[Senate Hearing 107-577]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-577
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA--U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 9, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
80-845 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2002
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Bellamy, William, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Dees, Learned, program officer for Africa, National Endowment for
Democracy, Washington, DC...................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Edgerton, Anne C., advocate, Refugees International, Washingtom,
DC............................................................. 28
Prepared statement and Refugees International Bulletin of
Jan. 28, 2002.............................................. 31
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 3
Hara, Fabienne, Africa Project co-director, International Crisis
Group, Brussels, Belgium....................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 19
(iii)
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA--U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:31 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D. Feingold (chairman of
the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I will call this hearing to order. Good
afternoon.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here to testify
at this hearing on ``Weak States in Africa--U.S. Policy Options
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.'' This is the second
in a series of hearings that share two primary aims.
First, the subcommittee hopes to examine those
characteristics of Africa's weakest states that draw
international criminal activity to the region, focusing on
issues such as illicit air transport networks and trafficking
in arms and gem stones and people.
Second, the subcommittee seeks to identify long-term policy
options for changing the context in these states such that they
are no longer as appealing to criminal opportunists.
Broadly, I am hoping that we can apply some of the lessons
that have been learned from South Asia recently to the sub-
Saharan context, lessons about the very serious consequences of
disengagement and neglect while states collapse and
institutions falter.
We began this series with a very useful hearing on Somalia,
and today we proceed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
[DRC]. Of course, the situations of Somalia and the DRC are
dramatically different. I hope that this subcommittee will go
on to look at Liberia in this same broad context, and there
too, the situation on the ground is distinct from other cases.
In fact, the particulars of each case are part of the point I
hope to make: we need to craft careful, nuanced, and long-term
policies tailored to each situation if we are to avoid the
prospect of sustained state failure.
Today I hope that we will hear from our witnesses about the
prospects for international criminal activity to flourish in
Central Africa and the relationship between this activity and
Congo's instability. We are also interested in a status report
on the implementation of the Lusaka Accord, the MONUC mission,
and the inter-Congolese dialog. What are the current obstacles
to progress, and what steps can the United States take to help
address these problems?
Finally and most importantly, we are seeking prescriptions
for a long-term policy toward the DRC. What steps can the
United States take to bolster a peaceful Congolese state? What
kind of development plan will be required to give a peaceful
Congo a chance at stability? How can a coherent, long-term DRC
policy strengthen state capacity and curtail criminal
opportunities within the DRC's borders? Even if the very
ambitious goal of a national election is achieved in the Congo,
how can we continue to work to shore up stability? As
experience has shown, perhaps most recently in Nigeria,
elections are not a finish line for policy aimed at improved
governance, and they are certainly not guarantors of stability.
Finally and critically, is the United States currently
devoting the appropriate level of attention and resources to
this complex conflict at the heart of Africa? Are we making
this urgent problem a priority and maximizing U.S. leverage to
help stabilize the situation?
In late 1999, I traveled to 10 countries, including Angola,
Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rwanda, Uganda, and
Congo itself, in the company of then-U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, Richard Holbrooke. We worked together to try to
get the parties to the conflict to agree on a facilitator for
the crucially important inter-Congolese dialog. The trip and
the process of trying to unravel the situation and understand
all of the interests at stake was unforgettable. And ever
since, I have been trying to follow developments in Congo with
deep concern, and I feel that calling attention to this
situation is critically important. The spillover effects,
criminal and otherwise, of sustained chaos in Congo are simply
too serious to ignore.
I want to add one additional point. I am concerned that by
focusing on the serious problem of weak and failing states in
sub-Saharan Africa, the subcommittee, to a little degree, runs
the risk of painting an inaccurately gloomy portrait of the
region. I wish there were time to run a series of counterpoint
hearings, focusing on the promise of states like Senegal,
Ghana, Mozambique, and Botswana, and the ways in which the
United States can help support all of the positive developments
in these countries, as this is an equally important part of our
policy in Africa. That is certainly a topic that I will
continue to focus on in all my interactions with my colleagues
and with the administration.
I also want to make it clear that even the difficult cases
that are the focus of the current series are not hopeless
situations. They are simply tough ones. In several cases, and
in the case of Congo in particular, I actually think that there
is a real opportunity for the United States to make a
significant difference in terms of regional peace and stability
and in terms of shutting down criminal networks and therefore
bolstering our own security. And today I expect that we will
hear more about some of the courageous and energetic Congolese
individuals and organizations working to build a better future,
living proof that there is reason to hope that Congo can
recover and one day prosper.
So, I look forward to the testimony today, and when Senator
Frist, the ranking member of the subcommittee, arrives, as he
certainly intends to do, I will ask him to make some remarks.
I also want to mention that my friend Howard Wolpe is here
in the audience. He traveled with us for part of that exciting
trip in Africa. And I certainly do not mean to embarrass him,
but it is good to see him. His knowledge and his expertise in
this area were incredible, and it is good to see you. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here to testify at
this hearing on ``Weak States in Africa--U.S. Policy Options in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.'' This is the second in a series of
hearings that share two primary aims. First, the subcommittee hopes to
examine those characteristics of Africa's weakest states that draw
international criminal activity to the region, focusing on issues such
as illicit air transport networks and trafficking in arms, gem stones,
and even people. Second, the subcommittee seeks to identify long-term
policy options for changing the context in these states such that they
are no longer as appealing to criminal opportunists. Broadly, I am
hoping that we can apply some of the lessons that have been drawn from
South Asia recently to the sub-Saharan context--lessons about the very
serious consequences of disengagement and neglect while states collapse
and institutions falter.
We began with a very useful hearing on Somalia, and today we
proceed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Of course the
situations of Somalia and the DRC are dramatically different. I hope
that this subcommittee will go on to look at Liberia in this same broad
context, and there too, the situation on the ground is distinct from
other cases. In fact, the particulars of each case are part of the
point I hope to make--we need to craft careful, nuanced, and long-term
policies tailored to each situation if we are to avoid the prospect of
sustained state failure.
Today I hope that we will hear from our witnesses about the
prospects for international criminal activity to flourish in Central
Africa, and the relationship between this activity and Congo's
instability. We are also interested in a status report on the
implementation of the Lusaka Accord, the MONUC mission, and the inter-
Congolese dialog. What are the current obstacles to progress, and what
steps can the United States take to help address those problems?
Finally and most importantly, we are seeking prescriptions for a long-
term policy toward the DRC. What steps can the United States take to
bolster a peaceful Congolese state? What kind of development plan will
be required to give a peaceful Congo a chance at stability? How can a
coherent, long-term DRC policy strengthen state capacity and curtail
criminal opportunities within the DRC's borders? Even if the very
ambitious goal of a national election is achieved in the Congo, how can
we continue to work to shore up stability? As experience has shown--
perhaps most recently in Nigeria--elections are not a finish line for
policy aimed at improved governance, and they are certainly not
guarantors of stability. Finally, and critically, is the United States
currently devoting the appropriate level of attention and resources to
this complex conflict at the heart of Africa? Are we making this urgent
problem a priority and maximizing U.S. leverage to help stabilize the
situation?
In late 1999, I traveled to ten countries--including Angola,
Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Congo
itself--in the company of then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
Richard Holbrooke. We worked together to try to get the parties to the
conflict to agree on a facilitator for the crucially important inter-
Congolese dialog. The trip, and the process of trying to unravel the
situation and understand all of the interests at stake, was
unforgettable. Ever since, I have been following developments in Congo
with deep concern, and I feel that calling attention to this situation
is critically important. The spill-over effects, criminal and
otherwise, of sustained chaos in Congo are simply too serious to be
ignored.
I want to add one additional point. I am concerned that by focusing
on the serious problem of weak and failing states in sub-Saharan
Africa, the subcommittee runs the risk of painting an inaccurately
gloomy portrait of the region. I wish that there were time to run a
series of counterpoint hearings, focusing on the promise of states like
Senegal, Ghana, Mozambique and Botswana, and the ways in which the
United States can help support all of the positive developments in
these countries, as this is an equally important part of our policy in
Africa. That is certainly a topic that I will continue to focus on in
all of my interactions with my colleagues and with the administration.
I also want to make it clear that even the difficult cases that are
the focus of the current series are not hopeless situations. They are
simply tough ones. In several cases, and in the case of Congo in
particular, I actually think that there is a real opportunity for the
United States to make a significant difference in terms of regional
peace and stability--and in terms of shutting down criminal networks
and therefore bolstering our own security. And today I expect that we
will hear more about some of the courageous and energetic Congolese
individuals and organizations working-to build a better future--living
proof that there is reason to hope that Congo can recover and one day
prosper.
I look forward to the testimony today.
Senator Feingold. Let me begin by hearing from our first
panel from Mr. William Bellamy, currently the Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, as Walter Kansteiner is
away. Mr. Bellamy, thank you, and you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BELLAMY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS,\1\ DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Mr. Bellamy is Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs. He was Acting Assistant Secretary during the absence of
Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Bellamy. Chairman Feingold, members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify today on the situation in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is the scene of a
complex and devastating war involving six nations, two
Congolese rebel groups, local Congolese militias, and Rwandan
and Burundian Hutu rebels.
The war has produced a major humanitarian crisis with some
2 million people displaced and an estimated 2.5 million deaths
from war-related causes. Government and rebel troops have
perpetrated gross abuses of human rights. The conflict has
generated large refugee flows into neighboring countries, such
as the Republic of Congo, and diverted scarce economic
resources to military expenditures, particularly in the Congo,
Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
The United States supports implementation of the Lusaka
cease-fire agreement as the best means to achieve a just and
stable peace in the region. The Lusaka agreement calls for a
cease-fire, a national dialog leading to a new political
dispensation, the disarmament and repatriation of armed groups
in the Congo, and U.N. monitoring of the withdrawal of foreign
troops.
Mr. Chairman, we are working with the parties to the Lusaka
cease-fire agreement, the United Nations, the Organization of
African Unity, our European allies, and key regional leaders to
help implement this agreement.
President Bush met with President Kabila last fall to
discuss ways to end the conflict. Secretary Powell has urged
implementation of the agreement in meetings with Presidents
Kabila and Kagame and other regional leaders.
I was in Kinshasa 2 weeks ago and reiterated to the
Congolese Government the importance of finding a negotiated
settlement to the conflict. Walter Kansteiner, Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, visited the Congo and Rwanda in
January. In his discussions with Congolese President Kabila and
Rwandan President Kagame, Mr. Kansteiner also urged both
leaders to support the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. We will
continue to make peace in the Great Lakes region a top priority
of the administration.
Of the non-Congolese signatories to the agreement, only
Rwanda and Zimbabwe retain significant numbers of forces in the
Congo. A cease-fire among the signatories has mostly held,
except in the eastern Congo. Fighting in the east involves,
among others, Rwandan-backed Congolese rebels, local Congolese
militia, the Rwandan Army, and Congolese-supported Burundian
Hutu rebels.
We have provided $2 million for the Joint Military
Commission, a commission of the signatories to the Lusaka
agreement, whose duties are to resolve military problems
connected with the agreement, including cease-fire violations.
We intend to notify Congress shortly that we will provide
additional assistance in fiscal year 2002.
The inter-Congolese dialog is currently taking place in Sun
City, South Africa. The participants include all the Congolese
signatories to the Lusaka agreement, as well as representatives
of Congolese opposition political parties and civil society.
The United States has provided $1.5 million to support the work
of former Botswanan President Masire, who is the facilitator of
the dialog.
We hope that when the meeting ends in Sun City this week,
the participants will have charted a way forward to further
negotiations and to a comprehensive and enduring settlement.
With regard to demobilization and disarmament, progress has
been limited. We believe that a broad-based agreement between
Presidents Kagame and Kabila will be necessary before any
general demobilization and disarmament can occur. The Congolese
Government continues to give some supplies to the Rwandan
rebels and to anti-Rwandan militias, while the Rwandan
Government continues its support to Congolese rebels in the
eastern Congo.
In February 2000, the United Nations Security Council
established the U.N. mission to the Congo, MONUC. Former
President Laurent Kabila consistently blocked deployment of
MONUC. Following his father's assassination in January, Joseph
Kabila reversed this policy. MONUC now has deployed 3,688
observers in the Congo and has effectively monitored the cease-
fire in accordance with its mandate.
In his February 15 report to the Security Council,
Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended an increase in MONUC's
troop ceiling from 5,537 to 6,387. The Secretary General said
this increase is needed to support MONUC's deployment to
Kisangani and Kindu in advance of a voluntary demobilization
and disarmament program.
At this time, we do not see the need for an increase in the
troop ceiling. However, if events on the ground should move
forward, a more robust MONUC could be useful.
Mr. Chairman, in terms of humanitarian and development
assistance to the Congo, the United States provided in fiscal
year 2001 about $98 million in assistance. That included $6
million of developmental assistance. This aid was mostly
directed at emergency food relief, including operation of
humanitarian aircraft outside areas of government control, food
security programs, and improved health services. We have also
provided money for programs targeting refugees and internally
displaced persons in the DRC.
We expect total U.S. assistance in fiscal year 2002 to the
DRC to be about the same order of magnitude as last year.
USAID's development assistance for fiscal year 2002 is
estimated at about $21 million. Projects will concentrate on
improving primary health care services in rural areas,
increasing immunization coverage, combating HIV/AIDS and
malaria, enhancing food security, promoting a peaceful
transition process, and protecting the environment.
With regard to international crime and terrorism in the
DRC, we do not have hard evidence of links between groups
operating out of the Congo and international terrorism.
However, both the war and the lack of an effective central
government create an environment that is conducive to
international crime. The Congo is rife in illegal trade in
mineral wealth and arms. The foreign armies and rebel groups in
the Congo steal diamonds, coltan, gold, and timber and use the
proceeds to finance the war and line the pockets of government
officials and army officers.
Moreover, the Congolese Government grants concessions to
its allies, most notably Zimbabwe, in order to win their
military support. The Congolese Government has conceded to the
Zimbabweans the right to set up commercial ventures to explore,
research, exploit, and market mineral, timber, and other
resources. Zimbabwean troops provide the military muscle to
secure these commercial activities. Top Congolese officials
also have personal financial interests in these concessions to
the Zimbabweans.
In summary, let me just reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that the
United States has a strong interest in bringing a lasting peace
to the Congo. We must use our influence to guide the
belligerents to a political agreement. The Congolese people
deserve stability, good government, and economic prosperity. I
believe they have the ability to achieve this, and the
international community has a duty to help them do so.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bellamy follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Bellamy, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Feingold, Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the scene of a complex and
devastating war involving six nations, two Congolese rebel groups,
local Congolese militias, and Rwandan and Burundian Hutu rebels. The
war has caused a tremendous loss of life, property, and economic
development opportunities in a potentially rich country.
