    [Senate Hearing 107-483]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 107-483

                     YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                          ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       on

                                  S.J. RES. 34

    APPROVING THE SITE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
     REPOSITORY FOR THE DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT
        NUCLEAR FUEL, PURSUANT TO THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982.

                                   __________

                                  MAY 16, 2002

                                  MAY 22, 2002

                                  MAY 23, 2002

                           Printed for the use of the
                   Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    79-940                       WASHINGTON : 2002
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                   COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

                      JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
    BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota        PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
    BOB GRAHAM, Florida                  DON NICKLES, Oklahoma
    RON WYDEN, Oregon                    LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
    TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota            BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
    DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         CONRAD BURNS, Montana
    CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York         JON KYL, Arizona
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           GORDON SMITH, Oregon

                        Robert M. Simon, Staff Director
                          Sam E. Fowler, Chief Counsel
                   Brian P. Malnak, Republican Staff Director
                   James P. Beirne, Republican Chief Counsel
                            Colleen Deegan, Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    S.J. Res. 34.....................................................     8

    Hearings:
        May 16, 2002.................................................     1
        May 22, 2002.................................................    45
        May 23, 2002.................................................   105

                                   STATEMENTS
                                  May 16, 2002

    Abraham, Hon. Spencer, Secretary, Department of Energy...........    10
    Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................     1
    Campbell, Hon. Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator from Colorado........    20
    Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from Idaho....................     9
    Domenici, Hon. Pete V., U.S. Senator from New Mexico.............     4
    Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from Nevada.......................     6

                                  May 22, 2002

    Anderson, Ross C., ``Rocky'', Mayor, Salt Lake City, UT..........    77
    Ballard, James David, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Criminal
      Justice, Grand Valley State University, Grand Rapids, MI.......    64
    Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................    45
    Ervin, Michael J., Sr., Vice President, Peace Officers Research
      Association of California......................................    82
    Gilinsky, Victor, Ph.D., Former Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory
      Commission.....................................................    73
    Guinn, Hon. Kenny C., Governor of Nevada.........................    46
    Halstead, Robert J., Transportation Advisor, Agency for Nuclear
      Projects, State of Nevada......................................    51
    Murkowski, Hon. Frank H., U.S. Senator from Alaska...............    61
    Prescott, Stephen M., M.D., Executive Director, Huntaman Cancer
      Institute, Salt Lake City, UT..................................    86
    Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from Nevada.......................    50
    Thomas, Hon. Craig, U.S. Senator from Wyoming....................    63

                                  May 23, 2002

    Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................   105
    Burns, Hon. Conrad, U.S. Senator from Montana....................   119
    Campbell, Hon. Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator from Colorado........   116
    Card, Robert, Under Secretary, Department of Energy..............   156
    Cohon, Jared L., Chairman, Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board..   140
    Hall, Jim, Former Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board,
      on behalf of the Transportation Safety Coalition...............   108
    Holmstead, Jeffrey R., Assistant Administrator for Air and
      Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency.....................   153
    Jones, Ms. Gary, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
      General Accounting Office......................................   144
    Meserve, Richard A., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission;
      accompanied by Greta Joy Dicus, Commissioner; Nils J. Diaz,
      Commissioner; and Edward McGaffigan, Jr., Commissioner.........   125
    Murkowski, Hon. Frank H., U.S. Senator from Alaska...............   107
    Reid, Hon. Harry, U.S. Senator from Nevada.......................   106

                                   APPENDIXES

                                   Appendix I

    Responses to additional questions................................   167

                                  Appendix II

    Additional material submitted for the record.....................   173

                     YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2002

                                           U.S. Senate,
                     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
    chairman, presiding.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

        The Chairman. We will call the hearing to order. The
    committee meets this morning for the first of three hearings on
    S.J. Res. 34, which is a joint resolution approving the site of
    Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for the development of the nuclear
    waste repository.
        We have today with us, at the invitation of the committee,
    Senator Reid and Senator Ensign, who are, of course, the
    Senators from the most affected State of Nevada, and we have
    invited them to be here, so that after committee members have
    asked their questions of either Senator Reid or Senator Ensign,
    if they wish to ask questions, they are certainly welcome to do
    that.
        The text of the resolution that the hearing relates to, and
    the rules for its consideration, were laid down 20 years ago in
    the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. That act gave the
    Secretary of Energy the responsibility for picking a site for
    the development of a nuclear waste repository. It subjected his
    decision to review by the President, by the Governor of the
    State that he selected, and ultimately, by Congress. The act
    gave the Governor the power to veto the site recommended by the
    Secretary and the President, but it gave Congress the final say
    on whether to sustain or override the Governor's veto.
        Congress took the site selection decision out of the
    Secretary's hands 15 years ago, when it designated Yucca
    Mountain as the only site that the Secretary could consider,
    but the law still required the Secretary to study Yucca
    Mountain to determine if the site is suitable for a repository,
    and it still gave the Governor the power to veto the
    President's site recommendation.
        The Department of Energy has been studying Yucca Mountain
    for 24 years. Based on these studies, the Secretary of Energy
    has decided that the site is safe for use as a nuclear waste
    repository. President Bush approved the Secretary's decision,
    and formally recommended the site to Congress in February. In
    April, Governor Guinn submitted a notice of disapproval of the
    President's recommendations,* which will have the effect of
    barring the use of Yucca Mountain for a repository unless both
    Houses of Congress pass, and the President signs into law, the
    joint resolution before us by July 25. The House passed the
    resolution by a wide margin last week.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The Notice of Disapproval can be found in the appendix.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Twenty years ago, the authors of the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act in both the House and the Senate spent more time debating
    the State veto than any other provision in the act, and
    recognized the gravity of the decision to bury many thousands
    of tons of highly radioactive waste in a State, and we are
    determined to give any State chosen to bury this burden the
    opportunity to appeal its selection to Congress, and to have
    its concerns heard and carefully considered.
        Senator Stennis called the State veto, quote, ``An act of
    essential justice.''
        At the same time, the authors of the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act recognized that, as Representative Morris K. Udall put it,
    ``In the final analysis, the nuclear waste repository is a
    project in the national interest which must be subject to a
    national decision.'' They ensured that the decision whether to
    approve the Secretary's site recommendation would rest not with
    the Governor or the President, but with Congress. The expedited
    procedures for considering the resolution to override the
    Governor's veto were designed to ensure that both Houses of
    Congress would have the opportunity to vote on the question,
    and those procedures were the necessary tradeoff for the State
    veto.
        Although the Nuclear Waste Policy Act itself is silent on
    the scope of our review, the legislative history of the act
    offers clear guidance as to what the authors of the act had in
    mind. Our task, in the words of Senator Howard Cannon, one of
    the original proponents of the State veto, is to determine
    ``whether the Secretary's decision to file with the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission for a license to construct a repository
    at a particular site has fully considered the objections and
    concerns submitted by the State Governor.'' The authors of the
    act also indicated that the burden of proof--more precisely the
    burden of going forward with the repository, would rest with
    the administration.
        At today's hearing, we will give Secretary Abraham the
    opportunity to present the administration's case for going
    forward. It will be up to the Secretary to show that the
    State's concerns have been or will be addressed, and to
    persuade us that the Department of Energy should be allowed to
    file a licensed application with the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission.
        Next Wednesday, we will give the State of Nevada an
    opportunity to present its concerns and its objections to the
    repository.
        And finally, next Thursday, we will hold a third hearing at
    which we will hear from independent technical experts who have
    statutory roles in regulating or overseeing the repository
    program, namely: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear
    Waste Technical Review Board, the Environmental Protection
    Agency, and the General Accounting Office.
        It would then be my intention to schedule a business
    meeting on June 5 for the committee to vote on whether to
    report the resolution to the full Senate.
        Our task, as the authors of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
    made clear, is to decide whether to allow the Secretary of
    Energy to file the license application with the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission. It is not our job to substitute our
    judgment for the Commission's on the technical questions of
    whether the geology of the site, or the design of the
    repository, or the design of the shipping containers comply
    with the Commission's licensing standards. We have neither the
    technical expertise nor all of the information we would need to
    make those judgments. Those questions can only be resolved
    after further studies and further public licensing hearings.
    The Nuclear Waste Policy Act wisely left those decisions to the
    technical experts at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, subject
    to our ongoing oversight and judicial review.
        Our task, instead, is to give a fair hearing to both sides,
    and then decide whether the Secretary has presented a strong
    enough case to allow him to apply to the Commission for a
    license, or whether the State has identified weaknesses in his
    case sufficient for us to terminate the program at this point.
        Senator Murkowski is not able to be here this morning. I
    understand Senator Craig might have an opening statement he
    would like to give, and then we will hear from the witness.
        [The prepared statements of Senators Bingaman, Domenici,
    and Reid follow:]
            Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senator
                                From New Mexico
        The Committee meets this morning for the first of three hearings on
    S.J. Res. 34, a joint resolution approving the site at Yucca Mountain,
    Nevada for the development of a nuclear waste repository.
        The text of the resolution before us, and the rules for its
    consideration, were laid down 20 years ago in the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act of 1982. The Act gave the Secretary of Energy the responsibility
    for picking a site for the development of a nuclear waste repository,
    but subjected his decision to review by the President, by the Governor
    of the State he selected, and ultimately by Congress. The Act gave the
    Governor the power to veto the site recommended by the Secretary and
    the President, but it gave Congress the final say on whether to sustain
    or override the Governor's veto.
        Congress took the site selection decision out of the Secretary's
    hands 15 years ago, when it designated Yucca Mountain as the only site
    that the Secretary could consider. But the law still required the
    Secretary to study Yucca Mountain to determine if the site is suitable
    for a repository, and it still gave the Governor the power to veto the
    President's site recommendation.
        The Department of Energy has been studying Yucca Mountain for 24
    years. Based upon these studies, the Secretary of Energy has decided
    that the site is safe for use as a nuclear waste repository. President
    Bush approved the Secretary's decision and formally recommended the
    site to Congress in February. In April, Governor Guinn submitted a
    notice of disapproval of the President's recommendation, which will
    have the effect of barring the use of Yucca Mountain for a repository
    unless both Houses of Congress pass, and the President signs into law,
    the joint resolution before us by July 25. The House passed the
    resolution by a wide margin last week.
        Twenty years ago, the authors of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, in
    both the House and the Senate, spent more time debating the state veto
    than any other provision in the Act. They recognized the gravity of the
    decision to bury many thousands of tons of highly radioactive waste in
    a State, and were determined to give any State chosen to bear this
    burden the opportunity to appeal its selection to Congress and have its
    concerns heard and carefully considered. Senator McClure, who chaired
    this Committee and managed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act on the floor 20
    years ago, called the state veto ``an act of essential justice.''
        At the same time, the authors of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
    recognized that, as Representative Morris K. Udall put it, ``in the
    final analysis,'' the nuclear waste repository ``is a project in the
    national interest, which must be subject to a national decision.'' They
    ensured that the decision whether to approve the Secretary's site
    recommendation would rest, not with the Governor or the President, but
    with Congress. The expedited procedures for considering the resolution
    to override the Governor's veto were designed to ensure that both
    Houses of Congress would have the opportunity to vote on the question.
    Those procedures were the necessary tradeoff for the state veto.
        Although the Nuclear Waste Policy Act itself is silent on the scope
    of our review, the legislative history of the Act offers clear guidance
    as to what the authors of the Act had in mind. Our task, in the words
    of Senator Howard Cannon, one of the original proponents of the state
    veto, is to determine ``whether the Secretary's decision to file with
    the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] for a license to construct a
    [repository] at a particular site has fully considered the objections
    and concerns submitted by the State Governor.''The authors of the Act
    also indicated that the burden of proof--more precisely, the burden of
    going forward with the repository--would rest with the Administration.
        At today's hearing, we will give Secretary Abraham the opportunity
    to present the Administration's case for going forward. It will be up
    to the Secretary to show that the State's concerns have been, or will
    be, addressed, and to persuade us that the Department of Energy should
    be allowed to file a license application with the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission.
        Next Wednesday, we will give the State of Nevada an opportunity to
    present its concerns and objections to the repository.
        Finally, next Thursday, we will hold a third hearing at which we
    will hear from the independent technical experts who have statutory
    roles in regulating or overseeing the repository program, namely: the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review
    Board, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the General Accounting
    Office.
        It would then be my intention to schedule a business meeting on
    June 5 for the Committee to vote on whether to report the resolution to
    the full Senate.
        Our task, as the authors of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act made
    clear, is to decide whether to allow the Secretary of Energy to file a
    license application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. It is not
    our job to substitute our judgment for the Commission's on the
    technical questions of whether the geology of the site or the design of
    the repository or the design of the shipping containers complies with
    the Commission's licensing standards. We have neither the technical
    expertise nor all of the information that we would need to make those
    judgments. Those questions can only be resolved after further studies
    and further public licensing hearings. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
    wisely left those decisions to the technical experts at the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, subject to our ongoing oversight and judicial
    review.
        Our task, instead, is to give a fair hearing to both sides and then
    decide whether the Secretary has presented a strong enough case to
    allow him to apply to the Commission for a license, or whether the
    State has identified weaknesses in his case sufficient for us to
    terminate the program at this point.
                                     ______

           Prepared Statement of Hon. Pete V. Domenici, U.S. Senator
                                From New Mexico
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings on issues
    surrounding the Senate's vote on the resolution that would allow
    continued evaluation of Yucca Mountain's suitability for a high level
    nuclear waste repository.
        Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your joining the Committee here today
    to share the extensive deliberations that you conducted to arrive at
    the decision to recommend approval of the Yucca Mountain site to the
    President.
        Members of this Committee don't need to be reminded of the vital
    role that nuclear energy plays in our national security. There's no
    question that it directly impacts our environmental security and our
    energy security. Without nuclear energy, we would have far dirtier
    skies and be far more dependent on foreign energy supplies.
        I've argued repeatedly that our nation must maintain nuclear energy
    as a viable energy source far into the future. With advanced
    technologies, it can become a fuel for centuries into the future. Its
    clean reliable baseload power will be essential in powering our
    economic growth for future generations, just as it is a vital component
    of today's economic successes.
        For nuclear energy to continue to support our economy, we must
    address the waste issue. There's no denying that these wastes represent
    an area of risk--but every energy source requires a balance of benefits
    and risks.The risks associated with nuclear waste are ones that we can
    fully control.
        I'm well aware that hundreds of outstanding issues have been
    identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And the Department is
    well aware that they must address each and every one of the NRC issues
    before the Commission is going to move towards a final license.
        In many meetings with the NRC chairman, as well as many of the
    Commissioners, I've always been impressed with their intent to deal
    with this, or any licensing issue, through careful study of the
    relevant scientific facts. The NRC has the expertise to evaluate these
    outstanding issues, and I'm confident that they will do so with great
    care. It is not up to the United States Senate to decide on the complex
    scientific issues that will eventually determine the fate of a license
    for Yucca Mountain.
        Certainly, both sides in the debates about Yucca Mountain have
    stated their interest in assuring that decisions are based on ``good
    science.'' For that reason, I want to thank the Secretary for choosing
    a superb research scientist, Dr. Margaret Chu, to lead the Yucca
    Mountain program. Dr. Chu, from Sandia National Laboratories, provided
    leadership for the complex licensing issues associated with WIPP. She
    is an outstanding choice to lead the Department through the scientific
    complexities of future licensing actions on Yucca Mountain.
        I've been very sorry to see the overblown concerns on
    transportation in the press lately. Apparently the opponents of Yucca
    Mountain are so intent on winning this battle that they are willing to
    use transportation issues to frighten the American people into
    abandoning nuclear energy. That would be a colossal mistake for our
    nation and would seriously undermine national security.
        The simple fact is that transportation of nuclear materials is a
    challenging and risky operation, but it is also an operation that has
    been extensively studied and engineered for success. In the United
    States, as well as in other countries, the record for transporting
    spent fuel is superb. Opponents need to remember that the shipping
    casks for spent fuel are designed to withstand the most rigorous
    conditions, and routes will be carefully chosen to further limit risks.
        In the United States, since 1960, we've shipped spent fuel about
    2,700 times and it's traveled over 1.6 million miles. Sure, there have
    been a few accidents. But no radiation has ever been released in any of
    them.
        The record at the Waste Isolation Pilot Project is also
    spectacular. In their 3 years of operations, they've logged about 700
    shipments traveling over 1.5 million miles. And in Europe. over 70,000
    metric tons of spent fuel have been shipped--an amount roughly equal to
    the total authorized limit for Yucca Mountain.
        Furthermore, in any debate about transportation, the simple fact is
    that route selection and detailed planning will begin at least 5 years
    before the first shipment and that the total number of shipments in a
    year will be around 175--a far cry from the 300 million annual
    shipments of hazardous materials that are currently moving around the
    country. There will be plenty of time to debate and optimize shipping
    plans before any spent fuel moves.
        In responding to the outstanding issues raised by the NRC, I'm sure
    the Department will continue to analyze the Mountain and improve their
    modeling and simulation. That's certainly important research that I
    fully support. But I want to note that other research is also vital.
        I've spoken on many occasions with my concern that the nation's
    policy of simply treating spent fuel as ``waste'' deserves careful
    debate. Spent fuel has immense residual energy content. I'm not
    convinced that we should be making a decision today that future
    generations will have no interest in this superb energy source.
        I've noted that alternative spent fuel management strategies should
    be carefully studied and evaluated. Reprocessing and transmutation
    could not only recover residual energy, but could also vastly reduce
    the toxicity of the final waste products. Such research was strongly
    supported in the President's National Energy Policy, and Congress has
    supported this research very well--with $50 million dedicated to this
    work in the current year.
        I was both amazed and disappointed that the Department chose to
    effectively zero this promising research in their request for fiscal
    year 2003. Recently Under Secretary Bob Card has been quoted as
    favoring research in this area. Mr. Secretary, in my view you should be
    speaking out on the importance of this research and providing funding
    for it in fiscal year 2003. If this work is not funded in 2003, the
    momentum and progress built up over years will be lost.
        Mr. Chairman, in my view, the nation is far better served by
    beginning to move spent fuel into a single well secured repository than
    to leave it stored in temporary facilities at 131 sites in 39 states. I
    look forward to supporting your joint resolution to override the veto
    of the Governor of Nevada and continue evaluation of Yucca Mountain as
    our nation's future repository.
                                     ______

        Prepared Statement of Hon. Harry Reid, U.S. Senator From Nevada
        I want to thank you Chairman Bingaman and Senator Murkowski for
    allowing me the opportunity to participate in this hearing--and for
    understanding the importance of this issue to me and to my state, and
    really to almost every state.
        The resolution this committee is considering refers to the
    President's recommendation of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the site for
    disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
        But this limited description fails to take into account the full
    implications of developing a repository there (or anywhere else)--
    namely, that before dumping the nation's nuclear waste on Nevada, it
    has to be shipped through 43 states--including the states most members
    of this committee represent.
        So while there are many fundamental problems with the site itself
    and concerns about the process that led to the President's
    recommendation of the site, I want to first address the dangers of
    transporting massive amounts of deadly nuclear waste along the nation's
    major highways, railroad tracks and waterways.
        Bush plan for moving 77,000 tons of deadly high-level radioactive
    waste requires 100,000 shipments by truck, 20,000 by train and perhaps
    thousands more by barge.
        This idea would be risky at any time, but after September 11, 2001
    it is just unthinkable.
        The long term radiation contained in each shipment is 240 times
    radiation released by the Hiroshima bomb.
        Shipments will pass by homes, schools, parks, churches, offices.
        Shipments jeopardize the safety, health, environment and the lives
    of many people who live in cities and towns all over the country.
        We know there will be hundreds of accidents involving shipments of
    nuclear waste.
        It's not a question of if, but when and where and how severe will
    these accidents be. And an accident involving a container of deadly
    nuclear waste is no routine fender-bender. A collision or fire
    involving a 25-ton payload of nuclear waste could kill thousands.
        Yet, the Department of Energy despite knowing there will be
    accidents recommended this plan without developing a plan for the
    shipments.
        In addition, DOE has failed to provide the millions of people who
    live near the proposed routes the information they need to understand
    the risk their families face.
        Deadly accidents are not the only concern. Shipping nuclear waste
    across the country increases our vulnerability to terrorist attack, by
    adding hundreds of thousands of targets for terrorists to attack with a
    missile or to hijack or to sabotage.
        So transporting deadly nuclear waste is dangerous--and it's a risk
    our country shouldn't take.
        The nuclear power industry and some of its backers suggest it would
    be better to have nuclear waste at a single site instead of scattered
    around the country. But this is a false promise, because the nation's
    nuclear waste will never be consolidated at a single site.
        It will continue to be at every one of the operating reactor sites.
    Spent nuclear fuel rods are so hot and radioactive that they have to be
    stored at the nuclear reactor site in a cooling pond for 5 years before
    they can be moved. So developing Yucca Mountain would add to the number
    of sites with nuclear waste, not reduce it.
        There are also risks about Yucca Mountain itself and hundreds of
    unanswered questions about whether it can be a safe storage facility.
        Independent federal experts agree that the science done on Yucca
    Mountain is incomplete.

              The General Accounting Office, a credible independent agency,
            chastised the Secretary of Energy for making a decision on
            Yucca Mountain when almost 300 important scientific tests
            remain incomplete.
              The experts at the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
            another independent agency, concluded that the technical basis
            for Yucca Mountain is ``weak to moderate''.
              The Inspector General at the Department of Energy found the
            that law firm they hired was working for the nuclear power
            industry at the same time.

        There is an alternative. We can safely leave the waste on site,
    where it will be any way as new waste is added to the existing waste.
    It will be safe there while we develop the technology for reprocessing
    or safe disposal without shipping 100,000 nuclear dirty bombs through
    your states.
        Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss this
    important issue.

            STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, U.S. SENATOR
                               FROM IDAHO

        Senator Craig. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        As you know, last week, the House passed House Joint
    Resolution 87, which approves the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada
    for development as the country's deep geological repository for
    high level nuclear waste. The House approved this resolution by
    an overwhelming bipartisan majority vote of 306 to 117. This is
    a very significant action.
        For over two decades, Yucca Mountain has been studied, over
    $4 billion has been spent on the study of the mountain. The
    action taken in the House last week, and a similar action soon
    to be taken here in the U.S. Senate--approval of this
    resolution--will allow the required licensing process of Yucca
    Mountain to move forward.
        Approval of this resolution is another step, moving further
    along in what has been a very long and careful process.
    Congress is not being asked, as our chairman has just said, to
    judge the licensing of the repository. These technical
    judgments will be made by the experts at the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission in the coming years. What Congress is being asked to
    do is to permit the Department of Energy, the Secretary, to
    move forward with the development of Yucca Mountain. We are
    being asked to allow the Department of Energy to submit a
    license application for Yucca Mountain.
        The Senate will soon begin the process of considering our
    own Yucca Mountain resolution, which is before the committee,
    S.J. Res. 34, introduced by the chairman of the Energy and
    Natural Resources Committee. This morning we are holding the
    first of a series of three hearings. The chairman has outlined
    those.
        And I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, we are pleased that you
    are moving expeditiously. You obviously are bringing in all of
    the right groups to be heard. It is critical that we hear from
    all sides on this issue.
        The Secretary is before us this morning. We look forward to
    his testimony, and the expertise that he and the Department of
    Energy bring to this issue.
        At the end of these hearings, it is my expectation that my
    colleagues, and the committee, and me will vote out the Yucca
    Mountain resolution with a strong bi-partisan vote. Shortly
    thereafter, in June or July, it is my expectation that the full
    Senate will also approve Yucca Mountain.
        There is something else that my colleagues need to be aware
    of. This process of our consideration of this resolution is
    laid out in current law, as the chairman has already spoken to,
    the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Under this process, both Houses
    of Congress must act to overturn Nevada's veto of Yucca
    Mountain. This is a one-shot deal. Congress gets one bite at
    this apple. If the Senate fails to overturn Nevada's veto,
    Yucca Mountain will be abandoned as a repository. The
    scientific investigation will stop. The Congress and the
    American people will be right back to square one, where they
    started decades ago.
        I believe that it would be most irresponsible to take that
    act. The responsible action is to proceed, to allow the experts
    to make judgment on and decide whether Yucca Mountain can, in
    fact, be licensed for the purpose of a deep geologic repository
    for high-level waste.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for starting this
    process here in the Senate in a timely fashion, and I look
    forward to participating.
        The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
        I know several members would like to do opening statements,
    but I think the way we will proceed is to just provide that
    there will be 8 minutes of questioning, which Senators can use
    for opening statements or for questions, or for some
    combination of those two.
        Before we start into that, let us hear from our witness,
    Secretary Abraham. Thank you for being here. Why not go ahead
    with your testimony?

      STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
                                 ENERGY

        Secretary Abraham. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
    appreciate the chance to be here with the committee today.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe this committee and the Senate
    should follow the lead of the House of Representatives and vote
    to override Nevada's veto, and to allow a full and objective
    final decision on Yucca Mountain to be made by the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission. As you indicated, the history of this
    program is a very long one. It dates back to Congress's
    decision in 1982 to begin the process by passing the Nuclear
    Waste Policy Act, committing to responsibility for radioactive
    waste disposal in this country.
        Since that time, and even actually before it, research had
    been conducted in conjunction with the site at Yucca Mountain.
    That research now has spanned 24 years. It has been in excess
    of $4 billion worth of scientific investigation. To put that in
    perspective, that is five times longer than it took to build
    the Hoover Dam; it is six times the entire duration of the
    Manhattan Project, twice as long as it took to plan and
    complete the first moon landing. So the commitment, in terms of
    energy, time, dollars, and research, I think, has been
    extensive.
        It fell to me, upon the completion of this extensive
    research effort, to reach a conclusion as to whether or not I
    could recommend this site as being suitable for the storage of
    nuclear waste. To reach that decision, I have considered the
    various research projects that have been done, and the science,
    and to try to determine two basic conclusions.
        First, is the site suitable for the development of a
    repository, based on the evaluation of the science that had
    been conducted, for a period called the ``pre-closure'' period?
    That is the period from when we might start this project, to
    the point when we might seal the mountain. To give the
    committee some perspective on that time frame, it is estimated
    to be anywhere from 50 to 300 years. In short, at its longest,
    the preclosure period would exceed the actual age of the United
    States of America.
        This is the period in which we would construct the
    repository, we would accept the waste into it, and we would
    monitor very closely any developments that might occur.
        To my knowledge, no scientific organization has disputed
    the conclusion that we reached, that during this pre-closure
    period, the site is suitable and safe for storage, because the
    task is very similar to that which we have done in other
    contexts. Yucca Mountain will be a state-of-the-art facility,
    with a controlled, secure operating environment, in close
    proximity to an air force range and its protected air space.
        We also were required, under the various congressional
    acts, to make a determination as to whether or not the site was
    suitable for a post-closure period. Here, the test that we were
    offered was a very stringent one. We were required to consider
    the safety and security of the site, in essence the suitability
    of the site not for 300 years, but for 10,000. In short, we had
    to make a determination as to whether over a period of time,
    that if you were to go in reverse, would return us to an age in
    which we were just beginning to domesticate plants, whether or
    not we could meet a very stringent set of safety standards.
    These standards, in fact, allow only 15 millirems annual
    radiation exposure for people living within an 18-kilometer
    range of this location, and impose a groundwater protection
    standard as stringent as we use for major cities in this
    country.
        To get there, we conducted most of the research I just
    mentioned over a long period of time. I might say, just to put
    this in perspective, we are talking about an annual exposure
    rate that would have to be less than that which a person might
    receive making several--just two cross-country airplane flights
    today. We concluded that, based on a total system performance
    analysis of the mountain and its prospective designs, we would
    be able to meet that standard during this time frame.
        Now, we recognize that 10,000 years is a long period, and
    that many potential events could transpire during that period,
    and so we were not only looking at it from the standpoint of a
    static environment, but we also took into consideration a
    variety of factors to be evaluated, and take into account.
    Those factors included such things as whether or not volcanic
    activity in the area might pose a higher radiation risk,
    whether seismic, earthquake activity in the area could
    conceivably cause us to not be able to meet the radiation
    standards, whether or not human intrusion could conceivably
    result in a harmful radiation exposure.
        By human intrusion we mean that we tried to evaluate, and
    were required to evaluate, whether in 10,000 years, somebody
    digging for oil and drilling through the top of the mountain
    might cause a radiation exposure to people in this area.
        We, of course, did extensive tests on whether or not water
    from the top of the mountain might somehow seep a thousand feet
    down into the repository area in sufficient quantities over
    10,000 years to somehow penetrate what we believe to be the
    extraordinarily impenetrable storage packages that will be
    used, and then have the capacity to somehow carry radioactive
    material another 800 feet down to the underground aquifer,
    which is a contained groundwater system.
        We only not considered that in the context of the
    mountain's current location and rainfall exposure, which
    because it is next to Death Valley is not very high, but we
    also even took into consideration whether or not we could still
    meet the standard if a new glacier age were to envelop the
    region, and then recede--posing, obviously, a much larger
    amount of water exposure to the mountain. We challenged
    ourselves in many other ways, and we concluded that the
    standards that have been set would be met even in the case of
    these sorts of uncertainties.
        Outside external checks and scientific evaluations, and
    groups including the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
    U.S. Geological Service, our national labs, and a variety of
    others, have peer reviewed the work that has been done, and
    support the findings that we have reached, and I am convinced
    of the soundness of the scientific basis for the recommendation
    which I made.
        I have visited the site, I have talked to the scientists at
    great length, I have studied many, many comments that were
    offered to us by a variety of people who participated in 116
    hearings that have taken place, and I did so, Mr. Chairman,
    with great concern for the people who live in this area, the
    people of Nevada, as well as others in this country, weighing
    as best I could their concerns about safety and security. I am
    convinced that the soundness of this project is established,
    and that we can move ahead, and should move ahead to allow an
    ultimate decision by the experts of the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission as to the licenseability of this facility.
        Once I was convinced that this site was suitable as a
    repository, I did not move immediately to a final decision,
    because I also felt it was important for us to consider
    national interests in whether or not there were sufficiently
    compelling national interests to go in this direction, and as I
    have said before, I believe there are a number of strong and
    compelling national interests that support us moving ahead to
    the next stage, and ultimately to the construction of the
    repository.
        One is energy security. A site designation clearly, in my
    judgment, will encourage continuing nuclear energy production
    in this country. Right now, nuclear energy is 20 percent of our
    electricity generation. It is important for us in terms of
    maintaining a diversity of fuels.
        Existing facilities, in order to operate through their
    current life expectancies, and beyond, for license renewals,
    need the commitment that we seek to make here--to have a means
    of dealing with nuclear waste. As is well known, a number of
    the facilities that are operating today are running out of
    space for the waste that we said we would accept back in 1998,
    in the original congressional actions.
        There is a strong national security argument as well. The
    most strategic vessels in our navy, the largest ships and
    submarines are dependent upon nuclear power for propulsion. The
    spent fuel from those navy reactors is currently temporarily
    stored in the State of Idaho, under an agreement with the State
    that is temporary. We do not have a long-term mechanism for
    dealing with that waste, other than the storage that would take
    place at Yucca Mountain, and that spent fuel must go to a
    repository.
        In addition, the repository is one of the more important
    components in the process which we have developed to comply
    with our end of the nuclear nonproliferation agreements we have
    reached with the Russian Federation for the disposition of
    weapons-grade plutonium. Without the repository, I think that
    program will be set back, if not stalled.
        As I have said many times, there are certainly arguments,
    in my judgment, that support this site for homeland security
    purposes. Prudence, I think, dictates trying to store as much
    of our nuclear waste as we can in this isolated repository, a
    thousand feet under the desert, where we can consolidate waste
    that is currently temporarily stored in a variety of places,
    including decommissioned reactors around the country that no
    longer function, but where waste remains.
        Of course, there is also the argument that is very
    compelling from an environmental cleanup point of view. Without
    the repository, waste remains where it is, in temporary
    locations. In my judgment, that is not in the best interest of
    the environment in those communities, especially those where we
    already have the decommissioning of the facilities that
    generated the waste to begin with, and not to mention, the
    nuclear material that is at Department of Energy sites, such as
    Rocky Flats, in Colorado, which ultimately needs to have a
    final resting place. So for all of those, I think, very strong
    national interest reasons, the decision to move forward with
    this is a very important one, and the correct one.
        I think it is important in summary, Mr. Chairman, just to
    put in perspective the choice before this committee and before
    the Senate. It is the same choice the House had. To override
    the veto merely allows the Department of Energy to move forward
    and to seek a final objective evaluation of the work which we
    have done over the last 20 years by the experts of the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, as to the safety and suitability issues
    relating to the development of this repository.
        A decision not to override ends the process entirely. It
    leaves the waste where it is, with Congress retaining its
    responsibilities to deal with the waste, but without a plan to
    do so. The problem with that is, I think, quite obvious on its
    face, but there is another factor, and that is that this waste
    is not going to just sit where it is at if Congress decides to
    terminate the Yucca Mountain project.
        Instead, what we will have, Mr. Chairman, is a variety, I
    think, of makeshift, ad hoc alternatives, seized upon by people
    in communities who do not want the waste to remain where it is,
    who have already been paying into our funds to have it dealt
    with and removed, and as we have already seen, you will
    continue to see such activities as efforts to create new
    storage facilities at alternative sites around the country.
        The Nuclear Regulatory Commission already has a request, a
    license request, before it from the Goshute Indian tribe, in
    Utah, who, in consortium with some energy companies, are
    offering their reservation land as a storage site. Whether that
    license is granted or not, others will be, and we will begin to
    see the waste moved, but it will not move through the
    coordinated plan that we have, it will not move under the
    Federal Government's oversight in the way that we propose, it
    will not go to a single repository, it will end up in a variety
    of locations, under a variety of different transportation
    processes, in my judgment, in a very uncoordinated way, and in
    a fashion that I do not think really reflects the best
    interests of the Nation from any of a variety of perspectives.
        So for all of those reasons, because the science is sound,
    because we have been able to demonstrate, I think, clearly,
    both in a pre- and post-closure period, that the site is
    suitable and safe, and because we have met the relevant
    standards, and because of the compelling national interest, as
    well as the likelihood that in the absence of moving forward,
    we would find a variety of makeshift undesirable alternatives,
    that the case is strong for at least allowing this process to
    go to the next stage, and let the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    make a final decision.
        I thank you for your time.
        The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Abraham follows:]
        Prepared Statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to
    appear before you today.
        On February 14, I forwarded a recommendation to the President,
    based on approximately 24 years of federal research, that Yucca
    Mountain, Nevada, is suitable for development as the nation's geologic
    repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive wastes.
    The President officially recommended the site to Congress on February
    15, and pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), the
    State of Nevada has exercised a disapproval of the President's
    recommendation.*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The letters referred to in this paragraph can be found in the
    appendix.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am greatly encouraged that on May 8 the House of Representatives
    voted, by an overwhelming margin, to pass the Joint Resolution before
    you today. The expeditious manner in which the House acted, and the
    wide margin and bipartisan manner by which the Joint Resolution passed,
    clearly signal this Nation's confidence and readiness to take the next
    step toward resolving the challenges of permanent waste disposal.
    Without delay, I ask that the Senate also pass the Joint Resolution, so
    that the Department may enter the next phase of repository development
    an expert and independent scientific and technical examination of the
    safety of the site by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
        Passing this Joint Resolution, thus overriding the State of
    Nevada's disapproval, hardly needs emphasis. Twenty years ago, Congress
    established in law the Federal government's responsibility for the
    disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In
    doing so, Congress foresaw the fundamental national security and energy
    policy considerations that weigh heavily in favor of proceeding with a
    geologic repository, and mandated that a repository program be based
    upon a thorough scientific evaluation of several candidate sites. In
    1987, Congress limited that evaluation to the site we consider today:
    Yucca Mountain.
        In formulating this recommendation, I first considered whether
    sound science supported a determination that the Yucca Mountain site
    was scientifically and technically suitable for the development of a
    repository. The scientific evaluation of the Yucca Mountain site had
    been conducted over a 24-year period; as part of the study, some of the
    world's best scientists examined every aspect of the natural
    processes--past, present, and future--that could affect the ability of
    a repository beneath Yucca Mountain to isolate radionuclides released
    from any spent fuel and radioactive waste disposed of there.
        The Department's scientific inquiries and modeling clearly
    demonstrate that a repository at Yucca Mountain can meet the
    Environmental Protection Agency's standards for protecting the health
    and safety of our citizens. These extremely stringent standards were
    based on the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. What
    they mean, in terms of the Yucca Mountain site, is that a person living
    11 miles away from the site cannot receive more annual radiation
    exposure during the 10,000-year regulatory period than a traveler
    receives today from natural sources in three round trip flights from
    Las Vegas to New York.
        In evaluating whether the repository can comply with the Agency's
    standards, our scientists employed extremely conservative assumptions
    and considered the impact of events with extremely low probability of
    occurrence, all erring on the side of public safety. For example,
    earthquakes were assumed to occur, and volcanic eruptions were
    evaluated--even though the likelihood of a volcanic event affecting the
    repository during the first 10,000 years is just one in 70 million per
    year. Even with these unlikely events analyzed into the Agency's 10,000
    year compliance period, Yucca Mountain still meets the EPA standards.
        A review of the documentation that accompanied the recommendation
    clearly reveals that the Department has carefully evaluated the extent
    to which Yucca Mountain's substantial natural geologic barriers work in
    concert with the robust engineered systems. We know that Yucca Mountain
    is in a closed hydrologic basin, a geologic feature that greatly limits
    the potential migration of radionuclides. Between the emplacement
    tunnels and the water table, which is approximately 2000 feet below the
    surface, the geology provides natural adsorption retarding any
    potential radionuclide movement. The hydrologic features at this site
    suggest that more than ninety percent of the annual rainfall runs off
    or is evaporated, meaning less than a half an inch of water travels
    beneath the surface. Our studies indicate that the vast majority of
    water samples taken from the mountain are thousands of years old.
        Even with this robust geology, our scientists again conservatively
    considered how engineered barriers 1,000 feet below the surface and
    1,000 feet above the water table might corrode by analyzing what would
    happen during an ice age, if Nevada's climate changed and rainfall
    increased dramatically. Even including these scenarios, Yucca Mountain
    still meets the EPA standards.
        After thoroughly examining the relevant scientific and technical
    materials, I have concluded that they demonstrate that the site is
    scientifically and technically suitable for construction of a
    repository. As I stated in my recommendation to the President:

              Irrespective of any other considerations, I could not and
            would not recommend the Yucca Mountain site without having
            first determined that a repository at Yucca Mountain will bring
            together the location, natural barriers, and design elements
            necessary to protect the health and safety of the public,
            including those Americans living in the immediate vicinity, now
            and into the future.

        Having reached this conclusion, I went on to evaluate whether
    compelling national interests counseled in favor of moving forward with
    a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, and if so, whether there were
    countervailing arguments so strong that I should nonetheless decline to
    proceed. This evaluation argued strongly in favor of proceeding, and
    certainly that there was no basis for abandoning the policy decisions
    made by the Congress in enacting the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act and
    the 1987 amendments to that Act. In short, the relevant considerations
    are as follows.
        First, Yucca Mountain is critical to our national security. Today,
    over forty percent of our Navy's combatant vessels, including aircraft
    carriers and submarines, are nuclear powered. The additional
    capabilities that nuclear power brings to these platforms is essential
    to national security. To maintain operational readiness, we must assure
    disposal of spent fuel to support refueling of these vessels. We are in
    the midst of advancing the non-proliferation objectives that have been
    the welcome result of the end of the Cold War. A geologic repository is
    an integral part of our disposition plans for surplus weapons grade
    materials.
        Yucca Mountain is an important component of homeland security. More
    than 161 million people live within 75 miles of one or more nuclear
    waste sites, all of which were intended to be temporary. We believe
    that today these sites are safe, but prudence demands we consolidate
    this waste from widely dispersed, above-ground sites into a deep
    underground location that can be better protected.
        A repository is also important to our nation's energy security.
    Nuclear power provides 20 percent of the nation's electricity and emits
    no greenhouse gases. The reactors we have today give us one of the most
    reliable forms of carbon-free power generation, free from interruptions
    due to international events and price fluctuations. This nation must
    develop a permanent, safe, and secure site for disposal of spent
    nuclear fuel if we are to continue to rely on our 103 operating
    commercial reactors to provide us with electricity.
        And a repository is important to our efforts to protect the
    environment. A repository is indispensable to implementing an
    environmentally sound disposition plan for high-level defense wastes,
    which are located in Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, New Mexico, New
    York, Tennessee, and Washington. The Department must move forward and
    dispose of these materials, which include approximately 100 million
    gallons of high-level radioactive waste and 2,500 metric tons of
    defense production spent nuclear fuel.
        Finally, I carefully considered the primary arguments against
    locating a repository at Yucca Mountain. None of these arguments rose
    to a level that outweighs the case for going forward with the site
    designation.
        Of these, the only one I shall address in my prepared testimony is
    the concern critics of the project have raised about the
    ``transportation issue.'' I wish to address this issue briefly, not
    because I believe there is any real basis for believing these concerns
    are warranted, but rather, because I believe that simply by incanting
    the words ``transportation of nuclear waste,'' opponents are hoping
    they can incite public fear, without any basis in fact, and that this
    hope has become the last refuge for opposition to the project. The
    facts, however, are these.
        First, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, working with the
    Departments of Transportation and Energy, has overseen approximately 30
    years of safe shipment of spent nuclear fuel in this country. The
    Department and commercial nuclear industry have substantial experience
    to date--some 1.6 million miles--without any harmful radiation release.
    And the successful and extensive European experience in transporting
    this type of nuclear material corroborates our experience. The
    transportation of this material will involve approximately 175
    shipments per year, not the 2,800 that the opponents allege. It would
    also constitute 0.00006% of the annual hazardous material shipments,
    and 0.006% of the annual radioactive material shipments that occur in
    this country today.
        Second, because the site has not yet been designated, the
    Department is just beginning to formulate its preliminary thoughts
    about a transportation plan. There is an eight-year period before any
    transportation to Yucca Mountain might occur. This will afford ample
    time to implement a program that builds upon our record of safe and
    orderly transportation of nuclear materials and makes improvements to
    it where appropriate. Thus any suggestion that the Department has
    chosen any particular route or mechanism is completely fictitious.
    Those decisions have not been made, and cannot possibly start to be
    made until the site has been designated and the Department has the
    opportunity to work with affected States, local governments, and other
    entities on how to proceed.
        Third, even without a repository at Yucca Mountain, the need to
    find a place to put the spent fuel that is continuing to accumulate
    will lead to the transportation of these materials, and likely quite
    soon. On-site storage space is running out and not all utilities can
    find new adjacent land where they can put this material. Therefore,
    they will devise ad hoc off-site consolidated storage alternatives.
    Already a consortium of utilities is working on a facility that they
    have presented to the NRC. Whether or not this effort ultimately
    succeeds, it is likely that some similar effort will. Thus the
    transportation of nuclear materials is not a function of a repository
    at Yucca Mountain, but rather is a necessary consequence of the
    material that continues to accumulate at the 131 sites in 39 States
    that are running out of room for it.
        Finally, Yucca Mountain critics argue that nuclear materials in
    transit could be a terrorist target. But they are forgetting the
    obvious: spent fuel in secure transit to a permanent repository is
    certainly less susceptible to terrorist acts than spent fuel stranded
    at the temporary, stationary sites--many very close to major cities and
    waterways--where it now resides.
        Let me close with one last thought. The critics of this program
    would have Congress overturn the fundamental decisions it legislated 15
    years ago--that a single underground repository located at Yucca
    Mountain holds the greatest promise for the long-term safety and
    security for the Nation. The great body of scientific work done since
    then has confirmed the fundamental soundness of the Yucca Mountain
    site. The only issues remaining are the type that only can be resolved
    in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing proceeding.
        The critics who would upend this path to resolution of the
    remaining issues have a heavy burden of proof in urging that the policy
    decision made by Congress in 1987 and the findings of the body of
    scientific work that examined Yucca Mountain both be abandoned before
    the NRC has even had the opportunity to pass on whether a repository
    can safely be sited there. Given the history and the work to date,
    their burden would be substantial even if this project were not
    critical to many important national interests. But it is. Rejection of
    the proposed resolution would leave the country with no ultimate
    destination for our spent naval fuel, no adequate path for disposing of
    our own surplus plutonium, thereby making it hard for us to press other
    countries to dispose of theirs, and no means to complete the
    environmental cleanup of our defense complex. Utilities may have to
    start planning to decommission existing nuclear reactors and figuring
    out how to replace them. Congress would still have to formulate an
    alternative in view of the statutory obligation that the Government
    dispose of commercial spent fuel that was legislated in 1982, but that
    would be no easy task.
        In short, a decision to oppose this project's going forward at this
    stage is a decision to abandon the repository program and subject the
    country to these consequences without ever letting neutral experts at
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decide whether that is the right
    course. Nothing the critics of this project have advanced comes close
    to meeting the burden of proof they should have to satisfy to warrant
    proceeding in this fashion. Opposition to nuclear power is not a
    sufficient ground, since we all, and the United States Government in
    particular, have an obligation to safely dispose of this waste
    regardless of any such policy view. Nor are concerns about
    transportation, for all the reasons outlined above. Rather, opposition
    to this resolution, and to submitting this question to the NRC, seems
    warranted only if one is convinced that there is such overwhelming
    evidence that a repository at Yucca Mountain cannot meet the NRC and
    EPA standards that it would be a waste of time and money to use the
    ordinary NRC processes to find out.
        Support for the proposed resolution, on the other hand, does not
    require being convinced that the Department of Energy is right in
    believing that a repository at Yucca Mountain will meet the applicable
    standards or that the NRC will decide it should be licensed--although
    in my judgment the scientific work to date provides ample basis for
    reaching that conclusion. Indeed, it doesn't even require being
    convinced that this outcome is the most likely. Rather, all that is
    required to support the resolution is to believe there is enough of a
    serious possibility that $4 billion and 24 years of scientific research
    have produced a sufficient basis for our conclusion that the site can
    be safely developed as a repository. That conclusion will then subject
    the extensive scientific basis for the President's recommendation to
    objective testing in the only official context it can be--an NRC
    licensing proceeding.
        I urge the Senate now to act promptly and favorably on the proposed
    joint resolution, as the House has done so overwhelmingly on May 8.
    This will allow the Department to proceed with the next stage of
    addressing the merits of all remaining issues, by applying the
    independent expertise of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

        The Chairman. We will go back and forth on questions, and
    do it in the order that people arrived.
        One of the issues that has been raised, Secretary Abraham,
    on this is that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires you to
    file an application for construction authorization with the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission within 90 days after the
    President's site recommendation becomes effective, if the
    Congress accepts your recommendation, and overrules the
    governor.
        GAO has said that you will not be able to file a license
    application for another 4 years, rather than 90 days. So
    assuming the joint resolution is signed into law, are you
    prepared to file an application within 90 days? If not, what
    happens if you do not meet that deadline?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, I do not believe that the actions
    we were required to take before reaching a recommendation
    required us to have a completed or near completed license
    application. In fact, I think to argue that somehow the 90-day
    rule was designed in some fashion to stop the process, rather
    than to expedite it, would be to turn it on its head. I think
    the 90 days was designed to try to make sure the process could
    move forward quickly.
        When Congress enacted the Waste Policy Act in 1982, it
    included in the Act a lot of deadlines, which represented its
    best judgment then of how the various steps could be taken.
    These deadlines included this 90-day provision. They also, of
    course, included the requirement that we begin accepting waste
    in 1998, which we have not done. I think the time frames in the
    Act have proven to be optimistic on their face, and I do not
    think that is any reason for the Department not to honor what
    was, I think, plainly the central objective here, which was to
    try to move this along as promptly as possible.
        The specific answer to your question is, we believe that we
    will be in a position to provide a license application by the
    end of the year 2004. We are moving forward to prepare that at
    this time. I would note that the Congress has constrained in
    appropriations the work that might be done by us on the license
    preparation side of our responsibilities, and instead has been
    very explicitly funding programs on the site suitability side
    of our responsibility. I do not believe that the 90-day time
    frame here is, in any way, a prohibition on us moving forward
    to seek a license at a date beyond 90 days after the finish of
    this process.
        The Chairman. One of the arguments the Governor has used
    is--he says that the poor geology there at Yucca Mountain has
    forced the Department to abandon reliance on the mountain's
    geology as a way to isolate the waste, and instead, in his
    view, the Department is now relying on what the Governor calls
    a series of fancy engineered waste packages, and a tangled web
    of man-made contrivances.
        To what extent will the repository rely on the geology of
    the mountain, and to what extent will it rely on waste
    packages, or drip shields, or other manmade barriers to ensure
    that the waste remains sealed in this repository?
        Secretary Abraham. Mr. Chairman, the legislation that
    governs this issue has never, in any sense, suggested that
    either a 100 percent geological approach or a 100 percent man-
    made approach is called for. I think it always contemplated a
    combination, and that is what we are proposing.
        Yucca Mountain has many positive attributes, because of its
    location and its composition. There is low rainfall. Obviously,
    it sits near Death Valley. It has a closed groundwater basin,
    which contributes mightily to the safety features. It is a
    benign environment for waste packages. It is isolated from
    population.
        The result of all that is that its natural barriers alone
    are going to protect public health and safety by isolating
    99.9999999 percent of the radioactive material which is
    emplaced in it over 10,000 years. Those natural barriers alone
    would reduce exposure to--just to put this in perspective--20
    percent of the level of exposure which is currently allowable
    for U.S. nuclear workers. In short, just by its geological
    factors alone, it brings the potential exposure below that
    which we have legally permitted to be the case for nuclear
    workers.
        It is still, at that point, higher than the EPA's
    standards, which are extraordinarily strict, which is why,
    based on those standards, we have added additional engineered
    barriers to accomplish the final small ingredient of protection
    that I referenced earlier.
        The Chairman. One of the concerns that has been raised, the
    Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board whom we are going to hear
    from next week, is that the technical basis for the
    Department's performance estimates is, quote, ``Weak to
    moderate.'' I guess I would ask whether you share the Board's
    assessments in that regard, and if you do, why the Department's
    technical basis is not stronger.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, first let me say that we take the
    Technical Review Board's comments and advice seriously. We have
    throughout this process--they have a different responsibility
    than we do. Their recommendations do not go specifically to
    meeting the EPA targets, or the Nuclear Regulatory targets
    only. Rather, I think they have tried to offer perspectives on
    how to perfect the design of all of the various components to
    an even higher standard, and we would like to do that as well.
        Let me just start by saying that there is no disagreement,
    I do not think, as I said in my comments, between us, and the
    Technical Review Board, or anyone, over the safety and
    suitability of the facility in the first 300 years. Where there
    have been some concerns raised by the Board that relates to
    that post-closure 10,000-year period, thereafter. They have
    identified some issues which they--let me put it this way.
        We have come up with what we believe is a basic design
    approach that will meet these extraordinarily stringent
    standards. The question is: Can we perfect them? I think the
    Review Board has asked us, and I think the comments you
    reference go to the question of whether or not we have done
    enough research to even perfect them further.
        For example, one of the main areas that they have made
    recommendations on, which I think a lot of the reference points
    you made before pertains to, is the question of whether or not
    the repository would be maintained on a hot versus a cold
    environment, and I think the Review Board believes more
    research needs to be done to make a determination as to which
    is preferable, in terms of what could make it even safer than
    the standard that we could meet, and we are conducting that
    research as a matter of following-up on their recommendation.
    So I think that the basis for the conclusion we made as to
    suitability is strong. I think the issues that they raise are
    important ones to look at over the period of time we have ahead
    to perfect the design even better.
        The Chairman. One other question I wanted to ask relates to
    transportation. A lot of the complaints about this proposal
    that you are advocating to use Yucca Mountain is that the
    transportation of the waste to this site will not be safe, and
    will create a series of new and unnecessary hazards. I would
    like your reaction to that, and also any estimates you could
    give us--if Congress were to approve going ahead, as you are
    requesting, when is the earliest that shipments would actually
    be made to Yucca Mountain?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, let me begin by talking about the
    safety record we have already achieved. In this country, as
    well as in Europe, literally, as cumulatively, as much nuclear
    waste as is contemplated being moved to Yucca Mountain, has
    been moved over the last 30 years, without any harmful
    radiation exposure. The track record is an impressive one. I
    think the chairman is familiar with the many protocols that
    were established, for example, in the movement of waste to the
    WIPP facility at Carlsbad, and the same kind of an approach
    would be taken here, but the point is, we move a lot of waste
    today, and we have done it safely.
        Moreover, just to put some numbers on the record, we move
    about 300 million hazardous waste shipments per year in this
    country. Three million of them involve some form of
    radiological material, and we do it safely, not just our
    department, but the transportation sector, and the other
    government agencies. So we can do this safely, number one.
    Number two, as I mentioned in my comments, this is not a
    situation that is unique to Yucca Mountain. If we do not go
    ahead with this program, if it were to be terminated now, as I
    said, there are already ad hoc makeshift alternatives being
    contemplated by people who have too much waste building up in
    their temporary storage facilities at nuclear reactors around
    the country. The question is going to be, not is there or is
    there not transportation--there will be. The question for
    everybody to consider is whether it makes more sense to do it
    in a centralized, highly secure, effective fashion, or to leave
    it to a variety of alternatives that will be different for each
    new approach that ultimately is developed by people who have
    the waste in temporary facilities that they do not wish to
    retain in those locations.
        So it can be done. The time frame that you asked about
    looks something like this. We believe, as I said before, that
    we can proceed through final application by the end of the year
    2004. We believe that process from there, forward, will be
    through the year 2006, to the end of 2007, when we believe a
    license decision could be made.
        After that, it will take at least 3 years to construct a
    facility, and make it capable of accepting waste. So it is
    eight years, roughly, from now, when we would envision our time
    frame for the first potential receipt of waste, 2010.
        The Chairman. Senator Campbell.

              STATEMENT OF HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

        Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, Mr.
    Chairman, I have no scientific background, whatsoever. They say
    most of our decisions are really made by our own personal frame
    of reference, so let me try and do that maybe not only as a
    Senator who represents Colorado, but as a private citizen, too.
    I might say that I am happy to see our old colleague here,
    Secretary Abraham. We do not get to see him much any more with
    his new job.
        I do not know how many on the panel have actually witnessed
    the awesome power of nuclear fission, maybe with the exception
    of Senators Ensign or Reid, because they are from Nevada, but I
    have. I know that this is a little different subject, but it
    has certainly set something in my frame of reference that I
    keep thinking about.
        In 1952 and 1953, I was stationed at Nellis Air Force Base,
    which is just out of Las Vegas, as you know, Mr. Secretary,
    about 90 miles from the location where we are talking about
    storing this waste, and had the opportunity to witness four, at
    least four, and as I remember, more than that, four bombs that
    were set off. Three of them were from the base, in the middle
    of the night. It was so bright that you could actually read a
    newspaper without any lights at all for probably a couple of
    minutes before that brightness died down.
        Once I was what was called a perimeter guard, since I was
    an MP, I think about 6 miles away from where it was set off,
    with very little protection. We watched it using smoked glass,
    if you can imagine that. To this date, I wonder--I do not mean
    to say this as an alarmist, but I wonder about the effects that
    being close to those things had on the American people who were
    there, the military guys who were there at the time.
        I understand, although I have no absolute documentation
    about this, that there is still places in Yucca Flats where you
    cannot go without some protective clothing, because of those
    bombs that were set off above ground.
        Well, that is one of my concerns. I always kind of factor
    that in, that I saw those things, and I know other people
    probably have, too, but one of my other big concerns that I
    think you talked about somewhat, it still does not satisfy me,
    though, is the transportation. As I understand it, the
    Governors do not have the right to veto the route that these
    shipments come through their State. You mentioned about 175
    shipments a year. I do not know how many the total amount is, I
    guess thousands and thousands over a period of years, but the
    main route for east-west for Colorado is I-70, right through
    downtown Denver, which has about 2 million people in the
    metropolitan area, and a governor that cannot veto that.
        It then goes over I-70, Vale Pass, maybe you have been that
    way, and down what is called Glenwood Canyon. Glenwood Canyon
    is a major east-west artery, but a very narrow canyon, and most
    of the tributaries that go into the river beside the highway,
    and by the way, the train tracks also go there, so you will
    have the same problem with trains or the highway. Most of that
    water feeds into the Colorado, which then, in turn, goes to
    Nevada, to California, to the lower Colorado, to Mexico, and I
    guess to, in some cases, Arizona, too.
        I checked with our Department of Transportation yesterday,
    and they told me that in 1993, the semis, the heavy trucks, the
    big trucks, there were 19 wrecks on that road in 1993, sixteen
    in 1994, 20 in 1995, 14 in 1996, 15 in 1997, 19 in 1998, 11 in
    1999, 12 in the year 2000, and I do not have any figures for
    this last year. So there is no question, trucks are crashing
    all the time. Of those, 75 percent of the accidents occurred
    during the daytime, and 75 percent of them were involved with
    collisions with other vehicles.
        Well, I do not blame the Governor of South Carolina, by the
    way, who has literally said he would call out the guard or
    throw his body down in front of the trucks if anybody tries to
    ship any nuclear waste into his State. I understand that. Our
    Governor in Colorado, Governor Owens, just recently put a
    moratorium on some shipment of low-level waste that was
    supposed to be imported by a company that was going to
    reprocess it in Canyon City, Colorado. I would think if a
    governor does not do that, or if the Senators, too, do not
    oppose that, they do not stay in office the next time around,
    because that is the way people feel.
        I also get criticized in my own State, because of my
    position on it, but every State gains the job base, and all the
    benefits from producing this stuff, every one of them. They
    have the jobs. They have the tax base. They have all the good.
    Sometimes I liken it to the guy who builds a nice home, but
    forgot to factor in the septic tank, so after he gets his nice
    home built, he wants to put the septic tank on his neighbor's
    land. I just think that is morally wrong.
        I have been involved with this, I guess, as much as anybody
    on this committee, having been on it since I have been in the
    U.S. Senate, and I think I have heard all the scientific
    reasons why we ought to do it, and maybe there are some. I just
    think that there is a moral obligation, too, and I am not at
    all sure we ought to be dumping it in Nevada.
        I just wanted to pass that on to you. I really do not have
    any questions, Mr. Chairman, but I wanted to get that off my
    chest.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Abraham. If I could just comment, Mr. Chairman.
        First, I would note that notwithstanding the challenge we
    are having with regard to South Carolina, the Governor of South
    Carolina, who is a strong proponent of this process, and
    endorses the decision to go forward with Yucca Mountain----
        Senator Campbell. But not in his State.
        Secretary Abraham [continuing]. I would also note that, as
    you are well aware, Senator, the----
        The Chairman. The Governor of Nevada also favors the
    shipments to South Carolina. It is the NIMBY system. I
    understand that.
        Secretary Abraham. So does Colorado----
        Senator Campbell. So does Colorado, and I get criticized
    for it.
        Secretary Abraham [continuing]. Because it is your governor
    and colleagues who wish us to ship the material from Rocky
    Flats to South Carolina. So, obviously, this is an ongoing
    challenge. But I do want to clarify a couple of things.
        First of all, under the rules which we have, if the site is
    designated, we will identify preliminary routes, we will
    consult with States and tribes through which routes would be
    used, and the States have the option, as we saw with the WIPP
    shipments, to provide preferred shipping routes instead through
    their jurisdictions, which they can designate, and which we
    will follow.
        I would also just add that----
        Senator Campbell. Then something has changed, Mr.
    Secretary, because the last time we dealt with this bill, as I
    read the bill, it said that the Governors could designate
    routes, and they could recommend routes, but, in fact, the DOE
    had the authority to veto that, not to go along with it, and in
    Colorado, I do not know about some of the other States, but
    there is on east-west route, except I-70, that is a four-lane
    highway. The rest of them are all two-lane country roads.
        Secretary Abraham. The process, as I understand it,
    Senator, includes notification of both the Governor, as well as
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, escort training for those who
    would be engaged in the management and the transfer, that is,
    the local personnel. Advance arrangements will be made with law
    enforcement agencies along the route. Advance route approval is
    required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, at least one
    escort to maintain visual surveillance of a shipment, status
    reports every two hours. There are a variety of those
    additional protections. We have done this--we have done it.
        Senator Campbell. Yes, and I understand that, and I
    appreciate that, and, in fact, some of those things, including
    driver training, and funds for local HAZMAT teams, and so on,
    were put in because of us, some of us, that were not very
    supportive the last few years of this movement, without
    additional precautions. So I think that is all to the good.
        Secretary Abraham. As I said, I think it is to the good as
    well. I also would, again, just reference two things. Number
    one, I believe you are going to have transportation and
    shipments whether it is done by this process or by alternatives
    that are developed by companies who find people willing to
    store this off-site, and, again, all I can say is, we have had,
    I think, over the last 30 years a track record, both with
    respect to this kind of material, as well as our WIPP program
    that is unblemished, and we are proud of the fact that there
    have been no harmful radiation exposures, both here as well as
    in Europe, despite a huge amount of shipments.
        Senator Campbell. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a
    last comment: I would recommend that maybe we study shipping it
    to Michigan.
        [Pause.]
        The Chairman. There is no response to that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Campbell. I noticed.
        The Chairman. I call on Senator Landrieu.
        Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Let me just thank you for your leadership, Mr. Secretary,
    on this very difficult issue in helping us to work through it,
    and to try to provide a plan that is really good for this
    country, respectful of all of our States, and continues to move
    us in a very progressive and positive direction to strengthen
    our economy, and to continue to march forward.
        Let me just ask two questions, and then I am going to make
    just a general comment. You alluded to this, but I think one of
    the issues that is raised by opponents is this transportation
    issue. So I would like to go over again, if you could put a
    little bit more on the record about the safe transportation of
    waste from the national weapons complex to New Mexico. You
    referred or alluded to the WIPP program. Could you go over
    again the results of that transportation, because, as you can
    see, it has been raised as a concern, and I think it is an
    important point to reiterate.
        Secretary Abraham. It is, and as I have said, I recognize
    the concerns people have. We believe, just as a preliminary
    point, it is not the case that failure to go forward with this
    means no transportation. The question is, who do you think can
    do it better, the people who have done it for 30 years, without
    a harmful radiation exposure, or others?
        We have a successful program shipping for WIPP, which has
    resulted in the safe movement of about 20 percent of the
    shipment trip volume anticipated for Yucca Mountain already,
    and we actually support the consideration of using the same
    kinds of protocols here, or something similar, as a starting
    point to design the system we would use for Yucca Mountain.
        Now, just to put that in perspective. With WIPP, we provide
    assistance with First Responder capacity and capability,
    through training and other assistance. Over 20,000 First
    Responders have been trained. We have worked with States to
    establish shipping protocols, such as time of day, the weather,
    and other restrictions, notification of the States, of all
    shipments and provision for feedback on modifying the time of
    day shipment at the release point, State patrol safety
    inspections, and DOE radiation inspection of shipping vehicles,
    and rigorous inspections done prior to the trip, as well as
    satellite tracking of en route vehicles. All of these, and
    more, are part of the protocols of WIPP that have been very
    effective. We would envision starting with that as a menu to
    choose from, as we would consider a similar approach at Yucca
    Mountain.
        Senator Landrieu. Well, the reason I raise this, Mr.
    Chairman, I think in this debate, it is very, very important
    for us to understand that while there might be risk associated
    with the moving of this material, the Secretary has outlined
    all of the extraordinary precautions that can and will be, and
    have been taken, with minimal effect, taken, but what people
    have to realize is, that right now there is even a larger risk
    of 131 sites with this nuclear-stored material that are also in
    populated areas, in some cases, right next door to
    neighborhoods, very populated neighborhoods.
        This is not just a matter of energy security and a mix of
    fuels, and the importance of nuclear, it is a security issue.
    With post-9/11, there are possibilities that we will not
    discuss in detail, but people could imagine, you know, attacks
    on some of these storage sites. They are in populated areas
    now. So one of the quotes that I have in my statement is a
    quote from George Patton, which basically says, ``A good battle
    plan that we act on today can be better than a perfect one
    tomorrow.''
        I suggest we have a good battle plan, that we need to act
    on it, and the argument that it is risky to move it is more
    risky than leaving it where it is. I do not think the science,
    or the evidence, or common sense, backs up that second
    argument. With 131 sites all over the country--primarily in the
    Northeast, not so much in the Western States--but you can see
    the grid here of where these sites are, and it is dangerous.
        So the plan that you have outlined, I just want to say, I
    think reduces risk, bolsters our energy security through
    promoting this nuclear renaissance, as well as answering a real
    immediate threat to our national security today.
        Now, my second question is, this report that has caused a
    lot of consternation, which has come out about technical
    defects in the plan, I understand that it was looking at sort
    of the next 50 years, 50 to 300 years. There were 293 technical
    items identified in this report. My question is: Are there any
    potential show-stoppers that you see in those 293, or how would
    you describe them to us? Are these things that we should be
    very concerned about? They are technical in nature, and could
    you give us a little of your feedback on that?
        Secretary Abraham. Senator, you are referring, I think, to
    the 293 agreements, or work, that must be done prior to
    finishing the license application preparation process. Some
    have tried to characterize these as defects. They are not.
    Rather, they are really a checklist items which have been
    agreed to by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
    Department of Energy as steps that remain to be done before the
    application is finished. I do not want to try to do a direct
    comparison, but we all at different points in our life
    participated in applying for things, whether it is admission to
    college, or graduate school, or other similar items. There are
    a lot of things that you have to provide. They are not
    automatically in the hands of the people to whom the
    application must go. It is the responsibility of the preparer
    to compile those, and we believe that we are in a position to
    do that.
        First of all, the 293 number, which came out some time ago,
    has already been substantially reduced. Forty-one of the
    agreements are now completed to the satisfaction of the NRC,
    which means the number is now 252. We believe by September 30
    of this year, a full third of these will be done, bringing the
    number down to about 200, and we are confident that the
    remainder are going to be addressed by December, 2004, when we
    expect to submit the license.
        Fifty-three percent of all of these relate to just simply
    providing documentation that already exists or is in a process
    of being revised to be appropriate for submission. So these are
    not showstoppers. These are technical steps that need to be
    taken on the way to licensing. Just to put one last point on
    the record here, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided
    us with a sufficiency letter, the kind of document that
    indicates that they believe we have met already the sorts of
    standards that would cause us to move towards this licensing
    process. They stated that existing and planned work, upon
    completion, would be sufficient for inclusion in a repository
    license application.
        I mean the choice we would have--to somehow do all of this
    work before we would even submit a license--is simply not
    contemplated in the statute. This work is simply part of the
    process. Actually, we have done quite a bit more, I think, in
    terms of preparation already than the preparation that is done
    for the normal licensing of a facility.
        Senator Landrieu. Mr. Chairman, let me just close with just
    a one-minute summary. I think the evidence and the testimony
    suggest that there have been very rigorous scientific and peer
    review studies that indicate that this is potentially at least
    the best site in the United States today. The people in
    Louisiana have already paid $253 million, through additions to
    utility bills, to build and invest in this site.
        It is not just the nuclear energy industry that is at
    stake, and its future, but it is the security of this nation.
    Again, in Louisiana, we have three sites, well we have two, but
    right across the line in Mississippi, we say our sister State,
    they have three sites. These are very dangerous sites. There is
    nothing to say that a terrorist could not slam a mortar shell
    or crash a small plane into one of the 131, of which three I
    have just cited. Forget trying to sabotage a nuclear facility.
    It is these dangerous sites. This material is all over the
    Nation.
        I would say that it is in our security to try to move it to
    a very secure place environmentally, and otherwise, and the
    faster we get about doing it, I think the better. I just wanted
    to add that to the record. I am very sensitive to any
    environmental considerations, but there are compelling national
    security reasons, as well as energy security reasons, why we
    should move this process forward. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Hagel.
        Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, we appreciate you being here this morning,
    and thanks for your leadership, and that of your colleagues
    over at the Department of Energy. These are elusive issues that
    we deal with, and I would build onto what my colleagues from
    Louisiana and Colorado have noted, and add one additional
    observation.
        We do not live in a risk-free society. If, in fact, we have
    the expectations, and standards, and values that we do, that we
    think are important in this country, to grow our economy, and
    provide opportunities in a more just and better world, for not
    just America, but for all the world, then that requires some
    risk.
        None of us today, I suspect, certainly, I do not believe
    the Secretary is stating this, or implying this, that he can
    unequivocally state that there is no risk in the transportation
    of radioactive materials, or in any other part dynamic of this
    equation. That is as it is, and I suppose we could go back to
    the time of the loincloth and spears and find less risk in
    society.
        I also note what my colleague from Colorado said about the
    moral decision here. Well, I would ask the next question, is it
    more moral to defer this decision, as essentially we continue
    to do, and leave it to the next generation? Does the world get
    safer? Is there less risk in 20 years? I do not think so.
        The fact is, we must step up to this tough, difficult
    decision, and I think the 20 years of very intense scientific
    studies that have gone into this is as sophisticated and
    complete as any other project in the history of this country,
    and the Secretary has noted some of the other projects that
    were rather significant to the future of mankind that took far
    less time in achieving an objective that what we are today.
        When my friend and colleague from Nevada, Senator Ensign,
    came to see me the other day, he brought up a good point, and I
    want to ask this question based on Senator Ensign's question to
    me, and the point he made about the development of alternative
    spent-fuel management strategies, which you are familiar with,
    Mr. Secretary. I am speaking specifically of the reprocessing
    and transmutation technology that is ongoing, developing, and I
    understand that the Energy Department has put more money back
    into the budget, which originally my understanding was that it
    had been zeroed out for this.
        The Senator from Nevada makes, I think, a good point. Why
    not wait until this is developed further, and, therefore, we
    would minimize the risk of moving, certainly, the intensity of
    the radioactivity of the material? That is a question I have
    for you.
        The second question, Mr. Secretary, is: What are the
    consequences, if, in fact, this body, the U.S. Senate, would
    further delay this decision by sustaining the Nevada governor's
    veto? Two questions. Thank you.
        Secretary Abraham. Thank you, Senator. The first answer is
    this: Obviously, the Department of Energy engages in research
    on new technologies and possible alternative ways to deal with
    nuclear waste, transmutation being one of the issues that has
    had a lot of attention lately, but the challenge we have is
    this, that all of the alternative processes which we can
    foresee today create byproducts themselves that still require
    disposal someway, somehow--in a repository, in our judgment--to
    ensure the protection of public health and safety. So that is
    the challenge, and I will not even get into issues of cost, as
    well as uncertainty.
        As far as the decision not to move ahead, as I have said
    here before, there are a variety of implications on national
    security, on the environment, on energy security that are quite
    clear. I believe that deciding to kill the project--at least
    now as we are up to the point of allowing a licensing process
    to occur, and providing for the consideration by the NRC--
    brings to a halt any immediate issue as to dealing with nuclear
    waste. That will have an implication, I think, on investment in
    and the potential for nuclear energy to remain a 20 percent
    provider of fuel for electricity generation. That has a lot of
    implications in terms of how we might alternatively provide
    that level of electricity generation.
        Second, it has an implication on the issue of national
    security. As I mentioned, our naval reactors program is
    dependent upon ultimately being able to dispose of the waste
    from the propulsion systems. Right now, the State of Idaho is
    under a temporary agreement providing a location for that, but
    the State of Idaho expected that we would dispose of that at
    some point in this fashion, and I think that it is hard to tell
    what would be the continuity of that program.
        I mentioned the non-proliferation programs, which are
    directly affected by our ability to dispose of plutonium
    through the conversion of it to MOX. This process
    creates a byproduct that has to go somewhere, and we have
    already found that the Governor of South Carolina, and people
    of that State are very concerned about having a pathway out of
    South Carolina for the byproducts of the plutonium disposition
    that we might conduct there.
        So there are all of those factors, as well as the issue I
    have raised before, and that is, I think people will engage in
    their own self-help efforts. Right now, the waste is at 131
    sites. A lot of them are near major cities, on important
    waterways, and the communities that are affected directly do
    not want the waste to stay there, and they thought they had
    been paying all this money into our Federal treasury to get it
    out of there by the beginning of 1998. That has not happened.
    It will at least be 12 years late.
        So I do think you are going to have alternatives develop of
    the sort that have already begun, and I do not think that is
    even the most prudent or safe way to deal with it. So I think
    those are the kinds of implications.
        Senator Hagel. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Craig.
        Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        Mr. Secretary, when the decision that you proposed to the
    President came about I was making an effort to contact you for
    a variety of other reasons, and I know that you sequestered
    yourself, and spent a good deal of time studying this issue.
    You had had exposure to it as a Senator. I do not think you had
    had the need to understand it in the depth that you have
    gained, and I appreciate that a great deal.
        I say that as somebody who does know a bit about it, and
    has dealt with this issue in a positive and negative sense for
    a long time, and I do not mean just Yucca Mountain. I mean
    spent fuel, and waste, and materials. While I am not cavalier
    at all about nuclear waste, high-level waste, I think you
    develop a level of pragmatism, because you understand the
    extreme measures this country has gone through historically to
    protect human safety, once we got through the learning curve in
    the very early days, and, therefore, built, in extraordinary
    ways, the materials, the equipment, the shields, and the
    containers in which high-level waste is trafficked, and as a
    result of that, we have, as you have noted, a phenomenal record
    of safety.
        Just recently, in my colleague's State of Wyoming, a truck
    left the road because of a wind storm, and it had waste on it.
    They picked it up, and put it back on the truck, and left. Why?
    Because the integrity of the containers was so substantial that
    there was no problem. While none of us like to see that, the
    reality is now, with the Tru-Pak situation, that we are moving
    transuranic waste out of Idaho to Carlsbad, it is a phenomenal
    track record.
        I invite my colleagues to come and see it, and to
    understand it, and to watch the GPS trafficking, and to know
    where those trucks are at every moment of their movement is
    something to be seen and understood, not feared, because if the
    public knew of the amount of trafficking of high-level waste
    today around the country, I do not know that they would be
    alarmed, I think they would be very surprised to find out that
    this has gone on for decades in phenomenally safe and secure
    ways.
        My colleague from Colorado has a right to be concerned. We
    have moved a good deal of waste out of his State to Idaho and
    to other places over the last good number of years. Ironically,
    now that we are using Tru-Pak, we are not saddling it all up in
    50-gallon drums, and throwing tarps over it, and wrapping
    bungee cords around it, and heading out, and that is how a good
    deal of waste left his State over the years, but we do that
    much differently today than we have in the past, and we
    understand the concern of the public, and rightfully so, and I
    think that is responsible.
        I have some letters in response to an article in Science
    Magazine that I will ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that
    they become a part of the record.* Senator Murkowski has asked
    that they become a part of the record.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The letters have been retained in committee files.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Chairman. They will be included in the record.
        Senator Craig. Many of us have been to the WIPP facility at
    Carlsbad. We know that is low-level transuranic waste, a
    perfect example of what has gone on, and I will give this
    information to my colleague from Colorado, because it is very
    important that we understand the scope and the magnitude of
    what we are dealing with here, but Rocky Flats environmental/
    technological site, we have moved 499 shipments, and that is
    395,412 road miles, from Colorado, out to New Mexico, to my
    knowledge, not one incident, and that is because of the great
    concern that we have today about how these issues get handled.
        To deal with the high-level waste issue, and to deal with a
    permanent repository that takes us down the road further,
    remember, as I said, in my statement, and you said so clearly,
    Mr. Secretary, this is the next step in the licensing process.
    We are passing judgment on your findings to see if we can move
    it the next step.
        If we do not go to the next step, and if we do not develop
    a repository, you have spoken some to the environmental
    management program at DOE, and how we handle INEEL waste in
    Hanford, and, of course, we have the Savannah River issues.
    Where do we go from here, if we do not go where we appear to be
    headed at the moment?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, I cannot answer that question,
    because it is the case that the statutes bring this process to
    an end, if Congress were to not act to override the veto of the
    State of Nevada, and so it would be left, I think, for the
    Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch to have to begin at
    square one, trying to decide if there is some other process,
    approach, et cetera, that could be used.
        Given the duration that has been involved in getting to
    this point, I do not expect, I would not at least anticipate
    that that resolution would happen very swiftly, but all of the
    implications I mentioned in commenting on this to Senator Hagel
    would, of course, come into play. Failure to override just
    simply ends the Yucca Mountain project. It does not, however,
    eliminate the Government's responsibility, from the Nuclear
    Waste Policy Act, to accept statutory responsibility for the
    waste. So it is not a situation where people will be
    essentially left to fend for themselves, it means that we would
    have to determine what the Government will do in the face of
    having collected billions of dollars for the purpose of the
    disposition of this waste.
        Senator Craig. Well, many of my questions have been alluded
    to or responded to in some form. Let me move to the concern
    that my colleague from Nevada has, and it is rightfully so for
    him to express and question why we cannot do something else.
        In light of the current level of high-level materials that
    are out there now that would ultimately seek final disposition
    at Yucca Mountain, both commercial and public, and the ongoing
    generation of waste at this time, we have not just accumulated
    a volume and stocked, we have an ongoing process here of waste
    accumulation, because of that 20-plus percent of our energy
    that is generated by nuclear and an anticipation, I hope, on my
    part, and a good many others, that in a cleaner environment and
    a concern on climate change, and all that, we are going to have
    a new reactor design, and new concepts out there that will
    generate high-level waste.
        Is it not true that while we search for new technologies,
    and ways of applying it, and you are correct to say waste
    streams occur as a result of these new technologies, or
    applications, to reduce the overall waste, and if we create
    reactors that burn more efficiently, and, therefore, leave less
    waste or less material to be processed, while we may diminish
    the waste stream, a waste stream will be there, and with the
    volume we have now, it is at least my reaction, and see if I am
    not right, Mr. Secretary, that with the volume we have now, and
    the intent that a large portion of that will go to Yucca
    Mountain, there is still clearly a need to do what the Senator
    from Nevada is doing, so that another Yucca Mountain, or
    another repository, at some time in the future, will
    certainly--we need to lessen the need for that by new
    applications.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, it is hard to prophesy what new
    technologies could be. We have a waste disposition problem
    before us today. I do not see a transition to the kind of
    alternatives anybody has talked about in the near future,
    because of a variety of issues. We have not built a new nuclear
    facility in this country in about 30 years, so the notion that
    we would engage in the construction of an as yet developed
    scientific alternative, whether it is a reprocessing, or a
    transmutation system, anywhere in the foreseeable future, to
    me, is extraordinarily unlikely.
        Clearly, even if we did, as I mentioned before, there will
    be waste as a byproduct of that, and so it still calls for the
    need to move forward at this time. Again, the speculation that
    has taken place over a long period of time on alternatives has
    yet to yield one that I think this country is even remotely
    close to considering, or that science is close to endorsing at
    a level that comes even near the kind of safety endorsement
    that I believe we can provide here.
        Senator Craig. Last question, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    for your tolerance. We have on the table before us a model of a
    fuel assembly. I think a lot of folks have been sitting out
    there saying, ``What is that sitting there?'' That is what
    would be transported to Yucca Mountain, and stored.
        I think there are myths and there are realities, there are
    illusions, and there are facts, as it relates to this issue.
    Those would be transported in containers, and then, of course,
    the container that is being developed now, which would be
    considerably more substantial to meet these 10,000-year tests,
    as such, but I think what is important for me to understand, is
    that items like that do not go boom. Items like this do not
    explode. They radiate. They have some heat, but they do not go
    critical, and we understand that, and the scientists understand
    that, and that is what is important as we deal with these
    issues.
        These kinds of items transported, even if the truck were to
    leave the road, and they remained in their container, and they
    were jostled around, do not go critical, meaning explode,
    because that is the character of them, and it is important, I
    think, for us to understand that. Is that not your
    understanding, Mr. Secretary, and that is what we are looking
    at here in this item?
        Secretary Abraham. Obviously, in the environmental impact
    statement, and every one of the scientific processes that have
    already been engaged in, because we have moved the exact type
    of thing that we are proposing to move to Yucca Mountain in the
    past, evaluations of safety have been extensive, and you are
    correct in the conclusion, the issue of harmful radiation
    exposure is one that we take at the highest, most serious
    level. We have an unblemished 30-year track record of being
    able to move this material. The issue is not one of explosions
    of this material, as it is in a non-explosive state. But we do
    not just consider explosiveness; we also consider whether or
    not we can package this in a fashion that protects the public
    from any kind of exposure, should there be any kind of
    incident.
        Senator Craig. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Thomas.
        Senator Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think you have covered this
    very well, and I appreciate it. I will be rather quick.
        First of all, it is my understanding that the South
    Carolina concern was not so much on transportation as it was
    simply on the timely processing issue, and transportation
    really is not the issue, but the State of South Carolina's
    concerns have been whether or not there was a pathway for the
    materials that came into the State to leave, and the commitment
    of both Congress as well as the Executive Branch are making
    sure that the things that we indicated would happen, in terms
    of building facilities to dispose of the plutonium would
    happen.
        I have heard, of course, and I understand the concerns,
    some of Nevada's concerns. One, they said they have not had an
    opportunity to be heard. How do you react to act?
        Secretary Abraham. I am sorry?
        Senator Thomas. Nevada sometimes indicates they have not
    had the opportunity to be heard in this decision.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, we conducted an extensive number
    of hearings. Somewhere in here I think I have the total number.
    But as we have moved ahead with this process, there have been a
    variety of stages in which public comment and public hearings
    were available. The total number of hearings that I think have
    been conducted--we have had 198 days of comment periods, just
    on the site recommendation. We have had 66 hearings in Nevada
    over a 4-month period, including 1,419 witnesses, and 605
    comments received. So there have been extensive public
    opportunities for participation in the process just in this set
    of final stages, as well as participation in other stages, as
    well as various reports and preliminary actions were subjected
    to public comment.
        Senator Thomas. I see. There is also an allegation that the
    siting guidelines were changed to make it possible for Yucca
    Mountain to meet them. How do you react to that?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, I find this frustrating, because
    the changes that took place were changes brought about because
    in 1992 Congress changed the way that this process should be
    conducted. It changed the standards that were to be applied.
    The Environmental Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission responded to those changes in the 1992 act, and we
    obviously had to change in response to that as well.
        It is a little bit frustrating, because the purpose of our
    changes was to make our regulations consistent with the new
    congressionally directed EPA standards and Nuclear Regulatory
    regulations. So that is the reason. The implication that this
    was done to somehow make this work just is wrong. It was
    because we had to meet a different standard that was put in
    motion by Congress's actions in 1992.
        Senator Thomas. Assuming we go forward, as I hope we will,
    what is necessary now before the Department and the
    administration makes a final recommendation?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, actually, that process has
    occurred. We have made the recommendation. Now, it is
    Congress's decision whether or not to move this process ahead
    to licensing, which would be the next stage. So as I have said
    from the beginning, the issue is: Do we end the whole process
    now, because that, in effect, is what happens if the Nevada
    veto stands, or do we give it to the NRC--I mean there has
    been, obviously--there are two Senators here from Nevada, and
    they and others have criticisms about the science, and they
    called into question a variety of issues, which will have been
    debated at great length.
        There are two cases here. The case we make is that this is,
    in fact, a suitable site that will protect the safety and meet
    the standards. And then there is the argument that it will not.
    My view is that it would be in the interest of the American
    people to let the objective decision-making process of the
    licensing of the facility by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    be a final decision.
        We believe--I strongly believe the recommendation that the
    site is suitable is the correct one, but I am willing to
    subject that analysis to the experts of the NRC. I hope the
    other side would be the same way. If they think they are right,
    then this is the appropriate venue in which to have an ultimate
    decision made.
        Senator Thomas. Some of the broad decisions, such as
    transportation, I have even heard that they would have an
    effect on the economy of Las Vegas. This has been going on for
    24 years, is that not right? We have spent over $4 billion so
    far.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, I think that in 1987, the specific
    decision to focus on the site in Nevada was finalized by
    Congress, and that has been 15 years. So in 15 years, the
    specific and only work has been done towards determining
    whether or not Yucca Mountain is suitable.
        Senator Thomas. I see. Well, I just feel very strongly. As
    has already been expressed to you, we have a problem. We have a
    situation. We have to find a solution, and this appears to be
    the best solution before us. So thank you very much for your
    work.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, for the information of the
    members, we should have a vote about 11 o'clock.
        The Chairman. All right. Senator Domenici.
        Senator Domenici. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, I think you know that I have been concerned
    that we need to be doing research today to enable better
    utilization in the future of the large amount of energy that
    remains behind as spent fuel, and furthermore, technologies
    that would provide better energy recovery, and also allow us to
    reduce the toxicity of final waste products.
        Since the existing powerplants, even if we add no more,
    will fill Yucca Mountain, we obviously need to have better
    approaches to spent fuel management a lot more than just a
    Yucca Mountain. I think we should be studying those better
    principles.
        This was strongly supported in the President's national
    energy policy. I saw it there as something he wanted to get
    done, but I was disappointed that the DOE budget request for
    2003 effectively provided no resources for the research
    projects on this topic, even though they had been started last
    year by Congress. Can you discuss the interest of the
    Department, and your thoughts on this particular approach to
    waste?
        Secretary Abraham. You know, I said before, and recently in
    a speech expressed that the views in our energy policy about
    the need for more research in this area remain intact. I do not
    think--and I think the budget was a reflection of the concern--
    that it makes as much sense to invest this level of money in
    some of these programs if we do not resolve this issue of Yucca
    Mountain first, because in my judgment, if there is not much of
    a future for nuclear energy--because we are not going to deal
    with this waste, or if there is a decision in the other
    direction--that should, I think, have some impact on the level
    of research that we would conduct. But I appreciate the
    concerns you and I have talked about before, and we are not
    shutting the door on that type of research in the future.
        Senator Domenici. Mr. Secretary--and these are just my last
    observations--I want to congratulate you on the efforts you
    have made in working with Russia in your short term as the
    Secretary. It is clear that they have a completely different
    view of nuclear power and spent fuel than we do. They actually
    think the spent fuel rods are the residue of the legacy of the
    Cold War, if there is one, and they think it is very valuable,
    because they want to use it.
        So we are working with them, because we want to get the
    waste products, like plutonium and others, out of the
    marketplace, and I think we are going to succeed in doing some
    really major things in this area. And it will probably change
    the opinion of many people with reference to nuclear waste and
    nuclear policy, once they get going and we cooperate with them.
    So I commend you for that, and I also, on this one, commend you
    for your courage. It is time we move on, vote, and decide what
    America is going to do about this. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reid.
        Senator Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Abraham, the changes about which you spoke in
    1992 related only to the NRC and EPA, and not DOE. Are you
    aware of that?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, the changes that were set in
    motion----
        Senator Reid. Answer that question. They were not directed
    to DOE; they were directed toward the NRC and the EPA.
        Secretary Abraham. Our need is to meet standards that are
    set by the NRC and the EPA, and so we are governed by what is
    the level of exposure and the nature of the standards that we
    were called upon to test. I mean the Energy Policy Act directed
    the EPA to develop a site-specific standard, which changed the
    mechanism by which we would be evaluated. Obviously, we had to
    change, therefore----
        Senator Reid. We have a vote coming up real soon, and you
    understand, having been a Senator, that we have to leave when
    the vote occurs.
        Secretary Abraham. I remember actually waiting for
    witnesses to answer that sometimes went too long, so I will do
    my best to keep that perspective as well.
        Senator Reid. I feel, Secretary Abraham--I know of your
    academic background. You are a very smart man. You are a
    graduate of Harvard Law School. I think one of the problems,
    and I am just speaking for myself, is that we get answers just
    like the one you gave me, and you do that very well. You do not
    answer the questions.
        For example, you talk about environmental need to move this
    waste to Yucca Mountain. I am sure you are aware that there are
    500 local environmental groups, 49 national environmental
    groups who all oppose everything that you are doing regarding
    nuclear waste. Are you aware of that?
        Secretary Abraham. I am aware that there are strong
    opinions on both sides of the issue, Senator, but in my
    judgment, leaving this waste in temporary storage facilities
    all over the country, and particularly at the sites in the
    Department of Energy's complex----
        Senator Reid. You see, Secretary Abraham, with all due
    respect, there is going to be stuff around in those sites
    anyway. You are not going to leave the stuff. It is going to be
    there. As you are aware, they are going to continually generate
    nuclear waste. There are a few sites that are going to be shut
    down. Of course, we read in the paper this morning that there
    is a $2 billion project to try to start one up in Alabama.
        So those sites--you realize that when you take one of those
    spent fuel rods out, you cannot move that thing any place for
    at least 5 years. It has to stay in a cooling pond for 5 years.
    So those places are still going to be there, and to say, again,
    with deep respect that I have for you and the office you hold,
    there is not necessarily going to be this mass transportation
    that is going to take place anyway, because you know that there
    are scientists who say ``Leave it where it is in dry cast
    storage containers.''
        I am working with Senators Clinton and Lieberman, and
    others, to make sure that those sites where we generate nuclear
    waste, but also generate nuclear power, are safe. We have real
    concerns--significant members of the Congress, House and
    Senate--about the safety of those facilities, and we believe
    that they can be made safer, and that leaving these containers
    where they are, in either underground or above-ground storage,
    would be certainly safer than trying to move them around.
        I will also say, Mr. Secretary, you talked about the
    shipment of waste around Europe, nuclear waste. You, of course,
    are aware that they have tried to move stuff in Europe on a
    number of occasions. People tie themselves to railroad tracks,
    chain themselves to railroad tracks. In fact, Germany has just
    given up on it. In fact, Germany has scrapped their nuclear
    waste repository program, because they cannot move the waste.
    That is a fact.
        The Department of Energy has spent--now I will ask you a
    question, rather than giving one of those Senatorial speeches
    of which you are so familiar. I want to make sure that Senator
    Ensign has time to ask his questions. The Department of Energy
    has spent billions of dollars studying the Yucca Mountain. I
    have heard $4 billion around here today. I think it is closer
    to $7 billion, as you are aware.
        How much of that has been spent on transportation? You may
    not know the breakdown today, but would you get that back to us
    very quickly?
        Secretary Abraham. I will, and I note that it was one of
    the major components of the EIS, the Environmental Impact
    Statement's preparation, so I will get that for the record.
        [The information follows:]
                              transportation costs
        From fiscal year 1983 to 2000, the Office of Civilian Radioactive
    Waste Management has spent $268 million on transportation and
    development of transportation casks. This information is from the
    enclosed report Monthly Summary of Program Financial and Budget
    Information, as of August 31, 2001, page A-3, items Engineering
    Development (a) and Transportation System.*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         * The report has been retained in committee files.

