[Senate Hearing 107-227]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-227
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
APRIL 3, 2001
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
S. Hrg. 107-227
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 3, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
76-968 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2009
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania MAX CLELAND, Georgia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JACK REED, Rhode Island
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM BUNNING, Kentucky JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
Les Brownlee, Staff Director
David S. Lyles, Staff Director for the Minority
______
Subcommittee on Strategic
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina JACK REED, Rhode Island
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Report of the National Commission for the Review of the National
Reconnaissance Office and the Report of the Independent Commission on
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
april 3, 2001
Page
Goss, Porter J., Co-Chairman, National Commission for the Review
of the National Reconnaissance Office.......................... 3
Cox, Larry D., Member, National Commission for the Review of the
National Reconnaissance Office................................. 5
Faga, Hon. Martin C., Member, National Commission for the Review
of the National Reconnaissance Office.......................... 6
Schneider, Hon. William, Jr., Member, National Commission for the
Review of the National Reconnaissance Office................... 7
Marino, Peter, Chairman, Independent Commission on the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency; Accompanied by Evan Hineman and
Gen. Tom Weinstein............................................. 23
O'Connell, Kevin, Executive Secretary, Independent Commission on
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency........................ 25
(iii)
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Smith, Allard, Reed,
and Nelson of Florida.
Committee staff member present: L. David Cherington,
counsel.
Professional staff members present: William C. Greenwalt,
Thomas L. MacKenzie, and Eric H. Thoemmes.
Minority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie and Thomas C.
Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; Menda S. Fife, assistant to
Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Terrence E. Sauvain,
assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN
Senator Allard. I call the Strategic Subcommittee to order.
We like to have a reputation of starting on time.
I know that we do not have all of our witnesses here, and
Congressman Goss is going ahead, but at least I think we want
to start with opening statements, and then if Congressman Goss
does not mind, then we will go ahead and proceed with those of
you who are here.
The Strategic Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony
from the National Commission for the Review of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and from the Independent Commission
on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).
These two commissions, which were established pursuant to
congressional direction, have performed a critical service, as
we seek to revitalize United States space and intelligence
organizations and operations. I believe that it is appropriate
that we hear from both the NRO and the NIMA Commissions in a
single hearing, given the close and synergistic nature of these
two organizations.
This hearing also complements the testimony that the
subcommittee received last week from the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, which was chaired by now Secretary of Defense,
Donald Rumsfeld. All three of these commissions have made
important recommendations that this subcommittee will carefully
evaluate as the new administration charts its path regarding
space and intelligence.
On our first panel, we will receive a presentation from the
NRO Commission. When we have the co-chairmen here, I will want
to give them an opportunity--that is Congressman Porter Goss,
he is the co-chairman with his fellow commissioners, Larry D.
Cox, Martin C. Faga, and Bill Schneider, Jr., of the NRO and
NIMA Commissions, to make a few remarks.
I would like to point out that it was my privilege and
great pleasure to serve on the NRO Commission with these
distinguished gentlemen. I understand that later on Congressman
Goss will be making an opening statement.
On panel two, we will hear from the chairmen of the NIMA
Commission, Peter Marino and Kevin O'Connell, and then the
Commission's executive secretary. We are looking forward to
that presentation as well.
Now, before I turn it over to Representative Goss for his
opening statement, I will recognize my ranking member, Senator
Reed, for any opening statement he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for calling this very important hearing. I want to join you
in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon.
It is good to see Congressman Goss, who is a colleague from
the House, and also Mr. Cox, who is a colleague from the House
Intelligence Committee, and Mr. Faga, welcome.
I think that we would all agree, in peacetime or in any
future conflict, we are relying much more heavily on our
ability to provide useful, timely information to our decision
makers, be they in the military or elsewhere in the government.
Certainly, superior knowledge or information superiority is
central to executing Joint Vision 2020, or any other reasonable
national military strategy that may emerge from the ongoing
defense review.
The NRO and the NIMA have been playing and will continue to
play a critical role in supporting these national priorities.
How we manage and modernize these two vital organizations and
their activities deserve the attention of this subcommittee and
Congress. We need to make sure that we are marching on the
right path.
These two Commission reports, which have broad implications
for the NRO and NIMA for the future, will be most helpful as we
conduct our oversight responsibilities. I look forward to
hearing from the Commission representatives today, and again,
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and for your
service on the Commission.
Senator Allard. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. It is
good to hear from you.
We will proceed with our testimony. Just to give the panel
and the members of the subcommittee an idea of what our
schedule may look like this afternoon, I have been told that we
can expect to vote around 3:15, or so. Now, that may be
delayed, but right now, until we find out the schedule, we are
assuming that that will happen, and as soon as that vote comes
up, my idea is that we will go vote right away, and come back
and finish the subcommittee's business.
So let me go ahead and recognize Congressman Goss, who I
served with in the House, an expert on intelligence matters. It
is good to have you here before the Senate subcommittee, Mr.
Congressman.
STATEMENT OF PORTER J. GOSS, CO-CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Congressman Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
pleased to look up and see two former colleagues, and wonder
what happened to me, where I went wrong.
Senator Allard. We know the feeling, Porter. [Laughter.]
Congressman Goss. I am pleased to be able to address the
subcommittee this afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Reed. I think
that the work that we did on the Commission is very useful. I
do not think it is definitive, in the sense that it is a final
recommendation, but I think that it is a series of conclusions
at a time of evolution in our intelligence capabilities, at a
time, equally, when we are reviewing new types of threats to
our national security, and, in fact, perhaps even a new
definition to our national security.
I am fortunate today to be accompanied by several
commissioners, at least two, I see so far. I do not know how
many others are coming. Of course, Senator Allard, who served
on the Commission. I think we have provided to the subcommittee
the materials from the Commission, and any comments from
Senator Kerry, who was Co-Chairman, I am sure are available,
and if not, can be made available.
I plan to make a brief opening statement, if that is all
right, Mr. Chairman, for the record. Considering the time
constraints, it will be brief, a couple of minutes. If you want
me to forego it, I will submit it for the record. I would
prefer to make the statement, because it synthesizes what I
think we did.
Senator Allard. You may proceed here, Congressman. That
will be fine.
Congressman Goss. Thank you.
The Commission was formed pursuant to the Intelligence
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2000. The legislative mandate
for the Commission was driven by recognition of the changing
threat environment and the growing concern about NRO's ability
to provide innovative space-based capabilities that are so
vital to maintaining our national security, and, indeed, are
unique.
The Commission held numerous meetings, as you will recall.
We received testimony from literally dozens of witnesses, from
March to November 2000, across a scope of interests. The
complete list of interviews and witnesses is included in the
final report, again, which I understand you have.
The Commission found that the NRO reconnaissance satellites
have had a crucially important role during the past four
decades in providing American presidents a decisive advantage
in preserving the national security interests of the United
States, and having just come from the celebration of the
fortieth anniversary of the NRO, I cannot emphasize how
strongly what a proud record that has been.
In many ways, the risks to the United States from the
potentially catastrophic acts of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction and mass disruption are more complex today than
those the United States confronted during the Cold War.
In addition, the number of extended U.S. military
commitments and other U.S. interests around the globe that
require continuing support is stressing the capacity of NRO
reconnaissance systems and the intelligence community to detect
critical indications and warnings of potentially threatening
events, and I can say that as we sit here today, we are,
indeed, testing our asset capability very strongly with events
that have come upon us over the weekend. Together, these and
other evolving conditions place an enormous premium on
maintaining a strong space reconnaissance capability.
NRO capabilities have been available in the past, because
President Dwight Eisenhower and his successors clearly
understood the significance of space reconnaissance to our
national security. They had the tenacity and determination to
endure the many risks and failures inherent in space
technology, and they personally directed and sustained the
investment needed for its development.
Those are critical points, lots of risk and lots of very
high-level commitment to the project. However, the clarity, and
mission, and the sense of urgency that led our past presidents
and congresses to invest in the future of space reconnaissance
has dissipated since the end of the Cold War, since the wall
has come down. The disappearance of the Soviet threat has
provided a false sense of security, and has resulted in under
investment in the NRO and other intelligence systems. It is not
just the NRO.
This comes at a time when the array of threats facing the
United States has never been more complex, and the demands on
the NRO and our other capabilities from new customers have
never been more intense. The advances in military technology
have led military customers to develop a voracious appetite for
NRO data. At the same time, non-military customers increasingly
demand more information from the NRO regarding a broad array of
intelligence targets.
Also, dynamic changes in information technology are
significantly affecting the NRO. In the absence of additional
resources, the NRO is being stretched thin, trying to meet all
its customers' needs, and I have not even begun to talk about
denial and deception, and what other people are doing to
frustrate some of the capabilities we seek to get through the
NRO.
We believe the American people may assume that space-based
intelligence collection matters less today than it did during
the Cold War at a time when paradoxically the demand for the
NRO's data has never been greater than it is now. The
Commission's final report stresses the need for decisive
leadership at the highest levels of government in developing
and executing a comprehensive and overarching national strategy
that sets the directions and priorities for the NRO.
Without that commitment from the top level, we do not think
it will happen. This is risk heavy, commitment heavy, and
attention heavy, and perhaps this subcommittee's efforts will
help us get those ingredients.
Ensuring that the United States does not lose its
technological eyes and ears will require the personal attention
of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of
Central Intelligence, along with diligent oversight by
Congress, and I will add, working together.
There has been and will continue to be, understandably,
heavy pressure to maintain current aging capabilities rather
than to bear the expense of riskier modernization and
development of advanced technologies. Some of us have seen this
manifested in different ways.
The fact of the matter is, we have to deal with today, but
we have to get ready for tomorrow. Without bold and sustained
leadership, and the necessary resources, the United States
could find itself deaf and blind, and increasingly vulnerable
to any of the potentially devastating threats it may face in
the next 10 to 20 years, some of which I cannot even imagine
yet.
Failure to understand and support the indispensable nature
of the NRO as the source of innovative, new space-based
intelligence collection systems will result in significant
intelligence failure.
These failures will have direct influence on strategic
choices facing the nation, and will strongly affect the ability
of U.S. military commanders to win decisively on the
battlefield, and we have just come from a wonderful battlefield
success in the Gulf, where we understand the value of getting
it right, what that does in terms of risk potential for our
troops in harm's way. Consequently, I think that we have found
success, we have to continue to find success, and I believe the
NRO is very much a part of that formula.
At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would, with your permission,
offer the other commissioners the opportunity to make comments,
and I would be pleased to answer any questions you have on any
of the particulars.
Senator Allard. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Cox.
STATEMENT OF LARRY D. COX, MEMBER, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Mr. Cox. I do not have any prepared statement made, but I
want to make a couple of points. Some of these will reinforce
what Congressman Goss just said.
There has been a decrease, I believe, in the budget
flexibility available to the NRO. In time past, you may
remember when the technological needs, and, therefore, the cost
of financing R&D were something the NRO did intuitively, and it
had sufficient, some would argue over-sufficient, budget to
actually execute that and do that.
There has been some reduction in the flexibility to execute
budget against both programs operational and R&D for the
future. Something that I think is a major concern is the use of
the power of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for
streamlined acquisition.
