[Senate Hearing 107-208]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-208
WEAK LINKS: HOW SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MANAGE AIRLINE PASSENGER
AND BAGGAGE SCREENING?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
and the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
76-802 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2002
____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Susan E. Propper, Counsel
Jason M. Yanussi, Professional Staff Member
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Ellen B. Brown, Minority Senior Counsel
Dan G. Blair, Minority Senior Counsel
Alison E. Bean, Minority Professional Staff Member
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
Marianne Clifford Upton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew Richardson, Minority Staff Director
Mason C. Alinger, Minority Professional Staff Member
Julie L. Vincent, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Durbin............................................... 1
Senator Lieberman............................................ 5
Senator Voinovich............................................ 21
Senator Thompson............................................. 27
Senator Akaka................................................ 55
Prepared statements:
Senator Cleland.............................................. 63
Senator Bunning.............................................. 64
WITNESSES
Tuesday, September 25, 2001
Monte R. Belger, Acting Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 8
Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 10
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office......................... 13
Robert W. Baker, Vice Chairman, American Airlines................ 31
Rear Admiral Paul E. Busick, USCG Ret., President and Executive
Director, North Carolina Global TransPark Authority............ 34
Leonard L. Griggs, Jr., Director of Airports--City of St. Louis,
Lambert-St. Louis International Airport........................ 38
Aubrey ``Bill'' Harvey, Jr., Training Supervisor for Argenbright
Security at O'Hare International Airport....................... 40
Michael B. La Pier, A.A.E., Executive Director, Central Illinois
Regional Airport............................................... 41
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Baker, Robert W.:
Testimony.................................................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 105
Belger, Monte R.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Busick, Rear Admiral Paul E.:
Testimony.................................................... 34
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 109
Dillingham, Gerald L.:
Testimony.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 87
Griggs, Leonard L., Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 38
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 115
Harvey, Aubrey ``Bill,'' Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 125
La Pier, Michael B.:
Testimony.................................................... 41
Prepared statement........................................... 131
Mead, Hon. Kenneth M.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 74
Appendix
Chart entitled ``Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large
Airports, May 1998-April 1999'' (submitted by Senator Durbin).. 140
Chart entitled ``Airport Security Breaches'' (submitted by
Senator Durbin)................................................ 141
Chart entitled ``Actions to Improve Aviation Security'' submitted
by Mr. Mead.................................................... 142
Letter from Billie H. Vincent, President and CEO, Aerospace
Services International, Inc., dated September 24, 2001, with an
attachment..................................................... 143
Responses to Questions for the Record from Senator Akaka:
Mr. Mead..................................................... 160
Dr. Dillingham............................................... 163
Mr. Baker.................................................... 165
WEAK LINKS: HOW SHOULD THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MANAGE AIRLINE
PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING?
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the
Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring
and the District of Columbia Subcommittee
Washington, DC.
The Committee and Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at
2:33 p.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, and Hon.
Richard J. Durbin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Durbin, Thompson, and
Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Senator Durbin. I would like to call this meeting of the
Governmental Affairs Committee to order, and Senator Lieberman,
the Chairman of this Committee, will be here very shortly. I am
going to make my opening remarks brief in the interest of time
because we have two very good panels, and I am sure we want to
have adequate time for questions.
I am glad that we are co-chairing this important hearing
today. I want to especially thank the witnesses who took a
great deal of time and sacrifice to travel to Capitol Hill in
an effort to help us make our airports and aviation system the
safest in the world.
I want to particularly commend Secretary Mineta and
Administrator Garvey of the Federal Aviation Administration for
their quick work on Tuesday, September 11. It is hard to
believe it was only 2 weeks ago. It seems like so much longer.
But they took action to halt national aviation operations and
to institute a ground-stop for all aircraft. These prudent
actions saved lives. They prevented tragedies and confusion.
This Congress and this administration has to expeditiously
develop a comprehensive plan to ensure the safety of the
traveling public, the security of our airports, and the
continued viability of the aviation industry. First and
foremost, I believe the Federal Government should immediately
take responsibility for the screening of passengers and carry-
on luggage and the control of security checkpoints at our
Nation's airports. The United States is one of only three
countries in the world--the other two are Canada and Bermuda--
that give the airlines the responsibility for passenger
screening. In fact, in 100 of the 103 countries with commercial
airports, screening is done by either the government or by the
airport. We can no longer rely on contractors and
subcontractors nor on employees with high turnover rates. We
need well-trained, professional Federal Government security
experts to be the central and first line of defense for airport
security.
According to the General Accounting Office report, the
average employment turnover rate for airport screening
personnel at 19 major airports in the United States is 126
percent.\1\ We have put this poster up here that you can take a
look at, if you can read numbers that small from that far away.
The turnover rate was as high as 416 percent at St. Louis-
Lambert airfield. Other countries have registered employment
turnover rates for airport screeners that are less than 50
percent, including Belgium, which has a rate of 4 percent.
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\1\ Chart entitled ``Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large
Airports, May 1998-April 1999'' (submitted by Senator Durbin) appears
in the Appendix on page 140.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GAO has also found in most cases a security screener's
starting salary is a minimum wage $5.15 an hour or slightly
higher. Other countries pay their screeners a livable wage, and
many provide health and other benefits. It is a sad testament
and an alarming indicator when airport parking garage
attendants and fast-food restaurant workers make more per hour
than those on the front lines of airline passenger safety.
I have introduced legislation today, the Airline Passenger
Safety Enhancement Act, that would require these airport
security checkpoints to be staffed by Federal employees and
better coordinate overall airport security. This bill would
also require the FAA to immediately issue an order for
uniformed armed law enforcement officers to monitor security
checkpoints.
I made this point last week in a hearing, and I would like
to tell you two things that happened afterwards. It was a
hearing with Secretary Mineta, and I said if we can't have
Federal employees there in charge, can't we at least have a
uniformed law enforcement officer on the scene right there?
By the time I returned to my office, just a few feet away,
I had a call from a gentleman who is going to testify today,
Mr. Griggs from St. Louis-Lambert airport, who said it will be
done immediately. It has been done, and I have seen it, and it
makes a difference. I went through Baltimore to go home on
Friday, last Friday, and saw two law enforcement officers
there. It was a completely different environment at that
screening checkpoint.
I don't want to suggest that there aren't good, hard-
working, and conscientious people at these screening
checkpoints already. But there are some, and I have seen them--
I bet you have, too--who are not paying as close attention as
they should, who are not taking the job as seriously as we want
them to. And I think the presence of law enforcement in some
capacity--until we come up with an overall national plan--will
have a dramatic and positive impact.
As we discover more about the events of September 11, it is
clear that we had some security breakdowns. The purpose of an
intelligence system in our country is to avert a crisis like
the one we endured on September 11, and the purpose of good
security is to make sure that we have done everything
conceivable to avert the same type of crisis.
The General Accounting Office has determined that
undercover agents have been able to penetrate restricted areas
of U.S. commercial airports with counterfeit or otherwise
invalid badges or other credentials, giving those agents the
opportunity, if intended, to carry weapons, explosives, other
things that are dangerous to the security of everyone.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Chart entitled ``Airport Security Breaches'' (submitted by
Senator Durbin) appears in the Appendix on page 141.
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We will go through this in detail. It is a sobering
accounting of efforts the General Accounting Office made last
year which disclosed how porous the security network was at
that time.
I share concerns about the effectiveness of our entire
passenger and carry-on baggage screening. I think that
passenger screening is just the tip of the compromised airport
security iceberg.
I am pleased to hear that the FAA is in the process of
performing background checks on airport employees. Double-
checking backgrounds and reissuing airport security badges is
certainly a step in the right direction. Inspector General Mead
will speak to that issue, I am sure.
I don't want to overlook an issue that will be raised by
one of our witnesses, and that is the cost of airport security,
particularly at smaller and regional airports. A lot of my
downstate Illinois airports support strong airport security
procedures. But we will hear testimony today concerning one
airport in Bloomington-Normal, Illinois, which may spend as
much as $30,000 a month for additional security measures.
Naturally, the administrators and managers at those airports
are concerned about the source of funding.
Finally, the airline industry is still reeling from this
month's senseless attack. While carriers are doing their best
to resume operations, while implementing stringent new security
procedures, it is clear they face a significant economic loss,
both short and long term. The quickest way to put passengers
back in the seats is to ensure that every possible safety and
security precaution is being taken at our airports and on our
planes.
[The prepared statement of Senator Durbin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Chairman Lieberman, thank you for agreeing to co-chair this
important hearing today. And a special thank you to our witnesses for
taking the time to travel to Capitol Hill to work with us on ways to
make our airports and our aviation system the safest in the world.
I want to commend Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey for
their quick work on Tuesday, September 11, to halt national aviation
operations and to institute a ground stop for all aircraft. These
prudent actions likely prevented further tragedy and confusion.
This Congress and this Administration must expeditiously develop a
cooperative, comprehensive plan to ensure the safety of the traveling
public, the security of our airports, and the continued viability of
our aviation industry.
First and foremost, the Federal Government should immediately take
responsibility for the screening of passengers and carry-on luggage and
the control of security checkpoints at our nation's airports. The U.S.
is one of only three countries--Canada and Bermuda are the others--that
give the airlines the responsibility for passenger screening. In fact,
in 100 of the 103 countries with commercial airports, screening is done
by either the government or by the airport. We can no longer rely on
contractors and subcontractors nor on employees with high turnover
rates. We need well-trained, professional Federal Government security
experts to be the central line of defense for airport security.
According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the average
employment turnover rate for airport screening personnel at 19 major
U.S. airports is 126 percent. The turnover rate in some cases was as
high as 416 percent at St. Louis Lambert Field [Chart]. Other countries
have registered employment turnover rates for airport screeners that
are less than 50 percent, including Belgium, which has a rate of 4
percent.
The GAO has also found that in most cases security screeners'
starting salary is minimum wage--$5.15/hour--or slightly higher. Other
countries pay their screeners a livable wage and many provide health
and other benefits. It is a sad testament and an alarming indicator
when airport parking garage attendants and fast food restaurant workers
make more per hour than those on the front lines of airline passenger
safety.
Today, I introduced legislation--the Airline Passenger Safety
Enhancement Act of 2001--that would require these airport security
check points to be staffed by Federal employees and better coordinate
overall airport security. This bill would also require the FAA
Administrator to immediately issue an order for uniformed, armed law
enforcement officers to monitor security checkpoints. While this
proposal generally appears to be supported by the airlines and by some
in the administration, I think it's important for Congress to act
swiftly to codify these important changes.
Neither this hearing nor my legislation is intended to diminish the
value of airport employees. I commend the thousands of hard-working,
honest airport and airline employees who help millions of Americans
travel safely every day. But, in light of recent events, we simply
can't let our guard down or take airport security for granted. It's
time to strengthen our resolve and our airport security.
But seamless airport security is about more than just passenger
screening, it must be comprehensive, coordinated security from the
curbside to the cockpit.
As we discover more about the tragic events of September 11, it's
clear that stunning security breakdowns and breaches occurred at
numerous levels. In fact, this week's TIME.com Website contains a story
about the September 11 hijackings. Here's an excerpt:
``The new evidence is causing officials to broaden their
investigative and security efforts to encompass not only the
carry-on bag screening system but the entire aviation security
apparatus at U.S. airports. The new evidence raises the
worrisome possibility that the hijackers may have had
accomplices deep within the `secure' areas of airports--that
may include the shops and restaurants in the terminal behind
the metal detectors, or amongst the thousands of people who
work in catering, fueling or cleaning aircraft; or anyone who
might have access to the airplane before takeoff.'' (TIME.com
Website, 9/24/01)
Investigators of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Office of
Inspector General, in unannounced tests, have successfully gained
access to supposedly secure areas of U.S. airports without proper
credentials in 68 percent of those tests. Investigators were then able
to board aircraft unchallenged 117 times.
The GAO has determined that undercover agents have been able to
penetrate restricted areas of U.S. commercial airports with counterfeit
or otherwise invalid badges or other credentials, giving those agents
the opportunity--if intended--to carry weapons, explosives, chemical/
biological agents, and other dangerous materials into those secure
areas and onto aircraft.
While I share concerns about the effectiveness of U.S. passenger
and carry-on baggage screening, we would be fooling ourselves if we
didn't devote the time and resources necessary to further restrict ramp
and other airport operations access. Passenger screening is just the
tip of the compromised airport security iceberg.
I was pleased to hear that the FAA is in the process of performing
background checks on airport employees. Double checking backgrounds and
reissuing airport security badges is a step in the right direction.
Inspector General Mead has noted in his written testimony that between
February 1999 and September 14, ten security incidents occurred at
major commercial airports ranging from selling false security badges to
false certification of screeners to improper use of an airport badge to
gain entry to a secured area [Chart].
Tighter and smarter airport security also has costs. I've heard
from a number of Downstate Illinois airports that support stronger
airport security procedures. However, these airports will be asked to
shoulder a heavy financial burden. For example, the Central Illinois
Regional Airport in Bloomington-Normal will likely need to spend as
much as $30,000 per month for additional security measures. These funds
are above and beyond what has been budgeted and could create a
financial hardship for the airport. The Department should explore ways
to help smaller airports by providing resources and technical
assistance to upgrade security and enhance passenger safety.
With regard to on board security, I am encouraged by the recent
announcement that Federal law enforcement officers will resume the sky
marshal program. This gives peace of mind and real safety assurances to
the traveling public. I am a cosponsor of Senator Hutchison's Emergency
Aviation Security Act, which would reinstate the Federal sky marshal
program.
However, I believe we can do more. Clearly, we have the
technological expertise to explore additional cockpit security, from
video cameras to tamper proof transponders. While we pursue common-
sense solutions like stronger and more secure cockpit doors, we
shouldn't delay developing high-tech solutions that very well may save
lives. And when it comes to security, we shouldn't forget about Amtrak
and the important role this passenger railroad plays in our national
transportation system. I will continue to work with Amtrak President
George Warrington and my colleagues to ensure that we address the
security and infrastructure needs of the railroad.
Finally, the airline industry is still reeling from this month's
senseless attacks. While carriers are doing their best to resume
operations while implementing stringent new security procedures, it's
clear that they face a significant economic loss, both short- and long-
term. On Friday, I voted to send desperately needed economic
assistance, in the form of grants and loans, to our nation's ailing
airlines. I will continue to work with my Senate colleagues to keep
this important sector of our economy flying while protecting airline
employees from layoffs and loss of benefits.
But the quickest way to put passengers back in the seats is to
ensure that every possible safety and security precaution is being
taken at our airports and on our airplanes.
I appreciate the difficult tasks that lie ahead for the Department,
the Congress, and our nation. Together, we can craft common-sense
solutions that protect passengers, secure our airports, and ensure that
our aviation system is the safest in the world.
Senator Durbin. I want to again thank the Department of
Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and my
colleague, the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Lieberman,
for scheduling this hearing.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Durbin. Thanks for
your initiative that led to the scheduling of the hearing, and
I am really pleased that the full Committee is doing this
alongside the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, which
you chair.
In light of the tragic events of September 11, the adequacy
of airport screening procedures is of immediate, paramount, and
very wide concern to the American people and to Members of
Congress. I think we just have to say flat out that the system
currently in place has failed to protect the safety of the
American people, and it is our responsibility to find out what
went wrong and how to correct it. This is vital from an
economic as well as the obvious safety point of view.
Last Friday, Congress approved a $15 billion assistance
package for the airlines, but this is just the beginning of a
response to the problems facing this industry that is so vital
to the quality of our lives and the health of our economy.
Unless we can also rebuild confidence among the American
people, the passengers, in the safety of our skies, and in
their safety when they enter an airport, the impact on air
commerce, let alone the economy generally, will only continue
to be worse and will ultimately affect every sector of our
economy. That is how important the airline industry is.
Since the passenger screening and carry-on baggage
inspection program was implemented nearly 30 years ago, after
the first wave of hijackings, the airlines, rather than the FAA
or other government agency, as is well known, have had
responsibility for hiring, training, and supervising the
screener workforce. Under this system, about 18,000 screeners,
mostly hired under contract, have been responsible for
screening about 2 million passengers and their baggage each day
in the United States.
As again has been over and over said in the last 2 weeks
and before by the gentlemen sitting before us and others, this
screening workforce has been characterized as underpaid,
undertrained, and underexperienced, with turnover rates that
sometimes exceed 400 percent at some of the airports in this
country. Training and background checks for these employees are
minimal. Indeed, although the FAA was directed by Congress in
1996 to develop certification regulations for screening
companies, the agency has missed several deadlines for issuing
rules, including a congressional deadline of last May.
Serious shortcomings in the quality of screening equipment
make the problem worse. Advanced detection equipment and new
technologies that could improve screeners' performance have
either not been made available or have been underused. These
and other safety drawbacks have been documented over and over
again by the General Accounting Office and by the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General.
In 1996, for instance, well after a Presidential commission
formed in the wake of the 1988 Lockerbie Pan Am bombing made
comprehensive recommendations to improve airline security, the
GAO testified that domestic and international aviation systems
still had ``serious vulnerabilities,'' and that typical
screening of checked baggage offered ``little protection
against even moderately sophisticated explosive devices.''
Again, in May 1998, the GAO testified that nearly every
aspect of the aviation security system could be exploited,
could be broken through, including passenger screening, baggage
inspection, and even controlling access to secure areas of
airports.
Last June, GAO reported that screeners missed as many as 20
percent of dangerous objects at screening checkpoints during
tests they carried out. This followed on the heels of a report
by the DOT Inspector General that investigators had breached
secure areas of airports in this country almost 70 percent of
the time they were testing.
The Inspector General has reported on aviation security
issues no less than 20 times in the last 4 years, finding
deficiencies in everything from the administration of security
guard contracts to the FAA's lack of policies and procedures
for implementing an advanced explosives detection system.
Clearly, sadly, we had ample warning of problems with the
way security is conducted for airlines. Our job today is to
look again intensely at these problems and ask questions that
can help us understand what it will take to make our skies safe
again, to restore public confidence in the aviation system, and
then to do exactly that.
For example, what new procedures and technologies can be
employed to improve screening? Why haven't these systems been
put in place? How do we ensure that the best technology is
deployed and developed? And how do we address privacy concerns
that some of our citizens may have?
Another question is whether the certification standards
that FAA is developing for screening companies will be strong
enough to be effective, or should the very idea of contracting
out screening services to private companies be jettisoned in
favor of federalizing the entire screening system, as Senator
Hollings and others have proposed in legislation they
introduced last Friday and which may well come before the full
Senate next week.
And, of course, we have got to decide where we draw the
line between security and convenience. There is no doubt, I
think, in anyone's mind that one of the outcomes of the
September 11 attacks is that checking in at airports is going
to be much more time-consuming. And it should be. Security
should never take a back seat to convenience.
