[Senate Hearing 107-589]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-589
SECURITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 13, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-033 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BILL NELSON, Florida BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Security of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Facilities
December 13, 2001
Page
Wells, Dr. Linton, II, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. 2
Blaisdell, Maj. Gen. Franklin J., Director, Nuclear and
Counterproliferation, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Air and Space Operations, U.S. Air Force....................... 4
Dwyer, RADM Dennis M., Director, Strategic Systems Program
Office, U.S. Navy.............................................. 10
Haeckel, Brig. Gen. Ronald J., USAF, Acting Deputy Administrator
for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration. 13
(iii)
SECURITY OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Reed, Ben Nelson,
Allard, and Sessions.
Committee staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel.
Minority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
minority counsel; and Brian R. Green, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert and Thomas C.
Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Barry Gene Wright,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Marshall A. Hevron, assistant to
Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric
Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Wayne Glass, assistant
to Senator Bingaman; Margaret Hemenway, assistant to Senator
Smith; and Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN
Senator Reed. Good afternoon. Let me call this hearing to
order. I'd like to welcome our witnesses. Today the Strategic
Subcommittee meets to receive testimony and discuss a matter of
great importance to United States national security interests,
the security of United States nuclear weapons. While the
security of nuclear weapons has always been a high priority,
since September 11 we have become even more cognizant of the
importance of ensuring that these weapons remain secure.
In this hearing we will cover all aspects of nuclear
weapons security, including personnel security, the physical
security of sites, security during transportation, emergency
response capabilities, and the security features of nuclear
weapons themselves. This hearing will start in open session. At
the conclusion of the witnesses' statements and one round of
questions, we will proceed to room 232A of the Russell Building
for a closed session.
Our witnesses this morning represent all elements of the
nuclear weapons complex. They are: Dr. Linton Wells, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence; Maj. Gen. Franklin J.
Blaisdell, Director of Nuclear and Counterproliferation, Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, U.S.
Air Force; RADM Dennis M. Dwyer, Director of Strategic Systems
Program Office, U.S. Navy; and Brig. Gen. Ron Haeckel, U.S. Air
Force, Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
National Nuclear Security Administration.
Security associated with nuclear weapons has, by necessity,
always been high. Today, we would like to discuss all aspects
of the security of U.S. nuclear weapons, but particularly the
impact of September 11 on the approach to nuclear weapons
security. I would like each of the witnesses to discuss what
improvements have been made since September 11, what
improvements still need to be made, what is needed to carry out
these improvements, and whether these identified improvements
are enough to maintain high security for these weapons.
The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) have requested an additional
$118 million for increased nuclear security requirements. I
would like to discuss this request and also discuss whether
there are additional needs in the Air Force or the Navy. I
would like to welcome each of you to the subcommittee today and
we look forward to hearing from you on this important issue.
I expect that we will be joined shortly by my colleague,
the ranking member, Senator Allard of Colorado. When he does
arrive, I would interrupt the witnesses to allow Senator Allard
to give his statement. But at this point, I would like to
recognize Dr. Wells. Your statement will be made a part of the
record, Dr. Wells.
STATEMENT OF DR. LINTON WELLS II, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND
INTELLIGENCE
Dr. Wells. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate
the opportunity to speak today, to talk about the Department of
Defense's policies and procedures for ensuring the security of
nuclear weapons in our custody. I've submitted a written
statement for the record, as you've noted. Because of their
destructive power and their political as well as their military
importance, nuclear weapons require special protection, indeed
the highest level of protection that we can provide. The
storage, handling, transportation, and maintenance of nuclear
weapons are grave responsibilities the Department takes very
seriously. This has never been more important than now, in
light of the events of the September 11 terrorist attacks
against the United States.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), my
office is responsible for the policies that provide for the
physical protection of nuclear weapons, and for the personnel
reliability program. This ensures only the best qualified and
most reliable people are selected to perform nuclear weapons
related functions. The services who have physical custody of
the weapons implement these policies, and the Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff provides oversight through periodic
inspections that are conducted through the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, or DTRA.
This is a system of overlapping, interlocking programs and
procedures, defense in depth, if you will, whose resultant
security is greater than the sum of its parts. These are our
highest priority weapons, and they receive the highest level of
protection. I provided additional information in my written
statement and welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wells follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Linton Wells II
Mr Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you
for giving me the opportunity to discuss with you today the Department
of Defense's (DOD) policies and procedures for ensuring the security of
nuclear weapons in our custody. I commend you for conducting this
hearing and for assembling a panel that can provide both a policy and
an operational picture to the subcommittee.
Because of their destructive power and political as well as
military importance, nuclear weapons require special protection--the
highest level of protection we can provide. The storage, handling,
transportation, and maintenance of nuclear weapons are grave
responsibilities that the Department takes very seriously. This has
never been more important than now in light of the events of the
September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence is responsible for the policies that provide for the
physical protection of nuclear weapons and for DOD's Personnel
Reliability Program (PRP), that ensures only the best qualified and
most reliable personnel are selected to perform nuclear weapons-related
functions. The Services, who have physical custody of the weapons,
implement these policies and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
provides oversight through periodic inspections conducted by a team of
experts assigned to the DTRA.
While I will concentrate today on the physical protection of
weapons, it is useful to understand that nuclear weapons are afforded
both significant and overlapping safety and security protections. It is
well understood that redundant and failsafe capabilities are designed
and built into our nuclear weapons. This means they are built to
function as designed only when all the right electrical and
environmental inputs are 100 percent accurate. This design philosophy
also contributes to these weapons' security by providing additional
protections against unauthorized use.
The protection of nuclear weapons is achieved through a system of
complementary programs, procedures, people, infrastructure, equipment,
and oversight. It is a defense-in-depth approach that seeks to deter
any potential attacker; however, should that deterrence fail, the
system is designed to identify a threat as early and as far away from a
weapon as possible, and then interdict it such that it is never in a
position to sabotage, destroy, steal, or detonate a nuclear weapon.
Nuclear weapons are stored in hardened facilities with very strong
doors, and high security locks and hasps. Protecting those structures
are combinations of electronic intrusion detection systems, both on the
buildings themselves and installed along the perimeter of the storage
site. These systems are continuously monitored by highly trained and
heavily armed security forces that can interdict any attempt to
penetrate the site. Assisting these forces are special lighting, visual
assessment tools, and other capabilities designed to ensure the
protective force maintains the combat effectiveness edge over any
attacker.
When nuclear weapons are moved, the same tight security goes with
them, whether we move them ourselves or they are delivered to us by the
Department of Energy.
Complementing these physical aspects of security are special
procedural, personnel, and oversight programs designed to ensure that
only the most reliable people are chosen to work around nuclear
weapons. No person is ever allowed to work alone on or close to a
nuclear weapon. Two people with an equal knowledge of the job to be
performed must be present before any access to a weapon. The people who
are chosen to be in the nuclear weapons program must undergo strict,
comprehensive and recurring vetting to ensure reliability is maintained
at the highest level. Top-level background investigations are
conducted; some, in critical positions, will undergo a periodic
polygraph examination; all will have personnel records reviewed for
administrative or disciplinary issues; all will have a medical
screening to include a records assessment by trained medical personnel
to identify physical or psychological conditions that may adversely
affect the inability to work with nuclear weapons. This reliability
program seeks to maintain these standards through continuous evaluation
by supervisors and peers alike. Any indication of a problem and the
person is removed from duties involving weapons until the situation can
be adjudicated. On top of this are strictly enforced entry control and
access procedures requiring specialized identification media and
verification controls. Overlooking the entire program is an integrated
inspection and assessment process that seeks to ensure we meet and
maintain the highest nuclear security standards.
The Department uses a system of complementary oversight and
inspection processes. To provide oversight independent of the Services,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff operates the Defense Nuclear Surety
Inspection (DNSI) Program, through the DTRA. DNSIs are conducted for
each nuclear capable organization a minimum of once every 5 years. In
addition, the Services are required to inspect each of their
organizations to the same strict level of compliance at least once
every 18 months. The organizations themselves are required to annually
conduct actual, on-the-ground, force-on-force exercises that pit
security forces against a mock terrorist force and, periodically, my
office along with DTRA conducts exercises to verify whether our
protective policies provide the level of security necessary to deal
with the changing threat environment. We use the results of these
exercises and assessments to help us identify problem areas and develop
new security policy.
This is a system of overlapping and interlocking programs and
procedures whose resultant security is greater than the sum of its
parts. These are our highest priority weapons and they receive the
highest level of protection.
From time to time, we conduct additional reviews of our methods of
protecting nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Command and Control System
Support Staff (NSS) periodically assesses the health of the system. The
NSS currently is providing support to a Federal Advisory Committee,
end-to-end review of the entire system. The assessment is chaired by
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor, and
is comprised of seven commissioners selected for their present or
recent past association with nuclear weapons. I am a member of the
committee and will soon participate in reviewing the final report. I
apologize in advance that I am not at liberty to discuss the findings
of the committee until they are approved by General Scowcroft.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to address this
very important matter. I will be pleased to answer any questions you
may have.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Secretary Wells. Now I'd
like to call on Major General Blaisdell for his comments.
