[Senate Hearing 107-364]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-364
ANTHRAX DECONTAMINATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
NOVEMBER 28, 2001--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
TOM HARKIN, Iowa PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HARRY REID, Nevada MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CONRAD BURNS, Montana
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Terrence E. Sauvain, Staff Director
Charles Kieffer, Deputy Staff Director
Steven J. Cortese, Minority Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Minority Deputy Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland, Chairman
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
TOM HARKIN, Iowa CONRAD BURNS, Montana
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin LARRY CRAIG, Idaha
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Professional Staff
Paul Carliner
Gabriel Batkin
Alexa Sewell
Jon Kamarck (Minority)
Cheh Kim (Minority)
Administrative Support
Isaac Green (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statement of Hon. Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency................................ 1
Opening statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski................. 1
Statement of Senator Christopher S. ``Kit'' Bond................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Statement of Christine Todd Whitman.............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Statement of Hon. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the
President...................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
ANTHRAX DECONTAMINATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on VA, HUD and
Independent Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 3:06 p.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara A. Mikulski (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Mikulski, Bond, Domenici, and Stevens.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN,
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
opening statement of senator barbara a. mikulski
Senator Mikulski. The VA-HUD Subcommittee, Appropriations
Committee will now come to order, and I wish to welcome the EPA
Administrator, Christie Todd Whitman, and the Science Advisor
to the President, Dr. John Marburger. First, we would like to
say to Administrator Whitman, we welcome her back once again to
testifying at this hearing. We know that she made significant
effort to be able to testify here today, and we appreciate her
courtesies to be able to do this, and also we clearly had an
excellent relationship during the past year and look forward--
--
Ms. Whitman. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. Dr. Marburger, we welcome you. We know
that you were confirmed on October 21, exactly 6 days after the
anthrax event in the Hart Building and the terrible events that
occurred 2 days later at Brentwood, and we know that you have
got a big job ahead of you, but President Bush has a lot of
confidence in you, and we look forward to getting better
acquainted with you and also to get your insights and
recommendations today.
The VA-HUD Subcommittee wanted to act very quickly to
convene this timely hearing to discuss the issues of
decontamination of anthrax both at the Hart Building, the
Brentwood postal facility, and other private sector buildings
that are exposed. This is to discuss the role of EPA and the
Office of the Science Advisor to the President in terms of
decontamination process.
These two agencies are being asked to take on new and
greater homeland security issues, so we have questions to ask,
both about the science of decontamination, as well as the
status and timetable of implementing them, and then also the
science of determining how clean is safe for workers to be able
to return to Hart, to Brentwood, et cetera.
We also know that the President is asking you to take on
these responsibilities in this great war against terrorism,
that you will have additional need for resources, and as your
appropriators we want to hear what challenges you are facing,
how you are serving the Nation, and how this subcommittee can
help you meet that challenge.
Many VA-HUD agencies are now in the forefront of the
consequence management of terrorism. This seems to be the
Consequence Management Subcommittee. The Federal Emergency
Management, of course, has consequence management for the
Federal Government Agency. EPA and OSTP have very important
roles that they are going to tell us about.
Let us talk about the purpose of the hearing. First, I
would like to know really who is in charge in the
decontamination effort for the Federal Government, and who is
in charge of the Capitol, Brentwood, and other facilities. Who
is in charge of the science, to know what is the best
methodologies for decontamination? Who is in charge of
identifying the decontamination methods? Who is in charge of
implementing them, and then who is in charge of telling us the
criteria for how clean is safe?
We understand that the goal for cleaning up the Hart
Building has been set at zero spores, but we do not know if
this is a goal, and we do not know if it is a standard. Also,
we are worried about the short-range consequence of buildings
being anthrax-free, or meeting the standard for safety, and we
are also concerned about the long-term consequences of whatever
is the clean-up methodology.
So we are interested in those issues as well as the status
of the decontamination, as well as the timetables for achieving
it.
We all would like to be back in the Hart Building. We know
that the postal workers are deeply troubled about if they
should even go back into Brentwood, but we would rather be safe
than sorry. This is my position. We feel that you two are
enormously conscientious public servants. We are going to turn
to you today for your comments. What we also appreciate is your
great competence, and we also need your candor about where we
are in this process, what are reasonable expectations, and how
we can join together in ensuring the safety of the people who
work for the Federal Government and therefore also be able to
give guidance to the private sector.
I turn now to my esteemed colleague, the Ranking Member,
Senator Bond.
statement of senator christopher s. ``kit'' bond
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and since I
am between the microphones I trust that my voice is loud enough
to carry. In any event, I welcome Governor Whitman back to make
her second appearance, and it is a pleasure to meet Dr. John
Marburger and congratulate you on being confirmed as the
Science Advisor. I look forward to getting acquainted with you
under better circumstances, but I do understand Dr. Marburger
brings a lot of experience and expertise on science and
technical issues, and be a valuable resource to the
administration and to this committee.
My sincere thanks and congratulations to the chair for
holding this important hearing, especially since we in the
Senate have had first-hand experience with anthrax
contamination. While we have received periodic reports from the
Capitol Police about the progress of decontamination efforts on
the Hill, I think there are a lot of questions that we all have
about exactly how the Federal Government is responding to these
very unusually difficult circumstances, and how responses will
be handled in the future for both the public and private
sector.
The day that we came together as a Senate to hear about the
contamination, the first thing I raised was, what we do here
not only is going to break ground, but it is going to set the
standard. The standard that we believe is safe for us is going
to be the standard that is adopted, essentially by everybody,
and we want to make sure that that is the right standard, that
it is based on sound scientific and medical information.
There has been a lot of confusion about public health
dangers of anthrax on Capitol Hill and the safety of
remediation options. In particular, response to remediation has
been handled differently in the Senate Hart than in Senate
Russell Office Buildings.
The Hart Building is closed, and the Russell Building
remains open, with the exception of certain contaminated areas,
and I understand that they have adopted there a standard of
medically insignificant as an appropriate standard, and maybe
that is the right standard, but I also need to hear from EPA
and OSTP how the anthrax remediation efforts are being done on
Capitol Hill compared to other parts of the country, such as
New York and Florida, and Kansas City, where we had a mail
facility contaminated.
If different approaches are being taken in different areas,
instead of a uniform approach, I think we need to know why the
difference. It is critical that we develop standards that
establish if there is a level of anthrax that is not a health
hazard, and how clean our buildings need to be to ensure
workplace safety. If it is impossible to get every last spore
out, do we have to tear the buildings down.
The uniform guidelines need to be developed on how to
respond properly to this contamination of anthrax so that our
response does not appear to be haphazard. I emphasize the need,
because we have to maintain public confidence and avoid
unwarranted hysteria.
In the early 1980's, when I served as Governor of Missouri,
a small community was found to be contaminated with dioxin, and
extremely expensive efforts were made to clean up the area, and
the greatest danger came from the hysteria spread by the
national media, and we knew we needed to clean it up, but how
clean, and the lingering effects had far greater impact than
the dioxin ever did, and I do not think we need to fall into
that trap. We need to make sure it is safe, but we cannot cause
panic, confusion, or shut down the Government because we demand
standards that are impossible.
I am not here to criticize any person or any organization,
because we have had really no experience outside of our
veterinarians, particularly in livestock areas where they deal
with anthrax all the time, and how to deal with anthrax
contamination in buildings, and here we had literally to
reinvent the wheel, but I hope that our witnesses today can
shed more light on what has occurred and what lessons have been
learned. I hope the Federal Government can, as I believe we
must, develop a uniform approach to respond to anthrax or any
other contamination that we may encounter, and I hope the
approach will result not only in substantially reduced risk to
the public health, which is a must, but also a minimal
disruption to either the Government or other private
activities.
I am very pleased that the President has addressed this
issue by coordinating the Federal Government's efforts through
the Office of Homeland Security, and I would like to know how
you are working with that. We must also have the best science
available, and OSTP has the unique capability to pull together
all the scientific expertise and knowledge so that we all
understand the implications of biological and chemical agents.
As the chair has noted, a number of Federal agencies are
involved in consequence management at the various facilities,
and the current lines of authority are beginning to look more
like a late unlamented national health plan that looked like a
spaghetti bowl gone wild, and sometimes it is easier to get
interagency cooperation--it is less easy to get interagency
cooperation than to build a bridge to Hawaii, but the time has
come when we have to get that done.
We are committed to ensuring that the Federal Government
has adequate resources to prevent and respond to terrorist
attacks, but we must have a coordinated approach, and I just
want to add personally before I conclude a special thanks to
two key EPA staffers, Richard Rupert, the on-scene coordinator,
and Thomas Voltaggio, the Deputy Administrator of Region 3, so
they are under a great deal of pressure, everybody wants to get
back in, but we very much appreciate the efforts that these two
and the teams they head ensuring that we decontaminate the
building the right way, because I certainly would not want to
send my chair back into an unsafe building.
I thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher S. Bond
Thank you, Chairperson Mikulski. I also welcome Governor Christine
Todd Whitman from EPA for making her second appearance before the
subcommittee, and Dr. John Marburger, who is making his first
appearance. I congratulate you Dr. Marburger on being confirmed as the
Science Advisor for the President. I look forward to working with you
and your office. Dr. Marburger brings a lot of experience and expertise
on science and tech issues and will be a valuable resource to the
Administration and this Committee.
I applaud the Chairperson for holding this important hearing
especially since we, in the Senate, have had first-hand experience with
anthrax contamination. While we have received periodic reports from the
Capitol Police about the progress of the decontamination efforts on
Capitol Hill, I believe that there are many questions about exactly how
the Federal government is responding to these unusual and difficult
circumstances, and how responses will be handled in the future, for
both the public and private sectors.
For example, there has been some confusion about the public health
dangers of anthrax on Capitol Hill and the safety of the remediation
options. In particular, response and remediation has been handled
differently in the Senate Hart and Russell office buildings where the
Hart building is closed and the Russell building remains open with the
exception of certain contaminated areas.
I would also like to hear from EPA and OSTP how the anthrax
remediation efforts are being done on Capitol Hill compared to other
parts of the country such as New York and Florida. It appears that
different approaches have been taken in these different areas instead
of a uniform approach. I believe that it is critical that we develop
standards that establishes what level of anthrax is considered ``safe''
and how ``clean'' our buildings need to be in order to ensure workplace
safety. Also, uniform guidelines need to be developed on how to
properly respond to anthrax contamination so that our response does not
appear to be haphazard. I emphasize this need because we must maintain
public confidence and avoid unwarranted hysteria. Without public
confidence, the terrorists win and that is unacceptable.
I want to be clear that I am not here to criticize any person or
any organization because I recognize that there has been little or no
experience in dealing with anthrax contamination. I think that it is
accurate to say that we are literally ``inventing the wheel'' as we
respond to the anthrax contamination on Capitol Hill. I hope that EPA
and OSTP can shed some more light on what has occurred and what lessons
have been learned from the experience on the Hill and other sites
across the Nation.
From these lessons learned, I hope that the Federal government
develops a systematic and uniform approach to respond to anthrax or any
contamination. I am hopeful that any approach will result in
substantial reduced risk to public health as well as minimal disruption
to business as usual. I also commend President Bush for addressing the
importance of coordinating the Federal government's anti-terrorism
efforts by establishing the Office of Homeland Security. I would like
to hear about EPA and OSTP's experiences in working with this new
office.
We must also have the best science available and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy should be a key player in coordinating
this work. OSTP has the unique mission of being able to pull together
the scientific expertise and knowledge from the appropriate Federal
agencies to ensure that we understand all of the implications of
biological and chemical agents and how to adequately remediate these
agents.
As the Chair noted, there are a number of Federal agencies
currently involved in the consequence management of the anthrax
exposure at the D.C. Brentwood postal facility and the Senate Hart
Building. The current lines of authority are beginning to look almost
as confusing as the old Clinton health care plan. I know that
interagency efforts can sometimes be as easy as building a bridge to
Hawaii but the events of September 11 will hopefully break down the old
turf battles that too often exist. And while we are committed to
ensuring that the Federal government has the adequate resources to
prevent, prepare, and respond to terrorist attacks, we must have a
well-coordinated approach so that the roles and responsibilities of
each appropriate agency is clearly defined.
