    [Senate Hearing 107-379]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 107-379

       S. 1867--A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
                         ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                              GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       on

                                    S. 1867

      TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
                     UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                FEBRUARY 7, 2002

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

    78-617              U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                                WASHINGTON : 2002
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
    Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
    Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001

                       COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TED STEVENS, Alaska
    RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey     GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    MAX CLELAND, Georgia                 PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
    JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri              ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
    MARK DAYTON, Minnesota               JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
               Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
                            Kevin J. Landy, Counsel
             Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
              Jayson P. Roehl, Minority Professional Staff Member
             Morgan P. Muchnick, Minority Professional Staff Member
                         Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statement:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Lieberman............................................     1
        Senator Stevens..............................................     2
        Senator Torricelli...........................................    11
    Prepared statement:
        Senator Bunning..............................................    25

                                   WITNESSES
                           Thursday, February 7, 2002

    Hon. Dave McCurdy, President, Electronic Industries Alliance, and
      Commissioner, Commission to Assess the Organization of the
      Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of
      Mass Destruction...............................................     3
    Norman R. Augustine, Chairman of the Executive Committee,
      Lockheed Martin Corporation and Commissioner, U.S. Commission
      on National Security...........................................     5
    Richard K. Betts, Director, Institute of War and Peace Studies,
      Columbia University and Commissioner, National Commission on
      Terrorism......................................................     7
    Maurice Sonnenberg, Senior International Advisor, Bear, Stearns
      and Co., Inc. and Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, L.L.P. and
      former Vice Chair, National Commission on Terrorism............     9

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Augustine, Norman R.:
        Testimony....................................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................    32
    Betts, Richard K.:
        Testimony....................................................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................    37
    McCurdy, Hon. Dave:
        Testimony....................................................     3
        Prepared statement with an attachment........................    26
    Sonnenberg, Maurice:
        Testimony....................................................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    43

                                    Appendix

    James Schlesinger, prepared statement with attached article
      entitled ``A Test by Terrorism''...............................    46
    Copy of bill of S. 1867..........................................    56

       S. 1867--A BILL TO ESTABLISH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
                         ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2002

                                           U.S. Senate,
                             Committee on Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:45 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
    Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Lieberman, Torricelli, and Stevens.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

        Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
        Today we are going to be considering legislation that
    Senator John McCain and I have introduced to establish an
    independent commission to examine and report on the facts and
    causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
        As you probably know, Senator McCain has minor surgery this
    week and that is why he is not here, because otherwise he would
    be here testifying.
        We introduced the legislation late last year because we
    felt that it was important to get the truth about how those
    attacks could have happened and whether there was anything the
    Federal Government might have done to prevent them. An
    independent and impartial commission, composed of knowledgeable
    citizens, we concluded was the best way to learn the lessons of
    September 11, so that we in Congress, together with the
    President and those serving with him in the Executive Branch
    have the information we need to make the best choices about
    protecting the future of the American people here at home. That
    is future security we are talking about.
        Our proposal would create a National Commission on
    Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States that will be charged
    with constructing a full picture of the circumstances
    surrounding the attacks, including the Federal Government's
    preparedness and response. The commission would also be charged
    with formulating recommendations for ways to strengthen our
    defenses against future terrorist attacks.
        Rarely in our history have events left scars on our
    national psyche as deep as those left in the aftermath of
    September 11, when more than 3,000 Americans were killed. The
    attack on Pearl Harbor was clearly one of those events, and it
    was followed by an independent investigative commission and, in
    fact, Congressional investigations.
        There have been many more recent commissions for serious,
    though less cataclysmic national security crises. Our military,
    for example, has investigated major terrorist actions in the
    past, as it did after the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, in order
    to learn lessons that might prevent future tragedies. And that
    is exactly what we have in mind here, on a larger scale.
        The most obvious question we have, of course, is how the
    terrorist plot succeeded despite the vast intelligence
    capabilities of our Nation. But we also ought to look into
    possible systemic deficiencies in other areas of our national
    security structure, including our counterterrorism
    capabilities, for example, our immigration and border control
    systems, our diplomacy, and our diplomatic activities.
        The best way to achieve the unvarnished truth is to allow
    those who know the most about the array of subjects that must
    be explored to deliberate in an atmosphere free of politics.
        Senator McCain and I have tried to create those optimum
    conditions with this commission. The initial months after
    September 11 were understandably and appropriately preoccupied
    with mourning and healing and then the aggressive and,
    thankfully, successful prosecution of the war in Afghanistan.
        But now that the Taliban has been removed from power and
    the reconstruction of Afghanistan is underway, we can and
    should begin to pursue in earnest the process of finding
    answers to our questions. Determining the causes and
    circumstances of the terrorist attacks will ensure that those
    who lost their lives on this second American day of infamy will
    not have died in vain.
        The commission we propose would, in that sense, pay tribute
    to the victims of September 11 but also would convey to their
    survivors and all Americans the message that their government
    is doing everything within its power to protect their future.
        We are very fortunate to have with us this morning four
    witnesses who have served on commissions that assessed the
    growing threat of terrorism and who therefore have expertise
    particularly relevant to the work of a national commission
    looking into September 11. I look forward to their testimony.
        Senator Stevens.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS

        Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. I am sorry to say I
    have another meeting in just about 20 minutes, but I am very
    interested in this. I support the concept, Mr. Chairman, but I
    am not sure it is timely yet. I think this event was just so
    staggering on our national psyche that we may want to wait a
    little while before we create a commission like this. But I
    will be pleased to hear some of these statements, and I thank
    you very much.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Stevens,
    for your support of the concept and I look forward to working
    with you on the timing. I think this is all about beginning a
    process that will take at least several months to go forward.
        I am going to down the table of distinguished witnesses and
    start with the Hon. Dave McCurdy, who is before us today as
    President of the Electronic Industries Alliance, and has served
    as a Commissioner on the Commission to Assess the Organization
    of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of
    Weapons of Mass Destruction. Dave, thanks for being with us.

       TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVE McCURDY,\1\ PRESIDENT, ELECTRONIC
    INDUSTRIES ALLIANCE, COMMISSIONER AND COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE
         ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO COMBAT THE
              PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

        Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a
    pleasure to be with you and Senator Stevens, as well. And
    always good to be with my friends and colleagues on this side
    of the table, as well.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy with an attachment
    appears in the Appendix on page 26.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I assume you are starting on this side because I have more
    gray hair, but Dick and I may compete for the quality of the
    gray hair, but it is an honor to be here.
        Chairman Lieberman. You have become one of our gray
    eminences very early.
        Mr. McCurdy. It is amazing what will happen.
        The commission proposed in your bill is charged with one of
    the most serious and significant tasks in our Nation's history.
    In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States
    is united in its resolve to take the war to the terrorist
    organizations, as well as the countries who harbor and support
    them. But not since World War II has the country rallied and
    come together to face a common enemy, albeit an amorphous and
    insidious variety.
        Mr. Chairman, the most fundamental role and responsibility
    of the government and Congress is to provide for our common
    defense. And I add my commendation to President Bush, the
    administration, and Congress for their remarkable leadership
    and crisis management we have witnessed since the September 11
    attacks.
        And I share Senator Stevens note of caution that, even
    though we have completed the first phase of this war by
    eliminating the Taliban and al Qaeda hold on Afghanistan, there
    is still much to be done to successfully prosecute the campaign
    against terrorism. It is imperative that nothing interferes
    with or impedes the prosecution of the war or efforts to
    bolster the defense of our homeland.
        Nevertheless, the requirements of this ongoing war must be
    balanced with the right of Americans to know why our
    intelligence, defense and law enforcement agencies were unable
    to prevent the attacks. Without question, now is not the time
    to point fingers or to look for scapegoats, but we must
    understand the causes, identify the weaknesses, and correct the
    lapses that allowed this catastrophe to occur.
        The American people deserve a forthright and complete
    accounting of the circumstances of that day. Above all, we must
    do all we can to ensure that such attack never occurs again.
        I know that the Chairman and the Senator know that when the
    National Security Act of 1947 actually was written, it was to
    ensure that we never had or suffered another Pearl Harbor type
    of attack. And I think that is the principle that we need to
    keep in mind.
        There are five Senate and five House committees that have
    jurisdiction and authority to conduct investigations and to
    review what happened. Arguably, there are even more, including
    this one. I certainly have the highest confidence in the
    leadership of these respective committees, particularly my
    former colleagues and current chairman, of the Intelligence
    Committee and Armed Services Committee, who I worked with on a
    daily basis.
        However, in my opinion, a commission has the advantage of
    being independent, singularly focused, and able to work outside
    the glare of the media. For these reasons, I support forming
    the commission to investigate the terrorist attacks upon the
    United States.
        In my experience, commissions work because they are not
    constrained by arbitrary jurisdiction or turf wars and
    politics, and thus have the ability to step back and take a
    more holistic view. In this instance, a commission can
    objectively collect facts, evaluate the evidence, and review
    the mission and effectiveness of the Federal, State, local and
    private organizations charged with our safety.
        Commissions are valuable because they are generally non-
    partisan and when effectively chaired seek consensus based
    recommendations and solutions. Operating an effective
    commission on the September 11 attacks will not be an easy
    task, but there already has been much valuable forensic work
    performed by the intelligence community, law enforcement, and
    the media to build upon.
        Based upon my experience with Congressional committees,
    presidential and Congressional commissions, war games, as well
    as my private sector experience in the technology industry, I
    believe there are numerous questions that this commission must
    investigate. It is especially important not to have any
    preconceived notions. And in this case, there are still many
    more questions than answers.
        These questions include but are certainly not limited to
    the following: Is there a clear chain of command and authority?
    What are the organizational impediments to effective
    collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence and
    information? Is technology being used to its fullest potential
    to provide effective information management? What indications
    and warning mechanisms were in place? How effective are they?
    What is the role of government versus private organizations?
    The list can go on, and I detailed more in my written
    statement.
        A priority for this commission must be to complement rather
    than compete with the efforts of Congress. Similarly,
    cooperation with the relevant Executive Branch agencies will be
    essential. I am confident that these issues can be worked
    through. Indeed, both Congress and the administration deserve
    enormous credit for the actions already being taken, such as
    the establishment of the Homeland Security office to improve
    coordination, the Patriot Act, and the Airline Security
    legislation.
        In addition, the President's budget proposal clearly makes
    homeland security a top priority. Still, this commission could
    serve a valuable role in looking at these additional measures
    and identifying areas that may need greater attention.
        I am also confident that the failures that resulted in the
    terrorist strike will be revealed and addressed, but this
    outcome is not automatic. Bureaucracies have a natural tendency
    to fight the last war rather than the next one. A commission
    can be particularly helpful in taking a comprehensive view of
    the events of September 11 and fashioning recommendations that
    mitigate this tendency.
        Mr. Chairman, Charles Darwin observed that it is not the
    strongest nor the most intelligent that survive, but the ones
    most responsive to change. The September 11 attacks were
    brilliantly evil, they were entirely outside the box of what we
    thought likely, and now it is our turn to adapt.
        To win this war, government must change how it thinks and
    acts, and do a much better job of coordinating its assets.
    Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, David, for that very thoughtful
    statement.
        Next is Norman Augustine, Chairman of the Executive
    Committee of Lockheed Martin Corporation, a leader in America's
    corporate and civic life for a good long time now, and also I
    will mention, as part of that, a Commissioner of the U.S.
    Commission on National Security known as the Hart-Rudman
    Commission.
        Thanks so much for being here.

    TESTIMONY OF NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE,\1\ CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE
     COMMITTEE, LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION AND COMMISSIONER, U.S.
                    COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY

        Mr. Augustine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
    Committee. I particularly appreciate the opportunity to share
    my views on the proposed commission.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine appears in the Appendix
    on page 32.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        With the Committee's permission, I would like to submit for
    the record a long statement and I will just abstract it now.
        Chairman Lieberman. Fine, we will accept and print that
    longer statement in the record.
        Mr. Augustine. I also probably should emphasize for the
    record that my comments this morning will be entirely my own,
    and I am not representing any of the organizations that I
    happen to be affiliated with.
        It goes without saying that the issues that are addressed
    by S. 1867 are of great importance to the country. It was, as
    you said Mr. Chairman, my privilege to serve on the Hart-Rudman
    Commission for several years. Having done so, it unfortunately
    came as no great surprise to me or, I believe, my colleagues,
    that America was subjected to an attack of the general nature
    that we suffered on September 11.
        I say this not because of any specific evidence of
    impending tragedy, but rather from a derived conclusion, if you
    will, from three basic considerations. The first of these was
    that it has been long evident that there are individuals and
    groups on this planet that have utter contempt for all that
    America stands for and have been very vocal about doing us
    harm.
        The second consideration is that with the end of the Cold
    War, when one views America's military capability it would be
    seemingly futal for such enemies to attack America in a
    conventional fashion on the land, in the air, at sea, or even
    in space.
        That leads to the third consideration, and that is in
    recent decades, we have witnessed a very fundamental change
    that largely has been brought about by the unintended
    consequences of advancements in science and technology. For the
    first time in history, individuals or very small groups can
    very profoundly impact much larger groups in a very adverse
    manner. It is not possible for the former, smaller groups to
    exert control over the larger groups, but they can certainly
    disrupt the stability that is enjoyed by these larger groups.
        So in short, for individuals or groups that are seeking to
    extort or physically harm America, by far the most obvious
    avenue today, and presumably in the future, will be through
    terrorist actions. There are groups that, as we now all know,
    have such capabilities and are seeking further capabilities for
    such actions.
        Clearly, we do have a great deal to learn and we have a
    great deal more to do if we are going to thwart terrorism and
    its consequences. The proposal that has been made to establish
    a commission to learn from the events of September 11 would
    appear to me to be a very logical undertaking. In the final
    assessment, though, I believe that its usefulness will, to a
    very large degree, depend on the quality and the judgment of
    the commissioners and of their staff, those who are involved in
    the endeavor. It will depend greatly on the perspective they
    take as they embark on such an undertaking.
        Specifically, it would seem that there would be little to
    be gained simply by revisiting history for history's sake. In
    fact, doing so might even be divisive.
        It is also important, I believe, that the commission not
    unduly burden those who already carry the heavy burden of
    responding to, preparing for, and hopefully avoiding future
    terrorist acts.
        On the other hand, I believe that if those involved in the
    commission's work are able to take a rather forward looking
    perspective, take a rather broad perspective of lessons
    learned, lessons that could impact our future security, I
    believe that the commission can make a very significant
    contribution. It is apparent, from the wording of the
    legislation and, Mr. Chairman, from the wording of your
    statement, that the drafting of this legislation recognizes
    those considerations that I have just cited.
        I would note one specific matter with regard to the
    proposed legislation. That is, it does not seem to make clear
    how much of the commission's work is to be conducted in full
    public view. Of course, America prides itself on conducting the
    affairs of its government under a spotlight, and that is to our
    credit in general. But at the same time, I can imagine many of
    the topics that the commissioners will be called upon to
    address will be topics to which we would just as soon our
    enemies not be privy.
        I particularly address here those issues that do not truly
    fall under the existing legislation for protecting national
    secrets, but are extremely sensitive in today's world and
    probably deserve some form of protection. It was not clear to
    me from the legislation how that would be dealt with.
        In summary, I would just say that I believe a commission of
    the type that has been proposed can indeed be very beneficial,
    but only if it is conducted in a very sensitive and a very
    responsible fashion. And I would close, as did my colleague,
    David, by noting that we do live in a new world and I would use
    a quote, as he did, Jefferson's reminder that the price of
    liberty is eternal vigilance. This seems to have never been
    more true than it is today.
        Thank you for this opportunity to share my views.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Augustine, and I
    look forward to having some exchange with you on some of the
    questions that you raised, which are well taken.
        Next we have Professor Richard K. Betts, who is Director of
    the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University
    and a Commissioner of the National Commission on Terrorism,
    which if I have got my commissions right was the Bremer
    Commission.
        Thanks for being here.

     TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. BETTS,\1\ DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF WAR
       AND PEACE STUDIES, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AND COMMISSIONER,
                    NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM

        Mr. Betts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of
    time, I will summarize my longer, prepared statement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Betts appears in the Appendix on
    page 37.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        My main points are that a national commission would perform
    an important function in coming to grips with the disaster of
    September 11, and such a commission should work best in
    addition to other efforts, such as Congressional
    investigations, not as a substitute for them.
        The organization of the commission in the proposed bill
    seems to make good sense, with one exception. That is that
    there is a tension between the objectives in Section 3(c)(3)
    concerning balanced representation of different professional
    groups, and the procedures for appointment of members of the
    commission set out in Section 3(a).
        In the coming months and years, there will be many rumors
    and half-truths leaking out to explain why the warning process
    failed before September 11, how organizational structures were
    unprepared, and so forth. There is a great need for an official
    post-mortem that brings the full story out in a thorough,
    careful, balanced and non-partisan manner. The main benefit of
    a national commission, I think, would be political credibility,
    to provide a detailed and sober investigation that the public
    could have confidence is as objective as humanly possible.
        There will be many exercises attempting to lay blame and it
    is important to have one serious effort that has high
    credibility in terms of two important criteria: Access to all
    relevant information and disinterest in scoring political
    points. In this matter, something I did not address in my
    statement, I would though like to associate myself with the
    last witness' emphasis on the need to conduct the most
    sensitive aspects of such a commission's work in reliable
    secrecy.
        My view is influenced by my own experience as a member of
    the National Commission on Terrorism established by Congress 3
    years ago. That commission operated in a thoroughly bipartisan
    way. I say that as one of the four members of the commission
    appointed by the Minority Democratic leadership. Although it
    was a commission created by a Republican controlled Congress,
    there was never a hint that our effort involved grinding axes
    to embarrass the Democratic administration.
        It would be unrealistic and undesirable to see a commission
    as the sole official solution to grappling with what happened
    on September 11. Neither presidential nor Congressional
    commissions ever completely settle the questions with which
    they are tasked. Other efforts, particularly Congressional
    investigations, can do things that a commission cannot. On a
    matter as crucial as September 11, some redundancy in
    investigation is not only unavoidable, it is useful.
        Consider the investigations of the intelligence community
    in the mid-1970's. The process began with the Rockefeller
    Commission and expanded to investigations by select committees
    of the House and Senate, and all of these were useful in
    different ways.
        S. 1867 does not have any truly serious deficiencies, in my
    view. My one reservation is about the process for appointing
    members of the commission. Section 3(c) of the bill sets out an
    excellent summary of the qualifications desirable for the
    commissioners to be selected. The current bill's Section 3(a)
    however, sets out a process that disperses appointment
    authority widely. That would seem, to me, to make it hard to
    carefully craft a group as a whole.
        The President would be able to design some balance with his
    four allotted appointees, but the other 10 appointments are
    parcelled out to 10 different committee chairs, or 20 people in
    all, if the consultation with their ranking members is to be
    genuine. To get a good distribution of people from the
    military, diplomacy, business, law enforcement and so forth, it
    seems that the 10 or 20 chairpersons and ranking members or
    their staffs would have to caucus and do some horse trading.
    Otherwise, it appears that we could get a random assortment
    that might not be ideally suited to conducting a full, thorough
    and competent investigation.
        Falling back on my experience with the Terrorism
    Commission, I would suggest considering some greater
    centralization of Congress' share of the appointments. One way
    to do this would be to give the final appointment authority to
    the majority and minority leaders of both houses. The committee
    chairpersons and ranking members could certainly make their
    preferences known and the leadership would be free to select
    many of them.
        To conclude, a national commission, however well it does
    its job, will not bring us to closure in understanding how we
    should best move to prevent another September 11 catastrophe.
    That should not be the test of such a commission. September 11
    was a watershed in national security policy, and figuring out
    and adjusting to the lessons will be a long process.
        The right sort of commission can be a good start. It can
    clear away underbrush, answer some questions, even if not all,
    lay down a valuable set of markers to channel other efforts,
    and discredit fast and loose attempts at easy answers. That
    will leave much to be done, but it will have done a lot.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Professor, again
    helpful testimony.
        It is a pleasure to welcome Maurice Sonnenberg, an old and
    dear friend who also happens to be Senior International Advisor
    to Bear, Stearns and Company, and was Vice Chair on the
    National Commission on Terrorism. Welcome.

       TESTIMONY OF MAURICE SONNENBERG,\1\ SENIOR INTERNATIONAL
    ADVISOR, BEAR, STEARNS AND COMPANY, INC. AND MANATT, PHELPS AND
      PHILLIPS, L.L.P. FORMER VICE CHAIR, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
                               TERRORISM