General.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FRANKLIN J. BLAISDELL, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR
AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Blaisdell. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today about the Air Force's nuclear
security program. In the interest of time I've submitted a
formal written statement for the record but will summarize my
comments here.
From the most senior levels of Air Force leadership to the
airmen in the field, Air Force personnel understand the
tremendous responsibility associated with the safety and
security of handling nuclear weapons. There is no higher Air
Force priority than maintaining the surety of our nuclear
weapons, due to the tremendous military importance and the
potential consequences of any accident, incident, or
unauthorized act.
Accordingly, we've established comprehensive operational
and oversight procedures to ensure that nuclear weapons and
weapon systems receive special consideration. During all phases
of the weapon system lifecycle, positive measures are taken to
ensure the complete control of nuclear weapons. Security, one
part of nuclear surety, is carefully considered during each
phase of the research, development, acquisition, and
modernization of our existing systems.
The Air Force's four critical elements of physical security
are: selection and use of the personnel; two-person policy;
security procedures and equipment; and security system
concepts.
For personnel selection, the screening and selection
process uses the nuclear weapon Personal Reliability Program
(PRP), and we accept only the most reliable personnel who are
individually certified to work nuclear-related duties by their
unit commander or other senior official. Commanders,
supervisory medical personnel, and peers continuously monitor
personnel working under the PRP to ensure continued compliance
with the PRP standards.
The two-person policy mandates the presence of a minimum of
two authorized persons during any operation that may require
access to nuclear weapons. Each member is capable of detecting
incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task
being performed, and each member is familiar with the
applicable safety and security requirements.
Security procedures and equipment, such as the intrusion
detection systems, and security force personnel ensure positive
identification and control of all persons entering areas where
nuclear weapons are present.
Finally, security system concepts are designed to provide
deterrence, detection, and denial of individuals who are not
authorized access to a nuclear weapon.
To quickly summarize, the Air Force has successfully
managed its nuclear surety and safety programs for 54 years and
fully recognized the need to continually monitor and improve
our nuclear safety and security processes in response to
dynamic global threats. As you mentioned, the tragedy of
September 11 reminds us of this threat and the vulnerabilities
to our nuclear weapons systems.
Since September 11, we have implemented higher force
protection levels across the Air Force, and committed Air Force
assets to around-the-clock combat air patrols (CAPs) over the
continental United States (CONUS). We've increased base and
controlled area entry inspections and security checks,
restricted nuke weapons movements to those necessary to keep
the force Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) ready.
We've also limited nuclear weapons maintenance and movements to
daylight hours, and increased our security force presence
during those operations. Additionally, we've added armed aerial
support. We will continue to work on long-term solutions to
deter and counter these threats.
There is no room for sub-standard performance when dealing
with nuclear weapons, and we have in place a layered approach
of checks and balances to ensure strict compliance. From our
over-arching procedural guidance to our systems assessment
programs, personnel screening, and comprehensive surety
inspection programs, the Air Force aggressively monitors all
facets of security compliance. While there are still
challenges, effective intelligence gathering, system
vulnerability assessments, responsive improvement programs,
improved communication links, and dedicated Air Force
professionals will all guarantee the security of our nuclear
weapons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Major General Blaisdell
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Franklin J. Blaisdell, USAF
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to speak to you today about Air Force nuclear weapons
security. Nuclear weapons continue to be at the center of U.S. National
Security Policy. The Air Force fully understands the value of these
weapons to America, and as such, affords them the highest protection.
From the most senior levels of leadership, to the airmen in the field,
Air Force personnel understand the tremendous responsibility associated
with safely and securely handling nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Air
Force has established comprehensive operational and oversight
procedures to ensure nuclear weapons and weapon systems receive special
consideration due to their national policy implications. Due to their
military importance, their destructive power, and the potential
consequences of an accident, incident, or unauthorized act, there is no
higher Air Force priority than maintaining the surety of our nuclear
weapons.
background
DOD policy specifies four DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety
Standards to serve as the foundation for all nuclear weapons safety
matters: (1) There shall be positive measures to prevent nuclear
weapons involved in accidents or incidents, or jettisoned weapons, from
producing a nuclear yield; (2) There shall be positive measures to
prevent deliberate prearming, arming, launching, or releasing of
nuclear weapons, except upon execution of emergency war orders or when
directed by competent authority; (3) There shall be positive measures
to prevent inadvertent prearming, arming, launching, or releasing of
nuclear weapons in all normal and credible abnormal environments; and
(4) There shall be positive measures to ensure adequate security of
nuclear weapons, under DOD Directive 5210.41.
It is DOD policy to protect nuclear weapons from loss, theft,
sabotage, unauthorized use, and unauthorized or accidental damage or
destruction. This policy is based on a peacetime environment. While
adherence to prescribed security procedures during wartime may be
impractical, particularly in a combat theatre, the same peacetime
philosophy for protecting nuclear weapons remains in effect. However,
in times of transition to war and during wartime, commanders are
expected to use those resources available to them to provide security
for weapons and to ensure their survivability.
Nuclear weapons require special protection because of their
political and military importance, their destructive power, and the
consequences of an unauthorized deliberate or inadvertent prearming,
launching, firing, or detonation. Nuclear weapons must not be subjected
to adverse physical environments except when such exposure is dictated
by operational requirements. The safety of the public, operating
personnel and property, the protection of weapons from capture, theft,
damage, and unauthorized use or loss are all of paramount importance
during all phases of operations involving nuclear weapons.
Positive measures are taken to ensure the complete physical control
of nuclear weapons during all phases of their life cycle. To ensure a
balanced security system, physical security procedures, forces, and
facilities must be combined. Survivability must be a significant
consideration in the design of a security system. In providing
protection for nuclear weapons, accurate assessments must be made of
all relevant factors including: weapon location, the configuration in
which they are maintained, the nature and capabilities of potentially
hostile forces, and the reliability and capabilities of personnel
responsible for working with or protecting them.
Security is considered early during the research, development, and
acquisition of nuclear weapon systems and the modernization and
updating of our existing systems. DOD components participating in the
acquisition and development process for new or modernized systems must
get a security concept of operations approved by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy.
Physical security requirements have a major impact on the
affordability and life-cycle costs of a nuclear weapon system.
Similarly, modernization or product improvement efforts on existing
systems must include reevaluation of system security provisions early
in the process to assess the utility of new technology and to determine
changing security requirements because of changes in deployment mode,
location of the systems, or other factors.
air force responsibilities
DOD guidance (DOD Directive 3150.2, DOD Nuclear Weapon System
Safety Program) mandates the Air Force assume the following
responsibilities: (1) Ensuring the safety and security of all nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapon systems for which the Air Force has a DOD
life-cycle management responsibility; (2) Conducting nuclear weapon
system safety studies, reviews, and safety assessments on U.S. nuclear
weapons and Allied systems using U.S. nuclear weapons to support the
DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program; (3) Ensuring nuclear weapons
technical inspections are conducted; (4) Establishing safety design and
evaluation criteria for nuclear weapon systems; (5) Conducting safety
certifications of nuclear weapon systems, including DOD support
equipment and software that affects nuclear safety; and (6) In
coordination with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
participating in a joint Service working group to define requirements
for the maintenance of nuclear weapon safety databases.
safety and security of all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems
In planning the security system for nuclear weapons, priority of
efforts and resources are given to the protection of nuclear weapons
themselves. Additional security is commensurate with the threat to or
vulnerability of the weapons, space limitations, and environmental
factors. In order to ensure the safety and security of our nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons systems the Air Force focuses on four
critical elements of physical security; (1) Selection and use of
personnel, (2) Two-person policy, (3) Security procedures and
equipment, and (4) Security system concepts.
selection and use of personnel
Personnel associated with and directly influencing the security of
nuclear weapons are classified as command and supervisory, operational,
security, support, and maintenance. Individuals are selected for these
positions after extensive screening. The personnel screening and
selection process, as well as the requirement for a continuing
evaluation by supervisors and co-workers, is detailed in DOD Directive
5210.42 Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program. The screening
process used in the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) ensures all
individuals are of the utmost reliability and personally certified to
work nuclear related duties by their unit commander or other senior
official. Certification may occur after completion of a formal course
of instruction or experience gained by on-the-job training. All
personnel having access to nuclear weapons shall have a security
clearance commensurate with the level of classification of materials to
which they may have access.
two-person policy
Under the two-person policy, no one individual shall have access to
a nuclear weapon. During any operation that may require access to
nuclear weapons, there is a minimum of two authorized persons, each
capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect
to the task to be performed and familiar with applicable safety and
security requirements. Two authorized personnel are physically
positioned where they can detect incorrect or unauthorized procedures
with respect to the task or operation being performed. When application
of the two-person policy is required, it is enforced by the persons who
constitute the team during the entire period they are accomplishing the
task or operation assigned and until they leave the area within which
the two-person policy is required.
security procedures and equipment
Intrusion detection systems and security force personnel ensure
positive identification and control of all persons entering limited and
exclusion areas. Entry control procedures ensure no lone individual is
permitted in an exclusion area or to have access to a nuclear weapon.