Before I close, I would like to recognize the hard work and
pressure that the EPA staff have been subjected to in dealing with the
anthrax problems here on Capitol Hill. Specifically, I want to thank
two key EPA staff, Richard Rupert, the On-Scene Coordinator, and Thomas
Voltaggio, the Deputy Regional Administrator of Region 3. Many of my
colleagues are anxious to get back in their Hart offices so I know that
you are under a lot of pressure. But, I want you to know that I
appreciate your efforts in ensuring that we decontaminate the building
the right way to ensure the maximum workplace safety and not purely for
expedience sake.
Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. Senator Stevens, would you like to----
Senator Stevens. No, I do not have any questions. I hope
when Senator Bond starts his bridge to Hawaii, though, he
starts from the Aleutian Chain. It would be a shorter distance,
you know.
Thank you very much. Nice to see you.
Senator Mikulski. Having had these opening remarks, then
Administrator Whitman, why don't you go first, and then we will
hear from Dr. Marburger, and then we will open it up for
questions according to our usual rules of engagement.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN
Ms. Whitman. Fine, and thank you, Madam Chair and members
of the subcommittee. I have, with your permission, a lengthier
written statement that I would like to submit for the record,
and to say that since September 11 the Environmental Protection
Agency has seen its longstanding mission to protect the public
environment and public health take on renewed sense of urgency
and some new meaning.
Under the provisions of the Presidential decision directive
number 62, which was signed back in 1998, EPA is assigned the
lead responsibility for cleaning up buildings and other sites
contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a result of
acts of terrorism. This responsibility draws, obviously, on our
decades of experience in cleaning up sites contaminated by
toxins through prior practices or accidents. Our role at a site
generally begins with the Centers for Disease Control
determining the presence of a contaminant that poses an
unacceptable risk to human health.
Once the decision is made to decontaminate a building, CDC
also has the responsibility of defining how clean is clean. We
rely on them to determine the extent to which a building must
be clean to make it safe for reoccupancy. The sites themselves,
of course, are under the control of the incident commander,
usually someone from the local response team.
With respect to the cleanup of those places that have been
found to be contaminated by anthrax, several different
approaches have been taken as Senator Bond has alluded to. The
Postal Service, for example, has hired qualified contractors to
perform the cleanup, the decontamination of their facilities,
as did several of the media organizations. In these cases, EPA
has provided technical assistance to those who are actually
doing the cleanup work.
Here on Capitol Hill, we have been asked by the Senate
Sergeant at Arms, who is serving as your incident commander, to
undertake the cleanup of the Hart Senate Office Building, just
as we were asked by the Clerk of the House, who serves as their
incident commander, to fulfill that function on the House side.
As you know, the cleanup of the Hart Building poses a far
greater challenge, and the most extensive cleanup for anthrax
that has ever been undertaken in a building. To meet this
unprecedented situation, our cleanup experts have been drawing
on their years of expertise and experience, on the talents of
scientists and industry, and academia, and on the knowledge
available from our Federal partners to devise the right plan
for the Hart Building.
As we seek to apply the lessons we have learned from all of
the decontamination efforts from the simplest to the most
complex, and there always will be that variety in the response,
one thing has become quite clear, and that is that one size
will not fit all. Each event has to be thoroughly analyzed as a
separate case before we can propose an effective solution. For
example, decontaminating or cleaning a facility that contains
rugged heavy equipment can be accomplished using foams or
liquids, methods that the contents of the building can stand up
to.
On the other hand, a facility that contains a lot of paper,
office furniture, and electronic equipment needs to be cleaned
up using a different method, such as fumigation, that will not
damage the contents in a way that a liquid or a foam solution
would.
Other factors, such as the amount of the contaminant found,
the ways and extent to which it can be dispersed throughout the
building, the nature of the surrounding area, and the ways in
which the building is used, all require added consideration
before proceeding with decontamination. That is why it is
taking more time to address the Hart Building decontamination
than any of us, believe me, would like.
Because of the size and scope of this particular challenge,
it is vitally important that we use the best science available,
that we take the time to do it right, and that we assure that
we are advancing our knowledge base as part of our effort. Of
course, while we are all hopeful that the information that we
are gaining about cleaning larger buildings contaminated by
anthrax will never have to be used again--I think we all are
certainly praying for that--we must proceed as if it will, and
I take the Senator's point on that. That is why there are two
specific things that I would ask you to consider in the future
as ways that you can help us.
The first concerns indemnifying the contractors that EPA
hires to perform the actual cleanup. We spent a great deal of
time in recent days, over the Thanksgiving holiday
particularly, working to provide the contractors we are hiring
to perform the Hart decontamination with sufficient protection
from liability should something unexpected occur during the
course of that cleanup.
After a lot of hard work, we have now worked that issue
out. I believe it was finalized yesterday, but it should not
have been as difficult as it became for us. EPA's current
indemnification authority under CERCLA is not adequate to meet
the needs resulting from acts of terrorism. That is why it
would be helpful in the future if EPA's indemnification
authority could be extended to meet responses to domestic
terrorism activities or acts as a separate category for us.
The second issue where I would like to ask for your help
concerns EPA's ability to recover costs from cleanup.
Currently, EPA can recover costs from performing the cleanup of
a hazardous substance. This authority, however, does not extend
to biological agents or various other pollutants that could be
used in a terrorist act.
Giving EPA the ability to recover those costs in those
instances would remove one more issue from the table, as we
enter into the cleanup efforts, and enable us to move forward a
little more rapidly, and I want to point out this has not been
an issue with the Hart Building. The Senate has indicated that
they would pay us for that from the beginning, and we are very
grateful for that. We appreciate that.
Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee, I thank you
again for the opportunity to meet with you here today, and look
forward to answering any questions that you might have on these
issues.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christine Todd Whitman
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to describe the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
role in combating bioterrorism: specifically, the role in the
decontamination of anthrax in buildings as part of the Agency's overall
mission to protect human health and the environment. I am pleased to
say that EPA's efforts to meet its counterterrorism obligations are
consistent with the President's statement that combating terrorism and
protecting the nation's critical infrastructures are a high priority
for his administration.
There are several Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that
specify a role for EPA in counter terrorism activities. PDD 39 assigned
EPA the task of assisting the FBI during crisis management in threat
assessments and determining the type of hazards associated with
releases or potential releases of materials in a terrorist incident.
EPA, as the lead agency for Hazardous Materials Response under
Emergency Support Function (ESF) 10 of the Federal Response Plan, is
also assigned to assist the Federal Emergency Management Agency, during
consequence management with environmental monitoring, decontamination,
and long-term site cleanup. PDD 62 reinforces our mission to enhance
the nation's capabilities to respond to terrorist events. PDD 63 which
addresses the protection of America's critical infrastructure, named
EPA the lead agency for the Water Supply Sector.
Under the provisions of PDD 62, signed by President Clinton in
1998, the EPA is assigned lead responsibility for cleaning up buildings
and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a
result of an act of terrorism. This responsibility draws on our decades
of experience in cleaning up sites contaminated by toxins through prior
practices or accidents.
Working with our Federal partners, private sector experts, and
drawing upon our considerable in-house expertise, EPA has been
developing new methods and protocols, and standard operating procedures
to deal with this new threat to the health and safety of the American
people. And we have been doing so on a real-time basis. The speed of
our response, however, has not been at the expense of sound science.
Indeed, a team of science experts has been integral to our daily
activities.
epa's role in buildings contaminated with anthrax
Our cleanup experts have been drawing on their years of expertise
and experience, on the talents of scientists in industry and academia,
and on the knowledge available from our Federal partners. Similar
analysis informed the cleanups undertaken at the several postal
facilities and media offices, although since they were of a much
smaller scope, they were more readily addressed.
Our role at a site generally begins after the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) has tested to determine the presence of a
threat and the risk that threat poses to human health. Once a decision
is made to decontaminate a building, CDC also has the responsibility of
defining: ``How clean is clean?'' They have the medical knowledge and
expertise--as well as the responsibility under PDD 62--to determine the
levels to which a building must be cleaned before being judged safe for
reoccupancy.
EPA staff has provided expert technical advice to facility managers
throughout the country on issues such as sampling plans, worker safety
and actual site cleanup methods.
This role is a natural fit for EPA's on-scene coordinators,
managers who are experienced in assessing contamination in structures,
soil, water and air-handling systems. On-scene coordinators have
considerable experience at sorting out hazards, quantifying risks,
planning and implementing emergency cleanups, and coordinating among
other agencies, State and local government, and the private sector.
EPA employees are working at the direction of the incident
commanders from other Federal agencies, and report to the U.S. Postal
Service and the Sergeant at Arms in the Capitol.
In addition to the activity generated by testing and cleaning,
these sites are also being treated as crime scenes. That is why our
Criminal Investigative Division has been working closely with the FBI
and with local and State law enforcement agencies at the various
contaminated sites. We are assisting the FBI in gathering evidence to
identify the criminals responsible for terrorist attacks.
As we seek to apply the lessons we're learning from all our
decontamination efforts one thing is becoming clear--there's no one
size fits all solution. Each event has to be thoroughly analyzed as a
separate case before we can propose an effective solution.
For example, cleaning a facility that largely contains rugged,
heavy equipment can be accomplished using such methods as foam or
liquid chlorine dioxide--methods that the contents of the building can
stand up to. On the other hand, a facility that contains lots of paper,
office furniture, and electronic equipment needs to be cleaned using
another method--such as fumigation--that won't damage the contents in
the way a liquid would.
Other factors, such as the amount of contamination found, the ways
and extent to which it can be dispersed throughout a building, the
nature of the surrounding area, and the ways in which the building is
used all require additional consideration before proceeding with
decontamination.
The first step in remediating a building is just like the first
step in any cleanup operation and that is to determine the potential
for risk to human health. Anthrax is a known threat to human health,
but the literature is scant on the number of spores that a person must
be exposed to before developing inhalational disease.
The health team that has come together to help us establish the
parameters for defining the extent of contamination and providing
direct health advice to affected individuals has involved a wide array
of experts. The Congress's own Office of the Attending Physician has
played a central role in providing direct medical advice to the people
who work in the affected buildings. The CDC in the Department of Health
and Human Services (in particular the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) within CDC) have provided world-
class expertise. The Department of Defense, including the U.S. Army's
CHPPM group has special expertise because of the potential that anthrax
would be used as a biological weapon in a war setting. OSHA has been
helpful in determining appropriate safety measures both for the people
who work in the buildings and also for the extensive remediation crews
that are at work here. The District of Columbia's Department of Health
as well as their State counterparts, Maryland's Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene, have been consulted regularly. And EPA's own in-
house expertise including toxicologists from as far away as our Denver
office and safety officers from our own nearby Ft. Meade laboratory
have also played a vital role.
Together this group of experts has reached consensus on when
cleanup activities are warranted, and they have also formed a team to
review final cleanup data to make a determination that the buildings
will be safe to reoccupy.
remediation strategies
While we have developed extraordinarily strong working
relationships with numerous partners in developing the appropriate
health and safety standards and in conducting our sampling work, it is
in the area of actual remediation efforts that our collaborations have
been the most broad-based.
The full array of Federal agencies with expertise in remediation
strategies has been involved in helping develop the tools we need to
deal with anthrax contamination. These include, of course, the various
components of the Department of Defense and a number of health agencies
out of the Department of Health and Human Services. We have consulted
with the White House's Office of Science Technology Policy. Indeed, the
President's science advisor has been at the Incident Command Center,
providing a key link to this Federal government-wide response.
At EPA, our Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, the
Office of Pesticides, our Emergency Response Team out of Edison, NJ,
the Emergency Operations Center here in Washington, and the legion of
responders from across the country led by our folks from Region III,
have all played important roles in the cleanup effort.
A number of liquid and foam applications are effective at actually
killing spores. Sandia Foam is a patented product, developed by the
Sandia Labs, that we have been able to use on a number of surfaces.