        Mr. Sonnenberg. Nice to be here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
    and Senator Torricelli.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sonnenberg appears in the
    Appendix on page 43.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I have been asked to testify in the efficacy of the
    creation of a terrorist commission. Having served as Vice
    Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism and having
    been on the Commission for the Roll and Capabilities of the
    Intelligence Community and the Commission for the Protection
    and Reduction of Government Secrecy, I do come with a point of
    view as to how these might be best structured.
        A panel of this sort is of immeasurable importance in
    helping to better understand what basically were the factors
    that led up to the catastrophe of September 11. It also places
    into context sound bites such as ``a failure of intelligence.''
    While these are catchy phrases, they are gross generalizations
    designed to convey the impression that it must have been a
    systemic all-encompassing failure on the part of the Agency,
    the Bureau, and others in the intelligence community.
        There may have been weaknesses in the intelligence
    community, but a more comprehensive analysis should also focus
    on the role of several governmental institutions, among them
    the White House, Congress, and the Department of Justice.
        When looking at these matters, the commission must also
    address obviously such matters as impediments to law
    enforcement, immigration, border controls, financing of
    terrorist activities, intelligence sharing, and on and on.
        The commission must obviously be established in a manner
    that supplements but does not replace the need for continued
    Congressional oversight, nor can it be allowed to compromise
    security, both at the National Security Council level and at
    the intelligence community level.
        But what about the specifics of a commission. It must take
    some very talented people and a superior staff to assess
    information available both in open and classified sources. The
    individuals appointed to this commission should bring to the
    task a broad understanding of the subject as a whole, rather
    than overly detailed knowledge of a specific field. It goes
    without saying that everyone associated with this commission
    will require multiple clearances, especially in the instances
    where the investigation hinges on matters related to covert
    operations.
        The commission will require, as we had before, a specific
    location, frankly not known to the public. On all the
    commissions I served on, that was the case.
        Congressionally mandated, our members were appointed, in
    our commission, by the majority and the minority leadership. In
    the other two commissions, the White House participated in the
    appointments.
        As far as I know very few people knew the names of our
    commission members until the report was published. We had never
    had a leak. This I might add was true for the commission on the
    role and capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence community. And
    that comes up to the topic of the security of the commission
    and where they are housed.
        Another reason that I am concerned about is the security in
    terms of the commission and staff members. We have got to check
    with law enforcement and intelligence community. We are now at
    a period after September 11. Do not underestimate the
    possibility that these commissioners could be jeopardized or
    pressured. And therefore, when this commission is set up, the
    idea of some secrecy behind where they meet and who they are,
    to some degree, must be looked at. I would do that in
    consultation with the proper law enforcement authorities.
        Finally, let me say you may wonder why, after all of this,
    would I want this commission? First, I am certain that the
    White House, or some branch of the legislature, is going to set
    one up no matter what happens. Second, a commission of this
    sort will have substantial public consequences. The cynics say
    oh well, all these commission reports wind up on the shelf.
    Frankly, most do. There is, however, a great difference
    regarding this one. It is post-September 11. If well written
    and carefully conceived, it will carry the gravitas and
    influence a study of this nature should have.
        The National Commission on Terrorism and the Hart-Rudman
    Report had some influence in focusing many members of the
    Congress, the media, and the press on the subject. The
    prescience of these reports made them unique and totally
    relevant to the legislation that passed after September 11.
        A commission report on the so-called ``monumental failure
    of intelligence'' can help to inform and educate the public to
    better understand the complexity of these matters. That is not
    to say that a commission would be a fount of wisdom. But it
    might, by its very making, keep the public focused on this
    problem that is not about to end or, for that matter, in our
    lifetime. You can control terrorism but you can never totally
    eliminate it. The sooner the citizenry is fully cognizant of
    this, the less likely it will lose its sense of purpose and
    resolve.
        That being the case, it is imperative that the public
    continue to be supportive of measures necessary to face this
    ongoing threat. The commission can be a valuable tool in this
    effort. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. It was excellent
    testimony, very constructive.
        I should indicate for the record that Senator Thompson is
    home in Tennessee because, as is known, of the death of his
    daughter last week. He and I spoke yesterday and he is very
    interested in this subject and will be re-engaged with us next
    week.
        I am delighted that Senator Torricelli is here. Senator
    Torricelli has introduced, along with Senator Grassley,
    legislation to create a commission on the same subject. For
    reasons known best to the Senate Parliamentarian, it has been
    referred to the Judiciary Committee, not here. But I wonder, my
    colleague, if you would like to deliver an opening statement at
    this time?

