual for many of
them to be bonded and not subject to customs inspections. Marine
containerization offers traffickers a nearly unhindered, unmonitored
mode for importation of illicit cargo. While the Coast Guard, Customs
and other federal agencies have engaged in numerous container
inspection task force operations, collectively we have inspected fewer
than two percent of the containers moving through Puget Sound ports.
Since 9/11, jointly we have inspected over 7,000 containers in the
Ports of Seattle and Tacoma, which represents a quadrupling of the
number of containers typically inspected annually. While point of entry
inspections will remain an important tool, point of origin inspections
and enhanced cargo information can be expected to increase the
effectiveness of container inspections.
Applied technology and information sharing can provide significant
improvements in how we optimally screen containerized cargo. But how
all the pieces come together is critically important. The U.S.
Department of Transportation is the lead Federal department for
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). Since mid-2000 the Federal
Highway Administration, in cooperation with the Secretary's Office of
Intermodalism, has supported funding for an intermodal ITS Field
Operational Test led by Washington State's Department of
Transportation. The primary focus of this intermodal test was to
demonstrate the use of electronic container seals on containers,
combined with automatic vehicle identification transponders attached to
the truck tractors, to track movements and monitor the security of
containerized freight. This technology can potentially provide the
information necessary for US Customs, US Coast Guard and other federal
agencies and state governments to automate the clearance and
credentialing of commercial vehicles through ports and terminals,
across international borders, and through weigh stations. Additionally
these technologies can potentially lead to substantial increases in the
efficiencies involved in the movement of goods by the intermodal
freight industry, as well as supporting greater visibility throughout
the supply chain to improve security from point of origin to point of
destination. The Department hopes to build on the success of this very
important project.
Prior to 9/11, routine waterborne security patrols were conducted,
active control of vessels was exercised via the joint Canada/U.S.
Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service, and shoreside security was
monitored through facility inspections and roving vehicle patrols. A
limited number of container inspections was coordinated with U.S.
Customs with emphasis on hazardous material violations. Due to a
largely foreign vessel customer base, a robust Port State Control
boarding program was in place that screened each vessel arriving in the
Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound using a security-targeting
matrix. Following the September 11 attacks, immediate actions were
taken by the Coast Guard to mitigate the threat posed by vessels
entering port areas. Arrival notices were extended to 96 hours and crew
lists are now required to help us identify and screen high-risk
vessels. Additional Coast Guard, Coast Guard Auxiliary, and state and
local law enforcement personnel and watercraft were deployed. Around-
the-clock vessel and vehicular harbor patrols were conducted. To
mitigate the shoreside threat to facilities, terminal managers were
directed to upgrade security and additional federal, state, and local
agency patrols were conducted. We increased safety and security
boardings conducting over 200 since September 11. A small number of
vessels considered to represent higher risk have either been Sea
Marshaled through U.S. waters or provided Coast Guard vessel escort.
Long transits in both Washington and Oregon require significantly
greater resources for the Sea Marshal or vessel escort than most other
U.S. ports. Additional resources for these programs are contained
within the President's recent Emergency Supplemental request and the
fiscal year 2003 budget request.
One of the greatest challenges we face is the threat posed by crews
and passengers of vessels. It is imperative that all vessels receive a
thorough screening prior to entry. To this end, it is essential we
identify every incoming vessel, exert control over its actions, and
conduct boardings to screen the vessel, passengers and crew.
Fortunately, the existing Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service (CVTS)
provides excellent vessel location information, a critical piece of
Maritime Domain Awareness--the overall knowledge of vessels, cargoes,
and people using the MTS.
Water and shoreside vessel, vehicle, and aircraft patrols continue
around the clock with procedures being refined daily. We are working
with ports and private terminal operators to enhance security. Using a
vulnerability matrix, we conduct facility security surveys in
conjunction with port authorities to identify and alleviate shoreside
security shortfalls. Risk management procedures have been used to
better identify critical operations and focus resources. The Coast
Guard Captain of the Port has established 11 separate Port Security
Committees in collaboration with port authorities and other
stakeholders. These committees have assumed a crucial role in all port
security efforts, with an increased emphasis on those facilities or
activities that pose the highest risks. We have recently completed
security guidelines for terminals and facilities focusing on such
issues as perimeter security, vehicle and personnel access, and control
of visiting vessels. These guidelines were developed in conjunction
with Pacific Area port users. They incorporate national and
international best practices and will be implemented this month.
We are also partnering with the U.S. Customs Service to better
target containers for inspection including better intelligence and
specialized screening equipment. We have a strong joint working
relationship and will continue to work together in conducting container
inspections. In the immediate future, the development of a port-wide
identification system and enhancing container security are areas of
focus. In these areas, the ports of Seattle and Tacoma intend to use
the Department of Transportation's work on credentialing and container
security as a springboard for their efforts.
conclusion
In conclusion, the United States Coast Guard in the Pacific
Northwest is an integral component of our nation's homeland security
efforts and we are a principal enforcement agency for our maritime
border. The security of the eight ports within Puget Sound and
particularly the ports of Seattle and Tacoma has improved significantly
in the months following the 9/11 attacks but we are not at the level
needed. I am confident our success is due in large part to outstanding
interagency cooperation and increased sharing of information and
intelligence. We will make the best use of our existing resources and
resources requested by the President to meet the demand for increased
security. I can assure you that we will maintain the viability and
integrity of the marine transportation system by working with other
public, private, domestic, and international partners so that people
and goods move safely, securely, and economically. The Department of
Transportation is committed to the continuing protection of our
nation's ports and cargo against terrorist threats. Thank you for your
continuing support of our Coast Guard. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Admiral Brown. We will now hear
from Rear Admiral Vinson Smith, Commander, Navy Region
Northwest.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL VINSON E. SMITH, COMMANDER,
NAVY REGION NORTHWEST
Admiral Smith. Good afternoon, Madame Chairman and
distinguished members. My name is Rear Admiral Vinson Smith,
and I am the Commander, Naval Region Northwest, headquartered
at Naval Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington.
I appreciate this opportunity to address you to discuss the
United States Navy's role in port security and harbor defense.
Homeland security and homeland defense are all but evolving
roles for the Navy. Our mission has traditionally been port
presence, power projection, and when necessary engaging in
warfare across the full spectrum of conflict on the enemies'
turf rather than American soil.
Our world changed on 9/11. Traditionally, the defense of
the United States coastal waters, ports and harbors were the
mission of the United States Coast Guard. The Navy is now
forging new paths to expand homeland security working closely
with the United States Coast Guard, our sister services and
other Federal agencies to address homeland security and
homeland defense.
The Pacific Northwest is home to some unique strategic
assets and facilities. This includes Trident submarines,
aircraft carriers, fast attack submarines, Submarine Base
Bangor, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Naval Magazine Indian
Island and a major fuel depot at Manchester.
Immediately following the events of 11 September, the Navy
and the Coast Guard took the following actions to enhance the
security posture of the region: Third Fleet deployed an Air
Defense picket ship off the coast of Washington and aircraft in
support of NORAD; Naval Surface Group Pacific Northwest
deployed three combatants in Puget Sound until all commercial
aircraft were on the ground across the United States; Naval
Region Northwest established Temporary Flight Restriction zones
with the FAA, added additional security boat patrols, and
increased perimeter security at all base facilities. In
addition to increased land and waterborne security, the region
deployed barriers to mitigate the air threat to Sub Base
Bangor, sonar swimmer detection system, log booms around
capital ships. Navy Region Northwest also activated a Regional
Operations Center manned on a 24/7 basis to respond to regional
security issues.
The Coast Guard provided 24/7 harbor defense patrols at
three major naval facilities, Bangor, Bremerton and Everett.
Continuous Coast Guard patrols were also provided at Naval
Magazine Indian Island during ammunition loading operations. In
addition to these security patrols, the Coast Guard provided
escort vessels for ballistic missile submarines, fast attack
submarines, and aircraft carriers in transit in and out of
Puget Sound.
Shortly after the President signed Executive Order 13223,
reserve components were activated for duty. This included 200
security personnel to sustain the New Force Protection
requirements for the Northwest. The Navy Coastal Warfare unit
provided specialists trained in Harbor Defense, and personnel
to augment the Regional Operations Center. The availability of
these units facilitated the reduction of Coast Guard presence
in support Navy venues. The coastal warfare forces were able to
provide a waterside radar picture of the waters around naval
installations not covered by the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic
System. This improved our ability to identify and track
waterborne contacts in the vicinity of naval installations. The
Navy deployed coastal defense ships from San Diego to augment
Coast Guard harbor defense and escort missions.
Once log booms were in place at Bremerton and Everett, the
region was able to eliminate daily Coast Guard patrols in the
vicinity of naval installations.
The United States Navy and United States Coast Guard
collaboration is occurring at all levels. The CNO and the
Commandant of the Coast Guard established a NABGAR board of
senior flag officers from both services in 1980, and they meet
every 6 months. The next meeting is on 10 April. In the
Pacific, collaboration at the Fleet Commander level of both
services is working to provide synchronization of terms,
standards, base land, and aligning normal course protection
requirements, identification of resource shortfalls,
establishment of joint command and control, and developing pre-
planned responses, and establishing a long-term plan for
employment of reserve Naval Coastal Warfare and coastal patrol
ships.
Since January of 2002, Coast Guard District 13 and Navy
Region Northwest provides an Executive Steering Committee
composed of Naval Coastal Warfare, FAA, Navy Criminal
Investigative Service, and Western Air Defense sector. This
Committee has been working to enhance communication between
various agencies and formulate Regional Force Protection
policies and procedures. This Committee also works to achieve
collaborative solutions on issues of mutual concern of member
agencies such as the Use of Force Doctrine. This forum has also
been instrumental in improving command and control prognosis
and in the near term, the coastal patrol ships have proven to
be ideally suited for the Puget Sound homeland security
mission. Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific is actively
pursuing a more permanent arrangement for a coastal patrol
ship--to support the Pacific Northwest.
Similar to flight restrictions, the restriction of water
traffic at installations and in the immediate vicinity of ships
is critical for both security and the safety of the boating
public. Navy Region Northwest is working with the Army Corps of
Engineers to establish restricted areas around other facilities
similar to the ones already in place at Submarine Base Bangor.
We are discussing the establishment of Joint Command and
Control Centers with the Coast Guard district to handle
waterborne security. In addition the regional operations center
will be equipped and operate with the joint Center. This will
have an added benefit of improving our ability to provide
military assistance to civil authorities in the event of major
disaster.
In the long term fleet level discussions envision a joint,
interagency organization in the United States Coast Guard
Pacific Area and Navy number fleets that will handle offshore
security and homeland defense issues. This agency will be
closely linked to Region and District Joint Command and Control
Centers, who are focused on near and in shore security.
In conclusion, the United States Navy in the Pacific
Northwest is comprised of assets vital to our national security
posture. A critical part of readiness is acting in cooperation
with other agencies with complimentary missions, thus our early
and close collaboration with the United States Coast Guard for
Harbor Defense and Homeland Security. Our ongoing commitment to
homeland security will ensure interagency alignment and
maximize our collective capabilities to safeguard the Puget
Sound region from asymmetrical threats.
Thank you very much for your support of the United States
Navy, and I welcome questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Vinson E. Smith
Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and distinguished members. My name
is Rear Admiral Vinson Smith and I am Commander, Navy Region Northwest,
headquartered at Naval Submarine Base Bangor, Washington. I appreciate
this opportunity to address you to discuss the U.S. Navy's role in Port
Security and Harbor Defense.
Homeland Security and Homeland Defense are old but evolving roles
for the Navy. Our mission has traditionally been one of forward
presence, Power Projection and when necessary, engaging in warfare
across the full spectrum of conflict on the enemy's turf rather than on
American soil. Consequently, manning profiles, ship designs, and weapon
systems are all designed to engage the enemy while forward deployed.
Our world changed on 9/11. Traditionally, defense of U.S. coastal
waters, ports, and harbors were the mission of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Navy is now forging new paths to expand homeland security working
closely with U.S. Coast Guard, our sister services, and other federal
agencies to address Homeland Security and Homeland Defense.
I echo ADM Brown's assessment of the force protection challenges
posed by the complex geography of the Puget Sound area. The transit
times from the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca to our three major
homeports are between 8 and 9 hours. Even within the Sound, it
routinely takes 4 hours to transit one-way between homeports. Coupled
with the narrowness of the passages, rough seas, weather, floating
debris, vessel transit restrictions, limitations on radar use near
populated areas, and the lack of air defense systems produces an
environment that favors potential attacks.
The Pacific Northwest is home to some unique strategic assets and
facilities. Damage or destruction to any of these assets would fit the
terrorist profile for a major ``CNN event'' and significantly degrade
DOD's ability to perform some of its missions. This includes SUBASE
Bangor, Trident submarines, aircraft carriers, fast attack submarines,
a nuclear-capable ship repair facility at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, a
deep-water ammunition loading facility at Naval Magazine Indian Island,
and a major fuel depot at Manchester.
The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard in Puget Sound have had an
active working relationship for many years. Since 1995, we have
conducted Harbor Defense exercises annually at various venues
throughout the Sound. These exercises facilitated command and control
and allowed U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy Coastal Warfare, and U.S. Army
Logistics assets to defend shipping, installations, and harbor
operations. These exercises facilitated the deployment of Navy and
Coast Guard Forces subsequent to 9/11.
After the attack on USS COLE in October 2000, Navy Region Northwest
began intensive collaboration with U.S. Coast Guard District 13 to
establish a synergistic anti-terrorism/force protection strategy to
protect homeported ships. By June 2001, the Captain of the Port
accelerated the process to expand the existing Security Zone at Naval
Submarine Base Bangor and a moving security zone around all U.S. Navy
submarines transiting on the surface in the Puget Sound.
navy regional security actions following 11 september
Immediately following the events of 11 September, the Navy and the
Coast Guard took the following actions to enhance the security posture
of the region. Third Fleet deployed an Air Defense picket ship off the
Washington coast. Naval Surface Group Pacific Northwest deployed three
combatants in Puget Sound until all commercial aircraft were on the
ground throughout the U.S. Navy Region Northwest established Temporary
Flight Restriction zones with the FAA, added additional security boat
patrols, and increased perimeter security at base facilities. In
addition to increased land and waterborne security, the Region deployed
air threat barriers at SUBASE Bangor, sonar swimmer detection systems,
and log booms around capital ships. Navy Region Northwest also
activated a Regional Operations Center manned on a 24/7 basis to
respond to Regional security issues. The Coast Guard provided 24/7
harbor defense patrols at three major Naval Facilities--Bangor,
Bremerton, and Everett. Continuous Coast Guard patrols were also
provided at Naval Magazine Indian Island during ammunition loading
operations. In addition to these security patrols, the Coast Guard was
tasked to provide escort vessels for all Class A and B naval vessels
during transits in and out of Puget Sound.
Shortly after President Bush signed Executive Order 13223, reserve
components were activated for duty. This included over 200 security
personnel to sustain new Force Protection requirements, Navy Coastal
Warfare units to provide specialists trained in Harbor Defense, and
personnel to man the Regional Operations Center. The availability of
these units facilitated the further reduction of Coast Guard presence
at Navy venues. The Coast Guard's Port Security Unit 313, which had
been providing both land and waterborne security at Naval Magazine
Indian Island, was relieved by the Navy's Inshore Boat Unit THIRTEEN.
Naval Coastal Warfare forces were able to provide a waterside radar
picture of the waters around Naval installations not covered by the
Coast Guard Vessel Traffic System (VTS). This improved our ability to
identify and track waterborne contacts in the vicinity of Naval
installations. The Navy deployed Coastal Defense Ships (PCs) from San
Diego to augment Coast Guard harbor defense and escort missions. Two
PCs were deployed to the Northwest in October. Once log booms were in
place at Bremerton and Everett, the Region was able to eliminate daily
Coast Guard patrols in the vicinity of Navy installations.
U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard collaboration is occurring at all
levels. In the Pacific, collaboration at the Fleet Commander level of
both Services is working to provide synchronization of terms and
standards, reestablishing the normal Force Protection Conditions to
threat-based standards, identification of shortfalls, establishment of
joint command and control, developing pre-planned responses, and
establishing a long-term plan for employment of reserve NCW forces and
PCs. Since January 2002, Coast Guard District 13 and Navy Region
Northwest have co-chaired a Regional Force Protection Executive
Steering Committee composed of Naval Coastal Warfare, FAA, Navy
Criminal Investigative Service, and Western Air Defense Sector. This
Committee has been working to enhance communication between various
agencies and formulate Regional Force Protection policies and
procedures. This Committee also works to achieve collaborative
solutions on issues of mutual concern of member agencies, such as Use
of Force Doctrine. This forum has been instrumental in improving
Command and Control issues.
progress on near term issues
For the most effective use of all of our assets, our Regional
Operations Center needs the ability to assemble real-time information
and communicate immediately with Navy and Coast Guard forces throughout
the Region. Accordingly, we are well along on the design for
modifications to the existing Operations Center to accomplish that
mission and consolidate improved communication for Region Public Safety
agencies. This will have the additional benefit of improving our
capability for Military Support to Civil Authorities in the event of
major disasters.
The Coastal Patrol Ship (PC) has proven to be ideally suited for
the Puget Sound Homeland Security Mission. Commander, Naval Surface
Force Pacific is actively pursuing permanently homeporting PCs to the
Pacific Northwest.
Similar to flight restrictions, the restriction of water traffic at
installations and in the immediate vicinity of ships is critical for
both security and the safety of the boating public. The Coast Guard has
assisted by designating a Security Zone at Submarine Base Bangor and a
moving Security Zone around submarines transiting on the surface in the
Puget Sound. Additionally, in September 2001, the Coast Guard
established Naval Vessel Protection Zones around all Naval vessels
which are enforced by ships' personnel and escorts. Navy Region
Northwest is working with the Army Corps of Engineers' to establish
restricted areas at our other facilities similar to the one already in
place at Submarine Base Bangor.
in the long term
The threat posed by an airborne terrorist is still a valid concern.
The limited regulation of general aviation and accessibility of small
aircraft allows a potential adversary to easily circumvent most
Homeland Security measures currently in place. The incomplete low-level
radar coverage in the Northwest exacerbates these vulnerabilities.
In conclusion, the United States Navy in the Pacific Northwest is
comprised of assets vital to our nation's strategic posture. A critical
part of readiness is acting in cooperation with other agencies with
complimentary missions, thus, our early and close collaboration with
the U.S. Coast Guard for Harbor Defense and Homeland Security. Because
of our outstanding relationship, we have attained and sustained a level
of security and readiness appropriate to the importance of the assets
in the Region. Concurrently, Navy Region Northwest has aggressively
pursued the hardening of our facilities and assumed the force
protection mission in a seamless and timely manner. Our ongoing
commitment to Homeland Security will ensure inter-agency alignment and
maximize our collective capabilities to safeguard the Puget Sound
region from asymmetrical threats. Thank you for your support of the
United States Navy. I welcome your questions.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Admiral Smith. We will now turn
to Mr. Robert Coleman, Jr., Seattle District Director,
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. COLEMAN, JR., SEATTLE DISTRICT
DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Coleman. Senator Murray, good afternoon. Thank you for
inviting me here today to testify on behalf of the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding seaport
security. America's seaports are an important link between the
United States and the rest of the world. The increasing flow of
people and goods through our ports help drive our economy, but
can also serve as a conduit for terrorists, weapons of mass
destruction, illegal migrants, contraband and other unlawful
commodities. This is especially true in Seattle with an
increase in cruise line traffic, freight movement as well as
the increased tourism to the northwest, we may be vulnerable.
At our Nation's seaports, INS uses both officers and support
personnel to enforce our immigration laws and facilitate the
flow of commerce and passenger traffic while interdicting and
deterring those who would take advantage of our openness.
SEATTLE DISTRICT OVERVIEW
By the way of background, the Seattle District comprises
the State of Washington and 10 northern counties and Idaho and
four pre-inspection sites in Canada. We cover over 70,000
square miles and geographically represent one of the largest
districts in the Nation. Our personnel operate out of over 30
locations. We have inspections staff at four preinspection
stations in British Columbia, six international airports in
Washington State, 14 landborder ports of entry located in the
States of Washington and Idaho, and five seaports of entry
located along Puget Sound.
The Seattle District also provides technical immigration
advice to United States Customs Officers at 10 additional
international ports-of-entry where INS does not have a
presence. With only 310 authorized inspectors and only 216 on
duty we are responsible for inspecting over 20 million visitors
to the United States each year.
As I mentioned, the Seattle District includes five
seaports. They are located in Tacoma, Seattle, Anacortes,
Bellingham and Olympia. In addition, the seaport operations are
both in Victoria and Vancouver, British Columbia.
In fiscal year 2001, the Seattle seaport unit inspected 56
cruise ships carrying over 120,000 passengers in Seattle. The
Port of Seattle has scheduled 78 cruise ship sailings for the
2002 season, and it is estimated that the number of cruise
ships and passengers will grow significantly in the coming
years.
I believe INS staff does an excellent job in inspecting
arriving ships and passengers. We owe much of that success to
the excellent working relationship we have with the U.S. Coast
Guard, U.S. Customs Service, FBI, U.S. Attorney's Office and
very importantly the Port of Seattle and Washington State
ferries.
The INS and the Seattle District have a long history of
sharing intelligence cooperation. These efforts facilitate the
interception of smuggling organizations transporting migrants
to the United States. One example of this cooperation was
Operation Cape May. During Operation Cape May, which began in
December of 1999, we discovered a container with 18 males
between the ages of 18 to 30 contained in a container from the
People's Republic of China. Four aliens died as a result of the
container's inhumane conditions. Three of the traffickers
involved in that case have pled guilty to human trafficking
charges, and five other persons involved have pled guilty to
charges of transportation of illegal aliens, or conspiracy to
transport illegal aliens. The standard sentences for these
crimes range from 30 to 78 months.
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, THE INS ROLE
At 10:05 a.m., September 11, 2001, the INS along with
Customs imposed the highest level of security alert at the
Nation's borders. Six and a half months later, we continue to
maintain that alert level. The district has established and
maintained a 24-hour command element staffed by senior district
personnel. When operating at threat level one, the INS
responsibilities entail much more intense inspections, closer
scrutiny of individuals, their documentation, and inspections
of vessels and crew.
All adult passengers and crew are asked to produce
government issued photo identification. Ferry crews are
required to submit manifests for our inspections, and areas
that conceal illegal entrants are inspected consistent with
threat level one guidelines. In order to maintain our
heightened level of operations, we have required our inspectors
to work many hours on overtime, in addition to rearranging tour
assignments to better fulfill waterway traffic needs.
COOPERATING WITH OTHER AGENCIES
The Seattle District works with Federal, State and local
agencies such as U.S. Customs Service, the Coast Guard,
Department of Agriculture, Washington State Patrol, city
police, the Port of Seattle, FBI, United States Attorneys
Office to foster better communication and improve security
along the waterways and ports. Private sector relations are
also very important to the Port of Seattle. All Federal, State
and local agencies are working to focus their resources on the
new mission at hand since September 11. Working groups in these
agencies have already been formed that can work to eliminate
the interagency differences and encourage the sharing of
intelligence, resources and responsibilities. These efforts can
result in creating stronger law enforcement in our Nation's
seaports.
The United States and Canada enjoy an outstanding working
relationship. Representatives of the INS, U.S. Customs, Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency and Citizenship and Immigration
Canada meet regularly to discuss facility and operational
issues in general. Through diverse partnership and an already
existing collaboration, we can continue to work to improve
security at our Nations' seaports. Some of these partnerships
include: U.S. Attorney's Anti-Terrorism Task Force; the Border
Vision and Cross-Border Crime Forum of the Shared Border
Accord, the Joint Terrorism Task Force; Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams; Integrated Marine Enforcement Teams, the
Joint Terrorist Tracking Task Force.
As we have already witnessed, acts of terrorism can come
from any direction. At the national level, the Coast Guard,
Customs Service, INS, the Department of Defense and others are
working on improving container inspection and tracking. Here in
the northwest, INS can be a conduit for communication within
the now robust informal cooperative mechanisms. Given the
degree of importance to our safety and our economy, formalizing
interagency relationships to protect critical infrastructure is
worth our collective effort.
The current atmosphere in the United States with the
ongoing war on terrorism, the formulation of the foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force and the Attorney General's Anti-
Terrorism Task Force present us with a situation where we can
only gain from sharing. Stronger law enforcement along the land
and air borders have pushed the drug runners, terrorists, human
traffickers to the waterways. The potential that our waterways
will be used to bring about the next wave of terror is real.
