[Senate Hearing 107-255]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-255
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANNING AND RESPONSE IN THE METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON AREA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
NOVEMBER 14, 2001--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
TOM HARKIN, Iowa PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HARRY REID, Nevada MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CONRAD BURNS, Montana
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Terrence E. Sauvain, Staff Director
Charles Kieffer, Deputy Staff Director
Steven J. Cortese, Minority Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Minority Deputy Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
JACK REED, Rhode Island KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
Professional Staff
Charles Kieffer
Kate Eltrich
Mary Dietrich (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu.................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator Mike DeWine................................. 4
Statement of Senator Jack Reed................................... 5
Statement of Hon. Anthony A. Williams, Mayor, District of
Columbia....................................................... 6
Accompanied by:
Margret Nedelkoff Kellems, Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and
Justice, District of Columbia.............................. 6
Peter LaPorte, Director, Emergency Management Agency,
District of Columbia....................................... 6
Richard A. White, General Manager, Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority..................................... 6
Michael Rogers, Executive Director, Metropolitan Washington
Council of Governments, District of Columbia............... 6
Ronnie Few, Chief, Department of Fire and Emergency Medical
Services, District of Columbia............................. 6
Charles H. Ramsey, Chief, Metropolitan Police Department,
District of Columbia....................................... 6
Dr. Ivan C. A. Walks, Director, Department of Health,
District of Columbia....................................... 6
District of Columbia Taskforce................................... 7
DC Taskforce Subcommittees....................................... 7
Operational Emergency Response................................... 8
First Responders................................................. 8
Emergency Communication Coordination............................. 8
Level 3 Emergency Response....................................... 9
Joint Information Center......................................... 9
Table Top Exercises.............................................. 10
Emergency Preparedness Investment................................ 10
Projected Revenue Losses......................................... 11
Prepared Statement of Mayor Anthony A. Williams.................. 12
Emergency Preparedness and Response.............................. 13
Short Term Investment in Emergency Preparedness.................. 15
Long-Term Fiscal Assistance...................................... 15
Prepared Statement of Michael Rogers............................. 16
The Steps COG Has Taken.......................................... 18
Prepared Statement of Richard White.............................. 19
Request for Security Funding..................................... 20
Emergency Planning in the National Capital Region................ 20
Statement of Linda W. Cropp, Chairman, Council of the District of
Colum-bia...................................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu.................. 43
Questions Submitted to Mayor Anthony A. Williams................. 43
Questions Submitted to Deputy Mayor Margret Kellums.............. 45
Questions Submitted to Chief Ronnie Few.......................... 46
Question Submitted to Chief Charles H. Ramsey.................... 47
Question Submitted to Dr. Ivan C. A. Walks....................... 47
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANNING AND RESPONSE IN THE METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON AREA
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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on District of Columbia,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:35 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Mary L. Landrieu (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Landrieu, Reed, and Dewine.
opening statement of senator mary l. landrieu
Senator Landrieu. Good afternoon, everyone, and our
subcommittee will come to order. I welcome you all to this
hearing on the District of Columbia's emergency operations
planning and the city's request for emergency supplemental
funding in the wake of the terrible attacks against our country
on September 11.
On that day, terrorists destroyed or partially destroyed
some of the great symbols of America's economic success and
military strength, the World Trade Center in New York City, and
the Pentagon across the Potomac, without the intervention of
several brave individuals we could have, in fact, seen,
according to subsequent investigations, some tragedy here in
the District itself.
Since then, all Americans have vowed that these cowardly
acts will not dampen our spirit, will not shake our belief in
freedom and democracy. The safety, security, and financial
strength of the District of Columbia, our Nation's Capital,
serves as a vital symbol of this national resolve. Given its
importance as a national symbol, and as the anthrax attacks of
recent weeks have shown, Washington, D.C. remains a target for
terrorism.
As we all; know, D.C. is more than just a symbol. It is
more than just a cluster of Government buildings. The District
of Columbia is also a living, breathing city of over one-half
million people, with the fire and medical services department
that was first on the scene at the Pentagon, and a police
department that provided security and directed the movements of
hundreds of thousands of people out of the city, back to their
homes, when the Federal Government and other offices were
closed down after the attacks.
The city's department of health has been on the front line
in responding to anthrax attacks. Mayor Williams, Deputy Mayor
for Public Safety Margret Kellems, and the heads of these
departments are all here today to testify. We want to thank you
for your work on behalf of the citizens of the District, the
residents that are here, and the workers that work in the
District every day. You were working on that day, and continue
to work under unprecedented, extraordinarily difficult
circumstances.
I must also give a personal thanks to all of you, because
my second home is D.C. My family is here. My husband and our
two children live here with me. For them, and for all the
families in the District, I wanted to say thank you for your
work.
The terrible attacks were a learning experience for all of
us, but especially for the District government. In the days
after the attacks, local officials and media began to detail
some of the shortfalls in the present emergency protocol.
Specifically, articles in the Washington Post highlighted the
need for coordinated and timely communication between Federal
and local law enforcement officers, coordinated evacuation
plans for the 180,000 Federal employees housed in the District,
and the release of accurate and timely emergency information
and instructions to the public.
Correcting these shortfalls cannot take place in a vacuum.
There must be coordination and emergency planning between the
District and the surrounding States and local jurisdictions in
Virginia and Maryland, as well as coordinated planning with
Metro, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
I look forward to all of our witnesses' testimony on this
issue. I am pleased that Peter LaPorte, the Director of the
District's Emergency Management Agency is here today, along
with Michael Rogers from the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments, for his testimony. I hope that he will be with us.
I anticipate the need for at least one additional hearing
to examine how the District can work with surrounding
communities on a seamless emergency plan for the entire region,
which I believe is crucial for our future and the fact that
this city and region will probably, unfortunately, remain a
target.
As I mentioned, the District of Columbia remains a target
for potential terrorism, more so than many other cities in this
country, because of the Federal Government's presence, because
this city is the Nation's Capital, because of the monuments and
the symbols that are here.
Mr. Mayor, you have submitted to us a request for more than
$250 million in emergency preparedness funding. There is a
wide-ranging and comprehensive proposal to acquire a special
hazardous material handling and detection equipment for the
city's police, fire, and emergency medical services and public
works department, improved communication equipment and other
technologies for city agencies, as well as a comprehensive
terrorist response training team, urban search and rescue
equipment, and a number of other important items.
Some might argue that the District should already have some
of this equipment and Congress should not provide funding for
such request. Others would argue that, as the Nation's Capital,
the city deserves and requires extra help to protect its
citizens and employees from potential harm.
I understand that the District does have hazmat equipment
to handle isolated chemical spills or accidents, but it is not
equipped for large-scale chemical or biological attacks or the
destruction of the scale of which we saw in New York City.
With my Ranking Member, Senator DeWine, and with my
committee members, particularly Senator Reed, we want to work
with you to develop a comprehensive emergency operation plan
that protects the people who live, work, and visit the District
of Columbia every day, and also effectively manages Federal
resources that may become available to you for this end.
prepared statement
I look forward to the presentations today. Let me welcome
all of you. Let me ask my Ranking Member and Senator Reed for
their opening comments at this time, then we will have
presentations from each panel member, and then enter into a
period of questions.
Thank you all very much for being here for this important
hearing.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Welcome to this hearing on the District of Columbia's emergency
operations planning and the City's request for emergency supplemental
funding in the wake of the attack against the United States on
September 11, 2001. On that day, terrorists destroyed, or partially
destroyed, some of the great symbols of America's economic success and
military strength: the World Trade Center in New York City and the
Pentagon, across the Potomac River in Arlington, Virginia.
Since then, Americans have vowed that these cowardly acts will not
dampen our spirit and will not shake our belief in freedom and
democracy. The safety, security, and financial strength of the District
of Columbia--our Nation's Capital--serves as a vital symbol of this
national resolve. Given its importance as a national symbol, and as the
anthrax attacks of recent weeks have shown, Washington, D.C. remains a
target for terrorism.
As we all know, Washington, D.C. is more than just a symbol. It's
more than just government buildings. The District of Columbia is also a
living, breathing city of over half a million people with a Fire and
Emergency Medical Services Department that was first on the scene at
the Pentagon and a Police Department that provided security and
directed the movement of hundreds of thousands of people out of the
City and back to their homes when the Federal Government and other
offices closed down after the attacks. The City's Department of Health
has been on the front line in responding to the anthrax attacks.
Mayor Williams, Deputy Mayor for Public Safety, Margret Kellems,
and heads of these departments: Fire and EMS Chief Ronnie Few, Police
Chief Charles Ramsey, and Doctor Ivan Walks, Director of the District's
Department of Health all deserve our thanks. Thank you all for being
here today. You were working--and continue to work--under unprecedented
and extraordinarily difficult circumstances. I must also give a
personal thanks to all of you. D.C. is my second home. My family, my
husband and our two children, live here with me. For them, and all the
families in the District, I say thank you.
The attacks were a learning experience for all of us, but
especially for the District government. In the days after the attacks,
local officials and the media began to detail some of the shortfalls in
the present emergency protocol. Specifically, articles in the
Washington Post highlighted the need for coordinated and timely
communications between Federal and local law enforcement officers;
coordinated evacuation plans for the 180,000 Federal employees housed
in the District; and the release of accurate and timely emergency
information and instructions to the public.
Correcting these shortfalls can't take place in a vacuum. There
must be coordination in emergency planning between the District and the
surrounding State and local jurisdictions in Virginia and Maryland, as
well as coordinated planning with Metro, the Washington Metropolitan
Area Transit Authority. I look forward to our witnesses' testimony on
this issue. I am pleased that Peter LaPorte, the Director of the
District's Emergency Management Agency is here, and Michael Rogers from
the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments are available to
discuss the regional planning effort. I anticipate the need for at
least one additional hearing to examine how the District can work with
the surrounding communities on a seamless emergency plan for the entire
region.
As I mentioned, the District of Columbia remains a target for
potential terrorism, more so than many other cities in this country
because of the Federal Government's presence. The Mayor has submitted
to the Congress a request for more than $250 million in emergency
preparedness funding. It is a wide-ranging and comprehensive proposal
to acquire specialized hazardous material handling and detection
equipment for the City's police, fire, EMS and public works
departments; improved communications equipment and other technology for
City agencies; as well as comprehensive terrorist response training,
urban search and rescue equipment, and a number of other important
items.
Some might argue that the District should already have some of this
equipment and that Congress should not provide funding for the request.
Others would argue that as the Nation's Capital, the City deserves and
requires extra help to protect its citizens from potential terrorist
harm. I understand that the District does have Hazmat equipment to
handle isolated chemical spills or accidents, but it is not equipped
for a large scale chemical or biological attack or destruction on the
scale of what we saw in New York City.
My colleague Senator DeWine, the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee, and I are committed to helping the District in this
regard as it develops a comprehensive emergency operations plan that
protects the people who live, work, and visit the District of Columbia
everyday, but also effectively manages any Federal resources that
become available.
I look forward to the presentations today. Let me thank our guests,
Mayor Williams, who will testify on behalf of the City, Council
Chairman Linda Cropp, Michael Rogers from the Metropolitan Area Council
of Governments, and the heads of District's key emergency response
agencies for being here today.
Senator DeWine.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE DEWINE
Senator DeWine. Senator Landrieu, thank you very much for
holding this very important hearing. This committee, under your
chairmanship, has focused on many important issues, but
certainly one of the issues that we have focused on is
children, and as we have today's hearing and hearings in the
future, as we look at the District of Columbia's needs in
regard to preparation for potential terrorist actions, we need
to pay particular attention to the children.
There are obviously sizeable differences between adults and
children, both physical and emotional differences. As we say,
children are not just small adults. They do have unique needs,
which means that in the event of additional terrorist attacks,
I believe we must be prepared to treat both adults and children
and understand the difference between the two.
Obviously, children are smaller than adults, they are lower
to the ground, which could put them in the direct path of some
agents like chlorine or sarin gas, both of which are heavier
than air and settle lower to the ground, where children would
be breathing.
Children breathe faster than adults, which means they will
inhale poisons and chemicals more quickly than adults. Children
often cannot swallow pills, and so we need to make sure that we
have antibiotics or other medicines that are in forms like
liquids that children can take.
Children lose body heat faster than adults, and so if a
child needed a decontamination shower as a result of a chemical
attack, firefighters emergency crews would need to take special
precautions for these children, such as setting up heat lamps
to keep them warm, so they do not go into shock.
It also means providing those children with a safe,
comfortable environment to ease their fears.
These are the kinds of things that we must take into
account as we assess the needs of our emergency response teams.
That is why today, Senators Dodd and Collins and I are
introducing legislation to help protect children from future
terrorist attacks. Our bill would make sure that those on the
front lines are prepared to treat and deal with child
casualties. We need to make sure that they are trained about
the differences between adults and children and, furthermore,
we need to make sure that first responders have equipment that
works on children, such as smaller needles, smaller oxygen
masks.
Madam Chairman, in addition to making sure that the
children in the District are protected, we are working on other
efforts. I am very pleased that in our recently passed fiscal
year 2002 D.C. appropriations bill, we were able to include $16
million to provide security protection for those living and
working in the District of Columbia. The September 11 Pentagon
bombing clearly demonstrated the need in the District to have
that integrated emergency management system in place. This
funding would pay for a coordinated emergency plan for the
District in cases of national security situations, including
terrorist threats, natural disasters, or other unanticipated
events.
Madam Chairman, of course, as you know, the bill also
includes funding for the local, Federal police mobile wireless
interoperability project, which would provide equipment to
facilitate direct communication between the D.C. Metropolitan
Police, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Park Police, and U.S. Capitol
Police.
In the next few weeks, we will be considering an emergency
supplemental appropriations bill that will provide additional
funds so that we may continue to recover, rebuild, and reassess
our Nation's ability to respond to future terrorist attacks.
I want to thank our panel for being here. We are involved,
of course, in providing some funds for the District of
Columbia, but you are the ones who are on the front line every
day. You are the ones who make a difference. You are the ones
who have to make the very, very tough and critical decisions,
so we thank you for being here. We have a great deal of respect
for you, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Senator DeWine, for that
excellent statement, and I so appreciate your comments about
helping us to be more sensitive as we design programs to make
sure they are designed well for adults and for children,
meeting all their special needs, as you so beautifully
outlined.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Let me
also commend you for holding this hearing, and commend the
Mayor and his colleagues for their valiant efforts over the
last several weeks. I suspect they knew a great deal about
emergencies on September 10. They know quite a bit more now,
not only the attack on the Pentagon, but the anthrax assault
here in Washington.
I think it is critical that we participate fully with you
as you reevaluate your plans, refocus your attentions, and
redirect resources so that the District of Columbia is prepared
for any eventuality going forward and frankly, after September
11 and the anthrax attacks, what we thought was unthinkable,
sadly is more and more routine. It is important that we
coordinate not only with you, but that you coordinate with your
neighboring communities, and I know you are doing that.
I hope through the series of hearings that the chairwoman
has outlined, that we can not only sense what you need, but
give you the resources to do the job. I had an opportunity to
sit down with my colleagues in Rhode Island, the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, all of the emergency management people in
Rhode Island. They have a good plan, but they have to exercise
the plan, and they need a lot of money to provide the resources
and the training to be effective responders. I would be
surprised if you were not in the same position.
But thank you very much, Mayor, and all of you, for your
great work and effort.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. Mr. Mayor, for your opening
remarks, and Ms. Cropp, and then we will take questions and
answers.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANTHONY A. WILLIAMS, MAYOR, DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
ACCOMPANIED BY:
MARGRET NEDELKOFF KELLEMS, DEPUTY MAYOR FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND
JUSTICE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
PETER LaPORTE, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
RICHARD A. WHITE, GENERAL MANAGER, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY
MICHAEL ROGERS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON
COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RONNIE FEW, CHIEF, DEPARTMENT OF FIRE AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARLES H. RAMSEY, CHIEF, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DR. IVAN C. A. WALKS, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
Mr. Williams. I want to thank you, Chairwoman Landrieu and
Ranking Member DeWine, and Senator Reed, for your interest in
this important topic and for calling this important hearing to
talk about our overall emergency preparedness plans. We are
grateful to all of you that you acknowledge that it is the
local jurisdiction in this case, most immediately the Nation's
Capital, that must perform the role as first responder in an
emergency incident. As residents and visitors of our city, we
have a responsibility to protect you and your families, and I
welcome the opportunity to discuss three important concerns to
you.
