[Senate Hearing 107-408]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-408
THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN HOMELAND SECURITY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 25, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MAX CLELAND, Georgia BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
BILL NELSON, Florida WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
David S. Lyles, Staff Director
Les Brownlee, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Role of the Department of Defense in Homeland Security
october 25, 2001
Page
White, Hon. Thomas E., Secretary of the Army and Interim
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Homeland Security.... 6
Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff..... 8
Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander in Chief, United States
Space Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command......... 10
Kernan, Gen. William F., USA, Commander in Chief, United States
Joint Forces Command........................................... 12
(iii)
THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN HOMELAND SECURITY
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in room
SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Cleland,
Landrieu, Reed, Akaka, Carnahan, Dayton, Warner, Inhofe,
Santorum, Roberts, Allard, Hutchinson, Sessions, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff
director.
Majority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Jeremy L.
Hekhuis, professional staff member; Maren Leed, professional
staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee,
Republican staff director; Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff
director for the minority; Edward H. Edens IV, professional
staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member;
Gary M. Hall, professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna,
professional staff member; George W. Lauffer, professional
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
Joseph T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Cord A. Sterling,
professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, minority counsel;
and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Dara R. Alpert, Jennifer L.
Naccari, and Nicholas W. West.
Committee members' assistants present: Craig Bury,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to
Senator Cleland; Marshall A. Hevron and Jeffrey S. Wiener,
assistants to Senator Landrieu; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator
Akaka; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Neal
Orringer, assistant to Senator Carnahan; Brady King, assistant
to Senator Dayton; Wayne Glass, assistant to Senator Bingaman;
John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier
III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to
Senator Allard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions;
Kristine Fauser, assistant to Senator Collins; and Derek Mauer,
assistant to Senator Bunning.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good afternoon, everybody. The committee
meets today to receive testimony on the role of the Department
of Defense in homeland security.
The committee welcomes Thomas White, Secretary of the Army,
who has been designated by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld as the
Interim Executive Agent for Homeland Security. Welcome also
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace,
joined by our two military leaders with direct responsibility
for military contributions to homeland security, Gen. William
Kernan, Commander in Chief, Joint Forces Command, which
includes the Joint Task Force-Civil Support that coordinates
military assistance to civilian authorities in the event of a
major incident or attack on U.S. soil, and Commander in Chief,
U.S. Space Command, Gen. Ralph Eberhart, who joins us in his
capacity as Commander in Chief of NORAD, the North American
Aerospace Defense Command. We welcome both of you.
On behalf of the entire committee, let me welcome each of
you to the committee for a very important hearing. We had
planned to hold this hearing in the larger central hearing room
in the Hart Senate Office Building, but that building remains
closed because of anthrax contamination, so our very setting
today underscores the new threats facing the United States.
This committee has focused on these threats for several
years. In 1998, Senator Warner created with my support the
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, chaired first
by Senator Roberts and now by Senator Landrieu. At extensive
hearings, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee
has focused on improving the ability of the Armed Forces to
meet nontraditional threats including nonterrorism and
unconventional means of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
In fact, based partly on those hearings, a Combatting
Terrorism Initiative to improve the ability of U.S. forces to
deter and defend against terrorism was approved by this
committee in the National Defense Authorization Bill, which we
voted to approve prior to the horrific terrorist attacks of
September 11. We had acted in that way prior to September 11,
but the attacks on New York and Washington have prompted an
unprecedented military role in ensuring the security of the
United States and the American people.
The extraordinary has become the ordinary. In their State
capacity, National Guardsmen stand guard at airports throughout
the Nation. U.S. military aircraft, assisted by NATO AWACS
surveillance aircraft, routinely patrol American skies. U.S.
warships patrol our shores. These aircraft and warships are
prepared to carry out a once unthinkable mission, if approved
by the chain of command: to shoot down hijacked U.S. civilian
airliners that threaten Americans on the ground.
These are extraordinary responses to an extraordinary
threat, and they require a reexamination of the proper role of
the U.S. Armed Forces in helping to ensure the security of the
American people. That reexamination and reorganization has
already begun. On September 30, the Department of Defense
released its report on the Quadrennial Defense Review, which
elevated the mission of homeland defense to the Department's
``highest priority.''
On October 2, the Secretary of Defense designated Army
Secretary White as the Interim Department of Defense Executive
Agent for Homeland Security. On October 8, the President
designated Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the new Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security. On October 12, the
President designated Secretary White as the Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict.
The Commander in Chief of NORAD, General Eberhart, now
exercises operational control of military aircraft over the
United States, to include their mission of flying combat air
patrols over New York, Washington, and other cities. Under
General Kernan, the Joint Task Force-Civil Support stands ready
to coordinate military assistance to civilian authorities in
the event of a major incident or attack on U.S. soil.
Overarching all of these efforts is the Posse Comitatus Act
of 1878, a criminal statute that prescribes the limited
circumstances under which the United States Armed Forces can be
used to enforce the domestic law. That act states: ``Whoever,
except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or act of Congress, wilfully uses any part of
the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to
execute the laws, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 2 years, or both.'' It is because this act does
not apply to National Guardsmen in their State status that
guardsmen are now being employed at airports.
This new environment requires careful consideration of some
important questions by the committee. Among them are the
following:
What exactly is the definition of homeland security, and to
what extent should the Department of Defense be involved in
homeland security?
How does the Department of Defense relate to the Office of
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Tom
Ridge's new office?
Is the Department of Defense organized properly to deal
with the many aspects of homeland security? For instance, is
there a need for a new Commander in Chief, or CINC, for
homeland security to coordinate the various military
contributions to homeland security? If so, how would that
command interact with NORAD and the Joint Forces Command? Is it
appropriate for a Service Secretary to be in the chain of
command?
Should the Posse Comitatus Act be revised or repealed? If
so, do we want the Armed Forces enforcing the law, as would be
required in an insurrection? What impact would training our
Armed Forces to make arrests, seize property, and preserve
evidence have on their capabilities and readiness to accomplish
their warfighting mission?
Should every State have a weapons of mass destruction civil
support team, such as the 32 already authorized and 27 already
established, to assist civilian authorities in responding to an
incident or attack on U.S. soil involving weapons of mass
destruction?
While there has been a tendency in the past to use the
Armed Forces to support civilian authorities in such events, is
that still realistic, given the Armed Forces involvement in a
war that is likely to last for an extended period of time?
Secretary White, we know that you and your colleagues do
not have all the answers to all those and other questions yet.
We are only 6 weeks removed from the attacks of September 11.
We are 19 days into the military campaign against the Al Qaeda
terrorist network and their Taliban protectors. But in times of
national emergency, few questions are as important as the
proper role of the U.S. Armed Forces in defending the Nation
and the American people, especially if that mission takes them
not only overseas, but to the skies and to the streets of
America itself. We look forward to hearing the options that you
are now considering, or the decisions that you have already
made, to address this new and evolving mission.
Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, your
excellent opening statement embraced much of the text that I
have here, and so I will ask unanimous consent to put mine in
the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made a part of the record.
Senator Warner. There are several comments I would like to
make. I would like to read two sentences: ``The protection of
America itself will assume a high priority in a new century.
Once a strategic afterthought, homeland defense has become an
urgent duty.''
That was incorporated in a speech given by President Bush,
then Candidate Bush, at The Citadel University in South
Carolina in September 1999. We are fortunate that our President
had the presence of mind and the foresight to look into the
future to begin to prepare America for the exact task that is
before us.
Second, our committee, as my distinguished chairman
acknowledged, did establish a subcommittee some 3 years ago
when I was privileged to occupy that chair, but it was a joint
action by all Senators around this committee. We laid a solid
foundation in those several years, under Senator Roberts and
Senator Bingaman, and other members of that subcommittee. The
very teams you referred to, the civil defense teams, previously
known as Rapid Assessment Initial Detection (RAID) teams, were
an outgrowth of the work of the Department and that
subcommittee.
Much has to be done now, and it has been entrusted to you
gentlemen and your subordinates. I cannot recall, really in the
history of the United States, and I have been privileged to
live longer than just about everybody in this room, when a
greater challenge has been posed to a man or woman, whether
they be President, or an ordinary citizen, to meet this
challenge and keep America strong and going.
Earlier in this very room, the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, under the chairmanship of Senator
Landrieu, held a hearing with the former chairman of this
committee, Sam Nunn, on the potential threat of smallpox, a
disease that was eradicated when I was a young man. Yesterday
the chairman and I had the privilege of sitting with the
President of the United States, the Vice President, members of
his Cabinet, and several other Members of Congress as we worked
with the new Cabinet officer, Governor Ridge, who you referred
to.
I just mention those things so that those citizens
following this hearing should understand that there are no
politics in this battle, in this war we are waging, whether it
is in Afghanistan by the superb leadership of the men and women
of the Armed Forces or here at home. We are all in it together,
and we cannot allow our lives not to go forward because of our
children and future generations, and because so much of the
world depends upon the United States of America to remain
strong and free, and to lead in the cause of freedom.
You are here today to outline your initiatives with regard
to following through on the President's speech given 13 months
ago, and the foundations that the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense have laid down and charged you with. We
wish you well, gentlemen, and generations will look back
hopefully grateful to your contributions and those of your
subordinates.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important
hearing on the Defense Department's role in homeland security. I join
you in welcoming our witnesses today.
We meet today as our Nation remains under attack, and regrettably,
will remain under attack from terrorists who have used unimaginable
threats, and as our Armed Forces are engaged in operations against
those responsible for the September 11 attacks. Our thoughts and
prayers are with those who have suffered as a result of these
continuing attacks on our Nation, and with the men and women of the
Armed Forces who are in harm's way, defending our freedom.
I commend our President and members of his administration for the
actions they have taken to respond to the attacks of September 11. It
is important to note, however, that President Bush identified homeland
security as his highest priority long before the heinous attacks of
September 11. In speeches at The Citadel in September 1999 and at the
National Defense University in May 2001, President Bush called for a
primary emphasis on homeland security and the transformation of our
Armed Forces to be able to deter, detect, and defeat the very different
threats we face in the 21st century. I want to highlight a quote from
then-Governor Bush's Citadel speech of September 23, 1999:
``The protection of America itself will assume a high priority
in a new century. Once a strategic afterthought, homeland
defense has become an urgent duty.''
We have experienced a great tragedy in our Nation and a blow to our
sense of security and freedom. We do not know from where the next
challenge to our freedom, security and vital national interests will
come, but of one thing we can be sure--it will come, and we must be
ready to confront the full spectrum of threats the enemies of freedom
may direct toward our country.
I think it is critically important that we all recognize that we
must not focus only on this most recent terrorist attack. Our review of
homeland defense and homeland security must look at all aspects of our
Nation's vulnerability. Because of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction around the world, and the related proliferation of
ballistic missile technologies to deliver such weapons, we must include
ballistic missile defense in any concept of homeland security.
These recent attacks on our Nation show, with complete clarity,
that our adversaries will use any means they have at their disposal to
attack the United States and indiscriminately kill American citizens.
They have now killed thousands with hijacked airplanes. This form of
attack took the world by surprise. How will the terrorists, or any
other potential adversaries, strike next? We must be prepared.
I also raise another issue--a controversial issue--and would
welcome the thoughts of our witnesses. On October 11, I wrote to
Secretary Rumsfeld asking that he re-examine the long-standing Posse
Comitatus doctrine in light of the September 11 attacks. This
doctrine--which prohibits the involvement of the Armed Forces in
civilian law enforcement--has served America well since its adoption in
1878. But, in light of recent events and the unique capabilities that
the Armed Forces can bring to emergency situations, is it not time to
re-examine this doctrine?
I thank all of our witnesses for your extraordinary service to our
Nation, and for your testimony today. I cannot overstate the importance
and urgency of this subject we will discuss today--a collective effort
to understand the role of our defense structure in protecting our
homeland, as well as protecting our vital interests around the world.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Warner. I have never
seen a Nation more united than we are in the war against
terrorism. I have never seen Congress as united as they are in
this war. A huge burden has been placed on you, gentlemen, and
we know you are up to it, but we are there to support you in
every possible way that we can.
I want to just take 30 seconds for a scheduling note which
is important to all of us, because it is so difficult for us to
rearrange schedules.
Tomorrow morning we will meet in S-407 of the Capitol at
9:30 a.m. to receive an update briefing from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and JCS officials on the ongoing military
operations in Afghanistan. Staff attendance will again be
restricted because of the classification level.
This morning, at the conclusion of our conference meeting
with the House, Chairman Stump and I agreed that we would make
completing our conference our highest priority for next week.
Members of the committee therefore can expect full conference
meetings with the House throughout next week, starting on
Wednesday morning. We are going to have a back-to-back
conference on Wednesday, and then we will continue on Thursday,
hopefully finish on Thursday, if not Friday, and of course we
will get the exact details of our schedule to the members of
this committee as soon as possible.
Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, does that mean we are not
going to be doing the late Tuesday afternoon meeting we had
previously discussed?
Chairman Levin. That is correct.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Secretary White.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND
INTERIM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY
Secretary White. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner,
distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate this
opportunity to appear before you in my role as Interim
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Homeland Security,
along with my colleagues who you have already recognized:
General Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
General Eberhart, Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace
Defense Command; and General Kernan, Commander in Chief, U.S.
Forces Command.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a brief opening
statement on behalf of all of us, and then respond to any
questions the committee may have, if that is acceptable to you.
Before I begin, I would like to make one thing very clear.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review published last month
restores the defense of the United States as the Department's
primary mission. Put another way, homeland security is the
number 1 job for the United States military, and it has our
full attention. I would like to assure the members of the
committee and the American people that we will spare no effort
in our endeavor to protect this Nation from aggression.
The attacks of 11 September and since prove beyond doubt
that terrorism is a permanent part of our future. Our
traditional response to terrorism at the Department of Defense
level has been to organize around crisis management and
consequence management functions, with the former being an
activity managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, while the latter
is principally accommodated by the Director of Military Support
within the Department of the Army.
In my view, that construct no longer works. It is far more
useful to view homeland security as an overarching effort that
includes two simultaneous and mutually supporting functions.
First is homeland defense, a DOD-led task involving protection
of the United States in areas where we in the Department of
Defense have unique military capabilities such as air defense.
The fighter aircraft flying combat air patrols over Washington
and New York City under the operational command of General
Eberhart are a prime example of the homeland defense mission.
Second is civil support, where DOD provides assistance to a
lead Federal agency, which can range from the FBI, for domestic
counterterrorism tasks, to Health and Human Services, for
biological attacks. Key to this civil support effort is a
layered approach, beginning with local and State first-
responders, progressing through deployment of State-controlled
National Guard units, and then finally to application of
Federal assets, including unique DOD capabilities on an
exception basis.
Above all, homeland security demands a comprehensive
approach to accommodate evolving threats and the reality of
finite resources. Properly focusing on this complex mission and
providing the coordination necessary for joint and interagency
integration requires, in my opinion, a reorganization of DOD
efforts. From my perspective, there are three fundamental tasks
that must be accomplished if we are to be successful.
First, DOD must consolidate its efforts in homeland defense
into a single staff organization. This will enhance the
coordination of policy planning and resource allocation
responsibilities that relate to homeland security. By focusing
our efforts, we can avoid gaps and duplication in capabilities
while dramatically improving the quality of our planning and
responsiveness.
Second, we must develop operational arrangements for the
future. Currently, the military responsibilities for homeland
security are assigned to several of the Unified Commanders on
an interim basis, pending revision of the Unified Command Plan,
and that, of course, includes North American Air Defense
Command, Aerospace Defense Command and Air Defense Space
Command, and Cyber and Info, Land and Maritime with Joint
Forces Command.
I will defer operational details to other members of the
panel, but I want to emphasize a key point. As we look to the
future, apportionment of forces must be balanced between
meeting warfighting requirements abroad and the need to defend
America at home, and this is a concurrent activity, obviously,
from what we are doing today. This is a threshold event with,
in my opinion, profound implications for the military.
As for the last task, we must improve the interagency
coordination process to guarantee timely and efficient
cooperation among the many Federal, state, and local
organizations that have or share homeland security
responsibilities. I have already met with Governor Ridge, as
you have stated, the President's Special Assistant for Homeland
Security. I have assured him the Department will fully assist
his office in the execution of his mission.
While doing so, DOD will continue to focus on its broad and
critical responsibilities: defending our Nation against attacks
of war and terrorism, providing the capacity to respond to
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
explosive events of so-called weapons of mass destruction,
whether intentional or unintentional, and supporting lead
agencies in the event of natural disasters.
The victims of a disastrous event do not necessarily
distinguish between whether the event was a result of actions
of non-State terrorists or State actors engaging in a war, or
just an unfortunate accident. What matters to the American
people is the knowledge that our homeland is secure against any
and all threats. We in the Department of Defense stand ready to
do our part to meet that challenge.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this invitation. This
concludes my statement. I look forward to the committee's
questions, along with my colleagues. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. General Pace.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
General Pace. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, members of
the committee. I do deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you again today and to have one more opportunity to say
thank you for the very strong, sustained bipartisan support of
this committee for all the men and women in your Armed Forces.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my written
statement entered into the record and save the time to answer
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Pace follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Peter Pace, USMC
INTRODUCTION
On behalf of General Myers, I want to thank you for the opportunity
to appear before this committee to discuss the important topic of
Homeland Security. It is an honor to be here. I should also thank
Congress, and especially the members of this committee, for your
enduring and significant support of America's Armed Forces. Your deep
commitment to our great men and women in uniform, who today are waging
war against international terrorist organizations, is very much
appreciated.
Of course, it was the tragic events of September 11 that led to
this hearing. So let me also add, on behalf of General Myers and the
Joint Chiefs, that our hearts and prayers go out to the thousands of
innocent Americans and other victims who lost their lives or were
injured that day, as well as to their families, friends, and
colleagues.
SEPTEMBER 11
Six weeks ago the terrorist attacks against the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center shocked the world. Today, we who serve in uniform
join with the rest of America, and with our friends and allies around
the world, in a multinational effort to take down the network of
terrorist organizations responsible for these acts. No one should
mistake our unified purpose and strength of our resolve. We did not ask
for this fight, but we will win it. The dastardly act of terrorism
against America will in no way diminish our commitments to our allies,
and it will in no way prevent our military from performing its duties
and responsibilities to defend the United States' interests around the
world.
As President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have frequently noted,
this is a new type of war--one that will require an unprecedented
pooling of all elements of our national power, at all levels of
government. It is also a war that will require us to work in close
concert with our friends and allies to maximize our effectiveness.
Our adversaries, unable to confront or compete with the United
States militarily, continue to spend millions of dollars each year on
terrorist organizations that target U.S. citizens, property, and
interests. These terrorists are indiscriminate killers who attack where
and when their victims are most vulnerable. They seek to find and
exploit perceived weaknesses, striking at us with what we call
``asymmetric means'' to achieve their goals. The September 11 attacks
were the most recent example of this strategy. Attacks such as these
further reinforce the necessity of improving our ability to protect our
homeland and the American people from future attacks.
HOMELAND SECURITY
Defending the homeland has always been a vital mission for the
military. Our traditional national military strategy has been to defend
the homeland by engaging threats beyond our Nation's shores; however,
the September 11 attacks have graphically illustrated the need to do
more to meet this threat. We must now focus on improving our levels of
security here at home, with appropriate deference to our
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, while simultaneously continuing
our strategy of detecting and defeating threats outside our Nation's
borders.
This new emphasis is reflected in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) Report, which states: ``The highest priority of the U.S.
military is to defend the Nation from all enemies.'' The report also
states that ``The U.S. will maintain sufficient military forces to
protect U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical
infrastructure . . .''
Homeland security also involves providing appropriate military
assistance to the responsible civilian authorities to mitigate the
consequences of such attacks. So we divide Homeland Security into two
major subsets, Homeland Defense and Civil Support.
The Homeland Defense piece of Homeland Security is about
warfighting missions, with the military clearly in the lead. These
missions include the defense of maritime, land, and aero-space
approaches to the United States. In the future, this will include
defense against ballistic missiles.
Today, your Armed Forces are conducting many of these missions. For
example, we have over 100 military aircraft involved in fighter Combat
Air Patrols (CAP) and on strip alert for increased air defense;
approximately 18,000 National Guard personnel are stationed in
airports, port facilities, and other critical infrastructure sites
reassuring our public, deterring future attacks, and providing
temporary increased security capabilities to other lead Federal
agencies; and finally, the U.S. Coast Guard has established over 90
coastal Security Zones on both the east and west coasts, using 60
cutters and patrol boats.
