    [Senate Hearing 107-467]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 107-467

    CIA NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF FOREIGN MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AND
                   THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THROUGH 2015
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

    INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                              GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 11, 2002

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

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    79-885                          WASHINGTON : 2003
    ____________________________________________________________________________
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                       COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TED STEVENS, Alaska
    RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    MAX CLELAND, Georgia                 PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
               Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
                  Richard A. Hertling, Minority Staff Director
                         Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk

                                     ------

    INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

                       DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
    ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     TED STEVENS, Alaska
    MAX CLELAND, Georgia                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
                       Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
                   Mitchel B. Kugler, Minority Staff Director
                          Brian D. Rubens, Chief Clerk
                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Akaka................................................     1
        Senator Collings.............................................     2
        Senator Cochran..............................................    10
        Senator Domenici.............................................    15

                                    WITNESS
                             Monday, March 11, 2002

    Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and
      Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council, Central
      Intelligence Agency............................................     3
        Prepared statement...........................................    29

                                    Appendix

    Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
      Through 2015, Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate......    39

    CIA NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF FOREIGN MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AND
                   THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THROUGH 2015

                                  ----------

                             MONDAY, MARCH 11, 2002

                                         U.S. Senate,
                     International Security, Proliferation,
                           and Federal Services Subcommittee,
                      of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:37 p.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
    Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Akaka, Cochran, Collins, and Domenici.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

        Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
    I want to welcome all of you to our hearing today on the
    intelligence community's assessment of foreign missile threats
    to the United States.
        I would like to thank Robert Walpole, National Intelligence
    Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs at the National
    Intelligence Council, for being with us today. His report
    describes the threat posed to the United States by weapons of
    mass destruction, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. It
    examines when a country could deploy an intercontinental
    ballistic missile based on technical, industrial, and economic
    capabilities, as well as when they are likely to do so based on
    potential technical problems, political developments, and
    economic delays.
        We last held a Subcommittee hearing on the National
    Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threats in February
    2000. At that time, senior North Korean official were preparing
    to come to Washington to discuss the missile moratorium. In May
    2001, North Korea extended their voluntary flight test
    moratorium until 2003, provided negotiations with the United
    States proceeded. But negotiations have not proceeded.
    Relations with North Korea have soured. A key question for this
    hearing is the current status of North Korea's missile program.
        There are some notable differences between this report and
    the one discussed at our February 2000 meeting. The previous
    report listed Russia as the chief threat. An increase in the
    danger of an attack by North Korea, Iran, and possibly Iraq, as
    well as the intelligence community's unanimous assessment that
    the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000 warheads by
    the year 2015, have reduced the threat assessment from Russia.
    In fact, the report states that the threats to the U.S.
    homeland will come from dramatically fewer warheads than today
    owing to significant reductions in Russian strategic forces.
        The estimate also emphasizes the threat from non-missile
    delivery means for WMD, especially from terrorist groups. While
    emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the
    risks to U.S. forces, interests, and allies throughout the
    world, the intelligence community judges that the U.S.
    territory is more likely to be attacked with WMD using non-
    missile means.
        The terrorist attacks of September 11 have demonstrated
    that our enemies can strike American soil directly without
    having to put the time and money into a ballistic missile with
    a return address. I am concerned about this growing interest by
    rogue nations and terrorist groups in unmanned aerial vehicles.
    During our Subcommittee hearing earlier this month on Iraq's
    WMD programs, our witnesses described how Iraq is adapting
    trainer aircraft and specially modified spray tanks that could
    be used in a biological weapon attack. This information is
    quite chilling.
        We all fear the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of
    mass destruction, but our policy cannot be one of constructing
    moats against imagined threats. We must have a policy that
    counters real threats in an effective and cost efficient
    manner. Some of these dangers may, in the medium- to long-term,
    come from intercontinental ballistic missiles.
        At this time, I would like to call on my colleague, Senator
    Collins.

                  OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR COLLINS

        Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
    to thank you for your leadership and that of Senator Cochran in
    this very important area. It is of utmost importance for this
    Subcommittee to continue to examine responsible methods for
    protecting against the threat of foreign missiles. Today's
    hearing will contribute substantially to our growing
    understanding of the threat and assist us in developing
    appropriate policy responses.
        I would note, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is particularly
    appropriate that you are holding this hearing exactly 6 months
    after the terrorist attack on our Nation. I do not think any of
    doubt that had Osama bin Laden had access to the kinds of
    missiles that we are discussing today that he would have
    hesitated in any way to use them.
        The magnitude of the threat is extraordinary and it is
    growing. As the estimate notes, because of reductions in
    Russia, the raw number of ballistic missiles that threaten our
    homeland will likely decrease substantially. The number of
    nations and non-state actors posing a threat, however, will
    likely increase. For example, North Korea's multiple-stage
    Taepo Dong missile, which is capable of reaching parts of the
    United States with a nuclear weapon-size payload, may be ready
    for flight testing.
        Looking more broadly, most intelligence community agencies
    project that before the year 2015, the United States most
    likely will face intercontinental ballistic missile threats
    from North Korea, Iran, and possibly from Iraq, barring
    significant changes in their political orientations, in
    addition to the longstanding missile forces of Russia and
    China. And while the number of Russian missiles will likely
    decline, the intelligence community projects that Chinese
    ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by the year
    2015.
        Moreover, these are not the only nations that pose threats.
    Iran is pursuing long-range missile capabilities and Iraq wants
    a long-range missile and all agencies agree that Iraq could
    test different long-range concepts before 2015 if U.N.
    sanctions were lifted.
        Non-state actors also pose threats. According to the
    estimate, terrorist groups continue to express interest in
    obtaining chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
    materials and the means to deliver them. Threats to our
    homeland are also posed by short-range missiles launched from
    forward-based ships or other platforms, and according to the
    estimate, some countries are likely to develop such mechanisms
    before 2015.
        In light of these very real and growing threats, I look
    forward to hearing Mr. Walpole's testimony, and again, I
    appreciate your convening this hearing.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, for
    your comments and statement.
        I welcome our witness to today's hearing and look forward
    to an interesting discussion later. At this time, I would
    welcome any opening statement or comments you may have, Mr.
    Walpole.