In conclusion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
in the Seattle District is committed to securing our borders. I
want to commend the men and women of this district for their
outstanding commitment to the INS mission and the protection of
our country.
Thank you, Senator, and I am glad to take questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Coleman, Jr.
Chairwoman Murray and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me here today to testify on behalf of the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regarding seaport security
in the Seattle District.
America's seaports are an important link between the United States
and the rest of the world. The increasing flow of people and goods
through our ports helps drive our economy, but it can also serve as a
conduit for terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal migrants,
contraband, and other unlawful commodities. This is especially true in
Seattle, with an increase in Cruise Line traffic, freight movement, as
well as the increased tourism to the beautiful Northwest. At our
nation's seaports, INS uses both officers and support personnel to
enforce our immigration laws and facilitate the flow of commerce and
passenger traffic, while interdicting and deterring those who would
take advantage of our openness. It takes dedicated people to keep
legitimate cargo and entertainment based waterway traffic moving, while
interdicting those who do not have the legal right to enter our
country, and those that may possess the capacity to do the United
States harm.
I know that you are familiar with the INS and our inspection
processes from previous field hearings. Today I will focus on the
Seattle District and various issues related to port security and
waterway protection.
seattle district overview
The INS Seattle District Office is located in downtown Seattle,
with sub-offices located in Yakima and Spokane. The Seattle District is
composed of five branches: Management, Adjudications, Inspections,
Investigations, and Detention and Removal. These branches each play a
vital role when it comes to enforcing the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
The Seattle District comprises the State of Washington, the ten
northern counties in Idaho and two pre-inspection sites in Canada. The
District covers over 70,000 square miles and geographically represents
one of the largest districts in the nation. Our personnel operate out
of 29 office locations. We have staff located at two pre-inspection
stations in British Columbia, three international airports in
Washington State, fourteen land border ports-of-entry located in the
States of Washington and Idaho, and five sea ports-of-entry located
along Puget Sound. The Seattle District also provides technical
immigration advice to United States Customs Officers at ten additional
International ports-of-entry where INS does not have a presence. With
only 310 authorized inspectors, we are responsible for inspecting over
20,000,000 visitors to the United States each year.
As I mentioned, the Seattle District includes five seaports. They
are located in Tacoma, Seattle, Anacortes, Bellingham and Olympia. In
addition, the District has seaport operations in both Victoria and
Vancouver, British Columbia, which process cruise ship and ferry
traffic. In fiscal year 2001, the Seattle Seaport unit alone inspected
56 cruise ship arrivals carrying over 120,000 passengers. The Port of
Seattle has already scheduled 78 cruise ship sailings for the 2002
season, and it is estimated that the number of cruise ships and the
passengers they carry will grow significantly in the coming years.
District-wide, we inspected 83,461 crewmen, 1,002,202 passengers, 2,554
ferry sailings, 2,230 cargo vessels and 131 private vessels. Faced with
the challenge of the continued increase in traffic, I believe that INS
staff does an excellent job in inspecting arriving ships and
passengers. We owe much of that success to the excellent working
relationship we have with the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs
Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Attorney's Office, and
the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The INS and the Seattle District also has a long history of shared
intelligence with Canadian law enforcement officials. These efforts
facilitate the interception of smuggling organizations transporting
migrants to the United States via Canada. One example of this is
Operation Cape May during the year 2000. During the Cape May operation,
we discovered a container with eighteen males between the ages of
eighteen to thirty contained therein from the Fujian province in the
People's Republic of China. Four aliens died as a result of the
container's inhumane and unsanitary conditions. Three of the
traffickers involved have pled guilty to human trafficking charges,
while five other persons involved have pled guilty to charges of
transportation of illegal aliens or conspiracy to transport illegal
aliens. The standard sentences for these crimes range from 30 to 78
months.
september 11, 2001, the ins role
At 10:05 AM, on September 11, 2001, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service imposed the highest level of security alert at
the nation's borders. Six-and-a-half months later we continue to
maintain that alert level. The District has established and maintains a
24-hour command element staffed by Senior District personnel. When
operating at threat level 1, the INS responsibilities entail much more
intense inspections: closer scrutiny of individuals, their
documentation, and inspection of vessels and crew. All adult passengers
and crew are asked to produce government-issued photo identification.
Ferry crews are required to submit manifests for our inspection and
areas that may conceal illegal entrants are inspected consistent with
threat level 1 guidelines. In order to maintain our heightened level of
operations, we have required our inspectors to work many hours on
overtime in addition to rearranging port assignments to better fulfill
waterway traffic needs.
cooperation with other agencies
The Seattle District Office works with Federal, State, and Local
Agencies such as the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Department
of Agriculture, the Washington State Patrol, Seattle City Police, the
Seattle Port Authority, the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney's Office, to
foster better communication and improve security along the waterways
and at the ports.
For example, the Coast Guard sends us the advance passenger and
crew lists they receive and we query the individuals listed against the
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), the joint lookout database
that all the border inspection agencies use. We notify all the federal
seaport enforcement agencies if there is any indication that a
passenger or crewman should be questioned further. We have used our
canine enforcement team in support of Customs to search for smuggled
contraband.
All Federal, State and Local Agencies are working feverishly to
focus their resources to the new mission at hand since September 11.
Working groups in these agencies have already been formed that can work
to eliminate the inter-agency mission differences and encourage a
sharing of intelligence, resources, and responsibilities. These efforts
can result in creating stronger law enforcement at our nation's
seaports.
The United States and Canada enjoy an outstanding working
relationship. Representatives of the INS, U.S. Customs, the Canada
Customs and Revenue Agency, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada meet
regularly to discuss facility and operational issues in general.
Through diverse memberships of partnership and already existent
collaborations, we can continue to collectively tap or activate the
already existent sources. Some of these partnerships include:
--Border Vision,
--Cross Border Crime Forum,
--Joint Terrorism Task Force,
--Integrated Border Enforcement Teams,
--Integrated Marine Enforcement Teams.
As we have already witnessed, acts of terrorism can come from any
direction. At the national level, the Coast Guard, Customs Service, the
INS, the Department of Defense and others are working on improving
container inspection and tracking. Here in the Northwest, we can be a
conduit for communication and coordination with the Maritime Anti-
Terrorism Team being implemented within the Region.
All agencies involved in homeland defense and law enforcement need
to be proactive in the fight against terrorism. Inter-agency
cooperation and sharing of information is a necessity. We must come
together to share, learn, respond and identify that which could destroy
our physical or economic security. The INS supports the Administration
efforts to deter and interrupt any threat from abroad.
The current atmosphere in the United States, with the ongoing war
on terrorism, the formulation of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task
Force, and the Attorney General's Anti-terrorism Task Force, presents
us with a situation where we can only gain from sharing. Stronger law
enforcement along the land and air borders have pushed the drug
runners, terrorists, and human traffickers to the waterways. The
potential that our waterways will be used to bring about the next wave
of terror is real. This would impact us economically, environmentally,
and undermine the public's belief in their personal and national
security. We should use the systems already in place, develop new
relationships and ways of thinking, to interdict and disrupt the next
possible assault on America.
conclusion
The Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Seattle
District is committed to securing the borders and waterways of this
country against those who wish it harm while facilitating legitimate
commerce and travel. I want to commend the men and women in this
District for their outstanding commitment to the INS mission, as well
as to commend our counterparts in other law enforcement agencies in
assisting the INS with its post-September 11, mission.
Thank you Madam Chairwoman for allowing me to present my testimony
regarding the INS Seattle District Office and port security. I will be
happy to take any questions you may have at this time.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Coleman. We will move to Mr.
Thomas Hardy, who is the Director of the Northwest Great Plains
U.S. Customs Service.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS HARDY, DIRECTOR, NORTHWEST GREAT
PLAINS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY
Mr. Hardy. Good afternoon. By way of orientation, my
jurisdiction runs from Aberdeen, Tacoma-Seattle, out to Duluth,
sort of the flat part of the border, as you know it. So I have
major land, major sea and major air components.
Senator Murray, thank you for your invitation to testify
before the Subcommittee today.
Since September 11, Commissioner Bonner's top priority has
been responding to the terrorist threat on our seaports, land
borders and airports. His highest priority is doing everything
we reasonably and responsibly can do to keep terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States. Through our
Customs Inspectors, Canine Enforcement Officers and Special
Agents, we are doing just that, protecting and defending our
country against the terrorist threat at all of our ports of
entry including our seaports.
In approaching our primary priority, we believe that
Customs must do everything possible to push the border outward.
We must expand our perimeter of security away from our national
boundaries and towards foreign points of departure. Any effort
to push the border outward must include the direct involvement
of the trade community.
The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT
builds on past successful security models built between Customs
and the trade. These were designed to prevent legitimate
commercial shipments from being used to smuggle illegal drugs
and taking the turn to apply this to the anti-terrorism
syndrome.
Another core area in these efforts is the implementation of
the Container Security Initiative or CSI. As you know, one of
our stated goals in current terrorist organization has been not
to only target American lives, but also to target the American
economy. The vast majority of world trade, about 90 percent,
moves in containers. Much of it is carried on ocean-going
container ships. Of the top 20 U.S. ports, Seattle, Tacoma
combined, container cargo accounts for 8.2 percent market share
and ranks third behind Los Angeles, Long Beach, and New York,
New Jersey. If terrorists were to succeed in concealing a
weapon of mass destruction, even a crude nuclear device among
thousands of containers that enter Seattle every day, the
devastation would be horrible to contemplate.
As a primary agency for cargo security, U.S. Customs should
know everything there is to know about a container headed for
this country before it leaves a foreign port such as Rotterdam
or Singapore or an American port, and Customs wants that
container prescreened there, not here. The effective use of
technology depends largely on good targeting, for which we
require advanced information. Prior to September 11, Customs
examined about 2 percent of the incoming cargo to the United
States. Since then we have refocused resources and technology
to increase the number and the type of exams.
Currently the submission of advanced shipping manifests to
Customs is voluntary. We cannot rest our Nation's homeland
security on the vagaries and haphazard advance information that
is often incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. Current
legislation takes us a major step closer to where we ultimately
need to be, particularly for the container security issue, and
that is to have full information of incoming cargo before it
even leaves the foreign port, beginning with the mega ports
that export to the United States. We should establish a new
international security standard for containers in order to
protect this vital system of the global trade.
There are four core elements of the container security
issue. First, we must establish international security criteria
for identifying high risk cargo containers that potentially
pose a risk of containing terrorists or terrorist weapons.
Second, we must prescreen the high risk containers at their
port of shipment, in other words, before they are shipped to
the United States. As a component of the Ridge-Manley Smart
Border Action Plan on March 25, a week ago, a Canadian Customs
Inspector was assigned to the Port of Seattle and in
collaboration with U.S. Customs commenced a program which
identifies and targets high risk sea containers destined in
transit to Canada. This is a reciprocal of a program we
established in February in Vancouver where we have a U.S.
inspector.
Third, we must maximize the use of detection technology to
prescreen high risk containers. Much of this technology already
exists and is currently being used by the Customs Service.
In March 2002, the Port of Seattle received a Mobile
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System, the VACIS. This
nonintrusive gammaray inspection system will be used to provide
images of containers, vehicles, trucks, and their contents. The
Port of Tacoma will receive a VACIS in May of 2002. The fourth
part of the container security initiative is that we must
develop and broadly deploy smart boxes. These are secured
containers with electronic seals and sensors that indicate to
Customs and to private importers and carriers if particular
containers have been tampered with, particularly after they
have been prescreened.
Technology and information are essential to a successful
container security strategy, and to our counter-terrorism
mission in general. Customs looks forward to the completion of
the Automated Commercial Environment or ACE, which as you know
is an extremely important project for the Customs Service. ACE,
our new system for trade automation, offers major advances in
both the collection and sorting of trade data.
The terrorists have already exploited one key component of
our transportation system, the commercial aviation segment. It
is not at all unthinkable that they will seek to target others
including maritime trade. We believe our seaports and the
system of global trade they support are vulnerable, and we
believe that the United States and the United States Customs
Service must act now to address this threat. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas W. Hardy
Senator Murray thank you for your invitation to testify before this
Subcommittee today. Since September 11, Commissioner Bonner's top
priority for the Customs Service has been responding to the terrorist
threat at our seaports, land borders, and airports. His highest
priority is doing everything we reasonably and responsibly can to keep
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States.
Through our Customs Inspectors, Canine Enforcement Officers, and
Special Agents we are doing just that: protecting and defending our
country against the terrorist threat at all our ports of entry,
including our seaports.
Since September 11, Customs has been at a Level One alert across
the country--at all border entry points. Level 1 requires sustained,
intensive anti-terrorist questioning, and includes increased
inspections of travelers and goods at every port of entry. Because
there is a continued threat that international terrorists will attack
again, we remain at Level 1 alert to this day and will be at Level 1
for the foreseeable future.
As part of Commissioner Bonner's response, Customs has implemented
round-the-clock coverage by at least two armed Customs officers at
every Customs location, even at low volume crossings along our northern
border. To this day, Customs inspectors are, in many places, working 12
to 16 hours a day, six and seven days a week.
To help ensure that Customs develops a coordinated, integrated
counter-terrorism strategy for border security, Commissioner Bonner
established a new Office of Anti-Terrorism.
In an operational context and to support our Customs officers in
the field, we have also established the Office of Border Security. The
mission of that office is to develop more sophisticated anti-terrorism
targeting techniques for passengers and cargo in each border
environment and provide a single point of contact for events taking
place in our field.
In approaching our primary priority to prevent terrorists and
terrorist weapons from transiting our borders, we believe that Customs
must also do everything possible to ``push the border outwards.'' We
must expand our perimeter of security away from our national boundaries
and towards foreign points of departure.
Any effort to ``push the border outwards'' must include the direct
involvement of the trade community. The Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, or ``C-TPAT,'' builds on past, successful security
models between Customs and the trade that were designed to prevent
legitimate commercial shipments from being used to smuggle illegal
drugs.
Another core area in these efforts is implementation of the
Container Security Initiative, or CSI. As you know, one of the stated
goals of current terrorist organizations has been not only to target
American lives, but also to target the American economy.
The vast majority of world trade--about 90 percent--moves in
containers, much of it carried on oceangoing container ships. Nearly
half of all incoming trade to the United States by value--about 46
percent--arrives by ship, and most of that is in containers. Of the top
20 U.S. Ports, Seattle-Tacoma combined container cargo accounts for 8.2
percent market share and ranks third behind Los Angeles-Long Beach and
New York-New Jersey.
If terrorists were to succeed in concealing a weapon of mass
destruction, even a crude nuclear device, among the tens of thousands
of containers that enter U.S. ports every day, the devastation would be
horrible to contemplate. And the impact on our global economy would be
severe. As the primary agency for cargo security, U.S. Customs should
know everything there is to know about a container headed for this
country before it leaves a foreign port, such as Rotterdam or
Singapore, for an American port. Customs wants that container pre-
screened there, not here.
The effective use of technology depends largely on good targeting,
for which we require advance information. Prior to September 11,
Customs examined about 2 percent of incoming cargo to the U.S. Since
then, we have refocused resources and technology to increase the number
and the type of exams. However, to some the overall number of
examinations may still seem surprisingly low in proportion to the vast
amount of trade we process. Yet it is important to note that the cargo
Customs selects for intensive inspection is not chosen randomly. It is
the result of a careful screening process, a process that uses
information culled from a vast database on shipping and trading
activities known as the Automated Manifest System. Using targeting
systems that operate within AMS, we are able to sort through the cargo
manifests provided to Customs by shippers and carriers, and chose those
shipments that appear unusual, suspect, or high-risk. It is a system
that has served us well, but one that can and must serve us much better
in light of September 11.
Currently the submission of advanced shipping manifests to Customs
is voluntary. We cannot rest our Nation's homeland security on the
vagaries of haphazard advance information that is often incomplete and
sometimes inaccurate. Timely, accurate, and complete information is
vital to homeland security and we should mandate it is provided in
advance. Current legislation, such as S.1214 takes us a major step
closer to where we ultimately need to be, particularly for the CSI--and
that is to have full information on incoming cargo before it even
leaves the foreign port.
As part of our immediate response to September 11, Customs promptly
sought, and the Congress promptly enacted, legislation that made the
submission of data on incoming passengers to Customs' Advance Passenger
Information System mandatory for all airlines. That law was passed last
November as part of the Aviation Security Bill. Initially, the
Commissioner ordered all international airlines flying into the U.S.
from abroad to submit advance passenger information to Customs, or face
100 percent inspection of people and goods departing their flights.
This enabled Customs to better secure advance passenger information on
all incoming international flights before the new law took effect.
Beginning with the mega-ports that export to the U.S., we should
establish a new international security standard for containers in order
to protect this vital system of global trade. The core elements of the
CSI are the following:
--First, we must establish international security criteria for
identifying high-risk cargo containers that potentially pose a
risk of containing terrorists or terrorist weapons.
--Second, we must pre-screen the high-risk containers at their port
of shipment--in other words before they are shipped to the U.S.
As a component of the Ridge/Manley Smart Border Action Plan, on
March 25, 2002, a Canada Customs Inspector was assigned to the
Port of Seattle and in collaboration with U.S. Customs
commenced a program which identifies and targets high risk sea
containers destined in-transit through the United States to
Canada. A reciprocal program was implemented in Vancouver,
British Columbia, Canada in February 2002. Effective March 25,
2002, Customs Inspectors were also placed at the Canadian ports
of Montreal, Quebec and Halifax, Nova Scotia to conduct the
same kind of container targeting.
--Third, we must maximize the use of detection technology to pre-
screen high-risk containers. Much of this technology already
exists and is currently being used by the U.S. Customs Service.
In March 2002, the Port of Seattle received a Mobile Vehicle
and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS). This non-intrusive gamma-
ray inspection system will be used to provide images of
containers, vehicles, and trucks with their contents. The Port
of Tacoma will receive a VACIS in May 2002. Both machines will
not only be used for inspection of U.S. Customs targeted cargo
but also for cargo identified by other federal agencies such as
the U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture.
--Fourth, we must develop and broadly deploy ``smart'' boxes--smart
and secure containers with electronic seals and sensors that
will indicate to Customs and to the private importers or
carriers if particular containers have been tampered with,
particularly after they have been pre-screened.
As you can glean from this list, technology and information are
essential to a successful container security strategy, and to our
counter-terrorist mission in general. And to put it simply, the more
technology and information we have, and the earlier in the supply chain
we have them, the better.
Customs also looks forward to the completion of the Automated
Commercial Environment, or ACE, which as you know is an extremely
important project for the Customs Service. ACE, our new system of trade
automation, offers major advances in both the collection and sorting of
trade data.
We are also working with the Canadian and Mexican governments to
improve information exchange and adopt benchmarked security measures
that will expand our mutual borders and reduce the terrorist threat to
most of the North American continent.
The terrorists have already exploited one key component of our
transportation system: commercial aviation. It is not at all
unthinkable that they will seek to target others, including maritime
trade. We believe our seaports and the system of global trade they
support are vulnerable, and we believe that the U.S. and the Customs
Service must act now to address this threat. Thank you.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Hardy. We will now
turn to Mr. Michael Thorne, CEO of the Washington State Ferry
Service.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL THORNE, CEO, WASHINGTON STATE
FERRY SERVICE
Mr. Thorne. Thank you, Madame Chair. Good afternoon. I am,
as you indicated, Mike Thorne, for the record, the Chief
Executive Officer of the Washington State Ferry System, and
welcome an opportunity to be with you this afternoon. I have
provided written comments.
Senator Murray. Do you have your mike on?
Mr. Thorne. Maybe I do not, does that help you? I will not
go back and start over. Let me just say that as I was saying, I
provided written comments, and I will summarize those very
briefly for you. Since September 11 as has been the case for
all of us, the security for the Ferry System, the security
interests for the crew and the passengers has been of extreme
importance, while the ultimate cost in terms of dollars pales
against our concern and interest in making sure that we
continue to provide the security necessary to satisfy all of us
that those measures are being appropriately addressed.
In order to do that, it seems to me that the proper
approach is to set the proper expectations. In other words,
what we need from the ferry system perspective and other users
of maritime commerce, I think, is a set of expectations or a
structure to the security plan, so that, in fact, we can go
forward in concert to maximize the benefits that we see
potentially from the resources that are available from Federal
and local and State efforts.
To date we have assigned specifically a Security Officer
who is in charge of not only the security but the safety
systems. In addition to that we have formed and established a
Security Committee that is chaired by the Coast Guard, and the
persons on that Committee include the Washington State Patrol
as well as representatives of the Ferry System. In addition,
we've reconstituted the importance of the vessel internal
security program that we presently have administered by the
Washington State Patrol. In addition to that we've put forth
and developed various, as you would expect, various training
and patrol security issues both for the vessels as well as
around the terminals.
To date we have spent an additional approximate $2 million
with the Washington State Patrol in terms of trying to enhance
our security system. The question is can more be done, and it
has to be done. The question is how do we go forward to develop
that, and my suggestions, Madame Chair, include essentially
this:
First and foremost, we need to establish the clear
expectations of what our security system needs to be. That
needs to take advantage of the sensitive intelligence
information that is held in the hands of many Federal and State
and local agencies, and then we need to take that information
to set the standards on which we are going to build our
security plan. Specifically, then we need to draw on the
knowledge and the experience of the Federal agencies--Many of
them are represented here. As we have been working with these
well as other agencies not at the table but who have an ability
to provide us with information that will guide our system, we
need to set up the process with Federal guidance and direction
from our perspective to allows us to take advantage of putting
forth a security plan that then ultimately we will then
understand how to implement it, what the cost will be, and how
to go forward.
Let me just conclude by saying, I cannot underscore enough
the importance of defining the plan which all of us can then
work toward in concert with which will then guide the resource
allocation. It is our observation that the cooperation I am
suggesting has been good, very good, in fact, and we look
forward to working with those agencies and with you and with
the direction that the Federal Government can provide in terms
of setting forth the national security plan that is being
discussed here today.
Thank you very much. I look forward to responding to any
questions that you might have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Thorne
My name is Mike Thorne. I am the Chief Executive Officer of the
Washington State Ferry System. Thank you for this opportunity to
testify on Maritime Security issues.
Since the attacks of September 11, the country and Washington State
Ferries have been faced with a new reality regarding security response
and readiness. We recognize that ensuring the security of ferry system
passengers and crew is of extreme importance. While we are concerned
with the ultimate cost of security measures, we are more concerned with
developing the proper expectations and structure of our security plan.
Let me share with you several new initiatives underway since
September 11, including:
--A Safety Systems Manager assigned responsibility for the
coordination of security efforts.
--A newly created Washington State Ferries Security Committee that is
chaired by the Coast Guard and includes ferry representatives
and the Washington State Patrol. As a side note, the Washington
State Patrol serves as the security agency for the ferry system
assisting us with a variety of law enforcement needs.
--Heightened security awareness and procedures at terminals and
onboard vessels.
--Basic planning for stepping up physical security resources on our
vessels and at our terminals.
To date the ferry system and the Washington State Patrol have
dedicated approximately $2 million to meet interim security needs
brought on by the September 11 attacks. Can more be done? Absolutely.
In order to do so, we would prefer not to `reinvent the wheel' and
instead suggest the following:
--A process of drawing on the knowledge and experience of Federal
agencies including the Coast Guard, the FBI, the Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Federal Transit
Authority and FEMA.
--A Federal/State/ferry system process for being informed of known
threats to our operations.
--The financial resources needed to implement the appropriate
security program.
I cannot underscore enough that we will need assistance in defining
expectations and in funding any new security initiatives from the
Federal Government. The cooperation we have received to this point is
encouraging and we look forward to working with all State and Federal
jurisdictions on this matter of critical importance.
Thank you for your interest and time devoted to this critical
issue. We look forward to working with you and your staff on this
issue.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Thorne.
COAST GUARD'S TRADITIONAL MISSIONS
Admiral Brown, I am going to start with you. During a
Subcommittee earlier this year, the Coast Guard Commandant,
Admiral Loy testified that one of the Coast Guard's greatest
strengths was its ability to shift gears when necessary, and I
could not agree more, but one concern I have is that when the
Coast Guard boosts its effort in one mission, its other
critical missions pay a price.
During our hearing with Admiral Loy last month, it became
clear that under his budget for 2003, missions like Fisheries
Enforcement and Marine Environmental Protection will have to
de-emphasize on a Nation-wide basis. Do you expect the activity
here in the Pacific Northwest to mirror that national trend?