I have got to tell you, I was on planes from here, from
Dulles, back and forth to Connecticut and New York over the
weekend, and I got the most thorough search of my person when I
entered the airport at Dulles that I have ever had. It took
more time. It took more time for everybody's search because
everybody was being searched. But I think we all felt better
when we got on the plane that that had happened. So that
inconvenience made us feel safer, and I hope it continues and
intensifies.
Of course, it is not enough to look only at screening
passengers. As Senator Durbin has indicated, there are so many
people--cleaning crews, maintenance workers, caterers--who have
unescorted access to aircraft and secure areas of the airports.
And, again, repeated investigations by GAO and the DOT
Inspector General have revealed vulnerabilities, weaknesses
here, in personal background investigations, in verifying
credentials, and in preventing unauthorized access to aircraft.
Recent news reports indicate that the September 11
attackers may have had accomplices who were able to position
weapons for them on the airplanes that were used in those
attacks. These individuals might have been caught if better
security procedures were in place for ground crews and other
airport employees.
So those are some of the areas of inquiry that the
Committee would like to get into this afternoon. I know that
our witnesses will be able to shed light on this very pressing
concern.
I want to thank Senator Durbin again for proposing this
joint hearing, for his leadership on this issue. He has had a
great interest and background in aviation matters, and this
Committee is more effective for having the benefit of his
experience and his sense of purpose. And I look forward to
working with him and other Members of the Committee as we
continue our oversight role and as we, from that oversight
role, contribute and cooperate with our colleagues as airport
security--and transportation security generally--legislation
comes to the floor of the Senate.
We are now ready to go to the witnesses. Senator Durbin, I
would be delighted if you would proceed.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much.
Our first panel consists of three individuals who have been
involved in this issue for quite some time and have a lot to
present to us in terms of their findings in an official
capacity. Monte Belger is the Acting Deputy Administrator of
the FAA of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Thank you for
joining us. Dr. Gerald Dillingham is the Associate Director of
the U.S. General Accounting Office on Transportation Issues.
And the Hon. Kenneth Mead is the Inspector General from the
U.S. Department of Transportation.
I thank you all for joining us. Mr. Belger, would you like
to start?
TESTIMONY OF MONTE R. BELGER,\1\ ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Belger. Thank you, sir. I will, with your permission,
submit my longer statement for the record and just make some
brief opening remarks.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Belger appears in the Appendix on
page 65.
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Chairman Lieberman, Chairman Durbin, I would like to begin,
if I could, just very briefly, by offering my heartfelt
condolences on behalf of all of the folks in the FAA to the
families and the friends of those who were lost on September 11
in New York City, Washington, and Pennsylvania. And I want to
publicly thank the courageous rescue workers and the volunteers
who have been working so long and hard in the aftermath of
these tragedies.
But even more so, I want to publicly just take a moment to
thank the staff of the FAA, and particularly our air traffic
controllers, as you referred to, Chairman Durbin. In the midst
of the hijackings and in the midst of the chaos, our
controllers successfully guided, working with the pilots very
closely, moved aircraft out of the area in which these hijacked
aircraft were operating. The national ground-stop that we put
in place on Tuesday morning, September 11, was unprecedented in
the history of civil aviation in our country. When the order to
land all planes was issued, the controllers and pilots safely
landed more than 5,000 flights in a little more than 2\1/2\
hours.
In the words of one editorial writer--and there have been
several--the controllers, the systems people, and the
management supporting them did their jobs and brought tens of
thousands of Americans safely back to earth. I am very proud of
their actions. It is a singular honor for me to be associated
with such professionals who performed such a remarkable feat.
In the aftermath of September 11, the President called on
America to return to normal as quickly as possible. Our focus
in the FAA has been twofold: First, to work with airports and
airlines to put more stringent security measures in place; and
only after we were assured that these measures were implemented
did we allow airports to begin operating, first to commercial
operations and then to other segments of the air transportation
system.
We ordered the evacuation of every airport terminal for the
airports to be inspected. Every aircraft was fully inspected
before any passenger was allowed to board. And we put into
place further security initiatives that have been sustained
beyond the reopening of the system. Some of these initiatives
are clearly visible to the traveling public, and others are
less so. Some of these initiatives are: Monitoring vehicles
near air terminals; discontinuing curbside check-in; requiring
passengers to present their tickets or boarding passes at
security checkpoints, and only permitting ticketed passengers
beyond the security checkpoint; reducing access points to
secure airports; reducing to an operational minimum the areas
that people have to be in; increasing random security checks
and ID checks through the entire terminal area; and as you
mentioned also, requirements to revalidate all airport
identification media, and also to check employees who have
access to the secure areas against the FBI watch list.
We have increased the number of uniformed and plainclothes
security officers at the airports, and we are in the process of
expanding the Federal Air Marshal Program. We are very grateful
and have received tremendous cooperation from the Attorney
General and the Justice Department in assisting us in getting
access to Federal law enforcement officers who are now in
training, and some have already started to fly as Federal Air
Marshals in our system.
Our second focus has been on restoring the system. We have
done this in a very methodical and deliberate way, in close
cooperation with the aviation community, with the law
enforcement community, with the Department of Defense, and with
all the airlines and airports. We are still in the process of
bringing the aviation system back up. But we are going to be
cautious and we are going to do it incrementally and in full
coordination with the military.
The coordination and the cooperation among all the parties
involved has just been extraordinary. We will continue to work
to restore the system to its full level of service. Security is
now at unprecedented levels. And as we enter what is literally
a new era of aviation, we are looking at ways to further
improve security at our airports.
As you know, the Secretary has created two rapid response
teams to address airport and airline security and the very
issues that were raised a few moments ago, as well as aircraft
security and what we can do to further strengthen and harden
and prevent access to the cockpit.
The incidents on Tuesday, September 11, have caused all of
us--airlines, airport operators, and public policymakers--to
look very closely at the balance of responsibility for civil
aviation security. In today's world, the threat assessment has
changed. Security must change in response to that.
I think the Secretary will soon provide recommendations,
perhaps even before the October 1 date that he had established
for the rapid response teams, recommendations to further
improve security at our Nation's airports and on airplanes.
In summary, we are focusing on four areas, just to repeat,
if I could: First, to bring the air transportation system back
to normal and restore public confidence; second, to expand the
use of the Federal Air Marshal Program; third, to improve
airport security, including the screening function; and,
fourth, to improve cockpit security.
I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I will
answer any questions.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Belger. Mr. Mead.
TESTIMONY OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Mead. I, too, want to express our sorrow to the many
families who have lost or are missing loved ones as a result of
the terrorist attacks of nearly 2 weeks ago, and also to
reinforce what everybody has been saying about the President,
Secretary Mineta, the Congress, the controllers, law
enforcement, and rescue relief workers, and the many people
that have pulled together in this response effort.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mead appears in the Appendix on
page 74.
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I would like most of my statement to be forward looking.
Everything everybody has said about the General Accounting
Office and the Inspector General issuing reports and testifying
many times on this subject is correct. As a matter of fact, it
goes back nearly 15 years.
I do think it is useful to overview what the different
elements of security are that we will be talking about today.
One, of course, is the passenger screening function that has
received a great deal of attention. Another function is access
to what they refer to as the sterile area or secure areas of
the airport. The sterile area is the concourse area after you
have been through passenger screening. The plane, too, is a
sterile area when it is on the tarmac. A third element is
screening checked and carry-on luggage. A fourth area is cargo
that ends up in the cargo hold of the air plane. And the fifth
area is the airport ID card system. I will be saying something
briefly about each of these areas.
I should also note that we have been involved in numerous
criminal investigations over the past 2 or 3 years in aspects
of aviation security, usually the falsification of airport
identification, security screener training records and
background checks. I will just give you two examples that I
think illustrate a point. Most recently, a private security
company was placed on 36 months probation and ordered to pay
over $1 million in fines for failing to conduct background
checks and falsifying training records on employee staffing
security stations at a major U.S. airport. Also, I believe it
was September 14, we arrested 12 non-U.S. citizens with INS,
who had illegally obtained security badges necessary to gain
admittance to secure areas at another U.S. airport.
Chairman Lieberman. Those were employees or people just
gaining access?
Mr. Mead. Well, in this case they were non-U.S. citizens
who illegally obtained security badges. But these types of
violations actually fall into two categories. Sometimes you
find people that have falsified their credentials to become an
employee, but get an ID card that is legitimate in the sense
that they are an employee. And then you have people that
illegally obtain an airport ID card, and through the use of
that ID card can obtain access to the secure areas of the
airport. We have also detailed some members of the Inspector
General's investigative staff to the Air Marshal Program.
Before I proceed, I just want to make clear that the
aviation security system is not foolproof. No security system
ever will be, particularly when you add the element of people
who are willing to die in the commission of their criminal
schemes. And that is why I think it is important not to lose
sight of what everybody is saying--that it is important to not
only root the terrorism out, but also to concurrently build a
strong aviation security system. Many of the efforts that Mr.
Belger outlined have to do with restoring public confidence
that has been badly damaged. I think Mr. Belger did a very good
job of overviewing the measures, and there are more on the way.
I think the Air Marshals' Program was very important, and
the point you made about having law enforcement presence at the
screening stations, I do think restores public confidence.
I would like the remainder of my statement to focus on two
areas. One is the governance of aviation security, how we go
about delivering it in this country, and then I would like to
proceed to some immediate areas I think we can consider to
tighten up security.\1\
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\1\ Chart entitled ``Actions to Improve Aviation Security,''
submitted by Mr. Mead, appears in the Appendix on page 142.
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Under our current system, FAA, which is charged with
governing aviation security and its regulation, and the
airlines and the airports which are charged with providing the
security, I think themselves face priorities and missions that
are different from security. Indeed, in some cases the security
mission conflicts with another mission, and other times I think
economic priorities get in the way.
So given the scope and complexity of the security challenge
as we know it now, and the long history of problems with this
aviation security program, I think the time has come to vest
governance of aviation security, as well as its delivery, in
one Federal agency or possibly one not-for-profit Federal
corporation or some combination of the two. But that entity
would have a singular focus of security. That would be its
profession. That would be its mission. It would not be in
competition with other aviation businesses. And I think that is
one way, a very effective way, of upgrading the training and
the standards for these screeners, and imposing some strict
controls over the issuance of airport ID cards. That cannot be
done overnight, so now we have to turn to the task of what do
we do now to immediately restore confidence?
I would like to cover several areas. One has to do with the
explosives detection machines and the use of them to screen
checked luggage. In the past we have not been using them.
Taxpayers have been spending about $1 million a copy on these
machines. They are good machines, but we are not using them.
They are sorely underused. I think FAA is going to change that
in the coming weeks.
Screening checkpoint security----
Chairman Lieberman. Forgive me. What do you mean they are
not being used? Are they in a warehouse somewhere, or they are
just at the location, but not being used enough?
Mr. Mead. Actually, the situation is both. There are some
in the warehouse that could be deployed, and there are some
that are operational that are sorely underused. Why are they
underused? Well, the FAA has set minimum standards for using
the machines. The airlines can decide if they want to use them
more. The airlines are concerned that the usage of these
machines will result in delays. It is true it will take more
time. These machines, Mr. Chairman, are much on the principle
of a Cat Scan machine, but they detect explosives. They are
greatly underused.
I would rather not, in open session here, go into the
numbers. I would be glad to share it with you later, but I
think I can document the statement that they are sorely
underused.
Senator Durbin. I might just add there is such a machine at
O'Hare. I was there several years ago when they bought it. I
have seen it as I walk by many times. I do not know the
criteria that they use to refer baggage or luggage for that
inspection, but it is only used in specific instances. It is
not part of the normal routine.
Mr. Mead. I believe these machines--if you have seen them--
they are a powerful, very visible exemplar of security. A
machine sitting idle is not a powerful exemplar of security.
Plus, they work.
On screening checkpoint security, I am not going to go over
the performance. I think that has been amply demonstrated for
the record. I would say though that it is important for FAA to
issue the rule. The role which is about to be issued sets some
standards on the certification of these screening companies.
And they also need standards for measuring the screener
performance. Now, what is acceptable? Is detecting a test
object 6 out of 10 times, 8 out of 10, 9 out of 10 acceptable?
And this is important because if screeners are having
difficulty detecting objects that are pretty obvious like a
test gun or a test grenade, it is even more difficult to detect
a bomb, a test bomb that is.
Airport access control. Several steps are needed here. What
you outlined, what our work had found, and what GAO's work had
found is accurate. I have four items on this area. The majority
of the aircraft boardings we did would not have occurred if the
employees had just challenged us and said, ``What are you doing
here? You do not have any business being here.'' Just that one
simple non-costly step.
A second is technology. This is an area where I think FAA
and the airports can mutually invest in cameras and anti-
piggyback devices. Piggy-backing is where an authorized
employee goes through the door, and an unauthorized one follows
right behind. And there are devices that prevent that--cameras
and various technological devices.
A third is revalidating the ID cards, which FAA has
announced. It is very important that we do an accurate
accounting in who is authorized to have these ID cards.
Finally, and I think a change in legislation will be
necessary to do this too, we need to require criminal checks on
all employees at commercial airports.
Chairman Lieberman. Does that happen at all now, Mr. Mead?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. For new employees at what they refer to
as the Category X airports. They are the top 20 airports. They
are required to do this with all new employees. The requirement
does not apply to employees that were established employees.
For airports other than those 20, they are not required to
do a criminal check, including on the screeners, unless certain
triggers are met, and I think that should change. I would
imagine that in the current environment that could be changed
fairly quickly.
And finally, cargo security. I am not going to go into any
details on this here, but we have recently completed some work
on cargo security, and we are going to be briefing the
Secretary and Mr. Belger and some others on the results of that
soon. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Mead.
Dr. Dillingham from the General Accounting Office. thank
you.
TESTIMONY OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, Ph.D.,\1\ DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Dr. Dillingham. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman and Chairman
Durbin.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Dillingham appears in the
Appendix on page 87.
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Although it is not fully known what actually occurred, or
which of the weaknesses in our Nation's aviation security
system contributed to the horrendous events that occurred on
September 11, it is clear that serious weaknesses do exist and
that their impact can be far more devastating than previously
imagined.
Today, I would like to offer some suggestions on what might
be done to address some of the known system weaknesses. The
focus of my testimony will be on preboard screening and
securing the ramp area, reiterating some of the points that the
IG has just made.
First, based on the work that GAO and the IG has done for
the Congress, I would like to say a little bit about what we do
know about the system. We know that airport security is
disbursed over several organizations with overlapping
responsibilities including FAA, airports, and airlines. These
organizations in turn may subdivide the responsibility even
further, as is done with passenger screening. We do know that
there may be multiple screening contractors in a single
airport, each with perhaps different quality control standards.
We do know that the screening contractor on duty is likely to
be the one that submitted the lowest bid to the airline. We do
know that as far back as the late 1970's, both FAA and the
airlines characterized the performance or lack of performance
of screening personnel as significant and alarming. Since that
time the trend in screening performance has been a downward
spiral. We also know that the extremely high turnover among
screeners not only means that there are often few skilled and
experienced screeners on the job, it also means that there are
literally thousands of individuals out there that know an awful
lot about how screening works or does not work.
By and large, the efforts today to address this problem
area have been largely ineffective and too slow in coming. A
case in point is the promulgation of a rule to implement the
provisions of the 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act that will
establish a screening company certification program. The rule
was scheduled for issuance later this month, more than 2\1/2\
years later than originally scheduled.
We also know quite a bit about gaps in security related to
the ramp area. We know that some airport operators do not
properly account for IDs for employees who need to have access
to secure areas, changes or have been terminated.
We know that both the DOT, IG and GAO have been able to
gain unauthorized access time and time again to the ramp and
other secure areas. The IG investigators were able to go as far
as to be seated on the aircraft and ready to take off. In the
instance that was cited before, our special agents used
counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to bypass
security checkpoints at two airports, and to walk unescorted to
the aircraft departure gates. And since those agents had been
issued tickets and boarding passes, they could have potentially
carried weapons, explosives or other dangerous objects onto the
aircraft.
Now, I would like to turn to some actions that could be
considered to address some of what we do know about the system.
I think it is only fair to say that FAA has begun to implement
remedies for most of the problems that have been identified in
access control and many other security areas. Although a
significant amount of activity is currently underway, we
believe that it is critical that a mechanism be put in place to
insure that these activities are fully implemented in a timely
fashion.
Mr. Chairman, it may also be time to consider a different
organizational structure for all aspects of airport security,
or minimally, the preboarding screening operations. The
preliminary findings of a study that we have underway for House
Aviation Subcommittee identified four alternatives which are
detailed in our written statement. In each alternative, FAA
could continue to be responsible for regulating screening,
overseeing performance and imposing penalties for poor
performance.
The first alternative is one in which the air carriers
would continue to be responsible for conducting screening. This
alternative assumes that FAA will implement the pending
certification rule and the other elements of the Airport
Security Improvement Act of 2000, which would enhance screener
qualifications and training.
A second alternative is one in which each airport authority
would be responsible for screening.
A third alternative is based on a new DOT agency with a
headquarters and field structure, created to conduct a national
screening program. It would be accountable to Congress through
the annual appropriations and oversight process.
And the fourth alternative is a new quasi-government
corporation, also with a headquarters and field structure,
created to conduct a national screening program. In this case
Congress could use its latitude to combine government and
private sector features as is done with Amtrak and TVA when
they create such a corporation, and define how it will be held
accountable and financed.
Of course, there are pluses and minuses associated with
each option, variations on the options, and perhaps other
options that should be considered. We also recognize that no
security system is 100 percent safe, but we are certain that
there is a lot that can be done to improve the current
situation. The GAO stands ready to continue to assist this
Committee in this extraordinarily difficult challenge. Thank
you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much.
I think that everyone agrees that before the flying
public--the American passengers--are going to return to
airplanes, they have to see something different. They have to
walk into that airport and understand that it is not business
as usual as it was September 10. I think some of those things
are starting to take place, but some of them are very slow,
some of them are not very visible.
Mr. Belger, what do you think in terms of that visible
change in airport security? What are the plans of the
administration to make those visible changes that will really
restore the confidence of the flying public?
Mr. Belger. Well, sir, I think the most visible change
would be more law enforcement presence. I think there are other
visible changes just in the professional way that the screening
check point is operated with more of a premium on thoroughness
rather than speed. I think the attitude, the demeanor and the
professionalism of the people doing the screening are visible
to the traveler. I think those are things that can improve.
Senator Durbin. How many screeners are we talking about? Do
you have a round figure, a number that you can give us of
people working at screening stations in airports across
America?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir. The numbers that we have been able to
gather are around 18,000 to 20,000.
Senator Durbin. And that is just on the screening side of
it?
