[Senate Hearing 107-455]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-455
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND MOTIVATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-736 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Judith A. Ansley, Republican Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Terrorist Organizations and Motivations
November 15, 2001
Page
Post, Jerrold M., M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Political
Psychology and International Affairs, The George Washington
University..................................................... 7
Jenkins, Brian M., Senior Advisor to the President, Rand
Corporation.................................................... 26
(iii)
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND MOTIVATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats
and Capabilities,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
room SR-222, Senator Mary L. Landrieu (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Landrieu, Roberts,
Allard, Hutchinson, and Collins.
Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
staff member; Maren Leed, professional staff member; Arun A.
Seraphin, professional staff member; and Terence P. Szuplat,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
professional staff member; Edward H. Edens IV, professional
staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
and Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Gabriella Eisen, Thomas C. Moore,
and Jennifer L. Naccari.
Committee members' assistants present: Barry Gene (B.G.)
Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Jason Matthews, Marshall A.
Hevron, and Jeffrey S. Wiener, assistants to Senator Landrieu;
Peter A. Contostavlos and William K. Sutey, assistants to
Senator Bill Nelson; Neal Orringer, assistant to Senator
Carnahan; Brady King, assistant to Senator Dayton; Wayne Glass,
assistant to Senator Bingaman; John Gastright, assistant to
Senator Thurmond; George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator
Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; James P.
Dohoney, Jr. and Michele A. Traficante, assistants to Senator
Hutchinson; Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and
Derek Maurer, assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU, CHAIRMAN
Senator Landrieu. Good afternoon, I would like to welcome
our special guests and panelists to the eighteenth hearing of
the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. The
ranking member, Senator Roberts, is joining me today and we
will have other members of the subcommittee who are actually
now attending a members-only briefing with Secretary Wolfowitz
on the latest developments on one of our fronts in Afghanistan.
So I will just begin.
As usual, we begin with opening statements and then go
through a round of questions. I want to again welcome you and
thank you very much for joining us. The first part of our
hearing, as was announced, will be open. The second part of our
hearing, with our second panel, will be classified and closed.
As we look around we can see that it is a very sunny day in
Washington, but it is actually even sunnier in Afghanistan,
with the bright faces of so many as this liberation begins. But
it would be a mistake to think that this is anything, as
Churchill would say, but the end of the beginning. The seeds of
the war with al Qaeda were planted long ago, the roots run very
deep, and the struggle to destroy those roots will take time
and sacrifice.
We only need to contrast the headlines of the Taliban
retreat with the report from the London Times this morning. The
headline reads ``Bin Laden's Nuclear Secrets Found.'' ``Within
one of al Qaeda's safe houses in Kabul, partly burned documents
written in Arabic and German and English give detailed designs
for missiles, bombs, and nuclear weapons.''
We should all realize that we face an enemy whose mindset
we can hardly even comprehend. These killers hold a world-view
so alien to us here in America that it poses a unique threat of
its own. Understanding the motives of our enemies has very real
impacts and consequences. First, it dictates strategy. If our
Government can correctly assess our opponent, our enemy's
motivations, our warfighters can make more educated decisions
about their objectives.
The alternative of not understanding motivations or
objectives, has disastrous consequences. We have only to look
as far back as September 11, the hijackings of that day, for a
very real example. Up until that time the majority of
hijackings did not result in a great loss of life. Therefore,
the pilots and crew of aircraft were trained to cooperate,
avoid resistance, and calm the passengers. That training was
ineffective, given the motives and objectives of these killers,
the enemy we face today. As a result, we were left unprotected
and unprepared.
The ash heap of history is riddled with nations which
failed to understand what their opponents wanted and what they
were willing to do to get it. Our own Nation made this mistake
during the Vietnam War. Yet in most cases it has been America's
enemies that have mistaken American respect for life as
softness, our dedication to democracy as weakness, and our love
of liberty as a lack of resolve. From imperial Japan's sneak
attack on Pearl Harbor to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the
Taliban's refusal to comply with our demands, our own
experience teaches us the lesson that we must understand our
opponent's motivation to craft a strategy to win the war.
Second, only through the study of motivations can we
prioritize the needs of our Nation. During the Cold War we
needed thinkers and leaders like George Kennan and Dean Acheson
and others to help us understand the Soviet enemy. In fact, we
placed a huge educational investment in understanding Russian
language, culture, history, and philosophy. We understood that
these investments were the only way we could make sound choices
in prioritizing the threats to our Nation.
Just as in our struggle with the Soviet Union, the
challenge to the United States today is multifaceted and one
for which we were initially unprepared and are still today
underprepared. If we had not studied Soviet motives and
understood their intentions, we never would have produced an
effective defense. We must undertake the same endeavor for this
war on terrorism, of which today we are just experiencing the
end of the very beginning.
I am sure that if you compile the list of all the unfunded
requirements for the Federal Government's anti-terrorism effort
it would stretch from here in this room right down to the
Treasury Department. Yet we cannot possibly meet all of these
requirements, so it becomes a matter of prioritizing them and
that prioritization is very critical to our outcome.
Finally, it is particularly important for the members of
this subcommittee to understand our enemy's motivations because
of our particular jurisdiction. Among other things, it is our
responsibility to resource and oversee the work of Special
Operations Command. Under that command, this Nation maintains
one of its front-line capabilities for psychological
operations. As our witnesses' testimony will make clear, this
constitutes one of the most important aspects of this war.
Therefore, it is vital for us to understand these motivations.
It is the only way for us to evaluate the effectiveness of the
Pentagon's efforts thus far and the only way for us to have
some sense of the direction of the future.
Terrorism, most experts agree, is violence or the threat of
violence in order to coerce others to alter their actions or to
refrain from actions. It has traditionally been aimed at
altering Government policies or actions. Terrorists have
traditionally taken hostages or victims in order to force
governments to meet their demands. We have heard over and over
from the 1960s to the present that the U.S. Government's policy
is no negotiation with terrorists.
But something has happened in the last decade. Some of the
terrorists we confront today do not leave calling cards. They
do not take credit for their actions and they are not
interested in negotiating, but they are interested in spreading
fear and exacting a high price in lives.
We are very fortunate indeed to have two distinguished
panelists before us as we deliberate this topic. Dr. Jerrold
Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology, and
International Affairs at the George Washington University. He
assumed this position after a 21-year career with the Central
Intelligence Agency, where he founded and directed the Center
for Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. He has
advised the U.S. Government on terrorist skyjackings, aviation
security, weapons of mass destruction, and has published
numerous books and articles on terrorism and political
psychology.
Mr. Brian Jenkins is a Senior Advisor to the President of
RAND. Prior to that he served as Deputy Chairman of Kroll and
Associates, an international investigative and consulting firm,
and as Chairman of RAND's Political Science Department. He is a
decorated combat veteran who served as a special operations
officer in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. He has also
served as a consultant on terrorism to several Government
agencies and has published books and articles on this subject.
I welcome our panelists today and thank you for your
insights. I thank you for the articles and the books that you
have written on this subject. I think you have a great deal to
share in terms of helping us in this subcommittee understand
terrorist motivations so we can help shape our military to deal
effectively to stem the loss of life, to prevent the loss of
life in the future, and defend this great Nation and our allies
from this day forward.
At this time I would like to ask my ranking member, Senator
Roberts, to join me with his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAT ROBERTS
Senator Roberts. I thank the Chair. I would like to thank
you, Senator Landrieu, for holding this important hearing and
the closed briefing on terrorist organizations and the
motivations behind such organizations. In light of September 11
and the terrorist attacks on our Nation, our ongoing war not
only in Afghanistan but also globally, this is a very pertinent
hearing. That is probably the understatement of the day.
On our first panel we have, as you have indicated, two very
distinguished experts, Dr. Jerrold Post and Mr. Brian Jenkins.
Without question, I think their insights will be most useful to
this subcommittee as we continue to focus on how best to
address and respond to global terrorism.
Madam Chairman, I asked my staff to take a look at how many
bills have been introduced since September 11 by members of
Congress and there have been over 50; how many hearings, there
have been 15; how many times people have asked Tom Ridge to
come and share his views with them and, more importantly from
the standpoint of those who asked, some marching orders I am
sure they would have liked to have given Tom; and the nine
committees that we have that have alleged or self-declared
jurisdiction over this issue. The nine committees range from
apples to zebras. That is not really a very good comparison, is
it?
Senator Landrieu. That is okay, it will work.
Senator Roberts. Aardvarks to zebras. At any rate, we have
the DOD responsibility and, as the chair has indicated, we have
had 18 hearings. In talking to Director Ridge, the Vice
President, and others, I have informed them continually that we
do have quite a wealth of information in hearings that really
warned us prior to the event.
We also have two Government witnesses in the closed
session, a representative of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center
and Ms. Jennifer Oatman, a Senior Terrorism Analyst for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Terrorism Analysis Center.
I am going to skip part of this statement in the interest
of time, but I think it is absolutely crucial as we continue
our efforts, as the President has indicated, in regards to a
lengthy war, a very difficult war on global terrorism, that we
focus on understanding what really motivates the individual
terrorist and the numerous terrorist organizations. Some
questions: How and why were certain terrorist organizations
really established? How do they recruit individuals to join
their organizations, and in some cases take on suicide
missions? In what way does U.S. foreign policy motivate and
impact these organizations? How and why have these
organizations become more violent and interested in
catastrophic attacks in recent years? What strengths does the
United States have to combat this new class of warrior, the
warrior described so well by our former Commandant of the
Marine Corps Charles Krulak?
Perhaps more importantly, what are our military weaknesses
as we engage in the war on terrorism? We had an unclassified,
if that is the proper word for it, briefing with the
Intelligence Committee yesterday where the Technical Advisory
Group people came in and urged a top-down--I will not even say
review; ``shakeup'' is probably a better word, in regards to
our intelligence community, and in regards to this mission.
These and many other questions must be addressed if we ever
want to get to the root cause of global terrorism and find ways
to deter and defeat it. It is my hope that this afternoon we
will begin to get answers to some of these questions. I have
some additional comments, but I would just like to make them
part of the record in the interest of the time we need to hear
from witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts
First, I would like to thank our chairman, Senator Landrieu, for
holding this important hearing and closed briefing on terrorist
organizations and motivations. In light of the tragic September 11
terrorist attacks on our Nation and our ongoing war on global
terrorism, this is a very timely hearing.
I am pleased that we have before us on our first panel this
afternoon Dr. Jerrold Post, Professor of Psychiatry, Political
Psychology and International Affairs at the George Washington
University and Mr. Brian Jenkins, the Senior Advisor to the President
of RAND. Their insights will be most useful to the subcommittee as we
continue to focus on how best to address and respond to global
terrorism.
I also look forward to hearing from our two Government witnesses in
the closed session. A representative of CIA's Counterterrorism Center
and Ms. Jennifer Oatman, a Senior Terrorism Analyst for the Joint
Staff's Joint Terrorism Analysis Center, will discuss our Government's
views and perceptions on terrorist organizations and motivations.
Madam Chairman, this subcommittee was established in 1999 to
provide a focus for the Department of Defense's efforts to counter new
and emerging threats vital to U.S. national security interests. Having
served as the first chairman of this subcommittee, and now as the
ranking Republican, I have devoted much of my time to focusing on the
terrorist threat to our Nation and I am very pleased that the
subcommittee, under your leadership, is maintaining that focus.
As we begin what we all expect to be a lengthy war on global
terrorism, I firmly believe that it is crucial that we focus on
understanding what motivates the individual terrorist and the numerous
terrorist organizations. Questions such as the following must be
answered with regards to terrorist organizations:
How and why were certain terrorist organizations established? How
do they recruit individuals to join their organizations, and in some
cases, take on suicide missions? In what way does U.S. foreign policy
motivate and impact these organizations? How and why have these
organizations become more violent and interested in catastrophic
attacks in recent years?
These and many other questions must be addressed if we ever want to
get to the root cause of global terrorism and find ways to deter and
defeat it. It is my hope that this afternoon we will begin to get
answers to some of those questions.
Madam Chairman, before we turn to our first panel, I would like to
read a paragraph contained in the Senate report accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000:
``The serious prospect that known-terrorist Osama bin Laden or
other terrorists might use chemical or biological weapons is of great
concern. Bin Laden's organization is just one of approximately a dozen
terrorist groups that have expressed an interest in, or have sought,
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agents. Bin Laden, for
example, has called the acquisition of these weapons a `religious duty'
and noted that `how we use them is up to us.' ''
While that was written in 1999, it clearly rings true today and
outlines the seriousness of the terrorist threat that we currently
face. Madam Chairman, I look forward to continuing our work in this
critical area and thank you again for holding this important and timely
hearing.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator Roberts. Senator
Allard.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD
Senator Allard. Madam Chair, I thank you. I want to just
make a few brief comments if I may. I will not be able to stay,
but I do appreciate your holding this hearing. I think it is
important that we hold this hearing and develop a thorough
understanding of terrorism and the terrorists themselves.
I think this is an important issue and I thank you for
calling this hearing. Dr. Post and Mr. Jenkins, I thank you for
coming here today. I look forward to reviewing your testimony.
In order to defeat terrorism in the most efficient manner
and limit the risk to ourselves and our allies, it is important
that we understand how terrorist organizations are put
together, how they are maintained, and what motivates them.
