[Senate Hearing 107-383]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-383
THE ROLE OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN
CONTROLLING THREATS FROM THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 7, 2001
CURRENT AND FUTURE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION
THREATS
NOVEMBER 14 AND 29, 2001
COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) WITH
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS: NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE COORDINATION ACT
OF 2001
FEBRUARY 12, 2002
MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
JULY 29, 2002
STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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___________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey TED STEVENS, Alaska
MAX CLELAND, Georgia SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Mitchel B. Kugler, Minority Staff Director
Brian D. Rubens, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Akaka...................................12, 31, 59, 93, 121
Senator Cleland..........................................12, 40, 60
Senator Cochran.................................12, 34, 72, 98, 122
Senator Domenici............................................. 32
Senator Carnahan............................................. 75
Senator Thompson............................................. 94
Prepared statement:
Senator Carnahan, November 14, 2002.......................... 52
WITNESSES
Wednesday, November 7, 2001
Michael L. Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological Arms
Control Institute.............................................. 4
Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., Director, Chemical and Biological
Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.................... 6
Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace............................................ 9
Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade,
U.S. General Accounting Office................................. 20
Richard T. Cupitt, Associate Director, Center for International
Trade and Security............................................. 22
James A. Lewis, Senior Fellow and Director of Technology Policy,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 24
Gary Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control........................................................ 26
Wendesday, November 14, 2001
Hon. Chuck Hagel, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska...... 35
Ms. Gary L. Jones, Director of Nuclear and Nonproliferation
Issues, Natural Resources and the Environment, U.S. General
Accounting Office.............................................. 38
Laura S.H. Holgate, Vice President for Russia Newly Independent
States Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative..................... 41
Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies........... 43
Thursday, November 29, 2001
Vann H. Van Diepen, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State........... 62
Marshall S. Billingslea, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Negotiation Policy, U.S. Department of Defense..... 65
Kenneth E. Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 69
Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Export
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.................... 72
Tuesday, February 12, 2002
Elisa D. Harris, Research Fellow, Center for International and
Security Studies............................................... 96
Amy E. Smithson, Ph.D., Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation Project, Henry L. Stimson Center.............. 99
Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University............................................. 101
Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Fellow, International Institute for
Strategic Studies.............................................. 106
Monday, July 29, 2002
Vann H. Van Diepen, Director, Office of Chemical, Biological and
Missile Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State............. 123
Marshall S. Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Department of Defense..................................... 127
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Baker, Kenneth E.:
Testimony.................................................... 69
Prepared statement........................................... 290
Billingslea, Marshall S.:
Testimony...................................................65, 127
Prepared statement.........................................279, 346
Borman, Matthew S.:
Testimony.................................................... 72
Prepared statement........................................... 296
Christoff, Joseph A.:
Testimony.................................................... 20
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 178
Cupitt, Richard T.:
Testimony.................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 196
Gormley, Dennis M.:
Testimony.................................................... 106
Prepared statement........................................... 322
Gottemoeller, Rose:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 171
Hagel, Hon. Chuck:
Testimony.................................................... 35
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 219
Harris, Elisa D.:
Testimony.................................................... 96
Prepared statement........................................... 298
Holgate, Laura S.H.:
Testimony.................................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 233
Jones, Ms. Gary L.:
Testimony.................................................... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 223
Lewis, James A.:
Testimony.................................................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 206
Milhollin, Gary:
Testimony.................................................... 26
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 212
Moodie, Michael L.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 145
Smithson, Amy E., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 99
Prepared statement........................................... 304
Spector, Leonard S.:
Testimony.................................................... 43
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 245
Tucker, Jonathan B., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement with an attached table.................... 155
Van Diepen, Vann H.:
Testimony...................................................62, 123
Prepared statement.........................................268, 331
Walsh Jim, Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 101
Prepared statement........................................... 313
Appendix
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of
Delaware, November 29, 2001, prepared statement................ 90
Information submitted for the record by Mr. Billingslea entitled
``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic
Energy Agency''................................................ 355
Copy of S. 673................................................... 369
S. 673--Section by Section Analysis.............................. 377
USEC Inc., Executive Agent for the U.S. Government Implementing
the Megatons to Megawatts Program, prepared statement, November
14, 2002....................................................... 379
Appendix ----: Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Proliferation Threats.................................... 387
Appendix ----: Background on Non-proliferation Assistance
Programs....................................................... 396
Appendix ----: Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes............. 414
Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Akaka with answers
from:
Mr. Christoff................................................ 417
Mr. Cupitt................................................... 420
Mr. Lewis.................................................... 423
Mr. Milhollin................................................ 425
Mr. Billingslea.............................................. 427
Mr. Borman................................................... 429
Ms. Harris................................................... 430
Ms. Smithson................................................. 435
Mr. Walsh.................................................... 441
Mr. Gormley.................................................. 459
Mr. Van Diepen............................................... 466
Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Cleland with
answers from:
Ms. Harris................................................... 434
Ms. Smithson................................................. 440
Mr. Gromley.................................................. 457
Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Thompson with
answers from:
Mr. Van Diepen............................................... 472
Mr. Billingslea.............................................. 485
CURRENT AND FUTURE WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION THREATS
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2001
U.S. Senate,
International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services Subcommittee,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel Akaka,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Carper, Cochran, Stevens,
and Thompson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
I welcome my friend, Senator Cleland, and our first panel.
Today's hearing about export controls and weapons of mass
destruction is not a new topic for this Subcommittee. Senator
Cochran, our distinguished Ranking Member and good friend, also
held hearings on export controls when he chaired this
Subcommittee. It is not a partisan issue. I think it is fair to
say that our witnesses today, who are all noted experts on the
subject of proliferation and export controls, reflect the
bipartisan nature of this discussion.
Since September 11, however, developing an effective
approach to controlling the spread of weapons of mass
destruction to both state and non-state actors has taken a new
urgency. The terrorists of the 21st Century are not intent on
using one bullet to assassinate political leaders, as did the
lone Serbian nationals who triggered the First World War at the
beginning of the last century with the shooting of Archduke
Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Twenty-first Century terrorists strive
to cause the maximum amount of damage to the maximum number of
innocent people. Their weapons of choice are amazingly simple
and astoundingly deadly. But they are still the few against the
many.
As one of our witnesses today notes, contemporary
terrorists have a mystical fascination with chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons. Osama bin Laden and his
followers would use these weapons to harm us all without regard
to age, gender, or nationality. Men, women, and children from
over 50 nations died on September 11. We cannot forget this
fact as we prepare for future conflicts during the rest of this
century, which has begun as sadly as the last.
The technology that has made us rich, however, also
threatens to be the technology that destroys us. High-speed
computers, Internet access, dual-use materials, equipment, and
know how are essential ingredients of these simple but deadly
devices. Unfortunately, we know from sad experience with the
recent anthrax attacks that these threats are real.
Our hearing is about how we can prevent more laboratories
with dangerous weapons capabilities from being developed. Some
might argue that it is too late. Technology is loose. Dual-use
items are too difficult to control, or trying to control dual-
use exports will only hinder our own economy.
I do not think we have the luxury of indulging in any of
those arguments anymore. Our enemies are using our own
technology and our own open society against us.
We cannot declare war against international terrorism while
saying at the same time that we should conduct business as
usual. There is no more time for business as usual. We need to
examine every aspect of our society to see how we can harden
ourselves against terrorist attack and we need to examine every
aspect of our international transactions to see how we can
inhibit our enemies from gaining technologies to use against
us.
In World War II, export controls were not ``dirty words.''
They were an essential part of our defense. In today's war,
there is also a role for export controls because if we do not
do everything we can do to deter our enemies from gaining
deadly weapons, then we all will pay the ultimate price in our
own backyards. This is the terrible message from today's
terrorists.
This hearing is an effort to start identifying those
technologies and the means to prevent them from hurting us
later.
I am pleased to welcome my colleague, Senator Cleland, and
ask him for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of our panel, thank you for coming. I am pleased that
this Subcommittee is addressing this critical issue today and
that we are further scheduled to address the Nonproliferation
Assistance Coordination Act next week.
I note that a dear friend of mine, former Senator Sam Nunn,
in his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee called once again for enhancing the cooperative
threat reduction measures that he helped put in place several
years ago. I strongly support such action. There is no more
important topic for our national security than addressing the
threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I
have long advocated a comprehensive national strategy for
dealing with this threat and I believe that our strategy must
be based on the likelihood of each type of incident as well as
on our vulnerability to it.
For many years, I have argued that we were too focused on
low probability, high-tech threats and not focused enough on
high probability, low-tech threats. Regardless of the threat, I
am convinced that we must enhance the mechanisms for
coordinating our response to WMD.
Coordination is essential. It is my conviction that we must
better coordinate the efforts of all players that led me to
develop legislation I am introducing today, the Public Health
Emergencies Accountability Act. This act puts in place a
procedure that allows clear assignment of responsibility in
cases where the public health is threatened. It further
mandates the exchange of information between institutions
primarily responsible for public health, such as the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, and those primarily
responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities.
We must also resource these agencies to enable them to carry
out this essential coordination. Coordination is particularly
important in the tough areas where the lines of responsibility
and definition blur.
This hearing addresses another such arena, the dual-use
technologies that lie at the heart of chemical, biological,
even nuclear infrastructures that exist around the world today.
To achieve the necessary coordination, we must tackle the hard
questions that arise when talking about technologies that
provide legitimate commercial opportunities, but which in the
wrong hands can also mask potential threats.
It is no longer enough to throw up our hands and walk away
from the table when the establishment and enforcement of
necessary counterproliferation protocols conflicts with
legitimate commercial interests. We have got to find a way to
strike a balance that allows commercial enterprises a
reasonable degree of autonomy while ensuring the greater public
good is not compromised.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement, Senator.
Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. I have no statement, Senator. I wish I
could stay longer. I am just here for a little while. Thank you
very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for being here.
We are glad to have our panel this morning. I am pleased to
welcome you. Dr. Moodie is co-founder and President of the
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and former
Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Dr. Jonathan Tucker is Director of the Chemical and
Biological Nonproliferation Program and was a member of the
biological weapons inspection team in Baghdad, Iraq, with the
United Nations Special Commission.
Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. She holds a joint
appointment, the Russian and Eurasian program and global policy
program, and is former Deputy Under Secretary for Defense,
Nuclear Nonproliferation, in the U.S. Department of Energy and
former Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National
Security.
I would like to at this time, before I call on Dr. Moodie,
to yield to Senator Thompson for any statement he may have.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have
any statement to give. I am looking forward to hearing the
testimony of these fine witnesses. This is, of course, a
continuation of a series of hearings that this Committee and
Subcommittee has had for a long time on this subject, and, of
course, it is much more timely now in a lot of people's minds
than it has been in times past, but I commend you for keeping
the spotlight on this important area. Hopefully, people will
now pay attention. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
Dr. Moodie, we welcome any opening statement you may have.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL L. MOODIE,\1\ PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE
Mr. Moodie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee as it
addresses this very important topic.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Moodie appears in the Appendix on
page 145.
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In the summary of my statement, in the few minutes that I
have, I would like briefly to address three interrelated
issues, the need for better threat assessments, the linkage
between state and non-state threats, and the need for a
strategic response in which export controls continue to play an
important role. My remarks today will focus on the chemical and
especially the biological weapons threats.
My starting point is the recommendation of the Gilmore
Commission that we must improve our threat assessments. This is
true not only with respect to the chemical and biological
terrorism threat, but also for the challenge of proliferation
at the state level. Traditionally, threat assessments have been
overly simplistic. They have tended to focus on only a single
factor, such as the agent that might be used or the motivations
of the state or terrorist who might use them. In addition,
these more simple threat assessments have emphasized
vulnerabilities rather than genuine risks, which are a
combination of vulnerability and likelihood.
But conducting more complex threat assessments is not easy.
It demands good intelligence and creative analysis. But better
threat assessments would do three things. First, they would
describe a threat envelope that identifies the most plausible
contingencies.
Second, they would provide a means to identify those
contingencies that require hedging in that due to the severity
of their consequences, some preparation for them should be
undertaken even if they are relatively unlikely, and this
combination of a plausible threat envelope and the hedging
contingencies should give to policy makers some measure for
making decisions regarding policy priorities and resource
allocations.
Third, a good threat assessment will highlight the fact
that the threat is not uni-dimensional, rather that it is
composed of several elements, including the actor, his
motivations, intentions regarding casualties and capabilities,
the agent involved, the target, and issues regarding the mode
of attack and other operational considerations.
The key to a successful threat assessment is disaggregating
the threat into these component elements and assessing the
possibilities that various combinations of them produce. Some
combinations of factors will yield significant consequences,
others will produce no consequences at all.
This approach to threat assessment leads to important
conclusions that should inform policy decisions. First, the
degree of risk declines as the level of desired casualties
increases insofar as the contingency involving higher levels of
casualties become less likely.
Second, we should not take great comfort from this
conclusion because, despite the low probability of catastrophic
attacks in the United States, there is still ample cause for
concern because we do not know how massive a mass attack has to
be. Worst case scenarios need not happen to stress the response
system to the point of collapse. Moreover, the danger and harm
inherent in the use of chemical and especially biological
weapons is not limited to physical casualties. As we have seen
with the anthrax attacks, psychological impacts and social and
economic disruption are also potentially severe.
Third, the events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax
attacks suggest that the connections between state and non-
state actors warrant increased attention. Analysts have tended
to conceptualize and address the state CBW proliferation
challenge and chemical and biological terrorism along separate
tracks.
Today, the distinction between war and terrorism has become
blurred and they have become inextricably linked. Our
adversaries have declared war on the West and the United States
in particular and they are using terrorist tactics as part of
their campaign. We confront an adversary that is not
necessarily a State, although it might be, but nevertheless has
chemical and terrorism weapons potential, at a minimum.
As this war unfolds, then, the United States may find
itself at war against one or more chemical and biological armed
adversaries, whether a state or non-state. How do they think
about the strategic and tactical utility of such weapons?
Saying that chemical and biological capabilities will be part
of an asymmetric strategy of either a state or a terrorist is
not enough. Different strategic goals point to different
chemical and biological weapons uses and a number of
possibilities, each of which has both a limited and an ultimate
form, suggest themselves as examples.
One, the desire to generate fear among the U.S. population,
ultimately pushing such fear to the point that it raises
questions about the integrity of U.S. society.
Second, slowing military action or ultimately crippling
U.S. strategies that depend on power projection and coalition
warfare.
Or third, disrupting the U.S. economy or ultimately
undermining it by attacking such critical components as the
agricultural sector, a threat that I believe has received
insufficient attention, or the financial centers of the
country. The willingness of terrorists or states to resort to
chemical or biological capabilities depends on these kinds of
strategic objectives, and our response depends, in part, on
understanding what those strategic objectives might be.
What does this approach to defining the threat suggest
about the needs for responding effectively? First, that because
the threat is a multi-dimensional one and a complex one, an
effective response must be strategic in nature, one that
addresses requirements that span a spectrum from deterrence
through prevention, defense, and preparedness to responses.
To perform each of these strategic missions effectively,
difficult challenges must be overcome. Effective responses, for
example, whether on the battlefield or in terms of homeland
defense, demand meeting both short-term needs, such as adapting
military concepts of operations or upgrading the Public Health
System, and long-term measures, including an effective research
and development program.
Second, a strategic response is also a multi-faceted
response. A range of tools must be exploited. These include
intelligence, defenses, both active and passive, diplomacy,
legal measures, preparedness, financial measures, military
options, and arms control. Each of these tools of policy
contributes something to an effective response to the CBW
proliferation challenge, but each tool has shortcomings that
must be overcome and none of them constitutes a silver bullet
that provides the total answer.
In this context, export controls have an important role to
play, but it is not necessarily the traditional contribution of
the past. Export control regimes can be effective in delaying
the acquisition of sensitive technologies by a committed
proliferator. But in the longer term, they cannot realistically
be expected to stop the transfer of technology that may be used
for weapons purposes, particularly since so much of that
technology also has legitimate commercial medical and other
uses.
This does not mean that export controls should be
abandoned. They perform other functions. Regulation through
export controls, for example, facilitates the global
dissemination of materials and equipment. By defining the rules
of the game by which companies must abide, for example, export
controls make it easier for those companies to engage in
international trade and cooperation.
It is this kind of newly defined role for export controls
that should be emphasized in the future. At the same time, the
United States must maintain open markets and avoid neo-
protectionist practices that deny or severely limit access to
markets or appropriate technology which would make key states
less inclined to pursue cooperative measures.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement.
Dr. Tucker, we welcome your statement.
TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN B. TUCKER, Ph.D.,\1\ DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Tucker. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee and guests, many thanks for the opportunity
to appear before you today on a topic of great importance and
concern in the aftermath of September 11: The proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons to states and terrorist
organizations. The recent series of anthrax attacks through the
U.S. mail indicates that the global spread of dual-use
technologies, materials, and scientific know how relevant to
the production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons
poses a clear and present danger to U.S. national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker with an attached table
appears in the Appendix on page 155.
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The anthrax that was mailed to Senator Tom Daschle's office
contained dried spores that were milled to an extremely fine
powder and treated with chemical additives so they would
readily become airborne and infect through the lungs. These
facts suggest that the perpetrators, whoever they are, had
access to specialized military technology and expertise related
to the weaponization of anthrax. Although to date the exposures
have remained limited, a large-scale attack by the chemical or
biological agent against U.S. targets at home or abroad is now
a real possibility.
Because the senders of the anthrax-tainted letters may have
received assistance from former weapons scientists or from a
state sponsor, it is important to assess which states possess
chemical and biological weapons capabilities and the extent to
which trade in dual-use materials and technologies contributes
to clandestine CBW programs. Evidence from open sources
indicates that roughly 13 countries are actively seeking
biological warfare capabilities and closer to 20 are seeking
chemical warfare capabilities. Proliferant states of particular
concern to the United States include Iraq, Iran, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria. More information on state-level
proliferation is contained in a table attached to my written
testimony.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The table referred to by Mr. Tucker appear in the Appendix on
pages 167-170.
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Furthermore, over the past decade, sub-state groups have
been increasingly interested in acquiring chemical and
biological weapons. The Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo,
the Kurdistan Workers' Party, and bin Laden's al Qaeda are only
a few of the groups actively pursuing weapons of mass
destruction capabilities.
In recent years, the growing availability of dual-use
technologies, materials, information, and expertise associated
with production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons
has exacerbated the problem of CBW proliferation. Indeed, the
relative ease of acquiring these weapons when compared to
advanced conventional or nuclear weapons has increased their
attractiveness to states that cannot afford more advanced
weapons or are technically incapable of developing them. Nearly
all the materials and equipment used to make chemical and
biological weapons are dual-use, complicating the control,
detection, and interdiction of proliferation-relevant exports.
Attempts to regulate trade in dual-use technologies to
countries of proliferation concern are extremely difficult.
They face intense opposition not only from non-aligned states
that claim that such controls are discriminatory, but also from
international suppliers, companies, and research institutes
that benefit from the commercial sale and transfer of such
technologies.
The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group, an
informal forum of 33 exporting counties, restrict trade in
chemical weapons precursors, dangerous biological pathogens,
and certain types of dual-use equipment. Even so, proliferant
states have often been successful in circumventing these
controls by purchasing the materials from unscrupulous
suppliers and evading interdiction efforts by means of trans-
shipment points and front companies.
Given the dual-use dilemma and the rapid diffusion of
legitimate chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology
industries around the globe, strengthened dual-use export
controls can buy time, but they do not offer a long-term
solution to the CBW proliferation problem. Accordingly, export
controls should be seen as one of a set of policy tools for
addressing the proliferation threat, together with active
interdiction efforts, passive and active defenses, strengthened
consequence-management capabilities, cooperative threat
reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union, and multilateral
arms control.
Although the Bush Administration has taken a skeptical
attitude towards arms control, a strengthened international
legal regime banning the possession and use of these weapons,
backed by a credible threat of economic sanctions and military
action against violators, offers, in my view, the best hope of
reversing the spread of these heinous weapons.
Because of the dangerous precedent that has been set by the
actual use of biological weapons against civilian targets in
the United States, it is vital for the international community
to continue to strengthen the existing international norm
against possession and use of chemical and biological weapons.
Although the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological
Weapons Convention impose a blanket prohibition on such
weapons, both regimes have serious weaknesses that undermine
their effectiveness. Accordingly, both regimes must be
strengthened if they are to promote the international norm of
non-use and non-possession by states of concern, and by
extension, sub-state actors, as well.
For example, the United States has repeatedly accused Iran,
a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, of systematically
violating its treaty obligations. To date, however, the United
States has failed to request a challenge inspection of Iran as
permitted under the Chemical Weapons Convention, undermining
the credibility of this key element of the treaty's
verification regime.
With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Bush
Administration decided in July 2001, earlier this year, to
withdraw from a 6-year effort to negotiate a legally binding
compliance regime. Although the administration has recently
proposed an alternative package of voluntary measures, they
appear insufficiently intrusive or effective to deter
violations or to enhance compliance with the treaty. The
administration should work with our European allies to make
legally binding the proposed measure for investigation of
alleged use of biological weapons and suspicious outbreaks of
disease.
To achieve these goals, the United States should devote
greater political and financial capital to strengthening the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, make more
effective use of existing treaty instruments, for example, by
requesting a challenge inspection of Iran and other suspected
violators, and seek to brand the possession and use of chemical
and biological weapons as a crime against humanity under
international law.
That concludes my oral testimony and I would be happy to
answer your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your testimony. Ms.
Gottemoeller.
TESTIMONY OF ROSE GOTTEMOELLER,\1\ SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for the honor of appearing today before the Subcommittee before
you and Senator Thompson.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller appears in the
Appendix on page 171.
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Suddenly, the press is full of terrible scenarios of
suitcase bombs spewing detonation in the middle of the Golden
Gate Bridge, a radiological bomb spreading plutonium over the
White House, creating a ``keep out'' zone in central Washington
that could last for many years. After reading about threats
such as these and scenarios such as these, many people are
worried, so I commend the Subcommittee for confronting these
complex and difficult issues in the search for new answers in
export controls as in other areas.
A simple device of the Hiroshima design is actually not the
easiest nuclear capability for a proliferator to acquire, be he
a terrorist or a rogue state actor. A simple device of this
kind actually requires a large amount of nuclear material to
achieve a nuclear explosion. We assume that 15 to 30 kilograms
of highly enriched uranium, or three to four kilograms of
plutonium are needed for a sophisticated nuclear device, and
for a cruder device, a great deal more material may be
required.
For this reason, international proliferation policy has
stressed keeping nuclear material production and enrichment
technologies out of proliferators' hands. Following the break-
up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the possibility that large
amounts of weapons-usable material could be stolen from former
Soviet nuclear facilities has also become a major concern for
nonproliferation policy worldwide. What would have been
achieved through years of arduous and expensive production,
enrichment, and separation work, that is, a sufficient amount
of material to build a bomb, could be acquired in an instant
through thievery.
Therefore, in the past decade, an enormous amount of
attention and significant U.S. dollars, $173 million in fiscal
year 2001 alone, have been spent on cooperating with Russia and
the other states in the region to enhance the physical
protection of weapons-usable material in facilities that house
the Soviet weapons complex.
In contrast to bombs that would produce a nuclear
detonation, however, radiological weapons are a simpler
capability for a proliferator to acquire, if only because the
threat in the case of a radiological device exists across a
wide spectrum. The spectrum could range from a low-level
nuclear waste package planted in an urban location through a
highly toxic nuclear material explosion in the form of a dirty
bomb, using conventional explosives to spread material over a
wide geographic area. At the very end of the spectrum could be
an aircraft attack on a nuclear facility that would turn the
facility itself into a radiological weapon.
It is important to stress in looking at this spectrum the
different types of radioactive materials that might come into
play in a radiological attack. Since 1993, the International
Atomic Energy Agency has tracked 175 cases of trafficking in
nuclear materials and 201 cases of trafficking in radioactive
materials. These are the kinds of materials used for medical
and industrial purposes.
Of all of these cases, only 18 involved small amounts of
plutonium or highly-enriched uranium, the so-called weapons-
usable material that is required to make a nuclear bomb. But
even a small amount of low-level nuclear waste, if planted in
an urban setting, would have the potential to sow considerable
panic unless authorities were quickly able to neutralize the
incident in the public mind. For that reason, I believe that
quick action to analyze and clarify for the public the nature
of radiological threats should be an important goal of public
policy in the current environment, whether here in the United
States or in other countries around the world where such
incidents might occur.
Now let me turn my attention quickly to nuclear and
radiological threats deserving more attention. In my view, we
must now strike a balance between the most dangerous nuclear
threats and the less lethal but profoundly disruptive
radiological threats. I would like to suggest in my spoken
testimony today that we focus immediately on four priorities as
threats that would deserve more attention, and I will pay a
little more time on the radiological threat because I think
that is essentially a new priority coming to play now. But I
also wanted to note that given the demand on U.S. budgetary
resources, we should also be considering new methods of funding
such projects, which I will specifically remark on, as well.
The four priorities that I would suggest are: Halting the
production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia; securing
nuclear facilities that remain vulnerable in the former Soviet
Union on a quick fix, quick turnaround basis; closing down
nuclear warhead production plants in Russia, that is, the
production of warheads and maintenance of warheads at plants in
Russia; and improving the security at nuclear reactors and
other sites where lower-level, that is, non-weapons-usable
nuclear material is stored. I offer these four in no particular
order of priority. That is not a relative list, but I do
believe that all should be given serious and urgent attention.
Before I turn for a moment to the radiological priority,
the fourth on my list, I would like to mention a new kind of
funding that I think we should consider, given that there are
many demands on the U.S. budget at the present time. One good
idea, I believe, has already been suggested by Senators Biden
and Lugar in some recent legislation, that is the so-called
debt-for-security swaps. Under this concept, we would forgive
Soviet-era debts that the Russians are holding in exchange for
Russia putting more rubles into nonproliferation programs, and
sir, I believe that should be an overall priority for U.S.
policy at this point, emphasizing urging Russia to put more of
their own budgetary resources into these important programs.
Now let me say just a few words about my priority with
regard to improving security at nuclear reactors and other
sites where lower-level nuclear material is stored or used,
because, as I mentioned at the outset, I believe it addresses
the radiological threat that has taken on new importance in the
wake of September 11.
Traditionally, U.S. cooperation with the countries of the
former Soviet Union to reduce the risks of nuclear
proliferation have emphasized so-called higher-value nuclear
materials and facilities, sites associated with the weapons
complex and especially with nuclear material that can be used
in the manufacture of weapons. But given that radiological
threats have taken on new importance, programs should be
emphasizing these particular kinds of threats, and I believe
that one simple step the United States could accomplish would
be to restore funds for international nuclear safety in the
Federal budget.
For nearly a decade, the United States has been working
with countries of the former Soviet Union to upgrade the safety
of Soviet-built nuclear reactors and prevent another Chernobyl-
style incident. This has been a largely successful program,
and, in fact, the permanent shut-down of the last unit at
Chernobyl occurred in December of last year. For that reason,
the program is slowly ramping down, dropping from over $30
million in fiscal year 1999 to just $10 million in fiscal year
2002. The program, I believe, could be quickly ramped up in
order to improve security at nuclear reactors and other sites
where low-level non-weapons-usable nuclear materials are
stored, and these efforts could be undertaken not only in
Russia and the former Soviet Union but also other countries
around the world where such facilities are vulnerable.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to note what I
believe is a potential important development in nuclear
technology that will, I think, impact in important ways on the
future of export controls with regard to nuclear systems.
Increasingly, those who are engaged in nuclear technology
development, particularly for electricity generation purposes,
are interested in new approaches that would limit the cross-
over between peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the
weapons sector.
They want to avoid the kind of situation that has been
inherent, for example, in the Soviet Union, where the Tomsk and
Krasnoyarsk reactors produced plutonium for the weapons system
at the same time they were producing heat and electricity for
the local urban areas, and this continues today. In fact, the
civilian use of these reactors continues apace while these
reactors are still pumping out plutonium that adds to stocks of
plutonium available potentially for weapons purposes in Russia,
although Russia, of course, says that no longer they are used
for that purpose.
For that reason, the nuclear industry today, and here and
around the world, is beginning to concentrate on developing so-
called proliferation-resistant technologies, particularly in
the reactor arena, that will minimize the production of
weapons-usable material in their cycles. Ideally,
proliferation-resistant reactors, for example, would burn
plutonium, dispose of plutonium, rather than breeding it.
Although such reactors may be 20 years or more from
commercial application, I think it is important that there is a
new strategic approach developing in the nuclear industry. The
industry is emphasizing proliferation-resistance along with
other attributes such as minimization of nuclear waste and
stringent design for safety and security. If this trend
develops successfully, it will simplify the export control
problem for nuclear technologies, and, in fact, may also prove
to be the best way to fulfill the promise of peaceful nuclear
uses under the Nonproliferation Treaty.
Thank you, sir, for this opportunity.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement.
I would like to yield to the Ranking Member and friend,
Senator Cochran, for any statement. Following his statement and
before the questions, I am going to ask that we recess. There
is a vote that is on now that is on the floor, and then we will
be back shortly. Senator Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
congratulate you for organizing and calling this hearing. It is
a very important subject for us to learn as much as possible
about.
I wonder, while we are over voting, whether the panelists
can be thinking about whether the recent experiences that we
have had with the anthrax attacks have led them to reach any
new conclusions about the proliferation of bioterrorism
capabilities and what, if anything, we should plan to do about
it.
One of the major efforts that we have made is to reach
agreements with other countries to try to prevent the export of
weapons or technologies that could be made into weapons of mass
destruction, especially in the chemical and biological area. Do
you think any of these agreements can serve as guides for the
future and have we prevented any terrorist acts or activities
by reason of these conventions and agreements that countries
have joined to use as a way to combat proliferation of weapons,
particularly the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological
Weapons Convention? Have they kept states or terrorist groups
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Chairman, I think, since we have jurisdiction over the
proliferation subject, it is certainly important for us to
begin a set of hearings on this subject and I congratulate you
for leading that effort.
Senator Akaka. As I mentioned, you have worked on this
before in this Subcommittee and we are still continuing this.
We all have questions for you, and I would ask that we
recess and come back to ask you the questions. In the meantime,
I want to say that your full statements will be printed in the
record. Are there any further comments before we recess?
[No response.]
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee recesses.
[Recess.]
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will be in order.
I want to thank you again for your testimony. I am
impressed with the work you have accomplished on
nonproliferation issues.
Let me begin with some questions for Dr. Moodie, and you
mentioned this, so I am asking the question about this. I agree
that the threat of agriculture terrorism has been given little
attention, as you mentioned. Do you believe that USDA has
access to the intelligence reports and information required to
perform a full risk assessment of American agriculture?
Mr. Moodie. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the inner workings
of the Department of Agriculture to be able to say exactly
whether they have access to that material or not. I do think
that the appreciation of the agricultural dimension of this
problem was slow in developing, and therefore, the Department
of Agriculture as a player in the development of our response
was slow to come to the table. As a consequence, I think they
are still trying to establish the kind of relationships among
the other players, probably including the intelligence
community, that they need to do the job that they have to do.
So while I cannot be specific, my hunch would be that they
probably need to improve their access, not just in terms of
looking at the information or the intelligence, but dealing
with the intelligence community on an ongoing basis so that
they have an ongoing, evolving appreciation of the nature of
the challenge that they confront.
Senator Akaka. You suggest that smallpox is unlikely to be
a threat, if you would mention something about that again.
Which kinds of chemical and biological threats do you see as
more likely at this time?
Mr. Moodie. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the
smallpox threat, I would put smallpox into that category within
the threat assessment that I talked about of contingencies
against which we have to hedge. Certainly, the consequences of
a smallpox attack are potentially so great that we have to have
taken some measure of preparation. But you can have a smallpox
scenario that either is--that is so horrific that it either
causes policy paralysis because it is too hard to do or that
you put so much money against it that you never have enough.
And I think that for those of you who are responsible for
allocating limited resources, this kind of open-ended
vulnerability assessment that has huge consequences is not the
best scenario on which to do your planning and to make the
kinds of decisions with respect to limited resources that you
have to make. Having said that, as I mentioned, I do think you
have to get a hedge against that possibility.
I think, though, that we have not necessarily, in our focus
on smallpox on anthrax, necessarily examined the full range of
other biological agents that have traditionally been examined
as potential biological weapons, including hemorrhagic fevers,
plague, tularemia, and things of that kind.
I also do not think that we have necessarily looked,
especially on the chemical side, looked at some of the low-tech
threats. We have been fascinated by the higher-end, VX, sarin,
the nerve gases, when, in fact, a contingency or a couple of
contingencies that we have not really looked at in as much
detail as perhaps we should are simple things like somebody
hijacking a chlorine tanker and blowing it up outside Wall
Street or somebody trying on a deliberate basis to produce the
kind of consequence at a chemical production facility that we
saw in Bhopal, essentially a deliberate Bhopal that caused
enormous loss of life. Those do not involve sophisticated or
exotic agents, but they are the use of chemicals to create mass
disruption and potentially mass casualties.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Tucker, in your testimony, you mentioned
that many developing countries have obtained or might develop
chemical and biological weapons capabilities as a result of
foreign investment by chemical and biotechnology industries.
Just as we have laws against bribery by American companies in
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, should we be considering
restrictions on American companies investing in certain
countries?
Mr. Tucker. I think we should with respect to countries of
proliferation concern, though it may be difficult. If we do not
invest in such a country, it is very likely that our
competitors will do so. So the problem with unilateral U.S.
action in this area is that we can be very easily undercut by
other countries, not only our allies, but also countries that
are not friendly to the United States but that are increasingly
investing in the developing world.
So that is why I view the utility of U.S. export controls
with some skepticism. I think this is a threat that has to be
dealt with in a multilateral context. We have the Australia
Group, but it encompasses only 33 like-minded countries that
export chemical or biological-relevant materials and equipment.
But there are other countries that are now in a position to
provide equipment and materials to countries of proliferation
concern, so it is a broader problem that we need to look at in
a multilateral framework.
Senator Akaka. You mentioned the Bush Administration
several times in your testimony. The Bush Administration has
recently made proposals to enhance the enforcement of the
Biological Weapons Convention. You recently stated that these
efforts are insufficient, since they would not be part of a
treaty with rights and obligations. What other measures would
you recommend the administration take in this area or in regard
to other unilateral actions?
Mr. Tucker. Well, I should say that the proposals by the
Bush Administration would be useful. I do not criticize them. I
just do not think they go far enough. For example, the idea of
urging countries to pass uniform domestic laws that would
regulate access to dangerous pathogens to make sure that these
materials are only accessible to legitimate scientists and not
terrorists or people who would misuse these materials to make
weapons, I think that is a very desirable goal and should be
encouraged.
But as you know, the United States withdrew in July from a
6\1/2\-year effort to negotiate a formal treaty that would
provide measures to enhance compliance and deter violations of
the Biological Weapons Convention. I do not think that the
alternative U.S. proposals, at least as far as we know, will be
effective. The details of these measures have not been released
yet, but from the press release that the White House released
last week, it appears that these measures are all voluntary,
they are not legally binding, and, hence, they really depend on
the good will of the participating countries.
My concern is, for example, if we set up a mechanism to
investigate alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious
outbreaks of disease and if this is done, let us say, within
the context of the United Nations but not in a treaty context,
then any country that is accused could simply refuse access to
the investigation team. It would have no legally binding
obligation to grant access to the inspectors or investigators
to determine that it is, in fact, in compliance or
noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.
So my concern about the Bush Administration approach is
that it is too weak, and clearly, we are facing a real threat.
These anthrax attacks have made it very clear that this is not
a hypothetical threat, that this is a real threat. The actual
use of anthrax against civilians is challenging the norm that
has existed for many, many years and we must reinforce that
norm. If we do not, then I think a growing number of states and
terrorist groups will be attracted to these weapons and we will
face a much more serious proliferation problem in the future.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ms. Gottemoeller, you mentioned
the danger of a terrorist developing a so-called dirty bomb
using nuclear waste. There are about 440 nuclear reactors in
the world and countless facilities with other types of nuclear
materials. What should we be doing now to secure those plants
or to monitor their use so terrorists cannot take them? Do we
need a new international agency or a new agreement?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I think the International Atomic
Energy Agency already has responsibility for many related types
of missions and the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. el
Baradei, called last week for enhanced funding for surveillance
of nuclear sites around the world, nuclear reactor and research
sites, related industrial sites, as you have stated. So I think
for certain missions, certainly, there is already an
international agency well experienced in this arena. I do not
think we need to create anything new.
I do think that we need to set some priorities. I mentioned
that the IAEA would like to enhance its capability for
surveillance of threats around plants. I think we also need to
pay attention to those research reactors, for example, where
the highest level of nuclear material is currently stored. Few
people know, for example, that there is a research reactor at
Belgrade where not so long ago U.S. bombs were dropping in the
vicinity, and at that site is stored a significant amount of
highly enriched uranium to fuel that reactor.
So I think it is important to look at some of the higher-
priority sites in order to get that material out of there. I
would urge for Soviet-built research reactors in Eastern
Europe, for example, that such materials be moved back to
Russia and down-blended so they no longer pose such a
proliferation threat in the future.
And then in regard to the radiological threats that I
mentioned, again, you do point to a good fact, sir, and that is
there is an enormous number of sites around the world where
such materials might be stored or used in one way or another.
So it does require some prioritization, as well, but I think
particularly with regard to training of facility operators and
some other perhaps lower-cost options, there are ways to
proceed that would not cost an enormous amount but could
overall increase and improve the security at these sites.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Carper is here. I would
yield to the Senator for any statement or questions.
Senator Carper. I have no statement, but a question or two,
if I could, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome one and all. I am glad you are here and thank you.
Obviously, I have missed your statements, and I would just ask,
if I could, for each of you just to maybe take a minute and
share with me, with respect to the issues that are before us
today, what should the Congress be doing? What is our
appropriate role? Dr. Moodie, we will start with you, if you
will.
Mr. Moodie. How much time do you have, Senator?
Senator Carper. Well, I have about 5 minutes. The Chairman
is in a good mood.
Mr. Moodie. I think, first of all, conceptually, we have to
recognize that the problems we are dealing with with respect to
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are a
single problem now. It is not the state problem on one hand and
the terrorists on the other. They are two sides of the same
coin, and to begin from that point.
Second, I think we have to focus on a strategic response
that ensures that, first of all, all the tools we have in our
toolbox--intelligence, diplomacy, defenses, military options,
arms control, and export controls--each individual tool is as
strong as it can be, but at the same time that our strategy is
one in which we allow those tools to work together to achieve
the same objective, not at cross purposes, and that is not
always an easy task.
Third, I think the Congress in terms of its own
organization should look at where it is. The Congress suffers
from the same problem the administration does in terms of the
vast number of people who are stakeholders in this and who have
responsibility for doing it, and just as the administration is
being called on to streamline their decision making processes
with respect to some of these issues, that Congress may take a
look and streamline how it does its business in this area, as
well.
Senator Carper. Good. Thanks very much. Dr. Tucker.
Mr. Tucker. Yes. I would endorse everything that my
colleague, Michael Moodie, has said, and I would add that the
United States really cannot go it alone in the field of
nonproliferation.
Senator Carper. You said can or cannot?
