[Senate Hearing 107-328]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-328
FOREST FIRE PREVENTION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF THE THIRTYMILE FIRE
AND THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE FIRE FATALITIES
__________
NOVEMBER 14, 2001
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
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78-160 WASHINGTON : 2002
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BOB GRAHAM, Florida DON NICKLES, Oklahoma
RON WYDEN, Oregon LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California CONRAD BURNS, Montana
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JON KYL, Arizona
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GORDON SMITH, Oregon
Robert M. Simon, Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Chief Counsel
Brian P. Malnak, Republican Staff Director
James P. Beirne, Republican Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests
RON WYDEN, Oregon, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota CONRAD BURNS, Montana
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana DON NICKLES, Oklahoma
EVAN BAYH, Indiana GORDON SMITH, Oregon
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JON KYL, Arizona
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
Jeff Bingaman and Frank H. Murkowski are Ex Officio Members of the
Subcommittee
Kira Finkler, Counsel
Frank Gladics, Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS
Page
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from New Mexico................ 2
Bosworth, Dale, Chief, Forest Service, accompanied by Jerry
Williams, Director, Aviation and Fire Management............... 11
Campbell, Hon. Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator from Colorado........ 1
Cantwell, Hon. Maria, U.S. Senator from Washington............... 5
Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from Idaho.................... 4
Gleason, Paul, Professor of Forest Sciences, Colorado State
University, Fort Collins, CO................................... 29
Gray, Jody, Yakima, WA........................................... 44
Hastings, Hon. Doc, U.S. Representative from Washington.......... 8
Schaenman, Philip, President, TriData Corporation, Arlington, VA. 24
Weaver, Ken, Yakima, WA.......................................... 33
Wyden, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from Oregon........................ 1
APPENDIX
Responses to additional questions................................ 49
FOREST FIRE PREVENTION
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Wyden
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. The subcommittee will come to order.
Let me apologize to my colleagues. Two places at once
turned into three places at once, and I want my colleagues to
know I am sorry for the inconvenience.
The chairman of the full committee is here, Senator
Bingaman. We are very pleased that he is here, and I want to
recognize him before we begin.
[A prepared statement from Senator Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell,
U.S. Senator From Colorado
Thank you Mr. Chairman for allowing me to testify before this
Subcommittee today.
I would also like to recognize and thank Mr. Paul Gleason, Forestry
Professor at Colorado State University for coming to Washington to
testify here today.
We are here to discuss an unfortunate incident, the type with which
Coloradans are all too familiar. The flames of the Thirtymile Fire
caused four fatalities, accounting for the nation's second worst
wildfire disaster. The Storm King Mountain fire west of Glenwood
Springs, Colorado has the infamous distinction of being our worst
wildfire tragedy. In that fire, on July 14, 1994, fourteen brave
firefighters gave their lives to protect the lives of so many others.
After that incident, I introduced a resolution to honor those brave
men and women and to highlight the importance of fire safety and
underscore the need to devise sensible ways to minimize fire damage.
I understand that there is a debate whether certain forest
maintenance methods, such as controlled burns, are environmentally
preferential or are contrary to a natural state.
Wildfires are common in the West. The arid conditions and
significant swing in precipitation levels make the region a prime
target for fires. Yet, with all of our experience, men and women, and
homes and habitat continue to perish in combating these blazes.
I submit to this Subcommittee, that any debate concerning forest
maintenance should recognize that fires in the West will continue.
Therefore, we should make sure that such maintenance programs focus on
the human factor and not on other concerns. If a particular forest
maintenance program can prevent the death of even one firefighter, then
that is the program we should implement. Some proponents of forests and
public lands seem to argue that man should be kept out of the
discussion altogether; that man has no place in a discussion about
wilderness, for example.
As an advocate for public lands, I can confidently say that man has
a place in such debates. Ignoring the human factor ignores the
fundamental relationship between man and the environment. I raise this
issue not to point blame, but to highlight that man has a place at the
environmental table.
Fire fighting is one of the most dangerous jobs in the world. The
men and women of our fire departments put their lives on the line every
day to protect us. We have a duty to enact policies that would protect
them in kind.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and in particular, to
find out what lessons we learned from the Storm King Mountain Fire, and
most recently, from the Thirtymile Fire.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEW MEXICO
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me congratulate you and Senator Craig on having this hearing. I
know Senator Cantwell had specifically asked for this hearing
to occur.
I was particularly interested in the issues that are going
to be dealt with here because we have seen this problem of
inadequate safety precautions in our firefighting efforts for
many years, and I am sure you are all aware of that. I had the
unfortunate occasion to travel to New Mexico in 1994 with then-
Secretary of Agriculture, Mike Espy, to attend a memorial
service for the three Federal firefighters who died in a
helicopter crash in my State there in the Gila National Forest.
And I know there have been many other instances of tragic
losses since then, and the deaths that occurred at the
Thirtymile Fire in the State of Washington this past July are
most recent examples, which obviously we are all very sad
about.
Let me just say I want to support any effort that you make
in the subcommittee and that we can make in the full committee
to keep a close eye on what is done here. As I understand it,
there is an action plan to improve safety in the fighting of
fires, and I hope we can have a constant oversight of that as
we proceed for the next year or 2. I think that would be very
important.
But thank you for letting me make a short statement. I am
not able to stay for the full hearing, but I do appreciate very
much the fact that you are having it.
[The prepared statement of Senator Bingaman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Bingaman, U.S. Senator
From New Mexico
I was deeply saddened when I heard the news last July that four
firefighters were killed fighting the Thirtymile Fire in the State of
Washington. I would like to express my deepest sympathy to the family
members who are here today.
Many members of this Committee are from Western States where fires,
and threats of fires, are an ongoing concern. These are bipartisan
issues that are important in many States. In my own State, we
experienced the catastrophic results of an out of control fire just
last year--the Cerro Grande fire. As Chairman, I want to assure
everyone that one of this Committee's highest priorities is oversight
of Federal fire policy on public lands.
After the 2001 fire season, Congress provided the agencies with
substantial additional funding to ensure that all aspects of the
National Fire Plan, including firefighting, were adequately provided
for. I was happy to be a part of that effort.
In addition, this Committee has held numerous hearings on fire
policy. At every one of these hearings, the Federal land management
agencies, including the Forest Service, tell us that firefighter and
public safety is the number one priority above and beyond everything
else.
In light of these assurances, I was troubled to learn that the
agency's internal investigation of the fire concludes that Forest
Service personnel made a number of tragic mistakes relating to safety
considerations. Recently, I was pleased to learn that the Chief
released an action plan to improve safety on the firelines. However, I
want to make it clear that we intend to closely monitor the
implementation of this action plan and hold the agency accountable.
I think it is appropriate that Senator Cantwell requested this
hearing so that we can better understand the questions surrounding
issues of safety. I was happy to accommodate her request for this
hearing. I look forward to working with her and other Senators to
improve firefighter safety. We must all work together to ensure that
this tragedy is not repeated.
Senator Wyden. I thank my colleague, the chairman of the
full committee, and again appreciate him coming.
The purpose of the hearing today in a sentence is to make
sure that the four lives were not lost in vain at the
Thirtymile Fire in Washington State. The job of this
subcommittee is to determine a new direction for the Forest
Service and the Congress as there is a bipartisan effort to
work together to prevent future forest fire fatalities. Our
hearts go out to the families and the friends of those who died
in the Thirtymile Fire in Washington State this summer, and we
are particularly anxious to follow up, at Senator Cantwell's
request, on the proposal and look specifically at this fire and
look at all possible ways that this committee can pursue to try
to prevent this kind of tragedy in the future.
Those of you who have attended recent subcommittee hearings
know that Senator Craig and I in particular have tried to team
up on a bipartisan basis to pursue constructive solutions to
the problems of our forests. We have concerned ourselves with
the nuts and bolts of forest management, the issues surrounding
old growth, the Northwest Forest Plan, and the mechanics of
fighting fires under the National Fire Plan.
Today, though, with the Thirtymile Fire in Washington
State, we turn our attention not just to dealing with the
tragic event, but to a human element of forest policy, the
safety considerations that are absolutely critical to saving
lives.
On a hot July day in a narrow river canyon this year, a
small fire quickly grew out of control. Four firefighters were
tragically killed. The Forest Service's own internal
investigation of the fire has concluded agency personnel made a
number of significant mistakes, ways in which the Federal
Government was not a good partner, not a good and effective
partner of the firefighters in their dangerous work.
The Forest Service has now released a 31-point action plan
to improve safety on the fireline. There is a variety of good
steps in the plan including better training of leadership,
improved management of the transition from the initial attack
to the extended attack, and implementation of measures to fight
fatigue.
To make sure that those lives were not lost in the Pacific
Northwest, this subcommittee is going to hold the Forest
Service accountable on the implementation of their action plan
to improve safety on the fireline. We appreciate that there has
been an admission of the agency's mistake and that there has
been a development of an action plan. Today's hearing in my
view is the beginning of an effort to assure a timely and
effective implementation of that plan.
The subcommittee is going to want to know, for example, how
the Federal Government is going to keep the public informed as
to the implementation of the plan. We are going to want to know
what assurances will be given to assure that everything is done
in the future to minimize the risk of future fire fatalities.
We appreciate the witnesses' being here. We can probably
agree that the Forest Service action plan is a step in the
right direction, but I am of the view that more may be needed
to protect firefighters in the future, and we will examine that
as well.
I want to recognize my colleague, Senator Craig, but also
make clear that Senator Cantwell has just been relentless in
pursuing this issue, making it clear that this was of critical
importance to her constituents to try to prevent these kinds of
tragedies in Washington State in the future. And to her credit,
she has made it clear that she wants the Congress to act so as
to prevent these tragedies all over this country. After we
recognize Senator Craig, we are going to recognize Senator
Cantwell.
Senator Craig.
STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, U.S. SENATOR
FROM IDAHO
Senator Craig. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
am a bit gravelly today, but I must tell you that I will excuse
your tardiness. The Senator and I are both refugees--refugees
of the Hart Office Building. So, we are victims of the current
war we are engaging in. I do not say that with any humor at
all. The sense of dislocation that has resulted is very
frustrating and confusing to all of us and our staffs.
But, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you and Senator Cantwell.
The hearing that we are holding this afternoon I think is of
critical importance.
Let me also recognize Representative Doc Hastings who is
here. The fire occurred in his congressional district, and I
know he is concerned about this too.
Each of us needs to understand what is working and what is
not working when it comes to the safety of our firefighters. We
need to ensure that we do everything possible to secure the
safety of the young men and women who work so hard to protect
the resource values in our forests.
I want to begin by expressing my condolences to the parents
of Jessica Johnson, Karen FitzPatrick, Devin Weaver--Devin's
father Ken is with us today--as well as Evelyn Craven, and Tom
Craven's parents for the sacrifice and the pain they have had
to endure as a result of this accident.
Additionally, I want to thank Jason Emhoff for his
sacrifice. I know each of you joins me in wishing Jason a
speedy and complete recovery.
While we cannot bring back your loved ones, we can ensure
that conditions and training and firefighting policies are
changed to do everything possible to guarantee the safety of
each and every firefighter who follows.
Mr. Chairman, I expect the Chief of the Forest Service, who
is with us today, will help us understand the findings of the
Thirtymile Fire investigation, as well as what is being done to
ensure that we have as few future injuries and fatalities as is
possible.
I also know that unless we are willing to sacrifice our
forests to fires, which I believe is unacceptable to all of us,
that fire suppression work is extremely dangerous and that
conditions and weather many times conspire to thwart the best
intentions of all involved.
Chief, I want you and your staff to know that I am troubled
by the apparent similarities between the Thirtymile Fire and
other past events. It suggests to me that your firefighters may
not be learning from past mistakes or that your training is not
getting through to the younger firefighters or possibly both. I
expect you to redouble your efforts and that you will implement
an effective program to ensure the safety of our firefighters,
our communities, and our forests.
I want everyone to know that I am not interested in a
protracted debate over whether or not forest plans or
regulations or manual language or the Endangered Species Act
are to blame for these or other injuries or fatalities. Nor
should we be getting all worked up about whether or not some
rules, laws, or policies direct that we do not send
firefighters into some areas such as research natural areas or
wilderness.
I expect the Federal land managers to use every tool at
their disposal within the direction of our forest plans to
fight fire in the most aggressive, but safe manner possible. It
is not acceptable to me to learn that we are not utilizing
every means possible to suppress these fires in a safe manner.
The time to fight fires is before they occur, by removing
fuels from our at-risk lands. Even the fuel suppression crews
recognize the need, when they responded to the TriData
Company's surveys. When a fire does occur, it should be
attacked with all available force before it has an opportunity
to transition into a high risk, catastrophic situation we all
worry about.
Mr. Chairman, I should not have to remind anyone that our
firefighter safety can be enhanced if we would direct the
Federal land managers to reduce the fuel loading in our
forests. We have been debating forest health and now the fire
management plan for nearly a decade. I expect the Federal land
managers, including Chief Bosworth, to get on with managing our
forests. We are long past a point where we can afford to debate
whether or not we have a forest health program. We are long
past a time when we should be debating whether or not to remove
trees through thinning or timber harvest to reduce fire
intensity. It is time for you, Chief, and the Forest Service to
reduce the fuel loading, reduce fire intensity, and increase
the margin of safety for America's best, our firefighters.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Senator Craig.
Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, U.S. SENATOR
FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate
your bringing this subcommittee together, for Senator Craig
being here. I also appreciate full committee chairman, Senator
Bingaman, attending the opening of the hearing.
On July 10, near Winthrop, Washington, the Thirtymile Fire
burned out of control and four courageous, young people lost
their lives. I think it is important to remember that Tom
Craven, just 30 years old; Karen FitzPatrick, 18; Jessica
Johnson, 19; and Devin Weaver, 21, were just a few of those
whose lives have been lost in firefighting.
Today, Congress is taking the first steps in understanding
why these tragic deaths occurred and learning and understanding
how to prevent them in the future. I believe Congress has a
responsibility to the families of the lost firefighters to
thoroughly examine the Forest Service's safety performance, to
make sure the right questions are being asked and answered, and
to ensure that appropriate actions are being taken to protect
the lives of firefighters.
We all recognize the courage and commitment of the men and
women who fight wildland fires and the important work that the
Forest Service and all the five Federal firefighting agencies
do on our behalf. We know that firefighting is a dangerous
profession.
Nevertheless, we owe it to the firefighters who lost their
lives in service to this country and to their communities, and
we owe it to their families, to vigorously investigate their
deaths, identify the causes, and learn from the mistakes that
were made. Only then can we prevent future tragedies from
happening.
On September 26, the U.S. Forest Service released its
investigative report on the Thirtymile Fire, and in this
report, it identified 14 causal factors and 5 influencing
factors that contributed to the deaths of Tom Craven, Karen
FitzPatrick, Jessica Johnson, and Devin Weaver. The report
identified the following causal factors: lack of escape routes
and safety zones; inadequate assessment of weather and fuels
that contributed to the fierceness of the fire; strategy and
tactics that did not adequately consider the existing
conditions; failure to maintain clear command and control;
fatigue; and missed opportunities for management and personnel
to take control. All 10 standing fire orders and 10 of the 18
watch-out situations, the Forest Service's most basic
guidelines, were violated and disregarded.
Unfortunately, this situation sounds all too familiar. The
causes of the Thirtymile Fire are nearly identical to the
causes identified in the Forest Service report on the
investigation of Colorado's Storm King Mountain fire, which was
issued 7 years ago. Also at that time, similar problems with
the Forest Service's training, leadership and management were
mentioned.
In the 7 years since the Storm King report, the Forest
Service and Federal agencies responsible for wildland
firefighting have initiated several significant interagency
reviews, conducted numerous studies, and promoted safety as
their top priority in wildland firefighting. And yet, here we
are today, 7 years and millions of dollars later, investigating
another horrible tragedy--one that the Forest Service itself
says could have been prevented.
To quote from the Thirtymile report, one crew member, who
was at the scene of the fire, was asked about the apparent
apathy towards safety guidelines. This crewmember responded,
``Everyone knows that these are just guidelines and they can't
always be followed.'' To me this indicates that there is a huge
gap between management's stated position on fire orders, that
``we don't bend them and we don't break them,'' and what really
happens when we send young men and women out to fight fires.
The gap between stated safety policies and real world practices
caused the death of these young firefighters. The question
before us today is, why are these safety policies more rhetoric
than reality?
In the end, the Forest Service's management failed these
young firefighters. The Forest Service's safety practices and
procedures failed all of us. Congress should not and must not
fail these firefighters.
I am concerned that this problem appears to be a cultural
or institutional failing in the Forest Service approach to
safety. Similar leadership and management training failures
continue to place firefighting personnel in harm's way. In all
of these reports, the common element is a lack of
accountability and leadership. We must ask ourselves why we are
seeing the recurrence of these same causal factors, why the
lack of progress in bringing about real change, and how many
more reports we are going to have.
The 1995 TriData study, which was commissioned after Storm
King, drew upon nearly 1,000 interviews with wildland
firefighters and Forest Service managers and formed the basis
for 86 goals to improve safety. The TriData study also stated
the absence of accountability, a critical element in overcoming
a cultural complacency. While the words may not be identical, I
am struck by the fact that the ideas behind the TriData
recommendation are similar to the safety action plan the Forest
Service issued just last month. It appears to me that these
recommendations are actually being recycled. They are not new
ideas. They simply have not been implemented.
In the wake of the Thirtymile Fire, it has become clear
that the Forest Service needs to make implementation a reality.
Lives are at stake and things must change.
To make any meaningful change in the Forest Service
culture, it is essential to have genuine and meaningful
accountability in the system. And I should say here that I know
the new leadership in the Forest Service has just been on the
job a very short period of time. But there must be more
accountability in the Forest Service. We will hear from an
agency today that has promised to reform and failed. The
current management team will need to take that into
consideration. History has shown through different
administrations that suggested action plans and promises have
come up short, and I am hoping that that will change.
I want to explore at this hearing on the Thirtymile Fire
different ways that that might be done. I am going to ask
questions about increasing the oversight of the Forest Service,
changing training procedures so that they are on par with
standards of other public safety organizations, increasing the
objectivity of the investigators in charge of probing these
tragic accidents, and implementing a zero tolerance policy for
safety violation and enforcement within the agency. Our goal is
clear and we must not fail. It is time for the Forest Service
to take action to increase firefighter safety.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of all those who
are here today, and to Congress continuing its oversight and
investigation. We must prevent the tragedies at Storm King and
Thirtymile from ever happening again.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Wyden. I thank my colleague.