Armed with that kind of knowledge, we can dismantle them piece-
by-piece and achieve greater success in preventing them from
organizing in the future.
I think it is important that we defeat terrorism on all
fronts. We are already seeing success in physically dismantling
the al Qaeda network and the destruction of their financial
backing, although we still have a long ways to go and I
recognize that. I am sure over the next months and years we
will see successes with other terrorist organizations as well.
Your insight into the hearts and minds of the kind of
people that can plan, coordinate, organize, and execute
terrorist acts against innocent people is of the utmost
importance. In particular, I am interested in what motivates an
individual to commit suicide for a cause and what we can do to
arrest that motivation. We will no doubt eliminate the current
terrorist networks with time.
However, we must remain vigilant against the growth of
future organizations and we must find them and eliminate them
early when they initially begin to form.
Again, thank you for coming here today and I look forward
to hearing and reading your testimony.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator Allard. I want to
thank both of you for your leadership on this subject and
really appreciate the support that you have shown. At this time
I would also like to include in the record a statement
submitted by Senator Carnahan.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Jean Carnahan
Thank you, Madam Chair. First, I want to thank the chair and
ranking member for arranging this hearing today. Usually, hearings
focus on proposals for resolving problems facing our Nation. But as we
enter this new and uncertain age, it is important that we first
understand clearly what the problem is. Therefore, this hearing will
help to define the gravest threats now facing our citizens, at home and
abroad.
Dr. Post and Mr. Jenkins are world-renown for their writings on
terrorism. They advise policymakers and continue to inform the public
of America's emerging vulnerabilities. Today, we ask that they help us
to understand the workings and motivations of world terrorist
organizations.
It has already become a cliche to say that America was forever
changed on September 11. But it is important to emphasize what the
changes really involve. The country now faces an unpredictable enemy
who is well-funded, and fully capable of launching horrible attacks
against Americans at home and abroad. Our people have already shown
tremendous resolve to support this Nation's campaign against such
heinous acts. We must now examine what the full scope of this campaign
will entail.
Today's panelists have written on the nature of the country's war
on terrorism. Dr. Jenkins has written about the importance of
coordinating our criminal justice system with other elements of the
government, particularly with the military.
It is important to remember that this is not a conventional war. We
cannot always expect to measure progress by military victories and land
seizure. Instead, we must keep sight of the primary objective: to rout
out and eradicate terrorism, at home and abroad.
So, in spite of our recent successes on the battlefield in
Afghanistan, we must also remain resolved to track down terrorists and
bring them to justice--even after the war in central Asia is over. This
will involve new covert tactics abroad, and new applications of
domestic law at home. At the same time, we will balance this approach,
by preserving fundamental civil liberties. This will take patience and
resolve. But let there be no mistake. As President Bush declared, ``The
battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waiver; we will not
tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will
prevail.''
I hope that our hearing will help contribute to our country's
preparation for this uncertain road ahead. We must remain realistic and
try to understand the true nature of the terrorist threat.
Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. As the witnesses know, we have your
testimony here, which is submitted in its entirety for the
record, and it has been read and reviewed. So if you could,
summarize in the time allocated of perhaps 10 minutes each, and
then we will go into some questions from the members. Dr. Post,
did you want to begin?
STATEMENT OF JERROLD M. POST, M.D., PROFESSOR OF PSYCHIATRY,
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Dr. Post. Madam Chairman, Senator Roberts, I am really
honored to be offered the opportunity to present to this
subcommittee, and I must say I am particularly honored to share
this opportunity with my long-time friend and colleague, Brian
Jenkins. We have been working together on this topic for
upwards of 30 years and that deserves emphasizing. This is not
the first war of the 21st century. This is a war in some ways
that has been going on since the Garden of Eden, but in its
modern incarnation dates back to the early 1970s. We all
remember the Munich Olympics and the capture of the Israeli
Olympic Village by radical Palestinian terrorists in 1972.
What I would like to do is walk you swiftly through the
landscape of terrorism. I was asked in particular to address
the question of what motivates terrorists, what makes them
tick. I think this is an extremely important question. We
cannot deter an adversary whom we do not understand.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
I think it is really important that we think of terrorisms
in the plural rather than terrorism in the singular. I will
walk you through this map. Across the top reading from right to
left, somewhat more alliteratively, we have crazies, criminals,
and crusaders.
The first thing to emphasize is that terrorists are not
seriously psychologically disturbed. They are not crazed
fanatics. In fact, terrorist groups expel from their midst
emotionally disturbed individuals, just as a Green Beret squad
would. They represent a security risk.
I will be focusing in particular on political terrorism. In
the middle tier, regime or state terrorism refers to actions by
the state against its own citizens, an example being the period
of the so-called ``dirty wars'' in Argentina, where citizens
who were dissident to the regime ``disappeared,'' and Germany
in the 1930s. When Saddam Hussein used nerve gas against his
own citizens, the Kurdish group in the north, this was an
example of state CBW terrorism.
State-supported terrorism, of course, has been and indeed
should be a major preoccupation of our Government. Usually on
the State Department list are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan,
North Korea, and Cuba. Especially as we have been increasingly
concerned with the question of weapons of mass destruction
terrorism, these states are particularly important to focus on
because the facilitation of states to groups will be
increasingly important.
I will try to lead you into the lower tier, sub-state
terrorism, and what makes these terrorists tick. At the lower
left we have social revolutionary terrorism. This was
particularly prominent during the early 1970s and 1980s. These
are the terrorist groups steeped in Marxist-Leninism, very much
on the wane since the end of the Soviet empire, but still
present. We had the Japanese Red Army, still present; Columbian
terrorists, such as the FARC, the Bader-Meinhof Gang, Red Army
Faction, Red Brigades. In the United States we had our own
group, the Weather Underground.
Two groups down from that are the national-separatist
terrorists. This again is a very important group, and in fact,
in the beginning of terrorism these were the two main groups we
were hearing from. As you pointed out in your introductory
remarks, they would leave their calling cards. The nationalist-
separatist terrorists refer to the groups who are carrying on
their family's missions in many ways. This refers to the
secular nationalist terrorists, the radical Palestinian
terrorists, the Provos--the Provisional Irish Republican Army
of Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque region, seeking a
separate nation for their minority group within a nation.
Now, if I could have the next slide.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
What I have put up here is a generational map, just to make
clear some of the distinguishing generational dynamics of
terrorism. Across the top we have the parents' relationship to
the regime, and down the left the youth's relationship to their
parents. What the X in the upper left-hand cell says is that
individuals who are loyal to a family that is loyal to the
regime do not become terrorists.
There are two boxes checked off and they are really quite
different, in fact mirror images in some ways. In the lower
left are individuals who are rebelling against the generation
of their families.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
These are the social revolutionaries. The goal of the group
is to destroy the world of their fathers. Their acts of
terrorism are acts of retaliation for real and imagined hurts
against the society of their parents. They are symbolically
dissenting against parents loyal to the regime. One of the
German terrorists said: ``This is a generation of corrupt old
men who gave us Auschwitz and Hiroshima.''
I am struck that there is a resemblance between these
dynamics and those of at least some of the terrorists of al
Qaeda, certainly Osama bin Laden in particular, who, in
striking out against the Saudi Arabian royal family, was biting
the hand that made his family so wealthy and ended up losing
his Saudi citizenship as well as being expelled from his own
family--surely, sibling rivalry run amok.
If I go back to the preceding slide once again.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Now, to the upper right-hand cell, individuals who are
loyal to families who are disloyal to the regime or dissident
to the regime or damaged by the regime. These are the
nationalist-separatist terrorists.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
They are carrying on the mission of their parents. They've
heard about it, be it in the coffee houses of Beirut, in the
occupied territories, or in the pubs of Northern Ireland. They
are taking action to retaliate for wounds caused to their
families, to carry on the cause of their parents and
grandparents.
I had the opportunity with the Department of Justice to
serve as an expert in the trial of the Abu Nidal terrorist
tried for the skyjacking of the Egypt Air plane over Malta
several years ago. This young man at age 8 was on his family
farm in the West Bank when the 1967 war occurred and they were
forced into a refugee camp. At that time his mother told him:
``This is what happened to me when I was 8 years old during the
1948 war when we were expelled from Haifa.''
In school he was taught the way to become a man is to join
the revolution and regain the lands of your parents and
grandparents. When he committed his act of terrorism, it was
the proudest moment of his life. He was carrying on the mission
of his family. He was acting as a member of the revolution.
If I could have the next slide.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Now, in the early years of terrorism those two groups
comprised the majority of the terrorists we were hearing from.
As you pointed out, they left their calling cards. They were
trying to influence the West. They were trying to call
attention to the West of their cause. This produced a certain
inhibition upon the extent of their violence because too
horrific an act would lead to counterproductive effects within
society.
Thus, in considering the prospects of weapons of mass
destruction terrorism, there is an inherent brake, or
inhibition for these types of groups, who do not wish to
alienate their constituents or society. We may recall in the
aftermath of the Good Friday Accords when the Real IRA killed
29 women and children in Omagh, there was such an outcry of
protest within Northern Ireland, they ended up apologizing for
their violence.
There is a vivid distinction to be made between these
groups trying to call attention to their acts and the group
that I will spend most of my time on now, namely the religious
extremist terrorists. Part of the reason they are so dangerous
has to do with the very fact that they do not use a calling
card. The terrorists of these groups are not trying to
influence the West. They are trying to expel the West. They do
not need a headline in the New York Times or a story running on
CNN. Their audience is up above, and God already knows that
they are responsible for that act.
So this is a very dangerous group indeed. Moreover, they
are ``true believers'' who have subordinated their own
individuality to the group, and uncritically follow the
directions of their charismatic leader. They believe what they
do is not only not immoral, but becomes a religious command.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
On this slide, I have indicated the principal differences.
Other terrorisms are interested in influencing contemporary
society; fundamental religious terrorism wishes no dialogue
with contemporary society. It wishes to eliminate modernizing
influences. Radical Islamic terrorism particularly seeks to
eliminate Western presence and influences. Moreover, these are
hierarchical groups who have an absence of conflict as ``true
believers'', because their acts of violence become sanctified
by religious authority.
Make no mistake about it, the seizure by Osama bin Laden of
the issue of the Palestinian cause does not represent by any
means his commitment to the peace process. Over the years,
Osama bin Laden has treated with contempt Palestinian leaders,
who have very much resented his lack of interest in the
Palestinian cause. But, in fact, this resonates well within the
area. But the only just solution for him would be expulsion of
all, not just some, but of all, Israelis from the region and of
Western influence from the area entirely.
Now, let me spend a few moments responding to the questions
raised in your opening comments concerning how suicide can be
justified by these individuals in pursuit of these goals.
Suicide is proscribed by the Koran. It is against the Koran:
``Whoever kills himself with an iron weapon, then the iron
weapon will remain in his hand and he will continually stab
himself in his belly with it in the fire of hell eternally
forever and ever.''
We had the opportunity to interview, through foundation-
supported research, 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists,
including 20 radical Islamist terrorists. We have some
remarkable material from them. These were all commanders that
we interviewed. One of them, when we asked him about this
question of justifying suicidal terrorism in pursuit of their
cause, got really quite angry and he said: ``This is not
suicide; suicide is selfish, suicide is weak, suicide is mental
illness. This is istishad.'' Istishad literally means martyrdom
or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah.
The commander of the group that led to the Netanyahu
victory and the defeat of Prime Minister Perez is now serving
46 consecutive life sentences in Israel for the 46 Israelis
killed in the wave of suicide bombings he directed in 1996. In
speaking to this question of how they justify this, he said:
``Suicidal terrorism is the highest form of martyrdom. These
are holy warriors for Allah, who will be given a higher place
in paradise.''
``This is not murder,'' another one said. ``This is jihad.
We are not interested in the bloodshed we cause. That is an
unfortunate byproduct. For us the question is one of carrying
on jihad.''
Finally, we asked the question about the moral red line,
whether there is any. For most terrorist groups, as I
indicated, there is a moral red line; too much violence would
be counterproductive. One of them responded: ``The more
violence, the greater the fear in the public. The greatest
violence possible is our goal. There is no moral red line.''
Now, there is a distinction to be made between the suicide
bombers in Israel and those in the United States. In speaking
to this distinction, I want to indicate this will not exactly
bring comfort to the subcommittee. In Israel we had a group,
ages 17 to 22, unformed youth really, unemployed, uneducated,
unmarried, persuaded by the seniors in the group, sometimes
recruited only hours before, that their acts of suicidal
terrorism would bring significance to their otherwise empty
lives, would enroll them in the hall of martyrs, and would lead
to prestige and monetary rewards for their family. Moreover,
once they were recruited into the group, they were never left
alone, lest they backslide.
In contrast, in the al Qaeda terrorists we had a group of
older individuals, highly educated in some cases, a number of
them from rather comfortable Saudi and Egyptian backgrounds,
and, most importantly, unlike those in Israel who were kept
under lock and key until they committed the act, operating in
free western society for a substantial period of time, exposed
to the openness of our society, yet carrying within them like a
laser beam their commitment to carry out their mission, giving
their lives for the cause as they were taking thousands of
casualties.
We see them as true believers, fully formed adults who, not
unlike a religious cult, had subscribed to the beliefs of
radical Islam as articulated by Osama bin Laden, and if it was
good for the cause they were willing to do this for the cause
and their individuality did not count.