Mr. Tucker. Cannot go it alone in the field of
nonproliferation. I mean, we can enhance our defenses. We can
improve our intelligence, develop better consequence management
in case we are attacked, but if we are going to try to attack
this problem at the roots, we need to do it through
multilateral instruments and mechanisms, including existing
treaties that are in force, the Chemical Weapons Convention and
the Biological Weapons Convention, that are potentially useful
tools but have been underutilized by the United States.
For example, they have been underfunded. We have
instruments such as the opportunity to request challenge
inspections of countries that we believe are violating the
convention and we have not used those instruments. And as a
result, they----
Senator Carper. Could I ask, why do you think that is?
Mr. Tucker. I think there are a number of reasons, concern
that, for example, there might be a retaliatory challenge. If
we challenge Iran, which we have openly accused of violating
the Chemical Weapons Convention, they might challenge us back,
and I think there has been some concern about a harassing type
inspection.
But I think we should be able to deal with that
contingency--there are mechanisms within the Chemical Weapons
Convention to manage access and to protect legitimate national
security information and proprietary information, and there is
a provision under the treaty for a three-quarter majority of
the Executive Council to block a frivolous or abusive
inspection request. If we make a compelling argument that a
retaliatory challenge is, in fact, frivolous and abusive, then
it could be blocked.
I also think that there are some concerns that if we
challenge a country and the inspectorate does not come up with
a ``smoking gun,'' or very compelling evidence of a violation,
then we will create a false sense of security that country is
in compliance. So I think we have to lower the bar of
expectation about what can be accomplished through challenge
inspection.
But I still think it is a very powerful mechanism. Even if
it does not find a smoking gun, I think it can find a pattern
of evidence that is indicative of a treaty violation and it is
probably the most powerful instrument within the Chemical
Weapons Convention verification regime. If we do not make use
of it, it will atrophy, lose its credibility, and any deterrent
effect it might have on would-be violators.
Senator Carper. Thank you, sir. Ms. Gottemoeller.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator, I believe that the Congress now
has both an opportunity and a responsibility to draw together
the struggle against international terrorism with regard to
weapons of mass destruction and are already establishing
cooperation with Russia and the countries of the former Soviet
Union to address what we commonly call the ``loose nukes''
problem, but it also refers to loose biological agents, and
loose chemical agents, as well.
And I think up to this point, quite frankly, there has not
been sufficient attention to placing new resources to the
service of this particular fight against terrorism, that is,
ensuring that all of these weapons of mass destruction
resources are safely and securely held in facilities where they
can be responsibly guarded by the countries that currently own
them or hold them in one way or the other.
I want to underscore, I believe that, in general, Russia is
a responsible custodian, for example, of nuclear materials, but
they are short on resources to ensure that those materials do
not go walking out of those facilities and into the hands of
those who might use them as instruments of terror.
So I think the Congress really has an important role to
play in drawing together the counterterrorism struggle with our
struggle to ensure threat reduction in the nuclear, chemical,
and biological arena.
Senator Carper. Great. Thank you. Thanks to each of you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your questions.
I have further questions. Dr. Moodie, we have been talking
about multilateral arms control and you mentioned that classic
multilateral arms control such as the Chemical Weapons
Convention is unlikely to yield significant results. So my
question to you is, how would you strengthen the CWC, and just
as importantly, what would you propose in terms of new
multilateral approaches?
Mr. Moodie. Mr. Chairman, my comment really was to the
biological side, and to me, the Chemical Weapons Convention is
classical arms control and I think it is appropriate for
dealing with the chemical weapons problem. I had the good
fortune, I guess it is, to have worked on negotiating the
Chemical Weapons Convention during the administration of the
former President Bush and I think that we accomplished
something in that.
But I think to take the same approach in the biological
area is not going to accomplish what we were able to do in the
chemical area because I think the chemical problem and the
biological problem are quite different and the politics and the
science and technology and the language of the treaty that
surround the biological side, to me are so complex that classic
arms control is not the way to go forward.
I think what we have to do is redefine the problem and
redefine the environment within which solutions can be found,
and what I mean by that is to take it out of being a classic
security arms control problem, but define the biological
weapons as part of a broader challenge that has to do with the
appropriate use of the life sciences to serve the public safety
and security and to create an environment in which the misuse
of that science is diminished to the point that you can manage.
It includes not just biological weapons but other kinds of
challenges that we have in looking at where the incredibly
rapid advances in the life sciences are going to be going in
the next two decades.
I think that if we approach the problem from that
redefinition, that we will, in fact, find more acceptable
mechanisms for dealing with the problem. One of the issues, for
example, in the arms control approach and the protocol
negotiations that was mentioned earlier was a difficult
relationship between industry and the negotiators and the role
of industry in this. I think if we set the problem on a
different footing, we will have a different basis in which to
engage industry to ensure that their contribution in this area,
because they are such a driver of the science and technology at
this point, that if we redefine the problem in that way, we
will have a better basis for engaging industry in looking at
solutions.
So I think some of the measures that the Bush
Administration has proposed to strengthen the Biological
Weapons Convention move in this direction. I think they provide
a basis for moving forward. They are not the total answer. They
are not where we want to go or should go. But I think they give
us a starting point for that kind of redefinition of the
problem that will yield some more creative solutions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much for that. There is a need
to review these and come out with other solutions.
Dr. Tucker, you just stated that export controls buy time
for diplomacy but do not offer a long-term solution. Are there
any changes to our current export control policies you would
advocate?
Mr. Tucker. Well, I think some of the controls probably
could be made more targeted on technologies that are really
critical, that provide bottlenecks to the acquisition of
chemical and biological weapons. Increasingly, of course, these
technologies are becoming widely available as they diffuse to
more and more countries in the developing world. So we have to
identify those really key critical technologies that are not
widely available that are really still a monopoly of the
highly-advanced countries and which by withholding, we will
place significant impediments in the path of proliferators.
So it may be a form of ``smart'' export controls or more
targeted export controls, which I think will be welcomed by
industry because they will be less affected by more targeted
controls. That will require quite a bit of thought, because it
is the conventional wisdom that this technology is all dual-
use. That is not strictly true. There are some specialized
technologies and certain types of pathogens, for example,
weaponized pathogens, whose access should be very tightly
restricted. So I think there is a need to rethink export
controls in a way to make them more targeted and, hence, more
effective.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. Gottemoeller, in your written testimony, I think you
raised a good point on the priorities we should take to prevent
further proliferation of nuclear material from the former
Soviet Union. Many are also concerned about the proliferation
of nuclear expertise and know how. We are familiar with
examples of nuclear scientists being offered substantial sums
of money either to train others or to develop nuclear weapons.
The Subcommittee is going to hold a hearing on this subject
next week, but some would suggest that it is already too late.
For example, there is no doubt Iran's nuclear program being
developed with Russian assistance has a weapons component or
potential. What should we be doing to ensure that Iran complies
with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I hesitate to say what the future
will bring, but I would say the first step, if U.S. relations
improve with Iran, as there have been some hints recently in
Washington they may improve, I think the first step we should
undertake is to take up these issues directly with Tehran.
We have been working this issue through and with Moscow. It
has been a difficult issue. Apparently, President Putin in an
interview that will appear this evening on television has
denied pretty firmly that there is any official Russian
government involvement in nuclear technology trade with Iran.
Well, I think we have long felt that it is not a matter of an
official Russian government policy, but that there are some
organizations in Russia that are perhaps not paying the
attention to export control laws that they should be paying
attention to, first of all. And second of all, I believe there
is also disagreement among some Russian experts about the
danger inherent in particular dual-use technologies, and so
there is a disagreement and discussion between the United
States and Russia in that regard.
I believe we should continue very vigorously to pursue
these issues with Russia and I hope that we will do so at the
upcoming Washington Crawford Summit. But I believe in addition
to that that should our relationship improve with Iran, this is
something we need to take up directly with the Iranians, as
well.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Carper do you have any
further questions?
Senator Carper. No, I do not.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Moodie,
Dr. Tucker, and Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you for all of your
testimony and for your cooperation, also. Some of what you said
will certainly be helpful to us in what we are trying to do
here. So thank you again and you may be excused.
Mr. Moodie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tucker. Thank you.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. I just received a call that there
is another vote on, but I want to prepare for the second panel
and ask the second panel to come forward, please.
The Subcommittee will be in recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will be in order.
Thank you, Mr. Christoff, Dr. Cupitt, Dr. Lewis, and Dr.
Milhollin for being part of our second panel, and at this time,
I invite you to make any statement or comments you wish,
beginning with Mr. Christoff.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF,\1\ DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Christoff. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the efforts of the United States and the
international community to stem the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff with attachments
appears in the Appendix on page 178.
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Historically, the United States has used four important
tools to combat WMD proliferation: International treaties,
multilateral export control arrangements, U.S. export control
laws, and security assistance to other countries. My bottom
line is that each tool is important to U.S. nonproliferation
policy, but each tool has limitations, and I would like to
briefly describe and comment on each of these tools.
First, the international community has established treaties
to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and prohibit the
spread of nuclear weapons. Three treaties are of particular
importance, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical
Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons and Toxins
Convention. These treaties share similar objectives. They are
legally binding and they include most countries. However, their
effectiveness depends on the mechanisms for verifying and
enforcing them and the integrity of those countries party to
them. For example, the Biological Weapons Conventions lacks the
inspection and enforcement provisions that might have detected
the Soviet Union's massive biological weapons program in the
1970's and the 1980's.
Limitations in membership also constrain the effectiveness
of these treaties. Key states remain outside the treaties. For
example, India, Israel, and Pakistan are not party to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, while Iraq and Syria have not
signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The second tool for controlling sensitive technologies is
multilateral export control arrangements. Both the Executive
and Legislative Branches have affirmed support for
strengthening these arrangements. However, their effectiveness
has been challenged in recent years.
As part of GAO's ongoing work on these arrangements, we are
examining the following important questions. Does the voluntary
nature of these arrangements and the dependence on member
nations to impose export control limits affect their
effectiveness? Do member nations abide by their commitments to
refrain from exporting items other members have denied? How do
member nations share information about their export decisions?
And how do the arrangements ensure that non-member nations do
not transfer sensitive technologies to countries of concern?
The third tool is U.S. export control policy, which is
intended to constrain the transfers of WMD technology. In GAO's
past work, we have identified problems with U.S. policy. First,
the Executive Branch has not assessed national security risks
for important dual-use items, such as high-performance
computers and semi-conductor technologies.
Second, the government does not adequately screen proposed
recipients of sensitive U.S. technologies. For example, the
government does not always have complete intelligence
information on license applicants who may serve as fronts for
proliferators or terrorists.
And third, the government cannot always ensure that
recipients of sensitive technologies comply with the conditions
of the license. This is most important in countries of concern,
such as China, which restrict U.S. officials' access to
facilities that house U.S. technologies.
And finally, the fourth tool is the security assistance to
other countries that we provide, most importantly to the former
Soviet Union. At the time of its collapse, the Soviet Union
had, by some estimates, 30,000 nuclear weapons, 40,000 tons of
chemical weapons, and an extensive biological weapons program.
The collapse also left 30,000 to 75,000 Soviet weapons
scientists without full-time employment.
Since 1991, the United States has helped Russia eliminate
and secure weapons of mass destruction and provide part-time
employment to former Soviet scientists. U.S. efforts have
helped make large quantities of WMD-related materials more
secure and they have supplemented the incomes of several
thousand former Soviet scientists.
However, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness
of these programs, which have cost about $5.5 billion since
1991. Russian officials continue to limit U.S. access to
certain WMD facilities. In addition, the part-time employment
provided by the United States may not necessarily deter Russian
scientists from selling their weapons knowledge to rogue states
or terrorists.
So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the events of the past 2
months provide the impetus for reexamining all these tools that
are used to restrict the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Ten years ago, the international community made major changes
in its controls over nuclear technology after revelations about
the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. We may be at a similar point
today. We need to reassess the adequacy of our current policy
tools to address the vulnerabilities and the changed
perceptions of the threat that we currently face.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Christoff. Dr.
Cupitt, please?
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD T. CUPITT,\1\ ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SECURITY
Mr. Cupitt. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
you calling and organizing this hearing on what I think is a
very important topic. I have submitted some additional remarks
that represent my personal views on several of the broader
export control questions raised by the Subcommittee staff, so I
would like to focus this testimony on some problems the U.S.
Government will face in coordinating nonproliferation anti-
terrorism export controls with its allies and on some possible
steps to address these difficulties.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Cupitt appears in the Appendix on
page 196.
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Senator Akaka. At this time, may I say that all of your
full statements will be made part of the record.
Mr. Cupitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The tragic events of
the last 2 months not only emphasize the need to reform the
multilateral export control system, they have shaken the
international community sufficiently, I believe, that reform
initiatives may actually succeed. So this is a moment of
opportunity for us, because the importance of limiting the
weapons of mass destruction capabilities of terrorists and
states that support international terrorism has never been more
clear.
Nonetheless, many of the same problems that plagued efforts
to improve multilateral coordination of proliferation-related
export control systems in the late 1990's will hamper attempts
to coordinate nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls
now. Let me mention five likely problem areas--and I will be
happy to go into detail about them perhaps in the question and
answer period--and then raise some possible responses to these
problems.
First and foremost, there is a very weak infrastructure for
coordinating nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls
internationally. The Australia Group, the Missile Technology
Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar
Arrangement, for example, have pretty primitive methods and
mechanisms for gathering and sharing information, resolving
disputes, and enforcing group norms.
Second, the list of sensitive anti-terrorism items appears
to be based mainly on delaying state-sponsored weapons of mass
destruction programs and not with a view towards delaying or
preventing the development of non-state weapons of mass
destruction programs.
Third, there are very divergent national nonproliferation
anti-terrorism export control systems now, even among key U.S.
allies.
Fourth, there are divergent views on the targets of
nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls.
And finally, there are very divergent approaches to
industry-government cooperation on nonproliferation anti-
terrorism export controls.
Based on these concerns, I would like to take the
opportunity to recommend that the U.S. Government consider five
steps in the near term to begin to address these problems.
First, I think the U.S. Government should consider doing
more extensive assessments of foreign export control policies
related to nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls,
starting with the policies and programs of the G-8 and other
key members of the supplier arrangements. Frankly, we simply do
not know enough. A critical lack of information and analysis of
these policies, as well as broader export control policies,
exists. We need to do more.
Second, the U.S. Government should consider providing more
funding, technical assistance, and critical information to help
U.S. partners implement and coordinate their intelligence,
licensing, and enforcement activities related to
nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls. This includes
an increase in efforts and support for U.S. export control
outreach programs worldwide. We do have an extensive program
through the Department of Commerce and also the Department of
Energy to do work in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere and
there has been some work now in China and India, but it needs
to be much more extensive in order to succeed--and the United
States has to take the lead on this.
Third, the U.S. Government should consider creating
priorities in its list of items of greatest nonproliferation
anti-terrorism concern as a basis for international
negotiations. It is not clear from our current list of, for
instance, dual-use items, which items are more important than
others to control for anti-terrorism purposes. There are very
few items that are controlled for anti-terrorism purposes
alone. For most of the others, it appears that if there is a
requirement related to chemical, biological proliferation,
nuclear nonproliferation, or missile proliferation, we just
tack anti-terrorism on to that as well, and I am not sure that
that is an appropriate way to address the problem. Some items
may be more important to control than others, and if we do not
see that, maybe some of our allies will.
Fourth, the U.S. Government should also consider creating
priorities for listed terrorists and terrorist organizations
that pose the greatest weapons of mass destruction threat as a
basis for negotiations. I think one might start by
differentiating among those individuals and entities on the
specially designated terrorist list or the foreign terrorist
organizations list according to the weapons of mass destruction
risk they present.
Finally, I think the U.S. Government should consider
creating new standards for industry export control compliance
programs, including certification of the substantive knowledge
of export administrators regarding nonproliferation anti-
terrorism controls. Export administrators in several of the
national laboratories, for example, have expressed keen
interest in certification as a means of ensuring the highest
standards of compliance with nonproliferation export controls,
and I think this would also hold true for related anti-
terrorism controls.
Again, let me thank the Subcommittee both for holding the
hearing and for allowing me to present my views. Thank you very
much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement. Mr. Lewis.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES A. LEWIS,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF
TECHNOLOGY POLICY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Lewis. Let me thank you for the opportunity to testify
on this important subject. I think that since September 11, we
have an opportunity and a need for a new look at
nonproliferation and controlling export of technology.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis appears in the Appendix on
page 206.
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Changes in international security and the global economy
have made export controls less effective in preventing
technology transfer. In particular, technological change and
economic integration pose real challenges for both
nonproliferation and counterterrorism. This decline in
effectiveness is less noticeable in the nonproliferation
regimes because of their strength. The Missile Technology
Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group have strong support from their members. They focus their
efforts on key proliferation technologies and they have good
mechanisms for information exchange.
In contrast, there is another arrangement called the
Wassenaar Arrangement. It is ineffective. There is little
consensus. This would be a problem except for the fact that
most of what Wassenaar controls is unimportant for
nonproliferation purposes, and I think we would get more
benefit if we paid less attention to Wassenaar and more
attention to strengthening both our own national catch-all
controls and helping foreign countries strengthen their catch-
all controls, as well.
Another problem that we have with the export control debate
in the United States, Mr. Chairman, is that we have not spent
enough time perhaps looking at some of the larger problems.
First, the rationale for nonproliferation export controls needs
to be reexamined, and hearings like this are very helpful in
advancing the thinking of the United States.
Export controls were designed, as many of my colleagues
have said, and it is amazing to me how, at least with the first
panel and I think some of the others, I will be repeating many
of the things they said, which is the problem for being last,
but export controls for nonproliferation were designed to make
programs more costly and to buy time for diplomacy. This worked
very well for the last 10 years, but we are now facing a hard
core of countries--Iraq, Iran, and North Korea--where export
controls are going to be very less effective and we will need
some new approach.
In addition to that level of problem, we face new problems
with non-state actors who seek to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. They pose a serious challenge to current
nonproliferation controls, which are aimed at countries and
large government programs. Nonproliferation is now more than an
arms control problem that can be approached in the traditional
diplomatic and military context.
Export licensing will be less important for dealing with
terrorist organizations. Terrorists will not be applying for
licenses and they may not even try to export materials. A more
plausible scenario is that terrorists will attempt to acquire
WMD-related materials in the country where they intend to use
them, bypassing all of our current export control mechanisms.
For example, many of the previous speakers have noted the
dangers of radiological weapons. While all countries have good
export controls on nuclear fuel, it is not clear that they have
all taken the necessary steps to safeguard this fuel from
theft, and this includes Western European countries. A
terrorist organization could steal spent nuclear fuel and use
it to build radiological weapons.
Similarly, security measures at U.S. and foreign
laboratories may not be adequate to prevent the theft of
dangerous biological samples, and in this sense, internal
security measures are important to nonproliferation as are
export controls.
Nonproliferation must become part of the larger system of
homeland defense and the response to terrorism that the
administration is building. Proliferation regimes can make an
important contribution to this by identifying the key WMD-
related items that need additional safeguards and by
coordinating effective security measures. Efforts to ensure
that WMD does not fall into the hands of terrorists must become
part of the multilateral defense against terrorism, and the
support we have received since September 11 could be channeled
into reinvigorating nonproliferation.
Let me just touch on one of the issues that your staff
raised, which is deemed exports. Making nonproliferation a part
of the larger counterterrorism and homeland defense effort has
implications for deemed exports. Students coming to the United
States to study and do research have been a problem for
proliferation here and in other countries for many years. The
important thing to realize is that the benefits we receive from
having these people in the United States probably outweighs the
costs of any potential leak of technology, and when I say this,
I am reiterating a conclusion that the Reagan Administration
came to in its National Security Decision Directive 189.
The answer to deemed exports may lie less in export
controls, but thinking in terms of the larger approach to
homeland security. Immigration control is one of the most
serious vulnerabilities revealed by September 11. All of the
terrorists were able to enter the United States, passing
through multiple checkpoints both here and in allied countries.
Some sort of improved screening for people coming to the United
States that included some nonproliferation criteria would
probably be more useful than export licensing.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think export controls can
still play a role in nonproliferation and national security,
but this role is shrinking. In looking at where we might want
to move ahead, it would help to reexamine the fundamental
approach to nonproliferation export controls. It would be good
to find ways to use the strengths of the three nonproliferation
regimes to support homeland defense and counterterrorism.
Deemed exports would probably be better treated as part of a
broader solution to screening immigrants. And finally, when we
move ahead with building export controls, picking up on what
Dr. Moodie and Dr. Tucker said, we probably should start with
the lists and procedures of the regimes, the use of catch-all
controls, and improved immigration procedures.
I would like to thank you and I will be happy to take any
questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Lewis. Dr.
Milhollin.
TESTIMONY OF GARY MILHOLLIN,\1\ DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Mr. Milhollin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is both an honor
and a privilege to appear before this distinguished
Subcommittee and testify on this important topic.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Milhollin with an attachment
appears in the Appendix on page 212.
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I would like to address my remarks to four points: First,
whether export controls are succeeding in protecting our
security; second, whether they are now being weakened; third,
whether violations are being punished; and fourth, what could
be done to make export controls stronger.
First, it is very important to realize that export controls
can work if they are given a chance. There are success stories
in the world that export controls can claim. Argentina and
Brazil decided to give up nuclear weapons because, in large
part, export controls were imposing great costs on the
development of those countries. We know from U.N. inspections
in Iraq that Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapon developers could
not import certain parts. They had to reverse engineer them,
which took time and it is not even clear that they worked.
Also, export controls pretty much stopped Saddam Hussein's most
ambitious rocket program.
Today, export controls are slowing down India and Pakistan
in their efforts to miniaturize their warheads and to build
more effective long-range missiles. As long as we have export
controls that work decently, that will be true in the future.
However, despite clear successes, American export controls
are now weaker than they have ever been in history. Since 1998,
when Saddam Hussein was building his mass destruction arsenal,
export controls in the United States have been cut about 90
percent. Today, the Commerce Department is receiving about a
tenth as many applications as it received in the late 1980's,
and when the applications do come in, they are almost always
approved. In the last fiscal year, only 4 percent of the
applications were denied.
This system imposes virtually no burden on industry and it
is a system that seemed to please us quite well in peacetime.
Now, however, we are not in peacetime and we know that there
are terrorist organizations that want to do us harm and we know
that weapons of mass destruction in their hands would threaten
our way of life.
I would just like to give you some examples of cases in
which our export control system has allowed technology,
American technology, to threaten American Armed Forces. Perhaps
the most recent case is that of Huawei Technologies, a Chinese
company that was caught earlier this year helping Iraq improve
its air defense network. These air defenses are designed to
shoot down our pilots.
This Chinese firm helped Iraq in defiance of the
international embargo against this kind of transaction. At the
time the assistance was discovered, Motorola had an export
license application pending at the Commerce Department to help
this company improve its ability to build high-speed switching
and routing equipment, which would be ideal for an air defense
network.
In the recent past, the Commerce Department has licensed a
series of sensitive items to Huawei Technologies. Huawei was
allowed to buy high-performance computers from Digital
Equipment Corporation, IBM, and Hewlett Packard, and Sun
Microsystems. In addition, Huawei got $500,000 worth of
telecommunication equipment from Qualcomm. Other U.S. firms
have helped Huawei by setting up joint operations. These
include Lucent Technologies, AT&T, Motorola, and IBM.
As a result of all this American assistance, Huawei's sales
are projected to reach $5 billion in 2001. This company began
as a $1,000 start-up in 1988, so the result is that U.S.
technology, some of which is controlled for export but
licensed, and other technology going through joint operations,
has built out of virtually nothing a Chinese company that now
is able to help Iraq improve its air defenses and put the lives
of U.S. servicemen and women at risk. These exports no doubt
made money for American companies, but at a cost of threatening
our pilots.
Huawei, unfortunately, is not an isolated case. There are
two others mentioned in my testimony. One is a situation in
which the Commerce Department approved exports to a company in
China that supplied anti-ship missiles to Iran and was
sanctioned for missile proliferation. We, the United States,
sold that company computer equipment for simulating wind
effects. If you are building anti-ship missiles, a computer to
simulate wind effects is quite useful.
Also, only last month, the Washington Times reported that
Iran was installing another large JY-14 radar near its border
with Afghanistan. This radar is a very aggressive and powerful
air defense radar. It was sold to Iran by a Chinese company
called China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation.
Before that sale occurred, the U.S. Government approved a
series of exports to that company that would be very useful for
making that very radar. So again, we are facing a situation
where our pilots, if we ever get in a fight with Iran, will
have to face equipment probably made with our own technology.
The second point I would like to make is that export
controls are now being weakened. In response to the attacks on
September 11, the U.S. Government dropped export control
sanctions on a series of Indian and Pakistani companies. In my
testimony, I provided descriptions and photographs of some of
the companies that were dropped from the control list.
One of them is Hindustan Aeronautics. It makes major
components for India's largest rockets. In my testimony, there
is a photograph of nose cones made by that company.
Another company is Godrej and Boyce. It also makes
components for India's largest rockets. It makes a rather
powerful liquid fuel rocket engine, which is depicted in a
photograph in my testimony.
A third firm is India's National Aerospace Laboratory. It
conducts missile research. In my testimony, I have a picture of
a missile being tested in this company's wind tunnel.
And fourth, there is Walchandnagar Industries. It produces
major components for Indian nuclear reactors that are not
inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The
absence of inspections means that the plutonium that those
reactors make is free for use in atomic bombs. This company,
too, was dropped from export control sanctions.
So we have this serious situation where we have a terrorist
attack on American soil, and in response to that attack, the
U.S. Government drops export controls on companies in
developing nations that are making weapons of mass destruction.
It seems to me that this is a mistake. It is not the right way
to respond to a terrorist attack.
Also, I would like to draw the Subcommittee's attention to
the problem of export enforcement. It is very rare for a big
company that breaks export control laws in the United States to
be punished. I have cited two cases.
One involves the company Silicon Graphics. In 1996, it sold
high-performance computers without the required export license
to one of Russia's leading nuclear weapons laboratories. After
the computers arrived, one of Russia's leading nuclear
scientists announced that the Russians were going to start
doing simulations like we did with computers instead of doing
actual tests. This is a case where it is undisputed that the
export needed a license. It was made without the license and
nothing has happened. It went to a grand jury years ago and has
simply disappeared.
More recently, in 1999, the Cox Committee found that Hughes
Electronics and Loral Space Communications--I am sure the
Subcommittee is familiar with that case--the Cox Committee
found that they deliberately acted without the legally required
licenses and violated U.S. export control laws. That case has
been in a grand jury for nearly 4 years without any results.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Milhollin, there is a vote that has been
in progress. How much more time do you need?
Mr. Milhollin. I need about 1 minute, perhaps 2 minutes.
Perhaps I can do it in 1 minute.
Senator Akaka. Yes. I have questions, but go ahead.
Mr. Milhollin. I think there are things we can do which
would be very easy. In my testimony, I have indicated that we
could list the dangerous companies abroad that are trying to
make weapons of mass destruction. We know who they are. Their
names are well known. I have attached to my testimony a list of
50 Chinese companies that could easily be added to the Federal
Register list of dangerous buyers. I recommend that be done as
soon as possible. That concludes my testimony.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Milhollin.
I am so sorry. We have a rash of votes going on, so let me
ask this question of Mr. Christoff and GAO. Has GAO ever looked
at which items are of greatest concern for WMD? Is it your
experience that an industry compliance program, voluntary or
obligatory, can work?
Mr. Christoff. Mr. Chairman, let me just talk to you about
what we have done in GAO. I think one of the important areas
that we have addressed is how to balance the risk in
determining what are the national security implications when
you try to decontrol an item and balancing it against the
market availability.
The work that we did for this full Committee on high-
performance computers is a good example in the sense that
Executive Branch agencies, I think, do a good job of
determining that many of these high-performance computers are
available elsewhere, but they do not look at the national
security implications. As we said in the past, that is an
important balancing act that oftentimes does not occur within
the Executive Branch.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Let me ask a final question so I have a few minutes left to
get to the floor. Dr. Cupitt, in your written testimony, you
made a strong argument for a comprehensive study of the anti-
terrorist export control policies of key U.S. allies. Should we
make changes in the way our current government agencies charged
with dual-use export controls work? Do we need a new agency or
new interagency process?
Mr. Cupitt. As you may know, I think S. 149, for instance,
was going to set up an Office of Technology Assessment that
would have as part of its mandate a requirement to assess the
export controls systems of other countries. I think that might
be an example of one of the things that might be done.
Even though we spend, I know at our Center, we spend a lot
of time assessing other countries' export control systems, we
are frequently asked, have you assessed country X, and we have
to say, no, and we have to say, no one else has and, at least
in a comprehensive or systematic way. And for us, I think, to
make good policy decisions and good strategies in terms of
building a coalition of partners that would have complementary
export control systems, we need to know a lot more than what we
currently do.
Related to that, I want to mention that I think Dr. Lewis's
point about catch-all systems, one of the successes that we
have had in recent years is to promote catch-all as a means of
addressing some of the items that may not be listed or may have
moved off the list, not only here in the United States but in
other countries, and that has been an important step. But even
there, we do not know that much about who is implementing the
catch-all control policies.
Even very basic data like that, we do not really have a
good idea, and I think that would be something that would be
very useful. Again, I think that S. 149, setting up that Office
of Technology Assessment in the Commerce Department, is an
example of one of the ways that this might be achieved, that we
might improve our data capabilities.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Lewis, would you make any comments on
the same question?
Mr. Lewis. The question being, do we need a new export
control agency? Was that the question?
Senator Akaka. Yes, whether we need a new agency or new
interagency process.
Mr. Lewis. One thing that would help, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for the question, is that we could definitely use a
new law. The law we have now dates from 1979, and so it is an
interesting historical artifact, but it does not work very well
and the system of export controls it sets up with national
security regimes is complicated and ineffective. So that would
be one area that I hope the Congress will be able to return to
next year.
We have looked in a couple of studies about whether or not
there would be a benefit from having an individual agency that
was responsible for export controls. I would agree with anyone
who said that none of the agencies now do a particularly good
job. It is very hard to get consensus on where you should move
it. And a new agency may not have the power or the clout of an
office that is linked to a cabinet member. So it probably would
not hurt to shake up the system, but I am not sure we are ready
to identify what the outcome would be.
Senator Akaka. I have to go, but we have questions for you.
We will send the questions to you for your responses. But I
want to thank you so much for coming today and appearing as our
second panel and for sharing your statements with us. There is
no question, what you have said will help us do a better job
here in the U.S. Senate. Thank you very much.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) WITH
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS:
NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE
COORDINATION ACT OF 2001
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001
U.S. Senate,
International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services Subcommittee,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel Akaka,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Domenici, and Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
The Subcommittee is here to discuss the threats we face from
insecure critical equipment and discontented scientists from
the former Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
complex.
I want to thank our colleague, Senator Hagel, for joining
us today. I also wish to thank our other witnesses for being
here, Ms. Gary Jones, the Director of Nuclear Nonproliferation
Issues at GAO; Ms. Laura Holgate, Vice President of the Russian
Newly Independent States Program of the Nuclear Threat
Initiative; and Mr. Leonard Spector, Deputy Director of the
Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for
Nonproliferation Studies.
President Bush and President Putin yesterday announced
historic cuts to the nuclear stockpiles in the United States
and Russia. For the future of both our nations and the prospect
of a more secure world, I hope they are successful in
addressing another legacy of the Cold War, the materials,
facilities, equipment, and people used to make these and other
weapons in the former Soviet Union.
We have faced a major national security problem since the
1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Control of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapon materials was suddenly spread
out among a number of newly independent nations. We could no
longer be assured of adequate control of these weapons or the
people who had designed them.
Prior to 1991, international nonproliferation policy
stressed keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands
of a few states. Since 1991, we have been faced with the
possibility the information and materials which would have
taken years to acquire to build a WMD weapon could be stolen in
an instant.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, the problem of
preventing WMD proliferation has gained both a new urgency and
a greater complexity. The FBI's assessment of the anthrax
attacks which have plagued the Senate and the Nation's mail may
have been perpetrated by a lone disgruntled scientist,
demonstrates how a weapon that had only been in the hands of a
state can now be wielded by a single terrorist. Weapons that we
previously worried about being delivered by an intercontinental
ballistic missile we now know can be infiltrated into our midst
without any advance warning.
We are faced with the prospect of spending billions of
dollars to protect our homeland against multiple threats from
multiple sources. Nonproliferation programs, the subject of
today's hearing, are a critical means to prevent weapons,
materials, equipment, and technology from falling into the
wrong hands.
I want to thank again our colleague, Senator Hagel, for
being here to discuss this proposal to achieve a national
strategy and improve coordination between the various
nonproliferation programs. His legislation, the
Nonproliferation Coordination Assistance Act, would establish a
coordinating body to ensure that nonproliferation activities
are efficient, effective, and further national interests.
The Departments of State, Defense, and Energy have asked
that their testimony be postponed until after President Bush's
summit with President Putin. We have agreed to this and will
reschedule their testimony in the near future.
In our discussion of current and future nonproliferation
plans and the ways to improve and better coordinate them, we
must keep in mind two questions. First, how can we adapt to
ever-changing WMD threats? And second, are our plans and
policies making the world more secure? I look forward to
hearing our witnesses' comments on these two questions.
At this time, I would like to yield to my friend, Senator
Domenici, for his statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel, I am pleased to be here adding some positive
thrust to your legislation. I want to compliment you and the
Chairman for holding this hearing. In addition, I want to
compliment Senator Hagel for his proposed legislation. It has a
very simple title but a very profound process is involved in
this. It is called Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act
of 2001.
The importance of nonproliferation programs with the former
Soviet Union should not be open to question. The collapse of
the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, but it also tremendously
increased the risk that materials and expertise for weapons of
mass destruction could contribute to new threats to global
stability. For a country which relied on guards and guns to
protect secrets and material, it was a jolting transition to a
new situation where it was not clear if the guards, that is, if
they were even still present, were being paid.
The current war on terrorism is critically dependent on
minimizing the extent of the threat that terrorists can mount.
Preventing their access to weapons of mass destruction must be
one of our highest priorities.
Many nonproliferation programs were created, all with the
best of intentions. Each program has well-stated goals. But
these programs frequently are intertwined and interrelated in
various complex and difficult ways. There could be no question
that better coordination among the programs would lead to
enhanced effectiveness, as well as potential cost efficiencies.
The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation--it is also obviously
in Nunn-Lugar, but this followed it by a few years, in 1996--
called for a nonproliferation coordinator for all these
programs. The administration at that time chose to ignore that.
After the legislation's call for a coordinator expired in 1999,
I helped with further legislation for this coordinator in
amendments to previous Defense Authorization Acts, again to no
avail. There was nobody worried enough about it, and clearly
the Executive Branch did not think it was a big enough or a
powerful enough issue.
Numerous committees have called for this coordination and
have studied it. John Deutch chaired one of these committees.
More recently, the superb effort from Senator Howard Baker and
the Hon. Lloyd Cutler again called for this coordination. That
is a current report, Mr. Chairman. For everybody on this staff
that is interested in moving this issue along, that is ``must
reading.'' It is very current and has many current evaluations
and studies in it. My friend, Chuck Hagel, is totally familiar
with it, I am sure.
In an amendment to the current defense authorization bill,
I called for tighter coordination. I was pleased to develop
that amendment with Senator Hagel, he might recall, building on
the same bill that you are discussing here today. In addition
to Senator Hagel, Senators Lugar, Biden, Bingaman, and Landreau
joined us in cosponsoring it. All I can say is that it was
unfortunate, but no action was taken on that amendment due to
confusion in the minutes before the Senate voted on the defense
authorization bill.
Now I understand that the Armed Services Committee is
working in conference to incorporate the themes of that
amendment. But I am very pleased that while that is stalemated
somewhere, you are giving birth to the idea with your bill here
today. I do hope it is given every consideration and I hope you
pursue it with vigor. It is very, very important.
We can't forget about this coordination as terrorism gets
closer and closer on the television monitors of Americans.
There is an awful lot of terrorism potential when you think
about what can be put together with all of the leftover Soviet
materials and all of the material that comes from dismantlement
programs. Clearly there are risks that come with the Soviet
Union's turning out to have a very different amalgamation of
programs. Clearly they have a difficult time finding money to
pay just the ordinary kinds of expenditures to maintain control
over these materials and expertise to avoid it spreading all
over the world.
There can be many examples where we needed this improved
coordination. One of the immediate concerns involves the very
vital plutonium disposition programs, which require
coordination between the United States and Russia. The recent
suggestion from the National Security Council that this program
might be modified, along with strong budget signals that we are
wavering in our support for the program, has introduced some
great uncertainties. Failure to coordinate this complex program
has led to some very serious issues which threaten to derail
the entire effort in terms of plutonium disposition with
Russia.
We are now seeing the Governor of South Carolina,
incidentally, refusing to accept plutonium from Rocky Flats and
a German company withdrawing their offer to assist Russia with
the MOX program because the administration has injected some
really serious uncertainty by saying the program did not work
by not having one to take its place. We saw a collapse of the
efforts to obtain international funding for the program in
Russia. Coordination could have avoided all these problems.
In conclusion, I strongly concur, Mr. Chairman, with
Senator Hagel and many of our colleagues that a far better
coordination is needed across the government for our
nonproliferation programs with the former Soviet Union.
I might say that I am privileged to serve on a board of
directors of a nonprofit corporation that is called the Nuclear
Threat Initiative. That was set up with a $50 million a year
pledge, I do not know how many years, but it will be a number
of years, perhaps 5 years, or $250 million. I note that one of
those who are working with Sam Nunn is Laura Holgate, sitting
in the front row. She is going to be on our next panel. It has
been a pleasure working with Ted Turner, Senator Lugar, and
former Senator Nunn, and some other distinguished people, and
we are going to make some real headway in terms of getting the
world moving with reference to nonproliferation.
We commented at our last board meeting that does not mean
that we do not need government's action. Quite to the contrary.
The reason some of the things are being done by that nonprofit
is because our government has failed and they have not done
some things they ought to be doing. So this is one of them, to
get started on coordinating our own programs.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Hagel.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Domenici. Thank
you for your statement.
Senator Cochran, may I yield to you if you have a
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. I ask unanimous
consent that my prepared statement be placed in the record as
if read.
Senator Akaka. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record.
[The prepared opening statement of Senator Cochran
follows:]
PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you in welcoming Senator Hagel
and our other witnesses to today's hearing on the United States'
nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance programs in the former
Soviet Union. I appreciate the fact that Senator Hagel is taking the
time to be here with us despite the fact that he has another hearing to
attend and so I will make just a brief statement.
We have in place already several nonproliferation programs which
are important tools that contribute to the effort to control the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But, I think we must do
more to deal with this serious problem which threatens our nation and
other nations as well.
The bill before us today is designed to strengthen and improve the
implementation of these programs by the U.S. Government. S. 673 would
create a committee within the Executive Branch with the responsibility
of monitoring and coordinating U.S. policies in the former Soviet
Union.
I commend Presidents Bush and Putin for their statements yesterday
reiterating their strong commitments to cooperation in this area of
concern. It is clear that the Bush Administration places a high
priority on these programs and is working, as the White House press
release stated, to ``ensure that existing efforts serve priority threat
reduction and nonproliferation goals, as efficiently and effectively as
possible. . . .''
I look forward to today's testimony on this very important topic
and to our future hearings on this subject.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, let me just welcome my good
friend and colleague from Nebraska. I appreciate the fact that
he is here today to talk about his new initiative in the
proliferation area, trying to control more effectively the
spread of weapons of mass destruction. I cannot think of a more
important subject for him to work on than that, and to looking
at who is cosponsoring the legislation with him, it makes me
realize that we need to take this very seriously. I am certain
that it is a proposal that has been carefully reviewed and
thought out and the Congress should pay close attention to this
suggestion. We appreciate your taking time to come and testify
before the Subcommittee.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.