The central African conflict has produced a major humanitarian
crisis with some two million people displaced and an estimated 2.5
million deaths from war-related causes. Government and rebel troops
have perpetrated gross abuses of human rights. The conflict has
generated large refugee flows into neighboring countries, such as the
Republic of Congo, and diverted scarce economic resources to military
expenditures, particularly in the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
u.s. interests
U.S. interests are to:
1) End the conflict;
2) Restore stability in the Great Lakes region;
3) Ameliorate the humanitarian and HIV/AIDS crises;
4) Promote a democratic government and respect for human
rights;
5) Promote economic development and reform.
THE LUSAKA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT
The U.S. supports implementation of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement
as the best means to achieve a just and stable peace in the region. The
Agreement--signed in 1999 by the Congo, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia,
Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and the Congolese rebel groups known as the Comgolese
Liberation Movement (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)--
provides a framework for resolution of the DRC conflict. It calls for a
cease-fire, a national dialogue leading to a new political
dispensation, the disarmament and repatriation of armed groups in the
Congo, and UN monitoring of the withdrawal of foreign troops.
Mr. Chairman, we are working with the parties to the Lusaka Cease-
Fire Agreement, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity,
our European allies and key regional leaders to help implement this
agreement.
President Bush met with President Kabila last fall to discuss ways
to end the conflict. Secretary Powell has urged implementation of the
agreement in meetings with Presidents Kabila and Kagame and other
regional leaders.
I was in Kinshasa two weeks ago and reiterated to the Congolese
government the importance of finding a negotiated settlement to the
conflict. Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
visited the Congo and Rwanda in January. In his discussions with
Congolese President Joseph Kabila and Rwandan President Paul Kagame,
Mr. Kansteiner also urged both leaders to support the Lusaka Cease-Fire
Agreement. We will continue to make peace in the Great Lakes region a
top priority for the Administration.
Cease-Fire
Of the non-Congolese signatories, only Rwanda and Zimbabwe retain
significant numbers of forces in the Congo. A cease-fire among the
signatories to the Lusaka Agreement has mostly held, except in eastern
Congo. Fighting in the East involves, among others, Rwandan-backed
Congolese rebels, Congolese-backed Rwandan rebels, local Congolese
militia, the Rwandan Army, and Congolese supported Burundian Hutu
rebels.
We have provided two million dollars for the Joint Military
Commission, a commission of the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement
whose duties are to resolve military problems connected with the
Agreement, including cease-fire violations. We intend to notify
Congress shortly that we will provide additional assistance in FY '02.
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue is currently taking place in Sun City,
South Africa. The participants include all the Congolese signatories to
the Lusaka agreement, as well as representatives of Congolese
opposition political parties and Congolese civil society. The United
States has provided $1.5 million to support the work of former
Botswanan President Ketumile Masire, the facilitator of the Dialogue.
We are pleased that the talks in Sun City have occurred and hope
that when the meeting ends this week, the participants will have
charted the way forward to further negotiations and to a comprehensive
and enduring political settlement.
At the same time, we believe that to end the war, meaningful
demobilization and disarmament of militias and rebel groups--most
importantly of Rwandan Hutu rebels--and a cessation of foreign support
to Congolese rebels must occur.
Demobilization and Disarmament
Progress on demobilization and disarmament has been limited. We
believe that a broad-based agreement between Presidents Kagame and
Kabila will be necessary before any general demobilization and
disarmament can occur. The Congolese Government continues to give some
supplies to the Rwandan rebels and the Congolese Mai-Mai militia, while
the Rwandan Government continues its support to Congolese rebels and
its occupation of most of Eastern Congo. Both countries are reluctant
to make the first move in fear that the other threatens their national
security.
The UN Observer Mission for the Congo
The UN Security Council established in February 2000 a United
Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC). Former President Laurent Kabila
consistently blocked deployment of MONUC. Following his father's
assassination in January, Joseph Kabila reversed this policy. MONUC has
now deployed 3,688 observers in the Congo and has effectively monitored
the cease-fire line in accordance with its mandate.
In his February 15 report to the Security Council, Secretary
General Kofi Annan recommended an increase in MONUC's troop ceiling
from 5,537 to 6,387. The Secretary General said this increase is needed
to support MONUC's deployment to Kisangani and Kindu in advance of a
voluntary demobilization and disarmament program.
At this time we do not see the need for an increase in the troop
ceiling. However, if events on the ground should move forward, a more
robust MONUC could be useful. For example, an agreement among the
Congolese parties over an interim government or a complete or partial
withdrawal of foreign troops, could yield opportunities for
demobilization and disarmament of irregular forces and the need for
monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces in larger areas of the
Congo.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
The United States provided about $98 million in humanitarian
assistance to the Congo in FY 2001. This aid was mostly directed at
emergency food relief, including operation of humanitarian aircraft
outside areas of government control, food security programs, and
improving health services. We have also provided money for programs
targeting refugees and internally displaced persons in the DRC. We
expect total U.S. assistance in FY02 for the DRC to be about the same
as last year.
USAID's Development Assistance for FY 2002 is estimated at $21
million. Projects will concentrate on improving primary health care
services in rural areas, increasing immunization coverage, combating
HIV/AIDS and malaria, enhancing food security, promoting a peaceful
transition process, and protecting the environment.
The cease-fire has created an increased opportunity for
humanitarian assistance to reach previously isolated populations.
Nonetheless, the war continues to restrict aid organizations and normal
economic activity. As a result, the condition of Congolese civilians,
especially in the East, remains truly horrific.
INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM IN THE DRC
We do not have any hard evidence of links between groups operating
out of the Congo and international terrorism. However, the United
States has an interest in a just and strong Congolese Government that
can contribute to the war on terrorism.
Both the war and the lack of an effective central government create
an environment that is conducive to international crime. The Congo is
rife in illegal trade in mineral wealth and arms. The foreign armies
and rebel groups in the Congo steal diamonds, coltan, gold, and timber
and use the proceeds to finance the war and line the pockets of
government officials and army officers.
Moreover, the Congolese Government grants concessions to its
allies--most notably Zimbabwe--in order to win their military support.
The Congolese Government has conceded to the Zimbabweans the right to
set up commercial ventures to explore, research, exploit, and market
mineral, timber, and other resources. Zimbabwean troops provide the
military muscle to secure these commercial activities. Top Congolese
officials also have personal financial interests in these concessions
to the Zimbabweans.
The Congolese Government lacks the ability to control trade in
these minerals or to set up a legal buying system that offers
attractive prices to buyers. As a result, dealers take the goods over
international borders, wherever they perceive they will get the best
price. The Congolese Government liberalized the legal diamond trade in
April 2001, which may help steer more diamonds through legal channels.
Nonetheless, smuggling in diamonds and other Congolese natural
resources will continue to be a problem.
A FEW FINAL THOUGHTS
In summary, let me just reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that the United
States has a strong interest in bringing a lasting peace to the Congo.
We must use our influence to guide the belligerents to a political
agreement. The Congolese people deserve stability, good governance, and
economic prosperity. I believe they have the ability to achieve this,
and the international community has a duty to help them do so.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Bellamy. I will
begin with some questions for you.
At a recent hearing that this subcommittee held regarding
Somalia, I was really kind of appalled to discover how little
we know about the situation on the ground there and the key
players. It is always difficult to gather solid intelligence
about a situation that is so insecure and remote. You sort of
alluded to this already in your remarks, but I would like you
to say a little bit more, to the extent that you can in an open
format, about the degree to which the United States really has
an understanding of what is going on inside Congo's borders.
Mr. Bellamy. Mr. Chairman, you are quite correct in
pointing out the difficulty of developing reliable
intelligence, reliable information from an area as vast and
conflicted as the Congo. I think it is safe to say that we have
a number of means at our disposal. We have a very capable and a
very active embassy on the ground in Kinshasa, headed by a
senior and experienced ambassador. Our embassy personnel, to
the extent that they can, travel outside Kinshasa, and we have
an active program in country of information gathering.
But clearly, there are still large gaps in our data base.
We have only an imperfect knowledge of the military situation
in the remote north and eastern areas of the Congo. We have
spotty coverage of those areas, and we are often forced to
rely, particularly when it comes to assessing potential
terrorist and criminal threats, on secondhand reports. So, it
is not a completely satisfactory situation from an information
gathering standpoint.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
The Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, or AliR, is
designated on the terrorist exclusion list of the United States
Patriot Act. Is the Congolese Government in Kinshasa providing
support to this organization? And if so, what are the
implications of that activity for our Government's relationship
with the Kabila Government?
Mr. Bellamy. The AliR organization is a matter of great
concern to us, along with a number of other armed formations
fighting in the eastern Congo. There have been credible reports
of government support to those organizations, including AliR.
We have, on a number of occasions, made it very clear to the
government in Kinshasa that that sort of support ought to
cease. We think that, in the context of an overall
understanding or settlement between President Kabila, the
government in Kinshasa, and President Kagame and the government
in Rwanda, the issue of support to AliR and other armed
movements has to be very much at the top of the agenda.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Sometimes press reports have surfaced about a North Korean
presence in Congo. To the extent you can, what can you tell us
about those reports in this setting?
Mr. Bellamy. To be quite honest, Mr. Chairman, I do not
have information with me concerning a North Korean presence in
the Congo. I do not, in fact, recall specific reports, but I
will be happy to look into that.
[The following information was subsequently supplied.]
NORTH KOREA PRESENCE IN THE CONGO
Chairman Feingold, at the subcommittee's hearing on the Congo on
April 9, you noted press reports about a North Korean presence in the
Congo and asked me to comment on those reports. I said I did not recall
specific reports concerning North Koreans in the Congo, but promised to
research this issue further. I have since looked into the issue. I am
prepared to discuss details with you and other subcommittee members in
closed session.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Let me return to the previous question for a second and ask
you if Mr. Kabila has responded to our exhortations to stop
support to AliR.
Mr. Bellamy. President Kabila, without necessarily
acknowledging that the government in Kinshasa may be supplying
rebel groups in the east, has on a number of occasions
expressed an interest in sponsoring investigations of alleged
supply to rebel formations in the east, suggesting that a
commission be established by the United Nations for this
purpose. He has been, I believe, responsive when we have
discussed with him the need to end any such assistance, should
it be occurring in the context of a settlement with Rwanda.
Senator Feingold. Let us talk a bit about the conflict
diamonds problem. What role do the so-called conflict diamonds
play in the DRC conflict and what steps is the United States
taking to address the problem in Congo?
Also, specifically I would like you to comment on reports
that al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have used
diamonds purchased in DRC to hide assets and increase their
resource base. We have been tracking reports in this regard, as
well as reports about Sierra Leone and other places. It would
be very helpful if you could comment on that.
Mr. Bellamy. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt whatsoever
that conflict diamonds have played a large role in fueling this
conflict. Diamonds are perhaps the most spectacular but not the
only resources that are being stripped from Congo. I think it
is fair to say that we are never going to be able to break this
cycle of arms being used to seize resources, which then are
being used to purchase more arms, which are being used to seize
more resources until we are able to bring peace to the country
and enable the government in Kinshasa to extend its effective
control over all of its territory.
With regard to al-Qaeda, we do not have specific
indications, Mr. Chairman, of al-Qaeda operating in the Congo
or profiting from diamonds being drawn out of the Congo. I
cannot exclude that as a hypothesis or as a possibility, but I
do not have specific indications that that sort of activity is
occurring.
Senator Feingold. Let me ask you again. Perhaps you
answered it. But what exact steps is the United States taking
to address the conflict diamonds problem in Congo?
Mr. Bellamy. Well, aside from the larger goal of working to
promote a peaceful settlement and to end the conflict in the
Congo, which is the ultimate solution, we are also very
actively supporting the Kimberley process, a worldwide process
whereby certificates of origin will be issued and the diamond
trade will be better regulated at its source.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
You mentioned arms. I wonder if you can comment on arms
trafficking in Congo. I took notice of the recent press reports
regarding Victor Bout's arms trafficking network and its role
in the diamonds for arms transactions in the Congo. Could you
say a little bit more about how these networks operate and is
there any capacity to monitor or track their activities?
Mr. Bellamy. Mr. Chairman, it is clear to us and I think
clear to most observers in the Congo, that the Congo is,
indeed, a very fertile area for illicit arms trafficking. You
mentioned Victor Bout. He is well known and perhaps the most
notorious of the arms traffickers operating in Central Africa.
No doubt there are others as well.
Yes, we do have some capacity for tracking the movements
and the activities of some of these arms traffickers. We rely
heavily on information sharing with other governments, with
friendly governments, who share our concerns, and where it is
possible, we seek to undertake or encourage others to undertake
law enforcement actions, where laws have been broken, to
curtail this form of activity. It is not an easy intelligence
target, but we do devote resources to it. We do not have a
complete picture, but we have enough of a picture to know that
this is a major problem in the Congo.
Senator Feingold. Of course, one of the problems with this
kind of an issue is the long borders not only of Congo, but of
so many of the African countries. Of course, we are having the
same problems here in the United States.
Mr. Bellamy. We do.
Senator Feingold. So, this is a subject that comes up much
more frequently than it has in the past, but in particular,
considering the Congo, what kind of border security is possible
for a vast, centrally located country like Congo, and what, if
anything, can the international community do to help?
Mr. Bellamy. Well, obviously border security in an area as
vast as the DRC is at this point only an aspiration or a hope
or an ambition.
The first thing that has to happen clearly is that the
Congo and its neighbors have to come to a mutual understanding
and recognition that they are all better off with secure
borders than they are allowing groups to operate across those
borders and allowing those borders to be porous. There needs to
be a clear regional understanding about the sanctity and the
importance of borders.
But beyond that, the government in Kinshasa needs to be
able to develop the means to extend control over its territory.
And part of the answer to that question, quite frankly, Mr.
Chairman, probably not in the too far distant future, will be
the eventual formation of an army in the Congo. President
Kabila is handicapped to a certain extent by the lack of a
professional or competent army or armed forces, hence the
requirement that he rely on foreign forces or on ill-
disciplined and poorly trained and often unpaid militia and
rebel groups. So, at some point in this equation, it will be
important that a professional army be formed in the Congo that
is capable of making progress in terms of defending the
borders.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Bellamy, you of course have talked
about the fact that the Lusaka Accord calls for the withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Congo. I believe you said that has
been achieved except with regard to Zimbabwe and Rwanda. Is
that what you said? In large part?
Mr. Bellamy. In large part. There remain Angolan forces. A
small number of Angolan forces are still deployed, I believe,
in the Congo. There are some Ugandan forces that are still
there. But both of those nations have withdrawn sizable
contingents from the Congo. The large foreign contingents
remaining are Rwandan and Zimbabwean.
Senator Feingold. In those two cases, is the potential
domestic problem presented by demobilization a significant
factor in dissuading them from withdrawing their forces, or
would you not rank that as a significant reason?