Let me conclude with my four-pronged program for countering
terrorism based on these psychological insights.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
One, to emphasize, terrorism is a vicious species of
psychological warfare, waged with violence as communication.
You do not counter psychological warfare with guns, missiles,
and smart bombs. To be sure, that was quite necessary in the
current campaign. You counter psychological warfare with
psychological warfare. What does that mean? In the first place
and quite importantly, inhibit potential terrorists from
joining the organization in the first place. Once they're in
that organization, the powerful group dynamics continue to
reinforce their message of hatred.
Two, cause dissension within the group.
Three, facilitate exit from the group.
Four, and particularly important, weaken support for the
group. Right now Osama bin Laden is a romantic hero to many in
his part of the world. How do we marginalize his group, how do
we delegitimate his leadership?
It is important to emphasize that radical Islam right now
represents a major danger in terms of their enmity of the West,
and for every terrorist we eliminate there will be 10 more
ready to take their place. When children are taught to hate,
when hatred is ``bred in the bone'', it is very difficult to
counter. That means it is necessary to be countering the quite
negative image of America being taught in the radical
madrassas, and being preached in the radical mosques, and
emphasize the importance of moderate Islamic clerics countering
the message of extremism.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Post follows:]
Prepared Statement by Jerrold M. Post, M.D.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International
Affairs and Director, Political Psychology Program, The George
Washington University, Washington, D.C. 20052 (202) 994-7386
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the mind of the terrorist: individual and group psychology of terrorist
behavior
The Spectrum of Terrorism
Terrorism is not a homogeneous phenomenon. There is a broad
spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a
different psychology, motivation and decisionmaking structure. Indeed,
one should not speak of terrorist psychology in the singular, but
rather of terrorist psychologies. Figure 1 depicts the broad spectrum
of terrorist types. In the top tier of the graphic, we differentiate
political terrorism from criminal and pathological terrorism. Studies
of political terrorist psychology \2\ do not reveal severe psychiatric
pathology. In fact, political terrorist groups do not permit
emotionally disturbed individuals to join as they represent a security
risk. Seriously disturbed individuals tend to act alone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Post, J. ``Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a
Product of Psychological Forces'' in Reich, W. (ed.) Origins of
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Considering the diversity of causes to which terrorists are
committed, the uniformity of their rhetoric is striking. Polarizing and
absolutist, it is a rhetoric of ``us versus them.'' It is rhetoric
without nuance, without shades of gray. ``They'', the establishment,
are the source of all evil in vivid contrast to ``us,'' the freedom
fighters, consumed by righteous rage. If ``they'' are the source of our
problems, it follows ineluctably in the special psycho-logic of the
terrorist, that ``they'' must be destroyed. It is the only just and
moral thing to do. Once one accepts the basic premises, the logical
reasoning is flawless.
What accounts for the uniformity of the terrorists' polarizing
absolutist rhetoric? My own comparative research on the psychology of
terrorists does not reveal major psychopathology, agreeing with the
finding of Crenshaw ``the outstanding common characteristic of
terrorists is their normality.'' Her studies of the FLN in Algeria in
the 1950s found the members to be basically normal. Nor did Beskin find
members of the IRA to be emotionally disturbed. In a review of the
Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups, McCauley and Segal conclude that
``the best documented generalization is negative; terrorists do not
show any striking psychopathology.''
Nor does a comparative study reveal a particular psychological
type, a particular personality constellation--a uniform terrorist mind.
But while there is a diversity of personalities attracted to the path
of terrorism, an examination of memoirs, court records, and, on rare
occasions, interviews, suggests that individuals with particular
personality traits and personality tendencies are drawn
disproportionately to terrorist careers--in particular, frustrated
individuals, who tend to externalize, seeking an external cause for
their difficulties. Unable to face his own inadequacies, the individual
with this personality style needs a target to blame and attack for his
own inner weakness, inadequacies and lack of success. Such individuals
find the polarizing absolutist rhetoric of terrorism extremely
attractive. ``It's not us--it's them.'' ``They are the cause of our
problems'' provides a psychologically satisfying explanation for what
has gone wrong in their lives. A great deal has gone wrong in the lives
of individuals who are drawn to the path of terrorism. One study by
German social scientists concluded that the group of terrorists whose
lives they had studied demonstrated a pattern of failure both
educationally and vocationally. Viewing the terrorists as ``advancement
oriented and failure prone,'' they characterized the terrorist career
as ``the terminal point of a series of abortive adaptation attempts.''
To summarize the foregoing, terrorists as individuals for the most
part do not demonstrate serious psychopathology. While there is no one
personality type, it is the impression that there is a disproportionate
representation among terrorists of individuals who are aggressive and
action-oriented and place greater than normal reliance on the
psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting. There is
suggestive data indicating that many terrorists come from the margins
of society and have not been particularly successful in their personal,
educational and vocational lives. The combination of the personal
feelings of inadequacy with the reliance on the psychological
mechanisms of externalization and splitting make especially attractive
a group of like-minded individuals whose credo is ``It is not us; it is
them. They are the cause of our problems.'' It therefore is not only
not immoral to strike out at them; it becomes a moral obligation.
Terrorism is not a consequence of individual psychological abnormality.
Rather it is a consequence of group or organizational pathology that
provides a sense-making explanation to the youth drawn to these groups.
At the middle tier, state terrorism refers to the state turning its
resources--police, judiciary, military, secret police, etc.--against
its own citizenry to suppress dissent, as exemplified by the ``dirty
wars'' in Argentina. When Saddam Hussein used nerve gas against his own
Kurdish citizens, this was an example of state CBW terrorism. State-
supported terrorism is of major concern to the United States. Currently
on the list annually distributed by the Department of State are Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan, North Korea and Cuba. In these situations,
when states are acting through terrorist groups, fearing retaliation,
the decisionmaking of the state leadership will be a significant
constraint upon the group acting under their influence or control.
In the lower tier, a diverse group of sub-state terrorist groups
are specified: social-revolutionary terrorism, nationalist-separatist
terrorism, right-wing terrorism, religious extremist terrorism,
subsuming both religious fundamentalist terrorism and terrorism
perpetrated by non-traditional religious groups (such as Aum
Shinrikyo), and single issue terrorism.
Social Revolutionaries
Social-revolutionary terrorism, also known as terrorism of the
left, includes those acts perpetrated by groups seeking to overthrow
the capitalist economic and social order. Social revolutionary groups
are typified by the European ``fighting communist organizations''
active throughout the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., the Red Army Faction in
Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy). While social-revolutionary
terrorist groups have experienced a significant decline over the last
two decades, paralleling the collapse of Communism in Europe and the
end of the Cold War, social-revolutionary terrorism and insurgency are
still underway, as exemplified by the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Sendero
Luminosa (the Shining Path), Movement Revolutionaire Tupac Amaru (MRTA)
in Peru, several Columbian terrorist groups who are also associated
with narco-terrorism, and Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional
(EZLN) of Chiapas, Mexico.
These are complex organizations, however, not groups per se. The
decisionmaking locus is outside of the action cells. In these secret
organizations, there is a tension between security and communication.
This leads to rather more decisionmaking latitude for the action cells
than might be present in a more open organization. Thus policy
guidelines may be laid down, but specific planning concerning the
target and the tactics has been delegated to the group.
Insofar as these groups are seeking to influence their society,
they would be significantly constrained from indiscriminate acts that
cause significant casualties among their own countrymen, or cause
negative reactions in their domestic and international audiences. But
discriminate acts against government or symbolic capitalist targets
could be rationalized by these groups.
Nationalist-Separatists
Nationalist-separatist terrorism, also known as ethno-nationalist
terrorism, includes those groups fighting to establish a new political
order or state based on ethnic dominance or homogeneity. The Irish
Republican Army, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri
Lanka, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, and radical
Palestinian groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization and the
Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(PFLP-GC) are prominent examples. Nationalist-separatist terrorists are
usually attempting to garner international sympathy for their cause and
to coerce the dominant group. Thus ETA is attempting to pressure Spain
to yield to its demands for an independent Basque state. These causes
of the Nationalist-separatist terrorist groups and organizations are
particularly intractable, for the bitterness and resentment against the
dominant ethnic group has been conveyed from generation to
generation.\3\ Hatred has been ``bred in the bone.'' In these
organizations, the young revolutionaries are often extolled as heroes
within their communities, for their mission reflects their people's
cause. Among incarcerated Palestinian terrorists my group has been
interviewing with support from the Smith-Richardson Foundation, the
regularity with which Palestinian youth chose to enter these groups was
striking. The responses of the interview subjects indicated, in sum,
``Everyone was joining. Everyone was doing it. It was the thing to
do.'' They have heard the bitterness of their parents and grandparents
in the coffee houses in Jordan and the occupied territories, or the
pubs of Northern Ireland, about the economic injustices they have
suffered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Post, J. ``Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a
Product of Psychological Forces,'' in Reich, W. (ed.) Origins of
Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 25-40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nationalist-separatist groups operating within their nation are
particularly sensitive to the responses of their internal constituency,
as well as their international audience. This provides a constraint
against acts so violent or extra-normal as to offend their
constituents, as exemplified by the attack by the Real IRA in Omagh in
1998 in which 29, mostly women and children, were killed. The resulting
uproar from their Irish constituents was so extreme, that the Real IRA
apologized and forswore future violence.
As reflected in Figure 2, the generational dynamics of these
nationalist-separatist terrorists are the very opposite of the social-
revolutionary terrorists discussed earlier. They are carrying on the
mission of their parents and grandparents who have been damaged by, or
are disloyal to, the regime. They are loyal to families that are
disloyal to the regime. Their acts of terrorism are acts of vengeance
against the regime that damaged their families.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
This is in vivid contrast to the social-revolutionary terrorists
who are rebelling against the generation of their parents who are loyal
to the regime. They are leading an underground life. The social-
revolutionary terrorists through their acts of terrorism are striking
out at the generation of their parents. They are disloyal to the
generation of their families that is loyal to the regime. Their acts of
terrorism are acts of revenge against the generation of their family,
which they hold responsible for their failures in this world. They are
striking out against their enemies--real and imagined--in their
parents' generation. A member of the Red Army Faction in West Germany
referred to his parents' generation as ``the generation of corrupt old
men who gave us Auschwitz and Hiroshima.'' They are seeking to heal
their inner wounds by attacking the outside enemy.
Religious Extremists
Religious extremist terrorism is characterized by groups seeking to
maintain or create a religious social and political order and includes
two types of groups and organizations: those adhering to a radical
fundamentalist interpretation of mainstream religious doctrines as well
as non-traditional religious groups representing ``new religions,''
such as Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack
on the subway system in Tokyo, Japan.
Religious Fundamentalist Terrorism
In the 1970s and 1980s, most of the acts of terrorism were
perpetrated by nationalist-separatist and social-revolutionary
terrorists, who wished to call attention to their cause and accordingly
would regularly claim responsibility for their acts. They were seeking
to influence the West and the establishment. But in the past decades,
no responsibility has been claimed for upwards of 40 percent of
terrorist acts. We believe this is because of the increasing frequency
of terrorist acts by radical religious extremist terrorists. They are
not trying to influence the West. Rather the radical Islamist
terrorists are trying to expel the secular modernizing West. They do
not need recognition by having their name identified in a New York
Times headline or on a story on CNN. They are ``killing in the name of
God'' and don't need official notice; after all, God knows.
Traditional groups include Islamic, Jewish, Christian and Sikh
radical fundamentalist extremists. In contrast to social-revolutionary
and nationalist-separatist terrorists, for religious fundamentalist
extremist groups, the decisionmaking role of the preeminent leader is
of central importance. For these true believers, the radical cleric is
seen as the authentic interpreter of God's word, not only eliminating
any ambivalence about killing, but endowing the destruction of the
defined enemy with sacred significance.
The radical cleric, whether ayatollah, rabbi or priest, has used
sacred text to justify killing in the name of God. Ayatollah Khomeini
employed a radical interpretation of the Quo'ran to provide the
ideological foundation for his Islamic revolution, and selected verses
to justify terrorist extremity, such as ``And slay them where ye catch
them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out . . . Such
is the reward of those who suppress the faith (2:190-193).'' In a radio
broadcast of June 5, 1983, Khomeini exhorted his followers: ``With
humility toward God and relying on the power of Islam, they should cut
the cruel hands of the oppressors and world-devouring plunderers,
especially the United States, from the region.'' To those who died
fighting this holy cause, Khomeini assured a higher place in paradise.
In inciting his followers during the Iran-Iraq war, he rhetorically
asked: ``Why don't you recite the sura of killing? Why should you
always recite the sura of mercy? Don't forget that killing is also a
form of mercy.'' He and his clerical followers regularly found
justification for their acts of violence in the Qur'anic suras calling
for the shedding of blood.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Robins, R. and Post, J. Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics
of Hatred. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1997, pp 153-154.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These organizations are hierarchical in structure; the radical
cleric provides interpretation of the religious text justifying
violence, which is uncritically accepted by his ``true believer''
followers, so there is no ambivalence concerning use of violence, which
is religiously commanded. These groups are accordingly particularly
dangerous, for they are not constrained by Western reaction, indeed
often wish to expel secular modernizing influences. They have shown a
willingness to perpetrate acts of mass casualty terrorism, as
exemplified by the bombings of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the
World Trade Center in the U.S., the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, the U.S.S. Cole, and the mass casualty terrorism on a scale
never seen before in the coordinated attacks on the World Trade Center
in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Osama bin Laden,
responsible for these events, has actively discussed the use of weapons
of mass destruction in public interviews.
