[Senate Hearing 107-524]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-524, Part I
AIR QUALITY IN NEW YORK CITY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR, WETLANDS, AND CLIMATE CHANGE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
AIR QUALITY IN NEW YORK CITY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS
__________
FEBRUARY 11, 2002--NEW YORK CITY
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-397 WASHINGTON : 2003
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
second session
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
HARRY REID, Nevada JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
BOB GRAHAM, Florida JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
BARBARA BOXER, California GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
RON WYDEN, Oregon MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
Ken Connolly, Majority Staff Director
Dave Conover, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, and Climate Change
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
HARRY REID, Nevada GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
FEBRUARY 11, 2002--NEW YORK CITY
OPENING STATEMENTS
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 3
Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
Connecticut.................................................... 1
Voinovich, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio,
prepared statement............................................. 6
WITNESSES
Berger-Arroyo, Judith, public health nurse, District Council 37.. 67
Prepared statement........................................... 140
Berger, Elizabeth H., resident, New York, NY..................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 88
Christodoulou, Marilena, president, Stuyvesant High School
Parents' Association........................................... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 132
Frieden, Thomas R., commissioner, New York City Department of
Health; accompanied by: Joel A. Miele, Sr., commissioner, New
York City Department of Environmental Protection............... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 122
Responses to additional questions from Senators Lieberman and
Voinovich.................................................. 125
Goldstein, Eric A., New York urban program director, Natural
Resources Defense Council...................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 108
Hiraga, Julie, teacher, PS 89, Manhattan; accompanied by: Randi
Weingarten, president, United Federation of Teachers........... 61
Prepared statement........................................... 134
Jackson, Marianne C., Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for the
World Trade Center Event, Federal Emergency Management Agency.. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 110
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Clinton.......................................... 114
Senator Lieberman........................................ 113
Johnson, Carl, deputy commissioner, New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation..................................... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 117
Response to additional question from Senator Clinton......... 120
Kelly, Kerry J., M.D., chief medical officer, New York City Fire
Department..................................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 103
Kenny, Jane M., Regional Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Region 2.................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 194
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Clinton.......................................... 200
Senator Smith............................................ 197
Landrigan, Philip J., M.D., chair, Department of Community and
Preventive Medicine; professor of Pediatrics; director, Center
for Children's Health and the Environment, Mount Sinai School
of Medicine.................................................... 65
Prepared statement........................................... 137
Levin, Stephen M., M.D., medical director, Irving J. Selikoff
Occupational Health Clinical Center, Mount Sinai Medical Center 54
Prepared statement........................................... 130
Malloy, Edward J., president, Building and Construction Trades
Council of Greater New York.................................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 127
Nadler, Hon. Jerrold, U.S. Representative from the State of New
York........................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 72
Orlan, Bernard, director of Environmental Health and Safety, New
York City Board of Education................................... 62
Prepared statement........................................... 136
Scotto, Thomas J., president, Detectives Endowment Association,
New York City Police Department................................ 51
Prepared statement........................................... 126
Thurston, George D., Sc.D., associate professor of Environmental
Medicine, New York University Medical School, Nelson Institute
of Environmental Medicine...................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 104
Responses to additional questions from Senator Clinton....... 107
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Agreement, WTC Emergency Project Partnership..................... 128
Articles:
CorpWatch, February 6, 2002, Trading in Disaster............. 150
New York Environmental Law & Justice Project, February 2002,
Downwind From Disaster..................................... 187
St. Louis, (MO) Post-Dispatch, February 9, 2002, Caustic Dust
Blankets World Trade Center Area........................... 75
Attachments from EPA:
Attachment 1, WTC-EPA Time-Weighted Routine Air Quality
Sampling at Fixed Stations................................. 205
Attachment 2, EPA Air Sampling and Monitoring Sites
Implemented in Response to the Attack on The World Trade
Center..................................................... 211
Attachment 3, Non-Fixed Location Air Sampling and Monitoring
Record of Results:
September 12, 2001....................................... 212
September 13, 2001....................................... 217
September 14, 2001....................................... 220
September 15, 2001....................................... 223
September 16, 2001....................................... 229
September 17, 2001....................................... 231
September 18, 2001....................................... 243
September 19, 2001....................................... 265
September 20, 2001....................................... 301
September 21, 2001....................................... 334
September 22, 2001....................................... 356
September 23, 2001....................................... 384
September 24, 2001....................................... 400
September 25, 2001....................................... 426
September 26, 2001....................................... 438
September 27, 2001....................................... 456
September 28, 2001....................................... 464
September 29, 2001....................................... 483
September 30, 2001....................................... 495
October 1, 2001.......................................... 511
October 2, 2001.......................................... 530
October 3, 2001.......................................... 540
October 4, 2001.......................................... 572
October 5, 2001.......................................... 604
October 6, 2001.......................................... 614
October 7, 2001.......................................... 647
October 8, 2001.......................................... 659
October 9, 2001.......................................... 670
October 10, 2001......................................... 688
October 11, 2001......................................... 720
October 12, 2001......................................... 735
October 13, 2001......................................... 758
October 14, 2001......................................... 777
October 15, 2001......................................... 799
October 16, 2001......................................... 823
October 17-18, 2001...................................... 847
October 19, 2001......................................... 867
October 20, 2001......................................... 901
October 21, 2001......................................... 903
October 22, 2001......................................... 910
October 23, 2001......................................... 930
October 24, 2001......................................... 948
October 25, 2001......................................... 970
October 26-27, 2001...................................... 994
October 28-29, 2001...................................... 1010
October 30-31, 2001...................................... 1041
November 1-2, 2001....................................... 1084
November 3, 2001......................................... 1102
November 6, 2001......................................... 1162
November 7, 2001......................................... 1176
November 8, 2001......................................... 1201
November 9, 2001......................................... 1235
November 10, 2001........................................ 1249
November 11-12, 2001..................................... 1263
November 13, 2001........................................ 1270
November 14, 2001........................................ 1294
November 15, 2001........................................ 1317
November 16, 2001........................................ 1347
November 17, 2001........................................ 1359
November 19, 2001........................................ 1365
November 20, 2001........................................ 1377
November 21, 2001........................................ 1410
November 22, 2001........................................ 1434
November 23, 2001........................................ 1453
November 26, 2001........................................ 1455
November 27, 2001........................................ 1492
November 28, 2001........................................ 1512
November 29-30, 2001..................................... 1582
December 1, 2001......................................... 1606
December 2-3, 2001....................................... 1619
December 4, 2001......................................... 1643
December 5, 2001......................................... 1662
December 6, 2001......................................... 1683
December 7, 2001......................................... 1707
December 8, 2001......................................... 1723
December 9-10, 2001...................................... 1731
December 11, 2001........................................ 1748
December 12, 2001........................................ 1762
December 13, 2001........................................ 1783
December 14, 2001........................................ 1802
December 15, 2001........................................ 1808
December 17, 2001........................................ 1837
December 18, 2001........................................ 1861
December 19, 2001........................................ 1874
December 20, 2001........................................ 1883
Guidelines, Initiation of Administrative and Civil Action Under
Section 303 of the Clean Air Act During Air Pollution
Emergencies, EPA............................................... 79
Letters:
Ameruso, Mark James, New York, NY............................ 163
Carpenter, David O., M.D., professor, State University of New
York....................................................... 178
Community Board No. 1........................................ 164
Ewald, Kathleen, Brooklyn, NY................................ 177
Fluss, Edward, New York, NY.................................. 177
Godsey, Antonia, Cold Springs, NY............................ 179
Karasyk, Philip B., Queller, Fisher, Dienst, Serrins, Washor
& Kool, LLP...............................................184-185
Memorandum:
Abestos in Manhattan, Cate Jenkins, Ph.D....................90, 189
Proposal, Medical Surveillance Program, Mt. Sinai Center for
Occupational and Environmental Medicine........................ 129
Resolutions, Community Board No. 1, Manhattan, NY................ 164
Statements:
Abbot, Susan, S., M.P.H., New York, NY....................... 186
Ameruso, Mark J., New York City Council Environmental
Committee; New York State Assembly Committee on
Environmental Conservation, Health, and Labor, and member,
Community Board #1.......................................165, 167
Benstock, Marcy, executive director of Clean Air Campaign
Inc........................................................ 171
Clarke, Marjorie J., Ph.D., scientist-in-residence, Lehman
College.................................................... 141
Dillon, Patricia R., New York, NY............................ 175
Koon, David, chair, New York State Legislative Commission on
Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances...................... 174
Levin, Sondra, former chairman, NYC Group of the Sierra Club. 176
Martin, Robert J., National Ombudsman, Environmental
Protection Agency.......................................... 78
Miller, David J., Burlington, VT............................. 152
Orkin, Jenna, Brooklyn, NY................................... 161
Saunders, Lee, on behalf of Judith Berger-Arroga of District
37, AFSCAME................................................ 140
Silverman, Maureen, tenant of Independence Plaza, co-founder
of the WTC Environmental Coalition, member of WTC Spot
Light on the Poor, and co-chair of the Outreach and
Education Committee of New York City Coalition to End Lead
Poisoning.................................................. 157
WTC Environmental Coalition.................................. 159
AIR QUALITY IN NEW YORK CITY AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS
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MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands,
and Climate Change,
New York, NY.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. at
the Alexander Hamilton U.S. Customs House, One Bowling Green,
New York, NY, Hon. Joseph Lieberman (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman and Clinton.
Also present: Congressman Nadler.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Senator Lieberman. Good morning. As people are coming in,
let me--I know there's a security screening which is delaying
some folks, so why don't we begin because we have a full
morning and a number of witnesses. I would ask the folks who
are here to try to take their seats.
Senator Clinton and I will make our opening statements,
then we'll go to Congressman Nadler as the first witness.
I want to call this hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on
Clean Air to order. I want to begin by thanking Senator Clinton
for her leadership on this problem. The fact is that this
subcommittee hearing would not be occurring here this morning,
were it not for Senator Clinton's concerns and for her
advocacy.
Five months ago today, just blocks from this site, tragedy
struck this Nation and this city like never before. This great
city particularly, the center of so much life and energy and
the place where so many American dreams have been born and
realized, was struck at its heart. The terrible images of that
day will forever be seared into our souls and into our psyches.
Now as we work together to ensure that such an attack never
happens again, we know that we will never forget the 3,000
loved ones and fellow citizens we lost, nor will we ever cease
to be inspired by their lives or by the lives of the rescue
workers whose heroism has rewritten the word for this new
century. The consequences of that day to our society, our
culture and our Government are great, and they seem to be
growing every day.
But today we've gathered to discuss a particular problem:
the public health consequences of the attacks on the World
Trade Center for the men and women who live and work here and
for the children who go to school here. Especially for the
workers whose tireless efforts in the cleanup and recovery of
the site have reminded so many of us of what's best in America.
We return to the scene of the crime, a horrific war crime,
to examine its consequences, continuing consequences, on the
people of New York City. Because the fact is that we cannot
allow the lingering consequences of September 11th to do any
more damage to the health and well-being of the people of New
York. When those two towers tumbled down, they brought tons and
tons of building materials with them, releasing large
quantities of dangerous chemicals into the air.
I know that there are serious concerns about the level of
asbestos and benzene and heavy metals at and around the site.
Workers at Ground Zero, from firefighters to police officers,
to the construction workers and the sanitation workers and so
many others, have reported respiratory ailments, mostly
complaining of the newly-named ``World Trade Center cough.''
According to the Firefighters Union, nearly 750 firefighters
have taken medical leave since the cleanup began.
The air conditions in the surrounding neighborhood also
have raised the community's anxiety. With private studies
sometimes contradicting the Government, people don't know what
to believe. I know there was a survey in October of local
residents and nearly 35 percent said they did not feel that
their homes were safe to live in, and about 80 percent wanted
more information about their neighborhood's air quality.
Parents of school children are understandably the most
concerned, with the parents of some children apparently
refusing to send their kids to school in the vicinity of Ground
Zero.
If this great part of this great city is to begin to get
back to normal, this situation has got to be clarified and
resolved. That is why Senator Clinton asked me to convene this
hearing today and why we are here to hear your testimony. We
want to get to the truth as best we can to find out the answers
to some of the questions that are on the minds of so many New
Yorkers and so many others who have spent time at or around
Ground Zero. Questions like what level of what contaminants
were detected and where, to what were workers on the pile
exposed, to what were people in the streets exposed? Are there
still hazards in places of work or places of residence or
places of education?
We also want to find out how our Government responded on
that fateful day and thereafter. There's no debate that the
overall response of Government was and has continued to be
excellent. It's certainly not our intent to re-enact or second-
guess every decision made in what were some of the most
difficult circumstances imaginable.
But as we go forward as a Nation in the struggle against
terrorism, it is our obligation to learn as much as we possibly
can about the lingering consequences of the attack on New York
on September 11th. It is in that spirit that we're here today.
I know there's been confusion in the press and the public
about which Agency, which level of government has been
responsible for what part of the air quality monitoring. That's
a question we're going to ask, too, because our citizens need
to know who's responsible. Accountability starts with cleaner
lines of authority, and we need to clarify how our Government
has organized its response to this part, this lingering part of
the attack.
Representatives of the agencies before us were on the site
5 months ago today, anticipating many of the air quality
problems and working to evaluate them. This morning, we're
going to assess what has been learned and consider what can be
done to address the gaps and overlaps and occasional
contradictions in the reporting of that data.
Finally, we've got to ensure that we do everything we can
to get the necessary help to those who may have been exposed to
hazards in the course of this experience. We've got to locate,
register and monitor the people who might have been exposed,
especially the heroic first responders, who plunged into the
danger onto the pile with no regard for what toxins might lurk
in the rubble, not to mention the air. This includes of course
all those from New York, but all those from outside who rushed
here to be of help.
As we continue to move forward from September 11th as a
Nation with remarkable unity and resolve to root out those who
did this to us, we cannot let its aftermath damage you or us
any more through the air you have inhaled or continue to
inhale.
This morning, we've got a very knowledgeable and diverse
group of witnesses who can help to educate us and all New
Yorkers about these pressing questions. I hope when we leave
here today everyone in the room, including the U.S. Senate, as
represented by Senator Clinton and me, will have a clearer
understanding based on the facts of what is and is not unsafe
in the air, and what we together can do to protect the health
and safety of the people of New York.
I want to again thank Senator Clinton and say to you, I've
known Senator Clinton for more than a few years, from her time
at law school in my home city of New Haven. I'm not going to
mention the years, she remains remarkably youthful and vital.
She has been an extraordinary addition to the U.S. Senate,
obviously very bright, extremely able, but has worked
tirelessly and very effectively on behalf of the people of New
York, really from the beginning of her service in January 2001,
but powerfully and passionately since September 11th.
I'm honored to be here at her request and proud to
introduce her to you now.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Clinton. Thank you so much, Chairman Lieberman.
Thank you for convening this hearing, which as you so well
explained, will help us answer questions, will help us
determine what we don't know, so that we can ask the right
questions, do the research that's needed, and most importantly,
ensure that we're doing everything possible to care for the
health of our residents, our workers, our children, our first
responders and everyone who has been directly and indirectly
affected by the disastrous events just 5 months ago today.
We're very fortunate to have our neighbor and our friend,
Senator Lieberman with us today. He's not only the chairman of
this Subcommittee on Clean Air that has jurisdiction over these
issues, but he is a statesman and someone whom I admire and
have for all those decades that we've known each other. It's a
great honor for me to welcome him to the Alexander Hamilton
U.S. Customs House for another piece of American history with
this Senate hearing.
There are many important individuals and groups who will be
testifying today, but I'm very well aware that there are many
others who could not be fit into the context of a Senate
hearing. I want to encourage all of you to submit written
testimony, either by giving it to us today or by sending it to
the committee. There is information posted about how to do
that. Because we know, just looking at this audience, that
there are many of you who have very specific concerns and
questions. Some I'm sure will be addressed by all of the
witnesses this morning, but others may not.
We want to hear from you. We'll be continuing to pursue
this issue. Because as Chairman Lieberman says, ``what we want
to do is know what the Federal Government's response was and
should be.'' I for one am not ready to point fingers at anyone.
I think that the work and the response of September 11th and in
the weeks following was heroic, was absolutely inspiring, and
everyone was working as hard as they could to deal first with
the rescue mission and then with recovery.
But clearly, since this had not occurred ever in our
history, and there had never been the collapse of such enormous
buildings with all that that means in terms of the materials
that were within them and their dispersal into the air and into
the ground, this was a new experience, a terrible, horrific one
that all of us have to learn from.
The purpose of today's hearing is really three-fold. What
we want to do is first find out what we know about the quality
of air at and around Ground Zero and any related health
impacts. Second, find out and be honest about what we don't
know. There are questions we can't answer. It's frustrating and
concerning to all of us, particularly those who live or work in
the vicinity. But let's just put them on the table, and then,
let's have a plan of action about what we're going to do. Not
only to answer those unanswered questions insofar as possible,
but to do everything we can to improve air quality, right now,
going forward, and to protect the health of the people that
live, work, attend school and generally call Lower Manhattan
home.
I certainly don't think any of us have all the answers. The
information that has been made available to us and that I have
been monitoring since September 11th based on the experts, both
in the private and public sectors, appears reasonably to
indicate that the outdoor air quality around the World Trade
Center site, not at the specific site, the so-called pile or
Ground Zero, but around the site is generally meeting standards
and has improved since the first few weeks following the
attack.
Now, while the outdoor air quality in the general area
seems to have improved and to be acceptable, there definitely
was and still is cause for concern at the site, at Ground Zero.
It is imperative that the people who have worked there and are
working there still have been supplied with and trained to use
the proper protective gear and that they actually use it, and
that they seek care when they are experiencing any symptoms,
such as the so-called ``World Trade Center cough.''
I think it's also clear that people have been confused by
the information provided by officials. Sometimes it didn't
match up with the personal experience that people were having.
It just didn't make sense. There has been conflicting
information almost continually from different sources, which
has certainly added to the confusion and concern. One of my
hopes is that we will create a system that will try to at least
eliminate the confusion insofar as possible.
But as little as we know and can agree upon, there is much
that still remains in question. The long-term health impacts of
exposure to air pollutants at and around Ground Zero is simply
not yet known or certain. The information made available thus
far seems to indicate that the risk of long-term health impacts
to the general public, people who live and work in Lower
Manhattan, is very low. But we don't know for sure. There is
definite and very much warranted concern for the short- and
long-term health of those who worked directly at Ground Zero.
There are also risks related to the dust and residue found
inside buildings, which can be or has been airborne. This has
to be appropriately addressed and we will be discussing that.
It appears uncertain whether all of the buildings around Ground
Zero have been adequately cleaned. Certainly some have been,
and have met the available standards. Others raise questions
about what was done and how well the cleanup complies.
Now, even though this is something that is unprecedented to
all of us, that cannot be an excuse for not acting at the
highest standards to do everything possible to meet the
concerns that people have. I would like to propose, and will
ask the witnesses to respond as we go through the day, five
general actions that I think could help.
First, I would like to urge Congress to pass and the
President to sign S. 1621, which is a bill I introduced and
which this committee passed early in November, that would
authorize a health monitoring program for all community
members, volunteers and workers in a disaster area when there
has been exposure to harmful substances.
Second, we need to immediately establish and fund a
comprehensive long-term environmental health registry,
referral, surveillance and education system for the World Trade
Center disaster. This should be included in the Federal budget
that is currently being debated in the Congress. There are a
number of efforts that have been started in this regard, but we
need an overarching program to pull this together and to
continue it for 20 to 30 years. Because I think we owe it to
our firefighters, our police officers, construction workers and
others who are most at risk that we follow them for however
many years it takes, and treat them for anything that might be
discovered.
Third, I believe we should address the continuing unknowns
regarding indoor air by establishing a World Trade Center
indoor air program. This should be a joint Federal-city effort
that will expand on existing indoor air quality testing and
monitoring and make the information available to the public in
real time. I'm concerned that some testing was done that wasn't
always immediately made public, and I don't think that that
builds the kind of confidence that we should have in the
information we're receiving. I look forward to working with the
city on this initiative.
Fourth, while we continue to clean up from September 11th,
we should make sure we don't add to our air quality concerns.
There should be a clean air initiative at the site to do
everything possible to keep under control the emissions from
the construction equipment being used. I've heard from a number
of residents that they are concerned by all the diesel trucks
that are lined up that have their motors running all day. I
think we could take some steps that would help to eliminate
some of the emissions and allay some of the concerns. I
encourage the State to work with us on that.
Finally, I think we need to capture the lessons we've
learned from this experience, incorporate them into a new
emergency protocol for environmental health that identifies
pollutants to be measured in the aftermath of a disaster, and
that establishes health-based standards to be used and sets
uniform sampling and testing methods. Then, tell us what we
need to do if the standards, based on the uniform testing,
reveals that the standards are not being met. I think this
should be a part of the Administration's homeland security
initiative and I know that this committee stands ready to work
with Governor Ridge's office on that important issue.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to just include in the record
a short statement of Senator Voinovich. I want to just read a
paragraph from it, because I think it illustrates that although
this is principally a New York issue, and those who live and
work in the region, there were many, as you said in your
remarks, who came from all over the country. Senator Voinovich
from Ohio is very concerned, because after Ohio Task Force One
returned home, those were the first responders sent in by FEMA
to work with our firefighters, police and emergency responders,
many of them experienced illnesses apparently caused by work at
Ground Zero.
Thirty-seven of the seventy-four emergency responders
became ill. Three people were hospitalized with viral
pneumonia, eight people experienced extreme weight loss, two
people have been diagnosed with adult onset asthma, one with
acute bronchitis, and the rest with various respiratory
disorders and rashes. Senator Voinovich expresses his concern
that no Federal Agency is monitoring these workers for health
problems. Clearly, the Federal Government owes them the duty to
inform of their health risks and to ensure that they receive
the best medical care while safeguarding their individual
privacy. That's clearly something that we agree with and hope
that we're going to be able to come up with some solutions to
some of these issues.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for coming to this
historic site to hold this historic hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
Statement of Senator George Voinovich, U.S. Senator from the
State of Ohio
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing on the air
quality and health impacts of the September 11th attack on the World
Trade Center. I would also like to especially thank Senator Clinton for
bringing this important issue to my attention and the attention of this
subcommittee and the U.S. Senate.
As I said on September 11th, our first responsibility is to secure
the support the victims and their families will need in the days and
the months ahead and pray that God will bless and comfort them. Today
part of that support is to ensure that those who work, live and attend
school in the area are safe and are not exposed to situations which put
their health at risk.
In addition, we have a very important responsibility to the
emergency responders and the thousands of workers and volunteers who
have dealt with the ongoing tragedy at Ground Zero everyday since
September 11th. Our Nation owes these brave men and women our gratitude
and our thanks. Many of the workers left their families for days and
weeks at a time, working long difficult hours, at emotionally difficult
tasks most Americans can not image. When I toured Ground Zero shortly
after the attack, I was struck with the dedication and hard work of all
of the volunteers and the fact that the television coverage did not do
justice to the devastation that I saw.
The bravery, professionalism, and sacrifice of the men and women of
the New York Fire and Police Departments and other emergency workers is
an inspiration to us all. These men and women are true heros in every
sense of the word. While all of New York and America should be proud of
the quick response of the New York rescue workers, we all should be
equally proud of the volunteers from across the country who responded
to the call for help. I am particularly proud of the 74 members of Ohio
Task Force One who were mobilized on September 11th and were among the
first out-of-state FEMA teams to respond to the site, where they worked
until September 20.
I am also proud of the Federal response to the tragedy by FEMA and
the other Federal agencies. I think it is important as we evaluate the
Federal response, in order to make improvements in the system, that we
do not lose sight of the fact that the terrorism attack on September
11th was unprecedented in size, scale, and devastation. Nevertheless,
some mistakes were inevitable and we must learn from them.
I am particularly concerned about the health problems of the
emergency responders and what they were exposed to during their work at
Ground Zero. Equally disturbing is the breakdown by the Federal
Government in monitoring the health problems and treatments of the out-
of-state FEMA volunteers following their work at Ground Zero.
After Ohio Task Force One returned home, many of them experienced
illnesses apparently caused work at Ground Zero. Thirty-seven of the
seventy-four emergency responders became ill, three people were
hospitalized with viral pneumonia, eight people experienced extreme
weight loss, two people have been diagnosed with adult onset asthma,
one with acute bronchitis and the rest with various respiratory
disorders and rashes. This data was supplied to me by Robert Hessinger,
the logistics chief for Ohio Task Force One.
I was concerned, and I remain concerned, that no Federal Agency is
monitoring these workers for health problems. The workers themselves
are concerned because they do not know what they may have been exposed
to during their work in New York. The only information they have
received since returning to Ohio is from what they have read in the
newspapers about potential exposure to asbestos. This is not
acceptable. If these people are going to leave their families and jobs
and risk their lives and health, then the Federal Government owes them
the duty to inform them of their health risks and to ensure that they
receive the best medical care, while at the same time safeguarding
their individual privacy.
The entire FEMA response effort depends upon the willingness of
volunteers pitching in from around the country. If we do not treat
these volunteers with the respect they are due, then we will have a
difficult time convincing people to volunteer for disasters in the
future. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and Senator
Clinton and others members of the subcommittee to ensure that all of
the emergency responders and the residents of New York City get the
most reliable health information and answers to their questions and
concerns.
Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Clinton, for a very
thoughtful statement and a very substantive five-point program
of response which I look forward to working with you on. That
first measure that you sponsored last fall, S. 1621, to provide
for health monitoring, we did report out of the committee. I
believe it's still on the Floor, and I hope we can get our
colleagues in the Senate to move it quickly.
Your statement and your program make the point that I think
is why we're here, which is that the response of the emergency
workers and the construction workers and everyone else set a
standard for the rest of the country. We hope and pray that
America will never have an other incident like this, but in a
real world, we cannot assume that that will not be so.
Just as a standard was set by the first responders and
those who continue to work to clean up at the site and to find
and search for survivors, we've got to be persistent enough,
and your leadership is going to make this so, to stay in there
with the people who live here, who have worked at the site, who
continue to work in the neighborhood, children who go to school
here, to make sure that we also set a standard which judges and
protects against the lingering consequences of these awful
attacks.
So with that in mind, I thank you and I now call our first
witness, who is our colleague and friend, Congressman Jerry
Nadler.
STATEMENT OF HON. JERROLD NADLER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Nadler. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman,
and thank you, Senator Clinton. I'd like to thank you for
holding this field hearing today and for inviting me to testify
regarding the continuing impact of the September 11th attacks
on the air quality in Lower Manhattan.
As the Congressman representing Ground Zero and the
surrounding area, I am deeply concerned about the environmental
and health effects posed by the collapse of the World Trade
Center for my constituents and for those who go to school or
work in the area. It has now been exactly 5 months since the
terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, the people in Lower Manhattan
still do not know whether or not it is safe to live and work in
the area.
Although the first responders and the emergency personnel
did excellent work, the (EPA) Environmental Protection Agency,
has failed in its mission to ``protect human health and to
safeguard the national environment'' by not exercising its full
authority to test and clean indoor spaces where people live and
work. As such, EPA has created what can only become a full-
scale crisis of public confidence.
Yet all is not lost. The EPA can and must act now to remedy
the situation and to make Lower Manhattan safe and to restore
public trust. Despite statements to the contrary, the Agency
does currently have the authority and resources to do so, and
it must do so quickly. If the EPA continues to fail New
Yorkers, we will have to introduce legislation to mandate
action.
I'm going to begin by being very blunt. We now know enough
to be alarmed and outraged at the Federal Government's response
to the environmental impact of September 11th. First, we know
that EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman misled the public
on September 18, 2001, when she said she was ``glad to reassure
the people of New York that their air is safe to breathe and
their water is safe to drink.'' She made that statement without
the indoor data necessary, without any indoor testing having
been done, to make such a pronouncement.
Second, we know that the EPA has made a series of
conflicting comments about the presence and quality of
hazardous materials and has even knowingly withheld critical
data regarding the causticity of the dust.
Third, we know that the EPA delegated authority to New York
City to handle indoor environments, but did nothing to assure
that the city's response was adequate or appropriate. This left
New Yorkers to their own uninformed devices, often without the
means to take care of themselves and their families. This is
true even as the EPA had its own building at 290 Broadway
professionally tested and cleaned.
Finally, we know that the EPA has treated New York
differently than it has treated other locales contaminated by
hazardous materials. New York was at the center of one of the
most calamitous events in American history, and the EPA has
essentially walked away. Ms. Whitman's statement reassuring the
public about the safety of air and water was based only on the
EPA's outdoor tests, the results of which are still in dispute.
At that time, there had been no systematic testing of indoor
air or dust in residential or commercial buildings by any
Government Agency, let alone by the EPA.
Ironically, the very first public testing conducted inside
residences, which was commissioned by the Ground Zero Elected
Official Task Force, which I formed, commenced on the very day
Ms. Whitman made her misleading statement. The results were
made available to the EPA on October 12. The test results
showed elevated levels of a number of hazardous materials in
many of these residences. The EPA did nothing and Ms. Whitman
did not clarify her statement.
In recent weeks, the EPA has stated repeatedly that the
city of New York, not the EPA, is responsible for indoor
testing. The city, however, didn't get around to testing inside
homes until November or December. The full results of these
tests are still not available, and according to the Health
Department, won't be available until the spring.
I do not understand why the results of tests undertaken by
a public agency are being delayed for public release. Our test
results, the ones that the Task Force commissioned, were
available for public release in less than a month.
Nevertheless, just 3 days ago, I assume in anticipation of
these hearings, the city Department of Health issued a press
release regarding this limited indoor testing. Despite a
pacifying headline, the limited data in the press release has
caused a scientist with whom we've consulted to believe that
full results will directly contradict Ms. Whitman's statement
about the safety of the air, at least as regards the indoor
air.
The release does make it clear, as did our commissioned
study, that there were disconcerting levels of hazardous
materials in people's apartments. Ms. Whitman's reassurances
are deeply confusing in light of other statements made by
agency officials and of other information we now have that EPA
has not itself released. For example, in a January 25 speech by
Walter Mugdan, EPA Region 2 counsel, he states, ``A significant
number of the WTC bulk dust samples that we analyzed did have
more than 1 percent asbestos.''
An October 3, 2001 EPA memo, ``Confirm[ing] No Significant
Public Health Risk'' states, ``The majority of EPA and OSHA
samples of air and dust analyzed for asbestos have been at
levels that post no significant risk to residents and workers
returning to their homes or area businesses.'' Now, that of
course is misleading. Because that may be the majority, but
that means the minority in plenty of places did find
significant risk.
This statement has been made repeatedly by EPA Region II
officials. How are New Yorkers to interpret these conflicting
remarks? I can't even tell you what they mean, except that they
cannot both be true.
Confusing remarks are one thing, withholding critical data
pertaining to the public health is another. We know that it
took a Freedom of Information Act request by the New York
Environmental Law and Justice Project to get test results
showing dangerous levels of hazardous materials in outdoor
ambient air. The EPA claimed that this was an oversight.
But now we have new, frightening information. According to
yesterday's St. Louis Post Dispatch, the U.S. Geological
Survey, using the country's best detection equipment and
methods, found pH levels in World Trade Center dust that are
``as corrosive as drain cleaner,'' and passed this information
along to health experts at the EPA on a Government-only
website.
It took less than 2 weeks in September for these test
results to be ready. But they weren't revealed until the St.
Louis Post Dispatch yesterday. I submit this article for the
record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection, the article will be
received.
Mr. Nadler. Andrew Schneider, the paper's Pulitzer prize
winning environmental journalist, charges ``the USGS data was
not released by the EPA nor apparently were the environmental
agency's own test results on the dust.'' The EPA claims to have
released this data to the public, but when Schneider reviewed
all of the EPA's statements made since September 11th, he found
nothing that warned of these high pH levels.
According to the New York Committee for Occupational Safety
and Health, such dust, ``once it's in contact with moist
tissue, the throat, the mouth, the nasal passages, the eyes and
even sweaty skin, it becomes corrosive and can cause severe
burns.'' This is utterly scandalous. We must determine why the
EPA hid this information from the public, and we must see all
the data now. I hope that the two Senators will join me in
calling on the Federal Government to explain why New Yorkers
were misled, and to demand the immediate release of the full
complement of data.
The EPA has not only provided false reassurances and
misleading information, the EPA has also abrogated its
responsibility to act. In a statement issued on January 17 in
response to charges at a press conference that I held, the EPA
states that it ``has led the effort to monitor the outdoor
environment, while the city of New York has taken the lead
regarding the reoccupancy of buildings.'' At least the EPA
admits that it has in effect delegated authority to the city.
Unfortunately, the EPA has yet to provide any justification
for doing so, nor has it provided any evidence that it has
taken any of the oversight measures the law compels it to take
to assure that the city is acting in accordance with strict
Federal standards. On January 23, I sent a formal inquiry to
Administrator Whitman asking for answers to these and other
questions about the city's response, which I submit for the
record today. It has been over 3 weeks since the letter was
sent, and I have yet to get a response.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Nadler. The EPA might say today, as it has in the past,
that it does not have the proper legal authority to take the
steps we are requesting to test and clean the areas affected by
the collapse of the World Trade Center. It will probably say
that the Clean Air Act, for example, does not govern indoor
air, and that it is therefore the responsibility of the local
and State governments, or even that of the landlords and
residents themselves. This is again all utterly misleading.
Under Section 303 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA has the
authority in an emergency situation to protect human health
when there is ``an imminent and substantial endangerment''
presented by a source of pollution. The intent of Congress is
clear in this regard. A Senate report from 1970 on Section 303
states, ``The levels of concentration of air pollution agents
or combinations of agents which substantially endanger health
are levels which should never be reached in any community. When
the prediction can reasonably be made that such elevated levels
could be reached even for a short period of time, that is that
they are imminent, an emergency action plan should be
implemented.''
In short, the EPA should not wait for people to actually
get sick before it acts, and it clearly has the authority to
act under Section 303. Indeed, an EPA memo entitled, ``Guidance
on the Use of Section 303 of the Clean Air Act'' was issued to
the regional offices on September 15, 1983, outlining these
very points. I submit a copy of this memo for the record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Nadler. The Clean Air Act is not the only governing
statute. The EPA has the authority to act on indoor air under
the National Contingency Plan of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. In
fact, I understand the EPA has indeed been utilizing some of
the NCP, National Contingency Plan, protocols at Ground Zero.
However, they have not relied on this authority or any other to
test or remediate indoor environments.
As we speak, the EPA is in fact doing indoor testing and
remediation in Herculaneum, MO, and other locales, which are
not, by the way, Superfund sites. We must learn why the EPA is
treating New York differently. I ask the Senators present here
today to help me find out. This double standard is
unconscionable.
The EPA was unwilling to act on its own, and yet did
nothing to ensure that those ostensibly charged with acting did
the right thing. The EPA on its website and in public press
releases referred residents to the New York City Department of
Health, which recommended that people clean their potentially
asbestos laden dust with a ``wet rag or wet mop.'' Clearly,
such cleanup measures are inadequate.
We know that the law requires proper remediation of
asbestos sites, not with a wet rag or a wet mop. The EPA's own
actions show this to be the case as the actions they took in
cleaning their own building at 290 Broadway. I today, again
ask, why the EPA applied stricter measures to Federal buildings
than the city advice for local residences and businesses
equidistant from the World Trade Center?
Given the lack of action, credible information or
oversight, I believe the EPA has failed in its responsibility
to protect the public health of the citizens of Lower
Manhattan. This is quite shameful, for public health is the
first thing we as a Government must protect.
In order to assure a full and fair public assessment on the
EPA's actions following September 11th, I have also asked the
EPA National Ombudsman, Robert Martin, to investigate these
matters. Mr. Martin has been doing so, and I am disappointed he
did not have the opportunity to share the status of that
investigation with the committee. However, I understand the
sharp time constraint today, so I have attached a statement
from Mr. Martin to be included in the record.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Nadler. As you may also know, Administrator Whitman is
attempting to place the Office of the Ombudsman under the
control of the Inspector General of the EPA, effectively
stripping the Ombudsman of his independence and ability to
investigate these and other claims. I sincerely hope that
Administrator Whitman will stop her request to eviscerate the
Office of the Ombudsman, and in doing so, further undermining
the integrity of her agency. I also hope that Congress will do
so if she doesn't.
I realize that I have leveled serious charges here today. I
believe I have the moral responsibility to do so. The salient
point is that we still do not know the extent of the presence
of hazardous materials in some areas of the city, especially in
indoor areas. It may or may not be dangerous in many indoor
areas of Lower Manhattan, we just do not know.
I am dismayed that there seems to be an unwillingness on
the part of our public agencies to get this information. But
given that we do not have all of the facts, we cannot conclude
anything. I do know that we must get the facts and act swiftly
and appropriately to get the job done right. We must not fall
into the catch-22 of saying there is no evidence of a public
health emergency without taking any steps to get such evidence.
The burden should not be on the landlords and residents
themselves when the testing procedures and cleanup measures are
expensive and must be conducted by properly trained personnel.
The EPA has the statutory and regulatory authority to test and
to remediate indoor environments in Lower Manhattan and has
exercised such authority elsewhere.
I am calling on EPA today to immediately commence a program
of full-scale testing and remediation using the best available
technology, and to make a report of all such test results and
actions available to the public. The EPA must also issue the
test results in a manner which is tied directly to health
standards, so that we can truly assess the public health risks
posed to the people of Lower Manhattan.
Finally, testing procedures should in no way impede the
expeditious remediation of hazardous materials found by other
Government agencies or private researchers. Similarly, should
the EPA find dangerous levels of hazardous materials before the
full spectrum of testing is completed, cleanup measures should
commence immediately.
If the EPA fails to act again, despite its current
authority, I will introduce legislation to compel it to do so.
People might say that the measures I am requesting here today
are expensive. That may be, but we must protect the public
health. Although the cost may be high today, imagine what the
cost will be in the future if it turns out there really are
dangerous levels of hazardous materials in Lower Manhattan,
especially indoors.
By the way, when I say Lower Manhattan, this applies
equally to Brooklyn, Jersey City and anywhere else that cloud
went. All of these areas must be properly tested. Imagine the
city's and EPA's contingent liability to lawsuits 20 years down
the road and envision to potential health care costs. It is in
the best interests of the residents, workers, students and
businesses, for the Government to act swiftly and appropriately
to address the public's environment and health concerns. We
cannot afford to wait while all the agencies point fingers at
each other. There is still time to right the situation.
Time is of the essence. My office has received numerous
complaints from people experiencing adverse health effects,
such as headaches, nosebleeds and respiratory ailments. The
symptoms are so widespread they have been dubbed the World
Trade Center flu. Public confidence is at stake. People know
when they are sick, they know when something is not right, and
they know when they are being lied to. I sincerely hope that we
do not have another Love Canal on our hands. But the best way
to avoid that is to do the necessary testing and cleanup now.
I again thank you for inviting me to testify before you
today. I look forward to working with my colleagues in both
chambers of Congress and with all interested parties to ensure
that New York City is safe and prosperous for many years to
come. I thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Congressman Nadler. That was a
characteristically direct, intelligent and passionate
statement. I appreciate it very much. You framed the issues and
issued a challenge as well as offering some solutions, which I
think will guide us as we go on in this hearing for the rest of
the morning.
Without objection, I'm going to include all the material
you've referred to in the printed record of this hearing.
I thank you very much for your time, your advocacy and for
a superb opening statement.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
Senator Clinton. I join in thanking the Congressman, and
especially for his leadership on the Ground Zero Elected
Officials Task Force. We're including on the record, I hope
that you'll just hand it to us, Jerry, because we want to be
able to refer to your material as we go through this hearing.
We will closely work together and make sure that the questions
you raised are at the forefront of certainly the Senate's
agenda as well.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you very much.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Congressman. See you in
Washington.
Now we'll go to the second panel. I'll call them to the
table. Liz Berger, who's a resident of the area; Dr. Kerry
Kelly, chief medical officer of the New York City Fire
Department; Dr. George Thurston, associate professor of
Environmental Medicine at the New York University Medical
School, Nelson Institute of Environmental Medicine; and Eric
Goldstein, who's the New York Urban program director of the
Natural Resources Defense Council.
I thank all of you for being here. You are either living
through or examining and being advocates about the problems
that we've talked about. So your initial testimony here is very
important.
We're timing this to 3-minute opening statements, then
we'll have questions. If you can't do it all in 3 minutes, we
will not give you the proverbial hook, but try to keep it as
concise as you can.
Ms. Berger, welcome, and we look forward to your testimony
now.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH H. BERGER, RESIDENT,
NEW YORK, NY
Ms. Berger. Thank you, Senator. I'm going to talk really
fast. Chairman Lieberman, Senator Clinton, staff members,
fellow panelists, neighbors, thank you for inviting me to tell
you about the doubts, concerns and questions which have
confronted downtown residents every day since September 11th.
I've submitted more comprehensive testimony for the record, but
I want you to know that we live in a time of deep uncertainty,
but are required to make countless decisions that may affect
our health and that of our children for decades to come.
I live 150 yards from Ground Zero. I have lived south of
Fulton Street for more than 19 years. My husband and I remember
life downtown before there was a single all night deli, and
restaurants closed early Friday and didn't reopen until Monday
lunch, and when the closest supermarkets were in New Jersey.
We loved being downtown. We loved the huge buildings on the
narrow, winding streets. We loved being closed to the water,
and we knew that in some powerful, visceral way, Manhattan was
an island and that we were at the center and the beginning of
everything.
For us, the World Trade Center was everything. It was our
indoor play space, our back yard, our mall, our theater. It was
where our kids flew their kites, where they went roller
skating, where they learned to ride their bikes. It was the
only place below Chamber Street where you could buy a decent
loaf of bread. My children, who are 5 and 2, spent part of
every day of their lives at the World Trade Center.
This is why it is so absurd to heed the call to return to
normal. There is no more normal for us. I saw the first plane
before it hit. Our building was evacuated. It was 8 days before
we knew that it was structurally sound, and another few weeks
before we were assured that One Liberty wasn't going to fall on
us. That entire time, I thought not of the apartment we were
going to lose, but of the destruction of our community, of 20
years' work gone in 18 minutes.
The theme of my remarks is uncertainty. I never doubted
that we would return. After the city recertified our building,
I realized the question was not whether, but how. Because as
you know, it is the city's job to certify for structural
integrity, not for environmental safety.
We then began a great education process which has made
downtown residents experts in products and services we never
knew existed--FEMA, HEPA, OSHA. We all learned fairly quickly
which were the best cleaning companies and testing companies,
but what no one to this day can agree on is what clean means
and how to measure it. It took eight guys in white suits and
respirators 5 days to clean my apartment. But is it clean?
Nobody tells you what to keep and what to toss.
In October, I attended a panel discussion at Cooper Union
featuring leaders in the field of pediatric environmental
health. I didn't even know this was a field. It included some
of the doctors who are testifying here today. There were six
doctors, they have seven opinions and they ranged from throw it
in the washing machine to get out of town and don't look back.
So the question for us is, what's in the stuff? Every day,
the air smelled different and the winds blew a different
course. We made our own rules divined from press reports, from
high school science as we remembered it, from the advice of
friends of neighbors. One scientist friend who lives two blocks
from Ground Zero measured the asbestos and lead levels in his
apartment and declared it safe for his family. They went back
after 3 weeks. The managing agent of his building, however,
reported high levels of those substances in the building's
public areas. So the question is, how to interpret the facts.
In the end, 248 stuffed animals, 8 handmade baby quilts, 5
mattresses, a trousseau's worth of sheets and towels, all the
food in my kitchen and 13 leaf and lawn bags of toys went into
our trash. We didn't throw away our books, our drapes, our
upholstered furniture or our clothes, although it did cost
$16,000 to dry clean them. We washed the walls, but we didn't
repaint them. Some people we know repainted, but they kept
their mattresses. Some people kept their stuffed animals, but
they threw away their furniture. Some people kept what they
just couldn't bear to lose and got rid of everything else.
Now, we haven't decided what to do about our floors. We
can't decide, if we strip, sand and reseal them, will the
asbestos, fiberglass, concrete, human remains, because we know
there are body parts pulverized throughout our apartment, heavy
metals, and these vague particulates, will they be contained or
will they just be released into the indoor air? I should say,
I'm going to submit for the record a January 11th memo I've
just received from Cate Jenkins of the EPA. When you read this,
I want to go home and I want to take all my furniture and just
put it out on the street. So I'll let you decide.
Senator Lieberman. We'll include it in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Berger. Thank you, Senator.
Indoor air is a tough issue. In our building, we have a
very primitive central air system. It circulates the air from
apartment to apartment. Some people hired professional
cleaners. Others did it themselves, and a few locked the door
and just didn't come back. So after the guys in suits left our
apartment, we sealed our windows, we filtered our vents, we
bought six triple-HEPA filtered air purifiers, which we run 24
hours a day. My extremely clean air is working its way through
the building, as is the air of my neighbors who didn't do that.
Now, this is also true for outdoor air.
Our building, all the systems in public spaces have been
professionally cleaned following the city DEP guidelines. We
are surrounded by buildings that have either not been cleaned
or have been cleaned very summarily. Now, we live on the 11th
floor. So we see the poor porters in the commercial buildings
around us sent up on the roof by management with push brooms.
I'm going to show you what it looks like. These pictures were
taken from my neighbor's window last week. That's not snow.
That's stuff. That's coming through our windows. I will submit
these to you as well.
Senator Lieberman. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Berger. Now, in our case, much of this debate has been
academic. We decided that with two young children, it would be
very foolish to return to our homes until the fire went out.
Now, we were urged to return to normal. Every time that we
thought we were being a little crazy and should go back, there
would be a new report of asbestos, of heavy metal and other
readings in the warm zone. We were told, well, you live in the
financial zone. Except our building's front door is 16 feet
from the fence of the warm zone.
Now, that was not easy. We've been home for 3 weeks. We're
all happier, but we don't know if we are safe. Now, this is
what my 5-year-old asked me to tell you. She said, tell them
please that we lived in three places in 4 months and that it
was very, very hard. So we're back home. We've opened our
windows, but we're not going to the park. Some of our neighbors
have HEPA window screens, some have their windows duct taped,
others have put their apartments on the market. We don't know
what the right thing to do is. Ours is a culture that's based
on authority, but there has been none.
We would do whatever we needed to do if only we knew what
that was. I have to say in this regard, the failure of the
Federal regulators to recognize that this is a residential
community and to think that OSHA standards apply is just an
outrage. I mean, we could smell it, computers, fluorescent
bulbs, copiers, electrolytic fluids, bodies. Let me tell you,
everyone downtown knows that we are the baseline of the 30-year
study on what happens when worlds collide. As a parent, that is
the most frightening experience and responsibility I have ever
faced.
What I find ironic in all this is that the only authority I
have found with respect to cleaning up the mess is William
James, who was the father of pragmatism. Pragmatism is arguably
the only American contribution to world philosophy, so I guess
it makes sense that when we're feeling very American, we're
turning to him. Now, as you know, Senator Lieberman, he was a
Harvard man, so I'm sorry to quote him. But as he said in a
lecture he gave right here in New York City in 1907, ``We have
to live today by what truth we can get today, and be ready
tomorrow to call it falsehood.'' I first read that when I was
19 years old in college, and I thought it was pretty cynical.
But now, as a 41-year-old mother of two, while I'm horrified by
the implications for my children's future, I know it is the
only way we can live.
James also said, ``Truth is an affair of leading.'' Now,
this is your charge. On behalf of the almost 30,000 people who
live here, I commend you for following it and I urge you not to
let go.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much for a very important
and eloquent statement. Thanks very much, and I think I can
speak for Senator Clinton when I say we accept the charge. That
was a very important and poignant statement.
Dr. Kelly, welcome and thanks for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF KERRY J. KELLY, M.D., CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, NEW
YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT
Dr. Kelly. Good morning, and thank you for inviting me to
appear before the subcommittee.
I am the chief medical officer of the New York City Fire
Department. I responded to the World Trade Center on September
11th and participated in the rescue and recovery efforts that
thousands of our members undertook on that day and on the days
to come. The recovery effort still continues now, engaging our
members in recovery of both civilians and uniformed members, 7
days a week, 24 hours a day.
The FDNY response to the World Trade Center event placed
our members in the epicenter within moments of the first plane
hitting the north tower. Members from emergency squads, rescue
companies, engines, ladders and medical teams from across the
city responded to the call. Firefighters about to end their
daily tour of duty stayed on. Off duty firefighters
commandeered vehicles. Retirees and members on sick leave found
their way to the scene.
Within a matter of moments, these rescuers became victims,
soldiers in the worst terrorist attack on our Nation's soil.
Three hundred forty-three members lost their lives that day.
Over 200 members were seen in emergency rooms for physical
trauma. Many members required hospitalization and surgical
intervention for significant orthopedic injuries. The rescue
and recovery effort involved thousands of members following a
job-wide recall during the first few days of operation.
In the initial moments and hours after the collapses,
firefighters and emergency workers continued to work without
pause in the desperate search for survivors. The air was full
of thick debris and dense dust clouds, with visibility so bad
that one could not see people more than 3 feet ahead. With the
collapse of the towers, and avalanche of acrid debris, metallic
meteors and a shower of gray dust descended on the survivors,
blanketing the new wave of rescuers as they rushed in to
assist. It seemed as though day had turned into night, but
still our members continued searching for survivors in the
surreal, black blizzard of debris. Fine dust coated every
crevice, making features indiscernible.
Dust, debris and particulate matter choked breath and
irritated the eyes. Due to the vast numbers of FDNY personnel
at the scene, respirators were not available for all members
working at the site. Many also found it more difficult to
operate while wearing respirators, and many chose to carry on
their search for survivors unprotected. Members ignored or
fought against symptoms. Many did not sleep for days, pushing
themselves to continue the search for survivors.
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse, as the rescue
work continued, many members complained of eye irrigation, as
well as, cough and congestion. As the air quality improved, eye
irritation symptoms improved. Cough complaints continued.
Pulmicort inhalers and inhaled steroid was offered to offset
the allergic cough symptoms.
Concerns for the physical and mental health of members were
raised by FDNY medical staff in those first few hours and days.
Due to the cough symptoms that members exhibited, questions
were also raised about exposure levels that were present at the
scene. It was, and is still unclear what exposures members
might have been experiencing following the fall of two 110-
story towers combined with the combustion of two planes and jet
fuel.
Within a week of the tragedy, the Fire Department's Bureau
of Health Services began preparing for an unparalleled medical
monitoring procedure for all members exposed at the site. BHS
partnered with National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
on this project. We are very grateful for the funding we
received from the CDC to conduct this initial analysis of our
members. From October 6 through 12, an initial sampling of 400
exposed members were given comprehensive medical evaluations.
BHS, NIOSH and CDC were satisfied with the logistics and
implementation of the medical evaluation, and BHS immediately
began the vast project of testing the remaining members. We
worked 7 days a week, with three shifts a day, and were able to
see approximately 180 members per day. From October 31 until
January 31, the medical monitoring of all personnel who
responded to the World Trade Center was undertaken. Almost
10,000 firefighters and 800 EMS personnel have now been
evaluated. I am proud to say that our initial medical
evaluation of all the members who responded to the World Trade
Center is now complete.
Medical monitoring consisted of ECGs, pulmonary function
tests, chest x-rays, hearing evaluations, and blood testing
consisting of CBCs, chemistries, liver functions, lipid
profiles, lead, beryllium, PCBs and urine mercury and
urinalysis testing. In addition, testing of dioxins and
hydrocarbons was done at the CDC lab on the initial group of
400. Blood from all remaining members was banked, to be tested
at a later time if the need arose. Although some of these tests
are part of a routine medical exam, other more specialized
tests were conducted due to environmental concerns.
At the time of the medical monitoring, members also
completed a computerized survey regarding their physical
complaints to assist the Department in tracking the symptoms
that members are experiencing. BHS has compiled a very complete
record of each of our members from prior annual exams to use as
a baseline for comparison.
Since the testing was completed less than 2 weeks ago, the
complete results from this computer survey are still being
tallied. Preliminary blood tests have not indicated any
significantly elevated levels of toxic metals or abnormal
chemistries or blood counts. At the time of completing the
computer survey, 25 percent of our members reported cough and
shortness of breath on exertion. The pulmonary function tests
taken during the medical evaluation have shown a decline that
matches this complaint. In most cases, this change has not
affected overall functional capacity. Some members remain ``off
the line'' with active symptoms, while others have returned to
work.
Our current medical leave rate is a reflection of both the
rise in respiratory symptoms and post-traumatic stress. There
has been a twofold increase in both respiratory problems and
stress-related problems in the last 5 months. It remains to be
seen how members will recover from this event.
However, in order to measure recovery, we must continue to
monitor all of the members who responded to the World Trade
Center event. We are grateful to have received funding from CDC
for one additional medical examination per member in the
future. We remain concerned about the potential health problems
in our members. We are also concerned about longitudinal
followup with our members. Those who become ill, or experience
a trauma of this level in their working life, may choose to
retire from this job when they can no longer withstand the
rigors of this work. We want to ensure that our members
continue to receive monitoring in the future, whether or not
they retire from the Department.
For this reason, the Fire Department's Bureau of Health
Services is now actively seeking funding for this project. We
must affirm our commitment to the members of our Department who
gave so much to this city and to this country, and who have
inspired people around the world with their courage and
determination. We owe it to them continue to monitor the
effects that their exposure on September 11th may have on their
future.
Bureau of Health Services has the pre- and post-World Trade
Center records, the expertise and the logistical set-up to
conduct an unprecedented and thorough investigation of the
effects of the exposure our members experienced on that
terrible day. Let us not forget that more of our members
experienced a far greater level of exposure than any other
group in this city. As far as I know, there are no hard and
fast answers to the potential effects of exposures. Many
unknowns remain. That is why it is critical that we continue
our monitoring.
The events of September 11th were catastrophic. In a matter
of moments, our members became participants in a battlefield.
The FDNY response was outstanding when we review the numbers of
civilians saved and we measure the heroic efforts of so many
individuals. Our losses are deeply felt with the deaths of
members from every rank and every branch of our service. Our
memories are filled with the experiences of that day and the
many days that followed. Both physically and emotionally, we
have been challenged by this event.
As we rebuild our Department, we must also restate our
commitment to our members who worked so hard to save others. I
am sure we can all agree it is no less than they deserve.
Thank you for your time.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Dr. Kelly. Thanks for those very
important results, and also for your eloquence.
Dr. Thurston.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE D. THURSTON, ScD., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL SCHOOL,
NELSON INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE
Dr. Thurston. Good morning. Thank you for this opportunity
to share our scientific results in your process of
investigating the World Trade Center disaster.
On September 12, my research center at the NYU School of
Medicine received an urgent request from the Office of the
Director of the NIEHS, the National Institutes of Health
Sciences, one of the National Institutes of Health, to respond
to the environmental impacts of the attack of September 11th by
doing whatever we could to monitor the air pollution that was
resulting from the disaster's dust and fires. That evening, we
sent a research team into the World Trade Center disaster zone
to collect numerous samples of the dust from locations
surrounding Ground Zero. The red dots on this figure display
the points at which they were able to gather samples of the
World Trade Center dust for us to analyze.
Our NYU Medical School research team also set up an ambient
outdoor air monitoring station at the NYU Downtown Hospital at
Beekman Street, just five blocks to the east-northeast of
Ground Zero. It's also noted on the figure. We sampled for
various types of particle air pollution from Friday, September
14th until the end of 2001. Although our work is far from
complete, we have weighed these samples to determine the
outdoor particulate mass concentrations, as well as analyzed
the ambient air pollution samples and the World Trade Center
dust for their constituents.
Therefore, our sampling data, and my testimony today,
applies to the general public living and working in the
vicinity of the disaster, rather than to the rescue workers
exposed at Ground Zero.
As shown in the next figure, our analyses of the World
Trade Center dust samples revealed that some 99 percent of the
dust was as particles too large to be penetrate deeply into the
lung, being largely caught in the nose, mouth and throat when
inhaled. This large dust, however, contained approximately one-
third fiberglass, with much of the remainder as alkaline cement
dust. This large dust therefore was quite caustic and had the
high pH that Congressman Nadler was discussing. Therefore, it's
caustic and irritating to the eyes, nose and throat, consistent
with the now infamous ``World Trade Center cough'' that nearby
residents reported.
Only trace amounts of asbestos were found in our samples.
The less than 1 percent that was as PM2.5, or the
particles that would reach deepest in the lung, was found to
have a neutral pH, with no detectable asbestos or fiberglass. I
think that's an important distinction from the results that
were, I gather, discussed. I didn't read the article. If you
just looked at these dust particles as an aggregate, it's
dominated by the large particles, and those are very caustic.
What we did was, we re-aerosolized the dust and we analyzed
it by size fraction, which is a very important distinction.
Because it's the fine particles that would get deep in your
lung. Those were not caustic, those were not alkaline like the
large dust that would be in your eyes, your nose, your throat,
and therefore would give you symptoms but not get deeply into
your lungs, which is a relief.
Thus, while our analyses are consistent with the
Government's conclusion that the World Trade Center dust is not
likely to have short- or long-term serious health impacts from
the fine particles on otherwise healthy local residents, we
found that it is very irritating and capable of causing the
symptoms reported by many residents. I would also note that we
also sampled in November one indoor residence near the World
Trade Center. We found very similar results of those particles
inside the home as what we found outside, where the majority of
the particles were in these very large size fraction that would
be caught in the eyes, nose and throat.
Our sampling of the outdoor air pollution at NYU Downtown
Hospital, and let me go to the next figure there, showed that
air pollution levels were very high in the first weeks
following the attack, especially at night, but then diminished
as the fires were brought under control. By October, soot
levels in the downtown area were generally similar to those
that we measured at the NYU Medical School in midtown, First
Avenue and 26th Street. We were also monitoring at another
location up toward midtown. Although levels occasionally
climbed in downtown on clear, calm nights throughout the fall.
This is pointed out in this figure, you can see that the black
line is the 24-hour average that the EPA might report and
measure. Then we had day time and night time samples. Each
evening, the levels are higher and lower in the day time. So
when the winds diminished at night, the pollution levels would
buildup.
Overall, our independent air pollution sampling results
were largely consistent with the data reported by the EPA. In
particular, although short-term peaks in PM2.5
particulate matter air pollution for a few hours did occur at
night, the 24-hour averages were of PM2.5 were
within the legal standards set by the U.S. air quality laws.
Despite the fact that individual pollutants in the
community were apparently at safe levels for otherwise healthy
persons in the general population, it is impossible to know
what potential interactive effects might have occurred among
the various pollutants, even at these low levels. Ultimately,
only epidemiological followup studies of possible effects among
especially susceptible individuals will provide a fuller
determination of the issue of possible health effects from the
various pollutants in the World Trade Center plume.
Finally, I feel strongly that we must make sure to learn
all the lessons that we can from this horrible catastrophe
regarding the communication of risk to the public in such
emergency situations. Something like what happened to New York
City on September 11th could, unfortunately happen again, and
we must be prepared. It is an understatement to say that the
public is skeptical of Government pronouncements of safety in
such situations.
In this case, I feel that the EPA was too quick to declare
the air ``safe'' and did not well enough define what was meant
by that term. Although the fine particle pollution was not of a
level that would make otherwise healthy people very sick, the
dust was caustic and irritating, causing many to have severe
and upsetting symptoms, including eye, nose, and throat
irritation. This caused people to further doubt governmental
pronouncements of safety, even after more complete data were
available confirming the EPA position.
As a result, the press turned to the academic research
community of New York City to fill the void. It has been my
duty and honor to play a role in the academic effort to answer
the environmental questions that New Yorkers had, and still
have. But we must improve the current situation. While we
cannot create governmental trust where there is none, I believe
that we should draw upon what happened in New York City to help
the Nation better cope with such situations in the future.
The Government should designate a suite of environmental
parameters to be measured in such situations, and designate the
appropriate health standards for best comparisons in such
short-term exposure situations. There was a lot of confusion,
especially in the press, citing which standards to compare.
They would get hold of data, and they would compare it to a
standard, and it would be an inappropriate standard, then it
would lead to false or, inaccurate, let's say, conclusions from
the data. So you really have to know what you're comparing
things to. I think there was a lot of misunderstanding about
how to interpret the data that was collected and reported in
the press.
Moreover, I recommend that we create a mechanism by which
blue ribbon panels of the leading independent experts in the
United States are formed in advance, perhaps by the National
Academy of Sciences, to be on standby in case, God forbid, such
an emergency happens again. If this is done, there would then
be an independent expert panel ready to be assembled, briefed,
and to then give their quick-turnaround assessment of the
public's environmental risks, and of the appropriate actions
that are needed to protect public health. Without such new
mechanisms, I fear that any future such disasters may be
accompanied by the same unfortunate confusion, doubts, and
distrust. Let us act now to help preclude this risk
communication problem from happening in the future.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important
issue.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Dr. Thurston, for some very
constructive recommendations. It kind of reminds me what we
went through in the Capitol when the anthrax was discovered in
Senator Daschle's office. There were some very quick
reassurances which turned out not as time went on to be
justified. It's a lesson for all of us which is, sometimes when
you're not certain, the best thing to say is nothing. Then when
you have some more information, to say what the information
leads you to say.
So I look forward to coming back in the question and answer
and asking you more about that.
Our final witness on this panel is Eric Goldstein of the
National Resources Defense Council. Thanks for being here.
STATEMENT OF ERIC A. GOLDSTEIN, NEW YORK URBAN PROGRAM
DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator
Clinton. It's an honor to appear before both of you, and we
appreciate your holding these hearings and all your good work
on the environment and for New York in general.
My name is Eric Goldstein and I am the New York program
director at the Natural Resources Defense Council. First, let
me express the condolences of NRDC on behalf of all of my
colleagues to all of those who lost loved ones in all of the
terrorist attacks on September 11th.
In the aftermath of the September 11th tragedy, my
colleagues Megan Nordgren, Mark Izeman and I began pulling
together a 1-year report and analysis of the environmental
impacts of the World Trade Center disaster and the Government
response to those events. We are releasing a preliminary
version of that report on Wednesday, and hope that you will be
able to incorporate the entire document into the record of this
hearing. I'll try to quickly make three points and several
recommendations.
First, the September 11th attacks, in addition to the
horrific loss of human lives and the huge economic
dislocations, constituted an unprecedented assault, as we all
know, on Lower Manhattan's environment. The collapse of the
110-story towers, two of them, the conflagration of vast
amounts of toxic materials, the forced distribution of debris
and dust throughout portions of Lower Manhattan, the long-
burning fires at Ground Zero all combined to create
unquestionably the single largest air pollution episode in the
history of New York City and probably urban America.
NRDC's report estimates that at least 10,000 New Yorkers
suffered short-term respiratory or other pollution-related
impacts from the Trade Center's collapse and subsequent fires.
Thousands of apartments and offices in the immediate vicinity
of Ground Zero received significant loadings of polluted dust.
As Congressman Nadler forcefully noted, there is of course much
that we still do not know about the air quality impacts of the
September 11th attacks. That's why the health studies that are
now being undertaken by Dr. Landrigan at Mount Sinai, Dr.
Carerra at Columbia, Dr. Thurston at NYU, Dr. Kelly at the Fire
Department and others are so important. That's why continuing
monitoring and assessment is so urgent.
Based upon the incomplete data that is now available,
here's what we can say. In general, outdoor air quality in
Lower Manhattan today is approaching or similar to levels in
the area prior to September 11th, with some exceptions. Some
portions of the Ground Zero work pile, of course, and localized
hot spots, such as areas with heavy concentrations of diesel
buses and diesel equipment, and at times, areas where Trade
Center debris is being removed or transferred to barges.
The most worrisome air pollution problem facing Lower
Manhattan today, in addition, of course, to the worker safety
concerns, now involves indoor pollution threats in some
residences and offices that were engulfed with thick layers of
contaminated dust and whose buildings were not properly
cleaned. These are pollution challenges that remain. They are
pollution challenges, including getting the best available
filtration devices for Stuyvesant and some of the schools there
that are manageable and solvable. But they exist, and they
shouldn't be swept under the rug.
In many ways, the response of Government agencies and their
employees to the Trade Center attacks was heroic and a
testament to the merits of public service, which is too often
undervalued. We recognize the environmental and health agency
staff who performed many tasks with distinction. EPA personnel,
for example, undertook numerous assignments including the
removal of hazardous waste from the Ground Zero site, the
deployment of HEPA vacuuming trucks and the establishment of
sophisticated air quality monitoring and testing facilities.
But there were some Olympic-sized problems as well, and I want
to briefly highlight them.
No. 1, overlapping jurisdiction among at least nine city,
State, and Federal agencies. This was a problem. This meant no
single agency was in overall charge of the environmental
response to the September 11th attacks. It meant that no agency
took the lead in ensuring environmental safety for those
working at Ground Zero. It meant that no agency took
affirmative charge of the environmental cleanup and inspection
of environmental conditions prior to re-occupancy of residences
and offices in the vicinity of Ground Zero. Many of these
problems, NRDC believes, resulted from shortcomings of the
Giuliani administration, which handled so many other aspects of
the September 11th response magnificently and which was in
tight, overall command of the entire rescue, recovery and
cleanup effort. The low profile of the city's Department of
Environmental Protection, which has 6,000 employees and wide-
ranging authority under the New York City charter to respond to
environmental emergencies, lends support to the growing belief
the department does not rise to the challenges posed by the
September 11th attacks.
No. 2, a major problem involved communicating environmental
health data to the public. As Ms. Berger has stated so
compellingly, there appeared to be no coordinated strategy for
conveying such information to concerned citizens. There were no
regular briefings of Government leaders of environmental or
health agencies. There was no one place for citizens to turn to
get environmental guidance and advice. Test data was not often
promptly released.
Government statements on air quality, at least as the
public understood them, stressed the good news and de-
emphasized issues that might raise further concerns. By
focusing almost exclusively on long-term risks in their public
statements, Government officials omitted warnings regarding
short-term health effects, particularly to Ground Zero workers
and other sensitive sub-groups. For at least a small portion of
those who suffered from short-term impacts, there could well be
long-term consequences.
Admittedly, the Government agencies had a very difficult
assignment here, and were responding not to an industrial
accident but an act of war. Nevertheless, as a result of
shortcomings on the communications front, a troubling
credibility gap on environmental health issues emerged.
No. 3, difficulty has been environmental safety
shortcomings at the Ground Zero site itself. While rescue,
recovery and site cleanup operations have made remarkable
progress with some heroic actions, the environmental health
issues that were handled at Ground Zero represent a glaring
exception to that overall record of accomplishment. A prime
example has been the failure to require Ground Zero workers to
wear appropriate respirators. The OSHA representatives who
seemed to argue that they were only at Ground Zero in an
advisory capacity, and did not or could not insist upon the
wearing of respirators certainly have some explaining to do.
Among other onsite safety problems of significance were
undue delays in establishing worker safety training procedures.
It's one thing in the first day or couple of days after, but
it's another thing when those procedures haven't gotten
underway weeks and months after the tragic events of September
11th.
A final shortcoming in the Government's environmental
response involves problems assisting Lower Manhattan residents
in environmental safety and cleanup issues. As previously
stated, in addition to the communications gaps, agencies failed
to prepare and provide complete and proper cleanup protocols
for many Manhattan residents, they failed to inspect even the
most heavily contaminated buildings for environmental safety,
prior to reentry. No agency took overall responsibility for
supervising the environmental cleanup and safe re-occupancy of
these apartments. It was left, for the most part, to residents
and building managers to sort these complex challenges out for
themselves.
No. 4, as to recommendations. We support Senator Clinton's
five-point program, of course, including S. 1621, and the
Health Registry funding. We urge that you encourage EPA and the
New York City Department of Environmental Protection and
whatever other agencies they together feel are appropriate to
create an Air Pollution Assistance Center located in the Ground
Zero vicinity, fully staffed to answer and respond to
residents' questions and provide one-stop shopping to address
the air quality and health aspects of this tragedy. Also, those
two agencies, U.S. EPA and the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection and others create a joint task force
that will promptly begin door-to-door visits and inspections of
individual buildings, to verify environmental conditions, at
least in the immediate ring of buildings within a 10-block
radius of Ground Zero.
Second, we urge that you prod the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and relevant New York city officials to
commence without further delay enforcement of environmental
safety rules at the Ground Zero work site. Third, as we
mentioned and you mentioned before, we urge you to assist
medical institutions, such as those mentioned before, in
securing the funds they need for these critical public health
studies, and to help obtain funds for a full health registry of
all Lower Manhattan residents and workers.
Finally, we urge you to convene a second hearing and
otherwise find ways of address the question of whether the
Federal Clean Air Act pollution standards and pollution
monitoring requirements need revision in the wake of the
lessons that we've learned from the September 11th tragedy.
Ultimately, if there were no violations of Federal air quality
standards from this event, the Federal and State air quality
standards certainly need to be re-examined.
Thank you very much for inviting us to testify, and we
definitely appreciate your interest in this issue.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Goldstein. We have become
accustomed, obviously, to saying what happened on September
11th was unprecedented in our history, that we never have been
attacked that way. You said something in your testimony that
may surprise some people, but it's important to the specific
focus of this committee, that what resulted, and I quote you,
was unquestionably the single largest air pollution episode in
the history of New York City. That cries out for our attention
at all levels of Government now.
Let me begin with a few questions and then I'll yield to
Senator Clinton.
Dr. Thurston, you stated that only followup epidemiological
studies will truly reveal the cumulative effects any of the
pollutants had or will have had on people in the area who are
exposed, particularly sensitive sub-populations, such as
children. That struck me as remarkably consistent with what Ms.
Berger said when she said that she knows that she's now part of
a 30-year baseline study by the fact that she lives in this
area.
I wanted to ask you how you would advise residents to
evaluate the risks from the pollutants, given the uncertainty.
In some sense your testimony has been reassuring, based on your
studies. In other senses, it obviously, I would guess, and I'll
give her a chance to say, leaves Ms. Berger and other residents
with questions about the future.
Mr. Thurston. Right. Well, first let me say that I think
there's only so far we can go by looking at the pollution
levels and trying to interpret them. I think that's the first
cut that we've done. We've looked at it, and we're not through
with it yet, but looking at the pollution levels, the various
pollutants, analyzing them, and trying to figure out what the
potential for health effects are.
But the serious complications of this of course is that
we've got a mixture of pollutants that are different from what
we normally experience. We do normally experience quite a bit
of pollution in big cities like New York, Los Angeles and
London, so that the epidemiologic studies I think are necessary
if we're going to get to the ultimate bottom line, is did it
affect people's health. I think initially as you look across
the pollutants, and we're not done yet, but it does appear that
looking at them individually, that in the general public that
the health risk is not significantly high.
Now, of course, the Ground Zero workers, rescue workers and
people like that, there's a different exposure and evaluation
that has to go on. But then when you start considering the fact
that there was this mixture that's not like other pollutants,
we really can't go back to previous studies to evaluate what
the health impacts are. We were saying that the air quality
standards aren't adequate for assessing these. Well, the way
that air quality standards work is, you look at past history
and you have to use studies that are published, and then you
say, well, OK, in those situations we saw effects, so we'll set
the standard.
We have nothing to look back to try and set those limits.
So I think that's going to make it much more challenging.
Now, in terms of advice to people, I think that it really
is going to be on an individual level. In other words,
otherwise healthy people are probably going to have very little
concern. But then if you have a pre-existing condition, a pre-
existing disease, young children, for example, spend a lot more
time crawling around on the floor, such that if an apartment
wasn't fully cleaned and there's still lead, there are elevated
levels of lead in the dust. Although levels we've found would
be acceptable to be in a playground under EPA limits, but not
acceptable to being on the floor in a home. There's a higher
level, because children are crawling, you have very young
infants that are crawling around and then they'll put their
fingers in their mouth and they'll get a higher exposure.
So it's very difficult, of course, you can't give across
the board advice here. I think that it's going to be very
individual and it's going to depend on what the pre-condition
is of the person and whether it's a pregnant woman or not. That
makes a big difference.
So those are the kinds of things that have to be considered
in deciding what action to take. So it's going to be pretty
individual, there's no broad, across the board advice, I think,
that's going to serve everyone.
Senator Lieberman. So what do you say to Ms. Berger? Should
she be, for instance, taking her children regularly to a doctor
to examine them for possible effects from air quality?
Mr. Thurston. Well, I don't know the situation of the
exposures and things, so it's very difficult to evaluate that.
I know that when I came down in November to speak to the
parents at Stuyvesant High School, at that point I told them
that I would be more than glad to have my daughter go to that
school because of the excellent education she would get. I felt
comfortable that the pollution levels for a healthy child like
mine would be appropriate, it would be fine, she wouldn't have
a problem.
Now, if she had severe asthma, then maybe I would have had
a somewhat different decision. So it's very difficult for me to
give advice without knowing the situation.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask Ms. Berger whether you are at
all reassured by what Dr. Thurston or Mr. Goldstein has said
this morning.
Ms. Berger. I'm not particularly reassured by what Dr.
Thurston says. I mean, I read before some of his findings.
I don't think the issue is a global one. I don't think
anybody believes there can be a certain answer. I think that's
actually the history of asbestos, that this long-term exposure
and it's after the fact, as he said, looking at the studies.
But what we don't know is how to clean appropriately.
You've just said, if you clean appropriately, you should be
fine. Well, I've done almost everything that's been suggested.
Every time I turn around, there's something else, there's
something that I've not done. That's really the issue. I mean,
the basis of the Kay Jenkins report is that in certain homes
they tested in Tribeca, the asbestos levels are 22 times what
they are in Libby, MT, which is a Superfund cleanup site.
Now, you're right, I have no idea how to evaluate that. But
I'm not a scientist. So what does that mean for me? She says
that the reason why the numbers are so off is that the testing
procedures are incorrect. There's a huge debate, again, I'm
sure you know it, about the size particle.
So I guess what I found so wonderful about your five point
plan and the way I would expand upon it is what are the testing
procedures, why aren't the Federal regulators coming in,
setting the standards, why aren't they doing the testing. Then,
of course, there are the financial issues, which is, what's the
cost of abatement on an individual level and who bears it.
Senator Lieberman. Very strong points. Dr. Kelly, let me
ask you a few questions. I gather from your testimony that in
the studies you've done and the work you've done with the
firefighters involved here that there's no evidence of
increased metallic or other toxins in their blood, but that
there is, basically 25 percent, or a quarter of those
firefighters surveyed not only have respiratory concerns but in
fact your studies and tests of them show that they have
respiratory problems. Have I heard that correctly?
Dr. Kelly. Yes, that's true. Our computer survey with the
symptoms, the results from the initial 400. We are still
tallying the computer survey for the remaining 10,000. But
that's approximately 25 percent.
We've certainly seen a number of people who have been ill,
unable to work due to respiratory symptoms. With treatment,
some have been able to go back. Others have not. I know you
mentioned that some of the people who are most at risk are
people who have underlying respiratory problems. But in the
case of our firefighters, these are people who are in good
health. These are people who have excellent pulmonary function
tests. We have baseline studies to show that.
This group is even more disheartened, because this is a
group that is normally very athletic, physically active. To
suddenly not be able to breathe or have symptoms and perhaps
face the loss of a career that they've loved is very upsetting
to them.
Senator Lieberman. Is there any indication in your studies
about unique characteristics to the 25 percent who are showing
respiratory problems? In other words, did it have anything to
do with where they were on the site or what they were doing or
when they were on it?
Dr. Kelly. We're still analyzing that as part of our
survey. We are asking what days they were working, what kinds
of activity they were engaged in. That will take continuing
studies. That's what we plan on doing over the next month or
several months.
Senator Lieberman. I was pleased, incidentally, that CDC,
which is obviously a Federal Agency, is supporting some of the
work you're doing. I hope they or some other Federal agencies
will continue to support it. Because this is very important
work to be done.
Do you know if there are any studies going on of the health
of firefighters or other emergency workers who came in from
outside of New York?
Dr. Kelly. I don't know the answer to that.
Senator Lieberman. A final question. Your testimony and
other material that I've read indicates that not only were
there not enough respirators available at the site, but also
that the equipment the fire department had was too bulky and
that firefighters couldn't use it for extended periods of time.
Am I correct in that understanding, and if so, is the fire
department looking for lighter weight breathing equipment for
the firefighters now?
Dr. Kelly. They will be continuing efforts to see what
equipment we can adapt or use for these situations. The P100
mask or respirator is excellent for both vapor and for
particulate matter. That was not as widely available at the
scene, though, in the initial few days. Again, this was a war
zone. The initial several days, the control of that site and
that environment was not easily done. The overall response of
our members was phenomenal, and people responded without really
any equipment just to be there and see what they could do to
help. Their efforts were really looking for people, finding
people, not even thinking of protecting themselves.
Senator Lieberman. So some, I presume, just didn't put the
respirators on because they were so focused on exactly what you
said, the search for survivors?
Dr. Kelly. The availability of those respirators was not
there, at least certainly the first few days.
Senator Lieberman. Is that because they were not available
in the department generally, or there were too few, or just
that they didn't get to the site on time?
Dr. Kelly. Again, we lost, had crushed over 70 some rigs.
Those are the rigs that normally would hold the backup
equipment. The mass service units, which are the units that
come to bring additional equipment, were lost. We had
tremendous losses of equipment and manpower that day.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, and I want to thank the panel.
I particularly appreciate all of the recommendations that
you've given us for future actions. I just want to ask a brief
question of each of you.
Liz, you just made a point about the cost of abatement. You
have done everything you know to do, and you've done it to the
highest possible level, trying to make your living situation as
safe as you can. Did insurance cover any of that for you?
Ms. Berger. I have to say, the insurance companies, in my
experience and the experience of my neighbors in general, have
been pretty good. The problem is that most people are under-
insured, myself included. Most of what we're talking about
comes under personal property damage. There was not a lot of
structural damage.
We're maxed out. The Federal agencies have been useless. I
went through the FEMA process, I went through the SBA process.
I kind of enjoyed being told by the SBA that I couldn't have a
loan because I didn't have enough debt. Well, maybe now I will.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, your Federal Government qualifies
for a loan on that basis.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Berger. It was just unbelievable. So in this case, I
mean, I can say for me it's not a question of money. I will do
whatever I need to do. For many people, it is, though. A lot of
people who didn't have renter's insurance, there were people
whose windows were open and so who had even greater property
damage. But to look at some of the reports that essentially
say, anything porous goes out the door, it's tough.
Senator Clinton. Well, I am concerned because right now we
are facing decreasing insurance available for any purpose with
respect to terrorist attacks, and in particular here in New
York. So what was available on September 10th may no longer be
available. That's a double whammy.
The other thing I just don't understand is, I've been
talking to the agencies and being quite agitated about this for
months, is that with all the money that came in, why helping
owners and renters clean up their living space was not on the
list, is something I don't understand. If the law needs to be
changed, if SBA or FEMA or any other agency needs to be
empowered to try to help, I think we have to look at that as
well. Because it's just not been appropriate the way that
there's been no help on these issues.
Ms. Berger. Senator, if I could just add one more thing.
We've now increased our personal property insurance but our
building, which is a co-op, has the misfortune of having its
insurance come due in the first few months after this. We had a
very difficult time finding a carrier that would write the
policy. That is really the issue, co-ops are kind of a unique
form of ownership here in New York. But to have a building
without insurance, it's pretty difficult.
Senator Clinton. Well, I appreciate that very much.
Now, Dr. Kelly, I thank you again for being willing to come
and testify and I want to thank Dr. Prezant, who's with you,
who I know has been your partner in doing this work. I'm
pleased that I was able to get some CDC money, Senator
Lieberman, about $12 million, for these followup studies. But
that is woefully inadequate for what needs to be done. If we're
looking at longitudinal studies for 20 to 30 years, taking into
account not only the firefighters and the first responders and
the construction workers who I feel strongly have to be
involved in the followup, but also residents and workers in the
area generally.
I'm hoping that the methods that you've used, which I am
very pleased you had a chance to describe today, will be looked
at as a real model.
If you, though, were to have the funding for the broader,
longer longitudinal study that you have referred to, could you
use the existing protocols and methods that you've already used
for the shorter term October to January study, or would you
need some additional assistance to design and implement such a
study?
Dr. Kelly. We certainly have the infrastructure in place.
Our concern is again, the longitudinal followup. We don't know
all the substances that people have been exposed to. One reason
we've banked blood is so that if substances become apparent
that we are unaware of, we will at least have the opportunity
to go back and check that blood. We're also concerned that
currently, once members retire, we no longer follow them, and
therefore it becomes difficult for good followup over the years
to see how people are doing.
So that's an area that we have a level of concern and we
would want to continue that information gathering. Because
again, this is the most affected group. If we look ahead to say
how are people going to do, we need to have an ability to
follow these people as time goes on.
Senator Clinton. Well, I agree 100 percent. I also believe
that we haven't up until now done a very good job in our
country following chronic diseases and conditions in any event.
It takes a disaster like this to point out the fact that we
have a system to track infectious disease, but we don't have a
system to track chronic disease. Maybe this will be the wakeup
call we need to put such a system in effect, and then to
correlate that with environmental information. Because the
interactions which Dr. Thurston referred to is something that
we just don't know the meaning of yet.
So I hope that as Senator Lieberman and I go forward with
additional legislation and hearings on this that we will look
to the fire department as a real example of what can be done.
Dr. Thurston, you have mentioned that we do have fiberglass
found traces of in some of the materials that have been tested.
As you know, the city announced on Friday the continuing
presence of fiberglass in indoor dust samples. When somebody
hears fiberglass, when I hear fiberglass, I find that
disturbing. In your testimony, you were critical of EPA's use
of the term safe.