The Civil Support piece of Homeland Security is where the military
provides support to other lead Federal agencies to help manage the
consequences of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) event, assist in
disaster relief efforts, and provide some counter-terrorism support.
The Department of Defense also provides unique capabilities to respond
to the effects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high
explosive weapons of mass destruction, complementing Federal, state and
local first responder capabilities.
Even before the horrific events of September 11, we had been
exploring organizational improvements to support Homeland Security. For
example, on 1 October 1999, we established Joint Task Force-Civil
Support (JTF-CS), an organization that is now fully operational under
the command of General William Kernan, Commander in Chief, United
States Joint Forces Command. This standing JTF currently has a major
role in the development of training and doctrine associated with
providing support to civilian first-responders for a WMD event. JTF-CS
also provides expertise and command and control to those DOD assets
deployed in support of civil authorities.
Additionally, on 1 November 1998 we created another standing task
force to defend the Defense Information Infrastructure against cyber-
aggression. Our Task Force-Computer Network Operations currently
operates under the command of General Ralph Eberhart, Commander in
Chief of the United States Space Command.
In the wake of the attack, we have placed an even greater emphasis
on these missions while continuing to examine other steps to more
effectively respond to emerging threats. We are also in the process of
carefully reviewing our Unified Command Plan (UCP). Currently a number
of Combatant Commanders are assigned different roles within our
homeland defense mission. Consequently, we are looking at ways of
eliminating any seams that may exist between the various organizations
and agencies involved in the Homeland Security efforts. We will be
reviewing the UCP with an eye toward developing a seamless command and
control of all DOD assets--active, reserve, guard, and civilians--
required to execute our Homeland Security responsibilities.
This past July, we established a new Homeland Security Division
within the Strategy and Policy Directorate (J5) of the Joint Staff.
This new division will serve as the focal point for the development and
coordination of the military strategy and policy aspects of Homeland
Security. Additionally, we recently established a General Officer
Steering Committee to facilitate the coordination of Homeland Security
issues.
Of course Homeland Security is not a DOD-only effort. An effective
Homeland Security posture requires that multiple Federal departments,
agencies, state and local governments, and the military all work
together as a team. Therefore, anything we do within DOD must be
synchronized as part of a comprehensive interagency effort. DOD is
currently represented in key interagency-working groups, identifying
and responding to emerging homeland security requirements.
Indeed, an overall Homeland Security strategy of preventing and
deterring future attacks, while simultaneously protecting the American
people and our critical infrastructure, demands improved communication
and sharing of information across the government. It also demands a
laser-like focus and unity of effort, and this is where Governor Ridge
and his team at the Office of Homeland Security will play such a
critical role.
CONCLUSION
The Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, and I recognize that much work
remains to be done. Together, with Secretary White, DOD's new Executive
Agent for Homeland Security, we will get the job done. For inspiration
we need look no further than the mountain of rubble in New York City or
the gaping hole in the Pentagon where so many from our DOD family were
suddenly taken from us. We will continue to focus our attention on
efforts to protect our homeland, our people, and our national
interests.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. General Eberhart, do
you have a comment?
STATEMENT OF GEN. RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND/NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General Eberhart. Sir, in the interest of time, I will
submit my statement for the record also, and I add my thanks to
those of the Vice Chairman for your continued support over the
years, and more so for your support in the upcoming weeks and
months as we challenge this task ahead of us.
[The prepared statement of General Eberhart follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF
Senator Levin, Senator Warner and members of the committee: Though
the circumstances that led to this hearing are tragic, it is an honor
to appear before you to represent the outstanding men and women of
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Our hearts and
prayers go out to those great American heroes who lost their lives or
were injured on September 11, 2001, as well as their families and
friends.
Our combined U.S. and Canadian response to the unprecedented
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was a
tribute to the professionalism of our people. We are proud to be part
of the national security team now focused on defeating terrorism.
MISSIONS
For 43 years NORAD adapted to the changing threats--transitioning
from an initial ``air'' defense orientation to a broader aerospace
dimension--one that provides surveillance and warning of ballistic
missile attacks and space events. The unprecedented attacks on 11
September 2001 were a reminder to our Nation of the need to detect,
validate and warn of hostile aircraft or missile attack against North
America. Proper attack assessment ensures the U.S. National Command
Authorities and the Prime Minister of Canada can take appropriate
action in response to an attack. Clearly, our ability to provide
surveillance and control of U.S. and Canadian airspace remains vital
and constitutes a critical component to the defense of North America.
NORAD's mission now has clearly expanded to protect North America
against a domestic airborne threat. Prior to 11 September 2001, our air
defense posture was aligned to counter the perceived external threats
to North America air sovereignty. Within this context, our aerospace
control and air defense missions have traditionally been oriented to
detect and identify all aircraft entering North American airspace, and
if necessary, intercept potentially threatening inbound air traffic.
These threats were generally considered as hostile aircraft carrying
bombs or cruise missiles. Based on the recent events, we are now also
focused on threats originating within domestic airspace such as
hijacked aircraft. While we have adjusted to provide a rapid response
to domestic air threats, we continue to execute our previously assigned
missions.
NORAD'S RESPONSE
On 11 September 2001, we quickly transitioned to an interoperable,
joint and interagency force consisting of active and National Guard
units, U.S. and Canadian military aircraft and U.S. Navy ships.
Additionally, we have positioned portable air control radars to more
rapidly respond to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requests for
assistance. We are also working together with FAA representatives to
access FAA radar data and now maintain a continuous communications
loop.
With the approval of the President and the Secretary of Defense, we
now have streamlined the Rules of Engagement for hostile acts over
domestic airspace to ensure the safety of our citizens and critical
infrastructure. We have increased our alert posture from 20 fighter
aircraft standing alert to more than 100 U.S. and Canadian aircraft.
These aircraft and aircrews now support the continuous combat air
patrols over Washington, DC, and New York, as well as random patrols
over other metropolitan areas and key infrastructure. They remain on a
high state of alert at 26 air bases across the country.
As a result of this heightened posture, our air defense activity
has increased significantly. Last year, we scrambled fighter aircraft 7
times (including exercises) from 10 September-10 October 2000. During
the same period this year, we scrambled 41 times, and we diverted 48
fighter patrols from ongoing combat air patrols to assess tracks of
interest, for a total of 89 events. Likewise, all of our units
supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE have experienced a significant
increase in NORAD-related flying sorties. Normally, our units fly 4-6
sorties a month in support of the NORAD air defense mission. Since 11
September 2001, several of our units such as the one at Otis ANGB in
Massachusetts have flown in excess of 100 sorties in the last month
(approximately one-third of Otis' entire yearly flying program).
CHALLENGES
From a resource perspective, we must address our manpower
shortfalls at the units charged with conducting our aerospace warning
and control missions. The administration's call-up of Reserve and
National Guard forces was the right solution. In the near term, we need
to ensure we allocate these forces to meet our greatest needs in the
field. For the longer term, the execution of our National Military
Strategy will hinge on our ability to attract and retain high quality,
motivated servicemen and women and civilian employees. As always, our
tremendous warfighting capability depends on our people. If we take
care of them, they will take care of our mission. Without them, even
our most effective weapon systems are of little value. Congress'
initiatives to improve military and civilian pay, health care and
housing for our professionals in uniform are a step in the right
direction. We are very grateful for your continued support in these
areas. However, we still have work to do.
CONCLUSION
NORAD remains committed to protect our homeland in the face of this
national tragedy. We believe we will be key to fighting and winning
this new war on terrorism against a faceless, cowardly enemy. To do
this, we need to provide the right people and equipment to get the job
done and we once again appreciate Congress' continued support. We are
heartened by the ongoing efforts to improve security at our airports.
Our hope is that this increased vigilance will deter foul play on the
ground and eliminate the need to commit fighters in the air. We should
be the last course of action, implemented only after all other
protective measures have been tried.
We stand with you and the rest of the Nation to meet every
challenge and ensure freedom prevails. I am honored to appear before
you and look forward to your questions.
Chairman Levin. General Kernan.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM F. KERNAN, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND
General Kernan. Sir, I would just like to echo the thanks
of all of our military for this committee and all of Congress'
staunch support, and in the interest of brevity I would like to
submit my written statement for the record.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Kernan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. William F. Kernan, USA
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
the opportunity to address this panel on this most fundamental of
military responsibilities, defense of our homeland. For the purposes of
this testimony, Homeland Security comprises Homeland Defense and
Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.
With over one million soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--some
80 percent of the Nation's general-purpose forces--U.S. Joint Forces
Command stands ready to defend our homeland and provide trained and
ready forces to combat terrorism worldwide. As the supported Command
for the land and maritime defense and civil support aspects of Homeland
Security, U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for defense against
land and maritime aggression targeted at our territory, sovereignty,
domestic population, and infrastructure, as well as directly supporting
the lead Federal agency in the management of the consequences of such
aggression and other domestic civil support. These responsibilities are
complementary to Federal, state and local responsibilities and
capabilities.
Additionally, we are pressing forward with our other mission areas
of joint force training, integration, and experimentation with the
overall objective to transform our Armed Forces to meet the unique
challenges of the post-Cold War environment.
The 11 September 2001 attacks have put our Nation and our command
on a wartime footing. This is a two-front war--at home and abroad. We
are moving aggressively forward with the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army as the Department's Executive Agent, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other combatant commanders, and our
National, state, and local governments to improve our collective
ability to defend our homeland. Likewise, our deployed forces are
actively defending the Nation through their offensive actions overseas.
Make no mistake, the status quo is not an option, and we are developing
solutions to combat terrorism both at home and abroad.
OUR RESPONSE TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACK
Within minutes of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade
Center (WTC), our Joint Operations Center, which operates 24 hours per
day, began notifying U.S. Joint Forces Command's senior leadership and
coordinating with the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon
as well as our component commanders (Atlantic Fleet, Air Combat
Command, Marine Forces Atlantic, and Army Forces Command). Next, the
command's operations director activated the Crisis Action Team and
began assembling key decision makers and planners from throughout the
command to respond as needed. This action began prior to the impact of
the second aircraft into the WTC, which ultimately confirmed our
suspicion that this was an act of terrorism. Actions taken were focused
in two directions: the possible need for DOD resources to augment first
responders, and the need to raise the threat condition and force
protection levels to ensure the safety of military personnel and
facilities in the United States.
Immediately after the terrorist attacks, U.S. Joint Forces Command
rapidly responded to the air, maritime, and land force requirements for
Operation Noble Eagle. Atlantic Fleet ships and Air Combat Command
tactical aircraft were deployed in support of North American Aerospace
Defense Command's (NORAD) mission and responsibilities. Aegis-equipped
ships were used to enhance the NORAD early warning radar system, two
aircraft carriers were dispatched to provide sea-borne combat air
patrol, and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit was placed on alert. The
Joint Task Force-Civil Support was also marshaled and an assessment
team dispatched to New York City to evaluate whether military resources
were needed in the consequence management efforts and to coordinate
support with the designated lead Federal agency. Within 6 hours of the
attack, Federal authorities made their first request for DOD
assistance, a request that was passed to U.S. Joint Forces Command by
the Department of the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS) for
quick action. Also, our Service components postured forces to protect
our critical military infrastructure. Concurrent with these domestic
support efforts, trained and ready joint forces deployed, and continue
to deploy, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, to support the fight
against terrorism abroad.
Support to civil authorities has been narrowly focused due in great
part to the nature of the attacks on New York City and the Pentagon and
the extent of New York City's robust response capability. However, it
is clear that other localities might not have such robust and sustained
capabilities in the face of a similar catastrophe. Clearly, we must be
ready to provide responsive military support if required while striving
for deterrence and prevention of future threats. There are numerous
measures required to realize this posture, both at the military and
interagency level.
In concert with ongoing operations and support, we initiated a
comprehensive Homeland Security planning process working hand-in-hand
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and my
fellow combatant commanders. This planning effort additionally included
extensive coordination and synchronization with the Services, our
components, and relevant government agencies, including the National
Guard Bureau.
As part of this effort, we organized and activated a 90-person
Homeland Security Directorate from within the command, with a two-star
Army general in charge, to oversee planning, organization and execution
of our responsibilities towards Homeland Defense and Military
Assistance to Civil Authorities. Leveraging the insights and concepts
gained from our joint training and experimentation work, we are
employing emerging concepts to organize, train and operate this new
organization as a highly functional command and control headquarters to
conduct Homeland Security.
These efforts have borne fruit as we take on responsibility for the
land and maritime defense of our Nation. We are postured to execute our
responsibilities in support of the National Homeland Security effort in
accordance with the Secretary of Defense's direction. We are continuing
to adapt ourselves for a sustained effort and to respond rapidly in
support of civil authorities.
In addition to the innovative organizational and operational
approaches mentioned above, we are conducting parallel planning with
the Joint Staff and our components to develop a Homeland Security
Campaign plan. We have established liaison with the appropriate
military, defense and select Federal agencies and we are prepared to
work in concert with them to execute the Homeland Security mission.
We have been in close coordination with the applicable unified
commands, particularly with Adm. Denny Blair at U.S. Pacific Command
and Gen. Ed Eberhart at NORAD, to outline and discuss campaign plans
for Homeland Defense. These efforts will continue, coordinating with
Service components and other commands to refine details of a campaign
plan and prepare necessary orders as additional guidance is received.
Finally, we are ready to provide command, control, and assessment
capabilities in response to chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, or enhanced high explosive incidents using Joint Task Force-
Civil Support (JTF-CS), Regional Task Forces East and West, the Marine
Chemical Biological Immediate Response Force, Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), and other forces as
necessary. This will be discussed in greater detail later in this
statement.
SUPPORTING HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. Joint Forces Command is currently working in support of DOD
leadership to dynamically refocus national responsibilities for
homeland defense and security. The goal is to coordinate all national
security elements to ensure the best possible predictive capability and
proactive response.
With this planning and command and control capability as a
foundation, our components are protecting our critical military
infrastructure. Likewise, after a careful review of applicable
contingency plans and functional plans with our components, U.S. Joint
Forces Command is ready to execute and support the national campaign to
protect our country.
As the command responsible for the land and maritime defense of the
continental United States, we work closely with many Federal
organizations to achieve unity of effort. Our key partners include the
U.S. Coast Guard and the law enforcement community. In developing our
ties to law enforcement, there has been much innovative and path
breaking work since 11 September to share critical information while
still safeguarding the liberties of American citizens. We have more
work to do to achieve full intelligence fusion and gain a true measure
of accurate, actionable, predictive analysis. That will enable all of
us, in support of and led by law enforcement, to transition from
today's posture of deter and respond to a more proactive stance of
effective prevention.
In the area of military assistance to civil authorities, we are an
active member of the Federal response community, and coordinate with
and support the various Federal response organizations, most notably
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These are long-standing
ties and feature well-practiced procedures previously used in support
of Federal efforts to deal with the effects of wildfires, floods, and
storms. Our partnerships in the area of military assistance are solid
and well-understood.
In light of these responsibilities, here is U.S. Joint Forces
Command's posture for providing responsive support to the Nation:
We have designated selected active duty ground forces as rapid
reaction forces and placed them on increased readiness. These Army and
Marine forces are stationed at bases that provide regional coverage
throughout the continental United States. Our intent is to provide the
President and the Secretary of Defense a flexible and responsive
capability in the event of unexpected incidents. We have also
designated necessary air transport from the Air Force's active, Guard,
and Reserve C-130 fleet to enable these reaction forces to rapidly
respond when requested to support local, state, or Federal emergencies.
We have exercised and trained these forces, and prepositioned aircraft
at the Reaction Force departure airfields where they are ready to load
now.
In our role as the joint force provider, U.S. Joint Forces Command
is providing forces as tasked to support military operations overseas
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
We are prepared to provide naval forces in support of Coast Guard
operations in ports and adjacent waters.
We provide active and Reserve component tactical aircraft to NORAD
and, in partnership with Pacific Command, will provide maritime assets,
if needed, to defend our coasts.
We are also identifying additional support forces, such as chemical
and biological detection and defense units, many of which reside in the
Reserve component, which might require mobilization to maintain the
appropriate capabilities.
We have worked closely with local, state, and Federal authorities
to be ready. I have met personally with Lieutenant General Russ Davis,
Chief of the National Guard Bureau and Admiral Jim Loy, Commandant of
the U.S. Coast Guard to discuss how best to integrate National Guard,
Coast Guard, and Active and Reserve Forces to secure our homeland. They
have sent liaison officers to U.S. Joint Forces Command, who are
integrated into our planning and operations, and our respective staffs
are working closely to ensure a seamless response to any event.
JOINT TASK FORCE-CIVIL SUPPORT
U.S. Joint Forces Command also has the responsibility to provide
military assistance to civil authorities. Along with traditional
assistance to local, state, and Federal agencies in the event of
natural disasters or civil disturbances--which we have planned and
organized for previously--we are also charged with providing
Consequence Management support.
Consequence Management is a critical task and for that purpose we
had previously formed and trained a standing joint task force
headquarters called Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). Joint Task
Force-Civil Support is a command and control headquarters ready to
respond today to support the lead Federal agency in the event of an
attack by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Let me outline the genesis of Joint Task Force-Civil Support and
clarify what it is and what it is not. The 1999 Unified Command Plan
(UCP) assigned U.S. Joint Forces Command the responsibility for
planning and executing military assistance to civil authorities for
consequence management of weapons of mass destruction within the
continental U.S. The 1999 UCP also tasked U.S. Joint Forces Command
with responsibility for consequence management response to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives (CBRNE) for
the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia. U.S. Pacific
Command and U.S. Southern Command were given responsibility for CBRNE
consequence management within their respective areas of responsibility;
U.S. Joint Forces Command provides support to them as necessary for
their Consequence Management missions. Joint Task Force-Civil Support
was activated in 1999, and following a rigorous training and validation
process, JTF-CS achieved full mission capability in April 2000. It is
currently authorized 36 personnel with a requested growth to 103 by
2003. In light of current conditions, and in order to maintain a
continuous 24-hour response, I have authorized through assignment and
augmentation the expansion of the headquarters to 164 personnel.
Joint Task Force-Civil Support has the mission to command and
control all DOD assets deployed to mitigate the effects of a chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives-incident,
in order to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical
life support. I want to emphasize that JTF-CS is not a lead agency nor
does it provide a first response capability. Joint Task Force-Civil
Support's mission is to provide command and control of military forces
in support of the designated lead Federal agency, for example, Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Joint Task Force-Civil Support's
primary functions also include consequence management support to
national special security events such as the State of the Union address
last February.
As envisioned, JTF-CS was designed to be a command and control
headquarters without assigned forces, organic communications, or
dedicated transportation. Required forces, communications and
transportation assets are allocated as the mission dictates. We are
taking steps to allocate forces to habitually train and work with JTF-
CS. It has the normal staff organizations you would expect, with the
addition of an interagency coordination element, comprising seven
personnel to include a U.S. Coast Guardsman, that is the conduit for
working with Federal agencies. This coordination element interfaces
regularly with FEMA headquarters and FEMA regions as well as the
Department of Health and Human Services.
Joint Task Force-Civil Support has developed detailed force
requirements for a variety of likely consequence management
contingencies. These requirements include communications and
transportation units, as well as service support, engineers, medical,
aviation and specialty units like the National Guard Civil Support
Teams (CST). The Service components are working through sourcing for
these contingency packages to facilitate joint training and exercises
to maximize proficiency. With forces allocated based on the mission,
the headquarters is ready for employment, but needs more depth. It is a
``one of a kind'' organization. With that in mind, we are assessing its
current structure and whether a second JTF-CS organization is required.
To further unity of effort between the varieties of forces that may
potentially be involved in providing support to a CBRNE incident, JTF-
CS has directly coordinated with a wide array of Federal, state, local,
and military organizations to conduct training and planning.