Similarly, chlorine dioxide in a liquid form, has been an extremely
effective sporocide. We know these techniques work because we have used
them in a number of areas. To address airborne particles, HEPA (high
efficiency particulate air) filter vacuums are able to capture
particles down to less than one-half micron in size. After the
remediation effort is complete, we have resampled these areas and they
have come back clean.
The tools in our toolbox are growing rapidly. Each method, though,
will have to prove its effectiveness before we add it to our Standard
Operating Procedures. And that proof will come from confirmation
samples that are taken after remediation is complete and come back
demonstrating no threat to human health.
epa's counterterrorism incident response activities
As EPA continues to strengthen its counter-terrorism (CT) program
by building on the existing national response system for hazardous
materials (hazmat) prevention, preparedness, and response, the Agency
is involved in a variety of activities with Federal, State, and local
officials that include: responding to terrorism threats; pre-deploying
for special events; planning, coordination, and outreach; and training
and exercises. Most recently, EPA was asked to chair the Security and
Safety of U.S. Facilities Group of the National Security Council's
Policy Coordinating Committee for Counterterrorism and National
Preparedness.
EPA established and maintains a National Incident Coordination Team
(NICT) to assure full agency coordination of all emergency preparedness
and response activities including counter terrorism. In the regions,
the Agency's first responders are the On-Scene Coordinators (or OSCs).
The OSCs have been actively involved with local, State, and Federal
authorities in preparing for and responding to threats of terrorism.
EPA's OSCs, located throughout the United
States, have broad response authority and a proven record of
success in responding rapidly to emergency situations.
registration of products
Another principal responsibility of EPA's in anthrax
decontamination is to ensure that the chemicals used to treat anthrax
spores are efficacious and safe. EPA is responsible for registering
pesticides, including these antimicrobial products used to treat
anthrax spores, prior to their marketing in the U.S.
Before issuing a pesticide registration, the Agency reviews a
significant body of data to determine whether use of that pesticide
will result in unreasonable adverse effects to humans or the
environment. These data can include information on short- and long-term
toxic effects and examine the potential for exposure under expected
application scenarios. For pesticides that have public health uses,
such as those used on anthrax spores, EPA also critically evaluates
their efficacy. Under emergency conditions, EPA may allow a new use of
a previously registered pesticide or use of an unregistered pesticide
where the Agency has sufficient data to make a safety finding. These
decisions can often be made quickly, based on the data that EPA
receives and reviews.
Responding to the anthrax contamination has presented some unique
challenges to our pesticides program. For example, currently there are
no registered pesticides approved for use against anthrax. Since the
beginning of the anthrax-contamination events, EPA has been working
hard to identify and evaluate existing pesticide products that are
sporicidal, that is, those that kill spore-forming bacteria, even
though such products may not have been tested on anthrax per se. Since
October, the Agency has approved two pesticides for treating anthrax
spores under emergency exemption provisions of existing pesticide
laws--the aqueous solution of chlorine dioxide and a foam used to treat
anthrax-contaminated surfaces. We have identified several potential
chemicals and new technologies which may be effective against anthrax.
The Agency continues to work closely with other Federal agencies,
emergency response teams, and independent experts to develop effective
remediation tools. On the basis of site specific information, EPA
recommends proper methods of decontamination including which
antimicrobial or other substances will be used. EPA has also
established a hotline for venders who believe they have products that
could effectively treat anthrax and has begun daily briefings to
establish routine communication between on-site personnel and key
centers within the Agency who oversee and/or support them. EPA
laboratories are assisting in testing samples from potentially
contaminated sites and the evaluation of antimicrobial products for
effectiveness against anthrax has been made a top priority. In
addition, EPA is using its experience in this situation to develop
approaches to handling future biological and chemical exposures should
they occur.
conclusion
September 11 has changed the world in which we live. EPA continues
to rely on sound science and effective treatment techniques to address
the threat of anthrax contamination in some of our nation's buildings.
We are proud to be a part of a massive public-private effort to meet
the challenges of this new world.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would
be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Senator Mikulski. Well, thank you very much. That was a lot
in a very short time.
Dr. Marburger, would you please proceed, and again you have
covered a wonderful scientific background. We can see why the
President has chosen you. Of course, you grew up in Maryland.
A degree from Princeton, applied physics at Stanford, you
have been the Director of the Brookhaven National Lab, you are
the third president of SUNY at Stonybrook, you had many
distinguished scientific awards, your peers have high regard
for you, you are recognized for your own scientific research,
and then of course you headed up a Federal lab, so we welcome
you and look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Dr. Marburger. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is a
delight for me to be here, because I think the actions that
have occurred in the aftermath of these terrible incidents have
demonstrated the capabilities of the Federal agencies to
respond quickly and effectively. Despite the occasional
appearance of spaghetti organization charts we communicate
frequently, and effectively, and I think we have a good story
to tell.
The contamination problem has two parts. One is the
decontamination of buildings, and the other is the sanitization
of the mail itself, which is the source of the contamination,
of course, and whereas EPA has focused on the building issue,
which is extremely difficult, we have been providing support
for the U.S. Postal Service and others regarding the mail.
I have a fairly long statement that I leave with you, but I
would like to go through parts of it because I think it shows
as a case study, as it were, just how the process works.
First, the charge from homeland security. At the end of
October I was called by Governor Ridge to take charge of
technical issues surrounding the treatment of the mail that was
contaminated in the Brentwood facilities, and the next day, the
day following his call, I managed to convene an interagency
meeting with chief science officials and the Postal Service,
and there were dozens of agencies that responded, to ascertain
the technical issues that the Postal Service was encountering.
It was a roundtable sort of discussion, and through this
process a technical task force on mail security was
established.
The U.S. Postal Service did welcome the technical advice of
OSTP, as they had been previously interacting with multiple
individual agencies on an ad hoc basis, so on October 30, the
next day after the phone call, I convened the task force
meeting and determined during the discussion that we simply did
not have all the information needed to make a decision about
the irradiation process in the Lima, Ohio, facility.
Despite the fact that the U.S. Postal Service already had
contracted for exclusive use of this facility for 6 months, I
recommended the formation of an interagency technical team, a
subset of the agencies that responded to the initial call, to
go to the facility in Ohio in order to test whether this
process was sufficient to rid the mail of bacterial
contamination.
A team was formed that day, and consisted of scientific
experts from the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute,
AFRRI, an exceptional small but effective institute, National
Institutes of Standards and Technology, NIST, United States
Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, and we
had others on call as needed.
The team met the following day and assembled two test boxes
that would be used to measure the amount of radiation received,
and whether it would kill the bacterial contaminants, and I
describe those boxes in detail in my statement.
The first box was taken with the team to Lima, and the
second box was loaded at Brentwood and sent to Lima by one of
the mail trailers that was in the stream. It was marked so that
we could identify it later.
A representative from the Postal Service was there,
accompanied the technical team on their November 1 trip. This
facility uses electron beam of radiation. The test revealed
that the radiation dosage was in a range that exceeded, far
exceeded the minimum needed to kill bacillus spores. These
spores have similar characteristics as far as their response to
radiation is concerned, so we did not feel it was necessary to
use live anthrax in order to perform this test. It would have
exposed the workers in that facility to hazard at any rate.
The simulant of the bacillus globigii was cultured over a
standard 2-week period. The only way that you can tell whether
you have killed it or not is to try to grow it in a broth, as
it were. There is another, faster method for detecting anthrax,
which is so-called polymerase chain reaction, but it can
respond to dead anthrax as well as to live anthrax, possibly
important to know that, so the only way that you can tell if
you have killed it is by culturing it over a period of time.
The same process was used for the second test box with the
same results. That is, after 2 weeks, no bacterial colonies
were grown. There was no bacteria there to produce, and that is
how you tell if you have killed it. This demonstrated that the
Lima facility was using an irradiation protocol capable of
delivering a dose of radiation lethal to bacteria.
The unanimous recommendation of the technical team--which,
by the way, examined the entire process, from delivery into the
plant through the detailed circulation of the boxes under the
e-beams. They were rotated in several directions, they measured
the pattern of radiation within the boxes, and various means.
The unanimous recommendation of the team that did that was to
release the letters that had been irradiated at the Lima
facility, and based on this recommendation, the Postal Service
did initiate the delivery of the letters quarantined at the
Brentwood facility and processed through Lima.
Irradiation was chosen in the first place by the U.S.
Postal Service because it is a proven technology, it has been
used in the food industry to sanitize--and also to sanitize
medical equipment, and prosthetic devices that are implanted in
the human body. It has been used for decades. There is a
regulatory history of the process. There are standards for the
equipment that is used and, of course, other technologies may
be promising for the future, but currently irradiation appears
to be the best immediate option.
There are some side effects. One has to understand that the
radiation not only kills anthrax, but it also may alter
specimens used for medical diagnoses that might be sent through
the mail. Film would be exposed, certain other substances are
affected. It is unlikely that these items would be contained in
the type of letters that are currently being delivered first
class mail, but they may be contained in the packages that are
yet to be irradiated.
There are other technologies that have been proposed and
could be used in the future. I indicate them in the next
paragraph of my statement. I will pass over those to make this
shorter.
At the same time that we formed the team and sent it to the
Lima facility and sent it to other facilities, we established
three interagency working groups under OSTP to continue the
work started by the technical task force. They include an
irradiation process and quality assurance group, detection and
monitoring group, and a group on long-term issues. The first
includes scientific experts representing DOD, AFRRI, the
previous facility that I mentioned, NIST, FDA, and USDA, and
this team has presented numerous interagency briefings to
assure dissemination of their test results and their approach.
I might add that we have had excellent cooperation from all
the agencies that have been contacted. They work with us well,
and I am very pleased at the speed of the response.
The detection and monitoring group is chaired by the DOD
DARPA agency, and includes CIA, Office of the Vice President,
Department of Energy, U.S. Postal Service, the Armed Forces
Radiological Research Institute, NIOSH, Department of Defense,
and so forth, and also consults with outside experts. They are
collecting information on the efficacy and utility of existing
technology for detecting microorganisms as they might be
encountered in the mail-handling process.
The third group will take findings from the first two and
determine whether any issues have been overlooked.
OSTP is also working closely with the National Academies of
Science, which has graciously volunteered the extensive
knowledge base of its membership in evaluating options for
ensuring mail security.
An overarching goal for all of the initiatives I have
described is coordination of the activities of all of those who
can contribute to ensuring that our mail is safe, drawing upon
the technical expertise housed in our science and technology
agencies, making sure that relevant information and test
results are disseminated to the appropriate parties, and
preventing duplication of effort.
I have been very impressed during this period with the
breadth and the depth of scientific and technical resources
available within the Federal Government to address these major
challenges, great as they are, but I am just as certain that
those resources cannot be used to their greatest effect unless
we join forces and resolve the technical issues together, and
at this point I see no evidence of resistance or turf battles
that might impede this effort.
I might add, finally, that our interaction with the Office
of Homeland Security, their staff, Governor Ridge, has been
absolutely first-rate. I regard these activities as having been
performed in support of the Office of Homeland Security, and
the actions that we have taken are taken on their behalf.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John H. Marburger
Good afternoon Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. It is
a pleasure to be here today to testify on the issue of anthrax
decontamination. OSTP has played significant role in the mail security
issue and I am happy to detail those efforts for you.
charge from homeland security
In the fourth week of October, I was called by Governor Ridge to
take charge of the technical issues surrounding treatment of the mail
contaminated at the Brentwood, D.C., and Trenton, N.J., postal
facilities. The next day I convened an interagency meeting with chief
science officials and the Postal Service to ascertain the technical
issues that the Postal Service was encountering. Through this process a
technical task force on mail security was established.
formation of technical team
The U.S. Postal Service welcomed the technical advice of OSTP as
they had been interacting with multiple individual agencies on an ad
hoc basis. On October 30, I convened an interagency task force meeting
regarding the issue of mail security. I determined during the
discussion that we did not have all the information needed to make a
decision about the irradiation process at the Lima, Ohio facility.