Again, I want to welcome you, Senator Hagel, and I want to
thank you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss S.
673, the Nonproliferation Coordination Assistance Act of 2001.
If you are ready for your statement, we will be glad to hear
it.
Senator Hagel. I am, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, could I become a cosponsor?
Would you let me do that today and you note it in the record?
Senator, I would like to be a cosponsor.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Fine.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
TESTIMONY OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL,\1\ A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to my friends,
Senator Cochran, and Senator Domenici, thank you. What I am
going to present today, Mr. Chairman, is essentially an effort
that has worked from and off of the leadership of Senators
Domenici, Lugar, Nunn, and Cochran and so many of my senior
colleagues who have been not just working on this general
issue, but trying to frame it in a way to call attention to the
relevancy and the real dynamic of the threat of terrorism.
That, of course, as Senator Domenici noted, has now been moved
from a threat to a reality as of September 11, and hence, the
timeliness and the importance of these kinds of issues, most
specifically nonproliferation, is beyond just urgent but it is
now of necessity that the Congress of the United States deal
with this.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Hagel with an attachment
appears in the appendix on page 219.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What I have done in the bill that I put together a few
months ago was essentially reframe much of the work of Senators
Domenici, Lugar, Biden, Cochran, and others with their support,
with their concurrence, and with their encouragement. And so I
want to acknowledge them as I begin to lay out what my bill
would do, Mr. Chairman, because essentially, it is because of
their efforts and those who have gone before me that I have
been able to do this.
A few months ago, I introduced, as you noted, the
Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act to address the
coordination of nonproliferation efforts in Russia and the
former Soviet Union. Senators Lugar and Biden were original
cosponsors of this legislation and we will include, of course,
Senator Domenici, as well.
This legislation was divided into eight sections. Section
four of this bill establishes a Committee on Nonproliferation
Assistance at the assistant secretary level or higher, to be
chaired by a senior representative of the National Security
Council and comprised of representatives from the Departments
of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy.
I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that I take no particular
pride in my colleagues' or others' efforts to strengthen,
improve, restate, and restructure what I have laid out here and
I am certain that can be done. I introduced this bill not
because of any territorial sense of prerogatives as to who
chairs anything, but rather to try to bring some accountability
to this issue, and you will hear from witnesses, especially GAO
and other administration witnesses that you noted later on,
that will have their own sense of this bill and will come
forward, I am sure, with a more effective way to structure the
bill.
Section five sets out the duties of the Subcommittee.
Section six relates to administrative support. Section seven
protects confidentiality of information.
Mr. Chairman, it has been 10 years since the Congress took
the important step to help reduce the threat of nuclear chaos
emerging from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Under the
foresight and leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar, Congress
established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
authorizing funding through the Department of Defense budget to
assist with the safe and secure transportation, storage, and
dismantlement of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons in the
former Soviet Union.
We are aware of that. It has been alluded to especially in
the remarks of Senator Domenici. And upon that first important
piece of legislation, we build the next stage of the Nunn-Lugar
effort. And as Senator Domenici noted, the next stage of that
came in 1996, when Senator Domenici joined with Senators Lugar
and Nunn to further define and refine Nunn-Lugar.
Thousands of nuclear warheads have been deactivated and
missiles dismantled in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Russia. In the past 10 years, the Nunn-Lugar initiative has
grown into a multi-pronged effort by the Departments of
Defense, State, and Energy to ensure that weapons of mass
destruction, weapons-usable material and technology, and
weapons-related knowledge in Russia and the Newly Independent
States remain beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons
proliferating states.
The investments we have made in this area have yielded an
impressive return. By assisting Russia in this area, we have
reduced, not eliminated, nuclear threats we face in the United
States and the world and have enhanced our national security.
But just as the Nunn-Lugar initiative has changed over the last
decade, so, too, has the world changed, especially since the
terrorist attacks on this country on September 11.
Nonproliferation is one of the key components of the war on
terrorism. On November 6, President Bush stated, ``Al Qaeda
operates in more than 60 nations, including some in Central and
Eastern Europe. These terrorist groups seek to destabilize
entire nations and regions. They are seeking chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons. Given the means, our enemies
would be a threat to every Nation and eventually to
civilization itself.''
Last January, a bipartisan task force led by former Senator
Baker and former White House Counselor Lloyd Cutler, which
Senator Domenici mentioned, released a report calling for
improved coordination within the U.S. Government on
nonproliferation assistance to Russia. In particular, the
report noted, ``Coordination within and among U.S. Government
agencies is now insufficient and must be improved. Although the
task force focused on the DOE nonproliferation programs, the
members heard from many interlocutors that the programs would
be improved and could be improved, as would the counterpart
programs in other agencies, if there were more coordination at
all levels among all U.S. Government programs.''
That, Mr. Chairman, is what my legislation intends to do.
President Bush recognized the need for greater coordination in
our domestic security policy, as evidenced by the appointment
of Governor Ridge as Director of the Office for Homeland
Security. The Baker-Cutler report recommended establishing a
new position for nonproliferation coordination within the
National Security Council or creating a high-policy-level
nonproliferation czar.
My legislation does not impose such a mandate on the
President, but instead calls for coordination of our
nonproliferation programs through a senior level coordinating
committee. And again, I would say that if there are
suggestions, particular points that could improve and would
improve the structure of this accountability, I certainly would
welcome those.
A second aspect of my legislation is the inclusion of
efforts undertaken by private sector programs in this area,
such as corporations and nongovernmental organizations, or
NGOs. And again, Senator Domenici alluded to one of those
organizations a few minutes ago.
This Subcommittee will hear testimony today from the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private organization founded by
Ted Turner and former Senator Sam Nunn to reduce the threat
from nuclear weapons. You will also hear from NGOs and their
efforts through testimony from a representative of the Russian
Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program at the
Monterey Institute. Currently, this private spending is small,
but it is registering positive results. It will continue to
increase. We should ensure that government and non-government
spending on nonproliferation programs complement each other and
are not duplicative.
Our previous efforts have yielded significant results, but
there is far more work yet to do. Yesterday, Senator Dodd and I
wrote in the New York Times that Presidents Bush and Putin
should use the current summit as an opportunity to discuss
effective ways to ensure that weapons and materials of mass
destruction in and around Russia remain safe, accounted for,
and secure.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the discussions between
Presidents Bush and Putin are already yielding agreement in
this area. As you noted, yesterday afternoon, President Bush
noted that the United States and Russia will strengthen our
efforts to cut off every possible source of biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise.
Presidents Bush and Putin also announced yesterday that they
will dramatically reduce nuclear arsenals in both countries.
This will probably require more spending from the United
States.
If we in Congress are asked to spend more of our budget on
this effort, then we must ensure these funds are spent
efficiently, effectively, and not on repetitive efforts. And
again, Mr. Chairman, that is as much the focus of my
legislation as any other part.
I appreciate the Subcommittee's serious review of this
timely and relevant issue and I would say, Mr. Chairman, that
if there is anything I can do to further that effort, I look
forward to working with you and the members of this
Subcommittee. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Thank
you for your leadership in this area. I really appreciate what
you have said. It will be helpful to the Subcommittee and with
you, too, in looking for ways of preparing us to deal with
whatever threats that might be coming, so I thank you very much
again for your statement.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Now you will hear
from the real pros.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
At this time, I will call our next panel, Ms. Gary Jones
from GAO, Ms. Laura Holgate from the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
and Leonard Spector from the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies. They have been asked to discuss current
nonproliferation programs, how they are coordinated with
Federal, private, and international efforts, and how S. 673,
the Hagel bill, would make these programs and efforts more
effective.
Ms. Jones, please proceed with your statement at this time.
I want all of you to know that your full written statements
will be entered into the record.
TESTIMONY OF MS. GARY L. JONES,\1\ DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR AND
NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased to be
here today to discuss our recent work on U.S. nonproliferation
programs and to comment on S. 673, a bill to establish an
interagency committee to review and coordinate U.S.
nonproliferation programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Jones appears in the appendix on
page 223.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As others have said, the events of September 11 have
heightened the importance of these nonproliferation programs to
our national security. Let me first briefly summarize the
results of our work on several of the U.S. Government's
nonproliferation programs. We have found that they have
achieved some success, but more needs to be done to keep
nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies out of the hands
of terrorists and countries of concern.
Successes include improved security systems, which have
reduced the risk of theft of nuclear material in Russia; the
purchase of weapons grade uranium that is equivalent to 4,000
nuclear warheads that has been turned into fuel for commercial
nuclear power reactors; and the creation of non-military jobs
for some weapons scientists.
But the task is far from over. Hundreds of metric tons of
nuclear material remain at some risk because improved security
measures have not yet been installed. This is because DOE's
program to secure this material has experienced problems with
access to sensitive Russian sites. Further, DOE does not know
how much and for how long additional assistance will be needed
to sustain the operation and maintain the new security
equipment already involved.
Two DOE programs and one at the State Department share the
goal of employing Russia's weapons scientists in non-military
work and thereby preventing them from selling their knowledge
to terrorists or countries of concern. With hundreds employed
by one program and several thousand employed part-time by
another, these programs are a long way from reaching the 30,000
to 75,000 senior nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
scientists without full-time employment.
Even when jobs are created, these programs face difficulty
in conclusively demonstrating that they are achieving their
intended goal of preventing the spread of weapons-related
knowledge and expertise. Our reports on these DOD
nonproliferation programs made numerous recommendations to
improve their overall management and DOE has addressed or is in
the process of making changes to address these recommendations.
Let me turn to the bill, S. 673, that the Subcommittee has
under consideration. There is some debate among officials, both
within and outside government, about the need for more
coordination of U.S. nonproliferation programs. To prepare for
this hearing, we spoke with representatives from the
Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and some private
interest groups. They all believe that coordination among
Federal agencies implementing nonproliferation programs is
already taking place and the mechanism envisioned by the bill
may not be needed.
However, based on our work and the findings of two
independent groups that recently examined these programs, the
Deutch Commission and the Baker-Cutler Task Force, we believe
that additional coordination would be helpful. For example,
some officials told us that better coordination is needed
between the United States and international programs, such as
those implemented by the European Union. Further, program
officials have also noted that although coordination does occur
at some level, it is frequently informal and subject to changes
in program personnel. We believe that greater coordination
could minimize duplication, leverage resources, and focus
programs more clearly on common goals and objectives.
However, the legislation did not address a number of other
problems that I have just talked about, such as limited access
to sensitive Russian sites and various program management
concerns. However, the coordinating body envisioned by the
legislation could serve as a vehicle to share information and
best practices for addressing these types of problems.
We also believe the bill could be strengthened by mandating
development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly
identifies overall goals, time frames for meeting these goals,
and ways to set priorities for allocating resources government-
wide to address nonproliferation concerns. Both the Deutch
Commission and the Baker-Cutler Task Force believe that such a
strategic plan was the missing element from the U.S. Government
implementation of nonproliferation programs.
Building on the individual programs' strategic plans, a
government-wide plan could also address questions such as are
the end dates for the completion of the various
nonproliferation programs, such as securing nuclear materials
in Russia, still viable? How can the security improvements made
be sustained beyond the completion of the programs? And in
light of September 11, do we continue to have the right mix of
nonproliferation programs needed to address the varying
security problems facing our Nation?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Jones.
At this time, I would like to yield to Senator Cleland.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank particularly our colleague, Senator Hagel, and
the witnesses who appear here today to testify about this
important subject.
The threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction that
are retained in the states comprising the former Soviet Union
is actually mind boggling. I was struck by the fact that a
bipartisan task force headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler
has recently called this, ``the most urgent unmet national
security threat to the United States,'' and called for a four-
fold funding increase for our threat reduction efforts.
In the wake of September 11, we cannot hesitate to take
strong action to implement this recommendation. We are indeed
fortunate that 10 years ago, a group of distinguished Senators,
including my friend and the former Senator from Georgia, Sam
Nunn, put in place what has come to be known as the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. The programs that have been
carried out under this legislation have, without a doubt,
profoundly improved the security of the United States and may
well have prevented a far worse catastrophe than what we have
recently experienced. I reiterate my support for these programs
and call for the enhanced funding recommended by the bipartisan
task force mentioned previously.
To the purpose of this hearing, I say that the proposed
legislation is fully consistent with the requirement to provide
additional resources for cooperative threat reduction and I
support it. I also believe that the committee proposed by the
Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 will need
a highly-placed advocate to ensure that its mandate is
effectively carried out.
To that end, I endorse Ms. Holgate's recommendation for the
creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed
exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of
mass destruction. This threat is far too grave to go without
such an advocate. I am convinced that our national security
depends upon the effective coordination and resourcing that
this position will enable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement and
your support.
I would like to now call on Ms. Holgate for her testimony.
TESTIMONY OF LAURA S.H. HOLGATE,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT FOR RUSSIAN
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
Ms. Holgate. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and other
Subcommittee Members for the opportunity to testify today about
how the U.S. Government can strengthen its efforts to prevent
the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and
keep them from falling into the hands of groups and states who
would do us harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Holgate appears in the appendix
on page 233.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Nation and the world discovered on September 11 that
there are terrorist forces in the world who will stop at
nothing in their efforts to take innocent lives. The work that
the U.S. Government does to reduce the threat from nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and materials is our first
line of defense in keeping these weapons out of terrorist
hands.
Dismantling weapons, securing material, eliminating
infrastructure, and directing know-how to peaceful pursuits,
all of these play an essential role in fighting the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. We have taken important steps
towards these problems, but to protect the security of the
American people, we need giant strides, so I would like to
thank the Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee for
putting the spotlight on this issue and giving me and others a
chance to contribute our ideas.
President Bush clearly shares the concern that has been
noted by Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler, and many others in the
introductory comments to this hearing. Two years ago at the
Reagan Library, candidate Bush praised, ``the foresight and
statesmanship of Senators Lugar and Nunn for their legislation
to improve security at many Russian nuclear facilities,'' and
then he added, ``A great deal of Russian nuclear material
cannot be accounted for. The next President must press for an
accurate inventory of all this material and we must do more. I
will ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance
to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly
as possible.''
Sadly, the administration's actions in the first months of
its tenure fall short of the vision and purpose articulated by
President Bush. Earlier this year, the administration announced
a review of nonproliferation programs, then cut the program
budgets back before it even began the review. The review itself
stopped action in its tracks. Travel was halted. Work was
postponed. Momentum was lost. And program managers felt they
lacked the authority to go forward. The review was undertaken
without even the courtesy of telling our partners in Russia.
Now we are told the review is complete, but we have not seen
its outcome.
I strongly support a review of our nonproliferation
programs. We have not had one since 1993. But it needs to be
broad and it needs to be strategic. The review that was
recently completed appeared to be aimed merely at finding
inefficiencies in individual program activities. That is a
worthy purpose in its own terms, but it is no substitute for
strategic thinking about U.S. national security goals and how
threat reduction programs can help achieve them.
I worked for many years in many capacities, first at the
Department of Defense in the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program, then at the Department of Energy, and now at the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, to implement and advance these
programs to prevent nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
from falling into the wrong hands. It is my view that these
programs are critically important, largely effective, and
because of the obvious urgency, more in need than ever of high-
level attention, increased funding, greater staffing, and
continuous fresh thinking to help speed up the pace and widen
the scope of these programs. If terrorists are racing to
acquire weapons of mass destruction, we ought to be racing to
stop them.
Ten years after the passage of the landmark Nunn-Lugar Act
to establish the legal basis of nonproliferation cooperation
with Russia and other former Soviet States, U.S. Government
activities in this area approach $1 billion annually and
involve multiple agencies from Defense to Health and Human
Services, myriad contractors, and over a dozen Congressional
committees and subcommittees. This growth has been, by and
large, organic, with each agency pursuing its own contacts and
relationships in recipient countries, assembling and justifying
its own budget, implementing programs based on its own culture
and approaches, and interacting with its own Congressional
oversight committees.
This is a complex task. Some point to the involvement of so
many agencies as evidence of poor management. It is not. It is
evidence that such a program requires wide-ranging expertise
and, therefore, will always be a challenge to administer, a
challenge that can be fully met, in my view, only with high-
level leadership and coordination. This leadership and
coordination has been hard to come by since the early days of
these programs.
Where it has worked well, it has been a consequence of
personalities, committees, or commissions that are not enduring
features of the organizational structure, either within the
U.S. Government or in relations between the United States and
states of the former Soviet Union. Coordination with
nongovernmental organizations like mine also occurs primarily
ad hoc, based on personal relationships and our own initiative.
Relationships with other countries working in these areas tends
to be intermittent and opportunistic.
Despite the complexity of these nonproliferation
cooperation activities, programmatic duplication has been
remarkably low and program implementation is, in general, very
effective. In spite of proceeding without a comprehensive and
coordinated vision administered from the top, these programs
taken collectively have massively improved U.S. national
security. Improving the coordination and accountability of
these programs should result in even greater improvements.
What is missing in the process is a definitive statement of
strategy and consistent advocacy of administration goals. This
must include holding agencies accountable for financing and
implementing programs that accomplish these goals. Without this
clear high-level direction and the interagency process that
creates and maintains it, agencies have set and articulated
their own priorities, resources have not always been aligned
with those priorities, even within agencies, and differences
among agencies' rhetoric and programmatic actions have created
perceptions of inefficiency and contradiction which are
exploited by opponents of the programs and missions.
To address these structural flaws, I recommend the creation
of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed explicitly and
exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of
mass destruction. This individual would be responsible for
leading and enforcing interagency decisions and for creating a
unified programmatic budget presentation.
In whatever manner Congress and the Executive Branch decide
to organize our programs, and there are many effective ways to
do so, they must have high-level Presidential attention. Any
organizational structure with high-level attention will be
better than the best organizational structure with low-level
attention.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Spector, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF LEONARD S. SPECTOR,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Mr. Spector. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on improving the
effective of U.S. nonproliferation programs in the successor
states of the former Soviet Union.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Spector with attchments appears
in the appendix on page 245.
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I want to try to emphasize three themes today. The first is
that the indecision of the administration, and what I think has
to be characterized to some degree as ``dithering,'' is
damaging our efforts to control weapons of mass destruction
material and expertise in the Newly Independent States,
especially in Russia. I think this is an especially troubling
situation given the new urgency that has emerged to deal with
these matters, in light of the September 11 events.
The second theme I want to emphasize is that the programs
that are functioning could function much more efficiently and
more effectively if they could be better integrated and if
there were better planning among them and better oversight from
above. I will support the current legislation in some of my
comments in terms of its approach.
And finally, I want to comment on the private-public
partnerships and just note how important a role they have
played historically in this area and how important a role they
are playing today.
The fundamental goal of the majority of the programs that
are operating in Russia today and the other Newly Independent
States, especially those whose purpose is to secure and
eliminate fissile material and to provide employment for Soviet
weapons of mass destruction scientists, is to prevent
terrorists and states of proliferation concern from acquiring
these materials and getting access to this expertise. As such,
the programs are an integral and highly important component of
U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Osama bin Laden, as we know, has been seeking weapons of
mass destruction, and, of course, he recently claimed to
possess chemical and nuclear weapons, although most observers,
disbelieve that latter claim of possession of nuclear weapons.
He is also known to have extensive links throughout the former
Soviet Union.
It is worth recalling the scale of the Soviet weapons of
mass destruction legacy. The Department of Energy estimates
that Russia possesses 603 tons of weapons-usable fissile
materials, that is plutonium or highly enriched uranium,
outside of weapons. That is enough for 41,000 nuclear arms. And
to provide a benchmark, let us just consider what North Korea
may have. It is said by the U.S. Government to possess enough
plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons, and we all know how
serious we take that national security threat.
But one or two weapons is less than five-one-thousandths of
a percent of the Russian stockpile of weapons-grade material
that I described earlier. One shudders to imagine the mischief
that Osama bin Laden or a terrorist of his ilk might cause, if
he were to obtain a comparably minuscule fraction of the
nuclear weapons material in Russia.
Russia also possesses a vast arsenal of chemical weapons
that are now currently awaiting destruction with U.S.
assistance, if we can get the program moving, and they also
possess the ability to manufacture the world's most potent
biological weapons. The bulk of these various weapons-of-mass-
destruction materials are not subject to adequate security
measures.
Despite new evidence of terrorist interest in acquiring and
using WMD, the Bush Administration has not acted to accelerate
efforts to improve security over these materials and over WMD
expertise in the former Soviet States. Indeed, nearly 10 months
after taking office, as Ms. Holgate just noted, and really
throughout an entire budget cycle, the administration is still
``reviewing'' U.S. nonproliferation programs in Russia. It is
apparently unable to decide whether and/or how to pursue a
number of the critically important initiatives that are already
underway.
Inexplicably, the one point that the administration has
decided upon is that the programs do not need additional
funding, and that, accordingly, no monies from the $40 billion
in anti-terrorist funds that will be made available by the
Congress should be used for the purpose of helping secure
weapons-grade materials and expertise in the former Soviet
Union.
Let me review with you a few of the programs. I have listed
quite a few in my testimony. I will try to just summarize and
only hit the highlights. Perhaps the most salient of the
programs for dealing with the Soviet nuclear legacy, is the
Material Protection Control and Accounting Program at the
Department of Energy. As was pointed out earlier by the GAO, to
date, this program has made great strides.
It has, I believe, protected about 200 tons of weapons-
grade material. It is roughly a third of the 603 tons that now
needs to be secured. The remaining material will not receive
so-called ``rapid upgrades'' until 2007 and it will not be
comprehensively secured until 2011.
Surprisingly, the Bush Administration's fiscal year 2002
budget reduced the funding for this program to a bit below the
fiscal year 2001 levels, (although 2 weeks ago, Congress
increased support for this effort above the administration's
request, from $143 million up to $173 million). The events of
September 11 call for additional funding.
Now, I was at the Department of Energy when we put together
the previous administration's budget in this field, and I know
that there were other parts of this program that are not going
to be addressed in the coming year because of these lower
budget numbers. We all know that not every item on the wish
list can be funded, but I know that we will not be doing some
very important work because of the administration's hesitancy
in moving forward.
Now, one way that we can rapidly improve security over tons
of material is to complete another one of these material
security programs in Russia, and that is to complete the
facility at Mayak, known as the Fissile Material Storage
Facility. We have already spent $400 million on this facility,
and it is supposed to be operational in the coming year, when
it will secure 6 tons of weapons-grade material. They will load
it at a rate of about 6 tons per year and eventually 25 tons of
plutonium will be secured.
What is holding up the operation of this facility is we
cannot quite come to conclusion with the Russians on measures
for having confidence about what goes into the facility and
mechanisms for monitoring it. This has been a problem for a
number of years, but it is not moving forward, in part because
it is not getting high-level attention at the Pentagon, where
this program sits. It is extremely important when you have a
high-level official from the Pentagon here to ask what steps he
is taking to make this $400 million investment good. We have to
take advantage of this facility in the coming year, and I think
the ball is very definitely in the court of the Pentagon.
Another program which I think has been an unalloyed success
and is widely applauded is the High Enriched Uranium Purchase
Agreement. This is an agreement under which weapons-grade
material is blended down to non-weapons-grade nuclear power
plant fuel in Russia and then purchased by the United States
and used to fuel U.S. nuclear power plants. This is where 110
tons of material have indeed been removed from being a problem.
This 110 tons is no longer usable for weapons, a very large
quantities. But the program itself will last for many more
years and needs to be accelerated.
The intellectual father of the program, Thomas Neff of MIT,
believes that with some ingenuity, we could double the rate of
down-blending from 30 tons a year to 60 tons a year at a cost
of roughly $150 million per year, but the bulk of this money
will come back to us when that uranium would be sold on the
open market some years from now.
The President is looking into this, supposedly. I had an
interview with Robert Joseph at the National Security Council,
which is an on-the-record interview that we published recently
in the Nonproliferation Review. He said that this program was
``under review.'' The administration was trying to stabilize it
in some fashion. But it was clear there was no impetus, no
energy to try to make the program move at a faster pace and to
try to introduce some new thinking as to how this might work.
Other programs are also losing momentum, including one that
Ms. Holgate used to run at the Department of Energy, is the
Plutonium Disposition Program. This program desperately needs
leadership and drive from high up in the administration because
it requires the participation of foreign governments. Because
of uncertainties about funding and the lack of such leadership,
the program has lost a year, an entire year, in its efforts to
eliminate and dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian weapons
plutonium, which would basically be removed from a concern if
we could get the program on track and moving forward. Again,
the problem, I would say, lies with the administration in its
slowness to come to a conclusion about the program and in its
reluctance to champion it internationally.
There are several other programs that are worthy of
mention. The plutonium production reactor shutdown agreement
would end production of new plutonium. Why do we want the
Russians making more plutonium? We have a program to end this.
Again, it is falling on hard times in the sense that it is not
getting the leadership from the Pentagon that it needs: In
particular, a solution was reached to actually get this program
implemented during the last part of the Clinton Administration.
It has not yet been embraced by the Bush Administration, but it
is ready and, I think, a very thoughtful solution. This needs
to be pried out of the bureaucracy and made to move forward.
Let me only turn to one or two other points here in
reviewing some of these programs. A program that I participated
in while I was at the Department of Energy was to go around to
small research reactors outside of Russia and try to bring
weapons-grade material back into Russia to be consolidated and
down-blended. The material is used as fuel at these facilities,
and one facility of particular concern was in the former
Yugoslavia. Now with the change of government there, the
dangers are reduced, but it is a significant quantity of
material and we need to get this program moving forward. We
also need to try to move material out of Belarus and out of the
Kharkiv reactor in the Ukraine.
Tactical nuclear weapons, just to change focus a bit, are
another area that has not gotten attention under this
administration or the previous administration. There are
thousands of them in Russia. We have done some work to secure
them, but there is no work to eliminate these weapons or to
provide transparency to ensure that Russia is complying with
undertakings made in 1992. Urgent work is needed here, but
there is no program of any kind in the administration's current
initiatives to address this challenge.
If I may, let me turn next to summarize a number of these
points and basically say that in all of these cases, the issue
really lies with the administration and its inability to decide
where it wants to come out and to move emphatically forward
with these efforts.
Let me turn now, if I may, to a different part of the
proliferation threat in the former Soviet Union, and this is
one that is very germane to today's dangers. This is the threat
of biological weapons. As we know, the Soviet Union, had the
most advanced biological weapons program in the world. We have
worked during the Clinton Administration and are continuing to
work during the Bush Administration to try to hire as many of
these scientists--this program was mentioned earlier--so that
they do not go off and share their expertise with others. We
have converted some of the biological weapons sites to non-
weapons use, but some of these sites remain completely unknown
to us. We are not given any access, and we have not had any
programs there. These are the programs that are in the Russian
military. It is an important gap.
But what came to mind most recently and what a colleague of
mine, Sonia Benouaghram, has brought to my attention are the
so-called ``museums.'' These are the collections of extremely
potent biological weapon agents that remain at many of the
sites. The work at the sites now, the ones that the United
States has worked with no longer involves offensive biological
weapons, but some of the material remains there.
Last night on television, I am not sure how many may have
seen this, Senator, but a broadcast showed the refrigerator in
which some of these vials were sitting. They were barely
labeled. There was very limited security. One only hopes that
we can do our work at these sites--and it is underway--more
rapidly than others may figure out how to defeat the
rudimentary security systems that now exist. This is a major
gap and we really need to move this forward dramatically.
Let me turn if I may, now, to the issue of planning and
coordination.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Spector you have exceeded your time, but
will you please summarize?
Mr. Spector. Thank you. I would be happy to do that.
Planning and coordination has been discussed here, and in my
testimony and in the accompanying article, I have identified a
number of areas where we simply do not have cross-program
coordination the way we need it. The most clear-cut example is
that the program to secure nuclear materials uses one number to
describe the amount of material that needs to be addressed.
Other programs, however, are reducing this quantity of material
by moving it, destroying it, or eliminating it in various
fashions, and we need a government-wide analysis of this
problem, as well as a government-wide analysis of job creation,
and of U.S. activities in other areas. If you had this, you
could exploit synergies between the programs; you could avoid
situations where programs interfere with each other
inadvertently; and you could make much more thoughtful planning
decisions.
In the interview that Bob Joseph gave, he did indicate that
the one element of the administration's review could be
announced, and it was that there would be increased planning
and that, indeed, the planning process would take place in an
interagency group of the very kind recommended in the
legislation before the Subcommittee. Now, if this is announced
publicly in a more formal way, perhaps during your next
hearing, it may mean that the need for legislation is less
apparent because the administration, in effect, will have
adopted this very strategy. However, I would recommend a number
of studies be requested by the committee that would, in fact,
push the planning process forward.
Let me conclude just by mentioning the relationship between
public and private activities. It really would be worthwhile
spending a bit more time on this to appreciate the incredible
history of participation by private organizations in this very
area. The concept of the Nunn-Lugar program and cooperative
threat reduction was first envisioned and described at Harvard
by a group up there. My organization has done very important
reviews of these programs, and has conducted extensive training
programs to support them, to create a cadre of specialists in
Kazakhstan and Ukraine and elsewhere. The Nuclear Threat
Initiative, of course, will play a very important role, as
well.
This has been a very successful partnership and I think it
is one that we certainly hope will continue. There is much more
work to be done and many more contributions to be made by these
private organizations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Spector.
I have some questions for each of you. I would just like to
ask your opinion on some of the views of the administration.
A number of critics have praised the administration for
undertaking the first comprehensive assessment of our
nonproliferation programs in decades. At the same time, they
fault the administration for failing to develop a strategic
plan for these programs. Do you agree with these views, and if
so, what should our strategy be? Ms. Jones.
Ms. Jones. Senator, I think part of our testimony today was
basically to say that the legislation currently being
considered could be improved by requiring a strategic plan and
that strategic plan would talk about the overall goals that we
are after government-wide for the nonproliferation program. It
would enable us to measure progress, hold particular agencies
accountable for meeting those goals, but it would also provide
a forum to set relative priorities, particularly from a funding
standpoint. So I would agree that a strategic plan is something
that we should be looking for here.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Holgate.
Ms. Holgate. I would certainly associate myself with the
views that you expressed, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the
contrast between a review of existing programs and a strategy
for how to move forward and match programs to goals. That
strategy can only be created in the context of interagency
coordination led by a firm hand at the White House and is
desperately needed.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Spector.
Mr. Spector. I would agree because I, among others, have
been urging such planning to take place. When you do such
planning, certainly in the fissile material area, you look
across a whole spectrum of challenges. I would say by the time
the last administration left office, pretty much every
challenge was addressed in some fashion, sometimes more
successfully, sometimes less successfully. But you need to have
that across-the-board approach which a senior-level review that
attempted to examine this work strategically could achieve.
So I would certainly support that, and I support the
comments of Ms. Holgate that the administration has not done
this. They have looked program by program at some of the policy
issues, but not at the big picture.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Jones, in terms of proliferation threats
from Soviet chemical and biological weapons facilities, we are
concerned with dual-use materials and equipment and expertise
being sent to suspected proliferating nations. To what extent
can these concerns be met by formal nonproliferation activities
and how can such activities be coordinated with multilateral
agreements and treaties?
Ms. Jones. If we are talking about expertise going from
weapons scientists in the Soviet Union possibly to other
countries, I think that the programs that the Department of
Energy has in place have been dealing with that, as well as the
science center programs at the State Department. I think that a
coordinating committee that we are talking about today in terms
of this legislation could go a long way to bringing those
programs together and possibly leverage the programs and we
could be more efficient in terms of their delivery.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Spector, there has been concern that too
much of U.S. assistance was going to the nuclear weapons
complex. Some have called for a new program dedicated to
chemical weapon scientists and engineers. Do you believe that
Federal programs have paid enough attention to chemical and
biological weapon scientists?
Mr. Spector. This was one of the occasions on which the
programs worked extremely well together. There was a very
specialized program during the previous administration, which I
know is continuing, to try to address these biological weapons
and chemical weapons scientists, institute by institute, and to
take every job creation program we had--the Science Centers,
DOD, DOE--and surge those programs in. Interagency teams were
always used to make the visits implement the overall strategy.
I would say that the job here is to keep these programs
going. They have received adequate funding, I think, for the
present year, and in this area, you had excellent planning. It
is really a model for what you want to see elsewhere. So I
think this is a job we have done very well--and with great
caution, so that we were not supporting improper activities at
these locations.
I would also have to say I was very familiar with the
danger of spending too much money in the United States, which I
think was the early part of your question. I think most of the
jobs creation programs now have ceilings on them limiting the
proportion of funds that can be spent here, which though
somewhat difficult to meet, are being met. As a result, the
bulk of money is spent in the former Soviet Union, and I think
these are good guidelines for us to have.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Holgate, in Sunday's Washington Post,
Russian President Putin is quoted as saying categorically that
he denied that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons
originating in Russia or the former Soviet Union. He also
stated that in the unlikely event that the terrorists in
Afghanistan have weapons of mass destruction, ``they cannot be
of Soviet or Russian origin. I am absolutely sure of that.''
What do you think of President Putin's comments? Is he
making a distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear
material, as some have suggested that nuclear material is
missing from Russia?
Ms. Holgate. It is an awkward position to criticize a head
of state currently visiting in the United States, but I will
say I have no basis myself to be as certain as he is. I think
he is not in a position to say anything other than the
statements that he made. I do not think he could possibly be
seen to be admitting that there are challenges. So I think he
made the statements you would expect a President to make.
Based on what I know of the Russian inventory of their
weapons, their materials, and the people that are involved with
them, I cannot imagine how anyone can make a categorical
statement that every gram of weapons-usable material is
accounted for and every individual with knowledge is safe in
their beds in Russia.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Jones, Mr. Spector recommends that our
Subcommittee use its oversight authority to request that the
administration prepare three baseline studies to improve the
planning and coordinating process. These studies would include
an inventory of cross-program relationships, a year-by-year
projection of the inventory of Russian nuclear material not in
weapons, and a year-by-year projection of the employment impact
of all U.S. nonproliferation programs. Would such an exercise
improve planning and coordination, and how useful would this
be?
Ms. Jones. Senator, I believe that it would provide a
baseline for the administration to begin setting goals. I think
the kinds of things that Mr. Spector has pointed out here could
be used as part of the goals for this overarching strategy that
we are talking about and the administration could then be
measured on an annual basis in terms of how effective the
programs are in meeting those goals. So I would sign on to the
fact that these studies might be useful.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. Holgate, some U.S. nonproliferation goals have been
hindered by Russia's strict secrecy standards. The GAO reported
in May that U.S. officials had yet to gain access to 104 of 252
nuclear site buildings requiring improved security. While we
can appreciate Russia's concerns, access is required to ensure
that U.S. tax dollars are being spent appropriately. In your
opinion, how do we resolve this conflict?
Ms. Holgate. This is a tough one that a lot of smart people
have been working on for quite a while, Senator, and it is in
some ways a measure of the success of the programs that we are
encountering this challenge. The easy stuff has been, by and
large, completed and we are getting into the more difficult
areas where we are talking about the most sensitive facilities
and the most sensitive materials in Russia. This has happened
simultaneously with Putin's rise to power, which has given a
boost to the security services within Russia, and at the very
same time, our own national security labs have had their
security posture raised in the wake of the Wen Ho Lee problems.
The challenge here, therefore, is that even when there can
be reciprocal visits, it can be almost more difficult for
Russian scientists to visit our facilities for cooperative
research than it is for our scientists and implementors to
visit Russian facilities. So it is kind of an upward ratcheting
process on both sides simultaneously with the increased calls
and increased political attention for access.
The first thing that is needed here is a clear statement
from both Presidents--and Senator Nunn has called for this to
come out of the summit, I do not know whether it will or not--
that the mutual monitoring of each country's weapons, excess
materials and weapons and stocks, could assure the world that
these are taken care of and that will give the Russian system
an ability to have access to some of the U.S. systems that will
help make it possible for U.S. officials to have access to
Russian systems.
So the first step is a presidential determination and
enforcement through the bureaucracies that puts the onus on the
security people to explain how to make transparency work as
opposed to taking the easy way out about why it should not
work.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Spector, and I would like to have Ms.
Jones also respond to this question, environmental and local
public advocacy groups have gained influence in the former
Soviet Union. What problems is this creating for American aid
efforts and how can the United States resolve them?
Mr. Spector. Well, I think this really varies program by
program. In some cases, such as the material protection
program, the environmental concerns are really nonexistent.
There are no environmental impacts. This is just improving
security.
In other settings where you are moving around radioactive
materials or you are proposing to irradiate materials in
reactors and so forth, local opposition is very significant and
it really must be taken into account. We are observing the
Russians now adopting a licensing and environmental impact
statement process somewhat like our own. So one program I was
involved in--we were hoping to have results in 2 years. It was
for storing spent fuel. We gradually were advised, ``well, that
is not going to happen in 2 years.'' We are going to have to go
by the book and make sure we have looked at all of these
issues.
I think virtually every program that I was associated with
is very environmentally attuned and has not caused serious
consequences, and I think we can make the case when we need to
to local Russian groups or through Russian government officials
make the case. But it is a factor that has to be weighed and I
think we should be sensitive to it. We do not want to have a
steamroller here that creates a backlash.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Jones.
Ms. Jones. Just one other point to add to what Mr. Spector
had to say, and that is as these environmental groups are
becoming more active, as he noted, it could delay certain
activities that the United States might want to have happen,
such as opening of a facility. And I think that as part of the
strategic plan, and as part of the funding requirements, you
have to look at the sequencing of these activities and whether
or not the timing is going to be different now because of some
of these environmental interactions. And again, let us make
sure that we can spend the money effectively and efficiently,
and if a schedule is going to be stretched out, then let us
only put the money in that can be spent during the time frame.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Holgate, Presidents Bush and Putin have
agreed to significant reductions in nuclear weapons. One expert
on nonproliferation issues, Kenneth Luongo, said that,
``Despite the widespread belief that the United States is
helping Russia to dismantle its nuclear weapons, it is not
true. There is no dedicated program to assist Russia with wide
dismantlement.'' Will you please share your thoughts on Mr.
Luongo's statement?
Ms. Holgate. His statement is technically accurate, Mr.
Chairman. The challenge comes from the confusion in how we talk
about these dangerous pieces of equipment. It is true that
there is no dedicated program to deal with the warhead
dismantlement itself, and sometimes people use the word
``nuclear weapon'' to talk about the warhead. Sometimes they
use it to talk about the entire delivery system, the missile,
the silo, the submarine, or the bomber. And while there are
massive programs underway in the Department of Defense aiming
at the delivery systems, the Russians have so far refused
offers of U.S. assistance to help actually dismantle the
warhead.
At the Defense Department, when I led the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program there, we orchestrated a package to
offer the Russians to help them dismantle nuclear warheads and
they were so concerned at that time about what kind of
information and sensitive knowledge might be gained by the
United States because of our access requirements that they knew
would follow from that money, that they refused to accept our
assistance to do that. I would expect that if you ask current
Department of Defense officials whether that offer would either
be reiterated or whether it is still on the table, you would
find that it is, but it is not part of a budget and it is not
part of a program at this time.
Senator Akaka. I have a question for all of you. Prior to
that, Senator Carnahan has asked me to place a statement into
the record, and so without objection, Senator Carnahan's
statement will be placed in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is especially important
today, as the United States examines claims by Osama bin Laden that he
has acquired chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The
implications are quite serious--whether or not this claim is true. the
United States must continue improving its efforts to counter the spread
of weapons of mass destruction.