     TESTIMONY OF ROBERT WALPOLE,\1\ NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
       FOR STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
                  COUNCIL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        Mr. Walpole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins,
    for the opportunity to be able to testify before your
    Subcommittee on the missile threats to the United States and
    its interests.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole appears in the Appendix
    on page 29.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ballistic missile remains a central element in the
    military arsenals of nations around the globe and will retain
    this status for at least the next 15 years. States willingly
    devote often scarce resources to develop or acquire ballistic
    missiles, build infrastructures to sustain development and
    production, and actively pursue technologies, materials,
    personnel on the world market to compensate for domestic
    shortfalls, gain expertise, and speed development.
        As you know, the SSCI requires that the intelligence
    community produce annual reports on the missile threat. These
    reports are also required to include a discussion of non-
    missile threats, as well. Our most recent report was published
    in December of last year as a National Intelligence Estimate,
    or what we call an NIE. My testimony today is drawn from the
    unclassified summary of that NIE. In the interest of time, I
    will limit my opening remarks but would like to submit for the
    record my compete statement and a copy of the National
    Intelligence Estimate.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Trheat
    Through 2015,'' summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, appears in
    the Appendix on page 39.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senator Akaka. The statement will be included in the
    record.
        Mr. Walpole. The summary of that estimate. Thank you.
        Our NIE describes missile developments and our projections,
    as you noted, of possible and likely ballistic missile threats
    to the United States, our interests overseas, and our military
    forces or allies through the year 2015. It discusses the
    evolving proliferation environment and provides a summary of
    forward-based threats and cruise missiles.
        To address the uncertainties associated with this work,
    particularly projecting out 15 years, we assess both the
    earliest date that countries could test various missiles, based
    largely on engineering judgments made by experts inside and
    outside the intelligence community, on the technical
    capabilities and resources of the countries in question, and in
    many cases, on continuing foreign assistance. We also assess
    when the countries are likely to test such missiles, factoring
    into the earlier assessments potential delays caused by
    technical, political, or economic hurdles.
        I want to underscore that we judge that the countries are
    much less likely to test by the hypothetical ``could'' dates
    than they are by the projected ``likely'' dates.
        Now, with that as a backdrop, I would note that most U.S.
    intelligence community agencies project that during the next 15
    years, the United States most likely will face ICBM threats
    from North Korea and Iran and possibly Iraq. Of course, that is
    in addition to the strategic forces of Russia and China. One
    agency assesses that the United States is unlikely to face an
    ICBM threat from Iran before 2015. That is different than the
    earlier estimate, where it was unanimous.
        I would underscore that short- and medium-range ballistic
    missiles already pose a significant threat overseas to U.S.
    interests, military forces, and allies. Emerging ballistic
    missiles continue to increase the range--reliability--I am
    sorry. Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase
    the range, reliability, and accuracy of their missiles, posing
    ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, and allies
    throughout the world. A decade ago, the Scud was the emerging
    missile of concern. Today, it is the No Dong. During the next
    few minutes, I will discuss the missiles of tomorrow.
        The proliferation of ballistic missile-related
    technologies, materials, and expertise, especially by Russian,
    Chinese, and North Korea entities, has enabled emerging missile
    states to accelerate missile development, gain new
    capabilities, and expand their capabilities to acquire longer-
    range systems. North Korea has assumed the role as missile
    technology source for many. North Korean willingness to sell
    complete missile systems and components has enabled other
    states to acquire longer-range capabilities much earlier. The
    North has also helped countries to acquire technology to serve
    as the basis for domestic development efforts. Meanwhile, Iran
    is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology.
        States with emerging missile programs inevitably will run
    into problems that will delay their development programs. Most
    emerging missile states are highly dependent on foreign
    assistance, but the ready availability of assistance from
    multiple sources makes it likely that most emerging missile
    states will be able to resolve such problems, albeit with a
    slippage in development time.
        All this leads us to assess that the probability that a
    missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used against
    U.S. forces or interests is higher today than during most of
    the Cold War, and it will continue to grow as the capabilities
    of potential adversaries mature. More nations have ballistic
    missiles. They have already used missiles against the U.S.
    forces and allied forces during the Gulf War, although those
    missiles did not deliver weapons of mass destruction, Iraq had
    weaponized ballistic missile warheads with biological and
    chemical agents and they were available for use.
        Moreover, some of the states armed with missiles have
    exhibited a willingness to use chemical weapons with other
    delivery means. In addition, some non-state entities are
    seeking chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
    materials and would be willing to use them without missiles. In
    fact, we assess that the U.S. territory is more likely to be
    attacked with these materials from non-missile delivery means,
    most likely from terrorists, than by missiles, primarily
    because non-missile delivery means are less costly, easier to
    acquire, more reliable and accurate. They can also be used
    without attribution.
        Nevertheless, the missile threat will continue to grow, in
    part because missiles become important regional weapons in the
    arsenals of numerous countries. Moreover, missiles provide a
    level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and deterrence than non-
    missile means. In short, the intelligence community must work
    both threats. We do not have the luxury of choosing to work one
    at the exclusion of the other. Neither is a ``no likelihood''
    situation.
        Let me turn now to some of the countries with missile
    forces or programs. First, Russia, which maintains the most
    comprehensive ballistic missile force capable of reaching the
    United States, although force structure decisions resulting
    from resource problems, program development failures, weapons
    system aging, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and arms
    control treaties have resulted in a steep decline in Russian
    strategic nuclear forces over the last 10 years. From
    approximately 10,000 warheads in 1990, Russia now maintains
    fewer than 4,000 warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs.
        In the current day-to-day operational environment, with all
    procedure and technical safeguards in place, an unauthorized or
    accidental launch of a Russian strategic missile is highly
    unlikely. Russia faces ballistic missile program delays and the
    requirement to simultaneously extend the service lives of older
    systems while maintaining newer, more capable systems. Unless
    Moscow significantly increases funding for its strategic
    forces, the Russian arsenal will decline to less than 2,000
    warheads by 2015, with or without arms control. Nevertheless,
    Russia has the most technologically evolved and best-equipped,
    maintained, and trained theater ballistic missile force in the
    world today, providing a rapid, precision-guided theater deep-
    strike capability.
        Let us look next at China. We project that Chinese
    ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015,
    but Beijing's current ICBM force, deployed primarily against
    the United States, will remain considerably smaller and less
    capable than the strategic missile forces of Russia or the
    United States. China's current ICBM force consists of large
    liquid propellant missiles armed with single nuclear warheads.
    China also has a medium-range JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic
    missile.
        Beijing is concerned about the survivability of its
    strategic deterrent of about 20 missiles against the United
    States and has a long-running modernization program to develop
    mobile, solid propellant ICBMs. We project that by 2015, most
    of China's strategic missile force will be mobile. China has
    three new mobile strategic missiles in development, the road-
    mobile CSS-X-10, sometimes referred to as the DF-31, which is
    being flight tested, a longer-range version of the DF-31, and
    the JL-2 SLBM. This modernization effort, which dates to the
    1980's, forms the foundation of Beijing's efforts to field a
    modern, mobile, and more survivable strategic missile force.
    China could begin deploying the DF-31 ICBM during the next few
    years and the DF-31 follow-on and the JL-2 SLBM in the last
    half of the decade.
        We have differing projections amongst analysts on the
    overall size of the Chinese strategic ballistic missile force,
    deployed primarily against the United States, over the next 15
    years, ranging from about 75 to 100 warheads. Deployment of
    multiple reentry vehicles on missiles and missile defense
    countermeasures would be factors in the ultimate size of that
    force. China has had the capability to develop and deploy a
    multiple reentry vehicle system for many years, including what
    we call multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or
    MIRVs. We assess that China could develop a multiple RV system
    for the CSS-4 within a few years. Chinese pursuit of a multiple
    RV capability for its mobile ICBMs and SLBMs would encounter
    significant technical hurdles and would be costly.
        On the theater front, China maintains a robust CSS-5
    medium-range ballistic missile force and continues to increase
    significantly the capabilities of its short-range ballistic
    missile force, deployed opposite Taiwan. Beijing's growing SRBM
    force provides a military capability that avoids the political
    and practical constraints associated with the use of nuclear
    armed missiles. That is because the SRBM force is
    conventionally armed. We project an SRBM force in 2005 of
    several hundred of those missiles.
        Now to North Korea, which has hundreds of Scuds and 1,300
    kilometer-range No Dong missiles and continues to develop the
    longer-range Taepo Dong-2 missile. In May 2001, as was already
    noted, Kim Chong-il unilaterally extended the moratorium until
    2003, but it is a flight test moratorium. It has not stopped
    development, and development continues. The multi-stage Taepo
    Dong-2, which is capable of reaching the United States with a
    nuclear-size payload, may be ready for flight testing. The
    North probably also is working on improvements to that current
    design.
        The Taepo Dong-2 in a two-stage configuration could deliver
    a several hundred kilogram payload up to 10,000 kilometers,
    sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the
    continental United States. If the North uses a third stage,
    similar to the one used in the Taepo Dong-1 launch of 1998, the
    Taepo Dong-2 could delivery a several hundred kilogram payload
    up to 15,000 kilometers, which is sufficient to strike all of
    North America.
        The intelligence community judged in the mid-1990's that
    North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.
    Since then, the North has frozen plutonium production
    activities at Yongbyon in accordance with the agreed framework
    of 1994. North Korea also has chemical and biological weapons
    programs.
        Let me turn now to Iran, which is pursuing short- and long-
    range missile capabilities. Iran's missile inventory is among
    the largest in the Middle East and includes a few hundred
    SRBMs, some 1,300 kilometer range Shahab-3 MRBMs, and a variety
    of unguided rockets. Tehran's longstanding commitment to its
    ballistic missile programs for deterrence and war fighting is
    unlikely to diminish.
        Iran is likely to develop space launch vehicles to put
    satellites into orbit and establish a technical base from which
    it could develop ICBMs or intermediate range ballistic
    missiles, capable of delivering nuclear weapons to Western
    Europe and the United States. Iran certainly is aware of the