In addition, maintenance or crew personnel, making up a two-person team
with a designated sole vouching authority, verify all entries into the
exclusion area.
security system concepts
Security for nuclear weapons is provided by in-depth systems that
provide deterrence, detection, delay, and denial of individuals who are
not authorized access to a nuclear weapon. These same systems provide
protection from damage attempts including standoff attacks. Security
systems are designed in response to actual validated threats or
postulated threats that may arise as adversary intentions develop.
Detection is accomplished through physical or electronic measures
that detect possible threats to nuclear weapons at the earliest
possible point when an attempt or the preparation for an attempt to
penetrate the system is being made. Delay consists of active and/or
passive security measures using either equipment or personnel, or a
combination of both, to inhibit intruders from reaching their
objective. Denial is the ultimate goal of delay and is the nullifying,
repulsing, or termination of an attack. Essential to the proper
operation of security systems are: assessment measures to determine the
size and intention of an unauthorized intrusion, response by security
forces specifically designated and trained for countering intruders,
and diverse and redundant communications to ensure command and control.
The efficient installation and operation of the security system,
including the training and exercising of response forces, is
sufficiently imposing to deter potential attacks. Deterrence is the
first line of defense, but it is only effective when supported by an
active, operational security system. Consequently, security forces are
trained, as they would be expected to be employed. Such training
includes, at a minimum, use of individual and crew-served weapons,
small unit tactics, and annual force-on-force exercises.
nuclear weapon system safety studies, reviews, and safety assessments
The Air Force safety review process is mandated by Air Force
Instruction 91-102 Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational
Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules. This instruction provides guidelines
to ensure nuclear weapons are designed, maintained, transported,
stored, and operated in a safe and secure manner. The Air Force
supports these goals by: convening the Nuclear Weapons System Safety
Group (NWSSG) to evaluate nuclear weapon systems, proposing nuclear
weapon system safety rules for Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approval,
conducting Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis (TNSA), and conducting
Nuclear Surety Inspections according to Air Force Instruction 90-201,
Inspector General Activities.
nwssg functions
The NWSSG reviews nuclear weapon system designs and operations to
determine if they meet the DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards
and proposes safety rules and recommends changes to improve nuclear
weapon system surety.
nuclear surety inspections (nsi)
NSIs are designed to evaluate a unit's capability to manage nuclear
resources while complying with all nuclear surety requirements. An NSI
may be combined with other MAJCOM inspections to reduce the number of
unit inspections.
NSIs are conducted at each nuclear-capable unit at least every 18
months. NSI requirements must be completed within 18 months after
completing the last NSI. The nuclear capable unit is provided the NSI
rating when all phases are completed. If a unit does not meet the 18-
month inspection requirement and is not granted a waiver, they will be
decertified. MAJCOM commanders will ensure nuclear weapons are
maintained in a safe, secure, and reliable environment until the unit
is recertified. Recertification must be accomplished by conducting an
Initial NSI. Units may be selected at the discretion of the MAJCOM IG
to receive a minimum notice inspection that will key on a unit's
ability to perform its nuclear mission.
Units are rated in 13 functional areas: Management and
Administration; Technical Operations; Tools, Test, Tiedown and Handling
Equipment; Storage and Maintenance Facilities; and Condition of
Stockpile; Security; Safety; Personnel Reliability Program Management;
Logistics Movement; Explosive Ordinance Disposal; Nuclear Control Order
Procedures; Emergency Evacuation Denial and Command Disablement; Use
Control; and Supply Support. If the unit is rated ``Unsatisfactory''
under pass/fail criteria, it may be reinspected prior to inspection
team's departure. If the unit is not reinspected to at least a
``Satisfactory'' level, the inspected unit must discontinue that
portion of its operation until reinspected or corrective measures are
implemented and approved by the MAJCOM commander pending reinspection.
A reinspection (NSI or INSI) will be conducted within 90 calendar days
for units rated ``Unsatisfactory'' that do not achieve an overall
``Satisfactory'' rating on an on-the-spot reinspection.
ensuring nuclear weapons technical inspections are conducted
Air Force Instruction 91-102, Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies,
Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules, mandates the requirement
for Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis (TNSAs). Prepared by the Nuclear
Weapons Product Support Center, a TNSA is an independent technical
analysis of the nuclear weapon system. Personnel who prepare the TNSA
may not represent organizations directly responsible for designing,
developing, producing, maintaining, operating, or providing logistics
for the weapon system under evaluation.
TNSAs describe the weapon system in depth, ensures compliance with
DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards in normal and abnormal
environments, provides engineering analysis of the weapon system
design, identify deficiencies, and recommend corrective actions for the
weapon system to comply with AFI 91-107, Design, Evaluation,
Troubleshooting, and Maintenance Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems,
or DOD Directive 5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear
Weapons. TNSAs also assess physical security features planned for the
weapon system, identify security deficiencies, and propose necessary
corrective actions. The analysis also includes a qualitative risk
assessment of the weapon's likelihood of violating any of the DOD
Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards or causing plutonium scatter.
safety design and evaluation criteria for nuclear weapon systems
DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards form the basis for the
Air Force's nuclear weapon system safety design and evaluation
criteria. Because the Air Force's goal is to design a system that
significantly exceeds the basic safety criteria, the weapon system
designer may add reasonable safety features to improve safety yet meet
operational design requirements. The Air Force or the Department of
Defense may prohibit or restrict operational use of a nuclear weapon
system if the minimum safety criteria are not satisfied.
The Air Force Safety Center (AFSC) manages the nuclear safety
design and evaluation program for the Air Force by developing design
and evaluation criteria, approving deviation requests, and identifying
criteria for, and approving troubleshooting and maintenance procedures
and operations on loaded nuclear weapon systems.
safety certifications of nuclear weapon systems, support equipment, and
software
Air Force Instruction 91-103, Air Force Nuclear Safety
Certification Program, governs the Air Force's nuclear safety
certification program. This program evaluates hardware, software, and
procedures against specific nuclear safety criteria before use with
nuclear weapons. The program's goal is to prevent nuclear weapon
accidents and incidents.
The Air Forces certifies the following hardware and software:
combat and non-combat delivery vehicles; operational and support
equipment used to move, support, store, handle, load and unload, or
mate and demate nuclear weapons; components that directly interface
(electrically or physically), with a nuclear weapon, critical
component, certified software, or are identified in a current launch
activation path; items that could degrade the command, control, and
status reporting capability; new and currently certified critical
components and software; all hardware or software used to directly
control critical functions such as targeting, enable, or launch
commands or data generation; Tamper Detection Indicators (TDI) used in
an operational system, as well as TDIs used in a non-operational
environment for storage and transportation; operational and maintenance
hardware and software used to command and control critical functions
and perform status reporting; facility lifting and suspension systems
(such as cranes, hoists, and suspended frames) used to lift, support,
or move nuclear weapons; modifications to non-specialized equipment
that could impact the item's primary structure, electrical and
hydraulic power systems, load-bearing capacity, steering and braking
capability, or positive control features; as well as any changes
resulting in noncompliance with specific directed design criteria.
Additionally, the Air Force certifies all test equipment that: verifies
the proper operation of the critical function circuits of a combat
delivery vehicle or directly interfaces with nuclear weapons or
operationally certified critical components; operationally certifies,
decertifies, or verifies proper operation of applicable nuclear
certified items; or identifies system anomalies or failures in special
test or maintenance programs.
coordinated effort with the defense threat reduction agency (dtra), to
define requirements for the maintenance of nuclear weapon safety
databases
Per Air Force Instruction 91-102, Nuclear Weapon System Safety
Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules, the Air Force in
conjunction with DTRA, Department of Energy (DOE), and U.S. Strategic
Command (as part of the NWSSG), reviews nuclear weapon system designs
and operations to determine if they meet the DOD Nuclear Weapon System
Safety Standards, proposes safety rules, and recommends changes to
improve nuclear weapon system surety to the SECDEF for approval through
the Joint Staff. Specifically, the NWSSG reviews weapon system
modifications, changes in operational procedures, or proposed tests to
determine if nuclear surety is affected. The NWSSG requests an
Operational Plan Data Document (OPDD), or OPDD change, and schedules an
NWSSG study when nuclear surety is affected. The NWSSG also serves as
the Air Force focal point for DOE field reviews of nuclear weapon
system safety rules. The NWSSG publishes a semiannual report containing
the status of NWSSG recommendations due to Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense, Nuclear & Biological Defense Programs (ATSD (NCB)) by the
1st of January and July with information copies to the Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and DOE. Finally, the NWSSG assigns an Air Force
member to nuclear safety studies or operational safety reviews
conducted by other military Services if the Air Force also uses the
weapon system under evaluation.
summary
The Air Force has aggressively managed its Nuclear Surety and
Safety Programs for the last 54 years. Nuclear weapons require special
protection because of their political and military importance, their
destructive power, and the consequences of an unauthorized deliberate
or inadvertent prearming, launching, firing, or detonation. When
dealing with nuclear weapons there is no room for substandard
performance. The Air Force recognizes the need to continually monitor
our nuclear safety and security processes in response to the dynamic
global threat. There will be challenges in the future. Effective
intelligence gathering, system vulnerability assessments, responsive
improvement programs, communication, and dedicated Air Force
professionals are the key. The partnerships we have with the other
services, government agencies, and other stakeholders will be critical
to our success. United, we can overcome these challenges and sustain
our nuclear surety and security into the 21st century.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General Blaisdell.