Let us now have Congressman Hastings come forward. Doc, we
very much welcome you and appreciate your coming and always
appreciate the chance to work with you. Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF HON. DOC HASTINGS,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate
your having this hearing, Senator Craig, and I especially want
to thank my colleague from Washington, Senator Cantwell, for
requesting this hearing. I know our staffs have worked together
on this, and I appreciate that very much. This is an issue of
great concern to those of us who live in eastern Washington,
but in fact everybody that has potential for wild fires.
We in the West are all too familiar with the enormous
impact of forest fires. While most folks experience the flames,
smoke, and devastation through their televisions, we experience
the impact these fires have firsthand on our communities and
our neighbors. The destruction wrought by forest fires can
devastate our homes and our environment and, even more
tragically, can claim the lives of both civilians and
firefighters.
On July 10, 2001, we experienced such a tragedy with the
untimely loss of four U.S. Forest Service firefighters in the
Cascade Mountains in Washington State in my district. While
proud and heroic members of the U.S. Forest Service continued
to fight the flames, known as the Thirtymile Fire,
unfortunately mothers, fathers, a wife, sisters, brothers,
children and friends were informed that their loved ones had
died fighting the blaze. Among those lost was an experienced
firefighter and a strong, proud husband and a father of two.
Lost as well was a young woman known for her faith who at one
point in her life saved her own home from a fire. Lost was a
youthful athletic woman with a promising future at Central
Washington University, and lost was a young man known as a
devoted outdoorsman with a keen interest in electrical
engineering. Tom Craven, Karen FitzPatrick, Jessica Johnson,
and Devin Weaver, brave Americans who gave their lives while
serving our country as Federal firefighters.
But amid the sadness and great loss, there were some
encouraging moments. Firefighter Rebecca Welch protected the
two hikers in her emergency shelter as the flames approached,
thereby saving their lives as well as her own. Firefighter
Jason Emhoff, who suffered severe burns, is now successfully
recuperating. And of course, countless others continued to
fight the blaze.
Unfortunately, many of these brave men and women will face
additional fires in the years to come. We must always be
mindful of their efforts and their bravery when faced with
adversity. It is with this effort and dedication in mind that
we must work to ensure the safety of the U.S. Forest Service
firefighters.
I too, like you, have reviewed the Forest Service report on
the Thirtymile Fire, and I have discussed its contents and the
findings with the Okanogan and Wenatchee Forest Supervisor,
Sonny O'Neal, as well as with Chief Dale Bosworth. And like
most, I believe the report is thorough and that all potential
and contributing aspects of this tragedy were reviewed.
But it is out of respect for those who serve day to day
fighting fires in my district and across the Nation and in
honor of those that we have lost that we must seek to ensure
our firefighters are protected by the policies that guide them
through these very difficult situations. Because far too many
questions remained unanswered, we are compelled to demand
answers regarding this event. The safety of our Forest Service
personnel and the application of findings of this event to
future fires require that we demand nothing less.
Regrettably, we have been in this situation before. 7 years
ago, following the tragic South Canyon fire in Colorado, Forest
Service officials were asked hard questions about wild fire
fighting procedures. At that time, Congress received forceful
assurances that changes would be made in both policies and
procedures and how those changes would be carried out in the
field.
Unfortunately, we are here again today, at least in part,
because apparently the Forest Service failed to adequately
follow through on those assurances. Much like South Canyon,
significant management findings of the Thirtymile Fire suggest
that a majority, if not all, of the standard firefighting
orders and watch-out situations were violated. In fact, all 10
of standard firefighting orders were violated during the course
of the Thirtymile Fire.
Why, if so many rules were violated and compromised during
the South Canyon fire and subsequent remedies were recommended,
were those rules again violated during the Thirtymile Fire?
Why, after managers, firefighters, and Forest Service
personnel received the additional training recommended by the
South Canyon final report, were all 10 of the standard fire
orders once again violated?
Furthermore, why were 10 of the 18 watch-out situations
violated as well?
From South Canyon, we learned that fuel loads were high,
that the fire's behavior was unpredictable, that shelter
deployments were not engaged properly, and that leadership and
management skills were lacking. Sadly these same situations
apparently occurred during the Thirtymile Fire.
Our responsibility now is to actively work to ensure these
issues are addressed once and for all. We must question why
these issues were not remedied then so that the same exact
scenario would not repeat itself 7 years later. We need very
specific answers to these concerns. The families of the
deceased firefighters are entitled to these answers and our
remaining firefighters need them for their survival.
I also remained concerned that a mop-up crew, which was the
case at the Thirtymile Fire, was engulfed by fire. They had no
knowledge it would explode so dramatically. Clearly, none of
the firefighters knew they were in such imminent danger until
the flames were upon them. Where were the communication
breakdowns? Why would a mop-up crew, when fatigued and
operating with little experience, suddenly be facing such
extreme conditions?
Furthermore, it is clear from both the Thirtymile report
and the South Canyon report that the management and approach to
these fires were not altered when there was a clear, obvious
observed threat.
Some have suggested that in contrast to the South Canyon
fire, those working the Thirtymile Fire on July 10 were not at
all aware of how dangerous the situation that they were facing
was. We must recognize, however, that in some cases whatever
preparedness and training available to firefighters, some fires
are just so bad that no amount of preparation can prevent major
disasters, and sadly that sometimes results in the loss of
life.
But that said, should a full-scale breakdown in a
communication, training, and management occur, the responsible
officials must be held accountable. Let me just repeat that.
When these factors break down, the responsible officials must
be held accountable.
I hope that today, in addition to discussing these events
surrounding Thirtymile, we will have the opportunity to discuss
how the Forest Service intends to address the issue of
accountability. If the post-South Canyon policy modifications
and recommendations were not implemented at Thirtymile, then we
need to know where the accountability lies between those two.
Wherever these issues take us, accountability,
preparedness, leadership, training, and resolution, we must
never lose sight of the reason why we formulate and implement
these firefighting policies. The brave men and women who fight
our forest fires, protecting our communities from disaster and
damage, deserve our unqualified respect and admiration, as well
as the comfort of knowing that their Government will make their
health and safety the number one priority before sending them
into these dangerous situations.
Again, I would like to thank the Senate and this
subcommittee for inviting to testify today and I look forward
to working with you as to any policies that may be developed
that requires our involvement. So, I look forward to working
with you, and once again, I want to thank the committee and my
colleague from Washington for having this hearing.
Senator Wyden. Doc, thank you for an excellent
presentation. I do not have any questions, but I want to
recognize my colleagues. I know that Senator Craig had a
request from our colleague from Colorado, Senator Campbell, and
I want to recognize him.
Senator Craig. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Doc, I have no questions of you, but I do appreciate that
testimony and your sensitivity to this issue.
Senator Wyden. Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. I just had one question. I
know, Doc, you hit on the themes of accountability and
leadership and training. Has your office thought of any
specifics along those lines on the issue of accountability?
Mr. Hastings. No, we have not specifically. We are like, I
think, a lot of people that have looked at the South Canyon
report and this report and compared the two, and wondered why
something has not been done.
I guess that I would characterize where we potentially need
to go on this is that if something like this tragically
happens--and I hope it does not happen again--there simply has
to be some sort of a trail where there is a breakdown. And if
there is a breakdown, there has to be accountability. Now,
lacking that, if all of the rules by which people are being
guided when they fight a fire are not being followed, as you
suggested, that they are just guidelines, then maybe there has
to be a new look within the agency as to what those rules are
with some sort of hammer to make sure that they are carried
out.
But beyond that, I have not gone into the specifics. I hope
that maybe as a result of this hearing and further action, we
can resolve that, however.
Senator Cantwell. Well, we certainly appreciate your being
here today and all your work on behalf of the 4th district of
Washington. We know that you are very concerned about this, and
your future efforts on this are appreciated.
Mr. Hastings. Good. Thank you very much.
Senator Wyden. Doc, thank you for an excellent
presentation. We will excuse you at this time.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you.
Senator Wyden. Okay. Our next panel: the Chief, Dale
Bosworth, accompanied by Jerry Williams, Director, Aviation and
Fire Management of the Forest Service.
Gentlemen, we are going to make your prepared remarks a
part of the hearing record in their entirety. I know that there
is always a sort of chromosomal compulsion to just read every
word that is on paper. We are going to make that a part of the
record. If you could perhaps, Dale, highlight your principal
concerns and Mr. Williams as well, that would be great.
STATEMENT OF DALE BOSWORTH, CHIEF, FOREST SERVICE, ACCOMPANIED
BY JERRY WILLIAMS, DIRECTOR, AVIATION AND FIRE MANAGEMENT
Mr. Bosworth. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and Senator
Cantwell and Senator Craig, while I appreciate the opportunity
to be here today, I must say that I regret that we are here
because of the Thirtymile Fire.
As you said, I have with me Jerry Williams. Jerry is the
Director of the Fire and Aviation Management program, and he is
going to be the person that is, in part, or largely responsible
for implementing a lot of actions that have come out of the
investigation report.
I would just like to say a couple of things about a sort of
personal situation. Jerry and I have been in our jobs now both
for about 6 months. I went on my first fire when I was 17 years
old, and for the following 20 years, I spent quite a bit of
time on fires. It has been about 40 years now that one way or
the other I have been involved in fires.
Jerry spent his whole career in the fire business. He was a
smokejumper. He was a fire management officer, and now he is
the Director of our Fire and Aviation Management program.
Both Jerry and I have sons who are in the same business. It
is really, really important to us that we deal with safety in
firefighting. It is important to Jerry and it is important to
me both, not just because we have sons that are in this
business, but that adds to it and that adds to the awareness,
but also because we care a lot about the firefighting family,
the Forest Service family, and as a Government organization, we
can do better than we have been doing.
I deeply regret the deaths that occurred on the Thirtymile
Fire, and I know that all Forest Service people do. The four
brave firefighters that lost their lives, as well as the
survivors, I believe truly are heroes. I have a huge respect
for them and I have a huge respect for all firefighters that
face those dangers every day trying to protect our resources
and our communities.
I also know that there is a perception that we are blaming
the victims, and I want to say up front, before I go any
further, that I do not believe that the victims are to blame. I
am confident in the overall conclusions that were reached in
the report. The report details a number of conclusions by the
investigation team. The members of the investigation team I
believe were highly skilled and they represent a whole lot of
years of experience. The investigation identified a number of
causal factors and those have been discussed already. They have
been laid out a bit already.
But I just want to repeat again I guess that the fire again
started from a campfire. It started about 30 miles from
Winthrop, Washington. We had initial attack crews on the fire.
They were replaced by Entiat Hotshot crews, and then a second
crew arrived on July 10, and that crew was subsequently
entrapped. Fire shelters were deployed and four people lost
their lives: Tom Craven, Karen FitzPatrick, Jessica Johnson,
and Devin Weaver.
The people that were on this fire I believe were dedicated
people. I believe that when the people went to this fire, they
intended to do the right things, but they ended up being
deceived by the fire, and the situation changed on them pretty
quickly.
The real lessons that we have to learn, though, I think are
the lessons about things that were not done that should have
been done. That is where there is an awful lot of opportunities
to try to prevent future fatalities. There were accepted
firefighting safety procedures that were not followed. The
fatalities and several injuries all occurred during or shortly
after the deployment of the fire shelters. But the mistakes
that were made were made before the entrapment. Those were the
major mistakes, before the entrapment and eventual deployment.
The report states the entrapment of the firefighters
occurred because of a failure to recognize a situation that was
rapidly deteriorating and because the placement of firefighters
were in a vulnerable position. There was a lack of
communication about critical information. Leadership had
ineffective control and command of operations, and probably
most critically, is there was a failure to adhere to safety
procedures and the 10 standard firefighting orders and the 18
situations that shout watch out.
Strategies and decisions were made on the fire from the
initial attack to deployment did not appropriately reflect the
extreme fire danger that existed at the time. It did not
recognize the fuel situation in the valley bottom, and lack of
adequate safety zones influenced the final outcome.
Transition fires are our most difficult fires. The
Thirtymile Fire was in transition at the time of entrapment.
When I talk about transition, I am referring to the stage that
a fire is escaping the initial attack capability and is growing
to become a large fire, a large project. And those are the
times when we have the greatest danger and that we have to put
a lot of thought into what we can do to minimize the risk to
firefighters during that time.
There was some confusion about why some of the firefighters
ended up deploying shelters in different locations. On October
3, I asked the Accident Review Board to conduct a review of the
investigation to make sure of what the details were that could
be pulled out of that. The board identified two possible
scenarios, either one of which may describe why some stayed on
the rocks and some were in the road. One possibility is they
never heard the orders. The other possibility is that they
believed that they were following the orders because they were
all fairly close together. We will probably never know with any
kind of precision or certainty really what took place at that
time. But we do know that communications were not adequate, and
we do know that they should not have been put in this situation
of entrapment in the first place.
On October 19, we released an action plan to address the
changes that were recommended by the report. We are taking
actions on situational awareness, assessment and transition,
fatigue management, incident operations, fire management
leadership, personal protective equipment, and safety
management and accountability. I have also asked the regional
forester in the Pacific Northwest region to initiate an
administrative investigation to consider performance and
accountability issues related to what took place.
So, again I deeply regret what took place on the Thirtymile
Fire. Again, I want to tell you that the whole Forest Service
grieves for the families who lost loved ones in this fire. And
I want to reaffirm to you that we have a commitment to do our
very, very best to improve firefighter safety and to reduce the
potential for risks to our people.
I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bosworth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dale Bosworth, Chief, Forest Service,
Department of Agriculture
Mr. Chairman and Subcommittee Members:
Good afternoon. While I appreciate the opportunity to testify
today, I regret that we are here because of the Thirtymile Fire
accident. Accompanying me today is Jerry Williams, Director, Fire and
Aviation Management, who will be responsible for many of the actions
arising out of our investigation report's recommendations.
I deeply regret the deaths that occurred on the Thirtymile Fire; my
grief and the grief of the entire Forest Service family are deep and
genuine. The Thirtymile Fire was a tragic event. The four brave
firefighters, who lost their lives, as well as the survivors, truly are
heroes. I have immeasurable respect for them and for all of our
firefighters who face danger every day protecting our resources and us.
I am confident in the overall conclusions reached in the report,
which details the collective conclusions reached by the investigation
team. The members of the investigation team are highly skilled,
representing many years of experience. The investigation identified a
number of interconnected likely causal factors that we must address.
Understanding the likely causal factors and taking all possible action
to prevent similar happenings in the future is a critical concern for
not only the Forest Service, but also for other Federal, State, and
local government fire suppression organizations who must learn from
these unfortunate and tragic events.
overview
The fire, caused by an abandoned picnic cooking fire, was located
30 miles south of Winthrop, Washington, along the Chewuch River.
Firefighters were assigned to initial attack; the Entiat Hotshots
relieved the initial attack crew and continued the initial attack
effort. On July 10, a second crew arrived that subsequently was
entrapped. Fire shelters were deployed, but four people lost their
lives: Tom Craven, Karen FitzPatrick, Jessica Johnson, and Devin
Weaver.
Before I discuss the findings of the report, let me tell you how we
respond to incidents when there is a serious accident, such as
entrapment and deployment. Within hours, we designate a team of
technical experts to meet on-site to make an initial assessment of the
facts. Within 24 hours of any fatalities, an initial report is filed.
The work continues and a more detailed report is written, 72 hours
after the investigation team meets. We do this because it is critical
for us to find out major issues and causal factors so that we can
quickly notify other firefighters about any preliminary factual
findings, which could affect their procedures or operations.
For the Thirtymile Fire, we chartered an investigation team that
held its first meeting on July 11, the day after the tragedy. On July
14, the team issued its report that stated the basic facts about the
fire. Although there were no immediate remedial measures called for,
many of our fire organizations did stop to review procedures and
reinforce basic safety messages. A conference call was held with our
Regional Foresters and Station Directors to discuss the fire. The
investigation report was completed on September 26. Because there were
continuing questions concerning why some of the victims and survivors
remained on the rock scree above the road, I asked the Review Board to
reexamine the factual report and witness statements relating to this
question.
summary of the report findings
The people on this fire were dedicated people. They intended to do
the right things, but they were deceived by the fire and the situation
changed on them quickly. The lessons to be learned as a result of the
fatalities on the Thirtymile Fire are mostly about what was not done
that should have been done. The report concludes that there were many
opportunities to prevent these fatalities. Accepted firefighting safety
procedures were not followed and, as a result, four firefighters lost
their lives. The fatalities and several injuries all occurred during,
or shortly after, deployment of fire shelters, but the mistakes that
led to this tragedy were made earlier before the entrapment and
eventual deployment.
The report states that the entrapment of the firefighters occurred
because of a failure to recognize a rapidly deteriorating fire
situation, the placement of firefighters in a vulnerable position, the
lack of communication about critical information, leadership's
ineffective control and command of operations, and, most critically,
the failure to adhere to safety procedures and Standard Firefighting
Orders and all firefighters are taught the ``Ten Standard Orders'' and
``Eighteen Situations that Shout Watch Out.'' The entrapment of two
civilians occurred because of a delayed closure of a potentially
hazardous area and failure to successfully evacuate the valley upriver
from the fire.
Strategies and decisions made on the fire from initial attack to
deployment did not appropriately reflect the extreme fire conditions
that existed, nor did those decisions appropriately consider the
diversity and complexity of fuel types in the valley bottom. Similarly,
features of the valley bottom and the lack of adequate safety zones
influenced the final outcome.
Transition fires are our most difficult fires. The Thirtymile Fire
was in transition at the time of entrapment and fatalities. Transition
refers to a stage of a fire when it exceeds the capability of the
initial attack forces to suppress the fire. Transition is usually
characterized by rapid growth, spotting across control features and
increased intensity. If firefighters are fatigued and the fire makes a
transition to a larger fire, the changed fire conditions may not be
recognized and good, quick decisions may not be made. On the Thirtymile
Fire, our firefighters exceeded our work/rest guidelines.
