[Senate Hearing 107-417]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-417
WHAT'S NEXT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 7, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Berger, Samuel R., former National Security Advisor, Washington,
DC............................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 4
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 6
Joulwan, Gen. George A., U.S. Army (Ret.), former NATO Supreme
Allied Commander, Arlington, VA................................ 14
Kristol, Hon. William, editor, The Weekly Standard; chairman,
Project for the New American Century, McLean, VA............... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 23
(iii)
WHAT'S NEXT IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM?
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Helms, and Allen.
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Let me begin
in a way I do not like to, by having to apologize to the
witnesses for the late start. I have to tell you, the vote
being called saved me from the total embarrassment of having to
be fully responsible for it being late, since the train was 20
minutes late. I am sure Mr. Kristol and his publication will
start talking about how we need to fund Amtrak, I hope. This is
really an Amtrak hearing, Bill.
Thank you all very, very much. Once again, Mr. Chairman, we
have a very distinguished panel here today as we continue our
next in a series of hearings on the review of American foreign
policy in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11. These hearings, as you well know, are designed to explore
the full range of potential challenges to our national security
and to attempt to ensure that we are allocating our resources
properly in order best to defend our Nation from threats.
The more we move forward in these hearings from--this is
the third in a series that will be, I hope, around a dozen--it
comes down to what my father always said from the time I was a
kid: ``Joe, if everything is equally important to you, nothing
is important.'' We have to prioritize, and that is what we are
really trying to figure out here.
On Tuesday, the Secretary of State presented a
comprehensive overview of the administration's budget
priorities. Yesterday two very distinguished former Secretaries
of Defense presented their views on issues ranging from arms
control to the threat of the use of chemical and biological
weapons in the hands of terrorists.
Today we deal with the question of where the war on
terrorism is likely to move next. For many, this is the heart
of the national security debate. When we ask where the war will
move, this question can be taken both literally and
figuratively. When we talk about upcoming battles, we are
talking not only about geography, but also about strategy and
debates within the Congress and within the administration.
In the realm of geography, there has been much discussion
over which parts of the globe are most likely to harbor members
of the al-Qaeda network and other terrorists plotting their
next attack on Americans. I know you have all read this
morning's paper and many of you heard the testimony yesterday
from the head of our CIA, George Tenet, on his prediction that
there is an attempt to reconfigure what is left of al-Qaeda and
that we still face a serious threat from that very
organization, let alone others.
The question is, as I said, will our efforts take us next
to countries like Somalia, Yemen, and Sudan, where governments
lack either the ability or the will to crack down on terrorism?
Or will it focus on countries like the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia, where governments may share our desire to root out
terrorist groups and could be willing, may be willing, to
cooperate with us if given the proper resources and diplomatic
backing?
Will our effort concentrate on the open societies of
Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere, whether NATO
allies or other longstanding friends? Many of our allies fully
support our goals in the war against terrorism, but have
significant disagreement with us about how to best wage this
new type of warfare. If you read today's major publications,
there is an awful lot of discussion among our European allies
about whether or not we are ``using'' the war on terrorism to,
as one Foreign Minister of an allied nation said, settle old
scores.
If we want their continued and unstinting support for
intelligence, for extraditing the suspects, and perhaps for
military operations, the question is how do we have to treat
their concerns? Is it necessary to treat their concerns? I
suspect we should with all the respect and seriousness that
friendship and simple prudence requires.
If our war on terrorism turns eventually to rogue nations,
such as those described by President Bush as the ``axis of
evil,'' what will such a decision mean? What sort of military,
diplomatic, and economic pressure will we bring to bear on
these nations? What sort of timeframe are we envisioning? What
actions by one or all of these nations might trigger an
immediate response? How can we build support for action,
whether military or non-military, among the rest of the world?
And if we do move and succeed, as I am confident we would be if
we did, are we ready to stay the course in those countries?
The discussion on Iraq yesterday in two different venues--
there is no doubt in my mind of our ability to take out Saddam
Hussein, none whatsoever. The question is, if we are reluctant
to keep folks even in Afghanistan, what does that say for what
will happen in Baghdad after Saddam's gone? What is our game
plan?
Today's issue, where next in the war on terrorism, can be
understood in a non-geographical sense as well. When we look at
the direction and source of future threats, we are not merely
looking at a map. Will future terrorists likely focus on
chemical or biological weapons and, if so, what will be their
most likely source for acquiring such barbaric instruments of
mass murder? What methods of delivery will they most likely
employ? Will they seek to acquire a radiological dirty bomb or
a full-fledged nuclear weapon? As for chemical and biological
agents, the black market in such materials makes these threats
too terrible for our Nation to ignore.
Will they be more likely to turn their attention in a more
conventional direction, perhaps by attacking our Nation's
bridges or tunnels or sports arenas or other high visibility
infrastructure? Let us not forget the heroic devastation of
September 11 was wrought by technology no more sophisticated
than knives, and not much of a knife to begin with, airline
fuel, and fire.
No nation can provide a perfect protection against every
threat that could ever possibly materialize. We have to figure
out our priorities. We cannot do everything, at least we cannot
do it all at once. Do we put our money into airport, rail, and
port security, border patrols, beefed-up police, fire
departments, medical response teams? Do we invest more money
and invest more creativity in intelligence assets and language
training for these specialists?
Each and every day, our electronic monitors gather a vast
wealth of raw material. They literally suck the ether out of
the air, and that remains, much of it remains, essentially
useless because we lack the specialists able to interpret it or
even able to read the language that we intercept.
Do we invest more money in foreign aid, cultural exchanges,
or other programs which help drain the swamp of terrorism? And
do they in fact drain the swamp of terrorism? Do we invest in
narcotic crop substitution, equip friendly governments to help
to battle our common enemy, and hire more financial watchdogs
to hunt down terrorists' finances and choke off the money that
keeps these groups alive?
How much of our limited resources do we devote to missile
defense, a project outside the scope of today's hearing, but
directly related when we consider the issue of allocation of
time, money, assets, and intelligence, that is the raw brain
power that this country and this government possesses? Do we
spend $60 billion, $100 billion, $200 billion?
Are we going to produce a boost phase, mid-phase, end phase
system? Or do we think, as some have suggested and was
mentioned yesterday, a pre-boost phase system, which is
preemptively go in and take these out? It costs less, raises
more costs in other ways maybe.
I will say parenthetically that in my view one of the best
investments we could make in the security of the United States
would be to fund fully ongoing programs to corral, safeguard,
and destroy stockpiles of chemical, biological, and nuclear
materials in the former Soviet Union. I have indicated that I
think, as much as I am concerned about Iraq, and I am, the real
candy store out there is Russia. If you want to go shopping,
that is the place to shop. Do we provide the funds necessary to
keep scientists with dangerous technical expertise from selling
these services to the highest bidder?
The budget priorities put forward by the administration in
my view are ones that we have a responsibility to debate and
discuss because, as, general, you know from your days at the
Pentagon, if you want to know what is important to a military
establishment, look at their budget, look at the budget.
I will also say that in my view one of the most important
lessons of September 11 is the need for a global perspective.
In the battle against terror, unilateralism is not an option.
That is not to suggest we do not have unilateral options and we
need not preserve them and exercise them if need be. Our
military can take on any adversary in the world. But this
battle on terrorism at least is not one that can be fought
purely by the military. It relies on intelligence, police,
diplomacy, and these rely firmly on cooperation with other
nations.
As Secretary Perry said yesterday, the tough call we are
going to have to make in the next decade or so--my phrase,
``the next decade or so,'' not his--is what are the tradeoffs
here? Clearly, we like to act with independence. Clearly, we
like to act without having to be bogged down with anyone else
being any part of the decision. But what is the tradeoff? If we
act that way, if we lose cooperation, what is the end result?
Is the tradeoff worth it or is it not worth it?
These are very difficult decisions that do not lend
themselves in my view to simplistic formulas. So we may not
know precisely where the war on terrorism will take us next,
but I firmly believe that it is likely to require us to have
some cooperation from our allies and friends.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Today the Committee on Foreign Relations continues a series of
hearings to review American foreign policy in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of September 11. These hearings are designed to
explore the full range of potential challenges to our national
security, and to insure that we are allocating our resources properly
in order to best defend our nation from any such threats.
On Tuesday, the Secretary of State presented a comprehensive
overview of Administration budget priorities. Yesterday, two former
secretaries of defense presented their views on arms control issues.
Today we deal with the question of where the war on terrorism will be
likely to move next. For many, this is the heart of our national
security debate.
When we ask ``where'' the war will move, this question can be taken
both literally and figuratively. When we talk about upcoming battles,
we are talking not only about geography, but also about strategy.
In the realm of geography, there has been much discussion over
which parts of the globe are most likely to harbor members of the al-
Qaeda network and other terrorists plotting their next attack on
Americans. Will our effort take us next to countries like Somalia,
Yemen and Sudan, where governments lack either the ability or the will
to crack down on terrorism?
Will it focus on countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Malaysia, where governments may share our desire to root out terrorist
groups, and could be willing to cooperate with us if given the proper
resources and diplomatic backing?
Will our effort concentrate on the open societies of Western
Europe, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere--whether NATO allies or other
longstanding friends? Many of our allies fully support our goals in the
war against terrorism, but have significant disagreements with us about
how best to wage this new type of warfare. If we want their continued,
unstinting support--for intelligence, for the extradition of suspects,
and perhaps for military operations--we will have to treat their
concerns with all the respect and seriousness that friendship and
simple prudence require.
And if our war on terrorism turns eventually to ``rogue nations''
such as those described by President Bush as the ``Axis of Evil,'' what
will such a decision mean? What sort of military, diplomatic, and
economic pressure will we bring to bear on these nations? What sort of
time-frame are we envisioning? What actions by one--or all--of these
nations might trigger an immediate response? How can we build support
for action, whether military or non-military, among the rest of the
world community?
Today's issue--where next in the war on terrorism--can be
understood in a non-geographical sense as well. When we look for the
direction and source of future threats, we are not merely looking at a
map.
Will future terrorists be likely to focus on chemical or biological
weapons? If so, what will be their most likely sources for acquiring
such barbaric instruments of mass-murder? What methods of delivery will
they be most likely to employ?
Will they seek to acquire radiological ``dirty bombs,'' or even
full-fledged nuclear weapons? As for chemical and biological agents,
the black market in such materials makes these threats too terrible for
our nation to ignore.
Will they be more likely to turn their attention in a more
conventional direction, perhaps by attacking our nation's bridges,
tunnels, sports arenas, or other high-visibility infrastructure? Let us
not forget that the horrific devastation of September 11 was wrought by
technology no more sophisticated than knives, airline fuel, and fire.
No nation can provide perfect protection against every threat that
could ever possibly materialize. We have to figure out our priorities.
We can't have everything, all at once: do we put our money into
airport, port and rail security, border patrols, beefed-up police, fire
departments, and medical response teams? Do we invest more money--and
invest it more creatively--in intelligence assets and in language
training for area specialists? Each and every day our electronic
monitors gather a vast wealth of raw intelligence that remains
essentially useless, because we lack the specialists able to interpret
it or who might understand the language.
Do we invest more money in foreign aid, cultural exchange, and
other programs which help ``drain the swamp'' of terrorism? Do we
invest in narcotics crop substitution, equip friendly governments to
help battle our common enemy, or hire more financial watchdogs to hunt
down terrorist finances and choke off the money that keeps these groups
alive?
And how much of our limited resources do we devote to missile
defense--a project outside the scope of today's hearing, but directly
related when we consider the issue of allocation of time, money and
assets. Do we spend $60 billion? $100 billion? $200 billion?
I will say parenthetically that, in my view, one of the best
investments we could make for the security of the United States would
be to fully fund ongoing programs to corral, safeguard, or destroy
stockpiles of chemical, biological and nuclear materials in the former
Soviet Union, and to provide funds necessary to keep scientists with
dangerous technical expertise from selling their services to the
highest bidder. The budget priorities put forward by the
Administration, in my view, are ones that we have a responsibility to
debate and discuss.
I will also say that, in my view, one of the most important lessons
of September 11 is the need for a global perspective. In the battle
against terror, unilateralism simply is not an option. Our military can
take on any adversary in the world--but this battle against terrorism
is not one that can be fought by the military alone. It relies on
intelligence, police, and diplomacy--and all of these rely firmly on
the cooperation of many other nations.
We may not know precisely where the war on terrorism will take us
next. I firmly believe that it is likely to require us to ask for
cooperation from our allies and friends.
The Chairman. I am anxious to hear what our distinguished
witnesses--and they are distinguished--have to say about these
and other issues, and I will now yield to the Senator from
North Carolina, the real chairman of the committee.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I am glad to see we have a group of young people here this
morning. Can you hear all right? Would you raise your hand if
you cannot hear any of the witnesses, because we have a blue
ribbon group of leaders here and I want you to hear what they
say.
The first is Samuel Berger. He was former National Security
Advisor to the President for 8 year. Then Gen. George A.
Joulwan--I got it right, did I not?
General Joulwan. You got it right.
Senator Helms. He is former NATO Supreme Allied Commander.
Last and certainly not least is Bill Kristol, editor of The
Weekly Standard and chairman of the Project for the New
American Century, which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia.
Now, I welcome all three of you, and I know it is an
imposition sometimes to come up here, but it makes a lot of
difference in terms of understanding the problems and
questions.
One of the things the American people learned on September
11 is that there are implacable enemies seeking to destroy us.
Everybody knows that. And if those enemies are not identified
and disarmed and/or destroyed, ``they will come for us,'' to
quote the President of the United States. President Bush
understands that and, in his State of the Union Address, he put
America's enemies on notice: ``We know who you are, we know
what you are doing; stop or we will stop you.'' And he said it
rather emphatically, to a standing ovation.
Terrorism and despotism, weapons of mass destruction and
the missiles to deliver, all of these threats exists today to
our Nation, and to our allies. Previous administrations have
erred in believing that one could confront terror and weapons
of mass destruction [WMD] proliferation as law enforcement
problems. Un-uh. No indeed, these are matters of vital national
security and must be addressed with a broad, consistent policy
that brooks no bargaining, no pinpricks, and no half-measures.
In all likelihood, there will be no need to make war on all
of our enemies, but we must be forthright in identifying them,
giving them an opportunity to reform, and, if necessary,
isolating or eliminating them. For that reason, many of us have
declared that Saddam Hussein must go. Now, all of our half-
measures have failed and our efforts to give Saddam room to
improve were used by him to consolidate his power and buildup
more weapons.
Every year a group of people, Saddam's constituency, who
want him out of office, come to see us and tell us what is
going on. If we bury our heads in the sand, as was done with
the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, we are going to find ourselves
confronting Saddam on his terms and at a time of his choosing.
Sure, we will prevail. We are certain of that. But at what
cost?
