[Senate Hearing 107-379]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-379
S. 1867--A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
on
S. 1867
TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
__________
FEBRUARY 7, 2002
__________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Kevin J. Landy, Counsel
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Jayson P. Roehl, Minority Professional Staff Member
Morgan P. Muchnick, Minority Professional Staff Member
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Stevens.............................................. 2
Senator Torricelli........................................... 11
Prepared statement:
Senator Bunning.............................................. 25
WITNESSES
Thursday, February 7, 2002
Hon. Dave McCurdy, President, Electronic Industries Alliance, and
Commissioner, Commission to Assess the Organization of the
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction............................................... 3
Norman R. Augustine, Chairman of the Executive Committee,
Lockheed Martin Corporation and Commissioner, U.S. Commission
on National Security........................................... 5
Richard K. Betts, Director, Institute of War and Peace Studies,
Columbia University and Commissioner, National Commission on
Terrorism...................................................... 7
Maurice Sonnenberg, Senior International Advisor, Bear, Stearns
and Co., Inc. and Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, L.L.P. and
former Vice Chair, National Commission on Terrorism............ 9
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Augustine, Norman R.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Betts, Richard K.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 37
McCurdy, Hon. Dave:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 26
Sonnenberg, Maurice:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Appendix
James Schlesinger, prepared statement with attached article
entitled ``A Test by Terrorism''............................... 46
Copy of bill of S. 1867.......................................... 56
S. 1867--A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Torricelli, and Stevens.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
Today we are going to be considering legislation that
Senator John McCain and I have introduced to establish an
independent commission to examine and report on the facts and
causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
As you probably know, Senator McCain has minor surgery this
week and that is why he is not here, because otherwise he would
be here testifying.
We introduced the legislation late last year because we
felt that it was important to get the truth about how those
attacks could have happened and whether there was anything the
Federal Government might have done to prevent them. An
independent and impartial commission, composed of knowledgeable
citizens, we concluded was the best way to learn the lessons of
September 11, so that we in Congress, together with the
President and those serving with him in the Executive Branch
have the information we need to make the best choices about
protecting the future of the American people here at home. That
is future security we are talking about.
Our proposal would create a National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States that will be charged
with constructing a full picture of the circumstances
surrounding the attacks, including the Federal Government's
preparedness and response. The commission would also be charged
with formulating recommendations for ways to strengthen our
defenses against future terrorist attacks.
Rarely in our history have events left scars on our
national psyche as deep as those left in the aftermath of
September 11, when more than 3,000 Americans were killed. The
attack on Pearl Harbor was clearly one of those events, and it
was followed by an independent investigative commission and, in
fact, Congressional investigations.
There have been many more recent commissions for serious,
though less cataclysmic national security crises. Our military,
for example, has investigated major terrorist actions in the
past, as it did after the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, in order
to learn lessons that might prevent future tragedies. And that
is exactly what we have in mind here, on a larger scale.
The most obvious question we have, of course, is how the
terrorist plot succeeded despite the vast intelligence
capabilities of our Nation. But we also ought to look into
possible systemic deficiencies in other areas of our national
security structure, including our counterterrorism
capabilities, for example, our immigration and border control
systems, our diplomacy, and our diplomatic activities.
The best way to achieve the unvarnished truth is to allow
those who know the most about the array of subjects that must
be explored to deliberate in an atmosphere free of politics.
Senator McCain and I have tried to create those optimum
conditions with this commission. The initial months after
September 11 were understandably and appropriately preoccupied
with mourning and healing and then the aggressive and,
thankfully, successful prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.
But now that the Taliban has been removed from power and
the reconstruction of Afghanistan is underway, we can and
should begin to pursue in earnest the process of finding
answers to our questions. Determining the causes and
circumstances of the terrorist attacks will ensure that those
who lost their lives on this second American day of infamy will
not have died in vain.
The commission we propose would, in that sense, pay tribute
to the victims of September 11 but also would convey to their
survivors and all Americans the message that their government
is doing everything within its power to protect their future.
We are very fortunate to have with us this morning four
witnesses who have served on commissions that assessed the
growing threat of terrorism and who therefore have expertise
particularly relevant to the work of a national commission
looking into September 11. I look forward to their testimony.
Senator Stevens.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. I am sorry to say I
have another meeting in just about 20 minutes, but I am very
interested in this. I support the concept, Mr. Chairman, but I
am not sure it is timely yet. I think this event was just so
staggering on our national psyche that we may want to wait a
little while before we create a commission like this. But I
will be pleased to hear some of these statements, and I thank
you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens,
for your support of the concept and I look forward to working
with you on the timing. I think this is all about beginning a
process that will take at least several months to go forward.
I am going to down the table of distinguished witnesses and
start with the Hon. Dave McCurdy, who is before us today as
President of the Electronic Industries Alliance, and has served
as a Commissioner on the Commission to Assess the Organization
of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Dave, thanks for being with us.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVE McCURDY,\1\ PRESIDENT, ELECTRONIC
INDUSTRIES ALLIANCE, COMMISSIONER AND COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO COMBAT THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a
pleasure to be with you and Senator Stevens, as well. And
always good to be with my friends and colleagues on this side
of the table, as well.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy with an attachment
appears in the Appendix on page 26.
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I assume you are starting on this side because I have more
gray hair, but Dick and I may compete for the quality of the
gray hair, but it is an honor to be here.
Chairman Lieberman. You have become one of our gray
eminences very early.
Mr. McCurdy. It is amazing what will happen.
The commission proposed in your bill is charged with one of
the most serious and significant tasks in our Nation's history.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States
is united in its resolve to take the war to the terrorist
organizations, as well as the countries who harbor and support
them. But not since World War II has the country rallied and
come together to face a common enemy, albeit an amorphous and
insidious variety.
Mr. Chairman, the most fundamental role and responsibility
of the government and Congress is to provide for our common
defense. And I add my commendation to President Bush, the
administration, and Congress for their remarkable leadership
and crisis management we have witnessed since the September 11
attacks.
And I share Senator Stevens note of caution that, even
though we have completed the first phase of this war by
eliminating the Taliban and al Qaeda hold on Afghanistan, there
is still much to be done to successfully prosecute the campaign
against terrorism. It is imperative that nothing interferes
with or impedes the prosecution of the war or efforts to
bolster the defense of our homeland.
Nevertheless, the requirements of this ongoing war must be
balanced with the right of Americans to know why our
intelligence, defense and law enforcement agencies were unable
to prevent the attacks. Without question, now is not the time
to point fingers or to look for scapegoats, but we must
understand the causes, identify the weaknesses, and correct the
lapses that allowed this catastrophe to occur.
The American people deserve a forthright and complete
accounting of the circumstances of that day. Above all, we must
do all we can to ensure that such attack never occurs again.
I know that the Chairman and the Senator know that when the
National Security Act of 1947 actually was written, it was to
ensure that we never had or suffered another Pearl Harbor type
of attack. And I think that is the principle that we need to
keep in mind.