How, though, can we communicate more effectively? Both you
and Mr. Goldstein made the point that we didn't communicate
information effectively. When we hear in the public that
there's fiberglass, then we hear an agency say that it's safe,
how do we sort that out? Do you have any guidance on that?
Mr. Thurston. The issue of fiberglass, there is actually
more than just a trace of fiberglass in the large particles.
But fortunately, those are very efficiently caught in the upper
airways, the nose, throat, the mouth, thankfully they don't get
deeper in the lungs. Also, fiberglass is very irritating as was
mentioned. It's also more readily cleared than asbestos from
the lung, so that it doesn't insinuate itself into the linings
of the lungs as readily, so that it's not as long a term risk,
not thought to be as long a term risk as say, asbestos. So it's
a short-term irritating kind of effect.
Now, in terms of having something to compare it to, that's
what I mentioned, we need to look at the standards we have.
Something like fiberglass, something like asbestos are based on
a 20-, 30-year exposure to it in an occupational setting. We
just don't have that here, thankfully. But it's difficult to
then take that and ramp it back to let's say a 1-year exposure
and figure out what that means. Because the mechanisms are
different in acute versus chronic exposure effects.
So it's a challenging thing. I think it will require,
again, perhaps a National Academy of Sciences panel or EPA to
go back and look at their standards and say, how can we set
these, so that we can set up some criteria by which to compare.
I think mentioned a few moments ago was the asbestos counts and
very high counts, when you use techniques that look at the very
finest asbestos. I think it's a good example of comparing
apples and oranges. It's led to a lot of confusion and scared
people, I think in all likelihood excessively. Because the
standard that was set was counting particles by a method that
counted the larger particles, larger asbestos, the longer
fibers, which are the ones that are thought to be the most
dangerous to health.
Now, the standard didn't include the little particles, so
that if you're going to start counting them, then you can't
compare it to a standard which didn't count them. If you were
to have, in setting the standard, added in the small particles,
you would have gotten a much higher level as your legal limit.
But what people are doing now is they're counting all the
particles and then they're comparing it to a standard set just
for the large fibers.
So that's inappropriate, even if the small fibers, let's
say, are as damaging as the large ones, which science would
indicate they probably are not, because they are much more
easily cleared from the lungs. But even if they were of equal
toxicity, the standard to compare it to wouldn't be one that
just counted the ones larger, it would also include the small
one.
So that's what we've got to do, we've got to have standards
that are comparable to what people are out there measuring.
Senator Clinton. I couldn't agree more, and I think that
Mr. Goldstein's recommendation that we need to consider changes
in standards, maybe even need to consider changes in the Clean
Air Act, is something that we have to take very seriously.
Mr. Thurston. Well, it's going to be challenging, because
as you probably know from your experience on the Senate
committee that looks into this issue, what's required is for us
to look at published studies of situations and to document very
carefully. If we don't have the documentation, then we can't
set the standard.
Senator Clinton. I understand that, but I guess it's a
chicken and egg issue. I think that's what's so totally
frustrating to people, is that we haven't invested enough, in
my opinion, we haven't invested enough in doing these studies
and in tracking this information longitudinally so that
therefore we come up short when it comes time to make
standards.
I know we're running out of time, and Mr. Goldstein, would
you just comment on the whole standards issue?
Mr. Goldstein. It's clear that this was an unprecedented
event, and that therefore, the standards that have been
established under the Clean Air Act might not have been fully
protective of public health. Among the things that ought to be
examined are whether there should be some even shorter term
standard for exposure to high intensity bursts of particulate
matter on a short standard than the current 24-hour measuring
standard, whether there ought to be some standards under the
EPA's Clean Air Act regarding fiberglass, and whether other
pollutants such as dioxins, which have some 30-year guidance
values, but are not part of the formal standard setting
process, ought to be incorporated.
So it's a complex issue, but it is one we believe this
subcommittee ought to be thinking about, and that EPA ought to
be carefully exploring.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Clinton.
Before we go on to the next panel, Mr. Goldstein, you were
quite critical of the New York City Department of Environmental
Protection. They're going to be represented on the next panel.
I wondered if you wanted to just say a few more words about
your criticism.
Mr. Goldstein. Well, ultimately if you examine, I guess in
terms of for the public, they care less which agency is in
charge than that some agency is in charge. One of the
weaknesses here was that many agencies had a variety of
responsibilities, and many agencies did some good work. But
there was no single agency in command of the environmental
health issues where the public could go that would have regular
briefings and that would be in charge of the whole operation.
In our view, after reviewing the New York City charter,
which is our city's constitution, the city Department of
Environmental Protection had wide-ranging responsibilities to
respond to environmental emergencies involving hazardous
substances. In our view, those duties were not fulfilled, and
therefore, other agencies who would have filled in,
particularly with the way in which New York City, again,
magnificently in most aspects of the problem, really ran the
show at Ground Zero, it made it all that much more difficult
for State or Federal agencies to step in in a very active way
when Mayor Giuliani and his team was running this operation in
the way that the mayor sometimes did.
So with that in mind, it was a responsibility, we believe,
of the city's Department of Environmental Protection, working
with the New York City Health Department, to coordinate all the
agencies. Someone had to take the lead. In our view, the most
logical agency to do so would have been the city DEP, to
coordinate the work of all these other agencies.
Senator Lieberman. I thank you. I thank all of you on the
panel very much. You've contributed very significantly to the
work of this committee. The committee will continue to be
interested in this matter and try to be constructive in our
response to it. If there was every any doubt about the
committee's interest, Senator Clinton will make sure that we
continue to be interested and respond. I promise you, we will.
I thank you very much for your time.
We'll now call the third panel. Ms. Marianne Jackson,
Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for the World Trade Center
Event, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Ms. Jane M. Kenny,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Region 2; Mr.
Carl Johnson, deputy commissioner for Air and Waste Management,
Department of Environmental Conservation, State of New York;
and Commissioner Joel Miele, Department of Environmental
Protection, City of New York, who will be accompanied by
Commissioner Thomas Frieden of the Department of Health, City
of New York.
Thank you all for being here. I ask you if you can, as
quickly as possible, to find your seats at the table. I'd ask
folks in the room to try to keep the noise down and we will
proceed with the testimony.
The hearing room will come to order. Ms. Jackson,
representing FEMA, you are first. We welcome your testimony,
and obviously we'd like to hear a response to some of what you
heard in the first panel, particularly Ms. Berger's complaint
about her inability to get assistance from FEMA.
STATEMENT OF MARIANNE C. JACKSON, DEPUTY FEDERAL COORDINATING
OFFICER FOR THE WORLD TRADE CENTER EVENT, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Ms. Jackson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Clinton. I am Marianne Jackson, Deputy Federal Coordinating
Officer for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for
the World Trade Center disaster. I thank you for this
opportunity to update you on FEMA's disaster response
operations in New York City.
Some 3,500 Federal workers were deployed to New York City
to support the disaster response. About 1,300 from FEMA and
almost 2,000 from other Federal departments and agencies. There
are still about 500 Federal workers supporting the city and the
State on this recovery.
As you know, FEMA's mission is to reduce the loss of life
and property protect our Nation's critical infrastructure. Our
success depends on our ability to organize and lead a community
of local, State, and Federal agencies and voluntary
organizations. We provide the management framework, the
financial resources and the Federal assets to help State and
local governments.
Immediately following the attacks on September 11th, the
importance of air quality and emergency responder health and
related issues emerged as critically important. Initially, we
attended daily meetings with the State and the city to discuss
a wide variety of issues including air quality. We worked
closely with EPA, the New York City DEP and the New York State
DEC.
Under the Federal Response Plan (FRP), we mission assigned,
that means tasked, and provided funding to EPA to conduct air
samplings as well as a number of other missions. The health and
safety of emergency responders was of paramount importance.
Immediately, various Government agencies, such as OSHA, NIOSH,
HHS, EPA and State and city agencies, were dispatched to the
site.
Federal personnel and teams deployed into the disaster
area, such as the Urban Search and Rescue Teams, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers experts and medical personnel from the
Department of HHS arrived with the necessary protective gear.
We were able to address immediately heath concerns involving
emergency responders through our coordination with HHS and its
Public Health Service. Five Disaster Medical Assistance Teams,
which are MASH type hospital units, were brought in, four
Disaster Mortuary Teams were brought in, and one Mental Health
Assistance Team was brought in, in addition to other assets to
address health concerns.
Long-term health monitoring was initially funded by FEMA,
and that's what Dr. Kelly from the fire department described.
We also included initial tests on 4,000 State emergency workers
working at Ground Zero, and CDC will continue that effort.
In another critical area, we provided funding to address
the long-term mental health of responders and others who may
have been affected by this tragedy. We coordinated with the
National Association of Fallen Firefighters to work directly
with the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) on crisis
counseling, and we also funded Project Liberty, at $23 million
at this point, which is a long-term mental health disaster
recovery program administered by the State of New York Office
of Mental Health.
Because of the amount of dust and debris that resulted from
the building collapses, cleanup of residences and the
surrounding areas has been a major priority. We provided almost
6,000 disaster housing assistance grants to both renters and
owners who lived in the vicinity of the World Trade Center. The
rent money, we gave renters 2 months rent and owners 3 months
rent, so they could go some place else and live until they were
able to get back into their apartments, which in some cases
were inaccessible for quite a while. We also provided cleanup
money and we also reimbursed people who stayed in hotels in the
first couple of weeks.
New York State administers a program called the Individual
and Family Grant Program. That program provided grants to
people to buy HEPA vacuum cleaners, air filters and air
purification systems for residences. In addition, the voluntary
agencies provided similar cleanup gear for people. The
voluntary agencies were also very active and helped with
cleanup for the special needs population.
We worked with the city Department of Health through our
joint outreach teams in distributing to residents flyers
containing recommendations on actions needed in order to be
able to safely reoccupy buildings and homes. This flyer
addressed cleanup and safety and health concerns and was
developed to facilitate individuals moving back into their
homes.
The Small Business Administration offers two kinds of
loans, economic injury loans, and that's for businesses who
lost business, to help them stabilize and get their business
back. But they also provide what are called physical loss
loans. They provided over 800 loans to both businesses and
individuals for physical loss. So that meant to repair and in
most cases, it meant there was money for cleanup.
Eligible Government clean-up costs and monitoring
activities are being funded 100 percent through FEMA's Public
Assistance program, which is aid to Government entities. For
example, the New York City Board of Education's cleanup of the
schools near Ground Zero is an eligible expense, and they will
be reimbursed, as is the cleanup of city vehicles such as fire
trucks and police cars.
All of FEMA's work has been created out of the authority
the Environment and Public Works Committee has provided through
the Stafford Act. This legislation has served us well and has
provided the necessary authority and flexibility to empower us
to do our best. The disaster response and recovery in New York
City will be a long-term process, but the President has said
that we will provide whatever assistance is needed to get the
job done. I can assure you that FEMA will be here as long as
needed.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Ms. Jackson, for all FEMA has
done. Do you want to take a moment to respond to what Ms.
Berger expressed as a concern?
Ms. Jackson. Yes, I gave Ms. Berger my card, and actually
she and I had met at one of the many meetings that we've had
down here since September 11th. I'm going to need, naturally
I'm very concerned about her interaction with FEMA. She and I
will talk later. We have to address these situations on a case
by case basis.
As I mentioned in my testimony, we have been giving people
money to clean up, so they can get back in. Additionally, if
someone has been given rent money and they come to us and say,
my doctor is saying I shouldn't move back to my residence
because of a health condition, because psychologically, it's
very, very difficult for me, then we're going to give them
additional money so they're not forced to move back into the
area.
Senator Lieberman. I'm glad you're going to work with her
and talk with her. Again, I appreciate what you've done. You're
absolutely right, FEMA is created by statute that comes out of
our committee and the documentation of the assistance you've
rendered here is impressive. I thank you.
Ms. Kenny, you're here representing EPA. Thank you for
that, and obviously we want you in your testimony as best you
can to respond to some of the criticism of EPA, both from
Congressman Nadler and from Dr. Thurston during their previous
testimony.
STATEMENT OF JANE M. KENNY, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 2
Ms. Kenny. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Clinton. I
appreciate the opportunity.
I'm Jane Kenny, Region 2 Administrator. I do welcome this
opportunity to discuss our response to the tragic events of
September 11th.
Today is February 11, 2002, a mere 5 months after this
unprecedented event in our Nation's history and 5 months of
incredibly intense work. So now we now reflect on the impacts
of the attacks and the extraordinary efforts so many have made.
EPA and our Federal, State and city partners have all played
important roles in the protection of public health and the
cleanup. Today, we look toward the future and the ultimate
recovery of Lower Manhattan. So I appreciate this opportunity
to do that.
EPA and other agencies have taken over 10,000 samples of
dust, air, drinking water, and storm water runoff at and around
the World Trade Center site, at the Fresh Kills landfill and in
New Jersey. We also conducted additional air sampling within
five boroughs.
EPA has tested for asbestos, fine particulate matter, lead
and other metals, volatile organic compounds, dioxin, PCBs and
other substances that could pose a threat to the public and to
the workers at the site. Fortunately, the vast majority of our
tests continue to find levels of these contaminants below
standards or guidelines set to protect public health. It's
important to emphasize, as we have from day one, that the risks
are different for response workers at the World Trade Center
site. We have repeated said that these response workers should
wear respirators and other protective gear.
We have found asbestos fibers in the outdoor air and dust
samples. Out of more than 5,500 air samples taken at and around
the site, only 15 have exceeded the Asbestos Hazard Emergency
Response Act standard we use to determine if children can re-
enter a school building after asbestos cleanup. Of those 15,
all but 4 were recorded before September 30.
Where we found elevated levels of asbestos in the dust EPA
used large HEPA vacuum trucks to clean sidewalks, local parks
and children's sand boxes. EPA has led the effort to monitor
the outdoor environment with support from New York State while
the city has taken the lead for the reoccupancy of buildings.
EPA has been testing for numerous volatile organic
compounds or VOCs such as benzene at several sites within and
near the perimeter of the World Trade Center site. To protect
workers, EPA takes daily ``grab'' samples of VOCs at ground
level where smoke plumes have been sighted. These samples
provide a snapshot of worst-case exposure. The samples are
immediately analyzed at EPA's mobile laboratory at the site,
allowing us to relay the results directly to the fire
department.
EPA standards and guidelines are set with an ample margin
of safety to protect public health. Our grab samples from
Ground Zero have found the presence of benzene at levels that
have exceeded Federal guidelines. That's why we continue to
urge workers to wear their respirators.
However, EPA air samples of pollutants such as benzene
taken at the perimeter of the site find levels that are very
low or non-detectable. Dioxin levels were generally below
health-based guidelines. Once the fires were diminished,
concentrations of several chemicals declined in most cases to
non-detectable levels, even at the work site.
Fine particulates, those smaller than 2.5 microns with a
few exceptions early on, have also been below the level of
concern. We do know that materials in construction dust and
smoke can be irritants. They can cause more serious reactions
in people with respiratory problems or asthma. Again, this is
one of the reasons we have recommended that workers wear
respirators and impacted homes and businesses be properly
cleaned. Sensitive groups have been advised by the city health
department and the CDC to take special precautions and consult
their physicians if they are experiencing symptoms.
We and the city have tested drinking water and water
quality in the Hudson and East Rivers. All samples of drinking
water met Federal standards. Runoff following heavy rain on
September 14 did show some elevated dioxins, asbestos and other
pollutants. Followup sampling found levels back to those
normally found in area waters.
Almost immediately after these attacks, President Bush
declared a Federal disaster, and that activated the Federal
Response Plan. Acting on FEMA's mission assignments, EPA is the
lead agency for hazardous waste disposal, for monitoring the
ambient environment, for coordinating sampling data, for
managing worker and vehicle wash-down operations and initially
supplying thousands of respirators and other personal
protective equipment. On September 11th, EPA provided a flyer
to FEMA for distribution at Ground Zero that emphasized the
potential from asbestos and urged workers to wear protective
gear. By September 20, EPA had set up worker wash-down
operations at the site, at which flyers were distributed and
signs posted recommending the use of respirators and other
protective gear.
In October, EPA began two scientific investigations, a
health risk evaluation and a comparative toxicological study.
They will help us better understand the possible health risks
to people who may have been exposed to various pollutants
following the disaster.
In addition, we have supported the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry and the city health department
in their study of residences impacted by the World Trade Center
collapse. We are committed to helping residents and businesses
and employees in Lower Manhattan address their concerns about
the indoor air.
From the start, EPA has been committed to sharing the
results and explaining what they mean. I must say, under
incredible circumstances, having witnessed the attacks and
having been evacuated from our Lower Manhattan offices, EPA
staff began sampling, analyzing, interpreting and conveying
environmental data to the first-line response agencies, the
press and the public. Those results are available in summary
form every day on our website and in detail at our offices in
Lower Manhattan.
As we look to the future, we will work with our Federal,
State and city partners and Congress, on science-based
approaches that ensure that public health is protected. I have
to say, I'm proud of the many dedicated people at EPA who have
worked tirelessly to protect the health of all New Yorkers in
the wake of this unprecedented event.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for helping me give you the
information that you need.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Ms. Kenny. We'll wait until the
question and answer period, I'll come back to some of the
questions that have been raised.
Mr. Johnson, on behalf of the State. Thanks for being here.
STATEMENT OF CARL JOHNSON, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Senator
Clinton, for providing the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation with the opportunity to testify
about our efforts to assist the residents and businesses of
Lower Manhattan to recover from the devastation that was caused
by the destruction of the World Trade Center.
We share with Governor Pataki and our sister agencies the
highest level of commitment to managing the cleanup, and we
appreciate the excellent coordination among all levels of
Government involved in this effort. I'm going to be brief,
because our role primarily has been one of support and
collaboration with EPA and the city agencies. I do want to say
that we often engage in friendly collegial competition, and in
some cases, we oversee city agencies, in some cases EPA
oversees our programs. There are opportunities for friction
there.
Throughout this process, I have never seen Government
agencies work together, collaborate, confer, communicate at the
levels that we have been involved in since September 11th. It
started immediately and has been ongoing through that time. I
think to the extent that we have success stories to tell, it's
as a result of the dedication of the professionals in all of
our agencies.
As soon as possible after the attacks the New York State
DEC began to work with the other agencies to monitor and assess
the environmental impacts from the devastation. We all have
slightly differing roles. We established a multi-jurisdictional
air monitoring group to coordinate that effort, which initially
focused on worker safety and then began to work out from the
site to try to learn what we could about the conditions for the
residents and the workers returning to the area. We did
identify specific monitoring needs and we put them in place in
the process of collecting that information. Ms. Kenny has
spoken to that, I'm sure we'll talk in more detail about that.
Certainly, we had an existing PM2.5 and
PM10 monitoring network. We expanded on that to try
to give us more information about the conditions in Lower
Manhattan and throughout the city. We adapted a number of those
monitors for asbestos because we had information very early on
that asbestos was present in one of the towers. It was
something that obviously would be of concern to the citizens of
New York.
We worked together with EPA in consultation to determine
what standard we could use. Dr. Thurston I think spoke ably to
the question of apples and oranges. There is no outdoor quality
standard for asbestos, because it's never happened before. We
worked very, very carefully to try to determine what we could
do that was already scientifically tested and acceptable and
apply it to an outdoor situation. It was a bit of a struggle to
do that, but we have continued to apply that, and I think we
can say with certainty on the outdoor air quality that we have
not seen issues with regard to asbestos, a few exceedances or
excursions in the early days, and since then, we do not believe
that breathing the outdoor air causes any issues.
The particulate matter, we have sampled for both
PM2.5 and PM10 is ongoing, as I said. We
expanded that. We added five new monitoring sites in Lower
Manhattan, both continuous air quality monitoring devices,
which gives the results people are looking for, I think on more
of a real time basis, and filter based, which are more
sensitive, more analyzable, can be archived and re-examined
later on. But obviously they don't give you the air quality
results that you want in that day.
To date, as Ms. Kenny said, in the particulate levels in
Lower Manhattan, as well as throughout the rest of the city, we
have not seen significant increases. Certainly in the early
weeks after the attack, there were elevated levels of
particulates. As we hoped and expected has happened, those have
come down.
We are also involved in the field work for dioxin
monitoring. We know any time you have a source of uncontrolled
combustion, you can certainly expect to see some levels of
dioxins. Folks were worried about that. We established the
monitoring for that as well, in conjunction with EPA. We have
seen similar results, that in the early days and when the fire
was still burning, we saw some levels of dioxins that have
since fallen off. That gives us some confidence.
The concerns about irritations and odors in the area are
certainly the trickiest when it comes to air quality. We spent
some effort with EPA and some of its specialized staff in
trying to determine additional monitoring that could be done to
look for some of the irritants and to study what sorts of
previous models we might learn from. I think one of the things
we learned is we haven't really had a long-term building fire
before to study and to determine what comes from these. Most of
our models have been in other areas.
So we have established additional contaminants that we
began monitoring for. Again, we primarily service monitors and
provide the information to EPA. We're going to maintain those
activities until the effort is completed and until we can
assure people that we have some sense of what came from the
pile and what effect it may have had on their health.
I would be remiss in speaking before the Senate if I didn't
mention that the State will soon be before both Houses looking
for assistance in solving an issue that we have as a result of
the World Trade Center with regard to transportation conformity
and the Clean Air Act. We're working to assure the
environmental community and the citizens that while we do
believe we need some relief in the planning requirements under
that, that we by no means intend for it to have any negative
environmental or air quality impacts whatsoever. We're working
aggressively and frequently with the environmental community to
bring forward a proposal that we believe both Houses would be
able to support.
I did want to speak just briefly to the issue of the diesel
truck emissions that's been raised a couple of times. The State
has been using its authority under a State idling regulation to
prevent idling. We've been as aggressive as we can be in making
the drivers turn off the engines when they're in an idling
situation. It's not allowed for more than 3 minutes in the
city.
We have also been working in a multi-jurisdictional effort
to try to bring relief to the site in the form of both lower
sulfur fuel for the site and to try to bring some particulate
traps and other control technologies to some of the equipment
of the site. We didn't begin this until January or so, we are
working very diligently with virtually ever city agency that
has any responsibility at the site and with the Northeast
States for Coordinated Air Use Management and EPA. We're trying
to bring a proposal forward. We have found that this is very
complex, but we are still moving forward on trying to bring
some relief from the ongoing operations at the site.
I just want to thank again the subcommittee. We appreciate
being here.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Commissioner Miele, thank you for being here, and I would
urge you to respond to the critique from Mr. Goldstein, and to
some extent from Congressman Nadler, who said in his statement
that EPA had delegated authority to the city for indoor
environmental consequences and had not followed up to make sure
that the city's response was appropriate.
Dr. Miele. Senator, if I may, the city has two responses.
Dr. Frieden would like to lead off, if that's all right with
you.
Senator Lieberman. OK. I'd urge you to try to be as concise
as you can, because time is running on and we've got a final
panel to go.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS R. FRIEDEN, M.D., COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK
CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; ACCOMPANIED BY: JOEL A. MIELE, SR.,
COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
Dr. Frieden. Good morning. We do appreciate the opportunity
to be here today.
Since being sworn in as health commissioner by the new
administration, less than 2 weeks ago, I have reviewed the
activities of the New York City Health Department and other
agencies since the first day of the disaster. I would second
what my State colleague has said. One of the most vivid
pictures to emerge is one of unprecedented cooperation between
local, State and Federal health, environmental and occupational
agencies. The teamwork is quite extraordinary.
Following the attack, the City Health Department had a
multifaceted role. The health department immediately
established systems to monitor first, emergency departments in
the immediate vicinity to assess acute injuries; second,
hospital staffing and equipment needs; third, illness and
injuries among rescue workers; and fourth, unusual syndromes
that might represent a bioterrorist event.
Other responsibilities included ensuring water and food
safety in the immediate area, conducting rodent and vector
control, initiating a worker safety program and providing
regular advisories to the public and medical community. The
Department also facilitated development and coordination of
environmental sampling plans.
Many individuals were exposed to large amounts of smoke,
dust, and airborne substances. The potential release of
contaminants during and after the disaster was a primary public
health concern from the beginning. Air monitoring was
established immediately, and continues. The Health Department
reviews the numerous air quality, debris sample results and
personal air monitoring tests being conducted by various
agencies. The data from air quality tests thus far have been,
in general, reassuring. None of the test results done to date
would indicate long-term health impacts.
The numerous substances of potential concern have led to
some confusion about health effects over the short and long
term. Some substances, such as the particulate matter from the
dust or smoke in the air, are irritating but are not expected
to have long-term health effects. Other substances, most
notably asbestos, are not expected to have short-term effects,
but if elevated over long periods of time can cause serious
health effects.
Asbestos was a known building component in the World Trade
Center. Asbestos levels in the air at and around the site in
the first few days were elevated. Fortunately, since that time,
except for a few transient spikes found in outdoor air
sampling, asbestos levels have been low and within standards.
With funding from FEMA, the Department of Health and the
Federal ATSDR conducted a study of both air and dust samples
taken in November and December of 2001 at 30 residential
buildings in Lower Manhattan. As soon as we received the final
results from ATSDR, we released them to building residents and
owners and to the public. We will continue to release results
as soon as they become available from ATSDR.
This study showed no elevated levels of asbestos in indoor
air. Dust sample tests showed low levels of asbestos in some
samples and fiberglass in some other dust samples. Asbestos and
fiberglass can be a problem if they become airborne. Airborne
fiberglass can cause cough and skin, throat and eye irritation.
While these findings are not unexpected, they underscore the
importance of proper cleaning to minimize exposure, as the DOH
has repeatedly emphasized.
I would add that the use of wet wiping is an important and
effective means of making our homes safe, and statements to the
contrary are unhelpful.
The standards used are conservative. For example, for
asbestos in outdoor air, we are using the indoor air quality
standard for reentry into a school after asbestos removal.
Stringent standards are also being used for other substances in
outdoor air, such as dioxins, identified at the perimeter of
the site. Both duration of exposure and concentration of the
substance are important to determine health effects.
Many standards which we are applying were based on
exposures for prolonged periods of time. The long-term health
risks associated with short-term exposures are not well
documented, but are generally believed to be quite low.
As fires at the WTC site burned far longer than
anticipated, many residents living and working in the
community, in particular rescue workers, have reported health
effects, such as acute breathing problems, worsening of asthma,
eye, nose, and throat irritation, nausea, and headaches. Many
residents also continue to experience significant psychological
and stress-related illness and anxiety.
Students of Stuyvesant High School, who returned to their
school on October 9, 2001, reported similar complaints. A DOH
analysis shows that the average daily rate of headaches,
respiratory, skin, eye, and throat complaints at Stuyvesant was
higher than in the previous year and higher than in four other
New York City public high schools. The data also show that
complaints decreased from October to November 2001. We will
continue to monitor this situation.
The department has been working with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to develop a protocol for a WTC
Registry. Since September 11th, we have all had to live in a
world of greater uncertainty. While we know that the air meets
safety standards today, we cannot state unequivocally that
there will be no long-term health effects of exposures on or
around September 11th. We simply do not know. For that reason,
rapid funding and implementation of the registry is
particularly important. The registry will enable scientists to
evaluate the long-term health effects as objectively and
comprehensively as possible.
But with every day that passes, implementation of a
registry becomes more difficult. We therefore urge our
colleagues to avoid any further delay in this very important
project which you have spearheaded.
Finally, the City Health Department recognizes residents'
concerns and will continue to work closely with local, State
and Federal agencies to monitor air quality and to inform the
public of findings as soon as they are available. Together with
the City Department of Mental Health, which is also under my
jurisdiction, we are addressing residents' mental health
concerns by promoting the ongoing Project Liberty program, a
statewide disaster-recovery initiative that offers free crisis
counseling, education and referral services. DOH will continue
its community outreach and education efforts.
Now I would like to turn to Commissioner Miele.
Dr. Miele. Thank you, Dr. Frieden, Senator Lieberman and
Senator Clinton. It's a pleasure to be here. My name is Joel
Miele, and I'm the commissioner of the New York City Department
of Environmental Protection.
In addition to the DEP's operation of the city's sewer and
water systems, which by the way withstood the attack well, our
expertise in regulating asbestos in New York City was a
significant portion of our responsibilities following September
11th. Since 1985, DEP has been the New York City agency with
responsibility for regulating asbestos abatement. Starting
September 12, DEP operated a network of outdoor air monitors
that have been used for monitoring outdoor asbestos levels.
Aside from repairing water and sewer infrastructure, assessing
and mitigating risks caused by the presence of asbestos-
containing material has dominated DEP's work in responding to
the Trade Center attack.
Since September 11th, DEP or its contractors analyzed 3,060
samples from 37 outdoor monitoring sites in Lower Manhattan;
500 samples collected adjacent to the four schools in the
vicinity of the Trade Center; and 328 samples taken in the four
boroughs of the city outside of Manhattan. The map and all
sampling results to date from the sites shown on this map are
available to anyone on DEP's website: www.nyc.gov/dep.
Of these samples, only 9 of the total of 3,864, or \2/10\
of 1 percent, exceeded the Federal re-occupancy standard for
indoor air. These nine samples were all taken in the vicinity
of Ground Zero. As Commissioner Frieden noted, there is no
established standard for asbestos in outdoor air. Unlike carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxides and other gases whose presence in
outside air is regulated under the Clean Air Act, asbestos is a
once-prevalent building material, and previous work at
standard-setting has focused on establishing safe levels for
asbestos within buildings.
On September 12, when my colleagues and I at all three
levels of Government were creating our monitoring networks, we
knew that there were no reliable, scientifically based,
acceptable standards that would tell us what level of asbestos
in outdoor air might be considered ``safe'' or ``unsafe.''
Therefore, we opted to use EPA's indoor post abatement re-
occupancy of schools standard as our threshold level of concern
since we felt it was more protective.
Let me briefly explain our sampling methodology. The
samples are collected on filters and examined under Phase
Contrast Microscopy utilizing a specific method developed by
the National Institutes for Occupational Safety and Health. The
PCM analysis counts all fibrous particles, including asbestos.
PCM sample results are compared to the clearance/re-occupancy
standard for indoor air following an asbestos abatement
project. This standard is 0.01 fibers per cubic centimeter.
Samples found to be above this standard are re-examined using
Transmission Electron Microscopy. The TEM analysis identifies
the type of particles collected. TEM results are compared to
the clearance/re-occupancy standard for indoor air in schools
after an asbestos abatement project. This standard is 70
structures of asbestos per square millimeter. The standard was
established pursuant to the Federal Asbestos Hazard and
Emergency Response Act, also known as AHERA.
Based on all Federal, State and local test results, public
health experts have consistently expressed confidence that,
based on sampling, airborne asbestos levels do not pose a
threat to human health. Health professionals have stated that
short-term exposure to airborne asbestos, at levels equal to or
lower than 0.01, carries an extremely low risk of causing
asbestos-related illness.
Before allowing occupants in any residential or commercial
building near the Trade Center site, the city's various
agencies, acting through its Office of Emergency Management,
required building owners to take the following steps. Assess
the building's structural strength and stability using
qualified professionals. Restore gas and electrical service.
Restore building water service, including flushing, re-filling
and cleaning roof tanks where necessary. Assess the presence of
hazardous materials such as asbestos, and remediate as required
under applicable city regulations using qualified
professionals. Finally, inspect, clean and repair mechanical
and HVAC systems.
While property owners were accomplishing these tasks, DEP
and its sister agencies, again acting through the Office of
Emergency Management, assumed responsibility for cleaning
streets, sidewalks and common areas so that there was a safe
outdoor environment to reach the buildings for contractors and
workers who were retained by owners and managers to effect all
necessary exterior and interior cleanup of private buildings.
To assist property owners, DEP engaged in the following tasks,
among others.
Developed and distributed advisories to building owners and
occupants; established HELP lines for concerned owners or
tenants to respond to complaints or concerns about proper
abatement procedures for contractors; provided telephone
consultation to building owners, contractors, consultants and
tenants related to asbestos cleanup; performed site inspections
and conducted building surveys; reviewed sampling data
submitted by building owners, their contractors and
consultants; reviewed the scopes of work for cleanup of
asbestos-containing material; and developed emergency
certification procedures and offered daily certification exams
to ensure a properly trained and qualified work force was
available.
Although city, State and Federal agencies have provided
oversight and guidance on interior cleanup, that task remains
the responsibility of building owners and occupants. For
example, some building owners identified the presence of
asbestos-containing material during their assessment for
hazardous materials in areas of the buildings under their
control. Once material is identified as ACM, New York City
rules require that a licensed contractor with certified
asbestos workers perform the cleanup activities.
As noted above, DEP technical staff has been continuously
available to assist in the development of plans for handling
asbestos cleanup activities. At the completion of the cleanup
activities, the city's regulations require clearance air
sampling by licensed professionals prior to allowing re-
occupancy of areas where asbestos work had been performed.
The city, through the Office of Emergency Management, looks
forward to working with Senator Clinton in developing an
improved indoor air quality program. With respect to the
question that was raised earlier by Congressman Nadler and Mr.
Goldstein, the issue of the DEP, the agency's name tends
unfortunately to be a little bit of a misnomer. The agency is
primarily involved in running and operating the water and sewer
systems of the city of New York. The staff available for
asbestos and hazmat, while adequate except in the case of a
catastrophic such as occurred here, has always been adequate
for the services that we've needed, whether it was for asbestos
abatement or the occasional hazardous materials situation that
arises.
I appreciate the opportunity.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Commissioner. So did EPA
federally make a mistake in reaching a judgment that the city
environmental protection department was in charge of indoor air
quality?
Dr. Miele. No, I think what they really meant by that was
that the outdoor air quality had been checked. It was very
clear to us in our daily meetings, and we met, all three levels
of government, each day for as much time as it took to
understand what was occurring in the past 24 hours and to
decide what we were going to do in the next 24 hours.
But essentially what happened, as you've heard here
already, the outside air immediately started clearing up
dramatically. There was a steep drop in the curve. By the time
we permitted people to go back into the interior buildings, we
were very comfortable that the level of materials outside were
well below the regulatory standards.
Consequently, when the buildings were entered, they were
entered not by the occupants, but by qualified experts to
determine whether there was an air problem within the buildings
or not, and whether cleanup was required. That work was done in
each case. What we did after that is, when the public was
allowed back in, after we were comfortable with the material
that had been done and we knew the buildings had been cleaned,
the owners then permitted reoccupancy.
If any tenant had any question, they could call us, did
call us on occasion. We would come out, we would question the
results, take a look at the results of the cleanup that had
been done, and the air testing that had been done, and if we
had any questions, we did our own air testing. There were only
minimal situations where that occurred, and in each case where
it did occur, we were comfortable that the air was acceptable.
Senator Lieberman. So you're testifying that----
[Interruption from audience.]
Hold on, we'll come back to you.
You're saying that every building was tested, every
building had its indoor air tested before people were allowed
to go back in.
Dr. Miele. That's the city regulation. That's correct, sir.
[Interruption from audience.]
Senator Lieberman. We're going to come back to you. Hold on
a second.
Ms. Kenny, Congressman Nadler made some very direct and
serious challenges to the EPA, and I want your response. The
first is, that EPA Administrator Whitman misled the public on
September 18 last year, when she said she was glad to reassure
the people of New York that their air is safe to breathe and
their water is safe to drink. She made the statement without
the indoor data necessary to make such a pronouncement.
Dr. Thurston seemed at least in part to corroborate
Congressman Nadler's statement when he said that EPA gave
assurances prematurely, before there was adequate evidence to
justify them. Do you agree?
Ms. Kenny. The procedure under this kind of an emergency,
and obviously, we've never experienced this kind of emergency
before, but the Federal response plan, once the President
declares a national emergency, the Federal response plan is
what the Federal agencies follow. We basically decided as our
agencies got together, there was a mutual agreement with the
city of New York, and with the Federal agencies, what each role
would be, trying to use our resources in the best possible way,
as efficiently as possible in terms of getting people out to do
the work that needed to be done.
It was agreed that EPA would monitor and immediately began
to set up monitors. I have to say that we used the most
extensive data ever. We never had more extensive testing than
was done in this particular case. That was the statement that
was made, was basically about walking around in Lower
Manhattan. We always said that if you were a sensitive
population or if you were right on the pile, that you should
protect yourself or you should see a physician. But in terms of
what the others have testified to, the outdoor air that we were
testing was showing low- or non-detectable levels, except for a
couple of spikes which I mentioned in my testimony.
So I think that there was a lot of confusion. I think
people understandably were confused about what exactly was safe
and not. I think there is a lot of uncertainty. We never have
dealt with this kind of issue before. Don't forget, there were
seven stories of debris that people were working through at
that particular time, right after this event.
I think we just have to remember going forward who the
enemy is. The people in public service were basically trying to
do the best that they could to make the kinds of determination
to protect the public health. Obviously, we need to continue to
work together. We need to continue to work as Federal agencies,
we need to work with Congress, we need to work with the city to
determine what the next steps are and how to protect people
that are feeling unprotected and uncertain right now.
Senator Lieberman. So you would reject the criticism that
Administrator Whitman gave premature reassurance about air
quality before it was justified?
Ms. Kenny. Again, I think what I want to make sure is that
what Administrator Whitman was talking about was the outdoor
air that was based on extensive sampling, air quality
monitoring in Lower Manhattan and the boroughs, at the Fresh
Kills, all those samples that were coming in. We can show you
what we have seen, and obviously in terms of what we didn't
know when those buildings came down with those tremendous fires
and etc., we didn't know what that air would be like. After a
certain amount of testing, we saw that the levels of the
particulates that we were testing for, the asbestos, etc., they
happened, they were based on data collected using sound
science.
We always said, and I know I said it, that people right on
the pile should protect themselves, and people that are
vulnerable, that have asthma or are prone to that should see
their physicians. But in terms of that outdoor air that we were
talking about, yes.
Senator Lieberman. I'm hearing you say that while the
Administrator's comments may have been confusing, they were not
intentionally misleading.
Ms. Kenny. Absolutely. I think there was, again, I don't
know whether the comments were confusing to everyone or not. I
know that people are confused about what is healthy for them.
I'm a parent, I understand that. It's certainly something that
is not hard to imagine. It was a scary time; people were
hearing different things.
In the EPA, we did countless public meetings. We spoke to
the press every day. We were constantly saying what I've said
to you. But sometimes you can't hear this, because it really is
so terrifying. You want to know, you want to have certainty.
I have a scientist with us today from EPA who can talk
about the science. We can talk about--there are just so many
emotional issues attached to it. When we actually remember what
we're talking about, there was not a lot of immediate concern
about being at risk. We know there was a risk posed by the
events of that day.
Senator Lieberman. Let me ask one more question, and then
yield to Senator Clinton. Congressman Nadler said some very
troubling data, just in yesterday's St. Louis Post Dispatch,
about the U.S. Geological Survey, using best detection
equipment and methods, found pH levels in World Trade Center
dust that are ``as corrosive as drain cleaner'' and passed this
information along to health experts at the EPA. The argument,
the charge here is that the USGS data was not released by EPA
nor apparently were the environmental agencies' own test
results on the dust. That's a serious charge. That last quote
is not from Congressman Nadler, but from the reporter, Pulitzer
prize-winning environmental journalist, Andrew Schneider.
What is your response to that?
Ms. Kenny. Yes, again, there were, certainly it was
consistent with our findings that there was a high level of pH,
that was alkaline, that is an irritant.
Senator Lieberman. Do you agree that it's as corrosive as
drain cleaner?
Ms. Kenny. I'm sorry, I can't address that. I don't know.
But it actually does present one explanation why residents
felt the kind of irritation that they felt. It was consistent
with all the information. Our understanding was that USGS did
publish this information and it was available on their website,
etc. We didn't do that kind of sampling, because that had been
done.
Senator Lieberman. So you're saying, from your knowledge,
and I ask you to go back and speak to the folks in Washington
about this, you were not intentionally concealing this
information, it was just assumed it was already published by
the U.S. Geological Survey?
Ms. Kenny. Absolutely.
Senator Lieberman. Is that what your answer is?
Ms. Kenny. Yes, that's my answer.
Senator Lieberman. OK, Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Ms. Kenny, Congressman Nadler has sent a
letter as of January 23 to Administrator Whitman with a lot of
the questions that flow from his work and the concerns of our
constituents. Would you reassure or I guess assure this
committee that you will do your best efforts to get that letter
responded to?
Ms. Kenny. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Clinton. I think that Congressman Nadler deserves a
rapid response, and it's been some weeks since then.
With respect to the issues that Senator Lieberman was
discussing with you, I think part of the problem that we
confront is the competing information and the feeling that
somehow this information is not being made available, or that
the EPA is not providing a contrary point of view, so that
people can have an opportunity to make a judgment. That's not
only true with respect to the U.S. Geological Survey, but also
as Congressman Nadler pointed out, the Ombudsman of the EPA,
Robert Martin, who has made, as I'm sure you know, a number of
charges and challenges about the EPA's work.
I would appreciate being given a very clear explanation of
the Ombudsman's points of view and concerns with a response
from the agency, so that we can evaluate it. I know that
Congressman Nadler joins me in that request.
I think one of the issues that is just still very confusing
and frustrating, and it goes to the authority and sharing of
authority between the EPA and the DEP, and that is, the burden
that is placed on the first instance on the city to supervise
indoor air, and then in the second instance, it really devolves
onto the landlords and residents to have to do a lot of that
remediation themselves.
Commissioner, in your response, and I know we had some
vocal audience members who responded to what you said, you said
that's the city regulation. But can you sit there today and
tell us that every landlord and every building complied with
the city regulations?
Dr. Miele. No, I can't tell you that. But the reason for
that, in large measure, has been the fact that we've let people
back into the buildings, that is to clean up the buildings, and
then when we're comfortable that they've got the tests, let
people back in. One of the things we did to try and facilitate
it was to let people get back in when we were comfortable that
they had cleaned up the buildings but before they had submitted
the formal permit application to us and gotten the permits from
us. Same reason why we tried to expedite the licensing of
personnel who could be qualified to do the cleanup.
We were overwhelmed, obviously, by the amount of area and
square footage that we obviously had to deal with. We had to
come up with some methodology to do that. We have the addresses
for each of those buildings, and anyone who has a question or
an inquiry as to whether their building was in fact cleaned up
could certainly get in touch with our agency and we'd be very
pleased to provide them with the information. Obviously, if
anyone fell through the crack, we certainly want to get at that
and find out how that happened and see that it is corrected.
Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Commissioner. One of
the recommendations that I've made is that we work together on
an indoor air quality task force. Because I do think that
residents and people who work downtown deserve accurate
information. Given the overwhelming nature of the demands that
were placed on your department, the fact that I think you very
forthrightly have said, you're a sewer and water department
primarily, so we may need to look not only at what was done but
what could be done. I think that residents and others need to
be sure to get that information.
What number would people call to have their building
checked?
Dr. Miele. They can call 718-DEP-HELP.
Senator Clinton. Seven one eight, DEP-HELP?
Dr. Miele. DEP-HELP, that's our help line. If they have any
difficulty with that whatsoever, they can call my office. My
office is 718-595-6565. We'll direct them down to air resources
and they'll take care of the problem.
Senator Clinton. I think you're going to have some calls,
Commissioner.
Dr. Miele. That's fine. That's what we've been encouraging.
We also have a website, and you can get to us at the website,
also.
Senator Clinton. What's that website?
Dr. Miele. That website is NYC.gov/dep.
Senator Clinton. OK.
The last question that I have, because I know we're going
to need to followup with both EPA, the city and the State. But
I just wanted to direct the last question to Ms. Jackson with
FEMA. You know, when I look at the numbers of requests that
came in for assistance and those that were deemed ineligible,
it seems like quite a high proportion were denied. I know that
in the Senate, the Small Business Administration Committee
chaired by Senator John Kerry has been concerned and
complaining that it didn't appear that SBA had acted with the
same kind of dispatch or results as we saw in other disasters.
What I would like as part of the hearing record, Ms.
Jackson, if we could get some comparative figures. Because just
the figures we've gotten so far and the complaints that my
office receives suggests that perhaps we're not getting the
same kind of eligibility numbers in the wake of this disaster
as we have in others. I would very much like to get that
information.
Do you have an immediate response to that?
Ms. Jackson. We would be delighted to provide it for you,
Senator. We've been urging people to call the FEMA 800 tele-
registration number. Many of them are calling, over 59,000 have
called to date. Some of them who are calling get referred to
other programs, based on what they tell us, they're referred to
disaster unemployment assistance or the regular State
unemployment assistance. It depends on what all their
requirements are at that time.
The Small Business Administration is a sister agency. We
work with them on disasters all the time. They are very, very
fast. They got here quickly, they set up sites in Chinatown.
But I will be happy to provide you with that followup
information.
Senator Clinton. I thank the panel, and I know that we've
got many other questions. I hope we're going to be able to have
a followup hearing based on what we've learned today and when
we evaluate the additional information we've received. I
appreciate very much Senator Lieberman's attention to these
issues.
I think we do need some changes in the Stafford Act. I
think we do need some changes in the way we address these
disasters. I don't think it's appropriate to put the burden so
completely on residents and owners as we have, since it raises
public health issues that affect people more generally. So I'd
like to work with you, Senator Lieberman, on these issues.
Senator Lieberman. Senator Clinton, I think you're right on
target. I must say that this was obviously an unprecedented
event. The city and the various emergency response efforts seem
to me to have been extraordinarily well coordinated. There were
some practice, if you will, done under Federal programs earlier
on. I'm not convinced that the environmental response was as
well coordinated to this unprecedented experience as the rest.
I think we've got an obligation to work with you, Federal,
State and local agencies, to make sure if, God forbid, this
ever happens again anywhere, that we have the same level of
coordination and that it is long term, it is immediate but it
is also long term because of the health consequences. We're not
organized here to have a lot of questions from the audience. I
think Senator Clinton got at one of the questions broadly that
concerned folks. I've got another that I'm going to ask you,
Commissioner Miele.
But I would invite people who are concerned and feel we
haven't answered the questions, submit them to Senator Clinton
and me. We'll put them to the witnesses and ask for their
responses in writing, which will become part of the record.
Here's the final question, which did come from somebody who
is here, a resident, I presume. Why did the DEP accept
landlords' claims that there was no asbestos present when
aggressive air monitoring was not performed and some of the
independent tests done by tenants in fact did show asbestos?
Dr. Miele. Well, that's an individual decision. But the
bottom line is that if there was any break-in or entry,
fracture of glass, open doors or what have you, then there's
undoubtedly dust throughout the building. If there was dust
throughout the building, the owner had to hire someone to
evaluate that who was competent and professional, and he had to
hire a certified cleanup team.
The bottom line is that if there was a building that was
closed that did not get anything in it, it's conceivable that
if an air monitoring professional came down and tested the air,
and found nothing in the air, the owner may not have had to do
any abatement. I can't conceive of that happening. But it's
conceivable.
Senator Lieberman. OK. We will welcome other questions in
writing. We will submit them to you. We're going to keep the
record of the hearing open for 3 weeks and ask for your
cooperation in responding.
For now, I thank you for your testimony, which helps us to
do better the next time around.
The committee will stand in recess for 10 minutes, and then
we'll come back to the fourth panel.
[Recess.]
Senator Clinton [assuming the chair]. We're going to
reconvene the hearing. We have a very important panel with a
lot of viewpoints and concerns that we haven't heard from yet.
I want to thank all of the witnesses for coming. I want to
reiterate my request that if you have specific questions,
concerns, statements, that you would like to submit from the
audience, from a group you represent, on behalf of yourself,
please, we'll leave the record of this hearing open for 3
weeks. I believe we've given information about how people can
get that to us.
If you submit questions, you may e-mail them to the
committee clerk at Duane--[email protected].
The record of this hearing will be published and available to
the public at http://www.senate.gov, at the link to the
Committee on the Environment and Public Works. We will keep it
open, the hearing record, until February 25, 2002.
I am delighted to see a lot of my friends and colleagues
here on this panel who have a very specific perspective that I
want to be sure to be in the record and to be publicly
recognized. Because it's such a large panel, we're going to try
to keep everybody to the time limit of 3 minutes, give or take
a little bit of time, so that everybody will have a chance to
be heard.
Our first witness will be Mr. Tom Scotto, president of the
Detectives Endowment Association.
Mr. Scotto.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. SCOTTO, PRESIDENT, DETECTIVES ENDOWMENT
ASSOCIATION, INC., NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Scotto. Thank you, Senator.
Based upon some of the remarks I've seen here this morning,
and in the press conference, I think it would be wise for this
committee to just focus on doing what is beneficial for
everyone, and not look at the finger pointing and accusations.
As a result of what happened on September 11th, I witnessed
people from all over this country coming together and putting
their best foot forward to make things work. Whether there were
some shortcomings or not that eventually developed from their
efforts, I'm sure they were all well intended.
Having said that, on behalf of myself and the members of
the New York City Police Department, I wish to express our
appreciation to this committee for affording us the opportunity
to express our concerns regarding the aftermath of the tragic
events of September 11th. Since that date, members of the New
York City Police Department have worked around the clock at the
World Trade Center and the Staten Island Landfill.
As such, they have been exposed to a number of identifiable
toxic substances and perhaps hundreds of other combinations of
these toxins that may never be identified, and the long-term
health effects of which are still unknown.
The major concerns of police officers can be grouped into
four categories. No. 1, the development of a uniform procedure
to provide physical exams over an extended period of time to
monitor the overall effects of their exposure to the elements
at Ground Zero and Staten Island Landfill. No. 2, assuring
essential and required medical treatment within the basic
health coverage provided by the city.
No. 3, in recognition of the fact that many of the
illnesses which result from contact with toxic substances can
take in excess of 10 years to appear, we should revise the
current pension provisions to protect the families of those who
retire and then may suffer a disability and/or terminal illness
as a result of their exposure to Ground Zero and the Staten
Island Landfill environment. No. 4, revise the current legal
requirements which impose an unrealistic time limit on one's
ability to commence an action against the city.
Those are highlighted as pinpoints, and if I may just take
the liberty just to explain them a little briefly, not from my
written statement, but right from the heart. I was so pleased
to hear Dr. Kelly testify before that the fire department has
implemented a procedure from day one to monitor the results of
physical exams over an extended period of time. Unfortunately,
I'm also saddened to inform this committee that no such
procedure exists in the New York City Police Department.
First, so disturbed were we, meaning, when I say we, the
five police presidents, that we called a meeting last week and
out of our own money, the union dues, we put up $85,000 as seed
money to implement the program to start a similar procedure
within the New York City Police Department, which does not
exist today. So I would hope perhaps as a result of the
testimony today, maybe the mayor or someone within the city
agencies will look at this and say, we were unaware of the fact
that no such procedure existed in the police department, and
commence one immediately. It should not be at the cost factor
of the members of the union.
Second, when I said assuring essential required medical
treatment within the basic health coverage provided by the
city, many of these ailments that occur as a result of being
exposed to toxics require special and specific type of
treatment and exams. Most of this type of treatment and exams
are not covered by the basic health packages provided by the
city of New York. Therefore, I think it's essential that we
take a very close look at that, and say if there is any
illnesses that are directly related to their exposures that
this type of coverage should be provided by either the State or
the Federal Government.
Third, in recognition of the fact that many of these
illnesses result from, you know, 10 years from now, many of the
members of the police department are retiring this year for a
number of reasons, a large amount are. Therefore, the way the
current pension rules are designed, if you do not have that
ailment on the day of your retirement, and subsequently, you
develop an illness, well, you cannot come back to the pension
system and get a modification to the payment.
I think there's going to be a desperate need for police,
fire and other city employees to have some sort of legislation
designed that would protect their families in the event that
they develop a disability and/or a fatal death, perhaps, even,
as an exposure, so that their families can be protected.
Fourth, under the current laws, you have up to 90 days in
which to file a suit against the city, or 90 days from the time
the ailment surfaces. If you fail to do so, then your timeframe
to take such an action against the city of New York is now over
with. So I think that again, although we're talking about air
quality here, these are some of the hybrids that come off of
this issue that we're talking about that I think are major
concerns to the members of the police department, and I'm sure
to the fire department and other city employees.
So to try and stay within the timeframe allotted me, I'll
just say thank you to the committee and hope that we have the
opportunity to address these issues.
Senator Clinton. Thank you so much, Mr. Scotto. I think
that your ideas are very good ones, and we'll certainly be sure
that both the city and the State representatives get those
specific recommendations.
Our next witness is Mr. Edward Malloy, the president of the
Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York.
Thank you for joining us, Mr. Malloy.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. MALLOY, PRESIDENT, BUILDING AND
CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW YORK
Mr. Malloy. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, nearly every
unionized construction project in New York City shut down as
workers rushed to Ground Zero. In the early days of this
tragedy, it is estimated that more than 10,000 of our members
volunteered their skills on the site. In the ensuing weeks and
months since, when the city of New York's Department of Design
and Construction assigned recovery and cleanup responsibilities
to a team of the area's most respected contractors,
approximately 2,000 of our members per day were employed in two
around-the-clock shifts of 12 hours. Today, as this recovery
and cleanup effort moves toward conclusion, several hundred of
our members remain on the job.
In testifying before the subcommittee this morning, we
would like to draw your attention to two areas of interest and
concern. The first is the area of measurable safety and health
data and the partnership between labor, management, and
government which has produced rather impressive results in this
regard. The second is the less certain issue of how we address
safety and health exposures which are not as easily detectable
as common bumps and bruises.
On November 20, 2001, the Building and Construction Trades
Council, the Employers Association, OSHA, and other public and
private entities working at Ground Zero implemented a safety
and health partnership agreement on the site. A copy of this
agreement is attached to our testimony for your consideration.
Let me share with you what we consider an exceptional report.
The results of this partnership and other cooperative efforts
are encouraging. With more than 2 million hours of labor
completed, there have been 96 claims for workers's compensation
reported. Of these claims, 13 have resulted in lost time due to
injury or illness. No deaths or life-threatening injuries have
occurred. All experts with whom we have consulted advise that
the number of injuries and illnesses, as well as their relative
severity, are well below what might have been expected.
It is our intention as an industry, with both a
continuation and expansion of the commitment to safety and
health, that this record be maintained and improved.
The second matter of concern pertains to the need for
clinical medical services to be made available to every
individual, whether they resided, volunteered, or were employed
at Ground Zero or in the nearby vicinity, particularly in the
earliest days of this tragedy when it would seem that the
potential for exposures to contaminants was at its highest. We
appreciate Senator Clinton's efforts to secure $12 million for
this purpose and submit to the subcommittee that additional
funding must be provided to assure that every individual whose
health has potentially been adversely affected by activities at
or near Ground Zero be available to receive clinical medical
services.
Madam Chairperson, members of the subcommittee, the losses
and devastation caused by the events of September 11th are
well-known. It is imperative that every effort be made to
assure that no further unnecessary and preventable tragedies
result, whether 10 days or 10 years from now. The provision of
funding to make clinical medical services available to all
individuals who need them is among the most important work that
we believe the Federal Government can undertake going forward.
We do not hesitate to argue that it is a particular moral
obligation to assure that those men and women who responded so
selflessly and even heroically to the events of September 11th
receive every possible consideration for their well-being that
can be offered.
We will be pleased to cooperate with you in every way to
achieve this goal. Thank you.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Malloy. I think
that the members you represent from all the building and
construction trades really deserve our thanks and gratitude,
not only for what they did in the immediate aftermath, but the
extraordinary way that the cleanup has proceeded, ahead of
time, below budget, and I hope you'll convey that on behalf of
all of us.
Our next witness is Dr. Stephen Levin, medical director,
Mount Sinai, the Irving J. Selikoff Occupational Health
Clinical Center. We look forward to your testimony, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LEVIN, M.D., MEDICAL DIRECTOR, IRVING
J. SELIKOFF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH CLINICAL CENTER, MOUNT SINAI
MEDICAL CENTER
Dr. Levin. Thank you. Senator Clinton, I'm happy to be here
today to talk about the health impacts of the attack on the
World Trade Center, our understanding of the short-term and
longer-range risks to health and a perspective on what needs to
be put into place to meet the needs of the thousands of workers
and volunteers who played a role in the response to that
disaster.
Our center is funded by the New York State Department of
Health, and it's part of a statewide network of occupational
medicine clinics that was established by the State legislature
to examine and treat workers who have developed illness or
injury caused by their exposures at work. We have an explicit
mission, and that is to find ways to prevent occupational
illness by reducing exposures or by detecting and treating such
diseases as quickly as possible once exposure has occurred.
That, I think, applies to the circumstances we're dealing with
today.
Since September 11th, we have examined more than 250 men
and women who worked or volunteered at or near Ground Zero.
Most of these individuals came to us because they had
respiratory symptoms that developed after their exposures
there. This very weekend, Saturday and Sunday, we saw over 100
iron workers who had responded during the first few days after
the attack, and we learned a great deal this weekend that
confirmed our clinical impressions from seeing individual
patients over the past several months.
We have long experience in our Center with the health
consequences of exposures in the construction environment. As
Ed Malloy knows, we've been working with the building trades
and employers for a long time. As a result of that experience,
we were able, therefore, to predict, unfortunately all too
accurately, what health risks were posed by the exposures at
and near Ground Zero. That's in exposures to the wide range of
airborne irritants present in the smoke and dust caused by the
fires and the collapse of the towers, which has been reviewed
earlier today by Dr. Thurston and others.
As with most cases of illness caused by environmental
agents, the likelihood of developing illness and the severity
of that illness depend largely on dose, how much exposure has
occurred. What I want to talk about today what we have observed
among adults who were exposed at the World Trade Center site.
My colleague and department chair, Dr. Phil Landrigan, will
talk shortly about the risks to children.
Among the people who fled the buildings, the firefighters,
police, and emergency medical techs and the ordinary citizens
who tried to help after the planes hit the towers, many were
caught in the huge, dense cloud of dust and combustion gases
released by the collapse of the buildings. Those people had
some of the worst exposures that occurred. They inhaled high
concentrations of smoke and dust. Following that grouping,
which had the worst of exposures, are those who came to the
Ground Zero in the days immediately area after the collapse,
the first days and weeks after September 11th, who performed
rescue and recovery work or to were involved in restoration of
essential services there. They also had heavy exposures. They
were selfless and heroic, often, in what did what they could in
the effort to save lives.
The thousands of construction and support workers who have
been involved in the removal of debris from the site, as
recovery efforts have been ongoing, often working 12 hour days,
sometimes 6 and 7 days a week, also have had all too frequent
exposures to the dusts and gases which until recent weeks were
a constant feature of the site. We were concerned early on, and
I mean within 24 hours, that these exposures would cause
respiratory tract difficulties, and that is, in fact, what we
have seen clinically. Problems range from persistent sinusitis,
laryngitis, bronchitis, and among some, the first attacks of
asthma they have ever experienced in their lives.
These problems have been especially severe, as has been
pointed out earlier today, among those who had respiratory
problems before September 11th. Many have noticed a marked
worsening of their pre-existing sinus problems or breathing
difficulties.
But what is perhaps most striking is the occurrence of
respiratory problems, chest tightness, cough, shortness of
breath, wheezing, among individuals who were in excellent
physical condition before the attack on the World Trade Center.
Firefighters are an example, ironworkers and other
constructions are similar examples. The experience of our
patients parallels that of the firefighters who have been
evaluated by Dr. Kelly and Dr. Prezant, that we've heard about
already today. High rates of respiratory illness have been
found among those firefighters, and it's our impression,
especially after this weekend's experience, that we're going to
see comparable rates of respiratory difficulties among
construction workers and others who were at or close to Ground
Zero, especially early on after September 11th.
Some of our patients, once they are away from Lower
Manhattan, have noticed a general improvement in their
symptoms, but find that exposure to cigarette smoke, to vehicle
exhaust, to cleaning solutions, to perfumes or other airborne
irritants that their symptoms are being provoked. They're
having reoccurrence of their symptoms, in these other settings
where irritants are present. None of them had such experience
prior to September 11th.
Now, not all who were part of the effort at or near Ground
Zero developed these persistent respiratory problems. Some are
more susceptible than others. The trouble is that we can't
predict who the susceptibles are. It's something we recognize
after the fact. It's very important for all individuals who
have been affected this way that you prevent further exposure
to irritants. But treatment with appropriate medications has to
be instituted as quickly as possible, to prevent these
conditions from becoming lifelong, disabling illnesses.
I want to make one comment, there's been a tendency to
ascribe to short-term problems the irritant reactions. To think
of long-term health consequences as only those who have to do
with asbestos and potential 20-year later cancer incidents.
Well, I can tell you that there will be individuals, especially
if they're not treated adequately, who will have developed
asthma as a consequence of these exposures which we are here,
until now calling them short-term reactions, who will have
asthma for the rest of their lives, especially if they are not
treated early. That's the importance of the kind of
surveillance program that's been discussed here.
In the past couple of months, and I think what I'm going to
say relates more to the issues of concern expressed so far
today. We have seen similar respiratory problems emerging among
some of the office workers who have returned to buildings
situated in the immediate periphery of Ground Zero, especially
those located downwind from the debris pile and the fires that
were actively burning until December. For most, these symptoms
of eye, nose, throat, and chest irritation are transient and
they're not of serious concern. That's for most people.
We have patients with new onset asthma since they returned
to work in nearby buildings, people who were never previously
asthmatic who now have this condition. They were not at Ground
Zero. They were four and five blocks downwind of Ground Zero,
but experienced some of the same problems. Most of our patients
note that now that the fires are out, their symptoms are
improving. That's an encouraging fact. There are some who
remain very provokable as time goes on.
I want to talk about one other clinical feature that
surprised us in its frequency and intensity, even though we
predicted that we would have some of these problems, and that's
the psychological distress that occurred especially among the
early responders. Many of our patients came to us for
respiratory problems, but a brief questioning also elicited
reports of persistent flashbacks of images and sounds of human
trauma and horror they had witnessed, especially early on.
Police officers, construction workers, and others have had
sleep difficulties, depression or irritability, and many had
difficulty controlling their tears when they described this or
whenever they were reminded of what this, and in New York City,
there are constant reminders of this.
The group debriefing sessions that many participated in
were simply insufficient to help some of these individuals
resolve these difficulties and the effects of their experience
on their emotional well-being and the need for a well developed
program to treat such individuals, I think, is clear. Among
these tough ironworkers that we saw this weekend, I'd say one
out of three were still experiencing significant impairments to
their psychological well-being. It was really quite striking
and surprising.
I want to address the issue of asbestos exposure at and
near Ground Zero, because it been such a constant feature of
discussion. We know that asbestos is in the debris pile,
there's no mistaking that, and we know that it's in settled
dust inside and on the outside of buildings. We know that
that's so. Fortunately, the data indicate that asbestos
concentrations in the outside air suggests that there really
will not be much of a problem as a consequence of walking down
the street near it. That's comforting.
For those who work at Ground Zero itself, respiratory
protection is the key. The kind of respiratory protection
that's been suggested early on from within 48 hours of the time
of the attack, this is the appropriate thing. The problem is
that compliance out there on the site can hardly be described
as universal. That remains something of an issue.
There is a group at special group risk for asbestos-related
disease that hasn't been talked about today: the workers who
are involved in the in cleanup of the buildings, the offices
and residential spaces near the site. For an individual
household resident or office occupant who cleans his or her own
space, surely it should be done correctly, but even if it's
done incorrectly, the likelihood of significant risk for
asbestos-related disease is low. We know that from looking at
occupational groups, the construction workers that have been
working a lifetime with this material. The risks are very low
for an individual apartment owner who does it, even wrong.
Although by no means should that be encouraged, and surely we
can prevent those exposures.
Those individuals who are involved in doing the cleanup
work day in and day out, perhaps for months, are at genuinely
significant risk. These are unprotected workers. Many of them
have been hired off the street, they're not unionized workers,
they're often not English speaking, and they are among the most
vulnerable of workers, that they should have been permitted to
be exposed to asbestos dust in this fashion is a public health
failure. Unfortunately, the information we have is that it's
ongoing.
Now, let me finish by saying that from our perspective,
from our own clinical experience, the experience of the
firefighters that have been so well studied, the information
points clearly to the need for developing medical surveillance
programs for everyone who placed himself or herself at risk in
the course of their efforts, whether as employed workers or
volunteers. A registry has to be established. It's quite clear,
everyone agrees that that's so.
Medical examinations to identify persistent respiratory,
musculoskeletal, and psychological conditions should be made
available to all who were there. Treatment should be initiated
where findings warrant it. There's been a lot of talk about the
need for ongoing research and surveillance for research
purposes. We know of workers who now 5 months after the episode
have still not been adequately evaluated and are still not
receiving adequate treatment. We learned that from the
ironworkers that we saw this weekend, 5 months after their
exposure. It's key that they be identified and treated as
rapidly as possible. Because the longer you delay treatment,
the less effective treatment is, and the more likely you're
going to wind up with long-term consequences.
If resources are made available, a consortium of medical
institutions under the guidance of occupational and
environmental medicine expertise can be established, working in
coordination with the appropriate Government agencies, to
provide these evaluations and treatment programs. I am
confident that we would receive full cooperation from relevant
employers and labor organizations to facilitate the development
of the registry and the clinical surveillance program itself.
As others have said before, the many workers and volunteers who
have given so much of themselves deserve no less. Surely, the
sort of program that the firefighters have been able to
establish is the sort of thing that's appropriate for many
others.
So I thank you, and I will be pleased to answer questions.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very, very much, Doctor. I think
that your insight and expertise is something we're going to be
relying on as we move forward. Perhaps after the hearing, you
and Mr. Scotto can talk about ideas you might have. Because I'm
concerned by what he's reported with respect to the police
officers. We look to you to give us some guidance.
Our next witness is Ms. Christodoulou, who is the president
of the Stuyvesant High School Parents' Association, and we
welcome you here.
STATEMENT OF MARILENA CHRISTODOULOU, PRESIDENT, STUYVESANT HIGH
SCHOOL PARENTS' ASSOCIATION
Ms. Christodoulou. Thank you. On behalf of the 6,000
parents at Stuyvesant High School, thank you for holding this
hearing on a matter of great concern to our community.
Stuyvesant is located four blocks from the World Trade
Center. The 3,000 students and 200 staff members were evacuated
in the middle of a cloud of toxic dust and debris as the second
tower was collapsing. The Board of Education reopened the
school on October 9. Unfortunately, environmental conditions in
and around the school continue to pose a potential threat to
our children.
I am not a scientist, I am not a doctor. I am a parent, and
the president of the Parents' Association. Having listened to
respected experts for the last 5 months, our conclusion is that
the environmental safety of Lower Manhattan is still very much
in debate. While this debate is going on, our children are
getting sick. Our experience since returning to school has been
and continues to be problematic. As the inside of the school
tested positive for asbestos, the Board of Education conducted
an asbestos abatement prior to reoccupancy, and agreed to
undertake environmental sampling inside and outside the school.
The excavation operations at Ground Zero continue to release a
variety of contaminants into the air. Several hundred trucks a
day carry the pulverized debris and steel beams coated with
asbestos from Ground Zero to a barge which is located right
next to our school. It's less than 100 feet north of our
school. This is the main debris removal from Ground Zero.
In addition to whatever the composition of the debris is,
which is dumped right next to our school and in the middle of
the community, diesel emissions from the many trucks and cranes
at the barge are a source of additional contaminants. That
makes it extremely important to take preventive measures to
prevent these contaminants from entering the school.
Unfortunately, this has not happened. Results from
environmental sampling conducted by the Board of Education
demonstrates that on more than 50 percent of the days, from
October 9 when our children returned to school to February 1,
measurements of respirable particulate mater, the
PM2.5, inside the school have exceeded EPA
guidelines for children. These particulates may pose a greater
danger because they contain a mixture of toxins. Levels of lead
dust in excess of regulatory limits were found inside
Stuyvesant on several occasions as recently as last Thursday.
To date, the Board of Education has failed to take adequate
measures to protect our children. It still has not cleaned the
ductwork of the ventilation system. After months of stalling,
it upgraded the filters of the ventilation system at the end of
January, after our children had been in the school since
October 9. You may hear from the speakers who follow me that
conditions at Stuyvesant have stabilized. There is no evidence
to support this conclusion, because the environmental quality
outside the school is unpredictable.
Also, in accordance with two independent environmental
engineers, working with the Parents' Association, the upgrades
to the ventilation system that the Board of Education has
conducted are inadequate.
The barge operation is a main source of contaminants. The
PA's environmental engineer has measured and compared airborne
concentrations of particulate matter at or near Ground Zero and
at the north side of Stuyvesant by the barge, and has
consistently found particulate matter to be higher at
Stuyvesant than at Ground Zero. On several occasions, the EPA
notified us that it had monitored high levels of certain
contaminants, which I'm going to attempt to pronounce----
Senator Clinton. You can just add that to the record.
Ms. Christodoulou. OK, fine. At its monitoring station
between the school and the barge. Carting of the Ground Zero
debris material to the barge constitutes an unacceptable risk
to our children and to the surrounding community along the
truck route. Within two blocks from the barge operation, there
are 4,500 school children, some as young as 4 years old. Of
course, it's in the middle of a residential community.
We are in the unique position to observe this operation,
and we can report to you that despite assurances from
Government officials, the trucks are not always adequately
covered. On cold days, the debris cannot be hosed down to
prevent the release of dust. The levels of visible dust in the
air and on the pavement are high. Diesel emissions from the
trucks and the cranes are high.
This morning, you heard Mr. Johnson of the Department of
Environmental Conservation testify that they are looking to
install particulate traps and low sulfur fuel for the trucks. I
have met with Mr. Johnson and with Ms. Wills, the chairwoman of
Community Board One at the barge in early December, 2 months
ago. We were talking about the same measures 2 months ago. I'm
very disturbed that we're still talking about it. We need
action. If the reason that action is not provided is a lack of
funding, some agency, FEMA, whoever it is, should step in and
provide this funding. We cannot just talk about things and not
have action.
To date, Government agencies have been unwilling to either
relocate the barge to a less damaging site or to take effective
measures to protect the community. Since the return to school
on October 9, a number of students and faculty have reported
and exhibited clinically diagnosable symptoms of illness. Many
parents report that their children have experienced unusual
rashes, nosebleeds, coughing attacks, and chronic sinus and
respiratory problems. Parents have reported to us several
emergency room visits.
Despite what you may hear from the speakers that follow me,
no epidemiological study of the students has been conducted. I
can say this with full confidence, because parents have not
been asked for their written consent, which is required in
order to conduct a study on minors. Also, there has been no
study or interviews of parents or students. The incidence of
student illness cannot be adequately characterized based only
on attendance rates and visits to the school nurse's office.
In conclusion, these developments call into question any
unequivocal assurances from Government agencies, including the
EPA and the Board of Education, about the health and safety of
our children.
Regarding what courses of action should be implemented to
protect environmental quality and public health, I have a whole
list. They're in the record. I want to focus on two. First, the
truck and barge operation right next to the school should be
relocated to an area where there is less residential and
educational impact. The Government should assume responsibility
for implementing a centralized and coordinated effort to
monitor and track incidence of illness. A central registry of
all residents, workers, and students who have been exposed to
contaminants as a result of the September 11th attacks should
be established.
The student population at Stuyvesant is very diverse. Many
of our students come from first and second generation non-
English speaking immigrant families. We are concerned that many
of these families do not have the wherewithal to seek early
medical care. Dr. Stephen Levin has advised us that early
detection and treatment of respiratory illness is critical in
terms of preventing such illness from becoming chronic. I would
like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Levin for his help
during this period.
The Government should assume responsibility, therefore, for
early detection and medical treatment of illness related to the
World Trade Center disaster. I will also go a step further. In
my opinion, a dedicated fund should be established to pay for
medical costs associated with any future health problems of
registered individuals.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
I think we've got some Stuyvesant family members here,
which I'm very glad to have. I think your points are very well
made. Residents, too. I know. Well, we've heard a lot from the
residents. I thought we'd give a plug to Stuyvesant. We're glad
to have all of you here.
Our next witness speaks from a different but related
perspective, as a second grade teacher at PS 89. Everything
that we've just heard about concerns affecting the high school
students and teachers at Stuyvesant is certainly very much in
the minds of all of us when it comes to the elementary school
students. So I'm very pleased that Julie Hiraga would be here
to speak on behalf of the students and teachers at PS 89.
STATEMENT OF JULIE HIRAGA, TEACHER, PS 89, MANHATTAN;
ACCOMPANIED BY: RANDI WEINGARTEN, PRESIDENT, UNITED FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS
Ms. Hiraga. Thank you. Good afternoon, Senator Clinton and
members of the committee. I am pleased to be here with Randi
Weingarten, president of the United Federation of Teachers.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the health issues
that concern those of us who live and work in Lower Manhattan.
The brutal attack on the World Trade Center on September
11th was a trauma we are all still learning to overcome, but
slowly we are trying to return to our normal routine, and
that's what the teachers at PS 89 want. We are scheduled to go
back to our home school on February 28th, and although there's
a lot of excitement and optimism, there's also some anxiety
about safety. Teachers are concerned about having to keep
windows closed and not having an outdoor play space for the
children.
Also, the school is on the truck route for debris removal.
These huge trucks emit diesel fumes and their cargo throws a
lot of dust in the air. Teachers are worried about the long-
term impact on their health and that of our students, and we
wonder if symptoms may not emerge for some time.
At PS 89, parents' environmental concerns have affected
enrollment. Some families have moved. Others have withdrawn
their children, and now we have only half as many students as
before September 11th. Sadly, we hear that parents of up to 30
more students intend to enroll them elsewhere, rather than
return to our home school at Ground Zero.
As for teachers, having our union as a watchdog has helped
allay some of those fears. For example, the UFT's two
industrial hygienists and its consulting physician made
presentations to our staff and answered all of our questions.
They and other union representatives explained what was being
done to control the dust, such as watering down the trucks, and
installing mats under all exterior school doors to hinder dust
seepage. They helped our school get a more efficient filtration
system and a HEPA vacuum for our custodial staff. They even
sent us snacks and paper towels, which was a real morale boost
when we needed it.
We've seen what happened as other schools reopened.
Stuyvesant High School was the first on October 9. After some
of its staff and students complained of respiratory problems,
the UFT asked the Federal Government to step in. As a result,
on January 29, the National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health began surveying Stuyvesant staff to compare their
symptoms with those at a high school away from the affected
area. We saw that the union's experts were not content with
acceptable facts and figures alone. They conducted onsite
visual inspections to make sure that all the affected schools
were properly cleaned and prepared for reoccupancy. When they
spotted potential hazards, they forced the city to delay the
move until it cleaned them spotless.
So to sum up, we have lingering concerns about our
students' psychological and educational welfare, as well as
parental reactions. All of us at PS 89 have had concerns about
air quality and other health hazards since September 11th.
However, the independent monitoring and involvement of the
UFT's health and safety experts has helped to reassure us.
Thank you.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
We'll now hear from Mr. Bernard Orlan, the director of
Environmental Health and Safety, New York City Board of
Education. Mr. Orlan, obviously the concerns that were
expressed about Stuyvesant and about PS 89 and about all of the
schools in the affected area are ones that I hope you will
address in your testimony.
STATEMENT OF BERNARD ORLAN, DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
AND SAFETY, NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION
Mr. Orlan. Good afternoon, Senator Clinton. I am happy to
appear here today on behalf of Chancellor Harold O. Levy and
the New York City Board of Education. We appreciate the
opportunity to speak about how the events of September 11th
have affected public schools in the area of the World Trade
Center.
I am Bernard Orlan and I am the director of Environmental
Health and Safety for the New York City Board of Education. As
you are aware, as of September 11th, we were forced to evacuate
a number of schools in the downtown area. While it has been
noted numerous times, it is worth pointing out once again that
this evacuation was accomplished without a single injury,
either to a teacher or to a child. Teachers and other staff
kept their charges safe. Indeed throughout the entire system,
teachers, principals, assistant principals and support staff
worked tirelessly to get children home safely and in the
aftermath of that day have helped our students get back to the
business of learning.
In the days following the disaster, many of our school
buildings were used by various emergency agencies including
FEMA, the city's Office of Emergency Management for rescue and
ultimately, recovery operations. Other school facilities were
used by the Red Cross as emergency shelters. Once permission
was granted by the city to normalize activity from the 14th
Street area to the Canal Street area and areas east of
Broadway, schools in this area were tested for various
contaminants, for particulate dust, for carbon monoxide, for
asbestos and a host of others. We compared it to the air
quality and established baseline levels that exist.
Unfortunately, there are not very many guidelines out there
that pertain to children of school age. Asbestos happens to be
one, and dust particulate happens to be another. That's why I
wholeheartedly agree with the other speakers that have
discussed the registry and the need to take advantage of this
situation. Hopefully, we'll never have to utilize this
experience. But since we have survived at this particular
point, it's incumbent upon us to use this as a laboratory, so
that we know that our children have been safeguarded in the
future against anything they may have been exposed to.
The results of these tests and other tests that were taken
in conjunction with various health agencies verified that the
buildings were safe for children and staff to return. This left
us south of Canal Street and west of Broadway seven schools
that were contained in six separate buildings that could not
immediately be reoccupied. They included two high schools south
of the Trade Center area, they included one high school north
of the Trade Center area, Stuyvesant High School, an
intermediate school and two primary schools.
Four of these schools were actually being used at the time
by emergency workers, by Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, by FEMA, by various other and agencies as staging areas
for the various rescue and recovery operations that were taking
place. Once these buildings were turned back to the
jurisdiction of the Board of Education, we began exhaustive
environmental testing, both inside and outside the buildings.
First, of course, would have been to test for asbestos. We used
the most sensitive testing available. We went directly to the
Transmission Electron Microscopy, because we are a school, we
have to follow the most sensitive, exacting, AHERA guidelines.
We had to take that step beyond what the EPA would have
required normally in a residence. But we had to go to the EPA
AHERA guidelines.
In some instances, we did find elevated levels of asbestos,
in others, we did not. Nevertheless, a decision was made to
clean these buildings from top to bottom by AHERA certified
asbestos abatement handlers that are State certified by the
State Department of Labor, that are certified by EPA. Even in
those situations where we did not encounter asbestos, the mind
set of these workers that knew how to operate a HEPA vacuum,
that knew how to wet wipe, that handled minute amounts of
contamination, were very important to us. So although in
hindsight we may not have needed to have these handlers used
throughout all the buildings, nevertheless, it was a decision
made and it is a decision we still stand by to make sure the
buildings were cleaned as best they could be at that time.
As the buildings were turned over to us to be allowed to
reoccupy for our occupation, for education and for other
activities that took place in the schools, we conducted a
battery of tests. These included testing for dioxins and PCBs,
asbestos, particulates, various metals, cyanides, various air
contaminants. Prior to the reoccupancy, we received acceptable
levels of all these contaminants. In addition, we worked
together with the United Federation of Teachers
environmentalists, the various health agencies that were
involved, and the Parents' Association consultant to develop
various tests that would give that feeling of comfort as we
moved along, as we go further from the actual September 11th
event. There were various tests that were conducted, again
daily for asbestos. At Stuyvesant High School we sampled,
continued to sample 21 times each day for asbestos, both inside
and outside the building, around the building, on top of the
building, close to the fresh air intakes, near the barge of the
building. We'd take close to 100 samples of particulate air on
instantaneous measure at these schools.
We continue to do these either on a daily or weekly basis,
depending on the necessity of the tests and based on the
previous results that have been found. For example, metals and
dioxin are done once a week. At this point, there are only two
schools that have not been reoccupied, one would be PS 89, that
shares a building with IS 89, and the school downtown, the High
School for Economics and Finance. When they are ultimately
going to return, which should be in a few weeks, they will
follow a three-pronged approach that we've had with our other
schools. Namely, when they do go in, the environmental
monitoring must continue, that the environmental situation in
the building in terms of the heating and ventilation system,
must be inspected, enhanced when available, so that we can trap
the smaller particles of air that many in the scientific
community feel may be hazardous to the occupants of the
building.
In addition, we have barrier mats to avoid having people
entering the building as being a vehicle for bringing in new
contamination. These mats have to be laundered periodically so
that they cannot bring anything else into the building from the
surrounding areas. In addition, there are medical and metal
hygiene staff located at each of our schools to assist and
document as necessary in all of our schools. They will be there
for the next period of time.
Basically in conclusion, we have done everything we can do
to ensure that our students are learning and our teachers can
teach and they can do so in a clean and secure environment. We
will continue to monitor their environment for those issues
that we've documented up to this point, and other concerns that
may arise. We will continue to work with members of the school
and public health community so that we can as a team approach
continue to safeguard the health and safety of the school
occupants, the teachers and of course our children. Thank you.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Orlan.
Our next witness is--we will have time for questions. Just
a minute. We're going to hear from all of our witnesses.
Our next witness is Dr. Phil Landrigan. I want to also ask
Judith Berger-Arroyo to join us at the table as well. We're
going to add her to this witness table for a very short
testimony following Dr. Landrigan.
Dr. Landrigan is the Ethel H. Wise professor and chairman,
Department of Community and Preventive Medicine, the Mount
Sinai School of Medicine. Certainly, I don't think there is
anybody in the Nation who is more expert on the environmental
effects of toxins and the exposures that children have than he
is. I really appreciate your being here, Dr. Landrigan.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. LANDRIGAN, M.D., CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE; PROFESSOR OF PEDIATRICS,
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CHILDREN'S HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
MOUNT SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
Dr. Landrigan. Thank you, Senator Clinton. Thank you very
much. I want to commend you and Chairman Lieberman for having
convened this hearing, and single you out for the extraordinary
leadership that you've given to public health generally and to
focusing September 11th on the consequences of the attack.
It was good to see Congressman Nadler here this morning. A
number of us have consulted Ground Zero Elected Officials Task
Force. That's been a very rewarding activity.