        Senator Reid. I would also, in providing that number, if
    you would also provide us with any and all documents or memos
    produced by the DOE on the transportation of any kind of
    hazardous waste, I would really appreciate that, too. That
    should be in some of the work that you have done.
        Secretary Abraham. I would be glad to.
        [The information follows:]
                  transportation of hazardous waste documents
        I have enclosed three documents that respond to your request for
    Department of Energy (DOE) documents or memos produced on the
    transportation of hazardous waste. The DOE brochure Spent Nuclear Fuel
    Transportation includes a chart (page 10) on hazardous materials. The
    chart references a U.S. Department of Transportation document,
    Hazardous Materials Shipments, that is also enclosed. Also enclosed are
    slides detailing DOE shipments of hazardous materials, both radioactive
    and nonradioactive.**
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ** All enclosures have been retained in committee files.

        Senator Reid. I would say, Mr. Secretary, that it is really
    not--and I think this is some of your Harvard logic, but we
    have to sort right through that. The fact that they have
    transported 3 million tons of hazardous waste has nothing to do
    with the transportation of the nuclear waste. Hazardous
    substances, we know that that could be a gown that somebody
    wore when they were doing an X-ray, or having an X-ray taken. I
    mean it is really minimal stuff.
        Hazardous waste has a very low threshold. Some of it is
    more dangerous than others when you get into some of the
    caustic acids and stuff that are hauled around, but you add all
    those together, the 3 million tons of hazardous waste together,
    it would not have nearly the punch of one truckload of nuclear
    waste.
        There is a group of scientists who have no dog in the
    fight, who said that one truckload of nuclear waste--that is,
    spent fuel canisters--would have 240 times the radioactivity of
    the bomb that was dropped in Hiroshima, and we know that a
    shoulder-fired weapon will pierce one of those canisters. So I
    just think your example about 3 million tons of hazardous waste
    is not well taken.
        We are going to have a vote very shortly, and so if--I
    would stop, so Senator Ensign would have some time.
        The Chairman. Senator Ensign.
        Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back
    to this--because you have made a big deal of it in the press, I
    want to go back to this, you know, 131 sites versus one site.
    Senator Landrieu had talked about that.
        Senator Craig, you have talked about that it is going to go
    forward, you know, transportation is going to go forward no
    matter what.
        When we start Yucca Mountain, when Yucca Mountain starts,
    what are the estimates that you have, as far as the number of
    tons of nuclear waste that would be in the country, already
    produced?
        Secretary Abraham. There is about 45,000, I think, today,
    if we are--you know, 10 years down the road, that is another
    20,000.
        Senator Ensign. Okay. About 65,000, thereabouts. It will
    take what, about 5 years to get the shipments up to what the
    DOE estimates are, approximately?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. I mean we have estimated--I mean we
    have used a conservative estimate in terms of the amount going
    to Yucca Mountain of 3,000 tons per year.
        Senator Ensign. And we produce 2,000 a year.
        Secretary Abraham. That is a function, though, of a variety
    of factors, of which the least of which is congressional
    decisions as to how much appropriation--you can move more
    potentially, if you----
        Senator Ensign. The bottom line, though, is your estimates
    are 3,000--you start with 65,000 tons. How many years does that
    get us to get to the waste to Yucca Mountain?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, you know that it is about a 70,000
    metric ton facility. So it is about 23 years, I guess.
        Senator Ensign. Wait a second. We are shipping 3,000 a
    year. We produce 2,000 a year. That is a net shipping of 1,000
    a year.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, you asked how long to fill the
    facility, and the answer is----
        Senator Ensign. I did not say fill. I said ship all the
    stuff that we are going to have. Okay? We produce 3,000 a year,
    or 2,000 a year, we ship 3,000 a year. That means we are
    netting out, from what we have around the country, going to
    Yucca Mountain, about 1,000 a year.
        Secretary Abraham. At the end of 23 years, we will have
    70,000 at Yucca Mountain. That is correct.
        Senator Ensign. Mr. Secretary, just follow me here.
        Mr. Abraham. Okay. I am trying.
        Senator Ensign. You produce 2,000 a year.
        Secretary Abraham. Right.
        Senator Ensign. Okay? You ship 3,000 a year. You start with
    65,000 metric tons of this stuff. Okay? Around the country, you
    have 65,000 metric tons, and you are producing an additional
    2,000 a year.
        Secretary Abraham. Right.
        Senator Ensign. But if you are only shipping 3,000 a year,
    that means that your net taking from around the country to
    Yucca Mountain is about 1,000.
        Secretary Abraham. What it means, by my calculation, is
    that at the end of 23 years, you will have 70,000 in Yucca
    Mountain, instead of the different sites around the country.
    That is the bottom line. There will be 70,000 metric tons that
    will not be at these----
        Senator Ensign. Yes, I agree with that.
        Secretary Abraham [continuing]. Temporary sites----
        Senator Ensign. I agree with that.
        Secretary Abraham [continuing]. Of 131 facilities.
        Senator Ensign. Mr. Secretary, I agree with that. The point
    I am trying to make is, there still will be all this nuclear
    waste----
        Secretary Abraham. We will be producing more, and there
    is----
        Senator Ensign. Not only that. Not only producing more,
    there will still be nuclear waste all over the country for
    many, many decades to come.
        Secretary Abraham. Right. I would predict two things:
    First, that, yes, there will be, and that it will be at more
    sites than we have today, because a lot of the current sites
    will decide they should move off-site the waste that is
    currently stored there. So instead of 131 sites, you are going
    to have it at more sites if we do not move ahead and----
        Senator Ensign. But the bottom line is: We are not going to
    just have one site, and that is what you have--kind of what you
    have led people to believe, is we are going to have one site.
    This stuff is going to be around, so there are still going to
    be a lot of targets out there.
        You have talked about national security, that it would be
    safer to have it at one site. Well, if you could scoop it all
    up and have it at one site, I would agree with you, but it is
    not going to be that way. We are going to have it at sites
    around the country. I do not mean to be combative here. I just
    want to make sure that we fully understand----
        Secretary Abraham. I appreciate your concern.
        Senator Ensign [continuing]. That there are many sites, and
    there will continue to be many sites. As Senator Reid pointed
    out, it takes at least 5 to 10 years to cool in the cooling
    pond.
        Secretary Abraham. But, Senator, as you know, we have a
    number of decommissioned sites right now.
        Senator Ensign. And I agree with that.
        Secretary Abraham. If we move it from there, those will be
    done, instead of the current situation----
        Senator Ensign. Decommissioned sites, I think you have a
    point there.
        Secretary Abraham. Also, at the Department of Energy sites,
    where we are hoping to close the site, we will be able to do
    that, if we have Yucca Mountain, but now----
        Senator Ensign. Okay. I want to get to the transportation,
    because--there is no question that there will be many, many
    sites out there, and not just one site.
        To get to the transportation issues: The transportation of
    nuclear waste, when you transport it, you cannot surround it
    with as much concrete, obviously, because of the weight
    factors, as when you store it on-site. These canisters that are
    going to surround these things, you can surround them with more
    concrete than you can when you transport them.
        Secretary Abraham. Well----
        Senator Ensign. Yes? It is obvious.
        Secretary Abraham. That would seem obvious, yes.
        Senator Ensign. Okay. The point is that when you transport
    them, you do subject them--you have seen or I am sure you have
    seen the video of the Toe Missile breaching one of these
    things----
        Secretary Abraham. Right.
        Senator Ensign [continuing]. And they said----
        Secretary Abraham. Let me point out to the Senator that the
    TOW Missile was not breaching a transportation cask, but one of
    the permanent storage casks.
        Senator Ensign. Correct, but there have not been studies
    done on the transportation cask, correct?
        Secretary Abraham. But the point is: You are recommending
    we would keep these in storage at the current sites, and it
    was, in fact, one of those casks that got penetrated by a TOW
    Missile.
        Senator Ensign. But not with the concrete surrounding it.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, we have not tested that, but you
    raised the issue of a cask being penetrated.
        Senator Ensign. But you have----
        Secretary Abraham. That is not the kind of cask we are
    talking about. It is the one you are talking about----
        Senator Ensign. The point is: Why move forward when we have
    not studied some of these things? This is what we are talking
    about here.
        Secretary Abraham. We are not going to transport these,
    except in Nuclear Regulatory Commission certified
    transportation casks. I mean we are not going to just put them
    in garbage cans and move them across the country. We have done
    it here and in Europe without any harmful radiation exposure
    over the last 30 years.
        Senator Ensign. Mr. Secretary, the point that we are trying
    to make is this: First of all, dry cask storage, according to
    the DOE, is safe for a hundred years. These containers are safe
    for a hundred years. If they are not safe, then we have a major
    problem in the country, and I agree, we need to make them even
    more safe than they are today.
        But the point is that they can store this stuff, according
    to the DOE, for a hundred years. The bottom line is: We have
    time to study transportation in a better way than we have
    today. There is no hurry.
        Yucca Mountain is, what, $58 billion, according to the
    latest estimates, $57 billion to $58 billion? Okay? The 1995
    estimate, it was, what, $30-something-billion? And then the
    1998 estimate, it was $48 billion, $47 billion. Now, the 2001
    estimate, it is up to $58 billion, and the DOE has said that is
    not even the final number.
        Secretary Abraham. Senator, the rule changes that continue
    to take place, that we have had to adjust----
        Senator Ensign. There would be----
        Secretary Abraham [continuing]. To have been a major factor
    in that change.
        Senator Ensign. The bottom line is: It is incredibly
    expensive. That is the same amount of money as all 12 of our
    aircraft carriers combined. It is a huge amount of money.
        Secretary Abraham. It is an expensive process and the
    American ratepayers have already been and will continue to be
    paying for it.
        Senator Ensign. But they will not pay enough to pay for
    Yucca Mountain at those costs.
        Secretary Abraham. We believe that at this point that our
    actuarial tables suggest that the monies being spent will, in
    fact, meet the current projected costs.
        Senator Ensign. By what year?
        Secretary Abraham. I am not sure. I will have to get that--
    --
        Senator Ensign. Could you get that number for us?
        Secretary Abraham. I will be glad to.
        [The information follows:]
                             fee adequacy analyses
        DOE's most recent fee adequacy analyses (and all previous analyses)
    have indicated that the current fee is adequate to fully fund the
    planned waste disposal program. I have enclosed two documents to
    support this conclusion: Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost
    of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program and Nuclear Waste
    Fund Fee Adequacy: An Assessment, both dated May 2001.*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The enclosures have been retained in committee files.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Tables 4 and 5 in the Nuclear Waste Fund Fee Adequacy: An
    Assessment show that the fund balance at the end of waste emplacement
    in 2042 ranges from $9.1 billion to $45.6 billion in constant 2000
    dollars for two different economic assumptions. These balances in 2042
    exceed the target, which would provide a sinking fund for monitoring
    and closure of the repository.

        Senator Ensign. Get that number for us. The point that we
    are trying to make is, one, that the dry cask containers are
    good for a hundred years; and, number two, why risk the
    transportation when we have not completely and fully studied
    the transportation? And because there is no hurry to go forward
    with Yucca Mountain, if dry cask storage is good and safe for a
    hundred years, do not risk the transportation; let us take some
    of the money and invest it in what Senator Domenici is talking
    about. Instead of building Yucca Mountain, take some of that
    nuclear waste trust fund money and put it into the recycling
    technology.
        We do not know whether it is going to work or not, but we
    have time. If we have a hundred years, what is the hurry? I
    would suggest to you that the DOE has been very, very biased in
    its view towards Yucca Mountain, and the reason that I would
    say that, I would point it out, obviously, you, in earlier
    testimony, said that there was not--you do not know what you
    are going to do if we do not go forward with Yucca Mountain. We
    do not know what we are going to do.
        Well, to not have plan B in place, or at least be thinking
    of plan B, I think is irresponsible for the DOE. That indicates
    to me that, what if Yucca Mountain would have proved not
    suitable? That means DOE has said, you know what, we are
    putting all of our eggs in one basket. That proves to me that
    the Department of Energy has completely tunnel visioned toward
    Yucca Mountain, because you do not even have plan B put into
    place if it is deemed unsuitable.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, I would be glad to answer and
    comment on each of those. First of all, with regard to the bias
    of the Department, I do not believe that to be the case. I have
    met with and talked to many of the people who participated in
    the research on this, and I believe them to have been fair and
    objective. However, I am willing to subject the decision we
    have made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's objective,
    neutral experts. If you are right, and we are wrong, then you
    should be willing to do that as well.
        Second, as far as having a backup plan, the Congress has
    not authorized us to do so. We, instead, have been limited very
    carefully, in terms of the appropriations we have received, to
    do one thing, and that is to determine the suitability of this
    site as a repository for the nuclear waste.
        Now, if Congress wanted to have alternative plans, they
    could have funded them, they could have given the guidance to
    do so. They did not.
        With respect to the issue of dry cask storage, the fact
    that we might be able to develop a dry cask that can become for
    a hundred years sufficient to protect the material is not the
    issue. The issue is, is there room at the current facilities
    for this elaborate building process, and this additional amount
    of waste that would be developed there over the next hundred
    years.
        Senator Ensign. Is that a scientific problem or just a
    political problem?
        Secretary Abraham. It is a physical problem at some of the
    facilities. There is not enough room for it.
        Senator Ensign. You just have to build a bigger concrete
    pad.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, in some facilities, they are going
    to run out of space altogether, and that does not even take
    into account the issues of regional decisions as to whether or
    not people want this----
        Senator Ensign. That is politics.
        Secretary Abraham [continuing]. At those local facilities.
    So what you will get, as I have said already, is the
    transportation of the waste to some new off-site location.
    Whether it is in Utah, or it is in Nevada, or someplace else, I
    do not know, but what I would point out is this, we have not
    done, nor have you, the research to study the various 131
    facilities to determine any of the kinds of considerations, as
    far as seismology, volcanic activity, or anything else.
        We are being told we have not done enough research, after
    $4 billion, to move it to Yucca Mountain. There has been
    virtually no research done as to the physical situation at the
    131 sites to just leave it there in a slightly harder
    container. But in my judgment----
        Senator Ensign. Does that mean that they are unsafe now?
        Secretary Abraham. Pardon?
        Senator Ensign. Does that mean that they are unsafe now?
        Secretary Abraham. I have not done the research as to its
    feasibility for a hundred years. It is safe today.
        Senator Ensign. Is it still going to have waste there?
        Secretary Abraham. It is safe today. It will have a lot
    more waste if we leave it there.
        Senator Ensign. Okay. But some waste versus a lot more
    waste, it is still unsafe. If it is unsafe, it is unsafe.
        Secretary Abraham. Well, to answer your other point, which
    is the one that Senator Domenici and others have raised, which
    you have talked to me about, and I think we have had a good
    conversation on before, and that is the issue of these
    alternative technologies, transmutation, and so on. We are, I
    think, going to continue to research those, but I do not want
    people to lose sight of a couple of things.
        First of all, even if we were to perfect the science to do
    that, there will have to be facilities developed, and remember,
    this is in a Nation which has not sited a nuclear facility in
    an awfully long time. Those facilities are going to be around
    the country, and all of this waste is going to have to get to
    those facilities.
        Senator Ensign. I agree.
        Secretary Abraham. So we will still have a lot of these
    issues, and we will have a byproduct at the end that needs to
    be stored in a permanent, in my judgment, underground
    repository. So that is not, in my judgment, a sufficient----
        Senator Ensign. Just to clarify that point, though, the
    scientists that tell me about some of these transmutation
    issues, and things like that, the nucleotides, the radioactive
    half-lives of those, would be dramatically reduced, so that
    licensing a facility, you know, you maybe have hundreds of
    years, instead of tens of thousands of years of radioactive
    half-lives. Well, it is much easier to build a facility for
    hundreds of years than it is for ten thousand years.
        Secretary Abraham. I would say, Senator, if the science
    ultimately confirms that we can move ahead with this, it will
    be interesting to see what the communities of this country, who
    have, at least for quite a long time, resisted having new
    facilities built there, think about it. It may they will be
    receptive, but even if they are, we are talking about moving an
    awfully lot of waste to them anyhow.
        Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence.
    Just my last comment. I think that the potential is there, and
    that is our point, is that we do not need to hurry with this
    thing. We have time. The dry cask storage, I think, affords us
    this time, and we should be going forward with this research,
    because I think it is so much better of a potential answer, and
    if it is not a potential answer, then we will need a permanent
    repository, but we ought to at least take the time, research
    it, research the transportation, but let us take our time with
    this. We have literally decades to do this. We do not need to
    spend the tens of billions of dollars on Yucca Mountain right
    now.
        Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, as you can see, my prediction
    of the vote at five-after did not come true.
        The Chairman. We appreciate having your expertise on the
    timing of these floor votes.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just say this.
    I appreciate very much your allowing us the ability to come and
    ask some questions, make some statements regarding Secretary
    Abraham, and what he is doing, but I hope I did not offend you
    by all my Harvard talk, because I forgot you were Harvard,
    also.
        The Chairman. That is quite all right. Quite all right. Let
    me see if any Senator has additional questions.
        Senator Craig. Very quickly, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Craig, then Senator Domenici.
        Senator Craig. Very quickly, because--I think Senator
    Ensign has asked an important question about why not a second
    strategy. In 1987, the Congress of the United States removed
    that strategy. They directed the Department of Energy to go one
    path. So it is not the Department of Energy that does not have
    a second strategy, it was the wisdom of the Congress in 1987,
    and largely, because of the mounting costs of a multiple
    strategy approach. So that is the answer to that question.
        Senator Ensign. Senator, just briefly, I was making the
    point not necessarily for a second site, but for a backup of
    second strategy----
        Senator Domenici. Dry cask----
        Senator Ensign. Well, at least studying dry cask storage as
    an alternative. Is that, in fact, a safe thing, and costing it
    out on an accurate cost basis, and that kind of thing.
        Senator Craig. Lastly, Mr. Chairman, while it is arguable
    that--and I am not about to sit here and say that 131 sites are
    unsafe today, that is not the issue. The issue is they were
    temporary by design. From the beginning, they were not
    permanent sites. They were designed to be temporary, until a
    permanent site was designed. So the argument that the Secretary
    makes about the extensive study that went into these sites,
    study went into them, but for a hundred-year lifetime, not a
    10,000-year lifetime. It is important that we understand that
    they are temporary by definition, and to make them permanent is
    a wholly different approach that I do not think any of us have
    contemplated.
        Lastly, I look forward to the testimony next week from both
    the Senators from Nevada, and the Governor. We will be pleased
    to have them before the committee. I know this is of critical
    concern to their State, and I say that with great sincerity,
    because I know how sensitive my State is to the issue of
    nuclear materials, and how they would be handled. So I look
    forward to having you here next week to testify.
        Secretary Abraham. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Domenici.
        Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, might I first say to the
    Nevada Senators that we have sitting there in the front row,
    Dr. Margaret Chu. Frankly, we have never had anyone as
    qualified in these matters as that professional woman, and we
    are glad that she is on----
        The Chairman. You're biased. She's from New Mexico.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Domenici. She worked at Sandia National
    Laboratories, where she got her education and expertise.
        The Chairman. She has a great education.
        Senator Domenici. Yes, and she is good, and she will be
    fair. Mr. Secretary, I believe, and on this round, I want to
    compliment you with reference to the way you have handled the
    concerns of the people of Nevada. As a matter of fact, you had
    an option to select a regulatory standard that was less rigid
    than the one you chose, and you chose the most rigid protective
    standard that was before you.
        You put the Environmental Protection Agency right in the
    middle of determining the validity of the regulations. Most
    people thought you should have used the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, because they know more about it, et cetera, but
    they were thought to perhaps be a little too much pro-nuclear,
    so you and the President's other Cabinet member recommended to
    him that you proceed with the Environmental Protection Agency
    as the final standard there for this project.
        I, frankly, believed when you made that decision that you
    finished this project, that it was not going to make the
    standards. I still believe it is so rigid, that it will be
    extremely difficult to make it. When it is finally challenged
    in court, it will be a close call, but I think you did that
    just because of the way you and this administration are. You
    went as far as you could to be absolutely sure, and I commend
    you for it.
        Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Reid.
        Senator Reid. With all due respect, my friend, Senator
    Domenici, that was done, because you had to do it. That was
    done by statute, as you are aware.
        The Chairman. Had to, and wanted to.
        Senator Reid. Yes. So, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to
    say to my friend from Idaho, I appreciate his concern, and I
    have great respect for him, but I would say that Senator Ensign
    was not implying, nor am I, that the 134 sites should be
    permanent repositories. We are saying they should be left for
    temporary storage, and the dry cask storage containers, of
    course, are a product everyone recognizes will be safe up to a
    hundred years.
        Anyway, again, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    allowing us to mess up your committee.
        [Laughter.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        And thank you, Senator Ensign.
        And we appreciate you, Mr. Secretary, taking so much time
    with us. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to be
    reconvened on May 22, 2002.]

                     YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 22, 2002

                                           U.S. Senate,
                      Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met at 9:30 a.m., in room SH-106, Hart Senate
    Office Building, Hon. Jeff Bingaman, chairman, presiding.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

        The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. This is the
    second in the committee's hearings on S.J. Res. 34, which is a
    joint resolution approving the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada,
    for the development of a nuclear waste depository.
        Last week we heard from the Secretary of Energy. He
    explained why the resolution that we introduced at his request
    should be approved, why he should be allowed to apply to the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license to build a
    repository at Yucca Mountain.
        Today we consider the State of Nevada's objections to the
    repository, and tomorrow we hear from the agencies that have
    been charged with regulating or overseeing the repository
    program.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act gives the Governor of Nevada
    the power to veto the President's nuclear waste repository site
    recommendation. Governor Guinn exercised that power on the 8th
    of April, without objection. His Notice of Disapproval and the
    statement of reasons accompanying that notice will be included
    in our record today.*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The Notice can be found in the appendix.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The committee invited Governor Guinn to testify today, but
    he was unable to be here. In his absence, the views of the
    State of Nevada will be presented by a panel of witnesses
    chosen by the Senators from Nevada, in consultation with
    Governor Guinn. They are Mr. Robert Halstead, who is the
    transportation advisor with the Agency for Nuclear Projects in
    the State of Nevada; Dr. James David Ballard--he's an expert on
    terrorist tactics related to nuclear waste transportation; Dr.
    Victor Gilinsky, who is a former member and chair of the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Honorable Rocky Anderson,
    who is the mayor of Salt Lake City, Utah; Mr. Michael Ervin,
    Sr., vice president of the Peace Officers Association of
    California; and Dr. Stephen Prescott, who is the executive
    director of the Huntsman Cancer Institute in Salt Lake City,
    Utah. In addition, Mr. Jim Hall, the former chair of the
    National Transportation Safety Board, will also testify on
    behalf of Nevada's views, but he was unable to attend today,
    and we will hear from him at the beginning of tomorrow's
    hearing.
        We have again invited the two Senators from Nevada,
    Senators Reid and Ensign, to sit with the committee and ask
    questions, and if they are able to be here this morning, they
    will be recognized after committee members have the chance to
    speak or to ask their questions.
        Why don't we go ahead and take about 6 minutes, or up to 6
    minutes, for each of the witnesses. Your full statements will
    be included in the record, so that you do not need to just read
    them into the record. If you could, summarize or identify the
    main points you think the committee needs to be aware of before
    we make any decision on this issue. Why don't we start with Mr.
    Halstead. Thank you very much for being here.
        [The prepared statements of Governor Guinn and Senator Reid
    follow:]
         Prepared Statement of Hon. Kenny C. Guinn, Governor of Nevada
        Honorable Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is
    Kenny C. Guinn and I am Governor of the State of Nevada. These written
    comments are submitted for inclusion in the hearing record. The state
    of Nevada compliments Chairman Bingaman for holding this important
    hearing and providing an opportunity for every member of the Senate to
    review in detail an issue of profound national importance--whether to
    proceed with the development of Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a site for
    a national nuclear waste repository. This is an issue that will
    tangibly affect tens of millions of Americans and it is hurtling toward
    finality in a manner that is premature, unnecessary and ill-conceived.
        As is widely known by this time, Nevada considers the Yucca
    Mountain project to be the product of extremely bad science, extremely
    bad law, and extremely bad public policy. With regard to Yucca
    Mountain, each of these elements is strongly negative on its own and
    when the three are combined, the totality of their weight cannot, and
    should not, be ignored.This project has failed to meet the scientific
    criteria established by this very body for a deep geologic repository,
    it has failed to meet the law in numerous instances and ways, and it
    would implement an unprecedented public transportation policy that
    literally puts tens of millions of Americans at risk on a routine
    basis.
        Attached to this statement are three documents: 1) the Notice of
    Disapproval and an accompanying Statement of Reasons I filed with the
    U.S. Congress pursuant to Section 116 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act;
    2) a copy of a recent peer review report commissioned by the U.S.
    Department of Energy (DOE) and conducted for DOE by the International
    Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the
    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); and, 3) a
    copy of an affidavit from John W. Bartlett, DOE's former Director of
    the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, outlining his
    experience overseeing the Yucca Mountain project and his reasons for
    concluding that the Yucca Mountain site is unsuitable for use as a
    high-level nuclear waste repository. Please consider these attachments
    as part of my written testimony to the Committee.
        For the reasons stated therein, as supported and augmented by the
    information in this written testimony, we in Nevada believe that the
    Senate should take no further action in support of the Yucca Mountain
    project.
         the iaea/oecd report on the unsound science of yucca mountain
        I would like to call the Committee's attention to a new document, a
    key document, which recently appeared from within the scientific
    community that excoriates the scientific work of DOE in connection with
    Yucca Mountain. Numerous independent scientific reviewers have now
    evaluated the project during the past year, and all have reached the
    same conclusion: There is nowhere near enough information to certify
    the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for high-level nuclear waste
    disposal, and the information that is available suggests the site is
    woefully unsuitable geologically.
        This latest report, the aforementioned peer review report
    commissioned by DOE from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
    Nuclear Energy Agency (IAEA) of the Organization for Economic
    Cooperation and Development (OECD), reaches shocking new conclusions.
    These agencies assembled some of the world's leading scientists to
    evaluate, over several months, the total system performance of Yucca
    Mountain as represented by DOE and its computer models. Among other
    things, these leading scientists concluded that DOE lacks sufficient
    information even to build a model to predict the suitability and
    hydrogeologic performance of the proposed repository. According to the
    peer review group, the water flow system at Yucca Mountain is ``not
    sufficiently understood to propose a conceptual model for a realistic
    transport scenario.''
        Moreover, according to the peer review group, DOE's level of
    understanding of the hydrogeology of the site is ``low, unclear, and
    insufficient to support an assessment of realistic performance.'' DOE's
    sensitivity studies in its computer models ``do not give any clues to
    the important pathways for the water in the system.'' Perhaps most
    troubling of all, in DOE's performance model of Yucca Mountain,
    ``increased ignorance leads to lower expected doses, which does not
    appear to be a sensible basis for decision-making.''
        It is truly amazing to me, as an elected executive official, that
    DOE commissioned this peer review report many months ago, and then made
    a final ``site suitability'' determination to the President and the
    Congress in spite of its stunning conclusions.It shows once again, in
    my view, that politics has long prevailed over science when it comes to
    Yucca Mountain. This is another reason for Nevada to redouble its
    efforts to stop this project--government bureaucrats seem unable to
    pull the plug, even in the face of shocking independent evidence that
    the science is bad or nonexistent.
           the peco solution and the myth of one central storage site
        It is almost certain that, even if Yucca Mountain proceeds, every
    nuclear utility in the United States will nonetheless have to build an
    interim dry storage facility for their inventories of spent nuclear
    fuel, if they have not already done so. This is because Yucca Mountain
    will not be ready to receive high-level radioactive waste until long
    after spent fuel pools at reactor sites have been filled to capacity.
    Moreover, as I have explained in my Statement of Reasons, Yucca
    Mountain will not reduce the number of storage sites across America for
    60 to 100 years, even if no new plants are built, and Yucca Mountain
    will never reduce the number of storage sites as long as nuclear
    reactors continue to be built and operated.
        In July 2000, the Department of Energy reached an agreement with
    PECO Energy Company, a division of Exelon Corp., the nation's largest
    nuclear utility, for managing spent nuclear fuel from PECO's Peach
    Bottom nuclear plant in Pennsylvania.
        The PECO alternative is simple: If DOE is unable to take PECO's
    spent fuel by a date certain, PECO will build a specially-constructed
    dry cask spent fuel storage facility at the Peach Bottom plant for
    storage of their spent fuel until such time as a permanent federal
    repository, or alternative, is operational. PECO will be allowed to
    reduce its contributions to the Nuclear Waste Fund (a $9 billion fund
    collected from the nation's nuclear plant operators through annual
    assessments), and use those funds to pay for the new facility.
        At PECO's request, DOE must become the title holder, owner,
    operator, and NRC licensee of the Peach Bottom independent spent fuel
    storage facility and its contents no later than five years after
    permanent shutdown of the Peach Bottom station, but no sooner than five
    years after the full 40-year license term of the station.
        As explained in my Statement of Reasons, the PECO deal is the safe,
    practical, economic alternative to a severely flawed Yucca Mountain
    project. It represents what utilities are planning to do, and will have
    to do anyway, in the real world. I urge the Committee to explore the
    PECO deal carefully, and to question DOE and the nuclear industry as to
    why it has recently been ignored, or even hidden from public view.
        So the cat is out of the bag--opening Yucca Mountain will not
    reduce from 131 to one (1) the number of sites where high-level waste
    and spent nuclear fuel is stored in America. As long as nuclear
    reactors continue to operate, which is the main purpose of developing a
    waste ``solution,'' there will continue to be waste stored above-ground
    at reactor sites across the nation. In fact, at current rates of spent
    fuel production, if Yucca Mountain were to open and be filled to
    capacity by around 2036, there would still be just about as much spent
    fuel stored at reactors sites as there is today. And that amount would
    continue to pile up for years to come, even if no new reactors are
    built, because nuclear plants generate about 2,000 tons of spent fuel
    each year, and will continue to do so regardless of what happens with
    Yucca Mountain.
        To borrow a popular phrase, ``Do the Math.'' Today, approximately
    46,000 tons of spent fuel is stored at the nation's reactor sites. By
    the time shipments start in 2011, DOE's earliest predicted date, there
    will be at least 64,000 tons. Yucca Mountain is being designed and
    licensed to hold only 77,000 tons, and is probably physically incapable
    of holding more. The law precludes it from holding more.
        DOE hopes to be able to ship 3,000 tons of waste per year to Yucca
    Mountain. But nuclear plants will continue operating on renewed
    licenses for decades beyond 2011, so spent fuel inventories will
    continue to grow at the rate of 2,000 tons per year. Thus, the net
    depletion rate will be only 1,000 tons per year.
        If DOE meets its shipping targets, it will take approximately 25
    years to fill Yucca Mountain with 77,000 tons of waste and spent fuel.
    But by then, operating reactors will have produced an extra 50,000
    tons, leaving approximately 37,000 tons of spent fuel still sitting at
    reactor sites across America--a mere 9,000 tons less than we have
    today.
        In short, on the day Yucca Mountain is filled to the brim, we would
    largely be right back where we started. Indeed, the 131 sites
    identified by DOE will not be reduced to one, but will in fact have
    risen by one. And in the interim, at least 50,000 shipments of highly
    radioactive waste will have been made through 43 states, almost every
    major city, and thousands of towns in between.
                             transportation issues
        The main thing I want to bring to your attention are the issues and
    concerns associated with the proposed massive campaign to transport
    77,000 tons of nuclear waste across the nation for up to 38 years. Some
    have accused Nevada of fear mongering simply for honestly and sincerely
    raising the many questions that these shipments to Yucca Mountain pose
    for our nation's citizens. But these are extremely legitimate
    questions, and they deserve legitimate answers.
        In its Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain, DOE's own
    numbers point to as many as 108,000 high-level waste and spent nuclear
    fuel shipments to Yucca Mountain. Almost every state, and most major
    metropolitan areas, will be affected by these shipments. More than 123
    million citizens reside within one-half-mile of the proposed transport
    routes. The modes and methodologies for shipment have not yet been
    determined, much less analyzed. For example, we recently learned from
    DOE that as many as 3,000 barge shipments may be involved, traversing
    numerous port cities and harbor areas. According to DOE's own analyses,
    a single accident scenario could produce thousands of latent cancer
    fatalities and lead to many billions of dollars in cleanup costs.
        Secretary Abraham testified last week that DOE now believes most
    spent fuel shipments would take place by rail, but that suggestion
    raises its own set of questions about practicality and physical
    possibility. For example, many reactor sites do not have rail access,
    and there are no known plans to create such access, so some form of
    truck or barge transport and transfer will still be necessary for many
    shipments. Additionally, in Nevada alone, DOE is proposing to construct
    more that 400 miles of new rail lines--that is more new rail capacity
    than we have built in the entire United States in the last century. My
    point, which I think is well illustrated by the Secretary's testimony
    announcing yet another change in approach, is that the transportation
    issue is a major concern--it is one that will affect literally millions
    of Americans, but it has not been well thought out. We are being asked
    to accept DOE platitudes and industry assurances in response to our
    questions and concerns, but that is not good enough, and it will not be
    good enough when the first problems arise, and we know they will.
        Another very troubling aspect of this issue is that DOE has never
    done an analysis of the terrorism risks associated with mass transport
    to Yucca Mountain. In a recent brief filed in NRC license proceedings
    by nuclear utilities for the proposed Private Fuel Storage facility in
    Utah, the nuclear industry took the position that it is essentially no
    one's jurisdiction, other than the U.S. military, to evaluate terrorism
    risks in spent fuel transport. According to the utilities, this is not
    a proper subject for analysis by DOE, the NRC, the Department of
    Transportation, or the industry itself. In short, if you believe the
    industry, this is an area that only Congress can now evaluate, or
    direct others to evaluate. Put another way, if Congress does not order
    such an analysis to be done, none will be done. In the wake of
    September 11, failure to perform such an analysis would appear unwise.
        And there is something else our experts now tell us: DOE has never
    done an evaluation of the nuclear criticality risk of a spent fuel cask
    getting struck by a state-of-the-art armor-piercing weapon. In recent
    nuclear industry advertisements and press statements, it was suggested
    that if a warhead penetrated a cask, authorities would simply dispatch
    an emergency crew to ``plug it up.'' This assumes the dose rate in the
    vicinity of the cask is not a lethal one. It assumes that the warhead
    does not essentially liquefy the contents of the cask, if it is not
    already liquid. It assumes that any inner explosion in the cask would
    not so alter the geometry of the contents that the contents would go
    critical, obliterating the cask. It assumes that the cask is not over a
    river or on a barge and will not subsequently fill with water, a
    neutron moderator. It assumes that the cask is not filled with U.S. or
    foreign research reactor spent fuel, which is usually comprised of
    highly-enriched, or weapons-grade, uranium.
        Finally, there are questions regarding the casks that will be used
    for shipping high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel to any repository.
    First of all, very few casks exist today, so the ones that would be
    used for a 38-year shipping campaign to Yucca Mountain are still in
    various stages of development. That might be acceptable if we knew they
    were going to be subjected to rigorous physical testing prior to use,
    but that is not intended. Instead, computer and some limited scale-
    model testing is the planned method of assessing cask integrity. Those
    ancient tapes we have all seen of discarded shipping casks being
    dropped from helicopters, run into cement walls and hit by trains--none
    of that is planned for the new generation of casks. NRC Commissioner
    Greta Dicus recently testified that NRC does now plan to physically
    test one cask, but that is the first time such an announcement has been
    made, and we therefore remain, respectfully, skeptical about what will
    actually be done.
        So for now, we are being asked to believe recent industry claims
    that the new, not-yet-built casks can withstand ``all but the most
    advanced armor-piercing weapons'' and a ``direct hit by a fully fueled
    Boeing 747.'' These wild claims are not based on actual testing, and we
    know from tests conducted at Sandia National Laboratories in the 1980s
    and by the U.S. Army at Aberdeen Proving Grounds as recently as 1998
    that even very robust casks are vulnerable to attacks from small
    missiles. Shouldn't the new generation of casks be subjected to full-
    scale physical testing under a range of conceivable scenarios,
    including an attack by terrorists willing to give their own lives?
                 the role of the nuclear regulatory commission
        The final issue I will raise is the notion being promoted here in
    Washington, and adopted by some mainstream media organizations, that
    Congress can responsibly move DOE's Yucca Mountain site selection
    forward because all remaining issues related to the site's suitability
    would be reexamined and resolved in licensing proceedings before the
    NRC. That is not the case.
        In fact, under current rules for licensing Yucca Mountain, which
    Nevada is challenging in court, NRC will not be examining or
    determining the geologic suitability of the Yucca Mountain site at all.
    Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, this critically important task was
    supposed to have been performed by DOE. But DOE recently revised the
    rules, and in doing so virtually abdicated this function. NRC will
    essentially be determining only whether DOE's man-made waste packages
    can keep radiation emissions to within standards set by the
    Environmental Protection Agency.
        In simple terms, NRC will be determining the suitability of the
    waste containers that DOE will put inside the mountain, but it will not
    be examining the suitability of the mountain itself at all. That's like
    making sure every deck chair on the Titanic can hold the heaviest
    passenger, without ever bothering to make sure the ship can float.
        Under this approach, DOE is both the promoter and arbiter of the
    suitability of the Yucca Mountain site. There is no independent
    government oversight. That's how we used to regulate things nuclear
    until we learned the hard way that it was necessary, indeed vital to
    the protection of public health and safety, to separate the promotional
    and regulatory aspects of the government's involvement in nuclear
    energy. (For example, witness the $250 billion cleanup bill taxpayers
    now face for the nation's mismanaged nuclear weapons complex.) But
    that's exactly happening with Yucca Mountain, and the result is a site
    recommendation that was made prematurely and against the strong
    concerns of virtually the entire scientific community and the U.S.
    General Accounting Office.
                                   conclusion
        Today, the President's recommendation to move forward with Yucca
    Mountain is heading down the path to finality, and only the Congress
    can stop it by choosing not to override my Congressionally-authorized
    site veto. If the matter of site suitability really were up to the NRC,
    Nevada and the scores of independent scientists alarmed by DOE's
    premature and falsely based site recommendation would be considerably
    reassured. But such is not the case.
        If Congress overrides my veto and simply punts to the NRC, the
    suitability of the Yucca Mountain site will never be independently
    reviewed by any government authority, barring a court order. We will
    seek that court order, but we believe Congress should accept its
    responsibility, recognize that the Yucca Mountain project is fatally
    flawed on numerous fronts, and not act to override my veto.
                                     ______

        Prepared Statement of Hon. Harry Reid, U.S. Senator From Nevada
        I want to thank you Chairman Bingaman and Senator Murkowski for
    allowing me the opportunity to participate in this hearing--and for
    understanding the importance of this issue to me and to my state, and
    really to almost every state.
        The resolution this committee is considering refers to the
    President's recommendation of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the site for
    disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
        But this limited description fails to take into account the full
    implications of developing a repository there (or anywhere else)--
    namely, that before dumping the nation's nuclear waste on Nevada, it
    has to be shipped through 43 states--including the states most members
    of this committee represent.
        Today, we are going to hear from witnesses who will tell us about
    the risks the Department of Energy's program will entail--these include
    risks in Nevada and more importantly, risks all over the country where
    this waste will be shipped.
        The Secretary said it best last week when he acknowledged that the
    Department of Energy has only had preliminary thoughts about a
    transportation plan for this waste. That's like a someone building a
    hospital with no doctors.
        So while there are many fundamental problems with the site itself
    and concerns about the process that led to the President's
    recommendation of the site, I want to first address the dangers of
    transporting massive amounts of deadly nuclear waste along the nation's
    major highways, railroad tracks and waterways.
        Bush plan for moving thousands of tons of deadly high-level
    radioactive waste requires 100,000 shipments by truck, 20,000 by train
    and perhaps thousands more by barge over 40 years.
        This idea would be risky at any time, but after September 11, 2001
    it is just unthinkable.
        The long term radiation contained in each shipment is 240 times
    radiation released by the Hiroshima bomb.
        Shipments will pass by homes, schools, parks, churches, offices.
        Shipments jeopardize the safety, health, environment and the lives
    of many people who live in cities and towns all over the country.
        We know there will be hundreds of accidents involving shipments of
    nuclear waste.
        It's not a question of if, but when and where and how severe will
    these accidents be. And an accident involving a container of deadly
    nuclear waste is no routine fender-bender. A collision or fire
    involving a 25-ton payload of nuclear waste could kill thousands.
        Yet, the Department of Energy despite knowing there will be
    accidents recommended this plan without developing a plan for the
    shipments.
        In addition, DOE has failed to provide the millions of people who
    live near the proposed routes the information they need to understand
    the risk their families face.
        Deadly accidents are not the only concern. Shipping nuclear waste
    across the country increases our vulnerability to terrorist attack, by
    adding hundreds of thousands of targets for terrorists to attack with a
    missile or to hijack or to sabotage.
        So transporting deadly nuclear waste is dangerous--and it's a risk
    our country shouldn't take.
        The nuclear power industry and some of its backers suggest it would
    be better to have nuclear waste at a single site instead of scattered
    around the country. But this is a false promise, because the nation's
    nuclear waste will never be consolidated at a single site.
        It will continue to be at every one of the operating reactor sites.
    Spent nuclear fuel rods are so hot and radioactive that they have to be
    stored at the nuclear reactor site in a cooling pond for 5 years before
    they can be moved. So developing Yucca Mountain would add to the number
    of sites with nuclear waste, not reduce it.
        There are also risks about Yucca Mountain itself and hundreds of
    unanswered questions about whether it can be a safe storage facility.
        Independent federal experts agree that the science done on Yucca
    Mountain is incomplete.

              The General Accounting Office, a credible independent agency,
            chastised the Secretary of Energy for making a decision on
            Yucca Mountain when almost 300 important scientific tests
            remain incomplete.
              The experts at the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
            another independent agency, concluded that the technical basis
            for Yucca Mountain is ``weak to moderate''.
              The Inspector General at the Department of Energy found that
            the law firm they hired was working for the nuclear power
            industry at the same time.

        There is an alternative. We can safely leave the waste on site,
    where it will be any way as new waste is added to the existing waste.
    It will be safe there while we develop the technology for reprocessing
    or safe disposal without shipping 100,000 nuclear dirty bombs through
    your states.
        Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss this
    important issue.

            STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. HALSTEAD, TRANSPORTATION
         ADVISOR, AGENCY FOR NUCLEAR PROJECTS, STATE OF NEVADA

        Mr. Halstead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm Bob Halstead, Transportation Advisor for the Agency for
    Nuclear Projects, State of Nevada.
        My pre-filed comments today summarize my analysis of the
    Department of Energy's final environmental impact statement for
    Yucca Mountain, which was released on February 14, 2002.
    Although high-level nuclear waste is an integral part of DOE's
    repository proposal, there is no transportation plan in the
    final environmental impact statement
        In my summary comments today, I'd like to emphasize three
    points about the Department of Energy transportation proposal.
        First, construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain would
    result in tens of thousands of shipments of high-level nuclear
    waste. DOE proposes to move 70,000 metric tons of high-level
    nuclear waste from 77 sites to Yucca Mountain over 24 years.
        By DOE's own account, the mostly legal weight truck
    scenario could result in 53,000 shipments over 24 years, or
    about 2,200 per year. DOE's mostly rail scenario, when the
    associated heavy-haul truck and barge shipments which are
    required to make it feasible, are included could result in
    22,500 shipments over 24 years, or about 935 per year.
        Now, after 24 years, under DOE's proposal, there would
    still be 49,000 metric tons of high-level nuclear waste at 63
    commercial sites and five DOE sites in 33 States. And it is not
    clear what DOE proposes to do with these remaining wastes. But
    DOE's final EIS says that moving these wastes would require an
    additional 14 years and could require 22,500 additional
    shipments by rail, truck, and barge, or 56,000 additional
    shipments by legal-weight truck.
        Well, we've gotten most of the numbers out of the way, Mr.
    Chairman. My second point is that a severe transportation
    accident or a successful terrorist attack on a shipment could
    unfortunately have catastrophic consequences.
        Now, 90 percent of the waste that would be shipped to the
    repository would be commercial spent nuclear fuel, which is an
    extremely hazardous material. Without shielding, a person
    standing next to a spent nuclear fuel assembly would receive a
    lethal dose of radiation in 1 to 5 minutes. Each spent fuel
    shipping cask loaded with spent fuel, would contain so much
    Cesium 137, the most dangerous radionuclide, that a one percent
    release in the city could cause thousands of cancer deaths
    unless cleaned up at a cost of billions of dollars.
        In the final EIS, DOE acknowledges that a severe accident
    or a terrorist attack could result in a release of radioactive
    material, and DOE admits that the cleanup cost could range from
    $300,000 up to $10 billion. Nevada's studies show that a severe
    accident, such as the Baltimore rail tunnel accident of last
    year, could cause widespread contamination costing somewhere in
    the rage of $10 to $14 billion to clean up. And if not cleaned
    up, it would cause between 4,000 and 28,000 cancer deaths over
    the following 5 decades.
        Nevada studies also show that a successful terrorist attack
    in an urban area using a 1950's era weapon against the newly
    designed truck cask could cause a large enough release to
    result in 300 to 1,800 latent cancer fatalities, assuming a 90
    percent blast penetration. Full perforation of a truck cask,
    which is what we think would occur in an attack involving a
    state-of-the-art weapon like a TOW missile, could cause a
    factor of ten increase, resulting in 3,000 to 18,000 latent
    cancer fatalities and a cleanup that would certainly exceed ten
    billion dollars.
        My third point is simply that DOE has no transportation
    plan presently that addresses these safety and security issues.
    DOE has searched rail as their preferred mode of shipment for
    safety reasons, but in fact DOE has no plan for maximizing rail
    use. And after 20 years of studying potential rail spur routes
    in Nevada, DOE can't even say which Nevada rail spur route they
    prefer.
        If they use the mostly legal-weight truck option, they've
    put forward no plan for picking the safest highway routes for
    the 53,000 to 108,000 cross-country truck shipments that would
    occur, nor do they have a plan for managing other aspects of
    truck safety, nor do they have a plan for addressing the post
    September 11 risks of terrorism against these shipments. And
    incredibly the Department of Energy not only has no plan for
    enhanced transportation safety regulations, such as the
    mandatory use of dedicated trains or full-scale cask testing;
    in fact, both DOE and the nuclear industry actually oppose
    mandatory use of dedicated trains and mandatory full-scale cask
    testing.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify this
    morning.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Halstead follows:]
       Prepared Statement of Robert J. Halstead, Transportation Advisor,
                  Agency for Nuclear Projects, State of Nevada
        I am Robert J. Halstead, Transportation Advisor, Agency for Nuclear
    Projects, State of Nevada. I have worked on nuclear waste
    transportation issues for the past 24 years. I have been Transportation
    Advisor to the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects since 1988. My
    primary responsibility is assessment of the impacts and risks of
    transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive wastes to
    the proposed Yucca Mountain repository site. In addition to reviewing
    the U.S. Department of Energy's Draft and Final Environmental Impact
    Statements for Yucca Mountain, my recent work for Nevada includes
    managing contractor studies on the vulnerability of shipments to
    sabotage and terrorist attack, on the radiological consequences of
    severe highway and rail accidents, and on radiation exposures from
    incident-free shipments.
        From 1983 to 1988, I was senior policy analyst for the State of
    Wisconsin Radioactive Waste Review Board, an agency created by the
    Wisconsin Legislature to represent the State in dealings with the U.S.
    Department of Energy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, other
    federal agencies, and nuclear electric utilities. I advised the Board
    and Wisconsin's congressional delegation on federal legislation that
    resulted in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, and the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Amendments Act of 1987. I monitored on-going spent nuclear fuel
    shipments; evaluated transportation impacts of repository candidate
    sites in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan; and represented the Board
    on all matters pertaining to transportation.
        From 1978 to 1983, I worked for the State of Wisconsin Energy
    Office. I evaluated utility plans for nuclear and coal-fired power
    plants, and represented the State in proceedings before the Public
    Service Commission of Wisconsin. I prepared policy recommendations on
    transportation of coal, petroleum, spent nuclear fuel, and low-level
    radioactive wastes.
        I have also worked as a consultant on nuclear waste transportation
    and storage for the States of Minnesota, Tennessee, and Texas. I also
    advised the Law and Water Fund of the Rockies on the transportation
    impacts of the Private Fuel Storage facility proposed for the Skull
    Valley Goshute Reservation in Tooele County, Utah.
     the u.s. department of energy's final environmental impact statement
                               for yucca mountain
        The Department of Energy (DOE) released the Final Environmental
    Impact Statement (FEIS) for Yucca Mountain on February 14, 2002. The
    FEIS was made available from DOE's website (www.ymp.gov) shortly
    thereafter. DOE apparently published no paper copies of the FEIS for
    direct distribution to the public. DOE has apparently provided paper
    copies of the FEIS to DOE Reading Rooms in some cities.
        The FEIS ``analyzes a Proposed Action to construct, operate and
    monitor, and eventually close a geologic repository for the disposal of
    spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca
    Mountain.'' [p. 1-3] Transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-
    level radioactive waste from 72 commercial and 5 DOE sites across the
    United States is an integral part of DOE's Proposed Action. The
    Proposed Action would ``require surface and subsurface facilities and
    operations for the receipt, packaging, possible surface aging, and
    emplacement of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste''
    and ``transportation of these materials to the repository.'' [FEIS, p.
    2-5]
        DOE has made no final decisions about the transportation options
    proposed in the FEIS. Decisions about ``how spent nuclear fuel and
    high-level radioactive waste would be shipped to the repository (for
    example, truck or rail) and how spent nuclear fuel would be packaged
    (uncanistered or in disposable or dual-purpose canisters) would be part
    of future transportation planning efforts.'' [FEIS, p. 2-5] For
    shipments nationally, ``DOE would use both legal-weight truck and rail
    transportation, and would determine the number of shipments by either
    mode as part of future transportation planning efforts.'' [FEIS, p. 2-
    13] ``DOE could use one of three options or modes of transportation in
    Nevada to reach the Yucca Mountain site: legal-weight trucks, rail, or
    heavy haul trucks.'' [FEIS, p. 2-48] The FEIS does not contain a
    specific transportation plan. DOE's discussions of potential
    transportation scenarios and DOE's transportation impact analyses are
    spread over more than 750 pages in the FEIS Summary, eight chapters,
    and four appendices.
        In order to obtain print-optimized files for the FEIS Summary and
    Reader's Guide, it is necessary to go to DOE's website and download
    48,425 KB. To obtain the eight chapters and four appendices dealing
    with transportation and related issues, it is necessary to download
    more than 113,300 KB.
            projected nuclear waste inventories and shipment numbers
        Under the Proposed Action, DOE would transport 70,000 metric tons
    of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
    waste to a repository over 24 years (2010-2034). The Proposed Action
    complies with Section 114(d) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments
    Act. The FEIS also evaluates the transportation impacts of the entire
    projected inventory of about 120,000 MTHM over 38 years (2010-2048).
    [Pp. S-77 to S-78]
        The FEIS estimates the total projected inventory of commercial
    spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive wastes (HLW) to be
    generated through 2046. This inventory, referred to by DOE as Module 1,
    includes 105, 000 MTHM of commercial SNF, 2,500 MTHM of DOE SNF, and
    22,280 canisters of DOE HLW (equivalent to about 11,500 MTHM). DOE also
    evaluates a projected inventory, referred to as Module 2, in which
    2,000 cubic meters of Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) waste, and 4,000
    cubic meters of Special-Performance-Assessment-Required (SPAR) waste,
    are added to Module 1. [FEIS, p. S-78, and Appendix A]
        Yucca Mountain, under DOE's Proposed Action, would receive the
    following wastes over 24 years (2010-2033): 63,000 MTHM of commercial
    SNF, 2,333 MTHM of DOE SNF, and 8,315 canisters of DOE HLW (equivalent
    to about 4,667 MTHM). [FEIS, p. S-78] At the end of DOE's Proposed
    Action, in 2034, there would still be about 42,000 MTHM of commercial
    SNF stored at 63 nuclear power plant sites in 31 states, 167 MTHM of
    DOE SNF stored at DOE sites in 4 states, and 13,965 canisters of DOE
    HLW (equivalent to about 6,833 MTHM) stored at DOE sites in 3 States.
    Additionally, all of the projected GTCC and SPAR wastes would also
    still be stored at 63 commercial and 4 DOE sites in 32 states. [FEIS,
    Pp. S-78, A-2 to A-16, and J-10 to J-22]
        DOE developed two national transportation scenarios--``mostly
    legal-weight truck'' and ``mostly rail''--in order to estimate the
    number of shipments required under the Proposed Action (24 years) and
    under Modules 1 and 2 (38 years). DOE adopted this approach ``because,
    more than 10 years before the projected start of operations at the
    repository, it cannot accurately predict the actual mix of rail and
    truck transportation that would occur from the 77 sites to the
    repository. Therefore, the selected scenarios enable the analysis to
    bound (or bracket) the ranges of legal-weight truck and rail shipments
    that could occur.'' [FEIS, p. J-10] DOE states that the ``estimated
    number of shipments for the mostly legal-weight truck and mostly rail
    scenarios represents the two extremes in the possible mix of
    transportation modes.'' [FEIS, p. 6-35] Table 1 shows the number of
    shipments estimated by DOE for these transportation and inventory
    scenarios.

                  Table 1.--DOE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SHIPMENTS FOR TRANSPORTATION SCENARIO COMBINATIONS
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             (Mostly        (Mostly     (Mostly rail)  (Mostly rail)
                     Inventory  scenario                  truck)  truck   truck)  rail       truck          rail
                                                            shipments      shipments      shipments      shipments
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Proposed Action (2010-2034).........................      52,786            300          1,079          9,646
    Module 1 (2010-2048)................................     105,685            300          3,122         18,243
    Module 2 (2010-2048)................................     108,544            355          3,122         18,935
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: DOE/EIS-0250, Table J-11

        DOE's ``mostly legal-weight truck'' national scenario would result
    in the largest number of shipments. Over 24 years, there would be more
    than 53,000 shipments, or about 2,200 per year. Over 38 years, there
    would be about 108,900 shipments, or about 2,870 per year. By
    comparison, over the past 40 years, there have been less than 100
    shipments per year in the United States.*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * There were about 3,025 shipments in the United States between
    1964 and 1997, about 92 per year. Reliable estimates of worldwide cask-
    shipments, through 1998, range from 24,000 to 40,041. Most of the
    international cask-shipments moved in trains carrying multiple casks,
    so the actual number of shipments would be considerably less, but
    precise information is unavailable. The estimate of 40,041 cask-
    shipments worldwide was published by the International Atomic Energy
    Agency in July 1999 and includes the following country totals: United
    Kingdom, 28,854; U.S.A., 2,425; Germany, 1,612; France, 1,570; Japan,
    1,399; and Sweden, 900. Source: R. Pope, IAEA, ``International
    Experience with SNF/HLW Transport,'' Presentation before the U.S.
    National Academy of Sciences, National Transportation Research Board,
    Washington, DC, September 11, 2000.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DOE's ``mostly rail'' national scenario would result in fewer
    cross-country shipments than the ``mostly legal-weight truck''
    scenario. Over 24 years, there would be more than 10,700 cross-country
    shipments, or about 450 per year. Over 38 years, there would be more
    than 22,000 cross-country shipments, or about 580 per year.
        However, the ``mostly rail'' cross-country shipment numbers do not
    include barge and heavy haul truck shipments from 24 reactor that lack
    rail access, which would add 2,200 shipments for the Proposed Action
    and 4,065 shipments for Module 2. Nor do the DOE numbers include the
    heavy haul truck shipments required in Nevada if there is no rail spur
    to Yucca Mountain, which could add 9,646 shipments for the Proposed
    Action and 18,935 shipments for Module 2.
        When the barge and heavy haul truck shipments are included, DOE's
    ``mostly rail'' total for 24 years could be more than 22,500 shipments,
    or about 935 per year. DOE's ``mostly rail'' total for 38 years could
    be more than 45,000 shipments, or about 1,185 per year.
                         yucca mountain shipment modes
        The DOE ``mostly legal-weight truck scenario'' is the only national
    transportation scenario that is currently feasible. All 72 power plant
    sites and all 5 DOE sites can ship by legal-weight truck. At present,
    there is no railroad access to Yucca Mountain., and the feasibility of
    long-distance heavy haul truck (HHT) transport of rail casks in Nevada
    is unproven.
        The DOE ``mostly rail scenario'' is unlikely to occur. Even if DOE
    is able to develop rail access to Yucca Mountain, the objective of
    shipping 90 percent of the commercial SNF by rail is unrealistic. DOE
    acknowledges that 25 of the 72 power plant sites cannot ship directly
    by rail. Nevada studies show that number could be up to 32 sites. The
    ``mostly rail'' scenario assumes that DOE can ship thousands of casks
    by barge into Boston, New Haven, Newark, Jersey City, Wilmington (DE),
    Baltimore, Norfolk, Miami, Milwaukee, Muskegon, Omaha, Vicksburg, and
    Port Hueneme (CA). Alternately, DOE would have to move thousands of
    casks from reactors to rail lines using HHTs, each of which will
    require special state permits and route approvals.
        The ``mostly rail scenario'' assumes that DOE can construct a new
    rail spur to Yucca Mountain, 99 to 344 miles in length, at a cost of
    more than $1 billion. Even the shortest of the five spur options would
    be the largest new rail construction project in the United States since
    World War I. Environmental approvals, right-of-way acquisition, and
    litigation could delay rail construction for 10 years or more. In the
    FEIS, DOE declined to identify a preference among the five potential
    rail corridors to Yucca Mountain.
        The alternative to rail spur construction, delivery of thousands of
    large rail casks by 220-foot-long HHTs over distances of 112 to 330
    miles on public highways, is probably not feasible. HHT route
    constraints include highly congested segments through rapidly
    urbanizing areas, and steep grades and sharp curves through high-
    mountain passes. All of the potential HHT routes would require
    substantial upgrading, and would likely cost more than a rail spur.
    State permits and operating restrictions apply to all use of HHTs in
    Nevada. In the FEIS, DOE declined to identify a preference among three
    potential locations for intermodal transfer stations.
        Certain programmatic and policy factors favor truck shipment,
    especially during the first 10-15 years of repository operations. DOE's
    ``hot repository'' thermal loading strategy may require truck shipment
    of 5-10 year-cooled SNF. Some utilities may exercise contract options
    to ship 5-10 year-cooled SNF from storage pools by truck, rather than
    shipping older SNF by rail. DOE's transportation privatization plan
    does not require transportation service providers to ship oldest fuel
    first or to maximize use of rail. Indeed, under DOE's fixed-cost
    contracting approach to privatization, rail transportation may not be
    cost-competitive with legal-weight at many sites.
                      yucca mountain transportation routes
        In the Draft EIS, DOE chose to conceal the specific routes used for
    impact and risk analyses in Chapter 6 and Appendix J. DOE did not
    identify the routes in its Federal Register notice nor in its public
    notices of scheduled hearings. During the public hearings that began in
    September, 1999, DOE provided some state-specific transportation maps
    at individual hearings around the country. But DOE did not release
    national maps showing the full cross country routes from shipping sites
    to Yucca Mountain until sometime in late January, 2000, near the end of
    the public comment process
        In the Final EIS, DOE decided to reveal the routes used for risk
    and impact analysis. DOE included national and state maps. [FEIS,
    Figure J-5, and Figures J-31 to J-53] The FEIS states that ``DOE has
    not determined the specific routes it would use to ship spent nuclear
    fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the proposed repository.''
    [FEIS, p. J-23]
        The FEIS truck routes were generated by the HIGHWAY computer model,
    and generally represent the quickest truck travel routes consistent
    with the current Federal routing regulations (HM-164). DOE refers to
    these as ``representative'' routes. [FEIS, p. 6-5] However, with two
    exceptions, DOE's cross-country routes agree with the highway routes
    identified in previous routing studies by DOE and Nevada contractors.
    Absent additional state designation of preferred alternatives or DOE
    policy decisions, we believe that these are the most likely highway
    routes to Nevada, with two notable exceptions.
        In between publication of the Draft and Final EISs, the State of
    Colorado exercised its authority under U.S. DOT regulations to prohibit
    SNF and HLW shipments on I-70 west of Denver. Colorado took this action
    to avoid shipments through the Eisenhower and Glenwood Tunnels. Under
    the Colorado designation, shipments would be diverted north or south on
    I-25. Nevada routing analyses show that the new preferred route to
    Yucca Mountain for shipments using I-70 would be through the
    Northeastern Denver metropolitan area to I-25, then connecting with I-
    80 at Cheyenne, Wyoming. For reasons we do not understand, DOE's FEIS
    map has the trucks on I-70 turning north on I-29 to connect with I-680/
    I-80 near Omaha, so that the major stream of shipments from the
    Southeastern region avoids Kansas and Colorado altogether. [Figures 35,
    39, and 47] Preliminary analysis indicates that DOE's route choice
    could add more than 20 miles to each of tens of thousands of shipments,
    compared to the new preferred route in Colorado. We are continuing to
    study this route.
        A second DOE highway route of concern was called to our attention
    by the State of Pennsylvania. DOE's FEIS map shows shipments from six
    reactor sites using the Pennsylvania Turnpike (I-76) West of
    Harrisburg. [Figure 49] Pennsylvania authorities informed us that all
    placarded hazardous material shipments must use bypasses to avoid four
    tunnels along this segment of the Turnpike, and that no SNF shipments
    have ever used this route. It is not clear how DOE could have missed
    these restrictions, since the Pennsylvania bypass requirements are
    clearly stated in a U.S. DOT guidance document cited as a reference in
    the FEIS. We are continuing to study this route also.
        Otherwise, DOE's FEIS routes agree with those identified by Nevada
    as most likely routes to Yucca Mountain. The primary truck routes out
    of New England and the Middle Atlantic states converge on I-80/90 near
    Cleveland, pick up shipments from Midwestern reactors, and follow I-80
    west from Chicago through Des Moines, Omaha, Cheyenne, and Salt Lake
    City to I-15.
        The primary truck routes out of the South are I-75 from Florida, I-
    24 from Atlanta, and I-64 from Virginia. These routes converge on I-70
    near St. Louis, and follow I-70 west through Kansas City and Denver to
    I-25, then join I-80 near Cheyenne.
        The primary route from the Pacific Northwest is I-84 to I-15 in
    Utah. Other major routes are I-40 and I-10 from the Mid-South and I-5
    in California. These routes converge on I-15 in Southern California.
        As with highway routes, DOE chose to conceal the rail routes
    analyzed in the Draft EIS DOE until late January 2000, near the end of
    the public comment process. In the Final EIS, DOE decided to reveal the
    rail routes used for risk and impact analysis. DOE included national
    and state maps. [FEIS, Figure J-6, and Figures J-31 to J-53] These
    routes were generated by the INTERLINE computer model, and generally
    represent the most direct routes to Nevada consistent with the current
    industry practice of maximizing freight-miles on the originating
    railroad.
        Since DOE has not yet identified a preferred rail destination in
    Nevada, the map shows all potential cross-country routes from the 77
    sites. For about 85 percent of the originating locations, the most
    likely route is unchanged by the Nevada destination. DOE's rail routes
    to Nevada generally agree with the rail routes identified in previous
    routing studies by DOE and Nevada contractors. While mergers and other
    rail industry developments would continue to affect routing, Nevada
    believes that the FEIS map shows the most likely rail routes to Nevada.
        The primary rail routes out of New England and the Middle Atlantic
    states are the former Conrail mainlines from Buffalo and Harrisburg to
    Cleveland and Chicago. These shipments switch to the Union Pacific near
    Chicago, are joined by shipments from Midwestern reactors in Illinois
    and Iowa, and continue west via Fremont, Gibbon, Cheyenne, and Salt
    Lake City to Nevada.
        The primary routes out of the South are the CSXT from Atlanta to
    East St. Louis, and the Norfolk Southern from Atlanta to Kansas City
    via Birmingham and Cairo. These two streams merge on the Union Pacific
    in Kansas City, and in turn merge with the northern UP shipments at
    Gibbon, Nebraska. Other major rail routes are the UP from Oregon via
    Boise, and the UP and BNSF from California and the Southwest via San
    Bernardino and Daggett.
        The potential highway and rail routes identified in DOE's Final
    Environmental Impact Statement could affect 45 states and the District
    of Columbia. More than 123 million people currently live in the 703
    counties traversed by DOE's highway routes, and 106 million live in
    counties along DOE's rail routes. DOE predicts that between 10.4 and
    16.4 million people will live within one-half mile of a transportation
    route in 2035.
                      recent spent nuclear fuel shipments
        During the past two decades, nuclear power plants and research
    facilities in the United States have made relatively few off-site
    shipments of SNF. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    regulates such shipments, and maintains a detailed SNF shipment
    database. Between 1979 and 1997, the most recent period reported by
    NRC, there were 1,334 domestic shipments containing 1,453 metric tons
    uranium (MTU) of civilian SNF. Table 2 summarizes significant
    characteristics of these shipments.

           Table 2.--U.S. CIVILIAN SNF SHIPMENT EXPERIENCE, 1979-1997
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amount Shipped.........................  1,453 MTU (76.5 MTU per year)
    Total Shipments........................  1,334 (70 per year)
    Truck Shipments........................  1,181 (62 per year)
    Rail Shipments.........................  153 (8 per year)
    Truck Share of SNF Shipments...........  88.5%
    Rail Share of MTU Shipped..............  75.5%
    Average Truck Shipment Distance........  684 miles (82%<900 miles)
    Average Rail Shipment Distance.........  327 miles (80%<600 miles)
    Shipment Origin & Destination..........  70% East of Mississippi River
                                              (935/1334)
    Number of Reactor Sites Making One or    27 (9 sites>2 shipments)
     More Shipments.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: NRC, NUREG-0725, Rev. 13 (October 1998)

        During the same period, the U.S. Department of Energy made several
    dozen shipments of Three Mile Island reactor core debris and intact
    commercial reactor SNF. These shipments were not regulated by NRC, and
    were therefore not included in the NRC database. There were also an
    undisclosed number of naval reactor fuel shipments, estimated at
    several hundred.
               radiological characteristics of spent nuclear fuel
        Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial power reactors would
    comprise about 90 percent of the wastes shipped to the repository. DOE
    acknowledges that SNF is ``usually intensely radioactive.'' [FEIS, Pp.
    S-3, 1-6] Otherwise, the Final EIS provides little information on the
    radiological characteristics of SNF that affect transportation safety
    until the reader reaches Appendices A, F, and J.
        Fission products, especially strontium-90 (half-life 28 years) and
    cesium-137 (half-life 30 years), account for most of the radioactivity
    in SNF for the first hundred years after removal from reactors. Fission
    products, which emit both beta and gamma radiation, are the primary
    sources of exposure during routine transportation operations. Cesium-
    137 is the major potential source of irradiation and contamination if a
    shipping cask is breached during a severe transportation accident or
    successful terrorist attack.
        Table 3, based on data developed by DOE, illustrates the general
    relationship between SNF age (cooling time) and the two radiological
    characteristics most important for assessing SNF transportation risks,
    total activity and surface dose rate. The table is based on average
    characteristics of older SNF (pressurized water reactor fuel with a
    burn-up of 33,000 MWd/MTHM). The average SNF assumed by DOE in the FEIS
    [p. A-13] (pressurized water reactor fuel with a burn-up of 41,200 MWd/
    MTHM), for shipments to Yucca Mountain, would be even more radioactive.

     Table 3.--RADIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMERCIAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Total
             SNF age (years cooled)             activity   Surface dose rate
                                                (Curies)       (Rem/Hour)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1.......................................    2,500,000      234,000
    5.......................................      600,000       46,800
    10......................................      400,000       23,400
    50......................................      100,000        8,640
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: U.S. DOE, DOE/NE-0007, 1980.

        After one-year in a water-filled storage pool, unshielded SNF is so
    radioactive that it delivers a lethal, acute dose of radiation (600
    rem) in about 10 seconds. After 50 years of cooling, the total
    radioactivity (measured in curies) and the surface dose rate (measured
    in rem/hour) decline by more than 95 percent, but SNF can still deliver
    a lethal radiation exposure in minutes. The lethal exposure time for
    unshielded SNF is less than one minute after 5 years cooling, less than
    2 minutes after 10 years, and less than 5 minutes after 50 years.
        DOE assumes that the average age (cooling time) of SNF shipped to
    the repository would be about 23 years. [FEIS, p. A-13] DOE calculates
    that the average rail cask shipped to the repository would contain a
    total radioactivity of 2.1 million curies, including 816,000 curies of
    Cesium-137. [FEIS, p. J-33] While DOE does not provide specific data
    for the average truck cask, it would about one-sixth as much as the
    rail cask (355,000 curies total activity, including 136,000 curies of
    Cesium-137). For accident and sabotage consequence analysis, DOE
    assumed that the casks would be loaded with SNF aged 14-15 years,
    [FEIS, p. J-52] which would double the radiological hazard, compared to
    average SNF. [FEIS, p. 6-46] However, repository shipments could
    include 5-year cooled SNF in truck casks and 10-year cooled SNF in rail
    casks, resulting in significantly greater radiological hazards than
    those evaluated by DOE.
                         routine transportation impacts
        NRC regulations allow a certain amount of neutron and gamma
    radiation to be emitted from shipping casks during routine operations
    and transport (1,000 mrem/hr at the cask surface and 10 mrem/hr 2
    meters from the cask surface). The dose rate allowed under NRC
    regulations results in near-cask exposures of about 2.5 mrem per hour
    at 5 meters (16 feet), in measurable exposures (less than 0.2 mrem per
    hour) at 30 meters (98 feet), and calculated exposures (less than
    0.0002 mrem per hour) at 800 meters (one-half mile) from the cask
    surface. [FEIS, p. J-38] Cumulative exposures at these rates can result
    in adverse health affects for some workers and some members of public.
    Moreover, the very fact that these exposures would occur has been shown
    to cause adverse socioeconomic impacts, such as loss of property
    values, even though the dose levels are well below the established
    thresholds for cancer and other health effects.
        The FEIS acknowledges that routine radiation from shipping casks
    poses a significant health threat to certain transportation workers. In
    the most extreme example, motor carrier safety inspectors could receive
    cumulative doses (200 rem over 24 years) large enough to increase their
    risk of cancer death by 10 percent or more, and their risk of other
    serious health effects by 40 percent or more. DOE proposes to control
    these exposures and risks by severely restricting work hours and doses
    for certain jobs. [FEIS, Pp. J-44 to J-45]
                          expected number of accidents
        DOE and the nuclear power industry are quick to point to their
    record of safely shipping limited quantities of spent fuel during the
    past 30 years. What DOE and the industry do not publicize is that,
    prior to 1971, there were, in fact, transportation accidents and
    incidents that resulted in radiation releases. Between 1957 and 1964,
    there were 11 transportation incidents and accidents involving spent
    fuel shipments by the US Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors.
    Several of these incidents resulted in radioactive releases requiring
    cleanup, including leakage from a rail cask in 1960 and leakage from a
    truck cask in 1962. There is no comparable data for the period from
    1964 to 1970, when utility shipments to reprocessing facilities began.
        Between 1971 and 1990, there were six accidents and 47 regulatory
    incidents involving spent fuel cask shipments. Most of the regulatory
    incidents involved excess radioactive contamination of cask surfaces
    (often referred to as ``weeping''), but a few involved violations that
    could have contributed to increased accident risks. Three accidents
    (two truck, one rail) involved casks loaded with spent fuel.
    Fortunately, no radioactivity was released in these accidents, although
    one truck accident was severe enough to kill the driver. However, the
    record clearly indicates that accidents do happen and that the
    potential for accidents involving radiation releases exists.
        DOE contractors evaluated these SNF accidents and incidents, and
    developed historical SNF accident and incident rates for use in
    projecting the impacts of future shipments to a Yucca Mountain
    repository. [OCRWM, YMP/91-17] These accident and incident rates have
    not changed appreciably, because of the relatively small number of
    shipments and shipment-miles during the 1990s. DOE chose to ignore this
    information in preparing the transportation impact analysis for the
    FEIS.
        Table 4 shows the results of applying the historical accident rates
    for U.S. SNF shipments to the projected shipment-miles for DOE's
    ``mostly legal-weight truck'' and ``mostly rail'' scenarios, plus an
    additional scenario developed by Nevada which assumes that each site
    ships based on its current modal capability. The Nevada analysis
    concludes that 160-390 accidents and 850-2,400 regulatory violations
    would be expected over 38 years if future shipments were to be as safe
    as past shipments.

                   Table 4.--PROJECTED REPOSITORY TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS  AND INCIDENTS, 2010-2048.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Scenario & mode                         Shipments   Shipment-miles   Accidents   Incidents
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mostly Truck (Sites)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Truck (77).................................................   108,544      227,735,000        159       2,391
    Rail to NV (1).............................................       355          181,000          2           4
    HHT in NV..................................................       355          118,000       NA *        NA *
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mostly Rail (Sites)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Truck (6)..................................................     3,122        8,657,000          6          91
    Rail to NV (77)............................................    18,935       37,484,000        364         727
    Rail in NV.................................................     6,312        2,039,000         20          40
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Current Capabilities (Sites)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Truck (25).................................................    27,435       65,784,000         46         691
    Rail to NV (52)............................................    14,886       28,353,000        275         550
    Rail in NV.................................................     4,962        1,603,000         16         31
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * NA--Not Available.

                 transportation accident and terrorism impacts
        In the Draft and Final EISs, DOE acknowledges that a very severe
    highway or rail accident, or a successful terrorist attack using high
    energy explosives, could release radioactive materials from a shipping
    cask, resulting in radiation exposures to members of the public and
    latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) among the exposed population
        In the Draft EIS, DOE evaluated a ``maximum reasonably foreseeable
    accident scenario'' involving a rail at a generic urban location.
    Following the accident severity categories designated by the NRC Modal
    Study, DOE estimated the consequences of the most severe (category 6)
    rail accident using the RISKIND computer code. DOE estimated that the
    accident would release and disperse enough radioactive materials to
    inflict a collective population dose of 61,000 person-rem (enough to
    give 61,000 persons a one rem dose) and cause about 31 latent cancer
    fatalities.
        In the Final EIS, DOE changed the basis of its transportation risk
    assessment, relying solely upon a controversial new NRC contractor
    report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories (NUREG/CR-6672). As a
    result, DOE's estimated consequence of the `` maximum reasonably
    foreseeable accident scenario'' involving a rail cask was reduced to a
    collective dose of 9,900 person-rem and 5 latent cancer fatalities.
    [FEIS, Pp. 6-45 to 6-47, 6-49 to 6-50]
        The FEIS acknowledges that the July 2001 Baltimore rail tunnel fire
    was so severe that it would have resulted in a release of radioactive
    materials if a rail cask had been involved. [FEIS, p. 6-50] The FEIS
    also acknowledges that clean-up costs following a severe transportation
    accident could range from $300,000 to $10 billion. [FEIS, p. J-73]
        As part of its review of the Draft EIS, the State of Nevada
    commissioned several SNF accident consequence analyses by Radioactive
    Waste Management Associates (RWMA). In 2000, RWMA reexamined the DEIS
    truck and rail accident estimates, using the RADTRAN and RISKIND
    computer models and a range of credible alternative assumptions. In
    2001, RWMA estimated the consequences of a rail SNF accident similar to
    the July 2001 Baltimore rail tunnel fire. Also in 2001, RWMA studied
    the consequences of credible worst case truck and rail accidents at
    representative urban and rural locations along potential Nevada highway
    routes. These studies concluded that DOE systematically underestimated
    the consequences of severe transportation accidents. The results of
    these studies are reported in State of Nevada impact report, A Mountain
    of Trouble, which can be accessed on the web at www.state.nv.us/
    nucwaste, or obtained in hardcopy by request from the Nevada Agency for
    Nuclear Projects (phone: 775-687-3744).
        The Nevada-sponsored study of the July 2001 Baltimore rail tunnel
    fire concluded that it would have resulted in significant release of
    radioactive materials. It burned for more than three days with
    temperatures as high as 1500 deg. F. A single rail cask in such an
    accident could have released enough radio-cesium to contaminate an area
    of 32 square miles. Failure to cleanup the contamination, at a cost of
    $13.7 billion, would cause 4,000 to 28,000 cancer deaths over the next
    50 years. Between 200 and 1,400 latent cancer fatalities would be
    expected from exposures during the first year.
        In both the Draft and Final EISs, DOE acknowledges that SNF truck
    casks are especially vulnerable to terrorist attack and sabotage. DOE
    and NRC testing in the 1980s demonstrated that a high-energy explosive
    device (HED) such as a military demolition charge could breach the wall
    of a truck cask. DOE sponsored a 1999 study of cask sabotage by Sandia
    National Laboratories (SNL) in support of the DEIS. The SNL study
    demonstrated that HEDs are ``capable of penetrating a cask's shield
    wall, leading to the dispersal of contaminants to the environment.''
    [DEIS, p. 6-33] The SNL study also concluded that a successful attack
    on a truck cask would release more radioactive materials than an attack
    on a rail cask. [DEIS, p. 6-34]
        In the Draft EIS, DOE estimated that a successful attack on a GA-4
    truck cask in an urbanized area under average weather conditions would
    result in a population dose of 31,000 person-rem, causing about 15
    cancer fatalities among those exposed to the release of radioactive
    materials. In the Final EIS, DOE updated its sabotage analysis,
    assuming the cask contained more radioactive SNF and assuming a higher
    future average population density for U.S. cities. The Final EIS
    estimated that the same successful attack on a truck cask would result
    in a population dose of 96,000 person-rem and 48 latent cancer
    fatalities. [FEIS, Pp. 6-50 to 6-52] In neither case did DOE evaluate
    any environmental impacts other than health effects. In particular, DOE
    ignored the economic impacts of a successful act of sabotage in both
    the Draft and Final EIS.
        Analyses prepared for Nevada by RWMA estimated sabotage impacts
    would be considerably greater than DOE's estimate. RWMA replicated both
    the Draft and Final EIS sabotage consequence analyses, using the
    RISKIND model for health effects and the RADTRAN model for economic
    impacts, the SNL study average and maximum inventory release fractions,
    and a range of population densities and weather conditions.
        The Nevada-sponsored study of the Final EIS scenario concluded that
    an attack on a GA-4 truck cask using a common military demolition
    device could cause 300 to 1,800 latent cancer fatalities, assuming 90%
    penetration by a single blast. Full perforation of the cask, likely to
    occur in an attack involving a state-of-the art anti-tank weapon, such
    as the TOW missile, could cause 3,000 to 18,000 latent cancer
    fatalities. Cleanup and recovery costs would exceed $10 billion.
        Public perception of transportation risks could result in massive
    economic costs in communities along transportation routes. Even without
    an accident or incident, property values near routes could decline by
    3% or more. In the event of an accident, residential property values
    along shipping routes could decline between 8% and 34 %, depending upon
    the severity of the accident.
             rail shipments, dedicated trains, and railroad safety
        Even if DOE is able to implement the ``mostly rail'' transportation
    plan, DOE's opposition to dedicated trains and other accident
    prevention measures raise grave concerns about DOE's commitment to
    transportation safety. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has
    long contended that spent fuel should only be shipped in so-called
    special trains--dedicated or unit trains hauling only spent fuel and
    other radioactive materials, operating under special safety protocols
    such as speed restrictions (now 35 to 55 mph), buffer car
    specifications, and train passing rules.
        Current USDOT regulations allow shipment of spent fuel casks in
    general freight service. The July 19-23, 2001, Baltimore rail tunnel
    fire has been cited as a prime example of the dangers of shipping spent
    fuel in mixed freight trains. The Baltimore fire has also rekindled
    calls for Federal regulation of spent fuel rail routing.
        Nevada believes the following safety measures should be mandatory:
    (1) spent fuel should never be shipped in mixed freight trains; (2)
    spent fuel should always be shipped in dedicated trains; (3) these
    trains should operate under strict speed limits (35-55 mph) and special
    passing rules; (4) U.S. DOT should regulate the selection of rail
    routes to minimize shipments through urban areas; (5) federal emergency
    response teams and security escorts should accompany all rail shipments
    at all times. DOE and the nuclear industry oppose these mandatory
    safety regulations.
           full-scale physical testing for spent fuel shipping casks
        NRC does not currently require full-scale physical testing of
    shipping casks as part of its certification process. Cask designers are
    allowed to demonstrate compliance with the NRC performance standards
    through a combination of scale-model testing and computer simulations.
    Nevada has long urged NRC to require full-scale testing as part of
    certification. Alternately, Nevada has suggested that DOE require full-
    scale testing as part of the procurement process. NRC is currently
    proposing demonstration testing of a ``representative'' shipping cask
    as part of the Package Performance Study being conducted by Sandia
    National Laboratories. Nevada has not formally opposed NRC's proposal,
    but it is not an acceptable substitute for full-scale testing of each
    new cask design prior to certification.
        Nevada has proposed a five-part approach to full-scale testing: (1)
    meaningful stakeholder participation in development of testing
    protocols and selection of test facilities and personnel; (2) full-
    scale physical testing (sequential drop, fire, puncture, and immersion)
    prior to NRC certification; (3) additional computer simulations to
    determine performance in extra-regulatory accidents and to determine
    failure thresholds; (4) reevaluation of previous risk study findings,
    and if appropriate, revision of NRC cask performance standards; and (5)
    evaluation of costs and benefits of destructive testing of a randomly-
    selected production model cask.
        Nevada believes that comprehensive full-scale testing would not
    only demonstrate compliance with NRC performance standards. It would
    improve the overall safety of the cask and vehicle system, and
    generally enhance confidence in both qualitative and probabilistic risk
    analysis techniques. It could potentially increase acceptance of
    shipments by state and local officials and the general public, and
    potentially reduce adverse social and economic impacts caused by public
    perception of transportation risks.
        Nevada estimates that the cost of a full-scale regulatory fire test
    for a truck cask would be less than $5 million. Comprehensive
    regulatory testing (drop, fire, puncture, and immersion) of a truck
    cask (up to 30 tons) would be between $8 million and $15 million.
    Comprehensive regulatory testing of a large rail cask (up to 125 tons)
    would cost $12 million to $25 million for the first cask, including the
    cost of required upgrading at the testing facility. By comparison,
    Nevada estimates the life-cycle cost of the repository transportation
    system at about $9.2 billion.
        None of the SNF shipping casks currently used in the United States
    have ever been tested full-scale. This fact was confirmed by NRC
    Chairman Richard Meserve in letters to Senator Harry Reid dated April
    2, 2002 and April 24, 2002. DOE has no plans for full-scale testing of
    the casks which would be used for shipments to Yucca Mountain. DOE and
    the nuclear industry oppose mandatory full-scale testing.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Before we proceed with the witnesses, let me see if Senator
    Murkowski or Senator Craig have a statement they'd like to make
    here at the beginning.

          STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR
                              FROM ALASKA

        Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Senator Bingaman.
        I want to welcome the witnesses, and please do not mis-
    characterize my comments, because I do appreciate your input.
        I was under the impression this was the opportunity for
    Nevada to be heard, and I'm looking over the list of the
    witnesses. I see Wisconsin, Michigan, Maryland, Utah,
    Sacramento. I don't see representation from Nevada. I can only
    conclude that perhaps Nevada's interest is not of the intensity
    that I once thought it was. Otherwise, we would be hearing from
    Nevada.
        I've been on this committee for 22 years. We've had
    hundreds of witnesses discussing all facets associated with
    Yucca Mountain--at least 30 hearings. And they've all been
    worthwhile. However, they're a rehashing of issues that are
    associated with Yucca, such as transportation. And evidently
    the discussion today is going to involve pretty much around
    transportation, which to me is a separate issue that involves
    the licensing.
        As you and I know, there is an extraordinary amount of
    high-level nuclear material that moves across our country
    safely. It's moved for many decades and will continue to move.
    So I'm not particularly motivated by the concern again over
    transportation, because these are ``what ifs.''
        And the reality of this particular issue is nobody wants
    the stuff. It's got to go somewhere. Those that have it want to
    get rid of it. The only way to get rid of it is to transport
    it. And you're still left with the reality that nobody wants
    it.
        I was just looking over here, relative to the circumstances
    that the Government finds itself in because of this dilemma,
    and as you may recall, gentlemen, the Federal Government was
    supposed to take this waste in 1998 under a contract with the
    nuclear power industry.
        Well, the Government wasn't ready to take that waste even
    though the rate payers have paid in some $17 billion. The
    claims against the Federal Government for not taking the waste
    in 1998 are estimated to be somewhere between $40 and $80
    billion. I grant you most of this will go to lawyers. But
    nevertheless we've seen a significant industry develop just on
    litigation. And, of course, the fall guy is the U.S. taxpayer.
        I would hope that today's hearing would lead into a
    recognition that we want to resolve this issue and get on with
    it. So I'm a little disappointed that we've not heard from the
    State of Nevada, because it's my understanding that that was
    the proposed schedule, to hear from the State of Nevada on the
    reasons why the Governor vetoed the selection of Yucca Mountain
    as a repository for high-level wastes and spent nuclear fuel.
        Now, as a sidelight for the mayor of Salt Lake, it would be
    interesting to see if the Goshute--I've been out there and
    looked at it, and they got a pretty rough piece of real estate
    when they were handed that particular land selection. I think
    you'd probably agree with me. There wasn't anything else left.
    They drew the short straw. But in any event they have offered
    to take this waste and store it in a temporary repository. It
    would be interesting to see if this is ever resolved, because
    it addresses an issue that--for those of us in the west--have
    always speculated on. Is there really a tribal sovereignty
    government-to-government relationship, where they can bypass
    the attitude of the State or the city of Salt Lake? We may come
    to a resolution of that. We may not. But that would be an
    interesting issue for the courts. But I'm fearful that it would
    take so long that we'd never get to it.
        Now, I was looking forward to hearing from the Governor and
    the legislature about the reason for the State's veto, as well
    as for many other Nevadans who may be opposed to this. I think
    this would have been important, because while the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Act is very clear on the administration's responsibility
    for site selections, it's ambiguous on the criteria for the
    State of Nevada to accept or veto that decision. Unfortunately,
    we're not going to have the opportunity today, because no one
    from the State is appearing to speak on behalf of the State.
        Instead, we have a slate of witnesses who will speak to
    issues that I think are unrelated to the limited question
    before this committee, and that is the question of the
    sufficiency of the site selection. The concerns that our
    witnesses will raise go to other issues--transportation--that
    will be addressed by the administration and the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission during the licensing process, where it is
    most appropriate. Because the witnesses will not be speaking to
    the direct issue before the committee, one could easily assume,
    as I have implied, that the State does not have an issue with
    the site selection.
        In any event, Mr. Chairman, we've provided an opportunity
    for the Governor, the delegation, and other officials from the
    State of Nevada to appear before the committee to discuss the
    veto, and they have chosen to decline.
        I do not want to suggest, however, that the issues these
    witnesses will address are not important. They are very, very
    important. They are simply not pertinent to the decision on the
    resolution before our committee at this time.
        The fact is, like it or not, we are now transporting spent
    fuel and legacy waste and will continue to do so, whether the
    destination is Yucca or Hanford or the Goshute reservation or
    in New Mexico or in the granite depositories associated with
    Vermont. But I'm not going to push that too far, although it
    comes to mind once in a while.
        Even if we were to uphold the Governor's veto and all the
    spent fuel and waste remained permanently on site, say in New
    York or several sites in California or the shores of the
    Chesapeake Bay, Lake Michigan, or elsewhere, we would still
    continue to transport waste. The committee, however, should
    take comfort in knowing that apparently the State of Nevada
    doesn't seem to have any objection to the actual site selection
    decision itself, and when all is said and done that is the only
    issue before the committee at this time.
        My good friend from Nevada, on my left, may have a
    difference of opinion. But we are disappointed that Nevada is
    not here to speak on the issue.
        Thank you, Senator Bingaman.
        The Chairman. Let me--we usually just have opening
    statements from the chair and the ranking member. Let me just
    ask if any of the other committee members wish to make an
    opening statement. If they do, they could.
        Senator Craig. No, Mr. Chairman. I'm anxious to hear from
    the witnesses. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Thomas.

             STATEMENT OF HON. CRAIG THOMAS, U.S. SENATOR
                              FROM WYOMING

        Senator Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just very briefly.
        I just want to indicate that in our home paper in Wyoming,
    some deputy assistant attorney from Nevada had this stuff in
    there about transportation, that every 10 minutes there's going
    to be something going through all of our towns and so on. The
    fact is that isn't true. The projection here is 175 annual
    shipments. There's three million shipments of radioactive waste
    done every year now. So I just hope that when we talk about
    this issue, we can try to get down some facts and not the scare
    tactics that are being used currently, at least as I see it in
    my paper.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Next we'll hear from Dr. James David Ballard,
    who is with Grand Valley State University, Office of Criminal
    Justice, in Grand Rapids, Michigan.
        I'm very glad to have you here. Please go ahead.