There are five Senate and five House committees that have
jurisdiction and authority to conduct investigations and to
review what happened. Arguably, there are even more, including
this one. I certainly have the highest confidence in the
leadership of these respective committees, particularly my
former colleagues and current chairman, of the Intelligence
Committee and Armed Services Committee, who I worked with on a
daily basis.
However, in my opinion, a commission has the advantage of
being independent, singularly focused, and able to work outside
the glare of the media. For these reasons, I support forming
the commission to investigate the terrorist attacks upon the
United States.
In my experience, commissions work because they are not
constrained by arbitrary jurisdiction or turf wars and
politics, and thus have the ability to step back and take a
more holistic view. In this instance, a commission can
objectively collect facts, evaluate the evidence, and review
the mission and effectiveness of the Federal, State, local and
private organizations charged with our safety.
Commissions are valuable because they are generally non-
partisan and when effectively chaired seek consensus based
recommendations and solutions. Operating an effective
commission on the September 11 attacks will not be an easy
task, but there already has been much valuable forensic work
performed by the intelligence community, law enforcement, and
the media to build upon.
Based upon my experience with Congressional committees,
presidential and Congressional commissions, war games, as well
as my private sector experience in the technology industry, I
believe there are numerous questions that this commission must
investigate. It is especially important not to have any
preconceived notions. And in this case, there are still many
more questions than answers.
These questions include but are certainly not limited to
the following: Is there a clear chain of command and authority?
What are the organizational impediments to effective
collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence and
information? Is technology being used to its fullest potential
to provide effective information management? What indications
and warning mechanisms were in place? How effective are they?
What is the role of government versus private organizations?
The list can go on, and I detailed more in my written
statement.
A priority for this commission must be to complement rather
than compete with the efforts of Congress. Similarly,
cooperation with the relevant Executive Branch agencies will be
essential. I am confident that these issues can be worked
through. Indeed, both Congress and the administration deserve
enormous credit for the actions already being taken, such as
the establishment of the Homeland Security office to improve
coordination, the Patriot Act, and the Airline Security
legislation.
In addition, the President's budget proposal clearly makes
homeland security a top priority. Still, this commission could
serve a valuable role in looking at these additional measures
and identifying areas that may need greater attention.
I am also confident that the failures that resulted in the
terrorist strike will be revealed and addressed, but this
outcome is not automatic. Bureaucracies have a natural tendency
to fight the last war rather than the next one. A commission
can be particularly helpful in taking a comprehensive view of
the events of September 11 and fashioning recommendations that
mitigate this tendency.
Mr. Chairman, Charles Darwin observed that it is not the
strongest nor the most intelligent that survive, but the ones
most responsive to change. The September 11 attacks were
brilliantly evil, they were entirely outside the box of what we
thought likely, and now it is our turn to adapt.
To win this war, government must change how it thinks and
acts, and do a much better job of coordinating its assets.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, David, for that very thoughtful
statement.
Next is Norman Augustine, Chairman of the Executive
Committee of Lockheed Martin Corporation, a leader in America's
corporate and civic life for a good long time now, and also I
will mention, as part of that, a Commissioner of the U.S.
Commission on National Security known as the Hart-Rudman
Commission.
Thanks so much for being here.
TESTIMONY OF NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE,\1\ CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION AND COMMISSIONER, U.S.
COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Augustine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
Committee. I particularly appreciate the opportunity to share
my views on the proposed commission.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine appears in the Appendix
on page 32.
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With the Committee's permission, I would like to submit for
the record a long statement and I will just abstract it now.
Chairman Lieberman. Fine, we will accept and print that
longer statement in the record.
Mr. Augustine. I also probably should emphasize for the
record that my comments this morning will be entirely my own,
and I am not representing any of the organizations that I
happen to be affiliated with.
It goes without saying that the issues that are addressed
by S. 1867 are of great importance to the country. It was, as
you said Mr. Chairman, my privilege to serve on the Hart-Rudman
Commission for several years. Having done so, it unfortunately
came as no great surprise to me or, I believe, my colleagues,
that America was subjected to an attack of the general nature
that we suffered on September 11.
I say this not because of any specific evidence of
impending tragedy, but rather from a derived conclusion, if you
will, from three basic considerations. The first of these was
that it has been long evident that there are individuals and
groups on this planet that have utter contempt for all that
America stands for and have been very vocal about doing us
harm.
The second consideration is that with the end of the Cold
War, when one views America's military capability it would be
seemingly futal for such enemies to attack America in a
conventional fashion on the land, in the air, at sea, or even
in space.
That leads to the third consideration, and that is in
recent decades, we have witnessed a very fundamental change
that largely has been brought about by the unintended
consequences of advancements in science and technology. For the
first time in history, individuals or very small groups can
very profoundly impact much larger groups in a very adverse
manner. It is not possible for the former, smaller groups to
exert control over the larger groups, but they can certainly
disrupt the stability that is enjoyed by these larger groups.
So in short, for individuals or groups that are seeking to
extort or physically harm America, by far the most obvious
avenue today, and presumably in the future, will be through
terrorist actions. There are groups that, as we now all know,
have such capabilities and are seeking further capabilities for
such actions.
Clearly, we do have a great deal to learn and we have a
great deal more to do if we are going to thwart terrorism and
its consequences. The proposal that has been made to establish
a commission to learn from the events of September 11 would
appear to me to be a very logical undertaking. In the final
assessment, though, I believe that its usefulness will, to a
very large degree, depend on the quality and the judgment of
the commissioners and of their staff, those who are involved in
the endeavor. It will depend greatly on the perspective they
take as they embark on such an undertaking.
Specifically, it would seem that there would be little to
be gained simply by revisiting history for history's sake. In
fact, doing so might even be divisive.
It is also important, I believe, that the commission not
unduly burden those who already carry the heavy burden of
responding to, preparing for, and hopefully avoiding future
terrorist acts.
On the other hand, I believe that if those involved in the
commission's work are able to take a rather forward looking
perspective, take a rather broad perspective of lessons
learned, lessons that could impact our future security, I
believe that the commission can make a very significant
contribution. It is apparent, from the wording of the
legislation and, Mr. Chairman, from the wording of your
statement, that the drafting of this legislation recognizes
those considerations that I have just cited.
I would note one specific matter with regard to the
proposed legislation. That is, it does not seem to make clear
how much of the commission's work is to be conducted in full
public view. Of course, America prides itself on conducting the
affairs of its government under a spotlight, and that is to our
credit in general. But at the same time, I can imagine many of
the topics that the commissioners will be called upon to
address will be topics to which we would just as soon our
enemies not be privy.
I particularly address here those issues that do not truly
fall under the existing legislation for protecting national
secrets, but are extremely sensitive in today's world and
probably deserve some form of protection. It was not clear to
me from the legislation how that would be dealt with.