Admiral Brown. Madame Chairman, in response to your
question, as you know we did surge, specifically here in the
Pacific Northwest, in response to the threat. We have now
substantially returned many of those assets we brought in from
the coast, and, as a result of your support working with the
Navy, we've been able to return substantially to all of our
mission areas, with the top two being Search and Rescue and
Homeland Security--Maritime Security
In terms of the assets we have, we apply them based upon
the information and knowledge and the threats that we have that
are known and available to us in terms of information. Our
assets that we have applied to those areas you talked about,
fisheries, maritime pollution and those other assets, we have
returned substantially to those. I suspect that in this area we
will apply them first and foremost to Search and Rescue,
Homeland Security and to the extent we have the resources
available, we will pursue the other missions.
Senator Murray. So I can assume from what you just said
that you have de-emphasized Fisheries Enforcement and Marine
Environmental Protection at this time because of Search and
Rescue and Homeland Security?
Admiral Brown. No, ma'am. We have returned substantially,
not 100 percent, but we've returned substantially to those as a
result of, your efforts in terms of budget, in terms of
resources we got, and of course, supplemental and resources we
are looking for in the second supplemental, and the resources
that we have coming in the 2003 budget.
CONTAINER SECURITY
Senator Murray. Captain Moore, I have a question for you.
Traditionally the Coast Guard focus when inspecting containers
has been on safety. The focus has been on whether hazardous
materials containers are properly manifested and whether the
container is properly placarded. Today, of course, the new
national concern is whether the container poses any kind of
security risk. Have you shifted your focus to deal with the
issue of container security here in Seattle?
Captain Moore. Well, Senator, we worked very closely with
Customs and, in fact, INS, to take our resources that were
allocated towards looking at containers, for as you say
hazardous materials and safety to leverage that into target
inspections, any containers that had the security concerns as
well. Because of our Reserve call-up, we've been able to
increase the number of containers we've looked at in
conjunction with Customs, with Customs taking the lead on
targeting for security concerns.
Certainly, we are concerned if there is a container on an
inbound vessel since we are the lead agency for vessel movement
in entering the port and tying in very rapidly into any
concerns that might come our way, so we can take appropriate
actions with respect to the vessel, but in terms of our
container inspection program, it has increased because of the
Reserve call-up, and so we've been able to sustain, actually
quadruple our effort there, but it has been in a lot closer
coordination with Customs than we ever had before.
Senator Murray. Even if we were realistically successful in
getting more of the best new x-ray technology here in Seattle,
what percentage of the container traffic can we expect to be
inspected?
Captain Moore. The Coast Guard inspection program for
containers is really a relatively small percentage of overall
containers coming through the ports. Approximately 10 percent
are estimated to have hazardous materials, and we have
traditionally hit just a small percentage of those containers
even with our program since 1994. I think the real key here is
going back to what was already alluded to and articulated and
that is the point of origin control and better advance
information on what is in the containers before they get here,
and we all know that is a much better answer than trying to
increase the container inspections once the Trojan horse is in
town, so to speak.
SCREENING SHIP'S CREW MEMBERS
Senator Murray. Admiral Brown, even though you now require
ships to submit the names of their crew members 96 hours before
they arrive, the Coast Guard cannot actually check all of those
names against the necessary watch lists and clear each crew
member before the ship arrives in port. Has this generally been
the case in the Puget Sound as well?
Admiral Brown. I would like to defer that to Captain Moore
who works more specifically, but we have set up a national,
centralized region where we collect all of the information, and
what it does for us is it gives us patterns that we can look at
and see what the anomalies are. As to specifics, I would have
to defer to Captain Moore.
Senator Murray. Captain Moore.
Captain Moore. Certainly when we kicked off the 96 hours
and received all those names, particularly of cruise ships
where you have a large number of crew, processing that data was
quite problematic. We put a lot of folks in place here locally,
to share locally with INS and Customs alone with a national
effort that was under way, and I know that they are checking an
increasing number and an increasing percentage of those names,
because of repeat crew names and so forth, and they are getting
a lot more efficient at the national level. We have decided
here locally to continue our local efforts on full sharing of
lists in advance of arrival of a vessel in as a check and
balance of the national system as it gets more completely up
and running and more efficient.
Senator Murray. But we do not check every name?
Captain Moore. We check every name here locally. The
challenge is when you have cruises that are under 96 hours back
and forth, ferry operations or cruise ship operations that are
to and from Canada. However, I cannot say from the 96 hours out
before they come into our waters, that we've had a hundred
percent sharing of information locally with INS and Customs
while the national system has done what it has done.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Senator Murray. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we
receive cargo in Puget Sound from Nations that do have known
terrorist activity, Nations like Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines. Many individuals who are concerned with port
security have said that we need to extend our borders to
foreign Nations. I've heard that here today as well, and by
that they mean that we must take measures to ensure that ships
and cruise and cargo are safe when they leave their ports of
origin, not when they come into the United States waters.
Admiral Brown, I guess I want to ask you and Mr. Hardy how
we can realistically depend on all the Nations that send us
cargo here to protect our securities to our standards.
Admiral Brown. Madame Chairman, I would answer by saying we
have established an international relationship, and we have an
international maritime history through our International
Maritime Organization, (IMO) and that issue has already been
raised in terms of trusted partners in validating the integrity
of the cargo that is being forwarded. So that would be my
response in terms of how we would go about it. That would be
through our IMO association where the Coast Guard has--
Senator Murray. Does that include Indonesia and the
Philippines as well?
Admiral Brown. I do not know. I would have to get back to
you for the record. I do not know.
Senator Murray. Mr. Hardy, do you want to comment on this?
Mr. Hardy. Specifically involving those countries, we have
no plans right now for interchange of Customs Officers or
information. We are testing our systems with Canada. We are
seeking, we are talking to Rotterdam and Singapore, because
those are major transit ports from shipments from those
countries, and that is our first cut is to take the bigger
locations.
Now, on the other side, I am sure there is diplomatic work
being done, and we are trying to deploy attaches to get a
better understanding how they do business in those countries.
The important point for us is we are not abandoning the
traditional methods that we have here, the tiered approach, the
databases that we have, the canine deployment and the
detection, but yes, we are.
Senator Murray. You are talking about in addition to what
we already do?
Mr. Hardy. Right.
Senator Murray. But are you talking about having your
Customs Officers at those ports, yourselves, or you are using
people from their ports to do this?
Mr. Hardy. Well, what we are testing now working with the
Canadians is having a U.S. Officer in Canada. We are also going
to take that out, we have them at Vancouver and Halifax and
Montreal. We are seeing what kind of information the Canadians
have to share with us, so that we can possibly do a better job.
We are going on an outreach to Rotterdam and Singapore to do
the same things, and those are the major transit ports for
containers through those two major ports.
Senator Murray. And you are talking about having United
States Customs Services at those points?
Mr. Hardy. Yes.
Senator Murray. Captain Moore, the Coast Guard has been
very successful with its Port State Control Program in holding
Nations accountable who do not comply with our safety
requirements. We do this by scrutinizing ships from
questionable Flag States with extra inspections before they are
allowed to enter the port or transfer cargo.
Do you see any potential for using similar methods to force
countries to implement stronger security measures and controls
at the point of origin so that ships can be precleared before
they enter United States waters?
Captain Moore. Absolutely, Senator, I think that falls into
the concept of fast track, slow track. You will get less
inspections if you have a safe record. I do not think we will
ever guarantee that we are not going to board somebody, but
certainly those that have a good track record know that they
can probably come in and have less chance of being delayed.
Here, we put a security matrix in place in the aftermath of
9/11, and we have continued to use it, and that is in addition
to what we are directed to do by Washington, D.C., and it is
essentially the same kind of port. It is really Port State
Control plus, the plus part being the security part, screening
vessels for the areas of risk and deciding to board vessels.
We have essentially doubled our numbers of boardings since
9/11. I suspect that exact same evolution is going to play out
in terms of those that are going to have problems are going to
recognize that they are going to get boarded by either the
cargo they carry or where they are coming from or some of the
crew that are, because I think they figured out why some of
those crew are being targeted. I think that same thing is
playing out.
NAVAL FORCE PROTECTION
Senator Murray. Very good. Admiral Smith, providing force
protection for our naval assets in Puget Sound is a critical
priority, but I am equally concerned about the burden that is
being placed on the Coast Guard to protect our Navy assets at
the same time as they are being required to address many of our
other security needs. The Commander in Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, Admiral Fargo, echoed my concern in response to a letter
that I wrote him several months ago, and he responds to my
letter by assigning five force protection units to the region
including 200 personnel and four vessels. Have these units been
permanently assigned to Puget Sound and how have they helped
you to maintain that level of force protection that you need?
Admiral Smith. Madame Chairman, thank you for the question
and thank you for your support in other areas as well.
Throughout the region, in supporting naval facilities and other
security issues, those forces have been deployed for the
region, and by those forces being deployed to the region, they
have relieved the pressure on the Coast Guard so that the Coast
Guard could go back and do those other missions that are so
critical to this area. What the Coast Guard is providing today
compared to what they were providing on 9/11 is almost nothing
more than our coordination that we do each day.
Now, the Coastal Warfare Unit with their 251 people, their
headquarters element is right here in the Coast Guard building
here at pier 36, and they are deployed throughout the Puget
Sound region, primarily in Navy venues, but that has relieved
the Coast Guard from providing the waterside security in those
areas. So those assets are now returned back to the Coast Guard
to go back out to the other ports to do other things.
Senator Murray. Part of that assignment included the two
Cyclone Class Patrol ships that were placed around the Tacoma-
California command of the Coast Guard, I believe. Has this
arrangement worked out to the satisfaction of everybody and
will we continue to see that kind of cooperation?
Admiral Smith. Currently there is one Cyclone Patrol Craft
that is here in the Pacific Northwest. Commander Naval Surface
Forces Pacific Fleet is looking at an alternative as to how we
can get more assets to the Pacific Northwest when it comes to
Coastal Patrol Craft. They are ideally suited for this mission,
the escort mission that the Coast Guard has now picked up by
those assets, and those assets are also supporting the Coast
Guard with some of their border patrols, and because of
inclement weather and other things, those craft are also
picking up that role, but yes, ma'am, those assets are tacked
onto the Coast Guard. There are 13 of those assets in the
United States Navy, and all 13 are tacked onto the Coast Guard.
Senator Murray. Is there any chance that those assets are
going to be moved out of Puget Sound?
Admiral Smith. There is a current effort to move some of
them to the Puget Sound.
Senator Murray. Currently here, and not away?
Admiral Smith. Yes.
Senator Murray. Okay, Mr. Coleman, let me turn to you. Ship
crew lists are now transmitted to INS 96 hours in advance of
ship arrivals. What is your agency doing with that information?
Mr. Coleman. We run the names through our databases. We
have increased requirements given the visa waiver part of that
process. The Coast Guard is doing more than just giving us the
lists now. They are helping us. They put out internal guidance
in their maritime law enforcement handbook. We run as many
people through those lists as we can so we have as much advance
information on the travelers as we can. You alluded to what is
going on in the Puget Sound with the ferries. We are getting
more cooperation from Victoria Clipper, Coho, are working more
with them because of the short time frames involved. There are
increased requirements, and they understand that. I believe
they are trying to work with us more, but there are some
hurdles that we have to get through.
Senator Murray. Last week in Virginia, I understand that
some Pakistani crew members were allowed to disembark their
ship and promptly disappeared and did not return. Some of the
names of those individuals were later found to be suspects by
other Federal agencies. What is the likelihood that a similar
situation could occur here in Puget Sound?
Mr. Coleman. The Seattle District enjoys a very robust
system for distributing policy, and our communications within
the district are very strong. They are very tight. When that
episode happened, we went so far as to try to find an inspector
in our ranks that did not know that policy, that did not
understand the rules that we are operating on, and we found
ourselves to be in really good shape. We have strong
communication, lines of communication in the District, and we
have very effective command controls.
Senator Murray. What rules are you referring to?
Mr. Coleman. The policies that INS have regarding visa
waiver and those things that are very much aware to us and our
staff. We use them very effectively, and I am just reporting
that the Seattle District was in good shape regarding that
policy.
Senator Murray. Let me ask you as well, passenger lists are
handled differently. They are not required to be transmitted,
as you just referred to a second ago, for cruise ships but
lists are voluntarily transmitted to INS. Are you or any other
agency currently prescreening passengers that arrive on cruise
ships?
Mr. Coleman. We prescreen the large crew ships that come to
us. We get some of that information.
Senator Murray. Some of that information.
Mr. Coleman. Well, it is, the cruise ship industry exploded
in Seattle really just last year, and it is increasing even
this year, but the Coast Guard provides us information, and we
run it the best we can through our data bases in advance.
Senator Murray. Right now, for all airplane passengers, all
passengers are screened. Why are we not doing the same thing
for cruise ships?
Mr. Coleman. The Customs Service issues that directive, and
I believe they have the primary jurisdiction on the issuing the
requirements to the traveling industry. I would defer to Tom on
that.
Senator Murray. He is delighted that you referred that to
him.
Mr. Hardy. I have not boned up on that too much, other than
the fact that we are moving to the cruise ship venue, and other
forms of transportation in terms of the advanced passenger
information system, but we will get you that information for
the record.
Senator Murray. I would appreciate that, as soon as you can
do that. As we sort through this transportation security maze,
one of my biggest concerns has been and will continue to be the
easy target presented by our public mass transportation system.
Our ferry system here in Washington State carries over 11
million vehicles and 26 million people annually, and improving
security on our ferries presents many of the same challenges as
improving security on our commercial ships. We want tighter
security, but we do not want to slow that traffic down.
So Mr. Thorne, you mentioned that you heightened your
security procedures at your terminals and on board your vessels
as well. Can you tell us what specific measures you have
implemented that you can talk about in this setting today?
Mr. Thorne. Yes, Madame Chair. Specifically we have
established with the Coast Guard and with the Washington State
Patrol the security system that we are using which includes,
for an example, I've mentioned since September 11, there had
been an additional $2 million committed where State patrol
members are present on the terminals and on the vessels. In
addition to that, we have been trying to develop a system
taking advantage of what Federal and other agency information
we can get to help us target our security efforts, and in my
comments I try to refer to the fact, if there is a need, the
need is taking advantage of the information that rests in
various agencies, but getting that consolidated so that we know
how to target our security plan, and I would tell you that that
in my mind is where some of the additional needs are. If there
is a hole in the plan, the plan is how do we take advantage of
the information that may rest in other agencies to make sure
that we--
Senator Murray. Are the other agencies talking to you at
the current time?
Mr. Thorne. Yes, we are working with the agencies; as I
said, the Coast Guard, the Washington State Patrol and the
ferries have a Security Committee now. In addition to that we
are talking advantage of other information. I am simply
suggesting that as we go forward the flow of information from,
whether it is the FBI or wherever, and the ability to be able
to be aware of where the security breaches may potentially come
is where I think the real focus needs to be.
Senator Murray. Admiral Brown, do you have any suggestions
on how we can achieve better security on ferries, and/or what
the Washington State ferries should be doing?
Admiral Brown. I would like to make some general comments
and ask Captain Moore to provide some more specific comments
based on his local experience working here with Washington
State ferries. This goes back to my opening comments about our
need to have tailored uniformity. We talk about uniqueness. We
have standards in place for our passenger vessels, cruise
liners, and we have right here in the State of Washington the
largest ferry system in the United States, but the requirements
are different though the threats and the consequences are no
different. So that is one of those examples that I've talked
about. Progress has been made. Things have been done, and I
would like to ask Mike Moore if he could speak to those.
Captain Moore. Yes, Senator, I have a couple of
suggestions. Certainly, early on our working relationship with
WSF was very dramatic and quick in terms of getting word out to
their crews, awareness is up, look for anomalous behavior,
where to report that, on-board procedures that are not suitable
to us to talk about in this open forum that were developed and
put in place on Washington State Ferries, certainly the
Washington State Patrol presence on board the vessels, the
level that that ought to happen in terms of on the terminals
and the vessels. Obviously it is hard to come up with an exact
right answer without specific threat information.
Likewise, the screening of folks coming on board or trucks
or autos, random, what percentage, how often, those kind of
questions remain to be fully answered. Certainly, some of those
screening, some of the screening activity took place, and I
think what Mr. Thorne is referring to is what are the specific
standards going to be along those lines. If we had just
established them early on 9/11, we likely would have shut down
the Washington State Ferries in terms of how fast can you come
up to screening 10 percent or 20 percent or 30 percent.
In fact, we took a target and an informed approach to using
the Washington State Patrol presence to do such a thing, and
now we have to move onto the next phase, which is establish
more consistent expectations and guidelines so they can plan by
budget and procedure to implement.
Senator Murray. Mr. Hardy, let me turn back to you. Earlier
this year, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security
testified about the administration's new smart border
declaration. This initiative is designed to expedite the travel
of cargo across the U.S./Canadian border. I am concerned about
cargo that is intended for the United States that will be sent
to Canadian ports instead of U.S. ports because the security
requirements in Canada will be more lax. How can you assure
this Subcommittee that containers coming into the United States
and into Canada and containers entering U.S. ports will be
subject to the exact same security requirements.
Mr. Hardy. Well, myself and others from our Headquarters
Office have been in fact been at all the key port cities. Our
commissioners had at least two meetings with his counterparts
on the shared border accord, and we are in lockstep in terms of
joint commitment to doing this. If all the perimeter approach
is accepted by both Nations, at least the Manley-Ridge
agreements indicate that, and our tests of putting a chief
inspector in Vancouver along with two other targeters from
Newark and Los Angeles, has been very successful, and
personally was looking at the different databases each has to
offer, both sets of officers are sharing that information,
looking at the same information that is coming in, bills of
lading. That type of information, the same thing is occurring
as of last week here in Seattle.
We have parallel ports out in Newark and Halifax and
Montreal doing similar work. We all think it is the same
threat. We are all looking at different information that each
country has. There are some sensitivities of, Canadians have
some databases that are sensitive in terms of their law and
they are trying to harmonize those laws through legislation, so
that they will be available to us for enforcement purposes.
Senator Murray. You talked earlier about this as well, part
of that Smart Border Declaration was placing U.S. Customs
officials in Canadian ports. Will containers that are entering
U.S. ports be more likely to be inspected by Customs and Coast
Guard than containers that have entered through Canada?
Mr. Hardy. I think the likelihood of examination is not
going to be prejudiced by who is asking for the exam. If the
Canadian officer wants to look at something, we will look at
it. If the U.S. officer wants to look at it, we will look at
it. That is another reason we are deploying more VACUS machines
even on the railheads coming in from Canada out in the midwest.
We will have an opportunity for a second chance at some x-rays
on rail if the shipments are moving quickly, and we still
identify something that has already left the port, we will have
another chance to get it when--
Senator Murray. When will those be in place?
Mr. Hardy. They will be in place beginning this summer,
they will deploy approximately eight of them over the next
year, 2003.
Senator Murray. Will the Custom's clearance process for
containers entering into Canada be just as long as the process
here in the United States?
Mr. Hardy. Long did you say?
Senator Murray. Time, in terms of time, will it take as
long?
Mr. Hardy. It should be similar, yes.
Senator Murray. Can we be assured of that?
Mr. Hardy. We are trying not to give one advantage to
another port, one port over another port.
Senator Murray. Will the ratio of U.S. Customs officers to
containers be the same for U.S. ports and Canadian ports?
Mr. Hardy. I do not have that information.
Senator Murray. I would actually like an answer to that
question, if you could get that back to me.
Mr. Hardy. I do have some information in the briefing book
coming back to the advanced information on cruise ships. It is
a volunteer program right now, and we are seeking legislation
for that. We have got the statement in here that indicates 70
percent compliance by the cruise ship industry in terms of
supplying information on their passengers.
Senator Murray. Very good. Let me go back to you again. One
of the great challenges in improving port security is enhancing
the quality and reliability of information about shippers and
cargo. I am especially concerned about the amount of cargo that
enters our ports with manifests that read ``Freight of all
kinds.'' Why are shippers allowed to be so vague in disclosing
what they are shipping?
Mr. Hardy. They are allowed to be vague, because there is
no criteria, there is no requirement for them to be more
specific. We have some requirements to, Customs does, to be
specific about this. There are several types of information
that is currently being allowed in terms of freight of all
kinds, general merchandise, and the U.S. Customs Service is
seeking some legislation to change that.
The difficulty lies in the proprietary. Some manifests are
subject to publicity. The newspapers can pick up that
information and send it and make it public, and that, of
course, exposes customers, buyers and sellers, and people, you
know, peruse those looking for business opportunities, and so
the shippers try to be as vague as they possibly can in order
to keep other businesses from taking their business.
The other part of this is the segment of the business known
as the NVOCCs which are non-vessel owned common carriers, are
allowed to manifest with less specific information, and that is
where we typically see that type of information, and we need to
tighten that up with some legislation.
Senator Murray. You do not have statutory authority to do
this?
Mr. Hardy. We do not believe that we have enough statutory
authority to do this. We have some information, or we have some
requirements on the carriers themselves, the ship owning
carriers to provide us proper manifest information and even
that is not specific enough for us, but the non-vessel owning
common carriers have less of a requirement.
Senator Murray. Captain Moore, let me turn back to you
again. Two weeks ago Admiral Pluta of the Coast Guard testified
that he is seeking international cooperation through the IMO
for new security issues. One issue that has received positive
support is the requirement to move up the deadline for the
slips to have automated information systems to 2004. This
relatively inexpensive technology allows ships to be identified
electronically by use of a transponder. Is your VTS ready to
handle this electronic information at this time, or by 2004?
Captain Moore. Senator, from a technology standpoint, some
adjustments would have to be made, but, of course, the unique
situation we have here is we do have some transponders from the
international tug system, Washington State ferries and some
tankers are already being received, as well as our radar data,
and I think the difference between this port and a few others,
and most other ports is that we do have a robust Vessel Traffic
Service with surveillance along with our Canadian counterparts,
and so when you look at the AIS system, and it is based on
radio transmission versus satellite, how far out can you reach
and obtain the data.
So I think that AIS will have great benefit where you do
not have Vessel Traffic Service. It will have some augmentation
benefit here, certainly, but less benefit here in that we
already have fully developed Vessel Traffic Service. I think
down the road, you will see more maritime domain awareness able
to reach out further than VHF or radio frequency transmissions
can take it.
Senator Murray. Admiral Brown?
Admiral Brown. Madame Chair, if I could add just one small
bit of information, in the President's request for the 2003
budget if approved as submitted, there is an opportunity for
our VTS to benefit in that regard, which would enhance the AIS
receptive capability.
Senator Murray. Some other ports have instituted
cooperative vessel information tracking systems that are, that
are already using the AIS. In fact, I know that Tampa, Florida
has cooperatively purchased transponders that all pilots hand-
carry onto the ships. Home ported ships have voluntarily
purchased AIS equipment. Is this something that would benefit
our existing VTS?
Captain Moore. Again, I think any time you can help track
where vessels are and help mariners make more informed
decisions about their vessel movements, it is an added value.
The robust VTS, again we know where the vessel you are talking
about the pilot vessel entered and participating in Vessel
Traffic Service. You go to say, the Columbia River, where you
do not have a Vessel Traffic Service, and you have AIS, or
transponders, they can see each other and the Coast Guard can
know where the vessels are. So you have to say that the benefit
in an area like that would be far greater than the added
benefit here, but it would not be as great where you do not
have that in place.
Senator Murray. Admiral Smith, would this capability be
something that would assist the Navy?
Admiral Smith. There is a very good system here except for
the Hood Canal. That is the only area we really do not have
covered.
Senator Murray. I believe you have stated that there are
areas around Navy installations that are not covered by AIS.
Admiral Smith. Yes, the Hood Canal and Indian Island are
not covered, but the primary approaches are covered. AIS would
be of benefit, but it would be limited benefit, but because it
is just a small, a couple of small areas that are not covered.
Senator Murray. Would the Navy be willing to invest in
expanded VTS coverage around those areas?
Admiral Smith. Ma'am, I cannot say on that one. I will take
that one back.
Senator Murray. I would appreciate that very much.
Captain Moore. Senator, could I add, where they share
information between ships, where you do not have a Vessel
Traffic Service, for instance offshore, up in some of our
northern areas near the San Juan Islands, our southern part of
the Puget Sound, we do not have a Vessel Tracking Service,
certainly AIS on vessels that would not otherwise be tracked
will add to the pretty comprehensive system, and certainly will
be a big benefit in other areas as well, both safety and for
tracking vessels for security concerns.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, and thank you to all
of our panelists. I appreciate your input on this.
We are now going to move to our second panel. So if you
would like to take a second to stand up and trade places, we
will move on.
We have a very distinguished second panel here. We want to
make sure that we have enough time for them to give their
statements, but before I do that, I just want to welcome
Lawrence Molloy, Port Commissioner. Welcome. It is good to have
you here, as well.