Mr. Bellamy. Mr. Chairman, it may well be. It is not a
suitable excuse, clearly, for keeping their forces in the
Congo, but it is often alleged that returning those forces
either to Rwanda or Zimbabwe could pose some political problems
for those governments' leadership. But I think that we, in
terms of pursuing our policy, simply have to insist that that
is obviously not an adequate reason for maintaining their
forces in the Congo.
Senator Feingold. Have we offered to help them with
demobilization? Have we thought about that?
Mr. Bellamy. The demobilization issue, to be quite honest,
has not to this point focused on demobilizing regular troops.
Zimbabwe, for its part, has not proposed demobilizing any of
its regular armed forces that are present in Congo. In the
Rwandan case, I do not believe this issue has specifically come
up, Mr. Chairman, of actually demobilizing regular Rwandan
forces who might be returning from the Congo. But it is an idea
certainly that has some merit and may be worth pursuing.
Senator Feingold. I hope it will be, as appropriate,
pursued so that we can find out if it is merely a justification
that is not the real story or whether we really could
facilitate that.
The Lusaka agreement calls for the disarmament of the armed
factions or negative forces operating in the DRC. What has been
done in that regard and what role will MONUC play in the
disarmament of negative forces?
Mr. Bellamy. MONUC's role, Mr. Chairman, is to facilitate
and to assist the parties in achieving disarmament and
demobilization. MONUC is charged with drawing up a game plan
for disarmament and demobilization, and I understand that that
game plan, that report, is in the process of being prepared and
should be ready shortly. MONUC has undertaken a number of
forward deployments to be in a position to assist with
demobilization and disarmament, but the reality is that there
has not been, up to this point, sufficient political will at
the higher levels in our view to begin to spark a serious
disarmament and demobilization process.
We have a particular case of 1,500 Hutu fighters, ex-
Rwandan armed forces or Interahamwe, who are cantoned in the
town of Kamina. This is an obvious target group for
demobilization and eventual repatriation to Rwanda. Some
considerable effort has been spent in trying to focus on that
group as an initial tranche of returnees to Rwanda to
demonstrate that, in fact, disarmament and demobilization can
work.
Senator Feingold. Is that just an example of the efforts
that are being made, or are there efforts being made in general
to achieve this? Is there really a plan for getting this done?
Mr. Bellamy. The U.N. is working on a plan for
demobilization and disarmament. In Rwanda itself, which will be
the destination of the largest number of disarmed fighters,
there is a repatriation program underway. There clearly is a
willingness on the part of Rwandan Government to accept
returned fighters and to, in one way or another, reintegrate
them into Rwandan society.
Now, this has happened largely as a result of Rwandan
forces surrendering, not through an organized disarmament and
demobilization program, but by soldiers who have surrendered,
who have laid down their arms involuntarily or otherwise gone
back to Rwanda. They have gone through a reintegration process
that suggests to us that Rwanda is willing to undertake
reintegration if the soldiers can be returned to them.
Senator Feingold. That helps me with those who have shown
some willingness to voluntarily do this.
What is the plan for those who are not voluntarily willing
to disarm?
Mr. Bellamy. I think, Mr. Chairman, our plan has to focus
on generating the political understanding and will at the
senior levels, the political will at the senior levels to begin
a real process of disarmament. We do not expect the fighters in
the field to voluntarily lay down their weapons or to come in
from the bush without clear indications from their leaders that
this is what is expected of them and this is what they want
them to do.
So, the answer I believe to your question, Mr. Chairman, is
that is a redoubling of our efforts principally with President
Kabila and President Kagame to encourage them to embark on
perhaps a series of mutually reinforcing confidence building
measures, reciprocal gestures, whereby the two parties will
work toward a more comprehensive disarmament and demobilization
and repatriation program.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that answer.
I want to return once again to the question of the Kabila
government's relationship to AliR. Has the Kabila government
shown any willingness to turn over individuals wanted by the
ICTR, and has the Kabila government been asked to do so?
Mr. Bellamy. Speaking just on behalf of the U.S.
Government--and I cannot speak on behalf of the U.N. or others
in the conversations they may have had with President Kabila--
we have discussed these issues with President Kabila. While I
think it is correct to say he has not formally agreed to hand
over individuals to the ICTR, and we have not made detailed or
formal requests, I believe there is a willingness and a
readiness on his part to consider taking steps along these
lines. But, again, this likely would be in the context of
perhaps a series of confidence building measures vis-a-vis
Rwanda.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that. That is going to be an
ongoing interest of mine. I think it is consistent with
policies that our President has indicated that I think should
apply in this situation as well.
Obviously, working on Africa, one of the challenging--it is
sometimes fascinating, but always challenging--things is the
interrelationship of the political situations in other
countries to the country you are focusing on. So, I am
wondering if you could talk a little bit about the effect, if
any, of a couple of the recent developments, one being the
cease-fire agreement and peace process in Angola. What effect
will that have in the situation in Congo? And will Zimbabwe's
recent election affect Harare's policy in Congo?
Mr. Bellamy. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that one of the
major reasons, if not the major reason, for Angola's
involvement in Congo was its concern that the Congo was being
used by UNITA as a staging area and as a rear base. With the
cease-fire process gathering momentum and with most of the
indications in Angola being very positive, the main reason for
Angola's involvement in the Congo is diminishing.
At the same time, we recognize--and I think the U.N. and
others in their reports on the Congo have recognized--that the
Angolan role in Congo has been somewhat different than that
than most of the other external players. We do not really see
much evidence of Angolan exploitation of Congolese resources in
the same way that this has occurred with the Zimbabwean and the
Rwandan presence. We have also seen a willingness on the part
of the Angolans to gradually draw down their forces. So, I
think there is a real possibility that Angola may be headed
toward a complete withdrawal in the Congo, although I cannot
say for sure.
It may also be that a continued Angolan presence in the
Congo of one kind or another could play a positive and
stabilizing role, given their behavior up to this point. I
think it is important to keep an open mind on that score.
With regard to the Zimbabwean presence, when I was in Congo
a couple of weeks ago, we had credible reports that Zimbabwe
was planning to withdraw about half its forces in the Congo.
Now, we have had such reports before. They have turned out to
be unfounded. There have been rotations of Zimbabwean forces
but no large-scale drawdown.
I do not believe that political events in Zimbabwe itself,
including the failed election, are going to have an impact on
the Zimbabwean deployments in the Congo. I think the
determination is likely to be that Zimbabwean forces there are
providing an important source of off-line revenue for the
Government of Zimbabwe. Whatever calculations may be made in
Harare about force levels in the Congo, I do not think it will
be based on political events at home.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that answer.
Many observers have suggested that one of the greatest
obstacles to peace is the distrust between Joseph Kabila and
Rwandan President Paul Kagame. What role can the United States
play in terms of trying to build confidence between Kinshasa
and Kigali?
Mr. Bellamy. I think that observation, Mr. Chairman, is
absolutely accurate. Shortly after he came into office after
his father's assassination, Joseph Kabila visited the United
States and met with Secretary Powell, President Kagame happened
to be here at the same time as Kibila. The two leaders took the
opportunity to meet here in the United States and they have met
on subsequent occasions. But it is clear that there is not a
good chemistry between these two leaders. They have not been
able to reach a mutual understanding, much less an agreement on
ways forward, to end this conflict.
We have given some thought to this. We believe that that is
a very important relationship in terms of breaking the current
deadlock in the Congo. We think that there are a number of
measures that can perhaps be put on the table, discussed,
combined, and sequenced in the right way so that if the two
were able to see perhaps a series of reciprocal confidence
building measures, it might be possible to start a dialog and
to generate some momentum. So, we are actively looking at ways
that we can put some of these ideas on the table and see if we
cannot draw the two leaders into a more productive discussion.
Senator Feingold. I am pleased to hear that. I want to know
what it will take to address Rwanda's security concerns and
thereby eliminate the justification for the Rwandan presence in
the Congo. In these conversations that you referred to, has the
United States really received clear information from the Kagame
government about their bottom line needs? And do you really
think they intend to leave? And do you think we need to put
more pressure on Rwanda?
Mr. Bellamy. I think the government in Rwanda has always
said that it will leave when its security concerns in the Congo
are adequately addressed. It has always said too that it will
be the sole determinant of when its security concerns have
adequately been addressed. There are skeptics and critics of
Rwanda that do not accept that. They believe that the Rwandans
are there for other reasons and have other criteria.
I think simply that it is time again to test both sides,
and I think that there are a number of ways that that could
probably be done.
Senator Feingold. Very good. You have been patient in
answering many questions. I have many more, but that was very
helpful.
Senator Frist is not going to be able to make it to the
hearing, but I want to say very clearly that he has been
incredibly devoted to these issues and has a strong interest
and has put great time into it. He is involved in matters
relating to the cloning debate, and frankly I am glad I am here
rather than trying to deal with that.
So, thank you very much, Mr. Bellamy.
Mr. Bellamy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. We will move to the next panel. Will the
second panel please come forward? Thank you.
We have an excellent panel here before us today. Ms.
Fabienne Hara is the co-director of the Africa Program at the
International Crisis Group. She is currently based in Brussels
but previously worked for the ICG in Nairobi and Burundi. She
previously served as the project director for the Great Lakes
Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, Center for
Preventative Action, and she has worked with Doctors Without
Borders, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and
the French Foreign Ministry.
Mr. Learned Dees is currently program officer for Africa at
the National Endowment for Democracy where he works to assess
and monitor projects supporting nongovernmental organizations.
Before coming to the endowment, Mr. Dees worked as a journalist
in Africa filing stories for NPR, BBC, and VOA from Kinshasa.
Earlier he served as a Peace Corps volunteer in rural Zaire.
Ms. Anne Edgerton is an advocate with Refugees
International for whom she has covered conflicts in the Horn as
well as the Great Lakes region of Africa. She brings 10 years'
experience in international nongovernmental organization
management, as well as program management experience in
international emergency coordination and humanitarian
assistance in the Great Lakes.
I want to thank all of you for being here today. What we
will do is hear from all of the witnesses and then I will have
an opportunity to ask you some questions. Ms. Hara, would you
please begin with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF FABIENNE HARA, AFRICA PROJECT CO-DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
Ms. Hara. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much
for inviting me here to testify on behalf of the International
Crisis Group. I have just returned from Rwanda and Burundi.
Over the 7 years that I have been working on Central Africa, I
have lived there for 3 years, visited the Democratic Republic
of Congo dozens of times, and met several times with President
Joseph Kabila of the DRC and repeatedly with President Pierre
Buyoya of Burundi. I am also in direct contact with most of the
rebel groups in the region.
After 4 years of war, the DRC has become one of Africa's
most fertile grounds for criminal economic activities. It is a
humanitarian catastrophe of staggering proportions, a
distortion to the governments of the DRC's neighbors, and a
major threat to African stability. At a time where the United
States is so focused on the roots and effects of international
disorder and terrorism, the DRC demands a much higher place on
the U.S. agenda.
The presence of armed insurgencies, including perpetrators
of the Rwandan genocide, on the DRC's territory, has already
led to two wars: the first in 1996 and 1997 that led to the
overthrow of President Mobutu; the second which began in 1998
and continues today. The result has been a 3\1/2\-year
occupation of the DRC territory by six foreign armies, the
partition of Congo into three separately administered
territories, and the death of more than 2 million people,
mostly civilians, from war, famine and disease.
Despite the halt of the conventional war since the signing
of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement in 1999, and a series of
high level contacts since then, Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda,
Uganda, and Burundi are still occupying the DRC and have so far
failed to agree on a timeframe for their departure. Rwanda and
Zimbabwe still have massive troop deployments in the DRC.
In effect, the fighting has shifted to eastern Congo where
Rwandan and Burundian Governments continue to battle their own
rebels on Congolese soil and the Kinshasa Government continues
to support those rebel groups. In the Kivus region of eastern
Congo, military operations by the Rwandan Army, as well as
attacks by Rwandan, Burundian, and Congolese armed groups, are
currently being carried out. The Rwandan-backed rebel group,
RCD-Goma [Congolese Rally for Democracy], recently launched an
offensive on the town of Moliro. RCD-Goma and Rwandan troop
movements in Katanga province have, in turn, put Zimbabwean and
Angolan troops on alert. All these unsettling developments have
resurrected the threat of a possible resumption of war. As a
matter of fact, today MONUC reported that there is a high
concentration of troops in Katanga.
In the meantime, the war has contributed to the complete
collapse of state authority across the DRC. This has led to the
destruction of economic infrastructure and generated predatory
behavior from the occupying armies and factions, as well as
from regional and international corporations. The violence
committed by multiple armed factions and the generalized
communal division and hostility have encouraged the emergence
of warlords and illegal trade networks of diamonds, minerals,
arms, and drugs, as documented by the U.N. panel reports on the
illegal exploitation of DRC natural resources.
The bigger war has aggravated several local sub-conflicts,
particularly in eastern Congo, leading to destruction of local
authority, inter-ethnic killings, the fragmentation of rebel
groups, and new tensions between Rwanda and Uganda. New local
groups have recently challenged the RCD and the Rwandan
occupation forces in the Kivus. As inter-ethnic fighting
continues, the fragmentation of the country increases and there
will be a need for local reconciliation processes parallel to
any national agreement.
Now, I am going to focus the rest of the presentation on
the peace process.
The Lusaka agreement, as was already mentioned, mandated a
three-part interlocking process: disarming the non-Congolese
armed groups, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and inter-
Congolese dialog. None of these steps is proceeding smoothly.
The Rwanda Hutu militias remain a fundamental stumbling
block to peace. All sides have acknowledged that they must be
disarmed, demobilized, repatriated to Rwanda, reintegrated and
resettled there or in a third country. To move the process
forward, all the latest U.N. resolutions on the DRC conflict
have mentioned the necessity of a direct dialog between
President Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame. However, despite
several meetings between the two Presidents, no agreement has
been reached and there have been no institutional followup. The
talks failed mainly because of the lack of trust and
intransigence of the belligerents and the lack of a sustained,
single mediation process between the two leadership. Rwanda
still accuses the DRC of harboring and supporting the Hutu
militias and refuses to withdraw until a new government is
established that can disarm these groups. The DRC government
has acknowledged the presence of the Hutu fighters on its
territory, but has not been able to demonstrate that total
support to these groups has stopped.
The U.N. observer mission, MONUC, has 55 military observer
teams deployed, but its so-called phase III deployment to the
east in Kindu and Kisangani has been delayed mainly due to RCD-
Goma and Rwandan opposition. As a result, voluntary operations
of disarmament have not yet started. MONUC has finally produced
an assessment of the number and strength of armed groups, which
is the first step to establishing DDRRR programs. Eventually
the MONUC presence will include 2000 troops in the east for
DDRRR and a deployment to fill the security gaps when
Kisangani, the third largest city in the DRC, is demilitarized.