Despite the fact that the U.S. Postal Service already had contracted
for exclusive use of this facility for six months, I recommended the
formation of an interagency technical team to go to the Lima facility
in order to test whether the irradiation process was sufficient to rid
the mail of bacterial contamination.
A team was formed that day and consisted of scientific experts from
the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), United States Department
of Agriculture, and Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The team met
the following day and assembled two test boxes that would be used to
measure the amount of radiation received and the killing of bacterial
contaminants.
The test boxes consisted of a mail package identical to the ones
packed at the Brentwood post office and sent to the Lima, Ohio
facility. It contained non-disease causing dry bacterial spore powder
of Bacillus globigii (glo-bee-gee-I), very similar to the Bacillus
anthracis that was found in the ``Daschle'' letter, and dosimeters that
measure the dose of irradiation. The first test box consisted mainly of
paper and lightweight materials with nothing that would perturb the
radiation dose distribution. A second box was prepared and loaded with
many irregular objects--metal, CDs, coins--in addition to spores and
dosimeters, to see if they have an effect on the killing of bacterial
spores.
The first test box was taken with the technical team to Lima and
the second test box was loaded at Brentwood and sent to Lima by one of
the mail trailers. It was discreetly marked so it could be identified
and tested after the irradiation process.
testing of irradiation facilities
A representative from the U.S. Postal Service accompanied the
technical team on the November 1 trip to Lima. The Lima facility uses
electronic beam irradiation and the test revealed that the radiation
dosage was in a range that exceeded the minimum needed to kill
Bacillus--spores. The simulant, Bacillus globigii, was cultured over a
standard two-week period and no bacterial colonies were grown. The same
process was used for the second test box with the same results. This
demonstrated that the Lima facility was using an irradiation protocol
capable of delivering a dose of radiation lethal to bacteria. The
unanimous recommendation of the technical team was to release the
letters that had been irradiated at the Lima facility. Based upon this
recommendation, the U.S. Postal Service initiated delivery of the
letters quarantined at the Brentwood facility and processed through
Lima.
The U.S. Postal Service contracted with another irradiation
company, IBA, to use its facility in Bridgeport, New Jersey. This
facility contains electronic beam (e-beam) irradiation equipment as
well as x-ray irradiation equipment. At this time only the e-beam
technology is operational. On November 16, the technical team drove to
Bridgeport to test a box of letters in much the same way that the Lima
facility was tested. It is important to test these facilities
separately as their processes differ.
On November 21, the technical team went back to the Lima facility
in order to test ``flats'' which are the typical 8\1/2\ 11
envelopes. It is anticipated that by the first of the year the x-ray
equipment at Bridgeport should be operational. At that time, the
technical team will be able to test the irradiation of packages. X-ray
irradiation may prove to be the preferred option for packages because
x-rays penetrate better than e-beam irradiation.
Irradiation was chosen because it is a proven technology and has
been used in the food industry and to sanitize medical equipment for
decades. Other technologies may be promising for the future but
irradiation is the best immediate option.
side effects of irradiation
The contaminated mail from Brentwood and Trenton must be treated
prior to delivery. This mail includes letters, flats, and packages.
Several items will be adversely affected by the dose of radiation that
is needed to kill bacteria. These include: medical specimens, including
fecal and blood; drugs; test kits; electronic equipment; film; food;
eyeglasses and contact lenses. Although it is unlikely that these items
would be contained in the letters that are currently being delivered,
they may be contained in the packages that are yet to be irradiated.
other technologies
Other technologies have been proposed as alternatives or
supplements to irradiation, include heat treatment and chemical
fumigation. Heat treatment seems unlikely to provide a solution for
large amounts of mail, since the target temperature is well over 300
degrees Fahrenheit, which could result in damage to many mailed items.
Within the realm of chemical treatment, OSTP is coordinating with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Justice (DoJ)
to explore the use of chlorine dioxide and ethylene oxide as
alternatives or supplements to irradiation. These technologies have
promise but need more extensive research and testing before they can
become a viable option for treating mail. Specifically, we need to know
more about how well these chemicals penetrate the mail and kill
dangerous organisms, the speed at which this treatment can occur, and
the safety of these chemicals both during treatment and during
subsequent handling of the mail. These treatments probably will not
solve the problem of routine bulk mail treatment, but may be useful in
certain specific situations.
mail security working groups
OSTP established three interagency working groups to continue the
work started by the technical task force. The working groups include:
(1) Irradiation Process and Quality Assurance; (2) Detection and
Monitoring; and (3) Long-term Issues. The first group includes
scientific experts representing DOD/AFRRI, NIST, FDA and USDA. This is
the team that has site-visited the irradiation facilities, consulted
frequently with the U.S. Postal Service, and presented numerous
interagency briefings to ensure dissemination of their test results.
The Detection and Monitoring group is chaired by the DOD Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and includes CIA, Office of
the Vice President, Department of Energy, USPS, AFRRI, NIOSH, DOD/JPBIO
and consults with outside experts. They are collecting information on
the efficacy and utility of existing technology for detection of
microorganisms as they might be encountered in the mail handling
process. The third group will take the findings from the first two
groups and determine whether any issues have been overlooked.
Membership will draw from the experts in the first two groups, as well
as agencies responsible for worker and environmental health and safety,
including EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
This group will take into account the benefits and limitations of
existing technology for detecting pathogens that might enter the mail
system and processes for mail sanitization and facility
decontamination. Recommendations will be based also on new technologies
in the pipeline that may have additional benefits over currently
available methods. All of these groups will report technical findings
and recommendations to OSTP and I will then forward relevant
information to the Office of Homeland Security.
conclusion
OSTP is also working closely with the National Academies of
Science, which has graciously volunteered the extensive knowledge base
of membership in evaluating options for ensuring mail security.
An overarching goal for all of the initiatives I have described is
coordination of the activities of all those who can contribute to
ensuring that our mail is safe--drawing upon the technical expertise
housed in our science and technology agencies, making sure that
relevant information and test results are disseminated to the
appropriate parties, and preventing duplication of effort.
In the short time I have been in this position, I've been impressed
with the breadth and depth of scientific and technological resources
available within the Federal government to address the major challenges
we are facing today--great as they are. But I'm just as certain that
those resources can't be used to their greatest effect unless we join
forces and resolve the technical issues together.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECONTAMINATION
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Dr. Marburger. I
know you can go on more extensively about it, but we appreciate
that, and let me go to my first round of questions, and we are
going to follow generally the 5-minute rule, but I would like
to inquire of the chair of the full committee, Senator Stevens,
do you have to get back to a conference or anything, Senator?
Senator Bond. Hope springs eternal.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. Let me move on, then, to the questions,
and thank you for your testimony. As has been indicated, there
are a number of Federal agencies that have been involved in the
consequence management of anthrax exposure both to the Hart
Building, the Brentwood Building, and then even other
facilities that were impacted upon the mail. Initially, I
counted 10 from the FBI and DOD and FEMA, as well as to EPA and
OSTP. Then there is CDC, the National Institutes of
Occupational Safety, and I could list even more. Then we
followed long-term consequence evaluations. The CIA, the Office
of the Vice President.
Here is my first question, and perhaps you have covered it
in your testimony, Ms. Whitman. Who really is in charge of
overseeing the decontamination effort for the President, and
therefore the Nation? Who does the President turn to when
something has to be decontaminated or he wants to talk to that
person? Is that you?
Ms. Whitman. It is the site or incident commander. Here on
the Hill it is the Sergeant of Arms, for the post office
buildings it is the Post Office. It is generally the local or
State first responder, it is the person who has the primary
responsibility and makes the determinations. We act in support
of that. Obviously, we coordinate everything through the Office
of Homeland Security and Governor Ridge.
Senator Mikulski. Let me back up. When the President of the
United States needs to turn to crisis management, and let us
say, like the terrible thing that happened in New York, FEMA is
in charge of the consequence management, the FBI in terms of
the crisis management in law enforcement. When you say, who is
in charge of decontamination, and you say it is the incident
responder, well, that could be 100.
In other words, thank God this happened in very limited,
but nevertheless significant institutions, but this could have
happened in 100 different places. 100 different people cannot
be in charge. Who is in charge for the United States of America
in overseeing the decontamination effort, the best science, the
best methodologies, the coordination of determining the
criteria on how clean is safe?
Ms. Whitman. Well, the coordinator of the overall
responder, the person with the overall responsibility would be
the Office of Homeland Security. Governor Ridge would be who we
would work with, but on-site, it is the site coordinator, it is
the first responder. That is the way that FEMA is set up, that
is the way that emergency response has been set up in this
country, that it is the State or local government, or the local
on-site coordinator, as I say. For the Hill here it has been
the Sergeant at Arms at either the Senate or the House. They
have been the ones who have called in the responders, and to
whom we provide information and support.
EPA DECONTAMINATION RESPONSIBILITY
Senator Mikulski. So who does--I understand from your
testimony on page 2 that you said under the Presidential
decision directive 62 of President Clinton, you have been
assigned the lead responsibility for cleaning up buildings and
other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a
result of terrorism, right? Does that mean that you are in
charge?
Ms. Whitman. That means that we are responsible for
overseeing that cleanup, but the building itself is still the
responsibility of the incident coordinator on-scene. They have
control of the building.
Senator Mikulski. Who is in charge of the process, not the
building? Who is in charge of the process?
Ms. Whitman. Again, what happens is that we will provide
the incident coordinator with the recommendations as to what
processes are to be used, unless and until they turn the
building over to us for the decontamination.
ostp responsibility
Senator Mikulski. Well, Dr. Marburger, my understanding of
PDD 62 is that Governor Whitman is in charge, but I was
somewhat surprised the day that we listened to testimony from
John Potter, the Postmaster General, when I said who is in
charge of decontamination, he named you. So you see, this is
part of my point, that we have essentially what looks like a
very fragmented system that--both of you tried to respond as
ably as you can, but we have an enormously fragmented system.
What were you in charge of? Were you in charge of the mail
as directed, and then Potter said--I said, well, who put
Marburger in charge, with all due respect, and he said, Tom
Ridge, so--and I wondered, well, what did that mean for
Christie Todd Whitman, so what were you in charge of? Were you
in charge of the mail?
Dr. Marburger. Yes. Let me explain how I interpret Mr.
Potter's remarks. The Office of Science and Technology Policy
is not an agency that has line responsibility. We are a
coordinating agency. We provide technical support to agencies,
and interagency coordination of programs that may cut across
agencies, and in general we do not become involved in
organizations that have the scientific expertise of their own
to do their missions, but we primarily focus on cross-cutting
issues.
In this case, it is my understanding that the U.S. Postal
Service, as a quasi government agency, did not have direct
access to scientific expertise that was necessary to evaluate
the effectiveness of the specific sanitization process that
they were planning to use on the mail, and Governor Ridge, who
was coordinating the response to the mail incidents, called on
us, OSTP, to arrange to provide technical support to the U.S.
Postal Service. He did that as part of his responsibility, and
as part of my responsibility I got the people together,
contacted the appropriate agencies and provided advice only. I
was not in charge. I provided advice to the U.S. Postal
Service. They could take that advice or ignore it.
Standards for Anthrax Decontamination
Senator Mikulski. I appreciate that. Let me go, then--
because you see, this is part of, I think the confusion that we
face. Let us go now to the science, because again I am talking
about who oversees the process? Governor Whitman on many
occasions has espoused her allegiance to sound science, and we
really thank her for that. We have been through some tough
issues.
But who is in charge of determining what is the best
science for both the cleanup, and then also for determining the
standard by which we can talk about the reentry of buildings,
meaning, how clean is safe, and Governor Whitman, would you
respond to that, and then of course there are the long-term
issues.
Ms. Whitman. Ultimately, on the determination of when a
building is safe to reoccupy, is the responsibility of the CDC.
That is who we look to. We will go in and do testing after the
decontamination, and share our results with them. We share our
results with them all the way through and work with them,
obviously all the way through, but that would be their decision
as to what is safe, when it is safe to reoccupy a building.
Senator Mikulski. Have they established a criteria?