    STATEMENT OF JAMES DAVID BALLARD, Ph.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF
    CRIMINAL JUSTICE, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY, GRAND RAPIDS,
                                   MI

        Dr. Ballard. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee. As you mentioned, my name is James David Ballard.
    And I am a former resident of Nevada, a graduate of UNLV. So I
    kind of represent the State even though I live in Michigan
    these days.
        The proposed shipments to Yucca Mountain facility will come
    from energy-, research-, and defense-related facilities. These
    shipments will traverse the roadways, railways, and shipping
    lanes of America. The proposed program will require decades of
    effort to complete. Removing such radioactive cargoes from the
    confines of their existing safe and secure facilities and
    exposing them to the dangers inherent in a massive
    transportation effort is not an optimal safety or security risk
    reduction strategy. Make no mistake. Terrorism is a threat to
    these shipments.
        Counter-terrorist experts recognize these cargoes for what
    they could become, potential weapons of mass radiological
    contamination. September 11 showed that terrorists would use
    weapons of mass victimization, multiple attack locations,
    asymmetrical tactics that could wreak havoc on our economic,
    social, and political stability. Let me reiterate. These
    cargoes have the potential to be used as weapons of mass
    victimization.
        The potential effects of a human-initiated release of the
    radiation contained in these shipments include massive public
    health impacts, cascading response demands on the emergency
    response infrastructure, severe impacts on the social fabric of
    the country, economic impacts that could dwarf those seen by
    September 11, and severe stigmatization of the communities
    where release would occur. Remember that for radiological
    dispersion to occur, only two components are needed. The first
    is explosives or a physical release mechanism. The second is
    radiological materials. Clearly, with these shipments and their
    cargoes, we only need to add the first.
        It is also important to recognize that these shipments are
    an attractive target for a variety of terrorist organizations.
    For example, because of the connection between some cargoes and
    our military infrastructure, there exists the potential for
    retaliation attacks from international groups. Likewise,
    attacks on energy-related targets are not uncommon
    internationally and were of real concern at a recent G8 meeting
    held in Detroit. The shipments may also attract considerable
    attention from domestic groups, who have already demonstrated
    their abilities with a 1986 attempt to derail a train carrying
    spent nuclear fuel just outside of Minneapolis.
        No matter the origin of the adversaries, I would ask you to
    think of the impact of the attack on the long-term viability of
    the energy industry and the negative economic impacts on the
    commodities markets if an attack was to be perpetrated. The
    effects of September 11 may pale in comparison.
        America is not immune to external or internal attacks. But
    the primary reason why these shipments will be a target is
    their symbolic value to terrorists. What does this mean? Just
    as the World Trade Center was not just a building, an attack
    against these waste shipments is not just an inconsequential
    incident probability to be explained away by statistics. To
    understand these facts, we should not forget that these
    shipments are radioactive and the general public fears this
    fact.
        Secondly, the cargoes are dangerous, not only in a symbolic
    sense, but they represent a potentially viable weapon of mass
    radiological contamination.
        Third, the whole shipment effort has the potential to
    create a mass counterculture-based revolutionary opposition
    movement.
        Several examples of attack scenarios should help illustrate
    what is at stake. They are exemplars of asymmetrical tactics
    that could be used by terrorists.
        The first is a capture and breach scenario. If the
    transportation vehicle and cargo were to be captured, it would
    be susceptible to the application of explosives and/or a human-
    engineering breach.
        Secondly, we should consider a transportation
    infrastructure attack. The huge variety of topography and the
    enormous number of tunnels, bridges, and interchanges that
    would be traversed in the nationwide shipment of these
    materials need to be considered.
        Third, we must address the risk of an attack using current
    generation weapons, weapons like readily available anti-tank
    missiles, like armor-piercing weapons, and the emerging
    category of weapons that are able to penetrate and/or destroy
    these cargoes or at least their containers.
        Knowing how to attack a shipment is not enough. We should
    consider if a terrorist group could locate these cargoes.
    Potential shipment saboteurs and attackers will be presented
    with what is called a target-rich environment, due to the
    frequent and persistent shipping pattern, as well as the
    physical size and unique configuration of the shipment
    containers.
        Clearly, the shipments will not be as safe and secure
    during transit as they are where they now reside. They will
    become a symbolic target, face a variety of adversaries, both
    foreign and domestic, be subject to asymmetrical tactics, and
    have the potential to be used as a weapon of mass radiological
    contamination. In short, moving them increases our risk of
    terrorist attack. It does not decrease the risk.
        The alternative available to you today and in the next
    weeks is far easier and more logical than going forward with
    the Yucca Mountain proposal. If allowed to be stored at their
    existing facility for 50 to 100 years, these wastes will become
    less viable as a weapon. Thus, one option is to make the DOE
    shelter them in place.
        Terrorism is a viable threat to nuclear waste shipments.
    The engineered controls put into the shipment containers are
    not equal to the challenge of asymmetrical terrorist tactics
    and motivated adversaries willing to commit what they consider
    altruistic suicide in the name of their cause.
        The multiple attacks on September 11 changed how we live.
    In this instance, to counteract the enduring threat posed to
    our way of life, we must reconsider the logic of the Yucca
    Mountain proposal. Allowing the DOE and NRC to proceed is
    tantamount to endorsing bureaucratic indifference of
    unimaginable consequences. Please, not on this watch and not
    with these dangerous cargoes.
        Mr. Chairman, members, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Ballard follows:]
     Prepared Statement of James David Ballard, Ph.D., Assistant Professor
      of Criminal Justice, Grand Valley State University, Grand Rapids, MI
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my name is Dr. James
    David Ballard. I am an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Grand
    Valley State University in Grand Rapids, Michigan where I teach a
    variety of courses on terrorism, research methods, criminology, and
    criminal justice. I am a sociologist and my training at the University
    of Nevada, Las Vegas was in political sociology, deviance, and
    criminology.
        Currently, around the world research is being done on the potential
    for attacks against nuclear facilities and radioactive waste shipments.
    I am involved in one such working group. This international effort
    includes a number of researchers from Stanford University, experts tied
    to various government agencies, and is being funded by a grant from the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO].
        For the last seven years, I have studied the risk of terrorism
    attacks on nuclear waste shipments to the proposed Yucca Mountain
    storage facility. In particular, I study the changing nature of
    terrorism and the terrorist tactics that could be employed against
    nuclear waste shipments. I appreciate the opportunity to provide this
    body with some information on the potential of terrorism attacks
    against the shipments of spent nuclear fuel [SNF] and high-level
    radioactive wastes [HLRW] that could be made to the proposed Yucca
    Mountain facility.
                                  introduction
        Several factors are important to recognize when considering the
    potential of terrorism against nuclear waste shipments to the Yucca
    Mountain facility. The proposed shipments to the Yucca Mountain
    facility will come from energy, research, and defense related
    facilities. These shipments will traverse the roadways, rail corridors,
    and shipping lanes of America and require decades of effort to transfer
    from their existing safe and secure facilities and to the proposed
    repository.
        This process could happen under a variety of circumstances. For
    example, it could start once the Yucca Mountain facility is licensed
    for use by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC]. If that process is
    completed, and the decision then passes expected legal challenges, the
    Department of Energy [DOE] would then have to finalize the planning for
    the construction of the Yucca Mountain repository, construct a huge
    fleet of shipment containers, and only then would the proposed facility
    be ready to accept shipments from around the country. Other
    possibilities exist, but what matters is that you have a chance to
    influence the eventual outcome. Understanding terrorism as a risk to
    these shipments may help that policy decision.
        Most experts would agree that removing such highly radioactive
    cargoes from the confines of their existing safe and secure facilities
    and exposing them to the dangers inherent in the massive transportation
    effort necessary to move them to Nevada is not an optimal safety and
    security risk reduction strategy. For example, two significant and
    unique risks would arise when removing these cargoes from their
    existing facilities and the subsequent transportation effort:
    Transportation accidents and in-transit terrorism attacks. The
    discussion that follows is focused around several of the most common
    questions surrounding the risk posed by these shipments with respect to
    in-transit terrorism attacks.
                   is terrorism a threat to these shipments?
        When we ask the question is terrorism a threat to these shipments,
    the answer is a definitive yes. The attacks of September 11, 2001
    demonstrated that terrorists continue to develop an interest in weapons
    of mass victimization and have seemingly perfected the use of
    asymmetrical tactics that can wreak havoc on the economic, social, and
    political stability of our nation with a single act of terror.
    Subsequent investigations of the infrastructure behind these particular
    attacks revealed an active interest by al Qaeda and others in the
    development of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and radiological
    weapons of mass contamination. The latter category is where the risks
    lie for shipments of radioactive wastes like SNF and HWRW to the
    proposed Yucca Mountain facility.
        What is being transported sounds benign when it is labeled ``waste
    products'' or ``spent fuel rods,'' but terrorists and counter terrorism
    experts recognize these cargoes for what they could become: Potential
    weapons of mass radiological contamination. Each of these shipments
    represents a huge inventory of highly radioactive materials including
    such cargoes as pressurized fuel assemblies, transuranic wastes, and
    surplus weapon grade plutonium. If these materials were to be
    deliberately released into the environment during transit, they would
    create potentially massive public health impacts, cascading response
    demands on the emergency response infrastructure of the United States,
    severe impacts on the social fabric of this country, economic impacts
    that could dwarf those seen from the September 11, 2001 attacks, and
    severe radiological contamination based stigmatization of the
    communities where the release occurs.
        Obviously, a human initiated release from any one of these
    shipments has the potential to contaminate the local community where an
    incident occurs with radiation. To avoid long-term national level
    dislocation of vital services that such an attack could induce, and to
    counteract potential negative human health consequences that would
    occur from such a deliberate exposure to these radioactive cargoes,
    would require immediate intervention, extensive environmental
    remediation, and would ultimately require an unprecedented national
    response equal or greater than that mounted to counteract the September
    11, 2001 attacks.
        Nuclear and radiological terrorism encompass two large categories
    of weapons. The first category is related to bombs that create a
    nuclear reaction and involve a massive explosion, radiation dispersion,
    and widespread destruction of property. The materials in SNF and HLRW
    cargoes will not be equal to these types of weapons in terms of overall
    effect, but they can be weaponized and thus fall into the second
    category of radiological weapons. The weaponization process using
    radioactive source materials like SNF and HLRW is referred to as a
    radiological dispersion device. The human initiated release of these
    particular radioactive cargoes would constitute a potential large-scale
    radiological dispersion incident.
        For radiological dispersion to occur, two components are needed:
    (1) explosives or a physical release mechanism and (2) radioactive
    source materials. The larger the inventory of source materials, and the
    more dangerous the inventory of radionuclides, the greater the impact
    of dispersion into the environment an incident would have. SNF and HLRW
    shipments clearly have the potential for use as radiological dispersion
    devices under certain circumstances. These circumstances depend on a
    variety of factors and several are noted in the discussion below.
         why target these shipments and not other hazardous materials,
                  radioactive cargoes, or radioactive sources?
        Several factors would make these shipments prime targets for a
    terrorist attack and attract the attention of potential adversaries.
    These include both factors that may attract international groups and
    those that may inspire domestic groups to commit an act of violence
    against the shipment. After noting these factors, it will be argued
    that another more important factor has been neglected in the discussion
    of safety and security; that is the symbolic value of the attack
    against radioactive waste shipments and disposition of the cargoes
    thereafter.
        First, it is important to recognize that these shipments might be
    an attractive target for international groups. They will represent an
    easily identifiable target, one that is predictable, and one that
    because of the longevity of the shipping campaign will allow for
    detailed planning and support from transnational sources. Because of
    the connection between the cargoes and our military infrastructure,
    there also exists the potential for retaliation attacks. Likewise,
    attacks on energy infrastructure have been a concern of terrorist
    experts for decades and were the discussion topic de jour for a recent
    G8 Energy Ministers meeting in Detroit. Also, anyone attacking these
    cargoes would be able to create an enormous economic impact by the
    introduction of ``event risk'' into the energy industry and its related
    commodities markets. These and many other factors all raise the
    international terrorism risk profile for the agencies and industries
    wishing to transport shipments of highly radioactive wastes, especially
    on the scale proposed for the Yucca facility.
        The shipments may also attract considerable attention from domestic
    groups willing to perpetrate violence to press their political and
    social agendas. These domestic terrorists could be motivated by a
    variety of factors. For example, they could be opposed to the forced
    acceptance of energy wastes into their state. Deeply held distrust of
    the DOE and its motives with respect to nuclear wastes may inspire
    individuals to commit violence against SNF and HLRW shipments.
        Domestic groups could also be motivated to commit violent acts in
    opposition to the shipments and nuclear facilities by using a variety
    of tactics. One example that is illustrative of the potential for
    attacks was a 1972 hijack incident where the perpetrator threatened to
    crash an airplane into a research facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
        Additionally, potential domestic adversaries could include radical
    groups similar in philosophy to the Earth First and Sagebrush Rebellion
    movements. Such groups, and those who would emerge over the lifespan of
    the proposed project, could represent as large a threat as a well-
    financed international terrorist organization.
        Domestic groups may have different motives than international
    terrorists, but we must recognize that America is not immune to
    internal attacks, even potential devastating attacks using mass
    radiological contamination tactics. After all, we have already
    witnessed a 1986 domestic terrorist incident where a group was willing
    to remove a rail section in front of a train carrying SNF at a location
    just outside of Minneapolis, Minnesota. While not successful, this was
    an organized attempt to derail the radioactive cargo and draw attention
    to the groups'' opposition to the shipment of nuclear wastes.
        Make no mistake, interest in radiological terrorism is not only on
    the terrorists' radar, but should be on policy makers' radar as well,
    since counter terrorist experts recognize that the future is not
    without serious risk of such attacks. While noting which groups could
    mount an attack is one way to begin to identify the risks these
    shipments pose, this exercise misses one of the most important aspects
    of why these shipments will become targets. The primary reason why SNF
    and HLRW shipments could become targets is their symbolic value to
    terrorists. The next section addresses this critical issue.
     what is the link between symbolic value and terrorism attacks against
                            nuclear waste shipments?
        Terrorism is generally defined in terms of the tactics used in the
    attacks, by use of a typology of potential adversaries, and/or within
    the confines of criminal law. Another way of understanding terrorism is
    to focus on why certain targets are more attractive than others.
        For example, why was the World Trade Center the target of repeated
    attacks? To answer that question we must understand that these
    buildings represented more than just steel and concrete. To the
    terrorists that attacked the complex in February 1993 and again in
    September 2001, this office and commercial complex represented American
    economic strength. These attacks were against the core values of this
    society and the financial force behind American global economic
    dominance. They were not merely attacks against buildings, nor were the
    buildings just a target for random violence. The attacks meant
    something and were designed to convey a message to America and the
    world community.
        So, could an attack against SNF and HLRW shipments be seen as such
    a symbolic act? Absolutely. To examine this idea, it is important to
    note several relative features that will help in an understanding of
    the symbolic value of these shipments.
        First, at a most basic level, we should not forget that these
    shipments are radioactive and the general public fears this fact. The
    cultural conditioning represented by such historical facts as the
    decades long Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction, and the
    images of mass victimization and destruction documented after the use
    of nuclear weapons during WW II, has contributed to a generalized and
    specific anxiety about radioactivity and all things nuclear.
        These historical facts are coupled with a generalized public
    distrust of the DOE and its management of the nation's nuclear weapons
    arsenal, the by-products of the weaponization of the atom, and what
    some consider the trivializing attitude taken by the energy industry
    and this federal agency when it comes to the safety and security of the
    public health, environment, and economic well being of the nation.
    Critics would point out that this is, after all, the same federal
    agency that was responsible for unethical medical tests on humans to
    determine the health effects of radiation and it is the agency most
    responsible for the serious mismanagement of such radioactive sites as
    Hanford, Washington and Rocky Flats, Colorado.
        Regardless of the actual health hazards posed by these shipments,
    any incident involving these cargoes would elicit a public response of
    fear, panic, and distrust of any authority figure wishing to explain
    the health science of radioactivity over the reality of the public
    perception of the risks they were exposed to during a contamination
    event. The symbolic value of an attack against highly radioactive waste
    shipments should not be underestimated, since such perceptions are very
    real in their adverse political, economic, and social consequences.
        Secondly, the cargoes are dangerous. The DOE itself reports that
    truck and rail casks will carry inventories of between hundreds of
    thousands to millions of curies respectively. Thus, they are not only
    dangerous in a symbolic manner, they represent a potential weapon of
    mass radiological contamination. A weapon that if used would create a
    backlash against the continued use of nuclear power in America, a
    backlash against federal agencies and their efforts at transporting
    these materials, and a backlash against anyone in charge at the time of
    the attack, and responsible for protecting public health and welfare
    against such actions.
        For example, imagine if you will how an attack, successful or not,
    would threaten all nuclear power and research, create an immediate
    stoppage of shipments and cause an extensive investigation into safety
    and security procedures. Additionally, it would be a publicity disaster
    of unimaginable proportions for those charged with the moral, legal,
    and ethical responsibility of protecting the public.
        A proactive search for a more viable and safe alternative, like a
    50-100 year term strategy of sheltering the wastes in place at their
    existing storage facilities, would allow the public to gain a semblance
    of acceptance for DOE actions and thus reduce the potential impact of
    this particular symbolic effect. The current DOE efforts to push ahead
    with the Yucca Mountain proposal, without completing the scientific
    study of the proposed repository, can only fuel fear of the DOE and
    increase the symbolic impact of this type of attack. Likewise, the
    failure by the NRC and DOE to adjust to the new reality of terrorism
    may have an equal or greater devastating consequence.
        Lastly, the whole shipment effort has the potential to create a
    mass counter culture based revolutionary opposition movement similar to
    that seen in recent years regarding the negative effects of
    globalization. Here, public safety and security experts saw the banding
    together of dissimilar groups like anarchists, labor advocates, and
    human rights activists to symbolically fight what they may consider the
    negative aspects of globalization.
        This is an illustrative model for future large-scale opposition
    groups who will oppose the shipments to the proposed Yucca facility.
    The result of this social development is that America will be facing
    what has already transpired in Germany and other industrial nations:
    Widespread anti nuclear protests from well-organized and highly
    motivated protest groups. These shipments have the symbolic value of
    sparking such protests and these in turn increase the risks of an
    attack when transporting the materials, not necessarily by the groups
    themselves, but by others and within the context of their protests.
        The symbolic nature of terrorism is multifaceted and difficult to
    codify into risk assessment methodologies, especially when those
    methods do not account for asymmetrical situations that could lead to
    an increased risk of an attack. Likewise, it is difficult to assess the
    risk of attacks when the DOE and NRC consider few, if any, non-
    traditional terrorist tactics that may form the basis of a human
    initiated mass contamination event using radioactive wastes. The
    connection between symbolic events and waste shipments is examined in
    the next section of this testimony.
     what types of symbolic or everyday situations could be envisioned and
                  could they be a threat to shipment security?
        One symbolic issue not necessarily recognized in shipment planning,
    and that is subject to change over time as America becomes more
    populated, is that of geographic location. The attack location plays an
    important symbolic part in the identification and assessment of
    situational terrorism risks for SNF and HLRW shipments from the
    existing production and storage sites and to the proposed repository.
    Examples include:
        1. Highly populated urban locations, especially large downtown
    office buildings, shopping districts, hotel complexes, convention
    centers, and specialized tourism areas are a different area of concern.
    These locations are different from other populated areas since urban
    attacks pose a different level of logistical challenge to the first
    responder community. Urban attacks may also create an initial higher
    public relations profile for the terrorist cause because of their
    proximity to a more intense concentration of media outlets.
        2. Locations of special events such as the Olympics, the Super
    Bowl, and other major sporting events, major international trade shows
    or conventions, and national political party conventions are examples
    of other types of situational events that will offer attractive
    symbolic target opportunities. These events have a symbolic value that
    could potentially draw an adversary because of the potential media
    coverage and/or because of the adversary's ability to communicate a
    message by attacking a particular type of event.
        3. Suburban locations near residences and difficult-to-evacuate
    facilities such as schools, hospitals, airports, shopping malls,
    industrial plants, amusement parks, sports stadiums, race tracks, and
    concert halls. The symbolic value of these targets and the motivation
    to perpetrate an attack in close proximity to these types of areas
    differs from that found in other areas. For example, a terrorist could
    choose to perpetrate an attack on these geographic areas to create a
    highly disruptive mass evacuation event.
        4. Rural locations near environmentally sensitive activities and
    resources such as farms, ranches, surface and underground water
    supplies, resorts, wildlife refuges, parks, and other public recreation
    facilities. Such areas have a different symbolic factor than that posed
    by other geographic areas, and the aggravated use of that value depends
    on the motives of the adversary.
        While location and situational factors are important, the outcome
    of a human initiated mass radiological contamination event can vary,
    depending on a number of variables. These factors could include the
    motivation of the adversary, the type of attack, the weaponry used, and
    other salient variables. Proactive terrorist risk assessment
    methodologies would account for such variations in tactics and
    recognize the variability of the symbolic value a terrorist could
    attach to such tactical considerations.
        For example, when considering these shipments and the contemporary
    terrorism threat potential, it is important to consider a range of
    terrorist attack outcomes such as:
        1. Attacks designed to induce a breach of the cask where the
    contents are damaged, where the various radioactive cargoes to be
    transported are released into the environment, and where the effects of
    radiation emissions as a result of the loss of shielding could be a
    danger to human health.
        2. Attacks can also yield a result where the cask is damaged, but
    with no large-scale release of radioactive materials. This could result
    in a measurable radiation emission from loss of shielding, but not a
    radiological dispersion equal to that from a full breach.
        3. An attack could also yield a cask, the transportation vehicle,
    or the transportation infrastructure being damaged during the attack,
    but because of the engineered controls and physical design of the cask,
    the shipment would suffer no release and no loss of shielding. The
    recovery effort for such an incident would be delicate since there
    would exist a potential loss of containment and/or shielding, but in
    general this would be a less risky situation than that posed by a full
    or partial breach of the shielding.
        4. The fourth category is where the cask is undamaged and the
    attack fails to yield any chance, or actuality, of a radiological
    dispersion. Under this scenario the actual attempt itself would have
    symbolic ramifications as noted above.
        Considering the range of outcomes of an attack against these
    shipments by use of such a typology is a critical omission in current
    analytical and methodological assessment models being used by the DOE,
    NRC, and various agencies and contractors who are assessing the
    security of these shipments. In the next section specific types of
    attack scenarios are discussed to help illustrate the evolving nature
    of the vulnerability of these shipments and how transportation planners
    who focus only on past experiences with shipments, and not on the
    future risk realities that these shipments will face, underestimate the
    impact of the changing face of terrorism.
           what types of attacks are viable against these shipments?
        The attack scenarios presented below are composites of more
    detailed work presented by Nevada and various academic experts from
    around the world. They represent several of the many varieties of in-
    transit terrorism tactics that have yet to be studied in any meaningful
    way as very real and probable transportation events during the lifespan
    of the proposed shipment effort. They also represent one way to
    understand the risks these shipments pose, since they are exemplars of
    asymmetrical tactics not addressed by DOE/NRC regulation and/or
    security practice in the American radioactive waste transportation
    industry.
        The first is a capture and breach scenario. If the transportation
    vehicle and cargo were to be captured and placed in an immobile state
    by any number of means, it would be susceptible to the application of
    explosives and/or a human engineered breach.
        Traditionally, most regulatory and security tactics focus on denial
    of the opportunity to capture and transport the radioactive cargoes
    thereafter, but this is an altogether different tactic and requires
    different responses.
        Success by the terrorists at fielding a capture and breach tactic
    would depend on how long the incident response would take and how
    effective the terrorists could be at holding off local emergency
    responders. Thus, depending on their success, the cargo could become a
    radiological dispersion device if the attackers were to breach cargo
    shielding and release the radioactive contents into the environment
    wherever the location of the incident.
        Several relative capture and breach factors not currently
    anticipated, or underestimated, by waste shipment risk analysis and
    security practice, include the presence of pressurized cargoes and the
    potential radiological dispersion effect of internal cask gasses, the
    preexisting physical degradation of the fuel pellets in SNF cargoes
    that could increase the amount of respiratable particles subject to
    dispersion, and the potential to further degrade the integrity of the
    cargoes as a result of a co-existent fire resulting from the terrorist
    attack, and thus increasing the radioactive dispersion plume.
        The capture and breach scenario may represent one variety of a
    maximum severe incident and could result in a release of radioactive
    cargo not anticipated by current regulations and/or cask design
    specifications. Compounding the analysis of this scenario would be such
    variables as the type of cargoes, the preexisting integrity of the
    cargoes, and the potential for a co-existent fire that may increase the
    distribution of the plume after an incident would transpire.
        A transportation infrastructure attack scenario would likewise
    represent a risk to these cargoes. The huge variety of topography, and
    the enormous range of infrastructure components that would be traversed
    in the nationwide shipment of SNF and HLRW present unique challenges to
    Yucca Mountain transportation safety and security planners. For
    example, a deliberate collapse attack on a radioactive waste shipment
    in a tunnel could expose the cargo to risks of an impact breach, a
    crush breach, and/or a fire related incident sufficient to cause a
    failure of the controls engineered into the physical design of the
    casks that would eventually be used to move these cargoes. Likewise, an
    attack that took place on a bridge and in proximity to populated areas
    (e.g., the Hudson, Delaware, etc.) may also pose unique security
    challenges.
        The transportation infrastructure breach is likewise a type of
    asymmetrical scenario that may represent a maximum severe incident and
    could potentially result in a release of radioactive cargo not
    anticipated by current regulations and/or cask design specifications.
        Another scenario example is that of a remote attack using current
    generation weapons. If the transportation vehicle and its cargo were to
    become vulnerable to line of sight or direct attack tactics and weapons
    (e.g., readily available anti-tank missiles, stolen military armor
    piercing weapons, and/or one of an emerging generation of munitions
    with sufficient penetrating power), an adversary could use existing
    regulatory protocols like the disabling device on these vehicles, and/
    or in conjunction with geographically disadvantageous locations, to
    isolate the moving target, fix that target, and attack the vehicle from
    a distance of upwards of 3000 meters.
        Remote attacks using such weapons as the Milan or TOW II missiles
    are a type of scenario that may represent a maximum severe incident and
    could potentially realize a release of the radioactive cargo not
    anticipated by current regulations and/or cask design specifications.
    This type of attack scenario will evolve over time and as increasingly
    more sophisticated weapons become available on the black market.
            why repository shipments are more vulnerable to attack
                           than fixed site locations
        Once repository shipments begin, saboteurs and attackers will be
    presented with what is called a ``target rich'' environment. This
    tactically advantageous environment will provide them the opportunity
    to plan and execute a terrorist attack, using features of the proposed
    transportation effort to their advantage. The shipments will not be as
    secure as they would be if stored at nuclear power plants or DOE
    facilities, since it would be impossible to recreate the same level of
    safety and security used in these facilities. In fact, these waste
    shipments will be more vulnerable than if they were left where they
    currently are. They will become a symbolic target, face a variety of
    adversaries both foreign and domestic, and have the potential to be
    used as weapons of mass radiological contamination.
        The overall time and effort necessary to transport the materials
    across the country is an advantage to terrorists. The choice of a
    single centralized repository that is located far from the majority of
    production sites is another advantage, since these shipments will need
    to travel long distances. Such sustained transportation efforts will
    produce easily identifiable and predictable shipment characteristics
    such as set times of day when a shipment is most likely to pass an
    attack location and large numbers of shipments along identifiable
    routes from which adversaries could pick and choose their targets.
        Such a massive shipment effort also affords the terrorist multiple
    and simultaneous attack opportunities. After September 11, 2001 it is
    hard to disregard the potential for large-scale suicide based terrorist
    attacks transpiring in different locations at the same time and focused
    on the same type of symbolic target. The numbers of shipments (be they
    in the form of the DOE's mostly rail plan, the mixed rail/highway plan,
    or the primary highway shipment plan) will increase the likelihood of
    an adversary being able to acquire the target (shipment) and thereafter
    execute an attack on one or more of the many highway, railway, or
    waterway shipments that will transpire.
        Massive numbers of shipments, predictable schedules, identifiable
    cargoes, and the overall length of the transportation routes, are all
    factors that add additional risks to the proposed Yucca Mountain
    program. The additional miles equal many more insecure areas and lower
    the potential for appropriate security defenses that can be planned and
    executed. Moving these materials out of their current safe and secure
    locations decreases the potential defense options available to counter
    terrorism planners, since the ability to secure tens of thousands of
    miles of roadways, railways, and waterways at the same level as that
    available at a power plant would be nearly impossible to achieve.
        The policy alternative available to you today is far easier and
    more logical than adding more targets for terrorists to attack across
    the span of America's transportation infrastructure. From a strictly
    security and safety standpoint, these materials are better off where
    they sit, behind the security of walls and fences, protected by trained
    and professional plant security, and secured by regulations and
    procedures that have been designed to protect fixed site locations
    where nuclear wastes are stored.
        If allowed to be sheltered in place at those facilities for 50 to
    100 years, these wastes will become less and less toxic. That means
    that their radioactive inventory will become less of a risk to move,
    and the symbolic value of an attack will be reduced. We are in an
    enduring period of threat by terrorists and since this nation will not
    soon be abandoning its use of nuclear energy, allowing these cargoes to
    be sheltered in place is a viable alternative.
                               concluding remarks
        Terrorism is a viable threat to nuclear waste shipments and the
    engineered controls put into the shipment casks are not equal to the
    challenge of asymmetrical tactics and motivated adversaries willing to
    commit what they consider altruistic suicide in the name of a cause.
    Current regulations, practice, and engineering do not account for the
    potential of 21st century terrorism and emerging modifications in
    terrorism tactics and philosophy.
        Terrorism is changing, and to counteract the enduring threat posed
    to our way of life, we must reconsider our existing and future tactics
    and security arrangements. Until a safe and secure transportation plan
    capable of protecting the public interest can not only be articulated
    but battle tested, a plan that accounts for the radical change in
    terrorism illustrated by the September 11, 2001 attacks, we should stop
    the forward movement of this risky process.
        Without due consideration and contingencies for the emerging
    asymmetrical terrorism tactics, it is folly to proceed with the Yucca
    Mountain project. Likewise, allowing the DOE and NRC to proceed without
    due consideration of the actual risks posed by terrorism is tantamount
    to endorsing bureaucratic indifference of unimaginable consequences.
        I urge this body to solicit testimony not only on the historical
    safety and security records of these agencies, but to seek out the
    actual plans that have been developed to face the world we live in
    today, a world where large groups of well trained and highly motivated
    adversaries are willing to commit mass suicide to achieve an objective.
    A world where the unwritten prohibitions against mass murder by
    terrorist attack has not only been replaced, but what has been embraced
    in its place is a world where the terrorists are rewarded for mass
    victimization.
        While no assurances can be made for the future, one thing is
    certain--if we offer an attractive target, someone will make an attempt
    to attack it. Do not allow the nation's nuclear waste products to
    become the golden carrot for would be terrorists. Nuclear waste
    shipments will be targets and unlike other targets, these shipments
    will have sufficient symbolic value to attract well-motivated and
    dangerous adversaries. Do not give them the easy opportunity to prove
    us unprepared once again.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify and answer questions today.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Next we'll hear from Dr. Victor Gilinsky, who is a former
    member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and is now a
    consultant.
        Go right ahead, Dr. Gilinsky.

       STATEMENT OF VICTOR GILINSKY, Ph.D., FORMER COMMISSIONER,
                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

        Dr. Gilinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Victor
    Gilinsky. I am an energy consultant and a former NRC
    commissioner. I've been engaged by Nevada to help out on Yucca
    Mountain issues.
        I'd like a few minutes to concentrate on the two issues
    that I think are most important for your upcoming vote. The
    first is the relation of Yucca Mountain to the future of
    nuclear power in the United States. Some people think that is
    the real issue and a reason for approving the project no matter
    what. I'd like to persuade you that nuclear power is not at
    stake in this vote.
        My second point concerns the validity of the assurances
    that you've received that the project is based on sound
    science. Here I want to underline the importance of the
    reservations of the nuclear waste technical review board.
        To consider the first point, what Yucca Mountain means for
    nuclear power, we can learn something from history. You know,
    the Government's plan in the early 1970's for long-term waste
    management was for what we would now call ``monitored
    retrievable storage.'' The Government moved away from that plan
    and adopted the current deep geologic permanent repository
    concept primarily because this was thought at the time
    necessary to protect the nuclear industry's immediate future.
        To fight off court challenges at the time by environmental
    opponents, it was thought essential by top officials, top
    nuclear officials, to be able to say there was a permanent
    solution to the nuclear waste problem. And so in this way,
    without much further thought, the Government lashed itself to
    the concept of permanent disposal. And this concept then took
    on a life of its own. Because permanent disposal entails or
    carries with it the possibility of irretrievable and
    irremediable error, the whole area became enmeshed in
    controversy, which continues.
        Now, I bring this up because the current effort to stampede
    the Nation into Yucca Mountain continues to be premised on the
    mistaken assumption that the future of nuclear power in this
    country depends on this project. It does not. The truth is that
    Yucca Mountain is not needed to continue or even expand nuclear
    power use. There is ample opportunity to expand existing NRC-
    approved on-site storage. In time the spent fuel casks should
    be collected at locations specifically dedicated to spent fuel
    storage. But the important thing is that there is time to do
    this and to do a good a responsible job in terms of safety and
    security and to do it at far lower cost than would be done at
    Yucca Mountain.
        And also do not think that if we go forward with Yucca
    Mountain this is going to be a plus for the nuclear industry.
    It's more likely to be a continuing source of contention that
    will spill over into other aspects of nuclear power,
    contentions over safety, over the environment, over Federal
    preemption, over licensing shortcuts, over transportation, and
    over its huge and growing expense.
        DOE actually brags about the money spent so far in
    researching this site, as if to say billions of dollars can't
    be wrong. This brings me to the issue of sound science.
        Now, proponents obviously accept the assurances; opponents
    don't accept the assurances. But significantly everyone agrees
    that you have to be convinced that the project is based on
    sound science in order to approve it.
        So now consider what the real experts, the members of the
    nuclear waste technical review boards say about it. As you
    know, the board has termed the technical basis for DOE's
    repository performance estimates as ``weak to moderate.''
    That's not a very good grade and not a very good report.
        Among other things, the board has criticized lack of
    critical corrosion data on the metal waste containers that
    would be deposited in the repository. Now that's especially
    important as DOE relies almost entirely on the integrity of the
    waste containers to meet NRC's licensing standards. More
    generally, the board has made clear that categories of
    technical work that should have been done by DOE before site
    selection have not been done.
        Now, I've said the board members are experts. More
    importantly, they are your experts, your technical watchdogs.
    Congress created the board in 1987, and the law says, ``to
    evaluate the technical and scientific validity of activities
    undertaken by the Secretary.'' In this sea of controversy, they
    are just about the only ones you can rely on for highly
    competent and impartial advice. If the board doesn't give this
    project its strong endorsement for sound science, how can
    Congress do so? This question is especially important
    concerning the suitability of the site, that is, the site apart
    from the waste container and the engineered barriers.
        I know that DOE says this site has been studied to death.
    But DOE never evaluated the site against its own geologic
    criteria, even though it is required to do so by the waste act.
    NRC is not going to do this either. It has other
    responsibilities.
        By default, therefore, if you go forward, you will not just
    be endorsing a site suitability finding by the Energy
    Department or have the consolation of knowing that if you do go
    forward this will be checked by NRC. You will be making the
    technical evaluation of the site suitability yourselves, which,
    it seems to me, makes the cautionary message of the technical
    review board all the more critical.
        We know that DOE is not remotely ready to file an NRC
    application soon after your approval, as is required by law. It
    seems to me this is not the time to give the department a green
    light. It would reinforce the wrong kind of behavior. This is
    the time to rethink the present course.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Gilinsky follows:]
      Prepared Statement of Victor Gilinsky, Ph.D., Former Commissioner,
                         Nuclear Regulatory Commission
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
        I am Victor Gilinsky. I am an energy consultant and have been
    engaged by the State of Nevada to assist on Yucca Mountain issues. I am
    here to present my views on the Senate Joint Resolution to approve
    Yucca Mountain as the site for a national high-level nuclear waste
    repository.
        My involvement with nuclear power and nuclear waste issues is long-
    standing. I served two terms as a Commissioner with the U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC), having been appointed by President Ford
    and re-appointed by President Carter. Prior to the NRC, I was head of
    the Physical Sciences Department at the Rand Corporation in California.
    In the early 1970s, I was on the planning staff of the NRC's
    predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission.
                    the issue is not nuclear power's future
        At that time the government's plan for long-term storage of nuclear
    waste was what would now be called monitored retrievable storage. After
    the reorganization of nuclear agencies in 1975, the government
    abandoned this approach and adopted the permanent geologic repository
    concept. This was done not to protect public safety in the distant
    future, but to protect the licensing of nuclear plants against then-
    ongoing court challenges by environmental activists and other
    opponents. The supporters of nuclear power thought it was essential for
    the industry's immediate future to be able to say the nuclear waste
    problem was solved permanently. In this way, without much consideration
    of its wisdom or thought to the difficulty of actually carrying it out,
    the government lashed itself to this concept and its long-term
    obligations. Because permanent, deep geologic disposal of nuclear waste
    carries with it the possibility of irretrievable and irremediable
    error, the subject quickly became enmeshed in controversy that
    continues to this day.
        I mention this because the current effort to stampede the nation
    into adopting Yucca Mountain as the site for a deep geologic repository
    continues to be premised on the mistaken assumption that the immediate
    future of nuclear power in this country depends on bringing this
    project to fruition. This view was expressed by the Wall Street
    Journal's editorial page: ``The real debate here,'' the Journal said,
    ``is less about Yucca than it is about nuclear power,'' and has been
    echoed by several other major newspapers. The truth is that Yucca
    Mountain is not needed to continue, or even expand, nuclear power use.
    In fact, there is ample opportunity to expand existing, NRC-approved,
    on-site storage. In time, we should collect the spent fuel casks at
    locations dedicated to long-term spent fuel storage. But the important
    thing now is to recognize that there is no immediate crisis, that there
    is time to do this and to do a good and responsible job in terms of
    safety and security, and to do it at a much lower cost to ratepayers
    than Yucca Mountain represents.
        Yucca Mountain is not likely be a boon to nuclear power, as some
    industry people seem to think it will be. Indeed, Yucca Mountain is
    much more likely to become an unhelpful and continuing reminder of
    nuclear power's history of contentions--over safety, over the
    environment, over federal preemption, over licensing short-cuts, over
    transportation, and over expense.
                   the project has taken on a life of its own
        The expense associated with Yucca Mountain is already huge, and
    continues to grow--approaching as much as $100 billion. Like other
    projects that don't meet a pressing need or have a definite measure of
    performance, it has taken on a life of its own--it is propelled by
    public money, supported by interested lobbies, and protected by a
    shifting array of arguments. These arguments don't, however, stand up
    to serious examination. You should not accept them as a basis for
    approval.
           yucca mountain is not the answer to current concerns over
                              spent fuel security
        The most egregious of the pro-Yucca arguments has to do with spent
    fuel security--egregious because it exploits public fears in the wake
    of September 11th. People have been given the idea that spent fuel from
    around the country will be moved quickly to Yucca Mountain where it
    will be placed deep underground. The mantra is ``better one site than
    131.'' But even if Yucca Mountain opened on schedule, according to the
    Department's projections, it would be several decades before the spent
    fuel could be shipped to Nevada, and probably decades more before the
    fuel actually went underground. And this scenario plays out even if we
    never license another nuclear plant. If we do license more nuclear
    power plants (which is in large part the point of opening a spent fuel
    repository), we will have lots of spent fuel in storage at reactor
    sites indefinitely. Because of the built-in delays involved, Yucca
    Mountain is not the answer to the current spent fuel security problem.
    The best thing we can do right now in this regard is to get the spent
    fuel at the reactor sites promptly moved into secure storage casks in a
    protected area at the reactor site. Such casks have already been
    licensed by the NRC and are in use at several sites.
                 appeal to national security is quite a stretch
        DOE also diverts attention from the important long-term Yucca
    Mountain issues with the claim that Yucca Mountain is important to our
    national security. The claim is that without Yucca Mountain our nuclear
    Navy operations could be constrained and U.S. nonproliferation policy
    could be undermined. First, let's face it; Naval operations are not
    going to be constrained no matter what happens at Yucca Mountain.
    That's a hollow argument. Second, DOE has the nonproliferation argument
    backwards. The proposed U.S.-Russian plutonium-recycling program to
    which DOE refers--the waste from which DOE wants to put in Yucca
    Mountain--would in my view raise the risks of proliferation and nuclear
    terrorism by encouraging the commercial use of plutonium.
        Aside from the deficiency of these DOE arguments, there is
    something basically worrisome about the lopsided appeal to national
    security interests in support of Yucca Mountain. Is the Department
    merely distracting attention from the problems of the site's geology?
    Or is it setting the predicate for future national security exemptions
    from safety and environmental requirements?
                doe did not apply its own geologic site criteria
        The site obviously has problems, the chief one being lots more
    water than anyone expected. (I was myself surprised to find water
    dripping on my head in the test cavity in the center of the Mountain.)
    Water promotes corrosion and movement of radioactive material and so
    its presence in a repository is a serious drawback. The current design
    concept now includes titanium drip shields--in effect, titanium
    umbrellas--over the waste packages to be placed in the Yucca Mountain
    tunnels. But the water problems don't end there. The 15 years of
    geologic investigation and the several billions that DOE spent don't
    make this a good site. The bottom line is that the site didn't pass
    DOE's own geologic selection criteria--DOE never risked applying them.
    In fact, in December 2001, shortly before it forwarded the site
    recommendation to the president, DOE threw out the set of geologic
    criteria it had adopted as a formal rule in 1984. In its place, DOE
    then adopted a new rule that made site geology irrelevant if the metal
    container encasing the waste was good enough.
                 doe site selection did not comply with the act
        This action was at odds with DOE's responsibilities under the
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The Act tells DOE to do two separate things--
    (1) select a suitable site, and (2) make sure it can be licensed by NRC
    for its intended purpose. First, DOE was to recommend or reject Yucca
    Mountain, with geologic considerations to be the primary criteria. DOE
    sloughed off this responsibility and decided all it had to do was
    satisfy NRC's licensing limit on potential radiation doses to the
    nearby human population. But NRC's licensing rule doesn't have any
    separate requirement for effectiveness of geologic barriers. In short,
    DOE avoided the Act's demand for an answer to the question of site
    suitability by ``deferring'' to NRC, but NRC will not answer the
    question either. This cannot be what Congress intended.
        It now appears that DOE's waste bureaucracy has rationalized its
    failure to comply with the Act's tough geologic requirements on their
    view that Congress already selected Yucca Mountain back in 1987.
    Congress was not, however, lowering the geologic standards in selecting
    Yucca Mountain for characterization. Indeed, that was also DOE's
    reading of the 1987 Amendment to the Act up until about 1996. Since DOE
    has now abandoned its geologic criteria, Congress is now being asked
    not merely to ratify a DOE site suitability decision, but instead to
    make one itself in view of DOE's default. Under this approach, a site
    suitability analysis and recommendation, as contemplated in the Act,
    will never be made. Congress should not allow this and should insist
    that DOE comply with the Act.
       if doe will rely mainly on its miracle metal container--why then
                                yucca mountain?
        As it is, DOE plans to get around Yucca Mountain's geologic
    deficiencies with its ``miracle metal'' container (to use the Nuclear
    Energy Institute's appellation), which is purported to meet NRC's
    licensing standards all by itself. If we are to suppose this is true,
    and therefore the repository site doesn't need favorable natural
    characteristics, why then should such a repository be in Nevada as
    opposed to anywhere else? Why not store the miracle containers at or
    near existing reactor sites and eliminate the risk of transporting
    high-level radioactive waste by truck, rail and barge thousands of
    miles across the country?
      congress should rely on nwtrb regarding ``sound science'' assurances
        A phrase that appears over and over in documents in support of
    putting the waste in Yucca Mountain is ``sound science.'' We are
    assured that the project is based on ``sound science.'' Significantly,
    the Secretary of Energy has said he would not have recommended the site
    were he not convinced that it was based on ``sound science.'' That says
    this body, the United States Senate, should not be approving the site
    if you are not similarly convinced.
        So now consider what the real experts--the members of the U.S.
    Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board--have said. If there are any
    heroes in this struggle, they are the Board members and their Chairman.
    They have carried out their responsibilities competently and even-
    handedly in difficult circumstances and have expressed themselves
    clearly and precisely. In the din of exaggeration on all sides it is
    possible to miss the vital importance of their message. You will hear
    from them directly tomorrow, but we should listen today to what they
    have already said.
           nuclear waste technical review board: technical basis is
                              ``weak to moderate"
        The Board has termed the technical basis for DOE's repository
    performance estimates as ``weak to moderate''--not an encouraging
    evaluation. The Board has criticized the lack of critical corrosion
    data on the metal waste containers to support DOE's basic design
    concept. That's especially important as DOE relies almost entirely on
    the integrity of the metal waste containers to meet NRC's licensing
    standard. As one of the Board members said, ``We are betting the
    performance of the systems on the long term performance of these
    effectively new materials.''
        Parenthetically, earlier this year a steel pressure vessel at an
    Ohio nuclear plant was found to be severely and dangerously corroded,
    to the point that a serious accident was barely averted. I mention this
    only because the metals involved and their environment were much better
    known than those planned for use in Yucca Mountain, and yet the
    corrosion came as a great surprise. In short, the lack of corrosion
    data the Board points to is a serious deficiency.
        In March the Board wrote DOE expressing concern that important
    water flow processes around Yucca Mountain ``remain poorly understood''
    and should be studied. DOE wrote back with the bureaucratic equivalent
    of ``don't call us, we'll call you.'' It wasn't the response of an
    agency dedicated to assuring a firm project basis in sound science. In
    a more general comment, at last week's meeting of the Technical Review
    Board, the Board chairman said very simply and clearly that technical
    work that should have been done before site selection has not been
    done.
        The Board members are not only experts; they are your experts, your
    technical watchdogs. Congress created the Board in 1987 to ``evaluate
    the technical and scientific validity of activities undertaken by the
    Secretary.'' In this sea of controversy, they are the ones you
    appointed and can rely on for highly competent and impartial advice. If
    the Board doesn't give this project its strong endorsement for ``sound
    science,'' how can Congress do so?
                             time to stop to think
        One thing is clear. DOE is not remotely ready to comply with the
    law's requirement to file an NRC license application 90 days after
    Congressional approval. DOE is talking about applying to NRC for a
    license in 2004, and there are some suggestions that it will be even
    later. They say they are keeping all options open--that it may be a
    high temperature repository or it may be a low temperature repository.
    That's another way of saying they don't even have a design. The trouble
    is, one concept may require a much larger repository than the other,
    and so the cost is up in the air, too.
        The project doesn't make sense in terms of expense, security, or
    safety, or even in terms of the future of nuclear power. This is not
    the time to give the Department a green light. This is the time to
    rethink the present course.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much. Appreciate your
    testimony.
        Our next witness is the Honorable Rocky Anderson, who is
    mayor of Salt Lake City, Utah.
        We're very pleased to have you here, Mr. Mayor.

            STATEMENT OF ROSS C. ``ROCKY'' ANDERSON, MAYOR,
                           SALT LAKE CITY, UT

        Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee. I certainly appreciate the opportunity to comment on
    the wholly inadequate proposal to transport deadly nuclear
    waste and the most deadly material known to man today across
    country for storage at Yucca Mountain and the shortsighted
    national nuclear policy that has led to this proposal.
        The people of Salt Lake City are intimately familiar with
    the tragic politics of nuclear exploitation. Tens of thousands
    of Utah downwinders and downwinders across America have
    suffered and died and continue to suffer and die as the result
    of nuclear weapons testing in Nevada during the Cold War. And
    now a coalition of electric utilities is seeking to exploit the
    impoverished Goshute Indian tribe to create a purported
    temporary storage site for spent nuclear fuel rods just 70
    miles from Salt Lake City.
        From experience, we know that the Yucca Mountain proposal
    would put most Americans, including all the citizens of Salt
    Lake City, at tremendous risk, by creating tens of thousands of
    highly lethal dirty bombs and shipping them through large
    metropolitan areas and 43 States on a daily basis.
        Now, the issue has recently arisen as to how many shipments
    this would really be, and Senator Thomas mentioned just a
    moment ago that DOE is now saying it would be 175 shipments per
    year. This has been truly a moving target in terms of DOE's
    analysis. In a review of department oversight from the Office
    of the Secretary, Department of Transportation, just within the
    last 4 months, they note there that according to DOE forecasts,
    there would be nearly 1,700 shipments by the year 2015, ten
    times as many as now DOE is asserting.
        To make matters worse, the Yucca Mountain project would not
    be a long-term solution to the problem of nuclear waste, as
    contemplated by the 1982 act. The project only further
    accommodates the irresponsible actions of our Nation's nuclear
    industry, facilitating the production of even more nuclear
    waste, without addressing the fundamental issue of how to deal
    with the ever increasing amounts of these deadly substances.
        A detailed transportation plan for shipping nuclear waste
    to Yucca Mountain has not yet been developed and not one actual
    full-size transportation cask in use has been physically tested
    to withstand plausible accident or terrorism scenarios. Without
    adequate research as to the safety of transporting this waste,
    without details of where and how it will travel, the American
    public, our representatives in Congress, and our Federal
    regulatory agencies are being asked to sign off on one of the
    most expensive projects and perhaps the most dangerous project
    in the history of the United States. Catastrophic loss of life
    could accompany a single major accident or terrorist strike in
    a metropolitan area, such as Chicago, Atlanta, and St. Louis,
    or in a major watershed area like Salt Lake City's. Such a
    scenario is almost a certainty. Human error is inevitable.
        Scientists predict as many as 340 transportation accidents
    and almost 2,400 incidents involving the waste during the
    transport period. These numbers do not include the risks of
    terrorism, a very real possibility even before the September
    11, 2001, terrorist attacks. A single terrorist attack, which
    could be carried out with far less planning and resources than
    the September 11 attacks, could result in thousands of cancer
    fatalities and cost upwards of $17 billion simply to clean up
    and respond to.
        Protecting the Salt Lake, 2002, Winter Olympic Games for
    less than 2 weeks in a relatively constrained geographical area
    was a monumental task, requiring over 15,000 law enforcement
    officers and costing over $310 million. Adequately protecting
    tens of thousands of highly lethal shipments of nuclear waste
    as they travel thousands of miles through dozens of major
    cities over a period of 38 years will be impossible.
        With tragic ramifications, our Federal Government has
    failed in the past to responsibly deal with major terrorism-
    related security concerns. We implore you to acknowledge the
    horrendous terrorism-related security risks entailed in
    transporting by rail and truck highly lethal spent nuclear fuel
    and to assume the responsibility that is yours to protect the
    people of this country, including later generations, and to
    protect our economy from those risks.
        Perhaps the most astounding fact about all the
    transportation risks inherent in the Yucca Mountain proposal is
    that they serve no fundamental long-term purpose. The safety of
    communities where nuclear waste is generated will not be
    significantly increased. Plants will still produce waste on
    site and will still be just as likely to fail in generation and
    storage operations. They will also remain just as likely
    targets of terrorist attack, as they are today.
        There are no plans for the storage of waste after the year
    2036, when Yucca Mountain will be at capacity. Therefore, after
    creating all of the significant risks to millions of Americans,
    resulting from the Yucca Mountain project, we will not be able
    to say that we have solved the long-term problem of nuclear
    waste storage. We will only have facilitated the continuation
    and exacerbation of a dangerous situation that has no
    foreseeable solution short of vastly reducing or eliminating
    the production of nuclear waste.
        There is a better approach.
        First, nuclear fuel should be stored where it is produced
    until a comprehensive, safe, and permanent solution to the
    entire storage and transportation problem is found. This cannot
    be characterized as a ``not in my back yard'' argument. And to
    characterize the position of Utahans and Nevadans as simply a
    ``not in my back yard'' argument epitomizes the crass hypocrisy
    of the industries and communities that have welcomed
    inexpensive nuclear power at their doorsteps, but now refuse to
    take responsibility for it in their back yards.
        Utilities proposing temporary storage of nuclear fuel at
    the Goshute Reservation or Salt Lake City have represented that
    these lethal materials can be safely stored in above-ground
    casks. If that is true, the materials can be stored in those
    casks where the materials are produced while Congress plans for
    an effective long-term solution to nuclear waste in America.
        Second, we must decommission nuclear powerplants at least
    until reprocessing or some other technology eliminates the
    problems of nuclear waste. Only 20 percent of electricity
    generated in the United States comes from nuclear power. We can
    and should make investments in construction and alternative
    general technologies that will make up for the energy generated
    by nuclear powerplants.
        We know that reversing the momentum behind the Yucca
    Mountain proposal will not be easy. It will take political
    courage. It will take an honest admission of failure, and it
    will take a return to integrity in the process, but it is the
    only way to take real steps toward reaching a permanent
    solution to the long-term problems of nuclear waste in America.
    Together we can make the hard decisions and take a leadership
    role in global environmental responsibility. While seeking to
    make good on broken promises of the past regarding the safe
    permanent storage of nuclear waste, Congress can finally set
    right our nation's nuclear policy for the long-term benefit of
    our country's public health, safety, and security.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mayor Anderson follows:]
           Prepared Statement of Ross C. ``Rocky'' Anderson, Mayor,
                               Salt Lake City, UT
        I am Ross Anderson, Mayor of Salt Lake City, Utah. I appreciate the
    opportunity to comment on the wholly inadequate proposal to transport
    deadly nuclear waste across country for storage at Yucca Mountain and
    the shortsighted national nuclear policy that has led to that proposal.
        The people of Salt Lake City are intimately familiar with the
    tragic politics of nuclear exploitation. Thousands of Utah downwinders
    have suffered and died--and more continue to suffer and die--as the
    result of nuclear weapons testing in Nevada during the Cold War.
    Private companies target Utah as a prime dumping ground for so-called
    ``low-level'' radioactive wastes. Further, a coalition of electric
    utilities is seeking to exploit the impoverished Goshute Indian tribe
    to create a purported ``temporary'' storage site for spent nuclear fuel
    rods just 70 miles from Salt Lake City.
        From experience, we know that the Yucca Mountain proposal would put
    most Americans, including all the citizens of Salt Lake City, at
    tremendous risk, by creating tens of thousands of highly lethal ``dirty
    bombs'' and shipping them through large metropolitan areas on a daily
    basis. To make matters worse, even if there were no serious risks from
    the transportation of this high-level nuclear waste, the Yucca Mountain
    project would not be a long-term solution to the problem of nuclear
    waste. The project only further accommodates the irresponsible actions
    of our nation's nuclear industry facilitating the production of even
    more nuclear waste and worsening our federal government's addiction to
    nuclear power, without addressing the fundamental issue of how to deal
    with the ever-increasing amounts of these deadly substances.
                              transportation risks
        A detailed transportation plan for shipping nuclear waste to Yucca
    Mountain has not yet been developed, and not one transportation cask in
    use has been physically tested to withstand plausible accident or
    terrorism scenarios.\1\ These facts illustrate the irresponsible and
    undemocratic manner in which this project is being developed. Without
    adequate research as to the safety of transporting this waste, without
    details of where and how it will travel, the American public, our
    representatives in Congress, and our federal regulatory agencies are
    being asked to sign off on one of the most expensive projects--and
    perhaps the most dangerous project--in the history of the United
    States.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Resnikoff, Marvin. The Next Nuclear Gamble. New York: Council
    on Economic Priorities, 1983. Reference also: United States. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission. Discussion Draft: An Updated View of Spent Fuel
    Transportation Risk. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards:
    Washington, D.C., 2000. Reference also: Direct communication with Diane
    D'Arrigo. Nuclear Information and Resource Center, Washington, D.C., 13
    August, 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        If the Yucca Mountain proposal were approved, huge amounts of
    nuclear waste would be transported through Salt Lake City every day for
    many years. Virtually all of the major shipping routes to Yucca
    Mountain from the eastern U.S., both rail and highway, traverse
    Utah.\2\ Salt Lake City will, by all estimations, see more traffic of
    nuclear waste than any other U.S. city except Las Vegas. Utah will be
    second only to Nevada in the number of high-level waste and spent
    nuclear fuel shipments routed through the state.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ United States Map of Probable Routes. Map. State of Nevada
    Agency for Nuclear Projects, 1995.
        \3, 4\ Clark County, Nevada. Comments on Draft Environmental Impact
    Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear
    Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County,
    Nevada. Clark County, Nevada. Clark County, Nevada, 1999.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Rail lines that may be used to transport spent fuel rods through
    Salt Lake City to Yucca Mountain lie 25 feet from residents''
    backyards. The trains travel within 100 feet of playgrounds. Six
    schools are within half a mile of transportation routes, well in range
    to receive measurable daily doses of radiation from incident-free
    transportation. Two interstate highways, the major arterials for truck
    transport from the east coast, run right through the heart of our city.
    Trains stopped at crossings and trucks stopped in traffic will sit only
    a few feet away from our citizens on a daily basis.
        Scientists estimate that incident-free transportation, mostly by
    truck, will cause as many as 31 cancer fatalities nationwide.\3\ This
    incident-free scenario assumes transportation utopia and does not take
    into account the Department of Energy estimates for transportation
    incidents and accidents.
        Catastrophic loss of life could accompany a single major accident
    in a metropolitan area or in a major watershed area like Salt Lake
    City's. Such a scenario is almost a certainty. Human error is
    inevitable. Scientists predict as many as 340 transportation accidents
    and 2,395 incidents involving the waste during the transport period.\4\
    These numbers do not include the risks of terrorism--a very real
    possibility even before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. A
    single terrorist attack, which could be carried out with far less
    planning and resources than the September 11th attacks, could result in
    thousands of cancer fatalities and cost up to $17 billion in adverse
    economic impacts.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Marvin Resnikoff, Ph.D. ``Testimony to the U.S. House of
    Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
    Subcommittee on Highway and Transit, Subcommittee on Railroads,'' 25
    April, 2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Protecting the Salt Lake 2002 Winter Olympic Games for less than
    two weeks, in a relatively constrained geographical area, was a
    monumental task, requiring over 15,000 law enforcement officers and
    costing over $310 million. Adequately protecting tens of thousands of
    highly lethal shipments of nuclear waste as they travel thousands of
    miles through dozens of major cities over a period of 38 years will be
    impossible.
        With tragic ramifications, our federal government has failed in the
    past to responsibly deal with major terrorism-related security
    concerns. We implore you to acknowledge the horrendous terrorism-
    related security risks entailed in transporting, by rail and truck,
    highly lethal spent nuclear fuel and to assume the responsibility that
    is yours to protect the people of this country, including later
    generations--and to protect our economy--from those risks.
    the yucca mountain proposal is not a solution to our long-term nuclear
                             fuel storage problems
        The most astounding fact about all the transportation risks
    inherent in the Yucca Mountain proposal is that they serve no
    fundamental long-term purpose. The safety of communities where nuclear
    waste is generated will not be significantly increased. Plants will
    still produce waste on site and will still be just as likely to fail in
    generation and storage operations. They will also remain just as likely
    targets of terrorist attack as they are today.
        There are no plans for the storage of waste after 2036, when Yucca
    Mountain will be at capacity.\6\ Therefore, after creating all of the
    significant risks to millions of Americans resulting from the Yucca
    Mountain project, we will not be able to say we have solved the long-
    term problem of nuclear waste storage. We will only have facilitated
    the continuation--and exacerbation--of a dangerous situation that has
    no foreseeable solution short of vastly reducing or eliminating the
    production of nuclear waste.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Honorable Shelly Berkley, NV. ``Opening Statement at the Joint
    Hearing on Transportation of Spent Rods to the Proposed Yucca Mountain
    Storage Facility, Subcommittee on Highways and Transit Subcommittee on
    Railroads,'' 25 April, 2002. Reference also: ``Abraham: Yucca Not
    Enough For Waste.'' Guardian Unlimited, 17 May, 2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress has created a process with a foregone conclusion.\7\ It
    has made promises to the nuclear utilities that it cannot keep and
    continues to appease the utilities that have profited while creating
    this enormous, dangerous dilemma for our nation. It is guaranteeing
    that an ever-growing amount of nuclear waste will be strewn across the
    United States, putting many generations of Americans at serious risk.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Fueled by enthusiasm for cheap power generation, Congress set
    up the circumstances for us to push forward with nuclear power without
    stopping to consider its pitfalls. Indeed, the designated role of the
    first nuclear agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, rife with conflicts
    of interest between advocacy and regulation, set the stage for the
    reckless pursuit of nuclear power by our federal government. Ford,
    Daniel. The Cult of the Atom: The Secret Papers of the Atomic Energy
    Commission. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          a better, long-term approach
        There is a better approach. Instead of pursuing half-measures that
    put millions of Americans at risk, we can take effective steps now to
    accomplish permanent solutions, including the reduction of threats
    posed by the disposal of existing spent nuclear fuel and vastly
    curtailing the production of nuclear waste in the future.
        First, nuclear fuel should be stored where it is produced until a
    comprehensive, safe, and permanent solution to the entire storage
    problem is found. While nuclear power advocates dismiss this plea of
    Nevadans and Utahns as a ``Not-In-My-Backyard'' argument, they
    epitomize the crass hypocrisy of the industries and communities that
    welcomed inexpensive nuclear power at their doorsteps but now refuse to
    take responsibility for it in their backyards. The utilities proposing
    ``temporary'' storage of nuclear fuel at the Goshute Reservation near
    Salt Lake City have represented that these lethal materials can be
    safely stored in above-ground casks. If that is true, the materials can
    be stored in those casks where the materials are produced while
    Congress plans for an effective, long-term solution to nuclear waste in
    America.
        Second, we must decommission nuclear power plants, at least until
    reprocessing or some other technology eliminates the problems of
    nuclear waste. Only 20% of electricity generated in the U.S. comes from
    nuclear power.\8\ We can and should make investments in conservation
    and alternative generation technologies that will make up for the
    energy generated by nuclear power plants. In the same way we led the
    atomic age, the United States has the opportunity to be a leader in
    conservation and alternative production technologies.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy Regarding the
    Suitability of the Yucca Mountain Site for a Repository Under the
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. February 2002: 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   conclusion
        The people of Utah were lied to repeatedly when told that
    government plans were safe. We will not be lied to again. We will not
    allow Congress and the Department of Energy to treat Utah and Nevada as
    remote, disposable places, where the self-inflicted problems of the
    reckless nuclear power industry--and of a federal government that has
    been astoundingly irresponsible in its nuclear policy--can be
    conveniently dumped.
        Reversing the momentum behind the Yucca Mountain proposal will not
    be easy. It will take political courage. It will take an honest
    admission of failure. It will take a return to integrity. But it is the
    only way to take real steps toward reaching a permanent solution to the
    long-term problems of nuclear waste in America. Together, we can make
    the hard decisions and take a leadership role in global environmental
    responsibility. While seeking to make good on broken promises of the
    past regarding the safe, permanent storage of nuclear waste, Congress
    can finally set right our nation's nuclear policy--for the long-term
    benefit of our country's public health, safety and security.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor.
        Our next witness is Michael J. Ervin, Sr., who is the vice
    president of the Peace Officers Research Association of
    California, located in Sacramento, California.
        Mr. Ervin, why don't you go right ahead.

       STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. ERVIN, SR., VICE PRESIDENT, PEACE
              OFFICERS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA

        Mr. Ervin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
        My name is Sergeant Mike Ervin. I live right outside of Los
    Angeles, and I'm a law enforcement officer with the city of
    Pomona Police Department in California. I have been a police
    officer for 22 years.
        Before becoming a police officer, I was a professional
    truck driver. I drove tractor-trailers, either 48-foot-long
    single trailers or short doubles, on the interstates of
    southern California for 5 years and logged approximately a half
    a million miles.
        I realize this hearing is about the proposal to transport
    and store nuclear waste and Yucca Mountain in Nevada. I have
    been asked to tell you what I know about truck driving and
    truck safety.
        I am still licensed to drive tractor-trailers along with
    combination vehicles and even a bus. I take a written test
    every 4 years or so before my license expires. There is no
    requirement to take a road test. I have never hauled hazardous
    materials, although if I wanted to drive a combination vehicle
    carrying hazardous materials, I could. All I would have to do
    is take another written test. In California, that's all that is
    required for a truck driver to be licensed to drive a truck
    carrying hazardous materials is pass the written test and have
    a clean driving record.
        As a truck driver and a police officer, I have seen a lot
    of truck crashes. I have concluded there are two elements to
    truck safety. The first is mechanical, the truck itself. It is
    important to understand that an 80,000 pound 18-wheeler is
    inherently dangerous. The fact is borne out by statistics.
    According to data from the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration, 457,000 large trucks were involved in traffic
    crashes in 2000.
        There are a number of factors that make trucks so
    dangerous. The first is the weight of a truck. A heavy tractor-
    trailer tends to have a higher center of gravity because the
    extra weight is typically stacked vertically. The higher center
    of gravity increasing the risk of dangerous rollovers. Heavy
    tractor-trailers are likely to accelerate more slowly and have
    difficulty maintaining speeds on upgrades, increasing speed
    differentials with other traffic and increasing the risk of
    accidents.
        If a truck is perfectly maintained, it will be a lot less--
    excuse me--it will be less likely to be involved in a crash.
    Some trucking companies do an excellent job of maintaining
    their trucks. They are checked daily and needed repairs are
    made immediately. However, I operate in the real world. And
    there are other truck companies that are not so scrupulous.
    They put off repairs because they are expensive. In addition,
    sometimes with even the best-maintained trucks, mechanical
    things do go wrong. The way I see it, the only way to have a
    perfectly maintained truck is if God came down himself and
    turned the wrenches.
        What does this mean? It means that when brakes are in need
    of adjustments and pumped, a great heavy truck barreling down a
    highway may need hundreds more feet to stop. It means that the
    steering of those heavy trucks, which is always difficult, will
    be more so. It means that sharp turns made to avoid smaller
    vehicles that are too close will result in rollovers. I think
    of a tractor-trailer rig as a missile. The question is, Is it
    under control or out of control?
        These are all factors that this committee should take into
    account when considering any proposal to transport nuclear
    waste on public highways.
        A second element of truck safety is the human element.
    Again, there are many very good, experienced, responsible
    drivers who work for trucking companies which are very strict
    about limiting the hours that the drivers are on the road and
    which they insist that they get enough rest. Some of these
    companies don't even put sleepers on their cabs, because they
    want the drivers to get out of their trucks and sleep in
    hotels. And truck drivers often feel that they must keep moving
    in order to make enough money to support themselves. They
    cannot afford to stop by the side of the road and rest when
    they are tired. These tired truck drivers make the roads unsafe
    for all of us.
        Long-haul truck driving is extremely stressful and tiring.
    You must--have to monitor your speed, make sure you keep a safe
    distance from cars in front of you, and adjust for any wind,
    rain, or bumps in the road, and all with the knowledge that you
    are the heaviest vehicle out there. That is a huge obligation.
    You always have to think about what could go wrong, and what
    would you do if it actually happened?
        Besides truck drivers, there are other human elements that
    make the roads dangerous. Trucks share the roads with
    automobile drivers. Most automobile drivers are not trained to
    deal with trucks that take up most of the lane. They are not
    aware that they should stay out of our blind spots.
        There are automobile drivers who can just be careless and
    some who are just plain weird. I can remember a number of
    instances where I was driving along, tired, fighting wind, when
    a car would pull along right beside me so the driver could look
    into my cab. He would stay with me, very close, peering, and it
    was very nerve wracking, to say the least. The fact is that all
    truck drivers run into strange people on the road. Dealing with
    them is part of the job. But it makes truck driving more
    dangerous. And if you throw in the congestion of traffic
    conditions, poor roads, inclement weather, it seems almost
    impossible for a truck accident not to occur.
        I feel that truck drive--excuse me--I feel that truck
    driving is a profession. A driver must be licensed. And I
    personally felt a great responsibility to everyone on the road.
    I felt that while I was driving everyone on the road was
    depending on me to do my job faithfully and carefully. If I
    drove past my skills or beyond my truck's capacity, the results
    could be disastrous.
        I understand that trucks in the question would--excuse me--
    I understand that the trucks in question would be typically
    80,000-pound tractor-trailers. But the heavier trucks may be
    used as well. Everything I have said to you today is about
    mechanical and human elements of driving heavy trucks. Even
    more important, if the truck gets heavier, more accidents will
    occur.
        The University of Michigan Transportation Research
    Institute found that a strong statistical link that some truck
    configurations between higher weight and greater risk--with
    higher weights and greater risk for fatalities. If weights go
    from--when weights went from 65,000 to 80,000 pounds, the risk
    of accidents involving a fatality went up 50 percent. Just
    imagine the fatality rate of 120,000 pounds or more.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, there are hundreds of
    thousands of truck crashes every year in this country. In the
    real world, there's no such thing as a perfect truck, a perfect
    road, or a perfect weather condition. Even if there were, you
    will still always have the human element. You can have the best
    trained truck drivers, but if they are tired, you can never
    predict how the truck and its driver will interact with
    motorists.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]
         Prepared Statement of Michael J. Ervin, Sr., Vice President,
               Peace Officers Research Association of California
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Sergeant Mike Ervin. I live
    right outside of Los Angeles. I am a police officer with the Pomona,
    California Police Department. I have been a police officer for 22
    years.
        Before becoming a police officer I was a professional truck driver.
    I drove tractor trailers--either 48-foot-long single trailers or short
    double trailers--on the interstates in Southern California for five
    years and logged about half a million miles.
        I realize that this hearing is about the proposal to transport and
    store nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. I have been asked to
    tell you what I know about truck driving and truck safety.
        When I was 23, I became a police officer. I had always wanted to be
    one, and thought that I had better do it when I could. I am still
    licensed to drive trucks though. I can drive Class I or combination
    vehicles or a bus. I take a written test every four years or so, before
    my license expires. There is no requirement that I take a road test. I
    have never hauled hazardous materials, although if I wanted to drive a
    combination vehicle carrying hazardous materials, I could. All I would
    have to do is to take another written test. In California, that is all
    that is required for a truck driver to be licensed to drive a truck
    carrying hazardous materials--pass a written test and a have clean
    driving record.
        As a truck driver and as a police officer, I have seen a lot of
    truck crashes. I have concluded that there are two elements to truck
    safety. The first is mechanical the truck itself. It is important to
    understand that an 80,000-pound 18-wheeler is inherently dangerous.
    This fact is borne out by statistics: According to data from the
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 457,000 large trucks
    were involved in traffic crashes in 2000.
        There are a number of factors that make trucks so dangerous. The
    first is the weight of a truck. Heavy tractor-trailers tend to have a
    high center of gravity because the extra weight is typically stacked
    vertically. The higher center of gravity increases the risk of
    dangerous rollovers. Heavy tractor-trailers are likely to accelerate
    more slowly and have difficulty maintaining speed on upgrades,
    increasing speed differentials with other traffic and increasing the
    risk of accidents.
        If a truck is perfectly maintained it will be a lot less likely to
    be involved in a crash. Some trucking companies do an excellent job of
    maintaining their trucks. The trucks are checked thoroughly every night
    and needed repairs are made immediately. However, I have to operate in
    the real world. And there are other trucking companies that are not so
    scrupulous. They put off some repairs because they are expensive. In
    addition, sometimes with even the best-maintained trucks, mechanical
    things go wrong. The way I see it, the only way to have a perfectly
    maintained truck is if God turns all the wrenches.
        What does this mean? It means that when brakes that need adjustment
    are pumped, that great big heavy truck barreling down the highway may
    need hundreds of more feet to stop. It means that steering those heavy
    trucks, which is always difficult, will be more so. It means that a
    sharp turn, made to avoid a too close motorist, will result in a
    rollover. I think of a tractor-trailer rig as a missile. The question
    is, is it under control or out of control?
        These are all factors that this Committee should take into account
    when considering any proposal to transport nuclear waste on public
    highways.
        The second element to truck safety is the human element. Again,
    there are many very good, experienced, responsible drivers who work for
    trucking companies which are very strict about limiting the hours that
    their drivers are on the road, and which insist that they get enough
    rest. Some of these companies do not put sleepers in their cabs because
    they do not want their drivers sleeping in their trucks. They give them
    hotel vouchers--they want them sleeping in beds and getting a good
    night's rest. But again, there are other trucking companies that are
    not so careful. And truck drivers often feel that they must keep moving
    in order to make enough money to support themselves. They cannot afford
    to stop by the side of the road to rest when they are tired. These
    tired truck drivers make the roads unsafe for all of us.
        Long haul truck driving is extremely stressful and tiring. You have
    to monitor your speed, make sure you keep a safe distance from the car
    in front of you, and adjust for any wind or rain or bumps in the road,
    all with the knowledge that you are the heaviest vehicle out there.
    That is a huge obligation. You always have to think about what could go
    wrong and what you would do if it actually happened.
        Besides truck drivers, there are other human elements that make the
    road dangerous. Trucks must share the roads with automobile drivers.
    Most auto drivers are not trained to deal with trucks that take up most
    of a lane. They are not as aware as we would like them to be of the
    ``no-zone'' area around a truck where they are hidden from a truck
    driver's view. There are automobile drivers who can be careless, and
    some that are just plain weird. I can remember a number of instances
    where I was driving along, tired, fighting the wind, when a car would
    pull along right beside me so that the driver could peer into my cab.
    He would stay with me, very close, peering. It was nerve wracking. The
    fact is, all truck drivers run into strange people on the road. Dealing
    with them is part of the job. But, it makes truck driving more
    dangerous, and if you throw in congested traffic conditions, poor
    roads, inclement weather, it seems almost impossible for truck
    accidents not to occur.
        I feel that truck driving is a profession. A driver must be
    licensed, and I personally felt a great responsibility to everyone on
    the road. I felt that while I was driving, everyone on the road with me
    was depending on me to do my job faithfully and carefully. If I drove
    past my skill level or beyond my truck's capacity, the result would be
    disaster.
        I understand that the trucks in question would be typical 80,000-
    pound tractor-trailers, but that heavier trucks may be used, as well.
    Everything I have said here today about the mechanical and human
    elements of driving heavy trucks is even more important as trucks get
    heavier. The University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute
    found that there is a strong statistical link within the same truck
    configuration between higher weights and a greater risk of fatalities.
    As weights go from 65,000 to 80,000 pounds the risk of an accident
    involving a fatality goes up 50%.\1\ Just imagine the fatality rate at
    120,000 pounds or more.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ U.S. DOT Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Study, Phase 1,
    Working Paper 1 & 2, 1995, P. 37.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, there are hundreds of thousands of
    truck crashes every year in this country. In the real world, there is
    no such thing as a perfect truck, a perfect road and perfect weather
    conditions. Even if there were, you will always have the human element.
    You can have the best-trained truck drivers, but they may be tired. And
    you can never predict how the truck and its driver will interact with
    the motorist.
        I am happy to answer any questions.

        The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ervin.
        And our final witness on this panel is Dr. Stephen
    Prescott, who is the executive director of the Huntsman Cancer
    Institute in Salt Lake City, Utah.
        Dr. Prescott, why don't you go right ahead.

           STATEMENT BY STEPHEN M. PRESCOTT, M.D., EXECUTIVE
        DIRECTOR, HUNTSMAN CANCER INSTITUTE, SALT LAKE CITY, UT

        Dr. Prescott. Mr. Chairman and members and guests. I'm a
    physician and medical scientist. It is in these roles that I
    appear today.
        At the Huntsman Cancer Institute we conduct research into
    the causes of cancer. We work to prevent cancer. And we treat
    cancer patients. Most of the patients we serve are from Utah.
    Many are from Nevada or other neighboring States, including
    Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, and even New Mexico.
        Every day we see patients who come from families who have
    borne the burden of environmental exposure to radiation,
    exposure that resulted from Federal policy. This began in the
    1950's with the atmospheric testing of nuclear devices at the
    Nevada test site, the location now proposed for the storage of
    spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Citizens
    of Nevada were exposed to this fallout, and because of the
    typical weather patterns, individuals in Utah, Arizona, and New
    Mexico were as well.
        One of our cancer patients recently told me a horrifying
    story. As children in southern Utah, he and his brothers would
    take a Geiger counter out into the pasture of their farm to
    find the areas that gave the loudest response. Why did their
    parents allow this behavior that now appalls us? It wasn't
    because of disinterest in the well-being of their children, but
    because those parents had been reassured that there was no
    danger.
        As illustrated by the experience of these downwinders, the
    residents of the intermountain west already have been asked to
    stand in harm's way with respect to nuclear exposure more than
    the other citizens of the United States. And yet there's
    another historical example.
        During the same time period, it was deemed important to
    have large stockpiles of uranium, and our region--the same one
    I mentioned--was a key area for mining and refining uranium
    ore. For many years I've kept this photograph of a man who had
    worked as a uranium miner. He gave me this photograph when he
    was my patient while I was an intern at the Veterans
    Administration Hospital in Salt Lake City. I would talk with
    him every evening when my rounds were done, because he had no
    family and he was lonely and he knew he was dying, and I
    couldn't stop it. He was dying from metastatic lung cancer, a
    type that is caused by the radon gas that he breathed in the
    uranium mines. He died, alone, in the Salt Lake VA Hospital.
        This is another example of how some individuals in the
    intermountain west were exposed to radiation that caused cancer
    and took their lives. They were assured that the mines and
    refineries were safe.
        Now the citizens of the same region are being asked to
    assume the risk of a third round of radiation exposure. We are
    told again that the risk will be low. But will an unanticipated
    accident during the transportation cause my neighbors to
    develop lung cancer, leukemia, bone tumors? What suffering will
    come this time to the people of Utah, Nevada, Colorado,
    Arizona, New Mexico? Will my colleagues and I be able to stop
    their premature deaths?
        I recognize that there are difficult questions to answer
    regarding nuclear waste. My purpose today is to emphasize that
    there are serious consequences if we err on the side of not
    enough safety.
        In the course of this public debate, I've heard it claimed
    that the risk from radiation has been overstated. We should be
    clear. Decades of medical research showed exposure to radiation
    causes many types of cancer. Whether an individual will develop
    cancer is hard to predict, because the risk depends on the type
    of radiation, the amount received, and how quickly it is
    received. But we know that high-level waste, as we're
    discussing here, is much more dangerous than low-level waste.
    We must be certain that precautions are in place to prevent the
    release of stored material, either rapidly, as might happen in
    a natural disaster, like an earthquake, or gradually, as would
    happen if the design did not prevent the leakage. Likewise, the
    procedures for transporting high-level waste must prevent
    sudden release, which could cause severe radiation exposure if
    it were to occur in a populated area.
        In conclusion, I plead with you today to not repeat the
    mistakes of the past. Please do not create a situation in which
    my successor will be sitting in front of your successors
    reporting on an excess of cancer deaths in Utah, in Nevada, and
    Colorado, because there were accidents during the transport of
    this material to Yucca Mountain or Skull Valley or because the
    protocol had an unanticipated flaw. None of us will be here to
    answer for our mistakes, because cancer isn't apparent until
    years after the radiation exposure. But posterity will not let
    us escape the responsibility today to ensure that we have done
    everything feasible to protect our neighbors.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Prescott follows:]
     Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Prescott, M.D., Executive Director,
                 Huntsman Cancer Institute, Salt Lake City, UT
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, and Guests: My name is
    Stephen Prescott. I am the Executive Director of the Huntsman Cancer
    Institute in Salt Lake City, Utah. I am a physician and a medical
    scientist and it is in these roles that I appear today. At the Huntsman
    Cancer Institute we conduct research into the causes of cancer, we work
    to prevent cancer, and we treat cancer patients. Most of the patients
    we serve are from Utah, or Nevada, or our other neighboring states.
    Every day we see patients who come from families who have borne the
    burden of environmental exposure to radiation--exposure that resulted
    from federal policy. This began in the 1950s with the atmospheric
    testing of nuclear devices at the Nevada Test Site--the location now
    proposed for storage of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive
    waste. Citizens of Nevada were exposed to this fallout and, because of
    the typical weather patterns, individuals in Utah, Arizona, and New
    Mexico were as well.
        One of our cancer patients recently told me a horrifying story; as
    children in Southern Utah he and his brothers would take a Geiger
    counter out into the pasture on their farm to find the areas that gave
    the loudest response. Why did their parents allow behavior that now
    appalls us? Not because of disinterest in the well-being of their
    children, but because they had been reassured that there was no danger.
        As illustrated by the experience of the Downwinders, the residents
    of the intermountain west already have been asked to stand in harm's
    way, with respect to nuclear exposure, more than other citizens of the
    United States. And yet, there is another historical example. During the
    same time period, it was deemed important to have large stockpiles of
    uranium, and our region was a key area for mining and refining uranium
    ore. For many years I have kept this photograph of a man who had worked
    as a uranium miner. He gave me this photograph when he was my patient
    while I was in intern at the VA Hospital in Salt Lake City. I would
    talk with him every evening when my rounds were done because he had no
    family to visit him; he was lonely and he knew that he was dying. And I
    couldn't stop that. He was dying from metastatic lung cancer--a type
    that is caused by the radon gas he breathed in uranium mines. He died,
    alone, in the VA hospital.
        This is another example of how some individuals in the
    intermountain west were exposed to radiation that caused cancer. They
    were assured that the mines and refineries were safe. Now the citizens
    of the same region are being asked to assume the risk of a third round
    of radiation exposure. We are told, again, that the risk will be low.
    But, will an unanticipated accident during the transportation cause my
    neighbors to develop lung cancer? Leukemia? Bone tumors? What suffering
    will come again to the people of Utah? Nevada? Colorado? Arizona? New
    Mexico? Will my colleagues and I be able to stop their premature
    deaths?
        I recognize that there are difficult questions to answer regarding
    nuclear waste. My purpose today is to emphasize that there are serious
    consequences if we err on the side of not enough safety. In the course
    of this public debate I've heard it claimed that the risk from
    radiation has been overstated. We should be clear: decades of medical
    research show that exposure to radiation causes many types of cancer.
    Whether an individual will develop cancer is hard to predict because
    the risk depends on the type of radiation, the amount received, and how
    quickly it happens. Thus, high-level waste is more dangerous than low-
    level. We need to be certain that precautions are in place to prevent
    the release of the stored material either rapidly, as might happen in a
    natural disaster like an earthquake, or gradually, as would happen if
    the design did not prevent leakage. Likewise, the procedures for
    transporting high-level waste must prevent sudden release, which could
    cause severe radiation exposure if it were to occur in a populated
    area.
        In conclusion, I plead with you today to not repeat the mistakes of
    the past. Please do not create a situation in which my successor will
    be sitting in front of your successors reporting on an excess of cancer
    deaths in Utah and Nevada and Colorado because there were accidents
    during the transport of this material to Yucca Mountain or Skull
    Valley. Or, because the storage protocol had an unanticipated flaw.
    None of us will be here to answer for our mistakes because cancer isn't
    apparent until years after the radiation exposure. But posterity will
    not let us escape the responsibility today to insure that we have done
    everything feasible to protect our neighbors. Thank you.