In summary, I would just say that I believe a commission of
the type that has been proposed can indeed be very beneficial,
but only if it is conducted in a very sensitive and a very
responsible fashion. And I would close, as did my colleague,
David, by noting that we do live in a new world and I would use
a quote, as he did, Jefferson's reminder that the price of
liberty is eternal vigilance. This seems to have never been
more true than it is today.
Thank you for this opportunity to share my views.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Augustine, and I
look forward to having some exchange with you on some of the
questions that you raised, which are well taken.
Next we have Professor Richard K. Betts, who is Director of
the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University
and a Commissioner of the National Commission on Terrorism,
which if I have got my commissions right was the Bremer
Commission.
Thanks for being here.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. BETTS,\1\ DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF WAR
AND PEACE STUDIES, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AND COMMISSIONER,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM
Mr. Betts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of
time, I will summarize my longer, prepared statement.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Betts appears in the Appendix on
page 37.
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My main points are that a national commission would perform
an important function in coming to grips with the disaster of
September 11, and such a commission should work best in
addition to other efforts, such as Congressional
investigations, not as a substitute for them.
The organization of the commission in the proposed bill
seems to make good sense, with one exception. That is that
there is a tension between the objectives in Section 3(c)(3)
concerning balanced representation of different professional
groups, and the procedures for appointment of members of the
commission set out in Section 3(a).
In the coming months and years, there will be many rumors
and half-truths leaking out to explain why the warning process
failed before September 11, how organizational structures were
unprepared, and so forth. There is a great need for an official
post-mortem that brings the full story out in a thorough,
careful, balanced and non-partisan manner. The main benefit of
a national commission, I think, would be political credibility,
to provide a detailed and sober investigation that the public
could have confidence is as objective as humanly possible.
There will be many exercises attempting to lay blame and it
is important to have one serious effort that has high
credibility in terms of two important criteria: Access to all
relevant information and disinterest in scoring political
points. In this matter, something I did not address in my
statement, I would though like to associate myself with the
last witness' emphasis on the need to conduct the most
sensitive aspects of such a commission's work in reliable
secrecy.
My view is influenced by my own experience as a member of
the National Commission on Terrorism established by Congress 3
years ago. That commission operated in a thoroughly bipartisan
way. I say that as one of the four members of the commission
appointed by the Minority Democratic leadership. Although it
was a commission created by a Republican controlled Congress,
there was never a hint that our effort involved grinding axes
to embarrass the Democratic administration.
It would be unrealistic and undesirable to see a commission
as the sole official solution to grappling with what happened
on September 11. Neither presidential nor Congressional
commissions ever completely settle the questions with which
they are tasked. Other efforts, particularly Congressional
investigations, can do things that a commission cannot. On a
matter as crucial as September 11, some redundancy in
investigation is not only unavoidable, it is useful.
Consider the investigations of the intelligence community
in the mid-1970's. The process began with the Rockefeller
Commission and expanded to investigations by select committees
of the House and Senate, and all of these were useful in
different ways.
S. 1867 does not have any truly serious deficiencies, in my
view. My one reservation is about the process for appointing
members of the commission. Section 3(c) of the bill sets out an
excellent summary of the qualifications desirable for the
commissioners to be selected. The current bill's Section 3(a)
however, sets out a process that disperses appointment
authority widely. That would seem, to me, to make it hard to
carefully craft a group as a whole.
The President would be able to design some balance with his
four allotted appointees, but the other 10 appointments are
parcelled out to 10 different committee chairs, or 20 people in
all, if the consultation with their ranking members is to be
genuine. To get a good distribution of people from the
military, diplomacy, business, law enforcement and so forth, it
seems that the 10 or 20 chairpersons and ranking members or
their staffs would have to caucus and do some horse trading.
Otherwise, it appears that we could get a random assortment
that might not be ideally suited to conducting a full, thorough
and competent investigation.
Falling back on my experience with the Terrorism
Commission, I would suggest considering some greater
centralization of Congress' share of the appointments. One way
to do this would be to give the final appointment authority to
the majority and minority leaders of both houses. The committee
chairpersons and ranking members could certainly make their
preferences known and the leadership would be free to select
many of them.
To conclude, a national commission, however well it does
its job, will not bring us to closure in understanding how we
should best move to prevent another September 11 catastrophe.
That should not be the test of such a commission. September 11
was a watershed in national security policy, and figuring out
and adjusting to the lessons will be a long process.
The right sort of commission can be a good start. It can
clear away underbrush, answer some questions, even if not all,
lay down a valuable set of markers to channel other efforts,
and discredit fast and loose attempts at easy answers. That
will leave much to be done, but it will have done a lot.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Professor, again
helpful testimony.
It is a pleasure to welcome Maurice Sonnenberg, an old and
dear friend who also happens to be Senior International Advisor
to Bear, Stearns and Company, and was Vice Chair on the
National Commission on Terrorism. Welcome.
TESTIMONY OF MAURICE SONNENBERG,\1\ SENIOR INTERNATIONAL
ADVISOR, BEAR, STEARNS AND COMPANY, INC. AND MANATT, PHELPS AND
PHILLIPS, L.L.P. FORMER VICE CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORISM
Mr. Sonnenberg. Nice to be here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
and Senator Torricelli.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sonnenberg appears in the
Appendix on page 43.
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I have been asked to testify in the efficacy of the
creation of a terrorist commission. Having served as Vice
Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism and having
been on the Commission for the Roll and Capabilities of the
Intelligence Community and the Commission for the Protection
and Reduction of Government Secrecy, I do come with a point of
view as to how these might be best structured.
A panel of this sort is of immeasurable importance in
helping to better understand what basically were the factors
that led up to the catastrophe of September 11. It also places
into context sound bites such as ``a failure of intelligence.''
While these are catchy phrases, they are gross generalizations
designed to convey the impression that it must have been a
systemic all-encompassing failure on the part of the Agency,
the Bureau, and others in the intelligence community.
There may have been weaknesses in the intelligence
community, but a more comprehensive analysis should also focus
on the role of several governmental institutions, among them
the White House, Congress, and the Department of Justice.
When looking at these matters, the commission must also
address obviously such matters as impediments to law
enforcement, immigration, border controls, financing of
terrorist activities, intelligence sharing, and on and on.
The commission must obviously be established in a manner
that supplements but does not replace the need for continued
Congressional oversight, nor can it be allowed to compromise
security, both at the National Security Council level and at
the intelligence community level.
But what about the specifics of a commission. It must take
some very talented people and a superior staff to assess
information available both in open and classified sources. The
individuals appointed to this commission should bring to the
task a broad understanding of the subject as a whole, rather
than overly detailed knowledge of a specific field. It goes
without saying that everyone associated with this commission
will require multiple clearances, especially in the instances
where the investigation hinges on matters related to covert
operations.
The commission will require, as we had before, a specific
location, frankly not known to the public. On all the
commissions I served on, that was the case.