There was some confusion about why or how the firefighters ended up
deploying shelters in different locations. As I stated, on October 3, I
asked the Accident Review Board to conduct a review of the
investigation to see what details could be discerned about why some of
the victims remained on the rocks. The Board identified two possible
scenarios, either of which may describe why the some firefighters
appeared to have chosen not to go the road. One possibility is that
those firefighters did not hear the incident commander's directive to
come to the road. Another possibility is that the five firefighters had
heard the directive to come to the road, but their interpretation of
the directive was to be ``close'' to the road and they believed they
were close to the road. Probably we will never know, with certainty,
precisely what was said, to whom, and at what time. What we do know is
that communications were not clear to all the crew members.
future actions
On October 19, I released an action plan to address the changes
recommended by the report. We are taking actions on situational
awareness, assessment, and transition, fatigue, incident operations,
fire management leadership, personal protective equipment, and safety
management and accountability. I have directed Regional Forester Harv
Forsgren to initiate an administrative investigation to consider
performance and accountability issues related to the actions taken to
suppress the Thirtymile Fire. I would be happy to keep the Committee
apprised of our progress on these actions, especially those related to
accountability.
As I said earlier, I deeply regret the deaths that occurred on the
30-Mile Fire; my grief and the grief of the entire Forest Service
family are deep and genuine. I reaffirm to you our commitment to do our
level best to improve firefighter safety and processes to reduce risks
we owe it to Tom Craven, Karen FitzPatrick, Jessica Johnson, Devin
Weaver, their families and the survivors and we owe it to the
firefighters of the future. I will now answer any questions you may
have.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Chief. Let us go now to Mr.
Williams.
Mr. Williams. Senator, I do not have any prepared comments.
I am here to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Wyden. All right.
Let me just ask a couple of questions. Then, Chief, I am
going to turn it over to Senator Cantwell, who really in my
view deserves great credit for constantly pushing to have this
committee work for changes. I want to let her know again that I
very much appreciate her leadership.
Chief, I know how dedicated you are and how sincere you are
in your work and your commitment to professionalism in this
area. But I will tell you that when I read the first couple of
sentences under Future Actions on page 3 of your testimony--
``We are taking actions on situational awareness, assessment,
and transition''--that basically sounds like business as usual.
Maybe you could tell me in English what that paragraph really
means in terms of shaking our policies up here so that we do
not have another subcommittee hearing requested by a member of
this Senate to look at another tragedy.
Senator Cantwell has pointed out with great specificity the
history of what has gone on in this area, and Congressman
Hastings has as well. This has gone on for years and years. And
now you have come and said you are going to take actions on
situational awareness, assessment, and transition, and a
variety of other things. I would like you to start by telling
me what are going to be the significant and tangible steps that
the Service takes so that this subcommittee is not back in
another year or 2 holding a hearing on yet another tragedy
referring to yet another report from the Forest Service saying
that things went wrong.
Mr. Bosworth. Well, the first thing is the action plan that
the board of review came up with. I am going to ask Jerry here
in a minute to be a little more specific on the action plan.
There are a number of items in the action plan.
I am briefly talking about things like situational
awareness. We have got to do a better job of training people,
making sure they are not fatigued, making sure that people are
following the fatigue guidelines, making sure that when they
are out there, they understand the situation that is going on
around them. If their eyes are looking down right in front of
them and they are not paying attention to the situation around
them, either because they do not have the training or because
of fatigue, then we have got them in a situation that is
unacceptable. So, we need to do some work on that with all of
our firefighters.
We need to do a better job, when I talk about fatigue, of
managing the fatigue guidelines. We are learning by working
with the Department of Defense that after a certain number of
hours without sleep and working hard, that judgment is
diminished a significant amount. We cannot afford to have
people out there in a dangerous situation with 30 hours of work
with no sleep. We need to manage that better.
We have accountability issues that we have to deal with,
and we need to start doing accountability before we have a
fatality. We need to be dealing with accountability every day
on every fire on every situation so that when we find people
that are not following the 10 standard firefighting orders or
they are not following the other guidelines and standards that
we have, that we take action at that time and not wait until
people are in the position where they are entrapped in a fire.
So, those are a few of the things, and I can have Jerry go
through more specifically the action plan, if you would like to
hear some of those things.
Senator Wyden. Yes, I would like to hear as much as you all
want to talk about that is specific about what changes are
going to be made because when I read that paragraph under
future actions and am told about incident operations,
situational awareness, assessment, transition, fire management,
leadership, that is just boiler plate that could have been
taken out of 50 hearings that have been held on this issue in
the past. What we are going to be doing--and thank goodness,
Senator Cantwell is going to keep the heat on on this issue--is
we are going to stay with it until there are real and
significant changes being made.
So, Mr. Williams, why do you not take a crack at that.
Chief, what I am going to do at the end of Mr. Williams'
answer is make a request to you, and I am going to hold the
hearing record open for 2 weeks. I would like you to furnish
specifically the concrete steps that will be taken to describe
what is going on in that first paragraph under Future Actions,
because I think we have got to have the specifics. Is there any
problem getting me that within 2 weeks?
Mr. Bosworth. No. We could give you a copy of the action
plan and a copy of the subsequent work that has been done on
that.
[The following was received for the record:]
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service,
Washington, DC, January 11, 2002.
Subject: Implementation of Thirtymile Fire Accident Prevention Plan
Action Items
To: Regional Foresters, Station Directors, Area Director, IITF
Director, and WO Staff
Enclosed is the Thirtymile Accident Prevention Plan and the
supporting documents. Integration of these Action Items into the
Directives System, training curricula, and standard practices will take
time. However, in order to ensure wildland firefighter safety, it is
imperative that we take certain actions prior to the next fire season.
Please refer to the text of the Accident Prevention Plan for
description of each action item below.
This letter addresses implementation of items A-1, A-3b, A-4, A-8a,
A-12, A-14, A-15, A-22, A-27, and A-29.
Action Plan Items A-1, A-4 & A-8a
A draft Transition Fire Guide is enclosed. This guide will be
shared with all Type 3, 4, & 5 Incident Commanders. Review of this
guide should be a part of your annual refresher training:
Local agency administrators are required to convey their
expectations on incident management to their Type 3, 4, & 5 Incident
Commanders. Those expectations should include as a minimum:
1. Provide for the safety and welfare of all personnel and
the public.
2. Develop and implement viable strategies and tactics for
the incident.
3. Monitor effectiveness of the planned strategy and tactics.
4. Disengage suppression activities immediately if strategies
and tactics cannot be implemented safely.
5. Maintain command and control of the incident.
6. Use local rules and specific criteria to determine when a
fire has moved beyond initial attack.
Action Plan Item A-3b
a. every fire line supervisor will be issued a ``pocket
card'' for the fuel types on their home unit. All fire line
supervisors will be issued a pocket card before deployment on
an assignment by the receiving unit.
b. Each unit will post their ``pocket card'' on the Pocket
Card web site at www.fire.blm.gov/nfdrs.
Action Plan Item A-12-a, A-12-b
The National Mobilization Guide will include direction to dispatch
centers that will ensure all resources know the name of the assigned
Incident Commander and announce all changes in incident command.
Geographic Area Mobilization Guides, Zone Mobilization Guides and Local
Mobilization Guides should include this direction as they are revised
for the 2002 fire season.
Action Plan Item A-14
A complexity analysis will be prepared on every fire at the time of
initial attack as a part of the size up. This analysis can be in the
form of a checklist similar to the enclosed or developed to meet local
conditions.
Action Plan Item A-15
Every fire that has been typed as a Type 3, Type 2 or Type 1 Fire
will have a dedicated Incident Commander. Collateral duties will not be
acceptable. Unified command, where appropriate, does not violate this
requirement.
Action Plan Item A-22
The Chief, Regional Foresters, Forest Supervisors, and District
Rangers will personally communicate their expectation of leadership in
fire management. This will be completed prior to fire season and in
conjunction with National Leadership Team meetings and annual fire
schools.
Action Plan Item A-27
Every fire line supervisor will be issued an Incident Response
Pocket Guide (PMS#461). Page 1 of the guide contains the National
Wildlife Coordinator Group endorsed risk management process.
Action Plan Item A-29
Every fire line qualified individual will receive training on
entrapment recognition and deployment protocols. This training should
be conducted in conjunction with refresher training and/or annual fire
schools. The principles outlined in the entrapment avoidance enclosure
will be incorporated into next iteration of wildland fire shelter
training.
The National Safety Specialist, prior to the 2002 western fire
season, will issue guidelines for crew actions in the event of
entrapment and in preparation for deployment. These guidelines will
include specific actions necessary for entrapment avoidance, safety
zone characteristics and selection, crew deployment training and
emergency deployment supervision.
Each Unit shall ensure that, upon completion, the above items are
documented and reported to the Regional Fire Safety Specialist.
The items above, as well as the other items in the action plan,
should be accomplished as soon as possible. The Fire and Aviation staff
unit will keep you informed as actions are completed and the Regions
make progress.
If you have any questions or require further clarification, contact
Marc Rounsaville at (404) 347-3464 or [email protected]
Dale N. Bosworth,
Chief.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Williams. One of the common denominators I think with
this fire and some of the earlier tragic fires that you have
referred to is this whole business of transition management.
Again, this is the kind of fire that is moving beyond initial
attack. It is a fire that at some point we thought we
controlled and no longer control, and it is on its way to a
large, dangerous fire.
One of the ironies in the wildland fire community is that
we have strategies in place to deal with initial attack fires.
You see that in our budgets, in the NFMAS, and in our most
efficient staffing levels. We also have strategies in place to
deal with large fires, and that is what incident management
teams are all about.
Senator Wyden. So, is something going to change in this
area known as transition management that is not being done
today?
Mr. Williams. Yes, sir.
Senator Wyden. What would that be?
Mr. Williams. We are putting together a group right now
that is developing fire danger thresholds for units across the
country, and we are going to use those fire danger thresholds
to guide judgment in dealing with transition fires. Number
one----
Senator Wyden. That I think human beings can understand.
So, as you face the question of these transition policies, you
are going to set in place an early warning system, so to speak,
so we will pick it up earlier. Is that right?
Mr. Williams. That is correct. There is going to be not
only an early warning system, but we will also introduce
operational protocols to do something different, that we are
modifying tactics and strategies as the fire is changing.
Senator Wyden. Well, that is the kind of thing we would
like to know within 2 weeks, Chief, what those operation
protocols would be in addition to the early warning system.
The only other question I had for you, Chief, is I think
that this issue is so important that we are going to need
regular briefings from the Service, not just the paper but
regular briefings, and Senator Craig has indicated that he
agrees with this request, as well as Senator Cantwell. Can we
agree, the subcommittee and you, that we will get briefed on
how the implementation of these changes are being made in a
verbal briefing every 60 days until we have got these changes
in place?
Mr. Bosworth. We would be very happy to do that. We will
commit to doing that.
Senator Wyden. Good.
At this point, I am going to turn it over to Senator
Cantwell and again thank her for making sure that this is
brought to our attention. Senator Cantwell, thank you for doing
this.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for the committee's ongoing commitment and oversight of this
issue.
Mr. Bosworth, if I could ask you a few questions about the
similarities between the Thirtymile Fire and the Storm King
Fire, and if we could put up the first chart.
[Chart.]
Senator Cantwell [presiding]. You can see from this chart
that there are several factors here that were cited as failures
in the Storm King Fire that happened in 1994, and were
specified in the report on the incident: command/control
failures; lack of management intervention; management did not
adapt to changing conditions; management ignored watch-out
situations; environmental factors ignored. Those are the same
management failures, if you will, that are cited here at the
Thirtymile Fire. At least that is what your investigative
report has come up with.
So, my question is, do you believe that we did not learn
the lesson from Storm King, as it relates to the fact that
there have been repeated failures in these key areas, or at
least in certain fire management situations? Don't you think
that these failures are the things that we know can go wrong
and that they should have been at the top of the list of things
to watch out for?
Mr. Bosworth. I would agree certainly that these are things
that should be at the top of the list. I would agree that there
is additional accountability that needs to be included in what
we do.
But I would also say that it is hard to know how successful
we were after Storm King. We had two or three significantly
difficult fire seasons where we do not know how many people our
actions might have saved after Storm King from the things that
we learned. Now, obviously, we did not learn them well enough
with what took place on Thirtymile. One of the things about
implementing the safety plan that sometimes gets difficult is
you only know when you are not successful. It is hard to tell
when you are because you do not know if our actions are the
reason or not the reason.
But I do know that there has been a high degree of
attention after Storm King to a number of these items, but you
cannot slip up at all. When you have a bad situation, you
cannot slip up at all.
Senator Cantwell. So, I want to make sure I understand
because I think part of this issue, at least for me, is
figuring out where the Forest Service is in terms of safety and
understanding the problem. You have to understand the problem
first to correct it. I look at this chart and it seems to me
that there is a gross negligence in understanding these issues.
Regarding your comment about the fires that have happened
in which people may have acted in a proper way: I would assume
that you would keep some sort of data and information on fires
that may have happened in between 1994 and 2001, and how well
the management teams performed in implementing the changes in
safety practices that have been recommended.
Mr. Bosworth. Yes. We do keep good track of the number of
fires that we have. Jerry, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Williams. I think in this business, because it is a
high risk/high consequence business, we tend to focus problems
or their solutions in one of three categories. Do we have
adequate policies in place to provide for the safety of our
firefighters? Are the procedures put in place to provide for
the firefighters' safety? And finally, are performance
expectations known and observed for all of our people at the
crew level, all the way up to the management level?
Senator Cantwell. Well, how do you measure that?
Mr. Williams. What I am indicating is that I believe the
policies and the procedures are largely in place. The one place
where we are soft is on these transition fires, and we are
committed to fixing that. This in many respects in my mind is a
performance issue. Did managers and supervisors intervene when
they should have intervened?
Senator Cantwell. Well, if we could go to the next chart.
[Chart.]
Senator Cantwell. You are saying that you think that the
procedures or the policies are in place, but I look at the
recommendations. The TriData study, after the Storm King Fire,
basically said, ``okay, let us do an analysis of why we are in
this situation. What are the safety things that need to be
improved?'' And you came up with a list. I applaud the Forest
Service for having that done, but then I look at the
recommendations that you are making from the Thirtymile Fire.
They are the same recommendations: to develop behavioral based
safety programs; improve training for individuals in leadership
positions; gather better information on fire dangers; and
improve firefighter preparedness and training. They are the
same recommendations. We are just making them several years
later. So, either we are not implementing them and we do not
have a way to measure the implementation--except in the most
extreme cases, in which the loss of life--or they are
implemented and not working.
Mr. Williams. I believe a lot of recommendations have been
implemented in terms of policy and procedure. Now, whether or
not that is being adhered to is another issue and that falls
into this whole business of accountability. I believe that is a
significant factor for us.
Senator Cantwell. Well, does it do any of us any good if
they are not being adhered to?
Mr. Williams. No.
Senator Cantwell. If we have them on the books, but nobody
is adhering to them?
Mr. Williams. No, not at all. But I would also offer that
this agency deals with about 10,000 fires every year. We field
a fire force of about 7,000 firefighters. The policies and the
procedures, the 10 orders, LCES, the 18 watch-outs in many,
many cases have saved lives and averted this kind of tragedy.
Senator Cantwell. So, are you saying that this is a
percentage issue?
Mr. Williams. No. I am saying that any loss of life is
unacceptable. I am saying that in my opinion we have a
performance issue here. It falls into this whole area of
accountability. Chief Bosworth is committed to dealing with the
accountability issue not so much after the fact as we are
having to do here, but introducing procedures where we deal
with accountability before this happens. That might be
something as simple as asking a crew where is your escape
route, and if they do not know, they are off the line. Or
asking them what is today's weather forecast, and if they do
not know one of those 10 standard orders, they are off the
line.
Senator Cantwell. Well, let me ask you then about the issue
of training. Do you think the current level of training that
the firefighters receive is adequate for personnel to know and
understand the safety regulations that you are talking about?
Mr. Williams. I think it is extremely difficult for a
first-year firefighter. My son is 21 years old. He is on his
second year in a hotshot crew. These young people, at this
point especially, need all the leadership and all the
management oversight that we can bring to bear. We do not ask
our firefighters to memorize the 10 standard orders, but we do
insist that the supervisors and the management oversight people
hold those 10 orders firm. When they do not, we know that
trouble is in front of us.
Senator Cantwell. In this instance, some of these young
firefighters had--what was it--32 hours of classroom training?
They had just been firefighters for a few weeks and were put in
this situation. So, are you recommending that we change the
training program?
Mr. Williams. What I am saying is that the training that
these folks receive, the 32 hours of classroom training, plus 8
hours of field training, is not adequate for the kind of fire
that confronted them. Now, I do not know that we have got any
training that is adequate for the kind of fire that confronted
those people.
What I am suggesting, though, is that our training does not
stop at 32 hours. The training that we do is on-the-job
training. We have performance based training regimens where
task books and so forth are used to elevate the training and
background and knowledge of the people that are put into these
situations.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Bosworth, how do you believe that we
get to a zero tolerance policy within the Forest Service as it
relates to safety violations within the work force?
Mr. Bosworth. Well, that is a good question and I am not
sure that I have a direct answer for how we get there except
that we need to get there. I think, first, it has to do not
just with fire but with our whole Forest Service safety program
and are we giving the proper attention to safety at the top of
the organization, at the top of the regional organization in
the forest and the district, and are we following up then with
some of the kinds of things that Jerry was talking about that
when somebody does not do that, does not follow the rules, does
not follow the safety direction, that they are out. They are
off the line. They may be given some time off. They may be
removed from service if it occurs, and do that before we have
serious accidents.
And I believed this before the Thirtymile Fire, shortly
after I came into this job. I believe that we need to take a
hard look at our entire Forest Service safety program not just
the fire part, although the fire part of it just brings it even
more after this year.
I would like to also add that there are other fatalities
that just are not acceptable. We lost four other firefighters
on Forest Service fires this summer, three in a helicopter
crash, one with a snag that fell. Those were just on Forest
Service fires. There were another eight people that died in
wildland firefighting that were either State or volunteer
firefighters in the other agencies.
Senator Cantwell. Who is accountable for the safety
violations that occurred in the Thirtymile Fire? Who is
accountable?
Mr. Bosworth. Well, it works its way up. Ultimately I am.
Senator Cantwell. And who else along the way?
Mr. Bosworth. Along the way, the regional forester who
works for me who has responsibility for the national forest in
Oregon and Washington is accountable, the forest supervisor of
the Wenatchee and Okanogan National Forests, the district
ranger on the ranger district. There are also other people.