The DCI has been given the power to do a class of
streamlined acquisition that can allow rapid procurement of
capability to support the intelligence community, and the
willingness or the interest in DCI has declined in exercising
some of that streamlined acquisition authority, I would say.
There is a continuing need to balance the intelligence
requirements of the national decision maker with military
support requirements. Some of the responsibility for
adjudicating the split between those classes of requirements
has fallen to the builders of systems. If you think of the NRO
as an acquisition agency, an agency that designs, develops,
procures, operates, and derives data from classified systems,
then you understand that it is an engineering organization,
most effectively.
It takes requirements from intelligence agencies and turns
them into intelligence technical capability. So a NIMA, for
example, would present a set of imagery requirements to an NRO,
and NRO would design, develop, and build the capability to
support those requirements. Similarly, an NSA would offer its
intelligence requirements, the NRO would respond with technical
capability, and the CIA, and so on.
Well, the decision about what is space, and what is air,
and what is human, I do not think should fall to an agency
responsible for building the capability against those things,
but what has happened is, I think a lot of the responsibility
for maintaining the balance between requirements has either
fallen to the NRO as a developer, or it has found itself in the
position of having to defend its decisions about how to balance
intelligence requirements in its design and development of
systems.
The tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
(TPED) issue is a pretty good example of that. Arguably, the
tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination of
intelligence data, imagery, for example, should lie with an
imagery agency, NIMA; yet, the TPED issue has fallen squarely
on the shoulders of the NRO as the builder of capability. So
the point of this is that I think intelligence agencies should
get heavily back in the requirements business, and the
acquisition agencies should get heavily back into the leading
edge technological acquisition business. So that would define
more clearly a role for the NRO as a technological agency, and
probably less so as an intelligence agency. Thank you.
Senator Allard. Mr. Faga.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN C. FAGA, MEMBER, NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Mr. Faga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to offer some comments on a specific matter
that I know is of interest to the subcommittee, and that is the
matter of the advisability of moving the NRO operations to the
Air Force, which has been a subject of interest for many years,
and I offer this view as a member of the Commission, and also
as a former director of the NRO.
First, I strongly support further integration of Air Force
and NRO activities. I think that is absolutely essential and
also inevitable. The subject of transferring operations is one
that I think is confused. There is an important variation in
language used here. In the sense in which a military officer
usually uses the word ``operate,'' the NRO does not operate
satellites at all.
At its ground stations, the NRO uses a largely contractor
workforce to provide for the health and maintenance of
satellites, collect data to pass to others for analysis, and
most importantly, to send commands to the satellites on what
they should do, but these decisions on what those instructions
will be, that is, to operate the satellites, are decisions made
outside the NRO by organizations within NIMA and within NSA.
During the Persian Gulf, I was frequently called by
officers at Central Command who would ask me to arrange a
specific collection by the NRO, and I would explain that I did
not have the power to do it. They were amazed. I also explained
that the officer who did have the power was a CENTCOM officer
who was located in the same building that they were in. They
were further amazed.
So in my view, the NRO could receive tasking instructions
from the U.S. Space Command or the JCS for certain collection
activities, if that should be a decision of the DCI and the
Secretary of Defense. However, I see such a decision as
separate from the matter of who should be the people at ground
stations providing the technical functions that need to be
performed there.
Since no operational decisions are made by the NRO or its
contractor personnel, this is not the place to decide what the
increased role of the Air Force or other military entity ought
to be. The ground station function is simply part of the NRO's
successful cradle-to-grave philosophy.
Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to discuss this and other
points, and your questions.
Senator Allard. Thank you.
Mr. Schneider.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR., MEMBER, NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just make a few additional points. The NRO
Commission study happened to occur more or less simultaneously
with two other important aspects of the Intelligence Community,
including the Committee on the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld served as a the
Chairman of the Space Commission.
These Commissions have highlighted the importance of a
modern and highly effective intelligence system, which
Secretary Rumsfeld is now working energetically to implement.
Intelligence and the transformation of our intelligence
capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century threats
are a special-interest item to the Secretary, and he has taken
very seriously one of the recommendations made by the NRO
Commission, and I think affirmed by the others as well, which
is to increase the intensity of collaboration with the DCI, as
the NRO billet is ultimately filled with the NRO as well.
So I think one of the central elements of having a high
order of cooperation between the Secretary of Defense and the
Intelligence Community will be implemented.
Further, the needs of the Department of Defense for not
merely better intelligence, but perhaps one might say exquisite
intelligence to support its operations in the kind of threat
environment we are likely to encounter in the first quarter of
this century makes the implementation of many of the NRO
Commission recommendations important, and I know the Secretary
will be following these energetically, and I am very pleased,
as a member of the Commission, to note how seriously the
Commission's work has been taken, and the appreciation for
Congress in raising the visibility of this issue, so that it
could be engaged and implemented by the new administration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. I want to thank the panel for their
testimony, and I want to let the panel know that I consider it
an honor and certainly very much a learning experience to be
able to serve with you on the NRO Commission and its
discussions that we have had.
One of the things that I wanted to get on the record is
that during a lot of the debate we were talking about the
leading edge technology that actually got the NRO started, but
then as we moved forward, we got more into the maintenance and
sustaining systems that were already put in place. The question
was coming up, can we continue to push the leading-edge aspect
and also be involved with maintenance and continuation with the
systems that are there.
I guess from a policy standpoint on this end, if we may
have limited funds, I think all of us were talking about the
fact that we wanted to see that cutting edge maintained, as far
as the NRO, but that may mean that you have to give up some of
the maintenance systems.
Is there any thought as to where those systems may be
transferred once you get into a posture where you are doing
maintenance and incremental upgrades on what you have? Does
anybody want to respond to that? For example, is the Air Force
the proper place to transfer that, if we do that?
Mr. Cox. I would say there is a very important thing to
understand about the NRO systems. They are very long-lived,
they tend to be more complex operationally than the typically,
say, communications satellite, or other things that are the
mainstay of the Department of Defense space systems.
I come from a narrower background, from the ground, up. I
have worked consoles, I have sat in field stations, I have
worked overseas on systems, hands-on, and then have been
involved in the design, manufacture, building, and so on, so
there is something different about them in this way. Operating
them hands-on, directly, lets you understand that this machine
is more complex than a typical spacecraft machine.
It is very useful to have factory support when you run into
problems with devices that last as long as these do on orbit.
They last much longer than the typical spacecraft, not always
by design, but by the way they are used and the way they are
supported over their lifetimes by the heavy involvement of the
contractor community typically that built the spacecraft
itself.
That is unique, I think, in our U.S. space systems, and I
would be disappointed if that were lost in a different kind of
managerial kind of construct. There is an intimacy there built
up through the design and operational process that is very
important to maintaining these long-lived, expensive systems,
and there are good procedures in place to make sure that it
happens that way.
So that is a difficult thing. I think it is appropriate to
separate operations from advanced R&D, no question about it.
Whether it should go into another agency's hands for operation
I think is subject to considerable debate.
Senator Allard. Yes? Mr. Faga.
Mr. Faga. I would agree with that. I served on the Jeremiah
Panel as well as the NRO Commission, and what we found most
striking there was having reconnaissance programs in an agency
that was under the joint direction of the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI was very important.
Having worked in satellite reconnaissance from the design
level, up to the director of NRO level, it is very important
for all of the people involved to have a real sense of the
mission. That is why the tie to the DCI is so important. He is,
at least under our current system, also providing for the
funding, so it is vital for the director of the NRO to be able
to sit essentially at his table, fighting for those resources,
as others fight to meet their needs.
I think that the idea we put forth in the Commission report
of a separate office under the director of the NRO to try to
deal with emerging new ideas is a way to separate new concepts
from the demands of everyday life in a program office, and the
mandate that today's satellites have to work today as something
that we experiment with for the future, can afford to fail,
something that has to fly and operate today must operate today,
and program offices respond to that accordingly.
Senator Allard. Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. One dimension of that, Mr. Chairman, that is
an important recommendation of the Commission, is to look at
opportunities to transition some of the NRO's collection
activities to the commercial sector. The technology that now
exists in the commercial sector and the fact that it is now
public policy to allow the commercial sector to operate imaging
satellites with a resolution of half a meter provides an
occasion where many of the commodity imagery requirements of
the NRO can be met through the commercial sector, allowing the
NRO to focus its special expertise on the tough military and
diplomatic and security problems that require much higher
levels of capability.
I think it is an illustration of the fact that the NRO
needs to focus on the things that it can do best, both now and
historically, and wherever possible, to have others who can
deal with other parts of its mission, and can do so
efficiently, to be allowed to do so.
Senator Allard. I am going to give the ranking member time
for some questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Goss, you indicated that there is a need for
enhancement of technology, and Mr. Cox, you indicated that
there is a need for budget flexibility, which I presume
includes increased budgets.
I wonder in the deliberations of the Commission, do you
have a ballpark figure about how much recapitalization that we
are going to have to do in the next, say, 5 years?
Congressman Goss. The answer is, yes, I have a ball park
figure. I have lots of ball park figures, and I am not being
facetious at all.
Senator Reed. No, I understand.
Congressman Goss. It really depends on what you want to do.
I am more interested in outcome than I am in shape or in turf
of this.
Let me back up for a second. I think that my three
colleagues on the Commission, who answered the Chairman's last
question, basically discovered most of the parameters we talked
about in terms of how do you deal with the fact that we are
eating up a lot of the NRO time doing projects that maybe
somebody else could do, should there be a transfer, is the TPED
thing right, all of that we went into.
My conclusion was that it was not a zero-sum game. So if
you are looking at the question within the box of just, we only
have so many dollars, if you are going to transfer something
out, then you have to do certain things.
Are the customers going to be happy if you do a transfer,
are you going to get a makeup back inside the box, so you can
go ahead and invest the savings on new R&D? Are you going to
make sure that whoever is inside the box running the program is
as competent? Some of these things, I think, as Larry Cox has
said, are very complicated to deal with. It is not just a
program where you switch somebody out of a seat and somebody
else takes a seat.
So the answer to your question is, I think that the process
should be driven by the policy needs of this country to protect
the national security of the country, with the capabilities we
need to provide for that policy. When you go at the process
that way, looking at what's the policy, what is the United
States of America's role in national security mission globally,
today, to protect Americans at home and abroad, or however you
want to define it? How do you get that done, what are the tools
and capabilities we reasonably have? Then go down into your
list of capabilities, and you have to run through a whole bunch
of agencies. It is not just the NRO, you have to get into the
NSA, and then you have to deal with the customer basis of that,
the things that we are counting on, the data that we need for
our baseline today that the military and non-military are
counting on. When you have figured all of that in, then you
begin to understand that it would be nice to have things that
we think we can get to to maintain that data base and keep
going forward, and the things we ought to be taking a risk on,
high expense, high risk, high commitment, the kind of thing
that got the NRO actually going, how much is left to do that.
My view is that if you do not start with the idea of what
you want, you are not going to get very far, because you are
going to use up all of the money if you start setting the
figure.
So the answer is, sure, I can give you a ball park figure,
but I would rather not, because I would hate to have anybody
throw it back at me----
Senator Reed. Right.
Congressman Goss.--down the road and say that doesn't
provide for all of these things.