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TORRICELLI

        Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I
    enjoyed the testimony and appreciate each of the witnesses
    appearing today. It is very good to see my neighbor from New
    York, Maurice Sonnenberg, here, and my former colleague, Dave
    McCurdy, who by all rights in my personal judgment, should have
    been a member of this institution but that is the way life
    works.
        Chairman Lieberman. Probably did better.
        Mr. McCurdy. It is nice on this side of the table, Senator.
        Senator Torricelli. That is his gain and our loss. Mr.
    Betts, Mr. Augustine, thank you all for being with us today.
        This is a subject about which I have extremely strong
    feelings. While, for some Americans, September 11 will soon
    become part of history, a painful event, but something that
    will take its place along with other tragedies in our
    generation. For those of us who live in New York, New Jersey,
    and Northern Virginia, it is something that is still unfolding
    every day. You cannot visit a community in my State without
    someone knowing a widow or an orphan, a parent. They wake up
    with this tragedy every single day. A loss child, a mortgage
    that cannot get paid, a family whose future has been changed.
        I support this commission because if not for everyone else
    in the Nation, and if not for history, if not for assuring that
    it never happens again, if none of those reasons were valid,
    then we are left simply with this. Those people deserve an
    answer.
        It is my own belief that the American people have
    remarkably low expectations for their government. They live
    their lives, they want as little contact with the government,
    usually, as possible. But at a minimum, they expect the
    government to keep them safe. In their homes from crimes and in
    the world from adversaries. And they trust that is being done.
        It was not done. And there may be many reasons, there may
    be many excuses, there may be many legitimate problems, but it
    did not happen. And somebody has to provide an answer.
        The President has made some remarkable appropriations
    requests for law enforcement, intelligence, and the military,
    historic changes in our level of expenditures that will
    radically change the finances of the U.S. Government. It may be
    the right recommendation. And Democrats and Republicans have
    competed with each other to endorse them more quickly than the
    next. That may be the right decision.
        The simple truth is there is not a member of this Congress,
    and there is no one in the administration, who really knows.
    One cannot build structure of law enforcement or defense
    without understanding whether the foundation is sound.
        These institutions upon which we would now rest our
    security and invest these new funds are the same institutions
    that failed on September 11. I do not say that because the
    institutions should be abandoned or dismantled or discredited,
    simply that we need to understand what failed before we invest
    in them again. That is the purpose of this commission.
        It is regrettable that the commission was not already
    formed. I genuinely believed that President Bush, in the weeks
    after September 11, would form a commission by Executive Order.
    This exercise in the Congress of legislatively creating a
    commission really should not have been necessary.
        Faced with the same decision, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
    created the Commission on Pearl Harbor in 10 days. Faced with
    the national trauma of the Challenger accident, Ronald Reagan
    acted within weeks. Faced with the catastrophe of the
    assassination of President Kennedy and what it implied for the
    security of the Executive Branch and the international
    implications, Lyndon Johnson acted immediately with the Warren
    Commission.
        This has been our history. This should not be the
    exception. In many ways, this is not as large a tragedy as each
    of those. In some respect, it is larger, the death of thousands
    in our greatest city and the capital of our country.
        We are too close to the event and there has been too little
    investigation to know much of what failed on September 11. Let
    me quote from the Los Angeles Times, if I could, ``In the last
    decade, suspected terrorists have repeatedly slipped in and out
    of the United States. They have plotted against America while
    in Federal custody. Key evidence that pointed to operatives and
    their plans was ignored until well after the attacks. The mixed
    signals now haunt a generation of U.S. intelligence and law
    enforcement officials who realize that their efforts to track
    terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden were undermined at times
    by bungled investigations and bureaucratic rivalries.''
        We now know that the FBI has known for at least 3 years
    that two bin Laden operatives trained to be pilots in the
    United States. One of them, a naturalized U.S. citizen from
    Egypt purchased a used military aircraft in Arizona in 1993.
    After he purchased the Saber 40 twin engine passenger jet for
    bin Laden for $210,000, he flew to the Sudan.
        Federal authorities also knew that Ramzi Yousef, who
    planned and carried out the 1993 World Trade Center attacks
    later planned to blow up 12 U.S. jets over the Pacific. One of
    his co-conspirators in the Pacific plot told Philippine police
    that he hoped to hijack a passenger plane and crash it into CIA
    headquarters. He had attended U.S. flight schools. No one took
    this evidence, to contact U.S. flight schools or raise the
    possibility of such a conspiracy.
        I know it appears easy after the attacks for people in my
    position or others to make it look easy. It was not easy. I
    understand it is difficult. Gathering intelligence from
    thousands or hundreds of thousands of sources, collating it,
    analyzing it, understanding it is difficult. Of course it is
    difficult. That is why we have a professional intelligence
    community.
        Maybe analyzing it and coming to the right conclusion was
    difficult. Maybe it was impossible. I do not know. Nobody
    knows. That is why we need a commission.
        It may be that to fight the war on terrorism and also
    undertake this review is difficult. It will involve some of the
    same people and some of the same resources. I suspect that is
    exactly the situation Franklin Delano Roosevelt had after Pearl
    Harbor. And I suspect the admirals of the Pacific raised the
    same objections. He ignored them and rightfully so.
        How could America's mothers and fathers be asked to entrust
    the lives of their sons and daughters to fight a war if they
    did not have confidence in the military hierarchy. How could
    Americans be asked to sacrifice and trust the future of their
    country's security in a military establishment reeling from
    Pearl Harbor if we did not believe in their competence or their
    structure or their command? And so we fought the war and
    undertook the review at the same time.
        No doubt the same arguments about the need for classified
    information were heard after Pearl Harbor and after the Kennedy
    assassination and after the Challenger accident, during the war
    that was being fought in Central America. But in each of those
    instances, each president from Reagan to Roosevelt reached a
    different judgment. We can analyze the problem and protect
    information because we needed to reach a national judgment.
        It may be, as was testified, that all these commissions did
    not succeed. Some did. NASA was saved, the American space
    program redesigned, because a commission did an extraordinary
    job in a difficult moment in history of admitting where we were
    wrong, why lives were lost, because of failures of the
    government. It worked.
        The Pearl Harbor Commission did restore confidence. People
    believed in the military establishment again. And I believe,
    for all the divisiveness of Central America, questions of
    strategic weapons, those commissions also succeeded in
    answering questions of highly classified materials, at a point
    where the Nation was very divided.
        This commission not only makes sense, it makes overwhelming
    sense. It will be painful because it will involve truth that we
    do not want to face, failures of institutions we believe in,
    and of people and friends that we like.
        In the final analysis, there is no choice. We owe this to
    the country. We owe it to the victims. And it is impossible to
    design a national security system to ensure that this never
    happens again without this review. We could not begin to
    appoint officials, redesign our security apparatus, and commit
    billions of dollars of new resources for the future unless we
    understand this failure of the past.
        I am committed to making this happen. It is regrettable,
    for reasons I do not understand, that Senator Grassley and I
    have undertaken different legislation than Senator McCain and
    Senator Lieberman. I hope that is reconciled. The differences
    are narrow but they are real. As was testified here today, in
    our legislation we specifically give appointment authority to
    the majority and minority leaders and the President of the
    United States to assure that those six individuals, balancing
    their interests, can ensure that the commission accurately
    reflects the different parts of the intelligence, military and
    civilian authorities.
        But we also specifically mandate the commission to look at
    the intelligence and law enforcement authorities involved,
    because while this should be a broad look at the failures,
    obviously the responsibility most directly lies there and
    should be addressed.
        I hope by the time this process has run its course that we
    have one bipartisan piece of legislation, but what is most
    important is that this gets done, and done quickly.
        In a democratic government, to have the people of our
    country doubt the ability of those that they have chosen to
    lead to protect them is very troubling. Even to have our
    adversaries believe, when they have exhibited our
    vulnerability, and inflicted us with enormous pain, that we
    have not undertaken a review to fix the problems, continues to
    signal vulnerability.
        For all these reasons I am very grateful that my colleague,
    Senator Lieberman, has called this hearing today. I think he
    has done a great service to the Senate and the country by
    beginning this process. And I am grateful to each of you and
    your participation today. After the Chairman has begun his own
    inquiries, I look forward to a discussion with you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Torricelli, for an
    excellent statement. I, too, share your hope that we can
    combine both bills. I think there were two major points of
    difference. One is in the form of the selection of the members,
    as you indicated, of the commission. The other is in the
    statement of jurisdiction because the bill that Senator McCain
    and I have introduced does mention intelligence but goes beyond
    that to other functions of government. I hope we can do that. I
    want to pick up and hope we can get together on a broad
    bipartisan, single approach to this.
        I want to pick up in my first question on something my
    colleague said and begin it this way. Some of those, including
    the White House, who have opposed the creation of such a
    commission, to try to do it justice, have said that their main
    concern is that it would distract those who have
    responsibilities now, both military as Senator Torricelli
    indicated, also I presume in the intelligence community and
    other aspects of our government, from their daily
    responsibilities.
        I must say that I am not convinced by that, both because of