        The Chairman. Well, thank all of you very much.
        Let me take the first round here, and we'll take about 6
    minutes each to ask questions.
        First, Mr. Halstead, as I understand your testimony, you
    cite a whole series of inadequacies and failures to properly
    plan for safety in connection with the transportation. But is
    it your view that if the proper precautions were taken and if
    the proper planning were to occur, that nuclear waste could be
    transported safely, or is it your view that that is not
    something that's achievable?
        Mr. Halstead. Well, Mr. Chairman, over the past almost 14
    years now that I've worked for the State of Nevada, the State
    of Nevada has made consistently constructive recommendations to
    the Department of Energy on the types of accident prevention
    and accident mitigation programs that the Department of Energy
    should adopt. And certainly it is possible to reduce both the
    probability and the consequences of accidents through proper
    planning. And the Department of Energy should be doing that.
        Nonetheless, it is important to know that even if all the
    recommendations that the State of Nevada has made were adopted,
    there would still be a residual risk of accidents involving
    release of radioactive materials. And it would behoove us to
    always be honest with the public.
        I think it's a difficult situation for the Department of
    Energy that they cannot stand before the public and say, ``We
    have adopted the best available control technologies. We have
    adopted the best engineering practices.'' And in particular one
    issue alone affects radiological risk. And that is the amount
    of cooling time before the spent fuel has been shipped.
        It will sound ironic, but one of the few areas of this life
    that I am aware of where procrastination enhances safety
    actually has to do with the amount of cooling time that the
    spent nuclear fuel at reactors stays on site before it is
    shipped off site. And I state this in my testimony. That
    basically if you--at the 40- or 50-year storage level, you get
    a 90 to 95 percent reduction in the radiological hazard,
    because the short-lived radionuclides, particularly Strontium
    90 and Cesium 137 have relatively short half lives, compared to
    some of the things we worry about, like the long-uranium and
    trans-uranic and plutonium isotopes. So the single most
    important thing we can do for safety is to ship the oldest fuel
    first and not ship any waste until it's been stored for 40 or
    50 years. And this was the original assumption when the
    Department of Energy issued its environmental impact statement
    in favor geologic disposal in 1980.
        And so, first of all there are things we can do to make the
    transportation system safer in terms of preventing accidents.
        Secondly, we can reduce the radiologic hazard by not
    shipping waste until it has been stored for 4 to 5 decades.
        Third, there is still the area of terrorism risk, which I
    think everyone is more aware of now than they were before, but
    it's important to note that the State of Nevada brought the
    terrorism risk to the attention of Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission in June 1999, taking the same approach, saying what
    we know now about the consequences of a successful terrorist
    attack means that we should immediately strengthen the what are
    called safeguards and physical protection regulations.
        And then secondly, we need to do more scientific research
    on what the consequences of a release would actually be. It's
    in this latter area of protecting shipments from becoming dirty
    bombs that I am most pessimistic about our ability to actually
    protect the public health and safety.
        But in the first two areas, the areas of shaping up the
    transportation system to prevent accidents, yes, there are many
    things we can do. And secondly, we can reduce the radiological
    hazard by extended cooling time.
        The Chairman. Let me ask, Dr. Gilinsky, one of the concerns
    that you--as I understand your position on this, you believe
    that a preferable solution to the problem of all of this
    nuclear waste having been produced, the preferable solution to
    putting it in a permanent repository would be to put it in what
    you call monitored retrievable storage at various locations.
        Now, is what the Goshute tribe planning to do, or what is
    being discussed there, one of these, because as I understand
    the mayor of Salt Lake City's testimony, he believes that a
    very objectionable proposal? What are your thoughts as to if we
    pick a variety of places for monitored retrievable storage,
    don't we buy a whole series of safety problems in shipping the
    waste to that as well?
        Dr. Gilinsky. Well, first, the proposal in Utah, I'm not
    familiar with it, and I can't speak to that one. I do think
    that we will in time want to collect the waste at more central
    locations. I think it makes sense in deciding where those are
    to minimize the amount of transportation rather than maximize
    it, as this proposal would do.
        I didn't say anything about transportation in my comments,
    but however you look at it and however you evaluate it, I think
    everyone has to conclude that it's the weakest link in the
    system of waste management. So however you----
        The Chairman. Transportation is the weakest link--is that
    what you're saying?
        Dr. Gilinsky. I would think so, yes. And so however you
    organize your management system, I would think you would want
    to minimize that aspect of it rather than maximize it.
        I mean, most of our plants are in the East. The Yucca
    Mountain of course is way in the West. So what we're doing is
    just maximizing the amount of transportation. And that it seems
    to me doesn't make a lot of sense. There's going to be a
    certain amount of it certainly.
        The Chairman. Let me just ask one additional question. Then
    I'll defer to Senator Craig.
        Mr. Anderson, your position is that you oppose the
    repository, the establishment of the repository or the approval
    of the site for the repository, but you really do believe we
    should go ahead and decommission the existing nuclear
    powerplants and recognize that this is not a safe way to be
    producing power, and until we come up with a different and
    adequate solution to the waste problem, we shouldn't be using
    nuclear power. Is that an accurate paraphrase of your position?
        Mr. Anderson. Absolutely. And I might also say, there was a
    comment earlier by Senator Murkowski that--because Governor
    Guinn or other people from Nevada weren't on this panel that
    apparently they weren't opposing this. Governor Guinn has
    provided very compelling comments to the House committee in
    this regard in terms of both the science of the site and the
    transportation difficulties. And I think there are very
    significant issues going to the very bad science between the
    siting decision to this point, the transportation safety
    issues--not only is it the weakest link, but the science hasn't
    even been done. There haven't been actual tests as to the
    casks. And the third thing that Congress needs to get a hold of
    is that ultimate question of what are the long-term solutions
    to this problem?
        I think in 1982, when Congress was looking to determine
    what one place would be the final repository--we now know that
    Yucca Mountain would be at capacity by the year 2036, and we're
    going to continue to have all of these problems.
        The Chairman. Let me defer to Senator Craig.
        Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    Gentlemen, thank you all for your testimony. I too am not here
    to question your sincerity or your knowledge. I have looked at
    this issue, debated it, studied it for over a decade now, and
    probably Dr. Gilinsky and I have been more involved in it over
    a longer period of time than most.
        I see you were testifying back in 1982, Doctor, and I'd
    like to quote some of your testimony at that time, because
    obviously you were thinking then about the need for a more
    permanent repository. The question is here, what about the
    interim? And this is a speech that you gave as a member of the
    commission in 1982.
        You said, ``We have seen that there is essentially no
    practical limit to the amount of spent fuel that can be stored
    at most reactor sites. This does not mean, however, that it
    would be a good idea to leave it there.'' And I think some of
    your comments today reflect that concern.
        A lot of folks think you can just leave it where it is--and
    I've heard that said reflectively today by several--even though
    the sites were temporary in the beginning, designed for only
    temporary storage, until such time as we, the country, not
    private sector individuals, determined a permanent solution to
    the nuclear high-level waste stream coming off from especially
    commercial reactors at that time, but also public purposes of
    the Federal Government.
        You went on to say, ``There has been a lot of exaggeration
    of the dangers of commercial spent fuel storage and disposal.''
        I don't see anything contradictory in that statement, but I
    think way back then you and I and others were involved. I was a
    freshman congressman or a sophomore congressman in the early
    1980's, looked at it and voted. So this is not a rush to
    judgment or this is not a last-minute debate, or I believe,
    Doctor, you referenced the word ``current effort to stampede.''
    We have been at this effort ad nauseam, since 1982, when you
    first became involved. I see no stampede today. I see time
    lines and decisions to be made, pro or con. And you know and I
    know that decisions are triggered by law, and these are not
    efforts at stampeding anybody.
        Now the Senate by law has a responsibility to make a
    determination whether to move a step further and allow the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which you once served on, to
    make a determination as to whether DOE was correct in its
    assumption, its scientific studies.
        So I can't argue stampede. I do believe that's a bit of
    false imagery. We're all entitled to our own language. But
    you've been involved in this too long to suggest that it's a
    stampede. A snail's pace or a desert tortoise's trot, possibly.
        Now you can comment to that, if you wish, but I only make
    comment on it, because I think you and I go back too long to
    suggest that we are rushing to a decision. The decision we are
    about today we determined several years ago. We would be on a
    time line to make that decision, based on an act of Congress
    and the findings of the EPA and DOE. That would be my only
    comment to your testimony.
        We have an interesting reflection today. I was at the
    hearing the other day and anticipated that we would have Nevada
    and Nevada citizens here. And, of course, that's not the case
    today. And I understand the politics of this and that we're
    really in the business of trying to generate as much fear as is
    possible on the issue of transportation, even though we have
    nothing to do with it at this moment. Transportation is being
    looked at and will be looked at in a much higher degree if the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission makes decisions.
        But, mayor, I guess I'm a little concerned about some of
    the language you used. We politicians love to use fear. It's a
    great motivating factor. I'm surprised that in fear of a
    terrorist attack and the world focused on Salt Lake, you did
    not cancel the Olympic Games. Everybody said that was the
    ultimate target. And yet I would think that citizens of your
    area were very fearful that they might come under attack. And
    yet I didn't hear you speak out in the cancellation of those
    games. And frankly I'm glad you didn't. You're to be
    congratulated for a marvelous production.
        But the world was focused and every television camera in
    the world was there, and it was the ultimate target. And yet
    fear did not stop you from allowing the games to go forward.
    And I know that we invested a good deal in them, and I voted
    for that.
        And so, in other words, we could prepare against fear, and
    we could most importantly prepare against a terrorist attack,
    which we did in Salt Lake. And as a result of, I think, the
    $310 million you're speaking to, we survived and the world and
    the country and Utah are prouder for it. I won't suggest the
    profits made or the monies recognized. That's neither here nor
    there. But this is something to be said, that if this Senate
    decides to go forward with allowing the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission to determine that the soonest possible date for
    movement of any material would be around 2010, now I would
    suggest to any of you on this dais today who are using 9/11 to
    heighten your argument of fear and terrorism, if this country
    doesn't have its act together by 2010 on the issue of
    terrorism, then maybe your arguments will be relevant.
    Certainly your arguments to engender alertness and preparedness
    and reexamination are extremely valuable.
        But I must tell you, and I look at the State of Maryland,
    with 1,160 metric tons of high-level waste stored in a
    temporary facility on everybody's map today, including probably
    most terrorists, Michigan, with 1,862 metric tons of waste
    temporarily stored in a static or a known location, seems like
    it's a much more reasonable target than a mobile target. And
    then I guess we could say Wisconsin, with 1,146 metric tons of
    high-level waste stored, California with 2,457, all of it in
    temporary storage, both pools and dry casks. Now, if the
    terrorist world believes that this is a right approach toward
    intimidating American citizens, then my guess is they know
    where every one of those locations is today. I cannot
    understand how you would suggest that that is not a level of
    high vulnerability.
        I know what your task is today. I understand it. But to
    prejudge how we're going to mow the lawn before we've even
    poured the concrete to build the structure is in itself a
    fascination. It seems to me that fear is the element you tried
    to generate today, not the logic, the reality, or the
    application of good science and a country dedicated to solving
    a problem, because we proved in Salt Lake, mayor, that if we
    are dedicated to doing something, we can get it done and you
    can profit by it. And so can we and the world.
        It would have been a shame, out of fear, to deny the world,
    our country, and Salt Lake an opportunity to have the winter
    games of 2002. Thank you for not succumbing to fear.
        Dr. Gilinsky. May I say a word, Senator?
        The Chairman. Did any witness wish to respond? If so, go
    ahead.
        Dr. Gilinsky. I certainly would like to, Mr. Chairman,
    Senator.
        Senator Craig, your reference to my speech years ago gives
    me the opportunity to say that I supported this concept at that
    time.
        Senator Craig. I didn't go that far. I wanted you to say
    that.
        Dr. Gilinsky. And which I had omitted in my remarks and had
    forgotten to mention. So what I'm saying is pretty much what I
    was saying back then.
        Senator Craig. Yes.
        Dr. Gilinsky. I had questions about the permanent
    repository disposal concept. And I thought we ought to go to a
    system of management where we continue to monitor the waste. I
    think DOE itself is having second thoughts about the disposal
    concept and is now talking about possibly keeping Yucca
    Mountain, if it is approved, open up to 300 years. And I think
    really that's saying forever. So they're really talking about a
    monitor retrieval system at Yucca Mountain, but a thousand feet
    down. It's a sort of a mixture of the old concept and the new
    concept. I think it's just an outdated relic of earlier
    thinking.
        In reference to your point about stampede, we know that DOE
    is not ready to file an application within 90 days, as required
    by law. And yet they're talking about filing an application in
    2004. They're not just going to miss this by a few days.
    They're going to miss this by years. So what's the hurry? So I
    think stampede really is an appropriate word.
        You mentioned that after all this is all going to be
    reviewed by NRC. Certain aspects of it will be, but not the
    basic site suitability determination that by law DOE is
    required to make. And they interpreted the law that way for
    many years, up to about 1996, and said so, that they had two
    responsibilities. One was site suitability, which was quite
    apart from the man-made structures and the container. And the
    other is to meet NRC's licensing requirements. Now they've
    dropped that first requirement and just said, ``We're just
    going to meet NRC's licensing requirements.'' So there's a gap
    here. And I frankly can't see how you can let them get away
    with this.
        Senator Craig. Well, 1990, we hadn't put EPA into it pre-
    1996, had we?
        Dr. Gilinsky. No.
        Senator Craig. No. And that did change the dynamics of the
    effort at Yucca Mountain.
        Dr. Gilinsky. But it didn't change the standards for site
    suitability. There are still two jobs.
        Senator Craig. We raised it to a 10,000-year standard, did
    we not?
        Dr. Gilinsky. It's one aspect of it. There's the licensing
    aspect.
        Senator Craig. But we did change it.
        Dr. Gilinsky. You did change it, but you didn't relieve
    them of that other responsibility.
        Senator Craig. I see what you're saying.
        Dr. Gilinsky. And let me just go to one other point, which
    is the mention of the word ``temporary.'' Now, as if somehow
    this is something terrible, you know, because these were
    intended to be temporary storage facilities at the reactors.
    Now, in fact, they were intended to be even more temporary than
    they are. Originally, we intended to reprocess all the fuel.
    And we were----
        Senator Craig. I didn't go that far. I studied them very
    closely.
        Dr. Gilinsky. Well, we both go back a long way. But we were
    just going to have the fuel there, you know, 1 to 3 years and
    then ship it off to reprocessing. We've learned something. And
    to say that this is--it wasn't meant to be this way 34 years--
    --
        Senator Craig. Don't use those words, Doctor, 'cause I
    don't want to engender fear of the current situation.
        Dr. Gilinsky. I don't know if you've read the
    recommendations of the Secretary of Energy.
        Senator Craig. I have.
        Dr. Gilinsky. But he is engendering fear. He has put stuff
    in there that I was just absolutely amazed. He lists all the
    cities that are within 75 miles of a reactor. He says these
    things are decaying. They could go into waterways. I haven't
    heard or seen stuff like this in the Union of Concerned
    Scientists. And then he says----
        Senator Craig. Well, you should listen to some of the
    testimony before this committee, then.
        Dr. Gilinsky. Well, maybe. But then he says once you get it
    into a truck and you take it over to Nevada, even if the
    container fails, even if everything fails, nothing is going to
    leak because this is ceramic. So somehow the ceramic sitting at
    the reactor site is vulnerable, but the ceramic sitting--the
    same piece of material sitting in Yucca Mountain isn't going to
    do anything. There's a real disconnect here. And if there's
    fear mongering, I think they've been engaged in.
        But the thing I wanted to say about the temporary, we
    shouldn't let all errors of the past become hereditary. We can
    learn some things. And if we've changed our mind and the thing
    of it makes sense, if we have a new way that makes sense, let's
    do it.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Any other response? Yes.
        Mr. Anderson. If I may, yes.
        And, Senator Craig, I absolutely agree with you that it was
    important to this country and I think the peace-loving people
    throughout the world to move forward with the Olympics even in
    view of the events of September 11. I advocated that. And
    following the Olympics, I've spoken a number of times about how
    moving forward with our lives and holding these kinds of
    events, especially where we bring people together from
    throughout the world in celebration and peace, that that in
    itself is a triumph over terrorism.
        But to characterize the presentations today as somehow fear
    mongering I think is an absolute mischaracterization. We are
    attempting to point out some of the massive security risks. I
    think you don't defeat terrorism by simply saying that there
    may be risk, but we're going to march merrily along and ignore
    those risks. And I felt that it was also important to talk
    about solutions. And I ended my remarks by discussing the need
    to, number one, come up with a good, long-term solution, as I
    think Congress intended in 1982.
        But we're facing very different circumstances now. We have
    131 storage sites throughout this country that will still be
    targets. As soon as Yucca Mountain goes into operation, if that
    in fact occurs, we're not going to be getting rid of these
    materials from these sites all at once. In fact, we're only
    going to have about a net depletion at these sites of about a
    thousand tons per year. Three thousand tons will be shipped
    each year. Two thousand new tons are projected to be produced.
    And we'll have 64,000 tons in place in the year 2010 or 2011,
    when these shipments commence. So these sites are still going
    to have these materials. We'll still have 103--at least at
    present we have 103 nuclear plants in 66 locations that will
    still be prime targets and still will be vulnerable to the same
    kinds of accidents and the human error and the technological
    problems that we already know about.
        So I think the three things that Congress must take a hold
    of, and I would submit that it's Congress's responsibility, not
    something you delegate to NRC, is that you make sure the
    science is good. And again, I would refer to Governor Guinn's
    testimony before the House committee--and I hope that's been
    submitted to this committee--where he references a new report,
    a peer review report commissioned by the DOE, that excoriates--
    those were his words--the scientific work of the Department of
    Energy in connection with Yucca Mountain.
        Secondly, that there be an insistence that actual tests on
    actual casks being utilized be performed and that these casks
    meet plausible terrorist acts and scenarios; that's not been
    done. And I think Martin Resnikof's analogy to what happened in
    1970 when NRC--who apparently someone on this committee wanted
    to delegate this authority to--NRC said, with regard to the
    shipment by air of plutonium, that drop tests of 30 feet were
    sufficient.
        And when the attorney general of New York made its case,
    NRC argued against New York's position, and it took Congress
    taking that decision away from the NRC--I think that's exactly
    what Congress ought to be doing today, demanding that actual
    tests be done on the very casks that are used.
        And then third, there will be no security. We're being
    absolutely foolhardy to move forward with any of this without a
    long-term final solution. And that means conservation. That
    means other technology that's not going to continue us on this
    disastrous course.
        Thank you.
        Senator Craig. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reid.
        Senator Reid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        People would like this hearing to be Nevada complaining
    about Yucca Mountain. And we could do that. And we've done it
    for years. But it's time the American people heard that this is
    not a problem that relates to Nevada. It's a problem that
    relates to our country. And that's why this panel of witnesses
    has been put together, and you've done on outstanding job.
        Now, for anyone to suggest that John Ensign, Harry Reid,
    and especially Kenny Guinn, Governor of Nevada, does not oppose
    nuclear waste is a dream that someone has. What good would a
    hearing do for Ensign and I to be down there and Governor Guinn
    to come and say we don't want nuclear waste? None. We've been
    doing it for 20 years. But what has developed now is a picture
    of what will happen if nuclear waste is attempted to be
    transported in this country. And that's why the Nuclear Energy
    Institute and these other people, who have this fetish to
    transport nuclear waste are upset about this panel that we've
    got here.
        Now, mayor, thank you very much for being here. I think it
    says it all, on the piece of paper that you have, introducing
    your testimony, which shows a cowboy on a horse, and it shows a
    nuclear bomb going off with the mushroom cloud. And this was
    from an Atomic Energy Commission booklet, 1957, Atomic Tests in
    Nevada. And under it, under this cartoon-like figure, and it
    turned out to be a real cruel cartoon, are the words, ``There
    is no danger.'' That's what we're hearing.
        We heard it with the above-ground nuclear tests--and that's
    what this illustrated--when we have people who are still dying,
    as Dr. Prescott has said, from these tests that took place in
    Nevada.
        You know, I used to watch them go off. And I was lucky,
    because they always made sure the wind did not blow toward Las
    Vegas. It blew toward Lincoln County, Nevada, and into southern
    Utah, where people are now dead and are dying. So anyone who
    suggests that the Federal Government has this under control is
    walking in dreamland.
        I wanted to go through the resumes of each of you here.
    Everyone within the sound of my voice should understand that
    the panel of witnesses here is above reproach. No one can touch
    their veracity, their educational, or professional backgrounds.
    Every one of you. Now, some of you have been hired by the State
    of Nevada. So what?
        We know that--I say this to you, Mr. Halstead, and I think
    you did a good job answering this already--the increase in
    shipments and the distance covered and the number of vehicles
    on the road, does that effect the risk of an accident? I mean,
    does it take much of a mathematician to figure that out?
        Mr. Halstead. No, Senator, it doesn't. And, in fact, many
    people would be surprised to find that, to begin with, the past
    statistical accident record of the industry is pretty average.
    And that's why, when we project their past accident rate
    forward with the large increase in shipment miles, that we get
    the numbers of projections of about 150 to as high as 400
    accidents over the shipments that are being proposed.
        The bottom line is that the Department of Energy, once they
    reach their full level of operations, would be shipping as much
    waste every year for certainly 24 years as they have shipped in
    the entire past 40 years. And the shipment distance would
    increase from about five to six hundred miles in the past to
    well over 2,000--about 2200 miles on average, creating more
    opportunities for equipment failure and human error.
        Senator Reid. And as Michael Ervin has said, he's a police
    officer and has been for several decades, but he could go out
    tomorrow, jump in a truck, and whip it through the country
    hauling nuclear waste or hazardous waste. Now, as alert as you
    appear, I think that you have--some of your driving skills, you
    may have to brush up on them a little bit; isn't that right?
        Mr. Ervin. Yes, Senator. Those are what I would consider
    perishable skills. The longer you're away from the business,
    the lower your skill level becomes. So you have to go out and
    restart again and practice.
        Senator Reid. I drove a truck, but a small one, that hauled
    oil, gas in it. And I was taught that you could drive as safely
    as you wanted, but the concern you had was with other people.
    And it's the same with driving one of these big trucks, isn't
    it?
        Mr. Ervin. Very much so. In fact, I was blessed and
    fortunate enough to learn from my father, who drove for 45
    years. And the big thing he taught me was not only to take care
    of yourself, but you need to predict what the people around you
    are going to do.
        And his favorite term was, ``If you think it's crazy or
    stupid for them to do, they'll probably do it, so be prepared
    for it.''
        And he was right more times than not.
        Senator Reid. Dr. Ballard--again, we have a panel here of
    witnesses who are extremely well qualified. Dr. Ballard is no
    exception to that.
        Secretary Abraham testified that the EIS considered the
    probability of a worst-case scenario to be 2.8 in 10 million
    per year over 24 years. In addition, the new threat post-
    September 11 has reflected that nuclear waste shipments could
    become targets for terrorists. In your opinion, how do these
    changes affect these safety projections, and do these
    projections still reflect the risk realistically?
        Dr. Ballard. Senator, thank you for having me here today. I
    have several comments that I'd like to bring to that particular
    point.
        Senator Reid. Your professional academic life is terrorism,
    isn't that right?
        Dr. Ballard. Yes, sir. I teach a variety of classes of
    terrorism, both domestic and international. I have spent the
    last seven years studying this area exclusively. My training is
    in political sociology, deviance, and criminology, though I
    teach in a criminal justice department, where I train police
    officers for their future careers.
        This particular issue has been one that's motivated me to
    become an academic. It seems like we're having a convention of
    former truck drivers here, 'cause in a former life, in southern
    California, I have driven a truck myself too.
        The answer to your question is very complex, but I have
    three points that I'd like to make. And I hope that they can
    get to some of the misperceptions I think that people may have
    about the risk of terrorism and the reason why somebody like
    myself, who's an academic of the terrorist tactics that could
    be used, would be testifying.
        First of all, I want to talk about the current threat
    environment. Yes, it has been heightened since September 11,
    but that is only true in the United States. Around the world,
    people are very concerned about attacks against nuclear
    facilities. This is an important point I'll get to in a moment.
    But as we've seen in the recent G8 meeting attended by Spencer
    Abraham, this concern is not just in the United States.
        We've seen mass protest in Germany and other countries that
    indicate what might happen after a large-scale shipment program
    could begin. We also do not hear very much in the United States
    about those attacks that are being perpetrated in places like
    Russia--in the former Soviet Union--pardon me--and the newly
    independent States. Have to get the acronyms right.
        There's a researcher named Lyudmilla Zaitseva at Stanford,
    who has documented 16 attacks against these type of facilities
    in the year 2000. I haven't talked to her recently about her
    newest research. The point of that is terrorists and those who
    would perpetuate mass violence are interested in radiological
    targets. That's what we should be discussing here today.
        There's also a process that's being more and more
    understood by the academic community. And this is a diffusion
    of tactics. If we have a successful terrorist attack, using an
    airplane, for example, to take down a building, other people
    are going to become interested in it. We have to be proactive,
    to stop that diffusion of tactics. So we have to start planning
    for these events much before there will be any other
    consideration. And part of that is a transportation issue. Part
    of that is a security issue. Part of it is a national security
    issue. All of those come to bear on this particular topic.
        Secondly, I spoke in my written comments about the symbolic
    value of these targets. These targets will be different than
    the shipments that are being made now. They'll be different
    because it's a large-scale planned campaign of federalization
    program that may be opposed by domestic groups because of its
    connection to military targets; it may be opposed by
    international groups. We have to be forward thinking in this
    process. And we have to address those potential risks.
        Lastly, because this is an energy committee, I will defer
    to some of the economic literature and talk about the event
    risk that this particular shipment program poses to the energy
    industry and the energy commodities market. It's very
    interesting to me to hear people not address those issues.
        If there was a single terrorist attack or major accident
    involving these materials, it would have a significant impact
    on these industries and the commodities market. They call that
    event risk these days. So after September 11 we saw a
    significant impact into the financial markets. The same would
    be true in the event of a terrorist attack.
        I hope that answers your question, sir.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And once again
    thank you very much for holding this hearing and allowing a
    little different side than I think most senators have been
    exposed to on the whole issue of storing nuclear waste and
    transporting nuclear waste.
        As Senator Reid mentioned, one of the reasons that we
    wanted the panel made up of different people today was that
    Nevada's side has been told. We have been telling it from every
    angle that we can tell it from and why we think that Yucca
    Mountain is a bad idea. But unfortunately people seem to have
    already made up their mind in a lot of cases. And so we didn't
    want to take why just Yucca Mountain is a bad idea.
        We want to also discuss why transportation is a bad idea,
    because then it impacts individual people in their own cities
    and towns across the country. And I think that it's very
    important as a national issue for these--the dangers--not to
    use fear, but for the dangers, the real dangers, to be
    explored, so that if we do currently as we are currently
    transporting nuclear waste, we need to explore those dangers
    and to try to correct them, to try to make it safer for the
    transportation that we're currently doing.
        All of us looked at September 11. And the reason I disagree
    with Senator--the Senator from Idaho and his characterization
    about fear is that--is that September 11 changed everything in
    this country. We need to look at everything differently. We
    need to look at the way that all of our security of all of our
    capital complex is different today, post September 11. And we
    need, I think, to look at the transportation of nuclear waste.
    As Dr. Ballard has talked about, these are huge targets. And so
    we need to think, I think, in different ways than we have
    thought about in the past.
        I want to explore a few of the areas that have been talked
    about. Senator Thomas, when he first opened his--or the one
    comment that he made was the 175 shipments that have been--that
    are going to be made. And I've heard that and I've heard that
    and I've heard that. And Dr. Gilinsky and I think Mr. Halstead,
    in your testimony, between the two of you, the Department of
    Energy--and I'd like to submit for the record the Department of
    Energy in their final EIS, on page J10 and page J11, those two
    pages, really point out--first of all, that they only did the
    final EIS on 77 of the sites, if I'm correct. Is that correct,
    Mr. Halstead?
        Mr. Halstead. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Ensign. And there's 131 sites total?
        Mr. Halstead. That's right.
        Senator Ensign. Under their lowest case scenario, they're
    talking about between--and if it's mostly rail--and that would
    be the lowest, lowest number that we have--under their lowest
    case scenario, over the 23 years, they're looking at about
    10,600 shipments. Is that number correct to you?
        Mr. Halstead. That's correct.
        Senator Ensign. This is all documented according to the
    DOE. Well, divide 10,600 by 23 years. I'm not exactly a
    mathematician, but I think that that's close to 500 per year.
    So--and that's on their lowest case scenario, with just 77 of
    the sites. So when somebody says 175 shipments per year----
        Mr. Halstead. Big shipments.
        Senator Ensign. Yeah. They're going to be a lot bigger
    shipments than the ones they're talking about.
        Mr. Halstead. Might I add to that, Senator Ensign, that
    what is unfortunately not made clear to the reader--and I have
    my document open also to page J11, because that's perhaps the
    most important page in the whole environmental impact statement
    for transportation--they forget to mention that in order to
    make that low case mostly rail work, they have to make 1,600
    barge shipments and they have to make 600 to 800 heavy haul
    truck shipments just on the reactor end alone. And then, since
    they haven't put forward a route for a railroad in Nevada, the
    possibility would certainly be there that they would have to
    move each of those rail casks onto a heavy haul truck, which
    because they would be separately permitted, would have to be
    counted as a separate shipment. And that adds another 9,600
    shipments. So that's why in my statement I added the more
    appropriate numbers. In order to make this mostly rail program
    work, you have to add a bunch of shipments that the Department
    of Energy has conveniently omitted from the table, which even
    in itself shows much larger numbers than the Secretary has been
    quoting publicly.
        Senator Ensign. Right. And once again that's only 77 sites,
    correct?
        Mr. Halstead. That's right.
        Senator Ensign. Which is amazing to me that they only
    covered 77 sites and forgot that there were--everybody's been
    talking about the 131 sites. So I thought that was important to
    get on the record.
        Dr. Gilinsky, you mentioned something about viability of
    nuclear power. And I hear a lot that the reason that people
    want to build Yucca Mountain is they think that it will make
    nuclear power more viable. You mentioned on-site dry cask
    storage cost, transportation risks, and some of those kind of
    things. Can you just explore that a little more, as far as the
    viability of nuclear power, of putting $60 billion-plus into
    Yucca Mountain and what that does to the possible cost of
    nuclear power in the future and we know the politics of
    transporting this waste.
        Dr. Gilinsky. Well, the cost of this project is already
    estimated by DOE to be $60 billion. And that has been growing
    rather rapidly. So to put a $100 billion label on it I think
    wouldn't be appropriate--wouldn't be inappropriate.
        Somehow or other the people who are most involved with
    nuclear power have convinced themselves that the thing that's
    holding up public approval, which is usually the phrase, to an
    expansion of nuclear power is the lack of a permanent
    repository. I think this is a complete misreading of what their
    problems are and what the pros and cons of nuclear power are
    and what the future of it will turn on. I think mostly it will
    turn on the quality of the generators, the economics and the
    safety of the generating plants.
        But somehow they have convinced themselves of this, and
    they think this is the be all and end all. And I think that
    Washington lobbyists have not done them a favor in convincing
    them of this. And so this to me is the driving consideration.
        I've talked to people in the Department of Energy. They're
    not personally concerned about the safety of the waste sites as
    they are now. They think the public out there is concerned. And
    so we must do this in order to convince the public to have more
    nuclear power.
        Well, this--even if it were true, I think it's not a good
    reason to spend public money this way. But I don't think it's
    right. And we have a system that works. The on-site storage is
    there. It's NRC approved. We can store fuel this way for many
    years, decades. And as I said, in time we'll want to collect,
    not because it isn't safe to be at those sites. But I think you
    want fuel generally to be in the hands of people whose
    principal business that is to limit the distraction of the--for
    the operators. But that's a matter of degree. And I think we
    have plenty of time to do it and to do a good and responsible
    job.
        I did want to make just one comment going back to your
    transportation comment. And that is I haven't myself gotten
    into this subject, but I have done a little arithmetic here
    while everybody was talking. And if you divide the 2,000 tons
    per year by 175, you get about 11. And that's 11 tons of spent
    fuel per shipment. And that implies cask weight several times
    that. So we're talking about tens of tons per shipment. I'm not
    aware that DOE has vehicles that can handle this at least at
    the present time. So that's a question I think that they ought
    to be asked.
        Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, if I may just follow up with
    one other question for Mr. Gilinsky, because I thought this was
    maybe the most important part of your testimony. It's something
    that I've been emphasizing that we have time. The point about
    Yucca Mountain, the point about a nuclear waste repository is
    we have time. And as a matter of fact, what I thought about
    your testimony is taking time actually improves the situation,
    because of the cooling time. The radioactive nucleotides that
    actually decrease their toxicity over 40 to 50 years.
        Waiting 40 to 50 years is actually a benefit
    scientifically. Not emotionally, not fear mongering, but from a
    scientific basis, it would actually be better, even if you were
    going to build Yucca Mountain, to do it 40 to 50 years from
    now, to ship that stuff and to bring it to the site. I thought
    that was very important.
        Do you care to comment further?
        Dr. Gilinsky. I agree with that, Senator. And, in fact,
    DOE's plans--they talk about two possibilities, a hot
    repository, which was their original plan, and the waste board
    raised a lot of questions about that--the technical review
    board. And so they're now thinking about a cool repository.
        Now, if you go to a cool repository, when they bring the
    stuff to Yucca Mountain, they're going to have to leave it on
    the surface for decades before they put it down there. So
    they're talking about collecting it and then leaving it on the
    surface. I mean, they will reconfigure it and change it from
    this kind of cask to that kind of cask and so on. But they're
    basically going to have to leave it on the surface, because
    they can't put it down right away.
        And this is why it's also extremely misleading that they've
    been putting out this idea, one is better than 131, as if all
    of a sudden we've had this terrorist attack, people are
    worried, and they're sort of suggesting, and a lot of editorial
    writers have bought this message, that we're going to collect
    this stuff really fast, get it out of all these sites, put it
    in one place and underground, and isn't that better?
        Well, ``A,'' it's not going to get collected for decades
    and then very likely it's going to sit--I mean, if we go
    forward with this proposal, it's going to sit on the surface
    there, and there will still be lots of waste at those sites. So
    I think this is not a good idea.
        Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman, I know that you have--like all
    of us----
        The Chairman. Go ahead. We still have time if you have an
    additional question.
        Senator Reid. We have a vote at 11:30.
        I want to say this, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I am
    grateful to you and your staff for allowing us to have this
    hearing. You could have jammed this through, as happens a lot
    of times in Congress.
        I want to say this. My friends came earlier, who are in
    support of Yucca Mountain, and in effect bad-mouthed this
    hearing. I'm disappointed they didn't stay for the hearing.
    They may have learned something.
        Here on this panel we have two Ph.Ds, one of the foremost
    medical doctors in the country, people who are experienced--one
    is a mayor of a major city in Utah--we have an eminent panel of
    witnesses here. And I'm so disappointed with people who come in
    and smear mud all over this hearing and then leave. I think
    that's not the right way to go.
        The situation is this. We don't like Yucca Mountain. Of
    course, we don't like Yucca Mountain. But the fact of the
    matter is the people of this country are going to react just
    like the people in Germany that Dr. Ballard talked about. They
    have dropped their plans in Germany to transport, to have a
    repository, 'cause why? They can't move it. We are never going
    to haul nuclear waste in America. Understand that.
        Now, it doesn't matter what--they can say, ``Okay, we're
    going to haul it to Yucca Mountain in 2010.'' It will never
    ever happen. Believe me.
        They are not going to allow nuclear waste to be transported
    in this country unless there are some changes made in
    procedures. You can't haul these trucks up and down the
    highways and rail. We have evil people in this country today
    who are looking for targets of opportunity. That's what we've
    been told here today. If fear has been generated today, it's
    the right thing to do. People should be concerned about what's
    taking place.
        The Department of Energy, led by the Secretary of Energy,
    who is from the State of Michigan, who was in love with nuclear
    waste when he was in the Senate--he's still in love with
    nuclear waste--gave some very bad advice to a President who I'm
    convinced wanted to do the right thing. He didn't do the right
    thing, and I won't go into how I feel about that.
        But we have a situation here that we at least have been
    able to let the people of this country know by people who have
    qualifications about what's about to happen to this country,
    and it's too bad.
        The Chairman. Senator Ensign, did you have any final
    question?
        Senator Ensign. I don't, Mr. Chairman, other than just to
    say thank you. I think it--I agree with Senator Reid. It is a
    shame that actually all the Senators to the committee on such
    an important issue--I mean, we're not talking about a $100
    million program; we're talking a $60 to $100 billion program
    that is of such import that it really is a shame that the rest
    of the Senators were not here to hear this, because I think
    that if an objective listener were listening to the testimony
    here, what Secretary Abraham did, just the going back and forth
    of all the facts, if anybody was objective on this, I think
    that it--the evidence is so clear against Yucca Mountain, it
    amazes me that people are still wanting to go forward with it.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Well, thank you. Tomorrow we have our final
    hearing on this issue with the various boards and oversight
    organizations that have been looking into this. And so we will
    convene again tomorrow.
        Thanks to all the witnesses. I think it was good testimony.
        The Witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to be
    reconvened on May 23, 2002.]

                     YUCCA MOUNTAIN DEPOSITORY DEVELOPMENT

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 23, 2002

                                           U.S. Senate,
                     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
    chairman, presiding.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

        The Chairman. We will call the hearing to order. The
    committee meets this morning for the last of three hearings on
    S.J. Res. 34, which is a joint resolution approving the site at
    Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for the development of the nuclear
    waste repository.
        The question posed to us by the joint resolution is whether
    Congress should allow the Secretary of Energy to apply to the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license to build a nuclear
    waste repository at Yucca Mountain. Last week we heard the
    Secretary of Energy explain that we should. Yesterday, we heard
    spokesmen for the State of Nevada explain why we should not.
    And today, we will hear from the agencies charged with
    regulating or overseeing the repository program.
        Our first panel will consist of the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, which will be responsible for deciding whether to
    authorize construction of a repository, if Congress approves
    the President's site recommendation.
        Following the panel made up of the Commissioners, we will
    hear from a second panel consisting of Dr. Jared Cohon, who is
    the Chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which
    was established to provide independent experts, scientific and
    technical advice about the program to the Secretary of Energy
    and the Congress.
        Second on this panel is the Honorable Jeffrey R. Holmstead,
    who is the Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation at the
    Environmental Protection Agency, which is responsible for
    setting radiation protection standards for the repository.
        Third on the second panel is Ms. Gary Jones, the Director
    of the Natural Resources and Environment Team of the General
    Accounting Office, which monitors the nuclear waste program for
    Congress.
        And finally on that panel is Mr. Robert Card, who is the
    Under Secretary of Energy.
        Before we hear from these two panels, however, we want to
    hear from Jim Hall on behalf of the Transportation Safety
    Coalition. Mr. Hall was originally invited to testify yesterday
    with Nevada's other witnesses, but was unable to be here
    yesterday. So, we have agreed to hear from him first this
    morning.
        As at the prior two hearings, we have again invited
    Senators Reid and Ensign to sit with the committee this
    morning, and ask questions if they desire to do so.
        I see my ranking member, Senator Murkowski, just arriving.
    Let me see if he has any opening statement before we turn to
    Mr. Hall for his testimony.
        [A prepared statement from Senator Reid follows:]
        Prepared Statement of Hon. Harry Reid, U.S. Senator From Nevada
        I want to thank you Chairman Bingaman and Senator Murkowski for
    allowing me the opportunity to participate in this hearing and for
    understanding the importance of this issue to me and to my state, and
    really to almost every state.
        The resolution this committee is considering refers to the
    President's recommendation of Yucca Mountain, Nevada as the site for
    disposal of high-level radioactive waste.
        But this limited description fails to take into account the full
    implications of developing a repository there (or anywhere else)
    namely, that before dumping the nation's nuclear waste on Nevada, it
    has to be shipped through 43 states, including the states most members
    of this committee represent.
        Today we are going to hear from witnesses who will tell us about
    the risks the Department of Energy's program will entail--these include
    risks in Nevada and more importantly, risks all over the country where
    this waste will be shipped.
        The Secretary said it best last week when he acknowledged that the
    Department of Energy has only had preliminary thoughts about a
    transportation plan for this waste. That's like someone building a
    hospital with no doctors.
        So while there are many fundamental problems with the site itself
    and concerns about the process that led to the President's
    recommendation of the site, I want to first address the dangers of
    transporting massive amounts of deadly nuclear waste along the nation's
    major highways, railroad tracks and waterways.
        Bush plan for moving thousands of tons of deadly high-level
    radioactive waste requires 100,000 shipments by truck, 20,000 by train
    and perhaps thousands more by barge over 40 years.
        This idea would be risky at any time, but after September 11, 2001
    it is just unthinkable.
        The long term radiation contained in each shipment is 240 times
    radiation released by the Hiroshima bomb.
        Shipments will pass by homes, schools, parks, churches, offices.
        Shipments jeopardize the safety, health, environment and the lives
    of many people who live in cities and towns all over the country.
        We know there will be hundreds of accidents involving shipments of
    nuclear waste.
        It's not a question of if, but when and where and how severe will
    these accidents be. And an accident involving a container of deadly
    nuclear waste is no routine fender-bender. A collision or fire
    involving a 25-ton payload of nuclear waste could kill thousands.
        Yet, the Department of Energy despite knowing there will be
    accidents recommended this plan without developing a plan for the
    shipments.
        In addition, DOE has failed to provide the millions of people who
    live near the proposed routes the information they need to understand
    the risk their families face.
        Deadly accidents are not the only concern. Shipping nuclear waste
    across the country increases our vulnerability to terrorist attack, by
    adding hundreds of thousands of targets for terrorists to attack with a
    missile or to hijack or to sabotage.
        So transporting deadly nuclear waste is dangerous and it's a risk
    our country shouldn't take.
        The nuclear power industry and some of its backers suggest it would
    be better to have nuclear waste at a single site instead of scattered
    around the country. But this is a false promise, because the nation's
    nuclear waste will never be consolidated at a single site.
        It will continue to be at every one of the operating reactor sites.
    Spent nuclear fuel rods are so hot and radioactive that they have to be
    stored at the nuclear reactor site in a cooling pond for 5 years before
    they can be moved. So developing Yucca Mountain would add to the number
    of sites with nuclear waste, not reduce it.
        There are also risks about Yucca Mountain itself and hundreds of
    unanswered questions about whether it can be a safe storage facility.
        Independent federal experts agree that the science done on Yucca
    Mountain is incomplete.

              The General Accounting Office, a credible independent agency,
            chastised the Secretary of Energy for making a decision on
            Yucca Mountain when almost 300 important scientific tests
            remain incomplete.
              The experts at the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
            another independent agency, concluded that the technical basis
            for Yucca Mountain is weak to moderate.
              The Inspector General at the Department of Energy found the
            that law firm they hired was working for the nuclear power
            industry at the same time.

        There is an alternative. We can safely leave the waste on site,
    where it will be any way as new waste is added to the existing waste.
    It will be safe there while we develop the technology for reprocessing
    or safe disposal without shipping 100,000 nuclear dirty bombs through
    your states.
        Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss this
    important issue.

          STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H., MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR
                              FROM ALASKA

        Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Senator Bingaman. I had the
    pleasure of making sure these hearings started on time when I
    was chairman. I am glad to see that you are continuing the
    effort. I am pleased to see that we have a witness from Nevada
    this morning.
        It looks like we have a pretty good list of witnesses
    representing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Waste
    Technical Review Board, the Government Accounting Agency,
    Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
        I am sure we are going to get some objective views on this.
    And I am also pleased to note that evidently the Honorable
    Robert Card is here from the Department of Energy, and I hope
    that he will feel free to jump in at any time to respond to
    questions or comments from both witnesses or members. I think
    he is very knowledgeable.
        As we know, we have had 20 years of study on this, over $4
    billion invested in determining whether this site is
    scientifically and technically suitable for the development of
    a repository.
        For those of you who say we are moving too fast, why, I am
    not sure that I would agree. This is a decision that has been
    made after 24 years of study by some of the world's best
    scientists, not that there are not other scientists out there
    that would disagree. But, at some point in time, you have to
    reach a decision. You can not vacillate forever, and then you
    have to be held accountable for that decision. So I am
    confident that the work done today by the Department of Energy,
    while it will continue, at least we are in a position now to
    move on, make recommendations and so forth, relative to the
    scientific investigations and analysis that will continue, of
    course, for the life of the repository.
        I personally believe that at some date that repository will
    be used for reprocessing of the waste which is what the French
    have done, what the Japanese are proceeding with, and I think
    is the appropriate way to proceed. But evidently, we are not
    quite there yet.
        We have got a realization that the $4 billion is not
    Federal dollars. Those are the dollars that have been paid into
    this by the rate payers. Now that money was paid in exchange
    for an obligation to take the nuclear waste. Remember, that was
    due in 1998. So far, no waste has been removed, despite the
    fact that the nuclear waste fund is now in excess of $17
    billion.
        If the spent fuel is not taken soon, we are told at least
    one reactor will shut down, Prairie Island in Minnesota. And I
    do not think that we can afford to sacrifice nuclear power, not
    in Minnesota or anywhere else.
        We have got 1,860 tons in California, 2,300 tons in New
    York, 5,800 tons in Illinois, and the recognition that the
    nuclear industry is still 20 percent of our power generation.
        We also have a responsibility to clean up our Cold War
    legacy and the Department of Energy weapons sites. Well, have
    them all over the United States. They have to be cleaned up.
    And to accomplish cleanup, waste must be removed. Sites like
    Rocky Flats in Colorado, Hanford in Washington, and Savannah
    River in South Carolina.
        It is rather ironic that those who are concerned about
    transportation, they want it out of their States, but they do
    not recognize the reality to get it out of their State--it is
    not going to disappear. It has got to be moved. So for a
    variety of reasons, all based on sound science, we must proceed
    to affirm the President's site designation of Yucca Mountain as
    our Nation's central remote nuclear waste repository. This is a
    decision before the committee, and what we will have to vote on
    the 5th of June.
        So, I look forward to proceeding, Mr. Chairman. I wish our
    witnesses a good day.
        The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
        Let me also just advise for anybody watching that we do
    have all of the testimonies at these hearings on our web site
    at energy.senate.gov.
        So, Mr. Hall, please go right ahead.

    STATEMENT OF JIM HALL, FORMER CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
     SAFETY BOARD, ON BEHALF OF THE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY COALITION

        Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators.
        My name is Jim Hall. For almost 7 years I served as
    Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board. I
    previously served as a member of Governor Ned McWherter's
    cabinet and director of the Tennessee State Planning Office,
    where I worked on spent nuclear fuel transportation and storage
    issues. I also directed the State's oversight of DOE operations
    during the cleanup and restructuring of the Oak Ridge National
    Nuclear Weapons Complex. I currently serve on the National
    Academy of Engineering's committee on combating terrorism.
        Mr. Chairman, I should state that at the outset that I am
    not anti-nuclear. My house gets electricity from a nuclear
    powerplant that I see from a nearby ridge. I have no position
    on whether or not Yucca Mountain is a safe site for nuclear
    waste.
        I am here today representing the Transportation Safety
    Coalition, an ad hoc group of organizations concerned about the
    transportation of nuclear waste on America's roads, rails, and
    waterways. This is not solely an issue that affects the
    citizens of the State of Nevada, but all Americans, because
    shipments of nuclear waste would travel through 44 States,
    affecting over 200 million people.
        I want the committee to know exactly why I joined this
    effort. I joined for three reasons. First, in my role at the
    NTSB, I became all too familiar with the human and economic
    toll caused by air, rail, truck, and marine accidents. Since
    September 11, we have learned that we must protect our Nation's
    transportation system from intentional acts, as well.
        Second, from my work with the State of Tennessee, I know
    that the Department of Energy operations need careful oversight
    to ensure that safety is considered at all levels of an
    operation. The Oak Ridge cleanup will cost taxpayers over $6.5
    billion, and could have been avoided if a plan for safe
    disposal had been in place when testing began.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, I hope that my entrance into this
    discussion will raise the level of discussion on transportation
    safety issues surrounding this important decision.
        As you evaluate legislation for a nuclear waste repository,
    you are considering a proposal for which there is no
    transportation plan. As the Secretary of Energy told you last
    week, and I quote his words, ``The Department of Energy is just
    beginning to formulate its preliminary thoughts about a
    transportation plan.''
        There is no plan, or even answers to basic questions. There
    is no post 9/11 risk assessment, no finalized modes and routes,
    no full scale test of the shipping containers.
        The Department of Energy has spent approximately $7 billion
    to study Yucca Mountain, but they have spent less that $200
    million over 20 years on transportation of nuclear material.
        Based on my review of the relevant materials and
    discussions with other experts in the field, it appears clear
    to me that much more work needs to be done. The proposal to
    send tens of thousands of shipments of high-level nuclear waste
    across country by truck, rail, and barge, will be, I believe,
    the biggest transportation safety decision made by this
    Congress in the next 50 years.
        The Department of Energy has not yet designated routes or
    modes of transportation. The DOE does not even support the use
    of dedicated trains, which would greatly enhance safety and
    security, in my opinion. We do not know what criteria the DOE
    will use to weigh safety against the cost of different
    transportation modes.
        According to a letter to Congress from the NRC, there have
    been no full scale tests on the casks that will be carrying
    high-level nuclear waste. According to news reports, terrorists
    have identified nuclear materials as their target of choice.
    And we do not know if the casks can withstand explosives or a
    missile.
        I know, from my work at the National Transportation Safety
    Board, that safe vehicles undergo vigorous tests for crash
    worthiness, structural integrity, and engineering reliability.
    Congress should demand vigorous tests on full scale shipping
    casks.
        A transportation plan for nuclear waste shipments should
    have a zero accident goal. The zero accident goal would reflect
    a culture in which safety is paramount and drives all aspects
    of the transportation system.
        Instead, the DOE estimates there will be over 66 truck
    accidents and 10 rail accidents over the first 24 years.
    Whatever the number, the fact is that one accident resulting in
    radioactive release will have long-term, devastating results.
        In the months following September 11, nearly every Federal
    agency has been engaged in evaluating the preparedness to deal
    with terrorist attacks and adopting measures to counter this
    new threat. Congress has approved billions of dollars for
    protecting Federal facilities from terrorist attacks, and is
    considering legislation to adapt the country's public health,
    emergency preparedness and response system to new threats.
    These ongoing efforts to protect citizens and infrastructure
    from terrorist acts, even those we have not yet been able to
    confirm. In contrast, we know that transporting nuclear waste
    is a hazard, and we need a full risk assessment of transporting
    nuclear waste.
        The DOE's proposal for transporting large amounts of high-
    level nuclear waste over long distances many times every year
    is a dramatic increase in the amount of waste we have moved in
    the past. The number of things that can go wrong will increase
    significantly.
        History has shown us, time and time again, that if the
    essential elements of a safety plan are not put into place
    before an activity begins, the momentum of the activity
    overcomes safety considerations. Congress has the obligation to
    protect the public safety of the American people.
        The members of this committee are very familiar with the
    record of Federal agencies to respond to mandates once
    appropriations have been made and projects are underway. It is
    essential, I believe, to the American people that Congress is
    satisfied with a transportation plan before proceeding with the
    Yucca Mountain project.
        Thank you very much, and I thank the members of the
    committee for their attention.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Jim Hall, Former Chairman,
                      National Transportation Safety Board
        Members of the Committee: My name is Jim Hall, and for more than
    seven years I served as Chairman of the National Transportation Safety
    Board (NTSB). In that capacity, I acted as the ``eyes and ears'' of the
    American people at transportation accidents across the country and
    around the world. Since leaving the National Transportation Safety
    Board in January of 2001, I have continued to work on transportation
    safety issues and serve as a strategic counselor in transportation
    safety and crisis management. In addition, I currently serve on the
    National Academy of Engineering's Committee on Combating Terrorism.
    This project is aimed at helping the Federal Government, and more
    specifically the Executive Office of the President, effectively use the
    nation's and the world's scientific and technical community in a timely
    response to the threat of catastrophic terrorism. The specific audience
    for the study will be the Office of Homeland Security, federal and
    state legislators, and state and local government officials responsible
    for mitigating terrorist threats.
        Prior to coming to Washington, I served as a member of Governor Ned
    McWherter's cabinet and director of the Tennessee State Planning
    Office. In that role, I was deeply involved with spent nuclear fuel
    transportation and storage issues while Tennessee was being considered
    a potential host state for Department of Energy's (DOE) proposed
    Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility. Additionally, I directed the
    State's oversight of DOE operations at Oak Ridge during the cleanup and
    restructuring of the national nuclear weapons complex. I also directed
    Tennessee's participation in the Southern States Energy Board Advisory
    Committee on Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Material and in
    the Southeast Compact Commission for Low-Level Radioactive Waste
    Management.
        I am here today representing the Transportation Safety Coalition, a
    group of organizations concerned about the safety of transporting
    dangerous nuclear waste on America's roads, railroads, and waterways.
    The coalition is composed of environmental, public health, and safety
    organizations, including the American Public Health Association, the
    Environmental Working Group, the National Environmental Trust,
    Physicians for Social Responsibility, U.S. Public Information Research
    Groups, and the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects. This coalition has
    come together to inform policy makers and the public on the dangers of
    proceeding with a nuclear waste repository without a thorough risk
    assessment of transporting nuclear waste.
                         doe has no transportation plan
        As the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, I saw
    the results of a failure to adequately build a safety culture into
    transportation systems. I also saw how hard it can be for government
    bureaucracies to change directions to respond to new safety concerns.
    The National Transportation Safety Board's Strategic Plan states that
    it is often difficult for Federal, State and local agencies to
    ``recognize and acknowledge when their safety regulations or programs
    are ineffective.''
        From my work with the State of Tennessee, I know firsthand about
    the failure to build a safety culture into the planning stage of an
    operation. The DOE's activities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
    site have contaminated soil, groundwater and rivers, even drinking
    water sources, as a result of leaks, spills, and past waste disposal
    practices. The resulting cleanup will cost taxpayers over $6.5 billion
    and could have been avoided if a plan for safe disposal had been in
    place when testing began.
        What I find most shocking about the Yucca Mountain Project is that
    DOE has no plan to transport spent nuclear fuel to its proposed
    repository. Secretary Abraham testified last week that the DOE is
    ``just beginning to formulate its preliminary thoughts about a
    transportation plan.''
        In fact, DOE's spending history suggests that transportation
    planning has never been a high priority. The Department has spent 7
    billion dollars looking into Yucca Mountain's geology, but less than
    200 million dollars on transportation of nuclear waste. That works out
    to less than 10 million dollars a year for the last twenty years. This
    is a fundamental flaw in the Department's approach. While some might
    have accepted this approach before 9/11, no one should now. Failing to
    plan for the safe and secure transport of nuclear waste is
    irresponsible.
        We should not move ahead with this project without a plan for the
    most critical element of the project, the element that affects more
    people directly than any other element--that is the lesson of September
    11th. The issue of safe transportation cannot be separated from the
    issue before Congress today, that of deciding whether or not to
    override Governor Guinn's veto and move ahead with a Yucca Mountain
    site license. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which will evaluate
    the DOE's work on Yucca Mountain, has no authority to require a
    transportation plan before deciding on a site license. Only Congress
    can demand that the DOE develop a credible, safety-based transportation
    plan.
        Today, we all live under the constant threat of terrorism. It is
    reckless and irresponsible to move ahead without a transportation plan.
    Congress must immediately demand a detailed transportation plan that
    protects our citizens before it considers a vote on this project.
                         transportation mode and routes
        Secretary Abraham testified last week that DOE has made no
    decisions on the mode or mechanism of transport. DOE's Final
    Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) simply predicts the maximum
    number of shipments that would occur under two scenarios: (1) shipments
    mostly by truck, and (2) shipments mostly by rail, which would require
    barge shipments from some reactors to rail lines.
        DOE's stated preference is to ship spent nuclear fuel mainly by
    rail. The rail industry concurs that safety and security are maximized
    by rail transport; however the Association of American Railroads
    testified to Congress that ``the safest possible method of transporting
    spent nuclear fuel is through the use of dedicated trains.'' DOE has
    not committed to using dedicated trains.In fact the Department appears
    to be resistant to the idea because it is cheaper to ship nuclear waste
    on a train that can also take on other types of cargo. Yet it appears
    there would be greater safety and security risks if the DOE does not
    use dedicated trains. A transportation plan should outline how the DOE
    will weigh safety against economic concerns. We don't know how the DOE
    is going to develop its transportation plan, and we don't know whether
    in fact it will rely on rail as its primary transportation mode.
        Construction of a rail line to Yucca Mountain would be the largest
    new rail construction undertaking in America since World War I and cost
    1.5 billion dollars or more. If there is no rail spur to Yucca
    Mountain, then high-level nuclear waste must be trucked. Without a new
    rail line to Yucca Mountain, large rail casks would have to move long
    distances on public highways by heavy haul trucks through the country's
    fastest growing urban area. In this scenario the waste would have to be
    transferred three times, increasing the risk and the exposure to the
    general public.
        The United States is undergoing a major demographic shift involving
    migration from rural areas to urban areas, meaning that both the
    population of urban areas and the size of urban areas will dramatically
    increase over the next ten to twenty years. Many of the interstate
    highways near urban areas already experience significant rush-hour
    congestion, which is expected to increase as the number of drivers
    increases. These interstates--such as I-75 through Atlanta, I-95
    through Connecticut and New York, and I-24 through Nashville--are the
    routes that will most likely be used for truck shipments of nuclear
    waste. Nowhere in DOE's materials was I able to locate any use of
    projected traffic patterns, demographics, or highway expansion, which
    should be a critical element of a transportation plan. A route that
    might take a commuter--or a truck carrying nuclear waste--15 minutes
    today may take over an hour in future conditions, and transportation
    planning must include this kind of forward thinking.
        It is worth noting here that even if shipments were to begin today,
    there are more than 200 million Americans living in the 700-plus
    counties that are traversed by DOE's potential roads and rail-lines.
    This population is only going to grow, and grow quickly, during the 24
    years DOE needs to move nuclear waste across the country.
        The DOE does not account for the fact that while nuclear waste
    shipments begin at scattered locations around the country, these
    shipments will begin to converge along certain routes as they near the
    proposed repository site. In these areas, nuclear waste shipments will
    become everyday occurrences, and the routes will become well known.
    This raises two concerns. First, risk is not constant across the
    country but may be higher along routes that converge near the
    repository, and a transportation plan should consider this. Second, in
    the past the DOE has usually been able to transport nuclear waste in
    relative secrecy. The proposed movement of 77,000 tons of nuclear waste
    is unprecedented, and in certain parts of the country, shipments will
    be frequent and predictable. We know that nuclear waste is an
    attractive target for terrorists--I have heard that al Qaeda has
    identified nuclear material as its target of choice--and it is unlikely
    that the DOE will be able to maintain a low profile for these shipments
    throughout the 24 years of shipments.
                                 shipment casks
        No government agency has demonstrated the safety of the casks that
    will be used to transport spent nuclear fuel under conditions that
    would be encountered in an accident or terrorist attack. Neither the
    Department of Transportation nor the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC) has tested the truck or rail waste containers, which is why I
    have called for immediate full scale testing of the shipping casks.
    Before transportation vehicles are allowed to carry passengers, the
    vehicles undergo vigorous tests for crash-worthiness, structural
    integrity and engineering reliability. The only tests that have been
    done on these casks to date were conducted on small-scale models or
    simulated with computer programs. These tests are no substitute for
    full-scale testing of the actual casks that will be used for
    transporting waste. This is especially true given the fact that these
    canisters, if breached in an accident or terrorist attack, could spread
    radioactive waste across many square miles and endangering the health
    of thousands of people.
        Full-scale testing of truck and rail casks would provide cask
    designers, regulators, and policy makers with the information necessary
    to determine whether the casks could withstand such damage, and what
    corrective actions, if any, need to be taken. The experts I have
    consulted tell me that full-scale physical tests should include, at a
    minimum, the following elements: meaningful stakeholder participation
    in the development of testing protocols and the selection of test
    facilities and personnel; full-scale sequential testing (drop, fire,
    puncture, and water immersion) on a single example of each new truck
    and rail cask type; and physical testing of casks against currently
    available armor-piercing weapons and other explosive devices.
                                the human factor
        Rather than setting a goal of zero accidents and zero releases, the
    DOE estimates that there will be over 66 truck accidents and 10 rail
    accidents over the first 24 years of transportation to a repository.
    Based on information from the DOE and the department's past
    performance, other experts are estimating that there will be more than
    150 truck or 360 rail accidents over 38 years. Whatever the number, the
    fact is that one accident resulting in radioactive release will have
    long-term devastating results.
        A transportation plan for nuclear waste shipments should have a
    zero-accident goal. The zero-accident goal would reflect a culture in
    which safety is paramount and drives all aspects of the transportation
    system. The goal encourages a culture of safety. The FAA and individual
    airline companies have set a goal of zero accidents and zero
    fatalities. The DuPont Corporation, with a 99.1 percent safety record,
    has set a zero tolerance policy for accidents and employee injuries.
    The company noted that if we all accepted 99.1 percent in other aspects
    of our lives, we would then accept:

       4,500 incorrect surgical operations each year;
       18 unsafe landings at O'Hare Airport in Chicago each day;
            and
       150,000 pieces of mail lost each hour.

        A transportation plan should include a careful look at all the
    human factors that contribute to risk in transporting nuclear waste.
    Over 80% and possibly up to 90% of all transportation accidents are
    caused by human error. In investigating the causes of accidents, the
    National Transportation Safety Board examines such human factors as
    operating practices and procedures; training; duty/rest cycles;
    fatigue; workload; control/display systems; crew coordination;
    situational awareness; and decision-making. These are all elements that
    should be in a transportation plan to ensure a culture of safety.
        September 11th and the anthrax mail incident have highlighted the
    importance of having a well-articulated communications system in place
    before it might become necessary to use such a system. But even before
    last fall, past incidents had already taught us that a strategy for
    crisis communication is essential. One of the most striking failures
    during the Three Mile Island incident was the series of
    miscommunications between plant operators, federal agencies, local
    officials, the press and the public. The widespread public panic that
    followed the first announcement of problems with the nuclear reactor
    has generally been blamed on poor communications, and the incident
    itself was in part caused by communication problems. It will be a huge,
    but critical, undertaking to develop a nationwide communications system
    as part of a nuclear waste transportation plan.
                              full risk assessment
        In the months following September 11th, nearly every federal agency
    has been engaged in evaluating their preparedness to deal with
    terrorist attacks and adopting measures to counter this new threat.
    Congress has approved billions of dollars for protecting federal
    facilities from terrorist attacks and is considering legislation to
    adapt the country's public health, emergency preparedness, and response
    systems to new threats (H.R. 3555). In 1998, federal agencies were
    directed to conduct vulnerability assessments of critical
    infrastructure (PDD 63). These ongoing efforts aim to protect citizens
    and infrastructure from terrorist acts, even those we have not yet
    confronted. In contrast, we already know that terrorists view nuclear
    material as the target of choice, and yet safeguarding the
    transportation of nuclear waste--a known hazard--has not received the
    same level of scrutiny.
        The issues I have just raised must be addressed before the DOE can
    tell us where, how and for how long shipments will occur. To address
    these issues, the Department must make some difficult decisions and
    initiate long-range planning. The DOE's decisions must be safety-
    driven, and safety-driven decisions are often not the most economical.
    The process by which the DOE makes these choices must be transparent
    and based on a system-wide risk analysis. What does that entail? In
    general terms, DOE must perform a comprehensive risk assessment that
    considers current and future conditions; identifies known hazards and
    anticipates unknown hazards; analyzes where, how, and how much the
    public may be at risk; and estimates how much each alternative--
    including security--will cost. It is essential that state and local
    officials, particularly transportation experts and emergency response
    providers, are involved in the risk assessment process. This risk
    assessment will provide the information needed to decide whether the
    unprecedented nationwide mobilization of spent nuclear fuel can be done
    safely and securely.
                                   conclusion
        Secretary Abraham admitted last week that no decision on routes or
    transportation modes has been made, and that any suggestion to this
    effect is ``completely fictitious.'' He further stated that those
    decisions can't be made until the ``DOE has the opportunity to work
    with affected States, local governments, and other entities on how to
    proceed.''
        I couldn't agree more with the Secretary, but I disagree that this
    work can wait until after a site is designated. The Secretary argues
    that because the DOE has shipped nuclear materials before, there is a
    record of safety. But I can assure you as someone intimately familiar
    with transportation in this country that we have never shipped waste in
    the vast quantities or with the frequency that the DOE is proposing
    now. Before Yucca Mountain is approved Congress should demand that DOE
    conduct a full risk assessment of transporting nuclear waste.
        My testimony is no different than what Secretary Abraham told the
    Committee last week with regard to the DOE's plan for transporting
    nuclear waste. There is no plan for shipping nuclear waste to Yucca
    Mountain. The potential consequences of an accident or terrorist attack
    on a nuclear waste shipment would be devastating, and the American
    people need to understand that their highways, their communities, and
    their neighborhoods are the sites for potential releases of this high
    level waste.
        History has shown us time and time again that if the essential
    elements of a safety plan are not put into place before an activity
    begins, the momentum of the activity overtakes safety considerations.
    We all have an obligation to ensure that everything that can be done is
    being done to protect the American people. I believe every member of
    Congress will fulfill their obligation by requiring DOE to develop a
    transportation plan with a full risk assessment before any repository
    site is approved.

        The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
        Let me start with a few questions. As I understand your
    statement, your testimony, your position is that there has not
    been near enough work done related to transportation issues in
    connection with Yucca Mountain, but that you are not saying
    that those issues--that there is anything that necessarily
    leads us to conclude those issues can not be adequately dealt
    with. Is that right?
        Mr. Hall. Well, Mr. Chairman, I look at this as two
    different decisions that this Congress has to make. One
    decision, obviously, is the designation of a permanent
    repository, and the decisions--you know, the questions, that
    need to be asked, and the decision that needs to made
    associated with that site, wherever it is.
        The other decision, obviously, is the safe transport of the
    waste from over 70 different locations around the United States
    to wherever that permanent repository is. There has been an
    expenditure of over $7 billion, and a great deal of work that
    has been done on one of those decisions.
        The second decision, as I pointed out in my testimony, over
    20 years, less--about $200 million has been spent on that
    decision. It would appear to me, however, that that decision is
    probably the most important decision to the constituents in the
    50 States of the United States, because these materials are
    going to be transported through their homes, their communities,
    their neighborhoods. And, therefore, Congress needs to be sure
    that this material can be transported safely, before it makes a
    decision on a final site for this material.
        The Chairman. What is your view? My impression, though, has
    always been that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
    authority to set requirements that have to be met related to
    transportation and to the adequacy of the shipping casks being
    used, and any other aspect of the project--the transportation
    aspects of the project that concern them, they can set those
    requirements and can condition a license on the meeting of
    those requirements. Is that wrong?
        Mr. Hall. Well, I would like to submit, for the record, a
    letter that was given to me that was sent to Senator Durbin on
    May 10, 2002 in which one of the questions was, ``What role
    would your energy play regarding transportation of spent fuel
    if Congress approves Yucca Mountain?''
        And the response was, ``If DOE takes custody of the spent
    fuel at the licensee's site, DOE regulations would control the
    actual spent fuel shipment.'' But, I think the important point
    here----
        The Chairman. This is from the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission to Senator Durbin?
        Mr. Hall. Yes, sir, and I will submit that for the record.
        The important point to me, Mr. Chairman, I believe, is that
    after 9/11, a risk assessment should take place; a risk
    assessment that would identify what can go wrong, what is the
    likelihood of it, and what are the consequences. And then
    Congress should make a decision on exactly who should set up
    the regulatory scheme for the transport of this material,
    because it possibly might be--it should be the responsibility
    of the United States military to handle the transport of this
    material.
        The Chairman. So, your view is that since 9/11 occurred, or
    as a result of 9/11 having occurred, the Secretary should not
    have gone forward with a recommendation to the President. The
    Secretary of Energy should not have done that until he did this
    risk assessment, is that right?
        Mr. Hall. Well, my position, sir, is that I would certainly
    not speak for the Secretary. I would certainly recommend, from
    my background at the NTSB and in Tennessee with the Oak Ridge
    facility, that I would like to recommend to Congress that I
    think it is your responsibility to ensure that there is a
    transportation plan in place that satisfies the members of
    Congress for the safe handling and the transport through the
    neighborhoods and homes of their constituents prior to
    approving this decision.
        The Chairman. Well, you understand, I'm sure, the legal
    framework in which this is coming before the Congress, in that
    when the Secretary of Energy made his recommendation to the
    President, the President had a limited period of time in which
    to rule on that. Then the Governor in Nevada had an
    opportunity, again a limited period of time, in which to veto
    it. And now Congress has a limited period of time in which to
    override that veto. And it is your recommendation to Congress
    that we not override that veto, and that we essentially
    terminate work on the project until this issue is adequately
    dealt with?
        Mr. Hall. Sir, I do not know all the options that might be
    available to the Congress in this situation, but I do strongly
    feel that a transportation plan is an essential ingredient to
    making the decision to transport this waste to a final
    repository.
        The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
        Senator Campbell.

              STATEMENT OF HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

        Senator Campbell. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Sorry I could not
    have attended yesterday. I had to chair another hearing for
    Senator Inouye, who is gone. But, I was particularly interested
    in hearing Jim Hall's testimony.
        I have not been a big supporter of the moving of this
    waste, as you probably know, Jim. And I think you pointed to
    one of the main reasons, and that is the transportation
    problem. I've mentioned two or three times our concerns in
    Colorado. And I have read all of the testimony of today, and I
    noticed in the Department of Transportation's testimony, they
    talk about using beltways, when available, and that the, you
    know, Governors can recommend designated routes and so on, but
    that is not an iron-clad way of dealing with it, I don't think,
    because most towns in the West do not have beltways, and the
    Governors do not have the authority to overrule the Federal
    agencies, as you probably know.
        And, so, we get down, you know, to really a question of
    what is the safest thing to do? It seems to me we have got
    three problems when we talk about transporting. You mentioned
    the opportunity of targets for terrorists. I was just musing
    about that. If you leave it where it is, they have an
    opportunity at the location where it is. If you move it, they
    have a second opportunity, and that opportunity is where it is
    and en route. And if you put it in Nevada, you have a third
    opportunity for terrorists, and one is where it is now, one is
    en route, and where you are going to put it, because it is not
    going to be done overnight. It is going to take long time to
    transport all that stuff.
        So it seems to me, if you are dealing with the opportunity
    for terrorists, they have got three opportunities, if we move
    it, instead of one opportunity. I think that is wrong to do
    that.
        I also read some of the tests. I did not bring them with me
    so I can not repeat them exactly, but the tests of how these
    casks were dropped on a hard surface, on a six-inch stake from
    a certain number of feet. I forgot the number of feet, if it
    was 50, 60, or something of that nature, but living in a State
    where it is nothing to have automobiles sometimes fall 800 or
    1,000 feet off some of those cliffs that they have missed the
    road. It seems to me that that is not an ironclad test as to
    whether that thing is going to break.
        And I read about how it was subjected to an amount of heat.
    Well, let me tell you, if steel beams can melt in the 9/11
    catastrophe in New York, that thing is sure going to melt under
    less heat. If you get enough heat, anything will melt. And I do
    not know where that leaves those pellets, frankly, if that does
    melt. And I have heard, a number of times, that diesel fuel in
    itself will fuel a fire hotter than this container can
    withstand.
        And when you talk about impact, there was also a study done
    on the impact of a moving impact to an immovable object, but I
    don't think there are any studies the other way around dealing
    with ballistics, at least not that I know of. Maybe it does.
        So it seems to me that there is so much based on
    hypothetical scenarios that we do not know, I just have to tell
    you I think it is safer leaving it all where it is. And I know
    that I come from a State that wants to get rid of it, and I get
    some criticism because of it, but it just seems to me that we
    are dealing with so much unknown that we ought to know a lot
    more.
        And my big concern, of course, is that I--part of the
    transportation that would go through Colorado is on I-25, that
    goes through Denver and down the Glenwood Canyon. Even if you
    could re-route it around Denver, there is no other route to get
    over the Continental Divide that is four-lane, except I-25,
    that goes through a lot of towns, but there is a railroad, as
    you know, that goes right beside the highway.
        Whether you ship it by railroad or ship it by truck, you
    have got the same problem. And one is on one side of the river,
    if you have ever been there, and the other is on the other side
    of one of the tributaries that goes into the Rio Grande. If
    something happened there, and it seems to me that it certainly
    is in the realm of possibility, considering we average eight to
    ten trucks per year that crash going down that I-25 west side
    of the Continental Divide, that water goes into Nevada, goes
    into California, goes into Mexico, and our international
    compacts. I cannot imagine the catastrophic results if that
    water is contaminated for millions and millions of people
    downstream.
        I do not really have any questions, Mr. Chairman, but I do
    want to throw that out, because I think I have learned a lot
    from Jim's testimony. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Thomas.
        Senator Thomas. Thank you for being here. It is correct,
    then, that you have no opinion on the siting issue.
        Mr. Hall. No, sir.
        Senator Thomas. That is what this hearing is about, as you
    know, is siting. What--do you not think--as the chairman
    pointed out, we have a sequence of determining the site, and
    then the obligation to determine the transportation
    requirements. Does that not seem reasonable? Why do you suggest
    that the Congress is going to ignore transportation
    requirements just because we already have a site?
        Mr. Hall. Well, sir, it is just my personal opinion. Let me
    say my opinion, in regard to the site, I have no opinion as to
    where the site should be. I do have a very strong opinion that
    I attempted to express, that I felt that it would be in the
    wisdom of Congress to ensure that there is the ability to
    safely transport this.
        Senator Thomas. That is what I am asking you. Why do you
    think that the Congress will not do that?
        Mr. Hall. My experience, sir, with--I think the Congress
    will exercise, obviously, the responsibilities. However, I have
    seen in my experience, both at the Federal level and State
    level, that many times agencies that have split authorities,
    given the emphasis to do one thing--we had a discussion, if you
    remember, with the Federal Aviation Administration during my
    tenure at the NTSB----
        Senator Thomas. Could you kind of come to the----
        Mr. Hall. Over there is a divided authority in regard to
    safety versus the promotion of aviation.
        Senator Thomas. My question is what makes you think that we
    are not going to address the safety transportation issue?
        Mr. Hall. My experience in government.
        Senator Thomas. I see. And you were there for how long?
        Mr. Hall. I was with the National Transportation Safety
    Board for over 7 years, and the State of Tennessee over 7
    years.
        Senator Thomas. We have been transporting nuclear materials
    for 30 years, over 16 million miles, and you do not have a
    safety arrangement from the Transportation Board? What did you
    do during that 10 years?
        Mr. Hall. What, sir?
        Senator Thomas. Well, we have been doing this--this is not
    the first nuclear waste that we have transported. We are
    transporting it right now.
        Mr. Hall. Well, I did not--I certainly did not----
        Senator Thomas [continuing]. And you have been on the
    Transportation Board who was responsible for the safety on
    transportation.
        Mr. Hall. Yes, sir, the National Transportation Safety
    Board is empowered by Congress for the investigation of
    transportation accidents--all aviation accidents and major
    transportation accidents in other modes. We do look at
    accidents of hazardous materials.
        The point in my testimony is there has been transport of
    hazardous materials and some radioactive materials. I am very
    familiar with that, and very familiar from my experience with
    the State of Tennessee. But you were talking----
        Senator Thomas. Have there been any real serious problems
    with that?
        Mr. Hall. There have been accidents and incidents----
        Senator Thomas. Have there been any accidents that have
    been nuclear?
        Mr. Hall [continuing]. But none that have resulted, that I
    am aware of, in any releases to this point, sir, but we are
    talking about the volume and distances that have never been
    looked at before. And we are discussing this issue post 9/11.
        Senator Thomas. Oh, I understand. And the Congress is aware
    of 9/11. I am a little offended that you say, ``Well, you are
    not going to look at the transportation.'' The obligation of
    these hearings is the site. And that is what is being done. Are
    you a paid consultant for the State of Nevada?
        Mr. Hall. Yes, sir.
        Senator Thomas. Okay. So you are representing the point of
    view of the State of Nevada.
        Mr. Hall. I am representing my own point of view, sir.
        Senator Thomas. I see.
        Mr. Hall. I am a representative and safety consultant, and
    transportation consultant for a number of clients, as I
    expressed in my opening testimony. I chose to get involved in
    this issue because of my experience at the NTSB, at Oak Ridge,
    and also because I did not think adequate attention was being
    given to the transportation safety issues. And I thought that
    by my participation and the possible potential, I understood,
    of others to attack my participation, it would at least serve
    to raise the level of issue of the Transportation Safety Plan,
    which I think does not exist.
        Senator Thomas. I see. I guess I am just interested that
    you served on the board responsible for that for 10 years, and
    you act as if there has never been----
        Mr. Hall. No, sir. We did not have a regulatory
    responsibility.
        Senator Thomas. It is the safety board, is it not?
        Mr. Hall. The safety board has a responsibility to make
    recommendations out of major transportation accidents.
        Senator Thomas. And it is your view, then, that probably
    once the site is done, there will be no more talk about
    transportation from the Congress.
        Mr. Hall. My concern is that if you look at the past 20
    years, that some $7 billion has been spent on the site, less
    that $200 million over 20 years in trying to look at very
    serious safety issues.
        When I was at the State of Tennessee, there was discussions
    at that time that there was no way that this material was going
    to be transported any other way than dedicated trains.
        You fast forward now and there is the discussion of not
    only putting this on our highways, but putting it on our
    waterways, as well. And I think, post 9/11, again, and I know
    the members of Congress much more than any other Americans are
    aware of 9/11----
        Senator Thomas. Waterways to Yucca Mountain?
        Mr. Hall. What, sir?
        Senator Thomas. Waterways to Yucca Mountain?
        Mr. Hall. No, barging from some of the 70 sites.
        Senator Thomas. I see. It is a little hard to barge to
    Yucca. But, in any event, I guess I am just kind of
    disappointed in the way you picked out one thing and suggest
    that despite 35 years of transportation of nuclear power
    without any notable incidents that the DOE is not going to take
    a look at the transportation, I think that is wrong, sir. They
    will look at it, and that will be the second phase to
    understand whether that is safe or not. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Burns.

             STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS, U.S. SENATOR
                              FROM MONTANA

        Senator Burns. Good to see you, Jim. I had not seen you for
    a while.
        Mr. Hall. Nice to see you, Senator.
        Senator Burns. We are still having wrecks.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Burns. Let the public be reminded the only thing
    that we got in that hole out there in Yucca Mountain, Nevada,
    is $7 billion. And we still have not resolved this thing. And
    let us also quiet the nerves of the American people that
    nuclear waste is being transported on waterways, and on land,
    surface transportation all over the world.
        If we want anyone to be responsible, then we should take a
    very close look on how it is being done in Europe. I have been
    in both of those reprocessing plants, have taken a look at
    their transportation. They have not had one loss of life, and
    some of that waste comes as far into France as far away as
    Japan. So it is on our high seas. I have seen these rods--stood
    within 10 feet of them with only ten feet of water between you.
    How it is unloaded; how it is handled; how it is reprocessed;
    and how the waste that is leftover is vitrified and stored. All
    that process and that technology was developed, for the most
    part, here in the United States of America. And yet, we go
    through this exercise like we are doing something here that is
    going to make those folks or those animals or whatever, on or
    near Yucca Mountain, or on or near a nuclear site glow at
    night, when we should be taking a look at common sense and the
    tools and technology that we have to deal with the challenge of
    nuclear waste.
        It defies common sense to me that the experience that we
    have had in the generation of power using nuclear fuels, the
    record that they have. Some folks point to Three-Mile Island.
    Who died? Did the system work? Did we learn from that accident
    up there that there are some weak points? But, those weak
    points held up, but we found out things and we learned things,
    and we changed our method of dealing with it in the correct
    way. We put emotion into it and hearsay, and misinformation to
    the point where we can not make a solid, sound, political or
    common sense decision on how to deal with nuclear waste
    produced from making power for this country. That simply defies
    common sense.
        And I know we all have our interests and we still have to
    do business in this 17 square miles of logic-free environment,
    and try to come to some conclusion on how to solve this
    challenge. It is not a problem. Problems are challenges, and
    they are opportunities, but it gets in the way--of all the
    rhetoric that is flying around here, it gets in the way of
    making a solid, sound decision.
        So, I have studied it. I have been around this thing--I
    have been on this committee for 13 years now--13 years. I can
    remember when the estimated cost was, what, around $2.5 or $3
    billion, Mr. Chairman? Something like that.
        The Chairman. I am sure it was.
        Senator Burns. And we ripped right by it, folks. I mean, it
    is just like trying to buy a house within 4 miles of where we
    sit. You can go past that peg of what you want to get for a
    house so fast it will make your head swim. And we still have
    not resolved the question that is at hand.
        So, I am going to continue to read and to watch, and Jim, I
    appreciate your testimony, and I appreciate your written
    testimony. And I know you kind of have a handle on that. But,
    it is also transported all over this world, and there has not
    been an accident there either.
        So we are doing something right. That is not to say that
    questions should not be asked. And some of the doubts that you
    have or some of the weakness that you see is valuable to us. So
    we appreciate you coming today and bringing those up. They will
    be studied and looked at, because we do want to make a prudent
    decision. But keep in mind, folks, we have been doing this for
    35 years. And the only people who got reckless about it were
    the folks that paid the price, and we know where that is. It is
    not here, and it is not in Europe. And 80 percent of the power
    that is being produced for the country of France is being
    produced by nuclear fission. So thank you for coming today. I
    appreciate that.
        Mr. Hall. Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman. Senator Ensign.
        Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to clear up just a couple of things. First of all,
    the Senator from Wyoming, when he was talking about the barges,
    that is according to the DOE. That is one of the possibles. If
    they go with mostly train scenarios, they have to go with
    barges. To get it from the sites to Yucca Mountain, and that is
    where--Mr. Hall, I think that that is where your comments came
    about the barge scenarios, and the potential for a terrorist
    attack.
        I want to get back to the 9/11 comment. People have talked
    about doing this thing for years and years and we thought about
    high rises or skyscrapers for years, we did not think about a
    missile--an airplane used as a missile going into those, and
    forming the kinds of devastation that happened in New York
    City.
        And not to use fear, but I think that when we are talking
    about some of the deadliest substances known to the planet, we
    need to look at worst-case scenarios. We need to study that,
    and I think that that is what you are talking about. Could you
    comment--I do not know how familiar you are with the train
    accident last year in Baltimore, the Baltimore Tunnel fire--
    just on some of the temperatures maybe and the canisters and if
    those have been studied, and would these things withstand some
    of the temperatures that were reached in the Baltimore Tunnel
    fire?
        Mr. Hall. Well, thank you very much, Senator. And let me
    say that I am sorry that the gentleman I have a great deal of
    respect for, Senator Burns, has left, but my purpose here is to
    raise what I think are issues that are important issues to this
    Committee. And I would not be here for any other reason. I
    think it is a fact that many people are concerned. I live in
    Tennessee. The TVA is--20, 25 percent of the power, the power
    for my home is generated nuclear.
        But there is a concern. We saw that in the reaction after
    the Three Mile Island incident. And not to take those things
    into consideration when we are talking about the amount of
    waste and the distance that we are talking about transporting
    this, that is the issue that I am trying to raise, and I
    certainly hope I am doing it responsibly.
        In regard to the accident in Baltimore, that occurred after
    my term at the NTSB. However, I am familiar with the accident.
    There is an ongoing investigation being conducted by the
    National Transportation Safety Board. I am told from the
    reports I have read, that the temperatures were in excess of
    1500 degrees. As you know, there was a study done by the State
    of Nevada looking at the economic and human consequences had
    that train, obviously, been one of the trains carrying this
    type of material. And I do not think that that is irresponsible
    at all.
        I think that is what any Senator here, if the material was
    going to their State, would be doing, wanting to be sure that
    this is being handle safely, because although it is coming from
    70 different locations, there is--that material is going to
    accumulate in large quantity at several Western States and
    eventually in the State of Nevada. So looking, obviously, at
    the amount of material and the amount of responsibility, it is
    extremely important.
        I have asked Dr. Merritt Berkey who was a fire and
    explosive expert at the National Transportation Safety Board,
    to look at some of these issues and to provide his opinion for
    this committee's evaluation. And I hope that if it is
    permissible with the chairman, that Dr. Berkey's comments, as
    soon as he has them prepared, could be submitted to the
    committee for its record.
        The Chairman. We will be glad to consider those comments,
    if we receive them in time to do so.
        Mr. Hall. Okay, Mr. Chairman. But those types of--I have
    seen, regrettably, many, many situations--as you know, our
    cockpit voice recorders and flight date recorders are built to
    withstand tremendous impact forces and heat. And yet, we have
    had accidents while I have been at the Board during my tenure
    in which we basically lost the use of those recorders because
    of many--usually because of the fire.
        So that is certainly a very important part of a risk
    assessment that needs to be done.
        Senator Ensign. Well--and correct me if I am wrong. But I
    think losing information in a flight date recorder is not
    nearly as serious as, obviously, you know, having a leak. And I
    think that the point of them going on barges or the point of
    these things happening in a major city is just the idea that,
    even if you are not concerned that--because they are in a
    pellet form or whatever, the release of radiation, I think we
    do have to--if you are not concerned about the health
    consequences, we do have to consider the economic consequences
    if nothing else.
        I mean, the reputation, if this happened, that we had a
    radiation leak in a tourist destination or in a business area
    or something like that and you are shutting down commerce
    because nobody is going to want to go to that area, and they
    have to seal the area off because of--to make sure that there
    is no radiation there, we know what happens with these places
    when they seal it off, and how long it takes the government to
    certify that an area was radiation-free, and the public
    perception.
        We saw from 9/11 how nobody wanted to fly for a while. They
    slowly came back, but a lot of economic damage was done at the
    time. And that, I think, is part of the study that needs to be
    done when we are talking about the transportation.
        I, frankly, think it is irresponsible for the Congress to
    go ahead with building Yucca Mountain when we do not have these
    answers done. And I appreciate you being here today and raising
    some of these questions for us.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reid.
        Senator Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to follow up on the last statement Senator Ensign
    made. Just being logical, I understand Senator Thomas--my staff
    told me Senator Thomas said that transportation is going to be
    the second phase of the nuclear waste program. Is that your
    understanding?
        Mr. Hall. Well, it is--yes, sir.
        Senator Reid. Now, if we cannot--if we find that
    transportation cannot be done safely, does it not seem to you
    that we would be better off finding out if we can do the
    transportation before you spend $100 billion? That is the
    latest figures we have on the program out there.
        Mr. Hall. Senator, what I was trying to respectfully say to
    Senator Thomas is that my experience with government and well-
    intentioned government employees and a very well-intentioned
    Congress--and I point to the example of ValuJet, where a
    government policy was made to try to accelerate the entrance of
    low-cost airlines into the market without thoroughly and
    clearly thinking out, you know, the regulatory and safety
    responsibility in advance. It can end up with consequences
    that, obviously, no one on this committee or anyone else could
    have intended.
        The most important part of this decision is not the site.
    The most important part of this decision is the safe transport
    of this material to the site. And I think, quite respectfully,
    that in this situation the cart is before the horse in the fact
    that we must know--the Congress must know and be satisfied that
    this material can be transported safely before it makes a
    decision on a final site for the material.
        Senator Reid. The State of Nevada has for almost 20 years
    been attempting to show, and I think it has been proven
    conclusively in the minds of many that Yucca Mountain is not a
    place that you should store nuclear waste. But that issue is no
    longer important to the Congress. And what Senator Ensign and I
    have been trying to do with the hearing we had yesterday and
    through other witnesses is show that the transportation is not
    a Nevada problem. Nuclear waste is not suddenly going to show
    up at Yucca Mountain some morning, ``Oh, we have 40,000 tons or
    70,000 tons. I wonder how that--that is nice. I am glad it is
    here.''
        The fact of the matter is it is going to have to come in
    thousands of different truckloads and hundreds and hundreds if
    not thousands of trainloads. And as we learned yesterday, using
    one transportation scenario, it will have to have thousands of
    barge trips before it can get to where it is. And it would seem
    to me that common sense would indicate that before you have a
    siting decision, you should decide if there is any way of
    putting the stuff there, before you site it. But we have not
    done it that way. And I think it is really wrong, and I do not
    think it takes a degree in calculus to figure that out.
        Mr. Hall. Well----
        Senator Reid. So I appreciate your testimony.
        Mr. Hall. I appreciate that, Senator. Obviously, in
    aviation, we are sure that we have redundant systems and an
    airplane is very well tested before we put passengers on it.
        Senator Campbell. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question
    of this witness?
        The Chairman. Certainly. Go right ahead, Senator Campbell.
        Senator Campbell. Senator Thomas's comment about barges not
    going to Nevada I think is well taken. But where are some of
    the places where barges might be used? Do they just come across
    the Great Lakes, for instance, or----
        Mr. Hall. Senator Campbell, I know that I only have a
    Tennessee public school education, which I am very proud of,
    but even I know that there are not barges to Yucca Mountain.
    But I was referring to the EIS study in which it relates--and I
    do not know specifically. There was some transport, I think, up
    in the northeast and other areas where at present the only way
    that----
        Senator Campbell. Well, then let me ask something else,
    because I consider you pretty much of an expert on
    transportation because of your background. Does that mean that
    there is a possibility that these containers could be loaded
    and unloaded three times? For instance, it has to come from
    somewhere, and could then have to be put on a barge, and then
    taken off the barge and put back on something else, trucks or
    trains.
        Mr. Hall. Senator----
        Senator Campbell. Is that correct?
        Mr. Hall. Yes, sir. And the thing that concerns me and the
    reason I have asked for the full-scale testing is that is just
    one part of it. You know, we had many failures in our pipeline
    system in the United States as a result of a phenomena called
    ``railroading.''
        We were making what we thought were good steel pipe to the
    specifications that were required. They were being put and
    placed on railroad cars and being shipped to their
    destinations. Some 10, 15, 20 years later, we began finding
    leaks and ruptures that were then discovered later to become a
    phenomena of the transportation of this particular container.
        Senator Campbell. Okay.
        Mr. Hall. So the handling of the specifications obviously
    for the container itself, what it can do in terms of accidents
    or intentional terrorist attacks is important. Looking at the
    human factors issues in regard to the handling of the cask is
    going to be extremely important; and testing, obviously, what
    impact the transportation is going to have on the container
    itself.
        All of these are issues that again--and I understand that
    there is a difference of opinion here possibly. But I think the
    responsible--my personal opinion is that the responsible thing
    to do is to know that this material can be safely transported
    before a decision is made that you are going to start a site
    and set it in motion.
        Senator Campbell. Well, I happen to have gotten through--I
    got through college by driving an 18-wheeler. I think I am
    still the only member of the Senate that still has a CDL. And
    as I remember from those years when I did drive, the biggest
    amount of damage was never in transport; it was in loading and
    unloading. If we broke something or did something, it was
    almost always when we were loading or unloading it.
        But it also brings up another question. And that is that
    when you are transporting by truck, there are all kinds of
    regulations now with the Department of Transportation for
    truckers, such as hours of service, as an example. As you know,
    they can only drive a certain number of hours, and then they
    have to park those things for a certain number of hours. You
    know that.
        It would seem to me that we have a whole bunch of other
    problems. I mean, what truck stop wants nuclear waste parked in
    his backyard with a bunch of other trucks? Nobody is going to
    want to.
        And in addition to that, some of the regulations now say
    that you cannot be over 100 feet from the cab of your trucker
    if you--when you are parked, as you probably know. And that is
    under the guidelines for any hazardous waste, not just nuclear,
    but hazardous waste. They cannot even leave the darn tractor to
    go to the bathroom if it is over 100 feet from the terminal.
        And it seems to me there are all kinds of things that have
    not been well thought out on the transportation issue.
        Mr. Hall. Well, Senator, I hesitate to comment on the
    transportation plan because my feeling is, after reading the
    material, I came to the same conclusion that Secretary Abraham
    had last week. There is no plan.
        Senator Campbell. Yes.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        We appreciate your testimony very much, Mr. Hall. Why do we
    not----
        Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, let me just personally thank you. I
    apologize to the committee that I was unable to be here; I had
    a commitment that I could not break. And I appreciate your
    willingness to let me appear this morning.
        The Chairman. Well, we understood that. I think you have
    given useful testimony and we appreciate you coming today.
        Mr. Hall. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Our next witnesses are four of the members
    from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Richard Meserve, Greta
    Joy Dicus, Nils Diaz and Ed McGaffigan. Thank you all for being
    here.
        [Pause.]
        Mr. Meserve. Thank you very much, Senator. We are very
    pleased to join you this morning.
        The Chairman. All right. Why do we not start with you, Mr.
    Meserve? And then if the other members have statements, we are
    glad to hear from them, too.

     STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. MESERVE, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
    COMMISSION; ACCOMPANIED BY GRETA JOY DICUS, COMMISSIONER; NILS
    J. DIAZ, COMMISSIONER; AND EDWARD McGAFFIGAN, JR., COMMISSIONER

        Dr. Meserve. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the
    Commission is pleased to join you today to testify on behalf of
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulatory oversight role
    in the U.S. program for management and disposal of high-level
    radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
        I am joined, as you indicated, by Commissioners Dicus, Diaz
    and McGaffigan. Commissioner Merrifield, who is the fifth
    member of the Commission, regrets that he is unable to attend
    the hearing. Prior to receiving the invitation, he had
    scheduled visits to two nuclear power stations, and had already
    coordinated the visits with another Federal agency.
        I have a prepared statement I have submitted for the
    record, but I would like to just briefly summarize a few
    points.
        The Commission believes that a permanent geologic
    repository can provide the appropriate means for the United
    States to manage spent nuclear fuel and other high-level
    radioactive wastes in a safe manner. We also believe that
    public health and safety, the environment, and the common
    defense and security can be protected by deep underground
    disposal of these wastes. However, the Commission takes no
    position on whether such a repository should be located at
    Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Our views on that question must be
    shaped by the results of the congressionally mandated licensing
    process.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides that it is the NRC's
    responsibility to establish licensing criteria for a potential
    repository, to provide preliminary views on the sufficiency of
    certain DOE information collected during site characterization,
    and to comment, along with other Federal agencies, on the
    Environmental Impact Statement prepared by DOE for Yucca
    Mountain. It is also the Commission's obligation to be prepared
    to make a fair, informed, and timely licensing decision, if the
    Congress should approve the President's recommendation.
        If the President's recommendation is accepted by the
    Congress, it represents a determination that the Department of
    Energy may apply to the NRC for construction authorization.
        I would like to point out that if that is the case, several
    important steps must be taken before the Commission can decide
    whether to authorize construction. First, DOE must submit a
    high-quality application. Second, staff at the NRC must conduct
    an independent safety review and issue a safety evaluation
    report. Third, we must conduct a full and fair public hearing
    on the DOE application. Only after these steps are complete
    will NRC be in a position to determine whether the DOE's
    license application complies with the NRC's regulations. Our
    decision will be based on the information before us at that
    time.
        Federal regulation of spent fuel transportation safety is
    shared by the U.S. Department of Transportation and the NRC.
    DOT regulates the transport of all hazardous materials,
    including spent fuel, and has established regulations for
    shippers and carriers regarding radiological controls, hazard
    communication, training, and other aspects. For its part, NRC
    establishes design standards for the casks used to transport
    licensed spent fuel, and reviews and certifies cask designs
    prior to their use. Further, cask design, fabrication, use and
    maintenance activities must be conducted under an NRC-approved
    Quality Assurance program.
        NRC also conducts an inspection and enforcement program,
    and reviews and approves physical security plans for spent fuel
    shipments.
        NRC has reviewed and certified a number of package designs
    intended to be used for transport of spent fuel to a
    repository, and has additional designs under review.
        We believe the safety protection provided by the current
    transportation regulatory system is well established.
    Nonetheless, we continually examine the transportation safety
    program.
        Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. My colleagues
    and I will be pleased to answer any questions that you or other
    members may have. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Meserve follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Richard A. Meserve, Chairman,
                         Nuclear Regulatory Commission
        Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to join you to
    testify on behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning
    the NRC's regulatory oversight role in the U.S. program for management
    and disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
        The Commission has long believed that a permanent geologic
    repository can provide the appropriate means for the United States to
    manage spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive waste in a
    safe manner. We also believe that public health and safety, the
    environment, and the common defense and security can be protected by
    deep underground disposal of these wastes. However, the Commission
    takes no position on whether such a repository should be located at
    Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Our views on that question must be shaped by
    the results of the Congressionally mandated licensing process.
        Congress provided in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA)
    and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 that the NRC would serve as an
    independent regulator to ensure that any repository adequately protects
    the public health and safety and the environment. I am pleased to state
    that the NRC has consistently met the obligations established by these
    Acts. We are now in the midst of preparations for an important
    transition--from the pre-licensing role defined for NRC in statute, to
    the role of regulator and licensing authority--if a decision is made to
    authorize the Department of Energy (DOE) to submit a license
    application for Yucca Mountain.
                         the president's recommendation
        As you know, on February 15 of this year, President Bush accepted
    the Secretary of Energy's recommendation that the Yucca Mountain site
    be developed as a potential repository for the disposal of high-level
    nuclear wastes and spent nuclear fuel. If the Congress approves a
    resolution of siting approval, the President's recommendation becomes a
    final decision and DOE could then apply to the NRC for construction
    authorization. If DOE does so, several important steps must be taken
    before the Commission can decide whether to authorize construction of a
    potential repository at Yucca Mountain. First, DOE must submit a high-
    quality application. Second, staff at the NRC must conduct an
    independent safety review and issue a safety evaluation report. Third,
    we must conduct a full and fair public hearing on the DOE application.
    Only after these steps are complete will NRC be in a position to
    determine whether the DOE's license application complies with NRC
    regulations. Our decision will be based on the information before us at
    that time.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides that it is NRC's
    responsibility to establish licensing criteria for a potential
    repository, to provide our preliminary views on the sufficiency of
    certain DOE information collected during site characterization, and to
    comment, along with other federal agencies, on the Environmental Impact
    Statement prepared by DOE for Yucca Mountain. It is also the
    Commission's obligation to be prepared to make a fair, informed, and
    timely licensing decision, if the Congress should approve the
    President's recommendation. I will discuss each of these activities in
    turn.
                            the regulatory framework
        Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the Environmental Protection
    Agency (EPA) was directed to establish dose-based environmental
    standards for Yucca Mountain. Congress required EPA to base these
    standards on the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences.
    The NRC was directed to modify its regulations to be consistent with
    final EPA standards within one year of their issuance. Because of the
    short period given to NRC to issue final implementing regulations, the
    Commission initiated its own rulemaking in parallel with that of the
    EPA.
        Immediately upon publishing our proposed regulations at 10 C.F.R.
    Part 63 for public comment in February 1999, our staff embarked on a
    series of public meetings to encourage involvement by members of the
    public in Nevada. From these meetings, together with written
    submittals, we received more than 1000 comments on our proposed
    criteria. The Commission carefully considered and analyzed these
    comments, and last November promulgated the health and safety
    regulations that will guide any licensing decision on Yucca Mountain.
    Our regulations are consistent with the health and safety standards
    established by the EPA. We are confident that any repository that can
    be shown by DOE to comply with these demanding standards and
    regulations will protect the people living near the proposed repository
    today and in the future.
                        doe's collection of information
        In forwarding his recommendation to the President, Secretary
    Abraham included the Commission's preliminary comments on DOE's
    examination of Yucca Mountain. As required by the NWPA, our comments
    addressed ``. . . the extent to which the at-depth site
    characterization analysis and waste form proposal . . . seem to be
    sufficient for inclusion in [a license application to the NRC].'' 42
    U.S.C. Sec. 10134(a)(1)(E). In offering these comments, the NRC drew no
    conclusions about the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site. Rather,
    we commented on whether sufficient information will exist to begin a
    potential licensing review, if the President's recommendation becomes a
    final decision and if DOE submits an application. To evaluate the
    adequacy of DOE's information for this purpose, the NRC staff reviewed
    all major program documents for Yucca Mountain, as well as the
    available supporting technical documents. Our staff's reviews of DOE's
    program documents and technical material were performed over many years
    of extensive pre-licensing interactions with DOE staff and various
    stakeholders, including the State of Nevada, Indian Tribes, affected
    units of local government, representatives of the nuclear industry, and
    interested members of the public.
        Based on our technical reviews and pre-licensing interactions, we
    believe that sufficient information can be available at the time of a
    license application. The DOE and NRC have reached and documented
    numerous agreements regarding additional information that will be
    needed for a licensing review. Approximately two-thirds of these
    agreements call for DOE to document the bases for assumptions or
    conclusions. The remainder oblige DOE to perform specific tests or
    analyses, to document prior tests or studies, or to provide other
    information. As DOE completes the actions necessary to fulfill these
    agreements, NRC will review the results promptly and notify DOE of our
    findings. Based on these agreements, we are confident that DOE can
    assemble the information necessary for an application that NRC can
    accept for review.
        It is important to note that NRC is as concerned about the quality
    of documentation supporting the recommendation of the Yucca Mountain
    site as about the quantity of information. Over the course of our pre-
    licensing interactions we have discussed with DOE the need to verify
    the quality of the documents it has generated to support the site
    recommendation. We are aware that DOE performed extensive reviews of
    this documentation, including dedicated reviews to determine the root
    causes of any errors. We acknowledge DOE's intention to qualify all
    data, software, and models fully if they are to be used to support a
    license application. Quality management continues to be a challenging
    program area for DOE, one which the NRC staff routinely monitors.
                    doe's final environment impact statement
        As required by the NWPA, Secretary Abraham included a final
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) with his recommendation to the
    President along with the comments agencies provided on the final EIS,
    including those of NRC. Our comments were developed on the basis of
    reviews of DOE's draft EIS for Yucca Mountain, the supplement to the
    draft EIS and the final EIS. Like the sufficiency comments I discussed
    earlier, our reviews were supported and informed by extensive pre-
    licensing interactions with DOE, the State of Nevada, Indian Tribes,
    affected units of local government, representatives of the nuclear
    industry, and interested members of the public.
        As a result of our reviews, we believe that the final EIS contains
    sufficient information about the environmental impacts of the proposed
    action to provide a foundation for a site recommendation. The analyses
    provided in the EIS appear to bound appropriately the range of
    environmental impacts. We expect that DOE's commitment to refine the
    repository design and define transportation modes and routes will allow
    for more precise estimates of impacts and possibly result in future
    revisions to the National Environmental Policy Act analyses. We expect
    that any such additional reviews will be completed in support of a
    license application. If the President's recommendation becomes a final
    decision, NRC will, of course, continue interactions with DOE and other
    interested stakeholders, to resolve outstanding technical and
    environmental issues, as needed.
                         nrc preparations for licensing
        As part of our overall pre-licensing strategy, our staff has
    applied the experience gained in the reviews of DOE documents and pre-
    licensing interactions to the preparation of a Yucca Mountain review
    plan that will eventually guide the NRC's review of any license
    application. The NRC staff recently published a draft of the review
    plan which is on our website for public comment. This week, members of
    our technical staff are conducting public information meetings in
    Nevada to seek public input on our draft review plan. As our
    preparation for possible licensing progresses, NRC will continue to
    conduct public technical exchanges between members of the NRC and DOE
    technical staffs and with NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste.
        In addition, our Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel has begun
    to evaluate hearing-related aspects, including location, and the
    development of the automation tools necessary to meet the time
    restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. These activities
    include development of an electronic hearing docket to expedite a
    possible hearing and completion of an Internet-based Licensing Support
    Network (LSN) that will provide access to all the key documents. Noting
    delays in entering key licensing documents due to security concerns
    after the events of September 11, it is important that DOE, which is
    the stakeholder with the most documents, enters its documents into the
    system as soon as possible. The NRC staff also is working to provide
    guidance to DOE on developing an electronic High Level Waste repository
    license application. In late June, NRC will conduct a public meeting
    with DOE on this issue in Las Vegas.
                safety and security of spent fuel transportation
        The Commission believes that the spent nuclear fuel and high-level
    radioactive waste stored at multiple sites can be safely and securely
    transported to a single location for geologic disposal.
        Responsibility for federal regulation of spent fuel transportation
    safety is shared by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the
    NRC. DOT regulates the transport of all hazardous materials, including
    spent fuel, and has established regulations for shippers and carriers
    regarding radiological controls, hazard communication, training, and
    other aspects. For its part, NRC establishes design standards for the
    casks used to transport licensed spent fuel, and reviews and certifies
    cask designs prior to their use. Further, cask design, fabrication, use
    and maintenance activities must be conducted under an NRC-approved
    Quality Assurance program.
        NRC also conducts an inspection and enforcement program, and
    reviews and approves physical security plans for spent fuel shipments.
    These plans provide information on how shippers and carriers comply
    with NRC spent fuel shipment protection requirements, including advance
    notification of each shipment to Governors' designees, the
    establishment of redundant communication capability with the shipment
    vehicle, the arrangement of law enforcement contacts along the route,
    and provision of shipment escorts.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE to utilize NRC-certified
    casks for spent fuel shipments to a repository, follow NRC's advance
    notification requirements, and to provide emergency response training
    along shipment routes. NRC has reviewed and certified a number of
    package designs intended to be used for transport of spent fuel to a
    repository, and has additional designs under review.
        The NRC believes the safety protection provided by the current
    transportation regulatory system is well established. Nonetheless, we
    continually examine the transportation safety program. In FY 2000, NRC
    re-evaluated its generic assessment of spent fuel transportation risks
    to account for the fuel, cask and shipment characteristics likely to be
    encountered in future repository shipping campaigns. Over two years
    ago, NRC began the Package Performance Study to study cask performance
    under severe impact and fire accident conditions. The study plan calls
    for full-scale testing of a cask to confirm computer models of cask
    response to severe accident conditions. NRC is also supporting a study
    by the National Academies' Board on Radioactive Waste Management that
    will examine radioactive material transportation, with a primary focus
    on spent fuel transport safety. As a part of its evaluation, the NRC
    staff is analyzing appropriate national transportation accidents, such
    as the 2001 train accident in Baltimore, Maryland, to determine if
    lessons learned from that event should be included in our
    transportation requirements or analyses. The results of our
    confirmatory analytical studies, the significant history of safe
    shipments, the rigor of our pre-certification design reviews, and our
    inspections form the basis for our confidence that spent fuel can be
    shipped safely today and in the future. Finally, NRC is sponsoring a
    study to update its evaluation of cask response to acts of sabotage.
    NRC plans to utilize the results of these studies as input into its
    comprehensive review of security in light of the events of September
    11. These studies should be available at the time possible licensing is
    being considered.
                                   conclusion
        The Commission believes that deep geologic disposal is appropriate
    for high-level radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel and that such
    wastes can be safely and securely transported to a disposal location.
    We take no position, however, on whether the site recommendation for a
    Yucca Mountain repository should be approved. Our role is to put in
    place a licensing system that will ensure adequate protection of public
    health and safety and the environment and to review and evaluate any
    license application submitted, to ensure its compliance with regulatory
    requirements. As I believe this statement makes clear, we take that
    obligation very seriously.
        I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

        The Chairman. Do any of you have other statements you want
    to make before we do questions?
        [No response.]
        The Chairman. Okay. Let me go right to the issue that Mr.
    Hall raised in his testimony just a minute ago. That is the
    question of whether or not the NRC can insist that a safe
    transportation plan be presented before you issue a license to
    use this facility. I mean, I am a little confused. We have a
    split of responsibility here between the Department of
    Transportation and the NRC and the DOE.
        And I guess where I come out on it is: Regardless of the
    split of jurisdiction here, I would like to know whether the
    NRC believes it can refuse to issue a license until it is
    satisfied that a safe transportation plan has been developed?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, let me give you my understanding of the
    way in which we would approach that issue. As part of the
    requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, the
    Department of Energy is required to prepare an environmental
    impact statement that analyzes all of the possible impacts of
    the decision that would be before us. And then we have to
    review that and be satisfied with it. That impact statement has
    to include transportation as a component.
        We have commented on the environmental impact statement
    that DOE has prepared at this juncture to say that we expect
    that there will be further development of the transportation
    plan and that will be reflected in supplementation of the
    environmental impact statement that has been produced to date.
        And we have to be satisfied with that environmental impact
    statement so that we can rely on it as part of our licensing
    decision.
        So the short answer to your question is: Yes, we will be
    looking at transportation safety as part of our process.
        As I indicated in my statement, we also have to license the
    casks that would be used for the transport of the spent fuel.
    We would have regulatory requirements that we would impose and
    do impose to assure that these casks are suitable for that use.
    So we have multiple levers by which we get at the
    transportation issue.
        The Chairman. One of the concerns that I believe Mr. Hall
    raised, and I believe Senator Campbell also alluded to it here,
    is the question of whether the NRC would require full-scale
    testing of these shipping casks; the concern being, I gather,
    that they have gone through some testing, but it is not
    adequate considering the risks involved.
        What is your view on that? I mean, will you make that
    decision as to how full-scale the testing will be as you go
    along, or do you plan--have you made that decision as a sort of
    generic decision, or what is your view?
        Dr. Meserve. We have licensed casks, as I indicated in my
    testimony. And we have not required full-scale testing of the
    casks. We do have stringent requirements that the licensees
    have to demonstrate that the casks satisfy. And the way they
    try to demonstrate that those requirements can be met is by
    smaller scale testing, sometimes of components, and a computer
    analysis of the engineering associated with the casks.
        These are relatively simple engineering structures, and
    they are ones that are susceptible to that kind of analysis in
    that there are reliable computer codes that can be used to
    assess the situation. And we know how the performance of the
    casks would scale with size, so the measurement of effects on a
    smaller scale model are sufficient, we believe, to be able to
    assess the effects of an accident on a larger cask.
        All of that being said, we recognize that there is a
    concern. We have undertaken what we call a package performance
    study that was started and that we will be continuing in which
    we do contemplate some full-scale testing of casks in order to
    verify that the analytical methods that I have described and
    the testing methods that we have described are accurate.
        The Chairman. So I guess the answer is that you will
    conduct the full-scale testing that you think is necessary in
    order to satisfy you that these casks can withstand whatever
    they encounter.
        Dr. Meserve. That is our plan.
        The Chairman. Okay. We have this issue that the law
    requires, as I understand it, that the Department of--if we go
    ahead and override the veto of the Governor of Nevada, if the
    Congress were to do that, then the law contemplates that the
    Department of Energy would file an application within 90 days,
    I believe is what the law says.
        And Secretary Abraham told us last week that the Department
    of Energy will not be prepared to file an application before
    2004. What is your understanding about this 90-day provision
    that is in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act? What happens if you
    wind up getting an application in 2004 instead of in the 90
    days provided for in the law?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, let me say that there is a 90-day
    provision in the statute as you have indicated. It is my
    understanding that the Department of Energy construes that as a
    permissive and an enabling authority within which to file the
    application.
        We do understand that the Department intends to file an
    application if permission is given in the 2004 period. From the
    Commission's point of view, we believe that that time before
    the filing is going to be important because there are issues,
    some of which have been raised here today, that we believe
    should be addressed and should be part of a license
    application.
        And so we are looking for a high-quality application that
    will provide the foundation for us to be able to conduct the
    necessary and thorough review. And it is going to take some
    time for the Department of Energy to pull that information
    together.
        So as a policy matter, we think that we are all served by
    there being a high-quality application. We are expecting to
    receive such an application in 2004 and we will docket it if it
    is a complete one.
        The Chairman. Let me ask one other question. Mr. Gilinsky
    yesterday, Victor Gilinsky, who previously served on your
    Commission, testified that the NRC's licensing rule does not
    have any separate requirement for effectiveness of geologic
    barriers. I just wonder what your view on that is. Is that
    true? What is your read on that?
        Dr. Meserve. Let me say that I think that Mr. Gilinsky's
    testimony may reflect some misunderstanding of both the statute
    and of our regulatory requirements, in that the statute
    requires a consideration of both natural and engineered
    barriers, as do our regulatory requirements. This reflects a
    general philosophy that we would apply of defense in depth. We
    look for a variety of different means to assure that the
    regulatory requirements can be satisfied.
        And that would include both natural and engineered
    barriers. We would anticipate that any Department of Energy
    application for the site would reflect the effectiveness of
    various of these barriers.
        We do not have separate requirements for each of the
    barriers. That, of course, is consistent with the advice that
    the Department of Energy and we received from the National
    Academy of Sciences that the system should be viewed as an
    integrated whole and that all of the barriers should work
    synergistically with each other, and that we should see the
    integrated picture rather than looking at each barrier in
    isolation.
        The Chairman. Let me ask probably the bottom-line question
    for the committee and for the Congress here: Do you see any
    reason why Congress should not allow the DOE to go ahead and
    file an application?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, we have indicated that the final
    environmental impact statement, we thought, was sufficient to
    allow a site recommendation. We are not aware of anything that
    would foreclose the--either decision that the Congress might
    make in this matter.
        I do not want to be seen as pre-judging how we would
    respond to an application. All of that work remains in front of
    us.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Campbell.
        Senator Campbell. Mr. Meserve, who does the actual testing
    of containers, as an example? Does your agency do that, or is
    that hired out to private contractors, or who does it?
        Dr. Meserve. Typically--well, let me express how I
    understand it to work, and let me say that I will supplement my
    response for the record if I have anything wrong.
        The requirements are ones that we establish as part of the
    process, and an applicant seeking to have a cask certified will
    submit information to us that will include the test results and
    the analysis.
        The NRC staff will then undertake its own review, an
    independent review of the cask design using the tools that are
    available to it. Typically, in this process, the applicant
    would provide the scale model tests.
        We have the authority to undertake independent scale-model
    testing. We would probably--if we were to do that, we would not
    do it ourselves. We would probably hire an independent
    contractor to do that work.
        Senator Campbell. Okay.
        Mr. McGaffigan. It would probably be one of the National
    Laboratories.
        Senator Campbell. One of the National Labs, okay.
        Mr. McGaffigan. And our intent would be----
        Senator Campbell. The computer analysis that you spoke of,
    some of the preliminary testing, was that also done by the
    National Laboratories?
        Mr. McGaffigan. The package performance study, if we go to
    full-scale testing, the intent is to--the tests would be done
    at Sandia, I believe. Sandia did the full-scale tests back in
    the 1980's.
        Senator Campbell. Sandia. Okay.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It just seems to me that when we
    talk about the billions of dollars we have spent and billions
    of more dollars we are going to spend, that we ought to--I do
    not know. Maybe I have something wrong here. But it seems to me
    that all of that complete testing ought be done before, not
    after the fact.
        What if we spend billions more and find out that it is--
    through some strange way that they are not as indestructible as
    we would like them to be? I mean, where does that leave us?
    That is a rhetorical question, I guess. You do not have to
    answer it.
        But I think we are making a big mistake in not doing the
    complete testing before we spend any more money on the
    development. But I just wanted to make that statement.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Senator Carper.
        Senator Carper. Yes. Let me yield to Senator Ensign. He has
    been waiting.
        The Chairman. Senator Ensign.
        Senator Ensign. Thank you, Senator.
        I thought that was interesting, what you just said. You
    said that ``We are planning on going ahead with full-scale
    testing,'' but then you said ``if.''
        Mr. McGaffigan. I did not mean to contradict the chairman.
    We do--the ``if'' is subject to congressional appropriations.
    Our intent is to ask for money in the fiscal year 2004 budget
    for the conduct of a full-scale test. We have said that in a
    letter to Senator Reid dated the 24th of April. But we do not
    want to presume on the congressional appropriations process.
    Hopefully, you will----
        Senator Ensign. Do you think that--without full-scale
    testing, do you think that you can ensure that these transport
    canisters will be safe?
        Dr. Meserve. Let me say in response to that, that we have
    been licensing the canisters. We think we have been responsible
    in licensing these transportation packages, based on the
    information that is available to us.
        Senator Ensign. Okay. Could the ones--those current ones
    that are licensed, could those have withstood--if one of those
    would have been exposed to the fires in the Baltimore Tunnel,
    could they have withstood the heat from that, or would they
    have actually been breached?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, let me say that part of the package
    performance study is to look at the performance of the casks in
    what we call severe accidents. There has been a preliminary
    analysis that has been conducted by the staff based on
    assumptions about the conditions that existed in the Baltimore
    fire, as to the temperatures, temperature profile over time,
    duration of the fire, which do indicate that the cask that they
    analyzed would survive. There would be no failure of the welds.
    In fact, there would not have been any melting of the fuel.
        But let me emphasize, it is a preliminary analysis, and I
    would not want you to rely on that. We are going to continue to
    look at these sorts of issues very carefully as part of our
    package performance study.
        Senator Ensign. When you are dealing with testing--because
    I think this is absolutely critical to the safety, when you are
    dealing with the testing. because I do not think that, you
    know, when they were--and I keep going back to 9/11. When they
    were thinking about building skyscrapers, I do not think that
    they foresaw the idea of terrorists taking planes into the
    World Trade Center, and the unusual circumstances.
        And it would seem to me that testing should take in not
    normal, every-day circumstances, but worst-case scenarios
    especially because we are dealing now with the most--if not the
    most, certainly one of the most deadly substances on the
    planet, and that we have to do everything possible, full-scale
    testing.
        And I agree with Senator Campbell. I think it is putting
    the cart before the horse. I think it is ridiculous that we are
    going forward with this thing before we know that we can
    address these problems.
        And I guess what I want is that your assurances that you
    will not license the site if you cannot get these things tested
    to make sure that we are protecting the citizens of America,
    because you are the ones responsible for the testing.
        Will you guarantee this committee and this Senate and the
    people of America that you will not license the site if you
    cannot guarantee the safe transportation?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, let me say that we are going to comply
    with every element of the statute as to what conditions and
    circumstances under which we should allow the licensing of the
    site to occur. Part of that process does require a full
    evaluation, as I have indicated, of the transportation issues
    as part of the assessment.
        We also have an obligation to assure the public health and
    safety in the context of the certification of casks. And we
    take that obligation very seriously. And we will be satisfied,
    before we certify the casks, that they meet the necessary
    requirements.
        You mentioned 9/11. This is an area in which there is
    continuing examination by the Commission of the possible
    vulnerability of all elements of our nuclear enterprise. That
    work is continuing. But in the period since 9/11, we have
    augmented the security that exists at various of our facilities
    including the transport of nuclear materials. But that work is
    also going to continue. And that may be manifested in some
    further requirements down the road.
        Senator Ensign. Let me rephrase the question, then. You
    know, can you--well, will you guarantee the American people
    that you will not license the site if, for instance, things
    that are commonly available to terrorists, if deployed against
    these canisters, that they will breach these canisters--will
    you guarantee and will you promise us that, that you will not
    license the site if that is the case?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, I think there is a separate question
    about licensing the site versus certification of canisters. And
    we certainly are examining all of those, the nature of the
    requirements that should be imposed on the certification of
    canisters. And included in that evaluation is certainly going
    to be the issue of dealing with possible terrorist attacks that
    might occur on canisters, and what kinds of requirements, if
    any, that we should add to the current requirements to deal
    with the terrorist threat.
        We are in an evolving situation where we are all learning
    about the nature of this threat, and it does require very
    thorough consideration and careful consideration, which we have
    undertaken. But in the interim, we have taken steps to assure
    that these materials can be safely transported, and we are
    going to continue that work.
        Senator Ensign. Well, I mean--and we obviously are
    transporting nuclear waste today.
        Dr. Meserve. That is correct.
        Senator Ensign. And I guess what we have to determine and
    what I am trying to get you to say, basically, is that your
    responsibility is to the safety of the American people, to make
    sure that those things, if they are being transported through
    major cities, on waterways, where the public is in potentially
    in danger, that it is your responsibility to make sure that
    those things are licensed, that something, obviously, with
    every possible scenario that we can think of, that they cannot
    be breached.
        And from what I understand, one of these things during
    transport--if they are surrounded by concrete, they will not.
    But during transport, one of these things can be breached by a
    TOW Missile. Have you seen the testing that has been done on
    some of that?
        Dr. Meserve. I am aware of some testing some years ago, in
    which a particular cask was subject to a TOW Missile attack,
    and there was a penetration of the cask. The significance of
    that is something that is--well, it was obviously an
    unfortunate event.
        Whether that would have resulted in a significant release
    of material or of hazard to the public is yet another matter.
        But we are aware of the fact that the nature of the tactics
    that might be used by terrorists, the nature of equipment that
    might be available to them, is something that is changing, and
    we need to consider these matters as we undertake our
    obligation to assure the protection of the public health and
    safety in the usage of the casks. And we will do that.
        Senator Ensign. The last concern I want to raise to you is
    that Israel is--probably there is no country more concerned
    about their own safety and their own prevention of terrorist
    attacks than the state of Israel. But yet, even today, I guess,
    there was a bomb put on a fuel container there that they tried
    to do everything they could to prevent something like that from
    happening.
        So I guess my charge would be to you, because you have such
    an awesome responsibility for making sure that the American
    people are safe, that whatever you think that you have done so
    far, you know, post-9/11, we have to rethink and rethink and
    rethink, and re-cross every ``t'' and re-dot every ``i,'' and
    do every kind of full-scale testing that you can possibly do.
        And I would think that if Congress does not give you the
    type of resources to do the testing, we would be irresponsible.
        But I still think, Mr. Chairman, we are completely
    irresponsible in going ahead with Yucca Mountain without doing
    this testing ahead of time.
        Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. McGaffigan. Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Yes, sir.
        Mr. McGaffigan. Could I just make one comment with regard
    to the transportation issue?
        The Chairman. Yes.
        Mr. McGaffigan. In the security issue in particular, we
    need to look at the security of our facilities--of our
    transportation casks against reasonable threats.
        But if a terrorist gets a TOW Missile, which I hope is not
    widely available in America, there are targets available to
    them where, instead of getting possible radiological
    consequences that might cause cancer sometime down the road,
    where they can get guaranteed large, tens of thousands of
    deaths potentially.
        There was an article in the Washington Post a few months
    ago about taking the chlorine tanks out of the Blue Plains
    facility, which is not far from this site, when they
    discovered, without the use of TOW Missiles, that they had too
    much chlorine there and if a terrorist had attacked at that
    site, there would have been very large numbers of deaths in
    Washington.
        So you have to put the radiological consequences of an
    attack--we have these massive containers that, unlike other
    things, actually can do pretty well against a TOW Missile. You
    have hazardous materials in the transportation system daily in
    this country that are, you know, no-risk opportunities for
    terrorists.
        So putting some of this in context, I think, is very
    important.
        Senator Ensign. Well, the reason I brought that up, Mr.
    Chairman----
        The Chairman. Senator Carper is about to sprint out of here
    to preside.
        Senator Ensign. Okay. I am sorry.
        The Chairman. Let me just give him a couple of minutes to
    say what he has to, and then we can ask additional questions.
    Go ahead.
        Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that because I
    have an 11 o'clock start. I appreciate your indulgence.
        Let me just ask two quick questions. One, in your view,
    what are the greatest risks that are posed to us as a people by
    the transportation of these materials? If they are indeed
    transported some years down the road, what is the greatest
    threat that we face? What are you doing about it? What do we
    need to do about it?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, let me say I think as to the transport
    of the material, that we have a record in which for commercial
    waste that they have gone nearly one million miles of transport
    without a radiological release. We cannot prevent the
    possibility that there will be ordinary traffic accidents that
    occur. If there were such an accident, we try to assure that
    there will not be a breach of a cask that would result in a
    radiological release. And that has been the focus of our
    requirements. And we have been successful in over one million
    miles of transport.
        We are going to continue that effort and expand it to make
    sure that we are dealing adequately with the terrorist threat
    that might be posed to these sorts of packages. And that is
    part of what our package performance study is intended to do,
    is to make sure we understand the severe events to which these
    sorts of casks might be confronted and to satisfy ourselves
    that they could survive those events adequately.
        Dr. Diaz. Senator, if I might----
        Senator Carper. The second half of my question is: What do
    we need to do? What do we need to do about it? I think you may
    have telegraphed the pitch by talking about an appropriation
    for 2004.
        Dr. Meserve. That is correct.
        Senator Carper. What do we need to do in the Congress to
    help avert a catastrophe?
        Dr. Meserve. Well, I know Dr. Diaz wants to respond, but
    let me just say quickly on that, I think that we will be
    seeking funds to support the kinds of full-scale testing that
    has been discussed here this morning, and to do other aspects
    of the package performance study. And I think that we would
    encourage you to review such a request favorably.
        Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
        Yes, sir.
        Dr. Meserve. Dr. Diaz.
        Dr. Diaz. Yes, I just wanted to say, Senator, that a
    catastrophe where significant life would be lost involving a
    transportation accident, is very difficult to imagine.
    Fundamentally, not only is the--not only are the casks very
    robust, but the amount of material in the casks that would
    potentially leak is, in our analysis, most of the time, not
    likely to result in immediate deaths or significant problems
    except for those who would be located right by the cask.
        Our concern, the Commission's, is always public health and
    safety. And so we look at the consequences very carefully. And
    we really do not see tremendous catastrophic results or
    disasters occurring from accidents with the casks.
        Yes, there is the potential of breaching the cask. There is
    a potential of radiation. Radiation is a very strange fellow.
    It is easily detectable. It can easily be measured. And in this
    country, we always have been and we always will be ready to
    take protective measures for our people. So it is not that
    something happens, and you have all of these immediate
    casualties.
        The American people are protected by many layers, we are
    one of those layers. And we do not see this tremendous
    catastrophic disasters occurring from a cask being breached.
        Senator Carper. All right. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of other questions. I am not
    going to ask them now, but I am interested in knowing how some
    other countries are handling the transportation of their high-
    level nuclear and radioactive waste.
        And the other thing I wanted to ask for you input on--and I
    will do this or ask for something in writing. But I have just
    an inquiry with respect to the future likelihood of our ability
    to reprocess this fuel, to recycle it, to reduce the amount of
    space that it takes up in the future.
        Dr. Meserve. We would be happy to respond to those, for the
    record.
        Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
        And I thank my colleagues, as well.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Let me go ahead. Senator Campbell indicated he had another
    question or two.
        Senator Campbell. I think they answered most of my
    questions, Mr. Chairman. I do not think anybody can absolutely
    guarantee total and absolute safety under all conditions. My
    gosh, we kill 55,000 people a year on American highways with
    accidents. And I do not think that that is in the mix.
        But I also do not think that there is anything known to man
    that cannot be cut into or destroyed, and I do not mean with a
    TOW Missile. I mean with a--my gosh, anybody, good guys and bad
    guys, can buy a cutting torch that will melt steel at any local
    hardware store. So I think that ought to be in the mix, too,
    that that is--that they can be penetrated, I think. But the
    danger of how far it leaks and so on, I think Dr. Diaz, he
    addressed that a little bit.
        But I had one question, but I think I will just go ahead
    and submit that in writing because I am going to have to leave
    in a minute, too. But thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Campbell. And I thank this panel.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Senator Ensign, did you have additional questions?
        Senator Ensign. Yes, just briefly in that I just wanted to
    go back to when you are talking, and I agree with you, that
    there are a lot of things that we need to restudy. We need to
    make our current facilities, nuclear facilities, safer. We need
    to put more security into those.
        And, Dr. Diaz, the point that you made about that if there
    is a leak that, you know, the possibility of mass deaths is
    very low and all of that, when you are talking about radiation,
    you are talking about fear. Okay? And sometimes it is
    irrational fear, but fear nonetheless.
        We all know of the device called an MRI. It is very, very
    commonly known to us as magnetic resonance imaging. The
    original name of that NMR. It contained the word ``nuclear.''
    Anytime you use the word ``nuclear,'' people are fearful.
    Nobody would have gone in for an NMR. They go in commonly for
    MRIs. They are the same exact technology, but because it evokes
    fear, that people become necessarily irrational.
        Terrorists play on people's fears. The reason that the
    terrorists--we know in our intelligence gathering that is why
    they are looking for nuclear types of targets is because they
    know that people are irrational with when it comes to any kind
    of radiation, anything to do with any kind of nuclear thing.
        So that is one of the big reasons, is that--it is that we
    know that these things are going to be targets, much more than
    a chlorine tank is a target, even though a chlorine tank may do
    more damage, that people are much more afraid of a radiation
    leak than they are of chlorine leaks even though chlorine does
    much more damage.
        Mr. McGaffigan. That may speak to the American educational
    system and perhaps the terrorists' educational system.
        Dr. Diaz. Senator----
        Senator Ensign. Right. But we all know up here. And, Mr.
    Chairman, we have learned very, very, very, very clearly in our
    dealings up here that perception is reality.
        The Chairman. Yes.
        Senator Ensign. And that is people's perception.
        Mr. McGaffigan. You work in a very high radiation
    environment. Last year, my son was a page in the Senate for
    Senator Warner, and I took my MicroR meter around the Capitol
    and got measurements in the 20 to 30 MicroR per hour range. You
    also travel a lot by air, and every time you go home to Nevada,
    you get about 4 millirems round trip so we may want to monitor
    you. You may be a radiation worker.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Ensign. I am going to start wearing a lead apron.
        [Laughter.]
        Dr. Diaz. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to add that I think
    the point is very well taken, and that is one of the things
    that I think and believe is our responsibility; that is to
    allay unnecessary fears. Our concern is always with respect to
    public health and safety, Unnecessary fears might actually
    detract from our society and might not let us use every useful
    thing that is possible, whether it is chemical or whatever it
    is. To allay unnecessary fear is certainly part of our
    responsibilities. And we take that very seriously, sir.
        The Chairman. All right. Well, thank you all very much. I
    think it has been useful testimony. We appreciate it.
        Dr. Meserve. Thank you.
        The Chairman. And we will go to the final panel. We have
    Dr. Jared Cohon, the Chair of the Nuclear Waste Technical
    Review Board; Ms. Gary Jones, the Director of the Natural
    Resources and Environment Team at the General Accounting
    Office; the Honorable Jeffrey Holmstead, Assistant
    Administrator for Air and Radiation at the EPA; and the
    Honorable Robert Card, who is the Under Secretary for the
    Department of Energy.
        Thank you all very much for being here.
        [Pause.]
        The Chairman. Dr. Cohon, please go ahead and begin.
        Dr. Cohon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Let me just, before you start, indicate that
    I understand this may be your last appearance before the
    committee, and we should take the opportunity to thank you for
    your many years of service on the Board, and particularly the
    last five during which you have been the Chair of the Board.
        Dr. Cohon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
    it.
        The Chairman. You have done an excellent job, and we
    appreciate it very much. So go ahead with your testimony.

    STATEMENT OF JARED L. COHON, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL
                              REVIEW BOARD

        Dr. Cohon. Thank you. In fact, as the Chairman knows, I am
    one of only ten members of the Board, and I am pleased that two
    of the other members could be with us today. I would like to
    introduce them very briefly and ask them to rise as I do so.
        Debra Knopman is a senior scientist at RAND Corporation.
    And Richard Parizek is a professor of hydrogeology at Penn
    State University.
        As the chairman noted at the beginning of the hearing, our
    Board was created by Congress in the 1987 amendments to the
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act. And you did so specifically to create
    a body that would provide to you independent technical review
    of the DOE's work related to Yucca Mountain and the management
    of high-level nuclear waste.
        Based on that, we did a review and, Mr. Chairman, I would
    like to summarize my testimony and ask that the full text be
    included in the record.
        The Chairman. We will include each of the witnesses' full
    testimony, and please do summarize your points.
        Dr. Cohon. Thank you.
        As part of that ongoing independent technical review that
    we provide, we notified the Secretary in December 2001 that we
    would be issuing our comments with regard to the site
    recommendation that we knew was forthcoming.
        That was contained in a letter on January 24 of this year,
    which was conveyed both to the Secretary and to Congress. I
    would like to just point out to you some of the key points in
    that letter. Based on our review of all of the relevant work
    that DOE had done to that point, the Board's view is that, when
    that work is taken as a whole, the technical basis for the
    DOE's repository performance estimates is weak to moderate at
    this time.
        The Board concurs with the consensus of the international
    scientific community that deep geologic disposal is technically
    feasible at a suitable site. The Board, however, makes no
    judgment on the suitability of Yucca Mountain itself. We
    believe and we are very clear in understanding the mandate that
    Congress gave us, which is to provide technical insight and
    technical review and not to make policy decisions of that sort.
    We defer to the policy-making process which is to say Congress
    now, on the suitability of Yucca Mountain.
        At this point, the Board found no individual technical or
    scientific factor that would automatically eliminate Yucca
    Mountain from consideration. The Board considers this minimum
    threshold to be a necessary, but by itself not a sufficient
    technical condition, for a positive determination of site
    suitability.
        The DOE's performance estimates are based on a complicated
    and large model called ``Total System Performance Assessment,''
    or TSPA for short. There are many uncertainties due to gaps in
    data and basic understanding as it relates to this model and
    its use. This creates limited confidence for the Board in the
    current performance estimates, which are a product of this TSPA
    model.
        The Board made several recommendations in its January
    letter that, if implemented fully, would likely improve the
    Board's view of the technical basis for DOE's performance
    assessments. Just to highlight some of those recommendations
    that we made, we strongly recommend that DOE continue a
    vigorous scientific investigation so as to increase basic
    understanding of the potential behavior of the proposed
    repository system.
        We note that high temperatures in the DOE's base case
    design increase uncertainties and, therefore, decrease
    confidence in the performance of waste package materials which
    are a key part of the system. Adopting a low-temperature design
    might reduce uncertainties; we do not know. But in any event,
    we strongly recommend that the DOE do a full and objective
    comparison of both high temperature designs and low temperature
    designs.
        Among the other recommendations we made was urging DOE to
    identify, quantify and communicate clearly the uncertainties
    associated with their estimates of performance. We point out
    the importance of DOE identifying other data or other arguments
    they could use to buttress their performance estimates other
    than TSPA. And we point out the importance of defense in depth.
        I should emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that even if all of these
    recommendations are in fact pursued, one cannot predict whether
    performance estimates would be better or worse after
    implementing these recommendations.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, your letter conveyed a question
    seeking the Board's view on whether sufficient technical
    information is or will be available to the NRC to enable it to
    assess the safety and environmental impact of a repository at
    Yucca Mountain. I would like to respond to that question now in
    full.
        The NRC issued a sufficiency statement on this subject in
    November 2001. The NRC and the DOE have agreed on a list of key
    technical issues that need to be addressed in the DOE's license
    application. The NRC, and not our Board, will judge whether or
    not DOE's efforts to resolve these issues are, in fact,
    adequate.
        However, the Board believes that given the significant
    uncertainties associated with the DOE's current performance
    estimates, addressing all of the key technical issues in the
    2004 time frame that has been discussed will be an ambitious
    undertaking.
        Finally, in closing, let me just note: The Board is
    certainly aware and the chairman and the other members of this
    committee are as well, that it is not possible to avoid all
    technical uncertainty associated with Yucca Mountain or any
    other potential repository site.
        It is up to policy makers to decide how much uncertainty is
    acceptable at the time that you make your decision.
        That concludes my statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Cohon follows:]
    Prepared Statement of Jared L. Cohon, Chairman, Nuclear Waste Technical
                                  Review Board
        Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am Jared
    Cohon, Chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. All
    members of the Board are appointed by the President and serve on a
    part-time basis. In my case, I also am president of Carnegie Mellon
    University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
        I am pleased to be here today to present the Board's technical and
    scientific evaluation of the Department of Energy's work related to the
    recommendation of a site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the location of
    a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level
    radioactive waste and to respond to questions posed by the Committee in
    its invitation letter. We hope that the Committee and other policy-
    makers will find the Board's testimony useful as you consider the
    various issues that will affect a decision on whether to proceed with
    repository development. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will
    summarize the Board's findings, and I request that my full statement
    and the Board's January 24, 2002, letter report to Congress and the
    Secretary of Energy be included in the hearing record.
        As you know, Mr. Chairman, Congress created the Board in the 1987
    amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Congress charged the Board
    with performing an ongoing independent evaluation of the technical and
    scientific validity of activities undertaken by the Secretary of Energy
    related to disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
    waste. The Board also reviews the DOE's activities related to
    transporting and packaging such waste. Since the Board was established,
    its primary focus has been the DOE's efforts to characterize a site at
    Yucca Mountain in Nevada to determine its suitability as the location
    of a potential repository.
        Early last year, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham indicated that
    he would make a decision at the end of 2001 on whether to recommend the
    Yucca Mountain site for repository development. As the Secretary's
    decision approached, the Board decided it was important to comment to
    the Secretary and Congress, within the context of the Board's ongoing
    evaluation of the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities,
    on the DOE's work related to a site recommendation. So, in November
    2001, the Board met to review comprehensively the DOE's efforts in this
    area. In December 2001, the Board sent a letter to the Secretary
    indicating that the Board would provide its comments within a few
    weeks. The Board conveyed those comments in a letter, which included
    attachments with supporting details, that was sent to Congress and the
    Secretary on January 24, 2002.
        I will now summarize the Board's review procedures and the results
    of the Board's evaluation. Questions posed by the Committee in its
    invitation letter are addressed in the context of the Board's
    evaluation.
        The Board's evaluation of the DOE's work represents the collective
    judgment of its members and was based on the following:

       The results of the Board's ongoing review of the DOE's Yucca
            Mountain technical and scientific investigations since the
            Board's inception;
       An evaluation of the DOE's work on the natural and
            engineered components of the proposed repository system, using
            a list of technical questions identified by the Board;
       A comprehensive Board review of draft and final documents
            supplied by the DOE through mid-November 2001;
       Field observations by Board members at Yucca Mountain and
            related sites.

        To focus its review, the Board considered the following 10
    questions for components of the repository system:
        1. Do the models used to generate input to the total system
    performance assessment (TSPA) and the representations of processes and
    linkages or relationships among processes within TSPA have a sound
    basis?
        2. Have uncertainties and conservatisms in the analyses been
    identified, quantified, and described accurately and meaningfully?
        3. Have sufficient data and observations been gathered using
    appropriate methodologies?
        4. Have assumptions and expert judgments, including bounding
    estimates, been documented and justified?
        5. Have model predictions been verified or tested?
        6. Have available data that could challenge prevailing
    interpretations been collected and evaluated?
        7. Have alternative conceptual models and model abstractions been
    evaluated, and have the bases for accepting preferred models been
    documented?
        8. Are the bases for extrapolating data over long times or
    distances scientifically valid?
        9. Can the repository and waste package designs be implemented so
    that the engineered and natural barriers perform as expected?
        10. To the extent practical, have other lines of evidence, derived
    independently of performance assessments, been used to evaluate
    confidence in model estimates?
        In evaluating the DOE's work related to individual natural and
    engineered components of the proposed repository system, the Board
    found varying degrees of strength and weakness. For example, the Board
    considers the DOE's estimates of the probabilities of volcanic events
    and earthquakes at Yucca Mountain strengths and the lack of data
    related to corrosion of materials proposed for the waste packages under
    conditions that would likely be present in the repository and the very
    short experience with these materials weaknesses.
        This kind of variability is not surprising, given that the Yucca
    Mountain project is a complex, and, in many respects, a first-of-a-kind
    undertaking. An important conclusion in the Board's January letter is
    that when the DOE's technical and scientific work is taken as a whole,
    the Board's view is that the technical basis for the DOE's repository
    performance estimates is weak to moderate at this time. However, if all
    the recommendations in the Board's January 24, 2002, letter report *
    are implemented and no surprises are found, the Board's view of the
    technical basis would likely improve. The predicted repository
    performance, however, might be either better or worse, depending on
    what is discovered.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * The letter has been retained in committee files.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Board concurs with the consensus within the international
    scientific community that deep geologic disposal is technically
    feasible at a suitable site. However, the Board made no judgment in its
    January letter on the question of whether the Yucca Mountain site
    should be recommended or approved for repository development. Those
    judgments, which involve a number of public-policy considerations as
    well as an assessment of how much technical uncertainty is acceptable
    at various decision points, go beyond the Board's congressionally
    established mandate.
        Let me explain in a little more detail, Mr. Chairman, the basis for
    the Board's conclusion on performance estimates. The DOE uses a
    complex, integrated performance assessment model to project repository
    system performance. Performance assessment is a useful tool because it
    assesses how well the repository system as a whole, not just the site
    or the engineered components, might perform. However, gaps in data and
    basic understanding cause important uncertainties in the concepts and
    assumptions on which the DOE's performance estimates are now based.
    Therefore, while no individual technical or scientific factor has been
    identified that would automatically eliminate Yucca Mountain from
    consideration at this point, the Board has limited confidence in
    current performance estimates generated by the DOE's performance
    assessment model.
        But first let me expand a bit on the comment I just made that at
    this point, no individual technical or scientific factor has been
    identified that would automatically eliminate Yucca Mountain from
    consideration. The Board considers this minimum threshold finding to be
    a necessary, but by itself not a sufficient, condition for a positive
    determination of site suitability.
        How can confidence in the DOE's performance estimates be increased?
    As noted in the Board's January letter report, the Board believes that
    a fundamental understanding of the potential behavior of a proposed
    repository system is very important. Therefore, if policy-makers decide
    to approve the Yucca Mountain site, the Board strongly recommends that,
    in addition to demonstrating regulatory compliance, the DOE continue a
    vigorous, well-integrated scientific investigation to increase its
    fundamental understanding of the potential behavior of the repository
    system. Increased understanding could show that components of the
    repository system perform better than or not as well as the DOE's
    performance assessment model now projects. In either case, making
    performance projections more realistic and characterizing the full
    range of uncertainty could improve the DOE's performance estimates.
        The DOE's estimates of repository performance currently rely
    heavily on engineered components of the repository system, making
    corrosion of the waste package very important.
        As the Board has mentioned in many of its previous reports and
    letters, we believe that high temperatures in the DOE's base-case
    repository design increase uncertainties and decrease confidence in the
    performance of waste package materials. Confidence in projections of
    waste package and repository performance potentially could increase if
    the DOE adopts a low-temperature repository design. However, the Board
    continues to believe that the DOE should complete a full and objective
    comparison of high- and low-temperature repository designs before it
    selects a final repository design concept.
        Over the last several years, the Board has made several other
    recommendations that could improve the DOE's projections of repository
    performance. For example, the Board recommended that the DOE identify,
    quantify, and communicate clearly the extent of the uncertainty
    associated with its performance estimates. The Board also recommended
    that the DOE use additional lines of evidence and argument to
    supplement the results of its performance assessment. Moreover, the DOE
    could strengthen its arguments about how multiple barriers in its
    proposed repository system provide ``defense-in-depth'' (or
    redundancy). Although the DOE has made progress in each of these areas,
    more work is needed.
        Other actions that might be considered if policy-makers approve the
    Yucca Mountain site include systematically integrating new data and
    analyses produced by ongoing scientific and engineering investigations;
    monitoring repository performance before, during, and after waste
    emplacement; developing a strategy for modifying or stopping repository
    development if potentially significant unforeseen circumstances are
    encountered; and continuing external review of the DOE's technical and
    scientific activities.
        Mr. Chairman, your letter of invitation asked what the Board's
    views are on whether sufficient technical information is or will be
    available to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to enable it to assess
    the safety and environmental impact of a repository at Yucca Mountain.
        This is the Board's answer to that question. The NRC issued the
    following statement in November 2001, ``The NRC believes that
    sufficient at-depth site characterization analysis and waste form
    proposal information, although not available now, will be available at
    the time of a potential license application such that development of an
    acceptable license application is achievable.'' The NRC and the DOE
    have agreed on a list of ``key technical issues'' (KTI) that need to be
    addressed in the DOE's license application. The NRC, not the Board,
    will judge the adequacy of the DOE's efforts to resolve these issues
    for a license application. However, the Board believes that given the
    significant uncertainties associated with the DOE's current performance
    estimates, addressing all of the KTI's in the 2004 time frame that has
    been discussed will be an ambitious undertaking.
        Mr. Chairman, let me close by observing that eliminating all
    uncertainty associated with estimates of repository performance would
    never be possible at any repository site. Policy-makers will decide how
    much scientific uncertainty is acceptable at the time various decisions
    are made on site recommendation or repository development. The Board
    hopes that the information provided in this testimony and in its letter
    report to Congress and the Secretary will be useful to policy-makers
    faced with making these important decisions.
        Thank you for the opportunity to present the Board's views. I will
    be happy to respond to additional questions from the Committee.

        The Chairman. Ms. Jones, why don't you go right ahead?

            STATEMENT OF MS. GARY JONES, DIRECTOR, NATURAL
          RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

        Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We are pleased to be here today to discuss DOE's project to
    develop a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
        This morning I would like to focus on three points. First,
    DOE has a significant amount of work ahead to prepare to submit
    an acceptable license application to NRC. Second, DOE is
    unlikely to achieve its goal of opening a repository by 2010.
    And third, DOE needs to reestablish a cost and schedule
    baseline for the project and use that baseline as one of the
    basic tools to manage the project.
        The President's recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site
    to the Congress on February 15th triggered specific statutory
    time frames for the next step in the repository project. For
    example, if the Congress enacts legislation overriding the
    State's disapproval. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE
    to then submit a license application within 90 days. However,
    DOE's managing contractor concluded that DOE would not be in a
    position to submit the application to NRC until January 2006 or
    about four years from now. This conclusion was based on a
    September 2001 detailed reassessment of the work required to
    submit a license application that would be acceptable to NRC.
        DOE did not accept this schedule and directed the
    contractor to shorten the time to a license application to
    December 2004 or about 2\1/2\ years from now.
        One of the key factors that drive DOE's ability to submit
    an acceptable license application is satisfactory completion of
    the 293 agreements with NRC under which DOE agreed to collect
    more scientific data and/or improve its technical assessment of
    that data.
        These agreements generally relate to uncertainties about
    three aspects of the long-term performance of the proposed
    repository: One, the expected lifetime of engineered barriers
    particularly the waste containers; two, the physical properties
    of the Yucca Mountain site; and three, supporting information
    for the mathematical models used to evaluate the performance of
    the planned repository.
        Minimizing uncertainties about the waste containers is
    especially critical because DOE's estimates of the repository
    system's performance depend heavily on the waste containers, in
    addition to the natural features of the site. According to NRC,
    as of March 4, 2002, DOE had satisfactorily completed work on
    38 of these agreements and could resolve another 22 by
    September 30 of this year.
        DOE is also continuing to address similar technical issues
    raised by the Board. As Dr. Cohon has testified, the Board's
    most recent report in January concluded that when DOE's
    technical and scientific work is taken as a whole, the
    technical basis for DOE's repository performance estimates is
    weak to moderate at this time. The Board added that gaps in
    data and basic understanding cause important uncertainties in
    the concepts and assumptions on which DOE's performance
    estimates are now based.
        With regard to opening the repository, it is unlikely that
    DOE can meet its goal of opening the repository in 2010.
    According to program estimates, 7 years would be needed after
    license application until the facility was operational, 3 years
    to obtain a license, and 4 years to construct the facility.
        Depending on the license application date, this would
    extend the opening date until about 2012 or 2013. However, even
    these time frames may be questionable. A repository at Yucca
    Mountain would be a first-of-a-kind facility, meaning that any
    scheduled projections might be optimistic. The contractor's
    reassessment statement that the proposed schedule to reach
    license application did not include any cost or schedule
    contingencies.
        Further, a contractor who independently reviewed the
    Nuclear Waste Program reported that the 4-year construction
    period was too optimistic and recommended that the construction
    phase be extended by a year and a half.
        Finally, unless the program receives the funding level
    assumed, the budget might become the determining factor when
    DOE will be able to accept wastes.
        DOE currently does not have a reliable estimate of when and
    at what cost a license application can be submitted, including
    the late 2004 date, or when a repository can be opened. This is
    because DOE stopped using its cost and schedule baselines to
    manage the site investigation in 1997.
        Further, DOE has accepted only the fiscal year 2002 portion
    of the baseline its contractor proposed. And DOE is currently
    reviewing the contractor's plan for submitting a license
    application to NRC by December 2004.
        Our December 2001 report recommended that DOE reestablish a
    baseline for the repository program that accounts for the
    outstanding technical work needed to prepare an acceptable
    license application and the estimated cost and schedule to
    achieve this milestone and use that baseline to manage the
    program. This would help to ensure that when changes occur,
    such as adding or modifying technical work, or unanticipated
    funding shortfalls, alternative courses of action can be
    assessed on the basis of each action's potential effect on the
    baseline. DOE has told us that the new baseline will be
    established by September 2002.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Jones follows:]
     Prepared Statement of Ms. Gary Jones, Director, Natural Resources and
                     Environment, General Accounting Office
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be
    here today to discuss the Department of Energy's (DOE) project to
    develop a nuclear waste repository. As required by law, DOE has been
    investigating a site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, to determine its
    suitability for disposing of highly radioactive wastes in a mined
    geologic repository. On February 14, 2002, the secretary of energy
    recommended to the president approval of this site for the development
    of a nuclear waste repository. The next day, the president recommended
    approval of the site to the Congress. The president's recommendation
    began a statutory review process for the approval or disapproval of the
    site, including action by the state of Nevada, the Congress, DOE, and
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) within specified time frames.
    If the site is approved, DOE must apply to NRC for authorization (a
    license) to construct a repository. If the site is not approved for a
    license application, or if NRC denies a license to construct a
    repository, the administration and the Congress will have to consider
    other options for the long-term management of existing and future
    nuclear wastes.
        Our testimony, which is based on our recent report on the Yucca
    Mountain Repository Project,\1\ addresses (1) DOE's readiness to submit
    a license application within the statutory time frame, (2) the extent
    to which DOE can meet its goal of opening a repository at Yucca
    Mountain in 2010, and (3) the extent to which DOE is managing the
    project consistent with applicable departmental procedures.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Waste: Technical,
    Schedule, and Cost Uncertainties of the Yucca Mountain Repository
    Project, GAO-02-191 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 21, 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    summary
        DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to
    NRC within the statutory limits that would take effect if the site is
    approved. The president's recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site to
    the Congress triggered specific statutory time frames for the next
    steps in the repository project. Nevada, which had 60 days from
    February 15 to disapprove the site, did so on April 8. The Congress now
    has 90 days (of continuous session) from that date in which to enact
    legislation overriding the state's disapproval. On May 8, the House of
    Representatives passed a joint resolution approving the site for a
    repository. If the Senate also passes this resolution--resulting in
    final approval of the site--the Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires DOE
    to then submit a license application to NRC within 90 days of the
    effective date of the legislation. Thus, the process gives DOE about 5
    to 8 months from the date of the president's recommendation to submit
    the license application. However, a September 2001 detailed assessment
    of the repository program by DOE's managing contractor concluded that
    DOE would not be ready to submit a license application that would be
    acceptable to NRC until January 2006. DOE did not accept the
    contractor's proposed new schedule and directed the contractor to
    develop a proposal to shorten the time to a license application to
    December 2004, or about 19 months from now. The contractor has now
    developed such a proposal, which is under review within DOE. Moreover,
    while a site recommendation and a license application are separate
    processes, essentially the same data are needed for both. Waiting until
    DOE was closer to having the additional information needed to support
    an acceptable license application would have put DOE in a better
    position to submit the application within the time frames set out in
    the law, and to respond to questions and challenges that may emanate
    from the statutory review process subsequent to the president's
    recommendation.
        DOE is unlikely to achieve its goal of opening a repository at
    Yucca Mountain by 2010. On the basis of DOE's managing contractor's
    September 2001 reassessment, sufficient time would not be available for
    DOE to obtain a license from NRC and construct enough of the repository
    to open it in 2010. Even under the more recent proposal to submit a
    license application as early as December 2004, it is questionable
    whether DOE could open the repository in 2010. A key factor in the
    future licensing and construction of a repository is whether DOE will
    be able to obtain the increases in annual funding that would be
    required to open the repository by 2010. Because of the uncertainty of
    meeting the 2010 goal, DOE is exploring alternative approaches, such as
    developing surface facilities for storing waste at the site until
    sufficient underground disposal facilities can be constructed. Had DOE
    elected to defer a site recommendation until it was closer to having an
    acceptable license application, it could have ensured that the site
    recommendation was based on the approach to developing a repository
    that it intends to follow. This would have enabled DOE to develop an
    estimated schedule to design and build the preferred approach and to
    estimate its cost, including the annual funding requirements, as part
    of the information on which to make a site recommendation.
        DOE currently does not have a reliable estimate of when, and at
    what cost, a license application can be submitted or a repository can
    be opened because DOE stopped using its cost and schedule baselines to
    manage the site investigation in 1997. DOE needs to reestablish a
    baseline for the repository program that accounts for the outstanding
    technical work needed to prepare an acceptable license application and
    the estimated schedule and cost to achieve this milestone. In
    conjunction, DOE needs to use the baseline as a tool for managing the
    program, in accordance with the department's policies and procedures
    for managing major projects. Therefore, our December 2001 report
    recommended that the secretary of energy reestablish the baseline
    through the submission of a license application and follow the
    department's management requirements, including a formal procedure for
    changing program milestones. According to DOE, it is currently in the
    process of establishing a new baseline for the nuclear waste program.
                                   background
        Recognizing the critical need to address the issue of nuclear waste
    disposal, the Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to
    establish a comprehensive policy and program for the safe, permanent
    disposal of commercial spent fuel and other highly radioactive wastes
    in one or more mined geologic repositories. The act created the Office
    of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management within DOE to manage its
    nuclear waste program. Amendments to the act in 1987 directed DOE to
    investigate only the Yucca Mountain site.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act also set out important and
    complementary roles for other federal agencies:

       The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was required to
            establish health and safety standards for the disposal of
            wastes in repositories. EPA issued standards for the Yucca
            Mountain site in June 2001 that require a high probability of
            safety for at least 10,000 years.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The Energy Policy Act of 1992 required EPA to establish
    specific health and safety standards for a repository at Yucca
    Mountain.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating repositories
            to ensure their compliance with EPA's standards. One
            prerequisite to the secretary's recommendation was obtaining
            NRC's preliminary comments on the sufficiency of DOE's site
            investigation for the purpose of a license application. NRC
            provided these comments on November 13, 2001. If the site is
            approved, then NRC, upon accepting a license application from
            DOE, has 3 to 4 years to review the application and decide
            whether to issue a license to construct, and then to operate, a
            repository at the site.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ The acceptance of a license application is not the same as
    approving an application. A decision to approve or disapprove any
    application would be made by NRC following extensive review and
    testing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (the board) reviews
            the technical and scientific validity of DOE's activities
            associated with investigating the site and packaging and
            transporting wastes. The board must report its findings and
            recommendations to the Congress and the secretary of energy at
            least twice each year, but DOE is not required to implement
            these recommendations.

        DOE has designated the nuclear waste program, including the site
    investigation, as a ``major'' program that is subject to senior
    management's attention and to its agency-wide guidelines for managing
    such programs and projects. The guidelines require the development of a
    cost and schedule baseline, a system for managing changes to the
    baseline, and independent cost and schedule reviews. DOE is using a
    management contractor to carry out the work on the program. The
    contractor develops and maintains the baseline, but senior DOE managers
    must approve significant changes to cost or schedule estimates. In
    February 2001, DOE hired Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC (Bechtel), to manage
    the program and required the contractor to reassess the remaining
    technical work and the estimated schedule and cost to complete this
    work.
       doe will not be ready to submit a license application within the
                              statutory time frame
        DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to
    NRC within the statutory limits that would take effect if the site were
    approved. Specifically, DOE has entered into 293 agreements with NRC to
    gather and/or analyze additional technical information in preparation
    for a license application that NRC would accept. DOE is also continuing
    to address technical issues raised by the board. In September 2001,
    Bechtel concluded, after reassessing the remaining technical work, that
    DOE would not be ready to submit an acceptable license application to
    NRC until January 2006. DOE did not accept the 2006 date. Instead, it
    directed the contractor to prepare a new plan for submitting a license
    application to NRC by December 2004. DOE's current plan is that, by the
    end of September 2002, Bechtel will develop, and DOE will review and
    approve, a new technical, cost, and schedule baseline for submitting a
    license application to NRC in December 2004.
        Moreover, while a site recommendation and a license application are
    separate processes, DOE will need to use essentially the same data for
    both.\4\ Also, the act states that the president's recommendation to
    the Congress is that he considers the site qualified for an application
    to NRC for a license. The president's recommendation also triggers an
    express statutory time frame that requires DOE to submit a license
    application to NRC within about 5 to 8 months.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ See General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for
    Nuclear Waste Repositories; Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines
    (preamble), 66 Fed. Reg. 57298, 57322 (Nov. 14, 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                doe lacks information for a license application
        The 293 agreements that DOE and NRC have negotiated address areas
    of study within the program where NRC's staff has determined that DOE
    needs to collect more scientific data and/or improve its technical
    assessment of the data. According to NRC, as of March 2002, DOE had
    satisfactorily completed work on 38 of these agreements and could
    resolve another 22 agreements by September 30 of this year. These 293
    agreements generally relate to uncertainties about three aspects of the
    long-term performance of the proposed repository: (1) the expected
    lifetime of engineered barriers, particularly the waste containers; (2)
    the physical properties of the Yucca Mountain site; and (3) the
    supporting information for the mathematical models used to evaluate the
    performance of the planned repository at the site.
        The uncertainties related to engineered barriers revolve around the
    longevity of the waste containers that would be used to isolate the
    wastes. DOE currently expects that these containers would isolate the
    wastes from the environment for more than 10,000 years. Minimizing
    uncertainties about the container materials and the predicted
    performance of the waste containers over this long time period is
    especially critical because DOE's estimates of the repository system's
    performance depend heavily on the waste containers, in addition to the
    natural features of the site, to meet NRC's licensing regulations and
    EPA's health and safety standards
        The uncertainties related to the physical characteristics of the
    site center on how the combination of heat, water, and chemical
    processes caused by the presence of nuclear waste in the repository
    would affect the flow of water through the repository.
        The NRC staff's concerns about DOE's mathematical models for
    assessing the performance of the repository primarily relate to
    validating the models; that is, presenting information to provide
    confidence that the models are valid for their intended use and
    verifying the information used in the models. Performance assessment is
    an analytical method that relies on computers to operate mathematical
    models to assess the performance of the repository against EPA's health
    and safety standards, NRC's licensing regulations, and DOE's guidelines
    for determining if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for a
    repository. DOE uses the data collected during site characterization
    activities to model how a repository's natural and engineered features
    would perform at the site.
        According to DOE, the additional technical work surrounding the 293
    agreements with NRC's staff is an insignificant addition to the
    extensive amount of technical work already completed--including some
    600 papers cited in one of its recently published reports and a
    substantial body of published analytic literature. DOE does not expect
    the results of the additional work to change its current performance
    assessment of a repository at Yucca Mountain.
        From NRC's perspective, however, the agreements provided the basis
    for it to give DOE its preliminary comments on the sufficiency of DOE's
    investigation of the Yucca Mountain site for inclusion in a future
    license application. In a November 13, 2001, letter to the under
    secretary of energy, the Chairman of the NRC commented that:

            [a]lthough significant additional work is needed prior to the
            submission of a possible license application, we believe that
            agreements reached between DOE and NRC staff regarding the
            collection of additional information provide the basis for
            concluding that development of an acceptable license
            application is achievable.

        The board has also consistently raised issues and concerns over
    DOE's understanding of the expected lifetime of the waste containers,
    the significance of the uncertainties involved in the modeling of the
    scientific data, and the need for an evaluation and comparison of a
    repository design having a higher temperature with a design having a
    lower temperature. The board continues to reiterate these concerns in
    its reports. For example, in its most recent report to the Congress and
    the secretary of energy, issued on January 24, 2002, the board
    concluded that, when DOE's technical and scientific work is taken as a
    whole, the technical basis for DOE's repository performance estimates
    is ``weak to moderate'' at this time. The board added that gaps in data
    and basic understanding cause important uncertainties in the concepts
    and assumptions on which DOE's performance estimates are now based;
    providing the board with limited confidence in current performance
    estimates generated by DOE performance assessment model.
        As recently as May 2001, DOE projected that it could submit a
    license application to NRC in 2003. It now appears, however, that DOE
    may not complete all of the additional technical work that it has
    agreed to do to prepare an acceptable license application until January
    2006. In September 2001, Bechtel completed, at DOE's direction, a
    detailed reassessment in an effort to reestablish a cost and schedule
    baseline. Bechtel estimated that DOE could complete the outstanding
    technical work agreed to with NRC and submit a license application in
    January 2006. This date, according to the contractor, was due to the
    cumulative effect of funding reductions in recent years that had
    produced a ``. . . growing bow wave of incomplete work that is being
    pushed into the future. Moreover, the contractor's report said, the
    proposed schedule did not include any cost and schedule contingencies.
    The contractor's estimate was based on guidance from DOE that, in part,
    directed the contractor to assume annual funding for the nuclear waste
    program of $410 million in fiscal year 2002, $455 million in fiscal
    year 2003, and $465 million in fiscal year 2004 and thereafter.\5\ DOE
    did not accept this estimate because, according to program officials,
    the estimate would extend the date for submitting a license application
    too far into the future. Instead, DOE accepted only the fiscal year
    2002 portion of Bechtel's detailed work plan and directed the
    contractor to prepare a new plan for submitting a license application
    to NRC by December 2004. Bechtel has prepared such a plan and the plan
    is under review by DOE. Although we have not reviewed the entire plan,
    we note that the plan (1) assumes that the program receives the $525
    million in funds requested by the Administration for fiscal year 2003,
    which would be more than $100 million above the funds provided for
    fiscal year 2002, and (2) work on 10 of the department's 293 agreements
    with NRC would not be complete by the target license application date
    of December 2004.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ DOE's budget request for fiscal year 2003 is about $527
    million, or $72 million more than assumed in Bechtel's reassessment.
    The preliminary amounts for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 are $538 million
    and $550 million, respectively.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     essentially the same information is needed for a site recommendation
                           and a license application
        Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE's site characterization
    activities are to provide information necessary to evaluate the Yucca
    Mountain site's suitability for submitting a license application to NRC
    for placing a repository at the site. In implementing the act, DOE's
    guidelines provide that the site will be suitable as a waste repository
    if the site is likely to meet the radiation protection standards that
    NRC would use to reach a licensing decision on the proposed repository.
    Thus, as stated in the preamble (introduction) to DOE's guidelines, DOE
    expects to use essentially the same data for the site recommendation
    and the license application.
        In addition, the act specifies that, having received a site
    recommendation from the secretary, the president shall submit a
    recommendation of the site to the Congress if the president considers
    the site qualified for a license application. Under the process laid
    out in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, once the secretary makes a site
    recommendation, there is no time limit under which the president must
    act on the secretary's recommendation. However, when the president
    recommended, on February 15, that the Congress approve the site,
    specific statutory time frames were triggered for the next steps in the
    process. Figure 1 shows the approximate statutory time needed between a
    site recommendation and submission of a license application and the
    additional time needed for DOE to meet the conditions for an acceptable
    license application. The figure assumes that the Congress overrides the
    state's disapproval of April 8, 2002. As shown in the figure, Nevada
    had 60 days--until April 16--to disapprove the site. The Congress now
    has 90 days (of continuous session) from that date in which to enact
    legislation overriding the state's disapproval. If the Congress
    overrides the state's disapproval and the site designation takes
    effect, the next step is for the secretary to submit a license
    application to NRC within 90 days after the site designation is
    effective. In total, these statutory time frames provide about 150 to
    240 days, or about 5 to 8 months, from the time the president makes a
    recommendation to DOE's submittal of a license application. On the
    basis of Bechtel's September 2001 and current program reassessments,
    however, DOE would not be ready to submit a license application to NRC
    until January 2006 or December 2004, respectively.
            doe is unlikely to open a repository in 2010 as planned
        DOE states that it may be able to open a repository at Yucca
    Mountain in 2010. The department has based this expectation on
    submitting an acceptable license application to NRC in 2003, receiving
    NRC's authorization to construct a repository in 2006, and constructing
    essential surface and underground facilities by 2010. However, Bechtel,
    in its September 2001 proposal for reestablishing technical, schedule,
    and cost baselines for the program, concluded that January 2006 is a
    more realistic date for submitting a license application. Because DOE
    objected to this proposed schedule, the contractor has now proposed a
    plan for submitting the application in December 2004. Because of
    uncertainty over when DOE may be able to open the repository, the
    department is exploring alternatives that might still permit it to
    begin accepting commercial spent fuel in 2010.
          extension of license application date will likely postpone
                              2010 repository goal
        An extension of the license application date to December 2004 or
    January 2006 would likely preclude DOE from achieving its long-standing
    goal of opening a repository in 2010. According to DOE's May 2001
    report on the program's estimated cost, after submitting a license
    application in 2003, DOE estimates that it could receive an
    authorization to construct the repository in 2006 and complete the
    construction of enough surface and underground facilities to open the
    repository in 2010, or 7 years after submitting the license
    application. This 7-year estimate from submittal of the license
    application to the initial construction and operation of the repository
    assumes that NRC would grant an authorization to construct the facility
    in 3 years, followed by 4 years of construction. Assuming these same
    estimates of time, submitting a license application in the December
    2004 to January 2006 time frame would extend the opening date for the
    repository until 2012 or 2013.
        Furthermore, opening the repository in 2012 or 2013 may be
    questionable for several reasons. First, a repository at Yucca Mountain
    would be a first-of-a-kind facility, meaning that any schedule
    projections may be optimistic. DOE has deferred its original target
    date for opening a repository from 1998 to 2003 to 2010. Second,
    although the Nuclear Waste Policy Act states that NRC has 3 years to
    decide on a construction license, a fourth year may be added if NRC
    certifies that it is necessary. Third, the 4-year construction time
    period that DOE's current schedule allows may be too short. For
    example, a contractor hired by DOE to independently review the
    estimated costs and schedule for the nuclear waste program reported
    that the 4-year construction period was too optimistic and recommended
    that the construction phase be extended by a year-and-a-half.\6\
    Bechtel anticipates a 5-year period of construction between the receipt
    of a construction authorization from NRC and the opening of the
    repository. A 4-year licensing period followed by 5 years of initial
    construction could extend the repository opening until about 2014 or
    2015.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ U.S. Department of Energy, Independent Cost Estimate Review of
    the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, 2001 Total System
    Life Cycle Cost (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, these simple projections do not account for any other
    factors that could adversely affect this 7- to 9-year schedule for
    licensing, constructing, and opening the repository. Annual
    appropriations for the program in recent years have been less than $400
    million. In contrast, according to DOE, it needs between $750 million
    and $1.5 billion in annual appropriations during most of the 7- to 9-
    year licensing and construction period in order to open the repository
    on that schedule. In its August 2001 report on alternative means for
    financing and managing the program, DOE stated that unless the
    program's funding is increased, the budget might become the
    ``determining factor'' whether DOE will be able to accept wastes in
    2010.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ U.S. Department of Energy, Alternative Means of Financing and
    Managing the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW-0546
    (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In part, DOE's desire to meet the 2010 goal is linked to the court
    decisions that DOE--under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and as
    implemented by DOE's contracts with owners of commercial spent fuel--is
    obligated to begin accepting spent fuel from contract holders not later
    than January 31, 1998, or be held liable for damages. Courts are
    currently assessing the amount of damages that DOE must pay to holders
    of spent fuel disposal contracts. Estimates of potential damages for
    the estimated 12-year delay from 1998 to 2010 range widely from the
    department's estimate of about $2 billion to $3 billion to the nuclear
    industry's estimate of at least $50 billion. The damage estimates are
    based, in part, on the expectation that DOE would begin accepting spent
    fuel from contract holders in 2010. The actual damages could be higher
    or lower, depending on when DOE begins accepting spent fuel.
           doe is reviewing alternative ways to accept wastes in 2010
        Because of the uncertainty of achieving the 2010 goal for opening
    the Yucca Mountain repository, DOE is examining alternative approaches
    that would permit it to meet the goal. For example, in a May 2001
    report, DOE examined approaches that might permit it to begin accepting
    wastes at the repository site in 2010 while spreading out the
    construction of repository facilities over a longer time period. The
    report recommended storing wastes on the surface until the capacity to
    move wastes into the repository has been increased. Relatively modest-
    sized initial surface facilities to handle wastes could be expanded
    later to handle larger volumes of waste. Such an approach, according to
    the report, would permit partial construction and limited waste
    emplacement in the repository, at lower than earlier estimated annual
    costs, in advance of the more costly construction of the facility as
    originally planned. Also, by implementing a modular approach, DOE would
    be capable of accepting wastes at the repository earlier than if it
    constructed the repository described in the documents that the
    secretary used to support a site recommendation.
        DOE has also contracted with the National Research Council to
    provide recommendations on design and operating strategies for
    developing a geologic repository in stages, which is to include
    reviewing DOE's modular approach. The council is addressing such issues
    as the (1) technical, policy, and societal objectives and risks for
    developing a staged repository; (2) effects of developing a staged
    repository on the safety and security of the facility and the effects
    on the cost and public acceptance of such a facility; and (3)
    strategies for developing a staged system, including the design,
    construction, operation, and closing of such a facility. In March 2002,
    the council published an interim report on the study in which it
    addresses a conceptual framework for a generic repository program. The
    Council plans to issue a final report this fall, in which it intends to
    provide specific suggestions for incorporating additional elements of
    staged repository development into DOE's repository program.
     doe's current license application milestone date is not supported by
                             the program's baseline
        As of December 2001, DOE expected to submit the application to NRC
    in 2003.\8\ This date reflects a delay in the license application
    milestone date last approved by DOE in March 1997 that targeted March
    2002 for submitting a license application. The 2003 date was not
    formally approved by DOE's senior managers or incorporated into the
    program's cost and schedule baseline, as required by the management
    procedures that were in effect for the program. At least three
    extensions for the license application date have been proposed and used
    by DOE in program documents, but none of these proposals have been
    approved as required. As a result, DOE does not have a baseline
    estimate of the program's schedule and cost--including the late 2004
    date in its fiscal year 2003 budget request--that is based on all the
    work that it expects to complete through the submission of a license
    application.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ DOE's 2003 budget request states that DOE now expects to submit
    the license application between October and December 2004.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        DOE's guidance for managing major programs and projects requires,
    among other things, that senior managers establish a baseline for
    managing the program or project. The baseline describes the program's
    mission--in this case, the safe disposal of highly radioactive waste in
    a geologic repository--and the expected technical requirements,
    schedule, and cost to complete the program. Procedures for controlling
    changes to an approved baseline are designed to ensure that program
    managers consider the expected effects of adding, deleting, or
    modifying technical work, as well as the effects of unanticipated
    events, such as funding shortfalls, on the project's mission and
    baseline. In this way, alternative courses of action can be assessed on
    the basis of each action's potential effect on the baseline. DOE's
    procedures for managing the nuclear waste program require that program
    managers revise the baseline, as appropriate, to reflect any
    significant changes to the program.
        After March 1997, according to DOE officials, they did not always
    follow these control procedures to account for proposed changes to the
    program's baseline, including the changes proposed to extend the date
    for license application. According to these same officials, they
    stopped following the control procedures because the secretary of
    energy did not approve proposed extensions to the license application
    milestone. As a result, the official baseline did not accurately
    reflect the program's cost and schedule to complete the remaining work
    necessary to submit a license application.
        In November 1999, the Yucca Mountain site investigation office
    proposed extending the license application milestone date by 10 months,
    from March to December 2002, to compensate for a $57.8 million drop in
    funding for fiscal year 2000. A proposed extension in the license
    application milestone required the approval of both the director of the
    nuclear waste program and the secretary of energy. Neither of these
    officials approved this proposed change nor was the baseline revised to
    reflect this change even though the director subsequently began
    reporting the December 2002 date in quarterly performance reports to
    the deputy secretary of energy. The site investigation office
    subsequently proposed two other extensions of the license application
    milestone, neither of which was approved by the program's director or
    the secretary of energy or incorporated into the baseline for the
    program. Nevertheless, DOE began to use the proposed, but unapproved,
    milestone dates in both internal and external reports and
    communications, such as in congressional testimony delivered in May
    2001.
        Because senior managers did not approve these proposed changes for
    incorporation into the baseline for the program, program managers did
    not adjust the program's cost and schedule baseline. By not accounting
    for these and other changes to the program's technical work, milestone
    dates, and estimated costs in the program's baseline since March 1997,
    DOE has not had baseline estimates of all of the technical work that it
    expected to complete through submission of a license application and
    the estimated schedule and cost to complete this work. This condition
    includes the cost and schedule information contained in DOE's budget
    request for fiscal year 2003.
        When DOE hired Bechtel to manage the nuclear waste program, one of
    the contractor's first assignments was to document the remaining
    technical work that had to be completed to support the submission of a
    license application to NRC and to estimate the time and cost to
    complete this work. The contractor's revised, unofficial baseline for
    the program shows that it will take until January 2006 to complete
    essential technical work and submit an acceptable license application.
    Also, DOE had estimated that completing the remaining technical work
    would add about $1.4 billion to the cumulative cost of the program,
    bringing the total cost of the Yucca Mountain project's portion of the
    nuclear waste program to $5.5 billion.\9\ As noted earlier, DOE
    accepted only the fiscal year 2002 portion of the proposed baseline and
    then directed the contractor to prepare a plan for submitting a license
    application to NRC by December 2004. The resulting plan is now under
    review within DOE.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ DOE estimated that the program cost $4.1 billion, on the basis
    of year-of-expenditure dollars from the program's inception in 1983
    through March 2002. The $5.5 billion estimate for the license
    application is based on year-of-expenditure dollars from 1983 through
    January 2006.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Because of these management weaknesses, we recommended in our
    December 2001 report that the secretary of energy reestablish the
    baseline through the submission of a license application and follow the
    department's management requirements, including a formal procedure for
    changing program milestones. According to DOE, it is currently in the
    process of establishing a new baseline for the nuclear waste program.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be
    happy to respond to any questions that you or members of the
    subcommittee may have.

        The Chairman. Mr. Holmstead, please go right ahead.

    STATEMENT OF JEFFREY R. HOLMSTEAD, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
           AIR AND RADIATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

        Mr. Holmstead. Thank you. My name is Jeffrey Holmstead, and
    I currently serve as the Assistant Administrator for Air and
    Radiation at the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss EPA's role in
    setting standards for the proposed repository at Yucca
    Mountain. As you have already heard this morning, EPA's
    responsibilities with respect to the proposed repository are
    described in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and also in the
    Energy Policy Act of 1992.
        These statutes assign EPA the task of developing public
    health and environmental radiation protection standards for the
    repository. These same statutes assign other roles and
    responsibilities to other governmental entities. The Department
    of Energy has the responsibility to determine whether the site
    is suitable for a repository. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    has the responsibility to review DOE's application for a
    license for the repository. And, of course, Congress has the
    responsibility for final approval for the Yucca Mountain
    repository.
        EPA issued its final standards for the Yucca Mountain site
    on June 13, 2001. These standards were developed after
    extensive consultation with DOE, NRC, the Office of Science and
    Technology Policy, and they were the subject of significant
    public comment. DOE, by law, must address these standards in
    its license application.
        NRC may issue a license only if it determines that DOE has
    demonstrated that the repository will comply with all the
    provisions of the EPA standards. EPA believes that disposal in
    compliance with the EPA standards will be protective of public
    health and the environment.
        Under EPA's standards, DOE must demonstrate compliance with
    three separate provisions: First, an individual protection
    standard; second, a human intrusion standard; and third,
    standards that are specifically intended to protect groundwater
    as a natural resource.
        The so-called individual protection standard is the core
    element of EPA's regulation. It is the most basic measure of
    how well the repository will operate. To meet this standard,
    DOE must demonstrate that the ``Reasonably Maximally Exposed
    Individual,'' which we refer to as the RMEI, will not incur an
    annual dose of radiation above 15 millirem, from all exposure
    pathways combined. The RMEI--that is the reasonably maximally
    exposed individual--is a typical person whose location and
    lifestyle would place him or her among the most highly, but not
    necessarily the highest, exposed members of the population.
    Although the NAS recommended using a ``critical group''
    approach, it has agreed that EPA's approach was ``broadly
    consistent'' with its recommendation.
        EPA's view is that, by meeting the standard for the RMEI,
    the vast majority of the population will be protected. This
    approach is preferable to hypothesizing unrealistic scenarios
    to protect those whose lifestyles might lead to unusually high
    exposures, and is consistent with the NAS recommendation to use
    ``cautious, but reasonable'' assumptions.
        The second standard, the Human Intrusion Standard, accounts
    for the possibility that future human activity could compromise
    the integrity of the repository sometime over the next 10,000
    years and cause releases of radioactive material. The NAS found
    that there is no credible means of predicting whether, when, or
    how often such an intrusion might occur at Yucca Mountain, so
    analyzing a simple event to determine how well the repository
    responds would be appropriate. In accordance with the NAS
    recommendation, EPA's Human Intrusion Standard requires DOE to
    meet the same RMEI standard as in the individual-protection
    analysis.
        Perhaps most importantly, EPA adopted a separate
    groundwater protection standard because it is long-standing
    Agency policy to protect groundwater as a natural resource,
    particularly when that resource is a significant current or a
    likely future source of drinking water.
        EPA believes that ground water should be protected to
    ensure that the Nation's drinking water resources do not
    present adverse health risks and are preserved for present and
    future generations. This is particularly important in arid
    regions, such as southern Nevada, where ground water is
    precious, and cleaning up the aquifer would be challenging and
    costly. Therefore, EPA's standards require DOE to demonstrate
    that ground water will not be radioactively contaminated above
    certain standards, which are consistent with EPA's radiation
    standards for drinking water.
        EPA does not believe that an all pathway exposure standard
    with groundwater as one pathway among several, provides
    adequate public health protection against groundwater
    contamination since groundwater is, in fact, the principal
    exposure pathway.
        Although EPA's statutory role was complete with the
    issuance of its final standards, it continues to be involved in
    many of the ongoing activities of other agencies. First, EPA is
    defending its standard in court against challenges brought by
    several parties. EPA has also reviewed and provided comment on
    NRC's licensing requirements for the Yucca Mountain repository.
    We have also provided comments on DOE's site evaluation
    guidelines, and DOE's Draft, Supplemental, and Final
    Environmental Impact Statements.
        EPA is currently reviewing NRC's draft Yucca Mountain
    Review Plan, and plans to comment throughout the licensing
    process as appropriate. EPA also expects to review DOE's
    evolving plans for transportation, although the selection of
    transportation modes and routes is DOE's responsibility with
    oversight from NRC and the Department of Transportation.
        Finally, EPA continues to receive and respond to questions
    from the public, not only about EPA's own standards, but on the
    other repository-related activities listed above.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today before
    the Committee to present the EPA's views. This concludes my
    prepared statement.
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Holmstead follows:]
    Prepared Statement of Jeffrey R. Holmstead, Assistant Administrator for
               Air and Radiation, Environmental Protection Agency
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Good morning. My name is
    Jeffrey Holmstead and I currently serve as the Assistant Administrator
    for Air and Radiation at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA). I am pleased to be here today to discuss EPA's role in setting
    public health and environmental radiation protection standards for the
    proposed spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste repository
    at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss
    EPA's responsibilities related to this important national project.
                                  introduction
        EPA's roles and responsibilities in the federal government's
    establishment of a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level
    radioactive waste are described generally in the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act, and more specifically for the Yucca Mountain site in the Energy
    Policy Act of 1992. These statutes assign EPA the task of developing
    public health and environmental radiation protection standards for the
    repository. These same statutes assign other roles and responsibilities
    to other governmental entities. The Department of Energy (DOE) has the
    responsibility to determine whether the site is suitable for a
    repository; The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the
    responsibility to review DOE's application for a license for the
    repository; and Congress has the responsibility for final approval or
    denial of DOE's suitability recommendation. EPA issued its final
    standards for the Yucca Mountain repository on June 13, 2001 (40 CFR
    197). These standards were developed through extensive consultation
    with DOE, NRC, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and were
    the subject of significant public comment. DOE must address these
    standards in its license application. NRC may issue a license only if
    it determines that DOE demonstrates a reasonable expectation that the
    repository will comply with all provisions of the EPA standards. EPA
    believes that disposal in compliance with the EPA standards will be
    fully protective of public health and the environment. In fact, EPA's
    standards are both implementable and among the most stringent in the
    world.
                                   nas report
        The Energy Policy Act of 1992 also directed EPA to contract with
    the National Academy of Sciences to provide findings and
    recommendations on reasonable public health and safety standards for
    establishing a repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level
    radioactive waste. NAS issued its report in 1995. I will refer to the
    NAS report as I discuss the EPA standards further. NAS has provided
    formal comments to EPA stating that our standards for Yucca Mountain
    are generally consistent with the NAS recommendations.
                           overview of epa standards
        Under EPA's standards, DOE must demonstrate a reasonable
    expectation of compliance with three separate provisions: an
    individual-protection standard, a human intrusion standard, and
    standards that are specifically intended to protect ground water as a
    natural resource.
        The Individual Protection Standard is the core element of EPA's
    regulation. It is the most basic measure of how well the repository
    will operate. To meet this standard, DOE must demonstrate a reasonable
    expectation that the ``Reasonably Maximally Exposed Individual,'' or
    RMEI, will not incur an annual dose of radiation above 15 millirem,
    from all exposure pathways combined. The RMEI is a typical individual
    whose location and lifestyle would place him among the most highly, but
    not necessarily the highest, exposed members of the population.
    (Although NAS recommended using a ``critical group'' approach, it
    agreed that EPA's approach was ``broadly consistent'' with its
    recommendation.) EPA's view is that, by meeting the standard for the
    RMEI, public health and safety, including the health and safety of
    those living in the immediate vicinity of Yucca Mountain, will be
    protected now and for future generations. This approach is preferable
    to postulating unrealistic scenarios to protect hypothetical
    individuals for whom lifestyles could be constructed that might lead to
    unusually high exposures, and thus is consistent with the NAS
    recommendation to use ``cautious, but reasonable'' assumptions.
        The Human Intrusion Standard accounts for the possibility that
    future human activity could compromise the integrity of the repository
    and cause releases of radioactive material. NAS found that there is no
    credible means of predicting whether, when, or how often such an
    intrusion might occur at Yucca Mountain, so analyzing a simple event to
    determine how well the repository responds would be appropriate. In
    accordance with the NAS recommendation, EPA's Human Intrusion Standards
    requires DOE to meet the same RMEI standard as in the individual-
    protection analysis.
        EPA adopted separate ground-water protection standards because it
    is long-standing Agency policy to protect ground water as a natural
    resource, especially when that resource is a source of drinking water.
    EPA believes that ground water should be protected to ensure that the
    Nation's drinking water resources do not present adverse health risks
    and are preserved for present and future generations. This is
    particularly important in arid regions, such as southern Nevada, where
    ground water is precious, and cleaning up the aquifer would be
    challenging and costly. Therefore, EPA's standards require DOE to
    demonstrate that ground water will not be radioactively contaminated
    above certain standards, which are consistent with EPA's radiation
    standards for drinking water.
        To determine the location where the three basic provisions of EPA's
    disposal standards must be met, EPA's standards set the point of
    compliance south of the repository at the Nevada Test Site boundary,
    about 18 kilometers (11 miles) from the repository. EPA used regional
    ground water flow patterns, current population patterns, and near-term
    local plans, to identify this location and to calculate potential
    exposure scenarios. EPA's standards apply at the location outside this
    boundary where radionuclide concentrations in ground water could be
    highest.
        DOE must demonstrate compliance with each of these provisions for a
    period of not less than 10,000 years after disposal. In addition, EPA's
    standard requires that DOE include analyses showing the performance of
    the repository after 10,000 years in its Environmental Impact
    Statement, so that the public will have the full record before it.
        Finally, although DOE must demonstrate compliance with these
    standards to the NRC, EPA recognizes that absolute proof in the
    conventional sense will be impossible to attain for analyses extending
    ten thousand years into the future. Therefore, EPA requires that DOE
    demonstrate a ``reasonable expectation'' that the standards will be
    met. This standard should not be construed as requiring a less rigorous
    or scientific process. It is simply a recognition that there will
    inevitably be significant uncertainties in projecting the performance
    of natural and engineered systems over very long time periods, and that
    these uncertainties must be understood and managed accordingly.
                  epa's role now that the standard is complete
        Although EPA's statutory role was complete with the issuance of its
    final standards, it continues to be involved in many of the ongoing
    activities of other agencies. First, EPA is defending its standard in
    court against challenges brought by several parties. EPA has also
    reviewed and provided comment on NRC's licensing requirements for the
    Yucca Mountain repository, DOE's site evaluation guidelines, and DOE's
    Draft, Supplemental, and Final Environmental Impact Statements. EPA is
    currently reviewing NRC's draft Yucca Mountain Review Plan, and plans
    to comment as appropriate. EPA also expects to review DOE's evolving
    plans for transportation, though the selection of transportation modes
    and routes is DOE's responsibility. Finally, EPA continues to receive
    and respond to questions from the public, not only on EPA's standards,
    but on the other repository-related activities listed above.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today before the
    Subcommittee to present the EPA's views. This concludes my prepared
    statement. I would be happy to address any questions that you may have.

        The Chairman. Secretary Card, why don't you go right ahead.