Then it gets down to the incident commander that was in charge
of that specific fire, the fire management officer on the
ranger district and the assistant fire management officer on
the ranger district, as well as the forest fire management
officer. Everybody has a hand in this.
Senator Cantwell. And what actions were taken to hold those
individuals accountable for the failures and loss of life in
this incident?
Mr. Bosworth. Right now we have got an administrative
review we have contracted out, and I have asked the region to
do an administrative review. So, we go through due process in
taking any kind of administrative action or disciplinary action
on people that were accountable, the people that we need to
hold accountable for this.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Bosworth, has the Forest Service
considered looking at the ways other enforcement organizations
or safety organizations hold people accountable for safety
violations?
I would just add that Doc and I represent a common area in
the 4th district of Washington, and I guarantee you if the
workers at Hanford committed the same level of health and
safety violations, we all would not be here. But there has to
be a culture that implements safety standards. So, something is
missing here within the firefighting agencies.
Mr. Bosworth. Part of the answer to your question is yes,
we have looked at that. We have contracted out. I cannot speak
as specifically to this as I would like to, but I know that a
few years ago there were some contracts with some consulting
firms to look at our safety program overall. There has been a
number of things that have been done in the last several years
to find out what other organizations are doing and to try to
improve our knowledge and our record.
I cannot tell you why we did not do them. I was not here. I
cannot tell you whether we dropped the ball, whether we
implemented some of those and did not implement others. But I
know that there have been some outside looks at what we are
doing.
Senator Cantwell. Let me ask you a few other questions if I
could. The issue of review of these fire incidents: they have
oftentimes been done within the Forest Service. Do you think
that there is a need to have someone outside the Forest Service
look at these incidents similar to how the National
Transportation Safety Board does investigations of airline
crashes? Do you think it is necessary for an entity that is
more objective about the causes and the severity of the
incident to have an independent view on the Forest Service and
its safety practices?
Mr. Bosworth. I think it is always good to have eyes other
than our own look at what we are doing. I believe that the
investigation team that we assigned to this investigation--
there was a lot of experience. There were several people that
were from outside the Forest Service. The lead investigator was
a contract investigator. There was a person I believe from the
University of Montana that brought some expertise. Then we also
had two people from OSHA that were participating very closely
with the investigation team. So, it was not just a 100 percent
internal look at ourselves.
On the other hand, I do not want to be defensive about
having other people look at other ways of doing it as well.
What I want to do is to figure out what is going to work. But
again, I think that the problem that we have--and Jerry said
it--is more of a performance issue rather than whether or not
we are doing a good job of investigating what took place.
Senator Cantwell. Well, let me ask you one last question.
Then I want to get on to our other panel. You mentioned OSHA.
OSHA is in the process of doing a review of this incident as
well, as I am sure they have in other past fire incidents,
because they have oversight in working with Federal agencies.
But I am not sure exactly what you do with their
recommendations.
Mr. Bosworth. Well, we follow their recommendations. I know
it has been said by some on occasion that, well, if you do not
have some kind of financial fine or something from OSHA that it
does not carry much clout, but I can tell you that getting a
willful negligence citation from OSHA when someone dies is not
something to be taken lightly, and we do not take that lightly.
Senator Cantwell. But what happens?
Mr. Bosworth. Well, again we have the accountability
aspect, which is always again after the fact, after somebody
has been injured or died. We also have recommendations from
OSHA that we follow. We do not take the recommendations from
OSHA and just throw them in a drawer someplace. At least all
the ones I have been involved with at the region and forest
levels where I have worked, we have taken the OSHA
recommendations very seriously.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think that there is some question
as to how we can come up with these same caused factors, these
same recommendations for change and be in the same place if
these OSHA recommendations have been implemented. So, I would
be curious to see how we might take that further. I find it
hard to explain to my constituents in the State of Washington
or in Yakima why a Yakima business has to comply with OSHA
standards, is penalized when those OSHA standards are not met--
whether by losing jobs or being financially fined--and yet this
Federal agency that we guarantee is going to implement health
and safety standards is not accomplishing the job.
So, I would like to further dialogue with the Forest
Service about a variety of issues: job training and the need to
increase it; the need for independent oversight when incidents
occur; and the issue of accountability. I am taking you at your
word and with sincerity, especially since you are new on the
job as Chief, that you want to institute a culture of
accountability.
But my opinion, in reviewing this information and reviewing
the data, the Forest Service has a cultural problem. The
necessary safety standard is not culturally there. I guarantee
you it is not the same standard that is in place at the Hanford
Nuclear Reservation or in air transportation or other sectors
in which people know that they are going to be held
accountable. I think that that is where we need to move the
Forest Service.
Mr. Bosworth. Well, again, I think that we need to learn
from this. I will tell you again that I am committed and I know
Jerry is committed to making the kinds of changes,
accountability, as well as the other changes that need to be
made, to minimize the risk to firefighters.
I do not want to leave here without saying, though, that
firefighting is dangerous and that does not make it okay to
lose people, but it just means that we have to be that much
more vigilant in terms of making sure that we do everything we
can to minimize the risk to our firefighters.
Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you, Chief Bosworth and Mr.
Williams, for your testimony today. We appreciate your being
here.
As the chairman mentioned, we will be holding open the
record, so I am sure there probably will be other questions
from other members. If you could get those back to us in
writing, we would greatly appreciate it. I am sure that my
office, as well as some of the others, would like to explore
more ways with you besides the continuing dialogue with
Congress on how we can make sure that safety plans actually are
implemented.
I would like to call up our next panel: Mr. Philip
Schaenman, president of the TriData Corporation, which
conducted the SAFE study we have been discussing here. Mr.
Schaenman is going to be joined by Mr. Paul Gleason, professor
of Forest Science at Colorado State University. Mr. Gleason was
part of the Nation's Federal firefighting force for more than
20 years before taking his present position, so I look forward
to comments from both the academic world and the world of
frontline firefighting.
Finally, we have Mr. Ken Weaver of Yakima, Washington, as
well as other members of the Weaver family, but I will let him
introduce them. Mr. Weaver's son Devin was one of the four
brave young firefighters killed in the line of duty at
Thirtymile Fire this July. I believe that Mr. Weaver has a very
compelling story to tell. I am glad that he is here today, but
I give my condolences to his family and am sorry that they have
now had to take up this cause in the aftermath of the
Thirtymile accident. But, Mr. Weaver, I appreciate your being
here today. If you want to take this opportunity to introduce
the rest of your family here.
Mr. Weaver. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. My name is Ken
Weaver. This is my wife Barbara, my oldest daughter Jeanette,
and my youngest daughter Andrea. Devin was 21 years old,
between the two daughters. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. I think, Mr. Schaenman, we are going to
have you go first.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP SCHAENMAN, PRESIDENT,
TRIDATA CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA
Mr. Schaenman. Thank you. Just a quick way of personal
introduction. I am Phil Schaenman. I am president of TriData
Corporation, which is a subsidiary or System Planning
Corporation in Arlington, Virginia. Firefighter safety is one
of our specialties within a broader range of work on public
safety and national security issues.
Before I started TriData 20 years ago--we are celebrating
our anniversary next week, as a matter of fact, 20th
anniversary--I was the associate administrator of the U.S. Fire
Administration, and before that I worked on the manned space
program, which actually was one of the largest safety
engineering programs that we have ever done in this Nation, if
you think about it that way.
After the South Canyon fire in 1994 that killed 14
firefighters, there was a widespread feeling that despite all
the attention that had been paid to safety, we were seeing the
same kind of problems over and over again killing firefighters.
In 1995, the five Federal agencies that did most of the
wildland firefighting decided to have an in-depth
multidisciplinary study of firefighter safety conducted by an
outside organization, and I ran that study. Its goal was to
identify the most important issues underlying wildland
firefighter safety and then recommend in detail what to do
about them. It was an unusual, even courageous Federal study.
It did not pull any punches. Our team was given academic
freedom, and it included sociologists and psychologists who
were expert on how to change the culture of workplace safety.
In the first phase of the study, we interviewed in person
300 firefighters and did a written survey of another 700, for a
total of 1,000 that you mentioned earlier. The firefighters
were extremely candid. They spoke from the heart. There was
remarkable consistency across all five agencies, across regions
of the country, across all ranks in firefighting that we heard
from.
They raised hundreds of specific problems, and we made over
200 recommendations in response. And that large number of
safety issues is a problem itself because it is difficult for
humans to keep checking on so many things all the time, and it
is also difficult for agencies to deal with such a larger
number of problems. It is not just a few things. There may be a
few things that come out of an individual fire investigation,
but when you look across fires, there are many, many things.
The firefighters said there were many strengths in the
national approach to wildland firefighting, but let me focus in
the short period of time I have on what some of the most
important safety issues were and what some of our key
recommendations were.
The first was to ensure that the people out in the wildland
firefighting leadership positions are qualified, and to do
that, we recommended better screening of candidates for their
leadership aptitude and then training them better in decision
making under stress and how to improve fire ground situational
awareness. And that means practicing a large variety of
scenarios, and it is expensive training and a lot of people
have to be involved in it.
To promote accountability, we recommended including safety
as part of employee performance evaluations, and we recommended
giving appropriate career penalties when safety practices are
violated. This was done for the astronauts. It is done in NFL
sports. It is done on the decks of aircraft carriers, and it
can be done in firefighting.
To rebuild the level of wildland firefighting experience,
which has deteriorated, we recommended developing a strategic
human resources plan to keep the talent pipeline filled at all
levels, and we encouraged making a special effort to retain the
more experienced fire leaders because they have better judgment
in emergencies.
We recommended that training be made more realistic and
more visual to compensate, in part, for the lack of field
experience. That high quality training is critical both to
teach safety practices and the proper use of safety equipment,
such as shelters. The firefighters have to be given special
training to respond properly and without hesitation in life-
threatening situations.
Another safety goal was that radio and face-to-face
communications be not only heard but understood, especially the
messages critical to safety. The firefighters have to learn to
ask questions when their orders are unclear, and the senders of
the messages have the responsibility to ensure that the message
was understood, perhaps similar to the way pilots and air
traffic controllers do. When you say move from area A to area
B, you say, right, area B, understood.
It is also important that all crews have radios so they can
immediately receive a message such as evacuate now.
Changing the culture of communications is one way to change
the culture of safety. Another way is to make it not just
acceptable for firefighters to raise concerns about safety, but
a professional responsibility to do so, again as exists with
air crews and ground personnel.
Yet another safety principle that is important is to avoid
pushing individuals beyond their capabilities. Crew supervisors
need to watch for symptoms of fatigue, and they have to
accurately report the level of fatigue when their crews first
report in.
The crew supervisors need to work at building crew cohesion
so that the crews not only work well together, but they respond
together in emergencies.
We need to better target and evaluate the safety programs
among all this myriad of issues, and we need a better data
system for reporting injuries and also near misses.
Finally, we need to improve the safety of the wildlands
through expanded fuel treatment programs and to better educate
the public who choose to live in wildland areas so they can
reduce fire risks themselves. These actions would improve not
just the public safety, but also reduce firefighter injuries.
Over 1,000 firefighters died in the decade before September
11, and 300,000 were injured. They routinely turn in heroic
performances to save people and our natural resources.
And there have been many positive steps since our study. We
just started a follow-up study for the Forest Service.
We can do even better if the safety program gets adequate
resources and the safety and health functions are given more
visibility on organization charts. All of this training, all of
these things cost money and they have to have adequate
resources, otherwise the safety programs will not be taken
seriously and they will not be adequately effective.
I think we have a moral obligation to listen to the
thousand firefighters who poured their hearts out to us and an
obligation to honor the firefighters who gave their lives. And
on behalf of all those firefighters, I thank the committee for
holding this hearing, and I would be glad to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaenman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip Schaenman, President, TriData Corporation,
Arlington, VA
My name is Philip Schaenman. I am President of TriData Corporation
of Arlington, Virginia. TriData specializes in a wide range of public
safety issues, from fire safety to bioterrorism surveillance. Prior to
TriData, I was the Associate Administrator of the United States Fire
Administration from 1976 to 1981. Before that, I worked as an engineer
on manned spaceflight safety issues.
Following the tragic 1994 South Canyon, Colorado fire in which 14
federal wildland firefighters died, there was a great deal of soul
searching in the wildland firefighting community. Despite the attention
paid to safety, there still were unsolved problems and underlying
factors that led to recurrence of the same kinds of tragic firefighter
losses as had occurred in the past.
The five federal agencies that do most of the wildland firefighting
are the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, National Park
Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Fish and Wildlife Service.
Together they decided to support an in-depth, multidisciplinary
examination of firefighter safety by an outside organization. It was
called the ``Wildland Firefighter Safety Awareness'' study but was even
broader in scope than the name implies. My company, TriData, was
competitively selected in August 1995 to start what turned out to be a
five-year effort to identify in detail the many facets of the wildland
firefighter safety problem, and then recommend what to do about it.
This was a highly unusual, even courageous, federal study that pulled
no punches. It was guided by Bill Bradshaw of the Forest Service. The
contract officer came from the Bureau of Land Management. A multi-
agency steering committee guided the general approach, but we had total
academic freedom when it came to describing the findings and making
recommendations. Our study team included sociologists and psychologists
expert in safety issues, as well as wildland fire safety experts. I led
the study.
The study had four phases: identifying the safety problems in
depth; developing a vision for the future; describing how to get from
here to there; and then helping with implementation.
In the first phase, we interviewed in person 300 federal wildland
firefighters of all ages and ranks across all regions of the nation,
and also many safety experts. We solicited their perception of the
biggest safety issues, and what to do about them. We followed that up
with an in-depth, written survey of another 700 federal wildland
firefighters, for a total survey of 1,000 firefighters. The written
surveys helped rank order the issues identified. The firefighters and
fire program officials we heard from were extremely candid and spoke
from the heart. There was remarkable consistency in what they told us
about safety issues across the nation. They raised too many specific
problems to describe them succinctly, which is a major problem itself;
the huge challenge to improving safety is that it is necessary to pay
attention to a great many details and to have the resources to
adequately train, adequately equip, and adequately staff the entire
wildland firefighting force. It also is necessary to give adequate
visibility and authority to the safety and health managers who oversee
safety programs, or the function is not taken seriously by the
workforce.
We found that the broad strokes of safety practices and policies
are there, but it is difficult to get humans to pay attention to the
myriad of safety issues all of the time. Overall, the wildland
firefighters have had a fairly good safety record relative to the
hazards of the job. For example, despite the very high physical demands
of wildland firefighting, very few succumb to heart attacks on the job,
primarily because of good fitness screening programs.
Three-quarters of the wildland firefighters we surveyed rated the
interagency wildland firefighting approach as good to excellent. They
noted a long list of strengths of the current national system. A
summary of them is attached. (It is Table 1, Executive Summary, Phase
1, Wildland Firefighter Safety Awareness report.) * They said that the
general approach should be kept but it should be fixed to work better.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Attachments have been retained in subcommittee files.
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Now let me summarize the safety problems they identified. The
problems fell under the broad headings of improvements needed in the
organizational culture, such as making it acceptable to raise safety
issues; improvements needed in firefighting leadership, especially in
the middle levels; attention to human factors, such as maintaining
situational awareness literally in the heat of battle; and external
influences on safety, such as the condition of the forests and the
actions of the people who are building homes in wildland areas.
In Phase II of the project, completed in January 1997, we defined a
vision for the future--what the safety environment ideally should look
like. Ultimately, 86 goals were identified, grouped under broad
categories such as making improvements in firefighting strategy with
limited resources; improving accountability of firefighters at all
levels; increasing experience of the firefighting workforce; further
improving physical fitness; improving flow of critical information to
crews; increasing training at all levels; addressing the fatigue
problem; and addressing the human and psychological factors that
sometimes stop firefighters and their supervisors from paying as much
attention to safety as they should. The goals were discussed and
accepted by the fire directors of the five major wildland firefighting
agencies before we moved on to Phase III.
In Phase III of the study, completed in March 1998, we developed
specific strategies to meet each of the goals. We titled the Phase III
report, ``Implementing Cultural Changes For Safety,'' because without
the cultural changes, many of the other changes were not likely to
follow. Our multi-disciplinary team made suggestions on how one could
truly change the culture in a way that safety was imbedded in everyday
actions. We ultimately made over 200 recommendations for specific
implementation strategies to achieve the 86 goals. (Attached to this
Testimony is a complete list of the goals and the suggested
implementation strategies.) Let me give you a few examples.
To assure that people in the leadership positions at all levels
were qualified, the study recommended better screening of potential
leaders from crew supervisor up through agency administrators, and then
training them in decision-making under stress, and how to improve
situational awareness and be prepared to handle the unexpected; one can
train for those skills.
To promote accountability for safety at all levels, we suggested
including safety as part of employees' performance evaluations, and
giving appropriate penalties when safety practices are violated.
Penalties for safety violations are given in NFL sports, aircraft
carrier operations, civilian air operations, and manned space flights.
It can be done in firefighting, too. Accountability needs to be taken
seriously.
To rebuild the level of firefighting experience, which has
deteriorated over the past decades in part because of the lack of
incentives for experienced fire managers and firefighters to stay in
firefighting, we recommended developing a strategic human resources
plan and working to keep the talent pipeline filled at all levels. We
encouraged making a special effort to retain experienced fire leaders
and firefighters, who tend to have better judgment in emergencies. That
is easy to say but a big effort to do.
We recommended that training be made more realistic to compensate
in part for the lack of field experience. This includes more training
under field conditions, use of more visual materials, and use of
virtual reality simulators like the military uses. High quality,
repeated training is critical to explain safety practices and the use
of safety equipment such as shelters. Training must also include
responding properly and without hesitation in a life threatening
situation.
Another important safety goal is that communications be clear and
understood, especially the critical safety messages in the field.
Firefighters should ask questions when radioed or face-to-face
instructions are unclear. There should be feedback from receiver to
sender, similar to the way pilots and air traffic controllers do it: a
short piece of the transmitted message is repeated to confirm that the
message is understood. And it is important for all crews to have radios
and to be continually in reach of safety information such as when to
evacuate.
Changing the nature of communications besides being important in
its own right is a key to changing the culture. Another way to change
the culture is to make it not just acceptable to raise concerns about
safety, but a professional responsibility from the line firefighter up
the chain of command. We recommended cultivating an attitude that
practicing safety is equivalent to being professional.