Senator Reed. I infer from your comments that your
advisement is to that high-risk----
Congressman Goss. Yes. I would definitely----
Senator Reed.--high-payoff approach, which implies some
additional resources.
Congressman Goss. Yes, absolutely, and I do not want to be
misleading or be cute in any way. I believe that the
uniqueness, the innovation, the creativity that we have seen in
the history of the NRO is its best asset. I think that is what
makes it shine out and gives it its special deserved niche
among the agencies in the Intelligence Community.
That seems to be the area we ought to nourish the most from
Congress, never forgetting that we have now created a
dependency with what the NRO has done so far, and we have to
serve that dependency.
So, in effect, our success has led us to need more success,
because we have an expectation that we can do this stuff, and
we have to do it. That is where I am. Yes, it is going to cost
something.
Senator Reed. Mr. Cox, or anyone else, any response or
comment?
Mr. Cox. No comments on that.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another line of questioning to
the panel. Last week we heard from the Space Commission. One of
their recommendations was to consolidate acquisition
responsibilities and authorities within the Office of the Under
Secretary of the Air Force. In your view, does this Space
Commission recommendation conflict with any recommendations you
have made, and in a more general sense, do you see any
differences of opinion or viewpoint with their report and your
report?
Congressman Goss. My quick answer to that is, it could be a
conflict or it might not be. It depends on how you get into
some of these programs. My view on the acquisition is that you
can't load it all up on one person.
The uniqueness that I have spoken to of the NRO, and the
testimony that we have had from the other people who have had
firsthand experience with it, people like Marty, Larry, and
Bill, have an amazing wealth of knowledge about how to make
this stuff work best, and what is the most efficient way.
I have listened to them, because they are the best people I
know to listen to. The view I come down to is that there are
some places where we can consolidate and probably make some
switches, and in some cases go to commercial and do some
things, and we should be attentive to that, very definitely,
but I do not think that the requirement is that we spin off six
things this year, because the requirement is that we spin off
six things this year. I do not think that is the way this works
at all.
So the answer is, I think some of the things the Space
Commission was trying to get at, to get their arms around how
we use space, and how we get some management involved in it
were right, and I embrace them, but some of the particulars of
saying fit that exact philosophy into how you run the NRO, it
is not a good fit. I do not think it is a conflict, it is just
not a good fit. That would be my take.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Mr. Cox, any comment?
Mr. Cox. A related comment. I would like to talk for a
moment about this thing called systems engineering, because
this is the NRO's real strength.
If I may have a moment to describe something tritely: If it
is a Saturday morning and you are making breakfast at your
home, you start the bacon, you start the potatoes, at a certain
time you put the toast in, at a certain time you put the eggs
on, and voila, everything arrives at the table ready to eat and
warm, and you start into it. That is good systems engineering.
Bad systems engineering is when the bacon arrives, and a
few minutes later the toast arrives, and a few minutes later
the eggs arrive, and nothing is hot, and nothing is edible. OK?
The NRO does systems engineering in the Intelligence
Community unlike any other entity in the world. It is a skill
that has been nurtured there for 30 years, through an
apprentice system of military and civilian people, working
their way up through a system, and becoming the preeminent
experts in something, and becoming expert in making their
something play with or interface to something adjacent.
Now, that skill, running through programs, can buy your
costs down, I would argue and can prove, 15 percent per
program, if you do it right up front. It is architectures
against requirements, it's technology against requirements,
it's bending metal, and building radios, and building optical
systems, and all this, in the best way, but according to a set
of requirements laid upon an acquisition agency by intelligence
agencies, so it is not build the best you can, it is build what
you need, and engineered, from beginning to end, in the most
efficient manner.
That skill is lacking in the NIMA, NSA, DIA, CIA, even
arguably General Motors, and other places. The NRO knows how to
do this. That cannot be lost, and that is what is at risk when
you start taking certain kinds of things, responsibilities, and
performance away from the NRO and trying to parse it out to
other places and other agencies.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. You are welcome.
I now recognize the Senator from New Hampshire.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, gentlemen. On page 75 of your report, you
recommended that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence develop a strategy that, quote,
``Recognizes the threat posed to the U.S. by the likely
availability of commercial space imagery to opponents of the
U.S.''
Relative to that recommendation, would you support the need
for an anti-satellite capability such as KE-ASAT? Anyone? Bill,
do you want to--are you the most qualified to answer that, or
who is?
Mr. Schneider. I should preface my remarks first, that even
though I am involved with the Secretary of Defense in the
transition apparatus, my remarks are as a member of the
Commission, and not as a representative of the Department of
Defense or the administration.
I think that it is very clear that we need to have an
ability to protect our assets in space, and exactly how that is
done is an important detail that needs to be managed carefully,
whether that needs to be done through an ability to attack
satellites or not is a technical question that needs to be
resolved, but the overriding issue is to be able to protect our
assets in space.
We have a high order of dependence on these assets in
space, the NRO, and other satellites that support the
Department of Defense and other national security agencies, and
the vulnerability of these assets is now well-understood, and
needs to be addressed on an urgent basis.
Senator Smith. In the Washington Times, on the 29th of
March, General Eberhart was quoted as saying that the United
States has a rudimentary anti-satellite weapon on the shelf
that could be used in a conflict, but that blowing up
satellites is a last-ditch option.
Unless there is something I am not aware of, it is not on
the shelf, the only game in town at this point that I am aware
of is KE-ASAT to incapacitate a satellite. It does not
necessarily blow it up. It could have that capability. It also
could be a fly swatter type of thing to disable it, but it is
the only game out there.
So I guess the question would be, if you believe in that
capability, would it trouble you to know that--well, let me put
it this way. We have a program--KE-ASAT is about 90 percent
complete, not to brag, but largely because for the last 8 or 9
years I have battled the Clinton administration to keep the
funding so that we would have it going, they had taken it out,
and line item vetoed it once. We are 90 percent complete. We
have appropriated $340 million. We need another $35 million or
$40 million to finish it.
Therefore, I guess the question is: Would it trouble you to
know that the entire management team of that program has been
taken off the program, has been off the program for perhaps as
long as 2 years, and that the whole program was being diffused
into something else called ``space control.'' Did you run into
anything like that, Congressman Goss. You probably have some
familiarity with it.
I do not mean to put you on the spot, but it is just--to
see the report, which I approve of and support, it is
frustrating to see those kinds of recommendations coming forth,
and it is one thing to project into the future and say, okay,
let us move along on these recommendations that you make, and
let us try to do something, but it is more frustrating to know
that we have the capability, and we have been thwarting that
capability for the last 8 or 9 years, and still are thwarting
it even to this day.
Congressman Goss. Senator Smith, thank you. I am going to
follow-on to the answer I gave to Mr. Reed, in part, and that
is that I believe policy has to drive expenditure.
I think that when we have the clear policy about what our
national security looks like and what our policy is, how we
define it, who we are, and the globe as it is today, with the
threats that are out there for the United States and its
citizens, whether they are here or abroad, the capabilities
that we spend money on to provide them the greatest degree of
protection is the issue, and I do not think you can make
intelligent decisions about money until you go through that
process.
Unfortunately, we have not gone through that process in
this country in quite a while. We need to do it. Certainly, not
since the wall has come down has a calculataging nuclear
weapons, the materials, the desire, as you say, or the need to
upgrade them and develop new capabilities?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, that is a very complex question that
would require extended discussion, but basically we now have a
site to deal with the waste from the weapons program. It is the
site in New Mexico called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP). I think you may be concerned about the arguments over
the site in Nevada, which deals with waste, or the individual
nuclear packages from nuclear reactors. That continues to be a
matter of great concern, but we are working effectively, if too
slowly, on disposing of the waste from the weapons program
itself.
There has been progress in Idaho. I think there is progress
continuing at Hanford. There is work going ahead at Savannah
River, so I think that in that area we have less concern than
about how to deal with the byproducts of the nuclear reactor
programs in this country, which has a much stronger ideological
element in it, may I say, than with regard to the weapons
program.
Senator Dayton. I learned something new. I thought that it
was all going to end up at Yucca Mountain, or some alternative.
Mr. Guidice. Nuclear weapon production does not generate
high-level waste. They typically generate low-level and some
transuranic, which is a mixture of chemical and low-level, so
the Yucca Mountain is high-level waste from reactors, but the
weapons program itself does not generate that kind of waste.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. These reactors, the fuel in them runs to
30,000 megawatt days. They can be very, very radioactive,
whereas with the weapons program basically you are just dealing
with the byproducts of production, much simpler.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Thank you. I have about four questions
here, and then I think we can call everything to a close. I
appreciate your comments this afternoon and the time you have
dedicated to the committee.
Both of you indicated that to increase efforts and
surveillance capabilities to predict and find defects in the
stockpile as atop priority. I guess the question related to
that, do you believe BOB and NNSA has made surveillance a top
priority, and are they responding to your concerns in that
regard?
Dr. Guidice. I think they have, at least I am told they
have in the last budget year.
Senator Allard. What about the Congress? I mean, the agency
is responding. Do you think the Congress is responding?
Dr. Guidice. I do not know where the negotiation is in
that. I do know that the Department has tried to make an effort
to put more money into surveillance on a scale that we thought
was appropriate.
Dr. Schlesinger. We will be better able to reach a judgment
on that, Mr. Chairman, in about 7 or 8 months time.
Senator Allard. I thought you would answer in that way.
With the loss of scientists with actual testing environment
expertise and experience, is there a fear that we could be
moving toward an era in which our stewards are more experienced
with computer codes than nuclear physics, and does that create
a concern for the reliability, safety, and security of the
stockpile?
Dr. Guidice. Absolutely. I mean, that is why it is
important not to allow these stewardship milestones to keep
slipping into the future until everybody else has died off who
could train them, and who has any practical experience to
temper their judgment----
Senator Allard. Experience is the bottom line in a lot of
this, is it not?
Dr. Guidice. Right, and new stewards need some humility to
realize that these things are not as simple as running a
computer code.
By the way, that is not to demean the current generation of
stewards. The ones that I have talked to I think do have a
sense of awe about what they are being asked to do, but we need
to let them do more while the older, experienced people are
around.
Senator Allard. Yes. You mentioned a report in section F,
under NNSA management, on page 24, that unfunded mandates to
meet functional requirements undermine the program budget,
plans, and milestones, and I guess the question is, do these
mandates come from Congress, or do they come from DOE, or both?
Mr. Guidice. The kinds of unfunded mandates we are talking
about are generally in safety and security, OK. Security is
relatively new, this last round of security. We had a round in
the 1980's as well, but it reaches its height in safety, where
approaches to safety are not coordinated with program
requirements, in other words, the work that is actually
necessary to do to maintain the stockpile.
We are hopeful that a true or good planning and budgeting
process would help decide how much to pay on what are now
unfunded mandates, but what we do not see is a process for
judging how much is enough. It is very difficult for people and
for organizations to decide how much safety is enough, are you
way out on the diminishing returns part of the curve for your
investment, and what we do not see is the process to put that
in balance.
Now, I hope the multiyear budget process----
Senator Allard. It is very difficult to measure.
Mr. Guidice. Yes.