While not a religious authority, Osama bin Laden is known for his
piety, and has been granted the title emir. Like Khomeini, Osama bin
Laden regularly cites verses from the Koran to justify his acts of
terror and extreme violence, employing many of the same verses earlier
cited by Khomeini. Consider this extract from the February 1998 Fatwa,
Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, World Islamic Front Statement:
In compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to
all Muslims:
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies--civilians
and military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do
it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to
liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from
their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all
the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.
This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, ``and
fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,''
and ``fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression,
and there prevail justice and faith in God.'' We--with God's
help--call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be
rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.
Note it is not Osama bin Laden who is ordering his followers to
kill Americans. It is God! Osama bin Laden is the messenger, relaying
the commands of God, which are justified with verses from the Koran.
While from the theoretical perspective of ``pure culture''
religious fundamentalist terrorism, there would be no constraint upon
these groups, in fact, some of the radical Islamist groups, such as
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, responsible for most of the suicide bombings
in Israel, do in fact have domestic constituencies which would provide
a measure of constraint against indiscriminate mass casualty acts.
But as the events of September 11 make clear, for the al Qaeda
organization, there is no constraint against mass casualty terrorism.
It is the willingness, indeed the goal to take as many casualties as
possible that is the dynamic of the ``true believers'' of the al Qaeda
group under the destructive charismatic leadership of Osama bin Laden
that places this group at high risk to move into the area of CBRN
terrorism, for they have already crossed the threshold of mass
casualties using conventional terrorism, demonstrating a willingness to
perpetrate super-terrorism.
In his prepared statement released after the U.S./British attack on
Taliban military targets on the night of 7 October, bin Laden
emphasized the climate of terror in the United States: ``America has
been filled with fear from North to South, from East to West, thank
God.'' He ended his statement by asserting his intent to keep the
United States in a continuing state of insecurity: ``America and those
who live in America won't dream of having security before we have it in
Palestine and all infidel armies depart from the land of Muhammad.''
While many drawn to the path of religious fundamentalist terrorism
are poor and uneducated, for some of these terrorists there are
suggestive similarities to the generational dynamics of the social-
revolutionary terrorists. A number of the 19 hijackers were well
educated and came from comfortable middle class Saudi families. Osama
bin Laden himself is the most striking example of these generational
dynamics. He is the 17th of 25 sons of a multi-billionaire Saudi
construction magnate, whose financial empire and wealth came from a
special relationship with the Saudi royal family. When he railed at the
corruption of the Saudi royal family and their lack of fidelity to
Islam in permitting the American military to establish a base on holy
Saudi land, he was striking out at the source of his family wealth,
leading not only to his being expelled from Saudi Arabia, but also
severely damaging his family, who also turned against him.
Non-Traditional Religious Extremist Groups
Non-traditional religious extremist groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo,
must also be considered. These generally closed cults are in a struggle
for survival against a demonized enemy that must be destroyed. While
the majority of millennial apocalyptic cults are waiting for the
millennium, some religious belligerents are seeking to force the end,
and, in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, to precipitate the final struggle.
Charismatic leaders of closed cults, like Shoko Asahara, the leader of
Aum Shinrikyo, who see themselves in a God-like role, a self-perception
rewarded by the God-like reverence with which they are treated by their
followers, can become obsessed with power. Asahara's fascination with
high technology led him to recruit nuclear physicists, nuclear
engineers, chemists, and microbiologists, simultaneously exploring
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Especially for closed
religious cults, the dynamic is one of a charismatic leader who holds
total sway over his followers. What he declares is moral and required
is moral and required. The followers yield their individual judgment to
the leader and become deskilled, acting as if they have no independent
critical faculties of their own. No doubt or doubters are permitted in
these powerful hermetically sealed closed organizations. The price for
defection in Aum Shinrikyo was death. This too had a high-tech aspect
to it, for apprehended defectors were incinerated in an industrial
microwave oven, ensuring the conforming loyalty of witnessing members.
Asahara, in mounting WMD programs, was attempting to precipitate
the final apocalyptic conflict. But Aum Shinrikyo is quite unusual
within the spectrum of millennial cults, for most such cults are not
religious belligerents seeking to precipitate the apocalypse, as was
the case with Aum, but rather tend to withdraw from society, passively
awaiting the ``final days.''
Right-Wing Groups
Right-wing terrorism includes those groups seeking to preserve the
dominance of a threatened ethnic majority or to return society to an
idealized ``golden age'' in which ethnic relations more clearly favored
the dominant majority. These groups generally espouse fascist
ideologies, including racist, anti-Semitic, and anti-government
``survivalist'' beliefs. These groups in the United States fear the
Federal Government, which they see as contributing to the decline of
the majority's dominance. In their view, the government is dominated by
Jews--hence ZOG, the Zionist Occupied Government--and accordingly is
illegitimate.
Because of this dehumanization of their enemies, discriminate
attacks on target groups, such as blacks, or, in Europe, on enclaves of
foreign workers, are justified by their ideology. Because of their
delegitimation and dehumanization of the government, discriminate
attacks on government facilities are certainly feasible by such groups,
including attacks on the seat of the Federal Government, Washington,
D.C., as represented in The Turner Diaries.
Right-Wing Community of Belief
Many individuals hew to a right-wing ideology, but do not belong to
a formal group or organization per se. Timothy McVeigh is an exemplar
of such individuals seeking to cause mass casualty terrorism, using
conventional weapons. McVeigh was enthralled by The Turner Diaries,
which he sold below cost at gun shows. At the time of his capture,
glassined, highlighted pages from this bible of the radical right were
found in his car.
The role of the internet in propagating the ideology of right-wing
extremist hatred is of concern, for an isolated individual consumed by
hatred can find common cause in the right-wing web sites, feel he is
not alone, and be moved along the pathway from thought to action,
responding to the extremist ideology of his virtual community.
Group and Organizational Dynamics
The differences between ``nationalist-separatist'' terrorists and
``anarchic-ideologues'' in terms of their social origins and
psychosocial dynamics have already been described. Their group dynamics
differ significantly as a consequence. The ``nationalist-separatist''
terrorists are often known in their communities and maintain
relationships with friends and family outside of the group. They can
move in and out with relative ease. In contrast, for the ``anarchic-
ideologues'' the decision to cross the boundary and enter the
underground illegal group is an irrevocable one, what the Germans call
``Der Sprung'' (The Leap). As one German terrorist wryly observed,
``The only way out of the terrorist group is feet first--by way of the
graveyard.'' Group pressures are especially magnified for the
underground group so that the group is the only source of information
and the only source of confirmation, and, in the face of external
danger and pursuit, the only source of security. Religious extremist
groups function on the basis of an underground psychology as well.
The resultant group pressure-cooker produces extremely powerful
forces. In particular, there are:
1. Pressures to conform, and
2. Pressures to commit acts of violence.
Pressures to Conform
Given the intensity of the need to belong, the strength of the
affiliative needs, and, for many, the as yet incomplete sense of
individual identity, there is a tendency to submerge their own
identities into the group, so that a kind of group mind emerges. The
group cohesion which emerges is magnified by the external danger which
tends to reduce internal divisiveness in unity against the outside
enemy. Doubt of the legitimacy of the goals and actions of the group
are intolerable to such a group. The individual who questions a group
decision risks the wrath of the group and possible expulsion. Indeed,
the fear is even more profound, for, as Baumann has stated, withdrawal
was impossible ``except by way of the graveyard.'' The way to get rid
of doubt is to get rid of the doubters. Extreme pressure to conform has
been reported by all who have discussed the atmosphere within the
group. What an interesting paradox, that these groups whose ethos is so
intensely against the authorities should be so authoritarian.
The group ideology plays an important role in supporting this
conformity inducing group environment. When questions are raised, the
absolutist ideology becomes the intellectual justification. Indeed, in
effect the ideology becomes the scriptures for the group's morality.
Questions have often been raised as to how individuals socialized
to a particular moral code could commit such violent anti-social acts.
Insofar as the individual submerges his own identity into the group,
the group's moral code becomes the individual's moral code. As Crenshaw
has observed, ``the group as selector and interpreter of ideology, is
central.'' What the group, through its interpretation of its ideology,
defines as moral is moral, and becomes the authority for the compliant
member. If the ideology indicates that ``they are responsible for our
problems'', to destroy them is not only viewed as justified but can be
seen to be a moral imperative.
The Pressure to Commit Acts of Violence
In attempting to clarify whether acts of political violence are
chosen as a willful strategy or are products of psychological forces,
it is of central importance to evaluate the goal of the act of
violence. The rationalist school, as espoused by Crenshaw, would aver
that in an unequal political struggle, acts of political terrorism
become an equalizer. These acts of political violence call forceful
attention to their legitimate grievances and have an impact on a much
wider audience than the immediate target of the violence. Indeed, as
Schmid has usefully clarified, it is very important to differentiate
between the target of the violence and the target of influence. But
there is an implicit assumption in this line of reasoning that the
political violence is instrumental, a tactic to achieve the group's
political goals, to help it achieve its cause.
The position argued in this paper that political violence is driven
by social psychological forces follows a different line of reasoning.
It does not view political violence as instrumental, as a means to an
end, but as the end itself. The cause is not the cause. The cause, as
codified in the group's ideology, according to this line of reasoning,
becomes the rationale for acts the terrorists are driven to commit.
Indeed, the central argument of this position is that individuals
become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of
terrorism.
That is surely an extreme statement, but since we are discussing
political extremism, perhaps that excess can be forgiven. If the cause
were indeed the cause, should not its achievement lead to the
dissolution of the terrorist groups committing violent acts in its
name? Consider the Basque separatist movement. Many would say they have
achieved a significant proportion of their goals. While not a separate
nation to be sure, the degree of autonomy they have achieved is
remarkable. Why does ETA not clap its collective hands in satisfaction,
declare victory, dissolve the organization, and go back to work in the
region's factories? Yet ETA roars on. Its goals are absolutist, and
nothing less that total victory will suffice, say its leaders, although
many Basque politicians feel their actions are counterproductive.
In part, this has to do with the difficulty individuals who
externalize their difficulties, and have sought an external target to
attack, have in giving up their espoused cause. Before joining the
group, he was alone, not particularly successful. Now he is engaged in
a life and death struggle with the establishment, his picture is on
``Most Wanted'' posters. He sees his leaders as internationally
prominent media personalities. Within certain circles, he is lionized
as a hero. He travels first class, and his family is provided for
should his acts of heroism lead to his death as a martyr to the cause.
Surely this is the good life, not easily relinquished.
If the major definition of authenticity is ``revolutionary
heroism'', this has important implications for the outcomes of debates
and personal rivalries within the group. The advocate of prudence and
moderation is quickly likely to lose his position of leadership to a
bolder individual committed to continue the struggle. This suggests a
dynamic within the group pressing for the perpetuation of violence and
leading toward ever-riskier decisions.
Terrorist Psychology: Implications for Counterterrorist Strategy
If these conclusions concerning the individual, group and
organizational psychology of political terrorism are valid, what are
the implications for anti-terrorist policy? (It is interesting to
observe how passionately arguments are waged concerning
counterterrorist policies given the relative lack of reliable
understanding of terrorist psychology.) This emphasizes that this is no
mere academic exercise, for after all, policies designed to deter
terrorists from their acts of terrorism should be based on an
understanding of ``what makes terrorists tick.''
Since terrorisms differ in their structure and dynamics,
counterterrorist policies should be appropriately tailored. As a
general rule, the smaller and more autonomous the group, the more
counterproductive is external force. When the autonomous cell comes
under external threat, the external danger has the consequence of
reducing internal divisiveness and uniting the group against the
outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the
sense of identity it provides. Terrorists whose only sense of
significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up
terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being.
To the contrary, for such individuals violent societal counter-
reactions reaffirm their core belief that ``it's us against them and
they are out to destroy us.'' A tiny band of insignificant individuals
has been transformed into a major opponent of society, making their
``fantasy war'', to use Ferracuti's apt term, a reality. One can indeed
make the case that left to their own devices, these inherently unstable
groups will self-destruct.
Similarly, for terrorist organizations for which violence is
defined as the only legitimate tactic for achieving their espoused
goals, outside threat and a policy of reactive retaliation cannot
intimidate the organizational leadership into committing organizational
suicide and ceasing to exist. For that is what ceasing committing acts
of political violence would be if those acts were the sole self-
definition.
For complex organizations dedicated to a cause, such as Basque
separatism, where an illegal terrorist wing operates in parallel with a
legal political wing as elements of a larger loosely integrated
organization, the dynamics and the policy implications are again
different. In such circumstances, if the overall organizational goals--
in this case Basque separatism--are threatened by societal reactions to
terrorism, one can make a case that internal organizational constraints
can operate to constrain the terrorist wing. However, insofar as the
terrorist group is not fully under political control, this is a matter
of influence and partial constraint, for as has been noted earlier, ETA
has its own internal dynamics and continues to thrive despite the
significant degree of separatism already achieved.