We will begin the second panel with Miss Andrea Riniker who
is the Executive Director of the Port of Tacoma. Andrea?
STATEMENT OF ANDREA RINIKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PORT
OF TACOMA, WASHINGTON
Ms. Riniker. Thank you so much. I think I have this system
down pat by now. Good afternoon, Senator Murray, and thank you
so very much for taking time to have a field hearing on this
important issue. My name is Andrea Riniker. I am here today
representing the Port of Tacoma.
As the port's executive director, balancing security with
the efficient flow of cargo across our docks is one of my
paramount concerns. Though ports have always devoted resources
to safety and protection of cargo, the industry now shares an
especially keen sense of responsibility with you, Congress and
other governmental entities in these challenging days since
September 11.
Before I begin my formal remarks, let me first put my
comments into some context by describing some of the port's key
attributes. The Port of Tacoma moved more than 1.3 million
containers across its docks in 2001, 70 percent of these
international containers holding products ranging from shoes to
machinery and lots of other things that we just heard about.
Our transfers from ships to trains are headed for markets in
the midwest and the east coast. Additionally, the Port of
Tacoma serves as the gateway to Alaska since over 75 percent of
the consumer goods that are bound for Alaska are transported on
the CFS and tote ships that call on Tacoma.
Another important distinction for our port is the fact that
it serves as one of the MARAD's 13 national strategic ports, a
designation that is really based on the load-out capabilities
the Port of Tacoma provides for facilities at Fort Lewis.
With nearly 102,000 jobs in Washington State related to
activities at the Port and with the Port of Seattle and the
Port of Tacoma working together, we clearly are major economic
drivers here in the Pacific Northwest. The Port of Tacoma
appreciates the opportunity today to share our perspective on
securing our Nation's seaports. It is certainly getting to be a
daunting challenge.
In my short time before you today, I would like to leave
you with essentially three key messages. One, that to us the
coordination between Federal agencies and with all aspects of
the transportation system as we work on these issues is
absolutely imperative.
Two, that the efficient movement of freight is essential to
our economy, not just here in the region, but of course, in the
Nation and the world, so that safety measures must be
integrated into our port operations.
And third, that the ultimate responsibility, of course, for
safeguarding our Nation's transportation system of which ports
represent a small, but economically crucial segment must lie
with the Federal Government.
Now, let me expand for a moment on those three. First, I
want to recognize the tremendous progress that has already
occurred in the enormous task in coordinating the myriad of
agencies, governments, ports, transportation interests at the
national level, and at the local levels. I would like to
acknowledge the leadership, particularly of the U.S. Coast
Guard that they have displayed, and our appreciation for the
other agencies that have also worked hand-in-hand with the
ports.
However, despite the positive interactions between the port
and the individual agencies and among the ports, some
fundamental questions exist about how the lines of
responsibility are actually meshing at the national level.
Congress can really assist these important coordination efforts
by further clarifying agencies' responsibilities and roles, and
alleviating any potential for obstructive turf wars.
It is also very important, I think, for Congress to make
sure that these agencies with their newly enhanced
responsibilities are sufficiently funded. Coordination within
the port industry is also critical. The ports of Seattle,
Everett and Tacoma have just submitted a joint grant proposal
seeking funds to better protect our ports, and to improve the
flow of information between the ports and the Coast Guard.
The $93.3 million in grants that Congress approved last
year is certainly a good start toward enabling ports to meet
the Coast Guard's interim regulations. As Congress considers
comprehensive port security legislation later this year, we
urge you to continue making general treasury funds available to
ports for these purposes.
Congress will hopefully avoid the temptation of attaching
fees to the movement of containers in order to fund security
improvements. Such approaches unfairly penalize steamship lines
and other businesses when in reality, the end user who benefits
from the movement of containers is ultimately each and every
one of us who is purchasing these products when they arrive on
the shelf.
Additionally, we must take care to avoid the creation of
competitive advantages, the ones that you were discussing
previously for our neighbor ports in Canada. We are happy to
compete on a level playing field, but let us not try to tilt it
through regulation.
Before I close, I want to comment on the unique nature of
the intermodal cargo that is the real niche for the ports of
Tacoma and Seattle. As I noted earlier, the Port of Tacoma
moved more than 1.3 million containers in 2001, and the Port of
Seattle moved a similar amount. Market trends indicate that
these volumes will double in the next 20 years. Establishing
technologies and processes that can efficiently confirm the
contents of containers is crucial to this mission.
We recognize the ultimate solutions lie in standardized
international port-of-origin controls. In the long-term,
technology will inform us of what is in a container at the time
the container is loaded and will allow us to track its
movements over the ocean or across town. We will have the
capability of knowing through electronic seals and other
devices whether tampering has occurred en route, and final
destination ports will be equipped with sensors to detect any
abnormalities before a container is ever brought on land. Some
of these technologies exist today and others are being
developed. It will be essential for Congress, ports and the
entire international transportation system to focus together in
addressing this significant challenge.
The events of September 11 have certainly put us all in a
pretty steep learning curve. We have reached a better
understanding of which safety improvements can occur quickly
and which ones will require worldwide cooperation. We know more
needs to be done to identify the contents of containers and to
ensure safety controls are in place at the port--point of
origin. As a Nation we have come to better understand the
complexities of the international transportation web and our
economy's absolute dependence on this seamless flow of
commerce.
The Port of Tacoma deeply appreciates your leadership in
this important arena and for convening the hearing today. I am
certainly looking forward to working with you as we continue to
address these important issues.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Ms. Riniker. I will introduce
Mr. Steve Sewell, Managing Director and Executive Director of
the Port of Seattle.
STATEMENT OF STEVE SEWELL, DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, PORT OF SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Mr. Sewell. Thank you, Madame Chair, and we do appreciate
your willingness to take the time to meet with us this
afternoon and listen to us this afternoon, and especially
appreciate your leadership over the past few months on this
issue.
As you know, the Port of Seattle is one of the major
container ports in the United States. We handled over $32
billion in foreign trade last year, which is the fifth largest
amount in the United States, and together with the Port of
Tacoma, we formed the third largest load center for
containerized cargo in the United States.
In addition, as several people in the previous panel
mentioned, we have a fast growing cruise industry, and expect
that to expand exponentially in the next few years, and we have
a downtown area which is somewhat unique to ports in the United
States, where we have 180,000 people working within close
proximity to our terminals on a daily basis, and as Mr. Thorne
mentioned, 11 million passengers annually through Elliot Bay on
ferries. So all these things mean that we, I think, here, need
to pay special attention to the issues of seaport security.
I want to talk briefly on four points. First, the
distinction, I guess, between cargo security and seaports or
port security, which I think you are well aware of. Secondly
and briefly, because you and Mr. Hardy I think had a good
exchange on the issues of Canada and equal enforcement in
Canada and the United States, so I will touch on that very
briefly. Third, one item on cruise ships that I think needs to
be addressed and probably is maybe not as visible as some
others, and finally a couple of comments on potential
legislation coming out of Congress.
First, seaport security versus cargo security. We are
initially as you know and in part of our grant application that
we made jointly with the Port of Tacoma and the Port of
Everett, looking at some of the, I guess, one would say easier
things to do, that is sort of the perimeter security and
hardening of security within the port area, whether that be
security cameras or access controls or additional police
presence.
The real issue as many have said today though is the
security of the cargo, itself, which is only touched by the
port at one point in that change of distribution, and many have
talked about the need to deal with that issue, and I think that
certainly this should be the primary focus for the Federal
Government, and it is something that is going to require
Federal oversight and Federal intervention, and I think as
Andrea has said, certainly requires clarity as to the agency
that is going to be ultimately accountable and responsibility
for making that origin to destination security logistics chain
secure. It can be done. It is a long process, and I think that
some of your questions were very good.
I think it is going to require some new and creative
thinking I think in the areas of technology, and what
information can and should be shared, both the commercial side
and the intelligence side, and then I think a real major effort
in terms of international diplomacy and international
negotiation is going to be required by the U.S. government.
Briefly on the Canadian issue which I think you are well
aware of based on your questions and Mr. Hardy's responses, I
think it is very, it is encouraging that there is this
reciprocal deployment of Customs agents in Seattle and in
Vancouver and also the east coast, but I think you are right to
ask the questions, and we certainly will be looking to make
sure that the Customs clearance procedures are the same in both
places. I think it is important to say that yes, we are
concerned about competition, but in a way that is almost a
secondary concern, because if we do not have the same kind of
security in Canada that we have in the United States, it will
be an incentive, not just for legal commerce, but for illegal
activities to go across those borders and into the United
States, and that is the reason why I think we need to be
continuing to work with our bordering countries, particularly
Canada, to make sure that that does not happen.
Cruise ships as is mentioned, we are seeing a tremendous
growth, and we have worked very closely with Customs and INS,
and they've done a good job in dealing with what was really
unexpected. It is exciting to us, but unexpected growth in that
business. One of the things that has been most troublesome for
all of us to deal with is on-the-water presence at a Level III
Security.
We do need to have presence on the water, law enforcement
presence, and although we were able to handle that via a number
of different local law enforcement agencies last year and will
be able to do that next year, in the end we see that as a
Federal responsibility. The Coast Guard clearly does not have
the resources at this time to do that, although they do provide
that kind of on-water presence in other parts of the country.
They are underfunded in that area as they are in other areas,
and we think in the long-term that should be based on the
intelligence and training required for that mission should be a
Coast Guard function.
Finally, with regard to legislation, we are pleased to see
that legislation is moving through both the Senate and the
House, and I think that the common thing in both of those
pieces of legislation that we like to see is something that
Admiral Brown mentioned and that is that there is a clear
standard be set up but with some flexibility locally to
implement that standard based on the conditions in a particular
port. That is important.
I think another thing that is important is that we act
carefully, but also act quickly, particularly because we need
to make sure that our ports are secure, but also many of us are
beginning to make substantial investments, and we do not want
to make investments that will become obsolete or not useful
once Federal legislation is in place, so the sooner the better
on that, and finally as my colleague from Tacoma said, we
really do need to make sure that if it can be done at the
administration level that Congress weighs in very heavily on
who is ultimately accountable for making sure that our ports
are secure.
Finally, a couple of comments. One, were I not leaving the
port, I would be the chair of the American Association of Port
Authorities next year. We are fortunate that John Moore of the
Port of Everett will be taking that position, and I urge you to
work closely with that association. They are very closely in
tune with the comments that Miss Riniker and I have said today,
and we are fortunate to have someone locally to be heading up
that association next year.
And I would just concur, we did coordinate as we
coordinated our application, we coordinated our comments so as
to not hit the same points, but we concur completely with what
Tacoma has said, particularly on the issues as I mentioned of
the clarity of Federal responsibility.
And also just touching on funding very briefly, it is
important that we, that this be funded. It is also important
that a single industry not bear the burden for what is in
essence similar to national defense, or how we fund the armed
forces. With that, thank you, and I would be happy to answer
any questions later.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Sewell. We will
move to Mr. Charles Wellins, Director, Pacific Northwest
Region, Maersk, Incorporated.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES WELLINS, DIRECTOR, PACIFIC
NORTHWEST REGION, MAERSK, INC.
Mr. Wellins. Good afternoon, Senator Murray. My name is
Charles Wellins. I am a director of Northwest Activities for
Maersk, Inc. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before all
of you today.
As you may know, Maersk Sea-Land has a significant global,
national and regional presence. In 2001 our fleet of 250 plus
ships made approximately 20,000 port calls throughout the
world. We have a presence in more than 100 countries. A Maersk
Sea-Land vessel is in and out of a U.S. harbor every day of the
week. On a global basis we make approximately 55 individual
port calls per day. The public generally recognizes us as a
global carrier. We also have a number of highly successful
companies involved in transportation of containers including
trucking companies, terminal operations and logistics.
Last year Maersk Sea-Land moved approximately 144,000
containers through the Port of Tacoma, while our terminal
company in Tacoma handled approximately 270,000 containers. We
have more than 130 offices and a terminal presence in every
major U.S. port, and we have invested hundreds of millions of
dollars in the United States infrastructure.
I would like to offer some brief general comments on port
security today. Port security is a complex and enormously
challenging issue. We appreciate, as do other carriers in our
industry, that enhanced port security is a permanent part of
our business process. As a company, Maersk Sea-Land made
substantial security investments prior to 9/11 primarily for
drug interdiction and theft protection purposes, but not to
prevent acts of terrorism. To respond as best we can, we have
recently initiated comprehensive security guidelines for our
fleet of ships and are currently in the process of addressing
this matter with other business units. We are not anti-
terrorist experts, however, given the existing pool of security
knowledge and our means, we are taking every available
initiative to voluntarily do what we can to enhance security
for our personnel, our ships, terminals and trucks, and to
protect the integrity of our customers' cargo.
Congress will inevitably enact legislation before
adjourning this year, and regulatory authorities feel the need
to take unilateral action to protect America's ports and
infrastructure. We share your goal to protect our ports. Our
industry, however, requires an international solution so that
the same security processes used in the United States are also
used in other countries where containers originate. By
international agreement, legislation or regulation, port
security requires, one, a process that allows government
authorities to detect and intercept security risks from a
container's port of origin through its final destination, and
two, a process to ensure the efficient route of that container
under all security conditions.
I would like to offer eight specific viewpoints. One,
security must facilitate the movement of trade. We must develop
and protect the system that facilitates international trade
even in the event of a terrorist incident. This is not a
maritime security issue, per se, but a matter of affecting
global commerce and the world economy. We ask Congress to make
certain the Federal Government has a strategy and a capability
to ensure that the container trade continues to be expedited
through U.S. ports should a terrorist incident occur.
Terrorists reach their ultimate objective by freezing the U.S.
economy.
Point two, mandatory security requirements. Explicit
mandatory rules are needed so that each entity in the supply
chain understands their obligations to preserve the integrity
of the container. We strongly support voluntary programs such
as those being pursued by Customs. In some cases, however,
mandatory requirements are necessary so that the security and
integrity of the container is not dictated by the marketplace.
Point three, container information. Government officials
view timely receipt of information as being the first layer of
defense against terrorism, so that they can detect an anomaly
and respond accordingly, and we agree. Congress needs to
appropriate sufficient revenue to data systems that accomplish
this objective. Congress also needs to specify which Federal
agency will be responsible for this function, and identify a
date when such a system must be fully functional. It is
important to note that carriers do not generate container
information. It is provided to them by the cargo interest.
In the future, we believe all information must be
transmitted electronically. It must be transmitted wherever the
container is stuffed, its doors are closed and sealed. Such
information must be transmitted before containers are loaded on
ships. The government should specify the type of security
sensitive information it needs in addition to the manifest, and
complete information must be supplied to the carrier for
documentation purposes.
Point four, port security grants. The fiscal year 2002
Department of Defense Appropriations Act included $93.3 million
for the newly established Transportation Security
Administration, aka TSA, to award grants for financing the cost
of enhancing the facility and operating security. This level of
funding appears insufficient for industry needs today. Perhaps
the single most important step that the committee could
undertake after this hearing is to appropriate more funding for
this important endeavor. Recent grant applications should
provide the committee an appropriate benchmark of necessary
appropriations for the future.
Point five, protecting the supply chain. Protecting the
supply chain is another important and challenging part of port
security. It starts by information being transmitted at the
factory, point of origin or consolidation and continues to the
destination. All entities must assume responsibility for the
security and integrity of the container: vendors, third-party
logistics providers and consolidators, truckers, rail, terminal
operators and carrier links. The integrity of the container
must be maintained.
Point six, container tracking. Container seals should be
subject to an internationally tested and acceptable standard.
We support a legal requirement that the cargo of interest seal
a container after it is loaded, and the seal number be recorded
on the relevant shipping documents; that seals need to be
checked at the various interchange points to ensure integrity;
and that procedures be established for when a loaded container
is received with no seal or a broken seal. We do not believe
that empty containers should be sealed.
Point seven, container inspection. It is not feasible or
even necessary to inspect every container entering or leaving
from a U.S. port. The use of nonintrusive inspection equipment
is increasing; however, comprehensive information about the
contents of the container will allow the government to target
which containers warrant such inspection. Advanced security
information is the first layer of defense and is the best way
to detect an anomaly before the container is loaded on the
ship.
Point eight, personnel port security. To the extent
background checks are required by law, one, the government
should assume this responsibility, not the employer, and two,
one security card should be issued by the government so that
appropriate truck terminal and ship personnel have access to
security sensitive areas.
In summary, port security grants are enormously important
and to make the most notable near-term impact by enhancing on
Tacoma, other ports in the States, and ports nationwide, we
encourage the subcommittee to give this matter further
consideration.
You have been very generous with your time. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear today.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Wellins. We will
move to Mr. Richard Softye, Vice President of Compliance
Programs, Holland America Line.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD SOFTYE, VICE PRESIDENT, COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS, HOLLAND AMERICA LINE
Mr. Softye. Good afternoon, Senator. For the record, my
name is Rich Softye. I am the Vice President, Compliance
Programs, for Holland America Line, and will be testifying on
behalf of Holland America and the International Council of
Cruise Lines. I have written testimony that I have submitted
for the record and will summarize in this oral statement.
Holland America Line is a member of the International
Council of Cruise Lines which is a North American industry
trade organization representing 16 of the world's largest
cruise vessel operators. Last year, ICCL members carried over 7
million passengers on over 90 ships calling at ports around the
world. The majority of these passengers were carried out of
U.S. ports, and a majority of those from the ports of Miami and
Fort Lauderdale. This coming year, I am pleased to say that the
departures will increase over previous years, as Steve has
already pointed out.
From previous testimony by Admiral Brown, you already know
that passenger ships and terminals are required to have
comprehensive security plans that are acceptable to the United
States Coast Guard. Holland America Line and the other ICCL
members worked closely with the Coast Guard a number of years
ago to provide a security plan template for use by our members
to assure that each of these plans contain the required
information in similar format to ensure consistency and
thoroughness. Because of these plans and the industry's
existing security posture on September 11, this industry was
able to immediately increase its security measures to the
highest level. In addition, ICCL initiated daily telephone
conference calls between cruise companies, security and
operations managers and government agencies. Participants
included Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command, Coast Guard Pacific
Area Command, Coast Guard headquarters, Coast Guard marine
safety offices, the Department of Transportation S-60 unit,
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service and other
agencies and port representatives as needed. Again, the purpose
was to modernize actions around the country, facilitate ship
relocations when the Port of New York was closed to cruise
ships, identify best practices for use for everyone, to share
information and control rumors and to standardize requirements
and procedures.
I was personally one of those representatives at the front
line of those conference calls and our front line facilitator
responsible for stepping up responsibility, relocating ships to
alternative ports and ensuring the consistent safety and
security of our passengers, not only here, but around the
world.
I have mentioned modernization and consistency. These
elements are absolutely critical to the success of all efforts
addressing terminal, ship, passenger and crew security. We are
currently working with the Coast Guard at several levels to
identify and implement a long-term security posture, that is
not only high, but is also sustainable, one that is flexible
enough to meet the demands of each of the unique ports that we
visit, either as a turn-around port, Seattle being an example,
or as a port of call. Because Holland America Line and the
other members of ICCL will travel worldwide, it is important to
assure that appropriate and adequate security is provided at
each port of call in whichever country we visit.
To assist in obtaining a consistency around the world, ICCL
has recently sent a letter to all Caribbean States and other
regions urging a review and timely upgrade of security at these
ports. We have and will continue to participate fully in the
U.S. Coast Guard initiative at the International Maritime
Organization to develop worldwide security regulations and
guidelines.
All ICCL members continue to operate at the highest level
of security. The visible measures a passenger will see in
arriving for a cruise ship actually in some ports exceed those
of airports. Not only are passengers and hand-held items
screened by metal detectors, all baggage, 100 percent is
screened by X-ray, hand searched, explosive sniffing dogs or
other methods. All stores coming on board are screened, and all
personnel, passengers, crew, and visitors are thoroughly
identified and vetted before boarding. Passenger lists with
pertinent information are provided to the Coast Guard, Customs
and INS at least 96 hours in advance for their screening.
Wayside, terminal and border side security where necessary is
coordinated with the Coast Guard and other Federal, State and
local authorities.
A lot has been done since September 11 and a lot remains to
be done. Let me assure you that Holland America Line and the
other ICCL cruise line members will be at the forefront of
these activities, in the development and implementation of
technologies and striving in partnership with responsible
agencies to assure that cruising remains a safe and secure
vacation option. I will be pleased to answer any questions you
may have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Softye
Mr./Ms. Chairman, my name is Richard Softye. I am the Vice
President Compliance Programs for Holland America Line. I am pleased to
appear before you today regarding security at our Nations seaports. I
am here not only to testify on behalf of Holland America Line but also
the industry and its trade association the International Council of
Cruise Lines.
The cruise industry was shocked and deeply saddened by the attack
on America and the tremendous loss of life that resulted from this
national tragedy. In light of these recent events, we are continuing
operations at a very high level of security and ICCL, together with our
cruise lines member operators, are working with all appropriate
Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure that traveling Americans
are protected to the maximum extent possible.
ICCL is a non-profit trade association that represents the
interests of l6 of the largest cruise lines operating in the North
American cruise market and over 73 Associate Member companies that are
cruise industry business partners and suppliers. ICCL member cruise
lines serve major ports in the United States and call on more than 400
ports around the world. Last year, ICCL's member lines carried more
than 7 million passengers on 95 vessels.
I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today
to review and discuss our industry's efforts to ensure the safety and
security of all of our passengers and crew. The cruise industry's
highest priority is to ensure the safety and security of its
passengers. A cruise ship is unique in that it is inherently secure
because it is a controlled environment with limited access. In order to
maintain this secure environment, cruise lines have established strict
and highly confidential ship security procedures that meet or exceed
strict ship and passenger terminal security procedures that are set
forth by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and by the
comprehensive regulations established by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).
In the United States, the USCG oversees the enforcement of these
security measures. Regulations address both passenger ship and
passenger terminal security and outline methods to deter unlawful
activities onboard passenger vessels.
The l986 IMO Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers
and Crew address concepts such as: restricting entry to sensitive
locations including the ship's navigation bridge and the terminal's
security control center for example; monitoring the flow of materials
and consumable supplies brought onboard a ship; and providing perimeter
security around the terminal and ship. Security procedures within these
measures include the use of metal detectors, x-ray machines and other
screening techniques to prevent unauthorized entry or carriage of
weapons onboard.
In l996, the USCG implemented an Interim Final Rule on Security for
Passenger Vessels and Passenger Terminals, which was finalized in
October of l999. These regulations require ship and passenger terminal
operators to submit comprehensive security plans to the USCG for review
and acceptance. In this regard, the plans for all ICCL member lines
have been submitted and accepted by the USCG. The security plans, which
are sensitive law enforcement documents and therefore not available to
the public, include the following major components:
--Identification of three levels of security and specific procedures
to implement and follow at each level
--Procedures to prevent or deter unlawful acts onboard
--Procedures to prevent or deter introduction onboard of weapons and
other unauthorized items
--Procedures to prevent and or deter unauthorized access to vessels
and restricted areas
--Designation of an onboard Security Officer
--Security training for all crew members
--Procedures for coordinating the ship security plan with the
terminal security plan
--Directions and procedures for reporting of violations and unlawful
acts
--Annual security audits for each ship
--Review of security plan amendments and security plan implementation
by the USCG
Passenger vessel security plans and their amendments are reviewed
by USCG Headquarters and examinations are conducted by the local
Captain of the Port to verify that all security practices and
procedures are effective, up-to-date, and are being followed.
As a result of this extensive security planning, the cruise
industry was one segment of the transportation industry that was able
to immediately move to a heightened security posture as a result of the
attacks on September 11, 2001. While implementation of Level III
security, the highest level of security, was directed by the U.S. Coast
Guard at U.S. ports, ICCL member operators reported that they
implemented security measures consistent with this declaration even
before it was ordered.
Security measures at U.S. cruise terminals, and onboard ICCL member
cruise ships remain at Level III--the highest possible. Passenger
vessel security measures include passenger-screening procedures which
are similar to but actually exceed those found at airports. This
includes 100 percent screening of all passenger baggage, carry-on
luggage, ship stores and cargo, and also includes higher levels of
screening of passenger identification. Official passenger lists are
carefully reviewed and proper identification is ensured before anyone
is allowed to board the vessel. Even before the attacks of September
11, and as a result of long standing memorandums of understanding, all
passenger lists were made available to the INS and Customs for
screening. Passenger identification is now subject to even stricter
scrutiny and the industry is working closely with the INS and other
Federal agencies to ensure that any passenger suspected of being on any
agency's' lookout list are reported to the Federal authorities for
further action.