    the historic precedents that my colleague states, the Roberts
    Commission after Pearl Harbor, the Warren Commission after the
    Kennedy assassination, the commission after the Challenger,
    etc.
        And even more to the point of the experience of the
    witnesses, Mr. Augustine, if there had been a major problem of
    Lockheed Martin of some sort where things had not been going as
    you had wanted, and I am sure this never happens, or at one of
    the new economy industries that is part of your association,
    Mr. McCurdy, I am sure that though those people would continue
    to be working on the line, you would jump right in and find out
    what the heck went wrong here so you could stop it from
    happening.
        Anyway, I wanted to ask your reaction to the notion that to
    create a commission of this kind might, in some sense, be
    negative because it would be a distraction for those who are at
    work now in these areas. Mr. Sonnenberg.
        Mr. Sonnenberg. I understand the feeling of the White House
    on this, however a commission of this sort will impinge upon
    some of the time of some of the people who are called up. But
    then, if we look at the role of Congress here, I think it was
    Jim Woolsey who once told me, you know Maurice, I had to go up
    there 104 times. Now that is not going to happen with this
    commission. We have 6 months. There is no way in the world we
    are going to fit someone in those days.
        So my feeling is that, as Senator Torricelli rightfully
    points out, it is absolutely imperative in my mind to have this
    commission, but I do not think there will be an impingement of
    the type that I am hearing about now.
        Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Augustine.
        Mr. Augustine. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have served on both
    sides of commissions and I think it gets to be a question of
    degree. I think there is no reason that it has to be
    disruptive. But I think it could be disruptive. And it is going
    to depend on the responsibility of the people who are involved.
        I think without question that if properly managed people
    can still do their jobs and respond to a commission of this
    type. In our own company the way we solve these things in a
    case of a major crisis, is we let one group of people worry
    about the ongoing activities and another worry about the crisis
    issues.
        That is not an ideal solution, but I think it is an
    approach that we have to consider. I don't think any of this is
    what, in the vernacular, you would call a show stopper.
        Chairman Lieberman. Either of the other two witnesses want
    to comment?
        Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, I concur with my colleagues'
    statements. First of all, I want to commend Senator Torricelli
    for his comments. I think they were superb.
        You can always make an argument to defer an investigation
    but quite frankly I concur with both of your sentiments that
    now is the time to at least initiate the study.
        As I said in my written statement, there is an incredible
    amount of forensic evidence that has already been accumulated,
    much of that in the public eye and through the media. So
    there's a lot to build on.
        As far as distraction, I think Mr. Sonnenberg said it well.
    There are such a large number of committees in both the House
    and Senate that have jurisdiction they could be truly
    distracted if they were called before all of those. If there is
    a deferral, I think the Congress should be focused on the
    actions of protecting from here forward, as they have been
    focusing, and allow a commission to take the time to reflect
    and look more holistically at a broader cross-section of
    jurisdiction.
        Part of the challenges, and I do not think any of us are
    prepared to make judgments, but from our experience the issue
    is there is a lot of questions. Was it seamless? Everyone talks
    about creation of fusion centers and this new cooperative
    effort. It is easier in a wartime environment to do that. It is
    in the non-wartime situation that you ask those questions
    whether jurisdictions did cooperate properly. And you want to
    know that there is not a gap in those seams. There are always
    going to be seams, but you try to reduce those as much as
    possible.
        So for those points, I think the commission is timely and
    appropriate.
        One other point is about the political credibility, and I
    think my friend, Mr. Augustine, raised that. I think there is a
    great deal to be gained by that credibility. We cannot, as a
    Nation, afford to have this degenerate into partisan finger
    pointing on one side or the other.
        And also, for those who argue that the internal reviews in
    the organizations themselves have taken place and therefore it
    is corrected, I would just point out there are a lot of
    accounting firms and other groups out there trying to do that
    to restore some credibility. But until it is raised to a higher
    level that has those kind of independent view, I am not sure
    the credibility is there.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Betts. The simple point is that the purpose of this
    commission is to learn something important about what went
    wrong. Presumably, that will help these busy people to do the
    jobs better that we do not want to distract them from unduly.
        Chairman Lieberman. Agreed. Congressman McCurdy, let me ask
    you this, as a former chair of the House Intelligence
    Committee, I am sure you can understand why the Intelligence
    Committees in both chambers are interested in investigating the
    role played by intelligence agencies leading up to September
    11. Nevertheless, you have supported an independent commission
    as a way to complement rather than compete with Congressional
    efforts.
        I wonder if you would expand a bit on that, about the
    different roles that might be played by both here.
        Mr. McCurdy. Clearly, the Intelligence Committees, who are
    chaired by very capable and experienced individuals, have an
    important role to play. I think you saw the commencement of
    that yesterday on the Senate side.
        Again, these can be complimentary efforts. If you look at
    the intelligence definition of the community, that in itself
    implies jurisdictional boundaries. I believe that any
    commission of this nature needs to look beyond those, much
    broader than that.
        Plus, my experience on commissions, and I have been on some
    actually for the CIA looking at issues of weapons of mass
    destruction prior to the presidential commission I was
    appointed to, there we had complete access to highly classified
    data. And the individuals on those commissions not only
    respected that, were experienced hands in dealing with
    classified information. And in the long term made
    recommendations that I think were helpful to the community as a
    whole.
        So again, they can be supportive, complimentary, but also
    with the experience can stand back and make an objective
    judgment at the end with regard to causality and concerns about
    both organization and efforts to prevent it in the future.
        Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask a final question in the time
    I have left. Mr. Augustine, your written testimony and what you
    delivered orally today urges us to make clear in the law the
    extent to which the work of the commission must be conducted in
    public view and can be conducted privately.
        My understanding is that existing law would allow a
    commission of this kind to hold closed hearings whenever it is
    dealing with classified information or information from law
    enforcement groups. And I gather that law governed Hart-Rudman
    and the Bremer Commission.
        I wonder if you, and then others if you wish, could reflect
    a bit on that or whether you think that we need to do something
    additional and specific in this proposed legislation, to
    protect the confidentiality of classified information?
        Mr. Augustine. It is an important and broad topic. My
    belief is that there is a shortfall in the current system in
    this regard. In the case at hand, I can well imagine a
    commission like this would like to hypothesize future threats
    and discuss them, to discuss vulnerabilities that we have. Some
    of these are truly hypothetical. It is quite different from
    having information on a specific threat of designing a specific
    weapon. I am talking about purely conjectural discussions that
    generally would not be covered by our laws.
        I would cite another example from recent experience. I
    served on the commission that reviewed the V-22 program in
    which, you will recall, 22 Marines died the year before last.
    One of the questions was how much of the problem was due to
    pilot error?
        So you are talking about fragmentary evidence, incomplete
    evidence, but it is very important. You need to be able to
    discuss something that can be very damaging to an individual or
    to a group or an organization. You need to be able to talk
    about it, but there is not enough factual evidence that you can
    really have a public discussion.
        We found it very inhibiting to be able to talk about issues
    like that in public, just because of the consequences on
    people--it had nothing to do with national security. It was
    human decency and the like.
        Chairman Lieberman. How about the experience that you had
    on the Bremer Commission, with regard to the authority that
    current law gives commissions to hold closed sessions when they
    are classified or law enforcement topics?
        Mr. Sonnenberg. To be frank, in terms of the Bremer
    Commission, we never had a public hearing.
        Chairman Lieberman. That eliminated the problem.
        Mr. Sonnenberg. That is not to say I understand the
    conflict between the openness of government and the necessity
    for secret, as Mr. Augustine has pointed out.
        We did it, for example, on the Secrecy Commission, which
    was Senator Moynihan and Senator Helms. That commission, we had
    one public hearing and that involved the subject of FOIA, which
    you would expect to have an opening hearing on.
        Now you might look at this in a different way. I understand
    the legislation is talking about a preliminary report in 6
    months and then another one to follow. You might think about
    having some public hearings at that other end, thereby
    eliminating the problem of free discussion, over and above
    classified----
        Chairman Lieberman. You mean after the preliminary report?
        Mr. Sonnenberg. I would think you might be able to do that.
    But remember what I said before, I am a little bit concerned,
    and that is why I want you to go to law enforcement and the
    intelligence community about the protection, and I am not being
    wild about this, about the protection of commissions. We are in
    a totally different era now and you will have to balance that.
        Now the second half might be the area where you might want
    to think about public hearings on specific subjects. You have
    them laid out and say all right, we are going to hold a public
    hearing. Because by then, after the preliminary report, it is
    pretty well known what the commission is doing, who they are.
    So I think you have to work on it a little bit.
        Chairman Lieberman. Professor Betts.
        Mr. Betts. I do not think the issue is the authority to
    hold closed hearings or to keep information secret. The issue
    is the general impression that is conveyed or the expectations
    about how much this is expected to be an exercise in opening up
    to the public. If the latter dominates the expectations, I
    think that would seriously compromise the work of the
    commission.
        Chairman Lieberman. You would say that would be a mistake?