One last thought, Mr. Chairman, and I am through. At the
end of the cold war we discovered that none were more beloved
in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc than Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher. Why were they beloved? They were respected
and beloved because they told the world the truth about Soviet
tyranny. I believe America will be equally beloved today if we
speak the unvarnished truth about the terrorist totalitarian
rulers in this world. After all, the people of Cuba, Syria,
Iran and Iraq are not terrorists. They have no desire, let
alone any plans, to annihilate us, with nuclear weapons or
anything else. But no one suffers more than they do at the
hands of the kind of leadership that they have.
The time has obviously come, I think, for all of us to
speak out. The President of the United States began a new day
last week with his denunciation of what he called the ``axis of
evil.'' The rest of us, I think, will do well to follow in his
footsteps.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms
Distinguished gentlemen, welcome. We are here to hear from you, and
not to hear Senators pontificate, so I will be brief.
One of the things the American people learned on September 11 is
that there are implacable enemies seeking to destroy us. If those
enemies are not identified, and disarmed or destroyed, they will come
for us.
President Bush understands that, and in his State of the Union, he
put America's enemies on notice. ``We know who you are; we know what
you are doing; stop or we will stop you,'' the President said
emphatically.
Terrorism and despotism, weapons of mass destruction and the
missiles to deliver them, all these are threats today to our nation and
to our allies. Previous administrations have made the mistake of
believing that confronting terror and WMD proliferation could be
treated as law enforcement problems. No indeed, these are matters of
vital national security and must be addressed with a broad, consistent
policy that brooks no bargaining, no pinpricks and no half measures.
In all likelihood, there will be no need to make war on all of our
enemies, but we must be forthright in identifying them, giving them an
opportunity to reform, and, if necessary, isolating or eliminating
them. For that reason, many of us have declared that Saddam Hussein
must go.
All of our half measures have failed and our efforts to give Saddam
room to improve were used by him to consolidate his power and build up
more weapons. If we bury our heads in the sand, as was done with the
Taliban and Osama bin Laden, we will find ourselves confronting Saddam
on his terms at a time of his choosing. Sure, we will prevail, but at
what cost?
One last thought:
At the end of the Cold War, we discovered that no one was more
beloved in the Soviet Union and East Bloc than Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher. Why were they beloved? Because they told the world
the truth about Soviet tyranny.
I believe America will be equally beloved today if we speak the
unvarnished truth about the terrorist, totalitarian rulers of this
world. After all, the people of Cuba, Syria, Iran and Iraq are not
terrorists; they have no desire, let alone any plans, to annihilate us
with nuclear weapons. No one suffers more than they do at the hands of
their disreputable leaders.
The time has obviously come for all of us to speak out. President
Bush began a new day last week with his denunciation of the ``axis of
evil''. The rest of us will do well to follow in his footsteps.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We will hear from the witnesses, and I will introduce each
and say a little about them in this order. I would like to hear
from Mr. Berger first. I should say that for 8 years I had a
chance to work with Mr. Berger. I think he is the single best
mind that existed at the time in that administration. One of
the things I have found about him is that this is a man who is
not reluctant to speak his piece and to suggest the use of
force when he thinks it is needed.
I am happy that he is here. I look forward to his input. I
must acknowledge in full disclosure, I consider him a friend.
So that does not mean I will not ask him tough questions, but I
consider him a friend and I am delighted he is here.
Would you begin, Sandy. Then what we will do is go to
General Joulwan. I want to say a word about him after you
finish your testimony.
STATEMENT OF SAMUEL R. BERGER, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Berger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for those kind words.
Senator Helms, Senator Allen, other members of the
committee who are here in spirit----
The Chairman. Some members will possibly make it who are
not now present. The farm bill is on the floor and what we all
know and all three of you know is farm policy always takes
precedence over foreign policy when there is an election year
and notwithstanding terror. So I am afraid there are a lot of
our colleagues down there dealing with farm policy right now.
Mr. Berger. I welcome your invitation to participate in
this important and timely set of hearings and to address in
particular the next stages of the war against terrorism. Let me
begin briefly with what we have already accomplished with
decisive and courageous leadership from President Bush,
skillful diplomacy and a military that has demonstrated
superbly the strength it has gained and the lessons it has
learned over the last decade. The Taliban regime is gone, its
demise unlamented by the Afghan people, its first victims. An
interim coalition, fragile but representative, has taken over
in Kabul. Al-Qaeda has been shaken and dispersed, for now
disrupted as a functioning network.
September 11 was a watershed for our country and the world.
It breached the boundaries of the unimaginable. A horrified
world stood with us. The response of the United States was
fierce and focused, directed at those what perpetrated the
crimes and those who support them. This response thwarted bin
Laden's fundamental objective, to provoke indiscriminate
actions by the United States that would further polarize the
West and the Islamic world, collapsing not just the Twin
Towers, but governments linked to us from Pakistan to Saudi
Arabia. We were not just the object of these attacks, but also
we were the potential instrument of the terrorist purpose, to
advance the vision of a radical pan-Islamic region from central
Asia to the gulf and beyond.
Americans, led by the President, have responded with
unified purpose. We have known that our cause is both right and
necessary, and so has the world.
So where do we go from here? We have an historic
opportunity if we show as much staying power as firepower, if
we are unrelenting but not overreaching, if we exercise not
only the military power necessary to protect our people, but
also the moral authority necessary to demonstrate that our
strength serves a purpose broader than self-protection, to
build a safer world of shared wellbeing.
Our first task, as the President has said, is to finish the
job of destroying al-Qaeda. That job necessarily involves
getting bin Laden. We must not define him out of existence. We
must dictate his destiny. After all, he is the man most
responsible for the crime against humanity nearly 5 months ago.
We cannot permit him to reemerge in a month or a year. We do
not want the legend of bin Laden, a symbol of defiance. We want
the lesson of bin Laden, a symbol of defeat.
It may take months or years. He may be dead already. But
the victims cannot rest in peace until that justice is done.
We must continue to take down al-Qaeda cells and hunt down
al-Qaeda operatives elsewhere, in Asia, Europe, Africa, North
America, in this country and elsewhere. Disruption will be an
ongoing enterprise, a priority that will require international
intelligence, law enforcement, and military cooperation for the
foreseeable future. As Director Tenet said yesterday, these
cells of fanatics will reconstitute themselves. We must treat
this as a chronic illness that must be aggressively managed,
while never assuming that it has been completely cured.
Where we can help our friends suppress terrorist threats,
we should do so, as we are in the Philippines, Bosnia and
elsewhere. We must be careful to distinguish that from
suppressing their legitimate opposition. Where we see remnants
of al-Qaeda and its allies regroup in countries with virtually
no governments, it may be necessary to act militarily,
balancing the genuine security gains against potential
allegations that we are assuming the role of world policeman.
As we move beyond al-Qaeda and its allies, we need to be
clear about our purposes, strategies, standing, and capacities.
In the State of the Union, the President dramatically expanded
the battlefield. He redefined and expanded the war to embrace
an ``axis of evil.'' Implicit in that ultimatum, I believe, is
the conviction that the threat of American power against
radical regimes and presumably its exercise will create a new
dynamic that causes these regimes to abandon activities that
threaten us. It assumes that others will follow our clearly
defined leadership and, if not, we will act alone if necessary.
These are profoundly important premises which promise a far
more interventionist global American posture. They deserve
serious and open-minded discussion. I do not believe the
President is engaged in empty threats or rhetorical bluff.
Each of the governments singled out by the President pose
unmistakable dangers. Saddam was, is, and continues to be a
menace to his people, to the region, and to us. He cannot be
accommodated. Our goal should be regime change. The question is
not whether, but how and when.
Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons and advanced
missile systems and to support terrorist and rejectionist
groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and PiJ. Its involvement in arms
shipments to the Palestinians is unacceptable.
North Korea's regime, a relic of the cold war, is
repressive toward it's people and promiscuous in peddling its
missile technology.
We ignore the risks these governments pose at our peril.
But each of them, and their context, is very different. Merely
labeling them as evil does not answer hard questions about the
best way to deal with them to effect needed change.
How do we build support in the region and among our allies
to intensify pressure on Saddam Hussein? Can the Afghan
template be applied in Iraq, where Saddam's power is more
entrenched and the opposition is weaker? Are we prepared to go
it alone militarily? Is that feasible and what would it take?
How does our role in the deteriorating Middle East conflict
relate to a more aggressive posture toward Saddam? Do flames in
Baghdad inflame the Middle East or quiet it?
Have we given up on the internal struggle in Iran, where
majorities of over 70 percent have expressed their desire for
change? Does branding Iran part of an evil axis strengthen
those who want to engage the United States or those who want to
demonize us?
Does disengaging from negotiations with North Korea, which
produced a missile moratorium that has held since 1998 and a
freeze on nuclear fuel production that has been continuously
verified by outside monitors, make it more or less likely that
we will gain restraint? Does it make war on the Korean
Peninsula more or less likely? Does it matter that our ally
South Korea believes that the policy of cautious engagement
with the North has reduced tensions on the peninsula to an all-
time low?
Finally, do we lose the focus on our war against terrorism
and the support of our allies for fighting it when we redefine
the conflict as a war against rogue states? From the beginning,
the President described the war against terrorism as a
monumental struggle between good and evil. But as our
definition of evil becomes more expansive, from Baghdad to
Teheran to Pyongyang, will our support in the world for the
fight against terrorism become more diffuse?
I think the President is absolutely right to sound the
alarm against the nexus between biological, chemical, and
nuclear states and terrorism. The discussion we should have in
a bipartisan and respectful way is not whether we deal with
these risks, but how. It must also include reducing the threat
of loose nukes and inadequately secured nuclear materials in
Russia. It should include putting teeth in the Biological
Weapons Convention and I would argue ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban treaty. It must include stopping friends
and allies from selling dangerous technologies to hostile
governments.
The struggle against global terrorism is not a fight we can
win alone. We need partners, coalitions built around us, not
against us.
The President was also right when he said we are usually
better off in the world when we say less and do more. A great
power threatens only if it is prepared to act if intimidation
fails. In an effort to impose new world order, we must be
careful not to contribute to new world disorder.
Let me make one final principal point about the war against
terrorism. We have been focused since September 11, Mr.
Chairman, on the military dimension of this struggle. It is an
essential part now and perhaps in the future. But this is not a
war we can fight with military power alone. Our objective must
not be only to destroy the terrorist networks that have
attacked and threatened us; we must do so in a way that makes
the world more stable, not less, that isolates the extremists,
not us.
That means, as Secretary Powell has said, we must commit
our resources to stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan,
including the possibility of participating in an international
security force. It means that we must make sure President
Musharraf succeeds. He has bought the program that he must take
on the terrorists within or lose his country. If he fails, no
one else in the Islamic world will try again, and it would be
more than ironic if we defeated the military extremists in
Afghanistan only to see them prevail in Pakistan and seize
control of nuclear weapons.
It means supporting the administration's active role in
diffusing the crisis between Pakistan and India, where
confrontation can lead to miscalculation and, with nuclear
weapons on both sides, miscalculation can lead to disaster.
It means that we must fight the terror and seek to break
the death grip in the Middle East. Pessimism about the Middle
East is an honest reflection of reality, but it cannot lead us
to fatalism, the view that we are unable to make a difference.
The situation will only get worse without sustained engagement
led by the United States, on Arafat to defeat the killers and
on the Israelis to respond as he does. The alternative is a
destructive war of attrition and a radicalization of the entire
region.
It means we must put as much energy into the Arab world as
we take out of it, but of the diplomatic, political, economic,
and intellectual variety. We must act more purposefully to
convince our friends in the region that pluralism and reform
are not the enemies of Islam, they are the enemies of the
extremists.
Finally, we must put at the heart of the U.S. agenda
efforts to enable the poor to reap the advantages of
globalization and opportunity. This too is part of the war
against terrorism, for unless we do so the world will become a
more divided and bitter place and our power, unrivaled as it
may be, will produce as much resentment as respect.
In short, Mr. Chairman, phase two in the war against
terrorism, a long-term struggle as the President honestly has
told us, must be defined not only by what we destroy, but also
by what we build, not only by what we stand against, but what
we stand for.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Samuel R. Berger, Former National Security
Advisor
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
I welcome your invitation to participate in this important and
timely series of hearings and to address, in particular, the next
stages in the war against terrorism.
Let me begin with what we already have accomplished with decisive
and courageous leadership from President Bush, skillful diplomacy and a
military that has demonstrated superbly the strength it has gained and
the lessons learned over the past decade. The Taliban regime is gone,
its demise unlamented by the Afghan people, its first victims. An
interim coalition, fragile but representative, has taken over in Kabul.
Al Qaeda has been shaken and dispersed, for now disrupted as a
functioning network.
September 11th was a watershed for our country and the world. It
breached the boundaries of the unimaginable. A horrified world stood
with us. The response by the United States was fierce and focused--
directed at those who perpetrated the crimes and those who support
them. This response thwarted bin Laden's fundamental objective: to
provoke indiscriminate actions by the U.S. that would have further
polarized the West and the Islamic world, collapsing not just the Twin
Towers but governments linked to us from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. We
were not just the object of these attacks but also the potential
instrument of the terrorists' purpose: to advance the vision of a
radical pan-Islamic region from central Asia to the Gulf and beyond.
Americans, led by the President, have responded with unified
purpose. We have known that our cause is both right and necessary, and
so has the world.
So where do we go from here? We have an historic opportunity--if we
show as much staying power as fire power . . . if we are unrelenting
but not overreaching . . . if we exercise not only the military power
necessary to protect our people but also the moral authority necessary
to demonstrate that our strength serves a purpose broader than self-
protection--to build a safer world of shared well-being.
Our first task, as the President has said, is to finish the job of
destroying al Qaeda. That job necessarily involves getting bin Laden.
We must not define him out existence; we must dictate his destiny.
After all, he is the man most responsible for the crime against
humanity nearly five months ago. We cannot permit him to reemerge--in a
month, or a year. We do not want the legend of bin Laden--a symbol of
defiance. We want the lesson of bin Laden--a symbol of defeat.
It may take months or years. But the victims cannot rest in peace
until that justice is done.
And we must continue to take down al Qaeda cells, and hunt down al
Qaeda operatives elsewhere--in Asia, Europe, Africa, here and elsewhere
in this Hemisphere. Disruption will be an ongoing enterprise--a
priority that will require international intelligence, law enforcement
and military cooperation for the foreseeable future. These cells of
fanatics will reconstitute themselves. We must treat this as a chronic
illness that must be aggressively managed, while never assuming it has
been completely cured.
Where we can help our friends suppress terrorist threats, we should
do so, as we are in the Philippines, Bosnia and elsewhere. We must be
careful to distinguish that from suppressing their legitimate
opposition. And where we see remnants of al Qaeda and its allies
regroup in countries with virtually no governments, it may be necessary
to act militarily, balancing the genuine security gains against
potential allegations that we are assuming the role of world policeman.