As you can see, U.S. Joint Forces Command has aggressively moved
forward since we received the military assistance to civil authority
mission as outlined in the 1999 UCP.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS
Another critical asset in Homeland Security are the National Guard
WMD-CSTs. These teams immediately deploy to the incident site to (1)
assess a suspected nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological event
in support of the local incident commander (2) advise civilian
responders regarding appropriate actions and (3) facilitate requests
for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and Federal
assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate
property damage. The WMD-CSTs are National Guard assets that are manned
by their respective states, and trained and equipped by the National
Guard Bureau. We currently are funded for 32 WMD-CSTs, of which ten
have been certified by the Secretary of Defense (in Washington,
Colorado, New York, Texas, Massachusetts, Missouri, California,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Georgia). Seventeen are in various levels
of training and equipping (not yet ready for certification); five still
need to be activated. We eventually expect to have a certified WMD-CST
in each U.S. State and in all U.S. territories.
Joint Forces Command is tasked only with training and readiness
oversight of the WMD-CSTs and does not assume that responsibility until
a WMD-CST receives Secretary of Defense certification. We are working
closely with the National Guard Bureau and the states where those teams
reside to standardize their training, tactics, techniques and
procedures.
LEVERAGING JOINT TRANSFORMATION
As our President stated, this is a war ``unlike any other.'' It
demands fresh approaches and new thinking. We are and have been working
on just such innovative joint operational concepts.
With our redesignation as U.S. Joint Forces Command on 1 October
1999, we assumed the responsibility to lead the transformation of the
U.S. Armed Forces to achieve dominance across the width, depth, and
breadth of any battlespace. That means that whether in peace, conflict,
or war, anywhere on the spectrum of operations, we will fight and
defeat any adversary. Our command is focused on achieving that
objective, and the events of the last month, both at home and abroad,
have shown that we must accelerate those efforts. We need today's
forces to get to the objective area quicker, dominate the situation,
and win decisively. Comprised of highly trained, competent units and
leaders, those forces need to operate with agility, versatility,
precision and lethality.
Combating terrorism, protecting the homeland, and transformation
are inextricably linked. We are working today with Enduring Freedom's
joint warfighters to rapidly operationalize the innovative ideas we
have been working on through our joint concept development and
experimentation program. The war on terrorism cannot be won with legacy
means alone. Development of advanced techniques, tools, and
organizations for these challenges require new thinking and aggressive
experimentation to develop alternatives for the future joint force.
For more than a year, U.S. Joint Forces Command has been working on
proposals for transformation that can directly address the operational
requirements we face today. Our most recent experiment on advanced
concepts, Unified Vision 2001 last May, envisioned a set of conditions
similar to those we face today. The intellectual foundation for dealing
with these new conditions should put us in the position of being able
to more rapidly operationalize our best concepts.
Converting these concepts into operational capabilities is now our
challenge. As we task organize our command for its role in winning this
war, we are also integrating many of our new ideas into our
organization and operations. Our execution of the Homeland Security
mission, and the fight against terrorism abroad, will be built around
the doctrinal, organizational, and technical findings that come from
our transformational efforts.
Our efforts to date have set the conditions for unified
transformation activities to take place across the Services and the
Joint Force. Our concept development and experimentation efforts over
the past 2 years have established the common joint context for service
concept development, have facilitated collaborative concept development
across the Services, and have synchronized the joint and service
experimentation programs.
Further, I think that these insights are compelling and have
immediate application. As I mentioned earlier, we leveraged these
concepts to guide our efforts to stand up our Homeland Security
Directorate and guide development of our Homeland Security Campaign
Plan. But in all of this, we have to remember the basics. War remains
close, personal, and brutal. There is no silver bullet that can change
that. There have been revolutions in how we fight . . . gunpowder,
nuclear weapons, and computers. But in the end, it still comes down to
our willingness and capability to decisively defeat our enemy. It's
never safe, easy, or risk-free. The enemy sees to that. Today while I
talk to you, there are people flying, sailing, and standing in harm's
way, under enemy guns, at night, and far from America. Our national
will, combined with their spirit and tenacious commitment, will define
our success. I look forward to working with you to give our troops what
they need.
In closing Mr. Chairman, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines
of U.S. Joint Forces Command are ready to defend our homeland and are
deploying to fight terrorism abroad. We are acting now, and ready to do
more. Each day, we improve our capabilities, refine our plans and
increase our Homeland Security capabilities while providing trained,
ready, and--over time--fundamentally transformed forces for combat
operations against terrorism.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. We will follow the
usual procedure here. We will have an early bird rule with a 6-
minute round.
Secretary White, can you describe what your authority is as
the DOD Executive Agent for Homeland Security? For instance,
does it extend to authority over the combatant commanders, or
the forces assigned to them?
Secretary White. Senator, my authority as Executive Agent
is to act on behalf of the Secretary to organize and get moving
the whole business of homeland security. I do not see myself as
having any operational authority or being a part of the chain
of command. I will make recommendations to the Secretary, and
he will exercise his authority.
Chairman Levin. Is it clearly established that you are not
in the chain of command?
Secretary White. The Secretary is the chain of command
along with the President, and I, as his Executive Agent, make
recommendations to him, but I do not exercise command
authority.
Chairman Levin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, would you
describe what you understand your relationship with Governor
Ridge and his office is going to be? How would, for instance,
good faith disagreements be resolved between the two agencies?
I know in your opening testimony you said you intend to fully
assist him, but there will be differences from time to time,
and the question is, when they are not resolved, who wins? Who
prevails? I know truth and justice will win, but who will
prevail?
Secretary White. Well, you know as well as I, the charter
that Governor Ridge has for homeland security is directly from
the President. We have had excellent initial meetings with
Governor Ridge. We have detailed a senior officer of the
Department who has extensive experience in homeland security to
serve on his staff. If there are differences of opinion between
the Department and Governor Ridge, I would presume that they
would be resolved, like any disputes in the executive branch,
either at the principal's level or at the Cabinet level, or
ultimately with the President himself.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your
position on the suggestion that the Posse Comitatus Act needs
to be revised?
Secretary White. I think, Senator, that at this stage our
general view is that the act is fine the way it sits. It has a
longstanding tradition of not using Federal forces in a law
enforcement role that I think serves the Nation well.
The General Counsel of the Department, in response to your
communication, is studying it in more detail to see if there
are revisions that need to be made to certain aspects of it,
either for flexibility or to deal with the new situation, but
in general this longstanding tradition is one that we would
like to see prevail. There may, of course, be necessary minor
revisions.
Chairman Levin. As part of that consideration, are you
looking at what the impact of training and using our Armed
Forces to enforce the law would have on their warfighting
capabilities, their readiness? Is that all being considered as
a part of this review, or is it just a legal issue?
Secretary White. It is principally a legal review of the
law against the current situation. The broader issue that you
raise gets to the whole fundamental question of having a common
force pool of active and Reserve components that have
longstanding primary missions in support of the combatant
commanders in chief, but that also have important homeland
security responsibilities either on a State or a Federal basis.
Obviously with the current events these challenges are on us
concurrently.
As we sit here today, the 29th Division from the Virginia
Guard is deployed in Bosnia, and consequently the elements that
are in Bosnia are not available to the Governor of Virginia for
title 32 purposes for homeland security, so as my colleagues
and I go about our business of the operational planning for
homeland security, one of the issues that has to be dealt with
is force apportionment, and how much time will be focused on
homeland security, and how much time will be focused on normal
warfighting activities.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
General Eberhart, there has been some confusion about the
sequence of events on September 11 that maybe you can clear up
for us.
The time line we have been given is that at 8:55 on
September 11, American Airlines Flight 77 began turning east,
away from its intended course, and at 9:10 Flight 77 was
detected by the FAA radar over West Virginia, heading east.
That was after the two planes had struck the World Trade Center
Towers.
Then 15 minutes later, at 9:25, the FAA notified NORAD that
Flight 77 was headed towards Washington. Was that the first
notification NORAD or the DOD had that Flight 77 was probably
being hijacked, and if it was, do you know why it took 15
minutes for the FAA to notify NORAD?
General Eberhart. Sir, there is one minor difference. I
show it as 9:24 that we were notified, and that was the first
notification we received. I do not know, sir, why it took that
amount of time for the FAA. You will have to ask the FAA.
Chairman Levin. Do you know if that was the first
notification to the DOD?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir, that is the first documented
notification we have.
Chairman Levin. Either NORAD or any other component of the
DOD?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I have a number of other questions relative
to that issue which should be clarified, and I am going to ask
you those questions for the record to clear that up. It seems
to me we all should have a very precise timetable and the
precise indication of why other agencies or entities were not
notified by FAA, if they were not.
Perhaps you could make that inquiry for us, or we will ask
the FAA directly, if you prefer. We would also ask what
notification was given to the buildings in Washington once it
was clear that this plane was headed towards Washington, but we
will save those for the record.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. I would have thought all of you in this
chamber would have gone back and rehearsed these things,
figured out what happened, what went wrong, so that we ensure
it will not happen again. If there was that significant a delay
and you cannot tell us why, how do we leave with an assurance
that you and your subordinates have taken steps so that it will
not happen again?
General Eberhart. Sir, I assure you we have, and we
practice this daily now. It now takes about 1 minute from the
time that FAA sees some sort of discrepancy on their radar
scope, or detects a discrepancy in terms of their
communication, before they notify NORAD, and so that certainly
has been fixed.
I think at that time the FAA was still thinking that if
they saw a problem, it was a problem that was a result of a
mechanical failure, or some sort of crew deviation. They were
not thinking hijacking. Today, the first thing they think is
hijacking, and we respond accordingly.
Senator Warner. So working with the FAA, NORAD had not
rehearsed the possibilities of an aircraft being seized for
some terrorist activity?
General Eberhart. Sir, the FAA is charged with the primary
responsibility in terms of hijacking in the United States of
America. We are charged with assisting the FAA once they ask
for our assistance. The last hijacking of a commercial aircraft
in the United States of America was 1991, so although we
practiced this day in and day out, the FAA sees on their scopes
scores of problems that are a result of mechanical problems,
switch errors, pilot errors, et cetera, and that is what they
think when they see this.
Although we have exercised this, we have practiced it, in
all the hijackings I am aware of, where we have plenty of time
to react, we got on the wing, and we followed this airplane to
where it landed, and then the negotiations started. We were not
thinking a missile, an airborne missile that was going to be
used as a target, a manned missile, if you will. In most cases
when we practiced this, regrettably we practiced it, the origin
of the flight was overseas, and we did not have the time-
distance problems that we had on that morning. We had plenty of
time to react, we were notified that for sure there was a
hijacking, and we were notified that they were holding a gun to
the pilot's head and telling him to fly toward New York City or
Washington, DC.
So that is how we had practiced this, sir. I certainly wish
we had practiced it differently, but I really think that for
sure in the first two instances of 11 September, and probably
in the third, time and distance would not have allowed us to
get an airplane to the right place at the right time.
Senator Warner. Let me just ask the following. You are now
the commanding officer in charge of the Combat Aircraft Patrol
(CAP) missions being flown over our various communities, which
so far as I know have functioned exceedingly well and serve, I
think, as a strong deterrent. It is being performed by Guard
and regular aviators, am I not correct?
General Eberhart. That is correct, sir.
Senator Warner. Are the missions for the Guard any
different than for the regular aviators?
General Eberhart. No, sir.
Senator Warner. They fly the same?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. If an aircraft begins to deviate and such
security measures as are on board fail, whether it is an armed
guard and so forth, then your aircraft is instructed, with
certain procedures, to fire and take that plane down. That is
basically what happens.
General Eberhart. When given the proper authority, yes,
sir.
Senator Warner. Here is my problem, and it is one of the
reasons that I raise this posse comitatus situation. I have
done some independent research on this matter. The Air Guard
person is up there within the law of posse comitatus. It is a
criminal penalty, as our chairman stated. By what authority is
the regular performing duty that the Air Guard is doing so we
get around the posse comitatus?
General Eberhart. Sir, I believe in this case it is not a
law enforcement action. I believe it is a national defense
action.
Senator Warner. Well, you say that. It could be a bunch of
drunks on the plane who have caused it--I mean, there are
scenarios by which it could not be terrorism. That is one of
the reasons I have raised this issue. I have been criticized
roundly for bringing this up, first in a question to the
Secretary of Defense, who acknowledged at that time in the
hearing that he felt it ought to be reviewed.
It is a subject of considerable debate in the National
Journal, and I do not mind taking criticism, but I really think
somebody ought to look at this very carefully, because what
that aircraft is doing is supplementing what the armed guard is
doing on the plane. If that measure fails, then and only then
will that aircraft perform its really awesome mission. I just
think we had better look at this posse comitatus.
We also have to look at it because we could have situations
where enormous numbers of our citizens could be put in harm's
way by some disaster, and the military folks who remain nearby
could come in and help the police establish some law and order,
if only to protect the citizens in some way against further
harm. So I am glad somebody is taking a look at the situation
of posse comitatus.
I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, the document has served us
very well, but there comes a time when we have to reexamine the
old laws of the 1800s. Given the challenge that we are faced
with today, I would take a look, and have your lawyers take a
look at that situation, because in Europe I am told by the
Department of the Air Force that they are referred to as air
police. Have you ever heard that term in Europe applied?
Secretary White. No, sir.
Senator Warner. Take a look at it. Have you or General
Eberhart?
General Eberhart. No, sir, I have not.
Senator Warner. You ought to have a chat with a couple of
the other two-stars around the hall. We ought to clarify that.
To you, General Pace, the Secretary of Defense, in
consulting with Senator Levin and myself and members of the
House, talked about proposals by which to either modify a
current CINCs responsibility and/or maybe even the creation of
another CINC to deal with the homeland defense, and also the
possible need for an additional, say, Deputy Secretary of
Defense to be the counterpart for Governor Ridge and such other
individuals within the Department of Defense and other agencies
and departments will begin to form the structure to deal with
these important challenges of homeland defense. To what extent
can you elaborate on that for us?
General Pace. Senator, thanks. The Unified Command Plan is
a plan that breaks down the individual authorities of the
individual commanders and, as you also know, it is the
Chairman's responsibility to recommend to the Secretary of
Defense changes to those.
As we speak, the individual service chiefs and the
combatant commanders are proposing changes to the Unified
Command Plan. They will be in to the Chairman by the end of
October. The Chairman will quickly synthesize all of those and
go forward to the Secretary with his recommendations for the
changes. One of the key elements in there is the requirement
for a CINC specifically designated for homeland defense.
If I may go back to your previous question, sir, just to
elaborate on the airmen who are flying right now. Because the
authority to shoot down that airplane must come from either the
President or the Secretary of Defense, and because the
President has emergency powers to use his Armed Forces in that
capacity, the particular pilot who is ordered to take that
action would not be, in my judgment, subject to criminal
prosecution.
Senator Warner. There is this exception in there, and I
think you raise a very important aspect of it. By virtue of the
President ratifying the subordinate commander's recommendation
that the shootdown occur, he then would be operating under that
exception of posse comitatus?
General Pace. Yes, sir, and we should certainly take a look
at that, sir, but we do not have your service members today in
any jeopardy.
Senator Warner. But, I mentioned it could be a bunch that
is intoxicated. It could be a mentally deranged person on the
plane. There are other hypotheses, regrettably, that jeopardize
the safety of aircraft from time to time which are apart from
terrorism.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much.
I would like to pursue this question of posse comitatus. I
am not a lawyer, but I really agree with Senator Warner, that I
think the events of September 11 have given us a new
demarcation here in our reaction as a defense team, or as a
defense system, and I will say that I think it was proper in
1947 for the U.S. War Department to then be called the Defense
Department. Since 1947 we have all been in the defense
business. The defense of what? The defense of NATO, certainly.
The defense of Bosnia, the defense of South Korea, certainly,
but ultimately the defense of our homeland.
So I think the number 1 lead agency for the defense of
America is the Defense Department. That is where we put our
money, our time, and our energy. We ask young Americans to risk
their lives in harm's way in America and all over the globe for
that purpose, so that is where I am coming from.
Regarding posse comitatus, to me the date 1878 says it all.
In my understanding, that is when President Grant asked
Sherman's troops to leave Georgia and said, don't come back. I
mean, that was the era where we had for 10 years Federal
occupation of a number of States in America. There was great
resentment of that, so I think the posse comitatus law that you
could not in effect nationalize the American Armed Forces and
have them go somewhere and occupy somebody, I think that was a
direct reaction to that particular era.
The point is, when it came to the war on drugs, in 1980 we
amended the posse comitatus law to allow the American military
to do what, to defend our homeland, and American blood has been
shed on American soil by a foreign foe on September 11, and now
we are under attack by germ warfare. I do not think we need
much more evidence to understand that we are not dealing with a
crime. If this were a crime we would put the FBI Sherlock
Holmes detectives on it, and we would nail Timothy McVeigh and
execute him.
This is war, and so I am not quite comfortable with the FBI
leading the war against terrorism and being the lead agency
when we have the entire Department of Defense out there taking
second seat. I think we have to figure out a new posse
comitatus amendment that allows the Department of Defense to
step forward and defend America.
It is interesting that when the commander in chief was
faced with that on September 11 he said, not only yes, but
definitely yes, put your aircraft in the air, General Eberhart,
without batting an eye. So in reality, that posse comitatus
went out the window real quick. The commander in chief said so,
and he had a right to say so, and he did the right thing, and
so I do not think we are in a crime scene here. I think we are
in a war.
If we are in a war, then I think the Department of Defense
ought to be the lead dog here. If we work from that premise,
then everybody else can follow in, or follow along and be part
of a homeland defense team, but I have been looking for a
leader in this thing. We just got a briefing here from Senator
Nunn, who sat in that chair, Mr. Secretary, just a few hours
ago. He played the President in a Dark Winter exercise, a germ
warfare attack against the United States, and what did he find?
He said, ``I found myself getting very impatient with
bureaucracy.'' In other words, he found that the agencies were
not coordinating, were not cooperating with one another, and
that is where we are today.
So I think we are in search of defining exactly what we
want to do as a Nation here. If we want to defend ourselves,
especially our homeland, the lead agency ought to be the
Department of Defense. I think there should be maybe a CINC for
the homeland area, to work closely with the homeland guard, or
the homeland czar, or whatever, but I am beginning to see that
we need somebody to step up to the plate, and I think that is
the Department of Defense.
Now, I know it was not popular to be involved in
counterterrorism and so forth, and the American military wanted
to be engaged elsewhere, but up until September 11
counterterrorism was buried over there in the Justice
Department and the FBI somewhere. Now we realize it is homeland
defense. It is what we are in the business of, survival, and so
I just thought I would throw that out.
Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you one question. The
President mobilized the Air Force within a matter of hours to
defend our Nation and said, we are in a war against terrorism.
The Coast Guard, in a war, comes under the Department of
Defense. Have you thought about asking for the authority, since
the President says we are in a war, to put the Coast Guard in
the Department of Defense now?
Secretary White. On a permanent basis, not in a national
emergency, but----
Senator Cleland. I would settle for a national emergency
basis.
Secretary White. That is a good question, and there has
been thought on that, obviously. If you look at the events of
11 September, the Navy and the Coast Guard have worked very
closely for maritime and coastal defense, as they have for a
long time, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard regularly
attends coordination meetings in the tank with the other
leaders of the military, so there is close coordination, albeit
at this point no direct chain of command authority.
Senator Cleland. Because the Coast Guard currently is under
the Secretary of Transportation, and in so-called peacetime it
is quite adequate, but this is not peacetime. This is war, and
we have been made painfully aware of that, and I would just
suggest that you look at that as one step towards DOD becoming
more engaged in the war on terrorism.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Warner. Senator Inhofe, would you yield just to
suggest to our witnesses in reference to the remarks made by
our colleague, there is a very good piece written by Paul
Stevens, called ``U.S. Armed Forces Homeland Defense, the Legal
Framework.'' I would urge that those who have not had a chance
to refer to it, it covers some of the points that our
distinguished colleague just reviewed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. General Eberhart, quite a few questions
have been asked about the length of time it has taken us to
respond to certain requests, and I am naturally concerned. We
have the 5073 fielding that is involved in all of this out in
Oklahoma.
Have you ever just sat down and in a very brief way
described what the decisionmaking matrix is for this process of
having to make a shootdown?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. First, we are cued by the FAA.
Now that cueing is a lot easier. We are actually up on a
hotline, a chat line with the FAA all the time, so as soon as
the FAA realizes there is a problem, we realize there is a
problem simultaneously. We have taken what we call air battle
managers and put them in the FAA sector, so they are present
for duty and are there to coordinate and facilitate. You are
familiar with air battle managers from the Airborne Warning
Control Systems (AWACS). They are at Tinker Air Force Base.