    STATEMENT OF ROBERT CARD, UNDER SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Card. Sure. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Robert
    Card, Under Secretary of Energy.
        As you know, Secretary Spencer Abraham testified before
    this committee last Thursday. I would ask the committee to
    refer to his written and oral statements and decision document
    which laid out the scientific basis for DOE's recommendation
    and the other compelling reasons to support this project.
        Rather than repeat his testimony, I want to emphasize three
    points. First, what is this vote about? The Department's
    position on the vote facing the Senate is as follows: A ``yes''
    vote is simply a decision to allow the expert and independent
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission to have the opportunity to rule
    on the safety on the Department's license application. If we
    fail to pass the rigorous and open review by the NRC, then no
    repository will be built.
        A ``no'' vote will indicate that the Senate either rejects
    more than two decades of national policy on creating deep
    geologic repository, or that this site policy is so hopelessly
    flawed that the NRC should be prohibited from ruling on its
    safety.
        A ``no'' vote is not a vote to delay or review or modify
    the proposal. Rather, a ``no'' vote terminates this entire
    process in its tracks, demobilizes the Yucca Mountain project
    and leaves DOE without congressional authorization to pursue
    any other path forward.
        Secondly, transportation: A ``yes'' vote, in DOE's
    interpretation, allows the DOE under NRC and other regulations
    to expand on its already substantial and successful shipping
    campaign to develop and implement a sophisticated shipping
    system to transport this material.
        A ``no'' vote does not stop either the substantial shipping
    taking place today or whatever makeshift and ad hoc shipping
    system that may arise from the actions and decisions of
    individual States and utilities to respond to the problem of
    managing would-be orphaned waste located at 131 sites in 39
    States.
        Thirdly, on capacity: While Congress has chosen to
    initially limit the capacity at Yucca Mountain to 70,000 metric
    tons, there is adequate potential capacity at the site for all
    of the high-level waste likely to be generated by all--and I
    repeat, ``all''--of the current waste sources, even assuming
    reasonable life extensions for the current fleet of nuclear
    powerplants.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Well, thank you all for your testimony.
        Let me ask a few questions, and then defer to my colleagues
    here.
        Dr. Cohon, as I understand your position, the position the
    Technical Review Board, you have--you believe or the Board
    believes that the Department of Energy has yet to make a
    convincing case that nuclear waste can safely be buried at
    Yucca Mountain. But you have not found any reason that would
    justify Congress terminating the project at this point.
        You believe that DOE may yet find a convincing case or yet
    may make a convincing case to the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission. Is that a fair summary of where you come out on
    this, or not?
        Dr. Cohon. It is not unfair, but I cannot give you a clear
    yes. I would like to qualify it a bit, if you do not mind,
    which I am sure you expected.
        The Chairman. Yes.
        Dr. Cohon. We do not use the word ``convincing.'' We talk
    about both the strength of the case and that is what led to the
    phrase ``weak to moderate.''
        And we also talk about confidence. We think that is
    actually a very key concept, both in a technical sense for the
    Board and for policy makers. On that score, we say our
    confidence is low, or low to moderate--I do not want to
    misquote myself from our letter--with regard to the technical
    basis for the estimates that DOE has offered.
        The other part of your question with regard to whether we
    have ruled out or--I forgot exactly your wording--but basically
    whether there are any clearly disqualifying factors, on that
    score we have said no, we have not seen any. No factor that,
    when taken by itself, would clearly rule out Yucca Mountain as
    a suitable repository. This does not exclude, however, a
    combination of factors that policy makers, you, might find that
    taken together would lead you to conclude the site was not
    suitable. So, I hope that that nuance is understood.
        The Chairman. Let me ask if you looked into this issue
    related to safe transportation to the site. Mr. Hall's
    testimony this morning and some of the testimony yesterday went
    to the point that Congress should not allow DOE to continue
    down this road of developing this site or preparing an
    application to get a license to develop this site until we are
    persuaded that a safe system of transportation is developed.
        Did you look at that? Is that something that the Board has
    a view on?
        Dr. Cohon. Transportation is certainly within the Board's
    purview as laid out by Congress. However, the Board is
    basically reactive to DOE. That is, our role is to review work
    that DOE has done. And as you know, to date DOE's focus, quite
    appropriately we believe, has been on the site and less so on
    the transportation system or plan.
        We have reviewed what DOE has done to date. We have also
    reviewed other statements with regard to the safety of
    transportation, for example, NRC's statements on the record and
    find nothing there for us to disagree with.
        The Chairman. Okay. Let me ask: Secretary Card, what is
    your response to the position that Mr. Hall stated which is
    that you folks at DOE should be required to give us a plan for
    how this waste could be safely transported to the site before
    we make any decision to allow you to go ahead and prepare an
    application to license this site?
        Mr. Card. Well, first, let me give a general answer and
    then I will go into specifics. I want to repeat in the general
    answer that transportation is not an issue that is unique to
    this decision before the Senate.
        Waste is shipped today and we believe more will be shipped
    in the future should the Senate vote in favor of this project.
    Or should the Senate not vote in favor of this project, there
    are 131 communities in 39 States and utilities that will seek
    alternate methods to deal with the problem of what could become
    orphaned waste at that time.
        Responding, though, specifically, I would cite the track
    record where we have already shipped, made approximately half
    of the shipments anticipated in this country, over the last 40
    years safely. Europe has already shipped a comparable volume of
    waste safely, as you have heard from other members and
    witnesses, and overseas and with all other modes.
        And to say that we do not have a plan, I would be
    interested to know what they felt a plan would look like. The
    environmental impact statement has fully analyzed a variety of
    routes and options for transportation. You have heard that
    there is a regulatory infrastructure in place. We have just
    recently started up a comparable transportation system for
    WIPP, and it has already safely ensured the shipment of over
    800 shipments, which is 20 percent of the estimated 4,000
    shipments for Yucca Mountain.
        So I think we feel very comfortable with transportation.
    There is obviously a lot of work to do with communities about
    siting and their community preferences for how this would be
    handled. But I would reject the notion that we do not have a
    plan or that we have not thought about this issue.
        The Chairman. Okay. Mr. Holmstead, EPA established
    radiation protection standards for the WIPP project in my
    State, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, back in 1998 and
    certified that WIPP would meet those standards. How do the
    standards that you have come up with for Yucca Mountain compare
    to those WIPP standards?
        Mr. Holmstead. The standards for the two different
    repositories are essentially the same. They are--I think the
    key parts that people have focused on appropriately are the
    total allowable exposure which is 15 millirem. That is exactly
    the same. The 10,000-year time frame is also the same, and as
    is the idea that we would need a separate groundwater
    protection standard. So in that respect, they are exactly the
    same.
        We have also used the concept that we should be addressing
    the--we should be effectively evaluating these standards at the
    point at which we can possibly foresee any human habitation.
        With respect to the site in your State, I believe that that
    location is something like about 3 kilometers from the actual
    repository. In the Nevada site, that is slightly farther away
    because this site is on the Nevada test range, as you know,
    where we think it is highly unlikely there would be any human
    habitation. And so the compliance point is slightly farther
    away. I think it is about 18 kilometers.
        But in all key respects, they are exactly the same.
        The Chairman. Okay. Dr. Cohon, let me ask you one other
    question here. Are you familiar with the international peer
    review of Yucca Mountain that was performed by the
    International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for
    Economic Cooperation and Development?
        Dr. Cohon. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. That review concluded that, while DOE needs
    to do more to increase confidence in its performance
    assessment, overall DOE has provided an adequate basis for the
    site recommendation decision. How does the evaluation of your
    technical review board jibe with this international peer
    review's assessment?
        Dr. Cohon. We actually agree much more than your question
    implies. And I think the level of agreement depends also on how
    one interprets the statements by that peer review panel.
        A key point on which we agree--and I think it is the
    central point made by that peer review panel--is that the total
    system performance assessment as a tool is a good one for
    estimating performance at Yucca Mountain. That was their key
    point.
        Whether or not the technical basis, that is, the results of
    applying that tool, is strong enough and provides sufficient
    confidence to support a decision about Yucca Mountain, that is
    something that we have spoken about. I do not know that the
    peer review really spoke to that.
        If they believe--well, we are on record as saying, and I
    have repeated it today, in our view, that technical basis is
    weak to moderate. And we have relatively low confidence.
        But again, with regard to the use of such a tool, we agree
    with the peer review panel. It is completely appropriate.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        Senator Craig.
        Senator Craig. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    apologize for not being here for everyone's testimony. I have
    been to the last couple of hearings, but there was another one
    this morning that I needed to participate in.
        Secretary Card, let me focus on you for all of my
    questions, and I will read the rest of your testimony. And I
    say that to all of the panelists, because I did have a
    question, as it related to the testimony of Mr. Hill, but I--or
    Hall, but I think that has been answered.
        I think the chairman asked that question, as it related to
    a criticism leveled at the Secretary for not having a plan and
    the reality of when plans come and how they get handled. And
    so, instead of asking that question, Bob, let me ask this
    question and go back to your experience at Rocky Flats, because
    I think that is important for the record to understand that the
    DOE has been in the business of moving high-level and low-level
    waste or materials around this country for a good, long while.
        And, of course, you came to us from Rocky Flats, where you
    were involved in a major cleanup of that facility. It is
    probably one of those areas of EM or Environmental Management
    that we like to point out as a success story, as it relates to
    how it was operated and the cleanup process that you were very
    much involved in.
        You have been handed a map, which was provided to Congress
    during a briefing last month, on the status of the Rock Flats
    cleanup. What this chart shows--I wish I had a blowup for the
    audience and for the committee--is the many off-site shipments
    that have been and will be necessary in the completing of the
    cleanup of Rocky Flats.
        What this map demonstrates to me is the necessary role of
    nuclear waste transportation and how it is played out and
    continues to be played out in DOE's Environmental Management
    Program, because part of the argument here is ``Leave it in
    place, leave it in place, leave it in place.'' And if you are
    going to clean up, you cannot leave things in place. And we
    have known that throughout time and with the EM Program we have
    had going through DOE.
        I see by the WIPP figures--and that is the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Project that the chairman referred to in his State at
    Carlsbad and, of course, I have focused on that for years,
    because of the low-level transuranic waste moving now from
    Idaho's INEEL to WIPP some 279 shipments as of May 20.
        But in Rocky Flats--let us talk about the map in front of
    you. And I think the chairman and Senator Ensign have that map.
    In the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, some 514
    shipments have gone to WIPP, alone. And by definition of WIPP's
    capabilities, that is low-level. But there are shipments to
    Hanford and shipments to Envirocare in Utah and Nevada Test
    Site and Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos and Pantex and Oak
    Ridge and Savannah, and some of that was high-level.
        Could you bring us up to speed, with your experience there,
    how all of that transportation plan was developed and when that
    plan came to place, how it was managed, how it is managed, the
    security involved in it, and which came first--the idea of
    cleanup and the cleanup plan, or the transportation plan--and
    how all of that fits together? Because part of the criticism
    here is the plan before the licensing, if you will. And yet, I
    see those kinds of things going hand-in-glove.
        Most importantly, while I do not, in any way, belittle
    concern over transportation, I have known the issue well enough
    over the years not to fear it, but I think, for the record, it
    is important to demonstrate, as I think you can, where we are
    going, what we have been doing, and what we can do, as it
    relates to transportation of waste.
        Mr. Card. Sure. Well, as you point out, there--hundreds to
    thousands of shipments have taken place from Rocky Flats;
    everything from final weapons components to weapons parts to
    transuranic waste, low-level waste, mixed waste, hazardous
    waste, et cetera. It would probably be most instructive, and to
    the point of your question, to focus on the Rocky Flats to WIPP
    example.
        WIPP, as you know, is the first geologic repository. We
    already have one in this country. The WIPP site was selected
    before there was the Transportation Plan that has been referred
    to here. That Transportation Plan-- I think that project was
    selected in 1988 time frame--I mean, there were studies done in
    the eighties on it. Transportation, and many of items that are
    being discussed here at this hearing by the various witnesses,
    were largely done in the last 2 or 3 years of that project. And
    the kind of work done is that the first responders were
    trained; in the States, the governors were provided the
    opportunity to designate routes.
        I remember, in Colorado, where I was at the time, that was
    an interesting process, as people realized just how much stuff
    is moving through their State, regardless of whether there is a
    WIPP or not a WIPP. And that, interestingly, became the focus
    of the issue.
        The same sorts of Armageddon results were predicted for the
    WIPP system. We have completed--successfully completed, as
    mentioned before, 800 shipments so far. And for Rocky Flats, of
    course, the decision was made by President Clinton to shut down
    Rocky Flats. I do not think anything was thought of
    transportation at the time that decision was made. And I do not
    think that it necessarily needed to be.
        Senator Craig. And the shutdown was not for a purpose of
    just locking the doors. It was for a purpose of shutdown and
    cleanup. Was it not?
        Mr. Card. Right. It was basically load the site up into
    drums and containers, and ship it to all of these locations
    that you have discussed. That is, in essence, what the project
    is.
        We had to develop the transportation strategies to deal
    with that. And, again, they worked out successfully without a
    single significant transportation incident in all of that
    experience.
        So, it seems to me a bit ``chicken and eggs.'' Since we
    have an extensive amount of shipping already in the United
    States and worldwide, you would have to argue, we must either
    have a system, or we are all derelict in some way now, whether
    or not there is a Yucca Mountain.
        It would seem appropriate, the norm of the commercial
    industry, where I came from, is you pick where you want
    something to go, and then you figure out how to get it there.
    And I do not know how you would come up with a siting decision,
    if you had to evaluate every conceivable transportation route
    for every conceivable place this stuff might go, before you
    picked anywhere for it to go. And so, we do not think this is
    out of step at all.
        Again, the kind of work that needs to be done, as we
    already have a shipping system, is largely routing, responder
    training along new routes--there is already responder training
    on existing routes--giving stakeholders, Governors and others
    the opportunity to comment on routing, time of day, other
    things that they're concerned about, and building a system like
    we have at WIPP, which I think the Western States and Southern
    States, through which transuranic shipments are made, are
    pretty darned happy with.
        Senator Craig. Well, thank you very much. I think you have
    expressed well my concerns and the fact that we have
    substantial quantities of material moving now, both in the
    high-level and low-level category, and that they do not move at
    random. They move with plan and organization and designed
    containers and all of that.
        I have watched, Mr. Chairman, with great interest, the
    protocol involved in the movement of substantial quantities of
    transuranic out of Idaho to your State, and the containers, the
    trucks, the designs, the GPS, the strategies of walk-through,
    all of it over time, to see a highly sophisticated system in
    place that clearly has gone without incident. And that is to
    the credit of the plan and the organization, the protocol and
    the execution of it.
        Bob, thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Ensign.
        Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to focus a little bit on the--Dr. Cohon, the high
    temperature versus low temperature. Could you just briefly
    describe the difference between a high temperature versus low
    temperature inside Yucca Mountain?
        Dr. Cohon. Certainly. First, let me explain why the board
    has focused on this and paid so much attention to it. A key
    element of the repository system and its projected performance
    is the performance of the waste packages within which the waste
    would be placed. Those packages are made out of a thicker alloy
    that seems to be very tough and corrosion resistant. Just how
    it performs will depend very much on the kind of environment it
    sees inside the tunnels, such as the temperature and moisture
    and the chemistry of the water or water vapor.
        Therefore, the temperature is directly important, in terms
    of influencing the corrosion behavior of the waste. It is
    additionally important in influencing how water moves through
    the mountain; that is, if the repository is above boiling, that
    suggests that water will be in the form of steam and will move
    and be mobilized away from the tunnels where the waste is.
        Temperature, in this sense, is a complicating factor; that
    is, it makes it harder to predict how water will move, how much
    water will be present, and how the metals will perform.
        The Chairman. Could you just describe the design, just in
    simple lay----
        Dr. Cohon. Yes. I am sorry.
        Senator Ensign [continuing]. Person's terms, the difference
    between high temperature and low temperature.
        Dr. Cohon. That was a very long preface. I apologize for
    that.
        Senator Ensign. No problem.
        Dr. Cohon. I will do so, but I will invite Secretary Card
    to correct or to add.
        The thing about the design, which includes the temperature,
    is how densely placed the waste is, as well as the age of
    waste, and therefore, its temperature when it is placed inside
    the mountain. But the most important thing is the spacing. When
    it is close together, you get higher temperatures. When it is
    farther apart, you get relatively lower temperatures.
        The two choices here, though--you can look at many others--
    DOE could look at many others--are the so-called base-case
    design, where it is estimated that the packages will see
    temperatures of up to 160 degrees centigrade, and then cooling
    over time, versus the cooler operating mode, where the
    temperatures would be maintained below, I believe, 85 degrees
    centigrade. Is that right?
        Senator Ensign. One of the reasons I asked the question is
    because yesterday Victor Gilinsky talked about--and I do not
    know if he was exactly talking about the high temperature
    versus the low temperature inside the mountain, but he
    commented that in the first 40 to 50 years, these nuclear waste
    rods cool during that period of time, because some of the
    nucleotides have shorter half-lives, and some of the ones that
    generate a lot of the heat have shorter half-lives. And if it
    was going to be a low temperature, one of the things that you
    could do is, if you do not ship it for 40 to 50 years, or if
    you keep it above ground for 40 to 50 years, obviously, you do
    not have to put these things as far apart. Is that correct?
        Dr. Cohon. That is correct.
        Senator Ensign. The reason that I wanted to follow that up,
    Ms. Jones, is--the GAO has commented a lot about the costs of
    the project. You said, when was it, back in 1997 that the DOE
    quit using their--I do not remember the exact term--cost
    baseline of how they were evaluating the project, and you want
    them--you have encouraged them to go back to using or to come
    up with a cost baseline.
        Ms. Jones. That is correct, Senator.
        Senator Ensign. I think that the important part of this is
    that right now the latest cost estimate was about $58 billion.
    And that is dramatically increased from 1995, when it was
    somewhere in the thirties, mid $30 billion range. Two years
    later, it was--or a few years later, it was in the mid $40
    billion range. And now we are at--a couple of years after that,
    we are in the high $50 billion range.
        The low temperature dramatically increases the cost. Is
    that my understanding? DOE can comment, if that is not the
    case. It would seem--obviously, common sense to make--to be
    common sense if you have to go to the low temperature design,
    the costs would dramatically increase.
        Mr. Card. Okay. Well, first of all, I will answer that
    question, but I would like to point out that the Nuclear Waste
    Fund, funded by the rate payers of one of the lowest cost power
    sources in the country, is adequate to construct this project.
        DOE conducted a formal and published periodic review of the
    fund in May 2001 and certified the fund adequacy.
        Senator Ensign. Does that include the total life cycle?
        Mr. Card. Yes, it does.
        Senator Ensign. And transportation?
        Mr. Card. Yes, it does. And, now, let me respond to your
    specific question.
        Senator Ensign. Before you go off of there, at what cost
    estimate does that work out?
        Mr. Card. I believe that was at $56 billion.
        Senator Ensign. $56 billion. What if it goes to $75 billion
    or $100 billion?
        Mr. Card. Well, I do not want to speculate. I would be glad
    to provide you a series of curves on the record, if you would
    like; however----
        Senator Ensign. Well, the reason I ask that is because if
    it is in the mid-$30 billions, just in 1995, and then it went
    to the mid-$40 billions in the later nineties, and now in 2001
    it is at $58 billion, I mean, how accurate are our estimates? I
    mean, it does not sound to me like they are going to be that
    accurate.
        Mr. Card. Can I answer that? I am comfortable that the cost
    estimates are conservative. We experienced the same issues at
    WIPP. In the planning stages, a number of conservatisms were
    introduced to--to know, everybody got to pick their favorite
    conservatism, and they were all added together.
        I am confident these costs can actually be reduced, not
    increased, from the repository. Of course, if you went to a
    cold design--and by the way, DOE continues to carry the cold
    design option, and we will until it is apparent that that is
    not necessary anymore. Obviously, the costs would be greater,
    but I am not prepared----
        Senator Ensign. Do you have any estimate of those costs?
        Mr. Card. Well, I am not prepared to say they would be
    greater than $56 billion, because I personally--I have managed
    projects, personally, at this scale before. And based on the
    reviews I have done over the last year, since I have been
    confirmed, I am not convinced that the costs are $56 billion to
    start with.
        Senator Ensign. Okay. Were the people at DOE comfortable,
    in 1995, with the cost estimates?
        Mr. Card. I was not here on the project in 1995.
        Senator Ensign. You imagine they were probably pretty
    comfortable with them, though.
        Mr. Card. I cannot speak for them.
        Senator Ensign. They probably would not have put them out
    if they were not comfortable with them, would be my guess.
        Mr. Card. That would be your presumption. I don't know.
        Senator Ensign. That would be, I think, a pretty good
    presumption. Probably, in 1999, they were comfortable with the
    mid-$40 billions on a cost estimate. You do not usually put out
    numbers that you are not comfortable with. I mean, you usually
    are--you know, because nobody likes to come back and say, ``Why
    are your numbers so bad?'' I mean, nobody likes to experience
    that. And, frankly, the numbers have been horrendous. And I
    would be curious to see what they are in another two years from
    now, especially if we have to go with the cool temperatures.
        The bottom line, to me, is that this thing has just been--
    the costs are just so outrageous. The most expensive
    construction project in the history of the world. And for
    what--for something that I believe is completely unnecessary,
    because onsite dry cask storage has been shown to be effective.
    And I would like to see us put more of that money, instead of
    building Yucca Mountain, into the research in some of these
    alternatives of recycling and some of the modern technologies.
    That is my own personal--as a policy maker up here, where I
    would rather see the money go.
        Ms. Jones, would you like to comment on the costs? I know
    that GAO is--that is part of the responsibility.
        Ms. Jones. The one comment I would like to make on the
    costs, Senator, is that in the bottoms-up approach that the
    contractor took as the basis for their report at the end of
    2001, that estimated license application in 2006, there were no
    contingencies built into that, either for cost or schedule.
        Now the contractor is trying to compress that time frame
    down to 2004. There is still no cost or schedule contingencies.
    So, I think that is very, very risky for a first-of-kind
    project, when you are in the design phase and you are still
    doing research.
        Senator Ensign. So, based on what Mr. Card has said, I
    mean, how confident are you in those numbers?
        Ms. Jones. I think I would like to wait and see DOE's
    approval of Bechtel's proposal, and see if they are going to be
    adding contingency factors in. If they do add contingency
    factors in, I would imagine that it is going to increase the
    costs.
        Senator Ensign. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Card. Mr. Chairman, can I just make a comment on that?
        The Chairman. Go right ahead.
        Mr. Card. As I have said, I believe we can meet the
    schedules for 2004 for the license application, and 2010 for
    the initial operations. And I would just pose two rhetorical
    questions for this issue.
        Regarding the start date and costs. For what predicted
    start date does the Senate think is so late that they should
    kill this project now and switch to an, as yet, unbounded
    alternative that has not had anywhere near the study,
    consideration and investment as this project?
        And second, what body of evidence does the Senate think
    would be appropriate to have accumulated before making such a
    momentous decision on either schedule or costs?
        And I would assert, from DOE's position, that we have an
    adequate handle on the schedule and costs to move forward at
    this point.
        The Chairman. Okay. Any other comment from any of the
    witnesses? If not, why do we not conclude the hearing? I think
    the testimony has been useful.
        And let me mention, there are four additional statements we
    will include in the record.* One is a letter from Charles
    Groat, the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey to Robert
    Card, dated October 4, 2001, related to the geology of the
    Yucca Mountain site.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * Can be found in the appendix.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second is a statement from Ellen Engleman, the
    Administrator of Research and Special Programs Administration
    at the U.S. Department of Transportation, related to the safe
    transportation of nuclear waste.
        Third is a statement from Allan Rutter, who is the
    Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration in the
    Department of Transportation, related to the transportation of
    nuclear waste by rail.
        And fourth is a statement from the National Association of
    Regulatory Utility Commissioners in support of the President's
    recommendation of Yucca Mountain as a site.
        That will conclude the hearing, and we will adjourn.
        [Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                   APPENDIXES

                                  ----------

                                   Appendix I

                       Responses to Additional Questions

                                  ----------

       Responses of Secretary Abraham to Questions From Senator Landrieu
                  transportation of transuranic waste to wipp
        Question 1. Mr. Secretary, there were many concerns raised during
    the approval process of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
    regarding the safe transportation of transuranic waste from our
    national weapons complex to New Mexico--could you tell me how that
    program has progressed so far in terms of transportation issues?
        Answer. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is recognized for
    the extensive safety programs incorporated into every aspect of this
    facility's operation, including the safety of the system used to
    transport transuranic waste over our highways to WIPP. As of the end of
    May 2002, the Department has made about 870 shipments, constituting 1.7
    million miles, without a safety incident. This record represents one of
    the safest hazardous materials transportation systems on the Nation's
    highways today.
        This safety record is the result of a multi-faceted approach to the
    transportation of transuranic waste to WIPP. DOE developed
    transportation protocols to provide for the safe and uneventful
    transportation of waste to WIPP. The protocols establish organizational
    responsibilities, carrier responsibilities, shipment schedules, route
    maps, emergency plans and contacts, communication strategies, packaging
    information, and agreements that will be followed over the course of a
    shipping campaign.
        Transuranic waste is transported in Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC)-certified transportation containers, TRUPACT-IIs. The
    transportation routes to WIPP have been negotiated with States and
    tribal governments in accordance with guidelines established by the
    U.S. Department of Transportation for the movement of radioactive
    material.
        The ultimate safety of the transportation system resides with the
    people who move the waste to WIPP. WIPP has contracted with two
    carriers that provide dedicated drivers and trucks to transport TRU
    waste to WIPP. Prior to hiring a driver, each carrier performs a
    background check to ensure applicants have no criminal history and have
    a good driving record; the New Mexico State Police performs an
    independent check as well. In addition, each WIPP driver must attend
    the same emergency response courses offered to firefighters, law
    enforcement personnel, and the ambulance crews and other emergency
    response personnel along the WIPP transportation routes. They are among
    the safest, most highly trained drivers on America's highways. The
    trucks are also inspected by Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)-
    certified State inspectors, and periodic audits are performed on the
    contract carriers. All WIPP waste shipments receive a CVSA Level VI
    Enhanced inspection (the most rigorous) at the point of origin and are
    defect-free prior to dispatch. Some States elect to perform re-
    inspections at their ports-of-entry.
        The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act requires that DOE ``provide advance
    notification to states and Indian tribes through whose jurisdiction the
    Secretary plans to transport transuranic waste to or from WIPP.'' The
    Department met this requirement by developing a transportation tracking
    and communications system to be used for shipments of radioactive
    materials and high-visibility shipping campaigns, as specified by DOE.
    The Transportation Tracking and Communications (TRANSCOM) satellite
    tracking system, which is also accessible to States, has been in
    operation since 1989.
        Communication between the TRANSCOM Control Center and WIPP drivers
    provides a constant source of information about changing weather
    conditions or any abnormal event that might occur. Safe parking areas
    are designated for use during inclement weather. Tractors are also
    equipped with backup communication capabilities. Emergency responders
    along the WIPP routes are trained to respond quickly and effectively to
    accidents. DOE also coordinates with the States on emergency response
    plans and procedures as part of the transportation planning process.
                      approving the site at yucca mountain
        Question 2. Though the recent U.S. General Accounting Report (GAO)
    report focused on the next step in Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) that
    is the licensing process vs. the current step we are here to discuss
    (site recommendation)--do you anticipate any potential show-stoppers in
    the 293 items as identified in the report?
        Answer. No, these are not showstoppers. These are technical studies
    and steps on the way to licensing. They are a checklist of items agreed
    to by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of
    Energy (DOE) to provide additional information related to nine key
    technical issues. NRC has issued a sufficiency letter (required by the
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act) stating its belief that DOE has obtained or
    has agreed to obtain the additional information needed for a license
    application. In fact, NRC has already formally closed 44 issues and
    about a third of the total should be closed by the end of September.
    The remainder will be addressed by the time of license application,
    planned for the end of 2004.
        Responses of Secretary Abraham to Questions From Senator Thomas
                  radioactive waste shipments through wyoming
        Question 1. Could you tell me how many shipments will travel across
    Wyoming, say per week? Will it be by rail or truck?
        Answeer. According to the Environmental Impact Statement for the
    Yucca Mountain repository, under the mostly rail scenario, 2-3 rail
    shipments per week (assuming 3 casks per train) and 3-4 truck shipments
    per month would travel across Wyoming.
        Question 2. Will the Governor or appropriate state officials be
    notified upon each shipment?
        Answer. The Department will provide advance notification in writing
    to the Governor or the Governor's designee. The notification will be
    postmarked at least seven days before the scheduled shipment. In
    addition to the required formal notification, the Department intends to
    provide oral or written notification to the Governor or designated
    point of contact so that the information is received at least seven
    working days prior to actual shipment.
        Question 3. Approval of Yucca aside, how many shipments currently
    cross the State of Wyoming?
        Answer. Since 1982, the Department of Energy has made 213 spent
    nuclear fuel cask-shipments by highway and 21 shipments by rail through
    the State of Wyoming. In addition, over the past 45 years, the Naval
    Nuclear Propulsion Program has safely shipped a total of 739 containers
    of spent nuclear fuel without injury to members of the public or
    harmful releases of radioactivity. These containers have traveled over
    1.5 million miles with spent nuclear fuel sealed inside of them. About
    450 of these containers have gone through Wyoming during those 45
    years.
        Question 4. Mr. Secretary, what commitment or assurances will you
    give me that your Department will work with the Delegation and our
    Governor to ensure that the people of Wyoming are fully informed as to
    the status of shipments within Wyoming's boarders?
        Answer. The Department fully intends to work with the Governor and
    whomever else is designated regarding the status of radioactive
    shipments across and within Wyoming's borders. The Department expects
    to use an approach to interacting and communicating with States and
    Tribes similar to that used during the successful program for shipping
    radioactive waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico.
        Responses of Secretary Abraham to Questions From Senator Bennett
                          private fuel storage efforts
        Question 1. In your testimony you mentioned your concerns that
    private efforts, like the Goshute Indians in Utah, to store spent fuel
    were not in the best interest of our nation. Would you please clarify
    your remark?
        Answer. As I have said previously, failure to proceed with a
    repository at Yucca Mountain likely will result in makeshift private
    alternatives for consolidated off-reactor site storage. As a result,
    spent fuel will end up being transported somewhere, regardless of
    whether Yucca Mountain proceeds. That being the case, it seems
    preferable for spent fuel transportation to occur by the federal
    government in the structure specified by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
    rather than pursuant to ad hoc private arrangements.
         Responses of Secretary Abraham to Questions From Senator Craig
                        transportation of nuclear waste
        Please provide responses to the following statements regarding
    transportation of nuclear waste, which were made by Jim Hall, Former
    Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, during the
    Committee's May 23 hearing:
        Statement 1. ``There is no plan, or even answers to basic
    questions.''
        Response. In point of fact, for over 30 years there have not only
    been plans for moving nuclear materials, but over that period we have
    successfully shipped nuclear waste without a single harmful release of
    radioactive materials. Over 2,700 shipments have occurred in this
    country, and over 70,000 metric tons have been transported in Europe.
    We know what has to be done to transport spent fuel in a safe manner,
    and we have established an impressive safety record.
        If Congress designates the Yucca Mountain site, detailed planning
    for shipments--much of which is dependent on a site designation--will
    begin about five years before the shipments commence. This planning
    includes the finalization of shipping routes, the provision of funding
    for training of first responders, and other technical assistance. As an
    example, DOE has provided approximately $30 million in training along
    routes to prepare for the shipments of radioactive waste to the Waste
    Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Since 1988,
    WIPP has trained nearly 24,000 State and Tribal first responders and
    emergency medical personnel in 22 States.
        Transportation to Yucca Mountain would not begin until 2010, and
    would last for 24 years. It is presumptuous to believe that there will
    be a single ``Plan'' that will address all aspects of transportation
    for the entire period. In conducting any transportation to Yucca
    Mountain, the Department expects to be responsive to evolving
    conditions, the changing needs of our stakeholders and customers, as
    well as advances in technology.
        The Yucca Mountain final environmental impact statement (FEIS)
    evaluated the potential impacts of transportation of spent fuel to
    Yucca Mountain under a variety of possible scenarios under which we may
    operate, to ensure that these potential impacts are fully understood.
    It is the Department's intent to work with our stakeholders, including
    States, Tribes and utilities, to ensure that the spent fuel is
    transported in a safe and secure manner.
        Statement 2. ``The DOE does not even support the use of dedicated
    trains, which would greatly enhance safety and security, in my
    opinion.''
        Response. The Department does not oppose the use of dedicated
    trains, and has not yet made a determination whether it will require
    the use of dedicated trains for shipments to Yucca Mountain. The
    Department of Transportation has been tasked by Congress to evaluate
    the use of dedicated trains; they currently expect to complete this
    study later this year. DOE will review the results of this study, along
    with input from our stakeholders, prior to making any determination on
    the use of dedicated trains for the transport of spent nuclear fuel.
        I would, however, like to re-emphasize my confidence in the safety
    of nuclear shipments. The Nation's outstanding and lengthy track
    record, the careful precautions taken, and the strict regulatory
    oversight to which these shipments are subject provide a sound basis
    for confidence in our ability to transport safely nuclear materials,
    either by the use of dedicated trains or in general freight.
        Statement 3. ``According to a letter to Congress from the NRC,
    there have been no full-scale tests on casks that will be carrying
    high-level nuclear waste.''
        Response. I believe the letter referred to in this statement was
    one of two pieces of correspondence that responded to a letter from
    Senator Reid dated March 12, 2002.
        In this correspondence (Commission letter to Senator Reid, April
    24, 2002), Chairman Meserve of the NRC also noted that ``casks are not
    complicated structures and that the physics and mechanical properties
    of the casks under accident conditions can be accurately predicted by
    scale model testing and computer analysis.'' That letter went on to
    state that the NRC is ``considering certain full-scale cask testing in
    order to contribute to public confidence in transportation casks,'' and
    conveyed the Commission's intent to ``include a request for NRC's share
    of the funding'' for full-scale tests in its 2004 budget request. The
    Department supports the NRC's effort on full scale testing.
        NRC regulations require that cask designs be shown to perform
    radiological safety functions under normal and accident conditions of
    transport. These safety demonstrations can be done in several ways that
    include analysis and testing. Furthermore, testing may include full and
    part scale model tests, and component tests. For casks, which are
    robust and designed with large safety margins, a combination of
    computer analysis, component tests, and scale model tests are generally
    sufficient to demonstrate safety for NRC certification. Although full-
    scale testing of casks are not generally performed for NRC
    certification, studies performed for NRC in 1987 and 2000 (NUREG/CR-
    4829 and NUREG/CR-6672) have shown the adequacy of the NRC
    certification process.
        Statement 4. ``. . . the DOE estimates there will be over 66 truck
    accidents and 10 rail accidents over the first 24 years--Whatever the
    number, the fact is that one accident resulting in radioactive release
    will have long-term devastating results.''
        Response. All aspects of the Yucca Mountain project are being
    conducted with a view toward having zero accidents; transportation will
    be conducted in the same manner.
        The above accident numbers were taken from the Yucca Mountain Final
    Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), and are statistical projections
    of vehicle accidents, including minor collisions with other vehicles.
    The statistical projections do not mean that we expect these accidents
    to occur, or that they would result in any breach of a cask or release
    of material if they did occur. Furthermore, the FEIS transportation
    risk analysis used general transportation accident statistics. As such,
    the statistics used did not reflect the exemplary record of the
    movement of nuclear materials over the past 30 years. For example, the
    Department's recent WIPP transportation experience shows that over 800
    shipments were moved safely over 850,000 miles.
        Studies by the NRC have concluded there would be no release of
    radioactive materials in approximately 99.99% of all accidents. The
    comprehensive analysis in the FEIS indicates that even if there were a
    radioactive release, the results would not be considered
    ``devastating'' and would be easily mitigated.
        In the Yucca Mountain FEIS, DOE described a maximum reasonably
    foreseeable accident for the mostly rail scenario that would involve a
    release of a fraction of the contents of a rail cask in an urban area
    under stable meteorological conditions. The accident scenario would
    have a likelihood of about 2.8 in 10 million, per year. In general
    however, in the highly unlikely event of a cask breach as a result of
    an accident, it is anticipated that the amount of radioactive material
    released would be small and the consequences easily mitigated. Please
    note that spent fuel is solid in form and cannot spill like a liquid.
    It is not flammable, and is not explosive.
        Statement 5. ``We know that transporting nuclear waste is a hazard,
    and we need a full risk assessment of transporting nuclear waste.''
        Response. DOE has performed an extensive assessment of the risks of
    shipping spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain
    in the FEIS. The Department believes that the FEIS considered bounding
    scenarios that adequately envelop the risks of anticipated activities.
    As stated above, the transportation of spent nuclear fuel is not a new
    activity. The requirements for safe transport and the risks of
    transport are well understood.
        Beyond the above, due to the events of September 11, 2001, DOE, NRC
    and other agencies are presently undertaking a top to bottom review of
    their nuclear security and safeguards practices, including those
    governing the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
    radioactive waste. DOE stands ready to follow the NRC lead regarding
    any changes to NRC transport regulations that the NRC may implement as
    a result of its review.
        I am confident that these reviews, and likely several that have not
    yet been conceived or initiated, will be completed and results
    implemented prior to any shipping of materials to a repository at Yucca
    Mountain. As has been stated in earlier testimony, the Department
    projects shipments to begin in 2010--8 years from now--which will allow
    for an exhaustive review of matters unique to these shipments.
                                     ______

         Response of Chairman Meserve to Question From Senator Landrieu
        Question. ``Based on NBC's technical reviews and pre-licensing
    interactions with DOE, do you anticipate any key technical issues
    pertaining to:
              a) expected lifetime of engineered barriers;
              b) physical properties of site;
              c) supporting information on mathematical models
    to significantly delay DOE's license application to the NRC?''
        Answer. If Congress approves the Yucca Mountain site, DOE has
    indicated that it expects to submit a license application in December
    2004.
        Although significant additional work is needed prior to the
    submission of a possible license application, we believe that the 293
    agreements reached between DOE and NRC staff during public meetings
    regarding the collection of additional information provide the basis
    for concluding that development of an acceptable license application is
    achievable. Based on the existing schedule for addressing issues
    contained in these agreements, NRC does not expect a delay in the
    license application to result from DOE addressing these issues.
        However, it should also be noted that DOE is exploring a flexible
    design concept to allow for the possibility of operating the repository
    over a range of thermal conditions. For example, if DOE were to adopt a
    lower temperature operating mode, NRC believes that additional
    information would be needed for a potential license application.
                                     ______

                     U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
                                           Arlington, VA, May 31, 2002.
    Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
    Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
            Washington, DC.
        Dear Senator Bingaman: Thank you very much for the opportunity to
    present the views of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board at the
    hearing of the Committee on Enemy and Natural Resources on May 23,
    2002. Following up on issues raised during the hearing, the Committee
    sent questions to the Board on May 29, 2002. Enclosed are the Board's
    responses to those questions.
        As you know, the Board is charged by Congress with conducting an
    ongoing and independent review of the technical and scientific validity
    of activities undertaken by the Secretary of Energy associated with the
    management of the country's commercial spent nuclear fuel and defense
    high-level radioactive waste. The Board provides its technical views to
    help inform policy-makers as they deliberate on issues that face the
    Department of Energy related to nuclear waste disposal.
        Please do not hesitate to contact me or have your staff contact
    Bill Barnard, the Board's executive director, if you have questions
    related to the Board's responses or any other issue related to the
    Board's technical and scientific review.
                Sincerely,
                                                Jared L. Cohon,
                                                              Chairman.
      Responses to Questions Asked by the Senate Committee on Energy and
                               Natural Resources
        Question. Could you further explain what you meant in your
    testimony about ``gaps in data and basic understanding cause important
    uncertainties in . . . DOE's performance estimates''?
        Answer. Gaps in data and basic understanding exist in a number of
    areas including: the hydraulic properties of faults and other
    significant rock-mass discontinuities at Yucca Mountain; thermal,
    hydrologic, and mechanical characteristics of the repository rock
    formations (especially thermal conductivity); the properties of the in-
    drift environment; fundamental mechanisms underlying long-term
    corrosion and passive-film behavior; the chemical composition of salt
    solutions on the waste package surface that could promote corrosion;
    colloid formation and dissolution; modeling of rock-matrix diffusion
    and radionuclide transport in the drift shadow; oxidation-reduction
    conditions in the saturated zone; and consequences of igneous activity.
    Because of the cumulative effect of these and other uncertainties, the
    Board has limited confidence in current estimates of repository
    performance generated by the DOE's performance assessment model.
    Increased understanding in these key areas could show that components
    of the repository system perform better than or not as well as the
    DOE's performance assessment model now projects.
        Question. Based on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
    assertion that the modeling already incorporates many conservatisms, do
    you believe that many of the uncertainties in the performance estimates
    may already be well within an acceptable risk range?
        Answer. Although the IAEA peer review group pointed out a number of
    conservatisms, it also mentioned a number of potential non-
    conservatisms and areas where additional data are required to achieve
    an increased level of understanding and confidence. More specifically,
    in the Board's view, the DOE's current performance estimates for Yucca
    Mountain are based on a mix of conservative, realistic, and non-
    conservative models and assumptions. This mix and the gaps in data and
    basic understanding, such as those mentioned above, make it very
    difficult to estimate what the ``true'' overall level of uncertainty is
    and whether or not this uncertainty lies within an acceptable range of
    risk. So that policy-makers can determine whether the risks and
    associated uncertainties are acceptable, the Board has recommended that
    meaningful quantification of conservatisms and uncertainties be a high
    priority for the DOE.
                                  Appendix II

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

                                  ----------

                   U.S. Department of the Interior,
                                 U.S. Geological Survey
                                        Office of the Director,
                                           Reston, VA, October 4, 2001.
    Mr. Robert G. Card,
    Under Secretary, Energy, Science and Environment, U.S. Department of
            Energy, Washington, DC.
        Dear Mr. Card: This letter summarizes the position of the U.S.
    Geological Survey (USGS) relative to the current state of scientific
    knowledge about the Yucca Mountain site to help the Secretary of Energy
    decide whether to recommend the site for development as a spent nuclear
    fuel and high-level radioactive waste repository. The USGS is
    commenting within the scope of our Earth science expertise and is
    neutral regarding other information the Secretary may consider.
        Earth scientists, many from the USGS, have long played an active
    role in studying the challenge of nuclear waste disposal. The
    conclusion drawn from these studies is that geologic disposal remains
    the only long-term approach for dealing with long-lived radioactive
    waste. Further, the USGS believes that the scientific work performed to
    date supports a decision to recommend Yucca Mountain for development as
    a nuclear waste repository. This position is based upon our
    understanding of the inherent natural attributes of the site as
    determined through extensive studies and takes into account the ability
    of the site to support waste retrieval long into the future. In
    addition to the positive attributes of the site, there is no feature or
    characteristic of the site that would preclude recommending the site.
    However, even after site recommendation, additional studies need to be
    performed, and there are some specific aspects of the proposed design
    that the USGS believes should be part of any final design.
        Physical assets of the site include its relatively uncomplicated
    geology; the lack of economic mineral or energy deposits; the ease of
    excavating stable tunnels; the arid climate; the very low rate of
    infiltration of precipitation into the subsurface; the small percentage
    of infiltrating water that could actually seep into subsurface drifts
    (tunnels); and the free drainage, through fractures on the floor of the
    drifts, of any water that enters the tunnels. Additional positive
    attributes are the natural, passive ventilation of the mountain; the
    presence of an extremely thick unsaturated zone allowing the repository
    to be built far below the land surface and above the water table; and
    natural minerals known as zeolites which tend to retard the movement of
    certain radionuclides.
        The Yucca Mountain site also has some characteristics that
    potentially may degrade repository performance and that consequently
    deserve scrutiny. If the President eventually designates Yucca
    Mountain, these attributes may require additional study and monitoring.
    During the preclosure period, critical surface facilities must be
    designed using state-of-the-art engineering practice to accommodate the
    potential for earthquakes. Whereas the engineering design is outside
    the scope of USGS studies, the USGS has confidence in the probabilistic
    earthquake hazard analyses upon which designs will be based. The
    potential for future volcanic activity has been extensively studied
    because of the presence of nearby volcanic features that are much
    younger than Yucca Mountain. The USGS concurs with expert panels that
    the probability of a repository-piercing eruption, including surface
    eruptions, is very low (on the order of 1.6 x 10-8/year, or
    odds of 16 in a billion per year). However, other scientists believe
    that the probability may be perhaps ten times higher. Although this
    topic continues to be discussed, the total range of current probability
    estimates remains very low. Potential contamination of a deep, potable
    aquifer beneath the site is of concern because it is a valuable
    resource for the human and natural environment of this arid region.
    However, the USGS believes that the site characteristics of an arid
    climate coupled with the hydrologic characteristics of the thick
    unsaturated zone will result in very limited contact of water and
    waste. Future climate change is inherently uncertain and can result in
    positive or negative effects on the proposed repository. Plausible
    limits on the future climate are based on records of climate change
    over the past one million years. Expected states range from present,
    and conditions to significantly cooler periods with double today's
    precipitation. It is likely that climate at Yucca Mountain in the next
    10,000 years will be intermediate between the two extremes, that is,
    semi-arid. Finally, although the local geology of Yucca Mountain is
    relatively uncomplicated, the regional hydrologic system is
    complicated, particularly when future conditions are included. This
    complexity accounts in part for the unparalleled characterization
    effort expended at Yucca Mountain.
        The discussion above is based upon the extensive studies conducted
    at Yucca Mountain. Nonetheless, it is practical and desirable to
    continue efforts to improve knowledge of the site, to reduce
    uncertainty, to apply new Earth science concepts as they develop, and
    to gather data to support refinements in repository plans.
        As the final design of the repository is prepared, the USGS
    strongly supports the inclusion of three design considerations. First,
    maintaining the surrounding rock at a temperature less than boiling at
    all times will minimize potentially negative effects of the repository
    on the site's natural attributes and thereby lower uncertainty in its
    predicted performance. Second, forced and natural ventilation should be
    used to improve repository performance by towering temperature and
    removing substantial amounts of moisture from the mountain. Third, a
    period of retrievability and monitoring preserves the options of future
    generations to make alternative disposal choices.
        Evaluation of any alternative for nuclear waste disposal is limited
    by our ability to make long-term predictions. The Department of Energy
    is proposing recommending the Yucca Mountain site in part because the
    results of the Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) indicate that
    the amounts of radioactivity likely to be released from Yucca Mountain
    meet regulatory limits. The USGS recognizes the benefits of the TSPA
    modeling technique as an important evaluation tool, but the limits of
    quantitative prediction as embodied in the TSPA over such long time
    periods need to be recognized. This fact reinforces the importance of
    retrievability and monitoring as discussed above.
        Additional confidence in the site's long-term ability to isolate
    waste from the biosphere can be attained through the examination of
    natural analogues and through geochemical studies. Studies of
    archeological and geological sites provide analogues for the potential
    of Yucca Mountain to isolate waste. Preservation of extremely fragile
    natural and human-made items for thousands to tens of thousands of
    years in caves, rock shelters, and fissures shows the potential to
    design and operate a repository successfully in the deep unsaturated
    zone of Yucca Mountain. Geochemical studies of calcite and opal in
    Yucca Mountain have shown unequivocal evidence that the water table has
    been below the proposed repository level for millions of years and that
    the effects of past climatic shifts are greatly attenuated at the
    proposed repository depth.
        Recognizing that uncertainty in the future performance of the
    repository remains, the USGS endorses a stepwise decisionmaking process
    and phased implementation of the repository program. This approach
    allows for future decision-makers to select alternative options, if
    necessary, based upon additional information, different societal needs,
    or changing priorities.
        A more detailed discussion of the above topics is attached to this
    letter. Please let me know if I can provide additional information.
                Sincerely,
                                              Charles G. Groat,
                                                              Director.
    [Enclosure.]
                          i. introduction and purpose
        The Secretary of Energy is considering the Yucca Mountain site for
    recommendation as a spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste
    repository. The Secretary's decision is based, in part, on the geologic
    and hydrologic nature of the site as determined through site
    characterization activities. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has no
    regulatory or management mandates and provides impartial science that
    serves the needs of the Nation. It is appropriate, therefore, for the
    Director of the USGS to provide policy-relevant, yet policy-neutral,
    science-based, input to the Secretary of Energy to aid in his decision.
                         ii. geologic disposal concept
        Earth scientists, many from the USGS, have long played an active
    role in the examination of the problem of high-level radioactive waste
    disposal. Since the 1970s, USGS researchers have published studies of
    the concept of geologic disposal. In 1978, for example, the USGS
    considered different rock types, the effect of the waste on the rocks,
    movement of contaminants through ground water, and containment of waste
    in a philosophical discussion of the problem. Subsequently, the USGS
    studied different potential repository rocks, proposed the concept of a
    repository above the water table in arid regions, and investigated the
    hydrology and geology of Yucca Mountain.
        National panels (such as the National Academy of Sciences/National
    Research Council) and international groups (for example, the Nuclear
    Energy Agency) examined the concept of geologic disposal of long-lived
    radioactive wastes on a number of occasions. These panels have
    consistently endorsed geologic disposal as the only viable long-term
    solution to the problem of long-lived radioactive waste. Considering
    the state of knowledge today, the USGS is confident that acceptable
    geologic repositories can be constructed. However, it is important that
    a repository be developed in a stepwise manner, with wastes remaining
    retrievable for a substantial period, in order to confirm the geologic
    and hydrologic attributes of the site or permit the development of
    alternative solutions by future generations.
                          iii. the yucca mountain site
    A. Natural System
        Studies of the natural system at Yucca Mountain have been of
    unprecedented extent and thoroughness. Here, we will try to put the
    natural system characterization efforts in the perspective of USGS
    studies and interpretations.
        For more than 120 years, the USGS has provided scientific support
    to help resolve the Nation's complex natural resource problems. The
    USGS began applying that expertise to the Yucca Mountain region several
    decades before Congress selected the site for study as a potential
    repository location. Major geological and hydrological studies in
    southern Nye County were conducted by the USGS in support of national
    defense programs at the Nevada Test Site.
        After the selection of Yucca Mountain for site characterization,
    USGS scientists worked with academic, national laboratory, and
    contractor geologists and hydrologists to compile a comprehensive
    description of the proposed repository site and its vicinity. The work
    included surface mapping, detailed stratigraphic measurements, studies
    of numerous soil pits and trenches, logging of hundreds of drill holes,
    observations in more than 10 kilometers (6 miles) of underground
    excavations, geophysical surveys, geochemical analyses, hydrologic
    tests, and studies of past climate records. The USGS stands firmly
    behind the quality of work that its scientists produced in the site
    characterization effort. Whereas scientific investigations commonly
    lead to additional possibilities for further work, the USGS is
    confident that the thoroughness of the work performed to date is
    sufficient to support a decision to proceed to the next step of
    repository site recommendation. At this time (October 2001), analysis
    of the extensive data by USGS scientists has found no feature or
    characteristic of the site that would preclude its designation as a
    repository site.
                Site Attributes
        Any potential repository site has attributes that are favorable for
    the isolation of waste as well as unfavorable. As site characterization
    proceeds, these attributes are studied exhaustively and the potentially
    negative attributes receive particular scrutiny. Yucca Mountain has
    been studied in this way and a number of site attributes, both positive
    and negative, have been documented. These are summarized below along
    with an explanation of why the negative attributes do not preclude a
    site recommendation decision at this time.
        Positive Attributes. National screening programs conducted in the
    1980s and site characterization studies have revealed a number of
    positive attributes of the natural system with regard to the siting of
    a potential geologic repository at Yucca Mountain. The local geology at
    Yucca Mountain is uncomplicated. Beds or layers of volcanic rocks of
    relatively uniform thicknesses dip gently to the east and are offset
    small amounts by northwesterly and northerly trending faults. The three
    dimensional geological framework of the mountain is well established by
    mapping, drilling, and underground exploration. In addition, the Yucca
    Mountain site has been thoroughly investigated for economic deposits
    that would be attractive for commercial mining and for energy
    resources, but there is no indication of either.
        The volcanic tuffs at Yucca Mountain are suitable for underground
    construction, as shown by the relative ease with which exploratory
    tunnels, drifts, and alcoves were excavated using tunnel boring
    machines and alpine miners. This feature is favorable both for worker
    safety during normal operations and for waste retrievability well into
    the future should that become necessary.
        Yucca Mountain is located in an arid climate zone of the northern
    Mojave Desert and receives about 190 millimeters (7.5 inches) of
    precipitation per year. Potential evapotranspiration exceeds
    precipitation by about an order of magnitude. Consequently, net
    infiltration is very low, averaging about 5 millimeters (0.2 inches)
    per year above the potential repository area under current climatic
    conditions. Because of the capillary barrier that surrounds underground
    openings in unsaturated rock, the percentage of net infiltration that
    can enter drifts of the potential repository as seepage is small.
    Furthermore, the interconnected fracture network within the potential
    repository host rock (Topopah Spring welded unit) will allow free
    drainage of water that might enter an emplacement drift, thereby
    inhibiting ponding of water. In addition, the interconnected fracture
    network of the Topopah Spring welded unit facilitates natural, passive
    ventilation of the repository. Such long-term passive ventilation of
    the repository would be beneficial because of the potentially large
    amounts of heat and water vapor that could be removed by this natural
    process.
        A fundamental attribute of Yucca Mountain is its location above an
    unsaturated zone that is among the thickest (500 to 800 meters or 1600
    to 2600 feet) in the United States. This allows a repository to be
    situated at a significant vertical distance below the land surface and
    above the regional water table. Such a location in the unsaturated zone
    ensures that a repository is extremely unlikely to be flooded by ground
    water. This conclusion is supported by geochemical and mineralogic
    studies that indicate that the water table has remained well below the
    repository horizon for millions of years. Another significant attribute
    of the Yucca Mountain unsaturated zone is that the rocks of the Calico
    Hills Formation beneath the repository site contain zeolites that can
    significantly retard the transport of certain radionuclides. Finally,
    Yucca Mountain is located in a closed desert basin with no discharge
    beyond the regional drainage system or to the sea.
        Negative Attributes. The principal objective of a geologic
    repository is to securely isolate nuclear waste from the biosphere (the
    environment and its inhabitants) to the greatest extent possible. In
    the previous section, we discussed natural attributes of the Yucca
    Mountain site that are favorable with respect to this goal; many of
    them are also referred to as ``natural barriers'' in Department of
    Energy (DOE) literature.
        The Yucca Mountain site also has some characteristics that
    potentially may degrade repository performance and that consequently
    deserve scrutiny. If the President eventually designates Yucca
    Mountain, these attributes may require additional study and monitoring.
    These include: (1) earthquakes; (2) potential volcanic activity; (3)
    the existence of a large aquifer of potable water at depth beneath the
    repository; (4) future climate change effects; and (5) the regional
    complexity of the hydrogeologic system. Without minimizing the
    importance of these attributes, the USGS believes that they are
    understood well enough with respect to the potential performance of a
    repository to support a decision to take the next step in repository
    development. Our reasons follow.
        The occurrence of earthquakes gives rise to strong ground motion
    and to surface faulting that primarily affects surface facilities.
    Critical operational facilities in the preclosure period, such as the
    waste-handling complex, can be designed to withstand earthquake ground
    motions following state-of-the-art engineering practice as applied to
    critical facilities. Whereas the engineering design is outside the
    scope of USGS studies, the probabilistic hazard analysis upon which
    designs will be based is supported by the USGS and follows
    internationally recognized state-of-the-art.
        The potential for volcanic activity has been extensively studied
    using probabilistic hazard analysis. The USGS concurs with expert
    panels that the probability of a repository-piercing eruption,
    including surface eruptions, is very low (on the order of 1.6 x
    10-8/year, or odds of 16 in a billion per year). However,
    other scientists believe that the probability may be perhaps ten times
    higher. Although this topic continues to be discussed, the total range
    of current probability estimates remains very low.
        The presence of a deep aquifer beneath the site is a primary reason
    for the two decades of efforts by scientists to characterize the
    geology, hydrology, geochemistry, and paleoclimate of the Yucca
    Mountain site. The aquifer is a valuable resource for this arid region.
    For reasons described in the final section of this paper, the USGS
    believes that the risk of possible contamination of ground water
    remains low. Nonetheless, this matter should continue to be evaluated
    and a monitoring program associated with repository construction should
    be designed with these concerns in mind.
        A variety of paleontologic, geologic, and isotopic evidence
    indicates that the climate of the Yucca Mountain area changed
    cyclically in the past million years. During this time it varied from
    that of the present--mean annual precipitation and temperature of about
    190 millimeters (7.5 inches) and 19 degrees Celsius (67 degrees
    Fahrenheit)--to a few extremely cold and wet periods that may have had
    more than double modern precipitation and perhaps more than 11 degrees
    Celsius (20 degrees Fahrenheit) colder temperature. However, during
    most of the past million years, the region is believed to have had
    intermediate climates. Predicting future climate at Yucca Mountain from
    the geologic records is uncertain, but limits observed during the past
    one million years suggest that the climate is likely to be intermediate
    between the present and the extreme climate states during the next
    10,000 years. Thus, the climate of the Yucca Mountain region would at
    such times be semi-arid, rather than arid, as it is today.
        The present-day regional hydrogeologic system is complicated, and
    is compounded by the inclusion of future climate change effects (for
    example, precipitation). Understanding this complex system is important
    in predicting repository performance. However, a substantial amount is
    known about the system, enough to understand the potential for the
    site's attributes to isolate waste.
                Continuing Studies
        The development of a high-level waste repository is a first-of-a-
    kind endeavor. The challenge to predict the performance of a proposed
    repository at Yucca Mountain has resulted in extensive local and
    regional studies as summarized above. Over time, site knowledge has
    increased dramatically and uncertainty in prediction of the performance
    of the natural system has been reduced. Nonetheless, the USGS also
    supports continuing study and monitoring efforts to improve knowledge
    of the site, to further reduce uncertainty, to apply new earth science
    concepts as they develop, and to gather data to support refinements in
    repository plans.
    B. Design and Engineering Considerations
                Cool Repository
        Engineered barriers can complement the natural barriers in
    isolating waste from the biosphere and can do much to offset
    uncertainties in characterizing the natural site conditions. One
    proposed engineering approach is to allow the rocks adjacent to the
    waste packages to exceed the boiling point of water, thus driving
    moisture away from the tunnels. The USGS supports a cooler operating
    regime (one in which the rock temperature never exceeds the boiling
    point of water) because of reduced impact on natural assets of the
    repository system and reduced uncertainties in predicting the
    repository system behavior. The USGS has consistently held this
    position for 23 years, since publication of USGS Circular 779, and
    continues to believe that the potential advantages of an above-boiling
    repository have not been sufficiently demonstrated to warrant changing
    our position.
                Ventilation
        In keeping with the USGS belief that the repository host rock
    temperature is kept below boiling, we support the proposed practice of
    using a combination of forced and natural ventilation of the drifts for
    the time necessary to prevent the drift wall temperatures from ever
    exceeding the boiling point of water. A substantial added benefit of
    drift ventilation is the removal of a large volume of rock moisture
    from the repository environs. This water must be replaced by
    infiltration following the end of ventilation before seepage into the
    drifts could occur. Thus, conditions for possible radionuclide
    transport could be delayed by hundreds to thousands of years. Again,
    this is a long-standing USGS position, held for 18 years, since
    publication of USGS Circular 903.
                Retrievability and Monitoring
        DOE proposes in the Yucca Mountain Preliminary Site Suitability
    Evaluation that the repository may remain open for as much as 325 years
    and will be designed to include waste package retrieval capabilities
    prior to closure. One of the advantages of locating a repository in the
    unsaturated zone is that it remains more accessible (e.g., for
    retrieval of waste) than a repository below the water table. A
    repository above the water table does not need to incorporate backfill
    in the waste-disposal drifts and will not flood after closure. As a
    result, extending the preclosure period may be economically feasible
    (as shown by DOE's consideration of a preclosure period exceeding
    proposed regulatory minimums) and retrievability after closure remains
    a possibility. The USGS remains supportive of repository designs that
    facilitate retrievability, as pointed out in USGS Circular 903.
        The USGS also supports design elements that incorporate the ability
    to monitor key attributes of the site, including moisture movement
    through the unsaturated zone, temperature, and watertable levels. A
    comprehensive monitoring plan is strongly endorsed by the USGS as a
    means to continuously evaluate the site prior to reaching a decision on
    closure. This will allow continuous validation and confidence building
    in the attributes of the natural system upon which the repository
    design is based. After waste emplacement, it is important to assure
    that the repository is functioning as expected and within accepted
    limits.
                     iv. risk to humans and the environment
        The disposal of wastes produced by human activities has been an
    ongoing problem for societies throughout the world since the beginning
    of civilization. A new challenge arose following the Industrial
    Revolution with the need for industrial societies to dispose of
    increasing quantities of toxic solid and liquid chemical wastes. The
    problem of toxic-waste disposal acquired a new dimension with the
    advent of the nuclear age in 1945 and the subsequent need to dispose of
    accumulating quantities of long-lived radioactive wastes. The disposal
    of radioactive wastes requires that these materials be isolated from
    the biosphere for time periods necessary to protect the environment and
    to ensure human health and safety. The National Research Council, in a
    recent report (``Disposition of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear
    Fuel''), reiterated its belief, and that of all nations with nuclear
    power, that underground disposal of nuclear wastes in a geologic
    repository is the ``only long-term solution available.''
        Radioactive-waste materials may reach the biosphere from a geologic
    repository by the mobilization and transport of radioactive substances
    by water moving through the repository system. Most proposed geologic
    repositories would be located below the water table where the wastes
    are in continuous contact with ground water. Yucca Mountain is an
    exception. Because of the thick unsaturated zone beneath this ridge,
    the waste can be emplaced several hundred meters (hundreds of feet)
    below the surface, yet also several hundred meters (hundreds of feet)
    above the water table. Because of the arid climate at Yucca Mountain
    and the hydrologic characteristics of the unsaturated rock mass in
    which the potential repository would be located, minimal quantities of
    ground water are expected to pass through the potential repository
    horizon under present-day conditions. Under expected future wetter
    climates, the natural attributes listed above in conjunction with the
    proposed engineered barriers should limit contact of waste with
    infiltrating water during the regulatory 10,000-year compliance period,
    and beyond.
        The regulations that govern development of a potential Yucca
    Mountain repository require that the collective processes that may lead
    to release of radionuclides to the environment be evaluated using the
    Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) methodology. TSPA is an
    internationally recognized tool not only for evaluating expected future
    repository-system performance but also for identifying additional data
    and information needs and for eliminating sites that may prove to be
    unsuitable for repository development. Although the USGS has not been
    involved directly in conducting the TSPA evaluations for the Yucca
    Mountain site, the earth-science investigations, data, and
    interpretations by the USGS have provided the fundamental scientific
    basis for these evaluations. The TSPA evaluations to date indicate that
    the radioactivity released to the environment from Yucca Mountain is
    likely to meet regulatory limits. The USGS recognizes the benefits of
    the TSPA modeling technique as an important evaluation tool, but the
    limits of quantitative prediction as embodied in the TSPA over such
    long time periods need to be recognized.
        Additional confidence in the site's long-term ability to isolate
    waste from the biosphere can be attained through the examination of
    natural analogues and through geochemical studies. Fossils and
    archaeological finds in caves and in human-made openings in rock
    comprise natural analogues for the possible fate of waste emplaced in
    the thick unsaturated zone beneath Yucca Mountain. Throughout the
    southwestern United States packrat middens, delicate fossils readily
    dissolved by water, are found in caves, rock shelters, and fissures.
    These middens are as much as 40,000 years old. Spirit Cave, Nevada, is
    famous for its 9,000-year-old mummies. Even in humid climates, caves
    contain fragile items such as ice-age paintings, some as much as 32,000
    years old. These paintings have survived, in over 150 caves in the
    presently sub-humid to humid climates of southern France and northern
    Spain, presumably owing to the tendency of infiltrating water to move
    around openings within the unsaturated zone. Detailed study of calcite
    and opal deposits in cavities within the exploratory drifts in Yucca
    Mountain has shown unequivocally that the water table has been below
    the proposed repository horizon for millions of years. Additionally,
    these studies indicate that the climatic shifts recorded at the surface
    were greatly attenuated at the level of the proposed repository.
        Recognizing that uncertainty in the future performance of the
    repository remains, and that continuing monitoring and scientific work
    will enhance understanding of critical processes, the USGS endorses
    national (National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council) and
    international (Nuclear Energy Agency) positions in favor of stepwise
    decisionmaking or phased development approaches. As stated by the
    Nuclear Energy Agency, a stepwise approach ``leaves open the
    possibility of adaptation, in the light of scientific progress and
    social acceptability, over several decades, and does not exclude the
    possibility that other options could be developed at a later stage.''
                                     ______

                               The Secretary of Energy,
                             Washington, DC, February 14, 2002.
    The President,
    The White House, Washington, DC.
        Dear Mr. President: I am transmitting herewith, in accordance with
    section 114(a)(1) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (the
    ``Act''), 42 U.S.C. 10134, my recommendation for your approval of the
    Yucca Mountain site for the development of a nuclear waste repository,
    along with a comprehensive statement of the basis of my recommendation.
    In making this recommendation, I have examined three considerations.
        First, and most important, I have considered whether sound science
    supports the determination that the Yucca Mountain site is
    scientifically and technically suitable for the development of a
    repository. I am convinced that it does. This suitability determination
    provides the indispensable foundation for my recommendation.
    Irrespective of any other considerations, I could not and would not
    recommend the Yucca Mountain site without having first determined that
    a repository at Yucca Mountain will bring together the location,
    natural barriers, and design elements necessary to protect the health
    and safety of the public, including those Americans living in the
    immediate vicinity, now and long into the future.
        The Department has engaged in over 20 years of scientific and
    technical investigation of the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site.
    As part of this investigation, some of the world's best scientists have
    been examining every aspect of the natural processes--past, present and
    future--that could affect the ability of a repository beneath Yucca
    Mountain to isolate radionuclides emitted from any spent fuel and
    radioactive waste disposed there. They have been conducting equally
    searching investigations into the processes that could affect the
    behavior of the engineered barriers that are expected to contribute to
    successful isolation of radionuclides. These investigations have run
    the gamut, from mapping the geologic features of the site, to studying
    the repository rock, to investigating whether and how water moves
    through the Yucca Mountain site.
        To give just a few examples, Yucca Mountain scientists have: mapped
    geologic structures, including rock units, faults, fractures, and
    volcanic features; excavated more than 200 pits and trenches to remove
    rocks and other material for direct observation; drilled more than 450
    boreholes; collected over 75,000 feet of core, and some 18,000 geologic
    and water samples; constructed six and one-half miles of tunnels to
    provide access to the rocks that would be used for the repository;
    mapped the geologic features exposed by the underground openings in the
    tunnels; conducted the largest known test in history to simulate heat
    effects of a repository, heating some seven million cubic feet of rock
    over its ambient temperature; tested mechanical, chemical, and
    hydrologic properties of rock samples; and examined over 13,000
    engineered material samples to determine their corrosion resistance in
    a variety of environments.
        The findings from these and numerous other studies have been used
    to expand our knowledge of the rocks beneath Yucca Mountain and the
    flow of water through these rocks, including amounts, pathways, and
    rates. Yucca Mountain scientists have used this vast reservoir of
    information to develop computer simulations that describe the natural
    features, events and processes that exist at Yucca Mountain and, in
    turn, have used these descriptions to develop the models to forecast
    how a repository will perform far into the future. Yucca Mountain
    scientists have followed a deliberately cautious approach to enhance
    confidence in any prediction of future performance.
        The results of this investigation have been openly and thoroughly
    reviewed by the Department and oversight entities such as the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board,
    and the U.S. Geological Survey, as well as having been subjected to
    scientific peer reviews, including a review undertaken by the
    International Atomic Energy Agency. The Department also has made
    available the scientific materials and analyses used to prepare the
    technical evaluations of site suitability for public review by all
    interested parties. The results of this extensive investigation and the
    external technical reviews of this body of scientific work give me
    confidence for the conclusion, based on sound scientific principles,
    that a repository at Yucca Mountain will be able to protect the health
    and safety of the public when evaluated against the radiological
    protection standards adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency and
    implemented by the NRC in accordance with Congressional direction in
    the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
        Second, having found the site technically suitable, I am also
    convinced that there are compelling national interests that require
    development of a repository. In brief, the reasons are these:

       A repository is important to our national security. About
            40% of our fleet's principal combat vessels, including
            submarines and aircraft carriers, are nuclear-powered. They
            must periodically be refueled and the spent fuel removed. This
            spent fuel is currently stored at surface facilities under
            temporary arrangements. A repository is necessary to assure a
            permanent disposition pathway for this material and thereby
            enhance the certainty of future naval operational capability.
       A repository is important to promote our non-proliferation
            objectives. The end of the Cold War has brought with it the
            welcome challenge of disposing of surplus weapons-grade
            plutonium as part of the process of decommissioning weapons we
            no longer need. A geological repository is an integral part of
            our disposition plans. Without it, our ability to meet our
            pledge to decommission our weapons could be placed in jeopardy,
            thereby jeopardizing the commitment of other nations, such as
            Russia, to decommission its own.
       A repository is important to our energy security. We must
            ensure that nuclear power, which provides 20% of the nation's
            electric power, remains an important part of our domestic
            energy production. Without the stabilizing effects of nuclear
            power, energy markets will become increasingly more exposed to
            price spikes and supply uncertainties, as we are forced to
            replace it with other energy sources to substitute for the
            almost five hours of electricity that nuclear power currently
            provides each day, on average, to each home, farm, factory and
            business in America. Nuclear power is also important to
            sustainable growth because it produces no controlled air
            pollutants, such as sulfur and particulates, or greenhouse
            gases. A repository at Yucca Mountain is indispensable to the
            maintenance and potential growth of this environmentally
            efficient source of energy.
       A repository is important to our homeland security. Spent
            nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and excess
            plutonium for which there is no complete disposal pathway
            without a repository are currently stored at over 131 sites in
            39 States. More than 161 million Americans live within 75 miles
            of one or more of these sites. The facilities housing these
            materials were intended to do so on a temporary basis. They
            should be able to withstand current terrorist threats, but that
            may not remain the case in the future. These materials would be
            far better secured in a deep underground repository at Yucca
            Mountain, on federal land, far from population centers, that
            can withstand an attack well beyond any that is reasonably
            conceivable.
       And a repository is important to our efforts to protect the
            environment. It is past time for the federal government to
            implement an environmentally sound disposition plan for our
            defense wastes, which are located in Tennessee, Colorado, South
            Carolina, New Mexico, New York, Washington and Idaho. Among the
            wastes currently at these sites, approximately 100,000,000
            gallons of high-level liquid waste are stored in, and in some
            instances have leaked from, temporary holding tanks. About
            2,500 metric tons of solid un-reprocessed fuel from production
            and other reactors also are stored at these sites. It is also
            past time for the federal government to begin disposition of
            commercial spent fuel, a program that was to have begun in
            1998. A repository is necessary for accomplishment of either of
            these objectives.

        Third, I have considered carefully the primary arguments against
    locating a repository at Yucca Mountain. None of these arguments rises
    to a level that would outweigh the case for going forward. This is not
    to say that there have not been important concerns identified. I am
    confident, however, these concerns have been and will continue to be
    addressed in an appropriate manner.
        In short, after months of study based on scientific and technical
    research unique in its scope and depth, and after reviewing the results
    of a public review process that went well beyond the requirements of
    the Act, I reached the conclusions described in the preceding
    paragraphs--namely, that technically and scientifically the Yucca
    Mountain site is fully suitable; that development of a repository at
    the Yucca Mountain site serves the national interest in numerous
    important ways; and that the arguments against its designation do not
    rise to a level that would outweigh the case for going forward. Not
    completing the site designation process and moving forward to licensing
    the development of a repository, as Congress mandated almost 20 years
    ago, would be an irresponsible dereliction of duty.
        Accordingly, I recommend the Yucca Mountain site for the
    development of a nuclear waste repository.
                Respectfully,
                                                       Spencer Abraham.
    Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy Regarding the Suitability of
    the Yucca Mountain Site for a Repository Under the Nuclear Waste Policy
                                  Act of 1982
                                 february 2002
    1. Introduction
    2. Background
        2.1. History of the Yucca Mountain Project and the Nuclear Waste
            Policy Act
        2.2. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the Responsibilities of the
            Department   of Energy and the Secretary
    3. Decision
        3.1. The Recommendation
        3.2. What This Recommendation Means, and What It Does Not Mean
    4. Decision Determination Methodology and the Decision-Makinz Process
    5. Decision Criteria
        5.1. Scientific and Technical Suitability
        5.2. National Interest Considerations
    6. Is Yucca Mountain Scientifically and Technically Suitable for
        Development of a Repository?
        6.1. Framework for Suitability Determination
          6.1.1. General Outline
          6.1.2. Radiation Protection Standards
          6.1.3. Underlying Hard Science
    7. Results of Suitability Evaluations and Conclusions
        7.1. Results of Pre-Closure Evaluations
        7.2. Results of Post-Closure Evaluations
    8. The National Interest
        8.1. Nuclear Science and the National Interest
        8.2. Energy Security
        8.3. National Security
          8.3.1. Powering the Navy Nuclear Fleet
          8.3.2. Allowing the Nation to Decommission Its Surplus Nuclear
                Weapons and   Support Nuclear Non-Proliferation Efforts
        8.4. Protecting the Environment
        8.5. Facilitating Continuation of Research, Medical, and
            Humanitarian Pro-   grams
        8.6. Assisting Anti-Terrorism at Home
        8.7. Summary
    9. None of the Arguments Against Yucca Mountain Withstands Analysis
        9.1. Assertion 1: The Citizens of Nevada Were Denied an Adequate
            Opportunity   to Be Heard
        9.2. Assertion 2: The Project Has Received Inadequate Study
        9.3. Assertion 3: The Rules Were Changed in the Middle of the Game
        9.4. Assertion 4: The Process Tramples States' Rights
        9.5. Assertion 5: Transportation of Nuclear Materials is Disruptive
            and Dan-   gerous
        9.6. Assertion 6: Transportation of Wastes to the Site Will Have a
            Dramatically Negative Economic Impact on Las Vegas
        9.7. Assertion 7: It is Premature for DOE to Make a Site
            Recommendation for   Various Reasons
          9.7.1. The General Accounting Office has concluded that it is
                premature for   DOE to make a site recommendation now
          9.7.2. DOE is not ready to make a site recommendation now because
                DOE   and NRC have agreed on 293 technical items that need
                to be completed be-   fore DOE files a license application
          9.7.3. It is premature for DOE to make a recommendation now
                because DOE   cannot complete this additional work until
                2006. The NWPA requires   DOE to file a license application
                within 90 days of the approval of site   designation
    10. Conclusion
                                1. introduction
        For more than half a century, since nuclear science helped us win
    World War II and ring in the Atomic Age, scientists have known that the
    Nation would need a secure, permanent facility in which to dispose of
    radioactive wastes. Twenty years ago, when Congress adopted the Nuclear
    Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA or ``the Act''), it recognized the
    overwhelming consensus in the scientific community that the best option
    for such a facility would be a deep underground repository. Fifteen
    years ago, Congress directed the Secretary of Energy to investigate and
    recommend to the President whether such a repository could be located
    safely at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Since then, our country has spent
    billions of dollars and millions of hours of research endeavoring to
    answer this question. I have carefully reviewed the product of this
    study. In my judgment, it constitutes sound science and shows that a
    safe repository can be sited there. I also believe that compelling
    national interests counsel in favor of proceeding with this project.
    Accordingly, consistent with my responsibilities under the NWPA, today
    I am recommending that Yucca Mountain be developed as the site for an
    underground repository for spent fuel and other radioactive wastes.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ For purposes of this Recommendation, the terms ``radioactive
    waste'' and ``waste'' are used to cover high-level radioactive waste
    and spent nuclear fuel, as those terms are used in the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Act.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The first consideration in my decision was whether the Yucca
    Mountain site will safeguard the health and safety of the people, in
    Nevada and across the country, and will be effective in containing at
    minimum risk the material it is designed to hold. Substantial evidence
    shows that it will. Yucca Mountain is far and away the most thoroughly
    researched site of its kind in the world. It is a geologically stable
    site, in a closed groundwater basin, isolated on thousands of acres of
    Federal land, and farther from any metropolitan area than the great
    majority of less secure, temporary nuclear waste storage sites that
    exist in the country today.
        This point bears emphasis. We are not confronting a hypothetical
    problem. We have a staggering amount of radioactive waste in this
    country--nearly 100,000,000 gallons of high-level nuclear waste and
    more than 40,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel with more created
    every day. Our choice is not between, on the one hand, a disposal site
    with costs and risks held to a minimum, and, on the other, a magic
    disposal system with no costs or risks at all. Instead, the real choice
    is between a single secure site, deep under the ground at Yucca
    Mountain, or making do with what we have now or some variant of it--131
    aging surface sites, scattered across 39 states. Every one of those
    sites was built on the assumption that it would be temporary. As time
    goes by, every one is closer to the limit of its safe life span. And
    every one is at least a potential security risk--safe for today, but a
    question mark in decades to come.
        The Yucca Mountain facility is important to achieving a number of
    our national goals. It will promote our energy security, our national
    security, and safety in our homeland. It will help strengthen our
    economy and help us clean up the environment.
        The benefits of nuclear power are with us every day. Twenty percent
    of our country's electricity comes from nuclear energy. To put it
    another way, the ``average'' home operates on nuclear-generated
    electricity for almost five hours a day. A government with a
    complacent, kick-the can-down-the-road nuclear waste disposal policy
    will sooner or later have to ask its citizens which five hours of
    electricity they would care to do without.
        Regions that produce steel, automobiles, and durable goods rely in
    particular on nuclear power, which reduces the air pollution associated
    with fossil fuels--greenhouse gases, solid particulate matter, smog,
    and acid rain. But environmental concerns extend further. Most
    commercial spent fuel storage facilities are near large populations
    centers; in fact, more than 161 million Americans live within 75 miles
    of these facilities. These storage sites also tend to be near rivers,
    lakes, and seacoasts. Should a radioactive release occur from one of
    these older, less robust facilities, it could contaminate any of 20
    major waterways, including the Mississippi River. Over 30 million
    Americans are served by these potentially at-risk water sources.
        Our national security interests are likewise at stake. Forty
    percent of our warships, including many of the most strategic vessels
    in our Navy, are powered by nuclear fuel, which eventually becomes
    spent fuel. At the same time, the end of the Cold War has brought the
    welcome challenge to our Nation of disposing of surplus weapons-grade
    plutonium as part of the process of decommissioning our nuclear
    weapons. Regardless of whether this material is turned into reactor
    fuel or otherwise treated, an underground repository is an
    indispensable component in any plan for its complete disposition. An
    affirmative decision on Yucca Mountain is also likely to affect other
    nations' weapons decommissioning, since their willingness to proceed
    will depend on being satisfied that we are doing so. Moving forward
    with the repository will contribute to our global efforts to stem the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons in other ways, since it will encourage
    nations with weaker controls over their own materials to follow a
    similar path of permanent, underground disposal, thereby making it more
    difficult for these materials to fall into the wrong hands. By moving
    forward with Yucca Mountain, we will show leadership, set out a
    roadmap, and encourage other nations to follow it.
        There will be those who say the problem of nuclear waste disposal
    generally, and Yucca Mountain in particular, needs more study. In fact,
    both issues have been studied for more than twice the amount of time it
    took to plan and complete the moon landing. My Recommendation today is
    consistent with the conclusion of the National Research Council of the
    National Academy of Sciences--a conclusion reached, not last week or
    last month, but 12 years ago. The Council noted ``a worldwide
    scientific consensus that deep geological disposal, the approach being
    followed by the United States, is the best option for disposing of
    high-level radioactive waste.'' \2\ Likewise, a broad spectrum of
    experts agrees that we now have enough information, including more than
    20 years of researching Yucca Mountain specifically, to support a
    conclusion that such a repository can be safely located there.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Rethinking High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Position
    Statement of the Board on Radioactive Waste Management, Washington,
    D.C., National Academy Press, 1990.
        \3\ Letter and attached report, Charles G. Groat, Director, U.S.
    Geologic Survey, to Robert G. Card, October 4, 2001 (hereafter USGS
    Letter & Report); Letter and attached report, Hans Riotte, NEA-IAEA
    Joint Secretariat, to Lake H. Barrett, November 2, 2001 (hereafter NEA-
    IAEA Letter & Report); Letter, Charles V. Shank, Director, Lawrence
    Berkeley National Laboratory, to Spencer Abraham, September 6, 200
    (hereafter Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Letter).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nonetheless, should this site designation ultimately become
    effective, considerable additional study lies ahead. Before an ounce of
    spent fuel or radioactive waste could be sent to Yucca Mountain, indeed
    even before construction of the permanent facilities for emplacement of
    waste could begin there, the Department of Energy (DOE or ``the
    Department'') will be required to submit an application to the
    independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). There, DOE would be
    required to make its case through a formal review process that will
    include public hearings and is expected to last at least three years.
    Only after that, if the license were granted, could construction begin.
    The DOE would also have to obtain an additional operating license,
    supported by evidence that public health and safety will be preserved,
    before any waste could actually be received.
        In short, even if the Yucca Mountain Recommendation were accepted
    today, an estimated minimum of eight more years lies ahead before the
    site would become operational.
        We have seen decades of study, and properly so for a decision of
    this importance, one with significant consequences for so many of our
    citizens. As necessary, many more years of study will be undertaken.
    But it is past time to stop sacrificing that which is forward-looking
    and prudent on the altar of a status quo we know ultimately will fail
    us. The status quo is not the best we can do for our energy future, our
    national security, our economy, our environment, and safety--and we are
    less safe every day as the clock runs down on dozens of older,
    temporary sites.
        I recommend the deep underground site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada,
    for development as our Nation's first permanent facility for disposing
    of high-level nuclear waste.
                                 2. background
    2.1. History of the Yucca Mountain Project and the Nuclear Waste Policy
            Act
        The need for a secure facility in which to dispose of radioactive
    wastes has been known in this country at least since World War II. As
    early as 1957, a National Academy of Sciences report to the Atomic
    Energy Commission suggested burying radioactive waste in geologic
    formations. Beginning in the 1970s, the United States and other
    countries evaluated many options for the safe and permanent disposal of
    radioactive waste, including deep seabed disposal, remote island
    siting, dry cask storage, disposal in the polar ice sheets,
    transmutation, and rocketing waste into orbit around the sun. After
    analyzing these options, disposal in a mined geologic repository
    emerged as the preferred long-term environmental solution for the
    management of these wastes.\4\ Congress recognized this consensus 20
    years ago when it passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Final Environmental Impact Statement for Management of
    Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste, DOE/EIS0046. 1980.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the Act, Congress created a Federal obligation to accept
    civilian spent nuclear fuel and dispose of it in a geologic facility.
    Congress also designated the agencies responsible for implementing this
    policy and specified their roles. The Department of Energy must
    characterize, site, design, build, and manage a Federal waste
    repository. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must set the
    public health standards for it. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission must
    license its construction, operation, and closure.
        The Department of Energy began studying Yucca Mountain almost a
    quarter century ago. Even before Congress adopted the NWPA, the
    Department had begun national site screening research as part of the
    National Waste Terminal Storage program, which included examination of
    Federal sites that had previously been used for defense-related
    activities and were already potentially contaminated. Yucca Mountain
    was one such location, on and adjacent to the Nevada Test Site, which
    was then under consideration. Work began on the Yucca Mountain site in
    1978. When the NWPA was passed, the Department was studying more than
    25 sites around the country as potential repositories. The Act provided
    for the siting and development of two; Yucca Mountain was one of nine
    sites under consideration for the first repository program.
        Following the provisions of the Act and the Department's siting
    Guidelines,\5\ the Department prepared draft environmental assessments
    for the nine sites. Final environmental assessments were prepared for
    five of these, including Yucca Mountain. In 1986, the Department
    compared and ranked the sites under consideration for characterization.
    It did this by using a multi-attribute methodology--an accepted, formal
    scientific method used to help decision makers compare, on an
    equivalent basis, the many components that make up a complex decision.
    When all the components`of the ranking decision were considered
    together, taking account of both preclosure and post-closure concerns,
    Yucca Mountain was the top-ranked site.\6\ The Department examined a
    variety of ways of combining the components of the ranking scheme; this
    only confirmed the conclusion that Yucca Mountain came out in first
    place. The EPA also looked at the performance of a repository in
    unsaturated tuff. The EPA noted that in its modeling in support of
    development of the standards, unsaturated tuff was one of the two
    geologic media that appeared most capable of limiting releases of
    radionuclides in a manner that keeps expected doses to individuals
    low.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ The Guidelines then in force were promulgated at 10 CFR part
    960, General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear
    Waste Repositories, 1984.
        \6\ Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy of Candidate Sites
    for Site Characterization for the First Radioactive Waste Repository,
    DOE/S-0048, May 1986.
        \7\ Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for the Management
    and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic
    Radioactive Wastes, Final Rule, 40 CFR Part 191, December 20, 1993.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 1986, Secretary of Energy Herrington found three sites to be
    suitable for site characterization, and recommended the three,
    including Yucca Mountain, to President Reagan for detailed site
    characterization.\8\ The Secretary also made a preliminary finding,
    based on Guidelines that did not require site characterization, that
    the three sites were suitable for development as repositories.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Letter, John S. Herrington, Secretary of Energy, to President
    Ronald Reagan, May 27, 1986, with attached report, Recommendation by
    the Secretary of Energy of Candidate Sites for Site Characterization
    for the First Radioactive Waste Repository, DOE/S-0048, May 1986.
        \9\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The next year, Congress amended the NWPA, and selected Yucca
    Mountain as the single site to be characterized. It simultaneously
    directed the Department to cease activities at all other potential
    sites. Although it has been suggested that Congress's decision was made
    for purely political reasons, the record described above reveals that
    the Yucca Mountain site consistently ranked at or near the top of the
    sites evaluated well before Congress's action.
        As previously noted, the National Research Council of the National
    Academy of Sciences concluded in 1990 (and reiterated last year) that
    there is ``a worldwide scientific consensus that deep geological
    disposal, the approach being followed by the United States, is the best
    option for disposing of high-level radioactive waste.'' \10\ Today,
    many national and international scientific experts and nuclear waste
    management professionals agree with DOE that there exists sufficient
    information to support a national decision on designation of the Yucca
    Mountain site.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Rethinking High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Position
    Statement of the Board on Radioactive Waste Management, Washington,
    D.C., National Academy Press, 1990. And: Disposition of High-Level
    Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal and Technical
    Challenges, Board on Radioactive Waste Management, Washington, D.C.,
    National Academy Press, 2001.
        \11\ USGS Letter & Report, supra; NEA-IAEA Letter & Report, supra;
    Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Letter, supra.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2.2. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the Responsibilities of the
            Department of Energy and the Secretary
        Congress assigned to the Secretary of Energy the primary
    responsibility for implementing the national policy of developing a
    deep underground repository. The Secretary must determine whether to
    initiate the next step laid out in the NWPA--a recommendation to
    designate Yucca Mountain as the site for development as a permanent
    disposal facility. The criteria for this determination are described
    more fully in section 5. Briefly, I first must determine whether Yucca
    Mountain is in fact technically and scientifically suitable to be a
    repository. A favorable suitability determination is indispensable for
    a positive recommendation of the site to the President. Under
    additional criteria I have adopted above and beyond the statutory
    requirements, I have also sought to determine whether, when other
    relevant considerations are taken into account, recommending it is in
    the overall national interest and, if so, whether there are
    countervailing arguments so strong that I should nonetheless decline to
    make the Recommendation.
        The Act contemplates several important stages in evaluating the
    site before a Secretarial recommendation is in order. It directs the
    Secretary to develop a site characterization plan, one that will help
    guide test programs for the collection of data to be used in evaluating
    the site. It directs the Secretary to conduct such characterization
    studies as may be necessary to evaluate the site's suitability. And it
    directs the Secretary to hold hearings in the vicinity of the
    prospective site to inform the residents and receive their comments. It
    is at the completion of these stages that the Act directs the
    Secretary, if he finds the site suitable, to determine whether to
    recommend it to the President for development as a permanent
    repository.
        If the Secretary recommends to the President that Yucca Mountain be
    developed, he must include with the Recommendation, and make available
    to the public, a comprehensive statement of the basis for his
    determination.\12\ If at any time the Secretary determines that Yucca
    Mountain is not a suitable site, he must report to Congress within six
    months his recommendations for further action to assure safe, permanent
    disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ This document together with accompanying materials comprises
    the recommendation and the comprehensive statement. The accompanying
    materials are described in footnote 26.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Following a Recommendation by the Secretary, the President may
    recommend the Yucca Mountain site to Congress ``if . . . [he] considers
    [it] qualified for application for a construction authorization. . .
    .'' \13\ If the President submits a recommendation to Congress, he must
    also submit a copy of the statement setting forth the basis for the
    Secretary's Recommendation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ NWPA section 114(a)(2)(A).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A Presidential recommendation takes effect 60 days after submission
    unless Nevada forwards a notice of disapproval to the Congress. If
    Nevada submits such a notice, Congress has a limited time during which
    it may nevertheless give effect to the President's recommendation by
    passing, under expedited procedures, a joint resolution of siting
    approval. If the President's recommendation takes effect, the Act
    directs the Secretary to submit to the NRC a construction license
    application.
        The NWPA by its terms contemplated that the entire process of
    siting, licensing, and constructing a repository would have been
    completed more than four years ago, by January 31, 1998. Accordingly,
    it required the Department to enter into contracts to begin accepting
    waste for disposal by that date.
                                  3. decision
    3.1. The Recommendation
        After over 20 years of research and billions of dollars of
    carefully planned and reviewed scientific field work, the Department
    has found that a repository at Yucca Mountain brings together the
    location, natural barriers, and design elements most likely to protect
    the health and safety of the public, including those Americans living
    in the immediate vicinity, now and long into the future. It is
    therefore suitable, within the meaning of the NWPA, for development as
    a permanent nuclear waste and spent fuel repository.
        After reviewing the extensive, indeed unprecedented, analysis the
    Department has undertaken, and in discharging the responsibilities made
    incumbent on the Secretary under the Act, I am recommending to the
    President that Yucca Mountain be developed as the Nation's first
    permanent, deep underground repository for high-level radioactive
    waste. A decision to develop Yucca Mountain will be a critical step
    forward in addressing our Nation's energy future, our national defense,
    our safety at home, and protection for our economy and environment.
    3.2. What This Recommendation Means, and What It Does Not Mean
        Even after so many years of research, this Recommendation is a
    preliminary step. It does no more than start the formal safety
    evaluation process. Before a license is granted, much less before
    repository construction or waste emplacement may begin, many steps and
    many years still lie ahead. The DOE must submit an application for a
    construction license; defend it through formal review, including public
    hearings; and receive authorization from the NRC, which has the
    statutory responsibility to ensure that any repository built at Yucca
    Mountain meets stringent tests of health and safety. The NRC licensing
    process is expected to take a minimum of three years. Opposing
    viewpoints will have every opportunity to be heard. If the NRC grants
    this first license, it will only authorize initial construction. The
    DOE would then have to seek and obtain a second operating license from
    the NRC before any wastes could be received. The process altogether is
    expected to take a minimum of eight years.
        The DOE would also be subject to NRC oversight as a condition of
    the operating license. Construction, licensing, and operation of the
    repository would also be subject to ongoing Congressional oversight.
        At some future point, the repository is expected to close. EPA and
    NRC regulations require monitoring after the DOE receives a license
    amendment authorizing the closure, which would be from 50 to about 300
    years after waste emplacement begins, or possibly longer.
        The repository would also be designed, however, to be able to adapt
    to methods future generations might develop to manage high-level
    radioactive waste. Thus, even after completion of waste emplacement,
    the waste could be retrieved to take advantage of its economic value or
    usefulness to as yet undeveloped technologies.
        Permanently closing the repository would require sealing all
    shafts, ramps, exploratory boreholes, and other underground openings
    connected to the surface. Such sealing would discourage human intrusion
    and prevent water from entering through these openings. DOE's site
    stewardship would include maintaining control of the area, monitoring
    and testing, and implementing security measures against vandalism and
    theft. In addition, a network of permanent monuments and markers would
    be erected around the site to alert future generations to the presence
    and nature of the buried waste.\14\ Detailed public records held in
    multiple places would identify the location and layout of the
    repository and the nature and potential hazard of the waste it
    contains. The Federal Government would maintain control of the site for
    the indefinite future. Active security systems would prevent deliberate
    or inadvertent human intrusion and any other human activity that could
    adversely affect the performance of the repository.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ During characterization of the Yucca Mountain site, Nye County
    began to develop its Early Warning Monitoring program and boreholes.
    These boreholes not only provide information about water movement in
    the area of the site, but also can serve as monitoring points should a
    repository be built at Yucca Mountain.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     4. decision determination methodology and the decision-making process
        I have considered many kinds of information in making my
    determination today. I have put on a hard hat, gone down into the
    Mountain, and spoken with many of the scientists and engineers working
    there. Of course my decision-making included a great deal more than
    that. I have also personally reviewed detailed summaries of the science
    and research undertaken by the Yucca Mountain Project since 1978. I
    relied upon review materials, program evaluations, and face-to-face
    briefings given by many individuals familiar with the Project, such as
    the acting program manager and program senior staff.
        My consideration included: (a) the general background of the
    program, including the relevant legislative history; (b) the types,
    sources, and amounts of radioactive waste that would be disposed of at
    the site and their risk; (c) the extent of Federal responsibilities;
    (d) the criteria for a suitability decision, including the NWPA's
    provisions bearing on the basis for the Secretary's consideration; the
    regulatory structure, its substance, history, and issues; DOE's Yucca
    Mountain Suitability Guidelines promulgated under the NWPA; \15\ the
    NRC licensing regulations,\16\ and EPA radiation protection standards
    \17\ as referenced in the Suitability Guidelines; (e) assessments of
    repository performance, including technical data and descriptions of
    how those data were gathered and evaluated; assessments of the
    effectiveness of natural and engineered barriers in meeting applicable
    radiation protection standards, and adjustments for uncertainties
    associated with each of these; (f) the Yucca Mountain Site Suitability
    Evaluation; (g) the views of members of the public, including those
    expressed at hearings and through written comments; (h) environmental,
    socioeconomic, and transportation issues; (1) program oversight
    history, technical issues, and responses, including the role and views
    of the NRC, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, the General
    Accounting Office, the Inspector General, and the State of Nevada; and
    the role and views of the National Laboratories, the United States
    Geological Survey, and peer reviews; and (j) public policy impact.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ 10 CFR Part 963, Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines,
    November 14, 2001.
        \16\ 10 CFR Part 63, Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste in a
    Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, November 2, 2001.
        \17\ 540 CFR Part 197, Public Health and Environmental Radiation
    Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, June 13, 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I also requested an external review of program briefing materials.
    It was conducted by Dr. Chris Whipple, a member of the National Academy
    of Engineering and an experienced independent peer reviewer of programs
    for both the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and the Yucca Mountain
    Project. Dr. Whipple previously had led a peer review team that
    critically analyzed Total System Performance Assessment (TSPA) work of
    the Yucca Mountain Project.
        I also reviewed the comment summary documents from both the
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and NWPA Section 114 site
    recommendation hearing process in order fully to take into account
    public views concerning a possible recommendation of the Yucca Mountain
    site. This review enabled me to evaluate scientific and research
    results in the context of both strongly held local concerns and issues
    of national importance. I took particular note of comments and concerns
    raised by the Governor of Nevada, governors of other states, state
    agencies, Native American tribes, and members of the public at large.
                              5. decision criteria
        My charge to make a recommendation to the President on this matter
    stems from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. That statute directs
    the Secretary of Energy to determine ``whether to recommend to the
    President that he approve [the Yucca Mountain] site for development of
    a repository.'' \18\ The NWPA establishes certain guideposts along the
    way to making this determination, but it also gives the Secretary
    significant responsibility for deciding what the relevant
    considerations are to be.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ NWPA section 114(a)(1).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Pursuant to that responsibility, I concluded that I should use
    three criteria in determining whether to recommend approval of the
    Yucca Mountain Project. First, is Yucca Mountain a scientifically and
    technically suitable site for a repository, i.e., a site that promises
    a reasonable expectation of public health and safety for disposal of
    spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for the next 10,000
    years? Second, are there compelling national interests that favor
    proceeding with the decision to site a repository there? And third, are
    there countervailing considerations that outweigh those interests?
        The first of these criteria is expressly contemplated by the NWPA,
    although the NWPA also confers considerable discretion and
    responsibility on the Secretary in defining how to determine scientific
    and technical suitability and in making a judgment on the question. The
    two other criteria are not specified by the NWPA, but I am convinced
    that they are appropriate checks on a pure suitability-based decision.
    5.1. Scientific and Technical Suitability
        Under the NWPA, the first step in a Secretarial determination
    regarding Yucca Mountain is deciding whether it is scientifically and
    technically suitable as a repository site. Although the NWPA does not
    state explicitly that this is the initial step, the language and
    structure of the Act strongly suggest that this is so. Most
    significantly, section 114(a)(1) of the NWPA states that the
    Secretary's recommendation is to be made at the conclusion of site
    characterization.\19\ Section 113, in turn, makes clear that the
    function of site characterization is to provide enough site-specific
    information to allow a decision on Yucca Mountain's scientific
    suitability.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Ibid.
        \20\ This is apparent from two related provisions of section 113:
    section 113(c)(1), which states that, ``The Secretary may conduct at
    the Yucca Mountain site only such site characterization activities as
    the Secretary considers necessary to provide the data required for
    evaluation of the suitability of such site for an application to be
    submitted to the Commission for a construction authorization for a
    repository at such site'' (as well as for NEPA purposes); and its
    companion provision, section 113(c)(3), which states that, ``If the
    Secretary at any time determines the Yucca Mountain site to be
    unsuitable for development as a repository, the Secretary shall . . .
    terminate all site characterization activities [there].''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As to what a determination of site suitability entails, the only
    real guidance the Act provides is that in several places it equates a
    favorable suitability judgment with a judgment that a repository could
    (1) be built at that site and (2) receive a construction authorization
    from the NRC.\21\ This suggests that a determination that the site is
    suitable entails a judgment on my part that a repository at Yucca
    Mountain would likely be licensable by the NRC.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\  NWPA section 112(b)(1)(D)(ii); NWPA section 113(c)(1); NWPA
    section 113(c)(3).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Beyond that, the NWPA largely leaves the question to the Secretary
    of Energy by charging him with establishing ``criteria to be used to
    determine the suitability of . . . candidate site[s] for the location
    of a repository.'' \22\ On November 14, 2001, following NRC's
    concurrence, the Department issued its final version of these criteria
    in a rule entitled, ``Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines.'' I
    shall describe these in detail in the next section of this
    Recommendation, but outline them here. In brief, DOE's Guidelines
    envision that I may find the Yucca Mountain site suitable if I conclude
    that a repository constructed there is ``likely'' to meet extremely
    stringent radiation protection standards designed to protect public
    health and safety.\23\ The EPA originally established these
    standards.\24\ They are now also set out in NRC licensing rules.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ NWPA section 113(b)(1)(A)(iv). That section contemplates that
    these criteria are to be included in the first instance in the site
    characterization plan for each site and thereafter may be modified
    using the procedures of section 112(a).
        \23\ 10 CFR part 963.
        \24\ 40 CFR part 197.
        \25\ 10 CFR part 63.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The EPA and NRC adopted the standards so as to assure that while
    the repository is receiving nuclear materials, any radiation doses to
    workers and members of the public in the vicinity of the site would be
    at safe levels, and that after the repository is sealed, radiation
    doses to those in the vicinity would be at safe levels for 10,000
    years. These radiation protection levels are identical to those with
    which the DOE will have to demonstrate compliance to the satisfaction
    of the NRC in order to obtain a license to build the repository.
        Using the Department's suitability Guidelines, I have concluded
    that Yucca Mountain is in fact suitable for a repository. The reasons
    for this conclusion are set out in section 7 of this Recommendation.
    However, I want to pause to make one thing clear at the outset. If for
    any reason I found that the site were not suitable or licensable, then,
    irrespective of any other consideration, I would not recommend it.
    Specifically, however much as I might believe that proceeding toward a
    repository would advance the national interest in other ways, those
    additional considerations could not properly influence, and have not
    influenced, my determination of suitability.
    5.2. National Interest Considerations
        Beyond scientific suitability, the NWPA is virtually silent on what
    other standard or standards the Secretary should apply in making a
    recommendation. It does direct me to consider certain matters. It
    requires that I consider the record of hearings conducted in the
    vicinity of Yucca Mountain, the site characterization record, and
    various other information I am directed to transmit to the President
    with my Recommendation.\26\ 26 The Act does not, however, specify how I
    am to consider these various items or what standard I am to use in
    weighing them. And finally among the items it directs me to take into
    account is, ``such other information as the Secretary considers
    appropriate.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ The statutorily required information is set out in Section
    114(a)(1) of the NWPA, which states: Together with any recommendation
    of a site under this paragraph, the Secretary shall make available to
    the public, and submit to the President, a comprehensive statement of
    the basis of such recommendation, including the following:
        (A) a description of the proposed repository, including preliminary
    engineering specifications for the facility;
        (B) a description of the waste form or packaging proposed for use
    at such repository, and an explanation of the relationship between such
    waste form or packaging and the geologic medium of such site;
        (C) a discussion of data, obtained in site characterization
    activities, relating to the safety of such site;
        (D) a final environmental impact statement prepared for the Yucca
    Mountain site pursuant to subsection (f) and the National Environmental
    Policy Act of 1969 [42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.], together with comments
    made concerning such environmental impact statement by the Secretary of
    the Interior, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Administrator,
    and the Commission, except that the Secretary shall not be required in
    any such environmental impact statement to consider the need for a
    repository, the alternatives to geological disposal, or alternative
    sites to the Yucca Mountain site;
        (E) preliminary comments of the Commission concerning the extent to
    which the at-depth site characterization analysis and the waste form
    proposal for such site seem to be sufficient for inclusion in any
    application to be submitted by the Secretary for licensing of such site
    as a repository;
        (F) the views and comments of the Governor and legislature of any
    State, or the governing body of any affected Indian tribe, as
    determined by the Secretary, together with the response of the
    Secretary to such views;
        (G) such other information as the Secretary considers appropriate;
    and
        (H) any impact report submitted under section 116(c)(2)(B) [42
    U.S.C. 10136(c)(2)(B)] by the State of Nevada. This material is
    attached to this Recommendation, as follows:
          The description of the repository called for by section
    114(a)(1)(A) is contained in Chapter 2 of the Yucca Mountain Science
    and Engineering Report (YMS&ER), Revision 1.
          The material relating to the waste form called for by
    section 114(a)(1)(B) is contained in Chapters 3 and 4 of the YMS&ER,
    Revision 1.
          The discussion of site characterization data called for
    by section 114(a)(1)(C) is contained in Chapter 4 of the YMS&ER,
    Revision 1.
          The EIS-related material called for by section
    114(a)(1)(D) is contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement
    (EIS) for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel
    and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada,
    along with letters received from the Secretary of the Interior, the
    Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Administrator of the
    Environmental Protection Agency, and the Chairman of the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission (NRC), transmitting their respective comments on
    the final EIS.
          The information called for by section I114(a)(1)(E) is
    contained in a letter from NRC Chairman Meserve to Under Secretary
    Card, dated November 13, 2001.
          The information called for by section 114(a)(1)(F) is
    contained in Section 2 of two separate reports, the Comment Summary
    Document and the Supplemental Comment Summary Document, and in a
    separate document providing responses to comments from the Governor of
    Nevada sent to the Department after the public comment periods on a
    possible site recommendation closed.
          Section 114(a)(1)(G) provides for the inclusion of other
    information as the Secretary considers appropriate. The report, Yucca
    Mountain Site Suitability Evaluation (DOE/RW-0549, February 2002), has
    been included as other information. This report provides an evaluation
    of the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site against Departmental
    Guidelines setting forth the criteria and methodology to be used in
    determining the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site, pursuant to
    section 113(b)(1)(A)(iv). In addition, impact reports submitted by the
    various Nevada counties have been included as other information to be
    forwarded to the President. In transmitting these reports to the
    President, the Department is neither deciding on, nor endorsing, any
    specific impact assistance requested by the governmental entities in
    those reports.
          The State of Nevada submitted an impact report pursuant
    to section 114(a)(1)(H). In transmitting this report to the President,
    the Department is likewise neither deciding on, nor endorsing this
    report.
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        The approach taken in the Act led me to conclude that, after
    completing the first step of reaching a judgment as to the scientific
    suitability of Yucca Mountain, if I concluded the site was
    scientifically suitable, I should also address a second matter: whether
    it is in the overall national interest to build a repository there. In
    considering that issue, I have addressed two further questions: are
    there compelling national interests favoring development of the site,
    and if so, are there countervailing considerations weighty enough to
    overcome the arguments for proceeding with development? Sections 8 and
    9 of this Recommendation set forth my conclusions on these questions.
        In my view, the statute's silence on the factors that go into the
    recommendation process makes it at a minimum ambiguous on whether I
    should conduct any inquiry beyond the question of scientific
    suitability. In light of that ambiguity, I have elected to construe the
    statute as allowing me, if I make a favorable suitability determination
    based on science, also to consider whether development of a repository
    at Yucca Mountain is in the national interest. For several reasons, I
    believe this is the better way to interpret the NWPA. First, given the
    significance of a siting decision and the nature of the officers
    involved, one would expect that even if a Cabinet Secretary were to
    find a site technically suitable for a repository, he should be able to
    take broader considerations into account in determining what
    recommendation to make to the President. A pure suitability-based
    decision risks taking insufficient heed of the views of the people,
    particularly in Nevada but in other parts of the country as well.
    Second, it is difficult to envision a Cabinet Secretary's making a
    recommendation without taking into account these broader
    considerations. Finally, it is plain that any conclusion on whether to
    recommend this site is likely to be reviewed by Congress. Since that
    review will inevitably focus on broader questions than the scientific
    and technical suitability of the site, it seems useful in the first
    instance for the Executive Branch to factor such considerations into
    its recommendation as well. I note, however, that if my interpretation
    of the statute in this regard is incorrect, and Congress has made a
    finding of suitability the sole determinant of whether to recommend
    Yucca Mountain, my Recommendation would be the same.
       6. is yucca mountain scientifically and technically suitable for
                          development of a repository?
        The Department of Energy has spent over two decades and billions of
    dollars on carefully planned and reviewed scientific fieldwork designed
    to help determine whether Yucca Mountain is a suitable site for a
    repository. The results of that work are summarized in the Yucca
    Mountain Science and Engineering Report, Revision 1, and evaluated in
    the Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Evaluation (YMSSE), which
    concludes, as set out in 10 CFR part 963, that Yucca Mountain is
    ``likely'' to meet the applicable radiation standards and thus to
    protect the health and safety of the public, including those living in
    the immediate vicinity now and thousands of years from now. I have
    carefully studied that evaluation and much of the material underlying
    it, and I believe it to be correct.
    6.1. Framework for Suitability Determination
                6.1.1. General Outline
        The general outline of the analytic framework I have used to
    evaluate the scientific suitability of the site is set out in the
    Department's Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, found at 10
    CFR part 963.
        The framework has three key features. First, the Guidelines divide
    the suitability inquiry into sub-inquiries concerning a ``pre-closure''
    safety evaluation and a ``post-closure'' performance evaluation. The
    ``pre-closure'' evaluation involves assessing whether a repository at
    the site is likely to be able to operate safely while it is open and
    receiving wastes. The ``post-closure'' evaluation involves assessing
    whether the repository is likely to continue to isolate the materials
    for 10,000 years after it has been sealed, so as to prevent harmful
    releases of radionuclides.
        Second, the Guidelines set out a method and criteria for conducting
    the pre-closure safety evaluation. The method is essentially the same
    as that used to evaluate the safety of other proposed nuclear
    facilities; it is not particularly novel and should be recognized by
    those familiar with safety assessments of existing facilities. This is
    because, while it is open and receiving nuclear materials, a repository
    at Yucca Mountain will not be very different, in terms of its functions
    and the activities expected to take place there, from many other modern
    facilities built to handle such materials. A pre-closure evaluation to
    assess the probable safety of such a facility entails considering its
    design, the nature of the substances it handles, and the kinds of
    activities and external events that might occur while it is receiving
    waste. It then uses known data to forecast the level of radioactivity
    to which workers and members of the public would be likely to be
    exposed as a result.
        Third, the Guidelines set out a method and criteria for evaluating
    the post-closure performance of the repository. This is the most
    challenging aspect of evaluating Yucca Mountain's suitability, since it
    entails assessing the ability of the repository to isolate radioactive
    materials far into the future. The scientific consensus is, and the
    Guidelines specify, that this should be done using a ``Total System
    Performance Assessment.'' This approach, which is similar to other
    efforts to forecast the behavior of complex systems over long periods
    of time, takes information derived from a multitude of experiments and
    known facts. It feeds that information into a series of models. These
    in turn are used to develop one overarching model of how well a
    repository at Yucca Mountain would be likely to perform in preventing
    the escape of radioactivity and radioactive materials. The model can
    then be used to forecast the levels of radioactivity to which people
    near the repository might be exposed 10,000 years or more after the
    repository is sealed.\27\
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        \27\ The selection of the 10,000-year compliance period for the
    individual-protection standard involves both technical and policy
    considerations. EPA weighed both during the rulemaking for 40 CFR Part
    197. EPA considered policy and technical factors, as well as the
    experience of other EPA and international programs. First, EPA
    evaluated the policies for managing risks from the disposal of both
    long lived, hazardous, nonradioactive materials and radioactive
    materials. Second, EPA evaluated consistency with both 40 CFR Part 191
    and the issue of consistent time periods for the protection of
    groundwater resources and public health. Third, EPA considered the
    issue of uncertainty in predicting dose over the very long periods
    contemplated in the alternative of peak dose within the period of
    geologic stability. Finally, EPA reviewed the feasibility of
    implementing the alternative of peak risk within the period of geologic
    stability.
        As a result of these considerations, EPA established a 10,000-year
    compliance period with a quantitative limit and a requirement to
    calculate the peak dose, using performance assessments, if the peak
    dose occurs after 10,000 years. Under this approach, DOE must make the
    performance assessment results for the post-10,000-year period part of
    the public record by including them in the EIS for Yucca Mountain.
        The relevance of a 10,000-year compliance period can also be
    understood by examining hazard indices that compare the potential risk
    of released radionuclides to other risks. One such analysis, presented
    in the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Management of
    Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste, DOE/EIS-0046F, examined the
    relative amounts of water required to bring the concentration of a
    substance to allowable drinking water standards. The relative hazard
    for spent fuel compared to the toxicity of the ore used to produce the
    reactor fuel at one year after removal of the spent fuel from the
    reactor is about the same hazard as a rich mercury ore. The hazard
    index is about the same as average mercury ores at about 80 years. By
    200 years the hazard index is about the same as average lead ore; by
    1,000 years it is comparable to a silver ore. The relative hazard index
    is about the same as the uranium ore that it came from at 10,000 years.
    This is not to suggest that the wastes from spent fuel are not toxic.
    However, it is suggested that where concern for the toxicity of the ore
    bodies is not great, the spent fuel should cause no greater concern,
    particularly if placed within multiple engineered barriers in geologic
    formations, at least as, if not more, remote from the biosphere than
    these common ores.
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                6.1.2. Radiation Protection Standards
        A key question to be answered, as part of any suitability
    determination is, ``What level of radiation exposure is acceptable?''
        DOE's Site Suitability Guidelines use as their benchmark the levels
    the NRC has specified for purposes of deciding whether to license a
    repository at Yucca Mountain. The NRC, in turn, established these
    levels on the basis of radiation protection standards set by the EPA.
    The standards generally require that during pre-closure, the repository
    facilities, operations, and controls restrict radiation doses to less
    than 15 millirem a year \28\ to a member of the public in its
    vicinity.\29\ During post-closure, they generally require that the
    maximum radiation dose allowed to someone living in the vicinity of
    Yucca Mountain be no more than 15 millirem per year, and no more than
    four millirem per year from certain radionuclides in the
    groundwater.\30\
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        \28\ Risk to human beings from radiation is due to its ionizing
    effects. Radionuclides found in nature, commercial products, and
    nuclear waste emit ionizing radiation. The forms of ionizing radiation
    differ in their penetrating power or energy and in the manner in which
    they affect human tissue. Some ionizing radiation, known as alpha
    radiation, can be stopped by a sheet of paper, but may be very harmful
    if inhaled, ingested or otherwise admitted into the body. Long-lived
    radioactive elements, with atomic numbers higher than 92, such as
    plutonium, emit alpha radiation. Other ionizing radiation, known as
    beta radiation, can penetrate the skin and can cause serious effects if
    emitted from an inhaled or ingested radionuclide. The ionizing
    radiation with the greatest penetrating power is gamma radiation; it
    can penetrate and damage critical organs in the body. Fission products
    can emit both gamma and beta radiation depending on the radionuclides
    present. In high-level nuclear waste, beta and gamma radiation
    emitters, such as cesium and strontium, present the greatest hazard for
    the first 300 to 1,000 years, by which time they have decayed. After
    that time, the alpha-emitting radionuclides present the greatest
    hazard.
        Radiation doses can be correlated to potential biologic effects and
    are measured in a unit called a rem. Doses are often expressed in terms
    of thousandths of a rem, or millirem (mrem); the internationally used
    unit is the Sievert (S), which is equivalent to 100 rem.
        \29\ The NRC regulations also require that the annual dose to
    workers there be less than 5 rem. See 10 CFR part 63, referencing 10
    CFR part 20. This is the general standard for occupational exposure
    that applies in numerous other settings, such as operating nuclear
    facilities.
        \30\ During both pre- and post-closure, the NRC licensing rules, 10
    CFR part 63, also contain a number of more particularized standards for
    specific situations. These are referenced in the results tables
    contained in the following sections. Pursuant to EPA's groundwater
    standard, 40 CFR part 197, they also contain concentration limits on
    certain kinds of radionuclides that may be present in the water,
    whether or not their presence is attributable to a potential
    repository. These are also referenced in the results tables.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This level of radiation exposure is comparable to, or less than,
    ordinary variations in natural background radiation that people
    typically experience each year. It is also less than radiation levels
    to which Americans are exposed in the course of their everyday lives--
    in other words, radiation ``doses'' to which people generally give no
    thought at all.
        To understand this, it is important to remember that radiation is
    part of the natural world and that we are exposed to it all the time.
    Every day we encounter radiation from space in the form of cosmic rays.
    Every day we are also exposed to terrestrial radiation, emitted from
    naturally radioactive substances in the earth's surface.
        In addition to natural background radiation from these sources,
    people are exposed to radiation from other everyday sources. These
    include X-rays and other medical procedures, and consumer goods (e.g.,
    television sets and smoke detectors).
        Americans, on average, receive an annual radiation exposure of 360
    millirem from their surroundings. The 15 millirem dose the EPA standard
    set as the acceptable annual exposure from the repository is thus
    slightly over four percent of what we receive every year right now.
        Moreover, background radiation varies from one location to another
    due to many natural and man-made factors. At higher elevations, the
    atmosphere provides less protection from cosmic rays, so background
    radiation is higher. In the United States, this variation can be 50 or
    more millirem. Thus, if the repository generates radiation doses set as
    the benchmark in the Guidelines, the incremental radiation dose a
    person living in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain would receive from it
    would be about the same level of increase in radiation exposure as a
    person would experience as a result of moving from Philadelphia to
    Denver.
        Ordinary air travel is another example. Flying at typical cross-
    country altitudes results in increased exposure of about one-half
    millirem per hour. If the Yucca Mountain repository generates radiation
    at the 15 millirem benchmark, it would increase the exposure of those
    living near it to about the same extent as if they took three round
    trip flights between the East Coast and Las Vegas.
        Rocks and soil also affect natural background radiation,
    particularly if the rocks are igneous or the soils derived from igneous
    rock, which can contain radioactive potassium, thorium, or uranium. In
    these cases, the variation in the background radiation is frequently in
    the tens of millirem or higher. Wood contains virtually no naturally
    occurring radioactive substances that contribute to radiation
    exposures, but bricks and concrete made from crushed rock and soils
    often do. Living or working in structures made from these materials can
    also result in tens of millirem of increased exposure to radiation.
    Thus, if the repository generates radiation at the levels in the
    Guidelines' benchmark, it is likely to result in less additional
    exposure to a person living in its vicinity than if he moved from a
    wood house to a brick house.
        Finally, it is noteworthy that the radiation protection standards
    referenced by the Guidelines are based on those selected by the NRC for
    licensing the repository. They in turn relied on the EPA rule
    establishing these as the appropriate standards for the site. The NRC
    and EPA acted pursuant to specific directives in the NWPA, in which
    Congress first assigned to the EPA the responsibility to set these
    standards, and later in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which directed
    the EPA to act in conjunction with the National Academy of Sciences and
    develop a standard specifically for Yucca Mountain. The EPA carefully
    considered the question of how to do so. The 15 millirem per year
    standard is the same it has applied to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
    in New Mexico.\31\ And it is well within the National Academy of
    Sciences-recommended range, a range developed in part by referring to
    guidelines from national and international advisory bodies and
    regulations in other developed countries.\32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ 40 CFR part 191.
        \32\ Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, National Academy
    of Sciences, National Research Council, 1995.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For all these reasons, there is every cause to believe that a
    repository that can meet the 15 millirem radiation protection standard
    will be fully protective of the health and safety of residents living
    in the vicinity of the repository.\33\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \33\ As noted above, the EPA, in 40 CFR part 197, also established
    groundwater protection standards in the Yucca Mountain rule; these are
    compatible with drinking water standards applied elsewhere in the
    United States, and apply maximum contaminant levels, as well as a 4
    mrem/yr dose standard.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                6.1.3. Underlying Hard Science
        As explained in section 6.1.1, the Guidelines contemplate the use
    of models and analyses to project whether the repository will meet the
    15 millirem dose standard.\34\ To have confidence in the model results,
    however, it is important to understand the kind of science that went
    into constructing them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ As well, of course, as the other radiation protection
    standards such as the groundwater standard.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For over 20 years, scientists have been investigating every aspect
    of the natural processes--past, present and future--that could affect
    the ability of a repository beneath Yucca Mountain to isolate
    radionuclides emitted from nuclear materials emplaced there. They have
    been conducting equally searching investigations into the processes
    that would allow them to understand the behavior of the engineered
    barriers--principally the waste ``packages'' (more nearly akin to
    vaults)--that are expected to contribute to successful waste isolation.
    These investigations have run the gamut, from mapping the geological
    features of the site, to studying the repository rock, to investigating
    whether and how water moves through the Mountain. To give just a few
    examples:
    At the surface of the repository:
       Yucca Mountain scientists have mapped geologic structures,
            including rock units, faults, fractures, and volcanic features.
            To do this, they have excavated more than 200 pits and trenches
            to remove alluvial material or weathered rock to be able to
            observe surface and near-surface features directly, as well as
            to understand what events and processes have occurred or might
            occur at the Mountain.
       They have drilled more than 450 surface boreholes and
            collected over 75,000 feet of geologic core samples and some
            18,000 geologic and water samples. They used the information
            obtained to identify rock and other formations beneath the
            surface, monitor infiltration of moisture, measure the depth of
            the water table and properties of the hydrologic system,
            observe the rate at which water moves from the surface into
            subsurface rock, and determine air and water movement
            properties above the water table.
       They have conducted aquifer testing at sets of wells to
            determine the transport and other properties of the saturated
            zone below Yucca Mountain. These tests included injecting
            easily identified groundwater tracers in one well, which were
            then detected in another; this helped scientists understand how
            fast water moves.
       They have conducted tectonic field studies to evaluate
            extensions of the earth's crust and the probability of seismic
            events near Yucca Mountain.
    Underground:
        The Department's scientists have conducted a massive project to
    probe the area under the Mountain's surface where the repository will
    be built.