First, I want to assure you that we have an emergency
response plan that works and integrates all local, regional,
and Federal partners.
Second, we want to request your assistance in the short
term to enhance our emergency preparedness infrastructure.
And third, we request your support for the long haul,
because as long as our Nation is at war our Nation's Capital
and, I dare say, our other local jurisdictions will be at risk.
Now, we must manage that risk. We can overcome that risk,
but at risk we will be, both physically and financially.
Now, I have submitted my full testimony for the record, and
I would like to use my time with you this afternoon to discuss
in detail our emergency preparedness planning, but before I do
so, I think we cannot talk about emergency preparedness without
once again acknowledging the heroism of the emergency
responders in New York City and here in our area, who on
September 11 I think showed us what public duty and honor is
about and, as Mayor of our Nation's Capital, I want everyone to
know that our thoughts and our prayers are with the people of
New York, are with the people of Virginia and, most
importantly, with their loved ones.
Like all Americans, the leadership of the District never
anticipated the evil of using a passenger airliner as a weapon
of mass destruction, or using the U.S. mail as a conduit for
terror. For us, like most Americans, the cowardice of the
recent terrorism attacks galvanized our resolve to outthink,
outsmart, and outplan any terrorism that targets the District
of Columbia.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TASKFORCE
Immediately following September 11, I convened a task force
of senior District officials to review and improve the
District's emergency operations plan. This task force is
updating and enhancing the District's responsiveness plan that
describes the roles and responsibilities of District agencies
for the overall delivery of disaster assistance, as well as
their relationships with Federal agencies that may support them
should the situation warrant Federal assistance.
Our response plan also coordinates response and recovery
activities with volunteer agencies active in disasters, area
neighborhood community groups, and the business community.
DC TASKFORCE SUBCOMMITTEES
As you know, there already exists a comprehensive Federal
response plan. As a part of its work, my task force established
subcommittees in each of the critical emergency support
functions to mirror the Federal response plan. These emergency
support functions include a transportation group to review
current evacuation plans, a communications group tasked with
planning and implementing the District's emergency
communications needs, a law enforcement group tasked with
ensuring the public order being maintained during a crisis, and
a command and control group to oversee and coordinate all
operational response.
To ensure cross-jurisdictional coordination and effective
resource-sharing, these subcommittees include representatives
from all of the relevant Federal agencies, as well as--I
emphasize this--officials from the surrounding jurisdictions in
Maryland and Virginia. We are particularly grateful for the
leadership provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
which has brought the resources and representation of the
National Capital Region Response Team to the work of the
District's task force.
In addition, we are working closely with private sector
organizations that are vital to our ability to respond in an
emergency, including the American Red Cross and the Washington
Area Hospital Association, and Dr. Walks in the question and
answer period can talk about the role that our hospitals have
played, working with us in a network, in the recent anthrax
situation here in the District.
OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The District response plan is always operative, and I
emphasize that. It is always operative. It does not need to be
activated. There is a contingency plan that merely needs to be
implemented as required by the nature of the situation. This
ensures that no matter when the incident occurs, or how serious
the emergency is, appropriate response actions are immediately,
instantaneously put into action. This means that there is no
question of the appropriate response, and no confusion about
what each of the many first responders should expect from their
emergency response partners. This is a core of an effective
response plan.
FIRST RESPONDERS
Now, should disaster strike tomorrow, God forbid, two
things happen immediately and concurrently. One, appropriate
first responders, police, fire, emergency medical services or
health care professionals are deployed to the scene to begin
initial response and containment activities. Simultaneously,
notification protocols are set into motion. My senior
administration team and I are notified of the facts as they
come in through any one of numerous redundant voice and data
communications technologies. These systems are currently in
place. Decisionmaking begins immediately, even as our first
responders race to the scene.
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION COORDINATION
The District's emergency plan identifies the appropriate
emergency support function leader for each type of emergency.
In an emergency, each emergency support function leader is
notified, as are a number of independent and nongovernmental
agencies and organizations, including the D.C. public schools,
the utilities companies, surrounding jurisdictions, emergency
management agencies, and selected individuals in the Federal
Government. The plan also identifies liaison personnel who are
deployed to field command posts and Federal command centers as
appropriate to facilitate effective communications, and I think
this committee is right to emphasize the need for communication
and coordination, and we certainly see the need for it. There
is no way that we can defend adequately, let alone
satisfactorily or optimally our Nation's Capital, unless we
have that coordination.
As I have mentioned many, many times, Madam Chair, you
compare Rudy Giuliani's doing a brilliant job in New York City,
but he has got 40,000 New York City's police officers working
for him. We have a huge center of activity here, and potential
targets here. I have approximately 4,000 officers, they are
great officers, and I have great fire personnel, but there is
no way we can meet the challenge unless we coordinate and
communicate.
Now, based on early information and assessment, I will make
the decision as to the readiness level of the city. In
addition, in normal operations there are three levels of
readiness that we have patterned on the Federal levels, with
level 3 being the most extreme crisis situation. This mirrors
the Federal Government.
LEVEL 3 EMERGENCY RESPONSE
During a level 3 emergency, I would activate the city's
emergency operations center, or EOC. Under my leadership the
District's emergency management team, which is primarily my
agency directors, would assemble at the emergency operations
center to manage the incident. We believe that in a Level 3
situation we would also secure other key decisionmakers in the
District for command and control purposes and for line of
succession purposes. For example, the Council Chair and the
Mayor would not be necessarily in the same place, and I am sure
you can understand the reason for that.
JOINT INFORMATION CENTER
The emergency operations center becomes a clearinghouse for
critical operational information, and all requests for support
resources being brokered through the EOC. In addition, the plan
includes the establishment of a joint information center at the
EOC that will manage all public communications during an
incident. The EOC structure parallels that of both FEMA
regional operations center, and the headquarters FEMA
interagency emergency support team, allowing clear paths of
communications between responders at the local, regional, and
Federal level as well as with the general public.
Each emergency support function is responsible for
executing specific tasks that are detailed by the District
response plan. The emergency support function leader on duty in
the EOC coordinates information to and from the field, ensuring
that decisionmakers and managers in the EOC have instant and
accurate information.
This structure in the EOC allows us to quickly determine
the best staging area for each activity, and how to move people
in emergency equipment in and out of town. Emergency evacuation
and access routes are identified and incorporated in the
District's response plan.
The response plan identifies and evaluates the resources
available at each potential staging area, as well as the
requirements needed for each emergency support function, so,
for example, the plan identifies which public schools have
generators in the event of power loss, or where there are large
parking areas that can serve as a biohazard decontamination
center. We now have the mapping capability to prioritize and
select the appropriate staging area for each function, as well
as identify the access routes to and from these areas.
The District's emergency plan anticipates that during a
Level 3 emergency it may be necessary to declare a formal state
of emergency, as authorized in the D.C. Code. In that
circumstance, I would make a declaration of emergency, defining
which authorities granted to me by law I would invoke to
maintain order and safety in the city.
If necessary, I would also request a presidential
declaration of emergency or major disaster, and the
implementation of the Federal response plan, the effect of
which would be to make Federal support and assistance available
through FEMA. This eliminates layers of bureaucracy and
accelerates a Federal response.
A small example of that happening actually happened this
summer, when we had floods in the Bloomingdale section of our
city. We moved very, very quickly to the scene. We requested of
the President a presidential declaration of disaster, and I am
pleased to say the Bush administration responded within hours
of our request, and help was on the way to people in record
time.
TABLE TOP EXERCISES
We will exercise our plans and procedures until we are
comfortable that we can execute our roles and responsibilities
without hesitation. Last week, we took our emergency response
plan for a test drive, if you will, during a table top
exercise, and as in any test drive we found a lot of bugs in
the car. We tested our notification procedure, evaluated early
communications and decisionmaking during various emergency
levels, and assessed our overall readiness levels. We are now
making adjustments and further refinements, and we will test it
over again shortly, and we will continue to test it until we
have it to our level of satisfaction. We are encouraged that
FEMA has agreed to participate in our next table top exercise,
and we are extending the invitation to participate in these
exercises to our neighboring jurisdictions.
emergency preparedness investment
If I could, just for one final moment, talk about our
investment in emergency preparedness, because while we work
toward even better response and planning for a cataclysmic
event, the day-to-day operations of our response activities are
taking a toll on our city. In fact, the District incurs
unbudgeted costs which may have an impact on our service
delivery in the future. That is why we have included $250
million for emergency preparedness in our $1 billion request
for special appropriations.
This request includes investment in protecting clothing,
breathing apparatus, and specialized protection equipment for
our first responders, police officers, fire emergency, medical
and public health personnel in a chemical or biological
emergency, heavy equipment such as urban search and rescue
tools, a mobile laboratory for detecting chemical and
biological risks, and containment units at local hospitals,
specialized training for police, fire, and public health
personnel, and finally, the technological and communications
infrastructure to support front line emergency response
communications.
Each of these investments in my estimation are critical to
protect the personnel that we depend on in an emergency, and to
better serve the people who live and work in the District of
Columbia. I want to emphasize to the committee, this is not a
wish list, and I am sure this committee as appropriators have
seen a lot of wish lists. I would argue to you in all
sincerity, this is not your usual wish list, because without
the full funding, you place me as Mayor, and you place our
Council Chair in a very, very difficult position as hosts of a
nightmare game show.
Behind door number one is the ability to handle a
bioterrorism threat such as anthrax. Behind door number two is
the ability to conduct urban search and rescue should one of
our major Federal centers be a target and sustain massive
damage, and behind door number three is the ability to fight a
fire of the magnitude of Monday's disaster in the Rockaways in
New York City, and we are forced to pick one. This is not a
choice any of us wish to make, and I ask you, if you were
mayor, how would you decide to pick one of these doors? It is
an impossible task.
Meeting the challenges of today's reality is not going to
be fast, it is not going to be easy, and it is not going to be
without cost. With your support, I am committed to seeing that
our city meets and exceeds the newly created national standards
for emergency management and business continuity programs that
are endorsed by FEMA, the National Emergency Management
Association, and the International Association of Emergency
Management.
PROJECTED REVENUE LOSSES
Finally, the loss of revenue to the District since
September 11 is staggering. We are projecting a $750 million
hit to our economy, resulting in a loss of about $200 million
in tax receipts. The economic impact felt here in the District
has rippled throughout the regional economy, and I want to
assure you that in the District we are closely monitoring our
budget. We will not overspend the budget, not on my watch, and
not on the watch of our District leadership, but it is a cause
for concern.
The District's economy will continue to be vulnerable as
long as we must provide services to a city that serves 2
million people each day with a tax base of only 572,000
residents for support. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the
fact that while our country is at war, our economic base,
tourism, is threatened.
Now, in my written testimony I have outlined three viable
options that would begin to address the structural imbalance in
the District's budget, and I have talked to this committee
about this in the past. As I have in previous testimony, I will
again today ask the Congress to give them serious
consideration, because the District really should have the
ability to compete on a level playing field, and compete it
must, compete we are prepared to do, but we cannot compete
effectively if half of our assets are tied up and offline.
In closing, let me reiterate, we must stand united to make
certain that our Nation's Capital is safe and open for
business. We have developed an effective emergency plan that
seamlessly meshes the resources of the District, Federal
emergency agencies, independent partners, and the surrounding
jurisdictions. We need your short-term support to raise our
emergency response capability, and your long-term financial
assistance so that our city may weather any crisis that may
come.
prepared statements
I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify to the
committee. I want to thank the committee for its partnership
with the District, and most immediately thank the committee for
its concern for a very, very important topic in all of our
lives and the way we do business.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Mayor Anthony A. Williams
Good afternoon Chairwoman Landrieu, Ranking Member DeWine, and
members of the Committee. Thank you for calling this important hearing
to discuss the District of Columbia's overall emergency preparedness
plans. I welcome the opportunity to discuss three important concerns.
First, I want to assure you that we have an emergency response plan
that works and integrates all local, regional, and Federal partners.
Second, I request your assistance in the short term to enhance our
emergency preparedness infrastructure. And third, I also request your
support for the long haul, because as long as the Nation is at war, the
Nation's Capital will be at risk--both physically and financially.
The President has warned that the war against terrorism may not be
short and will not be easy. Your assistance in strengthening our
immediate emergency preparedness capabilities will help ensure that
this city, the Nation's Capital, maintains the highest state of
emergency preparedness in the country for the foreseeable future.
Being Mayor of the Nation's Capital means making sure that hometown
Washington works--picking up the garbage, keeping the streets safe,
attracting new businesses and jobs and, of course, doing all of that
within the available financial resources. But since September 11, this
city has become a vastly different place, and the responsibility of
this municipal government to respond to the most extraordinary threats
and attacks has grown exponentially.
As Mayor, I am now trying to calm the fears of the public in light
of the recent bio-terrorist attacks--reassuring our 572,000 residents,
the hundreds of thousands of people who work here everyday, and the
millions who come to visit from across the Nation and from around the
globe--that Washington is a safe place to be. The District's Fire and
Emergency Medical Services Department is now responding to 20 or 30
times the number of calls for suspicious packages and other hazardous
material concerns throughout the city and at the White House, Congress,
the Supreme Court, and all Federal agencies. The District's Department
of Health has become a first responder and service provider to tens of
thousands of postal workers and mail handlers in the city so that the
mail can continue to flow to District residents, local businesses, and
the Federal Government. The Metropolitan Police Department, in a
heightened state of alert since September 11, has a whole host of
expanded responsibilities, responding to hundreds of suspicious
packages, suspicious people, and bomb threats, and providing additional
officers to support the Federal law enforcement agencies protecting the
Federal holdings in the city. All of these activities must be
integrated with and balanced against the rights of the citizens to have
sufficient police presence to protect their neighborhoods and control
crime in our streets.
All of the agencies in my Administration have accepted their
responsibilities to our Nation's Capital with honor and have performed
with courage, skill, and care. We stand united to ensure that
Washington, D.C. continues to be a safe and exciting place to live,
visit, and do business.
As you well know, the District has successfully rebounded from a
financial crisis. Congress has been supportive throughout our financial
recovery. With your help, and the support of the recently retired
Financial Authority, the District has achieved financial stability.
However, because of severe financial limitations placed on the District
because it is the Capital, the city operates on a very small margin
with revenues staying just ahead of expenditures. Between the decrease
in revenue caused by the recent loss of tourism and the increased
demands on public safety and public health services, the terrorist
attacks have put enormous financial pressure on the District. I am
confident that the strong relationship that we have built between the
city and Congress during the financial recovery will enable us to work
as partners to meet the challenges ahead.
emergency preparedness and response
Like most Americans, the leadership of the District never
anticipated the evil of using a passenger airliner as a weapon of mass
destruction and the U.S. mail as a conduit of terror. For us, like most
Americans, the cowardice of the terrorist attacks that began on
September 11 galvanized our resolve to out-think, out-smart, and out-
plan any terrorist that targets the District of Columbia.
Immediately following September 11, I convened a Task Force of
senior District officials to review and improve the District's existing
Emergency Operations Plan. I gave the Task Force two primary
imperatives:
--Immediately enhance critical linkages and operational relationships
with our Federal, State and regional partners; and
-- Develop a comprehensive emergency management program capability
robust enough to respond to any incident.
As you know, there already exists a comprehensive Federal Response
Plan. My Task Force established subcommittees in each of the critical
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to mirror the Federal Response Plan,
including: a transportation group to review current evacuations plans;
a communications group tasked with planning and implementing the
District's emergency communications needs; a law enforcement group
tasked with ensuring that public order is maintained during a crisis;
and a command and control group to oversee and coordinate all
operational response.
To ensure cross-jurisdictional coordination and effective resource
sharing, these subcommittees include representatives from all of the
relevant Federal agencies, as well as officials from the surrounding
jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia. We are particularly grateful
for the leadership provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), which has brought the resources and representation of the
National Capitol Region Response Team to the work of the District's
Task Force. The National Capitol Region Response Team includes FEMA,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, among many others.
In addition, we are working closely with private sector
organizations that are vital to our ability to respond in an emergency,
including the American Red Cross and the Washington Area Hospital
Association.
This Task Force is updating and enhancing the District's Response
Plan that describes the roles and responsibilities of the District
agencies for the overall delivery of District disaster assistance, as
well as their relationships with Federal agencies that may support them
should the situation warrant Federal assistance.
The D.C. Response Plan also coordinates response and recovery
activities with volunteer agencies active in disasters, area
neighborhood community groups, and the business community. The D.C.