Congressionally mandated, our members were appointed, in
our commission, by the majority and the minority leadership. In
the other two commissions, the White House participated in the
appointments.
As far as I know very few people knew the names of our
commission members until the report was published. We had never
had a leak. This I might add was true for the commission on the
role and capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence community. And
that comes up to the topic of the security of the commission
and where they are housed.
Another reason that I am concerned about is the security in
terms of the commission and staff members. We have got to check
with law enforcement and intelligence community. We are now at
a period after September 11. Do not underestimate the
possibility that these commissioners could be jeopardized or
pressured. And therefore, when this commission is set up, the
idea of some secrecy behind where they meet and who they are,
to some degree, must be looked at. I would do that in
consultation with the proper law enforcement authorities.
Finally, let me say you may wonder why, after all of this,
would I want this commission? First, I am certain that the
White House, or some branch of the legislature, is going to set
one up no matter what happens. Second, a commission of this
sort will have substantial public consequences. The cynics say
oh well, all these commission reports wind up on the shelf.
Frankly, most do. There is, however, a great difference
regarding this one. It is post-September 11. If well written
and carefully conceived, it will carry the gravitas and
influence a study of this nature should have.
The National Commission on Terrorism and the Hart-Rudman
Report had some influence in focusing many members of the
Congress, the media, and the press on the subject. The
prescience of these reports made them unique and totally
relevant to the legislation that passed after September 11.
A commission report on the so-called ``monumental failure
of intelligence'' can help to inform and educate the public to
better understand the complexity of these matters. That is not
to say that a commission would be a fount of wisdom. But it
might, by its very making, keep the public focused on this
problem that is not about to end or, for that matter, in our
lifetime. You can control terrorism but you can never totally
eliminate it. The sooner the citizenry is fully cognizant of
this, the less likely it will lose its sense of purpose and
resolve.
That being the case, it is imperative that the public
continue to be supportive of measures necessary to face this
ongoing threat. The commission can be a valuable tool in this
effort. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. It was excellent
testimony, very constructive.
I should indicate for the record that Senator Thompson is
home in Tennessee because, as is known, of the death of his
daughter last week. He and I spoke yesterday and he is very
interested in this subject and will be re-engaged with us next
week.
I am delighted that Senator Torricelli is here. Senator
Torricelli has introduced, along with Senator Grassley,
legislation to create a commission on the same subject. For
reasons known best to the Senate Parliamentarian, it has been
referred to the Judiciary Committee, not here. But I wonder, my
colleague, if you would like to deliver an opening statement at
this time?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TORRICELLI
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I
enjoyed the testimony and appreciate each of the witnesses
appearing today. It is very good to see my neighbor from New
York, Maurice Sonnenberg, here, and my former colleague, Dave
McCurdy, who by all rights in my personal judgment, should have
been a member of this institution but that is the way life
works.
Chairman Lieberman. Probably did better.
Mr. McCurdy. It is nice on this side of the table, Senator.
Senator Torricelli. That is his gain and our loss. Mr.
Betts, Mr. Augustine, thank you all for being with us today.
This is a subject about which I have extremely strong
feelings. While, for some Americans, September 11 will soon
become part of history, a painful event, but something that
will take its place along with other tragedies in our
generation. For those of us who live in New York, New Jersey,
and Northern Virginia, it is something that is still unfolding
every day. You cannot visit a community in my State without
someone knowing a widow or an orphan, a parent. They wake up
with this tragedy every single day. A loss child, a mortgage
that cannot get paid, a family whose future has been changed.
I support this commission because if not for everyone else
in the Nation, and if not for history, if not for assuring that
it never happens again, if none of those reasons were valid,
then we are left simply with this. Those people deserve an
answer.
It is my own belief that the American people have
remarkably low expectations for their government. They live
their lives, they want as little contact with the government,
usually, as possible. But at a minimum, they expect the
government to keep them safe. In their homes from crimes and in
the world from adversaries. And they trust that is being done.
It was not done. And there may be many reasons, there may
be many excuses, there may be many legitimate problems, but it
did not happen. And somebody has to provide an answer.
The President has made some remarkable appropriations
requests for law enforcement, intelligence, and the military,
historic changes in our level of expenditures that will
radically change the finances of the U.S. Government. It may be
the right recommendation. And Democrats and Republicans have
competed with each other to endorse them more quickly than the
next. That may be the right decision.
The simple truth is there is not a member of this Congress,
and there is no one in the administration, who really knows.
One cannot build structure of law enforcement or defense
without understanding whether the foundation is sound.
These institutions upon which we would now rest our
security and invest these new funds are the same institutions
that failed on September 11. I do not say that because the
institutions should be abandoned or dismantled or discredited,
simply that we need to understand what failed before we invest
in them again. That is the purpose of this commission.
It is regrettable that the commission was not already
formed. I genuinely believed that President Bush, in the weeks
after September 11, would form a commission by Executive Order.
This exercise in the Congress of legislatively creating a
commission really should not have been necessary.
Faced with the same decision, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
created the Commission on Pearl Harbor in 10 days. Faced with
the national trauma of the Challenger accident, Ronald Reagan
acted within weeks. Faced with the catastrophe of the
assassination of President Kennedy and what it implied for the
security of the Executive Branch and the international
implications, Lyndon Johnson acted immediately with the Warren
Commission.
This has been our history. This should not be the
exception. In many ways, this is not as large a tragedy as each
of those. In some respect, it is larger, the death of thousands
in our greatest city and the capital of our country.
We are too close to the event and there has been too little
investigation to know much of what failed on September 11. Let
me quote from the Los Angeles Times, if I could, ``In the last
decade, suspected terrorists have repeatedly slipped in and out
of the United States. They have plotted against America while
in Federal custody. Key evidence that pointed to operatives and
their plans was ignored until well after the attacks. The mixed
signals now haunt a generation of U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement officials who realize that their efforts to track
terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden were undermined at times
by bungled investigations and bureaucratic rivalries.''
We now know that the FBI has known for at least 3 years
that two bin Laden operatives trained to be pilots in the
United States. One of them, a naturalized U.S. citizen from
Egypt purchased a used military aircraft in Arizona in 1993.
After he purchased the Saber 40 twin engine passenger jet for
bin Laden for $210,000, he flew to the Sudan.
Federal authorities also knew that Ramzi Yousef, who
planned and carried out the 1993 World Trade Center attacks
later planned to blow up 12 U.S. jets over the Pacific. One of
his co-conspirators in the Pacific plot told Philippine police
that he hoped to hijack a passenger plane and crash it into CIA
headquarters. He had attended U.S. flight schools. No one took
this evidence, to contact U.S. flight schools or raise the
possibility of such a conspiracy.
I know it appears easy after the attacks for people in my
position or others to make it look easy. It was not easy. I
understand it is difficult. Gathering intelligence from
thousands or hundreds of thousands of sources, collating it,
analyzing it, understanding it is difficult. Of course it is
difficult. That is why we have a professional intelligence
community.