Mr. Belger. That is my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator Durbin. That would not include baggage handlers or
others?
Mr. Belger. I think that is just the people on the front
line that are visible to the public doing the screening.
Senator Durbin. Now, would you agree that ramp security is
also a major part of our effort?
Mr. Belger. It might even be more important, given what
happened on September 11. I mean we do not know what happened,
but as was referred earlier, it is very possible that these
items did not go through the screening check point. We do not
know that yet, but security is so integral that you cannot just
focus on one piece without focusing on the whole system.
Senator Durbin. I think there was a newspaper report that
after they did a thorough overhaul of one of the canceled
flights, they found one of these box cutters or paper cutters
in one of the seat cushions in one of the planes, and there is
no telling whether a passenger brought it on board or it was
planted at this point, but it obviously raises this question
about ramp security and security of access to the plane.
Now, when I asked the baggage handlers at O'Hare what is
the starting salary, it is $8.50 an hour. I was surprised. I
thought it would be higher since they are employees of the
airlines, but that is the starting salary. After 5 years they
can, I think, rise to $19 an hour which is a substantial
improvement, but you consider what kind of employee is
attracted to $8.50 an hour.
Let me ask you also as well, if we are talking about ramp
security, can you achieve ramp security without establishing a
perimeter around the airport?
Mr. Belger. Well, you have to have boundaries. Our whole
airport security concept is built around the principle that the
closer you are to the airplane, the more stringent and thorough
the security procedures must be. As that perimeter broadens,
the security procedures perhaps are less intensive than they
are at the airplane. That is the principle we have used in
airport security for 30 years. I think you have to define areas
in which people are supposed to be and areas which they are not
supposed to be, and you have to very clear procedures to
determine who is supposed to be there and who is not, and what
checks have to be done to allow people to be there.
Senator Durbin. Even in the smallest airports in Illinois,
it is a pretty big piece of real estate, and if you are going
to allow someone to come across the meadow and across the
cornfield and onto the runway and up to the plane, then you
breach the security that you have in place around the terminal
itself, and it strikes me that is one of the elements that is
inescapable here, that there has to be some sort of perimeter
security, a fence, some sort of monitoring camera, whatever it
takes, to make sure that you know who is on that field and that
they are supposed to be there. That is a big expense item we
will talk about, I am sure, as we get into this as well.
Someone mentioned the FBI watch list. Was that you, Mr.
Belger?
Mr. Belger. Yes.
Senator Durbin. Did the FAA have access to the FBI watch
list before September 11?
Mr. Belger. We have access to the names that the FBI gives
us of people that would be of interest to the aviation industry
or to the carriers. We do not normally have access to the same
watch list that the FBI might have. The FBI probably does not
have the same larger list that INS or Customs might have. So
FAA, which is not an intelligence organization, relies upon the
FBI and others to tell us when there is someone that we ought
to be cautious about or looking for.
Senator Durbin. Attorney General Ashcroft testified this
morning at another hearing, and we went into this with some
questions. And it appears that there is not an integrated
information network within our government, that if there is a
concern about an individual being here illegally, for example,
or being a danger to our country, that information is not
necessarily shared with all of the appropriate law enforcement
agencies that might come into contact with them, whether it is
INS, the FAA, or the FBI for that matter. All of that
information is not shared at this point, and that strikes me as
another key element in avoiding another disaster.
Mr. Belger. I think what you described is perhaps even an
understatement. If we are to move, as has been suggested, to
more Federal control of the screening and the ramp security at
airports, I believe it will make it easier to consolidate and
have access to the Federal databases that exist.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Mead, and Dr. Dillingham as well, let
me ask you about some of the options we have considered. I
support federalizing. I believe that when I look at this and
step back I can see that the types of federalizing we could
discuss--but it strikes me that if we are going to have a
national standard of national safety for every passenger, no
matter where you are flying to and from in the United States,
that it really is essential that we establish those standards
here in Washington, and then work with them on a local basis to
try to implement them. Mr. Mead, is that your feeling as well?
Mr. Mead. I think you are absolutely on target, and I think
those should be done expeditiously without delay. It is the
only way in a system like ours, in contra distinction to
Europe, where in a country like the Netherlands, it is easy to
say the airport should run security, because you only have one
or two airports. In this country we have at least 400
commercial airports, and 3,000 if you expand the net to cover
general aviation.
So you are right that you need consistent standards,
consistent training, and consistent certification.
Senator Durbin. Dr. Dillingham, what is your feeling on
that?
Dr. Dillingham. I think we need a change in the system. We
certainly need to find a unified way to deal with aviation
security. I am not sure what federalization means. We have been
talking to a number of people and they have different
definitions of what federalization means. So we think that it
is more important to think about some of the criteria that
might be important in selecting an alternative, and one of the
criteria is indeed, to bring together this fragmented system
under one roof; second, to make sure that the coordinating body
has the authority for effective coordination of intelligence
that you were talking about, data and intelligence sharing; and
that it has some accountability to the Congress, as well as to
make sure that there is an identified funding source for it.
So the criteria we think will be the driving force rather
than just federalization or nationalization, but clearly, the
elements that you mentioned are important.
Senator Durbin. I am just going to close, because my time
is up here, with one illustration of the challenge here when it
comes to small-town America. One of the cities I represent in
Illinois, Quincy, Illinois, has a good airport and four
commercial flights a day. And the obvious question is, if there
are to be Federal employees or people with a Federal
responsibility at that airport, is that practical? How would it
work? What would they do? Who would they answer to? How many
would be necessary?
So at a large airport, O'Hare, Midway, or St. Louis-
Lambert, you can see this in the context of thousands of people
coming every single day, but in a small town, whether it is
Aberdeen, South Dakota, which Senator Daschle mentioned at a
meeting this morning, or Quincy, Illinois, it does create a
different type of challenge and raises a question as to whether
or not there could be a delegation, either through the airlines
or to local law enforcement, or to some other entity we are not
even discussing here at this moment.
I am open to that, but I think establishing the Federal
standard, making certain that in the large context, the large
environment of the airports, that we have the Federal presence
and visibility as an essential part of restoring confidence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Durbin, thanks very
much.
Mr. Mead, I want to just comment on something you said. You
were very respectful in your language, but I do think you make
an important point here as we think about what to do next in
terms of providing more airport security, which is we have
previously given that responsibility largely to the airlines,
the responsibility for providing security. As you said,
graciously, I think, but directly, that responsibility for
security has very often yielded to other goals, including
profitability, or customer convenience. And the result has been
that security in the airline industry has been less than it
should have been, which is, I gather, the major reason why you
are now suggesting whichever form we choose, that we take the
security function for the airline industry away from the
industry, and put it either in the government or in some quasi-
public nonprofit organization which is solely focused on
security, in one sense, regardless of the cost because it is
that important. Is that correct?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir, it is. You know, I wonder if we all
reflect back on the different rules in aviation security that
have been proposed over the years, when that cost benefit
analysis is done to support that rule and the rule is sent back
for further cost benefit analysis, if in light of the events of
September 11, the cost benefit analysis that we would use today
would be materially different than the ones we have used
heretofore.
Chairman Lieberman. That is a very powerful point. In other
words, none of us can sit here and say that we could have
prevented what happened on September 11. I do think if security
had been higher, we could have made it a lot harder to do it,
but the normal economic calculus, when set against the vast
damage that the attacks on September 11 did to people, people's
lives, hard to calculate, impossible to calculate ultimately.
But also, more subject to being calculated, the extraordinary
adverse impact on our economy, not to mention just direct
dollar loss. It is a good point.
Mr. Belger, I actually want to ask you about that in terms
of the health of the airline industry and our shared desire to
get it going again. My impression on Sunday, when I was in
Dulles, Newark, and JFK, was that they were a lot quieter than
they normally are. The planes I was on were a quarter to a half
full. Does the FAA at this point have any statistics as to what
the rate of occupancy, if I can put it that way, or usage of
the airline industry is now, 2 weeks after the attacks?
Mr. Belger. We have data on the number of flights. I think
Mr. Baker from American Airlines is on the next panel, and it
would probably be better for him to speak for the industry on
the load factors. We generally just get that information
anecdotally. In terms of flights, we are operating at about 90,
92 percent in our air traffic control centers based upon an
average day last year. A lot of that is military operations
right now, but the number of flights in the system for the air
carriers is probably--and Mr. Baker could confirm this--but
probably in the 65, 70 percent range of what they operated
before September 11.
Chairman Lieberman. This is the number of flights taking
off or the extent to which they are full, the planes?
Mr. Belger. The number of flights.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you have any anecdotal evidence
about the extent to which the airline seats are being taken
now?
Mr. Belger. I would really ask that perhaps someone from
the airlines validate this--but I have been told that the load
factors are in the 55, 60 percent, some lower, some higher, but
that is kind of an average.
Chairman Lieberman. And normal would be what?
Mr. Belger. Oh, I think they were averaging in the high
70's, low 80's before September 11.
Chairman Lieberman. So we are still down. We are all
hearing, we talked about this, our colleague, Senator Durbin
said it, that confidence is returning but we have to do as much
as we can visibly to get back the public's confidence and get
the airline industry up to where it was before.
In that regard some people have suggested that we put a
visible or a covert marshal on every flight. And wonder whether
you have ever calculated, thinking about what Mr. Mead just
said about costs as compared to benefits, what that might cost
and whether it is within the range of the feasible. It is
certainly one very tangible way to say to people on every
flight there is going to be a marshal armed; that is some
reason for you to feel secure.
Mr. Belger. Well, we are absolutely looking at that, sir.
We have increased the size of the Federal Air Marshal Program
significantly, but we do not, obviously, now have the resources
to put an Air Marshal on every flight. There are about 7,000
commercial aircraft used daily. About 35,000 to 39,000
departures, commercial air carrier departures every day. But
even if you just looked at the number of airplanes and assume a
Federal Air Marshal can fly all day on one of those aircraft,
and if you assume they work as a team of two, that is 14,000
people. So that is absolutely an option we are looking at and
we are looking at what we can do short of that also.
Chairman Lieberman. I do not want to ask you the question
because I am worried about the answer, about how many Air
Marshals we have now, because I fear it might be lower than I
would like anybody to think.
Mr. Belger. We have tried not to talk about that publicly,
but I will be glad to privately.
Chairman Lieberman. Fine. Let me pick up on a line of
questioning that Senator Durbin began about the sharing of
intelligence information. Did the FAA in fact have from the FBI
the names of those two individuals on the watch list that we
now believe, or know, were involved in the hijackings and the
air attacks on September 11?
Mr. Belger. No, sir, we did not have those names.
Chairman Lieberman. So that was--they were not conveyed for
some reason to the FAA?
Mr. Belger. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. And therefore, when you said before
that the FBI shares information with the FAA, it would not
necessarily be in the category of those who are on a watch list
because they may have been associated with a terrorist
organization?
Mr. Belger. Well, I cannot speak for the FBI, obviously,
and perhaps this is a discussion we ought to have more
thoroughly in a closed session, but basically the way it works
is that the FBI provides to our intelligence unit in our
security organization, the names of people that they have
determined to be either a potential threat, or that might pose
some danger if they were flying. We give those names to the
airlines. They check those names against their reservation
systems.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you know what categories the FBI
turns over to you? In other words, what would be the basis of
them deciding they should give this to the FAA?
Mr. Belger. Well, again, I think they would have to speak
to the process they go through, but as I said before, the FAA
is not an intelligence-gathering organization and we rely on--
and I do not mean that defensively.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood.
Mr. Belger. We work very closely with them. We have, I
think, a very good day-to-day working relationship with the FBI
and other intelligence agencies.
But I think the main point here, if I could, I think the
fundamental point is the point that Chairman Durbin raised a
minute ago. I think there is much more we can do to provide the
people responsible for screening and airport security with
better access to a larger database that is now----
Chairman Lieberman. Let me just pursue this. What do the
airlines do now, what does the FAA do now with names that they
get from the FBI on a watch list?
Mr. Belger. We provide those names to the carriers in the
form of a security directive or security alert, and the
airlines look for those names on the----
Chairman Lieberman. Those names on a manifest of the
passengers on a flight. So, obviously, if the manifest did not
reveal the identities of the individuals, they were using false
names, there would be no match at that point.
Mr. Belger. That is correct.
Chairman Lieberman. Should the FAA now be looking at
deploying technology such as fingerprinting or biometrics or
other identification methods to identify passengers? Is that
worth pursuing at this point?
Mr. Belger. Absolutely it is. One of the teams that the
Secretary set up is looking at airport security. One of the
things they are looking at very closely is the use of biometric
screening systems, whether it be facial recognition,
fingerprint recognition, hand geometry recognition. San
Francisco Airport uses, today--and it might be the only
airport, at least the only one I am aware of--uses a hand
geometry type of recognition system, and it appears to be
working. I think facial recognition is also a very promising
technology.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. I appreciate it. Obviously,
I am quite surprised that the two individuals', who were
involved in the attacks, names were not communicated to the
FAA, and we should ask the FBI why that did not happen but I
appreciate that you are now very aggressively pursuing other
means of raising the guard and protecting passengers, and I
think the sooner we move forward on that, the better. Thank
you.
Senator Durbin. Senator Voinovich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Senator Voinovich. I would like to thank the Chairmen of
the Committee and the Subcommittee for holding this hearing. I
apologize for not being here, but I stopped into the briefing
by the Secretary of State, and our Defense Secretary.
The issue of airline security has been highlighted, not
only by the tragedies that we had in New York and here in
Washington, but it has also brought to our attention the
enormous impact the airline industry has on our economy, and I
think of our being so penny wise and pound foolish, and how we
often make representations. For example, securing our airports,
and we do not dot the i's and cross the t's. We say we are
doing it, but in fact, we are not doing it. And I think that we
are at the point right now where we realize how important it is
that we have the kind of security that we need to have.
If anyone looked at the statistics on the turnover of
employees, you would know there had to be something wrong in
this country. Atlanta, Hartsfield, 375 percent annual turnover
rate. Chicago O'Hare, Senator Durbin, 200 percent in Chicago.
Denver, another big airport, 193 percent. Houston, 237 percent.
St. Louis-Lambert, 416 percent turnover rate. Someone should
have read those statistics, and it should have sent a signal
out to them that something was awfully wrong.
We are grappling about how we are going to get our security
job taken care of, and Dr. Dillingham, in your testimony you
talked about a report of 102 countries with international
airports, 100 have placed the airport security responsibility
with the airports or the government, and the other two, Canada
and Bermuda, have placed responsibility with the air carriers.
The question I would like to ask you, from your observations,
is there any difference between the security that is being
provided in those that are run by the government and those run
by the carriers, or is there not any perceptible difference?
And then I would like all of you to comment on something
that seems to be obvious, that we do have some airports in this
world that are secure. I have been to Israel many times, and I
can tell you there is security in Israel. I have been to
Frankfurt. I can tell you, there is security at Frankfurt. And
it seems to me that if we are looking around to try and figure
out how to best deal with airport security, that my best
judgment always has been to go someplace where you have the
best practices and see what they do, and then figure out how
they are getting it done, and maybe that is a good model for us
to follow.
So I would be interested, Dr. Dillingham, in your response
to whatever security is different depending on who controls the
airport? And second of all, your comments about whether or not
all of you think that maybe what they are doing in Israel or in
Frankfurt or some other places, where the security is more
secure, is something we should look into. Dr. Dillingham.
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. Most countries keep very close to
the chest their performance statistics in terms of how well the
screeners perform. What we have found is that in most of the
countries, the turnover rate is considerably lower, and with
that lower turnover rate, you do get more experienced screeners
on the job. And you have to consider the fact that in some of
these other countries, there is a much smaller system that they
are dealing with, and even if it is controlled by the airport,
oftentimes it is supplemented by having visible security, or
armed forces or armed guards around as well.
The only information that we have about performance
indicates where there was a test, a joint test between the
United States and another country. The other country performed
twice as well as we did in the screener performance area.
Mr. Mead. I would like to make a comment about the airport
situation overseas. It is plausible that the approach would
work here if we had one airport, or two airports or three. In
Europe, where you do tend to find a situation where the airport
authority is responsible, and as Dr. Dillingham says, it is
supplemented by the government, but there are fewer airports
that they are responsible for. Here we have 400 different
airports, and one of our objectives now is a consistently
higher standard of security, no patchwork quilts. That is one
point.
And second, the airlines' relationships to airports in this
country are usually quite different from those in Europe. In
this country the airlines frequently have a vested financial
interest in, for example, gates, terminals at the airport,
through ownership or long-term leases. And the airlines have
quite a bit to say about the delivery of services by that
airport.
Mr. Belger. I began my FAA career 30 years ago as a
security inspector, so I have had a lot of jobs since then. I
have seen our performance and I have seen Europe's from a
variety of different perspectives.
We have thought in this country for many years that the
threat was different in other parts of the world than it was
here. And I believe that is why we have seen, particularly in
Europe and other parts of the world, the performance and the
visibility of armed guards, etc., to be much higher than we
have seen here. And in Frankfurt, for example, a lot of what
you see as additional security is a result of requirements that
we have put on our carriers who are flying out of those
airports.
We have to, in this country, I believe now, really step
back and reassess all of the basic principles that we have used
in determining responsibilities for aviation security. We have
to completely reassess those. What we thought might have been
completely unworkable 2 weeks ago are things that we have to
really consider today.
Senator Voinovich. Are there security screening lessons
that you get from Europeans in terms of technology they use and
procedures they follow that would be relevant here?
Mr. Belger. Well, from a technology standpoint, I am pretty
comfortable that our security folks know all the technology
that is available, and we have the wherewithal to test it and
use it to the extent we can.
Procedures, I think, is where we could learn a lot. As I
said earlier, the premium ought to be on thoroughness rather
than speed. The premium ought to be on professional, thorough
dedicated people, working at the screening points and
throughout the airport environment. And I think that is where
we could perhaps learn, Senator.
Senator Voinovich. It is also a question of cost. If it is
the cost to the airlines, then it affects their bottom line. In
the event that we decide to really make a commitment to
security--which means we are going to have to spend some
money--that the Federal Government is going to have to spend it
or the people who use the airlines will have to pay. The issue
would be who ought to pay for it? Should the people that use
airports pay for it, or should our Federal Government, or
should there be a combination thereof? And the issue again is
if they have it, and the money is not segregated into a pot and
it is on their bottom line, I think the tendency will be to go
on the cheap because it is affecting their profit situation.
Mr. Belger. Well, the airlines have had the responsibility
for about 30 years, and they had it actually through
legislation which requires that the screening be done by the
carrier or an agent of the carrier, and it has not worked to
the satisfaction of a lot of us, so we need to do something
different. If that means the Federal Government has to figure
out how to pay for it, then that is what we would like to work
with you to figure out.