Before calling Admiral Dwyer and General Haeckel, I'd like to
recognize the ranking member, Senator Allard. Senator.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
very timely and critical hearing regarding the security of our
nuclear weapons and our nuclear weapons facilities. I want to
thank the panel for being willing to come and testify before
the subcommittee. I appreciate the job that you're doing and
want to hear what you have to say.
The events of September 11 have increased everyone's
awareness of security, not just our own personnel security, but
the security of our critical public and private
infrastructures, including Department of Energy and Department
of Defense facilities. However, this protection goes far beyond
the physical infrastructure because of the inherent
destructiveness and political importance of our nuclear
weapons. The protection of these weapons has always been a top
priority, and that is our focus today.
As has been widely reported, it is now apparent that
terrorists are taking a keen interest in nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials. The threat of nuclear terrorism, either
through the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the construction of
a radiological weapon, or a successful attack on a nuclear
weapons facility or power plant, is one that we must take very
seriously. Consequently, the attention given to the security of
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons facilities must be
constant.
I hope this hearing will provide us with the background and
insight we need while we consider future congressional action
that might be useful in ensuring the safety and security of our
weapons. Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing, and I thank all the witnesses for taking time to be
with us here today.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Allard.
Now Admiral Dwyer, your comments please.
STATEMENT OF RADM DENNIS M. DWYER, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Dwyer. Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, thank you for
this opportunity to address the subcommittee. As the director
of the Navy's strategic systems, I'm responsible for the
production, support, and security of our nuclear weapons
ashore. Accompanying me today is Rear Adm. Charles Griffiths,
who is the Commander of Submarine Group 9. He is the commander
of fleet ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific.
In the Navy, this is in general a good story. We do have
significant challenges, but I can say with confidence that the
Navy's nuclear weapons, which are a vital national asset, are
safe and secure. In the Navy we have a policy to deny access by
unauthorized personnel to our nuclear weapons. We have multiple
perimeters for layered security. We also have recapture tactic
teams available at all times as an added insurance.
From the moment we receive these weapons from the NNSA,
they are stored in a high-security area called a limited area.
This is surrounded by high-security fences and state-of-the-art
electronic security systems and intrusion detection devices.
This provides us the ability to monitor and detect any
unauthorized attempt to breach this limited area.
Whenever the weapons are moved from building to building
inside the area, they are enclosed in specially designed
containers and vehicles that protect them from hostile
environments. An important component of our nuclear weapons
security is our Marine Corps security force. The sole
responsibility of the Marine Corps security force is to prevent
unauthorized access or theft of nuclear weapons, and should
that fail, to immediately recapture them.
The second element of our security program is the ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) crew. They are responsible and trained
to protect nuclear weapons while on board the submarine. In
addition, these marines, sailors, and any Navy employee that
performs a job that directly accesses nuclear weapons, are
placed in our Personal Reliability Program. Any security
program is dependent on meeting the system requirements, and
you need a strong inspection, testing, and exercise program. We
regularly inspect and drill our systems and people to ensure
that they exceed the requirements needed to protect these
national assets.
Prior to the attack on U.S.S. Cole in October 2000, the
Navy was already taking positive steps to further improve the
protection of our submarines at the two bases. We put in place
a phased plan to provide additional security improvements over
the next several years. The horrific events of September 11
highlighted additional potential threats and vulnerabilities of
both our nuclear weapons and strategic submarines. Since then,
measures that were planned to be executed as part of the
increased threat condition have been implemented. These
measures include: activation of auxiliary security forces,
additional entry inspections, additional water front boat
patrols, increased access control measures, and temporary over-
flight restrictions.
We continue to work on long-term solutions to counter these
threats. In summary, we have a robust nuclear weapons security
system in place and we rigorously inspect and test that system.
We continue to assess our vulnerabilities and we're making
improvements to systems to counter potential new threats. It's
for this reason I can tell you today that I have high
confidence in the Navy's nuclear weapons security program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of Rear Admiral Dwyer and
Rear Admiral Griffiths follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by RADM Dennis M. Dwyer, USN, and RADM Charles
H. Griffiths, Jr., USN
Thank you for inviting us to brief the subcommittee on the security
provisions in place at our Navy nuclear weapons storage facilities and
strategic submarine bases. As Director for the Navy's Strategic Systems
Programs, I am responsible for production, support and storage of our
nuclear weapons ashore. Accompanying me today is Rear Admiral Charles
Griffiths, Commander, Submarine Group 9, the commander of the nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in the Pacific. He will
join me in briefing security at our SSBN bases in the next session.
This is in general a good news story. We do have significant
challenges, but I can say with confidence that Navy nuclear weapons, a
vital national asset, are safe and secure.
These weapons are protected by a sophisticated system involving
three components: unique facilities, specialized hardware, and highly
trained people. I'd like to take a moment to describe each of these
elements of our nuclear weapons security system.
In the Navy, we have a policy to deny access, by unauthorized
personnel, to our nuclear weapons. We use multiple perimeters for
layered security and also have Recapture Tactics Teams available at all
times as added insurance. From the moment we receive these weapons from
the National Nuclear Security Administration, they are stored in a high
security area called a ``limited area.'' The limited areas at both
Strategic Weapons Facilities are encircled by high security fences and
state-of-the-art electronic security systems. These systems are
augmented by manned 70-foot-high guard towers, a suite of intrusion
detection sensors, coupled with closed-circuit television and high
intensity lighting. This provides the ability to monitor and detect any
unauthorized attempt to breach the limited area. Whenever the weapons
are moved from building to building as part of the maintenance and
missile assembly process in the limited area, they are enclosed in
specially designed containers and vehicles, which protect them from
hostile environments.
An important component of our nuclear weapon security system is the
Marine Corps security force assigned to the two facilities. The sole
responsibility of the Marine Corps security force is to prevent
unauthorized access or theft of the nuclear weapons, and, should that
fail, to immediately recapture them. These specially screened, trained,
and armed professionals are on the highest state of alert 24 hours a
day. Another important element of the security program is the SSBN
crew, who are responsible for and trained to protect the nuclear
weapons while on the submarine. In addition, the marines, sailors, and
anyone authorized access to nuclear weapons to perform their job are
screened, trained and placed in our Personnel Reliability Program. This
program adds assurance that only the most qualified and trustworthy
people have access to nuclear weapons.
An important element of ensuring that any security system meets
requirements imposed by the threat is a robust inspection, testing and
exercise program. We regularly inspect and drill our systems and people
to ensure that they exceed the requirements needed to protect these
national assets.
Prior to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000, the Navy
was taking positive steps to further improve the protection of our
submarines at the two bases. We have a phased plan to provide
additional security improvements over the next several years.
The horrific events of 11 September highlighted additional
potential threats to and vulnerabilities of both our nuclear weapons
and strategic submarines. Since then, measures that were planned to be
executed as part of increased threat conditions have been implemented.
Measures that have been implemented in response to higher threat
conditions include: activation of the auxiliary security force,
additional entry inspections, additional waterfront boat patrols,
increased access control measures, and temporary overflight
restrictions. We continue to work on long-term solutions to counter
these threats.
In summary, we have a robust nuclear weapons security system in
place and we rigorously inspect and test that system to ensure that it
exceeds our requirements. We continue to assess our vulnerabilities and
we are making improvements to that system to counter potential new
threats. It's for these reasons that I can tell you today that I have
high confidence that the Navy's nuclear weapons are safe and secure.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Haeckel.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. RONALD J. HAECKEL, USAF, ACTING DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
General Haeckel. Mr. Chairman, Senator Allard, I'm very
pleased to be here this afternoon to discuss the safety and
security philosophy that guides National Nuclear Security
Administration operations, as well as the decisive actions we
took following the tragic events of September 11, and our on-
going activities to further enhance our security posture. While
I've been the acting deputy administrator for only 3 months,
I've been deeply impressed with the skill, dedication, and
commitment of the men and women who make up the NNSA and meet
their mission requirements to implement new and tougher
security practices.