Yet another important principal is to avoid pushing individuals or
crews beyond their capabilities. Crew supervisors must watch for
symptoms of fatigue and dehydration, and try to prevent them. The
supervisors must accurately report the level of fatigue of their crews
when reporting in.
It is also important for crew supervisors to explicitly build crew
cohesion so that they not only work well together, but also share
safety responsibility and respond properly together in extreme
emergencies.
And we recommend improving the comprehensiveness and reliability of
safety data, and using it to evaluate programs and detect emerging
problems.
Finally, one of the most frequently mentioned aspects of safety we
heard from wildland firefighters was to improve the safety of the
wildlands through expanded fuel treatment programs. They also want to
educate the public on prevention and on the limitations of what
firefighters can be expected to do. If people insist on building in
wilderness areas that frequently experience natural fires, they should
not expect the firefighters to risk their lives to save their homes.
* * * * *
Over 1,000 urban, rural, and wildland firefighters died in the
decade ending before September 11th. Wildland firefighters and urban
firefighters routinely turn in heroic performances to save people and
our natural resources.
There has been an enormous amount of attention paid to safety.
There already are many good safety practices. We know that many
additional measures have been taken as a result of our study and the
other studies and investigations that it built on. The many issues
can't all be dealt with at once. But we can go much further than we
have with better training, better equipment, and better information--
all of which leads to safer firefighting. The safety problem needs
adequate resources, adequate attention, and visibility.
As project manager of the study, I had the unique privilege of
having access to all of the confidential comments the firefighters
made, including survey forms returned with smudges from fire sites. I
believe we have a moral obligation to listen to them. This Committee is
doing that, and I thank you for it on behalf of all the firefighters we
heard from.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Schaenman. I want to let
the rest of the panel speak, and then we will do questions. So,
Mr. Gleason, you are next.
STATEMENT OF PAUL GLEASON, PROFESSOR OF FOREST SCIENCES,
COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY, FORT COLLINS, CO
Mr. Gleason. It is an honor to be able to address you today
on behalf of firefighter safety.
From 1964 until January of this year, my job was as
superintendent, as a firefighter on an interagency hotshot
crew. I took relatively in experienced firefighters into
hostile situations, volatile firefights where my responsibility
was their health and welfare, and I had to make critical
decisions, technical decisions that would ensure their safety.
It is that that I want to address and talk with you about
today.
One thing that is important at a high price we have learned
these lessons, the fire orders, the 18 situations, LCES, and a
number of other guidelines and rules to ensure that
firefighters return home after the firefight. And I do not
think we need any more rules. We do not need any more
guidelines. We have what is needed.
What we really do need is experienced fireline supervisors
that are skilled in risk management, not governed by orders and
rules, but skilled in risk management, much like the military.
And risk management is based on a common set of values. I think
that right there is extremely important. We do not have the
basic framework we need to develop risk management from.
Where firefighters seem to be most vulnerable is when a
decision is to be made to engage or disengage from their
location in a highly dynamic environment. And this is an
environment where just the slight angle of the sun or a change
in moisture or a change in wind will turn the whole situation
into a volatile one.
Individuals making decisions can only frame them in the
context of their own unique experience, and it is a lack of
that experience at times that we do run into out on the
fireline. Tactical fireline decisions cannot always be
supported by computer models. Operations in the wildland fire
environment are often too complex for that.
Since 1994, in the wake of South Canyon, I have noticed a
refocusing of training toward decision making and leadership
skills. The firefighters have enlisted the advice of
organizational scientists such as Karl Weick and psychologists
such as Gary Klein to better understand firefighter safety. And
I believe this work is apparent in the current and planned
leadership training. Still, sometime outside the training
environment, one individual will be called upon to make the
correct decision, and are we sure next summer the newly trained
leader will make the right call?
One system in place to help decision makers is the 10 fire
orders and the 18 watch-out situations. These are supposed to
provide a mental checklist that will prevent injuries and
fatalities. However, I feel the orders are too numerous and
cumbersome to be useful in a fast-changing atmosphere of
wildland firefighting. Perhaps that is why some firefighters
see these as guidelines and not orders to be obeyed.
In a less complex system, embracing risk management, the
skills in risk management could be used that would still
encompass the spirit of the 10 and the 18. For example, one
such system is the use of LCES as a risk management tool, LCES
being lookouts, communications, escape routes, and safety
zones. Already that is being used by some wildland
firefighters, but I believe LCES should replace the 18 and 10
as a basic framework for fireline risk management.
Fireline decision making has been likened to a slide
projector carousel of experiences, where each new situation
faced adds a new slide to that carousel. When an experienced
decision makers is faced with a new decision, they mentally go
through their slides to help them understand the current
situation. Initially the new firefighter has no slides and only
through experience will they add more. During this time, a
safety conscious leader must mentor the new firefighter. This
is especially necessary for inexperienced people in fireline
leadership positions.
What can Congress do to help firefighter safety? First, I
believe it is important to realize that often these critical
decisions are being made by nearly entry level employees who
are in the process of assembling their slide trays. And are we
comfortable with these inexperienced leaders making life/death
decisions under stress when they are first out there on their
own?
Second, we must take every opportunity to send our
firefighter trainees to the firelines where they can gain real
fire experience under a strong, field-proven supervisor. Here
leadership and decision making skills can be observed and
trained firsthand. In this situation, we have a mentor who can
provide a backup slide for the trainee. There is especially a
need for experienced people to fill this mentor role, but all
too often experienced people get pulled off the fireline and
into management positions, trading chainsaws for coffee cups
and looking at spreadsheets instead of flames. This practice
takes away from the field exactly the people who most need to
be there to train tomorrow's fireline supervisors. The U.S.
military employs a similar technique successfully. This
strategy will increase suppression costs somewhat. However, in
light of the alternative, the cost is insignificant.
Wildland firefighting is unique in that it is accomplished
through manual labor, using some of the most basic of tools,
shovels and axes, while at the same time, this work occurs in a
highly dynamic environment where often there is only limited
information. Firefighter safety, at some moment in the future,
will be entirely determined by the leadership and decision
making skills of the individual in charge. I ask that this need
be addressed with the urgency it deserves.
Today on behalf of all past, present, and future wildland
firefighters, I thank Congress for their efforts to improve
firefighter safety, and I ask for your continued vigilance and
support for those firefighters who risk their lives on behalf
of the Nation. I thank this committee for the opportunity to
speak here today on this important issue.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gleason follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Gleason, Professor of Forest Sciences,
Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO
It is an honor to be able to address you today on behalf of
firefighter safety. My name is Paul Gleason. I am currently on the
faculty at Colorado State University where I teach fire ecology and
fire management. I spent most of my career as a supervisor of an
Interagency Hotshot crew taking relatively inexperienced firefighters
into volatile wildland firefights. Their safety and well-being was my
responsibility. Along with concern for my crew's safety, I believe on
the fireline I was aggressive in accomplishing suppression objectives.
Often I had to make critical decisions in tactical situations that
potentially threatened my crew's safety. It is the fireline
supervisor's decision-making ability in the dynamic wildland fire
environment I want to focus on.
Wildland fire fatalities are not a new event. Even prior to the
infamous 1910 fires, history records numerous lives lost while trying
to contain and control wildfires. Within the last fifty years: 1949
Mann Gulch, 12 smokejumpers; 1956 Inaja, 11 firefighters. And 10 years
later Loop, 12 members of a hotshot crew lost their lives while
building a fireline downhill into a chimney. Recently, 1994 South
Canyon, 14 firefighters; smokejumpers, hotshots and helitack members
lost their lives; and of course the Thirtymile tragedy which brings us
here today.
At a high price, wildland firefighters have learned how to
recognize signals in their environment and they have learned how to
work safely in their dynamic environment. They have assembled countless
operational procedures, orders, and guidelines to ensure firefighters
return home safely. They don't need help in assembling more--I
personally don't think there needs to be more. What is needed is
experienced fireline supervisors. People who know enough to make tough
decisions in the dynamic and dangerous wildland fire environment.
Where firefighters seem to be most vulnerable is when a decision is
made to engage or disengage from their location in a highly dynamic
environment; An environment where only a slight change in the angle of
the sun, or the humidity, or wind can change a fire's behavior.
Individuals making these decisions can only frame them in the context
of their own unique experiences. Tactical fireline decisions cannot
always be supported by computer models. Operations in the wildland fire
environment are often too complex for that.
Since 1994, in the wake of South Canyon, I have noticed a re-focus
in training toward decision-making and leadership skills. Firefighters
have enlisted the advice of organizational scientists (Karl Weick) and
psychologists (Gary Klien) to better understand firefighter safety. I
believe this work is apparent in the current and planned Leadership
training. Still, sometime outside the training environment, an
individual will be called upon to make the ``correct'' decision. Are we
sure next summer the newly trained leader will make the right call?
One system in place to help decision-makers is the 10 Standard Fire
Orders and the 18 Watch Out Situations. These are supposed to provide a
mental checklist to prevent injuries and fatalities. However, I feel
the orders are too numerous and cumbersome to be useful in the dynamic
and fast-changing atmosphere of wildland firefighting. Perhaps that is
why some firefighters see the 10 & 18 as ``guidelines that cannot
always be followed'' rather than orders to be obeyed. I think a less
complex system, based on predetermined norms and values of the wildland
fire industry, could be used that would still encompass the spirit of
the 10 & 18. One such less complex system uses the acronym LCES--
Lookouts, Communication, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones. This is
already used by some wildland firefighters, but I feel LCES could
officially replace the 10 & 18 as the primary safety guideline for
fireline decision making.
Fireline decision-making has been likened to having a ``slide
projector carousel of experiences'' where each new situation faced adds
a slide to the carousel. When an experienced decision-maker is faced
with a new situation, they mentally go through their slides created in
the past to help them understand the current situation. Initially the
new firefighter has no slides and only through experiencing more fire
situations will they add more slides. During this time, a safety-
conscience leader must mentor the new firefighter. This is especially
necessary for inexperienced people in fireline leadership positions.
What can Congress do to help firefighter safety? First, I believe
it is important to realize that often these critical decisions are
being made by nearly entry-level employees who are in the process of
assembling their ``slide tray'' of experiences. Are we comfortable with
these inexperienced leaders making these life and death decisions,
under stress, when they are first out there on their own?
Second, we must take every opportunity to send our firefighter
trainees to the firelines where they can gain real fire experience
under a strong, field-proven supervisor. Here leadership and decision-
making skills can be observed and trained first-hand. In this situation
we have a mentor who can provide a ``back-up slide'' for the trainee.
There is especially a need for experienced people to fill this mentor
role. All too often experienced people get pulled off firelines to
management positions; trading chainsaws for coffee cups, and looking at
spreadsheet instead of flames. This practice takes away from the field
exactly the people who most need to be there to train tomorrow's
fireline leaders. The U.S. military employs this technique
successfully. This strategy will increase suppression costs somewhat;
however, in light of the alternative this cost is insignificant.
Third, fire management strategies must be identified that are
consistent with the values at risk. Much too often a strategy is
selected requiring individuals to travel through the night putting them
on the fireline during active burning conditions with little to no
sleep. Fatigue is one of the greatest obstacles to quality decision-
making; my experience and numerous studies support this. Fatigue-
reduction strategies may result in more acres burned by fire, however,
under severe weather and fuel conditions this may be the best
alternative. I believe as land management plans are revised, and fire
management plans are developed to support the land management goals,
appropriate strategies can be identified to guide management response
to wildland fire under various scenarios. The fire management community
can use your support in marketing these strategies to the public.
Fourth, everyone here is familiar with the current forest structure
after many years of aggressively suppressing fire from much of our
landscape. The fuel problem is a reality. I am convinced as we begin to
manage the fuels in the critical wildland/urban interface we will see
improved firefighter safety. Many of the fires today are backing
firefighters into a hard corner when it comes to operations in a
heavily-fueled interface. Re-arranging these fuels will take time and
is not only a single year's fix. Fire management needs your support in
both marketing this effort to our public and your understanding the
fuel situation will take time.
Wildland firefighting is unique in that it is accomplished through
manual labor using some of the most basic of tools, e.g., shovels and
axes, while at the same time this work occurs in a highly dynamic
environment where often there is only limited information at best.
Regardless of how the fuels are managed or the appropriate response to
a wildland fire, firefighter safety at some moment in the future will
still be entirely determined by the leadership and decision-making
skills of the individual in-charge. I ask that this need be addressed
with the urgency it deserves.
Today, on behalf or all past, present, and future wildland
firefighters, I thank Congress for their efforts to improve firefighter
safety and I ask for your continued vigilance and support for those
firefighters who risk their lives on behalf of their nation. I thank
this committee for the opportunity to speak here today on this
important issue.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Gleason, and thank you for
being here. I appreciate your years of experience.
Mr. Weaver.
STATEMENT OF KEN WEAVER, YAKIMA, WA
Mr. Weaver. Thank you. On behalf of the other three
survivor families that were unable to attend today and on
behalf of my family and my son Devin, I thank you for this
opportunity.
My wife Barbara sleeps lighter than I do, so she heard the
phone ring at 1:05 in the wee hours of July 11. I woke up 2
minutes later with Barbara screaming in panic and terror. She
said, there is a guy on the phone and he says Devin is dead.
You have got to talk to him and tell him he is alive.
In that moment of realization, the beginning of a nightmare
came, a nightmare that would change the rest of my life. I knew
I had lost my best friend, my golf, my hunting partner, my
camping partner, my lifetime protector, my last name, my only
son.
The next 8 hours were spent in the state of shock. After
the initial wave of pain began to pass, all I could think of
was how could they do this.
Three members of the U.S. Forest Service came to our house
the next afternoon to give us the first details of the tragedy.
They described an out-of-control wildfire acting erratically
entrapped and burned to death my son. What they could not
explain were the empirical facts. This crew was down a dead end
road. They had ground tools. Yet the fire was over 100 feet
high. The fire was, indeed, out of control but had been for
several hours. It was not a surprise. They were in a steep box
canyon. They were down a dead end road.
As information became available over the next days and
weeks, what emerged is something far different than an act of
God. What emerged was a story of managerial misconduct,
ignorance of all safety rules and warning signs to a degree
that you could only describe as criminal. With 21 days of
experience on their first major fire, these kids were led down
a dead end road in front of an out-of-control canopy fire. And
even after they were trapped, with the fire screaming down both
sides of this canyon, they were given no leadership. They were
given no help. They were not even given any order to prepare,
no defensive actions. They never even heard an order to deploy
their shelters.
Do not be confused. This is how these guys died. They were
not defending their country. They were not acting heroically.
They did not give their lives. They were just doing their job
just as they were instructed, as best they were trained, and
they had their lives taken.
My son was so proud to be an American, and he was even more
proud of the Government he loved. He came home after his first
week of training, had a smile on his face that went from ear to
ear. He says, Dad, I'm a Fed. He was just delighted. But the
gut wrenching tragedy that I feel here is I believe the only
reason he lost his life was because he was a Fed, not because
of the job he was doing, but because of who he was doing it
for.
The U.S. Forest Service does not have to account for its
safety violations to anyone. Safety violations, so egregious
they would be criminally prosecuted if they occurred in the
private sector, do not even warrant a fine. In fact, they are
allowed to police themselves with absolutely no oversight from
any other agency. Oh, sure, OSHA writes citations, but they
cannot levy fines. I find it very difficult to call that
oversight.
This is an agency that has had de facto autonomy. They
operate completely unencumbered. They can choose to ignore any
or all of their own rules. In fact, they can violate every
single safety rule they have and they can ignore every single
sign of danger, abandon all common sense, operate with no clear
command structure, with no coherent plan of attack while they
drive down a dead end road in a steep box canyon in front of an
out-of-control wildfire. They can do all this and continue on.
Instead, our children paid the highest price possible, just
as others have paid this terrible price before them and, unless
we change something in a hurry, just as others yet will pay
this price again.
Accountable government is the foundation of our democracy.
Accountable government is what makes the free world free. Our
Founding Fathers dumped tea in Boston Harbor for accountable
government. Our greatest generation fought and died to preserve
it. My own father clung to life for over 6 hours in the Pacific
Ocean. His ship was sunk by Kamikazes. He fought and nearly
died so that his children and his grandchildren could live free
with an accountable government.
It seems morally bankrupt to me to stringently enforce
worker safety in the private sector but make Federal employees
working for the Government risk injury and death because safety
rules were unenforceable. How can we ask our best and brightest
young people to come protect our forests if we are not willing
to protect their lives? How many more brave, dedicated young
people will we betray by not ensuring the highest possible
level of workplace safety?
Adding to the irony of this disaster is the fact that, as
we have heard earlier in the TriData report, the Forest Service
has been aware of this problem for over 10 years, at least. It
clearly outlined the problem in their report and it clearly
outlined the solution. We do not need more safety rules. The
safety rules we have are excellent. All we need to do is
enforce them. Without enforcement, supervisory personnel on the
fireline have little incentive to stick with procedure. Fear of
their own safety does little to motivate them in the heat of
battling a blaze.
Does anybody in this room put on a safety belt on the way
to the store because they fear for their lives? No. We follow
the safety rule for fear of enforcement. We do not want the $45
ticket. Even though it could mean the difference between life
and death, the vast majority of us are motivated only by the
potential of a fine. These fire managers are no different than
you and I. Who among us here today follows any unenforced rule?
They talk about how difficult and complicated the solution
is. I scoff at that. Maybe it is my political naivete, but I do
not see a complicated solution here. The Occupational Safety
and Health Administration is charged with ensuring workplace
safety for the Federal employees. In the private sector, they
are given enforcement power. In the public sector, they are
not. The question that has haunted my days and nights since the
first hours of July 11 is, why not?
As my son had said to me during his first week of training,
these rules are in red ink because they are written in blood,
Dad. Who would have known that they would have written the next
action or inaction plan in his blood?
Why? Why the double standard? Why not give OSHA enforcement
power over all Federal employees? Can we possibly ask our
people to suffer greater workplace risk just because of
politics?
This issue takes on even greater importance when you
consider the effect of the aggressive fire suppression efforts
the Forest Service has engaged in over the last 50 years. Fuel
loads are at unnatural highs. We have continuing periods of
drought combining to make the most dangerous wildfire
conditions in history. We must not send our children into these
fires without the most stringent adherence to safety.
I am haunted by the pain and the sheer defeat that cut
through me when I saw my son's name on a death certificate. I
am here today to beg you, please, please do not let this happen
again. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weaver follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ken Weaver, Yakima, WA
Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee.