We also have increased FAA presence at our regions and our
sectors. The most important thing is cueing, so that we know
there is a problem. Cueing allows us to work the time-distance
problem I alluded to earlier.
Second, we have continuous CAPs over Washington, DC, and
New York City, which obviously allow us to respond very quickly
in those locations of the northeast seaboard.
We also run random CAPs throughout the United States of
America over population centers and key infrastructure. Our
goal there is to be unpredictable, and to have would-be
terrorists know that we might be there, so your chances of
success are not very good.
Then finally, we have improved the communication lines
between the pilot to the sector, the regional controllers, and
to me. We have exercised this almost daily to make sure that
once we see this problem, once we get in a position where we
can take action, all of that information is relayed up to the
National Command Authorities, and we get the authority to take
the action that they deem is appropriate. Hopefully, that is
the action we have recommended to them.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General. That is very specific,
and I do appreciate that. Talking about the CAPs program, the
role of the Guard, there has been some discussion on the
changing of equipment. For example, I understand the F-15 would
perhaps perform those duties better than the F-16. A lot of the
changes in this program since 11 September are going to cost
money. Are these in the QDR, or are you working on that now?
First of all, do you think there will be a substantial increase
because of the changes in emphasis and equipment?
General Eberhart. Sir, I think there are changes that are
appropriate. There are modernization programs that are
appropriate. We are reviewing those as we speak. Some of those
programs were included in the Department's request for the
supplemental. First and foremost I think we need to focus on
our command and control systems. As a matter of fact, our
command and control systems are 1970s and 1980s technology in
NORAD. They really have not kept pace over the years, and so we
need to bring them into the 21st century.
There are other things like additional radios for the F-
15s, VHF radios, which you are very familiar with, and fighter
data links. Right now, we are awaiting the benefit analysis for
these missions, and they are part of the supplemental that came
in, and will be part of the 2003 request.
Senator Inhofe. You are working on that now?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir, we sure are.
Senator Inhofe. General Pace or anyone else, I came in kind
of disagreeing with some of the things Senator Cleland said,
but he made a very persuasive argument in terms of the use of
our military. Historically, I have always opposed the use for
one specific reason we have not talked about here today, and
that is that we are currently in a crisis in terms of our
deployments, in terms of our force strength, and I know
everyone gets tired of hearing us talk about it, but
nevertheless it is true that we are about one-half of where we
were back in 1991 and we have deployments in places like Bosnia
or Kosovo, where many of us do not believe we should have been
deployed.
Nonetheless, if you are going to have an expanded role for
the military into these areas, I contend that you do not have
to change the act to do that. There is recently a study
released on October 12, that is this year, by the Center for
Strategic Studies here in Washington, DC, and it says neither
the Posse Comitatus Act nor, apparently, any other statute
purports to deny, limit, or condition the President's use of
the Armed Forces in response to a catastrophic terrorist attack
on the United States.
I guess what I am saying is I think it is going to happen
anyway regardless of what we do with that act. My concern is
that it affects readiness. I spent 5 years chairing that
subcommittee, and I have been concerned about deterioration
because of the force strength, modernization, and our
deployments. How is this going to negatively impact it, and
what can we do about that?
General Pace. Senator, as we do with all allocations of
resources, allocations especially of service members, part of
the process that delivers to the Secretary of Defense a
recommendation to send troops to Bosnia or to allocate troops
to a particular section of this country will include the impact
on readiness for the next most likely deployment of those
forces, so when it goes forward to him it tells him, we need X
number of troops to do this particular mission. If you send
them on this mission, then we will need X number of months to
get them back, retrained and ready to go for their most likely
combat mission, so that kind of readiness equation is part of
the process that tees up the decision for the Secretary.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that and appreciate that, but
that is on a specific mission or deployment. Right now, we are
dealing with unknowns. We are establishing a policy whereby we
may be using military in some areas where we had not used them
in the past, and I would just caution all of us to keep that in
mind, that somehow the cost of that is going to have to be
transmitted to us and we will have to act on it.
Unfortunately, it may be too late, and so we need to
prepare as much in advance, if anything new is going to be
imposed upon our military than they are already in their
overloaded commission performing today.
Secretary White. I suppose airport security is a classic
example. We have today 6,000 guardsmen that are deployed in 430
airports across the country, augmenting security forces. That
is all under State control, but that comes out of the same
force pot that we send to Bosnia and we have Federal authority
for, and that is the real challenge that we have to deal with
here.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Carnahan.
Senator Carnahan. Secretary White, I would like to follow
up on a question the chairman asked earlier and ask you to
elaborate on what steps are being made to coordinate your
activities with the new Office of Homeland Security headed by
Governor Ridge.
Secretary White. Senator, I have met with Governor Ridge
and laid out for him in some detail how the Department operates
in support of homeland security, both the civil support side
and the defense side. We have assigned a senior officer and
other staff to his office. The former Commander of the Joint
Task Force for Civil Support from Joint Forces Command, who has
extensive experience in homeland security, will be a part of
Governor Ridge's office, and I look forward to detailed
coordination with him as we go forward.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
General Kernan, there are currently 27 National Guard
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) in
existence. Ten of these teams have been certified to assist in
detecting the presence of chemical or biological agents. What
are the roles of civil support teams in the event of a chemical
or biological attack, and how else could these teams be of
assistance as civilian first responders in the event of such
attacks?
General Kernan. Senator, the civil support teams come under
State title 32 responsibilities to the Governor. They are the
first responders. They possess 14 different specialties. They
are commanded by a National Guard Lieutenant Colonel. They have
a mobile analytical lab and a mobile communications suite.
What they do is, they arrive at the incident site, they
assess, they analyze, they validate, and they facilitate the
military support that may be required to a catastrophic
incident in a State. They initially work for the State
Governor. If additional military support is required for a
weapons of mass destruction incident, or high yield explosive
event in the United States, they would then facilitate the
military support coming to help save lives, prevent suffering,
and reestablish critical infrastructure and facilities.
Secretary White. May I add that of the 10 that we have,
since 11 September every one of them has been employed for a
variety of tasks by the Governors, to include early on the team
in New York under the control of Governor Pataki, so we have
found them already to be enormously useful, and we are
accelerating the training and certification of the additional
teams.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you.
General Eberhart, you are responsible for overseeing the
security of America's skies. Would you describe the new
procedures that are in place to respond to hijacking of
commercial aircraft, and if there are additional resources you
feel are needed in intelligence or command and control to
further support this mission?
General Eberhart. Yes, ma'am. In terms of the new
procedures in effect, we have increased connectivity with the
FAA, so in fact, as I said earlier, we are on a chat line with
them 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, so when they see a
problem we simultaneously see that problem.
Second, up until this time we were looking out. We were
looking external to the United States of America for the
foreign threat, and aerospace warning, aerospace control were
our missions. It was redefined on 11 September, because now
aerospace warning and aerospace control means the unthinkable.
It means looking inside the United States for this terrorist
threat that developed at that time, and so now we are employing
additional radars.
These radars come in the form of Coast Guard airplanes,
Navy airplanes, and additional AWACS, to include NATO AWACS.
Five NATO AWACS are a part of our team now and are temporarily
deployed to Tinker Air Force Base. We are also moving ground
radars throughout the United States to fill areas where we did
not have good internal coverage in terms of the military. We
are also linking some of the FAA radars into our command and
control sectors in our region and NORAD command posts to make
sure we are seeing again what the FAA is seeing so we are able
to increase our situational awareness and decrease greatly the
reaction time to work the time and distance problem.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Carnahan.
Senator Allard.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Eberhart, I am very interested in NORAD, and so I
am particularly interested in how NORAD might interact with our
various agencies, particularly the FAA. I appreciate the
question that was asked by Senator Carnahan, but I am going to
ask for a little more detail. On September 11, my understanding
is we had aircraft at least up in the air when the second plane
hit the Twin Towers, is that correct?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir.
Senator Allard. So what I am interested in knowing is, what
was the process there, and then how was that followed up with
the other aircraft that you identified that were coming or
heading towards Washington, and how you responded, and how was
the FAA interacting with NORAD in that whole situation,
starting with that first plane you deployed heading toward New
York City?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. The first flight I think was
American Flight 11. The FAA, once they notified us, we issued a
scramble order almost simultaneously to the first crash, that
flight of two out of Otis Air Force Base, out of Cape Cod----
Senator Allard. Let me understand this. So right at the
time the first aircraft was hitting the Twin Towers, you are
being notified by the FAA that you had another plane headed
towards the towers?
General Eberhart. They notified us of the first hijacking
just about the time that airplane was hitting the tower, and at
that time we issued a scramble order to the two F-15s out of
Otis Air Force Base. We continued to send those airplanes
toward New York City, because initially, as we worked with the
FAA, we were not sure if that was the hijacked airplane.
I hate to admit it, but I was sitting there hoping that
someone had made a mistake, there had been an accident, that
this was not a hijacked airplane, because there was confusion.
We were told it was a light commuter airplane. It did not look
like that was caused by a light commuter airplane, and so we
were still trying to sort it out. We are moving the two F-15s,
and we were continuing to move them. They were flying toward
New York City. In fact, they were 8 minutes away from New York
City when the second crash occured. We did not turn them
around. We did not send them back.
Senator Allard. They had not made a sighting of that
airplane?
General Eberhart. Again, the issue is time and distance.
Once we told them to get airborne, it took them only 6 minutes.
Talk about the professionalism and training of these
individuals. Tragically, there was just too much distance
between Otis and New York City to get there in time.
Senator Allard. Now, did the FAA notify you that you had a
second hijacked plane somewhere up there?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. During that time, we were
notified. We will provide the exact time line for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Allard. I am not interested in the exact time line
as much as I am how the FAA reacted with NORAD during this time
period.
Then you had the other two planes, and then the FAA
continued to notify NORAD that you had two other potential
hijackings, these headed for Washington, is that correct?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. We were working the initial
hijacking of the one, I think it was Flight 77 that crashed
into the Pentagon. We launched the airplanes out of Langley Air
Force Base as soon as the FAA notified us about a hijacking. At
that time it took those airplanes, two F-16s again, 6 minutes
to get airborne. They were approximately 13 minutes away from
Washington, DC, when the tragic crash occurred.
Now, the last flight was a little bit different. I think it
was United Airlines Flight 93 in Pennsylvania. At that time we
were trying to decide initially if that flight was going to
continue west, and if there was some other target for that
flight, was it Chicago, was it St. Louis, and what might we do
to launch an aircraft to intercept it.
Senator Allard. So the FAA knew before it deviated its
flight pattern that it was hijacked?
General Eberhart. What they really knew was, it was headed
west, Sir. It dropped off their radar screen, and then they
reacquired it. At that time it became obvious to us, we thought
it was probably headed for Washington, DC, but maybe New York
City. We elected at that time to keep the airplanes that were
doing the Combat Air Patrol over Washington, DC, and New York
City right where they were in case there was another airplane
coming. Then our intent was to go out and meet that aircraft
and destroy it if we needed to, if it entered either
Washington, DC, or New York City air space.
Senator Allard. My understanding is that NORAD has made
some effort to get direct access to FAA radar data in the past.
You have not had access to that? What is the status of that?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. Again, in the past we have had
access to what we call the Joint Surveillance System, which is
that system which rings the United States. It looks for the
foreign threat. It looks for someone coming into our air space
that is not authorized.
We have not been charged, we have not been concerned with
any aircraft that originate inside of our air space because we
believed that, in fact, is an authorized aircraft on a flight
plan and is authorized to be in the United States of America,
so we have been looking out. We have had access to the Joint
Surveillance System, but we have not taken all of the radars
internal to the United States and imported those into our
command and control centers.
Back in the 1950s, we actually owned and controlled all of
those radars in the United States Air Force, and since 1958,
when we stood up the FAA, we have been moving those radars to
the FAA. We have helped pay for them and purchase them, and we
have actually moved manpower on the order of about 200 people
over the years to the FAA to operate these radars, but we were
looking out, and we used the radars that the FAA uses to look
out. We both use those radars.
But now, to answer your question, we have figured out a way
to take these internal radars and net them into our command and
control centers.
Senator Allard. Well, I just want to thank you and your
people for a tremendous effort, in light of totally unexpected
circumstances, and I, for one, appreciate the readiness that
was displayed. I think that when you think about getting that
plane and taking off in 6 minutes, there had to be a lot of
hustle there, and I recognize that, and we are searching for
better ways in which we can even do a better job while
recognizing that you did a superb job at the time. So I want to
thank you and your people, General, for that.
I see my time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Allard.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
your convening this hearing. This has been a day of very
impactful and instructive testimony. I want to thank our
witnesses here, too.
This morning we had a subcommittee hearing chaired by
Senator Landrieu, and with the involvement of the Ranking
Member, Senator Roberts. There was mind-blowing testimony about
the threats under the category of bioterrorism. I discovered
then, others have known it before, about possible threats in
the area of agricultural terrorism, chemical terrorism.
Now, this afternoon, we are reviewing the acts of civilian
airplane hijacking, turning them into, as you said, manned
missiles. In between we had a Top Secret briefing from the
Director of the FBI and the Director of the CIA. Since those
were Top Secret, all I can say is that there were areas
discussed there that, again, to a new Senator are revealing and
mind-boggling.
So I guess I want to say, following up on what Senator
Allard said, the magnitude and the enormity and the complexity
and the multidimensional nature of what we are now calling
homeland defense, or homeland security, are staggering.
It is one thing to come in with perfect hindsight, and I am
not saying we should not do so to learn the lessons for the
future, but we talk about a Dark Winter simulation. We have
been in a Dark Fall in reality, and we are still in the midst
of one right now with the anthrax situation, which is changing
on a daily if not hourly basis, and may have other unfoldings
that have already taken effect that we are just not aware of
yet.
So I think we have to take all of this both with respect
and appreciation for all you are doing. While looking for those
areas where we can improve, because we always can improve. But
we always say we are preparing for the last war. What
constitutes homeland defense we have learned through a $359
million defense budget, and then we are in the midst of a
legitimate debate about how much more, according to the
national missile defense development, and lo and behold we have
some very astute and very determined, to the point of self-
sacrifice, enemies who are looking for exactly what it is we
are not focused on or we are not prepared for, and that is
where they are going to strike next, at what we are not
prepared for.
We do not want to scare the American people. On the other
hand, no one is complacent any more. How do we cope with all of
this, and how do we do so without spending more money? I guess
I go back to that, because we just passed a tax cut. We thought
that was the right thing. People thought that was the right
thing to do. With all respect, we thought we had a surplus, but
now we find we have a diminishing surplus and we have these
greater needs.
We are told this morning our public health system is
seriously inadequate to address those potential threats and
those real threats now. How do we gear ourselves up across the
board for all of this, much less coordinate it?
Secretary White. Well, I think, Senator, we are geared up.
We have a great deal of work to do. For example, the key to
homeland security to me is the competence and capabilities of
the first responders. There are 11 million first responders in
this country--State police, emergency medical technicians,
local hazardous material teams--and the question is, if you
look at the threats that you are talking about, what are the
gaps in the capabilities, and then how do we fill those gaps on
either an interim basis with assets of the Department of
Defense, Reserve component or active, and then on a long term
basis how do we build the confidence of the first responders to
fill in those gaps?
We cannot take all the resources of the Department, because
our worldwide challenges are not going to go away, and there is
a concurrency to this effort between what we do in the homeland
and what we are doing in CENTCOM or other regions of the world
that all address the same set of forces.
I do not think there is any way, with the increased
operational tempo that we are currently facing, like the air
cap that General Eberhart is directing, that you are going to
be able to do this in the same resource ceilings we were
talking about before 11 September, because the operational
tempo is just significantly escalated, and that is our national
challenge, as to how to come to grips with that.
Senator Dayton. Do any of the others want to add to that?
General Kernan. Sir, I would just echo what Secretary White
said. We have some tremendous capability right now, and we have
refocused it, everybody is energized, and we are looking to get
the synergy that we need. Fusing efforts in the interagency
arena, and a fusion of both domestic and international
intelligence and information, and the ability to do the
collaborative planning, is going to allow us to better predict
what the threat is, and allow us to be much more proactive. We
will have to look at reducing those seams and gaps that you
talked about.
We are assessing what command relationships make the best
sense. I think we need to look at the authorities that Guard,
Reserve, and Active components have, and who can work for whom,
and under what conditions can you maximize the flexibility
within the State.
The key is the responsiveness of the first responders, as
Secretary White said. The more prepared we are for them to be
employed and engaged to deter, I think the better we are going
to be able to protect our citizens.
General Pace. Senator, I would simply add that part of a
good defense is a good offense, and we have a tremendous
country. It is an open society. We want to keep it an open
society. There are many parts of it to defend. A good way to
defend it is to keep the other guy off-balance by attacking him
where he lives.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Hutchinson.
Senator Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have had
several members make reference to the very excellent hearing
that the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee under
Chairwoman Landrieu conducted this morning. It was a pretty
chilling presentation, at least in my mind, what we heard, and
in that presentation Senator Nunn made the comment that
smallpox was--he expressed it as being that which was the least
likely to be used, but the most catastrophic if used as a
threat to our population, then he went on to say that the
Health and Human Services was moving very aggressively to find
multiple sources of smallpox vaccine.
Later in the hearing, the question was posed to the entire
panel, if smallpox is the least likely weapon to be used, what
is the most likely, and the answer was anthrax. Perhaps on a
wider scale, a more sophisticated scale, but anthrax was the
most likely bioterrorist threat that we faced.
Hearing that, the question rose in my mind, and the
question that I posed to the panel was, well, if the least
likely is smallpox, and we are seeking multiple sources of
access, multiple sources for smallpox vaccine, and the greatest
threat, at least the greatest in the sense of likelihood of
being used is anthrax, what is the logic behind us having one
source for anthrax vaccine? What is the logic?
Dr. O'Toole responded immediately by saying, it is not
logical, nor is it defensible. I think she is exactly right,
and it is a concern that I have had for a long time. My first
question is, can the vaccine that is produced at the BioPort
facility in Michigan, the anthrax vaccine, presumably,
hopefully that it will be approved quickly by the FDA and that
we can see production begin again.
How can the civilian population access that? Will it be
only for force protection? We are talking about homeland
security. What kind of prospects are there that the production
of anthrax vaccine could be available for protection of the
general population should that be needed?
Secretary White. Well, the anthrax vaccine, Senator, with a
single source, was in a single source because the only people
we felt necessary to protect with the vaccine were those people
in the Department of Defense who would have an immediate
concern with anthrax.
Senator Hutchinson. Which obviously was a misguided
strategy, since we do not have a vaccine for our troops today
going into the arena of harm's way.
Secretary White. Yes, given the events since 11 September,
but I would say two things. I was in Houston last Friday, and
met with the emergency health services people, and the doctor
there said, if you are really worried about a biothreat to this
country, get your flu shot this year, because 30,000 people a
year die of the flu in this country.
The Health and Human Services under Secretary Thompson is
going to move anthrax vaccines and the business and production
of it to a national program.
Senator Hutchinson. If I might interrupt you, Secretary
White, my understanding is, it is 36 months before any
commercial firm will be able to produce anthrax vaccine, so
even if they move very aggressively, for 36 months there is no
protection, unless there is some means of accessing the DOD
production.
Secretary White. The principal treatment for anthrax today
is antibiotics, and that depends upon early detection, but the
strain that started here is 100 percent treatable with
antibiotics.
Senator Hutchinson. I do not mean to be argumentative, but
I have been told there are strains of anthrax that are
resistant to antibiotics. Is that accurate?
Secretary White. I am not an expert, so I do not think I
should offer an opinion. I think the point is, we need
something far greater than the BioPort single source. I know
that Secretary Thompson, in working with the FDA, is pushing to
number 1, certify BioPort's production; and number 2, expand
those that are in the business as rapidly as he can.
Senator Hutchinson. Mr. Secretary, are there pathogens
beyond anthrax and smallpox that our troops, our forces face as
potential risk, potential dangers in the future?
Secretary White. I would say yes.
Senator Hutchinson. The Surgeon General of the United
States has endorsed the idea of a GOCO, a Government-owned,
contractor-operated facility because there are pathogens out
there that will never be commercially feasible. Will the
Department of Defense, working in conjunction with HHS, and
working in conjunction with the Surgeon General, move
expeditiously toward a GOCO?