On the political side, the inter-Congolese dialog is
intended to prepare for a new political dispensation that would
rebuild national Congolese institutions and create the
conditions for restoration of full sovereignty and territorial
integrity. The inter-Congolese dialog is currently taking place
in Sun City in South Africa, but it is deadlocked. The first
obstacle to progress is a dispute over the status of President
Joseph Kabila and on the principles of a constitutional
transition. The rebels and part of the civilian opposition,
backed by Rwanda and Uganda, insist that a new President be
appointed in Sun City for the transition period. President
Kabila and his backers have agreed in principle to share power
with the revels, but they would exempt the Presidency and key
security institutions, and insist that the rebels first return
territories under their control to the Kinshasa administration.
The second contentious issue is the format of the security
forces. The government proposes that the rebel armies be
integrated in the Congolese Armed Forces, while the rebels want
to see the creation of a completely new national army and claim
its high command.
The deadlock in the dialog can be explained by two factors:
first, neither side has won the war and can impose a solution;
and neither feels that its situation is hopeless and that it
must now compromise. Second, the states that have intervened in
the Congo have all unsatisfied political, security, and
economic needs that have not been satisfied and they do not
want to see a strong and legitimate regime emerge in Kinshasa,
which could jeopardize these interests. Many neighboring
governments have actually grown dependent on the economic
benefits of their presence in the DRC, while the security
concerns that began the conflict over Rwandan genocidaires have
not been resolved.
The scenario that is now emerging in Sun City is a source
of concern. There seems to be a deal emerging between Kabila
and one of the rebel groups, the MLC, the unarmed opposition
and civil society. This deal would marginalize the RCD-Goma.
There are already signs that RCD-Goma is splitting. If this
deal materializes in isolation of the hard core of RCD-Goma and
of Rwanda, then there are two risks. The first risk is that
Rwanda will resume war in Katanga, and then the second risk is
that the new government will bring a number of individuals
together in a Mobutu type of regime.
Because the stalemate is so dangerous for Africa as a
whole, it is time for the U.S. Government to reverse its
approach on the DRC. Rather than exclusively focusing on the
needs of external actors, the starting point should be to make
the Congolese state self-sustaining, giving the Congolese
themselves the strength to better carry out their obligations
to protect their own citizens and to ensure border security
with the neighbor countries. This means again that Congo will
have to be governed in a very different way than it has been.
Both Mobutu and Laurent Kabila ruled with little interest in
building domestic institutions and heavy reliance on foreign
military support.
First, in the short term, the U.S. Government should
immediately consult with France, the U.K., Belgium, and South
Africa and build support for a two-step process in order to
make the inter-Congolese dialog successful.
The first step should be to press the participants to
produce a framework agreement on a transitional constitution
and administrative reconstruction of the government, as well as
a basic program for the transition period before the end of the
Sun City session. The future transitional government must
commit to the proper policing of its territory and the ban of
all armed groups operating on DRC territory. Then the United
States will need to press the key players to find an agreement
on a government of national unity. The U.S. Government should
put heavy pressure on all the foreign countries to start
withdrawing as soon as the new transitional government is
appointed and to publicly commit to support it.
Second, the U.S. Government needs to take a leadership role
in seeing that Rwanda and the DRC sustain their direct dialog
and meet their commitments. President Kabila must be convinced
to fulfill international obligations, allow the arrest of the
key leaders of the Rwandan genocide, with assistance of his
allies or third parties, and transfer them to the ICTR. At the
same time, Rwanda should be pressured to come up with a
concrete plan of withdrawal. The sides should reach an interim
agreement on border security to allow withdrawal to proceed.
Third, the United States should press for the appointment
of a high profile U.N. representative to be charged with
implementing the future Sun City agreement, coordinating
regional and international action on DDRRR, and helping
harmonize the strategies of donors and the international
financial institutions for the reconstruction of the country.
Up to now, no one has been in charge of the overall Lusaka
process, and the lack of coordination has been a significant
drag on progress.
Fourth, the U.S. Government should work with the U.N. to
prepare MONUC to become not just observers, but a genuine
peacekeeping force throughout the territory to fill the gaps
when a new Congolese Government is in place and foreign forces
begin to withdraw. In parallel it should begin consultations
with other nations on security sector reform.
Finally, the United States could play a special role in
reconstruction by helping establish a regulatory environment
and codes of conduct for business in Congo in order to destroy
the international channels for illicit trade and to establish a
tax system that would benefit the reconstruction of the country
and help give the central government a regular source of
income.
The deadly stalemate in the DRC risks turning the country
into a no-man's land of crime, smuggling, and violence. It is
undermining development and democracy in at least half a dozen
nations in Central and Southern Africa. It is making a mockery
of regional efforts to slow the spread of HIV/AIDS. And it is
ensuring that tens of millions of people will spend their lives
utterly dependent on humanitarian aid. Long-term, this region
needs to move from being a set of countries at war to being a
set of countries in partnership with free trade, free
circulation of people and goods, and security cooperation. This
post-Lusaka security architecture might look like another SADC
to the north of SADC, Southern African Development Community.
This would very much be in the United States' interest, but it
cannot happen without U.S. involvement.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hara follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fabienne Hara, Africa Project Co-Director,
International Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for inviting me
here to testify on behalf of the International Crisis Group. I have
just returned from Rwanda and Burundi; over the seven years that I have
been working on Central Africa, I have lived in the region for three
years, visited the Democratic Republic of Congo dozens of times, and
met several times with President Joseph Kabila of DRC and repeatedly
with President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi.
After four years of war, the DRC has become one of Africa's most
fertile grounds for criminal economic activities. It is a humanitarian
catastrophe of staggering proportions, a distortion to the governments
of the DRC's neighbors, and a major threat to African stability. At a
time where the United States is so focused on the roots and effects of
international disorder and terrorism, the Democratic Republic of Congo
demands a much higher place on the U.S. agenda.
The presence of armed insurgencies, including perpetrators of the
Rwandan genocide, on the DRC's territory, has led to two wars: the
first in 1996-1997 that led to the overthrow of President Mobutu; the
second which began in 1998 and continues today. The result has been a
three and a half year occupation of DRC territory by six foreign
armies, the partition of Congo into three separately-administered
territories, and the deaths of more than two million people, mostly
civilians, from war, famine and disease.
Despite the halt of the conventional war since the signing of the
Lusaka cease-fire agreement in 1999, and a series of high-level
contacts since then, Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi are
still occupying DRC territory and have so far failed to agree on a
timeframe for their departure. Rwanda and Zimbabwe still have massive
troop deployments in the DRC.
In effect, the fighting has shifted to eastern Congo, where Rwandan
and Burundian governments continue to battle their own rebels on
Congolese soil--and the Kinshasa government continues to support those
rebel groups. In the Kivus region of eastern Congo, military operations
by the Rwandan army as well as attacks by Rwandan, Burundian and
Congolese armed groups are currently being carried out. The Rwandan-
backed rebel group RCD-Goma recently launched an offensive on the town
of Moliro. RCD-Goma and Rwandan troop movements in Katanga province
have in turn put Zimbabwean troops on alert. All these unsettling
developments have resurrected the threat of a possible resumption of
war.
In the meantime, the war has contributed to the complete collapse
of state authority across the DRC. This has led to the destruction of
economic infrastructure and generated predatory behavior from the
occupying armies and factions as well as from regional and
international corporations. The violence committed by multiple armed
factions, and the generalized communal division and hostility, have
encouraged the emergence of warlords and of illegal trade networks of
diamonds, minerals, arms and drugs, as documented by the UN panel
reports on the illegal exploitation of DRC natural resources.
The bigger war has aggravated several local sub-conflicts,
particularly in eastern Congo, leading to destruction of local
authority, inter-ethnic killings, the fragmentation of rebel groups and
new tensions between Rwanda and Uganda. New local groups have recently
challenged the RCD and Rwandan occupation forces in the Kivus. As
inter-ethnic fighting continues, the fragmentation of the country
increases, and there will need to be local reconciliation processes
parallel to any national agreement.
STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS
The Lusaka Agreement mandated a three-part interlocking process:
disarming the non-Congolese armed groups in eastern Congo; the
withdrawal of foreign forces; and an Intercongolese Dialogue among
government, rebels, unarmed opposition and civil society. None of these
steps is proceeding smoothly.
The Rwandan Hutu militias, which set off the conflict in 1998,
remain a fundamental stumbling block to peace. All sides have
acknowledged that they must be disarmed, demobilized, repatriated to
Rwanda, reintegrated and resettled there or in a third country--a UN
process known as DDRRR. To move the process forward, all the latest UN
resolutions on the DRC conflict have mentioned the necessity of a
direct dialogue between President Kabila and Rwandan President Kagame.
However, despite several meetings, no agreement has been reached and
there has been no institutional follow up. The talks failed mainly
because of the lack of trust and intransigence of the belligerents and
the lack of a sustained, single process of mediation between the two
leaderships. Rwanda accuses the DRC of harboring and supporting the
Hutu militias and refuses to withdraw until a new government is
established that can disarm these groups. The DRC government has
acknowledged the presence of these Hutu fighters on its territory but
has not been able to demonstrate that total support to these groups has
stopped.
The UN observer mission--MONUC--has 55 military observer teams
deployed, but its so-called phase III deployment to the East in Kindu
and Kisangani has been delayed. As a result, voluntary operations of
disarmament have not yet started. MONUC has finally produced an
assessment of the number and strength of armed groups, which is the
first step to establishing DDRRR programs. Eventually, the MONUC
presence will include 2000 troops in the east for DDRRR and a
deployment to fill the security gaps when Kisangani, the DRC's third-
largest city, is demilitarized.
On the political side, the Intercongolese Dialogue is intended to
prepare for a new political dispensation that would rebuild national
Congolese institutions and create the conditions for restoration of
full sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Intercongolese Dialogue
is currently taking place in Sun City in South Africa, but it is
deadlocked. The first obstacle to progress is a dispute over the status
of President Joseph Kabila and on the principles of a transitional
constitution. The rebels and part of the civilian opposition, backed by
Rwanda and Uganda, insist that a new president be appointed in Sun City
for the transition period. President Kabila and his backers have agreed
in principle to share power with the rebels; but they would exempt the
Presidency and key security institutions, and insist that the rebels
first return territories under their control to the Kinshasa
administration. The second contentious issue is the format of the
future security forces. The government proposes that the rebel armies
be integrated in the Congolese Armed Forces, while the rebels want to
see the creation of a completely new national army and claim its high
command.
The deadlock in the dialogue can be explained by two factors:
first, neither side has won the war and can impose a solution; but
neither feels that its situation is hopeless and that it must now
compromise. Second, the states that have intervened in the Congo all
have unsatisfied political, security and economic needs and don't want
to see a strong and legitimate regime emerge in Kinshasa, which could
jeopardize these interests. Many neighboring governments have grown
dependent on the economic benefits of their presence in the DRC; while
the security concerns that began the conflict, over Rwandan
genocidaires, have not been resolved.
A STRATEGY FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
Because this stalemate is so dangerous for Africa as a whole, it is
time for the U.S. government to reverse its approach on the DRC. Rather
than exclusively focusing on the needs of external actors, the starting
point should be to make the Congolese state self sustaining, giving the
Congolese themselves the strength to better carry out their obligations
to protect their own citizens and to ensure border security with the
neighbor countries. This means that Congo will have to be governed in a
different way than it has been. Both Mobutu and Laurent Kabila ruled
with little interest in building domestic institutions and heavy
reliance on foreign military support.
First, in the short term, the U.S. government should immediately,
consult with France, the U.K., Belgium and South Africa and build
support for a two-step process in order to make the Intercongolese
Dialogue successful. The first step should be to press the participants
to produce a framework agreement on a transitional constitution and
administrative reconstruction of the government, as well a basic
program for the transition period before the end of the Sun City
session. The future transitional government must commit to the proper
policing of its territory and the ban of all armed groups operating on
DRC territory. Then the U.S. will need to press the key players, both
the Congolese and their backers, to find an agreement on a government
of national unity. The U.S. government should put heavy pressure on all
the foreign countries to start withdrawing as soon as the new
transitional government is appointed and to publicly commit to support
it.
Second, the U.S. government needs to take a leadership role in
seeing that Rwanda and the DRC sustain their direct dialogue and meet
their commitments. President Kabila should first be convinced to
fulfill international obligations, allow the arrest of key leaders of
Rwandan genocide operating on his territory, with assistance of his
allies or third parties, and transfer them to the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. At the same time, Rwanda should be
pressured to come up with a concrete plan of withdrawal. The sides
should reach an interim agreement on border security, to allow
withdrawal to proceed.
Third, the U.S. should press for the appointment of a high-profile
UN representative, to be charged with implementing the Sun City
agreement, coordinating regional and international action on DDRRR, and
helping harmonize the strategies of donors and the international
financial institutions for the reconstruction of the country. Up to
now, no one has been in charge of the overall Lusaka process, and the
lack of coordination has been a significant drag on progress.
Fourth, the U.S. government should work with the UN to prepare
MONUC to become not just observers but a genuine peacekeeping force
throughout the territory, to fill the gaps when a new Congolese
government is in place and foreign forces begin to withdraw. In
parallel it should begin consultations with other nations on security
sector reform.
Finally, the U.S. could play a special role in reconstruction by
helping establish a regulatory environment and codes of conduct for
business in Congo, in order to destroy the international channels for
illicit trade and to establish a tax system that would benefit the
reconstruction of the country and help give the central government a
regular source of income.
This deadly stalemate risks turning the DRC into a no-man's land of
crime, smuggling and violence. It is undermining development and
democracy in at least half a dozen nations in Central and Southern
Africa. It is making a mockery of regional efforts to slow the spread
of HIV/AIDS. And it is ensuring that tens of millions of people will
spend their lives utterly dependent on humanitarian aid. Long-term,
this region needs to move from being a set of countries at war to being
a set of countries in partnership, with free trade, free circulation of
people and goods, and even security cooperation. This post-Lusaka
security architecture might look like another Southern African
Development Community--SADC--to the north of SADC. This would be very
much in the United States' interest--but it cannot happen without U.S.
involvement.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that very helpful
testimony.
Mr. Dees.
STATEMENT OF LEARNED DEES, PROGRAM OFFICER FOR AFRICA, NATIONAL
ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Dees. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to
testify today and for having concern about the issue in the
Congo. I have prepared a full text and I ask that it be entered
into the record and I will give a short summary of it.
As a former Peace Corps volunteer who served in Zaire about
15 years ago, I give my testimony as a personal testimony, not
as a representative of the organization. I had an opportunity
to return to the village where I was a Peace Corps volunteer
about 15 years ago recently, and when I got to the village, I
am haunted by what I heard. I met with my best friend, and I
said, how are things going? How do you feel? And he said to me
in the local language, ``beto ke bauumbi,'' and that means ``we
are the walking dead.'' And in Congo, a nation of 60 million
people, it is a nation of the walking dead that the
international community has forgotten. I am haunted by those
words, and I have prepared my testimony with that in mind.