    North Korean space launch and missile program and the benefits
    Pyongyang has tried to gain from the inherent ICBM capability
    posed by the Taepo Dong-1 and Taepo Dong-2.
        All intelligence community agencies agree that Iran could
    attempt to launch an ICBM about mid-decade, but believe Iran is
    likely to take until the last half of the decade to do so. One
    agency further judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve a
    successful test of an ICBM before 2015.
        Iranian acquisition of complete systems or major
    subsystems, such as a North Korean Taepo Dong-2 or Russian
    engine, could accelerate this capability to flight test an
    ICBM. If Iran were to acquire complete Taepo Dong-2 systems
    from North Korea, it could conduct a flight test within a year
    of delivery, allowing time for them to build a launch facility.
    Iran is unlikely to acquire a complete ICBM or space launch
    vehicle from Russia.
        Foreign assistance, particularly from Russia, China, and
    North Korea, will remain critical to the success of Iranian
    missile program for the duration or estimate, which is 15
    years. The intelligence community judges that Iran does not yet
    have a nuclear weapon. Most agencies assess that Tehran could
    have one by the end of the decade, although one agency judges
    it will take longer. All agree that Iran could reduce this time
    frame by several years with significant foreign assistance.
    Iran has biological and chemical weapons programs.
        Next, Iraq, which is constrained by international
    prohibitions but probably retains a small covert force of Scud-
    variant missiles with conventional chemical and biological
    warheads. Baghdad also wants a long-range missile. Iraq's goals
    of becoming the predominant regional power and its hostile
    relations with many of its neighbors are the key drivers behind
    Iraq's ballistic missile program. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq
    had several programs to extend the range of the Scud SRBM and
    became experienced working with liquid propellant technology.
    Since the Gulf War, despite U.N. resolutions limiting the range
    of Iraq's missiles to 150 kilometers, Baghdad has been able to
    maintain the infrastructure and expertise necessary to develop
    longer-range missile systems.
        We cannot predict with confidence how long U.N.-related
    sanctions and prohibitions will remain in place. They plausibly
    will constrain Iraq during the 15-year period of our estimate.
    Scenarios that would weaken those prohibitions several years
    from now are also conceivable. They would allow Iraq to
    reconstitute its missile infrastructure and begin developing
    the longer-range missiles before the end of the decade.
        Should U.N. prohibitions be significantly weakened in the
    future, Iraq probably would use the first several years to
    reestablish its SRBM inventory to pre-Gulf War numbers and
    pursue medium-range missiles to keep pace with its neighbors.
    Once its regional security concerns are being addressed, Iraq
    may pursue a first generation ICBM or space launch vehicle.
    Initially, Iraq is likely to resume production of the pre-Gulf
    War 650-kilometer range Al Hussein, the 900-kilometer range Al
    Abbas, or other Scud variants, and it could explore clustering
    and staging options to reach more distant targets.
        Iraq could resume Scud-variant production with foreign
    assistance quickly after U.N. prohibitions ended. With
    substantial foreign assistance, Baghdad could flight test a
    domestic medium-range ballistic missile by mid-decade. An
    imported medium-range missile could be flight tested within
    months of acquisition.
        After observing North Korean missile development for the
    past few years, Iraq would be likely to pursue a three-stage
    Taepo Dong-2 approach to an ICBM or space launch vehicle which
    would be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon-size payload to
    the United States. If Iraq could buy a Taepo Dong-2 from North
    Korea, it could have a launch capability within a year, again,
    time to build a launch facility. It could develop and test a
    Taepo Dong-1 type system within a few years. If it acquired no
    Dongs from North Korea, it could test an ICBM within a few
    years of acquisition by clustering and staging those motors. If
    Iraq bought Taepo Dong-2 engines, it could test an ICBM within
    about 5 years. Iraq could develop and test a Taepo Dong-2
    system within about 10 years of a decision to do so by itself.
    These are all presuming the U.N. prohibitions have weakened and
    been eliminated.
        Most agencies believe that Iraq is unlikely to test before
    2015 any ICBMs that could threaten the United States, even if
    U.N. prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced.
    Some believe if prohibitions were eliminated in the next few
    years, Iraq would be likely to test an ICBM, probably masked as
    a space launch vehicle, before 2015, possibly before 2010 with
    significant foreign assistance. Iraq relied on foreign
    assistance before the Gulf War and will continue to seek such
    assistance to expand its current capabilities.
        Baghdad had a crash program to develop a nuclear weapon for
    missile delivery in 1990, but coalition bonding and IAEA and
    UNSCOM activities significantly set back the effort. The
    intelligence community estimates that Iraq, unconstrained,
    would take several years to produce enough fissile material to
    make a weapon. Baghdad has admitted to having biological and
    chemical weapons programs before the Gulf War. We believe Iraq
    maintains those programs.
        Now to Libya. The imposition of U.N. sanctions has impeded
    Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer-
    range missile programs. Nevertheless, Libya wants longer-range
    missiles, even beyond the No Dong class medium-range missile.
    Tripoli would be likely to continue to try for longer-range
    systems to increase the number of U.S. and NATO targets it can
    hold at risk. If a missile were offered with a range sufficient
    to strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya would try to
    obtain it. Libya's paths to obtaining an ICBM during the 15-
    year period of our estimate probably would be to purchase a
    complete missile system or to set up a foreign assistance
    arrangement wherein the scientists and technicians went to
    Libya, developed the infrastructure, and developed the missile
    right there.
        Libya has biological and chemical weapons programs. Libya
    would need significant foreign assistance to acquire a nuclear
    weapon, but Tripoli's nuclear infrastructure enhancements
    remain a concern to us.
        Let us look briefly at Syria, which maintains a ballistic
    missile and rocket force of hundreds of Scud and SS-21 SRBMs
    and FROG rockets. Syrian regional concerns may lead Damascus to
    seek a longer-range ballistic missile capability, such as North
    Korea's No Dong medium-range missile. We judge that Syria does
    not now have and is unlikely to gain an interest in an ICBM
    capability during the next 15 years. Foreign assistance will
    remain critical to Syrian efforts to improve its production
    capabilities and to gain access to export controlled components
    and technology.
        Syria has developed chemical warheads for its Scuds and has
    an offensive biological weapons program. We remain concerned
    about Syria's intentions regarding nuclear weapons.
        Let me turn briefly to India and Pakistan. New Delhi
    believes that a nuclear-capable missile delivery option is
    necessary to deter Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and
    thereby preserve the option to wage limited conventional war in
    response to a Pakistani provocation in Kashmir or elsewhere.
    Nuclear weapons also serve as a hedge against a confrontation
    with China. Growing experience and an expanding infrastructure
    are providing India the means to accelerate both development
    and production of new systems. India continues to push towards
    self-sufficiency, especially in regard to its missile program.
    Nevertheless, New Delhi still relies heavily on foreign
    assistance.
        Pakistan sees missile-delivered nuclear weapons as a vital
    deterrent to India's much larger conventional forces and as a
    necessary counter to India's nuclear program. Since the 1980's,
    Pakistan has pursued development of an indigenous ballistic
    missile capability in an attempt to avoid reliance on any
    foreign entity for this capability, although foreign support
    for Pakistan's ambitious solid-propellant ballistic missile
    acquisition and development program has been and remain
    critical.
        Several countries are technically capable of developing a
    missile launch mechanism to use from forward-based ships or
    other platforms to launch SRBMs and MRBMs or land attack cruise
    missiles against the United States. Some of these are likely to
    develop and deploy such systems in the next 15 years.
    Nevertheless, long-distance strikes against the United States
    probably would be operationally difficult.
        An SRBM or MRBM could be launched at the United States from
    a forward-based sea platform within a few hundred kilometers of
    U.S. territory. Using such a sea platform would not pose a
    major technical problem, but the accuracy of the missile
    probably would be reduced significantly because of the movement
    of the ocean.
        One to two dozen countries probably will possess land
    attack cruise missile capabilities by the year 2015 via
    indigenous development, acquisition, or modification of other
    systems. Most of these cruise missiles will have a range of
    only a few hundred kilometers, again, sufficient to be used in
    a forward-deployed air or sea platform.
        Non-missile means of delivering weapons of mass
    destruction, as I noted earlier, do not provide the same degree
    of prestige, deterrence, or coercive diplomacy associated with
    ICBMs. Nevertheless, concern remains about non-missile delivery
    means. Ships, trucks, airplanes, and other means may be used.
    In fact, as noted earlier, the intelligence community judges
    that U.S. territory is more likely to be attacked with weapons
    of mass destruction using non-missile delivery means primarily
    because such means are less expensive than developing and
    producing ICBMs, can be covertly developed and employed to
    evade retaliation, probably would be more reliable, accurate,
    and more effective for disseminating biological agent than
    ICBMs, and would avoid missile defenses.
        Foreign non-state actors, including terrorists, insurgent
    or extremist used, have used, possessed, or expressed an
    interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
    materials. Most of these groups have threatened the United
    States and all of them have the ability to attack the United
    States or its interests. The events of September 11 and its
    aftermath have caused the intelligence community to focus
    significantly more resources on the threat from terrorism and
    we are obtaining more information on potential terrorist
    actions.
        Let me close my opening remarks with that and take any
    questions you have.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement.
        At this time, I would like to ask my colleague, Senator
    Cochran, for any comments or statements he may have.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CIA estimate
    in Mr. Walpole's statement, I think is a very timely reminder
    that even as we fight terrorism, the threat of ballistic
    missile attack against our Nation continues to grow. The new
    estimate, as you describe, suggests that the threat has in some
    ways worsened in the 2 years since the last estimate was
    issued. This is very troubling. In the portion of my
    opportunity to ask questions, I will explore some of these
    changes, but I think it is significant to note that instead of
    getting better, the situation is getting worse.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Cochran.
        I want to thank our witness for his statement and would
    like to proceed with some questions.
        Experts say that to be effective, missile defense needs an
    accurate assessment of missile and countermeasures
    capabilities. The National Intelligence Estimate states that
    North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing and
    producing ballistic missiles. Do you have any intelligence on
    North Korea's countermeasure technology?
        Mr. Walpole. Since this is an open session, I do not want
    to walk through what intelligence we have on specific countries
    on that because of how important it is to ballistic missile
    defense.
        But I do want to note that countermeasures are just that.
    They are counter to something else. So at this point, countries
    do not have to commit themselves to specific countermeasures
    they will employ. Until they see what system the United States
    would deploy as a missile defense, they have the luxury at this
    point of pursuing multiple types of countermeasure options and
    we have assessed and said in unclassified fora before that
    countries like China and Russia that have countermeasure
    technologies probably would be willing to sell some of those