I was thinking as I came in this morning, I'm still having
trouble personally on the 11th day of each month. I suspect
that I and many of us will for a long time to come. It's good
to have you transform that pain into the kind of energy that
we're exercising here this morning.
What I'd like to talk about, and I'll keep it very brief,
because I appreciate that I'm the next to the last thing
between everyone and lunch, is risk to children and
particularly what do we do about assessing, preventing, dealing
with the long-term health risk to children. We've heard a great
deal today about the exposures, the asbestos, the particulates,
the products of combustion, the other exposures that were
visited upon New York. We've heard from my colleague, Steve
Levin and from George Thurston and others, Dr. Kelly, about
what's being done to protect the workers.
Kids are a group at particular risk, of course, when we
think about environmental hazards. They live close to the
ground, so they breathe more dust than adults. They take in
more air per pound of body weight per day than we do, because
their respiratory rates are more rapid. They have more future
years of life, so they have much more time to develop any
disease that may be triggered by exposure. Last, of course,
kids are more vulnerable. They're just inherently more
vulnerable than adults to toxins.
I put some numbers together. On the morning of September
11th, there were 46,000 children living in Lower Manhattan
below 14th Street. About 11,000 of these kids are under the age
of 5, and 3 of them lived within \1/2\-mile radius of the
tower. You've already heard information on the numbers of
children who were at the various schools, which totals about
4,500 children. We also estimate that there were about 1,700
women in Lower Manhattan that morning who were pregnant,
various stages during the course of their pregnancy.
Thinking about risk to children, I think it's useful to
divide those risks into several categories. You've heard all
these this morning, so I'll just touch upon the headlines.
First of all, there are the risks that are associated with
inhaling ambient, outdoor air. I think the data that Dr.
Thurston presented are crystal clear, that levels were higher
at the beginning. They've declined since, and for the last
several months, particularly since the fires have gone out,
things are pretty decent.
You've heard about the schools, and I've consulted pro bono
to the Board of Education. It's my impression that by and
large, inside the schools, conditions are good, that the Board
of Education is making an extraordinarily diligent effort to
deal with the problems in the schools. I'm still a bit worried
about the playgrounds, because some of those outdoor play
spaces are right by the roadway where the trucks go, as Mr.
Hiraga just described the trucks. I've been down there, I've
seen those trucks go by inadequately covered. I certainly
wouldn't want any of my grandchildren to be out there.
Then last, there's a question of homes. It's clear that the
degree to which homes have been cleaned has been uneven. Some
have been dealt with very well, of course, but others have not
been dealt with adequately. Kids who are in those homes, and
indeed, people of all ages, are at risk of exposure to
particulates, asbestos, products of combustion, and whatever
else may have gone into those homes in the days following the
attack.
So I salute you for having proposed that there be long-term
surveillance of people who have been exposed to the products
that were liberated into the air following September 11th. The
way I see it now, there are two groups who are reasonably well
covered by ongoing surveillance efforts, and one group who are
mostly not covered at all. The workers are pretty well covered,
there are obviously gaps. We heard from Mr. Scotto about the
inadequate coverage of the police officers, but at least the
firefighters, certain of the construction workers, are being
well covered. My sense is that with the strong unions in place
and people like Steve Levin to keep an eye on things, that if
we all work together, we'll do a good job of covering the
workers.
We're also doing a reasonable good job of covering people
at the other end of life, namely pregnant women and their
children. Our group at Sinai with colleagues at Columbia have
received supported from the New York Community Trust, and we
hope to get additional support from National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences to organize a prospective
epidemiologic study of pregnant women and their offspring. In
fact, it's already been launched. We've already recruited a
couple hundred women against our target of 600. So that is
progressing reasonably well.
The group who are pretty much uncovered by any sort of
systematic medical effort at the present time are kids. Yes,
there have been sporadic efforts, ATSDR I think has looked at a
few people, various hospitals have looked at a few here and
there. But I agree with what Ms. Christodoulou said, to my
knowledge, there's been no organized effort to do systematic
surveys of respiratory health problems, mental health problems,
other health problems in children. I think this is a serious
need that needs to be met. We need to put into place organized
programs for examining, registering, caring for and tracking
these children.
I think these programs are going to have to be kept in
existence for several decades. Because we know about the long-
term risks of asbestos, mesothelioma, in particular, that may
not become evident for two, three and even four decades in some
of these children. We've had some preliminary discussions about
the need for such a registry with Dr. Henry Falk, the
administrator of ATSDR. He's supportive, money may be an issue.
I can say that, he can't.
Thank you again, Senator Clinton, for having convened this
hearing.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Doctor.
Our final witness is Judith Berger-Arroyo. She's a public
health nurse at the New York City Department of Health. She's a
member of Local 436 of DC 37, Lee Saunders, the very excellent
competent head of DC 37, is here. That was a union that
basically was driven out of its headquarters because of its
proximity to Ground Zero. So they've struggled not only with
the needs of their members, who are throughout the city in
various positions, but also very much trying to figure out how
to keep themselves going. I think you're back in, now, Lee,
basically? Good.
Well, thank you very much, Ms. Berger-Arroyo. We're looking
forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF JUDITH BERGER-ARROYO, PUBLIC HEALTH NURSE,
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37
Ms. Berger-Arroyo. Thank you, Senators Lieberman and
Clinton, for giving us this opportunity to address your
subcommittee.
As you pointed out, my name is Judith Berger-Arroyo. I'm a
public health nurse with Local 436. But in addition to being a
member of Local 436, I am the member at large representative
for Manhattan, which means I represent all the public health
nurses that work in the borough of Manhattan. I am testifying
not only on their behalf, but on behalf of the other 125,000
members of District Council 37.
We are the everyday heroes who helped in hundreds of ways
at Ground Zero and elsewhere to keep the city working during
the terrible tragedy that occurred on September 11, 2001. I am
here today to request that the Federal Government provide
funding for appropriate medical testing, treatment and
surveillance, as well as continued safety training for us city
workers who selflessly and violently put themselves in harm's
way following the September 11th attack to assist the citizens
of this great city.
From the moment the first plane hit, we have worked, our
members who work as paramedics and emergency medical
technicians rushed to the scene to begin the rescue effort.
Moments after the attack, DC 37 lost three members, two EMTs,
Carlos Little and Ricardo Quinn from Local 2507, and Father
Michael Judge, a chaplain from Local 299. A score of other
members were injured in the aftermath. Hundreds of other DC 37
members played and continue to play important roles in the
rescue, recovery and cleanup effort in and around the World
Trade Center.
At this point, I want to bring out more of what our members
specifically. I myself personally, Local 436 has close to over
800 members in the New York City Public School System. We
provide the health care there. I myself was a nurse in one of
those public schools in the red zone, if not specifically at
Ground Zero. As a member-at-large from Manhattan, I did hear
from the public health nurses that we had at PS 89, plus a few
other members that we had in the area who worked there.
The cloud, even though it went up Broadway and up to a
certain point, the wind, when it would change directions or
anything else, would bring it up as far as Chinatown, where
many of us worked. We worked for 12-hour shifts for days after
that, because we had displaced shelters there. So even though
the schools were closed, the shelters were open and the public
health nurses manned those shelters in addition to providing
services in the school.
So I was exposed, and since December I've had this ``cold''
that I haven't been able to get rid of. The cough comes and
goes, and once I think I'm feeling better it comes back.
Myself and my colleagues are most fortunate, because we
have health insurance that covers it. We have our own private
doctors that we go to. We have DC 37 here to help us, with Dr.
Weem from Mount Sinai. But we are concerned about parents and
teachers and the students in those schools that don't have
insurance or are immigrants and don't speak English and may not
think about that. We do outreach on this, we've been hearing
from our members.
In addition, our members who were working in the area, not
just at PS 89, and at the other schools, but we have the Bureau
of Tuberculosis Nurses that worked in the area, we had
epidemiologists, we had nurses that went down to Ground Zero
itself the very next day that tested masks and everything else.
A lot of them are coming back with either fatigue that they've
never had before or they again, like myself, have coughs or
this burr in our throats that we can't seem to get rid of. Some
of our nurses who have suffered from asthma before, who were
very well controlled on medication, now have had to add two or
three more medications and are not doing very well at all.
These are problems that continue to crop up for all of our
public health nurses in the area.
We also have, since I'm speaking on behalf of all the
members of District Council, we have our Local 983, our urban
park rangers, who were among those who assisted in the
evacuation of Battery Park City and the surrounding areas. They
were covered with, needless to say since they were evacuating
with the cloud. Our Local 1322 and 376 members who work for the
Department of Environmental Protection immediately responded by
ensuring that the water supply to fight the huge fires was
adequate.
Our motor vehicle operators from Local 983 also responded
immediately to address critical transportation needs. They are
also the ones who helped move all those cars recently with all
that dust and stuff to return them to their owners. As I speak,
they continue to haul debris from Ground Zero hundreds of times
a day. There are truck drivers, Local 375 hazmat workers, also
played a critical role, to make certain that chemical hazards
were abated quickly. Engineers and architects from Local 375
have been there from day one to provide technical expertise in
overseeing the safety of the rescue and recovery operations.
Other members of DC 37, such as Local 768, public health
sanitariums, Local 420, mortuary care technicians, local 371,
social service workers, have all played vital roles by tending
to the health and safety needs of those adversely affected by
this terrible event.
Until recently, Local 372, school lunch aides, fed
thousands of meals a day to the rescue workers at Ground Zero.
Since September 11, 2001, DC 37 has spoken out on the need for
adequate funding for the city to address the multiple concerns
of our residents, as well as our members, who have so vitally
assisted in the rescue and recovery efforts. To aid New York
City in its recovery, it is critical that the $20 million
promised by President Bush be made available promptly to enable
the city to meet the crushing and immediate economic needs.
More particularly, an integral portion of the $12 million
that you, Senator, and Senator Schumer have proposed to deal
with worker health issues must be specifically earmarked for
the medical testing, treatment and surveillance of employees
who are exposed to the numerous dangers, chemicals and other
toxins in and around Ground Zero. To date, only some of the
employees working at Ground Zero have received baseline medical
examinations. Unfortunately, hundreds of others have not. In
order to adequately protect the health of these heroic workers,
this money must be appropriated in an expeditious and efficient
manner.
We must not allow unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles and lack
of coordination on the part of city, State and Federal agencies
to further delay this essential funding. Monies for medical
testing treatment and surveillance of workers should be
allocated to the New York State Occupational Health Clinic
Network, which is well equipped, trained and staffed, but
presently lacks adequate funding to deal with the huge number
of workers potentially affected by this disaster.
Failure to allocate adequate funding to address these
pressing occupational health issues will unduly burden the
city's health insurance carriers and delay the needed medical
treatment and surveillance that workers need now. Our
Government should not place the burden of continued good health
on these heroic workers who have already given so much.
I also want to point out, as Dr. Levin and everyone has
pointed out, a lot of our members are also suffering from a
great deal of psychological stress. We have a great many public
health nurses that have been unable to return to their areas of
employment in the Manhattan area down there. In fact, we have
one public health nurse that, she just can't even look down at
the area. We have to try to arrange for a transfer for her, so
she will be able to continue doing her job.
DC 37 urges the subcommittee to immediately commit
necessary Federal funds to New York City to be used in the
following manner. To fund the occupational health clinics in
New York City, in order to provide appropriate medical testing,
treatment and surveillance. Develop training programs on safety
and health-related issues for workers taking part in the
rebuilding of the city and to develop a worker registry to
identify workers affected by the September 11th attack. That is
extremely important, because we need to know. A lot of these
chemicals are long-term effect and not short term. We may not
see anything for the next 10 or 20 years.
I would like to thank you for your time, and will answer
any questions that you might have.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
Well, the time is vanishing, and there are so many
questions. I reiterate that anyone with any questions in the
audience, please get them to us, we will pass them on, get them
answered. But there are several points that I want to touch on
before we have to end.
Mr. Orlan, let me turn to you, because there are two
specific issues that were raised, and I want your direct
response to them. The first, with respect to Stuyvesant, were
the ventilation systems and the ductwork cleaned, and who did
that work, if it was done?
Mr. Orlan. The air mixing chambers and the ventilation
system were cleaned by an asbestos hazard abatement company
prior to the reoccupancy of the school. Prior to that weekend,
and there was a holiday weekend, to ensure that there was
nothing lurking behind the ventilation system, the ventilation
system was run, a number of air changes, after which air
sampling was conducted throughout the school. The analysis was
using the TM analysis, we were able to get down to the smallest
level of particulate. Those results were shared prior to
reoccupancy of the school with both the environmentalists with
the UFT, with the various regulatory agencies and with the
parents' association consultant.
Senator Clinton. Ms. Christodoulou, you just heard Mr.
Orlan's response. What's your response to that?
Ms. Christodoulou. I think it was not a direct response.
Your question, Senator, was were the ducts cleaned. Mr. Orlan
responded that the intakes of the ducts were cleaned. It's a--
--
Senator Clinton. Let me stop you. Were the ducts cleaned,
Mr. Orlan?
Mr. Orlan. The ducts themselves were not cleaned.
Senator Clinton. Is there some reason why the ducts
couldn't be cleaned?
Mr. Orlan. The ducts, there was a sufficient number of air
changes going through the ducts. Whatever was reachable by the
ducts, the diffusers, the air chambers, the air handling
chambers themselves, were physically cleaned. From that point
on, sufficient amount of air was run through the ducts. It was
a protocol agreed upon by the parents' association consultant
prior to running this. We shared results with that particular
gentleman and with the environmentalists with the UFT.
Senator Clinton. Well, now, I think this needs to be
resolved. It's not going to be resolved here. But clearly, this
is the kind of either misunderstanding or lack of information
or just difference of opinion about what needs to be done that
I would very much like to see resolved one way or the other.
Because I think that going back to what Mr. Scotto said in the
very beginning, I don't think anyone has any desire to expose
our children to any toxins that can be controlled and
eliminated. If there are legitimate differences of opinion,
obviously my view is, you err on the side of doing more, not
less, and you will do everything that possibly can not only in
actuality, but frankly by perception, give the sort of
confidence that we need.
So I would hope that you can discuss this further and
perhaps on behalf of the parents' association. I would
appreciate getting a report as to whether you're going to go
forward and do that, or whether some independent expert says
it's not necessary. Because I think that that is the real
bottom line on the Stuyvesant issue.
But I also wanted to ask Mr. Orlan about PS 89. I know
there are teachers and parents in the audience. I guess they're
also wondering, can you have some kind of additional meeting
with some independent mediator or expert there, so that the
questions that they have can be answered? I know that this is
something that would be on the minds of any teacher or parent
about their children.
Mr. Orlan. So far as the staff and parents of 89, we did
meet again last week. Chancellor Levy attended, various
representatives of medical establishments that are working with
us, independent agencies. Also their own independent consultant
that the parents have hired.
I spoke to the president of the parents' association, and I
did offer to meet with them on an ongoing basis, even when
school does go back into session. If they have a regular PA
meeting, if they just need me to come in for 5 minutes once a
month to say, before we discuss reading and writing, let me
tell you what we've done, what our test results are, what the
mayor's office tells us is happening with the site and with the
barge. I will be more than happy to do that. I've made that
clear to them.
Senator Clinton. Dr. Landrigan, as I've heard your
testimony, you said that having consulted pro bono to the
board, and I know you've also met with parents groups and
teachers groups and others, you are willing to say that you
think that the interior of the schools are acceptable, but
you're worried about the playgrounds and the idling of the
diesel trucks and the movement back and forth to the barge. Is
that a fair paraphrase?
Dr. Landrigan. Yes, Senator, it is. My colleague, Joel
Foreman, who's a pediatrician with me at Mount Sinai, and he
directs an ATSDR supported pediatric environmental health
specialty unit, was actually at the meeting that Mr. Orlan
mentioned that was convened last week with the parents of PS
89. We're continuing to review the data. It's a work in
progress, and we understand that an examination of the data at
one point doesn't answer the questions for all time. But we're
committed to continuing to work with the parents and with the
board of education.
Senator Clinton. I will take very seriously your
recommendation about the registry for children. It's something
that we need to move on quickly.
Let me also just thank Dr. Levin for bringing to our
attention the un-unionized, unprotected, undocumented workers
who have been put into very difficult positions with these
cleanups. I think we have to try to have an outreach also to
try to deal with some of their potential health problems.
Now, I have to wrap this up. In fact, ending on the note
that several of you have mentioned, we need financial help to
do the kind of registry, the monitoring, the tracking and
surveillance, for all of these groups, and to provide the
additional expertise. I know how difficult it is, because
certainly those of us who have lived through what happened here
and what happened in the following weeks with anthrax know that
we don't have all the answers we wish we did have. The Hart
Building in Washington, DC where Senator Schumer has his office
was closed for months. Nobody knew how to clean it up. They had
to go back and try twice with an untried system to pump gas
into the building.
So this is an issue, when it comes to our response to the
health impact of these environmental disasters that flow from
terrorism that we've got to do a better job in addressing. I'm
on my way, actually, to go over to the city council, because I
am concerned that we're not going to be having the support we
need financially from the Federal Government to do the work
that I think all of us agree needs to be done. It's something
that to me just absolutely has to be a national priority.
I don't think that the war on terrorism can only be fought
either in Afghanistan or foreign countries or that our only
response here at home is to beef up security. We also have to
take whatever steps are necessary to protect the environment
and our health. I think this hearing today illustrates that
dramatically.
Now, I thank all of you for participating. I want again to
let the audience know that there are instructions on the table
as you enter the auditorium for submitting questions and
statements to the committee. Please do so by February 25, 2002.
Let me thank you all for being here. I look forward to
continuing to work with you on these issues.
The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the chair.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Hon. Jerrold Nadler, U.S. Representative from the State of
New York
Thank you, Chairman Lieberman. I would like to thank you and
Senator Clinton for holding this field hearing today, and for inviting
me to testify, regarding the continuing impact of the September 11th
attacks on the air quality in Lower Manhattan.
As the Congressman representing ``Ground Zero'' and the surrounding
area, I am deeply concerned about the environmental and health effects
posed by the collapse of the World Trade Center for my constituents,
and for those who go to school or work in the area. It has now been
exactly 5 months since the terrorist attacks and, unfortunately, the
people in Lower Manhattan still do not know whether or not it is safe
to live and work in the area. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has failed in its mission to ``. . . protect human health and to
safeguard the natural environment . . .'' by not exercising its full
authority to test and clean all indoor spaces where people live and
work. As such, the EPA has created a full-scale crisis of public
confidence.
Yet, all is not lost. The EPA can and must act now to remedy this
situation and make Lower Manhattan safe and to restore public trust.
Despite statements to the contrary, the agency does currently have the
authority and resources to do so, and it must do so quickly. However,
if the EPA continues to fail New Yorkers, I will introduce legislation
to mandate action.
I am going to begin by being very blunt. We now know enough to be
alarmed and outraged at the Federal Government's response to the
environmental impact of September 11th. First, we know that EPA
Administrator Christine Todd Whitman misled the public on September 18,
2001 when she said she was ``glad to reassure the people of New York
that . . . their air is safe to breathe, and their water is safe to
drink.'' She made that statement without the indoor data necessary to
make such a pronouncement. Second, we know that the EPA has made a
series of conflicting comments about the presence and quality of
hazardous materials, and has even knowingly withheld critical data
regarding the causticity of the dust. Third, we know that the EPA
delegated authority to New York City to handle indoor environments, but
did nothing to ensure that the City's response was appropriate. This
left New Yorkers to their own, uninformed devices, often without the
means to take care of themselves and their families. This is true even
as the EPA had its own building at 290 Broadway professionally tested
and cleaned. Finally, we know that the EPA has treated New York
differently than it has treated other locales contaminated by hazardous
materials. New York was at the center of one of the most calamitous
events in American history, and the EPA has essentially walked away.
Ms. Whitman's statement, reassuring the public about the safety of
air and water, which has been echoed by many at all levels of
government, was based only on the EPA's outdoor tests--the results of
which are still in dispute. At that time, there had been no systematic
testing of indoor air or dust in residential or commercial buildings by
any Government Agency, let alone by the EPA. In fact, the EPA did not
intend to do testing even of outdoor air in residential areas of Lower
Manhattan until my Ground Zero Elected Officials Task Force requested
that it do so on September 21. Ironically, the very first public
testing conducted inside residences, which was commissioned by our Task
Force, commenced on the very day Ms. Whitman made her misleading
statement. The results were made available to the EPA on October 12.
The test results showed elevated levels of hazardous materials in these
residences. The EPA did nothing and Ms. Whitman did not adequately
clarify her statement.
In recent weeks, the EPA has stated repeatedly that the city of New
York, not the EPA is responsible for indoor testing. The city, however,
didn't get around to testing inside homes until November and December.
The full results of these test are still not available and, according
to the Health Department, won't be until the spring. I do not
understand why the results of tests undertaken by a public agency are
being delayed for public release. Our test results took less than a
month to be released. Nevertheless, just 3 days ago, the city
Department of Health issued a press release regarding this limited
indoor testing. Despite a pacifying headline, many the limited data in
the press release has caused the scientists with whom we've consulted
to believe that full results would directly contradict Ms. Whitman's
statement. The release does make it clear, as did our commissioned
study, that there were disconcerting levels of hazardous materials in
peoples' apartments.
Ms. Whitman's reassurances are deeply confusing in light of other
statements made by agency officials and of other information we now
have that the EPA has not itself released. For example, in a copy of a
January 25, 2002 speech given by Walter Mugdan, EPA Region II counsel,
which I have obtained, I find that he states, ``. . . a significant
number of the WTC bulk dust samples that we analyzed did have more than
1 percent asbestos.'' But an October 3, 2001 EPA memo ``Confirm[ing] No
Significant Public Health Risk'' states, ``The vast majority of EPA and
OSHA samples of air and dust analyzed for asbestos have been at levels
that pose no significant risk to residents and workers returning to
their homes or area businesses.'' This statement has been made
repeatedly by EPA Region II officials. How are New Yorkers to interpret
these conflicting remarks? I can't even tell you what they mean--except
that they cannot both be true.
Confusing remarks are one thing, withholding critical data
pertaining to the public health is another. We know that it took a
Freedom of Information Act request by the New York Environmental Law
and Justice Project to get test results showing dangerous levels of
hazardous materials in outdoor ambient air. The EPA claimed that this
was an ``oversight.'' But now we have a new, frightening bombshell.
According to this Sunday's St. Louis Post Dispatch, the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), using the country's best detection equipment
and methods, found pH levels in World Trade Center dust that are ``. .
. as corrosive as drain cleaner'' and passed this information along to
health experts at the EPA on a ``government-only'' website. That's
right. As corrosive as drain cleaner. (By the way, it took less than 2
weeks in September for these test results to be ready.) I submit this
article for the record.
Andrew Schneider, the paper's Pulitzer Prize-winning environmental
journalist, charges, ``the USGS data was not released by the EPA nor
apparently were the environmental agency's own test results on the
dust.'' The EPA claims to have released this data to the public, but
when Schneider reviewed all of the EPA's statements made since
September 11th, he found nothing that warned of these high pH levels.
According to the New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health
(NYCOSH), such dust ``once it's in contact with moist tissue--the
throat, the mouth--nasal passages, the eyes and even sweaty skin--it
becomes corrosive and can cause severe burns.'' This is utterly
scandalous. We must find out why the EPA hid this information from the
public and we must see all the data now. I hope that Senators Clinton
and Lieberman will join me in calling on the Federal Government to
explain why New Yorkers were misled, and to demand the immediate
release of the full compliment of data.
The EPA has not only provided false reassurances and misleading
information. The EPA has also abrogated its responsibility to act. In a
statement issued on January 17 in response to a press conference I
held, the EPA states that it, ``has lead [sic] the effort to monitor
the outdoor environment while the city of New York has taken the lead
regarding the preoccupancy of buildings.'' At least the ERA admits that
it has delegated authority to the city. Unfortunately, the EPA has yet
to provide any justification for doing so, nor has it provided any
evidence of the oversight measures it is compelled to take to ensure
that the city is acting in accordance with the strictest federal
standards. On January 23, I sent a formal inquiry to Administrator
Whitman asking for answers to these and other questions about the
city's response, which I submit for the record today. It has been over
3 weeks since the letter was sent and I have yet to get a response.
The EPA might say today, as it has in the past, that it does not
have the proper legal authority to take the steps we are requesting to
test and clean the areas affected by the collapse of the World Trade
Center. It will probably say that the Clean Air Act, for example, does
not govern indoor air and that it is therefore the responsibility of
the local and State governments, or even that of the landlords and
residents themselves. This is, again, all utterly misleading.
Under Section 303 of the Clean Air Act, the EPA has the authority
in an emergency situation to protect human health when there is an
``imminent and substantial endangerment'' presented by a source of
pollution. The intent of Congress is clear in this regard. A Senate
Report from 1970 on Section 303 states, ``The levels of concentration
of air pollution agents or combination of agents which substantially
endanger health are levels which should never be reached in any
community. When the prediction can reasonably be made that such
elevated levels could be reached even for a short period of time--that
is that they are imminent--an emergency action plan should be
implemented.'' In short, the EPA should not wait for people to actually
get sick before it acts, and it clearly has the authority to act under
this law. Indeed, an EPA memo entitled ``Guidance on the Use of Section
303 of the Clean Air Act'' was issued to the Regional offices on
September 15, 1983, outlining these very points. I submit a copy of
this memo for the record.
But the Clean Air Act is not the only governing statute. The EPA
has the authority to act on indoor air under the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA). In fact, I understand that the EPA has
indeed been utilizing some of the NCP protocols at Ground Zero--
however, they have not relied on this authority, or any other, to test
or remediate indoor environments.
As we speak, the EPA is in fact doing indoor testing and
remediation in Herculaneum, MO and other locales without Superfund
designation. We must learn why the EPA is treating New York differently
and I ask the Senators present here today to help me find out. This
double standard is unconscionable.
The EPA was unwilling to act on its own, and yet did nothing to
ensure that those ostensibly charged with acting did ``the right
thing.'' The EPA, on its web site and in public press releases referred
residents to the New York City Department of Health, which recommended
that people clean their potentially asbestos-laden dust with a ``wet
rag or wet mop.'' Clearly such cleanup measures are inadequate, as seen
by the EPA's own actions taken in its building at 290 Broadway. I again
today ask why the EPA applied stricter measures to Federal buildings
than the city advised for local residences and business equidistant
from the World Trade Center.
Given the lack of action, credible information or oversight, I
believe the EPA has failed in its responsibility to protect the public
health of the citizens of Lower Manhattan. This is quite simply
shameful, for public health is the first thing we, as a government,
must protect.
In order to ensure a full and fair public assessment on the EPA's
actions following September 11th, I have also asked the EPA National
Ombudsman, Robert Martin, to investigate these matters. Mr. Martin has
been doing so, and I am disappointed he has not been invited to testify
and share the status of his investigation with the committee. However,
I understand there is a time constraint today, so I have attached a
statement from Mr. Martin to be included in the record. As you may also
know, Administrator Whitman is attempting to place the Office of the
Ombudsman under the control of the Inspector General, effectively
stripping the Ombudsman of his independence and ability to investigate
these claims. I sincerely hope that Administrator Whitman will stop her
quest to eviscerate the office of the Ombudsman, and in so doing,
further undermining the integrity of the agency.
I realize that I have leveled serious charges here today, but I
believe I have the moral responsibility to do so. The salient point is
that we still do not know the extent of the presence of hazardous
materials in some areas of the city. It may or may not be dangerous in
many indoor areas of lower Manhattan--we just don't know. I am dismayed
that there seems to be unwillingness on the part of our public agencies
to get this information. But given that we do not have all of the
facts, we cannot conclude anything. I do know that we must get the
facts and act swiftly and appropriately to get the job done right.
We must not fall into the catch-22 of saying there is no evidence
of a public health emergency without taking any steps to get such
evidence. The burden should not be on the landlords and residents
themselves when the testing procedures and cleanup measures are
expensive and must be conducted by properly trained personnel.
The EPA has the statutory and regulatory authority to test and
remediate indoor environments in Lower Manhattan, and has exercised
such authority elsewhere. I am calling on the EPA today to immediately
commence a program of full-scale testing and remediation using the best
available technology, and to make a report of all such test results and
actions available to the public. The EPA must also issue the test
results in a manner which is tied directly to health standards, so that
we can truly assess the public health risk posed to the people of Lower
Manhattan. Finally, testing procedures should in no way impede the
expeditious remediation of hazardous materials found by other
government agencies or private researchers. Similarly, should the EPA
find dangerous levels of hazardous materials before the full spectrum
of testing is completed, cleanup measures should commence immediately.
If the EPA fails to act again, despite its current authority,
compel it I will introduce legislation to do so.
People might say that the measures I am requesting here today are
expensive. That may be, but we must protect the public health. Although
the cost may be high today, imagine what the cost will be in the future
if it turns out that they're really are dangerous levels of hazardous
materials in Lower Manhattan. Imagine the City's and EPA's contingent
liability to lawsuits 20 years down the road. Envision the potential
health care costs.
It is in the best interest of the residents, workers, students and
businesses for the Government to act swiftly and appropriately to
address the public's environment and health concerns. We cannot afford
to wait while all the agencies point fingers at each other. There is
still time to right this situation.
Time is of the essence. My office has received numerous complaints
from people experiencing adverse health effects such as headaches,
nosebleeds, and respiratory ailments. The symptoms are so widespread
that they have been dubbed ``The World Trade Center Flu.'' Public
confidence is at stake. People know when they are sick, they know when
something is not right, and they know when they are being lied to. I
sincerely hope that we do not have another ``Love Canal'' on our hands,
but the best way to avoid that is to do the necessary testing and
cleanup now.
Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. I look
forward to working with my colleagues in both chambers of Congress, and
with all interested parties, to ensure that New York City is safe and
prosperous for many years to come.
______
[From the St. Louis, (MO) Post-Dispatch, February 9, 2002]
Caustic Dust Blankets World Trade Center Area
(By Andrew Schneider)
NEW YORK.--Even as the dust from the collapsed World Trade Center
was still settling, top government scientists were determining that the
smoky gray mixture was highly corrosive and potentially a serious
danger to health.
The U.S. Geological Survey team found that some of the dust was as
caustic as liquid drain cleaner and alerted all Government agencies
involved in the emergency response. But many of those on the front
lines of protecting the health of the public and workers cleaning up
the site say they never got the information.
``I'm supposed to be in the loop, and I've never heard any specific
numbers on how caustic the dust actually was,'' said Dr. Robin Herbert,
co-director of the Mount Sinai Center for Occupational and
Environmental Medicine. ``There is a large segment of the population
here whose physicians needed to know that information that USGS
submitted. Exposure to dust with a high pH could impact everyone, but
especially the very young, the very old and those with existing
pulmonary disease.'' Census data show large concentrations of young and
elderly living near the World Trade Center site.
The EPA's office in New York said it repeatedly told the public
that the dust was caustic because of the cement that was pulverized
when the towers collapsed. But an examination of all the EPA's public
and press statements made since September 11th found nothing that
warned of the very high pH levels found by the Geological Survey
scientists. Nor did the statements disclose the specific levels that
the EPA's own testing found.
``We've not heard of EPA or anyone else releasing information on
specific pH levels in the dust, and that's information that we all
should have had,'' said Carrie Loewenherz, an industrial hygienist for
the New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health, which
provides assistance to more than 250 unions.
``It's the specific numbers--those precise pH levels--that we need
to make the appropriate safety decisions for the workers, and they were
never released,'' Loewenherz said. ``The dust, once it's in contact
with moist tissue, the throat, the mouth, nasal passages, the eyes and
even sweaty skin, it becomes corrosive and can cause severe burns.''
Most of the samples taken by USGS' team had a pH of 9.5 to 10.5,
about the same alkalinity as ammonia. Two samples that were taken
inside a high-rise apartment and in a gymnasium across from the
wreckage of the World Trade Center had a pH of 11.8 to 12.1--equivalent
to what would be found in liquid drain cleaner.
The degree of acidity or alkalinity in a material is expressed as a
pH measurement. Neutral pH--like water--is 7 on a 15-point scale. Lower
than 7, to 0, is an indication of acid. Higher than 7, to 14, the top
of the scale, is alkaline. Levels near either end of the pH scale can
harm the health of people and animals.
Bruce Lippy, Loewenherz's counterpart with the operating engineers
union, is responsible for the 300 workers running heavy equipment at
Ground Zero.
``Part of the dilemma we faced was not knowing precisely what was
in the dust,'' Lippy said. ``We knew it was caustic but had no
information on exactly how caustic it was. I was trying to get people
to wear the respirators, but if I knew how high the pH levels were, I
could have been more persuasive in convincing the workers of the
dangers.''
Only a handful of the 100 or so workers sorting wreckage and
loading trucks on the site over 3 days last week were seen wearing
respirators or protective masks.
scientists rush to manhattan
Like the rest of the world, the USGS team watched the storm of dust
roll across Manhattan after the terrorist attack on September 11th.
With its world-class laboratories and sensors that can detect minerals
on a distant planet, the Denver-based team was already making
arrangements to get NASA's infrared sensors and aircraft over Ground
Zero as the EPA and the U.S. Public Health Service requested its help.
Responding to requests from the White House science office, the
NASA team flew over Manhattan four times between September 16 and
September 23, while USGS scientists collected samples of the dust from
35 locations below.
Back in Denver, more than two dozen scientists using the world's
most sophisticated analytical equipment ran the samples through
extensive testing.
The Geological Survey's test results were posted September 27 on a
Web site restricted to Government agencies.
The USGS findings were ``evaluated by our technical experts and
found to be consistent with the findings of EPA's Office of Research
and Development,'' said Bonnie Bellow, the agency's spokeswoman in New
York.
``The USGS data was also discussed by an interagency group of
scientists, epidemiologists and health officials,'' Bellow said.
But neither the EPA headquarters nor its New York office would
comment on what came out of these discussions or which EPA results they
were ``consistent'' with.
The USGS data on pH levels were not released by the EPA, nor
apparently were the environmental agency's own test results on the
dust.
``It is extremely distressing to learn that the EPA knew how
caustic samples of the dust were and didn't publicize the information
immediately, or make sure that OSHA publicized it,'' said Joel Shufro,
executive director of the New York Committee for Occupational Safety
and Health.
``If we had known at the time exactly how caustic the dust could
be, we would have been in a better position to make informed decisions
about respiratory protection to recommend and about the urgency of
ensuring that workers and residents followed those recommendations,''
Shufro said.
``It is inexcusable for EPA to have kept silent for so long about
such a potential hazard.''
dust weakens strapping youth
John Healy Jr. is 15, big, taller than his father. He looks as
strong as a bull. But when he talks, wheezes and deep coughs punctuate
his words. He and his father, John, live in an apartment overlooking
what was the World Trade Center.
``Something is tearing him up, hitting his lungs hard,'' said his
father. ``He had asthma when he was younger, but he was fine until
after September 11th. If I knew the dust was that caustic, there's no
way I would have brought him back here.''
John goes to Stuyvesant High School, a 10-story building for the
brightest of the bright. It's one block from the collapsed buildings
and beside the Hudson River, where barges are being filled with debris
destined for sorting at the Fresh Kills landfill.
``I need to go to this school, and I need to live here to do it,
but something in that dust is just hurting me,'' the teen said as he
looked down at the pile of pills, throat sprays and inhalers in his two
large hands.
His father looked out the narrow dining room window at the brightly
lighted carnage bellow. A light film of dust coated the window.
``I can't understand why the Government didn't tell us what was
actually in the dust,'' Healy said. ``Were they afraid we were going to
panic? I needed that information to decide what was best for my son. I
needed it.'' The teen's malady and other serious problems are being
seen by physicians throughout New York.
``What we're finding is incredible irritation to the lungs, throat
and nasal passages,'' said Herbert, from Mount Sinai. ``Some of the
tissue is cherry red, vivid, bright, and we've never seen anything like
it before.
``There are a large number of clinicians and public health
specialists who are struggling to reconcile the health problems they're
seeing with the exposure data they're being given,'' Herbert said.
``The high pH in the dust may be a part of the answer. If the
Government had these pH readings of 11 and 12, the public and their
physicians should have been told.
``Any credible information the Government had relating to health
issues just should have been released,'' she said. ``There is no
justification for holding it. You don't conceal the information from
those who need it.''
a dubious honor
Mark Rushing and Tori Bunch have the debatable honor of having
lived in one of the sites that USGS tested. In fact, their apartment on
the 30th floor of a building overlooking the World Trade Center tied
for highest pH--12.1--of the dozens of sites where samples were
collected.
``It's obvious to those of us living here that the Government--
city, State and Federal--wanted things to return to normal as quickly
as possible. The economic losses were great,'' Rushing said. ``But no
matter how you view it, that's no excuse for the Government, any
government, to conceal hazards from the people they are charged with
protecting.''
Rushing and Bunch found a new apartment as far from the World Trade
Center as they could get and still be in the city. The apartment is on
the lowest floor available.
Even within the EPA, professionals believe the agency did a
disservice by not acknowledging and releasing the Geological Survey's
data.
Cate Jenkins, a senior environmental scientist in the hazardous
materials division at the EPA headquarters, said: ``The pH levels the
USGS documented were far too high for EPA to ignore. They insisted that
all the information regarding health and safety was being released to
the public. Well, that's not true. There's nothing, internally or in
public releases, that shows the agency ever disclosed specific pH
levels.''
Late Thursday, the EPA's Bellow told the Post-Dispatch: ``We have
no specific data on pH levels.'' Bellow added, ``This is all the
available information on the subject.''
Late Friday, the EPA responded to the question of why it didn't
collect its own pH numbers.
``EPA had enough information about the alkalinity of the material
from the World Trade Center without doing further analysis,'' Bellow
said.
The question of why EPA didn't release the data it had had remains
unanswered.
The EPA is in a no-win situation. No Government Agency had been
prepared for the enormity of the terrorist attack on New York. Tight
budgets--Federal, State and city--ruled out planning and drills for an
unfathomable event of this size.
Even most critics say that no amount of preparation could have kept
the workers fleeing the twin towers--and the rescue workers racing to
save them--from sucking in lungfuls of toxic dust and smoke.
But it's what the EPA and OSHA and the New York State and city
health departments did after the dust settled and the smoke cleared
that has generated the most criticism.
On Monday, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, the New York Democrat who
represents the people in Lower Manhattan, is holding a congressional
hearing to determine who dropped the ball. He is expected to announce
that legislation will be introduced to ``force EPA to do the proper
testing inside offices and apartments and release the finding in a form
that would be of value to the public and their physicians.''
Sen. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., has scheduled a Senate
investigation of the issue.
Less than a week after the attack, on September 16, EPA
Administrator Christie Todd Whitman told New Yorkers: ``There's no need
for the general public to be concerned.''
That was the same day that USGS and NASA flew their first sampling
missions over the city.
The EPA said its boss's comments that there were no dangers from
dioxin, benzene, PCB or asbestos--all cancer-causing agents--were based
on thousands of outside air samples. Last month, the Post-Dispatch
reported that high levels of asbestos were found in many apartments and
offices. The EPA said its regulations did not call for indoor testing.
Hundreds of firefighters, paramedics and police officers are sick,
suffering what some physicians call ``ground zero coughs.'' Their
problems may have come from unprotected exposure the first week of the
attack.
But hundreds of other people--workers, students and residents--who
fled the area and stayed out for weeks and then came back also are
suffering major respiratory problems.
The few Christmas decorations that adorned light poles in Lower
Manhattan have been removed. But the metal poles still bristle with air
monitors and vacuum pumps sucking in air almost around the clock,
searching for asbestos fibers, chemicals and traces of heavy, toxic
metals.
These monitors are of little or no value when it comes to
determining the health hazard from dust contaminating apartments and
offices. For the most part, the EPA and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration say they're finding little, if anything, for New
Yorkers to worry about.
They are talking about contaminants in the air, which is the main
pathway for toxic materials to enter the body.
But the EPA pays little or no attention to indoor contamination.
Late Friday, the New York City Health Department issued a brief
statement, with very few details, about both indoor and outdoor testing
done by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. This
well-respected research arm for the Department of Health and Human
Services, found pulverized fiberglass in almost half of the samples it
examined. However, New York health officials released no specifics on
the levels of toxic material found, and no one could be reached for
comment.
Attention is being paid to keeping the contamination on the site.
Trucks hauling debris from Ground Zero pass through an EPA drive-
through shower before they reach the streets. City street sweepers and
washers drive a seemingly endless circle up and down the streets of
Lower Manhattan.
But even blocks from the collapse, massive windows on offices and
cornices on many apartment buildings are still caked with dust.
``We made this analytical effort because we were concerned about
the likelihood that the composition of the dust could be potentially
harmful to the rescue and cleanup workers at the site and to people
living and working in Lower Manhattan,'' said USGS team member Geoffrey
Plumlee, a geochemist who determined the pH levels.
``We shared our findings with EPA, FEMA, the Federal emergency
response coordinator and everyone else we felt was appropriate. We
anticipated that the results would have been shared with the people on
the ground, those at risk, but it looks like the information never got
to those who needed it.''
______
Statement of Robert J. Martin, National Ombudsman, Environmental
Protection Agency
I am pleased and honored to provide testimony to this subcommittee
exactly 5 months after the tragedy which struck this city and the
Nation on September 11, 2001. The Hon. Jerrold Nadler of the U.S. House
of Representatives and many affected citizens of New York City have
asked that I as National Ombudsman and Chief Investigator Hugh Kaufman
independently assess what needs to be done to protect the health and
environment of the community.
The initial phase of our investigation identified the fact that
asbestos testing being performed and/or paid for by the Environmental
Protection Agency was not performed with the best available technology
to identify the true health risks posed by the tons of asbestos
released into the community from the World Trade Center attack.
As a working finding, I have concluded that the Environmental
Protection Agency, or any other agency of Government that has not used
the best available technology to measure asbestos levels, cannot
irrebuttably conclude that dwellings in the community surrounding the
World Trade Center attack are safe. As a working finding I have further
concluded that besides asbestos, there are other hazardous materials
that pose a risk to the public health and environment from the World
Trade Center attack. These include, but are not limited to, benzene,
lead, mercury, PBDEs (flame retardants), fiberglass, and PCBs.
Although not a working finding, we have received substantial
anecdotal information that the workers and visitors to Ground Zero may
not have been provided adequate information, training, and protective
gear to assure their health and safety. We have also received
substantial anecdotal information that the Environmental Protection
Agency has provided erroneous information to the public during their
response to the World Trade Center attack.
As in all other major National Ombudsman cases, we will be
convening public hearings, taking on the record statements,
interviewing witnesses, reviewing records and issuing Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents and Working Findings. The
Ombudsman process is a transparent process and as in the past we expect
that if mistakes have been made, they will be corrected during the
process to afford the public the fastest possible help in protecting
their health. We anticipate and welcome full cooperation from you, EPA
and all other governmental authorities.
We look forward to working with all the elected officials in this
area just as I have done in other cases around the country from Florida
to Idaho, and from Pennsylvania to Colorado. I particularly want to
point to the leadership of Congressman Jerrold Nadler and the Ground
Zero Elected Officials Task Force in their efforts an behalf of all the
citizens in helping to expeditiously solve these problems.
______
Initiation of Administrative and Civil Action Under Section 303 of the
Clean Air Act During Air Pollution Emergencies
The purpose of this guideline is to explain the statutory
requirements and resource needs which must be met in order to take
action under Section 303 of the Clean Air Act\1\ in the event of an air
pollution emergency.
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\1\ Section 303, as amended in 1977 and codified at 42 U.S.C.
Section 7603, reads as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the
Administrator, upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source or
combination of sources (including moving sources) is presenting an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons, and
that the appropriate State or local authorities have not acted to abate
such sources, may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the
appropriate United States District Court to immediately restrain any
person causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the
emission of air pollutants causing or contributing to such pollution or
to take such other actions as may be necessary. If it is not
practicable to assure prompt protection of the health of persons solely
by commencement of such a civil action, the Administrator may issue
such orders as may be necessary to protect the health of persons who
are, or may be, affected by such pollution source (or sources). Prior
to taking any action under this section, the Administrator shall
consult with the State and local authorities in order to confirm the
correctness of the information on which the action proposed to be taken
is based and to ascertain the action which such authorities are, or
will be, taking. Such order shall be effective for a period of not more
than 24 hours unless the Administrator begins an action under the first
sentence of this subsection before the expiration of such period.
Whenever the Administrator brings such an action within such period,
such orders shall be effective for a period of 48 hours or such a
longer period as may be authorized by the court pending litigation or
thereafter.
(b) Any person who willfully violates, or fails or refuses to
comply with, any order issued by the Administrator under subsection (a)
of this section may, in an action brought in the appropriate United
States District Court to enforce such order, be fined not more than
$5,000 for each day during which such violation occurs or failure to
comply continues.
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This guideline is directed toward both meteorological episodes
(e.g., thermal inversions) involving dangerously high levels of
criteria or non-criteria pollutants, situations in which chronic
exposure to air pollution causes endangerment by cumulative effect, and
incidents involving industrial accidents or malfunctions (e.g.,
breakdown of pollution control devices) resulting in the release of air
pollutants in hazardous concentrations.
statutory prerequisites
1. An Imminent and Substantial Endangerment to Health
The threshold prerequisite is the existence of ``evidence that a
pollution source or combination of sources (including moving sources)
is presenting an imminent and substantial risk of harm. It should be
emphasized that endangerment means a risk or threat to human health,
and that EPA should not delay action until actual injury occurs. Such
delay would thwart the express intent of the Clean Air Act to protect
the Nation's air quality in the interest of the public health. Section
303 is a precautionary provision, aimed at the avoidance of potential
harm. This is best illustrated by the House Report on the Clean Act
Amendments of 1977:
In retaining the words ``imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons'', the committed intends
that the authority of this section not be used where the risk
of harm is completely speculative in nature or where the harm
threatened is insubstantial. However, . . . the committee
intends that this language be constructed by the courts and the
Administrator so as to give paramount importance to the
objective of protection of the public health. Administrative
and judicial implementation of this authority must occur early
enough to prevent the potential hazard from materializing.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, 95th Cong., Sess, 328 (1977) (emphasis
added).
There is also some judicial opinion supporting an interpretation of
the endangerment standard as being merely precautionary, and permitting
remedial action prior to the occurrence of any actual harm. In Ethyl
Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1976), the Court ruled that EPA had properly acted to regulate lead in
gasoline upon finding, under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, that
lead emissions would ``endanger'' as requiring only a finding that lead
emissions presented a ``significant risk'' of injury to the public.
There were no finding of the presence of actual harm. In upholding the
Agency's view of the ``endanger'' standard in Section 211, the Court
explained:
When one is endangered, harm is threatened; no actual injury
need ever occur. A statute allowing for regulation in the face
of danger is, necessarily, a precautionary statute. Regulatory
action may be taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed,
the very existence of such precautionary legislation would seem
to demand that regulatory action precede, and, optimally,
prevent, the perceived threat.
541 F.2d at 13. In Reserve Mining Company v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492 (8th cir. 1975), the court had
similarly interpreted an endangerment standard in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act in a case involving asbestos discharges into Lake
Superior. The court stated that ``Congress used the term
``endangering'' in a precautionary or preventive sense, and, therefore,
evidence of potential harm as well as actual harm comes within the
purview of that term.'' 514 F.2d at 528.
An important question for purposes of Section 303 of the Clean Air
Act, however, concerns the effect of the modifying phrase ``imminent
and substantial'' upon the meaning of ``endangerment.'' In Reserve
Mining, the Court stated that the ``term `endangering' . . . connotes a
lesser risk of harm than the phrase `imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons.' '' 514 F.2d at 528. Accord,
Ethyl Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d at 20
n.36. This issue is particularly important to EPA's ability under
Section 303 to abate suspected carcinogens, the harm from which might
take many years to manifest itself.
It is our position that in order to adequately safeguard public
health by being in a position to preclude an air pollution emergency at
its inception, the phrase ``imminent and substantial endangerment''
must be interpreted to refer to an imminent and substantial risk of
harm, no matter how distant the manifestation of harm may be. If there
exists a non-speculative risk of harm, the agency may properly act
under Section 303. This is consistent with the legislative history
quoted previously, and with the established definition of
``endangerment'' as referring to the risk of harm; not actual harm
itself. This is also consistent with the 1970 Senate Report on Section
303, which states:
The levels of concentration of air pollution agents or combination
of agents which substantially endanger health are levels which should
never be reached in any community. When the prediction can reasonably
be made that such elevated levels could be reached even for a short
period of time--that it is that they are imminent--an emergency action
plan should be implemented . . . S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 36 (1970). Thus, EPA may properly take action to abate air
emissions when a substantial risk of harm is about to arise. This is
several steps prior to the occurrence of any actual harm, but is
appropriate in view of the precautionary nature of Section 303.\2\
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\2\ This permits the Agency to act to seek abatement of emissions
reasonably believed to be carcinogenic but for which a harmful level,
and the time for harm from such emissions to become apparent, are both
uncertain.
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This approach is also crucial to the Agency's ability to abate
emissions which are believed to be but which are yet not confirmed as
dangerous to human health. In United States v. Vertac Chemical
Corporation, 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980), the Court found the
chemical dioxin, widely believed but not fully proven to be hazardous,
to be presenting a ``reasonable medical concern over public health''
and to be thereby constituting an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health under Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act. Id. at 885. An Agency response under Section 303 of the Clean Air
Act would be appropriate in the presence of pollutants reasonably
believed to be dangerous to human health. As with regard to any
pollutants sought to be abated under Section 303, EPA must be prepared
to document the basis of its belief in the danger of these pollutants.
If the Agency can show a ``reasonably medical concern'' created by the
suspect emissions, it will have met the ``imminent and substantial
endangerment'' test of Section 303.
Appendix L of the State Implementation Plan regulations (40 CFR
Part 51) outlines a phased emission reduction program for air pollution
emergencies involving criteria pollutants. In increasing degrees of
seriousness, the levels are ``alert'', ``warning'', ``emergency'', and
``significant harm to health.'' The ``significant harm to health''
levels are levels at which actual injury occurs and are levels that
should never be reached. It is not consistent with the intent of the
Act for the Regional Offices to wait until the levels of ``significant
harm to health,'' specified in 40 CFR 51.16(a), are reached prior to
initiating a Section 303 action. The ``emergency'' level is intended to
be the level at which action must be taken to avoid reaching levels of
significant harm. Generally speaking, it is at these designated
emergency levels that an imminent and substantial endangerment, i.e.,
an imminent and substantial risk to public health, is deemed to exist.
The ``warning'' and ``alert'' levels specified in Appendix L are
designed to ameliorate situations before the emergency stage by
application of moderate controls.
Under certain circumstances an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health may exist even though the Appendix L emergency
levels have not been reached. Accordingly, the concentrations outlined
in Appendix L as the ``emergency levels'' are only to be considered as
a guide in determining when an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health exists. Flexibility is essential and appropriate action must be
taken pursuant to Section 303 whenever it is necessary to prevent the
significant harm to health levels from being reached. For example, if
review of forecasted meteorological conditions indicate that a
situation is likely to deteriorate so rapidly that any action started
at the emergency level in Appendix L would come too late to be
effective in preventing the significant harm to health level from
being, reached, the Agency should act at such earlier time as is
necessary to allow for enforcement action to be effective. Moreover,
emergency conditions may be present even if there is no clear
prediction that specified endangerment levels will be reached. An
imminent and substantial endangerment to health may exist, for example,
where pollutant concentrations lower than established emergency levels
occur or are predicted to occur for an extended period of time.
With regard to non-criteria pollutants, sources of information on
dangerous concentrations may vary. Among these are standards
established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
for exposure to air pollutants inside the workplace. Although not
directly related to ambient air, these standards might provide a
starting point for assessing the risk to the public when such
pollutants, e.g., various organics, become airborne in a community.
Computerized health effects data bases, such as Toxline and Chemline,
might also be helpful. (These data bases are run by the National
Library of Medicine and may be accessed through the EPA Headquarters or
regional office libraries.) It will be necessary to gather scientific
and medical data, in addition to meteorological data, in order to find
an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health as a result
of emissions of non-criteria pollutants. The role of experts for this
purpose is discussed below.
2. State or Local Authorities Have Not Acted to Abate Pollution
Source(s)
A second prerequisite to initiating a Section 303 action is that
the Administrator receive evidence ``that appropriate State or local
authorities have not acted to abate such sources.'' Section 51.16(a) of
40 CFR requires that each State Implementation Plan for a priority I
region include a contingency plan which, as a minimum, provides for
taking any emission control actions necessary to prevent ambient air
pollutants concentrations of criterial pollutants from reaching levels
which could cause significant harm to the health of persons. More
specifically, the State Implementation Plans submitted to the
Administrator were: (1) to specify two or more stages of episode
criteria; (2) to provide for public announcements whenever any specific
stage has been determined to exist; and (3) to specify emission control
actions to be taken at each episode stage. (Section 51.16(g) of the
Implementation Plan regulations requires that the State Implementation
Plans for Priority II regions include, as a minimum, requirements (1)
and (2);) Although Section 51.16 addresses only SIP contingency plans
for criteria pollutants, the requirement of State or local failure to
abate applies also to conditions involving non-criteria pollutants. The
issue for purposes of implementing Section 303 is at what point it
becomes the duty or the prerogative of EPA to act to abate an air
pollution emergency.
Prevention and curtailment of an air pollution emergency is
initially the responsibility of State and local governments. EPA has
secondary responsibility for taking steps to avert emergency
conditions. The Regional Office's initial duty, therefore, is to
observe State and local abatement efforts (e.g., monitoring
implementation of an emergency episode plan) and to render assistance
should a State or locality request it. The Regional Office should take
action under Section 303 only if State and local action is either
unsuccessful or not forthcoming, as where a State lacks adequate
abatement resources or simply refuses to attempt to abate the
emergency. Under such circumstances, the Regional Office may assume
primary responsibility for curtailing the emergency or, preferably,
render technical assistance to the State's abatement efforts.
The time allowed for State and local government to take adequate
action prior to EPA's assuming primary responsibility will obviously
depend on the nature of the potential or actual emergency. The more the
endangerment would be increased by delay, the shorter this lead-time
should be. All that is required by Section 303, however, is that State
or local action be insufficient to abate or preclude the emergency
conditions, and that the appropriate State or local agency by consulted
in order to determine what action it intends to take, and whether the
information upon which EPA intends to act is accurate. The requirement
of consultation should not be viewed as an obstacle to effective action
by EPA. As explained in the House Report on the 1977 Clean Air
Amendments:
The consultation requirement is in furtherance of the
committee's intent that the Administrator not supplant
effective State or local emergency abatement action. However, .
. . if State and local efforts are not forthcoming in timely
fashion to abate the hazardous condition, this provision would
permit prompt action by the Administrator.
H.R. Rep. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1977). The
consultation requirement is therefore not a concurrence requirement,
but rather one of notification and corroboration prior to taking
action. The scope of action taken by EPA should be restricted to what
is necessary as a supplement to any action taken by State or local
authorities, as, e.g., where a State is able to implement only portions
of its SIP emergency episode plan, yet further action is needed to
curtail the episode.
relief available under section 303
The foregoing statutory prerequisites apply to both the initiation
of a civil action to abate an air pollution emergency and to the
issuance of an order by the Administrator directly to the source of the
hazardous air emissions, demanding a curtailment of those emissions.
These two forms of relief--the civil action for an injunction and the
administrative order--are briefly discussed below.
1. Injunctive Relief
Section 303 permits the Administrator to seek injunctive relief in
a Federal district court ``upon receipt of evidence that a pollution
source or combination of sources (including moving sources) is
presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
persons, and that the appropriate State or local authorities have not
acted to abate such sources . . .'' Pursuant to the Memorandum of
Understanding between EPA and the Department of Justice, codified in
Section 305 of the Clean Air Act, the action would be filed on behalf
of the Administrator by the U.S. Attorney for the appropriate Federal
court district. EPA Regional and Headquarters Offices, however, have
the responsibility of providing all data and evidentiary material to
the Department of Justice.
As will be discussed more fully below, it is essential to a
successful civil action that expert testimony by elicited, either in
the form of affidavits or through expert appearances at depositions or
trial, regarding the risk of harmful effects to the health of persons
from exposure to the relevant pollutant. This is especially so in the
case of an emergency involving a non-criterial pollutant, the harmful
levels or effects of which have not already been established by EPA or
other agencies. A diligent effort should be made to obtain evidence,
perhaps from citizen complaints or hospital records, that the
particular emission sought to be controlled has in fact already caused
adverse effects to the health of some individuals. Such evidence, while
not essential to a Section 303 action, could be helpful in
substantiating an imminent and substantial endangerment. Among the
experts to be consulted concerning hazardous pollutants and the
presence and extent of any adverse health effects are physicians,
epidemiologists, and toxicologists.
In addition, expert meteorological testimony is needed in order to
assess the magnitude of hazardous pollutant concentrations and to
pinpoint the source of the dangerous emissions, if not already known as
in an area of numerous industrial point sources), and to ascertain the
expected geographical breadth of the emergency, based upon such
parameters as current and forecasted wind speed, wind direction,
atmospheric stability, temperature, and precipitation.\3\
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\3\ Atmospheric stability refers the degree of turbulence in the
atmosphere.
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The meteorological expert may also be able to predict the duration
of an emergency episode by determining the time which will elapse
before changed meteorological conditions might substantially improve
the dispersion of the hazardous pollutant concentrations.
Also, experts in industrial processes and pollution controls will
be needed in order to explain to a court the nature of the polluting
process and what abatement options are available, e.g., plant shutdown
versus reduced production. In any action for an injunction, a court can
be expected to provide no more relief than is necessary, and place as
light a burden as possible on the emitting source, in providing for
effective curtailment of the air pollution emergency. The industrial
expert will thus play a crucial role in the shaping of judicial relief
in a Section 303 action.
This testimony--medical, scientific, meteorological, and
technical--is essential to prevailing in a Section 303 suit. The burden
of proof will be on the Government, which must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant is the source of air pollutants
which, by their very nature or because of existing meteorological
conditions, have caused harm to individuals or are presenting and
imminent and substantial risk of such harm. In order to assure the
credibility of this testimony, sampling personnel should be prepared to
testify to the reliability and quality assurance of the air samples
evaluated by the experts.
The procedure for seeking an injunction are set forth in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65 (copy attached). In the event
that immediate relief is needed, Rule 65 provides for temporary
injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction which can be
obtained from a Federal district court, after a hearing, in order to
reduce further emissions of the suspect pollutant below emergency
levels until a full trial can be held. The Government should be
prepared to have its experts testify in court if preliminary or
permanent injunction is sought.
The following should be kept in mind as elements of proof necessary
to obtaining a preliminary injunction:
(1) Absent immediate injunctive relief, irreparable harm will be
caused by the polluting source(s); (2) this harm would outweigh any
harm to the source(s) from the granting of relief requiring the
source(s) to abate emissions; (3) the risk to public health is
sufficient to make success on the merits and the granting of a
permanent injunction likely; and (4) the public interest necessitates
immediate relief. See 7-pt. 2 Moores Federal Practice para, 65.04
(1980); See also United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484
F. Supp. 138.144 (N.D. Ind. 1980). In addition, Rule 65 provides for
injunctive relief in the form of 10-day temporary restraining order
(TRO), which can be granted without a hearing while a motion for
preliminary injunction is prepared.\4\
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\4\ Only once has a TRO been requested under Section 303. The
incident occurred in 1971, in Birmingham, AL. After local efforts to
curtail emissions from several sources failed, a TRO was requested and
granted under Section 303, requiring various process modifications and
cessations.
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Expert testimony in the form of affidavit should suffice for the
purpose of obtaining a TRO.
The proof necessary to obtain a TRO is that immediate and
irreparable injury will occur if injunctive relief is withheld until
the defendant can be given notice and an opportunity to appear. Rule 65
implies that a hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction should
take place as soon as possible after the granting of a TRO. Id., Para.
65.05-65.08; see also 4 West's Federal Forms Section 5297 (1970).
2. Administrative Order
Prior to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, the only method of
enforcement provided in Section 303 was injunctive relief from a
Federal district court upon a showing of imminent and substantial
endangerment from air pollutant emissions. The 1977 Amendments left
this authority in place and added a provision authorizing the
Administrator to issue an order to a source to take steps to curtail
its emissions in the event ``it is not practicable to assure prompt
protection of the health of persons solely by commencement of . . . a
civil action.'' Within twenty-four hours of issuing the order, however,
the Administrator must file a suit for injunctive relief, or the order
will expire. Upon such filing, the court may then extend the life of
the order pending litigation. Violation of the order may be penalized
up to $5,000 per day per violation. This penalty may be sought in a
civil action brought to enforce the order.\5\
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\5\ This is analogous to the provision in Section 113(b) of the
Clean Air Act for a civil action to enforce, and seek penalties for,
violation of, an order issued under Section 113(a) to comply with
emission limitations.
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Also in such an action, a source may challenge the Administrator's
basis for issuing the order.
This administrative order mechanism was intended by Congress to
enhance EPA's emergency response capability even beyond that provided
by the TRO process previously discussed. As explained in the 1977 House
Report:
Even more prompt action may be necessary where pollution
levels exceed the never to be exceeded levels without prior
forecast that this may occur . . . The committed bill reflects
the committee's determination to confer completely adequate
authority to deal promptly and effectively with emergency
situations which jeopardize the health of persons. Thus, the
section provides that if it is not practicable to assure prompt
protection of health solely by commencement of a civil action,
the Administrator may issue such orders as may be necessary for
this purpose.
H.R. Rep. No.95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 327-28 (1977) (emphasis
added). The administrative order is thus an available enforcement
mechanism in those instances where even a TRO might be issued too late
to effectively curtail an endangerment to public health. Such
situations might be those involving emissions that are hazardous even
in very limited duration of exposure, rendering a TRO too late to be
fully effective, or situations which, although potentially quite
harmful, are expected to be of very short duration, such that the
emissions would cease before the TRO could issue e.g., the demolition
of an asbestos-lined building). In such situations, the time required
to gather the expert evidence in support of a TRO might defeat efforts
to avert adverse public health effects, absent a more immediate
enforcement mechanism.
The administrative order is just such a mechanism. Expert testimony
is not required for issuance of an administrative order. What is
needed, however, is evidence which reasonably leads the Administrator
to believe that certain air emissions from particular sources are
creating an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health.
This evidence might be in the form of emissions data combined with
adverse meteorological reports and medical bulletins. Provided the
informal consultation requirement has been met, the Administrator may
issue an order calling for abatement of emissions by whatever means the
Administrator determines are necessary under the circumstances of the
case. Because of the potential adverse economic impact of such an order
upon the source, the order should require no more than what is clearly
necessary to curtailing hazardous emissions. The fact that the order
may only last twenty-four hours, during which time a TRO application
and civil suit can feasibly be filed, and that the basis of the order
may be challenged by any source subject to it in a proceeding to
enforce the order, are indicative of Congress' intent that the order be
immediately available although not necessarily supported by the best
possible expert credible evidence.
Note that the administrative order may also be used to require
additional sampling or monitoring by the suspected source with a view
toward abating its emissions. This additional data can then be utilized
in a subsequent civil action, if such an action is necessary to
abatement.
Additional sampling and monitoring may also be required of a source
through the use of Section 114 of the Clean Air Act. Section 113(a)(3)
permits EPA to issue an order to a source if it fails to comply with a
requirement of 114. Such an order is not effective until the person to
whom it is issued has had an opportunity to confer with EPA.
Thus, Section 114 provides a mechanism for requiring source
sampling and monitoring with a much lower standard of proof of
violation than that required by Section 303. EPA may issue an order
requiring sampling and monitoring under Section 114 for the purpose
``(i) of developing or assisting in the development of any
implementation plan under Section 110 or 111(d), any standard of
performance under Section 111, (ii) of determining whether any person
is in violation of any such standard or any requirement of such a plan,
or (iii) carrying out any provision of this Act . . .'' This is
contrasted with the requirement under Section 303 that EPA have
evidence that a source ``is presenting an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons, and that appropriate State or
local authorities have not acted to abate such sources.'' However,
while the standard for issuing a 114 order is lower, a 114 testing
order takes longer to enforce because it must be enforced by the
issuance of a 113(a)(3) order after the source has been offered an
opportunity to confer.
delegations for issuing administrative orders and judicial complaints
under section 303
I. Administrative Orders
Pursuant to Delegation 7-49, authority to issue administrative
orders under Section 303 rests with the Regional Administrators and the
Assistant Administrator for Air, Noise, and Radiation. The Regional
Administrators must consult with the Associate Enforcement Counsel for
Air before issuing such orders. The Assistant Administrator for Air,
Noise and Radiation must consult in advance with the Associate
Enforcement Counsel for Air and notify any affected Regional
Administrator or their designees before issuing orders. Because speed
is of the essence in issuing administrative orders under Section 303,
the Headquarters concurrences card be issued by telephone and followed
up later in writing.
II. Referral of Civil Actions for Injunctive Relief
Pursuant to Delegation 7-22-A, all referrals to the Department of
Justice of requests for civil actions for emergency TRO's must be made
the Special Counsel for Enforcement. The Special Counsel for
Enforcement must notify the Assistant Administrator for Air, Noise and
Radiation and the appropriate Regional Administrator when a case is
referred to the Department of Justice.
forms for obtaining injunctive relief motion for temporary
restraining order
The United States of America, by its undersigned attorneys, by
authorization of the Attorney General and acting at the request of the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, moves that this
Court, in order to prevent irreparable injury to the United States and
its citizens, enter immediately an order to restrain temporarily the
defendants set for this in the complaint from discharging excessive
(pollutant) into the ambient air pending action by this Court on the
complaint filed this day by the United States in this cause, and in
support of the motion, states:
Defendants are discharging from their plants and/or installations
at (city, State), substantial amounts of (pollutant), into the ambient
air. Such discharges (in combination with adverse weather conditions)
have caused or are contributing to, concentrations of (pollutant), in
the ambient air exceedings a level of (number) (units) of (pollutant).
This level presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
health of persons.
The appropriate State and local authorities have diligently
attempted to decrease the level of contamination in the atmosphere.
However, defendants continue to discharge (pollutant) into the ambient
atmosphere causing imminent and substantial endangerment to the health
of persons.
The presence of such levels of (pollutant) is a present and
continuing danger to human health. Unless the discharges of (pollutant)
are immediately restrained, the health of people in the area will
continue to suffer immediate and irreparable harm.
Plaintiff further moves for said Temporary Restraining Order to be
issued forthwith and without notice, on the ground that the discharge
constitute and imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
persons.
Therefore, in view of the immediate danger to public health that
the defendants are contributing to by the release of (pollutants) into
the ambient air, plaintiff prays that the Court enter a temporary
restraining order immediately.
temporary restraining order
This cause came to be heard on the motion of plaintiff, upon the
complaint herein and affidavits attached thereto, for a temporary
restraining order; and, it appearing to the court therefrom that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage will result to the
plaintiff before notice can be given and the defendant or his attorney
can be heard in opposition to the granting of a temporary restraining
order for the reason that continued levels of pollution by (pollutant)
will cause irreparable damage to the health of persons, it is
ORDERED, that defendants set out in the complaint filed herein,
their agents, servants, employees and attorneys and all persons
in,active concert or participation with them are hereby restrained from
causing or contributing the alleged pollution and each defendant
separately must take the following action:
(List each defendant separately and state what immediate action
that defendant must take).
ORDERED, that this order expire within 10 days after entry, unless
within said time it is for good cause shown extended for a longer
period, and it is further
ORDERED, that this order expire within 10 days after entry, unless
within said time it is for good cause shown extended for a longer
period, and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiffs complaint be set for hearing on
preliminary injunction on (date) at (time) of that day or as soon
thereafter as counsel can be heard, in the United States District
courtroom in the city of ______, State of______.
This order issued at city, state, this ______ day of (month),
(year).
complaint (for civil action)
The United States of America, by its undersigned attorneys and by
authority of the Attorney General alleges that:
1. This is a civil action to enjoin the above names defendant(s)
from discharging any (pollutant) into the ambient atmosphere from their
manufacturing operations in the (city, state) area. Such discharges
contribute to the imminent and substantial endangerment to the health
of persons as determined by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency. Authority to bring this action is in the Department
of Justice by 42 USC 7605.
2. This court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action
pursuant to 28 USC 1345.
3. Defendant(s) are corporations doing business in (city, state)
within the ______ District of (Federal district court).
4. During normal operation of the defendants' plants the defendants
discharge (pollutant) into the ambient air.
5. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency has
received evidence that a combination of pollution sources, including
the defendant's plants, are presenting an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons of discharging matter into the
ambient air.
6. The appropriate State and local authorities have diligently
attempted to decrease the level of contamination in the atmosphere.
However, the various sources emitting (pollutant) in significant
quantities, including the defendants plants, continue to discharge
(pollutant) into the ambient atmosphere to levels that cause
significant harm to the health of human beings.
7. The average (pollutant) level in the ambient air for the past
forty-eight (48) hours is approximately (number) (units). Such levels
for such periods of time are harmful to the health of human beings.
8. The discharges of matter by the defendants should be eliminated
pursuant to Section 303 of the Clean Air act which provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, the
Administrator upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source or
combination of sources (including moving sources) is presenting an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons, and
that appropriate State or local authorities have not acted at abate
such sources, may bring on behalf of the United States in the
appropriate United States district court to immediately restrain any
person causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the
emission of air pollutants causing or contributing to such pollution or
to take such other action as may be necessary. If it is not practicable
to assure prompt protection of the health of persons solely by
commencement of such a civil action, the Administrator may issue such
orders as may be necessary to protect the health of persons who are, or
may be, affected by such pollution source (or sources). Prior to taking
any action under this section, the Administrator shall consult with the
State and local authorities in order to confirm the correctness of the
information on which the action proposed to be taken is based and to
ascertain the action which such authorities are, or will be, taking.
Such order shall be effective for a period of not more than 24 hours
unless the Administrator brings an action under the first sentence of
this subsection before the expiration of such period. Whenever the
Administrator brings such an action within such period, such order
shall be effective for a period of 48 hours or such longer period as
maybe authorized by the court pending litigation or thereafter.
(b) Any person who will fully violate or fails or refuses to comply
with, any order issued by the Administrator under subsection (a) may,
in an action brought in the appropriate United States district court to
enforce such order, be fined not more than $5,000 for each day during
which such violation occurs or failure to comply continues.
9. The continuous emission of (pollutant) into the ambient air the
defendants contributes to the present situation which, if allowed to
continue, will cause significant harm to the health of persons in the
city area.
10. The United States of America and its citizens will suffer
immediate and irreparable harm to their health unless the defendants
are immediately restrained from discharging (pollutant) into.
wherefore, the united states prays
a. That the defendants, their officers, directors, agents,
servants, employees, attorneys, successors, and assigns, and each of
them cease the discharge of (pollutant) into the ambient air in a
manner prescribed by this Court and not discharge such matter
thereafter unless pursuant to instruction to do so from this Court.
b. That costs and disbursements of this action be awarded to the
plaintiff; and
c. That this Court grant such other and further relief as it seem
just and proper.
(no signature necessary)
united states environmental protection agency region
(Address)
IN THE MATTER OF ______
(source)
DOCKET NO (______ )
SECTION 303 OF THE CLEAN ______)
AIR ACT, AS AMENDED, ______)
42 U.S.C. Section 7401 et seq., ______)
42 U.S.C. Section 7603 ______)
______
The Regional Administrator for Region (______) of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) makes the following Findings of
Fact, reaches the following Conclusion of Law and Issues the following
Order:
findings of fact
1. The Administrator of EPA his delegated the authority vested in
him by Section 303 of the Clean Air Act (the Act) as amended, 42 U.S.C.
Section 7401 et seq., 42 U.S.C. Section 7603, to the Regional
Administrator for Region (______).
2. Section 303 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 7603 provides that,
upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination of
sources is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
health of persons and that appropriate State or local authorities have
not acted to abate such sources, the Administrator may issue such
orders as may be necessary to protect the health of persons who are, or
may be, affected by such pollution source or sources.
3. Defendants are discharging from their plants and/or
installations at (city/State), substantial amounts of (pollutant), into
the ambient air.
Such discharges (in combination with adverse weather conditions)
have caused or are contributing to, concentrations of (pollutant)), in
the ambient air exceeding a level of (number) (units) of (pollutant).
This level presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
health of persons.
4. (source) is a source which is presenting an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health of persons.
5.(state) and (local jurisdiction) authorities have not acted to
abate (list sources).
OR
(state) and (local jurisdiction) authorities have diligently
attempted decrease the level of contamination in the atmosphere.
However, defendants continue to discharge (pollutant) into the ambient
atmosphere causing imminent and substantial endangerment to the health
of persons.
conclusion of law
1. The Regional Administrator for Region ( ) The Regional
Administrator, is vested with the authority of the Administrator under
Section 303 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 7603.
2. Source(s) have been found by the Regional Administrator to be
presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
persons and to be an appropriate subject for the issuance of an order
under Section 303 of the Act.
order
The Regional Administrator for Region ( ) hereby orders that
defendants set out in this order, their agents, servants, employees and
attorneys and all persons in active concert or participation with them
are hereby ordered to refrain from causing or contributing to levels of
pollution that will cause irreparable damage to the health of persons
and each defendant separately must take the following action:
1. (List each defendant separately and state what immediate action
that defendant must take.)
2. This order shall be effective for a period of not more than
twenty-four hours unless the Regional Administrator files a civil
action on behalf of the United States in the appropriate United States
district court to immediately restrain any person causing or
contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the emission of air
pollutants causing or contributing to such pollution or to take such
other actions as may be necessary.
3. This Order is effective immediately upon receipt by defendants.
The Regional Administrator for Region ( ) hereby issues the above-
identified Order which shall become effective as provided therein.
__________
Statement of Elizabeth H. Berger, Resident, New York City
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Voinovich, committee members,
staff members, esteemed panelists and neighbors, thank you for inviting
me to tell you about the doubts, concerns and questions which have
confronted those of us living and working in Lower Manhattan every day
since September 11th. We live in a time of deep uncertainty, but are
required to make countless decisions that may affect our health and
that of our children for decades to come.
I have lived south of Fulton Street for more than 19 years. My
husband and I bought our first home here, brought our children home
here from the hospital and helped site the local nursery school. We
remember life downtown before there was a single all-night deli (it
opened on Fulton Street for Op Sail in 1986), when restaurants closed
early Friday evening and didn't reopen until Monday lunch (except the
Roxy Diner on John Street, which stayed open through Saturday night),
when the closest supermarkets were in New Jersey. In those days, we
schlepped bags on the subway and had everything else delivered, basic
things most New Yorkers take for granted: dry cleaning, fresh
vegetables, laundry detergent.
But we loved being downtown. We loved the huge buildings on the
narrow, winding streets, we loved being close to the water and really
knowing in some powerful, visceral way that Manhattan was an island. We
loved the views, all the subways and weird bus lines, the scale and the
feeling that we were at the center and beginning of everything.
We loved the way we and other downtown pioneers turned a business
district into a community. This was especially true as we had children:
the World Trade Center was our indoor play space, our mall, our
theatre. It was where we flew kites, went rollerskating, learned to
ride two-wheelers, and the only place to buy a decent loaf of bread.
Dancers performed there, and musicians, and Ernie and Bert. My
children, who are 5 and 2, spent part of every day of their lives at
the World Trade Center.
This is why it is so absurd to heed the call to return to normal.
There is no more normal for all of us.
I saw the first plane before it hit. Our building was evacuated. It
was 8 days before we knew that it was structurally sound, another few
weeks before we were assured that 1 Liberty wouldn't topple on us. That
entire time, I thought not of the apartment we might lose--of our home,
the 5,000 family photos, the important papers, my grandmother's
jewelry, my children's drawings and my husband-the-writer's life work--
but of the destruction of our community: 20 years work gone in 18
minutes.
The theme of my remarks is uncertainty, but I never doubted that we
would return. We helped build downtown, and we'll help rebuild it. It
was after the city recertified our building for reoccupancy about 6
weeks after the attack, that I realized that the question was not
whether by how. From a health perspective, there has been little
guidance and fewer answers.
When I first returned to our apartment, I just sat down and cried.
It was a mess and we spent 2 hours cleaning it--not the dust that
covered everything, thinly in some places, like when the butler in
English movies goes upstairs and reopens the ballroom that has been
closed for 10 years, and thickly in others, like a blanket--but the
French toast that had been sitting on the table since my husband and
son had hurriedly left 2 weeks before. It didn't occur to us to wear
masks or take off our shoes. We just needed to straighten up. Recall,
in this regard, that it is the city's job to certify for structural
integrity, not for environmental safety; I knew this, but didn't quite
get what it meant until later.
We then began the great education process which has made downtown
residents experts in products and services we never knew existed: FEMA,
HEPA, OSHA. We all learned fairly quickly which were the best cleaning
companies and scientific testers, but what no one, to this day, can
agree on is what clean means and how to measure it.
It took eight guys in white suits and respirators 5 days to clean
my apartment. But is it clean? No one tells you what to keep and what
to toss. In October, I attended a panel discussion at Cooper Union
featuring leaders in the field of pediatric environmental health--who
knew it existed--including, Dr. Landrigan's associate, and among six
doctors there were seven opinions, ranging, in essence, from throw it
in the washing machine to get out of town and don't look back.
What's in the stuff? Every day the air smelled different and the
winds blew a different course.
We reluctantly made our own rules, divined from press reports, high
school science as we remembered it and the advice of friends and
neighbors. But even that was mixed. One scientist friend had his
apartment tested and declared it safe for his family; the managing
agent of his building, however, reported high levels of asbestos and
lead. In the end, 248 stuffed animals, 8 handmade baby quilts, 5
mattresses, a trousseau's worth of sheets and towels, a kitchen full of
food and 13 leaf-and-lawn bags of toys went into our trash, but not our
books, draperies and upholstered furniture or our clothes, though the
bill to dry clean them industrially was $16,500 (and they all came back
on individual wire hangers with individual plastic covers and
individual twist-ties). We washed the walls, but didn't repaint. Some
people we know repainted, but kept their mattresses. Some people kept
their stuffed animals but threw away their furniture. Some people kept
what they couldn't bear to lose and got rid of the rest. We have still
not decided what to do about our floors: will stripping, sanding and
resealing them contain the toxic mix of asbestos, fiberglass, concrete,
human remains, heavy metals and the vague ``particulates,'' or just
release more of it into our indoor air?
Indoor air quality is a touchy issue in our building. Converted in
the late 1970's, we have a primitive central air system that circulates
air from apartment to apartment. Some people in our building hired
professional cleaners. Others did it themselves, and a few locked the
door and didn't come back for a while. After the guys in the suits
left, we sealed our windows, filtered our vents and bought six triple-
HEPA-filtered air purifiers, which we run 24 hours a day. My clean air
is making its way through the building, as is that of my less
fastidious neighbors.
The same is true for outdoor air. All of our building's systems and
public spaces have been professionally cleaned, following City DEP
guidelines, yet we are surrounded by Class B commercial buildings that
have either not been cleaned or have been cleaned summarily. We live on
the 11th floor, and see the porters, without protective gear, up on the
roofs with push brooms. That stuff, too, is coming through our vents.
My son's nursery school vigorously cleaned its outdoor play space, then
stopped using it. PS 234 is now back, but the kids are not allowed to
run in the yard. We don't live in a bubble. If the outdoor air's not
good enough to breathe, how can we breath it inside?
In our case, much of this debate has been academic. The mantra of
real estate is ``location, location, location'' and, given ours, we
decided that it would be foolish to return our two young children to
their home until the fires went out. Although we were urged to return
to normal, we were chastened by early reports of high asbestos and
heavy metal readings in the Warm Zone; though we were told we were in
the Financial District Zone, our building's front door was 20 feet from
the fence.
Our view was controversial. It was based on intuition, not hard
science or ``facts.'' Our pediatrician didn't necessarily agree.
Several of our neighbors with children were back. But every time we
waffled, something else would happen: the benzene plume, high asbestos
readings on the debris, the fire fighters' cough. We have only been
home for 3 weeks. All of us are happier, but are we safe?
We've opened our windows, but are avoiding the park. Some of our
neighbors have HEPA window screens. Some still have the duct tape.
Others have put their apartments on the market.
What's the right thing to do? Ours is a culture based on authority,
and to date there has been none. We would do whatever we needed to do,
if only we knew what that was. In this regard, the failure of the
Federal regulators to recognize that ours is a residential community
and that OSHA standards simply do not apply is an outrage. Burning
computers, fluorescent bulbs, copiers, electrolytic fluid and bodies .
. . let me tell you, everyone downtown knows that we are the baseline
of the 30-year study on what happens when worlds collide. As a parent,
that is the most frightening responsibility I have ever faced.
The attack on the World Trade Center was an attack on America, and
has led me to consider the whole idea of being American in a new and
unironic way. What I do find ironic, however, is that the only
authority I have found with respect to cleaning up the mess is William
James, the father of Pragmatism, arguably the only American
contribution to world philosophy. As the Harvard professor said in a
lecture he gave right here in New York City in 1907, at Columbia
University, ``we have to live today by what truth we can get today, and
be ready tomorrow to call it falsehood.'' I first read that as a 19-
year-old college student, and thought it was pretty cynical stuff. Now,
as a 41-year-old mother of two, while I'm horrified by the implications
for my children's future, I know it is the only way we can live.
Thank you.
______
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Memorandum
January 11, 2002
Subject: LPreliminary Assessment, Asbestos in Manhattan Compared to
Libby Superfund Site; Why Cleanup of WTC Contamination is Ineffective
to Date; Advantages of Cleanup Under Superfund Statute; and Summary
Risk Assessment for WTC Fallout
From: LCate Jenkins, Ph.D.