Senator Voinovich. Any of the other witnesses want to
comment on that?
Mr. Mead. I think your point about paying is very
important. I know you are very familiar with the Highway Trust
Fund and the Aviation Trust Fund, the history of those. If this
is going to cost money, I think the American public is willing
to pay that money, but I do think that they would expect that
if they are going to pay it and have it denominated as a
security fee or something along those lines, that they would be
outraged if it went to some other purpose.
Dr. Dillingham. Just as a sort of general overall point,
whatever the Nation decides to do about aviation security, it
is very important that the energy that is associated with it
now not go away as the crisis recedes in our memory. We have
had aviation tragedies before, certainly not to this degree,
but not too long afterwards, the interest and the oversight
starts to become less, and we are back in front of you again,
telling you that things have not changed. So whatever is
decided, there needs to be clearly much more stringent
oversight to make sure that it happens.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Senator.
It strikes me that there are actually two contacts that
every passenger runs into when they get on an airplane in
America related to security. We focused almost exclusively,
when it comes to the passenger side, on one, the screening. The
second contact comes at the ticket counter when the questions
are asked, questions, ``Did you pack this bag and has it been
out of your control?'' ``No.'' ``Has any stranger given you
something to carry on the plane?'' ``No.'' I am just kind of
curious, always have been, how many people answer yes to those
questions. I doubt very many.
But going to the point that Senator Voinovich made, when
you go through an international airport like Frankfurt, you are
engaged in a conversation with someone, maybe with more than
one person, and it is not limited to two routine questions with
routine answers. And it struck me that what they were looking
for was not just the response to the questions, but my body
language and whether I looked nervous, or whether I was
somebody suspicious that they wanted to push along to somebody
else to take a closer look at. I think that is a best practice,
Senator Voinovich, that I have seen in the airports around the
world that are very concerned about security.
Now, I think the premise of the two questions that we ask
at all American airports is the following: No one would
knowingly get on a plane carrying a bomb. If I packed my own
bag and it has been under my control, then I am not bringing
one on and I did not take an object from someone. That premise
exploded four times on September 11. So the question I want to
ask you, Mr. Belger, and the other witnesses to respond to, is
whether there is any point to continue to ask those questions?
Should we be looking at some other kinds of questions or some
other type of interrogation so that we really try to get to the
heart of this question about whether someone suspicious is
getting on an airplane?
Mr. Belger. I definitely think we ought to rethink all of
our procedures in light of what happened, including the asking
of those questions. Even some of our concepts--well without
getting into details, many of our concepts have been built upon
the premise that an individual would not get on the airplane
with a bomb, would not commit suicide. That is clearly, clearly
no longer a valid principle. And when I answered the question
earlier about what we could learn from procedures, that is what
I was thinking about. The fact is, in many airports in the
world, speed is second to thoroughness and doing it right.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Mead or Dr. Dillingham, any comment
about the interrogation at the airport?
Mr. Mead. You probably know if you have been on an
international flight, you also get asked a series of other
questions. I think, as Mr. Belger points out, profiling, which
is used as a trigger for various things in the aviation system,
as well as that set of questions, needs to be revisited. The
profiles were based on a certain set of premises, which are no
longer adequate. So they need to be revisited. And I think if
you wanted to discuss elements of profiles, that is something
we would be doing in closed session.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. I agree with what Mr. Belger
said, and I think that not only do we need to revise and
enhance that procedure, the questioning procedure, more toward
the discussion that you referred to, we have to insure that the
people who are asking those questions are capable of more than
accepting the answers. In other words, you have got to look for
body language, you have got to be able to make some other
determination besides what people say yes or no to whatever the
conversation is.
And I think just adding to what the IG said, we do have a
computer profiling system in place, and I agree 100 percent we
need to revise that, as it needs to be connected with
additional criteria, and at the same time, perhaps linked to
the screening function, because as it currently works, you
could be picked as a profile person and still not be stopped at
the screening and have your hand luggage checked because the
profiling refers to looking at checked bags. So we have things
in place that we can enhance and make an immediate impact at
that level of security.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Senator Lieberman and then
Senator Thompson.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Durbin.
You know, Mr. Mead, you said something I want to draw on
because it makes the point that I think Mr. Belger made before
about how we have to rethink airline security generally. It is
a fact, is it not, that passengers are subjected to a higher
level of security review going on an international flight than
they are on a domestic flight?
Mr. Mead. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. And of course, one of the painful--and
that is based, I presume, on the previous higher tendency of
what we used to know as hijacking or planting of bombs on a
plane, on international flights rather than domestic ones.
Mr. Mead. Yes.
Chairman Lieberman. It leads me to the general point, you
know some people have gone so far as to say, ``Well, the
terrorists struck the airline industry now. They will not
strike there next time.'' We do not know that, and we have to
therefore raise our guard. I appreciate what you said, Mr.
Belger, and I think it is important that we all focus on this,
that as much as we have to raise our guard to protect against
the kinds of insane acts that occurred on September 11, it is
also critical--and this builds on the war metaphor that we are
all using, the war against terrorism--that we not just protect
ourselves or prepare ourselves to fight the last battle, which
was flying planes into buildings, that we have got to think, if
you will, like the terrorists think, and then defend ourselves
against what would be next, because the airline security
question basically, as the last question we talked about, has
been geared in general terms to hijackings, and at another
level of taking a bomb onto a plane. Nobody ever, because in
some ways we are too sane and humane, considered the
possibility that somebody might get on the plane and commandeer
it and fly it into a populated building.
Is that kind of review going on now?
Mr. Belger. Yes, sir. I absolutely know firsthand that
Secretary Mineta and the folks in the Department and the FAA
are even thinking beyond aviation for the future, and I think
we must.
Chairman Lieberman. Into other transportation forms?
Mr. Belger. Other transportation modes, yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Very important, because I think all of
us are thinking that way. Ridership on trains has gone up, and
yet people I know who get on trains, and I have been on a few
in the last couple of weeks, have a higher level of anxiety
there, too, than they had before, so I appreciate that.
Mr. Mead. I think the point that you made is very important
about the multi-modal aspect of this, and I think the solution
on what to do with the security function ought to consider
that, stop and think about it in a transit system, many of
which interconnect with airports. In San Francisco the BART
system is going to stop in front of the international terminal.
The people that are going to the airport often take both their
checked and carry-on luggage with them right into the terminal,
or right into the transit station, and what is to stop them
from leaving it there?
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Mead. So I am hopeful that one of the things that comes
out of this is a multi-modal consideration of security.
Chairman Lieberman. Me too, I hope so.
Just a final question, Mr. Belger. We referred to those
regulations and rule makings that are going on regarding the
screeners receiving more training and the contractors who hire
them being certified or certificated. It may be too late in a
way now. It may be that there is a rush and a movement that is
quite strong to move toward federalizing that function and
airport security generally. But nonetheless, that is not a
foregone conclusion, and I wanted to ask you when you expect
that rule will become final, and to the extent you are able,
what changes would the rule make in the standards for selecting
screening contractors and training, because it is possible for
those who may be skeptical about turning this function over to
the government, that a more demanding series of requirements
would make that alternative worth considering.
Mr. Belger. Right. We are ready to issue the rule. It has
been cleared through all the processes. We have made the
decision not to issue it right now until we complete the work
with the Secretary on the types of recommendations he wants to
make. And you are absolutely right, that some of the
certification criteria that we had thought of previously in the
rule probably ought to be stronger now, even if we continue
with some type of non-Federal screening operation.
The types of things that are in the rule now that you ask
about would require the screening company to be certified by
the FAA. They would basically have to have a security program
along the same principles that airports and air carriers have.
They would have to have programs approved by the FAA that would
speak to how they would hire, train, and test their people, and
we would set performance standards that the actual screeners
would have to meet.
One of the problems we had in getting this rule out sooner,
was the fact that there was no real objective way to test the
performance of the screeners other than to test objects that
our inspectors use, which really is not a good real-world way
to test. So we started with the rule making back in 1997 and
came to the conclusion that we really did not have a good way
to objectively measure the performance of the screeners. About
that time we were developing what we call the threat image
projection system, which superimposes on the x-ray machine the
image of a real weapon. You can do that in a very sophisticated
way with perhaps thousands of different images that could pop
up at any time, and actually test the screener in a real-world
environment. There are many hundreds of those systems available
throughout the country.
So once we thought we had developed an objective way to
test people, then we went forward with the rule making again,
and that is where we are now.
Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate that. Let me just share
this personal experience and point of view. It seems to me--
somebody mentioned before about the police presence in the
airports now, and that is encouraging. On the other hand, the
most encouraging and reassuring aspect of the air travel I have
done since this occurred was not so much seeing people there
but noting what they were doing.
Mr. Belger. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. And this is not rocket science, so the
very same screeners who we have been very skeptical of, that we
are all talking about, when I went through the screening device
at Dulles on Sunday, they asked me and every other passenger to
put the arms out and they put the mobile screening device over
and picked up every credit card and every single item that even
might have been--I had a key in one pocket, etc.
As I said before, it was inconvenient in one sense, but
that made me feel really comfortable as I went on. And the
passengers, as we went in the van over to the other terminal to
get on the plane, were talking about it, and one man told me
that they had found a nail clipper in his pocket and took it
from him. And that made us all more comfortable, too.
So I do think as we go forward it is not only important who
does this screening and other airport security, but what they
do that will make us comfortable enough to all get back on the
airplanes.
Thank you very much.
Senator Durbin. Senator Thompson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON
Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was looking over this GAO report, which, if there is
anything in here I shouldn't get into, stop me in a hurry. I
think all of this you have put in your statement. The
conclusion seems to be that the report consider that the
problem with security is not as much with equipment as it is
with personnel, and I am sure we have all talked about the fact
that our first line of defense is in some cases a minimum wage
employee. The FAA's testing has shown that over the years their
ability to do their job in screening has gone downhill,
apparently. They are not doing as good a job as they used to
do. Is that a fair assessment?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
Senator Thompson. Without getting into any more detail than
that--and it seems to me that it is indicative of a larger
problem that this Committee has dealt with for a long time.
Senator Voinovich has certainly dealt with it specifically. And
it has to do with the basic management problems that government
has, and it specifically has to do with what we call the human
capital problem. We are surprised now, not all of us, that we
realize that we have people placed in strategic positions who
are not particularly well qualified and who are not performing
according to our level of expectation.
The Results Act, of course, requires every department to
come up with performance reports, and develop standards they
are supposed to achieve. The DOT did not meet its certain
screening goals for fiscal year 2000 and is on track not to
meet those goals again this year. In other words, the
Department of Transportation has been good in setting out
appropriate goals, but the carrying out, their ability to
achieve those goals has not been good. We are not achieving the
goals that were set out, and it is endemic throughout
government.
There are places throughout government that are very
sensitive, secure, security-conscious positions where we are
not meeting our performance standards, our performance goals.
And we continue to do that year after year after year after
year. We have a high-risk list that most departments, many have
been on it for years and years, and they come in here and we
fuss on them a little bit, and they go and do the same thing
next year. It is not affected by budget, it is not affected by
any administration, it is not affected by the appropriations
process.
The last day I was Chairman of this Committee--I never will
forget it. [Laughter.]
Chairman Lieberman. Sad day for some.
Senator Thompson. We put out a little booklet called
``Government at the Brink,'' and it talked about some of those
things, the mismanagement throughout government. We hear it so
often, it rolls off our back. But we really need to take
another look at it in terms of these national security issues
now while we have a heightened sense of awareness.
Specifically, the financial mismanagement, has the inability to
incorporate information technology into the government services
the way that they have in the private sector, the billions of
dollars we have spent on trying to get our computers right.
I was looking at page 16, and one of the conclusions we
came to: The Defense Department's security clearance process
virtually collapsed during the 1990's. The Department has a
backlog of almost a half million security clearance
investigations for employees. The security clearance situation
has become a little more relevant lately. It takes well over a
year to complete a top secret clearance. This means that vital
positions dealing with the government's most sensitive national
security data go unfilled, or the people in those positions
operate with grossly outdated clearances. These problems stem
in part from productivity problems among investigators and ill-
conceived staff cuts.
We also talk about our difficulties with our computer
systems. Again, brand-new relevance in light of September 11.
On page 51, we deal with the case of the railway killer. In
1995, the INS began to work to improve its automated systems
which were grossly inadequate. According to the IG, the program
areas that they set up were mismanaged from the very beginning.
The IG reported that the INS still cannot sufficiently track
the status of its projects to determine whether progress is
acceptable. Also, INS staff were unable to adequately explain
how the funds were spent.
In addition, explain how these deficiencies led to tragic
human consequences in the case of Rafael Menendez Ramirez, a
Mexican national who has an extensive criminal record and is
accused of committing several murders in the United States. In
early 1999, Houston police contacted INS investigators several
times seeking assistance in the search for Menendez. In June
1999, the FBI formed a multi-agency task force in Houston to
capture him and also placed him on a list of the ten most
wanted.
Unfortunately, if the INS had done its job, these events
never would have occurred because Menendez had been apprehended
by the Border Patrol seven times in 1998 while crossing the
border illegally and had been enrolled in the computer system
each time and had been returned voluntarily to Mexico each time
without formal proceedings.
I could go on and on and on and on. Why we are surprised
that we have a problem with screening and airport security
should really be what surprises us. And we really need--and
this is not just an opportunity to talk about waste, fraud, and
abuse again in general terms. These are security, national
security issues.
We have talked about our laboratories, how vulnerable our
labs are in many different respects. Now we know about our
airports. The whole terrorist issue now has a special relevance
in light of September 11 with regard to immigration issues.
That in turn has to do with our inability to manage computer
systems or information technology. It is all part of the same
picture and is, once again, indicative of gross mismanagement
in the Federal Government for many, many years, in the
financial area, information technology area, human capital
area, and other things.
Now we are talking about federalizing another part of our
system. I know you probably discussed that. I won't get into
that in any detail here. I am really not sure how I feel about
that except to say that we must make sure we don't incorporate
all the other Federal Government employee potential problems,
and that is, we don't properly motivate them, we are losing the
ones we ought to be keeping sometimes, we oftentimes keep the
ones we ought to be losing. We have a civil service system that
makes it so there cannot be accountability most of the time.
All of those government management issues that we have
swept under the rug for so long are right back on the table
again if we are going to go down this road and consider moving
in that direction.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and
allowing me to make this statement.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Senator Thompson. Senator
Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to build on what Senator
Thompson said. As you know, I have been working for 2 years on
the problem of the human capital crisis and will be introducing
legislation soon. We can talk all we want to about getting
qualified people, but we are in deep trouble right now in the
Federal Government. In fact, by the year 2005, we could lose 80
percent of our Senior Executive Service. By the year 2004, we
could lose about 55 percent of all of our employees, through
either retirement or early retirement.
If we are going to go out and try and recruit these people,
we know we are going to have to pay a lot more money for them.
By the way, you were talking about the demeanor of people. When
you look at some of the people at the security, they give you
absolutely no confidence. And if you have a conversation with
them, you just wonder.
At BWI, I had my Senate identification card. The woman
there looks at it, the first one I went through, and it was
fine. I go through and I was detected for having some metal.
And I knew what it was. I have steel in my shoes. And I said,
``I have steel in my shoes,'' and I try--that is why I bought
the Rockports, because I don't have to worry about getting
stopped. But I showed her my card that I was a U.S. Senator,
and she looked at me with a blind stare like she didn't even
know what a U.S. Senator was. And that is the kind, too often,
of impression that you get from the people that are doing the
security. And that in itself doesn't give one very much
confidence. It means that you are going to have to upgrade the
people that you hire. You are going to have to pay them a lot
more money. You are going to have to motivate them, and you got
to have a system in order to get them into the government.
Of the agencies in the Federal Government, the only one
that has flexibility right now besides the GAO and the IRS is
the FAA. The FAA has got the flexibility to bring in people at
different pay grades and broad-banding and a lot of the other
things. So if we are going to pick an agency that could get
going quickly, if we decide to federalize this thing, the
agency that we ought to select is the FAA because they have the
flexibility to go out and hire these people to get the job
done.
Senator Thompson, I am glad that you brought that up
because we have neglected the human capital issue in this
government for years and years, and I want to quote Jim
Schlesinger, who testified in March before this Committee. He
said solving the personnel problem is a precondition to solving
all that is wrong in the U.S. national security edifice. All
that is wrong. The precondition is the personnel problem. And
it never really gets much attention in the Legislative Branch
of government because I don't think that too often legislators
appreciate how important it is that if you want to win, you
have to have the best and the brightest. And we are not getting
the best and the brightest in the Federal Government.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Thompson. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. With your
indulgence for just a second on that point, I would point out
the Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security reports that
the United States is ``on the brink of an unprecedented crisis
of competence in Government'' that reaches civilian and
military personnel at all levels. That is the much touted, and
properly so, Hart-Rudman Commission report that we have been
talking about lately.
Senator Durbin. Senator Lieberman.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Durbin, very briefly, there has
not been much to smile about in the last couple of weeks, but
if I may make a vain attempt by reporting this conversation--I
was thinking about it when we were talking about the profiling
that we expect people at the screening sections to do. I think
we are going to find that the citizenry will be doing a lot of
its own profiling, and it may lead to more socialization on the
aircraft.
One of our colleagues--Senator Breaux and I were talking
about this. We both had the same experience in the times we
have been on a plane since this awful incident occurred. We
find we are turning to the people to either side of us,
``Hello, how are you? Where are you from?'' [Laughter.]
``What do you do? Why are you going to where we are
going?''
Anyway, thank you.
Senator Thompson. I can understand why they do it with
Senator Breaux.
Chairman Lieberman. No, Senator Breaux was doing it.
Senator Thompson. Oh, I see. All right.
Senator Durbin. I just want to comment in general. Thirteen
years ago, when I introduced the bill banning smoking on
airplanes, I learned something interesting about Congress. Next
to politics, there is only one other thing that the Members of
Congress know more about, and that is flying.
Senator Thompson. That is true.
Senator Durbin. And now that we talk about airports and
airport security, each of us has probably logged as many miles
or more than anybody in the room, and I think that is the
reason why some of these questions are heartfelt but also get
into detail.
I thank this panel for your excellent presentation today.
We really hope that we can use this information to develop some
good legislation. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. The next panel I would like to ask to come
forward includes Robert Baker, who is Vice Chairman of American
Airlines; Paul Busick, President and Executive Director of
North Carolina Global TransPark; Colonel Leonard Griggs, an old
friend and Airport Director from Lambert-St. Louis
International Airport; Bill Harvey, Jr., not only Trainer of
the Screeners at Chicago O'Hare International Airport, but if I
am not mistaken, Mr. Harvey was 1999's Screener of the Year.
Glad to have you with us. And Michael La Pier, Executive
Director from the Central Illinois Regional Airport.