Secretary White. Absolutely. If the GOCO is the right way
to produce it, with all the experts, then we would obviously
support that. We are heavily involved in the research on this,
at Frederick, at Fort Dietrich. We have a leading research
laboratory there on biological terrorism threats, and we will
be an active part of the solution.
Senator Hutchinson. One of the suggestions Senator Nunn
made was the hiring of Russian scientists, and it was a very
constructive idea. My question is, after this amount of time,
is it too late for those Russian scientists that worked in
biological warfare, created a lot of the weapons that are
unfortunately out there, for us to endorse that kind of a
policy, where we try to take some of those that may be a
potential threat and utilize them and their expertise in trying
to fight these biological threats to our country?
Secretary White. Well, that is a good question. We have an
enormous research capability in this area already, both in the
Army and the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, and those
two facilities work very closely together. I know on the Army
side, and I am sure in Atlanta, they are looking to recruit
talent in these highly specific areas, but as we sit on the
ground today we think we have the finest technical base in the
world to deal with these things.
Senator Hutchinson. I do not think it is necessarily a
reflection on our lack of talent, but trying to get that talent
out of the potential of working for our enemies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Hutchinson.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Pace, since September 11, many operations have been
increased, and there is no question that there has been a
burden on the present Active Forces that we have, and so I am
concerned about the structure and training and personnel.
Do you believe, General Pace, that increased operations--
for example, increased air patrols over the United States'
cities and the use of National Guard personnel at airports, do
you think that they are likely to be maintained for a long
period of time?
General Pace. Senator, I am not sure what the definition of
a long period of time is, but certainly it must be maintained
until other forces are available. If it turns out to be a pure
police function and a police force can be built to take over
that function, then naturally we would turn it over. I do not
know who else in the United States could possibly do that, the
CAP that General Eberhart's people are doing, but I would like
to take the opportunity to tell you how fortunate we all are to
have such a robust capability in our National Guard and in our
Reserves, and those folks are critical.
Senator Akaka. I am glad to hear that, but let me ask you
this, then. Do we have adequate force structure, training, and
personnel to sustain these operations on the long-term basis?
General Pace. Sir, it depends upon how many other things we
embark on. Quite honestly, we may not have enough active force
structure. It all depends on the coalition. There have been
about 40 countries so far who have offered to assist us in many
ways, some of them financial, others up to going into combat
with us, so there are opportunities for our country to partner
with our friends around the world to be able to share some of
this burden, but as we go down this road, which is still very
uncertain, we may very well need to change our force structure.
Senator Akaka. General Pace, what, if any, is the impact of
your Department's current activities regarding homeland defense
on our readiness for other missions?
General Pace. Sir, short term we have not had a major
impact from the allocation of resources to homeland defense.
One area, however, is in the area of the Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS), early warning aircraft. In fact, that
aircraft has been in such demand that our NATO friends have
sent five of their AWACS type aircraft here to assist General
Eberhart in his mission, so there are specific low density,
high demand assets, primarily intelligence and air warning type
assets that are in short supply and are being used more rapidly
now than they were before.
Senator Akaka. General Kernan, would you have a comment on
that?
General Kernan. Yes, sir. Unquestionably there are some
significant training and readiness implications due to the
crisis we find ourselves in today. A lot of it has to do with
the force protection condition levels, for instance, that we
maintain to protect our military installations. Increasing our
force protection condition Charlie, will commit tens of
thousands of our troops to just protecting our installations.
As General Pace said, right now it has not had any
readiness impact. A lot of what we are being asked to do in the
way of homeland defense are collateral tasks to our primary
warfighting missions, but obviously operations tempo has
increased. We still rely heavily on the Guard and Reserve, so
the force structure issue is one that needs to be very
carefully studied.
Senator Akaka. General Eberhart, you said in your testimony
that NORAD forces are also focused on threats coming from
within our own air space. Are these duties in addition to the
prior focus on threats originally coming from external forces,
and if so, how are you preparing to do both?
General Eberhart. Yes, sir. They are in addition to the
aerospace warning, and aerospace control focus we had in
looking externally. We are preparing and training to do this
through the means we have talked about earlier in terms of
additional radars in the interior of the United States,
different netting and connectivity between the FAA and other
agencies and NORAD, and close cooperation with Pacific Command
and with Joint Forces Command.
In fact, on occasion we have had operational control or
tactical control of Navy ships or Navy airplanes to work these
kinds of problems, so we are looking at any and all ways as we
fight this war on terrorism to use the resources available and
use them as smartly as we possibly can.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Eberhart, a question that I would ask, and I think
this has been stated before, but by what authority was it that
your pilots had the authority to shoot down an aircraft? Where
was that given, and what, legally, do you have to have before
you can do that?
General Eberhart. Sir, the authority was from the National
Command Authorities. We never asked for that authority, and we
never gave the pilot that authority because we did not see that
situation. We did not see the necessity to do that, but the
authority was from the National Command Authorities.
Again, we have thought our way through this in exercises,
and worked with our lawyers, and have decided over time that if
we were convinced that the people on board that aircraft were
going to die regardless, and if we allow that airplane to
continue on, others are going to die, too, and we believe that
that is persuasive--that is difficult. I cannot imagine a pilot
living with that the rest of his life, but we have talked to
all of them. They all say they are prepared to do this if they
have to, and we know they are all hoping to God they never have
to do it.
Senator Sessions. But has there been an agreed-upon person
or command authority that would approve that, or is it up to
the pilot?
General Eberhart. No, sir, it is well above the pilot. The
National Command Authorities do not wish us to discuss that in
open testimony.
Senator Sessions. But you have clarified in your own mind
that there is no doubt as to how that should be handled?
General Eberhart. There is no doubt in the minds of our
pilots and all of our intermediate commanders, right on up to
the National Command Authorities.
Senator Sessions. A question about posse comitatus and the
involvement of the defense forces in homeland defense is a very
troublesome issue. We had hearings several years ago under
Nunn-Lugar and the Department of Defense willingly decided that
they would want to give up that responsibility of training
local police that was given them, and we agreed to that, and
the Department of Justice assumed that responsibility.
It seems to me that that is the right thing. Secretary
White, we went through that before, that we want our military
constantly ready at a moment's notice to do what it is
committed and trained to do, and if we put too many domestic
civilian training demands on them. But it does undermine your
core function, does it not, in addition to the legal and
historical reasons for minimizing military involvement in
domestic law enforcement?
Secretary White. Yes, Senator, it does, but at the same
time, if we in the Quadrennial Defense Review have said that
homeland security and homeland defense is the most important
thing we do, it becomes a matter of balance.
If we have deficiencies in first responders, and in
coordination with Governor Ridge, we have to figure out a way
to fill in those gaps between the States and local communities
to provide the necessary defense, then we are going to have to
make decisions about how to apportion resources and allocate
them, because somebody has to do it.
For example, we have biological and chemical units in our
structure because we face those threats on the battlefield, not
because there might be a biological attack in New York City. As
we review this whole business of homeland security, we are
going to have to revisit those questions of the appropriateness
of the force structure to a balanced capability between what we
do in homeland security and our traditional focus
internationally on the threats that face us and make some
decisions about priorities.
Senator Sessions. I think that is exactly right. I guess my
concern would be that we do not somehow look on the Department
of Defense but on the base force within the community, but it
would be a response force called on in an emergency. We need to
know, I think, for example, that we have certain chemical and
biological teams that do not need to be duplicated elsewhere if
yours are available to be called on. Is that what Mr. Ridge is
going to be working to do, to decide what the needs are and
what the gaps are and what the duplications are, and try to
develop a comprehensive program that will best cover our
Nation?
Secretary White. I think that is precisely the challenge,
and to me the cornerstone is to begin by looking at the 11
million first responders in this country, in State and local
organizations. The question is, what are the gaps, and how do
we fill in the gaps, and what do we add to them? Until we can
add it, what do we do in the interim? That to me is the essence
of Governor Ridge's challenge to sort out, and we aim to help
him do that.
Senator Sessions. I know we have a first responder training
center in Alabama for civil domestic preparedness, and surely
anybody who saw what happened in New York knows it was the
police and fire fighters that are first there. Now, the Guard
or the Active Duty Force could be called on to supplement, and
would be, but traditionally it is going to be--I mean, every
time it will be, in the inferno--the people who are right on
the scene to begin with.
General Eberhart, I know General Pace has wrestled with
this, and maybe I should ask him about it. In the Southern
Command, the drug effort and the law enforcement part of that
and the military mission is important. As a United States
Attorney on the Gulf Coast for 12 years, I was aware that we
were vulnerable to flights from South and Central America
coming into the country pretty much undetected. Now, we are
trying to protect our major cities. I will ask you, General
Eberhart, do you think that we need any increased effort to
maintain security over our southern border?
General Eberhart. Sir, we are doing a radar coverage
analysis as we speak, to include looking at aerostats. We have
used them there for years. We are going to draw them down, but
before we do that, we are going to make sure there is no value
added with this new mission of homeland defense and looking to
the interior. We are doing that analysis to see what is value
added, and that should be available soon.
Senator Sessions. I would add, the aerostats have not
proven to be spectacularly successful in the drug effort, but
maybe they will be in the effort for homeland defense.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Landrieu.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, if I
could, submit for the record a fairly lengthy opening statement
that would support many of the issues raised by Senator
Cleland. I want to associate myself with remarks he made, and
this statement goes into a lot more detail about that.
[The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
All government officials in this room, from Chairman Levin to
Secretary White, to General Pace, to our professional and personal
staffs, take an oath of office. That oath states, ``We shall protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States from all enemies--
foreign and domestic.'' At this time, our Nation and our constitution
require protection from enemies both foreign and domestic. The
hijackings on September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks were
infiltrated from within our borders. For the first time since the War
of 1812, our United States have been attacked. Like then, our military
should provide defenses to the Nation during this current time of war.
As the Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that you have called this
hearing. As one of 100 Senators and as one of millions of citizens, I
am grateful we are exploring the role of the Department of Defense in
homeland security. This morning, I chaired a subcommittee hearing to
investigate our Nation's preparedness in response to a hypothetical
smallpox outbreak. Quite frankly, the exercise, known as Dark Winter,
which was conducted under the direction of this committee's former
chairman, Sam Nunn, and the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), was quite sobering. Neither our Federal nor local
officials, responding to the smallpox outbreak, worked effectively to
curb and ameliorate the disaster. Moreover, in this exercise, the
government had to resort to martial law to restore any semblance of
order.
Politicians, generals, and think tanks have long hypothesized over
a possible terrorist threat to the United States of America. As of
September 11, the days of hypothesizing are over. The United States
faces, and will continue to face, real threats from biological,
chemical, radiological, and possibly even nuclear weapons, that could
devastate our critical infrastructure, our economy, our public health
system, and cause massive casualties.
Because our politicians, generals, and think tanks have been
contemplating the possibility of an attack, our level of preparedness
for such attacks has improved slightly in recent years. While I know
that our emergency responders and public health officials have worked
hard in response to the September 11 attacks and the anthrax scares,
those events have also shown that we are still under-prepared. Our
enemies are well aware that our citizens are scared, and that our
government has yet to remedy the public's fear. Our enemies are not
going to give us a time out or a reprieve to wait for the U.S.
government, local governments, and public health officials to tighten
up critical infrastructure, expand our vaccine programs, implement bio-
chem detection units, and otherwise improve our capabilities to respond
to the next public emergency. They do not play by the rules.
Regrettably, I think our Department of Defense is beholden to an
old notion of traditions and rules that hamper the Department's ability
to emerge as the leader it needs to be in Homeland Defense. For
generations, the Department has thought that wars would be fought on
other continents, and not on our soil. Under the doctrine of Posse
Comitatus, which dates back to the Revolutionary War, the U.S. was not
to maintain standing armies for any constabular purposes within the
United States. Our soldiers were not to engage in domestic defense or
activities generally associated with law enforcement. The F.B.I., local
police forces, and the National Guard were created to undertake
domestic defense. I recognize the spirit from which Posse Comitatus
grew, and I am a strong proponent of federalism. However, our 50 States
have been attacked, and we will only further endanger our citizenry if
the Department of Defense is withheld from taking action when American
soil is under attack. Posse Comitatus does not forbid the use of troops
to quell riots and civil disturbances, and it should not pose a barrier
when our Nation is under attack from its enemies. Notions that the
Department of Defense cannot actively participate in Homeland Defense
are antiquated, and they jeopardize our democracy.
The Department of Defense has long prepared its uniformed men and
women for the dangers of a non-conventional attack stemming from the
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These men and women best know
how to respond to the dangers that presently face the United States at
home. Moreover, the Department of Defense has dedicated teams of
scientists to create a wide array of counter-measures and defenses to a
WMD attack. Furthermore, they have created state-of-the-art WMD
detection units for troops in the field that our Federal and local
officials certainly need to protect the Nation. Our military has also
been better trained to respond to the likelihood of a WMD attack than
our civilian officials. We cannot afford to have the best department
suited for response, evaluation, containment, civilian security, and
defense on the sidelines because of its reluctance or beliefs in old
theories of states' rights that should not apply when America is under
attack.
Currently, over 40 Federal agencies and countless state and local
agencies have responded to the September 11 attacks and the anthrax
scares. Again, those brave men and women who have responded are to be
lauded. However, there have been dents in the armor, as evidenced by
the deaths of the postal workers in Washington, DC. What the American
people are looking for is a solidifying force to restore confidence,
and I believe that DOD can best provide that stability and confidence.
I am hopeful the Department of Defense is willing to undergo a paradigm
shift and take an active role, if not a primary role, in homeland
defense. We must not forget, after all, that the Pentagon was one of
the sites attacked on September 11.
The Quadrennial Defense Review, which was released on September 30,
2001, does not provide the framework it should as to how our military
will deal with the asymmetrical type of war that will dominate the
beginning of the 21st century. The tragedies of September 11 are
mentioned by the QDR as part of DOD's military planning, but DOD merely
papers over the problems posed by September 11.
At least the QDR states, ``Defending the Nation from attack is the
foundation of strategy.'' The QDR recognizes that the real chance of
another domestic attack has increased dramatically since September 11,
2001, and states ``. . . the defense strategy restores the emphasis
once placed on defending the United States and its land. . .''
Nevertheless, the QDR raises concerns that the Department of
Defense will not commit itself to an active role in homeland defense. I
recognize the Office of Homeland Security should oversee and coordinate
a national strategy to safeguard the United States against terrorist
attacks and respond to them. Again, however, DOD should not be so
willing to cede over its expertise in crisis management and response,
and by doing so, only take merely a supplemental role in Homeland
Defense. The QDR makes clear that local police and fire officials
should continue to serve as the first responders to future attacks, and
that the DOD does not wish to give such a duty to the military.
However, it seems evident that the military possesses both the human
and the scientific assets to best assess the aftermath of an attack,
restore calm, and provide further protection to the area affected in
the case of secondary attacks by an enemy.
I am hopeful that, today, we can alleviate much of DOD's misgivings
about any active participation in Homeland Defense. Of course, DOD will
have to change its force structure and organization to fight the new
type of war that so affects our Nation. Frankly, I am encouraged by the
possibility of such changes because it will signal an end to planning
and organizing based on the obsolete notions of the Cold War.
Furthermore, it is not my intention for military to undertake this task
without the means to do so.
Congress must and will provide DOD the funds to meet the demands of
the war we currently face at home. There is a war to fight on the home
front, and Congress will ensure that our military is funded to fight
that fight. DOD's role in Homeland Defense will not be an unfunded
mandate. We need our Nation's best and brightest at this urgent time,
and our men and women in uniform are the best and the brightest.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I am thankful you scheduled this hearing
today, and I hope we all understand that our military is crucial to
Homeland Defense.
Senator Landrieu. Just a comment, and then I have three
questions, if I could. One, it was said here on the record by
one of the panelists, and I thank you all for the excellent
work that you are doing, but we talked about being careful
about expanding the role of DOD in light of this sort of
domestic and homeland security. I know there are resource
issues and all sorts of things we have to address, and they are
legitimate, but I want to get back, Mr. Secretary, to what you
said, and to try to affirm that it is the original role of the
Department of Defense, the principal role, the central role,
the entire reason of being that the Department of Defense would
protect the life and liberty and well-being of the people on
the homeland, as well as people who have to temporarily travel
off the homeland to go for whatever carries them away, business
or commerce or other endeavors.
But the central role of the Department of Defense is
protection, and I think we are in a significant historic
paradigm shift. I think one of the roles of this hearing is to
help us focus on that new paradigm, and I for one am very happy
to see in the Quadrennial Defense Review the words reemphasized
about the primary role of the Department of Defense in
protecting the homeland.
We have had 6,000 innocent people killed. This is not a
crime, this is an attack. This is not a crime scene. This is a
battleground. 6,000 men, women, and children, innocent people
have been murdered and killed by the hands of our enemies,
using different weapons.
It is an asymmetrical attack, and I think the faster we get
clear about that, the better we will be able as a Government to
respond appropriately and quickly to prevent the further loss
of life and prevent the further deterioration of individuals'
well-being, and prevent the economic downturn for this Nation
that would have a dramatic effect not only on us but everybody
in the world, and to support what the President says about the
urgency of that.
Now, I want to just refer us to something that is not new,
because it was written in 350 B.C. by Sun Tzu. He said, ``know
your enemy, know yourself, and you can fight 100 battles
without disaster.'' I thank the chairman for calling this
hearing, because it is not only about knowing our enemy, who he
or she is, or where he or she is, or what it is, a State or a
terrorist cell, and where they might be and what their
motivations are, but a very important thing about what we are
doing today is knowing ourselves. Who are we? What have we
become? What are our departments, and what are our
capabilities, and how are we organized?
So along those lines, I just need to ask you, Secretary
White, if I could, one of the ongoing difficulties I believe we
face in this new era of symmetrical warfare which we are in,
and getting fully engaged, precisely when are we under attack
and when are we precisely at war?
We have developed a system for what we call low intensity
conflict. These actions are characterized by interventions
around the world to defend democracy during the Cold War. They
are fairly well-defined. We reached a hazy compromise under the
War Powers Act, by no means perfect, but it was the best option
that we had to reflect a changed world.
After the Cold War, we switched gears to peacekeeping, and
then the Pentagon has developed methodologies for what it calls
operations other than war, meaning peacekeeping and
humanitarian interventions. We are all familiar with this. It
has worked pretty well, because through the course of the Cold
War it was developed. There are expected protocols that have
been established, here and through the international community,
but I think we find ourselves in this new war without a
paradigm similar to the ones that we are familiar with. The
Pentagon does not seem to know how to treat non-State actors.
It does not seem to know what its proactive role is in
defending the continental U.S. That is what we are debating.
My question is, can you describe for me a scenario in which
a non-State actor would take actions within the United States
and which you would anticipate would put the Pentagon on a war
footing? Let me be clear. Could you describe for me a scenario
in which a non-State actor would take actions within the United
States and which you anticipate would put the Pentagon on a war
footing?
Secretary White. Senator, I think we are on a war footing
right now. I think we have just observed a war-like act. As the
President clearly said, we are at war with international
terrorism. If you look at what we are doing inside the
Department, we are on a wartime footing right now. We had 174
people killed in our building, and so we thoroughly understand
that we are at war, and the gentlemen on my right or left I
think understand that, and we are prosecuting that war both
domestically and internationally to the full measure of our
ability.
Domestically, as we have said earlier in the hearing, the
Quadrennial Defense Review cites our traditional role to
protect the homeland as the number one responsibility we have
in the Department. I absolutely agree with your comments on
that. We are at war right now, both domestically and
internationally, and I think we have the resolve and will and
support of the American people in that activity, and we are
going to prosecute it until it has finished.
Senator Landrieu. I want to agree with you and say I
support that most strongly, and I am also one of the Members of
the Senate that will try to provide the resources necessary to
do that, because there is a leadership role that must be
assumed, and the question about who assumes that leadership
role I think is central to being able to wage an effective and
appropriate battle for what we are experiencing right now.
There are many issues that have to be resolved, but I think the
people of the United States would welcome the military's
leadership role, respecting the other roles that all the other
Government agencies have to play when we are in fact in a new
kind of war, an asymmetrical battle. We are attacked in
different forms.