Yesterday, the Washington Post reported that a chief Pakistani
nuclear scientist had been holding talks with bin Laden's followers.
Equally as disturbing are recent reports that nuclear materials may
have been stolen from Russia in the last two years.
The intelligence community has said that it is unlikely that bin
Laden's al Quaeda group obtained sufficient resources to construct a
nuclear bomb. The prospect of international terrorists and rogue
nations obtaining such weapons is daunting.
For the last decade, America's enemies have expressed a willingness
to pay Soviet scientists for expertise to build weapons of mass
destruction. The United States and its allies have tried to stop this
so-called ``brain drain,'' by providing financial incentives to former
Soviet scientists to discourage them from cooperating with rogue
elements.
In addition, the Defense Department's Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction program has worked with other governments to reduce former
Soviet stockpiles. The results have been quite promising. Since 1997,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus have been free of nuclear weapons. And
Russia continues to work with the United States to comply with the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). As a result, we have managed
to cut nuclear stockpiles practically in half, with Russia maintaining
only 8,000 active warheads to date. But much more remains to be done.
I am pleased that President Bush and Russian President Putin are
conducting their arms control talks today. Both nations appear
committed to work closely together to reduce their nuclear arsenals to
START II requirements. This is an important step forward. As we
progress on the diplomatic front, we must also improve our internal
efforts to re-shape our government to reinforce counter-proliferation
policies.
It is imperative that the United States remain proactive in
suppressing the world-wide spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. This requires that we upgrade our intelligence capabilities,
continue monitoring other nations' compliance with arms control
treaties, provide adequate compensation to former Soviet weapons
scientists, and continue accounting for the thousands of weapons
produced by the Soviet Union.
As of now, our government attempts to accomplish these objectives
through several Federal agencies, spread out among three Cabinet
Departments. These organizations do great work. But I do not believe
that they have reached their maximum potential.
Senator Hagel's proposal attempts to better coordinate America's
WMD policies. I am hopeful that this hearing will shed light on this
proposal, and provide additional recommendations for improving our
counter-proliferation efforts.
I look forward to hearing our panelists' testimony today, and
working with Senator Hagel on this important issue. Thank you Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Akaka. To all of you, yesterday, President Bush
said, ``Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction and we will strengthen
our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise.'' From
this statement, what changes do you see with respect to U.S.
nonproliferation programs in Russia? Ms. Jones.
Ms. Jones. I think that statement calls even more for the
kind of committee we are talking about to coordinate the
efforts. I think it also underlies the importance of the
strategic plan so that we can look at whether or not we have
the right mix of nonproliferation programs? Are we providing
the funds to those pieces or those programs that could tackle
the highest risk? So I think the statement really underscores
the need for the strategic plan and this coordinating
committee.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Holgate.
Ms. Holgate. Mr. Senator, my fear is that the current
efforts to deal with the specific challenge that the President
referenced in that statement focus almost exclusively on the
demand side of the problem and totally inadequately on the
supply side. The current counterterrorism activities are trying
to identify, locate, and root out terrorists where they
currently are located, but it has no component that addresses
how you protect the material that those terrorists might be
trying to get access to.
As Dr. Spector mentioned, the $40 billion emergency
appropriation to address counterterror activities in the wake
of September 11 contained absolutely no money to increase or
accelerate these programs of cooperation with Russia designed
specifically to get at the supply of the materials and the
weapons that so concern us all.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Spector.
Mr. Spector. Well, I think that is right. I think there is
a disconnect between the President's statement and the actual
activities of the administration. We saw it in the way they
handled the budget this year, where these programs tended to be
trimmed rather than boosted up. We are seeing it now in this
sort of ongoing review that never seems to end, so that some of
these programs are just mired in uncertainty. Thus, I think
there is, as I said, there is a gap, indeed a gulf, between
what the President's aspirations are and what his
administration is actually doing at this time. I think that is
very unfortunate.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Jones, in your testimony, you note that
the Congress has authorized in excess of $5.5 billion for U.S.
nonproliferation programs to Russia and the other Newly
Independent States. How much of this money has been spent in
Russia and the Newly Independent States? Also, would you share
some success stories regarding the nonproliferation programs?
Ms. Jones. Senator, I am not sure that I would have the
numbers for you. I can certainly try to provide them for the
record in terms of how much has been spent in Russia. For two
of the programs that we have looked at, the Nuclear Cities
Initiative and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, as
Dr. Spector mentioned, a great portion of the funding was
initially spent at the weapons complex here in the United
States. That has been changing and it is evolving so that more
money will be going to Russia. But for the whole $5 billion, I
am not sure that I have that breakdown for you.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Holgate, are there routine joint U.S.-
Russian strategic planning meetings, and if so, how successful
are these meetings?
Ms. Holgate. At the current time, I am aware of no such
meetings. In the history of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in
this area, I would say that the bi-national commission
established by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin offered one of the few venues in which cabinet-
level colleagues in the United States and Russia would interact
every 6 months, and the preparation for that interaction, the
attention that was brought from the Vice President and his
office to delivering on commitments made at the previous 6-
month meeting, really did create a mechanism for senior-level
interactions, whether it is Defense, Energy, State Department,
or other departments involved. That interaction provided--
probably not what it was quite planned to do--but in this
nonproliferation cooperation field, it did provide a good
mechanism to be sure that senior people knew what was going on
and to give impetus to bureaucracies that might get mired down
in working-level concerns.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Spector, you recommend that Congress
should require that the President report on the status of its
efforts to accelerate the highly-enriched uranium purchase
agreement. Do you feel that the current focus on proliferation
risks of nuclear material from Russia will accelerate the
administration's review of the agreement?
Mr. Spector. I wish I could say yes. But, I must say that
that has not been my impression. My impression is that this
review is a slow but steady effort, and it seems to be dragging
on. When I interviewed the National Security Council official I
mentioned earlier, I asked him in many different ways what was
being done in this sphere in light of September 11. And in many
different ways, he deflected me, in effect to say, we are still
reviewing these programs. This high-enriched uranium program is
one of them. But nothing was said with a sense of urgency and
no statement was made suggesting that the administration was
moving the process aggressively because it was so concerned
about these matters. It was much the opposite, a sort of
treadmill. They are just going to go about their business as
usual.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Jones, the Department of Defense is
responsible for assisting former Soviet States with destroying
their nuclear and chemical weapons stockpiles. Were biological
agents stockpiled? If so, are there plans to destroy these
stockpiles, as well? Which agency should take the lead for U.S.
assistance?
Ms. Jones. I am sorry, Senator, I do not have the
information to be able to respond to that question.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Holgate.
Ms. Holgate. I can shed a little bit of light on that
question, sir. There was very minimal stockpiling of actual
delivery-scale biological agents in Russia in the Soviet time
frame. They mainly depended on having massive production
capability to allow for surge production in the case of an
order given from Moscow. Tons of anthrax could be created, just
as an example, within months of a direct order if a need was
identified. So there were very little actual stocks in place.
Many of those stocks were destroyed in the wake of
President Gorbachev's announcement that, in fact, the Soviet
Union had violated the Biological Weapons Convention and they
were coming clean in the late 1980's and the Soviets then
destroyed many of those stocks. Some of the way that they
destroyed them was to bury them on the island called
Resurrection Island in the Aral Sea in the territory of what is
now Uzbekistan, and there is a project underway through the
Department of Defense under the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program to go back and make sure that those stocks were
actually permanently destroyed. There was concern that they
were not fully destroyed.
And so that is one of the few examples where stocks have
been addressed. Mostly, the DOD activities have been focusing
on eliminating the massive production capabilities.
Senator Akaka. Can you answer the question about which
agency should take the lead for U.S. assistance?
Ms. Holgate. I would say the Department of Defense is
already engaged in this area, has good relationships, and has
the ability to get the funding when they are ready for it.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ms. Holgate, cooperative threat reduction efforts have
tended to experience mission creep in which funds are used for
other activities, such as infrastructure and support costs. How
have these tendencies affected the efficiency of these programs
and could a coordinating body make these programs more
efficient?
Ms. Holgate. Sir, I certainly think a coordinating body can
make the programs more efficient, but I would suggest that the
inclusion of U.S. Government funds to support some of the
infrastructure and supporting activities has actually increased
the efficiency of these programs. Rather than representing
mission creep, they represent a recognition of the total
mission.
The reason that many of these activities have been
undertaken in Russia has to do with resource limitations within
Russia, and what these program managers were finding was that
they might have funding to do a very narrow slice, in some ways
the most exciting slice of the project, but it was not moving
forward because they had inability to provide funding for the
support activities that would actually make the achievement of
the nonproliferation goals possible. And so they began to
incorporate into budget requests the supporting requirements to
achieve the goals, and that has made the achievement of those
goals much more efficient in the time since that has been done.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Jones, the brain drain prevention
programs within the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense
have enabled former USSR weapons scientists to remain in their
states without having to sell their weapons-related knowledge.
To what extent can these programs be combined with weapons and
material storage and disposal activities? Could former Soviet
chemical weapons scientists be employed in the construction of
Russian chemical weapons destruction facilities?
Ms. Jones. I think that is, again, where a committee that
would be coordinating the various activities of these programs
could look for those kinds of synergies. Are there skills and
abilities that weapons scientists have, whether they
specialized in biological weapons or nuclear weapons, that
could be used for some other program?
Just as a simple example, DOE also runs a program to
improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. When we looked
at that program, there was a need for fire doors, metal doors
rather than wooden doors in these particular facilities. Let us
look at the brain drain programs. Are there people already in
Russia that could help design and build those doors, again,
looking for leveraging with the different programs? So I think
there is room for that, Senator.
Senator Akaka. I have a final question to all of you. As I
said earlier, we will reschedule the administration's testimony
after the Bush-Putin summit. As experts in this field, are
there questions you would ask of our administration witnesses
when they appear before this Subcommittee in a couple of weeks?
That is my question to you. If you want to reserve that, please
give us the questions and that might help us have better
insight into some questions to them.
Again, I want to thank all of you for being here, for your
responses, for your testimonies, and I want to thank you, Ms.
Jones, Ms. Holgate, and Dr. Spector, for being with us today.
I believe that the Russian government wishes to be a
responsible steward of its weapons of mass destruction. I also
believe that President Bush recognizes the importance of threat
reduction programs. However, I share our witnesses' concerns
that the administration, even with new evidence of terrorists'
interests in acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction,
has not acted to accelerate efforts to improve security over
critical materials and expertise in the former Soviet States.
Indeed, coordination, management, and attention is needed
from senior levels in the administration. Unless this attention
is concentrated exclusively on nonproliferation and threat
reduction objectives, the relationships between U.S. and
Russian counterparts will continue to weaken and opportunities
for cooperation in new areas will continue to be lost.
Ms. Holgate recommends the appointment of a Deputy National
Security Advisor devoted to addressing these programs. This is
an interesting concept and I look forward to the
administration's comments on your proposal, Ms. Holgate.
The record will remain open for questions from Members of
the Subcommittee for 1 week and we ask that the witnesses
respond to any questions in a timely manner. I remind you
again, if you have any questions that we can ask to the
administration, we would certainly want to receive them.
Again, I thank all of you very much and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) WITH
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS:
NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE
COORDINATION ACT OF 2001
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2001
U.S. Senate,
International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services Subcommittee,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Cochran, and Carnahan.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will come to order.
I want to thank our witnesses from the administration for
being here with us today. We are joined by Vann Van Diepen,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation;
Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Negotiations; Kenneth Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation from the
Department of Energy; and Matthew Borman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Export Administration.
I would like to reiterate that our Subcommittee rules
require all testimony to be submitted 48 hours before the
hearing. The Departments represented today were invited to
testify at this hearing more than 2 weeks ago. In spite of this
and repeated reminders as of yesterday afternoon, we had
received only one statement. This was as of yesterday.
I would like to apologize to the Members of the
Subcommittee for the administration's inability to comply with
the Subcommittee rules.
This morning's hearing is a continuation of one we held on
Wednesday, November 14. The reason I called these hearings is
because I have been deeply concerned about potential
proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from
the former Soviet Union. Since September 11, I think this is an
issue that we have to focus on with even greater intensity.
President Bush came into office declaring that he would
ask, ``the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to
dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as
possible.'' He began his administration announcing a review of
Russian nonproliferation programs. This was a welcome first
step.
One of the reasons for this hearing is to determine how we
can focus our aid efforts more effectively. Unfortunately, the
administration cut the budgets for these programs before
completing its review. This approach does not seem to me to
make sense, particularly in light of the events of September 11
and the subsequent anthrax attacks.
I hope today the administration will be able to brief us on
the results of its review and indicate to us what its
intentions are concerning funding for the future of these vital
programs. If it still proposes to advocate cutting these
programs, the administration needs to justify why these cuts
increase our security.
We have lost valuable time in figuring how to recork the
bottles containing dangerous chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons. I hope the administration shares my sense of urgency,
and if it does not, I would like to know why not.
After the first day of the Bush-Putin summit, President
Bush remarked that, ``Our highest priority is to keep
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction . . . we
will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material and
expertise.''
Today's witnesses will discuss how the administration
proposes to carry out that pledge. I hope we may learn how the
various programs in the different agencies involved in
nonproliferation and threat reduction work together, how these
agencies include private sector and nongovernmental efforts in
nonproliferation activities. We must make certain that
government and non-government spending on nonproliferation
programs complement each other so that resources are used
effectively and efficiently.
Let me again thank our witnesses again for being with us
today. I look forward to your testimony on these important and
timely questions.
At this time, I would like to call on my colleague for his
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It has been clear to me for some time that nonproliferation
is an absolutely critical element to our national security. I
believe that we must expand and enhance our current
nonproliferation programs to eliminate as quickly as possible
the threat posed by inadequately controlled weapons of mass
destruction in the former Soviet Union.
A bipartisan task force led by Howard Baker and Lloyd
Cutler recently concluded that the funding for these programs
should be increased to four times the current level. As I
stated at our previous hearing on this topic, the
Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 is a
useful step to take in conjunction with the increased funding
recommended by the Baker-Cutler task force.
In their recent book, ``Plague Wars''--and I have a copy of
it here--it is a fascinating book. Investigative journalist Tom
Mangold and Jeff Goldberg provide a frightening glimpse of the
biological weapons research that was conducted by the Soviet
Union. They portray a bureaucracy run amuck with layers of
secrecy that prevented effective oversight by any responsible
agency.
Furthermore, they cite Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA
reports that as late as 3 years ago, we could not preclude the
potential of ongoing biological warfare research in Russia.
Some reports even suggest the Russian program has produced
genetically engineered anthrax and other pathogens resistant to
existing antibiotics and vaccines.
The proliferation problem is two-dimensional. We must
ensure that any existing stocks of biological agents are
properly secured and destroyed as soon as possible. We must
prevent Russian scientists with expertise in such weapons from
selling their skills to rogue states or terrorists.
In the face of this clear and present danger, we have
disturbing evidence that our own capacity to respond to
bioterrorist attacks is inadequate. Besides the difficulties in
coordination revealed by the recent anthrax attacks, Department
of Defense exercises over the past several years have
highlighted problems in our preparedness. Even with this
overwhelming evidence that more must be done quickly, my
efforts to speed funding to improve the facilities at the CDC
have met with opposition.
The CDC is the arm of our government responsible for
controlling outbreaks of disease. The almost accidental
involvement of the CDC in the first anthrax mailing in Florida
is all that stood between this country and a far higher
casualty count from these anthrax attacks.
The current facilities at the CDC that house these critical
links in our ability to detect and respond to a biological
attack are painfully and woefully inadequate. In the middle of
the anthrax crisis, a broken cable line interrupting the CDC's
testing of samples for 12 hours was found. With a finite window
of opportunity to test, diagnose, and treat victims of a
possible biological attack, every minute of testing counts. To
lose half-a-day is an eternity for scientists and technicians.
Yet, it has happened, and it will happen again if Congress does
not act to upgrade these facilities quickly.
That is why I introduced the Public Health Emergencies
Accountability Act earlier this month. This act puts in place a
procedure that allows clear assignment of responsibility in
cases where the public health is threatened. It further
mandates the exchange of information between institutions
primarily responsible for public health, such as the CDC, and
those primarily responsible for countering criminal and
terrorist activities.
We must resource the CDC to carry out its critical
function. The CDC currently has a 10-year construction plan to
make these necessary upgrades, but since September 11, it has
been painfully obvious that we do not have 10 years to get the
CDC ready for what we now know is a very possible bioterrorist
attack.
We need a 5-year plan at the very least. That means
Congress needs to approve the $250 million in funding this
year. The Senate has approved the full $250 million, and I
helped to get $100 million here, added on in the Senate, over
the $150 million the President proposed, but I am getting very
concerned that the Members of the House do not want to act on
this legislation.
The Members of the House who are participating in the
Labor/HHS/Appropriations Conference Committee are not willing
to fund the CDC above the $175 million for construction which
passed the House this fall. I do not know what else has to
happen in this country to demonstrate to the Members of the
House that this construction is not only important, but
mandatory, to upgrade the CDC as soon as possible. And I call
on them today to match the Senate's mark of $250 million in
construction aid to the CDC.
My friend, the former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia,
continues his tireless advocacy for the nonproliferation
initiatives begun under his sponsorship 10 years ago. He has
recently provided testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee upon which I sit with a series of recommendations for
enhancing our counter-proliferation programs as well as
improving our ability to respond to a bioterrorist attack.
These recommendations include increase funding for
nonproliferation programs, including a program to actively
engage the scientists of the Russian and former Soviet Union
programs in our own defensive research. Such a program could
enhance our ability to produce and stockpile needed vaccines
while preventing the loss of dangerous skills to other parties.
I am convinced that our national security depends upon the
effective coordination and resourcing of our nonproliferation
programs. I support both the Nonproliferation Assistance
Coordination Act of 2001 of which I am a co-sponsor and the
creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed
exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of
mass destruction.
We can no longer afford to under-resource nonproliferation.
Many distinguished of both parties have cited the need for
increasing nonproliferation funding. Our intelligence community
continues to highlight the threat of improperly controlled
weapons falling into the wrong hands. The time to act is now. I
encourage the administration and my colleagues in Congress to
support the full resourcing of required nonproliferation
programs and our public health infrastructure. There is no
higher national security priority.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement,
Senator Cleland.
Now I would like to ask for the statements of our
witnesses. Mr. Van Diepen, you may give your statement at this
time.
All the witnesses will have their full written statements
entered into the record.
You may begin, Mr. Van Diepen.
TESTIMONY OF VANN H. VAN DIEPEN,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen appears in the
Appendix on page 268.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am very pleased to be here to discuss nonproliferation
assistance programs and coordination. The proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles
capable of delivering them is a central security threat facing
the United States, our allies, and our friends. Where we once
faced thousands of nuclear weapons under centralized command of
a rival great power, September 11 and the biological attacks
since have shown how much more diverse and less predictable the
threat has become.
While we must be prepared to address the many avenues from
which rogue countries and terrorists and their supporters may
choose when seeking to advance their attack capabilities, we
must also, as both of you have noted in your statements,
address the Soviet legacy and its proliferation implications.
The State Department has direct responsibility for several
nonproliferation programs directed at or relevant to the
countries of the former Soviet Union. In addition, the
Department provides foreign policy guidance and diplomatic
support for the programs of other agencies.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the new countries lacked
the laws, expertise, and technical resources to implement
effective export controls. State's Export Control Assistance
Program was created to help establish or strengthen export
controls in the new independent states of the former Soviet
Union and in Eastern Europe. As funding increased and the
program matured, the scope has expanded to include key
countries through which weapons of mass destruction, materials,
and technologies are likely to transit while continuing to
support the development of more robust systems in potential
supplier states. This program has grown from less than $5
million per year in the mid-1990's to the President's request
for $39 million for this fiscal year.
State Department chairs an interagency working group on
export control assistance which directs and coordinates the
work of the various U.S. agencies that implement these programs
in over 25 countries worldwide.
Another concern was the threat posed by the thousands of
Soviet weapon scientists who no longer would be supported after
the Soviet Union's demise, and this is something that Senator
Cleland made clear in his statement.
The International Science and Technology Centers began
their work to address this problem in Moscow in 1994 and in
Kiev in 1995. As the program has matured, the focus has shifted
from simply stemming brain drain to also redirecting scientists
towards sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent, civilian
endeavors in their home countries, be these commercial
endeavors or scientific endeavors.
The program now includes nations of particular interest to
the U.S. war in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Armenia, and Georgia. Other key regional states,
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, are in the process of
joining one of the science centers.
For the past 4 years, the State Department has been an
active participant in the U.S. effort to redirect former Soviet
biological weapons scientists. The program provides incentives
for scientists to refrain from cooperating with terrorist
groups or states harboring them and focuses their expertise on
critical public health needs such as HIV/AIDS, multi-drug
resistant tuberculosis, and a number of plant and animal
diseases. The solid collaborative research basis that we have
developed through this effort will be a springboard for
expanded work that will respond to the Bush-Putin initiative to
counter bioterrorism.
The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, created to
permit a rapid response to unanticipated requirements or
opportunities, is a flexible responsive nonproliferation tool.
Of particular relevance to the request of this Subcommittee is
the NDF's work on Tracker, a stand-alone software package that
permits a country to use modern computer tools to track export
licensing and enforcement matters from a license application
through the process, among central government agencies, and
with the export control personnel at ports and border posts.
This system is now deployed in eight countries with further
applications in process.
State Department also plays a key role in efforts
concerning plutonium disposition, eliminating Russian plutonium
production reactors, support of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and safeguarding nuclear materials worldwide and
coordinating efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling.
Another priority is making sure that our friends and allies
shoulder their fair share of the burden. It is important to
build a community committed to paying more than lip service,
and we are not shy about letting our allies know when we think
they should be providing more resources.
On your question concerning how these programs are funded
and how they are coordinated, all U.S. policy implementation
and oversight of nonproliferation assistance to the states of
the former Soviet Union is coordinated at senior levels by the
Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, or PCC,
chaired by a National Security Council senior director with
Assistant Secretary-level representatives from the Departments
of State, Defense, Energy, and other concerned agencies.
This committee works to ensure that individual assistance
programs are coordinated within and across agencies and that
they serve nonproliferation threat reduction priorities
effectively. The PCC has also been charged to develop the
strategic plan to guide near- and farther-term nonproliferation
and threat reduction cooperation with Russia and Eurasia.
In addition, there are standing working groups to ensure
close day-to-day coordination among programs so that the
programs complement, not compete, with each other in addressing
U.S. nonproliferation objectives. The work of these groups feed
directly into the PCC. This structure works well and
substantially addresses what is proposed in the
Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.
As noted in several of the statements from the witnesses in
your November 14 hearing, despite the number and complexity of
nonproliferation assistance programs, effective implementation
and senior-level coordination already exists.
As you know, President Bush directed that a rigorous review
be conducted of all U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance to Russia and the countries of the former Soviet
Union. That review is now in the final stages.
Without prejudicing the White House's final decision, we
expect that the State Department's nonproliferation assistance
programs will continue to play a critical role in combating the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In the post-September 11 world, we believe that stemming
the flow of WMD materials, technologies, and expertise
worldwide has to be among our highest national priorities and
our programs must address that challenge.
The private sector and nongovernmental organizations play
several important roles in this endeavor. In our efforts to
redirect former weapons scientists to peaceful civilian
scientific and commercial research, U.S. industry is helping
scientists and their institutes make a permanent transition to
peaceful pursuits.
The Science and Technology Centers' industry partner
program, for example, now attracts over $20 million annually in
corporate funding.
In export controls, U.S. companies have a great deal of
expertise in implementing export control regulations. They know
the ins and outs of licensing systems, and they have a great
deal of knowledge to share with countries and foreign companies
that are new to this world. U.S. companies play an important
role in our effort to inform and educate their foreign
counterparts.
During the past year, a new opportunity for public-private
nonproliferation partnership emerged with the establishment of
Ted Turner's Nuclear Threat Initiative. Its management and
board of directors, which includes several members of Congress,
have consulted actively with the administration on their
program and have made a commitment to coordinate their
activities with those of the government.
I think it is clear that the Bush Administration fully
shares the objectives that led Senator Hagel and the other
sponsors of S. 673 to offer this legislation. I believe a close
examination of how we are coordinating policy and
implementation of these programs today will provide clear
evidence that we are already doing what Congress would have us
do in this regard. S. 673 is not needed, as the Bush
Administration has already acted and has already taken the kind
of steps this legislation calls for.
We look forward to working with you and other committees
and to keeping you fully informed on how we conduct these
programs of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the states of
the former Soviet Union, on how we work with other concerned
governments to increase their contribution and ensure that our
respective assistance is complementary and not duplicative, and
on how we seek to work with private-sector donors of assistance
in these areas.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Van Diepen, for
your statement.
Mr. Billingslea, you may give your statement now.
TESTIMONY OF MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA,\1\ ACTING DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATION POLICY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Billingslea. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear
before your Subcommittee this morning to discuss
nonproliferation assistance programs to the republics of the
former Soviet Union and the need for careful interagency
coordination of these projects.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Billingslea appears in the
Appendix on page 279.
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A key objective of this hearing, as I understand it, is to
obtain administration views on S. 673. So I will address this
legislation first and then will turn to a brief discussion of
the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program and our views on proliferation issues in general. And
with your permission, I will simply summarize and highlight my
testimony and submit the remainder for the record.
The Department of Defense has reviewed S. 673, legislation
that would establish an interagency committee within the
Executive Branch to review and coordinate U.S. proliferation
prevention efforts. We agree that interagency coordination of
nonproliferation programs is crucial, but the Department of
Defense believes that the Bush Administration is already doing
precisely that.
We believe that a legally mandated interagency committee
could complicate the existing interagency coordinating process
that is currently managed by the National Security Council. We
must be careful not to preclude delegation of authority below
the Assistant Secretary level since this would be inconsistent
with the way the Executive Branch is currently doing business.
A great deal of coordination and policy work is done at
successive levels beginning with action officers proceeding
through office directors and on to Deputy Assistant Secretaries
of Defense and up.
The strategy that the Executive Branch is pursuing is
straightforward. First and foremost, we seek to destroy weapons
of mass destruction and their means of delivery, if possible,
at their existing location. If it is not possible to destroy
such weapons, as is sometimes the case with pathogen stocks
that might be needed for disease research, then we will seek to
consolidate and secure them. Further, we seek to prevent
weapons of mass destruction materials and knowledge from
leaving the territory of the former Soviet Union.
The Department of Defense has worked closely with the NSC
and other Departments such as the Departments of State, Energy,
and Commerce to ensure effective execution of these programs.
We also work closely with other agencies to ensure that there
is no duplication of effort.
Finally, we must take great care to ensure that U.S.
assistance to the former Soviet republics cannot be diverted,
cannot contribute to offensive weapons programs or
proliferation, or subsidize or otherwise offset other military
activities.
A good example of this coordination that is ongoing is
found in the Department of Defense's efforts to prevent the
proliferation of biological weapons. The Department of Defense
is part of an interagency group that reviews all biological
weapons proliferation prevention projects that are proposed
through the Department of State's International Science and
Technology Center. Based on those reviews, approved projects
are matched to various departments' areas of expertise and
authority.
For our part, the Department of Defense is most concerned
with the threat that is posed by dangerous pathogens,
particularly the infectious diseases such as smallpox. Over the
years, we have found that Russian scientists frequently have
unique valuable insights into the pathogenesis of various
biological agents. The Department of Defense engages in
targeted biodefense research projects with Russia in these
areas, as agreed to in the interagency process. These projects
are designed to cooperatively exploit knowledge to enhance U.S.
detection of, protection from, and treatment of these
potentially deadly substances. I will return to the matter of
biological weapons in a moment, but I use it here to illustrate
that we do have a good process in place and that that process
is working well.
Let me turn now to an overview of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction program and the areas of activity in the former
Soviet Union. We believe that the CTR program is an important
part of our national security strategy. We are privileged to
have enjoyed sustained congressional support and robust funding
since the inception of this program.
The President's fiscal year 2002 budget request included
$403 million for the DOD CTR program, $403 million, which was
virtually the same amount budgeted by the previous
administration. We appreciate the House Appropriations
Committee's full funding of our request and are hopeful that
the Senate Appropriations Committee will be equally supportive.
The funds that we have asked for will be used in a variety
of program areas that I can summarize. In the nuclear weapons
and delivery systems area, we maintain a Strategic Offensive
Arms Elimination program that is reducing Russia's strategic
offensive arms by destroying strategic WMD delivery systems. I
can give you a breakout of the numbers of nuclear submarines,
launchers for submarine launch ballistic missiles and SLBMs. It
is in my testimony.
We also have a Weapons Transportation Security program with
Russia that assists in the movement and consolidation of
nuclear weapons from Russia's Ministry of Defense operational
sites to Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy nuclear weapons
dismantlement facilities, and we are providing assistance to
the Russian MOD to bolster their ability to respond to and to
mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapons accident or an
attempted theft.
For instance, in fiscal year 2001, we funded 53 train
shipments designed to carry nuclear weapons to dismantlement
sites. We funded the maintenance of 79 railcars and contracted
for special emergency response vehicles and equipment to be
given to the MOD.
We continue to be concerned, Mr. Chairman, with the
potential for theft or diversion from Russia of nuclear
weapons. Therefore, we have developed the Nuclear Weapons
Storage Security program to make physical security upgrades to
key sites, to install inventory control systems and practices
to account for these weapons in the custody of the Russian
Ministry of Defense.
During fiscal year 2001, we completed testing and we
finalized selection on an approved suite of sensors and
equipment to be installed at Russian weapon storage sites. We
shipped six sets of Quick Fix fences and sensors to various
sites in northern Russia. We funded and verified installation
of such kinds of equipment at numerous other sites, contracted
for additional guard equipment, training, and facilities, and
delivered certified computers to help in inventory management.
We think that the installation of physical security measures,
preferably those that can be provided without extensive
training of guard forces, is a good interim solution pending
the eventual dismantlement of nuclear weapons stocks, and we
may look to do more of this kind of work.
Because time is short, I will turn briefly to Ukraine and a
few other countries. I am pleased to report that our Strategic
Nuclear Arms Elimination program in Ukraine has eliminated all
of the START-accountable nuclear delivery system launchers, and
we are dismantling other WMD delivery systems and
infrastructure.
Similarly, we have completely eliminated all weapons of
mass destruction from Kazakhstan.
On the biological weapons front, we believe that it is
important to continue cooperation with the biological weapons
designers and engineers in the former Soviet Union. This
practice is enabling us to identify many research institutes
that house dangerous pathogens and production-capable
facilities.
The Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program of
the CTR program is consolidating and securing dangerous
pathogen collections. We are dismantling former Soviet BW
research and production facilities, and as I described earlier,
we are targeting research to enhance U.S. biodefense
capabilities against dangerous pathogens, some of the work we
actually are doing with the CDC and other research institutes.
In our view, the Biological Weapons Proliferation
Prevention aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional and
increasing importance. We also attach great importance to the
comparable programs maintained by other agencies such as the
Department of State's ISTC program and the Department of
Energy's programs.
We have two objectives for the BWPP, the consolidation and
elimination of pathogenic stocks, to prevent them from falling
into the wrong hands, and collaborative research and
development with foreign scientists who can assist the United
States in better protecting the American people and the global
community from these diseases. In this vein, the Department of
Defense believes that the Joint Statement on Bioterrorism
reached between President Bush and Russian President Putin
creates an important opportunity for closer collaboration.
On the chemical weapons front, we also are concerned with
the threat of chemical weapons proliferation, and we are
troubled by inadequate security and safety measures currently
being maintained on stocks of chemical agent and we have a
program that is addressing this concern.
In Uzbekistan, we are dismantling the former Soviet
chemical weapons research, development, and testing facilities,
and there are numerous other activities that I could get in,
time permitting, but I have already greatly exceeded my time,
Mr. Chairman.
So let me just summarize by saying that we believe the CTR
program has played a crucial role in the Department of
Defense's efforts and the U.S. Government's larger efforts to
prevent proliferation. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have
all acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and have
rid themselves of their nuclear capability. The DOD portion of
the CTR program was essential and instrumental in this respect.
The Congress, the Executive Branch, and the American people
can and should be proud of the Cooperative Threat Program's
accomplishments to date, and I appreciate the opportunity to
testify before this committee.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Billingslea, for
your statement.
Mr. Baker, you may give your statement at this time.
TESTIMONY OF KENNETH E. BAKER,\1\ PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk about
the Department of Energy's nuclear nonproliferation programs.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on
page 290.
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With your permission, I will make a few opening comments
and submit a longer one for the record.
Senator Akaka. We would appreciate that.
Mr. Baker. I want to thank the Subcommittee and, indeed,
all the Members of the Senate for their strong interest and
support of the U.S. nonproliferation programs. Congress'
demonstrated commitment to these programs has sent a strong
signal that it knows the mission is critical and enduring and
has helped the National Nuclear Security Administration to plan
effectively and to work even harder after September 11.
In the aftermath of September 11, the attacks against the
United States, the work of the National Nuclear Security
Administration within the Department of Energy has taken on
higher visibility and greater importance. Almost a year ago, in
January 2001, the bipartisan report by Baker-Cutler mentioned
by Senator Cleland concluded the most urgent unmet national
security threat to the United States today. This is the danger
of weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable materials
falling in the hands of terrorists or hostile states and used
against American citizens at home.
All of us have seen the reports that Osama bin Laden has
attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that he
has called the attainment of such weapons a religious duty. In
a nutshell, that face of the threat is confronting us today.
Let me assure you, all of the people in the National Nuclear
Security Administration are committed to supporting with all
available resources, this country's work, and accelerate our
efforts to eliminate this threat from the face of the earth.
If I may make a few general comments on the draft
legislation and more later that you are considering. The NNSA
wants to ensure to you that the interagency coordination is as
good as it can be in programs, and they are effective against
the nonproliferation agenda. We have already been successful in
many of these areas, and I will discuss a few of these in my
following testimony.
Even before September 11, reducing the potential for
diversion of Russian nuclear warheads and materials has been a
critical priority for the United States. It is essential that
such warheads and materials be kept out of the hands of the so-
called rogue states as well as terrorist organizations.
The National Nuclear Security Administration is working
with Russia to attack this problem on many fronts. For example,
to improve security at sites that have weapons-usable
materials, improve Russia's export control systems, and train
Russian experts to take greater responsibility to ensuring
security and protecting weapons of mass destruction materials.
The United States has already completed rapid security
upgrades for thousands of Russian Navy warheads, and security
of over 220 metric tons of Russian fissile material has been
secured, enough to make roughly 20,000 nuclear devices.
Last year, Russia and the United States agreed to dispose
of 68 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, 34 metric
tons in each country. The administration is currently examining
alternatives to reduce the cost of this program and to make it
more sustainable to Russia. A final decision is expected in
about 2 months.
And under the HEU purchase agreement, the United States has
removed more than 130 metric tons of HEU from Russia's military
programs. The United States is working with Russia to improve
its ability to detect and interdict nuclear materials at border
checkpoints and at airports. Some borders are thousands of
miles long and pose difficult challenges, but we are tackling
that problem.
The NNSA is working intensively to reduce the risk of
Russia's highly trained nuclear scientists and engineers
already mentioned, also, the ones that are unemployed or under-
employed and would be tempted to sell their expertise to the
highest bidder. The United States is taking steps to help
Russia transform its closed nuclear cities by developing
civilian employment opportunities for displaced workers. These
objectives are pursued principally through what we call the
National Nuclear Security Administration's Russia Transition
Assistance Efforts, which encompass the initiatives for
proliferation prevention in a program called Nuclear Cities
Initiatives.
To give you a couple examples of what the initiatives for
proliferation prevention system has done, we work very closely
with State Department to make sure that we secure jobs for
Russians in basic technology work. Currently, programs in
particular on the IPP have been effectively demonstrated. We
have private and public partnerships in pursuing the
nonproliferation objectives. IPP has developed partnerships
with former weapons scientists and technicians in over 160
institutions in the former Soviet Union.
While IPP had only $24.5 million to invest in projects
during the past year, it also has required commercial partners
at least to match IPP's investment projects. These matching
funds requirement assisted IPP and Russian partners in
identification of technologies that offer the greatest
commercial promise by requiring U.S. industry to make financial
commitments to development of technology at the project's
initiation.
The NNSA believes that the formula that we have developed
for converting former weapons scientists to commercial
enterprises have been successful.
A few examples. Several energy-related technologies have
been commercialized, including what we call a borehole radar
intended to enhance coal and oil recovery. This technology
could result in revenues exceeding $2 billion in the next 10
years.
We are seeing the successful commercialization of a
wheelchair seat cushion that will prevent pressure ulcers,
responsible for causing tens of thousands of deaths in the
United States every year, saving Medicare $3 billion in annual
costs.
The Nuclear Cities Initiative's first major commercial
effort facilitates the production of kidney dialysis equipment
by a joint venture established between Fresenius Medical Care
Center of Lexington, Massachusetts, and the Avangard nuclear
weapons assembly plant in Sarov, Russia. This has been a very
successful program that will put a thousand people to work.
A year ago, virtually no westerners has ever been allowed
to set foot into the Avangard facility. Now they are part of
the joint venture that will use resources, buildings, and
personnel that previously produced nuclear weapons to
manufacture life-saving medical devices. This is truly swords
in the plowshares.
Looking ahead, as we look ahead, the National Nuclear
Security Administration considers new priorities. We are
accelerating, an important word. The Secretary just said
yesterday in Russia, we will accelerate these programs. There
are on going efforts. The National Security Administration is
taking advantage of a recently signed DOE Ministry of Atomic
Energy access agreement and focusing on sites in Russia that
hold large quantities of fissile materials. Working with the
Russian Navy, we are securing approximately 4,000 nuclear
weapons and have completed the Second Line of Defense program,
and this now is being expanded into 12 sites. Today, the NNSA
will work even harder to get the 12 up to even higher numbers.
Research and development is critical to the National
Security Administration's mission. NNSA works with numerous
other government agencies to develop technologies that will
help detect nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation and
terrorism, and, hence, the United States' ability to address
nuclear smuggling and assist local responders to respond to
terrorist threat.
I would like to close by talking about the formal draft
legislation. Although the administration has not taken formal
position on draft legislation you are considering, NNSA
respectively believes that it is not necessary. Too many layers
of management can hurt, not help, effect the implementation of
these programs.
The NSC's Proliferation Strategy Policy Committee chaired
by Dr. Robert Joseph, Assistant to the President, provides a
vehicle for interagency coordination, as it cooperates and
provides over sight over nonproliferation assistance programs
to Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.
Chaired by the NSC, the Committee consists of Assistant
Secretaries of Defense, from State, from DOE, from
intelligence, and from the Office of the Vice President and
other agencies as appropriate for the issue.
This group meets frequently to coordinate critical
nonproliferation areas. Just yesterday, we had two meetings
discussing nonproliferation issues.
As you know, the NSC is completing a comprehensive review
of all U.S. nonproliferation programs. I applaud this review,
which I see as a viable road map to guide the program to follow
on for the next few years, but the best way to improve
communications and coordination is to make sure the people in
place are committed to doing the best job possible to
communicate and coordinate.
The NNSA is committed to this, and I know my colleagues
around this table and the other agencies share in this
commitment.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me appear today to
address this panel. I look forward to any questions that you
may have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Baker, for your
statement.