The security and safety of our nuclear weapons and nuclear
material stockpiles, as well as our facilities and personnel,
are critical for the success of my program responsibilities.
These have always been one of the highest priorities of the
Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration. Our nuclear weapons complex is a one-of-a-kind
operation spread over seven states and employing some 25,000
people. Each site has a distinct mission with highly
specialized equipment, tooling, materials, and workforce. The
security and safety of this unique enterprise is maintained
through thorough and detailed procedures, with sophisticated
state-of-the-art equipment, and a well trained, highly
motivated security force.
The transportation of nuclear weapons and special nuclear
material between our sites, and to and from our military users,
is a unique challenge. As you saw this morning, when you and
your staff were at Andrews Air Force Base, cargo is transported
in highly modified tractor trailers operated by armed Federal
agents and accompanied by other Federal agents in escort,
communications, and other convoy vehicles. These agents are
authorized by the Atomic Energy Act to make arrests and carry
and use firearms in the performance of their duties.
The transportation fleet includes safeguard transporters,
safe secure trailers, armored tractors, and escort vehicles
with special safety and security features. Our safety record,
over 100 million miles of over-the-road experience with no
accidents causing a fatality or release of radioactive
material, is a testament to the skill and dedication of these
Federal agents. Of course, the nuclear weapons themselves have
built-in safety features, and many incorporate unique use-
control devices to ensure that an accident or abnormal
environment will not lead to a nuclear yield or the scattering
of radioactive material. In the highly unlikely event of an
accident or incident involving nuclear materials, the NNSA also
maintains special emergency response assets to contain or limit
the contamination. Because of the importance of these issues, I
have asked several subject-matter experts to join us this
afternoon in the executive session to go into greater detail on
the subjects I just touched upon.
Let me now turn to our actions following the attacks on the
United States, which have dramatically changed all of our
lives. For NNSA, it expanded the threats to our vital nuclear
assets to include high-energy explosive attacks at multiple
locations that are well planned, sophisticated, and involve
many people. Immediately following the second plane crash into
the World Trade Center, and before the third and fourth
crashes, the NNSA went into a heightened alert posture. We
secured our weapons, our nuclear materials, our facilities, and
our people. Weapon convoys went to a safe haven. All convoys
were off the road in an hour and a half. Barriers were set up
to restrict traffic, and anyone or anything entering our sites
was carefully inspected. Emergency operation centers were
immediately staffed and operated around the clock to keep
communications open, perform vital coordination, and
continually assess the security situation. Our emergency
response teams went on heightened alert at the first moment of
the crisis and were deployed to New York to assist in recovery,
while others remained poised for a possible follow-on event.
NNSA personnel fully support the strengthened security
measured despite some inconveniences created in the day-to-day
work environment. We remain in heightened security with special
emphasis on high-energy explosive threats. We expect to be at
this level for some time and remain poised to return to even
higher security levels if conditions should warrant. We must
implement permanent measures that will better protect our
people and mission, but at the same time permit us to operate
effectively and efficiently. This requires us to utilize
technology and to capitalize on the great capabilities within
the NNSA.
With the above in mind, our NNSA administrator, Gen. John
A. Gordon, USAF (Ret.), has instituted several on-going
initiatives designed to further make the NNSA security posture
strong and visible so as to deter terrorists. At the same time,
NNSA will continue to provide support to other agencies in
accordance with their needs. The week after the September 11
terrorist attack, General Gordon directed that a vulnerability
assessment of our high-risk targets be completed.
This 72-hour security review rated our facilities,
laboratories, and associated assets against six criteria. Those
were: nuclear detonation, radiological dispersion, loss of
program capability, loss of technical staff, loss of life, and
costs. A prioritized list of security improvements has been
compiled to address the concerns from the study and are being
validated for possible supplemental funding requests.
In addition, the 90-day combat terrorism task force has
been established to review headquarters and field actions to
protect NNSA interests in the aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attacks. Twelve tasks have been initiated and are
staffed with the best expertise available. These tasks range
from deployment of a revised design basis threat document to
site-by-site security reviews and vulnerability assessments.
Where are we today? Immediate actions have been taken to
address the September 11 events and NNSA remains in an elevated
security posture. All sites are back to work and our nuclear
material convoys are moving. NNSA specialized assets remain on
alert and will be deployed when needed. The NNSA combating
terrorism task-force is energized and making progress.
Consistent with task-force efforts, we have identified and
prioritized additional actions which may require supplemental
resources.
We're maintaining close ties with the intelligence and law
enforcement community, and are a member of the White House
Counterterrorism Task Force. All of us in the National Nuclear
Security Administration recognize how vital our mission is to
national security. While the recent terrorist attacks have
dramatically changed things, we'll remain at the highest levels
of security for the nuclear weapons and materials in our
custody. Thank you for your continued support and I'll be happy
to answer your questions at this time.
[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Haeckel
follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Ronald J. Haeckel, USAF
overview
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the security and
safety of our nuclear weapons and nuclear material stockpiles, as well
as our facilities and personnel is the highest priority of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
Our nuclear weapons complex is a one-of-a-kind operation, spread
over seven states and employing some 25,000 people. Each site has a
distinct mission with highly specialized equipment, tooling, materials
and workforce. The security and safety of this unique enterprise is
maintained through thorough and detailed procedures, training and with
sophisticated state-of-the-art equipment. The transportation of nuclear
weapons and special nuclear material between our sites and to and from
our military users within the continental United States likewise
presents us with a unique challenge that we meet by developing and
using the best technology available at our plants and labs. Our success
can be judged by the fact that since 1975 we have accumulated over 100
million miles of over-the-road experience with no accidents causing a
fatality or release of radioactive material.
The nuclear weapons themselves have built-in safety features and
many incorporate unique use control devices to ensure that an accident
or abnormal environment will not lead to a nuclear yield or the
scattering or radioactive material over a wide area. In the event of an
accident or incident involving nuclear materials the NNSA also
maintains special emergency response assets to contain or limit the
contamination.
facility security
The security of our nuclear sites and facilities has always
employed ``defense in depth'' protection. The first line of defense is
our protective forces which are over 3,300 strong. In addition, we have
450 special response team members trained in special recapture/recovery
tactics located at our special nuclear material and weapon sites. Our
protective forces are well equipped with hardened vehicles, semi-
automatic handguns, assault-type weapons, body armor, digital encrypted
radios, protective masks, and night vision and thermal imaging
equipment.
We make use of the most sophisticated state-of-the-art perimeter
and interior intrusion detection and assessment equipment along with
delay entry systems at hardened storage vaults for our nuclear assets.
In addition, we have hardened critical guard posts and make use of
hardened guard towers at several locations. NNSA has also hardened and
technologically upgraded all of its alarm stations and has
compartmentalized access to sensitive facilities and nuclear assets
through the use of the most advanced access control systems available.
Personnel access control is monitored by visual badge checks by the
protective force, badge swipes, personnel identification number, hand
geometry, personal weight verification, X-ray and metal detection, or a
combination of these methods.
cyber security
All of our nuclear weapons information assets and computing
resources at our various sites are protected by firewalls, intrusion
detection systems, and software which automatically scans for malicious
viruses. Classified assets and systems are also physically separated
from the unclassified and sensitive computing systems for greater
security. These cyber security defenses are continuously examined
through a program of self-assessments, site peer reviews, and
independent oversight organizations.
personnel security
We also have human reliability programs covering over 14,000
employees with access to nuclear material/weapons, or have been
determined to occupy positions that, if abused could cause damage to
the health and safety of the public, environment, our work force, and/
or national security. These reliability programs require annual
certification of reliability through maintenance of a top secret
clearance, physiological interviews and testing, medical evaluations,
alcohol and drug testing, security file reviews, and supervision and
peer observations.
Our defense-in-depth approach is rigorously assessed through
computer modeling and performance tested against the design basis
threat through actual force-on-force exercises in the completion of a
vulnerability analysis at each nuclear material/weapon site and for the
transportation of our nuclear assets. The results of the vulnerability
analysis are documented annually in a Site Safeguards and Security Plan
approved by the operations manager and concurred in by myself. As with
any critical program, the effectiveness of our facility protection
postures is validated through internal as well as external independent
oversight reviews.
transportation security
The overall management, command and control of our transportation
assets are centralized in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and includes a fully
staffed, 24-hours-a-day, 365-days-a-year, operations center. The center
monitors vehicle status and location; and maintains real-time
communications with every convoy. The center also maintains an
emergency contact directory of Federal and state response organizations
located throughout the contiguous United States in the event of an
accident or hostile actions. Liaison is also maintained with law
enforcement and public safety agencies throughout the country, making
them aware of our transportation mission. Law enforcement officers are
provided information to assist them in recognizing our vehicles should
they be involved in an event, and what actions to take in conjunction
with the actions of the Federal agents.