Once everybody is in place, we will let Mr. Baker start
with the testimony, and we will go right down the table in the
order you are seated.
Thank you very much for being here.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT W. BAKER,\1\ VICE CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN
AIRLINES
Mr. Baker. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. Thank you.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on
page 105.
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Before I begin my remarks on the subject, on behalf of all
of the American Airlines family we would certainly like to
extend our deep sympathies and concern for the families of the
crew members, our passengers, and certainly all of the victims
on the ground of this terrible tragedy.
I would also like to thank Secretary Mineta, Administrator
Garvey, and her entire team for their responsiveness beginning
that terrible Tuesday morning. It has been outstanding. It has
been a real collaborative effort between the airlines and the
FAA to find the best choices and get through this and hopefully
get the system restored.
Finally, the work of Congress last week and the airline
stabilization plan is outstanding, and we thank you very much
for your contributions to that effort. But now we must turn our
attention to the security issues that surround our industry and
make some decisions about changes that are in order.
But I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify today
regarding the Federal Government's role in addressing aircraft
and airport security issues. September 11 has changed world
aviation forever. We can only speculate on the precise changes
that will result from this horrible event. However, I think
there are two very broad directions that we must pursue
promptly to preserve our air transportation system.
First, we must decide on specific changes to airline and
aviation security operations that will provide a higher level
of deterrence and make it much more difficult for terrorists to
repeat the horrible attacks on our country.
Second, we must make those changes which will provide
confidence in our aviation system to both the traveling public
and our employees.
If we do not restore confidence in aviation, we will not as
airlines be able to restore operations, and the American public
will not be willing to travel by air. This would obviously have
profound impacts on our industry and the U.S. economy since
there is really no practical alternative mode for most inter-
city travel in our very large geographical country.
A week ago Sunday, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta
announced the formation of two rapid response task forces to
provide recommendations in two areas: Aircraft security and
airport security. I was honored to be asked to participate in
this effort.
For the last week, we have been gathering input, examining
alternatives, and establishing priorities. We are committed to
provide the Secretary with recommendations not later than
October 1, and we will meet that objective. I anticipate both
short-term and longer-term recommendations.
Let me briefly discuss two of the subjects being dealt with
by these rapid response task forces. Both of these projects
enhance aviation security and also have a positive impact on
the confidence of our employees and the traveling public.
One of our focus areas is the hardening of the cockpit to
prevent terrorist entry. This will likely involve modifications
to aircraft bulkheads and doors and the adoption of procedures
to reduce the exposure when the cockpit door must be opened in
flight. We are processing close to 100 individual ideas and
suggestions in this area.
The second area that is receiving a lot of interest and
attention is the airport security checkpoint. You often hear
about the federalization of the checkpoint. The airlines have
said for many years that the operation of the checkpoint should
not be the responsibility of the airlines.
If you look outside the United States, other countries
typically both operate and fund all aviation security
activities. I believe that making material changes in the
checkpoint operation represents an important opportunity to
both enhance security and improve public confidence.
There is an approach which I believe makes sense and should
be debated. I believe that there are really three security
functions that we are going to need going forward:
First, a high-caliber, professionally operated checkpoint
that deters the unfavorable person, that is run professionally,
a system that restores passenger confidence most of all;
Second, the deployment of a sky marshal function on board
domestic aircraft;
Third, an ongoing surveillance and audit process to ensure
that the security procedures and policies are adhered to by the
airlines, the airports, and all of the various vendors that do
business at our airports.
These functions could be combined and performed by a
government-owned corporation made up mostly of law enforcement
officers.
Now, in response to your first two inquiries regarding the
airlines' role in screening passengers and baggage, each
airline is required to conduct screening in accordance with the
procedures, facilities, and equipment described in its FAA-
approved air carrier security program. The program is designed
to prevent or deter the carriage of an explosive, incendiary,
or a deadly or dangerous weapon on a passenger or in their
checked or carry-on luggage.
The specifics of the program are considered to be
confidential by the FAA. But, generally, the program uses
various X-ray machines, explosive trace detection, which helps
to find visual inspections to prevent the carriage of dangerous
weapons or devices onboard our aircraft.
In most instances, security checkpoint functions are
performed for the air carrier by a contract security provider
in accordance with the air carrier standard security program
and regulations set out by the FAA. Individual security
screeners are hired and trained in the specifics of this
program and the use of the security equipment by the contract
security provider.
The hiring standards are provided under the FAA
regulations. Background checks of the individuals' last 10
years of employment history are conducted. A 10-year criminal
history check will similarly be conducted for those individuals
with inconsistencies or gaps in their employment history.
Local air carrier management does provide oversight of the
security provider's compliance with these Federal requirements
and specific security measures.
Mr. Chairman, I have been involved in commercial aviation
for 40 years. There has never been anything that has had more
impact on our country, our industry, and our employees than the
events of September 11. I do know one important thing. We can
never have another September 11.
I would look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Baker.
Paul Busick is the President and Executive Director of the
North Carolina Global TransPark. Thank you for being here.
TESTIMONY OF REAL ADMIRAL PAUL E. BUSICK, USCG, RET.,\1\
PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NORTH CAROLINA GLOBAL
TRANSPARK AUTHORITY
Mr. Busick. Chairman Lieberman, Chairman Durbin, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, my thoughts and prayers
also go out to those people who have lost their loved ones to
this terrible act of violence.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Busick with an attachment appears
in the Appendix on page 109.
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I thank you for your invitation to share my perspective on
the current aviation security process and ways to improve it.
My position is not unique, although I think that very few share
it. I was personally involved in the decisionmaking process
that affected the way we provide for aviation security from
1993 through most of 1996 as the Director of Intelligence and
Security for the Secretary of Transportation. I am pleased to
offer my views now in 2001 as we revisit this important issue.
I have supplied the Committee with my written comments that
offer specific details on the evolution of aviation security
procedures as we know them today. I believe you will find that
my written statement will provide the background information
necessary to support my comments this afternoon. Therefore, I
would like to use my time allotted to focus on those issues I
believe need your pressing attention.
First and foremost, I would like to make a clarifying
statement. While I believe that it is essential that this
Committee examine the current structure and procedures used to
screen passengers and their belongings, I would also ask that
Members of this Committee be wary of addressing only this one
aspect of the aviation security system. At this time we are not
privy to all of the details of how this heinous act of
September 11 was carried out.
While passenger screening may have played a significant
role that day, it may have been only one element in a series of
failures in the system. It is important that we recognize that
a multi-billion-dollar intelligence effort did not predict
these events, that the FAA had no regulation in place
preventing persons from carrying the types of weapons
described. The airlines train their personnel to respond to
threat vectors of a wholly different nature. We have an
obligation to absolutely, positively get the program for
security in the air travel system right this time. Therefore,
it is essential that we look at the system as a whole and focus
our efforts on improvements and not on recriminations.
Each time we have had a crisis in our national aviation
system, a task force or commission is formed, studies are
conducted, recommendations are filed, the status quo shifts
slightly higher, until we face the next crisis. We can't let
that happen this time. It is time to make drastic changes in
the system in place. It is time that we ensure that support
necessary to carry out these changes does not wane when the
initial shock fades.
Given that the current approach has proven itself incapable
of providing a high-quality system, federalizing seems to me to
be the next best choice. But if we simply federalize without
the establishment of thorough training programs, the deployment
of high-quality equipment, standardized and regular
measurements of performance, and decent pay and benefits, one
can certainly predict failure of the new system just as well.
If we simply make a change that has the Federal Government
contracting out to the lowest bidder and make no qualitative
improvements, all we have done is change the name of the
employer.
There is no panacea to this. Screening is hard, repetitive
work. It will require significant efforts in human factor
analysis and human-machine engineering to make it work well.
A key issue is the professionalism of the personnel tasked
with the responsibility to provide our first line of defense.
These hard-working individuals have been asked to achieve the
improbable and are sometimes vilified for their failure to do
so. Minimal training, varied levels of equipment, low wages,
long hours, constant criticism.
This is the life of the aviation security screener. The
White House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security
recognize the value of these individuals and called for a
program to certify and license security screeners based on
their proficiency. Wages and benefits would rise accordingly,
as would the overall quality of the screening process. The
commissioners believe that such a program would encourage
people to seek out these positions as professional trades.
The recommendations were not carried out. The regulation to
address this issue is still in draft and, in fact, does not
provide for certification of individuals. Rather, it calls for
certification of the companies who provide these services.
Screeners are not recognized for proficiency; rather, they
receive bonuses for longevity. I will expand on these themes
for the duration of my allotted time.
Federalization, done properly, could address several other
flaws inherent in the current system. The Administrative
Rulemaking Procedure Act is one of the foremost reasons why
good ideas don't find their way to implementation. The
rulemaking process is slow and rife with compromise. In my
opinion, the industry has taken advantage of their legal rights
under the Rulemaking Procedure Act to question, delay, and
dilute rules intended to improve aviation security. When the
distinguished Members of this body pass a law telling the FAA
to institute a new security procedure, FAA is required to
embark upon the odyssey that is rulemaking. I can't imagine
police or military planners responsible for security engaging
with others in such a manner to implement necessary security
measures.
Federalizing the security screening process would eliminate
the need to get involved in a lengthy debate over the value or
cost of a specific measure. Costs associated with them would
also be looked at differently. If they are deemed to be
appropriate and necessary, they can be implemented.
While the question of who carries out this important task
may be less important than how it is done, the right agency
with appropriate authorities could make a difference. While I
am here today to address the pressing need of improved aviation
security, I also foresee the necessity of addressing terrorism
against all of our transportation modes. An organization
dedicated to transportation security within DOT with limited
law enforcement responsibilities and direct access to
information from intelligence agencies regarding all modes of
transportation is, in my opinion, the ideal entity to undertake
this task for several reasons.
Intelligence received by this agency can be disseminated
throughout the transportation system. A national cadre of
professional security personnel under the DOT umbrella could be
dispatched to locations of interest and heightened concern in
direct response to intelligence. R&D efforts could be directed
by this office in response to information not only on new
threats and methods, but also in response to experience gained
from the utilization of equipment in the real world.
Administrators from each of the modes of transportation
would play a vital role in determining specific procedures to
be undertaken at transportation facilities. They really are the
experts in their field within government and offer valuable
insight into daily operations. Their direct functional
knowledge applied in conjunction with resources of the
Department's Office of Intelligence and Security creates a
natural partnership between intelligence, operations, and
oversight.
Even with a single governing entity in place, it is hard to
determine the competency of an individual screener without
comprehensive testing procedures. The currently approved
testing devices are standardized, rudimentary, and not at all
effective in testing security under realistic conditions. In
addition, with an average of at least 8 percent turnover rate
per month, it is difficult to determine if training methods are
at all effective. FAA Red Team, DOT Inspector General, and GAO
methods appear to be more realistic. Low detection rates for
their tests reflect that. The electronic threat insertion
method would be a useful tool for teaching and testing, but
there are too few deployed at this time to be sure.
Test procedures should be realistic, consistent, and
objective to the degree possible. National results should be
compiled as often as practical and compared to address the
question of efficacy of training and equipment. A regular and
comprehensive review of test results would allow for rapid
modification in training methods, cycles, and curriculum.
Such a review would also indicate which types of equipment
are able to provide the image clarity necessary to determine if
there is a threat object present and which are not. Armed with
this information, the Secretary could amend procurement orders
to purchase only the equipment proven to be effective via
rigorous testing.
Efforts to encourage competition among equipment providers
must take place within a framework that recognizes that
technical standards and the need for rapid deployment of
properly certified equipment will not be abandoned merely to
create competitive markets. The most important aspect of the
free enterprise system is that success and accomplishments are
rewarded by market preference. The unintended consequence of
last year's congressional direction to split funding between a
fully certified system and an EDS system that was not fully
field vetted led simply to significant slowdowns in deployment
of certified EDS systems without any benefit to either aviation
security or the competitive marketplace.
Other nations have found greater success in screening
performance via the use of a single entity governing the
screening process. We have already talked about the GAO's look
at foreign governments and those were mostly European. In
short, the findings of the report show that other nations have
instituted programs that require much more extensive
qualifications and training, higher pay, much more stringent
checkpoint operations, and the assumption of overall
responsibility for the screening process by a single government
entity.
It is interesting to note that France requires screeners to
be citizens of an EU nation. The reasoning presented in the
report is the cooperative nature of the EU law enforcement
agencies. France believes that by requiring EU citizenship,
they may conduct a much more comprehensive background check on
the individuals by accessing criminal information data sources
from all European Union nations.
I think the United States should take its lead from France
and coordinate our efforts with other national governments to
compile similar information and vet security personnel against
these data sources as well.
No matter which entity assumes these tremendous
responsibilities, the responsibility for funding an ongoing,
dedicated effort lies with the U.S. Congress. There must be a
dedicated funding stream to support our Nation's security in
all its many facets. I believe both appropriated funds and a
dedicated transportation security user fee are necessary steps.
I also recognize that you as Members of Congress are elected to
represent all of the people, not just those who are using the
transportation system today.
Providing for transportation security is providing for
national security. The terrorists who committed this crime
against the United States were well aware of the impact it
would have on our economy as a whole. And, therefore, we as a
Nation must support the ongoing effort to ensure our national
security.
In conclusion, I would like to make a short personal
statement. I consider myself genuinely fortunate to have served
as the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security for
a whole lot of reasons. It was good, rewarding work, work that
needed to be done. But the primary reason was that people in
the industry with whom I was privileged to work, the
professional, dedicated, honorable individuals on the front
lines of aviation security, deserve our respect and gratitude.
These individuals struggle every day to make our system safe
and secure. They often have limited information and resources,
conflicting directives, and suffer the criticism of 20/20
hindsight following every incident.
I would ask you to join me in ending the process of
selecting who is to blame and instead appreciate the efforts of
the hard-working individuals who have accepted these awesome
responsibilities as their own, people like Al Grazier of the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey; Joe Lawless of Mass.
Port; Richard Kunicki in Chicago; Alvie Dotson at Dallas-Fort
Worth; Al Lomax of Kansas City; Jim Welna, Minneapolis; Richard
Davis, United Airlines; and Matt Vaughn of the United Parcel
Service. Each of these individuals stands out in my mind as a
stellar example of professionalism in aviation security. I
applaud their effort, and I look forward to working with them
and with you to craft a more secure future for our national
aviation system. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much. Mr. Griggs.
TESTIMONY OF LEONARD L. GRIGGS, JR.,\1\ DIRECTOR OF AIRPORTS-
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, LAMBERT-ST. LOUIS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Griggs. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am
Leonard Griggs, Director of Airports for the city of St. Louis.
I would also like to express my profound sympathy and sorrow to
all those families and friends of those people who lost their
lives.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Griggs with an attachment appears
in the Appendix on page 115.
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As you well know, we served over 31 million passengers last
year and are well on the road to becoming another major hub for
American Airlines as they take over from TWA.
I appreciate being invited to share Lambert Airport and
Mayor Slay's views on how this Nation's system can be improved
so that our citizens will have renewed confidence that our
skies are safe and that the Federal Government is adequately
protecting airports and aircraft operations from the full
spectrum of possible terrorist activities. I am pleased that
the focus of this hearing is on airport screeners since they
are a key element in the defense against terrorism.
In my 5 minutes, I plan to address the following points
which are expanded upon in my written statement: First is
airport police presence at airport screening checkpoints;
expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Program and security and
sanctity of the cockpit; timely sharing of intelligence by
Federal officials with local airports' police; federalizing the
passenger screening; improved cargo and baggage screening;
reduced carry-on baggage; assistance with unfunded Federal
mandates and other costs; and the possibility of reopening
Reagan Washington National Airport.
Security measures at Lambert Airport have been noticeably
increased in response to the FAA directives over the past 2
weeks. Law enforcement's presence has been expanded with
Lambert Airport police officers being stationed in patrols at
all three of the passenger screening points within the
terminal. I would like to thank Senator Durbin for this
suggestion--where it came from--and we have found that an
increased law enforcement presence reinforces the seriousness
of passenger screening and communicates to screeners how
important their functions are.
I have personally talked to the owners and managers of both
of the security companies on the need for professional conduct
and appearance, and they have responded.
I have provided a complete listing of increased security
measures that have been implemented at Lambert Airport. Other
security measures not publicly discussed or put in here have
also been put into effect in the operation of our plan.
As a result, the airport security at Lambert Airport is
very high. I was comfortable flying out of Lambert Airport
yesterday and believe that other travelers should feel safe
resuming their flights through our airport.
The city of St. Louis recommends additional actions to
further improve airport security and airline security. As for
aircraft security, St. Louis supports a substantial expansion
of the Federal Air Marshal Program for onboard protection and
improved protection of the cockpit in airline security.
In addition, the following is a partial listing of
additional security measures that we and I believe the DOT and
the Congress should consider to further improve the on-airport
portion of security:
First, better intelligence sharing by the Federal
Government. We have all read in the press accounts of how
information about some of the September 11 terrorists was never
passed on to local law enforcement or airport police. Federal
intelligence agencies do not timely share their information
with the FAA's Civil Aviation Security Office and, in turn,
with the local airport law enforcement. Some have urged that
expanded Federal intelligence efforts must be approved and
funded by Congress and the Executive Branch. Having all Federal
intelligence and enforcement agencies share the same computer
database would be very beneficial. In our view, it is important
that relevant, timely information must be shared with us.
Airport security is the last ground of defense to forestall
terrorism against civil aviation, but that defense must be
based on timely and adequate information.
Second, federalize passenger screening. I believe, and a
majority of my colleagues believe, that the passenger screening
function should be placed under control of a Federal agency,
probably within the U.S. Department of Transportation, rather
than being delegated as now to the private airlines. However,
some large airports have concerns that federalization could
result in inadequate manpower levels because of budgets that
have been starved over time. This has often been the case with
inspection staffing at both Customs and INS functions
throughout this country.
The federalized passenger screening program could be
another branch of the Federal Air Marshal Program and could be
very appropriate under the Federal Administrator of the FAA.
Federalizing the passenger screening function should make it
easier to pass intelligence to law enforcement agencies that
back up the passenger screening function at U.S. airports.
Next, restriction on carry-on baggage. Until a Federal
agency has taken over the passenger screening function, it
would be very advisable to limit carry-on bags to one per
passenger, with some exceptions, for example, people with small
babies carrying diaper bags and that kind of thing, which would
help reduce the screener workload.
Improved baggage, cargo, and mail screening. You have heard
this before. Congress should assure that adequate numbers of
explosive detection systems devices and other current
technology that are available for the inspection of
unaccompanied baggage, cargo, and mail packages be made
available.