The National Endowment for Democracy is a nonprofit grant-
making organization created in 1983 to strengthen democratic
institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts.
With its annual congressional appropriation the endowment makes
hundreds of grants each year to support pro-democracy groups in
every region.
NED's program supporting civil society organizations in
what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo began more than a
decade ago. The first grants were made in 1990 to organizations
which documented the abuses of the government of Mobutu Sese
Seko. Among the first international funding organizations to
support these efforts of nascent Congolese human rights
pioneers, NED has provided assistance to human rights groups
and pro-democracy groups in almost every region of the Congo.
In fiscal year 2001, Congo was the No. 1 priority for NED's
Africa grants program, and more than 30 grants were awarded to
human rights groups and pro-democracy groups.
This assistance to civil society organization in Congo has
taken place in the context of political chaos, state collapse,
and war, but the slow, steady deterioration of the state under
Mobutu, to the war launched in 1996 to overthrow Mobutu, to the
invasion in 1998 by Rwanda and Uganda aimed at toppling his
successor, Congo has been caught in a cycle of war, violence,
and retribution.
I will speak briefly about the human rights situation. The
impact of this conflict on 60 million people that live in the
Congo has been nothing less than calamitous. Indeed, the
conflict in the Congo has led directly and indirectly, as you
have heard before, to the deaths of 2.5 million people. More
people have died as a result of the conflict in the Congo in
the last 6 years than any other conflict in the world.
The collapse of the country's health infrastructure, the
destitution of millions of internally displaced people fleeing
the conflict, and the availability of arms has exacerbated a
desperate situation, especially in the eastern portion of the
Congo.
In the east of the country, the human rights situation is
extremely poor. Soldiers from Uganda and Rwanda, allied with
local Congolese forces, operate with impunity. The three rebel
movements have no popular support for their political or
military aims in the regions they occupy. According to the 2001
State Department report on human rights and local reports from
human rights organizations, these rebels and foreign troops
from Rwanda and Uganda are responsible for a long list of
abuses, including deliberate, large-scale killings,
disappearances, torture, rape, dismemberment, extortion,
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the forcible recruitment of
child soldiers.
Human rights activists and journalists face severe
restrictions and are often targets for abuse. Many human rights
activists, including some supported by NED in Kisangani, Goma,
Uvira, Beni, and Butembo, have themselves been victims of human
rights abuses, including torture.
A significant and underlying cause of continued conflict in
the east is the presence of the Rwandan soldiers and militias
associated with the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Estimates on
their numbers vary from 10,000 to 20,000. Regardless of their
number, their mere presence in the east is a destabilizing
force. They have been armed by and allied to the Kinshasa
Government and, on occasion, allied with local militia against
the Rwandan-backed rebels. Thus, the resulting conflict between
Rwandan combatants on Congolese soil victimizes first and
foremost innocent Congolese civilians caught in the middle.
Many innocent civilians have been killed after allegations of
assisting one side or the other without a clear resolution to
the fundamental disposition of these culpable armed combatants
from Rwanda who have escaped justice, conflict is likely to
continue.
In the Congo, human rights abuses are not limited to one
portion of the country. Significant abuses, in fact, also occur
in the government-held territory. According to local human
rights reports, the administration of Congolese President
Joseph Kabila, which rules by decree, uses arbitrary arrest,
torture, and detention as weapons against its critics. The
government security forces operate with complete impunity. Also
among its targets are journalists, human rights activists, and
political opponents.
Complicating this picture, as you have already heard, is
the connection between conflict and control of precious natural
resources. This has been the subject of two United Nations
Security Council reports. The panel concluded that the
exploitation was systemic and systematic involving networks of
government officials, military officers, military-owned
companies from Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Congo and the
involvement of European and American businessmen and companies.
It is clear that the Congo provides fertile ground for any
criminal network in the world wishing to launder money in
exchange for illicit goods such as diamonds. There is, in
conclusion, a strong financial disincentive for ending the war.
A quick note on MONUC, the United Nations mission. It has
played an important role in verifying and maintaining the
fragile cease-fire. With a mandate of slightly more than 5,000
troops, staff members, and monitors, MONUC has been deployed to
the front line, and many Congolese consider their presence
important and reassuring. In a fluid and complex conflict,
MONUC has provided an independently reliable source of
information, and despite its size, an effective force of
interposition. In many ways, this thin blue line is all that
separates Congo from chaos.
The inter-Congolese dialog is the discussion that is going
on now in South Africa to bring together the various forces in
the Congo to come up with a solution. Now in its final week,
the participants appear some ways away from the essential
agreement on the most important points, although progress has
been made on some of the issues. Among the sticking points are
the dates and time of retreat of foreign troops, the structure
and identity of the individuals who will lead the transition,
and a strategy for reconstituting the army. These, of course,
are the most important points. With just days to go to bring
peace, there is a real fear that dialog which does not deliver
at least some substantive agreement pointing to the direction
of peace, will in effect mean a maintenance of the status quo
in the best case scenario and a return to war in the worst.
It is the maintenance of the status quo which the majority
of the Congolese people reject. The status quo means the
continued division of the country, continued violence, the
continued misery of 60 million people who, for all practical
purposes, are stateless and depend on themselves. The status
quo means continued repression against ideas which are not in
sync with those who are in control of the various areas.
Of course, for the belligerents, the perspective is
different. It means the ability to control the levers of
coercion. It means the ability to control the abundant and
precious resources in their areas.
Urgent action is required to prevent this return to war. I
would like to highlight just a couple of recommendations.
First and foremost, given the gravity of the situation and
the status of the talks in Sun City, it is imperative that the
U.S. Government engage to play a leadership role in ensuring
that an inconclusive end to the talks this week are not an
excuse for a return to war. Specifically this means that the
United States get the U.N. to endorse a followup process to be
coordinated by an international personality with a profile and
support commensurate with the gravity of the crisis. This
person would coordinate, as was mentioned by Fabienne, the
implementation of the three main elements of the Lusaka
Accords: the reunification of the country, the withdrawal of
foreign forces, and the demobilization process.
You asked the speaker on the previous panel about the
demilitarization program. I think it is a priority that the
U.S. Government should provide leadership in devising a
realistic program which will focus on disarming the AliR forces
and bringing the culpable members of its leadership to justice,
while providing at the same time assurance to the other members
that they can be reintegrated back into the Rwandan society.
With that I would like to finish my testimony and thank you
once again for calling the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dees follows:]
Prepared Statement of Learned Dees,\1\ Program Officer for Africa,
National Endowment for Democracy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The views reflected in this document are my own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify on the topic of Weak States in
Africa-U.S. Policy Options in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a nonprofit,
bipartisan grant-making organization created in 1983 to strengthen
democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental
efforts. With its annual Congressional appropriation, the Endowment
makes hundreds of grants each year to support pro-democracy groups in
every region of the world. Endowment programs in the areas of labor,
free-market and political party development are conducted by four core
institutes: the American Center for International Labor Solidarity
(ACILS), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the
International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs (NDI). The discretionary grants
program assists pro-democracy organizations in other countries doing
work in areas such as human rights, civic education and political
participation, independent media and the free flow of information, the
rule of law and democratic governance and conflict resolution.
The National Endowment for Democracy has been providing support for
civil society organizations in what is now the Democratic Republic of
Congo (formerly Zaire) for more than a decade. The Endowment's first
grants there were made in 1990 to human rights organizations which
documented the abuses of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime. Among NED's first
grantees was the Voice of the Voiceless, the country's oldest human
rights group, which was founded by idealistic college students in the
late 1980s. In 1993, the Endowment made a grant to the International
Human Rights Law Group for human rights training and capacity building
in the east of the country. It was the first international assistance
specifically for human rights capacity building and contributed to the
training of a generation of human rights activists, many of whom have
assumed leadership positions in the human rights movement, including
Inimaculee Birhaheka, the 2000 winner of the Martin Ennals Award, a
prize awarded annually by the world's 10 leading human rights
organizations. The Endowment was among the first international funding
organizations to support the efforts of these Congolese human rights
pioneers and over the years Endowment assistance has helped human
rights groups in almost every region of the country. In FY 2001, Congo
was the number one priority for NED's Africa grants program and more
than 30 grants were awarded to human rights and pro-democracy groups.
NED's direct assistance to civil society organizations in Congo has
taken place in the context of political chaos, state collapse and war.
From the slow but steady deterioration of the state under Mobutu Sese
Seko, to the war launched in 1996 with the aim of overthrowing Mobutu,
to the invasion in 1998 by Rwanda and Uganda, aimed at toppling his
successor, Laurent Kabila, Congo has been caught in a cycle of
violence, retribution and war.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AND THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
The impact of this conflict on Congo's 60 million people has been
nothing less than calamitous. Indeed, the conflict in the Congo has
led, directly and indirectly, to the deaths of more than an estimated
three million people. More people have died as a result of the conflict
in the Congo in the last six years than from any other conflict in the
world.
The collapse of the country's health infrastructures, the
destitution of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people
fleeing the conflict and the continued availability of arms have
exacerbated a desperate situation, especially in the Eastern portion of
the Congo now under control of various factions seeking to overthrow
the current government of Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa.
This vicious cycle of war and retribution has filtered down from
cities to towns to villages. Innocent civilians are at the mercy of
numerous armed groups who roam the countryside. Both international
human rights groups and local groups have documented numerous massacres
of civilians by marauding combatants who make no distinction between
other armed combatants and innocent bystanders, including women and
children. In this context of conflict, clearly the human rights
situation is grave. Numerous human rights organizations have detailed
the extensive use of arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture.
In the east of the country, the human rights situation is extremely
poor. Soldiers from Uganda and Rwanda, allied with local Congolese
forces, operate with impunity. The three rebel movements, the Congolese
Rally for Democracy (RCD/Goma), the Movement for the Liberation of the
Congo (MLC), and the Congolese Rally for Democracy--based in Bunia
(RCDIML)--have no popular support for their political or military aims
in the regions they occupy. According to the 2001 State Department
report on human rights, and local reports from human rights
organizations, these rebel groups and foreign troops from Rwanda and
Uganda are responsible for a long list of abuses including deliberate,
large scale killings, disappearances, torture, rape, dismemberment,
extortion, arbitrary arrest and detention, and forcible recruitment of
child soldiers.
Human rights activists and journalists face severe restrictions and
are often targets for abuse for disseminating human rights reports or
news stories critical of local military or political officials. Many
human rights activists, including some supported by NED in Kisangani,
Goma, Uvira, Beni and Butembo, have themselves been victims of human
rights abuses, including torture.
In addition to these abuses local military and political leaders
have manipulated and exacerbated ethnic tensions with disastrous
consequences. One such example is the conflict between people from Hema
and Lendu ethnic groups in North Kivu. Since the fighting began in
1999, nearly 8,000 people have been killed and 200,000 displaced. Both
local and international reports implicate Ugandan army commanders in
causing or exacerbating the conflict.
In South Kivu, fighting has broken out recently between the RCD and
members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group. This conflict has serious
consequences for this vulnerable Tutsi community which has had its
nationality questioned and been the target of ethnic attacks for the
better part of the last decade. The Banyamulenge community has
requested that UN peacekeepers visit the High Plateau area of South
Kivu to verify the gravity of the situation.
A significant and underlying cause of continued conflict is the
presence of Rwandan soldiers and militias associated with the Rwandan
genocide in 1994 (formerly known as Interahamwe now known as ALIR
forces). Estimates on the number of these Rwandan combatants rage from
10,000 to 20,000. Regardless of the numbers, their mere presence in the
east of the Congo is a destabilizing force. They have been armed by and
allied to the Kinshasa government and, on occasion, allied with local
militias against the Rwandan-backed rebels. Thus, the resulting
conflict between Rwandan combatants on Congolese soil victimizes first
and foremost innocent Congolese civilians caught in the middle. Many
innocent civilians have been killed after allegations of assisting or
siding with one or the other of these armed groups. Without a clear
resolution to the fundamental disposition of these culpable armed
combatants from Rwanda, who have escaped justice, conflict is likely to
continue.
Another substantial armed force operation in the east of Congo is
the local self-defense militias, known as Mai-Mai, who are likewise
responsible for human rights abuses against civilians including
killings, rapes, torture, kidnaping and the arbitrary arrest and
detention of civilians.
In Congo human rights abuses are not limited to one portion of the
country. Significant abuses, in fact, are also occurring in government
held territory. According to local human rights reports, the
administration of Congolese President Joseph Kabila, which rules by
decree, uses arbitrary arrest, torture and detention as a weapon
against it critics. The government security forces operate with
complete impunity. Among its many targets are journalists, human rights
activists and political opponents. One such victim was Golden Misabiko,
a staff member of the African Association in Defense of Human Rights
(ASADHO), who was detained for alleged complicity in the assassination
of the head of state, Laurent Kabila, tortured and later released. The
government, like the rebel movements, often forcibly recruits child
soldiers.
Further complicating this all around dismal human rights picture is
the connection between the conflict and control over precious natural
resources. This was the subject of two reports last year conducted by
the United Nations Security Council appointed Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources. The panel concluded that
exploitation of resources was systematic and systemic, involving
networks of government officials, military officers, and military owned
companies from, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Congo with the
involvement of European and American businessmen and companies.
According to a recent Oxford Analytica brief on the Congo, illegal
exploitation of the country's mineral resources including diamonds,
timber, coltan and gold continues despite increased international
attention. The report draws a connection between fighting and
resources, noting that recent outbreaks of fighting in eastern Congo
have been highly localized around key coltan mining areas. It is clear
that Congo provides fertile ground for any criminal network in the
world wishing to launder money in exchange for illicit goods such as
diamonds. There is, in conclusion, a strong financial disincentive for
ending the war.
The United Nations Peace Keeping mission (MONUC) has played an
important role in verifying and maintaining the fragile cease-fire.
With a mandate of slightly more than 5,000 troops and support staff and
monitors, MONUC has deployed to the front lines and many Congolese
consider their presence important and reassuring. In a fluid and
complex conflict MONUC has provided an independently reliable source of
information, and despite its limited size, an effective force of
intervention. In many ways this thin blue line is all that separates
Congo from complete chaos.
Yet, despite this bleak environment and great hardships borne by
the majority of the Congolese, civil society continues to fill the
space left vacant by inaction and war. Efforts to rebuild Goma, for
example, which was almost completely destroyed by the recent eruption
of a volcano, are being led by local NGOs whose grassroots links have
made distribution of humanitarian assistance possible. NGOs and
religious organizations based in Catholic and Protestant churches are
filling gaps in the health, developmental, and agricultural sectors.
Although their self-reliance skills are finely honed, these NGOs are
now greatly tested by the war and economic collapse. Regardless of the
outcome of the current political discussions and military situation,
civil society, including religious institutions, nongovernmental
organizations, professional associations, and trade unions will
continue to play a significant role in the country's future, if
properly supported.