Response Plan is always operative. It does not need to be ``activated''
per se; it is a contingency plan that merely needs to be implemented as
required by the nature of the situation. This ensures that no matter
when an incident occurs, and what type of incident it may be,
appropriate response actions are immediately put into motion--there is
no question over the manner in which to respond, no confusion about
what each of the first responders should expect from their emergency
response partners. This is the core of an effective response plan.
Should disaster strike tomorrow, God forbid--any incident from a
water main break to a bioterrorism attack--two things happen
immediately and concurrently. One, appropriate first responders--
police, fire, EMS, or health professionals--are deployed to the scene
to begin initial response and containment activities, as necessary.
Simultaneously, notification protocols are set into motion. My senior
Administration team and I are notified of the preliminary facts as they
come in. Notification is received through any one of numerous redundant
voice and data communications technologies that are now in place.
Decision-making begins immediately, even as additional information and
confirmations come in from the first responders on the scene.
Based on early information and assessment, I will make the
decision as to what level of readiness the city should be in. In
addition to normal operations, there are three levels of readiness, the
highest of which is Level III, mirroring the Federal readiness levels.
In a Level III emergency--the most extreme crisis situation--I activate
the city's Emergency Operations Center, or EOC. Together with my senior
management team, I go to the EOC to manage the incident.
In a Level III emergency, the agency heads leading each Emergency
Support Function (ESF) are notified, as are a number of independent and
non-governmental agencies and organizations including the D.C. Public
Schools, the utilities, the surrounding jurisdictions emergency
management agencies, and selected individuals in the Federal
Government. Appropriate representatives have been identified for the
various types of emergencies, and those individuals would report to the
EOC where all emergency operations are coordinated. The plan also
identifies liaison personnel who are deployed to field command posts
and Federal command centers, as appropriate, to facilitate effective
communications.
The EOC is the clearinghouse of critical operational information
and all requests for support resources are brokered through the EOC.
The EOC structure parallels that of both the FEMA Regional Operations
Center and the Headquarters FEMA Interagency Emergency Support Team,
allowing clear paths of communication between responders at the local,
regional, and Federal level.
Each ESF leader is responsible for executing the tasks that come
to them, all of which are defined by the District Response Plan. Each
ESF leader in the EOC sends information to first responders in the
field. These ESF leaders also gather information from those in the
field to ensure that the decision-makers and managers in the EOC have
instant and accurate information.
From the EOC, we will determine where all activities will be
staged and how we will move people and emergency equipment in and out
of town on emergency evacuation and access routes. Since September 11,
we have identified all available staging areas, their physical
attributes, for example, generators at certain public schools, and the
requirements of the various ESF operations, such as the need for large
parking areas, independent power supplies, and square footage. We now
have a dynamic mapping capability that will allow the Incident
Management Team in the EOC to prioritize and select staging areas for
the various ESF operations and access routes between those areas and
the incident scene.
One important Emergency Support Function is Public Affairs
function that will be operated out of the EOC during a Level III
emergency. The Public Affairs ESF is the communications hub for getting
information out to the public. Since September 11, we have built the
operational framework for a Joint Information Center, at the EOC that
will manage all public communications during an incident.
It may be necessary during a Level III emergency to declare a State
of Emergency as authorized by D.C. Code. In that circumstance, I would
make a declaration of emergency, defining which authorities granted to
me by law I would invoke to maintain order in the city. If necessary, I
would also request a Presidential Declaration of Emergency or Major
Disaster and the implementation of the Federal Response Plan, the
effect of which would be to make Federal support and assistance
available through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This
eliminates layers of bureaucracy and accelerates the Federal response.
For example, once a Presidential declaration has been made, the
District Department of Public Works, which is the Emergency Support
Function leader for public works and engineering, can request Federal
assistance from FEMA for debris removal, emergency water supplies or
emergency power generation. My director of Public Works has been
meeting for several weeks with representatives of the Army Corps of
Engineers and FEMA to ensure that emergency plans are in place should a
Presidential declaration be made.
Similarly, my primary agencies for other emergency support
functions are building the same type of relationships with their
Federal partners to ensure seamless operations in each functional area.
The District Division of Transportation has met with the U.S.
Department of Transportation and the Departments of Transportation for
Virginia and Maryland to build interoperability in the transportation
function.
For all of these relationships to work effectively, we must test
our plans and exercise our operational responses. On Thursday of last
week I participated in a tabletop exercise with my key agency heads. We
reviewed our notification procedures, discussed early communications
and decision-making in an emergency operating environment and assessed
our readiness levels. As a result we are making adjustments and further
enhancements. We will have another tabletop next week and another
following that one. We will exercise our plans and procedures until I
am comfortable that we can execute our roles and responsibilities
without hesitation. FEMA has agreed to participate in our tabletop
exercises and we are extending the invitation to our neighboring
jurisdictions as the scenarios warrant.
If we are to be successful in safeguarding the Capital, it will
require effective communications between the Federal Government and the
District. Two weeks ago I had a productive meeting with Governor Ridge
who is personally committed to working with me towards additional
improvements in District-Federal cooperation. Since then, staff from
Governor Ridge's office have met with my senior staff as well.
short term investment in emergency preparedness
While we work towards even better response and planning for a
cataclysmic event, the day to day operations of our response activities
are taking a toll. Over the past two weeks, our Fire and Emergency
Medical Services Department have responded to between 30 and 70
hazardous material (hazmat) calls per day. The Metropolitan Police
Department has been on a heightened state of alert since September 11--
which has meant greater numbers of officers deployed, using more
overtime dollars. In fact, we estimate that the additional personnel
costs alone for police for the six months subsequent to September 11
will be more than $6 million and more than $5 million for Fire EMS.
I am here today to tell you that the men and women of the
District's public safety and public health agencies are doing what
needs to be done, but we are depleting our resources, and it is
creating problems for the normal operations of hometown Washington,
D.C. I have instructed the Fire EMS Chief to do what is necessary to
respond to 30-70 hazmat calls per day, but we are running our hazmat
units on unbudgeted overtime dollars. If we must sustain the current
operational tempo over the long haul, we are determined to develop
flexibility and depth far beyond what anyone has done before because of
the unique responsibilities of this city as home to the Federal
Government.
That is why we have included $250 million for emergency
preparedness in our $1 billion request for special appropriations. This
$250 million request includes investments in:
--Protective clothing, breathing apparatus, and specialized detection
equipment for our police officers, fire/emergency medical and
public health personnel who will be first responders in a
chemical or biological emergency;
--Heavy equipment such as urban search and rescue tools, a mobile
laboratory for testing and detecting chemical and biological
risks and containment units at local hospitals;
--Specialized training for police, fire/EMS and public health
personnel; and
--Technological and communications infrastructure to support front
line emergency response communications.
In addition to investing in the personnel that we depend upon in an
emergency, this request will allow us to better serve the people who
live and work in the District of Columbia. But this is not going to be
fast; it is not going to be easy; and it is not going to be without
cost. Together with our regional and Federal partners, and with the
support of Congress, I am committed to seeing that our city meets--and
exceeds--the newly created national standards for emergency management
and business continuity programs endorsed by FEMA, the National
Emergency Management Association, and the International Association of
Emergency Management.
This investment in the District's emergency response capability
will help strengthen our preparedness to levels the American people
should expect. Our Nation's Capital will always be a ``higher risk
environment'' than most cities, and responding to a major emergency
requires coordination and cooperation among all the local
jurisdictions.
long-term fiscal assistance
As we have seen so clearly over the past two months, when terrorist
attacks close down the U.S. Capitol, shut down Reagan National Airport,
and spread fear of biological warfare, many Americans are afraid to
come to their Nation's Capital. The loss of revenue to the District
since September 11 is staggering--we are projecting a $750 million hit
to our economy, resulting in a loss of about $200 million in tax
receipts. The economic impact felt here in the District has rippled
throughout the regional economy. From what I understand both Maryland
and Virginia are projecting significantly lower revenues as a direct
result of September 11, and local governments in the surrounding
jurisdictions have frozen spending and have imposed hiring freezes. In
the District we are closely monitoring our budget . . . We will not go
into deficit spending on my watch!
I am deeply proud of the fact that the city has successfully
rebounded from fiscal straits and emerged from a control period within
four short years, while vastly improving the quality of services we
provide to our residents. But the District's fiscal stability and
growth may be vulnerable due to pressures generated by a weakened
tourism industry combined with economic and national uncertainty. I
fear that we continue to operate at one emergency away from financial
difficulties. This will not be resolved until we address the core
problem--congressionally imposed restrictions on our tax base. I
strongly believe that the District's economy will continue to be
vulnerable as long as we must provide services to a city that serves
millions of people each day with a tax base of only 572,000 residents
for support. This vulnerability is only exacerbated by the fact that
while the country is at war our economic base, tourism, is threatened.
From the Federal Government, these restrictions represent a
reasonable exercise of prerogative in the Nation's Capital. For the
District, however, these restrictions prevent the collection of fair
compensation for services rendered--compensation that proves critically
necessary for investing in infrastructure and service improvements, and
maintaining a structurally balanced budget. For every dollar earned in
the District, over 60 cents goes to the surrounding jurisdictions, 60
cents that cannot be taxed to reimburse the District for maintaining
the city's infrastructure and services.
Congress should compensate the District for these restrictions.
Without an equitable compensation, the District's long-term financial
stability is at jeopardy. There are several viable options I ask
Congress to seriously consider:
Congresswoman Norton has presented the District of Columbia Non-
Resident Tax Credit Act. This would allow the District to tax income of
non-residents, then offset these taxes with a Federal credit. In its
anticipated form, this proposal would yield approximately $400 million
in fiscal year 2003. The advantage of this proposal is that it affords
the District, like States across the country, the opportunity to tax
local income at its source, without unduly harming the residents of
Maryland and Virginia.
Another option requires that the Federal Government provide a 2
percent credit to the District government on Federal taxes paid by
District residents. This amount, approximately $500 million in fiscal
year 2003, would compensate the District for Federal restrictions while
providing funds to provide critical services.
A third option envisions that the Federal Government establishes a
Municipal Reimbursement Fund on behalf of the District to support
critical needs.
Regardless of the compensation mechanism selected, the District
would focus substantial resources on infrastructure needs related to
transportation, information technology, capital construction, and
renovation. Through these options, or some appropriate alternative, the
Federal Government should provide compensation for restrictions that
have resulted in the structural imbalance of the District's budget.
In closing, let me reiterate: We must stand united in conveying
that the city is safe and open for business. The Nation looks to
Washington to define normal in this new reality; to that end we have an
effective emergency plan, but we need your short term support to
enhance our emergency infrastructure and your long term fiscal
assistance so that the city may weather any crisis that may come.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to
our ongoing discussions about protecting our beloved city and the
Nation's Capital and long term and short term Federal assistance to the
District. I will now be happy to answer any questions you may have.
______
Prepared Statement of Michael Rogers
Good Morning Senator Landrieu and Members of the Subcommittee. I'm
pleased to be here today to discuss emergency preparedness for the
Washington region and what the Council of Governments is doing to make
sure those plans are effective and complete.
As you know, the Council of Governments, or COG, is the association
of 17 major cities and counties in the Washington metropolitan area.
COG provides a forum for regional cooperation. At COG, elected
officials work together to find solutions to our shared challenges, and
then continue to work together to implement those solutions. This
organization also serves its members by acting as a think tank for
local governments and a regional information source on the environment,
transportation and human services.
COG represents a partnership that provides solid research, planning
and leadership, and can ensure that this region speaks with one voice.
As we confront the aftermath of the September 11 tragedy, I believe
there has been no other time in COG's 44-year history when those
services have been more valuable to the region.
In recent weeks, COG has brought together the emergency management
and public safety officials from our member governments, State and
Federal officials, and local health organizations. Our purpose has been
to coordinate the work that is being done by each of these entities
into an effective and complete regional plan of action to be used in
the event of major emergencies.
COG continues to do what we do best--serve as a forum for
interested parties to come together to discuss and plan for a specific
emergency. We can do this because of COG's committee support structure
that provides a place and mechanism for public safety officials to come
together to address common needs and responses.
In addition to the committee structure, the concept of a forum has
been extended to COG serving as moderator of regional conference calls
of public officials getting together to discuss event-related topics,
such as government and school openings and closings, need for
information hotlines, mutual aid, etc.
COG facilities also are available for emergency meetings at the
time of a disaster, such as those held during the Cryptosporidium scare
in December 1993 and recent meetings regarding the re-opening of
National Airport. If called upon 1COG can and did serve as the location
for a hotline, with the attendant call takers, to give information to
the public regarding the nature of the emergency.
To give the local governments the tools that they need to manage an
incident, COG has developed agreements, plans, and communication
systems to aid them. Basic to contingency planning are the police and
fire mutual aid agreements developed in the early 1970's. When one
jurisdiction has an emergency and has committed or foresees that it
will commit all of its resources, it can request aid from its
neighbors. This was ably demonstrated at the Pentagon on September 11
and continues as the FBI takes over the investigation at the disaster
site. Work remains to be done at COG that would allow mutual aid to be
used in a non-emergency, pre- deployment situation, such as the now
canceled IMF/World Bank meeting.
After the Air Florida Crash, COG took advantage of lessons learned
and greatly improved the mutual aid operational plan called for in the
police and fire mutual aid agreements. Using the Incident Command
System as a basis, the operational plan spelled out how mutual aid
would be provided to ensure that only legitimate aid was provided. The
principles of incident command--with a single incident commander in
charge and assisted by supporting staff--is being taught to responders
at all levels of government.
The question has been asked if COG has a terrorism plan. The short
answer is no. The mutual aid operational plan developed after Air
Florida is an all hazards plan. At the regional level, the planning
principles contained in the Incident Command System are applicable to a
whole host of contingencies, from a simple car crash to an aircraft
accident. Specific planning remains the responsibility of the local and
State Governments. Disaster response in this country flows from city or
county to State and then to the national level. A regional organization
such as COG is an anomaly in the process and thus is limited in what it
can do. We help where our local governments perceive a role for COG.
One such role for COG has been to develop the communications
systems needed to talk to each other and to the public. A variety of
systems exist. Police, fire, and DC hospitals have Mutual Aid Radio
Systems that are tested daily and used with some regularity and most
definitely on September 11. In the planning stage are systems such as
CapWin and PSWN, both are intended to provide communications
interoperability in this region. We are getting close to when every
public safety and transportation entity will be able to talk to each
other at the scene of an incident--a condition that didn't exist at the
time of the Suicide Jumper on the Woodrow Wilson Bridge in November
1998.
The quickest way for local, State and Federal Government agencies
to disseminate information is by use of the Washington Area Warning
System--a landline phone system known as WAWAS. WAWAS is a special
circuit of the National Alert Warning System (NAWAS). FEMA has given
this capability to the Washington area because the seat of government
is here in Washington and as such, is very vulnerable to attack--
nuclear in the past--terrorism in the present. Mostly this system is
used by the National Weather Service for weather warnings. This system
was used extensively in the recent disaster.
Whereas WAWAS is for inter-governmental communications, the
Emergency Alert System (EAS), formerly known as the Emergency Broadcast
System (EBS), is for communicating with the public. A public official
with a message for the public can interrupt radio and TV broadcasting
in the metropolitan region by arranging with their emergency management
agency to contact the primary EAS stations in the area, WTOP and WMAL.
Through a daisy chain arrangement, stations all over the region will
transmit the official's message to the listening and viewing public.
This system was not used at any level of government on September 11.
As you can see COG's role in an emergency is fairly limited but
effective where we are involved. In the September 11th incident at the
Pentagon, city and county administrators and school officials talked in
four COG-arranged conference calls to decide government and school
openings or closings. For future events, a recommendation was made for
emergency management officials to confer on a regular basis by
conference call rather than rely solely on the Washington Area Warning
System.
My final point is that COG provides a ready-made forum for
investigating and solving the region's disaster preparedness needs. As
such, the Federal Government is favorably inclined to deal with a
single entity rather than 17 individual governments. This was the case
with the Snow Plan, the Metropolitan Medical Strike Team and the
recently completed Planning Guidance for the Health System Response to
a Bioevent in the National Capital Region COG through the Bio-
terrorism Task Force developed the planning factors and the guidance
was passed on to the individual jurisdictions for implementation.
The COG Board and Chief Administrative Officers Committee have both
held extensive briefings on lessons learned from September 11 and have
begun to outline follow up plans for COG so that we may improve
regional coordination and communication in the future. Areas of focus
include:
--Developing a real-time communication capability to gather
information and coordinate decision-making.