Congress should help fund the new security mandates imposed
by the FAA on local sponsors. Lambert Airport is spending
millions of dollars of unbudgeted funds to implement the
increased FAA security to the tune of--for example, we are
spending $72,000 a week for additional security members.
We believe that unfunded mandates should be covered by
general Federal funds or through expanded authorization from
the AIP or the Passenger Facility Charges.
Another crisis we are facing is the cancellation and/or
tripling of premiums in our liability insurance, the same as
the airlines are facing. This is something that must be
addressed.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I feel it is absolutely critical to
reopen Reagan National Airport. To paraphrase Mayor Tony
Williams, Reagan National Airport is the first door to
Washington, is a vital symbol, and, therefore, keeping it
closed tells the terrorists that they have won. I am confident
security measures can be put in place to make Reagan National
Airport safe. As a matter of fact, if we do not, there is one
major airline which has been already threatened and the
possibility of severe financial damage to three of our major
airports.
Again, Mr. Chairman, my mayor and I appreciate the
opportunity to express my views and recommendations on this
most important topic of aviation security. I have been in this
industry for 25 years, and September 11 can never be allowed to
be repeated.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Griggs, for that
excellent testimony.
Mr. Harvey, a pleasure to have you here.
TESTIMONY OF AUBREY ``BILL'' HARVEY, JR.,\1\ TRAINING
SUPERVISOR FOR ARGENBRIGHT SECURITY, O'HARE INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
Mr. Harvey. Good afternoon, Senator Lieberman. I would like
to express my deepest sympathies to all those who lost someone
during the tragic events of 9/11/2001.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Harvey appears in the Appendix on
page 125.
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Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Harvey, come forward a little bit.
Those mikes are very directional.
Mr. Harvey. My name is Aubrey Harvey, and I am a checkpoint
security supervisor for Argenbright Security at O'Hare
International Airport. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before this Committee and give you the perspective of the men
and women who work as security checkpoint screeners at our
Nation's airports.
Those of us who work hard day in and day out to protect the
flying public--successfully, I might add--have found the news
reports pointing the finger of blame at screener for the events
of September 11 very disheartening. From all indications, there
is no evidence that any activity by a checkpoint screener--all
of whom were following FAA regulations correctly--contributed
to this horrible tragedy.
I want to thank you, Senator Durbin, and the other Members
of this Committee for taking the perspective of the security
screener in mind as Congress debates changes to the current
system. As an Air Force veteran who served with the 19th
Tactical Air Strike Squadron in Vietnam, I understand and
appreciate the role that security and national security plays
in our American transportation system. I want to assure you
that those of us working the checkpoints take this issue of
national security very seriously as well.
Let me give you a little bit of background about myself. I
was hired as a pre-departure screener for Argenbright in
November 1996. Given my interest in taking on more
responsibility, I was promoted to a checkpoint security
supervisor. In 1999, I became certified as a trainer and
advanced equipment trainer and currently train new members of
the O'Hare screening team. Training new members involves both
classroom instruction and on-the-job training. The latter is
particularly important, as human interaction with passengers
and attention to behavior is vital.
In 1999, I was selected as the FAA's Screener of the Year.
Candidates are chosen based on superior performances under the
difficult circumstances that can present themselves at an
airport checkpoint. My nomination was the result of two events
that occurred at O'Hare. The first occurred in December 1998
when a passenger attempted to board an aircraft with a 12-gauge
shotgun. We apprehended the weapon and the passenger was
arrested. In August 1999, a passenger broke through the
security checkpoint. I followed and contained the passenger
until a police officer made the arrest.
The activities of the individual screeners are important,
but new security measures and technology are also critical.
Since my time at Argenbright, I have seen the screening
technology vastly improve. Training procedures have become more
sophisticated, using computer programs such as the TIP program
and Safe Passage program to test screeners on the job.
Screeners are also required to have additional training yearly
to update them on the newest technologies and procedural
changes.
We are also making ongoing efforts to attract, retain, and
reward qualified employees. Since I began at Argenbright, I
have received two promotions and my wages have nearly tripled.
The events of September 11, 2001, were horrific and cruel.
Yet I believe that security screeners at the affected airports
and even those that were not affected acted with dispatch on
that day and in the days since to protect the flying public. As
a trainer and a checkpoint security supervisor, I know the
difficulties and challenges of the job. I also know the value
of following procedures and the importance of training. As an
individual employee of Argenbright Security, I have and will
continue to work with the Federal authorities to improve
screening, security, and the safety of the flying public.
Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Harvey. I am delighted
you are here and gave us that personal and unique perspective.
Mr. La Pier.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL B. LA PIER, A.A.E.,\1\ EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL ILLINOIS REGIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. La Pier. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee and staff. I would like to thank the Chair for the
opportunity to be here this afternoon to appear before you to
give a perspective of a small airport on the current situation
regarding civil aviation security in the United States today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. La Pier appears in the Appendix
on page 131.
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I would also like to thank the senior Senator from the
State of Illinois, Senator Durbin, for inviting me to be here
this afternoon, but most particularly for his unyielding
leadership and strong support of aviation issues in the State
of Illinois.
I should tell you this is my first opportunity to testify
before a Congressional or a Senate committee. It is an
opportunity that I welcome. It is an experience that I will
value forever as an American.
In the words of a song made popular against recently, ``In
a New York minute, everything can change.'' This is eerily true
of the world of civil aviation security as a result of the
tragic actions of September 11. The acts of aviation piracy and
subsequent terrorism have clearly changed the face of the
industry that the Central Illinois Regional Airport is a part
of forever. We recognize that change, Mr. Chairman, and,
frankly, we welcome it. We clearly don't welcome how the change
is being brought about, the reasons for these changes, but we
fully support the efforts, all efforts to strengthen civil
aviation security in our country.
Allow me for a moment to introduce you to Central Illinois
Regional Airport. We serve a region of about 1.2 million people
from Bloomington-Normal, Illinois. The airport has seen
unprecedented growth in the past few years, particularly in
passenger traffic but also in commercial flights.
Since 1987, passenger traffic has grown from just over
80,000 passengers annually to nearly 500,000 last year. At the
same time, the number of scheduled daily departures has
increased from 12 in 1987 to almost 50--or to over 50 last
year. In fact, the number of air carriers serving the airport
has grown from two in 1987 to its current level of five. This
growth is the direct result of the robust economy in the
region, and particularly the expanded service opportunities by
the airlines. I guess you could call us a true success story in
the deregulation era.
In terms of passenger traffic, we are proud that we were
recognized as the fastest-growing non-hub airport in the United
States in 1997, and over the last 5 years, we have been the
second fastest-growing airport in the Nation regardless of size
of airport.
Prior to the horror of September 11, Central Illinois
Regional Airport stood in full compliance with all applicable
security directives and regulations put forward by the Federal
Aviation Administration. I am also pleased to report that we
achieved compliance, full compliance, with all new directives
issued by FAA after September 11 within 24 hours. We believe
that made us one of the first airports in the Great Lakes
region to achieve that status.
If you would allow me a personal moment here, I brought
with me this afternoon my staff, members of my staff, the folks
that made it possible for us to achieve that status. They are
Don Schneider, the operations manager and principal security
officer of the Airport Authority; Fran Streebing, who is
director of marketing and public relations; and Chad Farashon,
my administration manager and finance manager. They are in the
audience with me this afternoon.
It is important to note that the full compliance that we
achieved does not come without a cost. Our security budget for
this year totals $125,000. The increased security dictated by
September 11 actions will cost us approximately $30,000 a month
or nearly triple our budget. This expenditure, if annualized,
would represent 20 percent of our $2.1 million annual operating
budget. This, Mr. Chairman, has the potential to become a
significant financial burden.
As we have talked about this afternoon and as the Members
of this Committee are aware, there are two separate but
intertwined areas of aviation security at our Nation's airports
today. First, the airlines are tasked with a variety of
different responsibilities and regulations under FAR Part 108.
It is their responsibility to provide for trained, qualified
security personnel at all airport checkpoints in the United
States. Currently, in most, if not all, of those situations,
those services are provided by one or several private
companies.
Airport operators, on the other hand, support passenger
security checkpoint operations with law enforcement officers.
These officers are not trained to operate the checkpoint but
are in place to support its operators if necessary.
In the case of Central Illinois Regional Airport, we meet
the obligation that is put upon us by FAA through a series of
alarms and a 5-minute response from the City of Bloomington
Police Department.
I don't mean to be critical here of the current operations
of the security checkpoints in the United States. I believe
that the vast majority of the folks that operate those
checkpoints are, in fact, doing the best job they can. It is
important to note, however, that they are not members of the
law enforcement community.
Whether we like it or not, the events of September 11 have
caused a change in the rules of the game. I believe that these
changes must be met with something other than simply regulatory
changes and adjustments. We must meet these changes with
significant actions that will again allow us to capture control
of the safety of our skies.
There has been a great deal of discussion here this
afternoon and over the past couple of days about federalization
of checkpoints. We strongly support looking into that issue
very in depth. We believe that a parallel may exist in the
Coast Guard.
Regardless of whoever is tasked with this responsibility,
we believe that they must have access to all pertinent
information and intelligence so that they can become a more
proactive rather than reactive organization.
Simply put, the rules of the game have changed, and I
believe that they are going to continue to change as we go
forward. We must have all necessary information, particularly
when it comes to communication, for us to be able to respond
effectively and proactively.
The second area of responsibility is obviously airport
security. That is one that we are very familiar with. In simple
terms, we are responsible for the security of the airport
facility itself and the environment within which our airlines
operate.
Under the current regulations, the extent of airport
security required varies depending upon the level of activity.
The level required varies from complete video monitoring and
law enforcement patrols at our Nation's busiest airports to
much less stringent but nonetheless effective security posture
at some of our smaller airports.
When I think back to the events of September 11, and
particularly those events as they occurred at Central Illinois
Regional Airport, the one thing that stands out in my mind was
the lack of information that we received. I fully realize that
the efforts of those in charge were probably correctly directed
at larger airports, more traffic-intensive airports than
Central Illinois Regional Airport. But I would maintain that
the threats at airports the size of Central Illinois Regional
Airport are no less real.
When we go back to the Gulf War, airports and the FAA
worked together to craft a plan to implement levels of security
based upon perceived threat. Without going into specific
details, all airports developed these guidelines under the
direction of FAA, and there were four levels of security that
were developed. We were all to implement those levels of
security and those actions of security at the direction of FAA.
At the time this action seemed to be reactive, but it
certainly could have put us into a proactive position.
Unfortunately, the one component that failed in that system on
September 11 was, again, communication. We did not receive
communication from FAA regarding increased levels of security
until the next day.
I don't wish to be critical of the individuals at FAA that
were responsible for communication or for enhanced security at
our airports. I believe they do a wonderful job of regulating
security at our Nation's airports. We must, however, learn from
the events and practice that old saying, ``An ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.''
I believe the agency in charge of aviation security must be
provided with all of the tools necessary to allow us to be
proactive, and the communication that has to occur must involve
all the partners in aviation.
I would tell you that airports and airlines are two
different types of operations. The airlines are typically and
are set up to be for-profit enterprises. Airports are, in fact,
on the main, government-sponsored agencies.
In our case, we are 38 percent tax dependent. We receive 38
percent of our operating budget from property taxes. Recently
the financial markets acknowledged the gravity of the situation
regarding aviation and airports and have now placed all North
American airports on credit watch. That means it is going to be
more difficult for us to raise capital to accomplish what will
need to be done to protect and to ensure security at our
airport and at every airport in the United States.
We would ask Congress to look very closely at the statement
that Standard and Poor's made in their recent announcement in
which they said immediate and broad authority should be granted
to FAA to reimburse airports for extraordinary costs for
security and to maintain financial viability.
We looked at our airport to determine what it was that we
thought we might need to put ourselves in a posture that would
be similar to what Colonel Griggs would experience in St.
Louis. Simply put, a one-time investment of $1.8 million and an
annual investment of $500,000 is what our quick analysis
determined. That is a tough pill for a small airport to
swallow.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my time is up. I
would like to thank you for the opportunity to be here this
afternoon not only personally but professionally as well. Often
small airports are left out of discussions of this nature, and
it is comforting to know that in this case we have had the
opportunity to share them with you. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. La Pier.
I apologize for stepping out. I mentioned to Chairman
Lieberman that, coincidentally, the father of one of the
victims of Flight 77 was in my office, and I obviously left to
speak to him. But it was a grim reminder that this inquiry at
this Committee is certainly not routine. It is a reflection of
the solemn duty and responsibility all of us have to do what we
can to make sure this never happen again.
Mr. Baker, since September 11, whatever you can tell us,
what has American Airlines done to do things differently in
terms of security? And could you address the issue we raised
earlier about the visible changes which we think the flying
public is looking for?
Mr. Baker. Well, there are a lot of things that I probably
shouldn't discuss, but let me----
Senator Durbin. Understood.
Mr. Baker [continuing]. Assure you that there has been
literally an ongoing, almost 24 hours a day, back-and-forth
with the FAA security staff and the airlines collectively,
making small and very large changes to the way we operate.
We have completely taken certain parts of the exposure out
of play, for instance, by removing portions of the cargo
business. They are no longer flying on our airplanes. Not known
to the general public but, nevertheless, that has happened.
A lot more activity and requirements in and around the
ticket counters and the checkpoints. We have closed all the
curbside check-in. Checking of IDs in multiple locations,
accelerating the random wanding of passengers at checkpoints
and at gates. A very complicated procedure to deal with the
nameless that you have had some discussion about, and those
lists today are nearing a thousand individuals.
Senator Durbin. Were those available before?
Mr. Baker. No.
Senator Durbin. Did you receive those names?
Mr. Baker. No, sir. This is all new territory for us.
Senator Durbin. Let me ask you about one particular area
that you have spoken about, and you are in a special position
here because of your being chosen to be part of this commission
by the Secretary. You have talked about the hardening of the
cockpit doors, and that seems so important and so clearly
needed. Are you considering other changes within the airplane?
One in particular that I have been looking at--and it is
controversial with people who have strong feelings on it--and
that is the whole question of video cameras in the airplane.
After the Egypt air crash, we never knew what happened, and the
technology we have in the cockpit now made sense 40 years ago,
but it doesn't make sense today. And when I talked to some
pilots in private about it, they said, ``We would love to have
a camera that is trained on the rest of the airplane to know
what is going on back there, and we would also like to have one
in the cargo hold so if something is going wrong, we know what
the nature of the problem is.''
Are you looking at other changes within an airplane that
might address some of those surveillance issues you raised in
your testimony?
Mr. Baker. Absolutely. Let me talk just a minute about the
door so that you understand what we are into there. That door
is not simply a door hanging on hinges that opens and closes
with a key and a lock. That door is a very sophisticated device
that must deal with other parameters of the aircraft,
specifically two.
If there were a decompression in the cockpit, we lost a
cockpit windshield, all of the air in the cabin will
immediately rush forward and try to exist via that missing
windshield area. That door cannot become a projectile from that
decompression activity. So the door and that whole bulkhead
must perform to allow the air to pass through without
structurally damaging the airplane.
So when we talk about hardening it, you and I could go out
and decide let's put metal strips on, let's put deadbolts,
let's put steel. We can make it strong, but we are going to
lose that other functionality.
The second parameter that is in the Federal Air Regulations
we have to pay attention to is that door must be removable in
the event of an accident so the crew can exit rearward or the
passengers can exit forward. So if you look at the door the
next time you get on an airplane, you will see the hinges are
very carefully designed with cables to pull the pins out of the
hinges so you can literally throw the door to one side and get
out of the airplane.
So we are balancing lots of objectives here in that door,
but we have some very specific, and I think, constructive
ideas, both short and long term.
We are very concerned about the crew's ability to know who
might be trying to get in the cockpit and make sure that
whenever that door gets opened that it is, in fact, an
authorized person. A video camera aimed at the door area is
certainly one of the alternatives we are going to suggest, in
addition to some other techniques for the flight attendant part
of the crew to alert the cockpit that something irregular is
going on in the back of the airplane. So I think you will see
some of that.
Video cameras in the cockpit is a different subject for a
different day, I think, because if the bad guy gets in the
cockpit, we have failed.
Senator Durbin. Yes.
Mr. Baker. We are working to keep them out.
Senator Durbin. I also was surprised when a pilot told me
that a camera in the cargo area might be of some value, too.
Mr. Baker. It would be because in the case of fire, smoke,
or an animal gets loose, it could be useful.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Harvey, thank you for coming, and
although I just caught the end of your testimony, I read it,
and am very happy that you joined us today and told us about
your experience.
How does your company recruit those who work at the
screening stations at O'Hare?
Mr. Harvey. I am not directly involved with the recruiting
process, but as a company, we use standard procedures,
newspaper advertisements. We also have an employee referral
type program.
Senator Durbin. How long have you worked at O'Hare on the
screenings?
Mr. Harvey. Five years.
Senator Durbin. And have you seen a change in the kind of
employees that are being hired by the company?
Mr. Harvey. Well, I see a broader mix. When I first started
we had quite a few very young individuals. Now I see that it is
spread out. We have a nice wide variety of people of all ages.
Senator Durbin. And what is the starting salary for someone
working the screening equipment?
Mr. Harvey. At O'Hare Airport, our screeners start out at
$6.75 an hour.
Senator Durbin. Any benefits with that?
Mr. Harvey. Yes, we do have company benefits that are
contributory, health insurance, life insurance, dental
insurance, and that type of thing.
Senator Durbin. And is that a full-time, 40-hour a week
job?
Mr. Harvey. Yes. We work pretty much 8 hours a day, half an
hour for lunch, two 15-minute breaks.
Senator Durbin. Colonel Griggs, I want to ask you about
your monitoring of screening operations at Lambert Airport. Can
you tell me, as the manager of the airport, how you monitor
their activities?
Mr. Griggs. Well, basically we have established the
presence of one of the policemen down there who is an armed
policeman. He supervises other things, but his job primarily
while he is down there is to watch the security people, watch
how they behave. If they are doing something that is
irresponsible like clowning or all the rest, to call his
attention to it. And I think probably that plus my talking to
the two managers of these companies had a profound effect upon
them, that they know we are there. They do not know exactly
where they are going to be at 24 hours a day, but I can tell
you, that doing the 16 hours, which is most of the time the
checkpoints are open, we have a profound presence and will
continue to have it.
Senator Durbin. And I can feel the difference. I can tell
you, it makes a difference. I think the environment around
those screening stations has changed.
You raised a point which is important, and I am sure Mr.
Baker could testify from his perspective on this, and that is
the increase in your insurance premiums. Are those increases--
you talked about a tripling of the liability insurance for the
airport--is that since the September 11 occurrence?
Mr. Griggs. Since September 11. We had just renegotiated
our entire insurance. We were being offered, and I think my
figures are provided to the record, but if I am correct on
this, we were offered $350,000 worth of insurance for $78,000.