        Mr. Betts. Yes, I think perhaps, as Maurice has suggested,
    emphasizing the public aspects of the enterprise in the later
    phase would make more sense. You would avoid a chilling effect
    on the sharing of information with the commission. You would
    avoid any conceivable problems, as unfortunately has happened
    in some cases.
        I remember many years ago, when Richard Helms was
    testifying at open hearings about ITT and Chile, and was asked
    whether the CIA had any covert operations. On the spur of the
    moment he decided to lie in order to protect secrecy and wound
    up having to go to trial over it.
        For all those reasons, I think it would be good to
    establish the presumption that for the most sensitive and most
    important aspects of this investigation, many of which will
    involve very sensitive classified information, that it is all
    going to be very closely held until whatever time the
    resolution is reached and the public phase can be emphasized.
        Chairman Lieberman. David, and then we will finish up with
    Norm Augustine.
        Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman and Senators, I concur. And I
    know, to many colleagues, this is somewhat of a surprise. But
    on the commissions that I have dealt with, we never had public
    hearings. Of course, in the Intelligence Committee we only had
    one public hearing in all the time I was involved there over 9
    years.
        So I think it would be very helpful for a commission of
    this nature that would be enduring a lot of scrutiny to be able
    to work together in not only a secure environment, but also a
    less public environment. Because there is going to be a lot of
    information that needs to be shared among commissioners and the
    staff. And I think the presumption should be that it would not
    be held in the open.
        Chairman Lieberman. Interesting. Mr. Augustine.
        Mr. Augustine. I was just going to add that I think how you
    handle this depends very much on the specific circumstances.
    Years ago I chaired a commission that reviewed NASA as a whole
    during the period after the Challenger accident. We held all
    our meetings on television and it worked fine.
        I think one has to view three categories of information.
    One, that is clearly covered by national security legislation,
    and you can discuss in private with no problem. Everything else
    that you possibly can should be discussed in public. But I say
    there is one exception, a third group that is not sensitive by
    the definition of today's law but is certainly sensitive by the
    definition of today's world. Perhaps there should be a
    provision given to the members of the commission, which
    hopefully they will use only very selectively, by majority vote
    or by the chairman's decision, to deal with certain topics in
    private.
        Chairman Lieberman. That is very helpful. I appreciate, as
    I listen to the four of you, from your experience, that to get
    at the truth, which is what this is all about, of what might
    have been done to prevent the attacks of September 11, a lot of
    this is going to have to be in private.
        There are categories where you may want to do some things
    in public, as you just said. But the report will then stand on
    its merits. I thank you. Senator Torricelli.
        Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I tell you,
    myself, while I think it is probably helpful to have one or two
    public sessions to give the country a view of what is expected
    and some insight into the discussions, because this is
    obviously a source of national anxiety while the report is
    being written and conducted.
        It certainly does not trouble me that most of this would be
    done privately. It is the final product in which we are
    interested in. I think we simply need to have enough of a
    public face to assure the public it is being done and being
    done properly because of the current state of unease in the
    Nation.
        I only had several questions really. First, in each of your
    experiences, the kind of people who should serve and where they
    should come from, this is obviously an enormous time
    commitment. It involves people who will have some expertise and
    background. It should also involve people who are not co-opted
    by their relationships with any of these institutions.
        But I wonder if you would talk about the mix. Specifically,
    some of these that involve members of Congress. It is always
    difficult for me to believe that a member of Congress, on
    something this intense, with a short time frame, has enough
    time do this while meeting other responsibilities. I would
    appreciate it if you would address that.
        And whether we should look for commissioners who can do
    this on a 6-month basis or a 1-year basis exclusively or almost
    exclusively. And then your experiences on the mix of
    personalities or experiences that these people should bring to
    a commission. I think that helps us answer how, indeed, we
    reconcile our legislation to get membership. I'll leave that to
    anybody.
        Mr. Augustine. I will be happy to start. The first
    suggestion is no zealots. No people who have made up their mind
    in advance or have taken a position----
        Chairman Lieberman. That is a tough one to write in a law,
    but it is a good idea.
        Mr. Augustine. But it is important. People who are willing
    to take an open mind, to learn, to change their mind, that is
    absolutely critical.
        The second is people who are willing to work together as a
    team and try to arrive at a reasonable consensus. Avoid people
    who have a single issue that they are fascinated by.
        And finally, with regard to your question, Senator, I think
    that to get people of the stature this commission would deserve
    and would require, it will be very hard to get people who could
    devote full time to it. And success is dependent on putting
    together an extremely good full-time staff. It does not have to
    be large, but it has to be very good. That means it has to have
    a good staff leader, chief of staff if you will.
        I think one has to call on the commissioners on a part-time
    basis. It is, frankly, hopeless to get people of the kind you
    want who are available full time.
        Senator Torricelli. I agree with that.
        How about, as we go forward now, please also address this
    question about how you do the balance between having people who
    have experience with these institutions or issues but are not
    people so identified with the institutions that are being
    examined that the commission loses credibility.
        Mr. Sonnenberg. First, I would add to Mr. Augustine's
    comment about the type of people. If full-time/part-time is the
    issue of getting the quality and the type of people you need, I
    doubt seriously you are going to find what you want full-time.
    You want these people who have had a depth of experience,
    knowledge of this material, and you are going to find them,
    unfortunately, on a part-time basis.
        Now about the stature, I believe that someone who has what
    I would call a rather deep general view of the subject becomes
    important. That is what you have staff for. You get all those
    experts in house--who have the abilities to examine specific
    issues.
        Your question again, Senator was, specifically you asked
    something just now?
        Senator Torricelli. I asked a variety of them, but I tend
    to do that.
        Mr. Sonnenberg. The last one.
        Senator Torricelli. The last one was this issue of how you
    balance that you want people with expertise that know these
    institutions, but you do not lose credibility of them being so
    identified with the institutions. Whether or not you have seen
    that as a problem before.
        Then I want people to come back to this issue of members of
    Congress as well, whether this has worked, who may have been
    members in the past.
        Mr. Sonnenberg. With regard to that, that is a double-edged
    sword. Obviously, people who are identified with a community,
    let's say, retirees maybe or people who have been out in the
    business or the legal world or wherever, they have something
    valuable to contribute. You are going to have to do that on a
    very selective basis.
        There are people, for example, who have been former agency
    and FBI personnel who are going to be extremely valuable on our
    commission. For example, on the Terrorism Commission, we had
    Jim Woolsey, and frankly he was quite good. In fact, he was
    excellent. We also had a fellow named John Lewis who had been
    at one time head of counterterrorism for the FBI. Exceedingly
    good.
        Now were they experts in a specific field? One could say
    so. Were they attached to an agency or bureau? Sure, by
    history. But I do not think that precludes them. As is pointed
    out, what you need really is an ability for all these people to
    get together.
        Now with regard to members of Congress, I served on the
    Commission for the Roll and Capabilities of the Intelligence
    Community. We had a Senator and a Congressman. Frankly, we had
    a Senator who never showed up until the day the report came
    out. On the other hand, we had a very involved Congressman by
    the name of Porter Goss, who is now Chairman of the House
    Intelligence Committee. He showed up to most meetings. But he
    had some expertise, in addition, to contribute to that
    particular committee.
        Now what I am saying is it all depends which member of
    Congress, or former member depending what they are doing, you
    put on.
        Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, I think the first criteria is
    that they need to be independent. They not only need to be
    independent thinkers, as I think Norm stated, they should also
    be independent of organization and somewhat--he said zealots,
    independent of ideology.
        There are some, and I think we have all had experience with
    this, there are some who lobby to get on commissions. And maybe
    one of the best criteria is someone who does not want to be on
    the commission. There are those who lobby to get on the
    commission because they have a single interest. It is their
    business to be involved in non-proliferation or whatever.
    Sometimes they are not as prone to work to develop consensus
    positions either.
        And so I think that is a judgment that has to be exercised
    by those making the appointments.
        With regard to time, it would be a very time-consuming
    activity. I do agree that the staff is the key there.
        With regard to Senators or members of the House, I also
    served on both types of commissions. And with all due respect
    to this institution, you are on a moment's notice and you have
    that beeper and it is a leash and it goes off constantly. There
    is always some interruption or someone trying to get a piece of
    your time. I think in some of these it is disruptive in a
    commission.
        I think it should be a private group as much as possible.
        And last, with regard to the issue of experience, I think
    you do not need--it is helpful to have the right mix. I think
    that one of the suggestions was maybe working with the
    leadership in a more consensus fashion. It is like the old
    baseball trading. You make sure that you have a shortstop and a
    third baseman, that you have someone who has experience in the
    intelligence community or law enforcement.
        Because we all spend time shaking our heads at acronyms and
    the language of specific areas. You do not have time for
    complete tutorials. So there has to be some knowledge there.
        And you often assign, in the commissions I have been
    involved in, Senator Specter and former Director Deutsch and
    others, they would actually assign two commissioners to go