Maybe analyzing it and coming to the right conclusion was
difficult. Maybe it was impossible. I do not know. Nobody
knows. That is why we need a commission.
It may be that to fight the war on terrorism and also
undertake this review is difficult. It will involve some of the
same people and some of the same resources. I suspect that is
exactly the situation Franklin Delano Roosevelt had after Pearl
Harbor. And I suspect the admirals of the Pacific raised the
same objections. He ignored them and rightfully so.
How could America's mothers and fathers be asked to entrust
the lives of their sons and daughters to fight a war if they
did not have confidence in the military hierarchy. How could
Americans be asked to sacrifice and trust the future of their
country's security in a military establishment reeling from
Pearl Harbor if we did not believe in their competence or their
structure or their command? And so we fought the war and
undertook the review at the same time.
No doubt the same arguments about the need for classified
information were heard after Pearl Harbor and after the Kennedy
assassination and after the Challenger accident, during the war
that was being fought in Central America. But in each of those
instances, each president from Reagan to Roosevelt reached a
different judgment. We can analyze the problem and protect
information because we needed to reach a national judgment.
It may be, as was testified, that all these commissions did
not succeed. Some did. NASA was saved, the American space
program redesigned, because a commission did an extraordinary
job in a difficult moment in history of admitting where we were
wrong, why lives were lost, because of failures of the
government. It worked.
The Pearl Harbor Commission did restore confidence. People
believed in the military establishment again. And I believe,
for all the divisiveness of Central America, questions of
strategic weapons, those commissions also succeeded in
answering questions of highly classified materials, at a point
where the Nation was very divided.
This commission not only makes sense, it makes overwhelming
sense. It will be painful because it will involve truth that we
do not want to face, failures of institutions we believe in,
and of people and friends that we like.
In the final analysis, there is no choice. We owe this to
the country. We owe it to the victims. And it is impossible to
design a national security system to ensure that this never
happens again without this review. We could not begin to
appoint officials, redesign our security apparatus, and commit
billions of dollars of new resources for the future unless we
understand this failure of the past.
I am committed to making this happen. It is regrettable,
for reasons I do not understand, that Senator Grassley and I
have undertaken different legislation than Senator McCain and
Senator Lieberman. I hope that is reconciled. The differences
are narrow but they are real. As was testified here today, in
our legislation we specifically give appointment authority to
the majority and minority leaders and the President of the
United States to assure that those six individuals, balancing
their interests, can ensure that the commission accurately
reflects the different parts of the intelligence, military and
civilian authorities.
But we also specifically mandate the commission to look at
the intelligence and law enforcement authorities involved,
because while this should be a broad look at the failures,
obviously the responsibility most directly lies there and
should be addressed.
I hope by the time this process has run its course that we
have one bipartisan piece of legislation, but what is most
important is that this gets done, and done quickly.
In a democratic government, to have the people of our
country doubt the ability of those that they have chosen to
lead to protect them is very troubling. Even to have our
adversaries believe, when they have exhibited our
vulnerability, and inflicted us with enormous pain, that we
have not undertaken a review to fix the problems, continues to
signal vulnerability.
For all these reasons I am very grateful that my colleague,
Senator Lieberman, has called this hearing today. I think he
has done a great service to the Senate and the country by
beginning this process. And I am grateful to each of you and
your participation today. After the Chairman has begun his own
inquiries, I look forward to a discussion with you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Torricelli, for an
excellent statement. I, too, share your hope that we can
combine both bills. I think there were two major points of
difference. One is in the form of the selection of the members,
as you indicated, of the commission. The other is in the
statement of jurisdiction because the bill that Senator McCain
and I have introduced does mention intelligence but goes beyond
that to other functions of government. I hope we can do that. I
want to pick up and hope we can get together on a broad
bipartisan, single approach to this.
I want to pick up in my first question on something my
colleague said and begin it this way. Some of those, including
the White House, who have opposed the creation of such a
commission, to try to do it justice, have said that their main
concern is that it would distract those who have
responsibilities now, both military as Senator Torricelli
indicated, also I presume in the intelligence community and
other aspects of our government, from their daily
responsibilities.
I must say that I am not convinced by that, both because of
the historic precedents that my colleague states, the Roberts
Commission after Pearl Harbor, the Warren Commission after the
Kennedy assassination, the commission after the Challenger,
etc.
And even more to the point of the experience of the
witnesses, Mr. Augustine, if there had been a major problem of
Lockheed Martin of some sort where things had not been going as
you had wanted, and I am sure this never happens, or at one of
the new economy industries that is part of your association,
Mr. McCurdy, I am sure that though those people would continue
to be working on the line, you would jump right in and find out
what the heck went wrong here so you could stop it from
happening.
Anyway, I wanted to ask your reaction to the notion that to
create a commission of this kind might, in some sense, be
negative because it would be a distraction for those who are at
work now in these areas. Mr. Sonnenberg.
Mr. Sonnenberg. I understand the feeling of the White House
on this, however a commission of this sort will impinge upon
some of the time of some of the people who are called up. But
then, if we look at the role of Congress here, I think it was
Jim Woolsey who once told me, you know Maurice, I had to go up
there 104 times. Now that is not going to happen with this
commission. We have 6 months. There is no way in the world we
are going to fit someone in those days.
So my feeling is that, as Senator Torricelli rightfully
points out, it is absolutely imperative in my mind to have this
commission, but I do not think there will be an impingement of
the type that I am hearing about now.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Augustine.
Mr. Augustine. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have served on both
sides of commissions and I think it gets to be a question of
degree. I think there is no reason that it has to be
disruptive. But I think it could be disruptive. And it is going
to depend on the responsibility of the people who are involved.
I think without question that if properly managed people
can still do their jobs and respond to a commission of this
type. In our own company the way we solve these things in a
case of a major crisis, is we let one group of people worry
about the ongoing activities and another worry about the crisis
issues.
That is not an ideal solution, but I think it is an
approach that we have to consider. I don't think any of this is
what, in the vernacular, you would call a show stopper.
Chairman Lieberman. Either of the other two witnesses want
to comment?
Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, I concur with my colleagues'
statements. First of all, I want to commend Senator Torricelli
for his comments. I think they were superb.
You can always make an argument to defer an investigation
but quite frankly I concur with both of your sentiments that
now is the time to at least initiate the study.
As I said in my written statement, there is an incredible
amount of forensic evidence that has already been accumulated,
much of that in the public eye and through the media. So
there's a lot to build on.
As far as distraction, I think Mr. Sonnenberg said it well.
There are such a large number of committees in both the House
and Senate that have jurisdiction they could be truly
distracted if they were called before all of those. If there is
a deferral, I think the Congress should be focused on the
actions of protecting from here forward, as they have been
focusing, and allow a commission to take the time to reflect
and look more holistically at a broader cross-section of
jurisdiction.