Senator Allard. Could you give me some examples of funded
mandates which you believe are not critical to the core mission
at NNSA or the labs?
Mr. Guidice. Well, I do not want to give you a specific
example, but I would stick on the issue of safety. A number of
things that we do in safety are way out on the diminishing
returns part of the curve. They go beyond the laws and
regulations. They go to interpretation and increasingly
restrictive interpretation. We go through waves of this, and
initially what happens--in fact, there is a wave going on with
security right now. The requirements are extremely stringent,
people realize they cannot afford them and pay for them, and
eventually reason settles in, but only after a long period of
time and a lot of money to get there.
I see that mostly in safety. We do things in the name of
safety that do not really add a lot to safety in terms of
value-added to the worker and health.
Dr. Schlesinger. In cases the redesign of a nuclear weapon
has diminished the reliability of that weapon because of the
addition of the safety features that might malfunction.
Senator Allard. I see. Now, in dealing with the question of
cooperation between DOD and DOE, to what extent has mitigation
of authority and the temporary vacancy of the assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs negatively affected the relationship between
DOD and DOE, if at all?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, I think the answer to that, Mr.
Chairman, is that without the critical personnel in the
Department of Defense in particular, the Nuclear Weapons
Council, which is supposed to be the bridge between the two
agencies, becomes less functional, less attentive to problems,
and therefore it is important either to have that assistant
Secretary in place, or alternatively to charge somebody else in
the Pentagon with the responsibility to keep the Nuclear
Weapons Council functioning.
Senator Allard. Then, just to conclude here, I would just
say--unless, Senator Dayton, you have any more questions, if
anyone needs testimony or copies of the slides you can come to
the committee and we will have them ready for you, and we will
leave the record open for 2 days for questions, and thank you,
Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Guidice.
Dr. Schlesinger. The pictures over there of the various
crumbling facilities also are available for the record.
Senator Allard. They will be made available. Thank you very
much.
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Guidice. Thank you.
Senator Allard. The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
Senator Smith. I note that like the DOE, the DOD has serious
problems sustaining its unique nuclear capabilities. Deterioration in
facilities, loss of experienced senior scientific and engineering
staff, the inability to attract a younger generation, and low morale
all apply.
What actions might the Panel take during the third year of study to
develop recommendations for coordination between DOE and DOD that
retain and reconstitute the complementary capabilities of each
organization?
Dr. Schlesinger. For the first few years following in the Cold War,
the Department of Defense gave, appropriately in my view, less emphasis
to the nuclear deterrent. The Panel's concern is that DOD has gone too
far in this regard and that the DOD portion of the nuclear deterrence
mission has suffered as a result.
Over the coming year, the Panel will be developing proposed
confidence indicators--measures that Congress might use to appraise the
success or failure of stockpile stewardship. This will include measures
involving the DOD nuclear mission and the Defense Department's
collaborations with NNSA/DOE. For this purpose, we will be looking at
the following:
Do DOD strategy reviews and the revised Nuclear
Posture Review result in a DOD nuclear deterrence mission that
is clearly defined, effectively communicated as a national- and
departmental-priority, and adequately resourced?
Does the DOD Nuclear Mission Management Plan provide a
genuine plan for all aspects of the DOD nuclear mission, to
include specific, measurable objectives; milestones for
accomplishments; and resources? Is the DOD plan congruent with
the NNSA/DOE Stockpile Stewardship Plan? Has DOD defined
specific requirements for the technical capabilities it needs
from NNSA, both to meet currently forecast needs associated
with the enduring stockpile and current delivery systems, and
to meet new requirements if and as the threats to be countered
change in the future?
Is the Nuclear Weapons Council functioning effectively
as the critical interface between DOD and NNSA/DOE? In this
regard, the Panel is encouraged that the NWC has resumed having
regular meetings and that at the end of last year it reached
initial agreement concerning Life Extension Programs (LEP) for
the B61, W80, and W76 weapons. The Panel will be monitoring
actions to define and accomplish these programs, plus the
status of, and lessons learned from, the W87 LEP that has been
underway (and behind schedule) for some time.
Is the Department of Defense providing appropriate
senior-level leadership and oversight for DOD nuclear matters?
In this regard, our second report recommended that DOD return
to the past practice of having an official appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate serve as Assistant to the
Secretary for nuclear matters.
As part of our appraisal in this area, the Panel will also be
examining the Defense Department's response to a recommendation posed
in 1990 by the Congressionally chartered Nuclear Weapons Safety Panel
that this Assistant to the Secretary of Defense be given a more senior
status as the OSD member of the Nuclear Weapons Council and upgraded to
the same status as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, with direct line
of reporting to the Secretary of Defense.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nuclear Weapon Safety. Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons
Safety of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Committee Print 15. December, 1990, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Panel will also give attention to the programs of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the successor to the Defense Nuclear
Agency. In the Panel's initial look at the DTRA program, the downward
trend in funding for nuclear weapons effects research and readiness is
of concern. Specific issues to be reviewed include integration of DOD
and DOE programs for nuclear weapon effects modeling, simulation, and
simulator technology development; the DOD nuclear weapons effects
phenomenology technical base; and readiness for nuclear tests. In the
current year, the Panel has already reviewed DTRA test readiness
activities. Our assessment is that DOD does not have a test readiness
plan and resourced program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger, why is funding for the Laboratory
Directed Research and Development program important to the overall
health of the laboratories?
Is this funding equally valuable for the weapons program?
Do you agree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Energy's
Advisory Board Report that LDRD program funding should be increased?
Dr. Schlesinger. Laboratory Directed Research and Development
(LDRD) is a very important component of the programs within the three
nuclear weapon laboratories--Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and
Sandia. It provides laboratory directors with some flexible resources
needed to sustain world-class scientific programs. It enables the
laboratories to initiate development of the next generation of
technologies in a timely way. LDRD funds are crucial for recruiting the
best and the brightest of the new scientists for whom the labs are
always searching.
Past LDRD funding supported development of some of the key
technologies being utilized in the Stockpile Stewardship Program.\1\
Examples include radiation hardened microelectronics at Sandia, proton
radiography at Los Alamos, and use of laser heated diamond anvil cells
to develop new information concerning plutonium equations of state at
Lawrence Livermore.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This and the examples below are based on the information
provided in: Review of the Department of Energy's Laboratory Directed
Research and Development Program. Department of Energy, External
Members of the Laboratory Operations Board. January 27, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LDRD provides the preponderance of current funding for weapons-
program-related basic research and new concept development work. This
is particularly important as we implement the science-based stockpile
stewardship program.
Particularly at the physics labs (Lawrence Livermore and Los
Alamos), LDRD plays an important role in funding postdoctoral
researchers, many of whom are involved in, or transition to, research
in direct support of the weapons program.
The specific Secretary of Energy Advisory Report recommendation
being referenced is:
The Congress should restore the LDRD program at the DOE multi-
program laboratories to at least 6 percent, and should restore
Environmental Management programs to the LDRD base.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Review of the Department of Energy's Laboratory Directed
Research and Development Program. Department of Energy, External
Members of the Laboratory Operations Board. January 27, 2000. p. 18.
Our Panel is not chartered to examine environmental management and
hence has no views concerning this portion of the recommendation.
Regarding funding level, in our fiscal year 2000 report our Panel
endorsed Congress' action \3\ to include an allowance of 6 percent for
LDRD.\4\ We believe it is appropriate to sustain LDRD funding at such a
level and to invest a significant percentage of these funds on projects
of direct benefit to stockpile stewardship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4635, Report 106-988, p.
264.
\4\ Fiscal year 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to Assess the
Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear
Stockpile, February 1, 2001, p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger, you indicated in your testimony that
the laboratories have been hurt in their ability to attract new
scientists and engineers as a result of the increased emphasis on
security.
Do you have any specific recommendations on how to improve the
image of labs and their ability to recruit?
Dr. Schlesinger. There is a strong commitment to security within
the laboratories, plants, and NNSA. Current issues involve the manner
in which responses to recent security incidents have been accomplished.
Our Panel endorses the analysis and recommendations of the security
review accomplished by Senator Baker and Representative Hamilton. With
regard to the situation within Los Alamos National Laboratory, it was
their finding that:
. . . the combined effects of the Wen Ho Lee affair, the
recent fire at LANL, and the continuing swirl around the hard-
drive episode have devastated morale and productivity at LANL.
The employees we met expressed fear and deep concern over the
influx of FBI agents and yellow crime-scene tape in their
workspace, the interrogation of their colleagues by the FBI and
by Federal prosecutors before a grand jury, and the resort of
some of their colleagues to taking a second mortgage on their
homes to pay for attorney fees. The inevitable anxiety
resulting from these circumstances collectively has, by all
accounts, had a highly negative effect on the ability of LANL
and the other national laboratories to continue to do their
work, while attracting and maintaining the talented personnel
who are the lifeblood of the cutting-edge work of the
laboratory. This is particularly true in X Division and NEST,
but seems to be a factor in the lab as a whole.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: a review of
the security incident involving classified hard drives at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A report to the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Energy by the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, September 2000, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ability of LANL and the other national laboratories to
attract and retain top talent has already been eroded, and now
stands at serious risk. If the National laboratories lose the
ability to attract and retain top talent, then U.S. national
security will be seriously harmed. That harm may be long
lasting, in light of the specialized nature of nuclear weapon
design technology and the inexorable attrition through
retirement and other departures of the dwindling numbers who
understand them thoroughly.
It is doubtful that the DOE, NNSA, LANL, and the University
of California will be able effectively to redress either
security or management lapses in the midst of a continuing
criminal investigation or prosecution. It is critically
important to national security that the internal disruptions at
LANL be brought to a swift and orderly conclusion, and that the
new management structure of the NNSA take all necessary
measures to put the laboratory back to work, and to establish
the conditions that will be conducive over the long term to the
development of leading-edge science in a safe and secure
environment.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: a review of
the security incident involving classified hard drives at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A report to the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Energy by the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Honorable Lee H. Hamilton. September 2000. p. 23.
Our Panel believes that Baker and Hamilton identify key actions
that are needed to achieve a long-term solution that provides for both
world-class science and effective security. Two of their
recommendations warrant particular emphasis. First--There is no who
answered the Chairman's last question, basically discovered most of the
parameters we talked about in terms of how do you deal with the fact
that we are eating up a lot of the NRO time doing projects that maybe
somebody else could do, should there be a transfer, is the TPED thing
right, all of that we went into.
My conclusion was that it was not a zero-sum game. So if you are
looking at the question within the box of just, we only have so many
dollars, if you are going to transfer something out, then you have to
do certain things.
Are the customers going to be happy if you do a transfer, are you
going to get a makeup back inside the box, so you can go ahead and
invest the savings on new R&D? Are you going to make sure that whoever
is inside the box running the program is as competent? Some of these
things, I think, as Larry Cox has said, are very complicated to deal
with. It is not just a program where you switch somebody out of a seat
and somebody else takes a seat.