For state-supported and directed terrorist groups, the terrorist
group is in effect a paramilitary unit under central governmental
control. In this situation, the individual, group and organizational
psychological considerations discussed thus far are not especially
relevant. The target of the anti-terrorist policy in this circumstance
is not the group per se but the chief of state and the government of
the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national
interests are the primary values, there is a rational case to be made
that retaliatory policies can have a deterring effect, at least in the
short-term. But even in this circumstance, to watch the children in the
camps in the aftermath of bombing attacks shaking their fists in rage
suggests such tactics are contributing to rising generations of
terrorists.
Just as political terrorism is the product of generational forces,
so too it is here for generations to come. When hatred is bred in the
bone, and passed from generation to generation, it does not yield
easily to peace talks. There is no short-range solution to the problem
of terrorism. Once an individual is in the pressure cooker of the
terrorist group, it is extremely difficult to influence him. In the
long run, the most effective anti-terrorist policy is one that inhibits
potential recruits from joining in the first place, for once an
individual is in the grip of the terrorist group the power of the group
and organizational psychology will increasingly dominate his
psychology.
Political terrorism is not only a product of psychological forces,
its central strategy is psychological. For political terrorism is, at
base, a particularly vicious species of psychological warfare. It is
violence as communication. Up until now, the terrorists have had a
virtual monopoly on the weapon of the television camera as they
manipulate their target audience through the media. Countering the
terrorists' highly effective media-oriented strategy through more
effective dissemination of information and public education must be key
elements of a proactive program.
As important as it is to inhibit potential terrorists from joining,
so too it is important to facilitate terrorists leaving. The powerful
hold of the group has been described in detail. By creating pathways
out of terrorism, that grip can be reduced. Amnesty programs modeled
after the highly effective program of the Italian government can
usefully contribute to that goal.
Reducing support for the group--both in its immediate societal
surroundings and in the nation at large--are further long-range
programs to foster.
Terrorists perpetuate their organizations by shaping the
perceptions of future generations of terrorists. Manipulating a
reactive media, they demonstrate their power and significance and
define the legitimacy of their cause. To counter them, effective
education and dissemination of objective information is required.
One does not counter psychological warfare with smart bombs and
missiles, although they can certainly play a useful role in a military
campaign against harboring states. One counters psychological warfare
with psychological warfare. In the long run, the most effective ways of
countering terrorism are to:
1. Inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group. Security
alone cannot accomplish this. Alienated youth must be able to envisage
a future within the system that promises redress of long-standing
economic and social inequity and come to believe that political
activism can lead to their finding a pathway to these goals. Otherwise,
striking out violently in despair will continue to seem like the only
course available.
2. Produce dissension within the group. The groups are virtual hot-
houses of tensions and rivalries. Active measures are required to
magnify these tensions and pressures.
3. Facilitate exit from the group. Once a terrorist has become a
member of a group and committed terrorist acts, he is a wanted
criminal, and it can seem he has ``no way out.'' Yet, as noted above,
with the pentiti program in Italy, a similar program in the Basque
region, and the so-called ``super-grass'' program in Northern Ireland,
where reduced sentences or amnesty is offered for cooperation with the
authorities, in effect a ``protected witness'' program, including for
the Basque region plastic surgery and resettlement in Latin America,
this can not only facilitate exit but also can produce dissension
within the group as well.
4. Reduce support for the group. This is particularly important, as
important as inhibiting potential recruits from joining in the first
place, indeed contributing to this goal. Thus the group or organization
must be marginalized, its leader delegitimated. Osama bin Laden at the
present is a romantic hero to many alienated youth in the Islamic
world, his organization al Qaeda a highly attractive option to
consider. An effective strategic communication program will
increasingly marginalize al Qaeda as an aberrant extremist group that
is contrary to mainstream Islam, and will depict bin Laden not as a
heroic figure, but as a self-consumed individual whose extreme actions
damage all of Islam and the future of aspiring Muslim youth.
All of these goals are components of a strategic communication
process that must be a central component of our anti-terrorist policy.
This is not a policy that will swiftly end terrorism, but a process
that must be put in place. Just as many of the attitudes that have made
the path of terrorism attractive to alienated youth have taken place
over decades, it will require decades to reduce the attractiveness of
terrorism for those who have been raised in a climate dominated by
hopelessness and despair, with hatred bred in the bone, so that
extremism and violence have increasingly come to be seen as the only
course.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Dr. Post, for that excellent
testimony. Your descriptions are rather chilling, but very
instructive to us, and we most appreciate your work. Mr.
Jenkins.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN M. JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT,
RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jenkins. Senator Landrieu, members of the subcommittee,
thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to address
this important subject.
When I entered the room I had planned on summarizing my
written testimony. I discarded that idea as I listened to the
questions that both you and Senator Roberts raised in your
opening statements. Let me try instead to address those
questions--people can read the written testimony later. Let us
focus on some of the topics that you raised.
I would like to emphasize one point. When we talk about the
psychology of terrorism, it is not simply the psychology of the
terrorists we are talking about. Terrorism is a phenomenon
which is intended to have psychological effects on the victims,
on the target audiences of that terrorist activity itself; we
have to understand our own psychology as well as that of the
terrorist.
I mention this because despite the high level of anxiety on
the part of the American people, I still do not think that we
fully comprehend the seriousness of the threats we currently
face or the longer-term consequences of the trends that were so
dramatically illustrated on September 11.
For me to say this is a departure, as Dr. Post can attest,
because frequently in my essays over the years I have been the
skeptic offering counterarguments to any suggestion that there
is an inexorable progress from smaller scale terrorism through
truck bombs up into weapons of mass destruction. I still do not
believe that there is an inexorable progression, but I must say
the confidence with which I am willing to say that such an
escalation is not likely is eroding fairly quickly. The
revision in my views has to do with what I think are
fundamental changes in mindset we have seen in recent years.
Senator Landrieu, you mentioned at the outset the need to
understand the adversary as thoroughly as we understood the
adversary during the Cold War. We do not have--despite all of
our intelligence efforts, despite the efforts of our behavioral
analysts--right now the operational code of the Politburo to
apply to bin Laden's group. It is something we are working on,
but we do not have it.
We can infer a great deal from terrorists' actions and from
their words that give us a rough version of their mindset and
decision-making. I do not know how many times people watching
the horrendous events of September 11 said: This is mindless
violence, insane violence. As Dr. Post has stated, terrorism is
certainly not insane, it is not mindless; it has a terrible
logic that becomes visible when you begin to look at it from
the perspective of Osama bin Laden. That is not to lessen the
condemnation of terrorist acts one bit, but when understood
from that perspective, it begins to become far more clear what
is going on here.
What was the objective or, more correctly, what were the
objectives behind the September 11 attack? A portion of it, to
be sure, is what probably would be called aggressive violence,
as opposed to instrumental violence. There was a powerful
element of punishment--inflict as much pain and suffering on
the American people as possible.
But beyond that, the violence was also instrumental. There
was purpose. The stated purpose, to drive the United States out
of the Middle East, raising very revealing comparisons of that
struggle to the struggles that went on over a thousand years
ago aimed at driving the Crusaders out of the sacred territory,
of comparisons between bin Laden and Saladin.
History, even events that took place centuries ago, is a
real and living construct for our adversaries, not something
that somebody reads in some musty old volume. This is a living
force.
Driving the United States out will destroy the prop for the
regimes that they despise. How is that to be achieved, because
we are a superpower, not easily driven out of any place? It is
to be achieved, first by terrorizing the American people; their
perception of us is that we are weak, that we are a people
addicted to self-indulgence, that we will not have the moral
muscle to stand up to this.
But they also believe that terrorist action will provoke a
military response by us, and that this military response then
can be portrayed in the Islamic community as an assault by
infidels against Islam. Just as we are desperately saying this
is not a war on Islam, they are saying the opposite: That it is
a war on Islam.
By doing this they think that if they can cause us
sufficient pain over a sufficient period of time, plus confront
us with growing resistance in the Middle East and throughout
the Islamic world, and that at some point, as we have done in
Lebanon, in their view, and as we have done in Somalia and in
other places, we will say: It is not worth it; we are leaving.
Is it a crazy idea? Perhaps not to people who believe that
they alone are responsible for driving the Soviet Union out of
Afghanistan, thereby ignoring all of the other factors, and
that the defeat inflicted upon the Soviet Union was so
devastating that it led to the collapse of the Soviet Union,
for which they claim credit. One superpower down, one to go.
The attack also has, however, a positive aspect for them.
Not to make an invidious comparison here, but they also think
as politicians and they do identify constituencies.
Senator Landrieu. Do not go there. Watch that, now.
[Laughter]
Mr. Jenkins. They ask: What does this do for us? We know
what it is going to do to our opponents, but what does this do
for us? What it does is advances the peculiar interpretation of
Islam that goes with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban; that
interpretation of Islam justifies a violent holy war and it
makes suicide attacks the benchmark of commitment.
So it is both an appeal to a constituency and it is in a
sense an arsenal of what is their most valuable weapon. Their
secret weapon on September 11 was not advanced hardware--their
weapons were box cutters! Their secret weapon was the
commitment of those individuals, and the ability to generate
more of these people.
The attack also elevates bin Laden personally. At the risk
of trespassing into Dr. Post's area here, there are elements of
megalomania here with issuances of fatwahs and his assertion of
exclusive rights to interpret what God demands, his
denunciations of other Muslims. In his view this is not just a
contest between Islam and the West; it is a contest between his
interpretation of Islam and other interpretations of Islam. In
fact, if he can be the heroic figure, that gives him the power
he needs to continue that struggle. It elevates him.
The suicide terrorists are the frightening part of this,
and September 11 did demolish some of the perceptions that we
previously had of suicide bombers. In Israel, we had previously
seen suicide bombers who were unformed youth, as Dr. Post said.
We are now seeing suicide bombers who are older, better
educated, people who would have some status in the world even
if they had not carried out these attacks.
Moreover, in the previous suicide attacks that we had seen
in the Middle East, the recruiting and handling of the suicide
bomber required coaches, control; attacks could not be launched
at great distance from the destination of the attack. You could
not send a suicide bomber to France and expect him to carry out
his mission by the time he reached the Champs Elysee without
this external reinforcement.
Yet, in this case we saw the dedication of people who could
live normal lives thousands of miles away from the source of
their motivation, and yet knowing in the back of their minds
while they are taking out the garbage, while they are eating
hamburgers on weekends, whatever they did, that one day they
are going to kill themselves and thousands of others; to
maintain that kind of dedication over a period of months is an
extraordinary thing.
The other part that demolished some of our presumptions was
we did not see a lot of group suicide attacks. We saw single
suicide attacks, not groups of people that would come together
and do this.
That is the drive behind September 11. There was also, in
terms of the choice of the World Trade Center, a bit of
showmanship in here. In 1993 people bombed the World Trade
Center--they tried to bring it down, they did not succeed.
Osama bin Laden comes back and says: All right, I will show you
how this can be done.
Now, that has an effect on all the other terrorists in the
world. It raises the level of terrorism; it makes all
terrorists say: Ah, what buildings do we have that look like
World Trade Centers? Where is our level of violence? It creates
a new entry level.
Two points I would like to make beyond this. One is simply
to reinforce Dr. Post's point about the change in mindset. As
we moved away from terrorism motivated by political agendas
into the realm of terrorism motivated by ideologies derived
from religion, then constituency, the importance of
constituency is reduced and with it the constraints--and this
is where I see some of my own arguments over the years have
been changing.
Years ago I wrote that terrorists want a lot of people
watching, not a lot of people dead. In fact, terrorist violence
has escalated; large-scale indiscriminate violence is the
reality of today's terrorism. Does that automatically take us
into the realm of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons? I
do not know. I do not believe that right now Osama bin Laden
has a nuclear weapon, but I have no doubt that if he had one he
would figure out a way to use it.
We do not want to run the test. The analytical conclusion
here is that so long as the al Qaeda network survives we must
assume that it will seek the most advanced means of destruction
and that we will be the target. Therefore, even though we
understand that the destruction of the al Qaeda network will
not end terrorism, it becomes absolutely necessary that we
destroy the capability of this organization.
A final trend here: Power--power defined in a crude fashion
as simply the capacity to kill, destroy, disrupt, alarm, force
us to divert vast amounts of resources to protection against
attack, is descending to smaller and smaller groups, whose
grievances, real or imaginary, it will not always be possible
to satisfy.
To put it another way, the small bands of irreconcilables,
of fanatics, of lunatics, that have existed throughout history
have in our age become an increasingly potent force to be
reckoned with. How we as a democratic society are going to deal
with that and remain a democratic society is one of the major
challenges that we have in the 21st century. I believe we will
come through. In direct response to Senator Roberts' question,
what is our strength in this? Our ultimate defense against
terrorism is not only going to be better intelligence and
better security, more concrete and more guards; it will be our
own individual courage and resolve, our sense of community and
humanity, our continued tolerance, our ability to realistically
accept risk, which is contrary to what we have done in the
past, and our continuing commitment to the values for which
this Nation stands.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement by Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the
President of the RAND Corporation \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this written
testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as
representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of the research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for
the opportunity to address this important subject.
Despite the high level of anxiety the American people are currently
experiencing, we may still not fully comprehend the seriousness of the
current and near-term threats we confront or the longer-term
consequences of the trends underscored so dramatically on September 11.
I say this not to arouse further alarm. I have never counted myself
among the ``Apocalyticians'' who forecast scenarios of doom in lurid
detail. In my own essays over the past 30 years, I have been skeptical
of the notion that there is an inexorable progression in terrorism from
car bombs to terrorist use of nuclear weapons. Rather, my purpose here
is to warn against a return to complacency once the shock of September
11 has begun to wear off.