I know I am out of time, but just as the planes were turned
into missiles, we have now been attacked through the mail. The
next attack could come, as Senator Sessions or Senator Roberts
said, through the crop-duster. The next attack could come from
some other place, and if we are relying on the 11 million first
responders who are hard-working, underpaid, not getting paid
for overtime, not trained the way the military department is, I
think we may be relying on something that was not necessarily
intended for the new paradigm we are facing, not to say they
have not been fantastic and terrific.
So I will save my other questions. My time is up, but I
just think that the role of the military, I think I want to
support you in that central mission for the military.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Landrieu.
Senator Santorum.
Senator Santorum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I just want to maybe shift a little focus to
some of the concerns that I have. When I think of Army, I think
of Army beginning with R, and that is the word resources, and I
have had big questions for a long time about the Army and its
resources.
Now you are here in front of us saying we have a new
mission, a new responsibility, all these things I have to do
now, and I keep coming back to the Army that is underfunded
with the plan of 33\1/3\ capitalized, modernized units, and I
am just wondering how this new mission is going to be a drag on
resources. I believe it is absolutely essential for the Army to
begin and finish the process of something this committee has
advocated for quite sometime, which is the transformation of
the Army.
I understand and I support the designation of the Army as
the leader of this homeland defense with respect to the
military, but I have to tell you, I have some huge concerns,
and I would like you to tell me how you are going to take what
is already an underfunded Army to do an additional mission and
still get to transformation.
Secretary White. I think it is clear, just like the other
services, there will be additional resources required for the
additional op tempo that we find ourselves in.
I was making cases all summer long in the Quadrennial
Defense Review that, given the operational tempo of the Army at
that point, with deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo and other
places around the world, that we were hard-pressed, from a
structure and resources point of view.
If you just take the Guard side of it, we now have 6,000
soldiers in airports across the country dealing with that
challenge, so I think clearly, depending upon the duration of
this activity, as the Vice Chairman has said, there are
significant resources and structural implications to this level
of operational tempo that we are addressing both in the 2002
budget and the 2003 one that we are putting together as we
speak.
We must, however, sustain the transformation that the Chief
of Staff laid out 2 years ago, and that you have supported in
this committee, the transformation that makes us more agile,
more strategically mobile than we have been in the past. In my
opinion, it is tailor-made for the security environment we find
in post 11 September, and so we have to sustain that
transformation effort while we keep up with this increased
operational tempo.
Senator Santorum. I agree with you. My question, maybe, is
more specific, and that is, what challenges do you face not
just with the increased operational tempo, but the resources
that operational tempo demands, and still have the resources to
invest in the transformation, and what is the impact? Well,
just give me that. Can you tell me how you believe you can
allocate those resources?
Secretary White. Before 11 September, the allocation was
very clear. The allocation was to fully fund people, fully fund
readiness of the structure as it existed then, and to support
transformation both in the interim brigades and in the
objective force due with the legacy force, and bandaging
together our infrastructure and our installations, and those
were the trades we made to make it work.
Post 11 September, in our budget submits you have seen we
have asked for more money for force projection, we have asked
for more money for our intelligence resources, and the
operational tempo that we are at will require more O&M money.
We have made those requests, and we are, of course, in
discussion with you right now as you go into conference.
Senator Santorum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Santorum.
Mr. Secretary, you have testified today about the current
plan for reorganization with respect to homeland defense. I
understand that plan was developed at the highest echelons, and
came down through the Pentagon. Could you give your personal
views, based upon your extensive experience as a professional
officer, as a business executive, as a thoughtful commentator?
Is this reorganizational plan effective? Does it go too far?
Does it go far enough?
Secretary White. Do you mean in terms of what we are doing
in the Department of Defense?
Senator Reed. Or perhaps overall. Just your impressions
would be very valuable, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary White. My personal opinion is, number 1, as I
said earlier, we need a focus at DOD level, most likely with a
dedicated Under Secretary, and we need to collect all the bits
and pieces from SOLIC and Policy and Health Affairs that have
to do with homeland security, and we need to pull that all in
one spot. The Secretary, I have made recommendations to him,
and he is considering precisely how he wants to do that. I
think that is number 1.
Step number 2 is the operational planning that the joint
commands are doing before we get the Unified Command Plan out
so we can clearly define what our homeland security
requirements are and figure out the apportioning of forces.
Details are associated with that, and that is a big task, and
ultimately it will mean changes to the Unified Command Plan, as
the Vice Chairman has discussed.
The third and perhaps the greatest step is the interagency
aspects of this, which Governor Ridge will drive, and that gets
down to practice, practice, practice, against the realistic
threats we find ourselves fighting post 11 September. There are
parts of this that we do very well, because we frequently
exercise chemical spills and hazmat things that you find in the
normal course, but we have an enormous challenge facing us in
these new threats, and we have to train up on the interagency
side, and I am confident, having spoken with Governor Ridge,
that he will drive that process, and those are the things I
think we need to do.
Senator Reed. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. In fact, you
have predicted my next question. The impression I have is that
we have lots of good plans at every level, we have units that
have been designed to implement some of these plans, but I am
not quite sure we know what we have out there, because we have
not exercised vigorously. We have not done the kind of command
post exercise and operational exercises that will show, as you
have said before, the gaps.
Do you have now a vigorous schedule of exercises? I should
also add that this has to extend not just through DOD, through
Federal agencies. This has to go down to local police
departments, local fire departments, the environmental managers
in agencies and States. Are you thinking about those kinds of
exercises, and do you have the resources to do them, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary White. We have to, and I think everyone
recognizes that, and everyone recognizes the key role the
Governors will play in this, and State and local responders. In
23 of our States the Adjutant General of the State is also the
emergency services coordinator for the Governor. We will get to
that, and we will train to do that, because we do not have any
choice. We have to have the operational capability that will be
developed by that exercise, and as a former military officer,
you understand what I am talking about. If you do not train it
and do not exercise it, you do not have the capability.
Senator Reed. I could not concur more, and I do not want to
belabor this point, but is the money there for these exercises?
Are you actively planning? Will the schedule coordinate all the
way down to the emergency management office in the State, and
to the local fire departments and police departments?
Secretary White. I do not think the planning is laid out in
adequate detail at this point. I know that is a focus that
Governor Ridge and his appointment brings to the Government,
and we will actively support him.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. One final point
before recognizing Senator Warner for a second round.
We recognize we are up against a very adroit adversary.
They have struck us through our aviation system. One would
assume that they would try to find an open door and knock on
it, or just come through, which leads me to the issue I think
could potentially be very vulnerable, and that is our maritime
security, which the Department of Defense and Department of
Transportation must play a key role in.
Could you, Mr. Secretary, and your colleagues, comment on
maritime security in terms of your efforts at coordination and
organization in general?
General Pace. Senator, if I could go at it in an
unclassified way, and then perhaps in another forum address it
more specifically, but for example, some ships that were
scheduled to deploy overseas have not been deployed, to be able
to stay here. Some that were overseas are being brought home.
The cooperation between the Navy and the Coast Guard is
tremendous, and they are working collectively in our major
ports, on our coastlines to provide the best security they can
with assets they have, and so from the maritime perspective I
think the Navy and the Coast Guard are working very closely,
and are reallocating resources to focus more on homeland.
Senator Reed. Is this also a issue of the Unified Command,
who is in charge with respect to Coast Guard, Navy, and civil
authorities?
General Pace. Unified Command Plan has a primary objective.
The work that is going on now for changes has as a primary
objective identifying a CINC responsible for homeland defense.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General Pace, and if I may take
this opportunity, there was some discussion earlier about the
posse comitatus counterdrug efforts, and General Pace, you have
a unique perspective, being a former USSOUTHCOM Commander.
The understanding I have is that our participation in these
operations supporting Colombia and other initiatives, that our
legislation provides the Secretary of Defense the authority and
the direction to ensure that members of the Army and Navy do
not participate in law enforcement activities, so that there is
not an active regulatory stricture against those law
enforcement activities where DOD personnel are doing military
things. Is that fair, or could you comment on that?
General Pace. Sir, let me try, and you can tell me if I
miss the mark.
The statute does for routine daily activities prohibit your
military from acting as a police force. There are also,
however, emergency measures that the President can invoke which
allows us to do the things we have been doing since 11
September.
Senator Reed. But again, and I think my question was
slightly tortured, with respect to your operations in Colombia
and elsewhere, you are performing a strictly military role. The
regulations and the guidance you are giving the troops did not
invite them to get involved in criminal justice activities.
General Pace. That is correct, sir.
Senator Reed. If there is no objection, at this point I
would request to have the prepared statement of Senator
Thurmond inserted into the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Strom Thurmond
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing on the
Department of Defense's role in homeland defense. Although the Nation
is focused on the ongoing attacks against the terrorists groups in
Afghanistan, we must prepare and posture our forces and government
agencies for the defense of the U.S. homeland. This struggle, like the
President's declared war against terrorism, will be long in duration
and one that will test the perseverance of our people and democracy.
Mr. Chairman, threats against our Nation are not new, however the
events of the past month are serious challenges to our citizens and
economy. Never before have our people been faced with the threat of
chemical, biological, or radiological attacks. Nor has our economy
faced the threat of an attack on the critical computer networks that
tie together the domestic and international business community. We have
to prepare to meet these threats and, more importantly, the potential
aftermath of such attacks.
Mr. Chairman, our panel of distinguished witnesses will have a
critical role, but not the predominate role, in determining how we
prepare the Nation for homeland defense. Governor Ridge has the
challenge of effectively bringing together the efforts of all
government agencies at the federal, state and local level. We must
ensure that he has the authority and support in this vital effort to
ensure the Nation is prepared. The Department of Defense's role should
be supportive so it can focus on the traditional and non-traditional
threats emanating from outside the United States.
Although it is critical that we focus on the homeland defense, I
have always advocated that the best defense is a good offense. In that
regard, we must ensure that our military forces are in the highest
state of readiness, are forward deployed, and have the capability to
detect and strike the threat at its point of origin. I hope we will
keep that focus in mind as we consider the role of the Department in
homeland security.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Secretary White, you referred to our
distinguished acting chairman as a former military officer. He
went to West Point, and we are very proud to have him on this
committee. He certainly handles things very well. But I am just
curious, who was senior at West Point, the Secretary or
yourself?
Senator Reed. The Secretary was senior, quite senior.
Senator Warner. Secretary White and General Pace, we have
had a lot of discussion here on posse comitatus, but there are
some related statutes which I am informed by our staff have
directives which inhibit such things as the sharing of
intelligence between law enforcement and local military
organizations, and maybe we had better take a look at that. I
think what we did on the floor today, the Senate terrorism bill
has gone part-way in alleviating that. I come back to our
President, who has handled this thing with tremendous courage
and I think with foresight and brilliance, who said we are all
in this together, and we have to look at things that have been
in place for so long, like posse comitatus, and maybe there are
good reasons for the military to have intelligence that you do
not want to share with law enforcement at one time in our
history, but I think after this hearing you have heard an
expression of a lot of our colleagues that we had better look
at it.
I am glad you touched on the maritime security issue, the
port security, which of course is with the Coast Guard, but we
need to coordinate with the Coast Guard if we are bringing
heavy tankers in. Our Nation is so dependent on overseas
petroleum, and if one of those tankers were blown up by a
terrorist in a port it would have devastating effects. I would
hope that would be examined also.
Now, as we all fully understand, Secretary White and
General Pace, our overseas combatant commanders--we refer to
them as CINCs--establish uniform standards within their
geographic areas for force protection and threat warning
conditions. Who is responsible for establishing such standards
and issuing such appropriate warning information to our bases
within the United States, and we have obviously Air Force
bases, naval bases, and Army bases, and it seems to me that
should have a uniform examination. Now, you can take that for
the record, but does anybody have anything for the moment on
that?
General Pace. Yes, sir. The Service Chiefs are the ones who
set the force protection standards at the bases and the
stations in the continental United States.
Senator Warner. With all due respect, is the Chief of Staff
of the Army looking at the same level of force protection for a
base that is right next to the Norfolk Naval Base, and the
Chief of Naval Operations responsible for that?
General Pace. They are, sir, and in fact that was a
discussion item in this week's tank session with all of the
Joint Chiefs. We do collectively look at that to make sure we
are on the same level, but your question for the record is what
should we do in the future.
[The information referred to follows:]
Currently, the Secretaries of Military Departments, through Service
Chiefs, set force protection standards at bases and the stations in the
continental United States (as set out in DODD 20001.12 and DODI
2000.16). In the future, this responsibility may go to a new ``Homeland
Security CINC'' or fall in line with a national homeland security
threat system, if one is developed. Any proposal on changing the
current system will need to be properly vetted throughout the
Department of Defense before implementation.
Senator Warner. Lastly, we are all moving out as quickly as
we can to solve these problems, and I think we had better take
a look, Mr. Secretary, at the procurement regulations which
this committee, over the 23 years I have been here, worked on
many reforms. We have achieved, I think, some improvement, but
right now if there is a small firm out here or a collection of
individuals that is making a product and you need that product
tomorrow morning, I would hate to see you encumbered with a
long procurement process of bidding and the lowest bidding,
best and final, and review the bids.
We do not have time for all of that, and I indicated
yesterday in our discussion with the President that I think we
ought to look at a statute which reposes a wide margin of
discretion in the Secretary of Defense and, indeed, the
Secretaries of other departments and agencies, and Governor
Ridge acknowledged he is going to look at this also, whereby
for a period, let us say 2 years, and we would sunset it after
2 years, but if the Department of the Army wants to get out
here and buy a product, go to it, and let us get that product
and bring it in and utilize it in this war on terrorism.
We have had a good hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you
and all members of the committee.
Senator Reed. Let me inquire, Senator Akaka, Senator
Sessions, do you have additional questions?
Senator Sessions. I would just like to make an observation.
Having served as a United States Attorney during the early days
of the drug wars, I saw the incredible difficulty of getting
every agency that has a role to play in drugs working together
in a harmonious way. I can understand the difficulties you are
facing. The only thing I was concerned about was the
suggestion, perhaps--and I do not think it was meant to be that
way--that somehow the Department of Defense now might be
involved and be responsible for investigating mail, or is going
to be responsible for security at airports permanently, or
going to have to take over for the Coast Guard and now guard
the ports of America.
We have this tremendous investment over the years in all of
these agencies which have a good deal of expertise and
equipment. They are trained specifically, the FBI is, to
investigate cases. I know every local police officer and the
things in their community does things that the Department of
Defense does not have the ability to do, so what we have to do
is figure out how to draw on the resources of the Department of
Defense and make sure that they are readily available on call
when needed, create an orderly process here in some way, and
the problem, the challenge is a tremendous one, and it falls on
Mr. Ridge primarily.
I do not favor a major change in the roles we have,
frankly. I just do not favor that. Yes, a murderer is a threat
to the homeland, drug dealers are threats to the homeland, but
I do not think we want to turn all of that over to the
Department of Defense now, at a time when you are trying to
transform and be prepared to fight wars around the world, so
however we do that, Mr. Chairman, is going to be difficult, but
a comprehensive plan is needed, and this committee is doing the
right thing in having hearings on it.
I just would say that we ought to recognize every
additional duty given to the Department of Defense--the 6,000
National Guardsmen that have been deployed, called up, and have
to be trained and paid for that purpose--does drain your
budget. It drains your readiness from other missions you are
trying to do.
I will submit some more questions for the record.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. If
there are no further questions, the hearing is adjourned. Thank
you, gentlemen.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
WMD-CSTs
1. Senator Levin. General Kernan and Secretary White, to date we
have authorized 32 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
(WMD-CSTs), but only 10 have been certified ready to conduct their
mission by the Secretary of Defense. At the same time, their
capabilities are limited to WMD detection. They do not conduct clean-
up. Instead, they reach back to other units who do so. Some proposals
have recently surfaced to create new teams. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps
and other services are expanding their response capabilities to include
more clean-up and management. What is the correct way forward--should
we create more teams or should we focus on improving the capabilities
of the armed services across the board?
General Kernan. Managing the consequences of a weapons of mass
destruction incident is a complex task that will most likely demand a
broad range of capabilities, exceeding those of any one unit. The
capabilities of our state and local first responders remain the most
important investment we can make. Supporting military capabilities
should be unique or complementary in order to provide depth. The
detection and assessment capabilities of the WMD-CSTs are critical to
determining the scope of the problem and the type of follow on support
needed for a particular incident. These teams immediately deploy to the
incident site to assess an incident, advise civilian responders
regarding appropriate actions and facilitate requests for assistance to
expedite the arrival of follow-on personnel and assets to help save
lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage.
When demands exceed local and state capabilities, Federal assets
can be employed. Requirements for additional Federal assets are broad
in scope, likely exceeding the capabilities of any single organization
and therefore will include a variety of military capabilities that are
established principally to support warfighting abroad. Organizations
with military unique capabilities should be limited in light of the 11
million first responders and the 600 local and state hazardous
materials teams in the United States. The WMD-CSTs are one such
capability. The various proposals for establishing a WMD-CST in each
U.S. state and U.S. territory are worthy of consideration.
Secretary White. Careful analytical analysis during several
Department reviews have concluded that the current 32 congressionally
authorized WMD-CSTs adequately support our national requirement. The
teams are federally funded and equipped to provide state Governors
ready access to fully trained military response assets to use in
preparing for and responding to WMD incidents as part of their state
emergency management response capability. The CSTs are not considered
to be part of the first responder community. Rather, they are designed
to arrive within 12 hours after being requested by local authorities.
The Department's placement of 32 teams ensures that a WMD incident
anywhere within the U.S. can be supported within that response
standard. Thus, establishing more than 32 teams would require
substantial fiscal investment with little benefit, in terms of
increased population coverage or expected response time.
As you pointed out, the role of the CSTs is limited. There are many
consequence management functions required in responding to a domestic
WMD disaster. Most of these are performed by non-DOD entities. Local
first responders do the most critical, time-sensitive functions. It is
the Department's position that improving the training, equipping and
manning of our first responder community is in the best interest of the
American people.
2. Senator Levin. General Kernan, about a month ago, the GAO issued
a report on combating terrorism that was mandated by last year's
National Defense Authorization Act. The report asserted that the WMD-
CSTs ``continue to experience problems with readiness, doctrine and
roles, and deployment that undermine their usefulness in an actual
terrorist incident.''
What is your command doing to bring all of the teams up to a high,
uniform standard of readiness?
General Kernan. The WMD-CSTs are National Guard assets that are
manned by their respective states, and trained and equipped by the
National Guard Bureau. Joint Forces Command provides training and
readiness oversight of the WMD-CSTs. We assume that responsibility once
a WMD-CST receives Secretary of Defense certification. Training and
readiness oversight includes guidance to the National Guard, comment on
their programs, and coordination and review of readiness and
mobilization plans. Therefore, under our training and readiness
oversight responsibilities, we are working closely with the National
Guard Bureau and the states where those teams reside to standardize
their training, tactics, techniques and procedures. Joint Task Force-
Civil Support serves as our Command's executive agent in this critical
effort. I would add that in recent visits to Fifth U.S. Army in San
Antonio, Texas, and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, I had the opportunity
to review the Army's training program that ensures that all WMD-CSTs
receive standardized, high quality training. In fact, collectively both
First and Fifth Army headquarters conduct a validation exercise for
each WMD-CST prior to Secretary of Defense certification. The high
standards and consistency of this program are impressive.
NORAD-FAA
3. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, as I mentioned in the hearing,
in order to get a complete account from you, I am resubmitting this
question and adding some related questions regarding the sequence of
events on September 11 relating to the aircraft that crashed into the
Pentagon. According to the timeline I have seen:
At 8:55 a.m. on September 11, American Airlines Flight 77 began
turning east over Ohio, away from its intended course.
At 9:10 a.m., Flight 77 was detected by FAA radar over West
Virginia, heading east. This is after the two planes had struck the
World Trade Center towers.
At 9:25 a.m., the FAA notified NORAD that Flight 77 was headed
toward Washington, DC.
General Eberhart, is this the first notification that NORAD and DOD
had that Flight 77 was probably being hijacked?
General Eberhart. At 0924 EDT, NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector
(NEADS) received the first notification that American Airlines Flight
77 was possibly being hijacked. This was the first documented
notification received by the Department of Defense.
4. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, given what had happened in New
York City, do you know why it took the FAA 15 minutes to notify NORAD
that Flight 77 had probably been hijacked and was headed toward
Washington, DC?