       They constructed a five mile-long main underground tunnel,
            the Exploratory Studies Facility, to provide access to the
            specific rock type that would be used for the repository. This
            main tunnel is adjacent to the proposed repository block, about
            800 feet underground. After completing the main tunnel, they
            excavated a second tunnel, 1.6-miles long and 16.5 feet in
            diameter. This tunnel, referred to as the Cross-Drift tunnel,
            runs about 45 feet above and across the repository block.
       They then mapped the geologic features such as faults,
            fractures, stratigraphic units, mineral compositions, etc.,
            exposed by the underground openings in the tunnels.
       They collected rock samples to determine geotechnical
            properties.
       They conducted a drift-scale thermal test to observe the
            effects of heat on the hydrologic, mechanical, and chemical
            properties of the rock, and chemical properties of the water
            and gas liberated as a result of heating. The four yearlong
            heating cycle of the drift-scale test was the largest known
            heater test in history, heating some seven million cubic feet
            of rock over its ambient temperature. This test also included
            samples of engineered materials to determine corrosion
            resistance in simulated repository conditions.
    In various laboratory-based studies:
        Yucca Mountain scientists have supplemented with laboratory work
    the surface and underground tests previously described.

       They have tested mechanical, chemical, and hydrologic
            properties of rock samples in support of repository design and
            development of natural process models.
       They have tested radionuclides to determine solubility and
            colloid formation that affect their transport if released.
       They have tested over 13,000 engineered material samples to
            determine their corrosion resistance in a variety of
            environments.
       They have determined the chemical properties of water
            samples and the effects of heat on the behavior and properties
            of water in the host rock.

        The findings from these numerous studies were used to develop
    computer simulations that describe the natural features, events, and
    processes that exist at Yucca Mountain or that could be changed as the
    result of waste disposal. The descriptions in turn were used to develop
    the models discussed in the next section to project the likely
    radiation doses from the repository.
             7. results of suitability evaluations and conclusions
        As explained above, the Guidelines contemplate that the Secretary
    will evaluate the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site for a
    repository on two separate bases.
        The Guidelines first contemplate that I will determine whether the
    site is suitable for a repository during the entire pre-closure or
    operational period, assumed to be from 50 to 300 years after
    emplacement of nuclear materials begins. To answer this question, the
    Guidelines ask me to determine whether, while it is operating, the
    repository is likely to result in annual radiation doses to people in
    the vicinity and those working there that will fall below the dosage
    levels set in the radiation protection standards.\35\ The Guidelines
    contemplate that I will use a pre-closure safety evaluation to guide my
    response.\36\
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        \35\ 10 CFR part 963.
        \36\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, the Guidelines contemplate that I will determine whether
    the repository is suitable--in other words, may reasonably be expected
    to be safe--after it has been sealed. To answer that question, the
    Guidelines ask me to determine whether it is likely that the repository
    will continue to isolate radionuclides for 10,000 years after it is
    sealed, so that an individual living 18 kilometers (11 miles) from the
    repository is not exposed to annual radiation doses above those set in
    the radiation protection standards.\37\ The Guidelines contemplate that
    I will use a Total System Performance Assessment to guide my response
    to this question.\38\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ Ibid.
        \38\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Department has completed both the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation
    and TSPA called for by the Guidelines. These project that a repository
    at Yucca Mountain will result in radioactive doses well below the
    applicable radiation protection standards. As I explain below, I have
    reviewed these projections and the bases for them, and I believe them
    to be well founded. I also believe both the Pre-Closure Safety
    Evaluation and the Total System Performance Assessment have properly
    considered the criteria set out in the Guidelines for each period.
    Using these evaluations as set out in the Guidelines,\39\ believe it is
    likely that a repository at Yucca Mountain will result in radiation
    doses below the radiation protection standards for both periods.
    Accordingly, I believe Yucca Mountain is suitable for the development
    of a repository.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    7.1. Results of Pre-Closure Evaluations
        As explained in section 6.1.1, the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation
    method I have employed is commonly used to assess the likely
    performance of planned or prospective nuclear facilities. Essentially
    what it involves is evaluating whether the contemplated facility is
    designed to prevent or mitigate the effects of possible accidents. The
    facility will be considered safe if its design is likely to result in
    radioactive releases below those set in the radiation protection
    standards.
        The Department has conducted such a Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation,
    which is summarized in the Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering
    Report, Revision 1.\40\ In conducting this evaluation, the Department
    considered descriptions of how the site will be laid out, the surface
    facilities, and the underground facilities and their operations. It
    also considered a series of potential hazards, including, for example,
    seismic activity, flooding, and severe winds, and their consequences.
    Finally, it considered preliminary descriptions of how components of
    the facilities' design would prevent or mitigate the effects of
    accidents.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report, Revision 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation concluded that the preliminary
    design would prevent or dramatically mitigate the effects of accidents,
    and that the repository would therefore not result in radioactive
    releases that would lead to exposure levels above those set by the
    radiation protection standards. It considered the pre-closure criteria
    of 10 CFR 963.14 in reaching this conclusion. In particular, it found
    that the preliminary design has the ability to contain and limit
    releases of radioactive materials; the ability to implement control and
    emergency systems to limit exposures to radiation; the ability to
    maintain a system and components that perform their intended safety
    functions; and the ability to preserve the option to retrieve wastes
    during the pre-closure period. The annual doses of radiation to which
    the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation projected individuals in the vicinity
    of the repository and workers would be exposed are set out in the
    following table. These doses fall well below the levels that the
    radiation protection standards establish.
        I have carefully reviewed the Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation and
    find its conclusions persuasive. I am therefore convinced that a
    repository can be built at Yucca Mountain that will operate safely
    without harming those in the repository's vicinity during the pre-
    closure period. Finally, I would note that although many aspects of
    this project are controversial, there is no controversy of which I am
    aware concerning this aspect of the Department's conclusions. This
    stands to reason. The kinds of activities that would take place at the
    repository during the pre-closure period--essentially, the management
    and handling of nuclear materials including packaging and emplacement
    in the repository--are similar to the kinds of activities that at
    present go on every day, and have gone on for years, at temporary
    storage sites around the country. These activities are conducted safely
    at those sites, and no one has advanced a plausible reason why they
    could not be conducted equally if not more safely during pre-closure
    operations at a new, state-of-theart facility at Yucca Mountain.
        That is not an insignificant point, since the pre-closure period
    will last at least 50 years after the start of emplacement, which will
    begin at the earliest eight years from today. Moreover, the
    Department's Pre-Closure Safety Evaluation also assumed a possible
    alternative pre-closure period of 300 years from the beginning of
    emplacement, and its conclusions remained unchanged. Thus, the
    Department's conclusion that the repository can operate safely for the
    next 300 years--or for about three generations longer than the United
    States has existed--has not been seriously questioned.

    7.2. Results of Post-Closure Evaluations
        The most challenging aspect of evaluating Yucca Mountain is
    assessing the likely post-closure performance of a repository 10,000
    years into the future. As previously explained, the Department's
    Guidelines contemplate that this will be done using a Total System
    Performance Assessment. That assessment involves using data compiled
    from scientific investigation into the natural processes that affect
    the site, the behavior of the waste, and the behavior of the engineered
    barriers such as the waste packages; developing models from these data;
    then developing a single model of how, as a whole, a repository at
    Yucca Mountain is likely to behave during the post-closure period. The
    model is then used to project radiation doses to which people in the
    vicinity of the Mountain are likely to be exposed as a result of the
    repository. Finally, the assessment compares the projected doses with
    the radiation protection standards to determine whether the repository
    is likely to comply with them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \41\ Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Evaluation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The challenge, obviously, is that this involves making a prediction
    a very long time into the future concerning the behavior of a very
    complex system. To place 10,000 years into perspective, consider that
    the Roman Empire flourished nearly 2,000 years ago. The pyramids were
    built as long as 5,000 years ago, and plants were domesticated some
    10,000 years ago. Accordingly, as the NRC explained, ``Proof that the
    geologic repository will conform with the objectives for post-closure
    performance is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word because
    of the uncertainties inherent in the understanding of the evolution of
    the geologic setting, biosphere, and engineered barrier system'' \42\
    over 10, 000 Years. The judgment that the NRC envisions making is
    therefore not a certainty that the repository will conform to the
    standard, certainty being unattainable in this or virtually any other
    important matter where choices must be made. Rather, as it goes on to
    explain, ``For such long-term performance, what is required is
    reasonable expectation, making allowance for the time period, hazards,
    and uncertainties involved, that the outcome will conform with the
    objectives for post-closure performance for the geologic
    repository.\43\ The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board recently
    summarized much the same thought (emphasis added): ``Eliminating all
    uncertainty associated with estimates of repository performance would
    never be possible at repository site.'' \44\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \42\ Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed
    Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
    55731, 55804, November 2, 2001.
        \43\ Ibid.
        \44\ Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Letter Report from all
    Board members to Speaker Hastert, Senator Byrd, and Secretary Abraham,
    January 24, 2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These views, in turn, inform my understanding of the judgment I am
    expected to make at this stage of the proceeding in evaluating the
    likely post-closure performance of a repository at Yucca Mountain. To
    conclude that it is suitable for post-closure, I do not need to know
    that we have answered all questions about the way each aspect of the
    repository will behave 10,000 years from now; that would be an
    impossible task. Rather, what I need to decide is whether, using the
    TSPA results, and fully bearing in mind the inevitable uncertainties
    connected with such an enterprise, I can responsibly conclude that we
    know enough to warrant a predictive judgment on my part that, during
    the post-closure period, a repository at Yucca Mountain is likely to
    meet the radiation protection standards.
        I believe I can. Essentially, the reason for this is the system of
    multiple and redundant safeguards that will be created by the
    combination of the site's natural barriers and the engineered ones we
    will add. Even given many uncertainties, this calculated redundancy
    makes it likely that very little, if any, radiation will find its way
    to the accessible environment.
        Before I describe in broad terms how the TSPA results and the
    criteria used in the regulations lead to this conclusion, I would like
    to give an illustration of how this works. The illustration draws on
    the TSPA analyses, but also explains what these analyses mean in the
    real world.
    An Example
        The most studied issue relating to Yucca Mountain, and the single
    most pressing concern many have felt about the post-closure phase of a
    repository there, is whether there might be a way for radionuclides
    from the emplaced nuclear materials to contaminate the water supply.
    This is not a problem unique to Yucca Mountain. Rather, besides
    disruptive events discussed later, water is the primary mechanism to
    transport radionuclides to people and is also the most likely mechanism
    for radionuclides to escape from the storage facilities we have now.
        In the case of Yucca Mountain, the concern has been that rainwater
    seeping into the Mountain might contact disposal casks and carry
    radionuclides down to the water table in sufficient amounts to endanger
    sources of groundwater. In my judgment, when one considers everything
    we have learned about the multiple natural and engineered barriers that
    lie at the core of the Department's planning for this Project, this
    concern turns out to have virtually no realistic foundation.
        Yucca Mountain is in the middle of a desert. Like any desert, it
    has an arid climate, receiving less than eight inches of rain in an
    average year. Most of that runs off the Mountain or evaporates. Only
    about five percent, less than four-tenths of an inch per year, ever
    reaches repository depth.
        In order to reach the tunnels where the waste casks would be
    housed, this water must travel through about 800 feet of densely welded
    and bedded tuffs,\45\ a trip that will typically require more than
    1,000 years. The amount of water that eventually reaches the repository
    level at any point in time is very small, so small that capillary
    forces tend to retain it in small pores and fractures in the rock. It
    is noteworthy that all our observations so far indicate that no water
    actually drips into the tunnels at this level and all of the water is
    retained within the rock.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \45\ Yucca Mountain consists of alternating layers of welded and
    nonwelded volcanic material known as welded and non-welded tuff: welded
    tuff at the surface, welded tuff at the level of the repository, and an
    intervening layer of nonwelded tuffs. These nonwelded units contain few
    fractures; thus, they delay the downward flow of moisture into the
    welded tuff layer below, where the repository would be located. At the
    repository level, water in small fractures has a tendency to remain in
    the fractures rather than flow into larger openings, such as tunnels.
    Thus, the small amount of water traveling through small fractures near
    any emplacement tunnel would tend to flow around the tunnel, rather
    than seeping, forming a drip, and falling onto the drip shields below.
    Non-welded tuffs below the repository also provide a significant
    barrier to radionuclide transport. Deposits of minerals in the
    fractures demonstrate that for the last several million years the
    repository host rock has been under unsaturated conditions, even when
    higher precipitation, owing to the continent's overall glacial
    conditions, prevailed at the Mountain's surface.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In spite of this finding, our TSPA ran calculations based on the
    assumption that water does drip into the tunnels. At that point, even
    just to reach radionuclides in the waste, the water would still have to
    breach the engineered barriers. These include waste packages composed
    of an outer barrier of highly corrosion-resistant alloy and a thick
    inner barrier of high quality stainless steel.
        The waste package is designed to prevent contact between the waste
    pellets and water that might seep into the tunnels unexpectedly, and
    thus to prevent release of radionuclides.\46\ In addition, anchored
    above each waste package is a titanium drip shield that provides yet
    more protection against seepage. But even assuming the water defeats
    both the titanium shield and the metal waste package, the waste form
    itself is a barrier to the release of radionuclides. Specifically, the
    spent fuel is in the form of ceramic pellets, resistant to degradation
    and covered with a corrosion-resistant metal cladding.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \46\ These engineered barriers will protect the waste under a wide
    range of conditions. For example, the barriers are protected by their
    underground location from the daily variations in temperature and
    moisture that occur above ground. As a result, the Mountain provides
    favorable conditions for the performance of these barriers. Indeed, the
    battery of tests we have conducted suggests that the waste packages are
    extremely resistant to corrosion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nevertheless, DOE scientists ran a set of calculations assuming
    that water penetrated the titanium shield and made small holes in three
    waste packages, due to manufacturing defects (even though the
    manufacturing process will be tightly controlled). The scientists
    further assumed that the water dissolves some of the ceramic waste.
    Even so, the analyses showed that only small quantities of
    radionuclides would diffuse and escape from the solid waste form. In
    order to reach the water table from the repository, the water, now
    assumed to be carrying radionuclides, must travel another 800 feet
    through layers of rock, some of which are nearly impenetrable. During
    this trip, many of the radionuclides are adsorbed by the rock because
    of its chemical properties.
        The result of all this is instructive. Even under these adverse
    conditions, all assumed in the teeth of a high probability that not one
    of them will come to pass, the amount of radionuclides reaching the
    water table is so low that annual doses to people who could drink the
    water are well below the applicable radiation standards, and less than
    a millionth of the annual dose people receive from natural background
    radiation. Extrapolating from these calculations shows that even if all
    of the waste packages were breached in the fashion I have described
    above, the resulting contribution to annual dose would still be below
    the radiation safety standards, and less than one percent of the
    natural background.\47\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \47\ Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report, Revision 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total System Performance More Generally
        It is important to understand that there is nothing unique about
    the kind of planning illustrated in the water seepage scenario
    described above. Rather, the scenario is characteristic of the studies
    DOE has undertaken and the solutions it has devised: deliberately
    pessimistic assumptions incorporated sometimes to the point of
    extravagance, met with multiple redundancies to assure safety. For
    example, one of our scenarios for Nevada postulates the return of ice
    ages, and examines Yucca Mountain assuming that it would receive about
    twice as much rain as it does today with four times as much
    infiltration into the Mountain.
        As in the example above, the Department evaluated physical and
    historical information used to develop models of repository components,
    and then employed those models to forecast how the repository would
    perform in the post-closure period. These results are described at
    length in the TPSA analyses and summarized in Chapter 4 of the Yucca
    Mountain Science and Engineering Report.\48\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \48\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Department used the suitability criteria set forth in 10 CFR
    963.17 in the TSPA analyses. It carefully evaluated and modeled the
    behavior of characteristics of the site, such as its geologic,
    hydrologic, geophysical, and geochemical properties. Likewise it
    evaluated what are called unsaturated zone flow characteristics, such
    as precipitation entering the Mountain and water movement through the
    pores of the rock--in other words, natural processes which affect the
    amount of water entering the unsaturated zone above the repository and
    potentially coming in contact with wastes inside. DOE also evaluated
    and modeled near-field environment characteristics, such as effects of
    heat from the waste on waterflow through the site, the temperature and
    humidity at the engineered barriers, and chemical reactions and
    products that could result from water contacting the engineered
    barriers.
        The Department carefully studied and modeled the characteristics of
    the engineered barriers as they aged. DOE emphasized specifically those
    processes important to determining waste package lifetimes and the
    potential for corroding the package. It examined waste form degradation
    characteristics, including potential corrosion or break-down of the
    cladding on the spent fuel pellets and the ability of individual
    radionuclides to resist dissolving in water that might penetrate
    breached waste packages. It examined ways in which radionuclides could
    begin to move outward once the engineered barrier system has been
    degraded--for example, whether colloidal particles might form and
    whether radionuclides could adhere to these particles as they were
    assumed to wash through the remaining barriers. Finally, the Department
    evaluated and modeled saturated and unsaturated zone flow
    characteristics, such as how water with dissolved radionuclides or
    colloidal particles might move through the unsaturated zone below the
    repository, how heat from the waste would affect waterflow through the
    site, and how water with dissolved radionuclides would move in the
    saturated zone 800 feet beneath the repository (assuming it could reach
    that depth).
        Consistent with 10 CFR 963.17, the Department also evaluated the
    lifestyle and habits of individuals who potentially could be exposed to
    radioactive material at a future time, based, as would be required by
    NRC licensing regulations,\49\ on representative current conditions.
    Currently, there are about 3,500 people who live in Amargosa Valley,
    the closest town to Yucca Mountain. They consume ground or surface
    water from. the immediate area through direct extraction or by eating
    plants that have grown in the soil. The Department therefore assumed
    that the ``reasonably maximally exposed individual''--that is, the
    hypothetical person envisioned to test whether the repository is likely
    to meet required radiation protection standards--likewise would drink
    water and eat agricultural products grown with water from the area, and
    built that assumption into its models.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \49\ 10 CFR part 63.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Using the models described above, as well as a host of others it
    generated taking account of other relevant features, events and
    processes that could affect the repository's performance, the
    Department developed a representative simulation of the behavior of the
    proposed Yucca Mountain site. It then considered thousands of
    possibilities about what might happen there. For example, it considered
    the possibility that waste packages might be manufactured defectively.
    It considered the possibility that the climate would change. It
    considered earthquakes. Our studies show that earthquakes probably will
    occur at Yucca Mountain sometime in the future. Because the occurrence
    of earthquakes is difficult to predict, our models conservatively treat
    earthquakes by assuming that they will occur over the next 10,000
    years.
        Essentially, if the Department believed that there was close to a 1
    in 10,000 per year probability of some potentially adverse occurrence
    in the course of the 10,000 year post-closure period (which comes to a
    probability close to one during the entire period) the Department
    considered that possibility, unless it concluded the occurrence would
    not affect the repository's performance. It then used the simulation
    model to calculate what the resulting dose would be based on each such
    possibility. Finally, it used the mean peak values of the results of
    these calculations to project the resulting dose.
        The Department then proceeded to consider the impact of disruptive
    events, such as volcanism, with a lower probability of occurrence, on
    the order of one in 10,000 over the entire 10,000 year period (meaning
    roughly a one in a 100 million per year of occurring during that time).
    This led it to analyze, for example, the effects that a volcano might
    have on the repository's waste containment capabilities. Scientists
    started with a careful analysis of the entire geologic setting of Yucca
    Mountain. Then, with substantial data on regional volcanoes, they used
    computer modeling to understand each volcanic center's controlling
    structures. Experts then estimated the likelihood of magma intruding
    into one of the repository's emplacement tunnels. The DOE estimates the
    likelihood of such an event's occurring during the first 10,000 years
    after repository closure to be one chance in about 70 million per year,
    or one chance in 7,000 over the entire period.
        Including volcanoes in its analyses, the TSPA results still
    indicate that the site meets the EPA standards.\50\ What the
    calculations showed is that the projected, probability-weighted maximum
    mean annual dose to an individual from the repository for the next
    10,000 years is one-tenth of a millirem. That is less than one-fifth of
    the dose an individual gets from a one-hour airplane flight. And it is
    less than one one-hundredth of the dose that DOE's Guidelines, using
    the EPA standards, specify as acceptable for assessing suitability.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \50\ The results produced under volcanic scenarios are weighted by
    probability under the NRC method specified for how to treat low
    probability events. 10 CFR Part 63.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, in a separate assessment, analysts studied a hypothetical
    scenario under which people inadvertently intruded into the repository
    while drilling for water. The Guidelines' radiation protection
    standards, based on EPA and NRC rules, specify that as part of its
    Total System Performance Assessment, DOE should determine when a human-
    caused penetration of a waste package could first occur via drilling,
    assuming the drillers were using current technology and practices and
    did not recognize that they had hit anything unusual. If such an
    intrusion could occur within 10,000 years, the 15 millirem dose limit
    would apply.
        DOE's analyses, however, indicate that unrecognized contact through
    drilling would not happen within 10,000 years. Under conditions that
    DOE believes can realistically be expected to exist at the repository,
    the waste packages are extremely corrosion-resistant for tens of
    thousands of years. Even under pessimistic assumptions, the earliest
    time DOE could even devise a scenario under which a waste package would
    be unnoticeable to a driller is approximately 30,000 years. Before
    then, the waste package structure would be readily apparent to a
    driller who hit it.
        Table 2 presents the summary results of the Total System
    Performance Assessment analyses and how they compare to the radiation
    protection standards.\51\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \51\ Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Evaluation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Summary
        Using the methods and criteria set out in DOE's Yucca Mountain Site
    Suitability Guidelines, I am convinced that the Yucca Mountain site is
    scientifically suitable--in a word, safe--for development of a
    repository. Specifically, on the basis of the safety evaluation DOE has
    conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 963.13, it is my judgment that a
    repository at the site is likely to meet applicable radiation
    protection standards for the pre-closure period. And on the basis of
    the Total System Performance Assessment DOE has conducted pursuant to
    10 CFR 963.16, it is my judgment that a repository at the site is
    likely to meet applicable radiation protection standards for the post-
    closure period as well. Additionally, I have evaluated the pre-closure
    suitability criteria of 10 CFR 963.14 and the post-closure suitability
    criteria of 10 CFR 963.17, and am convinced that the safety evaluations
    were done under the stringent standards required. Accordingly, I find
    the Yucca Mountain site suitable for development of a repository.
                            8. the national interest
        Having determined that the site is scientifically suitable, I now
    turn to the remaining factors I outlined above as bearing on my
    Recommendation. Are there compelling national interests favoring going
    forward with a repository at Yucca Mountain? If so, are there
    countervailing considerations of sufficient weight to overcome those
    interests? In this section I set out my conclusions on the first
    question. In section 9 I set out my views on the second.
    8.1. Nuclear Science and the National Interest
        Our country depends in many ways on the benefits of nuclear
    science: in the generation of twenty percent of the Nation's
    electricity; in the operation of many of the Navy's most strategic
    vessels; in the maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons arsenal;
    and in numerous research and development projects, both medical and
    scientific. All these activities produce radioactive wastes that have
    been accumulating since the mid-1940s. They are currently scattered
    among 131 sites in 39 states, residing in temporary surface storage
    facilities and awaiting final disposal. In exchange for the many
    benefits of nuclear power, we assume the cost of managing its
    byproducts in a responsible, safe, and secure fashion. And there is a
    near-universal consensus that a deep geologic facility is the only
    scientifically credible, long-term solution to a problem that will only
    grow more difficult the longer it is ignored.

    8.2. Energy Security
        Roughly 20 percent of our country's electricity is generated from
    nuclear power. This means that, on average, each home, farm, factory,
    and business in America runs on nuclear fuel for a little less than
    five hours a day.
        A balanced energy policy--one that makes use of multiple sources of
    energy, rather than becoming dependent entirely on generating
    electricity from a single source, such as natural gas--is important to
    economic growth. Our vulnerability to shortages and price spikes rises
    in direct proportion to our failure to maintain diverse sources of
    power. To assure that we will continue to have reliable and affordable
    sources of energy, we need to preserve our access to nuclear power.
        Yet the Federal government's failure to meet its obligation to
    dispose of spent nuclear fuel under the NWPA--as it has been supposed
    to do starting in 1998--is placing our access to this source of energy
    in jeopardy. Nuclear power plants have been storing their spent fuel on
    site, but many are running out of space to do so. Unless a better
    solution is found, a growing number of these plants will not be able to
    find additional storage space and will be forced to shut down
    prematurely. Nor are we likely to see any new plants built.
        Already we are facing a growing imbalance between our projected
    energy needs and our projected supplies. The loss of existing electric
    generating capacity that we will experience if nuclear plants start
    going off-line would significantly exacerbate this problem, leading to
    price spikes and increased electricity rates as relatively cheap power
    is taken off the market. A permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel
    is essential to our continuing to count on nuclear energy to help us
    meet our energy demands.
    8.3. National Security
                8.3.1. Powering the Navy Nuclear Fleet
        A strong Navy is a vital part of national security. Many of the
    most strategically important vessels in our fleet, including submarines
    and aircraft carriers, are nuclear powered. They have played a major
    role in every significant military action in which the United States
    has been involved for some 40 years, including our current operations
    in Afghanistan. They are also essential to our nuclear deterrent. In
    short, our nuclear-powered Navy is indispensable to our status as a
    world power.
        For the nuclear Navy to function, nuclear ships must be refueled
    periodically and the spent fuel removed. The spent fuel must go
    someplace. Currently, as part of a consent decree entered into between
    the State of Idaho and the Federal Government, this material goes to
    temporary surface storage facilities at the Idaho National
    Environmental and Engineering Laboratory. But this cannot continue
    indefinitely, and indeed the agreement specifies that the spent fuel
    must be removed. Failure to establish a permanent disposition pathway
    is not only irresponsible, but could also create serious future
    uncertainties potentially affecting the continued capability of our
    Naval operations.
                8.3.2. Allowing the Nation to Decommission Its Surplus
                        Nuclear Weapons and Support Nuclear Non-
                        Proliferation Efforts
        A decision now on the Yucca Mountain repository is also important
    in several ways to our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
    weapons. First, the end of the Cold War has brought the welcome
    challenge to our country of disposing of surplus weapons-grade
    plutonium as part of the process of decommissioning weapons we no
    longer need. Current plans call for turning the plutonium into ``mixed-
    oxide'' or ``MOX'' fuel. But creating MOX fuel as well as burning the
    fuel in a nuclear reactor will generate spent nuclear fuel, and other
    byproducts which themselves will require somewhere to go. A geological
    repository is critical to completing disposal of these materials. Such
    complete disposal is important if we are to expect other nations to
    decommission their own weapons, which they are unlikely to do unless
    persuaded that we are truly decommissioning our own.
        A repository is important to non-proliferation for other reasons as
    well. Unauthorized removal of nuclear materials from a repository will
    be difficult even in the absence of strong institutional controls.
    Therefore, in countries that lack such controls, and even in our own, a
    safe repository is essential in preventing these materials from falling
    into the hands of rogue nations. By permanently disposing of nuclear
    weapons materials in a facility of this kind, the United States would
    encourage other nations to do the same.
    8.4. Protecting the Environment
        An underground repository at Yucca Mountain is important to our
    efforts to protect our environment and achieve sustainable growth in
    two ways. First, it will allow us to dispose of the radioactive waste
    that has been building up in our country for over fifty years in a safe
    and environmentally sound manner. Second, it will facilitate continued
    use and potential expansion of nuclear power, one of the few sources of
    electricity currently available to us that emits no carbon dioxide or
    other greenhouse gases.
        As to the first point: While the Federal government has long
    promised that it would assume responsibility for nuclear waste, it has
    yet to start implementing an environmentally sound approach for
    disposing of this material. It is past time for us to do so. The
    production of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War and
    for many years thereafter has resulted in a legacy of high-level
    radioactive waste and spent fuel, currently located in Tennessee,
    Colorado, South Carolina, New Mexico, New York, Washington, and Idaho.
    Among these wastes, approximately 100,000,000 gallons of high-level
    liquid waste are stored in, and in some instances have leaked from,
    temporary holding tanks. In addition to this high-level radioactive
    waste, about 2,100 metric tons of solid, unreprocessed fuel from a
    plutonium-production reactor are stored at the Hanford Nuclear
    Reservation, with another 400 metric tons stored at other DOE sites.
        In addition, under the NWPA, the Federal government is also
    responsible for disposing of spent commercial fuel, a program that was
    to have begun in 1998, four years ago. More than 161 million Americans,
    well more than half the population, reside within 75 miles of a major
    nuclear facility--and, thus, within 75 miles of that facility's aging
    and temporary capacity for storing this material. Moreover, because
    nuclear reactors require abundant water for cooling, on-site storage
    tends to be located near rivers, lakes, and seacoasts. Ten closed
    facilities, such as Big Rock Point, on the banks of Lake Michigan, also
    house spent fuel and incur significant annual costs without providing
    any ongoing benefit. Over the long-term, without active management and
    monitoring, degrading surface storage facilities may pose a risk to any
    of 20 major U.S. lakes and waterways, including the Mississippi River.
    Millions of Americans are served by municipal water systems with
    intakes along these waterways. In recent letters, Governors Bob Taft of
    Ohio \52\ and John Engler of Michigan \53\ raised concerns about the
    advisability of long-term storage of spent fuel in temporary systems so
    close to major bodies of water. The scientific consensus is that
    disposal of this material in a deep underground repository is not
    merely the safe answer and the right answer for protecting our
    environment but the only answer that has any degree of realism.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \52\ Letter, Governor Bob Taft to Secretary Spencer Abraham, July
    30, 2001.
        \53\ Letter, Governor John Engler to Secretary Spencer Abraham,
    September 5, 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, nuclear power is one of only a few sources of power
    available to us now in a potentially plentiful and economical manner
    that could drastically reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas
    emissions caused by the generation of electricity. It produces no
    controlled air pollutants, such as sulfur and particulates, or
    greenhouse gases. Therefore, it can help keep our air clean, avoid
    generation of ground-level ozone, and prevent acid rain. A repository
    at Yucca Mountain is indispensable to the maintenance and potential
    expansion of the use of this environmentally efficient source of
    energy.
    8.5. Facilitating Continuation of Research, Medical, and Humanitarian
            Programs
        The Department has provided fuel for use in research reactors in
    domestic and foreign universities and laboratories. Research reactors
    provide a wide range of benefits including the production of
    radioisotopes for medical use--e.g., in body-scan imaging and the
    treatment of cancer. To limit the risk to the public, and to support
    nuclear non-proliferation objectives, these laboratories are required
    to return the DOE-origin spent fuel from domestic research reactors and
    from foreign research reactors. These spent fuels are temporarily
    stored at Savannah River, South Carolina, and at the Idaho National
    Engineering and Environmental Laboratory while awaiting disposal in a
    permanent repository.
        Again, we can either implement a permanent solution--Yucca
    Mountain--or risk eroding our capacity to conduct this kind of
    research. The chances of a person becoming sick from the nuclear
    materials to be stored at the Yucca Mountain site are, as shown above,
    all but nonexistent. Responsible critics must balance that against the
    chance of a person becoming sick as a result of the research that may
    not be undertaken, remaining sick for want of the drug that may not be
    found, or dying for lack of the cure that may not be developed--all
    because the nuclear fuel-dependent science that could produce these
    things was never done, our country having run out of places to dispose
    of the waste.
    8.6. Assisting Anti-Terrorism at Home
        As I have noted previously, spent fuel and other high level
    radioactive waste is presently stored at temporary storage facilities
    at 131 locations in 39 states. Ten of these are at shutdown reactor
    sites for which security would not otherwise be required. Moreover,
    many reactors are approaching their storage capacity and are likely to
    seek some form of off-site storage, thereby creating potential new
    targets.
        Storage by reactor-owners was intended to be a temporary
    arrangement. The design of the storage facilities reflects that fact.
    They tend to be less secured than the reactors themselves, and the
    structures surrounding the fuel stored in above-ground containers are
    also less robust.
        These storage, facilities should be able to withstand current
    threats. But as the determination and sophistication of terrorists
    increases, that may well change. That means we will have to choose one
    of two courses. We can continue to endeavor to secure each of these
    sites, many of which, as noted above, are close to major metropolitan
    areas and waterways. Or we can consolidate this fuel in one remote,
    secure, arid underground location and continue to develop state-of-the-
    art security arrangements to protect it there.
        To me the choice is clear. The proposed geologic repository in the
    desert at Yucca Mountain offers unique features that make it far easier
    to secure against terrorist threats. These include: 1) disposal 800
    feet below ground; 2) remote location; 3) restricted access afforded by
    Federal land ownership of the Nevada Test Site; 4) proximity to Nellis
    Air Force Range; 5) restricted airspace above the site; 6) far from any
    major waterways. The design and operation of a geologic repository,
    including surface operations, can also incorporate from the beginning
    appropriate features to protect against a terrorist threat and can be
    changed, if necessary, to respond to future changes in the terrorist
    threat.
        An operational repository will also be an important signal to other
    nuclear countries, none of which have opened a repository. Inadequately
    protected nuclear waste in any country is a potential danger to us, and
    we can't expect them to site a facility if we, with more resources,
    won't. A fresh look at nuclear material security should involve new
    concepts such as those inherent in a geologic repository, and should
    set the standard for the manner in which the international community
    manages its own nuclear materials.
        To understand Yucca Mountain's relative advantage in frustrating
    potential terrorist attacks compared to the status quo, one need only
    ask the following: If nuclear materials were already emplaced there,
    would anyone even suggest that we should spread them to 131 sites in 39
    states, at locations typically closer to major cities and waterways
    than Yucca Mountain is, as a means of discouraging a terrorist attack?
    8.7. Summary
        In short, there are important reasons to move forward with a
    repository at Yucca Mountain. Doing so will advance our energy security
    by helping us to maintain diverse sources of energy supply. It will
    advance our national security by helping to provide operational
    certainty to our nuclear Navy and by facilitating the decomissioning of
    nuclear weapons and the secure disposition of nuclear materials. It
    will help us clean up our environment by allowing us to close the
    nuclear fuel cycle and giving us greater access to a form of energy
    that does not emit greenhouse gases. And it will help us in our efforts
    to secure ourselves against terrorist threats by allowing us to remove
    nuclear materials from scattered above-ground locations to a single,
    secure underground facility. Given the site's scientific and technical
    suitability, I find that compelling national interests counsel in favor
    of taking the next step toward siting a repository at Yucca Mountain.
      9. none of the arguments against yucca mountain withstands analysis
        After explained above, after months of study based on research
    unique in its scope and depth, I have concluded that the Yucca Mountain
    site is fully suitable under the most cautious standards that
    reasonably might be applied. I have also concluded that it serves the
    national interest in numerous important ways. The final question I
    shall examine is whether the arguments against its designation not rise
    to a level that outweighs the case for going forward. I believe they do
    not, as I shall explain. I do so by briefly describing these principle
    arguments made by opponents of the Project, and then responding to
    them.
    9.1. Assertion 1: The Citizens of Nevada Were Denied an Adequate
            Opportunity to Be Heard
        Critics have claimed that the decision-making process under the
    NWPA was unfair because it allowed insufficient opportunity for public
    input, particularly from the citizens of Nevada. That is not so. There
    was ample opportunity for public discussion and debate; the Department
    in fact went well beyond the Act's requirements in providing notice and
    the opportunity to be heard.
        My predecessors and I invited and encouraged public, governmental,
    and tribal participation at all levels. The Department also made
    numerous Yucca Mountain documents available to the public. These
    included several specifically prepared to inform any who might be
    interested of the technical information and analyses that I would have
    before me as I considered the suitability of the site. There was no
    statutory requirement for producing these documents; I considered it
    important to make them available, and thus to provide a timely sharing
    of information that would form the basis of my consideration and,
    ultimately, decision.
        To assist in discharging part of the Secretarial responsibilities
    created by the Act, the Department conducted official public meetings
    before starting the Environmental Impact Statement. Subsequently, the
    Department held a total of 24 public hearings on the draft and the
    supplemental draft Environmental Impact Statements. With the release of
    the Yucca Mountain Science and Engineering Report in May 2001, the DOE
    opened a public comment period lasting approximately six months; the
    period continued through the release of the Preliminary Site
    Suitability Evaluation in July 2001 and closed on October 19, 2001.
    After publishing DOE's final rule, ``Yucca Mountain Site Suitability
    Guidelines,'' on November 14, 2001, 1 announced an additional 30-day
    supplemental comment period with a closing date of December 14, 2001.
    During these combined public comment periods, the DOE held 66
    additional public hearings across Nevada and in Inyo County,
    California, to receive comments on my consideration of a possible
    recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site. More than 17,000 comments
    were received.\54\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \54\ Comment Summary Document and Supplemental Comment Summary
    Document, February 2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The lengths to which the Department went to solicit public comment
    can be seen in the details: from 1995 through 2001, there were 126
    official hearings with a court reporter present. The Nevada cities
    where these hearings were held included: Amargosa Valley, Battle
    Mountain, Caliente, Carson City, Crescent Valley, Elko, Ely, Fallon,
    Gardnerville, Goldfield, Hawthorne, Las Vegas, Lovelock, Pahrump, Reno,
    Tonopah, Virginia City, Winnemucca, and Yerington. Elsewhere, meetings
    were held in Independence, Lone Pine, Sacramento, and San Bernardino in
    California; Washington, DC; Boise, ID; Chicago, IL; Denver, CO; Dallas/
    Ft. Worth, TX; Salt Lake City, UT; Baltimore, MD; Albany, NY; Atlanta,
    GA; Kansas City, MO.; Cleveland, OH; and St. Louis, MO.
        There were 600 hours of public meetings for the 2001 hearings
    alone. All in all, there were a total of 528 comment days, or about a
    year and a half. Additionally, the science centers were open for 340
    hours (both with and without court reporter) to receive comments. Since
    1991, there have been 2,062 tours of Yucca Mountain, and 49,073
    visitors have been to the site.
        In light of the extensive opportunities DOE has provided for public
    input, it is my judgment that the opportunities for hearing and
    consideration of comments were abundant and met any procedural measure
    of fairness.
    9.2. Assertion 2: The Project Has Received Inadequate Study
        Critics have said that there has been inadequate study to determine
    Yucca Mountain's suitability. To the contrary, and as I believe section
    6 of this Recommendation makes clear at length, the characterization
    process at Yucca Mountain is unprecedented for any even remotely
    comparable undertaking. Indeed, Yucca Mountain studies have now been
    under way for nearly five times as long as it took to build the Hoover
    Dam and more than six times the entire duration of the Manhattan
    Project. Yucca Mountain is, by any measure, the most exhaustively
    studied project of its kind the world has ever known.
        Beginning in 1978 and continuing to the present day, the Department
    has spent billions of dollars on characterization studies. There has
    been ongoing dialogue between the Department and the NRC over the
    goals, content and results of the test programs. As noted, there have
    been ample opportunities for public involvement. At this still early
    stage, and with many more years before the Yucca Mountain site could
    become operational, the request for yet more preliminary study, even
    before seeking a license from the NRC, is unsupportable. Additional
    study will be undertaken at stages to come as an appropriate part of
    the licensing process.
        For these reasons, I have concluded that the current body of
    accumulated scientific and technical knowledge provides a more than
    adequate technical basis to designate the Yucca Mountain site, thereby
    beginning the licensing phase of the project. For convenience, a
    listing of the types of tests that have been performed is provided in
    Table 3.
    9.3 Assertion 3: The Rules Were Changed in the Middle of the Game
        The State of Nevada claims that at some point the Department
    concluded that Yucca Mountain was not suitable under earlier
    regulations, and then changed the rules to fit the site. That is not
    true. Even the most elementary knowledge of the history of the program
    shows this claim is baseless.
        The Guidelines did change, but not in a way that disadvantaged
    critics from making their case, and certainly not to suit any pre-
    existing agenda at the Department. Rather, they were changed to conform
    to changes in the statutory and regulatory framework governing the
    siting process and in the scientific consensus regarding the best
    approach for assessing the likely performance of a repository over long
    periods of time.

        The DOE's original siting Guidelines were promulgated in 1984. At
    the time, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act called on the Department to
    evaluate and characterize multiple sites and to recommend one or more
    among them. Also at the time, consistent with the scientific and
    regulatory consensus of the late 1970's, the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission had in place regulations for licensing repositories that
    sought to protect against radioactive releases by focusing on the
    performance of individual subparts, or subsystems, that were part of
    the repository. Finally, the EPA had proposed rules for repositories
    that also focused on limiting the amount and type of radionuclides
    released from a repository. Consistent with this framework, DOE's
    Guidelines focused on making comparative judgments among sites and
    emphasized mechanisms for evaluating the performance of potential
    repository subsystems against the NRC subsystem performance
    requirements and the EPA release limits.
        Starting in 1987, however, both the regulatory framework and
    scientific consensus began to change. To begin with, Congress changed
    the law governing evaluation and selection of a repository site. In
    1987, it amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to eliminate any
    authority or responsibility on the part of the Department for comparing
    sites, directed the Department to cease all evaluation of any potential
    repository sites other than Yucca Mountain, and directed it to focus
    its efforts exclusively on determining whether or not to recommend the
    Yucca Mountain site. This change was important, as it eliminated a
    central purpose of the Guidelines--to compare and contrast multiple
    fully characterized sites for ultimate selection of one among several
    for recommendation.
        Next, Congress reinforced its directive to focus on Yucca Mountain
    in section 801 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. This provision also
    gave three new directives to EPA. First, it directed EPA, within 90
    days of enactment, to contract with the National Academy of Sciences
    for a study regarding, among other topics, whether a specific kind of
    radiation protection standard for repositories would be protective of
    public health and safety. The question posed was whether standards
    prescribing a maximum annual effective dose individuals could receive
    from the repository--as opposed to the then-current standards EPA had
    in place focusing on releases--would be reasonable standards for
    protecting health and safety at the Yucca Mountain site. Second,
    Congress directed EPA, consistent with the findings and recommendations
    of the Academy, to promulgate such standards no later than one year
    after completion of the Academy's study. Finally, it directed that such
    standards, when promulgated, would be the exclusive public health and
    safety standards applicable to the Yucca Mountain site. Section 801
    also contained a directive to the NRC that, within a year after EPA's
    promulgation of the new standards, NRC modify its licensing criteria
    for repositories under the NWPA as necessary to be consistent with the
    EPA standards.
        Pursuant to the section 801 directive, in 1995 the National Academy
    of Sciences published a report entitled ``Technical Bases for Yucca
    Mountain Standards.'' \56\ This report concluded that dose standards
    would be protective of public health and safety.\57\ It also concluded
    that if EPA adopted this kind of standard, it would be appropriate for
    the NRC to revise its licensing rules, which currently focused on
    subsystem performance, to focus instead on the performance of the total
    repository system, including both its engineered and natural barriers.
    It noted that this would be a preferable approach because it was the
    performance of the entire repository, not the different subsystems,
    that was crucial, and that imposition of separate subsystem performance
    requirements might result in suboptimal performance of the repository
    as a whole.\58\ Finally, National Academy of Sciences noted that its
    recommendations, if adopted, ``impl[ied] the development of regulatory
    and analytical approaches for Yucca Mountain that are different from
    those employed in the past'' whose promulgation would likely require
    more than the one-year timeframe specified in the Energy Policy Act of
    1992.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \56\ Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards, National Academy
    of Sciences, National Research Council, 1995.
        \57\ Ibid.
        \58\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Along with these changes in regulatory thinking, the scientific and
    technical understanding of repository performance at Yucca Mountain was
    advancing. The DOE's use of Total System Performance Assessment to
    evaluate repository performance became more sophisticated, and helped
    focus DOE's research work on those areas important to maximizing the
    safety of the repository and minimizing public exposure to radionuclide
    releases from the repository.
        In 1999, the culmination of years of scientific and technical
    advancements and careful regulatory review resulted in EPA and NRC
    proposals for new regulations specific to a repository at Yucca
    Mountain based on state-of-the-art science and regulatory
    standards.\59\ Since section 113(c) of the NWPA directed DOE to focus
    its site characterization activities on those necessary to evaluate the
    suitability of the site for a license application to the NRC, the
    proposed changes to the EPA and NRC rules in turn required DOE to
    propose modifications to its criteria and methodology for determining
    the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site. Accordingly, DOE proposed
    new state-of-the-art Yucca-Mountain-specific site suitability
    Guidelines consistent with NRC licensing regulations.\60\ After EPA and
    NRC finalized their revisions,\61\ DOE promptly finalized its own.\62\
    For the reasons explained in the National Academy of Sciences study,
    the revised Guidelines' focus on the performance of the total
    repository system also makes them a better tool for protection of
    public safety than the old Guidelines, since the old subsystem approach
    might have resulted in a repository whose subsystems performed better
    in one or another respect but whose total performance in protecting
    human health was inferior.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \59\ Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed
    Geological Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Proposed Rule, 64 Fed.
    Reg. 8640, February 22, 1999; Environmental Radiation Protection
    Standards for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg.
    46975, August 27, 1999.
        \60\ General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear
    Waste Repositories, Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, 64 Fed.
    Reg. 67054, November 30, 1999.
        \61\ Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
    for Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Final Rule, 66 FR 32073, June 13, 2001;
    Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Proposed Geologic
    Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Final Rule, 66 FR 55732, November
    2, 2001.
        \62\ General Guidelines for the Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear
    Waste Repositories, Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines, Final
    Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 57303, November 14, 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In short, far from seeking to manipulate its siting Guidelines to
    fit the site, DOE had no choice but to amend its Guidelines to conform
    with the new regulatory framework established at Congress's direction
    by the National Academy of Sciences, the EPA, and the NRC. Moreover,
    this framework represents the culmination of a carefully considered set
    of regulatory decisions initiated at the direction of the Congress of
    the United States and completed nine years later, in which top
    scientists in the country have participated, and in which expert
    regulatory authorities, the NRC and the EPA, have played the leading
    role. These authorities likewise agree that the new regulatory
    framework, of which the Department's revised Guidelines are a necessary
    part, forms a coherent whole well designed to protect the health and
    safety of the public.
    9.4. Assertion 4: The Process Tramples States' Rights
        Some have argued that a Federal selection of siting disrespects
    states' rights. That is incorrect. Indeed, Nevada's interests have been
    accorded a place in Federal law to an extent seldom, if ever, seen
    before.
        As provided by the NWPA, the State of Nevada has the right to veto
    any Presidential site recommendation. It may do so by submitting a
    notice of disapproval to Congress within 60 days of the President's
    action.
        If Nevada submits a notice of disapproval, Congress has 90 calendar
    days of continuous session to override the notice by passing a
    resolution of siting designation. If it does not do so, the State's
    disapproval becomes effective.
        The respect due Nevada has not stopped with grudging obedience to
    the statutory commands. Instead, as noted previously, the Department
    has held hearings over a range of dates and places well in excess of
    what reasonably could have been viewed as a statutory mandate. And I
    have taken full account of Governor Guinn's comment and those of
    Nevada's other elected officials who oppose this Project. Although they
    reflect a view I do not share, I will continue to accord them the
    highest degree of respect.
        Finally, the Federal Government has appropriated more funds to
    Nevada to conduct its own Yucca Mountain studies than any other State
    has ever been given for any remotely similar purpose. Since the start
    of the Program in 1983, the State of Nevada has received over $78
    million in oversight funding. Since 1989, when the affected units of
    local government requested oversight funding, they have received over
    $67 million. In total, the State of Nevada and the affected units of
    local government have received over $145 million over that timeframe;
    with Nye County, home to Yucca Mountain, receiving over $22 million and
    Clark County, home to Las Vegas, receiving about $25 million. In
    addition, over the last 10 years, the State of Nevada and the affected
    units of local government have been given over $73 million to
    compensate for taxes they would have collected on the site
    characterization and the development and operation of a repository if
    they were legally authorized to tax activities of the Federal
    Government. Nye County has also conducted its own oversight drilling
    program since 1996, for which over that time Nye has received almost
    $21 million. Thus, the grand total that has been awarded to the state
    and its local governments simply on account of Yucca Mountain research
    has been nearly $240 million.
        Given the extensive evidence that the state has been, and will be,
    accorded a degree of involvement and authority seldom if ever accorded
    under similar circumstances, it is my judgment that the assertion of an
    infringement on state's rights is incorrect.
    9.5. Assertion 5: Transportation of Nuclear Materials is Disruptive and
            Dangerous
        Critics have argued that transporting wastes to Yucca Mountain is
    simply too dangerous, given the amount involved and the distances that
    will need to be traversed, sometimes near population centers.
        These concerns are not substantiated for three principal reasons.
    First, they take no account of the dangers of not transporting the
    wastes and leaving them to degrade and/or accumulate in their present,
    temporary facilities. Second, they pay no heed to the fact that, if the
    Yucca Mountain repository is not built, some wastes that would have
    been bound for that location will have to be transported elsewhere,
    meaning that our real choice is not between transporting or not
    transporting, but between transporting with as much planning and safety
    as possible, or transporting with such organization as the moment might
    invite. And third, they ignore the remarkable record of safe
    transportation of nuclear materials that our country has achieved over
    more than three decades.
        The first point is not difficult to understand. The potential
    hazards of transporting wastes are made to appear menacing only by
    ignoring the potential hazards of leaving the material where it is--at
    131 aging surface facilities in 39 states. Every ton of waste not
    transported for five or ten minutes near a town on the route to Yucca
    Mountain is a ton of waste left sitting in or near someone else's
    town--and not for five or ten minutes but indefinitely. Most of the
    wastes left where they are in or near dozens of towns (and cities)
    continue to accumulate day-by-day in temporary facilities not intended
    for long-term storage or disposal.
        The second point is also fairly simple. Many of these older sites
    have reached or will soon reach pool storage limits. Over 40 are
    projected to need some form of dry storage by 2010. Additional
    facilities will therefore be required. There are real limits, however,
    to how many of these can realistically be expected to be built on site.
    Many utilities do not have the space available to build them, and are
    likely to face major regulatory hurdles in attempting to acquire it.
        Therefore one way or another, unless all these reactors shut down,
    off-site storage facilities will need to be built, substantial amounts
    of waste will have to be transported there, and this will happen not in
    the distant future but quite soon. For example, today nuclear utilities
    and a Native American tribe in Utah are working toward construction of
    an ``interim'' storage facility on tribal land. Whether or not this
    effort ultimately succeeds, it is likely that some similar effort will.
    Thus, if we are merely to keep our present supply of nuclear energy, at
    some fast-approaching point there will be transportation of nuclear
    wastes. The only question is whether we will have (a) numerous
    supplemental storage sites springing up, with transportation to them
    arranged ad hoc, or (b) one permanent repository, with transportation
    to it arranged systematically and with years of advance planning. The
    second alternative is plainly preferable, making the Yucca Mountain
    plan superior on this ground alone.
        Finally, transportation of nuclear waste is not remotely the risky
    venture Yucca's critics seek to make it out to be. Over the last 30
    years, there have been over 2,700 shipments of spent nuclear fuel.
    Occasional traffic accidents have occurred, but there has not been one
    identifiable injury related to radiation exposure because of them. In
    addition, since 1975, or since the last stages of the war in Vietnam,
    national security shipments have traveled over 100 million miles--more
    than the distance from here to the sun--with no accidents causing a
    fatality or harmful release of radioactive material.\63\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \63\ About the Transportation Safeguards System, Office of
    Transportation Safeguards Fact Sheet.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our safety record is comparable to that in Europe, where nuclear
    fuel has been transported extensively since 1966.\64\ Over the last 25
    years, more than 70,000 MTU (an amount roughly equal to what is
    expected to be shipped over the entire active life of the Yucca
    Mountain Project) has been shipped in approximately 20,000 casks.
    France and Britain average 650 shipments per year, even though the
    population density in each of those countries grossly exceeds that of
    the United States.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \64\ Presentation by Ronald Pope, Head of Transport Safety Unit for
    the Internal Atomic Energy Agency, at 13th International Symposium for
    Packing of Radioactive Materials 2001, Chicago, IL, September 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Even so, we need not, and should not, be content to rest upon the
    record of the past no matter how good. For transportation to Yucca
    Mountain, the Department of Transportation has established a process
    that DOE and the states must use for evaluating potential routes.
    Consistent with Federal regulations, the NRC would approve all routes
    and security plans and would certify transportation casks prior to
    shipment.
        In short, for all these reasons, I have concluded that the stated
    concerns about transportation are ill-founded and should not stand in
    the way of taking the next step toward designation of the Yucca
    Mountain site.
    9.6. Assertion 6: Transportation of Wastes to the Site Will Have a
            Dramatically Negative Economic Impact on Las Vegas
        There have been repeated assertions that shipments of radioactive
    waste through the Las Vegas valley could have effects on the local,
    entertainment-based, economy. Such effects could include, for example,
    discouraging tourism and lowering property values. These assertions are
    largely unsupportable by any evidence and are addressed in the Final
    Environmental Impact Statement.
        Much of what has been said in the preceding section applies here as
    well. The record speaks for itself. In addition to the history of safe
    shipment on interstate highways through relatively open spaces, five
    metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from 27 countries have, over the last
    16 years, been transported without incident through Concord,
    California, and Charleston, South Carolina (the latter, like Las Vegas,
    a tourist destination). There is no reason to believe that a similar
    safe record will not be achieved in Nevada.
        The truth of it is that many tourists coming to Las Vegas will be
    farther from nuclear sites when they get there than when they left
    home. All major nuclear power generation facilities in the United
    States are located near large metropolitan centers in order to minimize
    the amount of power lost during transmission. It is thus not surprising
    that more than 161 million Americans are closer to a commercial nuclear
    facility than anyone in Las Vegas is to Yucca Mountain, as shown in
    Table 4. Indeed there are few large metropolitan centers that do not
    have a major nuclear facility located within 75 miles.\65\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \65\ It is noteworthy that Atlantic City has three reactor sites
    closer than 75 miles at the same time its tourism-based economy has
    been expanding. Yucca Mountain, by contrast, would be one of the few
    nuclear facilities in the country in a remote area with no metropolitan
    center within 75 miles

        Many cities with strong tourism industries are located closer to
    existing storage facilities than Las Vegas would be to a repository at
    Yucca Mountain. Therefore, those who assert that a repository 90 miles
    from Las Vegas would have dramatically negative effects on local
    tourism have the burden of producing strong evidence to back up their
    claims. They have not done so. Thus, I know of no reason to believe
    that there is any compelling argument that the Las Vegas economy would
    be harmed by a repository at Yucca Mountain.
    9.7. Assertion 7: It is Premature for DOE to Make a Site Recommendation
            for Various Reasons
                9.7.1. The General Accounting Office has concluded that it
                        is premature for DOE to make a site recommendation
                        now
        The GAO did make this statement in its draft report, Technical,
    Schedule, and Cost Uncertainties of the Yucca Mountain Repository
    Project, which was prematurely released.\66\ After receiving the
    Department's response, however, in the final version of this report,
    released in December 2001, GAO expressly acknowledged that ``the
    Secretary has the discretion to make such a recommendation at this
    time.'' \67\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \66\ Nuclear Waste: Technical, Schedule, and Cost Uncertainties of
    the Yucca Mountain Repository Project, Unpublished Draft.
        \67\ Nuclear Waste: Technical, Schedule, and Cost Uncertainties of
    the Yucca Mountain Repository Project, GAO-02-191, December 21, 2001.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                9.7.2. DOE is not ready to make a site recommendation now
                        because DOE and NRC have agreed on 293 technical
                        items that need to be completed before DOE files a
                        license application
        The Nuclear Regulatory Commission provided a sufficiency letter to
    DOE on November 13, 2001, that concluded that existing and planned
    work, upon completion, would be sufficient to apply for a construction
    authorization. The agreed upon course of action by DOE and the NRC is
    intended to assist in the license application phase of the project, not
    site recommendation. In consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission staff concerning licensing, DOE agreed it would obtain
    certain additional information relating to nine ``key technical
    issues'' to support license application. The DOE agreed to undertake
    293 activities that would assist in resolution of these issues.
        The NRC has never stated that this was work that DOE needed to
    complete before site recommendation. In fact, it went out of its way
    not to do so. The Commission is well aware that section 114(a)(1)(E) of
    the NWPA requires a Secretarial recommendation of Yucca Mountain to be
    accompanied by a letter from the Commission providing its preliminary
    comments on the sufficiency of the information the Department has
    assembled for a construction license application. Had it been of the
    view that site recommendation should not proceed, its preliminary views
    would have stated that this information is not sufficient and that the
    Commission has no confidence that it ever will be.
        Instead, in its section 114(a)(1)(E) letter, the Commission said
    the opposite: ``[T]he NRC believes that sufficient at-depth
    characterization analysis and waste form proposal information, although
    not available now, will be available at the time of a potential license
    application such that development of an acceptable license application
    is achievable'' (emphasis added). It also listed the outstanding issues
    as ``closed pending,'' meaning that the NRC staff has confidence that
    DOE's proposed approach, together with the agreement to provide
    additional information, acceptably addresses the issue so that no
    information beyond that provided or agreed to would likely be required
    for a license application.
        The DOE has completed over one-third of the actions necessary to
    fulfill the 293 agreements and has submitted the results to the NRC for
    review. The NRC has documented 23 of these as ``complete.'' The
    remaining work consists largely of documentation (improve technical
    positions and provide additional plans and procedures) and confirmation
    (enhance understanding with additional testing or analysis or
    additional corroboration of data or models).
        As I explained earlier, the NWPA makes clear that site
    recommendation is an intermediate step. The filing of a construction
    license application is the step that comes after site recommendation is
    complete. It is entirely unsurprising that the Department would have to
    do additional work before taking that next step. But the fact that the
    next step will require additional work is no reason not to take this
    one.
                9.7.3. It is premature for DOE to make a recommendation now
                        because DOE cannot complete this additional work
                        until 2006. The NWPA requires DOE to file a license
                        application within 90 days of the approval of site
                        designation
        When Congress enacted the NWPA in 1982, it included in the Act a
    series of deadlines that represented its best judgment regarding how
    long various steps should take. These deadlines included the 90-day
    provision referenced above. They also included a requirement that DOE
    begin disposing of waste in 1998, in the expectation that a repository
    would by then have been built and licensed.
        Obviously, the timeframes set in the Act have proven to be
    optimistic. That is no reason, however, for the Department not to honor
    what was plainly their central function: to move along as promptly and
    as responsibly as possible in the development of a repository.
    Accordingly, to read the 90-day provision at issue as a basis for
    proceeding more slowly stands the provision on its head.
        Our current plans call for filing a license application at the end
    of 2004, not 2006. Assuming Congressional action on this question this
    year, that would mean that DOE could be two years late in filing the
    application. But any delay in site recommendation will only result in
    further delay in the filing of this application. For the reasons
    explained in section 7,1 believe I have the information necessary to
    allow me to determine that the site is scientifically and technically
    suitable, and I have so determined. That being so, I am confident that
    I best honor the various deadlines set out in the Act, including the
    central 1998 deadline (already passed) specifying when the Department
    was to begin waste disposal, by proceeding with site recommendation as
    promptly as I can after reaching this conclusion.
                                 10. conclusion
        As I explained at the outset of this document, the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Act vests responsibilities for deciding how this country will
    proceed with regard to nuclear waste in a number of different Federal
    and state actors. As Secretary of Energy, I am charged with making a
    specific determination: whether to recommend to the President that
    Yucca Mountain be developed as the site for a repository for spent fuel
    and high-level radioactive wastes. I have endeavored to discharge that
    responsibility conscientiously and to the best of my ability.
        The first question I believe the law asks me to answer is whether
    the Yucca Mountain site is scientifically and technically suitable for
    development as a repository. The amount and quality of research the
    Department of Energy has invested into answering this question--done by
    topflight people, much of it on the watch of my predecessors from both
    parties--is nothing short of staggering. After careful evaluation, I am
    convinced that the product of over 20 years, millions of hours, and
    four billion dollars of this research provides a sound scientific basis
    for concluding that the site can perform safely during both the pre-
    and post-closure periods, and that it is indeed scientifically and
    technically suitable for development as a repository.
        Having resolved this fundamental question, I then turned to a
    second set of considerations: are there compelling national interests
    that warrant proceeding with this project? I am convinced that there
    are, and that a repository for nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain will
    advance, in important ways, our energy security, our national security,
    our environmental goals, and our security against terrorist attacks.
        Finally, I examined the arguments that opponents of the project
    have advanced for why we should not proceed. I do not believe any of
    them is of sufficient weight to warrant following a different course.
        Accordingly, I have determined to recommend to the President that
    he find Yucca Mountain qualified for application for a construction
    authorization before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and that he
    recommend it for development of a repository.
                                     ______

                                               The White House,
                                      Washington, DC, February 15, 2002
        Dear Mr. President: In accordance with section 114 of the Nuclear
    Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10134 (the ``Act''), the Secretary
    of Energy has recommended approval of the Yucca Mountain site for the
    development at that site of a repository for the geologic disposal of
    spent nuclear fuel-and high level nuclear waste from the Nation's
    defense activities. As is required by the Act, the Secretary has also
    submitted to me a comprehensive statement of the basis of his
    recommendation.
        Having received the Secretary's recommendation and the
    comprehensive statement of the basis of it, I consider the Yucca
    Mountain site qualified for application for a construction
    authorization for a repository. Therefore, I now recommend the Yucca
    Mountain site for this purpose. In accordance with section 114 of the
    Act, I am transmitting with this recommendation to the Congress a copy
    of the comprehensive statement of the basis of the Secretary's
    recommendation prepared pursuant to the Act. The transmission of this
    document triggers an expedited process described in the Act. I urge the
    Congress to undertake any necessary legislative action on this
    recommendation in an expedited and bipartisan fashion.
        Proceeding with the repository program is necessary to protect
    public safety, health, and the Nation's security because successful
    completion of this project would isolate in a geologic repository at a
    remote location highly radioactive materials now scattered throughout
    the Nation. In addition, the geologic repository would support our
    national security through disposal of nuclear waste from our defense
    facilities.
        A deep geologic repository, such as Yucca Mountain, is important
    for our national security and our energy future. Nuclear energy is the
    second largest source of U.S. electricity generation 4nd must remain a
    major component of our national energy policy in the years to come. The
    cost of nuclear power compares favorably with the costs of electricity
    generation by other sources, and nuclear power has none of the
    emissions associated with coal and gas power plants.
        This recommendation, if it becomes effective, will permit
    commencement of the next rigorous stage of scientific and technical
    review of the repository program through formal licensing proceedings
    before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Successful completion of this
    program also will redeem the clear Federal legal obligation safely to
    dispose of commercial spent nuclear fuel that the Congress passed in
    1982.
        This recommendation is the culmination of two decades of intense
    scientific scrutiny involving application of an array of scientific and
    technical disciplines necessary and appropriate for this challenging
    undertaking. It is an undertaking that was mandated twice by the
    Congress when it legislated the obligations that would be redeemed by
    successful pursuit of the repository program. Allowing this
    recommendation to come into effect will enable the beginning of the
    next phase of intense scrutiny of the project necessary to assure the
    public health, safety, and security in the area of Yucca Mountain, and
    also to enhance the safety and security of the Nation as a whole.
                Sincerely,
                                                        George W. Bush.
    The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
    President of the Senate
    Washington, D.C. 20510
                                     ______

                                        Office of the Governor,
                                        Carson City, NV, April 8, 2002.
    The Hon. Robert C. Byrd,
    President Pro Tempore, U.S. Senate, U.S. Capitol, Washington, DC.
    Re: Official-Notice of Disapproval of the Yucca Mountain Site