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue
After the assassination of Congo's President Laurent Kabila in
January 2001, at the hands of his own bodyguards, the moribund peace
process was given new life. Kabila's son Joseph took over and
articulated a desire for peace. The Lusaka Accord, which was brokered
with U.S. assistance and first signed in 1999 was suddenly back in
play. The agreement itself included a cease-fire, the introduction of
United Nations peacekeepers, provisions for a roundtable discussion
bringing together the government, civil society, political parties and
rebel groups. This discussion, known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue,
was set up to be the central forum in which Congolese leaders would
devise a plan of action for moving the country from war to peace.
The meeting was charged with, among other things, devising a legal
framework for a transitional government, and the institutions for the
transition, creating a national army, and establishing a timetable for
the withdrawal of all foreign forces as well setting a timetable for
future elections. So far the 400 Congolese participants, including
representatives of the Congolese government, armed and unarmed
opposition members and members of civil society have divided up into
five commissions aimed at presenting final recommendations for the
group's final approval this week. The commissions are 1) the political
commission, which is tasked to examine the causes and consequences of
war, the new political institutions and the leaders of the transition,
2) the humanitarian social and cultural commission assigned to examine
modalities and timing for humanitarian relief and setting up a peace
and reconciliation committee, 3) the defense and security commission,
assigned to determine the timing of the withdrawal of foreign troops,
constituting a new army, and disarmament of armed groups, 4) economic
and financial commission assigned to look at how to jump start the
economy, the impact of economic decisions made during the war as well
as economic revitalization, and 5) the commission of peace and
reconciliation.
The discussion was slated to begin February 25 and run through
April 12, a length of 45 days. The meeting, however, was initially
delayed because of a dispute over the participation of specific
participants. That dispute was eventually resolved but precious time
was lost and now in the final week participants appear some ways away
from the essential agreement on the most important issues. As one of
the biggest contingents at the dialogue civil society or la force vive
is playing a pivotal role in trying to bridge the divide that separates
the various protagonists. But significant issues continue to divide the
delegates.
Among the sticking points are the dates and timing for the retreat
for foreign troops, the structure and identity of the individuals who
will lead the transition, and a strategy for reconstituting the army.
These, of course, are the most important points for a transition to
peace. Recent African led-efforts to dislodge the blockage surrounding
some of these issues have failed. With now just days to go before the
conclusion of the discussion to bring peace, there is a real fear that
dialogue which does not deliver at least some substantive agreement
pointing in the direction of peace, will in effect, mean a maintenance
of the status quo in the best case, and a return to war in the worst
case.
It is the maintenance of the status quo which the majority of the
Congolese people reject. The status quo means the continued division of
the country, continued violence, the continued misery of 60 million
people who, for all practical purposes are stateless, with only
themselves to depend upon. The status quo means continued repression
against ideas not in synch with those who control the various areas.
For the belligerents, of course, the perspective is different. It
means the ability to maintain control over the levers of coercion. It
also means the ability to maintain control over the abundant and
precious resources in the areas under their control.
Urgent action is required to prevent the return to war. The
following is a list of recommendations which could help avert the
looming disaster.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Engagement by the U.S. government to play a leadership role in
insuring that an inconclusive end to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue does
not become an excuse for a return to war. Specifically, this means
insuring that the UN endorse a follow-up process to be coordinated by
an international personality with a profile and political support
commensurate with the gravity of the crisis. This person would
coordinate implementation of the three main elements of the Lusaka
Accords: the re-unification of the country, withdrawal of all foreign
forces, and the demobilization process.
The UN Security Council, with strong support and leadership from
the U.S. government should endorse the call for strengthening of the
MONUC peacekeepers when its mandate is up for renewal this summer. The
mandate should support an increase as well in MONUC's human rights
monitoring programs and provide political support for deployment of
MONUC observers to Bunia and Minembwe.
The U.S. government should provide leadership in devising a
realistic Demilitarization Demobilization Reintegration Reconstruction
and Reconciliation (DDRRR) program which will focus on disarming ALIR
forces and bringing culpable members of its leadership to justice,
while providing assurances to other members that they will be
reintegrated back into Rwanda society.
The United States should strongly and regularly denounce violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law by all parties
involved in the DRC war. This would also include vigorous condemnation
of recruitment, abduction and training of children. Exert strong and
constant pressure on all foreign countries involved in the war to abide
by UN Security Council resolutions.
Significantly increase the level of funding for humanitarian
assistance in the DRC generally and in eastern Congo specifically.
Senator Feingold. Well, thank you too, Mr. Dees, for your
good testimony and the personal observations and the
recommendations as well. It is very helpful.
Ms. Edgerton.
STATEMENT OF ANNE EDGERTON, ADVOCATE, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Edgerton. Thank you. I want to thank the chairperson of
the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator Russell Feingold,
and the members and the staffers of the subcommittee as well
for providing the opportunity for Refugees International to
testify at this hearing.
Since 1999, Refugees International [RI] has completed seven
humanitarian assessment missions to eastern DRC.
At the outset of my testimony, I want to stress two points.
First, unless the prevailing insecurity is halted, there can be
no sustainable development in the east. Security is the single
most important area for the international community to address.
Second, I see no reason, based on my most recent trip to the
DRC, to modify RI's conclusion based on our earlier mission in
December 2000, that nowhere in the world is the gap between
humanitarian needs and the response of the international
community greater than in the DRC. The efforts of the
international community appear feeble and ineffective, dwarfed
by the scale of the suffering that they are intended to
mitigate. Only if peace is achieved and humanitarian assistance
substantially increased can this gap be bridged.
After many interviews over the past 3 years, RI has found
that Congolese civilians in the eastern portion of the country
are increasingly at the mercy of armed groups, including rebel
forces backed by regional powers, the Mayi-Mayi and the
Interahamwe, who murder civilians, rape women, capture
children, and steal crops with impunity. In the shadow of
insecurity, the village economy has given way to a war economy
which drives boys and young men to become child soldiers where
they get a gun. Much of the violence that is still occurring in
the east today is totally devoid of a political or strategic
rationale. It is banditry to allow unpaid soldiers to survive.
This makes the violence endemic and resistant to amelioration
through political action.
The insecurity and lack of a functioning government opens
the eastern Congo to foreign interests involved in exploitation
and smuggling of primary products such as coltan, diamonds, and
timber.
The insecurity severely and directly hampers the delivery
of emergency assistance. Access to war-affected civilians is
limited by two great factors: the enormous territory of the
Congo, which lacks a functioning transport network, and the
rampant insecurity, which further complicates delivery in the
eastern portion of the country and often prevents access to
vulnerable populations for months at a time.
The United States and the international community have
supported various cease-fire and peace agreements through
several measures, including U.N. Security Council resolutions,
the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission to
the Congo, or MONUC, and dedication in name to the process of
the inter-Congolese dialog.
If and when a real cease-fire is achieved, a requirement
for maintaining the peace will be the demobilization of armed
personnel. MONUC's mandate includes the creation of a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan. But the
concern is whether the international community will provide the
timely financial support that will be required to make the plan
a reality. As we have seen in Angola, for example, when the
demobilization is underfunded, it takes very little time for
the conflict to resume.
The United States remains one of the largest donors to the
Congo. Nonetheless, in fiscal year 2001, donor response came to
only 60 percent of the funds requested by the U.N. Consolidated
Inter-Agency Appeal, and fiscal year 2002 does not look more
promising.
Individual development organizations have since 1994
changed the focus of their programs to include humanitarian and
emergency assistance. These organizations continue to be
involved in humanitarian work, particularly in the eastern
parts of the country, which are most affected by the war and
mass displacement. Oxfam finds that countrywide 65 percent of
the population has no access to safe water and 40 percent of
primary school-age children have no access to education. In a
recent survey conducted by World Vision staff in North Kivu
province in January, 2 of 16 villages chosen could not be
included at the last minute because of prevailing insecurity.
Of the villages assessed for health and nutrition, a 30 percent
global malnutrition rate surfaced, with 14 percent or almost
half of that being severe malnutrition. Such numbers have not
been seen by the humanitarian community since the 1998 famine
in Sudan.
Through local NGO's and church-affiliated networks,
numerous Congolese are attempting to ease the suffering of
their people. Some of the most effective associations have been
the local peace committees.
Given the strength of Congolese civil society, development
assistance must support local organizations, thereby enhancing
effectiveness by being more responsive to local input and
conditions. Only by putting local communities in the driver's
seat while avoiding local armed elements, can development be
sustainable. Donors need to respond to the requests from the
community structures that remain intact after years of war.
One way to measure the level of community involvement in
bridging the gap to development is to talk with women. Women's
groups have consistently advocated a stop to the conflict and
urged all sides to try to return to peace. Traditionally,
development and assistance programs only include women in the
gender or soft social programs. But donors and beneficiaries
could both benefit from involving women in the planning stages
of infrastructure and public policy programs.
Given the above, Refugees International would like to make
the following recommendations to the U.S. Government.
Commit to high profile, U.S. attention to the
implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accords, with special
attention to stopping the atrocities.
Consider applying targeted economic sanctions, such as the
freezing of bank accounts of those benefiting from the economic
exploitation of Congolese resources, on governments and
individuals that continue to block the implementation of the
Lusaka Accords.
Identify ways, either through the U.N. or through U.S.-
based NGO's to channel assistance to small-scale Congolese
peace building, humanitarian, and development efforts.
In addition, RI makes the following recommendations to the
United States as a member of the international community.
Ensure that MONUC fulfills its current mandate and support
the expansion of its troop presence in the Congo, as called for
by the U.N. Secretary General on February 15.
Increase investment in the U.N. Consolidated Inter-Agency
Appeal, with particular focus on infrastructure improvements
throughout the country and support for humanitarian assistance
in the east.
Reassess the modes of delivery of development assistance to
ensure that community-based organizations are the driving force
in the design and implementation of development projects.
Appoint a senior U.N. humanitarian coordinator for the
eastern Congo, a high profile official who would work under the
direction of Kinshasa, but would have the necessary weight and
authority to advocate for a greater humanitarian response in
the east and for greater access from the belligerents.
Ensure that women directly gain access to development
assistance at the local level.
Support improvement in public expenditure management to
ensure that the revenues generated in foreign exchange sectors
benefit the Congolese people.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Edgerton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne C. Edgerton, Advocate, Refugees
International
I want to thank the Chairperson of the Subcommittee on African
Affairs, Senator Russell Feingold, and the members of the Subcommittee,
for providing the opportunity for Refugees International (RI) to
testify on the current humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), and to comment on the kind of assistance the
U.S. could provide to contribute to a peaceful, stable Congo. Since
1999, Refugees International has completed seven humanitarian
assessment missions to eastern DRC. Our most recent mission, in January
2002, was punctuated by the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo.
At the outset of my testimony I want to stress two points. First,
unless the prevailing insecurity is halted, there can be no sustainable
development in the east. Security is the single most important area for
the international community to address. Second, I see no reason based
on my most recent trip to the DRC to modify RI's conclusion based on
our earlier mission in December 2000: nowhere in the world is the gap
between humanitarian needs and the response of the international
community greater than in the DRC. The efforts of the international
community appear feeble and ineffective, dwarfed by the scale of the
suffering they are intended to mitigate. Only if peace is achieved and
humanitarian assistance substantially increased can this gap be
bridged.
The 1999 Lusaka Peace Accords provided the framework for an ordered
withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese soil, the disarmament of
rebel groups, including the Interahamwe, and an inter-Congolese
dialogue leading to the formation of a unity government for the
country. While lines of demarcation were agreed upon, and a cease-fire
line has nominally held for the past year, fighting nonetheless
continues in the eastern portion of the country. Current flare-ups in
South Kivu and Ituri provinces, under the control of rebel forces
backed respectively by Rwanda and Uganda, are two examples of fighting
between these rebels and the indigenous population. An armed Congolese
movement is the Mayi-Mayi, a military local defense force with a
current political objective of representation within the inter-
Congolese dialogue.
After many interviews over the past three years, RI has found that
Congolese civilians in the eastern portion of the country are
increasingly at the mercy of armed groups, including rebel forces
backed by regional powers, the Mayi-Mayi, and the Interahamwe, who
murder civilians, rape women, capture children, and steal crops with
impunity. In the shadow of insecurity, the village economy has given
way to a war economy which drives boys and young men to enlist in the
army, where they are not paid or fed, but at least they get a gun. Much
of the violence that is still occurring in the east today is totally
devoid of a political or strategic rationale; it is banditry to allow
unpaid soldiers to survive. This makes the violence endemic and
resistant to amelioration through political action.
The insecurity and lack of a functioning government opens the
eastern Congo to foreign interests involved in exploitation and
smuggling of primary products such as coltan, diamonds, and timber. The
local population benefits tangentially by assisting these foreign
business interests, either as owners, beneficiaries of bribes and other
financial dealings, or as workers hoping to gain the means to live by
selling primary products.
The insecurity severely and directly hampers the delivery of
emergency assistance. Access to war-affected civilians is limited by
two great factors: the enormous territory of the Congo, which lacks a
functioning transport network, and the rampant insecurity, which
further complicates delivery in the eastern portion of the country and
often prevents access to vulnerable populations for months at a time.
The U.S. and the international community have supported the various
cease-fire and peace agreements through several measures, including UN
Security Council resolutions, the deployment of the United Nations
Organization Mission to the Congo (MONUC), and dedication in name to
the process of the inter-Congolese dialogue. Currently, there are 5,500
MONUC troops approved by the UN Security Council, although only about
two-thirds have been deployed. The Secretary General has requested an
extension and expansion of MONUC. Even if all MONUC troops and
observers were to be deployed, their effectiveness would be limited,
because their mandate allows them to serve only as observers of a
cease-fire and prevents them from responding to the violence that
swirls through the eastern portion of the country. At the very least,
MONUC should be more aggressive in disseminating information widely on
the security situation and the human rights abuses that its personnel
observe. MONUC could do this within its existing mandate.
If and when a real cease-fire is achieved, a requirement for
maintaining the peace will be the demobilization of armed personnel.
MONUC's mandate includes the creation of a disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration plan, but the concern is whether the international
community will provide the timely financial support that will be
required to make the plan a reality. As we have seen in Angola, for
example, when the demobilization process is underfunded, it takes very
little time for the conflict to resume.
Child soldiers are prevalent in the Congo. All parties to the
conflict employ them. In the context of the Lusaka Peace Accords, the
international community has had some success in stigmatizing the
recruitment of child soldiers, but the commitment of the parties to
demobilizing them has thus far been largely a public relations
exercise. It is a collective responsibility of the international
community to make sure that the acceptance of children in the ranks of
soldiers delegitimizes a government or rebel force. Because of the
special needs and vulnerabilities of child soldiers, the demobilization
plan should contain provisions for the separation of child soldiers
from other combatants and for their rapid exposure to education and
other services. Programs also need to focus on reintegrating these
children into their communities and assuring that support for child
soldiers is in the context of programs that reaches all vulnerable
children.