General Eberhart. My understanding is that the FAA lost radar
contact with American Airlines Flight 77 and momentarily regained
contact at 0850. The FAA also began to receive calls from outside
agencies with reports of a possible downed aircraft. Additionally, the
loss of radio contact with the aircraft added to the confusion. In
light of this, I believe the FAA was faced with conflicting information
which hindered them from making an accurate assessment of the actual
location of the aircraft.
5. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, at 9:37 a.m., 27 minutes after
Flight 77 was detected by FAA radar heading east over West Virginia and
while the whole Nation was watching the devastation in New York City,
it crashed into the Pentagon. What level of the DOD had the knowledge
that Flight 77 was headed toward Washington at the time it crashed into
the Pentagon?
General Eberhart. The FAA notified the NEADS that American Airlines
Flight 77 was headed towards Washington, DC. NEADS then passed this
information to NORAD's Air Warning Center and Command Center in
Cheyenne Mountain and to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region's Regional
Air Operations Center. At 0925, the NMCC convened a Significant Event
Conference and during that conference, at 0933, NORAD reported one more
aircraft en route to Washington, DC.
6. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, was there ever any
consideration given, between the time the aircraft was detected heading
toward Washington and the time of the crash, to evacuating the
Pentagon?
General Eberhart. The FAA notified the NEADS of the possible
hijacking at 0924 EDT and F-16s from Langley AFB were airborne at 0930
EDT. At 0925 EDT, the FAA notified NEADS that Flight 77 was headed
toward Washington, DC. At that time, there was no way for the FAA or
NORAD to determine what target within the Washington, DC area the
terrorists on Flight 77 intended to strike. Because of this, NORAD did
not consider issuing an evacuation notice to the Pentagon.
7. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, to your knowledge who else did
the FAA notify aside from NORAD?
General Eberhart. After the FAA determined that American Airlines
Flight 77 had been hijacked, they convened a hijack conference, which
included representatives from the FBI, DEA, and CIA.
8. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, what, if any, existing
interagency plans were activated?
General Eberhart. Prior to the attacks on 11 September, the FAA and
NORAD established a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure
accomplishment of the air defense mission. The assigned
responsibilities and working relationships were fully executed during
the timeframe mentioned above.
9. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, who within DOD should NORAD
notify in the event of a future attack of this nature?
General Eberhart. Since the attacks on 11 September, NORAD has made
major changes regarding how we respond to an air threat. We have
established a new conference called the Domestic Threat Conference
which is used to alert and inform command centers, senior authorities,
and other agencies of a domestic event having the potential to threaten
the United States, U.S. Forces, or national security and critical
infrastructure protection interests. [DELETED] The Domestic Threat
Conference provides the ability to quickly pass time critical
information needed to react to a threat against North America.
10. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, during the hearing you
testified to the timeline of notifications from FAA to NORAD, and at
one point stated ``we were told that it was a light commuter plane''
that hit the first World Trade Center tower. Who told NORAD that it was
a light commuter plane?
General Eberhart. On the morning of 11 September, NORAD rapidly
received a vast amount of information concerning the attacks on New
York City and the Pentagon. During this timeframe, we received
conflicting reports on which aircraft were involved in the attacks and
which aircraft were hijacked. As we were responding to the first
hijacking, CNN reported that a commuter plane had hit the World Trade
Center. NORAD soon learned that the aircraft that crashed into the
World Trade Center was in fact the hijacked commercial airliner.
11. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, relating to Flight 77 and
Flight 93, what buildings or offices did NORAD consider notifying once
you learned that Flights 77 and 93 had been hijacked?
General Eberhart. The FAA informed NORAD that American Airlines
Flight 77 was headed toward Washington, DC, but neither NORAD nor the
FAA had any information on the terrorists' intended target. Concerning
United Airlines Flight 93, NORAD did receive word that aircraft had a
possible bomb on board; however, our records did not indicate the
direction the flight was headed. Therefore, we did not consider
notifying any offices or buildings.
12. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, to your knowledge did the FAA
notify the Pentagon that Flight 93 was hijacked?
General Eberhart. The data/log entries received by NORAD from the
FAA do not show a time or entry indicating the FAA specifically
notified the Pentagon that United Airlines Flight 93 was hijacked.
13. Senator Levin. General Eberhart, did NORAD notify the National
Military Command Center that Flight 93 was hijacked?
General Eberhart. NORAD did not notify the National Military
Command Center (NMCC) that United Airlines Flight 93 was hijacked. In
the event of a hijack, it is the FAA's responsibility to convene a
``hijack conference,'' which includes the FBI, DEA, CIA, and the NMCC.
Due to the rapidly evolving situation on 11 September, the FAA also
made direct contact with NORAD's NEADS.
14. Senator Levin. Secretary White (reassigned to General
Eberhart), what improvements have been made since September 11 to
communications among NORAD, the FAA and the National Military Command
Center?
General Eberhart. Since the attacks on 11 September, NORAD has
created three new conferences to improve communications between NORAD,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the National Military Command
Center (NMCC).
The first new conference is the Noble Eagle Conference. This is a
NORAD/FAA conference that allows for rapid investigation of air events
which do not require the National Command Authority's (NCA)
notification. This conference is convened to gather information on
emergent air events that are unusual in nature, but do not present a
threat to North America. [DELETED]
The second conference now used by [DELETED] is the Domestic Event
Conference. CINCNORAD uses the Domestic Event Conference to
characterize and assess domestic warning indications for potential
threat to North America and to inform agencies within the Department of
Defense as well as other Federal agencies. Based upon the situation,
the NMCC Deputy Director of Operations or CINCNORAD may recommend
upgrading the conference to a Domestic Threat Conference.
The Domestic Threat Conference is the third new conference used in
the event of an air threat to North America. This conference also links
[DELETED], and it is used to alert and inform command centers, senior
authorities, and other agencies of a domestic event having the
potential to threaten the United States, U.S. forces, or national
security and critical infrastructure protection interests. The Domestic
Threat Conference provides the ability to quickly pass time critical
information needed to react to a threat to North America.
Along with the newly established conferences, NORAD has sent
military representatives to the FAA's Air Route Traffic Control Centers
and the FAA has sent additional representatives to HQ NORAD and to
CONR.
UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN
15. Senator Levin. General Kernan, in the aftermath of September 11
you have augmented the staff you have dedicated to homeland security, I
understand as a stop-gap measure until the Secretary of Defense decides
where he wants this mission to be permanently housed. In addition, the
Joint Task Force-Civil Support, also under your command, has doubled
its size to 160 people who are enhancing planning and sustaining the
current 24-hour homeland security operations. Could this constitute the
nucleus of a homeland security staff, if JFCOM inherited the mission?
General Kernan. Our new 90-person homeland security directorate
could serve as the nucleus of a homeland security staff. It was
structured to be an interim Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. Led
by a two-star Army general, this directorate is charged with planning,
organization and execution of U.S. Joint Forces Command's
responsibilities for land and maritime homeland defense and military
support to civil authorities. JTF-CS continues to fulfill its charter
as a deployable command and control headquarters ready to respond today
to support the lead Federal agency for consequence management in the
event of an attack by weapons of mass destruction. The increase in
manning to 164 personnel was initiated prior to 11 September and we are
accelerating it. Achieved through assignment and augmentation, this
increased manning ensures that JTF-CS can maintain a continuous 24-hour
response. Furthermore, to enhance unity of effort, I have recently
placed JTF-CS and JTF-6, our counterdrug task force, under the control
of my Homeland Security Director.
16. Senator Levin. General Kernan, do you think Joint Forces
Command should take on the homeland security mission?
General Kernan. U.S. Joint Forces Command is fulfilling its
recently assigned responsibilities for land and maritime defense and
military assistance to civil authorities. The Unified Command Plan
establishes the missions and responsibilities of the individual
combatant commanders. In light of the 11 September attacks, the Service
Chiefs and combatant commanders are proposing changes to the Unified
Command Plan and the Chairman, under his Title 10 responsibilities,
will recommend changes to those authorities to the Secretary of
Defense. Joint Forces Command is ready now to assume this mission if
assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
17. Senator Levin. Secretary White, President Bush has appointed
several individuals to oversee or coordinate some aspect of homeland
security. This list of individuals includes: Governor Ridge, as head of
the Office of Homeland Security; an NSC counterterrorism coordinator,
General Wayne Downing; an NSC Cyberterrorism coordinator, Mr. Dick
Clarke.
As DOD's interim executive agent, how are you working with these
various individuals?
Secretary White. I have close and daily personal contact with
Governor Ridge, General Downing, and Mr. Clarke on homeland security
matters. There is a strong relationship developing between my staff and
the staffs of the Office of Homeland Security and the National Security
Council. The daily meetings and communications will continue to forge
solid relationships so that we may work together to effectively address
the many homeland security issues the country is facing.
18. Senator Levin. Secretary White, how are you ensuring that the
Homeland Security Office, the interagency and agency coordinators, and
the Department are not working at cross-purposes?
Secretary White. The Department of Defense fully participates in
Governor Ridge's daily Homeland Security Council principal, deputy, or
policy coordination committee meetings. Representatives from other
agencies also attend these meetings. This ensures that the agencies are
not at cross-purposes with each other or with Governor Ridge's office,
but are working together towards a focused, common purpose.
19. Senator Levin. Secretary White, in addition, how are those of
you charged with defending U.S. territory against terrorist attacks
coordinating with the officials in the NSC and State Department who are
focused on global terrorist threats to the U.S.?
Secretary White. Homeland defense is an integral part of Homeland
Security. DOD's homeland defense activities and operations are
coordinated with both the Office of Homeland Security and the National
Security Council, and are often a topic of discussion in meetings
chaired by these organizations. The State Department is represented at
these meetings to provide a linkage to the global threat from
terrorism.
JFCOM HOMELAND SECURITY CAMPAIGN PLAN
20. Senator Levin. General Kernan, in your testimony you mention
that your command is developing a Homeland Security campaign plan using
``innovative organizational and operational approaches'' and that you
are coordinating with other military, defense and Federal agencies.
What innovative approaches are you using?
General Kernan. In organizing our 90-person Homeland Security
Directorate from within the command, we leveraged insights and concepts
gained from our joint training and experimentation work. Specifically,
our standing joint task force headquarters initiative, associated
collaborative tools, and training initiatives provided the framework
for developing this organization into a highly functional command and
control headquarters to conduct Homeland Security. Our campaign
development and coordination with other agencies is guided by both
sound operational experience and joint experimentation insights derived
from work on the Operational Net Assessment and Effects-Based
Operations concepts.
21. Senator Levin. General Kernan, how will your campaign plan
relate to the existing DOD plans--the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's CONPLAN 0300-00 and the DOD Directives on Military Support to
Civil Authorities--as well as interagency plans, given the fact that
homeland security involves all agencies, as well as local, state, and
Federal governments?
General Kernan. Our campaign planning effort is nested within or
informed by all of these existing plans and directives. We are working
in concert with the appropriate agencies through the Joint Staff.
Ultimately, the Joint Forces Command plan will complement a National
Homeland Security strategy and plan.
NATIONAL GUARD
22. Senator Levin. General Pace, the National Guard is presently
functioning in a variety of ways with regard to homeland security in
both its State and Federal status. Are you satisfied that procedures
are in place to ensure that the use of the National Guard for homeland
security does not interfere with their potential use as envisioned in
the CINCs' warfighting plans?
General Pace. The Joint Staff and the National Guard Bureau have
been and will continue to track this issue. Currently, there are
555,000 National Guard and Reserves in the force with 30,000 volunteers
supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE. This commitment does not have a major
effect on our ability to execute current war plans. If further National
Guard and Reserve Forces were called up for Homeland Security missions,
or multiple warfighting plans were activated, we would certainly
reassess the impact of assigning those forces to our war plans.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE NATIONAL GUARD
23. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, the Hart-Rudman Report, page
XIV, states: ``We urge in particular that the National Guard be given
homeland security as a primary mission, as the U.S. Constitution itself
ordains.''
Major General Allen Tackett, the National Guard Adjutant General
for West Virginia, and other Adjutants General believe that homeland
security should be one of the missions of the National Guard, but not
the only mission. The Guard should still maintain its warfighting
missions. Do you agree with the Hart-Rudman recommendation that
homeland security should be a primary mission of the National Guard?
Secretary White. Historically, the National Guard has been dual
missioned for both its Federal warfighting role and its domestic
response, state role. Many of the Guard's capabilities, including
medical, command and control, and communications, are a direct result
of preparations to perform their warfighting mission. Given the recent
heightened interest in having the military execute domestic security
missions, the National Guard is being relied upon to perform its
domestic response role.
The National Guard does play a primary role as a military force
provider for disaster response within the United States. However, there
are several reasons why homeland security is not considered to be their
primary mission. First, as reservists, National Guardsmen are not
available to perform domestic missions for extended periods of time.
They are optimized to be recalled in the event of a major war or to
perform short duration consequence management missions following a
domestic disaster. Overall, most homeland security missions are likely
to involve many long-term tasks that are unsuited to be performed by
the National Guard.
Likewise, many homeland security missions within the United States
can be best performed by other Federal, state, and local elements.
24. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, what changes in force structure
and additional resources would the National Guard Bureau require in
order to fulfill the broader mission of homeland security?
Secretary White. There are still a lot of issues to be worked out
in defining the missions that make up homeland security, assessing
current capabilities, and assigning responsibilities. It is not yet
clear how much of the overall national mission will fall under the
purview of DOD, let alone the National Guard. Some temporary tasks
currently being performed by DOD, such as airport security by the
National Guard, will revert to another Federal agency for the long
term.
We anticipate that more changes will be required in resources than
in force structure. The Department is still developing what those exact
changes will be. The extent of changes required will depend on the
exact number and types of missions assigned to the National Guard.
Assuming that the Guard's role will be focused on crisis management
response, few force structure changes will be required, as forces can
be tailored to meet special missions and circumstances.
25. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, what statutory changes might be
required for the National Guard to conduct ongoing homeland security
operations and also take on broader support to law enforcement and
first responders?
Secretary White. The National Guard may undertake homeland security
missions in a State active duty status. In such a status, the National
Guard is under the control of the State governor and is funded with
State funds. All missions undertaken by the State National Guard in
this status must comply with State law. Our country's traditional
reliance on the National Guard is valued and the Federal strictures of
our Constitution prescribe a combination of national and State
structures to address national and State needs. Under our Federalist
form of government there are many missions in the Homeland Security
area that can and should be done by the States.
The National Guard may undertake homeland security missions in a
State active duty status. However, for those missions that are national
in scope, such a State active duty status has a number of
disadvantages: each State will perform the mission in a different way
depending on State law; the funding levels for each State National
Guard will be different; and the Federal Government has little say over
how the mission is accomplished.
A second status that is often considered for performing such
homeland security missions is duty pursuant to Title 32, United States
Code. Title 32 sets forth the authority under which National Guard
personnel are trained to perform their warfighting mission and provides
that such personnel remain under the control of the State governor but
are supported with Federal appropriations. Although title 32 also
authorizes the National Guard to undertake some specific missions that
do not constitute training (such as counterdrug support or support to
disadvantaged children), such missions are specifically authorized by
statute. We believe that the use of National Guard personnel under 32
U.S.C. Sec. 502(f) to undertake homeland security missions such as
critical infrastructure protection and national border security, which
constitute neither training nor a defense mission, is extremely
problematic legally.
It should be noted that National Guard members performing airport
security duties are now serving under title 32 under a unique set of
facts: airport security prior to September 11 was the responsibility of
State and local governments; the President requested State assistance;
the National Guard personnel performing the airport security mission
obtain valuable training (preparation for peacekeeping); and Congress
provided emergency funds to support State and local preparedness for
mitigating and responding to the September 11 attacks and for
increasing transportation security. These factors are not readily
apparent for most routine homeland security missions and the use of the
National Guard in a title 32 duty status to perform such homeland
security duties is not appropriate.
If it makes sense to perform homeland security duties with the
National Guard in a title 32 status, it is possible to amend title 32
to permit the use of the National Guard similar to the way the National
Guard is now employed to undertake counterdrug duties under 32 U.S.C.
Sec. 112. Such an amendment could provide for members of the National
Guard in a full-time National Guard duty status to undertake specified
homeland security missions as delineated by statute. National Guard
personnel performing such duties would be under the control of the
State governor but the costs of the National Guard program would be
borne by the Federal Government.
26. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, it is clear that the Guard has,
and will continue to have, an important role in responding to a wide
range of civil disturbances, from natural disasters to terrorist acts.
These missions can be essential to our national security. The National
Guard counterdrug program is a useful model for Federal support of the
state missions of the National Guard.
Will you support using defense dollars to increase the readiness of
the National Guard for homeland security training and exercises?
Secretary White. Yes. This is not different from current practices,
since we keep our National Guard forces trained and ready for various
types of employment; to include many missions that can be considered to
be homeland security-like missions. National Guard WMD-CSTs have
participated in inter-agency response exercises, such as TOPOFF. Since
DOD is not normally the lead Federal agency in responding to domestic
disasters, it does not take the lead in conducting domestic exercises.
The Department will continue to support other lead Federal agencies in
the conduct of such domestic exercises.
27. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, do you believe that the type of
homeland security threats we will face in the future require the use of
the specialized skills that National Guard Special Forces units can
provide, including knowledge of unconventional warfare, specialized
skills in urban and rural environments, and medical knowledge to
support first responders?
Secretary White. The National Guard does have impressive Special
Forces units, which will continue to prove valuable in the future.
However, legal restrictions on the use of military forces within the
United States apply to almost all of the tasks applicable to these
types of forces. Rest assured, that where they can be used most
effectively, National Guard Special Forces units will be used.
28. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, do you concur with the
recommendation to the Senate Armed Services Committee from General
Peter Pace, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, that the illicit
drugs flooding America should be considered a weapon of mass
destruction? Should counterdrug efforts be included as a part of
homeland security?
Secretary White. The Department of Defense's role in counterdrug
efforts is one of civil support. Additionally, we support U.S. and
foreign law enforcement agencies' interdiction of illicit drugs before
they reach the shores of the United States. Within that construct, the
Department of Defense is the lead U.S. agency for detecting and
monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs. The new Office
of Homeland Security focuses on the terrorist threat to our National
security. The structure of DOD's Homeland Security program is under
review, and it remains unclear whether the counterdrug mission will be
included in that program.
29. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, I have long supported the
creation of an integrated homeland security training site at Camp
Dawson, West Virginia, which includes the recently constructed Regional
Training Center, and would include a planned Virtual Medical Campus
located at West Virginia University. Combined, these institutions would
provide the necessary education, training, and certification
capabilities to prepare America's emergency first responders, including
the medical community, for an incident involving a weapon of mass
destruction or similar event. Camp Dawson incorporates the Integrated
Special Operations Training Facility (ISOTF), a world-class training
facility that would make Camp Dawson America's premiere training
facility for emergency first responders. According to a National Guard
Bureau feasibility study, dated March 2001, the ISOTF is a unique
facility that will encompass special training complexes unlike any
other in the world today. Some of the specific areas that will be able
to be taught at the ISOTF include:
Asymmetrical Warfare;
Counterterrorism (CT);
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD);
Law Enforcement Special Operations (SWAT);
Civil Disturbance Operations;
Military Operations on Urban Terrain (Basic and Specialized MOUT);
Special Forces and Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC);
Hazardous Material (HAZ-MAT) Response and Handling;
Fire Fighting;
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Response;
High and Low Level Rescue;
Disaster Preparedness;
Aerial Delivery Operations (Personnel and Equipment);
Cyber Terrorism;
Information Warfare;
Electronic Warfare;
Maritime Terrorist Training;
Emergency Services for Federal, State, and Local agencies; and
Live fire capability.
Please review the National Guard Bureau feasibility study on Camp
Dawson and provide comments on how you believe the capabilities at Camp
Dawson can be better integrated into our Nation's homeland security
efforts.
Secretary White. The feasibility study summarizes both the current
and planned training facilities at Camp Dawson, and notes that it
provides ``an excellent opportunity for military and non-military
institutional training.'' The number and variety of facilities at Camp
Dawson position it well for use in homeland security training, which
involves a wide variety of situations.
Camp Dawson will be considered along with other military, Federal,
and local training sites in a coordinated strategy incorporating
national requirements and capabilities.
30. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, I understand that certain
military technologies such as those that identify chemical and
biological agents are much more accurate than their commercial off-the-
shelf identification counterparts used by civilian HAZ-MAT
organizations. An integrated National Guard and first responder
training facility would allow for the education, training, and
certification of emergency and first responders using the latest dual
use military and civilian technologies to fight terrorism and
counterdrug operations. Camp Dawson has the potential to be such an
integrated facility.