As we move beyond al Qaeda and its allies, we need to be clear
about our purposes, strategies, standing and capacities. In the State
of the Union, the President dramatically expanded the battlefield. He
redefined and expanded the war to embrace an ``axis of evil.'' Implicit
in the ultimatum, I believe, is the conviction that the threat of
American power against radical regimes--and presumably its exercise--
will create a new dynamic that causes these regimes to abandon
activities that threaten us. It assumes that others will follow our
clearly defined leadership and, if not, we will act alone if necessary.
These are profoundly important premises, which promise a far more
interventionist global American posture. They deserve serious and open-
minded discussion. I do not believe the President is engaged in empty
threats or rhetorical bluff.
Each of the governments singled out by the President pose
unmistakable dangers. Saddam Hussein was, is and continues to be a
menace to his people, to the region and to us. He cannot be
accommodated. Our goal should be regime change. The question is not
whether but how and when.
Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons and advanced missile
systems and to support terrorist and rejectionist groups like
Hezballah, Hamas and PiJ. Its involvement in arms shipments to the
Palestinians is unacceptable.
North Korea's regime, a relic of the Cold War, is repressive toward
its people and promiscuous in peddling its missile technology.
We ignore the risks these governments pose at our peril. But each
of them, and their context, is very different. Merely labeling them as
``evil'' does not answer hard questions about the best way to deal with
them to effect needed change.
How do we build support, in the region and among our allies,
to intensify pressure on Saddam Hussein? Can the Afghan
template be applied in Iraq, where Saddam's power is more
entrenched and the opposition is weaker? Are we prepared to go-
it-alone militarily? Is that feasible and what would it take?
How does our role in the deteriorating Middle East conflict
relate to a more aggressive posture toward Saddam? Do flames in
Baghdad inflame the Middle East, or quiet it?
Have we given up on the internal struggle in Iran, where
majorities of over 70% have expressed their desire for change?
Does branding Iran part of an evil axis strengthen those who
want to engage the U.S. or those who seek to demonize us?
Does disengaging from negotiations with North Korea, which
produced a missile moratorium that has held since 1998 and a
freeze on nuclear fuel production that has been continuously
verified by outside monitors, make it more or less likely that
we will gain restraint? Does it make war on the Korea Peninsula
more or less likely? Does it matter that our ally, South Korea,
believes that the policy of cautious engagement with the North
has reduced tensions on the Peninsula to an all-time low?
Do we lose focus in our war against terrorism, and the
support of our allies for fighting it, when we redefine the
conflict as a war against rogue states? From the beginning, the
President described war against terrorism as a ``monumental
struggle between good and evil.'' But as our definition of evil
becomes more expansive--from Baghdad to Tehran to Pyongyang--
will our support in the world for the fight against terrorism
become more diffuse?
I think the President is absolutely right to sound the alarm
against the nexus between biological, chemical and nuclear states and
terrorism. The discussion we should have, in a bipartisan and
respectful way, is not whether we deal with these risks, but how. It
must also include reducing the threat of loose nukes and inadequately
secured nuclear material in Russia. It should include putting teeth in
the Biological Weapons Convention, and, I would argue, ratifying the
CTBT. And it must include stopping friends and allies from selling
dangerous technology to hostile governments. The struggle against
global terrorism is not a fight we can win alone; we need partners--
coalitions built around us not against us.
The President was also right when he said we are usually better off
in the world when we say less and do more. A great power threatens only
if it is prepared to act if intimidation fails. In an effort to impose
new world order, we must be careful not to contribute to new world
disorder.
Let me make one other principal point about what is next in the war
against terrorism. We have been focused since September 11th on the
military dimension of this struggle. It is a necessary part, now and
perhaps in the future. But this is not a war we can fight with military
power alone. Our objective must be not only to destroy the terrorist
networks that have attacked and threaten us; we must do so in a way
that makes the world more stable, not less--that isolates the
extremists, not us.
That means, as Secretary Powell has said, we must commit our
resources to stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan, including
the possibility of participating in an international security
force.
It means we must make sure President Musharraf succeeds. He
has ``bought the program''--that he must take on the terrorists
within, or lose his country. If he fails, no one else in the
Islamic world will try again. And it would be more than ironic
if we defeated the militant extremists in Afghanistan only to
see them prevail in Pakistan, and seize control of nuclear
weapons.
It means supporting the Administration's active role in
defusing the crisis between Pakistan and India--where
confrontation can easily lead to miscalculation and, with
nuclear weapons on both sides, miscalculation can lead to
disaster.
It means that we must fight the terror, and seek to break
the death grip, in the Middle East. Pessimism about the Middle
East is an honest reflection of reality, but it cannot lead us
to fatalism--the view that we are unable to make a difference.
The situation will only get worse without concerted and
sustained engagement led by the U.S.--on Arafat to defeat the
killers and on the Israelis to respond as he does. The
alternative is a destructive war of attrition and a
radicalization of the entire region.
It means that we must put as much energy into the Arab world
as we take out--but of the diplomatic, political, economic and
intellectual variety. We must act more purposefully to convince
our friends in the region that pluralism and reform are not the
enemies of Islam; they are the enemies of the extremists.
Finally, we must put at the heart of the U.S. agenda efforts
to enable the poor to reap the advantages of globalization and
opportunity. This too is part of the war against terrorism--for
unless we do so, the world will become a more divided and
bitter place, and our power--unrivaled as it is--will produce
as much resentment as respect.
In short, Mr. Chairman, ``phase two'' in the war against
terrorism--a long-term struggle as the President honestly has told us--
must be defined not only by what we destroy, but by what we build, not
only by what we stand against but what we stand for.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Berger, I want to thank you on behalf of
the committee for taking as seriously as you did our
invitation. That is a first-rate statement. Whether anyone
agrees or not--I happen to agree with it--the fact you took it
so seriously we appreciate very much.
Mr. Berger. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. General Joulwan is a man who has had
experience in combat. He had two combat tours in Vietnam. He
worked in the White House. He has worked in the Pentagon. He
was SACEUR. I find it interesting and somewhat poetic to know
that he was a second lieutenant when the Wall in Berlin was
built and he was a lieutenant general when the Wall came down
in Europe.
I have said this publicly as often as I can lately, Mr.
Chairman, because I have been incredibly impressed over the
last 10 years. Maybe it relates to my responsibilities and
exposure to individuals in the military, unlike I have had in
the first 15 years of my career. I find our flag officers among
the brightest, the most informed diplomats, diplomats, as well
as warriors. I have been stunned by it over the last 10 to 12
years.
I would point out--I do not want to get him in trouble, but
during the period of the expansion of NATO, which you and I
strongly supported, I suspect that--and I suspect Mr. Berger,
who oversaw that, would agree--that General Joulwan's diplomacy
and his input and his efforts as SACEUR were incredibly
important as well as they were in getting our allies to do what
I am convinced they did not want to do, which was the right
thing in the Balkans, including your recommendations, I would
add, with regard to Kosovo.
I have been mightily impressed, general, and we are
delighted to have you here. Please proceed at your pace.
STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER
NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ARLINGTON, VA
General Joulwan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
inviting me to testify here today. At the outset, I too want to
thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Helms and Senator Allen and
this committee, for your support during my time on active duty
and for the important role you have played in the development
and implementation of American foreign policy.
You have asked me to look at several questions as part of
your effort to better understand what we are confronting in
this war to defeat terrorism, specifically what are our next
steps in Afghanistan, how do we drain the swamp of terrorism,
and how do we foster better civilian and military cooperation?
I will do so as a soldier of 40 years, the last 7 as a
commander in chief of our forces in Latin America, and later as
the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.
Let me make a few brief points and then respond to your
questions. First, Mr. Chairman, we are at war, but it is a
different war than those we have fought in the past. There are
no front lines, the enemy is dispersed and operates in small
cells, and the underpinnings of this threat are in its
religious radicalism and its hatred of the United States and
the civilization that embraces freedom, tolerance, and human
dignity. It is an enemy willing to commit suicide of its young
to achieve its aims and with little regard for human life.
While the enemy may be small in number, it would be wrong to
underestimate the threat or the depth of their convictions.
Second, the al-Qaeda network has been in place for years,
if not decades, and we as a Nation have been surprised at the
number of countries from which al-Qaeda operates and the
sleepers who provide assistance and comfort to terrorists in
many democratic countries, including our own. Such is the
pervasiveness of this threat. While it would be wrong to paint
al-Qaeda 10 feet tall, it would be equally wrong to dismiss the
pervasiveness of the threat. I adhere to a very basic
principle: Never underestimate your enemy.
Third, let me underscore what President Bush and his
advisors have been saying. This will be a lengthy campaign, not
of months but years. We have bought some time in the disruption
we have caused the al-Qaeda terrorists, but do not for a minute
believe we have eliminated nor greatly diminished the threat to
our homeland and to our allies and friends. We have not.
While we Americans are used to quick action and return to
normalcy, the Congress, the media, and our elected leaders must
prepare our country for a long struggle. During the cold war,
we demonstrated a commitment and resolve for over 40 years.
That commitment and resolve transcended political party and
labels such as liberal and conservative, and we prevailed. In
this fight we need the same resolve and commitment for however
long it takes. And, Mr. Chairman, we will prevail.
The fourth point: The war on terror is being conducted on
three fronts. One front is Afghanistan and the surrounding
region, another here in our homeland, and the third is global
in scope. In Afghanistan we acted swiftly to punish those who
killed so many innocent people in New York, Washington, and
Pennsylvania. Indeed, in my opinion our military actions were
out in front at times of the political decisions needed to
provide clarity and direction for the campaign plan. We
surprised al-Qaeda, bin Laden, and their supporters with the
swiftness of our action and the resolve of the American people.
The surprise attack on the United States was answered in weeks,
not months or years.
The resolve of the American people to take the fight to
this new enemy has been resolute and unwavering. When the
Taliban and al-Qaeda chose to stand and fight, they were
defeated. The union of Northern Alliance fighters, the U.S. and
British Special Forces has been extremely effective in bringing
accurate deadly air strikes on the enemy, but the war in
Afghanistan is not over. The leadership of al-Qaeda has still
not been killed or captured. We have disrupted the enemy's
activities, but not rendered him ineffective. Without constant
pressure, the enemy can reconstitute and pose a threat to the
new interim government and to our troops on the ground.
Intelligence collection and sufficient U.S. ground troops
are needed to ensure that al-Qaeda and Taliban are not just
disrupted, but defeated. This means staying in South Asia. It
means developing a stronger relationship with Pakistan that is
economic and political as well as military. It means
involvement in resolving the potentially dangerous dispute
between India and Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, it was clear from the outset that the only
way we were going to be successful in Afghanistan and beyond
was to enlist global support. That support has been there from
the beginning. The stand-up attitude of the British confirms
the special nature of our relationship and NATO's invoking of
Article 5 for the first time in its history are the two best
examples.
There are others as well. Australia has troops on the
ground and Japan is supplying ships and aid for the war effort,
which is unprecedented. In addition, Russia, despite the ups
and downs in our relations, has been supportive. President
Putin, to his credit, has decided to use this opportunity, I
believe, to seek common ground with the United States and
broaden our relationship. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I had a
Russian three star general as my deputy for Russian forces in
Bosnia. We do have common interests and can build a foundation
for better relations in the future.
Also, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are providing bases for
U.S. and coalition forces. Part of the reason we have had such
immediate access to bases in both these countries is because
Americans have been training there since 1995 as part of the
Partnership for Peace developed between NATO and the states of
the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. Engagement works, Mr.
Chairman, and our allies and partners are important in this
global fight against terror.
As I said before, we should not be lulled into thinking we
have drained the swamp of terrorism in Afghanistan or anywhere
else quite yet. Afghanistan is still a dangerous place and the
two priorities in the near term to me are clear. One is a
combat mission to disrupt and defeat al-Qaeda and the
terrorists. The second is an international security force in
Afghanistan to provide security for the interim government and
the multitude of agencies committed to rebuilding Afghanistan
after the devastating years of Taliban rule. Both efforts are
important, both efforts need to complement each other, and both
efforts require U.S. leadership and direction.
I believe there are some lessons from Bosnia that we can
apply to Afghanistan. We went into Bosnia in the winter of 1995
in the worst terrain in Europe and in 6 months accomplished all
military tasks, separating 200,000 armed insurgents in 30 days,
transferring land in 45 days, and demobilizing all warring
factions in 180 days, and NATO did so with a coalition force
from 36 nations, including for the first time a brigade of
Russian troops.
Unlike UNPROFOR, the U.N. Protection Force, we had clarity
of mission, unity of command, and clear robust rules of
engagement. However, the civilian side was not well organized
or as successful. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, 6 years later
U.S. and NATO troops are still in Bosnia and the unemployment
rate is higher than it was in 1995. We are better than that as
a Nation and as an alliance.
Clearly, the military can bring about an absence of war,
but it is the civilian follow-on agencies that will bring true
peace. Therefore, my fifth point is that we must have an
effective, integrated, disciplined, multinational team with
clear objectives and milestones as a follow-on force in
Afghanistan. This is not nation-building, but security-
building. We did not do so 10 years ago in Afghanistan and we
must not make that same mistake again.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, al-Qaeda is not confined to
Afghanistan. I uncovered an al-Qaeda cell in Bosnia in 1996. It
has a global reach. President Bush is right, we cannot wait for
the next attack in order to take the next step. We must
anticipate, we must be proactive, not reactive. We must take on
those who support terrorist organizations with a global reach.
But while doing this, we must take into account several
criteria: What is the best allocation of our resources? What
will it take to succeed, and what impact will this have on the
international support we need over the long term to defeat
terrorism? We should not make threats we are not prepared to
carry out and we must match requirements with resources. While
we cannot be tied to the wishes or judgment of the
international community, we cannot ignore the very important
support it has to offer.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the most difficult
challenge will be that of Governor Ridge and homeland security.
My prior experience as the commander of U.S. forces in Latin
America reinforces how vulnerable we are to asymmetrical
threats. While missile defense is important and should be
pursued, a more daunting challenge is to develop a long-range
strategy for the protection of our people here at home. We are
vulnerable.
We need to better organize the 40 agencies involved in
homeland defense, particularly on our borders, which are
extremely porous. If the narcotraffickers can smuggle 200
metric tons of a chemical called cocaine through our borders
every year, what other chemicals can be brought into our
country? Make no mistake about it, Mr. Chairman. There is a
direct link between the narcotraffickers and al-Qaeda, not just
in Afghanistan but also in South America.