Ms. Whitman. We are looking at this point at a criteria
that would have no anthrax, no viable anthrax spores. You will
have the spores if you decontaminate appropriately, but they
will be dead. The DNA will be killed, and that is what we want
to ascertain, that the DNA is killed, and that is up to them.
Senator Mikulski. Let me be clear, is this a goal of kind
of zero tolerance for anthrax spores, or is this a standard?
Ms. Whitman. This is a goal. It is my understanding with
CDC, that this is a goal. At this point in time, I do not know
of any science that tells us there is a background level for
anthrax in urban areas or in buildings. On the farm, in the
land, yes, there is. We know there is anthrax occurring, but
not at a background level. One should not expect a background
level.
Senator Mikulski. Let me reaffirm this. In order for
Federal employees to return to either the Hart Building or our
postal workers to return to Brentwood--remember, we want to
have the same rigor, and stand sentry over these buildings not
only for those at the Capitol, but for those postal workers,
that every single aspect of those buildings will have zero
anthrax.
Ms. Whitman. That is what we are hoping to achieve.
Senator Mikulski. And if you do not, does that mean we
cannot go back, and that they cannot go back?
Ms. Whitman. That, again, is going to be the determination
of the CDC. That is their responsibility to decide.
Senator Mikulski. Have they, then, determined that?
Ms. Whitman. The Centers for Disease Control, do we have
anything new beyond what they have said originally?
Senator Mikulski. And I know Dr. Copland is not here, but--
--
Ms. Whitman. At the moment, it is zero.
Senator Mikulski. But you see, again, I am coming back----
Ms. Whitman. There has been some discussion, I have heard
some discussion earlier, or heard it said that there might be a
feeling that in fact there are levels at which it does not pose
a significant human health risk, but that is not our
determination to make. We rely on the Center for Disease
Control.
Senator Mikulski. You rely on the Centers for Disease
Control.
Ms. Whitman. To make that determination.
Senator Mikulski. First of all, what you are saying is,
they do not have a standard. They have a goal.
Ms. Whitman. Well, right now it is zero.
Senator Mikulski. They have a goal, and they have a
feeling. They have a goal, and they have a feeling, which I
think presents enormous problems.
Ms. Whitman. Well, it is not--Senator, with all respect, I
just want to be very clear. I really cannot speak for them. We
are operating now with the understanding from them and with
them that we are seeking zero levels of anthrax as a result of
the cleanup.
Senator Mikulski. Bear with me. In other words, their
people are saying, oh, you are going to be back in the Hart
after Christmas. You are going to be back in the Hart on New
Year's Eve. You are going to be--and then if we are talking
about zero, and we are saying that is the goal, that is the
current goal, because there seems to be a lack of certainty
about whether that is the appropriate goal, and I am not
arguing.
Ms. Whitman. No, I hear what you are saying.
Senator Mikulski. I am just saying that. I think that
presents very serious issues. I am not saying go back and for
it not to be zero, but there is a strong difference between
goals and very clear standards. When you have to clean up
Superfund sites, when you have to clean up brownfield sites,
when you set standards for indoor air quality, you have
standards and criteria as well as goals and objectives. They
are two different things, so I am troubled by the absence of
criteria, knowing that we are uncharted territory and breaking
new ground, but is that not part of the problem?
Ms. Whitman. Well, I think that is it. You have absolutely
hit on it. This is something new. We have not had to deal with
it in this kind of a situation before. It was never
anticipated, so I can only assume that that is why there is not
a clear standard, but we are shooting for the goal of zero live
anthrax or DNA, viable DNA, after the cleanup.
Senator Mikulski. So if I said to you, what would it take
for us to be able to return to either Hart or the Postal Office
workers to return to Brentwood, you would say a zero presence
of anthrax.
Ms. Whitman. Of viable DNA, yes, anthrax.
Senator Mikulski. My time is up. Senator Bond.
ANTHRAX IN RUSSELL BUILDING
Senator Bond. I am very disturbed by the answers we just
had, because this looks to me like a real disaster. I do not
know anything in nature that is absolutely perfect, and when we
have dealt with cleanup in the past, I thought we have always
had established a standard of what is dangerous and what is not
harmful, and is it your understanding, Governor Whitman, that
there was some incidental anthrax found in the Russell Building
but we were permitted to stay open because it was found to be
medically insignificant?
Ms. Whitman. The determination to stay open would have been
the incident commander's determination, and I know in those
buildings we were able to get in. The surfaces to be cleaned
were much less complicated than what we are facing in the Hart
Building, and those areas were cleaned and were determined to
be safe, but I know there was that discussion. That is where I
am answering the other Senator's----
Senator Bond. Could you assure anybody that there was not a
single live anthrax spore left in Russell?
Ms. Whitman. After the final cleanup we have not found any,
but we could assure them, yes, that there were no live spores.
We did not find any after the cleanup. We went in, cleaned up,
retested and cleaned up.
MAIL IRRADIATION
Senator Bond. Now, what little I have read about anthrax,
it appears that for the average person you need something like
4,000 to 5,000 airborne spores to contract inhalation anthrax.
I might ask Dr. Marburger----
Dr. Marburger. That is consistent with numbers that I have
seen.
Senator Bond. So is it consistent to assume that you could
have--that a building which somebody had walked through a
cattle ranch, through the building, perhaps with anthrax on his
or her shoes from having walked through an area where there was
livestock, cattle or sheep, is it possible that there are
backgrounds of anthrax throughout the country?
Dr. Marburger. If I could answer that question, perhaps go
to the conclusion, I am uncomfortable with having anthrax
spores in the environment, because anthrax bacillus can
multiply, unlike, let us say, chemical contamination. That is
the bad news. The good news is that it can be killed, unlike
chemical contamination, and I believe that the goal of zero
spores is under some conditions a feasible goal, because they
can be killed. They are killed in sunlight, for example, and
they are certainly--although they have not been completely
validated in all conditions, there are chemical treatments that
can kill spores.
Certainly our expectation in the mail irradiation
verification was that all spores would be killed in the
irradiated mail. The time of radiation, the amount of the
radiation to which the mail that we studied was exposed was
virtually certain to kill all the spores.
Senator Bond. How long a time was that?
Dr. Marburger. It varies with the facility, the amount of
mail, the type of irradiation. I cannot recall specifically,
but I am sure--in the types of beams that are available in the
Lima facility, several minutes of exposure would suffice.
Senator Bond. For how big a batch?
Dr. Marburger. These are for a tray of, let us say, first
class mail, about so long and so wide, about 6 inches thick.
Senator Bond. You are describing a process that could only
affect an infinitesimal amount of the mail that is shipped
through the U.S. Postal Service on a daily basis, are you not?
Dr. Marburger. It is important to understand that there are
different types of mail, some of which pose essentially no
risk. It is the anonymous part of the mail stream that is
particularly vulnerable here--the anonymous part. That is to
say, which is not picked up at a known facility and transported
under constant surveillance to the processing facility.
So I prefer not to get into exactly which part of the mail
stream is being treated in which way, but in fact I believe
that a significant fraction of the vulnerable mail could be
treated in this way.
Senator Bond. I am concerned about how we are going to deal
with this in future efforts, future actions, if this--if a
similar occurrence affects another building, and I know there
are private facilities that have been affected. Is it your
understanding, Governor Whitman, would you have an oversight
role in determining whether a facility is clean, or would this
be the CDC that would deal with a private facility?
Ms. Whitman. A private facility would hire their own
contractor. We could serve as, and we do serve as advisors to
them, and we can check the work that is being done. It would
only be under the circumstances where we felt they absolutely
were not performing, or they felt that they were overwhelmed,
that we would take a more active role there.
INDEMNIFICATION FOR CONTRACTORS, TRAINING, CHLORINE DIOXIDE TREATMENT
Senator Bond. You described the problems that the
contractor for the Hart Building has had, and you indicated
that we need to refine or expand the CERCLA indemnification for
private contractors. I trust you will be providing us the
legislative language that you wish the EPW and other committees
to consider.
Ms. Whitman. Yes. We ran into this situation with the
subcontractor of our contractor. We were able to provide the
primary contractor with indemnification. It was extending the
indemnification to a subcontractor that became problematic, and
that is where we had a lot of negotiations to do.
Senator Bond. Well, there is an article in the local paper
today that areas which have contamination of anthrax are having
difficulty finding contractors willing to clean up anthrax
contamination. If any private contractor is asked to go in to
apply a process that is still unproven, or dealing with a
biological agent that is potentially fatal, and they do not
have any assurance of any limitation on liability, I would
imagine that there would be very few contractors who would take
that on.
What kind of structure--and I would ask you and Dr.
Marburger--must we set up so that we will have private
contractors who are qualified, who understand the standards,
who would be willing to compete on a basis, knowing that there
is a reasonable standard, reasonable procedure set up, and some
form of insuring against horrendous liability if something goes
on? What do we need to do to make sure not only that we get the
governmental facilities clean, but we have private entities
that are able to take this job on for other areas where there
may be anthrax contamination?
Ms. Whitman. Well, Senator, first of all I think we will
know a lot more about what is going to be required when we are
finished with the decontamination of the Hart Building, and
when we have done the fumigation of the Daschle suite and
determine the effectiveness of that. It will give us even a
better understanding beyond what we have already determined
with the Sandia foam and the chlorine dioxide wipe, the liquid,
and we will have a better idea of what we are talking about.
We need to train contractors, we need to make sure that we
have contractors who have been through a process that gives us
a level of comfort that they have the skills and ability to
address these issues, but this is one where I think as we go
through this process, we are writing the book, as you have
pointed out before.
We have never faced this kind of contamination from this
sort of a biological agent in these types of facilities, so we
are writing the book as we go along, and part of that is going
to be what we need to do to ensure that we have enough private
contractors out there, because you are right, there has been a
concern about getting enough private contractors willing to
take on the risk, who have the expertise to be able to do the
job right, and that is the most important thing here, getting
the job done right.
Senator Bond. Dr. Marburger, I would like you just to close
my question asking you to comment on that, and then the
chlorine dioxide sounds powerful. Is it dangerous? What is the
hazard from the cleanup?
Dr. Marburger. Let me answer the first question first. I am
optimistic about contractors. If we can learn enough from the
incidents that we have now to establish clear standards for the
contractors to follow and train to, and appropriate
indemnification, I believe that contractors will come forward.
For example, in the facilities that are being used for the
mail irradiation, those facilities were designed originally for
food and medical supply irradiation, where the standards are
very clear and rigorous, and the equipment is appropriately
calibrated according to NIST standards. We do have contractors
that are capable of performing to those standards.
For the mail, we have two contractors currently that build
the equipment for irradiation. They know the process. We have
been able to assist the U.S. Postal Service to verify that it
works, and I am sure that more contractors will be willing to
come forward and sell machines to the mail service providers,
so that is a good case study.
We are very fortunate in the mail case to have the example
of the food, and the spice industry, for example, uses this,
and the medical industry, as sort of a case study, so I think
we can be optimistic about that.
Regarding the chlorine dioxide, it is a very interesting
substance. I do not think we know enough about its application
under conditions. I certainly agree with Governor Whitman on
this point, that we do need to have more experience, and study
the effectiveness under different conditions under which it is
now being contemplated to be used, but there is certainly much
promise in the chemical treatments that are being investigated.
Senator Mikulski. Senator Stevens.
HART BUILDING CLEANUP
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Well, Doctor, following up on that, as we go back into our
building, which I hope we do soon, and our staff wants to clean
off, if they take a Chlorox solution and clean off their desks,
are they helping themselves?
Dr. Marburger. Chlorox does kill living things.
Senator Stevens. It gets rid of anthrax, right?
Dr. Marburger. Yes. Well, actually----
Ms. Whitman. I do not know that I would encourage that in
and of itself. I think the important thing to know----
Senator Stevens. They have been told it is cleaned up. They
want to make sure.
Ms. Whitman. Oh, okay, they want to do extra things, that
is fine. They are not going to hurt anything doing that.