    technologies to others.
        Senator Akaka. Some have argued that countermeasures
    produced by emerging missile states will be crude and,
    therefore, not as much a concern as countermeasures deployed by
    Russia or China. Have you seen any activity on the part of
    Russia and China, as well as emerging missile states, to
    acquire more advanced countermeasures? Are Russia and China
    exporting countermeasure technologies?
        Mr. Walpole. Numerous countries have been looking at
    various options for dealing with missile defense, whether it is
    a theater missile defense or a national missile defense. And,
    of course, ways to deal with that--one simple way to deal with
    that is simply deploy more missiles. Make sure you have more
    missiles deployed than the other side has defense deployed.
        But in addition to that, they have looked at other means
    for deploying those. Those means include such ideas as decoys
    or using jammers or making the systems more accurate, other
    type of evasion technologies. Again, I do not want to get into
    specifics country by country in an open forum, but countries
    are looking at that and we are working with Department of
    Defense with letting them know what we are seeing specifically
    so they can plan for that.
        Senator Akaka. The 1998 North Korean rocket launch was
    later determined to be a space launched vehicle and a failed
    attempt to put an object in orbit. Do you believe North Korea's
    program has advanced sufficiently that it could orbit a
    satellite, and if so, how could this be accomplished without
    operational tests?
        Mr. Walpole. You are correct. You are completely accurate
    in saying that we later discovered it was a space launch
    vehicle. We had expected a missile launch. We had expected a
    two-stage missile launch for the Taepo Dong-1. We had been
    following that program for some time and it went off. We
    thought something went wrong, we could not figure out what, and
    it took us a while to sort out what was happening. Meanwhile,
    North Korea announced they had put a satellite in orbit. Well,
    that made us relook at the data to figure out what it was we
    had missed.
        I point that out and go over that painful memory of what
    had happened just to show that we are getting a little insight
    into these programs and we have to make projections as to where
    they are going. But it also underscores there is very little
    difference between a space launch vehicle and a missile. The
    difference is, you put a satellite up with a space launch
    vehicle and you attack somebody with a missile. Otherwise, the
    booster is identical, and so we could not discern it
    immediately.
        It also underscores that we did not know about the
    existence of the third stage until that launch. So when you ask
    me a question, could North Korea have progressed from 1998, 4
    years later, 3\1/2\ years later, to where we are now, to where
    they can put a satellite into orbit, my answer would have to be
    yes on the ``could'' front and even on the ``likely'' front
    would have to be yes. Since we did not see that third stage
    until it was flown and it almost put the satellite into orbit
    even then, it would be hard for me to argue that the
    probability, the likelihood of success is slim. I think the
    likelihood of success would be much higher now.
        Senator Akaka. Iraq continues to work on converting L-29
    jet trainer aircraft to unmanned aerial vehicles. These
    refurbished aircraft are believed to have been modified to
    deliver chemical or biological weapons. Will future estimates
    be expanded to include unmanned aerial vehicles?
        Mr. Walpole. There are actually two estimates at play and
    we are looking at a way to either merge them or link them
    better. Mine is the ballistic missile estimate and we mentioned
    a few comments about cruise missiles. The National Intelligence
    Officer for Conventional Military Issues, General John Landry,
    does the cruise missile estimate and he would look at that. But
    I think next year's ballistic missile NIE will even have more
    of that in it, but that type of issue is definitely being
    looked at.
        Senator Akaka. Ballistic missiles receive top priority
    because they are already widely available, while land attack
    cruise missiles have only begun to emerge as a threat. Have you
    seen an increase in the number of states interested in cruise
    missiles?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes, it is fair to say that we have. Part of
    the reason for the continued interest in ballistic missiles is
    the range. In order to reach the United States, Iran and Iraq
    would need 10,000-kilometer range, 9,000, 10,000 kilometers.
    That is a pretty hefty cruise missile and a ballistic missile
    is going to be easier for that. No one has really deployed a
    10,000-kilometer range cruise missile before. It is doable. The
    United States can certainly create something like that if it
    wanted. That is why you are going to see continued interest in
    ballistic missiles. That said, cruise missiles, particularly
    given yourself several hundred kilometer range, is an
    alternative that countries are looking at.
        Senator Akaka. What is the likelihood of terrorists
    acquiring ballistic missiles with the intent of using them
    against the United States?
        Mr. Walpole. That one is hard to calculate the likelihood
    on, in large part because the infrastructure required to launch
    a ballistic missile generally implies nation state. So if you
    are talking about a terrorist that is supported by a nation
    state, then acquisition--it may not even be the right word. You
    are still talking about the nation state itself.
        If you are talking about a terrorist group that is not
    getting nation state support, then they would need somewhere to
    either develop or store the missile and then some platform.
    Even if the platform is a Scud on a Scud launcher, putting it
    on a surface ship and bringing it to the United States, that
    still requires some steps along the way. It is not the same as
    getting a shoulder-launched missile you could then try to shoot
    an aircraft down with.
        Senator Akaka. I will yield to my friend, Senator Cochran,
    for any of his questions.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        One of the significant differences between this estimate
    that you described today and the one previously described 2
    years ago is the way you word the description of the threat
    from Iran. The previous estimate in 1999 said that we would
    face ICBM threats most likely from North Korea and probably
    from Iran, but now the estimate says we will most likely face
    ICBM threats from North Korea and Iran. Could you explain why
    that has changed and what significance does that wording change
    have?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes. It is significant. Before, we had, let us
    call it three tiers, we had most likely North Korea, probably
    Iran, possibly Iraq. What has happened is Iran has moved up
    with North Korea. There is most likely North Korea and Iran.
    Iraq is still possibly. There is nobody in the ``probably''
    category, which is fine. The significance is, Iran has moved
    up. I would rather not go into the details for our moving it up
    in an open session, but simply say that our concerns about Iran
    pursuing an ICBM have gone up enough to move that.
        Senator Cochran. One other significant change that we have
    noted is in connection with the range of the North Korean
    missile capability. The 1999 estimate suggested that the Taepo
    Dong-2, the two-stage missile, was capable of delivering a
    large payload to Alaska and Hawaii, which is a range from 4,000
    to 6,000 kilometers. Now, that missile is assessed at having a
    10,000-kilometer range with the same size payload, which would
    not only put them in position to strike Alaska and Hawaii, but
    much of the Western United States. Is that, in your estimate, a
    significant change?
        Mr. Walpole. That is significant, as well, and that takes
    into account--as I said before, even though a flight test
    moratorium is in place, development moratorium is not, and so
    it takes account for different things they could do to
    structure, materials, and even payload lightening to give it an
    increased range for the system.
        Senator Cochran. Is this change in your assessment the
    result of things that North Korea has done to improve its
    missile or because you have a better understanding of the
    performance of the missile?
        Mr. Walpole. I know the answer to that. I am trying to
    think of what to do in open session. Let us just say both.
        Senator Cochran. In assessing the Taepo Dong-2, if Iran
    were to acquire that missile, would it be able to strike the
    United States with a nuclear weapon-size payload? How does this
    change the new assessment of Iran's ability, if any to strike
    the United States if it were to acquire a Taepo Dong-2?
        Mr. Walpole. Definitely with a three-stage, it could strike
    the United States, maybe with a two-stage. I do not know if I
    mentioned it to the Subcommittee 2 years ago, but North Korea
    has the advantage--I mean, we all know the earth rotates, but
    because of the rotation of the earth, North Korea is launching
    in a direction that they get the benefit of that rotation to
    strike the United States. Iran would be launching over the pole
    and they do not get that benefit. So a 10,000-kilometer range
    missile would go--it almost sounds silly, but it would go
    longer launched from North Korea to the United States than it
    would from Iran, but I think it would still be able to reach
    parts of the United States.
        Senator Cochran. You mentioned that North Korea continues
    to develop technologies and capabilities in this ballistic
    missile area even though they have not had flight tests. They
    have adhered to, I suppose, according to your estimate, the
    moratorium that they announced?
        Mr. Walpole. For the flight test, yes.
        Senator Cochran. For the flight testing. But are they
    likely to conduct other tests that could improve the
    reliability of their missiles without flight testing?
        Mr. Walpole. Oh, I would expect so, yes.
        Senator Cochran. So there is no moratorium on improving the
    technologies or enhancing the performance capabilities of the
    missiles they have without flight testing?
        Mr. Walpole. No moratorium and we expect they are doing
    just that.
        Senator Cochran. Is the North Korean missile program more
    advanced today than it was 2 years ago when you testified
    before our Subcommittee?
        Mr. Walpole. I would say so, yes.
        Senator Cochran. Could you spell out ways that it is
    different or has been improved?
        Mr. Walpole. Not any more than I have already done, again,
    in open session.
        Senator Cochran. OK. There has been some discussion about
    delivering weapons of mass destruction using non-missile
    delivery means, such as truck bombs. People say that is more
    likely than the development and use of a ballistic missile for
    that purpose, and that is in your estimate, as a matter of
    fact. Does this mean we should not be concerned with your
    assessment that the capabilities continue to grow in these
    states that do have ballistic missiles, of using the missile,
    the capability of using the missile to deliver weapons of mass
    destruction?
        Mr. Walpole. No. In fact, as I said, we feel that we have
    to work both. Neither is a ``no likelihood'' situation, and we
    have got to cover both threats.
        Senator Cochran. If these other ways of delivering a weapon
    of mass destruction are easier to build and may be less costly,
    why would the nations who do have ballistic missiles continue
    to spend resources and efforts to develop longer-range
    ballistic missiles?
        Mr. Walpole. The non-missile delivery means do not provide
    the prestige, coercive diplomacy, deterrence that the long-
    range missile does. You can let people know you have it or hint
    that you have it with the space launch capability and you have
    gained that. The non-missile means are primarily terrorist-type
    weapons. You have to surprise somebody by using it. If you
    surprise the United States and say, ``We have got a ship right
    out there that has got a Scud pointed at you,'' I would hope
    that we would do something about it pretty quickly. It is a
    different type of threat. In fact, ``threat'' is not even the
    right word. It is more like just a use situation. That is why
    the nation states go after the missiles.
        Senator Cochran. Is it a part of your estimate, then, that
    nation states like North Korea and Iran will continue these
    programs, they will not abandon these ballistic missile
    programs and their efforts to increase the range and even the
    lethality of their weapons of mass destruction?
        Mr. Walpole. Not only do we not see them abandoning those,
    we project that they will not abandon those.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.
        I would like to yield to Senator Domenici for any statement
    or any questions you may have.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI

        Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Cochran,
    it is good to see you this afternoon.
        Have there been questions on Iran and Iran's contribution
    in this area already? I do not want to repeat them.
        Senator Akaka. Yes. We are completing the first questioning
    round.
        Senator Domenici. No, I mean, did somebody ask questions
    about Iran's participation in this area?
        Senator Cochran. One small question.
        Senator Domenici. There was a two-part article in the
    Washington Post that suggested that Iran--they have a drive to
    obtain long-range missile capability. This article said that
    drive and what they had accomplished was overstated. It cited
    interviews with Russian missile technicians who had been in
    Iran and described their missile program as modest, at best.
    This has been echoed by some U.S. experts who say that the
    Russian assistance is only at the basic research level and that
    Iranian capability has been overestimated by our intelligence
    and the intelligence community. It concluded that Iran may be
    shifting its emphasis away from long-range missiles to short-
    range solid-fuel missiles to use against regional threats,
    Israel, U.S. forces, and the like.
        It is pretty obvious to me that their intentions are pretty
    murky, not clearly defined, but let me just ask, as you know,
    there have been defense experts in this country that dispute
    this estimate finding concerning the capabilities of Iran. They
    say Russia's assistance to Iran in the area of technology in
    missiles is low-level, at best, and that the Iranian program is
    highly disorganized, as I indicated. Can you give us a sense of
    the voracity of these reports, that is, on the level of
    Russia's assistance to Iran as well as the state and focus of
    the Iranian program?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes. First, I do not know which Russian
    experts are talking now, but I had some tell me in mid-1998,
    right after we had done the March 1998 missile report, that we
    were overestimating Iran's and North Korea's capabilities. Of
    course, then in August 1998, North Korea almost gets a
    satellite into orbit. So the next time I met with those
    experts, I said, the Taepo Dong-1 moved the North Korean threat
    from hypothetical to real, because they were telling me before
    that all I was doing was talking about hypothetical, what could
    happen. Well, when North Korea did that, it became reality.
        So I guess I would say they tend to underestimate both what
    North Korea and Iran could do and I am not surprised there.
        Second, I do not think Russia is going to want to tell us
    the extent of their assistance with Iran because they do not
    want us to know. That is disconcerting on both fronts, both
    because of what Iran is getting and what Russia is doing, or at
    least Russian entities.
        And the third point is one that we did discuss before.
    Without getting into details, the intelligence was sufficient
    this year in the estimate that we moved Iran in the hierarchy.
    Two years ago, we said, most likely North Korea, probably Iran,
    possibly Iraq for an ICBM threat to the United States. Now, we
    have moved Iran up with North Korea and say most likely North
    Korea and Iran, possibly Iraq, and I told Senator Cochran that
    I could not give the details in an open session, but it was
    sufficient for us as a community to say that Iran has moved up.
        And even the agency that took the alternative view is not
    viewing that Iran has not moved up in concern. They are just
    saying they do not think they will be successful. So I think
    that the experts that are looking at this are not looking at
    everything I am looking at.
        Senator Domenici. Of the countries that have this
    capability, which ones are disseminating the most anti-
    ballistic missile technology from themselves to others? Who are
    the leaders in transferring? Is Russia one of them?
        Mr. Walpole. Transferring, you mean helping counter
    measures?
        Senator Domenici. Helping another country enhance its
    capability.
        Mr. Walpole. Oh, its ballistic missile capability?
        Senator Domenici. Yes.
        Mr. Walpole. I do not know where--we rank three right up at
    the top, and it is Russia, China, and North Korea. I have not
    tried, and I am not sure that we have tried to pick one out
    because they have different clients, there are different ways
    they go about it and different things they are helping with. I
    would rather just keep all three right there of top concern.
        Senator Domenici. Without going too far afield, and just
    asking this one question in this regard, it is being said that
    the risk to the United States is far greater from somebody
    carrying in a missile of mass destruction or driving it in or
    bringing it over on a boat or assembling it here, one of the
    three. Which is easier for the intelligence community to
    detect, the evolution of an interballistic missile system that
    can carry weapons of mass destruction or the technology and
    activities that would lead to a portable weapon of mass
    destruction?
        Mr. Walpole. Oh, the development of ballistic missile
    capability would be, by far, easier to follow----
        Senator Domenici. And the development of nuclear weapons in
    any traditional sense would be easier than those that are
    mobile, that you carry around, is that correct?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes.
        Senator Domenici. So in our homeland defense, we have a
    more difficult job, of homeland defense versus the potential
    for a weapon of mass destruction here, our job is more
    difficult versus the carry-on mobile type than it is from
    countries that might have a missile that could deliver the
    weapon here.
        Mr. Walpole. Oh, yes, and for these types of weapons,
    whether it is just manufacturing the weapon here in the United
    States and putting it in a water supply or something, I mean,
    those are the types of scenarios we are looking at and those
    are very hard for intelligence to track, whether it is domestic
    intelligence, FBI doing it, or whether we are trying to do it
    overseas.
        Senator Domenici. Over the years, in speaking with the
    national laboratories experts at Sandia, Los Alamos, and
    Livermore, they always were of the impression that we could do
    more to put ourselves in a position of being able to discern
    activities in the weapons of mass destruction area and that
    they thought there were some things we could do even homeland-
    wise with reference to mobile activities that we were not
    doing.
        Are you familiar with what they are talking about and what
    things we might be doing in our homeland defense in that regard
    versus what we are doing now?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes. I do not know exactly what they would be
    talking about today, other than I know on the nuclear front,
    which is where I work, mostly the nuclear missile side in terms
    of sensors and things like that. I am sure they are thinking
    the same situation on biological and chemical. Even post-use,
    the capability to identify exactly what the agent was or
    whether there was an agent there, you would not want to have an
    incident occur that you thought was simply a conventional
    explosive and then find out 4 days later that it released
    something and people were starting to get sick. So you want to
    have those kind of detection capabilities. If that is what they
    are referring to, I am familiar with that, but it could be much
    more than that that they are thinking of.
        Senator Domenici. I thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Walpole, our forward-deployed forces and
    overseas interests face threats from both short- and medium-
    range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Which do you
    believe is the greater threat today?
        Mr. Walpole. What are the two that I am comparing, the
    forward-based threats----
        Senator Akaka. The medium-range ballistic missiles and
    cruise missiles.
        Mr. Walpole. Oh, ballistic versus cruise?
        Senator Akaka. Yes.
        Mr. Walpole. Well, there are more ballistic missiles, so I
    guess I would have to throw in with the ballistic missiles. But
    I want to qualify the answer a little bit in that when we are
    talking about short-range missile use, whether it is cruise
    missile or ballistic missile within their own region, these
    countries develop these for war-fighting purposes. They plan on
    using them. They are almost an extension of artillery, whether
    it is a cruise missile or a ballistic missile. So the
    likelihood of use in a conflict is higher than a missile they
    would develop for deterrence or coercive diplomacy purposes.
        North Korea would be more likely to launch a short-range
    system in a conflict, I would think, than it would to be
    launching an ICBM against the United States, particularly if
    the short-range system was conventionally armed. It would be a
    conventional conflict, where the long-range missile would
    probably be nuclear. You just crossed a lot of thresholds, and
    so that kind of factors into that likelihood there.
        But the short-range systems are a system developed for use
    where the longer-range systems are systems developed for a
    threat. Does that make sense? You get the coercive diplomacy
    out of one and you have the war-fighting capability out of the
    other. Now, if there is a major conflict and the country is
    going down the tubes fast, those lines all of a sudden blur.
    Does that help with that question?
        Senator Akaka. Yes.
        Mr. Walpole. OK.
        Senator Akaka. One agency participating in the estimate
    judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve a successful test of an
    ICBM before the year 2015. Does this agency base its conclusion
    on technical capabilities or political conditions?
        Mr. Walpole. It is both. We all have to look at the track
    record and then try to forecast where that track record will
    go. That includes foreign assistance and so on, and difficulty
    getting foreign assistance and what it translates to. Most of
    the agencies have looked at that and said, yes, they are moving
    down this path and this is about when we see that they will be
    flight testing this system, and even given a couple of
    failures, we expect there to be something to happen about this
    time frame. The other agency looked at it and said, no, they
    are going to have more failures than that along the way and we
    think it is going to be longer. That is really what it comes
    down to. But both are looking at technical and political
    factors.
        Senator Akaka. The National Intelligence Estimate states
    that Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile technology.
    To whom are they trying to sell missile technology and have you
    identified the next generation missile states?