Another component of Level III Security requires ship operators to
restrict access to authorized personnel and to identify restricted
areas on the vessel that require positive access control such as
intrusion alarms, guards, or other measures to prevent unauthorized
entry. Restricted areas on a vessel will include the bridge, the engine
room, and other areas throughout the ship where operations are
conducted. Other onboard security measures, not generally discussed for
obvious reasons, are employed to maximize shipboard security and to
deter unauthorized entry and illegal activity. Every vessel has a
trained security staff responsible for monitoring activities and
responding to any suspicious activity that may jeopardize the safety of
the passengers and crew.
For many years, the cruise industry has been pro-active in
developing effective security measures and has looked for ways to
increase passenger safety. In fact, most ICCL member lines now utilize
advanced technologies to control access to our vessels. The Passenger
Access Control System, that has been installed on many of our members'
vessels, utilizes a passenger identification card that incorporates a
picture of the passenger that is taken at the time of boarding. This
picture and other passenger identification information and cruise
information is placed into an onboard computer system. During the
course of a cruise, the identification card is presented each time a
passenger departs or boards the vessel. The picture appears on a
computer screen that is matched against the person's face for
identification purposes before they are allowed to board the ship. The
card can also be used for room access and for onboard purchases. This
new technology is only part of an overall onboard security system that
further enhances the proper identification of all passengers and crew
boarding the vessel.
Since 1998, ICCL and its member operators have been members of the
U.S. Interagency Task Force on Passenger Vessel Security. This group,
which includes representatives from the Departments of Transportation,
Defense, State, and the U.S. Coast Guard and others, meets every 60
days to discuss emerging security issues, receive updated threat
information, and address specific security concerns. Starting on
September 12, the ICCL Security Directors and Operations Managers
teleconferenced on a daily basis with this group and other Federal
agencies such as the INS, USCG Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands,
major USCG Marine Safety Offices and port authorities to efficiently
communicate, resolve problems and control rumors. These daily
conference calls lasted for almost six weeks before being scaled back
to twice a week and finally eliminated, as the issues were resolved.
That information exchange was proven to be valuable both to our member
lines and the Federal agencies involved. As the need arises, we
continue to jointly address matters impacting both ship operations and
security. We are committed to providing the highest levels of security
for our passengers and to working with appropriate Federal agencies to
address additional security measures that may become necessary.
Mr. Chairman, we in the cruise industry, believe that our security
plans and working relationships with regulatory agencies are
accomplishing many of the goals of the Port and Maritime Security Act
of 2001. The collaboration and cooperation of all agencies and industry
exhibited since the events of September 11 are also accomplishing many
of the goals of this legislation. Of course all of the additional
security measures that we have put in place are consuming resources and
money at a rapid pace. We would urge you to ensure that there is
adequate funding that comes with any additional mandates that are
placed on agencies, ports or industry through the legislative process.
While we as an industry together with our Coast Guard partners seek
to identify a long-term sustainable security posture, we believe that
new technologies must be developed and brought on line in the security
battle. These technologies may include detection of exotic explosives,
plastic weapons, and biological and chemical agents. In the wake of the
Anthrax attack, there were many hoaxes, and instances of spilled
powders, sugar and coffee creamers that caused concern. This industry,
as with other segments of the travel industry, went to great lengths to
minimize the impact of these incidents. But, from an abundance of
caution approach, all had to be treated with the utmost seriousness.
Methods need to be developed, tested and certified to rapidly identify
and/or rule out agents such as Anthrax so as to give decision makers
the necessary tools to make well-reasoned and scientifically supported
decisions.
Neither the Coast Guard nor the ports currently have the resources
necessary to provide continuous effective waterside security patrols in
those ports where this may be necessary. In some ports, the cruise
ships themselves have been asked or directed by the Coast Guard Captain
of the Port, to lower lifeboats or rescue-boats to assist in the
waterside security equation. While this has been possible in the short
term, we do not believe that the ships themselves, whether they be
cruise ships or cargo ships, should be placed in a position of
utilizing lifesaving appliances for purposes other than lifesaving. It
is our belief that waterside security zone enforcement and other
waterside patrols, if not conducted by Federal or State agency assets,
should be the responsibility of the local port authority.
Mr. Chairman, these are challenging times--not only from a security
standpoint but also from a business point of view. But as I stated
before, the highest priority of the cruise industry is, and will always
be, to provide a safe and secure vacation experience for our
passengers. Our industry pledges its cooperation working in partnership
to sustain the level of security necessary to maintain the outstanding
safety record of the cruise industry.
This country can and will unite to exercise one of our most
cherished freedoms, the freedom to travel. It is up to us to ensure
that we protect not only the freedom, but to ensure that those whose
goal it is to disrupt our way of life are not successful. We, in the
cruise industry, will do everything possible to protect those who
choose this outstanding and safe vacation option.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Softye. We will
move to Mr. Del Bates, Vice-president, ILW Union, Number 19.
STATEMENT OF DEL BATES, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 19
Mr. Bates. Good afternoon, Senator Murray, and thank you
for giving us a voice at this forum.
As a vice-president of the International Longshore and
Warehouse Union Local 19, representing working men and women in
the Port of Seattle, I am pleased to submit my comments
regarding the security of our ports. The members of the ILW are
committed to making our ports and surrounding areas safe and
secure and free of criminal or terrorist activities. Just as
important, we are absolutely committed to insuring the security
of our work force, as well as the surrounding communities where
we all live and interact. This is essential since ILW members
face direct risk to their personal safety and livelihood from
such criminal and terrorist acts simply by virtue of where we
work.
Following the horrendous acts of September 11, ports
throughout the country went on immediate security alert. In
most ports, most major ports, meetings were held between the
Coast Guard, maritime employers and longshore labor to discuss
the threats we now face and the actions we must take. The Port
Maritime Security Act initially focused on criminal activities
rather than national security and terrorism. The present need
to secure our ports from the threats of international terrorism
now overrides all other issues.
There are substantial areas of omission in Senate Bill 1214
that need to be rectified to truly enhance our Nation's
seaports' security. The U.S. Coast Guard has basically been the
water side enforcement agency within the Federal Government.
For purposes of clarity, I understand that the land side
enforcement is a different matter altogether. Land side
security enforcement has been the function of the local ports'
board authorities and internal operators.
It is absolutely contrary to the facts and to the goal of
maintaining secure seaports to treat longshore workers as
security risks. Longshore workers are not the problem, but
rather we are a critical part of the solution for keeping our
ports safe and secure from crime and terrorism. It is the ILWU
members who are best able to detect and report suspicious and
unusual activity in the ports. We should be partners rather
than suspects in the efforts to secure our Nation's ports.
As a general matter of policy, the ILWU opposes background
checks on any of our dock workers. During the investigation of
the Graham Commission, the ILWU challenged the Commission to
prove their assertion that internal conspiracies are a problem
at many of our Nation's ports. We asked them for an example of
an internal conspiracy to commit crimes involving ILWU workers.
They could not produce one example of ILWU workers at our
Nation's ports involved in criminal conspiracies, not one. In
fact, the only involvement our members have with serious
criminal activity is reporting to authorities suspicious
activities and cargo.
In previous testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science
and Transportation Committee, we pointed out that the actions
of one longshore worker in the Port of Tacoma led to the
largest cocaine seizure in the port's history. Also, in times
of war, the ILWU members have delivered on their promise to
load military cargo in the safest and most efficient way
possible, and many of us are veterans.
It is equally critical that the government not respond to
the new terrorism against our country in ways that harm the
productivity of our commercial seaports. Excessive or imprudent
regulations that fail to account for the true realities of port
operations will only result in further damage to the national
and world economies at a time when we are in perilous
circumstances. We must not through rash government regulations
accomplish the very result our enemies seek and we are trying
to avoid--the disabling of waterfront commerce.
I appreciate the opportunity to submit comments on the
behalf of the ILWU. Accompanying the statement is a detailed
proposal designed to pinpoint critical security sensitive areas
with specific delineations between land-side and water-side
operations. The proposals are designed to increase and improve
port security protection in an economically feasible way. Thank
you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Del Bates
As Vice President of the International Longshore and Warehouse
Union, Local #19, representing working men and women in the Port of
Seattle, I am please to submit my comments regarding the security of
our Ports. The members of the ILWU are committed to making our ports
and surrounding areas safe, secure and free of criminal or terrorist
activities. Just as important, we are absolutely committed to
insulating the security of our workforce as well as the surrounding
communities where we all live and interact. This is especially so since
ILWU members face direct risk to their personal safety and livelihood
from such criminal and terrorist acts simply by virtue of the jobs we
do and the areas where we work.
Following the horrendous terrorist attacks of September 11, ports
throughout the country went on immediate security alert. In most major
ports, meetings were held between the Coast Guard, maritime employers
and longshore labor to discuss the threats we now face and the actions
we must take. The Port and Maritime Security Act (S.1214) initially
focused on criminal activities rather than national security and
terrorism. The present need to secure our ports from the threats of
international terrorism now overrides all other issues. There are
substantial areas of omission in S.1214 that need to be rectified to
truly enhance our National's seaport security. The U.S. Coast Guard has
basically been a waterslide enforcement agency within the Federal
Government. For purposes of clarity, understand that landside
enforcement is a different matter altogether. In major American ports,
including areas ILWU jurisdiction, landside security enforcement has
been a function of the local port and terminal operators.
It is absolutely contrary to the facts and to the goal of
maintaining secure seaports to treat longshore workers as security
risks. Longshore workers are not the problem but rather are a critical
part of the solution for keeping our ports safe and secure from crime
and terrorism. It is the well-established longshore workforce that
knows how things work best in the ports and, perhaps most importantly,
knows who belongs where in the marine terminals. It is ILWU members who
are best able to detect and report suspicious and unusual activity in
the ports. The government should, therefore, enlist these dedicated
workers as partners rather than as susptects in the effort to secure
our Nationals ports.
As a general matter of policy, the ILWU opposes background checks
on any of our workers. During the investigation of the Interagency
Commission on Seaport Security (the Graham Commission) the ILWU
challenged the Commission to prove their assertion that internal
conspiracies are a problem at many of our National's ports. We asked
them for an example of an internal conspiracy to commit crimes
involving ILWU longshore workers. They could not produce one example of
ILWU workers at our National's ports involved in criminal conspiracies.
Not one. In fact, the only involvement our members have with serious
criminal activity is reporting to authorities suspicious activities and
cargo. In previous testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee, we pointed out that the actions of one
longshore worker at the Port of Tacoma led to the largest cocaine
seizure in the Port's history. In times of war, the ILWU members have
delivered on their promise to load military cargo in the safest, most
efficient way possible.
It is equally critical that the government not respond to the new
terrorism against our country in ways that harm the productivity of our
commercial seaports. Excessive or imprudent regulations that fail to
account for the true realities of port operations will only result in
further damage to the national and world economies, at a time when they
are in perilous circumstances. We must not, through rash government
regulation, accomplish the very result our enemies seek and we are
trying to avoid--the disabling of waterfront commerce.
Accompanying this statement is a detailed proposal designed to
pinpoint critical security--sensitive areas with specific delineations
between landslide and waterside operations. The proposals are designed
to increase and improve port security protections in an economically
feasible way.
Waterside Security Issues
Match Personnel With Provided Documents.--Legislation should
require crew and passenger lists including names, addresses, passports,
and mariner documents be matched up in person with the documents
submitted. When the Immigration Naturalization Service (INS) is given
the documentation, they merely go through the documents without
requiring the individual's presence to insure he or she is who the
documents say they are.
Implementation of Integrated Systems.--Implementation of integrated
systems allowing Customs to inspect and/or review manifests containing
identification of shipper, port of origin, and cargo shipped prior to
vessel entering American waters.
Advance Security Clearances of Vessels.--The legislation should
require advance security clearance requirements for all vessels, their
owners, operators and crew before entering a U.S. port. Presently,
these vessels operate under secrecy and without regulations by the
scheme of flying the flag of a country (flag of convenience) that lacks
any meaningful regulations and scrutiny. The London Times reported that
the terrorist group Al Queda operates flags of convenience vessels.
Landside Security Issues
Container Security Seals.--Like luggage on airplanes, the
containers on vessels and in port facilities need to be subjected to
security screening to protect U.S. seaports and international maritime
commerce. Obviously, it is both impractical and cost prohibitive to
inspect every one of tens of thousands of containers that flow in and
out of our ports each day. Proposed legislation should at least mandate
that port workers who receive containers inspect the integrity of the
outside seal on each container. Seal inspection must be done to insure
that the seal number matches up with the consignee who was the last
person who sealed that container up and is responsible for the cargo
therein. To insure port security, this is one the ``primary'' actions
that must be undertaken. This act must mandate that the integrity of
the seals be checked and rechecked against terminal documentation to
insure the origins of that cargo. A broken seal would alert the port
facility that the container has been tampered with and that it needs to
be carefully inspected before entering a facility or being placed on a
vessel, and should be immediately earmarked to Customs for inspection.
A systematic check of container seals provides authorities with a
record as to the parties responsible for placing the seal on any
container that may be the means of terrorist act.
Empty Containers.--One of the most overlooked of potential security
risks to terminals, ships, and port infrastructure is the proper
handling of empty containers. On any given day as much as forty percent
of cargo delivered into any facility is comprised of empty containers.
A physical inspection of these containers is vital for a number of
reasons; (1) Terminal safety--knowing that in almost all port
facilities empty containers are very rarely inspected, the potential
for placement for some kind of explosive device is something that must
be considered and planned for, (2) Vessel Safety or remote site
endangerment--the concept where an uninspected empty container
containing an explosive device would be loaded onto a vessel for
detonation. In many ports throughout the world the inspection of empty
containers is a requirement, for exactly many of reasons that were
outlined! What would happen if a terrorist cell in a foreign country
for example were to take an empty container, place an explosive device
inside, then load it up and ship it for detonation elsewhere? For
years, inspection of empty containers was regularly done in America's
largest seaports; however this procedure was abandoned some years ago.
Once again, if we truly are desirous of creating safe and secure
seaports then the return to these inspections is a must.
Non Inspection of Truckers.--The primary threat to American
seaports is the ability to truckers grain access to dockside marine
containers terminals with ``carte blanche'' accessibility. The majority
of all truckers entering marine facilities in America's largest ports
do so without having to exhibit any kind of identification whatsoever.
Prior to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., there
was no requirement for truckers to produce any identification upon
entrance to marine terminal facilities. However, even following the
attack, only two marine container facilities now demand I.D. upon
entrance through marine terminal gates, but there is still no match-up
of photo I.D. with the truckers themselves because they only have to
produce the drivers license number for entrance. The truckers entering
these marine facilities have virtually unobstructed access to the
entire facility, enabling them to place anything, anywhere, at anytime.
The Failure to Provide Secure Cargo Handling Areas.--In many ports
throughout the world, the local workforces take the cargo (now in steel
cargo shipping containers almost all the time) and place them in
secured ``holding'' areas, many times located next to marine facility
entrance gates, awaiting truckers who are allowed only in these secured
areas to pick upon containers, usually on an appointment basis. This is
an excellent concept that has resulted from years of experience
realizing that he best way to secure your facility is only allow those
on the terminal that have immediate business needs. They then realized
that to allow trucker's unlimited ``carte blanche'' access to all areas
of the facilities was a dramatic error as it compounded the problems of
security and congestion. What followed was the establishment of secure
``holding'' for cargo retrieval.
Utilization of Existing Security Personnel.--Minimum manning
standards and uniform training procedures must be adopted for the
existing professional security personnel to meet the growing security
needs of our ports.
The above outlined points are a collection of the most critical
procedures that must take place if we are to safeguard our American
seaports. We have worked within these ports every day for many years
and our experience enables us the opportunity to share with you, the
Committee, some of the protocols and procedures in a marine
environment.
I appreciate the opportunity to submit comments for the record on
behalf of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union and I am
prepared to answer any questions from Committee members. I look forward
to the opportunity to work with you as we solve the problems of
reviewing security issues so that commerce within our National's
seaports may continue uninterrupted in a manner prosperous, safe and
secure for many years to come.
------
Postion Paper on Seaport Security for Container Terminal Facilities
preamble
Container terminals are unique waterfront operations that present
their own security challenges. Accordingly, this paper proposes a
security system to meet these challenges while at the same time
permitting the efficient and effective movement of cargo containers.
However, the principles introduced here will have application to other
marine cargo handling facilities as well other modes of transportation
and their facilities.
Moreover, some of the concepts discussed here are intended to
clarify elements of the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 (the
Hollings Bill or S. 1214) passed by the Senate and information provided
by the Port Security Direct Action Groups under the auspices of the
Office of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation.
The paper is organized into key areas that need to be addressed in
order to ensure that a seaport security regime is workable in the
context of the business of container terminal operations.
definitions
Clear Definitions.--House bill needs to clearly define key terms.
We suggest the following definitions:
--Secure Perimeter.--Are the elements designed or utilized to prevent
unauthorized access to a facility from the landside.
--Positive Access Controls.--The points in the secure perimeter where
entry and exit gates are placed, where credentials and
authorization for entry are validated and recorded, and where
delivery, cargo, cargo documentation and interchange
information are checked.
--Controlled Access Area.--As applied to container terminals, a
controlled access area encompasses the entire terminal inside a
secure perimeter without requiring further segregation or
positive access controls.
--Security Sensitive Information.--Information concerning the
contents of intermodal containers.
--Credential.--A national transportation worker credential applying
to truckers, railroad workers, maritime terminal employees,
etc. which positively verifies a person's identity and
suitability to access a transportation facility or security
sensitive information, issued on a uniform national basis by
the United States Government or an approved agent of the United
States Government after it has conducted the requisite
employment investigations and criminal history record checks.
Appropriate national security databases should be checked as
part of the criminal history record check.
--Credentialing System.--A security system that processes the
credential in order to determine if facility access is
authorized by validating and recording an individual's
identity, business purpose for access and records arrival and
departure. This should involve an interoperable electronic
system that includes biometric identifying information, and
networks positive access controls with controlling databases.
container terminal facility access
Each terminal or port area would establish a secure perimeter for
the purpose of establishing positive access and exit controls for
people and containerized cargo.
No Double Security Zones.--Each container terminal will create a
single secure perimeter encompassing the entire terminal facility.
There cannot be a general requirement for double security zones within
a facility. Employees daily work duties require them to move about the
entire terminal. A separate security zone or zones required within the
secure perimeter would require another secure access point which would
be extremely costly, unproductive and of no additional security
benefit.
Terminal watchmen are expected to do many things, but law
enforcement and physical searches are not among them. Law enforcement
agencies should not expect industry watchmen to become surrogate
policemen. If a beefed up police presence at any container terminal is
deemed necessary, this should be the sole function of Federal, State or
local law enforcement agencies, including port authority police. A
House bill should clarify that terminal employees are not to become law
enforcement officers or conduct physical searches.
credentialing standards
The Federal Government must create uniform Federal standards for
credentialing individuals who seek entry or have access to a container
terminal and/or security sensitive information wherever in the
intermodal transportation chain they are located.
The credential itself should be consistent with the uniform
national transportation worker credential being developed by the
Department of Transportation and Office of Homeland Security and should
supercede redundant credentials issued by other entities.
Credentials should be issued by the Federal Government or
appropriately delegated issuing authority according to Federal
standards. There should not be different authorities in different
geographic locations or States issuing credentials under different
standards. It is imperative that there be one standard and one
credential because, several States are enacting seaport security
legislation requiring such credentials based upon different standards
than proposed Federal legislation. Federal preemption is necessary.
Drug and alcohol screenings should reflect current statutory
standards for transportation workers and be required as part of the
credentialing process.
The credential adopted should have a period of validity for a duly
issued credential. The one-year renewal provision adopted by the State
of Florida is unreasonable; a longer period perhaps five-year period
would be better. However, there must be an automatic mechanism that can
invalidate a credential for subsequent disqualifying acts that might
occur during the credential's period of validity.
credentialing system requirements
The credentialing system must (1) authenticate the identity of all
individuals seeking access to the terminal or facility, (2) validate
the business purpose for such access and (3) record arrivals and
departures. The terminal or facility should be able to control access
even for credentialed individuals.
The credential system should employ appropriate technology to
process and validate credentials at a positive access control without
impeding terminal operations. This should involve an interoperable
electronic system that includes biometric identifying information.
The credentialing system should detect invalid credentials,
unauthorized users, inappropriate access to security sensitive
information and inappropriate use of credentials.
There must be a staggered phase-in period for requiring credentials
and background checks to ensure the availability of the workforce.
obtaining credentials
Individuals required to have credentials must be responsible for
obtaining their own credentials and ensuring that their employment
screening and criminal history record check is accurate.
Individuals should pay a Federal fee for their own credentials and
required employment investigations and criminal history records checks
as an individual would pay for his or her own driver's license.
A meaningful appeals process for individuals who might face adverse
employment actions as a result of the credentialing process should be
instituted.
Employers should not have access to the information generated by an
individual's government sponsored employment investigation and criminal
history check, or information on any appeal that may result.
Employers and employer associations would only provide the
credentialing entity with authorization that certain individuals are
entitled to apply for such credentials.
Employers and employer associations must be held harmless in any
seaport security legislation for adverse employment actions taken as a
result of statutorily required credentialing.
A credentialing system is necessary for seafarers. U.S. Merchant
Mariners should be covered by the Federal transportation worker
credentialing system. However, foreign seafarers present challenges
that require international cooperation and agreement. The U.S.
Government must define the appropriate credential that would be
required for foreign seafarers that would permit them to disembark a
vessel, leave the terminal and gain re-entry to the terminal if
authorized to do so by the vessel. Container terminal operators should
be able to rely on the Federal immigration clearance procedures to
allow seafarers into the secure perimeter of a facility without the
need for further credentialing checks. Container terminal operators
cannot perform the functions of Federal authorities and police vessels
or their personnel.
containerized cargo security
There must be security and reporting procedures for U.S. and
overseas personnel, entities and facilities that stuff cargo
containers.
The entity that stuffs cargo containers must be required to certify
the contents of and seal the container.
Individuals who perform the function of stuffing containers should
be subject to the same credentialing standards as container terminal
personnel.
Carriers and marine terminal operators must not be subject to civil
penalties for a shipper's failure to provide accurate and timely
information about the contents of a cargo container.
Electronic cargo data should be transmitted by a secure means
throughout the intermodal chain to ensure data integrity and prevent
tampering. Cargo data systems must employ appropriate technology to
process transactions without impeding commerce.
local security plans
Federal legislation should adopt the family of plans concept of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). The family of plans concept refers
to tiered levels of security plans ranging from national to individual
terminal plans.
A local port security plan should be required that is all
encompassing for the port area. Because each port is different, local
port security plan should be prepared by the Local Port Security
Committee in conjunction with the Coast Guard.
A container terminal security plan should be required to address
internal security at the container facility and should be prepared by
the terminal operator for approval by the Coast Guard.
A vessel security plan should be required to address vessel
security and should be prepared by the vessel operator for approval by
the Coast Guard.
The Port Security Plan should address Federal, State and local law
enforcement function, utilization and deployment.
funding
Federal funds must pay for the port security mandates designed to
protect the general public.
Instead of relying on annual appropriations from the general fund,
a dedicated intermodal security fund should be created to assure that a
long term source of funding is available to port authorities and
waterfront facility operators.
This dedicated fund should be funded by an appropriate fee charged
to the end users of the intermodal cargo chain, i.e., the initial
shipper placing the container into interstate or foreign commerce, or,
in the case of import containers, the receiving agent for the
container. This places the cost of security on the general public, as
does the airport recently federally enacted security fee.
Federal grants and loans should be provided until this dedicated
intermodal security fund is brought on line. Expenditures from the fund
should be retrospective allowing port authorities and terminal
operators to recover for mandated expenditures made pursuant to
regulation or statute.
Absent a dedicated fund, dollar for dollar tax credits should be
made available to the private sector to encourage fast compliance and
allow recovery for mandated security expenditures.
government efficiency
The government entities with overlapping authority must communicate
effectively and cooperate in streamlining the regulatory burden on the
industry.
limitations on liability
Marine terminal operators should have limitations on liability
provisions similar to those in the Aviation Security Act.
Facilities and ocean carriers should be insulated from potentially
devastating terrorist attacks. The Federal Government must make
available property and casualty insurance to cargo container terminal
operators. Presently, the private insurance market is not offering
sufficient coverage of losses due to a terrorist act.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Bates, and we will
move to Mr. Jon Hemingway, CEO, Stevedoring Services of
America.
STATEMENT OF JON HEMINGWAY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
STEVEDORING SERVICES OF AMERICA
Mr. Hemingway. Thank you, Chair and Senator, for the
opportunity to be here today. I am going to throw out a lot of
my prepared remarks, because a lot of it has already been said
today, but I did want to drill down on a couple of things that
have been raised here for the benefit of the subcommittee.