Over the past decade, we have suffered a series of devastating
terrorist attacks--attacks that in terms of the concentration and
magnitude of casualties have been greater than anything experienced by
other nations: The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was followed by the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which was, in turn, followed by the events
of September 11--each attack worse than the last. However, because
those attacks have been sporadic, the passage of time between them has
allowed us to go back to business as usual.
This time must be different. In that light, let me begin by
discussing the current and near-term threats we face, before turning to
the longer-term consequences of the trends emerging from September 11.
current and near-term threats
Turning first to the current and near-term threats, bin Laden's al
Qaeda network will almost certainly attempt further major terrorist
operations against American targets abroad and, potentially, here. We
know that the September 11 attack took years of planning, which means
that preparations for it overlapped the attacks on the American
embassies in Africa and the U.S.S. Cole, as well as the foiled attempt
to carry out terrorist attacks here during the millennium celebrations.
The terrorist leaders also would know that the September 11 attack
would provoke a military response, which they could then characterize
as an assault on Islam. In other words, the terrorist leaders did not
intend September 11 to be their last act--they intended it as the
beginning of their end-game. Therefore, they would have made plans to
survive the anticipated military response and continue to communicate,
and they may have set in motion terrorist operations that will occur
weeks or months or years from now, unless we can identify and destroy
every terrorist cell.
What form these attacks might take is impossible to say. There is
no obvious predictable scenario, and vulnerabilities are infinite.
However, we can speculate on some of the logical targets.
Commercial aviation remains a preferred target for terrorists
seeking high body counts through sabotage or through the acquisition of
an airplane to use as a guided missile. While a repeat of the September
11 hijackings may not seem likely, authorities did, after the September
11 attacks, uncover a terrorist plot to hijack a commercial airliner in
Nepal and possibly crash it into a target in India. Unfortunately,
despite efforts to improve it, aviation security is still inadequate in
this country, and general aviation also needs better protection.
Public surface transportation offers terrorists easy access and
concentrations of people in contained environments. We have seen
terrorist bombing campaigns on trains and buses abroad, and there was a
plot in 1997 to carry out suicide attacks on New York's subways, which
would have resulted in hundreds of casualties.
Because of its size and scope, the Nation's critical infrastructure
is hard to protect; then again, terrorists have historically not
attacked it, preferring instead to go after targets offering high
symbolic value or killing fields. Still, that does not mean that
terrorists will not seek to carry out such traditional sabotage. We may
want to exploit the opportunity afforded now to rebuild aging
infrastructure, incorporating security in the new design.
In terms of targets abroad, diplomatic facilities and corporate
symbols of America will bear the brunt of terrorist attacks.
Of course, bin Laden's televised appeals also may inspire
individual acts of terrorism by supporters around the world. Our own
military efforts against al Qaeda and the Taliban may provoke isolated
acts of terrorism as we saw during the Gulf War, although these are
likely to be more spontaneous, smaller-scale attacks.
I remain doubtful that the person who sent anthrax through the mail
in September reports to bin Laden. From the beginning, I have believed
he is more likely a single individual driven by idiosyncratic motives,
which will make him more difficult to identify and apprehend. He will
probably strike again, and his skills will continue to improve with
each attack. The publicity he has received will inspire others. Expect
to see further small-scale biological attacks by terrorists,
extortionists, and lunatics. Anthrax hoaxes already have become a major
problem. The anthrax letters also have illustrated one perhaps
unanticipated consequence--the persistence of the spores makes
decontamination difficult and costly and may deny the use of
contaminated facilities for long periods.
September 11 creates a new level of destruction toward which other
terrorists will strive. Since September 11, several terrorist plots
have been uncovered, including one by the Basque ETA to set off nearly
two tons of explosives at the Picasso Tower in Madrid, a building
resembling the World Trade Center.
Although our focus is on bin Laden and his al Qaeda network,
current and near-term threats abroad and on American soil will come
from other sources as well. Our growing involvement in Colombia's
vicious guerrilla wars could provoke a terrorist response. Anti-
globalization protests, which had been building in size and intensity
prior to September 11, will not fade with the slowdown of the world's
economy and may harden into a more aggressive anti-American posture.
Anti-Semitic, white supremacists, and other extremists here who see
themselves at war with the Federal Government also remain a threat.
Their fantasies tend toward scenarios of mass destruction, and they
have exhibited a dangerous interest in chemical and biological
substances.
In addition, politically inspired assaults in cyberspace now
regularly accompany international crises. September 11 overshadowed the
concurrent spread of a vicious virus that brought some companies close
to pulling the plug on the internet. Cyber-crime has evolved rapidly
with the growth of the internet. Cyber-terrorism and cyber-war are
still in their infancy. More sophisticated attacks are likely.
long-term consequences of the trends emerging from september 11
While the current and near-term threats will persist, there is also
the issue of the longer-term consequences of the September 11 attacks.
Was September 11 an anomaly or did it mark the transition to a new
world of terrorism? Seeing it as an anomaly would give us comfort that,
once we have dealt with those responsible, we can return to the world
as it existed the day before. That is unlikely to be the case, although
in several respects, the September 11 attacks derive from a unique
confluence of developments. In particular, the war against Soviet
forces in Afghanistan created a network of veterans throughout the
Islamic world. The subsequent victory of a like-minded Taliban
guaranteed safe haven for the network's headquarters and training
camps, which graduated thousands of additional volunteers, fanatically
obedient to a megalomaniac leader who possessed vast sums of money,
organizational skills, dedication to large-scale violence, and a sense
of strategy unusual among terrorists. Of course, the United States
contributed to his growing reputation by denouncing him as the
preeminent organizer of international terrorism. Add to this a
religion-based ideology calling for a violent holy war and offering
paradise to suicide attackers--the benchmark of commitment to their
cause.
Japan's Aum Shinrikyo cult had some of these attributes: vast
financial resources, a charismatic leader, fanatically obedient
followers, and a taste for schemes of mass destruction. However, it did
not have suicide attackers or a geographic safe haven. Within weeks of
its attack on Tokyo's subways, the organization was destroyed, and its
leaders were in prison.
Although the September 11 attacks derive from a unique confluence
of events, some aspects of those attacks also confirm broader trends.
Analysts in the 1990s began to describe a ``new terrorism'' that was
motivated by ideologies deriving from ethnic hatreds or extremist
interpretations of religion, that was organized into looser networks,
and that was more willing to engage in mass destruction. The Bremer,
Gilmore, and Deutch Commissions on terrorism and proliferation all
warned of the possibility of large-scale terrorism in the United
States, terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons, and even of
the major psychological consequences of small-scale bioterrorism
attacks. These warnings are now realities.
We must anticipate further large-scale terrorist attacks,
coordinated when possible to achieve greater destruction. The thwarted
1993 plan to bomb multiple targets in New York City, Ramzi Yousef's
plot to sabotage 12 U.S. airliners in the Pacific, bin Laden's
coordinated bombings of the American embassies in Africa, and the
September 11 attacks clearly indicate the mindset of today's most
dangerous adversaries. These attacks have political purpose, but they
also represent the hostile use of violence as opposed to the
instrumental use of violence.
In September, we suffered an uncoordinated multidimensional assault
comprised of a series of massive conventional attacks, a small-scale
bioterrorism attack, and a computer virus. The perpetrators probably
were not connected to one another, but in the future, we could see
coordinated multidimensional attacks calculated to achieve cascading
effects and overload our capacity to respond.
It is still uncertain whether the use of chemical or biological
weapons will become a routine terrorist tactic. Aum experimented with
biological weapons and used chemical weapons, but 6 years later, long
after most terrorist innovations become routine terrorist tactics, no
group has yet attempted to imitate the 1995 sarin attack, although
North African groups affiliated with bin Laden reportedly have
attempted to acquire poison gas. The al Qaeda network has been linked
with efforts to acquire both biological and nuclear material and
includes demonstrations of chemical warfare in its training curriculum.
Will terrorists go nuclear? Years ago I argued that while madmen
might nurture plans to destroy the world, self-imposed constraints
discouraged even those we labeled terrorists from operating at the
higher levels of violence of which they were clearly capable, even
without resorting to exotic and technically demanding weapons if mayhem
were their goal. Wanton violence could jeopardize group cohesion,
alienate perceived constituents, and provoke ferocious government
crackdowns. I wrote then that terrorists wanted a lot of people
watching, not a lot of people dead.
I still believe this to be true of most of the groups that have
resorted to terrorism, but these constraints were neither universal nor
immutable. Over time, terrorist violence has escalated. Large-scale,
indiscriminate violence has become the reality of terrorism in the
1990s. At the same time, owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the proliferation of nuclear weapons development programs, the
acquisition of nuclear material, the biggest technical hurdle, may have
become easier. How close we are to that theoretical point in time when
capabilities meet intentions I cannot say, but we are closer. Of
course, in focusing on the high end of the threat spectrum--a nuclear
bomb--we should not ignore the possibility of lesser actions involving
radioactive material.
Still, I doubt that bin Laden currently possesses nuclear weapons.
But if he did, I suspect he would find a way to use them, whether as a
deterrent to halt U.S. military action or, if facing annihilation, in a
final act of destruction. We do not want to run the test. So long as
the al Qaeda network survives, we must assume that it will seek the
most advanced means of destruction and that we will be the target. The
destruction of al Qaeda will not end terrorism, but it will buy time to
improve our intelligence and our defenses and to address some of the
reasons for the hostility that the bin Ladens of the world have been
able to exploit.
Terrorism comprises not only the attacks terrorists carry out but
also the psychological effects these attacks produce. Thus, another
long-term trend is that we live now in an age of alarms. Research since
September 11 shows that many Americans are suffering from trauma-
related stress reactions. The Nation's mental health must be considered
another vulnerability. Its protection will require public education and
skillful communications strategies.
The September 11 attack underscored a final long-term trend.
Power--the power to kill, destroy, disrupt, alarm, and force nations to
divert vast resources to protection against attacks--is descending to
smaller and smaller groups, whose grievances, real or imaginary, it
will not always be possible to satisfy. Put another way, the small
bands of irreconcilables, fanatics, and lunatics that have existed
throughout history have become, in our age, an increasingly potent
force to be reckoned with. How we, as a democratic society, will defend
ourselves against this and remain a democratic society is one of the
major challenges of the 21st century.
conclusion
In light of this sobering vision of the future--both the current
near-term threats and the longer-term consequences of September 11--our
biggest enemy may be our own complacency--a complacency born from our
typical American optimism and our frustration for long, frustrating
campaigns. Unlike our country, other countries that have confronted a
continuing terrorist campaign--such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and
Israel--have developed the focus and mindset to view the struggle as
ongoing.
That said, we must develop the same focus and mindset. In these
terms, our ultimate defense against terrorism will not be more concrete
and more guards. It will be our own individual courage and resolve, our
sense of community and humanity, our continued tolerance, and our
ability to realistically accept risk, as well as our continuing
commitment to the values for which this Nation stands. While the
challenge to do this is great, I am confident we will come through.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Jenkins, for that eloquent
and very helpful testimony.
We have been joined by two of our colleagues, Senator
Hutchinson and Senator Collins. I thought we would go through 5
minutes of questions. If we have time we will go through
another round, maybe just a wrap-up question, because I think
Dr. Post has to leave around 3:30. If you could be with us for
just a few more moments, because both of your testimonies were
just excellent.
Let me begin. Dr. Post, in a recent opinion piece you
wrote: ``The current conflict is fundamentally a war for
people's minds. If we rely solely on our technological
superiority without countering Osama bin Laden's psychological
war waged with the pen, the word, and the tongue, we will
surely lose this conflict.''
Given the risk associated with loss, given the magnitude of
the weapons that are now either close to or in their hands,
losing is not really an option. So with that, would you please
tell us whether you perceive the United States as taking steps
to win the psychological war; if so what steps have been
effective in your view; what steps have not been effective; and
what message would we need to send to terrorists and to
populations that produce them, and by what methods do we send
those messages?
Dr. Post. That is an excellent question. First, I think it
should be emphasized that we have been quite remiss in the past
in not relying more heavily on weapons of psychological
influence, of psychological deterrence. In many ways we have
left the arena of public opinion clear and free for Osama bin
Laden to be sending his distorted message of hatred. In the
madrassas, for example, in Pakistan, a very virulent brand of
Islam is being taught which is intensely anti-American, America
being portrayed as the enemy of Islam, with 8, 9, 10-year-old
boys holding up a Kalishnikov, saying: ``Jihad, jihad, kill the
Americans.''
So these feelings are very deep. How many in that area know
that our third largest foreign aid commitment has been to
Afghanistan? How is it that in Egypt, who received $2 billion
in aid, there is a virulent anti-American press alongside of
that aid being received?
Thus, the war for ``hearts and minds'' is crucial. I am
quite encouraged in fact, though, to see the crucial importance
of this issue as having been grasped quite thoroughly by this
administration. Efforts are underway through the State
Department, through the Department of Defense, to be seriously
marshalling the battle for the hearts and minds and in a really
quite sophisticated fashion. But it is a late entry to this
arena, and we should not be thinking of this as something that
is going to be a matter of weeks or months. This is a process
that will be taking not just years, but generations in fact.
When hatred is bred in the bone, it is not easily diverted.