        Mr. Walpole. I do not want to do that in open session. We
    almost--we had to work real hard even to get that line in the
    unclassified piece because we were worried about that. We
    thought, no, we ought to be able to say this much, but that is
    about as far as we can go.
        Senator Akaka. The estimate uses space launch vehicle
    programs as an indication of an increased ICBM threat. While I
    appreciate that much of the technology is the same, is there a
    documented case of a Nation converting a space launch vehicle
    system to an ICBM?
        Mr. Walpole. It has probably, generally, been the other way
    around, but that does not undermine the judgment any. The
    Chinese CSS-4 ICBM, the ICBM that I talked about that they
    could put multiple RVs on top of, that they have about 20 of,
    that booster is the same as the Long March-3, the mainstay of
    their space program. Our Titan ICBM was not a whole lot
    different than our Titan space launch vehicle.
        When we did the arms control negotiations with the Soviet
    Union and then Russia, we were both looking at options to,
    rather than waste ICBMs, converting them for space launch
    purposes. That is because we all recognize that the booster is
    basically the same. The conversion is not even so much the
    issue.
        That said, we look at these issues, and part of it is in
    terms of hostile intent. Japan has a space launch vehicle, but
    you do not see our estimate talking about a Japanese ICBM. The
    reason is obvious. India, even though we talk about India and
    Pakistan's missile forces, India has an ICBM--a space launch
    vehicle that could be flown on an ICBM trajectory if they
    wanted. It would be really big and would not work the way we
    would want an ICBM to work, but it could do that. We do not
    include that in here because of the intent situation.
        So a country that has space launch capabilities has an
    inherent ICBM capability, but we factor hostile intent into
    our--or just hostile feelings, anyway, into our assessments.
    But rest assured that the boosters for space launch vehicles
    and ICBMs are so close to identical that if you see a country
    with hostile intent developing a space launch vehicle, you had
    better be worried.
        Senator Akaka. Did your assessment consider whether or not
    Russia might choose to maintain their nuclear weapon production
    capability or to include multiple reentry vehicle warheads to
    keep up with the sizable responsive force proposed by the
    administration in its recent nuclear posture review?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes. We factored all of that in and we are
    still getting them coming down. That is why I say with or
    without arms control.
        Senator Akaka. Missiles are just a delivery mechanism. So
    the threats we face are not due to missiles, but from the
    payloads they carry. What we need to address is the WMD threat.
    How have our nonproliferation and assistance programs to the
    former Soviet Union factored into your threat assessment?
        Mr. Walpole. Nonproliferation programs to the former Soviet
    Union?
        Senator Akaka. Yes, nonproliferation and assistance
    programs to the former Soviet Union. How did that factor----
        Mr. Walpole. You mean keeping Russian fissile materials
    secure and things like that, or--I mean, it all factored in,
    yes.
        Senator Akaka. And their assistance programs, and how did
    that factor into your threat assessment?
        Mr. Walpole. As far as controlling fissile material, or
    their nuclear warheads, for that matter, it factors in our
    calculations for how quickly countries could get a nuclear
    weapon. As far as nonproliferation efforts to try to convince
    Russia not to help some of these other countries, the best case
    is Iran, where, again, Russia does not want us to know how much
    they are helping Iran, but they are helping Iran more than
    Russia is willing to admit. Obviously, that factors in, as
    well, because we are seeing this foreign assistance continue
    and we track that out for our projections 15 years.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you. I will yield to Senator Cochran
    for any questions.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, on that subject, it is
    perplexing when you discuss this issue with the Russians. You
    come away with a realization that they want us to believe that
    there is no official approval or participation, that there is
    no state program of assistance to Iran. But they know there are
    people, or other entities, and you used the phrase ``entities''
    a while ago, that are based in Russia or that are from Russia
    that are involved, clearly, in assisting in the missile
    development programs and maybe weapons of mass destruction
    development programs.
        To what extent does your estimate try to point out the
    difference, if there is a difference? And if there is a
    difference, does it matter if it is an officially endorsed or
    sanctioned program or if it is one that just involves other
    entities that are based in Russia? Does it make any difference?
        Mr. Walpole. Generally, it does not make a difference for
    the threat assessment whether it is a Russian entity or Russia
    officially, or Chinese entity or China officially. I say
    ``generally'' because you might get better assistance from some
    official sources because you are going to get, perhaps, access
    to others. But generally, it is not.
        We do not really go into a big distinction there. I used
    the word ``entity'' in the estimate because that is what we are
    getting from the nonproliferation experts. In fact, I have used
    the word ``entity'' more the last several years in these type
    of estimates than I have ever used in any other job before.
        There are experts that are trying to look at that specific
    problem for Russia, for China, for North Korea, for that
    matter, and that is in the WINPAC, the Weapons Intelligence
    Proliferation and Arms Control Center that was organized a
    little over a year ago to try to sort out what tools could help
    slow or stop the proliferation. There, it makes a difference if
    it is just an entity, as opposed to official, how you go about
    getting it stopped. But for the threat estimate, it is not a
    big difference.
        Senator Cochran. You were talking a while ago about the
    value of a long-range missile capability in terms of the
    threat, in terms of the coercive nature of that power. In that
    connection, is it necessary for a country to actually threaten
    us in order for the capability to be valuable to them as a
    matter of national policy or influence? Do they have to
    actually threathen us or is just the existence of the
    capability the threat?
        Mr. Walpole. A couple of answers to that. Secretary
    Rumsfeld, while he was chairman of the Rumsfeld Commission, had
    pointed out that had Iraq had either an IRBM capable of
    striking Europe, London, or an ICBM capable of striking the
    United States prior to the Gulf War, how would votes on the
    Hill had gone? How would public support have gone? Even if Iraq
    had not done any overt threat, the mere existence of that
    system could have changed people's feelings, the first point
    that I make.
        The second one is, look at how much mileage North Korea has
    gotten out of a failed Taepo Dong-1 launch and an unflown Taepo
    Dong-2 system. Now, I am one of the players in this because I
    have to write intelligence assessments on what this thing is
    capable of doing. They have not had to threaten anybody with
    it. They still claim it is a space launch vehicle.
        I mean, the answer to your question, I think, is built in
    both of those situations. That is why we lay out in our
    estimate both what could happen and what we judge is likely to
    happen, because I cannot--we were surprised by the third stage.
    I do not want to be surprised again, but I do not want to have
    readers think that our ``coulds'' are the only judgments we
    have. I think that would be wrong if all we published was the
    ``could'' judgments. We have to publish our best estimates, but
    we have to tell you, we might be wrong in that and this thing
    could go faster and this is where it could fall.
        Senator Cochran. In comparing the value of a long-range
    missile threat with a more primitive way of delivering a weapon
    of mass destruction, do you think North Korea could have
    achieved the same benefits if it had developed a non-missile
    means of delivering its nuclear weapons, if it has nuclear
    weapons?
        Mr. Walpole. Only if--yes. If you do not know about it, you
    cannot feel threatened by it. So if they developed a non-
    missile delivery means, they would have to have somehow let the
    world know they have it so that you could feel threatened by
    it, and it would have to be secure enough that you could not
    eliminate it.
        All of it depends on intent. If your intent is simply to
    kill a lot of people, there are easier ways to do that than a
    ballistic missile. If your intent is to hold a policy or a
    doctrine or a group of people hostage to a potential strike,
    then the missile has some value that the other does not.
        Senator Cochran. One of the changes in the estimate this
    year from 2 years ago suggests that proliferation has increased
    between these two dates, and there is more foreign assistance
    flowing to the countries that are trying to improve their
    capabilities. So the estimate concludes that a substantial
    decrease in assistance would delay an Iranian ICBM program, for
    example.
        Has there been any change in terms of halting or slowing
    down or reducing foreign assistance to Iran in the last 2
    years?
        Mr. Walpole. I do not think so. What has changed
    significantly in this is that you are now getting the second
    tier proliferators, North Korea stepping out as a proliferator,
    Iran stepping out as a proliferator, so that all of our efforts
    to try to get, first our allies, then Russia and China to back
    off, we are now having the next tier come along and unsharing.
        Senator Cochran. It is kind of like the cat is out of the
    bag sort of thing, or is that an analogy?
        Mr. Walpole. That is how some people would put it.
        Senator Cochran. But even if this assistance were halted
    today, do you think Iran would still be able to develop an
    ICBM?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes, it would just take a lot longer.
        Senator Cochran. Do you want to tell us how much longer? Is
    that something you can tell us?
        Mr. Walpole. It is hard for me to even think hypothetically
    that all of it stops, because I guess I do not see that
    happening. I get asked that sometimes and I struggle with it
    because it is hard for me to fathom. But let us just assume
    that all of it stops completely. I think you are pushed into
    the next decade and perhaps well into the next decade.
        Senator Cochran. There appears to be a difference of