So the answer to your question is, I think that the process should
be driven by the policy needs of this country to protect the national
security of the country, with the capabilities we need to provide for
that policy. When you go at the process that way, looking at what's the
policy, what is the United States of America's role in national
security mission globally, today, to protect Americans at home and
abroad, or however you want to define it? How do you get that done,
what are the tools and capabilities we reasonably have? Then go down
into your list of capabilities, and you have to run through a whole
bunch of agencies. It is not just the NRO, you have to get into the
NSA, and then you have to deal with the customer basis of that, the
things that we are counting on, the data that we need for our baseline
today that the military and non-military are counting on. When you have
figured all of that in, then you begin to understand that it would be
nice to have things that we think we can get to to maintain that data
base and keep going forward, and the things we ought to be taking a
risk on, high expense, high risk, high commitment, the kind of thing
that got the NRO actually going, how much is left to do that.
My view is that if you do not start with the idea of what you want,
you are not going to get very far, because you are going to use up all
of the money if you start setting the figure.
So the answer is, sure, I can give you a ball park figure, but I
would rather not, because I would hate to have anybody throw it back at
me----
Senator Reed. Right.
Congressman Goss.--down the road and say that doesn't provide for
all of these things.
Senator Reed. I infer from your comments that your advisement is to
that high-risk----
Congressman Goss. Yes. I would definitely----
Senator Reed.--high-payoff approach, which implies some additional
resources.
Congressman Goss. Yes, absolutely, and I do not want to be
misleading or be cute in any way. I believe that the uniqueness, the
innovation, the creativity that we have seen in the history of the NRO
is its best asset. I think that is what makes it shine out and gives it
its special deserved niche among the agencies in the Intelligence
Community.
That seems to be the area we ought to nourish the most from
Congress, never forgetting that we have now created a dependency with
what the NRO has done so far, and we have to serve that dependency.
So, in effect, our success has led us to need more success, because
we have an expectation that we can do this stuff, and we have to do it.
That is where I am. Yes, it is going to cost something.
Senator Reed. Mr. Cox, or anyone else, any response or comment?
Mr. Cox. No comments on that.
Senator Reed. Let me raise another line of questioning to the
panel. Last week we heard from the Space Commission. One of their
recommendations was to consolidate acquisition responsib
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE AND THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Wayne
Allard (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Smith, Allard, Reed,
and Nelson of Florida.
Committee staff member present: L. David Cherington,
counsel.
Professional staff members present: William C. Greenwalt,
Thomas L. MacKenzie, and Eric H. Thoemmes.
Minority staff member present: Creighton Greene,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie and Thomas C.
Moore.
Committee members' assistants present: Douglas Flanders,
assistant to Senator Allard; Menda S. Fife, assistant to
Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans and Terrence E. Sauvain,
assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to
Senator Reed; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD, CHAIRMAN
Senator Allard. I call the Strategic Subcommittee to order.
We like to have a reputation of starting on time.
I know that we do not have all of our witnesses here, and
Congressman Goss is going ahead, but at least I think we want
to start with opening statements, and then if Congressman Goss
does not mind, then we will go ahead and proceed with those of
you who are here.
The Strategic Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony
from the National Commission for the Review of the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and from the Independent Commission
on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).
These two commissions, which were established pursuant to
congressional direction, have performed a critical service, as
we seek to revitalize United States space and intelligence
organizations and operations. I believe that it is appropriate
that we hear from both the NRO and the NIMA Commissions in a
single hearing, given the close and synergistic nature of these
two organizations.
This hearing also complements the testimony that the
subcommittee received last week from the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and
Organization, which was chaired by now Secretary of Defense,
Donald Rumsfeld. All three of these commissions have made
important recommendations that this subcommittee will carefully
evaluate as the new administration charts its path regarding
space and intelligence.
On our first panel, we will receive a presentation from the
NRO Commission. When we have the co-chairmen here, I will want
to give them an opportunity--that is Congressman Porter Goss,
he is the co-chairman with his fellow commissioners, Larry D.
Cox, Martin C. Faga, and Bill Schneider, Jr., of the NRO and
NIMA Commissions, to make a few remarks.
I would like to point out that it was my privilege and
great pleasure to serve on the NRO Commission with these
distinguished gentlemen. I understand that later on Congressman
Goss will be making an opening statement.
On panel two, we will hear from the chairmen of the NIMA
Commission, Peter Marino and Kevin O'Connell, and then the
Commission's executive secretary. We are looking forward to
that presentation as well.
Now, before I turn it over to Representative Goss for his
opening statement, I will recognize my ranking member, Senator
Reed, for any opening statement he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for calling this very important hearing. I want to join you
in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon.
It is good to see Congressman Goss, who is a colleague from
the House, and also Mr. Cox, who is a colleague from the House
Intelligence Committee, and Mr. Faga, welcome.
I think that we would all agree, in peacetime or in any
future conflict, we are relying much more heavily on our
ability to provide useful, timely information to our decision
makers, be they in the military or elsewhere in the government.
Certainly, superior knowledge or information superiority is
central to executing Joint Vision 2020, or any other reasonable
national military strategy that may emerge from the ongoing
defense review.
The NRO and the NIMA have been playing and will continue to
play a critical role in supporting these national priorities.
How we manage and modernize these two vital organizations and
their activities deserve the attention of this subcommittee and
Congress. We need to make sure that we are marching on the
right path.
These two Commission reports, which have broad implications
for the NRO and NIMA for the future, will be most helpful as we
conduct our oversight responsibilities. I look forward to
hearing from the Commission representatives today, and again,
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and for your
service on the Commission.
Senator Allard. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. It is
good to hear from you.
We will proceed with our testimony. Just to give the panel
and the members of the subcommittee an idea of what our
schedule may look like this afternoon, I have been told that we
can expect to vote around 3:15, or so. Now, that may be
delayed, but right now, until we find out the schedule, we are
assuming that that will happen, and as soon as that vote comes
up, my idea is that we will go vote right away, and come back
and finish the subcommittee's business.
So let me go ahead and recognize Congressman Goss, who I
served with in the House, an expert on intelligence matters. It
is good to have you here before the Senate subcommittee, Mr.
Congressman.
STATEMENT OF PORTER J. GOSS, CO-CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Congressman Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
pleased to look up and see two former colleagues, and wonder
what happened to me, where I went wrong.
Senator Allard. We know the feeling, Porter. [Laughter.]
Congressman Goss. I am pleased to be able to address the
subcommittee this afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Reed. I think
that the work that we did on the Commission is very useful. I
do not think it is definitive, in the sense that it is a final
recommendation, but I think that it is a series of conclusions
at a time of evolution in our intelligence capabilities, at a
time, equally, when we are reviewing new types of threats to
our national security, and, in fact, perhaps even a new
definition to our national security.
I am fortunate today to be accompanied by several
commissioners, at least two, I see so far. I do not know how
many others are coming. Of course, Senator Allard, who served
on the Commission. I think we have provided to the subcommittee
the materials from the Commission, and any comments from
Senator Kerry, who was Co-Chairman, I am sure are available,
and if not, can be made available.
I plan to make a brief opening statement, if that is all
right, Mr. Chairman, for the record. Considering the time
constraints, it will be brief, a couple of minutes. If you want
me to forego it, I will submit it for the record. I would
prefer to make the statement, because it synthesizes what I
think we did.
Senator Allard. You may proceed here, Congressman. That
will be fine.
Congressman Goss. Thank you.
The Commission was formed pursuant to the Intelligence
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2000. The legislative mandate
for the Commission was driven by recognition of the changing
threat environment and the growing concern about NRO's ability
to provide innovative space-based capabilities that are so
vital to maintaining our national security, and, indeed, are
unique.
The Cos an ambitious goal, Senator.
Senator Dayton. An ancillary but still related issue is,
and we are struggling with this in the Congress, is the
designation and development of a permanent nuclear repository.
How does the failure of our country to develop such a site
impact, if it does at all, these aging nuclear weapons, the
materials, the desire, as you say, or the need to upgrade them
and develop new capabilities?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, that is a very complex question that
would require extended discussion, but basically we now have a
site to deal with the waste from the weapons program. It is the
site in New Mexico called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP). I think you may be concerned about the arguments over
the site in Nevada, which deals with waste, or the individual
nuclear packages from nuclear reactors. That continues to be a
matter of great concern, but we are working effectively, if too
slowly, on disposing of the waste from the weapons program
itself.
There has been progress in Idaho. I think there is progress
continuing at Hanford. There is work going ahead at Savannah
River, so I think that in that area we have less concern than
about how to deal with the byproducts of the nuclear reactor
programs in this country, which has a much stronger ideological
element in it, may I say, than with regard to the weapons
program.
Senator Dayton. I learned something new. I thought that it
was all going to end up at Yucca Mountain, or some alternative.
Mr. Guidice. Nuclear weapon production does not generate
high-level waste. They typically generate low-level and some
transuranic, which is a mixture of chemical and low-level, so
the Yucca Mountain is high-level waste from reactors, but the
weapons program itself does not generate that kind of waste.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
Dr. Schlesinger. These reactors, the fuel in them runs to
30,000 megawatt days. They can be very, very radioactive,
whereas with the weapons program basically you are just dealing
with the byproducts of production, much simpler.
Senator Dayton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Allard. Thank you. I have about four questions
here, and then I think we can call everything to a close. I
appreciate your comments this afternoon and the time you have
dedicated to the committee.
Both of you indicated that to increase efforts and
surveillance capabilities to predict and find defects in the
stockpile as atop priority. I guess the question related to
that, do you believe BOB and NNSA has made surveillance a top
priority, and are they responding to your concerns in that
regard?
Dr. Guidice. I think they have, at least I am told they
have in the last budget year.
Senator Allard. What about the Congress? I mean, the agency
is responding. Do you think the Congress is responding?
Dr. Guidice. I do not know where the negotiation is in
that. I do know that the Department has tried to make an effort
to put more money into surveillance on a scale that we thought
was appropriate.
Dr. Schlesinger. We will be better able to reach a judgment
on that, Mr. Chairman, in about 7 or 8 months time.
Senator Allard. I thought you would answer in that way.
With the loss of scientists with actual testing environment
expertise and experience, is there a fear that we could be
moving toward an era in which our stewards are more experienced
with computer codes than nuclear physics, and does that create
a concern for the reliability, safety, and security of the
stockpile?
Dr. Guidice. Absolutely. I mean, that is why it is
important not to allow these stewardship milestones to keep
slipping into the future until everybody else has died off who
could train them, and who has any practical experience to
temper their judgment----
Senator Allard. Experience is the bottom line in a lot of
this, is it not?
Dr. Guidice. Right, and new stewards need some humility to
realize that these things are not as simple as running a
computer code.
By the way, that is not to demean the current generation of
stewards. The ones that I have talked to I think do have a
sense of awe about what they are being asked to do, but we need
to let them do more while the older, experienced people are
around.
Senator Allard. Yes. You mentioned a report in section F,
under NNSA management, on page 24, that unfunded mandates to
meet functional requirements undermine the program budget,
plans, and milestones, and I guess the question is, do these
mandates come from Congress, or do they come from DOE, or both?
Mr. Guidice. The kinds of unfunded mandates we are talking
about are generally in safety and security, OK. Security is
relatively new, this last round of security. We had a round in
the 1980's as well, but it reaches its height in safety, where
approaches to safety are not coordinated with program
requirements, in other words, the work that is actually
necessary to do to maintain the stockpile.