Cargo is transported in highly modified tractor-trailers operated
by armed Federal agents and accompanied by other Federal agents in
escort, communications, and other convoy vehicles. Federal agents are
authorized by the Atomic Energy Act to make arrests and carry and use
firearms in the performance of their duties. Federal agents are
certified following a rigorous training course and receive on-the-job
training the balance of their first year. Agents continue to receive
in-service training throughout their careers and must continue to meet
regular and demanding qualification requirements relative to weapons,
tactics, physical fitness, and driving proficiency. The transportation
fleet includes safeguards transporters, safe secure trailers, armored
tractors and escort vehicles, which all incorporate special safety and
security features. The trailers have access delay systems to deny
unauthorized access to materials.
warhead security
The NNSA and its laboratories take every possible measure to
prevent accidents involving nuclear weapons and to prevent them from
getting into the wrong hands. The enduring nuclear weapons stockpile
was built from the early 1960s through the late 1980s. Some weapons
alterations/modifications have been performed to address specific
safety and use control concerns. Extensive joint reviews are conducted
with the Department of Defense to develop a Stockpile Life Extension
Program (SLEP) to refurbish weapons not only to ensure continued
reliability but also to ensure that the latest safety and use control
features are incorporated into our stockpile. The Nuclear Weapons
Council oversees the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, monitors its
safety and security, and provides yearly status reports to the
President and Congress.
Use control features incorporated into our weapons or weapons
systems are to ensure that these weapons only operate when properly
authorized by the President of the United States and to prevent
deliberate unauthorized use. Use control features include: Permissive
Action Links, which are electronic locks inside the nuclear weapon that
prevent it from being detonated until the proper externally obtained
unlock code is inserted; command disable features, which permit
nonviolent disablement of a nuclear weapon by destroying critical
components if loss of control is imminent; and active protection
systems, designed to make it possible to automatically disable critical
components within the weapon upon sensing an intrusion by an adversary.
Safety features incorporated into our nuclear weapons include:
Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety (ENDS), Insensitive High Explosives
(IHE), and Fire-Resistant Pits (FRP). ENDS prevents the electrical
system within the weapon from accidentally firing the detonators if
involved in an accident. All but one of the nuclear weapons types in
the stockpile have ENDS; the one that does not employ ENDS and that
system is scheduled for retirement. IHE, unlike conventional high
explosives, is highly resistant to unintended detonation, significantly
reducing the likelihood of scattering radioactive materials in an
accident. Only four weapons types (missile warheads) contain
conventional high explosives. To mitigate the unlikely event of a high
temperature fire involving a nuclear weapon, three of the last four
weapon designs have incorporated a pit coating capable of providing
additional safety in fire accident scenarios. Overall, these measures
are judged to limit the chance of a weapon producing a nuclear yield if
involved in an accident to one chance in a million. They also are
judged to limit the chance of a weapon pre-arming, arming, launching,
or releasing in all normal and credible abnormal environments to one in
a billion and one in a million, respectively.
emergency response
In the event of a nuclear or radiological incident, the Department
maintains specialized teams which can be readily deployed to respond to
the entire spectrum of nuclear and radiological issues. The Nuclear
Emergency Support Team (NEST), is an umbrella organization of
specialized crisis response assets. The Accident Response Group is a
team of scientific and technical experts ready to react to any accident
or incident involving one of our own nuclear weapons. The Search
Response Team conducts searches via ground and air for lost, stolen, or
missing weapons, devices, or nuclear material. There is also a Nuclear/
Radiological Advisory Team of subject matter experts here in
Washington, D.C. to support the FBI and the Department of State. There
are also advisory teams to support the Department of Defense special
mission units and to advise and assist in the neutralization and
movement of nuclear devices. It is important to note that NEST operates
only in areas secured by law enforcement or the military.
In addition to NEST, the Department also maintains some twenty-six
radiological assistance teams arrayed across the Nation to conduct
radiological measurements, to characterize releases and to provide
advice and guidance to state and local authorities. The Department also
provides expert medical assistance for radiation exposure accidents
through our facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. We also establish and
manage the coordination of all Federal radiological monitoring and
assessment functions for any nuclear or radiological incident. All the
individuals on these teams are volunteers from across the complex. They
are scientists, physicists, engineers, technicians, and other
specialists that volunteer for this duty. We could not perform these
vital functions without them.
september 11
The terrorist events of September 11, 2001, have changed all of our
lives. For NNSA it expanded the threats to our vital nuclear assets to
include high energy explosive attacks at multiple locations that are
well planned and sophisticated, and involve many people. Let me review
the actions taken to address this new threat and on-going efforts to
further mitigate this escalated threat.
Immediately following the second plane crash into the World Trade
Center, and before the third and fourth crashes, the NNSA went to full
alert. We secured our weapons, our nuclear materials, our facilities
and our people. Weapon convoys went to safe havens and all were off the
roads in an hour and a half. Numerous barriers were set up to restrict
traffic, and anyone or anything entering our sites were carefully
inspected. Emergency operations centers were immediately staffed and
operated around-the-clock to keep communications open, perform vital
coordination, and continually assess the security situation. Our
emergency response teams went on heightened alert at the first moment
of the crisis and were deployed to New York to assist in recovery while
others remained poised for a possible follow-on event.
Our protective forces are highly trained, well equipped and remain
energized and motivated even in light of long hours of work. Operations
Offices, Plant and Laboratory Directors, and staff are vigilant and
prepared for high-energy explosive attacks that were not previously
contemplated.
NNSA personnel fully support the strengthened security measures
despite some inconveniences created in the day to day work environment.
We remain at heightened security with special emphasis on high-energy
explosive threats. We expect to be at this level for some time and
remain poised to return to even higher security levels if conditions
should warrant.
We must implement permanent measures that will better protect our
people and mission but at the same time permit us to operate
effectively and efficiently. This requires us to utilize technology and
to capitalize on the great capabilities resident within the NNSA.
With the above in mind, General Gordon has instituted several on-
going initiatives designed to further make the NNSA security posture
strong and visible so as to deter terrorists. At the same time, NNSA
will continue to provide support to other agencies in accordance with
their needs. We will apply the unique capabilities of our laboratories
and plants in seeking innovative approaches to strengthening NNSA and
U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
The weekend after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, General
Gordon directed that a vulnerability assessment of our high-risk
targets be completed. This ``72-hour security review'' rated our
facilities and laboratories and associated assets against six criteria
(nuclear detonation, radiological dispersion, loss of program
capability, loss of technical staff, loss of life, and costs). A
prioritized list of security improvements has been compiled to address
the concerns from the study and are being validated for a supplemental
funding request. We plan to apply resources against the greatest needs
and will see the work through to completion.
In addition, a 90-day Combating Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) has
been established to review Headquarters and field actions to protect
NNSA interests in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. Twelve tasks have been initiated and are staffed with the
best expertise available. These tasks include development of a revised
design basis threat document; site-by-site security review and
vulnerability assessments; protection of our cyber data and resources;
assessment of current nuclear materials management practices; personnel
security review; transportation security review; chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear incident analysis assessment; contributions
NNSA can make to other in counterterrorism; review of international
programs; chemical/ biological detectors and sensors; emergency
management review; and defining the complex of the future.
General Gordon has directed the NNSA to protect ourselves, continue
to perform our mission, and assist others where possible.
To protect ourselves we want security forces that are so efficient
and effective, and facilities that are so strong that a terrorist will
see no chance of success and take his business elsewhere. The weapons
and material we have custody of demand no less.
It is understood that the war on terrorism will last for years and
therefore one must be able to accomplish our mission in an enhanced
security environment. We must carry out normal stockpile stewardship--
production, surveillance, refurbishment--and meet DOD delivery
requirements.
With the great talent and the taxpayer's investment in our
enterprise, we must make our skills and technology available to others.
We will continue to keep our emergency response assets ready to deploy
to assist--even as we look to improve them. We are bringing together
our multitude of capabilities to make certain other agencies know how
we can help with their problems. We are also looking to accelerate
materials protection control and accountability work and reactor safety
internationally.
So where are we today? Immediate actions have been taken to address
the September 11, 2001, events and NNSA remains in an elevated security
posture. However, all sites are back to work and our nuclear material
convoys are moving. NNSA specialized assets remain on alert and will be
deployed when needed. The NNSA Combating Terrorism Task Force is
energized and making progress. Consistent with the Task Force efforts,
we have identified and prioritized additional actions which will
require supplemental resources. We are maintaining close ties with the
intelligence and law enforcement community and are a member of the
White House Counterterrorism Task Force.