I think we all understand that there is a consensus
developing that we need to push our borders outward, and that
secure and efficient trade is a function of control at the
point where the container is loaded and a secure chain of
custody until the container is unloaded. Simply put, in the
container business, our jobs changed from protecting cargo from
people, to protecting people from cargo. I have to agree with
Mr. Bates that I do not think the problem is the longshore work
force, or that there is a conspiracy there. I do differ with
our longshore brethren in that I think that to the extent there
is a credentialing system, that it be a national system that
apply equally to all members of the chain, so any kind of
screening that takes place with our workers should apply to
management, the trucking community and others involved in
commerce.
That being said, I want to offer comments specific to some
of the great points that Director Hardy made with respect to
Customs activities. We were fortunate to grow up here in the
Northwest and Tacoma and Seattle, and with Local 19, and we
have been able to grow a bit with their support. We now operate
9 out of the top 10 container ports, 46 out of the top 50
ports, and we are the largest employer of waterfront labor in
the United States. We handle more cargo than anyone else, we
load more trains than anyone else, and partly it is because of
the lessons we have learned here working with some of the
people here at this table.
A lot has been said, and we all watch ``60 Minutes'', about
the inspections that need to take place and need to be stepped
up from where they are. We cannot push our borders out
tomorrow, but I think everybody feels the need to do more and
the pressure is no greater than on Customs today. The
temptation is to do highly visible inspections on our docks.
The problem is that the container facilities were not designed
for this mission. The solution in some cases, less intrusive X-
ray devices, are scarce, and there is only a few available. I
mean, all of the Port of Seattle is getting one. Tacoma is
getting one next year.
So our modest suggestion is that we look to leverage the
resources we have in the most effective way. Customs
administers Central Examinations throughout the container ports
in the United States. Those Central Examination Stations are a
remarkable platform for getting inspections done. The thing
that I want to strongly encourage is that we use those Central
Examination Stations to step up our inspections.
Now, traditionally they've been used for unloading
containers, going in in a very cumbersome and expensive way,
searching the entire contents, but there is no reason that we
cannot add this non-intrusive technology, X-rays, particularly
ones with fast scanning technology that allows us to detect
explosives, for example, in these examination stations. It does
not make a lot of sense to us to see scarce Customs personnel
moving scarce equipment between seven container terminals in
Seattle and Tacoma when we only have one machine.
Customs has control over every cargo in international trade
that crosses our docks. They tell us when we can release that
container and they can dictate where it goes. It is easy for
them to specify that a load goes to a Customs Examination
Station, and when they do that the cost of that extra move and
the cost of the inspection is borne by the end user.
As people do better jobs than others, and I will take
Maersk as a high quality carrier, they will get a lower
sampling rate and have lowest extra costs over time. That is a
great economic incentive, and guess what, the whole process is
self-funding. So why cannot we locate these X-ray machines at
Central Examination Stations and give them the tool to charge
for that facility? We have the legal and commercial framework
in place now to do it. We have a set-up in our industry that
understands the use of that tool.
In some cases, we do not have the legal authority to add
this tool to the Customs arsenal, but I respectfully submit to
the Senator and the Chair that this is something that we can
entertain immediately, and get a lot more out of what is a very
precious resource right now, Customs people that are trained to
do this as well as the equipment necessary to do that mission.
That is my two bits. I have a lot more, but I will wait
until question time. Thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jon Hemingway
Senator and Chairwoman Murray, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for
the opportunity to participate today. My name is Jon Hemingway. I'm
President of Stevedoring Services of America and several affiliated
companies, which together comprise the largest stevedoring and terminal
operating company in the United States and Western Hemisphere.
Collectively, we are the largest employer of the ILWU and the ILA and
the largest leaseholder and owner of waterfront facilities engaged in
international and domestic seaborne trade in the United States
Obviously, port security is an issue of paramount concern to our
company and its employees.
Permit me to preface my remarks with a bit of history. Before
September 11, I think it's fair to say that containerization and its
related elements in the intermodal chain were focused on a fairly
simple mission, delivering the most efficient transport of cargo within
a standardized system. The underlying foundation of this focus is the
container revolution, which has allowed us to dramatically increase
productivity and trade through our Nation's ports.
The events of September 11 brought into perspective a need for a
shift in focus. Before September 11, intermodal transport security was
focused primarily on protecting cargo from people and unfortunate
accidents in transit. Today, however, we understand that we need to
consider how to better protect people from what might be inside
containers. It is this shift and distinction, which I believe should
drive our government's policy toward improving port security.
In the wake of September 11 there has been a sincere, if
uncoordinated effort to improve the security of our Nation's seaports.
Unfortunately, companies engaged in international trade, and their
employees, have not yet been provided with a uniform policy or
direction as to how we improve port security.
I think it's fair to say that every constituent in the transport
chain has something to gain and lose from changes we need to make to
improve port security. Each principal agency touching international
trade, be it Customs, Immigration, the Coast Guard, the Transportation
Department and others, is trying to establish its role and funding for
whatever their new mandates may be. Each employer group is trying to
understand the legal requirements to be imposed as well as pursuing
more accountability from its workforce. Unions and employees alike are
concerned about improving security while mitigating invasion of their
privacy and avoiding changes, which could result in the
disqualification of some of their members from earning a livelihood.
So it's clear to this observer that, in this uncoordinated effort
of trying to achieve something positive, a common Federal policy is
required. The continued functioning of the Nation's transport chain and
hence our economic recovery, hangs in the balance.
While we need to establish Federal legislation to address the
problem with uniform solutions, the stakes require a careful and
practical implementation of changes. We strongly believe that any
suggestions to improve port security should be evaluated both for its
benefit in terms of improved security as well as its cost to the
transport chain and the Nation's economy.
As mentioned earlier, the benefits should focus on how we better
protect our people from what harmful agents might be in containers. We
feel this is a much more important focus than the secondary goal of
securing our perimeter and protecting our terminals and cargo from
people who shouldn't be around them.
Further, in the evaluation of proposals, we must carefully evaluate
potential for any step to become a bottleneck and create a traffic jam
at our Nation's ports. Therefore, before approval, any national or
regulatory standards should be supported by an impacts analysis. The
reason for this step is clear, given the limited space in container
port facilities, any step which adds even a few minutes to the transit
of a typical container bears the potential of creating a traffic jam
and a UP style meltdown which could bring our ports, and hence our
commerce, to a grinding halt.
With these objectives in mind, permit us to offer a few suggestions
based on our experience as terminal operators.
The focus of our efforts should be on better understanding what is
in a container, improving the intelligence of our customs service to
identify those containers which present risk to the American public and
enhancing the tools available to our various government agencies in
that mission. Awaiting Congressional direction, a number of agencies
have focused on stepping up their visibility and activity in the
container terminals. There has also been much discussion about
increasing the percentage of containers actually inspected by Customs
as well as improving the selection of which containers to inspect. In
this regard, we feel that the government would be best served by at
expanding its current infrastructure of Customs Examination Stations
(CES). The current CES system is already in place with a recognized
commercial and legal framework supporting it. To get the most bang for
the buck, beefing up the CES system with additional sites and to allow
for implementation of non-intrusive inspections using x-ray type
devices leverages existing assets to the most benefit and creates a
sound platform for improvement.
Enhancing our CES network makes sense for three additional reasons.
First, container terminals are designed to allow for the flow of cargo
without the violation or opening of the container itself. Everything in
the terminal is geared to maintaining the integrity and sealed nature
of the container. This improves the accountability of the transport
chain and certainly supports the government's overall policy of wanting
to improve the accountability for what's in the container. Secondly,
any inspection program must be complimented by a contingency plan for
what to do in the event that contents of that container may pose a
significant threat to people and property. For this reason, CES
stations would pose a better opportunity for a focused effort to
develop and execute those contingency plans for containers targeted as
presenting higher risk to the American public. The bottom line is that
Customs Examination Stations present the best opportunity for effective
implementation and enhancement of container screening and inspection.
Third, there is no space set aside or designed in container terminals
to facilitate safe, dry and secure inspection. CES stations are
typically located in areas near the harbor on less valuable land. As
such, accommodating increased inspections by expanding CES stations
will be more cost effective. It will also keep the inspection
operations together rather than splitting the inspections and
associated specialized non-intrusive screening equipment and limited
customs and other government personnel, over CES locations and the
multitude of container terminals.
Of course, effective intelligence and screening of containers is
also supported by better accountability in the intermodal transport
chain. To that end, we support the investigation and implementation of
electronic cargo seals that will help maintain the security and
reporting by proving that the contents of the container have not been
tampered with since the seal was put in place. We think the electronic
seal will be a key element in the effort to definitively establish the
contents of every container at the point of origin. I think, quite
correctly, our government leaders are focused on confirming what's in
the container by better establishing inspection and confirmation of
contents at the point the container is loaded. However, we then need to
make sure that that accountability remains intact by the use of
effective electronic seals and secure facilities.
Finally, a lot of effort and comment has been directed toward
securing the perimeter of our terminals and the accountability of
workers. To that end, we would like to offer the following suggestions
with the goal that the waterfront employers and their unions should be
working together to improve security with the least impact to people's
privacy and livelihoods.
From our perspective, the Nation's transport chain requires some
sort of national transport identification card. Today, it is too easy
to improperly obtain a driver's license. Any credentialing system
should involve some use of biometrics so that positive ID is confirmed
by means other than just a photograph. Further, drivers' licenses don't
provide all the necessary data to achieve the mission of establishing
who someone is and their purpose for being permitted access to a
facility. That being said, we think that the function of issuing ID's,
and any background checks or other standards applied in their issuance,
should be a government function. Similar to our Nation's experience at
its airports, our guards are merely watchmen without much training or
authority in the screening of people. Given the desire of our Nation's
agencies to integrate their threat assessment and intelligence-
gathering activities, we think it's important that this security
function be performed by a police force, not night watchmen. We also
feel that checking ID's and restricting access to facilities should
also be a government function. As an employer, we have no desire to
play big brother and be privy to backgrounds or deciding whether
someone presents a security risk. That is properly the province of
government.
Our concern is that qualified people are on the job and that these
people are the only ones admitted to the facility. We strive to keep
the amount of people on container terminals to a minimum, both for
efficiency and for safety. We do agree that we need to establish more
control over the perimeter of all port facilities engaged in
international trade. We think it's important that any designated
facility have a single perimeter to simplify administration and
execution of the security plan.
We have a variety of people visiting the terminals, not just
employees but also truckers hired by steamship line and cargo interests
over whom we have little control as well as ship's personnel employed
by carriers and, of course, port authority employees and vendors.
Whatever the standard that is applied to the identification and
screening of workers should also apply to these other groups. Of
course, when it comes to screening truckers and verifying their
credentials, we need to be very careful. Today in North America, we
handle over 30 million containers a year, when you include empties.
Each of these containers must pass through gates at our Nation's ports,
at least once and often several times. As a result, any additional
step, which involves as little as 30 seconds, has the potential to
overwhelm our port complexes and create a traffic jam. Accordingly, any
credentialing system must allow for the efficient capture and
verification of this authorization data. Failure to do so could bring
our ports to a halt. It will also hurt the environment by increasing
diesel emissions as trucks spend more time idling at our port complex
gates.
The final point I want to make today addresses the question of
funding. Obviously, a national credential, credentialing system,
increased inspections and electronic seals will cost money. In
evaluating who should pay, Congress should consider the following.
First, ultimately, the American public will pay for the cost of
enhanced security at our Nation's seaports whether it is in taxes and
government payments or in user fees. To the extent that the government
decides to pursue user fees as the means to fund enhanced security
requirements and procedures, it should consider using agencies and
institutions that are already well established. In this regard, Customs
is well suited to levy and collect fees for containers carrying
international trade. We feel that such fees levied on import containers
should be deposited into a trust fund and used to pay for enhancement
of the existing Customs Examination Stations system, the investigation
and promulgation of standards relating to electronic seals, the cost of
a credential and credentialing system and the cost of local government
providing security screening at our Nation's seaports.
In closing, I'd like to add that as our Nation's largest private
port operator, we want to do our part to enhance our Nation's security.
To that end, we are more than willing to participate in any pilot
projects and evaluation of proposals for improving port security. We
have a lot of practical experience about what works as well as a keen
desire to work with our labor force to get it done. I think it's very
encouraging for all of us to see our Senator and the Chair of the
Subcommittee, so personally engaged and informed on this issue.
That concludes my remarks. However, for the record, I would like to
submit the position paper on seaport security that has been agreed to
by employer groups that collectively handle 97 percent of containers in
U.S. Maritime Commerce. I would be pleased to address any questions
from the Chair and staff. Thank you for the opportunity to be here
today.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Hemingway, and I
will direct my questions to individuals, but if you feel from
your perspective you have something to add, please feel free to
let me know.
Mr. Bates, I am going to start with you. You testified
today on some commonsense requirements with the potential for
meaningful impacts on cargo security. One item that you
identified as critical is the requirement to check the
integrity of the seals on the outside of containers as they are
loaded and unloaded. Why is that not happening today?
Mr. Bates. There is some seal inspection done today, but we
must do more to ensure that the seal number matches up with the
consignee who was the last person to seal the container, match
up with the responsible cargo with them to ensure port
security. This is one of the primary acts that must be
undertaken. That act must mandate that the integrity of the
seals be checked, rechecked against the terminal documentation
to ensure the origins of that cargo. Then a broken seal would
alert us to the fact that there had been some tampering with
that, and we could divert that container to Customs.
Senator Murray. Mr. Hemingway, do you think this is an
onerous requirement?
Mr. Hemingway. As a matter of fact, today we have clerks
stationed on the docks, and if we are doing our job and the
clerks are doing their job, and they should, because they work
for us, they are checking whether those seals are intact, and
we should be generating an exception report when they are not
intact. So I am sure there are cases where it is not being
done, but, you know, that is one of the missions of the
terminal operators to report exceptions like that, and I am
sure that Mr. Wellins would reflect the same comments.
Senator Murray. Mr. Wellins, are your crews checking for
the integrity of the seal?
Mr. Wellins. It would not be our crew, as such, but I would
have to come back to you for the record on that. I will check.
Senator Murray. All right. I will appreciate knowing that.
In Mr. Bates' testimony, he indicated that the majority of all
truckers that enter marine facilities in America's largest
ports do so without having to exhibit any kind of
identification whatsoever. Miss Riniker and Mr. Sewell, if you
could comment, is this the case in Puget Sound, and if so, how
are you dealing with this issue?
Ms. Riniker. As of April 15th in the Port of Tacoma, you do
have to show photo I.D. to be able to have access to our
terminals.
Senator Murray. Including truckers?
Ms. Riniker. Yes.
Senator Murray. Is that the same with you, Mr. Sewell?
Mr. Sewell. It varies by terminal, and I would probably
defer to Jon as to how they are handling it, but we, the port
has not imposed a requirement, ourselves, but I do think it is
something that needs to be done. It relates to my earlier
comment that putting things that are in place that have to be
undone, and I completely concur with Jon's comments about
having a card and a system, which is one of the things that is
in the legislation pending before Congress now.
Senator Murray. Mr. Hemingway.
Mr. Hemingway. Every trucker that calls at the terminals we
are responsible for is required to present transaction numbers
that identify him, similar to a PIN at a cash machine. So for
example, there is no transaction that does not happen that is
not already preauthorized. Where there is a gap is whether
terminals check to see if that particular driver is authorized
to drive for that company, so if there is some kind of
conspiracy, and some driver was unauthorized to have that load,
then we would be, we would need to check photo I.D. That
capability does not currently exist.
Senator Murray. Does not currently exist?
Mr. Hemingway. No, there is now a database on the West
Coast of the United States for checking whether a given driver
and that particular driver's license number is authorized to
drive for that company. There is not currently a picture I.D.
that goes with it, but that technology is under development.
Senator Murray. Mr. Sewell, but the issue of which agency
should secure those ships and who should pay for that security
has been a subject of a lot of debate lately. Everybody else
has been conducting in-water coverage at a projected cost of
500,000 annually. I understand you suggested that this should
be a Federal or a State law enforcement function. Why are you
unable to obtain the law enforcement necessary to conduct this
mission?
Mr. Sewell. Part of it is I think just because we are the
Port of Seattle, but I think other ports have similar issues,
and for us we have the airport, and our police cover both the
airport and the seaports. And as you know, right after
September 11, the primary area of concern, although we are
talking about seaports now, it was not seaports then, it was
airports. For a long time thereafter, which just happened to be
during the end of our cruise season, our port police were
working 12 hours a day, 7 days a week, just trying to deal with
the additional requirements at Sea-Tac. You know, we were able
to pry loose some folks from various other local agencies, the
Seattle Police Department, the Bainbridge Police Department,
King County Sheriff, and finally as things calmed down a little
bit at the airport, get our own police on the water. And we
have been working with these other agencies to make sure we
have coverage this year.
But I think that points out the fact that, you know, these
are not people that are trained in security. They are not
trained for this kind of a--they are completely trained law
enforcement officers, but they do not have the kind of
intelligence or information that would be necessary to really
prevent any kind of incident at a cruise ship. That is why we
think it ultimately, because that information, intelligence is
going to be likely be with the Coast Guard or with the U.S.
Government, and because that is being done at other ports, that
is, Coast Guard is providing that kind of patrol, that the same
thing ought to be done in Seattle.
Senator Murray. Mr. Softye, you operate cruise ships. How
can your trained crew members assist us with port security, and
can you share with us what some of the other ports are doing
both nationally and internationally?
Mr. Softye. Yes, ma'am. As I stated before, we have worked
very closely with the United States Coast Guard, and the
position that they put forward at the International Maritime
Organization was a collaborative effort that we put together
regarding how we can raise our Level III requirements that were
already requirements in the last 5 years. And as a matter of
fact, 5 minutes before I left the office, I just received the
latest directive from the Coast Guard, 402, which explains in
detail some of the additional measures that we will jointly be
providing.
Some other ports, to answer your question, some other ports
required vessels to be put in the water, some of our small
boats, and ICCL is on the record saying that we are opposed to
this. Obviously if you are going to be using life saving
equipment in routine uses where we do not have any authority to
exercise any type of law enforcement, and we should be involved
in an altercation, what are the liabilities associated with it?
So it becomes very awkward. So our answer to that is to provide
ship-side security to all openings on the ship, and of course
the outer periphery of the ship, you have lookouts reporting
back to a central command on board the ship to report to the
locals if we, in fact, see something that is out of the normal.
There are many measures that are being taken in various ports.
Senator Murray. Very good. Mr. Wellins, one item that has
received absolutely no international support is the United
States proposal at the IMO for ship crews to be credentialed,
including background checks. Can you tell us what your company
does to ensure the integrity of the foreign crews that enter
the United States on your ships?
Mr. Wellins. Well, again, I would have to come back to you
on the record. I mean it is a vast operation. Crews do not
necessarily come from one country versus various countries. So
to be particular about it, I would like to comment for the
record on it.
Senator Murray. Anybody else want to contribute? I would
appreciate your getting back to me on that. A second issue that
was addressed by Mr. Bates is whether or not we should require
empty containers to be sealed.
Mr. Bates, in your testimony, you indicated that there is
an inherent risk of wrongdoing when empty containers are
shipped unsealed as they are today. Mr. Wellins in his
testimony indicated that sealing empty containers was not
necessary and was potentially burdensome. Will both of you
comment on how we should weigh the burden of industry against
the risk that someone may use an empty container for terrorist
activity?
Mr. Bates. Well, I think there is a great risk from the
containers coming in and not being sealed, not being inspected
was the biggest thing with the empty container. Somebody has to
look to see what is inside that. Potentially a driver from the
off-road would have something done to that container, some
explosive device put in that, and that could be shipped onto
the ship, and nobody would have inspected that container at
all, and that could have been detonated later when that ship
was at sea. I do not see a great deal of cost in something like
this, for somebody to open up a door of a container and see
what it is, what is inside of it. I do not think that cost is
insurmountable to overweigh the safety of our ships.
Senator Murray. Mr. Wellins, from your perspective?
Mr. Wellins. Basically, from an empty equipment point of
view, we often times do not really know where that empty
equipment is going until it is loaded on the ship, and in
specific bays. It is just going to replenish deficit areas
around the world or wherever the next port of call might be.
So I guess we should weigh what the risk is of possible
terrorism acts with an empty container if they really do not
know where it is going. I guess the biggest risk would be to
the vessel itself.
Senator Murray. Because the empty containers do not have a
port of designation, you think it would be less likely that
they would be used?
Mr. Wellins. Yes. I mean, we deplete--surplus equipment
that is empty might load on a vessel from Tacoma and be
discharged in Japan, Hong Kong, South China, Singapore, so you
know, and it is not decided until very close to the time that
the container is actually loaded onto the ship as to what is
going where, and it is not done by container numbers. It is
just done by size of equipment and type. So if you need
refrigerated equipment in Singapore, then, you know, they would
just take those x units and load that for Singapore. So I guess
you have got to weigh the risk and cost of that.
Senator Murray. Anybody else want to comment on this issue?
Mr. Hemingway. Certainly, in a lot of cases, we are already
inspecting containers for cleanliness, if we are dispatching
empty to pick up a load. In most cases we are handling empty
containers with very light duty side-pick equipment, which has
cutoff switches if there is material in the container. So it is
not an issue that is high on our radar screen, Senator.
Senator Murray. Let me go back to Mr. Sewell and Ms.
Riniker. Many port authorities have questioned the emphasis
that some in Washington, D.C. are placing on increasing the
physical security of our seaports. They argue that the use of
surveillance equipment, decreasing the access to the ports and
increasing the law enforcement presence will not address the
threat to the same degree as greater information sharing. Miss
Riniker, as you point out in your testimony, there are
technologies that could help us identify what is in a container
and would help us determine whether it has been tampered with
while in transit. Have you had an opportunity to use any of
these technologies, and if so could you share it with us?
Ms. Riniker. A number of years ago, the Port of Tacoma had
an opportunity to experiment with some technology that looked
inside the container. We found it to be very cumbersome and
very slow. Technology has improved, as you heard in the
testimony today. We have not yet received one of the newer
devices that has been deployed in Seattle, and I think that
part of the reason that we have applied for the grant together
is that we can experiment with some of the additions that we
can make to our own ability to control our facilities as well
as experiment with information sharing and what additional
information will be able to find out about both the people and
the containers and the equipment being used on our facilities.
So our experience with that kind of equipment has not been
positive to date, not to say that there are not improvements
that might be worthwhile.
Senator Murray. Mr. Sewell, you talked in your testimony
about the same port. Can you talk about that?
Mr. Sewell. Right. I think first, to comment on your first
comment, I think we would not say that the things that we can
do locally is not important locally. I think that it does not
address the bigger issue. I think we need to do both, partly
because that is what we can do now. I think the technology has
not developed yet that really can do what all of us have been
talking about. It can be, and I think in a relatively short
time, I am not the right person to talk about how long that is,
but to do the kind of origin to destination tracking, have
electronic seals that Andrea talked about.
We have been working with the Port of Singapore in trying
to get a program in place, and a system in place that would
provide that kind of origin to destination tracking. We will be
working on that in the next several months and will obviously
keep you informed of that. It does have the potential to
provide that kind of security function as well.
Senator Murray. Are there any ports that are using that
kind of system?
Mr. Sewell. The Port of Singapore is using it within their
own port, but it does not provide an origin to destination
tracking. Carriers, shippers, a lot of people in the supply
chain have their own proprietary systems for various pieces of
the transportation chain, but there is not a system in place
that is providing that kind of, you know, point to point
throughout the whole chain at this point. But I think many
people have been trying to develop it for commercial purposes,
because of the value of selling that to a customer, so it is
fairly well along in the development, but I think the key will
be getting international agreement and getting some standards
that are acceptable to all of the players in the chain.
Senator Murray. Making sure that the information is
trustworthy.
Mr. Sewell. Yes, and that the right people have access to
the right information.
Ms. Riniker. I would just like to add one thing to that. I
mean the fundamental question there, is what is the role of the
port? Is it the role of ports to develop the system, I mean
other than as an entrepreneurial undertaking? Is it the role of
ports to do this point-to-point system, or is it something that
we buy off the shelf, or is our real job to make sure that our
systems will be able to integrate with those point-to-point
systems so that we can assure our customer and the public and
everybody else that we are doing our part to fit into whatever
comprehensive international system is developed?
Senator Murray. Ms. Riniker, in your testimony earlier you
mentioned the potential for obstructive turf wars between
agencies, which I think we are all concerned about. Have you
already seen evidence of turf wars?