My wife Barbara sleeps lighter than I do. So it was her that heard
the phone ring at 1:05 in the wee hours of July 11th. I was awakened
two minutes later when Barbara, in a voice choked with panic, terror
and hysteria came into the bedroom screaming, ``Ken, there's a man on
the phone. He says Devin is dead. You talk to him, tell him Devin is
alive.'' Thus began the nightmare that would change the rest of my
life. In that first instant of realization I knew I had lost my best
male friend, my golfing partner, my hunting partner, my camping
partner, my lifetime protector, my last name, my only son.
The next eight hours were spent in a state of shock. After the
initial wave of pain began to pass all I could think of was, how could
they do this. Three members of the USFS came to our home that afternoon
to give us the first details of the tragedy. They described at act of
God that was no one's fault. What they could not explain were the
empirical facts. This crew was down a dead-end road. They had ground
tools, yet the fire was over 100 feet high. The fire was indeed out of
control, but had been for several hours before the crew trapped
themselves in a steep box canyon in front of the flames. As information
became available over the next days and weeks, what emerged was
something far different than an act of God. What emerged was a story of
managerial misconduct, that ignored all safety rules and warning signs,
to a degree that can only be described as criminal. With twenty-one
days of experience on their first major fire, these kids were led down
a dead-end road in front of an out-of-control canopy fire. And even
after they were trapped, with fire screaming at them advancing down
both sides of the canyon, they were given the fatal advice that would
cost them their lives twenty minutes later. ``Just hang out here,
people. This thing will burn around us and we will be safe.'' You break
every rule, you ignore every warning sign, and then incredibly don't
even take one single defensive action to protect your crew.
Don't be misled: This is how these young people died. They weren't
defending their country, they weren't acting heroically, and they
didn't give their lives. They were just doing their job as they were
instructed when they had their lives taken. They died utterly and
completely betrayed.
My son was so proud to be an American and he was even more proud to
work for the government he loved. He came home after his week of
training with a smile as large as his face just bursting with pride and
said, ``Dad, I'm a Fed.'' The gut wrenching irony here is that he lost
his life not because of what he was doing, but who he was doing it for.
The USFS does not have to account for its safety violations to
anyone. Safety violations so egregious that they would be criminally
prosecuted if they occurred in the private sector don't even warrant a
fine when committed by the USFS. In fact, they are allowed to police
themselves with absolutely no oversight from any other agency. Sure,
OSHA will write citations, but they can't levy fines. It's difficult to
call that oversight. This is an agency that has de facto autonomy; they
operate completely unencumbered by any safety regulations. They can
choose to follow their own rules, or they can choose to ignore any or
all of them. In fact, they can violate every single safety rule they
have, ignore every single sign of danger, abandon all common sense,
operate with no clear command structure and no coherent plan of
attack--while they drive down a dead-end road in a steep box canyon in
front of an out-of-control wildfire. They can do all of this and pay no
price. Instead, our children paid the highest price possible, just as
others have paid this terrible price before them, and absent change,
just as others yet will pay it again.
Accountable government is the foundation of our great democracy.
Accountable government is what makes the ``free world'' free. Our
founding fathers dumped tea in Boston Harbor for accountable
government. Our greatest generation fought and died to preserve it. My
father clung to life for over six hours floating in the Pacific Ocean
bleeding from a large shrapnel wound in his back after his ship was
sunk by a kamikaze. He fought and nearly died so that his children and
grandchildren could live free with a free and accountable government.
It seems morally bankrupt to me to stringently enforce worker
safety in the private sector, but make federal employees working for
the government risk injury and death because safety rules are
unenforceable. How can we ask our best and brightest young people to
come protect our forests if we're not willing to protect their lives?
How many more brave, dedicated young people will we betray by not
insuring the highest possible level of workplace safety?
Adding to the irony of this disaster is the fact that we have been
aware of this problem for at least a decade and we already know the
solution. The TriData report published in 1998 clearly outlined the
problem, and the solution. We don't need new safety rules; the rules we
have now are excellent. All we need to do is enforce them. Without
enforcement, supervisory personnel on the fire-line have little
incentive to stick with procedure. Fear for their own safety does
little to motivate them, in the heat of battling a blaze. Does anyone
in this room put on a seat belt on the way to the store for fear of
their lives? No, we follow this safety rule for fear of enforcement.
Even though it could mean the difference between life and death, the
vast majority of us are motivated only by the potential of a fine.
These fire managers are no different than you and I. Who among us here
today adheres to any unenforced rule?
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is charged with
insuring workplace safety for federal employees. In the private sector
they are given enforcement power, in the public sector they are not.
The question that has haunted my days and nights since the first hours
of July 11th is, why not? As my son said to me during his week of
training, ``these rules are written in blood, Dad.'' Who would have
known that the next chapter would be written with his squad's blood?
Why? Why the double standard? Why not give OSHA enforcement powers over
all federal employees? Can we possibly ask people to suffer greater
workplace risk just because of politics?
This issue takes on even greater importance when you consider the
effect of aggressive fire suppression efforts of the USFS over the last
fifty years. Fuel loads are now at an unnatural high, and with
consistent periods of drought, combine to make the most dangerous
wildfire conditions in history. We must not send our children into
these fires without the most stringent adherence to safety.
I am haunted by the pain and the sheer defeat that cut through my
heart when I saw my son's name on a Certificate of Death. Please,
please . . . please don't ever let this happen again.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Weaver, for your testimony
and your willingness to come here and share this very painful
moment. I want to again express my condolences to you and your
family, and I want to express condolences on behalf of Senator
Murray who wanted to be here today as well, and on behalf of
other members of our State's delegation.
Mr. Weaver. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. You have done us proud by being here and
paying attention to this issue at a point in time when I am
sure that you wish that these circumstances were very, very
different.
I have to ask you, Mr. Weaver, your son--do you know how
much time he had being trained when he first was hired?
Mr. Weaver. He just had the 1 week of training. They had
taught him fundamentally how to use a shelter. But more than
anything else, they taught him that the safety rules that the
Forest Service has are never bent, never broken. They never
ever told him that they, in fact, would break every single one
of them and abandon all common sense. He was totally
unprepared, totally untrained for that.
Senator Cantwell. So, you think that Devin understood what
the rules were, but when out on the fire scene, did not see
them being exercised?
Mr. Weaver. No. Devin thought that they were adhered to
stringently. They told him these rules were never bent, let
alone broken. He was very proud of the rules. He showed me a
big, long sheet of rules that you had to follow just to start a
chainsaw, something that he was very adept at using. And he
said, my gosh, Dad, these guys are so safe. He scoffed at his
mother's apprehension and his mother's fear. I never stated
mine. His mother did. Devin scoffed and he said, Dad, these
guys are so safe. There is no chance I could ever get hurt.
Senator Cantwell. So, the fact that he had this 1 week of
training and was able to produce these rules gave you and your
family some sense of comfort that there really was a culture
within the Forest Service that adhered to safety.
Mr. Weaver. Oh, absolutely. I did not lose an ounce of
sleep. Devin was an incredibly in-shape athlete. I figured, if
the worst case scenario happened, with the physical training
that he had put himself through running 7 miles a day with a
30-pound pack on his back, if anyone could survive anything,
Devin would. With the stated commitment to safety that the
Forest Service had given him, and through him to us, I felt
that there was absolutely no reason to be concerned at any
level for his safety.
Senator Cantwell. And when was his first fire?
Mr. Weaver. His first fire, I think, was right after his
training. It was just a little brush fire that they had out by
the woodshed on Highway 410. There was only a dozen or so trees
that burned. It primarily burned across a rocky slope.
Senator Cantwell. When was this after his training?
Shortly?
Mr. Weaver. This was, yes, like a day or 2 after his
training. They had him out stacking sticks, as they called it,
until this fire started, and so he was delighted to get on a
fire.
He was chagrined to be put on this mop-up fire at
Thirtymile because the big fire was at South Libby. And like
all of these guys--I mean, these young people--I mean, there is
this culture of machismo. They want to be out there on the big
fire. It does not matter they are not trained. They are all
relying on their supervisors for that. And when they sent him
down this road, he had no clue it was a dead end road.
Senator Cantwell. So, the Thirtymile Fire was what fire for
him, as far as being actually out----
Mr. Weaver. It was his first major fire, his second actual
fire.
Senator Cantwell. So, 1 week of training, coming home
convincing his mom with his rule book, one brush fire, and then
the Thirtymile Fire.
Mr. Weaver. Correct.
Senator Cantwell. That is the extent of his training as you
knew it.
Mr. Weaver. That was it. Period.
I think his training would have only been complete if it
would have included a disclaimer about the fact that we do not
need to follow rules when it is not convenient. Had he had that
suspicion, he would probably not have thought with the group
mind and he would not have underestimated the risk of this fire
bearing down on him.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Mr. Gleason, you mentioned this change in the system--the
LCES system--and possibly moving toward that instead of the 10
and 18 rules currently in place. My question is, would the
conditions at Thirtymile Fire have been obvious to most people?
We were in the middle of the second worst drought on record in
the State, given the elevation of the site, the fact that it
was limited access, and the weather conditions, would not all
of those have been early indicators of great concern?
Mr. Gleason. Yes, they would have been. But I would not
have expected first-year crew members to be alert to those kind
of signals because in those 32 hours, they are hit with a lot
of information. I liken it to when I was drafted and tried to
remember the 10 orders that the Army teaches you. You have 10
firefighting orders. You do not have any context to put that
in. It is just a list of terms and concepts. I think to
somebody who would be leading resources out there, that the
fire behavior indicators were there with the drought and with
the conditions the way they were.
Senator Cantwell. So, who should have been paying attention
to those conditions?
Mr. Gleason. A crew supervisor on up the chain of command
to the district, the forest level should have been aware of
those conditions.
Senator Cantwell. In your experience, do crew members also
usually have information about the forest floor and recent
burns? I think in this case there had not been a fire there in
200 years. So, we had a lot of fuel, very, very dry conditions,
and a high elevation, which made it hard to get to.
Mr. Gleason. They were probably exposed to that for at
least 8 hours during that 32-hour training, 8 hours of fire
behavior. But again, fire behavior is complex. A wildland fire
is complex, and you not only need to pay attention to the
fuels, but the topography and the weather. I reflect back in
1964 when I first went to fire school, and this is after living
in southern California and watching the mountains burn. Still
the amount of information that you are hit with there, I do not
think it is right to hold a first-year crew member accountable.
Senator Cantwell. And just to be clear, I am not suggesting
that. I guess what I am trying to suggest is that we may now
know the details of the situation, and maybe the supervisor or
the management team did not know at the time. But if you knew
that this had been one of the worst droughts on record in the
State, that there were some very dry conditions, and if you
knew that that particular forest area had not had a fire in 200
years, so there was lots of fuel on the ground, and you knew
that it was a steep area, would you--on a Richter scale of 1 to
10--already say this is a dangerous climate? Now, the fire
itself may be relatively contained at that point in time, but
you would think that the conditions that existed would be
something that would worry most experienced firefighters.
Mr. Gleason. Yes, and to go up that canyon to get up slope
from that fire while the fire was in the bottom of the canyon,
that would be a heads-up also. You would want to stay at the
bottom end of that just because you knew from experience that
the winds would start blowing up canyon and accelerate the fire
spread. So, to go to the front of a fire is definitely a watch-
out situation.
Senator Cantwell. So, you are saying, though, that the LCES
standards focus more on those escape routes in an up-front way.
Mr. Gleason. Right. I am always leery of simplification,
and that is what LCES does is simplifies. To restate myself,
the wildland fire environment is super complex. I am not
advocating that LCES in itself would have prevented those
accidents.
But I get a little bit concerned, and after reading
Managing the Unexpected by Karl Weick here, I get a little bit
concerned that we are too focused on the orders and the rules
and we are not going through a formalized risk management
procedure, risk assessment procedure like the military. And I
am wondering if those people would have got on site and said,
okay, everybody take 5 minutes, just take a timeout, step back
and to take a look at the big picture, think about how dry the
fuels are, where they are in the canyon, that the outcome would
have been different.
This is why I personally think that it is bigger than just
the Forest Service. It is all wildland fire management agencies
that are fighting fire. They have to come up with a set of
common values such as it is okay to speak out if you are
concerned about being in an area. It is okay to defer to
somebody who has more expertise. It is okay not to engage. If
those values were set--right now, they are not and there is not
a wildland fire community because you go to one part of the
country, one agency, maybe a local agency or a State agency, is
fighting fire entirely different than another part of the
country.
So, it is bigger than the Forest Service, and it relies on
a common understanding of what the values are and then to base
a risk management approach off of those values and not to come
up with LCES or fire orders or 18 situations or downhill
fireline construction guidelines, such as occurred in 1966
after 12 firefighters lost their lives behind Los Angeles. That
is what concerns me is that we are putting band aids on top of
something that is a lot deeper issue.
Senator Cantwell. And so, what do you think training
programs should look like for firefighters?
Mr. Gleason. Continual, number one.
Senator Cantwell. Do you mean continual as opposed to just
on-the-job exposure?
Mr. Gleason. Right, right.
And the best way to learn how to make a decision is to be
with somebody who is experienced in making decisions, watch
what cues they are picking up from the environment, and how
they are processing this information before they decide to
engage or disengage, and not to go to a course or simply to
follow one task, but to really follow the footsteps of an
experienced decision maker in a heavy duty fire fight.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Schaenman, you were a very
responsible, key person in the TriData study. Do you think the
recommendations were implemented?
Mr. Gleason. I know that a lot of them have been
implemented and not all have been implemented. We made over 200
recommendations and it was an awful lot to do in one shot. It
takes years to implement some of these things. I think we can
go much further than we have. I know that there have been
changes in the training.
But a lot of things take more resources than have been put
into this. We spend a lot more resources preparing the
military, preparing airline pilots for safety than we do
firefighters, both urban and wildland firefighters. We are
willing to spend a lot more money on equipment for a military
personnel than a firefighter personnel. We spend a lot more
money to get situational awareness. There are virtual reality
simulators, for example, that are commonly used in the military
now that are hardly used--I do not know if they are used at all
in wildland firefighting. They are starting to be used in
urban. There are lots of simulations you can run people through
to improve their decision making experience.
On the mentoring issue that was mentioned, Gary Klein, who
was a member of our team and was mentioned by Paul Gleason, has
done a lot of research in how do you teach people to mentor.
And you can teach people to mentor and bring up the experience
very quickly. The Marines are doing this at the squad level.
There are drones that can be used to monitor where fires are
and help situation awareness. There are better communication
systems. There are lots of things that can be done.
But the experience is one of the biggest. You can learn all
the rules in the world, and if you do not have the experience
level, making that real-time decision at the crew, at the
division, and higher up the line, it does not happen as well as
when you do have it. We have to stop the experienced decision
makers from leaving the wildland firefighting. We are not
giving them enough incentives to stay. They have a lot of
disincentives to stay actually.
Senator Cantwell. I want to come back to that question.
Mr. Schaenman. So, we have to save the experienced people
and we have to do better training of the people who do not have
the experience to make up for the lack of experience. There are
a lot of things that can be done. There are not resources to do
everything all at once at the same time.
Senator Cantwell. Not to put the Forest Service on the spot
when they are not up here--although Mr. Williams is still at
the table--but I did not hear lack of resources in any of the
testimony from the Forest Service. I heard other issues, about
policies that are in place that we have to make sure get
implemented, but I did not hear any suggestion that the Forest
Service lacks resources.
Now, my sense is that there is some level of agreement on
that there has to be more training, but from what Mr. Gleason
is describing and what was described earlier, it sounds like
two different problems. In particular, you mention the culture
of--I think you called it--control communication response or
something similar to that.
Mr. Schaenman. Closing the dialogue, closing the
communication loop.
Senator Cantwell. Yes. Closing the communication loop seems
to be a key issue in this particular investigation, with
several people saying that a command was given and several
other people saying they never heard the command.
Mr. Schaenman. That is not a money issue. That one is
simply changing behavior, changing a culture, and say I give
you an instruction, it is my responsibility to make sure you
understood the instruction. It is your responsibility, if you
did not understand it, to ask the question.
Senator Cantwell. Was that a recommendation in the----
Mr. Schaenman. Yes. That was one of our key
recommendations.
Senator Cantwell. So, do you have any knowledge that the
Forest Service has implemented it?
Mr. Schaenman. I think some of that is being practiced in
some of the training, but I do not know for sure the extent of
that.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Williams, did you want to comment?
Mr. Williams. One of the 10 standard orders is to give
clear instructions and to make sure they are understood.
My heart is awful heavy listening to Mr. Weaver and him
relating this experience his family has gone through. I cannot
help but think of my own son and my family.
This is a high risk/high consequence business. Rules have
got to govern our activities. Whether it is 10 standard orders
or 4 simple LCES, something has got to govern these activities.
I would go back to an earlier comment when we have got to look
at are the policies adequate, are the procedures in place, or
is this a performance issue, and I keep coming back to the fact
that in my mind, we have got a performance issue here and that
quickly falls to the accountability business.
There has been much discussion about the culture in
wildland firefighting. It is a can-do outfit. In this
environment, it has got to be. But in the absence of good crew
leadership, in the absence of supervisory controls, in the
absence of adequate management oversight, there are very thin
margins that separate can-do from make-do and make-do from
tragedy. The role of management and supervision and crew
leadership is to do the job right. There are places all over
this country where that is being routinely done. That did not
happen here.
Senator Cantwell. Well, given that, Mr. Williams, I would
think that the normal conclusion then would have been to take
disciplinary action against those individuals or suspend them
and not have them working on future fires.
Mr. Williams. I think you heard a little earlier that an
administrative review is underway. We have brought in an
outside----
Senator Cantwell. But these individuals are continuing to
work, are they not?
Mr. Williams. They are not working on firelines.
Senator Cantwell. Have any of them received promotions?
Mr. Williams. Not that I am aware of, but I do not know
that.
I would tell you, though, that in the past we have
disbanded type I teams. We have pulled red cards. The agency is
not averse to taking action when it is warranted.
Senator Cantwell. That would be something that would be
helpful to provide to the committee--a list of disciplinary
action that had been taken against personnel in past incidents.
Mr. Williams. Within the confines of the Privacy Act, we
will do everything we can, of course.
Senator Cantwell. Numbers are fine; not names, but numbers
in particular incidents.