I would also urge that the U.S. military play a key role in
homeland defense and I support the idea of a homeland defense
commander in chief or CINC. Intelligence collection and sharing
is the key to success. We need to ensure there is effective
coordination between our military, intelligence, law
enforcement, customs, and immigration agencies. The military
can help in that effort.
In my view it is very important: Law enforcement is in the
lead, the military is in support. The military should serve as
the operations coordinator, not as the operational commander
for homeland defense.
Mr. Chairman, these are the points I wanted to make. I am
prepared to elaborate on those in the question period. In
conclusion, let me say the terrorists who carried out the
attacks of 11 September greatly miscalculated the resolve and
resourcefulness of the American people. I can attest to the
quality of our troops and their ability to carry out any
mission assigned and I can assure you that those who died on 11
September did not die in vain. But I truly believe it is a time
for hope, not despair, optimism, not pessimism; and with the
help of this committee and the resolve of the American people,
we will prevail. Mr. Chairman, failure is not an option.
Thank you again for inviting me here today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, a very powerful
statement.
Our next witness is a man for whom I have great respect. He
is a serious intellect and he has persuasive advocacy that
sometimes I wish was not so persuasive. I liked him better in
1976 when he was a Democrat. I still like him personally, but I
have said--and I will probably get in trouble with my
colleagues for saying this--almost all the intellectual ferment
in the political spectrum in the last 20 years has been on the
right as opposed to the left.
But I am happy that he is here. I know he takes--anyone who
knows and takes American politics seriously knows of Bill
Kristol, and we are delighted to have you here, Bill, and the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM KRISTOL, EDITOR, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,
AND CHAIRMAN, PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY, McLEAN, VA
Mr. Kristol. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms,
Senator Allen. You have my prepared statement, so let me
summarize it and elaborate on one or two points.
The Chairman. Take your time. Do not short-circuit anything
in the interest of time here. We are anxious to hear what you
have to say.
Mr. Kristol. Thank you.
The question you posed to me was what is next in the war on
terrorism. Obviously, what is next in the short term is
finishing the war in Afghanistan, engaging in nation-building
in Afghanistan as we are doing, appropriately I think, trying
to secure Pakistan, and then moving on to do, as we are now
already doing in the Philippines, to roll up the al-Qaeda
network around the world.
I think this phase one of the war, though it is a difficult
phase to execute, requiring adept use of intelligence
resources, diplomacy, military assets, is not particularly
controversial in terms of U.S. goals. I think there is huge
bipartisan and popular support for that, and I will not dwell
on it. I think it looks unlikely that it will require major
military assets, at least major commitment of troops, though
obviously there will be Special Forces and others and trainers
and others supporting friendly governments and using some of
our own forces as need be. But it seems to me this phase one of
the war, which will now expand, obviously, into the Philippines
and presumably into other countries as well, perhaps Somalia,
is--we are in that phase. As I say, I do not think there is any
great--there will be controversy, I am sure, about tactics and
details, but I do not think there is any controversy that we
need to roll up the al-Qaeda network and convince states that
have provided safe havens either willingly or sort of
inadvertently to aspects of that network and allies of that
network that they should stop doing so.
So the real question I think is what is next in the sense
of what is next in phase two of the war. I think what is next
is Iraq. I am not simply saying that because I think that
should be phase two, but I think it will be. I think that is
the implication of the President's State of the Union speech
last week and really the implication of the logic of the war as
the President understands this war.
It seems to me that the President sees the threat of the
nexus of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and hostile
dictatorships, those three things coming together--terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, and hostile anti-American
dictatorships--differently from the way our European allies see
that threat. I was just at the Werkunde conference in Munich
this weekend with several of your colleagues, Mr. Chairman, and
I think we were all struck by how differently the Europeans see
the situation we are in.
I think this President sees the threat differently from the
way his predecessor or even his predecessor's predecessor, his
father, might have seen it. This President understands the
challenge of September 11 to require, I think, that he build a
new world or a new world order, to use a phrase that was
perhaps unjustly mocked when it was used in the first Bush
administration.
This President, it seems to me, does not simply aim to
restore the status quo ante. He does not think, well, let us
mop up the al-Qaeda network, punish the people who inflicted
this terrible damage on us, try to prevent them from inflicting
further damage, but then the world of September 10 is basically
what we go back to.
What struck me most about being in Europe is that that is,
I think, the mainstream European view of where we are: We were
attacked, we are entitled to respond, we should obviously do
our best to rip up the terrorists, but basically the world has
not changed and basically we are going to go back to the way
things were on September 10 and the way things were in 1999 and
2000 and 2001 and the same policies more or less would and
should stay in place vis-a-vis Iraq and Iran and North Korea
and other parts of the world.
I think the meaning of the President's State of the Union
speech last week was that he does not agree with that
assessment of where we are and where we should be, where we
should go. His analysis of the threat posed by the nexus of
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and hostile
dictatorships post-September 11 leads him to a different place.
This is a legitimate intellectual debate and political
debate, and I very much agree with Sandy Berger that it is an
important debate for all of us to have in a serious and
bipartisan way. It is good, I think that your committee, Mr.
Chairman, is having these hearings for that reason. It is not
necessarily unreasonable to say that we cannot really reshape
the world order, we simply have to manage these threats that
exist, that after all the nineties was not a terrible decade,
getting back to that status quo, certainly there would be worse
things than that, that we are not going to be able to change
the Middle East, we are not going to be able to change
fundamentally the character of the regimes that exist even in
Southeast Asia, that all we can do is keep Saddam in his box,
hope for hopeful developments in Iran, contain North Korea and
engage in arms control efforts, and try to find further agreed
frameworks, and that this is basically where we will end up 6
months or a year or 2 years from now when we basically have
taken care of this particular problem, the al-Qaeda terrorist
network.
Now, as I say, I do not believe the President has this view
that this is where we should go, that we can really afford to
take such a limited view of our war, of our war aims. It seems
to me that since September 11 the President has been
increasingly clear and detailed in laying out what he views as
a necessary and fundamental shift in policy and strategy. In
the State of the Union he really articulated this pretty
clearly.
The war, he said, has two great objectives, I think a
striking statement. The first objective obviously is defeating
terrorism and in particular the al-Qaeda network. The second
objective, he said--and I do think this was the most
significant declaration by an American President perhaps in 2
decades--was that, as he said, ``The United States of America
will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten
us with the world's most destructive weapons.''
That seems to me to imply an unequivocal rejection of the
international status quo, or at least where that status quo
uninterrupted by dramatic American efforts, is going, because
the fact is several of the world's most dangerous regimes are
developing the world's most destructive weapons and are
perfectly happy to threaten us with those weapons, certainly
our friends and our allies, and absent decisive intervention by
the United States there is no reason to think that they will
voluntarily cease that sort of development.
President Bush singled out, obviously, three regimes--North
Korea, Iran, and Iraq--as an ``axis of evil that poses a grave
and growing danger''--again a startling statement. One could
have argued a year or two ago, one could argue today, that the
dangers posed by those regimes, while serious, are not growing.
But the President believes the danger is growing. The President
believes that the peril draws closer and closer. The President
believes that time is not on our side.
Now, those are all legitimate statements to debate, but
they need to be debated. He has articulated his view. If you
believe that the danger is growing, if you believe that time is
not on our side, then I think one is led to the conclusion that
the President has come to, that we need to be willing to act,
if necessary preemptively and unilaterally, and that this is a
matter of American self-defense, not merely of American self-
defense which we think will also produce a safer and more just
world, but it is first and foremost a matter of American self-
defense, and we cannot rule out preemption, we cannot rule out
unilateral action, if that is necessary.
The Bush doctrine seeks to eliminate dictatorial regimes
developing these weapons of mass destruction, especially such
regimes that have a link to terror, and they all happen to do
so. So there is an almost perfect correlation between terror-
sponsoring regimes and regimes developing weapons of mass
destruction. The President makes clear that in fact rogue
regimes developing weapons of mass destruction in and of
themselves is a sufficient threat to warrant U.S. action,
whether diplomatic, political, or ultimately military.
The President does also lay out a positive vision based on
true and unchanging American principles which we will advance
in the world. One of the more startling sentences in the
speech, which I think received insufficient attention, the
President said: ``America will take the side of brave men and
women who advocate these values around the world, the values of
liberty and justice, including the Islamic world,'' which I
think is a commendable statement by the President.
For too long, this country and our allies--this has been a
bipartisan problem--have assumed that certain parts of the
world somehow are not interested in freedom or democracy or are
not ready for freedom or democracy or do not deserve perhaps
freedom and democracy. It seems to me the President overturned
an awful lot of American policy when he said that we will be
advancing these principles around the world, including in the
Islamic world.
The President said this was the only way to build a just
and peaceful world beyond the war on terror. This is, I think,
a strategic imperative, therefore, as well as a morally
desirable situation.
These words I do think augur a fundamental departure from
the U.S. policies of the past decade, both from a certain kind
of pseudo-sophisticated realism of the first Bush
administration and from a somewhat evasive multilateralism of
the Clinton years. The Bush doctrine I think is a shift, it is
a shift in U.S. foreign policy. It is a shift prompted by
September 11, but it is a shift that goes beyond the direct
response to September 11. As I say, it is therefore very
legitimate and important, I think, to debate it openly and
seriously.
What was distressing, frankly, at the Werkunde, the annual
security conference in Munich, that there did not seem to be
much interest in debating this with Deputy Defense Secretary
Wolfowitz or Senator McCain or Senator Lieberman or the other
members of the U.S. delegation. There was more interest on the
part of the Europeans in simply deriding it as if the President
was simply throwing around slogans or inventing enemies for us
to oppose.
But in fact he seems to me to have thought through the kind
of world he thinks we need to try to build over the next 5 or
10 years or more. As I say, it is a legitimate topic for
debate, but it certainly is not fair to say, I do not think,
that he and his administration are simply trying to settle old
scores, or using the war on terror as an excuse to buildup U.S.
power and marginalize the allies, or the kinds of things that
were said, unfortunately, at this particular conference in
Munich.
In this broader war on the nexus of terrorism, weapons of
mass destruction, and hostile dictatorial regimes, there is no
question that the Middle East is the central front in the war.
It is now, I think, the foremost problem area for U.S. foreign
policy, which incidentally is something new, I think, in the
last half century. The Middle East has always been, I think, a
difficult part of the world for us, and for the people there
unfortunately. It has not been really the heart of our
strategic concerns.
Certainly Europe was, Asia was during the wars in Korea and
Vietnam. But now the Middle East is the region of the world
that poses the greatest threat to the United States and
certainly to our friends and our allies. It is the most
unstable part of the world, the part of the world that
unfortunately has been least amenable to movement toward
freedom and democracy. It is today's challenge.
And at the heart of that challenge are the two regimes in
Iraq and Iran. North Korea plays a role clearly in
disseminating weapons of mass destruction or at least the means
to deliver them and in that respect is, I think, an appropriate
third, junior member of the axis. It also creates problems,
obviously, in Asia that are worth thinking about seriously in
their own right. But the Middle East is the center of the issue
and Iraq and Iran are key to addressing the problem in the
Middle East. This is not to say that other nations do not raise
very serious issues as well, both issues of terrorism and
issues of whether the regimes there are over the long term
stable and friendly to U.S. interests. But Iraq and Iran I
think are key.
As my friend Charles Krauthammer wrote in the Washington
Post last week: The good news about Iran is that you clearly do
have opposition to the regime. There is something of ``a
revolution from below'' going on there. The question for us is
how we can accelerate that revolution. One answer is ``by the
power of example and overthrowing neighboring radical regimes''
would, I think, show the people of Iran, it would inspire the
people of Iran, ``show the fragility of dictatorship,'' show
that dictatorship is not the inevitable way in the Middle East
or in the Arab world. It would ``challenge the mullahs' mandate
from heaven and encourage disaffected Iranians to rise.'' As
Krauthammer points out: ``First Afghanistan to the East, next
Iraq to the West, and then Iran.'' I think that is a reasonable
strategic template, stipulating always the uncertainties of war
and that one has to be ready for anything in this broad war on
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
I will not elaborate the problems we have with Iraq. Sandy
Berger certainly referred to them and there seems to be a
bipartisan consensus that regime change is desirable with
respect to Iraq. The question is how to do it. Obviously, there
are risks in trying and now moving to do it through military
action. There are risks in not moving to do it through military
action.
We need to have a serious debate about that. I am pretty
convinced that military action is now both necessary and poses
less in the way of risks than sitting by and hoping for a coup
or hoping that somehow U.N. inspectors could not just get back
in, but magically actually have the right to inspect in such a
way that we could have confidence that Saddam was not
developing weapons of mass destruction.
I think the President has decided, though, that a simple
policy of containing and deterring Saddam, of keeping him
allegedly in the box he has been in or supposedly been in for
the last decade is no longer acceptable.
The risks of moving against Iraq are considerable, both the
direct military risks obviously, and no serious and responsible
Commander in Chief will do this without taking seriously those
risks. But there are also, of course, political risks--the
stability of the region, will Iraq stay together as a nation,
Saudi Arabian oil, Turkey. These are all familiar issues. I
tend to think they are more manageable than some other people
do, but that is something we can debate and discuss.
I think they are certainly more manageable if a military
action against Iraq is combined with and followed on with a
serious commitment to, let us call it, nation-building in Iraq,
which I think is absolutely necessary. We would need to leave
troops there for a while. We would need to buildup a decent
civil government there. We could help hold the country
together, reassure neighbors. Obviously, the military effort
would have to go hand in hand with a serious political,
diplomatic, economic effort, and I believe this administration
would do that once we commit to the military effort.
The one point I would make is that I think in all the
discussion of risks we have lost sight of some of the rewards
of a reasonably friendly, reasonably pro-Western government in
Iraq. It would really transform the Middle East. A friendly,
free, and oil-producing Iraq would leave Iran isolated. I think
Syria would be cowed. The Palestinians would, I think, be more
willing to negotiate seriously with Israel after this evidence
of American willingness to exert influence in the region. Saudi
Arabia would have much less leverage, if only because of Iraqi
oil production coming on line, with us and with Europe.
Removing Saddam Hussein and his henchmen from power would
be a genuine opportunity, I think, to transform the political
landscape of the Middle East. The rewards would be very great,
and I would also say the risks of failing to do this I think
are very great.
We are now at a crossroads. Before September 11, one could
have argued--I did not personally agree with this argument, but
one could have responsibly argued--that we can in effect kick
the can down the road, put off a decision, see what happens.
The threat did not seem imminent. I think after September 11,
after the attack on us, after the President has identified this
nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as
unacceptable to us, to not go ahead and achieve regime change
in Iraq and after that put pressure on Iran for serious regime
change could really be disastrous.