Please comment on the value of disseminating dual use military
technologies and training to civilian emergency and first responders
through facilities such as Camp Dawson.
Secretary White. Senator Byrd, we agree with you that some military
technologies could be very beneficial to civilian emergency and first
responders. Demonstration of these technologies in integrated military-
civilian training and other venues is both a wise and valuable
approach. As such, we can assure that as we, in conjunction with
Governor Ridge's Office of Homeland Security and other Federal and
State agencies, develop and implement training strategies and
facilities, we will endeavor to capitalize on efficiencies and
synergies that may be gained by using facilities such as Camp Dawson.
HOMELAND SECURITY AND BIOMETRICS
31. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, in your new role as the Interim
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Homeland Security, you have
assumed the responsibility for bringing together the resources of the
Department of Defense to coordinate with and assist the Director of the
President's Office of Homeland Security, former Governor Tom Ridge, and
other Federal, state, and local agencies. You are also the Department
of Defense Executive Agent for Biometrics, a responsibility assumed by
the Secretary of the Army last year.
The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of September 30, 2001, lists
biometrics as one of five priority ``emerging technologies'' of which
the Department of Defense ``will vigorously pursue the development and
exploitation.''
What role in homeland security do you see for the Department of
Defense Biometrics Program, especially the Interim Biometrics Fusion
Center located in Bridgeport, West Virginia, within the Department of
Defense and within the Executive Branch? What responsibilities will you
be assigning the Biometrics Program in this new mission?
Secretary White. In light of the events of September 11, the
Biometrics Management Office refocused its singular direction from
information assurance biometrics efforts to an expanded role including
the use of biometrics applications for physical security.
This expanded approach will support greater knowledge
to the services for force protection and anti-terrorism
efforts.
The Biometrics Management Office and the interim DOD
Biometrics Fusion Center will further support homeland security
by maintaining a web site to assist DOD on biometrics issues.
The restricted access section of the DOD web site will contain
test and evaluation reports, biometrics product data, and
lessons learned.
Considering heightened interest in biometrics devices and
applications since September 11, we plan to use the Biometrics Fusion
Center to analyze more commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) biometrics
products. It is our intent for the Biometric Fusion Center located in
Bridgeport, West Virginia, to become a Center of Excellence that can be
utilized not just by DOD assets but can provide leadership, technical
expertise, and capability to National Homeland Defense efforts at
large.
I have tasked the Army CIO to supervise the biometrics initiative.
The DOD Biometrics Office will assist the CIO to carry out this
responsibility. I further directed the DOD Biometrics Office to expand
its singular direction from information assurance biometrics efforts to
the use of biometrics for physical security. Additionally, I have
tasked the DOD Biometrics Office to accelerate the full integration of
biometrics into the DOD Common Access Card, which is used across DOD
for network access, facilities access, and personal identification.
32. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, what relationships exist or are
being developed by the Department of Defense Biometrics Program to
assist the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S.
Customs Service, and other Federal, state, and local agencies to
improve security at airports and national points of entry, and to
assist in their law enforcement efforts?
Secretary White. I have tasked the Director, DOD Biometrics to meet
regularly with senior officials at the Federal Aviation Administration,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, and Department of
Justice to discuss common interests. Most recently, on October 18, he
visited the FBI facility in Clarksburg, West Virginia and recently met
with security officials in the Federal Aviation Administration. These
events focused on identifying opportunities to incorporate biometrics
technologies to enhance security at airports, national points of entry,
and other key points of interest for Homeland Security. The DOD
Biometrics Management Office continues to foster these relationships to
leverage lessons learned and exchange technical information.
33. Senator Byrd. Secretary White, biometrics offers the promise of
increased physical security, computer and communications systems
security, and information and identity assurance for military and key
civilian facilities, such as airports and national points of entry. The
largest biometrics repository in the world is the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) fingerprint center in Clarksburg, West Virginia,
and nearby is the Department of Defense Interim Biometrics Fusion
Center. The FBI uses its computerized fingerprint repository to provide
identity assurance for law enforcement personnel across the Nation and
overseas. What plans do you have to establish a centralized repository
for Department of Defense biometrics data?
Secretary White. We have developed conceptual models for three
databases including: Knowledgebase, Test and Evaluation, and
Operations.
The Biometrics Knowledgebase will serve as the DOD's
source of information about biometric security, technology,
products, test and evaluation results, and lessons learned.
The Biometrics Test and Evaluation Database will serve
as a stand-alone database for use by the DOD Biometrics Fusion
Center for test and evaluation activities such as validating
COTS and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) biometrics
technologies, products, and applications.
The Biometrics Operations Database (Gold Standard). A
study is awaiting contract award to define the capabilities and
functions of the database.
The current plan is for the centralized repository to be located at
the Biometrics Fusion Center in Bridgeport, WV, and to have the
Knowledgebase and Test and Evaluation databases initial operation
capable by March 2002. The study for the concept of the Operations
database is targeted to begin in March 2002. Following review of the
study, we will construct milestones for implementation.
Bottom Line.
We are working closely with the FBI Criminal Justice
Information Systems Division. The Biometrics Fusion Center is
located in Bridgeport, WV. The FBI activity is located in the
adjacent city, Clarksburg, WV.
We are working with the West Virginia National Guard
Home Land Security Facility, located at Camp Dawson, West
Virginia.
West Virginia University, College of Engineering and
Mineral Resources, Department of Computer Science and
Electrical Engineering is collaborating with DOD Biometrics
Office to develop the Information Assurance and Biometrics
Graduate Certificate Program, and Concepts in Biometric Systems
and Information Assurance Program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner
ACQUISITION REFORM
34. Senator Warner. Secretary White, a central goal of acquisition
reform has been to leverage the commercial marketplace and attract
``non-traditional'' commercial contractors to meet an increasing
proportion of DOD's needs. By overcoming the barriers to these
companies' participation in Federal contracts, DOD can tap into their
expertise and gain innovative new solutions to address the challenges
that confront our Nation. Despite the efforts of both the legislative
and executive branches over the last decade, many commercial
contractors still express frustration with the constraints of
governmental contracting rules and regulations.
In this time of crisis, and particularly with respect to how the
biotechnology and the information technology industries can help our
government wage its current battle against terrorism, do you see a need
for additional acquisition reform legislation? If so, what specific
legislative measures do you believe are needed?
Secretary White. Section 836 of the Fiscal Year 2002 National
Defense Authorization Act provides legislative authority that will help
in the current battle against terrorism. Specifically, it provides that
any procurement of biotechnology property or services needed to defend
against terrorism or biological attack will be considered a commercial
item, which facilitates its purchase under our regulations. It also
increases the micropurchase threshold and simplified acquisition
threshold for procurements needed to combat terrorism. Finally,
paragraph (b) of section 836 requires the Department to submit a report
to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives containing the Secretary's recommendations for
additional emergency procurement authority necessary to support
operations to combat terrorism. The Department is in the process of
identifying such additional legislative authority and will include them
in the report.
35-38. Senator Warner. [DELETED].
Secretary White. [DELETED].
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Strom Thurmond
COMMANDER IN CHIEF FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
39. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, last year Secretary Cohen
said that when he first proposed the formation of a ``commander in
chief for homeland defense'' the idea was controversial. ``Immediately
there were questions being raised as to whether or not this would
intrude upon constitutional prohibitions of getting our military
involved in domestic affairs.'' I understand the Department is again
considering establishing a CINC for Homeland Defense. How do you
address the constitutional question on getting our military involved in
domestic affairs?
Secretary White. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA/18 U.S.C. Sec. 1385)
and DOD Directive 5525.5, which as a matter of Department of Defense
policy extends the restrictions of the PCA to the Navy and the Marine
Corps, have for many years ensured that the Armed Forces of the United
States only engage in the direct enforcement of domestic criminal laws
under circumstances that are clearly authorized by laws of the United
States or the Constitution. The Department of Defense historically has
been reluctant to accept law enforcement missions. There are a number
of reasons for this reluctance:
(1) a longstanding distaste on the part of the citizenry for the
use of the military as a police force;
(2) a lack of formal training on the part of most servicemembers to
engage in domestic police activities involving functions such as
arrest, execution of warrants, searches and seizures, and the
protection and preservation of evidence;
(3) an unwillingness within the military to permit servicemembers
to undertake extensive law enforcement training because such training
may well interfere with a servicemember's ability to train for our
warfighting mission; and
(4) a significant concern that the addition of a law enforcement
mission to the many high demands already shouldered by the Armed Forces
in defending the country will degenerate or destroy their ability to
accomplish their primary mission.
Over the years, section 1385 has been interpreted to preclude the
use of the Army or the Air Force to execute the criminal laws of the
Nation regardless of whether the military was employed as a posse
comitatus or simply undertook law enforcement missions as part of its
military duties. Notwithstanding the Department's reluctance to use the
Armed Forces to engage in domestic law enforcement missions, the
Department has on rare occasions provided such support to civil law
enforcement agencies in emergency situations (e.g., support during
riots and insurrections). The President has inherent constitutional
authority, and longstanding statutory authorities (e.g., chapter 15 of
title 10), to direct the use of the Armed Forces domestically in
support of the national security interests of the Nation. In addition,
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, Congress provided express statutory authority to the President
under Senate Joint Resolution 23 (S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001)
(enacted)) to use military force to prevent further such attacks.
Accordingly, although I understand that a review of the PCA is on-going
within DOD, I do not believe that the PCA and the Department's
implementing directives pose an obstacle to the Department when the
President determines that the Armed Forces must be employed to protect
the national security interests of the United States.
ASD HOMELAND DEFENSE
40. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, a recommendation of the
United States Commission on National Security for the 21st century was
that a new office of assistant secretary of defense for homeland
security be created to oversee the various Department of Defense
activities. Does the Department agree and plan to create this new
position?
Secretary White. The Secretary of Defense requested that Congress
consider a new Under Secretary of Defense position for homeland
security. In that context, the Secretary asked that I carefully
consider how we might reorganize within the Department of Defense to
oversee homeland security activities; this review is ongoing.
IMPACT ON MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES
41. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, critics of DOD's involvement
in responding to incidents of domestic terrorism argue that extensive
military involvement in domestic matters will distract the DOD from its
core missions and may make the DOD more like domestic civilian
institutions. Consequently, the critics argue that this domestic
involvement will degrade military professionalism. What are your views
on this issue?
Secretary White. The Department of Defense carefully analyzes all
requests for support to civil authorities and other Federal agencies
prior to the commitment of resources. These requests are analyzed based
on four criteria: scope, duration, appropriateness (i.e., mission
profile), and exit strategy. Those requests that satisfy this analysis
are then weighed against other obligations and should not detract from
DOD's ability to execute its core missions.
With regard to military professionalism, our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines pride themselves in their professionalism and their
commitment to service. Performance expectations for domestic support
missions are no different than they are for any other mission and
servicemen and women will execute their duties with pride and
professionalism.
USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
42. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, Title 10 U.S.C. Section 382,
Emergency Situations Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass
Destruction and 18 U.S.C. Section 831, Prohibited Transactions
Involving Nuclear Materials, authorize the Secretary of Defense to use
of military personnel, equipment, and technical assistance in non-
hostile emergency situations that pose a serious threat to the United
States and its interest. Are you aware of any discussions between the
Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General that would create a
foundation for the rapid enactment of these statutes?
Secretary White. The Department of Defense and the Department of
Justice have already established detailed protocols and procedures for
these cases and have exercised them extensively.
WMD PROLIFERATION
43. Senator Thurmond. Secretary White, current United States Anti-
Terrorism Policy states that the highest priority shall be given to
preventing the acquisition of a WMD capability by terrorist groups. Do
you believe the Comprehensive Threat Reduction programs and related DOE
non-proliferation programs are effective tools for preventing the
acquisition of WMD materials from the former Soviet Union?
Secretary White. The CTR program is one element of a more extensive
program designed to keep WMD from being acquired by rogue states and
terrorist groups. Our efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorist
groups from acquiring WMD must include:
Enhancing our ability and willingness to interdict
shipments of nuclear weapons related material to countries
supporting terrorists;
Assisting foreign government in their efforts to
control exports or transshipments of material from or through
their territory, and efforts to interdict WMD-related
shipments;
Increasing efforts through diplomatic and military
channels to enhance U.S. nonproliferation objectives; and
Focusing the efforts of assistance programs such as
the CTR program on those areas where we can obtain the highest
return.
We continue to work to make the Department of Defense CTR program
and DOE nonproliferation programs as effective as possible in assisting
the FSU to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials in the face of
efforts by terrorists, organized crime and rogue states to acquire
these materials. The two departments are working with the states of the
FSU to consolidate and secure or destroy nuclear, biological, and
chemical agents.
HOMELAND DEFENSE MISSION
44. Senator Thurmond. General Pace, last month's report on the QDR
states: ``It is clear the U.S. forces, including the United States
Coast Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations
for performing these missions (homeland).'' How is the Department
addressing these issues?
General Pace. There will be a number of future changes that will
have a direct effect on how our forces prepare, train and execute
Homeland Security missions. In the near term, the Secretary of Defense
has designated JFCOM and NORAD as the two primary CINCs responsible for
Homeland Security. Long-term solutions will be incorporated into
ongoing revisions to the UCP. All UCP revisions are approved by the
President.
MILITARY HEALTH CARE SUPPORT
45. Senator Thurmond. General Pace, in February of this year the
head of the Joint Task Force for Civil Support, Major General Bruce M.
Lawlor, agreed with the views being expressed that the National Guard
and the Reserves could provide medical support in case of an attack,
but he had some reservations. Specifically, he pointed out that the
Army medical community ``has been downsized by as much as 40 percent,''
and ``what remains is not organized for domestic support. It is
designed for combat operations.'' What is the state of military
healthcare concerning a large-scale response to terrorist attacks?
General Pace. The DOD brings to the table significant assets that
can be called upon in a national crisis. These assets include
specialized medical platforms that can be used to provide surveillance,
detection, and field laboratory capabilities in support of operations
in a WMD environment. However, the DOD lacks the capability to provide
direct medical treatment and healthcare support for large-scale
populations requiring a response to terrorist attacks employing
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive (CBRNE)
agents.
The military healthcare system is neither equipped, task-organized,
nor staffed to function in a role of primacy for these types of events
either in the homeland defense scenario, or to support geographic
Combatant Commanders in operations overseas. Successful mitigation of a
WMD event will be predicated on interagency coordination and
cooperation. The DOD healthcare system will only be part of the wider
``system'' of assets that must be brought to bear in support of our
national consequence management efforts.
ROLE IN MONITORING
46. Senator Thurmond. General Pace, recently the Los Angeles Times
ran a story that detailed some difficulties the Department faces
regarding intelligence sharing. Specifically, the article noted that if
the National Security Agency were monitoring the cell phone calls of a
terrorist suspect, surveillance would be required to be stopped the
moment the suspect reached U.S. soil. The Senate passed the Uniting and
Strengthening America Act by a vote 96-1 that gives new tools to law
enforcement to combat terrorism. Will the DOD benefit or, more
specifically, be able to utilize the provisions articulated in this
bill to provide asset and intelligence sharing with Federal law
enforcement?
General Pace. Yes, the Uniting and Strengthening America Act allows
the DOD to receive more and better information on terrorism from U.S.
law enforcement. For example, the provision to allow grand jury
information to be shared among Federal officials, to include
intelligence officers, is a strength that will improve DOD's ability to
fight the global war on terrorism.
NATIONAL GUARD SUPPORT
47. Senator Thurmond. General Kernan, according to the U.S.
Commission on National Security for the 21st century, the National
Guard and associated Guard Response Teams are ``vital to creating an
effective national response ability'' for Homeland Defense. As such,
the report recommends that the National Guard ``plan for rapid
interstate support and reinforcement,'' and ``develop an overseas
capability for international humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief.'' Unfortunately, I have been informed by National Guard
officials that there is no current mobilization plan to bring regional
teams from other states to the site of multiple attacks. There is no
plan to respond to multiple attacks within a large single urban area
and due to the high operational tempo of the Air Force, ``there is no
military airlift support available for domestic mission training
scenarios.'' Is this accurate?
General Kernan. U.S. Joint Forces Command and our Army and Air
Force components are working with our assigned units, the Services, the
Joint Staff, and the National Guard Bureau to improve responsiveness
and coordination and formalize the process. In this regard, I have met
with Lt. Gen. Russ Davis, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, on a
number of occasions and with several state Adjutant Generals. One
result of these meetings is a combined Joint Forces Command-National
Guard Bureau initiated general officer steering committee, comprising
all involved active, National Guard, and Reserve organizations, to
further develop the collective way ahead.
Airlift issues are the responsibility of U.S. Transportation
Command. I would note that U.S. Transportation Command's support of our
Homeland Security Ready Reaction Force exercises has been superb. In
coordination with U.S. Transportation Command, C-130 aircraft have been
allocated on a regional basis and placed on high alert to rapidly
transport those Ready Reaction Forces throughout the United States.
MORTUARY SUPPORT
48. Senator Thurmond. General Kernan, the head of the Joint Task
Force for Civil Support, Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, addressed a
major problem that he feels is a significant gap in the current
organizational make-up of the national response plan--dealing with the
grim problem of the victims. He stated that the Civil Support Teams
``could not cope with collecting and burying possibly hundreds, if not
thousands of dead bodies,'' not to mention the ``host of legal and
religious issues'' involved in dealing with these victims and he warns
that ``there is currently only one mortuary affairs company on active
duty and one in Reserve.'' What steps is the Department taking to
address this shortfall?
General Kernan. The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams
are National Guard assets that are manned by their respective states,
and trained and equipped by the National Guard Bureau. These teams
immediately deploy to the incident site to assess an incident, advise
civilian responders regarding appropriate actions, and facilitate
requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of follow-on personnel
and assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate
property damage.
The primary responsibility for collecting and disposition of bodies
rests with the state and local coroner. If requested, military
assistance to civil authorities could include mortuary affairs. Joint
Forces Command has combatant command over three mortuary affairs units,
the 54th Mortuary Affairs Company in the Active component and the 311th
and 246th companies in the Reserve component. Both the 54th and 311th
have supported post 11 September recovery operations at the Pentagon.
Assets from the 246th augmented the 311th and the 246th is in the
process of being re-manned. These units exist to support combat
operations, but may be employed when a request for assistance is
received from the lead Federal agency and approved by the Department of
Defense. For example, in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing,
the 54th effectively assisted the medical examiner, the responsible
local agency, in processing remains. In wartime, a fully manned
mortuary affairs company can process up to 400 remains per day, though
actual capacity will vary based on the situation. It is important to
remember that there are many private, local, and state first responders
who will do the bulk of this difficult but necessary work. We have
certainly seen that in New York City since 11 September.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
DONOVAN TRANSPORTABLE DETONATION CHAMBER
49. Senator Sessions. Secretary White, in your positions as
Secretary of the Army and Interim Department of Defense Executive Agent
for Homeland Security, have you considered the need for technology such
as the Donovan Transportable Detonation Chamber (DTDC)?
Secretary White. As the Interim Department of Defense Executive
Agent for Homeland Security, I am continually looking for tools to
respond to situations involving threats to homeland security. I am
especially interested in technology developed in the private sector for
it portends a great benefit to the U.S. taxpayer. Over the past several
months, I have received a considerable amount of information on the
Donovan Transportable Detonation Chamber and share your interest in
pursuing its potential here in the United States.
50. Senator Sessions. Secretary White, I have been told the DTDC is
a promising tool to meet the need for explosive and chemical bomb
destruction devices. I understand that this technology is awaiting Army
validation. I request that you have the DTDC reviewed and its
validation decision be made as soon as is possible. Once the review has
been made have your staff report its findings to my office.
Secretary White. The DTDC has been approved for the destruction of
conventional munitions and other high-explosive devices. Additionally,
the U.S. Army is providing technical assistance to the Royal Military
Academy of Belgium in support of their efforts to evaluate the
potential of the Donovan Chamber for destroying recovered chemical
munitions. We are awaiting the results of the Phase I and Phase II
tests in Belgium to determine if we should move forward here in the
United States. Once our review has been completed, I will have my staff
report their findings to your office.
[Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the committee adjourned.]