All of us at the National Nuclear Security Administration recognize
how vital our mission is to National Security. While the recent
terrorist attacks have dramatically changed things, we will maintain
the highest levels of security for the nuclear weapons and materials in
our custody.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General Haeckel, and
thank you gentlemen for your testimony. We've been joined by
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator, would you like to make an opening
statement?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all the panelists who are here today. I think most
of the questions I'm going to ask might be more appropriate in
the closed session. I'm very anxious to learn as much as I can
about the security of our nuclear weapons and materials. Thank
you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator. Senator Nelson has
reminded us again that this is the open session. We will
reconvene in a closed session at the conclusion of the
questioning period. Let me go ahead and ask a few questions and
then turn to Senator Allard for his questions.
A frightening conclusion drawn from September 11 is that we
no longer have only to protect against the threat of the use of
nuclear weapons, we have to protect against suicidal attempts
to detonate those weapons within the United States and
elsewhere. That was a psychological barrier I think we crossed
on September 11. Having said that, I wonder Secretary Wells,
whether you've made any specific changes to policy that reflect
not only that particular insight, but any other insights based
on September 11?
Dr. Wells. Mr. Chairman, we have. There actually were a
number of initiatives underway before September 11 which were
crystallized, if you will, by that. There's been a robust
exercise program for some years that has tested different parts
of the security system, and some of those have emphasized the
importance of time to react. So, we have codified that into
policy. In addition, we are reviewing what the postulated or
design-basis threat is against which the security system should
be designed, and that is in coordination--revised and been
agreed upon between the Department of Energy and Department of
Defense--step and we're getting that formally coordinated.
Senator Reed. In terms of going forward, do you see any
particular areas that need additional improvement other than
those you've identified?
Dr. Wells. I think the general area of senior-level
emphasis on the areas of nuclear weapons is something that has
been an important focus for each of the services. Many of us
have custody, but I would expect that we will see even more of
that emphasis in the future.
Senator Reed. Thank you. One other question, Dr. Wells. In
terms of personnel security programs, are you evaluating or re-
evaluating the policy towards personnel security?
Dr. Wells. The Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and the
two-person controls that go with it have always been, I think,
one of the stronger points of the nuclear weapons security
program. One of the things that we have to be cognizant of in
the wake of September 11 is the possibility of an insider
threat which has always been there but that crystallized after
September 11. The Personnel Reliability Program gives us,
through the two-person control and the checks on the
reliability of the people involved, a powerful weapon against
that. I think that has stood the test of time and will be able
to be continued.
I think all of us, as I say, are more aware of the insider
threat. That will probably get more attention. I can't tell you
any policy changes at this point that will stem from that,
though.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Dr. Wells. Let me turn to General
Haeckel. The Department of Energy has requested $117 million in
additional funds for improved security, of which $106 million
is for nuclear weapons activities. Could you outline generally
what this additional money will buy in terms of improvements?
What are your areas of concern, and are there other areas that
should be addressed and additional resources committed to solve
those problems or allay those concerns?
General Haeckel. Supplemental funds of $106 million were
requested. Of those funds that were requested, $66 million were
for overtime and additional protective forces across the
complex. Twenty-five million of that was for cyber-security
measures, such as intrusion detection and response systems.
Another $15 million was for secure transportation assets, and
additional monies for those secure transportation assets that
you observed today, sir.
At this time, we believe the administration's request is
sufficient. We're continuing to look at the requirements and
better things to do. We're continuing through our 12-team
process to look at extra security measures that we think are
prudent to do in the near-future, in the far-future. At that
time, there may be additional supplemental activity.
Senator Reed. Let me also ask, it seems that the basic
operating cost of each Department has gone up. Is that the case
too, as you anticipate it?
General Haeckel. My understanding of overhead costs is that
we are doing more with our existing overhead as far as
headquarters personnel and field leadership is concerned.
Senator Reed. You have a limited number of agents, of whom
many are now working probably twice as long as they did 3 or 4
months ago in overtime.
General Haeckel. Yes sir.
Senator Reed. That is not likely to go away in the next
year. That automatically means that you have to ask for
increased funds. Is that a clear assumption?
General Haeckel. Yes sir, it is. That would be something
we'd have to look at very carefully. If we did submit an
additional request in the future for additional security
forces, guards that we do need, we would be committing to a
long-term investment in those personnel costs. We would have to
make arrangements for additional funding in the out-years and
watch that throughout our 5-year national security plan.
Senator Reed. My final question is on national
infrastructure, which I know in the DOE and the DOD has been a
constant struggle. Do you see yourselves coming to the point
where you have to borrow from needed modernization
improvements, the infrastructure, to simply pay the bills and
keep the lights going for security purposes?
General Haeckel. My desire is to have a balanced approach
to the budget and do as much as we can in each of the areas.
The three major areas that I'm concerned with are the
production and refurbishment activities, the research and
development scientific activities, and then the infrastructure
and facilities activities. We are currently looking at our
budget and trying to balance those to the best of our ability,
doing the most important thing in each of those categories
first, and walking down through that.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General. Let me turn to
ask Admiral Dwyer and General Blaisdell the same question. Does
your department have additional requirements and requests that
require funds for improved security, and are these funds
included in the supplemental or the budget documents that
you're forwarding to your service chiefs, the Secretary of
Defense, and then on to the administration? Admiral Dwyer.
Admiral Dwyer. Yes, Mr. Chairman, after September 11 and
even prior to September 11, after the U.S.S. Cole incident we
were asked to put together a list to define the mitigating
factors we put in place for these threats, basically in
personnel, high-tech barriers, and high-tech intrusion devices,
those types of things which were put into the list and that are
in the supplemental as it goes forward.
Senator Reed. Thank you. General Blaisdell.
General Blaisdell. Yes, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact I
have with me today Brig. Gen. Jim Shamess, who is our director
of security forces, and he will have more to say in the
classified session of this hearing. General Shamess, as
director of security, has a nuclear security roadmap and task
force that they have put together. Just recently, Air Combat
Command has briefed us with combat mission needs statements.
It's a little too early to put together all of the dollar
figures, but suffice it to say that not only barriers but
intrusion devices and several others that we'll get into in the
classified session are on there, and are greatly needed to
improve our capability.
Also, there is a full program on going with each of the
commands as they're putting together their requirements for
weapons storage areas and other opportunities. So, Mr.
Chairman, I think we have a good package prepared.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
panel. On September 11, when the attack took place, we
basically considered ourselves in a peacetime mode. Since then,
our country has declared war on terrorism, particularly in
recent days having seen some of the papers that have been
gathered from the headquarters of al Qaeda. We've become aware
that nuclear weapons and nuclear materials were a high priority
for at least that terrorist organization, and probably others.
In light of that, have security standards been increased
since September 11? I'd like to have all four of you respond to
that, if you would.
General Blaisdell. Certainly, I'd be happy to start,
Senator. In the Air Force, and you're absolutely correct on
levels going up in light of what has been found from al Qaeda,
we have increased our force-protection levels throughout the
United States Air Force. Likewise, we have gone through a
combat air patrol that you're familiar with, part of Operation
Noble Eagle, in light of the intelligence that's available.
Probably the best way to explain all of this is our defense in-
depth concept, based on the intelligence that we get--the FBI
and the inter-agency working right down to the security, the
fence line, the ability to bring security forces to bear, the
whole defense in-depth program, the way we work with DOE safety
procedures and weapons, that whole defense in-depth program is
going to try to prevent that.
Senator Allard. General Haeckel, do you want to elaborate
on that?
General Haeckel. The security standards were increased in
DOE facilities in three different ways that I can describe to
you. The first is cyber-security. We've had in recent years
very good insight into cyber-security for our computer
technologies. We've increased our vigilance and awareness of
that.
That leads into the second area that I want to mention,
which is our concern for operational security (OPSEC) both on
the cyber-side, the physical side, and the day-to-day
discussions making sure we protect those pieces of information
that we think would give insight into our operations and of
strategic nuclear materials.
Third, the physical side of it, the most visible side, as I
mentioned we went into a heightened state of security condition
immediately after the travesty occurred. We continue that
heightened state of security for some time and then, based on
our analysis of current threats, we've backed off to a more
appropriate, maintainable, and sustainable security condition
by increasing security entry procedures, increasing physical
distance standoff from vehicle parking areas to specific
buildings, and in general making our population within the
Department of Energy more aware of terrorists activities that
could occur and encourage reporting procedures.
Senator Allard. Rear Admiral Dwyer.
Admiral Dwyer. Yes sir, Senator, in our weapons storage
areas, our Marine Corps security force companies have always
been at the highest alert, 365 days a year, 24 hours a day. So
they are always at the highest threat condition and remain so
during threat condition Delta and Charlie, which we had at that
time. Most of the action for us is at our waterfront, where our
submarines are, where we have auxiliary security forces which
deployed. We increased our entry procedures into those areas
and we also imposed temporary flight restrictions which limit
the air traffic over these submarine bases.
Senator Allard. Secretary Wells, we'll let you wrap it up
if you have anything else you want to add?