Which brings me back to Mr. Schaenman. You mentioned that
one important thing to do in reviewing safety standards, once
they are implemented, is to have something like a data system
to see how you are performing. It does not seem like we have
that information. At least I did not get that from the Forest
Service earlier. How hard is that to put together, given that
you could have oversight of how a crew is working and see
whether command closure loops were being implemented, see
whether the various processes were actually being done?
Mr. Schaenman. The most basic thing is getting better data
on the actual injuries that do occur and also on near misses.
The Forest Service is in the process of upgrading its injury
reporting system, which I just learned at a conference a week
ago, and is very close to having a much better system than it
ever had before. It has tested it in one region and they are
considering expanding it nationally as a basis. I think there
has been a lot of progress made in that area, which is what I
have been concerned about. I headed the National Fire Data
Center. I am sort of a data person, and I think there is hope
for much better data on that.
The rest of the performance measurement, though, is very
complicated to measure everybody all the time on everything.
You do have to look at the near misses, the violations that do
not lead to a fatality or an injury, but could have. And that
is something that has happened in air safety where pilots are
responsible for reporting near misses and do, and things are
headed off before they hurt people that way.
There has been a lot of discussion of, well, how do you get
people to report near misses. It is a burdensome thing, and the
firefighters are sort of a special breed. They do not like
paperwork. They do not like reporting things like that.
But you have to change the culture of lots little things.
It takes years to change a culture. It requires lots and lots
of little actions. Management, middle management, people at the
bottom all have to agree on the change.
Senator Cantwell. And how does Congress then make sure that
the Forest Service makes that cultural change and implements
those things?
Mr. Schaenman. I think you are heading in the right
direction asking for a report card every so often about what
has been changed and also what is stopping the change.
Senator Cantwell. I would say, with Mr. Weaver here, I do
not think we are moving fast enough, and that is the issue. We
are not moving fast enough to make that happen. As Senator
Wyden said, we do not want to back here in a year at another
hearing with similar incidents driving us to pay attention to
something that, if it is a long process or a resource issue, we
should address.
I want to ask one last question, but I wanted to also give
you a chance to address this human resource issue regarding the
management team. I am not sure if you are being direct about
the Forest Service's management practices as they relate to
firefighter age or length of service, but you are clearly
stating that experience is important and that somehow we do not
have the infrastructure to keep those senior individuals. Is
that right?
Mr. Schaenman. Yes, and it is not just a Forest Service
issue. It is across all five wildland agencies. We have been
talking here mostly Forest Service, but we found the problem
across all five agencies that have wildland firefighters. And
State level agencies have told me it is very similar in their
situation also. So, yes, that is a big problem of retaining the
experienced leaders in the fire world. They do not have the
incentive.
Senator Cantwell. So, what do we do about that?
Mr. Schaenman. Well, we address a lot of things. One is to
have a strategic personnel plan basically to track how many
people you have with what level experience at different levels
and to try to make sure that you have got people in the
pipeline getting the experience to move up to the next level.
You also have to have the incentives to keep the people
with the experience there on the job. There is actually some
salary disincentives for people to give up their normal office
job and be part of the fire militia and only work part-time of
the year. So, there is a big personnel motivation issue that
needs to be solved. Then we had some specific recommendations
in our report on what needs to be done.
Senator Cantwell. Well, this panel has been very
informative, and I want to wrap it up and give you a chance, if
any of you want to make final comments on this. But I guess I
am left with very good data, Mr. Schaenman, from you and Mr.
Gleason about the realities of what could be great firefighting
management training efforts and safety procedures. Yet, I
cannot guarantee to Mr. Weaver that that is going to be
implemented. So, if you could in final comments tell me your
thoughts on how we bring about accountability--either by giving
OSHA broader authority or bringing in an outside inspector. How
we can make sure that that accountability is really there from
a congressional oversight perspective.I21Mr. Schaenman, Mr.
Gleason, Mr. Weaver. If anybody on the panel wants to make
final comments.
Mr. Schaenman. I do not think there is enough resources
going into the safety area or the training area. I think that
you can make more rapid change by asking people what is
stopping the change, whether it is personnel rules. I mean,
there are all kinds of privacy rules, there are all kinds of
personnel rules that stop you from just doing preemptive things
of taking somebody off the line as you can in sports. I use a
sports analogy. You can sit somebody down for a game. You can
sit somebody down for a season, and you do not have all kinds
of labor rules to deal with. It is not that easy to do with a
Federal employee. There are all kinds of constraints on that.
So, you have got to see what is stopping you from having the
immediate accountability. It is not orneriness. It is people
trying to find the best way to do this. But I think you all can
ask the question, is there a law stopping this? Is it will? Is
it money? What is stopping us from moving faster?
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Gleason.
Mr. Gleason. Yes. I am still convinced that with the finest
training, that we still need to have some sort of mentoring
process in place where people are making decisions alongside of
somebody else who is experienced in making that decision, all
the way from the crew boss, incident commander, to the fire
management officer, and on up the line. That is needed. How it
fits together, how it comes together I do not know because that
is basically doubling the workforce. I really feel that no
matter what quality of training there is that it is entirely
different when you are in the real environment that you
actually engage with those procedures and processes.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Weaver, any final comments?
Mr. Weaver. Yes. I claim still my political naivete. This
problem is always painted in various shades of gray, and I
understand, yes, that we need training and I could not agree
more. We need to figure out how to keep qualified people in the
job.
But it does not matter how good your training is and it
does not matter how qualified your people are, if you do not
adhere to the safety rules, if you do not have an action/
consequence equation, you are going to have deaths if you do
not have people following instructions. I do not care how
intelligent they are. I do not care how well trained they are.
I do not care how well funded you are. If you do not have the
guy on the fireline that is sending the crew behind that fire
to stop, take a time out, 5 minutes and think am I following
the rules, you are going to have deaths. At the end of the day,
in my mind--and I am sure I am guilty of simplifying this and I
worry about oversimplification. But at the end of the day,
without accountability, nothing that we are going to try to do
here, in terms of training, in terms of better personnel, will
ever have any impact.
Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you, Mr. Weaver, and I thank
the panelists for being here. As with the other panelists, if
there are questions from members, we would request that you
please respond to those. They will likely be in writing. We
appreciate your help on that.
This is a very important issue not just for those Western
States that have wildland fires but for the entire country. We
need to do a better job of ensuring that those who are employed
to fight fires are employed in a safe environment. That is
something I think this committee is going to spend a
significant amount of time on.
So, again, I thank everyone who testified today.
This Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:47 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Subsequent to the hearing, the following was received for
the record:]
Yakima, WA, October 18, 2001.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I feel compelled to write you this letter regarding the death of my
daughter Jessica L. Johnson--a death that was preventable, a death that
has blackened my world. Jessica was my sunshine and I loved her with
all of my heart. I pray that my daughters' young life was not taken in
vain. The only things that I am left with are the memories of Jessica's
short life and a pain and sadness that is indescribable unless you
yourselves have experienced such a tragedy. Jessica was such a caring
and giving person; so willing to give of herself to others she was very
sensitive and never wanted to hurt anyone. As a young child she became
friends with a little girl in first grade, a friend that was different
from most children their age.
Her friend suffered from Cerebral Palsy, physically she was
different from all of the other children and most children made fun of
her at school. Jessica would protect her and help her when others would
turn away. Jessica was a friend that she would have for life and when
she came to my home after Jessica's death she was so devastated that
she could hardly speak. Her sweet friend was no more. As Jessica grew
up over the years she became very outgoing and charismatic. Everyone
liked her and our phone would ring off of the hook from the time she
came home from school until bedtime.
She grew into a young woman and was attending Central Washington
University in Ellensburg, Washington. Jessica chose Central so she
would be close to home. She never wanted to be an only child, so after
15 years of waiting and wanting, a little sister or brother God blessed
our family with Ashley Jessica's little sister that is now 5-year-olds.
Jessica would often arrive at home mid-week from college just to be
with her little sister because she missed her and wanted to be near her
family and friends. I will never forget as long as I'm alive Jessie
driving away in her silver Nissan pickup with little Ashley standing on
the curb yelling at the top of her little lungs, so to be heard over
the roar of the truck for Jessica to be careful and to come home soon!
She did this every time Jessie came home, no matter what the weather.
Sometimes Jessie would come home during the week to help the local
fire department teach a fire safety class to the children attending
grade school. She always had a smile on her face and always had
something positive to say to others. She would often surprise us with
random acts of kindness it her special little way. Jessica was so full
of life and had made many plans to spend time with her family in the
days and years to come. She and I were walking one evening in June
before she started working for the Forest Service. We were talking
about her soon approaching 20th birthday. We talked about taking a trip
on her 21st birthday to a Spa. I told her that I would pay for the trip
but that she had to do the research and pick the place she would be on
her 21st birthday, That dream will never come true for her just, as she
never got to have her 20th birthday. She was killed just 15 days before
she turned 20 years old. Our family had to celebrate her birthday
without her.
During this same evening walk Jessica told me that she was reading
a book called ``Fire on the Mountain''. She told me that is was a story
about 14 fire fighters that were killed in 1994. She and I then had a
chance to talk about being entrapped by a wildfire and Jessica assured
me that the Forest Service would never let that happened, that she was
trained in fire shelter deployment and that she could deploy her
shelter in 20-30 seconds and that I didn't need to worry because,
``Safety First Mom, Safety First!'' I was so afraid for her and she was
not afraid because she trusted and believed in what she had been taught
over the years in the wildland fire training classes she attended.
She also trusted and believed in the Forest Service and the
propaganda that they taught her. They even have water bottles with
Safety First printed on the sides! Ashley misses her sister so much and
it is hard for me to answer the difficult questions she asks me--like
when is Jessie coming home? Then she says in the same breath, Jessie is
never coming home, she's in heaven and she will never pick me up after
school like she promised me, will she mom, because Jessie is dead. She
will yell out to God just all of the sudden, ``God you give me back my
sister, give me back Jessica!'' How do you comfort a child that has
lost her world, someone she adored, and someone that she thought was
the greatest? Maybe the Forest Service would like to explain these
things to my little Ashley. Maybe they would like to tell her someday
what really happened to her sister, and maybe they would like to
explain the horrific way Jessica died. Running for her life up a rocky
slope that is very difficult to even walk on, being licked by flames,
being burnt, screaming, suffering and crying in pain, praying to God in
an aluminum shelter, praying for her life all of the while being burnt,
aware of everything that was happening until her last breath was taken.
Maybe they would like to explain to Ashley why her Mommy cries
every day and can hardly concentrate on the simplest of tasks on some
days. Maybe they would like to feel the pain and sadness that I am left
with. Maybe they would like to have their futures taken away from them.
I will never see my daughter, the only child from my first marriage,
graduate from college and become a Registered Dietician like she
dreamed and work so hard to accomplish. I will never see her get
married, I will never be a grandmother to her children, I will never
get to celebrate another birthday with her. She will not be with our
family during the holidays. She is forever gone. I have lost my
connection to the future, someone that I cared very deeply about, loved
with all of my heart and raised to be a good person, a child that for a
period in my life I raised as a single parent, a good and loving person
that would not harm anyone. Her family and friends miss her and some
days it is just hard to go on. We often think about her, we often
wonder why?
Why can the U.S. Forest Service kill their employees, our countries
people, and there is no recourse no matter what happened. Our great
country has a justice system that persecutes people in our country for
their wrong doings. Why is there employer immunity? This basically
gives the Federal Government the right to do whatever they want to the
tax paying citizens; their employees and they know darn well that they
are untouchable. But we the people don't know these facts unless we are
faced with them, just as all four of the victims' families now know.
The Forest Service has slapped us in the face for the last time; the
citizens of this Nation will demand that they face justice and that
they are held accountable for their actions, just as we demand that the
Terrorist are held accountable for their deadly deeds to our people.
This is no different. They can tell us every lie in the book and even
control our funerals not allowing us to view our own children's bodies.
. . . only because my beautiful daughter who once weighed 150 pounds
came home in a casket, in a body bag only weighing 20 pounds, her
remains were basically her chest cavity, the rest of her was burned to
ashes and those ashes remain on the rock scree in the Chewuch River
Canyon.
It is my hope that there will be changes made within the U.S.
Forest Service, changes that will provide improvement in the future for
wildland Fire Fighters. Although this tragedy is new to my family and
me, this is not the first time that wildland Fire Fighters have
heroically given their lives. The have been over 400 deaths in wildland
fires from the Mann Gulch Fire, the South Canyon Fire and the latest
tragedy, the Thirtymile Fire. The number of the victims may not be as
large as those who heroically gave their lives in a rescue effort at
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, but the significance is
just as monumental.
Much like the story that is told of the 14 who died in Colorado
State in 1994, our daughter and the 3 others that also died were blamed
for their own deaths. The Forest Service then later retracted the
statements, stating that the four who died may not have heard the order
to come down off of the rocks. The truth is known that the statement
was never made for them to come down off of the rocks. I personally
have talked with some of the Fire Fighters that survived the Thirtymile
Fire and their statements to me were that those orders never came to
those who lost their lives.
Although I do give the Forest Service some credit for changing the
report and bringing it somewhat closer to the truth, once again they
made a baby step toward the truth without every acknowledging exactly
what happened and during this whole thing the families are being
tortured. Unlike the Storm King Fire, there are survivors of this fire.
There is a reason for this, the reason being that the U.S. Forest
Service needs to be held accountable for their actions, or lack of
actions. There are witnesses to what happened and the truth will be
known and it will be made right. Fire Fighters unselfishly give their
lives everyday, just as these four did on July 10, 2001.
My daughter had been involved in fire fighting since the end of her
junior year in high school. For three and a half years she was a
volunteer Fire Fighter for West Valley Fire Department here in Yakima
County. She gave her time and energy as a teenager to help those in the
community who were in need. She would come home on weekends from
college to take call for the local fire department; there are few
teenagers that care that much about others, who are willing to
sacrifice their time on the weekends to help others. My daughter was a
jewel that can never be replaced, as were all of the other victims.
This was the second season of fighting wildland fire for my daughter.
She worked last year for the Department of Natural Resources on a 20-
person crew.
She loved working with others and made many special friends as the
crew traveled to different areas to fight fire. She decided this past
winter to apply with the Forest Service. She told me that she felt this
was a better agency. The Forest Services in my daughters' eyes were the
cream of the crop and that's where she wanted to be, with the best! She
did not know, nor did we, that there are many flaws within the U.S.
Forest Service. Flaws that endanger peoples lives constantly while they
are working for them, flaws that actually kill innocent people, people
at the prime of their young lives, educated people who are trying to be
productive in society. It is time for the U.S. Forest Service to be
held accountable. It is time to write a new chapter in wildland fire
fighting, not a chapter of sadness and tragedy, but one filled with
guidelines that are useful that can be followed by all when fighting a
wildland fire.
How many times does history need to repeat itself. How many second
chances does one agency need to get it right? Those are the questions
that I have along with the huge question of why they have immunity and
why they are not held accountable for their actions. Why are they
allowed to repeatedly kill their employee's without facing the justice
system? Why can they do their own biased investigation and have that
reported to the public as fact, when it is full of holes and lies. Why
are they allowed to alter the statements of the witness and persecute
those who speak out against them, when all that is being said is the
truth?
Why were witnesses not allowed to tell reporters that the four that
died were screaming in pain as they were being burnt to death, because
the Forest Service had not told the families of the victims how they
actually died. How can they have such control? Is this not America and
don't we have freedom of speech? Is that not still written in the First
Amendment? Why do they employee incompetent people and not supervise or
assure their competence, yet put them in charge of human lives, in a
situation that was clearly a mistake from the very beginning. Why are
they allowed to break their own rules, rules they make, rules they
train their employees to follow? Why do they promote people and fast
track others into positions that they are not qualified to do? Why did
they let the Incident Commander and the Incident Commander trainee
continue to work and be in charge of supervising other Fire Fighters
after four people died at their hands?
Why weren't these people put on administrative leave until the
investigation was complete. Or better yet, why aren't they fired? The
Lake Leavenworth Fire Fighters nearly revolted and walked out on the
Forest Service for these actions. Why are they allowed to blame others
and lie? I believe that history has repeated itself, and enough is
enough and the time has come for those who are responsible to be held
accountable.
It is with this that my family is hoping changes will be made and
that the U.S. Forest Service will be held accountable. I am asking all
of you to make this right. I believe in the U.S. Government and I need
to have a restored faith in the U.S. Forest Service. We need to hold
them accountable for their actions and lack of intelligence. They have
made and broken promises to us and to the South Canyon Fire Victims
Families. They should be held to those promises and our tax dollars
must be used to make the necessary changes. The Forest Service must be
put under the microscope. They must be monitored diligently to assure
that they comply with the changes and they are held accountable if they
do not! There should never be a broken promise by the U.S. Government
to its people. Let this be the starting point for a new responsibility.
The U.S. Forest Service is accountable for their actions. Don't leave a
legacy of broken promises and repeated history. Make this right for the
people of our Nation and RESTORE ALL OF OUR FAITH!
This task is huge, there is a culture among the ``good old boys''
that needs to be changed. It is not allowable to cover-up the truth. We
the people demand the truth--after all, it is our tax dollars that pay
all of your wages. Wildland fires can be fought safely, but Fire
Fighters must be given all of the information, tools and resources (not
Pulaski's that break and fall apart, not hoses that burst when there
being used). Fire Fighters must demand that they be told everything
about the area they are fighting a fire in, all of the cards need to be
face up on the table, they need to know the weather, the fuels the
geographical location of the area they are working in etc., they must
all have maps, hand held computers, radios, etc., whatever it takes to
fight the fire safely. Then if there is any question on whether the
individual is willing to risk his our her own life knowing all of the
facts, then that is a choice that they make. Unfortunately, the Fire
Fighters on the Thirtymile Fire did not have all of the facts about the
weather, fuels, the dead end road, yet they were sent to assist engines
that made a decision to go up a dead-end road without permission.
The only escape route was the road and I believe that the Incident
Commander and trainee never briefed the Fire Fighters on the change in
strategy and the change in escape routes. After all, isn't it mandatory
for them to have two escape routes? When those engines got into trouble
and needed help whom did they call, the Fire Fighters? The Fire
Fighters were sent to assist those engines after the Incident
Commanders had given up the fire. The Incident Commanders knew the Fire
Fighters would be in front of the fire and the beast had long won the
battle. Yet, they sent 14 people up there!