--Improving communication equipment and system interoperability.
--Exploring guidelines for use by public and private employers,
including schools for any closure or early dismissal decisions.
--Accelerating COG's efforts to revise mutual aid agreements to allow
for pre-deployment in non- emergency situations of mutual aid.
--Identify the essential outcomes of various local, State and Federal
agency after action efforts, and organize a regional effort to
strengthen our region's overall emergency preparedness and
response capabilities.
In each of these areas, COG anticipates working closely with key
local, State and Federal emergency management and public safety
agencies to ensure that our regional efforts are carefully coordinated
with all relevant stakeholders.
This morning I would like to outline the major steps COG has taken,
and discuss how we plan to address the key issues and questions
regarding emergency preparedness that confront the region. I'll also
answer any further questions members of the committee may have.
the steps cog has taken
At a special meeting on September 25, the COG board encouraged the
Mayor of the District of Columbia and the chief executives from all the
region's jurisdictions to work with COG to ensure that our regional
infrastructure was prepared to respond to catastrophic events like
those on September 11.
At that meeting, we began the process of reviewing the police and
fire mutual aid agreements that COG has had in place since the early
1970's. The system worked very well on September 11, but we realize
they need to be widened to address the new types of threats that can be
directed at the Washington area.
On October 10, COG's Chair Carol Schwartz, an at-large member of
the District of Columbia Council, sent a letter to Secretary Tom Ridge
of the Office of Homeland Security, asking him to make security plans
for this region a model for the nation.
On October 24, Chair Schwartz convened the first meeting of the COG
Board Ad Hoc Task Force on Emergency Preparedness. The task force will
continue to meet to coordinate regional emergency response plans into a
unit that addresses policy-making, public safety, transportation,
evacuation, communications, public utilities and health systems.
On October 25, COG's Energy Policy Advisory Committee, which will
report to the Board task force, met with the region's energy providers
and distributors to get an assessment of the state of security for
energy generation, transmission and distribution facilities in the
region. We have the participation of the major utilities in the area
and the senior-level energy managers of our local governments. Efforts
are underway to coordinate the committee's work with Federal officials.
On October 30, another major part of the COG task force began
working as transportation officials from around the region met to
consider transportation plans in the event of an emergency. They
discussed the need for new radio systems to let police and
transportation officials from different jurisdictions contact each
other directly, as well as devising a plan to let the public know how
to get home in the event of an emergency.
At the next COG Board meeting, we will be very pleased to present
the recently completed regional Planning Guidance to help health care
systems handle bioterrorism. This document is a model of the kind of
coordination that COG helps to sponsor in the region. It is designed so
that every health official in the region knows the lines of authority
in each jurisdiction. More importantly, it details the relevant
information that must be gathered during what is termed a ``bio-
event,'' the methods of analysis to be used and the actions that must
be taken. It is designed to ensure that regional health officials are
responding in an organized, coordinated manner.
COG will also take a fresh look at its overall communications and
coordination role during emergencies. We have in place a system of
conference calls and notification systems among government officials
that will be strengthened and kept up-to- date. Finally, COG is working
on a critical issue that will require Congressional action. That is the
passage of legislation to address liability issues between
jurisdictions when the region's police and fire mutual aid agreements
must be used.
In conclusion, I want the committee members to know that the
Council of Governments is committed to working with the Federal
Government, through FEMA and the Office of Homeland Security and with
every jurisdiction in the region to develop the emergency preparedness
plans that we need in the region. I know I speak for all of our board
members when I say we regard this task as our goal and our duty.
We are working with caution, care and all deliberate speed and we
will remain in close contact with this committee and the relevant
Federal offices as we move forward.
------
Prepared Statement of Richard White
Chairman Landrieu and members of the Subcommittee, good afternoon,
and thank you for asking me to testify on the important subject of
emergency preparedness in the wake of September 11. I am Richard White,
and I am proud to serve as General Manager of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) here in the National
Capital Region.
The events of September 11 have affected all aspects of national
life. Daily and routine events like business trips, vacation travel,
and commuting have been changed forever. Although WMATA handled its
mission well on that tragic day, we now face altered expectations, from
our customers, many of whom work for the Federal Government.
By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 through enactment
of legislation by the U.S. Congress, and by the Commonwealth of
Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the District of Columbia. The
Metro System was designed primarily to serve the employees of the
Federal Government, the citizens of our region and the entire Nation
who come to Washington to do business with the Federal Government, and
the millions of people who visit the National Capital Region from
throughout the world.
Approximately 40 percent, or 200,000 of the region's residents who
commute to the National Capital Core Area use transit. Half of
Metrorail stations serve Federal facilities, and about 36 percent of
the locally based Federal workforce use the Metro system to commute to
their jobs. Safety and security are our top concern for each of the 1.1
million daily trips provided our rail and bus system, so the important
work of the National Capital Region can continue under all
circumstances.
Before responding to your questions regarding safety, I would like
to acknowledge the extraordinary efforts of our New York and New Jersey
colleagues. They were heroes in their communities. There were many
courageous acts performed by transit employees, actions which saved
thousands of lives that otherwise could have been lost in the subway
tunnels that ran underneath the World Trade Center complex. In those
and other systems across the Nation, America's transit customers were
safeguarded on that sad day. And, Madame Chairman and members of the
Committee, I believe that WMATA and transit systems across the country
will play an even greater role in our national defense and national
security in the months and years ahead.
The most significant issue facing WMATA is adapting to the post
September 11 reality that our freedom of mobility has been challenged.
Security is paramount in the minds of our riders. WMATA is considered
one of the safest transit systems in the country, but we are always
reviewing ways to improve. Even before September 11, WMATA had prepared
System Safety and System Security Program Plans; had developed standard
operating procedures and plans to guide a variety of operational
response situations; had established procedures and practices for
activating our Emergency Operations Command Center (EOC); and had
created redundant communications systems. In addition, we have been
conducting annual counter-terrorism and explosive incident training for
police and operations personnel, as well as providing a high level of
interagency coordination and training programs and exercises with the
many law enforcement and fire and emergency rescue agencies in the
metropolitan area.
Since September 11 we have taken a number of actions to provide
enhanced security, including:
Law Enforcement Visibility.--Metro Transit Police and all Metro
employees remain on high alert. Additional uniformed and plainclothes
officers have been deployed throughout the Metro System, wearing bright
orange safety vests to make them more visible to customers. Further,
many of our other front line personnel also wear bright colored vests
to make them more visible to our customers.
Improved Standard Operating Procedures.--Revised procedures were
put into place October 18, 2001, for responding to suspected releases
of hazardous materials on a train, right-of-way, rail station and on a
Metrobus. A companion training program for all appropriate operations
employees is also being put into place. These procedures, developed in
consultation with our local fire departments, strike an appropriate
balance between when, in case of an incident, we stop service for an
indefinite period of time and when we continue to operate, but in a
restricted manner.
Daily Sweeps.--Each day our Operations Department performs thorough
safety and security inspections of both our revenue and non-revenue
facilities at the beginning of each shift.
Removal of Trash and Recycling Containers.--All trash containers
and recycling bins have been removed from our station platforms and
relocated to other less crowded areas in order to minimize the
possibility of these being used for destructive purposes. We have also
moved, or removed, bicycle lockers and newspaper vending machines from
areas that sit below rail overpasses.
``Bomb Threat'' Assessments.--We have reinstructed our employees in
reporting suspicious or unattended packages and in dealing with phone
in threats.
Enlist the Help of our Customers.--Several ``Dear Fellow Rider''
letters have been distributed to our customers to engage them in our
security efforts and to ask them to help to be our eyes and ears in
reporting unusual events.
Improved Internal WMATA Security, Procedures and Communications.--
We have updated the emergency evacuation plans for each of our
facilities and are conducting emergency evacuation drills. The security
at our headquarters building has been enhanced and we have plans to
implement an electronic access system. In our mailroom, we have
conducted training sessions, with written guidelines, and issued
personal protective gloves for all mail handlers. All WMATA employees
are receiving training on emergency management issues, such as station
and train evacuation procedures and identifying and reporting
unattended packages.
request for security funding
We recently have conducted an updated comprehensive risk assessment
of our revenue and non-revenue facilities and equipment. On October 12
we sent a request to the Office of Management and Budget Director
Daniels detailing our a request of $190 million in security funding
requirements based on the security assessments that have been made to
date. I am submitting for the record a copy of our request to OMB
Director Daniels. Our request covers:
[Millions of Dollars]
Description of Enhancement Cost
Additional high visibility uniformed patrols at key Metrorail
stations and eight additional K-9 teams....................... 2.0
Completion of Metrorail Fiber Optic Network vital for video
recording devices............................................. 2.2
Metrorail Facilities Intrusion Detection Equipment................ 8.9
Electronic Employee ID targets and vehicular gates at all Metro
facilities.................................................... 1.8
Personal Protective Equipment for 5,000 employees; training; and
satellite telephones for key personnel........................ 5.0
Facilities modifications for bomb resistance, including bomb
containment trash containers at all stations.................. 7.0
Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) System for Metrobus to pinpoint
the exact location of all our buses and to direct emergency
personnel..................................................... 15.0
Expand chemical emergency sensor program.......................... 81.0
Intrusion Detection Warning System, Closed Circuit TV, and alarms
at Metrorail shops and yards.................................. 7.2
Backup Operations Control Center and Emergency Command Center..... 40.0
Digital cameras installed on all Metrobuses....................... 20.0
______
Total......................................................... 190.1
Our total $190.1 million request includes items that we believe are
highly valuable and directly linked to enhancing our safety and
security capabilities for our customers and our employees.
emergency planning in the national capital region
We are working closely with the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments (MWCOG) as a key member of a transportation committee--
chaired by City of Fairfax Mayor John Mason, who also serves as
chairman of MWCOG's National Capital Region Transportation Planning
Board--to ensure that our Metro system is seen by all as a vital
component of this region's national defense and emergency response
strategy. The important work of this transportation committee is now
bringing together all the region's transportation implementation
agencies (DCDOT, VDOT, MDOT) and the region's 11 transit providers to
open the lines of communication and coordination in an emergency
situation, and to develop a plan or ``play book'' for any number of
situations that may arise in the future. This effort, however, cannot
stand on its own. As part of a broader effort the MWCOG Board, chaired
by D.C. Council Member Carol Schwartz, is seeking to establish a truly
regional emergency response plan that includes police and security,
fire and safety, emergency medical and regional communications. It is
designed to mirror the work being done by Governor Tom Ridge in the
President's Office of Homeland Security.
There are several additional working groups that are undertaking
similar efforts to ensure a regional, rather than local, response to
any future potential terrorist acts. Madame Chair and members of the
committee, I feel strongly that any efforts along these lines will only
succeed when everyone who is a major stakeholder in the safety and
security of this National Capital Region, including the civilian and
military components of the Federal Government, the State governments
and regional and local governmental agencies, has a seat at the table
and is a contributing participant as plans are being developed.
conclusion
I greatly appreciate the Subcommittee's consideration of WMATA's
funding request for security enhancements. Now is the time for the
Nation to consider certain transit properties, such as the WMATA
System, as part of the national defense system, and to contemplate
their value and needs as the evacuation method of choice, and possibly
necessity, during specific emergency situations. Every mode of
transportation is important during emergencies, but transit has
experienced the highest growth rate of any of the transportation modes
over the past 5 years. It is able to move people much more quickly and
efficiently than congested roads and highways can. The Nation needs to
view our transit systems in this national defense context in order to
properly recognize the new reality. Given the fact that WMATA is
located in the National Capital Region and is so integral to the
workings of the Federal Government, there is an even greater need to
enhance security in the Metro System.
Thank you for holding a hearing on this important subject. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Mayor, for that very
concise and instructive statement, and now we will hear from
our council chair.
STATEMENT OF LINDA W. CROPP, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Ms. Cropp. Thank you very much, and good afternoon,
Chairwoman Landrieu and Senators DeWine and Reed. It is a
pleasure to be here with you, and thank you for the invitation
to allow the legislative branch of Government to come and
testify before you.
First, let me emphasize that the District of Columbia has
an operational emergency preparedness and response plan to
serve the needs of all who live, work, and visit the Nation's
Capital. I will not read the entire testimony, but I would like
to submit the entire testimony for the record.
While no one anticipated the terrorist attacks of September
11, there did exist on that day a working emergency operations
center at the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency,
where the Mayor went and became the incident commander, as is
protocol, from which the media communications operations was
launched, and where all interagency coordination occurred that
day, as is protocol.
With the anthrax concern, our Mayor gave this city and,
indeed, the Nation, a sense of calm, strength, and stability.
Also on September 11, the District of Columbia had the
Metropolitan Police Department state of the art joint
operations command center up and running, which coordinated all
law enforcement operations, both Federal and local, throughout
the city and, as you may know, the JOCC was instrumental in
rumor control.
Since September 11, the District government has been
participating with our Federal, regional, and private sector
partners in comprehensive planning for other potential
terrorist attacks. Immediately after 9/11, the Mayor
established a domestic terrorism task force in which virtually
his entire cabinet has participated, along with the legislative
branch. Kathy Patterson, who chairs our Judiciary Committee,
Vincent Orange with Government Operations, and several other
council chairs.
Through these meetings, the Williams administration has
been updating and enhancing the District's emergency operation
plans, which from now on will be based on the Federal response
plan. The District's domestic terrorism task force has
participated in table top exercises to test and practice the
city's response to disaster.
As you know, the District also has responded to 9/11 by
immediately assessing its critical needs in terms of resources
for specialized equipment, personnel training, and
communications infrastructure. The Mayor has outlined the
details of this $250 million request for Federal funding, which
is vital to ensure the adequate emergency preparedness and
response in this Nation's Capital.
The District of Columbia enjoys many benefits, but also
bears several unique costs because of its status as the
Nation's Capital. With regard to the effect of the devastating
terrorist attacks on September 11 and their continuing
aftermath, let me review some of the unique costs that are
being borne by the District government, and why we need the
uniquely high Federal dollars to assist us both directly with
these costs and to assist with our economic survival so that
the District has sufficient revenue to help pay for vital
services that we provide to the Federal Government.
As you know, it is primarily local resources that have been
used to protect the public safety and public health of not only
the 600,000 residents who live within the District and not only
the 2 million people, mostly from Maryland and Virginia, who
work here every day, but also the foreign embassies and the
entire Federal establishment which is headquartered here in our
Nation's Capital.
The reality is that local governments everywhere are the
first responders in this new war against terrorism on our
homeland. It has been our local police officers, local
firefighters, local emergency medical technicians, local
management directors, local public health officials who have
been the first responders to the attacks and the threats
against America. Here in the Nation's Capital, which has been
and will continue to be a primary target for terrorism, it has
been locally raised revenue that has been paying in large
amounts for the safety and health of the Federal Government and
its workforce.
While our fervent patriotism and responsibility demands
that we protect our Federal Government, our fervor and our
responsibility is not diminished to protect our local residents
and businesses. Therefore, Congress and the President must
recognize that when, for example, our police force is deployed
from our neighborhoods to protect Federal facilities and
Federal officials, more than what was previously the norm, our
local residents and businesses become less protected than
previous.
When demand by the Federal Government for the District's
first responders is greater than can be paid for by locally
raised revenue, the Federal Government has a special
responsibility to help address these financial needs. Other
cities have States that step up to the plate, and other cities
simply do not have the level of Federal presence and historic
monuments that we have.
Mayor Williams has indicated the District is expected to
lose $750 million in just the first 6 months after September
11. At least 10,000 small businesses are at risk, a result of
this disaster.
I am going to skip over some of my testimony.
Of course, we are a Nation at war, and unlike any war we
have ever experienced, because it is a war against terrorism in
our homeland and the Nation's Capital, it is at the epicenter
of this war. We who live here, with the nightly roar of F-15
Air Force jets flying overhead, with our main post office and
many mail rooms closed due to anthrax contamination, and with
the constant uncertainty of when and where and in what form the
next attack will take place, we are painfully aware of what a
prime target we are to our enemies, and yet those jets and
other security precautions that are being taken actually make
us one of the most protected cities in America today.
The Federal Government certainly must take all the
necessary steps to ensure the security of Federal facilities
and officials in Washington, and the District government with
our police, fire, public health, emergency management, and
other agencies is certainly doing our part to assist in this
security cost, for which the District has not been adequately
compensated.