Senator Stevens. I am not one to criticize what is going
on, although I have to tell you--it is not a bad sort of thing,
but we lived in the Hart Building for 3 days after those people
opened the envelope, and I compliment them and every one
associated with the discovery.
During that period of time, this anthrax had the chance of
circulating, right? That is the fear, right, and we were trying
to figure out the level, the area of its possible migration.
Ms. Whitman. Right.
Senator Stevens. Now, Senator Daschle's office is on the
southwest, fifth and sixth floor, I am on the fifth and sixth
floor on the northeast. We circulate through that whole place.
My staff and I, 40 some odd people, went through there for all
that time. Is there a way to find out the area that this stuff
can expand to from a source like the Daschle letter? Is there a
parameter?
Ms. Whitman. We have now tested every one of the suites in
the Hart Office Building.
Senator Stevens. I understand that, but do we know how far
it can expand itself, and how rapidly?
Ms. Whitman. It is a question of who picks it up. I mean,
we followed the mail trail, and that is how we were able to
determine the other hot spots, and you were able to see cross-
contamination from the letters going through.
Senator Stevens. With the air system, does it circulate any
known distance? Is it known the distance it would travel a day,
for instance?
Dr. Marburger. You can attempt to model this, but I am not
aware of any model that has been exercised to this extent. That
would be a subject of a very detailed investigation.
Senator Stevens. I am compelled to tell you that a friend
of mine from ranch country asked me if I had thrown out our
plants, and said that in his opinion the first place that stuff
would go would be to the dirt. Is that right?
Dr. Marburger. Well, it sounds logical to me, Senator.
Senator Stevens. Have we destroyed all the plants?
Ms. Whitman. No, sir. We are watering them.
Senator Stevens. My rancher friend says they ought to be
thrown away, or burned or something.
Ms. Whitman. We would be happy to throw them away, but we
have a contractor who is watering them and feeding the fish.
Senator Stevens. That is an aside.
Dr. Marburger. I believe we have to leave it up to the
experts to determine how to detect--I mean, they think of
things like this. We need to leave it up to them to determine
the most likely places to take samples, and how to detect the
existence of these spores in a building.
You know, we do have expertise distributed throughout the
Federal agencies, and while you might be disturbed by the fact
that there are so many agencies involved, I am reassured by
that fact, because it means that the people responsible are
reaching out to people that have the knowledge. And that is the
way it should work. Fortunately Congress, in its wisdom, has
set up a number of coordinating mechanisms, including the
Office of Science and Technology Policy and other
responsibilities that are built into the agencies, EPA and FDA
and so forth, and it is intricate. It really is intricate, but
we are charged with the responsibilities of learning those
intricacies and calling upon the appropriate places where
necessary, and I believe that that is happening in this case.
MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF HART BUILDING
Senator Stevens. Well, our job is a little different. We
are going to have here, soon, the opportunity to go back into
our offices, I hope, and we are going to have to look our staff
in the eye and tell them that they are safe, all right.
The chair was talking about a level of contamination. If
you determine that a level of contamination above zero is safe,
are there people out there that might be compromised who have
immune systems--for instance, I have one staffer who is just
completing radiation and chemotherapy, and there have been some
known HIV patients in, not my staff, but in the building. Are
there other people there that have to be considered, even if we
go to a level above zero?
Dr. Marburger. Senator, safe to me means safe for all, so
if there is a determination that the building is safe to
reoccupy, I would presume that it would be safe for anyone to
reoccupy.
Senator Stevens. It is going to be safe for public access?
Dr. Marburger. Absolutely.
Ms. Whitman. Senator, do not forget, the CDC is the one
that will make that determination, and they are collecting all
the health data now to make sure that when they make that
determination, that it is one based on the best-known science
that can assure that everyone, no matter what their individual
health conditions, can safely reoccupy the buildings.
Senator Stevens. That worries me, because as the ex-chair
of the Appropriations Committee, it seems to me we are going to
be looking for money to build some more buildings, because I do
not know who can give an assurance that something is zero. It
is one of those things that there are so many permutations,
combinations of how this stuff could be transported.
Currently we followed the trail of the mail truck, right?
Ms. Whitman. We did the mail, yes, the mail handling.
Senator Stevens. And we followed the air circulation.
Ms. Whitman. Yes. Actually, we did the entire building now.
We have gone into all the suites, even where we did not get an
initial hit we have tested all the suites and then all the
offices in those suites where there was any indication that
there might have been some contamination, and those that were
served by that particular HVAC system in Senator Daschle's
office.
Senator Stevens. Well, now tell me this. One of the
announcements was that there had been a trace, there had been a
presence of anthrax in an office, but no spores found. Can you
explain that, Doctor?
Dr. Marburger. No. I do not know how that would be
determined.
Senator Stevens. Can anthrax go through a room and leave a
trace, without being there after it goes through?
Dr. Marburger. Not that I am aware.
Senator Stevens. So the spores were either there or not
there, and as you said, Ms. Whitman, they are all right if they
are dead.
Ms. Whitman. Right.
Senator Stevens. I know they can travel.
Ms. Whitman. Well, that is why we tested throughout the
building.
Senator Stevens. How about my books, when I go back? My
staff, if they reach into my library and pull out a book, are
they going to be subject to something--you cannot have looked
at every one of the books in my office, and all the other
offices.
Ms. Whitman. What we have done is, we have put the Petri
dishes to take the samples throughout the office. There has
been a real discussion as to whether you open--for instance,
filing drawers, and if they were closed and have been closed
right along, are you risking contamination by opening them
before you have decontaminated the office entirely? We have
been as comprehensive as we believe is necessary in order to
anticipate any place that spores might have reached, and again,
in any office where we got any indication that there had been
some contamination, we did a much more thorough testing
throughout the entire suite, in every office, on shelves--we
have gone back into offices and moved things around to see what
kind of resuspension there might be from the spores, and
retested.
So what will happen after the decontamination is, we will
go back in and retest those places where we had contamination,
where we cleaned, to make sure that we are not seeing any
contamination left. Again, we want to see the spores, but we
would like to see them hollow. We would like to see them with
dead DNA, so that we know we have gotten them, and then the
determination will be made for reentry after that.
Senator Stevens. Well, so far we have had this very sad
exposure to a series of letters. No one in our community here,
the Senate or the House community, has gotten sick. No one has
tested positive. Was there any----
Ms. Whitman. There were some staff that had positive, in
the Daschle suite anyway.
Senator Stevens. They have been exposed, but not positive
for having----
Ms. Whitman. Right, but being exposed.
Senator Stevens. So what is the standard? Should we test
our people, Doctor, periodically? How are we going to set up
any kind of standard of monitoring these people when they come
back and are working for me in these rooms, and opening those
drawers, and opening those books, and picking up those papers
that have been there all this time?
Dr. Marburger. Well, I would presume that there would be
testing of the facility before the people went in and there
should not be a presumption that they will be contaminated.
Senator Stevens. Maybe I am missing something, but that
tests things that are in the air or exposed. No one has gone
inside the books. No one has gone into the drawers. No one has
gone into the papers. How do we know they are not there?
Dr. Marburger. I cannot answer that question.
Ms. Whitman. All I can tell you, Senator, is that in those
offices--and Mary Ann, correct me if I am wrong--in those
offices where there has been any indication of contamination,
we have made an effort--we have not opened drawers. We have not
gone into drawers, but we have gone onto the shelves, and we
have done swipes--what we do is not just leave Petri dishes, we
also do the swipe test, which means we have swiped the front of
books, we have swiped some of the books, the shelves, the cases
where you have your file cabinets, your file cabinets, to see
if there were any spores.
If there were, then we would open the drawers and do the
test. If not, there is no reason to assume that anything is in
the drawers if it is not on the outside.
Senator Stevens. My time is up, but Doctor, I wish we could
take some of these critters and turn them loose in a room and
see where they go.
Senator Mikulski. I would like to, if I could, just give
two questions to follow on to Senator Stevens, because he is
talking about actually going back, gassing the Daschle office,
but then offices like mine, which are part of those others
where traces have--which is, how will you know about the
upholstery? How will you know about--hello. Who are you? Hello.
Ms. Whitman. This is our on-scene coordinator. I thought it
might be interesting for you to hear exactly how we do the
testing.
Senator Stevens. Senator, I have been called to that
meeting you thought I might be called to. Thank you, though.
Senator Domenici. Senator, before we have him explain,
could I ask a few questions?
Senator Mikulski. Yes, absolutely. Then I will come back to
him.
Senator Domenici. I appreciate.
Senator Mikulski. No, I just had the one item here, but
that is okay. It is your turn.
Senator Domenici. I have to be somewhere in 10 minutes.
Senator Mikulski. You take all 10, sir. That is your
prerogative.
Senator Domenici. Thank you. First let me say to you, Madam
Chairperson, I think calling this hearing is very good
leadership on your part, and one thing I think we will find,
and our staff will find, is that we need a little bit more
expertise on our side of this in order to ask intelligent
questions, and in order to make sure that what we are getting
is, indeed, the right thing.
So let me just do a little bit, then I will perhaps follow
up on my own. Somebody can educate me so that I will be a
better member of your subcommittee the next time we will have a
hearing.
First let me say to you good Doctor, I know a lot about
you. I have not worked with you, but I was very complimentary
when you got appointed. I remain that, and from the admiration
that those working in the larger arena that we are engaged
with, their admiration for you, and using your office to give
them advice, turns out to indicate that you are in the right
place at the right time.
Dr. Marburger. Thank you.
Senator Domenici. I think you hit it right on the head when
you said there are many experts in the United States, and there
are. I am very proud, because two of those expert institutions
happen to be in New Mexico.
It is not accidental that Sandia National Laboratory and
Los Alamos, by history and by what we have asked them to do,
happen to have a very embedded and large biological department,
believe it or not, and in that they have some huge expertise in
this field, and I am very grateful that they were called in
before the final plans were implemented, and I know not whose
plan it was, but there was certainly a plan to clean that
building that was voted down by everybody that the
Environmental Protection Agency called in to ask about it. In
fact I think 20 different peer review people said, let us not
do that plan.
That was the plan to encapsulate the building in a balloon,
and the balloon would then be filled with hydrochloric air, and
then it would filtrate all through the building and get the
spores with it. The only problem is, it had a high propensity
for exploding, and therefore static electricity could cause it
to blow up, and I am so glad that somebody told you all that
before you did it, which leads me to believe that the
Environmental Protection Agency does not have very much
expertise on this subject, and I am not so sure that they would
not admit that, but I do not think we need to have an argument
about it now, I do not.
And they need it. They need experts. The problem is,
somebody has got to decide which experts we are going to use.
We cannot always go out there and ask all 68 institutions and/
or centers of study to contribute, and they are out there.
So I am pleased that we are migrating in the direction of
the Centers for Disease Control in terms of helping with some
standardization, drawing some conclusions as to danger, fitting
in with that, costs, and all kinds of things we are using
across the land when we try to define natural background of
various pollutants. This is another new pollutant of high and
serious consequence.
So let me just ask, has anybody asked you, Madam
Administrator, when we might get back into the Hart Building?
Has that question been asked?
Senator Mikulski. No. That was going to be one of the wrap-
ups, but you go ahead.
Senator Domenici. Oh, excuse me. Do you want to do it?
Senator Mikulski. No, sir.
Senator Domenici. When are we going to be back in the
building, and under what circumstances?
Ms. Whitman. As soon as it is safe, and you know, we are
starting the fumigation of the Daschle suite. Our intent is to
do that this weekend. We still are on track for doing that this
weekend. We are continuing at the same time to do the cleanup
of those other offices that have had lesser levels of
contamination. There are a few others that we believe need to
be fumigated just because of the nature of the contamination,
and we want to wait until we have the results back from the
Daschle suite before we move ahead with those.
We are looking to see if it is going to be possible to have
a partial reoccupation of the building, but at this point in
time I cannot promise you that, simply to say that we will do
everything we can to get you back as soon as we can.
Senator Domenici. Well, you may think that is a good
answer. I do not, when you say, we will let you back in as soon
as it is safe.
Ms. Whitman. Well, actually, the determination will be the
Sergeant at Arms, Senator. He will make the final
determination.