Once someone is in these groups, it is very hard to dislodge
them. So we are talking about what needs to be a longstanding
process and that means a major commitment to continue to fight
for the hearts and minds of these youth.
Senator Landrieu. In your experience--and Mr. Jenkins, if
you could please jump in here--what has our country done in the
past? Is there something you could point to that has been very
effective in terms of a strategy or a particular operation or a
particular exercise that has helped us to win over hearts and
minds, that might be applicable to this situation, or things
that you think have been very effective that we could step up
to in terms of funding?
If you wanted to take this opportunity to acknowledge
things that you see that are not effective at all, where we
could save some money and reinvest it in ways that would be
helpful, that would also be welcome.
Dr. Post. Let me begin. First, a number of countries have
been quite effective in doing this. In Italy, for example, at
one point 65 percent of the Italian population favored the
goals, if not the means, of the Red Brigades. Through the
pentiti program, which offered amnesty for dropping out of the
group in return for cooperation, and a public education
campaign, they were able to reduce the popularity of the Red
Brigades from 65 percent to something like 14 percent.
There are weapons that can be used in this way. One thing
we must not do, which we started to do, but have, for the most
part, ceased--and I have been pleased to see this decrescendo--
is personalize the conflict. This is to emphasize what Brian
Jenkins was talking about. Every time this becomes the United
States versus Osama bin Laden, this is points for Osama bin
Laden. It magnifies his stature.
I would like to see that $25 million reward for Osama bin
Laden reduced to $1. I would like to see his name never
mentioned: Osama who? I think this will not happen, but it
really would be extremely helpful.
I have been quite encouraged by our attempts to say this is
not a war on Islam, this is a war on terrorism. But we should
make no mistake about it, Osama bin Laden is trying to portray
this as Osama bin Laden as commander in chief of Islam versus
George W. Bush as commander in chief of the corrupt modernizing
West, with his able deputy Prime Minister Tony Blair, and he is
succeeding. It has a lot of resonance in his area, and that is
what we have to work very hard at not being engaged in, so that
this does not become Islam versus the West.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Jenkins, my time has expired, but
would you take a moment and respond?
Mr. Jenkins. Sure. It may sound odd to say this at this
moment, little more than 2 months after September 11, but in
fact we have had over the past 25 years a great deal of success
in combating terrorism internationally, in persuading a portion
of the world--a large portion of the world--to accept the
notion that there are certain actions in the international
domain that we will label terrorism and that will be
unacceptable behavior, in persuading people to buy that idea.
We have now a number of international conventions that deal
with various aspects of hijacking, sabotage of aircraft,
protection of diplomats, the taking of hostages. Are they all
adhered to the degree that we would like? Absolutely not. But
certainly in laying a framework internationally for combating
terrorism, we have had a measure of success.
The irony in this is that we have achieved that measure of
success by defining counterterrorism very narrowly.
Counterterrorism was just that. We would not get into the
issues of root causes, of political differences. I remember in
the 1970s entire international conferences drifting off into
the Bermuda Triangle of arguments about definition--did ends
justify means--and the sophistries that one man's terrorist is
another man's freedom fighter.
In order to avoid that swamp, we defined terrorism on the
basis of the quality of the act, not the identity of the
perpetrator or the nature of the cause. We would not enter
political discussions because that risked undermining
international progress. We did not want to argue about causes.
We wanted to say sabotaging aircraft is wrong; we may have
profound political differences with Cuba, with Syria, with a
number of other nations around the world, but we can all agree
that hijacking airplanes is bad for all of us to tolerate.
Not surprisingly, all of the diplomats of the world could
readily agree that diplomats ought not to be targets of
violence. International diplomacy depends on it. So by keeping
terrorism narrowly defined, we were able to achieve progress.
Now, we did not adhere to this approach entirely. We
intervened in places like Northern Ireland through Senator
Mitchell's activities, and in the Balkans, in other places, to
resolve or head off struggles that would produce terrorist
campaigns if left unattended.
So we did not ignore that dimension entirely, but it was
not part of our counterterrorism effort. We are now faced with
a situation where we have to not only dismantle terrorist
structures, but, as Jerry Post says--and it is going to take us
a couple of generations perhaps--we have to deal with that
fundamental mindset, with some of those more basic
psychological and political things that we did not address in
the past.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you very much.
Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I am going to ask a couple of questions of Dr. Post and
then hopefully move to Mr. Jenkins. Dr. Post, how does the
apparent collapse of the Taliban and support in Afghanistan for
al Qaeda now impact Mr. bin Laden's image?
Dr. Post. Well, I think we ought to remember--and the
estimates vary significantly--al Qaeda is estimated to be
operating in at least 30 countries, and as many as 68. So the
dismantling of the base in Afghanistan does not mean the
dismantling of al Qaeda by any means.
Also it is important to emphasize that even if we get Osama
bin Laden, al Qaeda will continue.
Senator Roberts. That is my next question.
Dr. Post. For other charismatically-led groups, such as
Sendero Luminosa of Peru with Guzman, the PKK, the Turkish
Kurdish separatist group led by Ocalan, when their leaders were
captured it was a mortal wound to the group. Osama bin Laden's
leadership is different. Based on his training in business
administration, he really should be thought of as more chairman
of the board of a large holding company that he has ``grown''
through mergers and acquisitions.
He has already appointed his successor, his number two
man----
Senator Roberts. That is my third question.
Dr. Post. --Zawahiri of Egypt, one of the founders of the
Islamic Jihad of Egypt and probably associated with the
assassination of Sadat. He may well in fact be the person who
helped plan this effort.
So while it would be a dent in the organization, it
certainly would not be the end of radical Islamic terrorism or
even of al Qaeda.
Mr. Jenkins. Can I just add a comment to that?
Senator Roberts. Well, not right away.
Mr. Jenkins. All right.
Senator Roberts. Madam Chairman, Dr. Post is clairvoyant.
He answered three questions within one----
Senator Landrieu. Brilliant minds at work.
Senator Roberts. --which is just amazing.
Dr. Post. I specialize in reading minds.
Senator Roberts. Then, I am going to let Mr. Jenkins have
his comment.
Mr. Jenkins. The point I wanted to make is that we know
that the planning of September 11 took years. That meant it
overlapped the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, it overlapped the
attack on the U.S. embassies in Africa, and whatever they had
planned for the millennium celebrations here which was
thwarted.
But this attack they certainly knew would have provoked a
response by us. Therefore, I am persuaded that there were two
plans on September 10th. One plan was for the operation to take
place, the other plan was for the survival of the al Qaeda
network--the survival of the leadership, the survival of the
financial structure, the ability to continue communications,
and perhaps having terrorist operations in place or the ability
to continue operations, knowing that they would have to go to
ground because a military counterattack would be the
predictable reaction to their attack.
I suspect that they put in place plans well before the
September 11 attack, anticipating these possibilities. Now, did
they anticipate the fall of the Taliban? I do not know that.
But certainly they would have made plans for their own
survival.
Senator Roberts. You are pretty much in sync, I think, with
what General Krulak, former Commandant of the Marine Corps,
kept advising us, that they will never fight us strength-on-
strength, that they do a great deal of planning, that actually
Osama bin Laden would know that we would react in this fashion,
that they would now go to more of a guerrilla conflict, and
that should he be brought to justice--in any way that you might
think appropriate--that he would have plans on down the road.
In your testimony you said the first thing you worried
about was complacency, and then on page 10 you said the last
thing you worried about was complacency. So the American people
are saying, well, good, we got him; that does not end it by any
means. In some instances he would become a martyr and the show
would go on.
Do you agree with Samuel Huntington that any time a country
gets over 20 percent of the population between 15 and 25 years
and mostly male we are in trouble, or the country is in
trouble?
Senator Landrieu. I would agree with that.
Senator Roberts. Well, Mr. Huntington points out exactly, I
think, what Dr. Post was trying to point out, and that is on
page 10. You indicated terrorists cannot be forced to give up
terrorism. It is something about the bone, that it goes to the
bone generation after generation. Yet you also say ``When
hatred is bred in the bone and passed from generation to
generation, it does not yield easily to peace talks,'' which is
certainly the case.
But then you say: ``All these goals are components of a
strategic communications process.'' I know the son of the Shah
is now trying to broadcast the proper kind of information to
Iran, which by the way has the same kind of ratio of young
people, but now they are forces in moderation.
So if it is in the bone and it is bred generation-to-
generation, what do we do in terms of communication to try to
break that? I have an idea. I want you to--you cannot
anticipate this because I have not said it yet--but at any
rate, I think the secret is women. If you saw the media
coverage in regards to what happened in northern Afghanistan
and the sheer joy on the part of the women of that country who
had been so punished, it just seems to me that that would be a
very exciting possibility.
Now, how do you get it out of the bone in regards to the
communications system?
Dr. Post. Well, what is most important, as long as there
are these structural inequities and impossibility for youth to
find some kind of decent future in a country, their only course
would be to strike out in despair with violence. So we cannot
counter this with security alone. It means there needs to be
alternative pathways within a society so that people can join
the system through political activism, rather than having to
leave the system.
That really means educational reform, economic reform, and
social reform. We have to play a leading role in helping these
nations move to a place where there is some possibility of a
brighter future for their youth, or else we are doomed.
Senator Roberts. My time has expired.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Dr. Post, I thank you for being with us and I am sorry that
you have to leave.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Jenkins, I am going to ask you a question that I was
going to ask Dr. Post, as well as one for yourself. I do
believe this administration understands the necessity of trying
to win the hearts and the minds of the people. That is one
reason we are dropping food, blankets, and leaflets. We keep
repeating that this is not a war against Islam. We are taking a
lot of steps in that direction.
But it seems to me that as long as you have schools in the
Middle East teaching hatred of Americans and you have state-
controlled media preaching hatred of Americans, that our
dropping leaflets is not going to do much to counter that.
Should we be making more of an effort, particularly with our
ersatz allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt in this coalition,
to put pressure on them to reform what is being taught to
children in schools and what is being preached in the state-
controlled media?
Mr. Jenkins. I do not think that is a bad idea. I do not
know how much effect it will have, because, to a certain
degree, these are regimes that survive by tolerating a great
deal of anti-Americanism, because if it was not anti-
Americanism it might be anti-regime. In fact, your question
raises a broader issue.
First of all, I think it is proper to say that this is not
a war against Islam. That is a first step. What we have done in
the area of psychological operations is good, but it is at a
primitive level. I would assert that 25 years ago we were
better at psychological operations--in the 1960s and 1970s,
than we are now. With the end of the Cold War, we dismantled a
lot of capability. We discarded a lot of the institutional
memory.
That is extraordinary for a country that understands so
much about behavior and indeed is so skillful in appealing to a
population and has such sophisticated politics. If you ran your
political campaigns on the level of sophistication that we are
running our psychological operations on in the Middle East, you
would not be sitting at this table now. This is simply not as
sophisticated as it should be. We can do a lot better.
In terms of our interaction with Islam, we are not going to
be recognized as experts in Islam. President Bush does not get
to issue fatwahs. We are not going to engage the Middle Eastern
audience on that level. But we do have positive values that we
projected during the Cold War.
This is a country that believes in liberty, believes in
human rights, believes in equality of gender. We have a number
of positive things that we believe in that educated people
around the world, even uneducated people, also believe in.
We have muted that message to a certain degree in the
Middle East, in part because if we become very vigorous about
projecting those kinds of American values, not just American
pop culture, but American values, that runs smack into some of
the regimes that are our allies in the area. So there is a risk
in that.
Afghanistan may provide the best opportunity. It is like a
crisis: out of the worst comes the best. Since the place has
been so politically demolished--and I agree with Senator
Roberts, a powerful force in Afghanistan are women who have
risked their lives in confronting the Taliban. If we can avoid
the temptation to walk away from Afghanistan once we succeed
militarily, whatever we mean by that, engage it politically and
assist in the development of its educational system and its
political system, we can make Afghanistan a recipient of not
only American assistance, but American values.
Senator Collins. Mr. Jenkins, I see my time has expired
already. Could I ask one more brief question? Would that be all
right?
Senator Landrieu. Go right ahead.
Senator Collins. If you could answer briefly. I want to
follow up on Senator Roberts' point. In your written testimony
you talked about how our biggest enemy may well be our own
complacency once the shock of the attack has worn off. It seems
to me we have a difficult task in striking the right balance,
because on the one hand we are telling people to get back to
normal life, to be optimistic, to not be frightened; yet we are
also warning against being complacent. It is hard to get back
to normal life, be optimistic, not be frightened, and not
become complacent.
Mr. Jenkins. No, I think you temper the message on both
sides. We get schizophrenic messages from Washington. On the
one hand we are told, go shopping, have fun, live life as
normal; and then we get an announcement from the Attorney
General that we are all going to die by Tuesday. This only
increases people's anxiety.
We are not going back to normal. The world as it existed on
September 10th does not exist any more. This is an
extraordinary time. It is going to require extraordinary
courage and resolve on the part of the American people. That is
a fact.
Now, on the issue of being frightened, even the heightened
probability of a terrorist attack does not translate into
significantly increased risk to the individual American. There
are 280 million of us. Hopefully, the Government is going to
get better at communicating. But more importantly, the citizens
are going to get a lot better at--as other countries that have
dealt with continuing terrorist threats have understanding
threat, understanding risk, and being able to go on with their
lives.