The degree of the loss of American credibility in the
region and the world, the degree to which it will seem that we
are willing to go change regimes when it is the Taliban and
they do not have anything in the way of an air force, let alone
weapons of mass destruction, but a serious larger nation that
has the potential to use weapons of mass destruction, that they
somehow are immune from our efforts, sending that message
around the world is obviously, I think, terrifying really in
terms of the implications others will draw, in terms of the
implications allies of ours will draw, in terms of the
potential for arms races and instability and a loss of
confidence in America and in American credibility. That
confidence is, as we all know, I think, the bulwark of a
stability and a reasonable order in so many regions of the
world.
So to leave Saddam there and to fail in a sense to achieve
the regime change that I think many people in both parties
think is so important there would have real consequences. Our
allies in the region who have stood with us--Israel, Turkey,
Pakistan now, the new Government in Afghanistan--would feel, I
think, a very lonely chill. Our allies in Europe, who might
enjoy for a month or two the fact that the United States
superpower had to retreat, would soon begin to worry about
their own prospects in a world in which terrorists and
terrorist states have acquired weapons of mass destruction, and
I think around the world we would see friends appeasing
adversaries. We would see dictators deciding that the way to be
secure against American attack is to acquire weapons of mass
destruction.
We would see neighboring nations deciding that the way they
could be secure is if they in turn acquire weapons of mass
destruction. This could happen not only in the Middle East. It
could easily happen, of course, in Asia, and you really do have
I think 5 or 10 years from now an extremely dangerous world.
So, we are at a crossroads. Either we secure the safer and
more stable and more just world that President Bush hopes to
secure or we are on a road toward a more dangerous and scary
world. We cannot really go back to the situation of September
10. I do not think we can find a stable balance of power with
the likes of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. We cannot afford any
more, as the President said, ``to wait on events while dangers
gather.''
Obviously, there are risks involved in carrying out the
President's strategic vision. But I very much believe that the
risks of not moving ahead to phase two and, if necessary, phase
three of this war on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction,
are greater.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kristol follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard;
Chairman, Project for the New American Century
Thank you, Chairman Biden, Senator Helms, and members of the
committee, for inviting me to testify before you today. You have asked
me to address the question, ``What's next in the war on terrorism?''
The short answer is that Iraq is next. I am not simply saying that
Iraq should be next--although I think it should be. I am rather drawing
a straightforward conclusion from President Bush's State of the Union
speech, and from the logic of the war itself. The president sees this
war differently from our European allies and differently, I think, from
the way his predecessor or even his father might have seen it. The
president has chosen to build a new world, not to rebuild the old one
that existed before September 11, 2001. And after uprooting al Qaeda
from Afghanistan, removing Saddam Hussein from power is the key step to
building a freer, safer, more peaceful future.
To explain my answer, let me address the basic questions about the
nature of the war. Have the events of September 11 fundamentally
changed the world? Is our aim to restore the status quo through limited
actions or is it a broader attempt to reshape the Middle East and the
other breeding grounds of terror? And how and when should we deal with
our enemies who possess or will soon possess weapons of mass
destruction?
Reviving the status quo would mean that we would be satisfied at
having deposed the Taliban, and at having dealt with Osama bin Laden--
presuming we eventually find him--and having crippled his al Qaeda
network. We would not overly concern ourselves with who's in power in
Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or in Central and South Asia. We would
continue to try to keep Saddam Hussein ``in his box'' and similarly to
contain Iran. We would return to the old Israeli-Palestinian ``peace
process.'' We would regard North Korea not as a Stalinist state
organized for war but as an arms control problem amenable to an
``agreed framework.''
This has been the ``post-Cold War status quo.'' It has been a
period of unprecedented great-power peace. The great international
questions of the 19th and 20th centuries, of Napoleonic France,
imperial Britain and Japan, the Kaiser and Hitler's Germany, of Tsarist
Russia and the Soviet Union, have all been largely settled. Indeed, the
only real unresolved great-power issue is that of China.
Yet this has also been a violent time, especially in the region
from the Balkans through the Middle East to Southwest and Central Asia.
Even before the final collapse of the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait. Though his army was defeated and driven back to
Baghdad, the failure to remove the Iraqi tyrant left a problematic
legacy.
Since then, the pace of major terrorist attacks--now directly aimed
at America--has increased, as Norman Podhoretz has chronicled in the
most recent issue of ``Commentary'' magazine. The initial attempt to
bring down the World Trade Center was in February 1993; two months
later, Saddam tried to assassinate President Bush when he visited
Kuwait. In June 1996, nineteen U.S. airmen were killed and 240 wounded
in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. On August 7, 1998, the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously attacked,
killing 12 Americans and more than 200 Africans. On October 12, 2000,
the USS Cole was struck while docked for refueling in Yemen, killing 17
sailors and wounding 39. And during the past decade, there have been
dozens, if not hundreds, of smaller attacks--as well as untold numbers
of foiled, failed or postponed assaults.
Despite these escalating costs, American policy has implicitly
considered the costs of significant U.S. action against terrorists as
higher still. As Podhoretz points out, this is a tradition that began
during the Cold War. But it has persisted through the Soviet Union's
final days and through the Clinton Administration. Even as terrorists
and rogue regimes lost their superpower sponsor, they learned there
would be few consequences from attacking America. President Clinton's
policy was, as his first CIA director James Woolsey has said, ``Do
something to show you're concerned. Launch a few missiles into the
desert, bop them on the head, arrest a few people. But just keep
kicking the ball down the field.'' Maintain the status quo.
Is that the goal of this war?
No. Since September 11, President Bush has been clear--and
increasingly detailed and articulate--that there has been a fundamental
shift in U.S. policy and strategy. On the evening of the attacks, he
vowed to bring to justice ``those who are behind these evil acts.'' Yet
by September 20, when he addressed a joint session of Congress, he had
determined that we were at war not only with a group of terrorists
directly responsible for the attacks but with ``every terrorist group
of global reach'' and with the ``nations that provide safe haven to
terrorism,'' as well.
Over the past few months, the president's views of ``our mission
and our moment'' have progressed further still. On November 6, he
assured the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism that the United
States would wage war on terror ``until we're rid of it.'' He also saw
the potential threat of terrorists armed with chemical, biological,
radiological or even nuclear weapons: ``We will not wait for the
authors of mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruction.'' And
shortly afterward, the president shifted his emphasis from terrorist
groups to terror-loving states: ``If you develop weapons of mass
destruction [with which] you want to terrorize the world, you'll be
held accountable.''
The State of the Union address marked the maturation of the Bush
Doctrine. This war, according to the president, has ``two great
objectives.'' The first is defeating terrorism. The second objective,
marking the most significant declaration by an American president in
almost 20 years, is an unequivocal rejection of the international
status quo. ``The United States of America,'' said President Bush,
``will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us
with the world's most destructive weapons.''
And President Bush singled out three regimes, North Korea, Iran and
Iraq, as enemies; they constitute an ``axis of evil'' that poses ``a
grave and growing danger.'' Nor will he ``stand by, as peril draws
closer and closer.'' Time, he said, ``is not on our side.'' The
president is thus willing to act preemptively and, if need be,
unilaterally. This is a matter of American self-defense.
The Bush Doctrine seeks to eliminate these weapons and the
dictatorial regimes that would use them. The president also seeks to
challenge tyranny in general. ``No nation is exempt,'' the president
said, from the ``true and unchanging'' American principles of liberty
and justice. Moreover, our role with respect to those principles will
not be passive. According to the president, ``America will take the
side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world,
including the Islamic world,'' and will do so because it is the only
lasting way to build ``a just and peaceful world beyond the war on
terror.'' This is now a strategic imperative as much as a moral one.
The president's words augur a fundamental departure from the U.S.
policies of the past decade, from the pseudo-sophisticated ``realism''
of the first Bush Administration or the evasive ``multilateralism'' of
the Clinton years. The Bush Doctrine rests on a revived commitment to
the principles of liberal democracy and the restoration of American
military power.
If the president has defined a new goal--or reminded us of what
Americans have always regarded as our true purpose in the world--how do
we get there? The president and his lieutenants have suggested answers
to what the next steps should be.
Since September 11, we have all understood that this will be a
large and long war. Already it is being waged on a variety of fronts.
The campaign in Afghanistan is far from complete. The Taliban has been
routed, al Qaeda's safe haven destroyed. But while bin Laden is on the
run, he is still on the loose. The initial battles have been
successful, but true victory in Afghanistan will be measured in the
long-term effort to create a viable and stable state that protects
individual liberties and promotes justice. Nor can victory in
Afghanistan be ensured without securing Pakistan.
The campaign against al Qaeda now is taking American soldiers into
Southeast Asia. More than 600 troops have been deployed to the
Philippines to help the government of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in its
war against the Abu Sayyaf group of Muslim extremists. Singapore and
Malaysia both have arrested terrorists with al Qaeda connections and
the Bush Administration is stepping up pressure on the Indonesian
government to do the same. The trail is also likely to lead into
Somalia and elsewhere in Africa.
The presence of North Korea in President Bush's ``axis of evil''
underscores his larger view of this war. The administration previously
has taken somewhat contradictory stands on North Korea, first
suggesting it would overturn the Clinton Administration's policy and
then to maintain it. North Korea may be impoverished and isolated, but
it is extremely dangerous. American policy must be to change the North
Korean regime, not simply to contain it and coexist with it.
The president also makes it clear that he regards the Middle East
as occupying the central front in this war, and that the problem is
political, not religious. What links Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein,
and the mullahs in Tehran is a common hatred of America and a desire to
drive America out of the region. President Bush wishes to promote the
principles of liberty and justice especially in the Islamic world.
The principal obstacles to that goal are the regimes in Iran and
Iraq. Ever since the revolt against the shah, experts have been arguing
that eventually shared interests would create a rapprochement between
Washington and Tehran. ``Openings'' to Iran are like the first blooms
of spring. But they are just as ephemeral. Iran's offer to rescue
American aviators hit in Afghanistan has been more than offset by the
discovery of its arms shipments to the Palestinian Authority. The
character of this Iranian regime is obvious, and implacable.
But, as Charles Krauthammer wrote in the ``Washington Post'' last
Friday, the good news is that Iran ``is in the grips of a revolution
from below. We can best accelerate that revolution by the power of
example and success. Overthrowing neighboring radical regimes shows the
fragility of dictatorship, challenges the mullahs' mandate from heaven
and thus encourages disaffected Iranians to the rise. First,
Afghanistan to the east. Next, Iraq to the west.''
This summarizes the strategic implication of President Bush's war
aims. We may never definitely know, for example, whether Saddam had a
hand in the events of September 11; the relationship between Mohamed
Atta and Iraqi intelligence may be lost in the mists of Prague. But
Iraqi involvement would come as no surprise. After all, Saddam Hussein
has remained at war with the United States since 1991. Every day, his
air defenses target U.S. and British aircraft enforcing the no-fly
zones over northern and southern Iraq. He flouts the UN resolutions
agreed to following the Gulf War. And we know that Iraqi-sponsored
terrorists have tried to kill an American president and Saddam's agents
were likely involved in the effort to bring down the World Trade Center
in 1993.
And Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction have
ruled out a return to the status quo strategy of containment. President
Bush has asked himself how this man will behave once he acquires these
weapons. The delicate game of nuclear deterrence, played with Saddam
Hussein, is an unacceptable risk.
A military campaign against Iraq is also something we know how to
do. Other than the Euphrates River and Saddam's palace guard, nothing
stood between the U.S. VII Corps and Baghdad in March 1991; the Army
even developed a plan for encircling and reducing the city in one move.
Despite the weakness of the sanctions regime over the past decade, and
Saddam's care and feeding of his army at the expense of the Iraqi
people, the Republican Guard is probably less formidable now than it
was then.
Moreover, as operations in Afghanistan show, the precision-strike
capabilities of U.S. forces have improved. While the Iraq campaign
would be far larger and would demand the immediate and rapid commitment
of substantial American ground troops--and though we should not
underestimate the lengths to which Saddam will go once he understands
that the goal is to remove him from power or kill him--the military
outcome is nearly certain.
The larger question with respect to Iraq, as with Afghanistan, is
what happens after the combat is concluded. The Iraqi opposition lacks
the military strength of the Afghan Northern Alliance; however, it
claims a political legitimacy that might even be greater. And, as in
Kabul but also as in the Kurdish and Shi'ite regions of Iraq in 1991,
American and alliance forces will be welcomed in Baghdad as liberators.
Indeed, reconstructing Iraq may prove to be a less difficult task than
the challenge of building a viable state in Afghanistan.
The political, strategic and moral rewards would also be even
greater. A friendly, free, and oil-producing Iraq would leave Iran
isolated and Syria cowed; the Palestinians more willing to negotiate
seriously with Israel; and Saudi Arabia with less leverage over
policymakers here and in Europe. Removing Saddam Hussein and his
henchmen from power presents a genuine opportunity--one President Bush
sees clearly--to transform the political landscape of the Middle East.
Conversely, the failure to seize this opportunity, to rise to the
larger mission in this war, would constitute a major defeat. The
president understands ``we can't stop short.'' But imagine if we did:
Saddam and the Iranian mullahs would be free to continue their struggle
for dominance in the Persian Gulf and to acquire world-threatening
weaponry. Our allies in the region who have truly stood with us--like
Israel, Turkey and now Pakistan and Hamid Karzai's nascent government
in Afghanistan--would feel a lonely chill. And our allies in Europe,
who may enjoy a moment's smugness at the defeat of the U.S.
``hyperpower,'' would soon begin to worry about their own prospects in
a world in which terrorists and terrorist states have acquired weapons
of mass destruction. Very shortly, for lack of confidence in America's
willingness to preserve and shape a global order, our friends would
start appeasing our adversaries, and our adversaries' ambitions would
grow even greater. Whether we want it or not, we are at a crossroads.
We can either take up the task the president has laid out before us, or
we can allow the development of a world that will soon grow far more
unstable and dangerous.
In short, even if we wished to, it is now impossible to recover the
world of September 10, or to find a stable balance of power with the
likes of Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Nor can we afford, as the
president said, to ``wait on events, while dangers gather.'' And while
there are risks involved in carrying out the president's strategic
vision, the risks in not doing so are all the greater.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, you and I have been around
this place exactly the same length of time. He was sworn in
maybe 2 minutes before I was in January 1973. I have heard a
lot of good panels, and some others, but I have to say to you
three gentlemen that I have never been more impressed with
three individuals who testified before this committee.
I was speaking to the chairman, and indicated that I think
we ought to give our colleagues an opportunity to have the text
of what you have said printed in a little booklet. We would
make it available to Members upon request so that they can mail
it as they wish to constituents who may desire to read what you
have said.
The Chairman. I would concur in that and we will do that. I
do think they are the three best statements I have heard, the
most thoughtful. I would suggest--we can work this out, Mr.