To: LAffected Parties and Responsible Officials
This memorandum compares data for asbestos in settled dusts and air
inside residences in the town of Libby, MT, which is designated as a
Superfund site due to this residential contamination, and similar data
for the interior of buildings in Lower Manhattan contaminated by
fallout from the World Trade Center (WTC). The reasons why the current
cleanup of WTC dusts inside buildings is ineffective is also discussed,
along with the advantages in addressing the cleanup through the
Superfund statute.
In addition, this memorandum provides a summary of calculated
cancer risks for occupancy of Lower Manhattan buildings, which was
performed in more detail in my December 19, 2001 memo.1
Whereas high level EPA and NYC officials have stated in sworn testimony
and to the press that there were no such risks,2 the
appropriate offices in EPA have been effectively proscribed from
conducting such a preliminary evaluation.
The analyses, projections, and opinions in this memorandum
represent my own professional judgment and do not necessarily represent
the official position of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and
has not been reviewed by EPA. This memorandum is not intended as any
final or definitive assessment risks from continued and past exposures
to asbestos in Manhattan.
1. asbestos contamination in buildings, manhattan compared to libby
superfund site
In Libby, MT, interiors of homes and residential soils have been
contaminated with asbestos from an adjacent vermiculite mining
operation. Homes have vermiculite insulation in attics, and vermiculite
was used for gardening. In addition, there are numerous waste piles of
vermiculite in the area.3 On December 20, 2001, the Governor
of Montana designated Libby for fast-track listing as a Superfund site
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act
(CERCLA).4
In Lower Manhattan, interiors of residences and offices were
contaminated with asbestos, fiberglass, fine particulate matter, and
possibly significant concentrations of other toxic materials from the
fallout from the implosion of the World Trade Center (WTC).
Tables at the end of this memo provide levels of asbestos in
settled dusts and air in two apartments before cleanup from the Ground
Zero Task Force Study,5 and levels of asbestos in settled
dusts in one apartment after cleanup from a study by the New York
Environmental Law and Justice Project.6
Use of ``PCM-equivalent'' asbestos data from Manhattan for comparison
to Libby
In order to compare asbestos levels found in Manhattan with that
from Libby, the data in the tables is for asbestos fibers longer than 5
m, width greater than 0.25 m, and an aspect ration
greater than or equal to 3 to 1. This is called ``PCM-equivalent
asbestos.'' The data from Libby only includes asbestos levels that are
PCM-equivalent. The Ground Zero Task Force Study7 of WTC
contamination provided not only total asbestos levels, but also PCM-
equivalent asbestos levels.
The reason why only fibers longer than 5 m (PCM-
equivalent) are given in the Libby risk assessment is because many
believe that asbestos fibers shorter than this cannot cause cancer,
because they can be eliminated from the body. Not all agree.
Comparison of Libby and Lower Manhattan data
As can be seen from the above tables, the asbestos contamination in
Lower Manhattan, up to seven blocks away from Ground Zero, is
comparable or higher than that found in Libby, Montana, a designated
Superfund site.
Most of the available data for Manhattan is before even a
rudimentary cleanup. One particular piece of data, the residue inside
an air vent at 105 Duane St., three blocks outside the boundary where
EPA said there was any contamination (7 blocks from Ground Zero), is
particularly alarming. This air duct sample was taken on December 3,
2001, long after all cleanups that had been thought necessary were
completed.
The highest level of dust inside a building in Manhattan was 79,000
structures (asbestos fibers) per square centimeter (s/cm2).
This was at 45 Warren St., an apartment building 4 blocks away from
Ground Zero where all of the windows faced north, away from the World
Trade Towers, locked in on all other 3 sides by other buildings. To the
casual observer, this apartment would not be described as being heavily
contaminated. There is a color photograph included at the beginning of
the study,8 where a dining room table showing only a light
dusting from WTC fallout, the dark grain of the wood clearly visible.
In comparison, the highest concentration of interior dust found
inside a home at Libby was only 3658 s/cm2. This means the
highest amount of asbestos lying on a surface in Manhattan was 22 times
that ever found in Libby.
The logical question thus arises: Why is EPA leaving people to
their own devices in the cleanup of New York City, while intervening to
clean homes at taxpayers expense in Libby because of an ``imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health''?
2. ineffective cleanup of wtc asbestos to date
To date, the cleanup of the WTC fallout containing asbestos,
fiberglass, fine particulate matter, and possible significant
concentrations of other toxic materials is not proceeding efficiently
or effectively.
Asbestos does not leave buildings with ordinary cleaning methods
The asbestos contamination is not going to leave buildings in
Manhattan by itself with ordinary cleaning any more than it will in
Libby. In the case of Libby, MT, the EPA stated:9
This indicates that there are multiple locations around Libby
that are likely to contain asbestos fibers in indoor dust, and
that this dust may serve as an on-going source of potential
exposure for residents.
Note that the dusts inside Libby residences were found to have the
highest calculated cancer risks for the Superfund-designated site.
Complex regulatory strategies and whole environmental statutes
address the necessary protocols for asbestos abatement inside
buildings, just because it will not go away by itself after a few
weeks, months, or years with ordinary cleaning measures. The National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS) under the
Clean Air Act and the regulatory requirements under the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act (AHERA) both include rigorous methods to
stringently clean every surface, like inside air ducts, and removal of
carpets, drapes, and upholstered furniture which cannot be effectively
cleaned, even AFTER the offending asbestos objects such as insulation,
ceiling tiles, and asbestos floor tiles have been removed from the
building. During these abatements, trained certified personnel must be
wearing HEPA respirators and protective clothing. Etc.
EPA's crude air testing cannot detect hazardous levels of asbestos
EPA has demonstrated a willingness and promptness in responding to
concerns of citizens by coming out to apartments and other buildings
and conducting an air test for asbestos. This test is called the
``AHERA TEM clearance test,'' which stands for Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act transmission electron microscopy. EPA is using
this AHERA TEM clearance test and claiming that if is shows 70 or fewer
asbestos structures per square millimeter, then the air is
safe:10
In evaluating data from the World Trade Center and the
surrounding areas, EPA is using a protective standard under
AHERA, the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, to evaluate
the risk from asbestos in the outdoor and indoor air. This is a
very stringent standard . . . The number of structures--
material that has asbestos fibers on or in it--is then counted.
The measurements must be 70 or fewer structures per square
millimeter . . . .
This statement by EPA is false and a gross misrepresentation of the
AHERA regulations which do not in any way claim that a simple air test
alone showing 70 or fewer structures per square millimeter can be used
directly to determine if air is safe.
AHERA TEM clearance test not sensitive enough to detect
hazardous levels of asbestos
The first, and fatal problem in using the AHERA TEM test is that it
is quite insensitive. It cannot detect airborne asbestos at levels that
are shown to cause excessive cancers.
First, it is necessary to explain a very confusing way in which the
results of the AHERA TEM test are reported. There are three different
ways to express the results, using one or all of the following units of
measure:
structures per square millimeter (s/mm2)
structures per milliliter (s/mL)
structure per cubic centimeter (s/cm3)
The ``structures per square millimeter'' unit is the value the
laboratory gets first, before converting it to structures per
milliliter. The lab needs to use the volume of air pulled across the
filter to make this conversion. Since a ``milliliter'' is the exact
same volume as a ``cubic centimeter,'' the last two units are identical
and used interchangeably. See my December 19 memo for a more detailed
explanation.
EPA has been giving test results using the ``structures per square
millimeter'' units. EPA will typically describe results as ``below 70
structures per square millimeter'' or however much was detected above
70. But what does 70 s/mm2 mean? This is not a SAFE level.
This is only the lowest level that the method can detect. This 70
structures per square millimeter (s/mm2) level is equivalent
to 0.02 structures per milliliter (s/mL):
The 0.02 s/mL (which is equivalent to 70 s/mm2) level is
not a safe level. It is only the lowest level that the method can
detect because of the method background (there is asbestos in the
cellulose filters used to collect the air). The EPA has determined that
a concentration of asbestos in air that is 0.0004 s/mL will result in
an increased risk of cancer of 1 in 10 thousand.11 An
elevated cancer risk of over 1 in ten thousand is the action level, or
trigger, for EPA to declare an imminent and substantial endangerment to
public health under CERCLA, as explained in Section 4 of this memo.
Thus, the AHERA TEM clearance text can only tell if the air has 50
times the safe level (or 10 times the safe level if it is assumed that
only 20 percent of the asbestos is in the hazardous size range called
``PCM-equivalent.'').
Air testing under passive conditions will not detect ``real
world'' asbestos levels
EPA is conducting the AHERA TEM clearance test under passive
conditions when the dusts are not being disturbed. As discussed in the
Ground Zero Task Force study12 and my December 19
memo,13 any activities which stir up dusts will result in
vastly higher airborne asbestos concentrations.
I suggest that when a Government Agency comes out to test air for
asbestos, be prepared to have the air drawn from a ``human activity
simulator.'' Have a large box with the open end sitting on carpeting or
on a couch that was contaminated. Have a plunger like a broom stick
mounted to a flat board about 1 foot square. (Use a broom if you have
to.) Put the plunger through a hole in the top of the box. You will be
making something the equivalent to a butter churn. Have 3-inch holes on
both sides of the box so that air can enter and exit. Then, the EPA or
NYC health inspector can draw air through the hole in one side of the
box while you are beating the carpet or the couch with the paddle. If
EPA tells you that this violates the testing protocols, reply that even
using the AHERA TEM test in lieu of certified professional abatement
violates the protocols.
EPA's air testing violates the AHERA protocols
By even performing the AHERA TEM clearance test in lieu of
professional asbestos abatement, EPA is violating the AHERA
regulations. This is because the AHERA TEM clearance test is only
allowed in conjunction with a whole range of asbestos abatement
procedures that go on prior to even taking the test.14 It
was designed to catch only gross contamination problems caused by some
worker on the asbestos abatement project, such as emptying one bag of
asbestos contaminated material into another inside a room that had
previously been carefully abated.
EPA use of 1 percent asbestos level for cleanups will result in
ineffective cleanups
There is another reason why the cleanup will be ineffective. Both
EPA15 and the NYC Department of Environmental Protection
(NYC DEP) are claiming that only dusts over 1 percent asbestos or more
are hazardous. The NYC Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP)
advised building owners16 to test dusts inside buildings to
see if they were over 1 percent. They said that if the dusts were over
1 percent, a professional asbestos abatement contractor should be used
for an inspection and cleaning:
EPA is using the 1 percent definition in evaluating exterior
dust samples in the Lower Manhattan area near the World Trade
Center. All affected landlords have been instructed to test
dust samples within their buildings utilizing this standard.
Landlords were notified that they should not reopen any
building until a competent professional had properly inspected
their premise. If more than 1 percent asbestos was found and
testing and cleaning was necessary, it had to be performed by
certified personnel.
This has presented problems, because there was no way for a
landlord to test at the 1 percent level if the dust was present in a
fine layer, and because dusts containing less than 1 percent are known
to be hazardous by EPA.
EPA determination that dusts and soils containing less than
1 percent asbestos are hazardous
The U.S. EPA has clearly stated that levels of asbestos lower than
1 percent could present hazards:''17
Levels of 1 percent or less could present a risk where there
is enough activity to stir up soil and cause asbestos fibers to
become airborne.
In one independent study, it was found that soils containing only
0.001 percent asbestos were still capable of producing measurable
airborne asbestos concentrations greater than 0.01 fibers per
milliliter (equivalent to structures per milliliter).18 This
air concentration is over the action level for declaring a public
health emergency, as discussed above for the sensitivity for the AHERA
TEM clearance test.
EPA Region 2, by its own actions, has demonstrated its
belief that asbestos in dust at levels lower than 1
percent are hazardous
There is another very important reason to believe that dust
containing less than 1 percent asbestos is unsafe: EPA Region 2
believes it is, and was willing to use taxpayer dollars to remove it
from their own building in NYC. This is what happened:
First, the EPA found no asbestos in any of WTC fallout samples
outdoors that was over 1 percent north of Warren St.19 As a
result, EPA told the press and everyone that the only contaminated
areas were below Warren St. and West of Broadway, the ``zone of
contamination.'' Next, EPA referred everyone to the NYC Department of
Health (NYC DOH) cleanup recommendations20 inside this same
``zone of contamination'' south of Warren. These are the controversial
recommendations which do not even recommend HEPA respirators, which
just say ``avoid breathing the dust'' while you mop up the asbestos.
This is what happened next: EPA's offices are at 290 Broadway,
which is 2 blocks north of Warren St., outside the ``zone of
contamination.'' Even though EPA said there was no asbestos over 1
percent up this far north at its offices, and that it was safe, EPA had
its own offices cleaned by certified asbestos abatement contractors. At
taxpayer expense.
Aside from considerations of criminal negligence and intentional
failure to warn citizens in both the ``zone of contamination'' and
outside this zone that they also should be using certified professional
asbestos abatement contractors--aside from these considerations, EPA
Region 2 at a minimum has demonstrated its recognition that dusts
containing less than 1 percent asbestos are hazardous.
There are no AHERA or other test methods for percent levels
of asbestos in thin layers of settled dusts
Unless the windows were blown out by the blast, WTC fallout inside
buildings in Manhattan was usually in thin layers, too thin to scoop up
into a jar or bag. Only dusts that can be put into a bag or jar can be
tested for the percentage of asbestos by the PLM percent asbestos
method.
If there is only a thin, visible surface dusting, or even an
invisible layer of dust, you are required to use what are called
``wipe'' samples or ``microvacuum'' samples. Wipe samples can only be
tested for the number of asbestos fibers per area, not a percentage of
asbestos in the total dust. These are not AHERA methods or even EPA-
validated methods, but they are used for Superfund investigations.
Thus, it was impossible for a landlord to test premises in most cases
for whether or not the asbestos was present at 1 percent or higher,
because there was not enough dust to use the PLM method.
It is inexcusable to try to brush together enough surface dust to
make up a ``bulk'' sample that can be placed in a jar for PLM percent
asbestos testing. This violates the method, and results in a highly
diluted sample due to the mixture with other dusts that are present, as
well as subjecting the very fine asbestos to escape to the air during
the brushing process.
Under the AHERA standard, which EPA claims it is using, the 1
percent level only applies to the material from which the asbestos dust
originated. All of the sample collection methods for PLM asbestos
analysis in the AHERA regulations at 40 CFR Part 763 address collection
of asbestos containing materials themselves. There are very strict
separate procedures for collecting samples of each particular type of
asbestos containing material, such as floor or ceiling tiles, or
insulation. There are no methods or protocols for taking dust samples
from surfaces. Thus, trying to run a PLM percent asbestos test on dust
violates the AHERA regulations.
The PLM method for percent asbestos is too insensitive to
find asbestos at levels of concern
EPA used PLM percent asbestos analyses of thick WTC fallout on
streets outdoors. Many, if not most, of these samples showed no
detectable asbestos21 See the tables at the end of this memo
for a summary of the findings. The PLM method is unreliable at
concentrations of 1 percent and less. In other investigations, EPA
found that soil samples below the level of detection of PLM did in fact
have high levels of asbestos when analyzed with SEM (scanning electron
microscopy) methods.22 Thus, many of the outdoor dust
samples in Manhattan probably were actually contaminated with asbestos.
Likewise, if landlords did manage to test their fine indoor dust
layers and found no asbestos by the PLM method, it could well have been
there in hazardous amounts.
Current EPA recommendations for Manhattan Cleanup Will Leave Most
Asbestos
To this date, EPA still recommends the unsafe and ineffective
cleanup recommendations of the NYC Department of Health (NYC DOH). The
EPA web page from early October until this present day specifically
states that schools, businesses, and residences should be cleaned using
the NYC DOH methods.23 Not only are these methods
ineffective, they are also unsafe to those who follow them, as detailed
in my December 3 and 19, 2001 memoranda.24
Dry-type HEPA vacuums do not remove asbestos from carpets
The NYC DOH recommends dry-type HEPA vacuum cleaners, even though
the EPA has found that dry-type HEPA vacuum cleaners simply do not
remove the asbestos from the carpeting any better than a regular vacuum
cleaner, removing essentially none at all.25 Professional
abatement firms recognize that dry HEPA vacuums are ineffective in
removing asbestos. There is documentation of at least one certified
asbestos abatement firm who removed and disposed of all carpeting which
was over padding in common areas in an apartment building near Ground
Zero, in recognition of the fact that there was no way to remove the
asbestos.26
The same EPA studies also document the fact that even the wet-
extraction HEPA vacuum cleaners are inefficient in removing asbestos
from carpeting--only 60-70 percent.
Upholstered furniture, drapes, vents and ducts not
addressed by NYC recommendations
The NYC DOH recommendations also do not address the problem of
upholstered furniture, which is almost impossible to effectively clean.
Draperies are another problem, often too large for washing in machines,
and some must be dry cleaned. Therefore, cross-contamination will occur
if these drapes are sent to commercial facilities for cleaning.
The NYC DOH also does not address the problem of contaminated duct
work, or air conditioners or other contaminated equipment, lice the
insides of computers which use cooling fans.
Any EPA recommendation of professional asbestos abatement not
enforceable
EPA officials have claimed they recommended professional asbestos
abatement for buildings ``unless they only had a light
dusting.''27 Even if EPA has issued such guidance, it will
not result in effective asbestos removal, because EPA has no legal
authority to enforce the use of certified asbestos abatement
contractors. The EPA has stated that it is using the AHERA statute as
the authority or standard for cleanup after the WTC disaster. This
statute only requires schools to use certified asbestos abatement
professionals. For the owners of buildings, the only requirement is
that if the owner does choose to have an asbestos inspection, then a
certified professional must be used. It does not require that any
advice or action resulting from that inspection be followed. The owners
of many buildings have not been hiring certified asbestos abatement
professionals, even when they were heavily contaminated.28
For tenants, the AHERA has no effect whatsoever. Many, if not most,
tenants have been cleaning their own apartments.29
High cost of professional abatement prohibitive to most, preventing
effective cleanup
Because professional asbestos abatement is expensive, tenants have
chosen to perform their own cleanups or hire unqualified persons. For a
2-bedroom apartment, the cost of professional abatement is $5,000; for
a 2-bedroom apartment, the cost is around $10,000. That would not
include the costs of replacement of any carpeting, upholstered
furniture, or draperies that cannot be effectively cleaned.
Recently, Bonnie Bellow of the EPA Region 2 press office claimed
that tenants do not have to pay for their cleanups; that all they have
to do is apply to the Federal Emergency Management Administration
(FEMA) for reimbursement. This is false, and not borne out by the many
accounts of citizens trying to apply for such costs. Some insurance
companies have paid for cleaning, but others have not. Sometimes
volunteers cleaned out buildings, and sometimes the Red Cross handed
out vouchers for cleaning, but not by professional asbestos abaters.
There are no statistics on what has actually happened.
Disorganized cleanup resulting in re-contamination of previously
cleaned areas
The disorganization of the cleanup is resulting in cross-
contamination of previously cleaned areas. Some individual apartments
may well be cleaned using professional abatement. But if another
apartment is not cleaned, the air ducts for the whole building can
become contaminated again. Dusts can be tracked from one area inside
the building which is not effectively cleaned to another area which is
cleaned.
3. advantages for a cleanup under superfund
At this time, I believe that the best solution to the problem in
Lower Manhattan is to invoke one or more parts of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Liability Act (CERCLA), or Superfund. It
would bring order to the situation and begin to alleviate the current
exposures to asbestos, fiberglass, fine particulates, and other toxic
substances like mercury and lead. It would enable the use of better
methods to test and monitor the contamination, particularly for
asbestos. It would take the financial burden away from citizens and
transfer them to the Government.
It would add credibility to the final solution after the action was
completed. Under CERCLA, there would be a point in time where the
Government could announce that the action was finished, and that
Manhattan was restored. Otherwise, there will be no opportunity for the
government to declare closure.
Two types of action under Superfund are possible
In Montana, the Governor exercised the ``silver bullet'' option
under CERCLA by requesting that EPA put Libby on the fast track for
listing on the National Priorities List, which means making it a
Superfund site. As a result, Libby does not have to wait years for EPA
to assess its hazards and make comparative cost-benefit judgments.
Federal money would go immediately to the cleanup, although the State
would be required to contribute 10 percent of the costs. The costs
should not be a problem to New York, as the Federal Government is
already contributing as much as it will take to put Manhattan back
together.
Another option would be to declare a public health emergency under
the CERCLA authority. Even though Libby is now scheduled for fast track
Superfund listing, EPA is now apparently intending to invoke this other
authority to address the situation at Libby. EPA has never before
invoked this authority under CERCLA. If EPA does invoke it for Libby,
it should be no problem to use it for Lower Manhattan.
Stigmatization of a Superfund balanced by public confidence and a point
of closure
There would be considerable stigmatization in a Superfund listing
for Lower Manhattan, potentially increasing the rate of economic
decline. However, the widespread knowledge of health concerns even
without a Superfund listing may have already had that effect.
Declaration of a public health emergency or a Superfund listing,
followed by an efficient and organized cleanup, with all watchdog
scientists agreeing on protocols, may actually help the public's
perception and restore confidence. Right now there is nothing but
chaos.
Cleanup using AHERA is not working
As seen from the preceding section, the cleanup is not proceeding
effectively. This is because EPA is trying to use the AHERA statute as
the authority. The AHERA statute is voluntary for all but schools. The
AHERA statute places the financial burden on the public.
The AHERA statute also specifies certain antiquated test methods
for asbestos, which offer some protection, but only if used in
conjunction with all of the other rigorous asbestos abatement
procedures which can only be performed by certified contractors. EPA is
trying to adapt these insensitive test methods, the AHERA TEM clearance
test for air, and the PLM test for asbestos, to situations which they
were not intended by the regulations.
Cleanup under CERCLA authority would allow the use of better testing
methods
Under the CERCLA statute, there is no prohibition against using the
best testing methods available. See the tables at the end of this memo.
The test methods which were used are described along with the data. For
the Libby Superfund site, Dr. Eric Chatfield designed the testing
protocols and chose the methods he believed were the best. These
methods were not limited to methods that the EPA had developed and
validated, but included methods developed by the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM) and the International Standards
Organization (ISO).
Dr. Chatfield was also the lead investigator in the Ground Zero
Task Force study of Lower Manhattan, where state-of-the-art methods
were again used. The HP Environmental study, also included in the
tables, utilized the best methods which could be devised for
characterizing Lower Manhattan.
Whether addressed through a CERCLA action or any other means, Lower
Manhattan has not undergone adequate testing. Within EPA itself, we do
not have the expertise to design or carry out state-of-the-art testing
protocols for asbestos. For other hazardous substances, we do have
expertise, but not for asbestos. The experts I know of at this present
time include the researchers responsible for the Ground Zero Task Force
study (Eric Chatfield and John Kominsky), the researchers for the HP
Environmental study (Hugh Granger, Thomas McKee, James Millette, Piotr
Chmielinski, and George Pineda), and Michael Beard of Research Triangle
Institute.
4. summary, asbestos risk assessment for wtc dusts
My December 19, 2001 memo30 provided a detailed
rationale for projecting cancer and asbestosis risks from WTC fallout
by calculating exposures from the very limited data which is currently
available. In that assessment, various exposure scenarios were
hypothesized, and risks of lung cancer for smokers and non-smokers,
mesothelioma (a cancer of the chest cavity), and asbestos risks were
hypothesized. As stated at the beginning of this memorandum, I believe
that initiating such an effort fills a critical need that was thwarted
in the appropriate EPA offices by the constant reassurance of high
level EPA officials that no such assessment was necessary.
PCM-equivalent Correction Factor and Other Changes to Risks in December
19 Memo
My December 19 risk assessment used the concentration of all
asbestos fibers, not just ``PCM-equivalent'' fibers (those longer than
5 m, width greater than 0.25 m, and an aspect ration
greater than or equal to 3 to 1) in making calculations of risk. An
explanation was provided as to why this correction was not made, along
with providing a range of 80 to 90 percent non-PCM-equivalent fibers
for WTC asbestos if such a correction were to be used. This was based
on two studies: From the Ground Zero Task Force study,31 the
PCM-equivalent fibers ranged from 1.3 to 20 percent of total asbestos
fibers/bundles for 8 different samples of settled dusts, with a mean of
8.7 percent. For the HP Environmental study,32 for 3 air
samples, PCM-equivalent fibers ranged from 3.1 percent to 6.5 percent,
with a mean of 5.6 percent. Because of the uncertainty from such
limited data, if any conversion were to be made at this time for WTC
fallout, then 20 percent of the total asbestos should be assumed to be
PCM-equivalent.
No correction should be made for PCM-equivalents to asbestosis
risks that were projected in the December 19 memo. This is because the
ATSDR reviewed studies showing that asbestosis is associated with
shorter asbestosis fibers.33 In addition, it would probably
be appropriate to use an uncertainty factor of 1,000 for asbestos
risks, according to CERCLA guidelines,34 so that the risks I
had previously projected in the December 19 memo for asbestosis would
be 1,000 times higher.
No correction should be made for the type of asbestos, chrysotile
vs. amphibole vs. amosite, etc. This is because EPA does not recognize
any difference in toxicity for the purpose of making risk
assessments.35
Cancer risk level constituting an imminent and substantial endangerment
to Public health pursuant to Superfund
The EPA generally considers an upper-bound lifetime cancer risk to
an individual of between 10-4 and 10-6 as a safe
range. A risk of 1074 represents a probability that there may be one
extra cancer case in a population of 10,000 (1 per 10,000). A
10-6 risk is the probability that there may be one extra
cancer case in a population of one million people over a lifetime of
exposure (1 per 1,000,000. The National Contingency Plan (NCP)
(Superfund) requires that the 10-6 risk level should be the
point of departure; the goal in any response by the EPA to ameliorate
exposures to carcinogens from man-made sources. A response action is
generally warranted if the cumulative excess carcinogenic risk for any
single individual affected by a site exposing humans to carcinogens
exceeds 1 in 10,000 (the 10-4 risk level) using reasonable
maximum exposure assumptions for either the current or reasonably
anticipated future exposures.36
Cancer risks for Libby compared to Lower Manhattan
The December 20, 2001 risk assessment37 prepared by Dr.
Weis of EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group (CAG) found that for maximum
concentrations of asbestos exposures to Libby residents through
breathing suspended dusts inside residences, the cancer risk was
between 1 in 1,000 to 1 in 100. This cancer risk exceeded the threshold
of 1 in 10,000 necessary to be considered an endangerment to public
health.
My December 19, 2001 preliminary risk assessment, based on much
more limited data, projected maximum risks as high as 1 in 1000, to
cancer risks of 1 in 10 for a persons either living apartments and/or
working in buildings that retained much of the asbestos in carpeting,
ducts, furniture, and draperies. If a correction factor for PCM-
equivalents of 20 percent is applied to these projections, the risks
range from 2 in 10,000, to risks of 2 in 100. For a laborer spending
only 3 months cleaning out buildings in Lower Manhattan without proper
protection, cancer risks of 1 in 5 were projected, which would be 4 in
100 if a correction for PCM-equivalents was applied. Other possible
exposure scenarios were evaluated as part of my December 19 memorandum.
Risks could be much higher if there were also exposures to
fiberglass, fine particulate matter, and other toxic substances at the
same time. There are wide ranges of uncertainty in these calculated
risks, because only limited data was available. However, I believe that
these calculations establish the need for a more rigorous evaluation of
risks.
______
Tables.--Lower Manhattan Asbestos Data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PCM-equipment
Settled Asbestos Dusts, Building Interiors structures per
Manhattan.--Fibers and Bundles (Structures) Longer square centimeter
than 5 Micrometers (s/cm2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground Zero Task Force Study,38 data from Table 21.
High Exposure Building, Before Cleanup, 250 South
End Ave. Fibers and bundles longer than 5
micrometers. Heavy visible dust layer, could still
read addresses on envelopes on table and see the
lines on a yellow legal pad on the table. Windows
had been blown out from some apartments. [Note Table
21 says fibers/cm2, but title of table is ``fibers
plus bundles'', which equals structures.] TEM
analysis using American Society for Testing and
Materials ASTM D6480-99.
250SEA-10D-D1 (A) (sample collected with toothbrush 21,000
sample) top of cupboard with glass doors............
250SEA-10D-D1 (B) (wipe sample) top of cupboard with 19,000
glass doors.........................................
250SEA-10D-D2 (A) (sample collected with toothbrush) 18,000
living room high boy side table.....................
250SEA-10D-D2 (B) (sample collected with toothbrush) 28,000
living room high boy side table.....................
Ground Zero Task Force Study,39 data from Table 19.
Low Exposure Building, Before Cleanup, 45 Warren
St., dust layer visible on dark table, grain of wood
still visible. 5 blocks from Ground Zero, building
faced north away from Ground Zero. Only light
dusting. See photo in study itself. Fibers and
bundles longer than 5 micrometers. [Note Table 19
says fibers/cm2, but title of table is ``fibers plus
bundles'', which equals structures] TEM analysis
using American Society for Testing and Materials
ASTM D6480-99.
45WAR-2-D1, 2nd floor, living room table near window, 2,300
wipe sample.........................................
45WAR-2-D2, 2nd floor, living room window sill, wipe 60,000
sample..............................................
45-WAR-5-D1, 5th floor, living room, window sill, 79,000
wipe sample.........................................
45-WAR-5-D2, 5th floor, roof level office, green 22,000
wooden chair, wipe sample...........................
NY Environmental Law and Justice Project, 105 Duane
St., after cleanup.40 Microvacuum method followed by
American Society for Testing and Materials ASTM D-
5755:
Sample inside central air conditioning duct. Total 111,000
asbestos concentration reported as 555,000 s/cm2.
Estimated that 20 percent of the structures are over
5 micrometers, or 111,000 s/cm2.....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The total asbestos levels found in Manhattan by the Ground Zero
Task Force study are much higher. The reason why only the ``PCM-
equivalent'' asbestos levels are given in the tables below is to make
comparison with the Libby data possible. See the explanation at the
beginning of this memo.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight percent
(%) (all asbestos
Thick WTC Fallout Dust Deposits Outdoors Manhattan.-- included, not
Includes all asbestos, not just fibers longer than 5 just PCM-
micrometers equivalent
asbestos)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground Zero Task Force Study,41 data from Table 22.
Analyses by gravimetric matrix reduction (American
Society for Testing and Materials ASTM STP 1342)
followed by PLM analyses of larger fractions and TEM
measurement of fine portion of samples.
Roof of automobile, Church St. south of Duane St..... 0.67
45 Warren St., roof, outside 5th floor loft, gaps in 1.05
stone floor.........................................
250 South End Ave., Apartment 11D, exterior window 2.25
ledge...............................................
250 South End Ave., ground level courtyard, top of 2.05
wall................................................
HP Environmental Study, Table 5.42 PLM analyses:
No. 1--Barkley St. west of Church.................... <0.25
No. 2--Barkley St. between Broadway and Church....... ND
No. 3--Barkely and Greenwich......................... ND
No. 4--Barkey between Greenwich and Joe Dimaggio Hwy. ND
No. 5--Barkey at Joe Dimaggio Hwy.................... 0.5
No. 6--Warren and Church............................. <0.25
No. 7--Murray near Broadway.......................... 0.75
No. 8--Murray and Greenwich.......................... ND
No. 9--Chambers between Broadway and Greenwich....... ND
No. 10--Murray between Greenwich and Joe Dimaggio.... 0.75
No. 11--Warren between Greenwich and Joe Dimaggio.... 0.75
EPA data on bulk dusts taken outside buildings in
Manhattan43 All the analyses performed EPA for
Manhattan used the less sensitive PLM method. EPA
did not fraction the sample and use electron
microscopy techniques in addition to PLM as did the
Ground Zero Task Force study above. EPA in its risk
assessment for Libby, however, noted that soil
samples showing non-detectable asbestos by PLM alone
actually had high levels when analyzed by scanning
electron microscope (SEM) methods.44
48 of 177 dust samples............................... 1-4.46
129 dust samples..................................... ND
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airborne Asbestos, Building Interiors Manhattan.--PCM- PCM-equivalent
equivalent fibers and bundles longer than 5 fibers per
Micrometers milliliter (f/mL)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ground Zero Task Force Study:45 data from Table 16.
High Exposure Building, 250 South End Ave, before
cleanup, passive conditions (no activities to
disturb dusts). Fibers and bundles longer than 5
micrometers. TEM analysis using the International
Standards Organization ISO10312 direct transfer
method
250SEA-10D-A1, Apartment 10D, den.................... 0.063
250SEA-10D-A2, Apartment 10D, den.................... 0.060
250SEA-10D-A3, Apartment 10D, living room............ 0.048
250SEA-10D-A4, Apartment 10D, living room............ 0.075
250SEA-10D-A5, Apartment 10D, bedroom................ 0.081
Ground Zero Task Force Study: Table 8.46 PCM-
equivalent fibers and bundles longer than 5
micrometers. Passive Conditions (no activities to
disturb dusts) low exposure Building, 45 Warren St.
before cleanup. TEM analysis using the ISO10312
direct transfer method.
45 WAR-2-A1, 2nd floor living room................... ``not
statistically
significant''
[detected but
uncertain]
45 WAR-2-A2, 2nd floor living room................... ND
45 WAR-2-A3, 2nd floor master bedroom................ 0.010
HP Environmental Study: Table 6.47 Two building
interiors near Ground Zero. Passive conditions,
before cleanup. Analyses by the modified EPA Level
II TEM method where samples were heavily loaded (all
3 samples below where asbestos detected), which uses
indirect preparation to separate out interferences
from other non-asbestos parts of WTC dusts. Study
demonstrated that up to 10 times more asbestos was
detectable by this method.
Sample 2............................................. 0.007
Sample 7............................................. 0.167
Sample 9............................................. 0.346
8 out of 11 samples, interior of 2 buildings near ND
collapsed WTC towers................................
EPA data: Passive conditions, after incomplete usually not
cleanup. EPA has been using the simple AHERA TEM detected
clearance test method inside buildings at the
request of tenants and others. This is a violation
of the AHERA protocols, which only allow this test
to be performed after professional and complete
asbestos abatement, which must thoroughly clean all
surfaces. The AHERA TEM clearance method is only
meant as an inexpensive, but not an assurance by
itself, that asbestos has been adequately abated.
The use of a leaf blower or other strong fan in
conjunction with taking the air sample would be
needed for that in addition to wipe samples of
surfaces. EPA Region 8 found that at Libby, even
when there were activities going on to disturb
dusts, air monitors worn by people sitting on
couches, etc. always gave higher readings than a
stationary air monitor in the same room (such as is
the case in the AHERA TEM test).....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tables.--Libby Asbestos Data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PCM-equivalent
Settled Asbestos Dusts, Building Interiors Libby.-- structures per
Fibers and Bundles (Structures) Longer than 5 square centimeter
micrometers (m) (s/cm2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA Region 8 data48 Microvacuum sampling by American
Society for Testing and Materials ASTM D-5755 with
analyses by TEM and counting rules specified in
International Standards Organization ISO 10312.
33 out of 261 samples (13 percent) that had 20-3658
detectable asbestos.................................
228 out of 261 samples (87 percent) had non- ND
detectable asbestos.................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weight percent
(%) (all asbestos
Residential and Garden Soils Libby.--Includes all included, not
asbestos, not just fibers longer than 5 micrometers just PCM-
equivalent
asbestos)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA Region 8 data:49 Analysis by PLM. EPA found that
for those Libby samples with non-detectable analysis
by PLM, many were found to actually have high levels
when scanning electron microscope (SEM) methods were
used.
Yard soil, 13 of 258 ( 5 percent) samples had 1-5 percent
detectable asbestos.................................
Yard soil, 106 of 258 (41 percent) samples had a trace
trace asbestos......................................
Yard soil, 139 of 258 (54 percent) had non-detectable ND
asbestos............................................
Garden soil, 43 of 109 (39 percent) had detectable 1-5
asbestos............................................
Garden soil, 59 of 109 (54 percent) had a trace trace
asbestos............................................
Garden soil, 43 of 109 (39 percent) had non- ND
detectable asbestos.................................
Driveway, 21 of 263 (8 percent) had detectable 1
asbestos............................................
Driveway, 141 of 263 (54 percent) had a trace trace
asbestos............................................
Driveway, 101 of 263 (38 percent) had non-detectable ND
asbestos............................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airborne Asbestos, Building
Interiors Libby.--PCM-equipment PCM-equipment PCM-equipment
fibers and bundles longer than 5 MEAN fibers per RANGE fibers per
Micrometers milliliter f/mL milliliter f/mL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA Region 8 data:50 Routine and
Active Occupancy. Analyses by
TEM.
Routine activities, personal air 0.35 0.023-0.048
monitor, 2 of 5 (40 percent)
samples had detectable asbestos..
Routine activities, personal air ................. .................
monitor, 3 of 5 (60 percent)
samples had non-detectable
asbestos.........................
Routine activities, remote 0.009 0.0003-0.036
stationary air monitor, 4 of 10
(40 percent) samples had
detectable asbestos..............
Routine activities, remote ND ND
stationary air monitor, 6 of 10
(60 percent) samples had non-
detectable asbestos..............
Active cleaning activities, 0.010 0.004-0.013
personal air monitor, 6 of 26 (23
percent) samples had detectable
asbestos.........................
Active cleaning activities, ND ND
personal air monitor, 20 of 26
(77 percent) samples had non-
detectable asbestos..............
Active cleaning activities, remote 0.008 0.007-0.010
stationary air monitor, 3 of 17
(18 percent) samples had
detectable asbestos..............
Active cleaning activities, remote ND ND
stationary air monitor, 14 of 17
(82 percent) samples had non-
detectable asbestos..............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
References
1. Jenkins, C. (December 21, 2001) Wipe sampling for asbestos in
Lower Manhattan; Projection of airborne levels from settled WTC dusts;
Estimation of increased cancer risks based on various WTC dust exposure
scenarios. C. Jenkins, Ph.D., Environmental Scientist, Office of Solid
Waste. Memo addressed to Affected Parties and Responsible Officials.
Posted at www.nyenvirolaw.org.
2. Jenkins, C. (December 3, 2001) World Trade Center asbestos. C.
Jenkins, Ph.D., Environmental Scientist, Office of Solid Waste. Memo
addressed to Lillian Bagus and Robert Dellinger. Posted at http://
www.nycosh.org/linktopics/WTC-catastrophe.html
3. See EPA Region 8 website for Libby, MT at http://www.epa.gov/
region8/superfund/libby/index.html
4. See 12/21/01 AP article posted at http://www.montanaforum.com/
indices/libby.php?nnn=6.
5. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001) Summary
Report: Characterization of particulate found in apartments after
destruction of the World Trade Center. Requested by: ``Ground Zero''
Elected Officials Task Force. Chatfield Technical Consulting,
Mississauga, Ontario, Canada and Environmental Quality Management,
Inc., Cincinnati, OH. Posted at http://www.nycoshorg/linktopics/WTC-
catastrophe.html.
6. New York Environmental Law and Justice Project (January 2002).
Information on 105 Duane St. posted at website at www.nyenvirolaw.org.
7. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op. cit.
8. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op. cit.
9. Weis, C. (December 20, 2001) Amphibole mineral fibers in source
materials in residential and commercial areas of Libby pose and
imminent and substantial endangerment to public health. Memo from Chris
Weis, Ph.D., DABT, Senior Toxicologist/Science Support Coordinator,
Libby Asbestos Site, EPA Region VIII, Denver, CO to Paul Peronard, On-
Scene Coordinator, Libby Asbestos Site.
10. U.S. EPA (2001) EPA response to September 11th, Benchmarks,
Standards and Guidelines Established to Protect Public Health. Posted
at: www.epa.gov/epahome/wtc/activities.htm
11. U.S. EPA (2001) Asbestos (CASRN 1332-21-4) Integrated Risk
Management System (IRIS). Posted at http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/
037l.htm
12. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op.
cit.
13. Jenkins, C. (December 19, 2001), op. cit.
14. U.S. EPA, Regulations at Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 763, 40 CFR 763. Posted at www.access.gpo.gov/nara/
cfr/cfrhtml--00/Title--40/
40cfr763--00.html.
U.S. EPA Guidelines for conducting the AHERA TEM clearance test to
determine completion of an asbestos abatement project. OTS. NTIS
Publication No. PB 90-171778, EPA Publication No. EPA 560/5-89-001.
15. EPA (2001-2002) Web page: EPA Response to September 11th posted
at: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/nyc/bulkdust/. After accessing this page,
click on any one of the dots on the map to find the following
statement:
``Asbestos in Bulk Dust If a substance contains 1 percent or
more asbestos, it is considered to be an ``asbestos-containing
material.'' EPA is using the 1 percent definition in evaluating
dust samples from in and around Ground Zero and other areas
potentially impacted by the World Trade Center collapse. The
majority of areas in which EPA has found levels of asbestos in
dust above 1 percent are in the vicinity of the World Trade
Center work zone. Daily summaries of this data and how it
compares to the level of concern for public health are also
available.''
16. Miele, J. A., Commissioner, Department of Environmental
Protection, city of New York (October 25, 2001) letter to Residents of
Lower Manhattan. Posted on the internet at www.nyeljp.org.
17. www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/libby/qsafe.html
18. Addison, J. (1995) Vermiculite: a review of the mineralogy and
health effects of vermiculite exploitation. Reg. Tox. Pharm. 21:397-
405.
19. EPA (2001-2002) Web page: EPA Response to September 11th posted
at: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/nyc/bulkdust/. After accessing this page,
click on any one of the dots on the map to find the following
statement:
``If dust or debris from the World Trade Center site has entered
homes, schools or businesses, it should be cleaned thoroughly and
properly following the recommendations of the New York City Department
of Health.''
20. New York City Department of Health (2001) Responds to the World
Trade Center Disaster, Recommendations for People Re-Occupying
Commercial Buildings and Residents Re-Entering Their Homes. Posted at
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doh/html/alerts/wtc3.html
21. EPA (2001-2002) Web page: EPA Response to September 11th posted
at: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/nyc/bulkdust/
22. Weis, C. (December 20, 2001), op. cit.
23. EPA (2001-2002) Web page: EPA Response to September 11th posted
at: http://www.epa.gov/enviro/nyc/bulkdust/. After accessing this page,
click on any one of the dots on the map to find the following
statement:
``If dust or debris from the World Trade Center site has entered
homes, schools or businesses, it should be cleaned thoroughly and
properly following the recommendations of the New York City Department
of Health.''
24. Jenkins, C. (December 3, 2001), op. cit.
Jenkins, C. (December 19, 2001), op. cit.
25. Evaluation of Two Cleaning Methods for Removal of Asbestos
Fibers from Carpet, U.S. EPA Risk Reduction Engineering Laboratory,
Cincinnati, OH 45268, Publication No. EPA/600/S2-90/053, April 1991.
Posted at www.epa.gov/ncepihom/nepishom. Also available from the
National Technical Information Service.
Evaluation of Three Cleaning Methods for Removing Asbestos from
Carpet: Determination of Airborne Asbestos Concentrations Associated
with Each Method, U.S. EPA Risk Reduction Engineering Laboratory,
Cincinnati, OH 45268, EPA/600/SR-93/155, September 1993. Posted at at
www.epa.gov/ncepihom/nepishom/
26. Lefrak Corp. (December 16, 2001) Gateway Plaza advisory, posted
at www.lefrak.com/all%20pages/gwyadvise/repairs.html. Contains the
following statement:
``There are 16 floors in the 600 building where the carpeting was
installed with padding and seams. We are immediately removing the
carpeting on these floors as it would be impossible to clean the carpet
in these cases.''
27. Mugdan, Walter (December 19, 2001) Regional Asbestos
Coordinators and National Asbestos Coordinators Meeting for December,
in which Cate Jenkins participated.
28. New York Environmental Law and Justice, website describing duct
cleaning by management after asbestos found. Posted at
www.nyenvirolaw.org.
29. Swaney, S. (January 8, 2002) personal communication from former
resident at 333 Rector St., NYC.
Haughney, C. (January 7, 2002) In N.Y.,--Taking a breath of fear.
Washington Post, page A01. Posted at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A11173-2002Jan7.html
30. Jenkins, C. (December 19, 2001), op. cit.
31. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op.
cit.
32. Granger, R.H., McKee, T.R., Millette, J.R., Chmielinski, P.,
and Pineda, G. (October 2, 2001) Preliminary Health Hazard Assessment:
World Trade Center, HP Environmental, Inc., 104 Elden St., Herndon, VA
20170. Paper submitted to the American Industrial Hygiene Association.
Please request a copy of paper from [email protected].
33. ATSDR (2000) Toxicological Profile for Asbestos, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Available by calling 1-888-
42-ATSDR. At this time, only the final draft version is posted on the
internet at www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp61.html.
34. EPA (1997) Rules of thumb for superfund remedy selection.
Publication No. EPA 540-R-97-013, NTIS PB97-963301. Posted at
www.epa.gov/superfund/resources/rules/
EPA (2000) Presenter's manual for: ``Superfund Risk Assessment and
How you Can Help''. Publication No. EPA/540/R-99/013. Posted at
www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/risk/vdmanual.pdf
35. U.S. EPA (1986) Airborne Asbestos Health Assessment Update.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and
Development. Washington, DC. Publication No. EPA/600/8-84/003F.
U.S. EPA (2001) Asbestos (CASRN 1332-21-4), Integrated Risk
Information System (IRIS). Posted at www.epagov/iris/subst/0371htm.
36. EPA (1997) Rules of thumb for superfund remedy selection.
Publication No. EPA 540-R-97-013, NTIS PB97-963301. Posted at
www.epa.gov/superfund/resources/rules/
EPA (2000) Presenter's manual for: ``Superfund Risk Assessment and
How you Can Help''. Publication No. EPA/540/R-99/013. Posted at
www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/risk/vdmanual.pdf
37. Weis, C. (December 20, 2001), op. cit.
38. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op.
cit.
39. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op.
cit.
40. Sampling by Ed Olmsted, CIH on December 3, 2001 for New York
Environmental Law and Justice Project. Results posted at
www.nyenvirolaw.org.
41. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op.
cit.
42. Granger, R.H., McKee, T.R., Millette, J.R., Chmielinski, P.,
and Pineda, G. (October 2, 2001), op. cit.
43. EPA (October 3, 2001) EPA and OSHA websites provide
environmental monitoring data from World Trade Center and surrounding
areas. Press release, posted at www.epa.gov/epahome/newsroom.htm.
Analyses of bulk dust on EPA website posted at www.epa.gov/enviro/
nyc/bulkdust/
44. Weis, C. (December 20, 2001), op. cit.
45. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op.
cit.
46. Chatfield, E.J., and Kominsky, J.R. (October 12, 2001), op.
cit.
47. Granger, R.H., McKee, T.R., Millette, J.R., Chmielinski, P.,
and Pineda, G. (October 2, 2001), op. cit.
48. Weis, C. (December 20, 2001), op. cit.
49. Weis, C. (December 20, 2001), op. cit.
50. Weis, C. (December 20, 2001), op. cit.
Statement of Kerry Kelly, M.D., Chief Medical Officer, New York City
Fire Department
Good morning and thank you for inviting me to appear before this
subcommittee. I am the chief medical officer of the New York City Fire
Department. I responded to the World Trade Center at 9:30 a.m. on
September 11th, and participated in the rescue and recovery efforts
that thousands of our members undertook on that day and in the days
that followed.
The FDNY response to the WTC event placed our members at the
epicenter within moments of the first plane hitting the North Tower.
Members from emergency squads, rescue companies, engines, ladders and
medical teams from across the city responded to the call. Firefighters
about to end their daily tour of duty stayed on; off-duty firefighters
commandeered vehicles; retirees and members on sick leave found their
way to the scene. Within a matter of minutes, these rescuers became
victims, soldiers in the worst terrorist attack on our Nation's soil.
Three hundred and forty-three members lost their lives that day.
Over 200 members were seen in emergency rooms for physical trauma. Many
members required hospitalization and surgical intervention for
significant orthopedic injuries. The rescue and recovery effort
involved hundreds of members, following a job-wide recall during the
first few days of the operation.
In the initial moments and hours after the collapses, firefighters
and emergency workers continued to work without pause in the desperate
search for survivors. The air was full of thick debris and dense dust
clouds, and visibility was so bad that one could not see people more
than three feet away. With the collapse of the towers, an avalanche of
acrid debris, metallic meteors and a shower of gray dust descended on
the survivors, blanketing the new wave of rescuers as they rushed in to
assist. It seemed as though day had turned to night, but still our
members continued searching for survivors in a surreal black blizzard
of debris. Fine dust coated every crevice, making features
indiscernible. Debris and dust choked breath and irritated eyes.
Due to the vast numbers of FDNY personnel at the scene, respirators
were not available for all members working at the site. Many also found
it more difficult to operate while wearing respirators, and many chose
to carry on their search for survivors unprotected.
Members ignored or fought against symptoms, and many did not sleep
for days, pushing themselves to continue the search for survivors. In
the immediate aftermath of the collapse, as the rescue work began, many
members complained of eye irritation, as well as cough and congestion.
As the air quality improved, eye irritation symptoms improved, but
cough complaints continued. Pulmocort inhalers, an inhaled steroid,
were offered to offset the allergic cough symptoms.
Concerns for the physical and mental health of members were raised
by FDNY medical staff in those first few hours and days. Due to the
cough symptoms that members exhibited, questions were also raised about
the exposure levels that were present at the scene. It was, and still
is, unclear what exposures members might have experienced following the
fall of two 110-story towers combined with the combustion of two planes
and jet fuel.
Within a week of the tragedy, the Fire Department's Bureau of
Health Services (BHS) began preparing for an unparalleled medical
monitoring procedure for all members exposed at the site. BHS partnered
with National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on this
project. We are very grateful for the funding we received from CDC to
conduct this initial analysis of our members. From October 6-12, an
initial sampling of 400 exposed members were given a comprehensive
medical evaluation. BHS, NIOSH and CDC were satisfied with the
logistics and implementation of the medical evaluation, and BHS
immediately began the vast project of testing the remaining members.
We worked 7 days a week, with three shifts a day, and were able to
evaluate approximately 180 members per day. From October 31 until
January 31, the medical monitoring of all personnel who responded to
the WTC was undertaken. Almost 10,000 firefighters and 800 EMS
personnel have now been evaluated. I am proud to say that our initial
medical evaluation of all the members who responded to the World Trade
Center is now complete.
Medical monitoring consisted of ECGs, pulmonary function tests,
chest x-rays, hearing evaluations, and blood testing consisting of
cbcs, chemistries, liver functions, lipid profile, lead, beryllium,
pcbs and urine mercury and urinalysis testing. In addition, testing of
dioxins and hydrocarbons was done at the CDC lab on the initial group
of 400. Blood from all remaining members was banked, to be tested at a
later time if the need arises. Although some of these tests are part of
routine medical examinations, other more specialized testing was also
conducted due to environmental concerns.
At the time of the medical monitoring members also completed a
computerized survey regarding their physical complaints to assist the
Department in tracking the symptoms that members are experiencing. BHS
has compiled a very complete record of each of our members from prior
annual exams to use as a baseline for comparison.
Since the testing was completed less than 2 weeks ago, the complete
results from this computer survey are still being tallied. Preliminary
blood tests have not indicated any significantly elevated levels of
toxic metals or abnormal chemistries or blood counts. At the time of
completing the computer survey, 25 percent of our members reported
cough and shortness of breath on exertion. The pulmonary function tests
taken during the medical evaluation have shown a decline that matches
this complaint. In most cases, this change has not affected overall
functional capacity. Some members remain ``off the line'' with active
symptoms, while others have returned to work. Our current medical leave
rate is a reflection of both the rise in respiratory symptoms and post-
traumatic stress. There has been a two-fold increase in both
respiratory problems and stress related problems in the last 5 months.
It remains to be seen how members will recover from this event.
However, in order to measure recovery, we must continue to monitor
all of the members who responded to the WTC event. We are grateful to
have received funding from CDC for one additional medical examination
per member in the future. We remain concerned about potential health
problems in the future. We are also concerned about longitudinal follow
up with our members. Those who become ill, or experience a trauma of
this level in their working life, may choose to retire from this job
when they can no longer withstand the rigors of this work. We want to
ensure that our members continue to receive monitoring in the future,
whether or not they retire from the Department. For this reason, the
Fire Department's Bureau of Health Services is now actively seeking
funding for this project.
We must affirm our commitment to the members of our Department who
gave so much to this city and this country, and who have inspired
people around the world with their courage and determination. We owe it
to them continue to monitor the effects that their exposure on
September 11th will have on their future. BHS has the pre- and post-WTC
records, the expertise and the logistical set-up to conduct an
unprecedented and thorough investigation of the effects of the exposure
our members experienced on that terrible day. Let's not forget that
more of our members experienced a far greater level of exposure than
any other group in this city.
As far as I know, there are no hard-and-fast answers to the
potential effects of exposures. Many unknowns remain. That is why it is
critical that we continue our monitoring.
The events of September 11th were catastrophic. In a matter of
moments, our members became participants in a battlefield. The FDNY
response was outstanding when we review the numbers of civilians saved
and we measure the heroic efforts of so many individuals. Our losses
are deep felt with the deaths of members from every rank and every
branch of our service. Our memories are filled with the experiences of
that day and the many days that followed. Both physically and
emotionally, we have been challenged by this event. As we rebuild our
Department, we must also restate our commitment to our members who
worked so hard to save others. I am sure we can all agree it is no less
than they deserve.
Thank you for your time.
__________
Statement of George D. Thurston, Sc.D., Associate Professor of
Environmental Medicine, New York University School of Medicine
Thank you for holding this hearing, and for giving me this
opportunity to contribute to the process of examining the environmental
consequences of the attacks of September 11th.
I am George D. Thurston, a tenured associate professor of
Environmental Medicine at the New York University (NYU) School of
Medicine. My scientific research involves investigations of the human
health effects of air pollution.
I am also the director of the National Institute of Environmental
Health Sciences' (NIEHS) Community Outreach and Education Program at
the NYU Department of Environmental Medicine. A goal of this outreach
program is to provide an impartial scientific resource on environmental
health issues to the public and to decisionmakers, and this is my
purpose in testifying to you here today.
In the aftermath of the attack of September 11th and the subsequent
anthrax bio-terrorism, we have come to realize that terrorism is more
than a security threat: it can also represent an environmental health
threat. On September 12, my research center received an urgent request
from the Office of the Director of the NIEHS, one of the National
Institutes of Health, to respond to environmental impacts of the attack
of September 11th by doing whatever we could to monitor the air
pollution that was resulting from the disaster's dust and fires, and to
assess its environmental health consequences. That very evening, we
sent a research team into the World Trade Center Disaster Zone to
collect numerous samples of the dust from locations surrounding Ground
Zero. Figure 1 shows a map of the locations where we collected settled
WTC dust samples on the evening of the 12th and on the 13th of
September.
Our NYU Medical School research team also set up an ambient air
monitoring station at the NYU Downtown Hospital at Beekman Street, just
5 blocks to the east-northeast of Ground Zero. We sampled for various
types of particle air pollution: ultrafines, soot, fine particles, and
inhalable particles from Friday, September 14 until the end of 2001,
when the fires had been extinguished. Although our work is far from
complete, we have weighed these samples to determine the ambient
particulate mass concentrations, as well as analyzed the ambient air
pollution samples and the WTC dust for their constituents. Our sampling
data, therefore, applies to the general public living and working in
the vicinity of the disaster, rather than to exposures at Ground Zero.
So my testimony today focuses only on those community exposures and
possible health effects among the general population in the downtown
Manhattan area of New York City.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
It is of interest to note that the NYU Downtown Hospital was
founded many years ago after an earlier terrorist bomber attack on Wall
Street on September 16, 1920 that killed dozens of New Yorkers, and it
was felt that downtown New York City needed a local hospital ready to
respond to such emergencies. Some 81 years later, when this city needed
it, the NYU Downtown Hospital was ready, and met that need. Moreover,
despite having to run on diesel power and being in an emergency status,
the hospital aided our environmental assessment efforts by providing us
with space and power on its second floor, where we could run our
sampling lines out to sample pollution in the ambient air.
Our analyses of the WTC dust samples revealed that some 99 percent
of the dust was as particles too large to be breathed deeply into the
lung, being largely caught in the nose, mouth and throat when inhaled.
This large dust, however, contained approximately one-third fiberglass,
with much of the remainder as alkaline cement dust. This large dust
was, therefore, quite caustic and irritating to the eyes, nose and
throat, consistent with the now famous ``World Trade Center cough''
that nearby residents reported. Only trace amounts of asbestos were
found in our samples. The less than one percent that was as
PM2.5, or the particles that would reach deepest in the
lung, was found to have a neutral pH, with no detectable asbestos or
fiberglass. Thus, while our analyses are consistent with the
Government's conclusion that the WTC dust is not likely to have short-
or long-term serious health impacts on otherwise healthy local
residents, we found that it is very irritating and capable of causing
the symptoms reported by many residents.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Our sampling of the ambient air pollution at NYU Downtown Hospital
showed that air pollution levels were quite high in the first weeks
following the attack, especially at night, but then diminished as the
fires were brought under control. By early October, soot levels in the
downtown area were generally similar to those that we measured at the
NYU Medical School in Midtown (at First Ave. and 26th St.), although
levels occasionally climbed in downtown on clear, calm nights
throughout the fall. In Figure 3, the solid line on the left shows the
declining trend in soot levels in September through December. Overall,
our independent air pollution sampling results were largely consistent
with the data reported by the U.S. EPA. In particular, although short-
term peaks in PM2.5 particulate matter air pollution for a
few hours did occur at night, the 24-hour averages were of
PM2.5 were within the legal limits set by the U.S. air
quality standards.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Despite the fact that individual pollutants in the community were
apparently at safe levels for otherwise healthy persons in the general
population, this does not mean that no effects might have been
experienced by especially susceptible individuals, such as infants or
persons with pre-existing respiratory disease. In addition, it is
impossible to know what potential interactive effects might have
occurred among the various pollutants, even at these low levels.
Ultimately, only epidemiological follow-up studies of possible effects
among especially susceptible individuals will provide a fuller
determination of the issue of possible health effects from the various
pollutants in the WTC plume.
Finally, I feel strongly that we must make sure to learn all the
lessons that we can from this horrible catastrophe regarding the
communication of risk to the public in such emergency situations.
Something like what happened to New York City on September 11th could,
unfortunately happen again, and we must be prepared. It is an
understatement to say that the public is skeptical of government
pronouncements of safety in such situations. In this case, I feel that
the EPA was too quick to declare the air ``safe'', and did not well
enough define what was meant by that term. Although the fine particle
pollution was not of a level that would make otherwise healthy people
very sick, the dust was caustic and irritating, causing many to have
severe and upsetting symptoms, including eye, nose, and throat
irritation. This caused people to further doubt governmental
pronouncements of safety, even after more complete data were available
confirming the EPA position. As a result, the press turned to the
academic research community of New York City to fill the void.
Fortunately, New York City is itself blessed with vast resources,
including a host of some of the finest educational and research
institutions in the world. Other locales may not have such local
resources as were available in New York City, and be less able to meet
such a disaster.
It has been my duty and honor to play a role in the academic effort
to answer the environmental questions that New Yorkers had, and still
have. But we must improve the current situation. While we cannot create
governmental trust where there is none, I believe that we should draw
from what happened in New York City to help the Nation better cope with
such situations in the future. The Government should designate a suite
of environmental parameters to be measured in such situations, and
designate the appropriate health standards most appropriate for
comparison in such short-term exposure situations. Moreover, I
recommend that we create a mechanism by which blue-ribbon panels of the
leading independent experts in the United States are formed in advance,
perhaps by the National Academy of Sciences, to be on stand-by in case,
God forbid, such an emergency occurs again. If this is done, there
would then be an independent expert panel ready to be assembled,
briefed, and to then give their quick-turnaround assessment of the
public's environmental risks, and of the appropriate actions that are
needed to protect public health. Without such a new mechanisms, I fear
that any future such disasters may be accompanied by the same
unfortunate confusion, doubts, and distrust. Let us act now to help
preclude this risk communication problem in the future.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important issue.
__________
Responses by George Thurston to Additional Questions from
Senator Clinton
Question 1. In your testimony, you were critical of EPA's use of
the term ``safe''. This gets directly to the issue of risk
communication. How can government entities improve methods of risk
communication?
Response. The specifics of risk communication are going to vary
from situation to situation, but a basic principle that I see as
important is to define carefully what is meant in statements to the
public, and to explicitly state the limitations on what is being said.
The public wants to be informed of what is known and what is not known,
as well as what are the most important factors for them to consider, so
that they can take the most appropriate individual actions to protect
themselves and their families. For example, when I have discussed the
risks associated with particulate matter exposures in Lower Manhattan
after September 11th, I have always tried to separate out the exposures
experienced by workers at Ground Zero as opposed to the public that is
located blocks away. I have also tried to always include a
differentiation between the effects of short-term pollution exposures
(of hours or days) versus those of long-term exposures (of months or
years). Making these kinds of careful distinctions, rather than broad-
brush generalities or reassurances, reduces the chances of potential
misunderstandings among the public, and thereby is more likely to
better maintain confidence in these more careful and qualified risk
communication pronouncements.
Question 2. I agree with your call for parameters. Can you comment
further on this--how should we proceed with this effort?
Response. There is a need to come up with exposure limitation
guidelines for pollutant exposures from shorter-term exposures in such
disaster situations, as opposed to the existing exposure limitation
guidelines that are more often designed primarily to protect against
more routine situations with longer duration exposures in the case of
non-community (i.e., uncommon) pollutants, such as those pollutants
more usually found in occupational settings. A critical feature of this
guideline-setting process will be external review by scientists and the
public outside the Government. Such peer review is generally a part of
the routine standard setting process, but given the emergency situation
faced by the governmental agencies involved in this disaster, they did
the best they could with what was available. But we must be better
prepared with more directly applicable guidelines in the future, should
such a horrible disaster ever occur again. A case in point was the
exposure limit set by the U.S. EPA for short-term asbestos exposures.
While the standard for acceptable limits in the air for short-term
exposure applied by the EPA in this emergency situation may yet in the
long-run be deemed as the most appropriate, there was no time for
external peer review of the guideline applied in the days and weeks
following the disaster, so this gave the impression to some that the
guideline used by the EPA was potentially arbitrary, rather than on a
solid scientific health-based footing. This doubt undermined trust by
those individuals in the EPA pronouncements regarding the health
implications of the ambient asbestos exposures they were measuring and
reporting. This uncertainty and resultant mistrust must be addressed as
soon as possible by conducting independent and public peer review of a
new set of guidelines for acceptable vs. unacceptable pollutant
exposure limits in disaster situations.
Question 3. Do appropriate health standards exist for short-term
exposure situations, such as those experienced by many at the World
Trade Center? Do such standards need to be developed? Should they be
developed?
Response. As I noted above, health-based guidelines for acceptable
vs. unacceptable exposures in such shorter-term exposures are not
available for all pollutants, especially for those pollutants that are
usually of greatest health concern from long-term exposure, and that
are not usually experienced in such an acute manner by the general
public. For these pollutants, the appropriate agencies, such as the
U.S. EPA, must develop a set of best science health-based guidelines
that have undergone the usual scientific and public peer-review
process, so as to avoid the kind of uncertainty that was faced by these
agencies and the public in the wake of September 11th.
__________
Statement of Eric Goldstein, Natural Resources Defense Council
Good morning Chairman Lieberman, Senator Clinton and members of the
Subcommittee, my name is Eric A. Goldstein and I am the director of the
New York Urban Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(``NRDC''). NRDC, as you know, is a national, non-profit legal and
scientific organization active on a wide range of environmental issues,
including urban air quality. Since shortly after its founding in 1970,
NRDC has placed a special focus on the New York region's environment
and the quality of life of city residents. We are especially grateful
to you for convening this hearing and for your continuing interest and
dedication to safeguarding air quality and environmental health in New
York.
In the aftermath of the September 11th tragedy, my NRDC colleagues
Megan Nordgren, Mark Izeman and I began collecting data and conducting
interviews as part of year-long study of the environmental impacts of
the World Trade Center attacks and government's response to the
problems identified. We are releasing a preliminary version of that
study this coming Wednesday, and would ask you to consider
incorporating this full document into the hearing record. This morning,
I will briefly make three points and propose four recommendations for
action by this subcommittee to help address air quality problems in the
wake of the Trade Center disaster.
First, it is important to state what is widely known to anyone who
lives or works in the vicinity of Ground Zero--the September 11th
attacks, in addition to the horrific loss of human lives and huge
economic dislocations, constituted an unprecedented assault on Lower
Manhattan's environment. The collapse of the 110 story towers, the
conflagration of vast amounts of toxic materials, the forceful
distribution of debris and dust, and the long-burning fires at Ground
Zero combined to create what was unquestionably the single largest air
pollution episode in the history of New York City. NRDC's report
estimates that at least 10,000 New Yorkers suffered short-term
respiratory and other pollution-related impacts from the Trade Center's
collapse and subsequent fires. Thousands of apartments and offices in
the immediate vicinity of Ground Zero received significant loadings of
polluted dust--everything from asbestos to fiberglass to pulverized
cement to, in many cases, metals and other toxic substances.
There is, of course, much we do not yet know about the air quality
impacts from the September 11th attacks. That is why the health studies
now being undertaken by distinguished medical institutions like
Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health and Mt. Sinai's
Selikoff Center for Occupational and Environmental Medicine, as well as
similar work at New York University's Nelson Institute of Environmental
Medicine, is so important.
But here in most condensed fashion is what we can say about air
quality right now. In general, outdoor air quality in Lower Manhattan
today is approaching or similar to levels in this area prior to
September 11th, with the exception of the Ground Zero work-pile and
localized hot spots, such as areas with heavy concentrations of diesel
equipment or vehicles and, at times, areas where Trade Center debris is
being moved or transferred to barges. The most worrisome air pollution
problem facing Lower Manhattan now involves indoor pollution threats in
some residences and offices that were engulfed with thick layers of
contaminated dust and whose buildings were not properly cleaned.
In short, from what we now know, the bulk of the exposures have
already occurred and the bulk of damage from the terrorist attacks has
been felt. The air pollution challenges that remain are manageable and
solvable. But, they exist and they shouldn't be swept under the rug.
Let me briefly turn to government's response to the environmental
health challenge presented by the September 11th attacks. In many ways,
the response of government agencies and their employees to the Trade
Center attacks was heroic and a testament to the merits of public
service, which is too often undervalued. Environmental and Health
Agency staff performed many tasks with distinction. U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency personnel, for example, undertook numerous
assignments including the removal of hazardous waste from the Ground
Zero site, the deployment of HEPA vacuuming trucks for collection of
dust layers from city streets, and the establishment of sophisticated
air monitoring and testing facilities. But when one closely examines
the governmental response to air pollution impacts from the collapse of
the Trade Center Towers and the subsequent fires, a more complicated
picture emerges.
One major problem was overlapping jurisdiction among at least nine
city, State, and Federal agencies, which meant that no single agency
was in overall charge of the environmental aspects of the response to
the September 11th attacks in New York. For example, no agency took the
lead in insuring environmental safety for those working at Ground Zero.
No agency took affirmative charge of the environmental clean up and
inspection of environmental conditions prior to re-occupancy of
residences and office buildings that were coated with debris and
pollution. Many such problems, NRDC believes, resulted from
shortcomings by the Giuliani administration, which handled so many
other aspects of the September 11th response magnificently and which
was in tight, overall command of the entire rescue, recovery and clean-
up effort. The low profile of the City's Department of Environmental
Protection--the 6,000 person department with wide-ranging New York City
Charter duties to respond to environmental emergencies--lends support
to the growing belief the department, for whatever reason, did not rise
to the challenges posed by the September 11th attacks.
A second major problem involved communicating environmental health
information to the public. There appeared to be no coordinated strategy
for conveying such information to concerned citizens, no regular
briefings by governmental leaders of environmental or health agencies,
and no one place for citizens to turn for environmental guidance and
advice. Moreover, government statements on air quality, at least as the
public understood them, stressed the good news and de-emphasized issues
that might raise further concerns. By focusing almost exclusively on
long-term risks in their public statements, government officials
omitted warnings regarding short-term health effects, particularly to
Ground Zero workers and other sensitive sub-groups. Admittedly,
government agencies had a very difficult assignment here, and were
responding not to an industrial accident but an unprecedented act of
war. Nevertheless, as a result of shortcomings on the communication
front, a troubling credibility gap on environmental health issues
emerged.
A third difficulty, and one of continuing concern, has been
environmental safety shortcomings at Ground Zero. While the rescue,
recovery and site clean-up operations have made remarkable progress
under exceptionally challenging circumstances, the way environmental
health issues have been handled represents a glaring exception to this
post-September 11th record of accomplishment. A prime example has been
the failure to require Ground Zero workers to wear appropriate
respirators. The OSHA representatives--who will be speaking later and
who will probably state that they were only at Ground Zero in an
advisory capacity and did not or could not insist upon the wearing of
respirators by the Ground Zero work force--certainly have some
explaining to do. Among other on-site safety problems of significance
were undue delays in establishing worker safety training procedures.
A final shortcoming in government's environmental response to the
Trade Center attacks involves problems assisting Lower Manhattan
residents on environmental safety and clean-up issues. In addition to
the previously stated communications gaps, city agencies failed to
provide complete and proper clean-up protocols to many Lower Manhattan
residents and failed to inspect even the most heavily contaminated
buildings for environmental safety, prior to re-entry. Once again, no
agency took overall responsibility for supervising the environmental
clean up and safe re-occupancy of apartments (and office buildings)
immediately surrounding Ground Zero. It was left, for the most part, to
residents and building managers to sort these complex challenges out
for themselves.
Let me conclude by listing four of the recommendations contained in
the forthcoming NRDC World Trade Center report, on which we believe
this subcommittee could be most helpful:
(1) Urge the New York City Department of Environmental Protection
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (with whatever other
agencies they deem appropriate) to: (a) create an Air Pollution
Assistance Center located in the Ground Zero vicinity, fully staffed
with a range of government personnel who could provide one-stop advice
for local residents and office workers, and (b) create a Joint Task
Force that will promptly begin door-to-door visits to and inspections
of individual buildings, to verify environmental conditions, at least
in the immediate ring of buildings within a 10-block radius of Ground
Zero;
(2) Prod the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and
relevant New York City officials to commence without further delay
enforcement of environmental safety rules at the Ground Zero work site;
(3) Assist medical institutions, such as those listed above, in
securing monies for public health studies, and help obtain funds for a
full health registry of all Lower Manhattan residents and workers who
may have been affected by pollution in the aftermath of September 11th,
and
(4) Consider convening a second hearing this spring to review
whether Federal Clean Air Act pollution standards and/or pollution
monitoring requirements for New York need revision in the wake of
lessons learned from the September 11th tragedy.
Thank you very much for inviting NRDC to testify at this important
hearing. We stand ready to assist this subcommittee in addressing the
air quality impacts of the World Trade Center disaster in any way we
can.
__________
Statement of Marianne Jackson, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer,
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am
Marianne Jackson, Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer for Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the World Trade Center disaster.
I thank you for this opportunity to update you on FEMA's disaster
response operations in New York City, especially related to health
concerns and clean up, since the World Trade Center attacks on
September 11, 2001.
The events of September 11th have become indelibly etched in our
collective memory because of the unthinkable and evil terrorist acts
perpetrated against the citizens of this great nation. The twin towers
at the World Trade Center complex collapsed and nearby buildings either
partially collapsed or suffered extensive collateral damage. The sheer
magnitude of this disaster caused untold suffering and generated
thousands of tons of debris.
I appreciate being invited here today to give you an update on
FEMA's continuing activities and the types of assistance we are
providing, along with our partners, to help alleviate the suffering of
the residents of New York City, to deal with the cleanup, and to
monitor the potential health effects on the emergency responders. As
you know, until you have seen the devastation in person, you can't even
begin to appreciate the enormity of this disaster and the recovery that
is involved. But I can assure you that tremendous work has already been
accomplished.
The level of cooperation and professionalism exhibited by all of
the Federal, State and local personnel and emergency responders has
been outstanding. I am especially moved and deeply humbled by the
heroic and unselfish efforts of the many emergency responders from
right here in New York City and of those who came in from around the
Nation to assist in the response and recovery. These people placed
themselves in harm's way to help others in their time of need and I am
forever grateful to them for their ultimate sacrifice and bravery. Many
of these policemen, firemen, and emergency medical technicians
tragically lost their own lives while doing what they do best, putting
everything aside to rush to the scene to save lives, rescue the trapped
and injured, and be the first responders. We will never forget what
they did and are committed to doing everything we possibly can to
ensure that any potential health effects they may encounter are
monitored and followed up. Just as they gave for us, we must in turn
reach out and do whatever we can to help them.
Some 3,500 Federal workers were deployed to New York to support the
disaster response, about 1,300 from FEMA, and almost 2,000 from other
Federal departments and agencies. All of these responders are caring
people working together toward a simple goal to help the victims
recover from this terrible national tragedy. There are still 491 people
working on the recovery in New York at the Disaster Field Office.
background
As background, I want to describe how FEMA works with other
agencies in responding to disasters. As you know, our mission is to
reduce the loss of life and property and protect our Nation's critical
infrastructure from all types of hazards. Our success depends on our
ability to organize and lead a community of local, State, and Federal
agencies and volunteer organizations. Our experiences in responding to
natural disasters have taught us who to bring to the table and what
questions to ask so that we may facilitate managing a wide range of
emergencies. We provide the management framework and the financial
resources to help State and local governments meet the needs, of their
communities.
The Federal Response Plan (FRP) forms the heart of that framework.
The FRP lays out the process by which interagency groups work together
in Washington, DC, and in all 10 FEMA Regions, to enable the Federal
Government to respond as a cohesive team to a wide range of natural and
manmade disasters and catastrophes. This team is made up of 26 Federal
Departments and Agencies, as well as the American Red Cross, and is
organized into interagency functions based on the authorities and
expertise of the members and the needs of our counterparts at the State
and local level.
Since 1992, and again in response to the tragic events on September
11, 2001, the Federal Response Plan has proven to be a solid framework
time and time again for managing major disasters and emergencies
regardless of cause. It works during all phases of disasters, including
readiness, response, recovery and mitigation. The framework is
successful because it builds upon the existing professional disciplines
and relationships among the participating agencies. Among Federal
agencies, FEMA has the strongest ties to the emergency management and
fire service communities. We plan, train, exercise, and operate
together to prepare for and respond to all types of hazards all of the
time. That puts us in a position to manage and coordinate programs that
address their needs. Similarly, the Department of Health and Human
Services has the strongest ties to the public health and medical
communities, and the Department of Justice has the strongest ties to
the legal, law enforcement, and victims' assistance communities. The
Federal Response Plan respects these relationships and areas of
expertise and relies upon them to define the decision-making processes
and delivery systems so that we maximize the use of all available
resources.
We received tremendous support from some our partners:
transportation of assets and movement support provided by the
Department of Transportation; telecommunications assistance from the
National Communications System; logistical and managerial support
provided by incident management teams from the U.S. Firefighting
Service; mass care, feeding, and mental health support from the
American Red Cross and other volunteer organizations; resource support
from the General Services Administration; food stamp program support
from the Department of Agriculture; assistance in resolving power
restoration problems from the Department of Energy, a medical screening
tool to assist in evaluating any potential medical outcome related to
worksite exposure has been developed U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
invaluable support from the various branches of the Department of
Defense; and extensive environmental monitoring and sampling support
from the Environmental Protection Agency.
monitoring air quality
Immediately following the attacks on September 11th, the importance
of air quality, emergency responder health, environmental degradation,
and related issues emerged as critically important, in addition to
responding to the immediate needs of the victims of the attacks. Right
away we began working closely with the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the New York City Department of Environmental Protection and New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation to monitor and
address air quality concerns. Under the FRP we mission assigned and
provided funding to EPA to conduct air sampling throughout Manhattan,
Brooklyn and Staten Island. Air quality monitoring continues today with
numerous monitoring sites providing data that can be used to evaluate
health and safety standards. Our funding will permit this monitoring to
continue through September 30, 2002.
ensuring appropriate safety and preventive measures
The health and safety of emergency responders is always a paramount
concern of ours. Right after the attacks numerous Government Agencies
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), within
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), EPA, and State and
city agencies dispatched representatives to the site to provide advice
on health issues and establish appropriate safety measures and
protocols. In fact, a comprehensive Health and Safety Plan was
developed with input from numerous Federal, State, and New York City
agencies. FEMA is a strong supporter of site safety. Our experience in
disaster responses has taught us the importance of ensuring the safety
of the emergency responders so that they do not themselves become
disaster victims.
Federal personnel and teams deployed into the disaster area, such
as the Urban Search and Rescue Teams, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
personnel, and medical personnel from the Department of Health and
Human Services, arrived with the necessary protective gear and as a
result of health and safety advisories that were issued were able to
adopt the required safety protocols. In the first weeks, FEMA's Safety
Officer closely coordinated with and participated daily in the New York
City Interagency Health and Safety Meeting and, as a result, was able
to pass on advisories and provide training from the meetings.
long-term health monitoring of first responders
We took measures to address immediate health concerns involving
emergency responders through our coordination with the Department of
Health and Human Services and its Public Health Service. Five Disaster
Medical Assistance Teams, four Disaster Mortuary Teams, one Veterinary
Medical Assistance Team, and one Mental Health Assistance Team, were
dispatched to New York City to provide health care and related
assistance. The Naval Hospital Ship USNS Comfort and burn nurses were
also deployed to support the response.
Long-term health monitoring was funded by FEMA for medical
surveillance of 11,000 firefighters and 4,000 State emergency
responders working at Ground Zero. As of December 31, 2001, blood
samples had been drawn by local clinics coordinated by the FDNY Medical
Office. These samples are being used to help establish a health
baseline. Follow-up and additional testing is to be completed by the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) over the next 12 months. We provided
$9 million for immediate testing, analysis and program management with
CDC as the lead agency.
In an effort to be cautious, we have asked the Urban Search and
Rescue (US&R) Task Forces that deployed to the World Trade Center to
notify us of any medical problems/illnesses resulting from or related
to their deployment. We have encouraged them to use the Workman's
Compensation Program as applicable and complete and provide us with
copies of the Federal Employee's Notice of Traumatic Injury and Claims
for Continuation of Pay/Compensation Form (Form CA-1).
A Centers for Disease Control doctor took voluntary blood samples
from members of the California-8 and Florida-1 US&R Task Forces to
study long-term effects and will provide FEMA the results of that
study. In addition, another doctor who is a member of Indiana Task
Force-1, created a database of medical problems he was seeing while in
New York at the Jacob Javits Center. Also, the Ohio Task Force
developed a survey for their members to capture any illnesses that they
may have and provided the survey to the other Task Forces.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements are incident
specific and the US&R Task Forces and Incident Support Teams (IST) are
trained on evaluation and detection to determine the level of
appropriate gear. PPE requirements for this incident were briefed to
the Task Forces and IST during deployment. The standard equipment was
P-100 APR's (respirators) and an ample stock was maintained at the
Jacob Javits Center for IST and Task Force members to use.
FEMA will continue to encourage the 28 US&R Task Forces to monitor
their World Trade Center deployed personnel for any medical issues and
to use the Workman's Compensation Program.
In another critical health area, we provided support to address the
long-term mental health of responders and others who may have been
affected by this tragedy. We coordinated and facilitated the actions
necessary for the National Association of Fallen Firefighters to work
directly with the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) in providing
immediate and long-term crisis and grief counseling to fire fighters
and their families. We also funded Project Liberty, a long-term mental
health disaster recovery program administered by the New York State
Office of Mental Health. To date almost $23 million has been approved
for this program.
assistance for clean up to ensure safe reentry of buildings
As you know, because of the amount of dust and debris that resulted
from the building collapses, clean up of residences and the surrounding
area has been a major priority. We provided housing assistance grants
to be used for clean up of residences. In addition, the New York State-
administered Individual and Family Grant program provided grants for
items such as High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) vacuum cleaners,
air filters, and other eligible items to help residents with reentry
into their homes. In many cases landlords and/or insurance companies
funded clean up. I should also mention that voluntary agencies were
very active and helped with clean up for Special Needs residents.
We also supported the New York City Department of Health through
their Community Teams and our own Outreach Teams in distributing to
residents flyers containing recommendations on actions needed in order
to be able to re-occupy buildings and homes. This flyer addressed clean
up and safety and health concerns and was developed to facilitate
individuals moving back into their homes.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) was on site September 12
and opened their first office to serve the public on September 14.
Through SBA, low interest loans are available to homeowners,
businesses, renters and non-profit organizations to repair or replace
damaged property. Additionally for businesses Economic Injury Disaster
Loans (EIDL) were available to pay necessary obligations until business
operations returned to normal. SBA assistance for physical loss has
provided home loans for 306 individuals totaling nearly $4.7 million
and 428 business loans totaling over $26 million. Eligible government
clean-up costs and monitoring activities are being funded 100 percent
through FEMA's Public Assistance program. For example, the New York
City Board of Education's clean up of schools near Ground Zero is an
eligible expense as is the clean up of city vehicles such as fire
trucks and police cars.
lessons learned
We learn from every disaster experience and incorporate these
lessons learned wherever possible into our planning and processes to
improve the next disaster response. The World Trade Center and Pentagon
disaster responses are no different. We have learned from both. We
recognize the need to have alternate operating facilities and flexible
response and operations plans that provide for actions such as
establishing a Fire Support Branch, an External Logistics Team and
robust and redundant communications networks. I should add, however,
that the Federal response to the World Trade Center attack clearly
reinforced the soundness of the Stafford Act and once again validated
the effectiveness of the Federal Response Plan and current FEMA
policies and procedures for responding to a disaster event.
authority and resources
All of FEMA's work, the response and rescue efforts, the recovery
programs, and plans to prevent future events, have been created out of
the authority the Environment and Public Works Committee has provided
through the Stafford Act. This legislation has served us well and has
provided the necessary authority and flexibility to empower us to do
our best. You can be proud of your work and its results. All of us at
FEMA thank you for your leadership. We believe current enabling
legislation and resources are sufficient for FEMA to respond
appropriately.