My friend and colleague, Ranking Member, Senator Cochran is
here, and I would like to ask him for his statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to compliment you for convening this hearing on our efforts to
deal with proliferation and the threat reduction programs that
are designed to help make it less likely that there will be
proliferation of mass destruction weapons systems from the
former Soviet Union.
The President has directed that these programs be reviewed,
and I am pleased that the administration has moved forward with
the review and has taken steps to ensure that we are getting
good value for the funds we are spending. It is deceptive and
misleading for some to suggest that funding has been reduced.
It is more important to look at these efforts on a program-by-
program basis. Reviewed in this way, it is clear that the
administration is increasing funds for programs that are
contributing to our national security and to the security of
others as well.
For example, the program to eliminate strategic offensive
arms in Ukraine has been increased by 77 percent in order to
accelerate the elimination of SS-24 ICBMs, and unlike previous
years, no funds were requested to eliminate silos because they
have already been eliminated.
So I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that the hearing will offer
insight and suggestions that will be helpful to us in
determining how we can put the emphasis where it ought to be
put, so that we are getting good value for the dollars we are
spending and that what we are spending is productive in the
overall effort to reduce the threat and improve security for
everyone.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement, Senator.
I would like now to call on Mr. Borman for your statement,
and following that, we will have questions for you.
TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW S. BORMAN,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Borman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you as
well on behalf of the Department of Commerce for the
opportunity to testify at this hearing on this important
subject.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Borman appears in the Appendix on
page 296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the years, I have been involved in a supporting role
in several hearings that Senator Cochran had chaired on export
control-related matters. So it is a pleasure to be here now at
the table, as it were, to testify.
As with my colleagues, I have a longer statement which I
would appreciate being put in the record, and I will summarize
it orally.
For several years, the Department of Commerce has played a
significant role in the U.S. Government's international
nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. My
testimony will give a brief overview of Commerce's role and
then address the questions you had in your invitation letter.
Since the end of the Soviet Union, Commerce has
participated in the U.S. Government's nonproliferation programs
in the former Soviet Union. Commerce has worked closely with
the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and the Customs
Service of the Department of Treasury to carry out the export
control cooperation programs designed to enhance and, in some
cases, establish export control systems in these various
countries.
Commerce strongly believes that bilateral and multilateral
export control cooperation is an important part of the U.S.
Government's effort to stem the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and conventional arms. Experience has shown
that export controls are most effective when producing,
consuming, and transit countries all cooperate and maintain
similar export controls.
The overarching objective of the U.S. export control
cooperation program, whether in the former Soviet Union or
other countries, is to: (1), assist countries in controlling
the export, reexport, and transit of all items on the various
multilateral export control regime lists; that is, the
Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia
Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime; (2), also have
these countries implement some kind of catch-all controls to
catch lower-level items that could be used for weapons of mass
destruction, but are not on the regime list; and then, (3),
also to control the activities of persons subject to these
countries' jurisdiction if these activities could facilitate
weapons of mass destruction program, brokering, financing, and
technical support.
Commerce's export control cooperation, which is done
primarily through funding from the State Department, consists
primarily of bilateral technical workshops on specific export
control issues, some multilateral conferences to encourage
regional cooperation on export controls, and seminars that are
targeted specifically at defense enterprises in the former
Soviet Union countries, particularly Russia and Ukraine.
Over the past several years, Commerce has conducted, in
conjunction with the agencies represented here and others, over
200 workshops and seminars with both government officials and
industry officials in the former Soviet Union States.
There have been several notable accomplishments as a result
of this program. They include comprehensive export control laws
enacted in over half of the former Soviet Union countries with
most of the remaining countries likely to enact such laws
within the next year, significant progress on a regional
transit agreement between the countries in Central Asia and the
caucuses to reduce the likelihood that items will be diverted
when transiting through these countries, Kazakhstan
promulgating a national control list that really mirrors the
multilateral control list that the United States and the
European Union have. Kazakhstan is the first former Soviet
Union country to do so.
We have also received some leads on possible violations of
U.S. export control laws from the context we have developed,
our law enforcement officials have developed in the course of
doing these cooperation programs.
Over 900 defense enterprises and other exporters in Russia
and Ukraine have received detailed training and software to
enable them to establish their own internal company control
programs, so that they can control properly the sophisticated
dual-use items and technology that they have.
Finally, we have also distributed software to train foreign
export control licensing officers in 9 of the 12 former Soviet
Union countries.
In addition, the enforcement arm of the Bureau of Export
Administration, Department of Commerce, has an export control
attache in Moscow now, and this attache essentially has two
functions. One is to really work with Russian export control
enforcement officials to get them to enhance their enforcement
of Russia's export control law and also to help ensure that
U.S. items that are exported into Russia are not diverted to
improper uses.
Let me now briefly address the questions that you had posed
in your invitation letter, Mr. Chairman; first, how does the
Department of Commerce participate in the nonproliferation
activities with Federal partners using multilateral export
control regimes. The Department of Commerce, as you know,
Bureau of Export Administration, is responsible for
implementing the dual-use controls of the various multilateral
export control regimes, and, of course, we do that in concert
with the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense. We both
make proposals to State Department to advance the regimes in
terms of changing controls and also provide input to the
Department of State when other countries make proposals to
change regime controls or policy. In connection with that,
whenever the regimes, for example, the missile technology
control regime, have outreach efforts to non-members like
transit states, the Commerce Department also participated in
that with the other departments mentioned here.
Your second question, how well do Federal nonproliferation
programs interact with U.S. commercial interests, from our
point of view, in export control cooperation, there is quite
good interaction. As Mr. Van Diepen has already mentioned,
whenever we have bilateral exchanges, we always have the
foreign delegations meet with representatives of U.S. exporting
companies, and we think this is crucial for them to understand
why U.S. companies spend time and money to comply with our
export controls and also how important it is for any government
to talk to its industry about controlling and consulting on
export controls.
In fact, just to give you a concrete example, a few weeks
ago, we had a delegation from Ukraine here. The delegation
consisted of some government officials, as well as some members
of the Ukrainian parliament, and in addition to meeting with
Commerce, Energy, State, Defense, and the Customs Service, they
also had a meeting with a U.S. exporting company and they came
up here and actually had meetings with some members as well.
We also work with the various agencies represented here and
any contractors they use on these various nonproliferation
assistance programs that you have already heard mentioned to
make sure that any delivery of goods or technologies from the
United States to Russia or other countries complies with U.S.
export control laws. So that is another way we interact with
U.S. commercial interests in doing our programs.
That really concludes my summary. Once again, I thank you
for the opportunity to testify on this important subject, and I
am happy to answer whatever questions you or other Members
have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Borman, for your
statement.
I would like to call on my colleague, Senator Carnahan, for
your statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN
Senator Carnahan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
want to thank you for holding this very important hearing
today.
The testimony that we will hear today is especially
important as the evidence mounts up that Osama bin Laden and
the Al-Qaeda network were actively taking steps to acquire
weapons of mass destruction.
Although these revelations are disturbing, the threat of
proliferation has been a concern for some time. Over 11 months
ago, Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler presented a report on
nonproliferation programs to the President, and those findings
were startling. They found that 10 years after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons remained scattered throughout
Russia in more than 100 poorly guarded depots. These weapons
are not appropriately accounted for or secured. These
conditions make it possible for rogue nations or terrorists to
steal or to buy nuclear materials and to smuggle them out of
Russia.
In fact, 3 weeks ago, the Washington Post reported that
nuclear scientists had been holding talks with bin Laden's
followers. In this same article, it was reported that nuclear
material may have been stolen from Russia over the last 2
years.
The Baker-Cutler report suggests that the only way to stop
this situation is to expand the United States' nonproliferation
programs. This will require sizeable investments, including a
$30 million 10-year budget for these programs overseen by the
Departments of Energy, Defense, and State. I believe that this
would be an important first step.
Today, I hope that we can use this hearing to evaluate the
findings of this report in light of the Nation's new war on
terrorism. It is imperative that the United States remain
proactive in suppressing the worldwide spread of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. To accomplish this goal, I
feel we need to upgrade our intelligence capability, more
closely monitor other nations for compliance with arms control
treaties, provide better compensation to former Soviet weapons
scientists, and provide accounting for the thousands of weapons
produced by the Soviet Union.
Currently, our government attempts to accomplish these
objectives through several Federal agencies spread out among
four Cabinet Departments. These organizations do find work, but
there is room for improvement.
Coordinating the nonproliferation activities of these
agencies, as suggested by Senator Hagel's legislation, is an
idea worthy of examination. Funding these nonproliferation
programs needs to be one of our highest national security
priorities, and I look forward to hearing from the panelists
today about that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement,
Senator Carnahan.
Now we would like to ask you questions. My first question
is for all of the witnesses here today. We have talked about
the National Security Council and about what they have been
doing. Has the extended National Security Council review of our
nonproliferation programs affected the activities of any of our
current programs? In other words, has it delayed implementation
of any programs or the fulfillment of their objectives?
Let me start with Mr. Van Diepen.
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I indicated in my statement that review is in its final
stages, but, certainly, as a general matter, we have not been
holding back from doing necessary work while the review has
been ongoing. The review is basically going to be an effort to
try and prioritize and give us guidance on, as Senator Cochran
said, trying to get the best bang for the buck on these
programs, but we certainly have not been holding back from
doing necessary work while the review has been proceeding.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea.
Mr. Billingslea. Mr. Chairman, the review is ongoing, but
it has not affected the important work that needs to be done
through the CTR program.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker.
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I applaud the review. I
think it is badly needed.
Our programs are continuing, the ones of securing nuclear
materials. We are working night and day. As a matter of fact,
just today I got 12 different teams throughout Russia securing
the stuff, just today.
What has changed a little bit is our plutonium disposition
because we are looking at a plutonium disposition program and
coming up with alternatives on plutonium disposition in
accordance with the treaty, and we will have options. The
Secretary of Energy has got the pin on this, and we will get
back to the White House in 2 months. A decision will be made
before the next budget cycle on what option we should pursue
with plutonium dispositions.
The Russians are on board on this. We met the Russians the
week before last, and we have come up with options to make this
program successful and to make it cheaper if that is possible.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Borman.
Mr. Borman. The export control cooperation programs that
the Department of Commerce is involved in have not been
affected in any way by the ongoing review. We have continued
with our efforts.
Senator Akaka. Let me ask Mr. Billingslea in relation to
what we just talked about. Has DOD's chemical demilitarization
program been affected?
Mr. Billingslea. The chemical weapons destruction facility
program is part of the ongoing review. Decisions on that
particular program have not been reached yet, and I would not
want to prejudge the outcome of that review.
But as I did mention in my testimony, one of the other
important areas relating to chemical weapons is the large
numbers of stockpiles of chemical agent throughout Russia,
which we believe are not subjected to the best possible
physical security measures. So we have been aggressively
pursuing the installation of physical security around those
stocks to prevent their diversion.
I am also told that the design of the facility is ongoing,
the chemical weapons destruction facility, although any final
determination on that facility is still going to be made at the
Cabinet level.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Van Diepen, in your testimony, you observe that several
statements from our November 14 hearing note that effective
implementation and senior-level coordination already exists.
While our witnesses say that nonproliferation programs have
been effective, they unanimously agreed that senior-level
coordination is lacking.
In fact, Laura Holgate of the Nuclear Threat Initiative
recommended the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor
to ensure high-level attention and agency cooperation.
Who is in charge of overseeing all of our nonproliferation
programs right now?
Mr. Van Diepen. At one level, Mr. Chairman, the President
is, of course, but at the more operational level, as we have
indicated in all of our statements, the Policy Coordinating
Committee on Proliferation Strategy is the sort of operational
place at the assistant secretary level where this kind of
coordination is done.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker, basic physical security upgrades
such as securing doors, installing alarms, and hardening guard
posts are not scheduled to be completed on all nuclear
facilities until, I think, 2007. The question immediately is:
Why is it taking so long?
In light of the events of September 11, how can we wait
until 2007, knowing that terrorists are actively trying to
obtain nuclear material?
Along that same line, are sites with the completed security
systems subject to periodic vulnerability testing?
Mr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I have been on both sides of the
house. I used to write the black book for the President during
the cold war and knew every target we had from Russia. When the
Cold War was over, I saw personally firsthand that these
nuclear materials were all over Russia, they did not know how
many they had. Their accounting system was not there, and we
are working night and day to get this secured. It is something
that you can't get done overnight.
During the Cold War, of course, they had guns, gates, and
guards, and all of that went away after the Cold War. I will
tell you, I walked into Kurchatov 1 day with a guard half
asleep and walked in myself and the deputy secretary and opened
up a locker like a bicycle locker and I found 75 KGs of highly
enriched uranium laying in a locker. So this is what we faced
back in 1993.
We have secured all of the Russian Navy facilities that we
know about that had warheads. We did triage immediately. We
have done quick upgrades. Yes, there has got to be
comprehensive upgrades, but to make sure these things are
secure, we have done that.
The other facilities, at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, we
are working on it as fast as we can. Like I say, I have got 12
teams in there now. One thing that slowed us down was an access
agreement with the Russians; that now we are seeing things that
we have never seen before; that they are letting us into
facilities that no American citizen has ever been in. So now we
have got an access agreement. Now we are into the biggest
facilities in Russia where there is tons and tons of the stuff,
securing this, and we are going to work as fast as we can to
get this done.
Senator Akaka. I will ask for any questions from my Ranking
Member.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
In my opening statement, I mentioned that the
administration had increased its funding request for work in
Ukraine in connection with eliminating strategic arms. I wonder
if there are other examples that you can tell us about.
I know, for example, that there has been an increase in the
program that is designed to provide employment opportunities
for former Soviet weapons scientists. Now, that is a program I
think the State Department is involved in.
Mr. Van Diepen, can you tell us about that program and
whether or not that is correct, that there has been a new
emphasis on trying to increase the opportunities for Russian
weapons scientists or former Soviet weapons scientists?
Mr. Van Diepen. Certainly, Senator. That is one of the key
programs that we have at the State Department. Through the
International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, our programs have
engaged with 40,000 former Soviet WMD and missile scientists to
try and give them peaceful civilian employment in-country and
thereby reduce the incentives that they may have to sell their
wares to countries like North Korea or Iran. This has been a
very effective program.
We have also been partnering with industry in trying to
leverage some of their resources to increase the impact that we
have on the problem, but, of course, there are many weapons
scientists in the former Soviet Union, and we continue to try
and do our best to prioritize and work where things could be
more effective, for example, increasing our outreach in the
biological area, which is of obvious relevance in the post-
September 11 environment.
Mr. Baker. Senator Cochran, we have one, also.
Senator Cochran. This is the Department of Energy?
Mr. Baker. Department of Energy, yes, sir.
We have what we call an Initiative for Proliferation
Prevention which is putting Russia's scientists to work with
commercial companies. We have over 160 commercial companies
right now involved. The commercial companies have put more than
$50 million into these programs right now.
As I was mentioning before you arrived, sir, things like
wheelchair, it was voted this year as the medical science
breakthrough of the year, which has a cushion that moves that
prevents people in nursing homes from getting pressure sores.
Many people have died. It will save Medicare, they say, $3
billion a year. It came out of this IPP program, Russian
scientists and our scientists working together. That is one
example.
Then we worked very closely with the State Department on
their ISTC program. Again, it is an example of coordination
between the agencies.
Senator Cochran. Are there any other examples, Mr.
Billingslea?
Mr. Billingslea. Yes, sir. I think it is important to
stress that the CTR program's funding is done on an ebb and
flow of business. We budget according to what can realistically
be achieved in the coming fiscal year.
Senator Cochran. What does the CTR mean? What is that
acronym?
Mr. Billingslea. I am sorry, sir. It is the Nunn-Lugar
program, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
The fiscal year 2002 budget actually had about $100 million
in new or expanded projects that included things like $15
million was for dismantlement of a chemical weapons production
facility in Russia. There was an additional $10 million put in
to expand our defense and military contacts programs through
the CTR program. We put $5 million additionally into biological
weapons proliferation prevention and so on and so forth.
Now, there were also funds that we did not need as we began
winding up various projects or it became apparent that the
Russians were not going to provide access to do certain things.
So we have engaged in several new starts and other old starts
are beginning to wind up, and it is just an ongoing review
process.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask you something about the
coordination of all of these activities. Mr. Van Diepen talked
about the fact that there is a committee at the assistant
secretary level that has the responsibility for coordinating
what all the departments and agencies are doing in this
connection and trying to make sure that there is no overlap. I
guess that is to ensure that we are not doing something twice,
and that there is nothing falling through the cracks.
What would your assessment be of the effectiveness of this
committee? I understand the National Security Council has a
chairman who serves as a coordinating chairman or an
organizational chairman. How is that working?
Mr. Van Diepen. Yes, Senator. It is chaired by a senior
director at the National Security Council and has all of the
relevant agencies involved. Obviously, any group can do its
work better, but what strikes me is how similar the functions
of the current PCC are to the functions that are envisaged in
the proposed legislation. Basically, this group is already
doing the kinds of things that the legislation calls for.
I think it is doing its work reasonably well. Again, it can
always do its work better, and one of the things we hope to
come out of the administration's review of these programs are
ways that we can do this job better and make sure that we are
getting the best value for the dollar and that we are
complementing each other as effectively as possible.
Senator Cochran. In connection with the cooperation of
Russia in particular, with the new spirit of cooperation and
the commitment to work together on a number of different issue
areas and problems confronting both of our countries, it seems
to me that the climate has improved. The relationship has
changed. Is this proving to be the case in fact in the day-to-
day operation of these programs we are talking about? What
would your assessment be?
Mr. Baker.
Mr. Baker. My assessment would be, yes, sir, they are
improving. In my opinion, they are better than they ever have
been since I came to the Department of Energy in 1993. I think
doors are opening that have not been opened. They are letting
us into facilities to help them. I think the relationship that
the two presidents have now is a great relationship.
I know just right now my boss, Secretary Abraham, is over
there meeting with the head of MinAtom. Minister Rumyantsev, I
just talked to him yesterday. He said that it is going great.
He has never seen better relationships. They want to accelerate
these programs. They want to work together. They want to work
hand in glove, and the Secretary was really happy.
As a matter of fact, he is on his way to Vienna today to
tell the chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Mohamed ElBaradei, how well it went in Russia. So I think after
September 11, things have really come together, and I think it
is going to even get better, and we are going to make this
thing work.
Like Baker-Cutler says, we have got to work faster, and we
are going to work faster and we are going to get this job done.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I noticed that the second
bells have rung on a vote over on the Senate floor. We might
talk ourselves out of a vote here if we are not careful.
Senator Akaka. That is correct. We have a vote on now.
I would like to ask Senator Carnahan if there are a couple
of questions you want to ask.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will confine
myself to just one question since the vote is underway.
Mr. Baker, as I discussed in my opening statement, the
Baker-Cutler report describes some very dire conditions in
Russia, with the tons of nuclear weapon material, much of it
unaccounted for and scattered throughout Russia in 100
different poorly guarded depots.
Some of the critics of the Energy Department programs have
indicated that DOE puts too much emphasis on quick fixes, just
putting bars on windows or securing doors or checking
inventories. Certainly, these are important initiatives, but I
think it is also important that we consider some long-term
solutions as well, such as installing fences or advanced
security systems, barcoding equipment, and training workers.
Would you describe the Energy Department's long-term plans
to enhance security at the Russian nuclear depots?
Mr. Baker. Yes, ma'am. We are doing exactly what you just
said. We are now. We did put up fences and gates and everything
you could think of, but we are barcoding. We have got a
complete inventory of what they have. We are barcoding all of
their stuff. We are working a sustainability program because,
some day when all of this is fixed, we have got to get out. We
cannot stay forever. So we are showing them how to sustain this
equipment and how to make sure it is secure in the future. So
we are working the long-term things right now, ma'am.
I was with Senator Baker and Mr. Cutler when we went to
Russia, and as a matter of fact, Senator Baker and I found out
we are related to each other from Tennessee and Kentucky, long
cousins, but he is a man that saw that we are for doing long-
term things and we are doing the barcoding. We are doing the
things that you just mentioned. That is going on right now. So
we are taking long-term issues to make sure these places are as
secure as you can make it.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your questions.
The Subcommittee will take a recess now. There is a vote
on, and we will return to the questions. We stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Akaka. The hearing will be in order.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for your statements
and your responses to the questions. My question now is to Mr.
Borman.
Commerce is responsible for deemed export control issues,
as you mention in your statement. Does Russia have similar
concerns? Have we discussed this with them in light of our
concerns, of our concerns about foreign students and scientists
who work in American universities and laboratories?
Mr. Borman. Yes, we have. I guess I can answer that or
address that in a couple of aspects, Mr. Chairman. When foreign
nationals come into the United States, whether they are from
Russia or another country and whether they are here for work or
other purposes, there is a certain set of regulations that
apply to them. And to simplify it, it is if they will have
access to technology that would require a license to be
exported to their home country, they need a license to get it
in the United States. That is why we call it the deemed export.
It most typically comes up with foreign nationals being
employed at U.S. companies.
Certainly, when we talk to Russia or any other country
about their own export control program, we also emphasize that
this is an element that we think they need to incorporate into
their own systems, so that if foreign students, for example,
from one country into Russia to study or to work, that the same
types of restrictions apply to them and their access to
Russian-origin technology. This is a harder concept for other
countries to get their arms around because it is kind of a
complicated concept, but I think that they are becoming more
and more sensitive to that and are really designing their
export control systems to account for that as well as the more
traditional export, the machine tool leaving the country.
Senator Akaka. You mentioned in your statement that there
is an attache----
Mr. Borman. Yes.
Senator Akaka [continuing]. Now in Russia, and that attache
is to carry out the programs and also to--and if I may use the
word--enforce some of our policies there. How long has the
attache been there in Russia?
Mr. Borman. He started there at the beginning of this year.
Senator Akaka. Oh.
Mr. Borman. This is the first time we have had funding for
such a position.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea, some have suggested that
U.S. taxpayer funds are going to Russian scientists who
continue to work on poison gas, biological agents, and nuclear
weapons designs for the Russian Government. Is this true, and
if so, what is being done to prevent it?
Mr. Billingslea. Mr. Chairman, we continue to have concerns
regarding Russia's compliance with the chemical and the
biological weapons conventions to which they are a party. We
could discuss that a little more fully in closed session.
However, as I indicated in my opening statement, the Department
of Defense is very concerned to know and to make sure that
funds are not diverted, that funds do not contribute to
offensive weapons programs, whether on the chemical or
biological side or even to offensive nuclear modernization or
missile modernization.
In order to guard against this, we have a very rigorous
audit and examination process that the Department of Defense
follows.
Further, no project, no research project that the
Department of Defense undertakes, is approved or undertaken
until it is subjected to a rigorous interagency review.
Speaking only for the Department of Defense's projects, I
do not believe on the basis of my review of the CTR program
that we are contributing in any way to Russian WMD programs,
but it is something that we must be very wary of. As we look to
improve our collaboration on biological defense activities with
the Russian Government, we must be very wary and must factor
this into consideration.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker, the International Atomic Energy
Agency has recently listed radiological dispersion weapons, or
dirty bombs as they call it, as their top priority. What is the
United States doing to address this proliferation threat?
Mr. Baker. Right now, sir, it is a concern. What it would
do if a dirty bomb was built, it may kill a few people very
close to it, but the big problem would be the radiation that
would be spread over an area like Chernobyl or that Chernobyl
had a problem, that long-term illnesses could occur.
What are we doing about it? Well, right now, we are looking
at how we can expand our materials protection control and
accounting program to do things that we have not done before,
like secure spent fuel.
There are areas that we have looked before the September 11
situation. We were securing weapons materials, things that were
enriched above 20 percent. Now you have to worry some about
below 20 percent. So we are concerned about this.
We are looking into what we can do. There is so much person
power one has and so many things you can do and negotiations
you have to make, but it is a concern and we are looking very
hard into that for the last 2 months.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea, witnesses in a previous
hearing stated that there is no dedicated program to assist
Russia in warhead dismantlement, and that plans for this are
not part of the budget at this time. Why is this the case, and
are there plans for including this type of assistance at a
later date?
Mr. Billingslea. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is
important to clarify that the Department of Defense is not
involved in the actual dismantlement of any Russian nuclear
weapons.
We are constructing a fissile material storage facility
that will provide centralized, safe, and ecologically sound
storage for up to 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and
200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium removed from nuclear
weapons. This is the Mayak facility. The Russians have, I
believe, a dismantlement site in proximity to that facility.
The physical construction of the storage facility and all
of the support structures is 80 percent complete, although
equipping the facility is only 60 percent complete at this
stage.
We have been under a cost cap for that facility, Mr.
Chairman, but the total cost is going to be about $40 million
less than that cap, I am pleased to report. About $370 million
it will cost to establish this facility.
We anticipate that the storage site will be completed next
year and that we will be able to begin loading it with fissile
material from the warhead dismantlement process, although I
think that we need to be clear that Russia has indicated that
it does not want or need U.S. Government assistance in
preparing the plutonium and the HEU from dismantled warheads
that is to be stored at this site.
Senator Akaka. I recall in your statement, I think, that it
is the intent of our country to dismantle at these sites as
much as we can.
Mr. Billingslea. We, together with the Department of Energy
and the other U.S. Government agencies, are very concerned with
the large numbers, large stockpiles of fissile material
throughout Russia, including stocks of warheads and would
obviously believe that dismantlement of warheads by the Russian
Government is a positive development.
It is important to maintain physical security on not only
the warheads, but the fissile materials stocks themselves which
is why the agreement that DOE has recently signed that Mr.
Baker referenced is so important. It begins to open the doors
for the U.S. Government to move in and provide the kinds of
physical protection that need to be provided.
With the Department of Defense programs, we continue to
have difficulty in obtaining access to key sites, and the
Russian Government is going to need to give us access to these
sites to perform surveys and assessments and then to install
equipment, and most importantly to verify after the
installation that it was done correctly and that we are, in
effect, getting what we are paying for, which is a key test.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker, at the end of September 2001, a
new agreement to provide U.S. officials with expanded access to
Russian nuclear sites and facilities was announced. What sites
are not covered by this agreement? How much nuclear material is
housed at the facilities covered by the agreement, and how long
will this agreement stay in force?
Mr. Baker. The agreement, sir, is with the Ministry of
Atomic Energy. It does not cover the work we are doing with the
Russian Navy. We have another agreement with the Russian Navy
already, and we have had no problems securing weapons with the
Russian Navy at all. We have had complete access.
This access agreement will cover all MinAtom facilities,
about 90 facilities.
It is about 600 metric tons that this access agreement will
cover. So, with that agreement, we can almost get into--well,
we can. With the Russian Navy, we have got complete access
right now so far, and with the Ministry of Atomic Energy, we
will have the other access now, which we have, to get into the
big sites like Tomsk. Chelyabinsk-70, it used to be called.
This is where a lot of material is that we never could get in
before. Now we are in.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Borman, what are the other problems with
Russian export controls? What is the Department of Commerce
doing to help Russia correct these problems and strengthen
their export controls?
Mr. Borman. Well, Russia's export control system is
evolving. Obviously, under the Communist system, they had
probably a very tight export control system. With the breakup
of the Soviet Union, obviously a lot of resources are lost, and
our principal focus right now with Russia's export control
system is on their defense enterprises.
As I mentioned earlier, we have a very, I think, aggressive
program to go to individual defense enterprises with Russian
Government officials. The Russian Government officials explain
Russia's export control system to these enterprises, and then
we bring U.S. company officials along to explain their own
internal company control programs and try to help the Russian
enterprises understand that it is in their business interest to
comply with Russia's export control system. We even have a
software tool that helps these companies set up their own
internal control program so they know what of their goods and
technologies are subject to export controls and which are not,
and that is an ongoing effort. We have done it in dozens of
defense enterprises, but these defense enterprise which, of
course, used to be very tightly controlled by the government
are now players in the free market and they don't have that
much exposure to even their own government's export control
system, let alone how the market operates. So that is one area
of our focus.
Another area of our focus, now that Russia has a
comprehensive export control law, is to work with them more on
enforcement techniques that are particular to export controls.
I think one view of export controls is you have to have tight
border security, and certainly that is true, but obviously a
lot of enforcement is done upstream. Enforcement officials have
to know what are the enterprises that are producing items of
concern, go out and talk to them and monitor them and make sure
that they are complying with the law. And that is another area
of our focus that we are going to be stepping up.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea, how should DOD's
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs be expanded to
accommodate the reduction in strategic nuclear weapons
agreement reached between President Bush and Russian President
Putin, 2 weeks ago? Do you expect increased funding, or will
other assistance activities need to be scaled back?
Mr. Billingslea. The potential, which has now been realized
in the agreement, for the deep reductions has already been
factored into our budget request. There may be substantial new
opportunities in the CTR program, but that may be more in the
chemical and biological side of the house where, again, as I
mentioned, the bioterrorism agreement that was reached, if this
leads to a greater opening in access and collaborative
research, then that would be an area of active consideration,
but on the nuclear side and the delivery platform side, this is
already factored within the budget.
Further, I do point out that since we have already
essentially begun to wind up the destruction of platforms in
places like Kazakhstan and Ukraine, there will be a natural and
inevitable tapering down of some parts of that program and a
ramping up in other parts. It is just depending on the
opportunities we are given.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker, nuclear accounting requires that
facilities undertake a physical inventory of their nuclear
material. To what extent have individual former Soviet sites
completed their physical inventory. Has a national inventory
system been established to account for nuclear material
movements from site to site?
Mr. Baker. When we first started doing this program back in
1993, it was not a good accounting systems where these
materials were located. We found this.
We have been on the ground over there, and we have got a
good accounting system. We have, sir, a system that we are
teaching the Russians how to count, and some of it, like
barcode, this equipment. We are monitoring when it goes from
site to site with help of other agencies. So we do have a
fairly decent--we think what you do not know, you do not know,
but we think we have a very accurate count of what they have in
Russia in terms of nuclear material. We have that ourselves,
and they, of course, also have it now.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea, what has DOD done to
destroy any biological weapons stockpiles or dismantle the
surge production capabilities developed within former Soviet
biological weapon facilities?
Mr. Billingslea. In fiscal year 2001, Mr. Chairman, we
continued--there were six ongoing projects--to make security
enhancements at various sites, six of those. We initiated
efforts at six additional sites in fiscal year 2001.
We also continued six ongoing collaborative projects and
initiated seven new collaborative projects, and we have been
working on dismantlement and continued that in this past year
of the former biological weapons production facility at
Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.
We also began developing dismantlement efforts at four
Russian institutes, and we have recently completed an
assessment of the former biological weapons test facility at
Vozrozhdeniye Island in Uzbekistan and are looking at ways to
engage in future dismantlement and pathogen elimination efforts
on that island. So these are the ongoing programs that we have.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Van Diepen, we have been talking about
how relationships have improved between us and Russia. The
Department of State coordinates the Defense, Energy, Health and
Human Services, and Agriculture to engage Russian and other
biologists in peaceful civilian collaboration with western
experts and businesses. How has this coordination changed since
September 11?
Mr. Van Diepen. Mr. Chairman, I think what we are trying to
do is intensify the effort. It is not so much changing the
coordination, but increasing the throughput that is being
coordinated to try and be more effective, reach out to more
institutes, get our hands around more capability that could
potentially find its way into the hands of terrorists.
The bioredirect program, we think the coordination has been
very effective on, and we are trying to use that coordination
to leverage increased output and effectiveness from that
program.
Senator Akaka. Are there plans for joint U.S.-Russian
planning meetings for nonproliferation? What are the formal
mechanisms to coordinate with your Russian counterparts in
that?
Mr. Van Diepen. There are a variety of interactions that we
have with the Russian Government on all different levels in the
nonproliferation arena. At the Under Secretary or their Vice
Foreign Minister level, it was agreed some time ago to have
regular discussions on nonproliferation issues. Likewise, at
the Assistant Secretary level, my boss, John Wolf, will be
beginning a regular series of consultations with his Russian
counterpart. Basically, this goes on down through the pyramid,
and, of course, integral to all of these cooperative programs
with Russia are ongoing interactions with the Russian
Government.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker, since the start of the Nunn-Lugar
nonproliferation programs, Congress has authorized $5.5 billion
for assistance to former Soviet States. How much of this money
has been spent in Russia and the newly independent states?
Mr. Baker. Sir, with all due respect, I think that can be
better answered by the Department of Defense, being as they
control the Nunn-Lugar money.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea, would you have any comment
on that?
Mr. Billingslea. Yes, sir. We are doing the calculations
for you right now. May I submit that for the record, so that we
get it down to the precise dollar amount? \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The information submitted for the record by Mr. Billingslea
entitled ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International
Atomic Energy Agency,'' appears in the Appendix on page 355.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Akaka. All right.
Mr. Baker and Mr. Van Diepen, the GAO has testified that
the Departments of State and Energy programs to employ weapons
scientists have not been able to demonstrate that they achieved
these objectives. What are you doing to correct this problem?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, I will start, Mr. Chairman. I am not
sure exactly what the assessment of GAO was, but a lot of
nonproliferation is trying to keep dogs from barking, so to
speak, and it is often difficult to demonstrate that a dog did
not bark and it did not bark because of your program. But we
are quite confident that the extensive engagement that we have
had through these programs, engaging again with 40,000 former
weapons scientists in the former Soviet Union, has had a
substantial impact on trying to reduce the so-called brain-
drain problem.
By definition, if a scientist did not go to North Korea
because he is employed in our programs, it is difficult for us
to know that he was going to go otherwise, except for our
program. So it is not clear to me how these sort of classic
accounting techniques could be used to measure the
effectiveness of these programs. All we can say is based on the
phenomena that we see in the intelligence, we are quite
satisfied that these programs have had a substantial impact on
addressing this problem.
Mr. Baker. That question, sir, always comes up, how many
people have you saved from going to a rogue state. As just
stated, it is hard to, but I will tell you from a personal
experience from talking to Russian scientists and asked them
across the table, have they ever been recruited. I had one down
in the Department of Energy just about a month ago, and he now
works in Emergency Management. I asked him the question, ``You
used to build Russian weapons. Why did you take an Emergency
Management job?'' He said, ``To feed my family.'' I said,
``Have you ever had a chance to get more money?'' He said,
``Absolutely,'' and he said, ``My buddies have done the same
thing.'' So, when the GAO makes that comment, I can tell you
from personal experience in talking to them, many of them have
been recruited by rogue states.
Now, have they gone? We do not have a number. It is very
hard to track if we have lost any, but I can tell you right
now, it is happening. It is happening that people are being
recruited.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea, environmental and local
public advocacy groups have gained influence in the former
Soviet Union. What problems is this creating for American aid
efforts, and how can we resolve those problems?
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, I am not aware of any specific
problems, at least in my short time within the Department of
Defense, that have been brought to my attention as resulting
from an environmental group's advocacy for one people or
another.
I am sure that Russia will encounter the same kinds of
environmental considerations when they finally commence their
chemical warfare destruction activities, as they are required
to do under the Chemical Weapons Convention, but to date I am
not sure that the CTR program that I would say we have been
adversely affected by environmental groups. Let me give you a
more fulsome assessment of that for the record.
It would appear there may have been some time, additional
time that was needed for us in establishing a facility to deal
with solid propellant. So there may have been some
environmental considerations there. Let me get you a
description of that.
Senator Akaka. All right. Thank you.
I have some questions here for Senator Levin, and let me
ask these questions for him. In your testimony, Mr.
Billingslea, you state, ``We remain concerned that Russia
continues to produce weapons-grade plutonium.'' You also state,
``The best approach to achieving shutdown of these reactors,
which we all agree is an important objective, is still under
review by the administration.''
At the time the DOD budget request was submitted to DOD, it
was going to build a fossil-fuel coal plant at one site and
upgrade an existing coal-fired plant at the other site. This
would allow the reactors to shut down.
The reactors produce plutonium, but also power for the
local communities. Building these fossil-fuel plants is the
cheapest and fastest way to shut down these reactors. Is DOD
walking away from this plan? What is DOD considering instead?
Will the alternatives cost less and be quicker to complete?
My understanding of the situation is that the NSC prefers
to pursue the fossil-fuel option, and here is a question. What
is the process for resolving this difference of opinion, and
when will it be resolved?
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, the----
Senator Akaka. Let me finish. There is just one more.
Mr. Billingslea. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. When can we expect a decision on how to shut
down these reactors?
Mr. Billingslea. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, my hope is that
the administration will arrive at a final decision on the best
approach for getting the plutonium production reactors, the
three of them, shut down in the near term. I cannot put a
precise date on it, but it is under active consideration by the
administration in discussion at the Cabinet level.
I would suggest, as I did in my testimony, that we very
much do want to see the reactors shut down. That is an
objective. However, as my testimony also states, the material
in the fuel assemblies that are being irradiated by these
reactors is of a less direct proliferation risk than the
processed weapons-usable material that lies at countless sites
that the Baker-Cutler Task Force talked about, unsafeguarded or
very poor safeguards throughout Russia. So, certainly, getting
physical security safeguards on that material is of a high
priority.
The Department of Defense has been looking at various ways
to achieve shutdown of these reactors. Fossil-fuel plants was
but one option. Other options have been considered, some put
aside, some being further explored, perhaps reactors that could
burn plutonium.
The House of Representatives and, in fact, the Congress has
been very cool in the past towards the Department of Defense
engaging in this effort, and, in fact, funds had been
prohibited from being used in the past for establishment of
fossil-fuel plants. I think the question is whether or not the
Department of Defense is the right agency to be involved in
building powerplants in Russia, but we look to have an
administration decision shortly on that.
Senator Akaka. I have another question from Senator Levin.
Mr. Billingslea, in your testimony, you address the question of
improving security of chemical weapons. What about destroying
those weapons? The DOD requested funds to build a chemical
weapons demilitarization facility. The Senate bill authorizing
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program supports this effort.
The House bill does not. Is DOD walking away from the U.S.
commitment to destroy these weapons? It seems to me that the
ultimate way to ensure they are secure is to destroy them.
So I guess the question to you, Mr. Billingslea, is DOE
walking away from the U.S. commitment to destroy these weapons?
Mr. Billingslea. Mr. Chairman, as Senator Levin's question
points out, the Congress is divided on the issue, which
suggests that there are good arguments to be made on both
sides. The administration is examining the merits of the case,
and my hope is that we will have a decision on that shortly.
Senator Akaka. Another question from Senator Levin to Mr.
Van Diepen, the Department of State appears to be the
appropriate agency to coordinate policy for these programs in
the absence of any formal coordinator. Has the State Department
sought additional funds for these programs from the $40 billion
in additional emergency funds?
We understand that, notwithstanding the recent evidence
that bin Laden is seeking nuclear materials, no additional
funds will be made available to secure these materials in
Russia. My understanding is that the administration has taken
the position that increased efforts to secure material is not a
priority. The question is: Is this true?
The final question is: Is securing these weapons-grade
materials not a priority and will additional funds be
forthcoming?
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of
securing weapons-usable materials, I think it is clear from the
testimonies that you have heard that that is and remains a key
priority. I am not sure it is my place to talk about the
programs that are not State Department programs. We don't do
securing weapons-usable materials.
On the question of resources from the supplemental, one
example is we were able to get, I believe it is, $42 million to
improve export controls and border security in Central Asia
that came out of the supplemental. So we definitely have been
weighing in and trying to use that to help improve our
nonproliferation efforts.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Billingslea, would you want to make any
comment on those questions?