We are hopeful that a true or good planning and budgeting
process would help decide how much to pay on what are now
unfunded mandates, but what we do not see is a process for
judging how much is enough. It is very difficult for people and
for organizations to decide how much safety is enough, are you
way out on the diminishing returns part of the curve for your
investment, and what we do not see is the process to put that
in balance.
Now, I hope the multiyear budget process----
Senator Allard. It is very difficult to measure.
Mr. Guidice. Yes.
Senator Allard. Could you give me some examples of funded
mandates which you believe are not critical to the core mission
at NNSA or the labs?
Mr. Guidice. Well, I do not want to give you a specific
example, but I would stick on the issue of safety. A number of
things that we do in safety are way out on the diminishing
returns part of the curve. They go beyond the laws and
regulations. They go to interpretation and increasingly
restrictive interpretation. We go through waves of this, and
initially what happens--in fact, there is a wave going on with
security right now. The requirements are extremely stringent,
people realize they cannot afford them and pay for them, and
eventually reason settles in, but only after a long period of
time and a lot of money to get there.
I see that mostly in safety. We do things in the name of
safety that do not really add a lot to safety in terms of
value-added to the worker and health.
Dr. Schlesinger. In cases the redesign of a nuclear weapon
has diminished the reliability of that weapon because of the
addition of the safety features that might malfunction.
Senator Allard. I see. Now, in dealing with the question of
cooperation between DOD and DOE, to what extent has mitigation
of authority and the temporary vacancy of the assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs negatively affected the relationship between
DOD and DOE, if at all?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, I think the answer to that, Mr.
Chairman, is that without the critical personnel in the
Department of Defense in particular, the Nuclear Weapons
Council, which is supposed to be the bridge between the two
agencies, becomes less functional, less attentive to problems,
and therefore it is important either to have that assistant
Secretary in place, or alternatively to charge somebody else in
the Pentagon with the responsibility to keep the Nuclear
Weapons Council functioning.
Senator Allard. Then, just to conclude here, I would just
say--unless, Senator Dayton, you have any more questions, if
anyone needs testimony or copies of the slides you can come to
the committee and we will have them ready for you, and we will
leave the record open for 2 days for questions, and thank you,
Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Guidice.
Dr. Schlesinger. The pictures over there of the various
crumbling facilities also are available for the record.
Senator Allard. They will be made available. Thank you very
much.
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Guidice. Thank you.
Senator Allard. The subcommittee is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Smith
Senator Smith. I note that like the DOE, the DOD has serious
problems sustaining its unique nuclear capabilities. Deterioration in
facilities, loss of experienced senior scientific and engineering
staff, the inability to attract a younger generation, and low morale
all apply.
What actions might the Panel take during the third year of study to
develop recommendations for coordination between DOE and DOD that
retain and reconstitute the complementary capabilities of each
organization?
Dr. Schlesinger. For the first few years following in the Cold War,
the Department of Defense gave, appropriately in my view, less emphasis
to the nuclear deterrent. The Panel's concern is that DOD has gone too
far in this regard and that the DOD portion of the nuclear deterrence
mission has suffered as a result.
Over the coming year, the Panel will be developing proposed
confidence indicators--measures that Congress might use to appraise the
success or failure of stockpile stewardship. This will include measures
involving the DOD nuclear mission and the Defense Department's
collaborations with NNSA/DOE. For this purpose, we will be looking at
the following:
Do DOD strategy reviews and the revised Nuclear
Posture Review result in a DOD nuclear deterrence mission that
is clearly defined, effectively communicated as a national- and
departmental-priority, and adequately resourced?
Does the DOD Nuclear Mission Management Plan provide a
genuine plan for all aspects of the DOD nuclear mission, to
include specific, measurable objectives; milestones for
accomplishments; and resources? Is the DOD plan congruent with
the NNSA/DOE Stockpile Stewardship Plan? Has DOD defined
specific requirements for the technical capabilities it needs
from NNSA, both to meet currently forecast needs associated
with the enduring stockpile and current delivery systems, and
to meet new requirements if and as the threats to be countered
change in the future?
Is the Nuclear Weapons Council functioning effectively
as the critical interface between DOD and NNSA/DOE? In this
regard, the Panel is encouraged that the NWC has resumed having
regular meetings and that at the end of last year it reached
initial agreement concerning Life Extension Programs (LEP) for
the B61, W80, and W76 weapons. The Panel will be monitoring
actions to define and accomplish these programs, plus the
status of, and lessons learned from, the W87 LEP that has been
underway (and behind schedule) for some time.
Is the Department of Defense providing appropriate
senior-level leadership and oversight for DOD nuclear matters?
In this regard, our second report recommended that DOD return
to the past practice of having an official appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate serve as Assistant to the
Secretary for nuclear matters.
As part of our appraisal in this area, the Panel will also be
examining the Defense Department's response to a recommendation posed
in 1990 by the Congressionally chartered Nuclear Weapons Safety Panel
that this Assistant to the Secretary of Defense be given a more senior
status as the OSD member of the Nuclear Weapons Council and upgraded to
the same status as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, with direct line
of reporting to the Secretary of Defense.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nuclear Weapon Safety. Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons
Safety of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Committee Print 15. December, 1990, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Panel will also give attention to the programs of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the successor to the Defense Nuclear
Agency. In the Panel's initial look at the DTRA program, the downward
trend in funding for nuclear weapons effects research and readiness is
of concern. Specific issues to be reviewed include integration of DOD
and DOE programs for nuclear weapon effects modeling, simulation, and
simulator technology development; the DOD nuclear weapons effects
phenomenology technical base; and readiness for nuclear tests. In the
current year, the Panel has already reviewed DTRA test readiness
activities. Our assessment is that DOD does not have a test readiness
plan and resourced program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed
Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger, why is funding for the Laboratory
Directed Research and Development program important to the overall
health of the laboratories?
Is this funding equally valuable for the weapons program?
Do you agree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Energy's
Advisory Board Report that LDRD program funding should be increased?
Dr. Schlesinger. Laboratory Directed Research and Development
(LDRD) is a very important component of the programs within the three
nuclear weapon laboratories--Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and
Sandia. It provides laboratory directors with some flexible resources
needed to sustain world-class scientific programs. It enables the
laboratories to initiate development of the next generation of
technologies in a timely way. LDRD funds are crucial for recruiting the
best and the brightest of the new scientists for whom the labs are
always searching.
Past LDRD funding supported development of some of the key
technologies being utilized in the Stockpile Stewardship Program.\1\
Examples include radiation hardened microelectronics at Sandia, proton
radiography at Los Alamos, and use of laser heated diamond anvil cells
to develop new information concerning plutonium equations of state at
Lawrence Livermore.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This and the examples below are based on the information
provided in: Review of the Department of Energy's Laboratory Directed
Research and Development Program. Department of Energy, External
Members of the Laboratory Operations Board. January 27, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LDRD provides the preponderance of current funding for weapons-
program-related basic research and new concept development work. This
is particularly important as we implement the science-based stockpile
stewardship program.
Particularly at the physics labs (Lawrence Livermore and Los
Alamos), LDRD plays an important role in funding postdoctoral
researchers, many of whom are involved in, or transition to, research
in direct support of the weapons program.
The specific Secretary of Energy Advisory Report recommendation
being referenced is:
The Congress should restore the LDRD program at the DOE multi-
program laboratories to at least 6 percent, and should restore
Environmental Management programs to the LDRD base.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Review of the Department of Energy's Laboratory Directed
Research and Development Program. Department of Energy, External
Members of the Laboratory Operations Board. January 27, 2000. p. 18.
Our Panel is not chartered to examine environmental management and
hence has no views concerning this portion of the recommendation.
Regarding funding level, in our fiscal year 2000 report our Panel
endorsed Congress' action \3\ to include an allowance of 6 percent for
LDRD.\4\ We believe it is appropriate to sustain LDRD funding at such a
level and to invest a significant percentage of these funds on projects
of direct benefit to stockpile stewardship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4635, Report 106-988, p.
264.
\4\ Fiscal year 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to Assess the
Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear
Stockpile, February 1, 2001, p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger, you indicated in your testimony that
the laboratories have been hurt in their ability to attract new
scientists and engineers as a result of the increased emphasis on
security.
Do you have any specific recommendations on how to improve the
image of labs and their ability to recruit?
Dr. Schlesinger. There is a strong commitment to security within
the laboratories, plants, and NNSA. Current issues involve the manner
in which responses to recent security incidents have been accomplished.
Our Panel endorses the analysis and recommendations of the security
review accomplished by Senator Baker and Representative Hamilton. With
regard to the situation within Los Alamos National Laboratory, it was
their finding that:
. . . the combined effects of the Wen Ho Lee affair, the
recent fire at LANL, and the continuing swirl around the hard-
drive episode have devastated morale and productivity at LANL.
The employees we met expressed fear and deep concern over the
influx of FBI agents and yellow crime-scene tape in their
workspace, the interrogation of their colleagues by the FBI and
by Federal prosecutors before a grand jury, and the resort of
some of their colleagues to taking a second mortgage on their
homes to pay for attorney fees. The inevitable anxiety
resulting from these circumstances collectively has, by all
accounts, had a highly negative effect on the ability of LANL
and the other national laboratories to continue to do their
work, while attracting and maintaining the talented personnel
who are the lifeblood of the cutting-edge work of the
laboratory. This is particularly true in X Division and NEST,
but seems to be a factor in the lab as a whole.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: a review of
the security incident involving classified hard drives at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A report to the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Energy by the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, September 2000, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ability of LANL and the other national laboratories to
attract and retain top talent has already been eroded, and now
stands at serious risk. If the National laboratories lose the
ability to attract and retain top talent, then U.S. national
security will be seriously harmed. That harm may be long
lasting, in light of the specialized nature of nuclear weapon
design technology and the inexorable attrition through
retirement and other departures of the dwindling numbers who
understand them thoroughly.
It is doubtful that the DOE, NNSA, LANL, and the University
of California will be able effectively to redress either
security or management lapses in the midst of a continuing
criminal investigation or prosecution. It is critically
important to national security that the internal disruptions at
LANL be brought to a swift and orderly conclusion, and that the
new management structure of the NNSA take all necessary
measures to put the laboratory back to work, and to establish
the conditions that will be conducive over the long term to the
development of leading-edge science in a safe and secure
environment.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: a review of
the security incident involving classified hard drives at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A report to the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Energy by the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Honorable Lee H. Hamilton. September 2000. p. 23.
Our Panel believes that Baker and Hamilton identify key actions
that are needed to achieve a long-term solution that provides for both
world-class science and effective security. Two of their
recommendations warrant particular emphasis. First--There is no
substitute for individual commitment to security.\7\ The security
consciousness of personnel within the complex is our primary
protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: a review of
the security incident involving classified hard drives at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A report to the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Energy by the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Honorable Lee H. Hamilton. September 2000. p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second--Security procedures should be subject to greater
predictability, consistency, and consultations with laboratory
employees.\8\ Staff throughout the complex support the objective of
having effective security. These are some of the most intelligent
people in the Nation. We need to involve them to a much greater extent
in developing measures that provide effective protection for critical
information and materials while at the same time reducing
administrative burdens that do not make substantial contributions to
our objectives. In this regard, we need to make greater use of their
talents to identify the specific items of information that would be of
greatest interest to adversaries, such as states attempting to develop
or improve nuclear weapons, and to develop improved protection for this
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Science and Security in the Service of the Nation: a review of
the security incident involving classified hard drives at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A report to the President of the United States and
the Secretary of Energy by the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Honorable Lee H. Hamilton. September 2000. p. 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If these and the other actions recommended in the Baker-Hamilton
review are implemented, the result will be a environment conducive to
excellent science, engineering, and production in which security is
integral to technical effort and nonproductive administrative burdens
are minimized. This will make a significant contribution to the ability
of the labs and plants to recruit the top-quality staffs that are
needed.