There is no doubt that the disaster response and recovery in New
York City will be a long-term process, but the President has said that
we will provide whatever assistance is needed to get the job done. I
can assure you that FEMA will be there as long as needed.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to answer any questions
you may have.
______
Response by Marianne Jackson to Additional Question from
Senator Lieberman
Question. Like so many other Federal employees, the members of the
FEMA Massachusetts Task Force 1 have private health insurance which
does not provide health care screening after deployment in potentially
hazardous conditions such as the World Trade Center complex. Some
members have already reported health problems. General concern has been
expressed as to the long-term health effects of ``Ground Zero''
exposure. In order to provide both adequate care and answers to such
long-term effects, what is FEMA doing to screen and monitor these
members who were deployed to WTC? Is what we are doing sufficient? If
not, and since time may be critical, what can be done to expedite a
solution?
Response. As we watched the images of fire and smoke on September
11th and the days that followed, we immediately recognized that there
was a potential risk to the health and well being of the rescue workers
and we moved quickly to assign the mission for air monitoring to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through the Federal Response Plan.
As the disaster response unfolded, FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R)
personnel worked closely with local incident management officials and
supporting Federal agencies to determine and provide appropriate levels
of personal protective equipment based on the best available
information. In addition, FEMA met with Department of Labor
representatives to identify and coordinate requirements and procedures
for processing any US&R workers compensation claims arising from the
WTC and Pentagon responses.
As US&R Task Forces returned home, higher than expected illnesses
were reported by some of the Task Forces. FEMA encouraged Task Force
personnel to file Federal worker compensation claims and contact FEMA's
Worker's Compensation Agent, LIFECARE, to receive information on how to
seek treatment if they suspected their illness was related to the
response, and to also provide a record of those individuals who took
part in the response and the dates of their mission deployment. FEMA
has surveyed all participating Task Forces to develop data on which
members worked these disasters and the amount of time they worked in
the impact areas. This information is still being received from the
Task Forces and compiled.
In February and March, FEMA hosted a series of meetings involving
the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
the National Institutes of Health, and the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry to discuss possible approaches for properly
addressing the long-term health effects of the September 11th attack on
the responders and others. Participants in the meeting were tasked with
developing recommendations for action. A number of strategies were
proposed the week of March 11th and are under an expedited review. FEMA
continues to monitor US&R responder health issues and support
processing of all workers compensation claims received from the Task
Forces.
______
Responses by Marianne Jackson to Additional Questions from
Senator Clinton
Question 1. What assistance has been provided to the schools and to
local tenants (commercial and residential) through FEMA for cleanup of
indoor air and dust?
Response. The following assistance has been provided for cleanup of
indoor air and dust:
cleanup at public schools
FEMA has provided funding, or is currently developing estimates for
funding, in all cases where the New York City Board of Education has
requested clean up of dust at public school buildings owned by the
Board. This funding, estimated at $4.7 million, covers cleanup of
contents and equipment, cleanup of interiors and exteriors, testing for
hazardous materials, and abatement of those materials if discovered.
air monitoring at schools
FEMA is providing funds to the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) for rooftop air monitoring at city
schools. Immediately after the collapse of the World Trade Center
Towers, DEP began conducting monitoring for asbestos, acid gases,
metals, and volatile organic contaminants at schools in each of the
five boroughs; DEP discontinued this activity after one month,
incurring costs of approximately $730,000. DEP continues to monitor for
asbestos at four schools immediately adjacent to the World Trade Center
site. FEMA is considering funding this activity through completion of
debris removal operations; the cost is estimated at $240,000.
The New York City Board of Education has requested assistance with
interior air monitoring at six schools in the vicinity of the World
Trade Center site. The estimated cost of this monitoring is $3 million.
FEMA has agreed to fund testing for the period prior to occupancy of
the buildings (estimated costs of $1.5 million), but has not yet
determined the eligibility of on-going air monitoring inside the
buildings after the students have reoccupied them. This determination
is based on the assumption that students would not be allowed in the
buildings if a potential health hazard existed.
cleanup of new york university (nyu) facilities
FEMA has not yet provided funding for the cleanup of the New York
City public school buildings at 90 and 100 Trinity Place. The Board of
Education spent approximately $2.5 million to clean the interior,
exterior, and ductwork of these buildings, as an emergency health and
safety measure. However, the Board of Education leases these buildings
from NYU, which is responsible for such work. FEMA can provide funding
for such work only to NYU as the entity with legal responsibility for
these facilities.
cleanup of residences and commercial businesses
FEMA, in cooperation with the New York State-administered
Individual and Family Grant Program, is providing eligible occupants
with high-efficiency air filters that trap minute particulate matter.
Others have received funds for general clean up and smoke abatement.
The Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program assists
commercial businesses.
Question 2. What were the greatest challenges that FEMA faced in
its response to the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center?
Response. Among the major challenges facing FEMA in response to the
attacks of September 11th were obtaining operational information,
communications inter-operability, and flight restrictions.
From an operational standpoint, trying to gather information about
the incident, what happened, what assistance was needed, along with the
requirement to gather information about what else might be occurring
presented a challenge. The attack, which directly affected the New York
City Office of Emergency Management and the Fire Department of New
York, impacted the flow of information. The attacks essentially created
4 major incidents that we had to respond to that developed in rapid
succession, with the very real possibility that additional attacks were
likely. As a result, it was necessary that we moderate our initial
response until we had a better understanding of the big picture. Once
we had a better handle on the situation, we were then able to deploy
additional resources to New York City and the Pentagon.
From a communications standpoint, communications interoperability
issues impacted our capability to collect and exchange information. The
inability to have common communications capability at the initial
stages of the response slowed our ability to gather information, and to
coordinate the Federal response. Cell phone saturation created another
major communications challenge. This event clearly pointed out the high
level of dependence of Federal, State and local responders on cell
phones for communications and the vulnerabilities that can be
associated with this mode of communication.
The decision to impose flight restrictions certainly was a good
one, and undoubtedly saved a great number of lives, but it limited our
ability to deploy and move resources and emergency teams. Because our
contingency planning had never anticipated that a flight restriction
would be put into effect, we had not planned on how to move emergency
teams from all parts of the country without air transport. While the
flight restrictions did delay some of the initial responses, we were
able to work around the problem and move teams by ground transport.
Since September 11th, we have worked with U.S. Department of
Transportation to develop alternative movement plans and established
plans for flight restriction waivers and priority air shipments.
Question 3. It appears that there have been more applications to
FEMA for human assistance in conjunction with the September 11th attack
on the World Trade Center deemed ineligible or denied by FEMA than have
been reimbursed. Please confirm and explain why this is the case? How
does the ineligibility/denial rate compare with other disasters?
Response. Traditionally, FEMA's Mortgage and Rental Assistance
Program averages a 20 percent to 30 percent eligibility rate. The
current rate for New York is 28 percent. Several factors contribute to
this low rate. Two of the more prominent criteria for program
eligibility are that the applicant must have suffered a loss of
household income totaling 25 percent or greater and that the applicant
have delinquent mortgage or rental payments as a result of the
disaster. Of the applicants determined ineligible, 64 percent did not
meet the criteria in these two categories. That is, household income
was not affected to any substantial degree and/or the applicant was not
delinquent on a housing payment.
It should be noted that these determinations are made based on the
initial application. If circumstances change, applicants can re-
establish their eligibility.
Question 4. What resources can FEMA provide to conduct long-term
health monitoring of first responders, other rescue and response
workers, as well as workers, residents, and school children in Lower
Manhattan?
Response. FEMA will provide the following resources:
first responders
FEMA has provided funds to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Public Health Service, to conduct baseline testing of first
responders. The funding, $9 million, was used to take blood samples
from 11,000 fire fighters and 4,000 New York State employees. This work
is now complete.
civilian workers
The New York City Office of Labor Relations has indicated that they
may request FEMA funding for first-phase medical monitoring of civilian
workers at the World Trade Center site. The city estimates the cost for
providing this testing to 2,000 workers to be $140,000. At this time,
the city has not provided sufficient information on the proposed
request for FEMA to evaluate the eligibility of this activity. If FEMA
determines that the testing is necessary to respond to an immediate
threat to health--as with the testing done for first responders--the
cost of the testing would be eligible.
Question 5. What is the estimated budget and expected time frame
for completion of cleanup?
Response. The estimated budget and timeframe for completion is as
follows:
assistance to the city of new york
The current cost estimate for removal of debris at the World Trade
Center site is $1.325 billion. This estimate includes:
$750 million for work at the site by the City of New York
and its contractors.
$575 million for disposal of debris at the Fresh Kills
landfill, including barging contracts.
This estimate does not reflect funds that may be recouped through
the sale of recycled steel; however, that amount is expected to be
relatively small. The City of New York expects to complete work at the
site by May 30, 2002.
direct federal assistance
FEMA is providing funds to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
for the following activities related to debris removal operations:
Assessment of hazardous substances and oil releases--$13
million (complete)
Development and implementation of decontamination plan--
$15 million (complete)
Set-up of hygiene station at the site--$4 million
(complete)
Operation of wash stations at the site and landfill--$24.5
million (until March 31)
Hazardous materials advisory activities--$1.5 million
(until March 31)
Air monitoring at the site and landfill and in Lower
Manhattan, the four other boroughs, and New Jersey--$25.7 million
(through September 30)
FEMA is also providing funds (approximately $1 million) to the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers for technical support at the landfill. The
total amount of Direct Federal Assistance is $84.7 million.
Question 6. There are reportedly many building roofs and terraces
in and around Ground Zero that have not been cleaned since September
11th. Will FEMA provide assistance in this regard?
Response. Yes, FEMA will provide the following assistance:
public buildings
FEMA has provided funding, or is developing estimates for funding,
for cleanup of dust at facilities owned by public entities throughout
Lower Manhattan. This funding covers cleanup of contents and equipment,
cleanup of building interiors and exteriors, testing for hazardous
materials, and abatement of those materials if discovered.
private buildings
The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has
requested assistance with inspection and cleanup of buildings within
the area of Lower Manhattan bounded by the Chambers Street, Battery
Place, Pearl Street, and the Hudson River. DEP estimates that, of the
approximately 500 private buildings located within this area, 250
buildings will require cleaning of facades, roofs, and terraces. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has provided FEMA with a
determination that a possible health threat exists due to the presence
of this dust. Consequently, FEMA has agreed to assist DEP with the
cleanup of exteriors of these buildings as an emergency measure.
The cleanup, currently estimated at approximately $10.5 million,
will include testing for asbestos-containing materials and any
abatement measures necessary if such materials are discovered. FEMA
will fund a one-time cleanup of the buildings, as well as any overtime
costs DEP incurs for contract management and inspection. DEP is
responsible for ensuring that building owners are aware of the effort,
identifying those structures that require cleanup, and securing right-
of-entry and indemnification for work on these buildings. Additionally,
the city is responsible for ensuring that there is no duplication of
benefits with insurance proceeds. FEMA will not provide funding for a
series of cleanup efforts for these structures, nor for long-term
monitoring activities.
city streets
Immediately after the collapse of the towers, DEP began testing
surfaces to identify and isolate asbestos-contaminated areas. The
results showed that many surfaces, including streets, sidewalks,
buildings, vehicles, and playgrounds, were contaminated with hazardous
levels of asbestos. DEP closed streets and businesses in contaminated
areas and conducted round-the-clock asbestos cleaning and removal. The
estimated cost of this activity, which is eligible for Federal
assistance, is $114,000.
Question 7. What resources can FEMA make available for tenant
groups and individual residents to hire professional environmental
cleaning firms to remediate their homes? What assistance has FEMA
provided in this regard to date?
Response. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is charged with providing
temporary housing while individuals work on their permanent housing
solutions. Temporary housing is provided as a grant of up to $10,000 to
make emergency repairs to a home to make it livable, including any
applicable clean up. If the home cannot be made livable quickly for
this amount, FEMA provides funds to rent alternative accommodations for
up to 18 months while the individual completes permanent repairs.
__________
Statement of Carl Johnson, Deputy Commissioner, New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation
Thank you for providing the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) with the opportunity to testify
about our efforts to assist the residents and businesses of Lower
Manhattan to recover from the devastation caused by the destruction of
the World Trade Center Complex. We share, with Governor Pataki and our
sister agencies, the highest level of commitment to managing the
cleanup, and we appreciate the excellent coordination among all levels
of government involved in this effort.
As with other New York agencies that have never reacted to a
disaster of this magnitude, in many respects NYSDEC's efforts at the
World Trade Center are unprecedented. Although these efforts spanned
many environmental media and critical issues, I will focus my testimony
today on the air quality issues noted in the subcommittee's letter of
invitation to Governor Pataki.
air quality monitoring and assessment
As soon as possible after the attacks on the World Trade Center,
NYSDEC began to work with other State, Federal and local environmental
and health agencies to monitor and assess the environmental impacts
from the devastation. We established a multi-jurisdictional air-
monitoring group to coordinate this effort, which initially focused on
worker safety during the rescue efforts. Safeguards were put in place
to prevent excessive exposure to contaminants released by the
destruction of these buildings, and these safeguards remain in effect
today.
Next, along with our sister agencies, we began the process of
identifying specific monitoring needs and then put in place the process
of collecting that information. NYSDEC, along with USEPA, OSHA, the
State Department of Health, and the city of New York, continue this
aggressive air monitoring effort. All of the data is posted on the EPA
website as it becomes available. NYSDEC collects data specifically on
asbestos, PM2.5, PM10 and dioxin.
Asbestos
Asbestos was used in the early stages of construction on Tower One,
and as a result, asbestos levels have been detected occasionally in the
samples we have collected. There are 18 monitoring locations in Lower
Manhattan at which asbestos samples are collected. NYSDEC is
responsible for seven of these sites, primarily located outside the
exclusionary zone, in conjunction with USEPA. We operate the equipment
and change the filters on a daily basis. Once our staff remove a
filter, we forward it to USEPA for analysis. This data, like other
asbestos data, is then uploaded to the USEPA website to ensure that the
public has access to this information as quickly as possible.
In determining, together with our sister agencies, a standard to be
used in monitoring asbestos levels, we decided on the asbestos standard
most protective of public health--the Asbestos Hazard and Emergency
Response Act (AHERA) standard of 70 structures per millimeter squared.
This standard, which USEPA established, is used primarily for indoor
air purposes and in schools to determine when it is safe for activities
to resume in a school building once it has been cleaned of asbestos.
Applied to outdoor air, this is a very conservative standard of
comparison.
Our multi-agency agreement to use the AHERA standard ensures that
there is a consistent approach used in analyzing the asbestos results.
These results must be obtained using Transmission Electron Microscopy
(TEM)--a method required to analyze for asbestos because it identifies
individual asbestos fibers and does not confuse asbestos fibers with
fiberglass or other fibers.
To date, more than 5,500 asbestos samples have been taken in Lower
Manhattan, with only 31 of the total samples above the TEM AHERA level.
Of those 31 samples, 27 were collected prior to October 9. The
remaining four were reported after that date. All of the levels above
the standard were observed in or very near to the exclusionary zone
around Ground Zero.
Thousands of asbestos samples have been taken at the Staten Island
Landfill to which debris is taken, with only 40 of the samples above
the TEM AHERA level. All of the levels above the standard were observed
within the exclusionary zone at the Landfill.
While we continue to monitor for asbestos, it is clear from the
findings that the asbestos levels detected in the ambient air have not
generally been above what is considered a safe indoor air standard--one
that is protective of the children in our schools.
NYSDEC also collects data from nine sites located in all five
boroughs of New York City. To date, this data does not indicate that
the TEM AHERA standard has been exceeded.
I would like to bring to your attention the results of the
residential monitoring study performed jointly by the New York City
Department of Health (NYCDOH) and ATSDR. In this effort, indoor dust
and air in buildings around the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan
were sampled. The results of the study are only now becoming available,
and appear to indicate that asbestos levels in indoor air are below
USEPA standards. In some locations, asbestos was found in settled dust.
Particulate Matter
NYSDEC uses two types of sampling techniques to monitor for small
particles in the air, also known as particulates. At present, we are
sampling for both PM2.5 (fine particulates) and
PM10 (both fine and coarse particulates) levels in Lower
Manhattan. We have selected five new monitoring sites in Lower
Manhattan--the Coast Guard Station in southern Manhattan, Park Row
(near City Hall), the Borough of Manhattan Community College, Albany
Street at West Street and Wall Street at Broad Street. Equipment at
these sites is a combination of both continuous air quality monitoring
devices and filter based air quality monitoring devices. The continuous
air quality devices provide information on the levels of
PM2.5 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This data is reported
automatically to two websites, one operated by the NYSDEC and the other
operated by USEPA. Both are available to the public.
To date, the particulate levels in Lower Manhattan, as well as
throughout the rest of the city, have not demonstrated significant
increases. In fact, readings have been consistent with levels recorded
prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center. At no time has there
been a level of particulates monitored that exceeded the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for a 24-hour period for either
PM2.5 (65 micrograms per cubic meter) or PM10
(150 micrograms per cubic meter). In fact, on only one day since the
attacks occurred has there been a daily average recorded at any monitor
throughout New York City that exceeded the 40 micrograms per cubic
meter level that USEPA uses as a guideline for concern for sensitive
individuals. Also located at our new monitoring sites are monitors to
collect PM10 data. There has been no exceedance of this
standard.
There has been some discussion about occasional spikes in the
particulate levels which could present public health concerns. These
short-term increases in particulate matter have been infrequent, and
were present previous to the World Trade Center collapse.
Dioxin
Finally, the Department has been involved in the field work for
dioxin monitoring. The Department maintains three sites and collects
samples for dioxin analysis by USEPA. As in the case of asbestos and
particulate levels, dioxins have been detected in some of the samples.
However, the presence of dioxin is also consistent with the nature of a
disaster such as this one, where fires continued burning for an
extended period of time. While the early results were above USEPA's 30-
year public health exposure guideline, since the fires were
extinguished these levels are decreasing. Similar decreasing
concentration trends have been observed for lead and PCB measurements.
Odors
The presence of odors in Lower Manhattan and concerns about eye,
throat, nose and respiratory irritation are a cause of concern to those
who live and work in this area. Odors, which can result from fires such
as those that burned after the World Trade Center's destruction, have
abated substantially. Short-term exposures to contaminants near the
immediate area of the World Trade Center may have contributed to the
irritation which some residents reported.
We monitor air quality for specific parameters and measure the
results against standards that have been set as the result of lengthy
public processes. Outside of the immediate area of the World Trade
Center, we have not seen a significant cause for concern through our
air quality monitoring. At the site, DEC and other agencies have
consistently and strongly recommended that workers use appropriate
safety equipment to minimize their exposure to these irritants. NYSDEC
will continue its air monitoring activities and expand them as needed
in consultation with the city and Federal agencies. We will maintain
these activities until this effort is completed.
transportation conformity
I would like to raise to you a critical priority for the State of
New York, along with the city of New York and neighboring counties. In
nonattainment areas, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 wisely
requires State Implementation Plans for air quality and transportation
plans, programs and projects to conform--so that the transportation
projects which are put in place help congested areas, such as
Southeastern New York, to attain National Ambient Air Quality
Standards.
In the 10-county region which includes New York City, Long Island,
and the lower Hudson Valley, the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Council (NYMTC) is the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO)
responsible for implementing this program. NYSDEC, the State Department
of Transportation, USEPA and Federal transportation agencies oversee
this process. NYMTC's state-of-the-art computerized simulation models,
and its efforts to implement the conformity requirements of Federal
law, are among the best in the Nation.
Among the many tragedies of September 11th, NYMTC lost three of its
staff; its office space; and its computer hardware, models, and data
bases in the terrorist attacks. While the Clean Air Act contemplated
many circumstances under which natural disasters could affect a
transportation network, it never contemplated an act of terrorism that
would destroy an MPO's offices and much of its institutional knowledge.
On one single day, over 100,000 jobs relocated from Lower Manhattan,
and other jobs have been lost since then, making much of the previously
used data obsolete.
NYMTC, along with other public and private businesses that had been
housed in the World Trade Center, is struggling now to recover from
this devastating loss. Along with moving to temporary offices in Long
Island City, NYMTC is working to reestablish its models, and to develop
data bases on the vastly different commuting patterns that now affect
the transportation networks and air quality of New York City and
surrounding counties. As it does so, we recognize the serious problem
that the New York Metropolitan Area cannot proceed with major new
transportation projects--even those needed to replace the networks
damaged or destroyed on September 11th--without a limited and temporary
waiver from the Clean Air Act's conformity requirements. Governor
Pataki, along with transportation organizations, businesses, and
commuters in this region, are greatly concerned about the need for this
waiver, and I urge your strong support for it.
Already, we are working with staff from the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, along with House Committee staff, on this
problem. On behalf of Governor Pataki, I want to thank Senator Clinton
and the committee staff for their sympathy and interest in the State's
waiver request. As they have noted, environmental concerns with the
waiver need to be considered as part of this process. We agree with
this concern, and have met several times with environmental
organizations to discuss the proposed waiver; how the State intends to
oversee its implementation; and how we will ensure the maintenance of
air quality during the period covered by the waiver. Our task is made
easier by Governor Pataki's strong and well-demonstrated commitment to
measures that protect and improve New York's air quality. We believe
that the citizens and workers of the New York Metropolitan Area can
rest assured that every effort will be made to continue to improve New
York City's air quality while we work to recover from the devastation
of September 11th.
diesel truck emissions
I also would like to raise the issue of idling trucks related to
the cleanup. State regulation provides that no truck shall idle for
more than 5 minutes, except in situations where the truck is to stand
for more than 2 hours at a temperature below 25 degrees Fahrenheit.
NYSDEC environmental conservation officers enforce this regulation, and
encourage the reporting of idling complaints to the Department's
Regional Office. In addition, the city of New York has an even more
stringent requirement that allows only 3 minutes of idling, which city
officers are able to enforce.
conclusion
I want to reiterate Governor Pataki's appreciation to the
subcommittee for providing us with the opportunity to relate to you the
actions that the State has taken and will continue to take since the
morning of September 11th to respond to and clean up the devastation
caused by the destruction of the World Trade Center Complex. For the
number of staff hours that have gone into our efforts to date, the
information that I have provided to you today is indeed brief. I hope,
though, that it provides you with a sense of the commitment we feel to
ensuring that public health and environmental quality are safeguarded
throughout the activities we are undertaking to clean up this site.
I want to remind you, as well, that the State's commitment to Lower
Manhattan will not end when all of the debris is removed from the site.
We will continue to monitor air quality in this region, and we look
forward to developing--along with the city of New York, the New York
State Legislature, other State and Federal agencies and the citizens of
Manhattan--environmentally sound plans for the future of this
devastated area.
Thank you again for allowing me to testify before you today.
______
Responses by Carl Johnson to Additional Questions from Senator Clinton
Question 1. Please provide further information on the State's
efforts to reduce diesel emissions at the site.
Response. Late last year, the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (Department) asked the Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) to convene appropriate State,
local and Federal representatives to discuss efforts that could be
undertaken to reduce diesel emissions from the ongoing recovery efforts
at the World Trade Center site. The NESCAUM discussions also began tile
development of diesel emission control practices for use during the
reconstruction phase that is scheduled to begin this year.
Given the nature of the cleanup, the Department recognized quickly
that the only option for reducing diesel emissions during the recovery
phase would be to require trucks and diesel equipment operating at the
site to use ultra-low-sulfur diesel fuel (ULSD). During recovery, our
options are limited to the use of low-sulfur diesel because of the lead
time required to construct and install retrofit equipment on diesel
engines. The retrofit equipment would not be available for diesel
engines and trucks prior to the completion of the recovery effort at
the site.
Since the initial meeting, the NESCAUM group has been working to
make the switch to low-sulfur diesel at the World Trade Center site.
The fuel is available and could be provided to the site for a small
difference in price. We are working with Mayor Bloomberg's office to
recruit various construction companies currently under contract at the
site to make this switch.
We also are working with FEMA to ensure that the city of New York
is reimbursed for the use of the low sulfur diesel during the recovery
phase.
Question 2. There have been reports that some of the trucks
transporting debris from the site are uncovered and not fully wetted
down. Who is responsible for monitoring this operation? What further
actions can be taken to ensure that this operation is conducted in a
manner that is as clean as possible?
Response. During the course of the debris removal operation, the
Department's law enforcement personnel have monitored truck tarping and
decontamination activities. Our law enforcement staff have been
instrumental in ensuring that dust control measures are in place and
are being used. Any questions about dust control measures have been
addressed immediately.
Shortly after the September 11th attack, measures were put in place
to reduce the environmental impacts of the recovery and removal
operation. These activities included the use of wash-down stations to
decontaminate trucks and wetting down their loads to control dust.
Continuously, roadways around Ground Zero have been wetted down to
reduce dust. Using two piers which are nearer to Ground Zero than other
transport points to the Staten Island Landfill, Pier 6 and Pier 25,
also helped reduce the environmental impacts of the removal of debris.
The shorter transport distances reduce truck emissions and the chance
for dust to come off the loads.
Question 3. Why are the debris barges not being required to be
covered in some fashion?
Response. Barges transported from the Marine Transfer Stations at
59th Street and Hamilton Avenue were covered by the netting systems
that historically were used at these transfer stations to cover
residential solid waste. Barges coming from Pier 25 and Pier 6 did not
have these netting systems, and the size of the barges makes it
difficult to cover them.
Other actions have been taken to control dust, and to protect
against the loss of materials recovered from the World Trade Center
site. The debris is wetted down to control dust, and the barges are not
filled completely. Freeboard (essentially empty space at the top of the
barge) is maintained from the top of the barge down to the top of the
debris as an effective way to keep recovered debris from blowing. The
relatively slow speed of the barges also reduces the possibility for
debris to be blown away in transit. The transport route of the barges
is well separated from the general public to minimize their potential
exposure.
Question 4. What actions will be taken during the rebuilding
process to reduce as much as possible the noise, dust, diesel exhaust,
and other forms of pollution at the site?
Response. As part of our discussions with NESCAUM and other State,
local and Federal entities, we are looking at the long-term issues
associated with emissions from the rebuilding activities that will
begin later this year at the World Trade Center site. It is our intent
to require the use of ULSD in all diesel equipment associated with the
reconstruction efforts at the site. The fuel is available in the New
York Metropolitan Area and can be readily supplied once a contractor
selected for the reconstruction activities requests it.
With respect to retrofitting diesel engines, the Department will
continue to work with New York City and contractors to maximize the use
of diesel retrofit control technologies during reconstruction
activities. We are seeking to identify a contractor that can pilot the
use of both low-sulfur diesel and retrofit technologies. Through this
pilot, we will establish a basis to demonstrate to the contractors
involved in the reconstruction efforts that the diesel control program
will not affect equipment operation and will not affect productivity.
These are proven diesel emission reduction technologies, and the pilot
project is meant to demonstrate that it is logistically possible to
incorporate these strategies into the rebuilding efforts.
With respect to dust from the site, the City of New York should
require the continuation of the dust control practices that are
currently in place at the World Trade Center as part of the recovery
effort.
Statement of Thomas R. Frieden, M.D., M.P.H., Commissioner, New York
City Department of Health and Joel A. Miele, Sr., P.E., Commissioner,
New York City Department of Environmental Protection
Good morning. I am Dr. Thomas Frieden, Commissioner of Health for
New York City. With me today is Commissioner Joel Miele of the New York
City Department of Environmental Protection. We appreciate having the
opportunity to be here today. I am very pleased that the committee is
holding these hearings. This is a complex and highly technical subject,
and we would like to take this opportunity to explain how the situation
is being monitored and let you know our views on the implications of
these findings.
As I have reviewed the record of activities of DOH and other
agencies since the first day of the disaster, one of the most vivid
pictures to emerge, and one that I find quite extraordinary, is the
tremendous cooperation and coordination among Federal, State and local
environmental, occupational and health agencies. The degree of teamwork
among more than a dozen agencies is probably unprecedented. For the
first several weeks after September 11th, health and environmental
agencies met daily to discuss environmental health issues. These
meetings and conference calls continued three times a week through the
end of 2001. Weekly conference calls continue.
i. department of health role
Following the attack on the World Trade Center, the New York City
Health Department had a multifaceted role in overseeing and
coordinating many health-related issues. Immediately after the attacks,
the Health Department established surveillance systems to (1) monitor
emergency departments in the immediate area to assess acute injuries
among victims, (2) assess hospital staffing and equipment needs
citywide, (3) monitor illness and injuries among rescue workers at the
World Trade Center site, and (4) detect unusual disease syndromes that
might represent a bioterrorist event at emergency rooms throughout the
city.
Other responsibilities included monitoring water and food safety in
the immediate area, conducting rodent and vector control, initiating a
worker safety program, and providing regular advisories to the public
and the medical community regarding issues of public health concern
related to the attack. The Department also facilitated development and
coordination of environmental sampling plans and results.
Many individuals were exposed to large amounts of smoke, dust, and
airborne substances during and after the initial collapse of the World
Trade Center buildings. The potential release of contaminants,
including asbestos, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds,
dioxins, PCBs, metals and other substances during and after the
explosion was a primary public health concern from the very beginning,
and air monitoring was established immediately, and continued over
time. The Health Department closely reviewed, and continues to review,
the numerous air quality, debris sample results and personal air
monitoring tests being conducted by various agencies. The data from air
quality tests thus far have been, in general, reassuring. None of the
testing done to date has shown results that would indicate long-term
health impacts.
The numerous substances of potential concern have led to some
confusion about health effects over the short and long term. Some
substances, such as the particulate matter from the dust or the smoke
in the air, can be irritating but are not expected to have long-term
effects. Other substances, such as asbestos, are not expected to have
short-term effects, but if elevated over long periods of time can have
serious health effects. Asbestos was one of the substances of greatest
concern since it was a known building component in the World Trade
Center. However, except for a few transient spikes found in air
sampling during the initial weeks, the asbestos levels have been within
standards.
An indoor study conducted by Department of Health and the Federal
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) of both air
and dust samples taken in November and December of 2001 at 30
residential buildings in Lower Manhattan showed no elevated levels of
asbestos in the air. Dust sample tests showed low levels of asbestos in
some samples and the presence of fiberglass in some other dust samples.
Asbestos and fiberglass can be a problem if they become airborne.
Airborne fiberglass can cause cough and skin, throat and eye
irritation. While there are no known long-term effects of fiberglass,
it is classified as a possible carcinogen. While these findings are not
unexpected, they underscore the importance of properly cleaning
surfaces to minimize exposure. DOH has issued advisories to building
owners and residents about appropriate cleaning methods. DOH has issued
advisories for residents about appropriate cleaning methods.
The standards used are very conservative. For example, for
asbestos, we are using the indoor air quality standard for reentry into
a school after asbestos removal. This stringent standard is being
applied to outdoor air quality in the residential areas. Stringent
standards are also being used for other substances, such as dioxins,
identified at the perimeter of the site. It is both duration of
exposure and concentration of the substance that are important to
determine health effects. Many of the standards were based on exposures
for prolonged periods of time. This is a key point. Some substances may
cause short-term effects; others have the potential to cause long-term
impact. In some instances, the health effects of exposures are not
known. Standards for other substances have been designed to include
many safety factors so that acceptable levels of exposure are far below
the levels at which health effects are expected to occur.
Many residents living and working in the community have reported
short-term health effects, such as acute breathing problems; worsening
of existing respiratory disease such as asthma; eye, nose, and throat
irritation; nausea, and headaches. Many residents also continue to
experience emotional and stress-related illness and anxiety.
Students of Stuyvesant High School, who returned to their school on
October 9, 2001, reported similar complaints. DOH performed an analysis
of these complaints, which shows that the average daily rate of
headaches, respiratory, skin, eye, throat, and injury complaints of
Stuyvesant was higher in October and November of 2001 than in the
previous year, and higher than four other NYC public high schools. The
data also shows that complaints decreased from October to November
2001.
DOH has also been working with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention to develop a protocol for a World Trade Center Registry,
which, if funded, would generate and maintain a database that can be
used as a basis for conducting studies that can provide a more complete
picture of short- and long-term health and mental health impacts among
affected populations.
The City Health Department recognizes residents' concerns and will
continue to work closely with local, State and Federal agencies to
monitor air quality and to inform the public of findings as soon as
results are available. Together with the City Department of Mental
Health, which is also under my jurisdiction, we are addressing
resident's mental health concerns by promoting the ongoing Project
Liberty program, a statewide disaster-recovery initiative that offers
free crisis counseling, education and referral services. DOH will
continue its community outreach and education efforts. Now I would like
to turn to Commissioner Miele to discuss DEP's role in our joint
efforts.
ii. the role of the department of environmental protection
In addition to DEP's operation of the city's sewer and water
systems, our expertise in regulating asbestos in New York City was a
significant portion of our responsibilities following September 11th.
Since 1985, DEP has been the New York City agency with responsibility
for regulating asbestos abatement. Starting September 12, DEP operated
a network of outdoor air monitors that have been used for monitoring
outdoor asbestos levels. Aside from repairing water and sewer
infrastructure, assessing and mitigating risks caused by the presence
of asbestos-containing material has dominated DEP's work in responding
to the Trade Center attack.
Since September 11th, DEP or its contractors analyzed 3060 samples
from 37 outdoor monitoring sites in Lower Manhattan; 500 samples
collected adjacent to the four schools in the vicinity of the Trade
Center; and 328 samples taken in the four boroughs of the city outside
of Manhattan. The map and all sampling results to date from the sites
shown on this map are available to anyone on DEP's website:
www.nyc.gov/dep. Of these samples, only 9 of the total of 3864, or 0.2
percent, exceeded the Federal re-occupancy standard for indoor air.
These 9 samples were all taken in the vicinity of Ground Zero. As
Commissioner Frieden noted, there is no established standard for
asbestos in outdoor air. Unlike carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and
other gases whose presence in outside air is regulated under the Clean
Air Act, asbestos is a once-prevalent building material, and previous
work at standard-setting has focused on establishing safe levels for
asbestos within buildings. On September 12, when my colleagues and I
were creating our monitoring networks, we knew that there were no
reliable, scientifically-based, acceptable standards that would tell us
what level of asbestos in outdoor air might be considered ``safe'' or
``unsafe.'' Therefore, we opted to use EPA's indoor post abatement re-
occupancy of schools standard as our threshold level of concern since
we felt it was more protective.
Let me briefly explain our sampling methodology. The samples are
collected on filters and examined under PCM (Phase Contrast Microscopy)
utilizing a specific method developed by the National Institutes for
Occupational Safety and Health. The PCM analysis counts all fibrous
particles, including asbestos. PCM sample results are compared to the
clearance/re-occupancy standard for indoor air following an asbestos
abatement project. This standard is 0.01 fibers per cubic centimeter.
Samples found to be above this standard are re-examined using TEM
(Transmission Electron Microscopy). The TEM analysis identifies the
type of particles collected. TEM results are compared to the clearance/
re-occupancy standard for indoor air in schools after an asbestos
abatement project. This standard is 70 structures of asbestos per
square millimeter. The standard was established pursuant to the Federal
``Asbestos Hazard and Emergency Response Act'', usually known as
``AHERA''.
Based on all Federal, State and local test results, public health
experts have consistently expressed confidence that, based on sampling,
airborne asbestos levels do not pose a threat to human health. Health
professionals have stated that short-term exposure to airborne
asbestos, at levels equal to or lower than 0.01, carries an extremely
low risk of causing asbestos-related illness.
Before allowing occupants in any residential or commercial building
near the Trade Center site, the city's various agencies, acting through
its Office of Emergency Management, required building owners to take
these steps:
assess the building's structural strength and stability
using qualified professionals;
restore gas and electrical service;
restore building water service, including flushing, re-
filling and cleaning roof tanks where necessary;
assess the presence of hazardous materials such as
asbestos, and remediate as required under applicable city regulations
using qualified professionals; and
inspect, clean and repair mechanical and HVAC systems.
While property owners were accomplishing these tasks, DEP and its
sister agencies, again acting through the Office of Emergency
Management, assumed responsibility for cleaning streets, sidewalks and
common areas so that there was a safe outdoor environment to reach the
buildings for contractors and workers who were retained by owners and
managers to effect all necessary exterior and interior cleanup of
private buildings. To assist property owners, DEP engaged in the
following tasks, among others:
developed and distributed advisories to building owners
and occupants;
established HELP lines for concerned owners or tenants to
respond to complaints or concerns about proper abatement procedures for
contractors;
provided telephone consultation to building owners,
contractors, consultants and tenants related to asbestos clean up;
performed site inspections and conducted building surveys;
reviewed sampling data submitted by building owners, their
contractors and consultants;
reviewed the scopes of work for clean up of asbestos-
containing material; and,
developed emergency certification procedures and offered
daily certification exams to ensure a properly trained and qualified
work force was available.
Although city, State and Federal agencies have provided oversight
and guidance on interior clean up, that task remains the responsibility
of building owners and occupants. For example, some building owners
identified the presence of asbestos-containing material (ACM) during
their assessment for hazardous materials in areas of the buildings
under their control. Once material is identified as ACM, New York City
rules require that a licensed contractor with certified asbestos
workers perform the clean-up activities. As noted above, DEP technical
staff has been continuously available to assist in the development of
plans for handling asbestos clean-up activities. At the completion of
the cleanup activities, the city's regulations require clearance air
sampling by licensed professionals prior to allowing re-occupancy of
areas where asbestos work had been performed.
As general guidance to Lower Manhattan residents, the Department of
Health developed a fact sheet ``Recommendations for People Re-Occupying
Commercial Buildings and Residents Re-Entering Their Homes.'' This fact
sheet, along with others on related topics, was distributed very widely
in Lower Manhattan. These fact sheets offer general information on air
quality issues as well as practical, ``how-to'' information on dealing
with dust, debris and other potentially hazardous conditions that
residents face as they return to their homes.
Finally, I have a few words concerning the potable water supply and
the marine waters that surround the city. Although I believe the
Subcommittee's major objective is to review issues associated with air
quality, I would like to take a few minutes to assure the subcommittee
that neither New York Harbor, nor the city's potable water supply were
degraded by the Trade Center attack.
As a result of the attack, DEP and EPA were concerned that
rainwater washing off the Trade Center site and into the sewers and the
harbor could be polluted. Manhattan's sewers--as well as most city
sewers--are combined sewers, meaning rainwater flooding into the sewers
from the streets ends up in the same pipe as the sanitary flow. During
a rainstorm, a percentage of this combined flow ends up at our
treatment plants, and the remainder of the combined flow is discharged
untreated into surrounding waters through outfalls located at the
bulkheads. In the case of Lower Manhattan, the combined sewers serving
that area lead to a very large pumping station at East 13th Street in
Manhattan. From there, the sewage is pumped to Greenpoint, Brooklyn
where it is treated at the Newtown Creek wastewater treatment plant.
DEP routinely samples raw sewage going into the Newtown Creek
plant, as well as treated effluent coming out of Newtown Creek, several
times each day. We also regularly take samples from open waters at
various locations in New York Harbor, including near the Battery. DEP
tests these samples for ``conventional parameters,'' such as
temperature, pH, dissolved oxygen, suspended solids and coliform. These
conventional parameters have consistently remained within their normal
ranges since September 11th.
Using the more sophisticated testing capabilities that EPA has at
its disposal, beginning September 11th, their staff immediately began
supplying us with results from tests for ``unconventional parameters''
on samples of run-off from the Trade Center site, harbor waters, and
sewage. These unconventional parameters include PCB's, dioxin, asbestos
and other organic chemicals and contaminants for which the city's
harbor water quality laboratories do not routinely test. Initial runoff
samples taken near Rector Street showed elevated levels of PCB's,
dioxin, asbestos and metals. Follow-up samples showed concentrations of
these substances below levels of concern. Samples of harbor water and
samples of effluent from the Newtown Creek plant also show the presence
of ``unconventional parameters'' at levels too low to be of concern.
Finally, let me reassure all New Yorkers that continuous sampling
of the drinking water supply at the reservoirs, in the aqueducts, and
within the city's distribution system have shown all parameters to be
within the normal range and below any levels of concern.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senators for this opportunity to present
testimony. We look forward to answering your questions.
______
Responses by Thomas R. Frieden to Additional Questions from Senators
Lieberman and Voinovich
Question 1. In your testimony, you mentioned a World Trade Center
Registry. Can you elaborate on this concept?
Response. Over the past few months, the New York City Department of
Health (NYCDOH), in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), has developed a protocol for a comprehensive WTC
Registry Such a registry is an important public health tool that will
provide a population base for assessing potential short- and long-term
health impacts. The Registry will include workers and responders to the
WTC site and Fresh Kills Landfill, evacuees of impacted WTC buildings,
residents, and people working within defined perimeters at the time of
and shortly after the disaster. The registry could include more than
100,000 people and would provide a system of followup for 10-20 years.
Substantial funding is, therefore, needed to implement and maintain the
Registry. It is our understanding that the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has requested funding from the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the Registry and that if the
funding is awarded, ATSDR would collaborate closely with the New York
City Department of Health, which would administer the Registry.
Question 2. In February, the Department of Health put out a press
release regarding some preliminary findings on indoor air, which you
also mention in your testimony. There is a discussion of fibrous glass
found in indoor air samples. Can you please elaborate on this? At what
levels did the fiberglass occur? Can people remediate this dust in the
same way that, they do asbestos-containing dust?
Response. As mentioned in the original testimony, the New York City
Department of Health, in collaboration with the New York State
Department of Health (NYSDOH) and the ATSDR, conducted Residential Air
and Dust Sampling in 30 Lower Manhattan buildings. In each building,
attempts were made to collect dust and air samples from one common area
(e.g. lobby, hallway); an outdoor area (e.g. near front entrance); and
two individual apartments. Fifty-nine apartments were sampled. Fibrous
glass was detected in settled dust samples from 23 of the apartment
samples, 11 of the common areas, and 9 of the outdoor area samples.
Fibrous glass, when detected, ranged from 2 percent to 35 percent of
total detectable fibers in the indoor samples and from 15 percent to 72
percent in the outdoor samples. The results of the dust samples
underscore the importance of wet cleaning and HEPA vacuuming to reduce
dust in indoor environments. Sampling was also conducted to better
clarify what, if any, fibrous glass was found in the air samples. These
results, which are pending, will be included in the final ATSDR report.
Question 3. In your press release, you indicate that there were two
dust samples which had greater than 1 percent asbestos--the definition
for asbestos--containing material. Were these indoor dust samples or
outdoor dust samples?
Response. Two of the dust samples were determined to be asbestos-
containing materials (as defined as material that contains 1 percent or
greater of asbestos as assessed by Polarized Light Microscopy (PLM)).
Both of these samples were collected outdoors and professional
asbestos-abatement work was completed.
Question 4. Is the Department of Health making detailed information
from this indoor air sampling available on its website? If not, why
not?
Response. The NYCDOH and ATSDR will provide a full report to the
public, not only on the website, but also through public meetings, as
soon as the final report is available from ATSDR. Two community
meetings were, already held to explain the asbestos and fiberglass
results: The final report is expected to be completed in late spring
2002. Information on this study is also available on the ATSDR website
at, www.atsdr.gov. In addition, New York City has recently established
a toll-free WTC, Hotline that can be accessed at (212) 221-8635. The
Hotline responds to WTC-related indoor and outdoor air quality
inquiries, provides referrals for specific requests, and maintain a
data base to identify problems to be addressed.
Question 5. Do you have adequate resources to meet response needs?
Has access to resources been an obstacle to fulfilling your
responsibilities in this regard?
Response. As with other responding agencies, the New York City
Department of Health has had to stretch existing resources to respond
to expanded public health needs following the WTC disaster. Although
assistance from State and Federal public health agencies has been very
helpful, there is still much that needs to be accomplished. For
example, the WTC Registry will need substantial funding for
establishment and maintenance over 10-20 years. We are also working
with other agencies to ensure an efficient integration of activities
and to decrease duplicative efforts as we seek additional funding. The
NYCDOH is anticipating further funding from FEMA to continue to address
the needs of Lower Manhattan.
__________
Statement of Thomas J. Scotto, President, Detectives Endowment
Association, Inc., New York City Police Department
On behalf of all of the members of the NYC Police Department, I
wish to express our appreciation to this committee for affording us the
opportunity to express our concerns regarding the aftermath of the
tragic events of September 11, 2001.
Since that date, members of the NYC Police Department have worked
around the clock at the World Trade Center and the Staten Island
Landfill.
As such, they have been exposed to a number of identifiable toxic
substances and perhaps 100's of other combinations of these toxins that
may never be identified and the long-term health effects of which are
still unknown.
The major concerns of police officers can be grouped into 3
categories.
1. The development of a uniform procedure to provide physical exams
over an extended period of time to monitor the overall effects of their
exposure to the elements at Ground Zero and the Staten Island Landfill.
2. Assuring essential and required medical treatment within the
basic health coverage provided by the city.
3. In recognition of the fact that many of the illnesses which
result from contact with toxic substances can take in excess often 10
years to appear:
(a) Revise the current pension provisions to protect the families
of those who retire and then may suffer a debilitating and/or terminal
illness as a result of their exposure to Ground Zero and the Staten
Island Landfill environment.
(b) Revise the current legal requirement which imposes an
unrealistic time limit on ones ability to commence an action against
the city.
Statement of Edward J. Malloy, President, Building and Construction
Trades Council of Greater New York
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. My name
is Edward J. Malloy. I serve as president of the Building and
Construction Trades Council of Greater New York, an organization
consisting of 60 affiliated local unions and district councils
representing more than 100,000 working men and women in New York City.
I also serve as an appointee of Governor George E. Pataki to the 11-
member Board of Directors of the Lower Manhattan Redevelopment
Corporation. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee and for bringing this hearing to New York.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, nearly every unionized
construction project in New York City shut down as workers rushed to
Ground Zero. In the early days of this tragedy, it is estimated that
more than 10 thousand of our members volunteered their skills on the
site. In the ensuing weeks and months since, when the City of New
York's Department of Design and Construction (DDC) assigned recovery
and clean-up responsibilities to a team of the area's most respected
contractors, approximately two thousand of our members per day were
employed in two around-the-clock shifts of 12 hours each. Today, as
this recovery and clean-up effort moves toward conclusion, several
hundred of our members remain on the job.
In testifying before the subcommittee this morning, we would like
to draw your attention to two areas of interest and concern. The first
is the record on measurable safety and health data and the partnership
between labor, management, and Government which has produced rather
impressive results in this regard. The second is the less certain issue
of how we address safety and health exposures which are not as easily
detectable as common bumps and bruises. On this second front, although
significant efforts through our safety and health partnership have been
made to prevent such exposures, there is an immediate need for clinical
medical services to be made available to identify and treat any
conditions that may not have been prevented or yet detected.
First, on November 20, 2001, the Building and Construction Trades
Council of Greater New York joined with the Building Trades Employers
Association, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
and other public and private entities working at Ground Zero to
implement an emergency safety and health partnership agreement on the
site. A copy of this agreement is attached to our testimony for your
consideration. It should be stressed that prior to this agreement being
executed, labor and management in our industry had been working under
less formal but effective means with OSHA and DDC to assure the
implementation of a safety and health program in which every member of
the building and construction industry on the site was required to
participate.
The results of this partnership and other cooperative efforts are
encouraging. With more than 2 million hours of labor completed, there
have been 96 claims for workers' compensation reported. Of these
claims, 13 have resulted in lost time due to injury or illness. No
deaths or life-threatening injuries have occurred. All experts with
whom we have consulted advise that the number of injuries and
illnesses, as well as their relative severity, are well below what
might have been expected. It is our intention, with both a continuation
and expansion of the commitment to safety and health, that this record
be maintained and improved. As we are sure the subcommittee is aware,
however, the circumstances of this project dictate that good providence
in addition to the most diligent human attention to safety and health
concerns will be required if our intentions are to be fulfilled.
The second matter of concern pertains to the need for clinical
medical services to be made available to every individual who has
either resided, volunteered, or been employed at Ground Zero or in the
nearby vicinity, particularly in the earliest days of this tragedy when
it would seem that the potential for exposures to contaminants was at
its highest. We appreciate Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton's efforts to
secure $12 million for this purpose and submit to the subcommittee that
additional funding must be provided to assure that every individual
whose health has potentially been adversely affected by activities at
or near Ground Zero is able to receive clinical medical services.
It is vitally important that individuals who may have been exposed
to contaminants be screened and, if necessary, treated. Doing so will
assure to the highest degree possible that conditions which can be
treated and resolved are, and that conditions which may entail longer
term consequences can be treated in a way that mitigates or even
eliminates such consequences.
Taking action on this matter in a timely fashion will not only
minimize the potential for human suffering, but also represent a
responsible approach to minimizing the negative fiscal implications of
healthcare and insurance costs which have come to be associated with
the events of September 11th.
It is also really important that these services be made available
in a well-organized and centrally-accountable manner so that a
comprehensive and professional evaluation can be made of what the
systemic exposures to contaminants and health problems at Ground Zero
have been. To date, the majority of scientific evaluation of which we
are aware has occurred with regard to monitoring contaminants in the
air, water, and soil. It has not occurred as thoroughly in monitoring
the blood, respiratory, and other body systems of human beings who may
have been harmed by these exposures. We have attached for your
consideration an initial proposal by the Mount Sinai Medical Center to
provide the clinical medical services needed to address this situation
for members of the building and construction industry. We of course
support such services being made available to any other affected
individuals.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the losses and
devastation caused by the events of September 11th are well-known. It
is imperative that every effort be made to assure that no further
unnecessary and preventable tragedies result, whether 10 days or 10
years from now. The provision of funding to make clinical medical
services available to all individuals who need them is among the most
important work that we believe the Federal Government can undertake
going forward. We do not hesitate to argue that it is a particular
moral obligation to assure that those men and women who responded so
selflessly and even heroically to the events of September 11th receive
every possible consideration for their well-being that can be offered.
We will be pleased to cooperate with you in every way to achieve this
goal.
Thank you.
______
WTC Emergency Project Partnership Agreement Between U.S. Department of
Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Site Co-
Incident Commands NYC Department of Design and Construction (DDC), NYC
Fire Department (FDNY); Employee Association, Building & Construction
Trades Council of Greater NY (BCTC); Employer Associations, Building
Trades Employers' Association (BTEA), Contractors Association of
Greater New York (CAGNY), General Contractors Association (GCA); Prime
Contractors, AMEC Construction Management, Inc., Bovis Lend Lease LMB,
Inc., Turner/Plaza Construction Joint Venture, Tully Construction. Co.,
Inc.
Whereas the United States Department of Labor Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) and the undersigned parties mutually
recognize the importance and value of contractors, employees, employee
representatives, and Federal, State and city government agencies
exerting leadership by bringing their respective skills to bear in a
cooperative, focused, voluntary effort to ensure a safe and healthful
environment for all personnel involved in the WTC Emergency Project.
Accordingly, to advance our mutual goal, we strongly agree on the
need to continue to develop a working relationship that fosters mutual
trust and respect for each organization's respective role in the WTC
Emergency Project. We recognize and embrace the responsibilities
inherent in those roles and are committed to work as partners to
achieve the following shared strategies and objectives:
Prevention of occupational related fatalities and serious
injuries and illnesses for all workers involved in the WTC Emergency
Project
Compliance with and implementation of the WTC Emergency
Project Environmental, Safety and Health Plan
Immediate abatement of all serious hazards
The sharing of all exposure monitoring data to include
sampling for air contaminants, noise, heat and cold, radiation and
biological agents
The sharing of a11 safety hazard data
All of the undersigned parties agree to continue to work in
cooperation with organizations assisting in the WTC Emergency Project
to achieve the above mentioned goals of this agreement including but
not limited to; NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM), New York City
Police Department (NYPD), NYC Department of Health (DOH), NYS
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), NYS Department of
Labor--Public Employee Safety and Health Program (PESH), Port Authority
of NY & NY, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA), Building and Construction Trades Department of AFL-CIO
(BCTD).
This agreement shall be in effect until the completion of the WTC
Emergency Project. Should any party choose to withdraw prior to the WTC
Emergency Project's completion, a notice of intent to withdraw will be
provided to all parties 30 days prior to any proposed termination.
Changes maybe made by any party to this agreement with the written
concurrence of all parties.
References:
1. WTC Emergency Project Environmental, Safety and Health Plan
2. Strategic Alliance between USDOL/OSHA, BTEA & BCTC--November 21,
2000
______
Mt. Sinai I.J. Selikoff--Center for Occupational & Environmental
Medicine
Proposal: Medical Surveillance Program for Construction and
Infrastructure Repair Workers Exposed to Environmental Contaminants
From the World Trade Center Disaster
background
Hazardous exposures, such as asbestos, silica, fibrous dusts, heavy
metals, PCBs, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, dioxins, and noise,
related to the World Trade Center disaster may result in short-term and
long-term illness among people working at or near Ground Zero. Short-
term health effects of exposures may include asthma/reactive airways
disease, chemical burns or irritation of the nasal passages, throat,
and upper airways, sinusitis, persistent cough, musculoskeletal
disorders, noise-induced hearing loss, and psychological problems, such
as post-traumatic stress disorder. Some of these health problems can
become long term if left untreated.
Therefore, there is a great need for medical surveillance to detect
current illness, recommend treatment regimens, and provide baseline
examinations should other health problems related to the disaster
arise.
Medical Surveillance Program
A three-phase program is proposed:
Planning Phase. --Identify exposed workers; analyze
exposure data; develop educational and benefits information materials;
develop secure and confidential data base to support project
administration and long-term followup.
Clinical Examination Phase.--Conduct baseline exams;
provide results to examinees; coordinate clinical followup; continue
outreach; manage data base.
Evaluation Phase.--Analyze results from medical exams;
generate report and disseminate results; develop recommendations for
long-term clinical followup and preventive measures to reduce disease
incidence in this population.
Contents of Baseline and Followup Medical Surveillance Examinations
The actual contents of the baseline and followup exam will be based
on review of current data and updated as new information becomes
available. For this proposal, the examination includes:
Standardized History.--Detailed work history at or near
the WTC site; current symptoms; prior medical and occupational/exposure
history.
Physical examination.--Particular attention to the nose,
throat, respiratory, musculoskeletal and neurological systems.
Laboratory tests.--Complete blood count; blood
chemistries; urinalysis.
Pulmonary function tests.
Chest x-ray.
Hearing tests.
Frequency and Scheduling of Examinations
First examination (baseline): As soon as possible.
Second examination: One year later. Additional
examinations for some individuals may be recommended by examining
physicians.
Third examination: Fifteen years later.
Estimated 2-Year Cost: $10,510,000.
Year 1: Planning Phase and Baseline Examination Phase;
Administrative costs: $800,000; 7000 clinical examinations: $4,655,000.
($665. per individual).
Year 2: Followup Examinations; Administrative costs:
$600,000; 7000 clinical examinations: $4,655,000. ($665. per
individual).
Mount Sinai Center for Occupational and Environmental Medicine
The Mount Sinai Irving J. Selikoff Center for Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, situated in the Department of Community and
Preventive Medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, has expertise in
evaluating and managing occupational and environmental exposures,
illnesses, and injuries. The Center integrates occupational medicine,
industrial hygiene, ergonomics, social work, occupational health
education, and coordination of return to work for workers who have
suffered occupational injuries and illnesses. Our program emphasizes
prevention as well as diagnosis, treatment, and management of
occupational and environmental health problems. The Center specializes
in addressing the very types of exposures and health consequences
experienced by workers at the WTC disaster site.
__________
Statement of Stephen M. Levin, M.D. Medical Director, Mount Sinai--
Irving J. Selikoff Center for Occupational and Environmental Medicine,
Department of Community and Preventive Medicine, Mount Sinai School of
Medicine
Chairman Lieberman, Senator Clinton, and members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
health impacts of the attack on the World Trade Center on September
11th, our understanding of the short-term and longer-range risks to
health, and a perspective on what needs to be put in place to meet the
needs of the thousands of workers and volunteers who played a role in
the response to this disaster.
My name is Stephen M. Levin, M.D. I am Medical Director of the
Mount Sinai--Irving J. Selikoff Center for Occupational and
Environmental Medicine, in the Department of Community and Preventive
Medicine at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York. Our Center
is funded by the New York State Department of Health and is part of a
statewide network of occupational medicine clinics established by the
State legislature to examine and treat workers who have developed
illness or injury caused by their exposures at work. We have an
explicit mission--to find ways to prevent occupational illness, placing
us in the domain of public health. We provided over 6,000 patient
services in the last year, and since September 11th, we have examined
more than 250 men and women who worked or volunteered at or near
``Ground Zero.'' Most of these individuals came to us because they had
respiratory symptoms that developed after their exposures there.
Our Center has long experience with the health consequences of
exposures in the construction environment, and we were able, therefore,
to predict, unfortunately all too accurately, what health risks were
posed by the exposures at and near Ground Zero--exposures to the wide
range of airborne irritants present in the smoke and dust caused by the
fires and the collapse of the towers, just reviewed by Dr. Thurston. As
with most cases of illness caused by environmental agents, the
likelihood of developing illness and the severity of that illness
depend largely on dose--how much exposure has occurred.
I want to discuss today what we have observed among adults who were
exposed at the World Trade Center site. My colleague and Department
Chairman, Dr. Philip Landrigan, in the next panel will talk about risks
to children. Among the people fleeing the buildings, the firefighters,
police, and emergency medical technicians who responded, and the
citizens who tried to help after the planes hit the towers--there were
many who were caught in the huge, dense cloud of dust and combustion
gases released by the collapse of the buildings. These groups had some
of the worst exposures, inhaling high concentrations of smoke and dust.
Those who came to the Ground Zero area after the collapse, in the first
days and weeks after September 11th, to perform rescue and recovery
work or to restore essential services there, also had heavy exposures,
as they selflessly and often heroically did what they could in the
effort to save lives. The thousands of construction and support workers
who have been involved in the removal of debris from the site, often
working 12 hour days, sometimes 6 or 7 days a week, also had all too
frequent exposures to the dusts and gases which until recent weeks were
a constant feature of the site.
We were concerned that these exposures would cause respiratory
tract difficulties, and that is, in fact, what we have seen clinically.
Problems range from persistent sinusitis, laryngitis, bronchitis, and
among some, the first attacks of asthma they have ever experienced. The
problems have been especially severe among those who had respiratory
problems prior to September 11th--many have noticed a marked worsening
of their pre-existing sinus problems or breathing difficulties. But
what is perhaps most striking is the occurrence of respiratory
problems--chest tightness, cough, shortness of breath, wheezing--among
individuals who were in excellent physical condition before. The
experience of our patients parallels that of the firefighters who have
been evaluated by Dr. David Prezant, who I believe is here today and
perhaps can comment later. High rates of respiratory illness have been
found among the firefighters, a group well recognized to be physically
fit prior to this exposure.
Some of our patients, once away from Lower Manhattan, have noticed
a general improvement in their symptoms, but find that exposure to
cigarette smoke, vehicle exhaust, cleaning solutions, or other airborne
irritants provokes reoccurrence of their symptoms, in ways that they
never experienced before September 11th. Not all who were part of the
effort at or near Ground Zero developed persistent respiratory
problems; some are more susceptible to the effects of such exposures
than others. The difficulty is, we have no way to predict who the
susceptibles are. It is very important that, in addition to preventing
further exposure to irritants as much as possible, treatment with
appropriate medications be instituted as quickly as possible, to
prevent these conditions from becoming lifelong, disabling illnesses.
In the past 2 months, we have seen similar respiratory problems
emerging among some of the office workers who returned to buildings
situated in the periphery of Ground Zero, especially those located
downwind from the debris pile and the fires which were actively burning
until December. For most, the symptoms of eye, nose, throat, and chest
irritation are transient and not of serious concern. But we have
patients with new onset asthma since their return to work in nearby
buildings - people who were never previously asthmatic. Fortunately,
most of my patients report that their symptoms are generally improving,
now that the fires have for the most part been extinguished and the
airborne irritant burdens have decreased.
A clinical feature, which surprised us in its frequency and
intensity, is the degree of psychological distress among the early
responders. Many of our patients who came to us for respiratory
problems also reported persistent flashbacks of images and sounds of
human trauma and horror they had witnessed, especially early on. Police
officers, construction workers, and others have had sleep difficulties,
depression or irritability, and many had difficulty controlling their
tears whenever reminded of what they had seen, even months after the
events themselves. The group debriefing sessions that many participated
in at the site was simply insufficient to help such individuals resolve
the effects of this experience on their emotional well-being.
To address the specific issue of exposure to asbestos at and near
Ground Zero, it is important to note that asbestos has been found in
the debris at the site itself and in settled dust on surfaces in nearby
buildings. Fortunately, the concentration of asbestos fiber in outside
air is low, and poses a correspondingly low risk of disease. For those
who work at the Ground Zero site itself, respiratory protection to
prevent inhalation of asbestos fiber is necessary, and the use of such
respiratory protection is the current policy for workers at the site,
although compliance can hardly be described as universal. A special
group at increased risk for asbestos-related illness (twenty or more
years from now) are the workers engaged in clean-up operations in
offices and residential buildings near the site. For the household
resident or office occupant whose exposure during the cleaning of
settled dust is brief, there is a very low increase in risk of illness,
even if the wrong methods are used. Such risk should be avoided, and
Dr. Landrigan will likely address the special risk for children in such
settings. The risk to unprotected building service workers, however,
who perform dust-disturbing tasks day in and day out for perhaps months
is of much greater magnitude. This group requires training and
protection. Many are hired off the street, are not English speaking,
and are among the most vulnerable of workers. That they should have
been permitted to be exposed to asbestos dust in this fashion is a
public health failure.
From the perspective of what needs to be done now, our clinical
experience, taken together with what has been learned from the study of
the NYC firefighters, points to the need for developing a medical
surveillance program for those who placed themselves at risk in the
course of their efforts--whether as employed workers or volunteers. A
registry of those who were present at or near Ground Zero must be
established as quickly and comprehensively as possible. Medical
examinations, to identify persistent respiratory, musculoskeletal, and
psychological conditions should be made available to all who were
there, and treatment should be initiated where findings warrant it. The
longer treatment is delayed, the more difficult treatment becomes, and
the less successful the clinical outcome. If resources are made
available, a consortium of medical institutions under the guidance of
occupational/environmental medicine expertise can be established,
working in coordination with the appropriate government agencies, to
provide clinical evaluations and treatment programs. I am confident
that we would receive full cooperation from relevant employers and
labor organizations to facilitate the development of the registry and
the clinical surveillance program itself. The many workers and
volunteers who have given so much of themselves deserve no less.
Thank you, and I will be pleased to answer questions.
__________
Statement of Marilena Christodoulou, President, Stuyvesant High School
Parents' Association
On behalf of the six thousand parents at Stuyvesant High School, I
want to thank you for holding this hearing on a matter of great concern
to our community.
Stuyvesant High School is an academically excellent school for
which each student must take a competitive examination in order to gain
admission. Approximately 20,000 students take the Specialized Science
High Schools' entrance examination for the 750 available spaces at the
school. It is the most competitive school in the New York City Public
School System and arguably in the country.
The school, located four blocks north of the World Trade Center,
was heavily impacted by the events of September 11th. The 3,000
students and 200 staff members were evacuated in the middle of a cloud
of toxic dust and debris as the second tower was collapsing. Almost
immediately, the school building was commandeered for use by rescue and
recovery agencies and personnel.
The Board of Education (BOE) reopened the school on October 9. We
were the first school in the Ground Zero area to return to its
building. Some of the remaining six schools have only returned last
week and one school, PS 89, has initiated legal proceedings against the
BOE seeking an injunction against the return. The goal of our Parents'
Association (PA) has been to ensure that the return to Stuyvesant would
occur only when the streets were safe for walking and the building was
safe for occupancy. Our single most important concern is the issue of
air quality--both inside and outside the school--specifically, the
possible presence of airborne contaminants and related potential
adverse health effects. Unfortunately, it is my opinion that the return
to Stuyvesant was premature and that environmental conditions in and
around the school continue to pose a potential threat to our children's
health and well-being.
As the inside of the school tested positive for asbestos, the BOE
conducted an asbestos abatement prior to reoccupancy. We were
encouraged by the fact that the BOE's cleanup should have taken care of
not only asbestos, but also all other particulate contaminants. In
addition, as a result of negotiations with the PA, the BOE agreed to
undertake environmental sampling inside and outside the school (which
continues to this day). Results are reviewed by H.A. Bader Consultants,
Inc., the PA's hired environmental engineers, and by the PA
Environmental Health & Safety Committee.
The excavation operations and the few remaining fires at Ground
Zero continue to release a variety of contaminants into the Lower
Manhattan air. These contaminants, all of which are associated with
potential adverse health effects, include asbestos, lead, crystalline
silica, dioxins, carbon monoxide, diesel and gasoline exhaust, PCB's,
heavy metals, and benzene and other volatile organic compounds. In
addition, several hundred trucks a day carry pulverized debris and
steel girders coated with remnants of asbestos fireproofing from Ground
Zero past Stuyvesant to the waste transfer barge operation located
immediately adjacent to the north side of the school on Pier 25. This
is the main debris removal operation from Ground Zero. Additional
contaminants are released into the air as loads are transferred from
trucks to barges. Diesel emissions from the many trucks and cranes at
the barge are another source of contaminants.
Our experience since returning to school has been and continues to
be problematic. Our children are getting sick. We are also concerned
about the possible delayed health effects (like cancer) 10-20 years
from now from exposure to the chemicals in the air.
contaminants are entering the school
Our goal is to prevent contaminants in the outdoor environment from
entering the school and affecting our children. The primary route of
outdoor contaminants into the school (assuming windows and doors are
kept closed) is through the ventilation system. The main defense
against contaminants is the filtration in the ventilation system. To
date, the BOE has failed to take adequate measures to protect our
children. Despite repeated requests from the PA, the BOE still has not
cleaned the ductwork of the ventilation systems. After months of
stalling, the BOE finally upgraded the filters at the end of January.
Although these replacement filters provide an improvement in
efficiency, they still do not provide adequate protection, according to
evaluations by two independent professional ventilation engineers
working with the PA.
Results from environmental sampling conducted by the BOE
demonstrate that, on more than 50 percent of the days from October 9,
when our children returned to school, to February 1, measurements of
respirable particulate matter (PM2.5) inside the school have
exceeded EPA guidelines for children. These particulates may pose a
greater danger because they may contain a mixture of toxins. Levels of
lead dust in excess of regulatory limits were found inside Stuyvesant
on several occasions in December, January, and February.
the barge operation is a main source of contaminants
It is clear that the close proximity of the barge to the school is
putting our children at a greater risk of exposure to toxic
contaminants. The PA's environmental engineer has measured and compared
airborne concentrations of particulate matter at Ground Zero and on the
north side of the Stuyvesant building, and found the particular matter
to be higher at Stuyvesant. As the north side of the school faces away
from Ground Zero and towards the barge operation, the only reasonable
explanation is that we have elevated levels of particulates coming from
the barge/truck operation. The PA expert also reports that levels of
particulate matter at Stuyvesant have consistently been double the
levels at Barclay Street, one block from Ground Zero.
On several occasions, the EPA notified the PA that, weeks earlier,
it had monitored high levels of certain contaminants in outdoor air at
its monitoring station, between the school and the barge, in excess of
EPA regulatory limits. These contaminants included asbestos,
tetrachloroethane, and isocyanate. Unfortunately, the EPA has not been
monitoring the latter contaminants on a regular basis nor is it
monitoring and disclosing the full array of possible contaminants.
Further, there is no system in place for proactive notification of the
residents, workers, and students in the area to enable them to take
protective measures (like staying at home) on days when levels of
contaminants in the air are high.
Carting of the Ground Zero debris material to the barge constitutes
an unacceptable risk to our children and to the surrounding community
along the truck route. We are in the unique position to observe the
truck and barge operation, and we can report to you that, despite
assurances from government officials, the trucks are not always
adequately covered; on cold days the debris cannot be hosed down to
prevent the release of dust; and the levels of visible dust in the air
and on the pavement are high.
To date, government agencies have been unwilling to either relocate
the barge operation to a less damaging site or to take effective
measures to protect the community. There was discussion to containerize
the debris at Ground Zero prior to trucking them to the barge; to
install particulate traps by the barge; and to use low-sulfur fuel for
the trucks and the cranes. To date, none of these measures has been
implemented.
Even simple measures such as halting barge operation on below-
freezing non-hose down days, rerouting trucks from Pier 25 to Pier 6
during the hours when school children are outdoors, and directing
trucks hauling loads with high dust content to Pier 6, have not been
implemented.
There are 4,500 school children, some as young as 4 years old,
within two blocks of this barge operation. We are at a loss to
understand how the Government could locate a toxic dump right next to a
school in the middle of a residential community. The BOE has taken no
effective action to have the barge relocated, or to ensure its
operation in an environmentally safe manner.
In summary, our children are exposed to three sources of
contaminants: the air inside the school, the toxic composition of the
Ground Zero debris trucked and dumped at the barge, and the diesel
emissions and combustion byproducts generated by the trucks and the
cranes.
incidence of illness among students and staff
Since the return to school on October 9, a number of students and
faculty have reported and exhibited clinically diagnosable symptoms of
illness. Many parents report that their children have experienced
unusual rashes, nosebleeds, coughing attacks, and chronic sinus and
respiratory problems, including new onset asthma and chemical
bronchitis. Parents have reported to us several emergency room visits.
It has been reported that several custodians have chemical bronchitis.
Since the return to Stuyvesant on October 9 through December 14, at
least 11 students have left the school due to air quality problems.
These students, who will not be allowed to return by the BOE, have
chosen to leave one of the most prestigious public high schools in the
Nation, and to forfeit a public educational opportunity that
essentially cannot be replaced.
Several faculty members have left or taken sabbaticals for health
reasons or medical concerns. The teachers' union has filed a grievance
over environmental conditions at the school. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (``NIOSH''), a branch of the Centers for
Disease Control, has begun an investigation of environmental conditions
and health effects among teachers at Stuyvesant (and other Lower
Manhattan locations). However, NIOSH can only investigate the health
impact on workers and has no jurisdiction to conduct an evaluation of
our children. Neither the BOE nor the NYC Department of Health have
conducted an epidemiological study of the students. The incidence of
student illness cannot be adequately characterized based only on
attendance rates and visits to the school nurse's office.
Stuyvesant's student population is very diverse. Many of our
students come from first and second generation non-English speaking
immigrant families. We are concerned that many of these families do not
have the wherewithal to seek early medical care. Dr. Stephen Levin, of
the Mt. Sinai Selikoff Center for Occupational and Environmental
Medicine, has advised us that early detection and treatment of
respiratory illness is critical in terms of preventing such illness
from becoming chronic. (I would like to take this opportunity to thank
Dr. Levin for his help during this period).
In conclusion, these developments call into question any
unequivocal assurances from government agencies, including the EPA and
the BOE, about the health and safety of our children.
immediate action is needed
The following courses of action should be implemented to protect
environmental quality and public health:
(a) Barge Operation.--The truck/barge operation on Pier 25 should
be relocated to an area where there is less residential and educational
impact.
(b) Ventilation Protocols.--The Government should immediately issue
protocols for proper preventive measures to be taken by schools and
other institutions in the area with regard to installation of
protective air filtration and cleaning and operation of ventilation
systems.
(c) Cleaning of Buildings and Enclosed Structures.--The Government
should mandate regular proper cleaning (i.e., wet-cleaning and HEPA-
vacuum) of building interiors and other enclosed structures in the
area, including foot-bridges such as the one outside Stuyvesant.
(d) Cleaning of Streets and Sidewalks.--The Department of
Sanitation, as well as entities such as the Battery Park City
Authority, should be required to regularly wet-clean the streets and
sidewalks in the area, as it is necessary for dust suppression.
(e) Environmental Monitoring and Notification.--The Government
should take action to ensure complete environmental testing, both
indoor and outdoor; full and timely disclosure of results; and
immediate and full notification of elevated levels of contaminants to
residents, workers, and students in Lower Manhattan.
(f) Monitoring of Incidence of Illness and Medical Coverage.--The
Government should assume responsibility for implementing a centralized
and coordinated effort to monitor and track incidence of illness among
residents, workers, and students in the area. A central registry of all
residents, workers, and students who have been exposed to contaminants
as a result of the September 11th attacks should be established. The
Government should assume responsibility for early detection and medical
treatment of illness related to the World Trade Center disaster. Also,
in my opinion, a dedicated fund should be established to pay for
medical costs associated with any future health problems of registered
individuals as a result of WTC chemical exposure.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you today.
__________
Statement of Julie Hiraga, Teacher at PS 89 in Manhattan Representing
the United Federation of Teachers
Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Clinton and members of
the committee. My name is Julie Hiraga. I am a second grade teacher at
PS 89 in Manhattan and am here representing Randi Weingarten, president
of the United Federation of Teachers. Thank you for this opportunity to
testify on the health issues that concern those of us who live and work
in Lower Manhattan.
The brutal attack on the World Trade Center on September 11th was a
trauma we are all still learning to overcome, but slowly we are trying
to return to normal. At PS 89, one of seven schools in the immediate
vicinity of Ground Zero, the teachers and paraprofessionals quickly led
children out of harm's way even as the Twin Towers fell and smoke and
debris filled the air. Miraculously, not one student was injured or
lost in the attack.
Following the disaster, our schools were relocated to other sites,
and some were moved yet again. For the children in PS 89, our two moves
took their toll, emotionally and educationally. The adjustments were
especially disruptive for students who had to take State tests in
reading and language arts. Unfortunately, children did not start
getting counseling until January. Still, the teachers have been doing
their best to keep students calm and focused on learning.
This has been a very frightening time for all of us, but the
teachers of PS 89 want to return to our normal routine. Right now, we
are scheduled to go back to our home school on February 28, and
although there's a lot of excitement and optimism, there's also some
anxiety about safety. Teachers are concerned about having to keep
windows closed and not having an outdoor play space for the children.
Also, the school is on the truck route for debris removal. These
huge trucks emit diesel fumes and their cargo throws a lot of dust in
the air. Teachers are worried about the long-term impact on their
health and wonder if symptoms may not emerge for some time.
Parents, too, are worried about air quality and health issues and
we wonder how that will affect student enrollment. Right now, we have
only half the students we had before Sept. 11 because parents have
moved or withdrawn their children. Now parents of about 30 more
students have applied to withdraw their children when we go back to our
building because they are concerned about health and safety. The
problem is compounded when children hear some classmates talk about
their parents' worries and become fearful.
Having our union as a watchdog has helped allay some of those
fears. The UFT's two industrial hygienists and its consulting physician
made presentations to our staff and made sure that our questions were
answered. They reviewed all the air-testing data and assured us that
they will continue reviewing the reports. They said that air testing
and sampling of a number of contaminants that could prove harmful to
students and staff will continue on a regular schedule, both inside and
outside every affected school.
The union's representatives have also been very responsive to our
concerns and needs. They explained what was being done to control the
dust, such as watering down the trucks and installing matting under all
exterior school doors to hinder dust seepage. They helped our school
get a new, more efficient filtration system and a new HEPA vacuum for
our custodial staff. They even sent us snacks and towelettes, and that
gave us a real morale boost when we needed it.
We've also had a chance to see what has happened at the other
schools that reopened. Stuyvesant High School was the first to reopen
on October 9. Teachers in my school followed events there very closely.
Stuyvesant is further from Ground Zero than PS 89, but the fires were
still burning when students and staff returned. Many of my colleagues
wondered if the air was safe, even though experts who reviewed the
sampling data tried to reassure everyone.
Since some staff and students at Stuyvesant complained of
respiratory problems, the union asked the Federal Government to conduct
its own evaluation. As a result, on January 29 the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) began the first survey
comparing staff symptoms at Stuyvesant High School with those at a high
school out of the affected area (Fiorello LaGuardia High School in
midtown Manhattan).
We also saw that the union's experts were not content with
acceptable facts and figures alone. They conducted on-site visual
inspections of all the affected schools to make sure they were properly
cleaned and prepared for reoccupancy. A good example is what happened
at the High School for Economics and Finance, which was had been
scheduled to reopen on January 30. Both the monitoring data and a
preliminary inspection showed that everything was ready. But then
additional work was done, releasing new dust and debris. Because union
representatives made a follow-up visit on the Sunday before the
scheduled reopening, they saw these new potential hazards and kept
students and staff from moving back until the board cleaned the school
again.
In the meantime, our sister school, IS 89, reoccupied the top two
floors of our shared building on January 22. It is doing well, which is
encouraging. I also hear that the staffs at PS 150 and PS 234, which
had many of the same concerns we had, are glad to be back in their own
buildings.
So to sum up, there are lingering concerns about the our students'
psychological and educational welfare, as well as about parental
reactions. All of us at the school have had concerns about air quality
and other health hazards in the aftermath of September 11th. However,
the independent monitoring and involvement of the union's health and
safety experts has helped reassure us.
Thank you.
__________
Statement of Bernard Orlan, Director of Environmental Health and
Safety, New York City Board of Education
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Voinovich and Senator Clinton, I am
happy to appear before you on behalf of Chancellor Harold O. Levy and
the New York City Board of Education. We appreciate this opportunity to
speak about how the events of September 11th affected public schools in
the area of the World Trade Center. My name is Bernie Orlan and I am
director of Environmental Health and Safety for the New York City Board
of Education.
As you know, last September 11th, we were forced to evacuate a
number of schools in the downtown area. While this has been noted
numerous times, it is worth pointing out again that this evacuation was
accomplished without a single injury--either to a teacher or a child.
Teachers and other staff kept their charges safe. Indeed throughout the
system, teachers, principals, assistant principals and support staff
worked tirelessly to get children home safely and in the aftermath of
that day have helped our students get back to the business of learning.
In the days following the disaster, many of our school buildings
were used by various agencies including FEMA and the city's Office of
Emergency Management for rescue and ultimately, recovery operations.
Other school facilities were used by the Red Cross as emergency
shelters. Once permission was granted by the city to normalize activity
from 14th street to Canal Street and areas east of Broadway, schools in
this area were tested for particulate dust, asbestos and other
compounds including carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. We also
established baseline levels for general air quality. The results of
these and other tests verified that the buildings were safe for
children and staff to return.
This left us with seven schools contained in six buildings that
could not immediately be reoccupied. These included two high schools
south of Ground Zero and one high school, one intermediate school and
three elementary schools north of Chambers Street, which is north of
Ground Zero. In all, more than 5,000 students were displaced.
Four schools were being used by emergency workers and agencies.
Once these buildings were turned back to the Board of Education
jurisdiction, we began exhaustive environmental testing, beginning with
tests for asbestos debris. Very little of this was found. Nonetheless,
the decision was made to clean each school as if it were contaminated.
Following the strict AHERA protocol designed by independent monitors
certified by both NYS Dept of Labor and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, teams of approved asbestos abatement handlers began
a top-to-bottom cleaning, first by HEPA-vacuuming and wet wiping the
buildings. Following the cleaning, the buildings were retested and
found to be clear of contaminants that would have come from the
collapse of the World Trade Center.
Just as the teachers and staff safeguarded the children as they ran
from their schools, it is our duty to safeguard them on their return.
Before the schools could reopen, a battery of environmental testing
was performed in and around each school. These included wipe and air
sampling for asbestos, respirable particulate concentrations, mercury,
PCBs, silica, fiberglass, hydrocarbons, dioxins, metal and cyanides. I
have provided a summary of these test results as an addendum to these
remarks. For the record, in and around the schools, we have not found
any of these materials in any concentration known to be hazardous.
While we expect to find background levels of some of these materials in
the air--in particular respirable dust--since mid-December when the
long-burning fires were extinguished, in daily tests, we found all of
these tests to show these contaminants to be absent or on rare
occasion, present in quantities that measure for the most part below
conservative safety guidelines.
At this point, only PS 89--which shares a building with IS 89--and
the High School for Economics and Finance, have yet to return to their
buildings. With the return to their home sites, we take a three-pronged
approach to safeguarding the physical health of our staff and students.
At every school, we perform more than 100 separate air tests a day. We
are also sampling over 24-hour periods, in order to collect and examine
all particulates and we continue to provide periodic environmental
surveillance for the contaminants of concern. Barrier mats at school
entrances help prevent people from tracking debris into the school. All
ventilation systems were inspected and upgraded to enhance their
efficiency to capture the finer dust particles. In addition, medical
and metal hygiene staff are located at each school to provide
assistance and documentation as necessary.
In conclusion, we have done everything we can do to ensure that our
students are learning and our teachers are teaching in a clean and
secure environment. We will continue to monitor their environment and
will continue to share all the information we collect with parents,
their environmental consultants, the unions and the public. We will
continue to work diligently and tirelessly for the health and safety of
our community so that they can continue to focus on our overall mission
of teaching and learning.
I am happy to take your questions.
__________
Statement of Philip Landrigan, M.D., M.Sc., Chair, Department of
Community and Preventive Medicine and Professor of Pediatrics,
Director, Center for Children's Health and the Environment, Mount Sinai
School of Medicine
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: My name is Philip J.
Landrigan, M.D. I am a pediatrician, chairman of the Department of
Community and Preventive Medicine and director of the Center for
Children's Health and the Environment of the Mount Sinai School of
Medicine. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached to my testimony.