Mr. Billingslea. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the nuclear
side, we are pressing the Russian Ministry of Defense very
aggressively to finalize procedures for access. We have for our
part done all of our work that we need to do, testing various
components, and looking at the different integration measures
that are needed to put a comprehensive security upgrade in
place at facilities once we gain access.
As I mention, we have also been engaging in the more
interim kinds of physical security measures, things like truck
barriers and very simple kinds of physical security that can be
provided on a quick basis that don't need a lot of training
involved.
This is a costly program. We are going to have to have
access to ensure that the upgrades that we are paying for are
actually installed and installed correctly.
On the biological side, we still have not been able to get
the Russian Government to designate an executive agent that the
Department of Defense can work with directly, and as a result,
we are working through the ISTC program that the Department of
State manages to address those kinds of issues.
Senator Akaka. Well, I want to say thank you to all of you
for your statements and your responses. This will certainly
help the Subcommittee.
The events of September 11 have made the prospect of WMD
terrorism a reality. It has certainly changed our lives here in
our country.
I am pleased that the administration today has stated that
it shares my sense of urgency for nonproliferation activities.
I hope its words will be matched by action with appropriate
funds.
On another issue, every witness today said that the
statutory coordination mechanism for U.S. nonproliferation is
unnecessary. Mr. Van Diepen suggests that it could even be
counterproductive or intrusive. This view contradicts those of
every one of our witnesses from our hearing on November 14.
Each of the proliferation experts welcomed the prospect of
additional senior-level coordination and even suggested how the
provisions proposed by S. 673 should be expanded. In fact, they
all stated that improved coordination was vital to an effective
national nonproliferation strategy. I am just giving you some
idea of what happened in the last hearing.
There is agreement that we need a national strategy. I hope
the administration's review will be completed soon so that this
Subcommittee can be briefed on its conclusions.
Senator Biden has asked to submit a statement for the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to submit written testimony to the
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security,
Proliferation, and Federal Services in support of S. 673, the
Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001, of which I am an
original co-sponsor. There are many important questions to consider on
U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union, including
the need to do far more than we do today.
S. 673 would perform a narrower, but vital, function: To establish
a high-level interagency committee within the Executive Branch to
achieve better coordination of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the
former Soviet Union. In addition, this new committee could help
coordinate official U.S. Government activities with those undertaken by
private sector organizations, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
and by foreign governments.
Senators Hagel, Lugar, and I decided to introduce this bill in
April, shortly after the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on
the results of the Baker-Cutler Task Force, a high-level advisory panel
which reviewed the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs in
Russia. Former Senator Howard Baker and the former White House Counsel,
Lloyd Cutler, the co-chairs of the Task Force, reiterated to the
Committee the report's principal conclusion:
The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United
States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or
weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to
terrorists or hostile nation-states and used against American
troops abroad or citizens at home.
The events of September 11 and the risks that U.S. forces face in
Operation Enduring Freedom only reinforce this conclusion. Every day,
we learn more details about Osama bin Laden's chilling quest for
weapons of mass destruction, including efforts to enlist the Russian
mafia in purchasing and/or stealing sensitive nuclear materials in the
former Soviet Union.
Over the past ten years, beginning with the Nunn-Lugar initiative,
the United States has spent more than $5 billion to help the states in
the former Soviet Union reduce the threat posed by poorly secured,
excess stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, related raw materials
and the human expertise behind it all. While these efforts have
contributed vital individuals to the security of the United States and
every other nation in the world, the bottom line is that we have not
done enough.
One glaring concern is the lack of sufficient coordination inside
the U.S. Government in planning and implementing various
nonproliferation activities. Dozens of program offices in various
Federal agencies and departments, ranging from the State Department to
the Department of Agriculture, implement nonproliferation assistance
with little or no overarching strategic guidance. According to the
final report released by the Baker-Cutler Task Force:
In particular, the urgent risk of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction demands the attention of the highest level of
the U.S. Government. . . . Coordination within and among U.S.
Government agencies is insufficient and must be improved.
[Emphasis added.]
Let me give you a sense of the costs of the lack of sufficient
coordination within the U.S. Government on this issue. I'm not just
talking about program duplication and overlapping efforts, although
those are legitimate concerns which can be addressed by better
coordination. More critically, the absence of an overarching strategic
vision on U.S. nonproliferation efforts can result in missed
opportunities to neutralize emerging threats. It can prompt a timid
bureaucracy to ignore opportunities for enhanced cooperation with
foreign governments. We cannot be satisfied with our efforts to date so
long as some nuclear materials and chemical weapons storage sites and
former biological weapons production plans in the former Soviet Union
still have no more protection than padlocks or barbed wire fences.
To ensure that the Executive Branch creates, implements, and
manages nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union in a
coordinated fashion, S. 673 will establish an interagency committee
consisting of high-level representatives from the Departments of State,
Defense, Energy, and Commerce and chaired by a National Security
Council official. This committee shall prepare appropriate analyses and
provide the needed guidance to ensure appropriate monitoring of U.S.
nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union. I understand
the administration has implemented an interagency process on these
lines, but judging by the slow pace of its review of existing programs,
a committee that is empowered to make decisions would be a most
beneficial addition to the policy-making process. This bill would
provide such a committee and not leave the policy process so dependent
on individual personalities or temporary circumstances.
I encourage the Governmental Affairs Committee to move quickly,
therefore, on S. 673 and report this bill out for floor consideration.
Two weeks ago, the Foreign Relations Committee incorporated a slightly
revised text of S. 673 in marking up and passing the Security
Assistance Act.
Regardless of the specific legislative vehicle, it is my fervent
hope that the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act will become
law in the near future. We cannot talk seriously about homeland defense
or a war to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction if we
do not put in order our own efforts to work with the states of the
former Soviet Union to secure, safeguard, and reduce its stockpiles of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials.
Senator Akaka. And any Senator wishing to give a statement
or offer questions for the witnesses may do so. The record will
remain open for 1 week to do that.
Again, I want to say thanks so much for your responses and
your statements.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION
REGIMES, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2002
U.S. Senate,
International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services Subcommittee,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka, Thompson, Stevens, and Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
I want to thank our witnesses, Ms. Elisa Harris of the Center
for International and Security Studies at Maryland and Dr. Amy
Smithson of the Stimson Center for being with us this morning.
I want to also welcome Dr. Jim Walsh of the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs and Dennis Gormley of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Today's hearing about multilateral non-proliferation
regimes is the fourth of a series of hearings this Subcommittee
has held on the issue of weapons of mass destruction
proliferation. Last November the Subcommittee held a hearing on
current and future weapons of mass destruction and
proliferation threats and a second on combating proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction with non-proliferation programs.
This Subcommittee has jurisdiction over intergovernmental
relationships between the United States and international
organizations of which the United States is a member. In
holding today's hearing we will explore ways in which these
organizations may be used more effectively to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
the means to deliver them.
Since September 11 we have all become aware of the dangers
directly posed by these weapons. Attacks against the United
States are no longer in the realm of science fiction or
Hollywood. As technology evolves, these weapons threaten to
become even more deadly and more difficult to detect and to
prevent from being used. If we do not take September 11 as a
wake-up call history may well repeat itself with even more
terrible consequences. We must use every tool at our disposal
to deter the development and use of these weapons.
We know now that the al Qaeda network was busy trying to
develop biological, chemical and so-called dirty nuclear
weapons. These were not weapons that al Qaeda could develop on
its own--they needed access to foreign technology and foreign
scientists. Fortunately, so far it appears that they did not
get enough information to perfect these weapon systems before
we disrupted their efforts. This demonstrates why it is so
important that we choke off the proliferation of WMD technology
at its source--government labs and commercial enterprises.
Terrorists can gain access to weapons of mass destruction or
the technology to make them but they can only do so if foreign
governments or foreign scientists or foreign companies
willingly provide that information or technology to them.
Multilateral agreements are one way to prevent terrorists
from gaining weapons technology but multilateral regimes are
worthless if they are not effective. China, for example,
adheres to most of these agreements but as a recent
unclassified report to the Congress by the CIA notes, China
continues to provide missile-related technology to a variety of
countries of proliferation concern. The CIA cannot rule out
contacts by China with foreign nuclear weapons programs and
Chinese firms continue to supply chemical weapons production
equipment and technology to Iran.
If we cannot get countries to abide by the international
agreements they have adhered to, then our only alternative may
be to take unilateral action to prevent the spread of weapons
of mass destruction. This is not the preferred step but it may
be our only choice if multilateral agreements do not work.
I welcome our witnesses to today's hearing. I look forward
to their suggestions as to what works and what does not work in
our effort to control the spread of weapons of mass
destruction.
I want to welcome Senator Thompson this morning to this
hearing and ask him for his statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this hearing today. I think it is an extremely
important one. We, of course, these days are very concerned
about the terrorism problem, but it is really hand in hand with
the proliferation problem. At least 25 countries now possess--
or are in the process of acquiring and developing--capabilities
to inflict mass casualties and destruction--nuclear, biological
or chemical weapons or the means to deliver them. The nexus
between terrorism and proliferation is very disturbing.
The possibility that a terrorist organization will acquire
a weapon of mass destruction from one of the many countries
developing weapons of mass destruction capabilities is
increasing daily. According to a recent intelligence report,
several of the 30 designated foreign terrorist organizations
and other non-state actors worldwide have sought chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons. Many of these terrorists are
receiving assistance from countries of concern. Highlighting
this danger is the fact that our troops recently uncovered
rudimentary designs of a nuclear weapon in an al Qaeda facility
in Afghanistan.
The rapid spread of information and technology has greatly
complicated our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of
mass destruction. The information on chemical, biological and
even nuclear weapons is widely available on the Internet.
Multilateral nonproliferation regimes are one of several
tools that our country, and the global community at large, uses
to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Today we
will be discussing the strengths and weaknesses of those
regimes. These regimes are not perfect. Each has significant
shortcomings. Collectively, though, they have apparently made a
difference in slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
However, we should keep in mind that a multilateral
nonproliferation regime is only as effective as the strength of
each member's commitment to abide by the principles and rules
of the regime. Unfortunately, some regimes have members with
weak national export control systems that invariably permit
elicit technology transfers.
Despite being a member of all of the regimes that we will
discuss today, Russia, for example, has yet to develop an
effective national export control system. Russia's export
controls are still apparently incapable of preventing the
illicit transfer of WMD technologies.
Other regimes have members that are covertly seeking
weapons of mass destruction. Iran, for example, is a member of
the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, but has not
honored the commitments to either regime. Intelligence reports
tell us that Iran has manufactured and stockpiled chemical
weapons and aggressively sought biotechnical materials and
expertise for its offensive biological weapons program.
Compounding these problems is the fact that some regimes
have members that deliberately sell weapons of mass destruction
technologies to countries of concern. These suppliers, though
publicly supporting the aims of multilateral non-proliferation
regimes, are covertly selling dangerous technologies to rogue
states. The most flagrant example of this behavior is China's
WMD assistance to Pakistan. Though a member of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and a proclaimed adherent to the Missile
Technology Control Regime, China has armed Pakistan with
nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles to deliver them.
We must never assume that because a country is a member of
a multilateral non-proliferation regime that it will abide by
its commitments. To do so, would lead us to a false sense of
security. We must be cautious and diligent. And we must be
careful not to rely on those regimes as the sole means of
stopping the spread of WMD information and technology.
Moreover, it is critical that we effectively use our other
foreign policy tools, as well. Sanctions, national export
controls, foreign aid, and military force are just a few
examples of tools that could be used to address the growing
threat of WMD proliferation.
I am pleased that we have such a distinguished panel of
experts with us today to discuss these issues, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Thompson.
I have some brief questions for you. Before I ask you the
questions I would like to ask you for your statements. So will
Miss Harris please begin?
TESTIMONY OF ELISA D. HARRIS,\1\ RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY STUDIES
Ms. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my testimony this
morning I would like to address three issues, consistent with
your letter of invitation: First, the nature of the chemical
and biological weapons threat to the United States; second, the
impact of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention on this threat; and third, measures for
enhancing the effectiveness of these multilateral treaties in
preventing the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons
by both national and subnational--in other words, terrorist--
groups. I will summarize my prepared statement but would
request that the full text be included in the hearing record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Harris appears in the Appendix on
page 298.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Akaka. Without objection, it will be included.
Ms. Harris. Thank you. Prior to September 11 and the
subsequent anthrax attacks, the threat of national and
terrorist acquisition of chemical and biological weapons were
often seen as separate issues requiring separate solutions.
Now, however, we must recognize that these two proliferation
problems are closely linked in that assistance from national
programs is likely to be critical to terrorist efforts to
acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully.
According to the U.S. Government, about a dozen countries
are believed to have chemical weapons programs and at least 13
are said to be pursuing biological weapons. These national
programs pose a direct threat to U.S. military forces and to
our friends and allies in the two regions where the weapons are
proliferating--Northeast Asia and the Middle East. They also
pose an indirect threat because of their potential to serve as
a source of chemical and biological weapons expertise or
materials to other national or terrorist programs.
One cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that
terrorists will acquire chemical or biological weapons on their
own without assistance from a national program. But to date,
the three most significant terrorist incidents involving
chemical or biological weapons--the recent anthrax attacks
here, the Aum Shinriko CBW attacks and the Rajneeshee
salmonella attack--all suggest that assistance from national
programs is likely to be crucial to terrorist efforts to
acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully.
Of course, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and
the Chemical Weapons Convention have had some impact on these
national programs. But the 1972 BWC lacks enforcement
provisions and has been violated by a number of countries,
including the former Soviet Union, and more recently, Iraq.
Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has opposed efforts to
negotiate legally binding measures to strengthen enforcement
with the Convention.
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, by comparison,
contains the most extensive enforcement provisions ever
negotiated in the arms control area. But it, too, faces a
number of challenges in these first years of its
implementation.
Clearly steps can and should be taken to enhance the
effectiveness of and reinforce the prohibitions in each of
these treaties. In the time that I have left, I would like to
just mention a few of those steps.
First, with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention,
we should resume multilateral discussions on measures to
strengthen the BWC. Specifically, the United States should
abandon its opposition to multilateral discussions and agree at
the November 2002 continuation of the BWC review conference on
a process that will allow both U.S. proposals and other
proposals for strengthening the Convention to be explored.
Second, pending international agreement on legally binding
measures to strengthen the Convention, the United States should
support efforts to expand the U.N. Secretary General's
authority to investigate allegations of the development,
production or possession of biological weapons. Today the
Secretary General can only investigate the use of these
weapons. We should give him the power to investigate activities
prior to use.
Third, we should strengthen controls over dangerous
pathogens. The United States should take the lead in securing
tighter international controls on culture collections and other
repositories of biological materials. We should also work with
other countries to strengthen oversight of laboratories to
prevent either deliberate or inadvertent misapplications of
biotechnology research for destructive purposes.
And fourth, we should enhance oversight of the U.S.
biological defense program. Revelations that the United States
has produced weapons-grade anthrax and replicated a Soviet era
biological bomblet as part of its biological defense program
have raised questions both here and abroad about the nature and
scope of U.S. activities in this area. Today, there are no
comprehensive review mechanisms in place for these secret
biological defense activities. The U.S. Congress should hold
oversight hearings on the biological defense program to ensure
that its scientific, legal, and foreign policy impact is
consistent with U.S. non-proliferation interests.
With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, we should,
first, make adherence to the CWC an explicit foreign policy
goal. Libya's recent decision to join the Chemical Weapons
Convention demonstrates that even in complicated regions like
the Middle East there are opportunities for expanding
membership in this treaty. It is not unimaginable that North
Korea might agree to abandon its chemical weapons program and
join the convention as part of a broader security arrangement
on the Korean Peninsula. The United States should ensure that
CWC adherence is a prominent issue in its foreign policy toward
the key hold-out countries, including North Korea.
Second, we should be prepared to use challenge inspections
to address serious compliance concerns, especially in countries
where bilateral consultations have been either unsuccessful or
are not appropriate.
Third, we should devote the resources necessary to meet the
treaty's destruction deadlines. Both the United States and
Russia have indicated to the treaty organization that they will
be unable to meet the April 2007 deadline for destroying their
chemical weapon stocks. We should work with Russia and ensure
in our own case that adequate resources are devoted to meeting
this important obligation.
Fourth, we should rectify the budget problems in the treaty
organization for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Because of a
zero growth budget imposed on the OPCW over the past 5 years,
we are beginning another year millions of dollars short for
implementation. This has serious implications for the
verification activities of the OPCW. The United States should
work with the OPCW and other parties to ensure that there are
sufficient funds to carry out all planned verification
activities.
And finally, we can strengthen both conventions, both the
BWC and the CWC, by making it an international crime for
individuals to develop, possess or use chemical and biological
weapons. Both the BWC and the CWC impose legally binding
obligations on governments but not on individuals. The United
States should support the negotiation of a treaty that would
make it a crime under international law for individuals to
acquire or use chemical or biological weapons or to knowingly
assist others in doing so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
At this time I would like to call on Senator Cochran for
his statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am
pleased to join you in this hearing this morning and I thank
you for convening the hearing and assembling the witnesses that
we will hear from today.
This is a very interesting and troubling issue. I have been
frustrated over a period of time that our efforts to control
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other
items that threaten the security of the world have not been
more successful. We have these international agreements, these
so-called non-proliferation regimes, and it seems to me that in
most of the serious cases of proliferation these agreements are
ineffective to stop or even slow down the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction or the missile systems that could
be used to deliver them over long ranges.
So I am concerned if we continue to put our trust and faith
in that process, in those regimes, whether we are really
contributing to a false sense of security. I am curious to know
what the witnesses might say about alternatives to the regimes
and I just heard Ms. Harris, of course, point out a couple of
things that she thinks could be considered to improve the
effectiveness of the regimes.
It is this kind of suggestion I think we are looking for
this morning, not only observations and discussions of the
regimes themselves and what our practices have been in the
past. And if there have been successes, we need to think about
those. We do tend to focus probably on the ineffectiveness
rather than the good that the regimes may have done and that
would be useful for us, in order to have a balanced view.
So it is important and I do not know of any other issue
more serious to us as a country at this time, certainly coming
on the heels of the attacks that we have seen last year and the
concerns we have for future terrorism attacks against the
United States and our citizens.
So it is very timely and we appreciate very much the
cooperation of all of you to help make this hearing a success.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cochran follows:]
PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the
greatest threats our nation faces today, and will continue to face in
coming years. Countering that threat in order to ensure the security of
our citizens and deployed forces requires a variety of means, ranging
from diplomacy to intelligence to active and passive defenses, and even
to military action when necessary.
Nonproliferation regimes are important tools in this fight against
the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and their
delivery means. Unfortunately, despite the existence of regimes
covering all types of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of these
weapons to nations and even terrorist groups continues, as the CIA has
documented in its recent Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Consider Iran, for example. According to the CIA's report, despite
being a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran has
manufactured and stockpiled several thousand tons of chemical weapons,
comparable in size to Iraq's stockpile before the Gulf War. And the
Director of Central Intelligence told the Senate just last week that
Iran, despite being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, is at work now on a nuclear weapons and may succeed in
developing one in just a few years.
The extent to which these nonproliferation regimes can stop or slow
the proliferation of WMD remains to be seen. I look forward to hearing
our witnesses' views on how the effectiveness of these regimes can be
improved, and I commend the Chairman for calling this hearing to
examine this important issue.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.
I would like to then call on a statement from Dr. Smithson.
TESTIMONY OF AMY E. SMITHSON, Ph.D.,\1\ DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, HENRY L. STIMSON
CENTER
Ms. Smithson. Thank you. Adjusting policies and programs to
address the threat of terrorism is not easy. I would like to
thank this Subcommittee for looking beyond the obvious, for
holding a hearing that examines the utility of international
treaties in helping to assure this Nation's well-being.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Smithson appears in the Appendix
on page 304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arms control critics often deride treaties as weak
mechanisms that can be broken with impunity, yet these same
critics would hardly advocate scrapping U.S. laws against
murder even if those laws are broken with disturbing frequency.
Rather, they would call for better enforcement of the laws.
Even a good law is only as effective as its enforcement. Member
governments are the custodians of these treaties. As the
world's most powerful nation, the United States has a special
responsibility to lead efforts to enforce them.
Despite what you might have heard, terrorists are likely to
have difficulty overcoming the technical hurdles associated
with acquiring a capability to inflict mass casualties with
chemical and biological weapons. Therefore one key to keeping
such weapons out of their hands is to tackle the proliferation
problem at the national level. Treaties such as the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention are intended to compel governments to abandon their
weapons programs.
Moreover, full and effective implementation of these
treaties applies to the subnational actor security threat in
three important ways. First, the fewer governments that
maintain chemical or biological weapons programs, the fewer
places terrorists can turn to for help with weapons materials
and expertise.
Second, the CWC, but not at present the BWC, requires
states to outlaw offensive weapons activities domestically. The
CWC approaches its fifth anniversary with 145 members, all now
obligated to have enacted penal laws that hold individuals
accountable.
Third, treaties can block weapons proliferation via the
incorporation of export controls. Three years after the CWC was
activated, treaty members were barred from trading so-called
Schedule II chemicals with countries that had not joined.
Should the CWC's members decide this fall to apply export
controls to the more widely traded Schedule III chemicals,
states that remain outside of this treaty would incur
tremendous economic hardship. Moreover, the CWC would have
significantly amplified the practice of multilateral export
controls by having almost five times the number of countries in
the Australia Group enforce export controls on hundreds of
chemicals.
As you know, midway through 2001 the Bush Administration
rejected the draft BWC monitoring protocol, a decision with
which I agree. My agreement is based on the advice of 35
technical experts, top-notch experts from the U.S.
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, research
institutes, universities, defense contractors, and veterans of
the two U.S. trial inspections to see how the BWC could be
monitored. There are a number of reasons why this protocol
should have been rejected, which I will be delighted to
elaborate on in Q and A.
In November of this past year the Bush Administration
proposed several alternatives to monitor the BWC, some of which
are downright puzzling. For example, putting investigations of
suspicious disease outbreaks and alleged biowarfare incidents
in the hands of the U.N. Secretary General suffers the same
handicap as the current structure; namely, the possible
politicization and delay of challenge inspections.
Another baffling proposal involves voluntary nonchallenge
visits. Not to mince words, but why would a BWC violator invite
inspectors into its midst unless it had taken extreme care to
clean up all evidence of cheating prior to issuing the
invitation?
The Bush Administration also advanced proposals with
significant merit, as Mrs. Harris has described, to strengthen
the security of access to pathogenic microorganisms, to have
governments oversee high-risk experiments with pathogens, to
establish professional scientific codes of conduct, to improve
disease surveillance, and to require BWC members to pass
legislation criminalizing offensive bioweapons activities. The
common downfall of these proposals is that the Bush
Administration would leave it to each of the BWC's 141 members
to set their own domestic standard; to wit, country A could
enact a criminalization law with slap-on-the-wrist penalties
while country B puts in place a stiff penal code.
As for the CWC, which has enjoyed a relatively strong
launch in its first 5 years, this treaty clearly could be
working better. One need only ask a U.S. official or discretely
circulate among the treaty's cognoscenti to hear whispers of
compliance problems, yet no challenge inspections have been
requested to address these concerns. The reasons for these
circumstances lie largely in how the United States has
implemented this treaty.
When the Senate gave its advice and consent to the CWC's
ratification and Congress passed the treaty's implementing
legislation, the bills were spiked with exemptions that
deprived the inspectors of their two strongest tools; namely,
challenge inspections and laboratory analysis of samples.
Officials from other nations, including Russia and China, have
privately told me that their countries would not hesitate to
cite the U.S. exemptions to hold inspectors at bay.
In this day and age it would be foolhardy to neglect any
viable mechanism that can reduce the threat of weapons of mass
destruction. I will conclude with a few recommendations to
improve the performance of these treaties.
I would ask that Congress and the Bush Administration waste
no time in taking the appropriate steps to see that the CWC is
fully implemented and that all reasonable efforts are made to
strengthen the BWC with a panoply of monitoring tools. U.S.
policymakers must push this year to add Schedule III chemicals
to the export control list and also overturn the aforementioned
exemptions, restoring full power to the CWC's inspectors.
Please give these inspectors a fighting chance to catch treaty
violators. Otherwise the United States will have no one to
blame but itself for this treaty's weakened condition.
Second, Congress should insist that the Bush Administration
fulfil Public Law 106-113 and conduct BWC monitoring trials at
various sites. Should such trials show that meaningful
monitoring results can be achieved at a tolerable cost, then
regular or random nonchallenge inspections would be far
preferable to the proposed voluntary visits. Moreover, to have
a chance of being effective, challenge inspections must be as
automatic and as distanced as possible from politics.
Finally, to make the other BWC monitoring proposals more
effective, the United States should add tough standards that
make the desired changes reasonably uniform, not hit or miss.
Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Smithson.
Dr. Walsh, your statement, please.
TESTIMONY OF JIM WALSH, Ph.D.,\1\ RESEARCH FELLOW, BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Walsh. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to speak to you
today about an issue that I think is of singular importance to
U.S. national security, and that is nuclear terrorism. What I
would like to do in my brief remarks is focus on three of the
questions that I raise in my written testimony. Those questions
are: First, are multilateral nuclear treaties effective?
Second, where do multilateral treaties fit in a broader
strategy against nuclear terrorism? And finally third, what is
the role for Congress?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh appears in the Appendix on
page 313.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Let us begin with the first question: Are multilateral
nuclear regimes effective? Of course, multilateral nuclear
institutions come in a variety of forms. Some are treaties,
like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.
Others are informal multilateral groups like the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, while still others, like UNSCOM and KEDO, are
at hoc agencies that were developed in response to a particular
crisis.
Now, of course, creating a multilateral institution is one
thing but having an effective multilateral institution is quite
something else. Some multilateral institutions have been
tremendous successes while others have been abject failures.
How are we to judge the regime, the nuclear regime and the way
it has performed? I would like to take just a minute and look
in particular at the role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and related regime components and their effect on the
spread of nuclear weapons around the world.
After 50 years the most striking feature of the nuclear age
is that there are so few nuclear weapon states, far fewer than
predicted by virtually every expert and every policy-maker. As
one observer noted, ``Almost all published predictions of the
spread of nuclear weapons have turned out to be too
pessimistic.'' Perhaps the most famous or infamous prediction
of nuclear proliferation was offered by President John F.
Kennedy. Kennedy warned that in 10 years--this was back in the
early 1960's--that in 10 years an additional 21 countries might
develop nuclear weapons. And published work at the time from
universities, from think-tanks and defense intelligence
estimates endorsed that prediction. As one commentator put it,
``The belief was common that the nuclear spread has proceeded
and would continue to proceed as fast as the technology would
take it.'' The French military theorist Pierre Gallois observed
that proliferation was as irreversible as the generalization of
fire arms.
Yet the results have been far different than those
predictions. An overwhelming majority of nuclear-capable
countries have opted to forego nuclear weapons and, over time,
the rate of proliferation has actually declined. Let me repeat
that, that the rate of proliferation has actually declined.
After peaking in the 1960's the number of new nations joining
the nuclear club each decade has gone steadily downhill and
several nations that built or inherited nuclear weapons--South
Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan--chose to renounce
their nuclear weapons.
When in history, asked one scholar, have so many nations
had the capability to produce a powerful weapon and chosen not
to exercise it? Indeed, I would argue that the absence of
widespread proliferation may be the greatest unheralded public
policy success of the 20th Century.
A key factor in the success was the establishment of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Archival documents,
interviews with former country leaders and a general pattern of
state behavior suggests that the NPT had a decisive impact on
the spread of nuclear weapons.
Now it should be emphasized that the nuclear non-
proliferation regime is not a magic bullet. Several factors in
addition to the NPT have contributed to nuclear restraint and,
like any policy instrument, the non-proliferation regime
suffers from imperfections and trade-offs. The record suggests,
however, that many of those earlier predictions of widespread
proliferation would have come true in the absence of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Let me turn to the second question. How can these
multilateral instruments fit into a broader strategy to reduce
the risk of nuclear terrorism? It seems to me that any strategy
to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism should recognize at
least two principles. The first principle is that the United
States is only as secure as the weakest link in international
security. Applied to the issue of nuclear terrorism, what that
means is that the security of nuclear materials and nuclear
technology is determined not by the level of security at the
most protected facilities but rather, by the level of security
at the least protected facilities.
The second principle, and I think it is self-evident, is
that it is better to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons
of mass destruction than trying to stop them after they have
already gotten them.
Together these principles suggest that in the field of WMD
terrorism, homeland security begins abroad. The United States
has to improve its level of domestic security--I think that is
obvious--particularly in the areas of aviation and infectious
disease, but that will not be enough. We cannot wait for
terrorists to acquire nuclear materials and then try to stop
them once they are bound for America on their deadly mission.
Instead, homeland defense abroad suggests five policy
objectives. One, prevent and otherwise reduce the number of
nuclear weapon states. Two, reduce the number of states with
stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Three,
secure all remaining nuclear weapons materials and facilities.
Four, increase the number of area and interstate nuclear
checkpoints. And five, develop the capacity to quickly identify
and trace nuclear materials.
All of these objectives lend themselves to multilateral
regimes. These regimes provide a way to build the first line of
defense against nuclear terrorism. Moreover, they do so in a
way that is financially and politically prudent. The United
States cannot singlehandedly improve the security of all the
world's nuclear installations. Such a task is neither
financially nor politically feasible. Working with other
nations through multilateral nuclear regimes provides a
practical alternative for reducing the threat of nuclear
terrorism.
Finally, let me turn to the third question: What is the
role of Congress? And here I am going to talk about nuclear
terrorism in particular and I can talk more generally about
non-proliferation in the Q and A if there is interest there.
There are a number of actions that Congress might take to
reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. These legislative
responses fall generally into one of three categories:
Oversight, appropriations, and policy innovation. Let me
briefly touch on each of these.
First, oversight. Congressional oversight can be a powerful
tool for change. Hearings, annual reporting requirements and
appropriations tied to certification can focus the attention of
the executive, the bureaucracy and the public. Given the events
of the last several months, there are a number of things
Congress might do in this area and I will just name one here.
Congress should insist on all available information about
nuclear terrorism. Congress cannot fulfill its legislative
responsibilities without such information and yet much of it is
scattered or being withheld from the public domain. A variety
of news organizations, including the Times of London and CNN,
have their own cache of documents collected from al Qaeda
safehouses and training facilities. Meanwhile, the Department
of Defense and various executive agencies have their own set, a
separate set of documents, as well as the results of prisoner
interviews and the results of forensics tests. Most of this
information can be made available without endangering sources
and methods.
This is a small but critical step in the fight against
nuclear terrorism. The history of WMD terrorism suggests that
it is self-defeating for the executive to maintain a monopoly
over information. Most of the important nuclear initiatives of
recent years have had their origins outside the executive--in
Congress, for example, with cooperative threat reduction, in
university research centers, and with nongovernmental
organizations.
If Congress is going to pursue new approaches to WMD
terrorism and if scholars are going to provide independent
assessments of the dangers and opportunities, then Congress has
to take the lead in seeing that the relevant information is
available.
Second, appropriations. Progress against nuclear terrorism
will not be possible without financial resources.
Unfortunately, efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism have not
been a funding priority. This year billions of dollars will be
devoted to new weapon systems and other activities whose
purpose is to respond to a terrorist attack and yet only a tiny
fraction of this amount will be expended on efforts that would
prevent WMD terrorism from taking place in the first place.
In the past, Congress has used its power over the purse to
ensure that funds were devoted to the problem of nuclear
terrorism even in the face of executive and bureaucratic
indifference. Today the need for Congressional leadership is
stronger than ever before. With rising deficits and a long list
of interests lining up for their share of the anti-terrorism
funds, this will not be easy. But success in the fight against
nuclear terrorism depends on continued leadership from
Congress. Congress must find a way not only to fund efforts to
prevent nuclear terrorism but fund them at a scale commensurate
with the size of the problem--at a scale commensurate with the
size of the problem.
Finally and quickly, third, policy innovation. One of the
most exciting areas where Congress can contribute to nuclear
security is in the field of policy innovation. For reasons of
time let me simply list some of these areas.
One, internationalizing the concept of cooperative threat
reduction beyond the Soviet Union. Cooperative threat reduction
started out of the Congress, started out of the Senate, and it
seems to me that this has been a successful innovative program,
not without problems but nevertheless successful and
innovative, that can be expanded beyond the former Soviet
Union.
Two, developing world-wide civil constituencies for nuclear
security. During the Cold War, the United States pursued a
variety of initiatives to promote democracy around the world
and to defeat communism. It set up a special institute to
support democratic institutions abroad, established Radio Free
Europe, and funded a variety of programs whose purpose was to
develop a constituency for democratic governance. Congress
later used this tactic in support of a different objective when
it established the private U.S. Institute for Peace. For its
own part, the executive has established a series of special
funds; for example, the special fund on AIDS in Africa.
These same tactics can be applied to the new problem of
nuclear security. Congress could, for example, establish a
foundation or an institute for the prevention of WMD terrorism.
Acting as a private entity, this institute could train and
support the development of professional nuclear societies,
journalists and locally-based environmental groups and others
from other countries, from foreign nations, and then these
people could go and monitor the state of nuclear security and
press for improvements in their own country, much as we did the
same thing in our fight against communism decades ago.
Third, Congress might look at the establishment of
legislator-to-legislator dialogue with legislators from other
countries on this issue of nuclear terrorism and WMD terrorism.
This list of initiatives is obviously not exhaustive.
Instead, it is meant to illustrate how Congress might approach
the question of policy innovation. Simply put, it makes sense
for Congress to think about policy instruments it has used in
other issue domains and how they might be creatively applied in
the new context of nuclear terrorism.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, it has been a
great honor to speak with you today. In my testimony I have
suggested that multilateral regimes have proven to be effective
and that they can be even more effective if considered as part
of a broader strategy against nuclear and WMD terrorism. This
strategy, premised on the notion that homeland security begins
abroad, seeks to prevent terrorism at the source, to stop
terrorists before they reach our shores.
September 11 was a wake-up call, as the Chairman rightly
said. It is history grabbing us by the collar and telling us to
act now before it is too late. No institution has shown more
vision, steadfastness or creativity on the problem of WMD
terrorism than the U.S. Senate but recent events clearly
demonstrate that additional action is required. My hope and
expectation is that the Senate will respond to this challenge
as it has responded to the challenges of the past and that
America will be a stronger and more secure Nation as a result.
Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Walsh.
Before I ask for Mr. Gormley's statement I would like to
ask Senator Stevens for his statement.
Senator Stevens. I am sorry to be late, Mr. Chairman. I had
another meeting. I have no opening statement.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Mr. Gormley, your statement,
please.
TESTIMONY OF DENNIS M. GORMLEY,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
Mr. Gormley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
offer my suggestions on ways to enhance the Missile Technology
Control Regime to cope with the prospects of weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of both state and nonstate actors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Gormley appears in the Appendix
on page 322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I fear we have fallen short in adapting the MTCR to cope
with rapid changes in the technologies underlying WMD delivery.
The most egregious shortcoming is in the way the MTCR is ill
prepared to deal with the next great missile proliferation
threat, that of land attack cruise missiles. Concern about the
spread of land attack cruise missiles is driven by two
realities. First, the quantum leap in dual use technologies
supporting cruise missile development, and these include
satellite navigation and guidance, high resolution satellite
imagery from a host of commercial vendors, unregulated flight
management systems for converting manned aircraft into unmanned
aerial vehicles, and digital mapping technologies for mission
planning.
And second, the fact that the 33-nation missile technology
control regime is much less effective at controlling the spread
of cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles than ballistic
missiles. To be sure, ballistic missiles receive top priority
because they are already widely proliferated while land attack
cruise missiles have only begun to emerge as a threat, but that
is precisely the reason why improved controls on cruise
missiles are so critical now. Were the gaping deficiencies in
the way the current MTCR provisions handle cruise missile
transfers eliminated, the MTCR could conceivably do as well
with cruise missiles as it has with controlling the spread of
highly sophisticated ballistic missiles.
So far, ballistic missile technology that has spread is
largely 50-year-old SCUD technology, a derivative of World War
II German V-2 systems. Many of the weaknesses of this
technology can be exploited by missile defenses.
It is equally important to say what has not spread because
of the MTCR--sophisticated Pershing-2 technology with terrain
contour guidance and maneuvering reentry vehicles, as embodied
in Argentina's and Iraq's forestalled Condor missile program,
which would have greatly stressed today's missile defenses. My
prepared statement goes into some detail on ways to repair the
regime but let me offer just two stark examples of what might
very well occur absent essential reforms.
First, whereas today's MTCR has hindered advanced ballistic
missile sales, ambiguities surrounding the ground rules for
determining the true range and payload of cruise missiles
threatens to open the floodgates of advanced cruise missile
sales. This would be the equivalent of uncontrolled sales of
Pershing-2 missiles to states outside the MTCR membership.
Second, perhaps the gravest near-term terrorist threat of
exploiting cruise missile technology lies in transforming
manned kit airplanes into unmanned and armed weapons carriers.
There is a dizzying array of kit airplanes in today's
marketplace. A simple Internet search recently produced close
to 100,000 copies of about 425 systems in a growing worldwide
market.
But the biggest challenge in transforming these kit
airplanes into unmanned attack means involves the design and
integration of a flight management system. At present, MTCR
controls fail to deal with an emerging phenomenon of small
aerospace firms getting into the business of selling flight
management systems for transforming manned into unmanned air
vehicles. The mind spins with scenarios of such unmanned
systems, which are ideal means for disseminating biological
agents threatening both domestic and overseas targets.
Essential MTCR reform will be impossible without the
determined leadership of senior Executive Branch
decisionmakers, as well as a more rigorous and consistent
management of the interagency process by the National Security
Council. Leaders of key MTCR states, spurred by U.S.
leadership, must come together to convince the broad
partnership of the benefits of enhanced MTCR controls on cruise
missile proliferation.
It is important to recall President Reagan's original
objective in announcing the MTCR in 1987, ``Hindering, not
eliminating the spread of missiles capable of delivering mass
destruction weapons.'' However imperfect the MTCR has been as a
non-proliferation mechanism, it has hindered the spread of the
most advanced and pernicious forms of ballistic missiles,
making ballistic missile defenses more conceivable. It needs to
do as well with cruise missiles. Letting cruise missiles
proliferate will ultimately not only present its own set of
unique demands from a cruise missile defense standpoint but
will make effective ballistic missile defenses more costly and
demanding, too. That is simply because in many respects they
use the same interceptors. Patriot-3 is one good example.
We need to spend far less time expanding MTCR membership
and writing an international code of conduct, which shamelessly
neglects to include cruise missiles in its language, and much
more time reforming and adapting the regime to cope with
technological change and new missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Gormley. We do have
questions.
I would like to ask Ms. Harris, the first question. There
has been an on-going debate on the question of mass attack with
biological weapons. Before September 11 and the anthrax
attacks, U.S. military and nongovernment experts agreed that
for some time to come terrorist groups are unlikely to have
sufficient expertise and resources to succeed in a mass attack
with biological weapons. Do you believe this statement?
Ms. Harris. Mr. Chairman, I think that assessment is still
valid, with one caveat, and that is assuming terrorists do not
get assistance from a national biological or chemical weapons
program. The technical and operational hurdles to terrorists
acquiring these capabilities on their own are really very
substantial.