Chairman, but what I would like to do is bind them up in a
small book \1\ with a short preface as to the context and make
sure all 100 colleagues have it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The book is a Committee Print entitled, ``What's Next in the
War on Terrorism?'' S. Prt. 107-59, February 14, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Helms. Exactly.
The Chairman. The reason why I think that is not just that
they were good, but you are the first group of people with
differing views who have agreed on at least two overriding
principles. One is that debate is needed. On the Democratic
side of the agenda, there is half my party afraid to say
anything, to debate anything, for fear of being accused by the
half of the Republican Party saying you are not supporting my,
our President, who is popular now. My Democratic friends are
going to be mad at my saying that, but it is true. It is the
truth.
The second half of it is that there are those in the
Republican side of the equation who suggest that to debate is
to be disloyal right now. You all three have indicated that
this warrants a debate.
The second thing, overarching principle you all agree on,
is that this is seriously a pivotal moment in American history,
in American foreign policy. This is a big deal. This is not any
small--we are not talking tactic here. We are talking a debate
about a fundamental shift in American policy that may be able
to be arrived at in a bipartisan way, because the world has
changed. We have all said it has changed.
Toward that end, let me--and I say 10 minute rounds,
Bertie, if we could, since we have four of us here, and
hopefully we can keep you guys a little bit because we would
like very much to be able to ask you a bunch of questions. We
will not get to all of them.
But let me begin with--and assuming for the sake of
discussion I was correct about the two things you agree on, the
two broad points. Let me make a characterization and I am going
to be as absolutely honest and straightforward as I can. My
objective here, by the way, in these hearings, and I hope I
have demonstrated it so far, is I genuinely, genuinely want to
engage in the intellectual tussle of what we should or should
not be doing here.
I do not pretend to have the answers. I have some points of
view that I must tell you I have found myself rethinking as
time goes on. I would suggest that there has been a shift--and
this is a premise to my question--there has been a shift within
the Congress after September 11--it did not always break down
on party, either, I might add--about what America's role in the
world was after the Berlin Wall came down.
There emerged in my view--and this is a vast
oversimplification in the interest of time, though--as we say
in my family when you are putting forward a proposition you are
not absolutely positive of, you say: I get a ``Get Out of Jail
Free'' card on this one. I want a ``Get Out of Jail Free'' card
on this. I am not trying to label anybody, but I am just trying
to give a context in which I think--how things have changed
from one politician's point of view.
I recall as I was asking for your help, General Joulwan,
and you always gave it, and as I was going down and talking to
Sandy, and we tended to agree most of the time, and as I was
imploring my friends like John McCain and others on the other
side of the aisle for us to get involved in the Balkans. I felt
very strongly that was important and for a while I was probably
up here the only voice literally, even before Bob Dole or
anybody else.
It made me wonder whether or not I might be wrong. If I am
the only one saying this, I must be wrong. As time went on, we
found two things developed. In my party, some of the remnants
of my generation, of the Vietnam generation, were so concerned
about getting involved anywhere in anything that they were very
reluctant to deal with this. On the Republican side of the
equation, there was sort of the isolationism at the beginning
of the century was rearing its head, that that was not our
role, our responsibility, all we had to do was----
So we went through a period. I can remember discussions
with you, Sandy, where you would say to me: OK, Joe, I agree
with you--or you were ahead of me on it. I was not suggesting
you were following me, but we would agree. And you would say:
But Joe, if the President does this the Congress is not going
to come with him, and then we are really going to look foolish,
not you the President, but the Nation.
I remember us being pilloried by many Republicans for
saying--thoughtful people--for saying we were violating the
sovereignty of Serbia by moving on Kosovo. Remember that
debate? Remember how many times we sat in your office and said:
Look, how do we deal with this? What happens if we do not get
the votes? We could not get the votes in the U.S. Senate or the
House of Representatives to use air power, air power, in
Bosnia--in Kosovo. We had been in this thing for 5 years.
Now, the reason I give you that background is I think we
have all sort of had an epiphany, left, right, and center, both
parties. September 11 comes along and now we are all saying
basically what you all three agreed in terms of the broad
principles: We not only have to worry about going after the al-
Qaedas, we have to worry about countries like the three that
were mentioned by the President and others that were not
mentioned by the President--Iraq, a lot of others.
But the thing they have in common, as you pointed out, one
of you or all of you pointed out, was they have dictatorships,
developing weapons of mass destruction, and they have engaged
in terrorist activities or support of terror in the past. A
serious problem, big deal.
So the President enunciates, Bill, a principle. You said he
articulated his view. With all due respect, I think what the
President has done is--and I have been impressed with him. I
mean this sincerely. I have only spent about 5\1/2\ hours with
him since September 11 either alone or with one or two other of
my colleagues and his staff in the Oval Office. I have been
impressed with his instincts. I have been impressed with his
instincts.
I think this is one of those cases where a man whose
instincts are right has enunciated a policy that has gotten out
ahead of his troops. Let me explain what I mean by that, and I
am going to finish this and let you all comment. One of the
things that I hear from thoughtful Europeans--and I do not know
how many there are these days because they are so upset--and
from thoughtful Democrats and Republicans is not if we go to
Iraq and take it out, but what is the President's vision for
Iraq, what is the Iraq he is looking for? Has he articulated
what that is, and how can he at the very moment--and I will not
mention names, Mr. Chairman.
You were necessarily not able to be there yesterday, but
Senator Allen was, up in S-407 talking about the situation in
Afghanistan. Several very senior, very pro-defense Democrats
and Republicans were saying: We have got to get out of
Afghanistan now, we got to get out of there, we got to get out
of there now, you cannot stay, do not make a commitment.
Now, that seems to me to be incredibly at odds, that
message, with the one the President sent when he said we will
not have any troops on the ground. I think he was dicing that a
little bit because I think he knows we are going to have troops
on the ground for at least 18 months or longer. But we cannot
be part of a multinational force.
So thoughtful people say, Bill: All right, you are going to
go in and take down Saddam, which I am all for. Now, does any
thoughtful person in the world think we can take down Saddam
Hussein and walk away? I do not know a single thoughtful voice
in the world that thinks that can be done without us staying in
Baghdad, staying in Iraq, staying there for--I do not mean
forever, but for at least the next several years.
Speaking of epiphanies, Bill, I met with the Iraqi
Liberation Force again that came to see me, Mr. Chalabi. I have
met with him many times and he brought in representatives of
each of the factions. They had a bit of an epiphany. You know
what they are asking me to do? Would I encourage the
administration to not only commit to them that they may have to
use air power and may have to use American forces, but will
they start to teach us now, train us. I thought they were going
to say to fight. No. Train us how to run a country, how to run
an oil industry, begin to train us right now and commit to us
that they will stay in Baghdad for the foreseeable future,
because, quite frankly, Senator Biden, we cannot do it.
So again, the point here is how do we, as General Joulwan
said, match our requirements with the resources and to
reconcile previously enunciated principles with these newly
enunciated principles that are at odds with themselves, coming
out of the same man's voice.
Now, the President suffers from and benefits from one
thing. It is one of his greatest strengths and all of our
strengths are also our weaknesses. His greatest strength is he
is straightforward and simplistic. His greatest weakness in
this area as he is viewed as straightforward and simplistic.
I do not mean, to make it clear to the press that is here,
I do not mean he is not a bright guy. But the criticism that
people level against us now at Werkunde and everywhere else,
Bill, is this simplistic notion. What did you hear Vedrine
saying today, which you might expect, Vedrine in the New York
Times saying? It is a simplistic plan, because there is no
enunciation, and there has been none even back channel at this
point, I have gotten confirmed by this administration, about
what this larger vision is, how are we going to do it, how are
we going to stay the course, are we committed, will we keep,
General Joulwan, will we keep two, three, four, five, ten,
20,000 Americans on the ground for the foreseeable future,
meaning the next 1, 3, 4, 5 years, when you have a President
saying, let us get the devil out of the Balkans, let us get the
devil out of Afghanistan now that we routed these guys?
So my question is this: Is there a way that you all, if we
left you to your own devices, locked you in a room, could you
guys come up with, do you think, because you all know one
another, do you think you could agree on not just broad
principles, but do you think there is a possibility that--I am
not going to ask you what it is--a possibility you could agree
on a way to do this that allayed the most dire fears of our
allies in the region and in Europe and at the same time allowed
us--nothing is without risk--allowed us a more reasonable
prospect of doing this, ``this'' meaning getting rid of Saddam
by whatever means, and still having the help of the rest of the
world in what will really be the hard job and that is
stabilizing Iraq?
Because, Bill, I agree with you, every one of the positive
things you said would flow, could flow and would flow if it
were stabilized, but if it were not I think it is a raw,
unmitigated disaster for U.S. interests.
At any rate, that is my question.
Senator Helms. Why do you not ask him to repeat it.
Mr. Berger. Mr. Chairman, let me respond in several ways.
First of all, I think all three of us are advocating active
American engagement in the world and believe that America has
to lead in this era. I think, however, that we should not--
there are some, I think, disagreements here. No. 1, I do not
think that we should underestimate the continued virulence of
al-Qaeda. There may not be controversy about it, but I think
that Director Tenet yesterday gave us in a sense the second
wakeup call that you ask for from the hotel receptionist.
He said that they are still there, they are still a threat,
they still have the capacity to reconstitute, they are
reconstituting. We have got to keep our focus on that. It may
not be controversial, but it is hard. To the extent that we now
in a very active way expand this war, I do think that it
deflects and diverts attention from something which I consider
to be a continuing clear and present and immediate threat to
the American people, No. 1.
No. 2, I agree with Bill that no one wants to go back to
the status quo ante, or at least I do not want to go back to
the status quo ante. History marches forward here. But we
should not underestimate the difficulties of doing Iraq, and we
can talk about those. I think we agree that the Afghan template
does not work particularly well in Iraq. Saddam Hussein is
stronger, the opposition is weaker. We are talking about
perhaps being largely by ourselves and therefore we are talking
about large numbers of American troops.
We have to look at whether we have the will to do that and
it seems to me we have not prepared the groundwork, not only in
terms of public opinion, but we have not prepared the
groundwork in terms of getting the focus back on Saddam
Hussein, not on Washington.
I thought the President was very smart about a month ago
when he said let us go back and talk about inspectors, not
because inspectors are going to find anything, but because
putting the focus back on inspectors puts the focus back on
weapons of mass destruction and on Saddam Hussein. Let us go to
the smart sanctions so we take out of his hand the martyr card.
Let us support the opposition, but not rely too heavily on
them. Let us operate to delegitimize Saddam.
There is, it seems to me, both a sequence to this as well
as a strategy here that takes account of the fact that this is
something of great difficulty and great risk, risk to regimes
in the area. We would like to do this, I would think, if we did
it, with support from others. We do not have that today.
So I guess I sum up by saying three things. No. 1, we
should not go back to the status quo ante; America has to lead.
No. 2, let us keep our eye on what is still a very dangerous
ball. That does not mean that we cannot do other things in the
world at the same time, but it means that this is not over with
al-Qaeda. No. 3, we need a strategy with respect to Iraq, not
simply a label.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General.
General Joulwan. Senator, I guess I have been around too
long. I remember when we got ready for Bosnia I got poked in
the chest and said: No American ground troops in Bosnia. That
is what I was told, but that is when I started preparing for
American ground troops in Bosnia. I did so after the 1994
shelling of Sarajevo and my assessment that UNPROFOR was not
capable of carrying out its mission. In my view political
decisions always come late and the military commander, if I can
use an old Pennsylvania term, ``has got to have cahungoes''
here to really give clear military advice before sometimes our
political masters think they need it. I did so in Bosnia. And
we need to do so on the war on terror.
The President's statement on the ``axis of evil'' allows
the military leadership to come back and say to our political
masters what are the resources required to do it.
Mr. Chairman, we have half the Army today that we had in
1990, half, and we are going to face in this ``axis of evil''
large tank threats. Half the Army, half the Navy, spare parts
and repair parts lacking in our Air Force. Clarity here of what
is going to be required, not that we should shy away from the
mission, but clarity of what is going to be required, matching
resources with requirements. We are much better off in some
respects. We have better sealift and airlift than we did 10
years ago. But we have to be clear in the military advice we
give to the President and the Secretary of Defense.
The best thing the President said in this war on terror, is
that all options are on the table. You remember on Kosovo we
did not say that. This President has said it. What does that
mean? Does that mean the III Corps down in Fort Hood gets
ready? You bet it does.
We have to understand that you are not just going to do
mission A, but if you need to you have another card to play. If
the bombing does not work to get rid of al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, then what do you do? You have to have the clarity
of mission. And our military leadership has to stand up and be
counted and say we may have to put the III Corps in if it is
going to take that to accomplish the mission. It is not over in
Afghanistan. If we want to include Iran, Iraq and North Korea
fine. But we need to give clear military advice. That is what
the Constitution says and that is what we swear to uphold.
Clarity is needed on what you want to do.
I would urge that as we look at what has to be done next
that the military voice be heard here, and it is very
difficult. I remember in Bosnia, trying to get access across
Austria, Hungary, and others--they are sovereign states--how to
get access to ports and airfields. Our allies can help us here,
and we have to consult not just inform. We can act
unilaterally, but we are much stronger acting together.
That includes Russia. I think we have a great opportunity
with Russia. The political debate is important, but the
military response to this is equally important, if not more
important. I would urge that take place. We have to be very,
very careful of what we commit to, given the resources that we
have. If bombing and Special Forces does not work, what is
next? We must think about that.
The Chairman. That is right. That is the point I was trying
to make about it is very important what the details of this
are, very important.
Bill, did you want to respond, and then I will yield to the
Senator.
Mr. Kristol. I think you commented that the President may
be out ahead a bit of his own administration and I think of the
political system in general, the Congress and our allies. I
think most good Presidents at key times do get out ahead. It is
the only way to jolt the system.
The Chairman. I was not being critical. I was just making
an observation.
Mr. Kristol. And I am agreeing. I think the Secretary of
State has done a very good job this week in his testimony of
filling in some of the details, and obviously the State
Department and the Defense Department are going to work now on
precisely what you correctly say needs to be done, which is to
go beyond the label of regime change or of confronting Saddam
and figuring out exactly how to do what the military assets
need to be and how quickly we can get them there and all the
diplomatic efforts that need to be engaged in.
On the other hand, to be fair to the President, I think he
has been about as specific as he can be. Imagine the reaction
among the French if the President had said: I have a very
specific vision for Iraq, here is how we are going to arrange
it. The INC is going to come in and control this part, we are
going to base military forces in the north----
The Chairman. That is not what I am talking about. But if
he just says that we guarantee that at the end of the day there
will be a united Iraq and America will in fact ensure that if
need be, which means that if a Kurdistan is attempted to be
established we will take on the Kurds, if it means that the
Shia decide that they are going to decide they are part of Iran
that we will see that--that is all I mean.