The U.S. remains one of the largest donors to the Congo. In fiscal
year 2001, the U.S. donated almost $100 million in development and
humanitarian assistance, and remains the largest bilateral creditor to
the Congo, providing 21% of the Congolese external debt. Nonetheless,
in fiscal year 2001 donor response came to only 60% of the funds
requested by the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, and FY 2002 does
not look more promising. As such, the UN humanitarian operation is made
more difficult due to severe under-funding.
The UN and NGO humanitarian network is attempting to manage a
complex and daunting humanitarian challenge for the entire Congo from
Kinshasa. While this approach is understandable in that it supports the
principle of the territorial unity and integrity of this vast country,
the practical consequence is the relative neglect of the eastern region
of the country where the needs are greatest.
In addition to attempting to respond to humanitarian needs, the UN
is also addressing infrastructure needs by rehabilitating the internal
transportation network, especially rail lines and river barges. This
can help to recommence the flow of commercial goods and allow
humanitarian supplies to reach isolated areas.
Individual development organizations have, since 1994, changed the
focus of their programs to include humanitarian and emergency
assistance. These organizations continue to be involved in humanitarian
work, particularly in the eastern parts of the country, which are most
affected by the war and mass displacement. Oxfam finds that, country-
wide, 65% of the population has no access to safe water, and 40% of
primary school-age children have no access to education. In a recent
survey conducted by World Vision staff in North Kivu province in
January, two of sixteen villages chosen could not be included at the
last minute because of prevailing insecurity. Of the villages assessed
for health and nutrition, a 30% global malnutrition rate surfaced, with
14%, or almost half of that being severe malnutrition. Such numbers
have not been seen by the humanitarian community since the 1998 famine
in Sudan.
The Congolese are impressive organizers. Through local NGOs and
church-affiliated networks numerous Congolese are attempting to ease
the suffering of their people. Some of the most effective associations
have been the local ``peace committees.'' These are inter-ethnic
associations that attempt to mobilize community response around a
shared goal, such as building a school or repairing a road. These
organizations draw primarily on local resources, however, so they lack
capital to undertake many projects. These all-volunteer committees
would benefit from an infusion of small amounts of resources to give
them the means to expand their efforts.
Given the strength of Congolese civil society, development
assistance must support local organizations, thereby enhancing
effectiveness by being more responsive to local input and conditions.
Only by putting local communities in the drivers' seat, while avoiding
local armed elements, can development be sustainable. Donors need to
respond to the requests from the community structures that remain
intact after years of war.
One way to measure the level of community involvement in bridging
the gap to development is to talk with women. Women's groups have
consistently advocated a stop to the conflict and urged all sides to
try to return to peace. Traditionally, development and assistance
programs only include women in the ``gender'' or soft social programs.
But donors and beneficiaries could benefit from involving women in the
planning stages of infrastructure and public policy programs.
Refugees International makes the following recommendations to the
US government:
Commit to high profile, U.S. attention to the implementation
of the Lusaka Peace Accords, with special attention to stopping
the atrocities.
Consider applying targeted economic sanctions, such as the
freezing of bank accounts of those benefiting from the economic
exploitation of Congolese resources, on governments and
individuals that continue to block the implementation of the
Lusaka Accords.
Identify ways, either through the UN or through U.S.-based
NGOs, to channel assistance to small-scale Congolese peace-
building, humanitarian, and development efforts.
In addition, RI makes the following recommendations to the U.S. as a
member of the international community:
Ensure that MONUC fulfills its current mandate and support
the expansion of its troop presence in the Congo.
Increase investment in the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency
Appeal, with particular focus on infrastructure improvements
throughout the country and support for humanitarian assistance
in the east.
Reassess the modes of delivery of development assistance to
ensure that community-based organizations are the driving force
in the design and implementation of development projects.
Appoint a senior UN humanitarian coordinator for the eastern
Congo, a high-profile official who would work under the
direction of Kinshasa, but would have the necessary weight and
authority to advocate for a greater humanitarian response in
the east and for greater access from the belligerents.
Ensure that women directly gain access to development
assistance at the local level.
Support improvement in public expenditure management to
ensure that the revenues generated in foreign exchange sectors
benefit the Congolese people.
______
[RI Bulletin--Jan. 28, 2002]
EASTERN CONGO: BEYOND THE VOLCANO, A SLOW MOTION HOLOCAUST
The eruption of Mount Nyiragongo in the eastern Congo on January
17th destroyed half of Goma, a city of 500,000 people, caused over 100
deaths, and sent thousands of the town's residents across the border
into Rwanda to seek temporary shelter. As destructive as the volcano
was, the devastation of its impact pales in comparison to the
consequences of the on-going conflict in the region. This war is a
human disaster of unimaginable proportions, the equivalent of daily
volcanic eruptions, but with far greater social and economic
consequences.
Refugees International just completed a two-week humanitarian
assessment mission to the eastern Congo, a mission capped by the
eruption of Mount Nyir gongo. After many interviews with Congolese
children, local NGO leaders, and the staff of UN organizations and
international NGOs, the picture that emerges is a tapestry of pain for
the Congolese people, who are at the mercy of armed groups who steal
crops, murder civilians, rape women, and capture children with
impunity. The efforts of the international community appear feeble and
ineffective, dwarfed by the scale of the suffering they are intended to
mitigate.
The 1999 Lusaka Peace Accords nominally provide the framework for
an ordered withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese soil, the
disarmament of rebel groups (the so-called ``negative forces,''
including the Interahamwe, the Hutu militia responsible for the 1994
genocide in Rwanda), and an inter-Congolese dialogue leading to the
formation of a unity government for the country. While a few gestures
have been made to withdraw foreign forces to lines of control and
achieving a ceasefire, the critical steps towards genuine peace have
not been taken. Indeed, fighting in the east has actually increased in
recent months as Congolese parties to the conflict, especially the
Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Mayi-Mayi
(the armed group contesting the Rwandan occupation) try to demonstrate
their strength to gain greater representation within the inter-
Congolese dialogue.
The most plausible scenario for reducing the conflict would involve
the Rwandans agreeing to withdraw their troops from the Congo in
exchange for international security guarantees along their border and
the cessation of the Kinshasa government's support for the Interahamwe
and the Mayi-Mayi. Neither Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, nor
Joseph Kabila, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), appear willing to reach such an accommodation, leaving the
Congolese people caught in an endless cycle of violence that is
justified by the intransigence of the other party. The Foreign
Ministers of Britain and France just completed a joint tour of the
region, and they admitted on departure that the political picture was
bleak.
The UN Observer Mission to the Congo (MONUC) has been deployed to
monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Accords. MONUC merely observes
the violence that swirls through the country, while frustrated and
bewildered Congolese hope for more aggressive action from the
international community to stop the conflict.
Since access to embattled communities is so difficult, RI can only
provide isolated examples to describe the catastrophe in the eastern
Congo:
In Shabunda, the Mayi-Mayi use rape as a tactic of war to
prevent displaced women seeking shelter in the town from
accessing their fields; as reported on ABC News Nightline, in
one incident alone last year 40 women were raped;
In north Katanga province women were unable to bring their
children for a vaccination day because they had no clothes and
could not be seen in public in daylight hours; men in the
community work only in the pre-dawn hours for the same reason;
Child prostitution and sex slavery are proliferating. In
Goma, a preliminary survey by a local NGO found that 38 out of
41 child sex workers were displaced from the countryside due to
the war and economic hardship;
All the armed groups have a systematic policy of pillaging
fields at harvest time and stealing crops from farmers trying
to bring it home or to market;
In Kindu, the capital of Maniema province and once the
breadbasket of the Congo, the impossibility of marketing
agricultural products means that a bag of rice has no more
value than a bar of soap; unmilled rice is used on muddy roads
to give traction to trucks.
Much of the violence derives directly from the collapse of the
state. With the government barely functioning, commerce impeded by
insecurity, and the only viable economy resting on the exploitation and
smuggling of primary products such as coltan, diamonds, and timber,
there is no way for large segments of the population to make a living.
The breakdown in the village economy drives boys and young men to
enlist in the army, where they are not paid or fed, but at least they
get a gun. Much of the violence in the east is totally devoid of a
political or strategic rationale; it is banditry to allow soldiers to
survive. According to a human rights officer for MONUC, the best way to
achieve an immediate reduction in the level of violence would be for
the rebel government in the east, the RCD, to begin paying its soldiers
and providing them with one meal per day.
Despite the obstacles, courageous humanitarian personnel attempt to
work with Congolese authorities and local communities to gain greater
access and respond to the needs that they find. A promising approach
being taken by the UN system is to focus on rehabilitating the internal
transportation network, especially rail lines and river barges, to ease
the flow of commercial goods and allow humanitarian supplies to reach
isolated areas. The simple task of repairing a bridge can have an
immediate humanitarian impact. International and local NGOs are working
with community-based peace committees that try to negotiate access for
relief supplies with the local commanders of the armed groups. These
all-volunteer committees would benefit from an infusion of small
amounts of resources to give them the means to expand their efforts.
While MONUC's logistical support to humanitarian efforts is
appreciated, it is interpreting its limited mandate too conservatively.
Especially lacking is a public communications effort to disseminate
information widely on the security situation and the human rights
abuses that its personnel observe. Previous large-scale peacekeeping
efforts in Kosovo and Cambodia, for example, have used radio broadcasts
aggressively to build awareness among the public of the critical
challenges faced by the respective missions. MONUC needs to clearly
explain its mission to the Congolese people and make a conscious effort
to increase its overall credibility through a public information
campaign.
Already there are reports of MONUC soldiers raping women and
demanding the services of child prostitutes in Kisangani and Goma.
After embarrassing episodes in Cambodia, where such behavior was
condoned, the UN had made public commitments that these actions by
peacekeepers in the future would not be tolerated. Given the Congolese
frustration with MONUC's apparent indifference to their suffering, the
commanders and civilian personnel of MONUC have no choice but to
implement a zero tolerance policy for inappropriate behavior by its
personnel. RI raised this issue with a MONUC child protection officer,
who informed us that one rape case is proceeding and MONUC is
cooperating with the investigation. She stressed that MONUC is willing
to take action if credible evidence of misconduct is presented.
The UN humanitarian system is attempting to manage the response to
the emergency in the Congo from Kinshasa. While this approach is
understandable in that it supports the principle of the territorial
unity and integrity of this vast country, the practical consequence is
the relative neglect of the eastern region of the country where the
needs are greatest. In the east regional humanitarian coordinators have
to divide their time between their agency duties and their overall
coordination tasks, while waiting for key decisions to be made in
remote offices more than one thousand miles distant in the capital. RI
believes that the UN needs to appoint a high profile humanitarian
coordinator for the eastern Congo, a senior official who would work
under the direction of Kinshasa, but who would have the necessary
weight and authority to advocate for a greater humanitarian response in
the east and for greater access from the belligerents.
What is taking place in the eastern Congo at the moment is nothing
less than a slow-motion holocaust. Yet RI cannot recommend a massive
external intervention to stop the violence because the political will
necessary to bring a halt to the war is lacking both internationally
and among regional and local actors. The humanitarian community is left
to make the best of an awful situation, bringing relief where temporary
openings appear.
Refugees International therefore recommends that:
The international community, especially the United States,
Britain, France, and Belgium, put greater pressure on the
leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to
implement the Lusaka Peace Accords. After an appropriate
interval, economic sanctions, including the freezing of the
overseas bank accounts of those benefiting from the economic
exploitation of Congo's resources, should be the penalty for
continued intransigence.
The United Nations appoint a senior official to serve as
humanitarian coordinator for the eastern Congo, based in the
region, but working under the direction of the overall
humanitarian coordinator for the country.
MONUC implement a large-scale, sustained public information
campaign, primarily through radio, to explain its mission and
report its observations to the Congolese public.
Donors provide greater funding support for infrastructure
improvements, especially for the continued rehabilitation of
transportation networks throughout the Congo.
UN agencies and international NGOs provide funding to
community-based peacebuilding efforts, especially supporting
local committees that are creating humanitarian space through
negotiations with armed groups.
MONUC adopt a zero tolerance policy for soldiers having sex
with minors and raping women.
Senator Feingold. Well, I want to thank you not only for
your excellent testimony, but for your enormous patience. We
have some infrastructure problems too obviously, and I
apologize for the problem with the microphone.
I will probably have to leave in a minute to vote, and so I
will ask some questions now until the vote starts but then I
will come back and conclude. Maybe we can figure out, at least,
which is the best microphone while we are gone and pass it
around. Thank you very much for putting up with that.
Let me first ask you something that you really all already
answered, but I really want it on the record from each of you.
And that is, from your perspective as observers of this crisis,
is the United States devoting enough high level attention to
the Democratic Republic of Congo? Are we sufficiently engaged?
Ms. Hara, I know you have answered this, but I would like
to get these three answers just next to each other in the
testimony. Ms. Hara.
Ms. Hara. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the crisis
in the Democratic Republic of Congo has not got the attention
that it needs, that it deserves. Certainly the U.S. Government,
as well as the European governments, have supported the
implementation of the Lusaka process, but we are now at Lusaka
plus 3\1/2\-years, and I think it is really time to focus on
outcomes of the process.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Dees.
Mr. Dees. Yes. I would give a practical answer to that
question. We can see a benchmark this week. The meeting in Sun
City is ending on Friday. What the U.S. Government does in the
next week is an indication of how seriously they are taking
that. So, I will leave that for us to see.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Edgerton.
Ms. Edgerton. While there has been significant attention at
various levels within the U.S. Government, I find that high
level attention is very much lacking, given the magnanimity of
the crisis in the Congo today. I find that the kind of high
level attention that is required from the U.S. Government to
actually generate a response within the ranks is not there.
Senator Feingold. I agree with those comments. I would just
make one comment before I ask more questions. Today I wake up
and realize I am doing a hearing on the Congo. You look at CNN
and you see the crises in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and
it looks like India and Pakistan, and all the problems around
the world. But that is sort of the whole point, which is if we
are going to be a world leader, we have to learn how to stay
engaged in places that are very important but are not getting
enough attention or are not directly on our radar screen all
the time. We have to be able to focus on more than one thing.
We are a great nation.
For example, during the cold war, we had one clear
objective in dealing with the problem with the Soviet Union and
sort of defined everything that way. But what we are finding
out, and one of the reasons that we are having these hearings,
is if we sort of focus on one thing over here and completely
neglect another major problem, it is not only very problematic
for the people in the country affected but that it also affects
us. So, I am very pleased that we are having this hearing at
this time.