The worrying thing, as both the President and Secretary
Rumsfeld have emphasized in recent weeks, is the possibility of
assistance from a national program to one of these terrorist
groups. This nexus between proliferation and terrorism really
is the issue that we should be focusing on--to prevent national
programs from being a source of assistance to terrorists'
chemical and biological acquisition efforts.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Smithson, the administration has pointed
to the failed UNSCOM inspections in Iraq as evidence of how
even the most invasive inspections cannot stem biological
weapon development and production. Do you agree?
Ms. Smithson. No, sir, I do not agree with that position,
the reason being that I have spent quite a bit of time in the
company of those very UNSCOM inspectors. They have told me that
virtually from the minute they walked into facilities, like Al
Hakum and Salman Pak, they knew they were in the midst of an
offensive biological weapons program. The same would hold true
for the inspectors who first went over to the former Soviet
facilities under what is known as the Trilateral Agreement.
This also is the case with what U.S. pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industry experts told me, and their views are
presented in the Stimson Center report ``House of Cards.''
So I think UNSCOM actually caught the Iraqi bioweapons
program quickly, but did not come up with hard proof until very
late in the game. So I would think there should be constructive
measures that might be put in place to monitor the BWC.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Dr. Walsh, Iraq nearly completed building nuclear weapons
despite IAEA inspections. There have been questions about
IAEA's capabilities. Can current IAEA inspections detect
clandestine nuclear programs?
Dr. Walsh. It is an excellent question, Mr. Chairman, and I
think when you look at the history of the non-proliferation
regime what you see is, as in a lot of domains in life,
something bad happens and then it is followed by something
good. Something bad happens and it focuses attention, creates
the political will, and then we have an improvement.
When the NPT first came into force in 1970, it had no
enforcement provisions, none. Subsequent to that we have had a
series of arms control and other agreements that have become
progressively more intrusive and therefore have given us
greater transparency, a better look inside countries to see, in
fact, if they are violating agreements.
Now, in the case of Iraq, I think it is absolutely right
that IAEA failed us, in part because they did not make use of
the powers that they already possessed. They could have done
more without having written an additional protocol but they
failed to use those powers.
Following Iraq, however, I think we have seen a reform of
IAEA. There are still improvements to be made but you will
remember that following Iraq we had the 93 Plus two protocol
that would have established environmental monitoring and now
there are a number of states who have joined that additional
protocol.
So, in response to Iraq, we developed new procedures and
technologies to improve our ability to detect violations of the
treaty. You also will have noticed that after Iraq, IAEA was
much more aggressive and part of the reason why we knew about
the North Korean problems, and were able to intervene to freeze
that program, was because of the work of IAEA.
I think also it would be unfair to say that IAEA was the
only one responsible for negligence in the Iraqi case.
Declassified documents indicate that a number of countries had
suspicions about Iraq's nuclear behavior in the 1970's but for
political reasons--animosity towards Iran after the hostage
crisis, that sort of thing--many countries looked the other
way. They knew what was going on but they looked the other way
because they were more focused on Iran than Iraq. That was a
decision that came back to haunt them.
So in summary, it was more than IAEA that failed us in Iraq
but since then there have been a number of administrative and
technical steps that have bolstered and strengthened the
regime.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Gormley, your testimony mentions the challenge of
determining cruise missile range and payload and how the range
of cruise missiles may be changed with little apparent
modification to its air frame. The question is could these
challenges be addressed through an inspection regime?
Mr. Gormley. That is a very good question and one I had not
much thought about but it seems to me that an inspection regime
with sufficient scrutiny would certainly provide one with
enough information about the sheer volume of the missile and
the relationship between the true payload and the amount of
space earmarked for fuel. Then the calculation of range is a
relatively straightforward one, assuming various launch
altitudes, which account for the difficulty with cruise
missiles compared with ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile
is a ground-to-ground system and it is a simple determination
of maximum range trajectory. In the case of a cruise missile,
it can be launched from the ground and fly at a low altitude
but because it is an aerodynamic vehicle, it can also fly at
higher altitudes where the fuel efficiency is much greater.
So the calculation based on an inspection with some
scrutiny would certainly allow you to provide enough
information to determine the true range capability of a cruise
missile.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
I call on Senator Thompson.
Senator Thompson. I will defer to Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. I yield to you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Thompson. Thank you very much.
Let me ask both Miss Harris and Miss Smithson for an
interchange about the issues concerning the chemical and
biological weapons conventions. I get the impression, Miss
Harris, that you think the United States should have signed on
to the recommendations of the November 2001 review conference.
I get the impression, Miss Smithson, you really do not
think that they should have and perhaps the United States is
not going far enough in terms of the issues of verification.
Here, as in other areas, it seems like we have a lot of
nations who have signed on and a lot of nations who are in
violation to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It seems we have
a better system of verification apparently than we have with
the Biological Weapons Convention. I would be interested in
elaborating a little bit more about the distinction, why that
distinction is extant, what you think about it, what we might
do differently and, as I indicated, your view of the United
States position with regard to the 2001 review conference. If
either one of you would like to comment.
Ms. Harris. Thank you, Senator. I think the key difference
we have to start with between the Biological Weapons Convention
and the Chemical Weapons Convention is that the BWC has no
enforcement provisions and the Chemical Weapons Convention has
extensive enforcement provisions--requirements for
declarations, routine visits to facilities that are covered by
the treaty and challenge inspections.
Today, we have no ability to pursue concerns that another
country is developing or producing or stockpiling biological
weapons.
Senator Thompson. If I could stop you there, how did that
come about? That does not make any sense to the average person
who is unfamiliar with the background. It might help for both
or either of you to explain to people why an area that seems
nowadays to be much more dangerous, and that is biological, why
would anyone enter into an agreement that had absolutely no
verification requirements at all.
Ms. Harris. I think it is very unlikely that any country
would enter into an agreement now that had no enforcement
mechanisms, but we have to remember the BWC was negotiated in
the late 1960's and early 1970's. When it was concluded in
1972, it was the first treaty to outlaw an entire category of
weapons. It was completed during the Cold War, at a time when
arms control and the accompanying verification provisions were
really in their infancy. To the extent that there were
verification provisions being pursued, they were on the nuclear
side, and relied primarily on national technical means.
At the time, it was viewed as simply not feasible to
consider anything more intrusive in terms of verification
arrangements. It was also deemed to be technically quite
difficult.
So I think one needs to look at the BWC in the context of
the time in which it was negotiated, these political
environments and what was deemed to be possible, both
technically and politically, in terms of verification.
Senator Thompson. The question is, as it always is, whether
or not it is better to enter into something that might give you
a false sense of security rather than having nothing at all.
Ms. Harris. I think the decision made by President Nixon in
1969 was the right one, which was that biological weapons
offered few military advantages to a major military power such
as the United States, but if they were to spread to other
countries, they could challenge and degrade our military
capabilities. So despite the political and technical
difficulties of verifying a BW ban, the Nixon Administration
decided to go forward with this treaty.
Senator Thompson. Would you move on to these other points,
please, that we raised?
Ms. Harris. Certainly. As I said a moment ago, today we
have no ability to enforce compliance with the BWC. The whole
point of the Biological Weapons Convention protocol was to try
to put in place enforcement mechanisms that, while not
providing high confidence ability to detect cheating, would
nevertheless make it harder, more costly and more risky for
countries to violate their obligations under this treaty.
So the goal was not to catch every cheater but instead, to
try to deter this illicit activity and to get information that
could help inform our own decisions about biological defense
activities, export controls, etc. Because the objective was
more modest--deterrence rather than verification--the set of
measures that were pursued in the negotiations were more modest
than those in the Chemical Weapons Convention. This meant
declarations of the facilities most likely to be misused for BW
purposes rather than all relevant faculties, on-site visits
rather than routine inspections and the possibility of
challenge inspections.
Senator Thompson. Ms. Smithson.
Ms. Smithson. You are correct in detecting a difference of
our opinions. I would argue that the draft BWC protocol should
have been rejected simply because it could not perform as
advertised.
Let me give you an example. One of the provisions that the
technical experts that sat around my table had problems with
was the idea that a nonchallenge visit would deploy four
inspectors for 2 days. One of the industry experts who
participated in this exercise, Dr. Steve Projan, who is the
director of antibacterial research at Wyeth-Ayerst Research,
summed up his views of this particular provision by saying,
``Four inspectors for 2 days couldn't even get through all the
bathrooms at my facility.''
Now what these experts told me is that they do believe it
is possible to craft monitoring provisions that can tell the
good guys from the bad guys, and I believe them because this is
one of the most heavily regulated industries in the world. They
know their way around inspections. They also believed that it
was possible to manage the risks of those inspections to
protect confidential or proprietary business information. That
is why they urged the Executive Branch, and they urge you to
ask the Executive Branch, to fulfill the public law that
requires additional research and field trials in this area. The
resulting data should inform the U.S. position in future
negotiations.
Ms. Harris. Senator, could I just add one point? While Amy
and I disagree on the value of the draft Biological Weapons
Convention protocol, I think the one thing we would both agree
on is that the Bush Administration has made a mistake in
rejecting any subsequent multilateral process for trying to
develop a stronger, legally binding regime to strengthen the
convention.
So whatever differences we have on the protocol, I think we
both feel that it is critically important for the United States
to support the resumption of international efforts to try to
develop legally binding enforcement mechanisms for this treaty,
which we both believe are possible.
Senator Thompson. My time is up, but what is that issue,
Miss Smithson? What is the procedural issue there and what
reason does the administration give for not proceeding with
trying to get a better deal?
Ms. Smithson. Perhaps you can ask that question directly of
Under Secretary of State Bolton, who essentially rained on the
party. He called the negotiations quits. There is a 1-year
hiatus here. I hope that the United States uses that year to
get its act together, to do the technical field work necessary
to come to the negotiating table with a well informed
negotiating position.
At this point, I think the jury is out. We really do not
know whether or not this treaty can be monitored but these are
such odious weapons that we ought to give it our best shot.
Senator Thompson. Whether or not anyone will agree to have
them monitored.
Ms. Smithson. Well, sir, I would remind you that 145
countries have signed up for the tremendously strict monitoring
provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, so sometimes it
can surprise you what countries will agree to.
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, one of the ways we have
tried to enforce agreements and to convince countries they
should not engage in proliferation activities is the use of
economic sanctions. To what extent do you think these have been
effective? Are there any instances where you know that the
imposition of sanctions have worked to help diminish the threat
caused by proliferation? Mr. Gormley, let us start with you.
Mr. Gormley. In my view, I think there is room for and a
strong utility for the implementation of sanctions.
Unfortunately, the history of the use of sanctions in regard to
missile proliferation has been notably weak.
Do I think there is room for improvement? I think one might
look at ways of standardizing the best provisions of the
existing law to create more targeted and calibrated sanctions
that are precisely focused on the issue of trying to take the
profit out of proliferation. This requires identifying those
particular entities and imposing costs on those entities that
outweigh the benefits of sanctionable activity that has
occurred.
So I think there is some room for improvement, but I think
the record from 1990, with the implementation of the first
Export Administration Act and more recently in 1996, with the
Arms Export Control Act, the evidence is not strong that it has
been terribly effective at impeding missile proliferation.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Walsh.
Dr. Walsh. Sanctions have not been a frequent part of the
nuclear non-proliferation regime but they have been used on
occasion. You will remember after the Indian nuclear test in
1974 there were a series of sanctions imposed by individual
countries and again after the 1998 tests in South Asia, Japan
and to some extent by the United States placed economic
sanctions against the parties. Those were later withdrawn.
I think sanctions can be useful. You want to be able to
send the message to potential proliferators that if they cross
the line there will be consequences to their behavior. And when
people do cross the line you do want to punish them so that
future proliferators see what those consequences will be.
I am an advocate of smart sanctions. I think that when it
comes to nuclear proliferation the key question is who is
sitting around the table? Who are the decisionmakers and what
are their interests? When it comes to nuclear weapons the
decisionmakers tend to be the country leader, the military, the
scientific bureaucracy, typically the nuclear agency, and
sometimes there are players on the side. And they are
struggling with this question: Is this nuclear weapons program
in my interests or not, not only from a national security
standpoint but from the standpoint of bureaucratic interests?
Do I, as the head of my nuclear agency in Country X, am I going
to do better or do worse if we pursue nuclear weapons?
Sometimes these people have concluded they will do better
budget-wise, jurisdiction-wise, etc., and have voted in favor
of pursuing nuclear weapons.
I think one of the things we can do with sanctions is not
only send the message that if you cross this line you will be
punished but also make them smart, targeted sanctions so they
affect the interests at the table as decisionmakers sit around
and try to decide their nuclear future.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Smithson.
Ms. Smithson. The main sanction that has come into play
with efforts to retard the proliferation of chemical and
biological weapons would be economic sanctions. In the mid-
1980's a number of countries, led by Australia, formed an
export control cooperative known as the Australia Group, which
controls now a lengthy list of chemical precursors, chemical
and biological equipment, as well as pathogens and other
diseases that could be used to inflict harm on animals, humans
or crops.
The Chemical Weapons Convention has amplified the Australia
Group's effectiveness many times over when it comes to the
control of chemical weapons precursors.
There is a role for sanctions, although I have to concede
that since I do not see classified information, I do not know
exactly how effective these sanctions have been. However, I
hear a number of government officials arguing that these are
efforts well worthwhile.
Senator Cochran. Ms. Harris.
Ms. Harris. Senator, I would make three points with respect
to sanctions. First, I believe, having been involved in
sanctions decisions over the course of 8 years in the Clinton
Administration, that sanctions are most effective before they
are imposed, when they can be used as a tool to try to
influence state behavior, to try to influence governments to
tighten up their export controls so as to prevent the transfer
of sensitive WMD-related technologies.
Second, sanctions are most effective when they are applied
broadly by the international community, rather than by the
United States alone.
And third, they are most effective when they give the
Executive Branch the flexibility to defer the imposition of
sanctions in order to work with the government of jurisdiction
to try to put a stop to the transfers of concern and to put in
place stronger domestic mechanisms to prevent such transfers in
the future.
Senator Cochran. Its been several years now since the
Chemical Weapons Convention has been in force. One of the
provisions is to permit challenge inspections of suspected
activities or facilities. Why hasn't that been used? Why hasn't
that right to ask for challenge inspections been used? And do
you think it would be appropriate, since according to
unclassified intelligence reports that we have talked about,
there are suspected activities, there are suspected facilities,
why not use that provision of the treaty to try to find out
what is going on and put a stop to it under the terms of that
treaty? Dr. Smithson.
Ms. Smithson. Actually, I would argue that the reason
challenge inspections have not been used or one of the main
reasons is that we have shot ourselves in the foot. There was
an exemption passed with the implementing legislation on this
treaty that gives the President the right to refuse a challenge
inspection on the grounds that it might threaten U.S. national
security. Well, according to the article in the treaty that
governs challenge inspections, that option is not there. So
what this exception does is it allows other governments to use
a loophole that we ourselves have created.
I mentioned that Chinese and Russian officials have told me
they are delighted at this turn of events, that they would be
able to say hey, you challenge us; well, we refuse the
challenge because it would threaten our national security.
So we have kind of made this an impotent tool and that, I
think, is definitely not in U.S. interests, which is why I
argued that this exemption and the exemption on analysis of
samples must be overturned if we are to restore full powers to
these inspectors.
Senator Cochran. Dr. Walsh, do you have an observation
about that question?
Dr. Walsh. No, sir, I do not. Only to say that I would like
to see us break that barrier and for them to be a more regular
feature of arms control and international multilateral
treaties. I would like to see more challenge inspections. That
was the issue around Iraq. IAEA had the power to do more and
they did not use it. They became much more aggressive in North
Korea and I would like to see that same level of aggressiveness
in other areas, as well.
Senator Cochran. Ms. Harris.
Ms. Harris. Senator, I think the situation with respect to
the Chemical Weapons Convention and challenge inspections is
rather more complicated than has been suggested here. There
are, in fact, a number of reasons why challenge inspections
were not utilized in the first few years after the treaty
entered into force, which was in 1997.
First, here in the United States, we were very much focused
on our own implementation of the treaty--passing implementing
legislation, preparing our declarations, ensuring that on a
national basis we were meeting our treaty obligations.
Second, the international implementing organization, the
OPCW, also was focused in the initial years on verifying the
initial declarations by countries, verifying the beginning of
destruction activities and, quite frankly, was not prepared
technically to proceed with challenge inspections.
And third, as Under Secretary Bolton said at the CDClast
week, we were using the treaty's consultation provisionsvery
effectively to pursue concerns about whether a number of
countries had made accurate declarations or whether they may
have been engaged in on-going offensive activity. Those
bilateral consultations resolved our compliance concerns with a
number of countries.
Today, we are in a different situation. Our own domestic
implementation is going fairly well, notwithstanding delays in
the destruction program. The treaty organization is up and
running and ready to carry out challenge inspections. And we
have come close to exhausting the prospects for using other
treaty provisions, such as the consultation provisions to
resolve our concerns.
So I think it is appropriate now to be considering
challenge inspections in those cases where consultations have
not addressed our concerns or in cases where such bilateral
discussions are simply inappropriate or not likely to be
productive. If we have good intelligence information about
particular countries, we should proceed with these types of
inspections.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.
Senator Stevens, your questions?
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Dr. Walsh, you have twice said that we did not use the
powers that we had in Iraq. My memory is that Sadam Hussein
dismissed the American leader of our inspection team and then
he expelled the whole team. What powers did we have under those
circumstances that we did not use?
Dr. Walsh. I am sorry, Senator Stevens. I should have been
clearer in my statements. I am talking not about the post-Gulf
War inspections. I am talking about IAEA's failure to use
challenge inspections prior to the Gulf War when there were
suspicions about nuclear activities in Iraq.
You will remember, for example, in 1981 the Osiraq reactor
was bombed by Israel. There are any number of documents that
have mentioned--American declassified documents--that expressed
concerns about Iraqi nuclear behavior throughout the 1970's. So
what I would have liked to have seen is that power exercised
earlier so that we were not in a situation where we fought a
war and then, after the fact, discovered nuclear ambitions and
nuclear programs that were further along than we had suspected.
Senator Stevens. My problem is I do not know how to go back
and renew that now. You imply that we might be able to do
something now. What would you suggest we could do now?
Dr. Walsh. Well, let me speak more generally about the
issue of challenge inspections and make two points.
First, I probably take a different view than some of my
colleagues in that I would like to see more regular challenge
inspections. Right now challenge inspections are seen as such a
big deal that if I issue a challenge inspection it is really an
indictment of another country. So there is a real barrier, a
psychological and political barrier, to crossing that line.
Those who might ask for a challenge inspection ask themselves:
Do we have the goods? Do we really want to do this or do we
want to pursue other instrumentalities?
I would like to see the threshold for being able to execute
a special inspection, the political threshold lowered so that
they are more common because I think the more common they are,
the greater the transparency and the greater the likelihood
that we will deter potential proliferators. So I would like to
see them become a more frequent part of the regime.
In terms of IAEA in particular, we have had a strengthening
of IAEA since Iraq and part of that has been this protocol I
referred to earlier, 93 Plus 2, or the Additional Protocol.
Essentially it says we are going to collect information about
nuclear activities not only by going to the reactor or doing
material accountancy; we are also going to test the air and the
water. We are going to do environmental monitoring. So even if
you do not let us into a facility, we are still going to have
the ability to detect clandestine activity. I think that is
enormously useful. So what we need to do is continue to expand.
Senator Thompson, you raised the issue of why would we join
something that did not have an enforcement mechanism and, of
course, the NPT did not have an enforcement mechanism. I think
it is important to remember that these institutions are not
fixed. They evolve over time. The NPT and the non-proliferation
regime is certainly bigger and better than it was in 1970. We
have more instrumentalities, we have more resources, so we
should expect that with experience, sometimes bad experiences,
but with experience we are able to craft better instruments to
try to enforce and try to verify the agreements.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Walsh, I am sorry to say I do not
think we have any options left with Iraq.
Dr. Walsh. Oh, you mean currently?
Senator Stevens. Yes.
Dr. Walsh. Well, let me be clear about Iraq. I know we are
focused on nuclear terrorism and Bin Laden. Bin Laden has
somewhere between $25 and $300 million. Sadam Hussein has
billions of dollars. He is, in my mind, an international war
criminal. He is one of the few leaders ever to have used
chemical weapons against innocent civilians and then used
weapons of mass destruction in a war with another country. I
think he is a seriously bad guy.
I think having said that, I would like to see him removed
from office. The question is how do you get to that? How do you
get there? And I think reasonable people can disagree. This is
a policy conundrum. It is not going to be an easy one to solve
but he ranks as high as anyone in my mind as a threat to
international security.
Senator Stevens. Let me just state that Senator Cochran and
I are on the Appropriations Committee and we do not have money,
as you have indicated, to continue down some of these avenues
you would like us to pursue because of the circumstance that
exists now.
We do not make any more nuclear weapons. Russia throws
theirs out and renews them every 5 years. Most of the nuclear
nations make new weapons. We do not make any new weapons. We
have a nuclear stockpile program that now costs us several
billion dollars a year to try to determine whether the nuclear
weapons that were built 20 years ago are still not only safe
but potentially effective if we ever were called upon to use
them.
Now that determination not to test weapons has strained
away in the appropriations process the money we would use to
follow all the things you would like us to follow in terms of
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons inspections and
detection concepts. Do you have any comment on that? Why were
we pushed into that corner of not making weapons and instead
spending billions of dollars to pursue the policy of assuring
the utility of weapons made 20 years ago?
Dr. Walsh. A quick overview and then a response to your
question, Senator. The overview is that nuclear weapons, and I
do not have to tell this Subcommittee but I think it is worth
it for the broader public to understand this, nuclear weapons
are not like conventional weapons. Numbers matter less. Whether
I have five nuclear weapons and you have four is less of an
issue. The issue is deterrence and national security and the
destruction that you can do to another country.
I do not know of another country in the world that we would
want to trade places with in terms of our current nuclear
stockpile. There is no country that has a more resourced, more
sophisticated, more deadly stockpile and any of those countries
that have ambitions in those areas would certainly prefer ours
to theirs. So I do not worry about our stockpile as much.
I think we also have to look at this in the context of
proliferation. We made commitments under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and we made commitments to other countries
in order to get the indefinite extension of that treaty that
said that we would pursue the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
And I know that there are different views about this treaty
probably on the Subcommittee, as there are in Congress, but my
own view is that this is an important non-proliferation tool
and it is an important political issue because of the
commitments the U.S. Government has made in order to get other
non-proliferation achievements and victories.
Now as to the question of cost, yes, stockpile stewardship
is a very expensive program and I would certainly not disagree
with that. But I am hopeful that given the intelligence and
creativity of the Senate, that they will be able to find funds
for these vitally important issues for U.S. national security,
as they have been able to find funds for other things.
Before September 11 the surplus was going down and yet we
have been able to find the money to fund homeland security. It
seems to me, again with this notion that homeland security
begins abroad, that we can find the money and we need to find
the money to strengthen the system internationally so that
those things do not come back to haunt us.
Senator Stevens. The vote is on, Mr. Walsh. I do not know
if maybe the rest of the people want to make some comments on
that but in my judgment you may be right today but will you be
right 5 years from now, 10 years from now? We will still be
maintaining the most expensive program of stockpile maintenance
in the world. We spend more annually than most nuclear nations
spent to get into the nuclear circle and we spend it to
preserve weapons that are 20 years old now.
I disagree violently with this concept that we should
continue to spend that money. We should start building some
again and we should toss out the ones that are old. If we did,
we would have some money to do what you suggest.
Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. I would like to ask the
Members present whether they want to return for more questions.
We now have a vote call and we expect to have three votes, one
after the other, which will take some time.
So let me ask the Members whether you have further
questions or whether you would be willing to submit it and
adjourn this hearing.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions. I
asked that my complete statement be printed in the record at
the beginning of the hearing.
Senator Akaka. Without objection it will be printed.
Senator Cochran. We appreciate very much the witnesses'
efforts to help us this morning and the excellent answers to
our questions. I think it has broadened our appreciation of the
challenge that we face in this area and deepened our
understanding, as well. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Senator Thompson.
Senator Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I have no further
questions, either. I would ask that my full statement be made a
part of the record and I, too, would want to thank the
witnesses and let them know that the statements they have
submitted will be the basis of a lot of consideration by the
staff. As we approach these issues it is much more than just
the little time we spend here together that you have
contributed and we appreciate that.
I am always trying to learn more about these complex issues
and trying to figure out just exactly what is the significance
of inspection. Miss Smithson, you seem to have some faith in
it. Sometimes I feel that we should look at it more from a
common sense standpoint. Who would allow you to come in and
inspect something that is going to be a problem for them?
Ms. Smithson. That is what I said, sir.
Senator Thompson. I hope Sadam Hussein never agrees to us
coming in to inspect because if he does, we will be in the same
rigmarole that we were in before. It will be hide and seek and
running around. I am convinced he will never let us in. An
inspection regime presumes a mechanism whereby people in good
faith are trying to convince one another that there is no
problem. If there is a problem and you allow an inspection
regime, that just means it is a matter of one trying to out-fox
the other. Then, in his case you get into issues of
intrusiveness and what was actually found, then running to the
United Nations every time there is a dispute and the same sorts
of things.
So I am troubled by the whole concept. I am not sure how
effective that can ever be in a big nation, with all kinds of
capabilities.
I also look for signs of optimism with regard to these
other regimes. Clearly we have got to try to reach some
accommodations with these other countries. But, when you look
at the nuclear non-proliferation regime, we learn things as we
go along. One of the things we learn is that it does not keep
China from outfitting Pakistan soup to nuts and we do nothing
about it. Basically we catch them and they say well, those
pictures you have of missile canisters, you cannot prove there
are missiles actually in those canisters that we have sent to
Pakistan and we accept that. So it is kind of farcical.
With regard to the MTCR, China and Russia or entities
within those countries basically do what they feel like they
need to do with regard to assisting Iran, Pakistan, and other
nations. Then you have the rogue nations themselves, like North
Korea, developing indigenously all these things and becoming
suppliers within their region.
So continue to look for reasons for optimism, why these
regimes really work. I am sure that there are some things that
we have deterred that we otherwise would not, as you pointed
out. But, with regard to the big players and countries that
determine this is what they need in their own national
interest, whether it be India or Pakistan, it seems that these
things, international norms and all that mean nothing in the
face of all that. So continue trying to convince people like
myself that these are doing a lot of good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you, Senator Thompson.
As you can tell, Members of this Subcommittee have deep
interest in this area and we will continue to explore this.
Miss Harris, Dr. Smithson, Dr. Walsh, and Mr. Gormley, I
want to thank you again for coming this morning and for your
testimony and your responses.
A number of points are clear. Terrorists will need to rely
largely on states to develop weapons of mass destruction.
Currently multilateral non-proliferation regimes are not
effective enough to detect and prevent states from developing
WMD programs. However, these regimes are an essential part of a
strategy to prevent WMD proliferation.
The key question then is how does the administration intend
to strengthen verification regimes? The administration's
proposals for national regulations and voluntary cooperation
mechanisms within the BWC are not enough and what I would call
moving beyond traditional arms control. Moving beyond
traditional arms control is no substitute for arms control if
there is nothing concrete to replace it.
For our next hearing that we are planning on this subject,
we will invite the administration to appear.
We have no further questions at this time because of the
vote that we are expecting. However, Members of this
Subcommittee may submit questions in writing for any of the
witnesses. We would appreciate a timely response to any
questions. The record will remain open for these questions and
for further statements from my colleagues.
I would like to express my appreciation once again to all
the witnesses for your time and for sharing your insights with
us this morning.
Any further comments? Otherwise, the Subcommittee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES
----------
MONDAY, JULY 29, 2002
U.S. Senate,
International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services Subcommittee,
of the Governmental Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka and Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
I want to say good afternoon to everyone, both our witnesses
and the audience. I want to welcome all of you here today.
As you know, last week the Committee approved a substitute
amendment to S. 2452, legislation creating the Homeland
Security Department. Today, we are going to focus on how we can
improve our security through more effective international
agreements.
Earlier this month, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control, commented in a State Department
journal, ``With very few exceptions, terrorist groups have not
acquired and cannot acquire weapons of mass destruction without
the support of nation-states.''
Our nonproliferation policies help prevent terrorists from
obtaining these weapons. U.S. nonproliferation strategy is a
four-pronged approach that includes treaties, export control
systems, multilateral regimes, and assistance to other
countries.
This Subcommittee has held hearings in the past on U.S.
export control systems and assistance to other nations,
especially the states of the former Soviet Union. Today, we
will discuss international regimes and treaties.
Over the next 4 months, each of the six nonproliferation
regimes will have a general members meeting. A primary topic to
be discussed will be the new threat environment and how the
regimes should address WMD proliferation to terrorist groups.
Today, the Subcommittee will learn what steps the
administration is taking to strengthen these regimes.
Last week, Stephen Younger, the Director of the Department
of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, said ``Al Qaeda
has been trying to get weapons of mass destruction capability.
I think that they had a limited infrastructure in Afghanistan
to produce it indigenously. However, that doesn't mean that
they don't have a different capability elsewhere.''
The President's just-released national homeland security
strategy fails to include nonproliferation among the principles
of homeland security. However, our nonproliferation policies,
including U.S. participation in multilateral regimes, are an
essential part of our defense against a WMD terrorist attack on
American soil.
I would like to welcome our administration witnesses, Vann
Van Diepen, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and
Marshall Billingslea, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense. This is not the first time either of you have appeared
before this Subcommittee, and I thank you for your continued
assistance in our international security and proliferation
oversight responsibilities.
And now, I would like to yield to my friend, Senator
Cochran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your convening this hearing
today. It follows on an earlier hearing that we had back in
February, when we heard from experts in this area on the
dangers that flow from proliferation, dangers to our national
security and the security of mankind, as a matter of fact. When
you stop to think about the awesome consequences of an
accidental nuclear incident, for example, or an exchange
between two nation-states of ICBMs equipped with weapons of
mass destruction, the consequences are just enormous and not
just for the individual countries that may be actively engaged
or involved.
I recall saying one time that an accident in the nuclear
area, such as we had with the Chernobyl incident in Ukraine, a
nuclear accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere,
because of the possibility of fallout and the impact that it
potentially has around the world.
One other aspect of this hearing that I think is
particularly significant is assessing not just what our
obligations are to try to strengthen the nonproliferation
regimes--that is part of our challenge, and that is the topic
that we are operating under today--but what are the
consequences on our cooperative efforts to develop defenses
against missile attacks, and how would they be affected by the
Missile Technology Control Regime?
For example, specifically, our relationship in the co-
production of the Arrow missile system--it is a missile defense
system that Israel has deployed--to what extent will our export
or cooperation in developing and co-producing these systems
have, in terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime?
There are other nation-states, too. In NATO, for example,
we are talking about cooperative efforts to defend our European
allies. We already have one program, the MEADS program, which
involves Germany and Italy as well as the United States. It
would be interesting to assess what impact the Missile
Technology Control Regime or any other nonproliferation regime
might have on our future efforts to cooperatively defend
against missile attack on NATO countries.
So those are some of my thoughts as we open this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for chairing the hearing. We look
forward to hearing our government witnesses today.
Senator Akaka. Thank you for your statement, Senator
Cochran.
And now, I would like to proceed to our witnesses and ask
Mr. Van Diepen to proceed with his statement.
TESTIMONY OF VANN VAN DIEPEN,\1\ DIRECTOR OF CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL AND MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran.
It is my privilege to testify before you today on behalf of the
State Department on the important subject of multilateral
nonproliferation regimes, which play a vital role in the United
States and international efforts to impede the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, missiles for their delivery, and
advanced conventional weapons.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen appears in the
Appendix on page 331.
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Nonproliferation continues to be one of the most important
and complex of America's foreign policy challenges. Preventing
the spread of WMD and missiles is among the President's highest
national security priorities. He has made clear that halting
proliferation is a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy and
that a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy is needed.
We are responding to this challenge with the active use of
a broad range of tools: Norms, export controls, interdiction,
sanctions, counterproliferation, deterrence, and direct
diplomacy. Our toolkit also includes the multilateral
nonproliferation arrangements or regimes: The Missile
Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar
Arrangement.
Members of these regimes agree as a matter of policy to
control an agreed list of items according to agreed guidelines
implemented according to national laws.
The other key multilateral approaches are legally binding
global treaties that establish basic norms: The Chemical
Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
These regimes and treaties have made important
contributions in conjunction with the rest of our
nonproliferation strategy in slowing WMD and missile
proliferation worldwide. Through effective enforcement of
comprehensive export controls, broad multilateral cooperation
in halting shipments of proliferation concern, and active
outreach to key nonmembers to increase their awareness of
proliferation threats, the regimes and treaties have made it
more difficult, more costly, and more time-consuming for
programs of proliferation concern to obtain the expertise and
material needed to advance their programs, compelling them to
rely on older and often less effective technology.
The treaties also have established a global, political, and
legal barrier against the spread of WMD. The Chemical Weapons
Convention and Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in particular,
have international verification organizations that have a legal
right to inspect and require other measures from states'
parties in order to promote compliance and provide a basis on
which the International Community can cooperate to enforce
these norms.
My written testimony, which I hope can be entered into the
record, describes the background, purpose, and membership of
each of these regimes and treaties. Each of them continues to
serve a vital role in the fight against proliferation. Each has
recorded a number of successes, and each faces unique
challenges.
I would like to review now the current effectiveness of the
various mechanisms. By the 1990's, the Australia Group had
largely succeeded in removing its members as an inadvertent
source of supply for nation-state chemical and biological
weapons programs.
Since September 11, the group has been focusing on
revamping its controls to better address the terrorist threat.
In 2002, the AG adopted licensing guidelines that include CBW
terrorism as a reason for control and became the first regime
to require participants to have so-called catchall controls,
controls that cover nonlisted items when destined for a CBW
program, and the first regime to control intangible transfers
of technology. The AG also agreed to control technology for the
development and production of listed biological agents and
equipment.
In recent years, AG members have begun to consider measures
to address the cooperation between nonmember countries on CBW
programs. While the AG has been attacked in the BWC and the CWC
by some nonaligned countries seeking to abolish export
controls, AG participants agree on the continued necessity and
viability of the group, its compatibility with the conventions,
and the need to educate nonmembers on the regime. Dealing with
a hostile environment in the BWC and the CWC will remain a
priority.
Over the course of the Missile Technology Control Regime's
15-year history, the regime has persuaded most major suppliers
to control responsibly their missile-related exports. We have
reduced the number of countries with MTCR-class or Category I
missile programs, eliminating programs in Latin American and
Central Europe. MTCR countries have cooperated to halt numerous
shipments of proliferation concern. The MTCR has established a
broad outreach program to increase awareness of the global
missile threat, and the MTCR Guidelines and Annex have become
the international standard for responsible missile-related
export behavior.
In addition to the MTCR, the United States supports the
wide acceptance of the International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Initiated by the MTCR
countries in 1999, the code is intended to be a new
multilateral complement to the work of the MTCR. It will
supplement but not supplant the MTCR.
The code would consist of a small set of broad principles,
general commitments, and modest confidence-building measures.
It is intended to be a voluntary political commitment to
establish a broad multilateral norm against missile
proliferation. It will complement the MTCR and other national
missile nonproliferation efforts by establishing a widely
subscribed consensus that countries should cooperate on a
voluntary basis to impede missile proliferation. We hope the
code will come into effect as early as the end of this year.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group's greatest successes included
requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear
supply to non-nuclear states, and controlling nuclear dual-use
equipment and technology.
We have had notable success in gaining consensus within the
Wassenaar Arrangement conventional regime on guidelines for the
exports of Man Portable Air Defense Systems, expanding the
arrangement's mandate to explicitly prevent terrorists from
acquiring controlled items and increasing categories for arms
reporting. Wassenaar provides a useful forum for discussing
developments that have a bearing on national export control
policies, regional developments, and possible mutual restraint.
The Biological Weapons Convention has served for nearly 30
years as an important international prohibition on nearly all
activities associated with biological weapons. The BWC does not
include a mechanism for checking compliance, as it is
inherently unverifiable.
Although the United States concluded that we could not
support the approach embodied in the draft BWC protocol and
that the protocol's flaws could not be fixed, we have proposed
several important alternative measures to combat the BW threat.
Such proposed measures include promotion of standards for
biosafety and biosecurity, scientific and industrial codes of
conduct, and improved disease surveillance.
Our goal is to highlight compliance concerns and gain
support from states' parties for the U.S. package and other
measures that would address the BW threat of today and the
future. We hope that BWC parties can agree on measures that
will effectively do so.
The Chemical Weapons Convention has helped reduce the
threat from chemical weapons, resulting in international
disclosure of chemical weapons programs in India, China, and
Iran. Stockpiles of chemical weapons, as well as chemical
weapons production facilities, are being destroyed in Russia
and a number of other countries. Around the world, facilities
that could be used for chemical weapons-related purposes are
subject to international inspection.
The CWC demonstrates the value of properly designed
multilateral agreements for placing constraints on potential
proliferators. Our experience with the CWC demonstrates the
need for supplementary mechanisms, such as the Australia Group,
to assist like-minded states in coordinating national
nonproliferation efforts, and it also demonstrates the critical
importance of U.S. leadership not only in negotiating an
agreement but also in ensuring that it is effectively
implemented.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has contributed
importantly to stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation.
States such as South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil decided
against nuclear weapons and joined the NPT. Following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, all former Soviet nuclear
weapons were transferred to Russia. All other former Soviet
States joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. The NPT
remains especially critical today with the threat of nuclear
terrorism.
The periodic NPT review process called for in the treaty is
an important means for addressing these issues, including
strengthening the treaty's verification system. As the key
verification mechanism under the NPT, the International Atomic
Energy Agency has performed well but has also been frank in
recognizing its deficiencies and in proposing remedies. Over
the past 10 years, the IAEA has taken several steps to improve
its safeguard systems.
Adoption by member states of the model additional protocol
to existing safeguards agreements would strengthen the
effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguard
system.
After September 11th, the IAEA moved promptly to expand its
programs to combat nuclear terrorism. The IAEA has served as an
important source of assistance to developing countries, which
might otherwise not obtain the benefits of peaceful nuclear
applications as envisaged for NPT parties in good standing.
A strong, effective, and efficient IAEA serves important
U.S. interests. The IAEA must have sufficient and predictable
funding resources to fulfill all aspects of its mission.
The Zangger Committee, the committee of NPT nuclear
exporters, has taken the lead in developing supplier consensus
to add enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production
commitment to the so-called trigger list that the group
administers.
This talks about what we have done up until now, but
nonproliferation faces a challenging future. As events of the
past year have demonstrated, we face an increasing
proliferation threat from terrorists and their state sponsors.
The treaties face a continuous threat from states that would
seek to violate them. We must scrutinize not only the
nonproliferation regimes and treaties but all of our
nonproliferation tools with an eye toward improving their
effectiveness.
These regimes and treaties have contributed greatly to
international nonproliferation efforts, but we cannot become
complacent. As a starting point, rigorous, energetic, and ever-
vigilant enforcement is essential.
Nonproliferation remains a perpetually unfinished project.
More work always needs to be done. We must deal with continuing
proliferation threats posed by countries such as Iran, Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. We must strengthen
cooperation and cope with the impact of technological advances.
We must continue to combat the terrorist threat. We must
consider new potential threats, expand our nonproliferation
toolkit, and improve the efficiency of those tools we have.
My written testimony describes our ongoing and future
efforts to address these challenges in some detail. To
summarize, I would note the need for the regimes and treaties
to focus on the following five priority areas.