Mr. Kristol. Well, I think he has made it clear that we
prefer a united Iraq, but I would say this. Look, obviously
this needs to be debated and there will be increasing
specificity. On the other hand, one lesson of Afghanistan is it
is very hard to know ahead of time exactly. The commitment has
to be, as General Joulwan says, to be engaged and to keep your
options on the table and to work out those options in a serious
way.
Planning does not mean figuring out ahead of time exactly
how it is going to work out. I do not know a lot of people who
knew that Mr. Karzai was going to be the person to head
Afghanistan when we began this enterprise, but we were engaged
in a serious way, and I think we would have to be in Iraq and I
think we will be in Iraq.
I agree with the implications of your statement that there
is some leftover Republican and conservative doctrine, some
hostility to nation-building, some hostility to peacekeeping,
which I myself have never agreed with and I think the President
is gradually jettisoning. He might have jettisoned it a little
faster when approached by Mr. Karzai with the request for
participation in the peacekeeping forces. But the truth, is we
are engaged in Afghanistan in a major diplomatic and economic
way and I think that is appropriate. To the degree that there
was some sniping, some partisan sniping, at the Clinton
administration on the peacekeeping and nation-building efforts,
I think that is pre-September 11 and I think he has moved on
and I think probably most Republicans have moved on from that.
The final point I would make is just, is it better if we
have a united Iraq than a partly disunited Iraq? Sure. Is it
better if we can manage it incredibly smoothly than if it is a
messy chaos? Sure. I would still say that my own judgment is
that the disasters, as you called them, or the problems of even
a very messy situation post-Saddam in Iraq, with potential
decentralizing forces, with unrest in the Kurdish area, with
unrest in Saudi Arabia, is still less, the danger of that in my
view is still less than letting the status quo continue.
But again, that is a debate we should have: What is the up
side of going in and how dangerous exactly is the down side.
But I have debated this many times and people have these
cliches and we all use them, of course, ``the cure would be
worse than the disease.'' I really do not think that is the
case here. I think the current ``disease'' is sufficiently
grave that, even if Iraq is a mess and even if the region is
something of a mess, that I think is manageable by an engaged
and powerful United States, and I think the disease of letting
Saddam continue to develop weapons of mass destruction is worse
than almost any outcome resulting from removing Saddam from
power.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. I missed the meeting yesterday morning
because I had a little engagement with a doctor.
The Chairman. I knew that. That is why I said necessarily
absent. I did not want to mention it.
Senator Helms. It was one of the first meetings I have ever
missed. But I met with some of the Senators and a staff member
who were there. There apparently was a debate about
Afghanistan's request for military assistance, and what that
would mean for the United States and others. And the assumption
was that there was going to be a role for the U.S. military,
but not the role of the United States alone.
The President, I think has been very clear. He has said to
me in discussions that we will play a key role in rebuilding
Afghanistan, but we are not going to do it alone, and we cannot
do it alone.
But in any case, let me move on to something else. Mr.
Berger, there have been statements in the media and political
circles that the previous administration was presented an
opportunity to take bin Laden into custody and the offer was
declined. Do you feel comfortable commenting on that?
Mr. Berger. Yes. Not true.
Senator Helms. Not true.
Mr. Berger. I can elaborate, but that is the short answer.
Senator Helms. I thought that it must not be true or it
would not have been handled in a hushed manner.
I was a little troubled that the United States did not
strongly protest Syria's rotation onto the United Nations
Security Council last year. As a matter of fact, I was just
dumbfounded, and I feel it is ironic that the United States is
fighting terrorism and at the same time we are sitting next to
a terrorist state at the United Nations.
Now, the President of Syria promised the Secretary of State
that Syria's illegal trading partnership with Iraq would end,
notwithstanding that Syria is now the No. 1 illegal trader with
Iraq. Now, I wish you three gentlemen would tell me how you
think the United States ought to handle this matter involving
the Security Council of the United Nations? Mr. Berger, maybe
you want to go first.
Mr. Berger. Well, as you know, Senator, the Security
Council selects these rotating members on a regional basis and
it is often difficult to block what country the region
designates for the Security Council. I do not know whether this
administration sought to block that. But in general, I think we
have to continue to be concerned about Syria's support and
hosting of terrorist organizations.
I have not yet seen a great deal of evidence that the new
President Assad is prepared to change direction fundamentally
from his father. Although, I think there is some recognition
there that Syria is falling farther and farther behind in the
world and perhaps some opportunity to at least have some
economic activities with Syria. But I think they remain a
country that we have got to be very concerned about.
Senator Helms. General, do you have any opinion on this?
General Joulwan. It is really a political question,
Senator, but all I could say is I think we need to be very
careful with the United Nations on what they can and cannot do.
If we are ever going to get them involved in a peacekeeping
mission, if you want to call it that, like we saw in Bosnia and
elsewhere, then I think the United States has to get involved
in a leadership way to make sure they do it right.
We have not done that, and benign neglect is not going to
help us with the U.N. I think they need leadership. They need
to change their organization. But I think we need to assist and
help them do that. The U.N. has a role to play. If we do not
help them then I think they are going to go in a different
direction.
What we see with Syria is a case in point. We just have to
understand what are the limitations of the U.N. when you have
nearly 200 nations involved, but what is it that they can do
and what are we willing to provide the leadership for them to
do. If we are not willing to do nation-building or
peacekeeping, and the U.N. is going to do it then we have to
help them develop the tools and the resolve and the
organization to do it. I think that can be done.
Senator Helms. Mr. Kristol.
Mr. Kristol. I think it does suggest that one can be a good
multilateralist and be for working with allies, friends, or
other countries in the world and that that does not always mean
deferring to the U.N. or choosing the United Nations as the
instrument of multilateralism. Some of the most successful
peacekeeping and even nation-building efforts around the world
today are not in fact United Nations efforts, and I think that
is maybe not an accident. The fact that Syria is on the
Security Council suggests some of the problems with the United
Nations, though again there are times when it is obviously
useful to use that international body.
In terms of Syria, I do think it is the case, and this is
truly a bipartisan statement, that for the last 20 years
administrations of both parties and Congresses controlled by
both parties have put other items in our international agenda
pretty far ahead of terrorism as weightier items to deal with,
whether it is the Middle East peace process, whether it was
certainly in the eighties fighting the Soviet Union, whether
there were other issues in the nineties.
I do think that has changed now, again on a bipartisan
basis, after September 11 and that does I think change one's
attitude toward a nation like Syria, should change one's
attitude toward a nation like Syria and toward that nexus of
terror-friendly and terror-sponsoring states in the Middle
East. How one goes about, what order one addresses those states
in, what the interrelationships among them are, is complicated.
But basically I think the President's sense, and I very
much agree with this, is that whereas in the past there have
been fancy geopolitical arguments about going after one state
would strengthen another one and we have to have a balance of
power, I think in fact that going after terrorist sponsorship
against one state in the neighborhood will teach a lesson to
the other states in the neighborhood that the sponsorship of
terror is generally not a good business to be in.
I am for pushing on all fronts as much as you can, but I
think we need to get out of the mind set that somehow we can
create a sort of balance of power somehow among different
terror-sponsoring states. I think that really is--well, we see
what the consequence of that view is, I think.
Senator Helms. Let me address another subject, Mr.
Chairman, that bothers me. I hear so many statements indicating
that if, as, and when we get rid of Saddam Hussein, there will
be no one there to take over and run the country. I can
understand why people are reluctant to take a public stand. We
have people coming over here, and I know you have met with them
in your previous capacity. These people are not only gifted,
they are pleading for help in getting freedom for their
country. Yet they have to be so careful, because the slightest
bit of information and you will have a gun pointed in your ear
and the trigger pulled.
We all know the story of the member of Saddam's cabinet,
who gassed many of his own people, the Kurds, simply because he
did not agree with them. It is a matter of public record, at a
cabinet meeting--I call it that, I do not know what he calls
it--that one of Saddam's cabinet members who began to question
him was asked to step outside to discuss the disputed issue.
They stepped out in the hall, and he put a pistol to the guy's
head and blew his brains out. Now, this is the kind of fellow
who Saddam Hussein is. It is a matter of record. So, no wonder
they are careful about when they come over here. But, there are
plenty of fighters in Iraq who will stand up with the United
States and Great Britain and other countries, which I am
confident will help if, as, and when we can get rid of this
guy.
I see my time is up and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a very good hearing and I want to thank you also
for your testimony. I certainly share the concern of many of my
colleagues that we have to act decisively to limit the access
of terrorist organizations to weapons of mass destruction. But
I also think, and I am trying to in my role on the committee
emphasize that, we also have to act to address some of the less
obvious dangers posed by what you might call weak or failed
states around the world.
As we know, failed states and the criminal networks within
them can and have already provided a safe haven for terrorist
networks. I have the pleasure of being the chairman of the
African Affairs Subcommittee and one of the things I am doing
is to hold a series of hearings in the subcommittee over the
next few months to consider the manifestations and risks
involved in these failed states. We held one yesterday that I
felt was just very, very helpful on Somalia, which is one that
is very much on people's minds.
These situations include problems posed by piracy, illicit
air transport networks, trafficking in arms and drugs and gems
and people. Another example that I have encountered and have
visited last year, of course, is Sierra Leone and, having read
the accounts of what relationship those diamond fields may have
had to the financing of al-Qaeda is another example.
These are attributes that we find a lot in Africa, but
these are weaknesses that are encountered in other regions as
well. I think that we all agree that these pose a very real
threat to our national security.
But given your expertise, I would like each of you to
comment on how serious you think these situations are. How
would you compare these shadow threats to some of the more open
threats that we have been talking about, and what steps can we
take to begin to address these threats more consistently in
different regions? Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. Senator, I think you are absolutely right in
drawing attention to this. We have focused, for good reason, on
the military dimension of the war against al-Qaeda. That I will
say again has to be in my judgment getting al-Qaeda, destroying
it, ripping up that network. It is not done. It has to be
finished. That has to be our overriding focus.
But I said in my statement that there is a political
dimension to phase two as well as a military dimension. The
political dimension involves our diplomacy in the Middle East.
It involves our diplomacy in South Asia, and I believe,
Senator, that it involves not only exercising our power, but
exercising our moral authority so that the world understands
that our power is not only for self-protection, but also serves
a larger purpose.
Since this hearing began about an hour and a half ago, 500
people have died in Africa of AIDS. That is a problem that is
not simply a health problem, not simply a moral problem; it is
a problem of creating failed states which will, if we did not
even think about it as a moral and health problem but as a
security matter, will come back. We will reap that whirlwind.
So I think that we have to stay focused on the immediate
terrorist threat, but we have to recognize that our engagement
here in the world cannot only be manifest in terms of what we
destroy, but what we build, and that we have to be deeply
engaged in each of the problems that you have pointed out.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
General.
General Joulwan. Senator, beside my role as NATO Supreme
Allied Commander, as the U.S. commander in Europe I had great
responsibility for much of Africa and the Middle East as well
as Europe. Let me try to respond to your question on the weak
or failed states, particularly in Africa, in this way. One of
the challenges I gave my staff was how to make the military
which is the strongest organization in these countries part of
the solution, not the problem. How to engage in, in a way, not
nation-building, but security-building, how to engage in a way
with our troops that provide an example for the evolution we
want in the military of these nations.
I did so in Latin America to a great degree when I was
there, with I thought very good results. What we have done in
Europe with 46 nations now in the Partnership for Peace, with
the military to military contacts that have been--I think the
outcome has been very good. We have seen the military establish
the framework or the foundation on which political dialog could
take place.
I really think this to me, if we had the resources--and
again it is an issue of priorities, and Africa unfortunately is
on a lower priority than many other areas for our military--
that this military to military contact, not just training how
to fight, but also the proper role of the military in a
democratic political system.
So I would say that we need to try to figure out how to
engage across the spectrum, political, diplomatic, economic,
and military in these countries, but to make the military part
of the solution, not the problem.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that answer because it is
something I am very concerned about with regard to the African
countries, that it is an exciting prospect, but, just as on the
other subjects you are discussing, it is essential that there
is follow-through, not that we simply train or work military to
military, but that there is accountability for human rights and
a long-term commitment on our part to make sure that that
training is not used in a way that would be problematic. But
obviously your comments suggest a genuine commitment to that.
General Joulwan. Senator, if I could just add, you may be
interested and maybe you know, here at our National Defense
University we have a Center for African Studies that brings
particularly the military and other leaders back here and we
have this interchange. We have the center, the Marshall Center
in Garmish, that does this same thing. We have the Nimitz
Center. We have one now for the Near East and we have another
one for Latin America.
This is the positive side of engagement, and many civilians
are involved, not just the military. So I think, given your
interest, I think that this newly established center over here
at Fort McNair can be of great interest to you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
Mr. Kristol.
Mr. Kristol. It seems that these international terrorist
networks like al-Qaeda can find homes in two kinds of states:
either rogue regimes, which are sometimes strong states, I
guess you would say, but which are friendly to terror, or
obviously in failed states, which are so weak that they cannot
resist these organizations or cannot adequately police their
own land. Or in the case of Afghanistan you had sort of the
next twist on this, which is you had a failed state which then
the terrorist organization went in and basically took over and
created basically or supported a government there.
So I very much agree that it is important, it is in our
national interest. There are some places, obviously, where
there are limits of what we can do, other places we can do
more. It seems to me I think you are right to mention Somalia,
in this way. It has now become conventional wisdom that pulling
out as we did of Afghanistan so abruptly and completely, I
guess in 1989, was a mistake and we paid a horrible price for
that many years later.
One really needs to look back at Somalia, too, and ask the
same question, because obviously I think we were right to go in
in late 1992. Maybe the mission got a little confused and
overextended in 1993. I am not entirely convinced of that, but
we then suffered casualties in, was it, early October 1993 and
pulled out, not as quickly as people think in retrospect, but
we did pull out over the next several months and there was
bipartisan support for that, obviously.
But we paid a huge price for that. We should not kid
ourselves. Bin Laden personally was inspired by that, for one
thing. Rwanda followed from that, which was really the greatest
pure humanitarian, in numbers I think the greatest disaster of
the nineties. And God knows in general what message people
around the world took about America's willingness to intervene
and to take casualties around the world.
So I think you are absolutely right that one cannot sort of
take a part of the world and say, well, that does not matter,
it is not of strategic importance, we are not going to worry
about failed states there, because it turns out in this day and
age, even if that ever was legitimate, in this day and age
terrorist networks can find havens in those states and they can
attack us and our allies in different parts of the world.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that comment on Somalia. To
be candid with you, I supported our getting out of there
militarily, given the American people certainly had been not
prepared for what came to be known as the mission creep in that
situation. But what we were presented with rather starkly
yesterday at our hearing was we did not just pull out
militarily; apparently we severed almost any kind of contact
whatsoever with any aspect of Somalia at any part of our
government, is the way it was presented. Perhaps that is an
exaggeration.