    opinion within the Intelligence Community about the timing of
    the maturation of the ICBM programs. Is there any debate about
    whether Iran is attempting to acquire or develop an
    intercontinental ballistic missile?
        Mr. Walpole. No, that is why I underscored the agency that
    said they dissented was only on success, not on intent.
        Senator Cochran. Do you think there is consensus in the
    community that Iran could develop and flight test an ICBM
    before the year 2010?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes, again with the caveat of success.
        Senator Cochran. So the debate appears to be over whether
    Iran will have a successful flight test by 2010 or 2015?
        Mr. Walpole. Right.
        Senator Cochran. So how difficult is it, then, to predict
    whether a Nation will or will not have a successful flight
    test?
        Mr. Walpole. Well, now you have hit on the crux of the
    matter. I have a hard enough time projecting when a country
    could and is likely to test. I do not know how I would project
    whether it was successful or not. Again, you look at the Taepo
    Dong-1. We were looking at that and thinking it was a failed
    two-stage test, then we thought, no, it was a failed space
    launch vehicle, but gee, the first two stages worked just fine.
    And that is looking at data after the fact.
        So projecting 15 years out, 10 years out, I would have
    trouble projecting success or failure. We tend to think in
    terms of success because we are not just writing an estimate
    saying, oh, well, all of our dates are based on failures. We do
    not think there is really a threat out there. We are just
    projecting failure.
        We are trying to project success, so to be fair to that
    other agency, that is where we are leaning. But they have then
    cut that line a little bit thinner and said, but everything
    that happens before 2015 will be a failure. I do not have
    confidence in making that judgment.
        Senator Cochran. My last question about Iran is that your
    estimate suggests that Iran is expanding its efforts to sell
    missile technology. Does Iran have technology that other
    countries would be interested in acquiring, and could it become
    a supplier of ballistic missile technology?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions
    about Russia and China. Should I go ahead and do those, or
    would Senator Domenici like to ask some more questions?
        Senator Akaka. Let me yield to Senator Domenici.
        Senator Domenici. I have two questions, Senator Cochran,
    and I will finish.
        You know, we are now concerned in our war against terrorism
    with determining who has weapons of mass destruction and under
    what conditions, and it would appear to this Senator that we
    are not doing that just to find out, but we are doing that to
    find out who it is that has them. It seems to me we have made a
    calculation that it is one thing for India and Pakistan to have
    nuclear weapons, which they have now. We did not try to take
    them out. We did not say to them as we saw them developed--and
    surely we did, they did not just come dropping out of the sky,
    you all told us about them on a regular basis as they evolved
    from the trucks building an area, cleaning it up, and getting
    it ready to 12 years later a missile, I mean, a nuclear weapon.
        Today, you look at the world--you who help a President make
    a decision--and you must try to calculate not only where they
    are, but who is it that controls them, and there must be a
    distinction by our leadership as to what we should do about who
    holds them or who is about to develop them. So that if you
    listen to the President's speech today in the White House Rose
    Garden--I happened to be there--I think it is a very, very
    important speech for people that keep talking about Iraq and
    what are you going to do about that to read.
        I came away with an impression that I thought myself, and
    that was that we cannot let a country that has no conscience
    and has a record of not caring about human life, we cannot sit
    by and watch them develop weapons of mass destruction. That is
    paraphrasing, but that is pretty close.
        Can you tell me, who makes the decision? How does that
    process take place in the United States, the determination that
    that country is not the right one to have weapons of mass
    destruction but maybe this one is OK? We do not want that to
    happen, but it is OK. Do you help in that? Does the CIA help in
    that?
        Mr. Walpole. We prepare estimates of where various
    countries are in their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. We
    have given short summaries in this unclassified paper, but you
    can imagine, while I can talk more openly about ballistic
    missile developments, it is going to be really hard to talk
    about countries' nuclear weapons developments just because of
    the fragility of the intelligence. But we do assessments on----
        Senator Domenici. But they may go together in some
    instances. They may go together----
        Mr. Walpole. Oh, they may go together.
        Senator Domenici [continuing]. But flight testing,
    infrastructure, and so on for ballistic missiles are----
        Senator Domenici. I understand.
        Mr. Walpole [continuing]. They are harder to hide and so
    on. It is just easier for me to do that openly and not lose
    sources. If I start talking about some of the ins and outs of
    our nuclear analysis, then we would not be able to do the work
    anymore.
        But we do those assessments. Some of those conclusions are
    factored into what I have even covered today for the various
    countries. So we submit that information, how long it would
    take Iran to get a nuclear weapon, how long Iraq, all the way
    down all the countries, what they have got in terms of
    infrastructure, in terms of aspirations, and so on, and the
    same with chemical. Larry Gershwin does biological. John Landry
    and other national intelligence officers do chemical weapons.
    All that information is forwarded to the policy committees that
    work through those questions.
        I do not know who makes that decision, but part of our
    assessment in India and Pakistan, in Iran, wherever, where we
    can discern who in that country would control those weapons,
    what type of nuclear doctrine they would have, command and
    control, security, and so on, all of that is factored in. You
    can imagine that we were constantly covering requests, some of
    them coming from the Hill, on Pakistan's command and control
    and security of those weapons given what was taking place. So
    that all gets generated with the Intelligence Community for
    others to make that decision.
        Senator Domenici. It seems to me that it is almost a
    political decision in the end, a decision on what kind of
    person, people, are going to control the weapon, and that is
    not a decision that is made based on total objectivity. It is
    also based on some subjectivity as to what they are apt to do
    with a weapon, right?
        Mr. Walpole. I would imagine it would be, yes.
        Senator Domenici. I would assume there is no other way to
    do it.
        Now, let me just ask my last question with reference to
    Russia. I did not, for today, add up the money we are giving to
    Russia for programs that we are calling nonproliferation,
    everything from Nunn-Lugar to other programs we have put in the
    appropriation process to help them make sure that the
    proliferation ingredients are not spread all over and that they
    can take inventory of them and that they can better police them
    and money to pay scientists so they are not just running around
    selling the secrets. But, in essence, they get quite a few
    billions of dollars from all of that combined each year.
        What would you say the impact on Russia's continuing to
    supply information, supplies, and the like regarding nuclear
    weapons or intercontinental ballistic missiles or other weapons
    of mass destruction, what would you say about the relationship
    of us giving them this money and then them doing those kinds of
    acts in the world in a clandestine manner? Should there be a
    relationship? Should we say, why should we keep on? That is
    going to come up, and it would be nice to hear what somebody in
    the intelligence field thinks about it.
        Mr. Walpole. Yes. The question is going to come up. The
    question has come up, and I think what you have to do in
    looking at those types of calculations is what would it be--it
    is not a, thus much money is going to this and they are doing
    this much to help over here. They ought to cancel each other
    out. It ought to be, what would the situation be if we were not
    doing this? What would the situation be if Russia's weapons
    were not as secure as we have helped them to be, if Russia's
    material was not as secure as we had helped it to be?
        When you make that sort of comparison, then, what is going
    on in helping Iran, while still not something you want to see
    happen, takes on a different light and I think you have got to
    make the comparison that way. The world is not a perfect place
    and we have to set up schemes that will make it better. We
    probably will not make it a perfect place, but make it better,
    and that type of calculation is essential to that.
        Senator Domenici. What seemed to me, though, that there is
    some relationship that is a little more than that and that
    might be how much is all of the aid they receive, which we are
    saying that aid is good for us, not for Russia, or we would not
    be giving it to them, right? But you get to a point where the
    aid and the activity that we do not want them to do may become
    quid pro quo. It may be where it could get bad enough where we
    would say, look, we know about it. You continue to do it. We
    are just not going to have any of these programs.
        Now, if it is not that, what leverage do we have? Certainly
    what we give them by way of this exchange of resources under
    Nunn-Lugar would have no relevancy unless they knew that we
    might at some point cut it back if they did not so-called
    ``behave,'' is that not true?
        Mr. Walpole. I think that would factor in, as well. Of
    course, all of that is what I would expect the policy makers
    are doing. We give them our assessments on where the programs
    are going, how the money is being used as far as security of
    the weapons, and what proliferation activities we are seeing
    made and then somebody, thank goodness, at the other end has to
    figure out what to do with all of that.
        Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
        The French have opened negotiations, we understand, with
    South Korea about providing French rocket technology for future
    South Korean space launch vehicles. There have been concerns in
    the past regarding South Korea's missile program that would be
    seen as violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Do