Part of the challenges, and I do not think any of us are
prepared to make judgments, but from our experience the issue
is there is a lot of questions. Was it seamless? Everyone talks
about creation of fusion centers and this new cooperative
effort. It is easier in a wartime environment to do that. It is
in the non-wartime situation that you ask those questions
whether jurisdictions did cooperate properly. And you want to
know that there is not a gap in those seams. There are always
going to be seams, but you try to reduce those as much as
possible.
So for those points, I think the commission is timely and
appropriate.
One other point is about the political credibility, and I
think my friend, Mr. Augustine, raised that. I think there is a
great deal to be gained by that credibility. We cannot, as a
Nation, afford to have this degenerate into partisan finger
pointing on one side or the other.
And also, for those who argue that the internal reviews in
the organizations themselves have taken place and therefore it
is corrected, I would just point out there are a lot of
accounting firms and other groups out there trying to do that
to restore some credibility. But until it is raised to a higher
level that has those kind of independent view, I am not sure
the credibility is there.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Betts. The simple point is that the purpose of this
commission is to learn something important about what went
wrong. Presumably, that will help these busy people to do the
jobs better that we do not want to distract them from unduly.
Chairman Lieberman. Agreed. Congressman McCurdy, let me ask
you this, as a former chair of the House Intelligence
Committee, I am sure you can understand why the Intelligence
Committees in both chambers are interested in investigating the
role played by intelligence agencies leading up to September
11. Nevertheless, you have supported an independent commission
as a way to complement rather than compete with Congressional
efforts.
I wonder if you would expand a bit on that, about the
different roles that might be played by both here.
Mr. McCurdy. Clearly, the Intelligence Committees, who are
chaired by very capable and experienced individuals, have an
important role to play. I think you saw the commencement of
that yesterday on the Senate side.
Again, these can be complimentary efforts. If you look at
the intelligence definition of the community, that in itself
implies jurisdictional boundaries. I believe that any
commission of this nature needs to look beyond those, much
broader than that.
Plus, my experience on commissions, and I have been on some
actually for the CIA looking at issues of weapons of mass
destruction prior to the presidential commission I was
appointed to, there we had complete access to highly classified
data. And the individuals on those commissions not only
respected that, were experienced hands in dealing with
classified information. And in the long term made
recommendations that I think were helpful to the community as a
whole.
So again, they can be supportive, complimentary, but also
with the experience can stand back and make an objective
judgment at the end with regard to causality and concerns about
both organization and efforts to prevent it in the future.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask a final question in the time
I have left. Mr. Augustine, your written testimony and what you
delivered orally today urges us to make clear in the law the
extent to which the work of the commission must be conducted in
public view and can be conducted privately.
My understanding is that existing law would allow a
commission of this kind to hold closed hearings whenever it is
dealing with classified information or information from law
enforcement groups. And I gather that law governed Hart-Rudman
and the Bremer Commission.
I wonder if you, and then others if you wish, could reflect
a bit on that or whether you think that we need to do something
additional and specific in this proposed legislation, to
protect the confidentiality of classified information?
Mr. Augustine. It is an important and broad topic. My
belief is that there is a shortfall in the current system in
this regard. In the case at hand, I can well imagine a
commission like this would like to hypothesize future threats
and discuss them, to discuss vulnerabilities that we have. Some
of these are truly hypothetical. It is quite different from
having information on a specific threat of designing a specific
weapon. I am talking about purely conjectural discussions that
generally would not be covered by our laws.
I would cite another example from recent experience. I
served on the commission that reviewed the V-22 program in
which, you will recall, 22 Marines died the year before last.
One of the questions was how much of the problem was due to
pilot error?
So you are talking about fragmentary evidence, incomplete
evidence, but it is very important. You need to be able to
discuss something that can be very damaging to an individual or
to a group or an organization. You need to be able to talk
about it, but there is not enough factual evidence that you can
really have a public discussion.
We found it very inhibiting to be able to talk about issues
like that in public, just because of the consequences on
people--it had nothing to do with national security. It was
human decency and the like.
Chairman Lieberman. How about the experience that you had
on the Bremer Commission, with regard to the authority that
current law gives commissions to hold closed sessions when they
are classified or law enforcement topics?
Mr. Sonnenberg. To be frank, in terms of the Bremer
Commission, we never had a public hearing.
Chairman Lieberman. That eliminated the problem.
Mr. Sonnenberg. That is not to say I understand the
conflict between the openness of government and the necessity
for secret, as Mr. Augustine has pointed out.
We did it, for example, on the Secrecy Commission, which
was Senator Moynihan and Senator Helms. That commission, we had
one public hearing and that involved the subject of FOIA, which
you would expect to have an opening hearing on.
Now you might look at this in a different way. I understand
the legislation is talking about a preliminary report in 6
months and then another one to follow. You might think about
having some public hearings at that other end, thereby
eliminating the problem of free discussion, over and above
classified----
Chairman Lieberman. You mean after the preliminary report?
Mr. Sonnenberg. I would think you might be able to do that.
But remember what I said before, I am a little bit concerned,
and that is why I want you to go to law enforcement and the
intelligence community about the protection, and I am not being
wild about this, about the protection of commissions. We are in
a totally different era now and you will have to balance that.
Now the second half might be the area where you might want
to think about public hearings on specific subjects. You have
them laid out and say all right, we are going to hold a public
hearing. Because by then, after the preliminary report, it is
pretty well known what the commission is doing, who they are.
So I think you have to work on it a little bit.
Chairman Lieberman. Professor Betts.
Mr. Betts. I do not think the issue is the authority to
hold closed hearings or to keep information secret. The issue
is the general impression that is conveyed or the expectations
about how much this is expected to be an exercise in opening up
to the public. If the latter dominates the expectations, I
think that would seriously compromise the work of the
commission.
Chairman Lieberman. You would say that would be a mistake?
Mr. Betts. Yes, I think perhaps, as Maurice has suggested,
emphasizing the public aspects of the enterprise in the later
phase would make more sense. You would avoid a chilling effect
on the sharing of information with the commission. You would
avoid any conceivable problems, as unfortunately has happened
in some cases.
I remember many years ago, when Richard Helms was
testifying at open hearings about ITT and Chile, and was asked
whether the CIA had any covert operations. On the spur of the
moment he decided to lie in order to protect secrecy and wound
up having to go to trial over it.
For all those reasons, I think it would be good to
establish the presumption that for the most sensitive and most
important aspects of this investigation, many of which will
involve very sensitive classified information, that it is all
going to be very closely held until whatever time the
resolution is reached and the public phase can be emphasized.
Chairman Lieberman. David, and then we will finish up with
Norm Augustine.
Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I concur. And I
know, to many colleagues, this is somewhat of a surprise. But
on the commissions that I have dealt with, we never had public
hearings. Of course, in the Intelligence Committee we only had
one public hearing in all the time I was involved there over 9
years.