Security must be balanced with public accessibility and
democratic values. We worry about projecting the wrong negative
image of a city under siege and hurting tourism, which is our
number one business, once we get past the Federal Government.
We must reopen and advertise the reopening of the White House,
the United States Capitol, and our other national icons here to
tourists as soon as possible.
We urge you to support the request of the National Capital
Planning Commission for Federal funding of security measures
which are comprehensively designed and built to increase public
safety while also maintaining public accessibility and the
physical beauty of the Nation's Capital.
We appreciate the President's request for $25 million in
emergency management funds to the District. We also appreciate
that this amount is in addition to the $16 million already
included in both the House and Senate version of the 2002
budget. However, these amounts, as the Mayor detailed, fall far
short of the city's needs. The Council joins the Mayor in
asking for your support and advocacy in obtaining the
District's full request of $1 billion in emergency preparedness
and economic assistance funding. These funds are critical to
the District's survival. The specific purposes of each of these
dollars are detailed in the document provided by the mayor to
the Congress and the White House.
The Council calls upon the Congress to support
Congresswoman Norton's legislation to require the District
government to be included in all aspects of Federal emergency
planning, emergency preparedness. We also support the
legislation to provide the Mayor of the District of Columbia
with the authority to mobilize the National Guard, the same
authority that governments of all 50 States have. The Council
joins with the Mayor and our Congresswoman in urging the
subcommittee's advocacy for short-term funding.
prepared statement
I want to thank you again for this opportunity to testify
before the subcommittee today and, as always, I look forward to
working with you to ensure a brighter tomorrow for the Nation's
Capital for all who live, work, and visit here.
Thank you very much.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Linda Cropp
Good morning, Chairwoman Landrieu and members of the Subcommittee,
and thank you for your invitation to testify at this hearing today. I
would like to take this opportunity to comment on the District of
Columbia's emergency preparedness and the District's economy in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States.
First, let me emphasize that the District of Columbia has an
operational emergency preparedness and response plan to serve the needs
of all who live, work and visit the Nation's Capital. While no one
anticipated the terrorist attacks of September 11, there did exist on
that day a working emergency operations center at the District of
Columbia Emergency Management Agency, where the Mayor went and became
the Incident Commander, as is protocol, and from which the media
communications operation was launched, and where all inter-agency
coordination occurred that day, as is protocol.
Also on September 11, the District of Columbia had the Metropolitan
Police Department's state of the art Joint Operations Command Center
(JOCC) up and running, which coordinated all law enforcement
operations--both Federal and local--throughout the city. As you may
know, the JOCC was instrumental in rumor control and law enforcement
deployment throughout 9/11. In addition, the District implemented its
evacuation plan for traffic, which was used successfully on 9/11, given
the extraordinary circumstances of a non-staggered closure of all
Federal offices as well as the closure of the city's major bridges out
of the city--closures which occurred, I might note, without appropriate
consultation with District officials.
Since September 11, the District government has been
participating--with our Federal, regional and private sector partners--
in comprehensive planning for other potential terrorist attacks.
Immediately after 9/11, the Mayor established a domestic terrorism task
force, in which virtually his entire cabinet has participated (along
with Council member Kathy Patterson, who chairs our Judiciary
Committee, as the Council's representative). Through these meetings,
the Williams Administration has been updating and enhancing the
District's emergency operations plan, which from now on will be based
on the Federal Response Plan, which has a basic plan and then over two
dozen emergency support functions (e.g., law enforcement, urban search
and rescue, mass care, transportation, communications, etc.). The
enhanced plan is almost completed and once final, will be published in
the DC Register and sent to the Council for approval. (A copy of the
most recent draft of this enhanced emergency response plan is available
here and will be submitted for the record, with your permission.)
The District's domestic terrorism task force has participated in
table top exercises to test and practice the city's response to a
disaster. As you know, the District also has responded to 9/11 by
immediately assessing its critical needs in terms of resources for
specialized equipment, personnel training and communications
infrastructure. The Mayor has outlined the details of this $250 million
request for Federal funding which is vital to ensure adequate emergency
preparedness and response in the Nation's Capital.
The District of Columbia enjoys many benefits but also bears
several unique costs because of its status as the Nation's Capital.
With regard to the effects of the devastating terrorist attacks of
September 11 and their continuing aftermath, let me review some of the
unique costs that are being borne by the District government, and why
we need uniquely high Federal dollars to assist us both directly with
these costs, and to assist with our economic survival so that the
District has sufficient revenue to help pay for vital services that we
provide to the Federal Government.
As you know, it is primarily local resources that have been used to
protect the public safety and public health of not only the 600,000
residents who live within the District, and not only the two million
people (mostly from Maryland and Virginia) who work here every day, but
also the foreign embassies and the entire Federal establishment which
is headquartered here in the Nation's Capital.
The reality is that local governments everywhere are the first
responders in this new war against terrorism on our homeland. It has
been local police officers, local firefighters, local emergency medical
technicians, local emergency management directors, and local public
health officials who have been the first responders to the attacks and
threats against America. Here in the Nation's Capital, which has been
and will continue to be a primary target for terrorism, it has been
locally raised revenues that have been paying in large amounts for the
safety and health of the Federal Government and its workforce.
While our fervent patriotism and responsibility demands that we
protect our Federal Government, our fervor and responsibility is not
diminished to protect our local residents and businesses. Therefore,
the Congress and the President must recognize that when, for example,
our police force is deployed from neighborhoods to protect Federal
facilities and Federal officials more than what was previously normal,
our local residents and businesses become less protected than
previously. When demand by the Federal Government for the District's
first responders is greater than can be paid for by locally raised
revenue, the Federal Government has a special responsibility to help
address these financial needs. Other cities have States that step up to
the plate, and other cities simply do not have the level of Federal
presence to protect as we must do here in the Nation's Capital.
If the United States Capitol police force of about 1,200 officers
(which is the same size as the police force in San Diego that protects
a city of over one million residents) must be supplemented with D.C.
National Guards to protect the Capitol complex and these surroundings,
then surely the Congress recognizes that the District's entire police
force of 3,600 officers must also be supplemented.
As Mayor Williams has indicated, the District is expected to lose
$750 million in just the first six months following September 11. At
least 10,000 small businesses the engine that generates economic growth
are at risk. As a result of this economic disaster, the District
government itself is currently projected to lose $200 million in tax
revenue over the next year. Moreover, the cost to District agencies to
enhance emergency preparedness is $250 million. And this amount, as
I've stated, does not include the substantial costs of increased
protection to the Federal establishment.
To quantify our post-911 economic loss in human terms, the Mayor
has submitted documentation as to why we need approximately $766
million in economic recovery assistance. Twenty-four thousand District
jobs are projected to be lost during the next 6 months jobs held not
only by DC residents but also in fact a majority by residents of
Maryland and Virginia. At least half of these jobs are in the hotel and
restaurant business. Right now, about half of the local travel, hotel,
restaurant and tourism-related employees are unemployed. The projected
loss of these tens of thousands of jobs in the District completely
wipes out all of the employment gains that we had finally made in the
District during the past few years after decades of job loss.
These gloomy projections were made prior to the most recent anthrax
scares and deaths, which of course shut down Congressional buildings
last month, along with mail delivery service throughout the entire
city, further negatively impacting both businesses and residents.
Reagan National Airport, which is thankfully open again and which
during the past few weeks has thankfully resumed service to 12 more
cities, is still today running at only one-third of the commercial jet
service it provided prior to September 11. We need to establish
benchmarks and timetables to restore full service to National Airport--
what the Mayor has accurately described as our front door.
Tours of our most popular destinations, particularly for
schoolchildren the White House, the U.S. Capitol building, the FBI, the
Supreme Court, and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing have been
suspended indefinitely, and of course the Washington Monument has been
closed for a long time due to renovations. This of course sends an
inaccurate message to the Nation that all of Washington is closed, and
it obviously has a downward ripple effect on the entire hospitality
sector.
Although other monuments and museums on the Mall and elsewhere are
in fact open, there are currently few visitors. Other than the Federal
Government, tourism is the District's most important industry, with
over 25 million visitors a year to Washington. We must do everything we
can to return to an image of being safe and open for business and
pleasure travellers to visit Washington.
Of course we are a Nation at war, and unlike any war we have ever
experienced, because it is a war against terrorism on our own homeland.
And the Nation's Capital is at the epicenter of this war. We, who live
here with the nightly roar of F-15 Air Force jets flying overhead, with
our main post office and many mailrooms closed due to anthrax
contamination, and with the constant uncertainty of when and where and
in what form the next terrorist attack will take place, are painfully
aware of what a prime target we are to our enemies. And yet those jets
and other security precautions that are being taken actually make us
one of the most protected cities in America today.
The Federal Government certainly must take all necessary steps to
ensure the security of Federal facilities and officials in Washington.
And the District government, with our police, fire, public health,
emergency management and other agencies, is certainly doing our part to
assist with this security--costs for which the District has not been
adequately compensated.
However, as we increase security against terrorism, which we are
doing, and as we prepare for and respond quickly and comprehensively to
various emergencies and ensure the public safety and health, which we
also are doing, we must be equally vigilant about maintaining our free,
open and economically prosperous society which this war is all about.
Security must be balanced with public accessibility and democratic
values. Because if we continue falling too much into a fortress
mentality--where, for example, we allow the proliferation of ugly
concrete jersey barriers which shut off citizens from their public
streets, their national symbols, and their daily commerce--we will
continue to project the wrong negative image of a city under siege,
thereby killing the economic vitality of Washington, DC and providing
the terrorists with a huge victory. That is why we must re-open and
advertise the re-opening of the White House and the United States
Capitol and our other national icons here to tourists as soon as
possible. That is also why I urge you to support the request by the
National Capital Planning Commission for Federal funding of security
measures which are comprehensively designed and built to increase
public safety while also maintaining public accessibility and the
physical beauty of the Nation's Capital.
We appreciate the President's request for $25 million in emergency
management funds for the District of Columbia out of the first $20
billion in supplemental funds that were authorized by Congress to
address the immediate needs of affected jurisdictions following the
September 11 attacks. We also appreciate that this amount is in
addition to the $16 million already included in both the House and
Senate versions of the fiscal year 2002 D.C. appropriations bill for
the District to respond to the attacks, and in addition to the $6
million received by the District in fiscal year 2001 emergency
supplemental appropriations to pay for police overtime in advance of
the IMF/World Bank meetings in Washington that were ultimately
cancelled.
However, these amounts, as the Mayor has detailed, fall far short
of the city's needs. The Council joins the Mayor in asking for your
support and advocacy in obtaining the District's full request for $1
billion in emergency preparedness and economic assistance funding.
These funds are critical to the District's survival. The specific
purposes of each of these dollars are detailed in documents provided by
the Mayor to the Congress and the White House.
The Council calls upon Congress to support Congresswoman Norton's
legislation to require the District government to be included in all
aspects of Federal emergency planning, domestic preparedness and
homeland security which affect the Nation's Capital. The Council also
urges your support of her legislation to provide the Mayor of the
District of Columbia with the authority to mobilize the National
Guard--the same authority that the governors of all 50 States have. We
have all realized that more systematic consultation, cooperation and
coordination amongst Federal, District and regional officials are
essential to better anticipate, prepare for and respond to the array of
emergencies with which we are challenged as the Nation's Capital
community.
The Council joins with the Mayor and Congresswoman Norton in urging
this subcommittee's advocacy of not only this short-term Federal
funding necessary to pay for the Federal Government's fair share of the
District's immediate and substantial costs as a result of the recent
terrorist attacks--costs for emergency preparedness, public safety,
public health and economic recovery assistance in the Nation's Capital.
We also once again join with the Mayor in urging Congressional and
White House support for Congresswoman Norton's legislation to provide
an annual funding source for the District of Columbia--one that
adequately compensates us for the annual costs of services provided and
revenue denied as a result of the Federal presence and the unique
Congressional prohibition on taxing the income of two-thirds of the
income earned within the District of Columbia.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify before the
subcommittee today. As always, I look forward to working with you to
ensure a brighter tomorrow for the Nation's Capital and for all who
live, work and visit here.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you all very, very much for your
testimony. I think to expedite the hearing we could go into
some questions, perhaps our first round of 5 minutes each, and
then go through a second round of question and comments to the
full panel.
Let me just make one observation before my questions.
Shortchanging the District at this time would unquestionably
put lives at risk, and so I hope we take very seriously our
efforts today to hear carefully and clearly the request being
made by this team and to do our best to provide the resources
necessary for the District to protect and preserve lives, and
to continue to serve as such a symbol for our Nation.
Just as the Senator from Rhode Island mentioned his
Government has a significant need, I am sure as I visit with my
Governor and legislative branch and local officials in
Louisiana, and have been meeting with them, their needs are
quite significant, Ohio's needs are quite significant and our
cities and our States will make every effort to find moneys
within their budget to set up their plans, but particularly I
was struck, mayor, by your comments about the District and its
attempts to do that, which all of our cities and States are
attempting to.
You have been doubly hit, though, because one of your
sources of income being tourism, because you are, in fact, the
Nation's Capital, has taken a serious downturn, so it really
inhibits your effort, or makes more difficult the task before
you.
Coming from a tourism State, as the City of New Orleans, I
am sympathetic and certainly can understand that, but let me
just ask for the record, what percentage of your revenues are
tourism-related for your city, your tourism revenues? What
percentage of your budget, approximately, comes from tourism?
Do we have any record of that, or do you know, Ms. Cropp?
Mr. Williams. I could get you that exactly, Madam Chair.
Senator Landrieu. Approximately.
Mr. Williams. The sales tax is over $700 million, and as
you can imagine, a huge part of your sales tax is generated by
tourism. I can give you another example of the impact. There
are fees, receipts that go toward defraying the cost of our new
convention center, itself a locomotive for tourism. This is
based on receipts from our hotels and our restaurants.
When you have got a situation where a waiter is taking in
in a week what he normally would take in in receipts in an
hour, you can see how that has trailed off, but I can get you
an exact table of the amounts.
Senator Landrieu. Let the record just stay there. I know
that there are other committees that have looked more closely
at the economic issues, but it relates and overlaps, and is
quite important for us to have that clear picture, because this
is about the District's efforts to invest in their own security
plan, but those efforts themselves are hampered by the attacks
and the consequences of the attacks, just for the record.
My questions would be these, Mr. Mayor. If you would maybe
go into some more detail--first of all, let me ask this, and
then I will get back to the regional. Has there been any
thought to your plan, which I have read and find very
comprehensive in its request, but has there been any thought to
having an independent evaluation of your plan? Do you believe
that that would be important, or has anyone suggested--has
there been an independent evaluation of the plan by an outside
entity? Mr. LaPorte.
Mr. LaPorte. After about a few weeks, after we wrote the
plan and started to kind of go through it and test it a little
bit, we submitted it to the Federal Emergency Management Agency
asking for their review of the document specifically, both FEMA
headquarters and the FEMA region, and to look at our plan
specifically and how it corresponded with Maryland and
Virginia's. In fact, we shared our plan with those two States
as well.
FEMA has given us some pretty good feedback. We
incorporated that feedback in our plan. As any plan, it
continues to evolve, but it has received that review, and we
also shared it with the field office of the FBI here in town.
Senator Landrieu. It might be helpful to our committee to
have that feedback as we evaluate the plan also. I think it
would be very helpful, and I commend you for submitting it for
outside evaluation, particularly to an agency that probably
supervises and helps stand up emergency management plans all
over the Nation, so they would be in a good position to say
what are some of the stronger and weaker points of the plan.
Mr. Mayor, let me ask you, could you go into a little bit
more detail about the regional cooperation efforts, and
perhaps, Mrs. Kellems, you would want to speak to that also.
Could you just try to describe in some more detail about what
efforts have been made with Virginia and Maryland, and how
established are those institutions that will help us to form a
seamless regional plan?
Several Senators, obviously from Maryland and Virginia have
mentioned to me their interest and concern in making sure that
our plan is coordinated with particularly those two States, and
the counties, so could you just go into some more detail to
help us be clearer on that point?
Ms. Kellems. Sure. We have got a number of different points
of connection, operationally. Everyone sitting at this table
can tell you about their specific functional area integration.
I will give you some of the overview of it.
On the law enforcement side, there is a longstanding
relationship between MPD and the Federal agencies, but also MPD
and all of the surrounding jurisdictions. Because we have so
much interaction in terms of large-scale events, other kinds of
protests, this has been a normal part of our operation, one
that we have really focused on in the last few weeks, of
course, in terms of emergency response, but that is very much
part of the normal course of business for MPD.