They delivered milk during the blitz in London when 45,000
people were killed. We can go on with our lives and still deal
with whatever the terrorists can throw at us.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
We are going to try to wrap this up at about 4 o'clock.
Senator Hutchinson we will go to you for your 5 minutes and
then we will have some closing questions and then break for our
closed session.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Jenkins, thank you for your testimony. I am trying to
understand exactly what we are facing. It seems to me from the
testimony today, that there are a lot of characteristics of a
cult mentality in what we are dealing with. Yet it is not
really a typical cult.
Of a billion or so Muslims in the world, what percentage of
those Muslims would embrace the radical fundamentalist
extremist Osama bin Laden version?
Mr. Jenkins. I could not give you a percentage, but
probably only a tiny portion of it; it would vary according to
where we are in the Islamic world. It would be higher in places
like Pakistan. It would be much lower in places like Indonesia.
Senator Hutchinson. I have heard as high as 20 percent,
which we are talking 200 million, not a typical cult when you
talk about 200 million people.
Mr. Jenkins. Right.
Senator Hutchinson. Let me pick up on the changing
demographics that you mentioned. You said that they are now
older and that they are more educated, many of these who are
the actual terrorists. Of the tens of thousands that have gone
through these terrorist training camps, and over the last
decade there have been tens of thousands, is it typical for
them to lose zeal as they grow older or the longer they are out
of those training camps? I mean, surely not the tens of
thousands that have actually gone through the camps are out
there somewhere in Europe or in the United States or in the
West plotting terrorist acts.
How does that typically occur as they age?
Mr. Jenkins. I suspect, Senator Hutchinson, there is some
erosion as one departs from the camp, and not everybody departs
the camp as a fanatical obedient of al Qaeda, nor do they
remain so over a period of time. I think it is not just the
camps; what is unique, which Dr. Post mentioned, is the issue
of the schools. If you can get to a 12-year-old boy, you have
him for life, if you can inculcate certain beliefs, whether we
are talking about the madrassas or the Hitler Youth.
Senator Hutchinson. Is that not also true--I mean, we talk
about the power of women, but we are talking about religious
devotion and religious ideology, and it seems to me that even a
repressive religion, if they are taught that from childhood,
that they have accepted that submissive, repressed role, and
that that may inhibit some of the potential for them to
liberate themselves.
Mr. Jenkins. Many I suspect have, but what is remarkable is
the degree of resistance. In a world of open communications,
they can see comparisons between their own condition and the
rest of the world, and it does lead to comparisons where they
say, this is not proper for us.
Senator Hutchinson. I have many questions and I wish I
could stay on one track longer. My understanding of Islamist
terrorism is that they like to do sensational terrorist events.
I have read that they have even a two-track approach, where
there are sensationalist terrorist events as well as a kind of
low-grade effort to disrupt the lives of the American people.
We had this sensational attack on September 11 and then we
had this anthrax and there were 17 cases and a few letters. It
did not kill a lot, four people; tragic, but it is not a
massacre. Why have there not been--if they planned out what
would happen, if they have the network out there, why have we
not seen another sensationalist terrorist attack since
September 11? How does the anthrax--do you think the anthrax is
part of their strategy?
Mr. Jenkins. I do not believe that the individual that sent
the anthrax letters reports to bin Laden. I think there we are
dealing with an individual motivated by idiosyncratic motives,
which will make that person all the more difficult to identify
and apprehend.
I think the person was probably inspired by the events of
September 11 and certainly inspired by the public discussion in
the days immediately after September 11 about chemical and
biological warfare. There is a relationship between popular
culture, what we speculate about in our novels and on our TV
sets, and what individual actors do.
Going forward, what we had in September was an
uncoordinated multi-dimensional attack. We had the suicide
attacks with the airplanes. We had the anthrax letters. We had
what was little noticed but quite serious in the corporate
world--a very vicious computer virus at the same time. In the
future, because terrorists learn too, they are watching what
happened in terms of cascading effects--we could see
coordinated multi-dimensional attacks.
Right now they are going from spectacular to spectacular to
spectacular. In the future, if they see the results on this,
they may begin to do this twin track thing that you are talking
about.
Senator Hutchinson. Are you surprised that there have not
been additional attacks since September 11? Have they just been
thwarted by our security measures?
Mr. Jenkins. Some of them may have been thwarted. But no, I
am not surprised. Their concept of time is different from our
concept of time. If we go 2\1/2\ months without an attack, we
ask why or, worse, we are in some cases breathing sighs of
relief. If you look at their patterns of activity, these
attacks are years apart.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator, for those questions.
They were excellent.
I have one wrap-up question. I know Senator Roberts has one
or two, and we would like to try to wrap up at about 4 o'clock.
Given your extensive background, Mr. Jenkins--and I can't
thank you enough for what you have shared with our
subcommittee--my wrap-up question would be this. Given the
profile that you have outlined, the motivations that you have
helped clarify for us, what in your view would be the weapons
of choice for these terrorists that you have described and why?
That might be helpful to us in our planning.
Mr. Jenkins. I wish I could answer that, and forgive me in
some cases for giving you frustrating answers. If we look at
commercial aviation, surface transportation, critical
infrastructure, large assemblies of people, terrorists have
virtually unlimited targets.
We can look at past patterns of activity and discern that
commercial aviation is an attractive target to them; surface
transportation, for different reasons. For other reasons,
because they prefer targets with high symbolic content or
killing fields, they have tended not to carry out traditional
acts of sabotage against infrastructure.
But beyond this, we cannot really say much with any
confidence on the basis of their past behavior. They want
something spectacular. Spectacular in today's context means
massive casualties, massive disruption, attempting really
literally to bring society to its knees. So you look at those
sorts of things.
Having said that, it really becomes a problem for
government, since terrorists can attack anything, anywhere,
anytime; we cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the
time. We need to dismantle their ability to carry out those
attacks. In terms of increasing our own physical protection, we
need to have some strategy for doing so. We simply cannot pour
enough concrete, deploy enough guards, to protect every nuclear
reactor, every power transformer, every bridge, every subway,
every airport. We do not have enough people to do that.
Senator Landrieu. Senator Roberts.
Senator Roberts. The comment that you made as to what makes
Osama bin Laden tick or his master plan really intrigued me. I
think I am right, and you correct me if I am wrong, in terms of
his specific goal, i.e., to bring down the pro-western
governments in the Arab states and then have him be the
messenger or actually fulfilling the mandate that when Mohammed
went to meet his maker or Allah in 641 and declared that Arabia
would be for Muslims, as opposed to Jews and Christians, that
he has succeeded; and that he is a master manipulator and
planner to really achieve that.
Then you went ahead and indicated that once you get a
youngster 11, 12 years old and you inculcate them with this
kind of thinking, it is almost impossible to change. Then we
are also suggesting, however, that somehow we can nation-build
or stabilize Afghanistan, which is a tall order to say the
least, with all the tribes and all the differences and all the
cultures and all the ethnic differences. Is that a doable
thing?
In saying that, I am reminded of Lawrence of Arabia, which
is a great movie and I would urge anybody that is interested in
this subject to see it about three times. If my memory serves
me correct, Omar Sharif and Peter O'Toole and Alex Guiness and
Anthony Quinn all rode to Damascus under the guise of uniting
all Arab tribes and to take down the Turkish occupation of
Damascus--by the way, on behalf of Great Britain, which is what
it was all about. But once they got there and all sat around a
table, the lights went off, the hospitals did not work, the
water did not work, everything sort of turned into a very bad
situation.
So they all got on their camels and went back to their
original tribal lands and continued it to the point that it is
today, that nothing has really changed unless it is technology.
Who did that? David Lean I think was the director.
That is a pretty negative view on all this. However, Samuel
Huntington indicated that western nations should quit trying to
export our values in places where they are not welcome and have
not taken root, and re-establish them and nurture them in
places where they have.
How do we do this? In fact nation-building in Afghanistan
may be part of the answer, but my word, I do not know if there
is enough money and enough time and enough effort to do that to
the degree that we would want to to prevent--of course, Osama
did not used to be there. The only reason that we are there is
because he runs a terrorist group trying to kill us.
Now, I have rambled on. Can you offer any suggestions?
Mr. Jenkins. I have the easy part. I only have to think
about terrorists. You have the much more difficult part, you
have much broader decisions to deal with.
I do not know that we can. If you look at a place like
Afghanistan, I think one lesson that we have learned, we can
either leave it as it is and periodically come back; it will
remain in a perpetual state of semi-war. We can just keep on
going after bin Laden and the son of bin Laden and the grandson
of bin Laden and whoever else comes along after that. That is
one future scenario. Or we can try, with the limits of our
resources and without being imperialist, to attempt to put into
place something that has a reasonable chance of working better
than the anarchy that they have now.
Either we accept Afghanistan in perpetual anarchy--tribes,
warlords--and we will just be a bigger warlord with air power
that will occasionally come in, or we can try to do something.
Will we succeed? That I do not know.
Senator Roberts. We have had this situation with Kosovo
which is somewhat comparable, although that was not of vital
national interest, with all due respect. You have the Russian
influence now and all the Stan countries and the Northern
Alliance. You have Pakistan on the other side. This is going to
be quite a feat if we can pull it off, I would agree.
I had only one other comment. The TAG group that advises
the Intelligence Committee, the Technical Advisory Group,
indicated to the chairman's question what is next, that we can
expect that you could guess 100 times and be wrong on 100 and
they would do 101. That is the definition of a terrorist. The
only defense against terrorism is a very aggressive offense,
and that we ought to use all technology, all means, all legal
means, to try to figure this out, or you will get back to your
complacency situation and we are in for a very long and
difficult time.
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Jenkins. I do, simply because I know from experience
that physical security measures, the control measures that we
can put in, do not prevent terrorism; they displace the risk.
That does not mean we should not do things to improve the
protection of commercial aviation, certain aspects of our
critical infrastructure, because we do want to displace the
risk. There are certain things that we definitely do not want
to happen. We do not want more airplanes crashing into more
buildings. We are going to have to improve aviation security;
apart from even consideration about the passengers, these are
potential weapons. We have to do a better job there.
So some things are clear and obvious and we must do them,
but we know that on the basis of security alone we cannot win.
We cannot create a society that has enough controls and enough
guards and enough concrete barriers without fundamentally
changing the nature of that society to defeat terrorism with a
defense.
Therefore, we are obliged, even if we did not want to
engage in this, to dismantle the terrorists' capability. That
does not mean we are going to eradicate or wipe out terrorism.
Forget terms that are more properly reserved for the field of
public health. We are going to contain it, we are going to
combat it and keep it within certain levels.
We can exist as a Nation with a certain level of terrorist
activity in the world. We cannot go on, even if it is every
third year or fourth year or fifth year, with what happened on
September 11 or worse. That requires destroying that particular
organization and any other organization that has those
capabilities.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. That is a perfect place to end
this open session, because that is exactly what our
subcommittee is basically charged with the task of helping to
lead this Armed Services Committee and the Senate and Congress.
We thank you for the contributions you have made to that
effort.
The closed session for members only and the highest level
clearance will be in 232 right next door. Thank you.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
1. Senator Thurmond. Dr. Post, in response to a question by Senator
Roberts regarding what steps we could take to win the ``hearts and
minds'' of the population in the Muslim world, you responded, ``provide
outlets for their grievances.''
Could you be more specific? How do we provide these ``outlets''
while protecting those secular regimes in the region that currently
support us?
Dr. Post. When societies are blocked, when there is no opportunity
for youth to see opportunities within the society, they may well be
compelled to strike out violently in despair. But, when there is
opportunity for social justice and economic advancement within the
society, when legitimate political activism is experienced as offering
promise, this in the long-run will diminish the attraction of the path
of terrorism. This is what I meant by ``outlets for their grievances.''
During the first Intifada, the attraction of Palestinian youth to the
path of terrorism was diminished when they experienced the promise of
achieving their goals within society, through active participation in
the political process. This need not threaten the secular regimes that
support us. Indeed, improving the educational systems within their
nations, and helping to open up their societies, will lessen the
resentment toward the leadership that now exists.
2. Senator Thurmond. Mr. Jenkins, you commented that the United
States is doing a poor job in the information campaign compared with
the al Qaeda network and bin Laden.
Do you believe the United States Information Agency could or should
play a more prominent role in this regard?
Do you believe there is a better model for fighting the battle for
the ``hearts and minds'' of those in the developing world who are
susceptible to the influence of radical Islam, and could you describe
that model?
Mr. Jenkins. We need a comprehensive communications project to
support our current war against terrorism that comprises both tactical
and strategic elements aimed at reducing al Qaeda's influence and
combating some of the underlying antagonisms in the Islamic world.
The effort would include both specific psychological operations and
a broader effort to project fundamental American values such as human
rights, liberty, democracy, equality of race and gender, and religious
tolerance. We also want to support secular education and free
expression. We would want to make it clear that these are our values--
we are not engaged in religious proselytization, the destruction of
local cultures, or subverting allied governments. There, inevitably,
will be tensions between our values and oppressive local governments
that often are our allies; keep in mind that the opponents of these
governments may often be the bellicose fundamentalists who despise us
the most. It would be ironic if Afghanistan were to become an example
of democracy, but it has the ingredients, and with international help,
it may be possible.
A 21st century version of the USIA can play a vital role in
supporting U.S. efforts along with other State Department programs,
Voice of America, new regional versions of Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty, and other communications outlets.
[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]