Dr. Wells. From a policy perspective, Senator, since
September 11 we have directed more rapid responses in the case
of instincts involving possible attempts to take over a weapon.
We have also taken steps to ensure that personnel assigned to
nuclear weapon security duties are not drawn off for temporary
duty in other areas, thus emphasizing the importance of nuclear
weapons security even in the face of Operation Enduring Freedom
overseas. We've also worked with the intelligence community to
get a revision to the threat assessment against nuclear weapons
which, of course, will permeate all of the future policy
documents.
Senator Allard. You've done a nice job of talking about
what you've done in stationary sources. I'd like to now move to
mobile sources. We have some nuclear materials that necessarily
have to travel through one mode or another, and my question is,
have the delays caused by September 11 within the National
Nuclear Security Administration had any impact in delaying
other DOE shipments, for example in the Environmental
Management program?
General Haeckel. There were delays, sir. We stood down
operations for security purposefully to re-group, re-orient
ourselves, and make sure we understood what potential threats
were out there. Over the last couple of months, and over the
next months we will regain that ground in different areas and
different ways and be back on track with our program.
Senator Allard. On the resources that are shared between
NNSA and Environmental Management, if we have delays in the
NNSA, will those have an impact on the Environmental Management
program and cause delays in one or the other of the two?
General Haeckel. Sir, as Defense Programs representative, I
work very closely with our Environmental Management personnel.
As a matter of fact, I was just discussing this very same issue
earlier this afternoon, and we are working together, instead of
competing, with the limited resources we have to identify the
highest priorities on a continual basis and allocate our
resources for those highest priorities. But just like on my
budget discussions, there are things that we want to do on the
weapons program side and things we want to do on the
Environmental Management side. The personnel in Environmental
Management and myself are committed to making sure we get those
things done on a parallel track.
Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to wrap up with
one final, short question. As you're moving these materials
across the country, I assume that you're avoiding high-risk
areas such as high passes where you have snow slides, or
tunnels and various bridges, and I would like to hear your
comment in that regard.
General Haeckel. We can get into that in the classified
session, but I have the highest confidence in our transporters,
that they will make the calls on the scenes and avoid the risks
that they identify as high, whether it be potential terrorists
or potential snow slide, and make sure that our number one
priority is that our assets are delivered carefully and
precisely and safely.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Allard. I'd like to
recognize Senator Nelson for his round of questioning and then
Senator Sessions for his opening statement and his round of
questioning.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
again for calling this hearing to deal with this very important
issue. We've talked primarily about weapons and the security
that must be in place to protect weapons, both stationary and
in transit. I'd like to ask something with respect to nuclear
power plants and other nuclear material. Is there a protocol
between the military, the DOE, and the NRC as it might relate
to the security of that nuclear material? Anyone who might want
to respond to that?
Dr. Wells. I'm not aware of any with the NRC, Senator. Let
me take that for the record and I'll get back to you.
General Haeckel. I'll take that for the DOE side, sir.
[The information follows:]
Dr. Wells. The only security protocol/agreement that exists between
NRC and DOD is an ``Industrial Security Agreement'' related to the
``National Industrial Security Program'' (NISP).
However, Executive Order 12656, (November 18, 1988), does assign
responsibilities during emergencies. In part five of the E.O., the
Department of Defense is tasked ``in consultation with the Secretaries
of State and Energy, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and others, as required, develop plans and capabilities for
identifying, analyzing, mitigating, and responding to hazards related
to nuclear weapons, materials, and devices; and maintain liaison, as
appropriate, with the Secretary of Energy and the Members of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure the continuity of nuclear
weapons production and the appropriate allocation of scarce resources,
including the recapture of special nuclear materials from Nuclear
Regulatory Commission licensees when appropriate.''
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, DOD, NRC, and
DOE and other agencies have been cooperating extensively in response to
the National emergency. This cooperation is occurring in accordance
with the broad framework established under the Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan, the Terrorism Annex of the National Response
Plan, and Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62, and 63. NRC can
formally request DOD assistance through the FBI to the Attorney General
through the President to the Joint Chiefs and DOD.
General Haeckel. At the present time there are no agreements or
protocols between the department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) regarding the security of nuclear materials. however,
in light of the events of September 11 and the transportation security
expertise within the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office
of Transportation Safeguards, both are working together on a
comparability study for transportation of Category I and Category II
nuclear material to allow the NRC to consider revising their
transportation protection strategy. This study effort will be completed
in September 2002.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure. I think it's clear that in moving
material, whether it's from a power plant--and we can in the
closed session talk about spent nuclear rods and other
material--but in moving the material the utmost care is
obvious. It hardly needs to be stated. When I was governor of
Nebraska, as you may recall or will find out, one truck tipped
over in transit in the State of Nebraska for a period of time
that caused more than a slight embarrassment, it was in fact a
major concern. Fortunately, it was out in the middle of the
sand hills where there are more cattle than people, and the
threat of a terrorist incident seemed rather unlikely.
But I am concerned also about any kind of movement of other
material, not just weapons, if we're going to be dealing with
some of the concerns that have been offered and suggested with
respect to not detonating nuclear devices, but those that
spread nuclear material. So I will take that up in the closed
session. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Senator
Sessions, if you'd like to make an opening statement and your
questions, please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having this hearing. In recent weeks, I have just personally
developed a very great concern about the danger of
proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. We
particularly have to worry, I think, about the situation in the
Former Soviet Union (FSU). I do not believe we are effectively
meeting that challenge. I think that we're going to need to be
better at meeting it. There are a lot of things that could be
done to improve our effort in that regard, in partnership with
the FSU, that could benefit both of us and help ensure that
these kinds of weapons do not find themselves into the hands of
terrorists like bin Laden.
Obviously he would like to have had those kinds of weapons.
His network would like to have them, and so we need to work on
that. I think that also puts a burden on us, as a responsible
world leader, to make sure our weapons are secure, and to
protect the interests of the United States.
Let me ask one question. The President has just talked
about reducing the number of operationally-developed weapons to
the range of 1,700 to 2,200, which would mean that we'll be de-
commissioning some weapons. Maybe Secretary Wells would be the
appropriate person to ask: What kind of stresses does that put
on you and those that will be involved in that? Do you foresee
extra funding or other challenges that might arise? If you've
answered that, I apologize.
Dr. Wells. I think, Senator, clearly there will be costs
associated with the draw-down of the overall weapons--the
weapons we retire. It puts a premium on putting additional
security on the weapons that remain. We are preparing a package
to put in the counterterrorism supplemental for additional
research and development on the security of nuclear weapons to
support this sort of thing.
Senator Sessions. Research and development in how to be
more successful or better?
Dr. Wells. How to apply new technologies, how to apply in
denial of access and keeping the weapons safe.
Senator Sessions. What about the draw-down on destruction,
on rendering them inoperable? What is the mechanism of doing
that and what kind of costs could be involved?
Dr. Wells. Let me refer that to the NNSA, if I may.
General Haeckel. Yes, sir, we've been looking at that for a
couple of years as a case that may occur. We are currently
devising and integrating a plan that we will execute over the
next several years. Some of the things that we're looking at
are the increased number of security personnel that we'll need,
increased storage capacity that we may need, and also an
increased number of movements that drives the security force
personnel also, but increased number of movements and possible
convoy assets that we would need.
Senator Sessions. That would be in the short term, would it
not? Once the weapons are de-commissioned it should be easier
and less expensive. Will savings balance off the costs, I'll
guess I'll ask it that way, in the long run?
General Haeckel. No, sir, if I have a fleet of trucks, if I
have 5,000 trucks or 1,700 trucks there's still a certain
amount of mechanics that I need to service those, and spare
parts that I need. So I don't see a one-for-one decrease in the
overhead expenses, even if we do decrease the number of weapons
that the United States currently has. So, as far as I know, as
far as I have researched so far, it's not a one-for-one
savings. There's still expenses in maintaining a stockpile that
we'll have to face up to in the far term. In the near term,
there are more expenses and more things that we'll have to do
to make that happen.
General Blaisdell. If I can help the General there,
Senator, you may recall we were going to retire the Peacekeeper
(MX) missile. Those particular warheads, in other sessions when
I was here with Admiral Mies, I think with you, we mentioned
that those are going on Minuteman missiles. So there will be
some movements that the DOE needs to help us with, and there is
a drawdown cost associated with taking Peacekeeper missiles off
alert. There is also a study ongoing, and I think this is where
your question is, there's an ongoing study from the
requirements side, from the shooters' perspective, to our
supplier. How many are inactive and how many are responsive,
and we will have more to say about that once the Nuclear
Posture Review comes to you all at the end of the month.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. Thank
you very much, General, for your testimony.
For the closed portion of this hearing, we will move to
232A of the Russell Building. This session is only for those
with appropriate clearances. I thank you all, and this open
session is concluded.
[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned and
reconvened in closed session.]