But there is a distinction sometimes between the military
role, which sometimes is needed, sometimes is not, and then a
complete disengagement. So I think that is a helpful remark.
Mr. Berger.
Mr. Berger. I just remember, as I suspect Senator Biden
probably is the only one who was at the meeting at the White
House in October in which the President pleaded to stay in
Somalia, and we had very little support in that room. He said:
We cannot, because we have suffered casualties, leave. We have
got to learn from what went wrong, but it would send a terrible
message. There were very few folks in that room who thought we
should not leave immediately.
The Chairman. You are generous saying ``very few.'' You are
generous when you say ``very few.''
Mr. Berger. I am trying to be generous in all of my
dealings these days.
We had negotiated with the Congress for a 3-month phaseout,
and I think it was a mistake. But this is not just--let us go
back a little farther in history. In 1983, 243 marines were
killed in the second largest terrorist attack against the
United States, and what did we do? We did not bomb Lebanon, we
did not bomb Syria. We withdrew.
So I just want to broaden out here the span of time. We
have been engaged in many episodes, but I think that we in some
cases have been too quick to disengage.
The Chairman. Now is not the time to go back and talk about
who in my view. But some day the books will be written and
people will be surprised, who were at those meetings hollering
the loudest to get out.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing.
I want to thank all three of these gentlemen for their
insight. I have taken notes through it all and there is kind of
a thread of consistency in a mission statement here. Some of
the particulars may differ in some of the aspects. In Mr.
Berger's view, of course--and I think I agree with--all the
risks that we face here, we have to differentiate between
different nations. But also I see you agree very much with Mr.
Kristol that in the rebuilding we have to rebuild these
countries based on our values.
The general's comments again echo what the President says,
reinforces: This is going to be a long struggle, this is not
going to be something quick. The efforts of coordinating law
enforcement and the military, this is very important. Also,
making sure that we recognize while we are all coming up with
these mission statements, let us make sure that the military
can get this job done in safety for those in uniform. I think
some of us are admiring, as we always do, those who serve our
country in the military, and we think that with the new
technology, which is great and gives us a lot of advantages,
especially in the air and also in the seas, let us remember it
will be a different target this time and make sure we are
prepared in it.
Then through it all, we are talking about all these
borders. You think of Afghanistan, and in one of the earlier
hearings you had in this committee, Mr. Chairman, we said we
need a modern day George Mason or a modern day James Madison,
trying to get a confederation together in Afghanistan. That has
been done before. When the Central European countries became
free from the Soviets, they had to create their governments.
All of that when you start talking about borders gets into
a lot of military matters, because I suppose you have to say
you want the post-Saddam Iraq to be a single country the same
way. But you have to go back through history and wonder why do
they have borders like this, why is Afghanistan a country, that
not even logistically, by mountain ranges and geography and
differences of languages and religions and all sorts of ethnic
differences, and some of those go back to colonial days. But we
have to be considerate, obviously, of Turkey.
Now, when I read Bill Kristol--I read your comments before
you expressed them, Bill, and this is an absolutely
fantastically well-written, thoughtful, logical statement. It
is consistent with not only our quest for security, but also
for the expansion of the values of individual freedom.
Countries that have individual freedom do not have these
problems or these threats to our country. They may be
competitors economically. We may bicker with the European
countries, but nevertheless they are not a threat. They are
competitors, they have a slightly different point of view, but
that is fine, just like we have different points of view here.
Now, as we go forward in talking about Iraq, I almost
wonder is this really the place to do it, publicly, about here
is what we are going to want to do and it is going to be this
action after this action after this action. I wonder how much
credibility that gives us when we are trying to build allies
and they are saying, well, the United States wants to do this
anyway, and so all of these things that we are making or
stating are provocations for action, because the United States
does not usually act without provocation.
I think the President has tried to start building the case
for provocation and why we do need to act proactively, not just
sit back and wait until there is provocation.
But as we go forward with Iraq, which I think the President
laid out as well as with, not just Iraq, but Iran, Hezbollah
and other terrorist groups and those who sponsor them, there
are those who say that absent evidence of its involvement in
the September 11 terrorist attacks, we cannot be taking action
against them. Now, to me this is nothing but a red herring. The
President made clear that the war on terrorism is not about
revenge, it is about prevention.
Now, I think Saddam Hussein has figured out the President
Bush means business and he is serious and this country is
serious and behind him, and you see that from the reflection of
support from his speech, not just the State of the Union but
before, and the State of the Union put a finer touch on it. I
think Saddam is undoubtedly trying to buy time. Now he wants to
negotiate with the United Nations.
Now, I would like to ask all three of you gentlemen: Do we
want to negotiate again with Saddam Hussein or do you believe,
as a previous witness to this committee said, the former U.N.
weapons inspector, Richard Butler, told this committee that as
long as Saddam is in power he will seek weapons of mass
destruction? So how do we handle this latest ploy to buy time
by Saddam?
Mr. Berger. Let me start, Senator. I do not think
negotiations with Saddam are fruitful. Before Desert Fox, at
the last minute he invited the Secretary General to Baghdad for
negotiations. But I do think that we have to prepare the ground
here, and let me just expand on that for 1 minute. No. 1,
again, I will say again, I think we have to remember that we
have to tear up this al-Qaeda network and we cannot in my
judgment do things at this point that divert and deflect us
from that principal goal.
That said, it seems to me there are a number of steps here
with respect to Iraq. No. 1, put the focus back on Saddam
Hussein, not on Washington. I think the President was smart to
talk about inspectors and weapons of mass destruction, not
because I think that Saddam Hussein will allow inspectors back
in, but because it raises the question in the minds of the
world, what is he hiding.
No. 2, I think we ought to revise the sanctions, as
Secretary Powell has suggested so that they are tighter and
that he does not have the martyr card to play.
No. 3, I think we need to work with the external
opposition, such as the INC, and strengthen it, but I do not
think we should have an illusion that they are a panacea or
that they are the Northern Alliance, because they are not. This
is going to take, if we do this, it is going to take largely
American men and women.
I think that we ought to continue to delegitimize Saddam. I
think that there is no reason why he should be recognized as
the voice of Iraq. There was an ``indict Saddam'' campaign. I
am not sure exactly where it stands. But I think again we need
to try, in my judgment, to build acceptance from most nations
in the world and support from some and prepare the ground.
There is a covert action piece of this. Saddam is capable of
making mistakes, as he did when he was under pressure in 1991,
and I think we have to prepare the ground here. We have to have
a strategy. We have to take account of the potential
consequences--Scud missiles that are launched, what the impact
of this is on Turkey, what the impact of this is on Pakistan
and other countries in the region.
So I think the objective in my judgment is there, but I do
not see this, I suppose, on the same timetable necessarily as
perhaps my friend Mr. Kristol does.
Senator Allen. General.
General Joulwan. Senator, I think as we look at Iraq and
Saddam Hussein, I do not think we want to negotiate either. But
I would look at it from a little different angle since I was
responsible for Northern Watch, which was northern Iraq, during
my time in Europe. I think we have to say what has he learned
in the last 10 years about us? He has an integrated air
defense. I understand that the assessment may be he is not as
strong. I think we need a good analysis there. What lessons did
he learn from the gulf war, that he waited? What may he do now?
I think we need to look at all of that and I think we have
to understand that we may not want to negotiate with him. I
think we have to build the case, as has been mentioned, against
him and also try to build a coalition to try to help us. Bases
in Turkey are critical for this and I think Turkey needs to be
part of that solution. Access to ports, very important.
We need to give clarity to our military that has been
mentioned here several times. What are our goals? Do we think
we can do it with air and Special Forces again? Perhaps, but
the clarity I want here is, if that does not work, what other
cards do you have in your hand to play, and we need to
understand that. Do we occupy it? Do we occupy, as the chairman
mentioned, Baghdad? What does all that mean? We need to have
that debate and that clarity beforehand.
I would recommend that we use all tools in the toolkit--
economic, political, diplomatic, as well as military--in this
fight. I think all of those can be used very effectively and
blended into a coherent strategy. The important thing here is
keep the American people behind us by providing this
information on exactly what it is we want to do. There will be
covert operations, but I think much of it can be made public in
building this solid case for what we need to do next.
Mr. Kristol. Governor Allen, Senator Allen--I guess I still
think of you as Governor Allen, as a citizen of Virginia. I
think there is bipartisan agreement on not negotiating with
Saddam. The question, as a practical matter, will be: do we
feel we need to give him an ultimatum or use the U.N. Security
Council, and presumably the 6-month rollover of the sanctions
as an occasion, to give him an ultimatum for letting inspectors
back in? Do we do that through the Security Council or do we
simply do that with a few allies or unilaterally?
I think the danger of negotiations is not that any American
President or representative is going to negotiate with Saddam,
it is that we end up negotiating with our allies and with the
United Nations and that Saddam uses whatever splits there are
on the kinds of inspections that are appropriate and we end up
with a diplomatic mess of the sort that the Clinton
administration unfortunately had to deal with an awful lot, and
we could end up in the attempt to sort of be nicer to and more
considerate of other nations and the United Nations, could end
up producing more mess actually than a more straightforward, I
think, United States ultimatum of some sort or other.
The truth is from a real military point of view, of course,
there is a case for preemption and for not giving a whole lot
of notice to Saddam about when we are coming and how and when,
though getting so many troops in the area is going to make it
not a true preemption and not a true surprise. Still, I would
not want to--I do not think it would be appropriate--I would be
wary of doing what we did in the gulf war, which was a real in
effect telling him when we were coming. That is very dangerous.
Saddam has had a lot of time to plan for this and one thing any
prudent war-planner and the President obviously will have to
think through is all the things he could do over the next
months to cause death and destruction and chaos in the area.
Obviously, I am sure the President is discussing this today and
there are a lot of military and diplomatic and covert things
that will have to be done.
I do think we need to have a public debate, within the
appropriate limits of what can be made public, about all this.
I would say this that I think the President by, as the chairman
said, getting out a little ahead of perhaps his own
administration and the political debate in general, has now
forced this debate in a healthy way. My own personal view, for
example, is that, though some of my ``allies,'' if I can call
them that, who are hawkish on Saddam think it can be an
Afghanistan model, Special Forces and air power, I myself am a
little dubious about that and think you would at least as a
precaution have to be ready to go with serious ground troops.
You hear numbers like 200,000, presumably out of Kuwait and
Turkey in particular. That is the kind of thing that needs to
be hashed out within the Pentagon and the State Department,
above all in the NSC, but also to some degree in public. If the
President is going to send 200,000 troops over there, I assume
that at some point the Congress will have to----
The Chairman. A lot of Presidents do not assume that,
Democrat and Republican.
Mr. Kristol. Well, I think that the President will have to
come to Congress and get authorization to go ahead. That would
be a good thing. I was for that in the gulf war when I was in
the first Bush White House and there were others who were
against coming to Congress at all. I think it will be important
to have the country behind this effort.
So I do believe we could do it at the same time as we are
prosecuting the rest of the war against al-Qaeda. I take Sandy
Berger's point that--you know, I have been in government, too--
you tend to lose focus. You cannot do too many things at once.
On the other hand, I do think it would be a mistake to--I am
not saying this is Sandy Berger's view, but it would be a
mistake to think that you have to wait until you have mopped up
every al-Qaeda cell around the world or that there are not 600
Special Forces troops deployed somewhere in the Philippines,
Indonesia or Somalia before you could begin serious military
preparations for Iraq.
If time really is not on our side, I think Iraq is a matter
of months, let me put it that way, rather than years.
Mr. Berger. Senator, can I add just one thing very quickly?
Senator Allen. Sure.
Mr. Berger. I think that we have to be very clear about the
costs and consequences of doing this largely by ourselves. What
worries me a bit is that we have gone from what a friend of
mine described as a posture of ``together if possible, alone if
necessary as a country'' to ``alone if possible, together if
necessary.''
We proceed with a quarter of a million soldiers marching
into Baghdad by ourselves or largely by ourselves at a very
heavy price. I think that there is an awful lot of careful
thought, discussion, debate that needs to go into a decision of
that kind of magnitude.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, the time is not on our side. There
is no more time left on the vote. But go ahead.
Senator Allen. Thank you all for your comments. I do think
the President in his State of the Union laid out this mission
statement, and obviously one gives a State of the Union and it
is not dispositive of the issue. But it is the road map and the
principles and the theory and reasons where we are going to be
going forward.
I do think the Bush administration does want to work
together with others. I do not think they want to go on their
own. There is a practical reason for that as well, and that is
the debate on the nation-building and after the war has been
won what is going to be done, and how long are the U.S. troops
going to be staying in Afghanistan. There are certain things
the United States is preeminent on and that is air power, sea
power, military strength. As far as the nation-building and
having folks in there, keeping the combatants or factions
together, whether it is in Bosnia or whether it is in
Afghanistan, other countries, European countries, Japan and
others, are capable of doing that, and to have that support
long-term for the legitimacy of whatever government follows, it
is important I think to have other nations saying, this is a
just cause, a reasonable cause, this affects us, and we want to
be helpful. Then you get the logistics aspects as far as the
bases and airfields as well.
General Joulwan. One caution. You mention that an Iraq
option would require 200,000 to 250,000 troops. We have 10
divisions in the Army. That is the total. Probably we could
free about 150,000, at the max about 180,000. Thus you are
going to use every division in the Army for an Iraq option--and
that means the troops now in Afghanistan. Remember we have half
the force we had in 1990.
So I think we have to be clear here on what it is going to
take. That is what I meant earlier about clear military advice.
The Chairman. And we ain't even mentioned Korea yet.
General Joulwan. Right.
The Chairman. We have not even mentioned Korea.
General Joulwan. For 250,000 troops in an Iraq option means
we take them out of Korea.
The Chairman. Look, gentlemen, I really appreciate your
testimony. I wish we had more time. As you all three know, I am
going to take advantage of your advice as we go forward here.
But you know that old expression, big nations cannot bluff, and
I promise you--I have only been doing this 30 years and you
guys have been doing it in different ways than I have been
doing it, but the whole world is watching to see whether we
finish the job in Afghanistan and what kind of commitment we
are really willing to make. They will judge what we are likely
to be willing to do other places based on how well we finish
this one.
I thank you all. It was great testimony. I hope you do not
mind if we do publish it to our colleagues, and I would ask you
each individually to be willing to maybe, even in an informal
setting, get together with some of my Democrat and Republican
colleagues in an office and really hash some of this stuff out.
I was not talking about laying out operational plans for
going into Iraq. I was talking about the broader principles of
what is our vision of what the region should look like at the
end of the day, and that is a pretty important point I think.
Anyway, thank you all very, very much. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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