Senator Domenici. Well, you do not even have even a guess
as to whether it is going to be a month, 2 months, or 6 months?
Ms. Whitman. I could certainly tell you that I think it is
going to be a lot shorter than 6 months or 2 months, but one of
the things we have found as we have been going through this is
that it changes, just as we talk about what CDC determines is a
safe level has been a--there is no--there has been no standard
set for biological agents. That is not something we do. That is
something the CDC would do. That has not happened.
They are in the process of doing that in this instance to
see what is safe, but that is changing, so as we deal with
changing circumstances, as we find additional contamination
from the additional testing that we are doing, then that leads
to more action that needs to be taken to ensure everyone's
safety.
Senator Domenici. Well, that is the case, and the sooner we
decide what is safe means that you may, in fact, be able to put
the circle around that last conclusion on your part sooner. If
we do not know what the standard is yet--and it clearly is not
going to be zero, as a standard. It will be something else, but
it will not be zero.
Unless and until we know what it is, it would seem to me
that you will wake up every day with something else to research
and study, and you will not have anything to measure it
against, and we will be back here wondering if the time is yet
arrived, so I would urge that part of the time be dedicated and
devoted to getting some answers as to how to determine when my
suite and other suites is actually safe, not that we are going
to find something new all the time, but what is going to be
safe.
My last observation, since I have to leave, is to thank you
for all the hard work. I do not know how many hundreds of
people you must have on this project, but I assume you have a
lot of them.
Ms. Whitman. I do. Senator, let me just say that the
determination of whether or not people can go back into the
building is going to be a health-based decision, and it will be
made by the Senate Sergeant at Arms based on recommendations
they receive from the Assistant Physician to the Capitol.
Senator Domenici. Good.
Ms. Whitman. Based again on the tests that we do after the
cleanup, the decontamination has taken place, whether that
shows--what that shows as far as the success in killing the
anthrax.
Senator Domenici. I think that is a very positive kind of
statement, and we can look to that as some kind of a point in
time in any group that we can start inquiring of.
You know, we had a situation, Madam Chairperson, when we
had standards set for a pollutant that you have become very
familiar with, where there was real reason to have a different
standard in the West than there was in the East.
Senator Mikulski. Yes.
Senator Domenici. I do not want to raise----
Senator Mikulski. It is another word that begins with A.
Ms. Whitman. Another one of those A words.
Senator Domenici. All the words I ever want to speak to an
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator have been spoken
about it, so I do not choose to do that. I choose to smile,
where I really had difficulty smiling for quite some time, but
now I would ask that we be understanding of the fact that there
is a lot of this in the western States that is not present in
the eastern States, and there are a lot of it present that is
not so dangerous as we have been led to believe because of what
we found here.
I think it is very, very important that we be fair, and
that as a matter of not just curiosity, but real necessity for
knowledge, that we do try to find out the difference between
the safety, the health hazards in the West versus the East. As
everybody out there will tell you, right now out in the West
you surely would not want to test the cowboy boots that came in
from a week's work around the corrals and around cows and what
cows put on the ground.
You sure would not want to be out there for a week and come
in and say, let's see if there is anthrax out here that is
dangerous enough that we ought to be worried about. Nobody has
been worried about it for a long, long time, but it is there,
and nobody seems to have gotten sick over it, but it is there.
So I would hope that between the Administrator and you good
Doctor, that you will at least keep in your mind that there is
a difference, and maybe the difference is insignificant, and I
am wrong, that it is the same everywhere, but I would ask that
you be serious about that issue as you move through.
With that, let me just say I am very proud of the expertise
that houses itself in New Mexico, and of their help to you thus
far, and I believe in many ways they have been very technically
sound.
Ms. Whitman. They are very helpful.
Senator Domenici. They know a lot, and they are pretty good
at it, and we will continue to inquire of them, and if we think
that at some point we ought to bring a few of them by to talk
with you and your staff, that will be--if you are interested,
we will volunteer that at some point.
Senator Mikulski. And Senator, we will be happy to convene
anything that you would ask us to do.
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. Either a roundtable, informal, or an
official hearing. We will enjoy working with you.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. Your expertise in energy, as a senior
member of the Energy Committee, and your knowledge of truly the
Federal laboratories and their role, is really very much
appreciated.
Senator Domenici. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Mikulski. I want to ask, I want to continue the
conversation about decontamination for a few more questions,
one about the Hart Building, and the other about Brentwood,
because I must center on Brentwood, and then talk with you,
both of you about the resources you need to do, really be able
to honor the responsibility given you now, additional
responsibility, actual, operational responsibility, and your
role in counterterrorism.
You have had public directives before, but we are in the
first war of the 21st Century, and we are all soldiers in that
war, and we want to make sure that you have the resources.
But I want to go to first the Hart Building, and then
continue on the decontamination issues, and then about
Brentwood, because it goes to the mail in the facility. We
understand that the Senate is, in many ways, the experimental
site, and Brentwood will be for a manufacturing facility,
because we are an office building and they essentially, and I
will put it in quotes, but because it is a lot of gear and
processing and so on, it functions like a factory.
Could you tell us what technologies were explored, to
expunge, if you will, anthrax from the Hart Building, and how
did you reach those decisions on what were the best
technologies to use on the Hart Building?
Ms. Whitman. Senator, we looked at a number of different
technologies that are out there. There were three primary ones
that we decided to work with, and we had a facility set up at
Brentwood, a trailer, where we used those to determine what was
going to be the most effective on the type of cleanup that was
required in the different rooms.
Again, as I indicated in my testimony, if you are dealing
with just hard desks, metal casings, flat surfaces, then the
Sandia foam is very effective and the chlorine dioxide liquid
is also effective. The envirofoam is two products, an ammonia
product and hydrogen peroxide, and it is a wipe-down process
that is used.
What we looked for is what was going to kill the spores,
and then what provided us the best ability to get into every
part of it.
Senator Mikulski. You did all this in a trailer in
Brentwood?
Ms. Whitman. No. We have had--I mean, there has been
testing done outside of this, as far as these--nothing had been
licensed prior to these events of the 14th and 15th, the
letters coming in to actually deal with anthrax.
Senator Mikulski. Particularly anthrax, yes.
Ms. Whitman. And we have had to go through the emergency
process actually to license the chlorine dioxide and the Sandia
for this use.
As the Doctor pointed out, there are other spores that have
the same characteristics as anthrax, that have been used to
determine the effectiveness of these as cleanup methodologies,
and they have proven their effectiveness.
The difference in the Hart building and the Daschle suite
is the cubic footage that is required.
Senator Mikulski. That takes me to my question. First of
all, what I understood is that most anthrax research in the
last part of the 20th Century was done really to protect a
military that could be exposed as combatants, and it was based
on the military belief that an aerial attack could occur on our
military, but it would be primarily an out-of-doors event, and
it would be done on a population primarily between the ages of
18 and 30 that could be immediately treated, removed from the
scene, and the scene itself would be evacuated, never, ever to
return. In other words, get the heck out of there.
There was no experience in the view that it could happen in
the civilian sector, and also to a great office building with
10 million cubic feet, 50 Senators, 1,000 staff, as well as a
postal facility that employs hundreds and even thousands of
people, so my question was, did your information come from the
military? Were these standard procedures that have been used in
cleanup, and do we know the consequence, the long-term public
health or personal health consequences of the cleanup itself?
In other words, if we go back, and one day I am sure we
will, are we going to be inhaling fumes? Do we know it is out
of the upholstery? What about soft surfaces? Rugs are different
than hard surfaces, and I am not trying to make the job more
difficult. I would like, again--is this not the magnitude that
you are facing, that you have to ponder and probe?
Ms. Whitman. Yes, Senator, absolutely. These are the very
questions that we have had to ask, and these are the questions
that we are reaching out to a number, not just the labs that
Senator Domenici, to which he referred. The Army, Department of
Defense has done a lot of work in this. We work closely with
them, Centers for Disease Control, all of our Federal partners
we are very close contact with, and the private sector. We have
been talking with the various companies that produce these
kinds of decontaminants.
I think it is important to remember that with the chlorine
dioxide, that is a substance that actually the liquid was first
registered by the Environmental Protection Agency as an
antimicrobial pesticide back in 1967. It is used on municipal
water supplies. You see it used for washing fruits and
vegetables. You are absolutely right we have never had to use
it in these concentrations.
Senator Mikulski. We are not carrots.
Ms. Whitman. No, but the point is----
Senator Mikulski. Maybe we act like cucumbers, but--no,
really----
Ms. Whitman. Your point is very well taken. It is used to
sterilize manufacturing equipment, factory equipment, so it has
been used--the foam and the spray have both been used in
instances where there has been subsequent human exposure, and
that subsequent human exposure has been found to be of minimal
negative consequence, if any. It has been determined to be
safe, which is why it is a process that we feel relatively
comfortable using.
Having said that, that is why we are not letting people
back in the building. We do not want people in the building
when we do the fumigation, even though we are going to seal off
the suite. We are just taking every precaution possible to make
sure----
Senator Mikulski. Also to people outside the building.
Ms. Whitman. Yes, exactly--make sure that no one has any
kind of health risk exposure that we can avoid.
Senator Mikulski. So that is the fumigation. Now, I am part
of this kind of Daschle 13 that was in the air vent system, and
traces found among others. According to a Washington Post
article you are going to use chlorine dioxide in Senator
Daschle's office, but then also what you are going to do is
spot clean the 10 Senators' suites. What does spot clean mean?
Ms. Whitman. That is using----
Senator Mikulski. Only the mailroom, or----
Ms. Whitman. That means using the chlorine dioxide liquid
and the Sandia foam in those areas that showed concentrations,
or gave us anthrax hits, as it were, where we found evidence of
anthrax, and those offices will be cleaned. The surfaces will
be wiped down.
Senator Mikulski. Do we know the consequence or the best
things for upholstered furniture, or rugs? You see, there is a
great concern among staff, and I must say I share part of it,
which is that just the walking around on--we do not know what
spores are on these rungs, and again you have got quite a bit
of square footage. Are you going to be foaming rugs, and
foaming furniture?
Ms. Whitman. The wipe-down is going to occur on those areas
where we have found evidence of anthrax, and we have tested
throughout the suites. I think it might be helpful, if it is
all right with you, if I asked Rich Rupert, who is the on-scene
coordinator, to perhaps walk you through the testing that we
did.
Senator Mikulski. Well, why don't we do that, because then
I am going to ask the same thing for Brentwood, and then I
would like to know about----
Ms. Whitman. It would be the same.
Senator Mikulski [continuing]. The consequences that you
think might occur to respiratory systems, and how we are going
to do the monitoring, because you are going to continue to
monitor the mail.
Would you state for the record your name and your title?
Mr. Rupert. My name is Rich Rupert, and I am on-scene
coordinator.
The approach that we are going to take----
Senator Mikulski. Are you an employee of FDA?
Mr. Rupert. No, ma'am, I am sorry. I am with the
Environmental Protection Agency.
Senator Mikulski. Okay. Go ahead.
Mr. Rupert. In the 11--it is actually 11 suites in the Hart
Building, and the approach that we are taking is, there were
very localized areas where mail was handled, where we found--
you might even consider residual contamination in most cases,
something that was obviously cross-contamination from perhaps
the Daschle letter, and in those areas we are using the Sandia
foam, or the chlorine dioxide liquid, where we apply it
liberally all over the area, wipe the surfaces down.
Upholstered furniture will be decontaminated with it, but we
are not leaving the seats that are in the immediate area there.
We are taking them out. Carpet in the immediate area also will
be treated with the chlorine dioxide liquid or the Sandia foam,
and then that carpet in the immediate area will be taken out
also.
Senator Mikulski. So you are going to take out carpet and
furniture that you think might be fertile hidden caves for
these.
Ms. Whitman. Yes.
Mr. Rupert. We believe that we are going to be able to have
an effective decontamination of it, but because there is some
unknown, we are not taking any chances. It just does not make
sense.