We just got that turned down, and we have now been offered
$50,000 premium for $650,000 premium. We have been charted $600
million, now must pay $600,000 for it. This is an abominable
thing. This is what we brought in our testimony, that my mayor
provided to the Council of Mayors. Not only is it important for
the airlines to be guaranteed liability or they are not going
to fly, I have got to have some relief on this or I cannot
protect the public beyond that air side to the land side. I
cannot do it.
Senator Durbin. Mr. La Pier, have you run into the same
thing?
Mr. La Pier. We have, Senator. Recently a good portion of
our liability insurance has been canceled. We are renegotiating
its reinstatement, but it was canceled for the purpose of
increasing the premiums.
Senator Durbin. Senator Lieberman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks again, Senator Durbin.
Mr. Baker, let me ask you the question I asked Mr. Belger
and the earlier panel. Do you know--I think you called it--what
the percentage usage of planes is now since September 11?
Mr. Baker. First of all, the industry, has, as a general
statement, reduced the size of the schedule we are trying to
fly by approximately 20 percent, so we are not offering as much
product as we used to. This is a relatively slow time of the
year anyway. This situation has clearly impacted us severely.
Our load factors yesterday on the domestic system were just
over 50 percent of the reduced schedule.
Chairman Lieberman. And what is the norm for this time of
the year?
Mr. Baker. This time of the year should be in the mid 60's.
Chairman Lieberman. So we are down, but not--I mean, it is
significant, but it is not overwhelming.
Mr. Baker. Except I have 20 percent of the assets sitting.
Chairman Lieberman. Sitting, OK.
Mr. Baker. Now, I talked yesterday to our manager of
revenue, who looks forward 180 days, and compares the booking
build every day against a year ago, so we can tell whether we
are in trouble versus a year ago each day of the week.
He sees nothing in the advanced booking trends that
suggests that the public is returning in the form of making
reservations.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is the important point. In
other words, people have not yet regained sufficient confidence
to bring the usage back to anywhere near where it was before
September 11.
Mr. Baker. Absolutely not. It fell off, and it stayed down
since September 11.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Obviously, for an industry that
was already having economic difficulties.
Mr. Baker. Exactly.
Chairman Lieberman. So I know it is more complicated than
this, but it does seem to me that those numbers cry out to us,
and the Department of Transportation, the industry, everybody
to take quick and dramatic action to reassure the public that
it is safe to fly again.
Mr. Baker. We think building confidence of both crews, and
passengers, and the American public is essential, and that is
why I believe when you see the recommendations we make to
Secretary Mineta, we are trying real hard to do some things
right now to build that confidence and have a demonstration of
change so that we can begin that building process.
Chairman Lieberman. I take it from your testimony and the
three points that you said, the second one was sky marshals,
that one of the things you think we should do as quickly as
possible is to increase the number of marshals on planes.
Mr. Baker. Absolutely. And I think by combining those three
functions that I mentioned, I think we deal with another
problem. I think part of the high screener turnover that we
reviewed earlier certainly has to do with low wages because
people will always move toward higher wages somewhere in the
economy, but I also believe that we need to deal with the
content of the job. These are tough jobs because they're kind
of monotonous, and so by combining those three functions, it
seems to me, and doing some rotation, we create variety, which
makes a job much more interesting.
And, finally, we create a promotional ladder potential so
that somebody like Mr. Harvey, who is very aggressive and
capable, can move from one part of the security function upward
to another and up a management ladder. Now we are starting to
build a security culture that is here forever.
Chairman Lieberman. The sky marshals now are not in
uniform, correct?
Mr. Baker. They are not. They are in plainclothes.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you think that should continue to be
so or should they be in uniform?
Mr. Baker. I think they should be in plainclothes for
maximum effectiveness.
Chairman Lieberman. And I suppose as a matter of--I agree
with you--as a matter of deterrence, if we say that there will
be a dramatic increase in the number of sky marshals and, in
fact, there is a dramatic increase, but we do not put them in
uniform, then anyone intending ill on a plane would have to go
on assuming that a sky marshal was on that plane.
Mr. Baker. I think it is a very important deterrent to not
disclose everything that we are doing, but to clearly state the
intent and how we are going to get there.
Chairman Lieberman. Under the current system, I just want
to get a fact on the record, unless I missed it up until now,
the requirement that the law puts on the airlines to provide
the screening at the checkpoint, am I correct, and somebody
said to me in the last couple of weeks, the airlines add $5 to
every ticket to pay for security; is that correct?
Mr. Baker. No.
Chairman Lieberman. I was under the impression that there
was no fee associated with the security responsibilities that
you have been given, but it is to be taken out of your normal
operating.
Mr. Baker. That is correct, and we believe that the large
carrier industry represented by the Air Transport Association,
which is 90 percent or so of all of the passengers being flown,
spend about a billion dollars a year on security at airports
alone. We think that is roughly the number.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Harvey, I wanted to ask you, from
your perspective because you have been on the front lines, and
I appreciate your testimony, at one point you said in your
testimony--I want to quote it exactly--``From all indications,
there is no evidence that all activity by a checkpoint
screener, all of whom are following FAA regulations correctly,
contributed to this horrible tragedy of September 11.''
I do not want to contest that. I wanted to ask you--because
we do not know exactly yet. We know from the stories we have
heard, apparently, that the terrorist had either these box
cutters or maybe plastic knives. So I want to ask you, as
somebody who has been there, screened, trained, knowing now
what we pieced together about what happened, how would you
guess they got those tools, weapons, on the planes?
Mr. Harvey. Prior to September 11, on the security
checkpoints, we had a set of guidelines regarding the length of
knives, also whether they were menacing and that type of thing.
Right after that, right after the incident, we did, FAA changed
that particular directive as a direct result of the incident.
Chairman Lieberman. So it is possible----
Mr. Harvey. There were several--go ahead.
Chairman Lieberman. I am sorry. It is possible, I know some
of the stories I have seen said they might have taken plastic
knives on, that they might have gone through the system, as the
FAA regulations existed at that time?
Mr. Harvey. Exactly. Because if a person only had a plastic
knife on their person and walked through a metal detector, the
metal detector----
Chairman Lieberman. Would not go off.
Mr. Harvey [continuing]. Would not go off.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. How about what we have all been
describing as box cutters, would that have set the metal
detector off?
Mr. Harvey. Possibly, in the sense that the metal detector,
the magnetometer is set up to detect a small-caliber weapon,
and the operational test piece that we use to test the metal
detector functions, if the box cutter did not weigh the same as
that particular test item, then the metal detector should not
alarm.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Harvey. Because it is based on density.
Chairman Lieberman. So we cannot say definitely that a box
cutter would have set off the magnetometer.
Mr. Harvey. Exactly.
Chairman Lieberman. And, of course, the other explanation,
which we have mentioned earlier, we have seen in the media, is
that they did not go through the screening with these devices,
but some other airport personnel might have placed them on the
planes beforehand. We do not know that.
A final question for you, Mr. La Pier. We have all been
absorbed by the information and different theories about what
happened here, and I am sure you noted with more than casual
interest that the terrorists who took the plane from Logan, two
of them who took the Logan plane down, entered in Portland,
Maine, went into the airport of Portland, Maine. So the
question was raised why did they do that? Did they do that
because security was less at that regional airport, and once
they got on the plane there, they were inside the system?
I wonder just from your expertise and experience, it may
have been obviously a totally different reason, but how you
reacted to that pattern that they followed.
Mr. La Pier. Let me preface my response with this. I
believe that smaller airports are equally secure as larger
ones, but I do believe that the system does not recognize that
and believe that there are, because of the way we connect
passengers through regional carriers feeding larger carriers,
in our case, you clear security at Bloomington normal at
Central Illinois Regional Airport, you may fly to Paris before
you see another security agent.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. La Pier. It may well be that we need an extraordinary
amount of attention paid to airports the size of Central
Illinois Regional Airport to ensure that we are not the
security hole. I do believe firmly that airports our size are
secure under the regulation, but I do believe that there are
things that we can do to make sure that we are even more
secure.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, I appreciate that answer, and I
go back to yours, Mr. Harvey. After September 11, the FAA
regulations changed, I gather, that is, in regard to the
plastic knives, but would the magnetometers now be more likely
to--has something been done with the equipment to make it more
likely that they would pick up box cutters or the box cutters
would----
Mr. Harvey. No, the directive that changed for the length
of knives and that type of thing?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Harvey. At this point in time, we are not allowing any
knives of any size to go.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Harvey. As far as being able to detect a plastic knife
as it comes through the metal detector, the change in the
system that was implemented after September 11, we now have to
do continuous hand-held metal detector searches. As people come
through the security checkpoint----
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Harvey [continuing]. We have to do hand-held----
Chairman Lieberman. The wand.
Mr. Harvey. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. Would that pick up the plastic knife?
Mr. Harvey. The wand itself would not, but if they were
doing the procedure, if a screener was doing the procedure
correctly, the wand itself would sound off, not as far as
alarming for metal, but you would hear--can I demonstrate?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Sure.
Mr. Harvey. Hear that?
Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
Mr. Harvey. OK. If the screener is using the hand-held
metal detector correctly, if he hit the plastic or she hit the
plastic, then you should hear the sound, and then go to a pat-
down in order to detect that particular type of weapon.
Chairman Lieberman. I can tell you from the experience that
I described earlier at Dulles the other day, the wand picked
up, I was carrying a few credit cards loose in my coat pocket,
and it picked them up.
OK. Painful lessons I guess we learned from September 11.
Thank you very much.
Senator Durbin [presiding]. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Baker, you said the airlines spend
about a billion dollars a year on security.
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. I would be interested, and I should know
this as the former mayor of the City of Cleveland, who hires
the security company, the director of the airport? How does
that work?
Mr. Baker. The responsibility to perform various security
measures to protect our aircraft and our passengers is passed
from the FAA to the air carrier, as part of our operating
certificate responsibility. We have the choice of doing that
ourselves with our own people if we would choose to or hiring a
contractor. So we hire the contractors.
In many airports, we share that responsibility. On a given
concourse where there are multiple airlines on a concourse, one
carrier will take on the management of the checkpoint, we will
split the costs and so forth.
Senator Voinovich. So that the security people, in effect,
they are not answerable to the airport director, but rather
they are answerable to the airlines, and if you have got a
multiple concourse, you prorate the costs.
Mr. Baker. With the exception of the law-enforcement
officer function. That is typically provided by the airport or
the city, and those folks are at checkpoints or spread between
a couple of checkpoints at each airport, and they are typically
paid for by the airport and answerable to the airport.
Senator Voinovich. And depending on the budget of the
airport is or the city, providing those people will depend on
what that budget situation happens to be.
Mr. Baker. I think that is correct.
Senator Voinovich. Following up on the statistics here of
the turnover, were you aware of those statistics in those
airports?
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. What did the airlines do about those
statistics?
Mr. Baker. Well, it is interesting because we share those
kinds of statistics in many of the other jobs in the aviation
sector during a full-employment economy. We have had very high
turnover in our entry-level jobs, in our ticket counter
positions and on the ramp, so they are not particularly
different than what we see throughout the beginning end of
aviation.
Senator Voinovich. But the thing that is interesting, Mr.
Griggs, is the unbelievable turnover rate in St. Louis. Were
you aware of that number?
Mr. Griggs. I was aware of that number with the airlines.
Senator Voinovich. Was it attributable to the fact that the
private company that was hired, and I assume a private company
handled that, that was paying different wages, say, than what
they were paying at some other airport where the turnover is
lower? Mr. Harvey, you said they start at $6.75; is that right?
Mr. Harvey. That is correct.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. La Pier, do you know what the
security people get at your place?
Mr. La Pier. I do not know. We are not privy to that
information, sir.
Mr. Baker. These folks, Senator, do not necessarily go from
one security company to another. They leave the industry to
other parts of the economy usually pursuing different hours of
work or slightly higher wages in the fast-food industry.
Senator Voinovich. But the point I am getting at is that,
from your perspective, if you see those numbers, does anybody
ever say, hey, what is the problem there? Is the salary level
less at that place, the fringe benefits, the package less and
that is why we are having the turnover, and do we need to do
something about that?
Mr. Baker. Realistically, I do not think so because they
are not unusual, and they have been that way for a number of
years, and we see it in other parts of our business,
particularly in the last 2 or 3 years with a full economy.
Senator Voinovich. Federalize it?
Mr. Baker. Yes, sir.
Senator Voinovich. Anybody disagree with that?
Who pays for it? If we federalize it, who pays for it? Do
the airlines pay for the federalization, and do you want the
Federal Government to have Federal employees do it or do you
want them to contract it out? What is your preference?
Mr. Busick. Mr. Voinovich, I think that if you look at the
system as a whole, there are portions of it that have to be
done with general tax revenue. You have law-enforcement issues,
you have intelligence issues, you have all of those issues that
currently are paid for out of general revenues, and they need
to continue to be paid for out of general revenues because they
are very national security in nature, and you cannot parse out
the portions of the CIA, the FBI or any of the other
intelligence agencies to figure that out.
On the other hand, the cost of the individual, of what Mr.
Harvey does, that direct screener function, probably could be
parsed out and that probably ought to be paid for by some user
fee.
Mr. Griggs. I do not think there is a passenger in the
United States of America that would object to paying 50 cents
to a dollar on a ticket in order to get adequate security.
Senator Voinovich. But the question I have is if we
federalize it, and it goes to the FAA or somebody else, you
want them to do it themselves? Should they be Federal employees
or do you think that they should hire private contractors?
Mr. Griggs. My personal opinion, it should be a Federal
employee, and he should be paid for by that agency's budget.
Mr. Busick. Sir, I do not really have a preference. My
concern is the quality of the screening process and making sure
that whoever does it is required to be appropriately trained
and actually be able to find the things we are looking for. Who
the employer is, is much less important.
Mr. Griggs. I think Monte Belger testified, sir, that they
were looking at this, and I would wait for them to come back
with what their recommendation was. I think they are looking at
that specifically.
Mr. Baker. Senator, our preference would be that it be a
government-owned corporation so that we can gain the benefits
of some of the flexibility inherent in that approach rather
than simply tack it onto an existing department of the United
States.
I think probably the costs, rightfully, should be shared
between those who use the aviation system and the General
Treasury since this is a crime against America. This is just an
example of terrorism in our country. They are not mad at the
airlines. The airline was not the target, it was America. I
think that we believe that is a national priority and certainly
ought to be shared by all of the taxpayers of the country. But
I think there is some sharing that needs to happen in there. We
are spending a billion dollars. That certainly ought to be
available, and if we want to do some more with the passengers,
perhaps that is another approach.
Senator Voinovich. And it is the cost of your ticket. I
mean, you have to build that cost in across the board.
Mr. Baker. One thing we would very much like to see if we
go toward a surcharge of some type is that we would like to
have that as an add-on specified charge below the fare so that
we can continue to advertise a $200 fare and a $1 security
surcharge so the American public sees that surcharge for what
it is, and it does not get rolled up into the fare ball, and
then we cannot show the American public what we are doing with
the money.
Senator Voinovich. Your costs went up three times. Is it
because of insurance costs or are you hiring more people or are
you paying higher wages or what?
Mr. La Pier. That is simply personnel costs, sir. We have
not----
Senator Voinovich. You are hiring more people then.
Mr. La Pier. Actually, we are.
Senator Voinovich. So that is why it went up. You did not
raise the salary, you just hired more people.
Mr. La Pier. Hired more people.
Senator Voinovich. My last question, and I have taken
enough time. I talked to somebody very high up in the
government today, and I will not mention his name, but somebody
very high up, and indicated that I am the Ranking Member of the
Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring, and the
District of Columbia, and the closing of Reagan National
Airport has had a very negative effect. Well, 10,000-and-some
employees out there that some of the representatives are
concerned about here, and it is having a negative impact on the
economy of D.C. But I think it is also having a negative impact
in terms of people's confidence in security. And if the premier
airport in the Nation's capital is not open because of security
reasons, do you not think that sends a very bad signal out
across the country, in terms of security, and that we ought to
be doing everything we can to, as soon as possible,
understanding how important security is, I would not want to
risk that, but to get that airport open because it sends a
major message out across the country?
I would like your reaction.
Mr. Baker. I, clearly, would support that view. We have
moved our entire operation to Baltimore and Dulles, including
the employees. I think there have to be ways that we can get a
great deal more comfort that an airplane shooting the river
approach, which is the one they are worried about, down the
river, is in the hands of the right people before they allow it
to shoot that approach. So I would be surprised if they do not
find a way to get that open in a secure way in the next couple
of weeks.
Mr. Griggs. I also echo that. I think it is absolutely
essential. It is the symbol of American air power and it is a
symbol of the country. And if they keep that airport closed, it
remains closed, that is a lesson that they have learned and
they have won, and this really bothers me tremendously.
Mr. La Pier. Senator, I would fully agree. I think that the
airport needs to be opened. We cannot allow the people that
perpetrated this crime to shut down a premier airport in the
United States today. We need to look seriously at reopening
that airport as soon as possible, if for no other reason than
to show the terrorists that they did not win.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I regret
that I was not here earlier, but I wish to thank you, and
Senator Lieberman, and Members of the Committee for having this
hearing today. For a moment, I wish to speak particularly about
Hawaii. Without question everyone knows how much Hawaii relies
on air transportation.
Hawaii depends on the commercial airlines for mail and
cargo, as does Guam. It all stopped on September 11. There were
several days there when nothing was delivered, and as a
Senator, I heard from people who were asking for medicine and
other necessities that were not delivered. Of course these
problems were a result of what had happened. Who would ever
think that somebody would use a 757 as a missile rather than as
an airplane to carry people? This means that we must change our
aviation security to make it safer and to detect any problems
that might occur, some of which were mentioned here today.
I am glad to see you here, Mr. Baker, and others of you on
this panel representing the aviation industry.
I have some questions, and, Mr. Chairman, I also have a
statement that I would like to include in the record.
Senator Durbin. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
September 11, 2001, was a day America will never forget. We have
all seen the tragic images of commercial airliners crashing into the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These terrorists, while aiming for
symbols of our financial strength and military might, succeeded in
targeting our sense of security. We long believed that our country was
immune to such acts of violence. We now see that, with the ever
widening gaps in our security systems, our Nation is no longer secure.
And while we may never know exactly how the terrorists were able to
board the planes, we must nonetheless implement new security measures
to ward off future threats.
First and foremost, we must take a critical look at our baggage
screening process. The turnover rate and lack of training for screening
personnel is alarming. Although the turnover rate for airport security
personnel in Honolulu is 30 to 40 percent compared to 400 percent
nationally and the employees there are well trained and tested
repeatedly every day, Hawaii cannot afford to feel immune.