The same is very true of the fire and EMS department here.
We have, through the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments, had for many years mutual aid agreements for fire
and emergency medical services with all of the surrounding
jurisdictions. In fact, on September 11, many of those mutual
aid agreements were invoked, allowing District fire and EMS
folks to go provide support at the Pentagon while our own
resources were backed up by people from Maryland, by the
departments from Maryland coming in to back-fill for us.
In the department of health, and I hope Dr. Walks will get
an opportunity to talk more about this, we have probably the
most significant advancement in the last couple of years. They
have built a network of monitoring symptomology, for example,
because of the impending threats just like this.
They have a communications network that allows all of the
regional hospitals to communicate with each other instantly,
get out the kind of information they need, so on the operating
level you are seeing a lot of that, and of course through EMA,
from a coordination perspective, we have representatives from
the emergency management agencies who respond to our emergency
operations center, and we do the same for them, so I think
across the board people should rest assured that there is a
significant amount of operations and management integration now
with all of the surrounding jurisdictions.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Mayor, you indicated in your
testimony that you had recently conducted a table top exercise
of this plan that you are submitting, and you mentioned in your
testimony you found some kinks that needed to be worked out.
Could you just go into some more detail about how you actually
walked through that exercise? Did that exercise occur with all
of your emergency support functions, and do you plan to go
beyond any table top exercises to perhaps some sort of real
field testing or operations, and Mr. Mayor, if you might
comment, and then Mr. LaPorte or any of the other panelists
that would have something to share about this operation.
Mr. Williams. I would just say, Senator, just for your
information, if you will, you can analogize it to World War II,
General Marshall is Margret Kellems, and the commander on the
scene--she does not look like it, but--the commander on the
scene is Peter LaPorte, and she is responsible really, she is
the ultimate person responsible in terms of accountability for
making all of this happen and for bringing to bear all the
resources, not only within the District, but across the region,
if you will, to the scene, and I think she is doing a brilliant
job of it, so she really is the person responsible.
But in terms of these exercises themselves, the table top
exercise is an effort for us to actually put the plan into
action, and following this table top exercise I asked that we
increase the frequency of them and, if necessary, the duration
of them, to see that we are getting it right. Not that anything
was grievously wrong, but to see that we are getting it right,
and even more importantly, we fully intend to actually have
sessions and practices out there in an open setting involving
our agencies, and I think as we get through this, our private
businesses as well, because everybody has to be prepared.
This particular exercise itself involved a hypothetical,
obviously, of a bomb in the subway out of one Judiciary Square,
and how the response would happen, and just some of the issues
that came up. One was the issue of seeing that your first
responders are coming to the scene and responding to the scene
on predescribed routes and plans, protocols and everything
else, and at the same time reserving to civilian authority the
official declaration of Tier 3 level of alert, or preparedness,
reserving to civilian authority obviously the formal
declaration of an emergency.
We talked about communications. We have all the technology
now in place. The communications protocols for Tier 1, as a
matter of fact, Level 1 District notification protocol for
emergency action talks about how the different classes, if you
will, echelons in the District government will be notified in
an emergency. We talked about how we would get immediate
communication, continuous communication out to people in the
public in an emergency situation, the need to quickly begin
sending out bulletins as quickly as possible, get out there
with a press conference in a matter of minutes, as opposed to a
matter of hours.
So these are all issues that came up and we discussed.
Senator Landrieu. Well, my colleagues will have questions,
but I just want to follow up, because this was, of course, an
issue that we actually got to witness and see in New York, and
we have had our own exercises in terms of our own Federal
responses to these emergencies, but are you testifying that in
your plan Mrs. Kellems is the authority, police report to her,
fire report to her, there would be no problems with the CIA,
the FBI, and how are the Federal agencies and the
jurisdictions--would they, under your plan, be responsive to
your deputy? Is that what we are setting up?
Mr. Williams. Well, yes and no.
Senator Landrieu. Or is she just coordinating the city
agencies?
Mr. Williams. She is coordinating the city agencies in an
emergency. She would be over at the joint operations command
center, at the police department, representing me at the police
department, and to the extent that at the joint operations
command center there is active involvement--she can tell you
about this--active involvement from the Secret Service, the
FBI, and other law enforcement there at the scene, she
certainly is a conduit of that information, information
assessment to me as mayor at the emergency operations center
and the other authorities there.
Senator Landrieu. And who is the senior authority at that
joint operations center? Who is the top authority at that joint
operations center, chief, because I know you are represented
there, the police chief would be represented, the mayor's
office would be represented as a joint center, but who does
everyone answer to?
Mr. Ramsey. Well, the job that we have is for law
enforcement, and depending on the nature of the incident for a
terrorist attack, for example, the FBI is the lead law
enforcement agency. We all come together, we do everything in
consultation, but they would be the lead law enforcement
agency, but as it relates to the deployment of MPD assets, I
certainly would be making that call.
We would use an incident command system, where everyone has
clear roles and responsibilities that would be given them in a
situation like this, but we would have representatives not only
from Federal agencies but also from regional law enforcement
agencies that would be present at the time.
It really works quite well, but a lot of it is driven based
on the nature of the incident itself, in terms of who has the
final say on what law enforcement action would be taken in a
given situation.
Senator Landrieu. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. I look down through the requests,
obviously, two of the big-ticket items are $46.2 million for
the Office of Chief Technology Officer for a first response
land line, wireless system, and then $32.4 million for a city-
wide secure data center facility. I know you have talked a
little bit about that.
How long, for both of these, would it take to spend that
money? In other words, what is the startup?
Ms. Kellems. Some of the things we could begin immediately.
If you look at the second category--I am not going to find the
page in here, but the first response wireless communications,
that is obviously our highest priority. It is the
infrastructure that will allow all the first responder agencies
within the District to communicate as well as with the outside
jurisdictions, getting everyone on a common radio system, a
common set of infrastructure.
The Office of the Chief Technology Officer to put things
together, things that are short-term and intermediate
solutions, we could be deploying them--we could be procuring
them immediately and deploying them within about 30 days, begin
the deployment. Some of it is obviously longer term, in the
more 9 to 12 month range, if you are talking about building
additional radio sites, so really everywhere in the range of
that.
Senator DeWine. Excuse me, does it all fit within 12
months?
Ms. Kellems. I am going to say most of it. There are
certainly items in there that may end up getting pushed beyond
that deadline, but the idea of that is very short-term. In that
category of stuff we are talking about very short-term
solutions.
The second category is a longer term proposition, again
some of which would begin immediately, but that would continue
more into the 24-month time frame. Its focus is, of course,
secured network, protecting against cyber terrorism as much as
anything, and ensuring constant redundant secure information
systems.
Senator DeWine. Assuming both of these were completed,
where would that put you in relationship to other major cities
in the country? Of course, it is a moving target. I understand
everyone is trying to get caught up, but what is the benchmark
here?
Ms. Kellems. On the first category, that would put us far
beyond many jurisdictions, or many regions. The issue there,
again, is the interoperability of the various communication
systems. Here in Washington and the surrounding counties we
have about a dozen different radio systems that our public
safety folks are on, and this has been a persistent problem for
25 years that people have been trying to resolve--since Air
Florida, exactly.
What we are suggesting is that we think we can solve this
problem in a very short time frame by building out an
infrastructure that would support everyone migrating to this
system. Everyone has the same problem, which is lack of
infrastructure right now.
Senator DeWine. One of the other big-ticket items is
District of Columbia public schools. I wonder who can talk to
me a little bit about that.
Ms. Kellems. I think I can, unless Peter wants to.
Senator DeWine. And again--well, go ahead.
Ms. Kellems. The idea there was that shortly after the
11th, as you mentioned, Senator, there was a lot of concern
about making sure that there were adequate measures to protect
the children.
It was particularly significant, because we kept all of our
children in school, which we think was the right decision on
September 11, with hundreds of thousands of parents and
families struggling to get out of the city and pick up their
kids, and in those conversations a lot of people raised
concerns not just about the post-disaster response, but just
about the preparedness of children. Are we training them
effectively, are there facilities secure, so there were a
couple of big things in there.
Metal detectors, which would be used all the time, in more
sort of a preparedness sense than a response sense, and some
architectural landscaping, those kinds of things, to harden our
schools, make the school buildings themselves a little more
capable of withstanding, God forbid, some kind of cataclysmic
event. That is what the bulk of that cost is.
Senator DeWine. Would you anticipate the use of metal
detectors all the time?
Ms. Kellems. They are in there. I think that is a policy
decision that would need to be made between the Mayor and the
Superintendent. The idea is, though, certainly that they would
be available any time there is a threat, and if a decision is
made to use them on an ongoing basis they would be available
for that.
Senator DeWine. Break out for me, if you could, of the
$65.6 million, what are the big-ticket items there?
Ms. Kellems. I am sorry, are you still in the public
schools?
Senator DeWine. Yes, still in public schools.
Ms. Kellems. That was done essentially on a per-school
average cost. We have I think 175 school buildings. We assume
that half of them are fairly large, half of them are fairly
small. The kinds of things you do are move the road or the
driveways further back from the schools, put harder barriers
between the schools and parking lots, things like that, that
you are really securing it externally, also reinforcing the
facilities that you have inside to withstand any kind of shock
or explosion, to have safe places in the schools. It is that
sort of thing.
Senator DeWine. Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First, let me associate myself with Mayor Williams' remarks
commending the police officers and firefighters and emergency
medical technicians in the District, and also their colleagues.
One reason I have to say that is my brother is a firefighter
and it makes the peace at home, but thank you, ladies and
gentlemen, for what you have done, and Dr. Walks, your
department, too.
Let me just follow up quickly with some questions and
issues that have been raised. First, just a general point. Are
there competitive grant programs that might be able to satisfy
some of the needs, and are you applying for those?
Mr. LaPorte. Yes, let me speak to some of the grant
program. The Department of Justice specifically had a planning
and equipment grant. In fiscal year 1999, the city was treated
as a municipality. We were able to apply for $200,000. We had
done that. In fiscal year 2000, the appropriations defined 50
States specifically. At that time, I was the Director of
Emergency Management in Massachusetts, so I know Rhode Island
very well. I grew up in Attleborough, right on the border.
In 2000 we made a request to apply for those funds. We were
denied initially, but with some persistence the Department of
Justice invited us and the territories to participate in that
program, so we are fully engaged in those programs, applying
for the maximum amount of money, as well as asking for more
than they are saying we can get. We have applied for those
programs, we have finished our three-part assessment, which is
threat vulnerability and public health, which is an online
submission. We are about 10 days away from actual submission of
that, so every program that Justice has we have knocked on
their door.
Senator Reed. Very good, and you will presumptively
qualify, after your plan has been accepted, for the actual
equipment grants?
Mr. LaPorte. And those moneys specifically equal--in 2000
it is $361,000, same as in 2001. In 2002, we have yet to see
exactly what that appropriation is.
Senator Reed. But that would barely put a dent in the needs
that you have identified today.
Mr. LaPorte. A very limited amount of money, and
specifically the money is categorized for only specific items
that you can use it for.
Senator Reed. Thank you. Let me follow up on the point that
the chairlady made, and that is, you have had a succession of
table top exercises. Have you actually scheduled an operational
exercise, because I think the quantum leap in knowledge from
going from inside an air conditioned room with telephones and
discovering the problems to having people drive around looking
for the address and not finding it is a huge increment in
knowledge.
Mr. LaPorte. It is our plan, as we go from table tops to
functional to full-scale, it is our plan to do that. In fact,
the District in May of 2000 participated, as one of three
jurisdictions in the country, in the TOP OFF exercise, which
was a full-scale exercise, full field exercise. That certainly
brought up a number of issues, and it is our intent to go
forward aggressively with a number of exercises testing the
wide varied challenges that we will face.
Senator Reed. But you have not set a date yet. You have not
set a schedule yet, is that correct? There is no schedule?
Ms. Kellems. That is correct, there is no schedule yet.
Senator Reed. And what is inhibiting you, money?
Ms. Kellems. A couple of things. We think it is a useful
exercise to go through what we are now. The paper version of
this, you would be surprised how much you can gather sitting
around a conference table.
I think that once we are quite certain we have been
through, I would guess, a couple more of these, we will deploy
out in the field, but yes, you are acting with fake equipment
at this point. There is a lot of stuff we do not have that we
would want to use in that circumstance, and so it will be a
hybrid, somewhere between a table top and doing an exercise
with the real thing, but not being equipped to do it.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me follow up a final category with Dr. Walks. As Ms.
Kellems suggested, a lot of the police and fire coordination
has been going on for years and years and years, because of the
nature of Washington and the nature of incidents here, but you
were thrust into a very, virtually unique situation, and I
would suspect it exposed a great deal of problems with
communication, with collaboration and coordination. If you
would elaborate on that, that would be useful.
Dr. Walks. Thank you, Senator. One of my challenges when I
talk about what we have done in the last several weeks is to
sort of balance that, look at what we did, and at the same time
say, but we still need a lot more, because there was a
tremendous amount of good that came out of the last several
weeks, and the place I always start is with the Mayor's
leadership, because we were ordered by the Mayor to prepare a
day one plan, what if, what would you do if.
The department of health has been working for about 5 years
regionally, so that part is not new to us. The Council of
Governments has supported those efforts in a real way, and we
have a regional plan to respond to bio and chemical attacks. We
had to put that plan into place, and it actually worked pretty
well.
It is built on relationships. It is built on not just
knowing who you will call, but knowing in terms of a
relationship who you are going to call. We had tremendous
responses from our neighboring jurisdictions. Georges Benjamin
knows me as Ivan, I know him as Georges, Ann Peterson, who was
in Virginia a couple of weeks ago, those kinds of relationships
allowed us to perform very well.
But what we also found was, this is part of the kind of
leadership we have in the District. The folks who had to work
were willing to come to work and stay. We had people do their
regular day job, then go and answer the hotline phones
overnight with a pack of clothes hanging in the cubicle where
they worked. They would go downstairs and shower, then go back
to work the next morning. That kind of a commitment is a
testimony to the Mayor's leadership and their willingness to
work for him.
The danger in that is that it really pointed out a
tremendous problem for us. We are dependent on people going
above and beyond the call of duty in ways that they are not
healthy over a long period of time. We are dependent on a lot
of person-work.
For example, the communications system that Deputy Mayor
Kellems talks about is critical. We did a lot. We did it with
paper and with people. We had folks actually driving out to the
hospitals, looking at patients, getting information real-time,
so we could meet the Mayor's mandate of having clear
information real-time every day, so that there was no need for
speculation about what was going on.
I think that what we have seen in the District,
particularly around what we have done with our health partners
is, you have seen clear commitment, absolute response to strong
leadership coming out of the Mayor's office, but then
recognizing that that is not how we really need to do this
going forward. We really need the kind of technical support
that is being talked about, and we need to make sure that the
relationships we have built we do not abuse by asking people to
work as individual people outside of a system that we know we
can put into place.
Senator Reed. Thank you, doctor.
One just final question, which, looking over the material,
the national pharmaceutical stockpile, would you just very
briefly explain what it is?
Dr. Walks. Brief answers are not my strong suit, but I will
try.
The national pharmaceutical stockpile is the pile of drugs
that the Government has, the Federal Government has in case
they are needed in a particular jurisdiction. We actually used
a lot of Cipro and doxycycline from that stockpile over the
last couple of months.
The challenge with that for us as a local jurisdiction is,
we are supposed to get that handed to us when the Mayor calls
and asks for it. What we do with it would be a challenge. We
saw tremendous Federal cooperation. They brought drugs and
people this time for us. What we are supposed to do is to
provide the people, and they are supposed to bring the drugs.
If they had just dropped off those drugs this time, we would
have had a problem. We did over 17,000 patient visits in a
little over a week. That is a tremendous amount of person-
power, and so our planning needs to include the people, as well
as the medication.
Senator Reed. Thank you, doctor.
Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. Just a point on one of the
items that has caught my attention--many of them are very, very
important, but this child care center, center for emergency
personnel that you request under your Department of Human
Services, just if somebody just wants to comment briefly, it
would seem to me that $24,000 is a minimum amount to prepare
some sort of arrangement for personnel workers, particularly
workers that would be for extended periods of time, as we have
seen with the New York City situation.
And what an important part of any emergency plan this would
be for all of our cities and States, to have some system for
supporting the families of the emergency responders, because
then everyone benefits if the responder, him or herself, can
really be fully engaged in the work, not having to worry about
their own personal family or children, would seem to me a very
wise expenditure of dollars, and it is only $24,000, so could
you, Ms. Kellems, comment?