Ms. Riniker. Well, I think everybody has sort of tiptoed
around that in there, because several folks have mentioned it.
I think the issue is that we have picked up signs of who is in
charge being a question that is being asked, actually more in
Washington, D.C. than out here in the Pacific Northwest, and so
I think reinforcing who is in the lead, and I think funding
that----
Senator Murray. Do you think that is the responsibility of
the Administration to do that?
Ms. Riniker. Yes, I do.
Senator Murray. I mean, we have got the Coast Guard,
Customs, Maritime Administration, local law enforcement, INS,
Transportation Security----
Ms. Riniker. Security Administration. Again, which on the
face of it, what one would have thought, homeland security, we
are seeing these agencies created, but we are not really seeing
the funding shift, and I am not sure that we should. I think
that it is vigilance that we are looking for here, and we have
seen some tripping over one another back in D.C.
Senator Murray. So do you want clarification?
Ms. Riniker. We do.
Senator Murray. Both of you have talked about the ports of
Tacoma, Seattle and Everett submitting a joint application to
TSA for a grant to help pay for the costs associated with new
security measures, and I do want to commend you for working
together on that, and I think that is really progress for all
of us. But can you share with us how you envision all the ports
coordinating their efforts to improve security under this
grant?
Ms. Riniker. Well, there are a couple, actually, we all
have got pieces in the grant where we are looking at addressing
the issues that you have raised about our own facilities, so I
think we are all committed to wanting to improve our own
ability to ensure the security of port facilities in each
location.
One of the more interesting things that is coming up in
this grant is something called a regional access control
system, where we are looking at how much of the information
that we all collect about both individuals using our port,
information about the boxes and the ships that are coming in,
how much of that can we form kind of a regional network to
share that is made available to the Federal agencies, to
Customs, to the Coast Guard, to INS, if that is what is
required.
So we have as a part of this grant request a desire to see
if we can do a better job of sharing the information that each
the ports has, not only among each other but with the Federal
agencies.
Mr. Sewell. Yes, that is correct, and I think the next step
there in one of the parts of our grant is to look at designing
potentially the feasibility, I guess, of us taking that
information as Andrea said and designing a central command
center, we have been talking with the Coast Guard about that.
Which presumably could be fed into any kind of national or
international system as well, but I think that the other part
of this is, I think although all of us have done vulnerability
assessments already, we are going back and doing a more
intensive vulnerability assessment regionally so that we are
making sure that we are putting all our resources in the region
in the right places. So I think that is the value of having all
three ports working together.
Ms. Riniker. And we are hoping that this regional system
might be a pilot. If we are going to have something like a
national identification system, or some national system of
sharing information, we are hoping that our regional effort
might be a pilot for that kind of program.
Senator Murray. As both of you know, your ports and all the
rest of the ports in the Nation pay into the Harbor Maintenance
Trust Fund. We do not get much back in this State. We are
facing a lot of daunting new requirements under security. Do
you think Congress should consider tapping that fund for the
security? This is for the record. I just thought I'd ask.
Mr. Sewell. For the record, I would say only as a second
option from getting rid of it. If we cannot get rid of it, and
I have only got a few more weeks here, but if somebody else
will pick up the weight and try to do that----
Senator Murray. We have not been successful in getting rid
of it. I just wonder what you thought about making it useful.
Mr. Sewell. Yes, we have always said then we ought to be
able to use it for things that of value in this region, and
security is certainly one that is of high value to us in this
region, but that would be our view on it.
Ms. Riniker. I was hoping before Steve moved on that he
would be successful in getting rid of it, but our view is
exactly the same.
ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED STATEMENTS
Senator Murray. Before we wrap up, does anybody have any
additional comments that they would like to give? If not, I
really appreciate all of our witnesses who are here today for
their testimony, and we will again take written testimony from
the public or individuals as part of the record of this
committee.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department,
City of Seattle
Chairwoman Murray and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Gil
Kerlikowske, and I am the Chief of Police for the Seattle Police
Department, City of Seattle. On behalf of Mayor Nickels, I appreciate
the opportunity to testify today about the role the Seattle Police
Department plays in protecting the security of citizens, commerce and
facilities in Elliott Bay and adjacent waters.
The Seattle Police Department has played a vital role in protecting
transportation traversing the inland waters of Puget Sound within our
jurisdiction and nearby areas. We recognize many Northwest workers are
dependent on the Puget Sound for employment and the viability of Puget
Sound is very important to the local economy and to the people who live
in the Northwest.
scope of problem
The City of Seattle is essentially an island that is geographically
situated between freshwater lakes and saltwater fairways, with 155
miles of shoreline.
The Puget Sound, bordering the west side of the city, teems with
activity and, aside from the 12 hour per day patrol of the Seattle
Police Harbor Unit (hereinafter Harbor Unit), has no specifically
dedicated security. On the Coleman Docks alone, thousands of people
embark or disembark hourly from the Washington State Ferries, a vital
economic link to the West Puget Sound. There is no directed routine
waterside night patrol of the ferry terminal, no way to respond (or
more importantly, deter) any act of aggression directed at this
potential target.
Flight paths into and out of our major airports are directly over
Elliott Bay and across major highways in the region. Twenty-four hours
a day, container ships loaded with sensitive commerce come well within
one mile of our downtown. Harbor Island houses a variety of fuels for
regional distribution for the Pacific Northwest. The prevailing winds
and currents also create a potential hazard to the city. The
positioning of our sports stadiums along the shores of Elliott Bay
place them in close proximity to many of the hazards I have discussed.
Additionally our local threat assessment includes several biotech
companies and critical public utility plants located near the water.
The Harbor Unit provides patrol in Elliott Bay during daylight
hours only. In partnership with the United States Coast Guard we
monitor the shipping lanes for vessels that may obstruct or do harm to
our commercial vessels as they arrive or depart our port authority. We
assist in providing unobstructed transit of all vessels and assure safe
passage in the Puget Sound traffic lanes.
Todd Shipyard provides routine scheduled maintenance, emergency
repairs, and overhauls on a wide range of U.S. Navy ships.
services provided
The September 11 terrorist attacks gave the issue of homeland
security a renewed national scope, and provided the Seattle Police
Department with unique challenges.
The Harbor Unit is providing primary waterborne security for the
U.S. Navy ships that are at berth or in dry dock at Todd Pacific
Shipyard in Elliott Bay. This includes a 24/7 official patrol staffed
with experienced Harbor and Special Weapons and Tactics Officers. The
Harbor Unit provides protection of a 100-yard Naval Vessel Protection
Zone established by the United States Coast Guard. This responsibility
includes early detection and formal interdiction of all immediate
threats to our U.S. Navy ships. The Police Dive Team partnering with
Navy EOD Divers participates in dive operations to sanitize and make
safe piers used in the docking of navy ships. Recently a restored
Boeing 307 Stratoliner was forced to ditch in Seattle's Elliott Bay
close to the Navy ships dry docked at Todd Shipyards. The plane went
down 45 minutes after takeoff from a local airfield. The initial
response of the Harbor Unit included the determination of a continuing
threat to navy ships and emergency rescue. The Harbor Unit provided
salvage service and dive operations to ensure the evidence of the
National Transportation Safety Board investigation was preserved.
The Harbor Unit is the primary agency providing marine security of
bridges and strategic sites following the February 2001 earthquake and
September 11 attacks. A recent threat made to bridges in Portland OR
has prompted continued monitoring.
The Harbor Unit continues to provide marine security for the Lake
Washington Ship Canal and Hiram M. Chittenden Locks. The locks are
crucial to the economic and ecological viability of our region. The
locks and ship canal provide a transportation route for tens of
thousands of vessels annually. Since September 11, the Harbor Unit
provides increased patrols around the Locks and carefully monitors any
suspicious activity observed.
The Seattle Police Department is the primary agency to all search
and rescue incidents in the waterways surrounding the City of Seattle.
Since September 11, we have responded to many surface water incidents
that range from capsized and sinking boats with people in the water,
boat fires, and the identification of ships with activated distress
beacons.
The Harbor Unit lends assistance to the Department of Ecology and
the Environmental Protection Agency in providing a boat platform for
aquatic science experimentation that measures the quality of our waters
and the impact on our salmon population. The Harbor Unit has ongoing
involvement with the State of Washington Fish and Game, providing the
use of our facility for continued monitoring of salmon populations in
our freshwater fisheries.
The Harbor Unit continues to monitor water pollution spills for the
United States Coast Guard. Harbor officers assist in the initiation of
vessel emergency spill plans and when request will dispatch petroleum
based spill absorbent into the water. We continue to provide this type
of service daily for the United States Coast Guard.
To facilitate the commercial viability of the City of Seattle and
at the request of the United States Coast Guard the Harbor Unit
maintained a 100-yard exclusionary zone for all vessels transiting in
the immediate area of the International cruise ships. We maintain a
presence around the ships from passenger load time until departure when
notified by the USCG to terminate the escort. It is anticipated this
program will be renewed during the cruise season May through September.
The Harbor Unit participated in the Seattle Anti-Smuggling Team a
program established by U.S. Customs. We have participated in regional
task force operations of freighter containers to identify contraband.
Harbor Officers also participated in the hull search of foreign vessel
requested by U.S. Customs to identify general descriptive anomalies. We
continue working with U.S. Customs and I.N.S. providing an immediate
vessel platform for tactical operations.
The Harbor Unit continues to work with the U.S. Army Corp of
Engineers to provide clean up of all navigable hazards in the Lake
Washington Ship Canal (Federal waters) and in the area around the
spillway to the Hiram M. Chittenden Locks. We claim all hazards and
place them in scrap booms at the Harbor Patrol Station or west of
Webster Point in Union Bay. We handle all requests for deadheads,
commercial waste drums, and man made piers and floats adrift due to
storm or environmental damage.
The Harbor Unit responds to incidents initiated by activities of
environmental/eco organizations. We provide patrol security to
potential targets to include NOAA research vessels, navy ships, fishing
boats, and university scientific vessels. The Harbor Unit provides
marine security for protective details to include visiting dignitaries
and elected officials.
conclusion
We are being tasked with increased frequency to participate in
activities that require partnership with local, state and numerous
federal agencies. In order to keep up with the increasing demands for
marine services in this region we must have additional resources. These
additional requests for security enhancements have been numerous and
unique and requires the need to add patrol boats to our inventory.
These boats will enable us to augment our aging and thinly stretched
vessel resources in order to provide the security demanded by our
seaport constituency. This request is being made at a time when local
and state resources are not available. Additional resources such as
fuel, equipment, maintenance, and communications equipment would also
be of great assistance to the Harbor Unit.
The Harbor Unit is the best resource on Puget Sound equipped,
trained, and ready to expand to meet the needs of our regional port
security requirements.
Thank you for this opportunity to present our request for
additional funding and we very much appreciate your consideration of
this matter.
______
Letter From Fred Felleman, MSc., NW Director, Ocean Advocates
Ocean Advocates,
Seattle, Washington, April 5, 2002.
Hon. Patty Murray,
Senate Subcommittee on Transportation, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairwoman Murray and Members of the Committee: I would like
to thank you for holding this field hearing at the Port of Seattle
today. The attention to the vulnerabilities of our Maritime
Transportation System to terrorism is greatly appreciated here in one
of the nation's busiest trading centers.
Trade statistics are often tabulated by individual Ports, which are
then used to compare trade volumes around the Country. While the Port
of Seattle generates a significant amount of trade to the region, it is
but one of a number of ports located along the inland waterways of
Washington State and British Columbia, Canada. The vast majority of
traffic calls on the region through the Strait of Juan de Fuca which is
exposed to the risk of over 15 billion gallons of oil being transported
as cargo and fuel by 10,000 ships which enter and leave the Strait each
year.
The strategic nature of this waterway is further defined by the
type of traffic utilizing the glacially carved Strait of Juan de Fuca.
Washington's waters serve as the homeport to 8 of the world's 18
Trident Submarines along with four other major Naval facilities.
Military maneuvers are regularly conducted within the Strait and off
the Coast. Washington State is also home to the nation's largest
passenger ferry system and boasts one of the highest per capita private
boat ownership. It also serves as a major source of refined oil, being
the West Coast's largest producer of jet fuel. Container traffic, with
its particularly hard to inspect cargo, has steadily increased over the
years as ships have gotten larger and ports have significantly expanded
their container yards on both sides of the boarder.
Senator Murray pointed out in her opening remarks at the hearing
held on Cargo Security in Washington, DC on March 21st, ``Our
government policies and regulations have largely been designed to
prevent an accidental release of hazardous materials. They have not
been designed to protect against a deliberate release.'' As you know
the State and federal governments have funded a rescue tug at the
entrance to the Strait over the past 4 winters to be available to
respond to shipping accidents. During that time the tug has been called
out 18 times (see http://www.ecy.wa.gov/biblio/0208001.html).
A Federal Port Security Grant Application was submitted by a
partnership of the Port of Port Angeles, Makah Indian Tribe's Port of
Neah Bay, and the Washington State Department of Ecology entitled,
``Improving the Security of Puget Sound Ports by Strengthening Port
Security Measures in the Strait of Juan De Fuca.'' Those parties are
seeking just over $1 million to match the State's commitment of $1.4
million to provide safety and security escorts for ships deemed to be
high risk by the Coast Guard. In addition, those monies would be used
to enhance the infrastructure of the Ports of Port Angeles and Neah Bay
in order to facilitate the tug's operation and inspection of vessels.
There is broad public support for this effort as evidenced by the April
4, 2002 cover story in the Peninsula Daily News and from the comments
made at the public meeting the Chair held that day in Port Angeles.
Unfortunately, due to nobody's fault, the computer system crashed
while the State was submitting its application. The State got
confirmation from MARAD acknowledging the problem. The State was
initially told that the grant would not be considered because of the
missed deadline, now they are told it will be considered. I bring this
to your attention because the safety and security of this strategic
waterway should not be held hostage to a computer malfunction and we
urge your oversight so that this application is given a fair review.
Governor Locke wrote a letter to the Chair on 23 October 2001
requesting her help to secure federal funds for the Neah Bay rescue
tug. In that letter he stated, ``The Coast Guard has had to redeploy
some of their coastal personnel and vessels to augment the security of
major Puget Sound ports, even while they have determined that the risk
of major oil spills continues to increased. In, addition to its primary
mission of assisting disabled vessels, the tug is available to monitor
or escort vessels that pose security or safety risks, provide initial
containment during spill events, conduct search and rescue operations,
and potentially assist the Coast Guard in any terrorist-initiated chain
of events.'' It is my understanding that the Washington State
Department of Ecology will be submitting copies of the Governor's
letter and the narrative portion of the grant to be made part of the
hearing record.
The need to enhance our nation's salvage capacity has been known
for many years, but has taken on particular urgency since September 11.
In 1994 the Marine Board's Committee on Marine Salvage Issues of the
National Research Council wrote, ``Congress should update the national
salvage policy to ensure that an adequate level of salvage capacity is
present in U.S. waters. The policy should clearly delineate the
following goals: to protect national security, to minimize or prevent
environmental impacts due to pollution from marine casualties, to
protect public safety, and to ensure minimal disruption to the U.S.
economy resulting from marine casualties in the nation's port and
waterways (p. 4).''
While the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster will be forever remembered by
the general public for 11 million gallons of oil spilled, among salvors
it will be remembered for the vast majority of oil that was safely
transferred to another ship. In contrast, the relatively small, New
Carissa, which grounded off the Oregon Coast in 1999 is the poster
child for what happens when adequate salvage capacity is not readily
available. The costs of the incident exceed $60 million, not counting
the U.S. Navy's contribution, and half the ship is still grounded on
Oregon's coast.
The Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) in the New Carissa, Captain
Mike Hall, stated, ``. . . [W]e are essentially an island nation with
over 47,000 miles of shorelines . . . approximately 85 percent of all
Americans live within 100 miles of these shorelines . . . 90 percent of
all international commerce enters the United States by vessel. One can
see from these facts that our nation's ports and waterways are the
backbone of the U.S. intermodal transportation system. This system must
include a national salvage plan. We need a salvage plan more capable
than that demonstrated during the initial stages of the NEW CARISSA
casualty. It was my belief on 4 February 1999 and it remains my belief
today, that adequate and timely salvage capability would have
significantly mitigated this crisis on the coast.' There are currently
only two salvage vessels on the Pacific coast capable of refloating a
large grounded ship, and neither was readily available to respond in
this case.''
In January 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy hosted the National
Maritime Salvage Conference in Seattle. The Admiralty Counsel to the
U.S Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, Richard Buckingham presented
a paper entitled, ``Toward a National Salvage Policy.'' The abstract to
his paper states:
The problem of inadequate domestic marine salvage capacity is well
documented and recognized by both the government and commercial
sectors; furthermore, the situation is not getting any better. Because
of the nation's overriding interest in the protecting the environment/
economy/marine transportation system (MTS), as well as meeting homeland
security needs, we need a cohesive federal national salvage policy. The
first step, however, will be identifying a federal agency to take the
lead in forging such a policy. Should it be the Coast Guard, the Navy,
or perhaps some other agency? Who appears best suited for the role?
Once the appropriate agency assumes (or is tasked with) this leadership
responsibility, what are some of the likely issues to be initially
confronted? Also, this pressing need for a national salvage policy
should really be a high profile issue on the agenda of the newly
created U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, as well as a specific focus of
the Department of Transportation's MTS policy and SEA-21 maritime
infrastructure funding initiatives.
The complete proceeding of the conference are available on CD Rom
and the March 2002 issue of the Marine Digest provides a summary of the
conference highlights (attached). Richard Buckingham is quoted as
saying, ``This is no longer just a matter of transportation, economic
and environmental concerns. It is also an issue of homeland security.''
However, the Coast Guard has yet to implement the salvage and fire
fighting rules mandated by Congress in OPA'90. Arnold Witte, head of
the American Salvage Association and president of Donjon Marine Co. is
quoted in Marine Digest as saying, ``The latest word is that federal
regulations will not be in place until 2004 . . . In today's world,
that is unacceptable. We're still waiting for salvage regulations that
are absolutely essential.''
While the Coast Guard and Navy try to resolve this longstanding
problem, I urge you to see that the port security grant that was filed
by the State of Washington, in cooperation with the Ports of Port
Angeles and Neah Bay, is looked on favorably by the reviewers at MARAD
and the Coast Guard. I urge you to pay particular attention to the
request of the Makah Tribe to have the U.S. Navy provide one of their
uniquely qualified T-ATF tugs for this service. The National Research
Council found in their 1994 report on Salvage, ``Surplus assets,
particularly the T-ATF class of ships, if operated by the private
sector and strategically deployed, could go a long way to restoring the
traditional salvage capacity of the United States, particularly in
rescue towing. The operation of these vessels by the private sector
would require substantial subsidy, as it has been demonstrated in the
United States and elsewhere that salvage revenues cannot cover the
costs of operating and maintaining the vessels and their crews. The
excess costs could be covered, as they were in the past, through the
Salvage Facilities Act, and the plan could be implemented through the
arrangements in place for Navy contracting for commercial salvage
services.'' (p. 55-56).
Thank you once again for seeking the input of local citizens as you
embark on this important effort to protect our Nation's ports and
waterways. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any of the
supporting documents or if there is anything else I can do to assist
you in your deliberations.
Sincerely,
Fred Felleman, MSc.,
NW Director, Ocean Advocates.
Ocean Advocates works with policy makers in government, industry
and the academic community throughout the world to provide information
needed to form sound global ocean policies. Our approach is objective
and open minded, but not neutral--we have a bias for the oceans.
______
State of Washington,
Office of the Governor,
Olympia, Washington, October 23, 2001.
Hon. Patty Murray,
United States Senate, 173 Russell Senate Office Building, Washington,
DC.
Hon. Norm Dicks,
United States House of Representatives, 2467 Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
United States Senate, 717 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Hon. Rick Larsen,
United States House of Representatives, 1529 Longworth House Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senators Murray and Cantwell and Congressmen Dicks and Larsen:
I am writing to request your help in securing Federal funding for
the Neah Bay rescue tug. This vessel is invaluable in protecting our
State's shoreline and marine waters from oil spills.
As background, a majority of the bipartisan North Puget Sound Oil
Spill Risk-Management Panel voted in favor of establishing a permanent,
government-funded rescue tug at Neah Bay. Our state committed $1.5
million far emergency tug services last winter, and another $1.7
million for the coming season, but I am concerned that the current
economic downturn may jeopardize State funding far 2002-2003.
The Coast Guard has had to redeploy same of their coastal personnel
and vessels to augment the security of major Puget Sound ports (news
article enclosed), even while they have determined that the risk of
major oil spills continues to increase. This redeployment reduces our
coastal search and rescue, security and small-vessel towing
capabilities. The multi-purpose rescue tug Barbara Foss (which arrived
at Neah Bay on September 15) is even more indispensable given the
reduced Coast Guard presence. In addition to its primary mission of
assisting disabled vessels, the tug is available to monitor or escort
vessels that pose security or safety risks, provide initial containment
during spill events, conduct search and rescue operations, and
potentially assist the Coast Guard in any terrorist-initiated chain of
events.
I urge you to support dedicated Federal funding for the rescue tug
during the ongoing Congressional budget discussions related to homeland
security. Such funding should be an addition to the Coast Guard's
operating budget, as we do not want to detract in any way from the
Coast Guard's ability to complete its many important missions.
I appreciate any assistance you can provide. If you have questions,
please call me or Tom Fitzsimmons, Department of Ecology Director, at
(360) 407-7001.
Sincerely,
Gary Locke,
Governor.
______
Letter From Dale Jensen, Program Manager, Spill Prevention,
Preparedness, and Response Program, Department of Ecology, State of
Washington
State of Washington, Department of Ecology,
Seattle, Washington, April 4, 2002.
Hon. Patty Murray,
Senate Subcommittee on Transportation, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Murray: Thank you for your leadership in marine
transportation safety and security. I appreciate the opportunity to
provide input during today's Port Security field hearing in Seattle.
While the Department of Ecology is not an expert in port security, we
believe that the multi-mission Neah Bay rescue tug could play an
important role in protecting this vital waterway from potential threat
of terrorist attack. It can also improve the security of Puget Sound
ports by strengthening infrastructure in the Strait of Juan De Fuca as
our first line of defense before high risk vessels reach their port of
final destination.
The 2002 Washington State Legislature has provided another $1.4
million in funding to provide 200 days of rescue tug service at Neah
Bay during the period July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003. We are offering
the Federal Government an opportunity to leverage any additional
funding it provides with the State monies.
The Department of Ecology is working in partnership with the Port
of Port Angeles and the Makah Indian Tribe's Port of Neah Bay to
complete a port security grant application to MARAD that requests a
portion of the $93 million available. In addition to the rescue tug,
our partnership proposes important improvements for the ports of Port
Angeles and Neah Bay. Among other improvements the proposal would
enhance the ability of these ports to accommodate vessels that are
detained by Federal authorities, improve security from unauthorized
access, and at the same time improve berthing for large vessels. A
summary of our partnership proposal is attached for your consideration.
The State remains committed to maintaining the rescue tug at Neah
Bay. Evidence of that commitment is provided by Governor Locke's
attached letter to you, and the State Legislature's Senate Joint
Memorial to Congress (SJM 8004) which is also attached.
The Department of Ecology urges you to provide Federal funding to
increase forward-deployed security assets in the Strait of Juan De Fuca
to enhance the ability of Federal agencies to intervene in potential
terrorist threats prior to those threats entering Puget Sound proper.
The multi-mission Neah Bay Rescue Tug could play an important role in
this effort.
If you have any questions, please call me at (360) 407-7450.
Sincerely,
Dale Jensen,
Program Manager, Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response
Program.
______
Federal Port Security Grant Application, April 2002
improving the security of puget sound ports by strengthening port
security measures in the strait of juan de fuca
Background
The Strait of Juan De Fuca is the entry point for all vessels bound
for Puget Sound ports, refineries, Department of Defense facilities,
and population centers. It is also the primary route for vessel traffic
inbound to British Columbia ports through vessel traffic separation
lanes in waters of the United States and State of Washington. The Port
of Port Angeles is the first United States harbor in the Straits that
can and routinely does accommodate deep draft vessels. Port Angeles is
also the U.S. terminus for vehicle and passenger ferries from Victoria,
British Columbia. The Port of Neah Bay, owned by the Makah Tribe is
located near Cape Flattery at the entrance to the Strait of Juan De
Fuca.
In 2001, nearly 10,000 deep draft vessel transits carried over 15
billion gallons of oil as cargo and fuel through the Strait of Juan De
Fuca from ports from all over the world. Additionally, there were 1,814
vehicle and passenger ferry transits occurred between Port Angeles,
Washington and Victoria, British Columbia, Canada.