    focus on specific issues. I focused on technology with regard
    to WMD. Someone else focused on the bioterrorism portion of it
    and biology. So again, it is nice to have that mix, aviation
    mix, and law enforcement mix.
        So you have to do an initial assessment of the scope of the
    commission and try to fill those as much as possible. And then
    you supplement it with the staff. You fill the holes with the
    staff. Having a good staff director is absolutely critical.
        Senator Torricelli. Given the desire of many institutions
    to protect themselves and their people, their reputations and
    their budget, it would be my belief that to do this without the
    ability to compel testimony and subpoena power with the force
    of law would be to make this a rather hollow exercise. We are
    not interested in simply providing cover for institutions, to
    provide comfort to the American people, but get genuine
    answers.
        Does anyone disagree with this notion that you have to have
    subpoena power put in this to make this a meaningful exercise?
        Mr. Betts. I think the ideal is to have the power but never
    have to use it, to have it in your pocket.
        Senator Torricelli. But nevertheless, it has to be given.
        Just for the historic basis of this, as we are going
    forward to argue with this, there are arguments about the
    sensitivity of sharing classified information with such a
    commission, given the sensitivity of the situation. I do not
    ever remember that being a problem when we were going through
    the debates about the MX missile on the commission, or the wars
    in Central America, or even our missile technology and the
    redesign of the Challenger. It is extraordinary to me that it
    is arising now.
        Do any of you remember there being problems of losses of
    classified information during those exercises that would give
    us pause now? Mr. Augustine.
        Mr. Augustine. No, I do not ever remember a problem of a
    loss of sensitive information from a commission of which I am
    aware. But that really was not the point that I, at least, was
    trying to make. I think the commission has to have full access
    to all information and I think they will protect it if we pick
    commissioners properly.
        Senator Torricelli. Actually, I was not responding to your
    point. I was responding to people down the street here.
        Mr. Augustine. My concern is that there is information that
    is not covered by existing laws that we still do not want
    people living in caves to hear. That is the part I am talking
    about. I do not worry about the commissioners. They should have
    access to everything that is available.
        Senator Torricelli. But I did not want, rhetorically, if
    Senator Lieberman and I take this to the Floor, people are
    going to rise and say well, to have this commission means
    sharing this classified information with commissioners and this
    involves certain risk. In my experience of watching this on
    everything from the defense of our Nation with strategic
    weapons to actual policy issues in combat with people on the
    ground, I never remember that this was ever a problem with a
    commission. Which raises whether that is an excuse or a reason
    not to have a commission.
        Mr. McCurdy. Again, the mix of the commissioners is vital
    there. My experience is, both in the Intelligence Committees in
    the Congress, where we dealt with highly compartmented--and
    there were times, quite frankly, and it may be a model even in
    commissions. There were times that only the chair and the
    ranking member were alerted to certain things with regard to
    source and methods.
        But if there is proper attention paid to the appointment of
    people, such as my colleagues here who I have the utmost
    respect for, most have held tickets before, classification and
    access, and probably maintained them. It would be helpful to
    have someone who is current in some of those, so you do not
    have to go through lengthy background checks.
        I am on the advisory board for the Department of Energy in
    Nuclear Matters, with regard to the former Soviet Union. Those
    are areas, and again, people do not go out and advertise those.
    But I think the commissioners and the experience again, there
    is a wealth of resource out there in the private sector you can
    draw upon, people who are willing to spend the time, sacrifice
    the time to do this appropriately.
        Mr. Sonnenberg. In all the commissions I have served on,
    three in the intelligence, and the President's Foreign
    Intelligence Advisory Board for 8 years, we never had a leak.
    What was interesting is once I had the National Security
    Advisor to the President come in and say you know, this is the
    only place around here where we have never had a leak. Now,
    having said that, I would not consider that important.
        However, we did do one thing which would be of interest. In
    the National Commission on Terrorism, we looked at findings.
    That was relegated, the permission to look at those findings
    was with the chairman and the vice chairman. So even in a
    situation where you have this top priority classified material,
    higher than top secret, you can then divide that up with the
    chairman, vice chairman, whoever. That is how you prevent
    leaks.
        In that case, I do not think there would have been a leak
    if the member had seen it because we all knew who the members
    were, but there is a way of handling that.
        Senator Torricelli. So the panel, in any case, is confident
    that we can argue with some certainty that the history of these
    commissions is that indeed classified information has been
    protected and it has never previously been raised as a problem
    in Democratic or Republican administrations regarding any of
    these issues. And I think that is important for us.
        I want to thank the panel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. This
    has been a very useful exercise.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Torricelli, for your
    substantial contribution to the discussion. Thanks to the four
    witnesses for your time and for the help that you have given
    and some of the details of how this might work.
        I must say, hearing your testimony reinforces my belief
    that the Nation would benefit from such a commission. Certainly
    the Nation's future security would benefit from such a
    commission.
        This is not going to be an easy road ahead for this
    legislatively, both because though we talk about complementing
    some of the committees of Congress, there is a natural
    sensitivity about turf here. And because, at least for now, the
    administration appears to be opposed to this. But I do think
    there is no substitute for the most aggressive pursuit of the
    truth here. And I know that Senator McCain feels this way.
        I look forward to working with Senator Torricelli, Senator
    Grassley and others to advance this idea and, in the first
    instance, to move as quickly as seems appropriate when we are
    ready to mark this bill up before our Governmental Affairs
    Committee.
        Mr. Sonnenberg. May I make one last comment? The irony of
    this is the administration, if they participate in this
    commission, might find out that it is more helpful than not.
        Chairman Lieberman. Exactly my feeling, that this is a
    commission, as others, that I see working quite closely with
    the administration, not in an adversarial or confrontational
    relationship. And of course, going to the members, that is
    exactly the tone that you would hope, or I would hope, that the
    chair or the members of the commission would create right at
    the outset in their relations with the administration, even
    while they are involved in a very aggressive pursuit of the
    truth.
        I thank all of you for your continuing public service,
    whether in or outside of the public service directly.
        I am going to leave the record of the hearing open for 2
    weeks, in case my colleagues want to either submit statements
    or perhaps even submit questions to all of you. But for now,
    thank you.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned,
    subject to the call of the chair.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

                     PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The attacks on September 11 painfully illustrated weaknesses in
    American national security. The fact that terrorists were able to
    hijack four American planes with box cutters, and then turn those
    planes into weapons is almost incomprehensible.
        I am confident that America will recover from these cowardly acts.
    However, never again should we be caught off guard.
        Major changes need to be made, including tightening security at our
    borders and ports, improving our intelligence gathering operations and
    strengthening our military.
        We are moving in the right direction. The President has established
    the Office of Homeland Security, which is responsible for coordinating
    domestic security among the Federal agencies.
        The administration has also requested additional money for our
    military in 2003, and Congress has held numerous hearings concerning
    the September attacks.
        While we will never be able to completely insulate ourselves from
    another terrorist attack, we can and will take the necessary steps to
    increase our readiness, fortify our military and protect our citizens.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their
    experiences on past commissions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.002

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.003

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.004

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.005

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.006

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.007

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.008

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.009

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.010

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.011

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.012

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.013

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.014

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.015

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.016

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.017

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.018

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.019

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.020

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.021

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.022

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.023

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.024

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.025

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.026

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.027

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.028

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.029

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.030

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.031

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.032

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.033

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.034

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.035

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.036

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.037

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.038

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.039

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.040

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.041

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8617.042