That brief comment led me up to the vote time. So, I will
go vote. I will come back as soon as possible, and I have a few
more questions. I appreciate the panel's patience. It should
not be too long. The hearing is in recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Feingold. I call the subcommittee back to order.
Thank you for waiting.
I would like to ask some questions. Let me just say that
although I am just one Senator here, I hope you realize again
that not only Senator Frist but others are very interested in
this and I want to communicate to you how important we consider
this subject of the Congo and the related issues. It is my
intention and I think the intention of others to stay engaged
in it. So, we want you to realize your words and your efforts
on this are certainly not wasted.
Ms. Hara, let me ask you a more specific question about the
MONUC mandate. You began to refer to this. MONUC troops can
protect themselves and their colleagues, but they have no
mandate to stop violence targeted at Congolese civilians or in
fact to protect civilians in any way. At most they can simply,
as I understand it, monitor and report on abuses that may
occur. Now, is that accurate, and has this situation created a
distrust or anger directed at MONUC on the part of the
Congolese population?
Ms. Hara. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that your description is
accurate. Indeed, there are some reports from the Congolese
population, from certain specific places in Congo, that MONUC
is not doing enough, is not deployed in enough places and it is
not doing enough. Certainly they are not asking for protection,
but also to witness at least the violence that is committed
against civilians.
In Kisangani, for example, there were reports that some
MONUC troops also misbehaved with the Congolese population.
Senator Feingold. So, it is partly that people do not
understand the limitations on MONUC, and some of it may be
inappropriate behavior in some cases.
Ms. Hara. Yes, indeed.
Senator Feingold. Let me followup by commenting that
monitoring and reporting can only really have a deterrent
effect on attacks on civilian populations if there are some
consequences associated with being publicly identified as a
force that targets civilian populations. Currently are there
meaningful consequences in this regard? What can the United
States do to increase the costs of abusing civilians? And is
there any mechanism for accountability that is being considered
by the inter-Congolese dialog in this regard?
Ms. Hara. I do not think that there are mechanisms
considered by the inter-Congolese dialog for violence committed
against civilians. But there are certainly ways, and the U.S.
Government certainly can help in that respect. There are ways
to insist with the Rwandan and Ugandan and all the occupation
forces that human rights be respected. Certainly one of the
things that the U.S. Government could do is insist on the
respect of the Geneva Convention.
Ms. Edgerton. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Yes, if you would like to comment, Ms.
Edgerton.
Ms. Edgerton. If I may. One MONUC human rights officer did
tell us that one sure way to decrease the violence committed
against civilians tomorrow would be to pay the RCD, the rebel
forces, a wage and give them one meal a day.
Senator Feingold. Let me go back. Ms. Hara, in talking
about RCD-Goma, I understand that RCD-Goma has a strained
relationship with many of the civil society organizations in
the east and that it is very unpopular with large swaths of the
civilian population in the area it controls. Could you comment
on what this means for the political dynamics in the east? Does
the RCD's bad reputation increase ethnic polarization in the
Kivus? Is there evidence such as hate radio broadcasts of
escalating ethnic tensions?
I also understand that some Banyamulenge associations are
at odds with the RCD in part because they want to disassociate
themselves from the RCD practices.
What can be done to ease ethnic tensions in eastern Congo
in the next few years? If you can just sort of talk about some
of those issues, Ms. Hara.
Ms. Hara. That is a big----
Senator Feingold. A small item.
Ms. Hara. I think the first thing that I would like to
mention is that ethnic polarization is not new in eastern
Congo. Eastern Congo has always been a trouble spot. It has
always itself been extremely difficult for the Kinshasa
Government to control, to administer this territory partly
because there are lots of issues, land and cattle, inter-
community issues, that have been very acute for a long time.
Now, of course, the Rwandan refugees that have come out of
Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide have certainly aggravated the
local tensions, and the two wars, the 1996 and the 1998 wars,
have again aggravated this local violence.
There is an issue of RCD administration of this territory.
The RCD has definitely failed to acquire legitimacy with the
Congolese population and has failed to provide most of the
services that this population needs.
Now, the issue of the Banyamulenge is also a very
complicated one. Some Banyamulenge are part of the RCD movement
and others have refused to join the RCD, have refused to
participate in the second Congo war, and have now created
organizations that challenge the occupation of Rwandan forces
and the RCD-Goma. As we talk, there is very heavy fighting
going on between some of the RCD troops and the local
Banyamulenge groups associated with Mayi-Mayi groups as well.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Hara.
Mr. Dees. May I comment on that question?
Senator Feingold. Yes, Mr. Dees, go ahead.
Mr. Dees. I have a little different take, having lived in
the eastern Congo in 1988. I think it is a problem that exists
across Africa and across the world, ethnic tensions. I think in
1988 the problem did not exist to a degree that was
destabilizing in the east. But the thing that we find is poor
leadership and opportunistic leadership causes ethnic conflict,
and that is the cause of the conflict in the east currently. It
is not a historical problem, but it can reappear in any African
country or even here in the United States. So, I think that is
an important point.
In terms of what can be done, obviously one of the key
issues is demilitarization because the relationship between
civil society and the RCD is a function of one group having
force over the other, and that can never be balanced until that
balance of force is taken into account. There are a number of
local efforts underway, and a lot of those efforts are being
undermined by the RCD. So, there is a great willingness after,
as you can imagine, 6 years of warfare to return to peace, and
communities are trying to get along but that is being
destabilized by the RCD.
Senator Feingold. If there was a peace agreement, what kind
of programs do you envision that we could actually put into
place that would help ease these ethnic tensions? What do you
think could be done?
Mr. Dees. There are a number of efforts that can be helped.
I think one of the things that the Congolese are already
looking at is inter-community dialogs where folks from one
community are getting together talking to members of a
community that is neighboring.
One of the things that can be done is support for local
radio programs which send a positive message that this is the
direction we are going to take. Left to their own means, I
think the Congolese can return to the situation I knew in 1988
which was peaceful coexistence. I think one of the most
important things we can do is support radio programs that send
out that message.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Dees, I am going to ask you a couple
more, and if either of you would like to chime in on this,
please do.
Mr. Dees, I understand that the field office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights has some 20 human rights
officers in the Congo and that MONUC has some human rights
observers on the scene as well. Are these efforts coordinated
and are they sufficient to monitor conditions in such a vast
country?
Mr. Dees. I think that is one of the recommendations I
would have. It is obviously insufficient and coordination in
the Congo is a difficult concept. There can be improvement on
the coordination.
There was a particular human rights monitor in Kisangani
who I met with last year when I was there. An effective human
rights monitor makes a difference, and I think that the number
of human rights monitors connected with MONUC and supported by
the U.N. could easily double or triple and they could have the
same impact where they are located.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Dees, what incentives can compel the
parties to the conflict to make a just and lasting peace? For
example, what about RCD-Goma? Surely they do not believe that
they are going to prevail in a national election. What is to
stop RCD or other actors from throwing up obstacles to peace as
soon as the prospect of losing power becomes apparent? And what
kind of disincentives would there be to that kind of
obstructionism? And how is the United States and the
international community helping to craft that incentive
structure?
Mr. Dees. Yes. I think it is an important question because
obviously the Rwandan Government, as we heard in earlier
testimony, said it is there primarily for security reasons. I
think if we take them at their word and there are security
interests, it is important to focus on what they are
specifically and to eliminate those issues. As I alluded to in
my testimony, the AliR forces being isolated and encouraged in
terms of isolating the leaders and encouraging the rank and
file to go back is an important issue. That is if we consider
that they are willing to leave the Congo.
There is the other possibility, of course, that they are
not willing to leave the Congo. The only thing that can force
them to leave is international pressure, and there are various
levers, including those of the U.S. Government, which provides
a lot of their support, to do exactly that.
Senator Feingold. Let me just follow on that.
Understandably, RCD-Goma is backed by Rwanda. When you talk
about leaving, you are not referring to the actual Congolese
members of that leaving. What is the future with regard to
those people?
Mr. Dees. Well, I think in the context of process of local
people making decisions about their local leaders, the RCD does
not have very much of a future. They do not have popular
support, and I think they would see the handwriting on the
wall.
Senator Feingold. Let me ask all of you to just think about
an optimistic hypothetical situation. What if, in a few years
into the future, all foreign troops have withdrawn from the
Congo, the negative forces are no longer engaged in military
activity within Congo's borders, and a successful inter-
Congolese dialog has paved the way for a legitimate government?
The country must deal with tremendous infrastructure problems
and desperate social needs. Let me start with Ms. Edgerton by
asking what steps should the United States take at this point
to help ensure that stability lasts in Central Africa.
Ms. Edgerton. In fact, when I was last there in January, a
Congolese said to me if the war were to end tomorrow, it would
be ``une bonne tragedie'' because there is not the
infrastructure in place. There are not the plans that are
currently being sought out that could, in essence, start taking
place tomorrow to replace what has become a war economy. Kids
are not going to school and this has been for the past 5 or 6
years that the national education infrastructure has crumbled,
not to mention the physical infrastructure of road, rail, and
barge as well. When you get that kind of isolation in the
communities and then all of a sudden everyone says, well, there
is an end to the war and that is the only way anybody knew how
to make any money, what is in place?
What needs to be in place is what Mr. Dees mentioned. We
need to be thinking in the mid- to long-term right now, radio
programs that are nationwide that reinforce Congolese
nationality and let citizens know that it is not just their
area that is undergoing hardship but all over the Congo, that
foreign troops are not just occupying our village or our town,
but it is actually rife throughout the Congo that this is
occurring. OTI has taken up this initiative and is looking at a
comprehensive radio program, as has MONUC and several NGO's.
In addition, rehabilitating not only the crumbling health
infrastructure, but the crumbling educational infrastructure,
these large infrastructure programs that are being looked at
right now by the World Bank. The United States is not exactly
stepping up to the plate as one of the large donors or pledgers
to these programs. These are the kind of programs that can
start now to be implemented in areas of security and then
slowly, as peace does reign, can spread out to other areas.
But at the same time, there needs to be a recognition that
emergency assistance is needed in areas that are undergoing
active war right now, that there needs to be an international
presence that responds to the needs of civilians only, giving
them other options.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Dees, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Dees. Just to make a connection between opportunity and
stability. I think my experience in the village where people
were, for all practical purposes, destitute, the ability to see
opportunity is perhaps the greatest stabilizing force. In
Congo, I think to encourage that stability of which--the motor
is really the resources that exist. So, it is not necessarily
outside resources coming in to develop the Congo. It is using
what is there. So, making a connection between giving Congolese
an opportunity see and use this opportunity perhaps by
discouraging the militarization of the society is perhaps the
best way we can do that.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Hara.
Ms. Hara. I just want to make a point about the economy. I
think there is a need obviously for a major economic recovery
strategy for the whole of Congo, but there is also a need, as I
was pointing out in my testimony, to establish an environment
in which people can do business safely. I think that is one of
the big problems in Congo right now. Violence is used to do
business, and the business that is being done has no rules. An
informal economy has always been there in Congo, but the new
thing now is that violence is used against the civilians. So, I
think a major international effort would need to be focused on
establishing rules, establishing a business code of conduct for
companies.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Let me ask each of you, if you like, to what degree does
the history of the United Nations in Congo and, for that
matter, the history of the United States in Congo hamper our
efforts to make MONUC as effective as possible and to resolve
the current crisis? Do you want to start, Ms. Edgerton?
Ms. Edgerton. One of the wonderful things about the
Congolese is their ability to recognize what is happening
today. The arrival of MONUC troops, which I witnessed in
eastern Congo, was one of the most celebratory times for the
Congolese. Everything else aside, they thought the
international community was going to save them from the war.
Only as time has gone on and they have seen the limitations not
only of MONUC, but of the lack of international attention to
their plight, has their dissatisfaction with the United States
and the international community grown again. It is not that,
oh, yes, there is a history of our being treated this way. They
were truly willing to embrace MONUC troops, the idea of U.N.
soldiers on their soil. They thought that they were coming as
their liberators. But given the limited actions that have
actually taken place, including when civilians report human
rights abuses or cease-fire violations and those reports going
nowhere and having absolutely no effect, this has a very
disheartening effect on the Congolese. So, I think that they
are willing to take us at our word and at our action, and that
we owe that at the very least.
Senator Feingold. So, it is pragmatic.
Ms. Edgerton. Absolutely.
Senator Feingold. Despite the history and the problems, if
we are able to perform, they will be open to that.
Ms. Edgerton. I believe so.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Dees.
Mr. Dees. I would agree.
Senator Feingold. Ms. Hara.
Ms. Hara. It is only bad leadership who try to use the U.N.
image. The U.N. was involved in an operation in the 1960's and
it is only Laurent Kabila who tried to use that and to
manipulate that, manipulate public opinion against the U.N.
Senator Feingold. And you do not feel that that succeeded.
Ms. Hara. But I think I agree with the two other remarks.
Ms. Edgerton. If I may give another example. While I was
there in January, the Belgians came to apologize for their role
in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, and the Congolese on
the media and to me personally and in the streets were saying,
they came here now and that is what they were talking about?
That is the kind of practicality that you find in the
Congolese.
Senator Feingold. That is very interesting, and that is of
interest to me as well because it is something I have tried to
get a sense of, to what extent our own Government's actions,
which were obviously nothing to be proud of, are something that
still causes problems for us in that country.
Finally, Mr. Dees, the last question. In a country so
devastated by mismanagement and conflict, the notion of
rebuilding functioning institutions is daunting. Give me a
sense of what current institutions in Congo are still
functioning today, and to what extent has civil society taken
over some of the traditional functions of the state? How strong
is that civil society, and is it capable of uniting or is it so
polarized along regional, ethnic, or political lines that it is
not possible?
Mr. Dees. That is a very fair question. In terms of
institutions that exist that could take off, I would say the
only existing institutions are religious institutions, the
various churches. They are nationwide and they are respected
across ethnic and regional lines.
There was an old joke during the end of the Mobutu years
about an article 15 in the constitution, and that article was
imaginary, but basically it said, take care of yourself. So,
that is what many of the Congolese have been doing for the last
25 years, taking care of themselves.
One of the key issues in the Congo is the generation issue.
The political leaders in the Congo that are still active
represent the independence generation of 1960. Some of the
names, if you look at those competing for power, with the
exception of Kabila, are the same people in the history books
from 1960. So, civil society represents that next generation.
They will be the leaders. They will be the politicians. They
will be the hope of the Congo. So, if one is optimistic, one
believes that they can take up the challenge.
Senator Feingold. I want to thank all of you. As a member
of this committee for almost 10 years, I work on many different
issues and many different countries, but I want you to know
that there are few situations that I find more compelling and
few that I want to be involved in more than the plight of the
Congolese people, their seemingly endless struggle for real
self-determination and to have a future and a recognition of
the central importance of this country for Central Africa, all
of Africa, and much of the world.
So, I admire your work and I look forward to working with
you, and I thank you for your testimony today.
That concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]