First, regional nonproliferation, focusing on steps beyond
simply controlling our own exports that we and our partners can
take individually or collectively to impede proliferation.
Two, look for ways that these mechanisms can help deal with
the threat of terrorism.
Three, continue to update control lists to reflect
technological advances and ensure that they keep pace with
proliferation trends, including terrorism and the use of so-
called dirty bombs or radiological dispersal devises.
Four, work to extend export controls in line with regime
standards to all potential suppliers, as well as to those
countries that serve as transshipment points.
And five, increase efforts to make nonmembers more aware of
the threat and consequences of proliferation, urge them to
adopt polices and practices consistent with regime standards,
and provide export control assistance as necessary.
In closing, multilateral nonproliferation regimes and
treaties have an important role to play as two components of a
comprehensive approach to advancing U.S. national security and
nonproliferation policy. They must remain vibrant, active
tools, focused on their collective and individual core mission,
impeding threatening weapons programs, especially via impeding
the spread of weapons and related equipment and technology, and
reinforcing and verifying treaty obligations against the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
At the same time, these multilateral instruments must also
possess the flexibility to adapt to new challenges on the
battlefield of proliferation. The continued exercise of strong
U.S. leadership will play an indispensable role in
strengthening these multilateral regimes and treaties to better
combat proliferation. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your statement.
Mr. Billingslea, please proceed with your statement.
TESTIMONY OF MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Billingslea. Chairman Akaka, Senator Cochran, as
requested, today I will provide the views of the Department of
Defense regarding the effectiveness of current multilateral
nonproliferation regimes and organizations in preventing WMD
and missile proliferation. I will discuss some of the emerging
trends that we are witnessing and how these regimes are able or
unable to address such developments. I will then conclude with
a look at where we should go from here.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Billingslea appears in the
Appendix on page 346.
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I will start by characterizing the growing WMD threat. In
terms of the terrorist dimension to the problem, we see an
alarming pattern developing. With increasing frequency since
the mid-1980's, we have seen a steady growth in the awareness
of and interest in WMD by terrorist groups. These groups are
aggressively trying to procure the necessary materials to
conduct a WMD attack.
For instance, Osama bin Laden has publicly announced his
WMD aspirations. He has likened the acquisition and use of WMD
to a religious duty.
Our friends and allies have, on several occasions, thwarted
WMD acquisition efforts, whether we are talking about cyanide
smuggling or trafficking in radiological materials. A few
months ago, for instance, a terrorist cell was caught with a
cyanide compound and a map of the U.S. Embassy in Rome.
Though we have had some important successes, we know we are
not completely blocking WMD procurement efforts by terrorist
organizations.
Part of the problem is that much of the equipment used to
make and deliver WMD is commercially available from a large
number of sources. It is very difficult to track dual-use
technology and to stop it from falling into the wrong hands.
The manufacturing equipment is generally small; it is generally
portable; it is easily concealed. For instance, this hearing
room is big enough to house a complete nerve agent production
facility. And even less space, the anteroom, would be needed
for a biological weapons production program.
Likewise, terrorist groups have both used and are
interested in a variety of delivery mechanisms for their WMD;
again, many of which can be constructed or adapted from
commonly available materials or systems, such as pesticide
sprayers.
There are, in short, seemingly infinite ways that a
determined terrorist group could conduct a WMD attack. As you
can see, it is difficult to combat the spread of this
capability through multilateral arms control instruments such
as treaties or export control regimes, though we believe that
these regimes are generally helpful to the overall effort to
block proliferation.
Terrorist WMD aspirations and threats are receiving a high
degree of attention from the Bush Administration because the
results of a WMD attack by terrorist groups or by countries
could be catastrophic. We are particularly intent on ensuring
that these groups are not able to obtain highly contagious
pathogens.
Giving added emphasis to our efforts is the variety of
excellent work being done by the medical and academic community
regarding the various unconventional threats we now face. In
particular, I would like to direct the attention of the
Subcommittee to the recent work done by Johns Hopkins
University in an exercise called Dark Winter. I summarize the
results of that exercise in my testimony.
In addition to the fact that many terrorist groups are
known to harbor WMD ambitions, there is another worrisome
linkage. Every country that is a ``state-sponsor of terrorism''
also is pursuing its own national-level WMD and missile
programs. In other words, every country that harbors, funds, or
otherwise assists terrorist groups as a matter of government
policy also as a matter of government policy is pursuing
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and missile systems to
deliver these weapons.
Countries such as Iran and Syria continue to support terror
groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
and other groups, such as the PFLP-GC.
Some of the groups, like Hamas, are exploring ways to
utilize WMD. Hamas is working with poisons and chemicals in an
effort to coat suicide bomb fragments.
At the same time, both Iran and Syria themselves have
robust chemical warfare programs, and both are exploring
biological weapons. Both countries can deliver these weapons by
a variety of means via short-range missile systems such as
Scuds or by artillery shells. And Iran is making strides in
developing the Shahab-3 medium range missile and longer range
systems.
We also believe that Iran is pursuing aggressively a
nuclear weapons capability, and we are concerned that the
Bushehr nuclear power project is, in reality, a pretext for the
creation of an infrastructure that is designed to help Tehran
acquire atomic weapons.
The same worrisome linkage exists in other terror-abetting
countries.
Cuba, for instance, has a limited developmental research
effort relating to biological weapons and also harbors
terrorist groups such as the Basque separatist ETA and FARC and
ELN operatives.
Iraq, which stands in violation of numerous Security
Council resolutions and which expelled international weapons
inspectors several years ago, is believed to be rebuilding its
WMD infrastructure. On the terrorism side, Iraq today continues
to harbor several terrorist organizations and provides bases of
operations for groups such as the PKK, MEK, Abu Nidal, and the
Palestine Liberation Front.
The linkage between terrorist groups and countries with WMD
aspirations concerns us for several reasons. First, these
countries give wide latitude to terrorist groups that operate
within their borders. Terrorists are able to establish training
and research camps where they are free to develop WMD and to
perfect their plans for delivery. There also is a very
dangerous potential that equipment and expertise meant for a
state-level program could fall into the hands of terrorist
groups, either unintentionally or by design. Finally, we are
worried about the potential for a country to use terrorist
networks to conduct a WMD attack.
I will turn now to an assessment of nonproliferation
regimes. President Bush has placed a high priority on combating
the spread of WMD and their delivery systems. We have moved
rapidly to counter imminent terrorist threats and to identify
and thwart future ones. In countering these urgent threats,
President Bush has stated that traditional Cold War concepts,
such as deterrence and containment, may no longer be
appropriate in every situation. The international security
situation has changed, and we must adapt our nonproliferation
and defense strategies to recognize these changes.
Over the last 50 years, we have achieved important success
in stemming the proliferation of WMD through a variety of
mechanisms, ranging from treaties to multilateral technology
control mechanisms such as the Australia Group and the Missile
Technology Control Regime. Domestic export controls and
transshipment laws and regulations designed to control the
movement of sensitive goods and technologies also are very
important.
That said, while the traditional nonproliferation policy
instruments the United States has used to combat the
proliferation of WMD--again, international treaties,
multilateral export control regimes, and so forth--continue to
have value in the collective international nonproliferation
framework, they also have limitations.
One of the limitations is enforceability. At this stage,
for instance, several countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and
Cuba seem able to violate their obligations under treaties such
as the Biological Weapons Convention with relative impunity.
The United States continues to employ treaty compliance as an
issue at annual or biennial review conferences associated with
these treaties and regimes, but we have not received a great
deal of support from even our closest allies.
In the case of multilateral export control regimes--the
MTCR, the Australia Group, Wassenaar--these are voluntary,
nonbinding agreements. And an underlying assumption has been
that the members are like-minded and would implement voluntary
controls in a like-minded fashion. Unfortunately, in some
instances, that has not always been the case.
Domestic export control laws and multilateral export and
transshipment controls continue to be a vital part of the
various successes that the United States and other allies have
had. But with the global economy becoming more and more
interconnected, dual-use items and technologies used to develop
weapons of mass destruction cannot be effectively controlled
without better cooperation among exporting and transit
countries. Moreover, export controls and transshipment controls
are only as good as the capability of those who adopt the
measures in terms of their ability to enforce their laws and
regulations.
This is an area where the Department of Defense sees an
opportunity for improvement. We need to look at ways to bolster
our interaction and cooperation with key transit countries,
most of whom are friendly to the United States but who lack the
technical capacity themselves to monitor and seize dangerous
cargo.
We also need to work on countering the ability of WMD
states and terrorist organizations denied an item by one
country to obtain the same item from other sources outside the
reach of traditional nonproliferation treaties and regimes.
Finally, we are seeing new patterns in WMD-related trade
developing that existing export control regimes are currently
unable to address, but which I think can be expanded and
adapted to address this problem. Increasingly, trade in WMD and
missile-related items is occurring between countries outside of
the regimes. This is a new trend in secondary proliferation;
that is, former importers are now becoming exporters to other
states of concern.
And most troubling of all is the nexus that I have
described between WMD, state-sponsors of terrorism, and
terrorists themselves seeking these capabilities.
So as a result, the picture I paint today is a threat that
is increasingly diverse, increasingly unpredictable, dangerous,
and difficult to counter using traditional measures. But while
these dangers are growing, the United States and our allies in
the International Community are formulating ways to improve our
ability to deal effectively with these new threats.
We will continue to use existing diplomatic and economic
tools to engage with countries involved in proliferation
activities to urge them to constrain, halt, or reverse those
activities, to encourage them to desist. And we will continue
to work with and assist friends and allies in developing and
implementing their own mechanisms, domestic export controls
regimes.
But to meet the threat head-on and stop it is going to
require a new definition of nonproliferation, a stronger global
nonproliferation architecture, and strenuous national efforts.
On the international front--and here I will echo much what
my State Department colleague has said--we need to expand and
enhance and enforce existing international nonproliferation
treaties and regimes. This includes pursuing adoption of the
IAEA's Additional Protocol. This is the protocol developed in
the wake of Desert Storm and the discoveries of how Iraq was
exploiting the existing protocol at that time, the new protocol
that plugs those loopholes. We need to encourage countries to
adopt that treaty and encourage other countries to fully comply
with their obligations to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention.
Naming names is a very powerful diplomatic tool that we
will continue to use at these annual review conferences for
these treaties.
The United States also has proposed an amendment to the
1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Treaty, or the SUA
Convention. We have proposed to expand the coverage of that
treaty to include a wider range of additional offenses,
including terrorist acts.
The proposed amendment the United States is pushing will
make it a criminal offense to carry or transport, or cause to
be carried or transported, items that are in violation of the
CWC or the BWC or the NPT. If adopted, this proposal would
effectively transform the SUA Convention from an after-the-fact
extradite or prosecute treaty to a proactive treaty where
military forces could board ships in international waters if
they were carrying dual-use WMD-related materials.
We also need to continue to strengthen the multilateral
export control regimes themselves to better equip them to
combat the evolving global nonproliferation threat. Sensitive
dual-use items and technology cannot be controlled effectively
unless there is broad cooperation among exporting and transit
countries. We have made an important start in this effort with
the decision taken by the Australia Group to broaden the number
of dual-use items that it controls.
But all of these steps taken together, unfortunately, are
not going to be enough, given that yesterday's recipients of
WMD-related systems and technologies are today's purveyors of
WMD-related systems and technologies to other countries. As
President Bush said in June at the West Point commencement
ceremony, ``We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping
for the best. We cannot put faith in the word of tyrants, who
solemnly sign nonproliferation treaties and then systematically
break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we
will have waited too long. The war on terror will not be won on
the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy. In the
world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of
action.''
So in conclusion, from our standpoint, the future is ours
to lose. In preventing the spread of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems, there is no excuse for
inaction. The United States and the International Community
must act and act decisively. As long as there are would-be-
proliferators or groups seeking WMD, we must remain vigilant
and resolute. And we need to take the initiative away from
these groups, so that they are not able to choose the time and
place of such an attack. I thank the Subcommittee.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Billingslea, for
your statement.
Mr. Billingslea, as you mentioned Dark Winter, we have
witnesses in previous hearings from Johns Hopkins who
participated in Dark Winter.
Mr. Van Diepen, according to an article in today's
Washington Post, there is discussion among some in the
administration about a preemptive strike against the Iranian
nuclear reactor before it becomes operational. Others argue
that the reactor would be under the International Atomic Energy
Agency's safeguards and does not pose a security risk.
What are we doing now to ensure that the IAEA has the
financial and personnel resources to safeguard this facility?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, Senator, first of all, overall, we
have been doing a lot to assist the IAEA in improving its
safeguard system through direct U.S. contributions, so-called
voluntary additional contributions, that we make. We provide a
lot of assistance in terms of technology and expertise to help
them boost their overall level of safeguards capability.
As Mr. Billingslea indicated, we have serious concerns
about the Bushehr facility. And while certainly, if and when
that facility becomes operational, the IAEA will safeguard it
and do the best job possible, our real concern runs to the
cover that the existence of that facility, and the large amount
of equipment and technology and personnel attendant to it,
could provide for a covert Iranian nuclear weapons program. And
IAEA's safeguards of the reactor itself really would not deal
effectively with that problem.
Senator Akaka. In your statement, you mentioned, ``The IAEA
must have sufficient and predictable financial resources to
fulfill all aspects of its mission.'' The IAEA has determined
that it will need an additional $40 million to fulfill all the
safeguard activities that it is being asked to do. The United
States share amounts to $10 million. Is the United States
providing this additional funding?
Mr. Van Diepen. Senator, I do not know the exact answer to
that particular question. I do know, again, that we have been
making additional contributions, so-called voluntary
contributions, that go beyond our assessed contribution. And we
have been working both internally and with other countries to
try to boost the overall level of funding for the IAEA
safeguard activities.
If you wish, we could provide you an answer for the record
that specifically addresses that question.
Senator Akaka. Will you please do that?
And this next question is for both of you. The pledges by
the United States and other nuclear states to never use nuclear
weapons against a non-nuclear state were a significant factor
in winning a consensus for an indefinite extension of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Administration officials openly state
that we should expand our options for nuclear attacks and widen
the number of targeted nations.
Has the United States changed its policy? If so, do you
think that this change will have any effect on compliance with
the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
Mr. Billingslea.
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, I think that the policy of the
United States has been clearly articulated by both the
President and by the National Security Advisor. It very much
tracks other statements for the record under the previous
administration.
Secretary Cohen, for instance, made clear that any use of
WMD against the United States, its friends, its allies, or our
troops overseas would be met with an overwhelming and
devastating response. We would not specify in advance the
nature of that response, but there should be no doubt in that
fact.
Senator Akaka. Would you have any comment, Mr. Van Diepen?
Mr. Van Diepen. Just, Mr. Chairman, that I am certainly not
aware of any change in policy in this area.
Senator Akaka. To both of you, has the administration
engaged in any new discussions with either India or Pakistan
concerning a possible resolution to bringing them into Non-
Proliferation Treaty compliance?
Mr. Van Diepen. We have extensive dialogues with both
countries that include extensive nonproliferation discussions.
And certainly, in those discussions, we make clear our desire
that those countries restrain their programs to the maximum
extent possible. And of course, our ultimate objective would be
to see them do what would be necessary to sign up to the NPT as
non-nuclear weapons states.
But the current reality is that there is no near-term
prospect that those countries will take that step.
Senator Akaka. Would you have any comment to that, Mr.
Billingslea?
Mr. Billingslea. No, sir. I would agree with that
assessment.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Van Diepen, last year, the GAO produced
a report that showed minimal emphasis by the State Department
in recruiting and placing Americans in international
organizations. We understand that the number of Americans
employed by the IAEA has been decreasing.
Could you tell us what efforts are being made to make it
more attractive for Americans to accept employment at the IAEA?
Mr. Van Diepen. Frankly, Senator, I do not know the answer
to that question. I will have to take that one for the record.
Senator Akaka. Well, I am not surprised at that answer,
because, on this Subcommittee, Senator Voinovich and I have
been pursuing what we call workforce or human capital issues.
We find, according to some of the reports that we are
receiving, that our country is going to be in critical need of
people to work in our workforce. And we know that, by next
year, the baby boomers are going to be eligible to retire.
Eventually, they will have to retire. By then, we will be in
deep trouble if we do not begin to plan to recruit and hire
people for those jobs now.
Mr. Van Diepen, since September 11, the IAEA has moved to
expand its programs to combat nuclear terrorism. Did the
emergency appropriations supplemental include a request for
programs for the protection against nuclear terrorism through
IAEA? If not, does the State Department still support the
programs proposed by IAEA?
Mr. Van Diepen. Senator, I do not know what was in the
supplemental, but we are certainly strong supporters of the
IAEA's efforts to deal with nuclear terrorism. We have been
providing a lot of direct assistance in that effort. They are
trying to come to help deal with this problem of radiological
dispersal devices, trying to locate and secure so-called orphan
sources, nuclear sources that could provide the basis for
radiological dispersion devices that, particularly in the
former Soviet Union, have literally been misplaced and cannot
be located.
So they are in the process of doing a lot of good work to
deal with this problem. We are certainly very supportive of it.
But I am not aware of what was or was not in the supplemental.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. I will yield to Senator
Cochran for questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thought it was fortuitous that in this morning's paper
there was a detailed discussion of the construction of the
nuclear power reactor in Iran where Russia is actively involved
in the construction of that facility.
In your opinion, so we will have this in the record, why is
it there is so much concern about the construction of that
nuclear power plant? And why does it pose a threat, in the view
of some, to our security and the security of other countries in
that region of the world?
Mr. Billingslea. Well, we should start with examining the
Iranian claim that the power reactor is to help bolster Iran's
energy grid. The truth of the matter is that Iran is a major
natural gas-producing country, but they are flaring or venting
six times more natural gas than any other major gas-producing
nation.
Now, the energy equivalence of the gas that they are
venting or flaring off is three times what they are going to
get out of that one reactor at Bushehr. So they could, for a
fraction of the cost at the Bushehr plant, simply capture three
times as much energy, if they wanted to. So there is clearly
something else going on here.
What is going on is Iranian recognition that possessing the
Bushehr reactor will allow them to argue to have all of the
other bits and pieces of a domestic nuclear infrastructure that
ostensibly is designed to support the civil power plant but, in
reality, we feel is designed to support nuclear weapons
ambitions.
It also puts them in proximity to Russian firms and allows
them to continue to try to obtain materials and expertise for
what is, in effect, a violation of their NPT obligations.
Senator Cochran. Is it true, as the paper suggests, that we
still have 5 or 6 years left within which to decide how we are
going to react to this? Or do you think we are operating under
a much shorter time constraint than that?
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, I read the press story this
morning, and I do not want to be overly alarmist, but I would
also say that this is a pressing matter that has very much got
the administration's attention. We have a tendency in the
nonproliferation business to be overly sanguine that we can
predict when those red-line thresholds are crossed and
frequently find ourselves surprised. Often, we only learn how
wrong we were after the fact.
So the only surprise here is that, as Secretary Rumsfeld
says, we keep allowing ourselves to get surprised. We should
not do that.
So I would not want to debate 5 years, 7 years. It is an
ongoing matter of the highest priority for the administration.
We are dealing with the Russians on this issue.
Senator Cochran. Judging from press accounts, our President
has been in active discussions with President Putin and others
about this situation and has expressed our concerns, and has
requested that Russia take steps to see that this activity, the
proliferation aspects of it, come to a halt. Do you have any
indication now whether progress is being made in that area?
That is in the diplomatic effort to persuade and convince our
friends in Russia that they have an obligation to take some
positive steps here to ensure that security interests here and
elsewhere, even in Russia, are not threatened by the
development of this nuclear capability in Iran.
What is your reaction to that, Mr. Van Diepen? Could you
give us the status on that? What is the latest?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, this continues to be an issue that is
discussed with the Russians regularly and at the highest
levels. It was discussed at the recent summit, and it has been
discussed in every significant meeting of United States and
Russian officials.
I think the honest answer is that it is a mixed picture. On
the one hand, because of the high-level U.S. efforts since
about mid-1997, the Russians have taken a number of important
steps to help them deal with this problem. They have put in
place very good export control legislation, including so-called
catchall controls, to deal with items not on multilateral
lists. They have investigated some entities. They have taken
some level of action.
But the unfortunate truth is that Iranian entities, in
particular, still continue to have substantial success in
obtaining missile and nuclear-related technologies from Russian
entities. And so we are far from satisfied with the level of
performance from the Russians.
And so we continue to engage. We continue to try to get
them to realize that this is a serious, ongoing problem that
they need to devote the necessary resources and priority to,
because it is happening in their territory, so it is
fundamentally their responsibility to get it fixed.
Senator Cochran. We are also at a disadvantage with respect
to discussions with Iranian officials because we do not have
diplomatic relations, and we do not have people there. Is that
true, that we have an impediment to our efforts to discuss this
directly with Iranians?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, I guess potentially implicit in your
question is some assessment of the effectiveness of having such
discussions. Certainly, our European friends and others have
had direct discussions with the Iranians on these matters, and
the answers either range from, ``We are not doing anything,''
to ``Hey, we live in a tough neighborhood.'' So it is not clear
to me that the addition of a direct U.S.-Iranian dialogue on
this subject would necessarily be all that helpful, given where
they are. I think, frankly, that our other range of
nonproliferation activities is more effective in impeding
Iran's activities than a direct dialogue would be.
Senator Cochran. There is a suggestion that the Iranian
reactor and others that may come afterward would be subject to
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and inspections.
What is your assessment of that? And will that help assuage our
concerns, or should it, that there is no plutonium being
converted to nuclear weapons?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, by treaty, the Iranians must subject
reactors to IAEA inspections, so that is not an extra offer on
their part. That is part of their current obligation as being a
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And likewise,
the Russians in this case also are obligated under the treaty
to subject reactors to those kinds of safeguards.
I think the real issue is less with the reactor itself than
with, as Marshall indicated, what having the reactor and the
reactor project in place may allow the Iranians to do under the
surface and the sort of covert assistance that could facilitate
to a nuclear weapons program.
Senator Cochran. It was also suggested in this newspaper
article that the Russians plan to sell equipment to the
Iranians for four or five additional reactors after this
project is over. Do you have any assessment of whether that is
true or not? And what, if anything, does our administration
intend to do to convince them they should not do that or take
steps to dissuade them from it?
Mr. Van Diepen. Marshall, you may correct me, but my
recollection is there has been talk off and on for years about
potential additional units at Bushehr, and it remains to be
seen to what extent they may eventuate.
By definition, our concerns about the current ongoing
project would extend to any additional units, and additional
units would simply make it easier to use the infrastructure of
this project to try to facilitate a covert nuclear weapons
program.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Billingslea, anything to add on that?
Mr. Billingslea. Well, Senator, all I would say is that, if
we are upset about one reactor at Bushehr, you can imagine how
upset we would be over the prospects of five or six.
Senator Cochran. This is considered to be a very serious
matter, as far as this administration is concerned?
Mr. Billingslea. This is a very serious matter. And the
concern over Bushehr predates this administration as well.
There has been a great deal of success in turning off
cooperation with the Bushehr project in terms of other
countries. But the quest to obtain Russian cessation is ongoing
and has not produced the kind of results we want yet.
Senator Cochran. There was some talk at one time about our
offering lucrative incentives to Russia to help them understand
that it would be in their own interest if they took steps to
stop this proliferation of technology and information that
could be converted to weapons use. Has there been any
indication that those incentives have been a positive
contribution to getting the Russians to do what we hope they
will do?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, certainly some of the progress we
have seen out of the Russians--for example, legislation,
actions against specific entities--has come in the context of
previous efforts to use sort of a carrot-and-stick approach.
For example, in 1998 and 1999, we used discretionary
authorities to put penalties on certain Russian entities that
were involved with Iran's missile or nuclear programs. And in
the wake of that activity, there was a noticeable upsurge in
Russian efforts on the legislative front.
So certainly, there is a generic understanding that the
carrot-and-stick approach is helpful in getting progress. But
we still have a substantial way to go, and the exact path ahead
to get to where we want to go is sort of unclear right now.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I see that the red light
came on, and I think my time is up for this round.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
I have a number of questions. I want to switch from nuclear
weapons proliferation to missile proliferation, and you may
have time after that for further questions.
This is to both of you. Israel is considering arm sales of
the Arrow missile defense system to India. Do either of you
have concerns over the Arrow sale for Missile Technology
Control Regime reasons? And do you think that Arrow sales to
India might further destabilize the security situation in South
Asia or exacerbate the regional arms race?
Mr. Van Diepen. Mr. Chairman, let me try to answer that in
generic terms. First of all, the Arrow interceptor is a so-
called MTCR Category I rocket system. Israel is a country that
unilaterally has pledged its adherence to the MTCR, so it, just
as we or countries that are members of the MTCR, is committed
to apply what is called a strong presumption of denial to
exports of any Category I system, including Arrow, to any end-
user for any purpose.
And so, in the example that you cite in that case, Israel
would have to go through the necessary procedures to decide
that it could overcome that strong presumption of denial and
make that sale. And that is, by definition, not an easy matter.
Clearly, South Asia is a region of tension, as is obvious
by ongoing events. India is a country that is pursuing programs
of proliferation concern. So by definition, there would be
issues that one would have to consider of that nature, in
deciding whether or not to go ahead with such a sale.
Senator Akaka. Do you have any comments on that, Mr.
Billingslea?
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, this matter came up in a hearing
last week on the Moscow Treaty, where Senator Levin asked
Secretary Rumsfeld about this, so I will cleave to, in essence,
what my Secretary had to say.
We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are
part of an inherently stabilizing concept. The right to defend
yourself against these missiles is something that we feel is a
matter to explore with the Indians, with the Pakistanis, if
they are interested. What I would say is that we need to look
at it more from the standpoint of what do the Indians feel they
need in terms of defense for the region.
The Arrow system, because it is an MTCR-class missile, does
raise certain obligations that we have under the MTCR. And I do
not think the administration has come to a position on that
whole complex issue of balancing the MTCR, our defense
cooperation with India, so on and so forth. But it is a matter
under active discussion.
Again, we also need to hear from the Indians in terms of
what they want and what they need.
Senator Akaka. To both of you, the United States is
considering collaborating with international partners on
development and fielding of a missile defense system. Would the
interceptor technology anticipated for use in a missile defense
system violate the MTCR if it is shared with non-MTCR partners?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, Mr. Chairman, the answer is, it
depends. It depends critically on what the capability of the
missile system is we are talking about.
For example, Patriot PAC-3 is below the so-called Category
I threshold, and so exports of PAC-3 would not be subject to
this strong presumption of denial. MEADS, which Senator Cochran
mentioned, falls below that line. So a lot of the more theater-
oriented missile defense systems do not raise this issue of the
strong presumption of denial.
If there were a future system that were capable enough to
cross that line, then, again, we would be committed under the
MTCR guidelines to apply that strong presumption.
Now, as we discussed in the UAV hearing, the strong
presumption is not an absolute ban. It can be overcome on so-
called rare occasions that are extremely well-justified in
terms of five specific nonproliferation and export control
factors in the MTCR guidelines. So another thing it would
depend on would be who is the recipient, and how do they stack
up against those factors?
So it is difficult to go too far down the hypothetical
path, because the real world facts of what system to whom for
what purpose really start to come into play very early on into
this.
Senator Akaka. Do you have a comment, Mr. Billingslea?
Mr. Billingslea. Well, happily, most of the countries with
whom we would want and intend to work collaboratively on
missile defense are within the MTCR framework as member
countries. So a lot of this issue really goes away, in effect.
I am certain that we will be able to balance these two
priorities to get a good outcome.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Van Diepen, in your testimony, you
discussed the possibility of challenge inspections as provided
in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Is the administration
considering using challenge inspections? And if so, against
whom?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly could not
say anything in open session about anyone we might be
considering challenging. But it is an active tool in the
toolkit, and we are looking for potential opportunities for
using it that makes sense, balancing all the various factors,
including the very important need to protect intelligence
sources and methods.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Van Diepen, in November 2001, the United
States declared the Biological Weapons Convention draft
protocols a dead issue and proposed voluntary measures for BWC
members to demonstrate compliance. The question is, has the
administration offered any standards or guidelines for these
voluntary measures? And have any state parties enacted criminal
legislation or stricter standards for security of biological
agents?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, first of all, we made very specific
proposals at the November 2001 review conference, along the
lines that I described in my testimony. So there were very
explicit proposals that we made.
Under the existing convention, states' parties are required
to put in place criminal legislation to enforce their
obligations under the convention. One of the things that we
have found out, to our disappointment, is that a large number
of states' parties have not done so. And so we have been
engaged in a remedial effort to try to get them to meet their
treaty obligations in that respect. And certainly in the wake
of September 11th and, in a sense, outside the context of the
BWC, we have been engaged in separate efforts.
As Marshall indicated, it is very important to try to
secure dangerous pathogens that might fall into the hands of
terrorists. And we have been engaged in a number of efforts in
the Australia Group and elsewhere to try to promote awareness
of this problem and to try to urge countries to put on higher
levels of security in biosafety.
Senator Akaka. Here is a question about control lists. The
BWC and CWC have their own control lists. Is it realistic to
pursue a comprehensive control list?
Mr. Van Diepen. I am not quite sure I understand the
question, Mr. Chairman. But, first of all, the BWC, the
convention, does not have attended to it any lists of pathogens
or equipment. Such lists were posited in the context of this
protocol, but as you have already noted, the protocol is not
going anywhere.
The CWC has lists of agents, but the purpose of that list
of agents is to facilitate the work of onsite verification. In
addition, those lists are used, in effect, as a sanction
against countries that are not members of the convention to try
to get them to join. There are so-called trade restrictions
that limit to varying extents the degree to which state parties
to the CWC can trade with nonparties in listed chemicals.
But, strictly speaking, there is not really an export
control component to the CWC.
Senator Akaka. Before I yield to my friend, Senator
Cochran, I would like to ask Mr. Billingslea a question.
In your testimony, you state the United States has proposed
an amendment to the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the safety of maritime navigation. The amendment would allow
military forces to board ships in international waters if they
were carrying items in violation of the CWC, NPT, and BWC. How
have our allies and international partners responded to this
proposal?
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, I do not have in front of me a
roster of reactions. This is being worked through the
International Maritime Organization.
What I will say is that there already exists a consent-
based regime for dealing with narcotics trafficking. We have
gotten good support out of a number of nations in terms of
maritime operations to stop and board and inspect vessels
suspected of trafficking or moving terrorists. And so there is
a logical third piece to the puzzle that needs to be added
here, which is the WMD cargo moving about.
If we feel that a vessel is carrying commodities that would
assist a terror group or a terrorist-sponsoring state in
acquiring WMD, we would like to see a consent-based regime, as
well as a nonconsensual regime, established for stopping and
searching certain vessels.
I am told that actually the United Kingdom has expressed a
lot of interest in helping us on this, so it would appear that
this piece of the puzzle also will be put in place.
Senator Akaka. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to explore
just for a minute some of the policy decisions that are being
made by the administration with respect to what is and what is
not subject to Missile Technology Control Regime provisions.
For example, you mentioned already this Category I
definition of the kind of missile that would be included or
prohibited from being exported or shared, even with a
cooperative arrangement with an ally and even if it is for a
defensive purpose. It is not designed to be an offensive
missile; it is designed strictly to defend against missile
attacks; it is an interceptor that is supposed to intercept an
incoming missile.
Now you mentioned that the standard, if I have this right,
was whether a missile has enough energy or capacity to propel a
500 kilogram warhead a distance of 300 kilometers, not whether
the missile is actually suitable as an offensive weapon.
And if such a missile has those characteristics, then, as I
understand it, there would be a strong presumption to deny its
export. Does this mean that there is room in that definition
and that standard to decide that you could export the missile,
even though it had the capacity to propel a certain size
warhead a certain distance?
Mr. Van Diepen. That's exactly right, Senator. Under the
guidelines, we are allowed to overcome that strong presumption
of denial in what are called rare occasions that, again, have
to be very well-justified, in terms of these five specific
nonproliferation and export control factors in the MTCR
guidelines.
So in the past, for example, we sold Trident missiles and
Tomahawk missiles to the UK as a rare occasion to overcome the
strong presumption of denial. And that was a recipient that
obviously scores very high in terms of those five----
Senator Cochran. But in the case of the Arrow system and
Israel, for example, I understand that there may be a strong
presumption of denial invoked there because it would fit within
that category. If we co-produce the Arrow interceptor missile
here and ship it back to Israel, because they cannot produce
enough to really meet what they consider to be their need to
protect their security interest, is it our policy right now to
deny the export of those interceptor missiles if we co-produce
them with Israel?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, actually, Senator, this is a good
example of how we work to balance the various considerations
that apply to these sorts of ideas.
In this case, we worked very closely with the government of
Israel, with Israeli industry, with U.S. industry, and with the
Missile Defense Organization, and came up with a way of
increasing Israel's ability to make Arrow interceptors that did
not require the United States to export Category I items to
Israel. In effect, we designed what we are calling enhanced
production of components for the Arrow.
And so Israel will be building more Arrows in Israel using
more components from the United States. And so the Israelis
will be able to get what they need in terms of enhanced
production of the Arrow, while the United States will be able
to support that basically in the way that we have supported the
Arrow program since 1982. That does not rely on the transfer
from the United States to Israel of Category I items.
And so, we found, in effect, a workaround that does not do
co-production in the sense of making it here and shipping it
there, but having enhanced U.S. assistance to Israel making it
there, so that they can make more, faster, by getting more
components made in the United States.
Senator Cochran. Well, adhering to that, would you then say
that it would be a prohibition of the regime if we decided to
build the entire missile here and ship it back to Israel? Are
you painting us in a corner where, in an emergency situation or
under later developing challenges that Israel might face, we
would not be able to build that missile here and send it to
them, even if it meant it was critical and important to the
protection of Israel from its adversaries?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, again, Senator, that same strong
presumption of denial would apply and the United States would
have the ability to decide as a matter of policy that, in that
particular case, it was a rare occasion. But we would have to
be prepared to justify that to our MTCR partners. In terms of
the MTCR guidelines, we would have to be prepared to live with
whatever precedents other countries decided to draw from that
sale.
The problem being, of course, that Israel itself maintains
certain programs of proliferation concern, and so if the United
States said yes to a Category I rocket system export to Israel,
it is going to be hard for us potentially to say no to a
Russian export of Category I rocket technology to Iran.
I do not want to draw those kinds of parallels, but you can
see people trying to make those kinds of arguments. And all of
that would have to be taken into account in any decisionmaking
on that kind of question.
But thus far, we have been able to provide very substantial
support to the Arrow program by remaining below the Category I
line, and that seems to be working out very well.
Senator Cochran. Another anomaly seems to me to be the
situation with another missile system like the Theater High
Altitude Area Defense System. It is a long, slender missile. It
does not have the capacity, really, to accommodate a 500
kilogram payload. But because of the amount of energy and
thrust it has and capabilities to propel objects long
distances, could it probably be classified the same as the
Arrow in terms of reaching the Category I definition?
Mr. Billingslea. Senator, let me ask for us to go away and
come back to you with the technical parameters on that, because
I am not certain that is a----
Senator Cochran. That is correct?
Mr. Van Diepen. Yes, I also----
Senator Cochran. It would be good to know, because if we
are adhering to a standard that is really going to get us in
deep trouble in terms of our own security interests and our
allies' security interest, then we need to rethink it. That is
all I am saying.
And that is why, in my opening statement, I wondered aloud,
what do we need to think through and what do we need to assess
as serious challenges in this area? We are all in favor of
doing everything we can to keep down the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles, but in the effort to
do that and adhering to the MTCR, we at the same time are
putting ourselves in jeopardy by our own interpretations and
our own policies and our cooperative efforts with our friends
around the world. I just do not want us to go off down a trail
that ends up putting us in jeopardy.
Mr. Van Diepen. And there is certainly no intention to do
that, Senator. I think what we were able to work out with our
Defense Department colleagues on UAVs is very much proof of the
idea that we can in fact think ahead----
Senator Cochran. These are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
that we are seeing now, the Global Hawk, the Predator.
Mr. Billingslea. But that's a good example, I think. There
are a lot of analogies to be drawn from that experience. When
you look at operation Enduring Freedom, you see what systems
worked really well, what systems did not. You come to the
conclusion that there is a real future for UAV and weaponized
UAV platforms.
Now, the UAV family of systems has a lot of technical ties
to basic cruise missile technology and, therefore, do in fact
potentially get caught up in the whole Missile Technology
Control Regime effort.
But we were able to work out with the Department of State,
recognizing this fact but also recognizing that we want to work
with our NATO allies and our other allies to bring them along
to capitalize upon this new generation of technology, we were
able to work out a regime that lets us cooperate with allies
but, again, in a way that does not jeopardize the effective
functioning of the MTCR, which in and of itself, I have to say,
is a valuable regime.
When you look at a lot of the threat missiles that we are
dealing with today, one thing that can be said of a lot of it--
now, this is not perfectly true, because you have a lot of
Russian and Chinese technology increasingly mixed in--but a lot
of this stuff is based on Soviet Arrow Scud technology that has
been configured and reconfigured in new and interesting ways to
give longer and longer and more dangerous range. So we have
effectively channeled some of the foreign missile programs, and
the MTCR gets a lot of credit for that.
But that is only part of the picture, and both active and
passive defenses have to be brought into the equation here.
And in the case of India, Arrow with India, Israeli
cooperation with India, the jury is still out on that. The
administration is working the issue, but we also need to hear
from the Indians in terms of what they need, what they want,
what kind of missile defense systems do they want to have, and
for what ends. And we are pursuing that.
Senator Cochran. Well, thank you very much. I think your
testimony today and your participation in this hearing have
been very helpful to our depth of understanding and
appreciation of the challenges that we face in trying to help
support the administration's good efforts in this area. Thank
you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.
Mr. Van Diepen and Mr. Billingslea, thank you very much
again for being with us today and for your statements. No
question, it will be a big help to this Subcommittee.
As your testimony indicates, without help from the states
with weapons of mass destruction, terrorists will have
significant difficulty in acquiring a WMD capability. We need
to work on both ends of the problem, discouraging state WMD
programs, as well as destroying terrorist organizations.
We also need to strengthen current nonproliferation
regimes. As Mr. Van Diepen indicated, an activist agenda must
use a broad range of tools--and I like that toolkit
description--to limit proliferation. These tools include our
bilateral assistance programs. We must be careful about the
impact that weakening one of these tools will have on our
overall nonproliferation goals.
For example, the administration froze funding for all
cooperative threat reduction programs because of Russian
noncompliance to the Biological Weapons Convention and the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Is America more secure after
several months of stalled projects in the former Soviet Union?
Is Russia more open to U.S. pleas to end their assistance to
Iran's nuclear power plant? These issues are linked and must be
answered.
Press reports indicate that Russia is proposing to
construct five additional nuclear power plants in Iran. Where
our bilateral efforts are insufficient, we should strengthen
multilateral regimes. A fully funded IAEA is a good way to
ensure that a new Iranian nuclear reactor is not being used to
advance a weapons program.
Preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD is a complicated
task. However, it is easier than the alternative of responding
to a WMD terrorist attack.
Gentlemen, we have no further questions at this time.
However, Members of this Subcommittee may submit questions in
writing for any of the witnesses. We would appreciate a timely
response to any questions. The record will remain open for
these questions and for further statements from my colleagues.
Again, if my friend does not have anymore statements----
Senator Cochran. I have nothing further.
Senator Akaka [continuing]. I would like to express my
appreciation to our witnesses for their time and for sharing
their insights with us. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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