Ms. Kellems. Sure. What we are trying to do is build on
some resources we already have, use existing recreational
facilities, or existing other facilities. We would do some
minimal build-out of them. What we would end up staffing them
with are D.C. government personnel who are trained to work with
the kids through the Department of Human Services, or the
Department of Parks and Recreation.
As an overall note, and I will come back to that in just a
moment, the request that we have here is essentially one-time
capital investments. What you do not see reflected in here is
ongoing personnel costs. We anticipate that if we did have a
major event and we had to do something like this, that there
would be a state of emergency and much of our personnel cost
would be a reimbursable expense through FEMA, or through other
means, as we have seen, like a September 11 event, so this, of
course, would not cover personnel, which would be the bulk of
the cost.
This is to do some retrofitting of some existing facilities
to make sure that they could accommodate kids, to buy some of
the equipment if we had to have children sleeping there, to
make sure we have sufficient goods there.
We have also worked with public schools and some of the
private sector organizations to see what they have. This
obviously would not be a facility that we would keep on an
ongoing basis, but something we could activate to get at the
issue you mentioned, which was a very, very high priority, and
a very real issue even on September 11 and the few days
afterwards.
Senator Landrieu. Along those same subjects, it has come to
my attention that several of the schools in the area have been
putting their own sort of emergency plans together for how they
would respond if parents cannot get to pick up the children on
time, or highways are blocked, or bridges, or roads.
It might be for the public schools here to think, if they
have not addressed that--I did not see it outlined in the
documents submitted, to address the possibilities of overnights
for some children, which would be safer maybe for them to stay
at school than to try to traverse roads or move across town,
whether it is traffic or other substances or chemicals.
So I do not know if the public school system--perhaps at
our next hearing we could have some testimony from public
schools. It just seems to be on the minds of so many parents,
which is really to think first of our children and then of
ourselves, that the public schools would play a very important
part.
But Ms. Kellems, let me ask you this. This list that
Senator DeWine has pointed out, and I appreciate his questions
about the larger ticket items, but this $250 million of
primarily equipment, capital improvements, et cetera, under the
plan, who is given the task--and maybe, Mr. Mayor, you could
tell us this--to coordinate not only the purchasing if this
amount of money was provided, but the management of these
resources to make sure the proper equipment was purchased, and
the proper training so that everything could be maximized? Who
is tasked, Mr. Mayor, with that responsibility for sort of the
accounting and management of this $250 million request? And I
know that it goes to each different department, but is there
some----
Mr. Williams. The overall point of coordination and
accountability to me would be Margret, as the Deputy Mayor for
Public Safety. She would be backed up on the accounting and the
documentation side by her independent and beloved CFO, Nat
Ghandi, who would do an excellent job, I think, in ensuring
that all of the documentation is there to ensure that we are
doing all the cross-referencing between the receipts and
expenditures we are making, so that would all happen.
And then John Koskinen, our city administrator, who comes
with a tremendous, wide-ranging experience of Deputy Director
of OMB, and the private sector turn-around specialist, would
see that Margret is getting all the support she needs from all
of our agencies, especially our internal support agencies,
whether they are personnel, or technology, or procurement.
Senator Landrieu. I see that Mr. Rogers has arrived. I do
have one or two questions for you about the regional
commission. Thank you for joining us. But Senator DeWine may
have a few additional questions or comments.
Senator DeWine. Go ahead. I have a few more.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Rogers, could you just explain--the
presentations have been excellent, but several Senators have
expressed to me their concerns, particularly the Senators from
the other jurisdictions, Maryland and Virginia, about if our
plan is being coordinated with those jurisdictions, and in your
role could you please maybe elaborate on some of the sort of
pre-September 11 opportunities, and then post September 11, and
what we have either learned, or some of the challenges that
still may be out there based on interjurisdictional
cooperation?
Mr. Rogers. Well, Senator, the Council of Governments has a
long history in this region of coordinating with the
jurisdictions in the area of mutual aid agreements. There have
been longstanding mutual aid agreements in the region in public
safety and fire, police. Particularly there is assistance given
when needed.
Just recently we completed an 18-month process of
developing a planning guidance for the health system response
to a bio event. That was spoken to by Director Walks, and that
guidance proved, though it was released, I guess finished on
September 6, it served as an excellent framework for not just
the District, but the region responding to the events dealing
with the anthrax issues.
I guess for the first time we can say that not just the
local hospitals were talking to the District health department,
but the health officers in Maryland and Virginia and the health
officers committee within COG, which represents the local
jurisdictions, were also participating, as well as the Private
Hospital Association in Virginia and Maryland.
So there is a long history of COG serving as a forum for
discussing a number of issues in public safety and health, and
emergency management, et cetera.
Our role on September 11 and those events was in working
with our chief administrative officers we reached out through a
regional conference call which has been a COG role generally in
planned events like snow, when we have advance warning, but
there was a conference call for the chief administrative
officers, I think the police chiefs and fire chiefs and others,
to talk about the events of the next day, and the school
superintendents, and it was there in that conference call that
the decision was made that the schools would be closed on the
12th but the Governments would be open on the 12th, and that
was a very important decision.
There is no one in the region, because of our complexity
and the different jurisdictions, that has the authority to say
to any one jurisdiction you must do X, Y, or Z, so we have the
coordination, and through sharing information generally we are
able to come to a decision of what is in the best interest of
the region.
Senator Landrieu. Well, I can appreciate that, but I would
just suggest that we are all going to probably have to take
this to a little higher step, and I think it is a challenge for
all regions around the Nation, because you know, we have all
operated on sort of natural disasters, snow or hurricanes or
floods or tornadoes, or whatever--we do not have snow in New
Orleans, but we do have hurricanes and tornadoes, but there is
a different kind of public mentality or panic that sets in when
it is an attack and not a natural occurrence which causes all
sorts of other things to trigger, and that is what we have to
be prepared for.
That is what we are preparing for. It is not just your
ordinary emergency. It is not a naturally occurring event, and
it is the sense of, you know, I am willing to follow orders in
this situation, but I want to make sure the orders I am getting
are right, the information I am getting is accurate, and the
person giving the orders is somebody that I trust, and it makes
it very complicated in a region where maybe the residents of
the District might look to the Mayor, but the employees of the
District look to their own Governors, or their own elected
officials, and then you have got the added complication of
having any number of Federal agencies that have their own
hierarchy.
And so I want to urge us, as we review this document and
look at these numbers, to really understand the dynamics of
these emergency plans that have to come together in a wholly
new way, and I know there is some discussion, well, but if you
decide to close the schools here, and then Virginia did not
close, and Maryland closed, and then it was--you could cause
considerable problems over a long extended period, and we are
struggling with that. I am sure the Ohio elected officials are
having those same discussions.
So on that line, is there any formal regional--is it your
organization, or is there a formal, regional commission
established to help sort through some of these questions, or
would that be done with your organization?
Mr. Rogers. We are beginning that process. We have started
that process. There is a COG task force on homeland security
and emergency response. It includes representation from around
the region, and including the Federal Government. The Federal
Government in the form of FEMA, the Washington Military
District, OPM, are important players in this process.
It is our hope and expectation that the regional plan will
really be a composite of the local plans. COG's role is to help
fill in the gaps, to identify the gaps and help fill in the
gaps, and that is what we are working on.
Senator Landrieu. Chief, just--and I will turn to Senator
DeWine in a minute, but if you could just comment for the
testimony. You have listened to all that has been said. For the
police, what would you list as your number one or number two
priorities, or what you think some of the immediate
challenges--I know they are many, but what would be sort of in
your mind, having gone through the experience of September 11,
what would you like to call to our attention at this point?
Mr. Ramsey. As it relates to the budget request, the need
for equipment is first and foremost. Our first responders do
not have the kind of protective gear they would need to go into
a hazardous situation.
We just recently got 75 protective suits in that we had
ordered for our emergency response team--this was our SWAT
team, our bomb disposal unit and so forth, and they are
beginning training, but the vast majority of our police
officers, and we have 3,600 sworn officers, that first
responder that gets that initial call, not quite knowing what
it is, needs basic equipment to be able to be protected if, in
fact, there is something chemical or biological that had been
released, and that is very, very important.
From the standpoint of some of the planning efforts, I
think the whole issue around transportation is probably the
biggest concern that I have, and we have done an awful lot in
terms of the planning. Dan Tangherlini, who heads our Division
of Transportation, has done an excellent job putting together
that particular emergency support function, but it really
points to the need for regional coordination, because in the
event of, let us say, an evacuation, all the traffic cannot
stack up at the border.
If you do not have a traffic plan that extends well out
beyond your own borders, certainly outside the beltway,
immediately outside the beltway, we are going to have some
tremendous problems. That requires a tremendous amount of
coordination between jurisdictions, and you may have just the
opposite.
It may not be evacuation. It may be quarantine. Perhaps
there will be situations where people--it is not in anyone's
best interest that they leave a given area. What do you do with
them? These are people that are just in here to work. Their
homes are outside the District.
Those are very, very critical issues that we are working on
to come up with the kinds of plans, but it requires a great
deal of regional involvement, because it affects not only the
district, but all of the surrounding jurisdictions as well.
Senator Landrieu. We intend to help you with this equipment
need, but what about your training, just very briefly, in terms
of training for hazmat?
Mr. Ramsey. Yes, ma'am. Last year, we had a 4-hour block of
instruction with our mandatory in-service training, exposing
officers to what is a mass destruction, and kind of a
theoretical conversation about what to do in the event of that.
Of course, everything now has taken on added significance. We
now in our current block of 40-hour instruction actually have
devoted 8 hours of training to the responsibility of first
responders, and how to quickly identify a situation that you
may come up against, and the kind of things you should be
doing.
So training, in fact with the 75 suits we got today, there
is a tremendous amount of training for people to be able to
operate with those things on. One of my assistant chiefs, his
son is a member of the FBI's HRT team. They have been
practicing for sometime with that emergency gear on, and these
are people who train every single day, are in the best physical
shape, and they are still limited in the amount of time that
they can spend actually functioning in that suit, so getting
the equipment is one thing. Training is a totally different
thing.
Senator Landrieu. Do we have a regional training site for
police, or regional training site for firefighters?
Mr. Ramsey. No, we do not have a regional--we do a lot of
training together, but it is not really a situation where there
is any kind of real plan. We do some joint training exercises
through COG with our police chief subcommittee. We have a
training subcommittee and there are some joint trainings that
take place, but it is not nearly as extensive as it should be.
Senator Landrieu. Could the fire chief just comment, then I
will turn to Senator DeWine for some closing questions, because
we are going to try to recess close to 4:00.
The same question, fire chief. I know you have a long list,
but what are the two or three things that really jump to your
mind that you would like to share with us about your immediate
needs?
Mr. Few. Well, after September 11, and during September 11,
we understand that when we have the adequate equipment, that we
do a very good job, and equipment is very important to us, and
we know that when we have that equipment we do a good job, and
we do not have a lot of reserve at this point.
Our city is a city that has so many targets in the city
that we have to have the proper equipment, and we realize we
cannot depend on a lot of people in the first 24 hours, or 48
hours of an incident, that we have to have that equipment,
because we have so many firefighters that are coming in from
off duty. We do not have one fire service here in D.C.,
although we do a very good job with mutual aid. After September
15 we realized we could not count on a lot of people on mutual
aid, so equipment is very important to us.
I listened to Senator DeWine speak about even pediatrics
life support systems and all, and I realized 6 months ago that
that is important, and we put some of the actual protocols in
place, and I have a lot of equipment on some of our individual
trucks, but I do not have enough, and so that is important.
So equipment is the biggest issue, and then training is
another issue, and although we keep our training up, and even
that day we were having hazmat training on September 11,
training is important. It has to be ongoing. That is why you
have a quality service when you have training ongoing.
Senator Landrieu. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Does anyone on the panel feel comfortable
in regard to talking about Metro's request? We have a request
for $190.1 million.
Senator Landrieu. We are going to have them at the next
hearing.
Senator DeWine. We are going to have them separately, okay.
Let me ask you then, Chief Ramsey. Chief Few has commented
a little bit about my question about pediatrics. I wonder if
you have taken a look at that issue and whether any of the
things that you would be dealing with would be uniquely dealing
with children. Well, let me say that we think it is very
important to make sure that we have BP cuffs that fit
pediatrics.
I realized that 6 months ago, that we need to change our
protocols, and one of the good things about the Mayor's
leadership, and Dr. Walks spoke about that, has made us
actually join at the shoulder, and Dr. Walks and I, we have
looked at the medical protocols on pediatrics. I do have a
number of equipment, like I said, in place, and I am expected
to--and if we get this money I want to make sure that we have
pediatric equipment on every piece of equipment that is
necessary, because you do not know which equipment is going to
get there first, so we like to see that in our community. With
the number of visitors that we have in our community it is
absolutely necessary that we do have that type of equipment in
place.
Senator DeWine. Chief Few, thank you very much. Chief
Ramsey.
Mr. Ramsey. Well, Chief Few and Dr. Walks have been
handling the medical aspect of it, but I do have a concern as
it relates to children, and that would be during an event,
having children that perhaps are in school, day cares,
separated from parents, trying to reunite families. That was a
huge issue in New York City, when we had a chance to visit
there. That took a lot of resources, to be able to make sure
that the kids were safe and secure, and somehow we were able to
reunite, and a lot of that with our children and family
services and the police department, we would be working
together to make that happen.
Senator DeWine. I think it is clear from my conversation
with both of you today, and conversations I have had with other
officials, and other fire chiefs and fire departments, as well
as police, that what we learned in New York and are continuing
to learn, tragically will be of benefit if we ever have another
event like this, that as you just said, Chief Ramsey, you
picked up things from that trip and the conversations you have
had with your colleagues there.
Dr. Walks. If I could just add, Senator--excuse me--there
are two points that I think are critical. Pardon me for
interrupting, with respect to children. One we have not touched
on today is the mental health impact on children. Children that
go through these kinds of disasters have a critical need for
emotional support.
The other thing is just making sure we assess the
environment. One of the things in the Department of Health's
request is that kind of technology that will let us really
protect the first responders on the scene. We have requested
the kind of technology that lets us safely go to a scene first
to assess what chemicals may be in the air. The fact that
someone blows up a bridge does not mean they do not put other
things there besides just the explosion, and I think that that
sort of integrated approach between health and police and fire
is what the District is really modeling here.
Senator DeWine. Good.
Senator Landrieu. Very good point.
Senator DeWine. Mayor, let me ask one final question, and
you touched on this a little bit, but I do not think I heard
you specifically respond to this, and that is, with the decline
in tourism, have you calculated exactly what that cost has
been. What is it running per week or per month to the District?
I know it is early in this and we hope it turns around.
Mr. Williams. Have not been in the CFO job for a little
bit, so my arithmetic may be off, but we are looking at the
duration of this going on as long as 18 months. Right now we
are looking at the impact of $200 million to our District
budget.
Senator DeWine. Excuse me, $200 million----
Mr. Williams. Dollars to our District budget. That is $750
million overall to the economy.
Senator DeWine. And that is projected over what period of
time?
Mr. Williams. Pardon me--for 18 months.
Senator DeWine. What has it been, though? What is the
history? What has it been since September 11? Do you have those
figures?
Mr. Williams. Well, we are tracking that. I am working with
our private businesses and our task force tracking that. Julia
Friedman, who is the District's chief economist, is monitoring
that as well.
Senator DeWine. Excuse me--you do not see that in revenues,
those figures are not----
Mr. Williams. $200 million for this period is a loss to the
District's budget. We would otherwise have had this revenue. We
will now not have it. Fortunately, because of the leadership of
folks like Senator Hutchison, and you know as a member of this
committee--well, everybody knows, we have had a very, very
conservative approach to our budget over the years. We have
built up cash balances. We have built up reserves, and that now
turns out is going to help us in a very, very difficult
situation, but we still are in a difficult spot, even with
those reserves.
I just think in making the case that we are going to need
to make to our colleagues, one of the things that we need to
look at is the good, hard data that you gave us today and that
we hope you would continue to give us in regard to the drop in
tourism. I mean, we all see it. Anyone who works around here,
we see it every day. We see it anecdotally, but we do not have
the figures, and obviously you are the ones who do have those
figures. I would just state the obvious: it is important for us
to continue to have those figures.