So I think it would be very helpful for a commission of
this nature that would be enduring a lot of scrutiny to be able
to work together in not only a secure environment, but also a
less public environment. Because there is going to be a lot of
information that needs to be shared among commissioners and the
staff. And I think the presumption should be that it would not
be held in the open.
Chairman Lieberman. Interesting. Mr. Augustine.
Mr. Augustine. I was just going to add that I think how you
handle this depends very much on the specific circumstances.
Years ago I chaired a commission that reviewed NASA as a whole
during the period after the Challenger accident. We held all
our meetings on television and it worked fine.
I think one has to view three categories of information.
One, that is clearly covered by national security legislation,
and you can discuss in private with no problem. Everything else
that you possibly can should be discussed in public. But I say
there is one exception, a third group that is not sensitive by
the definition of today's law but is certainly sensitive by the
definition of today's world. Perhaps there should be a
provision given to the members of the commission, which
hopefully they will use only very selectively, by majority vote
or by the chairman's decision, to deal with certain topics in
private.
Chairman Lieberman. That is very helpful. I appreciate, as
I listen to the four of you, from your experience, that to get
at the truth, which is what this is all about, of what might
have been done to prevent the attacks of September 11, a lot of
this is going to have to be in private.
There are categories where you may want to do some things
in public, as you just said. But the report will then stand on
its merits. I thank you. Senator Torricelli.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I tell you,
myself, while I think it is probably helpful to have one or two
public sessions to give the country a view of what is expected
and some insight into the discussions, because this is
obviously a source of national anxiety while the report is
being written and conducted.
It certainly does not trouble me that most of this would be
done privately. It is the final product in which we are
interested in. I think we simply need to have enough of a
public face to assure the public it is being done and being
done properly because of the current state of unease in the
Nation.
I only had several questions really. First, in each of your
experiences, the kind of people who should serve and where they
should come from, this is obviously an enormous time
commitment. It involves people who will have some expertise and
background. It should also involve people who are not co-opted
by their relationships with any of these institutions.
But I wonder if you would talk about the mix. Specifically,
some of these that involve members of Congress. It is always
difficult for me to believe that a member of Congress, on
something this intense, with a short time frame, has enough
time do this while meeting other responsibilities. I would
appreciate it if you would address that.
And whether we should look for commissioners who can do
this on a 6-month basis or a 1-year basis exclusively or almost
exclusively. And then your experiences on the mix of
personalities or experiences that these people should bring to
a commission. I think that helps us answer how, indeed, we
reconcile our legislation to get membership. I'll leave that to
anybody.
Mr. Augustine. I will be happy to start. The first
suggestion is no zealots. No people who have made up their mind
in advance or have taken a position----
Chairman Lieberman. That is a tough one to write in a law,
but it is a good idea.
Mr. Augustine. But it is important. People who are willing
to take an open mind, to learn, to change their mind, that is
absolutely critical.
The second is people who are willing to work together as a
team and try to arrive at a reasonable consensus. Avoid people
who have a single issue that they are fascinated by.
And finally, with regard to your question, Senator, I think
that to get people of the stature this commission would deserve
and would require, it will be very hard to get people who could
devote full time to it. And success is dependent on putting
together an extremely good full-time staff. It does not have to
be large, but it has to be very good. That means it has to have
a good staff leader, chief of staff if you will.
I think one has to call on the commissioners on a part-time
basis. It is, frankly, hopeless to get people of the kind you
want who are available full time.
Senator Torricelli. I agree with that.
How about, as we go forward now, please also address this
question about how you do the balance between having people who
have experience with these institutions or issues but are not
people so identified with the institutions that are being
examined that the commission loses credibility.
Mr. Sonnenberg. First, I would add to Mr. Augustine's
comment about the type of people. If full-time/part-time is the
issue of getting the quality and the type of people you need, I
doubt seriously you are going to find what you want full-time.
You want these people who have had a depth of experience,
knowledge of this material, and you are going to find them,
unfortunately, on a part-time basis.
Now about the stature, I believe that someone who has what
I would call a rather deep general view of the subject becomes
important. That is what you have staff for. You get all those
experts in house--who have the abilities to examine specific
issues.
Your question again, Senator was, specifically you asked
something just now?
Senator Torricelli. I asked a variety of them, but I tend
to do that.
Mr. Sonnenberg. The last one.
Senator Torricelli. The last one was this issue of how you
balance that you want people with expertise that know these
institutions, but you do not lose credibility of them being so
identified with the institutions. Whether or not you have seen
that as a problem before.
Then I want people to come back to this issue of members of
Congress as well, whether this has worked, who may have been
members in the past.
Mr. Sonnenberg. With regard to that, that is a double-edged
sword. Obviously, people who are identified with a community,
let's say, retirees maybe or people who have been out in the
business or the legal world or wherever, they have something
valuable to contribute. You are going to have to do that on a
very selective basis.
There are people, for example, who have been former agency
and FBI personnel who are going to be extremely valuable on our
commission. For example, on the Terrorism Commission, we had
Jim Woolsey, and frankly he was quite good. In fact, he was
excellent. We also had a fellow named John Lewis who had been
at one time head of counterterrorism for the FBI. Exceedingly
good.
Now were they experts in a specific field? One could say
so. Were they attached to an agency or bureau? Sure, by
history. But I do not think that precludes them. As is pointed
out, what you need really is an ability for all these people to
get together.
Now with regard to members of Congress, I served on the
Commission for the Roll and Capabilities of the Intelligence
Community. We had a Senator and a Congressman. Frankly, we had
a Senator who never showed up until the day the report came
out. On the other hand, we had a very involved Congressman by
the name of Porter Goss, who is now Chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee. He showed up to most meetings. But he
had some expertise, in addition, to contribute to that
particular committee.
Now what I am saying is it all depends which member of
Congress, or former member depending what they are doing, you
put on.
Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, I think the first criteria is
that they need to be independent. They not only need to be
independent thinkers, as I think Norm stated, they should also
be independent of organization and somewhat--he said zealots,
independent of ideology.
There are some, and I think we have all had experience with
this, there are some who lobby to get on commissions. And maybe
one of the best criteria is someone who does not want to be on
the commission. There are those who lobby to get on the
commission because they have a single interest. It is their
business to be involved in non-proliferation or whatever.
Sometimes they are not as prone to work to develop consensus
positions either.
And so I think that is a judgment that has to be exercised
by those making the appointments.
With regard to time, it would be a very time-consuming
activity. I do agree that the staff is the key there.
With regard to Senators or members of the House, I also
served on both types of commissions. And with all due respect
to this institution, you are on a moment's notice and you have
that beeper and it is a leash and it goes off constantly. There
is always some interruption or someone trying to get a piece of
your time. I think in some of these it is disruptive in a
commission.
I think it should be a private group as much as possible.
And last, with regard to the issue of experience, I think
you do not need--it is helpful to have the right mix. I think
that one of the suggestions was maybe working with the
leadership in a more consensus fashion. It is like the old
baseball trading. You make sure that you have a shortstop and a
third baseman, that you have someone who has experience in the
intelligence community or law enforcement.