Our Panel's agenda for the coming year includes development of
proposed measures indexing the extent to which we can have warranted
confidence in our stockpile, and the technical and production
infrastructure that supports it. This will include measures dealing
with the weapon labs and plants. These indicators will involve
confidence in the people who do stewardship, in the processes employed,
and the adequacy of the criteria for the tools necessary to judge
whether the stockpile can be certified.
Several years ago the Chiles Commission conducted a very insightful
survey within the weapons complex.\9\ It asked some very important
questions, for example: ``Would you recommend your laboratory,
facility, or test site as a good place to work?''. Responses were 75
percent, yes; 25 percent, no. To allow the changing status of
conditions within the labs to be appropriately monitored and appraised,
Congress might direct that a follow-on survey asking the same questions
be conducted at several year intervals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons
Expertise, Report to Congress and Secretary of Energy, March 1, 1999.
Question responses are provided on p. C-20 of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger, you suggested a possible need to
design a robust warhead design.
Is this suggestion made to ensure maintenance of technical skills
to design a new warhead, or is this recommendation made to support
actual development, certification and deployment of a new warhead?
Dr. Schlesinger. Several points warrant attention in addressing the
design of robust, alternative warheads. A starting point involves
policy considerations as articulated in statements made by the previous
administration that I hope will be endorsed by its successor. The first
of these is that having the ability to design and field new weapon
types is an integral part of the stockpile stewardship program.\10\
Second, nothing in the proposed CTBT to which the Senate did not give
advice and consent would inhibit the design, development, or production
of nuclear weapons.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ ``. . . The ability to design and field new weapons types,
however, is, appropriately, an integral part of the stockpile
stewardship program. Response to advanced questions by Ms. Madelyn R.
Creedon to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, April
11, 2000, p. 8.
\11\ ``The United States understands that Article I, paragraph 1
does not prohibit any activities not involving nuclear explosions that
are required to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the
U.S. nuclear stockpile to include: design, development, production . .
.''. U.S. Department of State. Article-by-Article Analysis of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Article I--Basic Obligations. p.
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to recognize that when currently deployed weapons
were designed, there was no expectation that they would be sustained
beyond their projected service lives in circumstances in which there is
a unilateral moratorium on testing.
We did not ask our experts to design weapons on the assumption that
testing would not be permitted. Instead, we asked them to design
weapons that are safe and are highly optimized for weight, yield, and
material usage. The result is that some current stockpile weapon
designs have thin performance margins. These designs are fussy, and
past testing has revealed inconsistencies that are not understood.
Every part within our enduring stockpile weapons is a limited life
component; every one of these parts will at some point be replaced.\12\
Some of the original parts will no longer be available; some
manufacturing processes cannot be reproduced. Change is unavoidable.
Consequently, the issue involves decisions concerning the types of
change that have the lowest risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Statement by Henry G. Chiles, Jr. Before the U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee, October 7, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Panel recommends design of more robust, alternative warheads
based on successfully tested designs for both of the reasons stated in
the question. The objective is to design, develop, and certify robust,
alternative warheads that would provide hedges against future
uncertainties. We believe that there may come a time 10 or 20 years
from now at which we may have more confidence in alternative weapons
based on more conservative versions of previously tested designs than
we would have in the inevitably modified versions of enduring stockpile
weapons.
In this proposal risk would be reduced by making use of
conservative versions of designs that have been previously tested.
There are, however, limits to our confidence in past experience and our
calculations. If a decision is made to introduce a new robust warhead
into the active stockpile, decisions would have to be made concerning
potential testing requirements.
The Panel also recommends doing this in order to ensure maintenance
of the technical skills needed for design of new warheads. Perhaps the
greatest of our challenges is human capital. We need to train a new
generation of stewards for the nuclear stockpile. This is most
effectively done by having them work now on design of real weapons
under the tutelage of experienced designers.
Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger, you and Mr. Guidice discussed that
the weapons programs are burdened by unfunded mandates for health and
safety.
Can you provide some specific examples of specific unfunded
mandates and can you identify the source of those mandates?
Dr. Schlesinger. The most problematic unfunded mandates involve
direction to the laboratories and plants that must be implemented
immediately or in a very brief period of time. Such direction involves
actions that were not anticipated when program plans were developed and
approved and hence can only be implemented by taking resources away
from other weapons program activities and resources. In other cases
these mandates involve costs that could be anticipated, but DOE has
elected not to program the needed resources. Over the past decade,
unfunded mandates have typically involved matters having to do with
environment, safety, and health (ES&H) and security matters.
In every case the organization with primary responsibility for such
direction is the Department of Energy.
In some instances mandates involving ES&H result from
recommendations made by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board
(DNFSB). For example, there are 29 actions responding to DNFSB
recommendations scheduled for implementation in 2000-2002. However, it
remains the responsibility of the Department of Energy to manage
implementation of such actions in a manner that is responsive to both
the DNFSB's recommendations and the National objectives being
accomplished in the weapons program.
In a recent review, the National Nuclear Security Administration
has succinctly summarized the impact that unfunded mandates have on
critical stockpile surveillance tasks:
Efficiency of conducting surveillance cycles and the timeliness
of surveillance data have been adversely affected at the plants
by frequent and unexpected changes in security and safety
requirements, facility availability, and safety authorization
basis changes or expirations. Programmatic needs and schedules
should be considered before implementing changes to facilities,
processes, or safety authorization basis requirements. Of
course, critical safety issues are paramount and must be
addressed as quickly as possible.\13\
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\13\ Strategic Review of the Surveillance Program: 150-Day Report.
National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Programs. January 1,
2001.
Many of the recent unfunded mandates involve security. Over the
past 24 months, DOE has promulgated more than 40 new Orders, Notices,
and other directives. Once issued, contractors are audited to these new
standards.
An example of an unfunded mandate involving security is the
Secretary of Energy's 9 Point Cyber Security Initiatives and the Six
Further Enhancements. These were required to be implemented on short
timelines, with no immediate funding for this purpose. In the case of
Los Alamos National Laboratory, implementation of this new direction
entailed a cost of approximately $15M in fiscal year 2001. At Pantex
Plant, the estimated cost was $31.5M. Some of the new standards had to
be implemented within 14 days of promulgation. Subsequent to the
issuance of this guidance, DOE made provision for additional funding
for these activities; however, when initially implemented,
reprogramming of resources within the plants and labs was required.
Another example that had complex-wide impact was DOE direction in
June, 2000 requiring changes in long-standing security practices. For
example, some computer media had to be encrypted and all vaults for
storage of classified materials continuously staffed and when not
staffed, locked and alarmed. The time frame for implementation varied
from immediately to 30 days.
The age of many facilities within the complex impacts
implementation of a DOE directive to provide for Nationally Recognized
Testing Laboratory or Equivalent certification for electrical
equipment. The estimated cost for only the high voltage system at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is $34M. Los Alamos National
Laboratory's current estimate for related expenses is approximately
$50M.
Many additional examples could be provided. Viewed individually,
any specific unfunded mandate may not appear significant. To understand
the impact that these unfunded mandates have on the complex's ability
to accomplish the Stockpile Stewardship Program, it is necessary that
attention be given to their substance, to the circumstances within
which they are being implemented, and to the processes employed by the
Department of Energy in managing their promulgation and implementation.
With respect to the substance of the direction provided in these
mandates, there are instances in which new direction is warranted. Our
understanding of safety, security, and ES&H matters continues to
develop, due in large part to a vigorous research program that improves
our understanding of potential issues. It is the objective of our
national counterintelligence activities to improve our understanding of
both potential security threats and appropriate countermeasures. As new
technologies are deployed as integral parts of the weapons program, new
measures are needed, e.g., in cyber security. Standards and
expectations for ES&H and other matters have changed significantly in
the many decades since some of the current facilities were constructed.
There are, however, some situations in which required and implemented
mandates did not add to safety or security. For such cases, it is
important to improve the process in a manner that allows all
stakeholders to participate in the appraisal of costs and benefits.
There is a legitimate requirement for the Department of Energy, as
the governmental agency responsible for all aspects of the weapons
program, to provide top-down direction for these matters. Practices
need to be state-of-the-art and consistent throughout the complex. It
is also appropriate for DOE to establish milestones for implementation
of measures to enhance safety, security, and ES&H. A past problem
within the complex was that such issues could be identified without
prompt action being taken to redress them.\14\
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\14\ In one past situation, a number of years transpired before
action was taken to respond to a safety-related issues. Nuclear Weapon
Safety. Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Committee Print 15.
December, 1990. p. 26.
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Furthermore, it is important to recognize that there can be
exceptional situations, particularly those involving potential safety
hazards, in which immediate implementation of guidance is imperative.
Circumstances can make it very difficult to implement unfunded
mandates. Key issues were identified by the Department of Energy in its
30-Day Review:
Additional pressures such as increased security requirements,
newly discovered stockpile issues, and resource limitations
have collectively forced the program, overall, to be ``wound
too tight'' with too little program flexibility or
contingencies. This is evident from the fact that the Campaign
and Directed Stockpile Work is so tightly intertwined that
adjustments to specific program milestones or budgets may
result in significant regrets for the SSP as a whole. . .\15\
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\15\ Stockpile Stewardship Program: 30-Day Review. U.S. Department
of Energy. November 23, 1999. p. 7-6.
Viewed in isolation, many of the unfunded mandate issues that might
be identified by the laboratories and plants do not appear impressive.
Why should it matter if 10 staff members were diverted to a new task
for a number of months? The problem is that in a program that is
``wound too tight'' the few people capable of performing a technical
task are diverted in a manner that requires important weapons program
work to halt, or be significantly delayed, until they are released. A
similar point holds for management resources within the complex. A new
task that might be readily managed using standard processes and
timelines may, if immediate implementation is directed, take a number
of key managers off-line for a period of time in a manner that has a
negative impact on multiple activities that can no longer receive
needed attention. Furthermore, much of the problem is due to the
aggregate demands posed by the large number of unfunded mandates as
opposed to mandate-specific burdens.
Another important circumstance involves the age and deterioration
of key facilities. We are attempting to apply modern standards in
facilities that were designed to meet very different criteria. In many
instances implementation is very difficult. Furthermore, aging and
uncorrected deterioration make it more likely that issues requiring
action are likely to develop.