Thank you for having invited me to testify before you today.
I will focus my testimony on the impacts of the September 11th
World Trade Center attacks on the health of children.
demographics
On September 11, 2001, 46,000 children ages 0-19 resided in Lower
Manhattan below 14th Street. Approximately 11,000 of these children
were under the age of 5 years, and 3,000 lived within a half-mile
radius of the tower. Twelve hundred children were attending the three
primary schools closest to the World Trade Center (P.S. 89, P.S. 150,
and P.S. 234); 300 children were in attendance at I.S. 89; and 4,000
children were at Stuyvesant High School, the Leadership High School and
the High School for Finance. We estimate that 1,700 women in Lower
Manhattan were pregnant on the morning of September 11th.
exposures
When the twin towers were destroyed, the communities of Lower
Manhattan were enveloped in smoke and soot. Women, children and persons
of all ages were placed at risk of exposure to dust, debris, asbestos,
fibrous glass, products of combustion, volatile organic compounds
(VOCs), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and dioxins. For many weeks
last fall and into early winter, these communities were subjected
intermittently to the smell of acrid smoke from the long-burning fires.
Many offices and apartments were coated with dust that entered those
structures through shattered windows or inadequately protected air
handling systems.
You have learned much today already about these exposures. In
particular, you have been informed of the risks to workers by my Mount
Sinai colleague, Dr. Stephen Levin. To provide further background on
the nature of these exposures, I attach to my testimony articles
prepared by our group at Mount Sinai that were published in November in
Environmental Health Perspectives, the journal of the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS).
the special vulnerability of children
Children are particularly vulnerable to environmental toxins such
as those released into the air of Lower Manhattan on September 11th.
Several factors act together to increase children's risk.
Children live closer to the ground than adults and thus
are more like to inhale any materials stirred up from dust.
Children breathe more air per pound of body weight per day
and thus take into their bodies proportionately larger quantities of
any toxic materials suspended in the air.
Children's developing lungs and other organ systems are
more sensitive than those of adults.
Children have more years of future life in which to
develop delayed diseases that may result from exposures to dust,
asbestos or other toxic materials.
prenatal toxicity
Potential for toxicity in utero affecting the next generation is a
further dimension of the September 11th disaster. The possible physical
and psychological consequences of the attacks on pregnant women and
their children are not known and need to be explored.
To address this issue, researchers at Columbia University Center
and the Mount Sinai School of Medicine have developed a joint project
to examine infants born to women who were pregnant on September 11,
2001 and who were either acutely or chronically exposed to the fires
and explosions. The acute exposure group will consist of pregnant women
who actually were in the World Trade Center or in nearby office
buildings at the time of the attacks. The chronic exposure group will
consist of women who live and work in the communities of Lower
Manhattan. Samples of blood and other biological fluids will be taken
from these women to assess their exposures. Their infants will be
evaluated at birth and periodically over the first several years of
their lives. Outcomes will be assessed.
community health needs
Protection of the health of community residents in Lower Manhattan,
particularly young children and pregnant women, requires that we take
strong and consistent action on several fronts.
Sound Health Recommendations
The most immediate need in the communities of Lower Manhattan is
for scientifically sound, evidence-based guidance (1) about the risks
to children and families and (2) about what families can do to minimize
those risks.
To formulate health recommendations for families and communities in
Lower Manhattan, we have relied heavily on the extensive environmental
assessment data collected by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
State and city agencies, the Board of Education and private
consultants. Although there is always room for more sampling, the
aggregate amount of data that has been collected in Lower Manhattan
since September 11th is astounding. It represents the most
comprehensive environmental sampling that has ever been undertaken in
any community in the United States. Most of these data, including all
the data collected by governmental agencies, are of high quality and
very credible.
In the early weeks after the disaster, while the sampling data were
still quite incomplete, we urged prudent avoidance. At that time the
smell of acrid smoke hung heavy over Lower Manhattan, especially at
night and on days with little wind. Although the actual measured levels
of airborne pollutants where below Federal standards, there were
intermittent peaks of exposure. Accordingly, we developed
recommendations in collaboration with the Ground Zero Elected Officials
Task Force and the Manhattan Borough President that urged families to
take the following prudent steps:
Limit the amount of time you spend out of doors near the
WTC site.
Limit vigorous outdoor exercise and vigorous play by
children in the affected area. Both increase the rate of breathing.
For ongoing clean up, use a HEPA vacuum (they can be
rented) and a damp mop or rag on floors, walls and furniture to clean
your apartment. Brooms stir up dust.
Be sure all air-handling systems in your building are
properly cleaned.
Frequently change filters on air conditioners and other
ventilation equipment, and run air conditioners on `recirculate' with
vents closed.
Use HEPA air filters at home or in the office.
Keep windows closed.
Take your shoes off at the door.
More recently, now that the fires have largely been extinguished,
we have continued to monitor health risks to community residents,
particularly to children. Much of this assessment has focussed on the
schools and on the question of whether to reopen the schools and
playgrounds in Lower Manhattan.
School Health Risks
Based on our review of the most recent data, we are comfortable
that the indoor environment of the schools in Lower Manhattan is now
clean and safe for children and adults.
The public schools in Lower Manhattan have undergone an extensive
array of environmental tests more thorough than any that have been
performed in any other New York City public school. Measurements of
contaminants (fine particulates, PCBs, dioxins, lead and other metals,
asbestos, and volatile organic compounds) have found levels that in
virtually every instance are well below applicable standards and
background levels. The following paragraphs summarize our
interpretation of these data:
PCBs, Dioxins, and related compounds.--These compounds are
produced by almost any sort of combustion and are found widely in our
industrialized society. If one were to test air and surfaces in any
large city, trace levels of these compounds would frequently be
detected. The air and surface test results undertaken in the schools in
Lower Manhattan found all levels to be either undetectable or far below
even the most conservative standards. For instance, the highest
reported wipe sample level of dioxin in P.S. 89 was 0.032 ng/
M2. This is nearly 1,000 times below the New York State
Department of Health standard.
Fine Particulates (PM2.5). These particles are
ubiquitous in a city environment. They arise principally from the
combustion of fuel in car, truck, and bus engines as well as industrial
exhaust. The U.S. EPA guideline of 40 micrograms/m3 is based
on a 24-hour average. All of the EPA 24-hour average measurements of
fine particles near the schools in recent months have been well below
this level. In any urban environment, levels of fine particulates
fluctuate from moment to moment and day to day. In fact, spot
measurements taken at 13th Street, where P.S. 234 was temporarily
housed, revealed levels greater than 100 micrograms/m3. The
levels of fine particulates in Lower Manhattan are now more a
reflection of background urban air pollution than a result of the
continuing WTC clean up. Indeed these levels may increase when the
roadways are re-opened to general traffic.
Asbestos. Although ``no asbestos is good asbestos'', the levels of
asbestos fibers in the air in Lower Manhattan and in and around P.S. 89
are at background levels for the city, and the levels in the schools
are well below the AHERA standard of 70 structures/mm2.
That said, however, we need to be watchful for the long-term
consequences of exposure to asbestos. Almost no data exist on the
possible long-term consequences of low level asbestos in early
childhood. Causes of malignant mesothelioma have, however, been
reported in the grown children of asbestos workers who were exposed to
take-home asbestos; among non-working women in the asbestos mining
townships of Quebec who were exposed in the community; and among long-
term residents of a community near an asbestos-cement plant in Northern
Italy.
Last, with regard to the question of playgrounds, we have advised
that they be kept closed for the present time, because trucks are still
rolling by on the West Side Highway carrying construction materials and
potentially asbestos. Although measured levels of particulates and
asbestos are below Federal standards, we believe that prudence should
dictate that children not play outdoors in immediate proximity to the
highways where these trucks are running.
I have attached to my testimony a copy of a letter that we
submitted on February 5, 2002 to the parents, staff and community of
P.S. 89. Previously we had submitted a similar letter to the family of
P.S. 150. We have provided similar advice pro bono to the New York City
Board of Education.
Home Health Risks
Many apartments in Lower Manhattan were heavily inundated by dust
on September 11th. Dust entered these apartments through shattered
windows and also through air handling systems.
Cleanup of apartments has been very uneven. Some have been
effectively and thoroughly cleaned with HEPA vacuums, while others
appear not to have been adequately cleaned. Although data are more
fragmentary and incomplete than for the schools, there appear to have
been apartments and buildings where children may have been
significantly exposed to particulates and asbestos.
future needs
Follow up Assessment
It will be very important to continue to follow up vulnerable
populations who were present in Lower Manhattan on September 11th and
in the succeeding weeks and who were therefore placed at risk of
exposure to toxic materials liberated from the fires and explosions at
the World Trade Center. Specific follow up assessments that are needed
are the following:
Follow up of women in Lower Manhattan who were pregnant on
September 11th and their children.--As I have noted above, studies are
already underway as a joint endeavor between the Columbia University
School of Public Health and the Mount Sinai School of Medicine. They
need to be sustained for at least 3-5 years.
Follow up of children residing in and attending schools in
Lower Manhattan.--To date, only scattered assessments of children in
Lower Manhattan have been undertaken; these initial studies are
proceeding under the leadership of CDC, ATSDR, the New York City and
New York State Departments of Health. While these studies will provide
useful information on the impact of the environmental exposures on
September 11th on the health of children in New York, with a particular
focus on asthma and other respiratory problems, they have some
shortcomings. One problem is that the number of children included is
relatively small. Second, the planned duration of follow up is
limited--only one year. This will limit these studies' ability to
address parent's concerns about the possible long-term consequences of
the events of September 11th on their children's health. Third, the
studies currently underway are not assessing the impacts on children's
mental health of the events of September 11th. Those psychological
impacts are expected, however, to be substantial.
A need exists therefore to generate high quality information on the
short and long-term health consequences, including the mental health
consequences on children, of the events of September 11th.
broad national needs
The events of September 11th and the anthrax attacks that followed
underscored the weakness, deterioration and current state of disarray
of the public health infrastructure in the United States. They
underscore how ill prepared are most doctors and hospitals to
recognize, response and care for victims of chemical and biological
attack. Most American physicians have never seen anthrax or smallpox,
the two agents judged most likely to be used in biological terrorism.
Most hospitals do not have plans for the proper isolation of victims or
the protection of their staff.
The lack of preparedness for chemical weapons is equally low. It is
sobering to note that in the aftermath of the Tokyo subway attack with
sarin in 1995 many secondary cases of chemical poisoning occurred in
hospital workers caring for the victims of the attack. These cases
resulted because health care workers were untrained and because
hospitals had no plans in place for the chemical decontamination of the
victims prior to treatment.
A major need exists in the United States to strengthen programs for
disease tracking. The extremely sensible recommendations of the Pew
Commission on Public Health need to be heeded by health officials at
every level of government. Training programs in public health and
disaster preparedness need to be established for doctors, nurses, and
other health care providers. Hospitals, particularly major hospitals in
urban centers, need to be provided the resources and materials needed
to develop response plans. These plans need to be closely coordinated
with prehospital responders including fire departments, emergency
medical technicians, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
conclusion
Many questions of profound importance for public health were raised
by the attacks on September 11th. Many of these questions remain to be
answered, and some will not be answered for decades. The urgent need
now is to put in place the studies and to establish the registries and
the disease tracking systems that will enable us to answer these
questions in the future. New York, Washington and all of the United
States need to press forward and not be paralyzed by these terrible
attacks. At the same time, we must put in place the prudent safeguards
that will prevent further loss of life. Thank you. I shall be pleased
to answer your questions.
__________
Statement of Lee Saunders, on Behalf of Judith Berger-Arroga of
District 37, AFSCAME
Thank you Senators Lieberman and Clinton for giving us this
opportunity to address your subcommittee. My name is Lee Saunders and I
am the Administrator for District Council 37, AFSCME. I am testifying
on behalf of the 125,000 members of District Council 37. Our members
are the ``Everyday Heroes'' who helped in hundreds of ways at ``Ground
Zero'' and elsewhere to keep this city working during the terrible
tragedy that occurred on September 11, 2001. I am here today to request
that the Federal Government provide funding for appropriate medical
testing, treatment and surveillance as well as continued safety
training for our remarkable members--city workers who selflessly and
valiantly put themselves in harms' way following the September 11th
attack to assist the citizens of this great city.
From the moment the first plane hit, our members who work as
Paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians rushed to the scene to
begin the rescue effort. Moments after the attack DC 37 lost three
members--two EMTs, Carlos Lillo and Ricardo Quinn from Local 2507 and
Farther Mychal Judge a Chaplain from Local 299. Scores of other members
were injured in the aftermath. Hundreds of other DC 37 members played
and continue to play important roles in the rescue, recovery and clean-
up effort in and around the World Trade Center.
Our Local 983 Urban Park Rangers were among those who assisted in
the evacuation of Battery Park City and the surrounding areas. Our
Local 1322 and 376 members who work for the Department of Environmental
Protection immediately responded by ensuring that the water supply to
fight the huge fires was adequate. Our Motor Vehicle Operators from
Local 983 also responded immediately to address critical transportation
needs. As I speak, they continue to haul debris from ``Ground Zero''
hundreds of times a day. Local 375 HAZMAT workers also played a
critical role to make certain that chemical hazards were abated
quickly. Engineers and Architects from Local 375 have been there from
day one to provide technical expertise in overseeing the overall safety
of the rescue and recovery operations. Other members of DC 37, such as
Local 768 Public Health Sanitarians, Local 420 Mortuary Care
Technicians and Local 371 Social Service Workers, have all played vital
roles by tending to the health and safety needs of those adversely
affected by this terrible event. Until recently, Local 372 School Lunch
Aides fed thousands of meals a day to the rescue and other workers at
``Ground Zero''.
Since September 11, 2001, DC 37 has spoken out on the need for
adequate funding for the city to address the multitude of concerns of
our residents as well as our members who have so valiantly assisted in
the rescue and recovery efforts. To aid New York City in its recovery,
it is critical that the $20 billion promised by President Bush be made
available promptly to enable the city to meet its crushing and
immediate economic needs.
More particularly, an adequate portion of the $12 million that
Senators Schumer and Clinton have proposed to deal with worker health
issues must be specifically earmarked for the medical testing,
treatment and surveillance of employees who were exposed to the
numerous dangerous chemicals and other toxins in and around ``Ground
Zero''. To date, only some of the employees working at ``Ground Zero''
have received baseline medical examinations. Unfortunately, hundreds of
others have not. In order to adequately protect the health of these
heroic workers, this money must be appropriated in an expeditious and
efficient manner. We must not allow unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles
and lack of coordination on the part of city, State and Federal
agencies to further delay this essential funding. Monies for medical
testing, treatment and surveillance of workers should be allocated to
the New York State occupational health clinic network, which is well
equipped, trained and staffed but presently lacks adequate funding to
deal with the huge numbers of workers potentially affected by this
disaster.
Failure to allocate adequate funding to address these pressing
occupational health issues will unduly burden the city's health
insurance carriers and delay the needed medical treatment and
surveillance that workers need now. Our government should not place the
burden of continued good health on these heroic workers who have
already given so much.
DC 37 urges this subcommittee to immediately commit necessary
Federal funds to New York City to be used in the following manner:
To fund the Occupational Health Clinics in NYC in order to
provide appropriate medical testing, treatment and surveillance.
Develop training programs on safety and health related
issues for workers taking part in the rebuilding of the city.
Develop a worker registry to identify workers affected by
the 911 attack.
I would like to thank you for your time and will answer any
questions you may have.
__________
Statement of Marjorie J. Clarke, Ph.D., Scientist-in-Residence,
Lehman College
My name is Marjorie J. Clarke, Ph.D. I'm a scientist-in-residence
at Lehman College, and an adjunct professor at Lehman and Hunter
College, City University of New York. I was the Department of
Sanitation's specialist on emissions from incinerators in the 1980s,
the author of a book and numerous publications on the subject of
minimizing emissions, and I served on a National Academy of Sciences
committee on Health Effects of Waste Incineration, co-authoring the NRC
publication by that name. I also served on the New Jersey Standard-
Setting Task Force on Mercury emissions from incinerators in the early
1990s. My graduate degrees are in geology, environmental sciences, and
energy technology. More details about my credentials can be gleaned
from the above website.
I thank the Senate Environment Committee for having this hearing on
the health impacts on lower Manhattan due to the World Trade Center
collapses and fires. I hope that, once you have fully investigated the
statements and actions by EPA and other governmental agencies at all
levels, investigated the precedents set by earlier EPA actions that
have applied to similar situations elsewhere but not in Lower
Manhattan, that you will work hard to investigate what happened, why it
happened, to make recommendations for improvements in procedures,
standards, communications, and research, and to seek to have
implemented the many good recommendations that were made at the hearing
and subsequent testimony. It's vital to understand that not only are
there immediate problems to remediate (clean up, treatment of illness),
but there are many more problems to solve so that the next time there
is an environmental disaster of any kind, procedures are in place for
every aspect of the myriad of issues that result. As important as
remediating current problems and preventing new ones, I hope you will
publicize everything that you find so that the public understands, and
is therefore more likely to support all recommendations.
There are several issues of importance to and lessons to be learned
by New York State in the way the environmental agencies have handled
air quality issues in Lower Manhattan since September 11th.
First, I concur with the Ground Zero Task Force, that there still
needs to be a Cleanup Oversight Agency--I'd go further and say that
there needed/needs to be one agency responsible for monitoring health
and providing health assistance, and another for environmental
sampling, analysis and public dissemination of the results. There was a
long delay before all the environmental and health agencies even began
to talk with one another about sampling of air quality and accumulated
dust. I heard from a high level policy official at City DEP that it
took 2 weeks for discussions to start between the head of NYCDEP
(Miele) and the local USEPA office. When did DEC begin to coordinate
with these other agencies? Can we learn specific lessons from each
breakdown in communications and preparedness and devise specific
procedures for all to follow in the future?
Second, the WTC collapses and fires actually constituted a brand
new, combination type of air pollution source, with aspects of a (1)
crematorium (most of the bodies will never be found because they were
cremated, and their ashes scattered all over downtown and surrounding
areas intermingled with the asbestos, fiberglass and concrete dusts),
(2) a solid waste incinerator of unprecedented proportion (described
below), (3) asbestos factory (but on a scale thousands of times the
size and intensity of what would be found even in a badly operated
factory) and (4) volcano (the initial cloud was similar to nuee--
ardente--hot gas and dust cloud--in some respects, depositing ash in a
large area). There are many toxic, carcinogenic and irritating
pollutants, standards need to be rewritten to assess the impacts of
synergy--to protect the public health.
Since this is a new type of air pollution source, with
characteristics of a crematorium, a solid waste incinerator, an
asbestos factory, and even an ash-spewing volcano, no emissions
standards exist and therefore, none of the existing standards for other
sources directly applied. Many of us remember the bitter battles
between Brooklyn residents and the city over the Brooklyn Navy Yard
plant. The emissions from this plant would have been controlled well
over 90 percent for most pollutants, and yet we have an incinerator
downtown which continues to burn totally uncontrolled. New York State
wrote a law banning the construction of this incinerator due to public
pressure. Yet the extent of environmental contamination by this
incinerator would have paled in comparison to what people have been
living with for months. The emissions from the World Trade Center fires
were orders of magnitude more than any incinerator, many months have
passed, and we have heard very little about a serious attempt to
contain the emissions from the site. No attempt had been made to put
out the fires (i.e. by cutting off the sources of oxygen from above and
the tunnels below.) No procedures have been established to require or
do this. Why wasn't there discussion to erect a temporary structure
(dome) over the site, and install incinerator emissions controls to
clean the air inside the dome so that the workers could do their work
in safer conditions and the cleanup around the downtown be finished,
once and for all? (Now every time there is a wind, the debris is picked
up and dispersed)
Third, there has been a toxic and carcinogenic ``soup'' of air
pollutants in the downtown air, constantly being generated by fires,
and worse, smoldering embers that incompletely combust thousands of
tons of toxic precursors present in the form of fine particles and
gases--the perfect recipe formation of dioxins, furans, and similar
products of incomplete combustion.
It's hard to imagine a more perfect machine for generating toxic
and carcinogenic air pollution. First, there were thousands of tons of
asbestos, fiberglass, silica, and very alkaline concrete which was
pulverized into various size fractions, but much of which was extremely
fine in size. Then there was a tremendous source of heavy metals, PCBs,
and acids just from the building's contents (latex paints typically
contain mercury--think of the number of gallons there was on the
walls). Lead came from volatilization of lead from car batteries,
leaded glass in computer screens, lead solder, and lead pigments among
other sources. Mercury would have come from batteries, fluorescent
lighting, paints, thermostats and thermometers, mercury light switches,
and other sources. The same is true of cadmium, chromium, arsenic, and
other heavy metals. Most of this was initially pulverized; much of that
was then in a form easy to volatilize given a high enough temperature.
In addition there were combustible products and packaging all over
the buildings--everything from products and packaging made of paper,
cardboard, wood and plastic, including furniture, floor coverings,
textile partitions just to name a very few. Fire is easier to start
when the combustible matter is a very fine size because the temperature
and oxygen can get to all surfaces quickly (try to start a log burning
vs. small scraps of paper). The source of heat in the WTC came not only
from burning of the jet fuel, but also from the cars underground, as
well as from the combustible materials in the building (paper and
plastic are highly combustible).
The paper and plastics are not only important because they fed the
fires, which volatilized metals and other toxic gases, but also because
under conditions of a few hundred degrees to 1800 degrees Fahrenheit,
dioxins, furans, and similar compounds form, de novo, when paper and
plastic smolder where insufficient oxygen and temperature is present to
burn them thoroughly. In the 1970s, before it was known that municipal
solid waste incinerators needed to be designed and operated very
carefully to combust the waste thoroughly, some incinerators created
tens of thousands of nanograms/cubic meter of dioxin emissions. The
stack size of one of these incinerators was a tiny fraction of the
equivalent stack size of the World Trade Center air pollution source.
In the pile, there was certainly little oxygen, there was a great deal
of dioxin precursors (paper and plastics), and the temperatures were
perfect for incomplete combustion, so the smoldering would have
permitted the generation of an enormous quantity of toxic and
carcinogenic organics.
Dioxin is a family of 210 discrete man-made chemicals that are some
of the most carcinogenic and toxic chemicals known. Dioxin is the
contaminant of Agent Orange that was responsible for birth defects
across Vietnam after that war ended. Dioxin adheres very tightly to
particulate matter in incinerators, and is stored in fatty tissues in
human beings for long periods of time. Dioxins are created in large
quantities in poorly designed, uncontrolled incinerators, when products
such as paper, cardboard, wood are incompletely burned with such
substances as PVC plastic, benzene, and other chlorinated ring
structures. The Trade Center was full of fuel for such incomplete
combustion. The optimal temperatures for formation of dioxin are
roughly between 400 to 1800 degrees Fahrenheit. European dioxin
emission standards from an incinerator with a small stack (as compared
with the area of Ground Zero) are 0.1 nanograms (billionths of a gram)
Toxic Equivalents per cubic meter of emission.
The finer the size of the particulate matter, the greater that
amount of volatilized heavy metals, dioxins/furans, and acid gases that
can condense from the air and adsorb onto the particulate surfaces
(because the surface area of the particulate is so much greater). Also,
the finer sizes of particulate matter, laden with toxic and
carcinogenic substances, can evade the body's coughing mechanism--the
cilia--all the way down to the alveoli (air sacs) where they can reside
for the long-term. The longer the fires burned, the greater was the
source of volatilized metals, organics, and acids. The fires burned and
smoldered for at least 100 days; a decision was made on some level not
to attempt to suffocate them (i.e., blocking off all the sources of air
from above and below). Because the decision was made not to contain the
site, every time we have a heavy wind, the dust that is still all over
Lower Manhattan is kicked up and spread around more. The city's meager
attempts to wet down the streets certainly resulted in some of the
asbestos/fiberglass/toxic and carcinogenic dust to be washed out into
the harbor via the storm sewers (doing unknown damage to ecosystems
there), but much of the dust remained in place, just to become airborne
again once the water had evaporated. The city should have been applying
a ``wet-vac'' technology to collect the dust so that it could be
brought to a hazardous waste disposal site.
Fourth, there are a few types of air quality standards----
(1) Ambient air quality--mostly irritants (SO2,
NOx, CO, O3, particulates) from cars,
(2) Occupational exposures (a wide range of pollutants, 8-hour/day
exposure), and
(3) Emissions from point and non-point sources (as measured in the
stack or tailpipe).
(4) There are just a few standards for hazardous air pollutants,
which cause health effects with far lower doses (ppm, ppb) than the
criteria air pollutants for which there are ambient air quality
standards. Most toxic and carcinogenic air pollutants are not regulated
under ``NESHAPS'', and there has been decades of delays in standard-
writing for other pollutants. This needs to be rectified soon, before
we face something like this again.
The shortcoming of ALL these types of standards is that they were
calculated by considering the effect on human health and the
environment (i.e., the health of ecosystems) of only one pollutant at a
time. If the air contains 2, or 5, or 500 discrete organics, heavy
metals, acids, each of which has its own toxic and carcinogenic
properties, but every pollutant is below the individual standard
levels, then the Government points to that and says that the air is
safe. But is it? The Government hasn't written standards for
combinations of pollutants, so it considers the air to be safe if all
standards, as currently written, are met. It's common sense that
elevated levels of five pollutants is worse than one. It's also common
sense that when there are widespread complaints of symptoms ranging
from headaches and coughing to new onset asthma in marathon runners,
and when everyone who entered into areas a half mile away and more from
Ground Zero could smell the pollution, the air has not been ``safe''
for everyone. The additive effects of multiple pollutants need to be
considered in assessing evacuation zones, public and health measures.
Furthermore, two or more pollutants can interact with one another and
produce impacts that are significantly more than the additive effects.
Research has shown that inhalation of both asbestos and cigarette smoke
produces several times the effect of either one alone. When 1+1+1 does
not equal 3, but equals 30, this is called synergy. The Mt. Sinai
Environmental Sciences Laboratory, which pioneered research into the
health effects of asbestos, has found that those exposed to asbestos
and who smoke, have not twice but 80 to 90 times the probability of
suffering from asbestos-related diseases such as lung cancer,
mesothelioma and asbestosis.
Despite the fact that the air was still so full of contaminants
that everyone could smell ``it'' many blocks from Ground Zero until the
end of November, all three environmental agencies stated that nothing
was wrong with the air at the City Club's forum on October 26. Their
basis is that each individual pollutant is below action or standard
levels ``most'' of the time. But it is clear that a large number of
pollutants are significantly elevated above background levels. I
received an email from Dr. David Cleverly, dioxin expert at USEPA, that
dioxin had been 50 times normal background levels, but not as high as
actionable levels most of the time.
But EPA's website says that ``most of the air samples taken in
areas surrounding the work zone and analyzed for dioxin have been below
EPA's screening level, which is set to protect against significantly
increased risks of cancer and other adverse health effects. The
screening level is based on an assumption of continuous exposure for a
year to an average concentration of 0.16 nanograms per cubic meter (ng/
m3)'', which is 60 percent higher than incinerator emission
standards at the stack exit in several European countries. Twelve days
after the attack, ambient concentrations of dioxin were 0.139 ng/
m3 at Church and Dey just east of the site, 0.16 and 0.18 at
Barclay and W. Broadway just north of the site, and at Broadway and
Liberty, levels were at the 0.1 level. No measurements were taken
northeast of the site, which would be downwind most often. The
temperatures of the debris have also continued to be sufficient to
vaporize many toxic heavy metals, such as lead, cadmium, chromium,
arsenic, mercury, to mention just a few of the many that have surely
been emitted in large quantities from this uncontrolled incinerator. I,
myself, could smell the metals in the air while I was at the Municipal
Building for a meeting in early October. My colleague, and medical
waste incinerator expert who wrote the city's Medical Waste Management
Plan in 1991, Wally Jordan of Waste Tech, remarked that he smelled
chlorinated organics when he went to the site around that time. From
what I have heard, the temperature of the pile has been within this
temperature range for much of the time since September 11th, so the
emissions from these fires could easily be similar to a number of
uncontrolled incinerators.
Only recently did EPA put any dioxin data at all on its website,
and there is no mention of background or action levels for dioxin or
any other pollutant. Many heavy metals have not been listed on the
websites. Background levels refer to what is loosely considered to be
``normal'' levels of any given pollutant in the atmosphere. But what
does it mean if dioxin plus hundreds of discrete substances including
asbestos and several other toxic and/or carcinogenic organic compounds,
heavy metals, silica, acids and other gases and particulate matter are
elevated, or even many times background levels, and are borderline
actionable? Doesn't it seem likely that breathing air in which many
toxic or carcinogenic pollutants are borderline actionable is worse for
public health than breathing air in which only one pollutant is
borderline? Yet standards assume the impact on human health is from
only one pollutant. Is it protective of public health to look at each
pollutant one at a time, ignoring the additive effects of inhaling each
of several pollutants? Can we assume that the impacts on human health
is only the additive effect of the concentrations of each pollutant, or
might there be synergistic interactions between some of these compounds
that increase the impacts further? Since ambient air standards are for
individual pollutants, it is imperative that research be done to assess
the impacts on public health of combinations of pollutants. Standards
need to be rewritten as well to assess the impacts of synergy. The
environmental agencies at all levels need to become more expert in
evaluating the health and environmental effects of various mixtures of
pollutants. Based on this information EPA should rewrite its air
quality standards to assess the impacts of various combinations of
pollutants so that we will be ready next time to know how to protect
the public health.
Fifth, various governmental agencies have applied occupational
safety exposure levels for specific pollutants to those exposed to WTC
air. But there are several distinct groups of those exposed, and each
group has had distinctly different exposures:
Those working on the pile (Variables: the level of
emissions have decreased over time as the fires decreased in extent,
degree of protective respirator/masks used, amount of time spent).
Those who were caught in the initial horrendous dust
cloud, covered in dust, running away, breathing intense quantities of
dust deeply into the lungs and ingesting dust particles.
Those living in the area (Variables: level of emissions
varies depending on specific location, on weather, and length of time
since September 11th; degree of protective respirator/masks used).
Those who cleaned apartments (level of exposure varying
with amount of dust in apartment, method of cleaning, degree of
protective respirator/masks used, amount of time spent in cleaning).
Those working in the area--8 hours a day five days a week;
(Variables: degree of protective respirator/masks used).
Those at risk: children, elderly, compromised immune
systems, those with pulmonary problems are more likely to suffer more
adverse affects than others for all the above categories.
Handlers of disposed debris: shipments to India, S.
Korea--no protection for workers offloading (no knowledge of contents).
Most of these groups of exposed cannot be compared with
occupational exposure. Studies of occupational exposure assume 5 days a
week, 8 hours a day exposure to adults (healthy males?) What about
those who live there, those at risk, those caught in the initial cloud?
This requires considerable investigation, and many new standards need
to be created to address these different categories of exposure.
Sixth, entrainment of pollutant-laden fine dust is also occurring,
as we heard, by loading debris into trucks and barges. There are
standards for reducing entrainment of incinerator ash. These involve
spraying water and containment in leak-proof, covered trucks. Why
aren't we enforcing those standards? Is it because this is not an
incinerator? Shouldn't common sense dictate that the closest standards
that exist be the ones to be followed in such a case? We heard that
``guys with guns'' enforce covering of trucks--Now. But I had heard
from people who lived in the area, that the military had been enforcing
the opposite in the first weeks, when pollutant levels were highest, so
that they could check the trucks' contents. That the trucks might be
covered by leaky tarps now does not negate the exposure to residents
and workers of pollutants that were emitted earlier.
Seventh, air quality data has been selectively shared with the
public, leaving the public mistrustful. Further, the agencies waited
far too long to begin adding monitors to the area. We can only imagine
the levels of dioxin, asbestos, heavy metals, acids, other organics,
silica, etc. that was in the air while people were running from the
area. We shouldn't ignore this impact on their health. On EPA's
website, it initially listed only asbestos in air, asbestos in dust and
a gross measure of particulate matter in air. After several weeks
passed, EPA added PCB and lead. After another few weeks, a few days'
individual samples of dioxin were presented. All told, this is maybe 20
pages of information. But in a televised public forum (City Club forum
held October 26 and subsequently televised on CUNY TV), EPA said that
all of its data was online. EPA repeated this at City Council hearings
on November 1 and at State Assembly hearings later in November. Early
on, I learned that EPA had 900 pages of data, including a list of heavy
metals, dioxins and furans, acid gases, as well as those items listed.
But EPA has demanded that the Manhattan Borough President and City
Council must file Freedom of Information requests for it or else come
to the repository and look at it. I asked for an electronic copy. I was
told I was the first one to ask for it, and was told that it would not
be possible to email me the data. How could this be, since the data
surely exist on someone's computer? The Borough President's office
never filed the FOI request (since their policy is not to do so). It is
just this kind of secretive behavior that invites journalists or others
without scientific training, who do go down to view the full datasets,
to quote data selectively. If the data were freely available in a
spreadsheet, then academic, environmental, and community institutions
could have already started studies. Those who want to conduct analyses
are still unable to do so. Considering what is available online, the
datasets appear to be thin, with many pollutants missing from the
database and with only a few dates sampled for some pollutants. The
first date that dioxin data are available are 12 days after the event.
Most data are not available daily. Datasets for many pollutants are not
available at all online.
Where was EPA while thousands of New York City residents were
exposed to air pollutants from the WTC collapses? The EPA website shows
only summaries of data, when they could have made data from September
11th onwards available for Lower Manhattan. If more or earlier data is
available online, it's not easy for the public to find. EPA should make
its entire air quality archives easily available on its website as well
as those from all other sources.
Not only was EPA's secretiveness reprehensible this time, but
procedures should be put in place NOW to ensure that should anything
like this ever happen again, the environmental agencies would
immediately be meeting to coordinate comprehensive sampling and
analysis, AND prompt disclosure to the public via the internet of ALL
data along with all current and applicable standards as well as
background levels for each pollutant.
We also need to conduct research to understand toxic and
carcinogenic impacts of multiple pollutants. One method of doing this
is by conducting assays using surrogate organisms, to observe the
impacts of different pollutant combinations. Tetramitus flagellate is
one such organism that has been shown to indicate toxicity of unknown
mixtures. Dr. Robert Jaffe, of the Environmental Toxicology Laboratory,
http://www.envirolab.com/ has been pioneering work in this area.
Eighth, very little has been spoken about building codes, and how
the composition, structure, and operation of buildings contributed to
the death toll, and how revision of these regulations is needed to
prevent future deaths. When I worked on the 83rd floor of WTC 1 for a
couple of years around 1980, we didn't have fire drills very often (I
can only remember one, maybe two). When we did have drills, we were
told to walk down the stairs to the 78th floor at which point we were
told to stay put. That was the total extent of the fire drill. Is that
protective of public health? The truth is, the WTC buildings were so
tall that they were not readily evacuable. The stairways were not
designed to evacuate everyone in a reasonable amount of time. To
complicate this further, the Port Authority made announcements to go
back to their offices. They did not immediately send announcements to
everyone in both buildings to evacuate to the ground floor and leave.
Some people who had gone to the first floor returned to their offices
and lost their lives. A last point: Firefighters were coming up the
same stairwells that the thousands of office workers were using to
evacuate. This effectively halved the capacity of the stairwells for
evacuation purposes. How many people might have gotten out if they
didn't have to wait to enter a stairwell that was reduced to half its
original capacity (remembering that some of the stairwells became
impassable due to the fires themselves)? How many other tall buildings
in NYC have insufficient number of narrow stairwells? How many are not
totally evacuated during fire drills? What about those in wheelchairs
on high floors? All these questions point to the need to limit the
number of floors of new buildings to a size that can easily and
routinely be evacuated quickly, assuming that firefighters will need
space in the stairwells.
Insofar as construction of future buildings is concerned, attention
must be paid to the safety factor chosen for retarding the effect of
fire on the building's structural members. The WTC was designed to
withstand the impact of a 707 aircraft. But why wasn't it also assumed
that the 707 would be carrying thousands of gallons of jet fuel, and
that this jet fuel would cause a fire of sufficient temperature and
duration to melt the steel members? This is not a difficult mental
exercise, and structural engineers figured this out within a day or so
of having watched the floors compact. There is no room for error. If
just one floor gives way, because the steel has partially melted, the
weight of floors above comes crashing down, and the entire building
will collapse, immediately, as we saw. Note that WTC building No. 7 was
not even hit by an aircraft, but it also collapsed due to the duration
of fire. The structural engineers interviewed said that it would have
been possible to put a thicker layer of protective coating on the
structural members of the WTC, but it would have cost a little more.
How many people would have been saved if the buildings held together
for another half hour? We should learn from this disaster. Building
codes should be revisited to address all these issues and correct all
deficiencies.
Since the City Council's Environmental Protection committee held
two days of hearings (November 1 and 8), and the New York State
Assembly held hearings in late November 2001, the Senate Environment
Committee would be well served by looking at the transcripts and videos
of those presentations--particularly those presented by the public.
I'll close by drawing an analogy with the way the environmental
agencies are dealing with the public health hazard downtown. In south
Florida, where I grew up, in the 1940's, as tourism was quickly
growing, the Government kept information about hurricanes secret for
fear that too much information would hurt business, particularly the
tourist trade. Predictably, south Florida got walloped a couple of
times, and then the Government, wisely, decided to make an about-face
and become the world's experts on hurricane tracking, prediction,
alerts, mitigation and standards for evacuation of the population to
protect the public health. They established a world-class center in
Coral Gables to serve as the source of information and research. Later,
by the time I was six, I was tracking every hurricane's progress on a
chart I got for free at the 7-11 store by listening to the radio for
coordinates.
We have exactly the same situation here. There is a lot we don't
know. The Government wants to protect business and the tourist trade.
The Government has kept a great deal of information off limits to
anyone for the first several weeks, and lately it has made it difficult
to obtain in any usable form. Even worse than this is that we don't
know the long-lasting impacts of the initial huge, dense cloud of
finely pulverized asbestos and silica-laden dust on those running and
inhaling deeply in its midst. We don't know the additive and
synergistic effects of combinations of many toxic and carcinogenic
pollutants that continue to be emitted from the fires or entrained from
the dust as it blows off the rooftops and ledges. Will this exposure to
air pollution compromise immune systems, making people more vulnerable
to future illnesses or terrorist attacks? On what basis did the
Government choose a perimeter for evacuation? On what basis did they
rush to reopen the area? Have we learned anything from this experience?
Now is a time for the environmental agencies to pull their heads from
the sand, make an about-face, coordinate and release all data and
interpretive guidelines on the Web. We need to err on the side of
caution rather than seeking to go ``back to normal'' at the cost of the
public health.
The Federal Government should assist the city by committing its
funds and encouraging the Governor to seek additional Federal September
11th grants on an accelerated basis to conduct ongoing, comprehensive
surveillance of symptoms in affected populations, buy room filters for
residents, pay for proper indoor and building cleanup, research the
acute and long-term impacts on health of highly concentrated
combinations of pollutants acting for a short time, as well as elevated
levels of combinations acting for longer periods of time.
The Federal Government should write new standards to reflect short-
term exposure to high concentrations, as in the initial cloud, as well
as synergistic effects of many toxic, carcinogenic pollutants.
We also need to have contingency planning for different types of
environmental disasters as this new war against terrorism progresses.
We need to actively examine worst case scenarios and plan for them. We
need to understand how far to evacuate and for how long. This is the
only way to regain public trust. Recalling the hurricane example, and
realizing that we may not be finished with terrorism, becoming the
world's experts in environmental health disasters and being truly open
with the public is the best course of action in the long term.
recommendations
1. To investigate, quantify, substantiate, and publicize any lies,
misstatements, unpreparedness, lack of coordination, ineptitude, lack
of attention to redirecting staff, or worse that did occur in the days
and months since the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001.
The Ombudsman should investigate all apparent or actual conflicts of
interest that might have motivated agency and elected officials to make
statements or make decisions.
2. To investigate and come to conclusions on:
(a) the bases for EPA's and other elected and appointed officials'
statements as to the safety of the downtown area for reoccupancy,
(i.e., what did they know, when did they know it, who did they ask,
what agencies did they coordinate with, and on what topics--example:
when did EPA first learn about the caustic nature of the dusts from
USGS),
(b) the instructions and protective equipment tenants and landlords
were given for cleaning indoors, by which agencies, and the agency
procedures on which this was based, and
(c) the lack of attention to indoor air quality by EPA and the
agencies for months after the attacks despite precedents of EPA having
done so in other similar instances. Knowing this information should
help in designing.
(1) Improved procedures for intra- and inter-agency
communications in the event of environmental disasters.
(2) Criteria for evaluating whether an incident, be it a
natural or man-made disaster is an Environmental disaster, and
procedures for their use.
(3) Procedures for immediate, multi-pronged, and continual
communications of all information with the affected public.
(4) The standards that should be used to protect public
health. Per Cate Jenkins memo, the NYC DOH chose a standard
many orders of magnitude less protective than the one in one
million standard that EPA typically chooses.
3. To issue recommendations on EPA emergency actions in the case of
suspected environmental accidents, disasters, releases. Which Federal
Agency takes the lead in protecting public health in such a
circumstance? How do they coordinate, on what topics, and in what time
frame? How fast should they communicate and coordinate with the State
and local agencies? How is the responsibility and work to be divided?
4. To issue, publicize and widely disseminate a report combining
measures and procedures used to measure all specific pollutants from
ALL air quality and dust measurements that have been taken by EPA,
other agencies, and private companies since September 11th. It would be
helpful if this, and other reports you issue, were available for
download, and that data be available in database or excel format that
can be used in research (PDF format cannot).
5. To characterize and quantify the extent to which the public's
health has been adversely affected (those working on the pile, those
living/working in the area, children, elderly, immune-depressed, short-
and long-term) by the air pollution from the WTC attacks, or at least
make detailed recommendations of who should research this.
6. To seek to make the overall results of extensive medical tests
(baseline and continuing) being done on the entire group NYC fire-
fighters to become public.
7. To make determine and make recommendations on how much money is
necessary to examine and conduct long-term follow-up on all those
exposed to air pollution and dusts from the September 11th attacks, and
from where the source of funding might come, and seek increased Federal
funding to cover these costs.
8. To recommend that the National Academy of Sciences conduct a
risk assessment of the public health impacts due to the air pollution
caused by the September 11th attacks.
9. To ensure that guidance is disseminated to all physicians and
hospitals in the area to look for and properly treat those exposed to
WTC air. According to Mt. Sinai February 4, 2002 memo to help
physicians determine whether pulmonary symptoms are related to WTC,
some symptoms from exposure can begin as late as 3 weeks after exposure
or cessation of exposure. If physicians have to be given guidance on
these issues, many of those exposed are likely not to realize their
symptoms are WTC-related. Why didn't the city, State or Federal
government issue this memo in September? Efforts are not being made to
locate all those who were exposed and to characterize their exposures
and register their symptoms over time.
10. To recommend and publicize specific measures that need to be
taken immediately to clean up the downtown area of dangerous dusts and
to prevent the continuous reentrainment and spread of these dusts from
the Ground Zero area into surrounding areas.
11. To investigate existing EPA standards and procedures to see
whether standards required to prevent, control, or remediate
environmental contamination in environmental disasters, accidents, or
releases were not used to prevent, control or remediate pollution in
this case (and why). Example: to prevent the spread of incinerator ash
when it is transported from its source to a landfill, Federal
regulations requires that the generating (and intermediate handling)
facility be enclosed and operated with negative air pressure, that the
ash is totally wetted, that trucks transporting ash be entirely
containerized and sealed to prevent entrainment or leaking onto the
ground, and that receiving facilities operate under similar
constraints. Despite the fact that the debris from the WTC has the
consistency and many properties of incinerator ash, leaky, imperfectly
covered trucks are continuously scattering the debris between Ground
Zero and the barge at Pier 25. Why aren't existing protective
procedures being used? Steps need to be taken (i.e., legislation) to
ensure that in all future environmental disasters, the entire array of
existing procedures be canvassed and that the most protective
procedures appropriate to the situation be utilized.
12. To develop and recommend what measurements need to be taken in
the event of an environmental release, accident or disaster, and how
the measuring stations should be deployed and operated. It is
unconscionable that data taken early on is still dribbling out from the
Federal Government--e.g., Two samples that were taken inside a high-
rise apartment and in a gymnasium across from the wreckage of the World
Trade Center had a pH of 11.8 to 12.1--equivalent to what would be
found in liquid drain cleaner. It is clear that stations were not
deployed in concentric rings around Ground Zero were not done, and few
of the measuring stations were in the predominant downwind areas. It is
clear that many measurements were ``grab'' samples, only for 5 or 6
minutes. Since the wind direction and speed varies, it is necessary to
have continuous, long-term samples looking both for long-term averages
and for short-term spikes.
13. To recommend measures that need to be taken immediately to
remediate the public health impacts resulting from inhalation and
ingestion of polluted air. First we need to identify Everyone who was
in the area at the time of the attacks, including the pile and
enforcement workers, those who have lived or worked in the area, those
who have been hired to clean up apartments and businesses. Then we need
to get medical histories to construct a baseline (a Registry). The
exposure should be quantified, first by location during each day of the
pollution period, and then by the type of activities performed--those
breathing heavily due to working on the pile, running for one's life,
etc. involves an increased exposure due to more forceful inhalation
(more air and particles brought deeper into the lungs, allowing the
possibility for more to be retained long-term in the lung. This study
and ongoing medical examinations and treatments, for all diseases that
should arise, should be performed, at Federal expense, for a period of
20 or 30 years.
14. To investigate the procedures underway at Fresh Kills
landfill--are they protective of workers, what is the airborne
dispersion of dangerous materials. Procedures at the barge should also
be investigated; are workers wearing protective gear? Are materials
being well-contained?
15. To investigate the disposal and marketing of WTC debris and
recyclable steel--has testing been done to quantify whether this is a
hazardous waste, and should be transported and handled under those
rules? If it is hazardous waste, is the facility that has been selected
for the debris, consistent with Federal or State rules? To the extent
that scrap steel or other materials are exported to other countries
(e.g. steel that has already gone to India and S. Korea), has EPA or
any other Federal or other agency advised those on the receiving end
about the composition of the materials, or protective handling
procedures? This isn't the first time a company or municipality in the
United States has exported toxic waste to another country without
proper advice or precautions, and it won't be the last. There should be
a law.
16. To encourage research into and adoption of more protective
building codes (less toxic materials, evacuable buildings, better fire
drill and practice evacuations, better, more well-thought out
announcement systems during emergencies. It is arguable that many
people died in stairwells too small to evacuate everyone, especially
since their capacity was reduced by half due to firefighters climbing
them at the same time. It is arguable that some died when they heard
Port Authority announcements to go back to their offices. Could the
buildings be built with fewer toxics?
17. If the U.S. Attorney General's statements can be taken at face
value, we can expect worse terrorist attacks in the future. It is not
unlikely that any future attacks will involve some degree of
environmental contamination. Many scenarios for future attacks would
involve some of the same issues as are being dealt with here (indoor
contamination, removal, not just wetting of outdoor contamination). In
addition to terrorist attacks, environmental disasters can and have
occurred in other ways: industrial accidents, natural disasters (e.g.,
major earthquakes in urban areas, tornadoes, fires, hurricanes).
Utilizing my knowledge of geology, it is a 100 percent certainty that
major west coast cities will suffer even greater destruction
(collapses, fires) than they have already due to larger earthquakes in
the future. We just can't reliably predict when. Therefore, many of
these recommendations will be useful in protecting public health after
future disasters.
18. There are no uniform, justifiable procedures for determining
the evacuation of nearby populations after an environmental disaster,
therefore, we are woefully unprepared for any environmental disasters
in the future. This time, the ``frozen zone'' was not based on specific
scientific principles, and neither was the timing of allowing people to
return. We should learn from the experience with establishing hurricane
evacuation routes, and the procedures taken to order evacuations for
approaching hurricanes. As important, it is necessary to develop
justifiable procedures for repopulation after an environmental disaster
(i.e., the testing that needs to be done, the verification that safe
conditions exist).
19. For these reasons, and similar to the decision to establish a
National Hurricane Research Center in Coral Gables (when it was
realized that we didn't know how to track, predict, evacuate or
minimize impacts of hurricanes), we need to establish a permanent
Environmental Disaster Research center dedicated to conducting all the
research that was needed prior to now to determine and address the
synergistic and other impacts on human health of various types of
environmental disasters. Examples of research would include
investigating the impacts of combinations of pollutants that we have
observed in this case. Other areas for research, development, and
demonstration would be the measurement technologies for screening for
unknown combinations of pollutants, as Dr. Robert Jaffe has developed.
This research should then be used to develop new air quality standards
to address impacts from combinations of pollutants. Results of the
research conducted at this facility would be invaluable to the Congress
and those writing air quality, emissions, occupational safety, and
NESHAP standards at EPA.
______
Attachment 1
[From CorpWatch, February 6, 2002]
Trading in Disaster
(By Nityanand Jayaraman and Kenny Bruno)
world trade center scrap lands in india, indian citizens group protests
wtc scrap, potential contaminants in world trade center debris
CHENNAI and NEW YORK--It might seem like a tangent to the tragedy
of the Sept 11th attacks: the fate of the thousands of tons of steel
that formed the twin towers. As with so many other unwanted materials
from the United States, more than 30,000 tons of steel scrap--possibly
contaminated with asbestos.
PCBs, cadmium, mercury and dioxins--has been exported to India and
other parts of Asia. Though the risks from the scrap are probably not
on the order of the health threats at Ground Zero, the United States
nevertheless has the obligation to ensure that toxic contamination from
the World Trade Center is not exported to other nations.
mysterious shipments
At least one shipload, onboard a vessel named Brozna, landed in the
South Indian port city of Chennai in early January. The scrap was
unloaded, as any routine consignment would be, by port workers with
absolutely no protection. Two other ships, Shen Quan Hai and Pindos,
also reported to be carrying World Trade Center scrap berthed and
offloaded their cargo in Chennai. But preliminary investigations failed
to reveal documentation linking the cargo to the Trade Center. Reports
are vague about another shipment making its way into Northern India
through the Western port city of Kandla.
Similar shipments have reportedly reached China, where Baosteel
Group purchased 50,000 tons of the potentially toxic scrap. Malaysia
and South Korea are also reported to have received shipments.
Eventually, most of the 1.5 millions tons of scrap from the cleanup may
end up dirtying Asian ports and threatening Asian workers.
Few details are known about who purchased the scrap, but an
unidentified Indian trader reportedly bought an undisclosed amount of
the World Trade Center debris, and the 33,000 ton shipment onboard the
Brozna was collected by Chennai-based Sabari Exim Pvt. Ltd. and removed
to the company's facilities outside the city.
Nor are the names of U.S.-based traders who may have exported the
shipments to India known. However, two New Jersey companies were among
the bidders that won the contract for removing more than 60,000 tons of
Trade Center scrap. New Jersey-based Metal Management Northeast, bought
40,000 tons and Hugo Neu Schnitzer, based outside Jersey City, bought
25,000 tons. Schnitzer was reportedly eyeing the Southeast Asian
markets, possibly Malaysia, where prices are higher.
public health concerns from tribeca to chennai
In this case, it is hard to accuse the United States of double
standards because U.S. safety regulations were trampled in the chaos
over Ground Zero. In Lower Manhattan, thousands of rescue workers and
residents have been exposed daily to unknown but significant dangers
from air contamination. Hundreds of New York firefighters are filing to
go on permanent disability, while serious respiratory infections and
other chronic health problems afflict area residents, especially
children. A few days after the attacks, even President Bush stood on
the rubble without protective gear, joining the rest of a city too
shocked and too busy to take proper precautions against the toxic cloud
over Manhattan.
The steel scrap imported by India and China may not represent the
same level of health threat as Ground Zero. But given the amount of
material involved, and the short time frame for any decontamination
process, it is indeed possible that the steel is contaminated with
toxic materials.
In the months after the bombing reports surfaced about the presence
of toxic contamination at Ground Zero, including poisons such as
dioxins, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), cadmium, mercury, asbestos
and lead in the debris. What remains in question is whether toxic
chemicals have attached themselves to the steel scrap.
There are no safe levels of exposure to cancer-causing substances
like asbestos, PCBs and dioxins, and toxic metals like cadmium, mercury
and lead. Asbestos, PCBs and dioxins may cause harm even in miniscule
doses. Also, like cadmium and mercury, once ingested or inhaled, they
resist degradation or excretion and tend to build up to dangerous
levels in the body over the long run.
Insurance companies like American International Group and Liberty
Mutual have refused coverage to the demolition contractors charged with
the cleanup. The contractors fear that without insurance they will be
driven into bankruptcy by an anticipated flood of lawsuits over
asbestos, mercury and other toxins released into the air by the
collapse of the twin towers and clean-up efforts, according to the New
York Times.
not enough information
Contamination of steel scrap is a common concern in the scrap
industry. As far as CorpWatch has been able to determine, U.S.
authorities have not studied the levels of contaminants in the Trade
Center scrap that was exported. If they have, the information has not
reached Indian authorities or port workers.
Trade union groups swiftly moved into action when the exports were
reported last month, but were hamstrung by the lack of information.
``The Port Authorities tell us that steel scrap is legal. Unless we
find evidence of contamination, we can't stop the shipment,'' said S.R.
Kulkarni, secretary of the Mumbai-based All India Port & Dock Workers
Union.
Nor has the information been forthcoming in the United States. The
New York Environmental Law and Justice Project recently filed a Freedom
of Information Act request with the USEPA after U.S. public health
activists suspected regulatory officials were downplaying the toxic
contamination in and around Ground Zero.
However, Chennai-based lawyer T. Mohan says there's enough doubt
raised about the safety of the debris to warrant precautionary steps.
``There were talks to declare Ground Zero a Superfund site. That's
proof enough for us to be concerned that this consignment may be
contaminated,'' he noted.
who's responsible?
Under the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste, it falls to the Indian Government to prevent the
import of wastes if they are found hazardous. That's because the United
States refuses to sign the Basel Convention and is therefore not bound
by the treaty. This includes an amendment know as the Basel Ban
prohibiting developed countries from exporting hazardous material to
industrializing nations like India. But Mohan believes that morally,
``the burden of proving [the waste] is not hazardous rests with the
U.S. exporters and U.S. Government.''
Despite a Indian Supreme Court order prohibiting the imports of
hazardous waste into India, U.S. shipments top the list of hazardous
waste exports to India. Everything from zinc ash, toxic ships-for-scrap
and lead-bearing wastes are routinely sent to unscrupulous importers in
India. The Indian regulatory agencies, notably the port and customs
authorities and the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, have
maintained their habitual silence on matters such as this that pertain
to human health and environment.
``They seem more intent on passing the buck to each other rather
than dealing with the problem and hauling in the U.S. Government for
negligence,'' says Attorney Mohan.
Steel reprocessing is a dirty business, especially when the steel
contains plastic, chemical and heavy metal contaminants. In fact,
secondary steel almost always contains some toxic materials. Lower
wages and laxer environmental regulations in Asian countries mean that
Asian traders and reprocessors can offer better prices for the steel
scrap than their European or North American counterparts. That is one
of the reasons why scrap metal is exported to Asia in the first place.
The export of contaminated scrap and hazardous wastes to
industrializing countries fits a long-standing pattern of environmental
discrimination by the United States. An infamous example is the
shipload of toxic incinerator ash from Philadelphia that traveled the
oceans for 2 years before ending up on a beach in Haiti in 1988.
In a February 4 letter to the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, three
major Indian trade unions, Greenpeace and People's Union for Civil
Liberties blasted the U.S. Government for its ``continued inaction'' in
stemming the export of wastes and scrap to industrializing countries.
They called it ``a consistent pattern in keeping with USA's tacit, if
not active, support for toxic trade.''
``We're totally opposed to the United States and other rich
countries using India as a dumping ground for all kinds of wastes and
rejects. Such dumping of steel scrap is adversely affecting the major
steel plants in our country, apart from causing environment and health
problems,'' says P.K. Ganguly, the New Delhi-based Secretary of Centre
of Indian Trade Unions.
The way out of the current bind over the World Trade Center scrap
is simple, say environmentalists. United States authorities should
provide evidence that the scrap lying in India is free of poisonous
contaminants. If the it is found to be contaminated, then immediate
steps should be taken to return the consignment to the United States.
If, on the other hand, the shipment is found clean, there may be no
immediate threat of exposure to toxic chemicals. Even if the scrap
turns out not to be dangerous, the question remains: who profits--and
who suffers--from shipping valuable steel scrap to be recycled half-way
across the globe in India before it returns to the United States in its
new incarnation as soup cans or luxury cars?
Nityanand Jayaraman is an independent, investigative reporter based
in India.
Kenny Bruno coordinates CorpWatch's Corporate-Free UN Campaign.
__________
Statement of David J. Miller, Burlington, VT
Military Jet Fuel (JP-4) and Its Possible Implication on Public Health
At this time I know of no other paper that has drawn a broad review
regarding benzene, toluene, xylene, hexane and their metabolites with
regard to petroleum products like (military) JP-4 jet fuel and the
implication to public health now and in the future.
If one reviews the literature on benzene it goes back to the
beginning of the 20th century and continues today, however for those
parties benzene affected the most, they have little or no idea of its
danger or its causation. Their life and quality of health being
affected the most.
Some may view this presentation with a meta analysis argument,
however my fundamental motive is edification, bringing about dialogue
even debate, illuminating issues, establishing proper measures
appropriate for a remedy.
introduction
Physicians acknowledge benzene's effect on bone marrow immune
system and the CNS, however by taking an analytical approach one could
ignore the synergism of the exposure due to a lack of proficiency in
occupational and environmental medicine.
To assist in achieving that goal I choose military (JP-4) jet fuel
due to its composition and wide use during the 1950's, 1960's, 1970's
and part of the 1980's.
background
``During the distillation of crude oil to make JP-3 and JP-4 a wide
cut is take of the distillate so as to include both the naptha
(gasoline) and kerosene fraction, JP-4 is typically composed of about
50-60 percent gasoline and the remainder is kerosene1. Now
with almost 50 years since JP-4 being standardized under MIL-F-
5624A1.'' It's clear (with the body of information presented
in (ATSDR) Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Publication
Toxicological Profile for JP-4 and JP-7 June 1995, henceforth to be
referred to as the profile) a serious balance review must be initiated
due to JP-4's composition of hydro-carbons to include (additives)
itemized with generic identification, Page 70. Note aromatic hydro-
carbons are concentrations in weight percent, Pages 72, 73, 74.
concerns: (the profile)2
Page 3 1.3 (How might one be exposed to jet fuel JP-4 and JP-7?)
``Workers involved in making or transporting or in refueling military
aircraft that use JP-4 might breath air containing it.''
Page 38 2.4 Relevance to public health ``thus apart from those
individuals involved in the manufacturing process, persons living or
working near or on a military base would constitute the greatest
population at risk for JP-4 and JP-7 exposure.''
To digress, if those concerns apply to JP-4 and JP-7 then similar
situations would warrant the same attention due to possible evaporation
from petroleum storage tank farms and emissions due to transfer of
product JP-4 etc. from point of transport truck, rail or barge without
vapor recovery systems.
Although vapor recovery systems are being installed, the question
of (past exposure) and those most likely at risk identified in the
profile need to be addressed more fully to expand those factors for
occupational and residential exposure. Example Machle3
writes in (Chronic Intoxication), ``This term is applied to poisoning
which results from exposure to low concentrations of gasoline vapor for
long periods of time; severe acute symptoms do not appear, but minor
symptoms of a general nature are manifested a few weeks or months after
the exposure has started and become progressively worse, the patient
may become disabled in a month or in several years.'' The implications
are profound if the exposure is compounded, Goldstein4. As
Toranosuke Ishimaru5 articulates here, ``the six occupations
noted at a higher frequency among the index cases than in the controls
in Table 4 were selected for an examination in more detail of the
relation of occupational exposure and A-BOMB exposure (Table 7) note
relationship between occupational exposure to benzene or medical x-ray
occupations and atomic bomb exposure status; frequency of history of 6
selected occupations. Continuing--in general, the risk was
approximately 5 times higher among those with a history of any of these
six occupations in comparison with those without. The relative risks in
the proximal group and in the distal and non-exposed group were 6.0 and
4.5, respectively.''
Continuing with the profiles concern of risk to handlers we then
can review Lindquist, R.6 ``Our results indicate a three-
fold increase risk of developing leukemia for professional drivers who
are exposed to petroleum products, i.e., gasoline or diesel and their
motor exhausts, our findings support previous work suggesting an
increased risk of acute non-lymphocytic leukemia after occupational
exposure to petroleum products (3)''. From a public health perspective
we can no longer ignore past exposure only because of present and
future implication and that impact on society.
To reinforce those concerns of previous risk, Pier Alberto
Bertazzi7 reports, ``the most distinctive pattern of
increased cancer mortality seemed to be the one observed in association
with moving operations. Significant excess mortality from all cancers,
lung cancer and brain tumors was noted.'' (Continuing further) ``The
greatest opportunity for exposure to volatile hydrocarbons occurred
during the loading operation, which required the manual connection of
all filler pipes to the trucks and train tanks and manual measurements
of product levels in tanks.''
``In addition, workers were exposed while staying at the filling
platform especially during the hot season, to volatiles coming from
open tanks of standing trucks, and trains.''
Now there's an obligation to ask at what levels do these
hydrocarbons have a genotoxic effect on those exposed? Ralph I.
Nilsson8 established these thoughts. ``The results at
different exposure levels indicate that even a low level exposure to
benzene possibly in combination with other compounds in gasoline, may
cause a genotoxic effect (Table 111, V.) as both tests measure damage
to DNA. Our findings indicate a genotoxic effect at benzene exposure
levels of around 0.1 ppm.''
The before mentioned citations demonstrate the danger to individual
workers; however we must readdress (the profile's) community concerns
with more clarity. This can be accomplished by reviewing E.G.
Knox9. ``The apparent hazards included oil refineries oil
storage and distribution depots, railway lines, and other industrial
sites. Effective ranges extended as far as 5km from the sources. This
suggested a hazard related to large scale uses of fossil fuels,
especially petroleum, operating through leakage or evaporation or
combustion, perhaps all three.''
Benzene, toluene, hexane, xylene and lead have been identified in
(the Profile)2 on Page 3, Paragraph 2. ``When they enter the
environment as part of jet fuel they may behave the same way as when
they are released alone.'' That being the case, one is compelled to at
least review some of those complications associated with those
chemicals and their metabolites.
review
In the formulation of this review, I've adhered to scientific
discipline, balanced with objectivity. That mosaic, if you will, began
to focus on a perspective that was more widespread than I had
anticipated regarding occupation, exposure and illness. This all
crescendoed while doing a literature search that directed this author
to a paper which Lesley Rushton11 had written and made
reference to ``a proportional mortality study of all deaths over a 10-
year period in New Hampshire found high proportional mortality ratios
(PMR's) for service station workers for leukemia, suicide, emphysema
and mental conditions.''
Once again this odyssey has been punctuated with an intriguing
citation. This was of great interest only because I had to travel to
Britain by paper to learn what had transpired in my own back yard. The
excitement was soon tempered by the sheer dynamics of the report!
Eugene Schwartz10, M.D. MPH states in the report, ``Further
the finding of an excess proportion of deaths from suicide in both
groups is consistent with the known neurotoxic potential of solvent
exposure. Acute exposure to solvents may produce transient and
reversible central nervous system symptoms including headache,
dizziness, and incoordination. At higher concentrations convulsions,
loss of consciousness, and death may result. Long-term exposure to
solvents can result in memory impairment and behavioral changes,
including irritability, depressive symptoms, and emotional stability.
Gasoline is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons blended with a
combination of additives including antiknock agents, inhibitors, and
dyes, of the more than 40 components, most are paraffins, naphthenes,
aromatics, and olefins. The benzene content of gasoline is between 1
percent and 3 percent by volume and is higher in unleaded than in
leaded fuels (McDermott and Voss, 1979)''. Further on, ``recent data
indicate that gasoline vapor may be carcinogenic apart from its benzene
component.'' (Note: JP-4 is 50 to 60 percent gasoline).
Individuals subjected to benzene and other compounds should be
instructed of the quantitative risk associated with the nature of their
exposure in order that appropriate medical protocol may be established
for present and future assessment and care. Once those parties are
instructed of the dangers of exposure, they can immediately take steps
needed to lessen the burden on the already stressed (MFO) mixed
functioned oxidases process.
``Benzene is converted to toxic metabolites mostly mixed function
oxidases MFO in the liver and bone marrow. MFO-inducing drugs (e.g.,
phenobarbital, alcohol) and certain chemicals (e.g., chlordane,
parathion) may increase the rate at which toxic metabolites of benzene
are formed. Theoretically persons with rapid synthesizing marrows, the
fetus, infants and children, persons with hemolytic anemia or with
agranulocytosis are at increased risk12. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) classifies benzene as a Group A carcinogen and
has estimated that a lifetime exposure to 0.004 PPM benzene in air will
result in, at most, 1 additional case of leukemia in 10,000 people
exposed. (EPA risk estimates assume there is no threshold for benzene's
carcinogenic effects.)''
An interesting characteristic of petroleum hydrocarbons, (in
relationship to the MFO process) is a seemingly kindling effect to
addiction. Yasuhiro Takeuchi13 writes, ``Lasarew (1929)
reported that the narcotic effect of petroleum hydrocarbons became
stronger as the number of carbon atoms became larger, and that aromatic
hydrocarbons had stronger narcotic effects than paraffins.''
Harrington14 says, ``The well-recognized acute narcotic
effect of organic solvents has recently led various researchers to
suggest that a chronic neuroasthenic syndrome can follow repeated low
doses. Some workers, mainly in Scandinavia, postulated that organic
psychoses can ensue from such exposure.'' (Axelson et al, 1980).
To expand on these two points of view, its clear a demonstration
would be needed to indicate tissue reaction. That evidence was
articulated by J.M. de Gandarias.15 ``A dense accumulation
of enkephalin immunoreactive fibers was seen in the basal portion of
the lateral septal nucleus and the densest accumulation of enkephalin-
containing processes was observed in the globus pallidus, ansa
lenticularis and amygdaloid complex, forming a continuous field
extending over these areas. This enkephalinergic distribution is
coincident with previous reports (Akil et al, 1984; Zamir et al, 1985).
(Continuing further) ``The limbic systems is usually affected by
organic solvents exposure and it has been demonstrated that aromatic
hydrocarbons can cause behavioral changes in mood and even (addiction).
This is the case for the largely studied ``glue sniffers'' (Schikler et
al, 1982; Lazar et al, 1983).
The hypothesis I bring forth now is, could benzene be the
underlying catalyst that stimulates addiction on most levels, drug and
alcohol, and if so an uncorrected condition would create a cycle
difficult to break. Could elevated ambient air levels of benzene be a
new facet of concern, ever stressing the MFO process in relationship to
addiction?
reference: benzene, toluene, hexane, xylene and lead
I have (emphasis, real concern) with past exposure to JP-4 and
those particular chemicals incorporated into the formula only because
of existing documentation and possible public health consequences.
Example: Benzene: and Breast Tumor Tissue
Gregory G. Oakley16 writes , ``In addition, studies have
demonstrated the copper-dependent oxidation of chemically similar
structures, e.g., hydroquinone and 3-hydroxyestradiol, metabolites of
benzene and 17B-Estradiol, respectively, to reactive intermediates that
induce oxidative DNA damage (19, 20). This pattern of genotoxicity is
similar to that reported in the DNA of human breast tumor tissue 21).''
It would seem the point of concern here could be either primary
(occupational) or secondary exposure expressed as ambient air
concentrations from automobiles, trucks, buses, trains, and domestic
exposure, for example, gasoline powered lawn or recreational equipment,
combined with alcohol or another substance that would place extra
burden on the MFO process.
N-Hexane, Xylene and Toluene and Occupational Exposure
Katsuyuki Murata117 examines workers exposed to n-
hexane, xylene and toluene and writes, ``The C-CV rsa reflects the
activity in the parasympathetic nervous system (Pagani et al, 1986,
Hayano et al, 1990a, 1991, Ewing, 1992). Organic solvents, therefore,
may affect the CV rr through depression of parasympathetic activity.''
olfactory and causation
At this juncture it would be appropriate to explore a (reactive
route) of toxic exposure, the olfactory pathway and its implication on
health. Robert Ader18 states, ``Even before sympathetic
innervation of lymphoid tissues was recognized, it was known that
lesions of the brain, especially the hypothalamus and limbic systems,
had immunological consequences''18, (further on), ``Medical
or posterior hypothalamic lesions are associated with reduced numbers T
and B cells and enhanced allograft rejection.''
Claudia Miller19, M.D., M.S. has presented these
thoughts, ``The olfactory nerves provide the most direct link between
the outside chemical environment and the brain. There is no blood-brain
barrier where these nerves enter the brain as there is for other
portions of the brain. The olfactory nerves communicate directly with
the limbic portion of the brain, the so-called ``primitive smell
brain.'' This brain area is essential for laying down new memories
(hippocampus) and regulates mood (amygdala). In addition, it supplies
much of the input to the hypothalamus, which in turn regulates
autonomic nervous system and endocrine function. Temperature
regulation, smooth muscle tone and appetitive behaviors are influenced
by hypothalamic output. For many chemically sensitive patients and Gulf
Veterans, mood and memory difficulties are their most disabling
symptoms. The possibility exists that such symptoms could be triggered
by extraordinarily low level chemical exposures and that sensitivity
could spread to chemically unrelated substances as a consequence of
limbic sensitization or partial kindling.''
examples of associated toxic exposure
As the profile2 previously indicated, handlers and
persons living in proximity of operational activity are of concern;
page 3 addresses those chemical elements and their behavior. ``We have
some information on several chemicals found in jet fuel (for example,
benzene, toluene, hexane, xylene and lead). We know more about what
happens to them when they enter the environment as individual
chemicals. When they enter the environment as part of jet fuel, they
may behave the same way as when they are released alone.''
These chemicals, being heavier than air, are capable of having an
intrusive effect on workers or populations via ambient inhalation.
Remembering Knox9, ``Effective ranges are extended as far as
5KM from the sources. This suggested a hazard related to large scale
uses of fossil fuels, especially petroleum, operating through leakage
or evaporation or combustion, perhaps all three.'' James W. Tetrud,
M.D.20 narrates a case study of an individual and petroleum
ingestion. He states, ``There is little doubt that the relatively small
quantity of ingested petroleum waste caused this individual's
Parkinsonism. The temporal relationship between ingestion of the
substance and subsequent emergence of parkinsonism is clear-cut.''
(Further on), ``In another report, Pezzoli et all described a case of
Parkinsonism in a leather worker chronically exposed to n-hexane.''
Pezzoli's21 report states, ``Since n-hexane is the substance
to which the patient had been mostly exposed, a possible toxic action
of this volatile hydrocarbon, alone or associated with the other glue
compounds and capable of inducing signs of Parkinsonism has to be
considered.''
conclusion
There seems to be sufficient documentation that suggest petroleum
produces causation, however that's little solace to anyone at risk and
develops symptoms.
Without doubt the many sequels following petroleum exposure can
have an exhausting effect on both patient, (family), and physician, due
to the many symptoms and changing protocols. A team strategy with
expanded expertise would benefit not only the patient directly, but
also reassure family members that appropriate clinical direction had
been taken.
references
1. History of aviation fuel development in the United States--AFRL/
PRSF.
2. Toxicological profile for jet fuels (JP-4 and JP-7), Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
3. Gasoline Intoxication, Willard Machle, M.D. Cincinnati, Volume
117, Number 23, Jour A.M.A., Dec. 6, 1941.
4. Goldstein, M.D. 11 Benzene Toxicity-Occupational Medicine, State
of the Art Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, July-September 1988.
5. Occupational factors in the epidemiology of leukemia in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Toranosuke Ishimaru, American Journal of
Epidemiology (Received for publication July 20, 1970) Copyright by
Johns Hopkins University, 1971, Vol. 93, 157-165.
6. Acute leukemia in professional drivers exposed to gasoline and
diesel. Lindquist R. EUR J. Haemtol 1991: 98-103.
7. Mortality study of cancer risk among oil refinery workers, Pier
Alberto Bertazzi. Int Arch Occup Environ Health (1989), Int Arch Occup
Environ Health, 1989, 61:261-270.
8. Genotoxic effects in workers exposed to low levels of benzene
from gasoline. Ralph I Nilsson. American Journal of Industrial Medicine
30:317-324 (1996).
9. Hazard proximities of childhood cancer in Great Britain from
1953-80. EG Knox. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 1997;
51;151-159.
10. Proportionate mortality ratio analysis of automobile mechanics
and gasoline service station workers in New Hampshire, Eugene Schwartz,
M.D. MPH: American Journal of Industrial Medicine 12:91-99 (1987).
11. A 39-year follow-up of the U.K. oil refinery and distribution
center studies: results for kidney cancer and leukemia. Lesley Rushton.
Environmental Health Perspectives Supplements 101 (Suppl. 6):77-84
(1993).
12. ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry #11 Case
Studies in Environmental Medicine Benzene Toxicity, October 1992.
13. Polyneuropathy Caused by Petroleum Benzene, Vasuhiro Takeuchi
Int. Arch. Arbeitsmed.34, 185-197 (1975).
14. Health experience of workers in petroleum manufacturing and
distribution industry: A review of the literature J. Malcolm
Harrington, American Journal of Industrial Medicine 12:475-497 (1987).
15. Brain met-enkephalin immunostaining after subacute and
subchronic exposure to benzene, J.M. de Gandarias Bull. Environ.
Contam. Toxicol. (1994) 52:163-170.
16. Oxidative DNA damage induced by activation of polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs): Implications for PCB-induced oxidative stress in
breast cancer, Gregory G. Oakley--Chem. Res. Toxicol., 1996, 9, 1285-
1292.
17. Changes in autonomic function as determined by ECG R-R interval
variability in Sandal, shoe and leather workers exposed to n-hexane,
xylene and toluene, Katsuyuki Murata, Neuro Toxicology 15 (4):867-876,
1994.
18. Psychoneuroimmunology: Interactions between the nervous system
and the immune system: Robert Ader Review Article, The Lancet vol. 345,
January 14, 1995.
19. Invited presentation NIH workshop on the Persian Gulf
experience and health, April 27-29, 1994, National Institutes of
Health--Claudia S. Miller, M.D., MS UTHSC-San Antonio-Multiple chemical
sensitivity and the Gulf War veterans.
20. Parkinsonism caused by petroleum waste ingestion, James W.
Tetrud, M.D.-Neurology 1994; 44:1051-1054.
21. Parkinsonism due to n-hexane exposure, G. Pezzoli The Lancet,
October 7, 1989.
Statement of Maureen Silverman, Tenant of Independence Plaza, Co-
Founder of The WTC Environmental Coalition, Member of WTC Spot Light on
The Poor, and Co-Chair of the Outreach and Education Committee of New
York City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning
My name is Maureen Silverman and I am a tenant of Independence
Plaza and Co-Founder of The WTC Environmental Coalition and Co-Chair of
the Outreach and Education Committee of New York City Coalition to End
Lead Poisoning. I will first begin by conveying the environmental
problems at Independence Plaza. Independence Plaza is a Mitchell Lama
development located five blocks from the WTC which has over 1,300
apartments with approximately 4,000-5,000 tenants. We are one of the
few racially and economically diverse complexes in Lower Manhattan.
During the week of September 11th, one of the three buildings in our
complex was evacuated for two weeks. Many tenants in the other
buildings voluntarily evacuated because of the danger we were faced
with. I live on Harrison Street, which is down the street from the
barge WTC clean-up operation at Pier 25. Since September 11th, my
neighbors in all three of our buildings have been kept up all night by
the thunderous noise of the barge and have been subjected to the
environmental contaminants released from it. From our windows we can
view the dust and debris released from the site and still witness
inconsistent watering down and covering of the debris. Numerous tenants
have developed chronic respiratory problems, nose bleeds, sore throats
and skin rashes. The recurring noise from the barge has exacerbated the
trauma many tenants experienced from the WTC attack. Although the
Commissioner of DEP claimed at the Clinton hearing on February 11th
that DEP ensured that all indoor buildings were tested and thoroughly
cleaned before people moved back, my landlord did not test and clean
310 Greenwich Street before the evacuated tenants returned. Our
landlord only did random testing for asbestos in our complex over 2
months after September 11th. They used a non-aggressive testing method,
which industrial hygienists informed us is not effective. There has not
been testing for any contaminants other than asbestos, in our entire 3
building complex, despite the host of toxins released from the WTC and
our close proximity to the barge. The ducts in our complex have also
not been tested. Although many of our terraces have been permeated with
dust from the WTC, the landlord claims he has is not responsible to
clean or test these areas. The roof tops are still covered with debris
and have not been cleaned.
Many tenants report that outside dust continuously enters and
covers their apartments and they are afraid of the contaminants they
are being exposed to. Maintenance staff are not consistently vacuuming
with HEPA vacuum cleaners and have not been trained in safe cleaning
methods in the aftermath of September 11th. Our landlord informed us
that they applied to FEMA for assistance with further testing and
cleaning, but were denied because the EPA told them the air is safe.
I was appalled by DEP Commissioner Miele's contention at the
Clinton hearing about the great job DEP has done in ensuring that all
indoor spaces were tested and cleaned to the utmost safety in the
aftermath of September 11th. A few days after The Clinton hearing I
took him up on his recommendation to call the DEP Help line if testing
and cleaning has not been done. When I called the help line I was told
that they only address water and sewer problems. I subsequently
reported this to the Commissioner's office and was referred to the
Bureau of Environmental Compliance. After being referred to several
different people at this office, I was told someone would call back and
take the complaint. All of these people said they were not sure what
DEP would inspect for or test for etc. After I asked for and reached a
supervisor and told him I was in touch with the Commissioner's Office
and attended the Clinton hearing, he told me DEP would send an
inspector to my apartment the next day. He said they generally only
inspect and test for asbestos. However, he said in light of the
circumstances, they would start by inspecting and testing for asbestos
and may be able to test for other contaminants later on. He also said
they would inspect and test the inside of my apartment, my terrace and
the roof. When the inspector came to my apartment, he said he knew I
was the one who called the Commissioner's Office and was at the Clinton
hearing. He quickly looked around the apartment and terrace and told me
DEP is not responsible for anything inside of apartments and the only
thing he would do is tell the landlord to clean the terrace. He also
said they did not address roof tops. Since last Saturday, my terrace
has not been cleaned and no one from DEP called about the situation. I
subsequently called a supervisor at the DEP Bureau of Compliance to
report the inept response from the inspector and was told someone would
get back to me. As of today, no one from DEP has called back. It was
obvious that DEP quickly sent someone to my apartment to appease me
because of the political circumstances, and did nothing to protect my
home. Unfortunately, many tenants of Independence Plaza have moved out
in the last 5 months because of the environmental hazards we are facing
and the total neglect of government agencies to hear our concerns or
protect us. IPN Tenants Association and individual tenants have written
numerous letters and have called government agencies about the unsafe
and noisy barge operation to no avail.
The tenants association invited FEMA, DOH, DEP, DEC, the CDC to our
complex to hear tenants concerns and answer questions. These agencies
promised to address our concerns several months ago and have yet to do
so. We were told several months ago that the city would start using low
sulfur fuels and truck retrofits to trap diesel emissions by February 1
and this has not happened. We have been promised that the city would
ensure that the barge is operated safety and noise would be reduced.
This has yet to transpire.
At the end of September, I co-founded the WTC Emergency
Environmental Group (now the WTC Environmental Coalition) with a couple
of neighbors from Independence Plaza and another neighbor from Warren
Street. We were very concerned, confused and frightened. The EPA was
telling us the air was safe, although we were feeling sick and articles
by independent scientists reported that there were dangerously elevated
levels of a variety of toxins in the air which the EPA was not
divulging to the public. No one was taking responsibility for indoor
testing and clean up and we heard many reports of the unsafe conditions
for workers. Unfortunately these circumstances have changed little
since the end of September when we first started to meet.
To my knowledge, we were the first group of activists who began to
organize to address the WTC environmental concerns down town. Our
coalition now consists of residents, workers and school parents. We
organized the first public forum regarding WTC environmental concerns
and held a rally and press conference at City Hall in December. We have
written letters to government officials and testified at public
hearings and press conferences regarding the lack of community
participation and communication regarding environmental safety issues
facing residents, workers and school parents. We have complained about
the fragmented, uncoordinated and neglectful manner in which government
agencies have dealt with the catastrophic and unprecedented
environmental dangers we are facing. However, we have been ignored at
all levels of government and by all governmental agencies. We defined
11 immediate needs in after math of September 11th and also developed a
longer list of demands.
The 11 immediate needs are:
(1) Implement a centralized coordination of the cleanup effort that
is responsive to community needs and includes public participation. The
cleanup must address all affected communities, including the immediate
surrounding areas and those in contiguous areas. Affected communities
must include Tribeca, South Street Sea Port, Battery Park City, The
Financial District, China Town, The Lower East Side, Hudson Square,
Soho, Greenwich Village, and the East Village. The Federal definition
of the disaster must be expanded to include these areas.
(2) Move the barge on Pier 25 away from schools and residences. All
other barge and truck clean-up operations must be located away from
schools and residences.
(3) Establish strict guidelines and protocol for the entire testing
and clean-up operation including affected areas beyond Ground Zero.
Protocol should include proper measures to be taken by schools and
other institutions in the area with regard to air filtration and
operations of HVAC systems.
(4) Control and contain debris to prevent dispersal in trucking and
barge operations and minimize diesel emissions and noise.
(5) HEPA vacuum and wet clean streets, side walks, roof tops and
parks to continuously assure dust suppression.