The Straits are a point of entry to a number of critical national
seaports including:
--5 major crude oil petroleum refineries;
--U.S. Naval facilities at Bangor, Everett, Bremerton, and the Oak
Harbor Naval Air Station;
--The commercial ports of Seattle, Tacoma, Everett, Port Angeles,
Bellingham, Olympia, and others. These ports move:
containerized, bulk, break-bulk and ro-ro cargos; and are the
terminus for international vehicle and passenger ferries, and
cruise ships.
Both Puget Sound and British Columbia sea ports handle a wide range
and enormous volume of commodities.
Given the need to ensure protection of this vital waterway from
potential terrorist attack threat an up grading of our security network
is required. This grant application is submitted as a partnership among
the Port of Port Angeles, the Makah Tribe, and the Washington State
Department of Ecology requesting a total of $1,095,000.
There is a critical need to advance the security of Puget Sound.
This proposal improves the ability of Federal security and defense
jurisdictions to intervene in potential terrorist threats before they
approach the major Puget Sound facilities. The Strait of Juan De Fuca
should be the region's first line of defense, not a simple conveyance
of vessels posing a potential threat. Early identification of risks and
immediate intervention is the key. This local/tribal/State partnership
improves the Federal Government's ability to intervene in potential
threats prior to the threat entering Puget Sound proper.
The Federal Government should not use the city and port of Port
Angeles, Washington to detain and secure vessels that pose a terrorist
threat without appropriate federally funded improvements.
The Port of Neah Bay proposed dock improvements to enhance its
ability to support port security operations including the Neah Bay
Rescue Tug.
The multi-mission Neah Bay Rescue Tug is an existing forward
deployed 126 foot ocean tug whose current mission can easily
accommodate port security applications. It also provides an opportunity
for the Federal Government to leverage $1.4 million in money available
from the State of Washington that will be used to deploy the tug for at
least 200 days during the winter of 2002-2003.
Grant Application
This Port Security Grants Program application is based on the
security needs of Puget Sound seaports. This application is for a grant
to finance the cost of enhancing facility security at the Port of Port
Angeles and improve operational security in the Strait of Juan De Fuca
through the Neah Bay Rescue Tug.
The Port of Port Angeles proposes that grant monies be used to
enhance ``Facility and Operational Security--including facility access
control, physical security, and cargo security and passenger
security''. The Port of Port Angeles' project should be considered as a
demonstration project on how an international port can protect the
nation by improving the management of passenger ferry traffic, as it
did when the terrorist Amad Ressam entered Port Angeles via a ferry
from Victoria, British Columbia. The Port would also provide a secure
location for boarding and detaining vessels that pose a potential
terrorist threats before they enter the highest threat portion of the
waterway (in this case Puget Sound).
The Department of Ecology has produced 2 reports on the Neah Bay
Rescue Tug can be found at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/biblio/0208001.html
and http://www.ecy.wa.gov/biblio/0008023.html. The reports evaluate and
discuss the value of the tug in marine safety and security
applications. The Neah Bay Rescue Tug should be used as a port security
asset in addition to preventing vessel grounding due to propulsion and
steering failures.
The application partnership believe this proposal meets the
attributes of protecting:
--A ``strategic port'';
--A nationally important economic port (in this case all Puget Sound
ports) responsible for a large volume of cargo movement or for
movement of products that are vital to U.S. economic interests
as required for national security; and
--Ports and terminals responsible for movement of high volume of
passengers.
Proposal
Specifically, the partners propose that grant monies would be used
to improve the security of Puget Sound and its ports by strengthening
security measures in ``gateway'' Strait of Juan De Fuca. This
application proposes 2 sets of improvements:
Obtain $500,000 in Federal port security grant monies to improve
the Port of Port Angeles' ability to secure vessels diverted to Port
Angeles harbor for inspection, and improve shore-side port property
including improvements to facilities related to international ferry
passenger/vehicle debarkation. The port proposes the following specific
improvements inclusive of labor, equipment, and material:
--Dock improvements including installation of mooring dolphins--
$250,000;
--Security fencing and lighting--$150,000; and
--Gates, security cameras and other improvements--$100,000.
Obtain $95,000 in Federal port security grant monies to improve the
Makah Indian Tribe's Port of Neah Bay's ability to support larger
vessels including the Neah Bay Rescue Tug.
--Installation of mooring dolphins--$60,000; and
--Electrical upgrades to 208V/3 Phase--$35,000.
Obtain $500,000 in Federal port security grant monies to leverage
the $1.4 million in State money that was provided by the Washington
State legislature to station a rescue tug at Neah Bay, Washington for
at least 200 days during the time period of July 1, 2002 through June
30, 2003. The Federal grant monies would be used to extend the period
the rescue tug is available and expand the contractor's (Foss Maritime,
at this time) responsibilities to provide for its use by personnel from
Coast Guard Station Neah Bay and other Federal law enforcement
personnel. The State of Washington agrees to negotiate the contract for
tug operation consistent with reasonable Federal security needs. All
costs associated with managing tug's operation (excepting Federal
security operations and personnel), including contract management, will
be provided at no additional cost to the grantor. The bottom-line is
that 100 percent of grant funds would be used to expand the mission and
extend term of operation of the tug (including labor, equipment, and
material) to:
--Support the Sea Marshal boarding program allowing U.S. Coast Guard
Station Neah Bay personnel (and other law enforcement
personnel) to board vessels (considered by Federal authorities
to be high risk) at the entrance to the Strait of Juan De Fuca.
The tug is a large platform with good sea-keeping ability,
``lots of steel'', heavy fendering, good maneuverability, and
the capability of closely approaching vessel in open water for
the boarding vessels.
--Prior to entering Puget Sound waters, initiate the escort of
vessels that pose a potential security threat. Example of such
vessels could include those failing to make their 96 hour
advanced notice of arrival, or otherwise rank highly on the
threat matrix.
--Reconnaissance of suspicious vessels in the vicinity of the
entrance to the Strait of Juan De Fuca, approximately 100 miles
west of Puget Sound proper.
The applicants do not believe that further security assessments are
needed in relation to these proposals. Further assessment would only
delay implementation of the needed improvements and put Puget Sound
Ports at additional risk. However, the applicants would involve all
appropriate Federal, State, and local officials in the detailed design
and implementation of the proposals. Vital to successful implementation
will be input from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
Customs in the Port of Port Angeles portion of the proposal and the
Coast Guard and Navy in the Washington Department of Ecology portion of
the proposal.
The Coast Guard and Navy have implemented a number of measures on
the outer coast and in Puget Sound since September 11, 2001. We
understand that relatively little has been done to improve security in
the Strait, in fact significant U.S. Coast Guard resources have been
moved from Washington's coast into Puget Sound to enhance the port
security mission. This has the potential effect of increasing the
terrorist threat in the Strait. These are measures that have not been
made public.
The proposals set forth by the application partnership addresses
three critical security vulnerabilities:
1. Ability to isolate trucks and cars of potential international
terrorists who have arrived in Port Angeles via the passenger and
vehicle ferry from Victoria, British Columbia.
2. Ability to secure high risk vessels at the Port of Port Angeles
which have been detained as a posing a possible international terrorist
threat.
3. Improve the ability to observe, escort, and board suspicious
vessels that may pose a threat of international terrorism by expanding
the mission of the existing rescue tug stationed at the far Western
entrance to the Strait of Juan De Fuca-Neah Bay.
The benefits of the proposals include:
--The applicants anticipate that there will be a considerable
outcomes of reduction in the of vulnerability of Puget Sound
ports by intervening in potential terrorist threats in the
Strait of Juan De Fuca. This allows for a proactive approach to
managing risks at the point of entry into waters of the United
States and the point of international ferry passenger
debarkation.
--The entire Puget Sound basin first line of defense will not be
enhanced if the proposed measures are not implemented.
--The Neah Bay Rescue tug has been in place during the last 4
winters. However, the contract for the tug does not currently
identify a port security mission. Should this application be
funded, the contract would be expanded to include the port
security mission.
--The Port of Port Angeles has not had adequate funding to make
critically needed improvements since 9/11/01. The Port of Port
Angeles needs to improve a range of existing security measures,
including, but not limited to personnel access identification
procedures, access control, internal security, perimeter
security, security alarms/video surveillance/communication
systems, training and security awareness, and security plans,
if it is expected to play a significant role in being at the
front lines of protecting Puget Sound from the threat of
terrorist actions.
Expected outcome, and how the proposed methodology would improve/
enhance national security
Port security improvements at the Port of Port Angeles and
improving the ability of Federal law enforcement agencies to interdict
high risk vessels in the Strait of Juan De Fuca have obvious advantages
to enhancing national security as discuss above.
Cost-sharing arrangements
Grant monies for rescue tug would leverage the $1.4 million in
State money that was provided by the Washington State legislature to
station the tug at Neah Bay, Washington for at least 200 days during
the time period of July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003. The Federal
grant monies would be used to extend the period the rescue tug is
available and expand the contractor's (Foss Maritime, at this time)
responsibilities to provide for its use by personnel from Coast Guard
Station Neah Bay and other Federal law enforcement personnel. The grant
monies could be provided directly to the Department of Ecology or
through the Port of Port Angeles or possibly managed by the 13th
District, U.S. Coast Guard.
Partnership and Qualifications
The partnership consists of:
--Port of Port Angeles--Contacts: Port of Port Angeles Executive
Director Clyde Boddy, and Deputy Executive Director David
Hagiwara.
--The Makah Indian Tribes Port of Neah Bay--Contact: Bob Buckingham,
Port Manager, and the Honorable Gordon Smith, Tribal Council
Chairman.
--Department of Ecology--Contacts: Program Manger Dale Jensen, and
Jon Neel.
The Port of Port Angeles and Department of Ecology management teams
have many years of experience in managing multi-faceted projects and
would be happy to supply additional information upon request.
Project Timing
All projects are anticipated to be completed within 12 months of
receipt of funding with the exception of mooring dolphin construction
which will be completed within 18 months of funding receipt.
______
Prepared Statement of the Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO, Puget
Sound Ports Council
Maritime workers will be the ``first responders'' and bear the
greatest casualties in the event of a calamity on the Puget Sound
waterfront. Maritime trades workers include Longshoremen, Mechanics,
Boilermakers, Marine Engineers, Electricians, Tugboatmen, Pile Drivers,
Harbor Pilots, Port Police, Truck Drivers, Ship's Officers, Restaurant
& Hotel Workers, Machinists, Plumbers and Pipe-fitters and Merchant
Seamen of all ranks and ratings. Our personal safety and livelihoods
will be directly affected by your decisions. It is appropriate that our
voices are heard during the course of your deliberations.
During the subcommittee hearings held in Seattle on April 4, 2002,
Senator Murray urged all partners to ``step up'' and play their part in
maintaining port security. Maritime workers have always been and will
continue ``stepping up'' to the plate. However, if the problems ahead
are to be adequately addressed workers must have input into the
process.
Specifically, maritime workers are concerned about the focus of the
current deliberations. We believe that the focus should be where the
threat is greatest. Our ports are at the very end of a complex
transportation chain that originates overseas. Vast amounts of money
are made transporting goods in and out of the United States. The
demands for the ever more efficient flow of commerce should not inhibit
changes that are necessary to protect U.S. ports and citizens.
The focus for change should start at foreign points of origin, with
international shippers who are shipping goods to U.S. ports and with
ocean carriers that transport our trade. American seafarers have known
for many years that adequate control and inspection of containerized
cargo is virtually impossible under current practices.
A typical large container ship may carry as many as 6,000 TEU's
(``twenty-foot equivalent units''--the industry standard for
containers). This size container vessel generates some 40,000 documents
pertaining to the cargo. Although containers vary in size from the
``twenty foot'' industry standard to other larger lengths including,
forty and forty-five foot units, even small container vessels carry
upwards of five-hundred to seven hundred containers or ``boxes.''
Except as limited by the size of a container and absent adequate
scrutiny of information at the point of origin, anything can be shipped
into United States ports.
At present, shipboard and port safety is dependent on the honesty
of shippers and carriers. It is estimated that in 2001 some 9 million
TEU's arrived in U.S. ports by sea. That works out to 17,000 actual
boxes per day. More arrive every day by truck or train from Canada.
Maintaining this tremendous flow of cargo could hardly be accomplished
if every container and manifest was inspected.
However, scrutiny of shippers and carriers is absolutely necessary.
Data banks on shippers and carriers need to be developed. Cargo
profiles must be established to identify suspicious shipments. This
must be done at the point of origin rather than at the destination in a
U.S. port. Shippers and their agents and consignees, freight
forwarders, logistics suppliers and transportation intermediaries must
be held legally responsible to provide accurate cargo data. Ocean
carriers need to be examined to ascertain responsible parties. All
could be gradually certified as a prerequisite to continued business
operations in this country. Entry into our commercial markets is a
tremendous opportunity. The privilege should entail responsibility from
shippers and ocean carriers alike.
A recent New York Times article (October 8, 2001) noted that the
Al-Qaeda owned a fleet of merchant vessels hidden under various flags
of convenience. Every day, vessels enter our ports whose owners are
virtually anonymous. Anything from illegal immigrants, contraband or
explosive devices can be carried aboard these vessels. Much has been
said since September 11 regarding background checks for U.S. citizen
workers who make their living in the maritime industry. We are calling
for background checks and certification for the shippers and ocean
carriers who choose to bring their business into our ports.
Fly-by-night ship owners, operators and shippers are endemic in the
international maritime industry. The focus should start on these
entities if we are serious about port security.
Regarding container shipments, it is obvious to anyone who has
worked aboard ship or at a marine terminal that empty, unsealed
containers represent a potential security hazard. No container should
be loaded aboard ship unless it is sealed and certified by a
responsible party as empty. Loaded, sealed containers must have
accurate descriptions of their contents in appropriate manifests. The
data must be certified by responsible parties in the transportation
chain.
The United States Coast Guard has regulated most of the vessel-
operating personnel represented by our organization for many years. Our
members are among the most highly regulated workers in America.
Background checks and stringent training requirements for U.S. Coast
Guard documented personnel are not new. What is disturbing is that (i)
there is an irrational and unwarranted urgency to extend this condition
to American citizen shore-side workers, and (ii) there is no apparent
urgency to extend equivalent requirements to the hundreds of foreign
seafarers who every day bring dozens of foreign-flag vessels in and out
of United States ports.
We are concerned that American maritime workers and United States
flag employers will be burdened with more regulations, while the rest
of the industry carries on with business as usual. Recent events bear
this out.
In February of this year the U.S. Coast Guard created a double
standard by delaying the enforcement of internationally agreed training
standards for foreign seafarers working in U.S. waters. These standards
established by the International Maritime Organization (``IMO'') are
known as Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, 1995 (known as ``STCW95''). After intense pressure from the
international maritime community, foreign seafarers in U.S. ports were
exempted from these regulations for at least 6 months. At the same time
the U.S. Coast Guard is enforcing these requirements for American
seafarers. Although this is a training issue as opposed to a security
issue, there is little doubt among mariners that American seafarers
will continue to be given the highest degree of regulation and
scrutiny, be it training or security, while our foreign competitors
will continue on unhindered.
Shore-side workers should not be subject to onerous background
checks and security regulations at this point of time when just about
any foreign interest can ship unspecified goods into or operate
anonymously owned vessels in U.S. waters. This contradiction has been
not been addressed in any of the discussions that this organization has
heard, much less participated in.
If the question of why there is a double standard has become moot
by the course of events, then at least American standards of due
process must be maintained. Logically, waterfront workers are part of
the solution rather than part of the problem. Our workers are better
placed than most to determine who does not belong in, around and aboard
our workplaces. Instead, we are the first to be considered potential
suspects. We are deeply concerned that the new regulatory scheme will
have the potential to deny many of our workers their livelihoods
without due process and without contributing one iota to increased port
security.
Any background checks of maritime workers should be carefully
tailored to promote port security against terrorism and crime.
Incumbent workers with several years of service should be exempted from
new requirements. In all cases in which background checks lead to
questions of disqualification from employment the right to a hearing
with due process protections including the right to a hearing,
representation, a presentation of the facts upon which the
disqualification is based and an appeal process must be included. If
maritime workers are to be investigated in this manner then all others
who have free access to cargo and ship manifests should be similarly
scrutinized. Anything less would make a mockery of the legislative
intent regarding port security.
In the greater picture, true port security, would mean national
maritime security. We are the world's greatest trading nation, yet we
carry less than three percent of our ocean-going foreign trade aboard
American-flag vessels. No great trading nation in history has allowed
itself to be as dependent on foreign shipping interests as the United
States currently is. Our economic and military security, let alone our
port security are primarily dependent on foreign ocean carriers,
foreign seafarers and foreign shipping interests. It is strange that
the focus of the ``port security'' discussions seems to on criminal
background checks for a relative handful of U.S. citizen longshoremen
when any one of hundreds of thousands of international shippers can
load just about anything into a container bound for a United States
port.
Our Federal Government should be focusing on a comprehensive
maritime policy that promotes the U.S. flag shipping and an even
playing field for all players in the transportation chain. Bona fide
foreign carriers and shippers should be certified and held to the same
standards of responsibility as their American counterparts. This should
be a condition of having access to our ports. Ultimately, United States
flag, citizen-crewed ships, which carry a reasonable proportion of U.S.
foreign trade, is the best protection of our maritime as well as our
port security. Security is dependent on self-reliance. Port security is
an extension of maritime security. We cannot reasonably expect to have
either if our foreign trade is for all practical purposes carried and
controlled by foreign interests.
Thank you for considering these thoughts.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)
Like the majority of States around the country, Washington faces
the tremendous challenge of implementing new security measures that
respond to homeland defense issues since September 11 while struggling
with budget shortfalls. (The National Governors Association has
estimated a fiscal year 2002 State budget shortfall of between $40
billion and $50 billion.) Unlike many States, Washington has an
extremely high need for vigilant homeland protection due to:
--Crucial seaports, which ensure the economic lifeblood of the State
but also serve as the point of entry for potential threats to
the United States from the Asia Pacific region;
--Already identified threats, such as the attempt of a documented
terrorist to enter the State with a carload of explosives
intended for a terrorist act at the L.A.International Airport;
--Exposed territorial borders with Canada;
--Strategic U.S. military bases, including a strategic naval
submarine base;
--Critical private sector assets, including Boeing and Microsoft;
--Nuclear power plant and storage facilities;
--Populations centers with globally recognized urban architecture;
--Vulnerability to ballistic missiles from Northeast Asia; and
--Important dams and bridges essential for our energy, agricultural,
and transportation needs.
The State's public and private leaders now must determine how best
to protect their citizens and these assets against possible future
terrorist attacks. Through the allocation of assistance funds, the
Federal Government is beginning to help the States to ease the budget
shortfalls that might impede effective solutions. Starting in October,
the Federal Government will allocate $3.5 billion to enable the States
to effectively manage homeland defense efforts, most notably through
the allocation of funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency
and Department of Justice grants. Given the vital strategic assets in
Washington State, a large constituency of public and private interests
must be part of the debate on how this Federal assistance is used. In
preparation to receive these Federal allocations, Washington State must
develop a concerted plan to determine how these disparate groups can
all contribute to the homeland security debate to ensure that the
Federal funds are used effectively, flexibly, and accountably.
Although it is human nature to look for one easy solution, no such
solution exists for a national strategy toward homeland security. While
measures such as electronic seals to prevent tampering with containers,
gamma-ray inspection systems to examine containers, vehicles, and
trucks, and passenger background checks for aircraft and cruise ships,
are integral to a comprehensive and effective security program, there
is no single technology--no ``silver bullet'' solution--to ensure
security. An integrated effort among Federal, State, local, and private
sector interests is critical.
This integrated approach should provide a forum for and
coordination of interests from public and private sector constituents
to address how the Washington State can:
--Understand, track, and monitor security threats to the State and
region, many of which are likely to originate in the Asia
Pacific;
--Explore options for protecting the State's interests against those
threats;
--Examine the perceptions of our major trading partners toward the
State's security measures;
--Analyze the potential impact to the State's economy of adopting new
port security measures;
--Provide a forum for public and private sector officials to think
through the strategic consequences of new policies being
implemented locally by U.S. Customs, U.S. Coast Guard, FBI,
INS, and the Transportation Security Agency;
--Develop innovative approaches for the State Executive and
Legislative branches to share security-related information with
Federal agencies as required;
--Establish a ``community of interest'' for networked access to
independent and government analyses, roundtable discussions,
and coordinated posting of critical State policies and
decisions to all State web pages (as directed);
--Host seminars, discussion groups, and roundtables to facilitate
timely communication among diverse State and local constituents
on emerging issues of interest; and
--Work with State officials to develop an approach to ``Threat
Forecasting'' for use within the State--to communicate risks to
citizens, to respond to alerts from the U.S. Homeland Security
Office, and to establish a database permitting longer-term
pattern analysis of what kinds of threats the State and Pacific
Northwest are facing.
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) has identified three
approaches the State might take to accomplish these goals.
(1) The Homeland Security Model
Using this model, all coordination is accomplished from the top
down, whereby the Federal Office of Homeland Security transmits goals
and activities to Washington State's homeland defense representative,
Adjutant General Timothy Lowenberg. This is the model that has been in
use in the seven and a half months since the terrorist attacks, and,
while it has been an invaluable first response, the wide range of
specific vulnerabilities of Washington State dictate that security
solutions must originate from the bottom up. In recent testimony before
Congress and in press releases, Washington's Governor Gary Locke and
governors from around the country have expressed concern that the top-
down method leaves State and local leaders without the necessary access
to Federal intelligence and understanding of real threats. Federal
coordination of homeland security is a necessity, but, in order to
effectively respond to the specific needs of Washington, solutions must
be indigenous to the State.
(2) The 1962 Federal-Aid Highway Act Model
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Randall Yim, director of National
Preparedness, proposed the need for regional agreements whereby a
``State shares services, personnel, supplies, and equipment with
counties, towns, and municipalities within the State, with neighboring
States, or, in the case of States bordering Canada, with jurisdictions
in another country'' (GAO-02-62IT). In support of this testimony, Mr.
Yim identified the 1962 Federal-Aid Highway Act as a model that might
aid regional cooperative planning and coordination of security. Yim
emphasized the importance the Federal program gives to the role of
State and local officials in developing a plan to meet regional
transportation needs. The model continues to be in use in the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) program. This
model could be applied to Washington State's homeland defense efforts
by involving the relevant public and private organizations and
interests groups (i.e., the Ports, the U.S. military services, the
Coast Guard, INS, Customs, British Columbia/Canadian officials, etc.)
in cooperatively planning and coordinating regional security.
(3) Northwest Security Studies Institute Model
NBR proposes that the State of Washington and its private sector
create a Northwest Security Studies Institute (NSSI). NSSI will be the
State's think tank, where the strategic implications of public and
economic security policies may be analyzed, debated, and communicated
among the State's public and private sector constituents. NSSI will
leverage the well-established expertise of the Seattle-based National
Bureau of Asian Research, whose analyses of Asian economies, politics,
and political-military capabilities have been instrumental to
investment planning of the State's private sector and strategic
planning of the U.S. Pacific Command in addition to policy planning
within the executive branch and Congress. NBR also has extensive
experience in balancing security concerns with the need to encourage
trade. The NSSI concept would create an independent forum to enable
Federal, State, and local officials and private sector representatives
to jointly define a common strategic approach to public and economic
security planning. By establishing a non-profit think tank through NBR,
State and local government authorities and private sector officials
will have access to scholars and analysts with proven track records in
strategic threat assessments, national security policy perspectives,
and Asian regional studies.
Regardless of the ultimate model, or hybrid, employed, the State of
Washington does not need to create a new public agency to implement
security efforts. All the capabilities and personnel are already here.
Strong and effective local and State leaders want to make a difference
and are working effectively to coordinate with Federal administrators.
The State is the home to a robust community of nonprofit organizations,
and the local private sector is eager to assist in efforts to ensure
the security of the State's citizens and trade infrastructure. As
Washington State's public and private leaders develop indigenous and
sustainable homeland security measures they must discourage the
replacement of State funds with Federal monies and they must understand
that security solutions will unavoidably entail the intersection of
concerns from the local, State, regional, and national levels.
Above all, the crucial balance will be in ensuring that these
security measures are not implemented in a vacuum. The State of
Washington faces a real need to protect its citizens and borders in a
way that also protects the sustainability and profitability of the
economy. Foreign trade is a fundamental lifeline of the economy, and
understanding the threats from and the perspectives and sensitivities
of the State's commercial trading partners is a top priority.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Murray. This subcommittee now stands in recess
until Tuesday, April 16th, when we will hear testimony from the
Federal Aviation Administration.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., Thursday, April 4, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
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