For example, International Total Services, the company contracted
to manage airline security at the Honolulu International Airport and at
more than 100 other airports in 34 States, tested the effectiveness of
the security checkpoints in which fake hand grenades were taped to
wheelchairs. Sadly, in seven out of nine trials, the wheelchairs with
the fake grenades passed through undetected. In another incident, just
4 days after the terrorist attacks, a person without a ticket was
discovered beyond the security checkpoint at the airport in violation
of FAA rules.
Although Honolulu's airport prides itself on the training and low
turnover rate of security personnel, more must be done to increase
weapon detection. This is especially true for a State like Hawaii which
is so reliant on air transportation. Steps must be taken to ensure that
proper security measures are in place for large commercial airlines,
small passenger planes, charter planes and cargo planes alike.
As we review the passenger and baggage screening process, we must
also consider whether we should invest in technologies such as high-
resolution X-ray, cargo baggage imaging systems, or personal
identification measures. However, as Congress pushes forward with much
needed security measures in the next few weeks, we must be mindful not
to erode our civil liberties. If through fear we become the military
state of our enemies and cease to protect the freedom we so cherish,
the terrorists would have accomplished their mission. They would have
destroyed the very essence of America.
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Chairman for holding
today's important hearing. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
on how we can restore America's feeling of security in air travel.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker, today we have been talking about
the kind of problems that we have been facing and the cost to
the airlines. When we talk about screening and security
measures at the airport, we know that the airlines have been
paying that bill. My question to you is if these systems are
enhanced, and I am leaving aside the issue of lost revenues,
what impact would it have on the carriers with this increased
cost of security?
Mr. Baker. I think that the economists that study our
industry would suggest that as our costs go up for any reason,
necessitating a fare increase to maintain the corporate entity,
that the demand for our product will go in the opposite
direction. The concept of elasticity of demand for our product
is clearly there. As prices go up, demand goes down, and vice
versa. So over the long run, increased costs drive increased
fares that will have an adverse effect on demand.
Then, as you know so well in Hawaii, we work very hard with
all of the travel and tourism interests in Hawaii to try to
keep the whole package of going to Hawaii affordable because we
know what will happen if it gets out of sight--no one will go.
So we are very sensitive to--over the long run--what happens to
our costs and the effects on revenues that must come to cover
those costs.
Senator Akaka. As you know Hawaii is suffering
tremendously. When a person called me and said, ``I just saw
only one car in Waikiki,'' that gives you an idea of what is
happening there. And the airlines of course are suffering.
Mr. Harvey, you have been through the screening system, and
have trained people to do it correctly. As a trainer of
screeners, what challenges do you currently face in maintaining
a competent workforce?
Mr. Harvey. Well, it is really not, from a recruiting and
hiring standpoint, I really do not have anything to do with
that, but from a training standpoint, my goal all of the time
is to make sure that each and every day, when we open up those
security checkpoints at O'Hare, that I have well-trained, fully
capable, fully qualified screeners on the checkpoint.
Senator Akaka. When people apply for the jobs of being
screeners, do you take any time to screen them?
Mr. Harvey. Again, I say that I am not in the direct hiring
process of screeners for our company, but what I do and take
into account when they come into the classroom setting, there
are two different settings that we have for the training of
screeners. One, you have a 12-hour theoretical class. When they
are in the 12-hour theoretical class, they are required not
only to go through the theoretical class, but to take two X-ray
image interpretation tests.
They also have to take a language competency test, which is
a 20-question test, and what I really look for is attitude. If
they do not have the right attitude, then most of the time I
make the decision not to let them go to our security
checkpoints out at the airport. I will refer them back to our
Human Resources people and see if we have anything else
available for them in order to make an income.
Senator Akaka. I wonder what you would suggest and
recommend, since you have been a supervisor and trainer, and
you have watched people come through the process. Would you
have any thoughts or any recommendations as to how we can
improve the system?
Mr. Harvey. Well, one of the things that we can do to
improve the system is just to make sure that we are very
consistent. Everybody is talking about federalization of the
screening process. The one thing that I can see that would be
beneficial from my perspective would be that we be consistent
throughout the system, no matter whether you are in Central
Illinois or whether you are out at O'Hare, whether you are out
at Reagan National Airport. We would all be doing exactly the
same thing. We would all be trying to make the same decisions.
The other thing is, as far as the technological advances
go, at O'Hare, naturally, being one of the larger airports in
the country, we have available to us all of the latest
technology, as far as our X-ray machines, our walk-through
metal detectors, our explosive trace detection equipment, the
wireless communication with the threat imaging projection
system, with our hand-held metal detectors. If that technology
and equipment was available all the way across the country, now
that would also enhance our capabilities of being a better
screening operation.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Griggs, I want to conclude with you. Much attention has
been focused appropriately on the security screening of airline
passengers, but the level of sophistication and organization
involved in the September 11 hijacks has raised concerns beyond
the screening of passengers. Today's airports offer many
conveniences. After you get through the checkpoint, there are
restaurants and gift shops. How would the recommended security
measures discussed today by our various witnesses address the
physical screening of airport employees who work beyond
security checkpoints?
Mr. Griggs. Well, we are in the process at Lambert
Airport--I cannot speak for other airports--of going through
and revalidating everybody's badge. For example, if you had a
badge, it is going to be revalidated. If you are like I am, can
drive on the flight line, you have to have a background check
done on you. So these are the kinds of things we can do.
I think one of the ways the system broke down is this
sharing of intelligence from the Federal level on down. I know,
for a fact, that our FAA Civil Aviation Office was not provided
some of these facts. We were actually getting, my chief of
police was getting information from the FBI before the FAA was
getting it. There is something wrong when that sort of thing
happens.
So I think irrespective of what you do on the Federal
checkpoint, you have got to look at the whole system in
totality--have we let an airplane crew member go through a
checkpoint, have we let the concessionaire go through the
checkpoint, have we delivered deliverables to that checkpoint
to provide that restaurant service? And so the whole system has
to be looked at.
It is not just the checkpoint, it is the entire system and
the way we operate. I think it was Monte Belger that summed it
up, and Mr. Baker, who has got more experience than any of us,
and that is the whole threat perception has changed. We had
designed and put together a system that quite frankly it was
more of a deterrent than it was an absolute guarantee we could
get through this thing.
Now we are facing a faceless enemy, and how do you face
that? But it is something we have got to grow into, learn how
to deal with it, and make sure we deal with it. That is what we
are all talking about.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
We have really focused almost all of our discussion today
on commercial aviation and major airlines, and yet for most
airports, almost all of the airports that I am familiar with
and represented here today, they share the airport with general
aviation. And general aviation, as we know it, operates by
significantly different rules when it comes to security and
screening.
I have often wondered if it is still possible, as it was
September 10, for me to charter a jet at an airport, you name
it, and to get on that jet without anybody ever asking who I
am, what my criminal record might be, and to carry on board a
bagful of whatever--explosives, guns--and to be in a position
to take a jet plane under the same type of control as happened
on September 11.
It seems clear to me that general aviation is going to have
to go through some substantial changes for airport security and
general security. Has anyone here addressed that or considered
that aspect of this discussion? Mr. Baker, has that come up?
Mr. Baker. Well, we have certainly talked a lot about it
within the airline circles because if the threat assessment is
that airplanes as ballistic missiles, and clearly corporate
jets and other forms of general aviation are equally capable of
flying the mission. So we are going to have to think that
through. We are going to have to understand how to prevent
that, just as we are trying to do it in commercial aviation,
not only in the shared airports, but as you know there are a
tremendous number of other airfields in the country where there
are no air carriers, and I am not quite sure how to deal with
that.
But we have really got to sit down and define the threat
and then build a plan to deal with it. But until we understand
the threat, we are not probably going to hit the mark. So I
think some hard work on that is going to come, and then the
plan will flow out of that, but it is clearly an exposure.
Mr. Busick. Senator, I am aware that the FAA is actually
looking at airline or FAR 108-type regulations for aircraft
over 12,500 pounds in the corporate fleet, charter fleet. So
they are already looking at it.
Senator Durbin. I think that Secretary Mineta might have
mentioned that last week in testimony, but clearly the
customers and personnel of general aviation are also in that
same airport setting, in that same secure setting, and they
have to be viewed, I hope, with the same level of scrutiny as
anyone who would be involved in commercial aviation. I do not
think that there is much doubt or question about that.
Let me ask you, Mr. Harvey, you have been at this for 5
years; is that what your testimony is? And how often have you
run into a situation at your security station where you had to
call law-enforcement personnel? I know there are two times you
mentioned in your testimony where you were given an award for
your extraordinary service, but how often does that happen at
an airport like O'Hare?
Mr. Harvey. We probably run into--I will just give you a
classic setting, the day of the incident--the very next day we
caught a weapon on an employee coming through the checkpoint in
their backpack. I think just last Saturday--we had three gun
incidents, in the past week since the incident. So I would
probably say we run into at least one a month, not so much
because the person is trying to do anything to the airplane.
Let me clarify that. Normally, it is a direct result of a
person not understanding the law as it involves transporting a
firearm from Point A to Point B. It is just the ignorance of
the law, but screeners, at O'Hare anyway, they just do not miss
weapons, not firearms, whether they are disassembled or whether
they are assembled.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Griggs, I know that O'Hare has
exceptional devices that they use for bomb detection and other
close scrutiny. I do not know if Lambert Airport does, but
could either one of you tell me under what circumstances
baggage or packages are referred to that kind of a device for
examination.
Mr. Griggs. I think, probably to be very frank, it has been
on a random basis in the past. The whole thing again was a
threat. It was a deterrent against a threat, and the threat, as
we envisioned it, as the public understood it, as everybody
understood it, that was the counterintelligence we had to
counter against this. I think there could be better use of EDS
systems, and I think airports are going to have to address
this, and I think that the airlines are going to have to come
to grips with it. If we have a system like this, we have to do
it.
Somehow we have got to get this cargo restored. Somehow the
mail has got to be delivered. So all of these are deterrents
that you can take and definite steps that would prevent some of
this.
We have the same surveillance equipment at our checkpoint
that they have. It is just a matter of how it is used. We
probably detect one or two guns a month, and basically most of
it comes from just negligence on the part of the guy going
through the checkpoint. ``I forgot to take the thing out. I am
going hunting. I put it in the backpack,'' which they know they
cannot do, but they get caught at it. Thank God they get caught
at it.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. I would like the permission of the
Chairman to submit for the record a statement that I wanted to
make.
Senator Durbin. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH
Good afternoon. I would like to thank Chairman Lieberman and
Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee Chairman Durbin for
calling this hearing this afternoon. As the Ranking Member of the
Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee, I am pleased to be
able to work with Chairman Durbin on the management practices of the
Federal Government. This afternoon's joint full Committee and
Subcommittee hearing focuses on how well our aviation security is being
managed at our Nation's airports; an issue that is key to restoring
faith in flying--a faith that is essential to the economy of our
country.
Mr. Chairman, the number one responsibility of the Federal
Government is to ensure the safety and security of the citizens of the
United States, and I am concerned that the government is not doing
everything it can to ensure the safety of air travel. We need to
determine whether allowing airports and airlines to be responsible for
such a critical piece of our national security is appropriate in light
of these recent acts of terrorism.
At a hearing on the issue of airport security in the House of
Representatives last week, Transportation Secretary Mineta announced
one short-term fix that would require the imposition of stricter
qualifications and training requirements for airport security
personnel. Like most of my colleagues, I believe this is a necessary
first step, however more must naturally be done. I look forward to
discussing what additional steps today's witnesses believe should be
taken to increase passenger safety and restore public confidence in air
travel. I am pleased to report that this public confidence is already
beginning to return; my flight from Cleveland to Washington earlier
this week was packed. As Ranking Member of the District of Columbia
Subcommittee, I understand the concerns both economically and
symbolically of keeping National Airport closed. If the security needs
can be addressed completely and thoroughly, which are our first
priority, we should re-open the airport.
I am also interested in discussing some of the issues raised in
recent reports by the General Accounting Office and the Transportation
Department's Office of the Inspector General; reports that are critical
of the airport security industry for its alarmingly high rate of
personnel turnover and the lack of incentives for airport security
personnel. From my own experience as a chief executive of the City of
Cleveland and of the State of Ohio, I know that such personnel concerns
can only have a negative effect on the productive operation of one's
enterprise. And when one's enterprise directly impacts the safety of
millions of Americans, it is of particular concern to the U.S.
Congress. I believe that adequate time and attention must be re-focused
on improving employee incentives and addressing the high rate of
turnover that plagues this profession.
Finally, we need to remain vigilant in our effort to ensure the
safety of air travel in this country. This can't be something that we
react to during a time of crisis and then forget about once things
settle down.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you again for calling this
hearing today and I look forward to discussing how we can all work
together to improve airline safety.
Senator Voinovich. I would like to get back to the cost of
paying for this federalizing of screening. Does your national
organization have some information about the percentage of your
costs that go into security? For example, the thing that I
would love to see is you have a ticket, and what portion of
that ticket is attributable to security? How much of that is
going for security?
I would also like to know, and I would, for the record,
like to get the answer, the percentage increase that you have
experienced over the last several years in your security costs,
in terms of how it has impacted upon your bottom line. I would
like to see how much the cost of living percentages have gone
up. Has it been about what the cost of living is? Because we
are going to have to get a handle, I think, on what the public
is now paying as part of the ticket, in terms of screening. It
gives us an idea of how much we should earmark for that
purpose.
Mr. Baker. We can try to develop those numbers through our
industry association by asking the carriers to submit what they
believe. These are difficult numbers to come by because the
costs fall in lots of different buckets in the typical cost
accounting system, but we will take that off and see if we can
give you those kind of numbers.
Senator Voinovich. I think it is important because I know
when we finally get to this whole business, there is going to
be an argument here in the Senate, and in the House, and maybe
with the administration, about how do you allocate the costs of
this, and it would be interesting to find out just how much
right now the public is paying for security and does not know
it. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. I might say, Senator Voinovich, that I
spoke to Senator Hollings this morning, and most of the bills
that we are considering have a $1 surcharge on tickets. For the
screening aspect of this, it is believed that the total cost,
and I do not know how they come up with this number, would
require a $4 surcharge for the screening part of this. So the
question is how much would be general revenue, how much would
be a ticket surcharge, and that has not been determined.
Senator Voinovich. If he says $1 for a surcharge, if you
look at what people are already paying for security, and I have
no idea what it is, they could be paying $2 right now and not
even know it or maybe it is more than that.
Senator Durbin. That is right. I am sure we are going to
explore that further.
I want to thank the witnesses on this panel for coming
forward today and really providing extraordinary testimony for
this Governmental Affairs Committee. I thank you so much. I
cannot think of anything more important for us to focus on, and
you are going to help us understand it.
The official record of the hearing will be open for Members
to include statements and questions for the record, and the
Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak on such an
important issue as airport security. The terrorist attacks on New York
City and the Pentagon on September 11 forever changed the way Americans
travel by air. Increased security at the nation's airports has become
standard procedure but there is still much more to do to protect the
traveling public.
We need to ease the fears of flying Americans while we take steps
to ensure that the events of September 11 never happen again. We should
adopt measures that assure the traveling public that from the moment
they cross the first airport checkpoint until they reach their
destination, they will have the benefit of the best technology, the
most highly trained professionals, and the most secure aircraft that
this nation can provide. These measures may include the federalization
of screeners as professionally trained as our Customs agents, the use
of high-tech explosives detection equipment, state-of-the-art
identification and expanded background checks of airport personnel,
improved coordination of intelligence information, to name just a few
of the proposals.
In fact, I am cosponsoring Senator Hollings' Aviation Security
legislation to improve airport safety, which is one alternative which
must be considered. This legislation establishes a deputy administrator
at the Federal Aviation Administration for Aviation Security;
establishes an Aviation Security Council that will coordinate national
security, intelligence, and aviation security information among several
agencies; federalizes Airport Security Operations and improves training
and testing for screening personnel; and improves the screening
procedures for passengers by checking names against a coordinated
database comprising criminal, national security, intelligence, and INS
information.
This hearing will examine whether the screening of passengers and
baggage should be managed and operated by the Federal Government within
an existing agency or a newly created not-for-profit Federal
corporation. This entity would have the security of airport and air
travelers as its primary focus. Such an organization would also ensure
that passenger and baggage screeners have uniform, more strenuous
training and performance standards that apply throughout the nation.
According to transportation and airport experts, such a system would
take time to develop even though a lot of the current proposals were
suggested years ago. It is vital, now more than ever, to do more than
just authorize commissions and reports that only define and analyze the
problem. We must develop a comprehensive strategy for responding to the
September 11 tragedies and we must give the appropriate agencies the
ability to implement new security measures. We must do this now.
I personally support fast tracking regulations which directly
impact upon our national security. Too often and for far too long we
have put on hold publishing final airport security rules because of
political pressures. In the past, more stringent security measures have
been recommended and rejected due to cost or pressure to keep fares
reasonable and avoid undue inconvenience to travelers. In fact, the use
of government employees to screen passengers and baggage was considered
and rejected when passenger screening procedures first were implemented
in 1973.
Mr. Chairman and members of our distinguished panel, the threat of
terrorism remains as high today as it was throughout the 1990's when a
plot to destroy 12 United States airliners was discovered and thwarted
in 1995. We must do better. The future of aviation security hangs on
the actions that we take today to prevent future terrorist attacks on
Americans. The American people and the world expect us to follow
through this time--God only knows what may happen if we do not. Thank
you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses on
how together we can achieve a safer aviation industry.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BUNNING
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to thank our guests for being here today.
What we witnessed on September 11 illustrates just how deeply
certain groups hate America and the desperate measures they are willing
to undertake to destroy us.
I doubt there is anyone who questions whether we need to improve
our airport security.
Over the next couple of months, I expect Congress will be making
many changes to our aviation system.
We will be debating everything from hiring additional sky marshals
to changing cockpit doors to possibly allowing pilots to carry weapons.
Today, we are looking at the baggage and passenger screening
system, and whether the Federal Government should play a role in this
process.
As several of our witnesses will testify and many government
reports have indicated, the airport screening system has many flaws.
Employees are paid low wages, with few or any benefits. Turnover is
high. In fact, a GAO study indicates that the average turnover rate at
19 of the country's largest airports was 126 percent during a 1-year
period.
Other issues we will have to look at include the amount of training
screeners receive along with the type of technology used to detect
dangerous weapons.
Commercial aviation is a critical industry in this country, and we
do need to make some changes to ensure we have the best airport
security possible.
The American people are looking to us for answers and solutions
during this difficult time. We have already seen the horrific damage
terrorists can inflict when our airport security fails.
The challenges of balancing increased security against the economic
necessity of a vibrant airline industry is great.
However, I am confident that we can strike that balance. Today's
hearing should be another good step toward that goal.
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