(6) Provide safe working conditions and enforcement of safety and
environmental laws for Ground Zero workers and other area workers.
(7) Assess and test for environmental contaminants in indoor and
outdoor spaces.
(8) Share public and private sampling data, including health data,
in a timely and complete manner.
(9) Notify workers, residents and schools prior to potentially
hazardous work operations such as removal of the freon tanks and major
demolitions.
(10) Engage in public health educational outreach to all area
workers, residents and students.
(11) Create a health registry of individuals whose health has been
impacted by WTC exposures, including medical surveillance of high risk
populations.
despite our vigorous organizing efforts, these needs have still not
been met
Most recently, our group wrote letters in January asking for
meetings with Mayor Bloomberg and Governor Pataki. The Mayor's Office
never called us about our request for a meeting and has ignored our
phone calls to his office asking for a meeting. Governor Pataki's
Office called a couple of weeks ago telling me they would like to
arrange a meeting with our coalition and the Commissioner of State DEC
and the Director, State of DOH in March in Albany.
When I told the Governor's Office that we could not go to Albany
since we are working people and we think the nature and magnitude of
this catastrophe warrants a meeting in New York City by the State,
their office told me, the next time they could arrange a meeting in New
York City would be in April. After calling back several times and
asking for a meeting at an earlier date, the Governor's Office arranged
the meeting for March 22 in New York City. However, the Governor
himself does not feel he needs to be at the meeting since the State DEC
and DOH are in charge of addressing these issues for his office.
Considering the urgent and unprecedented environmental health problems
we are experiencing down town, I find the late date for the meeting and
the disinterest on the part of the Governor reprehensible.
As a long-term activist with New York City Coalition to End Lead
Poisoning, I have been concerned about lead hazards in the aftermath of
September 11th. Unfortunately, Dr. Evelyn Mauss, a leading expert on
lead poisoning who I have worked with for the past 10 years could not
be here since she is out of the country. I asked Dr. Mauss, an expert
on lead poisoning and Senior Research Consultant to the Natural
Resource Defense Council, to analyze the lead hazards, testing and
provide some recommendations. Since the October, Dr. Mauss has reported
that she was concerned with some very high lead spikes in the air and
in the schools that exceeded the lead safety levels. Moreover, she
repeatedly reported at public hearings, press conferences and meetings
that EPA testing for lead has been grossly inadequate. She has
recommend that the EPA conduct more comprehensive and adequate testing
and clean up in air dust and soil and in all post-1970 buildings to
reflect the impact of the WTC attack. She also recommended that lead
testing and clean up be done in all parks in areas immediately near
Ground Zero and in peripheral area in Lower East Side, China Town
Greenwich Village Etc. Another recommendation she made was for The
Department of Health to test and screen children for lead in down town.
The WTC Environmental Coalition has supported these recommendations.
Governmental agencies have refused to implement these recommendations.
Dr. Mauss has testified about the potential lead hazards from
numerous sources after September 11th. The World Trade Center was built
before lead paint was banned for commercial purposes in 1978 and a
decade and a half before lead paint was banned in plumbing. Computers
contain four pounds of lead and the steel beams of the World Trade
Center also contained lead. Many of the surrounding buildings that were
damaged by the WTC attack were also constructed after lead paint was
banned. The recent findings of lead paint in the elementary schools and
Stuyvesant High School which are all near the barge at Pier 25, create
serious concerns for parents, students as well as residents living near
the barge. If lead hazards have been found in the schools a couple of
blocks from Independence Plaza and near several other apartment
complexes, including River Terrace, there is a significant risk that
our apartments contain lead hazards. However, no Government Agency has
provided indoor testing of our apartments for lead or a host of other
contaminants. I am appalled at this indifference on the part of our
government considering lead causes irreversible brain damage, kidney
problems, speech and hearing impairments, and a many other
developmental delays and health problems in children. In adults, lead
causes osteoporosis and mental confusion. Children are most at risk for
lead poisoning. However, adult workers, residents and others are also
at risk of lead poisoning and the consequential health affects.
We urge the Senate to mandate thorough and safe testing and clean
up of all of Lower Manhattan expeditiously. We ask him to help us meet
all of our 11 immediate needs, including moving of the barge
immediately. We have waited long enough and can no longer compromise
the health and safety of the residents, workers, and school children in
Lower Manhattan.
______
Environmental Demands of The WTC Environmental Coalition
The WTC Environmental Coalition is comprised of downtown residents,
workers, school parents and and supporting activist organizations who
are concerned about the environmental impact of the World Trade Center
disaster. We demand the following from government agencies:
immediate site safety at ground zero
Public input on site management and with the help of that
input, require improvements in site management at Ground Zero to reduce
pollution associated with the site and recovery and removal efforts.
These improvements should include safe clean-up methods for debris
removal from the WTC site. A primary concern is clean up at Pier 25. We
demand that the barge and truck clean up operation be moved to an area
that is less populated by residents and where there are not schools. We
also demand safe, adequate and consistent covering and watering down of
the debris. Diesel trucks and equipment must be replaced with cleaner
fuels such as oxi, bio or low sulfur diesel. The City Anti-Idling Law
must be enforced. Truck retrofits such as catalytic converters must be
used to trap diesel emissions. Noise must be reduced to avoid
disturbances to residents from the clean-up operation.
Implementation of OSHA work safety standards.
An on site industrial hygienist for all workers in WTC
clean up with authority to implement precautionary health measures.
public health and safety outdoor air
Ongoing disclosure of updated and accurate test results of
all contaminants to residents, workers, Parent Teacher Associations and
other public members. EPA, DEC, DEP and DOH must ensure that the public
has access to all outdoor test results, methods of testing and safety
standards for each contaminant.
Massive, consistent and ongoing clean up of streets, roof
tops, awnings and other outdoor areas with Hepa vacuums and subsequent
watering down of these areas.
Government agencies should invite public comment on the
air monitoring program. They should then develop a revised air testing
program based on public comment.
Government agencies should regularly report outdoor test
results to the public through TV and radio announcements, literature
distributions, facts sheets etc. in various languages, especially
Spanish and Chinese.
Risk Communications to the public should be done by an
Environmental Health Advisory Committee comprised of environmental
health doctors, environmental advocacy groups, community members and
representatives of the Department of Health.
Preventive and Precautionary Health Measures Must be
Implemented--Government agencies must make specific recommendations to
the public regularly regarding ways to reduce their exposure to outdoor
air emissions thorough public service announcements, facts sheets in
multiple languages and ongoing community meetings. Specific education
geared to vulnerable groups such as children the elderly, those with
pre-existing respiratory, heart problems, compromised, immune systems,
etc.
Consistent and ongoing testing and professional cleaning
of all parks, playgrounds and community gardens in core and periphery
areas for lead, asbestos and all other contaminants. These include
outdoor areas in Tribeca, The Financial District, The Sea Port, South
Bridge, China Town, The Lower East Side, Greenwich Village and parts of
Brooklyn effected by the disaster.
Since lead levels have exceeded safety standards for
ambient air, there must be massive and ongoing testing for lead in air,
dust and soil. Independent scientists have reported that tests have
shown lead to be in the highest concentration of all heavy metals in
air dust samples surrounding the WTC site.
public health and safety indoor air
Implementation of a well coordinated and comprehensive
hazard assessment for a variety of contaminants of all downtown
buildings, including residential buildings, offices and schools by a
team of industrial hygienists (i.e. Asbestos, lead, silica, fiberglass,
PCB's, Dioxin, etc.). Government must ensure professional clean up and
abatement by certified and trained workers when tests show levels of
toxins above safety standards.
Indoor testing of lead should be done in buildings
constructed after 1970, when the prohibition of indoor lead paint was
enforced in order to reflect the impact of the WTC disaster.
Clean up must include thorough and professional clean up
of all ventilation systems, air ducts, air conditioning systems and
heating systems, along with clean up of general areas.
Post clearance testing by independent parties must be
implemented.
All indoor test results and post clearances must be
provided to the public.
Preventive Public Health Advice must be provided to all
residents, workers and school parents regarding indoor hazards.
(Through public service announcements, fact sheets, community meetings,
etc. in multiple languages).
immediate assistance to affected groups
Public education regarding health symptoms requiring
medical intervention and referrals to appropriate health professionals
for early detection and treatment.
Better coordination and consistency of information to the
public about assistance available from the Red Cross, FEMA and other
agencies for air purifiers, HEPA vacuums, relocation money,
professional clean up etc. To assist in these efforts, funding and
support for creation of community based advocacy groups to help people
apply for funds and services and navigate the bureaucracies. These
services must be provided in multiple languages.
Up-front funding for home interventions such as air
purifiers, HEPA vacuums, etc.
environmental oversight and planning
Environmental concerns must be treated as part of the WTC
disaster, instead of an extraneous aspect of it.
Community participation in environmental decisions must
take place. We recommend regular bi-monthly meetings between government
agencies and the public where public input is part of plans taking
place.
A Dedicated disaster fund specifically earmarked to
address WTC environmental concerns.
Implementation of new testing and safety standards for
indoor and outdoor air that accurately reflect The WTC situation. This
should include development of methods to test the synergistic effect of
all the contaminants.
An Independent Scientific Advisory Board to represent the
public in review and approval of all research on environmental issues.
Communities should be collaborators in the research and the public
should get results promptly along with recommendations to improve
hazardous conditions etc.
An independent Ombudsmen representative of the public must
be established with assistance of the Scientific Advisory Board to
oversee research and clean-up efforts.
Establishment of a central registry to monitor health
problems related the WTC.
Vigilant and ongoing testing and monitoring of children's
lead levels in areas near the WTC. This should include reporting of
children's lead levels to the Department of Health and to parents.
Implementation of environmental justice principles,
including funding and support for low-income communities of color
affected by the WTC disaster, including China Town, The Lower East Side
and parts of Brooklyn.
Funding for a Grass Roots Community Group to address
environmental concerns from a bottom up community-based planning
perspective.
__________
Statement of Jenna Orkin, Brooklyn, NY
Senators Clinton and Lieberman, I am a co-founder of the World
Trade Center Coalition for Clean Air, an organization of parents and
residents of Lower Manhattan. I am also a parent at Stuyvesant High
School. Stuyvesant High School is in a unique position. Not only do we
have the World Trade Center site to the south. We also have the World
Trade Center site to the north. All the debris is brought to
Stuyvesant's north doorstep where it is dumped onto the barge before
making its way to its final resting place in Staten Island. The barge
operation blocks our most important exit for evacuation. In the event
of another disaster downtown our school will not be able to go north,
away from the disaster but will have to go south, toward it. However,
this is the least of our problems. The barge operation also involves
diesel cranes and trucks going full throttle day and night. Diesel
contains forty toxic air contaminants (American Lung Association of
Pennsylvania) from acetaldehyde to xylene isomers. These include lead,
cadmium, mercury, benzene and dioxins. It also contains sixteen
carcinogens. The EPA says diesel is ``highly likely'' to be
carcinogenic. (Http://www.epa.gov/ncea/diesel.htm). Because of the
diesel and the debris, Stuyvesant has had readings of PM2.5
that have been many times higher than the readings at Ground Zero.
PM2.5 is particulate matter that is small enough to
penetrate deep into the lungs and alveoli. Unlike PM10, it
doesn't come out again. Being so small, it also has a relatively large
surface area to volume ratio so that other noxious chemicals attach to
it. Lead levels have been 15 times higher than regulation limits in the
cafeteria, where the lead could be eaten. Asbestos has also been high.
A recent article by Andrew Schneider in the St. Louis Post Disptach
says that asbestos may, in fact, be nine times higher than current
instruments would indicate. Cancer rates from the asbestos alone may be
1 person in 10. Other chemicals such as isocyanate, are not routinely
tested for. But on the few occasions they were tested for, they were
found to be high.
The synergistic effect of all these chemicals, as you will read in
Marjorie Clarke's testimony, is explosive. For instance, if you're an
asbestos worker and a smoker, it's not 2 or 3 times as bad as being one
or the other; it's 80 or 90 times as bad.
How is Stuyvesant protected against this onslaught of toxins? To
date, hepa filters have not been installed and the ducts have not been
cleaned according to protocol. The mouths of the ducts were cleaned,
air was blown through forcefully, then tested and found to be
satisfactory. But the company that did the testing, ATC, is the company
that told us asbestos levels were satisfactory on a day when the EPA or
the Parent Association's company, Howard Bader, (accounts differ) made
a special call to the Parents' Association to say asbestos was well
above regulation limits. The air at Stuyvesant is so bad that recently
the Principal decided to let students go out for lunch on the theory it
didn't make that much difference where they went.
Students, like the residents in the neighboring buildings, have
contracted chemical bronchitis and new-onset asthma, conditions which
could last their entire lives. When we have complained to the
Chancellor's office, their response has usually been some version of,
``So take your child to the doctor,'' and, ``You're welcome to transfer
him to his zoned school.''
In the immediate aftermath of September 11th the city's attitude
was, ``This is an emergency; everyone has to roll up his/her sleeves.''
But after the abandonment of any hope of rescue, what kind of emergency
is this, exactly? A real estate emergency? An economic emergency?
Whatever it is, it is creating far more emergencies down the line with
the reckless manner in which it's being conducted. The burden of this
clean up is falling largely on the shoulders of the young. When
Giuliani and other officials spoke of making sacrifices, what this has
come down to in the case of our children is decades off their lives.
Under the guise of heroics, the city has been engaged in chemical
warfare against its own children. This is murder. The fact that we
don't know who will die, precisely, or when, makes it no less criminal.
Many will die. As always, the excuse will be the times we were living
in. Morals are mores, goes the argument, ethics are in the ether. In
fact, morals and ethics have standards that stand outside what everyone
else is doing. This ``emergency'' clean up is not an emergency. It is
immoral, unethical and a crime against humanity.
We urgently request the immediate installation of hepa filters. We
also request that drastic action be taken with respect to the barge. If
there is any space anywhere else, for instance at Pier A, move the
barge away from Stuyvesant. If not, contain the debris so dust clouds
don't fly when it's dumped onto the barge. Retrofit the trucks to catch
particulates. Please take care of our children.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Community Board No. 1,
New York, NY, February 1, 2002.
Mr. Tom Ridge, Director,
Office of Homeland Security,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Ridge: At our January 15 monthly meeting Community Board
No. 1 adopted the attached resolution offering our recommendations for
improving homeland security here in Lower Manhattan. Our Community
Board is empowered by the city of NY to represent the interests of the
residents and workers of this area which includes the site of the
former World Trade Center. Regrettably, our districts has twice been
targeted by terrorists (1993, 2001) and with such landmarks as the NY
Stock Exchange and the Statue of Liberty here, we will continue to be a
potential target. We urge you to consider these four recommendations as
you put together our Nation's homeland security plan:
(1) A No Fly Zone for any aviation be established in and around
Lower Manhattan
(2) Sophisticated, state-of-the-art monitoring devices be installed
in the district which would indicate the presence of biological,
chemical and nuclear agents.
(3) Any trials of suspected terrorists should not be conducted in
our highly populated district nor should suspected terrorists be
imprisoned in Lower Manhattan.
(4) The Office of Homeland Security should appoint a liaison to
interact between their office, Community Board No. 1, and other local
government offices.
______
Community Board No. 1 Manhattan
Resolution
February 19, 2002
Committee of Origin: Executive
Committee Vote: 12 IN FAVOR, 0 OPPOSED, 0 ABSTAINED, 0 RECUSED
Board Vote: IN FAVOR, OPPOSED, ABSTAINED, RECUSED
Re: Senate WTC Air Quality Oversight Hearing Requests
WHEREAS, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (NY) is conducting
oversight hearings concerning the air quality and health effects at
Ground Zero and Lower Manhattan due to the WTC attacks, and
WHEREAS, Since the September 11th attacks on WTC and the subsequent
collapse of the towers and surrounding buildings, the quality of the
air has been of great concern and confusion to lower Manhattan
residents and workers due to conflicting reports. Independent and other
government agencies test results seem to contradict the Environmental
Protection Agency and other official government bodies despite official
assurances that the air is ``safe'', and
WHEREAS, With the fires burning different types of materials inside
the WTC, there was significant exposures from both airborne outdoor and
indoor dust, smoke, particulate matter, gases, individual toxins and
combination of toxins interacting with each other (aka: synergistic
effect). As a result residents and workers downtown have been
experiencing varied health problems, and
WHEREAS, Some of these symptoms include skin rash, eye, nose, and
throat irritation, nausea, headaches, asthma, chronic bronchitis,
severe coughing (aka WTC cough), and upper respiratory reactive airway
disease, and
WHEREAS, All of the above exposures have short-term and long-term
health risks depending on what was inhaled, how much of it, in what
combination, and for how long, and
WHEREAS, The EPA test results showed the levels for individual
contaminate without taking into account how they interact like a toxic
soup in an increasingly exponential way, and
WHEREAS, There was also significant distributions of dust on top of
roofs, water towers, and sucked into air conditioning units and
building ventilation systems: Now therefore, be it
resolved that:
CB No. 1 strongly urges that the following recommendations be
implemented immediately:
(1) Designate a lead agency to handle environmental issues affected
by the WTC disaster.
(2) Enforce existing laws, especially environmental regulations and
public health standards and policies.
(3) Create a central medical data base registry to keep track of
all exposed people who are having health problems, for tracking of
short- and long-term health risks, and to inform people of the medical
treatments that are available.
(4) Improve and continue indoor and outdoor air testing, and
surface testing using state-of-the-art equipment and up to date
methods.
(5) Conduct research to assess the short- and long-term health
impact of combinations of dust and gases, the synergistic effects and
combinations of toxins, and provide funding for the research.
(6) Establish new air quality standards for individual and
synergistic combinations of pollutants.
(7) Develop clean-up and post-clean-up protocols for indoor and
outdoor spaces.
(8) Containerize the debris removal operation.
(9) Require stringent mitigation of diesel exhaust pollutants from
vehicles, cranes and generators through the use of low-sulfur fuel,
particulate traps and other technologies.
(10) Establish an air quality hotline with an appropriate
Government Agency or qualified group or organization.
(11) Establish standard operating procedures for future emergency
responses.
______
Community Board No. 1 Manhattan Resolution
January 15, 2002
Committee of Origin: Executive
Committee Vote: 7 IN FAVOR, 1 OPPOSED, 0 ABSTAINED, 0 RECUSED
Board Vote: 34 IN FAVOR, 5 OPPOSED, 2 ABSTAINED, 0 RECUSED
Re: Home Land Security
WHEREAS, The Federal Government is requesting recommendations to
improve homeland security, and
WHEREAS, Lower Manhattan has twice (1993, 2001) been the target of
terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Center, and
WHEREAS, Lower Manhattan, as the financial capital of the world and
the home to many internationally known or otherwise sensitive buildings
and residences and structures, continues to be a potential target for
terrorists, now therefore, be it
resolved that:
CB No. 1 recommends that the Federal Office of Home Land Security
provide adequate funding to implement the following recommendations to
improve security in Lower Manhattan:
(1) A No Fly Zone for any aviation be established in and around
Lower Manhattan.
(2) Sophisticated, state-of-the-art monitoring devices be installed
in the district which would indicate the presence of biological,
chemical and nuclear agents.
(3) Any trials of suspected terrorists should not be conducted in
our highly populated district nor should suspected terrorists be
imprisoned in Lower Manhattan.
(4) The Office of Home Land Security should appoint a liaison to
interact between their office, Community Board No. 1, and other local
government offices.
______
Statement of Marc J. Ameruso, New York City Council Environmental
Committee
My name is Marc Ameruso, I have been a resident of Tribeca for 10
years. A member of Community Board No. 1 for 4 years, and very much
involved with community activism in the neighborhood.
Since September 11th I have like many others, have been very
concerned with air quality caused by the collapse of the World Trade
Center (WTC). Also, since the first week I have been learning as much
as possible to educate myself on the subject of air quality.
Four weeks ago, I never heard of furans or chrysotiles, or how
harmful they can be to humans. Today I speak to you as an American, a
New Yorker, and a Tribeca resident. Not to diminish what people are
feeling around the world, the country, or even in the rest of New York.
This area where the WTC stood is my neighborhood, and my HOME.
Please let's not forget that, because even after the attacks, I
still find myself having to convince the some powers that be and the
people who will be charged with the rebuilding the WTC site, that this
is area is a neighborhood with many long time residents who want to
stay and continue to raise their children in this wonderful community,
that myself and many others have been working so hard to make a better
place. We will rebuild and come out of this better than before.
One day the fires will go out, the smoke will clear and that smell
will disappear. But right now, the air quality can throw a monkey
wrench into all our efforts.
People just want to know what, how to protect themselves and safely
clean up. I am not an alarmist, I just want the truth and so do they.
With the resulting distribution of dust and particulate matter
blowing around the city, including into Brooklyn, Queen's, Staten
Island, and New Jersey as well as, the fires continue to burn who knows
what. Under the rubble, spouting out a laundry list of harmful toxins
into the air are making residents and rescue workers sick. They visit
their doctors, only to be told that their symptoms are psychosomatic.
Please allow me to briefly relay part of my experience to the
committee which will bring the air quality issue into perspective.
On September 11th, I was home just waking up, preparing for primary
day. Of course, that did not happen. When the towers collapsed I went
to the trunk of my car and retrieved my construction gear that I kept
there from my old construction job many years ago, then proceeded
downtown to see what I could do to help.
By the way, my equipment did not include a respirator.
I stayed at the site for the next 3\1/2\ days helping in anyway I
could, from search and rescue to off loading ships to bringing supplies
and equipment to various locations.
I slept in Stuyvesant High School for two nights. Everybody down
there helped in the same way with no real direction from a supervisor.
pictures\1\
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\1\ Retained in the committee's file.
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I have a few photos that I would like to share with the committee.
(September 11, surgical mask); (September 12, smiling, just got
respirator); (September 13, just evacuated from Ground Zero, 1 Liberty
imitate collapse).
By the way, there were many other people down there like me, who
were for lack of a better term were ``Ground Zero civilian rescue
volunteers'' working side by side on top and around the rubble pile
with the incredible firefighters, police, and other rescue workers.
So please remember not leave this courageous group of people out
of in any future citations or accolades.
I knew there were all types dangers but help was needed and I had
not a second thought about it. The 3\1/2\ days I spent at the site I
observed very few rescue workers wearing respirator masks, and I did
not hear anyone giving instructions to do so.
Although I did see handwritten signs posted around saying,
``Asbestos levels are high, wear your masks.''
Interestingly, members of the military and rescue workers from out
of town who had their own respirators almost always keep there mask on
while working. The treatment I had at the triage center set up inside
Stuyvesant High School included oxygen respiratory treatment twice, eye
washes at least nine times, and antibiotic eye drops for a scratched
cornea.
I still have a nagging cough as do many other people. I have
resigned myself to the fact that I may get sick in 10 or 20 years
because of this. But I accept it because helping was the right thing to
do.
I relay this part of my experience to you not brag, that is not way
I am. I told you my story because going down to help was my choice. The
main problem here is that the EPA is not giving the residents of New
York and the rescue workers a choice by telling them the air quality is
OK. This is where your committee can help. The correct specific
questions need to be asked to the EPA under oath.
The City Council has the power with these oversight hearings, to
subpoena the EPA to testify as to the truth. Just don't subpoena the
bosses, the administrators, the talking heads. Subpoena the
toxicologists and epidemiologist, some of whom I have spoken to one on
one. They can't even look me in the eye when they say the air quality
is OK. I can see the torment in their faces, they know the truth with
air and I feel they wish they could tell us. Get them down here to
testify.
Your committee must ask very specific questions or they will double
talk and bog you down with scientific and technical banter and all the
while never answering the question.
There are people here that can show the committee exactly how to
frame these questions today and for the followup hearing next week. The
EPA has been very selective with the information they have been
releasing to public and on there website.
Picking and choosing what you want someone to see is the same thing
as lying in my book. There is proof of this in the EPA's own air
quality test results and reports and confirmed by other independent
testing. One independent test that I obtained at a location on Rector
Place had a test result of 4.3 percent for Asbestos on an area
described in the report as, ``Roof/Play area''. We now know that OSHA
uses a 1 percent level for Asbestos as a safe standard.
Let's now talk about the EPA test results. It is my understanding
that the EPA air quality reports were only able to be obtained through
a freedom of information request by the New York Environmental Law &
Justice Project.
That first week or so after the attacks, I thought I was the only
person who believed that we were not getting the whole truth from that
EPA. I felt like I was in a bad ``B'' movie claiming that a meteor is
going to hit the earth and I was the only one hit.
Also as of today a Freedom of information request sent to NYC
Department of Health for their test results and air quality reports as
not been honored. Please ask them why there are holding back? So the
questions remains. What is in the air that is making people sick? Each
time some rubble is removed, oxygen gets down under there and fuels the
fires burning the countless type of materials that were in the WTC. Is
the EPA using adequate equipment?
At a recent air quality forum, a scientist said that there are
chemicals known as super tiny particles. The current EPA equipment can
not detect these tiny particles. So how do they know it is safe?
Furthermore, the broad spectrum testing the EPA is conducting does
not take one important factor into account. Just because a particular
test result does not reach or go over some threshold set by the EPA or
OSAH, does not mean these particles can't make people sick. In other
words, just because some reading does not make it up to some number
that they have in a book doesn't mean people can't still can get sick.
These ``low levels'' are making people sick and that is exactly what is
happening.
I am going to briefly read to you some of the EPA's own test
results and air quality reports that was obtained through the Freedom
of Information Request I told you about earlier. There will be more
specific and detailed information from other people who have testified
or who will be testify.
September 20, 97 samples taken, 26 could not be analyzed because
the filters became clogged.
October 14, Dioxin, 10 samples were collected on October 2 and
analyzed for dioxin/furans. Four of the samples showed results above
the guideline level at which EPA would take some type of action to
reduce people's exposure.
September 22, Internal Use, 13 new asbestos samples analyzed from
the 13 (two new) fixed air monitors in Lower Manhattan. Five of the
thirteen had levels above the EPA school standard.
October 13 and October 14, Ambiet Air Sampling.--VOCs-Sampling for
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) was conducted on October 13 and
October 14 in the smoke plume within the debris pile at Ground Zero.
Benzene exceeded the OSHA time-weight average permissible level at two
locations, on both days.
This is just a small sample of what I read in the EPA's own
reports. There is enough in there to question what is really going on
with the air. We should be jumping up and down for the truth! I do not
buy the EPA party line that breathing the bad air is OK short term. It
has been 6 weeks with no end in site. It was smelling on the way to
City Hall. If it makes you sick something is wrong. Lets be honest; is
the real estate values of downtown and the stock exchanges worth people
lives. Downtown Manhattan is not going anywhere.
Thank you. I will happy to take any questions.
______
Statement of Marc J. Ameruso, New York State Assembly Committee on
Environmental Conservation, Health, and Labor
My name is Marc Ameruso, I have been a resident of Tribeca for 10
years. A member of Community Board No. 1 for 4 years, and very much
involved with community activism in my neighborhood.
Today I speak to you as an American, a New Yorker, and a Tribeca
resident. Since September 11th, I have like many others, have been very
concerned with air quality caused by the collapse of the World Trade
Center (WTC) because of the continuing cloud of gases and dust that
spew from under the rubble for the last 2\1/2\ months. Also, since the
first week I have been learning as much as possible to educate myself
on the subject of air quality. I have lost count on how many forums and
town hall meetings I have attended, including two City Council
Environmental Oversight hearings. I would like to commend Stanley
Michaels for having those hearings and also thank Speaker Silver and
the rest of the committee for having these oversight hearings today.
I would like to submit part of the transcript from the City Council
November 8 hearing for your records. I have highlighted much of the
relevant testimony. Six weeks ago, I never heard of furans,
chrysotiles, or the term synergistic effects also know as ``toxic
soup'' and how harmful they can be to humans.
I always hear the same party line statement from the EPA and others
at these hearings and forums. The air is ``safe'' and there are ``no
long-term health effects'', which is always qualified with [according
to current studies or to best of our knowledge]. This is a cover-your-
ass statement for 10, 15, 20 years down the road. The statement also
gives the impression that the air is safe and is misleading to the
public at large. There are too many unknowns on the effects of this
amount of combination of gases. In the limited amount of research, it
has been shown that combinations just doesn't double your health risk
but can increase it exponentially. They should just say definitely that
they do not know what the long-term and short-term risks are and then
we can take it from there.
I want to say the following because I think it is important not to
diminish what people are feeling around the world, the country, or even
in the rest of New York. This area where the WTC stood is my
neighborhood, and my HOME. Please let's not forget that, because even
after the attacks, I still find myself having to convince the some of
the air quality powers that be and the people who will be charged with
the rebuilding the WTC site, that this area is a neighborhood with many
long-time residents who want to stay and continue to raise their
children in this wonderful community, that myself and many others have
been working so hard to make a better place. We will rebuild and come
out of this better than before.
One day the fires will go out, the smoke will clear and that smell
will disappear. But right now, the air quality can throw a monkey
wrench into all our efforts. People just want to know what, how to
protect themselves, what type of treatment they can receive if they are
sick, and how to safely clean up their buildings and apartments? Not to
be told when they visit their doctors, that their symptoms are
psychosomatic. Please, enough of that already. I am not an alarmist, I
just want the truth and so do they.
With the resulting distribution of dust and particulate matter
blowing around the city including into Brooklyn, Queen's, Staten
Island, and New Jersey, as well as the fires that continue to burn, the
numerous amount of materials under the rubble spouting out a laundry
list of harmful toxins into the air that are making rescue workers sick
as well as residents and office workers outside of Ground Zero.
Children, pregnant women, and the elderly are at the most risk. Mount
Sini has been seeing some of these people at there clinic, so something
is wrong.
Please allow me to briefly relay part of my experience and
observations to the committee which will bring the air quality issue
into perspective. On September 11th, I was home just waking up,
preparing for primary day. Of course, that did not happen. When the
towers collapsed, I went to the trunk of my car and retrieved my
construction gear that I kept there from my old construction job of
many years ago, then proceeded downtown to see what I could do to help.
By the way, my equipment did not include a respirator.
I stayed at the site for the next 3\1/2\ days helping in anyway I
could, from search and rescue to off loading ships to bringing supplies
and equipment to various locations. I slept in Stuyvesant High School
for two nights. Everybody down there helped in the same way with no
real direction from a supervisor.
pictures\2\
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\2\ Retained in the committee's file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I have a few photos that I would like to share with the committee.
(September 11th, (surgical mask); September 9-12, (smiling, just got
respirator); September 9-13, (just evacuated from Ground Zero, 1
Liberty, imitate collapse).
If you look closely at the picture you can see in the background
that the other rescue workers around me do not have the proper
protective equipment. By the way there were many other people down
there like me, who were for lack of a better term were ``Ground Zero
civilian rescue volunteers'' working side by side on top and around the
rubble pile with the incredible firefighters, police, and other rescue
workers.
So please remember not leave this courageous group of people out of
any future citations or accolades and they may also have health
problems. How do we track them or everybody else for that matter. I
knew there were all types dangers but help was needed and I had not a
second thought about it. The 3\1/2\ days I spent at the site, I
observed very few rescue workers wearing respirator masks, and I did
not hear anyone giving instructions to do so. I did see some
handwritten signs posted around saying, ``Asbestos levels are high,
wear your masks.''
Interestingly members of the military and rescue workers from out
of town who had their own respirators and almost always keep there mask
on while working. The treatment I had at the triage center set up
inside Stuyvesant High School included oxygen respiratory treatment
twice, eye washes at least 9 times, and antibiotic eye drops for a
scratched cornea.
I still have a nagging deep chest cough as do many other people I
have spoken with who were not rescue workers. I have resigned myself to
the fact that I may get sick in 10 or 20 years because of this. But I
accept it because helping was the right thing to do. I relay this part
of my experience to you not brag, that is not the way I am. I told you
my story because going down to help was my choice.
The main problem here is that the EPA is not giving the residents
of New York and the rescue workers a choice by telling them the air
quality is OK and there will be no long-term health effects. This is
where your committee can help. The correct specific questions need to
be asked to the EPA under oath. If the Assembly has the power with
these oversight hearings, to subpoena the EPA to testify as to the
truth. Just don't subpoena the bosses, the administrators, the talking
heads. Subpoena the toxicologists and epidemiologist, some of whom I
have spoken to one on one off the record. They can't even look me in
the eye when they say the air quality is OK. I can see the torment in
their faces, they know the truth with air and I feel they wish they
could tell us.
Get them down here to testify. Your committee must ask very
specific questions or they will double talk and bog you down with
scientific and technical banter and all the while never answering the
question. There are people here that can show the committee exactly how
to frame these questions today and hopefully there will be a followup
hearing on this subject. The EPA has been very selective with the
information they have been releasing to public and on there website.
Picking and choosing what you want someone to see is the same thing
as lying in my book. There is proof of this in the EPA's own air
quality test results and reports and confirmed by other independent
testing which I am sure you will hear about. One independent test that
I obtained at a location on Rector Place had a test result of 4.3
percent for Asbestos on an area described in the report as, ``Roof/Play
area''. We now know that OSHA uses a 1-percent level for Asbestos as a
safe standard. But I think we need to be very careful about being happy
that a certain toxin is below a particular level. What has happened
here is unprecedented. Some of the standards that exist today were set
many years ago and were not set for the type of exposure that we are
experiencing.
They also may have set at a certain level in a negotiation between
a chemical company and the Government. Many of the toxicologists and
epidemiologist I have spoken with tell me that these standards change
often, most of the time to lower threshold. The standards are also
subject to debate in the scientific community.
Let's now talk about the EPA test results. It is my understanding
that the EPA air quality reports were only able to be obtained through
a freedom of information requests.
Also as of today, a Freedom of Information Request sent to NYC
Department of Health for their test results and air quality reports as
not been honored. Please ask them why they are holding back? So the
questions remains, what is in the air that is making people sick? Each
time some rubble is removed, oxygen gets down under there and fuels the
fires burning the countless type of materials that were in the WTC. Is
the EPA using adequate equipment? At a recent air quality forum, a
scientist said that there are chemicals known as super tiny particles.
Can the current EPA equipment detect these tiny particles? So how do
they know it is safe?
Furthermore, the broad spectrum testing the EPA is conducting does
not take one important factor into account. Just because a particular
test result does not reach or go over some threshold set by the EPA or
OSAH, does not mean it is safe. Also, what about the background levels?
It does not mean these particles can't make people sick. Just because
some reading does not make it up to some number that the EPA has in a
book doesn't mean people can't still can get sick. It is irreverent
that individual toxins are at ``low levels'' most of the time when they
are making people sick, and that is exactly what is happening.
I am going to briefly read to you some of the EPA's own test
results and air quality reports that was obtained through the Freedom
of Information Request I told you about earlier. There will be more
specific and detailed information from other people who have testified
or who will be testifying.
September 20, ``97 samples taken, 26 could not be analyzed because
the filters became clogged.''
October 14, ``Dioxin.--10 samples were collected on October 2 and
analyzed for dioxin/furans. Four of the samples showed results above
the guideline level at which EPA would take some type of action to
reduce people's exposure.''
Setpember 22, ``Internal Use''.--13 new asbestos samples analyzed
from the 13 (two new) fixed air monitors in Lower Manhattan. Five of
the thirteen had levels above the EPA school standard.
October 13 and October 14, ``Ambient Air Sampling.--VOCs--Sampling
for volatile organic compounds (VOCs) was conducted on October 13 and
October 14 in the smoke plume within the debris pile at Ground Zero.
Benzene exceeded the OSHA time-weight average permissible level at two
locations, on both days.''
This is just a small sample of what I read in the EPA's own
reports. There is enough in there to question what is really going on
with the air. We should be jumping up and down for the truth! I do not
buy the EPA party line that breathing the bad air is OK short term.
It has been 6 weeks with no end in site. When does short term end.
What is the short term for Dixon or the short term for PCB's? I was
smelling it on the way to this hearing. If it makes you sick something
is wrong. To sum up, I think four things need to be done; (1) The City
needs funding to coordinate and organize the cleanup, with a Ground
Zero air quality czar for lack of a better term. (2) Begin research and
study the what happens when so many contaminants and toxins interact
with each other in various combination, the synergistic effects. (3)
Track people's long- and short-term health effects from the ``toxic
soup'' that we have been breathing in since September 11th and have all
these people in one data base. I guess we have now become lab rats. (4)
Have better protocols for debris removal, at the November 1st City
Council hearing, the EPA said there were using some Super Fund Site
protocols but were unwilling to declare the WTC site an overall Super
Fund Site.
Why? Like anything else, always consider the source of the
information. Who has an agenda? Lets be honest; is the real estate
values of downtown and the stock exchanges being open worth people
lives. Downtown Manhattan is not going anywhere. Thank you. I will
happy to take any questions.
______
Niche Analysis, Inc.--Bulk Sample Analysis Report
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Material
Sample No. Condition/ Sample Location Asbestos Content Non-ACM Content
Appearance and Percent and Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................... Dust/Gray......... Apt 2J/Living room/ 2.3 Chrysotile.... 25 FB, 2 CL
Window wash.
2............................... Dust/Gray......... Apt 2J/Living room/ ND................ 95 FB, 2 CL
Trapped on AC
filter.
3............................... Dust/Gray......... Apt 2J/Bedroom/ ND................ 90 FB, 5 CL,
Trapped on AC
filter.
4............................... Dust/Gray......... Apt 2J/Living room/ 1.8 Chrysotile.... 30 FB, 30 CL
Window sills.
5............................... Dust/Gray......... Apt 2J/Debris from ND................ 6 FB,< 1 CL
exterior window
frame.
6............................... Dust/Gray......... Apt 2J/Living room/ 2.1 Chrysotile.... 45 FB, 10 CL
Dirt sample from
floor.
7............................... Debris/Gray....... Roof/North edge of Trace Chrysotile.. 45 FB, 10 CL
room.
8............................... Debris/Gray....... Roof/Play area (on 4.3 Chrysotile.... 40 FB, 30 CL
end of rubber
squares).
9............................... Dust-Debris/Gray.. Roof/South side of 3.2 Chrysotile.... 40 FB, 15 CL
roof.
10.............................. Debris/Gray....... Roof/Perimeter 0.6 Chrysotile.... 50 FB, 10 CL
north side.
11.............................. Debris/Gray....... Roof/Middle 2.2 Chrysotile.... 40 FB, 15 CL
section.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The balance of each sample is non-fibrous particulates. Please contact us promptly if you have any
questions about the results. Analysis was performed by using ``Point Count Technique'' as required and
recommended by the New York State Department of Health and USEPA Interim Method for ``Identification of
Asbestos in Bulk Samples''. This report must not be used by the client to claim product endorsement by NVLAP
or any of the U.S. Government. This report relates only to the items listed. Detection limit is 1 percent for
asbestos. NICHE's liability not to exceed the invoice amount. Sample location was provided by the client.
Polarized light microscopy is not consistently reliability in detecting asbestos in floor coverings and
similar non-friable organically bound materials. Quantitative transmission electron microscopy is currently
the only method that can be used to determine if the material can be considered or treated as non-asbestos-
containing. ND=None Detected CL=Cellulose FB=Fiberglass
Statement of Marcy Benstock, Executive Director of Clean Air
Campaign Inc.
Clean Air Campaign Inc. is grateful to Subcommittee Chairman Joseph
I. Lieberman and Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton for holding a February
11, 2002 hearing on the impacts of the September 11th attack on the
World Trade Center on air quality in the area of the WTC, and how to
address them. We appreciate the opportunity to submit these comments
for the hearing record.
Clean Air Campaign (CAC) worked closely with City and Federal
agencies, and organized citizen watchdogs to go door-to-door, to get
soot from every polluting building in a 200-block area of Manhattan
cleaned up at the source in the 1970's. This effort succeeded in
reducing particulate pollution by one third in the target area, CAC
also has an office in a commercial office building near the WTC, which
was downwind when the towers collapsed. We have been trying for more
than 5 months to get the information necessary to get our office and
its contents decontaminated the right way.
recommendations
1. Cleanup first.--The Lower Manhattan, Development Corporation,
(LMDC) placed a fullpage ad in today's New York Times (February 25,
2002, p. B5) proposing to use a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) Community Development Block Grant to provide
financial assistance and/or incentives to eligible individuals to
remain in homes or apartments in Lower Manhattan, or to move into the
area. This is premature.
Asbestos and other dangerous contaminants which do not go away on
their own should be removed from the air and dust inside all the
offices, apartments, schools, stores and buildings in Lower Manhattan
which have not yet been effectively decontaminated. This should happen
before residents and workers in the Lower Manhattan are given
incentives to go back to their homes and offices, or to relocate to an
area--Lower Manhattan--which may endanger their health.
2. More than a ``professional'' cleaning should be performed.--Many
``professional'' cleaning companies working in Lower Manhattan are not
performing asbestos remediations, and may not have skilled and trained
staff qualified and licensed to do the work, or the required
certifications. Even certified firms may have outstanding violations.
Even top companies known to do good asbestos remediation work have not
been informing potential commercial tenants that there is a difference
between an asbestos remediation and other kinds of cleaning, or what
specific tasks should be included in a cleaning contract for a given
office.
A widespread cleaning/decontamination should be performed in as
many buildings and offices and apartments in Lower Manhattan as
necessary by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Agency
that cleaned the Senate Hart Office Building. At minimum, the
appropriate EPA office should issue the contracts for this widespread
clearing and decontamination, in an open, public contracting process
which fully complies with all appropriate Federal mandates, Qualified
asbestos remediation firms from across the country should be encouraged
to submit their qualifications and bids.
3. Truly independent and credible testing of air and dust samples
should be performed at appropriate locations throughout Lower
Manhattan, under protocols developed and reviewed by the best Certified
Industrial Hygienists (CIHs) in the country, the best qualified U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staff in Washington, DC and
Research Triangle Park, and other qualified professionals.
It is essential that this effort begin again without built-in
conflicts of interest. The testing must be performed in the absence of
political or financial incentives to do the testing the wrong way, to
void certain data, and/or to prevent the data from being reviewed by
competent professionals across the country--quickly.
The NY Daily News reported February 22, 2002, that the Lower
Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) was considering the funding of
air quality ``testing and remediation,'' and was considering ``hiring a
consultant to `harmonize' standards for indoor air quality.'' LMDC
should not be involved in either air testing or remediation in any way.
4. In considering any appropriate role for LMDC, U.S. EPA and
Members of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and its
staff should review the documents through which the LMDC was created,
and the New York State laws which govern the powers and mandate of
LMDC.
The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC, formerly called
the Lower Manhattan Redevelopment Corporation) is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC),
doing business as the Empire State Development Corporation (``ESD'').
LMDC has no office of its own; the address in its Certificate of
Incorporation is ``c/o NYS Urban Development Corp.'' at UDC/ESD's 633
Third Avenue address.
Pursuant to a 2-page November 5, 2001 memorandum, to the UDC/ESDC
Directors from Charles Gargano, ``Subject: Lower Manhattan
Redevelopment,'' a 1-page ``Authorization to Create the Lower Manhattan
Redevelopment Corporation . . .'' authorized UDC/ESD's president and
chief executive officer to establish a Lower Manhattan Redevelopment
Corporation (sic) as a subsidiary of UDC/ESD. The New York State
Department of State Division of Corporations and State Records issued a
``filing receipt'' for the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation
(LMDC) on December 17, 2001. LMDC is to have ``perpetual'' duration.
According to this Certificate of Incorporation (5 pages) and LMDC's
initial By-Laws (Exhibit, A, 11 pages), LMDC was to be incorporated
under Section 402 of the State's Business Corporation Law, as
authorized by Section 12 of New York's Urban Development Corporation
Act (``the UDC Act''). Its purposes are to exercise the ``all purposes,
powers and functions'' of UDC, ``in furtherance of the implementation
and management of the redevelopment of the area of Manhattan south of
Houston Street [with no southern, eastern or western boundary] in the
city and State of New York (said area referred to as `Lower
Manhattan').''
These vast, unaccountable powers include condemnation, the power to
spend unlimited Federal, State and local funds, the power to issue tax
exemptions and create still more subsidiaries, and broad powers to
tissue contracts, deeds and other instruments. In certain respects UDC/
ESD is very much like Enron--except that its powers are broader than
Enron's, since, as Robert Caro explained in The Power Broker, such
quasi-public authorities partake of both all the powers of government
and all the powers of a private corporation.
At least six of LMDC's directors were appointed by UDC/ESD on the
advice of Governor Pataki, and at least three by UDC/ESD on the advice
of Mayor Giuliani. They all serve at the pleasure of UDC/ESD, a state
authority controlled by the Governor of New York State, unless they
hold an official position in New York City or State. In that case
alone, the Governor or Mayor can remove an LMDC board member by
removing him or her from his/her official State or city position. This
arrangement shields the Governor and Mayor of New York from
accountability.
An organization called ``Reconstruction Watch'' lists the following
11 people as members of the LMDC board (in alphabetical order): Roland
Betts (by Gov.), Paul Crotty (by Mayor), Lewis Eisenberg (by Gov.),
Charles Gargano (the head of UDC/ESD), Richard Grasso (by Mayor),
Robert Harding (by Mayor), Ed Malloy (president of the Building and
Construction Trades Council of Greater New York and the New York State
Building and Construction Trades Council) (by Gov.), John C. Whitehead
(LMDC'a Chair) (by Gov.), Madelyn Wils (by Gov.), Howard Wilson (by
Mayor), Deborah Wright (by Gov.), and Frank Zarb (by Gov.). Louis
Tomson (LMDC's executive director) was appointed by the board. Ira M.
Millstein is counsel to the board. None of the LMDC board members has a
record of public service employment in environmental protection or
public health agencies.
LMDC has at least five Advisory Councils, but the power resides
with the Governor of New York, the man the Governor appoints to head
UDC/ESD (currently Charles Gargano), and the campaign contributors,
political fundraisers, and other powerful and or wealthy but unelected
``players'' who are appointed to the LMDC board.
Meetings of the LMDC board may be held without notice even to the
Board, ``at any place.'' ``No such notice of any meeting need be given
to any director who attends the meeting without protesting, prior
thereto or at its commencement, the lack of notice to him or her. . .
.'' The meeting may occur by conference call ``or similar
communications equipment. . . .''
This development authority has $2 billion from the Federal
Government already, according to the Daily News. It was created without
any environmental review under the State Environmental Quality Review
Act (the state equivalent of the National Environmental Policy Act,
NEPA).
At least five pages of LMDC's Certificate of Incorporation and
initial By-Laws shield the directors of this UDC/ESD subsidiary from
various kinds of liability.
5. The Federal Government (including a bi-partisan Special
Committee of the U.S. Senate) should play an important implementation
and oversight role over disaster recovery efforts for Lower Manhattan.
This country's greatest environmental and public health protection
laws were written in, Washington in the 1970's and 1980's. They were
written in Washington because State and local governments have shown
over and over that they cannot withstand pressure from major campaign
contributors to avoid the enforcement of State and local laws when
wealthy and/or powerful campaign contributors want those laws ignored.
The disaster that resulted from a terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center, may be worse than any other that has ever occurred in
this country. The toxic pollutants released when the towers were
pulverized--and as fires continue to burn--present wholly new air
quality monitoring and remediation problems, and the pollutants in the
area now (both regulated and unregulated) are likely to have
synergistic affects. The health of a great number of the citizens of at
least three states (New York, Connecticut and New Jersey) is at risk.
The exposures of people who work in Lower Manhattan to these
pollutants is generally more than 8 hours a day, In addition, many
people who live in Lower Manhattan also work or go to school in Lower
Manhattan, so they may be exposed to this whole new order of pollutants
24 hours a day. Children are already suffering from increased asthma
attacks; adults are getting adult-onset asthma, which they will have
for the rest of their lives; and people can die from asthma attacks.
This increased incidence of asthma problems may not be as bad as the
lung cancers likely to show up 10, 20 or 30 years down the road--but it
ought to serve as the canary in the coal mine, and prompt effective
preventive actions.
Neither the State of New York, nor the City, nor, their agencies or
authorities is up to the job of protecting the health of the hundreds
of thousands of U.S. citizens who live, work, or go to school in Lower
Manhattan. The U.S. Senate and EPA will just have to take a leading
role.
6. Commercial tenants as well as resident of Lower Manhattan must
be given far better information on cleanup options and techniques.--
Commercial tenants are not being told that there is a difference
between asbestos remediation (i.e., a gold standard office cleanup) and
some other kind of cleanup. Vague ``bid proposals'' are being offered
which do not list the cleanup tasks which will be performed. No
Government Agency that CAC is aware of has mentioned that office
carpeting should be removed if possible, and should only be replaced
after post-cleaning clearance and/or re-entry testing shows that the
air and any dust in the office is safe to breathe.
Decontamination chambers are generally used in asbestos-
remediation-style cleanups, to keep toxic contaminants from being
resuspended, Cleaned desks, file cabinets, and papers should be moved
out of the office if possible, and not put back until the office tests
clean.
Clean Air Campaign still has not been able to find out how many
decontamination chambers one needs if the office contents cannot be
moved out, and how big they need to be--i.e., whether or not two would
fit into a small office.
Both the Internal Revenue Service and the State Tax Department have
sent mailings to employers with payrolls in the WTC area, informing us
of extended tax filing deadlines. Information on truly effective
cleanups could be included in future mailings.
7. Better information on the internet.-- Any citizen anywhere in
this country who wants to help devise better testing or cleanup
protocols, or who wants to see what real experts (with names and
affiliations) have to say, should be able to get the information--and
provide it--using the internet. The Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee should sponsor appropriate websites until other agencies show
they are willing and able to do the job.
conclusion
It is in everyone's interest to restore air quality to safe levels
in Lower Manhattan by cleaning up all possible contaminants at the
source, and removing them from Manhattan. The alternative approaches
aren't working (providing misleading reassurances, misspending the
public funds available to solve the real problems in Lower Manhattan,
and seeking to shift the costs and liability for a public health
disaster, onto other parties, especially the individuals who live,
work, or go to school in Lower Manhattan). Parents of schoolchildren,
residents and workers who want to return (or send their children back)
to Lower Manhattan have been getting sick and facing agonizing choices
over the last 5 months. Before we all go to stress counselors (which we
haven't had time to do), we need to have the sources of the stress
removed. Those include the unprecedented burden of contaminants in
Lower Manhattan.
Clean Air Campaign would be happy to provide additional information
on request. We also hope there will be more U.S. Senate, House of
Representatives, and EPA hearings. Finally, we would appreciate
receiving a copy of the written record of this hearing, unless all the
statements which have been submitted for the record are put on EPW's
website.
Statement of David Koon, Chair, New York State Legislative Commission
on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances
Thank you for inviting my testimony as chair of the Legislative
Commission on Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances to be entered into
the record of today's proceedings.
The devastating attacks at the World Trade Center on September 11th
have left emotional scars on the victims, their families, and the
country. Just as important, these events have left the potential for
serious long-term health impacts on the thousands of individuals who
risked their lives to save others, have responded to assist with
cleanup efforts, and who live and work in Lower Manhattan. I would like
to commend your efforts here today to further bring to light many of
the environmental health issues resulting from the events of September
11th.
As the chair of the Assembly's Hazardous Waste and Toxic Substances
Commission, my office has been closely monitoring the developments of
reported health effects of contaminate exposure to workers and
residents of Lower Manhattan.
As the rescue, recovery and cleanup efforts have progressed, issues
regarding worker safety as well as residential exposure have come to
the forefront. Environmental monitoring data has not been consistently
provided to the public, and government agencies have been criticized
for not releasing environmental data sooner. After the initial delay in
posting environmental data, a clear picture of the extent of the
contamination and its implications for public health and the
environment remains elusive.
There are a number of factors that have contributed to the general
unease and anxiety over environmental monitoring information. The delay
in making test results publicly available and the failure to reveal all
information that EPA used to make public health determinations, further
exacerbated the situation. In addition, the test results of independent
consultants, some whom had been previously hired to perform
environmental monitoring analysis after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombings, were dismissed, citing that their ``testing methods weren't
recognized.''
The confusion and skepticism expressed by many people regarding
environmental monitoring and testing at the World Trade Center site has
resulted, in part, because there is no clear legal or regulatory
framework in place to deal with the type and magnitude of the
disastrous building collapse. The environmental and public health
impacts caused by the sudden, complete and unplanned destruction of the
office buildings in Lower Manhattan are not directly addressed at
either the Federal or State legal levels. In attempting to determine
what levels of environmental exposure to chemicals are ``permissible''
or ``acceptable'' has left government officials looking to statutes and
regulations that would have applied in a normal building construction
and demolition scenario, and the amounts of chemicals that could be
legally permitted to enter the air under those statutes. The laws and
regulations that are being referenced address many substances including
asbestos exposure to workers, asbestos clean-up requirements, hazardous
waste content of debris, and fine particulates in the air.
More than 20 thousand people live within \1/2\ mile of Ground Zero,
close to three thousand of them are children. As I am sure you will
repeatedly hear during today's proceedings, many workers and residents
within the Lower Manhattan area are reporting similar health symptoms:
nosebleeds, sore throats, bronchial infections and an ``endless racking
cough'' more commonly referred to as the ``WTC Cough.'' Several
students who attend nearby Stuyvesant High School have reported cases
of skin rashes, nosebleeds, headaches, respiratory infections, and eye
infections. Three Stuyvesant High School teachers have left due to
respiratory illnesses. Approximately one-fourth of the city's
firefighters involved in rescue and cleanup activities complain of
severe coughing. FDNY has reported that approximately 750 firefighters,
8 percent of its work force, are on medical leave. Several hundred of
these individuals may be forced to retire from the Department. More
than one thousand have filed claims against the City. In early January,
four Port Authority officers were reassigned after blood monitoring
tests revealed high mercury levels.
While government test analysis show asbestos and other contaminate
levels generally fall below the standards set for safe human exposure,
health officials remain concerned about long- and short-term health
impacts of these exposures. Officials have publicly stated that their
knowledge on related-health impacts is based on long-term exposure.
There is no precedent for a disaster of this magnitude and many health
implications remain unknown.
Acting on public concern, the Assembly Speaker, whose District
encompasses the World Trade Center site, convened a public hearing in
November to examine the public health and environmental impacts of the
terrorist attacks. Witnesses included panels of elected officials,
community groups, government agencies and representatives from
environmental, health and labor organizations. The recurring themes of
the hearing were the same: inadequate testing methods, particularly
outside the perimeter of Ground Zero; better coordination of
communication between the agencies conducting the testing and releasing
information; extensive health concerns for workers onsite at Ground
Zero; and inadequate action taken to protect the public from the
hazards of pollutants released by the 11-week-long fire.
The Assembly hearing testimony confirmed that despite the well-
intentioned efforts, communication between the various governmental
agencies and the public was inadequate. While the enormity of the
incident was unprecedented and the need to initially concentrate all
resources on emergency and recovery efforts is certainly
understandable, subsequent governmental actions failed to reassure the
public about their health and safety. The discrepancy in testing
methods and results has created much anxiety for the residents and
workers in Lower Manhattan. The failure of government to conduct
residential indoor air testing and subsequently allow residents to
reoccupy their homes may result in real long-term health concerns,
particularly in children and the elderly.
Further, very little information has been provided regarding water
quality in the World Trade Center area. Upon a recent visit to EPA
headquarters, Assembly staff witnessed cleanup workers spray washing
the dust and debris from the sides of the buildings. While the workers
wore protective face gear, the runoff simply emptied into the street,
dropping on scaffolds on the sidewalks as pedestrians walked underneath
and around them, simply changing the pathway of exposure.
It serves no public interest to point fingers and blame as we move
forward from this great national tragedy. Moreover, as the City moves
ahead with cleanup and redevelopment efforts, let us work together to
regain the public's trust by establishing better communication between
governmental entities regarding who is testing what area and for which
contaminants. Develop consistent reporting methods to inform the public
of all potential health impacts that exist. Testing methods themselves
need to be the most stringent and protective of the public health and
environment available. Improvements in all these areas will help to
allay fears of the public, thereby allowing them to make informed
decisions.
Thank you very much. We would be happy to provide you with
information collected by the Commission staff as well as a copy of the
Assembly's hearing transcript and testimony given at those proceedings.
__________
Statement of Patricia R. Dillon, New York, NY
My sincere thanks to the committee, and to Senators Clinton and
Lieberman, for today's hearings regarding health and environmental
problems in Lower Manhattan related to the September 11th World Trade
Center disaster.
I am a resident of the Tribeca neighborhood and I also work in
Lower Manhattan--at 80 Centre Street. My mild respiratory
difficulties--seasonal sneezing and itchy eyes, and an occasional cough
caused by New York City's normal poor air quality--have been greatly
exacerbated by the current, ongoing problems with recovery and
``cleanup'' (I hesitate to use that word, since what precious little
cleanup is occurring is being done in the most sloppy and dangerous
manner).
When I leave the city for a few days, my coughing stops and my
breathing eases, so I know that these difficulties are due to my
virtually constant exposure to the air near Ground Zero. I am assured
by the Department of Health and other public agencies that I will
certainly suffer no long-term ill effects. But, how can I trust any of
these Government agencies when it is clear that they have obfuscated,
covered up and outright lied about what they do know, and given us the
worst possible advice about how to deal with the situation. Wet-mop
indeed! What about the air-intake vents on the roofs of apartment
buildings, which are sucking in toxins from the never-been-cleaned
roofs and distributing them throughout all the air ducts in the
buildings?
Why is New York City not mandating building owners to do
environmentally safe cleaning of their buildings, and why is the
Federal Government not reimbursing the owners for doing it? FEMA, as
well as NY State agencies and the Red Cross, is throwing money at
individual victims for rent, mortgage payments, food, etc., but we are
told there is no money available for environmental cleanup. That is
insane!
There are hardly any protocols being followed for the environmental
cleaning of building interiors or exteriors, or for roads and streets.
Washing of the roadways around Ground Zero and along the routes to the
barges is happening much less frequently in the past month, even though
there is just as much airborne toxic dust and debris in our
neighborhood as ever. Recycled water could be used if drought is the
excuse; salt/sea water could be used if freezing temperatures are the
problem.
Some of the trucks carrying the debris to the barges at Pier 25 are
still operating uncovered and minimally wetted down; the barges, once
loaded, have never been covered. Why on earth not?
The initial sitting of the barges next to a high school, across the
street from a college, and four blocks from three other schools, speaks
volumes about the lack of concern for the health of our children.
They--and the thousands of residents nearby--are clearly in danger! I
understand that it is probably too late in the process of debris
removal to move the barges to a less dangerous location, but I do not
see why the cleanup contractors cannot be obligated to follow the
strictest environmental safety procedures.
Can the committee take action to ensure that the barge operation at
Pier 25 will be dismantled when the cleanup is completed, and that any
new barge operation in the post-cleanup/construction phase will be
located in a less heavily residential area, such as Canal Street or
Pier A near Battery Park?
Who is responsible for the cleaning of the sidewalks--especially
those around our schools--which are always dusty and littered with
debris?
Can the committee help residents with testing of apartments and
building interiors and, if contaminants are found, enforce
environmentally safe cleaning?
Can you find a way to enforce the cleanup of roofs and building
exteriors, to prevent constant re-contamination of the downtown area?
Or get it done by a Federal Agency?
Will you initiate and fund studies on the effects of multiple
contaminants, and on the best cleanup methods, and then enforce the
best possible guidelines?
Will the committee press for a health study immediately, to look at
immediate effects, and for followup studies on a regular schedule
(every 6 months or yearly)?
Will the committee introduce legislation providing for free medical
care for WTC disaster-related illnesses, now and in the future, for
those being exposed to poisons in our environment that are being swept
under the rug by our Government?
Will you investigate and report on:
EPA's double standards in re the thorough cleanup of their
own Lower Manhattan offices vs. the complete disregard of all other
office space?
The decision to reopen downtown residences?
Air quality data gathered during the first 2 weeks after
the disaster that seems to have been withheld from the public?
Finally, what is the plan for decontaminating the Fresh Kills
landfill after current activity ends?
Thank you for any help you can give us.
__________
Statement of Sondra Levin, Former Chairman, NYC Group of the
Sierra Club
The New York City Sierra Club is dismayed that misinformation and
lack of enough information has been provided by the city Health
Department and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency about the
significant amount of air pollutants from the World Trade Center
disaster.
The city health department under the Giuliani administration also
gave misinformation about massive pesticide spraying over the city
during the past 3 years. Former Mayor Giuliani falsely claimed the
spraying was safe when pesticides used and the way they were used were
unsafe. As a result of the spraying, many people became sick and the
city's environment was contaminated. The exact extent of the damage is
still unknown, but it was significant.
The city Sierra Club is dismayed that heroic rescuers of the World
Trade Center disaster including firefighters and police were exposed to
air pollution without proper protection.
The city Sierra Club advocates that the World Trade Center site and
surrounding buildings affected by air pollutants be cleaned up at
public expense according to the highest safety standards.
We highly commend Senator Hillary Clinton for spearheading an
investigation to find out how much of a problem exists, since that is
still unclear. Complete information and action is needed to avoid
compounding the tragedy of the World Trade Center disaster.
Letter from Edward Fluss, New York, NY
Hon. James M. Jeffords, Chairman,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Washington, DC.
Senator:
I want to be clear and I want this message for the record to be
simply understood.
Have any of you any clue what is going on in downtown Manhattan? I
say you do not have a clue. Perhaps you have not visited, perhaps you
don't look up at the buildings still standing. Perhaps you are afraid
like I am that you will get sick.
Have any of you visited any building in downtown Manhattan? I
repeat any building?
Look out ANY window and look to any building and you will see dust
still on the window sills and glass of all buildings downtown! This
dust is contaminated with all sorts of toxins--yes asbestos included!
Need proof? Call me-212-231-5139 and I will show you pictures and
provide you with samples.
More insane, yes I use the word insane is the fact that the
buildings surrounding Ground Zero such as the Deutche Bank building to
the south of Ground Zero stands open with broken windows filled with
dust and debris from September 11th! That dust is still, yes still
today, February 19, 2002, blowing out of the building onto men, women
and children living, working and attending school in the area!
I'll repeat: Yes, the dust packed office space is open and dust is
blowing out of the building onto citizens such as myself, into
apartments such as my apartment in 600 Gateway and polluting the
downtown area each day, every day 24 hours a day!
How can this contaminated building be standing and absolutely open
to the environment and to people living and working in its vicinity! I
ask again how can this be? This is a private building but why isn't it
wrapped in a plastic bubble or something?
There must be action taken by someone or some institution. The EPA
is failing, The NYC DOH is failing. Government is failing us all here!
__________
Kathleen Ewald,
Brooklyn, NY., February 22, 2002.
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Senators: I live in a part of northwest Brooklyn called Carroll
Gardens, which is right on the East River, approximately 2 miles
southeast of WTC. The wind on September 11th blew the dust and debris
straight over this part of Brooklyn.
That morning, I had accidentally left my air conditioner turned on.
In my panic over finding family and friends (phones were barely
working)--let alone my fear that the entire city was being destroyed--I
failed to realize that the air conditioner was running. It wasn't until
that night, that I realized I was smelling the dust and debris that was
falling on my neighborhood in my house, that I turned off the air
conditioner. I coughed through the night and into the next morning.
Then I watched Christie Whitman at the site on TV saying the dust/air
was only dangerous if you were at the site. I had fine brown dust
around my bedroom, not the inches of dust they were showing in
apartments near the site. I followed the advice to clean up dust with
wet rags. At the same time, I was incredulous that people were supposed
to clean up their own apartments.
Outside, in my neighborhood, there was an inch of brown soot on
everything. Homeowners brushed it off their stoops and into the
streets.
Then I went on with my life. I followed instructions: ``Don't
panic. Be strong. We can't let the terrorists win.'' I spent my Fridays
volunteering at a Brooklyn charity that gave financial aid to September
11th victims.
In returning to work in NoHo on September 13, I was hit by air that
smelled like pure chemicals. I felt like my lungs were closing up.
Still, officials continued to say the air was safe. I particularly
remember newspaper articles quoting officials who said that any
respiratory irritation was temporary and would pass. Around this time
Whitman also announced that our air ``is safe to breathe.''
I ignored my symptoms for weeks, then realized that they were not
going away. In an ER in late October, I was diagnosed with reactive
airways disease. A pulmonologist did pulmonary function tests and
confirmed it further, calling it asthma.
I don't smoke, and I never had asthma before September 11th.
My symptoms don't end there. I have frequent headaches and stomach
burning, a symptom of GERD, which MSNBC recently reported is a common
symptom of WTC Syndrome sufferers.
Late last year, I started reading the articles on Joel Kupferman's
website. Andrew Schneider's recent articles on (a) how the EPA used 20-
year-old methods to measure asbestos and (b) the withholding of
information as to the causticity of the dust finally scared me into the
realization: This stuff is still in my house and I've been sleeping in
it and breathing it in since September! This is why I'm still sick!
I hired an environmental testing company. They did not find
asbestos in the samples they took, but they did find pulverized
fiberglass--and lots of brown dust. Attempting to clean it up myself
was apparently NOT the thing to do. I am currently having it re-tested
for other chemicals.
I had the apartment HEPA vacuumed. I suppose my apartment is clean
now. But it's 5 months later, and I don't know what toxins are coursing
through my veins or turning into cancer in my lungs. I was a completely
healthy young woman a year ago. Now I don't know what's going to happen
to me, and I'm terrified.
Had we been told: The dust is caustic! Fiberglass is a carcinogen!
The dust isn't just dangerous at WTC, it's dangerous in every
neighborhood where the wind took it on September 11th! If you have a
bit of dust in your house, leave immediately, don't clean it yourself
with wet rags! . . . Had we been told that, I'm sure I would have
responded differently. But I believed what we were told, and now I'm
paying the price.
Sincerely yours,
Kathleen Ewald.
__________
State University of New York, University at Albany,
Rensselaer, NY, February 8, 2002.
To the Parents of Children in PS 89: It was my pleasure to address
the parents and teachers at PS 89 last Tuesday night where I could
explain why, in my opinion, it is not safe to re-occupy the building at
this time. This letter is to put in writing these reasons, and also to
tell you more about who I am.
In 1980 I came to Albany as the Director of the Wadsworth
Laboratories of the New York State Department of Health. The major
event which brought me to Albany was related to Love Canal, which was
the first time in our history when people became aware of the hazards
of chemical wastes in our communities, and event with many
commonalities to the WTC attack. I became the Dean of the School of
Public Health at the University at Albany in 1985. When I resigned as
Dean in 1998, I became the Director of the Institute for Health and the
Environment, a research and teaching Institute directed at protecting
health. I have considerable expertise on issues related to children's
environmental health, as evidenced by the fact that I have been the
organizer of two meetings on this subject in Asia, sponsored by the
U.S. National Institutes of Health and the World Health Organization.
Children are much more vulnerable than adults to the effects of
environmental contaminants, but most of the standards that have been
set by EPA and other Federal and State agencies are based on effects
(often occupational) on adult white males. Therefore, in order to
protect children it is essential that one add safety factors over what
is proposed for adults. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to be
concerned only with immediate, acute health effects, but also to
protect children from cancer and other chronic diseases which may
appear many years after the exposure to toxins. In my judgment no one
has demonstrated that PS 89 is safe for reoccupancy at present, and
indeed the evidence presented is clear that it is not safe. The reasons
for this conclusion are as follows:
Air-borne particulates are dangerous to everyone. They can triggers
asthma attacks in vulnerable individuals, and may even cause asthma and
other respiratory diseases. While the EPA standard of an 8-hour work
day for adults is 65 ng/m3, EPA has set a level of particulates in air
of 40 ng/m3 for adults with respiratory or cardiac disease. This value
is also applied to children. The level of particulates measured in PS
89 was greater than 40 ng/m3 on 5 of 11 days tested, and on 3 days even
the average sample was greater than this value, while on a fourth ,day
the average was 39.9 ng/m3. On days when the outsider particulate
levels were high, the insider levels were high. Therefore, the present
filtering system is not preventing particulates from getting into the
building. There is, at present, no convincing evidence that the
technique used for these measurements is invalid. On the basis of these
readings, alone, the school should not be re-opened. There is certainly
adequate evidence for asthma, coughs and other kinds of breathing
disorders in persons exposed at other sites near the WTC, and children
should not be in the school building until the particulate levels are
definitively documented to be below 40 ng/m3 at all times.
Most usual particulates are simple products of combustion, and
contain only small quantities of toxic chemicals. This may not be true
near to the WTC, since there is clear evidence that dioxins, furans,
PCBs, asbestos and several metals were released during the collapse and
fires. Thus, even if the particulate levels are below the magic number
of 40 ng/m3, it is essential to demonstrate that the particulates do
not contain toxic substances at high concentration. This is done by
collecting either the particulates from an air filter or the dust from
surfaces, weighting the sample, and then determining the relative
percentage of the weight that is toxic. This has not be done. There
have been some measurements of toxins in air and on surfaces, but not
on the basis of weight. Furthermore, some of the measurements done have
been totally flawed. For example, the sensitivity of the measurement of
PCBs in air was so low that the smallest value that could be detected
was 4.2 times greater than the occupational standard for adult white
males, and even that value would not be protective of children.
Other health experts recommend no outdoor play at times when the
particulate levels are high. This is a wise recommendation, but the
same recommendation applies to the inside environment.
In my judgment parents have the right, and indeed the
responsibility, to demand that the indoor environment of PS 89 be
proven to be safe from both acute and long-term health hazards before
the building is reoccupied. There is presently no such evidence, and
too much doubt to justify re-occupancy at the present time. We must not
repeat a Love Canal by making decisions in haste that may adversely
affect the health of our children.
Sincerely,
David O. Carpenter, M.D.,
Professor.
__________
Response by Antonia Godsey to Comments from Walter E. Mugdan, Regional
Counsel, U.S. EPA
NYSBA Environmental Law Section Annual Meeting, January 25, 2002
Re: Response to Remarks
Thank you for your presentation at the New York State Bar
Association Environmental Law Section Meeting on January 25, 2002
addressing the air quality in downtown Manhattan. My response to your
comments will address the concerns I have about the health risks
associated with exposures to contaminated dust found near the WTC site
and the extreme need for EPA to take a more active role in monitoring
and conducting a responsive clean up of the interior of apartment
buildings and office spaces in downtown Manhattan as well as the
interior of homes where rescue workers and construction workers live
and may have tracked contaminated dust into homes.\1\
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\1\ It was mentioned at the NYSBA in comments made by EPA
representative, Ms. Callahan, that ``EPA conducted a professional
abatement of its office building; by professional contractors and under
strict asbestos guidelines, because FBI personnel who were entering the
building had come directly from the site and thus may have tracked
contaminated materials into the building''. (My notes taken at meeting
January 25, 2002).
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stringent control measures should be enforced to address toxins in the
air near the wtc site
The Mugdan comments note the importance of emphasizing the NESHAPS
regulations along with the significance of the Clean Air Act, yet, in
the same breath the comments go on to state that, ``the regulations do
not apply to the cleaning of WTC dust from apartments or offices:'' \2\
In particular you state that ``the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes EPA
to regulate the protection of outside air and not indoor air.'' \3\ The
neighboring vicinity of the WTC site has become a great concern among a
number of people who live and work within the community. Just this past
week, FOX News and USA Today reported that EPA continues to downplay
the potential air quality problems at the WTC site. There are a number
of professionals who have commented on the potential for dangers
associated with the known and hazardous pollutants identified in
downtown Manhattan,\4\ yet EPA continues to assert interpretations of
the law that skirt the issue.
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\2\ Mugdan comments NYSBA meeting, January 25, 2002 ELS at page 11,
para 5 at FN 12.
\3\ Mugdan comments NYSBA meeting, January 25, 2002 ELS at page 10,
para 2.
\4\ See Statement of Marjorie Clarke, Ph.D., State Assembly
Committee on Environmental Conservation public hearing on health
matters resulting form the September 11th WTC attacks submitted
November 27, 2001 and statement of Cate Jenkins, Ph.D., USEPA
Preliminary Assessment Hazardous Waste Identification Division January
11, 2002 and UC Davis News and Information, Trade Center Air Held
Unprecedented amounts of Fine Particles . . . Metals Say Scientists, UC
Davis Delta Group, February 11, 2002. www.news.ucdavis.edu
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The Mugdan comments cite the Clean air Act (CAA), the National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS), the Toxics
Substance Control Act (TSCA) and Asbestos Hazardous Emergency Response
Act (AHERA)\5\ as authority for the EPA reasoning to refuse to enforce
regulations for the quality of indoor air. In the interpretation of
these regulations, the Mugdan comments provide the definition of the
words ``renovation'' and ``demolition'' and their meaning under
NESHAPS. These comments go on to state that: the definition for
``renovation'' cannot plausibly be stretched to include the cleaning of
WTC dust that reached apartments and offices'' \6\ (in downtown
Manhattan). When considering the meaning of a statutory phrase, one
must consider not only the ordinary meaning of the words but also the
meaning of the words in light of the purpose, context and structure of
the entire statute of which the phrase is apart.\7\
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\5\ Section 112 CAA 42 USC Sec 7412 and NESHAP codified at 40 CFR
Part 61, subpart M; AHERA amendment to TSCA 15 USC Sec 2641 and 40 CFR
Part 763, subpart E. Sec 7630.80 et seq.
\6\ Mugdan comments NYSBA meeting, January 25, 2002 ELS at page 12,
para 4.
\7\ American Mining Congress vs. USEPA; 263 US APP. D.C. 197, 824 F
2d 1177, 1184-85 (D.C. Cir: 1987).
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sampling results are finding levels above the maximum threshold that
can be dangerous to human health
Hazardous substances are presently documented near the neighboring
vicinity of the site and in some cases were found to be above the
maximum standards allowable for the protection of human health. A
sample of 2.2 percent chrysotile\8\ (asbestos, ACM) was found inside of
an apartment building on Pine Street in downtown New York, a few blocks
away from the site.\9\ In light of this information there is a strong
presumption that ACM is present in other apartments and office
buildings in the same vicinity. This creates a serious concern and has
caused a number of people to give attention to the issue of whether the
WTC site and vicinity should be classified under. CERCLA as an
emergency measure to respond to the threat of further hazardous
substance releases. Under CERCLA it is noted that,
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\8\ Chrysotile currently accounts for more than 99 percent of world
asbestos consumption; e.g. asbestos cement construction products,
asbestos cement pipe, roofing tiles, sheeting and fibers combined with
resin to produce temperature resistant linings. Researchers now believe
that the carcinogenicity of the fibrous substance is related to several
physical and chemical characteristics. www.asbestos-institute.ca/crg/
crgcontent.html Article entitled, Chrysotile Reference Guide, Asbestos
Family of Fibers, Asbestos Related Disease, data from world consumption
production 1984-1994.
\9\ Test results from ATC Assoc. Inc. NY Bulk Asbestos Analysis
Sheet PLM results Field No 315, 2.2 percent chrysotile October 10,
2001, Batch No. 3068, published at nyenvirolaw.org.
Upon receipt of information that there is a hazardous waste
at any site which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to human health, the administrator shall provide
an immediate notice to the appropriate local government
agencies. In addition, the administrator shall require notice
of such endangerment to be promptly posted at the site where
the waste is located.\10\
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\10\ Title 42 Chp 82 Subchapter VII Sec 6973 (c) Immediate Notice.
Consider the relationship between CERCLA and TSCA: e.g. the Toxic
Substance Control Act (TSCA) authorizes the EPA to control existing
chemical substances determined to cause an unreasonable risk of injury
to public health or the environment and to take action with respect to
chemical substances which are imminent hazards.\11\ Under TSCA, Title I
and Title II, (AHERA amended in 1990 ASHARA) EPA should be obliged to
monitor and sample the air inside of buildings in downtown Manhattan
where a serious threat to human health potentially exists.\12\
Likewise, under CERCLA an action may be brought, consistent with the
National Contingency Plan, if necessary to respond to the release of a
hazardous substance imminently dangerous to public health.\13\ CERCLA
provides several complimentary mechanisms to effectuate hazardous
substance removal. It was designed by Congress to protect and preserve
public health and the environment. Under the statute, the Federal
Government may conduct its own removal of hazardous substances which
includes such action as may be necessary to monitor, access and
evaluate the further release of a hazardous substance; the disposal of
removed materials and the taking of any such other action as may be
necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate damage to the public health
or welfare.\14\
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\11\ TSCA Title I--Control of Toxic Substances--includes provisions
for regulating hazardous chemicals substances and mixtures with
provisions for managing imminent hazards Title II--Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act (AHERA, Pub. L. 99-519), which was amended in
1990 by the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Reauthorization Act
(ASHARA, Pub. L.101-637) to require the accreditation of persons who
inspect for asbestos containing material in schools and public and
commercial buildings. It also authorizes requirements for the
accreditation of persons who design or conduct response actions with
respect to friable asbestos containing material (ACM) in such
buildings. See infra.
\12\ Guidance for Controlling Asbestos Containing Materials In
Buildings [EPA 560/5/85-024]: Introduction to the problem of asbestos
in buildings and guidance for coping with the problem, 6/85; USEPA
Office of Pollution and Prevention of Toxics.
\13\ 42 USC Sec 9605 CERCLA/SARA Sec 105 (4)(d) National
Contingency Plan--Any person who may be affected by a release or a
threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant, may petition the President to conduct a preliminary
assessment of the hazards to public health and the environment which
arc associated with such release.
\14\ Id The term ``removal'' means the cleanup of a hazardous
substance in the environment and any such other actions that may
necessary in the event there is a threat of release of a hazardous
substance; CERCLA 42 USC Sec 9601 (23) removal defined at (Sec 101) and
(106)(a).
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epa has not rebut the presumption that acm is present in dust samples
above the threshold requirements
In an OSHA Administrative decision that came before the DC Circuit
last year in December 2001, petitioners sought review of a decision and
Court Order imposed by the OSHA Review Commission.\15\ There, the court
found that a company performing abatement activities committed 10
violations of the Asbestos Construction Standards promulgated at 29
CFR. Sec 1926.1101. It was noted that the company failed to use the
required sampling methodology for asbestos abatement. Under the
regulations, a building owner must identify all installed-thermal:
system insulation and surfacing materials found in any building built
before 1980; as it is presumed that ACM material is present.\16\ The
regulation provides a means to rebut the presumption by following
specified testing requirements. The OSHA Commission ruled that ``an
owner who fails to use specified testing methods to identify the
presence of ACM fails to rebut the presumption that ACM is present in a
building.'' \17\ The U.S. Court of Appeal for D.C. agreed that ``when
specified methodology does not follow regulatory requirements a company
will be found to have not exercised reasonable diligence in its
asbestos abatement analysis.'' \18\ Similarly, EPA Government officials
have failed to come forward with adequate notice to the public and has
failed to use due diligence in investigating this matter. In New York
City, at and near the WTC site there is a strong presumption that ACM,
along with other potentially innocuous dust, is present inside of
buildings.\19\ EPA has not necessarily provided any proof to rebut the
presumption that ACM and a dangerous mix of other potential toxins may
be present in dusts found in occupied buildings and office spaces
downtown.
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\15\ Odessey Capital Group III. L.P. d/b/a Cascade Apartments v.
OSHA Review Commission and Secretary of Labor No. 01-1030, 2001 U.S.
App., Lexis 27797.
\16\ Id see Odyssey Capital Group, III, L.P.
\17\ Id see Odyssey Capital Group III, L.P.
\18\ Id see Odyssey Capital Group III. L.P.
\19\ There may be certain synergistic interactions between some of
the compounds that may be present in the dust that is unknown since
ambient air standards are for individual pollutants. See Statement of
Marjorie Clarke, Ph.D. State Assembly Committee on Environmental
Conservation Public Health Matters November 26, 2001; Also see UC Davis
News & Information article entitled Trade Center Air Held Unprecedented
Amount of Very Fine Particles . . . February 11, 2002.
www.news.ucdavis.edu and www.nyenvirolaw.org
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piecemeal control of the risks associated with acm is not satisfactory
Comments and proposals published in the Federal Register January
29, 1986 relating to 40 CFR Part 763 (the proposal of a rule under
Section 6 of TSCA)\20\ provides supplementary information that takes
into consideration EPA's former objective, back in 1986, with regards
to consumer products containing asbestos material. Under the proposed
rule it is noted that:
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\20\ In 1986, EPA proposed a rule under Section 6 of Toxic
Substance Control Act (TSCA) to prohibit the manufacture, import and
processing of asbestos in certain products and to phaseout the use of
asbestos in all other products.
Asbestos, since the advent of it's widespread use, has
resulted in thousands of painful premature deaths from lung
cancer and other diseases.\21\ Because of the widespread use of
asbestos and its particular nature, piecemeal control of the
risks it presents is not satisfactory; only elimination of
asbestos to the extent feasible will produce acceptable
reduction of risks.\22\
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\21\ Mesothelioma occurs in the pluera (the membrane that surrounds
the lung cavity) and the peritoneum (which surrounds the abdominal
organs); Asbestosis involves fibrosis of the lungs and plural tissues;
USEPA FR. Vol 51 No. 19 p. 3741.
\22\ Asbestos Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed
Manufacturing, Importation and Processing Prohibitions: USEPA; Federal
Register Vol 51, No. 19; Wednesday, January 29, 1986; Proposed. Rules;
(comments made by EPA Administrator William Rielly).