Mr. Williams. Absolutely, and we work closely with your
staff, and we want to provide the regular flow of information
on this as we get it, absolutely.
Senator DeWine. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, and I really appreciate your
questions and your help, Senator.
Just in closing, let me just follow up on that particular
point, and you know, we have seen such a focus and want to be
so helpful to New York and New Jersey and that whole region.
There have been literally billions of dollars that are leaving
Washington to try to help basically stand up the city and
rebuild, and I want to try to have the opportunity to have some
similar focus on D.C., not that the attack itself was here in
the District, because it actually occurred across the river,
but the consequences of that have been devastating to the city,
and it is not just any city, it is the Nation's Capital, so as
the symbol, it has taken on a greater hit than even cities that
sustained themselves.
There have been great losses in Nevada. Senator Reid has
spoken to us many, many times, as Senators from that State.
There have been great losses in my own State with the
experience, because of course New Orleans and many of our
communities are really tourist-related, but to my knowledge no
city, except outside of New York itself, New York and D.C.,
have been directly affected for obvious--different, but obvious
reasons.
So mayor, I want to pursue that with you, because I think
it is only important to get those facts out there.
Mr. Williams. If I might say, Senator, I think one thing
that--you know, Speaker Hastert and Majority Leader Daschle
were both good friends of the city, and President Bush
certainly has in many different ways, and I would not presume
on them that they want to keep their facilities closed. I know
they do not. I know they want to get them open as quickly as
possible, but when you talk to educators and leaders of trips
around the country, one of the big impediments, for example,
for bringing school children back to the District is getting
our national symbols open again. I mean, it is absolutely vital
that we do that.
Senator Landrieu. Because the city itself depends on those
revenues. It really is quite--this emergency--let me just say
in conclusion that I really appreciate all of your testimony.
Mr. Mayor, in your opening comments you said, this plan will
help us. It galvanizes our resolve to outthink, outsmart, and
outplan any terrorists that might target the District of
Columbia, and I hope that we will keep that goal in mind, and
we would like to help you achieve that goal.
Our next hearing hopefully will be after Thanksgiving, and
we are going to focus the first part of this next hearing on
the emergency management plans of the regions and how it
relates to the District, so we may have some regional
representatives and invite some of you back to participate in
that discussion to see how the coordination and planning
regionally and training opportunities that could be shared by
the region, and then probably the second part of the hearing
will be about the public schools emergency management plan and
Metro as independent agencies, and we may, Senator, get into
some questions about the schools financial situation, because
the audit will be completed by then and we will have a little
bit more information to go on.
So are there any closing comments?
Thank you all.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the District for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mary L. Landrieu
Questions Submitted to Mayor Anthony A. Williams
Question. Given that OMB has only recommended $25 million for the
District to assist with its emergency preparedness, what impact would
such a funding level have on the City's ability to prepare for a
terrorist attack?
Answer. As you know, in its fiscal year 2002 Federal appropriation
to the District, Congress provided the city with approximately $13.5
million for domestic preparedness activities. Our highest priorities at
this point are to fund those planning activities, personal protective
and emergency response equipment, and training to our first responders
who would be first on the scene to manage a catastrophic event.
With only $25 million, the District will have to forego a number of
important emergency preparedness investments. For example, we will not
be funding transportation-related equipment that would facilitate
traffic control and management in a large-scale emergency. We will not
be in a position to make critical investments in information technology
and telecommunications for local and regional public safety
interoperability. Nor will we be able to fund most of the much-needed
health response equipment such as a mobile hospital facility, chemical
and biological monitoring and testing equipment, and decontamination
and containment space in the local hospital facilities. The investment
in mental health training and outreach in preparation for future
disasters will also not be funded.
Question. In the event that Congress cannot fully fund the
District's $250 million request, what items in the request are your
highest priorities?
Answer. Specialized Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and hazardous
materials response equipment, personal protective gear, detection
equipment and supplies, and planning and training for first responders
are our highest priorities. We must ensure both that we have the
capacity to respond to emergencies and that the safety of our first
responders is not compromised during that process. Each day, our
police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel continue to
respond to potentially dangerous or life-threatening situations such as
suspicious packages and bomb threats. We can not let them do that
without adequate equipment.
Question. The District has created a detailed Emergency Operations
Plan outlining the roles of various City agencies during an emergency.
Are there any aspects of the Plan that the District cannot implement
without the $250 million in funding?
Answer. The new District Response Plan (DRP) is based on the same
format as the highly successful Federal Response Plan. In it, we have
identified fifteen (15) Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), each
responsible for carrying out a unique emergency function. While the
basis for the DRP is solid and the assumptions correct, it is necessary
to continually plan, train and exercise the Plan in order for it to be
effective, and this takes a large initial investment in human and
physical capital. While a written plan goes a long way in meeting our
legal requirements, it must be exercised. These efforts require
continual and ongoing fiscal support for such items as equipment,
overtime (for backfilling positions), supplies, and the actual
resources to respond when an actual WMD event occurs. The bottom line
is that the Plan can not be fully and effectively implemented without
the funding requested.
Question. Has the city submitted the Emergency Operations Plan for
an independent evaluation?
Answer. Yes. The District officially submitted a working copy
(DRAFT version 3.0) of our new District Response Plan (DRP) to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency on October 5, 2001. FEMA's
Readiness, Response and Recovery Directorate staff thoroughly reviewed
the document and provided detailed comments and suggested improvements
on November 27, 2001. These comments were reviewed by the Mayor's
Domestic Preparedness Task Force on December 6 and the modifications/
suggestions are currently being integrated the final version of the
Plan. The DC Emergency Management Agency is working with all of the
lead ESF agencies to ensure that the FEMA comments are folded into the
current draft (version 8.0). Each ESF that involves outside Federal
cooperation is also being reviewed by the participating Federal
agencies in each subcommittee on an ongoing basis. The DRP is expected
to be presented to the City Council and published by mid-January, 2002.
Question. What impact have the terrorist attacks of September 11
had on the economy of the District? Please give specific examples of
jobs lost and the employment sector.
Answer. The District anticipates $750 million hit to the economy,
which will result in a $100 million loss in fiscal year 2002 revenue.
Hotel occupancy was down more than 50 percent and approximately 3,000
hotel and restaurant workers lost their jobs. In addition, 50,000
tourism jobs across the Washington metropolitan region are in jeopardy.
Question. What adjustments is the city making to its financial plan
in fiscal year 2002 and beyond considering the economic slowdown?
Answer. We are monitoring the economic conditions of the District
and will adjust the financial plan as necessary. The District is facing
real challenges because of the national economic slowdown, the related
increase in unemployment and the new security requirements resulting
from September 11. We are determining the magnitude of the spending
pressures and agencies have begun to identify areas where spending can
be cut and savings can be achieved.
Revenues drive the financial plan and will be revised in the
spring. At that time, we will know if, and/or how much, programs will
have to be reduced. Though these are austere times, the District will
maintain financial integrity and live within the constraints of the
budget.
Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that schools and
major employers emergency operations planning is coordinated?
Answer. The Superintendent of the DC Public Schools is a standing
member of the Mayor's Domestic Preparedness Task Force and is invited
to participate in all of the meetings and proceedings of this body. The
DC Emergency Management Agency is also working with the schools in
developing a hazard identification workbook. EMA has provided over
1,000 ``Master of Disasters'' curriculum kits, and provided a free
tone-alert weather radio to each DC public school. In addition, the DC
Emergency Management Agency has been working with the DC Consortium of
Colleges and Universities (representing 12 colleges and universities
with a daily population of nearly 150,000 students/staff) to integrate
the Consortium as a ``one-stop shop'' in its emergency notification
protocol. Various meetings with the Consortium have occurred since
September 11.
Additionally, the Task Force and its various subcommittees have
been working with the major employers in the District, with the largest
being the Federal Government in coordinating emergency response and
notification efforts. Most recently, DCEMA and the Mayor's Office has
instituted a direct hotline to the Federal Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to coordinate activities such as potential
evacuations, government shutdown procedures and overall information
sharing before, during and after a major emergency. Finally, DCEMA has
begun initial discussions with the major private employers through
organizations such as the Building Operators and Managers Association
(BOMA) in developing coordinated building evacuation procedures that
can be implemented not only during terrorist threats, but for any
disaster event.
Question. Do employers, Federal and private, notify the city and
the school system when they decide to close in the event of an
emergency? What kind of notification system is in place for when
schools close due to an emergency?
Answer. Refer to the reply to previous question.
______
Questions Submitted to Deputy Mayor Margret Kellums
Question. The District has requested a great deal of funding for
training--particularly for the Fire/EMS Department and the Police
Department. Training is crucial to effective implementation of an
Emergency Operations Plan. Can the District utilize training facilities
in the surrounding jurisdictions in Maryland and Virginia? Is any
training available through the Federal Government?
Answer. Much of the training contemplated in the District's request
is provided at no charge by the Federal Government. As we cycle large
numbers of staff through training programs, it will be necessary to
maintain our baseline staffing levels to ensure that service delivery
does not suffer. In order to accomplish both of these goals--training
and maintenance of baseline staffing levels--we must backfill using
overtime. Thus, much of the District's request represents the cost of
allowing employees to attend training at existing facilities. We are
currently investigating training opportunities in the surrounding
jurisdictions as well. Not only do we intend to take full advantage of
the local and State-level opportunities, we are planning to engage in
regional training and exercises with the public safety agencies in the
surrounding jurisdictions.
Question. The City has requested $867,306 for the Department of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. Please describe what this Department's
role would be in a terrorist attack.
Answer. The Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) is
the regulatory agency responsible for ensuring the structural integrity
of buildings. Although DCRA would not be a first responder in the event
of a terrorist attack, they would be required in certain cases to visit
disaster scenes and assess the structural integrity of buildings. The
budget request for DCRA would be to cover the necessary equipment that
they would need, including for example, self contained breathing
apparatus to permit them to enter a hazardous scenes. The remainder of
the costs are for specialized training and supplies for addressing the
extraordinary circumstances of a terrorist attack for which they are
not currently equipped.
Question. The City has requested $160,000 for the Department of
Parks and Recreation. Please describe what this Department's role would
be in a terrorist attack.
Answer. The Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) is responsible
for running neighborhood-based programs and recreational facilities
throughout the city. In the event of a terrorist attack or other
cataclysmic emergency, the community facilities would be utilized as
shelters or staging facilities. The budget for DPR would prepare the
staff with the training and equipment they require to support our
emergency response. For example, the funding request for DPR included
800 MHz radios to ensure that appropriate communications devices would
be in place in the event of an emergency.
Question. The District of Columbia Public Schools have requested
over $78 million in funding for security equipment and facilities
upgrades--more than the combined requests of the Fire/EMS Department,
the Metropolitan Police Department, the Division of Transportation, the
Department of Health, and the Chief Medical Examiner's office. In the
draft Emergency Response plan, however, DCPS's role is limited to
providing school buses for transportation and temporary shelter at
school facilities for the displaced families as well as giving disaster
response training to students. Please explain how these activities
justify a $78 million request.
Answer. The District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) request
represents an investment in prevention, not necessarily response. This
large request was to enhance security technology such as x-ray machines
at every school, as well as physical enhancements to building
exteriors. You will note that this is consistent with the security
request made by the Office of Property Management for a number of the
District's largest government facilities. We considered it important to
ensure the safety of the children in all of our schools.
______
Questions Submitted to Chief Ronnie Few
Question. The District has requested $6.6 million for various Fire/
EMS vehicles: 12 ambulances, 6 fire engines, 3 trucks, a Hazmat command
vehicle, 6 response cars, and other motor vehicles. Some argue that
this equipment could have, or should have, been purchased as part of
the Department's normal operations and replacement schedule. Does the
Department plan to use these vehicles to replace those that are already
in service? If so, why didn't the Department make these purchases
sooner?
Answer. The Fire/EMS department does have a regular fleet
maintenance program through which it regularly replaces its fleet. The
vehicles that we have requested will give us the capability of
expanding our resources, when necessary, in the event of a major
catastrophe. The events of September 11 demonstrate the need for a
surplus number of trucks for cataclysmic events. In the same way that
the Department of Health needs a ``surge capacity'' in the event of an
event that impacts large number of citizens, so too does the Fire
Department. For example, in a large-scale disaster, we must transport
extraordinary numbers of staff to the scene of the disaster, which we
cannot do with only existing resources even including our reserve
equipment. This request will be used to supplement, not supplant, our
reserve replacement program.
In addition, some of the vehicles we have requested are specialized
equipment, such as the Mass Casualty Unit, that will be needed in the
event of a major disaster. This unit will also be used on a more
frequent basis to supplement our response to localized disasters, such
as bus accidents, small building collapses, and multiple shootings. The
vehicles in the emergency preparedness request therefore represent a
net gain to the Department. We will continue our current fleet
replacement schedule as planned.
Question. The Fire/EMS Department has requested a large amount of
specialized Hazmat equipment. Please describe in detail the
Department's plans for deploying these resources. Does the Department
play to equip every fire fighter and EMT with this equipment and, if
so, does it have the storage facilities in all of the fire and EMS
stations to hold this equipment until it is needed?
Answer. Hazmat protective gear is classified as Level A, B, & C,
with Level A offering the highest level of protection. Level A is an
encapsulating suit with its own air supply. Level A equipment will be
placed in four specialized units, in four quadrants of the city
(Engines 12, 15, 2, and 24). The rest of the Hazmat equipment will be
used to upgrade the protective gear of the remainder of our providers.
All front line EMS and firefighting units will be issued personnel
protective clothing and Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA),
which will outfit our providers to Level B. (All firefighters currently
have SCBAs, but some of the funds will be used to purchase reserve
equipment). This equipment will be carried on the apparatus and will be
available for immediate use. At present, protection for EMS providers
is at a level C, meaning that they have basic chemical protective
clothing and filter masks. Although this offers some protection, it is
not adequate protection for emergency medical workers who will
certainly be in the center of the most horrific disasters.
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Question Submitted to Chief Charles H. Ramsey
Question. The Metropolitan Police Department has requested funds to
upgrade its protective equipment. How are you planning to distribute
this equipment in an emergency? Do you plan to equip every officer or
every patrol car with this protective gear?
Answer. New gas masks are on order for all members of the
Department. These new masks will be equipped with both chemical-
biological and chemical munitions filters. The masks will be
distributed immediately upon receipt to all sworn and civilian members
of the Department as part of their issued equipment, i.e., the members
have the masks available for immediate use as part of their regular
equipment.
Initially, each Patrol Service Area vehicle will be equipped with
Level C protective equipment. This includes the Tyvek suit, boots and
gloves. One suit, pair of boots, and pair of gloves in each size (S-M-
L-XL) will be maintained in the vehicle, with a replacement inventory
maintained by the Special Operations Division. This equipment will be
immediately available for use in the event of an emergency.
Ultimately, and as funding becomes available, it is the
Department's intent to equip each sworn member with personal Level C
protective equipment that will be carried and maintained with their
issued equipment.
Seventy-five (75) sets of Level B protective equipment have been
issued to specially trained personnel assigned to the Special
Operations and Forensic Services Divisions. Level B equipment is the
same as Level C, with the addition of an external SCBA worn on the
outside of the Tyvek suit. The equipment is issued to and maintained at
the members' duty station and is immediately available for use in the
event of an emergency.
All members of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit are equipped
with Level A protective equipment. Level A includes a sealed suit, with
an internal SCBA unit. The equipment is also maintained at the members'
duty station and is immediately available for use.
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Question Submitted to Dr. Ivan C. A. Walks
Question. The Department of Health and its staff have done
extraordinary work during the ongoing anthrax crisis in the City. The
City's emergency preparedness request for DOH was put together before
the scope of the attacks was known. Given the experience over the last
several weeks, is the current request still valid in the wake of the
anthrax attacks?
Answer. Our request included over $23 million for Department of
Health resources, including on-site response equipment, a limited stock
of pharmaceuticals, and containment facilities, among other things. The
recent anthrax attacks demonstrated that in addition to supplies and
equipment, vast amounts of human resources are necessary in the event
of a biological incident. Should another event like the recent anthrax
attack occurs, the District's challenge will be to identify similar
levels of personnel to support an operation. We are reluctant, however,
to include in a request for one-time funding, resources such as
personal services, which would impose an ongoing cost on the city that
we may not be able to support in out years. Thus, we think that the
submission we made is still valid.
I hope these responses answer the questions you have posed. Please
fell free to contact me if you should require additional information.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Landrieu. The hearing is recessed.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., Wednesday, November 14, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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