The processes by which direction is provided by DOE to the
laboratories and plants exacerbate the problems. A important issue is
that there have been too many personnel and organizations within DOE
and NNSA capable of issuing guidance directly to organizations within
the complex, bypassing line management.\16\ When this happens,
authority and responsibility are no longer aligned. Congress has taken
action to solve these problems through establishment of NNSA, and by
requiring NNSA to develop an appropriate staffing and organization plan
to identify roles and responsibilities of headquarters and field
organizations; appropriate modifications, downsizing, eliminations, or
consolidations of organization units; and modifications to headquarters
and field organization staffing levels.\17\
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\16\ The problem that there are too many people within Defense
Programs and measures that might be taken to simplify DOE management of
the weapons program are addressed in The Organization and Management of
the Nuclear Weapons Program. Paul H. Richanbach, David R. Graham, James
P. Bell, and James D. Silk. Institute for Defense Analyses Paper 3306.
March 1997.
\17\ H.R. 5408, The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Section 3153.
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In its recent report, our Panel recommended additional actions to
improve NNSA management that would, among other objectives, alleviate
some of the burdens associated with unfunded mandates. Specifically,
DOE needs to focus responsibility and authority in its line management;
all DOE functional interactions with the weapons complex should flow
through NNSA; and roles, responsibilities, and line management
structures within NNSA should be aligned with the structure of the NNSA
program.\18\
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\18\ Fiscal Year 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to Assess the
Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear
Stockpile, February 1, 2001. pp. 24-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A second set of process issues involves the manner in which
direction is developed and communicated. A significant part of the
problem is that direction with a major impact on accomplishment of the
weapons program can arrive at the labs and plants with little or no
advance notice. Modern management practices that make use of integrated
process team (IPT) and related methods could substantially alleviate
this problem. This would involve a team approach in which participants
from the labs and plants would work with NNSA to give consideration to
new direction before it is issued. This is not to say that the labs and
plants should have a veto; the objective, rather, is to involve all
stakeholders in a manner that crafts appropriately focused guidance
that can be implemented in a manner that minimizes negative impacts on
other aspects of the weapons programs. In a an extreme situation such
advance consultation may not be possible, e.g., if a serious safety-
related issue is identified. In most circumstances, however, the Panel
believes that such advance consultation would be practical and, given
experience with IPTs within the Department of Defense, beneficial.
As part of this increased collaboration, the Panel believes that
actions need to be taken to reduce the amount of time that technical
staffs within the complex spend on administrative actions that respond
to DOE taskings. The Panel recommends that DOE and NNSA give immediate
priority to elimination of two-thirds of these burdens.\19\
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\19\ Fiscal year 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to Assess the
Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear
Stockpile, February 1, 2001. p. 25.
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The Panel also recommends that NNSA, with significant participation
from the labs and plants, address some of the strategic issues
underlying specific direction for matters involving security, safety,
and ES&H. A basic issue is: What are the standards? There is nothing
that cannot be made safer or more secure. There appear to be situations
in which the criteria being imposed exceed or do not clearly correspond
to law or regulation. This may, in specific situations, be appropriate.
However, this needs to be established in a more systematic way. This
would allow resources to be more optimally invested in a balanced
manner, complex-wide. It would also allow potential interactions
between standards to be identified and managed; measures to enhance
safety may or may not contribute to improved security.Furthermore,
there appear to be situations in which, over time, there is
requirements creep that adds to burdens without improving safety and
security.
Resources are needed for implementation of new direction. Here the
fundamental problem is a weapons program that is ``wound too tight.''
The Panel believes that the Department of Energy's appraisal is on the
mark:
. . . Flexibility and contingency is needed in both the science
and engineering programs and the production facilities to
address these issues. Indicators of stress include lower morale
in parts of the work force and increased difficulty in
recruitment of top scientists and engineers.\20\
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\20\ Stockpile Stewardship Program. 30-Day Review. U.S. Department
of Energy. November 23, 1999. p. 7-6.
NNSA/DOE needs to program funding to meet security and ES&H needs.
Given recent experience with such mandates , it should be possible to
estimate the magnitude of the investment that may be needed.
Senator Reed. Dr. Schlesinger, you mentioned that a weapon has been
redesigned to address a safety issue and as a result the reliability of
the weapon has been reduced.
Can you please provide some additional detail on this including
which weapon, when was the modification made, why was the modification
made and what was the specific requirement that drove the modification?
Dr. Schlesinger. The point made during testimony applies to
multiple weapons in the enduring stockpile. The reliability estimates
for each of these weapons is classified; however, NNSA does publish
semi-annual classified reports which you might request.
A starting point for considering potential interactions between
weapon safety features and weapon reliability is provided in the report
of the Congressionally-chartered Nuclear Weapons Safety panel, which
provides an unclassified overview of the modern approach to enhance the
electrical safety of a nuclear weapon against premature detonation. All
of the weapons in the enduring stockpile, except the older W62 which we
expect to be retired, were designed to incorporate what is called
``enhanced nuclear detonation safety'' (ENDS). The ENDS concept was
developed to improve the predictable safe response of our weapons in
accident environments, such as a fire. ENDS introduces three links (two
strong and one weak) in an exclusion region within the weapon. For the
weapon to arm, both strong links have to be closed electrically, one by
specific operator coded information input, the other by environmental
input corresponding to a trajectory or spin motion appropriate to the
weapon's flight profile. The weak link is designed to open (or break)
and thereby prevent arming if there is a temperature excursion beyond
set bounds, as might be caused by a fire during an accident.\21\ Design
or redesign of a weapon to incorporate ENDS necessarily adds components
to the device. Each component that is added to a weapon is another part
that might fail, impacting reliability.
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\21\ Nuclear Weapon Safety. Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons
Safety of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Committee Print 15. December, 1990. p. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same point holds for use control or other features that might
be added to a weapon. Particularly if these features are integral to
the performance of the weapon, they involve additional parts that might
fail and, more generally, add to the complexity of the device, and
complexity can be the enemy of reliability. Furthermore, such safety
and control features, like every other part of a nuclear weapon, must
be regarded as limited life components that will at some point be
replaced.\22\ Again, this adds a source a complexity with attendant
implications for reliability.
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\22\ Statement by Henry G. Chiles, Jr. Before the U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee, October 7, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regard to plans for Life Extension Programs (LEPs) for our
enduring stockpile weapons, over the coming year the Panel will again
be looking at how well we accomplish safety and security in the design
of our weapons. We need to make sure that the weapon safety and
security improvements that are implemented do not unduly reduce our
confidence in the reliability of our weapons. This is especially true
if these improvements are designed into the nuclear package of the
weapon, which cannot be tested under the current nuclear test
moratorium.
On this subject, an observation made in the Panel's recent report
also merits attention: The Panel is concerned that some current
enduring stockpile weapon designs are so highly optimized for weight,
yield, and material usage that they provide very thin performance
margins. These designs are fussy, and testing has revealed
inconsistencies that are not understood.\23\
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\23\ Fiscal Year 2000 Report to Congress, Panel to Assess the
Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear
Stockpile, February 1, 2001. p. 13.
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For the enduring stockpile weapons with these characteristics, the
complexity (and hence potential performance risk) added by safety and
use control devices is done on top of very thin performance margins.
The enduring stockpile weapons were never designed on the assumption
that they would be retained beyond their originally intended service
lives. Under these circumstances, the Panel recommends that, as a
matter of prudence, work also be undertaken on the design of robust,
alternative weapons that will provide a hedge.
Looking to potential safety/reliability interactions in the future,
a final point warrants note. The Congressionally chartered Nuclear
Safety Panel was established in response to issues that had been
identified in the stockpile of that time. Some of these issues were
developed because of advances in modeling. With the advent of the first
three-dimensional codes, it was possible to determine that some
previous assumptions made concerning the weapons were incorrect. As the
Stockpile Stewardship Program advances our understanding of the
enduring stockpile weapons, it is reasonable to expect that we may
uncover additional issues. In 1990, it was still possible to make
significant changes to weapon designs and then test them to ensure that
modifications did not impair reliability. For a modification that
impacts the nuclear package of the weapon, that option is no longer
available.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
0 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
o recruit?
*ERR11*Dr. Schlesinger. There is a strong commitment to security within the
laboratories, plants, and NNSA. Current issues involve the manner in which
responses to recent security incidents have been accomplished. Our Panel
endorses the analysis and recommendations of the security review
accomplished by Senator Baker and Representative Hamilton. With regard to
the situation within Los Alamos National Laboratory, it was their finding
that:
*ERR11* . . . the combined effects of the Wen Ho Lee affair, the recent
fire at LANL, and the continuing swirl around the hard-drive episode have
devastated morale and productivity at LANL. The employees we met expressed
fear and deep concern over the influx of FBI agents and yellow crime-scene
tape in their workspace, the interrogation of their colleagues by the FBI
and by Federal prosecutors before a grand jury, and the resort of some of
their colleagues to taking a second mortgage on their homes to pay for
attorney fees. The inevitable anxiety resulting from these circumstances
collectively has, by all accounts, had a highly negative effect on the
ability of LANL and the other national laboratories to continue to do their
work, while attracting and maintaining the talented personnel who are the
lifeblood of the cutting-edge work of the laboratory. This is particularly
true in X Division and NEST, but seems to be a factor in the lab as a
whole.\5\*ERR14*
\5\ Science and Security in the Service of the
Nation: a review of the security incident
involving classified hard drives at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. A report to the President of
the United States and the Secretary of Energy by
the Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr. and the
Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, September 2000, p. 23.
*ERR11* The ability of LANL and the other national laboratories to attract
and retain top talent has already been eroded, and now stands at serious
risk. If the National laboratories lose the ability to attract and retain
top talent, then U.S. national security will be seriously harmed. That harm
may be long lasting, in light of the specialized nature of nuclear weapon
design technology and the inexorable attrition through retirement and other
departures of the dwindling numbers who understand them thoroughly.ds, as
we have been talking about age here, and equipment. We are going to need
those young scientists in the future to come in and continue this
stewardship, and that was my concern.
*ERR13*Dr.
Schlesinger. Well,
it is a very
appropriate concern,
Senator. In this
post cold war period
there must be
something
scientifically
exciting to attract
personnel to the
laboratories, and
the NIF was one of
those elements that
provided scientists
excitement, and I
think that may be
the most important
aspect of the NIF,
even given its role
in stockpile
stewardship.________
Senator Akaka. Thank
you very much.______
Senator Allard.
Thank you, Senator.
I would like to
follow that up just
a little bit. Over
the last few years,
there has been a
push with the labs
to get more involved
with economic
development
activities, and they
set up private
business
partnerships and
other activities
which do not seem to
support, in my view
at least, the
stewardship mission.
Do these activities
detract, or do you
think they enhance
the core stewardship
mission for the
labs?_______________
Dr. Schlesinger.
That in my judgment
at least, Mr.
Chairman, ently able
to act autonomously?
This was kind of an
issue of debate, how
much autonomy you
give NNSA.__________
Dr. Schlesinger. I
am sorry, Mr.
Chairman.___________
Senator Allard. Do
you feel that it is
sufficiently able to
act autonomously?___
Dr. Schlesinger.
Well, of course, the
NNSA is responsive
to the Secretary,
and the balance of
the DOE shares
certain functions,
legal and
comptroller, with
both sides of the
agency, but yes,
with functions,
legal and
comptroller, with
both sides of the
agency, but yes,
with .]_____________