        Dear Mr. President Pro Tempore: Pursuant to Section 116(b)(2) of
    the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
    Sec. 10136(b)(2), I am transmitting to you for submission to the
    Congress a Notice of Disapproval of the site designation of Yucca
    Mountain in Nevada as the nation's high level nuclear waste repository.
        A Statement of Reasons explaining why I have submitted the Notice
    of Disapproval accompanies this notice.
                Sincerely,
                                                Kenny C. Guinn,
                                                              Governor.
    [Attachment.]
      Statement of Reasons Supporting the Governor of Nevada's Notice of
               Disapproval of the Proposed Yucca Mountain Project
        Honorable members of Congress, it is my privilege and duty, under
    Section 116(b)(2) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, to articulate my
    reasons for issuing a Notice of Disapproval of the designation of Yucca
    Mountain in Nevada as the site for the nation's high-level nuclear
    waste repository. I trust you will carefully consider Nevada's views.
    As a matter of science and the law, and in the interests of state
    comity and sound national policy, Yucca Mountain should not be
    developed as a high-level nuclear waste repository.
                                  introduction
        Nevada strongly opposes the designation of Yucca Mountain for
    nuclear waste disposal because the project is scientifically flawed,
    fails to conform to numerous laws, and the policy behind it is ever
    changing and nonsensical. The Department of Energy has so compromised
    this project through years of mismanagement that Congress should have
    no confidence in any representation made by DOE about either its
    purpose or its safety. Nevada is not anti-nuclear and does not oppose
    nuclear power. Our state is pro-science and pro-common sense.
        Because of the state's longstanding opposition to the Yucca
    Mountain project, some have accused Nevada of being a not-in-my-
    backyard, or NIMBY, state. Nothing could be further from the truth.
    Nevada has already borne more than its fair share of this nation's
    radioactive waste burdens.
        During the Cold War, Nevada served as host to hundreds of nuclear
    weapons tests, most with bombs several times more powerful than the
    Hiroshima blast. The government misrepresented the risks and impacts of
    those tests to our citizenry, and many Nevadans were injured as a
    result. Nearly 300 million curies of toxic radioactive contaminants
    remain in the ground in our state to this day. We have not forgotten
    this legacy.
        Nevada is also being forced by the Energy Department to play host
    to the world's largest low-level and mixed radioactive waste disposal
    facility, at the Nevada Test Site. DOE plans to use this site for the
    disposal of hundreds of millions of cubic feet of radioactive and
    hazardous garbage and contaminated soil from the nation's nuclear
    weapons complex. Tens of thousands of shipments of this waste through
    our state are anticipated.
        Once upon a time not long ago, the concept of ``environmental
    equity'' would have made it unthinkable, given the sacrifices already
    imposed on Nevada, that the state would be forced to play host to yet
    an additional nuclear waste dump--indeed, the dump to end all dumps.
    DOE plans to use Yucca Mountain for the disposal of 77,000 tons of
    high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel from throughout the United
    States and 42 other countries. And we know if we permit it to happen,
    it won't end there.
        But Nevada will not permit it to happen. Not simply because it is
    the wrong thing to do, at the wrong time, from the standpoint of
    environmental equity. Even when carrying the load of others, Nevadans
    will never tire of serving their country for a worthy cause.
        We will not permit Yucca Mountain to happen--and it will not
    happen--because the project is manifestly not a worthy cause. Yucca
    Mountain is but the latest in a long series of DOE boondoggles--one
    based on bad science, bad law, and bad public policy. In addition,
    better, cheaper, and safer alternatives exist. Finally, national
    security will not be helped, but hindered, by this ill-advised project.
        Some say Nevada should acquiesce to the project because the Yucca
    Mountain repository is now inevitable. Obviously, they fail to
    understand Nevadans, or the power of the American legal system. I
    assure you, the only thing inevitable about Yucca Mountain is that it
    will plot the course of so many other doomed DOE mega-projects.
                                  the science
        Although DOE bureaucrats claim the Yucca Mountain site is suitable
    for nuclear waste disposal based on ``sound science,'' it is hard to
    find a scientist who agrees. Even the project's apologists know that
    hundreds of technical issues remain unresolved. Initially, the
    scientific community was optimistic about the prospects of Yucca
    Mountain. When Congress selected the site in 1987 for intensive study,
    preliminary data showed it would likely have good geology. In the past
    four years, however, DOE's own studies proved the mountain was in fact
    so porous to water, and otherwise so geologically unfit, that the very
    concept of geologic isolation of the waste had to be abandoned. But
    geologic isolation was the very purpose of the federal repository
    program.
        DOE no longer refers to the Yucca Mountain project as a deep
    ``geologic'' repository. Rejecting the global scientific consensus that
    nuclear waste should be disposed of by means of geologic isolation, DOE
    now calls Yucca Mountain merely a deep ``underground'' repository. This
    is no surprise. There is nothing ``geologic'' about it. As the former
    director of the Yucca Mountain project, Dr. John Bartlett, recently
    testified, the project has become nothing more than a series of fancy
    engineered waste packages that just happens to be located 1000 feet
    underground. The Nuclear Energy Institute recently bragged that the
    repository can be licensed ``without the mountain.''
        Which begs several questions: If the mountain itself is irrelevant,
    and waste packages can now be made to last for 10,000 years, why make
    tens of thousands of shipments of lethal radioactive waste through the
    nation's cities to the seismically adverse, volcanic zone of Yucca
    Mountain? It can go practically anywhere else--or stay where it is. If
    the only reason the waste must be buried is to protect it from
    terrorists, why spend $60 billion putting it 1000 feet underground,
    when a mere 20 feet would do the job? And this could surely be done at
    the reactor sites. NRC has recently re-affirmed the safety of on-site
    storage.
        In the absence of geologic isolation. we don't believe for a minute
    that DOE can demonstrate the long-term safety of the Yucca Mountain
    repository. We don't believe an agency that, as the General Accounting
    Office has noted, has rarely succeeded at building anything can now
    build a first-of-a-kind waste package that will soak in Yucca Mountain
    groundwater for 10,000 years without a leak.
        DOE's computer models of Yucca Mountain repository performance and
    radiation emissions currently have an uncertainty factor of up to
    10,000. This incredible number bears some pondering. Imagine if a
    salesman with nothing but fancy computer models told you the brakes on
    his new model car would be safe for 10,000 miles, plus or minus an
    uncertainty factor of 10,000. Think about it. What this means is, your
    brakes could be safe for as many as 100 million miles, or as few as one
    mile. We simply can't know.
        Maybe we Nevadans are a people of uncommon sense. Because that's a
    car we simply wouldn't buy. That's a car we wouldn't let on our roads.
        DOE has yet to finish the very design of the Yucca Mountain
    repository. We don't even know whether it will be a high temperature
    repository (above the boiling point of water) or a low temperature
    repository (below the boiling point of water), a feature that could
    change the amount of real estate required for the project by up to a
    factor of 10. Imagine if you submitted a plan for your new house to
    local authorities for a building permit. You tell them: It may be a
    4,000 square-foot gas-heated house, or a 40,000 square-foot all-
    electric house; the design is still unfinished. I don't have to tell
    you what our local authorities would do with that plan.
        The scientific uncertainties of the Yucca Mountain project are so
    numerous as to defy enumeration. Attempting to count them all, the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently identified 293 unresolved
    technical issues in 9 critical areas. Though DOE dismisses these as
    trivial, perfunctory, or problems that will be solved ``as we go'' over
    the next 300 years, their mere specification belies this claim.
        The unresolved issues include critical matters such as volcanism:
    DOE's gamblers say the odds of a volcano at Yucca Mountain are only 1
    in 70 million per year. Yet, there have actually been three active
    volcanic eruptions within 50 kilometers of the Yucca Mountain site in
    the past 80,000 years. Indeed. Nevada's geologic studies indicate Yucca
    Mountain appears to be at the center of one of the most potentially
    active volcanic areas in the west.
        Unresolved are issues such as the seismic integrity of the site:
    Yucca Mountain sits dead-center in one of the largest earthquake fault
    zones east of California. In 1992, a magnitude 5.6 earthquake caused
    tens of thousands of dollars of damage to DOE's own facilities right at
    Yucca Mountain. More than 600 earthquakes greater than magnitude 2.5
    have been recorded at Yucca Mountain just in the past two decades.
        Among other things, there remains a real question whether the
    above-ground storage facility required to facilitate storage and burial
    of spent fuel at the site can ever meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    temporary storage standards, given the site's adverse seismicity. In
    other words, it may not be possible to license an above-ground concrete
    storage pad at this earthquake-prone location. What does this say about
    the safety of the complex underground facility? And why is it not
    necessary for DOE to complete seismic studies before plunging ahead
    with a site determination?
        The plethora of unresolved issues includes critical problems such
    as rapid groundwater flow through the repository: Flows measured by DOE
    have been more than 100 times greater than was expected when Congress
    designated Yucca Mountain in 1987 as the only site to be characterized.
    Surface water that was supposed to have taken thousands of years to
    pass through the planned repository area to the underlying water table
    was found to have actually done so in less than 50 years. One former
    NRC Commissioner visiting the underground test area at Yucca Mountain
    described its humid environment as a ``tropical rain forest.''
        Secretary Abraham recently wrote, in a Washington Post Op-Ed piece
    March 26, that ``Yucca Mountain has an average precipitation of under 8
    inches a year, less than half an inch of which actually makes it below
    the surface.'' If that is true, Mr. Secretary, why has DOE posted a
    sign deep within the mountain informing visitors not to worry about
    liquid dripping from the ceiling of underground caverns, that this
    liquid is only water, and that it is normal for the subterranean
    environment of Yucca Mountain? Why is DOE proposing to build a $5
    billion titanium ``drip shield'' around buried spent fuel to channel
    away effusive dripping water?
        The tangled web of man-made contrivances necessary to compensate
    for the stunning geological surprises at Yucca Mountain has turned the
    repository system into a kind of Rube Goldberg contraption. To prevent
    the unexpected water from corroding spent fuel containers, a titanium
    drip shield is required for each package to channel water away from the
    containers. But channeled water is apparently subject to boiling from
    the decay heat of buried spent fuel. Therefore, say independent
    experts, the repository must be redesigned to space the fuel packages
    further apart, vastly increasing the real estate, and of course the
    amount of titanium, required. But there may not be enough real estate
    within the Yucca Mountain site boundary to do that. And the titanium
    itself is subject to corrosion. Therefore, all waste packages must be
    fabricated from a ``miracle metal,'' Alloy-22, to prevent them from
    corroding if the drip shield fails.
        And what about Alloy 22? You guessed it. As recently as last month,
    the Chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board wrote DOE that
    so little is known ``it is not currently possible'' to assess the
    likelihood of corrosion of Alloy 22 for the thousands of years that
    will be required to assure the safety of the facility. Indeed, Nevada's
    independent laboratory tests of Alloy 22 showed corrosion in less than
    half a year. And the titanium apparently fares no better. Just two
    weeks ago. DOE's own Waste Package Materials Performance Peer Review
    Panel issued its report with the astonishing revelation that, unless
    the proposed titanium drip shields somehow perform better in the ground
    than they have in laboratory tests, they cannot be used at Yucca
    Mountain. What's next? Maybe the drip shield will need a drip shield.
        Secretary Abraham calls this ``sound science.'' We beg to differ.
                                    the law
        Nevada currently has four legal actions pending against the Yucca
    Mountain project. These include a challenge to the siting guidelines
    re-released at the eleventh hour by DOE, and a challenge to the
    Environmental Protection Agency's gerrymandered health and safety
    standards for Yucca Mountain licensing. They include a challenge to
    DOE's misuse of Nevada's precious water resources, and a challenge to
    the legal soundness of both the Secretary's and the President's Yucca
    Mountain site recommendations.
        At least two additional actions, one challenging DOE's
    Environmental Impact Statement, and one challenging NRC's Yucca
    Mountain licensing rule, will be filed imminently by Nevada.
        These are each serious lawsuits, raising fundamental, dispositive
    legal issues--issues that ought to concern every member of Congress.
    Issues such as whether DOE cavalierly ignored the dictates of your
    institution and blatantly violated the Nuclear Waste Policy Act or the
    National Environmental Policy Act. Issues such as whether the
    repository is fundamentally unsafe even if it is theoretically
    ``licensable.'' Issues such as whether radioactive emissions from the
    site can be declared safe by EPA merely by first diluting them in
    Nevada's drinking water.
        We are not suing simply for the sake of suing. We are suing to
    enforce the law, because, unfortunately, government bureaucrats pushing
    Yucca Mountain have chosen to ignore it. It is not necessary for us to
    win them all, though we believe all are legally sound. One and only one
    will suffice.
        It is astounding to Nevada that DOE refused to postpone its site
    recommendation pending the outcome of any of these lawsuits. After all,
    DOE itself says it will not be ready to submit a license application to
    NRC until at least December 2004. What, then, is the rush? It is likely
    that all of Nevada's cases will have been decided long before that
    time.
        Let me describe to you just one of our lawsuits--the one against
    DOE. It's really quite remarkable: After 17 years of using one set of
    site suitability rules, DOE made the surprising determination that
    Yucca Mountain, unlike the WIPP nuclear waste repository in New Mexico,
    couldn't pass the ``good geology'' test. Instead of reporting this bad
    news to Congress, as the law requires. DOE changed the rules late last
    fall. A mere 17 days or so later. DOE proclaimed the site ``suitable''
    using these new rules, ignoring the bedrock geologic isolation
    requirements of Congress. ``Good geology''--the cornerstone of every
    high-level nuclear waste repository program in the world--was simply
    ignored by DOE.
        To Nevadans, we are like passengers sitting on the runway in a
    brand new experimental aircraft for 17 hours while mechanics crawl all
    over the plane inspecting it. After this enormously long wait, the
    mechanics finally determine the plane is unfit to fly. At the same
    time, bureaucrats come on the loudspeakers: ``Not to worry, folks.
    We've just changed the flight fitness rules, and the plane will be
    taking off in 17 seconds.'' Needless to say, that's a plane none of us
    would dare dream of flying. But that is exactly what DOE has done with
    Yucca Mountain.
        The New York Times recently published an editorial suggesting
    Congress should simply approve the Yucca Mountain site recommendation
    and refer all remaining issues of site suitability to the NRC, which
    was purported to have the expertise to make appropriate decisions in
    this regard. Remarkably, notwithstanding his own agency's clear
    statutory duties, Secretary Abraham likewise adopted this view in his
    recent editorial.
        This approach, however, poses both a scientific and a legal
    paradox. DOE and NRC have each taken the position, in their respective
    Yucca Mountain rules, that site suitability is a matter to be assessed
    by DOE and its geologists, not by NRC and its nuclear engineers. Under
    NRC's current licensing rule for Yucca Mountain (which Nevada will soon
    fight in court), site suitability is presumed determined the moment the
    Yucca Mountain application comes in the door. NRC merely determines
    repository licensability, not Yucca Mountain site suitability. NRC will
    not evaluate the suitability of Yucca Mountain's geology. That was
    supposed to have been DOE's job.
        Adopting the approach suggested by the New York Times would mean
    DOE's bogus site suitability determination could never be reviewed on
    the technical merits. On an issue of this magnitude, Nevada and the
    country as a whole deserve their day in court. And we think Congress
    should wait until that day has come and gone.
                      national security and public policy
        In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, DOE has tried to
    paint the Yucca Mountain project--as a badly needed national security
    measure. A well-financed promotional campaign by the nuclear industry
    appears to have helped shape the public policy debate in this regard.
    The Secretary himself, in his Washington Post piece last month,
    strongly urged that ``one safe site'' for the nation's nuclear waste is
    best for national security, rather than having the waste scattered at
    numerous reactor sites across America. This national security myth is
    one that can and must be debunked. The Yucca Mountain site will
    contribute nothing to national security.
        Even if you believe DOE's optimistic schedule, Yucca Mountain will
    not be ready even to begin receiving spent fuel from reactor sites for
    a decade. DOE plans to ship 77,000 tons of high-level waste and spent
    fuel--the project's design capacity--in up to 98,000 shipments
    extending through 2046. Once there, the spent fuel will remain stored
    above ground at Yucca Mountain for up to 100 years while it cools. In
    the meantime, reactors (many operating on renewed licenses) will
    continue to generate at least 2000 additional tons of waste each year.
        By 2046, even if (in the unlikely event) Yucca Mountain proceeds on
    schedule, there will be at least 77,000 tons of additional waste still
    stored at reactor sites, awaiting shipment to a supposed second
    repository. As the waste is removed, it will merely make room for an
    equivalent amount of newly generated waste that will take its place at
    the various sites. I'm no nuclear engineer, but this sounds like the
    status quo to me. I fail to understand how this aids national security.
        DOE's Acting Director of the Yucca Mountain project affirmed last
    month before a House appropriations committee that as long as there are
    nuclear reactors operating, there will continue to be spent fuel stored
    above ground at sites all across America. In fact, he confirmed, given
    the slow pace at which spent fuel will be transported to Yucca
    Mountain, together with the fact that newly generated waste will
    continue to pile up almost as fast as the old waste is removed, the
    current backlog of 46,000 tons at plant sites now will never be less
    than 42,000 tons by the time Yucca Mountain is filled to its design
    capacity. In short, Yucca Mountain will change nothing.
        And that may not be the end, but apparently only the beginning. In
    its annual strategic plan, ``Vision 2020,'' the Nuclear Energy
    Institute claims utilities will build as many as 50 new nuclear plants
    by 2020 if their growing nuclear waste stockpiles are bounded by the
    availability of Yucca Mountain. More waste is coming to your
    jurisdictions, not less.
        The bottom line is this: Even if Yucca Mountain proceeds, spent
    fuel will continue to be stored above ground at reactor sites across
    America for many decades, perhaps centuries, to come. Secretary
    Abraham's ``one safe site'' is a figment of DOE's imagination. The
    Yucca Mountain site is neither ``safe'' nor will it ever be ``one.''
        The solution to the security issue is to shore up existing storage
    facilities and increase security at the reactor sites--not to magnify
    the existing storage facility targets with shipments of tens of
    thousands of mobile, new targets traversing the country on their way to
    a geologically flawed Yucca Mountain repository. Not to expose tens of
    millions of additional citizens to the risks posed by spent fuel
    packages.
        Utilities across the nation are now building interim dry storage
    facilities, where spent fuel will be stored in casks capable of safely
    containing the fuel for up to hundreds of years. Several such interim
    storage facilities are already operating at various utility sites.
    Since, in any event, these casks will be stored on site for many
    decades, some experts say they should be covered in a concrete
    containment to shield them from terrorist attack. NRC is studying the
    use of anti-aircraft guns at nuclear sites. Reactor sites already have
    armed guards and comprehensive security plans. Given these measures,
    the casks will continue to be far more secure at reactor sites than
    they will ever be on the streets of St. Louis, Chicago, or Peoria--or
    on barges cruising the Hudson River.
        What really does implicate national security is the widespread
    shipment of spent fuel in casks that, we now know, are not impervious
    to ubiquitous armor-piercing weapons. It was surprising for us to learn
    recently from NRC that, since 9/11, the only analysis done by industry
    or the government of the impacts of terrorism on spent fuel shipments
    involved merely a computer simulation of a Boeing 767 engine
    (unaccompanied by aircraft and fuel) striking a railcar shipping cask
    at 350 miles per hour. Not to worry, said the modelers: the virtual
    train car moved only a virtual tenth of an inch from the virtual
    impact, and the virtual lethal waste was contained.
        To anyone who watched in horror as the twin towers of the World
    Trade Center collapsed, this timid virtual test result seems more than
    a bit incredible. On the other hand, the possibility of a terrorist
    shooting at a cask from the back of a pickup truck with a small
    optically-guided armor-piercing missile has been considered by NRC and
    the industry as ``too remote.'' We once heard the same about suicide
    bombers.
        Thanks to a secret videotape of an industry-sponsored test done by
    the Army at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in 1998, obtained last month
    by Nevada representatives, we now know such a weapon can blow a hole
    through even the heartiest of spent fuel casks. According to credible
    sources, there are over 500,000 TOW missiles alone in circulation in at
    least 36 countries, including over 1700 in Iran. These missiles can
    penetrate up to 30 inches of armor. Smaller, hand-held weapons in
    widespread use, like the Stinger, can pierce up to 15 inches of steel.
        If Yucca Mountain proceeds, just one of these could potentially
    give a terrorist access to tens of thousands of radioactive ``dirty
    bombs,'' with free delivery to hundreds of U.S. targets. Clearly, this
    is an issue warranting careful investigation by Congress, not a cover-
    up of the facts by DOE. Many in Congress already share my view;
    hearings on the security of waste transport to Yucca Mountain are
    scheduled for later this spring.
        In responding to our legitimate concerns, some have accused Nevada
    of fearmongering, claiming the Aberdeen test was flawed, that a small
    missile would ``only'' blow a six-inch hole in some casks, that few if
    any people would die in such an event, and that further tests are
    unnecessary. Since no one has studied the issue in light of current
    events, however, we don't really know. If DOE will not undertake these
    studies, surely Congress must. If Nevada's mere mention of the
    potential event is causing fear, imagine the panic if, God forbid, it
    actually happens.
                            the ``peco alternative"
        Though the nuclear industry seems to prefer you didn't know it,
    there is a viable alternative to Yucca Mountain--one that has already
    been quietly embraced by DOE and at least one utility, DECO Energy, a
    division of the nation's largest nuclear utility, Exelon Corporation.
        In June 2000, PECO signed a deal with DOE that would ultimately
    have DOE take title to PECO's spent fuel on-site at the Peach Bottom
    nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. PECO will construct a dry storage
    facility, ownership of which will also eventually be assumed by DOE. At
    a date certain, DOE will own, operate, and manage the facility, with
    the waste stored there in robust, dry casks for the indefinite future.
    Funds for the deal are provided from the $8 billion Nuclear Waste Fund.
        At the time. DOE touted the deal as an arrangement all nuclear
    utilities should follow. And for good reason. If adopted by the
    industry, the PECO alternative would solve a host of pressing problems.
        First, it would end all utility spent fuel lawsuits against DOE--
    now estimated to pose up to a $58 billion contingent liability. Second,
    it would allow utilities to remove spent fuel liabilities from their
    books and decommission their retired nuclear plants on schedule. Third,
    it would remove the fuel from utility rate bases and the jurisdiction
    of state utility commissions, ending their numerous lawsuits against
    DOE as well. Fourth, it would buy the government time to find a viable
    new repository or develop new technologies to vastly reduce the dangers
    of nuclear waste. (Many of these technologies, under development at our
    national laboratories, already look promising.) Fifth, as Senator
    Domenici has long indicated, it would preserve the substantial energy
    content of spent fuel for later use if necessary to supplement the
    nation's energy needs. Finally, implementing the PECO alternative would
    cost ratepayers and taxpayers merely pennies on the dollar to the
    estimated $60 billion (and growing) price tag of Yucca Mountain.
        Far from embracing the deal, however, a group of competing
    utilities sued last year to block it, claiming, ironically, that it
    gives PECO an unfair economic advantage over utilities who choose to
    sue the government and place their bets on Yucca Mountain. A ruling is
    expected from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals soon. Rather than
    await this key decision. DOE pressed forward with its Yucca Mountain
    site recommendation as if its own PECO deal were nonexistent. The PECO
    alternative is not even mentioned in the 67 pounds of Yucca Mountain
    documents DOE recently sent to the President. It is not even mentioned
    in the so-called ``no action'' alternative to Yucca Mountain in DOE's
    voluminous Final Environmental Impact Statement. Yet, when the deal was
    signed less than two years ago, DOE endorsed it as ``a precedent for
    additional settlement negotiations with other utilities.
        I urge Congress to explore DOE's arrangement with PECO in detail. I
    applaud the deal made by the nation's leading nuclear utility in the
    state of our new Homeland Security Director, Tom Ridge, while he was a
    fellow Governor in Pennsylvania. The PECO arrangement is a convincing
    and practical alternative to a diseased and utopian Yucca Mountain
    project. It is a real contributor to national security, not a mythical
    one.
                                   conclusion
        The State of Nevada will redouble its efforts to bring science and
    the law back to the nation's high-level waste program, and to restore
    sanity to America's nuclear energy security policy. But we are not
    alone.
        A growing chorus of scientists and independent technical reviewers
    has voiced grave reservations about the project. These include the
    NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste, the General Accounting
    Office, the Congressionally-created Nuclear Waste Technical Review
    Board, the National Academy of Sciences, Physics Today, the
    International Atomic Energy Agency, and the OECD's Nuclear Energy
    Agency, among others. A recent national poll concludes that those
    Americans opposed to Yucca Mountain now equal in number those in favor.
        I urge each and every one of you to look carefully at the facts.
    Yes, Yucca Mountain is the most studied piece of real estate in the
    world. What the studies starkly concluded, however, has been
    overshadowed by the mere fact they occurred. A hundred more years of
    study will not change the fatally poor geology of Yucca Mountain, or
    remove the site from an earthquake fault zone. Nor will decades of
    moving waste across the countryside to Yucca Mountain even dent the
    amount of spent nuclear fuel stored above ground at nuclear sites
    throughout America.
        We are well beyond the days when Yucca Mountain was simply Nevada's
    problem. If the project proceeds, high-level nuclear waste shipments
    will impact as many as 44 states, 703 counties, and 109 cities with
    populations of 100,000 or greater, including several major metropolitan
    areas. Nearly 50 million American citizens reside within three miles of
    a proposed shipping route. There will be more spent fuel shipments in
    the first year of Yucca Mountain operations than occurred in the entire
    history of such shipments in this country. We are in this together.
        In short order, Congress will have the prerogative to consider my
    Notice of Disapproval and, under procedures in the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act, override it by simple majority vote in both houses, with a
    signature by the President. I respectfully urge Congress not to take
    such action. With the proliferation of safe, economical dry storage
    facilities at reactor sites, we face no spent fuel emergency. Nuclear
    power plants face no risk of shutdown. We have the time to do this
    right. And Yucca Mountain is not right.
        Nevada deserves better, and so does this nation.

                             *      *      *      *

        For additional information, see Nevada's Yucca Mountain website at
    www.state.nv.us/nucwaste. This Statement of Reasons has been posted
    there.
                                     ______

                              Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition,
                                           Pinehurst, NC, May 16, 2002.
    Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
    Chairman, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Washington,
            DC.
    Re: Senate Joint Resolution 34

        Dear Mr. Chairman: As testimony for the record, the members of the
    Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition (NWSC) strongly support the
    President's recent designation of Yucca Mountain as the nation's
    geological permanent repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel
    and high-level radioactive waste. Accordingly, we strongly support
    approval of Senate Joint Resolution 34 (S.J. Res. 34), and we urge the
    Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee to send it to the full
    Senate for a vote as soon as possible.
        The NWSC is comprised of state regulators, state attorneys general,
    nuclear electric utilities and associate members working together to
    hold the Federal government accountable for its contractual and
    statutory obligations to remove spent nuclear fuel from power plants
    across the nation to interim storage and eventually to a permanent
    repository. Our membership includes participants front 44 organizations
    in 25 states.
        There have been many recent efforts to obfuscate the facts about
    transportation of high-level nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain by those
    opposed to this Resolution. The Department of Energy (DOE) is
    approximately 5 years away from selecting the mode, routes and
    timetable as to how 70,000 MTU, as mandated by the NWPA, will be
    transported to Nevada.\1\ The DOE will be collaborating with the State
    of Nevada, Tribal and local governments, and Federal agencies on the
    transportation infrastructure systems in accordance with the Department
    of Transportation regulations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Department of Energy/OCRWM, Transportation of Radioactive
    Materials and Yucca Mountain, April 2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Over the last 30 years, there have been more than 2,700 shipments
    of spent nuclear fuel travelling over 1.6 million miles and there has
    never been a release of radioactive material harmful to the public or
    the environment--not one.\2\ If a repository is licensed at Yucca
    Mountain, the DOE projects approximately 4,300 shipments over a 24-year
    period, averaging 175 shipments of spent nuclear fuel per year, a
    relatively small amount compared with the approximately 300 million
    annual, shipments of hazardous materials, (explosives, chemicals,
    flammable liquids, corrosive materials, and other type of radioactive
    materials), that are currently transported around the country every
    day.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The Department of Energy/OCRWM, Transportation of Radioactive
    Materials and Yucca Mountain, April 2002.
        \3\ The Department of Transportation Office of Hazardous Materials
    Safety Research and Special Programs Administration, October 1998.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Further, the DOE has spent more than 20 years investigating whether
    Yucca Mountain would be a suitable site as a repository. Studies
    undertaken clearly demonstrate that the science and technical
    evaluations support the President's decision to recommend that the
    Yucca Mountain site be developed as a permanent repository
    Additionally, the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), as amended,
    clearly mandates the DOE to continue with scientific studies as it
    proceeds with the multi-year formal licensing process. As further
    specified in the NWPA, the licensing process will be conducted before
    an independent federal agency, the Nuclear Regulator Commission, which
    will hold several years of hearings designed to scrutinize the DOE's
    findings. Failure by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee
    to pass S.J. Res. 34 designating Yucca Mountain site will kill the only
    Federal spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste management
    program and keep spent nuclear fuel rods and high-level nuclear waste
    stranded indefinitely at multiple locations nationwide.
        Under the NWPA, Congress created the Federal Nuclear Waste Fund for
    the purpose of funding the removal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
    radioactive waste from the nation's plant sites and to provide a
    permanent disposal repository. Since 1983, the nation's ratepayers have
    contributed more than $20 billion, including interest, into the Fund--
    it should now be used for its intended purpose.
        We urge the members of the Committee to keep S.J. Res. 34 focused
    as specified under Section 115(a), in the NWPA, and vote ``no'' to any
    amendments or procedural issues that would effectively kill the
    Resolution. We urge the Committee to allow the Resolution to proceed to
    the Senate floor unencumbered and unimpeded.
        In conclusion, the NWSC urges the Committee to recognize that
    failure to override Nevada's objection to development of the Yucca
    Mountain site could be detrimental to the nation's energy supply,
    security, economy the ratepayers, and our environment.
                Sincerely,
                                            LeRoy Koppendrayer,
                                                              Chairman.
                                     ______

      National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners,
                                          Washington, DC, May 22, 2002.
    Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
    Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,
            Washington, DC.
    Re: Yucca Mountain Hearings

        Dear Mr. Chairman: The National Association of Regulatory Utility
    Commissioners respectfully requests that the attached statement be
    included in the record of the hearings your Committee is currently
    conducting on the President's recommendation of the Yucca Mountain site
    for development of a national nuclear waste repository.
        Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on this most
    important issue.
                Sincerely,
                                              Christopher Mele,
                                          Legislative Director, Energy.
    [Attachment.]
          Statement of the National Association of Regulatory Utility
                                 Commissioners
                                    summary
       NARUC supports the president's decision to approve the site
            at Yucca Mountain for the geologic repository.
       Analyses show that a repository at Yucca Mountain can be
            designed, built, operated, monitored and eventually sealed
            while meeting all statutory and regulatory requirements to
            protect public health and the environment. While the scientific
            research about Yucca Mountain continues, enough is known at
            this point to support the site designation today.
       Transportation of nuclear material is not new and the public
            is largely unaware of that there has been an excellent safety
            record of transportation of nuclear materials over the past-30
            years.
       Unless the government finds a way to dispose of spent
            nuclear fuel, some nuclear plants may need to shut down if they
            are unable to meet their license requirements to store used
            fuel in pool or dry storage. That will have heavy financial,
            environmental or energy supply consequences--probably all
            three. And it likely rules out any utility being willing to
            invest in a new nuclear plant.
       Most importantly, NARUC represents ratepayers in 41 States
            who have, in good faith, paid over $16 billion into the Nuclear
            Waste Fund (including interest), according to DOE, and have
            little to show for it. Worse, they have also had to pay
            utilities that had to bear additional on-site waste storage
            expenses when DOE missed the 1998 date to begin removing the
            fuel. In fact, among the States, we often ask, ``Why, after DOE
            failed to meet its contracted 1998 deadline, are we still
            paying that fee?''
       The so-called ``PECO Alternative'' is NOT an alternative.
       Reform the Nuclear Waste Fund so it is fully available for
            its intended purpose.

        NARUC is a quasi-governmental, nonprofit organization founded in
    1889. Its membership includes the State public utility commissions for
    all States and territories. NARUC's mission is to serve the public
    interest by improving the quality and effectiveness of public utility
    regulation. NARUC's members regulate the retail rates and services of
    electric, gas, water and telephone utilities. Each State Commission has
    the obligation under State law to ensure the establishment and
    maintenance of such energy utility services as may be required by the
    public convenience and necessity, and to ensure that such services are
    provided at rates and conditions that are just, reasonable and
    nondiscriminatory for all consumers.
        NARUC has had a direct stakeholder interest in the civilian
    radioactive waste management program ever since the Nuclear Waste
    Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) established that the federal government is
    responsible for safe, permanent disposal of high-level radioactive
    waste and spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear reactors, as well
    as making certain that the utilities pay their share of these disposal
    costs. The primary reason for NARUC's interest is that the fees paid by
    nuclear utilities to the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) are passed along to
    ratepayers through their electric bills. We would submit that passing
    the costs of the NWT on to the ratepayers has been the only aspect of
    the NWPA that has taken place on schedule.
        We strongly support the President's decision to approve the site at
    Yucca Mountain for the geologic repository. It is an historic milestone
    for this troubled program and it is legally and scientifically sound.
        We say ``troubled'' because, as the Committee members know well,
    there have been a series of technical, political, legal and financial
    hurdles that have had the cumulative effect of delay to the point
    where, even under the most optimistic schedule, nuclear waste will not
    begin to be emplaced in the repository until 2010--twelve years after
    the mandate set in the NWPA.
        The Department of Energy (DOE) has spent over four billion dollars
    studying the site at Yucca Mountain for suitability for repository use,
    in what I have heard described as the most studied piece of real estate
    on earth. NARUC praises the dedication and professionalism of the
    inter-disciplinary public and private sector team of scientists who
    have worked on this unprecedented venture and upon whose analytic
    investigations the President can rely upon with confidence.
        The science is right. Analyses by the DOE team show that a
    repository at Yucca Mountain can be designed, built, operated,
    monitored and eventually sealed while meeting all statutory and
    regulatory requirements to protect public health and the environment.
    Principle among those requirements is the radiation standards
    established by the Environmental Protection Agency. While the
    scientific research about Yucca Mountain continues, more than enough is
    known at this point to support the site designation today.
        The time is right. Yucca Mountain is the right place. While we can
    never have perfect information, it is hard to imagine a better site. We
    know there are questions that remain to be addressed to the fullest
    extent required to support a license approval by the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, but extensive findings support the President's decision to
    advance toward that next step. Secretary of Energy Abraham put it in
    the right context in his site recommendation when he observed that
    Yucca Mountain has been studied for a longer amount of time than it
    took to plan and complete the moon landing. Let us move on.
        First and foremost, let us continue to focus on sound scientific
    facts surrounding the site designation, not the fear campaign being
    conducted, in particular, on the subject of nuclear waste
    transportation. These arguments ignore the excellent safety record of
    transportation of nuclear materials over the past 30 years. Each of
    those shipments, and all future shipments to Yucca Mountain, are and
    will be carefully planned and conducted under NRC, as well as other
    federal and State agency regulatory oversight. The public is largely
    unaware of that record, however, and is often predisposed to believe
    the worst about anything nuclear. The public may not realize, that
    despite claims of ``100,000 shipments through 43 States and many large
    cities over 40 years,'' DOE has yet to choose either the mode (truck or
    rail) of shipments or any of the routes. In the Final Environmental
    Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain, DOE states a ``preference for the
    mostly rail scenario,'' which would involve approximately 11,000
    shipments over 24 years. If the ``mostly truck'' alternative is more
    feasible, it would involve 53,300 shipments over the same period. We
    join others in urging that DOE consult with federal, State, tribal and
    local governments--as DOE has said it will--to coordinate these
    important decisions so that all will be prepared to ensure that the
    past safety record is sustained or exceeded. DOE is working today with
    the transuranic shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in
    New Mexico and we believe that States and local governments, with the
    assistance to public safety officials provided for in Section 180 of
    the NWPA, can be prepared so that waste can be safely moved to Yucca
    Mountain.
        The Secretary of Energy's Site Recommendation to the President is
    compelling. While NARUC did not join the flurry of press releases that
    were unleashed the day the report was out, because we chose to read the
    recommendation first, we did issue a release praising the
    recommendation and the President's acceptance of it the following
    Monday. The Secretary carefully examined the statutory and regulatory
    requirements and summarized the analyses derived from a plethora of
    supporting technical documents. As a result of this exhaustive
    examination of the data, the Secretary presented the conclusion that
    the scientific basis exists to meet the requirements. Additionally, he
    developed and added the five ``compelling national interests'' that are
    found in the recommendation. It is often lost in the discussions of
    this subject, for example, that a geologic repository would still be
    needed for defense-related materials even if there never were nuclear
    power plants. Secretary Abraham is to be commended for the diligence
    with which he applied his own evaluation of the site qualifications and
    need, including addressing the arguments against recommending the site.
        NARUC supports the President's decision to accept the
    recommendation. He is aware of the likely criticism and expected
    reactions from those who either oppose anything to do with nuclear
    energy or the actions taken by Congress in 1987 to designate a single
    site to examine for suitability. In our opinion, President Bush has the
    sound science basis to support the decision he has made.
        NARUC and its members have a direct interest in the disposal of
    spent fuel from commercial power plants for two reasons:

              1. Unless the government finds a way to dispose of spent
            nuclear fuel, some nuclear plants may need to shut down if they
            are unable to meet their license requirements to store used
            fuel in pool or dry storage. That will have heavy financial,
            environmental or energy supply consequences--probably all
            three. And it likely rules out any utility being willing to
            invest in a new nuclear plant.
              2. Most importantly, we represent ratepayers in 41 States who
            have, in good faith, paid over $16 billion into the Nuclear
            Waste fund (including interest), according to DOE, and have
            little to show for it. The utility ratepayers that are
            represented by NARUC's members have paid the fees required to
            pay for this program. Worse, they have also had to pay
            utilities that had to bear additional on-site waste storage
            expenses when DOE missed the 1998 date to begin removing the
            fuel. In our opinion, this begs the question, ``Why, after DOE
            failed to meet its contracted 1998 deadline, are we still
            paying that fee?''

        Therefore, it is a matter of equity to those who are paying for
    this program that we move forward to the next step. Let the technical
    and legal experts of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission make the
    decision that really counts, whether to issue a construction license
    for the repository. That is the role the NWPA assigns to the
    independent Commission which bears the mission to protect the public
    health, safety, and the environment for all nuclear activities in this
    country, in a rigorous and adjudicative public process.
        The equity issue is pretty simple. When you make an obligation, you
    honor it or you face the consequences. Since the Nuclear Waste Policy
    Act set the policy that the disposal of the Nation's high-level
    radioactive waste must be the Federal Government's responsibility, the
    utilities can hardly switch to another removal agent. Similarly, the
    electric utility ratepayers or consumers have upheld their part of the
    deal. The money has been paid to the utilities to pay the Federal
    Government to pay for the program. Given the sound scientific basis for
    the Secretary and President's decisions to recommend the site, it is
    now time for the U.S. Congress to do the right thing, honor its
    commitment and move this program to the next step of the license
    application process.
        A final issue that needs to be addressed is the so-called ``DECO
    Alternative.'' Some opponents of the Yucca Mountain site have asserted
    that there is a viable alternative to Yucca Mountain, referring to the
    example of a settlement agreement reached between DECO Energy and DOE
    over expenses already incurred by PECO at its Peach Bottom Nuclear
    Plant. Those expenses were due solely to DOE's failure to meet the NWPA
    mandate to begin accepting commercial spent nuclear fuel in 1998, as
    contractually bound with DECO. Governor Guinn has misinterpreted the
    stopgap measure to recover costs of waste acceptance delay as a
    substitute for geologic disposal. In short the ``PECO Alternative'' is
    not an alternative at all.
        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act sets national policy for geologic
    disposal as the permanent solution for all high-level radioactive waste
    disposal. It does not allow for temporary on-site storage costs to be
    paid from the Nuclear Waste Fund, which is why several utilities are
    suing DOE over the Peach Bottom settlement. The settlement agreement
    basically allows the utility to forgo required payments to the Nuclear
    Waste Fund up until the amount agreed in the settlement. This has the
    effect of diverting NWF payments that are intended for permanent
    disposal to cover on-site storage costs that are due solely to the
    government's ongoing failure to begin waste acceptance. If all
    utilities were to enter into similar settlements, there would be no
    revenue flowing to the NWF and the repository could never be built.
    Moreover, for those plants already shut down there are no payments to
    credit against the storage costs.
        Leaving spent fuel at current commercial and government storage
    sites indefinitely is not the solution to the waste disposal problem
    that the NWPA contemplated twenty years ago. The DECO settlement does
    not provide for geologic disposal nor has the Peach Bottom site or any
    of the other 71 reactor locations been studied for suitability for
    indefinite storage. The Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement
    compared disposing of nuclear waste at the Yucca Mountain geologic
    repository with leaving the waste at the 77 commercial and government
    sites, where it is currently, for the same 10,000 year period of
    isolation from the human environment. The ``No Action'' approach was
    found to have one of two consequences; it would either cost $5 trillion
    dollars or have intolerable human and environmental repercussions,
    depending on what assumptions were made about regulatory compliance for
    the sites once the reactors reach the end of their productive operating
    lives. There is no need for Congress to ``explore'' the PECO approach:
    the Environmental Impact Statement has already done that and the
    financial or environmental consequences are simply unacceptable.
        In conclusion, NARUC has been frustrated in the past with all the
    delays, but we are encouraged that the President has recommended that
    the program move forward and we urge the Senate to concur with the
    House by passing a resolution approving the President's site
    recommendation.
        Thank you for the opportunity to present our views. We hope that
    once Congress has addressed the issue of site recommendation, that it
    will then undertake the equally important issue of reforming the
    Nuclear Waste Fund, so it is fully available for its intended purpose.
    Without such reform the repository may never be built, even if
    approved.
                                     ______

                                           Glen Echo, MD, May 28, 2002.
    Hon. Jeff Bingaman,
    U.S. Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Washington, DC.
        Dear Mr. Chairman: In last Thursday's hearing on Yucca Mountain you
    asked NRC Chairman Meserve to respond to my testimony that ``the NRC's
    licensing rule does not have any separate requirement for effectiveness
    of geologic barriers.'' You received the following answer (with my
    emphasis):

            NRC Chairman Meserve: Let me say that the testimony, Mr.
            Gilinsky's testimony may reflect some misunderstanding of both
            of the statute and of our regulatory requirements in that the
            statute requires the consideration of both natural and
            engineered barriers. As to our regulatory requirements, it is
            part of our general philosophy that we supply defense in depth
            and that we look for a variety of different means to ensure
            that the regulatory requirements can be satisfied and that
            would include both natural and engineered barriers. And we
            anticipate that any DOE application for the site would reflect
            the effectiveness of various of these barriers. We do not have
            separate requirements for each of the barriers. And that of
            course is consistent with the advice that the Department of
            Energy and we received from the National Academy of Sciences
            that the systems should be viewed as an integrated whole and
            that all the barriers should work synergistically with each
            other. And that we see an integrated picture rather than
            looking at each barriers in isolation.

        In short, Chairman Meserve agreed that NRC's licensing rule does
    not have any separate requirements for effectiveness of geologic
    barriers. But he also prefaced this specific response with a discussion
    that could easily have left the listener with the opposite impression.
    In view of the question's significance for distinguishing between DOE's
    and NRC's responsibilities, I thought it was important to provide this
    additional clarification and emphasis. I would be grateful if you would
    include this letter in the record of the hearing.
        It was a pleasure to appear before you and the members of the
    Committee on this issue which is so important to the Nation.
                Sincerely,
                                                       Victor Gilinsky.
                                     ______

      Statement of Ellen G. Engleman, Administrator Research and Special
           Programs Administration U.S. Department of Transportation
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, and members of the committee, I
    appreciate the opportunity to provide this statement discussing DOT's
    role in ensuring the safe transportation of hazardous materials;
    including spent nuclear fuel.
        Spent nuclear fuel has been transported safely in the United States
    for many years. It is noteworthy that there have been many hundreds of
    domestic shipments of spent nuclear fuel with no deaths, no injuries,
    and no releases of the hazardous material. Right now, approximately 15
    shipments of spent nuclear fuel are being made annually by utilities,
    academic institutions, and other facilities that are regulated by the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). There also are shipments by the
    military and other shippers not regulated by NRC. All future shipments
    of spent fuel, just as the ones being made today, will be subject to
    mandatory transportation requirements and operational procedures to
    minimize the risks involved in that transportation.
                                  agency roles
        Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the Department of Energy
    (DOE) has primary responsibility to plan for and arrange the
    transportation of spent nuclear fuel to a geological repository. NRC
    licenses storage facilities and also approves the packages and requires
    transportation in accordance with a physical protection plan. Within
    DOT, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) issues
    hazardous materials regulations, the Federal Railroad Administration
    (FRA) issues rail safety regulations, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Administration (FMCSA) issues motor carrier safety regulations, and the
    United States Coast Guard issues marine transportation safety
    regulations--all of which apply to the transportation of spent nuclear
    fuel and other radioactive materials. RSPA, DOE, and the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have provided grants, courses, and
    course materials for emergency responder training related to this
    transportation.
                            regulatory requirements
        I want to provide a brief overview of the regulatory requirements
    that would apply to spent fuel shipments to Yucca Mountain. Because of
    NRC's jurisdiction over these and other facets of nuclear waste and
    other radioactive materials transportation, and DOT's jurisdiction over
    hazardous materials transportation, the two agencies have entered into
    a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the regulation of the transport
    of all radioactive materials. Under the MOU, NRC has the lead
    responsibility for the review and certification of the packages that
    are and will be used for spent nuclear fuel transportation. The MOU has
    been an effective vehicle for a sound regulatory program drawing upon
    the expertise of both agencies.
        Nuclear fuel must be packaged for transportation in cask containers
    approved by NRC. These specialized casks both reduce the effects of
    radiation during routine transportation and in a transport accident.
    NRC's certification process requires demonstration through tests and
    analyses that casks can survive hypothetical accident scenarios. The
    on-going radiation exposure protection provided by the casks is equally
    important for transportation workers who load and unload a shipment of
    spent nuclear fuel from its conveyance or remain near it during its
    movement in transportation. Because the time that it takes to move a
    shipment from origin to destination directly affects radiation
    exposure, DOT requires that shipments of spent nuclear fuel be planned
    to avoid intermediate stops to the extent practicable.
        Within DOT, several agencies are involved in regulating the
    transportation of spent nuclear fuel. RSPA's regulations, issued under
    the Federal hazardous material transportation law, impose packaging,
    hazard communication, training, operational, and other requirements;
    they specifically prohibit unnecessary delay in the transportation of
    hazardous materials. FRA's regulations, issued under the Federal
    Railroad Safety Act, impose requirements to ensure the safe rail
    transportation of hazardous materials. FMCSA's regulations, issued
    under the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act, impose requirements to
    ensure the safe highway transportation of hazardous materials; they
    require the use of routes that minimize time in transit when spent
    nuclear fuel is transported by motor vehicle. FMCSA's routing
    regulations permit States, following Federal regulatory guidelines, to
    designate certain routes for transporting hazardous material. Preferred
    routes are Interstate highways and alternate routes designated by a
    State routing agency. An Interstate bypass or beltway around a city,
    when available, must be used rather than an Interstate route through a
    city. Many States have designated highway routes for radioactive and
    other hazardous materials (or restricted the use of other routes), in
    accordance with FMCSA's regulations. Under these DOT regulations, a
    State or locality may not designate (or restrict the use of) routes
    that ``export'' transportation risks to a neighboring jurisdiction or
    unnecessarily delay the transportation of hazardous materials. To
    protect barges engaged in spent fuel transportation, the Coast Guard
    can impose moving security zones around barges under the Magnuson Act
    and 33 C.F.R. Part 6, and can impose moving safety zones around barges
    under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA); under the PWSA, Coast
    Guard captains of the port can take other protective actions.
        Rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel adhere to recommendations of
    the Association of American Railroads for the use of special or
    dedicated trains over key routes. These special trains carry no other
    cargo and have priority use of the mainline. Key routes are higher
    volume lines that have safety detection devices (such as wheel bearing
    detectors) and receive the most frequent inspections and best
    maintenance.
        The NRC's requirements for physical protection of a shipment of
    spent nuclear fuel, including armed escorts who must be in close
    contact with a communications center about the status of the shipment,
    protect against intentional or unintentional disruption of the
    transportation and reduce the risks of an accident or incident. The
    same is true of other operational requirements, including State and
    local provisions that address traffic control and local safety hazards,
    as well as regulations of RSPA and its sister agencies within DOT--FRA
    for rail carriers, FMCSA for motor carriers, and the Coast Guard for
    water carriers. All transportation workers must have training in the
    requirements that apply to the functions they perform and how to avoid
    accidents and protect themselves from the hazards of materials being
    transported. Escorts for shipments of spent nuclear fuel must be
    trained in security measures, communications, responding to
    contingencies and threats, the hazards of radiation, and the Federal,
    State and local requirements that apply to the transportation of
    radioactive materials.
        Many Federal and State agencies enforce these regulatory
    requirements through inspections. For example, FMCSA has worked with
    DOE and the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) to develop the
    CVSA Level VI Enhanced Radioactive Inspection Protocols. Under these
    protocols, every vehicle transporting spent nuclear fuel is required
    (by DOE contract) to be inspected at its point of origin. This
    inspection includes radiation scans, as well as driver and vehicle
    compliance checks. Any defect discovered during the inspection,
    regardless of how minor, must be corrected before transportation
    begins.
                               emergency response
        In addition to imposing regulatory requirements intended to prevent
    incidents and releases, DOT and its partners are concerned about
    emergency response in the event an incident should occur. Effective
    response to a transportation accident or incident involving spent
    nuclear fuel is enhanced through Federal requirements and resources,
    including financial assistance to States and localities for emergency
    response planning and training. DOE maintains regional emergency
    management field offices that can dispatch qualified response teams to
    an incident involving nuclear material, although the first responders
    on the scene of an accident usually are local fire departments and law
    enforcement agencies. RSPA's hazard communication requirements
    (placarding, shipping papers, and package marking and labeling) inform
    these responders of the hazards involved. For shipments of spent
    nuclear fuel, coordination with local responders is also enhanced by
    the NRC's physical protection requirements that provide for advance
    notification to the State governor of each shipment to or through the
    State and advance arrangements with local law enforcement agencies for
    response to an emergency or a call by escorts for assistance. Local
    emergency response capabilities are strengthened by RSPA's planning and
    training grants to States, who in turn pass at least 75% of the grants
    through to local communities. Significantly, both DOE and FEMA have
    actively conducted and promoted emergency responder training that
    enhances the ability of State and local fire, police and other
    emergency personnel to respond to and mitigate hazardous materials
    spills and other incidents.
                                    summary
        DOT provides a regulatory structure for the safe transportation of
    spent nuclear fuel, other radioactive materials, and all other
    hazardous materials. Our enforcement of those regulatory requirements
    would be greatly assisted by passage of legislation to reauthorize the
    hazardous materials transportation safety program; the Administration's
    proposal was introduced last year as H.R. 3276 and S. 1669. In
    partnership with other Federal agencies, States, local and tribal
    governments, and carriers and shippers of hazardous materials, we will
    continue to ensure the safe transportation of all hazardous materials
    into, through, and within the United States.
                                     ______

      Statement of Dr. Gail H. Marcus, President, American Nuclear Society
        Mr. Chairman, as President of the American Nuclear Society, I
    appreciate the opportunity to provide a written statement on behalf of
    ANS regarding transportation issues related to the nuclear waste
    repository at Yucca Mountain for the committee's hearing.
        ANS' confidence in the safety of high-level waste (HLW)
    transportation arises from the robustness of the cask design, the
    demonstrated safety record of HLW transportation and safeguards in the
    transportation process. I would like to elaborate on each of these
    factors.
                         robustness of the cask design
        Casks used for shipping spent nuclear fuel are designed to protect
    against radiation exposure to the public under both normal and accident
    conditions. The casks are designed and tested in accordance with
    requirements established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
    Department of Transportation and documented in volumes 10 and 49 of the
    U.S. Code of Federal Regulations.
        The casks are about 15 times thicker than a gasoline tank truck
    shell and they include three inches of stainless steel with thick lead
    radiation shields. Typically, for every ton of spent nuclear fuel,
    there are more than three tons of protective packaging and shielding.
        Casks are designed and tested to withstand crashes, fire, water
    immersion and puncture. To be certified, a cask design must withstand a
    sequence of four tests that measure its performance in specified crash
    and fire accident conditions. This means the casks are designed to
    contain its contents in the event an accident occurs.
    Safety Record of Transportation
        Over the past 40 years, about 3,000 shipments of spent nuclear fuel
    have navigated more than 1.7 million miles of U.S. roads and railways.
    Since the early days off HLW transportation, 90 spent fuel casks have
    been involved in accidents. None of these accidents resulted in any
    release of radioactive material.
        It should be noted that the impact tests required by Federal
    Regulation exert forces on the casks that are greater than the impact
    forces (g forces) in the worst recorded accidents. Temperatures
    produced in the casks by the regulatory fire tests are higher than
    those in any recorded fire accident.
        In addition, Sandia National Laboratories has conducted three
    extra-regulatory types oh tests:

       A 20-ton truck cask struck by a 120-ton diesel locomotive
            traveling at 81 mph
       A 22-ton cask on a flatbed crashed into a 690-ton concrete
            block at 84 mph
       A propane tank car exploding next to a cask in a pool fire,
            throwing the cask 33 feet.

        The casks emerged from these tests with only minor damage, and in
    none of the tests did the casks fail to hold their contents.
        While there would be more shipments of nuclear waste in the coming
    years as a result of the opening of Yucca Mountain, the probability of
    radiation exposure to the public from an accident would remain low
    because casks of the same design would be used and the same safety
    procedures would be followed.
        Recently, concerns have been raised about the potential impacts of
    terrorist attacks during the transport of HLW. While there are many
    dimensions to the issue of terrorism that we, as a nation, are only
    beginning to understand, we can say that the same features that render
    casks highly resistant to highway and rail accidents tend to make them
    difficult targets for such attacks. By comparison, many hazardous
    chemical and other substances are shipped by truck and rail in less
    robust containers, and are more apt, if successfully attacked, to
    result in immediate casualties.
                    safeguards in the transportation process
        Public routes used for the transport of nuclear materials must meet
    strict safety requirements before nuclear fuel is transported.
    Department of Transportation regulations require carriers of certain
    controlled radioactive materials, such as spent fuel, to use the safest
    routes available. Risk assessments of the transportation of radioactive
    materials evaluate factors such as accident rate, transit time,
    population density, other vehicles sharing the route and time of day.
        The DOT identifies ``preferred routes,'' which consist primarily of
    interstate highways and bypass routes around cities, where such bypass
    routes exist, or an alternative route selected by a state routing
    authority. If the routing authority selects an alternate route, it must
    demonstrate by a routing analysis that using the alternate route does
    not increase overall risk. Alternate route selections must be preceded
    by consultations between DOT and affected state and local authorities
    before such designations can go into effect.
        Most materials being transported are monitored by global satellites
    and are monitored at all times during the transportation process.
    Specialized trucking companies handle spent nuclear fuel shipments in
    the United States. These experienced, specially licensed companies haul
    all kinds of hazardous materials more than 50 million miles annually.
    Vehicles are state of the art, equipped with computers that provide an
    instantaneous update on the truck's location and convey messages
    between driver and dispatcher through a satellite communications
    network. Drivers receive extensive training and must be certified by
    the federal government.
                                   in summary
        The regulatory requirements on casks and transportation security,
    and the industry's high level of performance, have produced a safety
    record that would be difficult to match. This performance record gives
    us strong confidence that the transport of spent nuclear fuel to Yucca
    Mountain can and will be conducted without harm to the public.
        Mr. Chairman, we sincerely appreciate the opportunities to share
    our views and facts concerning the safety of transporting nuclear fuel.
        The American Nuclear Society is a professional society devoted to
    advancing nuclear science and technology.
                                     ______

           Statement of Allan Rutter, Administrator Federal Railroad
               Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, and members of the Committee, I am
    very pleased to have the opportunity to present this statement on the
    important subject of the transportation of nuclear wastes. The Federal
    Railroad Administration (FRA), on behalf of the Secretary of
    Transportation, administers the Federal railroad safety laws, including
    those concerning the transportation of hazardous materials by rail.
    Ranking at the top of FRA's priorities is the safety of rail shipments
    involving Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) \1\ and High-Level Radioactive Waste
    (HLRW).\2\ These materials have been transported safely by rail in the
    United States for more than 45 years. Since 1957, approximately 1,100
    shipments of SNF and HLRW have traversed our Nation's railroad system.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) defines ``spent
    nuclear fuel'' as ``fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor
    following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not been
    separated by reprocessing.''
        \2\ NWPA defines ``high-level radioactive waste'' as ``(A) the
    highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of spent
    nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing
    and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that contains
    fission products in sufficient concentrations; and (B) other highly
    radioactive material that the Commission, consistent with existing law,
    determines by rule requires permanent isolation.'' The term
    ``Commission'' as used in the definition means the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To ensure the safe transportation of nuclear materials by rail, FRA
    works as part of a multi-agency team that includes, among others: the
    Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
    the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Research and Special
    Programs Administration (RSPA), and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Administration (FMCSA). We also work closely with various State
    governmental organizations, including the Council of State Governments,
    the Western Governors Association, and the Southern States Energy
    Board.
        DOE, of course, has broad responsibilities in the area of nuclear
    power that include planning and arranging for the transportation of SNF
    and HLRW. NRC, in addition to licensing nuclear facilities, has
    developed the overall design criteria for the casks in which these
    materials are transported and reviews and approves physical security
    plans for spent fuel shipments. RSPA, another agency of the Department
    of Transportation, sets the standards for the transportation of all
    hazardous materials, including SNF and HLRW. RSPA's relevant standards
    cover hazard communication, shipment documentation, packaging safety,
    and training. FMCSA oversees the safety and routing of shipments by
    highway.
        In general, FRA establishes safety standards concerning the design,
    maintenance, and inspection of many elements of our Nation's railroad
    system, including track, motive power and equipment, signal and train
    control, operating practices, and hazardous materials transportation.
    Railroads are required to conduct their own inspections to ensure that
    these safety standards are being met. FRA leads a cadre of
    approximately 400 Federal and State safety inspectors whose role is not
    to conduct safety inspections for the railroad industry, but to monitor
    the railroad industry's own inspection forces to ascertain whether the
    railroads are in compliance with applicable Federal safety standards.
    FRA inspectors accomplish this task by conducting routine, random and
    programmed inspections of railroad properties and comparing their
    findings to a railroad's own inspection records. Thus, while primary
    responsibility for inspecting the railroads rests with the railroads
    themselves, FRA's inspection strategy is to ensure the integrity and
    effectiveness of the railroads' own inspection programs.
        With regard to rail transportation of SNF and HLRW in particular,
    FRA conducts inspections to verify that the shipment is properly
    prepared and in compliance with all applicable hazardous materials
    regulations. We also help to ensure that the track, signal systems,
    grade crossings, bridges, and rail vehicles used for these shipments
    are in safe condition and that responsible railroad employees are
    properly trained and briefed. In these activities, of course, we work
    very closely with the railroads, their employees, and the affected
    communities. We believe the regulatory structure, planning, monitoring,
    coordination, and experience have produced a very safe system for the
    transportation of nuclear wastes by rail, but we understand the need to
    continue to improve that system to meet the new challenges posed by the
    expected increase in those shipments and the post-September 11th
    security environment.
                  rail transportation of radioactive materials
        Railroad transportation is well suited to moving high-level
    radioactive materials safely and efficiently. Complementary Federal
    regulations issued by RSPA and NRC require SNF and HLRW, even when
    shipped in small amounts, to be transported in specially shielded
    containers or casks that conform to NRC's regulations for Type B
    containers. Typically, in accordance with NRC's standards, these casks
    are constructed of multiple layers of stainless steel with shielding
    sandwiched in between the layers of steel to protect against
    radioactive emissions. Railroads are ideally suited to moving these
    large, heavy casks.
        Most rail shipments of SNF or HLRW move in casks that weigh up to
    125 tons when loaded and are capable of carrying large quantities of
    high-level radioactive material. Many truckloads would be required to
    move an equivalent amount of nuclear material by highway. To get a
    sense of the great efficiencies that can be achieved by moving high-
    level nuclear materials by rail, consider the data projections
    presented in the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Yucca
    Mountain site. Over the 24-year period covered by the EIS, there will
    be approximately 10,700 shipments of SNF, which means there will be
    about 150 train movements carrying up to 450 shipments (three shipments
    per train) annually. To carry this same quantity of SNF by truck would
    require approximately 53,000 shipments over 24 years, which would mean
    2,200 highway movements (one shipment per truck) annually. The inherent
    efficiency of rail transportation in moving SNF and HLRW has a direct
    bearing on safety, as fewer shipments of nuclear materials mean less
    public exposure and less opportunity for a transportation incident.
        Rail movements of SNF and HLRW have a long and very positive
    history, and the volume of these shipments is growing. The Navy has
    been shipping SNF to disposal sites since 1957. In 1989, Carolina Power
    and Light began sending SNF from its commercial nuclear reactors to
    temporary storage facilities. Several years ago, FRA realized that the
    relatively modest number of rail shipments of SNF and HLRW, which had
    numbered between 15 and 25 annually during the early 1990s, was likely
    to increase dramatically. In 1995, DOE began shipment of SNF and HLRW
    as part of its Foreign Research Reactor Fuel Program, which is intended
    to safeguard SNF shipped from research reactors around the world and is
    an important element in the Nation's nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
    As a result of these programs, rail shipments of SNF and HLRW increased
    from 38 shipments in 1997 to an average of more than 64 shipments per
    year in the succeeding years. Furthermore, two separate consortiums of
    commercial nuclear power producers each anticipate initiating as many
    as 100 rail shipments per year of SNF and HLRW to temporary storage
    facilities, possibly as early as next year. Therefore, even without the
    Yucca Mountain shipments, rail shipments of SNF and HLRW are destined
    to increase sharply.
                 fba's safety compliance oversight plan (scop)
        Ultimately, the safe movement of SNF and HLRW depends on the
    application of sound safety regulations, policies and procedures. This
    requires extensive planning and coordination among Federal agencies,
    State and local governments, and commercial transportation companies.
        In the mid-1980s, partly as a result of the rail shipments from the
    Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, FRA implemented its High-Level
    Nuclear Waste Rail Transportation Inspection Policy for all known rail
    shipments of SNF and HLRW. Under FBA's Inspection Policy, there has
    never been a rail accident or incident involving the transportation of
    SNF or HLRW that has resulted in a release of the material from the
    packaging. Furthermore, there has never been a single death or injury
    resulting from a rail shipment of radioactive material.
        Taking a proactive approach to railroad safety, FRA recognized the
    need to enhance its high-level radioactive materials rail
    transportation inspection policy to ensure that the railroad industry's
    outstanding safety record for nuclear material shipments could continue
    unabated despite the sharp increase in nuclear materials shipments.
    Therefore, in 1998, FRA developed the Safety Compliance Oversight Plan
    For Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear
    Fuel (SCOP), which set forth an enhanced FRA policy to address the
    safety of rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. While the SCOP was originally
    developed in support of DOT's Foreign Research Reactor Fuel program,
    FRA believes this enhanced policy is necessary to ensure the safety of
    future rail shipments of SNF and HLRW, which are destined to increase
    significantly with or without the opening of Yucca Mountain.
        Development of the SCOP involved a coordinated effort between FRA,
    DOE, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), railroad labor
    organizations, and representatives of affected States. Also, through
    participation in DOT's Transportation External Coordination Working
    Group, FRA has consulted with Native American groups on the relevant
    issues. FRA wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of its
    safety partners, whose insight and wisdom were instrumental in
    formulating the policies and procedures that are incorporated into the
    SCOP.
        Key elements of the SCOP include: planning the most appropriate
    routes, training of railroad employees and emergency responders, and
    enhancing FRA safety inspection practices and overall safety oversight
    policies.
        Under the SCOP, FRA works with DOE, the offeror or its agent, and
    the rail carriers in planning and selecting the routes, emphasizing the
    selection of the highest classes of track. (FRA regulations define
    various classes of track; each class of track has a maximum allowable
    operating speed and specific design, maintenance, and inspection
    requirements. The higher the class of track, the higher the permissible
    operating speed and the more stringent the safety standards.) FRA also
    prepares an accident prediction model for the highway-rail grade
    crossings along the intended route and uses this model to assist DOE in
    coordinating with appropriate State, local, and tribal agencies in
    route planning activities. We also coordinate with Operation Lifesaver,
    a private safety organization, to increase grade crossing safety
    awareness and education in communities along designated routes. We also
    work with DOT's Office of Intelligence and Security in coordinating
    security precautions, such as the identification of ``safe havens,''
    with the offeror, law enforcement officers, and intelligence
    communities. As the new Transportation Security Administration begins
    its work in the Department, we will be coordinating closely with them
    to ensure the security of these shipments. Finally, FRA reviews the
    emergency response plans of the offeror, rail carrier, and DOE to
    ensure that they adequately address the actions to be taken in the
    unlikely event of an accident or incident involving the train.
        Training is another important element of the SCOP. It is FRA's
    policy to assist DOE, and the offeror or its agent, in the development
    of emergency response training and safety briefings and to monitor the
    industry to verify that requisite training and briefings have been
    performed. FRA also conducts reviews to ensure that train crews who
    operate the trains in which nuclear materials are transported are
    properly certified, trained, and experienced in running over the
    designated routes. FRA also checks to see that these crews have
    received specific training concerning the nature of the shipments.
        As explained above, FRA's safety inspection program is primarily
    designed to monitor the safety performance of railroads, which are
    responsible for performing their own inspections and ensuring the
    safety of their operations. However, under the SCOP, FRA plays a more
    direct role by conducting more focused and intensive safety inspections
    to ensure the highest level of safety for rail shipments of SNR and
    HLRW. For example, instead of inspecting a limited sample of
    locomotives and freight cars as we do for routine rail operations, FRA
    equipment inspectors conduct a thorough inspection of each and every
    locomotive and freight car for every train that transports SNF and
    HLRW. These inspections ensure that locomotives, freight cars, and the
    train's braking systems meet all applicable Federal safety standards.
    Furthermore, along a designated route, it is FRA's policy to observe
    the operation of all automated warning devices at highway-rail grade
    crossings, to ascertain that they are operational before the shipment.
    FRA signal inspectors also conduct inspections of selected grade
    crossing warning devices to gauge the reliability and integrity of the
    grade crossing warning system. Furthermore, FRA places operating
    practices experts in the rail carriers' dispatching centers during SNF
    and HLRW shipments on designated routes to observe firsthand the
    progress of the shipments and any operational problems that might
    arise. It is also FRA's policy to inspect all the tracks along the
    entire route of a nuclear shipment; this includes both visual
    inspections and automated inspections by FRA's track geometry vehicle
    (the T-2000), which is capable of measuring the alignment, gage and
    cross-level of every foot of railroad track. In addition, FRA reviews
    the rail carrier's rail flaw detection vehicle data to ensure that rail
    flaw inspections have been performed on the designated route, and
    necessary rail repairs have been made prior to the shipments.
        It must be emphasized that the SCOP is a living document that has
    evolved from 45 years of accumulated experience regarding the safe
    movement of nuclear materials by rail. FRA will continue to work in
    partnership with the rail community to periodically review, evaluate,
    and update the SCOP to keep pace with the latest developments and
    technologies involving the safe transportation of nuclear materials.
        From this brief description of FRA safety inspection policies under
    the SCOP, one can understand why FRA inspection resources are stretched
    to their limits, even with the relatively modest number of nuclear rail
    shipments that are currently taking place. We are working within the
    budget process to anticipate the resources needed to maintain the
    highest level of safety for SNF and HLRW rail shipments. For example,
    one of the budgetary challenges FRA will need to overcome involves our
    automated track geometry vehicle, which is capable of inspecting 30,000
    miles of track per year. When the interim nuclear storage facilities or
    Yucca Mountain begins accepting shipments of SNF and HLRW, the number
    of track miles over which SNF and HLRW travel will most assuredly
    exceed 30,000, and we must be prepared to respond to the challenge.
                         safety and security protocols
        Federal regulations for shipment of nuclear material by rail are
    augmented by a series of safety and security protocols and special
    operating restrictions that have been agreed upon by DOE and the
    railroads. These protocols and operating restrictions have evolved over
    the years and are often tailored to the particular needs of the
    individual shipments. Under these protocols, a train carrying SNF or
    HLRW would typically include the cask cars, two buffer cars (one on
    each end of the shipment to cushion against impacts in the event of a
    collision), and an occupied escort car staffed by security personnel.
    Special operating restrictions have included limitations on the maximum
    speed of trains carrying nuclear materials, requirements to stop
    opposing trains on adjacent tracks when they meet a train carrying
    nuclear materials, and requirements that nuclear material cars be
    switched only with an attached locomotive rather than allowing them to
    roll to a stop on their own during switching.
        Another convention involving the shipment of SNF and HLRW by rails
    concerns the use of dedicated trains. Until the mid-1970s, most rail
    shipments of these radioactive materials were handled in regular
    service trains that carried a wide variety of freight in addition to
    the radioactive materials cars. In 1974, the railroad industry began
    insisting that radioactive materials shipments move in dedicated trains
    that solely transport the radioactive material cars. There has been
    much debate about this topic over the years; while many nuclear
    materials shipments do move in dedicated trains today, this is not the
    case for all such shipments. (In 1977, the Interstate Commerce
    Commission issued a decision that prevented railroads from mandating
    the use of dedicated trains.) FRA has engaged the services of the John
    A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to conduct a thorough
    study of the safety and security implications surrounding the
    transportation of high-level radioactive materials in dedicated trains
    versus regular service trains. We hope to have the study completed by
    the end of this year or early next year.
        The security of rail shipments of radioactive materials has long
    been a priority even before the tragic events of September 11th. Some
    of the protocols described above contain stringent security measures to
    protect against terrorist threats, including the accompaniment of these
    shipments by armed security forces and requirements to protect the cars
    when sitting in rail yards or sidings.
        More recently, Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) technology is
    being used to track the location of trains carrying radioactive
    materials. FRA is leading a departmental effort to build a Nationwide
    Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS) that can greatly improve
    the accuracy of conventional GPS to several centimeters. This level of
    precision permits the system's user to determine exactly which track
    (where there are adjacent tracks) a train is occupying. Our goal is to
    have dual NDGPS coverage for the entire United States. Presently, 80
    percent of the continental U.S. has NDGPS coverage while 40 percent has
    dual coverage.
        Although security concerns have long played a prominent role in the
    safety of rail shipments of radioactive materials, the events of
    September 11th have reinforced the fact that we must constantly
    reassess our assumptions and beliefs. A few weeks after the attacks on
    the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Association of American
    Railroads secured the services of an experienced security firm to
    conduct a comprehensive review and assessment of the security of our
    Nation's freight railroad system. The security of hazardous materials,
    including radioactive materials, and defense-related shipments are two
    areas that have received special emphasis in the security review. FRA
    has obtained the services of its own security experts to review the AAR
    security assessment. We will provide input into the security review,
    which may include proposed enhancements for the security of rail
    shipments of nuclear materials.
        Nothing that we do in transportation after last September 11th can
    ignore the threats to security posed by terrorist organizations. The
    Federal agencies responsible for direction or oversight of these
    movements have worked successfully over the years through the
    Governors' offices of the respective States to ensure that emergency
    planning and emergency response agencies have the information and
    training they need to do their jobs. This sharing of information and
    cooperation must continue. However, it will be particularly important
    that specific information regarding routes and timing of individual
    shipments is kept secure by those with a need to know. The
    Transportation Security Administration and other participating
    agencies, including FRA, will need to evaluate how best to address this
    security concern.
                                   conclusion
        FRA believes that it is critical that rail shipments of high-level
    radioactive materials continue to be conducted with a maximum degree of
    safety and security. This can only be accomplished through a sound and
    meaningful safety partnership involving all relevant elements of the
    nuclear industry, the railroad community and appropriate Federal,
    State, and local governmental bodies. Our current safety requirements
    and practices have evolved over a period of 45 years. We must build
    upon the knowledge and experience we have gained over that period to
    meet the challenges that are likely to arise with the projected
    increase in rail shipments of SNF and high-level radioactive materials
    in today's railroad environment. As noted above, new challenges will
    arise regardless of whether or when the Yucca Mountain storage facility
    becomes operational, and when they do, FRA and its many partners are
    determined to be prepared to successfully meet these challenges.
                                     ______

            Statement of Joan Claybrook, President of Public Citizen
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the
    opportunity to submit for the record written testimony on the
    president's February 14th recommendation that a nuclear waste
    repository be developed at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and Senate Joint
    Resolution 34. I am President of Public Citizen, a national non-profit
    public interest organization with 150,000 members nationwide. Public
    Citizen works to protect citizens and the environment from the dangers
    posed by nuclear power and advocates for safe, affordable, and
    sustainable energy policies.
        Soon the Senate will face an unprecedented decision about whether
    to support or override the Governor of Nevada's Notice of Disapproval
    to prevent establishing a Yucca Mountain repository for 70,000 metric
    tons of high-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power
    plants and Department of Energy (DOE) weapons activities.
        Public Citizen urges the Committee to decisively reject Energy
    Secretary Spencer Abraham's unscientific site recommendation, support
    the Notice of Disapproval and stop the Yucca Mountain Project, in order
    to protect public health and safety. The DOE has a long record of
    investing in wasteful ventures and white elephants at a cost of tens of
    billions of dollars to the U.S. taxpayer. No private business could
    survive operating with such a string of misjudgments and failures. It
    is time for the Congress to insert a dose of reality and pull the plug
    on the hazardous Yucca Mountain venture. Just look at the DOE's
    mishandling of military nuclear waste projects, some of which were
    highlighted by 60 Minutes on Sunday, March 17, 2002 (transcript
    available on request). Yucca Mountain is poised to become another
    contaminated DOE site if the repository proposal moves forward.
                             the site is unsuitable
        After fifteen years of site characterization studies at a cost
    exceeding $5 billion, DOE scientists have been unable to demonstrate
    that a repository at Yucca Mountain could effectively isolate high-
    level nuclear waste throughout the quarter million years it remains
    dangerously radioactive. Having originally instructed the DOE to assess
    the suitability of the site for a geologic repository, Congress should
    now consider this question answered in the negative, and terminate
    repository activities at Yucca Mountain.
        The geology of the site is ill-suited to the task of containment.
    Yucca Mountain is a ridge of porous volcanic tuff, highly fractured as
    a result of seismic activity. Thirty-three earthquake faults are known
    to exist within and adjacent to the Yucca Mountain site, with
    additional fault lines expected to develop over time. The proposed
    repository would lie about 1,000 feet above a freshwater aquifer, which
    currently provides the only source of drinking water for area residents
    in Amargosa Valley, Nevada, and parts of Inyo County, California. If
    radioactivity from the proposed repository reaches the aquifer below,
    it not only will contaminate this important source of drinking water,
    which is in short supply, but also will provide a pathway for
    potentially dangerous levels of radioactivity to reach the accessible
    environment.
        Although the climate at Yucca Mountain is generally dry, evidence
    points to relatively rapid movement of water through the rock. Elevated
    levels of the tracer isotope Chlorine-36 found in the DOE's test tunnel
    at Yucca Mountain indicate that water traveled from surface- to
    repository-level (about 1,000 feet) in 50 years or faster. The original
    siting guidelines (10 CFR 960) would have disqualified the Yucca
    Mountain site on the basis of water flow time alone.
        To prevent the site from being disqualified, the government changed
    the rules. The DOE inappropriately rewrote the repository siting
    guidelines in November 2001 to accommodate the deficiencies in the
    Yucca Mountain site. The revised guidelines (10 CFR 963) are a
    dangerous departure from the concept of geologic containment and offer
    an inadequate basis for site recommendation. The new performance-based
    siting guidelines permit a reliance on ``engineered barriers'' in an
    attempt to mask the many problems that should disqualify the Yucca
    Mountain site. DOE's repository design proposals rely more than 99% on
    engineered barriers for containment. The geology of Yucca Mountain
    contributes less than 1%.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office analysis of DOE
    presentation to Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 1/25/99.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Given the difficulties in accurately predicting, on the basis of
    very limited experience, the performance of engineered barriers over
    tens of thousands of years, coupled with the inadequacies of the
    ``natural barriers'' at Yucca Mountain, it is only a question of when--
    not if--the proposed repository's isolation systems would fail.
        High-level nuclear waste is intensely radioactive and very long-
    lived. It is one of the most hazardous substances ever created. The
    waste's dangerous radioactivity will outlast any engineered barriers
    employed at Yucca Mountain. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
    site-specific radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain (40 CFR
    197) arbitrarily established a 10,000-year limit on containment
    requirements at the repository, which has been subsequently adopted by
    the DOE in its siting guidelines and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (NRC) in its Yucca Mountain licensing rule.
        Yet, high-level nuclear waste will remain dangerously radioactive
    for much longer. For example, Plutonium-239, which accounts for
    approximately 1-4% of high-level nuclear waste by weight, has a half-
    life of 24,400 years and remains dangerously radioactive for close to a
    quarter-million years. If DOE's optimistic predictions are correct and
    the underground nuclear waste storage containers at Yucca Mountain do
    not begin failing from corrosion for 40,000 years, peak radiation dose
    rates from the proposed repository are expected 100,000-200,000 years
    into the future--outside EPA's inadequate regulatory timeframe.
        The EPA's radiation standards (40 CFR 197) also establish a lower
    level of environmental protection for Yucca Mountain than the generic
    rule applicable elsewhere, by expanding the unregulated zone to 18
    kilometers from the repository boundary in the direction of groundwater
    flow. This site-specific rule allows the DOE to rely on dilution and
    dispersion in groundwater, rather than containment of radioactivity,
    and as such sets an inadequate benchmark for performance assessment
    evaluations. A map illustrating the unacceptable leniency of the EPA
    rule is attached. 1a Public Citizen, together with the
    Natural Resources Defense Council and other environmental and public
    interest organizations, filed a lawsuit last June challenging these
    aspects of the EPA rule. Our case has been consolidated with a lawsuit
    from the State of Nevada, and the joint brief, filed with the District
    of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals on May 3rd, 2002, is available
    online at http://www.nrdc.org/media/docs/020506.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1a\ The map has been retained in committee files.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        But even projections of the proposed repository's compliance with
    this inadequate standard are inconclusive. The Nuclear Waste Technical
    Review Board \2\ advised Congress on January 24, 2002, that ``the
    technical basis for the DOE's repository performance estimates is weak
    to moderate.'' Also, a December 2001 report by the General Accounting
    Office highlighted 293 unresolved technical issues, identified by the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that require further study and
    analysis.\3\ As the GAO report suggests, Secretary Abraham's site
    recommendation is premature at best.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ The presidential-appointed Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
    is an independent agency of the U.S. Government. The Board provides
    independent scientific and technical oversight of the civilian high-
    level radioactive waste management program.
        \3\ Nuclear Waste: Technical, Cost and Schedule Uncertainties of
    the Yucca Mountain Project (December 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         the risks of nuclear waste transportation cannot be justified
        Intrinsic to any assessment of Yucca Mountain's suitability as a
    national nuclear waste repository is the feasibility of transporting
    waste to the site. Yet, the DOE has consistently downplayed the
    transportation impacts of the Yucca Mountain proposal. Secretary
    Abraham's site recommendation does not detail a specific plan for
    transporting waste from the 77 nuclear power plants and DOE weapons
    sites across the country where it's currently stored to Nevada. Basic
    decisions about the mode of transportation (truck, train, or barge) and
    routes have not yet been made.
        The maps of potential Yucca Mountain transport routes, included in
    the project's final Environmental Impact Statement, indicate that tens
    of thousands of high-level radioactive waste shipments would likely
    pass through 44 states and the District of Columbia en route to Yucca
    Mountain.Recognizing the explosive nature of route designations, the
    DOE refuses to announce a specific proposal for transporting nuclear
    waste until after Yucca Mountain is licensed. At least until DOE
    reveals precisely which routes would be used for nuclear waste
    transportation and details a specific proposal for ensuring the safety
    of Yucca Mountain shipments, a vote in support of the repository
    proposal would be not only premature but grossly irresponsible.
        Transporting nuclear waste is inherently dangerous because it
    increases the likelihood of radioactive release and introduces this
    risk to densely populated areas where the emergency response/public
    health infrastructure may lack the capacity to respond effectively to a
    nuclear emergency. The Department of Transportation (DOT) recorded
    438,000 crashes involving large trucks in 2000, the most recent year
    for which statistics are available.\4\ Over the same period, the
    Federal Railroad Administration reported 2,983 train crashes.\5\
    According to RailWatch analysis of accident reports, a train carrying
    hazardous materials in the U.S. runs off the tracks, spills some of its
    load, and forces an evacuation about once every two weeks.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Large Truck Crash Facts, 2000, Analysis Division, Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (March
    2002).
        \5\ Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety, http://
    safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/, viewed 5/28/02.
        \6\ Why Is There a Train Accident Every 90 Minutes? RailWatch
    (revised March 1999).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since the dawn of the Nuclear Age, approximately 3,000 shipments of
    high-level nuclear waste have traveled on U.S. roads and rails. This
    number would be exceeded within the first two years of shipments to the
    proposed Yucca Mountain repository. While the nuclear industry
    frequently refers to an accident-free shipping history, a 1996 analysis
    of DOE accident reports \7\ documents 72 ``incidents'' since 1949
    involving nuclear waste shipments, including four involving
    ``accidental radioactive material contamination beyond the vehicle,''
    four with radiation contamination confined to the vehicle, 49 of
    accidental container surface contamination, 13 traffic accidents with
    no release or contamination, and 2 incidents with no description.
    Extrapolating on the basis of this past history and considering,
    statistically, general traffic crash rates along probable nuclear waste
    transportation routes, crashes involving Yucca Mountain shipments are
    certain to occur if the repository program moves forward.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Reported Incidents Involving Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments, 1949
    to Present, Nevada Nuclear Waste Project Office (1996).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Given the statistical certainty of crashes involving Yucca Mountain
    nuclear waste shipments, the DOE and nuclear industry safety assurances
    rest upon the robustness of shipping containers, or ``casks,'' and
    their ability to contain radioactivity even in the event of a crash.
    However, we are concerned that in the event of a severe crash casks may
    not perform as expected. DOE accident analyses fail to consider the
    statistical likelihood of manufacturing and human error and its impact
    on cask performance. Also, NRC license requirements for high-level
    radioactive waste transport casks rely on computer modeling. Amazingly,
    currently licensed casks have never had full-scale, dynamic tests.
    Limited dynamic tests in the 1970s were performed on now-obsolete casks
    and have not been repeated. In those tests, cask valves and shielding
    failed during extended fire tests. Furthermore, the NRC's performance
    requirements for nuclear waste casks (10 CFR 71.73), established in the
    1970s, are outdated and dangerously underestimate the conditions of
    today's worst-case accident scenario:

       The drop test requires casks to withstand a fall from 30
            feet onto an unyielding surface, which simulates a crash at 30
            miles per hour. Yet, no regulations are in place to limit to 30
            mph the speed at which nuclear waste shipments can travel. This
            test condition could easily be exceeded, if, for instance, a
            cask traveling at regular highway speeds (now 65-75 miles per
            hour) crashed into oncoming traffic or a virtually unyielding
            structure such as a bridge abutment.
       The burn test requires casks to withstand an engulfing fire
            at 1,475 degrees Fahrenheit for 30 minutes. Other materials
            routinely transported on our roads and rails could spark a
            hotter fire (diesel burns at 1,850 degrees) and could
            potentially burn for longer than half an hour. Last summer's
            fire in Baltimore's Howard Street train tunnel--which the DOE
            has identified as a potential Yucca Mountain shipment route--
            burned for more than 3 days and likely reached temperatures of
            at least 1,500 degrees. If a nuclear waste cask had been on the
            train involved in that accident, its containment would have
            been breached, exposing 345,493 people in the area to radiation
            and costing at least $13.7 billion dollars to clean up.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Radiological Consequences Of Severe Rail Accident Involving
    Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments To Yucca Mountain: Hypothetical Baltimore
    Rail Tunnel Fire Involving SNF, Radioactive Waste Management Associates
    (September 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The puncture test requires casks to withstand a free-fall
            from 40 inches onto an 8-inch-long spike. A train derailment or
            a truck crash on a bridge could result in a fall from much
            higher than 40 inches and potentially result in puncture damage
            to the cask's shielding.
       The same cask is required to withstand submersion in 3 feet
            of water, and a separate test requires an undamaged cask to
            withstand submersion in 200 meters of water (656 feet) for 1
            hour. If a crash involving a nuclear waste shipment occurred on
            a bridge or barge, a damaged cask could be submerged in depths
            greater than 3 feet. Furthermore, given the weight of nuclear
            waste transport casks, it is not reasonable to assume that a
            submerged cask could be rescued within one hour. Licensed truck
            casks weigh 24-27 tons, loaded, and train casks can weigh up to
            125 tons, loaded. In the case of a barge transport accident, if
            a crane capable of lifting such a massive load out of the ocean
            were not immediately available, water pressure over longer
            periods could result in cask failure and radiation release.

        The prospect of transporting high-level nuclear waste across the
    country through major population centers also poses a security risk,
    particularly in the current context of heightened national security
    concerns. Immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks, at
    least 10 people were arrested on charges of possessing fraudulent
    permits for transporting radioactive and hazardous materials.
        Regulatory requirements are also inadequate to protect against the
    risk of terrorist attacks. Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    does not require transportation casks to be tested against this
    vulnerability, tests and studies have demonstrated that an anti-tank
    weapon could easily penetrate a nuclear waste transportation cask and
    result in a potentially catastrophic release of radiation. In a 1998
    demonstration at Aberdeen Proving Ground, a TOW anti-tank missile shot
    at a Castor V-21 storage cask a blew a hole through the wall of the
    cask. Analysis by the state of Nevada indicates that a successful
    terrorist attack on a GA-4 truck cask using a common military
    demolition device could cause 300 to 1,800 latent cancer fatalities,
    assuming 90% penetration by a single blast. Full perforation of the
    cask, likely to occur in an attack involving a state-of-the-art anti-
    tank weapon, such as the TOW missile, could cause 3,000 to 18,000
    latent cancer fatalities. Cleanup and recovery costs would exceed $17
    billion.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ ``Potential Consequences of a Successful Sabotage Attack on a
    Spent Fuel Shipping Container: An Analysis of the Yucca Mountain EIS
    Treatment of Sabotage,'' Radioactive Waste Management Associates, April
    2002.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Yet, just a few months ago, on March 11, 2002, CIA national
    intelligence officer Robert Walpole told the Senate Government Affairs
    Committee that while the chance that a missile with a nuclear,
    chemical, or biological warhead will be used against U.S. forces or
    interests is greater today than during most of the Cold War, the
    agency's analysts believe there is an even greater threat that such a
    weapon will be delivered by truck, ship or airplane ``because non-
    missile delivery means are less costly, easier to acquire, more
    reliable and accurate''.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ The Boston Globe March 12, 2002 and The Milwaukee Journal
    Sentinel March 12, 2002 quoting the Associated Press.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On September 11, 2001, and again in October when U.S. forces
    entered Afghanistan, Secretary Abraham suspended all nuclear shipments
    because of the security risks they pose. Yet, his Yucca Mountain site
    recommendation, issued only 5 months later, failed to acknowledge or
    address this security concern in relation to the tens of thousands of
    nuclear shipments that would be launched by the Yucca Mountain Project.
        The unintentional and non-accident risk of nuclear waste
    transportation is also a concern. NRC regulations allow nuclear waste
    shipping casks to emit 10 millirem of radiation--the equivalent of a
    chest X-ray--per hour from a distance of 6.5 feet. The cumulative
    impact of routine radiation exposure from Yucca Mountain nuclear waste
    shipments on other motorists (maximized in gridlock traffic scenarios)
    and people who live or work along transport routes has not been
    adequately examined.
        The multiple risks associated with transporting large volumes of
    nuclear waste over long distances to an unsuitably sited repository in
    Nevada simply cannot be justified. Since a repository at Yucca Mountain
    necessarily involves an unprecedented program of nuclear
    transportation, we urge the Committee to fully consider the impact of
    the many transportation dangers in its evaluation of the Yucca Mountain
    Site Recommendation.
                the integrity of the process has been undermined
        The dramatically flawed process railroading the Yucca Mountain
    Project toward approval undermines the credibility of Secretary
    Abraham's site recommendation. The downgrading of environmental
    regulations (EPA's more lenient site-specific radiation protection
    standards and DOE's revised siting guidelines that prevent Yucca
    Mountain from being disqualified) has set a dangerous precedent of
    sacrificing public health and environmental safety to nuclear industry
    interests. And yet even these underhanded decisions cannot mask the
    fact that this site is not suitable, as the GAO, IG, and Nuclear Waste
    Technical Review Board have made clear.
        A Public Citizen report released April 1, 2002, indicates that
    nuclear industry interests may have directly biased Secretary Abraham's
    site recommendation. The report is available online at http://
    www.citizen.org/documents/yuccamtbands.PDF. According to our research,
    the nuclear industry contributed $82,728 to Secretary Abraham's failed
    bid for re-election during the 2000 election cycle, and in 2000 alone,
    top nuclear contributors to his campaign spent more than $25 million--
    nearly half a million dollars each week--on lobbying efforts that
    included support for the repository proposal. Public Citizen, in
    January 2002, requested that Secretary Abraham recuse himself from
    Yucca Mountain site recommendation activities, based on the precedent
    of Attorney General John Ashcroft recusing himself from the Justice
    Department's Enron investigations because the failed energy trading
    company had contributed $75,000 to his election campaign. We have
    received a legalistic response to our letter that doesn't deal with the
    issue of the appearance of impropriety.
        As another indication of pro-industry bias in the Yucca Mountain
    Project, a November 2001 report by the DOE Inspector General disclosed
    that the law firm Winston & Strawn was simultaneously employed as
    counsel to the DOE, working on the Yucca Mountain Project, and
    registered as a member of and lobbyist for the Nuclear Energy Institute
    between 1992 and 2001. The executive summary of this report is
    attached. The DOE, as a federal agency, is supposed to be objective and
    unbiased in its evaluations of the repository proposal and to uphold
    the same standards of integrity for its contractors. Yet, it hired a
    member of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the lobbying arm of the nuclear
    industry that specifically advocates in favor of the proposed nuclear
    waste repository at Yucca Mountain, which would serve the narrow
    financial interests of its nuclear industry members. The involvement of
    Winston & Strawn lawyers in both shaping the DOE's Yucca Mountain
    activities and advising and lobbying on behalf of the Nuclear Energy
    Institute on nuclear waste legislation undermines the integrity of the
    recent site recommendation. After this conflict was publicly disclosed,
    Winston & Strawn resigned from the Yucca Mountain Project. But even in
    the wake of this scandal, but the firm's work was not withdrawn.
        The same Inspector General report notes that TRW, Inc., hired by
    the DOE as the managing and operations contractor for the Yucca
    Mountain Project until February 2001, was simultaneously engaged in
    lobbying activities on nuclear waste storage issues. TRW was
    additionally implicated in December 2000 as the author of a memo
    attached to a leaked overview of the DOE Yucca Mountain Site
    Recommendation Considerations Report (later released as the Preliminary
    Site Suitability Evaluation and the Science and Engineering Report).
    The memo indicated that the overview was intended to help supporters of
    the Yucca Mountain Project express their support for a favorable site
    recommendation and that ``the technical suitability of the site is less
    of a concern to Congress than the broader issue of whether the nuclear
    waste problem can be solved at an affordable price in both financial
    and political terms.''
        Clearly, the DOE has failed to exercise necessary and proper
    oversight of its contractors, resulting in an obvious pro-industry bias
    in the agency's site characterization and site recommendation
    activities. In January, Public Citizen joined 232 public interest and
    environmental groups calling on Congress to suspend consideration of
    the Yucca Mountain Project pending a thorough review of the causes and
    consequences of contractor conflict of interest in the DOE's site
    characterization and site recommendation activities. This letter and
    the list of co-signing organizations can be viewed online at http://
    www.citizen.org/cmep/enemy enviro nuclear/nuclear waste/hi-level/
    conflict /articles.cfm?ID=7086. The public cannot--and lawmakers ought
    not--have confidence in Secretary Abraham's site recommendation, which
    has arisen out of such a conflicted and compromised process.
                                   conclusion
        The 1957 National Research Council report, commissioned by the
    Atomic Energy Commission, marked the beginning of this government's
    continuing process to identify ``disposal'' options for high-level
    nuclear waste. Its summary states: ``Unlike the disposal of any other
    type of waste, the hazard related to radioactive waste is so great that
    no element of doubt should be allowed to exist regarding safety.'' \11\
    Numerous unresolved technical, environmental, and policy issues plague
    the Yucca Mountain Project. To approve the repository proposal would
    directly threaten the health and safety of current and future residents
    of Nevada and more than 50 million people who live along likely nuclear
    waste transportation routes. Furthermore, the failed Yucca Mountain
    Project serves as a distraction from the serious policy examination and
    scientific study that is needed to more appropriately address the
    increasingly urgent issue of high-level nuclear waste management.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on Land, National Research
    Council (1957).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Department of Energy and others have incorrectly suggested that
    the many outstanding concerns with the repository proposal would be
    more appropriately addressed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
    in the licensing phase that would be initiated by Senate approval of
    S.J. Res. 34. This effort to downplay the role of Congress is
    dangerously misguided. In fact, the NRC's Yucca Mountain licensing rule
    (10 CFR 63) reflects the inadequacies of EPA standards, discussed
    above, and as such does not consider the fundamental issue of site
    suitability or issues related to nuclear waste transportation. Nor does
    the NRC's mandate extend to an examination of conflicts of interest
    with the DOE's Yucca Mountain program or the regulatory rollbacks that
    have inappropriately weakened EPA and DOE standards at Yucca Mountain.
    Thoughtful Congressional oversight of this unprecedented project is
    clearly in order, and the DOE's current incomplete and serious flawed
    proposal does not merit the Senate's approval.
        We recommend that:

       the Committee uphold Nevada's anticipated Notice of
            Disapproval of the Yucca Mountain Project and reject any siting
            approval resolution;
       the Committee hold additional hearings in all major cities
            along nuclear waste transportation routes identified in the
            final Environmental Impact Statement for the Yucca Mountain
            Project to give the public a voice in this decision;
       Congress and its Committees maintain vigorous legislative
            oversight of the nuclear waste transportation program that
            accompanies any repository proposal; and
       Congress initiate a complete review of the civilian nuclear
            waste management program.