This discussion presented by EPA in 1986, goes on to address the
serious and well-documented studies linked to asbestos as a carcinogen,
a cause of lung disease and an alarming threat to human health. In
particular, the threat is insidious due to the unique quality of its
fiber which has aerodynamic features that allow the fibers to become
easily suspended and re-suspended in the air, transported on clothes,
and able to travel long distances.\23\ Once released asbestos fibers
are difficult to detect and contain and they continue to readily enter
the ambient air. Persons may be exposed not only at the time and place
of release but long after the release has occurred. There is a constant
renewal of risks as asbestos fibers re-enter the atmosphere repeatedly
over time.\24\ According to sampling results taken by EPA the
suspension of numerous toxins including asbestos has been identified in
exceeding limits in various sampling results that have been published
on the New York Law and Justice Project NYLJP) website and EPA
website.\25\ With this in mind, it may be appropriate to take
exceedingly stringent precautions when sampling and monitoring for
contaminant dust in downtown Manhattan, including the bulk sampling of
interior of buildings.
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\23\ Id FR Vol 51, no 19 p. 3738.
\24\ Id FR Vol 51, no 19 pp. 3738-39.
\25\ www.nyenvirolaw.org Laboratory Analysis Report, conducted by
ATC Associates, accredited by NVLAP (Lab code 1187-00 and NY State DOH
ELAP (Lab ID 10879), states that samples that are layered and analyzed
by the gravimetric method as composite (NESHAPS, AHERA) should be
considered positive if results are between trace and 1 percent, unless
every layer is analyzed separately.
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the dangers associated with the release and re-release of toxic dust
may be harmful to health
The National Research Council Committee on Non-Occupational Health
Risks of Asbestiform Fibers has adopted a linear no threshold model to
estimate the risks to non-occupational populations from exposures to
asbestos in the environment.\26\ Despite the known risks of asbestos,
continuous release of asbestos fibers will occur if downtown Manhattan
buildings with occupied apartments and office spaces are not cleaned
properly.\27\ Leaving the abatement process up to resident owners is
not in compliance with The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act
(AHERA, Pub. L. 99-519), which was amended in 1990 by the Asbestos
School Hazard Abatement Reauthorization Act (ASHARA, Pub. L. 101-637)
to require the accreditation of persons who inspect for asbestos
containing material in schools and public and commercial buildings. It
also authorizes requirements for the accreditation of persons who
design or conduct response actions with respect to friable asbestos-
containing material in such buildings.\28\ At a minimum, EPA should be
overseeing the cleanup of downtown buildings to assure that adequate
abatement is being carried out by accredited persons, not only in
schools but also in public and commercial buildings. Under the
regulations, public and commercial building is defined as:
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\26\ Id at 3742-43 The derivation and validation of the models is
discussed in detail in ``EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis of Controls
on Asbestos Products''.
\27\ Id at 3742-43 and also see UC Davis News and Information
article entitled: Trade Center Air.
\28\ AHERA 40 CFR 763, Appendix C to subpart E--Asbestos Model
Accreditation Plan.
the interior space of any building which is not a school
building. . . . The term includes, but is not limited to:
industrial and office buildings, residential apartment
buildings and condominiums of 10 or more dwelling units,
government-owned buildings, colleges, museums, airports,
hospitals, churches, preschools, stores, warehouses and
factories. Interior space includes exterior hallways connecting
buildings, porticos and mechanical systems used to condition
interior space.\29\
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\29\ Id at Appendix C to subpart E--I. Asbestos Model Accreditation
Plan (A)(6).
Furthermore, under the Federal regulations, EPA is supposed to
provide extensive technical assistance programs which provide guidance
to public and private building owners for the safe removal of asbestos
dust during abatement projects.\30\ Substantial health risks are
potentially present among building occupants, office workers and the
general population where asbestos contaminated dusts still lie
dangerously embedded within carpets, around window sills in ventilation
systems and in corners of dwelling spaces inside of buildings where
dust has settled both near and several blocks away from the WTC
site.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Id.
\31\ An apartment building located on Pine Street levels of
asbestos which are above threshold safety standards. See FN 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you know, the health effects of exposure to asbestos dust can be
devastating. Repeated reports that attempt to downplay the danger
suggest that short-term exposures may not be serious. This may not
necessarily be true. Many years of studies have been undertaken to
identify the potential risks associated with occupational exposures and
studies have been conducted on populations exposed to airborne
concentrations of asbestos for relatively long periods of time.\32\
However, please note, that there is direct evidence of adverse health
effects from non-occupational asbestos exposures among persons living
in households of asbestos workers who have developed mesothelioma and
asbestos related radiographic changes in a persons lungs.\33\ A number
of mesotheliomas have also been documented among populations whose only
identified exposure was from living near asbestos mining areas,
asbestos product factories and shipyards where asbestos use has been
very heavy.\34\ People may encounter higher than average environmental
asbestos concentrations in air if they live near an asbestos containing
waste site or asbestos related industry of if they live or work in a
building that has undergone a poorly performed asbestos removal
operation.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See Federal Register Environmental Protection Agency Asbestos
Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions . . . Vol 51 No 19 January 29,
1986 Proposed Rules pgs. 3742-3743.
\33\ Consumer Product Safety Commission Report; A study based on
findings of the National Institute of Environmental Health, 8th Report
on Carcinogens: Asbestos; As a result of these and other findings, EPA
amended the Asbestos Worker Protection Rule (40 CFR 763). Under the
Supplementary information Sec II (A)(5) The economic consequence of
this rule states: ``EPA has found that this rule is likely to result in
other benefits such as asbestosis cases being avoided among workers,
with reduced exposures to worker families from asbestos fibers being
brought home on clothing. . . .
\34\ Id; and the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
Vol 14, Sec 7, 1986 and FR Vol 51, No 19 p 3741; January 29, 1986.
\35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inclusive in the sampling and abatement of the interior of
buildings in downtown Manhattan should be an accounting, sampling and
abatement of the homes-of rescue workers and contractors who worked at
the site prior to the use of proper protocol during the emergency. Many
workers were working under conditions that were not adequately
monitored under adequate quality-control methods. In the early days
during the aftermath of the tragedy, workers did not have quality
controlled change rooms for decontamination after human exposure at the
site; nor did workers utilize proper worker techniques for minimizing
risks of exposures.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See Testimony Before the Environment Committee of the New York
City Council on the Public Health Concerns Resulting from Exposures in
the Wake of the Collapse for the WTC Towers Submitted by Barbara J.
Olshansky and Nicole Pollier (3rd Year CUNY Law Legal Intern) Center
for Constitutional Rights New York, NY p. 6 of 10
(www.nyenvirolaw.org). ``Preventive measures must be taken to achieve
compliance,'' dated November 1, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
overview of abatement for construction projects and worker protection
The need for proper working techniques for minimizing fiber release
and future potential contamination episodes was acknowledged early on
when the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences issued a
report in October 2001 stating that ``there was no evidence or even
suggestion that any safety health program was operative at the WTC site
and workers continued to work for days lacking in any compliance with
worker protection regulations.''\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Id at p4 of 10; This report is cited in the testimony before
the Environmental Committee of the New York City Council; by the Center
for Constitutional Rights; November 1, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training of workers at the site is incorporated in the following
overview, of regulations: NESHAPS 40 CFR Part 61 subpart A&M; EPA
Worker Protection Rule, (40 CFR Part 763 subpart G); OSHA Asbestos
Construction Standard (29 CFR 1926.58); OSHA Respirator Requirements
(29 CFR 1910.134); Asbestos; Model Accreditation Plan for States (40
CFR 763 Subpart E Appendix C (1) and any other applicable Stateand
local or Federal regulations that may apply. Under the OSHA Asbestos
Construction Standard (2 CFR 1926.58) there are requirements for
notification of other contractors on a multi-employer site with the
need for proper training and safe working conditions for a number of
potential hazards including the minimization of the potential for
contaminated major or minor fiber release episodes.\38\ EPA must
seriously consider classifying the WTC under Superfund.\39\ Design and
construction techniques have been flawed and innocent workers have been
needlessly exposed to exceeding levels of contaminant dust at the
site.\40\ The use of non-air supply respirators and the lack of
protective suits may have also placed workers at a high risk. The
presence of asbestos and other known chemicals found at this site are
highly regulated under industry standards and cutting corners in lieu
of a fast demolition project displays a serious weakness on the part of
EPA along with Stateand local authorities. Proper working techniques
for minimizing risks to workers include adequate sampling and design
stages, proper maintenance of containment barriers, decontamination
enclosure systems, electrical ventilation systems, entry and exit
procedures, positioning of warning signs; use of negative pressure
exhaust systems, ventilation equipment, proper clean up and disposal
methods, work practices that may apply to encapsulation; proper
selection, inspection, donning use, maintenance and storage procedures
for respirators.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Major fiber release episode means any uncontrolled or
unintentional disturbance of ACBM, resulting in a visible emission
which involves the falling or dislodging of more than 3 square or
linear feet of friable ACBM.
Minor fiber release episode means any uncontrolled or unintentional
disturbance of ACBM, resulting in a visible emission which involves the
falling or dislodging of 3 square or linear feet or less of friable
ACBM.
\39\ Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA).
\40\ See Center for Constitutional Rights Report Testimony before
NYC Environment Committee, November 1, 2001 at page 4-5 of 10.
\41\ OSHA Requirements for Abatement Construction Projects 29 CFR
1926.58; also see NESHAPS, TSCA, AHERA and CERCLA, supra.
Once it is concluded that a proper remedial action will take place
in the WTC downtown area, (including the proper clean up of inside of
buildings) defensive actions should begin as soon as possible to
prevent and mitigate any future damage to human health or the
environment. Section--300.65 (b) of the National Contingency Plan
expressly provides that an agency be given wide latitude in selecting
the appropriate response to a perceived threat to human health.
__________
Queller, Fisher Dienst, Serrins, Washor & Kool, LLP,
February 4, 2002.
Leecia Eve, Esq.
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Eve: Further to our conversation of yesterday morning,
enclosed is a letter which was sent to the Captains, Lieutenants and
Detectives of the New York City Police Department regarding exposure to
toxic substances as a result of their work either at Ground Zero or the
Staten Island Landfill.
For your information, thousands of police officers including
Captains, Lieutenants and Detectives have been assigned to Ground Zero
and the Staten Island landfill on a round-the-clock basis since
September 11, 2001.
The landfill received the wreckage from the World Trade Center.
Detectives were specifically assigned to the landfill and tasked to
pick through the debris in the hopes of locating evidence which could
prove helpful to the overall investigation. Unfortunately, many
officers were not provided with the necessary protective equipment on a
consistent basis.
We do not know the long-term health effects which may result due to
their exposure to the various toxic substances both at Ground Zero and
the landfill. We would like to appear at the hearing scheduled for
February 11, 2002 and propose that a legislative mechanism be
implemented to preserve the rights of New York City police officers who
may become ill many years hence with an illness-related to their work
at the sites.
The letter I have enclosed is self-explanatory on this issue,
specifically beginning on the last paragraph of page 2.
I do not anticipate that our presentation would last more than 10
minutes.
Thank you in advance for your consideration.
By: Phillip E. Karasyk.
______
Queller, Fisher, Dienst, Serrins, Washor & Kool, LLP,
January 4, 2002.
As part of legislation intended to ``bail out'' the airline
industry after the September 11, 2001 tragedy, Congress passed a
statute known as the ``September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001.
While it is difficult to summarize the new law in any brief fashion, it
essentially provides that those injured, or the families of those
killed, can avoid bringing lawsuits to obtain traditional jury-awarded
damages for their losses.
It provides that the Attorney General shall appoint a Special
Master to administer a compensation program. Special forms have been
drafted to allow claimants to set forth the nature of their injuries or
that their loved one was killed and to further provide detailed
information regarding economic and non-economic losses. Non-economic
losses mean such things as physical and emotional pain, loss of
enjoyment of life, mental anguish and other types of loss.
The statute provides that once a claim is submitted, the Special
Master will have 120 days to render a decision on the amount of damage,
if any, to be awarded. Within 20 days thereafter, he will authorize
payment of the claim. The decision of the Special Master is final and
cannot be appealed.
The main benefits of this Special Master system include the fact
that there is no need to bring a lawsuit. The system provides for a
prompt resolution of the claims; whereas lawsuits take many years. The
Association of Trial Lawyers of America has pledged to represent any
claimant without charge. There will be no legal fees. Our firm will
certainly be available to any member or their family on a pro bono
basis to assist in the claim process should you choose to participate.
The system, however, is not without problems.
The main concern is the language in the statute that provides that
all ``collateral sources'' received by the claimant shall reduce the
amount of any award from the Special Master. Collateral sources include
life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs and all payments
by Federal, State or local governments. It is not clear whether this
reduction will apply to the claim in its entirety or to specific
portions of the claim. It is not clear whether collateral sources would
include any moneys received from charity. It is also unclear in the
case of a death of a police officer who leaves children, whether their
potential awards for loss of parental care and guidance would be
reduced by the collateral source.
If one participates in the claim process, a lawsuit cannot be
brought against anyone.
I strongly suggest that members and their families hold off making
a final decision on whether to bring a lawsuit or file a claim under
the Government's system until certain issues, particularly those
concerning collateral sources, are resolved by regulation or by
decision of the Special Master. Additionally, you should consult with
an attorney from our firm before making any decisions.
The statute provides that claimants have two (2) years from the
date that the Special Master promulgates regulations regarding the
details of the procedures to bring a claim. Thus, the statutory time
period has just begun.
Lawsuits for wrongful death against the airlines are governed by a
two (2) year statute of limitations from the date of the death. If any
claim is to be brought against the Port Authority, the time limit is
one (1) year with a requirement that a Notice of Claim be filed at
least 60 days before the institution of a lawsuit.
With regard to those members exposed to toxins at the World Trade
Center site or the Fresh Kills Land Fill site or any other exposure
related to the attack, many of you have heard via the rumor mill that
Notices of Claim with the city of New York must be filed by January 7,
2002 to protect their right to sue New York City for injuries received
while working at the site.
The Civil Procedure Law and Rules which govern the timeframe in
which Notices of Claim against the City must be filed makes a
significant exception to the 90-day filing requirement for a Notice of
Claim against New York City for:
personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent
effects of exposure to any substance or combination of
substances, in any form, upon or in the body or upon property
shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of discovery of the
injury by the plaintiff or on the date when through the
exercise of reasonable diligence the injury should have been
discovered, whichever is earlier. CPLR Sec. 214(c)(3).
This exception recognizes the fact that illnesses of the type which
may be caused by exposure to harmful substances may not become apparent
for many months or years after the exposure.
Thus, the 90-day claim period begins from the time the member is
aware of any potential injury sustained as a result of exposure to
toxins. It is believed that many law enforcement officers were exposed
to elevated levels of asbestos, dioxins, dangerous metals, polynuclear
aromatic hydrocarbons, respirable silica and many other types of
hazardous materials. If you believe that you were exposed to any such
toxin, or if in fact you were at the site following the September 11th
attack, we believe the best cause of action to follow in order to
protect your right to sue New York City is to report a Line of Duty
illness and document your condition by visiting your doctor. Once your
medical doctor has made a diagnosis, contact us immediately. We will
evaluate your particular situation and advise you regarding the
procedure to follow in filing a Notice of Claim.
Please bear in mind that in our opinion only medical conditions
capable of causing significant impairment of your health and/or ability
to function in your daily life will stand any chance for significant
recovery in a cause of action against New York City. You should also be
aware that although you are obligated to file a Notice of Claim within
90 days of learning or discovering an injury, should that be done and
should your case be resolved prior to manifestation of any serious
illness, a settlement with the City based upon a filed lawsuit may have
the effect of precluding you from recovering damages commensurate with
the illness discovered after the settlement of your lawsuit. Therefore,
it is essential that you discuss these issues with our attorneys.
To those members who have already been diagnosed with any exposure-
related illness such as asthma, bronchitis, reduced lung capacity,
etc., the time in which to file is 90 days from the date of discovery
of the injury including a statutory toll for the 30 days following
September 11th. Therefore, time remains to file your claim and our law
firm will be happy to prepare these claims on your behalf. When you
contact us please be able to provide the date of exposure, the date
first seen by a medical provider and the diagnosis of that condition.
Please be aware that actions filed as outlined in this letter will
not preclude you from filing for an accidental disability pension.
I realize that this memorandum may raise numerous questions in your
mind, therefore, feel free to contact me at my office and we can go
over these issues in greater detail.
Very truly yours,
Philip B. Karasyk,
Queller, Fisher, Dienst, Serrins, Washor & Kool, LLP.
__________
Statement of Susan S. Abbot, M.P.H., New York, NY
Dear committee members: I was unable to attend the committee
meeting at the U.S. Customs House in Lower Manhattan and am now
submitting my testimony for your review.
My husband and I are long-term residents of Battery Park City (10
years). Since September 11, 2001, we have waited patiently for a
Federal, State, or NYC government authority to issue standards for
abatement and clean up of residential buildings in Battery Park City,
to no avail. Since the EPA deferred its responsibility for assuring the
safety of residential buildings (i.e. free from contaminants and
carcinogens, not structural) to the NYC Department of Health (NYCDOH),
and since the NYCDOH has done nothing to this end, we are hopeful this
committee will be able to quickly remedy this problem, and within a
short timeframe reassure residents of Lower Manhattan that it is truly
safe to live there.
We were shocked shortly after September 11, 2001, that Christine
Whitman issued a statement indicating that the air quality in Lower
Manhattan was safe and presented no danger to long-term health and that
it was safe for residents to return to their homes after clean up of
the dust. There are two important issues here (1) the outdoor air
quality is not the issue and (2) at least in my building, clean up of
the dust (contaminated with at least asbestos) was not done using
proper asbestos abatement procedures.
My family (husband and two small children) and I live in Gateway
Plaza: a complex of six buildings on the corner of South End Avenue and
Liberty streets (the closest complex in Battery Park City to the WTC
site). Before deciding whether or not to renew our lease we decided to
have the apartment and the building tested by a certified environmental
company. Although, as you know, there are a variety of contaminants we
could have tested for, we limited our testing to asbestos.
Briefly, I would like to give you the data I, and a neighbor of
mine (Sharon McGarvey 365 South End Ave., Apt. 2F) have gathered
documenting the contamination of our particular buildings. The testing
was done by an accredited firm, Donohoe Environmental, and the samples
were analyzed by the TEM method for asbestos by EMSL Labs (also
accredited). I have enclosed the results of the tests I had done on my
apartment, the buildings ventilation system (ducts in the hallways and
in the apartments), the exterior of the building, and the building
hallway carpeting. These wipe samples were all taken after the building
was supposedly cleaned. Most samples, particularly in the ventilation
system, the hallway carpets, and on the exterior of the building were
positive for moderate to high levels of asbestos. Even though the air
levels of asbestos were low, asbestos is easily disturbed and becomes
airborne, having it in the vents and the carpet, and on the exterior of
the building means it will eventually end up in the air or on your feet
and therefore in your apartment.
In Summary: As defined by EMSL lab:
1,000 structures/cubic centimeter = low level of asbestos
10,000 structures/cubic centimeter = moderate level of
asbestos
100,000 structures/cubic centimeter = high level of
asbestos
Result summary:
Hallway vent (385 South End, 7th floor): 51.114
structures/cubic centimeter.
New air conditioner/heating unit--4,259 str/cc.
Child's bedroom window (outside)--30,666 str/cc.
Hallway vent--32,031 str/cc.
Hallway carpet--1,635. str/cc.
Other hallway carpet 6,815 str/cc.
Results from other neighbors had even higher levels on their apartment
vents and the hallway carpets.
The only solution we can see is for one agency (be it Federal,
State, or local) to define contaminant and abatement standards for
residential buildings is Lower Manhattan and mandate repeated on-going
clean up of the ventilation systems of residential buildings, repeated
washing of the exterior and roofs of the buildings, and removal of the
common area carpets until a sufficient time after the demolition of the
WTC site is complete that we can be assured no recontamination will
occur. This mandatory cleaning should be monitored with repeated wipe
testing for asbestos and other contaminants done by one agency and made
readily available to all residents.
While doing my research into what methods were appropriate for
testing for contaminants, I consulted a number of publications by Cate
Jenkins, Ph.D. (from the EPA) ([email protected]). She recommended
wipe or microvacuum samples as the only practical way to see if a
building is contaminated in this situation (not air samples). Also, a
number of sources stated that even if air level are less than 1 percent
asbestos could pose a risk because asbestos fibers can become airborne.
There is no threshold safe level for exposure to asbestos particularly
for children.
We look forward to your timely response and action in this matter.
__________
[New York Environmental Law & Justice Project, February 2002]
Downwind From Disaster
The dust from the WTC is unlike any other. It is a powder created
by the implosion and burning of over 200 floors of a skyscraper and
everything and everyone in them. There are thousands of chemicals
present in that dust, not just asbestos, lead, dioxin, and the pitiful
handful of chemicals being tested. Yet based on this paltry data, the
New York City Department of Health declares ``the general public's risk
for any short- or long-term adverse health [effects] is extremely
low.''
Short Term Effects.--We already know that short-term health effects
are seen among the heavily exposed firefighters. Twenty-five percent of
them have been diagnosed with occupational asthma and related diseases.
But people exposed only for a few hours also are sick. A Guide to
Clinicians from the Department of Community Medicine of Mt. Sinai
School of Medicine states that ``Conditions that have been seen in
adults who have been at or near the site for as little as 24 to 36
hours, include reactive airways disease, new onset or exacerbation of
preexisting asthma, RADS [reactive airway disease], sinusitis, irritant
rhinitis, persistent cough, and diffuse irritation of nasal mucosal
surfaces.''
The Mt. Sinai Clinician's Guide also includes ``Residents of the
surrounding communities'' as an exposed population. Mt. Sinai doctors
such as Stephen Levin, have treated residents living 6 and 7 blocks
from the site.
The WTC mobile medical unit has screened hundreds of day laborers
for respiratory ailments with between \1/4\ and \1/3\ exhibiting
``Significant respiratory affect'' such as cough, shortness of breath,
sore throat, dizziness and headaches after weeks of cleaning
contaminated twin towers dust from Lower Manhattan home and office
buildings, and has hundreds on waiting lists.
Long-Term Effects.--Some effect which occur in the short-term also
become long-term effects. For example, people who have developed asthma
from the dust are likely to find this become a life time problem. Some
of the components of the dust can cause the ultimate long-term effect:
cancer.
Cancer.--The dust contains many carcinogens: asbestos, the many
dioxins and PCB compounds, and some of the metals such as chrome and
nickel. The fiberglass commonly found in the dust is also listed by the
National Toxicology Program as ``reasonably anticipated to be a human
carcinogen.''
Asbestos.--On carcinogen, asbestos, has especially worried
scientist Cate Jenkins, a 22-year employee of EPA. She has written
several memorandums about errors that have lead the NYC DOH to
underestimate the risk to workers and residence for asbestos related
cancers. In the latest release, Cate Jenkins uses the word ``coverup''
in describing the behavior of the health department.
Other Data.--Andrew Schneider at the St. Louis Post Dispatch has
reported that the U.S. Geological Survey tested the dust immediately
after the disaster and e-mailed data all government contacts by
September 27. But New Yorkers were never told that the USGS found some
of the dust was as caustic as liquid drain cleaner. The USGS also found
that the dust contained heavy metals, especially chromium and aluminum.
These data were ignored as well.
Toxic Smoke.--For months, smoke billowed from the 16-acre caldron
that was the Trade Center complex. Deep in the earth, a month after the
fires were declared out, there are still materials burning according to
the EPA. (Callahan, January 25, 2002).
No one knows the effects of the components of this smoke. No one
knows the combined effect of all the chemicals and particulates in the
dust. The EPA admitted that it did not account for synergy. We are
promised further studies. Unfortunately, it is the firefighters,
police, construction workers, and downtown residents that are the lab
rats.
The Federal Government has cleaned up many of its own buildings
with full abatement while failing to protect the safety and well being
of people who work and live in downtown New York.
The New York Environmental Law & Justice Project calls upon the EPA
to take over the clean up under the National Contingency Plan, and
calls upon all agencies to be forthcoming with data and information.
See our website for further information www.nyenvirolaw.org.
nyeljf concurs with nycosh's statement in response to heath
department findings
Statement by Joel Shufro, executive director of the New York
Committee for Occupational Safety and Health in response to ``NYC
Department of Health Presents Findings from indoor Air Sampling in
Lower Manhattan,'' released at 4 p.m. on Friday, February 8. [The
Department of Health document is at http//www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/doh/
html/public/press02/pr08-208.html]
We find it extremely disturbing that the Department of Health has
published such an uninformative and confusing report that raises more
questions than it answers. The people of New York City have an urgent
need for useful and accurate information, not obfuscating and baseless
reassurances.
The report literally raises more questions than it answers:
Were the indoor air and dust samples taken in areas that
had already been cleaned up?
Were the indoor air samples taken under aggressive
sampling conditions?
What method was used to obtain the samples?
What method was used to analyze the samples?
What, specifically, were the results of the tests?
What is an ``elevated level of asbestos''?
Were samples taken in any heavily contaminated buildings?
Why, more than a month after the last samples were taken,
are the results of the air samples for fiberglass not available?
How many dust samples were taken, and how many contained
asbestos, and how much asbestos did each of them contain?
What does ``low levels of asbestos in some samples'' mean,
specifically? What levels, in how many samples?
Is the Department of Health aware of any safe level of
exposure to asbestos? If so, what is it?
Why are residents being advised to clean up dust when
``some'' of the dust contains low levels of asbestos?
Why does the report contain no information about or advice
concerning respiratory protection?
In fact, the Department of Health release makes it clear that some
of the tested dust contains asbestos, which confirms the EPA
recommendation that workers and residents in Lower Manhattan should
assume that untested dust contains asbestos.
According to the EPA tests, more than three-quarters of the dust
samples contain some asbestos. Thirty-four percent of the EPA samples
contain between 1.1 and 4.49 percent asbestos.
Under city law and State law, it is illegal for anyone who does not
have an asbestos handler's license to clean up any significant quantity
of dust that is more than 1 percent asbestos. The Department of Health
is inviting New Yorkers to put themselves at potentially grave risk,
when it advises workers and residents how to clean up untested dust
themselves.
No one who is not properly trained, equipped and licensed should
clean up untested dust that could be contaminated with asbestos. But if
an untrained, unlicensed person does clean up untested dust that could
contain asbestos, they should wear appropriate (HEPA) respiratory
protection to minimize their exposure.
The Department of Health report states that ``the likelihood of
developing disease from limited, short-term, low-level exposure [to
asbestos] is low.'' It is true that the likelihood of developing
disease is lower from low-level exposure than it is from high-level
exposure, but without any accurate data about exposure levels, it is
impossible to characterize the level of risk.
More than 25 years ago the U.S. Congress wrote this finding of fact
into the Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act, and nothing
has been learned since to contradict it ``Medical science has not
established any minimum level of exposure to asbestos fibers which is
considered to be safe to individuals exposed to the fibers.''
We urge anyone who is considering cleaning up a residence or a
workplace, and anyone who is in a residence or a workplace that has not
been cleaned up by a licensed asbestos abatement contractor, to follow
the instructions and advice in our factsheet, ``Cleaning Up Indoor Dust
and Debris In the World Trade Center Area,'' posted on the NYCOSH
website at http//www.nycosh.org/wtc-dust-factsheet.html.
For more information, contact NYCOSH at 212-627-3900. Fax 212-627-
9812. [email protected]
______
Memorandum from Cate Jenkins, Ph.D., U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Date: February 10, 2002
Subject: LNYC Department of Health Misrepresentations, February 8, 2002
Press Release: ``NYC Department of Health Presents Findings from Indoor
Air Sampling in Lower Manhattan''
From: Cate Jenkins, Ph.D.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The conclusions and opinions in this memorandum are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To: Affected Parties and Responsible Officials
A February 8, 2002 press release from the New York City Department
of Health (NYC DOH) (attached) contains an interpretation of
preliminary data from a study not yet released by the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) of the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC). This study conducted tests in apartments and buildings
in Lower Manhattan which were impacted by fallout from the collapse of
the World Trade Center (WTC).
The ATSDR does not plan releasing the study or preliminary results
to the public until spring, so it is difficult to determine whether or
not the NYC DOH correctly represented the data. However, there is at
least one major clear misrepresentation of the data by the NYC. There
is evidence of other misrepresentations as well.
airborne asbestos
The NYC DOH made the following claim in its press release:
The air samples from inside the buildings showed no elevated levels
of asbestos. (NYC DOH)
The DOH does not mention in its press release exactly what the
level of asbestos would be considered ``elevated.'' However, the press
release refers readers to the NYC Department of Environmental
Protection (NYC DEP) for more information. The cited NYC DEP web page
(attached) states that the ``safe'' level, or standard, is 0.01 fibers
per cubic centimeter (f/cc) (which is the same as fibers/milliliter):
The U.S. and NYC standard for asbestos in community and
residential buildings is 0.01 fibers/cubic centimeter (f/cc)
[same as f/mL] in Indoor air. . . . As testing continues, there
may be the possibility of occasional short-term increases in
levels of asbestos in the air above the residential standard of
0.01 f/cc of air. [NYC DEP]
This is a misrepresentation. Due to the many public discussions
over the safe level of asbestos in air, there can be no
misunderstanding on the part of either the NYC DOH or DEP that the
residential or ambient air standard of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is 0.01 f/mL. By law, any State or city
standards for asbestos must be at least as stringent as the Federal EPA
standard.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The EPA itself has erroneously referred to the AHERA TEM test
level of 70 structures per square millimeter a ``standard'' on its
website at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/wtc/activities.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EPA standard for asbestos
The EPA standard for asbestos in indoor and outdoor air is found in
its Integrated Risk Management Information System (IRIS), attached, and
other public documents. It is the policy and goal of EPA to protect at
the 1 in a million cancer risk level (10-6 risk level), the
point of departure. In all cases, action by EPA is triggered by any
risk greater than 1 in 10,000. The EPA air standards for asbestos in
inside and outside air at the different risk levels are given in the
table below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cancer Risk Level Air Concentration
----------------------------------------------------- of Asbestos fibers
per milliliter (f/
mL), ``PLM''
number of cancers risk level fraction of fibers
over 5 micrometers
long
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 in 1,000,000.................. 10-6 (=E-6)....... 0.000004 f/mL (=4E-
6 f/mL)
1 in 100,000.................... 10-5 (=E-5)....... 0.00004 f/mL (=4E-
5 f/mL)
1 in 10,000..................... 10-4 (=E-4)....... 0.0004 f/mL (=4E-4
f/mL)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The safe level and goal of EPA, the actual air standard, is
0.000004 f/mL, and the action level for EPA to trigger a cleanup is
0.0004 f/mL. The EPA standard is thus 2500 times lower than the 0.01 f/
mL level claimed to be the standard by the NYC DOH and DEP.
It is particularly important to test asbestos at the
10-6 risk level, because other carcinogens and possible
carcinogens are potentially present in WTC fallout, including
fiberglass, dioxins, PCB's, and heavy metals. If several are present,
the carcinogenic risk could be additive and result in a higher
aggregate cancer risk.
Origin of NYC claim that their standard and the U.S. standard is 0.01
f/mL
The NYC DOH and DEP are apparently basing their claim that the
standard is 0.01 f/mL on a particular test that must be conducted while
using a one-horsepower leaf blower to stir up all the asbestos in a
room after certified professional abatement. This is the AHERA TEM
clearance test (Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act transmission
electron microscopy).
The EPA regulations for conducting the AHERA TEM clearance test are
contained in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 763,
Appendix A. Regulations are implementations of statutes, and thus are
the law and legally binding. States and cities must adopt these
regulations or have more stringent regulation. The AHERA TEM clearance
test is a TEST, not an air STANDARD. Nowhere in any of the EPA
regulations is the 0.01 f/mL level called a ``standard'' for air. The
procedures for this test are given in part below:
40 CFR-Chapter I-Part 763
Appendix A to Subpart E--Interim Transmission Electron
Microscopy Analytical Methods--Mandatory and Nonmandatory--and
Mandatory Section to Determine Completion of Response Actions .
. .
II. Mandatory Transmission Electron Microscopy Method
A. Definitions of Terms
1. Analytical sensitivity--Airborne asbestos
concentration represented by each fiber counted under
the electron microscope. It is determined by the air
volume collected and the proportion of the filter
examined. This method requires that the analytical
sensitivity be no greater than 0.005 structures/cm 3 .
. .
14. The final plastic barrier around the abatement area
remains h place for the sampling period.
15. After the area has passed a thorough visual
inspection, use aggressive sampling conditions to
dislodge any remaining dust. (See suggested protocol in
Unit III.B.7.d.) . . .
17. A minimum of 13 samples are to be collected for
each testing site consisting of the following:
a. LA minimum of five samples per abatement
area.
b. LA minimum of five samples per ambient area
positioned at locations representative of the
air entering the abatement site. . . .
[Unit III.B.] 7. Abatement area sampling.
a. LConduct final clearance sampling only after the
primary containment barriers have been removed; the
abatement area has been thoroughly dried; and, it has
passed visual inspection tests by qualified personnel.
(See Reference 1 of Unit III.L.)
b. LContainment barriers over windows, doors, and air
passageways must remain in place until the TEM
clearance sampling and analysis is completed and
results meet clearance test criteria. The final plastic
barrier remains in place for the sampling period.
c. LSelect sampling sites in the abatement area on a
random basis to provide unbiased and representative
samples.
d. LAfter the area has passed a thorough visual
inspection, use aggressive sampling conditions to
dislodge any remaining dust.
I. LEquipment used in aggressive sampling
such as a leaf blower and/or fan should be
properly cleaned and decontaminated before use.
II. LAir filtration unit shall remain on during
the air monitoring period.
III. LPrior to air monitoring, floors, ceiling
and walls shall be swept with the exhaust of a
minimum one (1) horsepower leaf blower.
IV. LStationary fans are placed in locations
which will not interfere with air monitoring
equipment. Fan air is directed toward the
ceiling. One fan shall be used for each 10,000
ft 3 of worksite.
[40 CFR 763, App. A]
The reason that the EPA designed the AHERA TEM clearance test,
requiring first certified asbestos abatement procedures followed by a
leaf blower, and then a fan, followed by air testing to the 0.01 f/mL
(PCM) level (equivalent to 0.02 s/mL or 70 structures per square
millimeter) was to save costs and time. EPA found that using a leaf
blower increased asbestos concentrations in air by thousands of times.
One study showed that using a leaf blower increased airborne asbestos
concentrations over 100 times that caused by even vigorous broom
cleaning.\3\ Vigorous broom cleaning has been demonstrated to increase
asbestos levels hundreds or thousands of times over that of passive
conditions which do not disturb dusts. Testing at the low levels that
are actually those of health concern, 0.000004 f/mL, can often take 24
or more hours, which was found to be impractical for asbestos abatement
contractors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Millette, J., et. al. Applications of the ASTM Asbestos in Dust
Method D5755. In: Advances in Environmental Measurement Methods for
Asbestos, ASTM Special Technical Publication 1342.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even if testing is done at the low levels associated with asbestos
health effects (0.000004 f/mL), there must be human activities or
simulated human activities in the same room at the same time of the
testing. When testing airborne asbestos levels inside homes in Libby,
Montana, the Superfund site, EPA had both stationary air monitors and
monitors worn by residents going about their normal daily activities.
See the attached risk assessment for the Libby site for a description.
Another study showed that asbestos concentrations in air can be
undetectable or below 0.005 f/mL when there are no activities in the
room to stir up dusts, but as high as 0.09 to 54 f/mL when activities
such as vacuuming, broom sweeping, gym activities, etc. are going on in
the room to disturb the dusts.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Millette, J.R., and Hays, S.M. (1994), Chapter 8, Resuspension
of Settled Dust, in: Settled Dust Sampling and Analysis, page 63, Table
2, Lewis Publishers, ISBN 0-87371-948-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following table gives the legal/legitimate and illegal/
illegitimate ways to determine whether asbestos levels in air in homes,
offices, or schools meets EPA standards:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legal/Legitimate Airborne Asbestos Testing Methods Illegal/Illegitimate Airborne Asbestos Testing
--------------------------------------------------------------- Methods
-------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.000004 f/mL (PCM) laboratory 0.01 f/m (PCM) = 0.02 s/ 0.000004 f/mL (PCM) 0.01 f/m (PCM) = 0.02 s/
sensitivity (detection limit), the mL (all fibers) = 70 laboratory sensitivity mL (all fibers) = 70
EPA safe level. structures per square (detection limit), the structures per square
millimeter. EPA safe level. millimeter
Conditions of actual or simulated Testing for this level Passive conditions, This level under either
human activities, such as a child ONLY AFTER the i.e., no activities to passive testing
jumping on a contaminated couch or following conditions, disturb dusts to cause conditions (no human
rolling around on contaminated as required by law in them to be airborne.. activity) or even
carpet. 40 CFR 763: (1) normal human
Completion of activities
professional certified
asbestos abatement;
(2) Suspension of
dusts by using one-
horsepower leaf blower
followed by fans
during actual testing.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Probable testing methods of the CDC's ATSDR
Although we do not know what methods the ATSDR used to test air
inside buildings, it is doubtful that they utilized techniques that can
detect asbestos at the 0.000004 f/mL level. If the ATSDR did test at
this low level, it is unknown whether there were simulated or actual
human activities taking place at the same time to disturb the dusts.
It is also doubtful that if they tested the air using less
sensitive methods, that they used the aggressive leaf-blower condition
required for tie AHERA TEM test. It would be impossible to use the
aggressive leaf-blower test conditions in currently occupied spaces, as
it could contaminate surfaces that had previously been cleaned.
However, this is no excuse, since there are plenty of unoccupied
apartments and business spaces which could be sealed off and tested,
and contaminated carpeting and upholstered furniture from the same
building could be placed in the space to be tested. (It would be a
minor cost to purchase the carpeting or furniture from other tenants in
the building.)
indoor dust testing
The NYC DOH described the results of the indoor dust testing as
follows:
Testing was also conducted in four buildings above 59th
Street to provide information on the background level of
various substances present indoors in New York City.
The analysis of 98 dust samples for asbestos taken from the
inside and outside of residential buildings in Lower Manhattan
indicated that while a 20 percent were above background levels,
only two samples which were taken from outdoors required
abatement. Professional abatement work was completed in this
area.
Samples taken from inside and outside of residential
buildings in Lower Manhattan were analyzed for fibrous glass.
Fibrous glass was detected in 43 of the 98 samples taken. The
results of air sampling for fibrous glass, and for air and
surface testing of other materials, are not yet available.
It is alarming that 20 percent of samples from indoors (or this
could be both indoors and outdoors) were over background levels.
Although it was not stated, there could also be more than 20 percent of
the indoor dusts that had detectable levels of asbestos, but which were
not over background. At the Libby, Montana Superfund site (see
attachment), only 11 to 23 percent of the indoor dust samples had
detectable asbestos from the random homes selected in Phase 1 of the
Libby investigation.
It is also inappropriate for the NYC DOH to establish background by
going to other areas of Manhattan. The buildings above 59th Street
could have been contaminated with WTC fallout, or could be contaminated
from other sources of asbestos These ``background'' buildings might
also have unsafe levels of asbestos and require professional abatement.
It is an unfair comparison to imply that only 20 percent of the inside
building dusts in Lower Manhattan had elevated levels that required
abatement, based on a comparison to levels in buildings above 59th
Street, which might themselves be unsafe.
The finding of fibrous glass (fiberglass) in 44 percent of the
samples is also alarming. It is also unfortunate that the ATSDR did not
test for other hazardous substances, such as dioxins, PCB's, and heavy
metals such as mercury.
outdoor dust testing
The NYC DOH made the following statement regarding outdoor dusts:
The analysis of 98 dust samples for asbestos taken from the
inside and outside of residential buildings in Lower Manhattan
indicated that while 20 percent were above background levels,
only two samples which were taken from outdoors required
abatement. Professional abatement work was completed in this
area.
Although the NYC DOH does not state what level they consider to be
a ``safe'' level in the outdoor dusts that triggered professional
abatement, it can be deduced. The NYC DEP issued a letter on October 25
to residents of Lower Manhattan, stating that professional abatement
was only necessary if indoor dusts contained 1 percent asbestos or
higher. See attached.
The 1 percent asbestos level is not considered to be a ``safe''
level by the EPA. It is not a risk-based number. It was developed to
apply to the asbestos products themselves that were used in homes and
other buildings, because it was found that these products always
contained 1 percent or more asbestos. The dusts in a building that used
these asbestos materials would always have lower levels of asbestos
than the asbestos materials themselves. The EPA regulations require the
removal or management in-place of the asbestos materials (at 1 percent
asbestos or higher) and then the thorough abatement of all contaminated
surfaces, whether containing 1 percent asbestos or not.
EPA has determined that levels of asbestos lower than 1 percent
could present hazards.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/libby/qsafe.html
Levels of 1 percent or less could present a risk where there
is enough activity to stir up soil and cause asbestos fibers to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
become airborne.
In one independent study, it was found that soils containing only
0.001 percent asbestos were still capable of producing measurable
airborne asbestos concentrations greater than 0.01 fibers per
milliliter (equivalent to structures per milliliter), which is an air
concentration thousands of times higher than the EPA safe level of
0.000004 f/mL.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Addison, J. (1995) Vermiculite: a review of the mineralogy and
health effects of vermiculite exploitation. Reg. Tox. Pharm. 21: 397-
405.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusions
The CDC's ATSDR should immediately provide the public with all the
information and data that it has supplied to the NYC DOH, so that an
honest evaluation can be made. Through its misrepresentations, NYC DOH
is giving the public a false sense of security and the erroneous belief
that exposures to asbestos and fiberglass are not hazardous, and also
that there are no other hazardous substances present because the ATSDR
did not test for them. Since the full study will not be released until
spring, there are many months that may go by with additional needless
exposures, particular during unsafe cleanups by citizens themselves.
It is a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act and the
Sunshine Act for a Federal entity such as the ATSDR to provide
preferential treatment to the NYC DOH by the early release of
preliminary data without simultaneously releasing the same data to the
public. The fact that the NYC DOH requested the study does not entitle
it to receive any results prior to the public.
Oftentimes industry, public interest groups, or even individual
citizens request studies by Federal agencies. When any data resulting
from these studies is released, it is released to all parties
simultaneously. The NYC DOH has no special standing in this regard.
list of attachments
This version of the memorandum does not contain the attachments,
because it has been difficult for some to open the file with the
attachments. However, you can access the same documents from the
websites listed with the attachments.
You can also access this memo with all of the attachments at
either: www.NYenviroLAW.org or http://cbns.qc.edu/
asbestos5--references.pdf
You can download Adobe Acrobat Reader Version 4.0 for free from a
very dependable, easy, safe website at: http://www.adobe.com/products/
acrobat/readstep.html
NYC Department of Health (February 8, 2002) NYC Department of
Health presents findings from indoor air sampling in Lower Manhattan.
Posted at:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/public/press02/pr08-208.html or
www.NYenviroLAW.org
NYC Department of Environmental Protection. (Undated) Air, noise
and hazardous materials. Web page posted at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dep/html/airnonit.html
U.S. EPA (August 2001) Integrated Risk Management Information
System (IRIS) Summary for Asbestos, posted at httn://www.epa.gov/iris/
subst/0371.htm
USEPA (2001) Appendix A to Subpart E--Interim Transmission Electron
Microscopy Analytical Methods--Mandatory and Nonmandatory--and
Mandatory Section to Determine Completion of Response Actions, 40 CFR--
CHAPTER I--PART 763. Posted at: www.epa.gov/epahome/cfr40.htm
Miele, J.A., Commissioner, NYC Department of Environmental
Protection (October 25, 2001) Letter to Residents of Lower Manhattan.
Posted at www.NYenviroLAW.org
Weis, C.P., Senior Toxicologist/Science Support Coordinator, U.S.
EPA (December 20, 2001) Excerpts from: Amphibole mineral fibers in
source materials in residential and commercial areas of Libby pose an
imminent and substantial endangerment to public health. Posted at:
http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/libby/riskassess.html
__________
Statement of Jane Kenny, Regional Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I am
Jane M. Kenny, Region 2 Administrator with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). I welcome this opportunity to join my Federal,
State and city colleagues to discuss the ongoing response to the tragic
events of September 11th by EPA.
Today is February 11, 2002. It has been 5 months since that
terrible day. After months of incredibly intense work, we can now
reflect on the impacts of the attacks and the extraordinary efforts
made by so many individuals and government at all levels. EPA and our
Federal, State and city partners have all played important roles in the
protection of public health and the cleanup efforts. Today, we look
toward the future and the ultimate recovery of Lower Manhattan.
On the morning of September 11th, EPA responded immediately as
events unfolded. Our emergency response teams were on the scene that
day in Lower Manhattan, in Brooklyn, where the smoke plume was moving,
and in New Jersey--assessing the possible public health and
environmental impacts of the attacks. Let me assure you that EPA's
highest priority then and throughout this response has been protecting
the health of everyone in the New York metropolitan area.
Since September 11th, EPA and other Federal, State and city
agencies have taken over 10,000 samples of dust, air, drinking water,
and storm water runoff at and around the World Trade Center site. We
have also sampled in Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx and Staten Island, at
the Fresh Kills landfill and in New Jersey.
In addition to the monitoring conducted by our Federal, State and
city partners, we have tested for the presence of pollutants such as
asbestos, fine particulate matter, lead and other metals, volatile
organic compounds, dioxin, PCBs and other substances that could pose a
threat to the public and workers at the site. These samples are taken
from more than 20 fixed monitoring stations at and around Ground Zero
and an existing New York State air quality-monitoring network that was
augmented for the World Trade Center response. The agency also uses
portable sampling equipment to collect data from a range of locations
in Lower Manhattan. Fortunately, the vast majority of our tests
continue to find levels of these contaminants below standards or
guidelines set to protect public health. We have also found that
environmental conditions on and off the site have improved considerably
over time.
While this news may be reassuring to the general public, it is
important to emphasize--as we have from day one--that the risks are
different for response workers at the World Trade Center site; they
have been working long hours in dusty and what were very smoky
conditions. That is why we have repeatedly said that response workers
should wear respirators and other protective gear.
We have found asbestos fibers in some of the outdoor air and dust
samples taken at Ground Zero and in the surrounding area. To date, out
of more than 5,500 outdoor air samples taken at and around the site,
only 15 have had levels of asbestos that exceed the Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response Act or AHERA standard, we use to determine if
children can re-enter a school building after asbestos has been removed
or abated. Of the15 exceedances, all but four were recorded before
September 30.
Where we found elevated levels of asbestos in the dust or where
dusty conditions were observed, EPA used large HEPA vacuum trucks to
pick it up. We've cleaned sidewalks, the promenade at Battery Park
City, local playgrounds and parks and even children's sand boxes. EPA
has led the effort to monitor the outdoor environment with support from
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC),
while the city of New York has taken the lead for the reoccupancy of
buildings.
We do know that some people returning to area homes and businesses
have found dusty environments. EPA recommends that interiors be cleaned
with the assumption that any dust may contain asbestos. The New York
City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has issued
instructions to building owners and managers directing them to use
professional asbestos inspectors to assess the presence of asbestos-
containing materials and to use licensed abatement contractors to
conduct any necessary cleanup work. EPA, the Department of Health and
Human Services through the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) and the New York City Department of Health (DOH) has
recommended ongoing and frequent cleaning to minimize future risks from
any dust that might remain. All cleanups should be done using wet wipe
methods on surfaces and vacuums with HEPA--high efficiency particulate
air-filters.
Regarding some Federal buildings, EPA took a small number of indoor
air samples in several buildings. The General Services Administration
changed the filters on the air conditioning systems and, after noting
significant amounts of dust tracked into Federal building lobbies by
workers responding at the World Trade Center, asked EPA to have them
cleaned. The lobby cleanup, announced in a September 18 press release,
was done by EPA contractors using HEPA vacuum trucks already operating
in the area. No other specialized cleanup was conducted on the upper
floors at 290 Broadway or 26 Federal Plaza.
Now I would like to detail some of our other findings and response
efforts. EPA has been testing for numerous volatile organic compounds
or VOCs such as benzene--at several sites within and near the perimeter
of the World Trade Center site. To protect workers, EPA takes what are
called ``grab'' samples of VOCs where smoke plumes have been sighted.
These samples--taken at ground level on the pile--provide a snapshot at
a moment in time of worst-case exposure. The samples--taken daily--are
immediately analyzed at EPA's highly sophisticated mobile laboratory
set up at the perimeter of the site. The proximity allows us to relay
the results directly to the New York City Fire Department.
EPA standards and guidelines are set with an ample margin of safety
to protect public health. In some samples taken since September 11th,
EPA testing at Ground Zero has found the presence of benzene at levels
that have exceeded Federal guidelines. Taking the more protective
approach, we continue to urge workers to wear their respirators.
However, EPA air samples of pollutants such as benzene taken at the
perimeter of the work site find levels that are very low or non-
detectable. Dioxin levels were generally below health-based guidelines.
Once the fires were diminished, concentrations of several chemicals,
declined in most cases to non-detectable levels, even at the work site.
DEC routinely monitors for fine particulates--those smaller than
2.5 microns--at their existing network of monitoring stations. DEC and
EPA have added four additional monitoring stations in Lower Manhattan.
With a few exceptions early on, fine particulates have been below the
level of concern for the general public, as well as groups more
sensitive to air pollutants.
We know that materials in construction dust and smoke can be
irritating to the eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract. They can
cause more serious reactions in sensitive populations, such as people
with respiratory problems or asthma. Again, this is one of the reasons
we have recommended that workers wear respirators and impacted homes
and businesses be properly cleaned. Sensitive groups have been advised
by New York City DOH and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) to take special precautions and consult their physicians if they
are experiencing symptoms.
In addition, we also tested drinking water in cooperation with New
York City DEP and water quality in the Hudson and East Rivers. All
samples of drinking water, which were analyzed for a wide range of
contaminants, met Federal standards. Analysis of runoff following heavy
rain on September 14 did show some elevated levels of dioxins, asbestos
and other pollutants. Follow-up sampling found levels back to those
normally found in area waters.
Almost immediately after the attacks, Governor Pataki asked
President Bush to declare a Federal disaster, activating the Federal
Response Plan. The plan becomes effective when destruction from a
disaster goes beyond local and State capabilities. Twenty-seven Federal
agencies and the American Red Cross are activated to supplement State
and city resources, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
in the lead. In the World Trade Center response, Federal agencies have
provided funding, personnel, technical expertise, equipment and other
resources at New York City's request. Acting on mission assignments
generated by FEMA, EPA is the lead agency for hazardous waste disposal
and has also taken primary responsibility for monitoring the ambient
air, water and drinking water and coordinating the sampling data for
all the response agencies. In addition, EPA was asked to manage worker
and vehicle wash down operations at the site and the Fresh Kills
landfill, which has been receiving debris from the disaster site.
In support of the agencies directly responsible for worker safety,
EPA initially supplied the New York City Office of Emergency Management
(OEM) 12,432 respirators, 37,600 dust cartridges, 13,000 pairs of
safety glasses and 1000 hard hats. In addition, 1465 respirators, 2608
cartridges plus Tyvek suits, booties and hard hats were provided to the
New York State Departments of Environmental Conservation and Health.
The U.S. Coast Guard, at the request of FEMA, worked with EPA to assist
with the response, and the New York State National Guard conveyed the
equipment to the city for distribution to response workers.
On September 11th, EPA provided a flyer to FEMA for distribution at
Ground Zero that emphasized the potential danger from asbestos and
urged workers to wear protective gear. By September 20, EPA had set up
worker wash down operations at the site, at which flyers were
distributed and signs posted recommending the use of respirators and
other protective gear. During daily interagency site operations
meetings, EPA repeatedly emphasized the need for response workers to
wear their respirators. This message was continuously reiterated at
community meetings and with the press.
EPA has set up a full service, winterized wash station at which
workers can vacuum off their work clothes, shower and change before
going home. Signs directing workers to wear protective gear are posted.
Several thousand workers pass through the wash station every day.
EPA recognizes that the collapse of towers was a cataclysmic event
unlike any we have experienced. The monitoring data collected in
response to this event, warrants further study. With this in mind, in
October, EPA began a health risk evaluation and a comparative
toxicological study. These are in addition to studies being conducted
by other agencies and academic institutions.
Through our health risk evaluation, we hope to better understand
the possible health risks to people who may have been exposed to
various pollutants during several periods following the disaster. EPA
is reviewing ambient air monitoring data gathered by EPA, OSHA, the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation and various
academic and commercial entities.
The Agency is assessing possible exposures during the first days
after the attack, the following several weeks and the subsequent months
through early January. This evaluation focuses on the different
population groups of concern--response workers and volunteers at Ground
Zero, residents and workers in the immediate surrounding areas.
We expect to have a preliminary report completed this month, which
we will share with your Subcommittee and the public. A more detailed
evaluation, building on our initial findings, should be complete by
early May, with the final report due in April 2003.
Our second investigation is a comparative toxicity analysis. The
objective is to compare the toxicity of the particles released from the
World Trade Center collapse to other particulate samples of high and
low toxicity that have been tested on animals. In this effort, we are
comparing particles collected from Ground Zero to fly ash from oil-
fired power plants, dust recovered from the volcanic eruption of Mount
St. Helens and urban ambient air particles.
EPA is also collaborating with New York City and State officials,
with two components of the Department of Health and Human Services
through the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and various academic
institutions on research in progress and the identification of future
research needs. These efforts will help us better understand the
magnitude of any effects from the World Trade Center disaster.
In addition, EPA has supported the Federal Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and the New York City
Department of Health in their study of residences impacted by the World
Trade Center collapse. We are committed to helping residents and
business employees in Lower Manhattan address their concerns about the
indoor air. We will continue to work with the city agencies until
people are assured that their health is protected.
Before concluding, I would like to touch on one additional topic.
From the start, EPA has been committed to sharing the results of our
data with the public and to helping people understand what they mean.
Under incredible circumstances --having witnessed the attacks and been
evacuated from our Lower Manhattan offices--EPA staff began the process
of sampling, analyzing, interpreting and conveying environmental data
to the first-line response agencies, the press and the public. All of
the agencies use our data to assess the risks to workers and the
public, and to develop approaches to address any concerns.
EPA has taken the lead in making the data available to the public
through our website. Sampling results for the major pollutants of
concern and daily summaries of our monitoring results are available at
www.epa.gov. A complete set of laboratory results--updated daily--is
available to the public at our offices at 290 Broadway in Lower
Manhattan.
Response workers and the people of New York have been through much
trauma and uncertainty. We hope that our findings, comprising thousands
of pages of text, will help them address concerns about their health
and their environment. Be assured that we will be vigilant in our
ongoing efforts.
As we look to the future, we will work with our Federal, State and
city partners and Congress, on science-based approaches that ensure
that public health is protected.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for giving us
this opportunity to share the work of the many dedicated and
professional EPA employees who have worked tirelessly to protect the
health of all New Yorkers in the wake of this unprecedented event.
______
Responses by Jane M. Kenny to Additional Questions from Senator Smith
Question 1. Please provide the Committee with all available
information regarding the location and use of monitors employed to
analyze air quality in the wake of September 11, 2001 attack on New
York City. Please identify monitors that were in operation prior to
September 11, 2001, as well as any monitors put in place after that
date. At a minimum your response should address:
(a) the precise locations and type of each of those monitors;
(b) when data samples were collected from each monitor;
(c) whether any of those monitors have been removed, and if so
when;
(d) a description of the use of any non-stationary air monitors.
(e) In addition, please supply the Committee with the data taken
from each monitor for, at a minimum, the period from September 11th to
November 11, 2001.
Any additional information that may be useful or helpful in
understanding the information requested above would be welcome.
Response. Since September 11th, EPA has taken over 15,000 samples
of dust, air, drinking water, and stormwater runoff at and around the
World Trade Center site. We have also sampled in Brooklyn, Queens, the
Bronx and Staten Island, at the Fresh Kills Landfill and in New Jersey.
The following is a description of EPA's monitoring activities:
fixed location routine air sampling and monitoring stations
EPA has collected time-weighted air samples at fixed locations in
Lower Manhattan and analyzed these samples for asbestos, metals,
dioxin, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), polyaromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs), silica, particulates (PM2.5, PM10) and
aldehydes. EPA also collected and analyzed air quality samples for
asbestos, metals and particulates from fixed locations on and at the
perimeter of the Fresh Kills Landfill in Staten Island.
In addition, EPA collected and analyzed air samples for asbestos,
dioxin, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), aldehydes and particulates
from monitoring locations that are part of the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) air sampling network,
including permanent sites and locations added after September 11th.
Air samples of asbestos were also collected and analyzed from
monitoring locations in New Jersey that augmented the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection's permanent air monitoring
network.
Attachment 1 (WTC--EPA Time-Weighted Air Quality Sampling at Fixed
Stations) provides sample locations, parameters, sampling frequency,
sampling start date, sampling end date and the reason why the sampling
location was moved or eliminated, if applicable. Attachment 2 shows
exact sampling locations.
fixed location non-routine/episodic air sampling and monitoring
stations
EPA conducted non-routine/episodic monitoring for isocyanates,
phosgene (a possible product of Freon combustion), other gases and VOCs
at fixed locations. A summary of this monitoring follows:
Isocyanates.--Isocyanate samples were collected on December 11 and
19 at locations (See Attachment 2) R, A, 3B (Church and Vesey Streets),
B, C, D, P, S, E, North Tower and Vista Hotel (World Trade Center
Building 3), and on February 8 and 12 at locations R, E, P, S, D, C, B,
3A (at the SW corner of Building 5, near Church and Dey Streets), A,
Vista Hotel and North Tower. Isocyanate samples were analyzed by EPA
contract laboratories, which provided a lower level of detection than
that provided by the tape meter screening devices used for additional
real-time monitoring. Real-time monitoring for isocyanates using the
tape meters was performed on December 4, 6, 11 and 19 at locations R,
A, 3B, B, C, D, P, S, E, North Tower, South Tower, Austin Tobin Plaza,
Vista Hotel (West and Liberty Streets.) and World Trade Center Building
4.
Phosgene and other gases.--From September 19 to January 20, EPA
monitored twice daily for phosgene, chlorine, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen
cyanide, hydrofluoric acid, hydrochloric acid, ammonia, explosive
gases, oxygen and total VOCs at all fixed monitoring locations in Lower
Manhattan to determine the presence of gross amounts of airborne
contaminants. The monitoring was discontinued based on consistently
negligible or non-detectable readings throughout the affected area.
This monitoring was performed using hand-held, non-stationary
monitoring instruments and provided real-time snapshot results.
data collection for risk evaluation studies
EPA's Office of Research and Development (ORD) has done time-
weighted sample collection (24-hour samples each day) and analysis for
particulates, metals and elemental and organic carbon, as well as
continuous monitoring of PM concentrations at locations A and C
(including alternate site C1) and K. ORD has also been collecting VOC
grab samples at worker breathing levels at sites A, C and K and from
outside the 16th floor at 290 Broadway (site 16). Typically, samples
were collected each day at sites A, C and K and periodically at 290
Broadway (See Attachments 1 and 2).
non-fixed location air sampling and monitoring
In addition to fixed location monitoring, EPA continues to sample
and monitor air quality at non-fixed locations. VOC grab samples are
taken daily at various locations at Ground Zero, generally in the
vicinity of the North Tower, South Tower and Austin Tobin Plaza. EPA
originally analyzed these samples using the national Emergency Response
Team Trace Atmospheric Gas Analyzer (TAGA) and now analyzes the samples
at our Mobile Laboratory, stationed at the perimeter of the site. This
allows us to provide results within four hours of sampling. The data is
used to alert the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) and Ground Zero
workers about conditions that pose immediate health concerns. A total
of four VOC grab samples are collected daily at ground level or
breathing level.
Air monitoring is also performed during activities conducted by EPA
to remove hazardous materials and to recover oil from storage tanks
throughout the Ground Zero excavation, particularly when those events
take place within confined spaces. This monitoring is performed to
ensure that air quality in the vicinity of the response workers is
within permissible levels, and to determine the proper level of
personal protective equipment that must be worn during these
operations. Oxygen, hydrogen sulfide, carbon monoxide, explosive gases
and total VOCs have been routinely measured.
EPA has also conducted air monitoring at the special request of the
FDNY. On several occasions air monitoring was performed during below-
grade entries in or near the main and auxiliary World Trade Center
chiller plants. The standard five-gas monitor, mentioned above, was
used along with a halocarbon monitor purchased specifically to detect
Freon R-22 (chlordifluoromethane). This monitoring was performed as
needed and three times daily during the excavation of the main chiller
plant. The daily R-22 monitoring using the halocarbon meter was
discontinued when a permanent R-22 monitoring system was installed by
the New York City Department of Design and Construction. Freon R-22
monitoring was discontinued after the recent removal of the chiller
plant.
We have provided a record of our sampling results to date (See
Attachment 3).
Question 2. Please provide a precise description of the type of
safety equipment that was distributed to personnel in the Ground Zero
area and the date that equipment was made available, including, but not
limited to:
respiration masks made available to the workers;
when decontamination showers and procedures were
implemented; and
what contractors were employed to distribute masks and
operate and oversee the decontamination showers and procedures.
Response. On September 11th and in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks, EPA relied on the stock of personal protective gear
(respirators, cartridges, tyvek suits and other equipment) that the EPA
national Environmental Response Team had on-hand in our Edison, New
Jersey offices. The equipment was used by EPA response personnel, the
Agency's Criminal Investigations Division and local New Jersey county
responders. By September 14, EPA had placed an emergency order for
additional protective gear for distribution to response workers. By
September 22, EPA had distributed thousands of respirators, cartridges
and other gear to New York City. EPA supplied the following personal
protective equipment to the city: 22,100 air purifying respirators,
30,500 sets of P100 particulate cartridges, 14,000 pairs of safety
glasses and 1,000 hard hats. In addition, 600 respirators, 2,000
cartridges plus tyvek suits, booties and hard hats were supplied to the
New York State Departments of Environmental Conservation and Health.
Mine Safety Appliances Company (MSA) and 3M brand respirators with GME-
P100 OSHA-approved cartridges were supplied.
Initially, respirators and other protective gear purchased by EPA
were delivered to the New York City Office of Emergency Management by
the U.S. Coast Guard, which had been activated by EPA for the response.
Some equipment was delivered directly to the city by the manufacturers.
The bulk of the EPA-purchased personal protective equipment was
transported from the EPA Edison facility and delivered to the Office of
Emergency Management by the New York State National Guard for
distribution to response workers.
On September 20, EPA began operating the first personal wash
station for workers at Ground Zero at the southeast corner of the
marina. Shortly thereafter, EPA posted signs at the wash station and
provided flyers (Attachment 4) that instructed response workers about
personal safety and health protection. On September 22, EPA began
operating the first vehicle wash station on West Street near Murray
Street. Over the past seven months, as many as 18 wash stations have
been operating at the site. These wash stations have been operated by
Clean Harbors Inc. and Miller Environmental Inc. under contract to the
U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard continues to provide valuable
assistance to EPA and the workers at Ground Zero through contractor
procurement and oversight services.
On November 24, EPA opened the central wash station at West Street
near Vesey Street. It was constructed, is operating, and will
eventually be dismantled under EPA's contract with Earth Tech Inc. The
wash tent has provided a place at which workers can decontaminate and
change their work clothes, shower, store their belongings, wash up and
eat. The showers have received minimal use and are being partially
dismantled.
Question 3. Please provide copies of all pamphlets, flyers or other
handouts explaining air quality risks provided to the workers and the
dates each item became available.
Response. On September 11th, EPA developed a flyer (Attachment 5)
entitled Asbestos Hazards and Precautions, which was provided to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for distribution at Ground
Zero. The flyer stated that ``Cleanup workers should be protected with
appropriate eye protection, air purifying respirators and personal
protective clothing.'' As stated above, just after September 20, EPA
also distributed information about the need to wear respirators and
other protective gear at our worker wash at the site. In addition,
during daily interagency meetings at the city's Emergency Operations
Center, EPA repeatedly emphasized the hazardous conditions at the site
and the need for response workers to wear their respirators.
EPA used every opportunity during communications with the public
and the press to urge response workers at Ground Zero to wear
respirators. On September 13, Administrator Whitman appeared before the
media at Ground Zero to emphasize the need for workers to wear their
respirators. EPA's role in providing respirators was covered in our
press releases (Attachments 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) of September 13, 14, 18,
21 and 30. On numerous occasions EPA response staff discussed with FDNY
personnel the need for proper respiratory protection when working at
Ground Zero. On October 5, EPA sent a letter to the New York City
Department of Health (NYCDOH) highlighting our concerns about workers
not wearing respirators (Attachment 11). In addition to our press
releases, numerous news accounts included comments by EPA officials on
the importance of respiratory protection at Ground Zero.
______
Responses by Jane M. Kenny to Additional Questions from Senator Clinton
Question 1. You stated in your testimony that EPA is responsible
for ``coordinating the sampling data for all the response agencies.''
Can you please tell us more about this? Is this coordinated data
available to the public?
Response. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center disaster, many
organizations and agencies involved in the response conducted sampling
and monitoring activities to assess environmental impacts. NYCDOH
initially requested that the data be forwarded to them so that it could
be aggregated and made available to Federal, State and local decision-
makers. Initial sampling results were discussed among the agencies
during daily telephone conference calls and were shared in hard copy
and electronically when possible.
On September 25, 2001, the city asked EPA to develop a database to
collect and track the results of the multi-agency ambient air
monitoring. On September 28, EPA finalized the World Trade Center
Multi-Agency Database that houses data from thirteen Federal, State and
private organizations that conducted environmental monitoring after the
September 11th event. The participating organizations send their data
to EPA in many formats from electronic spreadsheets to hard copy to be
manually entered into the database. Some of the organizations conducted
limited testing and stopped submitting results after the first week.
EPA, NYSDEC and New York City Department of Environmental Protection
(NYCDEP) continue to monitor and submit results daily to the database.
EPA and NYSDEC have provided roughly 95 percent of the data in the
database.
The World Trade Center Multi-Agency Database has been used
primarily as a tool for the response agencies. Data from some of the
organizations was not quality assured for accuracy in the early months
and could not be publicly released. EPA began to make our monitoring
results and data from NYSDEC available to the public on EPA's website
in late September. All of EPA's monitoring data, with the exception of
the complex analytical data ORD has collected for research, was made
available in our Lower Manhattan offices at 290 Broadway (See
attachment 12). Other government organizations including the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), NYSDEC and NYCDEP
have posted their monitoring results on their respective websites.
EPA has been assured by participating government agencies that data
contained in the World Trade Center Multi-Agency database has now been
quality assured and will continue to be as additional data is
submitted. The database, which will include data provided by government
agencies, will be made available to the public on EPA's website this
spring.
Question 2. How exactly does EPA relay its information to the
firefighters, to the schools?
Response. Within hours of the attacks, EPA began to coordinate its
response activities through FEMA. Initially, information was shared
with the FDNY and other responding agencies at the city's Emergency
Operations Center and the response center at P.S. 89. Currently, EPA
hand-delivers our VOC data to the FDNY on a daily basis and discusses
the results with the Deputy Chief in charge of health and safety. We
also meet regularly with FDNY representatives to discuss sampling
results and future needs. In addition, the VOC data is also delivered
daily to New York City health and safety contractors at the AMEC
trailer at Ground Zero. AMEC has been assigned responsibility for
overall site health and safety at Ground Zero. As explained earlier,
the proximity of our Mobile Laboratory to the World Trade Center site
makes it possible for us to quickly relay information to the response
agencies.
EPA participates in general contractor meetings twice each week and
attends weekly health and safety meetings with representatives of all
the on-site contractors. EPA also attends a weekly health and safety
meeting that addresses site safety issues related to governmental
personnel working at Ground Zero World Trade Center.
EPA has had regular communications with the New York City Board of
Education (NYCBOE) regarding environmental conditions in Lower
Manhattan. The NYCBOE uses our maps and data summaries at meetings with
parent organizations, school representatives and local groups. Printed
copies of EPA data summaries have been important communications tools
for local residents who do not have access to the Internet. EPA has
reported any results that exceeded Federal standards or benchmarks
which have been few to the NYCBOE. We have also informed the Chair of
the local community board and the president of the Stuyvesant High
School Parents Association about several results that exceeded
standards or benchmarks near the barge operation adjacent to the
school. In addition, we have provided information to the environmental
consultant for Stuyvesant High School, appeared at a Stuyvesant Parents
Association meeting on air quality and fielded numerous calls from
concerned parents seeking information.
Question 3. You indicated in your testimony that EPA did conduct
some indoor sampling in some of the Federal buildings in Lower
Manhattan. Please provide the results of that sampling.
Response. EPA took a small number of indoor air samples (Attachment
13) at 290 Broadway and 26 Federal Plaza on September 13 and at 100
Church Street on October 23. At 290 Broadway and 26 Federal Plaza, low
levels of asbestos were detected in several of the samples. At 100
Church Street no samples were found to be above the minimum detection
limit. The General Services Administration (GSA), our Federal landlord,
also took dust and air samples in our building and at the Federal Court
House at 500 Pearl Street. Asbestos was found in some of the dust
samples and low levels of asbestos were detected in some of the air
samples. EPA vacuumed up the visible dust that had been tracked into
Federal building lobbies by response workers before we received the
monitoring results from GSA.
As detailed above, EPA's Office of Research and Development sampled
periodically outside at 290 Broadway to gather data for a health risk
evaluation. (See Attachment 1.)
Question 4. In your testimony, you indicated that only 15 asbestos
samples exceeded the AHERA standard. Yet your website says that there
were 31 exceedances, as does Carl Johnson in his testimony. Can you
explain?
Response. EPA used our agency website to get information to the
public as quickly as possible. By late September, we were posting
asbestos results to the website almost as soon as the data was received
from the lab and reviewed. Later, after consulting with experts in
asbestos analysis techniques, we found we had been making an
additional, unnecessary technical adjustment for the volume of air
sampled, which affected the results. We ultimately stopped making this
adjustment. For consistency of scientific comparisons, we then
reevaluated the data we had previously posted on the EPA website and
corrected the asbestos values where necessary.
This lowered the number of asbestos exceedances. Given the
extremely low percentage of asbestos exceedances now 21 out of almost
8,000 in Lower Manhattan the significance of the adjustments is minor.
Question 5. Please provide information on the rate of sampling and
reporting of data since September 11th. The frequency of sampling
varies between sampling parameters and locations.
Response. As described in our response to Question 1 from Senator
Smith above, we conducted a wide range of sampling at a variety of
rates ranging from continuous daily sampling to less frequent episodic
sampling. (See Attachment 1.)
In the aftermath of the disaster, information about our monitoring
results and response activities was shared daily with the other
Federal, State and local response agencies, summarized for the press
and reported to thousands of local residents at public meetings and
through our telephone hot-line. As soon as we were assured that the
data was accurate, all daily summaries and laboratory reports, with the
exception of the complex ORD data collected for research, were made
available in our Lower Manhattan offices. Data related to the major
pollutants of concern was posted on our website beginning in late
September.
Question 6. As you know, EPA has been widely criticized for the
statements that it made in the first few days following the attack.
Please respond to this criticism, and explain what the Agency intends
to do to improve its communications efforts in the future.
Response. At each stage of our response to the events of September
11th, we have based our findings on the scientific data before us. The
statements made by EPA about the results of air quality monitoring in
Lower Manhattan have been based on sound science. To date, the results
of our comprehensive tests of the outdoor air consistently indicate
that air quality in Lower Manhattan did not and does not pose an
increase to significant long-term health risk to those who live, work
or visit here.
Of course, as we emphasized from the start, this does not apply to
workers at Ground Zero who must wear respirators and other appropriate
protective equipment, even now that the fires are out. We were aware
that the dusty and smoky conditions during the months following the
disaster could and did cause a range of respiratory problems,
especially among sensitive groups such as people with asthma. Our
advice to anyone experiencing symptoms was that they should consult a
physician as soon as possible. We also emphasized that people returning
to dusty homes and workplaces should have their interior spaces
professionally cleaned.
We note that Dr. George Thurston of the New York University School
of Medicine testified at the February 11 Senate Committee hearing that
``While our analyses are consistent with the Government's conclusion
that the WTC dust is not likely to have short- or long-term serious
health impacts on otherwise healthy local residents, we found that it
is very irritating and capable of causing the symptoms reported by many
residents.''
EPA is collaborating with our Federal, State and city partners to
address ongoing concerns about indoor air quality through a multi-
agency task force. The group has already made considerable progress.
With EPA's guidance, NYCDEP will soon begin to remove residual debris
from roofs and building facades, EPA will conduct a pilot study of
indoor cleaning techniques, and all of the agencies will continue to
assess the cleaning that has been conducted and develop testing
criteria.
In the event of a future disaster, EPA will be better prepared to
quickly communicate monitoring results to the public. We have developed
a database for collecting and tracking environmental monitoring results
and have identified standards and benchmarks to help us evaluate our
findings. We have revised agency operations at a national level to
identify opportunities for improving responses especially under
terrorist attacks. Additionally we will complete a regional after-
action review to identify opportunities for improvement.
Question 7. Eric Goldstein of Natural Resources Defense Council
recommended that it should be examined whether there should be shorter
term standards for exposure to high intensity bursts of particulate
matter (i.e. shorter than a 24-hour measuring standard), and whether
standards should be established for exposure to fiberglass, dioxin and
other pollutants that are not currently part of the formal standard
setting process. Please comment.
Response. As part of its responsibilities under the Clean Air Act,
EPA periodically (every five years) conducts a review of scientific
advances for criteria pollutants. EPA is currently in the middle of a
comprehensive, periodic review of the most recent scientific
information on health effects associated with exposure to ambient
particles. This review includes a full evaluation of available
information on health effects associated with exposures over a wide
range of averaging times, including annual, 24-hour periods and shorter
periods such as hourly. When completed, this scientific review will
form the basis for EPA's decision on whether revisions to the PM
standards, such as the agency's actions in establishing a new standard
for PM2.5. EPA will take advice from the Agency's scientific
advisory committee and public comments into account in making any
decisions.
With respect to other pollutants such as dioxin and fiberglass, EPA
currently has a formal, two-stage standard-setting process that
addresses such pollutants. Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, EPA
establishes technology-based emissions standards for specific sources
of the 188 listed hazardous air pollutants (including dioxin and
fiberglass, as a fine mineral fiber).
Ultimately, EPA will evaluate the residual risks that would remain
after such emission standards are met and sets risk-based standards, as
appropriate, to protect public health.
In addition, EPA has been developing Acute Exposure Guidelines for
dozens of chemicals that will establish three levels of concern from
reversible to irreversible anticipated effects for exposure durations
of 30 minutes, 60 minutes, 4 hours and 8 hours. The guidelines will be
published following peer review by the National Academy of Sciences.
These guidelines are being established on a ``worst first'' basis,
addressing the chemicals widely understood to be most toxic in short,
intense exposures. Dioxin and fiberglass have less acute toxicity than
the chemicals for which guidelines are now being established.
Question 8. There have been reports that some trucks transporting
debris from the site are uncovered and not fully wetted down. Who is
responsible for monitoring this operation? What further actions can be
taken to ensure that this operation is conducted in a manner that is as
clean as possible?
Response. All trucks leaving the World Trade Center site are
required by the city to be covered. Typically, the trucks go through a
cutting station, where any overhanging metal is burned off. The drivers
then either apply their own covers or the trucks are covered with
rolled material, which is applied on the cutting stands. In the fall,
the trucks were routinely wet down. Wetting operations were curtailed
during short periods during the winter, when sub-freezing temperatures
made the procedure too hazardous; wetting is not done when the debris
is already sufficiently wet because of site conditions.
Various agencies have responsibility for vehicles leaving the site,
including:
EPA, which operates vehicle wash down stations at World
Trade Center exit points to prevent vehicles from tracking contaminants
off the site;
the New York City Department of Design and Construction,
which is responsible for overall site operations, including traffic
routing;
NYCDOH, which also monitors trucks to ensure that they
have been washed down as required under an order from the NYCDOH
commissioner. It is our understanding that NYCDOH issued violations and
fines for trucks that they determined were not adequately washed down
or covered.
NYSDEC, which enforced traffic control at Ground Zero last
fall and monitored trucks to ensure that loaded vehicles were covered.
NYSDEC informed EPA that the agency issued citations for trucks that
were not properly covered, in violation of State regulations.
Question 9. Why are the debris barges not being required to be
covered in some fashion?
Response. It is our understanding that the city has not covered the
barges because the sharp-edged exposed metal in the World Trade Center
debris would destroy any covering material. Instead, the debris-laden
barges are wet down to suppress the dust. EPA raised this issue with
New York City officials and was informed that the mesh-like material
used to cover the barges when they carted municipal waste to the Fresh
Kills Landfill would not be practical under these conditions.
Question 10. What actions will be taken during the rebuilding
process to reduce as much as possible the noise, dust, diesel exhaust
and other forms of pollution at the site?
Response.
New York State and New York City have primary responsibility for
the redevelopment of Lower Manhattan. EPA is working with the city,
State and other Federal agencies on ways to mitigate emissions from
diesel engines associated with the recovery and rebuilding of the World
Trade Center area. The Agency is encouraging the State and city to
promote and require the use of ultra low sulfur diesel fuel (ULSD) and
retrofit devices for diesel powered equipment and vehicles. The use of
diesel particulate filters has the potential to reduce emissions of
particulates up to 95 percent and the use of ULSD can lower sulfur
oxides up to 99 percent. On March 22, EPA Regional Administrator Jane
Kenny recommended to FEMA that increased costs associated with using
ULSD and installing retrofit devices be reimbursable.
In addition, EPA is serving on the Federal Task Force to Rebuild
New York City. We have and will continue to encourage our Federal
partners to apply ``green'' standards in Federal contracts and grants
for World Trade Center redevelopment, to fund clean ferries, and to
advocate the use of lower polluting construction equipment, cleaner
burning alternative fuels and green construction practices.
An Environmental Review and Planning Subcommittee of the Federal
Task Force has been established. FEMA has prepared a preliminary draft
programmatic environmental assessment addressing, in a generic way,
potential impacts associated with future projects. As specific projects
are proposed, more detailed environmental documents will be developed
to address the potential impacts and any necessary mitigation.
Question 11. There are reportedly many building roofs and terraces
in and around Ground Zero that have not been cleaned since September
11th. Will EPA be providing assistance in this regard?
Response. Many building exteriors were cleaned by building owners
as instructed by NYCDEP. In January and February, EPA, NYCDEP, NYSDEC
and the New York State Department of Labor performed site visits at
more than 400 buildings to assess exterior building cleanups conducted
by building owners in the vicinity of the World Trade Center. Residual
debris was observed in isolated areas at the perimeter of roofs, at the
base of parapet walls and in gutters of 211 of these buildings. Debris
was also visible on horizontal surfaces of building facades.
As announced in a March 25 press release (Attachment 14), NYCDEP
will remove residual debris from rooftops and facades with EPA's
support. OSHA will work in a coordinated effort with the city and EPA
to ensure the safety and health of the workers performing this
cleaning. The work is expected to begin as soon as the city completes
its contracting process. This action is the result of collaboration
between New York City and the Federal Government through EPA's Task
Force on Indoor Air in Lower Manhattan.
Question 12. Are some of the air quality data gathered in the first
two weeks after September 11th still being withheld, and if so why?
Response. EPA has made every effort to provide data to elected
officials, the media or the public as soon as possible. Under
circumstances of extreme difficulty, having been evacuated from our
Manhattan offices, EPA staff developed a system for sampling,
analyzing, interpreting and conveying environmental monitoring results
to the first-line responders, the press and the public. A website was
developed to present the complex scientific data to the public in a
format that was easy to navigate and understand. Copies of laboratory
reports and data summaries were provided to requesting members of the
public as soon as the information was validated through an expedited
quality assurance process. As stated above, the Agency began to post
data on our website in late September. By October 16, EPA's data, with
the exception of research data collected by ORD, was made available for
review in our Lower Manhattan offices. The data repository is kept up-
to-date and new data is regularly posted on our website.
Question 13. Do you have adequate resources to meet response needs?
Has access to resources been an obstacle to fulfilling your
responsibilities in this regard?
Response. Acting on mission assignments from FEMA under the Federal
Response Plan, EPA is the lead agency for hazardous substances. EPA has
been given primary responsibility for monitoring the ambient air, water
and drinking water and coordinating the sampling data for all of the
response agencies. In addition, EPA was asked to manage worker and
vehicle wash down operations at the site and at the Fresh Kills
Landfill, which has been receiving debris from the disaster site. A
mission assignment from FEMA confirms that FEMA will provide funding
for the performance of the assigned activities.
The $94 million committed to EPA by FEMA has been sufficient to
provide for the activities described above. New mission assignments,
including those to address the assessment and remediation of indoor
spaces, will also require FEMA funding.
Question 14. Please provide information on activities planned for
protecting public health and the environment at and around Fresh Kills
after current disaster-related activity ends.
Response. In September, EPA established a network of fixed air
monitors at the Fresh Kills Landfill and on the perimeter of the site
to protect workers who handle World Trade Center debris at the landfill
and people living in nearby neighborhoods. EPA monitors for asbestos,
particulate matter/dust and metals at these fixed monitoring stations.
(See Attachment 1.)
New York State operates a federally approved air monitoring network
that includes ambient monitoring stations on Staten Island. These
monitors, which are adjacent to the Fresh Kills Landfill and in the
surrounding neighborhood, measure particulate matter and hazardous air
pollutants. Monitoring results are available to the public, in some
cases in real-time, on the state's Web page. EPA and the State will
continue to review this data to ensure that citizens are not exposed to
unhealthful levels of pollutants related to disaster response
activities or normal operations at the landfill. In addition, EPA will
continue to provide the State with fiscal support under Section 105 of
the Clean Air Act and technical support for future monitoring.
New York State is authorized to manage the Fresh Kills Landfill and
we expect that the State will address post-disaster operations at the
landfill.
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