The Fire Fighters are the ones that got trapped and died, somehow
miraculously the people on the engines escaped with their lives, as did
the Incident Commander trainee who dropped off the 14 Fire Fighters and
left an Incident Commander with a vehicle that would only carry 11
people, when it took the Incident Commander trainee two separate loads
to drop the Fire Fighters off. These are the cold hard facts. Please
help us bring the U.S. Forest Service to justice. After all, the Fire
Fighter was doing exactly what he or she had been taught--FIGHT FIRE
AGGRESSIVELY! How crazy is that?
They are taught to have a can-do attitude then they are punished,
persecuted and even blamed for their own deaths for doing so!
Unfortunately, sometimes that punishment is death! The number one
Standard Fire Order is: Fight Fire Aggressively but provide for safety
first. Is this not an oxymoron?
Nothing that is done will ever bring back the lives that have been
lost over the years, but it may prevent the Forest Service from having
their calloused attitude, acting as though they are God, when one of
their own dies. Structural Fire Fighters don't have this cold calloused
attitude; they can and are held accountable for their own. When one of
them dies in the line of duty they loose their brother or sister,
members of their own family and they make it right or as close to right
as one can get when someone dies.
Please make this right for the Fire Fighters.
Respectfully,
Jody Gray.
APPENDIX
Responses to Additional Questions
----------
Responses of Dale Bosworth, Chief, Forest Service, to Questions From
Senator Wyden
Question 1. As we have discussed, I am concerned that the
recommendations contained in the Forest Service's Accident Prevention
Plan are strikingly similar to those made at the conclusion of the Tri-
Data study, which was done after 14 federal firefighters lost their
lives in Colorado's 1994 Storm King fire. In addition, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration performed its own investigation of
Storm King, and issued additional recommendations. You have said that
the Forest Service takes these recommendations very seriously, but
indicated that you are unsure of how many of these measures have been
implemented since Storm King. Please provide the Committee with a
comprehensive status report on the implementation of these enhanced
safety measures and programs. For those that have not yet been
implemented, please provide an explanation as to why and a timeline for
their completion. Please also submit a list of the measures the Forest
Service intends to have in place by the beginning of the 2002 fire
season.
Answer. On an annual basis, the Forest Service fights about 10,000
wildfires with about 7,000 firefighters. The agency also assists other
wildland fire agencies in suppression actions under their
jurisdictions. Annually, these fires burn over 800,000 acres of
National Forest. Over 90 percent of all wildfires are suppressed upon
the initial action. Additionally, firefighters carry out activities
over 1.3 million acres for hazardous fuels reduction each year. This
work is accomplished with few accidents or injuries.
There were 183 action items in the Interagency Management Review
Team (IMRT) report from the South Canyon tragedy. One hundred seventy
four have been completed. The management of transition fires was an
issue at both South Canyon and Thirtymile. To provide additional
guidance on the management of transition fires, we are developing a
transition fire guidebook for all Incident Commanders that will be
available before the 2002 fire season.
The Management Review Board for the Thirtymile fire identified 31
action items. Some of these are similar to the South Canyon action
items. The 31 items in the Thirtymile Mile Accident Prevention plan
have been assigned to an individual or group for implementation. It is
our objective to institute as many of these items as possible into our
regular operational procedures prior to the 2002 fire season.
Although policy and procedural issues surfaced during the course of
the investigation, many of the fundamental issues centered on
performance. Specifically, adherence to established safe practices
procedures. We are working on strengthening performance expectations at
management, supervisory and crew leadership levels of the organization.
Question 2. As part of the National Fire Plan, Congress passed
Appropriations of $1.1 billion in 2001, and the President's budget
called for $1.3 billion for Fiscal Year 2002. It is not clear, however,
that any of the additional funds have been spent on enhanced training
or safety. Please provide the Committee with a comprehensive breakdown
of the Forest Service's safety and training budgets from Fiscal Year
1995 (the year of the Storm King fire) through the present. In
addition, please provide information regarding the percentage of the
Forest Service's overall firefighting budget devoted to safety and
training during these years.
Answer. Since 1995, the Forest Service has allocated approximately
$23 million dollars to the development and delivery of fire and safety
training. This allocation includes funding for the establishment of a
National Academy for wildland fire suppression in cooperation with the
Department of Labor to help develop new leadership.
Funds for training are included in each Region and unit budget and
nationally we do not track these expenditures. Each Region's
responsibility is to conduct regional and local training to ensure
firefighters are fit, qualified, and prepared to control and suppress
fire. The National figure does not reflect the total amount of money
spent by each unit to prepare their firefighters, that number is in the
tens of millions each year. A conservative estimate for the past 7
years would be $100,000,000 of Regional preparedness budgets. This
represents an estimated annual percentage of fire preparedness funds
for the agency ranging from 5 to 10 percent.
DIRECT NATIONAL TRAINING EXPENDITURES FOR 1995-2001
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year NWCG NARTC SEPFA NJAC Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 850,000 930,000 1,780,00
0
1996 900,000 950,000 1,850,00
0
1997 989,500 1,049,00 500,000 2,538,50
0 0
1998 989,500 1,000,00 500,000 2,489,50
0 0
1999 979,300 1,000,00 500,000 2,479,30
0 0
2000 1,000,00 1,142,00 500,000 1,400,00 4,042,00
0 0 0 0
2001 1,000,00 1,443,00 500,000 5,200,00 8,143,00
0 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 6,708,30 7,514,00 2,500,0 6,600,00 23,322,3
0 0 00 0 00
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NWCG--National Wildland Fire Coordination Group to develop wildland fire
and safety training.
NARTC--National Advanced Resource Technology Center to develop and
deliver Nationally level fire management and safety training.
SEPFA--Southeast Prescribed Fire Academy to delivery prescribed fire and
safety training.
NJAC--National Junior Apprenticeship Academy to deliver basic and
advanced firefighter and safety training in an academic setting to
develop fire management and leadership.
Question 3. The issue of training also appears to be key in
enhancing firefighter safety, and I believe this is particularly
crucial given the large numbers of new firefighters hired under the
National Fire Plan. I understand that last year's appropriations were
sufficient to allow State and Federal agencies to hire more 8,000 new
firefighters this year, creating 3,000 new permanent positions that
include employee benefits. To date, some 5,300 additional firefighters
have been hired. You have suggested that firefighter safety violations
and subsequent fatalities stem not from a failure of Forest Service
policies, but from performance in the field. Do you believe this
performance failure is caused by a failure in training? If not, to what
other factors could performance failure be attributed?
Answer. Any time there is performance failure training and
supervision must come under scrutiny. There is reason to believe that
both training and supervision were lacking at Thirtymile. The training
shortcoming is primarily in leadership and situational awareness. These
will be addressed in our Leadership Curriculum that is in the
implementation stage and our annual refresher training. This annual
refresher training will include lessons learned from Thirtymile,
Incident Commander expectations and transition fire management.
Supervision and management oversight will be strengthened through
training and the Fire Management Plan development process.
Question 4. We have already discussed the fact that the existing 32
hours of training for first year Forest Service firefighters falls far
short of that required for volunteer municipal firefighters. Please
describe the existing training regimen and the specific safety
instruction first-year firefighters receive. Do you believe that
extending the training period would enhance safety performance? Why or
why not?
Answer. The National Wildfire Coordinating Group, comprised of the
Forest Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
and the National Association of State Foresters, takes the position
that 32 hours of basic introductory fire training is sufficient for
first year wildland firefighters. Municipal departments must deal with
hazardous materials, interior fire suppression, emergency medical
responses and a multiplicity of unpredictable daily responses that
wildland firefighters rarely see.
The Forest Service has been fortunate to add 5,400 new firefighters
to the federal workforce this past year. These firefighters were not
placed on assignment until they were qualified and unless there was
adequate supervision. Before a firefighter is deemed qualified, they
must pass a work capacity test and receive basic training and
experience. Qualified supervision and leadership are always assigned to
help the firefighters accomplish their work safely.
The Forest Service recognizes the value of having new employees
mentored by more experienced employees. The agency has initiated a new
employee orientation program that encourages supervisors to either
mentor or select mentors to answer questions and introduce techniques.
More important, these people demonstrate safe fire practices. The only
barrier to the continued development of mentoring within the agency is
time needed to transfer experience from the mentor to the employee.
With the large number of new people, this becomes a much bigger
challenge. There is simply no way to transfer every experience within a
week. Mentoring and experience transfer is a long-term process the
agency is dedicated to implementing.
Question 5. The Forest Service and other experts have commented
that effective firefighting also requires on-the-job training, given
the multiplicity of variables and complexity of the environment our
firefighters face. In order for our novice firefighters to acquire
needed experience under the safest possible conditions, some have
suggested that a mentorship program should be put in place. What role
does mentorship currently play in firefighter training? Has the Forest
Service considered implementing or expanding such a program? What do
you perceive as the barriers to doings so?
Answer. The Forest Service recognizes the value of having new
employees mentored by more experienced employees. Following the South
Canyon tragedy, the Forest Service and the other members of the
National Wildfire Coordinating Group adopted a performance based
training system. This was in recognition that classroom training was
not always adequate. The more effective method of training was a
combination of classroom and on-the-job training, and experience. The
agency has initiated a new employee orientation program that encourages
supervisors to either mentor or select mentors to answer questions and
introduce techniques. More important, mentors demonstrate safe fire
practices. The only barrier to the continued development of mentoring
within the agency is time needed to transfer experience from the mentor
to the employee. With the large number of new people, this becomes a
much bigger challenge. There is simply no way to transfer every
experience within a week. Mentoring redundant is a long-term process
the agency is dedicated to implementing.
Question 6. Some parties have also expressed concerns about the way
federal agencies including the Forest Service have gone about hiring
new personnel, as funded by the National Fire Plan. With retirements
already eroding the experience of our firefighting crews--I recall that
earlier this spring, you testified before the Committee regarding the
``graying of the workforce''--there is concern that shifting personnel
among agencies in order to fill the 3,000 new permanent positions is
breaking up veteran crews, which may have an impact on firefighter
safety. It is important to note that the lack of crew cohesion was one
the influencing factors cited in the Thirtymile investigative report.
What policies are currently in place to retain our more experienced
firefighters? Do you believe that hiring policies are having an impact
on federal agencies' ability to retain veterans? So you believe these
policies require reform? If so, how should they be reformed?
Answer. Wildland firefighting is physically and mentally stressful.
To perform safely and effectively, firefighters must maintain a high
level of mental and physical agility and stamina. These necessary
mental and physical capabilities decease with age. Firefighter early
retirement was established to keep the average age of firefighters less
than that of the general federal workforce. The intent was to maintain
a healthy, vigorous, mentally and physically capable firefighting
workforce. A large portion of the veteran firefighting workforce will
become eligible for retirement or be at their mandatory retirement date
in the near future. As a result, we expect to lose many of our veteran
firefighters. The firefighter retirement system is working as designed.
Large numbers of new firefighters have not been hired by federal
wildland firefighting agencies since the late 1970s. Consequently, in
the next several years a larger proportion of our veteran firefighter
workforce will be retiring than has in the recent years. The best
solution to the dilemma is to even out the hiring of firefighters over
time so that the inflow of rookie firefighters equals the out-flow of
retiring, veteran firefighters. To accomplish this requires predictably
consistent funding for wildland firefighting programs over years and
decades. The boom and bust cycle of funding and related hiring of
firefighters is the main culprit, not the firefighter retirement
program.
Another symptom of the ``boom-bust'' hiring trend is an over-
reliance on temporary firefighters. Managers are reluctant to hire new
permanent firefighters during a budget upswing because there is a
possibility they will be forced into a reduction-in-force on the next
budget downswing. To compensate they hiring a greater proportion of
temporary firefighter . . . those easiest to lay-off. These temporary
firefighters often work 10 seasons or more only to loose their job
during the next budget down-swing. Some of these long-term temporary
firefighters are already over 37 years old, the maximum age they can be
hired into a permanent position covered by firefighter retirement.
The restriction on maximum retirement age imposed by the
firefighter retirement system is the only management tool currently in
use to provide for a firefighting workforce that is mentally and
physically capable of safely and effectively meeting the demands of the
job.
Question 7. We have already discussed the concept of a ``zero-
tolerance'' policy for violations of firefighting safety policies--one
means of instituting a culture of accountability within the Forest
Service. However, it is not clear from my research that your agency
currently has any formal disciplinary policy in place. That is, in the
wake of Storm King and the Thirtymile Fires, you have instituted
administrative reviews of personnel, their actions, and involvement in
the incidents. It seems tome that these reviews--done on a case-by-case
basis--may lead to inconsistent disciplinary measures for safety
infractions. Within the confines of the Privacy Act, please make
certain to submit the list of safety violations and subsequent
disciplinary actions taken against personnel that I have already
requested. In addition, do you believe that having in place a concrete,
comprehensive and proactive disciplinary policy would increase the
level of accountability at all levels of the Forest Service? What are
the barriers to putting such a policy in place? In addition, do you
believe that fire-line safety inspectors would helpful in enforcing
such a policy? What other specific measures are you considering to
increase accountability of Forest Service firefighting personnel and
management?
Answer. The Forest Service does not maintain formal list of
disciplinary actions taken as a result of violations on fires. Formal
disciplinary actions are handled at the Regional level. Removal,
suspension or down grading of an employee is based on OPM guidance and
5 CFR 752.
We are currently working on a process for reporting safety
violations and safe practices. Attachment A is the first attempt at
collecting this information.
Each Incident Management Team has afire safety officer to oversee
fire operations on that particular incident. These individuals have
proven their value many times over by stopping unsafe fire operations.
There is no real way to know the numbers of lives they have already
saved, but we see their continued use as imperative.
Question 8. You have also indicated that it is difficult to know
which safety measures have been effective, because it is impossible to
track ``how many people our actions might have saved after Storm King
from the things that we learned.'' In addition, I understand that the
Forest Service currently does not require reporting or investigation of
near-miss incidents and entrapments that do not lead to casualties. I
understand that Region 5 of the Forest Service is currently testing a
new data system--the Automated Accident and Injury Reporting System
(AAIRS). Will this new system track data associated with these near
misses? If not, please describe the barriers to doing so. When will
this system be in place for all Regions of the Forest Service?
Answer. The AAIRS program is a pilot program that is being tested
in California. The goal is to have a program that would track all
accidents in order to perform trend analysis and to prevent accidents.
Currently accidents are reported and ``charged'' in an agency specific
manner and these agency specific databases do not always share
information. The first test of the program, which is underway now, is
to capture accident information when Incident Management Teams are
involved. The second phase would be to capture this same information
for accidents that occur during initial attack. The National Wildfire
Coordinating Group is assisting in the evaluation of the program and
could recommend the program for all wildland fire accidents.
It is too early in the evaluation of the program to generate a
timeline for possible national adoption.
Question 9. Please comment more specifically on the steps the
Forest Service takes to ensure the integrity of its own internal
investigations. Does the Forest Service have a stated policy regarding
the way it assembles it investigative teams to look into these
incidents? Do you believe that officially injecting another voice into
the process--such as an Inspector General--would be constructive and
help bolster public confidence in there investigations' conclusions?
Answer. There is policy developed on accident investigations.
(Forest Service Manual 6730). Information on the specifics of
assembling accident investigation teams in contained is Forest Service
Handbook 6709.12, chapter 30. Both documents are currently under
revision. The revisions will contain expanded information on the
specifics of assembling accident investigation teams. In addition, more
specific information on accident investigation teams is contained in
the recently published Accident Investigation Guide.
Internal accident investigations are an accepted process not only
in Federal agencies but also in private industry. It is sound safety
practice to investigate all accidents. Also, OSHA requires all
accidents to be investigated and ``the extent of the investigation
shall be reflective of the seriousness of the accident''. (29 CFR 1960,
``Elements for Federal Employee Safety and Health Programs'', part 29)
In accordance with 29 CFR 1960.70 and OSHA conducted a concurrent
investigation.
The Forest Service contracts the position of Chief Investigator on
all Washington Office level accident investigations. This is done to
ensure we do not compromise, in any way, our serious accident
investigation process.
The current process requires the team leader to be an SES employee
of the agency. This duty is rotated and an ``on call'' roster is
maintained. Also, a contract chief investigator is used. Upon
completion of its investigation, the accident investigation team
presents its findings to a board of review. This board works with the
investigation team to ensure the report is complete and accurate. The
board then makes recommendations on actions that are needed to prevent
future mishaps.
The teams are assembled by the team leader to ensure the necessary
expertise is represented on the team and also to ensure the team can
respond in a timely fashion. Teams that are assembled to investigate
entrapments have fire behavior, weather, fire operations and equipment
specialist on the team. The National Weather Service normally provides
a meteorologist. Other wildland fire agencies may provide expertise as
well.
The Thirtymile incident was investigated using accident
investigation guide developed in 2000. This guide was assembled in
order to improve our investigative process.
Question 10. In the case of the Thirtymile Fire, the Forest Service
took the unusual step of reopening the investigation after the initial
report had been issued, on September 26. Why did you decide to reopen
the Thirtymile Fire investigation? Isn't this the first time the Forest
Service has ever done so? Do you believe the emergence of new evidence
after the report had already been issued speaks to an underlying flaw
or the thoroughness of the investigative process?
Answer. The Chief directed the Board of Review to review the
portion of the investigation that dealt with directions or orders that
were given following entrapment and prior to deployment. Witnesses had
conflicting statements and there was much public discussions relating
to what was said or not said and to what was heard or not heard. The
Board of Review looked into this part of the report again and
determined that there was some uncertainty as to what was said and
heard during that crucial time.
The reopening of the investigation did not alter that findings of
the report nor did it affix blame to the victims.
Question 11. How, specifically, do you believe Congress can be a
better partner in ensuring the safety of our federal wildland
firefighters?
Answer. Recognize fire fighting is dangerous. Recognize we have
made significant progress in safety despite the recent tragedies.
Recognize there is a lot of pressure to fight every fire and a lot
of pressure not to fire in particular places. At time the public debate
over natural resource management comes together on the wildfire stage.
Our dedicated wild land fire managers and fire fighters are often
expected to process many factors quickly and always make the right
decision a difficult task at best.
As the federal budget comes under more pressure, some will want to
reduce preparedness finding. The Forest Service workforce over next
several years is going to be developing essential knowledge, skills and
abilities. This workforce will rely on adequate funds for training
development and staffing depth to ensure safety.
You can also assist us by continuing involvement though your
oversight, support and interest.