And I might add--I kind of skipped a step--after we find
with our initial examination the anthrax detection we go in and
we do an extensive amount of sampling, maybe 20 or 30 samples
in a 10 by 10 foot area.
Senator Mikulski. Well, first of all that is a pretty
rigorous undertaking in, again, 10 million cubic feet.
Let me ask, then, again, and then I will move to Brentwood,
and then a resource question, you are using foam, chlorine
dioxide wipes, spot cleanings. What is the science and the
research and your degree of certitude related to the public
health consequences of the cleanup. Let us assume that the goal
is zero anthrax spores, and that you have achieved the goal.
Then, at the same time, you have used these methods that have
been used in other circumstances affecting people, but not
quite like this.
Ms. Whitman. Right.
Senator Mikulski. What then--what is the data, or the
source of the data to ensure that there will not be long-term
consequences to the methodology used for decontamination on
those of us who work in the Hart Building and those who work in
Brentwood or other postal facilities?
Ms. Whitman. Do you want to respond to that, Rich?
Mr. Rupert. You are talking about the threats from the
chlorine dioxide?
Senator Mikulski. Yes--from anything.
Mr. Rupert. The detection equipment that we have measures
well below the levels that are recognized by NIOSH and other
agencies to present a health risk.
Senator Mikulski. Have they ever been used in a building
like this?
Mr. Rupert. Chlorine dioxide is used for disinfection of
water, drinking water, particularly out West and in Europe, it
is trickled over fruits and vegetables----
Senator Mikulski. But I am talking about working in
essentially a contained building with a rather mediocre heating
and air conditioning system before the anthrax attack.
Mr. Rupert. Yes, ma'am. On the basis of exposures that have
been measured and assumed, with people taking showers in water
that has been treated with chlorine dioxide, which is
residual--you are breathing it when you are taking a shower.
Senator Mikulski. People do not live in their shower, and
if they do, they belong in another kind of facility.
Mr. Rupert. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. I mean, really.
Mr. Rupert. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. I am not being picky here.
Mr. Rupert. No, ma'am, I understand, and I am probably not
answering your question properly.
Senator Mikulski. We are extrapolating from other
circumstances, is that correct?
Mr. Rupert. Yes.
Ms. Whitman. Thresholds have been established. Human safety
thresholds have been established, and subsequent to the
decontamination we will be going back in and measuring for the
residual dioxin, chlorine dioxin as well.
Senator Mikulski. Will you be part of the ongoing
monitoring team?
Ms. Whitman. Yes, until it has been determined that it is
safe for you to go back in, yes.
Senator Mikulski. But once we go back in, who is going to
be in charge of monitoring to make sure of continuing safety?
Mr. Rupert. We will not release it until we are sure that
it is safe to inhabit from the standpoint of the chlorine.
Senator Mikulski. I am talking about a longitudinal study.
Dr. Marburger, the CIA has a long-term task force, and he has
got CIA and the Army and lots of other agencies involved
looking at the long-term consequences of the mail. I am worried
about the long-term consequences to the mail, but I am worried
about the long-term consequences of the 50 Senators, 1,000
people who work there, as well as the people who come in there.
Ms. Whitman. Well, Senator, I think the best answer to that
is that if you want to have an ongoing monitoring system
established, that can be established. What we would do would be
to determine----
Senator Mikulski. So the Sergeant at Arms is the one to
determine that.
Ms. Whitman. The Sergeant at Arms would be the one to work
with on that.
Senator Mikulski. Right now you see your responsibility
ending the day we walk into the door.
Ms. Whitman. When you go back in, when it is determined to
be safe, because we will as well--besides the anthrax, and
determining zero anthrax, we will be looking to ensure that
there is no residual chlorine dioxide above levels that have
been determined by CDC and NIOSH to be safe levels in those
offices.
Senator Mikulski. Well, this is going to be a pretty big
undertaking. I know everybody says maybe 2 weeks or whatever,
but I think to achieve the standard, the goals that have been
set, is going to be an ongoing challenge.
Let me go to Brentwood. Who is in charge of choosing the
method of decontaminating Brentwood? Are you overseeing the
Brentwood cleanup?
Ms. Whitman. No. We are offering advice to the Postal
Service. They are making the determination there as to how to
go forward.
Senator Mikulski. And they chose the methodologies for
cleanup?
Ms. Whitman. Yes. They will be choosing that.
Senator Mikulski. But they have not yet chosen them?
Ms. Whitman. Nothing is happening with that facility, the
building itself, I do not think at the moment.
Senator Mikulski. Dr. Marburger, could you fill us in on
Brentwood?
Dr. Marburger. Yes, that is correct. However, there have
been tests and fumigations of trailers, which of course are
much smaller, on the order of, at most, 50 to 60 feet long, by
let us say, 10 feet wide.
Senator Mikulski. What about Brentwood itself?
Dr. Marburger. Brentwood facility itself has not yet been
subject, as far as I know, to fumigation.
Ms. Whitman. It is closed indefinitely at this point.
Senator Mikulski. So Brentwood is closed indefinitely, but
Mr. Potter functions the way the Sergeant at Arms functions
here.
Dr. Marburger. Correct.
Ms. Whitman. Right.
Senator Mikulski. But then for Mr. Potter you assembled the
technical advisory team for the mail. Have you assembled the
technical advisory team for Mr. Potter in terms of his
decontamination?
Ms. Whitman. We have provided the support that he has asked
for, yes. We are there providing support to him, recommending
different methodologies for cleanup that can be used, and we
stand ready to continue in that role.
Senator Mikulski. And then Mr. Potter is also turning to
the CDC as well.
Ms. Whitman. Yes.
Senator Mikulski. So essentially what you are doing at
Hart, Potter is doing at Brentwood, but he can turn to both of
you for advice and technical assistance. The decisionmaking on
methodologies will be there, but again, for the standard of how
clean is safe, Mr. Potter would ben turning to the CDC.
Ms. Whitman. That is right.
Senator Mikulski. Am I correct, and that there would be the
ongoing testing of Brentwood and other postal facilities, but
Brentwood is indefinitely closed.
Ms. Whitman. Yes.
Senator Mikulski. That is essentially the way it is
working?
Ms. Whitman. Right, correct.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I know we spent a lot of time on
Hart, because I think Hart in some ways is the model. Am I
correct in that?
Ms. Whitman. It is the biggest challenge we have ever
faced, yes.
Senator Mikulski. It is the biggest challenge, not that
Brentwood is not, but that the lessons learned from us, here at
the Capitol, will then be applicable for Brentwood and other,
including private sector facilities.
Well, this has been illuminating in terms of what all you
had to do, but this had to be very expensive from the
standpoint of both finances and staff, I believe, Administrator
Whitman, on the Environmental Protection Agency. I happen to
believe that you have more expertise than sometimes EPA is
given credit for.
Ms. Whitman. I think we do, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. And you have the availability to turn to
other scientific endeavors. Could you tell me now, with your
new--and also, Dr. Marburger, I believe that you will be called
upon for other responsibilities, for assembling technical
assistance, or even given insights and recommendations to the
President on where we should be deploying some of our resources
for what we are going to need from the scientific community.
Could you share with us what new jobs you think you are going
to have, or new roles, and what resources do you need?
I know you are going to--quote, you want authority to
recapture costs, but-- and that is an excellent authority,
along with the contractors. We are not disputing that.
Ms. Whitman. No, no. I understand.
Senator Mikulski. But what funding do you think EPA and
OSTP need in the short term, and looking ahead to next year's
budget cycle?
Ms. Whitman. Well, Senator, as far as the anthrax
decontamination is concerned, we have spent about $7.5 million
thus far, and anticipating looking to the future for all
things, not just Capitol Hill, but the rest of D.C. and the
rest of the country in cleanup, it could be upwards of $20
million.
There also is obviously the need, we believe, to do
training and get additional equipment so that we are prepared
to be able to respond to these kinds of things if they occur
again in greater numbers for criminal investigation and
emergency response, and again we are in the process of
determining what those numbers will be, because we are learning
as we go along.
Senator Mikulski. Is this the training of your own, of
other environmental EPA staff, or is this the training you
referred to with my colleagues for the private sector?
Ms. Whitman. It is both--both, and that could be, you know,
upwards of another $55 million, but those are not hard and fast
numbers at this point. We are, as I say, learning as we go
along. Those are what we anticipate at this point.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I want to also ask the same
question of Dr. Marburger. You see, I think those are valid
requests. Our VA-HUD bill, which funds you for the fiscal year
of 2002, has already passed, so my question is, do you need
help in the supplemental?
Ms. Whitman. There is already, as I understand what has
been done in the supplemental in the House, there has been some
money set aside for the Environmental Protection Agency.
Obviously, we would welcome it.
Senator Mikulski. I do not want to get you into trouble
with OMB.
Ms. Whitman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. But if we gave you help----
Ms. Whitman. We could use it.
Senator Mikulski. Okay, and these are current estimates,
and I will be working with the head of OMB for the President's
budget, and I would really urge you in the strongest way to
identify these as really needed resources, because it is in the
President's budget. We could work with you and even grant a
supplemental that will come in the spring.
Dr. Marburger, what about you?
Dr. Marburger. OSTP is a coordinating agency, and the work
that we do comes from Governor Whitman's budget, so indeed the
agencies have been very generous with the time and people that
we have called upon to help, and those agency budgets certainly
need to be sustained. So we are a small office. We still have
uncommitted vacancies available to us. We are staffing up. As
you know, in the transition process a number of terms expired
and we have openings that we still can fill to add our staff,
and we certainly need those people.
Senator Mikulski. You need additional expertise?
Dr. Marburger. In these areas we have the ability to hire
the expertise that we need for the coordination process, but we
do call upon, and heavily, upon the agencies for the expertise,
and that is where the money is. They have the responsibility
for the programs.
Senator Mikulski. So that you are operating off of what we
would call detailees.
Dr. Marburger. That is correct, detailees, and more than
that, remember these expert teams are not even detailees. They
are actually employees, actively working at their jobs in the
agencies like EPA or FDA, USDA, and they are performing their
jobs in those agencies as they help on these cross-cutting
teams, so they are coming together. I would say it is part of
their job responsibility within their agency to provide the
service to the other agencies in a team fashion, and it works
well.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I know that in 1994 the Office of
Technology Assessment that was under the Science Advisor was
disbanded, then both your predecessors, Drs. Gibbons and Lane,
functioned along the lines that you have talked about. I am not
interested in helping you create a new Office of Technology
Assessment, though my own view is it should not ever have been
disbanded. I think we could have used it, perhaps scaled down.
But as you move ahead, I really do believe that as we get
more involved in our issues, in protecting our country, that
the Science Advisor's role will only be enhanced, and we look
forward to working with you.
We would also ask you, because we know you have the ear of
the President and his top team, to really be an advocate for
these agencies through the OMB process so that they are not
misunderstood to look like they are building bureaucracies or
empires. Really, Administrator Whitman has a big job ahead. We
think of Dr. Copland at FDA--not FDA, excuse me, CDC. CDC has
always had to forage for funds. They are in several out-of-date
buildings that need to be renovated so that the scientists can
work really with the best available technology. they need help.
So we are really going to need you to be an advocate so
that we do not look like we are big spenders, but that we are
wise spenders, because really I believe that it is in our
scientific community that this has worked so well.
And you know, first of all I want to thank you again for
all the hard work you have been doing on this, and we would
like to thank your staffs and all the hours, because I know
there were days and weeks when you were going 24-7, so I want
to express my appreciation.
But you know, it is really an incredible country. When you
listen to the agencies that were involved, where both the
civilian and military community could come together, their
appropriate roles constitutionally were maintained, and yet we
all kind of pulled together, and in other countries the
military is so suspect. Their information is so secret. There
is nothing that they would share with the civilian population,
and in fact they are often feared by their own civilian
population.
So this is a great country, and we have got a big job ahead
of us, and remember, we are all soldiers, that we serve in
different platoons, so we look forward to working with you.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
This subcommittee stands in recess, subject to the call of
the Chair.
[Whereupon, at 4:49 p.m., Wednesday, November 28, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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