    you still have concerns that the South Korean program might
    violate the MTCR?
        Mr. Walpole. I will leave it to policy makers to determine
    violations and so on, but as I have said before, we view space
    launch technology as directly applicable to missile technology,
    and whether France is helping South Korea or whether France is
    helping Iran or Iraq--I mean, you see where I am going with
    this--it does not matter what country it is, we have got to
    view space launch technology as aiding and abetting a ballistic
    missile program. So from an intelligence perspective, of
    course, we are concerned.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Cochran.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, there was a report released
    recently on the safety and security of Russia's nuclear weapons
    and materials by the Intelligence Community. Is it the view of
    the Intelligence Community that the Russians retain adequate
    security on their operationally deployed nuclear warheads?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes.
        Senator Cochran. Could Russia retain more deployed warheads
    without an increased risk of nuclear weapons proliferation?
        Mr. Walpole. I think Russia is going to have trouble
    retaining more warheads, proliferation notwithstanding, and
    that was why the laugh. The problem for Russia is maintaining
    the warheads, not that they are trying to do it in a secure
    manner, and it is really the delivery systems for the warheads.
        When we say that they will fall below 2,000 with or without
    arms control, the problem is aging systems, economic
    constraints. They got out of cycle with the dissolution of the
    Soviet Union, I mean, all of those things have got them to the
    point where they are going to have a difficult time maintaining
    those.
        So the best way to answer your question is, I do not think
    they can maintain more, but if they could, they could do it
    without causing proliferation problems. Does that make sense?
        Senator Cochran. Yes.
        Mr. Walpole. OK.
        Senator Cochran. Are you aware of any instances of an
    attempted theft of Russian nuclear weapons?
        Mr. Walpole. Other than what was in the paper?
        Senator Cochran. Well, that is an instance, if it is in the
    paper or not.
        Mr. Walpole. Right.
        Senator Cochran. Are you aware of any attempted thefts?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes.
        Senator Cochran. Could you tell us about it and how serious
    that would be in terms of endangerment and whether or not we
    should be concerned and try to take steps to protect ourselves?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes. In the paper, we cite two examples. One
    was weapons-usable material seized in Bulgaria in 1999, and the
    other was one that was not independently confirmed, but it was
    reports of a theft in 1998. The claim was sufficient material
    to produce an atomic bomb. It did not have any corroboration of
    that type of thing.
        Our concern, as we note in the paper, and I want to confirm
    that we did this in the unclassified--yes. We published both
    the classified and the unclassified version of this report. We
    said, ``Weapons-grade nuclear materials have been stolen from
    some Russian institutes. We assess that undetected smuggling
    has occurred, although we do not know the extent or magnitude
    of undetected thefts. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the
    total amount of material that could have been diverted in the
    last 10 years.''
        Our point in putting that together, and there are similar
    words in the classified version, but our point in putting that
    together was, look, we are only detecting what we are
    detecting. We cannot tell you what we are not seeing. And we
    are concerned, based on what we are seeing, that over a 10-year
    period of time, perhaps enough could have gotten out that
    somebody could do something with.
        Senator Cochran. You are talking about the theft of nuclear
    materials. Do you know of any instance where there has been an
    attempted theft of a Russian nuclear weapon?
        Mr. Walpole. No, not confirmed. I mean, you have seen the
    reports. We all see the reports all the time. They end up in
    the press.
        Senator Cochran. But you are not aware of any attempted
    theft of a Russian nuclear weapon?
        Mr. Walpole. No.
        Senator Cochran. The estimate that you have described to us
    today says that China is modernizing its strategic missile
    forces. Can you tell us how long this modernization effort has
    been underway?
        Mr. Walpole. Yes, since the mid-1980's. China became
    concerned about the survivability of its silos when the U.S.
    deployed the Trident II-D5 because it could then hit those
    silos.
        Senator Cochran. What do you think are the factors that are
    behind China's desire to modernize its military forces, and
    strategic military forces?
        Mr. Walpole. Largely to move to mobile, more survivable
    systems.
        Senator Cochran. Do you think they will expand their forces
    beyond the 75 to 100 assessed in your estimate now that the
    United States has withdrawn from the Antiballistic Missile
    Treaty?
        Mr. Walpole. Our 75 to 100 takes into account U.S.
    decisions toward missile defense, and we look at them doing
    multiple different options, but the 75 to 100 really reflects
    two different approaches. Seventy-five is more missiles, no
    multiple RVs on missiles. One hundred is fewer missiles but
    multiple RVs on the CSS-4s and we do not know which way they
    would go and so we are only speculating. When the report came
    out, one of the Chinese leaders had said that it was just
    baseless on speculation. One out of two is not bad. It is
    speculation. We are speculating, but it is far from baseless.
        Senator Cochran. But is there any relationship or
    correlation between our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on what
    they are doing?
        Mr. Walpole. I think there is a relationship. I think the
    relationship would be both the numbers of weapons they would
    put together and the types of weapons, because they would want
    to carry countermeasures on these that they would use. But the
    modernization program to develop the two mobile ICBMs and the
    one SLBM that I talked about date clear back to the 1980's.
        Senator Cochran. The estimate also says that China's
    development of a multiple reentry vehicle capability for its
    mobile ICBMs and its new SLBM would encounter significant
    technical hurdles that could be costly. How many missiles will
    China be able to place multiple reentry vehicles on?
        Mr. Walpole. In the near term, it would be about 20 CSS-4s
    that they have, the big, large ICBMs. The mobile ICBMs are
    smaller and it would require a very small warhead for them to
    put multiple RVs on them.
        Senator Cochran. My final question is, do you think that
    China will attempt to develop a multiple warhead capability for
    its new missiles?
        Mr. Walpole. Over time, they might look at that. That would
    probably require nuclear testing to get something that small,
    but I do not think it is something that you would see them
    focused on for the near term. They might look at developing a
    larger mobile ICBM. I mean, we had the MX at one point. We were
    looking at the Peacekeeper, looking at being mobile. Russia has
    the SS-24 mobile. Those lent themselves to MIRV-ing because
    they were so large. That is an option, but then neither of
    those systems were very mobile.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, while I do not have any more
    questions, I think this is really a very timely hearing and I
    commend you and the staff of the Subcommittee for scheduling
    this. Ironically, we are having this hearing on the 6-month
    anniversary of the attacks by the terrorists on our Nation.
    Senator Collins made that comment in her opening statement.
    While a lot of our attention is focused on the war against
    terrorism, what this hearing has shown and the estimate has
    shown is that we have to be reminded that the threat of
    ballistic missile attack against our Nation continues to get
    more serious and this new estimate shows that, in some ways,
    the situation has gotten worse since we had the hearing 2 years
    ago to talk about the Intelligence Community's assessment of
    the threat.
        So it has been a very important exercise for us. I know I
    have learned some new things and our Subcommittee will learn
    new things and the Senate will be better prepared to recommend
    ways that we can protect ourselves against these new threats.
    Thank you very much.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for your comments, Senator
    Cochran.
        I want to thank our witness, Mr. Walpole, for testifying
    this afternoon. There is no question that this has been
    stimulating and useful to this Subcommittee.
        I must say that I am concerned over the greater
    sophistication in both missiles and weapons by the countries
    that continue to develop them. Yes, fewer countries are
    developing missiles, but the ones that do so are devoting
    considerable effort to expanding their range and capability and
    this is a compelling reason for continuing a missile defense
    program. It is also a compelling reason to continue using
    diplomacy to enhance our international arms control agreements.
        At the same time, we have to keep focused on present and
    future threats. We need to rank these dangers, prioritizing our
    precious time, energy, and resources in a comprehensive
    national strategy.
        Today, as has been noted, is the 6-month anniversary of the
    terrorist attacks on American soil. Unfortunately, this marks a
    tragic and all-too-real example of how the greatest immediate
    threat we face is from terrorists using means other than
    missiles or weapons of mass destruction to attack America. Mr.
    Walpole's testimony supports this disturbing conclusion.
        As we confront the implications of the range of possible
    threats against the United States, we must balance the
    resources needed to confront immediate enemies against those
    needed against future enemies. This hearing has contributed to
    the public debate that is needed in this country as we
    formulate our national security policy.
        I appreciate the willingness of Mr. Walpole and his
    colleagues from the Central Intelligence Agency to discuss this
    topic with us publicly.
        Mr. Walpole, we have no further questions at this time.
    However, Members of the Subcommittee may submit questions in
    writing for the witness. We would appreciate a timely response
    to any questions. The record will remain open for these
    questions and for further statements from our colleagues.
        Again, I wanted to say thank you very much for your
    responses today.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

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