Because we all spend time shaking our heads at acronyms and
the language of specific areas. You do not have time for
complete tutorials. So there has to be some knowledge there.
And you often assign, in the commissions I have been
involved in, Senator Specter and former Director Deutsch and
others, they would actually assign two commissioners to go
focus on specific issues. I focused on technology with regard
to WMD. Someone else focused on the bioterrorism portion of it
and biology. So again, it is nice to have that mix, aviation
mix, and law enforcement mix.
So you have to do an initial assessment of the scope of the
commission and try to fill those as much as possible. And then
you supplement it with the staff. You fill the holes with the
staff. Having a good staff director is absolutely critical.
Senator Torricelli. Given the desire of many institutions
to protect themselves and their people, their reputations and
their budget, it would be my belief that to do this without the
ability to compel testimony and subpoena power with the force
of law would be to make this a rather hollow exercise. We are
not interested in simply providing cover for institutions, to
provide comfort to the American people, but get genuine
answers.
Does anyone disagree with this notion that you have to have
subpoena power put in this to make this a meaningful exercise?
Mr. Betts. I think the ideal is to have the power but never
have to use it, to have it in your pocket.
Senator Torricelli. But nevertheless, it has to be given.
Just for the historic basis of this, as we are going
forward to argue with this, there are arguments about the
sensitivity of sharing classified information with such a
commission, given the sensitivity of the situation. I do not
ever remember that being a problem when we were going through
the debates about the MX missile on the commission, or the wars
in Central America, or even our missile technology and the
redesign of the Challenger. It is extraordinary to me that it
is arising now.
Do any of you remember there being problems of losses of
classified information during those exercises that would give
us pause now? Mr. Augustine.
Mr. Augustine. No, I do not ever remember a problem of a
loss of sensitive information from a commission of which I am
aware. But that really was not the point that I, at least, was
trying to make. I think the commission has to have full access
to all information and I think they will protect it if we pick
commissioners properly.
Senator Torricelli. Actually, I was not responding to your
point. I was responding to people down the street here.
Mr. Augustine. My concern is that there is information that
is not covered by existing laws that we still do not want
people living in caves to hear. That is the part I am talking
about. I do not worry about the commissioners. They should have
access to everything that is available.
Senator Torricelli. But I did not want, rhetorically, if
Senator Lieberman and I take this to the Floor, people are
going to rise and say well, to have this commission means
sharing this classified information with commissioners and this
involves certain risk. In my experience of watching this on
everything from the defense of our Nation with strategic
weapons to actual policy issues in combat with people on the
ground, I never remember that this was ever a problem with a
commission. Which raises whether that is an excuse or a reason
not to have a commission.
Mr. McCurdy. Again, the mix of the commissioners is vital
there. My experience is, both in the Intelligence Committees in
the Congress, where we dealt with highly compartmented--and
there were times, quite frankly, and it may be a model even in
commissions. There were times that only the chair and the
ranking member were alerted to certain things with regard to
source and methods.
But if there is proper attention paid to the appointment of
people, such as my colleagues here who I have the utmost
respect for, most have held tickets before, classification and
access, and probably maintained them. It would be helpful to
have someone who is current in some of those, so you do not
have to go through lengthy background checks.
I am on the advisory board for the Department of Energy in
Nuclear Matters, with regard to the former Soviet Union. Those
are areas, and again, people do not go out and advertise those.
But I think the commissioners and the experience again, there
is a wealth of resource out there in the private sector you can
draw upon, people who are willing to spend the time, sacrifice
the time to do this appropriately.
Mr. Sonnenberg. In all the commissions I have served on,
three in the intelligence, and the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board for 8 years, we never had a leak.
What was interesting is once I had the National Security
Advisor to the President come in and say you know, this is the
only place around here where we have never had a leak. Now,
having said that, I would not consider that important.
However, we did do one thing which would be of interest. In
the National Commission on Terrorism, we looked at findings.
That was relegated, the permission to look at those findings
was with the chairman and the vice chairman. So even in a
situation where you have this top priority classified material,
higher than top secret, you can then divide that up with the
chairman, vice chairman, whoever. That is how you prevent
leaks.
In that case, I do not think there would have been a leak
if the member had seen it because we all knew who the members
were, but there is a way of handling that.
Senator Torricelli. So the panel, in any case, is confident
that we can argue with some certainty that the history of these
commissions is that indeed classified information has been
protected and it has never previously been raised as a problem
in Democratic or Republican administrations regarding any of
these issues. And I think that is important for us.
I want to thank the panel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. This
has been a very useful exercise.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Torricelli, for your
substantial contribution to the discussion. Thanks to the four
witnesses for your time and for the help that you have given
and some of the details of how this might work.
I must say, hearing your testimony reinforces my belief
that the Nation would benefit from such a commission. Certainly
the Nation's future security would benefit from such a
commission.
This is not going to be an easy road ahead for this
legislatively, both because though we talk about complementing
some of the committees of Congress, there is a natural
sensitivity about turf here. And because, at least for now, the
administration appears to be opposed to this. But I do think
there is no substitute for the most aggressive pursuit of the
truth here. And I know that Senator McCain feels this way.
I look forward to working with Senator Torricelli, Senator
Grassley and others to advance this idea and, in the first
instance, to move as quickly as seems appropriate when we are
ready to mark this bill up before our Governmental Affairs
Committee.
Mr. Sonnenberg. May I make one last comment? The irony of
this is the administration, if they participate in this
commission, might find out that it is more helpful than not.
Chairman Lieberman. Exactly my feeling, that this is a
commission, as others, that I see working quite closely with
the administration, not in an adversarial or confrontational
relationship. And of course, going to the members, that is
exactly the tone that you would hope, or I would hope, that the
chair or the members of the commission would create right at
the outset in their relations with the administration, even
while they are involved in a very aggressive pursuit of the
truth.
I thank all of you for your continuing public service,
whether in or outside of the public service directly.
I am going to leave the record of the hearing open for 2
weeks, in case my colleagues want to either submit statements
or perhaps even submit questions to all of you. But for now,
thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned,
subject to the call of the chair.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The attacks on September 11 painfully illustrated weaknesses in
American national security. The fact that terrorists were able to
hijack four American planes with box cutters, and then turn those
planes into weapons is almost incomprehensible.
I am confident that America will recover from these cowardly acts.
However, never again should we be caught off guard.
Major changes need to be made, including tightening security at our
borders and ports, improving our intelligence gathering operations and
strengthening our military.
We are moving in the right direction. The President has established
the Office of Homeland Security, which is responsible for coordinating
domestic security among the Federal agencies.
The administration has also requested additional money for our
military in 2003, and Congress has held numerous hearings concerning
the September attacks.
While we will never be able to completely insulate ourselves from
another terrorist attack, we can and will take the necessary steps to
increase our readiness, fortify our military and protect our citizens.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their
experiences on past commissions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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